

THE
JEWISH JOURNAL
OF
SOCILOGY

JJS

EDITOR

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VOLUME THIRTEEN 1971

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

CONTENTS

Berkeley Hillel and the Union of Jewish Students: The History of a Conflict, The by <i>Matthew Maibaum</i>	153	Addresses by <i>Donald MacRae, May Eppel, Maurice Freedman, Lord Robbins, and Leslie I. Edgar</i>	5
Books Received	126, 251	New York Kehillah, 1908-22, The (Review Article) by <i>Lloyd P. Gartner</i>	197
Books Reviewed	3, 133	Notes on Contributors	128, 253
Book Reviews	95, 219	Notice to Contributors	4, 134
Chronicle	122, 245	Persistence of Ethnic Political Preferences: Factors Influencing the Voting Behaviour of Jews in Australia, The by <i>Peter Y. Medding</i>	17
Correspondence	242	Register of Social Research on the Anglo-Jewish Community 1968-1971 by <i>Marlena Schmool</i>	189
Education and the Under-Privileged in Israel by <i>Tessa Blackstone</i>	173	Student Revolt and Generational Conflict: Phantasy and Reality (Review Article) by <i>Percy S. Cohen</i>	205
Intermarriage and Conversion: A Guide for Future Research by <i>Bernard Lazerwitz</i>	41	Television and the Sabbath Culture in Israel by <i>Michael Gurevitch and Gila Schwartz</i>	65
Jewish Identification among Students at Oxford by <i>Bernard Wasserstein</i>	135		
Jewish Identity in Cape Town, with Special Reference to Out-Marriage by <i>Ziona Strelitz</i>	73		
Morris Ginsberg: Five Memorial			

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

Blackstone, T.	173	MacRae, D.	5
Cohen, P. S.	205	Maibaum, M.	153
Edgar, L. I.	15	Medding, P. Y.	17
Eppel, M.	7	Robbins	12
Freedman, M.	10	Schmool, M.	189
Gartner, L. P.	197	Schwartz, G.	65
Gurevitch, M.	65	Strelitz, Z.	73
Lazerwitz, B.	41	Wasserstein, B.	135

AUTHORS OF BOOK REVIEWS

Albrow, M. C.	231	Lipman, V. D.	219
Andreski, S. L.	234	Martin, D.	101, 224
Banton, M.	113	Mason, P.	104
Beloff, M.	110, 236	Novc, A.	114
Denison, N.	118	Parkes, J.	239
Freedman, M.	103, 228, 237	Rieff, P.	238
Geber, B.	117	Rosenthal, E.	115
Glikson, P.	106	Scharf, B.	227
Gottmann, J.	102	Schmool, M.	108, 240
Jacobs, L.	223	Skukman, H.	229
Kemper, K. D.	112	Weingrod, A.	232
Krausz, E.	120	Werblowsky, R. J. Z.	95
Levy, H.	234	Wilson, B.	116, 225

BOOKS REVIEWED

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>Arberry, A. J., Gen. ed., <i>Religion in the Middle East, Three Religions in Concord and Conflict</i> 95</p> <p>Boudon, R., <i>The Uses of Structuralism</i> 228</p> <p>Bowker, H., <i>Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World</i> 101</p> <p>Brod, M., <i>Paganism—Christianity—Judaism, A Confession of Faith</i> 223</p> <p>Cohen, E., <i>The City in the Zionist Ideology</i> 102</p> <p>Cutler, D. R., ed., <i>The World Year Book of Religion, The Religious Situation, Volume II</i> 103</p> <p>Dushkin, A. M., <i>Comparative Study of the Jewish Teacher Training Schools in the Diaspora</i> 235</p> <p>Fals Borda, O., <i>Subversion and Social Change in Colombia</i> 234</p> <p>Fernandes, F., <i>The Negro in Brazilian Society</i> 104</p> <p>Feuer, L. S., <i>The Conflict of Generations, The Character and Significance of Student Movements</i> 205</p> <p>Fleischmann, E., <i>Le Christianisme 'Mis à Nu'. La critique juive du christianisme</i> 224</p> <p>Fraenkel, J., ed., <i>The Jews of Austria, Essays on their life, History and Destruction</i> 106</p> <p>Garrard, J. A., <i>The English and Immigration, A Comparative Study of the Jewish Influx 1880-1910</i> 236</p> <p>Gartner, L. P., ed., <i>Jewish Education in the United States, A Documentary History</i> 234</p> <p>Gay, John, <i>The Geography of Religion in England</i> 225</p> <p>Goldberg, B. and Bok, W., <i>Dualité culturelle et appartenance</i> 108</p> <p>Goren, Arthur A., <i>New York Jews and the Quest for Community, The Kehillah Experiment</i> 197</p> <p>Gutwirth J., <i>Vie juive traditionnelle, Ethnologie d'une Communauté hassidique</i> 237</p> <p>Habermas, J., <i>Toward a Rational Society, Student Protest, Science and Politics</i> 205</p> <p>Hannerz, U., <i>Soulside, Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community</i> 104</p> | <p>Herman, S. N., <i>American Students in Israel</i> 238</p> <p>Katz, I. and Silver, H., <i>The University and Social Welfare</i> 205</p> <p>Katz, J., <i>Jews and Freemasons in Europe</i> 110</p> <p>Lambert, J. R., <i>Crime, Police, and Race Relations, A study in Birmingham</i> 112</p> <p>Lane, M. ed., <i>Structuralism, A Reader</i> 228</p> <p>Mason, P., <i>Race Relations</i> 113</p> <p>Mendelsohn, E., <i>Class Struggle in the Pale: The Formative Years of the Jewish Workers' Movement in Tsarist Russia</i> 229</p> <p>Osipov, G. V. ed., <i>Town, Country and People</i> 114</p> <p>Peel, J. D. Y., <i>Herbert Spencer, The Evolution of a Sociologist</i> 231</p> <p>Robinson, A. L. et al., <i>Black Studies in the University, A symposium</i> 205</p> <p>Ross, A. D., <i>Student Unrest in India, A Comparative Approach</i> 205</p> <p>Schmelz, U. O. and Glikson, P. eds., <i>Jewish Population Studies 1961-1968</i> 115</p> <p>Schneider, L., <i>Sociological Approach to Religion</i> 116</p> <p>Segre, V. D., <i>Israel, A Society in Transition</i> 232</p> <p>Vorspan, M. and Gartner, L. P., <i>History of the Jews of Los Angeles</i> 219</p> <p>Watson, G., <i>Passing for White, A Study of Racial Assimilation in a South African School</i> 117</p> <p>Weinberg, W., <i>Die Reste des Jüdisch-deutschen</i> 118</p> <p>Weisgal, M. W., Gen. ed., <i>The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann</i> 239</p> <p>Wells, A., <i>Social Institutions</i> 120</p> <p>Wilder-Okladck, F., <i>The Return Movement of Jews to Austria after the Second World War</i> 240</p> <p>Wilson, B., <i>Religious Sects, A Sociological Study</i> 227</p> <p>Yorburg, B., <i>Utopia and Reality, A Collective Portrait of American Socialists</i> 205</p> |
|--|---|

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME XIII NO. 1

JUNE 1971

CONTENTS

Morris Ginsberg: Five Memorial Addresses <i>Donald MacRae, May Eppel, Maurice Freedman, Lord Robbins, Leslie I. Edgar</i>	5
The Persistence of Ethnic Political Preferences: Factors Influencing the Voting Behaviour of Jews in Australia <i>Peter Y. Medding</i>	17
Intermarriage and Conversion: A Guide for Future Research <i>Bernard Lazerwitz</i>	41
Television and the Sabbath Culture in Israel <i>Michael Gurevitch and Gila Schwartz</i>	65
Jewish Identity in Cape Town, with Special Reference to Out-Marriage <i>Ziona Strelitz</i>	73
Book Reviews	95
Chronicle	122
Books Received	126
Notes on Contributors	128

PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

Annual Subscription £1.40 (U.S. \$4) post free
Single Copies 75p (\$2.25)

*Applications for subscription should be addressed to the Managing Editor,
The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 55 New Cavendish Street, London W1M 8BT*

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD
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BOOKS REVIEWED

<i>Author</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Reviewer</i>	<i>Page</i>
A. J. Arberry, General ed. John Bowker	<i>Religion in the Middle East Problems of Suffering in the Religions of the World</i>	R. J. Zwi Werblowsky David Martin	95 101
Erik Cohen	<i>The City in the Zionist Ideology</i>	Jean Gottmann	102
Donald R. Cutler, ed.	<i>The World Year Book of Religion, vol. II</i>	Maurice Freedman	103
Florestan Fernandes	<i>The Negro in Brazilian Society</i>	Philip Mason	104
Josef Fraenkel, ed. Berty Goldberg and Willy Bok	<i>The Jews of Austria Dualité culturelle et appartenance</i>	Paul Glikson Marlena Schmool	106 108
Ulf Hannerz	<i>Soulside</i>	Philip Mason	104
Jacob Katz	<i>Jews and Freemasons in Europe</i>	Max Beloff	110
John R. Lambert	<i>Crime, Police, and Race Relations</i>	Kenneth D. Kemper	112
Philip Mason	<i>Race Relations</i>	Michael Banton	113
G. V. Osipov, ed.	<i>Town, Country and People</i>	A. Nove	114
U. O. Schmelz and P. Glikson, eds.	<i>Jewish Population Studies 1961-1968</i>	Erich Rosenthal	115
Louis Schneider	<i>Sociological Approach to Religion</i>	Bryan R. Wilson	116
Graham Watson	<i>Passing for White</i>	Beryl A. Geber	117
Werner Weinberg	<i>Die Reste des Jüdischdeutschen</i>	Norman Denison	118
Alan Wells	<i>Social Institutions</i>	Ernest Krausz	120

NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

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NOTES should follow the style of this *Journal* and should be given at the end of the article in numerical sequence according to the order of their citation in the text.

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MORRIS GINSBERG: FIVE MEMORIAL ADDRESSES

The following five speeches by Professor Donald G. MacRae, Dr. May Eppel, Professor Maurice Freedman, Lord Robbins, and Rabbi Dr. Leslie I. Edgar were delivered at a Memorial Meeting organized by, and held at, The London School of Economics and Political Science on 4 December 1970, with the Director, Sir Walter Adams, in the chair.

DONALD G. MACRAE

I shall be very brief. In one sense, when a man dies full of years, with a great work done, there should be nothing publicly to mourn, whatever the burdens of private feeling, loss, and grief his friends must feel. Rather should one meet to honour his memory and celebrate his achievements. Yet to do so, and do only that, would, for Morris Ginsberg, be somehow false and inappropriate. I shall indeed try to suggest something of his achievement, but I think that of all of us who are here to remember Morris Ginsberg, most want to share with you something of personal feeling and hold that it is fitting that we should do so.

For the fact is that Morris was in some ways an intensely private, self-enclosed man. Generations of students knew him and learned from him: all, I think, of them according to their capacities were affected not merely in knowledge but increased in moral and intellectual capacity and found in Morris a man of exemplary quality whose standards of scholarship went beyond that scholarship and operated as a moral force. But to know him more personally was not easy. Some students did in fact gain access to the man as well as the thinker and teacher. Mrs. Eppel—May Ravden—was one of those, and she can tell us of something immensely appealing in Morris, yet hidden from most: his capacity for delight.

I knew him for almost exactly twenty-five years, but he influenced me before we met. I read his little book (little in size, modest in tone, but lucid, learned, and original in exposition, criticism, and creation) on *Sociology* in 1943. It was a landmark in my life. I was determined by it, if I could, to become a sociologist. I was determined by it, if I might, to come to the London School of Economics and to work where such

things were known, such learning practised. Already as an undergraduate in another place I knew of the School as the home of Beales, Bowley, Laski, Malinowski, Eileen Power, and Robbins. Now I knew of it as also the home of a sociology dedicated to the understanding and appraisal of all those varied devices by which we limited and imperfect men and women somehow can bear to live and work together.

By good fortune and the kindness of Tom Marshall I achieved my ambition, and here I am. I met Morris, stayed with him and Ethel Ginsberg in the plain-living but real hospitality of Adams Road in Cambridge. When in December 1948 they returned fully to London my wife and I saw even more of them in the context of their home, their garden, the mulberry tree Morris loved, the hens Ethel not very effectively tended so that Morris might have his eggs, their books and pictures. I returned there many times, saw Morris suffer during Ethel's long illness and continued to see him up to his last years, as always a little melancholy, but illuminated by his steady mental fire and tended by the devotion of his companion and housekeeper Miss Ludwig. Early in August this year (1970) I discussed with him a new volume of his essays, and he talked of holidays spent with Malinowski in the Tyrol. A few weeks later I returned from America and Maurice Freedman told me of his death. The fact overwhelmed me. That may sound absurd, but I have known no man so permanent, so steady, so resigned, and yet so directed always to what remained to be done.

During these years I learned something of his life and observed it. Professor Freedman has more to say about it than I on this occasion. I feel more optimism than he that its last sixty years at least can be pieced together, for these are the years of the two great institutions of the University of London, this School and University College—places of which he was so proud and to which he gave so much. The School had pioneered sociology and Lionel Robbins has something to say of Ginsberg carrying that subject forward here in the difficult transition from the lonely days of L. T. Hobhouse to the present almost dreadful popularity of the discipline. But it is important to realize that without Morris sociology would not have survived here and might not then have spread not only to such colleges in London as Bedford, but throughout Britain.

For long in these islands Ginsberg *was* sociology. That is to say that sociology was sceptical, rational, philosophical, and very cool, uninvaded by passion or desire, yet never despairing of human capacity and reason. But it is also to say that it was empirical, comparative, and historical. People underestimated Morris in these respects. He knew so much, factually, and he could not believe that others knew less, so he assumed a knowledge in those others which would illustrate and validate his spare but quietly efficient prose. Usually they did not have it. So to some extent his work and legacy have not been understood.

MORRIS GINSBERG

But I said I would be brief. I cannot speak here of his practical interests and his quiet kindness. Refugees from European tyranny, boys helped by the National Association of Boys' Clubs could testify on this, and so can all his friends. Quite simply, he was a very good man.

What remains? I would judge him as he judged. His work will live, not vividly, nor even steadily. It will be forgotten and rediscovered. It will not always be acknowledged; it sounds so reasonable that it will be judged obvious and common property, as though such learning and sense were ever common things. But again and again it will be refound. Like the man it is of the kind that endures. More immediately he lives through those who knew, worked, studied with him. It sets for them a kind of North Star, distant, faint, clear, but a mark for true direction. And like that star its constant burning is something for which they will feel a certain awe before a remote, a limited if you like, but real perfection towards which one may move, but to which those of us who work in his tradition cannot attain.

MAY EPEL

Ladies and gentlemen, at this moment my feelings are somewhat mixed. On the one hand I feel an acute sense of privilege at being asked to do honour to someone I shall always consider as a great man, on the other hand I feel a sense of inadequacy at measuring up to anything like the standards he would expect of one of his students attempting such a task. This ambivalence was something I frequently experienced in his presence during a continuous period of tutelage extending for thirty years.

I want, by reflecting on my own experience of Morris Ginsberg during that time, to try to express something of the impact that this remarkable teacher had on generations of students. If they could all be here, not only would they be numbered in thousands but they would represent a wide range of professions now scattered in many parts of the world—politicians, judges, administrators, church leaders, social workers, academics in almost every field of the human and political sciences, and ordinary housewives. Many of them have told me of the way in which their appreciation of what Morris Ginsberg did for them and meant to them has become sharpened as the years have passed.

I remember a few months before the outbreak of war travelling from my sheltered sixth form schoolroom to be interviewed by Professor Ginsberg. On the journey I somewhat feverishly looked through the 1934 edition of his *Sociology* in the Home University Library. To me it seemed the ticket of admission to the presence of a great scholar, and my head was filled with the concluding remarks of the book about the

idea of a self-directed humanity and that the ultimate object of sociology was to enquire into the possibilities of its realization. People's views of the object of sociology have changed, but it was an intoxicating idea for me at eighteen, and it still is. I remember my first impression of Morris Ginsberg vividly when I entered his room on that occasion from the darkened Houghton Street corridor. What I saw was a small, round, quiet, serious yet friendly man, curled up in an old armchair, surrounded by walls of books, looking as though he had grown out of them. My last impression of him, a few days before he died, was very much the same, a little smaller, still curled in an old armchair, still surrounded by books, still with the same quizzical look, the same quiet seriousness.

He always had a quiet compelling authority with students, stemming from his great store of knowledge, a background of wide and deep reading, and much personal experience. He had a lucidity, profundity, and succinctness of exposition that impressed all who came in contact with him, whether they attended a single thickly textured and highly polished public lecture or, as some of us were privileged to do, attended the courses of lectures he gave at Cambridge during the war years. These lectures packed the Mill Lane Lecture Theatre and the Art School off Benet Street. They covered the whole field of Social Philosophy, Ethics, Social Psychology, Sociology, and Comparative Morals and Religion, and those who attended them are not likely to forget the impression they created. At the end of each one he would shuffle out shyly and disappear slowly along the Backs to Adams Road. There, in the peaceful atmosphere of his home he and Mrs. Ginsberg welcomed us to seminars. Most of us sat on the floor and he would listen with attention to student papers and then reshape the effort into a new and more impressive intellectual outline. Some of us had the illusion of providing some raw material for a master sculptor. I say the *illusion*, because with time we would discover that almost invariably he had himself a far wider range of material on the subject than we could hope to acquire. The excellence of his intellectual performance compelled us to try to emulate him—to know more, to look more deeply, to consider unexpected complexities, and to withhold judgment. He often said 'Remember the possibility that they might be mistaken.' He often played with ideas but he never allowed them to become inert; every issue was of burning importance and he had great skill in choosing topics that would be of especial interest to young undergraduates.

For one whole term I literally sat alone at the feet of Professor Ginsberg, the only student taking Ethics in that year. The anxiety induced in trying to live up to his level of scholarship, intellectual honesty, and clarity was a price he exacted, all unwittingly, for the generous reward of making the problems seem a little more intelligible. The feelings engendered by Morris Ginsberg's sincere intellectual convictions contain, in my view, the key to his power over the minds of his students.

MORRIS GINSBERG

He never tolerated the superficial, the shoddy, or the hasty conclusion. He never spoke down to his audience, but he often fixed them with his eyes like the Ancient Mariner and made each session seem like a personal communication. To have been a student of Morris Ginsberg over a period of years was like being in a continuous Masterclass.

For me that ended twenty years ago. From then on my husband and I enjoyed a continuous relationship with Morris as students and friends. He retained a sympathetic interest in every enterprise, academic, occupational, social, and familial, that we brought to share with him. The tutorials continued on almost every visit. Even when he was unwell he found sufficient energy to consider matters of the moment, old writers and new, causes and people who were rising or falling. Even during our last visit to him, after returning from Israel this summer, when we were animatedly discussing research into Kibbutzim, he produced for us a report he had written on the growth of that movement some twenty years previously. Not unexpectedly, its main ideas proved to be still highly relevant.

Morris sometimes gave the impression of being a sad man, and there was enough distress and tragedy in his life to make that impression understandable. But I remember a lot of gaiety, occasionally even mild horseplay, and an abiding memory is of the way his face would light up in a broad smile when he savoured a good joke or took delight in the antics of other people's children. Many of the things he wrote and talked about he felt deeply and personally: prejudice, intolerance, family conflict, mental illness, and physical handicaps. He quietly and unostentatiously helped many people experiencing these problems with sympathy, with advice, with time, with accommodation, with loans. He helped to advance the personal careers of not a few people, with the right encouragement and support at the right time.

At this moment I have an image of Morris looking over my shoulder, suggesting modestly, but half petulantly, that he could have said all this with greater economy and skill. And yet this was the one area of knowledge where his own deep personal shyness would have inhibited any self-assessment. He often quoted Schopenhauer's pessimistic image of man as a hedgehog, and I believe that Morris himself, with his many disguises for a deep sensitivity, was the embodiment of that image, a man trapped in his own loneliness. Even after thirty years one felt the need on each occasion to reassure the hedgehog before proceeding to closer contact. But he rose above personal distress by intellectual endeavour and moral courage, and constantly reiterated his belief in human reason. 'In the long run our faith in the unity of mankind must rest upon our faith in the unity of human reason.' When he retired from the School in 1964 he said, 'It has always been clear to me that to make anything of reason it was necessary to study unreason. I think all my work has been directed to this end.' He asked, 'Was this too ambitious?'

MAURICE FREEDMAN

He was not too sure that the human condition justified optimism, but he was clear that it did not warrant pessimism. He put some trust in human intelligence and will and felt justified in hoping that 'the energies which are now expended in mutual destruction may come to be used in the service of ends in which reasonable men can find fulfilment' (Frazer Lecture).

I think of Morris Ginsberg as the product of the fusion of great traditions of Jewish and Western scholarship. I see him as a combination of dispassionate intellectual excellence and quiet moral passion, and I am honoured and pleased to pay this tribute to his memory, on behalf of all of us who were his students and his friends.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

He was among the least hopeful of optimists, for the intellectual force that drove him to a vision of conquering rationality was cancelled, in his private life, by a quiet sadness and an instinct for the worst outcome of events. A sort of socialist by reason was balanced, if not defeated, by a kind of conservative by temper. I suppose that paradox was evident to most of the people who knew him as both writer and man. But to see another curious side of his life called for some special knowledge of his dual intellectual and social origins. Jews from eastern Europe are not an unfamiliar part of the English landscape; but there can have been few talmudic scholars, entirely Yiddish-speaking until their adolescence, who transformed themselves into members of the austere English middle class. That transition was made by Morris Ginsberg. Yet while he came to live within that area of the middle class, it did not embrace all of him, although a casual observer might have reasonably concluded otherwise. He told me once that his first acquaintance with English society was through a Hebrew translation of *Daniel Deronda*; and if that was the beginning of the road from a closed Lithuanian Jewry to the LSE and Highgate, it was a long and winding road.

How the transformation was worked will never be known, at least, not in sufficient detail, for he refused to record his memories and could be got to talk about his youth only in snatches. It was as though—but here I merely speculate—he found it difficult to reconcile the two fundamentally different worlds between which his life had in effect been a bridge. He was made by the world of UCL and the LSE and by the teachings of his revered master, Hobhouse; he came to live the life of the English middle class scholar, surrounded by his books and immersed in the ideas they represented. But his Jewish foundations were also evident. As I know from the manuscripts and publications he handled for me, he retained his Yiddish, while his thorough grounding in classical

Hebrew enabled him to cope with its modern Israeli version. His style of life no longer reflected the ritualized Judaism in which he was reared, but he was never alienated from it. All religion was to him a sociological mystery; within Judaism he sought the rational and the ethical.

I knew him when I was a graduate student and young teacher here at the School, but our closer association grew from his undertaking to edit *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*; whose affairs kept us in close touch for the last twelve years of his life. By that period of his career sociology had in general moved far from his wide conception of it, and in moments of despair he told me that he wished he had remained a philosopher. But he constantly read and thoroughly understood what his juniors were writing, and he was alert right up to his death to every shift of interest in the social sciences. It is not very long since I discovered that he was following the new work on ethology, which he was analysing with his customary keenness of mind and finding frail beneath his critical gaze. He would question me closely on the latest developments in social anthropology and (in so far as he thought I knew them) in sociology. In the appraisal of any piece of sociological writing he could be relied upon to do two things: first, to say more clearly and with greater economy than the author of the work was himself capable of, what the work was about; and second, to put his finger at once on weak links in the argument and on deficiencies in scholarship. Above all, he detested intellectual pretentiousness, and any writer in whom he detected what he called humbug (there were several eminent examples) was treated with scorn. I remember the severity of his expression when he handed back to me the books I had lent him by one of the stars in the international social science heaven; he said he had wasted his time reading them. In sociological work he looked in the author for an ability to pose what he called a real problem, and he was especially disdainful of what he thought of as mere verbiage masquerading as general theory. It fell to me sometimes to defend an abstract treatise which he was inclined to dismiss as oblivious of concrete problems. But anyone who argued with him was likely to be on weak ground, for he could always marshal greater forces of skill in logic and often call upon greater resources of factual knowledge. Those who think of him as a philosopher with little sense of empirical research are quite mistaken. He had a keen sense of the factual, and was capable of making shrewd remarks about the reliability of the observations reported by X and Y. The little old man, looking like a walking version of the image of the introspective and unworldly scholar, was in reality a sharp observer. Highgate and the LSE may have appeared in his last decades to bound his life, but behind that narrow experience there lay still very active the understanding of human variety formed in Lithuania, in English provincial life, in schoolteaching, in France in the First Great War, in business, in Jewish life, and in his occasional travels abroad.

LORD ROBBINS

One comes to the point that his greatness as a thinker and a scholar are not fully reflected in his writings. And it was a tragedy that he knew it. For on the one hand he was fully conscious of his own intellectual powers (he was modest but never unrealistically so), and on the other aware of his inability to display those powers in all their richness in the written word. He wrote with great difficulty, never being able to free himself of a curb upon his imagination. I never heard him express envy of another scholar except in regard to that man's ability to write with ease and style. He himself may possibly have attributed the spareness and directness of his writing to the character of his mother-tongue, upon which he often commented; but one might have supposed that Yiddish could also have supplied him with models of a more colourful kind. At bottom, he was nervous of what he liked to call cold print; it frightened him, and he would hesitate long before handing over his writing to the publisher, calling upon his friends to reassure him. I repeat: it was not that he had any serious doubts about his ability; it seems to me that he rightly thought himself to be head and shoulders above the people with whom he came into touch and above nearly all the social scientists whose work he read. But he was nervous of not saying in print precisely what he meant or of not saying it well enough; and he certainly wanted to avoid misunderstandings that might involve him in published controversy.

How will his life be written? From what meagre sources? I am guilty of not having pressed him hard enough to write down his memories. But what is one to do when faced by a determined privacy? If we keep silent now we shall respect his evident wish to remain a man unknown except by his works. Yet we shall also conceal one of the most interesting lives of our time, made up as it was of movement across great cultural distances, the establishment of sociology in Britain, the achievement of wisdom. That scholar whom we remember with profound respect, we should also honour as a human being, rich in experience and well endowed with character. But as I pursue the point I see before me the characteristic words he often wrote on the manuscripts submitted to us for publication: 'I don't much care for this' . . . and I stop.

LORD ROBBINS

I cannot claim any of the special qualifications of the other speakers in this symposium. But I was a colleague of Morris Ginsberg for more than three decades. I had a profound respect for his standing as a scholar and a warm affection for his qualities as a human being. I therefore count it as a considerable privilege to be allowed on this occasion to pay my tribute to one of the great teachers in the line of great teachers at the School.

MORRIS GINSBERG

My first recollection of Morris goes back to the early twenties when I was still a student. I was not a sociology specialist. But in those days we were all part of one family in the sense that we all knew what was going on everywhere; and those of us who had wide interests in social studies in general had no inhibition in attending lectures outside our prescribed subjects. It was therefore not at all unusual that, as a specialist in the History of Political Ideas studying under Laski, I should have thought it appropriate to attend Ginsberg's lectures on Ethics; and the impression that they left is still vividly with me.

His appearance as he came into the lecture room was not radically different from what it was in more recent years. Although he was a comparatively young man, he had already the outward characteristics of the thinker and the scholar. He had rather heavy shoes, yet a very quiet method of entry: I remember thinking at a very early stage in the course that he must have been born gentle and serious. His delivery was diffident. There was nothing sensationally inspirational about his exposition. But nevertheless it had authority; you felt that behind each tentatively formulated statement lay meticulous examination of the texts and prolonged reflection on their significance. The subject was one which, I fancy, was especially congenial to him: there was something in the quiet persuasiveness of the style of the writers whose works he chiefly discussed—the British moralists of the eighteenth century—which, despite so many differences of background, corresponded to similar tendencies very deep in his being. There were giants among the seniors in those days and Morris was still a comparatively junior lecturer: but he speedily established himself with all of us as one of those who really counted.

By the time I had taken my first degree, the centre of gravity of my professional interests had established itself in the sphere of economics rather than political science or sociology. But, for the greater part of the time that we were colleagues together, we each had the duties of what nowadays is called the convenership of our respective departments—in those days there was no wooden compulsory rotation—and we met frequently on the comparatively small committees which then had the main academic responsibility for the welfare and development of the School. We shared a common conviction that our various specialisms in social studies, far more than those of the natural sciences, were apt to lose perspective, and even usefulness, unless informed by knowledge of what was going on elsewhere in this field. We shared, too, a strong belief that training in individual social sciences gained enormously by contact with the broader studies of methodology and moral philosophy. Quite apart, therefore, from the indefinable *camaraderie* which the School so often breeds among its members, there were strong bonds of intellectual sympathy between us.

