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BOOKS REVIEWED

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THEOCRACY IN ISRAEL
IN ANTIQUITY AND TODAY

Mordecai Roshwald

I

A. *Is Israel a theocracy?*

THE history of Israel and the nature of Judaism have often been linked with the idea of theocracy. While this link has been mostly viewed with approval by those who have studied or explored it, one occasionally comes across others who point an accusing finger at modern Israel because of its alleged theocratic nature. The modern mentality, especially in democratic countries, is committed to the separation of church and state, and even if the separation is not formally insisted upon—as in the case of England—it is clear that the use of the state as an arm of religion would not be tolerated any longer. Even in Italy, where the power of the Catholic church is still immense, the wind blows in the new direction of increased separation between the secular and the spiritual. How is it, then—the argument goes— that Israel, which claims to be a modern democratic state, remains in various domains of its public life bound to religious notions? Israel is a Jewish state and Jewishness contains, at least partially, religious elements. Marriage and divorce of Jews are administered by rabbinical courts; the observance of the Sabbath in public is, to a great extent, enforced by law. The whole notion of the return of the Jews to the Holy Land has religious overtones. In short, the evidence of the theocratic nature of modern Israel seems indisputable.

True, many of the orthodox Jews, in and outside Israel, complain that the state does not live up to the demands of the Judaic law, that it does not enforce all the religious observances, that life is not as holy there as they expect it to be in a Jewish state. Surely, they argue, it is an abuse of the word and the idea to view modern Israel as governed by the commandments of God.

Obviously, there is no simple answer to the question whether or not modern Israel is a theocracy. The situation requires not only an examination of Israeli institutions and attitudes, but also, in the first place, a definition of the term (which has been used rather loosely). This definition, to be adequately related to the issue, must not simply

rely on common usage as defined in a dictionary, but should explore the historical roots of the concept, as well as the social institutions associated with this concept. Such an exploration is, of course, of considerable interest in itself, and is undertaken partly for this reason. But it will also lead to the examination of the present situation in a historical perspective which might provide deeper insight than a mere legal and sociological approach could do.

B. *The origin of the concept*

It is noteworthy that the term 'theocracy' was introduced into the vocabulary of the Western (or, more precisely, Greco-Roman) civilization by Josephus (Flavius). In coining the word he seems to have intended to explain to the non-Jewish world, in categories current there, a notion which was in essence peculiarly Jewish or Israelite. To state outright that the Jews regard God as their ruler would have meant presenting them as queer barbarians: for in Roman civilization the primacy of political authority over religious institutions was undisputed. The only way of expressing the idea of the rule of God was to adapt it to the current terminology by referring to theocracy as another form of government, beside those with which the Roman and Greek world was familiar:[1]

> Some legislators have permitted their governments to be under monarchies, others put them under oligarchies, and others under a republican form; but our legislator had no regard to any of these forms: but he ordained our government to be, what, by a strained expression, may be termed a *Theocracy*, by ascribing the authority and the power to God . . .

It is noteworthy that Josephus does not ascribe theocracy in Judaism to *God's* act in choosing Israel as His people and therefore ruling over them, nor does he present theocracy as the result of a covenant between God and Israel—though both these (mutually complementary) approaches are fundamental to the biblical and post-biblical tradition. He prefers to explain theocracy as instituted by a human legislator (Moses)—evidently because it puts theocracy on the level of other forms of government, and it was fashionable in Greek civilization to ascribe the constitution and institutions of a society to a Lycurgus or a Solon (whether historically justified or not).

None the less, the substance, if not the form, of his argument points to the peculiarity of theocracy, which fundamentally differs from other social systems:[2]

> But our legislator . . . did not only prevail with those that were his contemporaries to agree with these his notions, but so firmly imprinted his faith in God upon all their posterity, that it never could be removed. The reason why the constitution of this legislation was ever better directed to the utility of all, than other legislators were, is this, that Moses did not

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make religion a part of virtue, but he saw and he ordained other virtues to be parts of religion; I mean justice, and fortitude, and temperance, and a universal agreement of the members of the community with one another: for all our actions and studies, and all our words, have a reference to piety towards God . . .

What Josephus emphasizes here is, in the first place, the durability—indeed, permanence—of the Judaic institutions and way of life, a trait which is implicitly contrasted with the temporary nature of the institutions of other societies.[3] It need be hardly added that he viewed the permanence of social institutions as laudable, while change was concomitant with imperfection. That theory may not be wholeheartedly endorsed in our own era; however, it concides with the Judaic view of the immutability of divine laws, as well as with the Greek notion that what is absolutely perfect—such as Platonic 'ideas'[4]—is unchanging.

The stability of Mosaic law is embedded in its religious nature and in the totality of the religious approach to human life, which also lend Judaism its peculiar character. Personal and social virtues, the life of the individual and relations among the members of the community, as well as the ties which bind that community, are all conceived of in Judaism as the outcome of religion—if we may recouch Josephus's statement in modern terms. And there is nothing left in strict Judaism which remains outside the province of religion: 'for all our actions . . . have a reference to piety towards God . . .'

Thus, in fact, theocracy comes to mean much more than another form of political and even social institution, comparable to monarchy or democracy. Unlike these, it encompasses not only the sphere of the political, but also the domain of the private life. It is a prescription for every step of each and all; it includes the state, the society, the family, and the individual. Moreover, this total, religiously directed, way of life is based on a belief in divine rule and supervision: 'while we in all things and always are satisfied that God is the inspector and governor of our actions.'[5] The total way of life is sanctioned by a total belief.

C. *The meaning of theocracy*

While Josephus coined the term 'theocracy', the idea of God's rule over Israel is, of course, much older, and was given an emphatic expression in various passages of the Bible.

Martin Buber sees in the covenant at Sinai (Exodus 24:4–11) an acceptance by the tribes of Israel of JHWH (God) as their eternal King.[6] He also sees in the name 'Israel', which can be interpreted as meaning 'God rules', the expression of a fundamental theocratic belief and commitment.[7] It is noteworthy that the conception of God as King of Israel is reflected in what are probably ancient folk songs preserved in the Bible. Thus, in a song attributed to Balaam, God is described

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as a king residing among Israel: 'the Lord his God is with him, and the shout of a king is among them' (Numbers 23:21).[8] Similarly, in the Blessing of Moses, God is a King of Jeshurun, which is a synonym for Israel (Deuteronomy 33:5). Divine rule is seen, at least in these passages, as a *direct* kingship of God, and not as a rule of God executed on His behalf by priests. Theocracy here retains its literal meaning (however odd this may sound to us) and must not be confused with hierocracy, the rule of priests.[9] To do so is to misunderstand the fundamental and perennial notions of Israelite belief, which stresses the close relationship between God and His people and views any intermediaries (and notably priests) as no more than intermediaries. To be sure, a man like Moses, or the anticipated Messiah, assumes super-human proportions; but they are exceptions. Moreover, even Moses in the Jewish legend is occasionally cut down to human size, for the sake of presenting Israel as having close and direct contact with God.[10] Similarly, the messianic belief in its early stages views the Messiah as a righteous descendant of the house of David who will establish peace and knowledge of the Lord, but who need not himself be super-human (Isaiah 11:1–9).

As for the historical origins of the theocratic idea in Israel, it seems very unlikely that it originated in the era of the Second Temple when the priests wielded considerable power and the Jews did not have political independence. The textual evidence, if examined without prejudice, would point to the early (in fact, rather primitive) theocratic notions of God as the Lord of Hosts, God as a military chieftain who fights Israel's battles. Echoes of this belief can be easily detected in the Hymn of the Sea (Exodus 15:3, 4, 6):

> The Lord is a man of war: the Lord is his name. Pharaoh's chariots and his host hath he cast into the sea: his chosen captains also are drowned in the Red Sea. . . . Thy right hand, O Lord, is become glorious in power: thy right hand, O Lord, hath dashed in pieces the enemy.

The theocratic belief in ancient Israel, whatever its origins, developed into a belief transcending the primitive tribal-military notions. It eventually became associated (neither only nor primarily) with Israel's deliverance from enemies and afflictions, but also and fundamentally with ethical-religious perfection. If Israel obeys God, it will be 'a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation' (Exodus 19:6). This is not a merely pious, though nebulous, dream. For in another passage, the exhortation to Israel, 'Ye shall be holy: for I the Lord your God am holy' (Leviticus 19:2) is only a preamble to a series of detailed commandments. These include such specific and enforceable laws as not to make molten gods, or to leave the corners of a field unreaped for the poor, and such moral exhortations as not to hate one's brother in one's heart, or to love one's neighbour as oneself; but all the commands are practical ways on which a good, just, and holy society is founded.

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The rule of God over Israel means that the people must in their way of life reflect the principles of divine perfection. Theocracy means the implementation of ethics and religion in social institutions and human relations; it is the perfect society.

The quest for a perfect society is in no way peculiar to Judaism. One has only to consider ancient Greece, where the ideal commonwealth was the focus of political philosophy. Yet there is a profound difference between, say, the ideal republic as envisaged by Plato and the Israelite theocracy—not merely the obvious difference between human and divine guidance, but also a difference pertaining to the internal structure of society. For Plato's republic is based on the assumption that some people, the elect few, are the ideal leaders (the philosophers who ought to be the kings), while others have to fulfil their diverse functions in the state. This division entails a rank-ordered society; for the sake of the perfection of the society as a whole, the principle of human equality is totally ignored. Israelite theocracy, on the other hand, while it implies God's superiority over men, also implies human equality under God. When God declares 'And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation' (Exodus 19:6), the clear indication is that *all* of Israel will attain this privileged position. And while in practice some people have always fulfilled functions of greater social responsibility than have others, and were thought to have a greater capacity for doing so, or were even believed to be divinely inspired leaders of society, the ideal of the fundamental equality of the Israelites stubbornly persisted. A typical expression of this attitude is contained in the story of Eldad and Medad, who were two of the seventy elders chosen to share with Moses the burden of leadership, and who, consequently, were to receive through God's intervention, some of Moses's 'spirit' (Numbers Ch. 11). When, endowed with that spirit, they started to prophesy in the camp (which presumably they were not supposed to do), and Joshua asked Moses to stop them, Moses replied: 'Enviest thou for my sake? would God that all the Lord's people were prophets, and that the Lord would put his spirit upon them!' (Numbers 11:29). The lesson is clear: while unequal ability of men and selective functions in society may be a fact of life, the élite is not thereby entitled to an entrenchment of its special position. A gift of God entails social responsibility, not personal privilege. Envy or a struggle for power among the holy people is totally rejected, for ideally it is *all* the Lord's people who should be prophets.

This essentially egalitarian approach is not a necessary and logical corollary of the theocratic ideal. One could well imagine a theocracy which is rigidly rank-ordered; nor need a secular ideal commonwealth be non-egalitarian. In fact, the polity of Aristotle is much less élitist than that of Plato and, of course, in modern politics secular philosophy has often led to democratic and egalitarian ideals. However, although

the egalitarian note and (as we shall see below) some other democratic aspects of Israelite theocracy are not the *necessary* corollary of the fundamental principle, they are none the less *factual* and *compatible* components of the theocratic ideal and combine with it to form the peculiar Israelite theocracy.

While the above lines suggest a certain similarity between the theocratic egalitarianism of ancient Israel and the egalitarian ideals of modern democracy, there is a notable difference between the two approaches to equality. Modern democratic philosophy tends to cherish equality above excellence and prefers mistaken policy and institutions based on the equal participation and consent of all (or of the majority) to the right way imposed by the few. The theocratic ideal of ancient Israel, on the other hand, does not allow such a concession to the people: it is the perfection of the divine way which has to be attained by society. Everyone can share equally in the holy life, but holiness must not be debased to suit everybody's (or the majority's) inclinations. All the Lord's people may aspire to be prophets, but prophecy will not be diluted in order to be within the reach of every mortal. The right way, truth and justice, remain absolute; they are open to all alike, but their quality must not be affected by the general participation. Thus, the perfection of the ideal holy society remains the paramount element in the theocratic belief.

D. *The institutional forms of theocracy*

While theocracy, in the literal sense of the direct rule of God, seemed to have been both the fundamental notion and the lofty ideal of ancient Israel, its translation into reality required some kind of *human* and *institutional* implementation. A historical survey would show that the institutionalization of theocracy did not take a single form and, moreover, that the forms changed under the impact of new circumstances. The various institutional forms of theocracy can be summed up as follows: (1) soteric, (2) kingly, (3) prophetic, (4) priestly, (5) legal, and (6) messianic. Each of these requires some elaboration.

1: The nature of the soteric theocracy was that, in human terms, it was expressed by a deliverer, a saviour (*soter*), who appeared in times of need or emergency to save Israel. The classical testimony to the soteric theocracy is the book of Judges, which relates the heroic deeds of the various saviours. Indeed, the institution of the judge-deliverers is explained in general terms in an early chapter of Judges (2:16, 18): 'Nevertheless the Lord raised up judges, which delivered them out of the hand of those that spoiled them . . . And when the Lord raised them up judges, then the Lord was with the judge, and delivered them out of the hand of their enemies all the days of the judge . . .'

It is God who is believed to have raised the judges and it is the Spirit of the Lord which comes upon Othniel (Judges 3:10), upon Gideon

(Judges 6:34), upon Jephthah (Judges 11:29), and upon Samson (Judges 13:25; 14:6, 19; 15:14). Thus, the direct intervention of God is stressed throughout the book and the judge-deliverer is but a vehicle of divine will. True, the philosophy of biblical Judaism regards human history in general, and specifically the history of Israel, as the enactment of divine will, as a system of reward and punishment for the people's religious and moral behaviour. Yet the link between God and the appointed deliverer in the person of a 'judge' is especially direct and emphatic. Indeed, it seems as close as that between God and a prophet, the main difference being that the prophet is the divine *spokesman*, while the judge *acts* on behalf of God. (Another difference is that the prophet is mainly, though not exclusively, concerned with the internal affairs of the people and the ethical quality of human relations, while the judge delivers Israel from external enemies.)

But if God is close to the judge-deliverer, whom He chooses as His agent, or to the prophet, whom He chooses as His spokesman, this does not imply remoteness from His people. On the contrary, both functions indicate the special proximity of God to His nation. For judge and prophet are not permanent institutions but improvised plenipotentiaries of God. The temporary nature of their respective functions indicates His direct involvement: obviously, an appointee for a specific mission is less of a barrier between the ruler and the ruled than a *permanent institution*. Thus the relationship is closer when a judge watches over Israel than when 'a hereditary monarch performs this function. Similarly, it could be said that the sporadic appearance of prophets underlines the divine proximity to the people, a relationship which would have been adversely affected had prophecy become a permanent institution.

True, after the judge delivers Israel from its enemies, he may continue to judge it for the rest of his life; but he is said to *judge (shafat)* Israel and not to rule (*mashal*) or reign (*malach*) over it, a significant distinction. For a judge resolves disputes according to law, custom, and equity, but does not wield the power of government (involving bureaucracy, taxation, privileged positions for functionaries, and the like). Moreover, the idea that the judge-deliverer should become a permanent institution, that the *ad hoc* messenger of God should institute a hereditary monarchy (which would, of course, also enlarge the scope and power of his position), is rejected explicitly and emphatically in the famous retort of Gideon to the people's invitation to make him a hereditary ruler: 'I will not rule over you, neither shall my son rule over you: the Lord shall rule over you' (Judges 8:23).

Significantly, in the story of Moses, which combines the greatest deliverance of Israel (namely, from Egyptian bondage) with the greatest prophetic message (namely, the codification of the way of life of the people of Israel), Moses—who is a combination of deliverer and prophet

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—does not transmit his function, or any part of it, to his children. He is chosen by God, but God is the architect of the deliverance and of the institutions: God remains the ruler of Israel.

The close link between the limited and temporary function of a judge-deliverer and the notion of direct theocracy does not necessarily mean that the judge's role derives *only* from a religious belief in divine rule. For while a logical connexion between theocracy and the temporary nature of judgeship is clearly indicated in Gideon's statement, the sporadic and limited nature of the authority of the judges may well be related also to some fundamental non-religious notions of the Israelite tribes in their historical infancy. Martin Buber points out that there may be an affinity between the opposition to the institutionalized authority of a king among the pre-Islamic Beduin and similar sentiments in ancient Israel.[11] While Buber assumes that the Beduin's attitude is rooted in a pre-Islamic theocratic belief,[12] it is not impossible that it is also simply an expression of resentment of authority based on a primitive freedom-loving egalitarianism, a kind of democratic sentiment preceding the establishment of a firm and institutionalized political authority. In this respect the semitic attitudes of the Beduin and of the ancient Israelites may only be a case of a more general phenomenon. Obviously, such a sentiment must have increased in intensity when it became linked with the theocratic belief, namely the conviction that only God is the ruler of the community and superior to men.

2: The kingly theocracy eventually replaced the soteric one, despite the adherence to the principles of liberty and equality. This transition is admirably recorded in Chapters 8–11 of I Samuel. While these passages also document the opposition to the establishment of monarchy —an issue to be dealt with below—the reasons for the ascendancy of kingship must be considered now.

An examination of the biblical text reveals three explicit and two implicit reasons for the establishment of a monarchy. The first reason can hardly be seen as a major basis for instituting monarchy: it is the people's dissatisfaction with the judgeship (in the literal sense) of Samuel's sons, who were not honest in the performance of their duties (I Samuel 8:1–5). (Obviously, such a dissatisfaction could be remedied by the appointment of other judges.) More significant reasons (pertaining to the institution and not to the personality of the individual in authority) are given when the people, rejecting Samuel's arguments against monarchy, insist on having a king and add: 'That we also may be like all the nations; and that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles' (I Samuel 8:20). The people want to follow the example of other nations—the diffusion of institutions across cultures or civilizations is a well-known phenomenon. They also want a wartime leader, obviously for protection against numerous foes. An *ad hoc* response to an enemy attack or to subjugation by another nation

did not seem to be the best way of ensuring national security. A warrior with the nucleus of a ready army, which Saul eventually established (I Samuel 13:2), is a more efficient system of defence than the raising of volunteers under adverse conditions, which the judges used to do. The judge must turn into a king.

Apart from these conscious reasons, one can clearly detect two significant causes for the emergence of monarchy. The first is simply the tendency of sporadic judgeship to solidify into a permanent institution; it is in the nature of social institutions that they are often the product of recurring incidents. To put it in the words of MacIver when he describes the hypothetical emergence of institutionalized personal authority in a tribe, 'Custom is always at work turning example into precedent and precedent into institution...'[13] That this process was at work in ancient Israel seems to be shown by the endeavour to establish a monarchy under Gideon (Judges 8:22), as well as by Samuel's attempt to make his sons succeed him as judges (I Samuel 8:1–2). The second cause was the need to unify the tribes of Israel in the military-political sense. While this is not the reason actually advanced by the people who came to Samuel, it transpires from the facts recorded in the Bible. For, since the judges had (as a rule) unified only *some* of the tribes in any military action, Saul in his first campaign aimed at saving from the Ammonites the inhabitants of one town (Jabesh-gilead) made all the Israelites participate in the battle (I Samuel 11). The unity thus established (a remarkable achievement when compared with that of the judges) was, significantly, the first act of Saul as king; it may well be assumed to have constituted a cardinal motivation for establishing a monarchy. That the monarchy in Israel failed to maintain national unity over a long period does not disprove the assertion that the quest for such a unity was a major cause of the foundation of kingly rule.

Though the establishment of a royal house was a clear break with the former tradition of judges and was seen as such in I Samuel 8, it is interesting to note that there is a certain gradualism in the transition between the two forms of polity. Thus, when the people ask Samuel for a king, they say, 'Now make us a king to judge us like all the nations' (I Samuel 8:5), and when they reiterate their demand they again refer to judging and to military command (I Samuel 8:20). Evidently, the function of the king is seen as similar to that of the judges; it is only the permanence of the institution which distinguishes kings from judges. Typically, however, in Samuel's attempt to dissuade the people, the king is referred to as one that shall *reign* over them (I Samuel 8:9, 11), indicating that the nature of royal rule is altogether different; the allegation is supported by a detailed list of the king's uses and abuses of power. The gradualism of the transition from judgeship to monarchy is also reflected in the fact that Saul is not immediately accepted as king by all the Israelites; only after his success in the war with the

Ammonites is the opposition to his rule silenced and his kingship renewed in Gilgal (I Samuel 11:14-15).

The participation of Jonathan, Saul's son, in the military campaign in the capacity of a commanding officer, as well as the appointment of Abner as 'the captain of his host' (I Samuel 14:50), are distinctive features of a gradually solidifying monarchy. The military organization, a major reason for the establishment of monarchy, was its evident institutional characteristic, as was the preparation of Jonathan for succession. The fundamental meaning of kingship was its permanence, which contrasted sharply with sporadic judgeship; and the way to secure this permanence was the widely accepted system of hereditary succession. The dynastic principle was a part of the notion of monarchy. True, dynasties did occasionally change, the transition from the house of Saul to that of David being a case in point—not to mention the rather frequent dynastic changes in the northern kingdom of Israel after its separation from Judah. The alleged choice of the new dynasty by God, as expressed through a prophet, did not prevent wide support for the former house, as David's prolonged struggle against the house of Saul indicates. Apparently the divine choice claimed by the new house was either the result of biased historiography, a propaganda move on the part of the usurper, or, at best, the decision of a prophet-kingmaker. In any case, the claim must have been ignored or disbelieved by a great number of people, who otherwise would not have supported the existing regime with such fervour.

The support for the king and the dynasty, at least as long as the monarchy did not discredit itself by frequent *coups d'état* (as it did in the northern kingdom of Israel), was rooted in a belief in the theocratic nature of kingship, in the king being the elect of God. For, whatever the theocratic arguments against the establishment of monarchy in I Samuel (more of which below), once the kingship was established, the holders of the office became legitimated by being regarded as chosen by God. Thus, it is God who tells Samuel that Saul is his choice for a ruler over Israel: 'Behold the man whom I spake to thee of! this same shall reign over my people' (I Samuel 9:17). Then there was the sacramental ceremony (destined to be adopted by Christian monarchies) in which Samuel, on behalf of God, anoints Saul (I Samuel 10:1). The king becomes the Lord's Anointed, which indicates that he was empowered by God to rule over the people.

Typically, however, the story of Saul's elevation to kingship retains and stresses the notion that, despite the establishment of monarchy, Israel remains God's domain: Saul 'shall reign over my people' (I Samuel 9:17), proclaims God; 'the Lord hath anointed thee to be captain[14] over his inheritance,' says Samuel (I Samuel 10:1). The power of the king is clearly viewed as being merely delegated and entrusted to him by God, who retains ultimate authority over Israel.

The theocratic principle is therefore not discarded, but only given a new political expression. And as God remains the ultimate authority, He can also dismiss a ruler and his dynasty and entrust the office to another man: 'Because thou hast rejected the word of the Lord, he hath also rejected thee from being king' (I Samuel 15:23), says Samuel to Saul, and subsequently adds: 'The Lord hath rent the kingdom of Israel from thee this day, and hath given it to a neighbour of thine, that is better than thou' (15:28). Similarly, it is the God of Israel on whose behalf Ahijah announces to Jeroboam: 'Behold, I will rend the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee' (I Kings 11:31). The fact that many of the people on various occasions opposed the new claimant does not mean that they questioned God's authority to change kings and dynasties; they merely doubted whether, in fact, the claimant had been sanctioned by God.

3: The prophet in ancient Israel was God's spokesman; God tells Moses: 'I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth; and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him' (Deuteronomy 18:18). The justification for prophecy given here was the people's awe at Sinai of hearing the voice of God. The prophet is closer to God than anyone else could possibly be; the comparison of future prophets to Moses ('like unto thee') emphasizes their stature.

Yet it is noteworthy that a prophet in Israel will be raised 'from among their brethren', which seems to indicate some fundamental egalitarianism in the relationship between the prophet and the people. The democratic aspects of theocracy are particularly strengthened by the fact that the prophet—a man of the people overriding the monarch —is the person closest to God. The divine proximity elevates the stature of this 'democratic' figure.

While Moses is called a prophet and Deborah the prophetess urges Barak to campaign against a Canaanite king (Judges Ch. 4), prophecy in its distinctive form seems essentially to be co-eval with kingship. Moses was a prophet and a deliverer in one, and as God's spokesman he codified the entire way of life for the Israelites. In this sense his image is larger than, and different from, that of other prophets. The case of Deborah seems almost incidental: other judges did not require prophetic prodding, but took the initiative under direct divine inspiration. It is only with the establishment and functioning of monarchy that the mantle of prophecy sits firmly on some prominent men. Samuel makes and unmakes kings, Nathan moralizes to David, as does Elijah to Ahab. Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah have even more comprehensive messages to kings and to people. To be sure, prophecy continues in the Exile in a rather distinctive fashion, with Ezekiel and deutero-Isaiah, but it shrinks and disappears with the return from Babylonia.

The historical connexion between prophecy and monarchy is probably

not accidental. As long as theocracy was expressed through occasional judge-deliverers (that is to say, by individuals who were believed to *act* on behalf of God), there was little need for individuals who would *speak* in the name of God. When, however, the political rule became institutionalized in an enduring dynastic monarchy, despite the fact that this monarchy was conceived of as sanctioned by God and the monarch as the Lord's Anointed, there was no guarantee that the individual king would follow God's ethical laws. The kings were not necessarily inspired by God, as the individually picked judges had been, and moreover, royal power had a corrupting influence even on those who were thought to have been chosen by God to found a dynasty (including David). Therefore monarchy needed a corrective force in the person of the prophet. The prophet could not *act* on behalf of God, in the sense that the judge-deliverer had been able to do— for the authority to act politically was in the hands of the king—but the prophet could *speak* in the name of God and in so doing he could criticize and reprimand the king and sometimes have influence through an appeal to the people. The prophet is not His Majesty's loyal opposition; he is the Almighty's *ombudsman*, trying to ensure that theocracy remains supreme and that kings do not abuse their authority. (Of course, he also tries to preserve theocracy when it is threatened by the people's abuses and deviations.) While prophecy seems linked with monarchy, it must be admitted that prophets of stature continued in the Exile, after the monarchy had ceased to exist; but there their function was entirely different: they assured the people of God's continued support. In conditions in which the political authority of the kings had collapsed and the self-confidence of the people was shattered by loss of independence and by exile only the prophets could provide this assurance.

The distinctive character of prophecy is its preoccupation with the true religion and the just society. These are the themes with which the prophets deal with monumental perseverance. They clearly reflect the quest for the realization of the theocratic ideal.

4: The origins and early history of the priestly caste in ancient Israel are a matter of some controversy which need not concern us here. What, however, seems to be borne out by the relevant texts in the Pentateuch is an image of the priests, including the high priests, which must not be confused with hierocracy or with theocracy. The priests are neither the rulers of Israel, nor do they represent the rule of God on earth, or His rule over Israel. They are rather the servants of God in His abode, performing a special function in an elaborate ritual requiring strict rules of purity and sanctity. The phrase used, in connexion with the preparation for the priestly function, is that they are 'to minister unto the Lord' (Leviticus 7:35), or 'minister unto me' (when the statement is attributed to God directly). The phrase is, in the context, a rather

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appropriate and telling translation of *lekahen li* (Exodus 28:1; also 29:1, 29:44, 30:30, 40:13, etc.)[15] The priest is a servant unto *God*, and not a representative of God to the *people*. Typically, it is Moses, the man closest to God and His spokesman, who is told to prepare the priests for their office and is given elaborate instructions on how to set about it (Exodus, 28, 29). In other words, it is Moses who performs the theocratic function *for* the priests.

The service of the priests in the sanctuary is not simply attending to the master; they *represent* the people of Israel in the service of God. The basic function of the priests in sacrificing to the Lord—an elaborate and complicated ritual outlined in great detail in the Pentateuch—is the expression of the people's submission, penitence, and devotion to God. The high priest especially is entrusted with atoning for the sins of the people (Leviticus 16:16–17) and with confessing their sins (16:21). Indeed, in one passage the Levites are substitutes for Israel's firstborn who, by right, belong to God (Numbers 8, especially verses 16–17). Thus, the conclusion can be reached that the priesthood originally meant the representation of the people before God—even the substitution for the people in the service of God—and not the representation of God to the people, or the ruling of the people in the name of God.

The priests may have had some other, secondary, functions, which would today belong to the sphere of public health (Leviticus 13) or of private morality (Numbers 5). But even these could hardly be interpreted as expressing the rule of God in the sense that a judge-deliverer or a prophet was an embodiment of divine will. The priestly functions of testing the faithfulness of a woman (Numbers 5) or dealing with leprosy (Leviticus 13) were on a much lower level of administration. Even the oracular device, *Urim* and *Thummim* (which the high priest wore and which was believed to express the will of God), was only a mechanical contrivance—used to discover God's will about a certain specific issue or His answer to a specific question. Such a device (the high priest was merely its passive carrier) stands no comparison with the spontaneous expression by a prophet of a substantive demand of God, with the spontaneous action, under divine inspiration, of a judge-deliverer, or with the rule of a God-chosen king. Even the blessing of the people (Numbers 6:23–26) is more a ritual, expressing a pious wish or attempting to bring down the blessing of God, than a direct expression of God's benevolence. Typically, God tells Moses to instruct Aaron and his sons how to bless Israel.

There was a profound change in the office of the priesthood after the return from the Babylonian exile. The new position of the high priest is adumbrated in Zechariah, at a time when the office must have started on its course of ascendancy. This is the message of God to Joshua the high priest: 'If thou wilt walk in my ways, and if thou wilt keep my

charge, then thou shalt also judge my house, and shalt also keep my courts . . .' (Zechariah 3:7). That the high priest will judge God's house is not unlike the pronouncement about Saul that he shall reign over God's people (I Samuel 9:17). The theocratic assumption that the people are the Lord's, but the king (or the priest) is set to rule over them, seems implicit in both cases.[16] In another passage in Zechariah (6:12–13) the prospective building of the Temple and authority are attributed not to the high priest, but apparently to the Messiah (possibly in the person of Zerubbabel); yet even in this context the high priest is assured some kind of parallel authority, which is a very dignified status.[17] Moreover, in the same context, it is the high priest upon whose head some kind of crown is to be set (verse 11). It is also noteworthy that in Malachi (a book of a somewhat later period than Zechariah), while the priests are upbraided for failing in their duties, the ideal of the priest is exalted; he is seen as the man who knows the ways of God and he is spoken of as 'the messenger of the Lord of hosts' (Malachi 2:7). In other words, he is seen not merely as the representative of the people to God, but also as the representative of God to the people; a truly theocratic notion of priesthood.

The impression gained from the above biblical texts, dating from the time of the Persian rule, is further enhanced in the poetry of Ben Sira (or Jesus the son of Sirach), probably composed in the pre-Maccabean Hellenistic period. It is noteworthy that, speaking of Aaron the first high priest, Ben Sira tells us 'that he should teach Jacob the testimonies, and inform Israel in his laws'[18]—echoing a poetic passage in Deuteronomy (33:10), as well as the substance of Malachi's statement. However, his description of the deeds and image of the high priest Simon, the son of Onias, apparently Ben Sira's contemporary, is more telling.[19] The high priest not only repaired the temple and performed his duties, but also 'fortified the city against besieging', evidently exercising some political authority under foreign rule, an authority which priests had not possessed in the days of independence. The high priest is likened to 'the morning star in the midst of a cloud', 'the sun shining upon the temple', 'the flower of roses in the spring of the year', etc. A few centuries later, Josephus refers in prosaic terms to the priests as men who 'had the main care of the law, and of the other parts of the people's conduct committed to them', and who also were inspectors, judges, and punishers.[20] This again implies a wide authority and, in the context of Josephus's essay, a theocratic conception of such authority.

Thus it is safe to assume that after the Jewish return from exile, the functions, authority, and prestige of the high priests started to rise and that they soon became the focus and symbol of the theocratic idea. In the absence of a king and with the decline of prophecy, the high priest was the natural inheritor of divine authority. Apart from his

former function as spokesman of the people before God, he put on the mantle of God's ruler within God's community. To be sure, as long as the Jews were subjected to foreign domination, the high priest's political power was limited to internal affairs and shared with the Council of Elders; but it was certainly wider than that of the earlier high priests, when the king claimed to rule the Lord's people.

Significantly, it was a priestly family, the Maccabees, who provided the leadership in the revolt and who became the new rulers. And, typically, their chief source of authority over the people seems to have been associated with their functions and title as high priests rather than with their authority as kings. Thus, rather typically, Antigonos on the coins he minted designates himself as king in the Greek wording and as the high priest in Hebrew.[21] While this practice might have been affected by the Messianic belief that the king of Israel would come from the house of David, it might also have reflected the prestige of the high priesthood, which had symbolized theocratic rule over several centuries. Thus, while the Maccabean high priest became also the king and ruler of the Jews, the priestly authority added a theocratic aura to his rule in the absence of a prophet who could choose and anoint a monarch. Needless to say, the actual extension of the high priest's power—to include wide political functions and to symbolize national independence—also benefited the office of the high priest. (To be sure, this was by no means an unqualified boon, as some objections were raised to the merging of the kingly and priestly authority, and the ruthlessness of Alexander Jannaeus, king as well as priest, in fighting the Pharisees may have greatly damaged the prestige of his office.)

The priestly theocracy was greatly strengthened when it became an inherited office, as it had essentially been from the beginning of the Persian rule until the kingship of Herod, the priestly dynasty having shifted to the Maccabees after their successful revolt. The hereditary principle must have given the priesthood some of the prestige of monarchy. And, conversely, the office of the high priest must have greatly declined in popular esteem when the appointment was made by the secular ruler (from the days of Herod to the destruction of the Temple), especially as such a ruler was usually hated by the people either as a domestic tyrant (Herod), or as a foreign usurper (Roman procurator). Under this system the high priest was sometimes appointed for a year or even a few months, to be replaced by another, albeit one from a priestly family. The occasional scramble for office under such a system did not add lustre to the venerable position. It is hard to believe that many people continued to regard these high priests as God's messengers. As we know, the destruction of the Temple put an end to the high priesthood, whose image must have been tarnished well before the final abolition of the office.

5: A cardinal expression of the theocratic principle in ancient Israel was the law laid down by God and announced through Moses. Naturally, a transgression against the law is a sin against God, and the punishment is divine—whether meted out by God or through human agencies.

The law in the Pentateuch is comprehensive in its conception, covering different aspects of individual and social life. While it deals with matters of worship and ritual, with sexual morality and personal hygiene, diet, social justice and charity, criminal offences, judicial procedure, constitutional issues, etc., it makes no formal distinction among these spheres; they are all interlocked. The fact that the law tries to encompass the *totality* of human existence is a testimony to the seriousness of the theocratic ideal. Nor is it a vague ideal to be *striven* for; it is a detailed way of life to be *practised*. The way to practise it is laid down by God Himself and can be implemented here and now.

The law as the embodiment of theocracy has several beneficial characteristics. In the first place it is relevant to every individual who, by following it, participates in the divine order; it allows—indeed demands—democratic participation. Another aspect of the law is its superiority over the other theocratic institutions. A king and a priest, even though the Lord's anointed, have to abide by the laws of God; they cannot change or modify them. The judge-deliverer and the prophet, although direct carriers of divine will, are themselves bound by the law. Their message expresses a direct intervention of God in the affairs of His people, but such an intervention—with some possible marginal exceptions[22]—is not meant to encroach upon the absoluteness of the established commands of God. While the law is conceived as superior to other institutions of theocracy, a factor adding to its strength is its permanence: the soteric and the prophetic messengers of God come and go, the institutions of monarchy and high priesthood are abolished in the wrath of God, but the divine laws are immutable and will endure for ever.

Moreover, the laws were exhaustive; Moses said: 'Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish ought from it, that ye may keep the commandments of the Lord your God which I command you' (Deuteronomy 4:2). That injunction is reiterated and emphasized as coming directly from God in a later verse (Deuteronomy 12:32).

This theocratic conception of the law, which regarded the Scriptures as the absolute and final embodiment of divine injunctions, must have encountered practical difficulties (even in very early days) when novel situations arose for which the written law did not seem to provide. Such situations were usually resolved by means of legal or legalistic interpretations which could be related to the written law. Occasionally a problem was resolved by a decision which, although not deriving

from the Scriptures, was claimed to have come down from Sinai by oral tradition. Over the centuries—for the process of interpretation and amplification must have started very early—the body of supplementary law grew to very sizeable proportions and was finally (at the beginning of the third century C.E.) organized into a written code, the *Mishnah*. The laws of the *Mishnah* underwent further interpretation during the following three centuries to become solidified in the *Gemara*, but essentially the process did not then come to a stop: whenever a new practical issue had to be resolved, further interpretations were needed.

What is of interest to us in this peculiar legal system is the tenacity with which the notion of the theocratic nature of the law was preserved. Not only was the *written* law of the Pentateuch considered divine, but the *oral* law, accumulated over many centuries, was also deemed God-given. The legal interpretations of the written law and the other occasional amplifications were not regarded as the product of rabbinical good sense or ingenuity, but as the oral interpretations and amplifications conveyed to Moses by God Himself to complement and explain the basic written *Torah*. Thus, later generations of judges and scholars claimed to be only the transmitters of the divine dictates. Even when a controversy arose between two schools, or two scholars, it was a controversy about the right interpretation or the right tradition of the explanation or amplification, but no doubt was expressed as to the divine-Mosaic origin of the final right answer. Occasionally, to be sure, certain decrees and ordinances were made by rabbinical scholars which were *not* regarded as originating from the *Torah* or as having been transmitted by tradition from Moses; but they were negligible in quantity and not held to have the same absolute validity.

The significance of law as the practical embodiment of theocracy increased even more with the decline of other theocratic institutions. When the monarchy, and the high priesthood as its successor, declined, it was natural to rely even more on divine law. It is likely that the great development of the oral law from the first century B.C.E. onwards was at least in part due to the decline in moral prestige, and eventual abolition, of the Maccabean priesthood-monarchy. When the priest-kings lost their popularity (as Alexander Jannaeus did), and when later the high priests became the appointees of tyrants, the theocratic commitment tended to focus on the divine law. When the high priesthood and the remnants of political independence vanished with the destruction of Jerusalem, the law remained to be adhered to by God's devout subjects: His rule over Israel could not be destroyed by any earthly power. And, indeed, for nearly two subsequent millennia when Jews were dispersed throughout the world, their theocratic loyalty could be, and was, maintained by their acceptance of (and adherence to) divine law. Theocracy in Judaism survived the loss of country, political independence, and centralized worship.

It is noteworthy of this rule of God's law that its scholarly interpreters (whether in the Roman era or fairly recently) were *not* regarded as God's representatives on earth or within Israel. The rabbis throughout the millennia were not successors to kings and high priests—or to the judge-deliverers and prophets, for that matter. They were respected or venerated but were no more than interpreters of God's law, which anyone could study. Indeed, education (involving the study of the law, at least in some basic form) was given a broad popular base by the high priest Joshua ben Gamala (or Gamla)[23] shortly before the destruction of the Temple. The study of the law was destined to remain the centre and core of Jewish education through the ages; and the rule of God was thus secured through the moulding of the minds of children and of adults.

The supremacy of the law over holders of office is one of the foundations of democracy. For such supremacy implies an essential equality of *all* men under a ruling principle, an equality which could not be maintained if *one* of them became an absolute ruler. The supremacy of law in Israel's theocracy thus contains elements of democratic egalitarianism. These elements were further strengthened by the decline of the monarchy and of the high priesthood, when law remained the sole expression of divine rule. As universal education, rather than enforcement, became the guarantee of the rule of divine law, the democratic aspects of theocracy gained in strength in another sense, too, for the subjects of the divine rule, besides being equal before God's law, became also its intelligent and participant supporters.