If I try to depict Morris as I knew him during these years, there are

three qualities which I would wish to emphasize: his scholarship, his integrity, and his loyalty.

It goes almost without saying that Morris was a great scholar. He had tremendous respect for the written word where it aspired to truth and honesty. He knew the vast range of the miscellaneous literature which was his subject as few have known it in our generation; and he knew too, very intimately, the great traditional heritage of Western philosophy. Yet he carried his learning lightly. There was no display of superfluous allusion in his talk or his writings. But throughout there was continuous awareness of all that is really relevant. As you listened to him or read his books you felt, what you should feel of all good academic exposition, that behind each sentence there was ten times as much in reserve.

Coupled with this vast range of learning there were moral qualities equally impressive. Morris was a very humble man. He had an immense respect for traditional wisdom and the opinion of those of his contemporaries whom he believed to be sincere. But he had still greater respect for what seemed to him to be the truth. And although he would always put forward his own convictions with diffidence, he was not swayed by mere authority; he would resist to the utmost what he thought to be spurious or pretentious. He disliked controversy of any kind. But where what he conceived to be the ultimate values were at stake, he never wavered in his defence of them, painful though the effort might sometimes be.

Finally, I must dwell on his loyalty: his loyalty to the School, to his friends, and to any from whom he conceived himself to have received benefits, either friendly or intellectual. In this last connexion, I would especially mention his loyalty to his predecessor, L. T. Hobhouse. I would not wish to say a word in disparagement of Hobhouse, who was an important figure in his time and almost certainly has had less than justice done to him since his death. But I have no doubt that if the valuable elements in his contribution come to be more generally recognized, this will be as much due to Morris's self-effacing piety in this respect as to their original intrinsic quality. In my judgement, of the two, Morris had the subtler mind, the greater sensitivity, and the more catholic understanding. I suspect that he sometimes had some difficulty with Hobhouse's more optimistic assertions. But, even where he criticized, he always let the man from whom he had derived inspiration in his youth have apparently the more prominent place.

Morris's view of life and its possibilities was sober. In common with all men of sensibility, and especially with those of his race, he was shocked and saddened by the human scene in this harassed and atrocious century. He was saddened too, I believe, by the shallowness and lack of responsibility of much contemporary thought, so alien to his own candid and reflective temperament. A meliorist by disposition, I think he had moments of considerable despondency. But he did not despair.

MORRIS GINSBERG

He thought that it was still possible that quiet discussion and persevering persuasion might eventually produce a greater consensus on ultimate values and a greater understanding of the ways to achieve them. He was not at all certain that this would happen. But at least he felt that it was worth while going on trying.

I think that this is how he would like us to remember him and how we may profit by his example.

LESLIE I. EDGAR

I have been deeply moved, as I am sure we have all been, by the tributes to Morris Ginsberg from those who were his intimate friends and, in one way or another, colleagues of his.

Unfortunately, I cannot claim to have had the privilege of intimate friendship with him though happily I did enjoy a measure of his friendship. But it is chiefly as Emeritus Rabbi of the Synagogue of which Morris Ginsberg was a member for nearly forty years that I have been asked to speak.

It was characteristic of the courageous and forward-looking attitude of Morris Ginsberg that he joined the Liberal Jewish Synagogue at a time when it still represented a new movement in Judaism and one with which it required a certain independence of mind and spirit to be associated. The aim of Liberal Judaism is to develop the beliefs and traditions of Judaism and to relate them to modern thought and to modern conditions of life. It is clear, therefore, why it appealed to Morris Ginsberg.

He did not, during my time, take a great part in the organized life of the Synagogue. But, at an earlier period, he was for some while a member of the Synagogue's Council, and throughout he was always ready to advise and help. I myself had the great good fortune of his advice and help on several occasions. I wish, however, that the former and very distinguished Rabbi of the Liberal Jewish Synagogue, Rabbi Dr. Mattuck, were alive to pay this tribute since he was a very close friend of Ginsberg's; they had a close affinity in brilliance of mind and constructive, but critical, judgement, and it was during his Ministry that Ginsberg was active in the Synagogue's affairs.

I should like to say, however, that my own most powerful memory of Professor Ginsberg in connexion with the Liberal Jewish Synagogue is of a striking address which he gave, assessing contemporary philosophies and their relevance to the outstanding problems of the modern world. I have never forgotten the overwhelming impression of hearing a man of so brilliant a mind, of such wide-ranging knowledge, and of the marvellous exactitude and critical integrity of his exposition.

In the Anglo-Jewish community generally, Morris Ginsberg's

position was very similar to that in the Synagogue itself: always ready with counsel and help; though not caring for too much involvement in 'organizational' affairs. But, when crucial situations arose as at the terrible time of Nazi persecution, there was no hesitation in the readiness of the secluded scholar to step into the arena, and Ginsberg did very much to help refugees from Germany to find a new life in England. I understand that many a scholar from the Continent owed new opportunities, and even the saving of his life, to Ginsberg. His other considerable services to Jewry were mainly his editorship of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* and his work for the Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

The time when I personally came nearest to intimacy with Ginsberg was undoubtedly at the sad moment of the death of his wife whom he had tended with such loving concern through a long and most distressing illness. One then saw how deep were the emotions behind the reserved and reticent, disciplined and controlled, exterior of this scholar. It was painful to witness the depth of his grief and most moving to see his love for, and pride in, his wife. He spoke to me of her courageous spirit throughout her long illness, of her many services to others, especially to retarded children; of her intellectual ability, for she was herself a scholar; and of her merit as a poet. I remember particularly the pleasure and pride with which he told me that when her poems were published—she wrote under her maiden name of Ethel Street—some of her lyrics had been described, by a reviewer of distinction, as not unworthy of the poet Herrick. No-one should be misled into thinking that there were not great depths of feeling behind the exterior reserve of Morris Ginsberg.

Ginsberg was deeply proud of Jewish heritage and tradition and he must have had a very considerable knowledge of Jewish traditional literature. I should imagine he had a very profound Jewish education in his youth. But, modest as he was, this Jewish knowledge was only known to me by occasional references in his conversation. It had to be 'glimpsed'.

Without question, it was the universal aspects of Judaism which appealed to him—its contribution to the developing thought of mankind and to universal ethical ideals. I never knew what he thought or felt about some of the profoundest and most intimate aspects of religion but Ginsberg's passion for service to mankind and his intense love of truth—truth which, in Jewish tradition, has been described as the 'seal of God'—was manifest and dominant. I think it appropriate, therefore, to conclude by quoting from the fifteenth Psalm, which reflects the high ethical ideal Ginsberg set before him, which in no inconsiderable measure he lived up to, and which refers to the pursuit of truth, which was a preponderating factor in his life:

He that walketh uprightly and worketh righteousness,
And speaketh truth in his heart.

THE PERSISTENCE OF ETHNIC POLITICAL PREFERENCES: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF JEWS IN AUSTRALIA

Peter Y. Medding

Base points in the analysis of ethnic voting behaviour

IN seeking to explain persistence and change in ethnic voting behaviour, one must begin from what might be termed a base point, or in some cases a cumulation of base points. For example, Dahl's examination of this question in the United States began from the base point of ethnic entry into the working class at the time of arrival in the new country.¹ Where such ethnic groups adopt the usual working class pattern of supporting Left parties, this base point enables the scholar to follow the political history of the group, and to study, for example, the effects of socio-economic advancement and declining ethnic identification upon the original ethnic preference, namely the Left preference.

This approach carries with it an implicit theory of the salience of ethnicity in politics that needs to be made more explicit. It suggests that such Left preferences result not only from the pursuit of socio-economic interests but, in addition, from some connexion and linkage between ethnicity and party choice. (This would, of course, be more evident where newly-arrived working class ethnic groups support Right parties. But, on the other hand, it would make it impossible to study the effects of socio-economic advancement upon ethnic political choices.)

The notion of political salience demands that the ethnic group believe ethnic issues and identity to be important in politics, and that there are ethnic group advantages to be derived from supporting a particular party. Salience can wax and wane as issues, circumstances, candidates, and leaders change. In the United States the various supports offered ethnic groups by the political machines served to make ethnicity salient. So too did the incorporation of recognized ethnic leaders into political roles and their choice as candidates for office. Negatively, a sense of exclusion or discrimination (real or imagined) could serve to direct

ethnic political preferences away from parties that were perceived in this light.

There are two other base points, relating to the political history and voting traditions of ethnic groups prior to immigration and to their cultural value systems. Ethnic groups may arrive in the new country possessing a long established political tradition of support for one end or other of the political spectrum, stemming from the particular historical circumstances in the country of origin. This, too, is related to the question of saliency. If highly salient at the time of arrival this tradition can be expected to be maintained in the new country for some time so long as there are no immediately obvious and equally or more salient counter or rival political signals there which demand changes in the tradition. In the absence of counter-signals it will in all likelihood be maintained out of habit, inertia, and familiarity, until proved by time to be meaningless or irrelevant. Of course, it will be maintained considerably longer if reinforced by similar experiences in the new country. For example, a group which votes one way in the old country because it feels discriminated against will continue to do so if it believes that this situation exists in the new one.

The ethnic cultural tradition, too, may be an important base point. A group's values may predispose it consistently to support the policies of one party as opposed to those of others. Thus groups with egalitarian, humanitarian, other-oriented, public-regarding value systems are more likely to support welfare policies and other aspects of public spending (even if they do not stand to benefit themselves), than groups which do not promote such values.² This difference will not be as relevant where the political parties generally promote similar policies and are not sharply differentiated in these culturally significant areas. On the other hand, past differences between the parties, and previous ethnic group responses deriving from values, may still influence political preferences even though the differences may long have ceased to be relevant, if they have come to constitute part of a group's political tradition and history.

General theories of persistence and change in ethnic voting behaviour

The assimilation theory. This theory asserts that occupational, educational, and geographical mobility lead to a change in ethnic voting patterns. These forms of mobility, it is argued, lead to a decline in feelings of ethnic identity and cohesion. Thus, as ethnic values change and become those of the general population, and as the ethnic group rises in socio-economic status its voting pattern should come to approximate to the similar native class-voting distribution.³ (It should be noted, as was explained above, that this can only apply to an initial Left voting pattern.)

Two counter-theories have been proposed, the mobilization theory of Wolfinger and the non-assimilation theory of Parenti.

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

Counter-theory A: The mobilization theory. This asserts the opposite of the former: that ethnic voting may become stronger as socio-economic status rises. This is because entry into the middle class enables the ethnic group to mobilize its political resources behind ethnic candidates. Political skills and political resources are, it is being suggested, middle-class skills and resources. In other words, there occurs a major increase in the political salience of ethnicity, owing to the appearance of middle-class ethnic political leaders and candidates, balanced tickets, and so forth. And it is generally more likely that these will come to the fore in the party that has hitherto been most closely allied with the ethnic group—the Left party.⁴

Counter-theory B: The realist non-assimilation theory. This bases itself upon the distinction, well known to sociologists, between acculturation and structural assimilation. It suggests firstly that acculturation itself is never complete: new values may be adopted without completely replacing the old. Thus ethnic cultural values may be maintained side by side with the adoption of those common to the general population and continue to influence political preferences. (This is, of course, a statement of the cultural pluralist position.)

Ethnic identification, too, need not wane with upward social mobility as suggested in the assimilation theory, and may even get stronger. There are many reasons. There may be positive pride in the ethnic group and a strong sense of belonging; ethnicity may help to establish a sense of identity and provide social support and warmth in an individualized atomistic society; it may be 'in' to be ethnic. Ethnic identification may become more salient as the result of external historical events (for example, the effect of the establishment of Israel upon Jews), or by changes within the group's position within the society (Negroes in America). Then again there may be unpleasant negative experiences heightening the sense of ethnic identity: discrimination, lack of acceptance by the host society, and other forms of social rejection. This may be particularly relevant after upward social mobility into the middle classes where acceptance may be expected more readily and where, therefore, rebuffs hit harder.

Upward social mobility and a general rise in economic status facilitate the development of the whole network of ethnic group institutions within which a group life can be maintained. Thus as friendship groups and associational involvements take place within the confines of the ethnic group, in short, in the absence of structural assimilation, ethnic group identity may be reinforced and maintained, not weakened.⁵

Jewish political traditions and culture

The traditional voting pattern of Jewry has been for parties on the Left. In Europe the Left and Centre-Left parties enjoyed Jewish support owing to their liberal and internationalist positions and their more

willing acceptance of Jews and Jewish rights. The parties on the Right were associated with discrimination, antisemitism, and fascism. This historical preference for Left parties, particularly in eastern and central Europe, has also been shown to have continued in the United States where Jews have been predominantly Democrat since 1932. The historical and traditional preference has been reinforced by Jewish liberal values and by feelings of discrimination.⁶

One of the more puzzling questions has been the relation between Jewish values, and the intensity of ethnic identity, with this voting choice. That is to say, was Jewish Left voting a result of history, tradition, continued minority situation, discrimination, and social unease among Gentiles (negative ethnic factors), or did it stem also from positive ethnic involvement and specific ethnic values? Thus Fuchs has argued that Jewish values predispose Jews to liberal political attitudes and that liberal political attitudes lead to Left voting.⁷ But the theory is difficult to sustain. For example, the connexion between Jewish values and political liberalism has never been demonstrated with any degree of certainty. Moreover, it has been found that the most religiously involved Jews, those supposedly the most involved in and influenced by the ethnic values, have been the least Left-of-Centre.⁸ It may be, of course, that these values are carried by those not religiously involved, while the latter are more influenced in their political behaviour by the salience of other values, albeit Jewish ones.

The political salience of ethnicity for Jews in Australia

Historical events in Australia have made some aspects of the above issues sharper. In the 1930s and 1940s the Liberal Party and its forerunner the United Australia Party, and their leader Mr. Menzies, were openly accused of antisemitism, which was deemed to be fairly active on the Conservative Right and seen in discrimination in exclusive social, business, and golf clubs, and in the exclusion of Jews from the Melbourne Stock Exchange—this, in spite of the fact that the only Jewish politicians were politically on the Right. Conversely, Labor gained support through Dr. Evatt's key role at the United Nations in the establishment of Israel, and through Mr. Calwell, who as Minister of Immigration made possible Jewish immigration after the war.

Twenty years of continuous Liberal rule have blotted out some of the memories of these past contributions. Moreover, many Jews migrated to Australia after the Liberals came to power in 1949. Their political experience, and that of their fellow Jews already there, was that the Liberal government continued Jewish immigration, gave strong support to Israel, and raised the plight of Soviet Jewry at the United Nations. Liberal Prime Ministers and various other Ministers have been publicly and ceremonially honoured by the Jewish community. They, in turn, have expressed pride in Jewish communal achievements, while

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

officiating in opening new Jewish buildings or in unveiling their foundation stones. Australian Prime Ministers have made front page news photographs wearing skullcaps at these ceremonies.

The result of all this was that Labor could no longer be said to be clearly and obviously more favourably disposed to Jews. In short, there no longer seemed any differences between the parties as regards their attitude to Jewry. In general, popular and elite antisemitism also seemed to have waned in Australia since the beginning of the 1950s. Thus a basic element in the historical argument—that party choice is salient to ethnic groups and perceived in ethnic terms—has disappeared. That is to say, the factors of class and increasing assimilation and acculturation are given greater freedom to operate to break down the traditional Left-of-Centre choice. One can thus examine whether Jews in Australia became more likely to move to the Right politically as they became upwardly mobile, better educated, and more integrated in Australian life, and as the European experience receded.

A limited amount of research has been carried out in the past in Melbourne seeking to examine Jewish voting preferences. Thus in 1947 Taft found that 75 per cent of his sample of Melbourne Jews who were prepared to state how they voted supported Labor.⁹ Similarly I found that in 1958 and 1961 approximately two-thirds of Melbourne Jews supported the ALP.¹⁰

The 1966-67 Sociological Survey of Melbourne Jewry provided a further opportunity to examine some of these questions, particularly the effects of increasing acculturation and socio-economic mobility, and the changed historical conditions for Jews in Australia and overseas upon their political preferences.¹¹

These general observations gave rise to the following hypotheses for empirical investigation and analysis:

1. That Jews will be predominantly Left-of-Centre in their voting choice, which would represent the continuation of the traditional ethnic voting preference (EVP).
2. That EVP will be directly related to European origin.
3. That EVP will be directly related to the degree of ethnic insecurity and perception of discrimination in Australia (negative ethnic group involvement).
4. That EVP will be directly related to political liberalism.
5. That EVP will be directly related to religio-ethnic identification (positive ethnic group involvement).
6. That as socio-economic status rises EVP will decline.
7. That Australian birth will lead to a decline in EVP.
8. That EVP will decline as the degree of structural integration increases.
9. That EVP will decline as the degree of cultural integration and degree of satisfaction with Australian life increases.

PETER Y. MEDDING

It will be noted at the outset that the first five hypotheses state the various arguments for the traditional Jewish Left-of-Centre voting response (European experience, political liberalism, minority feelings of insecurity and discrimination, and commitment to ethnic values). Hypotheses 6-9 present the argument for a declining EVP in terms of rising socio-economic status and integration, acculturation, and assimilation in Australian society, and a decline in the salience of ethnicity in political choice. To the extent that these relationships exist, and as they are maintained, the traditional Jewish Left-of-Centre voting preference will disappear.

Findings

The predominance of Left-of-Centre voting. For this to hold, we would have to find that more Jews vote Labor than Liberal. As we can see from Table 1, this is so for both men and women, although the Labor vote is barely stronger than that for the Liberals.

TABLE 1. *Vote at 1966 Federal Elections by Melbourne Jews, by sex, compared with Victorian population (Gallup Poll February 1967)*

Vote	Sex			Gallup Poll %
	Males %	Females %	Total %	
ALP ¹	40.8	42.8	41.9	36.1
LCP ²	40.4	38.7	39.5	48.3
DLP ³	1.3	1.5	1.4	7.0
Other	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.1
Don't know, Informal, ⁴				
Not Voted	2.6	2.2	2.4	2.0
Not Registered	4.7	4.8	4.7	
Not answered	9.8	8.9	9.3	5.6
N	(235)	(269)	(504)	

¹ ALP Australian Labor Party (Labor).

² LCP Liberal Country Party (Liberal).

³ DLP Democratic Labor Party.

⁴ Informal votes are those in which the ballot paper is either filled in incorrectly or not filled in at all. Voting is compulsory in Australia.

When we compare the Labor and Liberal preferences by excluding all other responses we find that the Labor vote captures a bare majority of voters as shown in Table 2.

To see the predominance of Labor voting in proper perspective, it is useful to compare this distribution with a Gallup Poll survey for the same period as shown in the last column of Table 1. This demonstrates that the Jewish support for Labor is clearly in excess of that in the general Victorian population.

Not only is Labor voting among Jewry higher than among the

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

TABLE 2. *Vote by sex*

Sex	Vote		N
	ALP %	LCP %	
Male	50.4	49.6	(191)
Female	52.5	47.5	(219)

general population; it must be noted that it occurs despite the higher socio-economic status of the Jewish sample as evidenced by Table 3. Whereas less than one-tenth of the general population are to be found in the two highest occupational groups, just over half of Melbourne Jews are situated there.

TABLE 3. *Comparison of socio-economic distribution of general Victorian population and of Melbourne Jewry*

	Melbourne Jewry %	Victorian population (Gallup) %
Professional and High Managerial	22.2	4.4
Small Business	29.0	3.7
White Collar	33.9	24.1
Skilled Workers	8.9	32.3
Unskilled, Semi-skilled	4.0	24.2
Farm Owners	—	5.6
Farm Labourers	—	2.3
Others, Don't work	2.0	3.3
N	(504)	

We may thus conclude that Melbourne Jews are more favourably disposed to Left-of-Centre political parties (the ALP) than the rest of the general population, and that this is so despite a strikingly higher socio-economic status, which ought to dispose them to be predominantly Right-of-Centre. We have therefore established the continuation among Melbourne Jewry of the traditional EVP for Left parties. (I shall later return to the relationship of socio-economic status to voting, and shall examine its influence upon EVP more closely.)

That EVP will be directly related to European origin. The empirical evidence verifying this hypothesis is shown in Table 4. The figures bear out our hypothesis for Poland and Germany/Austria. Jews born in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, are predominantly Liberal in their voting support, which replicates a previous finding.¹² Jewish support for Left parties was strongest in eastern Europe and Germany and Austria, and was brought to Australia by the migrants from those countries. It was strongly reinforced by the experience of

PETER Y. MEDDING

the 1933-45 period when Jews in Europe suffered from Nazi persecution and the attempted Final Solution. For Jews from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, however, the fear of Communism, forcing their emigration thence, was superimposed upon this historical memory, and has left its impact in a flight from Left-wing politics (including that of the ALP) because of its supposed associations with Communism. This came out strongly in the interviews.

TABLE 4. *Vote by country of origin*

Country of origin	Vote	
	ALP %	LCP %
Poland (N = 161)	65	35
Germany/Austria (N = 63)	56	44
Hungary/Czechoslovakia (N = 40)	35	65

Significant at .001 level, chi-square test

That EVP will be directly related to the degree of ethnic insecurity and perception of discrimination in Australia (negative ethnic group involvement). This hypothesis was tested by an Index of Perception of Discrimination which was constructed on the basis of responses to three survey questions: the degree of antisemitism in Australia at present rated by subjects on a 5-point scale; their personal experience (if any) of anti-semitism in Australia; and the way 'the average Australian feels about most Jews', also rated by subjects on a 5-point scale of friendliness. The raw scores were then standardized on an 8-point scale. This measure clearly demonstrated the correctness of our hypothesis of a direct relation between perception of discrimination and Left-of-Centre voting, as shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5. *Vote by perception of discrimination*

Perception of discrimination	Vote	
	ALP %	LCP %
Low (N = 129)	40	60
Medium (N = 132)	53	47
High (N = 149)	60	40

Significant at .01 level, chi-square test

That EVP is directly related to political liberalism. As a measure of political liberalism involving humanitarianism and attitudes to problems with overtones of colour and race, we used a single question relating to

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

attitude to the immigration to Australia of Asians. Respondents were asked 'Do you think the Government should allow Asian immigrants into Australia on the same basis as European migrants?' While no strong claims can be made for a single question as an index of overall political liberalism (if indeed such an index can be constructed), it does discriminate strikingly between Labor and Liberal supporters as shown in Table 6, demonstrating that political liberals are more likely to vote for a Left party. To put these figures in proper perspective it might be noted that approximately 25 per cent of a nationwide sample in 1967 supported the immigration of Asians on equal terms to Europeans, as compared with about 56 per cent of our sample.¹³

TABLE 6. *Vote by political liberalism*

<i>Asian migration</i>	<i>Vote</i>	
	<i>ALP</i> %	<i>LCP</i> %
Same as Europeans (N = 227)	60	40
Not same as Europeans (N = 152)	40	60
Significant at .001 level, chi-square test		

That EVP is directly related to the degree of religio-ethnic identification (positive ethnic group involvement). Subjects were rated on an Index of Religious Involvement and Observance which was scored in relation to ten separate questions in this area. The raw scores were then standardized on a 6-point scale. Table 7 shows that the predicted relation is not proven, and that in fact there is an inverse relationship between Religious Involvement and Observance and Labor voting.

TABLE 7. *Vote by religious involvement and observance*

<i>Religious observance</i>	<i>Vote</i>	
	<i>ALP</i> %	<i>LCP</i> %
Low (N = 97)	62	38
Medium (N = 234)	50	50
High (N = 79)	43	57
Significant at .05 level, chi-square test		

A number of factors explain this finding. Among those with a low level of Religious Observance (generally speaking, secular Jews) are to be found many who regard themselves as ideologically committed to socialism of both Bundist and Zionist varieties. Religion and secular socialism are thus alternatives. This group heavily weights the low

religious observers towards Left-of-Centre voting. On the other hand, among religiously observant Jews such factors as opposition to atheistic socialism and communism, general conservatism, and reluctance to change help to produce this Right-of-Centre response. Thus when we took an even stricter test of religious observance, strictly Orthodox Sabbath observance, we found that 67 per cent in this group voted Liberal (N = 30). An historical parallel exists in the actions and attitudes of first-generation Orthodoxy, particularly the Orthodox Yiddish Press, in the United States. According to Cohn, 'the Orthodox Yiddish journalists of this first generation felt that in a country like the United States, their Conservatism in Jewish matters could best be complemented by Conservatism in politics too'.¹⁴ This situation continued in the United States until events in the 1930s (the growth of domestic antisemitism, and the rise of international antisemitism in the guise of Nazism) swung Orthodox Jews over to the Democrats. In Melbourne, moreover, certain leading Rabbis have publicly expressed support for incumbent Liberal politicians who have assisted the religious educational institutions with which they are connected, and this too must have had some impact.

That as socio-economic status rises the degree of EVP will decline. Our earlier figures suggested that Jews as a whole, despite relatively high socio-economic status, are predominantly Left-of-Centre. But these overall figures do not tell us anything about the effects of socio-economic status upon voting. While the group as a whole may be predominantly Labor, there might be widespread variations between different socio-economic groups. This is in fact the case, as shown in Tables 8 and 9: Labor voting declines as socio-economic status (as measured by occupation and by class self-identification) rises. This finding is directly contrary to at least one study in the United States, which found that Jews with higher socio-economic status were more Left-of-Centre than those with lower socio-economic status.¹⁵

Again, to put these findings in proper perspective it is useful to compare the figures for occupation and class self-identification with Gallup Poll figures. While we have shown that the tendency to vote Labor declines as occupational status and class self-identification rise (corresponding to a similar general relationship in most industrial societies), it should be noted that at the same time Jews differ markedly from the general Australian population in the way in which this relation develops. This is seen clearly in Tables 8 and 9.

The differences are unmistakable. The point at which a majority of Jewish voters prefers Labor is higher up the socio-economic scale than among the general population. Among Jews the Labor vote is close to half in the small business section, whereas the same group in the general population is only 30 per cent in favour of Labor. Moreover, the Labor vote, even when less than a majority, is considerably higher

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

among Jews than among non-Jews at all socio-economic levels. This should not detract from the major finding, however, that voting among Jews is influenced by socio-economic status, even though the socio-economic status must be higher among Jews before the EVP ceases to be predominant.

TABLE 8. *Vote by Melbourne Jews compared with February 1967 Gallup Poll,* by occupation*

Occupation	Vote			
	Melbourne Jews		Gallup Poll	
	ALP %	LCP %	ALP %	LCP %
Professional, Higher Managerial (N = 97)	38	62	16.6	83.4
Administrative (Small Business) (N = 130)	48.5	51.5	35.8	64.2
Non-Manual (White Collar) (N = 131)	56	44	32.6	67.4
Manual (Skilled and Unskilled) (N = 45)	78	22	55.8	44.2

Significant at .001 level, chi-square test

* Recalculated to exclude those voting for other than the two parties.

TABLE 9. *Vote by Melbourne Jews compared with May 1967 Gallup Poll,* by class self-identification*

Class Self-Identification	Vote			
	Melbourne Jews		Gallup Poll	
	ALP %	LCP %	ALP %	LCP %
Upper (N = 51)	37	63	21	79
Middle (N = 268)	47	53	35	65
Lower (N = 73)	78	22	61	39

Significant at .001 level, chi-square test

* Recalculated to exclude those voting for other than the two parties.

That Australian birth leads to a decline in EVP. This follows from our assumption that the salience and relevance of the Jewish political experience in Europe which helped to produce predominantly Left-of-Centre voting has waned in Australia. This is borne out by our finding that 36 per cent of those born in Australia/New Zealand voted ALP and 64 per cent LCP (N = 70). To be kept in perspective this finding should be compared with Table 4 above.

That EVP will decline as the degree of structural integration increases. By structural integration we mean the degree of entry into personal friendship with non-Jews. The assumption is that the more Jews come into contact with non-Jews the more likely they are to adopt the political

PETER Y. MEDDING

stance of the rest of the society, which is far less Labor inclined. As a result EVP will decline. On the other hand, Jews who restrict their social friendships to other Jews, that is, are not structurally assimilated, will find their EVP being reinforced within the cultural and friendship boundaries of the ethnic group. Table 10 clearly bears out this hypothesis.