6: The suggestion that sacred law remained the only embodiment of theocracy during the two millennia of the Dispersal requires some modification. The law was the only *practical* expression of theocracy, applicable and applied in everyday life, but it was complemented by a theocratic *belief* which was of an altogether different order: messianic belief. The law was the way to ensure God's rule through its observance and willing acceptance. However, the people also needed the assurance of divine response, the confidence in God's benevolent reward for the faithfulness of His subjects. This assurance was embodied in the belief that the Messiah (or God Himself) would appear at the right time, and bring about all the blessings that He held in store for His people.

The messianic belief in Israel is fundamentally linked with the expectation of divine good will, a good will which was conspicuously absent in the reality the people were experiencing; it can even be suggested that the belief was a way of saving the theocratic idea in times when there was little evidence of God's concern. If the ruler does not fulfil the aspirations of his faithful subjects, their reaction is either to revolt or to assume that he knows better and will reward them at the proper time. Since in this case the ruler was God Himself, the option was either to lose faith or to retain trust in His ultimate benevolence. The

second alternative was expressed through the messianic belief; it provided a solid framework—be it a framework in the imagination—which could be filled out with all the anticipated divine rewards and blessings.

Messianic belief came in times of misfortune to reassure the people of God's concern for them: it usually thrived in times of national affliction, but remained dormant when there was safety and prosperity. Thus it was the prophets of doom (Isaiah and Jeremiah) who, living in the shade of foreign conquests, spoke of the wrath of the Lord and of the destruction of the land, but consoled Israel with the vision of a messianic future. Typically, the messianic theme shrinks in the Apocryphal literature written in the secure days of Maccabean rule,[24] whereas it had flourished during the preceding persecutions of Antiochus, in the (biblical) book of Daniel.[25] It blossomed in the Pseudepigraphic literature, composed in the days of Herod and the Roman rule.[26] Moreover, after the destruction of the second Temple messianism is assimilated by the rabbinical literature of the *Mishnah*,[27] and thus becomes a cardinal part of Jewish belief during the subsequent millennia.

Messianism also revealed its connexion with the theocratic idea in its political contents. For Jewish messianism has been consistently associated with the expectation of national revival, independence, and security. A few examples will suffice. God 'shall assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of Judah from the four corners of the earth' (Isaiah 11:12); 'They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain' (Isaiah 11:9). Daniel says that 'the saints of the most High shall take the kingdom, and possess the kingdom for ever . . .' (Daniel 7:18) which should be understood literally, in the political sense.[28] The biblical association of the messianic belief with a descendant of the house of David and the later Hebrew phrase the king-Messiah (*hamelekh hamashiah*) further strengthen the national-political aspects of the Messianic belief. It is theocracy in the political sense which is awaited.

Yet the messianic belief is much more than that. It promises not *only* national revival and perpetual political security and peace; it also holds out a promise of a change of heart that reaches beyond political institutions. The idea is best conveyed by Jeremiah: '. . . I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; . . . And they shall teach no more every man his neighbour . . ., saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them . . .' (Jeremiah 31:33–34.) The notion that the messianic era establishes a permanent and absolute following of God and His commandments has been deeply ingrained throughout the ages. Nor does it contradict the theocratic principle on which messianism is founded. For while theocracy has political implications, it reaches beyond politics in as much as God is a *total* master of His people and

cares not solely for their political fortunes. Moreover, as the Israelite notion of history views the afflictions of the nation as divine punishment for sins, the promise of permanent piety and righteousness implies the establishment of permanent national bliss. Thus righteousness and piety, while not exclusively political virtues, have crucial implications for a change in the political order.

The messianic belief also addressed itself to the world at large, primarily in promising universal peace. In the much-quoted passage, Isaiah announces that nations 'shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more' (Isaiah 2:4). The extension of divine good will goes even beyond that by opening the way to the true worship of God to other nations, a prophetic idea which was continued in later forms of messianism. Thus deutero-Isaiah announces (Isaiah 56:7) in the name of God: 'for mine house shall be called an house of prayer for all people' ('all the peoples', or 'all the nations', in the Hebrew text). Moreover, divine good will is accorded to the animal kingdom (Isaiah 11:6–8). This extension of God's benovolence to other nations and to the animate world at large need not be interpreted as a step beyond the theocratic idea. For while God remains the ruler of Israel, He is the only and universal God, which explains His concern for other men and beings. The messianic theocracy in Israel is destined to become God's rule over the entire world.

The messianic idea goes one step further when it envisages miraculous changes in the destiny of man and connects the blissful future with resurrection and immortality for the righteous. The idea emerges only with Daniel: 'And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise [the righteous] shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever' (Daniel 12:2–3). The rule of God ultimately means the change of the order of nature to grant man's quest for absolute justice and eternal life.

Since the messianic belief, unlike other expressions of the theocratic idea, is projected into the future, the problem arises of the time when the hope will be realized. Typically, the time of the realization was not fixed: messianism *had* to be flexible to ensure the belief in theocracy. In times of revolt against oppression or in other critical periods, the expectation of imminent salvation was not infrequent, and it was then necessary for the people to believe that salvation had simply been postponed. In the years before and during the great Jewish revolt against the Romans the belief in the impending messianic salvation was quickly seized upon and often became associated with specific persons.[29] Indeed, in all likelihood, Jesus was believed to be such a Messiah by a group of Jewish followers. Later, messianic beliefs seem

to have been associated with the revolt of Bar Kochba even by such a sage as Rabbi Akiba.[30] They were activated in the sixteenth and notably the seventeenth century (Shabbatai Zevi).[31] Since, however, the time was not firmly announced in the Scriptures—the Bible often refers to 'the last days'—the hope could survive the disappointment. When the expectations had failed, it could be said that 'the Messiah will appear "when the mind is diverted" [i.e., unawares] and one must not calculate the beginning of the Messianic age'.[32]

The awaited turnabout in the history of Israel (and the world), which will open an era of permanent freedom, peace, perfection, and bliss, is the core of the messianic belief. This transformation could be brought about by God Himself, or through His distinguished messenger sent for the purpose.[33] The Bible contains many passages indicating the direct intervention of God in the affairs of Israel and of the rest of the world, but it also refers to a personal Messiah, such as the famous 'rod out of the stem of Jesse' (Isaiah 11:1). In the post-biblical literature the messianic creed becomes increasingly associated with a God-sent but human redeemer, the Messiah, who eventually becomes part and parcel of the Jewish creed.

A fundamental characteristic of the Messiah is that, however wonderful his personality, he is not a *substitute* for God's rule, but merely a *means* (and a *human* means) for the realization of divine will and benevolence. In this sense he belongs to the category of judge-deliverers, kings and prophets, each of whom was conceived as a human vehicle of the theocratic principle. Yet the Messiah is not identical with any of these. To be sure, he is occasionally referred to as the King-Messiah and Jewish tradition, even in the Bible, overwhelmingly expects him to be a descendant of the house of David, a clearly monarchist association. Yet the Messiah is not a king in the sense of being the establisher, or re-establisher, of a hereditary monarchy. He is rather envisaged as a one-time redeemer, apparently because his action would lead to perfect human relations and peace, secured and made permanent by their own immanent nature, or through God's benevolence, or both. Thus, the image is closer to that of a *soter*, judge-deliverer, than of a king. He appears to fulfil God's mission, but not to establish himself as an institution. Of course, he is more than a judge-deliverer in that he is endowed with unusual spiritual powers. Essentially, his image comes closest to that of Moses, a combination of deliverer and prophet, practical saviour and spiritual leader. The Samaritan notion of the Messiah (called the Taheb) which sees in him another Moses, or perhaps even the re-incarnation of Moses, may well embody a genuine primary notion of the Messiah in Israel. But in one respect the Messiah remains even superior to Moses: his salvation is not merely an event in history which, however important, is to be followed by miseries and tragedies as well as by occasional success and deliverance; his salvation

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is on the edge of history and opens an era of permanent and absolute bliss. For he, unlike Moses, does not merely offer guidance to his people in his own and future generations; he also ensures that the people and all mankind will see the light, follow the way of God, and therefore prosper for ever.

E. *Conflicts of theocratical institutions*

The theocratic principle embodied the idea of absolute perfection in the political life of the community of Israel—indeed, in the way of life of the people in every conceivable sense. Theocracy, thus being the best of all possible systems, would not allow changes or modifications. However, as we have seen, the theocratic principle had to be and was translated into social institutions in order to transcend the realm of mere belief, or (to put it in other words) in order to descend from the domain of religion to the realm of everyday social and individual reality. The institutionalized forms of theocracy did not remain immutable, as the principle itself was: they showed considerable flexibility. It was this flexibility of human institutions which helped to adjust the theocratic principle to the circumstances of any age. Usually the decay of one institutionalized form, or its inadequacy under novel conditions, led to the rise of another form: the monarchy succeeded judgeship when the time was ripe for it; prophecy rose in importance as kings failed, morally and politically; the high priesthood assumed a theocratic image when no king could rule; the law became dominant when the high priesthood degenerated. In short, the absoluteness of the theocratic *principle* when linked to the flexibility and adjustability of the theocratic *institutions* seemed a perfect system for the survival of theocracy, despite the profound changes in the fortunes of the Jewish people.

Yet, this overall perfection of the system does not mean that the various theocratic institutions always co-existed peacefully or succeeded each other smoothly. What to a detached observer (who takes a bird's-eye view of history) may seem a perfect system, to the people involved could present a problem and raise even serious controversies. The issue as to which institution was the true expression of God's will, or whether one institutional form should replace another, was a matter of fundamental argument. Such disputes were often, though not exclusively, conducted in terms of theocratic belief, and therefore shed an additional light on it. Moreover, even the not strictly theocratic arguments which these disputes aroused amplify our understanding of political notions in ancient Israel.

A conflict which has been rather well documented in the Bible is that between the soteric and kingly forms of theocracy. The opposition to the establishment of monarchy, obviously favouring the continuation of the sporadic functioning of judge-deliverers, has recourse to theo-

cratic belief. The demand for the establishment of monarchy is viewed as an ungrateful rejection of the rule of God by the people of Israel. The vigorous words of Samuel (I Samuel 10:18, 19) speak for themselves:[34]

> ... Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, I brought up Israel out of Egypt, and delivered you out of the hand of the Egyptians, and out of the hand of all the kingdoms, that oppressed you: And ye have this day rejected your God, who himself saved you out of all your adversities and your tribulations; and ye have said unto him, Nay, but set a king over us ...

Indeed, the verb 'rejected' in English is a rather weak rendering of the Hebrew *ma'as*, which persistently appears in this connexion (also in I Samuel 8:7).[35] For *ma'as* indicates not simply rejection, but rejection out of disgust or contempt. While the quest for monarchy is thus criticized, the soteric form (apparently because only a make-shift arrangement) is implicitly regarded not as substituting for but as expressing divine rule.[36]

It is noteworthy that the soteric opposition to monarchy is couched not *only* in religious terms, that it is proclaimed not *solely* in the name of theocracy. The Bible provides evidence of more prosaic anti-monarchic sentiments, even if they are uttered by Samuel the prophet (I Samuel 8:13–14, 16–17) in the name of God. These sentiments are primarily the fear and resentment of the abuse of royal power.

> And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks, and to be bakers. And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliveyards . . . .and give them to his servants . . . And he will take your menservants, and your maidservants, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, and put them to his work. He will take the tenth of your sheep: and ye shall be his servants.

The picture of the misuse of authority for private gain and for showering favours on the ruler's courtiers is a familiar one. Whether in this case it is based on later Israelite experience, or whether it is a warning on the eve of the establishment of kingship (a warning based on the observation of other monarchies), the sentiment expressed has the unmistakable ring of authenticity. It voices attitudes which must have been prevalent among at least some sections of ancient Israelite society, as indeed they have been in other societies ill-used by self-seeking kings. The peculiar point about that passage is that it is not addressed to a *specific* king—as was later criticism of Solomon, or Rehoboam (I Kings, Ch. 12)—but is against the king as such, against kingship as a form of government. For in the opening to the list of calamities, God, and then Samuel, refer to *mishpat hamelekh* (I Samuel 8:9, 11), which means not just 'the manner of the king' (as in the King James version), but 'the fixed order of kingly behaviour', 'the institutional nature of kingship'.

However, the criticism of the monarchic institution here goes beyond

warning against abuses of power. Indeed, the list of such abuses is preceded by examples of legitimate and necessary *uses* of power, and these too are criticized by being made part of the list of woes of kingship. Here are some of the calamitous royal practices (I Samuel 8:11–12):[37]

> He will take your sons and put them in his chariot and among his horsemen and they shall run before his chariot. And he will appoint him captains over thousands, and captains over fifties; and [men] to ear his ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his weapons, and his vehicles [of war].

If using men for the king's agricultural work might be, in certain circumstances, still regarded as abuse of power, the recruitment of horsemen and the appointment of 'captains over thousands' and 'captains over fifties' (that is to say, military commanders) as well as the use of manpower for manufacturing instruments of war, can in no way be regarded as such an abuse when the main purpose of the monarchy was national defence. Indeed, the argument against monarchy here amounts to an argument against *any* institutionalized form of government; the opposition to royal rule becomes an objection to government as such. It seems that the notion of freedom and equality which the early Israelite tribes cherished (and which was underscored by the belief that only God is the ruler of free men) found formidable expression in the opposition to kings and governments.[38]

If the opposition of the soteric theocracy to monarchy is explicit and vigorous, a note of restrained and implicit criticism can be detected also in the stand of the Pentateuchal law. It has already been stated that law, being conceived as divine, is an expression of theocracy superior to that of kingship. Consequently, the king 'shall write him a copy of this law in a book . . . and he shall read therein all the days of his life: that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do them' (Deuteronomy 17:18–19). While this establishes the primacy of law over personal rule and firmly opposes the notion of a king who 'can do no wrong', of a monarch *legibus solutus*, it is not critical of king and kingship as such. Nonetheless, the sequel to the above exhortation contains an implied (or rather a potential) criticism, when it explains the negative purpose of writing down and reading the law, namely, 'That his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that he turn not aside from the commandment, to the right hand, or to the left . . .' (Deuteronomy 17:20). The warning against these transgressions reflects the realization of the pitfalls of monarchy; typically the anti-theocratic and anti-democratic tendencies of kings are mentioned in one breath. Perhaps it is the king's *hubris* aimed at his fellow men (brethren) which is also the source of his deviation from divine law. In any case, the king must beware lest

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he be corrupted by his own power: he must retain the consciousness of being subject to the law, and, despite his important function, must remain the equal of his brethren. 'His brethren' is the word used by the Bible, the clearest indication of the desirable relationship between king and people.

If the law thus curbs royal authority, and in general terms criticizes the king who might transgress the limitation imposed on him, the criticism becomes in a way more biting when it singles out some more specific royal sins. The king is told not to acquire many horses, or many wives, or great amounts of silver and gold (Deuteronomy 17:16–17). And though the acquisition of horses and wives is objected to for some particular reasons, the inclusion of excessive silver and gold in the prohibition and the general tenor of the passage leave the impression that the basic misgivings here are that riches corrupt, just as power does. The divine law, which rules supreme, makes no allowance for the Lord's anointed: he must live within the law and resist the typical temptations of monarchs, if he wants his and his children's rule to continue (Deuteronomy 17:20). The threat of divine punishment for transgressions of the law is clearly stated.

The soteric opposition to monarchy was essentially limited to the period of transition from sporadic judgeship to hereditary monarchy. The restrictive influence of the law on monarchic excesses had limited chances of being effective, for who would normally dare to invoke the law against a tyrannical monarch? It was the prophets who continuously and persistently carried the burden of active criticism of the kings, who spoke out against the vices of a lecherous David or a greedy Ahab, against a disastrous policy or sinful conduct. They did so in the name of God, of divine law and morality; and in so doing they tried to sustain the theocratic principle. The prophetic criticism of kings in the name of God and of right, their conflicts and collisions with monarchy, are too familiar to require repetition here. As we know, prophecy was roughly co-eval with monarchy and for no mean reason: it was the great power of kings which endangered the rule of God and therefore the prophets were needed to curtail abuses of that power.

The relationship between the prophets and the law, to switch to another conflict of theocratic institutions, is much more subtle. The law being conceived as the embodiment of the divine will, it was self-evident that the prophets did not 'come to destroy the law, . . . but to fulfil' it. Yet there is in prophecy an insistence on the significance of morality as contrasted with the triviality of ritual, which borders on criticism of certain aspects of the religious law. Thus says Hosea: 'For I desired mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings' (Hosea 6:6). Isaiah not only belittles sacrifices, but even the observance of Holy Days (Isaiah 1:11–14). Jeremiah too seems

to think little of sacrifices (Jeremiah 7:21-22). It can be argued that this disparaging attitude to what was seen as a God-commanded form of worship means criticism of a part of the law, or is evidence of a direct collision between prophetic and legal theocracy. But it can be counter-argued that these passages, when read in their context, do not disparage ritualistic law, but merely point to its irrelevance when the worshippers disregard God's *moral* law. While this interpretation of the various relevant passages is certainly within the limits of plausibility, the impression persists that the prophets regarded morality as much more significant than ritual observance.[39] If they did not intend to criticize a part of the law, at least they meant to point out which part of the divine commandments was the *centre* of piety. Such an attitude to law, if it is not in outright conflict with it, is in a sense a modification of it. Thus the prophets could be regarded as spokesmen for theocracy who dared to criticize not only the Lord's anointed, but even to evaluate God's law, to set the priorities of divine commandments in a way faithful to God's moral purpose.

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II

The expressions of theocracy in modern Israel

Having thus explored the nature of theocracy and its major embodiments in institutional forms in the history of ancient Israel and of the Jews, we may pose again the issue of theocracy in modern Israel. To what extent and in what sense and manner is the modern State of Israel theocratic (that is to say, if it is theocratic at all)?

On the face of it, it would seem that there can be hardly any similarity or substantial relationship between the theocracy of ancient Israel and that of the modern state. There are no soteric judges, no prophets, no Lord's anointed in modern Israel; and traditional religious law is by no means the exclusive or dominant factor in the legal system. In a way, the historical chain of theocracy, expressed through various institutions, has not been continued. But such an outright rejection of the relevance of theocracy to modern Israel may be the result of a superficial way of looking at the present reality and of a too credulous acceptance of the historical image. Let us elaborate the last point first.

If our review of Israelite and Jewish history presented it as dominated by the theocratic idea, it does not follow that all the Israelites and Jews have been, throughout the last three thousand years, strict and consistent adherents of the doctrine. The theocratic principle, undoubtedly a significant aspect of the social and spiritual past, has come to our awareness distilled by history, which is to say, in a form purer than its

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actual state in most (if not all) past periods. Indeed, a careful analysis of the historical evidence will show that the theocratic institutions and office-bearers have not always been accepted as such by *all* the Israelites and the Jews, and that some men were accepted as rulers without any apparent claim to divine spirit. Thus Abimelech the son of Gideon could kill his seventy brothers and be accepted as ruler by the people of Shechem, obviously without any theocratic claim (Judges 9). Barak and Deborah (to cite an example of lack of popular support for divinely inspired personalities), were not aided in their fight by the tribes of Reuben, Dan, and Asher, or by the inhabitants of Gilead (Judges 5:15–17). Some people refused to accept Saul as king, even though he had been chosen by Samuel on behalf of God (I Samuel 10:27). The history of the Israelite kings is, of course, full of frictions and fights, from the conflict of Saul and David, through the bloody wars of David against Saul's successors, through the revolts against David, to the schism between Judah and Israel. In the northern kingdom of Israel, a *coup d'état* would often establish a new ruler. Obviously, the theocratic dignity of kings, and perhaps even of the monarchy, could not remain unquestioned through all these conflicts and upheavals. There is no need to validate this argument with further examples taken from the Hellenistic, Maccabean, and Roman periods, when the holders of the high-priestly office occasionally became controversial figures.

Indeed, one could go even further and point out that not only were the holders of theocratically conceived institutions (and even such institutions themselves) subject to doubt and controversy, but that pure theocracy, the direct rule of God, was also not always adhered to. From the golden calf, through the book of Judges and in fact until the Babylonian exile, the biblical account refers again and again to the sinful, rebellious, stiff-necked practices of the Israelites (and often of their kings) who worshipped God in the wrong manner or even followed other gods. Possibly the biblical account exaggerates the transgressions in order to justify national misfortune in terms of sinful conduct, but there can be no doubt that the theocratic principle was not as firmly and universally accepted in that era as our preceding analysis may have seemed to indicate. The post-exilic picture changed substantially in this respect, allowing for some deviations during the Hellenistic and Roman eras. Theocratic notions seemed to all but dominate Jewish life and belief also during the millennia of the second Exile until religious orthodoxy faced the new winds of European civilization and intellectual scepticism on the eve of our own times.

To summarize: although the theocratic idea can be singled out as a dominant streak of Judaism through the millennia of Israelite and Jewish history, it has not dominated that history with a uniform intensity and has not been accepted by all Jews at all times. With this

reservation in mind, an attempt to discern theocratic elements in modern Israel may prove more rewarding. For if we are dealing not with a fixed absolute, but with a major and somewhat fluctuating tendency, the possibility of discerning it where its presence is not obvious must not be ruled out.

That the total and unquestioning acceptance of the religious law and the view of this law as the sole guide in life (an attitude typical of orthodox Judaism) are not the governing principle of the State of Israel is an undeniable fact. In this sense, the break with a long tradition is clear. That break started with the secularization of Jewish life in Europe, but it is not total: for while it affects the majority of the Jewish population in Israel, a significant minority of about 20 per cent[40] adheres to the doctrine and practice of the traditional religious law, which it regards as both all-embracing and adequate. It is in the nature of such an adherence that it is intense and fierce, which increases its social significance beyond its statistical limits.

For this important minority, the messianic expectations still amplify the legal or legalistic theocracy. Indeed, for many among the orthodox in Israel, the spectacular success of the country in its struggles against hostile neighbours is evidence of God's good will, is a visible expression of God's concern for His people, perhaps even constitutes a near-messianic fulfilment.

Religious law has relevance beyond the lives of those who orthodoxly observe it and the numerous others who follow it less strictly. Matters pertaining to the personal status of Jews (notably the significant sphere of marriage and divorce and to some extent issues of inheritance and adoption) are regulated by religious law and are within the jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts.[41] This system is sanctioned by statutory law. Thus, in a limited sphere, traditional theocratic law is the law of the entire Jewish community, although many individuals resent the situation. But its influence reaches beyond those spheres of rabbinical law and jurisdiction. Rules of an essentially religious content have been incorporated into the law of the State of Israel. Thus, there is the Pig-Raising Prohibition Law, 1962,[42] which is religiously motivated. The Days of Rest Ordinance issued in 1948 prescribes the Sabbath and the Jewish festivals as days of rest, while allowing non-Jews to observe their own days of rest.[43] The municipalities regulate the closing of shops on the Sabbath and festivals by instituting appropriate by-laws, and most public transport is also prohibited. While these restrictions stop short of legally enforcing full observance, whether in the field of dietary laws or of the Sabbath and festivals, they are dominated none the less by religious considerations, and meet the

rigorous demands half-way. Significantly, in a recent amendment to the Law of Return, the State of Israel legally accepted the religious definition of a Jew as 'a person born of a Jewish mother, or converted to Judaism'.[44]

The limited (but not negligible) success of the religious law is primarily due to the ardour of the orthodox sector, who have exerted pressure, including political pressure through religious parliamentary parties, to make the state conform to their theocratic notions. However, the majority of the population, and the majority of the parties, do not share this theocratic zeal; indeed, some even strongly resent it. The majority parties yield to some of the ardent demands of the orthodox in order to avoid social and political crises, or to gain their support in non-religious issues in exchange for concessions in religious matters.

Yet this somewhat cynical picture requires modification. A segment of the religiously inspired legislation (a segment difficult to determine) may express some more widely held beliefs. Thus, for example, public rest on the Sabbath and festivals may well have the support of a wider section of the population. In some ways, there is an air of religiosity in Israel which is shared by many of those who are not, strictly speaking, observant: this is perhaps a residue of the long theocratic history of the Jews.

However, a more significant impact of theocracy on modern Israel must be sought outside the sphere of the religio-legal influence. It is the theocratic notion of 'an holy nation', it is the Mosaic outcry 'would God that all the Lord's people were prophets', which, when translated into novel circumstances, has had a much more profound influence than has the rabbinical law. The theocratic notion of the morally perfected, just society, which was a cardinal message of the great prophets, has played a very important role in the modern national renaissance and in the formation of Israel. This notion in recent times has not always been connected with a religious belief, but even when it was proclaimed in secular terms, it was animated by a zeal for social perfection characteristic of the ancient theocratic and theocratic-prophetic beliefs. Indeed, one could go even further and assert that the old theocratic passion for 'an holy nation' was passed from generation to generation as a living ideal and flourished again in modern times when the opportunity for its realization seemed to have arisen. That the reformulation of the ideal and the attempts at its fulfilment were not always dominated by, or consciously connected with, religious belief did not diminish the ardour of the idealists. It was as if the theocratic faith lent its force to the new ideals, whatever their link with religious belief. A few examples will substantiate the point.

In his *Rom und Jerusalem*, published in 1862, Moses Hess, a distinguished figure in early socialism and an important forerunner of Zionism, advocated the resettlement of the Jews in Palestine and their national-political revival in that land. Yet, while he was as firm on the Jews' right to national self-determination as he was critical of attempts to assimilate, his nationalism was combined with a peculiar religio-socialistic idealism. The new Jewish society must establish its economic life (agriculture, industry, commerce) on 'Mosaic, that is to say, socialistic principles.'[45] This insistence on the quality of social relations, and not merely on national independence, is further amplified by the ideal of the Jews' international mission. Hess announces: 'Nowhere does Judaism separate the individual from the family, the family from the nation, the nation from mankind . . .'[46] And he expected that the beneficial influence of Jewish life, once established in an autonomous framework, would be felt among nations, 'when again the teaching will go forth from Zion and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem'.[47] Interestingly enough, Hess's lofty idealism is intertwined with religious (in fact, theocratic-messianic) notions, as even these brief quotations show.

If Hess's dedication to a transcending nationalism could be partly attributed to the fact that his Zionism was not connected with any practical scheme, that it was a dream unhampered by reality, it is noteworthy that such an idealistic quality persisted in the founder of political Zionism, Theodor Herzl. Herzl (who was not only the ideologue of the Zionist movement but who became its organizer and tried to achieve concrete results through diplomatic efforts), Herzl the realist, was committed to lofty ideals. To be sure, had he merely thought about a Jewish state as a refuge for Jews and as a solution to antisemitism, that in itself would have constituted a noble achievement. But his idealism went further: he strove after the *good society*; and he provides another instance of the vitality of the theocratic passion in Judaism.

In his utopian novel *Altneuland* Herzl depicts a revived Palestine which is not merely a refuge for Jews, a place of national renaissance, as well as a society utilizing modern technology and a rational approach to raise the material quality of life; it is also a society based on the principle of human fraternity, irrespective of religious or ethnic affiliation. 'Man, thou art my brother!' is the slogan recommended by the protagonist in the novel.[48] The society Herzl outlines arrives at 'a happier form of human co-existence',[49] a restrained formulation he uses to keep in line with the intention to remain realistic. The old city of Jerusalem becomes a centre of various creeds, with their own places of worship and charitable institutions; it has a Peace Palace, where international conferences of friends of peace and scientists are held. In short: 'All the forms of alleviating suffering which mankind

had sought throughout history were assembled here: faith, love, science.'[50] It is in the old-new land that the Temple is built again, because only there would the Jews develop 'into the free community in which they could work for the highest goals of mankind', an objective fitting into Herzl's notion of God as one whose presence is 'the will for universal good'.[51] Thus the idealistic, universal, prophetic, and in some ways theocratic, ideas assert themselves also in the planner and pioneer of political Zionism. Nor was it for Herzl a mere vision, a utopia in the academic sense; for the book's motto is his famous saying: 'If you will it, it is no fairy-tale.'

Another major figure in early Zionism, Asher Ginzberg (better known as Ahad Ha-'am) shows a similar tendency. Ahad Ha-'am, as is well known, stressed the primacy of spiritual and cultural regeneration over the material and political achievements of Zionism. Such a regeneration meant finding one's own national self and Ahad Ha-'am believed that national identity is both focused on, and sustained by, a central creed or principle. In Judaism this principle is *absolute justice*:[52]

> 'Justice, justice shalt thou follow.' 'Keep thee far from a false matter.' You shall not respect the strong; 'and a stranger shalt thou not wrong . . . Ye shall not afflict any widow, or fatherless child.' But neither shall you wrest justice on the side of the weak: 'Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in his cause.' The guiding rule of your lives shall be neither hatred nor jealousy, nor yet love and pity, for all alike pervert the view and bias the judgment. 'Justice, justice'—that alone shall be your rule.

The principle of justice, embodied in prophecy and notably in the image of Moses, involves the duty and the mission on the part of the Jews to implement it in their personal lives and social institutions, and thereby set an example to the rest of mankind. This has been the perennial meaning of Judaism and this must be its guiding principle in the new society built in the Land of Israel. Thus, here again, a lofty idealistic notion—in this case clearly dominated by an ethical principle—remains central in modern Jewish nationalism.

The peculiar idealistic streak in Zionism, looking beyond ordinary nationalistic aims, has maintained its vitality throughout the various forms it assumed. It is outside the framework of this study to follow it up in detail, but one can easily mention some of the prominent names whose bearers continued this tendency: Aaron David Gordon (1856–1922), Judah L. Magnes (1877–1948), and Martin Buber (1878–1965). Significantly, the insistence on ethical standards, irrespective of what may be conceived as national expediency, has coloured some of the best contemporary Israeli literature which deals with relations with Arabs.[53] What, however, may be the most crucial testimony to the idealistic streak in Zionism is the concrete attempts to build model communities in Israel. The kibbutz, in a variety of its forms, has tried

not only to serve as an avant-garde of national reconstruction and Zionist settlement; it has also attempted to establish a just and closely bound community, in which absolute social equality is translated into a viable and practicable system, and where fraternity is not merely a pious slogan. It is significant that the kibbutz movement encompasses not only people from the pronouncedly socialistic parties, but also, if to a lesser extent, groups from other parties, including the strictly ortho-dox. Thus, this idealistic form of community can be attributed not only to socialistic ideals, but also to the theocratic-ethical tradition in Judaism. Moreover, socialism itself may be deeply affected by this tradition, as the case of Moses Hess well exemplifies.

All this is not to say that modern Israel is 'a kingdom of priests and an holy nation', whether in the theocratic or a borrowed sense. It is, in many ways, a nation like other nations, with its share of rugged individualism, quest for material prosperity, and ordinary nationalism. Yet the idealism, which has its roots in theocracy and which was typical of so many of Israel's founders and builders, is by no means marginal; if not dominant, it is influential beyond its clearly discernible limits. A universal humane note permeates educational books, there is a quest for equality in the widespread co-operative movement, and a concern for mankind in the assistance to developing nations (even if political factors also play a major role in this case). The quest for a better, and not merely independent, society is very much alive.

There is another aspect of modern Israel which possibly—though one cannot be dogmatic about it—is connected with the theocratic tradition. That is the democratic nature of Israeli society and of the State of Israel.

To be sure, outwardly the constitution and institutions of Israel are modelled on the familiar pattern of parliamentary democracy. Periodi-cal parliamentary elections, conducted in a fierce multi-party contest, the formation of a government by the leader of the majority (or of the strongest of a coalition of parties), an independent judiciary, are well-known features of such a regime. Obviously they follow the British rather than the ancient Israelite or Jewish tradition. However, while the democratic institutions of Israel can be traced to an alien model, the successful *working* of democracy, the *stability* of the system, has to be sought elsewhere.

Democratic institutions are not plants which thrive in every soil. The emulation of British or other well-established democracies, or a consti-tution, did not safeguard democracy in many an African state, or for that matter in eastern Europe, and in Germany after the First World War. The success of a democratic regime seems to depend on a certain

mentality—such as respect for the law and resistance to charismatic leadership even when it seems useful; a mentality which must be forged over generations before it becomes a solid foundation. Moreover, democratic attitudes imply agreement to disagree, the co-existence of a spectrum of political convictions and parties, the competition for power through persuasion. In times of national danger tolerance is in a most precarious position, even in established democracies. When the nation is threatened by enemies on its border, it is not unusual to see the establishment of a military dictatorship, or at least a serious curb on the freedom of speech.

How, then, can we explain the singular democratic stability of modern Israel, even in most adverse circumstances? Israel has been living under virtual siege ever since the birth of the state; in fact, it was born under siege. A remarkable military organization and efficiency have resulted and drawn much praise, but there has been no sign of an attempt by the military to take over the administration of the country, or in any way to control the government. Nor has a military leader ever been encouraged, still less has he attempted, to become an autocratic ruler. The supremacy of the parliamentary institutions and of the civil government has never been questioned. Moreover, public and private discussions of political issues have gone on unhampered, including those conducted by the Communist parties and by various small groups dissenting from the political consensus on pacifist or other idealistic grounds. The democratic frame of mind in Israel seems to be rooted very deep indeed.

What is the source of these attitudes? Have the Jewish immigrants acquired them in their countries of origin? Certainly not! Only a very small percentage of the population came from the United Kingdom, the United States, or other democratic countries. The origin of the majority is eastern and central Europe, the Balkans, and Arab countries—that is to say, societies where democracy was either a mere façade or virtually unknown. Significantly, the leaders of Israeli society are predominantly of eastern European origin; they, or their parents, grew up in countries where democratic institutions had, at best, a limited and ephemeral existence.

It makes sense, therefore, to look for the roots of Israel's democracy in Jewish tradition. We have seen that Jewish theocratic notions have some democratic implications; the fundamental belief that God is the ruler means that, under God, the people are essentially equal—equal and privileged. The resistance to institutionalized human authority was very explicit in the opposition to monarchy and, while this conflict goes back to remote antiquity, the biblical recording of the event may have had its impact through the centuries. Perhaps even more influential was the notion that the (religious) law is God's law, and men (including the scholars and the rabbis) are no more than its interpreters

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or transmitters, a notion which again rejected the absolute authority of men over men as a matter of principle. However respected a learned man is, the truth and the right way are not of his making and any mortal can have access to them and argue about an issue in the objective terms of the law.

This attitude may well have carried over to the realm of political life in Israel, in its secular manifestations. For indeed one can discern in the Israeli democratic mentality the peculiar streak of guarding against the adulation of leaders and of readiness to argue independently about any political issue. Prominent men (like David Ben Gurion or Moshe Dayan), despite their many ardent followers, have or have had critics and opponents both inside their party and in the population at large. In fact, it is noteworthy that no prominent Israeli leader can avoid being the target of popular anecdotes, often quite biting, which both reflect and enhance the egalitarian and anti-authoritarian attitudes.

While democratic opposition to authoritarianism in modern Israel may be rooted in the egalitarian implications of the theocratic belief, the tolerance of a wide, virtually unlimited, spectrum of political opinion may also be linked to another aspect of theocracy: the ardency of a religiously inspired philosophy.

The fervent belief which has been associated with religious conviction still seems to inspire various political and social ideologies. Whether an Israeli is an orthodox Jew or a Communist (indeed, even when he follows one of the centre parties), he is likely to be an ardent adherent of the doctrine he adopts. There is a tendency to view the party message, the message of any party, as an absolute truth in a way reminiscent of, and possibly influenced by, a theocratic philosophy; that is to say, there is an attitude of looking for divine and absolute guidance in politics. The conscious theocratic reference is absent (except for the religious parties), but the theocratic fervour seems to continue to inspire the diverse advocates of the absolute good. Since the various parties share this fervour, but not the substance of the message, the resulting conflict is inevitable.

This situation might well seem to promote intolerance, for a fervent, even dogmatic, belief in the rightness of one's views leads to clashes and to mutual intolerance. Ever since J. S. Mill's *On Liberty*, we have been accustomed to thinking of tolerance as a public virtue based on a certain humility concerning one's own 'truth' and on respect for the other person's opinion. A fervent confidence in the absoluteness of one's own truth seems to lead away from tolerance; but that has not happened in modern Israel. For while people believe most ardently in the rightness of their own opinions, they realize that it is virtually impossible to restrain others who believe, with equal ardour, in the absolute truth of *their* opinions. Mutual tolerance is not so much the result of

mental concession to other views as it is the outcome of the *practical limitations* in changing or curbing the views of believers. In a sense, *vox populi vox Dei* is almost literally the situation in Israel. And how can one curb *vox* (or rather *voces*) *populi* when it is (they are) believed to be *vox Dei*?

Thus despite rather non-Millian attitudes, tolerance is the rule in Israel. The difference between that tolerance and the Western variety is that, whereas the latter is expressed in a low key, in Israel people bravely endure the high-pitched conflicting tones of various parties claiming to know the way to salvation.

NOTES

[1] Josephus, *Against Apion*, Book II, 17; *The Works of Flavius Josephus*, trans. William Whiston, Philadelphia, 1841, Vol. II, p. 512.

[2] Ibid., p. 513.

[3] It is noteworthy that Philo, born fifty years before Josephus, also dwells on this point. He contrasts the transient nature of the institutions of other peoples with the laws of Moses which 'truly come from God', and being 'firm, unshaken, immovable . . ., remain secure from the day when they were first enacted to now and we may hope that they will remain for all future ages . . .' Philo, *The Life of Moses* ii. 12–15; *Philo's Works*, Loeb Classical Library, London, 1935, Vol. VI.

[4] See Plato, *Phaedo* 78.

[5] Josephus, *Against Apion*, Book II, 42, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 523.

[6] Martin Buber, *Kingship of God*, New York and Evanston, 1967 (translated from the third German edition of *Königtum Gottes*, 1956), p. 136.

[7] Martin Buber, *Moses*, Oxford and London, 1946, p. 114.

[8] Cf. Buber, *Kingship of God*, op. cit., pp. 133–35.

[9] Cf. Yehezkel Kaufmann, who vigorously rejects the approach of Wellhausen and others; they virtually do not distinguish theocracy from hierocracy and attribute the theocratic notions in Judaism to the post-exilic period when the earlier Israelite history was allegedly rewritten by the dominant priests in a theocratic spirit. Y. Kaufmann, *Toldot Ha'emuna Hayisre'elit* (*History of the Israelite Creed*), in Hebrew, Vol. I, Book I, Tel-Aviv, 1937, pp. 686–94.

[10] Thus there is a legend that at Sinai the first two commandments were announced directly by God and the rest through Moses; consequently the first two were never forgotten. 'But they forgot some of the things Moses taught, for as man is a being of flesh and blood, and hence ephemeral, so are his teachings ephemeral . . .' Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, Philadelphia, 1909–1933, Vol. III, p. 108.

[11] See Martin Buber, *Kingship of God*, op. cit., p. 137.

[12] Ibid., p. 138.

[13] R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government*, New York, 1947, p. 34.

[14] It may be significant that the text does not use in this connexion the term *melekh*, king, but *nagid*, translated here as 'captain', and probably originally meaning 'leader', or 'the elevated one'.

[15] It is noteworthy that in another context (Deuteronomy 17:12) the Hebrew phrasing refers to the priest as standing to *serve* (*lesharet*) the Lord, though the use of another Hebrew verb there is not reflected in the King James version which uses 'minister' on this occasion also.