TABLE 10. *Vote by friendship with non-Jews*

<i>Non-Jewish friendships</i>	<i>Vote</i>	
	<i>ALP</i> %	<i>LCP</i> %
None (N = 155)	60	40
Limited (N = 169)	53	47
Extensive (N = 86)	35	65

Significant at .01 level, chi-square test

That EVP will decline as the degree of cultural integration and satisfaction with Australian life increases. This was tested by an Index of Acculturation. It was constructed on the basis of replies to questions about the degree of satisfaction with Australian life, feelings about being Australian, the speed of naturalization, the desire to remain in Australia, and the use of English at home. While primarily aimed at the migrants, it also discriminated among the Australian born, not all of whom were in the highest category. The raw scores were standardized on to a 9-point scale. The assumption here is that as Jews become more culturally integrated, satisfied, and at home in Australia, their voting will take on more of the characteristics of the surrounding society, which in our case should lead to increased Liberal voting. This assumes of course that political issues are not perceived as ethnically salient or relevant or closely related to political party choice, and that there is little or no difference between the parties in their attitude to Jews or issues of direct Jewish political interest. It assumes also that EVP is strongest during the earliest period of residence in a new country, when the degree of acculturation is at its lowest. Table 11 bears out these assumptions.

Our analysis so far has proceeded at the fairly uncomplicated level of separately checking a number of hypotheses relating to voting preference. In so doing we found that certain factors were associated with the tendency to maintain the EVP and vote Labor, while others were associated with the breakdown and decline in EVP and the consequent Liberal preference. I now turn to a second level of analysis, which will consist of further examination and testing of the findings by

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

holding other variables constant, and particularly by investigating situations where individuals were simultaneously subject to conflicting factors, for example, high perception of discrimination and a high degree of acculturation. Although all these variables were held constant in turn, in addition to others such as age, sex, and education, I shall report only those findings which alter the original relationships and not those which maintain or reinforce them in the predicted directions.

TABLE 11. *Vote by degree of acculturation*

<i>Degree of acculturation</i>	<i>Vote</i>	
	<i>ALP</i> %	<i>LCP</i> %
Low (N = 55)	76	24
Medium (N = 214)	56	44
High (N = 141)	35	65
Significant at .001 level, chi-square test		

National Origin. To recapitulate briefly, we found that Poles and Germans/Austrians tended to vote Labor, while Australian born and Hungarians and Czechoslovakians voted Liberal. One of the first questions that arise in relation to this finding is the durability of the traditional EVP. Does it erode in one generation, or does it take longer?

TABLE 12. *Vote by birth in English-speaking* country, parents' country of origin held constant*

<i>Subjects born in English-speaking countries, both parents born in</i>	<i>Vote</i>	
	<i>ALP</i> %	<i>LCP</i> %
Eastern Europe (N = 32)	53	47
English-speaking country (N = 37)	11	89
Significant at .001 level, chi-square test		

* This includes all those born in Australia/New Zealand, Britain, and other English-speaking countries. Altogether there were 85 subjects born in Australia/New Zealand and 35 born in Britain and other English-speaking countries. We felt free to combine them at this juncture to test the above relationship, for two reasons; first, exactly the same proportion of the second group 36% (N = 28) voted ALP as among Australian/New Zealand born; and second, the European Jewish political experience was equally removed from all of them.

That is to say, do all Australian born exhibit a greater propensity to vote Liberal, irrespective of how long their forebears have been in Australia and from where they came? Table 12 sheds considerable light upon these questions.

Table 12 can be taken at two levels. We may say simply that the traditional eastern European preference for Left-of-Centre parties is

not eroded completely in one generation; it seems that it takes two or more generations for this to occur. But at a deeper level these figures represent the continuation and maintenance of the eastern European preference for Left-of-Centre parties. The English-speaking children of English-speaking parents had little contact, if any, with the traditional EVP. Many of them, moreover, belong to that group of 'Anglicized' Jews of predominantly British and German origin who came of age in Australia and Britain in the 1920s and 1930s, and who sought to be 'more British than the British'. This fact manifested itself politically in a strong Right-of-Centre voting preference. Some of the leading members of this group in Australia (Mr. Archie Michaelis, Mr. H. I. Cohen, and Mr. H. E. Cohen) were Right-of-Centre parliamentarians. In many other ways, too, they sought to minimize ethnic distinctiveness, so that they were most unlikely to maintain any traditional Jewish ethnic political preference.¹⁸

The English-speaking children born of eastern European parents, on the other hand, although less strongly Left-of-Centre than those themselves born in eastern Europe, are still more likely to vote Labor than Liberal in about the same proportions as German and Austrian Jews. In other words, the traditional voting patterns have maintained themselves among the new generations born in Australia, and birth in Australia alone is not sufficient to erode that preference.

Other major qualifications to these findings come when levels of friendship with non-Jews, degree of acculturation to Australia, perception of discrimination, political liberalism, and occupation are held constant, as we see below in the following tables.

TABLE 13. *Vote by country of origin, level of friendship with non-Jews held constant*

Country of origin	Friendship with non-Jews							
	None		Limited		High			
	ALP %	LCP %	ALP %	LCP %	ALP %	LCP %		
Australia/NZ	38	62 (13)	39	61 (31)	31	69 (26)		
Poland	68	32 (78)	66	34 (67)	44	56 (16)		
Germany/Austria	64	36 (22)	59	41 (27)	36	64 (14)		

Table 13 shows that at all levels of friendship with non-Jews, Jews born in Poland and Germany/Austria are consistently higher in their EVP than are Jews born in Australia. On the other hand, where there is extensive structural integration with non-Jews, the preference for Labor among Poles and Germans/Austrians declines, and national origin is no longer associated with majority Left-of-Centre support.

Table 14 demonstrates that for Poles and Germans/Austrians, EVP

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

is maintained at all levels of acculturation and despite the predicted decline in Labor voting as degree of acculturation increases, a majority in both groups still votes Labor. The Australian born response is puzzling. Nothing can be said about Low Acculturated Australians because the figure is too small for statistical analysis. The High Acculturated group behaves as predicted, but it is at the middle level that a problem arises. It will be noted that this group is higher in ALP support than the other national groups with a similar degree of acculturation. A possible explanation of this phenomenon is that Australian-born Jews, in a situation where the vast majority of their fellows are in the High Acculturated group, register a strong ALP vote as a protest against their feelings of dissatisfaction with life in Australia and relatively lower degree of cultural integration. This dissatisfaction would perhaps be more strongly felt than among European migrants

TABLE 14. *Vote by country of origin, degree of acculturation held constant*

Country of origin	<i>Degree of acculturation</i>							
	<i>Low</i>		<i>Medium</i>		<i>High</i>			
	<i>ALP</i>	<i>LCP</i>	<i>ALP</i>	<i>LCP</i>	<i>ALP</i>	<i>LCP</i>		
	%	%	%	%	%	%		
Australia/NZ	—	—*	69	31	(13)	27	73	(55)
Poland	82	18	62	38	(38)	50	50	(28)
Germany/Austria	—	—*	56	44	(36)	52	48	(21)

* Too few cases for analysis

whose level of expectation and, consequently, sense of relative deprivation, is lower, so that Australian-born Labor voting as protest is more pronounced. This explanation is reinforced by the fact that English-speaking children born of eastern European parents make up over three-fifths of the Medium Acculturated group, but less than one-fifth of the High Acculturated group.

When levels of discrimination were held constant, the national groups behaved as predicted. Poles were consistently above 50 per cent in their Labor voting, and Australian born consistently below it. The major exception is the German-born group where a low perception of discrimination breaks down EVP and we find only 41 per cent of this group voting ALP (N = 22); so too when political liberalism was held constant, as shown in Table 15.

The major exception to predicted behaviour are German born who oppose Asian migration. While they were more pro-Labor than Australian born and less pro-Labor than Poles, the traditional EVP had broken down and less than a majority supported the ALP. These two findings together suggest that German-born Jews can be divided into two groups. There are firstly those for whom discrimination against

Jews is still salient and for whom the ideals of political liberalism are still highly relevant. As might be predicted, this group remains staunchly Left-of-Centre in its voting. On the other hand, there is a second group for whom discrimination is no longer salient, and who are not politically liberal, and among these the traditional EVP has disappeared. Further evidence of this dichotomy can be found in the fact that German/Austrian Jews produced the highest proportion in the whole sample who saw their party preference being tied to Jewishness, ideology, or class.

Finally, when occupation was held constant, the expected voting differences were found within all national groups, with the exception of Polish born in Professional and High Managerial occupations. Here occupational mobility had produced a decline in the traditional Labor preference, to the extent that only 41 per cent of this group voted Labor

TABLE 15. *Vote by country of origin, political liberalism held constant*

Country of origin	Asian migration			
	Same as Europeans		Not same as Europeans	
	ALP %	LCP %	ALP %	LCP %
Australia/NZ	32	68 (31)	33	67 (33)
Poland	71	29 (100)	56	44 (45)
Germany/Austria	66	34 (35)	41	59 (27)

(N = 27), which was little more than in the Australian-born Professional and Managerial group.

Perception and discrimination. Here our findings were unambiguous; when every other variable was held constant the Labor vote consistently increased as the perception of discrimination increased. This suggests strongly that arguments linking Left-of-Centre EVP with negative ethnic group identification, minority feeling, and insecurity are valid.

Political liberalism. As we have seen, there is a direct relationship between liberal attitudes to Asian migration and ALP voting. This relationship was maintained as each variable in turn was held constant, with only one exception, the Australian born. Here political liberalism made no difference; among those supporting Asian migration 32 per cent voted ALP (N = 31), while 33 per cent of those opposing Asian migration voted ALP (N = 33). This fits in with our previous argument that the degree of acculturation and Australian birth are likely to alter traditional ethnic political values in the direction of greater similarity with the general population.

But further refinement is introduced when we compare the responses

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

of those born in English-speaking countries of eastern European parents, with those born in English-speaking countries of English-speaking parents, as shown in Table 16.

TABLE 16. *Vote by political liberalism, birthplace of subject and parents held constant*

	<i>Subject born in English-speaking country, parents born in</i>					
	<i>Eastern Europe</i>			<i>English-speaking country</i>		
	<i>ALP</i> %	<i>LCP</i> %		<i>ALP</i> %	<i>LCP</i> %	
<i>Asian migration</i>						
Same as Europeans	62	38	(13)	19	81	(16)
Not same as Europeans	47	53	(17)	0	100	(19)

Table 16 makes it clear that when parents' place of birth is held constant, political liberalism still does make a difference in the predicted direction, and is positively related to Labor support. On the other hand, support for the Right among Jews whose parents were born in English-speaking countries is nevertheless so overwhelming that the quantitative impact made by political liberalism is negligible, and hardly increases the size of the pro-Labor vote.

Religious observance and involvement. Our earlier analysis suggested that ALP voting declined as the degree of religious involvement and observance increased. When our other variables were held constant this relationship was maintained except in two instances: among the Australian born and the highly acculturated. This is indeed surprising, as both these variables ought to operate in the direction of reducing the propensity to vote Labor. In both cases, the opposite occurred: and when these variables were held constant Labor voting increased. However, in the case of the Australian born, as in other similar cases, when they were divided according to parents' place of birth, the predicted relationship was restored; that is, within each group an increase in religious observance was positively related to a declining Labor vote. Those whose parents were born in English-speaking countries were overwhelmingly pro-Liberal, with about 90 per cent in the medium and high religious observance categories voting that way.

When degree of acculturation was held constant, Labor voting decreased as degree of religious observance increased, except in the case of the Highly Acculturated. Here approximately two-thirds at each level of religious observance supported the Liberal party. This high level of support for the Liberals seems to represent a ceiling beyond which increasing religious observance does not provide any further reinforcement. It should also be noted that there is a very high proportion of Australian born among the Highly Acculturated.

Socio-economic status. Here we found that ALP voting declined as occupational status and class self-identification rose. This relationship was maintained when other variables were held constant, except in the case of national origin. The relationship between occupation and vote held consistently for those born in Poland, but it made no difference among the Australian born, where there was a consistently low ALP vote. The figures for self-identification of class confirm these findings: the ALP vote increased as class declined for Polish born, but not for Australians or Germans. This forces us to qualify our earlier finding about the impact of class upon EVP. The revised finding would be that class position, as it rises, brings about a decrease in the predominance of Left-of-Centre voting among Jews born in Poland (the largest single group of adult Jews in Melbourne), but that class is less important among Jews born in Germany/Austria and Australia. That class does operate as a factor among Polish Jews is of importance in relation to overseas findings about the non-influence of class on Jewish voting patterns. But at the same time while rising class position decreases the propensity to vote Labor among Polish-born Jews, each of these occupational groups is well in excess of the comparable group in the general population. The fact that occupational mobility seems to have little impact upon the voting patterns of our German/Austrian-born subjects reinforces our previous analysis that perceptions of discrimination, feelings of antisemitism, and the tendency to see things in class terms (irrespective of objective class position) seem to be the distinguishing features of this group.

Structural integration. It will be recalled that we found an inverse relationship between Labor voting and degree of friendliness with non-Jews. The relationship was maintained in all cases when other variables were held constant, except for qualifications that must be made for degree of acculturation and occupation, as will be seen in Tables 17 and 18.

TABLE 17. *Vote by friendship with non-Jews, degree of acculturation held constant*

<i>Friendship with non-Jews</i>	<i>Degree of acculturation</i>					
	<i>Low</i>		<i>Medium</i>		<i>High</i>	
	<i>ALP</i> %	<i>LCP</i> %	<i>ALP</i> %	<i>LCP</i> %	<i>ALP</i> %	<i>LCP</i> %
None	89	11 (28)	56	44 (90)	47	54 (37)
Limited	65	35 (20)	57	43 (96)	40	60 (53)
Extensive	—	— *	54	46 (28)	22	78 (51)

* Too few cases for statistical analysis

It will be recalled that Labor vote also varied inversely with the degree of acculturation. Overall, the relationship between voting and

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

friendship with non-Jews is maintained. What is significant is that belief by subjects that they have undergone only a moderate degree of acculturation (itself linked to a high Labor vote) clearly counteracts the expected impact of extensive friendship with non-Jews (associated with a high Liberal vote).

TABLE 18. *Vote by friendship with non-Jews, occupation held constant*

<i>Friendship with non-Jews</i>	<i>Occupation</i>										
	<i>Profes- sional</i>			<i>Admin.</i>			<i>Non- manual</i>			<i>Manual</i>	
	<i>ALP</i>	<i>LCP</i>	()	<i>ALP</i>	<i>LCP</i>	()	<i>ALP</i>	<i>LCP</i>	()	<i>ALP</i>	<i>LCP</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
None	52	48	(21)	52	48	(48)	60	40	(63)	84	16 (19)
Limited	30	70	(47)	53	47	(64)	63	37	(41)	86	14 (14)
Extensive	38	62	(29)	22	78	(18)	37	63	(27)	50	50 (10)

Table 18 suggests that overall the expected relationship between non-Jewish friendship and Labor voting is maintained. However, there is a different cut-off point for different occupations. Among professional and high managerial occupations where there is general lack of support for the Labor party, only those who maintain no non-Jewish friendships provide a majority supporting Labor. Any degree of socializing, however minimal, is sufficient to bring about a Liberal majority among this group. For the other occupational groups, where Labor support is higher, the cut-off point is below the next level, that of limited non-Jewish friendships. Thus among these groups, it takes extensive non-Jewish friendships to break down the majority Labor support.

Acculturation. Here too, when we held other variables constant, an increase in the degree of acculturation regularly brought with it a decline in the Labor vote. Two reinforcing exceptions stand out. While not detracting from the overall impact of degree of acculturation, moderately acculturated Australian-born Jews and moderately acculturated professionals both produced exceptionally high ALP votes, 69 per cent ($N = 13$) and 53 per cent ($N = 38$) respectively. (We have already referred to the high ALP vote of moderately acculturated Australian born.) In the case of moderately acculturated professionals and high managerial class, the explanation probably lies in the status discrepancy. The phenomenon of lack of status consistency resulting in high Left voting as a protest vote and as an attempt to compensate for the situation has been well established in the United States by Lenski and others.¹⁷ A similar situation may exist here. Professionals and those in higher managerial occupations may be presumed to have a high expectation of degree of satisfaction and cultural integration into Australian life. To the extent that they are

disappointed, they manifest this in a high ALP vote. By way of contrast only 24 per cent of professionals with a high degree of acculturation vote ALP ($N = 50$).

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has provided evidence in support of both the Assimilation theory of ethnic voting propounded by Dahl and the counter-theory of Parenti. (The Mobilization theory is probably less relevant to Australia because it depends crucially upon the existence of ethnic issues and ethnic candidates.) The major support for Dahl's theory comes in our findings that socio-economic and occupational mobility, and increasing acculturation and structural assimilation do produce a decline in the strength of traditional Jewish Left-of-Centre voting patterns. On the other hand, major support for Parenti's theory is to be found in the continuing strength of perceptions of discrimination, despite increasing acculturation and structural assimilation, in the maintenance of particular voting traditions among specific national groups (for example, eastern Europeans), as historical patterns handed down from generation to generation, and in the differing ways in which these patterns are eroded. Similarly, striking evidence is found for the strength of particular ethnic group values (for example, political liberalism) and their influence upon voting behaviour. Nevertheless, we could not establish any direct correlation between positive religio-ethnic involvement and voting. It seems that a two-step process is involved: group membership and involvement produce greater support for specific political values within the group than there is among the rest of the population. These values then predispose the group, or those members espousing the values, to vote in a particular way. These group political values either derive from the general orientations of the group's cultural and religious value-systems, and are reinforced by historical circumstances, or may arise directly out of the group's historical experience. In the end, the two tend to merge; the group's experience if repeated over a long enough period will come to influence its values.

Thus the intensity of feelings of group membership and the forms of group belonging (for example, strict religious observance) seem to have less effect on voting behaviour than the *fact* of group belonging, and the manner in which this exposes the group member to group traditions and values on the one hand and discrimination and feelings of insecurity because of ethnicity on the other.

This is not to discount completely the importance of the group's socio-religious network of friendship cliques and institutions. It is in these and through these that group values are transmitted, and perceptions of discrimination can be checked for validity and reinforced as group experience, or dismissed as subjective individual experience.

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

This connects up directly with the question of salience. What today seems politically unimportant to the ethnic group may one day become crucial. And it is in these friendship cliques and institutions that the factor of salience will be weighed and decided. For example, the attitude of one or other party may change on matters of crucial importance to Jewry (Israel, antisemitism) which would produce wholesale movements of support away from one party and towards the other. So long as group members are connected to the interlocking ethnic socio-religious institutional and friendship network, they are available for political mobilization by the group, so that Wolfinger's mobilization theory, while not relevant today, could become so in the future.

Returning to our specific data, we can see that the analysis demonstrated the continued predominance of the traditional Left-of-Centre Jewish voting pattern among Melbourne Jewry, and isolated those factors that contributed to its decline in strength. Thus the fact that over 70 per cent of Melbourne Jews in 1947, over 60 per cent in 1961, and just over 50 per cent in 1966 voted ALP can be explained by the increase of the Australian born, of the well integrated, and of the upwardly socially mobile, during a record term in office by a Liberal party that publicly supported Jewish causes and interests, in an era of Australian history when antisemitism and discrimination significantly declined.

Whether the ethnic preference for Left-of-Centre parties will decline further is a moot point. It has already been emphasized above that compared with non-Jews in equivalent occupations, Jews support the ALP more strongly. In the period under examination the ALP itself was at its lowest ebb in Australian political history. It is probable indeed that the marked improvement in its public support in 1969 was also felt among Jewry, perhaps even more strongly than among other groups, although we have no hard data to establish the point; but we may perhaps assume that Jews would be affected like the rest of the population by major voting swings, and perhaps more so in view of the support Labor already had among them. In the future, ALP support could well increase if perceptions of discrimination were to become stronger, and in this context it is significant that the perception of discrimination is not lower among Australian born than among Polish born (if anything it is a trifle higher). Nor will a mere numerical increase among Australian-born Jews necessarily lead to a radical decline in the ALP vote. For many years to come a large proportion of Australian-born Jews will be the children of eastern European parents, and as we saw above they are significantly more ALP than the children of Australian-born parents. Political traditions of this kind once established often carry on long into the future. Moreover there are limits to the upward social mobility of Jews: although they are never likely to reproduce the typical Australian occupational profile, it is not clear

how much higher their occupational status will rise, if at all. Our figures also indicate that only 34 per cent of Australian-born Jews have more than a limited number of friendships with non-Jews, which suggests that here, too, there may be a ceiling, which will bar more far-reaching effects of close structural integration upon ethnic political preferences.

Given these conflicting pressures and the unpredictability of political life, it would be foolish to attempt to forecast the future voting patterns of Melbourne Jewry. But we can say with some degree of confidence that there will *not* be a steady unilinear decline of ALP support until the Jewish voting pattern is identical with that of non-Jews in similar occupational groups.

NOTES

¹ R. A. Dahl, *Who Governs?*, New Haven, Conn., 1961, pp. 32-36.

² E. C. Banfield and J. Q. Wilson, *City Politics*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, pp. 235-40.

³ Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-25.

⁴ R. E. Wolfinger, 'The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 59, December 1965, pp. 896-908.

⁵ For a statement of this theory in relation to politics see M. Parenti, 'Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 61, September 1967, pp. 717-26. For a general statement of theories of assimilation and acculturation and factors that promote ethnic group survival see P. Y. Medding, *From Assimilation to Group Survival*, Melbourne, 1968, ch. 1.

⁶ Among others see L. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews*, Glencoe, Ill., 1956.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Medding, *op. cit.*, pp. 243, 256-57.

⁹ R. Taft, *The Melbourne Jewish Community*, unpublished MS., 1947.

¹⁰ Medding, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-39.

¹¹ This study was conducted under the auspices of the Jewish Social Service Council of Victoria and was guided by a Steering Committee consisting of Mr. Walter M. Lippmann, Mr. A. Bloch, Dr. L. Mann, Professor M. Marwick, Mr. L. Sharpe, Professor R. Taft, Dr. C. Tatz, and the writer. The other members of this committee are thanked for their contribution to the planning of the present study, but the writer takes full responsibility for it.

Financial support was provided mainly by the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, and by supplementary amounts from various Melbourne Jewish institutions. All computations in the present article were carried out at the Monash University Computer Centre. Thanks are expressed to Mr. Tran Van Hoa for assistance with programming, and to Mrs. Judith Irvine for her research assistance.

The sample was selected from the Jewish Communal Register. This is an almost complete record of all addresses at which any Jews live, and it was drawn up to serve as a basis for various appeals for funds. The list was compiled diligently from all possible sources, and has been kept up-to-date. The information was obtained from other communal lists and from records of births, marriages, and deaths, including the names of family members mentioned in newspaper announcements of these personal events. Because of the importance of the representativeness of the sample for this study, the members of the Steering Committee tested the Register by compiling lists of Jews whom they thought would most likely have been overlooked because they are extremely peripheral. Almost all of these were, in fact, in the Register. A further confirmation of the completeness of the Register comes from demography: multiplying the number of households in the Register by the average number of Jews per household found in the actual Survey produces an estimated population of 34,000, which is consistent with the Australian Population Census.

A random sample of 626 households

JEWISH VOTING IN AUSTRALIA

was drawn and after the exclusion of persons untraceable, overseas, or too ill to be interviewed, and those who claimed not to be Jewish (2 per cent of the sample), the possible sample remained at 559. Successful interviews were conducted with 504 respondents (90.2 per cent). Comparison with the Census suggests that this random sample was representative of the Jewish community in its major demographic and socio-economic dimensions, age, area of residence, country of origin, etc. Further details on these aspects can be found in Peter Medding, ed., *Jews in Australian Society* (forthcoming).

¹² Medding, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-43.

¹³ See Michael Kahan, 'Some Aspects of the Political Assimilation of Migrants in Australia', unpublished paper, Australian Political Studies Association, 1969 Conference, p. 3.

¹⁴ W. Cohn, 'The Politics of American Jews' in M. Sklare, ed., *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, p. 621.

¹⁵ E. Litt, 'Status, Ethnicity and Patterns of Jewish Voting in Baltimore', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 23, 1961, pp. 159-64. It should be noted that the findings of Maurice Guysenir, 'Jewish Vote in Chicago', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 20, 1958, pp. 195-214, are similar to ours.

¹⁶ On this group see Medding, *passim*.

¹⁷ Gerhard E. Lenski, 'Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Status', *American Sociological Review* no. 19, August 1954, pp. 405-13; Gerhard E. Lenski, 'Status Inconsistency and the Vote: A Four Nation Test', *American Sociological Review*, no. 32, April 1967, pp. 298-301; David R. Segal, 'Status Inconsistency, Cross Pressures, and American Political Behavior', *American Sociological Review*, no. 34, June 1969, pp. 352-59. For a somewhat contrary view, see Donald Treiman, 'Status Discrepancy and Prejudice', *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 71, May 1966, pp. 651-664.

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INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION: A GUIDE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH¹

Bernard Lazerwitz

Background

THE characteristics and consequences of intermarriage and conversion have been long-standing major concerns and 'scare' topics among both Jews and Christians. In turn, these concerns have stimulated a large number of research endeavours. Among the very recently published works are the studies by Goldstein (1968) of Springfield, Massachusetts and, with Goldscheider (1968), of the Providence, Rhode Island, Jewish Communities; Axelrod et al. (1967) on Boston Jewry; Sklare and Greenblum's (1967) study of a contemporary Jewish suburb; Gordon's (1967) case studies of conversion; and Rosenthal's (1963) investigation into intermarriages in Washington, D.C. and the small Jewish communities of Iowa. Elsewhere, research is becoming equally productive, intermarriage data being developed for the Jews of Australia by Lippmann (1969), for Italy by Pergola (1969), for Canada's Jews and Christians by Heer (1962), and even for Israel by Cohen (1969). The characteristics of intermarriages and conversions amongst United States Protestants and Catholics have been recently investigated by Greeley (1964); Croog and Teele (1967); and Salisbury (1964 and 1969).²

Collectively the studies of Jewish intermarriages have revealed the following demographic information:

- a) Low, but increasing, intermarriage levels. The United States Census Bureau's (1958) Current Population Survey, taken in March 1957, reports that 7 per cent of existing Jewish marriages were with non-Jews. However, all researchers agree that in this century the percentage of Jews married to non-Jews rises considerably with number of generations in an industrial diaspora country. For example, the Springfield and Providence surveys by Goldstein (1968: 145-48) and Goldstein and Goldscheider (1968: 155-57) report that 4.4 and 4.5 per cent of Jewish households were based on intermarriages but that the children of respondents have intermarriage rates of 9 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively.

BERNARD LAZERWITZ

- b) Intermarriage rates appear to be highest in large growing Jewish communities and in the very small ones. For instance, Rosenthal (1963: 16) reports that a substantial (for the United States) 13 per cent of Washington, D.C. Jewish marriages were intermarriages, and that the small Jewish communities of the state of Iowa averaged a 42 per cent intermarriage rate between 1953 and 1959.³
- c) Many more Jewish men intermarry than do Jewish women.
- d) The intermarried have a higher proportion who are in their second, or more, marriage. For example, Goldstein and Goldscheider (1968: 164-65) report an intermarriage rate of 24 per cent among those 40 to 59 years old who have married more than once but one of only 4 per cent among those of this same age group married just once.
- e) The typical convert to Judaism is a non-Jewish woman marrying a Jewish man. Furthermore, according to Goldstein and Goldscheider (1968: 157) the conversion rate is on the increase. Among their intermarried couples 60 years old or older, none of the non-Jews had been converted to Judaism. Among those intermarried couples under 40 years, 70 per cent of the non-Jews had been so converted.
- f) All students of intermarriage agree that very few Jews are converted to other faiths.
- g) Goldstein and Goldscheider (1968: 164), Goldstein (1968: 150), and Rosenthal (1963: 30) report less intermarriage with increasing amounts of Jewish education.⁴

Students of Protestant-Catholic intermarriages have found:

- a) Rather sizable Catholic intermarriage rates. For example, Greeley (1964: 3) reports that 12 per cent of his respondents in a national sample of Catholics were intermarried. The Current Population Survey of March 1957 reported that 21 per cent of married Catholics had non-Catholic spouses and 9 per cent of married Protestants had non-Protestant spouses.
- b) As in the case of the Jews, Greeley (1964: 8) finds that the intermarriage rate increases as the proportion of the Catholic population declines.
- c) Unlike the case of the Jews, Greeley (1964: 6) finds that Catholic women are considerably more likely to intermarry than are Catholic men. Salisbury (1964: 420) also states that more Protestant women intermarry than do their men.
- d) As among Jewish intermarriages, Salisbury (1964: 424-25) reports a divorce rate of 14 per cent for Protestant-Catholic marriages in contrast to 5 per cent for marriages in which both spouses are Catholics and 8 per cent when both are Protestants.
- e) As with Jews, most conversions to Catholicism or Protestantism are results of intermarriages. After examining the available research literature, Salisbury (1964: 420-22) concludes that there are about

INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION

equal conversion rates among the Protestant and Catholic religious communities.

- f) Salisbury (1969: 126-27) observes that Protestant women are converted at a higher rate than Protestant men and Catholic men and women.
- g) Both Greeley and Salisbury report that those who intermarry become less involved with their religions. Those in Catholic 'invalid' intermarriages are the least likely to raise their children as Catholics or to send them to Catholic parochial schools. Finally, Catholic women who marry higher social status Protestant men are converted at a higher rate than are Catholic women who marry equal or lower status Protestant men.
- h) Salisbury (1964: 421) reports a greater likelihood that children of intermarriages who have Catholic mothers will be reared as Catholics. Croog and Teele (1967: 97-98) qualify this by saying that Catholic upbringing is likely for the children of low status intermarriages who have Catholic mothers, while Catholic women married to high status Protestants are more inclined to rear Protestant children.

The research literature on the intermarried, then, does an excellent job of presenting their demographic and social status characteristics. By way of contrast, information on the group identity factors among the intermarried is rather scarce. This article seeks to narrow this gap in our knowledge in the following two ways:

- a) Presenting data on the group identity characteristics of those who are converted and those who intermarry without being converted.
- b) Contrasting converts and those couples who intermarry without conversion with Jewish and Protestant denomination changers, with third generation American Jews, and with white Protestants and Catholics.

The final goal is to present a set of generalizations to be tested on the large quantity of intermarriage data now being gathered by the United States national Jewish population survey.⁵

Source of data

The intermarriage data to be presented were gathered as part of a survey of religio-ethnic identification in the Chicago, Illinois, metropolitan area. The survey involved 572 Jewish, 464 white Protestant, and 257 white Catholic interviews. All respondents resided in Cook County (including Chicago) or contiguous areas in eastern DuPage and southern Lake counties in Illinois during 1966 and 1967. A disproportionately selected and multi-stage area probability sample was used to pick respondent housing units within each religio-ethnic community.

Then, within sample housing units one respondent 20 years old or older was selected for interview by the use of the Kish adult selection tables (1965: 398-401).⁶

This survey yielded merely 63 Jewish intermarriages, consisting of 11 conversions to Judaism, 3 conversions from Judaism, 29 marriages with Protestants, and 20 with Catholics. There were 138 Protestant-Catholic intermarriages including 35 conversions *to* Protestantism from Catholicism and 25 conversions *from* Protestantism to Catholicism.

It is clear that the small number of interviews with those who had intermarried or been converted requires us to handle the data with considerable awareness of their limitations. Despite this, in the judgment of the author, the quality of the data is adequate for the task of contrasting those who marry within and without their religio-ethnic communities and for reaching conclusions to be tested by more ample data.

The conceptual scheme

The previous analyses of these data from the Chicago area survey have been the exploration of the components and consequences of religio-ethnic identification. By the use of similar research upon religious and ethnic identification, such as is found in Glock and Stark (1965) and Lazerwitz (1953), together with concepts developed during the survey's design stage, eight theoretical dimensions of religio-ethnic identification were developed and measured by a set of equivalent indices.⁷

These identity dimensions and their measurements are:

- 1) Religious behaviour: this component is measured by an index of religious behaviour formed from such standard items as church and synagogue attendance on the sabbaths and the yearly religious holidays, etc.
- 2) Pietism: this dimension is concerned with the more intense religious experiences and practices, and is equivalent to Lenski's (1961: 22-24) concept of devotionism and the Glock and Stark (1965: 20) experiential component. It is measured by an index formed of items such as private prayer, religious fasts and abstinences, etc.
- 3) The intellectual: this covers a respondent's formal religious education and knowledge together with participation in less structured learning situations such as religious summer camps and adult religious study classes. Hence, an index of religious education is formed from all these items.
- 4) Religious organizational activity: this consists of an index measuring activity in religious and ethnic voluntary associations and charities.
- 5) Ideological: this dimension covers both traditional beliefs and those beliefs now current among the better educated and informed members of a religious grouping. For this survey only a traditional beliefs index has been formed.

INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION

- 6) Attitudes towards and concern about co-religionists in the rest of the world. For the survey this was confined to Jewish concern about Israel and has been measured by a Zionism index.
- 7) The parental role: this dimension covers what a respondent's parents do for him religiously and what a respondent, in his turn, does as a parent. Children's religious education and parental concern over religious intermarriage are included. This dimension has been established by two indices. The first index covers childhood religious memories, childhood attendance at services, and parental religiosity; the second index covers the actual religious education given, or intended to be given, to their children by respondents.
- 8) The ethnic element: this covers the concentration of friends and courtship within one's religious and ethnic grouping and is measured by an ethnic index based upon such question items.

The basis of the operational indices involves our viewing people as relating to their religious community in one of the following ways:

- a) Involving themselves in both an active and consistent manner. For example, this means that such people relate to churches or synagogues by going to weekly services *and* observing the various yearly religious festivals *and* observing the several religious fasts and acts of self-denial.
- b) Involving themselves in a somewhat active but inconsistent manner. For example, such people, if Jewish, might eat on Yom Kippur but not eat bread during Passover.
- c) Involving themselves in an infrequent manner. This could consist of going to religious services just a few times a year.
- d) Involving themselves not at all.

The use of these four categories frees one of too great a concern over which particular question to ask in any of the eight identity dimensions. Any series of questions which cover the behavioural and attitudinal aspects of an identity dimension in a way which permits expression of varying amounts of activity and consistency will furnish adequate operational categories.

In order to get enough survey cases into the analytical categories, each of these nine identity indices had to be divided into a high level composed of respondents who were consistently involved on the various items forming an index; a low level composed of respondents who were slightly or not at all involved on the various items of an index; and a medium level composed of the remaining respondents.⁸

Intermarried respondents have been separated from the other respondents by a series of questions which ascertain the religious preferences of past or present spouses in contrast to the religion in which respondents have been reared. Anyone who reported now being married,

or having been married, to someone of a faith different from that of his childhood has been considered intermarried. Converts were separated out by a series of additional questions about the faiths in which respondents had been reared in contrast to their present faiths. Those who reported being reared as Jews, Protestants, or Catholics but were now members of another one of these three faiths have been considered converts. Such converts were asked extra questions about their childhood homes and early religious experiences and education. In Jewish housing units with intermarriages or converts, both spouses were interviewed. In such Christian households only one adult was interviewed.

Jewish and Protestant denomination changes were ascertained by asking in which denominations respondents who had not been converted had been reared and what their present denomination affiliations or preferences were. Where childhood and present denominations did not match, respondents were classified as denomination changers.⁹ For example, Jews who were reared in the Orthodox denomination but are now Conservative or Reform Jews have been put into the denomination change category.

Findings: Status and demography

TABLE 1. *In- and inter-marriage percentages for adults in the Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

<i>Family Marriage Group</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Protestants</i>	<i>Catholics</i>
	%	%	%
Is a convert or is married to a convert	2	7	5
Spouse is of a different faith	6	11	7
Spouse has same faith	82	75	79
Never married	10	7	9
Base	100	100	100
N	572	464	257

In order to verify the ability of the limited number of interviews with converted and intermarried respondents to portray important category differences, let us first look at a set of their demographic characteristics. In Table 1 are given the various intermarriage percentages among those now members of the three religious groups. Converts and intermarriages are fewest amongst Jews. Here, in a major Catholic population centre, Protestants show a somewhat higher intermarriage percentage than do Catholics.¹⁰

Social status is examined in Table 2. Here the Jewish change groups are couples in which one spouse is a convert to Judaism, couples in which only one spouse is Jewish, and adult respondents who have changed

INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION

their childhood denominations (but have not intermarried). Jews whose U.S. ancestry goes back for at least three generations are included as a group for comparison. Among Protestants and Catholics, the change groups are composed of respondents who were converted to these faiths,

TABLE 2. *Social status of the various religious groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

<i>Jewish Groups</i>				
<i>Social Status</i>	<i>Converts and Spouses</i>	<i>Mixed Religion Couples</i>	<i>Denomination Changers</i>	<i>3rd Generation Jews</i>
	%	%	%	%
High	83	23	29	35
Moderate	17	70	57	60
Low	0	7	14	5
Base	100	100	100	100
N	11	49	292	175

<i>Protestant Groups</i>					
<i>Social Status</i>	<i>Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Converts</i>	<i>Mixed Religion</i>	<i>Denomination Changers</i>	<i>White Protestants</i>
	%	%	%	%	%
High	36	26	27	38	33
Moderate	51	51	62	44	50
Low	13	23	11	18	17
Base	100	100	100	100	100
N	22	13	45	144	464

<i>Catholic Groups</i>				
<i>Social Status</i>	<i>Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Converts</i>	<i>Mixed Religion</i>	<i>White Catholics</i>
	%	%	%	%
High	14	44	14	16
Moderate	75	31	75	54
Low	11	25	11	30
Base	100	100	100	100
N	16	9	33	257

other respondents whose spouses are converts, respondents whose spouses are of the other Christian faith, and Protestant respondents who, while not intermarried, have changed their childhood denominations. Again, for the purpose of comparison, the entire adult samples of white Protestants and white Catholics have been included.¹¹

BERNARD LAZERWITZ

Families with Jewish converts are of distinctly higher social status than the other Jewish change groups. Mixed religious couples have somewhat fewer high status families than are found among third generation Jews, while denomination changers are somewhat lower in overall status relative to the third generation group. Among Protestants, the differences are slight. However, among Catholics, spouses of converts have distinctly higher status than Catholics at large, while converts and Catholics married to Protestants are disproportionately in the middle status category.

As would be expected from the research literature, converts to the

TABLE 3. *Age of the various religious groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

<i>Jewish Groups</i>					
<i>Age</i>	<i>Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Christians</i>	<i>Denomination Changers</i>	<i>3rd Generation Jews</i>
	%	%	%	%	%
Under 40	47	50	75	29	74
40-59	53	44	21	56	25
60 and over	0	6	4	15	1
Base	100	100	100	100	100
N	11	11	49	292	175

<i>Protestant Groups</i>						
<i>Age</i>	<i>Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Jews</i>	<i>Spouses of Catholics</i>	<i>Denomination Changers</i>	<i>White Protestants</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Under 40	27	44	87	44	40	42
40-59	62	56	11	43	38	39
60 and over	11	0	2	13	22	19
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	22	13	29	45	144	464

<i>Catholic Groups</i>					
<i>Age</i>	<i>Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Jews</i>	<i>Spouses of Protestants</i>	<i>White Catholics</i>
	%	%	%	%	%
Under 40	50	44	67	61	41
40-59	40	56	33	29	45
60 and over	10	0	0	10	14
Base	100	100	100	100	100
N	16	9	20	33	257

INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION

various faiths are disproportionately women. Among Jews and Protestants their converts are 90 per cent women; among Catholics converts are 70 per cent women.

Clearly, among Jews these forms of religious change are far more characteristic of people now under 60—as shown by Table 3. About half of the converts, their spouses, and denomination changers are between 40 and 59 years of age, while those Jews married to Christians are similar to third generation Jews in age spread. As would be expected, the Christian spouses of Jews are also quite young.

Among Protestants, converts and their spouses are more concentrated in middle age than are Protestants as a whole. As in the case of Jews,

TABLE 4. *Number of marriages by the various religious groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

<i>Jewish Groups</i>					
<i>No. Marriages</i>	<i>Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Christians</i>	<i>Denomination Changers</i>	<i>3rd Generation Jews</i>
	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>
0	—	—	—	3	19
1	74	67	89	84	76
2 or more	26	33	11	13	5
Base	100	100	100	100	100
N	11	11	49	292	175

<i>Protestant Groups</i>						
<i>No. Marriages</i>	<i>Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Jews</i>	<i>Spouses of Catholics</i>	<i>Denomination Changers</i>	<i>White Protestants</i>
	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>
0	—	—	—	—	4	7
1	85	88	74	82	88	82
2 or more	15	12	26	18	8	11
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	22	13	29	45	144	464

<i>Catholic Groups</i>					
<i>No. Marriages</i>	<i>Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Converts</i>	<i>Spouses of Jews</i>	<i>Spouses of Protestants</i>	<i>White Catholics</i>
	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>
0	—	—	—	—	18
1	82	88	93	89	79
2 or more	18	12	7	11	3
Base	100	100	100	100	100
N	16	9	20	33	257

BERNARD LAZERWITZ

Catholic religious change groups are younger than are Catholics as a whole.

Considering all three religious groups, one can say that intermarriage is now youthful, while conversion seems to wait a few years. Apparently, with the development of marital stability and the passage of children from infancy to childhood, comes a quest for family religious homogeneity and, hence, an increased amount of conversion.

In Table 4 data are given on the number of marriages for the various religious change groups. As would be expected from the research literature, those who have been converted or intermarried fairly consistently have more multiple marriages than the comparison groups of third generation Jews, white Protestants, or white Catholics.¹²

On the whole then, the demographic data on the religious change groups among Jews, Protestants, and Catholics are in agreement with what earlier studies have shown to be the various characteristics of the converted and intermarried, despite the quite small number of interviews and the sampling errors of the percentages. They give added confidence to the conclusions next to be drawn about the identity characteristics of converts and the intermarried.¹³

Findings on identification

The three identity indices of religious behaviour, pietism, and traditional beliefs, given in Table 5, show a mixed picture. For religious

TABLE 5. *Religious characteristics of the Jewish groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

Identification Index Levels	Jewish Groups					
	Converts	Spouses of Converts	Spouses of Christians	Denomination Changers	3rd Generation Jews M	W
A. Religious Behaviour Index	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	37	72	0	23	21	9
Moderate	63	22	17	56	44	62
Low	0	6	83	21	35	29
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
B. Pietism Index						
High	11	6	3	33	21	10
Moderate	37	94	70	47	44	58
Low	52	0	27	20	35	32
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
C. Traditional Beliefs Index						
High	36	11	30	30	23	48
Moderate	32	6	36	34	26	28
Low	32	83	34	36	51	24
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
N (A, B, C)	11	11	49	272	70	105

INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION

behaviour there is a three-way split, with the most involvement shown for converts and their spouses, a middle ranking sector formed by denomination changers and third generation men and women, and the Jewish spouses of Christians trailing behind. On pietism, the denomination changers and third generation men lead. Following them come the two spouse categories. The lagging third generation women and converts, largely women, have relatively similar percentages. However, on traditional beliefs third generation women lead, being followed closely by converts, denomination changers, and spouses of

TABLE 6. *Jewish education and background characteristics of the Jewish Groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

Identification Index Levels	Jewish Groups					
	Converts	Spouses of Converts	Spouses of Christians	Denomination Changers	3rd Gen. Jews	W
	%	%	%	%	%	%
A. Own Jewish Education Index						
High		33	13	36	24	31
Moderate		61	31	27	46	40
Low		6	56	37	30	29
Base		100	100	100	100	100
B. Childhood Home Jewish Background Index						
High		0	3	18	7	5
Moderate		33	46	65	36	42
Low		67	51	17	57	53
Base		100	100	100	100	100
C. Jewish Education for One's Children Index						
High	63	67	2	37	39	48
Moderate	32	33	11	45	39	35
Low	5	0	87	18	22	17
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
N (A, B, C)	11	11	49	272	70	105

Christians. Third generation men are the middle group and the spouses of converts trail behind.

On Jewish education one finds that the basic difference in Table 6 is the low ranking of spouses of Christians. A secondary difference is the larger concentration of spouses of converts in the moderate rank. Childhood home Jewish background makes the denomination changers the leading group, the spouses of converts trailing behind and the others in between. On Jewish education for one's children, the leading groups are converts and their spouses, the spouses of Christians are the trailing group, and the rest are in between but nearer to the converts.¹⁴

From the Jewish organization activity index percentages shown in Table 7, one sees that the most active categories are the spouses of converts (largely male) and third generation women, followed closely

BERNARD LAZERWITZ

by converts, third generation men, and the denomination changers. The spouses of Christians are far behind. On ethnicity, as would be expected from the nature of this dimension, one finds converts, their spouses, and spouses of Christians trailing behind, with the third generation in the middle and the denomination changers slightly in front of them. On the Zionism index, the converts and their spouses are the leaders, denomination changers are in the middle, and the other three religious change categories trail behind.

To summarize the data on these nine indices across six categories, we may note that the spouses of Christians are not involved in Jewish

TABLE 7. *Jewish communal involvement of the Jewish Groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

Identification Index Levels	Jewish Groups					
	Converts	Spouses of Converts	Spouses of Christians	Denomination Changers	3rd Gen. Jews	
					M	W
A. Jewish Organization Activity	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	37	50	1	36	39	48
Moderate	58	39	16	36	39	35
Low	5	11	83	28	22	17
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
B. Ethnicity Index						
High	0	0	0	48	24	30
Moderate	26	33	20	37	56	32
Low	74	67	80	15	20	38
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
C. Zionism Index						
High	21	56	10	21	7	7
Moderate	53	11	46	39	42	56
Low	26	33	44	40	51	37
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
N (A, B, C)	11	11	49	272	70	105

communal life with regard to religious behaviour, Jewish organizations, ethnicity, or Jewish education intentions for their children. Converts and their spouses are clearly involved in Jewish communal life, as is shown by their religious behaviour, Jewish organization activity, Zionism, and Jewish education for their children. Denomination changers differ in a meaningful manner from third generation Jews in only ethnicity and childhood home Jewish background.¹⁵

Perhaps the most interesting pattern results from the large percentage differences in Jewish education. Here the spouses of converts report a considerable amount of Jewish education while the spouses of Christians report much less. Since the two groups differ so little in Jewish home backgrounds, one is quite tempted to conclude that a major factor in

INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION

the conversion of non-Jewish women is the Jewish involvement of their husbands generated by appreciable amounts of Jewish education.

The Protestant data begin with Table 8. Here the Protestant spouses of converts are the leading group on religious behaviour and traditional beliefs. On pietism, there are close percentage distributions for spouses of converts, spouses of Catholics, the percentages of denomination changers, and white Protestants. Throughout the three indices, denomination changers and white Protestants are in close agreement. Throughout, Protestant spouses of Jews and converts are the least in-

TABLE 8. *Religious characteristics of the Protestant Groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

Identification Index Levels	Protestant Groups					
	Converts	Protestant Spouses of			Denomination Changers	White Protestants
		Converts	Jews	Catholics		
	%	%	%	%	%	%
A. Religious Behaviour Index						
High	5	39	0	14	21	22
Moderate	49	22	55	49	52	53
Low	46	39	45	37	27	25
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
B. Pietism Index						
High	8	16	0	18	21	20
Moderate	16	69	47	54	57	50
Low	76	15	53	28	22	30
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
C. Traditional Belief Index						
High	17	74	2	51	39	43
Moderate	47	17	21	44	43	42
Low	36	9	77	5	18	15
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
N (A, B, C)	22	13	29	45	144	464

involved. Protestant spouses of Catholics fall between the spouses of converts and denomination changers.

The Protestant education percentages of Table 9 show reduced differentiation, the spouses of Jews, denomination changers, and white Protestants being relatively similar, as are the spouses of converts and Catholics. On childhood home Protestant background, the spouses of converts lead and the spouses of Jews lag behind, with the remaining three groups in between. On religious education for their children, spouses of Catholics are slightly in the lead with close agreements among spouses of converts, denomination changers, and white Protestants. Converts are concentrated at the moderate level; spouses of Jews are about equally spread throughout the three levels.

BERNARD LAZERWITZ

TABLE 9. *Religious education and background characteristics of the Protestant Groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

Identification Index Levels	Protestant Groups					
	Converts	Protestant Spouses of			Denomination Changers	White Protestants
		Converts	Jews	Catholics		
	%	%	%	%	%	%
A. Own Protestant Education Index						
High		19	34	14	35	27
Moderate		60	34	49	34	36
Low		21	32	37	31	37
Base		100	100	100	100	100
B. Childhood Home Protestant Background Index						
High		40	4	21	24	26
Moderate		26	70	50	41	45
Low		34	26	29	35	29
Base		100	100	100	100	100
C. Religious Education for One's Children Index						
High	15	46	28	55	47	42
Moderate	77	42	36	21	45	48
Low	8	12	36	24	8	10
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100
N (A, B, C)	22	13	29	45	144	464

TABLE 10. *Protestant communal involvement of the Protestant Groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

Identification Index Levels	Protestant Groups						
	Converts	Protestant Spouses of			Denomination Changers	White Protestants	
		Converts	Jews	Catholics		M	W
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
A. Protestant Organization Activity							
High	19	31	13	12	33	17	29
Moderate	51	16	11	18	20	15	20
Low	30	53	76	70	47	68	51
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
B. Ethnicity Index							
High	0	0	0	0	23	20	21
Moderate	45	55	9	47	56	43	51
Low	55	45	91	53	21	37	28
Base	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N (A, B)	22	13	29	45	144	154	310

Involvement in Protestant organization, shown in Table 10, is highest for the spouses of converts, denomination changers, and white Protestant women. In the middle fall converts, and trailing behind come the spouses of Jews and Catholics and white Protestant men.

INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION

Ethnicity is quite similar for denomination changers and white Protestants. The least ethnicity is registered by the spouses of Jews with the remaining three groups in the middle and quite like one another.¹⁶

The data in these last three tables suggest that converts to Protestantism are not as well tied into their religious community as are the Jewish converts. However, on all but the ethnicity index the Protestant spouses of converts register quite substantial levels of involvement within the Protestant community. This strongly suggests that, as among Jews, conversion to Protestantism results from intermarriage

TABLE 11. *Religious characteristics of the Catholic groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

Religious Items	Catholic Groups				
	Converts	Catholic Spouses of			White Catholics
		Converts	Jews	Protestants	
	%	%	%	%	%
A. Frequency of Church attendance in past month					
0 times	21	13	81	33	17
1-3 times	18	22	3	11	13
4 times	43	43	3	50	51
5 or more	18	22	13	6	19
Base	100	100	100	100	100
B. Attended Mass last Christmas					
Yes	82	83	33	78	90
No	18	17	67	22	10
Base	100	100	100	100	100
C. Number of times received Communion in past month					
0 times	43	41	87	33	52
1-3 times	33	34	0	50	29
4 times	18	19	0	17	12
5 or more	6	6	13	0	7
Base	100	100	100	100	100
N (A, B, C)	16	9	20	33	257

with a strongly identified Protestant man. Again, typically, Protestant spouses of Jews and Catholics exhibit low levels of involvement within Protestantism, the spouses of Catholics being the more involved of the two. Finally, the denomination changers are quite similar to the white Protestants.

The Catholic data are not composed of indices. Instead, the far fewer number of Catholic interviews makes it wiser to use distributions on specific items of religious involvement. Accordingly, Table 11 covers three religious behaviour items for which white Catholics, converts, and their spouses show fair agreement, while the spouses of Protestants have less and the spouses of Jews have the least religious involvement.

In Table 12 we find that the spouses of Jews and Protestants report

BERNARD LAZERWITZ

more Catholic education than the other groups. On frequency of church attendance until 16 years, the spouses of Protestants lag behind the other groups, while spouses of Jews are most concentrated in the 1-3 times per month category. On frequency of bedtime prayers, the leading (and similar) groupings are white Catholics and spouses of Jews. Then follow the spouses of Protestants, spouses of converts, and converts.

TABLE 12. *Childhood background characteristics of the Catholic groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

Background Items	Catholic Groups				
	Converts	Catholic Spouses of			White Catholics
		Converts	Jews	Protestants	
	%	%	%	%	%
A. Number of years attended parochial grade school					
0-2 years		44	0	32	40
3-7 years		17	8	0	13
8 years		39	92	68	47
Base		100	100	100	100
B. Frequency of Church attendance until 16 years					
Weekly	58	67	30	75	90
1-3 times per month	24	26	63	0	5
Several times per year	12	7	0	0	3
Rarely, if ever	6	0	7	25	2
Base	100	100	100	100	100
C. Frequency of bedtime prayers when a child					
Weekly	53	60	87	64	87
1-3 times per month	0	0	0	0	5
Several times per year	18	13	0	29	3
Rarely, if ever	29	27	13	7	5
Base	100	100	100	100	100
N (A, B, C)	16	9	20	33	257

In Table 13, we find the parents of spouses of Protestants and of all Catholics leading in church attendance; the parents, especially the fathers, of spouses of Jews lag behind. The parents of converts and spouses of converts are quite similar and occupy a middle rank.

As shown in Table 14, converts and spouses of converts persist in having lower percentages of Catholic best friends. Spouses of Jews are lowest on third best friend Catholic. Spouses of Protestants and all white Catholics are consistently high in Catholic best friends. Next, membership in Catholic organizations is lowest among the spouses of Jews and Protestants. Such membership is highest for converts and spouses of converts; in the middle are white Catholics.

INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION

TABLE 13. *Parental church attendance during childhood in the Catholic groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

<i>Catholic Groups</i>					
<i>Parental Attendance</i>	<i>Converts</i>	<i>Catholic Spouses of</i>			<i>White Catholics</i>
		<i>Converts</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Protestants</i>	
	%	%	%	%	%
A. Father's Church attendance frequency					
Weekly	23	32	10	68	68
1-3 times per month	12	16	0	16	6
Several times per year	15	0	3	0	13
Rarely, if ever	50	52	87	16	13
Base	100	100	100	100	100
B. Mother's Church attendance frequency					
Weekly	32	37	13	82	80
1-3 times per month	18	13	53	7	8
Several times per year	12	13	7	0	7
Rarely, if ever	38	37	27	11	5
Base	100	100	100	100	100
N (A, B)	16	9	20	33	257

TABLE 14. *Catholic community involvement of the Catholic groups, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1967*

<i>Catholic Groups</i>					
<i>Items</i>	<i>Converts</i>	<i>Catholic Spouses of</i>			<i>White Catholics</i>
		<i>Converts</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Protestants</i>	
	%	%	%	%	%
A. Percentage of Three Best Friends Catholic					
1st Friend	44	47	70	67	76
2nd Friend	62	62	80	61	76
3rd Friend	56	60	33	78	74
B. Memberships in Catholic Organizations					
0	50	56	87	89	64
1	44	22	13	4	26
2 or more	6	22	0	7	10
Base	100	100	100	100	100
N (A, B)	16	9	20	33	257

These last four tables suggest that the Catholic spouses of Jews have become the least involved with Catholicism, and that Catholic spouses of Protestants, too, show reduced involvement with Catholicism relatively to other groupings. By way of contrast, both converts and the spouses of converts have made a 'successful' adjustment to intermarriage and are part of the Catholic community.

A predictive model

A quantity of intermarriage and conversion data from the Chicago area has just been examined. It is now possible to leap beyond its narrow confines and to set out the following generalizations about the intermarriage process.

A. Converts

- 1) Converts usually melt successfully into their new religio-ethnic community.
- 2) They are often religiously and organizationally more active than those born into a religio-ethnic community.
- 3) They come of parents who were marginally attached to their childhood faiths.
- 4) Converts have received less religious training and education than other members of their childhood faiths.

B. Spouses of converts

- 1) The spouses of converts, too, are quite active religiously and organizationally in their faiths.
- 2) They have received considerable religious training and education.
- 3) They have a childhood and adolescent history of activity in their religio-ethnic communities.
- 4) Hence, as fairly solid members of their religio-ethnic community, it is to be expected that they would only intermarry with marginal members of other faiths,
- 5) and that such marginal members would regard it as 'the natural thing' to be converted.
- 6) Typically, it is the men who become spouses of converts and the women who are the converts. This applies to all groups. Hence, even among intermarried Jews, it is expected that intermarried Jewish women will often be more remote from Judaism and more frequently converted to other faiths than intermarried Jewish men.