[16] The conclusion that the function of the high priest can be regarded here as parallel to that of a king is based on the interpretation of 'judge my house' (Zechariah 3:7) as meaning the house of *Israel*, or the people of Israel. This interpretation of the passage is not the customary one, which merely assumes that 'my house' means God's *sanctuary* and that Zechariah simply assures the high priest that he will be master in the Temple. While this customary interpretation can be supported by other examples in the Bible in which 'my house' refers to the Sanctuary, and by the parallel statement in

Zechariah 3:7 that the high priest will 'keep my court', meaning the court of the Temple, there are several arguments against this interpretation. (1) The parallel in biblical poetry does not necessarily repeat the same idea, but often extends it: in this sense, judging the house of Israel (House of Israel is a common biblical phrase) could very well be amplified by keeping the courts of the God of Israel. (2) The use of the phrase 'judge my house'—in fact, the more exact translation in this context of *tadin et beti* would be 'rule my house'—is quite unusual if referring to the Temple, where the customary verb would be *kahen* (minister) or *sharet* (serve). *Din* implies authority over other people and it would seem almost banal and incongruous that a prophet, in an inspired address, should give the high priest only authority over other priests in the Temple. Authority over the house of Israel seems fitting in this context. (3) In another passage in Zechariah (9:8) (though modern scholarship attributes Chapters 9–14 to another period) God says, 'And I will encamp about mine house because of the army,' which means that God will protect His house against a hostile army; this again would make more sense if it meant divine protection of the house of Israel rather than merely the defence of the Sanctuary. At least it should mean that the defence of the Sanctuary symbolizes the protection of the entire land and community. (4) In I Chronicles (17:14) God makes a promise to David in respect of his son: 'But I will settle him in mine house and in my kingdom for ever: and his throne shall be established for evermore.' While 'house' in this passage *may* mean the Temple, if it does, the Temple certainly means more than the mere building, as it is parallel to God's kingdom. The house of God and the kingdom of God, that is to say Israel, here complement each other, virtually blending into one. The interpretation of 'my house' as basically indicating 'the community of my people' may be further strengthened through another passage in which God refers to Moses as 'faithful in all mine house' (Numbers 12:7). Though it can be argued that 'house' here also indicates the Sanctuary, it is more likely that Moses's virtue is extolled as against the entire house of Israel. Therefore the passage in Zechariah seems to me to indicate the high priest's role as a ruler

of the people and not merely an administrator of the Temple.

[17] The King James version of Zechariah 6:13 is somewhat misleading in this connexion. It runs: '. . . and he shall bear the glory, and shall sit and rule upon his throne; and he shall be a priest upon his throne: and the counsel of peace shall be between them both.' Obviously, the first 'he' and the second 'he' are two different persons, or else there would be no point in referring to 'both' at the end of the verse. To be sure, the Hebrew text is somewhat ambiguous in its wording, but its proper translation should be: '. . . and he shall bear the glory, and shall sit and rule upon his throne; and (the) priest shall be upon his throne (too): and the counsel of peace shall be between them both.'

[18] *Ecclesiasticus* XLV, 17. Quoted from the English translation in *The Old Testament, The Apocryphal Books*, London, 1880.

[19] Ibid., L, 1–21.

[20] *Against Apion*, Book II, 22, in *The Works of Flavius Josephus*, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 514.

[21] See M. Stern, 'The Period of the Second Temple' in H. H. Ben-Sasson (ed.), *Toldot Am Israel (History of the Jewish People)*, in Hebrew, Vol. I (*Antiquity*), Tel-Aviv, 1969, pp. 221–22.

[22] The prophetic criticism of the ritualistic aspects of religion (e.g. Isaiah 1:10–15, Jeremiah 7:21–3) *could* be interpreted as a rejection of established practices sanctioned by law; but it may have been merely a rhetorical means for stressing the centrality of moral commandments and true piety.

[23] See *The Babylonian Talmud, Baba Bathra*, 21a. In English translation, *The Babylonian Talmud, Seder Nezikin*, Vol. II, The Soncino Press, London, 1935, pp. 105–6. Cf. also Josephus, *Against Apion*, II, 19 in *The Works of Flavius Josephus*, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 513.

[24] See Joseph Klausner, *The Messianic Idea in Israel*, translated from the third Hebrew edition by W. F. Stinespring, New York, 1955, pp. 248 ff.

[25] Ibid, pp. 222–36.

[26] Ibid., pp. 274–76 & ff.

[27] Ibid., pp. 396 ff.

[28] Cf. Klausner, op. cit., pp. 229–30.

[29] Cf. M. Stern in Ben-Sasson, ed., op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 267–68.

[30] See Klausner, op. cit., pp. 397–99, where the Talmudic references are specified.

[31] See Ben-Sasson in Ben-Sasson, ed., op. cit., Vol. II (*The Middle Ages*), pp. 297–99 & ff.

[32] Klausner, op. cit., p. 403, where the Talmudic sources are quoted.

[33] Incidentally, the *idea* of a Messiah preceded the *term*. The term itself became connected with the idea only in the Pseudepigraphic *Book of Enoch*, while in the Bible the Anointed one is not the future redeemer, and the future redeemer is not called the Anointed one (Cf. Klausner, op. cit., p. 8.).

[34] The King James version, here slightly corrected to render the original more faithfully, runs: 'and out of the hand of all kingdoms, and of them that oppressed you'. 'That oppressed you' in the Hebrew text is a descriptive clause related to both, 'the Egyptians' ('Egypt' in the Hebrew original) and 'all the kingdoms'.

[35] Significantly, when Saul is deemed a sinner and the disastrous reversal in his fortune is announced to him by Samuel, and to Samuel by God, the word repeatedly used is again *ma'as*, only this time it is God who contemptuously rejects the earthly king. (See I Samuel 15:23, 26; 16:1.)

[36] Cf. Buber, who stresses that, unlike the case of a king (a dynastic ruler), where the 'judge' is concerned 'the Spirit seizes upon and endows him not for power and dignity, but only for a limited mission . . .' (*Kingship of God*, op. cit., p. 160).

[37] The translation here substantially differs from the King James version to render the original meaning more faithfully.

[38] Cf. above, where the egalitarian and libertarian aspects of the early Israelites are also discussed. Cf. also Buber, who suggests a fundamental connexion between the theocratic and the libertarian-egalitarian elements when he writes that 'original and direct theocracy . . . involves the intractableness of the human person . . . the drive of man to be independent of man . . .' (though he adds: 'but for the sake of a highest commitment'). *Kingship of God*, op. cit., p. 138.

[39] Cf. Yehezkel Kaufmann, op. cit., Vol. I. Book I, pp. 31 ff.

[40] As Israel has (Jewish) religious parties competing for parliamentary seats, it is relatively easy to estimate the proportion of orthodox Jews. The percentage of supporters of these parties in the last five elections oscillated between under 14 and over 15. Allowing for the non-Jewish electorate (about 14 per cent of the total) and assuming that some of the orthodox vote for other than religious parties, one arrives at an estimate of the orthodox element of 20 per cent of the Jewish population.

[41] See 'Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law—1953'. *Laws of the State of Israel*, Vol. 7, No. 64, pp. 139–40. (The original Hebrew text in *Sefer Hahukim*, No. 134.)

[42] See *Laws of the State of Israel*, Vol. 16, No. 45, pp. 93–5. (The original Hebrew text in *Sefer Hahukim*, No. 377.)

[43] See 'Law and Administration Ordinance—1948', No. 6 (or Chapter Six A), *Laws of the State of Israel*, Vol. 1, *Ordinances* 1948.

[44] 'Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 1970.'

[45] Moses Hess, *Rom und Jerusalem*, 1862. Quoted from the second edition, Leipzig, 1899, pp. 97–8. Although there is an English translation of the book by Meyer Waxman, entitled *Rome and Jerusalem*, New York, 1918, the quotations here are translated from the German original.

[46] Ibid., pp. 4–5.

[47] Ibid., p. 17. The quotation from Micah 4:2 or Isaiah 2:3 used here by Hess is more faithfully rendered when *torah* is translated by 'teaching' (*Lehre*, in German) rather than by 'the law', as does the King James version.

A brief but penetrating analysis of Hess's peculiar Zionism can be found in Martin Buber, *Israel and Palestine*, London, 1952 (English translation from the German version of 1950; the book was first published in Hebrew in 1944), Part 4, pp. 111–22.

[48] Theodor Herzl, *Altneuland*, Berlin, 1902. There is an English translation by Paula Arnold: *Altneuland (Old-New Land)*, Haifa, 1960. The quotations, here and further on, do not always rely on the English translation, but are sometimes retranslated from the original. While the references to Book and Chapter are common to the original and the translation, the page references in parentheses are those to Paula Arnold's English translation, but they are preceded by the relevant page number in the German original, as reprinted in Theodor Herzl, *Gesammelte Zionistische Werke*, Berlin,

1935, Vol. V. The present quotation is from *Altneuland*, Book Three, Ch. III, p. 274 (118).

[49] *Altneuland*, Book Five, Ch. VI, p. 419 (217). 'Human co-existence' stands for 'Zusammenleben von Menschen' in the original, which literally means 'living together of men', a phrase implying closer human relations than 'co-existence'.

[50] Ibid., Book Five, Ch. I, p. 371 (184).

[51] Ibid., Book Five, Ch. I, p. 377 (188 and 189).

[52] Quoted from Ahad Ha-'am (Asher Ginzberg), 'Moses', as translated into English by Leon Simon in *Selected Essays by Ahad Ha-'am*, Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1912,

pp. 321–22. 'Moses' was originally published in Hebrew in 1904.

[53] See, for a prominent example, S. Yizhar, *Hirbet Hiz'ah*, a novelette dealing with the occupation of an Arab village and published in 1949. An excerpt in English translation, entitled 'The Story of Hirbet Hiz'ah', was published in J. Sonntag, ed., *Caravan: a Jewish Quarterly Omnibus*, New York, 1962, pp. 328–34.

For an English analysis of this moral trend in recent Hebrew literature (though the article is not confined to that theme) see Amnon Rubinstein, 'And Now in Israel a Fluttering of Doves', *The New York Times Magazine*, 26 July 1970, Section 6, pp. 8 ff.

THE STRUCTURE OF A HASSIDIC COMMUNITY IN MONTREAL

Jacques Gutwirth

WHEN I was engaged in research on the Belzer Hassidim of Antwerp,[1] I learned that there was a similar community in Montreal with whose members several of my Antwerp informants were linked by kinship or other ties. In both cities the majority of the faithful had immigrated after the Second World War.

Until 1940 the hundred-year-old dynasty of the Belzer *rebbe* (charismatic leaders) had been established in eastern Galicia (Poland) and most of their faithful had been drawn from the same geographical area. In Antwerp nowadays the Hassidic community contains an appreciable number of 'Magyars', but the Polish influence is still important. In Montreal most members are of Hungarian origin. I thought that this recent development of Belzer Hassidism merited study; and in 1971 I was able to investigate it for two months, employing the anthropological method of participant observation.

Montreal's *shtibel*, the house of prayer and study of the Belzer Hassidim, is situated about half way along the Rue Jeanne Mance—a very long street going from north to south—in an area where Jews are certainly in evidence. In 1965 there were 2,321,000 inhabitants[2] in the city, of whom more than 100,000 were Jews.[3] The *shtibel* is in a residential and quiet area; the houses date from the 1920s and 1930s, they have only one or two floors, and are in a dilapidated condition. Even in this context the building housing the *shtibel* strikes one as being especially decrepit, and the pale green paint of the clapboard elevation is flaking. This dilapidated aspect makes the house easily identifiable by a visiting adherent from New York or Antwerp.[4] He would also not fail to notice the discreet plaque in Hebrew characters which states *Hassidei Belz Umahzik Hadath* (Hassidim of Belz and Upholders of the Faith).

Like the Antwerp community, the Montreal Hassidim acquired an adjoining house and they have therefore access to the *shtibel* through two front doors. On Saturdays, one of the entrances is reserved for women, who follow the morning service from an adjacent room. The rabbi has a small flat on the first floor of one of the houses, with an independent entrance up the external staircase which is an architectural feature of all the houses in the area.

The Montreal community consists of about 70 heads of household (*balbatim*) and of about ten bachelors who are over twenty years of age.[5] There is a high average of 4 children per household, and the community therefore numbers more than 400 souls. The mother tongue of the members remains Yiddish, though today many speak some English, and occasionally a little French. The group have their own male ritual bathing facilities in the basement, and a *talmud-toire* (traditional religious school) in a third house on the opposite side of the street. On the other hand, the Belzer Hassidim possess neither their own girls' school nor ritual bathing facilities for women; nor, again, do they have their own burial society (*hevre kadishe*). They have had, willy nilly, to join other Hassidic communities in Montreal for the provision of such services.

The Belzer *shtibel* of Montreal is clearly not as large and comfortable as that of Antwerp; and its immediate surroundings are not as obviously Jewish in character. True, one does see now and then (especially early in the morning and in the evening) some men presenting a traditional Hassidic appearance (beards and ear-locks, and black felt broad-rimmed hats); and there are to be seen women wearing wigs, scarves, and long-sleeved loose dresses. There are also some Jewish organizations and shops in the street and in the locality; but the district appears to be largely peopled by Greek immigrants. In fact, the *shtibel* is situated in the old Jewish quarter of the town, where[6] '. . . from 1921 to 1946, the majority of the Jewish population of Montreal, lived within a radius of one mile from the . . . corner of Mount Royal Avenue and Jeanne Mance Street'. Nowadays, only a minority of Montreal's Jews live or work in the district.[7] The Belzer Hassidim certainly live near the *shtibel*, but many of them go further afield during the day: their economic activities, comparatively diversified, require them to travel to other localities.

It is clear that this community depends for its character on specific economic, demographic, and social conditions different from those in Antwerp (which has only 12,000 Jews, most of whom make their living in the diamond industry). But what is mainly dealt with in this paper is not so much the specific difference as the form and structure of the community, that is to say, the pattern of relationships which makes possible the operation of this one branch among several of the Belzer Hassidim.

These Hassidim established themselves in Montreal in the autumn of 1952. One of the most active members of the group was Moshe, who was born in north-west Hungary in 1920. He came from a small town which had a devoutly orthodox Jewish community known as *Ashkenazi* in character.[8] The term clearly had more implications than its usual meaning of European or Western Jew; in the Hungarian context it was applied specifically to non-Hassidic Jews who worshipped according to

the traditional German (Ashkenazi) rite, whereas the Hassidim were inspired by the Safed Kabbalists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and had adopted a more mystical liturgy of Sephardi inspiration.[9] The term *Ashkenazi* is still used in the same way by the Belzer Hassidim of Montreal.

Moshe's father had been an observant Ashkenazi. The First World War brought to Hungary a flood of Jewish refugees from Galicia, including the third *rebbe* of the Belz dynasty, Issachar Dov (1854–1926); Moshe's father became his disciple, and brought up his son as a Hassid of that persuasion.

Shortly before the Second World War, Moshe himself resided for two years in Belz, where he studied under the fourth *rebbe*, Aron (1878–1957); and when both men found themselves in Budapest during the war, Moshe became the *rebbe's shames* (general factotum). Moshe managed to escape deportation; but he nevertheless went to a Displaced Person's camp in Germany at the end of the war: the Hassidim who had survived the genocide had learned very quickly that the devoutly orthodox among them had assembled in that particular camp, where rabbi Yekutiel Yehuda Halberstamm, the Klausenberger *rebbe*,[10] had organized them as a group. There was also in the camp the rabbi of Papa (*Puper ruf*), who had been the head of a yeshiva at Papa, in Hungary; that yeshiva also had a Belzer inclination.

The pious Hassidim in the camp came together for religious services. Among them there was the man who became in 1954 the present rabbi and the undisputed leader of the Montreal Belzer Hassidim, Rabbi N. Like Moshe, he was born in Hungary in 1920, and had been a pupil at the Papa yeshiva; he had also spent a brief period in Belz. Again, like Moshe, he had escaped deportation and had helped to organize Hassidim in Germany.

In the summer of 1946, Moshe was among the first handful of Belzer who came to Antwerp; he took this decision (as, according to him, all other important decisions) after consultation with *reb* Aron, the Belzer *rebbe*, with whom he corresponded. *Reb* Aron was disinclined to see his followers emigrate, like many other refugees, to the United States. It seems that since the beginning of the present century the Belzer charismatic leaders did not approve of what they considered to be the religious laxity of the European Jewish immigrants in the United States. On the other hand, *Reb* Aron viewed Antwerp with favour; it was a *shaine shtut*, a fine city: there, traditional piety could flourish. Moshe, with the help of Rabbi N. and of a few others, brought a good number of Belzer Hassidim as well as the Papa rabbi and his pupils to Antwerp. The *Puper ruf* established a yeshiva, and Rabbi N. became his assistant, while Moshe helped to establish a Belzer *shtibel*.[11]

When the Korean war broke out in 1950, many members of the Antwerp community feared the onset of another world war, and expressed

the desire to emigrate to the United States; this was especially the case with many Hungarian Hassidim, who were not then prospering in Antwerp.[12] Moshe himself had at the time five children, all of whom had been born in Antwerp (by 1971 he had twelve), and could barely make ends meet as a baker-confectioner. In 1952 he took his family to Montreal—after he had again consulted the Belzer *rebbe*. (The Belzer *rebbe* lived in Tel Aviv, where economic conditions in the early 1950s were harsh, and he did not encourage his disciples to join him in the Holy Land.)

Moshe did not go to Montreal alone: several others from Antwerp went at about the same time. Nowadays, about a quarter of the male members of the Montreal Belzer were either born in Antwerp or lived in the Belgian city for a period of years. On the other hand, the *Puper ruf* and many of his former pupils and followers went to Williamsburg, in New York. Other famous rabbis had already settled in the metropolis; this meant that facilities now existed for Hassidim to lead a traditionally pious life. Moreover, there were favourable economic prospects in New York. But the American immigration laws were strict; Canada was close to the United States, both geographically and in its economic and political system, and was therefore considered a good alternative—or perhaps even a stepping stone to New York.

In 1951 there were 204,836 Jews in Canada,[13] of whom 80,829 lived in Montreal[14] and a smaller number in Toronto. The majority of them were, like the Jews of the United States, of eastern and central European origin; and they also for the most part did not lead a traditional Orthodox Jewish existence. New York, with its large Jewish population, could sustain a comparatively substantial nucleus who continued to follow the old European way of life and were devoutly observant; this was not the case in either Montreal or Toronto. Admittedly, in the two Canadian cities there were orthodox communities, but they were orthodox 'American style', as the Belzer say: that is, far less strict in their observance than they or their parents would have been in the old country. As for Hassidism, it hardly existed in Montreal before the Second World War; there was a *shtibel*, but it had only a few dozen members, mainly of Galician origin. On the other hand, Montreal certainly offered the necessary facilities for leading an observant life, and kasher food was available. These factors, together with the existence of philanthropic associations, allowed the establishment of Hassidic communities numbering about 300 households which reached Montreal between 1946 and 1956.[15]

In June 1949 the Klausenberger *rebbe*—who had meanwhile settled in New York—actively helped to establish in Montreal a traditional yeshiva called 'First Mesifta of Canada', which began teaching with 30 pupils. The basement of the yeshiva was used by adults for religious services; and on the high Holy Days in the autumn about a hundred

heads of household of both orthodox and different Hassidic persuasions came together for prayer. By 1951 there were 130 to 140 heads of household, and the Klausenberger *rebbe* continued to take an active interest in their affairs. But in the course of that year the first split occurred: some members constituted themselves into a separate community of followers of the Satmar[16] *rebbe*, who had settled in New York. (He differed from the Klausenberger *rebbe* in at least one matter: he did not approve of the existence of the State of Israel, where he had lived briefly before settling in Brooklyn; on the other hand, the Klausenberger *rebbe* supported Israel—where he went to settle in 1959. As for the Belzer, they are closer to the Klausenberger than they are to the Satmar, but they are far less militant.)

In 1952, in the season of *selihot* prayers (which precede the High Holy Days of New Year and Yom Kippur), a small group seceded to found the community of *Hassidei Belz Umahzik Hadath*; there were about 20 persons and they were led by Moshe who had arrived in Montreal only three months earlier. It was in a basement not far from the site of their present *shtibel* that the new community was created; six months later there were thirty heads of household and they acquired a house.

Why did the rift take place? The spiritual leader of the Klausenberger Hassidim in Montreal is Rabbi U., a man of Moshe's age. Moreover, he is descended (like Moshe) from an Ashkenazi family, and like him he resided in Belz for a period. He had tried to prevent the separation, but had failed to do so. On the other hand, not all the members of the splinter group were Belzer Hassidim or indeed Hassidim of any particular leaning: they were devout Ashkenazim (that is, very orthodox) who came into association with the Belzer. Hence the joint name of the new movement, Hassidim of Belz *and* Upholders of the Faith. For Moshe and for some others, their allegiance to the Belzer *rebbe* made it desirable to establish their own community; but there were also some other motivations, one being that the members of the splinter group differed from the Klausenberger *rebbe* and Rabbi U. in their conception of a traditional Jewish education. Although both factions teach their pupils in the traditional Hassidic style, the Williamsburg rabbi does not enquire as meticulously as the Montreal community into the degree of pious observance of the parents of the pupils. This more 'open' mind—verging on the missionary[17]—also allows a member of the group with a trimmed beard to lead communal prayers on the Sabbath, and a clean-shaven man to lead these prayers on other days of the week. But Belzer Hassidim—whether they live in Antwerp, in Montreal, or anywhere else—will be led in prayer only by a *husset* (*hassid*, or pious man) with a rough beard.

However, the Ashkenazim who joined the splinter group at that time (1952) were clean shaven; most of them still are. There may have been, therefore, other somewhat unformulated motives for the separation.

There is no doubt that today the two groups are clearly differentiated in socio-economic terms. The Klausenberger (although they have retained their small *shtibel* in the old district still inhabited by the Belzer) have moved their main premises to a more residential area because the majority of their group had moved, with many other Jews, to that more pleasant and modern locality; per capita income in the area is far higher than it is in the old immigrant quarter.[18] The contrast between the Klausenberger rabbi's comfortable house and Rabbi N.'s modest flat, and the fact that each man is maintained by his own community, epitomizes the general disparity of economic level between the two groups.

At the time the schism occurred, however, the members of both factions were in a precarious situation; they were not only immigrants without means and survivors of an abominable persecution but they were, moreover, strictly orthodox Jews who had to observe the Sabbath and other religious practices meticulously and this observance handicapped them severely in their economic pursuits.[19] From the outset, the Klausenbergers' 'broadmindedness' meant that they tolerated a more ambiguous cultural behaviour; this tolerance seems to have been positively associated with economic vitality, and the members prospered. Mintz, in his *Legends of the Hasidim*,[20] recounts two variants of a story dealing with this subject; in the first version, 'The Klausenberger Rebbe said: "I have the keys to parnosseh [livelihood]. Whoever wants them must catch them." '

When the split occurred, the authentic Belzer Hassidim were a minority within the splinter group. The secession arose because the members of the new group would not compromise their 'Jewishness' for the sake of an easier accommodation to the host society. Admittedly, they allowed some latitude, but on a restricted scale; and their economic achievements have also been limited. There seems to be a dialectical relationship between economic modes and strict traditional observance. Moshe himself is a case in point.

He had difficulty when he first came to Montreal in obtaining paid employment as a baker-confectioner since he would not work on the Sabbath, among other things. He then found a partner willing to finance the acquisition of a kasher bakery and confectionery; the business has grown, and today he and his present partner have four retail shops—two in the old Jewish quarter, and two in the newer Jewish district. Nevertheless, although Moshe is hard-working and skilled, he is not well-to-do. Indeed, a fellow-Hassid has described him as a *bal-hoives* (literally, owner of debts). About two years ago he had again to look for a partner willing and able to finance him; eventually an Ashkenazi member of the group (who had recently emigrated to Canada but who could not immediately find a niche in his trade) invested some of his money in Moshe's business.

Moshe's major problem seems to stem from his family responsibilities: he has fulfilled his heartfelt desire of giving his daughters in marriage to enthusiastic Belzer Hassidim. (Two of his sons-in-law come from Israel.) But the young men were poor and they had to be maintained for several years while they studied the Talmud in a *koilel* (teaching establishment for married men).

Moshe's uncompromising adherence to his religious and Hassidic principles both stimulated and hindered him in the acquisition and management of an independent business, which he runs according to the capitalistic principles valued by all members of the community. But just as he had to seek business partners from the ranks of the Ashkenazim, so did he have in 1952 to ally himself and his fellow Belzer Hassidim with them in order to secede. He clearly believed it permissible to make some compromise so that traditional Belzer Hassidism might survive in Montreal. Of course, his own background was helpful to him in his task of organizing the new movement. He came from a family who had been Ashkenazim; and he had been linked in his native Hungary, in Germany, and in Antwerp with pupils of the Papa rabbi and with other Hassidim following diverse charismatic leaders who joined the new community.

In fact, the alliance apparent in the appellation 'Hassidim of Belz and Upholders of the Faith' must be seen in its historical perspective. In 1878 the second Belz *rebbe*, Yeoshua, sponsored a political movement and two journals which were called *Mahzik Hadath* and which united the orthodox and the Hassidim.[21] In 1879 that movement put forward as a candidate a rabbi who was elected member of parliament in Austria-Hungary. He was an Ashkenazi rabbi, a son of the Hatam Sofer, an illustrious orthodox rabbi[22], who is revered more than a century after his death as the spiritual guide of the Ashkenazim of Slovakia and of north-west Hungary, including those of the Belzer *shtibel*. In short, the Belzer Hassidim and those Ashkenazim had in common an uncompromising loyalty to orthodox Judaism; and the Belzer were closer to the beliefs and practices of the Ashkenazim with whom they allied themselves than they felt themselves to be to the Klausenberger.

The Montreal *bes-medresh* (the main prayer and study-room in the *shtibel*), like that of Antwerp or of Williamsburg, in New York, is in a sorry state. The paint on the walls is flaked and cracked, the wooden furniture is worn and shaky. In Montreal, moreover, the ceiling is lower, the windows are smaller, and it is generally more uncomfortable. But there are some other points of differentiation. In Antwerp all the faithful sit around tables, in Hassidic style; but in Montreal about a quarter of the heads of household have their own seats behind three rows of benches and desks—rather in the style of synagogue seats. This lay-out allows for greater seating capacity, but the point is that the benches are occupied by clean-shaven men presenting a modern

appearance (Ashkenazim), while the Hassidim are seated around tables. On the other hand, the curtains draped across the Holy Ark, the cloth covers of the *sifrei Torah* within, the tablecloths, the lectern, and the pulpits of the rabbi and his assistant, are all far superior in quality and in artistry to those either in Antwerp or in Williamsburg. They are the gift of a confirmed Ashkenazi, and were selected and embroidered by his wife. This ornamentation, although it is considered unworthy of note and purely incidental by the devout Belzer, is nevertheless a symbol of Ashkenazi participation in the community.

No tea or coffee is served before the afternoon or evening services (*minha* and *mariv*). This contrasts with the practice both in Antwerp and among the Williamsburg Belzer, a practice much appreciated by the faithful. On the other hand, the other Williamsburg congregation led by the *Puper ruf* do not serve hot drinks; they also follow the old Ashkenazi synagogal tradition.

The Montreal *bes-medresh* is usually very well attended for *minha* and *mariv*; the room is full, but the faithful do not all present the appearance one is led to expect at a Hassidic service: untrimmed beards and long sidecurls. In fact, about 45 per cent of the congregation do not look like Hassidim; although about a quarter of them have small trimmed beards, the remainder are clean-shaven, and they are dressed in modern Western-style clothes. Clearly, they are Ashkenazim. Their 'modern' appearance is, for the bearded members, admissible: they know that the clean-shaven faithful are indeed observant and not the 'troublemakers' which the unbearded Galicians are in Antwerp. (In the Belgian community many of the clean-shaven have lapsed in the sense that they used to have untrimmed beards and to dress Hassidic-style.)

In Montreal the clean-shaven congregants do not lead communal prayers, which means that they concede that theirs is not the superior norm. Moreover, in the school owned by the community, the young are imbued with traditional Hassidic values and many of the children of Ashkenazim wear sidecurls and later, in due course, untrimmed beards. Yet even among professed Hassidim there are some who do not strictly observe all the Hassidic traditions. On the Sabbath and Holy Days only about 15 men (20 per cent of all married men) wear a *shtraimel*. (Bachelors, of course, are not allowed to wear this hat with long fur tails.) Now the *shtraimel* is certainly an important symbol of Hassidic membership. Even the *gabe* (*gabbai*, the synagogue official in charge of administration) who had been a pupil at the *Puper ruf*'s yeshiva, does not wear a *shtraimel*. This is because many of the older Hassidim, especially those who are over forty and remember the old country, balk at wearing accoutrements which are foreign both to their family tradition and to the tradition of their native land—be it western Slovakia or western Hungary.

However, there is some ambivalence also among the confirmed Ashkenazim: some button their jacket from right to left according to

Hassidic tradition, while many also adhere to Hassidic ritual and even wear the special Hassidic belt, *gertl*, when they pray. On the other hand, other Ashkenazim remain faithful to their own traditional rites and pray without benefit of *gertl*; indeed two of these members have their usual seats next to the officiating Rabbi N., near the Ark—which is a further symbol of the co-existence of both trends within this Montreal movement.

All the faithful seem to pray in the synagogue with all their hearts and minds. While during the interval between the afternoon and evening services there are conversations and collections are made for various purposes, during the service itself (however lengthy it might be) there is intense attention to prayer. Although there are individual variations of intensity and concentration, it is noticeable that even the most committed Hassidim are more restrained than the Antwerp congregants: their fervour seems to be more internalized and their gestures during prayers more restrained.[23] Hassidic mysticism and emotionalism appear to have been tempered with Ashkenazi sobriety and reserve.

In Montreal the study of the Talmud is more advanced and more systematic than in Antwerp. Several evenings a week, Rabbi N. gathers around him about fifteen of the regular congregants for a Talmudic class, a *shiur*; the men are over thirty years old, and the class lasts for at least half an hour, being held at the *bes-medresh* itself before or after the evening prayer. Other congregants are reluctant to remain lest their presence disturb the class in their study or their discussions and commentaries, and they adjourn to an adjacent room. This, of course, is not Hassidic practice—Hassidim usually study the Talmud disregarding any noise or conversation around them. There is also a confirmed Ashkenazi who is reputed to be a Talmudic scholar and who holds a Talmudic class every single evening between the afternoon and evening services. The lesson lasts from ten to twenty minutes, and he usually has about the same number of students (fifteen) as the rabbi; the majority of the men are Ashkenazim. It is customary for the evening service to be held only after the *shiur* is over. The rabbi also takes pupils for other lessons, including tuition for newly married men. The whole group is inspired by a systematic talmudism of orthodox leanings.

Nevertheless, the Hassidic cult of the *rebbe* and the belief in his wonder-working powers are very much alive in the community—although here again there are noteworthy differences between Montreal and Antwerp. For Moshe and some other middle-aged men, as well as for some other young Hassidim who were pupils at the Belzer yeshiva in Jerusalem, there is a total commitment to the charismatic leadership of the Belzer *rebbe* dynasty, whose present representative is the young fifth *rebbe*, Issachar Dov. (He was born in 1948, and has been Belzer *rebbe* since 1966. His status as *rebbe* is undisputed in Montreal, while the Antwerp *shtibel* are not unanimous in their adherence to him.)

However, not all the Montreal Hassidim are fully committed disciples of the *rebbe* for the simple reason that they have only a general acquaintance with the dynasty. For them it is easier and cheaper to go to Williamsburg than to Jerusalem. New York is only a few hundred miles away from Montreal, and the spiritual guide of many men is the *Puper ruf*; he is available for advice, and some of the faithful even submit to him *kvitleh* (Hassidic petitions for miraculous intercessions), although the *Puper ruf* is not a *rebbe* in the Hassidic meaning of the term. (But *rebbe* of course also means spiritual leader.)

Another dynasty also attracts many followers: it is that of the so-called *Skverer* (after the area of Skvira in the Ukraine). The Skverer *rebbe*, Yakov Yosef Tversky, died in 1968; most of his disciples in the United States are of Hungarian origin. He had founded in 1954 a village known as New Square, an hour's drive from New York city; its inhabitants are Hassidim and they are able to live away from what they consider the undesirable socio-cultural pressures of the wider society. In spite of many difficulties, the community seems to function successfully.[24] Some members of the Montreal community revere the Skverer dynasty; they were drawn by the personality of the *rebbe* and the peculiar mode of existence in New Square; they are also of the same Hungarian origin as the majority of the 'villagers'. Some Montreal congregants send their children to study in the New Square yeshiva, and they are linked by kinship ties (including marriage) with members of the village.

The present Skverer *rebbe* is the son of the founder of the village community. In 1971 I observed the visits of some faithful to New Square; they had brought *kvitleh*, but they had also come for a pilgrimage to the founder's grave, in the village cemetery. On the anniversary of his death (*yurtsait*), on the second day of the month of Nissan, the disciples assemble in large numbers; in 1971, about 25 members of the Belzer *shtibel* in Montreal had come by various means of transport in order to visit that grave. In the Canadian *shtibel* several dozens of the faithful lit each a candle which was affixed to a metal panel especially reserved for that purpose and secured on the lectern from which the Torah is read. Throughout the year, there are similar rites frequently held to honour the memory of various *rebbe* or rabbis revered either by the Hassidim or by the Ashkenazim of Hungary and Slovakia.

There are also other cults individually favoured by the Montreal congregants: sometimes the *rebbe* is venerated because he is a kinsman or because he used to live in the same (or a neighbouring) locality as the faithful. Nor is veneration for a *rebbe* limited to Hassidim; some Ashkenazim appear to have no hesitation about visiting the New Square *rebbe* or the Belzer *rebbe*; but other Ashkenazim, although they show respect for a *rebbe*, do not go so far as to make a special journey to his home.

It seems clear that, although the Montreal community follow the cult of a *rebbe* in Hassidic style, the cult of the Belzer *rebbe* in particular is not observed with the degree of intensity that is found in Antwerp. Of course, the Belzer dynasty has been revered by Hungarian Hassidim for a comparatively short period, and many of the Montreal followers have come to the cult through the influence of another revered leader, the rabbi of Papa; moreover, the Belzer *rebbe* is geographically far removed from Montreal.

Nevertheless, a true Belzer will still find in Montreal the ritual observances peculiar to Belz Hassidism. Religious services are led by men presenting a true Hassidic appearance, who draw out the prayers and chant in the wailing tradition of Belz. But the number of Montreal faithful who are capable of such a performance for the Sabbath and the Holy Day services is limited; there is a small rota of such experts and they take it in turns to lead prayers. A true Belzer would also be pleased to note that on feast days the Montreal Hassidim eat fish in the traditional way, without benefit of cutlery, and that on the eighth day of Passover the hymn *Haarefnu* is sung at the beginning and at the end of the day.[25] On the other hand, he would also note some lapses: none of those who read the portion of the law on the Sabbath wears a *shtraimel*; and on Holy Days the reader does not put his prayer shawl above his fur hat (since he does not wear a fur hat). These practices are faithfully followed both in Jerusalem and in Antwerp.

But such details, according to the Montreal Hassidim, are of secondary importance. Loyalty to Judaism is wholeheartedly total, and Hassidic traditions are generally preserved. For instance, at morning services both prayer shawls and phylacteries are as large and as distinctive in appearance as they are in Antwerp, and an appreciable number of members—especially the Hassidim among them—use two sets of phylacteries, *Rashis tfilen* and *Rabenu Tams tfilen* (the difference between them is in the order of the Pentateuch verses); the last meal of the Sabbath and the prayer of *melave malke* are occasions of true Hassidic observance, with the congregants singing in unison. On Saturday mornings, before prayers, there is an unmistakable Hassidic atmosphere: the faithful gather as a family around the coffee cups (the brew has been kept hot since the previous day), and one of the men may quote a commentary on a religious text by a Belzer *rebbe* or by another master. The congregants also go in large numbers, and frequently, to the ritual bath (*mikve*); although some Ashkenazim question the propriety of doing so on the Sabbath and cite the views of the Hsam Soifer (Hatam Sofer) on the matter. The preparation and baking of unleavened bread for Passover is a communal enterprise, in which both the young and adult members join.

The religious structure is certainly permeated by Hassidism (and especially by some practices peculiar to the Belzer), but it also has

marked orthodox characteristics. As we saw above, the cult of a *rebbe* in the Montreal community does not appear to be the cohesive force it is in Antwerp. On the other hand, Belzer Hassidim, Ashkenazim, followers of the rabbi of Papa, and others, have some common beliefs and practices and they are certainly united in their adherence to religious traditions. Nevertheless, it is the Hassidic pattern of values and behaviour which predominates and which is taught to the children at school—this is surely a most important matter. Ashkenazi modes of behaviour are perfectly acceptable, but they are at the same time penalized; this is most clear in the case of personal appearance. Within the wider Canadian society, Ashkenazim are not as clearly recognizable as are Hassidim: they are less distinctively Jewish, and their aspect reflects a more ambiguous attitude.

Slightly over half the total number of adult male members of the Montreal community were born in Hungary: 55 per cent; another 12 per cent were born in Slovakia. Moreover, a large number of young men who are their sons were born between 1946 and 1951, and they can be considered as of the same origin as their fathers; they swell the percentage to 95.[26] The number of those who are neither Hungarian nor Slovakian is therefore almost negligible; it includes only one Galician, who has fathered sixteen children (all by the same wife), a feat unequalled by any other member of the community; a Bielorussian; a German; and an Alsatian. Most of the young people under the age of twenty were born in Montreal.

The majority of the older members of the group were born in small provincial towns of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants;[27] these towns had Jewish populations which were strongly orthodox—they were outside the eastern areas where Hassidism had established itself since the nineteenth century.[28] The members, be they Ashkenazim or Hassidim, have a large number of children; there are two households with 12 children each, one with 13, and one with 16; in several others there are eight or nine children. In homes where the father is over 30 years old, there is an average number of five children; where he is under 30, there seems to be at least the same degree of fertility (three children per household at that stage). The group is certainly more fertile than other Canadian Jews.[29]

As for occupational distribution, Table 1 shows that there is some diversification; more than three-quarters of adult male members are engaged in four trades or professions: occupations associated with religious practice, food, textiles, and luxury goods (such as crystal, jewelry cases, and diamonds in one case only).

The proportion of self-employed is almost exactly half the total: 51 per cent; the men are, in order of numerical importance, merchants, manufacturers, shopkeepers, and craftsmen. One-third of the wage-earners are office workers, mainly supervisors and storekeepers; there

arc no accountants or secretaries; but the majority of the salaried staff work for religious institutions, as teachers in Jewish schools, ritual slaughterers, and officials (including, of course, the rabbi). In fact, the religious sector provides paid work for the largest single group of wage-earners (23 per cent). There are only two men among the self-employed who are engaged in occupations connected with the practice of Judaism: a *soifer* or scribe (of phylacteries) and a retailer of religious books and accessories. Moreover, there are other occupations which are closely linked to religious practice, such as the manufacture of cloth skull-caps (for sale to Jews who wear them only on special occasions,

TABLE 1. *Gainful occupations*

	Number	Percentage
Religious occupations	16	26
Food	14	23
Luxury articles	12	20
Textiles	8	13
Building trades	4	6
Leather goods	2	3
Customs clearance	2	3
Furrier	1	2
Mechanic	1	2
Ironmonger	1	2
Total	61	100

TABLE 2. *Socio-economic status*

Wage-earners	%	Self-employed	%
Employees of Jewish Institutions	23	Merchants	20
Office workers	16	Manufacturers	13 *
Manual workers	10	Shopkeepers	10
		Craftsmen	8
Total	49	*Total*	51

such as a *barmitzvah*), but especially the food industry. Twelve of the 14 men in this category deal in kasher goods: six in bakeries and pastry shops; three as grocers; and one each as butcher, milkman, and cheese importer. In effect, therefore, almost half the men (45 per cent) are engaged in occupations of a religious nature, or with the supply of ritually acceptable food and religious goods. (In Antwerp, only about a quarter of the men were thus employed.) This occupational distribution is strikingly different from that of the whole of Montreal Jewry, who are engaged largely in secular trades and professions.