C. Religiously heterogeneous marriages

- 1) Those who intermarry without conversion will frequently be marginal religio-ethnic members marrying marginal members of other religio-ethnic groups.
- 2) They will frequently come of parents who had reduced, or marginal, religio-ethnic attachments.
- 3) They will have had less religious training and education than most members of their childhood faiths.

INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION

- 4) After marriage, they and their spouses will frequently further reduce, if not fully eliminate, any involvement with both their childhood faiths. *
- 5) Such people often deliberately seek out marital partners from other religio-ethnic groups. In contrast to the more accidental set of factors which result in a 'core' member of a religio-ethnic group intermarrying (and which often produces a convert), the people falling into this type frequently seek intermarriage or are highly indifferent to religio-ethnic backgrounds.
- 6) If a marginal man marries a not-so marginal woman, their children will be brought up in the wife's faith, but usually the man will not be converted.
- 7) Typically, the presence of different, and marginal, faith backgrounds in the same family will neutralize any tendencies towards religio-ethnic activities. If such a situation becomes intolerable with regard to the rearing of children, such a couple will seek out a mutually 'neutral' faith such as Unitarianism in the United States.

D. Denomination changers

- 1) This group differ little from most members of their faith.
- 2) In all probability their change of denomination is frequently a function of geographical or socio-economic mobility rather than meaningful religious change.
- 3) More traditional denominations will find that members change to those less traditional denominations which better facilitate adjustment to and activity in modern urban industrial society. Hence, the children of Orthodox Jews become Reform or Conservative Jews; children of fundamentalist Protestants become members of main-line Protestant denominations. Since the changes from the eastern European orthodox milieu have been so great and abrupt, such denominational changes are considerably more frequent among Jews than among fundamentalist Protestants, who have undergone a lesser and slower rate of social change.

E. A Typology

Slotkin (1942: 35-39), in a case study of Chicago Jewish intermarriages, proposed eight types of intermarried person: a) the unorganized or demoralized; b) the promiscuous; c) the adventurous; d) the detached or isolated; e) the rebellious; f) the marginal; g) the acculturated; and h) the emancipated. This early characterization of the intermarriage process stressed the destructive effects of immigration and poverty upon Chicago's Jews which resulted in, according to Slotkin, 30 per cent of the intermarriages involving deviant personalities.

The other 70 per cent of the intermarriages were of people who had little part in Jewish communal life.

It is now suggested that contemporary intermarriages in all three religious communities show a greatly reduced percentage of deviants, a moderate reduction in the percentage of those marginal to their religio-ethnic community, and the appearance of a substantial minority of intermarried people who have and maintain religio-ethnic involvement. It is this last group whose spouses are converted.

The tables permit one to contrast the small Jewish intermarriage group with a much larger all-Jewish marriage group whose family members typically rank low on the identification indices. The contrast shows that the basic threat to Jewish continuity does not stem from intermarriage. Rather, intermarriage (without conversion) is but a symptom of diaspora Jewry's growing dissatisfaction with contemporary Jewish institutions and cultural forms.

These generalizations, as they apply to Jews, will soon be fully tested on the much larger number of interviews with Jews, intermarried and not, to be obtained by the forthcoming national survey of the United States Jewish population. Most importantly, the prior statement of many of the identity concepts and generalizations guiding this major Jewish survey ensures that the basic advantage of concept testing will be obtained and post hoc formulations reduced.

NOTES

¹ This research was made possible by National Science Foundation grants GS637 and GS1766 and by the Florence G. Heller-Jewish Welfare Board Research Center. I wish to thank Richard Curran, Steven O'Connell, Linda Stephens, Maurice Satin, and Jerry Wade for their able research assistance. The late Rabbi Albert Gordon, whose rabbinical and Jewish sociological contributions are well known, helped to enrich my thinking in this area.

² In their turn, the recent works give collectively a large bibliography of earlier intermarriage and conversion studies. Some of the more prominent of these are listed in a bibliography to this article below.

³ The Washington, D.C. area Jewish community, among the larger ones in the U.S., is estimated to have had 81,000 Jews in 1956; the large state of Iowa is estimated to have had 9,100 Jews in 1960.

⁴ A short well written summary of information on Jewish intermarriages is also available in Maller (1969).

⁵ This research endeavour is financed

by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds and is being designed, carried out, and analysed by a team of six social scientists (including the author). It seeks a very large probability sample of United States Jewry and will sample more intermarriages and converts, as well as gather far more information, than has ever been achieved.

⁶ The details of this complicated sample design together with rules for religious classification of respondents, the interview schedules, and the organization of the field force are available upon request.

⁷ Detailed presentations of the theoretical bases and operational characteristics of these religio-ethnic identity concepts are available in Lazerwitz (1969). Some of the other findings from this survey are given in Lazerwitz (1970a and b).

⁸ Space limitations do not permit a more detailed statement on the questions forming each identity index and on how respondents have been divided into high, medium, and low identity levels.

INTERMARRIAGE AND CONVERSION

Such a detailed description is available upon request. These operational indices have not yet been computed for Catholic respondents. Hence, Catholic data will be restricted to a set of response items that are part of the eventual Catholic identity indices.

⁹ Respondents who had no religious preferences were classified according to parental preferences. Being reared in a denomination and now having no denomination preference (or vice versa) put a respondent into the denomination change grouping.

¹⁰ There were only three cases of conversion away from Judaism—all to the Unitarians. Hence, this very small sample group will not be subjected to statistical analysis.

¹¹ Jewish intermarriage data were gathered on both husbands and wives. Christian intermarriage data were gathered on either the husband or wife (in a random manner), but not on both. Hence, in Table 2, Jewish converts and spouses, being married to each other, carry a common social status. Christian converts and spouses, not being married to each other, bear different social statuses. From Table 3 onwards individual characteristics are dealt with.

Therefore, Jewish converts and spouses must be separately treated from this point on.

¹² The percentage of multiple marriages in the entire Jewish sample was 10. Incidentally, these comments on multiple marriage hold even if the multiple marriage categories are computed only among ever-married Jews, Protestants, and Catholics.

¹³ In the entire Jewish sample, 51 per cent of the respondents have been classified as denomination changers; in the entire Protestant sample, 31 per cent of the respondents have been so classified.

¹⁴ In Tables 6, 9, and 12, some of the data apply to childhood experiences *within* the indicated faiths. Since converts cannot have had such experiences, their data columns are empty.

¹⁵ This paper will not concern itself with third generation Jews apart from using them as a comparison standard. For a discussion of such findings see Lazerwitz (1970b).

¹⁶ Since prior analysis in Lazerwitz (1970b) indicated major differences between Protestant men and women on Protestant organization activity, the white Protestant category is here controlled on sex.

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JUDAISM is a quarterly published by the
American Jewish Congress
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TELEVISION AND THE SABBATH CULTURE IN ISRAEL

Michael Gurevitch and Gila Schwartz

IT has never been very simple to decide what to do about the Sabbath in Israel. The controversy is part of the long-standing *Kulturkampf* between the religious and the secular groupings, at the heart of which lie conflicting opinions about what a Jewish state ought to be like. The Sabbath issue, in brief, revolves around the proper way one should spend the Sabbath: should it be a day of absolute rest and service of the Lord, as religious Jews would like to see it, or should it be patterned after the Western weekend—a day on which one can pursue all the leisure activities of which one is deprived during the working week?

While service of the Lord cannot easily be legislated for, some alternative preoccupations often can be. According to official Israeli policy, the period between sunset on Friday and sunset on Saturday (which spans most of the abbreviated Israeli weekend) is an official moratorium on commercial activities: shops and offices must remain closed, public transport is prohibited unless it was already provided for at the time when the status quo agreement with the religious sector was reached, most cafés and restaurants do not open, and cultural or recreational events which require the purchase of tickets (that is, the use of money) are limited. From the religious point of view, these prohibitions create the proper climate for maximizing attention to religious duties; from the secular point of view, they are an infringement of the cultural and recreational rights of the individual. From the religious point of view, the sacred character of the Sabbath is thus ensured; from the secular point of view, what has been ensured for the Sabbath is a cultural wasteland.

In mid-1968, television entered the arena. During the first year of its regular operation, the Sabbath debate did not arise in connexion with the new medium, for programmes were limited to only four hours on each of three, and later four, weekday evenings. But as broadcasting became routinized and the number of receiving sets increased, it was only to be expected that the natural tendency of the broadcaster to go on the air every day of the week would sooner or later challenge

the Friday night television black-out. When the Broadcasting Authority announced its new seven-days-a-week schedule towards the end of 1969, the Sabbath debate was re-activated, now being focused upon television.

There were two aspects of the Sabbath television debates. The first concerned the legality of television broadcasting *per se* on the Sabbath. The claims of the religious minority, backed by some self-styled 'traditionalists', were based upon the tenet that television broadcasting would constitute a desecration of the Sabbath beyond what was already being perpetrated (such as sound broadcasting, for example, which was accepted as part of the status quo agreement on religious issues). Since the Broadcasting Authority was a public institution, it was argued that television broadcasting on the Sabbath would imply that the State of Israel was giving official sanction to the desecration of the Sabbath. The secular camp, on the other hand, asserted that it was in fact the *obligation* of the Broadcasting Authority to provide a full service; to refrain from doing so would deprive the majority of the population of their civil rights—to happiness, to information, and to their money's worth from an expensive set. There is, moreover, an annual licence fee of IL.85 (£10).

The second aspect of the controversy concerned the message of the new medium (in so far as the medium and the message are still distinguishable). Here, both the advocates and the opponents of Sabbath television raised their voices in the name of Culture. The religious camp, augmented by others who were fearful of the invasion of mass culture through television, argued that television would compete with the rich cultural content that gives the Sabbath its special character in Israel: the traditional dinner that brings the family together, the gathering of friends for coffee and conversation, close attention to the weekend newspapers and other reading, and perhaps even synagogue attendance. The pro-Sabbath-television camp, asserting an equivalent yet more realistic commitment to fostering a meaningful Sabbath, argued that what was really characteristic of Friday night in Israel was a cultural regression of the non-religious to card-playing, aimlessly walking the streets, hanging over apartment balconies talking to neighbours, or looking for some other way to fill up the cultural void. Thoughtful television programmes, they maintained, could fill Friday night with cultural content.

The decision to broadcast on Friday night was ultimately made on the basis of legal manoeuvres, but the cultural aspect of the controversy remained unresolved and subject to speculation. With the introduction of Friday night television broadcasts, however, the debate about their possible effects upon the pattern of Friday night activities could now be empirically explored. What, in fact, has been their effect upon Sabbath leisure patterns? Perhaps a prior question should be, what leisure activities were being prejudiced by the competition of the new medium?

TELEVISION AND THE ISRAELI SABBATH

Did the cultural content of the Sabbath stand to gain or to lose? What we attempt here is a tentative evaluation of the situation, comparing data which we had already collected concerning the Sabbath culture before the television era with new data collected two or three months after the Friday night patterns were presumably upset. While we cannot predict with certainty the changing leisure patterns that will follow in the wake of television, we hope to appraise a situation that is at present much obscured.

The study upon which our findings about pre-television leisure patterns are based was conducted in the summer of 1966, two years before Israel began television broadcasting. A sample of approximately 1,500 individuals were interviewed on their use of leisure time. Part of the interview consisted of a time-budget record in which respondents were asked to record what they did during the 'noon', 'afternoon', and 'evening' hours of Friday and during parallel periods on Saturday. Table 1 presents the percentage of participation in various leisure activities on a pre-television Friday night in Israel.

TABLE 1. *Percentage of respondents participating in various leisure activities on Friday night in Israel (Summer 1966)**

	%
Visiting or entertaining (including parties)	27
Conversation	27
Reading	22
Radio	22
Prayer	19
Strolling in town	11
Games	8
Television**	5
Café, nightclub, dancing	3
Family celebrations	1
Out-of-town trips	1
Studies	1

(N = 1,478)

* These data are based upon interviews with 1,478 members of the adult Jewish population of two cities, Haifa and Ashdod. The figures were weighted by level of education in order to render them representative of the entire adult Jewish population of Israel. The percentages add up to more than 100 because most respondents participated in more than one activity during the evening.

** Although no Israeli television broadcasting existed at the time of the study, 7% of the sample owned sets and could tune in to Arab television broadcasting in the area.

The interesting finding in Table 1 is the fact that the two most popular forms of leisure activity on a pre-television Friday night in Israel were visiting or entertaining (27 per cent) and conversation (27 per cent). While there is possibly some overlap between the two—since conversation is often the primary content of visiting or entertaining—some type of social activity was clearly the most common leisure pursuit. This tends to substantiate the popular image of Friday night in Israel as the 'weekly meeting of the national gossip club'; and, in some ways, this picture of a 'talking society' brings to mind the sociological image of a 'pre-media society'.

Other 'self-entertainment' activities made up for the lack of organized recreation in pre-television Israel. Reading and radio-listening shared third place (22 per cent) in the order of leisure activities performed. Radio-listening, however, varied greatly with the degree of religious observance of the respondents: only 3 per cent of those who defined themselves as 'religious' listened to the radio, while 29 per cent of the 'non-religious' reportedly listened. (Of respondents who defined themselves as 'traditional', that is, somewhere between the two in religious observance, 22 per cent listened to the radio.) The next most popular activity, prayer (19 per cent), was also highly correlated with the degree of religious observance.

One of the arguments of the pro-Sabbath-television faction was based upon the assumption that Friday night is characterized by a cultural malaise. Aimless strolling in the streets has been regarded as one highly visible indication of such a malaise. However, the data indicate that only 11 per cent went for a 'stroll in town' on culturally-deprived Friday night, while the findings on Saturday night indicate that *more than double* (24 per cent) strolled on that evening. Thus, even though commercial cultural alternatives were available on Saturday night, the percentage of those who strolled in town actually increased—browsing in the cultural supermarket without necessarily buying, it would seem. It should be noted that the image of the stroll as an indicator of cultural malaise is probably due to its association with 'having nothing to do' and therefore with seeking external stimulation in the absence of internal resources. This approach, however, does not take proper cognizance of strolling as a basic form of human relaxation and social contact.

Similarly, another potential indicator of a 'cultural wasteland' would be participation in games, but, according to our figures, only 8 per cent indulged, which constitutes only a small percentage of the population. Furthermore, a game could have been chess, as well as poker, which may or may not qualify as a symptom of cultural malaise.

From the above data, the picture which emerges of the Sabbath culture in pre-television Israel is of a Friday night mainly devoted to social activity, of which the prime content is conversation. Depending upon one's values, one might view an evening of conversation—regardless of its content—as possibly a more civilized and human way of spending the evening than being glued to a television set. Did television transform these patterns? Here we turn to the results of a national sample survey conducted in the spring of 1970 in the new Sabbath television era.¹

First, to what extent do Israelis have the opportunity to watch television at all? At the time of this study, 62 per cent of the respondents said that there was a set in their homes, and an additional 21 per cent reported that although they did not own a set, they watched with

TELEVISION AND THE ISRAELI SABBATH

friends or neighbours. Only 17 per cent said that they did not watch at all. Moreover, almost half the respondents (45 per cent) watched 'almost every day', and three-quarters of them (76 per cent) watched at least once a week. Thus, it is apparent that television has established itself as an integral part of the daily leisure patterns of the average Israeli.

What about Friday night television-watching? Has it brought to an end the Sabbath culture of entertainment? A cursory look at the figures suggests that it might indeed have changed the established pattern: we found that 50 per cent of the population watched television in a country where, but a few months before, only 5 per cent had done so on a Friday night. More careful analysis, however, brings signs of hope for those on the side of a sociable Friday evening: much of the watching, it seems, actually takes place in a situation of visiting or entertaining, 23 per cent of the respondents having watched with friends or neighbours. Furthermore, if almost one-quarter of those who watched did so in another home, then (if one includes their hosts) probably double that number watched in some form of social arrangement—and to these one can add the people who went visiting for purposes other than watching television. Thus, although it was initially feared that television would take away an enormous slice of the Sabbath social life, it seems that, in the Israeli context, television still acts as a catalyst for social contact, on week-day as well as on Friday nights.

Further confirmation of this view can be derived from the answers to the question, 'Do you generally spend Friday night with members of your family or with other people?'; 63 per cent of the respondents reported spending their time 'with both' or 'only with other people'. There is thus a significant amount of traffic between homes on a Friday night, even in post-television Israel. It appears, therefore, that previous visiting patterns have been integrated with television-viewing, and perhaps have even been stimulated by it to some extent.

What did those who now resort to television-viewing on a Friday evening do before this new opportunity opened up? Respondents were asked what leisure activity primarily characterized their Friday evenings before Israeli television began to broadcast on that night, and this information was cross-tabulated with their answers as to whether or not they watched on the Friday night preceding the interview. While the results will not indicate what activities have been cut into by television, they will give the relationship between current television-viewing and previous leisure activities (Table 2).

Table 2 gives some insight into the shifting patterns which accommodate the old leisure habits to the use of the new medium. Those who primarily used to watch television on the Sabbath—even in the days before Israel was broadcasting on that evening—naturally continued to devote their attention to the medium. The activity which seems to

MICHAEL GUREVITCH AND GILA SCHWARTZ

have 'lost' the most was radio-listening, for the data suggest that a relatively large percentage of the former regular radio audience was currently involved in watching television. While this is not definitive proof that they did not listen to the radio as well, neglect of the radio

TABLE 2. *Current television-viewing according to primary activity before Friday-night television broadcasts*

<i>Primary activity on Friday night before Israeli television</i>	<i>Percentage of each group who currently watch on Friday night</i>
Television viewing	93
Radio listening	62
Visiting or entertaining friends, relatives	57
Sleeping	45
Reading	40
Spending time with the family	36
Other	49
	(N = 1,754)

during prime television time is a familiar pattern from the experience of other countries.

The data on visiting patterns are less clear, however, for viewing can still be done within the context of visiting, as we have noted. On the other hand, the nature of the visit may have been transformed by the penetration of the new medium: instead of the 'national gossip club' being convened there may now be discussions which depend for their subject on the scheduled programme.

The relatively low percentage of television-viewers from among those who used to spend Friday night primarily with their families (Table 2) can be explained by the fact that there is a relatively larger proportion of religious respondents in this group. It is remarkable, however, that even among the people who define themselves as 'religious' or 'very religious', there is a considerable number who could not resist tuning in on a Friday night (Table 3).

TABLE 3. *Percentage of television-viewers on Friday night within categories of religious observance*

<i>Degree of religiosity</i>	<i>Percentage of viewers</i>	
Very religious	17	N = 228
Religious	39	N = 188
Traditional	58	N = 839
Non-religious	56	N = 506

This inconsistency between religious attitudes and behaviour is, however, more apparent than real, because a brief examination of the characteristics of the 'religious' and 'very religious' viewers reveals that most of them are of Asian and North African origin. Since the interpretations of religious observance among these ethnic groups differ from those of the Ashkenazim, for many of them television-viewing (as

TELEVISION AND THE ISRAELI SABBATH

well as some other activities) on the Sabbath is not considered to be a breach of any religious injunction.

Finally, we examined the hypothesis that the Sabbath controversy (like controversies in general) and the introduction of television on Friday night have led to an increased polarization of the population on this issue, and thus to an exacerbation of the *Kulturkampf*. But, as Table 4 indicates, the population was already quite polarized in the spring of 1969, with the majority expressing an acceptance of Sabbath television. The subsequent controversy led to fairly small further changes, and these have been in the direction of augmenting the ranks of those favouring the introduction of Sabbath television even more emphatically. It seems, therefore, that there is no room for arguing that the television controversy has severely exacerbated the schism between the religious and the secular sectors.

TABLE 4. *Attitudes towards television on the Sabbath*

Question: Do you think Israel should broadcast television on the Sabbath?

	<i>Spring 1969</i> <i>(pre-Sabbath television)</i>	<i>Spring 1970</i> <i>(post-Sabbath television)</i>
	%	%
Yes, absolutely	44	54
Yes	29	23
Maybe	6	5
No	8	8
Absolutely not	13	10
	<hr style="width: 50%; margin: 0 auto;"/> 100	<hr style="width: 50%; margin: 0 auto;"/> 100
	(N = 1,889)	(N = 1,726)

To return to the original question then, what are the possible effects of Sabbath television upon the Friday night cultural situation in Israel? Even though the data presented above are by no means conclusive, it seems that both the fears and the hopes that have charged the debate were overstated. On the one hand, television apparently did not undermine the existing culture of the Sabbath; and, on the other hand, it will not necessarily serve to landscape the cultural wasteland. For those for whom cultural patterns are already well-established, attention to the new medium will probably be integrated with, and mitigated by, current Friday night activities. For those for whom Friday night has been a cultural void, it is doubtful whether television will provide a panacea. Thus, there seems to be no real basis for looking to the arrival of television as the cultural redeemer, or for dreading its coming as the ruin of the Sabbath heritage.

NOTE

¹ This study was carried out as part of the Ongoing Survey conducted by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research and the Communications Institute of The Hebrew University of

Jerusalem. Over 1,700 respondents were interviewed from the adult Jewish population of the four largest cities in Israel—Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Beer-sheva—and their environs.

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JEWISH IDENTITY IN CAPE TOWN, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO OUT-MARRIAGE

Ziona Strelitz

1. *A sketch of Cape Town Jewry*

I BEGIN with a brief summary of the history of Cape Town Jewry.¹ The first Jewish immigration to Cape Town was overwhelmingly western European, and mainly English. The immigrants came to seek their fortunes, particularly after the discovery of diamonds further north. The English character of Cape Town Jewry remained marked until almost the close of the nineteenth century, and Anglo-Jewish bonds were several. The Cape Colony was part of the British Empire, and Cape Jewry viewed British Jewry as a mother community. The ministers of the Jewish congregation in Cape Town were all from England, whence they brought English expressions of Judaism. Further, most of the immigrants had either been born or had lived in Britain, which they regarded as their home country, and where they maintained family and business ties. There was little stratification among Cape Jews at this stage. Contemporary documents suggest that they were all well-to-do.

Towards the close of the nineteenth century this homogeneity was broken by the arrival in Cape Town of increasing numbers of eastern European, mainly Lithuanian, Jews, who were fleeing mounting Tsarist persecution. Their education had been mainly religious and their business experience mainly as artisans, small-scale retailers, and middlemen. In Cape Town most of them continued to follow these occupations. The result was economic stratification in the broadened Jewish community.

Conflict between the eastern and western Europeans arose from differences in life-style. The Easterners believed that they led *the* Jewish way of life,² and further held that the English expressions of Judaism fell below the requisite standards of piety. Conversely, Jews from elsewhere saw Yiddish culture as specifically that of eastern European Jewry, and the English Jews further considered the 'foreigners' ignorance of

ZIONA STRELITZ

English as evidence of lack of education. An index of this conflict was the formation of separate synagogues.

Gradually, however, a Jewish corporate life developed, reinforced by the new force of Zionism after the establishment of the Zionist Congress in 1897. While the community was rising above internal differences, and while eastern European immigration in particular was continuing, new generations of South African Jews were being born into a specifically South African Jewish culture.

By the 1960s the earlier differences had been greatly blurred. Their traces seem most apparent in the pride among some English- or South African-born Jews of older generations in not having been born in eastern Europe, and in the fact that some younger Jews are embarrassed by parents or grandparents who show obvious eastern European cultural traits. It would seem that the submergence of the earlier

TABLE 1. *Occupational patterns*

Managerial executive, upper (Company directors)	33
Professional	14
Managerial executive, lower (Supervisors, manufacturers' representatives, small retailers, artisans running medium-scale workshops)	26
Skilled artisans (Individual operators, running small-scale workshops)	4
White collar	3
Total	80

cultural differences was due, in part, to the gradual dying out of the older generation of eastern Europeans, of whom—mainly because of their speech—a stereotype had developed, but also very largely to improved economic conditions, which in turn produced changes in residential and occupational patterns.

In 1969 I undertook a demographic survey of Cape Town Jewry. One of its most significant findings was that there is a low concentration of Jews living in the central Cape Town areas; several decades ago these areas had housed vast numbers of Jewish pedlars, artisans, and small shopkeepers struggling for a living. There is also a comparatively low concentration in areas further up towards Table Mountain, to which a move from central city areas had been previously considered an index of upward social mobility. Along with changing residential patterns, there has been a change in occupational patterns. The occupations of household heads in the families of the 80 respondents in the sample are set out in Table 1.

In more than half the cases, occupations fall into the managerial executive (upper) and professional classes, as opposed to the high con-

centration in the petty-retailing and artisan categories earlier in this century. The raised economic status is confirmed by the physical appearance of respondents' homes. Since 72 out of the 75 respondents interviewed in their homes appeared to live in more than adequate comfort, the sample could be said to be economically middle class and above.

Two new lines of differentiation have emerged within Cape Town Jewry. The first is the division between Orthodox and Reform congregations, the influence of which is mainly to be seen in congregational life. It appears to have no correspondence with the earlier eastern-western European division, though this possibility could be investigated.

The second new division is between Ashkenazim and Sephardim. Cape Town Jewry was almost completely Ashkenazi until the arrival of noticeable numbers of Sephardi Jews after the Congolese independence crisis. The Sephardim, whose idioms of Judaism frequently differ from those of the Ashkenazim, tend to form a separate community, but, probably because the ratio of Sephardi to Ashkenazi Jews is relatively low, the differences between these two groups have not produced conflicts on a community level as obvious as the earlier ones between eastern and western European Jews.

2. *The Sample*

A 1.5 per cent sample of names was taken from the Jewish Communal Register.³ This was considered the best index of 'who is Jewish', since it had a fully comprehensive list of all traceable people in the Cape Peninsula accepted as Jews by the Jewish Community of Cape Town. The aim was to interview one per cent of the list of approximately 8,000⁴ people whose names appeared on the register; but 0.5 per cent extra was taken to cover refusals and inability to contact informants.

Those who were not Ashkenazi were deleted from the sample, because it was considered that the introduction of Sephardi cultural differences would detract from the degree of homogeneity provided by the former informants. Some such homogeneity in background was desired as a working basis. The interviews lasted on average forty-five minutes each. I conducted all eighty interviews personally. A questionnaire was administered.

Both co-operation in agreeing to be interviewed and readiness to discuss what might be considered 'private' matters were underestimated. The expectation that a low degree of co-operation would be received was based on past experience, where middle-class respondents had shown greater reluctance than those of a lower class to furnish information about themselves and give up time, and on the assumption that Jews in Cape Town are, on average, middle class. The evidence yielded support for this latter assumption.⁵ There were very few cases of outright refusal—only four.

Reasons which favour research in one's own culture-group, despite the possible disadvantages, emerged strongly in the course of this study. Well over half the respondents asked me if I was Jewish, usually when the discussion on out-marriage had just begun. This having been ascertained, the initial tension of the interview relaxed, and answers to questions were then seldom prefaced, as they had been before, by: 'Why do you want to know all this?' There followed interspersions into the talk of *shiksas* (Gentile women), *goyim* (Gentiles), and other in-group comments and terminology, the use of which appeared to reflect an assumption that I shared a world-view which conformed to the respondents'. This pattern of tension-relaxation-communication did not emerge in all the interviews, but I am certain that, in most cases, had I been unable to state that I was Jewish, and, further, to make it clear that I understood the nuances in the replies, answers to questions on inter-group relationships would either not have been given, or would have been given far less honestly. There appears, then, to be a great advantage in respondents being able to identify the research-worker as 'one of us' in interviews about inter-group relationships. Three respondents had married out: two males and one female.

3. Attitudes to out-marriage among Jews in Cape Town

Attitudes to Jewish out-marriage are of course contained in the Bible,⁶ and it seems that while they may not reach many Capetonian Jews from their primary sources, they still get delivered via two media. The first medium derives from the translation of endogamous attitudes into Jewish *secular* culture. The other medium is the stressing of Jacob, with his pointedly Hebrew ancestry, as Israel in the Religious Instruction classes of secular schools in Cape Town. From my own experience,

TABLE 2. *Views on intermarriage in principle*

<i>Oppose</i>	<i>Indifferent</i>	<i>Approve</i>
52	27	1

and that of my age-mates (in their twenties) who attended various schools, it seems that Genesis received great, if inadvertent, emphasis in these school classes, if only because little progress was made beyond Genesis.

My first hypothesis, then, is that *negative attitudes to out-marriage are prevalent in Jewish secular culture in Cape Town*. Three questions were used to see what support, if any, emerged for this hypothesis. The first question put to respondents was: 'What do you feel about intermarriage between members of different religious or ethnic groups in principle?' The answers to this question are set out in Table 2.

JEWS IN CAPE TOWN

Some time later in the interview, respondents were asked how they imagined they would react if one of their children married out of the Jewish group. The hypothetical nature of this question gave no assurance that people would, in fact, react as stated, but the intention in asking it was to give respondents scope to qualify, by their personal preferences, their more general views given earlier. The responses to this question are set out in Table 3. The categories of 'approve', 'indifferent', and 'oppose', are those which were used in answer to the previous question, and they have been retained in order that modifications to the more general responses may be seen.

TABLE 3. *Reactions to hypothetical out-marriage of respondents' children*

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Indifferent</i>	<i>Oppose</i>
Indifferent	1		
Indifferent and accept, and/or point out pitfalls of inter-religious marriage		11	
Be hurt and disappointed; favour conformity with Jewish endogamy		16	
Oppose and try to prevent such a marriage, but would accept status quo if attempts at intervention were unsuccessful			39
'Indifferent, but would suspect that religious barrier was making for infatuation and not love'			1
Would sever relations with transgressing child			4
Respondent extremely angry at suggestion			1
Question not put to respondent			7
Total	1	27	52

The one person who had previously indicated approval, and who now indicated indifference to out-marriage by her offspring, was in her eighties. Both she and her daughter had married Jews, but her grandson had recently married a Christian, an action of which she was extremely proud. She was further delighted that the young man's parents were pleased with his choice of marriage-partner. Her universalistic ideas, of which more will be said later, appear to be related to her background, which was more individual and more cosmopolitan than that of most other informants. She was born in the Cape, but had lived in England for some time, and later in continental Europe.

Of the 27 respondents who had claimed to be indifferent to out-marriage in principle, 16, including the two out-married males in the sample, had a strong preference for their own children to marry Jews.

ZIONA STRELITZ

Among those who had opposed intermarriage in principle, the reactions against a posited situation of out-marriage by informants' own children were couched in more forceful terms, such as 'I'd be absolutely sick' and 'I would be very deeply hurt'. Despite the strength of the objections raised, and the numerous projected attempts at intervention, 39 such informants said they would accept an out-marriage by a child if attempts to stop the union were unsuccessful, for 'what else can you do—lose your child?' The frequency of this relatively tolerant response, that is, the statement that they would eventually accept something which was anathema, went against predictions. The response contrasts very strongly with the traditional eastern European adherence to the Orthodox Jewish practice of mourning for a child who has married an unconverted Gentile. Only four informants said they would sever all relations with a child who married a Gentile, and only one of these said that she would also 'sit Shivah' (the seven-day intensive mourning for the dead). The general change in attitude was embodied in an incident which one informant related. A man had married a non-Jewish girl and his parents had 'sat Shivah'. Several weeks later the young man was killed in a motor accident, and his parents again 'sat Shivah', this time guilt-ridden over their son's actual death, which they now believed their previous mourning to have precipitated. The story was told as an indictment of parents who react too harshly towards, and who are too ready to sever relations with, children who marry out.

The objections to, or reservations about, marriage between members of any two different religious or ethnic groups were also examined (see Table 4).

TABLE 4. *Objections to marriage between members of any two different religious or ethnic groups*

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Indifferent</i>	<i>Oppose</i>	<i>Total</i>
No objections or reservations	1	11		12
Children of out-marriage suffer insecurity from lack of identity		8	18	26
Marriage partners face a reduced chance of compatibility because of differences in background		5	23	28
Religious objections			2	2
Out-marriage 'just not right'		1	8	9
Object only if marriage partners feel deeply about religion			2	2
Couple will have social difficulties—society proscribes out-marriage			1	1
Not concerned about out-marriage in general; concerned only when Jews are involved		2	8	10

JEWIS IN CAPE TOWN

There was an overlap in responses, some informants having more than one objection. A few informants, who considered that difficulties derive from differences in religious background, couched their reservations in terms of stereotypes about Jewish-Gentile relations: 'She'll always turn round and call him a bloody Jew.' In these cases, the question was answered as if it had been restricted to the incidence of Jewish out-marriage specifically and not to intermarriage in general. Similarly, some informants said that their objections to out-marriage only held in cases which involved Jews. In this vein, one informant rejoined: 'What do I care if a Catholic marries a Protestant—it's not my business!' Another said that she had not known that there was a difference between the two (that is, between Catholic and Protestant). The two religious objections were along the following lines. An elderly man said that since the whole of life is based on religion, it was better to marry within one's own religious group. The other informant, an old lady who appeared to be living a *shtetl*-like existence, said that the parents of a child who had married out would 'have no place in the other world'; 'the angels will say: "Look what your children have done" '.

The reservations and objections reflect negative attitudes to out-marriage, and some of the more individualist reservations in particular appear to reflect more specifically Jewish cultural influences. To what extent are most of the objections, however, rationalizations of a basic distaste for out-marriage, mere translations of traditional religious proscriptions into secular idiom?

Although 28 informants specifically stated that a different religious or ethnic background is a handicap, only six respondents had drawn explicit attention to the importance of anything like this in answer to a first question on marriage: 'What do you consider the most important factors making for success in marriage?' Three had stated that they considered common religion an important factor, while another three mentioned a similarity in values and background. Of course, it may well be that ideological compatibility, notably common religion, was thought by most respondents to be too obvious a factor to warrant mention.

In terms of the main hypothesis under consideration it is significant that, even while an objection to out-marriage such as that discussed above might be a rationalization, such rationalizations appear to become standardized and traditionalized and, frequently couched in the subtle idiom of a group, become an aspect of the culture which reinforces the distaste for out-marriage. A good illustration came from one informant who objected to religious out-marriage on the grounds that it affected the success of the union. She volunteered further: 'It can never work out. It may last a few years, but in the end it must break up. I can't explain it, but from when I was young I always had this feeling.'

It would seem that negative attitudes to out-marriage have thus become secularized among Jews in Cape Town.

My second hypothesis is that *Jews in Cape Town see their group ultimately as a kinship unit, no matter how extended the kinship relationship be, and no matter whether this conception be explicit.* A lead was furnished by the Jewish genealogy, with the familiar patriarchs (Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob) at its apex, which is so similar in type to the genealogies recorded in much ethnographic literature. A further lead was taken from the Judeo-Christian idiom—the use of ‘brothers’ as an appellation for fellow-members in both Jewish and Christian groups. The kinship conception being tested here is membership in the group by descent. It does not, however, preclude notions of a unique common ancestry, for although this notion might seem latent, it emerges frequently in comments such as ‘When you meet another Jew and mention enough of your relatives, you’re bound to discover that the two of you are also related in some way.’ The hypothesis that kinship was a strong force of cohesion binding Jewry was tested by three questions.

The first question asked in this connexion was whether respondents would find one born of a Jewish mother and non-Jewish father more acceptable as a Jew than one born of a Jewish father, but of a non-Jewish mother (see Table 5). This is, in effect, a questioning of traditional Jewish law and contemporary rabbinical policy, which declare that to be a Jew one must be the child of a Jewish mother.⁸

An Orthodox and a Reform rabbi in Cape Town made the following comments. The Orthodox rabbi said that both the birth itself and the affinity between mother and child during the child’s formative years were important contributors to the superior strength of the maternal bond. The Reform rabbi said that the fact of birth was not without significance, but that the law was based, rather, on the presumption that the mother sets the tone of the home. Many respondents volunteered that they were familiar with this law, a familiarity which was expected, since marriages are permitted in synagogues in Cape Town only when each of the spouses was born of a Jewish mother. (Where there has been a formal conversion to Judaism, the restriction does not hold.)

Many of the respondents who favoured Jewish maternity as a criterion of Jewishness said that they held this view because the law dictated so. Some of these, however, stressed the cultural aspect of the maternal bond—‘With a non-Jewish mother you aren’t shown the Jewish faith at all,’ or: ‘A Jewish mother puts a Jewish heart into you.’ Only one informant explained that he preferred Jewish maternity on the grounds that one has definite knowledge only of maternity. The reasoning used by most people who found either alternative acceptable was summed up by one respondent who said that a person is Jewish ‘as long as there is Jewish blood’. Grounds on which neither alternative was acceptable

JEWS IN CAPE TOWN

were: 'The child can't have a real Jewish feeling,' and 'People will say you're half-half.' On the whole, informants laid great stress on *descent* as a criterion of Jewish identity. Where descent was not given as the sole criterion, descent together with an upbringing reflecting Jewish cultural influences was considered important.

The next question used to test the kinship hypothesis was: 'Do you accept a convert to Judaism as a full Jew socially?' The question was put to discover whether respondents accepted as Jewish those not of Jewish descent. Some comments on Jewish attitudes to conversion must, however, precede the opinions given by informants.

Conversion to Judaism is, according to traditional Jewish law, legitimate, and converts should be accepted as full Jews. Contemporary rabbinical policy, however, seems not to favour conversion.⁹ An Orthodox rabbi in Cape Town explained contemporary rabbinical reluctance to accept converts to Judaism in terms of a prospective

TABLE 5. *Respondents' acceptance as Jews of children of mixed parentage*

Jewish maternity with non-Jewish paternity	39
Jewish paternity with non-Jewish maternity	1
Either alternative confers acceptability as Jews on offspring	22
Neither acceptable: both parents must be Jewish	6
Depends (i.e. on parental influence on upbringing)	8
No answer	4
Total	
	80

proselyte's motives. He said that if the motive was pure (that is, love of the Jewish religion) the conversion would be granted. If, however, a person wished to be converted for convenience (for example, to facilitate marriage to a Jew), the conversion would not be granted unless the applicant persisted. He stated that requests for conversion were always initially refused, in order to test the applicant: if the would-be convert is sincere, he will persist in his request with determination. The rabbi added that there were two more factors contributing to the reluctance to accept converts: one was that the Rabbinate believed that refusals acted as deterrents to potential out-marriages; the second was that, since more women than men wished to be converted to Judaism, some Jewish women would be left without Jewish spouses if all Gentile women seeking entry into the Jewish group were granted admission.

The Reform rabbi, who appeared to have sharper sociological insight, explained the contemporary rabbinical reluctance to admit converts to Judaism in the following terms. He said that in classical times Jews had been a great proselytizing people, but that the Romans

enacted an edict whereby a convert to Judaism and the person who converted him were liable to the death penalty. However, Jews continued to grant conversions, but had to exercise caution because the Romans sent out agents provocateurs. It was then that rabbis enacted a measure that a conversion be granted only if the would-be convert had sought it three times. This safety measure, the Reform rabbi explained, is the historical root of the contemporary reluctance to admit converts to Judaism, reinforced in modern times by the social problem created by the fact that many more women than men seek entry into the Jewish group. He added that the Orthodox rabbis believed that refusals to grant conversions acted as a deterrent to out-marriage, but that there had been unofficial changes in Orthodox rabbinical policy over the past fifteen years, during which period conversions had been more freely granted.

It is uncertain to what extent, if any, this conflict between rabbinical law and contemporary rabbinical policy, and the difference between what now appear to be two Orthodox rabbinical policies, an official and an unofficial one, have affected lay Jews' attitudes, but it is advisable to bear these factors in mind when appraising the response. Of relevance, too, is the Reform rabbi's assurance (with figures to support him) that the widely-held belief that the Reform Rabbinate is far more liberal than the Orthodox in granting conversions is invalid. Like several informants, the Orthodox rabbi (who referred to the Reform congregation as 'the next-door shop' and to its conversion policy as 'the back-door to Judaism') held this belief. The responses to the question whether informants accepted converts to Judaism as full Jews socially are set out in Table 6.

TABLE 6. *Acceptability of converts to Judaism as full Jews*

Converts accepted as full Jews socially	45
Converts not accepted as full Jews socially	29
Converts acceptable if conversion is sincere	6
Total	80

Informants who did not find converts acceptable as full Jews reveal that for them it is essential to be born Jewish: 'It's blood that counts'; 'It can never be the same as with a born Jew'; 'Blood is thicker than water'; 'Only with a few can you forget that they were once not Jewish'; and 'You can't make chalk cheese'. 'But though there are some more *frum* [that is, more observant] than the Jews, how many are there like Mrs. . . . [an example, frequently cited by informants, of a convert to Judaism whom they see as more Jewish than born Jews]? *A goya blaiht a goya* [a Gentile woman remains a Gentile woman].' Most enlightening

JEWS IN CAPE TOWN

in terms of the hypothesis under examination was the reasoning of one of the men in the sample who had married out: he made the reservation that he accepted a convert to Judaism as a Jew but not as a Hebrew. He seems to have considered a kinship tie a more basic qualification for full membership in the Jewish group than belief in the Jewish faith. I suggest that the reasonings quoted above are important in that they reflect a concern with *descent* as an ultimate criterion for membership in the Jewish group.

The number of informants not accepting converts to Judaism as full Jews socially was lower than expected, but the confusion generated by the difference between Jewish law and official Orthodox policy, between the latter and unofficial Orthodox policy, and by the conflict between the Orthodox and Reform Rabbinate on this issue may be playing a part. Against the background of the present more liberal attitude by the rabbis to conversion, the resistance to converts among the respondents is perhaps noteworthy.

The third question used to test the kinship hypothesis was: 'Which do you think preferable of the following two in terms of potential compatibility: a marriage between a South African Jew and a Jew of a different country, say, a South American Jew, or a marriage between a South African Jew and a South African non-Jew?' The example of the South American Jew was suggested in order to evoke an image of a person having a considerably different national and cultural background, but who could at the same time be considered 'white'. A 'racial' factor was not, therefore, presented, and informants responded as follows (Table 7).

TABLE 7. *Preference for Jewish in-marriage as against national in-marriage*

	<i>Oppose</i>	<i>Indifferent to</i> <i>(intermarriage in principle)</i>	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Total</i>
Two Jews of different countries	42	12	1	55
Two South Africans, one non-Jewish	3	6		9
Depends on the individuals	5	9		14
No answer	2			2
Total	52	27	1	80

Some of the explanations volunteered by people favouring the marriage between two Jews were: 'There is still something basic'; 'There must be a similarity somewhere along the line'; 'Being Jewish is stronger than any other differences'; 'A Jew is a Jew'; 'They can't call each other "bloody Jew" '; and that such a partnership is the more desirable, irrespective of the success of the marriage. One respondent who had been born and brought up in the United States stressed that her answer had particular reference to South African Jews, whom she considered

to constitute a closer group than Jews elsewhere, who are more cosmopolitan. .

These results are particularly interesting in view of the fact that 28 respondents had earlier specifically stated that their main objection to out-marriage in general was the handicap of differences of background between the marriage partners (Table 4). Now 55 of the respondents (Table 7) asserted that a marriage between two Jews, irrespective of differences in background, was preferable in terms of potential compatibility (with the exception of the one informant who said that the success of the marriage was irrelevant). These informants, some of whom are quoted above, believed that there was a basic bond between all Jews which overrode any cultural differences they may have, *and in many of these explanations there does not appear to be even an implicit notion that the common basis is cultural*. Further, most of those favouring the marriage between the two Jews volunteered no explanation for their preference, other than answering in terms such as 'The two Jews, of course!' or 'The two Jews. It's obvious, isn't it?'¹⁰

Some of the explanations given by respondents not favouring the 'two Jews' option reflected a greater insight into the interplay of cultural factors. One man, for example, explained his choice of two South Africans as follows: 'Because Jews are so different in every country'. Of those who said that the option to be preferred depended on the two individuals involved, one said that people everywhere are so different that generalizations cannot hold, and another that the respective social classes of the individuals would be as significant as their respective religions.

The support which the evidence thus far cited gives to the first two hypotheses indirectly validates the third: *that Jews in Cape Town view out-marriage as a strong threat, and conversion to Judaism as a relatively weaker threat, to the continuity and integrity of their group*. Three questions were used to test the first part of this hypothesis.

The first question discussed here was the last one put to informants, since it was considered a leading question and it was undesirable that informants answer other questions consciously in terms of the answers they might have given to this one. The question read: 'Do you have any particular objections (or "reservations" or "misgivings" where the use of "objections" would have been inconsistent with informants' previously stated views) which relate only to cases of Jews marrying out of the Jewish group—as opposed to intermarriage in general?' There were too many individualistic answers for all the opinions to be tabulated, and only responses which have a bearing on the hypothesis are included in Table 8.

Forty informants, then, answered the question in terms of the potentially assimilationist effect that Jewish out-marriage could have on the Jewish group. Five of these said it would be a good thing if Jews dis-

JEWS IN CAPE TOWN

TABLE 8. *Respondents' reactions to Jewish out-marriage in particular*

Objected because out-marriage would eventually lead to the total disintegration of the Jewish group through assimilation	32
Approved of Jewish out-marriage in particular, because this would lead to the disintegration of the Jewish group through assimilation, which would be a good thing	5
Total Jewish assimilation could never come about through out-marriage	3

appeared as a group, and two of these five held this view because they saw the total assimilation of Jewry as part of the road to a universalistic society. The old woman who had approved of out-marriage in principle was one of the two holding this opinion: she saw Jewish out-marriage in no particular light, but considered that, like intermarriage in general, it made for a broader outlook for the individual, and constituted a panacea in that it led to the disintegration of groups and the emergence of individuals. The other three of these five informants reasoned that if Jews ceased to stand apart as a group, they would not be exposed to persecution.

Thirty-two informants were gravely concerned about the effects of out-marriage on Jewish identity. Their fears were expressed in a fairly typical comment: 'If we are all going to intermarry, where is our Jewish faith, strength, and everything we hold dear going to land us?' That 40 per cent of the sample (32 out of 80) objected to Jewish out-marriage on these grounds lends fair support to the first part of the hypothesis under examination.

A further question was asked to test whether Jews in Cape Town viewed out-marriage as a threat to the continuity of their group.¹¹ The question put to respondents read: 'Do you consider it worse (or "different" where the informants' previously stated views made the use of "worse" unsuitable) for Jewish women to marry out of the group than for Jewish men to do so?' The responses are set out in Table 9.

TABLE 9. *Different reactions to the out-marriage of males and females*

Same for both women and men to marry out	47
Worse for women to marry out	21
Worse for men to marry out	4
Less common for women to marry out	3
Women might find it more difficult, but not good or bad either way	1
Cannot generalize	2
No answer	2
Total	80

The figures seem to reflect few extreme views. Forty-seven respondents considered it one and the same thing for Jewish men or women to marry out. Two of these, however, commented that despite their feelings about the situation, it would be better if women rather than men married out, since in that case the children of the union would be Jews according to Jewish law.

Twenty-one respondents said that it was worse for Jewish women than for Jewish men to marry out. Some of them explained that the wife of a Jew led a much more pleasant life than did the wife of a Gentile. (This is a belief commonly held by South African Jews.) One respondent explained his choice by observing that a Jewish woman who married a Gentile ceased to be a Jewess, whereas the opposite combination was profitable to Jewry. (His assumption was that a Gentile woman who marries a Jew tends to be converted to Judaism.)

Of the four respondents who considered it worse for Jewish men than for Jewish women to marry out, three held their preference because the children of out-married Jewish women would be Jewish, whereas those of out-married Jewish men would not.

That 21 of the respondents considered it worse (or different) for Jewish women than for Jewish men to marry out is at first surprising, in view of the widespread knowledge of the Jewish law discussed earlier. But it ceases to be surprising when one realizes that—as Table 9 shows three informants to have stated—it is less common for Jewish women than for Jewish men to marry out.

Informants cited 60 specific cases of out-marriage among their relatives: 15 were women and 45 were men. (A further 11 cases of kinsmen who had married out were mentioned but respondents were unable—or unwilling—to go into any detail.) The Reform rabbi I interviewed reported that three out of every four persons he had converted to Judaism were women. This means either that more Jewish males than females have been marrying out, or that more Jewish women than men marry out without bringing their partners into the group, or both. Figures from abroad indicate the same sex differential in Jewish out-marriage rates.¹²

Himmelfarb, speaking about the U.S.A., suggests that out-married Jewish women are more likely than out-married Jewish men to disappear as Jews, probably without the formality of conversion to Christianity, and that their children are less likely than the children of out-married Jewish men to be considered Jewish.¹³

To test the second part of the third hypothesis—that conversion to Judaism is also seen as a threat to the integrity and continuity of the Jewish group, even if a relatively weaker threat than out-marriage without conversion by the non-Jewish partner—only those 51 (see Table 6) who had accepted converts to Judaism as full Jews socially were asked whether this included acceptance of the convert's Jewish-

JEWS IN CAPE TOWN

ness if he/she had been converted with the express purpose of marriage to a Jew.

Many respondents were amused by the question, exclaiming, 'Why else do they convert?', 'It's the only reason they convert anyway!', etc. It appears, then, that the vast majority of informants answered the first of these questions in terms of the second. The conclusions suggested by the response to the first question can, therefore, be restated: despite traditional Jewish law and current rabbinical policy favouring the acceptance of converts to Judaism, a fairly strong stress is placed on descent as the criterion for membership in the Jewish group. The fact that it was so widely believed that the only reason for a Gentile's conversion was to marry a Jew, taken together with the number of people not accepting converts as full Jews, seems to indicate that there is considerable feeling that conversions to Judaism threaten the integrity of the Jewish group.

Nevertheless, it seems that Jews in Cape Town still prefer this type of marriage to an outright out-marriage in which the non-Jewish

TABLE 10. *Acceptance of convert to Judaism whose conversion has been in prospect of marriage*

Yes	42
No	2
If sincere	7
Total	51

partner is not brought into the Jewish group. The responses to the following questions are set out in Table 11: 'If partners about to enter an interreligious marriage agree to adopt a single religion between them, do you prefer that the Jew convert to Christianity, that the non-Jew convert to Judaism, or are you personally indifferent as to which way the conversion goes in such marriages?'

The responses reflected two main opinions, that held by half the total number of informants who favoured the conversion of the non-Jewish partner to Judaism, and the indifference expressed by about a third of the total. In this latter connexion it is worth noting that those informants of higher education and comparative youth, who had been indifferent to out-marriage in principle, were those whose opinions were formulated mainly in terms of the individual, rather than in terms of the group. The overall evidence does, however, seem to support the view that Jews in Cape Town consider the entrance into the Jewish group through formal conversion more desirable, in terms of the continuity of the Jewish group, than outright out-marriage by Jews, despite the threat to the integrity of the Jewish group which seems to be seen in formal conversion to Judaism.

ZIONA STRELITZ

The evidence has yielded fair support for the hypotheses. It cannot, of course, be concluded that kinship is the *only* force of cohesion binding the Jewish community in Cape Town. Other factors (for example, Zionism) remain to be investigated.

TABLE I I. *Respondents' preferences for the direction of conversions*

	<i>Oppose</i>	<i>Indifferent to (out-marriage in principle)</i>	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Total</i>
Non-Jew to Judaism	31	8	1	40
Indifferent	8	17		25
Woman to adopt man's religion	2			2
Man to adopt woman's religion	3			3
To religion of partner with dominant personality	1			1
To religion of partner with stronger belief	1			1
As their conscience and belief dictate	1	1		2
Neither: conversions unacceptable	2			2
No response	3	1		4
Total	52	27	1	80

4. *Tension points arising in intergroup relations*

During the course of fieldwork there emerged some standard tension points which arise in intergroup relations in which Cape Town Jews participate. It is probable that these types of tension are inevitable where a group has no strong external sanctions against out-group associations, where social roles of members of different groups are structured so as to intersect in the wider society, but where a group wishes to perpetuate its separate identity. I suggest that this conflict is particularly marked in intergroup relationships in which Capetonian Jews (like Jews elsewhere in the Diaspora) are involved. Here the freedoms of association and of opportunity are highly valued in contrast to the restrictions and persecution imposed on European Jewry several decades ago, while Jewish group-consciousness, probably highlighted by these same events, calls simultaneously for a stressing of Jewish group identity. We are considering Jewish-Gentile relations in Cape Town only within a 'white' framework. The reason for this limitation in a discussion of intergroup relations in which out-marriage plays a part is obvious in Cape Town, since the effective range of interaction for Jews in South Africa is within a 'white' framework.

The first question used to investigate the nature of such relations was: 'What do you feel about young Jewish men taking out non-Jewish girls on a strictly casual basis—just one or two dates?' When the answer had been given, informants were asked what they felt about the same situation with the sexes reversed.

JEWIS IN CAPE TOWN

All those informants whose opinions reflected a sex differential allowed greater licence to Jewish males than to Jewish females. A significant number of them implied or stated that Gentile girls were 'free and easy', and thus attractive to Jewish men.

Twenty-nine respondents who answered both questions saw obvious sexual motives behind Jewish-Gentile dating. Some informants who interpreted Jewish-Gentile dating in this way, and who did not regard such dating differentially, disapproved of it, in a few cases because the motive which was seen to be prevalent was considered immoral. Other informants who read a sexual connotation into Jewish-Gentile dating were indifferent to it, whether it involved Jewish males or Jewish females. Two informants, also assuming a motive of easy sex behind Jewish-Gentile dating, approved of such dating for both Jewish males and Jewish females; one of them said that such dating 'probably takes the place of brothels overseas', and another that, though she did not favour the sexual motivation, 'young people must learn to mix'.

The general trend of opinion held by informants who mentioned the sexual motive was that 'men had to sow their wild oats', or as an elderly woman of *shtetl*-like views chuckled: 'Well, men—men are like dogs.' The Jewish girls, on the other hand, had to be protected from Jewish-Gentile dating, because they 'become involved more easily' than their Jewish male counterparts. It would seem that the reason suggested to protect Jewish females, that is, that they become *emotionally* involved more easily than do men, is rather a rationalization, and that the objection really felt was that expressed by one informant who said: 'A man can come and go as he likes. He is like a brass pot; you can clean him up again and no-one will know. But a woman is like a white dress—you can't remove the stains.' One elderly informant bluntly stated that if a Jewish girl dates a Gentile, 'then the girl is like a prostitute'. Others said that 'it puts a stigma on the girl', 'it's ugly', or that 'it doesn't look nice'. Several informants, aged approximately between thirty and thirty-five years, said that motives of easy sex which had been prevalent in pre-marital Jewish-Gentile dating were now no longer dominant: 'Today fellows don't have to take out non-Jewish girls to get their sex.' Other informants made no allusions to a sexual motive behind Jewish-Gentile dating, but were indifferent to the practice when Jewish males were involved, while disapproving of it for Jewish females.¹⁴

One informant, a middle-aged psychology student, had sharp insight into this pattern. She said: 'The ethnic barrier tends to make for sexual attraction and exploitation—people are inclined to exploit one another across the ethnic barrier.' Slotkin, in his study of Jewish-Gentile marriage in Chicago, suggests similar explanations.¹⁵

Several informants approved of Jewish-Gentile dating because it is 'good to learn to mix', while others, approving of such dating (usually

ZIONA STRELITZ

when Jewish males were involved), said that it was a good thing 'as long as they didn't bring them home and marry them'. Yet another informant said that she encouraged her children to have non-Jewish friends because she 'believed in mixing', but she disapproved of Jewish-Gentile relations when they were heterosexual.

Many informants disapproved of Jewish-Gentile dating because 'that's how things start', 'it's bound to end in a mixed marriage', and because 'there's a danger of involvement', etc. It is also clear, however, that at least some of the respondents thought that Jews and Gentiles should mix in spite of the risks involved. One informant, indifferent to Jewish-Gentile dating but opposed to Jewish out-marriage, explained: 'It could end in intermarriage, but otherwise you find yourself in a ghetto.'

Most respondents had conflicting aims: they wished fully to participate in the wider society, but they also had a simultaneous desire to maintain a distinct Jewish group identity.

How do Jews in Cape Town react to out-marriages in which their close kin are involved? The responses to the question: 'Do you think the reactions of relatives, Jewish friends and neighbours might embarrass one whose close kin married outside the Jewish group?' are set out in Table 12.

TABLE 12. *Out-marriage as an embarrassment to close kin*

Yes	23
No	27
Depends on people involved	15
Not today	7
Should not embarrass them	3
No response	5
Total	80

The almost exactly equal force with which the extreme views were held seems to invalidate any conclusions.

The next question used in order to assess reactions to out-marriage was: 'How important do you think is the approval of close relatives, mainly parents, to the success of a marriage?' The opinions are set out in Table 13.