The employees of religious institutions (school-teachers, slaughterers, etc.) are all Hassidim, while those engaged in the manufacture and sale of food are equally divided between Hassidim and Ashkenazim. In the religious sector earnings are comparatively low: weekly wages are \$100–\$125, which is the rate of pay of a semi-skilled workman. Among the self-employed the only well-to-do men are Ashkenazim;

they are Moshe's business partner, two owners of another large bakery-confectionery (with six retail outlets), and the importer of kasher cheese. Most of the men engaged in the religious sector (or in occupations closely related to religious practice) must be pious Jews, for such behaviour is expected of them by those with whom they have dealings. Moreover, where the sale of kasher foodstuffs is concerned, the Montreal Jewish Community Council is said to take into account personal orthodoxy before it grants its seal of approval to retailers.

Half of those employed in luxury goods are engaged in the manufacture of jewelry cases: the owner of the business and his two sons, as well as four employees. In the secular sector, there are slightly fewer wage-earners than self-employed. These Jewish wage-earners are paid better than Gentiles working for the same employer: they earn a minimum of $2.50–$3.00 an hour. Among wage-earners there are as many Ashkenazim as Hassidim. Two-thirds of those in the secular sector are Ashkenazim, and the remaining third are Hassidim; the former are mainly self-employed well-to-do business men, while the few independent Hassidim are small earners.

Men employed in secular occupations are in the same categories as the large majority of Canadian Jewry: commerce and industry;[30] moreover, they are in traditionally Jewish specialities: textiles, luxury goods, crafts, etc. Their jobs take them daily some distance from their place of residence (which is, of course, close to their religious institutions), but on the whole they are still able to practise their chosen traditionally religious way of life. As we saw, almost half the men (45 per cent) are engaged in occupations which are religiously oriented and which require them to be pious. The economic structure of the community thus generally favours and sustains traditional Judaism. It is striking that the religious bipolarity of Hassidim and Ashkenazim has its economic counterpart: the former are mainly wage-earners in occupations associated with religious practice and their salaries are modest, while the latter are mainly in secular occupations, are mainly self-employed, and have higher earnings.

However, in spite of this religious and economic bipolarity, Ashkenazim and Hassidim have fairly harmonious relations. The former are well represented in the community's Council, which is made up of three clean-shaven men and three with untrimmed beards. There are few disagreements about religious services. Members also readily agree to be ruled by their council's decision, and the general meetings are normally of brief duration: they exist so that the faithful may be kept informed, not so that they may democratically express their opinions. Here the personality of the rabbi is of major importance. He is reputed to have good relations with the influential members of both the Ashkenazi and Hassidic segments, and he certainly has prestige. Another factor making for consensus is that two of the six executive members of the

community council, an Ashkenazi and a Hassid, have each a large circle of dependents or associates. The Hassid is Moshe, who has four sons-in-law, a son, and a nephew (all adult members of the congregation), who are all devout Belzer; Moshe is also the employer of the community's *gabe* (administrator) and, as we know, he is also in partnership with a well-to-do Ashkenazi. He is therefore at the centre of a whole nexus of persons linked by kinship and economic ties.

On the Ashkenazi side there is Shmil, who manufactures jewelry cases; he came to Montreal in 1949 with some capital and he was one of the *shtibel*'s founders in 1952. He has two adult sons who work with him; both went to study at the Belzer yeshiva in Jerusalem, but neither is a Hassid. On the other hand, the elder son takes a great interest in community activities and works in close liaison with the rabbi. Shmil also has two sons-in-law and four employees; thus there are at least eight distinct households in his sphere of influence.

But Shmil and Moshe are not the only dominant personalities. There are others, mostly Ashkenazim, who have some prestige either because they are very active in community affairs or because they devote a great deal of time to Talmudic learning and teaching. The leaders take pains not to behave ostentatiously or to appear arrogant (in contrast to the situation in Antwerp). During Sabbath services Moshe sits unpretentiously at the back of the prayer-room rather than in the more prestigious position by the eastern wall near the Holy Ark. As for Shmil, I discovered only indirectly that he paid for the heating of the *shtibel* out of his own pocket. The same restraint is seen when bids are made publicly for the privilege of reading a portion of the law on the Sabbath and on Holy Days. The bids are made so discreetly that it is almost impossible for an outsider to recognize the bidders. As a rule, it is usually the well-to-do Ashkenazim who pay for the honour of reading a portion of the Law; but often they then surrender the privilege in favour of less affluent Hassidim or Ashkenazim. In this way, on the Saturday before Passover 1971, Shmil paid for a number of young adolescents to be called up to pray; they had come home on leave from the various yeshivas at which they studied. This type of generosity is appreciated and endows the donors with prestige as well as self-esteem.

There is also little doubt that it is the Ashkenazim who contribute the major share of the finance necessary to keep the communal enterprises going: the annual budget (including the school's expenses) is $75,000–$80,000, or an average of about $1,000 for each male householder; but, comments the Ashkenazi member who is in charge of financial affairs, 'a large number of wage-earners do not pay even $500 a year'.

Since, clearly, the community's affairs are largely dependent on Ashkenazi economic help, and the Ashkenazim know it, why do they accept values and norms imposed by the Hassidim? The explanation they themselves give most frequently is that theirs is a truly observant

community, that this is of major importance, and that such piety cannot easily be found elsewhere. On the other hand, there are other socio-cultural factors which draw the two segments together. Ashkenazim and Hassidim not only share the same general background, but also the status of immigrants in a large metropolis where Hungarian and Slovakian Jews (and especially the orthodox among them) are few in number.[31] Furthermore, those able Ashkenazim who play a prominent role in communal affairs are rewarded by honours and prestige, which compensate them for the concessions they make to Hassidic practice. It is also worth noting that the community's Ashkenazi and Hassidic values harmonize with a very conservative economic and political ideology in secular matters, and favour the affluent (who are predominantly Ashkenazim). In fact, both segments of the community take the capitalist society and its values for granted, and there does not appear to be any conflict between their religious and their economic values—indeed, they march together. I attended a Talmudic course of several lessons dealing with extracts from *Baba Metsia* which are devoted to commercial practice; the course was given by the rabbi, and it was attended mainly by well-to-do Ashkenazim with a sprinkling of Hassidic wage-earners. The rabbi would often explain certain passages and comment on them with illustrations drawn from the economic activities of his wealthy congregants.

Politics is not the most popular subject of conversation, but when the matter arises it is certainly discussed in conservative terms. For all the members of the community, the United States is a political and economic model; if anything is wrong with the system, it is an excess of tolerance of hippies, Blacks, the Left, etc. As for the province in which they live, the men more or less consciously identify with the English-speaking minority who by and large still hold the reins of economic power in Montreal; they are hostile to the Parti Québecois, the main opposition separatist party, because they consider it to be 'socialist'.

Of course, the patriarchal and paternalistic community organization, in which the authorities (rabbi, *gabe*, executive committee) are deeply respected, suits the conservative and affluent members very well. Moreover, respect for authority is probably an old traditional attitude of Hungarian and Slovakian Jews.

It may be of interest to conclude the study of this Montreal community with a brief comparison between it and its sister community in Antwerp; the religious, social, and economic structures of the two communities are very similar and even isomorphic. We have seen that in the Montreal case religious attitudes are distributed between two poles: Hassidic and Ashkenazi (in the special sense of 'traditionally orthodox') and are related to general socio-economic differences. The Hassidic pole is that of the men in the poorer, wage-earning, and reli-

gious occupations, while at the Ashkenazi pole cluster the better-off, self-employed, members of the community in secular occupations. A similar bipolar structure is found in Antwerp. While the community there is by definition Hassidic in its prevailing values and behaviour, yet some of its members deviate in the direction of normal orthodox practice. And again there is a connexion between the religious and economic structures. Traditional schoolteachers, the retailers of kasher food, and the like, display more Hassidic conduct, while it is among the diamond brokers and business men (that is, among men in the secular, better-off, and self-employed occupations) that we find the deviations towards normal orthodoxy. The chief difference between Montreal and Antwerp lies in the fact that the pattern just described is associated in the former case with a common Ashkenazi past, while in Antwerp it is connected with a difference in origin: Hungarian or Galician—the latter being the better-off and more deviant element.

The bipolar and sometimes dichotomous religious structures represent an open compromise in Montreal, but only a covert one in Antwerp. In both cities the compromise ensures financial and practical advantages to the Hassidic party, and furnishes cultural, social, and even ideological motivations to the more orthodox. Traditional and deviant attitudes have to co-exist, especially since the latter, through some forms of ambiguous behaviour (for example, in dress and physical appearance), allow a mode of adaptation to society at large, to the benefit of the community in the satisfaction of its great financial needs. Of course, the gap between norms and deviant behaviour is narrow: and this narrowness distinguishes the Montreal Belzer community from the Klausenberger, a difference again associated with a difference in economic situation.

The general patterns of the Antwerp and Montreal communities have of course been affected by both synchronic and diachronic factors. For instance, in Antwerp the stronger cult of the Belzer dynasty operates as a mechanism to compensate for the greater diversity of the origins of the members of the community. In Montreal, the common Ashkenazi and western Hungarian (in a few cases Slovakian) background makes up for a weaker charismatic integration. In both cities the economic structure works in a compensatory fashion within the framework of different overall situations: in Antwerp, while a quarter of the occupations are religious in character, the secular economic activities are for the most part connected with the predominantly Jewish diamond industry, and the Belzer Hassidim work close to home and *shtibel*; in Montreal the secular occupations are rather diverse and some members of the community work outside the Jewish neighbourhoods, but at the same time almost half of the members are engaged in activities of a religious character, which presupposes conformity with religious norms.

The bipolar constitution of the two communities has allowed them to function smoothly enough for a good many years—since 1946 in Antwerp and since 1952 in Montreal. It is important to take note of the fact that this structure has not sprung inevitably from the circumstances of a long-established local community (as in an old Galician or Hungarian town), but has arisen upon the basis of common voluntary action. Of course, this voluntary action arose in both Antwerp and Montreal from the fact that all partners to it shared many values and goals; but we may note that each party to the bipolar system was too small to form its own communal entity by itself. Contrast with the situation in Montreal that in Williamsburg, New York, where the Belzer Hassidim and the followers of the Papa rabbi (both much more numerous than in Montreal) have each their own communities, *shtibel*, and talmudic schools. Further analysis might possibly reveal that within each of these groups in Williamsburg there is again a bipolar structure founded on the same bases we have discovered in the case of Montreal and Antwerp.

We may go further and speculate on the possibility that patterns with a strong family resemblance to those we have been discussing are to be found in present-day Jewish suburban communities, as in the United States. Seymour Leventman writes:[32]

> Upwardly mobile and wealthy Jews needed community workers to guarantee them a status audience, while the latter needed successful Jews to provide a setting and the money for their professional activities. Thus, this persistent alliance between affluent Jews and community workers is a symbiotic one reaffirming mutual ethnic identity and strengthening communal bonds.

The author adds that this situation is consonant with middle-class American values. In fact, in the case of the Montreal Hassidic community, still close to its centuries-old roots, we are able to see how Judaism, Hassidic and orthodox, as the main source of Jewishness and ethnic identity, is connected with a typical economic structure and middle-class ideology.

NOTES

[1] See Jacques Gutwirth, *Vie juive traditionelle: Ethnologie d'une communauté hassidique*, Paris, 1970; and 'Antwerp Jewry Today', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968.

[2] Cf. Georges Cerlcbaud Salagnac, ed., *Canada*, Les Guides Bleus, Paris, 1967, p. 131.

[3] There were 102,724 Jews returned at the 1961 Census; see Louis Rosenberg, *The Jewish Community in Canada, 1931–1961*, Canadian Jewish Population Studies, Canadian Jewish Congress, Montreal 1965, p. 3. The number has certainly increased since 1961.

[4] See André Leroi-Gourhan, *Le Geste et la parole, II, La mémoire et les rythmes*, Paris, 1965, pp. 82–83.

[5] I arrived at these figures on the basis of regular attendance on an ordinary Sabbath; they agree with the approximate estimates by the community's leaders. Nobody can give an exact number, since there is no fixed criterion

for participation or attendance. Some people attend the *shtibel* irregularly, usually because they take part in the life of another Hassidic community—but there are not more than five or six such individuals. The personal names mentioned in this paper are fictitious.

[6] Louis Rosenberg, *Changes in the Jewish Population in the Old Area of Jewish Settlement in Montreal . . . in the period from 1951 to 1957*, Canadian Jewish Congress Research Paper no. 3, Montreal, 1958, p. 2. The *shtibel* of the Belzer Hassidim is situated about half a mile from that corner. For a description of the atmosphere of the district, see Mordecai Richler, *The Street*, Toronto, 1969.

[7] Only 20·8 per cent did so in 1961 (about 21,300 persons); the number had certainly decreased by 1971. In 1921, 87·4 per cent of Montreal's 45,927 Jews lived in the district. See Louis Rosenberg, *Changes in the Geographical Distribution of the Jewish Population of Metropolitan Montreal . . . from 1901 to 1961 and the Estimated Possible Changes . . . from 1961 to 1971*, Canadian Jewish Congress Research Paper A, no. 7, Montreal, 1966, p. 2.

[8] See Solomon Poll, *The Hasidic Community of Williamsburg*, Glencoe, Ill., 1962, p. 16.

[9] Hassidic ritual is inspired by the traditions initiated by Isaac Luria and his school in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For the chief differences between Hassidic and Ashkenazi ritual, see H. J. Zimmels, *Ashkenazim and Sephardim*, London, 1958, pp. 119–121, 326.

[10] He is a grandson of the celebrated 'Sanzer' *rebbe*. He is famous as an organizer and administrator of religious institutions, at first in Displaced Persons camps, and later, in Williamsburg and in Israel. See Jerome R. Mintz, *Legends of the Hasidim, An introduction to Hasidic Culture and Oral Tradition in the New World*, Chicago, 1968, p. 89 n. 2 and p. 195.

[11] See Gutwirth, *Vie juive . . .*, op. cit., ch. 3.

[12] Op. cit., pp. 43–44.

[13] See Louis Rosenberg, 'The Demography of the Jewish Community in Canada', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. I, no. 2, December 1959, p. 230.

[14] Cf. Louis Rosenberg, *Changes in the Geographical Distribution . . .*, op. cit., p. 5.

[15] This is the figure quoted by Oscar Stromberg in *The Cultural Factor in Case Work with Immigrants, A Case Study of Five Immigrant Families of the Jewish Orthodox Cultural Pattern . . .*, unpublished Master's thesis, University of Montreal, 1956, p. 13. His use of the term 'Jewish Orthodox Cultural Pattern' covers both Hassidim and orthodox Ashkenazim.

[16] For Hassidism in Satmar, see Israel Rubin, *Contemporary Satmar: A study in Social Control and Change*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms no. 66–10,086, 1966.

[17] See Mintz, op. cit., p. 154.

[18] Cf. J. Legare, 'La population juive de Montréal est-elle victime d'une ségrégation qu'elle se serait elle-même imposée?', *Recherches Sociographiques*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1965, p. 323.

[19] See Stromberg, op. cit., pp. 117–18, 123, 137, 138, 139; and S. Endler, *The Prevention of Hard Core Cases among Immigrant Displaced Persons*, unpublished Master's thesis, School of Social Work, McGill University, Montreal, 1952, p.106.

[20] Op. cit., p. 211.

[21] Cf. Joseph Margoshes, 'Upholder of the Faith: The Rebbe of Belz', in Lucy S. Dawidowicz, ed., *The Golden Tradition*, Boston, 1967, p. 195; and Harry M. Rabinowicz, *The World of Hasidism*, London, 1970, p. 127.

[22] He was born in Frankfurt in 1763; he was a rabbi in Pressburg (Bratislava) for many years, and he died in that town in 1839.

[23] Rubin, op. cit., p. 56, notes that Hungarian Hassidim are less 'Dionysian' than those of Galicia or the Ukraine.

[24] I visited it in 1971. See also Mintz, op. cit., pp. 43–47.

[25] Cf. Gutwirth, *Vie juive . . .*, op. cit., pp. 216, 269–70.

[26] Demographic data were collected in the course of the field work, with as much care as was possible in the circumstances. They are neither exhaustive, nor are they based on a random sample. Nevertheless they deal with the large majority of the members of the community, and I do not think that any segment has been either ignored or overestimated. The percentages and numbers given here may not be absolutely accurate, but I believe that they give a fair picture of the constitution of the community.

[27] The same is true of the Antwerp Belzer Hassidim. See my *Vie juive . .*, op. cit., p. 62. In Montreal the adult males were born in a variety of towns: Papa, Gyor, Bonhyad, Szombathely, Paks,

Csorna, Sarvar, Soltwadkert, Eger, Mickolc, Satorljaujhely, and Budapest, in Hungary; and in Slovakia, in Bratislava, Košice, Lučenec, and Topolčany.

[28] Rubin, op. cit., pp. 52–53.

[29] See Rosenberg, 'The Demography . . .', op. cit., p. 227; and his *The Jewish Community in Canada* . . ., op. cit., p. 16.

[30] See Rosenberg, *The Jewish Community* . . ., op. cit., p. 14.

[31] In the 1961 Canadian Census, the percentage of Jews born in Poland was 13·4; those born in Russia, 9·4; and in Hungary, a bare 2·7. See Rosenberg, *The Jewish Community* . . ., op. cit., p. iv.

[32] Seymour Leventman, 'From Shtetl to Suburb', in Peter I. Rose, ed., *The Ghetto and Beyond*, New York, 1969, p. 44.

THE IDENTITY OF JEWS IN
AN ENGLISH CITY

Sydney Harris

TH E point hardly needs labouring that it is difficult to identify Jews in Britain. They obviously do not all hold the same Jewish values and play the same Jewish roles. Neither legally nor socially can they easily be disentangled from the English population of which they form a part. Yet many people, Jews and non-Jews alike, believe and act as though the Jews can be distinguished from other groups in the same way as Englishmen can be distinguished from, say, Germans or Russians. And some people, again both Jewish and non-Jewish, think and behave as though there existed an essential quality of Jewishness, an unchanging essence.

The piece of research reported upon in this paper[1] was designed to discover, within the context of a city in the south-western part of England, whether in fact Jews behave differently from non-Jews and think of themselves as different; and to account for the differences discovered. I was also interested in finding out whether the Jews I studied live in a marginal situation and whether, if the outside observer found no such situation, the Jews under study experience some marginality.

As the research progressed I became increasingly aware of a discrepancy of the latter sort: the respondents held stereotyped ideas about themselves and non-Jews which were incompatible with reality as defined by the observer. They might not be living in a marginal situation,[2] but they nevertheless responded as if they did. Finally, I investigated the rather different question whether the Jews I studied can be said to live in what has been called a 'marginal culture'.[3] Such a culture forms an area within which members of a group may live despite the fact that the 'marginal culture' does not embrace the total culture of a society. The 'marginal culture' provides the individual with norms and standardized behaviour patterns; it allows him forms of participation in group activities and an opportunity to express his own cultural interests; and so gives him a sense of security which the marginal man, in the classical formulation, does not have.

It was clearly not possible for me to sample statistically the 'total'

Jewish population of the city. After discarding unworkable plans to get at non-practising Jews through names listed in the telephone directory, I came to the conclusion that the membership lists of the two synagogues in the city would furnish me with a basic sampling frame from which to draw a random sample (of Orthodox and Liberal Jews) that would make it possible to trace, through their ties with synagogue Jews, many of the Jews in the area who were not themselves members of synagogues.

As things turned out, I was able to obtain a full membership list only from the Orthodox synagogue; from the Liberal synagogue I got the names of six members. As a result, I decided to build up my sample by the pyramiding method, one respondent leading on to new ones. I started by asking the chairmen of the two synagogues to suggest the names of people who would be prepared to answer questions on 'Jewish identity'. An advantage of the method was that by this means I was able, through following links into outlying areas, to study the effects upon Jews of living in isolation from other Jews. But the disadvantage of the method will be clear: because the sample is not random, I cannot say how representative it is, and, although I did my best to guard against this bias by choosing respondents from among the Orthodox, the Liberal, and the non-practising Jews, I cannot be sure that I was not channelled in my enquiries along certain routes.

I used a semi-structured and discursive method of interviewing. I saw the respondents in their homes, recording the conversations on tape (except for one respondent who refused me permission to use my tape-recorder: in his case I wrote down his replies). Only two individuals among all those I approached refused to be interviewed.

The sample consisted of 55 respondents, of whom 50 identified themselves as Jews in response to my enquiry. The remaining five were non-Jewish wives of Jews; three were Anglicans, one was an agnostic, and the other was an atheist. Twenty-six Jewish respondents (13 male and 13 female) were members of the Orthodox synagogue; 16 (nine men and seven women) were members of the Liberal synagogue; and eight (five men and three women) were non-practising Jews. Except for two unmarried doctors resident in a hospital, and one unmarried respondent who lived in a flat, I interviewed respondents in 26 households.

There were 24 households with children; the total number of these children was 59. The (rounded) mean number of children per household was 2·5. The mean age of the children was 12·6 years, and the mean age of the respondents was 39·7 years (males were 42·4 years and females 37·5).

In comparison with their fathers the respondents, male and female, manifested upward economic mobility, and in addition I found evidence of that diversification of occupations among Jews which has

been noted in other studies.[4] While 46 per cent of the respondents are higher or lower professionals, only 20 per cent of their fathers were in these occupational categories. Whereas 33 per cent of the fathers were independent business men employing fewer than 25 persons, only 22 per cent of the respondents are in that category. Only 10 per cent of the respondents are skilled or unskilled manual workers, while 40 per cent of their fathers were in these occupations. This is clear evidence of upward occupational mobility. There has been a reduction in the numbers engaged in the 'traditional' Jewish occupations and an increase in professional occupations.

Jewishness provides the respondents with the cohesive force which binds them together. Objectively, it comprises their ritual observances, and subjectively, their Jewish self-consciousness. It is an important fact to be emphasized that in this city Jewishness is not to any great extent a matter of ritual observance; indeed, it is only a limited part of the Jewishness I found there. The essence of the respondents' Jewishness is their consciousness of kind: their belief that they belong to a separate group and that they are different from non-Jews.[5]

The degree of self-consciousness I found is all the more remarkable in that it could be argued from my evidence that objective differences between the respondents and non-Jews are barely discernible. The important point to be stressed is that while their behaviour is almost identical with that of non-Jews, the respondents nevertheless believe that they are different from them.

In terms of the objective criteria of Jewishness, my findings indicate a considerable degree of acculturation among the members of the sample, and a falling away from religious observance in comparison with their parents. Few of the respondents can be said to be motivated by Judaic religious values. In this they are similar to Gentiles in Britain, few of whom can be said to be motivated by Christian religious values.

On prima facie grounds alone one would expect a weaker religiosity among Jews in south-west England, because they and some of their parents chose to live away from the main Jewish settlements in London, Leeds, Liverpool, and Manchester, where it is relatively easier to practise Jewish ritual observance. Almost 53 per cent of the Jewish respondents have lived in the city and its environs for less than nine years. Thus at least this number recently chose to become domiciled in an area where it would be relatively more difficult to live as a practising religious Jew than it is in the larger Jewish centres.

Most of the respondents tend to treat the Sabbath as a day of leisure and a 'public' holiday, and as an opportunity for bringing the family together. Nearly half of them (46 per cent) do not light candles; 74 per cent do not make *kiddush*, 88 per cent smoke, 84 per cent do not attend the synagogue, and 82 per cent work and cook on the Sabbath. Only one respondent does not travel on the Sabbath.

The observance of festivals has polarized around the celebration of Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah and of the Passover and Hanukah. Sixty-eight per cent of the Jewish respondents say that they stay away from work during Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah, and 62 per cent say that they observe the fast. Passover observance is in most cases either attendance at a *seder* in a restaurant (for the Liberals) or at one or both *sedarim* at home, and the eating of *matzot*. Only 20 per cent say that they change pots and crockery for Pessah, but 48 per cent say that they eat *matzot*.

Hanukah observance is in most cases merely the lighting of candles in the *menorah*, although 10 out of the 16 Liberals whom I interviewed say that they attend the Hanukah service in the synagogue. Since Hanukah is connected with the revolt of the Maccabees, the motivation for observance might be said to be nationalistic rather than religious. On the other hand, Hanukah candles and the celebration of the festival might be seen either as the Jewish mode of celebrating Christmas, or as serving the function of preventing Jews from celebrating Christmas. But one could also argue that in so far as Hanukah does function as 'the Jewish Christmas', it is a sign of accommodation to the norms of British society.

The respondents reported a decline in *kashrut* observance as compared with their parents. Seventy-two per cent of the parents of Jewish-born respondents observed *kashrut* at home and 46 per cent observed it also when eating out; the corresponding figures for the respondents themselves were 33 per cent and 19 per cent. In addition, the strength of *kashrut* observance must be measured against the manner in which it has been re-interpreted by respondents. It has come to mean the purchase of *kasher* meat for home consumption and the avoidance of certain prohibited foods inside and outside the home. Some of the respondents interpret it further to mean the use of separate utensils for meat and milk products. All those who observed the dietary laws within these limits were members of the Orthodox synagogue, who by their re-interpretation of *kashrut* observance might be said to have moved towards the position of the Liberal and non-practising respondents.

The sort of religious observance reported by the respondents was far removed from the traditional Judaism practised by those eastern Europeans who came to the United Kingdom before the First World War. It is a form of observance adapted to an advanced and secularized industrial society—pragmatic and utilitarian and based on an 'ethic of responsibility' rather than on an 'ethic of ultimate ends'. From the evidence it would seem that the 'cost' of religious observance to the respondents was minimal[6] and that religious ritual is not the central factor of their Jewishness. Thus in terms of religious role-playing I found a weakened Jewish identity, and in some cases barely discern-

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ible differences between the behaviour of respondents and that of Gentiles. My findings are similar to those of Sklare and Greenblum in the Lakeville Studies; they noted that among the younger generation of American Jews there is an increased emphasis on Hanukah and the Passover *seder*. They also found a 'sharply decreased observance of the dietary laws'.[7]

But despite the evidence of a weak religiosity, the majority of the respondents wish to perpetuate their Jewishness through their children. The Jewish socialization of their children through circumcision, Hebrew lessons, and *barmitzvah* was considered of crucial importance by most of the parents. Out of a total of 34 boys, 25 had been circumcised, 22 had received or were receiving Hebrew lessons, and three more would do when of age. All would be or had already been *barmitzvah*. Out of a total of 25 girls, 12 had received or were receiving Hebrew lessons, and five more would do so when of age, while another five were to go through the *barmitzvah* ceremony.

However, although parents attach great importance to the religious education of their children, the quality of that education is not high. The Liberal congregation is too small to support a professional Hebrew teacher. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that Hebrew classes in the Orthodox synagogue were characterized by indiscipline and antipathy on the part of the children and a lack of interest by some parents. In this case there might be some validity in Rosenthal's assertion that Jewish education tends to implant Jewish self-consciousness rather than Judaism, 'to inoculate the next generation with that minimum of religious practice and belief that is considered necessary to keep alive a level of Jewish self-consciousness that will hold the line against assimilation.'[8] But even if we allow what is implied in this quotation about the content of Jewish education, nevertheless, the stress laid upon the religious training of their children by most of the respondents showed that they considered themselves as possessing a separate Jewish identity which they wished to perpetuate in the next generation.

If I found evidence of a decline in religiosity, I also found a large amount of evidence of Jewish self-consciousness, of a feeling of separateness which I consider to be at the root of the respondents' Jewishness —their Jewish identity, the components of which I shall now describe.

The large majority of those interviewed reported that they feel different from Gentiles. Significantly, almost all the non-practising are included in this category. Respondents said:

'I have an inner feeling that I am different from non-Jews. My non-Jewish friends are bound to treat me as different.'
'I feel separate when they discuss, say, colour prejudice. I feel that if I wasn't there, they'd talk about me. I feel more at home with Jews. I feel

separate just because I'm Jewish. It's the sort of thing that people look down on.'

'I feel different sometimes. I feel Jewish.'

'At work we talk about religion quite a lot and then I feel different because they know I'm Jewish.'

'I feel different in Reading, but I don't feel different [here]. I have more Jewish friends in Reading and I feel more Jewish with them and more different from non-Jews. It isn't so [here].'

'When you're with non-Jews, obviously, you're dealing with a different type of person.'

'Sometimes people come here to this house and they look around, and they wonder whether we have any secret signs, whether we have any outlandish things, or whether we eat unusual food—and that sort of thing—because it's a Jewish household.'

'I feel that I could go and have tea with the Queen and it wouldn't worry me. I feel that I could be as good as her, whereas lots of non-Jews live in awe of other people.'

'You have a common spirit with Jews, a kindred spirit. You go into a Jewish home, and you're not in there long before they offer you something to drink and eat. They're hospitable. But you go into a non-Jewish home and they stand on ceremony, and your tongue can hang out before you get anything. There's always some reserve. You can't get any further.'

'A Jew couldn't go to Sandhurst.'

'I feel different—the same as a coloured person feels.'

'It's there, they can be friendly. But at the back of my mind I think this friendship is false.'

'If I have a non-Jewish person in the house I can't make the same kind of conversation with him as with a Jew, even if I don't know the Jew. I feel more at ease with a Jew.'

'We put more of an accent on things like food. I think non-Jewish people are a lot more inclined to go and get it out of a tin. I know I cook at least six times as much as any non-Jewish person I know.'

'Next door we've seen the fellow come home after a hard day's work and if I had the meal he had . . .'

'I think Jewish people in the main think money is a means to an end, whereas non-Jewish people think money is an end. You can sleep with an Englishman's wife, you can do anything but take his money. But with a Jewish person money doesn't mean that much.'

'I'm conscious all the time that I'm different.'

'There are certain inherent characteristics in the Jewish make-up which don't exist amongst Gentiles.'

'Most Jews have very intelligent eyes. Most Jews have oblong faces.'

'I feel that the Jewish person has different ideas of how to go about things. In business, I like to go round things, whereas an Englishman wouldn't see the way round. He'd want to go directly through.'

'I can tell a Jewish person by the back of his head. The hairline is different in a Jewish person. If you lined up 100 men and 50 of them were Jewish I'll bet you that I could pick out 40 of these 50 by the backs of

their heads. A lot of Jewish people with dark hair have definitely got a characteristic hair line and neck' (a hairdresser).

'For years I don't feel different, then something happens that makes me feel different. I have to go abroad and all my colleagues put down Caucasian on the form, but I thought, "I'm different from them—I'm Semitic." At that moment, I felt a gap.'

'Lots of people when they come to the door say, "What's this?" referring to the *mezuzah*. I say, "It's our equivalent of the Christian's Lord's Prayer, and it means that it's a Jewish household and we're Jewish." And I look at them—at their faces—to see what happens when I say that. Putting myself in their place, I can imagine what goes on in their minds. Everything they've heard about Jews is bad—from Shylock the Jew to religious instruction classes; so instinctively they think we're odd and we're different.'

In answer to my question whether excluding his son from religious instruction at school would make him feel separate, a respondent replied, 'He *is* separate.'

'In a crowded room I sometimes think, "Do they know I'm Jewish?" I feel people are entitled to know I'm Jewish because it might alter their behaviour.'

'Having mixed with Jewish people and coming away from them I don't feel that I belong [among non-Jews].'

'I feel different because I feel part of a fairly old tradition.'

One way of feeling different from members of another group is to feel superior to them. I found evidence that 82 per cent of the respondents feel superior to Gentiles, as can be inferred from a number of the quotations above. I have also listed the areas where the respondents feel superior to non-Jews, although every respondent does not feel superior on every count.

Jews are more self-possessed than non-Jews.
Jews are more hospitable than non-Jews.
Jews have a higher standard of living than non-Jews.
Jews are less instrumentally involved with money than non-Jews.
Jews are superior in business to non-Jews.
Jewish family life is better than non-Jewish family life.
Jewish parents care more for their children than non-Jewish parents, particularly in matters of education.
Jews are more generous than non-Jews.
Jews are warm; non-Jews are cold.
Jews have a stronger moral conscience than non-Jews.
Jews are more sensitive than non-Jews.
Non-Jews are less controlled than Jews over alcohol.
Jews are cleverer than non-Jews.
Jews are a unique race and have made a unique contribution to humanity.
Jews are more ambitious than non-Jews.
Jews are more upright in business dealings than non-Jews.
Jewish husbands treat their wives better than non-Jewish husbands treat their wives.

Jewish wives have higher standards than non-Jewish wives.
Jews are more conscientious than non-Jews.
Jews are more civilized and kindly than non-Jews.
Jews have a greater fighting instinct than non-Jews.

The following is a selection of quotations illustrating the feeling of superiority.

'Jewish parents are better to their children. They go to any length to give them an advantage. They're willing to deny themselves so that their children can have a chance.'

'Jewish parents are more conscious of education. I think they encourage their children more. I think you get more discussion in the home, and this stimulates the mind and gives you a thirst for knowledge.'

'I'm proud to belong to a race that has survived generations. It's a unique race that has given the world many of its fundamentals. The world is jealous of our genius and has persecuted us.'

'Jews are more go-getting than non-Jews.'

'I think on the whole we're a more ambitious group and we think far more about the future. A pint of beer is not enough to satisfy us. We're already worried about next year.'

'Non-Jews are less upright in business dealings than Jews.'

'Jews are cleverer and nicer than goys. That's why I feel superior. They just *are* cleverer.'

'A Yiddishe kop [a Jewish head]'.

'A real Jewish wife makes a home what it is. Jewish wives are much better wives. They're more thoughtful, more concerned for their husband's well-being. They don't want him to work so hard.'

'Non-Jewish wives might not expect so much materially as Jewish wives. A Jewish wife expects a more comfortable home, a higher standard of living.'

'Jews on average are more decent, civilized, and kindly.'

'I've got a different sense of values from non-Jews. I put my home and family first before anything else.'

'Our children are going to have a better upbringing than the average children of the average Gentile family round the corner.'

'Jews are warmer and more emotional than non-Jews.'

'I think they have an *easier* time, because they're a jump ahead, because they've got that much more intelligence. And they're harder workers. I've come up against many non-Jews who are intelligent—they'd give any Jew a run for his money. But they're the exception rather than the rule. The Jews are the rule rather than the exception' [in answer to my question: 'Do you think Jewish business men have a *harder* time because they're Jews?'].

'I suppose I feel superior. I've got 5,000 years. They've only got 2,000 years. This is a bit of the chosen people rubbing off on me.'

In addition, 18 per cent of the respondents manifested a feeling of difference from non-Jews in that they said that they felt a duality of

being British and being Jewish. (It should be noted that the interviews took place after the Six-Day War.) Some said:

'If England went to war with Israel there'd certainly be a split. I'd plump for Israel. I can't feel the same about the National Anthem as the English are supposed to feel.'
'The Jewish part of me responds in any situation. I'm a Jew first, then a British citizen.'
'At times I feel a stress between being British and Jewish. I feel more Jewish than British.'
'If the British government were supporting the Arabs to the detriment of Israel, I'd be disloyal. I'd subvert the British government if I could.'
'I would not stand for anything where I felt that the British government was undermining the well-being of the Jewish people.'
'I'm British to the core, but I'm Jewish first. If I had a choice of fighting for the British or the Jews, I'd obviously fight for the Jews first.'
'I'm conscious of a dual British and Jewish identity. Normally, my mind, my person trots on happily like this as a unit. Occasionally, something happens and it bifurcates immediately into two different attitudes—violently opposed attitudes—and I'm at a loss to know which one to take notice of. I think in most cases it's the Jew that wins. For instance, I'm against apartheid because I'm a Jew. As a British subject I'm against interference with the liberty of the individual. But the Jewish part of me says: "I know what they feel. I've been there. I know how they feel. This must not happen to them, what happened to us for so long." People say: "In the case of immigrants in general, we must stop them coming in because there's no work for them." The Britisher in me says: "This is true, we must safeguard our jobs." The Jew says: "Balls, this can't be allowed to happen. These are people like me." '

On the other hand, others said:

'I feel Jewish as a religion, but I feel British as a nationality.'
'I feel as angry at hearing criticisms of my being British as of hearing criticisms of my being Jewish.'
'My loyalty belongs to this country. I wouldn't be alive without this country.'
'I do feel an affinity for the Israelis. But I feel this as an Englishman feels affinity for the underdog. I don't feel for them as Jews.'
'Our biggest common aggravation is over relatives who call people Jews and English.'

I found that although a large majority of the respondents feel they are different from Gentiles, only a small proportion of them have been treated differently by non-Jews; and almost all the differential treatment occurred 20 to 30 years ago. Only nine respondents reported discriminatory treatment. One said:

'I've been told by other people that I have reached that sort of category that my friends here in local circles will say, "He is a nice boy, he's a nice chap. He's all right to get on with but he's a Jew." I've heard that

said. Not maliciously meant, with no antisemitic undertones of any kind; rather feeling a little strange of the unknown. . . . But people who don't know me still whisper to each other. You know the sort of attitude. Or they nudge each other.'

Another reported that one of his colleagues had said:

'You'll get somewhere. You've got drive. You'll go places because you have the will [as a Jew] to get on.'

He regarded this as commendatory differential treatment.

Another respondent said:

'In India, during the last war, my officer who organized horse racing out there automatically assumed that because I was a Jew I would be able to act as a bookmaker. . . . The sergeant-major in India used to play this game every Sunday. It was a regular Sunday morning panto. There were 800 men on parade and the sergeant-major would shout, "Fall out C. of E.'s. Fall out R.C.'s. Fall out Methodists, etc." This would leave me standing on my own. Then the sergeant-major would shout, "What are you then, Brown?" I would reply, "Jew, sir." '

He added that he would then be rudely ordered back to the hut, and that this was a regular weekly occurrence.

Only five out of the nine respondents reported that they had experienced discrimination at work and in leisure. One said that when she went for one of her first jobs and asked to be allowed to take Friday afternoon off, the manager said that this would be impossible and that she could not have the job. Another reported that she lost a job 12 years ago in London. She wanted time off without pay for Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah, and the manager refused to allow it. She stayed away for the three days and left the firm. A third respondent reported that he was refused a job by an insurance company because he was a Jew. He also reported that he was refused entry to the Freemasons because he was Jewish. Another said that he was refused membership of the Rotary Club and the Round Table because he was a Jew. One of the respondents played as a visitor at a golf club in Nottingham. When he wanted to become a junior member he was told not to bother; he attributes this to his being Jewish. Two others, in addition to these five, gave hearsay evidence of discrimination: one woman reported that her mother had heard that Jews were discriminated against at a famous girls' public school; and a man said that his cousin wasn't allowed to join a golf club in London because he was a Jew. Only four respondents said that they expected discrimination against themselves. One said that she expected it if she wanted to join the Conservative Party, and another if she or her husband wanted to join a golf club. Two others said:

'The fact that I'm a Jew would probably discriminate against my getting

a headship. But several of my personal characteristics might prevent my getting a headship.'
'When one tries to get a job in a university, one is always anxious about an East End boy trying to get in for medicine or something like this. At the back of one's mind one always has the view that there might be some discrimination in the selection.'

Fifty per cent of the respondents reported that they had experienced antisemitism, although most of the antisemitic experiences had not occurred recently. Only 14 per cent had experienced it within the last five years. These are some of their experiences.