In all, 50 respondents considered the approval of close kin to be of importance for the success of a marriage. Further, those informants who said that the importance of parental approval depended on the closeness of the individual to his family implied that in some cases such approval was a factor affecting the success of a marriage.

The question asked as a sequel to this was: 'Even if a couple of

JEWS IN CAPE TOWN

TABLE 13. *Importance of approval by close relatives for the success of a marriage*

Very important	15
Of importance	35
Parents should not interfere	3
Depends on individual's attachment to family	8
Used to be important, but no longer so	2
Not at all important	15
No response	2
<hr/>	
Total	80

different religious backgrounds were convinced that they would be happily married—no conversion contemplated—which do you favour of the following three: 1) that strong pressure should be brought on them to change their minds; 2) that gentle attempts should be made to dissuade them from their decision; or 3) that they should be left alone to decide for themselves?⁷ The responses are recorded in Table 14.

TABLE 14. *Action where persons of different religions propose to marry*

Strong pressure to abandon marriage	(A)	7
Gentle attempts	(B)	27
Point out pitfalls of out-marriage	(C)	8
Persuade one partner to convert for sake of children		3
Leave couple alone to decide for themselves		30
No answer		5
<hr/>		
Total		80

Clearly, more than half of the respondents (A, B, and C) favoured some attempt to obstruct a projected out-marriage. In view of the fact that an even greater number (see Table 13) had said that the approval of close kin was of importance for the success of a union, I thought it would be interesting to discover how close kin had behaved when an out-marriage had in fact taken place.

Respondents recorded the reactions to 55 out-marriages involving their close relatives. In five cases they mentioned spontaneously that the out-marriage had been a second marriage, and in nine cases it emerged that either one or both of the out-marrying Jew's parents had been dead at the time of the union. This ties in with a hypothesis of Heiss¹⁰ that those who are emancipated from parental influence at the time of the marriage are more likely to marry out than those who are not. Indices of probable emancipation from parents at the time of marriage are: 1) marriage at a late age; 2) previous marriage; and 3) marriage after the death of one or both parents. In 10 of the above 14

cases mentioned by Capetonians, however, the out-marriage was still frowned upon by the surviving Jewish parent or by other close Jewish relatives.

In seven cases, close relatives were 'happy with' or 'indifferent to' the out-marriage. In five cases, the out-married Jew had been cut off by his family, even if the ritual mourning of 'Shivah' had not been observed. In the remaining 29 cases, the reactions of parents had shown a fairly regular trend. Parents had at first 'tried to break up the marriage', had initially severed relations with their child, had demanded that the non-Jewish partner be converted to Judaism, or had put obstacles in the way of a conversion, all in the hope of preventing the marriage. In all of these 29 cases, however, ultimate acceptance of the union is reported. Sometimes parents 'became very fond of the girl', that is, of the non-Jewish partner (or, by now, convert to Judaism), but sometimes, despite reconciliation, 'it was never the same as it would have been had she been Jewish'.

I suggest that these adverse reactions to kin who marry out must produce tensions in many of the marriages. There appears to be a vicious circle. Many Jews believe that out-marriage 'does not work', so when out-marriages do occur, they react with hostility and register opposition. This attitude might affect the marriage to the extent that it actually does not work out, or, at best, does not work out very well. People then have material in hand for reinforcing negative attitudes towards out-marriage.

The tensions outlined here seem to be the price that Jews in Cape Town are paying in their attempt to achieve a dual ideal: maximum acceptance as individuals in the wider society and minimum threat to the perpetuation of their distinct group identity.

NOTES

¹ I. Abrahams, *The Birth of a Community*, Cape Town, 1955. This book, by a previous Chief Rabbi of Cape Town, who was also Professor of Hebrew at the University of Cape Town, is the most useful source on the historical aspect.

² M. Zborowski and E. Herzog, *Life is with People*, New York, 1967, p. 428. 'When they think of Klal Israel [the entire Jewish people all over the world], they think of a world-wide *shtetl* where speech and even thought is in Yiddish.'

³ This register, alphabetical and up-to-date, is available on loan at the Zionist offices, Zeeland House, Foreshore, Cape Town.

⁴ Married couples were entered as one person. The register itself, therefore, lists more than 8,000 adult Jews in Cape

Town. Among married couples, more women than men were interviewed since the former were usually free during the day.

⁵ See Table 1.

⁶ E. Leach, 'Genesis as Myth', in *Myth and Cosmos*, ed. J. Middleton, New York, 1967, p. 12, concludes that the series of Genesis tales asserts 'that a rank order is established which places the tribal neighbours of the Israelites in varying degrees of inferior status depending on the nature of the defect in their original ancestry as compared with the pure descent of Jacob (Israel)'.

⁷ Cf. M. L. Barron, 'Research on Inter-marriage: A Survey of Accomplishments and Prospects', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 57, no. 3, 1951, pp. 250-52;

JEWIS IN CAPE TOWN

also J. T. Landis, 'Marriages of Mixed and non-Mixed Religious Faith', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 14, no. 3, 1949, p. 401.

⁸ M. Himmelfarb, 'The Vanishing Jews', *Commentary*, vol. 36, no. 3, 1963, p. 249.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 249-50, for a description of the roots of rabbinical reluctance to accept converts to Judaism.

¹⁰ Cf. M. L. Barron, 'The Incidence of Jewish Intermarriage in Europe and America', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 11, no. 1, 1946, p. 8; also Barron, 1951, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

¹¹ Cf. Barron, 1951, *op. cit.*, for a tentative hypothesis that intermarriage poses a grave threat to people's values of identity, homogeneity, and survival. R. J. R. Kennedy, 'Single or Triple Melting-Pot? Intermarriage Trends in New Haven, 1870-1940', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 49, no. 4, 1944, p. 331, concurs with this.

¹² The *Jewish Chronicle*, 23 May 1969, reports that twice as many Jewish men as Jewish women in London marry out, and that for every three female converts to Judaism there is one male convert.

Barron, 1946, *op. cit.*, p. 9, A. B. Hollingshead, 'Cultural Factors in the Selection of Marriage Mates', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 15, no. 5, 1950, p. 623, and Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 331, report similar tendencies for American Jewry.

¹³ Himmelfarb, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

¹⁴ Cf. Barron, 1946, *op. cit.*, p. 8, where he quotes popular Yiddish rhymes reflecting similar attitudes in the United States more than two decades ago, and probably even earlier.

¹⁵ J. S. Slotkin, 'Jewish-Gentile Intermarriage in Chicago', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1942, p. 36, suggests that people are motivated to have sexual contact across the ethnic barrier, because it is in this context that the social nexus is at a minimum, so that the relationships can be casual without the participants becoming involved in ties, obligations, and 'entangling alliances'. He adds that on a sexual plane exotic myths have arisen about the attractions of the outgroup.

¹⁶ J. S. Heiss, 'Premarital Characteristics of the Religiously Intermarried in an Urban Area', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1960.

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

VOLUME SEVEN

MAY 1971

NUMBER TWO

THE EVOLUTION OF QAJAR BUREAUCRACY: 1779-1879	Shaul Bakhash	139
THE CORRUPTION OF FUTUWWA: A CONSIDERATION OF DESPAIR IN NAGIB MAHFUZ'S AWLĀD HĀRITNĀ	P. J. Vatikiotis	169
THE 'ARAB REBELLION' OF AMĪR GHĀLIB OF MECCA (1788-1813)	M. Abir	185
WESTERN-SOVIET RIVALRY IN TURKEY, 1939—II	Frank Marzari	201
'ALĪ BEY AL-KABĪR AND THE JEWS	John W. Livingston	221
MOSUL IN 1909	H. E. Wilkie Young	229
RUSSIAN JOURNALS DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST	Jacob M. Landau	237
RECENT BOOKS ON COLONIAL ALGERIAN HISTORY: A REVIEW ARTICLE	Edmund Burke, III	241
BOOK REVIEWS:		
John Waterbury, <i>The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite; a Study of Segmented Politics</i>	Clifford Geertz	251
F. R. Wingate, <i>Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan</i>	G. N. Sanderson	255
Iliya F. Harik, <i>Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845</i>	Gabriel Baer	257
Gavin Hambly et al., <i>Central Asia</i>	G. E. Wheeler	259
Homa Pakdaman, <i>Djamal-Ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani</i> A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, <i>Sayyid Jamal Al-Din Al- Afghānī</i>	E. Kedourie	260

*Published three times a year. Annual Subscription £4.00.
Single Issues £1.50*

FRANK CASS & CO. LTD.

67 GREAT RUSSELL STREET, LONDON WC1B 3BT

BOOK REVIEWS

A. J. ARBERRY, General editor, *Religion in the Middle East, Three Religions in Concord and Conflict*, 2 vols., vol. I: xii + 595 pp., vol. II: xi + 750 pp., Cambridge University Press, London, 1969, £7 the set.

Over 1,300 pages, written by more than thirty authors, can make confusing reading. They are certainly difficult to review, especially if the reader is not quite sure what the purpose of the work is and for whom it is intended. It is definitely not a source book. As an historical work it is at times too sketchy, at others too detailed. As a reference work it is too chaotic. And though the chapters on the three religious traditions of the Middle East were parcelled out to three competent editors (E. E. J. Rosenthal, Max Warren, and C. F. Beckingham for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam respectively), one misses the General Editor's tight rein and co-ordinating hand. There is much repetition and overlapping, and some subjects are discussed, in different parts of the work, two or three or even half a dozen times. The criteria which guided writers and editors in determining the scope of the work may be justifiable, but they are nevertheless confusing. Thus, for example, it is legitimate for J. Petuchowski to write several pages on Reform Judaism in America since it forms part of 'Judaism Today' and without the latter, Judaism in the Middle East—including Zionism and the State of Israel—cannot be understood. Islam is dealt with by areas (Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan-India-Pakistan, U.S.S.R., North-West Africa, Sudan, East Africa, West Africa, Balkans), though Sufism has a (somewhat inadequate) separate chapter, as have also the Wahhabis, Zaydis, Ibadis, Ismailis, Druzes, and Ahmadis. Christianity is dealt with by denominations, and the reader is taken through a crash course in the history, past and present, of the Assyrian, Syro-Malabar, Uniate Chaldean, etc., churches. Oddly enough, the areas covered by the Islamic and the Christian sections are not congruent: there are no chapters on 'Christianity in East Africa', 'Christianity in West Africa', or 'Christianity in the Balkans' (except, of course, for the section on the Patriarchate of Constantinople).

It is perhaps the profusion of Christian denominations in the Middle East and the necessity of dealing adequately with Judaism (in spite of the relatively small numbers of its adherents) which account for what might otherwise appear to be an absence of reasonable proportion. Vol. I gives 235 pages to Judaism and 355 pages to Christianity. Vol. II gives 360 pages to Islam! Part 2 of vol. II, 'The Three Religions in Concord and Conflict', again deals almost as much with Christianity as with Islam, and incidentally repeats much of what had already been said in earlier chapters.

For a work of such bulk, the two volumes are relatively free of printer's errors. However, Pope Pius VII (vol. I, 384) should be Pius IV. The Protes-

BOOK REVIEWS

tant printing press with oriental type faces in Beirut was not established in 1933 (vol. II, 532) but in 1833. Athanasius V was Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Jerusalem 1827-44 (and not from 1927: vol. II, 484), and one presumes that Mr. Pareja (vol. II, 569) meant to say that his chapter was 'not the place to dilate [rather than "dilute"] upon his [Afghani's] lasting influence on modern Islamic thought'.

The chapters dealing with Judaism are generally good. Special mention should be made of Jacob Petuchowski's 'Judaism Today' (vol. I, 3-58) which is excellent, a few hasty, inaccurate, and cliché-type statements notwithstanding. The contributions by H. Z. Hirschberg ('The Oriental Jewish Communities', vol. I, 119-225) and S. D. Goitein ('The Jews of Yemen', vol. I, 226-35) are competently written and informative. Norman Bentwich's chapter on 'Judaism in Israel' (vol. I, 59-118) is the weakest in the Judaism section; it is curiously shallow and occasionally inaccurate.

Of the nineteen chapters on Islam only two are by Muslim scholars. While this fact invites speculation, it will go here without comment. There is little in these chapters—competent and useful as they are—that is new or unfamiliar to students of Islam or the Middle East. As is inevitable in a work of this kind, every reader will find statements with which he disagrees (for example, Tibawi's statement, vol. II, 572: '[al Afghani] was essentially a political agitator whose weapon was religion, while 'Abduh was more of the religious revivalist').

The authors of the chapters on Christianity are all committed Christians, mostly ordained priests and theologians, and not infrequently members of the denominations with which they deal. Hence the authors' spiritual perspectives and perplexities, their certainties as well as their searchings of heart, frequently obtrude. This will not necessarily recommend their writing to every historian or social scientist, yet it has its advantages. Students of Comparative Religion in particular will find such reading very rewarding since the chapters in question have the quality of 'source material' rather than of descriptive summaries: they are sources for our understanding of the at times tortuous, at times sophisticated, modes of thought in which engagé Christians (either natives of the area or Western sympathizers) grapple with the predicaments, affirmations, ambiguities and (especially in the case of Protestants) bad conscience with regard to the Oriental churches, that go with being a Western Christian in the Middle East. It is regrettable that this dimension of self-understanding and self-interpretation is absent from the section on Islam.

The Christian authors are to be commended, by and large, for their honesty. No attempt is made to disguise or whitewash facts, and for Christian readers these chapters must be extremely painful reading. For what we are given is in great part a depressing catalogue of the most shameful ecclesiastical corruption. The record of intrigue and violence accompanying the history of the successions to the many Patriarchates with which the Middle East is littered is as amusing to the cynical outsider as it must be harrowing to a Christian. Nevertheless one is glad to learn that of the nine mistresses of one nineteenth-century (Coptic-Egyptian) Patriarch of the Ethiopic Church, only two were nuns (vol. I, 462). Professor Meinardus of the American University in Cairo says of the Coptic Church in the middle of the

BOOK REVIEWS

present century that 'corruption within the hierarchy had reached unimaginable limits' (vol. I, 436) and refers (vol. I, 445) to the quarrels between Copts and Ethiopians about the Deyr al-Sultan near the Holy Sepulchre as one of 'those unpleasant Jerusalem stories' that mar the record of Christianity in the Holy Land. He also emphasizes the deeply ingrained theological antisemitism of the oriental churches. Referring to Vatican II, Professor Meinardus states (vol. I, 450-1) that 'throughout the sessions, the Copts have repeatedly voiced their objections to the Vatican proposals for exonerating the Jewish people from the responsibility for the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. . . . This determined anti-semitic attitude, which is shared by the Orthodox and Evangelical Copts, should not be merely interpreted in terms of an opportunistic accommodation of the Christians to the political policies of the Egyptian government.'

Occasionally prejudice and one-sidedness are in evidence, especially in regard to Israel. Canon Max Warren is well aware of the 'insupportable ambivalence' (vol. I, 588) that must characterize the attitude of Christians in general and of Arab Christians in particular to the Zionist claims and the reality of Israel. Professor Meinardus is similarly conscious of 'the problem of Israel' (vol. I, 547-9) and warns against the danger of a new Marcionism from which, however, neither he nor others seem to be entirely free. F. M. Pareja states that 'the proposals of the United Nations [for a partition of Palestine] came to nothing before the negative and intransigent attitude of the antagonists' (vol. II, 540), but prudently fails to specify which side in the conflict accepted and which side rejected the partition proposal. Father Anawati declares (vol. I, 364) that it was necessary for Egypt 'to be armed against Israel, not so much, perhaps, for the sake of military revenge as in preparation for the everpresent possibility of attack'. The Israeli attack in 1956 is duly mentioned, but not a word is said of the closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping or about the constant and murderous incursions of the *Fedayeen* into Israeli territory.

The two most fascinating chapters are those by Dr. Charles Malik and by Abd al-Tafahum. Why the Editor permitted the author of the opening chapter ('Doctrine') in the section on 'The Three Religions in Concord and Conflict' to use a pen-name is difficult to understand, let alone to condone. Abd al-Tafahum ('Servant of Understanding') has written a very beautiful, sensitive, and at times wrongheaded essay, and the reader realizes after a few pages that it is the sensitiveness of a Western Christian (I would guess an Anglican, since the author's *habitus mentalis* exhibits both Catholic and Protestant features). As an example of how a deeply committed Christian can try to interpret for himself the existence of Judaism (including Zionism and Israel) and of Islam by mobilizing all his resources of knowledge and empathy, this chapter is moving indeed—many blind spots and some downright nonsense notwithstanding. His essay would have graced admirably any Christian symposium devoted to meditating upon the dimensions of 'the Abrahamic triangle' (vol. II, 386); in a work like the one under review it is inadmissible. To justify its inclusion, the General Editor ought also to have invited a Muslim and a Jewish thinker to project their perspectives on these three religions 'in Concord and Conflict'. The implicit claim that Abd al-Tafahum's essay is an objective presentation doing justice to the *Lebens-*

BOOK REVIEWS

gefühl and self-understanding of all three religions of the 'Abrahamic triangle' is a very naïve, foolish, and indeed dangerous illusion. For example, as a piece of sophisticated modern Christian theology the author's meditation on the Cross is of some interest. But it is unfair to confront the reader of this work with a statement such as 'the Cross is not manifest victory: but it is victory manifest' (vol. II, 386), without making it clear that Abd al-Tafahum is not discussing Religion in the Middle East but rather articulating his own creed. Nevertheless his very suggestive reflections on the role of place (geography) and people (nationhood) in the life and doctrine of the three great religions should provoke serious thought among believers and unbelievers alike.

Charles Malik, unlike Abd al-Tafahum, sails under his own flag. Dr. Malik, sometime Foreign Minister of the Lebanon and one of the most distinguished lay members of his Church, has written a most fascinating and revealing chapter on 'The Orthodox Church' (vol. I, 297-346). Again it is not an outsider but a committed Christian who writes about his church with knowledge and passion (in both significations of the word). His chapter is thus both description and 'testimony', and—as has been remarked earlier—may serve as source material to the student of contemporary 'Religion in the Middle East'. Malik is deeply imbued with a sense of the 'glorious religious tradition of Byzantium in the Middle East'. As a professing Christian he is also aware of the dimension of mystery in the life of the Church, and can thus write that 'the inner life of Orthodoxy in the Middle East, both as a corporate church and as individual believers, is known in its fullness only to God'. But there are other things known not only to God but also to the historian, and hence the acute anguish with which the author discusses 'the utter disorder, decay and corruption in the Orthodox Church' and reports that 'the documents reveal an incredible amount of intrigue, malice, spitefulness, meanness, mercenariness, venality, pettiness, feuding, vengefulness and violence'. *A propos* violence: 'the bishops of the Holy Synod of at least one see physically hit and wounded each other in a recent session' (vol. I, 340). Happily, not everything is 'corruption and rotteness . . . confusion and decadence', and Malik's account is informative and generally reliable. Passionately longing for a spiritual revival of his church, the author may have overestimated the promise of certain developments (for example, the Orthodox Youth Movement), but by and large he is sober and realistic to the point of disillusionment. The Orthodox Youth Movement 'appears to have slumped and wilted' (vol. I, 344), and 'The Orthodox today are unworthy of their possibilities' (vol. I, 343). Perhaps the picture for other denominations would not be much different if the writers had Dr. Malik's ruthless honesty.

In view of the incessant complaints made by Christian leaders and church organizations (and gratefully taken up by the Arab propaganda machine) to the effect that the State of Israel makes life for the Christian minorities so difficult as to encourage their emigration, some of Dr. Malik's facts are of considerable interest. Of course it is well known that Christian emigration from the Middle East has been going on for many decades, and even Father Anawati (vol. I, 415) feels in honesty bound to explain (without necessarily agreeing with) the feelings of many Arab Christians:

BOOK REVIEWS

Christians have no future in a country [the reference is to Syria, Egypt, and Iraq] which is becoming all the time more socialist and totalitarian. Their children are indoctrinated in the schools where the syllabus is devoted more and more to Islam and their faith is in danger. Debarred increasingly from public office and from nationalized societies, robbed of the property of their parents and unable to engage in profitable business in a society where almost everything is under State control, how can they survive? To remain is to condemn oneself to death by suffocation.

Dr. Malik, with his usual frankness, minces no words. '... there is hardly a Christian family in the Middle East (outside the Copts) that does not claim some relative in the United States' (vol. I, 324). In fact, orthodoxy in particular and Christianity in general are subject to what Malik calls 'the phenomenon of the squeeze' (vol. I, 333). Hence he can speak of 'the virtual liquidation of the Orthodox community in Egypt, and the emigration from Egypt to Lebanon since 1955 of tens of thousands of Orthodox of Lebanese or Syrian origin', and of the 'migration of perhaps a hundred thousand Orthodox from Syria into Lebanon in recent years' (vol. I, 304-5). However, 'even Lebanon is treated by many of these Christians as only a stopping station on their way out' (vol. I, 333). Dr. Malik's correct evaluation of the nature of this emigration is expressed in the statement that 'the virtual liquidation of Orthodoxy in Turkey and Egypt is more a cultural-political phenomenon than a religious one'. The statement could be applied also to other Middle Eastern countries (Israel, Jordan) as well as to other denominations.

This review has concentrated—perhaps unduly—on the Christian contributions to *Religion in the Middle East*. Some of the reasons for this on-sidedness have already been indicated. The contributions dealing with Islam do not contain much that is unfamiliar to students of the subject. Since most of these chapters were written by non-Muslims, they lack the value of 'testimonies' in which authors reveal their own 'self-understanding'. But this is precisely what the chapters on Christianity display. It is a great pity that Part 2 of vol. II, which could easily have been the highlight of the whole work, turns out to be the most unsatisfactory, perhaps because the themes 'Society and Politics', 'The Cultural Aspect', and 'Religion and Anti-Religion' raise too many expectations. Dr. Pareja's chapter on 'Society and Politics' contains many inaccuracies. Thus one would like to know what exactly is 'the synagogue' (as distinct from the Chief Rabbinate) with which the State of Israel has difficulties (vol. II, 541), or how the author came by 'the Mizrachi party of the grand rabbinate' (*sic*). The account of the Daniel Rufeisen case has mistakes or misunderstandings in practically every line. It is also unfortunate that these potentially crucial chapters tend to evade the problem of the special forms of involvement which religion in the Middle East has with other aspects of cultural, social, and national life as well as with the passions of politics. Only Dr. Malik shows explicit awareness of the pivotal significance of Arab nationalism as a *tertium quid* enabling the Christian and Muslim populations to transcend denominational divisions (vol. I, 337-8):

Nationalism, whether Syrian or Arab, hankers back [*sic*] to something more natural and more inclusive than religion; it has the effect, at least in theory, of equalizing between Muslim and Christian, and this is a great relief to both. . . .

BOOK REVIEWS

The examination of this whole theme of the political and nationalist implications of Orthodoxy in the Middle East calls for a separate and much deeper treatment.

The same point is illustrated unwittingly by Father Anawati who, in his chapter on 'The Roman Catholic Church', reports with what appears to be considerable satisfaction that 'the history of the Arab nationalist movement shows that in the early stages the influence of the Christians was decisive' (vol. I, 411).

Instead of listing names of ecclesiastics or presenting theological lucubrations, the contributors might usefully have given some texts illustrating the life, function, and roles of religion in the Middle East. Although the work under review was commissioned and completed before the Six-Day War (see the General Editor's Foreword, vol. I, p. xi), this reviewer may perhaps be permitted to refer to post-June 1967 events to exemplify the kind of material that could usefully be cited to illustrate some of the aspects of religion in the Middle East 'in this second half of the twentieth century' (vol. I, p. xi). Thus it would be illuminating to print at least one *fatwa* by a Muslim authority declaring war against Israel to be a *jihad*. It would be equally illuminating to print the statement of the Chief Rabbi of Israel to the effect that no Israeli Government, present or future, has a right to cede even one square foot of the occupied areas, these being the territories God Himself gave to His people under an eternal covenant. Finally, the patterns of behaviour characteristic of many churches in the Middle East could be illustrated by the declarations of several ecclesiastics after the unfortunate fire, in August 1969, at the Al-Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem. Since the Arabic texts referred to are not widely known, it may be useful to quote them here in translation. Apart from their documentary value, they also illustrate both the aforementioned involvement of Middle Eastern Christianity with Arab nationalism, and the importance of political factors in promoting 'ecumenical' co-operation, otherwise so conspicuously absent on most other levels of Christian life in the Middle East.

The fire at the Mosque was described by the Greek Orthodox Bishop Diodoros (Jordan) as 'a calculated step by Israel to destroy it [the Mosque] and to build the Temple of Solomon in its place. . . . It is not unlikely that they will lay fire to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and claim that it was the result of a short circuit' (*Al-Dastur*, 22 August 1969). Similarly the Latin Bishop Al-Sama'an declared that 'the abominable crime of the burning of the Al-Aksa Mosque is a calculated attempt, on the part of the Israeli authorities, to feel the pulse of the Muslim and Arab world and to test their reactions. Will they be satisfied with speeches, demonstrations, and declarations, or will they take drastic actions? . . . We are afraid that what happened today to the Al-Aksa Mosque will happen tomorrow to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre' (*Al-Difaa*, 24 August 1969). After the arrest, by Israeli police, of the incendiary—a young Australian sectarian fundamentalist found to be mentally ill—the following 'ecumenical' statement was published by the leaders of the Christian Churches in Jordan:

The abominable crime perpetrated by the Israeli authorities in laying fire to the Al-Aksa Mosque has profoundly shocked the feelings of the religious leaders and Christian clergy all the world over no less than it shocked their Muslim

BOOK REVIEWS

brethren. For that reason the [Christian] religious leaders sent a telegram to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to all the leaders of Churches in the world, in protest and condemnation, and demanding intervention to put a stop to this.

But Zionism, whose characteristic is plotting, has gone even further in its impertinence by trying to evade [the responsibility for] this abominable crime in order to cause strife and division among the Arab Muslim and Christian citizens, but its intrigues have been denounced all over the world. It concocted lies in order to justify its crimes. After having [first] claimed that the fire was due to a short-circuit, they told us yesterday that the crime was perpetrated by an Australian belonging to one of the unrecognized sects, but they did not realize that the name of this Australian—Rohan—is Jewish.

The *Daily Star* reports that the aforementioned Rohan lived in a kibbutz for four months, where he was trained by the authorities to commit this crime and to desecrate the holy places in preparation for their dream to [re-] build the Temple.

We herewith proclaim that the Muslim and Christian citizens in the Arab world are united in one national brotherhood and that a common enemy who has robbed them of their homeland and holy land is threatening them. . . . We proclaim that the continued conquest by Israel of the Holy City is a desecration of both the Muslim and the Christian holy places.

signed

Bishop Diodoros (Greek Orthodox)

Bishop Na'amath Al-Sama'an (Roman Catholic)

Archimandrite Nicolas Baril, on behalf of

Bishop Mikhail Asaf (Greek Catholic)

Rev. Shafik Farrah, head of the Anglican Church

Rev. Butrus Thoma, head of the Syrian-Orthodox Church

(*Al-Dastur*, 24 August 1969)

This document, and similar ones, are recommended for inclusion in a future edition of *Religion in the Middle East*.

R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY

JOHN BOWKER, *Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World*, xii + 318 pp., Cambridge University Press, London, 1970, £3.50.

This is a book of genuine intellectual distinction which also forms about as good an introduction to the comparative study of religions as one could wish for. The question, or rather the experience of suffering, provides a central axis around which the varying perspectives of the world religions can be elucidated and compared. The elucidation is remarkably clear, and the comparison very charitable without being syncretistic or glossing over differences. Indeed the material is so arranged that the reader himself can 'read off' the differences: for example, the varying attitudes of Islam, dualism, and Christianity to crucifixion as a focus of suffering. John Bowker makes especially good use of dualism both as a bridge between East and West and as an instructive analysis which does not manage to live adequately with the great tensions posed by the omnipotence or the love of God. In another sense Islam partly eliminates these tensions by an over-simplification based on the arbitrary power of God. Hence, there is relatively little development in Islam as compared with the complexities explored by Judaism and Christianity. Bowker has a section on 'development' for each religion, and these

BOOK REVIEWS

sections also illustrate the contrasting internal logic of the religions. If Islam elaborates an orthodoxy rather than achieving a development, Hinduism hardly has an orthodoxy to be developed: it is heterogeneous and broadly accommodating from its beginnings to the present day. (For that reason I am not quite sure how Mr. Bowker can determine corruptions of Hinduism.)