'I was a scapegoat in the Forces and at school.'
'At school we were playing netball and we didn't agree, so they said, "Go back to Jerusalem." '
'I experience it in business. They call me grasping because I'm a Jew. They say my firm's grasping because it's Jewish.'
'When we refuse to exchange an article they say, "It's a Jew shop." '
'The milkman called me a mean Jew.'
'Someone said to me, "The Jews wouldn't give a cup of tea to anyone." '
'I went to a school where for most of the time I was the only Jewish girl. I can remember quite distinctly the kids saying, "Go back to your own country." It's a funny thing, since we've had our own country I've never heard it said.'
'I was walking in the street in Leeds with my wife. We were looking at shops. A chap walked by and said, "Go back to Palestine." '
'When we came into this house a neighbour said, "Of course, he [the previous owner] didn't want you to have the house when he knew you were Jews." '
'There's a form of jealousy amongst a group of people I've got involved with recently. I was helping to organize a Christmas party, and just because I mentioned I've got various things—"You can come and use my Kenwood," I said—one girl actually said, "You lucky Jew." She knew I was a Jewess.'
'I met antisemitism at university. My tutor was very scathing about the fact that I resented the non-Jews. But I didn't. I'd come from the East End to a very unfriendly city. . . . At my grammar school where I was the only Jewish girl out of 300, whenever I did anything like winning a reading prize or a drama competition, people were always saying, "You know she's Jewish." '
'There was antisemitism at school, mainly I suppose because there was a large Jewish colony there. You're bound to get a lot of racialism when there's a large proportion of that type of person. Oddly enough, I got in a way persecuted by the Jewish boys at my grammar school as well as by the others because I wasn't Orthodox.'

Sixty-eight per cent of the respondents thought antisemitism had declined since the war, but 12 per cent of the respondents believed that antisemitism cannot be cured despite their belief in its recent decline.

'Antisemitism can't be cured, because Jews are more flamboyant and different.'

'It's there just under the surface and it takes an incident to arouse it.'

'You can't cure antisemitism. It can never be cured. They instill it into the child. Such things as "The Jews killed Christ." '

'You're always going to have antisemitism. As long as you've got Jews, there'll always be antisemitism.'

'There's just as much antisemitism today as in 1939. It's still there—it's dormant.'

'Fascism could happen here.'

'There'll always be some little Hitler.'

It seems of considerable significance that such a strong feeling of separateness should exist even when few of the respondents have experienced recent antisemitism, when a majority consider that it has declined, and when few have experienced discrimination or expect it for themselves and their children.

One aspect of their Jewishness is where, when, and how often Jews identify themselves as Jews to non-Jews. It could be maintained that the more often Jews identify as Jews the greater is their Jewishness. I found that respondents said that they identified on the following occasions: to prevent antisemitic remarks (18 per cent); on hearing antisemitic remarks (88 per cent); to defend Jews who are under attack (86 per cent); with Gentile friends (100 per cent); at work (86 per cent); when famous Jews or Jewish achievements were mentioned (88 per cent); and with neighbours (62 per cent). This is a high degree of Jewish identification.

A number of respondents reported that they were pleased when they saw Jewish celebrities on television. Others said:

'I'm pleased at European meetings of university lecturers when the president of a big society is a Jew.'

'[This city] has a Jewish J.P. We might have a Jewish Lord Mayor.'

'I think that this is one of the ways that one instinctively reacts and one wishes one wouldn't. You hear a Jewish name, say Yehudi Menuhin or Einstein, and you immediately think of him as a fellow Jew. I do, I can't help it.'

'I'm interested that Arthur Miller is a Jew. We do take a delight if we find that a personality is Jewish.'

One respondent criticized those who like to claim all famous people as Jews. He said:

'We don't take [a Jewish periodical] because it's a snob paper. Anybody with even the remotest connexion with Jewish blood, if he does something—if it were Chichester for instance—and his great-great-grandfather were Jewish, it would have been in [that periodical].'

The corollary of pride in Jewish achievement is shame when Jews

break the law or perform other unworthy acts; 54 per cent of the respondents said that they were ashamed when they heard of Jews who had broken the law, while only 42 per cent reported that they can be objective when they hear Jews criticized.

Both Rose and Brotz argue that Jews regard themselves as being representative in relation to the outside world. Rose found that many of his American respondents regarded themselves as ambassadors to the Gentiles.[9] Brotz says that Jews have a desire to 'appear well' to the outside world. He writes:[10] 'Sometimes in talking with Jews one gets the impression that they think that a gigantic telescope is focused upon them by the non-Jewish world, which does very little else but sit and stare and approve and condemn.'

I found that 54 per cent of the respondents thought they should act as ambassadors to the Gentiles. They said:

'One Jew is representative of all Jews.'
'I try to be good at my work because they think of me as that Jewish girl.'
'You've only got to read about one Jewish millionaire and immediately every Jew is a millionaire.'
'I've always felt that I should not do anything that would bring Jewry into disrepute.'
'We wince if a Jew on TV speaks with a broken accent, or if he is ostentatious.'
'If I went out for a drink I would prefer to buy the first drink.'
'Ideally Jews should be like angels.'
'If I'm a Jew high standards are demanded of me. If a Gentile commits some social offence, then they think, "There's Fred Smith." But if *I* do, they say, "There's the Jews for you." The blame falls not only on me, but also on the Jews.'
'The Jews who do well aren't just doing it for themselves. They're doing it for the whole group.'
'I believe that everything bad I do will be reflected on the Jews, and everything good I do will be reflected on me.'
'I have a higher standard of conduct over monetary matters and pay back loans without being asked.'
'Any minority has all reasons to be specially law-abiding and specially good because they're in a minority.'
'People say Jewish M.P. They don't say Anglican M.P.'
'Jews ought to be able to think about themselves in the same way as other people think about themselves. . . . *I* don't consider myself an ambassador, but I have to be careful because I've been naturalized.'

Most of the Orthodox and four of the Liberal respondents were opposed to intermarriage. This is a further aspect of their Jewishness, of their desire to retain a separate identity. Even the married-out Orthodox man said: 'I would prefer my children to marry Jews.' The most common objections to intermarriage were that: a) the children would suffer in that they would tend to be between two cultures and

would lapse from Judaism; b) without the religious factor in common, there might be strain.

Others who opposed intermarriage said:

> 'The children of intermarried parents would probably lose religion altogether. If a couple have the same beliefs this gives them more in common and there's a better chance of a successful marriage.'
> 'There are difficulties with children. They're not Jewish unless the mother is Jewish.'
> 'It's bad for children. It leaves them without any beliefs at all—they're mixed up.'
> 'If I didn't try and stop my children from intermarrying I'd be contributing to the assimilation of the Jews.'
> 'With intermarriage, parents and children end up nowhere. You're helping to propagate atheists.'

But 32 per cent of the sample were intermarried—eight Jewish males and one Jewish female were married to Gentiles. It might be inferred that the high degree of intermarriage, particularly among the Liberal and non-practising Jews, is evidence of a weakening of Jewishness. Indeed, Orthodox respondents regarded intermarriage as the major factor in the break-up of Jewish identity. They said:

> 'Intermarriage will break up the Jewish identity.'
> 'Intermarriage breaks up the Jewish identity within three generations.'
> 'The second generation after intermarriage the children have become Christian.'
> 'Intermarriage makes children less Jewish.'
> 'Intermarriage is one of the massive things eroding the Jewish religion.'

Neustatter agrees with these Orthodox respondents and says, 'It is even possible that as much as half of the Jewish population might have to be written off within two generations as a result of intermarriage alone.'[11] On the other hand, it could be argued that Neustatter may not have taken enough account of the possibility of Liberal Judaism gaining converts to Judaism by allowing Jews to marry converts, and of that form of Judaism reclaiming lapsed Jews. It could indeed be argued on the basis of my findings that intermarriage does bring non-Jews into Judaism and does reclaim lapsed Jews. Three Liberal respondents are proselytes who have been brought into Judaism because they married Jews. One of them told me, 'The only reason for becoming a Jewess was because I married my husband.' Nevertheless, this respondent and her husband are very active members of the Liberal congregation.

One liberal respondent had been a non-practising Jew. He married a Gentile who became a proselyte. He said: 'Marriage spurred me into the Liberals. I thought it was inconceivable to give up my faith, but I was prepared to adapt it.' After he had joined the Liberals he

introduced his parents to the congregation. His father was a non-practising Jew who had married out. Now both parents are enthusiastic Liberal Jews. In addition, eight married-out respondents are bringing up their children as Jews.

I must here make the important qualification that the number of people in my sample was small and that I was unable to interview the hypothetically large number of married-out Jews who have totally lapsed from Jewishness. This sort of exercise would be necessary before one could talk with any degree of certainty about the effects of inter-marriage on Jewish identity. Indeed, because most of the respondents were members of either the Orthodox or Liberal synagogue, most of the Jews whom I interviewed would be those who identified as Jews. Nevertheless, despite these reservations, I consider it important and significant that I found evidence of a strengthening of Jewishness through intermarriage.

I found a certain ambiguity among some of the respondents with regard to Christmas cards and the Christmas tree. Milton Matz analysed the attitudes of some American Jews towards the Christmas tree and used their attitudes towards this latter symbol as an index of their identification with the non-Jewish culture. He pointed out the ambiguity present when Jews identify with American culture by utilizing a Christian symbol.[12] Although almost all the respondents send Christmas cards, some of them are uneasy about doing so, and only six reported that they have a Christmas tree. This uneasiness seems to reflect an aspect of their Jewishness. At Christmas, some of the respondents separate themselves to some extent from the majority culture. They said:

'We don't have a tree because it would be like observing something con-crete of another religion. We have the *menorah* [the branched candlestick used for Hanukah] instead.'
'We have a Christmas tree, but I don't agree with it.'
'I don't like the idea of Christmas, but my wife [a proselyte] does. It's one trivial bone of contention amongst us.'
'I don't celebrate Christmas. I'm against the idea of having a tree.'
'I have to accept sending Christmas cards because I live in a non-Jewish community.'
'We don't send Christmas cards. We've made a point of telling our friends that we're not sending Christmas cards.'
'I say, "I'm sorry I haven't sent you a Christmas card. I'm Jewish, I don't believe in Christmas." But paradoxically, I give Christmas presents, to avoid people saying "He's a mean Jew." '
'I send Christmas cards, but I try to get out of doing this because Christ-mas has religious significance, although paradoxically, it doesn't have for non-Jews.'
'The kids know they're Hanukah presents, but they open them on Christmas morning.'

'I'm a business man living in an alien world. I have to recognize *their* Christmas.'

In London and other cities some Jewish people send Christmas cards to their Jewish friends with ironical inscriptions inside them. One card says: 'It it wasn't for Christmas we would all be Jewish.' When a Jew sends this type of Christmas card to another Jew he is manifesting the same sort of ambiguity towards Christmas as was shown by some of my respondents. It is interesting that while for most non-Jews 'Christ can be said to have been taken out of Christmas' and the festival has, in practice, become almost completely secularized, for the respondents, Christmas still symbolizes Christianity.

While some respondents manifest their feeling of Jewish separateness at Christmas, a majority manifest it at the time of Rosh Hashanah; 76 per cent say that they send and receive Jewish New Year cards; and although five respondents receive cards at this time from non-Jews, no one sends cards to non-Jews.

None of the non-practising Jews expressed any preference for Jewish friends. They were indifferent to the religion of their friends. One said:

'Jewish community life is a form of segregation.'

Another said:

'Our friends are exclusively non-Jewish. It would be difficult to be friendly with Orthodox Jews because they'd be critical of our position. . . We'd be interested if another Jewish couple moved into our area.'

Nevertheless, 65 per cent of the Orthodox and 25 per cent of the Liberals showed no ambiguity in their friendship preferences. They told me that they preferred Jewish friends and this was another aspect of their Jewishness. Some of them said:

'We feel the need of living and mixing with Jewish people. Had I known there were so few Jewish people, and children in particular [in this city], I don't think I'd have come here.'

'We entertain Jewish friends at home in the evenings. We entertain non-Jews less frequently. When I entertain non-Jews, it is mostly wives on their own during the day.'

'Invariably when we go to the pictures, etc., we go with some of the Yiddishe crowd. Our evening activities are with Jews, but coffee mornings are with non-Jews.'

'Most of my friends are Jewish in London, but they're not [here]. I regret this. I feel more at home with Jews.'

'But we do long for a little co-religionist company.'

'On board ship we unpack our things and then say, "Where's the Yiddishe people? Let's find them?" '

'When you've lived in a town with lots of Jews you miss them more.'

Two Liberal Jews who had expressed no preference for Jewish friends qualified their position. They said:

'But if there's a Jewish friend there's an additional point of contact because you're both Jewish.'

'We choose not to live in a Jewish area. But if we like someone very much we say that's because they're Jewish. But it's really not true when you come to analyse it.'

Surprisingly, not one respondent stated that he would prefer Jewish friendships for his children. But I gained the impression that it was the scarcity of Jewish children in the city that created this attitude among the parents, because almost all of them pointed out this scarcity to me. A number were worried about the possibility of their children marrying out because of the potential shortage of Jewish partners in the city.

Sixty-eight per cent of the respondents would prefer to attend a Jewish Armistice Service; almost 44 per cent take the weekly *Jewish Chronicle*; 24 per cent would prefer to use the services of a Jewish doctor and solicitor; and 60 per cent were against the anglicization or changing of Jewish surnames. With regard to the latter, four respondents said:

'I can't stand changing names. It's anglicizing and losing our identity. People who change their names would like to chop down their noses a bit and dye their hair.'

'Name changes are stupid and silly.'

'I don't understand why. I never could understand why. I think it's rather a cowardly thing to do.'

'We think it's despicable. We have a cousin who's changed his name from Rothstein to Roberts because he's a doctor. They've called their child Andrew Timothy. He should have been called Abie Rothstein, and they've called him Andrew Timothy Roberts. It's despicable because being Jewish is something to be very proud of and not something to be ashamed of.'

A number of those who had changed their names seemed aware that they had given up an important index of Jewishness. This was apparent from the nature of the reasons they gave for changing their names.

'If Jews change their names to disguise their Jewishness I'm against it. If they do it for business reasons so that people can pronounce their names, I agree.'

A man said:

'In a way I'd like to change my name. Literally, you've got to say your name five times. It's embarrassing. Round here we call ourselves Cooper. If I had a name like Cohen I'd keep it. Our next door neighbours call us Mr. and Mrs. Cooper, though they probably know we're Karminsky. It gets round. But I haven't changed my name at work because I've published stuff under Karminsky.'

His wife said:

'I wanted my husband to change his name for aesthetic reasons as not many babies' Christian [sic] names go with Karminsky. It wouldn't be to hide our Jewishness. I tend to despise people who change their names to hide their Jewishness. But our name sounds foreign. You get fed up with people saying, "How do you spell it?" People are always asking where we come from.'

The majority of respondents were indifferent to the religion of the professional men they employ, but a number showed a particularistic preference in this respect. Some said:

'I feel they'd [Jewish professional men] have more interest in us. But they don't necessarily get better results.'
'Because they're better.'
'All other things being equal, I'd choose a Jew as long as he was of equal merit with non-Jews.'
'I have done and I do choose Jews.'
'I would always go for the Jewish professional man. I don't think because of his professional ability, but simply because one prefers to associate with one's own kind.'
'I would tend to say that if I wanted to fight a case that was very important to me, I would tend to think of going to London and finding a very good Jewish solicitor. They have the fighting instinct that non-Jews don't have. I wouldn't want a Jewish doctor or accountant because they don't need to fight to do the job properly.'
'Going to a Jewish solicitor would give me an edge because of free-masonry—old school tie and all that.'
'I have a Jewish doctor and accountant and we understand each other.'

The identification of Diaspora Jews with Israel is one of the most important and crucial indices of Jewishness. For the great majority of the respondents Israel is the place of ultimate Jewish achievement and the place where they can ultimately be secure as Jews. It is the place where they would no longer feel separate. Ninety-six per cent of the respondents took the Israeli side against the Arabs in the Six-Day War. The following summary of what respondents regarded as the signifi-cance of Israel to Jews in the Diaspora suggests that many of them felt a special personal commitment as Jews: Israel is a home for the Jews; when Jews visit Israel they feel the same as everyone else; it's easier to be Jewish in Israel; the existence of Israel increases Jewish pride and self-confidence; the existence of Israel shows that Jews are achiev-ing something on their own; Israel is achieving something for Jews all over the world; Israel is an anchor, providing safety and security; Israel is a rallying point for Jews; Israel is a place for oppressed Jews to go; Israel is the spiritual home of the Jews; it is the promised land; the existence of Israel shows that Jews are capable of doing what everyone else has done; Israel is for a Jewish emergency.

The following is a selection of many statements of a similar nature made to me about Israel.

'We can go in and call it home and that's it.'

'When you're in Israel you don't have to remember any longer that you're Jewish. You don't feel different.'

'When I was there I was proud to be a Jew. I was sorry to come back, because life as a Jew is so natural in Israel.'

'Every now and then you realize that we're not as safe as we think we are. It's somewhere to go.'

'We've got a hook to hang our troubles on to.'

'A fellow came into the shop and when I told him we didn't have the thing he asked for he mumbled something about the Jews and said, "Hitler didn't finish the job, did he?" Before the Six-Day War I would have attacked him with words, but now, I could turn round quite proudly and say to him, "It's a pity you weren't in the Sinai Desert with the Egyptians." He said something about "Jewboys" and I told him, "There aren't any Jewboys in the world today—not after Dayan." '

'I think we all feel a lot more confident [as Jews] now that there is Israel, even if we never go there.'

'In Israel I was walking on the promenade of a seaside resort at night with my wife and I sneezed. A passer-by said "*Gesunt*" ["Bless you"]. It was a complete stranger who knew that one of *his* people had sneezed. Everyone was a Jew. This was a revelation. Every single soul was a Jew as you looked down the long avenue in Tel Aviv.'

'Jews have achieved something on their own, whereas a large number of Jews allowed themselves to be killed in the Second World War.'

Despite this evidence of a high degree of identification with Israel, only 18 per cent of respondents had been there, only 5 per cent would like to live there, and only 11 per cent would prefer their children to live there if they decided to live abroad. However, lack of money might have prevented some respondents from visiting Israel. One respondent and the children of four others had volunteered to go to Israel during the Six-Day War. In addition, the daughter of two respondents had lived in an Israeli kibbutz.

Some respondents spoke critically of Israel and Israelis. They said:

'My sons found them chauvinistic.'

'I have very little sympathy, if any, with the State of Israel as a political unit. As a place for refugees I have sympathy.'

'Too many Jews. Israel is an unnatural society.'

'I doubt whether it could supply the kind of life I want.'

'Israel is an ordered society that I withdraw from.'

My findings suggest that the acculturation of the respondents has limited the area in which they play Jewish roles, and that in addition the Jewish roles have lost some of their Judaic content. It could be argued that there are few objectively valid differences between the

respondents and their Gentile fellow citizens. This is because the respondents are not united by a belief in a Jewish God and because their Jewish role-playing is restricted and limited.

But the research demonstrated that the respondents consider themselves to be significantly different from non-Jews. Thus their Jewish identity consists in a limited and diluted ritual observance and in a very strong and deeply held belief that they are separate and different from non-Jews in a number of important areas. I have described this identity as Jewishness; its most important elements are non-religious, those that emphasize conciousness of kind. The decline in the religious and cultural difference between the respondents and their Gentile neighbours has not been accompanied by a decline in Jewish self-consciousness.

Historically, an important aspect of the separate Jewish identity has been that Jews since the dispersion have been strangers within their host societies. The evidence I have presented concerning the acculturation of the respondents tends to suggest that they are no longer strangers within non-Jewish culture. Indeed, one might argue that except for sharing its history, the lapsed respondents are strangers within the Jewish interaction system. Nor in contemporary terms can the respondents be said to exist in a 'marginal situation'. Their degree of acculturation tends to suggest that their biographical roots are in the same social world as that in which they operate. The respondents do not seem to experience conflict between the different norms and values of the Jewish and non-Jewish social worlds. This is because they have accepted Gentile norms and values.

In addition, an important constituent of a 'marginal situation' for a Jew is the existence in the host society of a high degree of antisemitism and discrimination. In this sense, British Jews could be said to have existed in a 'marginal situation' in the 1930s when antisemitism was common in Britain and Europe. But few respondents have experienced recent antisemitism, a majority consider that it has declined, and few have experienced discrimination or expect it for themselves and their children. Thus, from the evidence presented by the respondents one could not maintain that their situation is marginal.

On the other hand, it is possible that in a wider sense the respondents do exist in a 'marginal situation', in that the Nazi atrocities form an important part of the social framework in which contemporary Jews live. Antisemitism still exists in eastern Europe, and the respondents tend to see Arab attacks on Israelis as attacks on themselves. Finally, a number of respondents reported that they view colour prejudice as a form of hatred that has been displaced from Jews on to coloured persons. But I think that it is valid to infer from the evidence that in Britain itself the respondents cannot generally be said to be living in a 'marginal situation'.

Nevertheless, whether one takes the wider or narrower view of the 'marginal situation', the evidence suggests that the respondents *experience* their situation as having the features of marginality, and this feeling of marginality is a very important aspect of their Jewish identity. The fact that they experience their situation as marginal serves to separate them from non-Jews. Alternatively, it is possible that in the part of their lives where they feel different from non-Jews the respondents can be said to live in a 'marginal culture'. With the exception of the proselytes the Jewish respondents' lives can be said to fit the four conditions postulated by Goldberg for the existence of a 'marginal culture'.[13] They have been conditioned to their existence on the borders of two cultures from birth; they have shared the conditioning process with a large enough number of individuals; they have participated in some institutional activities with other Jews; and they have suffered no frustration of desires and expectations. But possibly all that is required for the existence of a 'marginal culture' is that some shared conditioning and institutional activity of sub-group members should occur, although not necessarily from birth, and that sub-group members should not suffer frustrations of desires and expectations. If this argument is accepted, the proselytes in the sample can also be said to inhabit the 'marginal culture' of the other Jews.

NOTES

[1] More fully reported in my M.Sc. dissertation in sociology, University of Bristol, 1970.

[2] On the Jew as 'marginal man' see Robert E. Park, *Race and Culture*, New York, 1950, p. 345: '. . .'a cultural hybrid, a man living and sharing intimately in the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples; never quite willing to break, even if he were permitted to do so, with his past and his traditions, and not quite accepted, because of racial prejudice, in the new society in which he now sought a place. He was a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which now completely interpenetrated and fused. The emancipated Jew was, and is, historically and typically, the marginal man . . . He is, par excellence, the "stranger" . . .'—For a full discussion of the contemporary theory of marginality where a distinction is drawn between the 'marginal situation' and the 'marginal response', see H. F. Dickie-Clark, *The Marginal Situation*, London, 1966, pp. 7–49.

[3] See Milton Goldberg, 'A Qualification of the Marginal Man Theory', in *American Sociological Review*, vol. VI, no. 1, 1941, pp. 52–58, where he argues that the second and third generation American Jew may well live in a 'marginal culture', said to be 'a non-geographical equivalent of the anthropological concept of the "marginal area" '. The marginal area is 'psychologically a type of culture area, for its actual content is as much of a unit and has the same value to its human carriers as the contents of a fully-fledged "culture area" '.

Goldberg puts forward four conditions for the existence of a marginal culture: 1, the marginal individual must be conditioned to his existence on the borders of two cultures from birth; 2, he must share this existence and conditioning with a large number of individuals in his primary groups; 3, his years of early growth, maturation, and adulthood must find him taking part in institutional activities manned largely by other marginal individuals like himself; 4, his marginal position must result in no major blockages or frustration of his learned expectations and desires.

[4] See Ernest Krausz, 'The Economic and Social Structure of Anglo-Jewry', in Julius Gould and Shaul Esh, eds., *Jewish*

Life in Modern Britain, London, 1964, pp. 27–34; and his 'Occupation and Social Advancement in Anglo-Jewry', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 4, no. 1, June 1962, pp. 82–89.

⁵ Cf. Norman Cohen, 'Trends in Anglo-Jewish Religious Life', in Gould and Esh, eds., op. cit., p. 43: 'In short the force which binds Anglo-Jewry together is not faith but gregariousness.'

⁶ See W. Pickering, 'Religion—A Leisure Time Pursuit', p. 83, in David Martin, ed., *A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain*, London, 1968: 'If on the other hand the "cost" is minimal, religion may be assumed to be lightly esteemed.'

⁷ M. Sklare and J. Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier*, New York and London, 1967, p. 55.

⁸ Erich Rosenthal, 'Acculturation without Assimilation—The Jewish Community of Chicago, Illinois', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, no. 3, 1960, p. 287.

⁹ Peter I. Rose, 'Small Town Jews and their Neighbours in the United States', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1961, p. 180.

¹⁰ Howard M. Brotz, 'The Outlines of Jewish Society in London', in Maurice Freedman, ed., *A Minority in Britain, Social Studies of the Anglo-Jewish Community*, London, 1955, p. 184.

¹¹ Hannah Neustatter, 'Demographic and other Statistical Aspects of Anglo-Jewry', in Maurice Freedman, ed., op. cit., p. 94.

¹² Milton Matz, 'The Meaning of the Christmas Tree to the American Jew', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 136.

¹³ See Note 3 above.

A NOTE ON THE TEACHING OF HEBREW IN AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

David Rudavsky

HEBREW learning was brought to colonial America from England, where a chair of Hebrew had been established at Cambridge in 1540. Hebrew was of particular importance to the Puritans as a key to the Scriptures, which they believed to be the source of divine law.[1] It was introduced at Harvard in 1640,[2] soon after the College was established (1636); Michael Wigglesworth was the first instructor. His successor was Judah Monis,[3] a Moroccan Jew who accepted baptism as a condition of his appointment; but he is said to have persisted in observing Saturday as the Sabbath throughout his life. He wrote a Hebrew grammar, the first Hebrew book to be published in the country (1735).

Yale College was founded in 1701, and it too assigned Hebrew an important place in its curriculum. Ezra Stiles, who served as President of the College, delivered his inaugural address in Hebrew in 1778.[4] Other colleges followed Harvard and Yale's example: Pennsylvania, Princeton (the College of New Jersey), Brown (started as Rhode Island College), Columbia (originally King's College), and Dartmouth.

An interest in Semitic languages grew in the eighteenth century with the publication of the polyglot Bibles.[5] The archaeological activities of French scholars in Napoleon's entourage in Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century (and the publication of their seven-volume report early in the nineteenth century) gave further stimulus to Semitic studies. Col. Mendes J. Cohen of Baltimore travelled up the Nile and brought back a collection of Egyptian relics; American scholars later travelled to Palestine and located many Biblical sites which had been obscured by Arabic names. These developments prompted universities to establish new (or to strengthen existing) departments of Semitics to train scholars in the task of deciphering inscriptions and texts in the ancient tongues. The philological approaches of Semitic scholars freed Hebraic learning from its dependence on theology. By

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1896[6] there were 16 institutions with fairly complete Semitic programmes; in 1882 there had been only two: Harvard and Yale.

The American Jewish Year Book for 1917–18 listed 55 colleges and universities which offered Hebrew, generally as part of a Semitics programme; Yale and Chicago are reported to have been teaching Yiddish as well. Most of these Semitics departments have since been either discontinued or merged with other divisions of the universities.

In the 1930s a new attitude towards Hebrew was generated by its revival as the modern spoken and literary tongue of a living people. In 1929 New York City had included Hebrew in the foreign language curriculum of its secondary schools; Chicago and other cities followed suit. This, in turn, sparked off a parallel development in colleges and universities; New York University added Jewish cultural studies to its Hebrew programme, as did later the New York municipal colleges (Brooklyn College, Hunter, City College, and Queens).

In 1940 only nine institutions of higher learning in the country maintained programmes in modern Hebrew, while sixty-eight taught the Biblical or classical variety. After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 several more universities established courses in modern Hebrew: Alabama, Butler, Illinois, Maryland, Miami, Omaha, Rutgers, Texas, Western Reserve, and Wisconsin.[7] One other factor which contributed to the expansion of modern Hebrew teaching was the religious revival after the war; another factor was the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which made the dissemination of foreign languages a matter of national policy.[8]

The Modern Language Association (MLA) report for 1960[9] states that in that year there were 3,834 students of modern Hebrew. From 1965 onwards, the Association's reports deal with 'Foreign Language Enrollment' and therefore include both classical and modern Hebrew; in 1965 the combined registration was 8,059; in 1968 it was 10,283; and by 1970 it had reached 16,992. I have attempted to break down the figures for these three years into two major categories: classical (and biblical) Hebrew, and modern Hebrew. (See Table.)

There has been a distinct trend in favour of modern Hebrew; but the classical variety has also greatly risen in popularity. The Table—which shows an impressive increase in both classical (55 per cent) and modern (70 per cent) Hebrew from 1968 to 1970—indicates that one category does not prosper at the expense of the other, but that the two exercise a mutually stimulating influence. It also indicates that the large enrolment for modern Hebrew is distributed among a much smaller number of institutions than the lower enrolment for classical and biblical Hebrew. The modern Hebrew programmes are, in the main, taught in larger urban institutions which have more substantial Jewish student bodies than the smaller schools. The great majority of students of modern Hebrew are Jewish; in fact, a considerable pro-

portion of the programmes are offered by colleges and universities in and around New York City. In 1970 the various schools of Yeshiva University alone reported an enrolment of 4,251 or 25 per cent of the overall combined Hebrew registration throughout the country; and 34 per cent of that of modern Hebrew. The several branches of the City University of New York account for 2,303 students or 14 per cent of the total (and 20 per cent of the modern Hebrew) enrolment. Thus these two universities, Yeshiva and City, comprise 39 per cent of the combined registration for both phases of Hebrew and 54 per cent of the enrolment for modern Hebrew.[10]

Enrolment in Modern and Classical or Biblical Hebrew in Colleges and Universities for 1965, 1968, 1970

	1965* Enrolment	No. of Units	1968* Enrolment	No. of Units	Enrolment Increase	1970* Enrolment	No. of Units	Enrolment Increase
Modern Hebrew								
Under- graduate	5,370	54	7,003	65	1,633	11,438	98	4,435
Graduate	326		384		58	1,020		636
Sub-Total	5,696		7,387		1,691	12,458		5,071
Classical Hebrew								
Under- Graduate	906	92	1,051	106	145	2,955	157	1,904
Graduate	1,457		1,845		388	1,579		−266
Sub-Total	2,363		2,896		533	4,534		1,638
Grand Total	8,059*	146	10,283*	171	2,224	16,992*	255**	6,709

*MLA totals: for 1965, 8,093; for 1968, 10,169; for 1970, 16,567.
**MLA gives 248; the higher figure includes institutions omitted in the MLA report.

The increase in registration for 1970 at the undergraduate as well as graduate level of Hebrew study may be attributed partly to an improvement in gathering data. Generally speaking, the under-graduates predominate overwhelmingly in the modern Hebrew courses, while the graduate students did so in classical Hebrew study in 1965 and 1968. The latter situation was reversed in 1970; but, while the graduate enrolment in classical Hebrew declined by 14 per cent, it rose by 26 per cent in the case of modern Hebrew. This can be explained by the tendency discernible among graduates of classical courses to continue their graduate work in modern Hebrew programmes. The large undergraduate enrolment in modern Hebrew has also produced a greater number who embark upon graduate work in that field, rather than on other academic programmes.

The curriculum in modern Hebrew does not preclude classical Hebraic sources such as Bible and rabbinic or medieval Hebrew texts, but offers them for their intrinsic content, or as stages in the evolution of Hebraic literature and thought, and also for their contemporary significance. The inclusion of courses in conversational Hebrew, and the use of Hebrew as the instructional language or as a key to current Hebrew bibliography, characterize this approach. Modern Hebrew, it should be noted, has become increasingly necessary as a tool in Judaic study because the State of Israel has become the primary centre of Judaic scholarship. (The non-linguistic Judaic programmes, referred to in educational parlance as 'area studies' and consisting of courses in Hebrew culture and civilization, taught in English, have also been geared increasingly to the outlook of the modern Hebrew programmes.)

While the programme in modern Hebrew represents the study of a living and vital language and literature, the classical programme commonly taught in denominational colleges or theological schools is generally confined to various aspects of biblical study or ancient Hebrew texts, regarded as shedding light on the origin or evolution of Christianity or Christian doctrine. It considers Jewish creativity as having ceased in the main with the advent of Christianity, which it views as the fulfilment of true Judaism. Thus the classical programme may be seen largely as a branch of Christian apologetics. The attitude underlying the modern Hebraic programme is that Jewish civilization reflects a continuum of three millennia of cultural productivity and takes in the literary works of later centuries, including contemporary times. Its curriculum is geared to a study of all periods and phases of Jewish history, religion, philosophy, and thought. It includes courses such as Jewish movements and sects (past and present), the Dead Sea Scrolls, World Jewry, the American Jewish community, the State of Israel, Hebrew and Jewish literature in translation, and cognate subjects.[11]

The MLA survey of foreign language enrolment has shown a consistent growth in the aggregate registration, from its inception in 1958 until 1968. The 1970 study, however, reported a drop of 1·4 per cent for that year, despite the rise of almost 13 per cent in general college enrolment in the preceding two-year interval. Five of the leading languages declined in enrolment during this period: French by 7·4 per cent from its 1968 register (388,069); German by 6·3 per cent of its earlier enrolment (216,263); Russian by 11·1 per cent from its 1968 figure (40,696); Latin by as much as 21·1 per cent since 1968 (34,981); and Ancient Greek by 13·4 per cent from its previous 1968 total (19,285). Spanish, however, gained 6·7 per cent over its 1968 enrolment (364,870), displacing French as the highest ranking language. Italian gained even more, 12·8 per cent over 1968 (30,359).[12]

In 1968 Hebrew had a combined overall registration in its classical and modern phases of 10,283; it accounted for 31 per cent of the total registration of 'other' (that is minor) languages, and ranked first on that list. The 1970 enrolment (16,992) represented 36 per cent of the aggregate of all 'other' languages, and again topped the list in that category. Among the other less commonly taught languages, Japanese registration (6,620) constituted 14·5 per cent of the overall register in the fall of 1970; Chinese with 6,238 formed 13·3 per cent of the total; and Portuguese (with 5,065) only 11 per cent. While Hebrew grew by 65 per cent from 1968–70, Japanese rose by 53 per cent, Chinese by 23 per cent, and Portuguese by 25 per cent. Swahili almost trebled from 608 to 1,787 in this period. The position of Hebrew rose to the point that Richard I. Brod, MLA Project Manager of the 1970–71 Foreign Language Survey, was prompted to state:[13]

> Since registrations for Hebrew now exceed those of Ancient Greek future MLA reports may have to list Hebrew separately from the remaining 'other' languages.

The fact that the elimination of language requirements did not hinder the growth of the 'minor' ethnic languages, particularly Hebrew, proves that factors other than mere academic interest motivate registration in these ethnic tongues. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that Hebrew is bound to grow further, for its popularity is enhanced by an intensified ethnic consciousness and enthusiasm, its role in Judaism, and in the State of Israel. Students find courses in modern Hebrew useful in, among other things, preparation for a visit to Israel, or for a period of study or work in a kibbutz. These factors are bound to stimulate a greater demand for its teaching in American schools of higher learning.[14]

An appreciably larger number of students in colleges and universities prefer Judaic studies to Hebraic linguistic courses. Many institutions which do not offer the latter type provide courses with Jewish content. The interest in them on the part of Jews and non-Jews has been stimulated by the current regard for Judaism as a major American religion or religious culture, on a par with Catholicism and Protestantism. The introduction and sponsorship of Black studies, moreover, left college authorities little alternative but to yield to the clamour of Jewish students for ample provision for Judaic study courses in their institutions.

An 'educated guess' leads me to estimate a present enrolment of at least 25,000 students in these courses; 20–25 per cent of them are probably non-Jews. The courses are often offered by related departments on an interdisciplinary basis: Jewish history in the History department, Jewish religion in the Religion department, and so on. In a considerable number of American colleges and universities it is

now possible to major either in Hebrew language and literature or in various aspects of Judaic culture and civilization, for a bachelor's, master's, or doctor's degree. There are at present facilities for graduate work in classical or modern Hebrew or in Judaic Studies at some thirty-five colleges and universities, about half of which offer programmes leading to a doctorate. Among the latter are Brandeis, Chicago, Dropsie, Harvard, Iowa, Johns Hopkins, New York University, Ohio State, Pennsylvania, Temple, Vanderbilt, UCLA, Wayne State, Wisconsin, Yale, and Yeshiva.[15]

In addition, an increasing number of institutions—including Washington University (St. Louis), Temple, the State University of New York, Brooklyn College, and Farleigh Dickinson—conduct summer undergraduate programmes in co-operation with Israeli universities, or the Jewish Agency for Israel. Hundreds of American undergraduates also independently attend summer courses at various Israeli institutions. UCLA conducts a Junior year at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and Brandeis has its own semester in Israel. A sizable group of American students of Hebrew and various other disciplines study for a year at the University of Tel-Aviv or Bar Ilan; but a far greater number, totalling almost two thousand, are enrolled in the undergraduate Programme for Overseas Students of the Hebrew University.[16] American graduate students, mainly in the field of Judaica and Near Eastern or related programmes, attend the Hebrew University, and to a lesser extent other universities, as Visiting Students.

There are as yet only a small number of separate departments of Hebraic and Judaic study at American colleges and universities. Such departments exist at Brooklyn College, Brandeis, New York, Wisconsin, Rutgers, Temple, and Roosevelt Universities. In the main, Hebraic language and literature programmes are attached to Ancient, Modern, Romance, Oriental, and Foreign Language departments; they are also associated with Near Eastern or Middle Eastern Studies, Comparative Literature, Classics, Religion, Linguistics, Humanities, German, and other departments. It appears that the reason for this wide range of departmental affiliation is that it was a matter of chance or convenience at the time the programme was initiated, rather than of logic. This is also true of the few accredited courses offered in Yiddish. At Columbia it is taught under the auspices of the Linguistics department, at Brandeis in the Judaic Studies department, and at City and Brooklyn Colleges of the City University of New York, in the Modern Languages department.[17]

In most instances the Hebrew and Judaic study courses are supported by the regular institutional budgets; in some they are maintained by the local Jewish community or an individual sponsor. The Hillel Foundation, the National Foundation for Hebrew Culture, and other Jewish agencies sponsor professorships, or contribute to the

support of the Hebrew or Judaic study programmes in a number of institutions. There are twenty endowed chairs in Hebrew or Judaic studies at as many institutions, notably Brandeis, California, Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, State University of Iowa, University of Pennsylvania, New York University, Ohio State, Vanderbilt, Wayne, Wisconsin, and Yale. Approximately a hundred full-time professors are engaged in teaching the Hebrew and Judaic courses, in addition to a larger number of part-time instructors, consisting of Hillel directors, local rabbis, and Hebraic scholars generally. The field of Judaic and Hebraic studies is one of the few in higher American education still able to absorb qualified personnel.

The splendid achievement in the field of Hebrew and Judaic learning in American colleges and universities has been largely the work of a small number of dedicated individuals. Only recently have national Jewish communal bodies entered the field, but what they will do still remains to be seen. There are several serious problems, financial and other, to be solved if substantial further qualitative progress is to be made.

NOTES

[1] John Cotton, 'Moses and his Judicials', in Peter Force, *Tracts and Other Papers*, Washington, 1844, vol. III, part 9. See also B. Selbie, 'The Influence of the Old Testament on Puritans', in Edwyn R. Bevan and Charles Singer, eds., *The Legacy of Israel*, Oxford, 1927, pp. 407–50.

[2] David de Sola Pool, 'Hebrew Learning Among the Puritans of New England Prior to 1700', in *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society (P.A.J.H.S.)*, vol. XX, 1911, pp. 39 ff. See also Isidore S. Meyer, 'Hebrew at Harvard (1632–1760)', in *P.A.J.H.S.*, vol. XXXIV, 1939, pp. 145 ff.

[3] George Foote Moore, 'Judah Monis', in *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, vol. LII, Boston, 1915, pp. 291 ff. See also Meyer, op. cit., pp. 161 ff.

[4] Abraham I. Katsh, *Hebrew Language, Literature and Culture in American Institutions of Higher Learning*, New York, 1950, pp. 3 ff.

[5] This contained the Old Testament, the Samaritan Hebrew and the Samaritan Aramaic, the Septuagint, all the *Targumim*, the Peshita (Old Syriac), the Ethiopic, and the Persian versions.

[6] William Rosenau, 'Semitic Studies in American Colleges', in *CCAR Journal*, vol. VI, 1896, p. 103.

[7] Cf. Abraham I. Katsh, 'Modern Hebrew in American Colleges and Universities', *Modern Languages Journal*, vol. XXXV, January 1951, pp. 3 f.

[8] David Rudavsky, 'Hebraic Studies in American Colleges and Universities', in Israel Naamani, ed., *Doron: Hebraic Studies*, New York, 1965, pp. 16 ff.

[9] See *Modern Foreign Language Teaching in Junior Colleges, Fall 1959 and Fall 1960;* also *Modern Foreign Language Enrollments in 1206 Four-Year Colleges and Universities, Fall 1960*, and corresponding reports for Fall 1961, published by the Modern Language Association, New York City. The MLA began its surveys in 1959, but it did not give any figure for the aggregate enrolment in Hebrew; it did so only for modern Hebrew. The report for 1959 gives 582 undergraduate majors in modern Hebrew, 33 for the master's level, and 2 for the doctoral level. According to that report, Hebrew was then taught by 45 teachers in 31 institutions located in 14 states.

[10] On the basis of the MLA list and of the corrected figures I obtained for various schools of Yeshiva University and the City University.

[11] See, for example, *Bulletin* of New York University Institute of Hebrew Studies, 1971–72.

[12] See Richard I. Brod, 'Foreign Language Enrollments in U.S. Colleges, Fall 1970', in the Bulletin of the Association of Departments of Foreign Languages (*ADFL Bulletin*), vol. III, no. 2, December 1971, pp. 46 ff.

[13] Ibid., p. 47.

[14] For some recent developments, see Alfred Jospe, *Jewish Studies in American Colleges and Universities*, B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1971.

[15] In his article, 'Jewish Studies in American Liberal Arts Colleges and Universities', *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. LXVII, 1966, Arnold Band states that a 'student can gain a fairly adequate training in Judaic studies in about 40 accredited colleges and universities and can acquire substantial information in the subject in at least 25 other institutions offering a variety of courses but no undergraduate majors' (p. 14).

[16] See the Bulletin of the School for Overseas Students 1971–72, published by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The University is now planning a two-year programme for foreign students in which the language of instruction is to be English.

[17] In 1968, three institutions—Brandeis, Columbia, and Brooklyn College—were teaching Yiddish to a total enrolment of 109 students. See Table 17, pp. 31 ff., and Table 18, pp. 53 ff., in MLA *Report* for 1968.

THE BLACK PANTHERS AND ISRAELI SOCIETY

Erik Cohen

'I only pray that there be no peace, otherwise we shall destroy each other.'
(A police officer of Yemenite origin a day after the
large demonstration in Jerusalem on 18 May 1971.)

I

IN January 1971 the Israeli public was shocked to discover that the Black Panthers had arrived on the Israeli scene. A society pre-occupied for many years with external tensions, war, and relations with Arabs in the occupied territories was made rudely aware of the existence of serious unrest in its midst.[1] A group of young Oriental Jews from Jerusalem, mostly of Moroccan origin, proclaimed them-selves *Panterim Shchorim* (Black Panthers), and put forward a series of peremptory demands. They asked the government immediately to stop all alleged discriminatory practices against Oriental Jews and to root out poverty. They asked that steps be taken to clear the slums and to provide adequate housing for their inhabitants. They demanded drastic improvements in educational opportunities for Oriental children. They called on the government to provide employment for Oriental youths and to re-admit to the armed forces those of their number who had been rejected as 'unfit'.[2] Although the number who actually joined the Black Panthers was not very large, the spontaneous movement quickly gained popularity and triggered off the expression of widely-felt resent-ment and dissatisfaction among Oriental Jews. The movement achieved world-wide attention after the violent demonstration in Jerusalem on 18 May 1971. The government and the general public were taken aback by this apparently unexpected and intense outburst of ethnic feeling. Admittedly, there had been mounting tension and dissatisfaction among the under-privileged groups of Israeli society during the economic recession of 1966–67, when the always tenuous links which hold together the many ethnic groups within Israeli Jewish society started to break up under the impact of the recession. Serious social upheavals were probably averted by the Six-Day War and the

prolonged fighting on the borders which followed: the common danger welded together the Jewish sector of Israeli society, and internal conflicts were apparently resolved. The War had a strangely rejuvenating impact on the national morale, an impact which could not escape anyone who visited Israel in late 1967 or early 1968.[3] Tens of thousands of soldiers of Oriental origin took an active part on the various fronts. It was generally acknowledged that they fought bravely and thereby sealed their full acceptance into Israeli society. It had been asserted in the past that the Orientals did not contribute significantly to national defence; this assertion was proved wrong. Now a 'blood covenant' was created between Ashkenazi and Oriental fighters. In those days of national euphoria it seemed as if the Orientals had finally ceased to be second-class citizens of Israel. Indeed, the salience of the ethnic issue in the national elections of 1969 was much reduced in comparison with its role in previous elections,[4] particularly those of 1965.[5] It appeared that Jewish society in Israel was finally on the way to achieving an ideal degree of integration and common national identity.

The sudden emergence of the 'Black Panthers' dealt a severe blow to this premature optimism. There was, first of all, the name. Deliberately, the movement chose the appellation of an extremist and separatist Negro movement in the United States, with an outspoken 'revolutionary-nationalist' ideology[6] and racist and often antisemitic overtones. Even if the Israeli Panthers were not wholly serious about the implications of that name, they succeeded in jolting the usually complacent Israeli public and establishment—who realized the potential threat a movement with such a label could pose for morale at home and for Israeli prestige abroad. Moreover, the emergence of the movement, and the popular support it enjoyed for a while among broad classes of Oriental Jews, led many to question the assumption that 'national integration' had indeed been almost achieved and to face with some trepidation the prospect of prolonged and intense ethnic strife.

Israel, after a period in which it had been mainly concerned with its external problems, started in 1971 to look inward again. The by now familiar problems of the 'quasi-affluent' Western society—poverty-amidst-plenty, slum conditions, ethnic tensions—suddenly became a major concern of the press, the public, and the national institutions. Though the initial excitement engendered by the Black Panthers has by now largely subsided, and the movement itself has spent much of its vigour and lost its grip upon the minds of most Oriental Jews, general concern with internal problems remains intense. In this paper I deal with the Panther phenomenon as an outgrowth of these problems and analyse the interplay between them and Israeli society. I shall not analyse the internal structure and dynamics of the movement itself, which are currently the subject of an intensive anthropological study.[7]

II

Israeli society is based upon the fundamental assumptions of the essential unity of the Jewish nation and of the identity between the Jewish national and religious collectivities. These assumptions made Zionism a living force among the Jews of many countries, Occidental and Oriental. They form the basis of the ideal of the 'Ingathering of the Exiles' (*Kibbutz haGaluyot*) and of the policy of the melting-pot (*Mizug haGaluyot*). Most Israeli Jews, even if they are not fiery Zionists, would react violently to any attempt to tamper with these assumptions— either by asserting the existence of a broader regional identity which would include non-Jewish people (as, for example, the 'Cana'anites' or the 'Semites' would have it),[8] or by asserting the national separateness of one of the Jewish ethnic groups within what is ordinarily considered to be 'the Jewish nation'.

The generally accepted ideology, however, is at serious odds with the social reality of the country: glaring social and economic inequalities and persistent cultural differences still exist between Ashkenazim and Orientals, and there are no signs that the gap is narrowing significantly: that gap can be observed in any sphere of life, whether economic, educational, or political.[9] It is almost a commonplace that all the major institutional spheres of Israeli society—the government and the Knesset (Parliament), the political parties, the Histadrut (The General Federation of Labour), the major economic enterprises and corporations, the universities, state schools, and the cultural activities—are dominated, on the national and often also on the local level, by people of Ashkenazi origin and by expressly Western values. Oriental culture, in which at least some of the Oriental communities had been deeply steeped, has made no perceptible imprint on Israel's cultural life. Oriental civilization was generally considered 'backward' or 'Levantine', and Oriental immigrants were asked to shed their way of life as quickly as possible.[10] They were put under pressure to 'Westernize' and 'modernize', and thus, by implication, to accept 'modern' standards and aspirations in the areas of housing, employment, education, etc. However, the steps taken by the national institutions to facilitate the social and economic 'progress' of the Orientals did not succeed in putting them in a short time on an equal footing with Ashkenazim. Though great improvements in the economic and educational attainments of the Orientals have taken place in the last twenty years, their relative position vis-à-vis the quickly advancing Ashkenazim has not significantly altered. The economic gap, in particular, remains almost unchanged.[11] Orientals continue to predominate in low-status occupations, and although the absolute number of unskilled Oriental workers tends to decrease, that of Ashkenazim diminishes at a much quicker rate.[12] In the educational sphere, in spite of considerable improvements, the

progress of the Orientals is still extremely slow and tends to be limited to the lower and middle rungs of the educational ladder. The gap in higher education remains almost unchanged.[13] It is true that Oriental leaders have made some progress in penetrating the lower and middle echelons of local and national political institutions,[14] but it is difficult to determine whether these achievements have given them any effective power. It might be argued that Orientals have simply been co-opted by the Ashkenazi-dominated establishment.

The housing and living conditions of many Orientals are also precarious. Admittedly, the problem of sheltering hundreds of thousands of destitute immigrants was overwhelming, and the Israeli authorities on the whole performed their task of supplying public housing to almost any Jew who needed it very creditably. There are no immigrant squatter settlements in Israel, and the number of veteran immigrants still living in temporary immigrant camps (*ma'abarot*) is relatively small. Nevertheless, a considerable housing gap exists between Orientals and Ashkenazim. During the period of mass immigration (1948–51), new immigrants were indiscriminately settled in abandoned Arab towns and urban neighbourhoods. The Ashkenazim succeeded in leaving these areas at a faster pace than the Orientals, and moved into better homes. The urban slums in the larger cities are consequently inhabited by a disproportionately large Oriental population; these are the areas where the dissatisfaction which gave birth to the Panther movement was nourished.

The same is essentially true of the public housing projects (*shikunim*). Ashkenazi immigrants tend gradually to abandon the worse types of *shikunim* and to move into privately built housing.[15] Hence, the older and already dilapidated areas tend to become almost completely Oriental. (The situation in such housing projects is often similar to that prevailing in the dilapidated neighbourhoods of the inner city.)

The housing problem of young urban couples of second-generation Oriental origin is often particularly acute, since they do not receive the same help or housing subsidy to which new immigrants are entitled. Meanwhile, the recent building boom has driven the cost of private housing to unprecedented heights. This is another important cause of unrest among the urban Oriental young, which loomed large in Panther protests. Indeed, groups of young couples organized themselves into short-lived associations and demanded that the government provide them with adequate housing.

It could be asserted that the perpetuation of the gap between Ashkenazim and Orientals is due largely to the very rapid socio-economic progress of the former rather than to any stagnation or lack of progress among the latter; but such an argument is not of much practical importance. The Oriental Jews are not concerned with historical comparisons, which contrast their 'backwardness' at the time of their *aliyah*

with their present position. For them, the significant reference group are the Ashkenazim, and in relation to them most of the Orientals are nowadays almost as disadvantaged as they had been when they immigrated to Israel.

In conclusion, Israel is quickly becoming a highly developed and fairly affluent modern nation, with a large stratum of relatively 'backward' Oriental Jews (and Arabs, but I do not deal with them in this paper). The realities of the social situation in Israel contrast sharply with the ideology of the melting-pot and even with the assumption of 'national unity'. In fact, the demarcation line between the 'First Israel' of the Ashkenazim and the 'Second Israel'[16] of Oriental Jews continues to be clearly marked and is easily perceptible by all but the most doctrinaire observers.

Obviously, the official ideology could not gloss over so blatant a discrepancy between ideal assumptions and social reality. It has, however, a well-formulated rationalization for this state of affairs: in the official view, adopted by many Israeli Jews (Ashkenazi and Oriental alike), the social disability of the Orientals is merely temporary; as they and their children are gradually educated and westernized, they will be able to achieve ever higher social and economic positions and will thus be absorbed into the mainstream of Israeli society. (The actual perpetuation of the socio-economic gap is often ignored in such arguments.) The existing disabilities, it is asserted, should under no condition be seen as a result of deliberate discrimination—on the contrary, every effort is (and should be) made to further the advancement of the Orientals. Arrangements such as *norma beth* (a lower criterion for judging scholarly achievements applied in schools with predominantly Oriental children) are advanced in support of this assertion; the success of some Orientals in the fields of education, politics, and the army is said to be proof that progress has actually been made. If this trend continues, the argument goes, the present division between Ashkenazim and Orientals will eventually disappear.

Such reasoning provides the ideological underpinnings for the perpetuation of what could be called an ethnic *status quo* in Israel. In spite of the almost unchanging ethnic gap, the vast majority of Orientals did not revolt against the system. They continued to accept the premises of Ashkenazi superiority, the requirement of full assimilation to Western culture, as well as the Western standards of competence as prerequisites for full participation in Israeli society.[17] The socio-economic gap, coupled with the current low regard for Oriental culture and widespread contempt of Oriental origin, caused an internal split in the Oriental Jewish community: those of their number who have 'made it', who had succeeded economically or even politically, tended often to become alienated from their origins. In the process, the Orientals lost their ablest potential leaders. Those who did not succeed either continued to

believe in the system or became apathetic. Though people harboured innumerable complaints of neglect and discrimination,[18] they were generally not inclined to act militantly, or violently, in order to change their lot.

Admittedly, at different times some ethnic Oriental movements and organizations had come into being, but their influence had been limited; they were of two types: organizations initiated by pre-State Sephardim and political movements set up by immigrant Orientals. The former were often led by persons who had enjoyed high social status in traditional Palestinian society, but had lost it through Israel's transition to modernity; the most prominent example of such an organization is the Jerusalem Council of the Sephardi Community.[19] The movements of the latter type were led by immigrant leaders who often used the ethnic factor as a means of rising to political prominence. Several attempts have been made to organize ethnic political parties; the most notable is the party founded by one Ben-Haroush, the Moroccan leader of the ethnic disturbances in Wadi Salib in Haifa in 1959, which—like the Panthers—also caused extensive agitation among Orientals. However, these ethnic organizations and political movements did not enjoy widespread or lasting support. The old-timer organizations nursed complaints too narrow to be of wide public appeal. The immigrant movements were in most cases quickly co-opted by the established political parties, or neutralized by the establishment. The ethnic *status quo* between Ashkenazim and Orientals was never seriously threatened by any organization or movement.

III

The ethnic *status quo* is now put in question by a new generation of under-privileged Orientals whose parents came to Israel in the past twenty years or earlier. During their school years in Israel they heard much of the essential unity and equality of all Jews in the land. Members of this generation served in the Army; they fought in the Six-Day War, and later took part in the prolonged and exacting fighting. They were led to expect real social and economic equality with Ashkenazim—but most of them are nowadays almost as far removed from such equality as were their fathers nearly a generation ago, and as estranged from the young Ashkenazim as their fathers are from the veteran European immigrants. A great number continue to live in congested and run-down immigrant areas; when they marry they find it hard to secure adequate housing and are forced to live with their parents. Many work in unskilled occupations or do not hold steady jobs. There is a sizeable minority, particularly in the larger cities, who live on the margin of society; they engage in shady deals and become recruits of the burgeoning Israeli underworld. This generation is largely alienated, disillusioned, and embittered; they speak sarcastically of the

official ideology, are mistrustful of the political parties and national institutions, and are wary of being manipulated by vested interests. It is from this group that the Black Panthers sprang up. And, since the Black Panthers gave vehement voice to a widely felt dissatisfaction, the identification with their cause and the support they enjoyed were much broader than the comparatively small number of the movement's adherents might suggest.[20]

Since the causes of dissatisfaction on the part of the under-privileged Oriental young are of long standing, what were the more immediate circumstances in early 1971 which led to the outburst of their pent-up bitterness? Since the Six-Day War, the authorities have been pre-occupied with problems of security and have tended to neglect internal social problems. The continuous international tension inhibited public exposure of these problems, and even the injured party was wary of creating internal strife in moments of national peril. However, after the cease-fire of August 1970, the frontiers were quiet.[21] Many Israelis then turned their attention from grave national problems to personal, day-to-day grievances.[22] In this situation one particular set of circumstances served as the spark which lit the fire of the Black Panther protest: the recent changes in the nature of immigration to Israel and in the absorption policies of the authorities. It is well known that the most recent immigrants, mainly from affluent Western countries and the Communist bloc, were treated exceptionally favourably by the authorities. The correlation between immigrant status and low socio-economic status, so common in Israel since the creation of the State, disappeared. The recent immigrants had been accustomed to a relatively high standard of living; many were professionals who would not forgo their previous living standards—even if they had been Zionists or had escaped from political oppression in Communist countries. The authorities, partly for political reasons, were anxious to give these newcomers every possible assistance. In addition, their arrival was heralded as the realization of the highest Zionist dream. All this contrasted sharply with the welcome given to Orientals when they had immigrated, as well as with their treatment during their many years in the country. The young Orientals objected particularly to the fact that small, relatively well-off, immigrant families were given large new flats and generous loans, while slum-dwellers were left in their overcrowded dwellings. It is not by chance that the Panther movement started in the slums of Western Jerusalem opposite the comfortable new Jewish quarters of the 'Eastern city' being rapidly built by the authorities and where many of the new European immigrants are housed. But beyond this complaint against material discrimination there was the larger issue of symbolic neglect. The Orientals claimed that the fuss made of the new immigrants was largely due to the fact that they were Ashkenazim, like the leaders of the establishment. They felt that in Israel,

in order to be considered a Zionist and a Jew in the full sense, one must be an Ashkenazi. They asserted that not enough was being done for their own social and economic advancement, because they were not the right kind of Jew. The Panther protest was largely intended to give vent to those feelings. 'Golda, teach us Yiddish' was one of the slogans in the Jerusalem Panther demonstration, while a rallying cry was 'Sephardi pride, Sephardi pride!' During the time of the demonstration they renamed the square where it took place the 'Square of the Real Jewry of Silence'—implying that they (and not Russian Jewry, to whom the term is ordinarily applied) had kept silent through all the years of neglect. At the same time Orientals complained that too little attention was devoted to the sad fate of the remaining Jews in Arab countries.

The main thrust of the Black Panther movement was directed against the government, which kept promising improvements in housing and living conditions for urban slum-dwellers but did not keep its promises, while at the same time providing the new immigrants with high-quality housing and good jobs. They held the authorities responsible for the demoralizing effects of slum conditions on Oriental youth: the up-surge in juvenile delinquency, the spread of drugs, and the rising number of drop-outs in educational institutions or in jobs. They wanted these young people to be taken back within the fold and to be rehabilitated—for example, by admitting them to the armed forces.

These various demands and claims of the Panthers actually boil down to one general assertion: the system blocked their avenues of advance and acceptance into the wider Jewish society, since, as long as their conditions of life remained what they were, they would not be able to change so as to become acceptable; while the system itself denied them the very means of altering their basic conditions of life. Hence the radical and often extremist character of their protest which often—though not always—had an ethnic slant. Their whole attitude was permeated by the conviction that the Orientals had been oppressed and cheated by the Ashkenazi-dominated establishment or even used for its ulterior purposes. One Yemeni intellectual, writing in the wake of the Panther protest, even went so far as to assert that Oriental youths died in Israel's wars 'in order that the Abromoviches and similar people . . . might be appointed as civil servants'.[23] Thus he questioned one of the most fundamental assumptions of Israeli society: that the sacrifices of the wars served the supreme goal of national survival.

Owing to their alienation from the system, the Panthers became convinced that they would not be able to achieve anything of import-ance unless they forced the establishment, by public pressure and even by violence, to yield to their demands. They therefore approved of violence as a legitimate weapon; violence was indeed resorted to in some of the bigger demonstrations. More broadly, some of the Panther leaders intended to weld the Orientals into a political force, which would

endow them with increased power vis-à-vis the Ashkenazi-dominated establishment. A few were even prepared to carry their struggle through even if it meant the overthrow of the existing political system. Those leaders were usually influenced by radical views from the extreme left, and often put their views in terms reminiscent of other radical 'movements of national liberation'. But even those who were not politically radicalized were intent on putting an end to the ethnic *status quo* in Israel. For the first time in many years the establishment had to face a radical force which enjoyed considerable popular support from under-privileged groups.

IV

The Panthers asserted that the complaints and frustration of the Oriental immigrants were not given a fair hearing in Israel. Their demonstrations, and the general uproar they caused, were intended to jolt the Israeli public into a clear awareness of their problems. More than any other protest group, they succeeded in gaining access to the top national leaders; they had a long conversation with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, as well as with many other ministers and prominent politicans. This face-to-face meeting gave the leaders a rare opportunity to gain insight into a social reality from which they are ordinarily far removed. It is doubtful, however, whether they comprehended fully the nature of the protest. The impression one received of their reaction was that of a usually benign and often blatant paternalism. This attitude was most clearly expressed by Mrs. Meir who remarked, after the violent demonstration of the Panthers in Jerusalem: 'They [the Panthers] were good boys, and I hope that there are some among them who will be good boys; but there are a few, I am afraid, who will not change any more.'

Mrs. Meir was ordinarily more defensive than the other leaders when speaking of the Panther problem and inclined to point out that the responsibility for the under-privileged position of the Orientals is not to be placed on the Israeli government, but is rather a consequence of the discrimination and deprivation they had suffered in their countries of origin and had 'brought with them to Israel'. Some other leaders, notably Mr. Alon (the Minister of Education and Culture), were more prepared to admit that the system was at least partly to blame, though none of them would agree that violence was a legitimate—let alone effective—means of influencing policy.

At the same time the national leadership took some energetic steps to deal with the Panther threat and to prevent the spread of unrest. Some of the demands were fully accepted and considerable sums of money were at once appropriated to deal with pressing problems in the urban slums, such as rehabilitation, youth programmes, and education.

At the same time, the leadership attempted to neutralize the Panthers through the co-optation of their leaders, while the police applied a stick and carrot policy, intended both to intimidate and to mollify. The leadership, however, was also astute enough to lend support to Oriental ethnic organizations attempting to represent ethnic demands within 'legitimate' political frameworks, for example, the Alliance of Moroccan Immigrants. This support was intended to canalize the rage engendered by the Panthers into more manageable forms.

The Panther phenomenon led to considerable public discussion of the nature and causes of the problems it represented, and of the most appropriate ways of dealing with it. The politically most conservative view is one which approaches the problem from a *cultural* angle. On this view—to which, as already mentioned, Mrs. Meir's attitude seems to have closely approximated—the lot of the Orientals cannot be improved unless they change their 'backward' customs: Orientals were advised to spend less on family celebrations[24] and to use their money more 'rationally'. They were asked to work harder and to achieve by their own efforts the economic benefits which they claimed as their due. The cultural approach also stresses the demographic problem, an issue of considerable confusion: Oriental families tend to be large—and though a high rate of reproduction is still officially encouraged in Israel, some people have recently started to argue that family planning is a necessary prerequisite for the social and economic advancement of the Oriental community.

Another group of observers and politicians views the problem essentially in *economic* terms. For them, the primary problem is poverty, while the fact that the poor in Israel are predominantly of Oriental origin is a largely incidental factor.[25] On this view the Panther phenomenon should be dealt with as simply an outburst of economically depressed classes. Help to raise their living standards would then be the most adequate answer, since an improvement in their economic position would enable them to resolve their other problems.[26] This view ought to be less to the taste of the establishment, since it implies that widespread poverty exists in Israel in spite of the fact that it is a welfare state and in spite of the (at least nominal) socialist orientation of the ruling political parties. Great stress was therefore placed on the government's massive expenditure on security, which had top priority. And the Defence Minister, Mr. Moshe Dayan, even went so far as to proclaim that Israel cannot bear at one and the same time 'the banner of security and the banner of social reform'.

Perhaps the most widespread approach to the problem (and one which is at least implicitly critical of the government) sees the Panther phenomenon as a consequence of failures in Israel's *social policy*. According to this view the Panthers emerged as a result of the unofficial and often thoughtless neglect of the Orientals. It was necessary to face

social problems more vigorously, to improve housing conditions, to improve educational facilities, to create employment opportunities for marginal young Orientals, and to recruit them into the Armed Forces. Those who put forward such proposals would actually go a long way towards meeting the demands of the Panthers; but they usually rejected violence as a legitimate means of expressing these demands and showed concern to redirect the Panthers' resentment into 'positive' action. One ingenious proponent of this attitude would even like to turn the Panther leaders into street-group workers and use them to fight juvenile delinquency in their own neighbourhoods.[27]

It is interesting to note, however, that none of the social commentators and national leaders openly advocated a *political* approach to the problem: a change in the *balance of power* between Ashkenazim and Orientals, a disruption of the existing ethnic *status quo*. Such an approach would be illegitimate from the point of view of the ideology of 'national unity', according to which ethnicity is not a legitimate power basis. There was readiness for some concessions, for instance, for a greater articulation of Oriental demands within the existing political framework as well as for greater cultural pluralism instead of a rigid emphasis on the melting-pot ideal. On the other hand, there was no readiness at all to give in on one of the major points of the Panther protest: that only a radical change in the power position of the Orientals can generate a real change in their economic and social position.

Whether the concession that ethnic pluralism is legitimate represents a real change of policy, or whether it is merely political expediency, remains to be seen.

V

The Panther movement succeeded in capturing the attention of the Israeli public to an unprecedented degree. Since no systematic study of public reaction to the Panthers has been conducted, I shall attempt to outline only the most salient features in the response of the various social groups.

The liberals of Ashkenazi origin (composed primarily of a section of the intelligentsia and the professionals) generally showed an understanding and sympathetic attitude to the Panthers, but they usually opposed the use of violence. They often found themselves in the typical predicament of most liberals who support a radical movement: though genuinely willing to help, they were out of place in the movement, while the radical leaders were not very eager to accept their assistance.

The Panthers engendered widespread anxiety and resentment among the broader Ashkenazi public, particularly among the older European immigrants. They felt threatened by the rebels' demands and mostly

considered them 'unworthy' of any help, since in their opinion they did not work hard enough to improve their social and economic position by their own efforts, but were idle and tried to achieve by the threat of violence the benefits which the Ashkenazim had attained by hard work.[28]

Resentment of the Panthers, however, was not limited to the Ashkenazi veterans. It could also be found among the young, well-to-do, Israeli-born Ashkenazim, including the students. The latter have adopted until now a conformist, almost conservative stand on most social, political, and military issues. At one time it seemed that they would support the Panther's demands and thereby start a tendency for a more critical and radical attitude towards the Israeli establishment. However, at a 'sit-in' with Panther representatives at the Hebrew University a few days after the Jerusalem demonstrations, the students were already inclined to belittle the complaints of the Panthers against police brutality; they were treated with scepticism, irony, or even outright hostility. This attitude was strengthened by a kind of 'white backlash' in the subsequent days—which was expressed in private conversations, but only rarely in public.[29]

The well-established Orientals were divided in their reaction to the Panthers. Many of those who had succeeded in establishing themselves in a secure or respectable position within Israeli society, or who saw a likelihood of such success, generally resented the Panthers and saw in the movement a threat to their own social status. But those among them who, though personally comfortable, felt neglected or slighted by the system often identified with the rebellious movement or even supported it; or they tried to co-opt it for their own ends, as did, for example, the Jerusalem Council of the Sephardi Community, or the leaders of the Alliance of Moroccan Immigrants. Most interesting, however, was the reaction of the disadvantaged Orientals and particularly the young among them; the emergence of the Panthers gave an enormous boost to their pride and self-respect. For a while, there was widespread outright hostility against Ashkenazim and the system they dominated. Support for the Panthers was general, as was identification with them. However, only very few young Orientals outside Jerusalem actually joined the movement, in spite of efforts by the Panther leadership, and of the emotions which they engendered. They did not succeed in rousing a mass-movement, even among those who were closest to them in origin and social position. The reasons for this singular failure are discussed in the following section.

VI

The Panthers generated a considerable amount of activity in the first few months after their emergence. Youth programmes for slum children

were hastily launched by the government and the Jerusalem muni-
cipality. Various voluntary groups offered their help for community
action in Musrara, the neighbourhood in which the Panthers had
started. Radical groups on the left and on the right attempted to
penetrate the movement or to use it for their own purposes. A group of
several scores of marginal youths managed to stir up a greater amount
of social action, re-evaluation of existing policies, and general concern,
than the 'moderate' Oriental leadership had achieved in twenty years.

In the beginning the Panthers took the uproar they had created in
their stride. They outmanœuvred successfully the attempt by various
ethnic organizations and extremist political movements to co-opt them
for their own purposes; they also usually disdained offers of practical,
well-meant aid on the part of various voluntary organizations and
groups; for example, they showed little interest in direct community
action programmes in their own neighbourhood. They saw in the large
government appropriations for social programmes and the general con-
cern for their demands signs that their tactics were successful. They
hoped that by spreading the protest into ever broader circles and by
intensifying their struggle they would eventually be able to revolution-
ize the status of the Oriental community.

The Panthers, however, were not able to live up to the task they had
set themselves. After the initial successes the movement gradually lost its
impetus and started to decline. The rebels never succeeded in transform-
ing an intensive emotional protest movement into a well-organized large-
scale movement with clear goals and a cohesive programme of action.
The reasons for their decline are manifold and not all of them can be
appreciated without a thorough analysis of the internal dynamics of
the movement, which is beyond the scope of this paper.[30] There are
some immediate reasons for their decline: for instance, dissent among
the leaders or the co-optation of some of the latter by the authorities.
The increased attention to the problems of the under-privileged and
the programmes of social action initiated by the government also
probably helped to reduce the agitation among the most disadvantaged
Orientals and made them less responsive to the Panthers' battle-cry.

Another set of reasons for the failure of the Panthers is due to the
fact that they were originally a neighbourhood gang. There was an
intense particularistic solidarity among their leaders which could not
easily be extended to other groups;[31] and other neighbourhood groups,
though essentially in agreement with the Panthers' goals, would not
easily accept their leadership. Instead, like-minded youths in many
areas founded short-lived protest movements of their own; these con-
tinued to proliferate in 1971.[32] But there was no single leader of these
movements, the Panther leaders included, who had enough charisma to
attract all the various groups and to create an organization of nation-
wide proportions. In addition, the fact that several Panther leaders

were drop-outs or had a criminal record estranged the 'straight' Orientals who often sympathized with their cause but found it difficult to identify with the leaders.

VII

The deepest reasons for the Panthers' failure, however, to my mind, lie on the structural and ideological plane. They were not in a position to create a new 'social myth', a radical ideology of a force compelling enough to make people break away from their traditional attachments and attitudes and embark upon a path of radical transformation of the whole society. They themselves, and those they addressed, were still too much attached to the fundamental assumption of the 'unity of the Jewish nation' and had too strong a stake in the survival of Israel as a 'Jewish State', to create a radically separatist Oriental ideology. The Panthers therefore equivocated between identification with the basic premises of Israeli society and a demand for full acceptance in it on the one hand, and the emphasis upon a separate Oriental Jewish identity, with its at least implicit disloyalty to an Ashkenazi-dominated state, on the other. Unable to take a clear stand, they could not go beyond the point of mere social protest.

The Panthers aired a demand for a greater concern with the plight of the lower-class Oriental Jews in Israeli society, for more equality among the ethnic groups, more social participation of the Orientals, and quicker national integration. They emphasized their Jewishness and their wish to belong. Their demand for equality and belonging was symbolized, *inter alia*, by their claim for marginal youths to be allowed to serve in the Israeli army: one of the splinter movements even called itself 'Blue-White Panthers'.[33] But the Panthers also aired the rage of the disadvantaged Orientals over their helplessness and their frustration when facing what to them appeared as the Ashkenazi monopoly on Jewishness in Israel. They therefore strove to achieve more power over and against the Ashkenazim within the framework of the Jewish community in Israel. Most Panther leaders stressed that they did not accept the assumption that one has to assimilate to the Ashkenazim in order to achieve full acceptance in Israeli society; they demanded the acceptance of Orientals *qua* Orientals, and attempted to revive the pride of the Orientals in their origin ('Sephardi pride!'). Some leaders, but not many, praised the traditional Oriental values and way of life and rejected the common tendency to discard these values in favour of the western ones. Implicit in the Panther protest was always the threat that if equal participation with the Ashkenazim was not conceded and if they continued to be treated as 'second-class Jews', the Orientals might attempt to 'go it alone', by dissociating themselves from Ashkenazi Jewry and establishing themselves as a separate community with its own identity: two Jewish nations would

then exist in Israel. Some of the leaders indeed manifested a separatist tendency, verging sometimes on outright disloyalty to the State. However, the Panthers did not dare to raise openly the banner of separatism, and most of their leaders would probably shrink from the more extreme consequences of such an attempt to break the 'unity of the Jewish nation'. It is, moreover, doubtful whether under prevailing conditions such a separatist call could indeed be effective. Conditions in Israel so far have simply not reached the stage at which the leaders of protest movements are likely to decide that they can achieve their goals only by a call to separatism, by something similar to a 'struggle for national liberation'. Only if there is a prolonged period of peace during which social problems continue to be neglected and most resources devoted to the absorption of new immigrants, would conditions be created which would lead to a total disenchantment of the under-privileged Orientals, and foster the appearance of a powerful separatist myth, leading to a 'Sephardi Revolution'.[34] Such an outcome is unlikely, since the authorities have already started to pay increasing attention to the problems of poverty and of the under-privileged and marginal social groups. They have placed renewed emphasis upon ethnic pluralism and started to curtail the privileges of new immigrants. More could obviously be done if the country were at peace with its neighbours: resources now devoted to national defence could then be used for more expenditure at home. If more is indeed to be done in the future, there will have to be a continuance of some radical social protest, to spur the authorities to change their attitudes, to make concessions, and to take effective steps to alleviate the social conditions of the under-privileged.

The likely long-range effect of the Panther movement upon Israeli society might then well have been that they catalysed some of the latent tensions into open protest and thereby initiated—or at least speeded up —a process of cultural and political pluralism in Israel. The Panthers strengthened the awareness of the masses of Oriental immigrants and their claims for fuller participation in Israeli society *qua* Orientals. The established political parties and the government will be forced willy-nilly to take cognizance of these claims in the future. The Panthers have therefore contributed to the gradual breaking up of the ethnic *status quo*, without, however, effecting any dramatic changes in it or in the system which produced it. In consequence, it seems that, similarly to what is occurring in other countries (notably in the U.S.), in Israel too there are the beginnings of a gradual reformulation of the fundamental ideal of democratic participation: from an 'equal right to be similar' (symbolized by the slogan of the melting-pot), to an 'equal right to be different' (symbolized by renewed ethnic pride and self-consciousness and a growing mutual tolerance and respect among differing cultural traditions).

NOTES

[1] I am indebted to Mrs. Yael Atzmon, Miss Dvorah Bernstein, Professor S. N. Eisenstadt, Dr. Yohanan Peres, and Mr. Gadi Yatziv, for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[2] These demands were set out in a series of leaflets distributed at meetings and demonstrations organized by the Black Panthers in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

[3] Public morale in Israel was very low in the first months of 1967; it rose enormously during and after the Six-Day War, and remained high until the renewal of the fighting during the so-called 'War of attrition' on the Suez Canal, when it started to decline again. (This generalization is based upon the Current Surveys of Public Opinion conducted periodically by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. See also the article by E. Livneh: 'The Spiritual Significance of the Six-Day War', *Ma'ariv*, 28.4.71, in Hebrew.)

[4] See, for example, S. Deshen, ' "The Business of Ethnicity is Finished?" The Ethnic Factor in a Local Election Campaign', to be published in A. Arian, ed., *The 1969 General Elections in Israel*.

[5] See M. Lissak, *Social Mobility in Israel Society*, Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1969, pp. 76 ff.

[6] G. Feaver, 'The Panther's Road to Suicide; a Black Tragedy', *Encounter*, May 1971, p. 30.

[7] The study is being carried out by Miss Dvorah Bernstein, of the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is supervised by the author. Miss Bernstein supplied extensive detailed information for this paper.

[8] The first of these splinter movements in Israel asserts the existence of an Israeli or Hebrew identity for all inhabitants of the country, Jewish and Arab alike. The second asserts the existence of a broader 'Semitic' identity of all Middle-Eastern peoples.

[9] Some of the data relating to the differences between Ashkenazim and Orientals are summarized by Lissak, op. cit. S. Samuha and Y. Peres, in an as yet unpublished paper, survey systematically the economic, educational, and political gap between the Israeli Jews of Euro-American and those of Afro-Asian origin. The raw data for most economic and educational indicators of the gap can be found in current publications of the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (for example, the *Statistical Yearbook* and *The Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*); data on the relative strength of Orientals and Ashkenazim in local government were presented by Shevah Weiss, *Local Government and its Leadership in Israel*, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, in Hebrew, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1968.

[10] This cultural pressure on Oriental Jews was observed by R. Patai as early as in 1949–51; see his *Israel Between East and West*, 2nd edn., Westport, Conn., 1969.

[11] This has been conclusively demonstrated in Samuha and Peres's unpublished paper mentioned above.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] A recent survey of the rent-paying inhabitants of government housing projects showed that almost three-quarters of them are Orientals and only one quarter are Ashkenazim. See *Amidar Tenants Survey 1968*, in Hebrew, Amidar (Israel National Housing Corporation for Immigrants) and Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series No. 328, Jerusalem, 1970, p. 1.

[16] These terms are often colloquially employed in Israel. There existed a 'Second Israel' movement of Oriental Jews.

[17] This point emerges very clearly from Y. Peres's data on the aspirations of Orientals to intermarriage with European Jews, their readiness to live with them, as well as their desire that no differences remain in the future between the two groups. See Y. Peres, 'Ethnic Relations in Israel', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 76, No. 6, 1971, pp. 1032 ff.

[18] In this context, an incident in one of the development towns some years ago is often mentioned: an Oriental applicant for a job was rejected when he put down his real country of origin on the application form, but accepted when he put down a European country. This incident caused considerable stir in Israel at the time, since it was interpreted as one of the few cases in which it was possible to

demonstrate outright ethnic discrimination.

19 The Council publishes a monthly bulletin *Be' Ma'aracha* ('In Strife'); it also sponsored two vitriolic attacks on the Ashkenazi-dominated establishment, written by M. Selzer: a pamphlet called *The Outcasts of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1965) and a book, *The Aryanization of the Jewish State* (Black Star Publishing Co., New York, 1967). See also W. P. Zenner: 'Sephardic Communal Organizations in Israel', *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1967, pp. 180 ff.

20 This fact was brought home to me very clearly during field work in a mixed Jewish–Arab town in the summer of 1971. Many Jewish marginal youths, though not members of the Panther movement, strongly identified themselves with the views and the tactics of the Panthers.

21 Even now, however, the external danger to Israel serves as a moderating factor; consider, for example, the following statement by a leader in a club for marginal youth in the above-mentioned mixed town: 'I am opposed to the Panthers as long as there is no peace. Security of the state comes before everything else. When there will be peace, there will be fratricidal war [in Israel].'

22 The Current Survey of Public Opinion of November–December 1970 points to an increased preoccupation of the public with personal problems and cares, as opposed to the preceding periods of intense concern with national security.

23 Y. Nini, 'Thoughts on the Third Holocaust', *Shdemoth*, Spring 1971, in Hebrew, p. 58. See also, A. Rubinstein's response, 'The Gap, Discrimination and Hatred', *Haaretz*, 21.5.71, in Hebrew.

24 For example, by Mr. Z. Sheref, the Minister of Housing; see 'Middle East: Israel's Other War', *Time*, 21 June 1971, p. 25.

25 This point is made, for example, by C. Adler in an as yet unpublished paper entitled 'Inside Israel in the Seventies', to be included in a forthcoming report published by the American Jewish Committee. Some observers also called attention to the existence of poor Ashkenazim; see, for instance, the article by the well-known journalist L. Y. Yerushalmi, 'Poverty of Ashkenazim', *Ma'ariv*, 28.5.1971, in Hebrew.

26 M. Atar, 'The Black Panthers and the Economy', *Jerusalem Post*, 27.5.71.

27 Y. Cahana, 'The Panther Phenomenon is Preferable to Delinquency', *Haaretz*, 25.5.71, in Hebrew.

28 Typical of this attitude of the old-timer Ashkenazi was the piece by the Hungarian-born humorist Y. Lapid, 'To the Hungarian Panthers!', in *Ma'ariv*, 25.5.71, in Hebrew.

29 There appeared, for example, many graffiti unfriendly to the Panthers in the lavatories of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in which students gave vent to an intense hostility to the Panthers which they would generally not express in public.

30 Such an analysis is undertaken in Miss Bernstein's study.

31 I am indebted for this point to Miss Bernstein.

32 One of the most recent of these called itself 'Organization of Sabras [native-born] in Want of Housing'; this movement used particularly vitriolic phrases in their attacks against the new immigrants and their special privileges.

33 Blue and white are, of course, the colours of Israel's flag.

34 This was the phrase used in a biting article by Y. Ben-Porath, 'On the Verge of the Sephardi Revolution', *Haaretz*, 17.6.1971, in Hebrew; the author, a Sephardi, lived in the U.S. when he wrote the article.

NEW COMMUNITY

Journal of the Community Relations Commission

Editor: Sheila Patterson

This is a new general journal of record, analysis and debate for all who are working in, or concerned with, the field of race and community relations in Britain. The first issue was mainly concerned with the theme Britain, Europe and Migration; the second with Community Relations Work in Britain; and the third with Migrations and Minorities. Each number includes other features and regular reports from correspondents, research and action notes, and book reviews.

Other contributors will include: Christopher Bagley, Jocelyn Barrow, Dennis Brooks, Eric Butterworth, Errol Hill, Peter Loizos, Robin Ward.

BOOK REVIEWS

HERIBERT ADAM, ed., *South Africa, Sociological Perspectives*, xii + 340 pp., Oxford University Press, London, 1971, £3·50.

This is a valuable collection of papers. In his opening sentence the editor rightly observes that 'there is no paucity of publications on South Africa', but whereas many add little to knowledge and understanding this book can be counted upon to repay the effort of any reader who takes the time and trouble to absorb and to analyse each of the fifteen separate contributions. For, taken together, the papers provide a substantial body of accurate, up-to-date, and significant information on contemporary South Africa. The authors are also to be commended for their admirable and helpful scholarly detachment, especially those who are or have been deeply involved in politics and committed to specific causes: their involvement has given special insight or understanding, while their critical scholarship has enriched their contributions.

Several disciplines are represented besides sociology—social psychology, political science, law, social anthropology, economics—but the emphasis of each contributor is upon the relationship of his subject to the social or societal *Gestalt*, rather than upon any restricted technical expertise, and it is this which justifies the use of 'sociological perspectives' in the title. Readers unfamiliar with details of the political history or economic development might at times wish for a systematic exposition of the important details of, say, the electoral laws, and of past election results, and the policies of the contestant parties and rival leaders, but a great deal of the relevant information can be readily deduced or discovered by a discerning reader of all the appropriate contributions. The volume also concentrates deliberately upon the events and tendencies of the past decade, as does the substantial and useful bibliography. This limitation of time or period possibly has more serious effects than does the concentration upon the 'sociological' as distinct from the political, economic, legal, and psychological aspects of human relations in present-day South Africa. One or two contributors even appear to suggest a definite wish to discount the influence of the past before 1960 or to minimize the significance of the diagnoses of past analysts. But this is certainly not true of most of the writers and Professor Mann, for example, very rightly pays generous tribute to Professor I. D. MacCrone, whose historical and psychological researches and findings of the 1930s as well as his subsequent work on 'race attitudes' continue to possess great significance. The whole volume, however, might have benefited from the inclusion of a general historical paper which highlighted the major demographic, constitutional, and other facts which illuminate the overall social structure. The past twelve or twenty-four years of a country like South Africa require to be seen within their full historical context, and it would be advantageous to include

even a select list of major thinkers and analysts of former years, such as Professor R. F. A. Hoernlé whose fundamental diagnoses retain their force. It is naturally impossible to give attention, let alone adequate critical attention, to each of the fifteen contributions. In my review copy each chapter is studded with questions: thus G. V. Doxey appears to adopt too narrow a definition of 'legalization' in his account of stratification in the labour market, while Richard B. Ford's interesting comparisons of urban and other frontiers in the United States and South Africa seem imprecise in certain respects. Kurt Danziger's stimulating ideas on 'modernization and the legitimation of social power' likewise seem to be over-ambitious at times and some of his evidence and assertions appear to be contradictory. But to be just to every contributor would require a review of each article in which one had space not only to enlarge upon one's questions but also to indicate the many statements or hypotheses with which one agrees. Certainly Doxey, Ford, and Danziger merit close attention, as do all the other contributors. It should perhaps be said for the benefit of the non-specialist that while the 'Comprehensive Bibliography on South Africa since 1960' is to be welcomed for its general usefulness it nevertheless contains a number of errors and omissions, while the reasons for marking some books, articles, and pamphlets as 'important contributions by social scientists' rather than others are sometimes obscure. From time to time also one is puzzled by the selection of particular publications for purposes of footnote illustration and by the exclusion of other examples of equal or greater importance. The reports of the Social and Economic Planning Council, and of certain perceptive and outspoken commissions of the Smuts–Hofmeyr era deserve to be cited and read or re-read.

It is particularly pleasing that in addition to the editor and his wife and to the contributors who have been mentioned, there are papers from Dr. Ellen Hellmann, Mr. Jordan Ngubane, and Mrs. Fatima Meer, as well as valuable reprints from Professors Gwendolen Carter and Philip Mayer. Professor Dickie-Clark on education and plural societies and Professor A. S. Matthews on security laws and social change add penetrating analyses which are based on detailed local knowledge and experience, while Professors Stanislav Andreski and Pierre van den Berghe contribute significant comparisons from an international standpoint.

There can be no doubt that this volume as a whole is well conceived and that it fills a gap both in sociological literature and among books which can assist a deeper understanding of South Africa.

<div style="text-align: right">KENNETH KIRKWOOD</div>

JUDITH BLAKE and JERRY J. DONOVAN, *Western European Censuses, 1960, An English Language Guide*, Population Monograph Series No. 8, viii + 421 pp., University of California, Berkeley, 1971, $3.25.

In the Introduction, the authors echo my own statement (in 'Jewish Populations in General Decennial Censuses, 1955–61: A Bibliography', in this *Journal*, vol. XI, no. 1, June 1969) about the difficulties of gaining access

to the decennial population censuses of foreign countries. Since they are located on the west coast of the United States, they apparently were not aware of the collection of censuses in the special library of the Statistical Office of the United Nations in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs in New York. Nor was an attempt made to evaluate the holdings of the New York Public Library. The Index to the volume reveals the major characteristics that are enumerated by each country in its decennial population census. There the demographer interested in data on the Jewish population can identify those countries that enumerate the religious composition of the population. For each country the compilers have translated both the titles of the *volumes* and the titles of the *tables within* each volume. In addition, a glossary has been provided of area concepts (e.g., *Stadt* equals town or city) and of demographic concepts (e.g., *Muttersprache* equals mother tongue).

This volume, then, is truly what it promises, an English language guide, and thus a most valuable addition to the demographer's tool chest.

ERICH ROSENTHAL

MIA BRANDEL-SYRIER, *Reeftown Elite: a study of social mobility in a modern African community on the Reef*, xxxvii + 335 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971, £3·50.

The popular stereotype of the *apartheid* policy probably envisages an African population unable to live on the land and reduced in employment to an undifferentiated mass of unskilled labourers. As a picture of the great majority of Africans this is true. But there is considerable social differentiation among urban Africans, and *apartheid* has contributed to this in so far as it has led to the withdrawal of Europeans from management positions in township institutions (of course this could be, and has been, done elsewhere in pursuance of quite different policies).

Mrs. Brandel's study was made in a township south of Johannesburg, one of those created in the housing drive initiated after 1950. The élite there are either public servants or self-employed. There has been a change in prestige ranking from the early days when the teacher was the most highly respected member of the community. Now only head teachers are élite, but this status is accorded to all new-type professionals, such as social workers. Status competition is fierce, and the game is played partly by 'up-naming' your own job and 'down-naming' other people's, particularly by calling someone 'only the boy'.

Of the sixty élite members from whom Mrs. Brandel got detailed life-histories, only four had been born in a large town, and the majority had first come to town to look for work when they were over twenty. They had not all been put to school by ambitious parents, as another stereotype would have it. 'Father was of the opinion that successful farming did not need education'; 'father had to agree although he had wanted me to work on the farm'. Mothers pressed their children to stay in school—particularly widows who saw in professional employment for their sons their best hope of security.

Influx control makes it always harder for newcomers to establish themselves in town. Except for qualified teachers, employment in the mines is the only safe way in, and all but two of the clerks, ministers of religion, and self-employed in the sample who migrated as adults came in this way. Then a good many graduated to the police.

Not the least interesting feature of this book is its frequent reference to studies in other countries of rural-urban migration, of life on new housing estates, and of the appearance of new standards of social differentiation.

<div style="text-align: right">LUCY MAIR</div>

COLIN CAMPBELL, *Toward a Sociology of Irreligion*, viii + 171 pp., Macmillan, London, 1971, £3·50.

Dr. Campbell's book is one of the first studies of irreligion, his fellow students in the field being Dr. Susan Budd and Professor Demerath. (Dr. Budd's thesis is not cited in the bibliography.) He defines irreligion as being concerned primarily with antagonism towards religion, and thereby excludes movements for which the secularist component is ancillary to other objectives. He recognizes immediately that such a definition begs the question concerning what is meant by religion. His solution to the problem is radically relativistic: religion is the dominant, established belief in any given society and the content of irreligion therefore alters with time and place. It also varies in degree and Dr. Campbell spends a considerable amount of time suggesting the fine gradations from established orthodoxy through to outright disbelief. He also indicates the variety of disbelief itself in that some desired the abolition of religion while others desired a functional equivalent less morally objectionable and more scientifically respectable.

At the theoretical level Dr. Campbell is deeply and rightly critical of a functionalist sociology of religion which he regards as over-emphasizing its positive functions and as being over-anxious to praise the ability of religion to solve problems of meaning. Like religion itself, problems of meaning are—in his view—a matter of cultural time and place, and different systems cannot really be compared with each other with respect to their ability to solve such problems.

His actual empirical focus is on those ethical and rationalist movements which petered out in the late nineteenth century and on the mid-twentieth-century appearance of organized humanism. The latter is of course very much a study in the politics of middle-class progressivism, and charts the kind of tension which also developed in C.N.D. between those with specific aims (in this case, irreligion) and those with wider, linked social and political objectives.

Inevitably the movements themselves seem small in relation to atheistic movements like Communism and to the diffuse expressions of religious apathy in culture at large. Moreover, his suggestion that cultural irreligion at *all* status levels dates only from the last century and a half comes at a time when Keith Thomas has indicated comparable phenomena in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed, Dr. Campbell's broad historical context

and his references to supposed biases in the sociology of religion are inevitably sketchy and poorly documented. But this is a useful book in its consideration of organized Anglo-American infidelity and its careful itemization of the relevant distinctions to be made in studying it.

DAVID MARTIN

AARON ESTERSON, *The Leaves of Spring, A Study in the Dialectics of Madness*, xxxv + 278 pp., Studies in Existentialism and Phenomenology, Editor R. D. Laing, Tavistock Publications, London, 1970, £3·15.

In this book Dr. Esterson continues the study of one of the eleven families described in *Sanity, Madness and the Family*, of which he was co-author with R. D. Laing. Like the other ten families, the Danzigs have one member who has been called schizophrenic, but whose reactions are seen as socially intelligible in the context of the family interaction. The book has two sections. The first gives a comprehensive description of family communication and non-communication, interpreting their meaning on both a conscious and unconscious level. The second part discusses the theory on which the study is based and suggests wider applications of such a theory.

The Danzigs are portrayed as a family who see themselves as harmonious when, in fact, they quarrel constantly. Mr. and Mrs. Danzig see themselves as loyal husband and wife and as loving parents when, in fact, their main concern is to satisfy a projected idea of what 'public opinion' requires of them. They see themselves as religious Jews, although their belief and practice are studded with contradictions. They see themselves as wanting their children to be independent, when what they really require is for them to be compliant while seeming independent. They see themselves as liberal and modern, wanting their children to lead a 'natural, normal life', but are in fact obsessed with anxiety about what the children might do sexually, and especially that Sarah may be seduced. They are incapable of seeing the contradictions inherent in their practice and in their ideas, what the author, after Sartre, calls their praxis; and so their communication is confused and confusing. Somehow, John is able to understand what is required of him, that is, that he can have sexual adventures if he does not talk about them; that he can disregard the Sabbath if he does so privately; that he can be aware of family conflict so long as he pretends in public that there is family solidarity, etc. But Sarah takes it all literally. Told by her parents that they live in harmony, she mistrusts her own judgment when she sees them quarrel. Warned about sexual dangers, she takes to her room. She reads the Bible half the night and is confused because this distresses her 'religious' parents.

I think one can accept that Sarah's actions are intelligible in terms of her family's communication system. One is less easily persuaded that this means that she is sane. There has been much study of families of schizophrenics; we do not have comparable studies of communication in supposedly normal families. I think it likely that, in any society which is changing as fast as ours, contradictory messages are inherent. Do we not, for example, preach the

virtues of meekness, charity, and non-worldliness while we teach our children to compete in games and study, and worry if they are less aggressive than their playmates? My own hunch is that most family communication is riddled with contradictions. What we do not know is why certain children adjust to it and imitate their parents; some revolt in various ways; and some, like Sarah, become helpless victims. Dr. Esterson sees the victims as chosen by the parents to be the scapegoat or safety valve for the parents' pathology. Although this seems a valid hypothesis, it perhaps represents only one side of the equation. That is, that there is probably something about the victim (whether genetic, chemical, or psychological) which contributes to his being chosen. Dr. Esterson's interpretation of this particular family system is that the Danzig parents, themselves still occupied, in phantasy, with bowel control, unconsciously experience Sarah as their own infant gut always in danger of imminent incontinence. He makes a fairly plausible case for this interpretation, but I for one find it hard to imagine that these two people, husband and wife, should be so similar in their unconscious phantasy life as to experience their daughter in just the same way. The parents incidentally are treated with far less sympathy than their daughter, and at times I had the feeling that the observer reacted to them as what he calls 'non-persons'.

But even if we assume that the author's interpretation is correct and also that Sarah's behaviour is a logical response to her parents' treatment of her, it still does not mean that she is sane any more than it means that they are mad. When the gates of the Nazi concentration camps were opened it was perhaps more surprising to find that most of the victims were sane than that some were mad. It is interesting and important to understand those forces which can drive people mad; but it is also important to understand what it is that makes some people succumb to pressures that other people are able to withstand. The latter problem is ignored by Dr. Esterson, as it is by Laing. He does admit that some people may be 'driven mad' and at times he implies that this has happened to Sarah; at other times the implication is that there was nothing wrong with her except that she did not act as her parents wished her to. He is scornful of the Danzigs for considering their daughter 'sick' because she spent long hours brooding in her room, refused to go to school or to work, ate irregularly, stayed up at night reading the Bible, heard 'voices' over the telephone, and thought people on the television were talking about her. (The last symptom was mentioned only once and not discussed.) He is even more scornful of the psychiatrists who labelled her as schizophrenic and thus led to her being treated as a 'non-person'. Since most of her symptoms could be understood in terms of the way she experienced her family, he contends that she is not mad; and the psychiatrist who saw her as mad did so because of his own middle-class prejudices. I think, however, that there is no society in the world, including those considered most primitive, in which such behaviour would not be labelled mad.

In the second section Dr. Esterson hits out at those psychiatrists who think that they are being analytic and scientific but who actually treat patients as if they were objects and who confuse conformity and middle-class morality with mental health. He does not specify what kind of psychiatrist he is talking about, but one gets the impression that he means the

great majority. Who are these psychiatrists who, according to Dr. Esterson, label a woman psychopathic 'if she has pre- or extra-marital relations', who diagnose a child as paranoid if the child shouts 'that her mother hates her and the mother looks hurt', who 'judge that a white South African who sees a black African as his equal is mentally unwell because he is not "normal" while a white racist is healthy'? I do not mean that no such psychiatrist exists, but when he so labels psychiatrists in general it seems to me that he is projecting his own phantasies in a manner not very different from the phantasied 'public opinion' that Mr. Danzig feels the need to appease.

I do not feel less strongly than Dr. Esterson that it is of over-riding importance to respect the patient; nor less strongly that the goal one should look towards should be the patient's and not the doctor's. However, the crucial problem for Sarah is not whether she is labelled lazy (her family's diagnosis in the early years), or sick, or mad, or eccentric; but whether she can be helped to replace her present lonely existence, an existence without love and without work, by a life that is meaningful for her. I agree with Dr. Esterson that such change is at least theoretically possible. The problem is how to develop a relationship which will not simply be a repetition of the disappointing relationships in the patient's (and perhaps in the doctor's) past; one which can give the patient enough support, and at the same time enough freedom, so that he can find his own way. How to achieve such interaction is the technical problem which has occupied all thoughtful psychotherapists since Freud's discovery of the crucial importance for therapy of the doctor–patient relationship.

Dr. Esterson describes his method of treating patients as 'dialectical science' which he defines as the 'study of the reciprocities of persons and groups'. He goes on at great (and to me rather confusing) length to describe the methods by which one can listen not only to the patient but to oneself listening to the patient, to the patient listening to oneself listening to him, etc. What he describes is not, I think, very different from Sullivan's 'participant observation', Reik's 'listening with the third ear'; or what Fromm–Reichmann managed, more than twenty years ago, to set out in a small book without the use of any jargon or even of very technical language.

'Dialectical science', however, has a much grander aim than a method of understanding and helping to resolve individual or even family conflict: to resolve conflict in society itself. To the author, the difference between what he calls macro- and micro-social praxis is only quantitative. He gives as an example of a micro-social paradox that of William who tells Mary he loves her but in such an indifferent manner that his non-verbal contradicts his verbal communication. A supposedly comparable macro-social paradox is that in present-day Britain both employer and working man are richer than they were eighty years ago. But this absolute increase in wealth masks the fact that since the proportion of the national wealth allotted to the worker is exactly the same now as it was then, the relative situation of the worker remains unchanged.

His is a theory which attempts to synthesize current psychoanalytic theory, the communication theories of Bateson *et al.*, the existentialism of

Sartre, and the political philosophy of Marx. I do not think that he succeeds. The contradictions of capitalism are not, in my opinion, comparable to the contradictory messages we all exchange with our fellows. Dr. Esterson's 'dialectical' approach not only results in over-simplification, but his need to find a single philosophical concept to explain everything leads to some rather surprising blind spots.

For example, in brushing aside as superficial and meaningless the Danzigs' preoccupation with being proper Jews, he seems quite unaware of the real problems of an orthodox Jew living in London. He says scornfully that to Mr. Danzig being an orthodox Jew means 'respectful, ritual demonstration'. Is he not aware that the difference between being an orthodox and a non-observant Jew is not one merely of religious belief but of just such ritual demonstration? Another instance is his statement about the Danzigs that 'in no other sense than the institutional could they be said to be married'. What other sense is there? Dr. Esterson's ability to close his eyes to whatever does not support his argument seems to me to be shown in a rather peculiar omission in this intensive study of a family.

An elaborate method of studying the family is described. The various members were seen as a group of four, and in various combinations with the observer. However, Ruth (the younger daughter) was, at the parents' request, omitted from the study. This is mentioned at the outset and she is referred to again only twice: once to say that she was too young to go out to dinner with the family and once, when the plan of the house was described, to say that she occupied a bedroom. Once it was decided that Ruth was not to be part of the interaction between family and observer, she ceased to exist. Sarah's relationship with everyone else in the family is considered in microscopic detail, but this child, born when Sarah was eight years old and now a young adolescent, is simply not considered because she was not part of the study. But how can one describe a family 'system' and make no allowance for the fact that one member of the five is not considered? Dr. Esterson makes a great deal of the different attitude the parents have towards John's and Sarah's early sexuality. He explains it in terms of their unconscious phantasy towards Sarah. To what extent might it not be due to their different attitude towards boys and girls? He would at least be on surer ground if he knew something of their attitude towards Ruth. John's rejection of Sarah and his alliance with the parents is described as an important precipitant of Sarah's illness. We have no idea what sort of relationship she had with her sister. And here, I think, we see one of the contradictions inherent in treating the 'here-and-now' interaction between people as the *only* relevant material. The 'here-and-now' is very important both for itself and because of the way we re-live the past in the present. But to deny that there is anything else seems to me to deny that the patient has ever had other meaningful relationships than the ones he is experiencing now, to deny a part of his history, and therefore a part of his reality.

However one may disagree with the author's philosophy, *The Leaves of Spring* is a stimulating and, sometimes, a persuasive book. Dr. Esterson is often a sensitive listener, and even if one rejects his interpretations, the Danzigs come alive under his hand. For anyone working in psychiatry his book is worth reading if only to become acquainted with a point of view

which has greatly influenced the present student population and consequently some contemporary attitudes towards mental illness.

<div align="right">DORIS Y. MAYER</div>

CARL FRANKENSTEIN, *Impaired Intelligence, Pathology and Rehabilitation*, xii + 244 pp., Gordon and Breach, London, New York, and Paris, 1970, £6·00 or $14.50.

CARL FRANKENSTEIN, *Varieties of Juvenile Delinquency*, xii + 252 pp., Gordon and Breach, London, New York, and Paris, 1970, £6·00 or $14.50.

The author of these two books is the Professor of Special Education at the Hebrew University, and both books deal, each in its own sphere, with problems that educationalists must solve. The related problems of defining, categorizing, diagnosing, and treating children who deviate in some way from what is regarded as the norm of child development and appropriate behaviour are major problems for educationalists and clinicians alike. The first of the two books looks at these problems in relation to intellectual subnormality, the second in relation to delinquency.

The books bring together Professor Frankenstein's writings, many of which have appeared previously. This collecting together has resulted in a certain unevenness of emphasis as well as a degree of disjunctiveness which can be irritating to the reader. The books are not easy to read, not because of any inherent complexity of conceptualization, but because of the style of writing and the presentation of data. It is easier to approach them as a collection of writings than as a coherent statement of a theory or as exhaustive coverage of the field. Looked at in this way, the variations in the depth of analysis among chapters in both books become less important.

In both works the author approaches his subject psychogenically and, while recognizing biogenic factors, attempts to show that the particular manifestations of either delinquent behaviour or intellectual impairment are directly rooted in the socio-cultural system as well as in personal experience. This emphasis, although not adequately supported by relevant data in the books themselves, is one that is well worth making, and could benefit from a thorough documentation, particularly in the areas with which these volumes are concerned. Too often, socio-cultural conditions are assumed to be simply variations in child-rearing techniques, or perhaps differing relationships between home and school; but the more subtle relationships that Professor Frankenstein suggests, and related variations in symptoms and behaviour, need to be closely examined.

One problem that is particularly vexing in the field of abnormal and deviant behaviour is that of defining the normal and the standard. Professor Frankenstein does not shirk this problem, and gives structure to the field by presenting his own typologies, and relating them to his definition of normality. In his chapter on feeble-mindedness he writes, 'Only to the extent that each change and growth, that is each expansion of a present state, each

egotranscendence and -enlargement is related to a phase of systematization and staticness, and only to the extent that systematization and staticness are not aims in themselves but a basis only for further expansion—can we speak of normal development.' While one could take exception both to the assumptions and to the manner in which they are expressed, we are allowed to understand the author's perspective on defining the deviant in relation to the normal. Whether one accepts his definition will depend very much on one's own theoretical position. It would have been useful to have had Professor Frankenstein defend his position against others who work in the same fields, in order both to distinguish and to clarify his assumptions. Particularly in the case of intellectual development, where there has been so great an advance in recent years both in theory and in research, the paucity of reference to other workers and to the experimental literature is disturbing.

Turning specifically to *Impaired Intelligence*, we find interesting ideas and a valuable attempt to order what could be a very muddled field. The differentiation of the congenitally feeble-minded from those who suffer from forms of secondary retardation is not new, but Professor Frankenstein expands and tabulates the differences, and further distinguishes retardation as a result of emotional deprivation from retardation due to social deprivation. In addition, the case for viewing the development of the feeble-minded as different from, rather than as slower than, that of the normal child is well documented and convincingly argued and its implications for testing and treatment clearly drawn. And yet, if we take the book as a whole, despite the undoubted value of much that is presented, the style in which it is written, the tortuousness of the phraseology, and the obscurity of the conceptual anchorages all tend to dull the spark of insight.

The work on delinquency is in many ways more satisfactory than that on intellectual impairment. It draws on a wider and more comprehensive body of literature, the arguments are tighter, and the presentation and style more readable. Although one can discern a relationship between the two works in terms both of general assumptions and basic orientation, the approach sits more comfortably with the work on delinquency. The chapter on waywardness and the following section on psychopathy are of particular interest. Together with the initial chapter on classification, they constitute half the book and reflect both the author's interest in the topics and the fact that he has previously published work on these subjects. The remaining chapters, on drifting and 'drivenness', on aggressive delinquency and on adolescent delinquency, are less satisfying and less coherent, depending heavily on the earlier chapters for detail and interest. They appear as after-thoughts, which may in time be re-presented in another form and prove more substantial. It is here that the book, as a collection of works not conceived as a whole, is clearly at a disadvantage.

Yet despite these faults the specialist reader will find interest in at least certain aspects of each of the books. For those involved in the care of the feeble-minded the work on impaired intelligence will be of interest, and the exhortation to the teacher to understand and relate to the emotional content of the child's thinking may correct a tendency to view intelligence simply on the cognitive level. The work on delinquency should interest a wider audience as one man's view of some varieties of deviant behaviour, rather

than as a wide and comprehensive presentation of the theory and research in the field.

<div align="right">BERYL A. GEBER</div>

ARIE JARUS, JOSEPH MARCUS, JOSEPH OREN, and CHANAN RAPAPORT, eds., *Children and Families in Israel, Some Mental Health Perspectives,* 634 pp., Gordon and Breach, New York, Paris, and London, £6·25.

This book of twenty-two chapters is really a collection of essays by some thirty contributors from various social disciplines: sociology, administration, law, social work, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, and anthropology. Although they all deal directly or indirectly with child and family welfare, they serve such diverse purposes as description of present society, an outline of historical development, a guide to available training programmes and social services, evaluation of present programmes, and planning for future research.

The first section, titled 'The Scene', describes Israeli life at many levels and from many points of view. We get some idea of the tremendous diversity in Israel of peoples, languages, traditions, economic and cultural status, family structure, and methods of child rearing. A separate and fascinating group of essays deals with childhood, adolescence, and family life in the kibbutz. The second section has to do with problems of what are called 'Target Groups': the culturally and economically deprived (who incidentally make up a third of the school population), the children who migrated to Israel without parents, the blind, the crippled, the retarded, the delinquent, and the emotionally handicapped. The final section, 'Ways and Means', lists and describes the various welfare services as well as the training programmes for workers in the behavioural sciences. The last chapter deals with projected planning and research.

It is perhaps symbolic of the spirit of Israel that this book follows the 'tradition' of reporting on child and family welfare each decade. That tradition started in 1950!

The first chapter, 'An Overview', describes the immensity of the country's social problems and puts them in historical perspective. Israel became a state in 1948. At that time there were 800,000 people. Twenty years later there were three million—most of the increase, of course, being due to immigration. These immigrants were very different from the early Jewish settlers who had come as socialist idealists mostly from eastern Europe and who, with a sprinkling of Zionists from all over the world, had succeeded in 'making the desert bloom', laying the foundations for a viable agricultural economy. Nor were they like the immigrants of the thirties and early forties, urban people from western Europe, sophisticated business and professional people fleeing from Nazi persecution; nor like the later survivors of the holocaust, often old, ill, irreparably scarred both physically and emotionally. The largest immigrant group in the last twenty years have been what are here called the Oriental Jews, the 'black' Jews from the Middle East, bringing with them many of the practices and traditions of the Muslim

world. Families were large and patriarchal. High mortality, morbidity, poverty, and sometimes illiteracy had been taken for granted. Women were of inferior status. Some (the Yemenites) were polygynous. These people had little in common with other Israelis except their yearning for a Jewish homeland, a yearning so little linked with reality that it often led to crushing disappointment. Many of them thought that in coming to the biblical land of milk and honey they were coming home as a child to its mother—home where all troubles are over and everything is provided. They found themselves in an advanced competitive society for which they had not the skills, the education, or the attitudes necessary for success. The many social problems they brought with them for themselves, their children, and their host country and the methods by which Israel has tried to cope with these problems, are discussed in an illuminating chapter by Dr. Louis Miller, Chief Psychiatrist of the Ministry of Health. For the most part, the older people have clung to their earlier ways of life, forming enclaves of poverty and deprivation. Immigrant children, caught between two cultures, have found solutions which seem related to their cultural background. Some children, from all immigrant groups, adapt quickly to Israeli values and often become estranged from their families. Others find more pathological solutions. The young Moroccans are likely to turn to violence; the eastern Europeans are more likely to become depressed.

The findings, discussed by Palgi, on both crime and mental illness, are of particular interest and significance for all workers in these fields. They lend support to the hypothesis that not only crime but mental illness, particularly schizophrenia, are related to certain kinds of external stress, especially the stress of moving from one sort of society to another. During the peak years of immigration from the Middle East (1949–57) crimes of violence increased sharply. This is in line with what was happening in the rest of the world. What was different was that in the following years, as the young immigrants were becoming absorbed and acclimatized to Israeli society, the rates dropped equally sharply, by 50 per cent from 1957 to 1964. Even more interesting was the parallel rise and fall of first admissions to mental hospitals for all causes in general, and specifically for schizophrenia. The rate for first admissions for Oriental males rose to a peak in 1958; and had dropped by 35 per cent in 1966. During that time the rate of first admissions for psychotic depression (which is twice as high among Europeans as among Orientals in Israel) showed no change.

Some of Israel's problems, like those of absorption of immigrants, are different only in scale from those of other industrial or semi-industrial countries. Some, such as devising vast social and educational programmes, are similiar to those in all fast-developing countries. But some problems are peculiar to Israel. Whatever the rights or wrongs of her being there (and this is not discussed), Israel is a tiny country of which one border faces the sea and the other three face countries whose avowed purpose is to push her into it. Thus she is an embattled country. Israel is also unique, not only for the speed with which she has grown, but because she was founded with a specific purpose, the provision of a Jewish homeland, a means of solving the 'Jewish problem'. Thus she has a self-consciousness, an awareness of identity, quite different from that of a state which has developed over countless

generations. This study seems very much an expression of such self-consciousness. Programmes and policies do not evolve; they are planned from the start. And almost immediately, the social planners look them over critically; if they do not work they are changed, or scrapped. They do not have the kind of vested interest in the status quo of countries with a long national history. Social policies can be planned to take advantage of current thought in a way which would be impossible in a country whose policies had evolved slowly over a long stretch of years. To take a very small example, the planners have carefully considered the best way of caring for children during episodes of fighting and particularly in those border communities which are always in a state of war. Only brief consideration, however, was given to the notion that children should be excluded from the danger spots. The findings of Anna Freud, during the Second World War, that children were more likely to be emotionally scarred by separation from their parents than by bombing, were accepted policies.

The essay by Dr. Shalit on 'Children in War' is one of the most fascinating in the book. Written by a woman who experienced war in Israel as a child herself, as a mother, and also as a child psychiatrist, she is peculiarly well qualified to explore the paradox of a people who 'greet each other with the word "shalom" but who must bring up their children against a background of war and permanent aggression'.

Most of the essays, or chapters, in this book are chockfull of interesting material. They are very uneven in terms of organization, clarity, and level of writing. They were written by distinguished people, experts in their fields. One gets the impression that many were written hastily and assembled without much care. Some of the material is repetitive. Some of the essays were obviously written by people for whom English is not a first language, and this has resulted in such malapropisms as 'problematic children' and children whose success at school has been 'entailed'. Other chapters are so full of sociological jargon as to make them almost unreadable. What does one make of a paragraph that begins, 'The postulate of maximization of rationality requires a specification of conditions under which maximization has to take place'? Although this could be a useful reference book, there is no index. Sometimes it is hard to tell whether the errors are of language or of proof reading as in the 'followink case'. The whole reads rather like a rough proof with mistakes on most pages. Since many of the writers are psychoanalytically oriented it is perhaps not unfair to end by pointing out an error which may spring from the unconscious. Of the twenty-two chapters in the book only twenty-one are listed in the Table of Contents. The missing one is the single chapter on the Arab family in Israel.

<div style="text-align: right">DORIS Y. MAYER</div>

ALVIN F. NELSON, *The Development of Lester Ward's World View*, viii + 67 pp., Branch-Smith, Fort Worth, Texas, 1971, rev. edn., $3.95.

We are offered a highly condensed view of Ward's career and life's work. There is a biographical chapter followed by four chapters dealing with the

years 1876–83, 1884–92, 1893–1900, and 1901–13. A short final chapter defends Ward's claim to have anticipated Bergson's theory of creative evolution. The author concentrates upon Ward's philosophical position rather than his sociology. No attempt is made to demonstrate either the truth or falsity, or the contemporary relevance or irrelevance of Ward's work. Potential purchasers should be warned that of the sixty-seven pages of this tiny book, fifteen are either blank or offer only chapter titles, and they will find neither a collected bibliography nor an index.

M. C. ALBROW

RICHARD H. OSBORNE, ed., *The Biological and Social Meaning of Race*, viii + 182 pp., W. H. Freeman and Co., San Francisco, 1971, $2.95.

One needs to keep up-to-date with scientific thought on racial matters, and it is not easy to do so. This little book, specially designed 'to discuss questions on race in a matter-of-fact and unemotional manner, presenting the most solid work of the scientific community and ignoring the brushfires around its edges' (p. vii), is a very good guide indeed. It is written for the most part with great clarity, and it does everything it can to clear unnecessary difficulties out of the path of the reader with a less than adequate knowledge of the basic biology involved. As a matter of fact, one might argue that it overdoes the editorial help to the halting reader by prefacing each of the contributions with a summary—knowledge so succinctly presented and so painlessly acquired may be of little use. One hopes that these summaries will not prevent the papers themselves from being studied carefully, more especially because some of them have been composed by such distinguished and authoritative scholars as Professors William H. Howells and Theodosius Dobzhansky.

The times being what they are, a book of this sort has to struggle against not only old-fashioned racialist bigotry but also the newer sort of racialist nonsense: 'egalitarianism'. It is quite right to say (and indeed we can say nothing else) that there is no evidence that racial groups are unequal in their genetic capacity; it is going beyond the evidence to assert that racial groups are and will continue to be equal. One might add that to argue fiercely that all men are biologically equal runs the risk of creating the impression that one's entitlement to equal treatment in society somehow depends on one's genetic heritage: a nasty paradox.

The book falls into two parts. In the first, 'Biological Factors', we find Dobzhansky on 'Race Equality', Paul T. Baker on 'Human Biological Diversity as an Adaptive Response to the Environment', Jean Hiernaux on 'Ethnic Differences in Growth and Development', and Albert Damon on 'Race, Ethnic Group, and Disease'. The second part, 'Social Factors', consists of: Frederick S. Hulse, 'Social Behavior and Human Diversity'; Thomas S. Pettigrew, 'Race, Mental Illness, and Intelligence: A Social Psychological View'; Francis P. Purcell and Maurie Hillson, 'The Dis-

advantaged Child: His Education and Life Chances'; Arthur A. Campbell and Clyde V. Kiser,. 'Nonwhite Fertility and Family Planning'; and Frederick Osborn, 'Races and the Future of Man'. In an appendix the editor provides 'The History and Nature of Race Classification'. The introduction, 'The Meaning of Race', by Howells, is capped by no summary and therefore, happily, will be read by anyone with a serious interest in the book.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

RAPHAEL PATAI, *Israel Between East and West: A Study in Human Relations*, 2nd edn., xiv + 394 pp., Greenwood Publishing Corporation, Westport, Connecticut, 1970, $12.00.

Originally published in 1953, the book has now been reprinted, and a 'postscript' and 'supplementary notes' added, in order to indicate 'The social and cultural developments of the last seventeen years'. The author is well aware that this treatment cannot satisfy the reader interested in present-day Israel, but as he considers the book in its original form to possess some intrinsic historical value, he was content with a compromise.

With the wisdom of hindsight it is easy to point out the faults and mistakes of an outdated book, while its virtues can be expected to have been incorporated in later work and improved upon. One is therefore surprised to discover, or to recall, as the case may be, how thoroughly this book deals with the relationships between Oriental and Western Jews in Israel, a problem that has only recently risen to renewed prominence. Patai traces in considerable detail the attempts of the authorities to 'absorb' immigrants from Middle Eastern countries in the first years of the State of Israel. The desire of the officials to make the newcomers the equals of the dominant Western Jews often amounted to outright contempt for their cultural heritage. This attitude is documented in excerpts from official pronouncements and newspaper articles, which make disturbing reading: for they reveal a paternalistic approach to the Oriental Jew, who was not consulted as to whether he wished his children to be westernized or not. Patai justly remarks in his postscript that this dilemma no longer exists for the younger generation: 'Although the Jews of Sephardi and Oriental extraction had attained the absolute majority . . . it has nevertheless become clear that the race has been won by the progress made in importing Western education, skills, values and other cultural attainments to the Oriental Jewish element in Israel' (p. 377). He indicates that, whatever the anthropologist might feel about the wholesale loss of cultural values, the Oriental Jews willingly underwent the transition. He feels that the next steps now ought to be to reduce differences in income and education, and to preserve the remaining cultural patterns of each ethnic group.

EMANUEL MARX

ROBERT PINKER, *Social Theory and Social Policy*, xvi + 226 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1971, £2·00.

ANTHONY PIEPE, *Knowledge and Social Order, The Relationship between Human Knowledge and the Construction of Social Theory*, 81 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1971, £1·50.

Here are two books from the same publisher illustrating a new-found confidence among British sociologists in looking beyond their discipline into adjacent intellectual fields, a confidence based on the belief that sociology can begin to repay its past debts to other disciplines. Robert Pinker aims to instigate the confrontation of sociology and academic social administration in order to promote more rational social policy. He shows how this has only just become a possibility. The founding fathers of sociology neglected the details of social policy in favour of broader issues, while the early exponents of careful factual research for administrative purposes relied on moral conviction to provide the intellectual framework for their reports. In the first half of his book Mr. Pinker explores this contrast by considering Durkheim, Spencer, Marx, and Weber, and then recounting the English history of social policy and administration from the Poor Law of 1834. He devotes the second half to examining the kinds of mutual benefit which may accrue from the collaboration of sociologists and social administrators. He identifies the different value systems underlying social welfare programmes and suggests that sociology can be utilized not to eliminate these, but to provide more systematic insights into the relevant social processes. His own choice to illustrate this is to apply the concepts of exchange and stigma to the social services and to show how they enable us to see why the normatively based approaches of selectivity or universalism in welfare meet with unexpected responses from the users of welfare services. It is in this kind of bridging of the gap between strong conviction and difficult facts that Mr. Pinker has most hopes of the contribution theoretical sociology may make to social policy.

Mr. Pinker's book will undoubtedly be widely and appreciatively read among students of both social administration and sociology and will be of immense use as a provocative stimulus to thought about the relations of the two disciplines. If important ambivalences about these relations are apparent in his work, this is only because the author is well aware of the conflicting currents and tendencies in each of the two fields. It is never quite clear from his argument what it is in sociological theory that is expected to rectify imbalances in social policy. One could argue, for instance, that the concept of stigma is more important in adding a dimension to the moral framework of welfare thought than as part of a predictive apparatus. Certainly, the moral commitment of the theories Pinker favours, those of Berger and Luckmann, Goffman and Matza, is quite as apparent as that of neo-Marxists he deplores, with their emphasis on alienation. A decision to view the world in one way rather than another is also a form of moral choice. He stops short of dissecting the philosophical problems of the relations between normative and empirical modes of discourse in social science, but to have brought the reader to the point where the relevance of such a discussion is clearly apparent

is a measure of the author's achievement in forging the much-needed links between sociology and social administration.

Normative thought is also a central problem area for Anthony Piepe, but he is concerned to show how a misconception of the relations of normative and cognitive expectations in social life has bedevilled sociological theory. He aims to illuminate the relationship between sociology and social knowledge through a critique of Pareto, believing that he tried but still failed to give a proper account of the place of cognitive expectations in any theory of society. Unfortunately the book is altogether too ambitious in scope for its length and too elliptical in its mode of expression to render the argument clear, as these examples of Mr. Piepe's style may indicate: 'If it is impossible to distinguish expectations as logical or non-logical, cognitive or normative, scientific or social, what remains is the assumption that the source of expectations is society, and their validation, synchronic and diachronic utilities' (p. 74); 'The question therefore of the scope of sociology is also an agenda for the role of knowledge in society, and of the forms and limits of human freedom' (p. 75). This book is also provocative, in a quite different way.

M. C. ALBROW

MOSES A. SHULVASS, *From East to West. The Westward Migration of Jews from Eastern Europe during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, 161 pp., Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1971, $8.95.

Every Western Jewish community was built up by immigrants, and migration is the key to much of modern Jewish history. Much attention has been devoted by scholars to the mass migrations from eastern Europe which began in 1881. But far less is known about the migrations of preceding centuries. Professor Shulvass's work is therefore especially welcome since it deals with the movement of Polish–Lithuanian Jews into central and western Europe, and even beyond to America, from 1600 to 1800. It is important to stress that the migration discussed is solely from eastern Europe. Hence the book can tell us much about the growth of the Jewish communities in Germany, where migration from Poland across the long land frontier was relatively easy. But Polish immigration was much less important in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Holland or France, and of little direct importance in England. Professor Shulvass attributes, for instance, the growth of the German Jewish population from 20,000 in 1700 to 65,000 in 1750 and to 200,000 in 1800 largely to Polish immigration. On the other hand, the impression he gives of Polish immigration into England probably overstates the position: in Plymouth (where we happen to have an aliens list showing Jewish immigrants during the latter half of the eighteenth century) only six out of fifty-eight immigrants came from Poland.

In explaining the migrations, Professor Shulvass considers as exaggerated the theory that pogroms were the main factor. While agreeing that the disturbances of 1649 and 1768 caused movement at the time, he sees two longer-term forces at work. The first was the progressive decline, impoverishment, and ultimate partition of the Polish–Lithuanian kingdom. The

second was the political and economic development of western European countries, and the willingness of their governments, albeit in varying degrees and with changes in policy, to accept Jewish immigrants.

One feature of the migration was the tendency of rabbis, scholars, teachers, and the intelligentsia generally to emigrate. Even Frankfurt-on-Main and the Altona–Hamburg–Wandsbeck communities drew their rabbis from Poland; and certainly in England, at least, Polish immigrants were better known as rabbis than as merchants or artisans (most of whom came from Holland or Germany).

Professor Shulvass also directs attention to the *Betteljuden*, the groups of Polish beggars who wandered across Europe, in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, causing grave problems to governments and local Jewish communities. Probably the swarm of Jewish pedlars and hawkers in eighteenth-century England and the London Jewish criminal class of the 1770s may have been a local reflection of this continental phenomenon. A subject on which this book only touches, and which deserves a monograph, is the relationship between the eastern European immigration into central Europe and the migration of central European and Dutch Jews, which had such important effects on English and American Jewry in the eighteenth century.

V. D. LIPMAN

LESLIE SKLAIR, *The Sociology of Progress*, xvi + 272 pp., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970, £3·25.

This is a daring book. Mr. Sklair sets out not only to document the sociological conditions for social progress, but also to write into the script a new, large—perhaps leading—part for sociology to play in the epic of human development. Vigorously taking issue with Bury, the author distinguishes different types of theory in order to show that the contention that the idea of progress was unknown until the late seventeenth century rests on an unduly narrow definition of the word. Thus he goes back to Greek science, arguing that men have always had an idea of progress, which he also finds (although he is rather sketchy on this) in Christian millennianism. Inevitably, most of his discussion of the concept also devotes itself to the Enlightenment, to Herder, Kant, Comte, and Marx, and on to Darwin, Spencer, and T. H. Huxley. Curiously, Hobhouse, with whose work Mr. Sklair's book shows more than accidental similarity, goes all but unmentioned. If at times this discussion is in danger of becoming commentary on commentaries on classical thinkers, there are, none the less, some interesting and (to this reviewer) new insights and convergences.

The purpose of this exposition, to which nearly half the book is devoted, is to prepare the way for a sociological theory of progress. Radically, it is argued that some idea of progress is indispensable to the continued existence of man as man on earth and specifically in society. The task of sociology is not only to explain progress, but also to provide it, since, says the author, men must want to solve their problems, hence to progress. This expression

of man's dreams may, of course, over-intellectualize the situation: individuals at any rate do not always solve problems—reality obliges them to content themselves with the containment of tensions.

The distinction that the author makes between different theories of progress turns on innovation: non-innovational progress proceeds by the wider diffusion of existing things, ideas, and processes; innovational progress by means of the production of new things, ideas, and processes. The former has little, the latter maximal, impact on society. Whilst societies may differ in their inventiveness, Mr. Sklair is concerned with the extent to which inventions have little impact (non-innovational societies) and those where they have great impact. 'Innovativeness' becomes the crucial distinction. The distinction appears to apply not only to societies but also to theories. Thinkers usually regarded as anti-progressive are now said to be actually progressives, but have been regarded as opposed to progress because they hold non-innovational (and usually anti-scientific) ideas of progress.

Interesting as this idea is, its relation to Mr. Sklair's core concern is not always clear. That concern is with moral progress and the guidelines for a rational ethic, but a rational ethic that is grounded not in logical analysis but in social life—a sociological ethic. 'The future of ethics . . . lies not with moral philosophy but with the study of man in society' is Mr. Sklair's latter-day Comtean claim. He avers, rather than establishes, that moral progress has occurred, 'is meaningful and measurable'. Duly exposing the weaknesses of ethical relativism, the author passes on to the functional imperatives of social systems, and to the exposition of a model for a sociological ethic. That ethic is to be based on intersubjective rather than objective criteria; it 'must accommodate all sociologically viable value systems'; is amenable to change; and 'operates on the conception of constraints on social actions and the possibility of moral responsibility'.

Mr. Sklair necessarily hedges in seeking to distinguish his position from both functionalist conservatism and Comtean authoritarianism. Thus the concept of disruptive forms of behaviour has to be dealt with circumspectly, for 'disruptive' is said to be an 'inflammatory' term . . . 'one man's disruption is another man's development'. The solution here is Comtean: 'in a future in which justice is fairness, and where well-known and trusted mechanisms exist for resolving disputes over the whole vista of societal problems, the necessity for these social controls is obviated'. The actual content of justice, fairness, the well-trusted mechanisms, and the social controls, remains unspecified. Elsewhere, however, Mr. Sklair is concerned with safeguarding 'the preferences of people in groups' (there appears to be an avoidance of conceding *individual* preferences). One of his assumptions is that 'social justice, mainly a matter of taking other people's preferences into account when social arrangements are being made, is on balance the most satisfactory basis of social organization'. It is when one comes closer to the specificity of the sociological ethic that one's persisting doubts about Mr. Sklair's thesis become most sharply focused. What does it mean to say, 'anything inhibiting sufficient reproduction, communication, socialization, motivation and role-differentiation, preferences, and institutionalization is morally wrong'? What, above all, is *sufficient* is respect of socialization? Might it not be contended that over-reproducing, over-socializing, and

above all, over-communicating, are ultimately greater threats to our survival?

It is at such points that the ambitiousness of his book betrays the author: it is all a long way removed from social reality, and whilst that might be all right for the moral philosophers (whom the author is inclined to condemn), it is less satisfactory in sociologists. He refers to the first part of his book as 'history', and the second part as 'theory': but, in fact, the 'history' is only intellectual history—events sieved through the minds of men who in their day and in their way were theorists, not really historians so much as philosophers of something that they all-too-loosely called 'history'. I doubt if Mr. Sklair will make many converts, but I hope that he will have many readers of his provocative, often stimulating, and at times brilliant study that dares to press so hard against the contemporary grain of sociology.

<div align="right">B. R. WILSON</div>

MARGARET STACEY, ROSEMARY DEARDEN, ROISIN PILL, DAVID ROBINSON, *Hospitals, Children and their Families, The Report of a Pilot Study*, xii + 180 pp., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970, £2·50.

This book is based on research designed to study the problems of young children in hospital, specifically to determine what has prevented full implementation of the 1959 Platt Committee on the Welfare of Children in Hospital. The best known of these recommendations has to do with the provision for some mothers to live in hospital with their pre-school children and for all others to be permitted unrestricted visiting.

The Platt Committee based its suggestions on psychological evidence, particularly that of Bowlby and Robertson concerning the traumatic effect of early mother–child separation. Little attention was paid to the social implications of unrestricted visiting either for the hospital staff or for the family of the hospitalized child. This pilot study, by three sociologists and a psychiatrist, attempts to redress the balance.

Its aim is to relate sociological and psychological factors, to develop techniques for making further studies, and to make practical recommendations to the Ministry of Health concerning the hospitalization of young children; and further to contribute to theory in the field of socialization. These aims, especially the last, are rather more ambitious than seems warranted by the scope of the research, but it is a painstaking piece of work and it is to the credit of the authors if the results in some respects highlight a drawback which is inevitable in studies of this sort. Thus, to satisfy their strict criteria for statistical comparability they limited the sample in various ways. To exclude differences in the nature of the illness, they had to select children undergoing the same kind of surgery. To exclude developmental differences, it was necessary to compare children of the same age. In order to evaluate the effects of the hospital experience objectively, they had to test children before and after surgery; this could only be done where the operation had been planned in advance.

A large enough sample, in a single geographical area, satisfying the above criteria, could only be found among children undergoing tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy. The final sample comprised thirty-two patients, in the fourth year of life, admitted to the Ear, Nose, and Throat Department of two hospitals in South Wales over the course of a year. The study excludes emergency admissions, which are the most common admissions for young children, and must certainly be the most frightening. Although 'having one's tonsils out' has the advantage of being the most common sort of surgery undergone by young children, it is probably also the least worrying. This then is not so much a study of hospitalization of young children as specifically of short-term planned hospitalization for tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy. The authors are well aware of these limitations which are, in fact, pointed out by Dr. Stacey in the introduction. It is partly to compensate for them that the main research was supplemented by an interview-based survey in which Dr. Robinson compared the attitudes of three groups of parents: those who have never had a child in hospital; those who had had a child under five hospitalized in the previous year; and a group of mothers who had lived-in with their children in Amersham General Hospital. This is a quite illuminating study especially when looked at along with that by Mrs. Pill, who uses the techniques of the ethologist to observe the children in hospital. Some of the findings might have been guessed by anyone with common sense, for example that the more children a mother has at home the less likely she is to be willing, or able, to spend long hours with her child in hospital. Other findings, although they seem no less reasonable once they have been pointed out, need just this sort of investigation before they become obvious. Thus, even a devoted mother may feel bored when she spends a whole day by the bedside of her child, with no function except to reassure him by her presence. A nurse may be reluctant to ask a mother's help in routine tasks because she feels that these tasks define her professional role. She may dislike long visiting hours because she feels under constant observation. The nurse's resentment enhances the mother's feeling that she is in the way, interfering with hospital routine. Thus, even where hospital rules allow all-day visiting there may be a kind of collusion between parents and staff so that the staff manages not to make the rules explicit; and the parents are quite willing not to know that they are entitled to unrestricted visiting.

The psychiatric research was conducted by Dr. Dearden. The parents and children were interviewed (the children by doll-play techniques) before hospitalization, and a week, two months, and six months after discharge. They were compared with a carefully selected control group. Half of the sample had appeared well adjusted on first and equally on last interview. About a quarter of the sample had been considered maladjusted at the first interview (a very high percentage incidentally when compared with other studies of British children) and they remained equally maladjusted. Another quarter had appeared well adjusted on first interview but showed signs of maladjustment six months after surgery. This was the group considered to have been disturbed by the trauma of the hospital experience. Analysis of this group of presumably vulnerable children was quite interesting, especially in those variables which were *not* found to be significant. There was no difference by socio-economic class, age of parents, or family

size. The variables which correlated positively with disturbance were: living in an extended rather than a nuclear family; being one of the younger children in the sample, especially a younger boy; being in a family who had few visitors and themselves did little visiting, and particularly in a family where the child had had little experience of non-traumatic separation, such as visits to grandparents. The disturbed children tended to have mothers who were either more, or less, anxious than average. There was also some indication that children from permissive homes were more at risk than those from authoritarian homes. However, it seems to me that the criteria for defining 'permissive' and 'authoritarian' were both narrow and arbitrary.

The final chapter is one of recommendations, all very sensible and practical, which merit careful consideration by all persons likely to be concerned with the hospitalization of young children.

DORIS Y. MAYER

DOV WEINTRAUB and associates, *Immigration and Social Change: Agricultural Settlement of New Immigrants in Israel*, xi + 278 pp., Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, and Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1971, £3·00.

The *moshav* has generally been the poor relation of the *kibbutz*. Lacking the ideological glamour and relative economic success of its more purely socialist (or, it might be argued, more rationally capitalist) sibling, the *moshav* has only recently been accorded the degree of attention which social scientists have traditionally lavished on the 'human laboratory' of the *kibbutz*.

This book, one of a number dealing with the sociology of the *moshav* which have recently been published in English, consists of a series of papers (some previously published) summarizing the results of research undertaken between 1959 and 1965 by Dr. Weintraub and several associates in the Sociology Department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In his introduction Dr. Weintraub explicitly eschews any over-ambitious aims: his object is simply to present 'the new immigrant village in Israel as a slice of life, valid and interesting in itself'.

The book contains a plethora of maps, charts, tables, diagrams, 'sociograms', notes, appendices, and folding-out pages, necessitating constant cross-reference. Tucked into a flap at the back of the book is a curious detachable 'organizational blueprint of the *moshav*', measuring 17″ by 25″, and enabling the reader to perceive refinements of *moshav* administration in tabular form: by this means we learn that analysis of fat-content in milk, location of fire-fighting equipment, and religious worship accessories are in the provinces (respectively) of the livestock, fire-fighting, and religious affairs committees. The authors themselves admit that 'most readers, we assume, will skip the extremely elaborate list, and take our word for the information contained'—which begs an obvious question. A general failing of this book is indeed an apparent attitude of '*numerosi nil a me alienum puto*' on the part of the writers. With rather engaging candour the authors concede that 'in order to present what we have presumed to call a "slice of life", we must state the obvious,

primarily because it is there, and also because it is so significant'. Unfortunately the primary criterion (surely more appropriate to mountaineering than to sociology) appears to have been invoked too often.

A second major objection arises from the nature of the research itself. The book is divided into two parts: the first details the results of research carried out between 1959 and 1962 in eleven selected *moshavim*; the second, in which the authors 'try to refine some of our earlier findings, study the continuing processes of change, and evaluate some of our earlier findings', is based on data collected from 1963 to 1964. But the value of this latter part is to a large extent vitiated by the fact that the second stage of field research was conducted in an entirely different set of villages. The result is tantalizing and seriously impairs the value of the book in its primary purpose: analysis of the character and pace of social change among different kinds of immigrant groups in the *moshav*. The authors' anticipation of this objection is a little lame: 'We might well have used up their fund of goodwill and our own welcome. . . . In any case, we had no desire to transplant to these villages the popular image of the Navaho family—supposedly composed of two parents, three children and a Harvard anthropologist.'

Nor do the authors remain within their own self-imposed limits of presenting a 'slice of life'. Instead the book is lumbered with otiose attempts to establish universally valid theoretical principles concerning such concepts as 'tradition', 'modernity', and 'change' on the basis of evidence so peculiar to Israel, and indeed to the *moshav* itself, that it can have little relevance to the problems of rural modernization anywhere else. This applies in particular to the twenty-two page 'Conceptual Framework of the Study' which might with advantage have been omitted altogether, and which suffers (as do some other parts of the book) from a proclivity to neologistic jargon at once irritating and obfuscating.

Notwithstanding these major drawbacks, however, the basic empirical conclusions of this work are both interesting and important. The authors demonstrate how crucial is the link between the nature of the immigrants' place in their home society and their capacity for successful adjustment to the economic and social demands of the *moshav*. The book shows how traditional social structures and loyalties, translated to the *moshav* context, can on occasion form vehicles *facilitating* modernization as much as barriers retarding it. This can even apply apparently to traditional *conflicts*: we are given, for example, a striking glimpse of one *moshav* comprising two rival *hamulat* (patrilineal kinship groups) transplanted to Israel *en bloc* from the Sultanate of Haban in the Hadramaut (formerly part of the Aden Protectorate). In Haban these *hamulat* had lived in close physical proximity but on terms of almost total cleavage in social and religious matters. Rivalry between the two groups had occasionally escalated to such a level that they polluted each other's *mikveh* with a dead camel or rotten fish. Transferred to the *moshav* the strife continues, and the two groups, while they live together, maintain their separate and exclusive identities. All the same, their conflict, because it is based on a common cultural consensus, and because it is both sanctioned and regulated by accepted 'rules of the game', in fact helps to render the new world of the Israeli *moshav* 'both familiar and reassuring', and thus to strengthen the underlying *stability* of its structure.

Special attention is focused on the outlook of youth in the *moshavim*. It is notable that here the old pioneering values formulated by the founders of the *moshav* movement are vanishing rapidly (even faster than parallel attitudes in *kibbutzim*). In a survey of the views of the 17–24 age group in a number of *moshavim*, positive commitment to the *moshav* as a way of life varied from 40 per cent (at the highest) to only 14 per cent. Few of its inhabitants (and even fewer of its younger inhabitants) now regard their membership of the *moshav* in ideological terms; instead 'the image of the farm as being primarily a family "business" is gradually becoming the accepted motivational pattern among the *moshav* youth'.

The *moshav* (like the *kibbutz*) is probably on the threshold of a drastic transmogrification. In spite of the reservations which this book inevitably provokes, Dr. Weintraub and his colleagues have provided a serious and frequently illuminating basis for the understanding of a unique and exciting phenomenon.

BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

CHRONICLE

The First International Symposium on Victimology will be held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in the first week of September 1973.

The National Organizing Committee state: 'The first task will be to delimit the scope of Victimology: Is it a branch of Criminology, or does it have wider implications?

'Next, we must focus upon the victim himself. How far does he lend himself to typologies, and what should be the basis of such typologies—legal, psychological, sociological, psychiatric? How is the victim affected by his involvement with the machinery of justice—police interrogation, encounter with his advocate, cross-examination in court, judicial consideration of his role at the sentencing stage?

'Thirdly, we must consider the offender–victim relationship. What is the victim's contribution to the commission of the crime? What determines the selection by the offender of the particular victim? These questions can best be considered in the context of the different types of offence. One must consider also the possibility that the offender may in turn become a victim whether of blackmail on the part of a private individual (his original victim?), of ill treatment on the part of the correctional institutions, or in some other way.

'How far must society take responsibility for the welfare of the victim? Compensation schemes are becoming increasingly popular—but would insurance provide a better solution? What clinical measures should be taken to treat a victim, and what can be done so that others will be prevented from acquiring this status? These are some of the main topics to be discussed—but the list is by no means closed.'

The languages of the Symposium will be English and French.

Additional information may be obtained from the Organizing Committee, Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.

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An Association for the Sociological Study of Jewry has been established in the United States. 'The purposes of the Association are scholarly: it will arrange academic sessions in its area of specialty (wherever possible, for convenience, in conjunction with meetings of other appropriate academic organizations), establish regular means of communication among social scientists studying Jewry, and prepare and distribute materials that can be helpful to people in the field. While the Association is sociological in its primary focus, it welcomes members from related disciplines who wish to participate in its activities.'

Further information may be obtained from the Association's secretary, Dr. Norman L. Friedman, Dept. of Sociology, California State College, Los Angeles, California 90032.

*

The small Jewish population of Japan is organized in two communities: in Kobe and Tokyo. The former has 35 Jewish families; it is Sephardi in origin and ritual.

The Jewish Community of Japan (Tokyo) was officially chartered in 1953, having been organized in 1948; it has now about 160 families. It is Ashkenazi in origin; the pioneers were Russian Jews who had lived in Harbin and Shanghai. Nowadays nearly half the members are American, about a quarter are Israelis, and the remainder are of many other nationalities—including Japanese. In general, the members are business men and professionals, and are semi-permanent residents of Japan. The Tokyo community maintains a synagogue, a religious school (which about fifty pupils attend three times a week), a library of about 1,000 volumes, a mikveh, a restaurant, and a swimming pool. The Jewish Community centre provides a class in Judaism for Japanese wives and adult seminars in Jewish History and Bible. The Centre also houses the Japan–Israel Friendship Association and the Japan–Israel Women's Welfare Organization, and it has co-operated with them to award scholarships for Japanese in Israel.

*

The Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel reported last March that 34,000 residents of the administered territories were employed in Israel in 1971, compared with 21,000 in the previous year. About 26,000 were from the West Bank and 8,000 from the Gaza Strip; they represented 19 per cent of the total labour force of the administered areas. Nearly 70 per cent of the workers were employed in the building trades (compared with 47 per cent in 1970); about ten per cent were engaged in agriculture, and 20 per cent in industry.

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A spokesman of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics stated last April that 13,000 immigrants arrived in the first three months of 1972—a rise of more than 50 per cent over the corresponding period in 1971, when there had been 8,500. The 13,000 include 3,400 'potential' immigrants (that is, temporary residents). In the first quarter of this year about 900 temporary residents had changed their status to that of immigrants.

During the whole of 1971 there were 42,000 immigrants; 26,200 became Israeli citizens on arrival while 15,800 were registered as 'potential' immigrants.

*

The Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel held a convention in Haifa last March. They have a membership of 32,000 veteran and recent immigrants. The Chairman is reported to have stated that there are about 40,000 North American Jews in the country; and that approximately half of that number settled in the country after the Six-Day War of 1967. In 1971 there were 8,500 immigrants, an increase of 12 per cent over the previous year.

There is a high rate of absorption failures: 21 per cent of North American immigrants return home within the first year of their arrival; but only 9 per

cent of all immigrants to Israel return home within that period. The secretary of the Association is quoted as saying: 'During 1949–53, 90 per cent of the North American immigrants went back. In the following eight years, 50–60 per cent went back. Between 1962 and 1967, it was 40 per cent; in 1968, 30 per cent and now it is 21 per cent . . . the reasons for the higher percentage of those staying are the better conditions for the absorption of the individual immigrant.'

*

The Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel reported last April that 7 per cent of Israel's 788,600 Jewish households live in overcrowded conditions. Fifteen per cent of the households whose head was born in Asia or Africa have three or more persons per room; 7 per cent of households whose head was born in Israel, and 1·4 per cent of households whose head was born in America or England, live in these conditions.

· The total number of housing units built by the Ministry of Housing in 1971 was 33,224—an increase of 20 per cent over the previous year. The total number of units (including private housing) completed in 1971 was 38,000. The Minister of Housing, addressing a symposium on housing held in Jerusalem last April, is reported to have stated that 49,000 units would be required in 1972 to cover current needs.

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Last March 77,500 tourists came to Israel—an increase of 57 per cent over the same month in 1971; part of the increase may be attributed to the fact that the Passover and Easter fell in March. There were 151,700 visitors in the first three months of 1972—an increase of about 52 per cent over the corresponding period in 1971.

The number of tourists in 1971 was 650,000 (twice as many as in 1966). There were 280,000 from North America; 70,000 from France; 63,000 from Great Britain; 43,000 from Asian countries; 35,000 from Germany; 30,000 from Scandinavia, and 22,000 from Africa. Nationals from Australia and various other European countries accounted for the remainder.

The country's income from tourism was estimated at 160 million dollars.

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It is reported that in February 1972 the Council of Administration of the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) met to approve the programme for its 81st year of activities. For 1972 the major part of the programme will continue to be directed towards agricultural settlement, education, and research in Israel. Projects already in progress or yet to be started include the consolidation or extension, together with the Jewish Agency, of twenty border and other settlements, as well as land improvement schemes with the Jewish National Fund. In all nearly fifty settlements in Israel will receive some form of help from the ICA during 1972.

The meeting approved grants for agricultural research at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Weizmann Institute, and elsewhere.

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The seventh edition of *The Jewish Press of the World*, compiled by Josef Fraenkel and published by the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress in London, appeared in January 1972. It lists 954 publications (dailies, weeklies, monthlies, quarterlies etc.) published in Israel and the Diaspora. Over a third of the total—325—appear in Israel; 284 are published in the United States, 190 in Europe, 79 in Central and South America, 27 in Africa, 28 in Canada, 16 in Australia and New Zealand, and five in Asian countries outside Israel.

Well over half Israel's publications (61·23 per cent) are in Hebrew, less than a fifth (18·46 per cent) in English, only 4·30 per cent in Yiddish, and the remainder in French, German, Spanish, and 'other languages'.

In the Diaspora, over half (56·28 per cent) of the Jewish publications are in English, 15·42 per cent in Yiddish, 7·79 per cent in French, 7·15 per cent in Spanish and Portuguese, 4·77 in German, 3·02 in Hebrew, and the remainder in 'other languages'. The total of Hebrew publications is 218: 199 in Israel and 19 in the Diaspora.

There are 111 publications in Yiddish: the United States lead with 40, followed by Central and Latin America with 28, Europe with 17, Israel with 14, Canada with five, Africa with four, and Australia and New Zealand with three.

*

An Institute of Work and Welfare was established at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem last April; it has been sponsored by the Ministry of Labour and the National Insurance Institute. It will, among other things, conduct research into social problems, study income distribution, and examine ways in which people can get more satisfaction from their work.

*

Last March, on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem, the foundation stone was laid of an Institute of Genetics and Study of Twins; it will be a branch of the Gregor Mendel Institute in Rome and will be staffed by Italians and Israelis.

The head of Tel Aviv University's Medical School stated last April that 220 doctors had graduated in Israel in the course of the last two years; there had also been 2,200 immigrant doctors. He commented that Israel now had one doctor for every 450 inhabitants.

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The first number of *Jewish Cultural News* (October 1971), published by the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress in Jerusalem, states that The Hebrew University's Folklore Centre, in conjunction with Haifa's Municipal Museum of Ethnology and Folklore, has 'recorded some 9,000 folktales, and it envisages publication of 26 separate volumes of folktales each devoted to immigrant ethnic groups in Israel with parallel translations into Hebrew and English'.

The first volume of *Folklore Research Centre Studies*, edited by Dov Noy and Issachar Ben-Ami, was published in 1970.

The Centre aims at establishing 'an "oral library" which will be a living

accurate record of investigation into many hitherto unknown areas of Jewish folklore, including tape-recordings of tales (in the original dialects), folk customs, . . . etc.' It also intends to establish a photographic library.

*

Americans for Music Libraries in Israel (AMLI) was established twenty years ago by an American couple from Chicago. Until recently, its activities were confined to Israel, where it provided music libraries and musical instruments. In 1971, however, AMLI sent abroad complete collections of books on music and musical works printed in Israel, as well as recordings of Israeli chamber music and symphonies. Collections were sent to seven cities in the United States: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, Miami, Philadelphia, and Cleveland; in each case the collection is administered by the local bureau of Jewish education. A collection was also sent to Bilthoven, in the Netherlands.

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Israel Book World, no. 6, December 1971, reports on the planning of new central public libraries in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The Jerusalem municipal library, due to be completed this year, will be next to Beit Ha'am where the library is now housed. The new building is being financed by private donations and from Mifal Hapayis, the national lottery. The library has a collection of some quarter of a million books; about half of them are in the central library, while the rest are distributed among 16 branches throughout the city.

The new Tel Aviv library will occupy a site on King Saul Boulevard, next to the new art museum. The plans for the new building include shelf and storage space for half a million books and for special collections. The Tel Aviv library system has 44 branches; they bought about 30,000 books in 1970, of which 24,000 were in Hebrew.

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Israel Book World, No. 7, March 1972, states that it gathered data last summer from Israeli publishers about dictionaries printed in the country. It lists 34, which have been produced by 12 publishers; three are Hebrew dictionaries, two are Hebrew–English, three are English–Hebrew, while a further six are Hebrew–English and English–Hebrew; two are Hebrew–French, two French–Hebrew, and a further two are both Hebrew–French and French–Hebrew; there is one Hebrew–Spanish and another Spanish–Hebrew; there are two Hebrew–Rumanian and two Rumanian–Hebrew; one Hebrew–Arabic and Arabic–Hebrew; one Italian–Hebrew; one Hebrew–Yiddish, one Hebrew–German and German–Hebrew; and one Hebrew–Polish. In addition, there are a music, a medical, and a 'Technical' dictionary.

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Archer, Margaret Scotford, ed., *Students, University and Society, A Comparative Sociological Review*, viii + 280 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1972, £4·20.

Argenti, Phillip P., *The Religious Minorities of Chios, Jews and Roman Catholics*, x + 581 pp., Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1970, £7·00.

Association of Latvian and Esthonian Jews in Israel, *The Jews in Latvia*, 384 pp., Tel Aviv, 1971, n.p.

Atkinson, Dick, *Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative*, x + 307 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1971, £3·75.

Balandier, Georges, *Political Anthropology*, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith, 214 pp., Penguin Educ. Specials, Harmondsworth, 1972, 40p.

Baldelli, Giovanni, *Social Anarchism*, 192 pp., Penguin Educ. Specials, Harmondsworth, 1972, 40p.

Barbu, Zevedei, *Society, Culture and Personality, An Introduction to Social Science*, xxi + 183 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971, £2·10 cloth; £1·10 paperback.

Bartov, Hanoch, *An Israeli at the Court of St. James's*, vi + 160 pp., Vallentine, Mitchell, London, 1971, £1·90.

Bensimon-Donath, Doris, *L'Intégration des Juifs Nord-Africains en France*, 263 pp., Mouton, The Hague, 1971, 22 guilders.

Bermant, Chaim, *The Cousinhood, The Anglo-Jewish Gentry*, xii + 466 pp., Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1971, £5·00.

Birenbaum, Halina, *Hope is the last to Die, A Personal Documentation of Nazi Terror*, translated from the Polish by David Welsh, 246 pp., distributed by Twayne Publishers, New York, 1971, $5.95 hard-back; $2.50 paperback.

Boyers, Robert and Orrill, Robert, eds., *Laing and Anti-Psychiatry*, 227 pp., Penguin Educ. Specials, Harmondsworth, 1972, 40p.

Clegg, A. B., ed., *The Changing Primary School, Its Problems and Priorities, A Statement by Teachers*, 175 pp., Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, £1·50.

Cooper, Charles A. and Alexander, Sidney S., eds., *Economic Development and Population Growth in the Middle East*, xviii + 622 pp., American Elsevier Publishing Company, New York, 1972, 82·50 Dutch guilders.

Daiches, David, *Two Worlds, An Edinburgh Jewish Childhood*, 152 pp., reissue, Chatto & Windus, London, 1971, £1·75.

Dennison, George, *The Lives of Children, The Story of the First Street School*, 243 pp., Penguin Educ. Specials, Harmondsworth, 1972, 45p.

Diamond, A. S., *Primitive Law, Past and Present*, xxiii + 410 pp., Methuen, London, 1971, £5·00.

Dinnerstein, Leonard, ed., *Antisemitism in the United States*, 140 pp., Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1971, n.p.

Economy and Society, A New Quarterly Journal for the Social Sciences, vol. 1, no. 1, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972, £1·25.

Flakser, David, *Marxism, Ideology and Myths*, 328 pp., Philosophical Library, New York, 1971, $6.75.

Fraenkel, Josef, *The Jewish Press of the World*, seventh edn., 128 pp., Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress, London, 1972, £1·00.

Glaser, Barney G. and Strauss, Anselm L., *Status Passage*, vi + 205 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971, £3·25.

Gould, S. J., *The Rational Society* (Auguste Comte Memorial Trust Lecture), 21 pp., The Athlone Press, London, 1971, 40p.

Gray, Gibson, *The Lobbying Game, A Study of the 1953 Campaign of the State Council for Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Commission*, xiii + 226 pp., Gibson Hendrix Gray, 403 West First Street, Tyler, Texas, 1970, $7.50.

Habermas, Jürgen, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, translated from the German by Jeremy J. Shapiro, viii + 356 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1972, £3·50 hardback; £1·75 paperback.

Hall, Constance Margaret, *The Sociology of Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–65)*, ix + 228 pp., Philosophical Library, New York, 1971, $8.50.

Hassan, Jacob, ed., with the collaboration of Rubiato, Teresa and Romero, Elena, *Actas del Primer Simposio de Estudios Sefardíes*, xxvi + 781 pp., Instituto 'Arias Montano', Madrid, 1970, n.p.

Jackson, Brian, *Working-Class Community: Some General Notions Raised by a Series of Studies in Northern England*, 195 pp., Penguin Educ. Specials, Harmondsworth, 1972, 30p.

Le Chêne, Evelyn, *Mauthausen, The History of a Death Camp*, 296 pp., Methuen, London, 1971, £3·50.

Lieberman, Bernhardt, ed., *Human Sexual Behavior, A Book of Readings*, 444 pp., John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1971, £5·05 cloth; £3·50 paper.

Likhovski, Eliahu S., *Israel's Parliament, The Law of the Knesset*, xxii + 236 pp., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, £4·25.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Raab, Earl, *The Politics of Unreason, Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1970*, xxiv + 547 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1971, £3·80.

Minority Rights Group, *The African's Predicament in Rhodesia*, 31 pp., Minority Rights Group, Report No. 8, London, 1972, 30p.

Mol, Hans, *Religion in Australia*, xviii + 380 pp., Thomas Nelson (Australia), Melbourne, 1971, Australian $9.50.

Moser, C. A. and Kalton, G., *Survey Methods in Social Investigation*, second edn., xvii + 549 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1971, £3·50 hardback; £1·75 paperback.

Parker, Franklin, *George Peabody, A Biography*, x + 233 pp., Vanderbilt Univ. Press, Nashville, 1971, $8.95.

Proceedings of the Symposium on Law in the Age of the Electronic Computer, xii + 52 pp., Publication of the Institute of Criminology No. 18, Jerusalem, 1971, n.p.

Raiser, Thomas, *Einführung in die Rechtssoziologie*, xii + 100 pp., J. Schweitzer, Berlin, 1972, DM10.

Robinson, David, *The Process of Becoming Ill*, xi + 132 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971, £2·10.

Rogers, Rolf E., *The Political Process in Modern Organizations (A Fresh Look at our Bureaucracies—and Some Vital Predictions for the Future of our Society)*, 158 pp., Exposition Press, New York, 1971, $6.50.

Rome, Beatrice K. and Sydney, C., *Organizational Growth through Decision-Making, A Computer-Based Experiment in Eductive Method*, xvi + 242 pp., American Elsevier Publishing Company, New York, 1971, 81·00 guilders or $23.75.

Sahay, Arun, ed., *Max Weber and Modern Sociology*, 111 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971, £1·50.

Shmeruk, Chone, *Peretz's Vision of Despair*, viii + 359 pp. (Hebrew), Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, New York, 1971, n.p.

Sklare, Marshall, *America's Jews*, xiv + 234 pp., Random House, New York, 1971, n.p.

Stark, Werner, *The Sociology of Religion, A Study of Christendom, Volume V, Types of Religious Culture*, ix + 453 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972, £5·00.

Strizower, Schifra, *The Children of Israel: The Bene Israel of Bombay*, xiv + 176 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971, £2·25 hardback; £1·15 paperback.

Yudkin, Leon, *Isaac Lamden, A Study in Twentieth-Century Hebrew Poetry*, 255 pp., Cornell Univ. Press, London, 1971, £2·40.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

COHEN, Erik; PhD., Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Chief publications: 'Mixed Marriage in an Israeli Town', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XI, no. 1, June 1969; *The City in Zionist Ideology* (Jerusalem Urban Studies, No. 1), Institute of Urban and Regional Studies, Jerusalem, 1970; 'Developing Towns: The Social Dynamics of "Planted" Urban Communities in Israel', in S. N. Eisenstadt, R. Bar-Yosef, and C. Adler, eds., *Integration and Development in Israel*, Jerusalem and New York, 1970; Co-author, 'The Relations between Generations in the Israeli Kibbutz', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 5, No. 1, 1970; 'Towards a Sociology of International Tourism', *Social Research*, vol. 39, no. 1, 1972.

GUTWIRTH, Jacques; Docteur ès Lettres, Attaché de recherche au Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (C.N.R.S.); Chargé d'enseignement à l'Université René Descartes, Paris; Chargé de Mission au Musée des Arts et Traditions Populaires. Chief publications: 'Antwerp Jewry Today', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. X, no. 1, June 1968; *Vie juive traditionnelle: Ethnologie d'une communauté hassidique*, Paris, 1970; 'Les Communautés Hassidiques, sources et trésors pour la sociologie religieuse de la judaïcité', *Social Compass*, vol. XVIII, no. 3, 1971. Currently engaged in studies of Jewish life in France and of Hassidic communities in various countries.

HARRIS, Sydney; M.Sc., Senior Lecturer in Methods of Social Research at Lanchester Polytechnic, Coventry. Currently engaged in research on Gentile perceptions of Jews.

ROSHWALD, Mordecai; M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Social Science, University of Minnesota. Formerly lecturer in Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Chief publications: *The Education of Man* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1954; *Humanism in Practice*, London, 1955; *Level Seven*, London, 1959 and New York, 1960; *A Small Armageddon*, London, 1962; *Moses: Leader, Prophet, Man* (jointly with Miriam Roshwald), New York and London, 1969; 'Who is a Jew in Israel?', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XII, no. 2, December 1970.

RUDAVSKY, David; Jur.D., Ph.D., Professor of Hebraic Studies, New York University; Director of Research, National Association of Professors of Hebrew. Chief publications: 'The Historical School of Zachariah Frankel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. V, no. 2, December 1963; *Modern Jewish Religious Movements: A History of Emancipation and Adjustment*, New York, 1967; 'S. D. Luzzatto's Jewish Nationalism', *Herzl Year Book*, vol. VI, Raphael Patai, ed., New York, 1965; 'Martin Buber's Existentialism: Sources, Influences and Interpretation', *The Journal of Hebraic Studies*, vol. I, no. 1, 1969; Co-editor with Israel Naamani and Abraham I. Katsch, *Israel Through the Eyes of its Leaders*, Tel Aviv, 1971. Currently engaged in writing a monograph entitled 'Pauline Faith and Judaism'.