The author illustrates his themes from the texts of the religions themselves. They speak on their own behalf. Moreover, each religion also speaks through modern representatives in its central tendencies: Bishop Wilson of Singapore, Ebenezer Kovenski (in the 'Wolkovisk Memorial Book'), M. F. Jamali ('Letters on Islam'), Gandhi, and Thich Nhat Hanh ('Vietnam: the Lotus in the Sea of Fire'). There is also a section treating classical, Russian, and Chinese Marxism as related to religious traditions, illustrating the evanescence of profundity in an activism which—in Maoism at least—achieves a unique naïveté. Characteristically Mr. Bowker does not elaborate on this weakness but simply quotes the texts.

His analysis of the range of responses to suffering in Judaism is a particularly impressive part of a book everywhere marked by exemplary scholarship and intellectual control: thus suffering may be viewed as merely temporary, as a punishment, as a test, as a means of sacrifice and redemption, as inexplicable within the partial limited perspectives of men, as the necessary opposite of the good, or as taken up either in the renovation of the world or in personal immortality—'the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and there shall no torment touch them'. The last two responses just cited are of course very much part of the overlap with Christianity, even though the original affirmation of God in Jewish experience courageously lived with the possibility of death as final.

Perhaps what this book also illustrates is the radical consequences for culture of the varied responses and contrasting logics of the world religions. As the author points out, modern politicians may barely realize it, but a central factor in their understanding of a situation must be the fact that people are Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, or Jewish.

DAVID MARTIN

ERIK COHEN, *The City in the Zionist Ideology*, 8 + 63 pp., 1 map, Jerusalem Urban Studies (No. 1), The Institute of Urban and Regional Studies, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1970, n.p.

The author focuses on the theme that the Zionist bias in favour of rural settlement and of a policy of a 'return to the land' has deprived the present urban system of Israel of adequate planning. Lamenting the pro-agricultural philosophy of early Zionism, Dr. Cohen asks: 'What social developments take place in those areas of the society which were not emphasized by the ideology? It is mainly to these problems that this paper addresses itself' (p. 2). And he proceeds to tell the history of town planning. In fact, this essay is not concerned with Zionist ideology but rather with the lack of interest shown in the settlement of Israel in implementing the tenets of the school of planning which advocates a systematic urban hierarchy, and Christaller's central place theory. Quoting the advocates of these ideas, the author

BOOK REVIEWS

does not seem aware that no modern government has actually carried out policies of that sort.

The title is indeed misleading, for the author stresses repeatedly the rural and peasant themes in Zionist texts, but only just mentions that the Fathers of Zionist ideology, and Herzl himself, 'were not opposed to the establishment and development of Jewish cities in Palestine' (p. 3). He mentions also that the Garden-City concept had considerable influence on the early stages of Zionist urban settlement, especially in Tel-Aviv (pp. 9-10), but does not develop the point. He chiefly bemoans the lack of the kind of town-planning which he favours; only in the planning of the still quite small new town of Arad does he find some solace (pp. 48-9).

One does occasionally glean some interesting facts about the history of town-planning in Israel as one reads this essay, but on the whole it contributes more to professional polemic than to scholarly research. It would be interesting to explore the part the city, urban improvement and urban future, did play in the writings of early Zionist leaders. Certainly one should not forget the extraordinary role of one city, Jerusalem, in Zionist ideology and in the policies of the state of Israel. One could also find some general ideas in the planning and development of Haifa, Beersheba, Ashkelon. . . . Besides a certain rural bias, strategic considerations in organizing space have greatly influenced the planning of settlement. Dr. Cohen does not mention any of this. His argument is rather narrow-minded. His title points, however, to a worthwhile field of study, and it is a good sign that the Hebrew University of Jerusalem has started a new series of urban studies.

JEAN GOTTMANN

DONALD R. CUTLER, ed., *The World Year Book of Religion, The Religious Situation, Volume II*, 1091 pp., Evans Brothers, London, 1970, £6.30.

Volume I of this publication was reviewed in Vol. XII, No. 1 of this *Journal*. The second volume is much like the first, the series settling down into a somewhat disappointing shape. The book contains a few excellent pieces buried in a mass of considerably less interesting ones. If the volume were a third of its length, pruned of its superfluities, and better organized it would hold out the prospect of an attractive annual. As it is, one is overwhelmed by the number of the pages and irritated by the lack of clear relation among the many contributions. True, there is an arrangement of Parts and themes within Parts, but the logical order is weak and artificial—disparate pieces are forced into vaguely labelled boxes.

Intellectual distinction is to be seen in the sociologist Robert N. Bellah's 'Transcendence in Contemporary Piety' and in the theologian Harvey Cox's 'Feasibility and Fantasy: Sources of Social Transcendence'. On the Jewish side there is an interesting sociological essay by Charles S. Liebman, 'Toward a Theory of Jewish Liberalism', and there are two theological pieces: 'Elijah and the Empiricists' by Emil L. Fackenheim, and 'Non-Violence in the Talmud' by Reuven Kimelman. For the rest, one may usefully inform oneself, for example, on some religious trends in mainland China, North

BOOK REVIEWS

America, Communist Europe, and Latin America, and on the religious implications of some aspects of modern medicine. It is a sign of the times that Karl Marx makes a number of appearances.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

FLORESTAN FERNANDES, *The Negro in Brazilian Society*, ed. Phyllis B. Eveleth, translated by Jacqueline D. Skiles, A. Brunel, and Arthur Rothwell, xxv + 489 pp., Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1969, \$12.50.

ULF HANNERZ, *Soulside, Inquiries into Ghetto Culture and Community*, 236 pp., Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1969, \$5.95.

The views of Professor Florestan Fernandes have been known to English-speaking students of race relations since his article 'The Weight of the Past' in *Daedalus* (Spring 1967). He there argued that when the Brazilian slaves were freed in 1886, they were so little prepared for freedom that they took it to mean they need work only when they felt in the mood. To sell their labour was to sell themselves again. They were therefore hard to employ in the city of São Paulo and the jobs created in the course of industrial expansion went to European immigrants. White stereotypes of the Negro as idle and feckless were thus confirmed; poverty, malnutrition, disease, the unstable family, were realities. The familiar vicious circle had begun.

This volume is an abridgement and translation of Professor Fernandes' two-volume work: 'A Integração de Negro na Sociedade de Classes'. It continues and expands the social, historical, and psychological account sketched in his article. To the first period of withdrawal from the class society, there succeeded a period of protest movements, led by intellectuals. (By 'the class society' is meant the urban, industrial, and nominally democratic society of the Republic, as opposed to the traditional, hierarchical, and primarily agricultural society of the colonial and former imperial regimes.) But organized political protest came to an end with the Second Republic under Vargas and a new phase began. Individual social mobility became the aim; those Negroes who might have led reforming movements switched their energy to personal advancement in the scale of wealth and social esteem; they accepted white values, dress, and behaviour. Their aims became more realistic, their techniques subtler and more mature; above all, their outlook changed and the emphasis was now on self. His own efforts, they argue, are all a man can rely on; he must recognize that the cards are stacked against him and that he must do better than a white man to succeed. But there are few who do succeed and even they find that it is not enough to be rich; the doctor may have a good practice but he is still a Negro. There is a story of a dark mulatto who, when he had qualified as a dentist and had a practice, made up his mind to call on a rich white family for whom his grandmother had worked and who had brought him up in childhood. They received him politely and the sons, with whom he had played as a child, pressed him to stay to lunch. He agreed with some diffidence—but it was served in the kitchen, with the deliberate object of showing him his place.

BOOK REVIEWS

By a wealth of illustration, this book—if it were still necessary—has killed the Brazilian myth. Prejudice is strong in Brazil, though not expressed in the same way as in the United States. Ardent copulation and culinary eclecticism have not been enough to destroy the association of dark skin with slavery. But though the analysis is subtle, sensitive, and immensely thorough, it seems to me doubtful whether the conclusions go far enough. In the traditional society, it was hardly necessary to draw rigid distinctions in law; the premisses of the whole society were hierarchical, and the freed man stayed at the foot of the ladder. There was thus an appearance of tranquillity. But in the class society, the Negro sees personal promotion in the social scale as his goal. This means isolation from the Negro masses—a point Professor Fernandes makes repeatedly. He also repeats that the Negro is not yet a threat to white society. But, surely, in so far as he succeeds, he *will* become a threat, and the likelihood of more savage and overt white reactions cannot be discounted. Further, there is a steady influx to São Paulo of rural Negroes, who have not learnt city ways and whose behaviour is likely to reinforce white stereotypes. Can the policy of individual progress really alter the position of the masses? In the northern cities of the United States, fifty years ago many would have argued that it might; few would do so today. What is likely to be the attitude of the children of the successful, but socially rejected, Negro dentists and lawyers? Will they not turn to some modification of *Négritude* or Black Power? Are there really no Fanons or Carmichaels in São Paulo? Or have they slipped through the net of Professor Fernandes's questionnaires? In spite of these questions, this is an indispensable book. But it is hard reading. There is a sensation of repetition, which sometimes, on very careful consideration, is found to be unjustified.

Soulside, on the other hand, has been acclaimed on the jacket by one reviewer as 'reading like a novel'. His novel reading must be remote from mine. Dr. Hannerz does, it is true, describe graphically the growing tension when a man was being arrested, a crowd began to gather, more police-cars began to arrive—but this sequence is described as 'symmetrically schis-mogenetic interaction'. Dr. Hannerz is not in fact usually a jargoneer, but his reviewer is misleading in a more profound sense. The value of the book lies not in description but in explicit discussion. For anyone who has read even a little about race relations in the United States, Dr. Hannerz will have little to tell that is new about what goes on in the city ghettos; he tells his tale with sensitivity but we do know a good deal about it already. True, his descriptive sections refine usefully on what we have had before; his classification of four 'life-styles' in the ghetto is helpful and is not overstated; as he sensibly points out, the boundaries between the four styles are 'rather permeable'. But it is in discussion that the book comes into its own.

Here, too, the words 'sensitive' and 'sensible' must both be used. It is sensible to refuse the over-emphasis on one aspect that has sometimes characterized writing about the family life of the Afro-American. Neither African culture nor slavery nor national social structure alone account for the phenomena with which we have become so familiar. And this balance, this refusal to be rushed, distinguishes Dr. Hannerz's discussion of the deeper causes and the immediate occasions of race riots. His theoretical discussion has practical ends in view. He perceives the reactionary use that may be

BOOK REVIEWS

made of the concept of the 'culture of poverty' if 'culture' is defined in a sense that is too 'hard', by which he means too limited. The values and roles of a culture are learnt as a child grows up; every culture, however defined, is thus to some extent self-perpetuating, and there are those who argue that there is therefore little that can be done about the ghetto; children will follow the ways of their parents. At the worst this provides a 'spurious scientific underpinning' for leaving things as they are; better, but still dangerously, it may suggest that efforts should be directed to changing the culture. But it is the essence of Dr. Hannerz's book that the ghetto is the product of national forces and that what seems to be 'ghetto-specific' behaviour is the joint product of the constriction which its inhabitants feel and the ambivalence, present in varying degrees in every one of them, between the values of the greater society, which they inwardly admire but which are largely unattainable, and those outwardly admired in the ghetto, which are attainable and immediately gratifying but which in the long run are disastrous. From this ambivalence spring up the attempts to create an autonomous culture, Black Power, the emphasis on Soul, and the like. But these are so far either bogus or essentially negative; the dilemma of how to escape from the ghetto without becoming absorbed in the main stream of American culture is so far inescapable. This is a clear-headed and valuable book.

PHILIP MASON

JOSEF FRAENKEL, ed., *The Jews of Austria, Essays on their Life, History and Destruction*, xv + 585 pp., Vallentine, Mitchell, 2nd. edn., London, 1970, £3.50.

The Jews of Austria is a valuable contribution to that vast body of memorial literature that emerged after the end of the Second World War when the full extent of the extermination of European Jewry became known. Sons and daughters of the destroyed Jewish communities tried to record for themselves and to preserve for posterity the great cultural values and spiritual traditions of the world which had perished for ever. The hundred and fifty odd volumes of the series *Dos Poilische Yidentum* published by the Central Union of Polish Jews in Argentina, or the *Yearbook* (New York, 1964; Tel-Aviv, 1967) issued by the World Federation of Polish Jews; the valuable *Year Book* published regularly since 1956 by the Leo Baeck Institute for Jews from Germany, and its excellent *Schriftenreihe Wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen und Studies; Hungarian Jewish Studies* of the Federation of Hungarian Jews; and many hundreds of monographs and collective volumes on individual communities in eastern and central Europe put out by various *Landsmannschaften* in Israel, the United States, and Latin America are examples of this kind of literature.

The present volume, ably and competently edited by Mr. Josef Fraenkel, contains contributions by thirty-five authors, arranged somewhat arbitrarily, into four sections: Life, Biography and Memoirs, History, and Destruction. Six articles are in German, and twenty-eight in English (apart from the Editor's Introduction). The highly interesting paper by Dr. S. A. Birnbaum, 'Nathan Birnbaum and National Autonomy', falls, linguistically, between

BOOK REVIEWS

the two: extensive documentary extracts in the original German with brief introductory and connecting lines in English.

In the first part, there are thirteen essays dealing with various aspects of Jewish life and the Jewish contribution to Austrian culture: arts and crafts in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries by Walter Pillich, music by Peter Gradenwitz, jurisprudence by the late Franz Kobler, medicine by Moshe Atlas, literature by Harry Zohn. Here the selection of 'Three Austrian Jews in German Literature: Schnitzler, Zweig, Herzl' seems unduly arbitrary; the contribution of, say, Franz Kafka, Joseph Roth, Karl Kraus, Franz Werfel or Max Brod to Austrian (and world) literature was by far more significant and more worthy of Professor Zohn's discriminatory critical acumen. Richard Grunberger contributes a lively sketch on 'Jews in Austrian journalism', and Hilde Spiel on 'Jewish women in Austrian culture'. We have also Josef Fraenkel's penetrating analysis of Rabbi Moritz Güdemann's *Memoirs* (the manuscript of which seems to have perished during the Holocaust period) and the chief *Protestrabbiner* complex attitude to Theodor Herzl and Zionism. Wolfgang von Weisl provides a fascinating account of the beginnings of the illegal *aliya* to Palestine on the eve of the Second World War. Leon Kolb and Erich Juhn write respectively on the Vienna Jewish Museum and the Jewish sports movement in Austria (unequaled ever since by any other diaspora Jewish community or by Israel), and O. O. Dutch on the influence of Austro-Jewish emigration upon the Anglo-American world.

The second part starts with a charming essay by Sigmund Freud's son, Martin, dealing with the deep and enduring Jewishness of Freud's thought and attitudes. Sol Liptzin writes about Richard Beer-Hofmann (should not Zohn's translation of Beer-Hofmann's poem *Growing Old* have followed rather this paper?), Eric Mandell about the Jewish musician Salomon Sulzer, and Joseph Leftwich muses nostalgically about a number of his Viennese literary friends. *Memoirs* by the late Max Brod, Martha Hofmann, and Ernst Waldinger conclude this section.

A scholarly essay by Dr. Arieh Tartakower on 'Jewish migratory movements in Austria in recent generations' heads the section on History. Professor N. H. Tur-Sinai contributes an essay on Viennese Jewry, Rabbi A. Willman on 'Famous Rabbis of Vienna', Rabbi M. Papo on the little-known 'Sephardi community of Vienna', Rabbi J. Heshel on 'The History of Hassidism in Austria', and M. Henisch on 'Galician Jews in Vienna'. We have also essays on three provincial Jewish centres in Austria: E. S. Rimalt's on 'The Jews of Tyrol', Silvio S. Stoessl's 'The Jews of Carinthia', and M. K. Schwarz's 'The Jews of Styria', as well as Gustav Jelinek's valuable paper on the long-drawn-out and complex history of the negotiations on the Austrian restitution to the Jewish victims of Nazi discriminatory measures.

The destruction of Austrian Jewry is described in four essays: P. G. J. Pulzer and Robert Schwarz deal with the development of political anti-semitism in Austria; Norman Bentwich and Herbert Rosenkranz with the rescue operations following the *Anschluss* in March 1938, and the tragic fate of those Jews who were left behind.

A selected and clearly arranged bibliography compiled by Mrs. Ilse R. Wolff of the Wiener Library lists some hundreds of books and papers relating

BOOK REVIEWS

to Austrian Jewry. The editor did not forget to add a name index which greatly enhances the value and usefulness of this publication.

PAUL GLIKSON

BERTY GOLDBERG and WILLY BOK, *Dualité culturelle et appartenance*, 81 + 3 pp., Centre National des Hautes Etudes Juives, Brussels, 1970, n.p.

The breakdown of physical and cultural barriers between Jews and society at large, and the general secular climate of contemporary Western society have contributed to create a situation where the meaning of Jewishness, at both the individual and the group level, is frequently questioned. Parallel to this, the social sciences—more especially sociology and social psychology—have come to be regarded as the means by which the question should be studied and, it is hoped, answered.

In recent years, the two elements have combined to produce a crop of Jewish 'identity' studies. Mostly, such studies have taken the form of sample surveys using a fully-structured interview schedule with questions concerned, in the main, with behavioural aspects of Jewish daily life and chosen to be suitable for developing indices of communal and individual adherence to ritual and tradition. The research has not usually been directed at examining the values or ideals underpinning these behaviour patterns, particularly since the methodology limits the extent to which attitudes and values can be studied in depth. Generally speaking, the approach runs the risk of being to some extent prejudiced and prescriptive. Where respondents are contacted by Jews, often under the aegis of a Jewish organization, and are interviewed as Jews (rather than as fathers, mothers, breadwinners, or housewives), the atmosphere of the interview may be determined from the outset—particularly if an appointment has been made for the session. Moreover, questions of the 'Have you ever eaten . . .?' variety when asked in this interview situation may be perceived as recommendatory and, promises of anonymity notwithstanding, some respondents may feel obliged to give the 'right' answer.

Given the proliferation of such studies, it is stimulating to come upon a well-presented piece of research which employs a less rigid procedure and which can be regarded as a critique of earlier surveys. Indeed, the authors take to task studies which often begin with a question asking if the respondent is Jewish, and in this study have omitted from their questionnaire any reference to religion or religious groups. The study aims at discovering the group affiliation patterns and the values prevalent among young people, in this case students aged 18 to 22 years, reared in families where the parents have dissimilar socio-cultural backgrounds in that one parent is Jewish and the other not. This group the authors have called *indeterminés* throughout the study. The fieldwork was carried out among students registered at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, in the academic year 1967-68. The objectives of the research were such that a new methodological approach was deemed necessary. Accordingly, a neutral questionnaire was developed and administered to the group under review and, additionally, to two control groups,

BOOK REVIEWS

one where both parents were Jewish and one where both were non-Jewish.

The authors were fortunate in being able to draw upon the results of an earlier study, conducted by the Centre National des Hautes Etudes Juives, to pinpoint their subjects. This had brought to light seventeen students of mixed Jewish/non-Jewish parentage, fifteen of whom agreed to participate in this further research. Of the fifteen subjects, all but one had a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother. The control groups were selected at random from, respectively, the membership of the Union des Etudiants Juifs de Bruxelles and the total student body of the University. The numbers involved in the study are too small to give statistically significant results, and the authors themselves regard the work as a pilot study. However, the importance of the research lies not so much in the extent of its coverage as in its character, particularly in the comparative approach and in the form and content of the questionnaire. This was made up almost completely of open-ended questions examining topics such as the groups to which respondents felt themselves to belong, their leisure activities, their attitudes towards hunting, drink, etc. The answers of each group are fully analysed and presented at length in the text. However, since the numbers concerned are so small, and as the findings are not for the most part unexpected, especially as regards differences between the two control groups, they need only be mentioned here in passing. As a final chapter, the authors bring together the findings for, and develop a profile of, each group and conclude that the offspring of mixed marriages do not hold an intermediary position between Jews and non-Jews but may be presumed to behave in a manner undifferentiated from that of the population at large. There are, however, one or two exceptions to this general finding where the *indeterminés* are considered to show their undefined position. The main example comes in their attitude to the family, which they see as something outside themselves, preferring to identify with their friends. This preference is seen as an attempt, on the part of the *indeterminés* to avoid being confronted with an unresolved family situation and, when connected with an absence of any reference to Jews as a group, is interpreted as possibly revealing a disquiet spirit—more especially as most of the *indeterminés* were particularly interested in the resurgence of neo-nazism.

Taken as a basis for further research, this report is absorbing, although the choice of certain questions and a few of the findings raise some queries: what, for example, should be substituted for the question 'Do you go hunting?' which is meaningful in Belgian society but would hardly be significant for British Jewry? And, are the family situations of the *indeterminés* in fact unresolved? It would also have been interesting to know the number of non-Jewish parents who had been converted and whether or not the families of the *indeterminés* regarded themselves as Jewish. Perhaps data from the earlier study could have been introduced to enlarge our background picture of the group. Such points do not, however, detract from the worth of this preliminary study. M. Bok and Mlle Goldberg are very careful to point out that this short report discusses only a pilot study, and I can only hope that researchers in the field will take up the challenge so that this work becomes the precursor of research covering larger, less special, groups.

MARLENA SCHMOOL

BOOK REVIEWS

JACOB KATZ, *Jews and Freemasons in Europe, 1723-1939*, translated from the Hebrew by Leonard Oschry, xii + 293 pp., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford University Press, London, 1970, \$11.00 or £5.25.

The double condemnation of Jews and Radicals by radicals of the Right has been so common in Europe for nearly a century that it is perhaps surprising that no one had tried to make a serious study of the relationship between European Jewry and the Masonic movement, before Dr. Katz embarked upon his studies. One reason is no doubt the difficulty of getting at much of the material, since the freemasons remain, however respectably so, a secret society and averse to publicity; so that Dr. Katz was for instance denied access to the records of the English freemasons. Indeed he owes much to the Nazi hostility to freemasonry and to the Nazi pillaging of archives which helped eventually to bring them into the public domain.

To piece together the story both of the real relations between Jews and freemasons and of the imaginary relations which they acquired in the public mind also demands knowledge of general European and social history over two centuries, of the evolution of western European Jewry during and after the Enlightenment, as well as of masonic matters and of the demonology of antisemitism.

Even Dr. Katz for all the breadth and depth of his learning has his limitations. His instincts would seem to be those of the antiquarian rather than of the historian or sociologist; and he devotes what may seem disproportionate attention to tracing the rather meagre contacts between Jews and freemasons in the period before the French Revolution when masonry was largely (on the continent) something that attracted noblemen and adventurers rather than the essentially middle-class activity that it became in the nineteenth century.

In contrast, his references when he comes to more recent phenomena are somewhat limited. He is much more at home in German than in French history, which is as well since despite the book's title, the content is very heavily oriented towards Germany with France having only a subsidiary role, with England and Holland getting only sparse mention, and with hardly any mention of any other country. To talk of the Action Française as the inheritor of the ideas of Edward Drumont is a misleading oversimplification; and to say that in 1926, differences between the Catholic Church and the Action Française 'almost caused an open clash' is extraordinary, if one thinks of the importance of Maurras's breach with Rome for himself and his movement.

These errors are, however, symptomatic of a deeper weakness; Dr. Katz is obviously very sensitive to the differing tendencies within Judaism and to the role of participation by Jews in masonic lodges in promoting the Reform Movement. He is less acutely aware of the importance of divisions within Christian Europe. He himself makes the point in relation to the origins of masonic doctrine, ceremonial, and symbolism that while Christian scholars in the Middle Ages and later were often conversant with post-Biblical Jewish writings, the reverse was not the case. But this understandable tabu hardly justifies a modern Jewish scholar like Dr. Katz in ignoring the fact that

BOOK REVIEWS

western and central Europe in the period of which he writes had been divided from the religious point of view by the effects of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and that both masonry in general and masonry in relation to the Jews would not function in the same way in basically Catholic and basically Protestant societies.

It is not surprising that freemasonry which was acceptable to Lutheran Prussia and patronized by the Hohenzollerns could resist, at least in Berlin, penetration by Jews with some partial exception for a relatively Liberal period between 1848 and 1873, while in France the catholic-clerical orientation of the extreme Right brought it to classify Jewry and freemasonry together, as two disintegrating forces launched against French and European society by the French Revolution.

In the basically Protestant England and the Netherlands, with their generally more tolerant tone, a humanistic freemasonry capable of finding a place for 'enlightened' and assimilated Jews could most easily flourish. The efforts to gain admission to the lodges by Jews, either as visitors or as actual members, in other German cities were affected by local conditions, by the religious affiliations of particular communities, by the degree of authority maintained or claimed by the Berlin lodges, and by their accessibility to French, Dutch, or even English influences.

As one surveys the scene as depicted in such careful detail, one is impressed by the extraordinary importance which Jews attached to membership in the lodges, and by their readiness to accept personal rebuffs of a humiliating kind at least until the new wave of antisemitism of the last quarter of the nineteenth century made progress along these lines more obviously hopeless, and drove them to seek substitutes of their own such as the B'nai B'rith.

It is the more astonishing a phenomenon in that unlike the question of Jews at Universities to which it bears some resemblance, the lodges were not themselves instruments of social promotion. On the contrary, only those who had achieved some status in middle-class occupations could aspire to membership at all. Since Dr. Katz nowhere tells us what the lodges did in respect of their members, one cannot tell to what extent their activities themselves provided an attraction. No doubt the possibility of extending social relations outside the Jewish community might offer some business or professional advantages; but the degree to which the question was pursued suggests some less down-to-earth reason. One must assume that what was really at issue was social recognition itself; that to be a mason was somehow to be purged as far as one was oneself concerned of the unfavourable stereotype of the Jew, cherished not only by antisemites but even by philosemites and by many Jews themselves.

To discover the importance of the theme could only be done by relating it to the general history of Jewish assimilation in Germany in this period. Other things must have been much more important both to the Jews and to their enemies. Perhaps Dr. Katz implies that just because the issue was one of content rather than of form, it can be taken as symbolical of the whole process and of its terrible aftermath. It is therefore perhaps a little more than a footnote to history, but not very much more.

MAX BELOFF

BOOK REVIEWS

JOHN R. LAMBERT, with the assistance of Robert F. Jenkinson, *Crime, Police, and Race Relations. A study in Birmingham*, xxviii + 308 pp., Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, London, 1970, £3.

John Lambert's book is a useful, though not unbiased, contribution to recent criminological literature. It is the first section on crime that deserves most attention.

The crime section is a study of crime data and 'minor incidents' collected during a four-month period in one of Birmingham's police divisions. The findings confirm what is obvious and has been documented for other places, that crime is more prevalent in some areas than in others, and that it is related to symptoms of urban decay. Moreover, not only is crime geographically localized, but it is local in character. Crime then is merely a part of the general social pathology of city areas with more than their fair share of other social problems. These happen to be the areas where certain groups are more or less forced to live. These, also, happen to be the areas with most of the coloured immigrant population.

Lambert compares the rates of crime among ethnic groups in the areas. His results here confirm earlier findings: West Indian and Asian immigrant involvement with crime is smaller, and that of the Irish immigrant population significantly greater, than their proportion within the population. All immigrant groups show greater involvement with police in 'minor incidents'. All these situations require sensitive handling, and it is here that the police exercise the greatest discretion.

In Lambert's police section, he emphasizes the distinction between what it is that police actually do and the general police perception of their role. He argues that police see their role as one of successful law enforcement and judge efficiency almost solely on that basis. This, unfortunately, is true, and both police selection and training are too much geared to this narrow vision of their role, while police actually spend more of their time doing an enormous variety of tasks, providing a myriad of social services.

While Lambert says that in order to improve community relations police must be sensitive to the needs of the communities served, he fears police may too easily stereotype and reflect attitudes of the white community. He urges that more effort be put into social service police activity, modification of complaints procedure, separation of crime and order police, new training programmes, and recruitment of more coloured police. Lambert, however, is here manifestly unfair to the Police Service, especially on the issue of coloured recruiting, and also because he assumes that an individual policeman's attitudes will necessarily affect his working behaviour and hinder development of the proper police relationship with the community. Besides, his assessment of police reaction to coloured immigrants and their lack of awareness of the differences among communities is exaggerated, possibly owing to great reliance on American literature and to the dangers of participant observation. Lambert puts too much responsibility on police shoulders for adjusting to the needs of immigrant communities, arguing, as he does, that unless police treat immigrants differently from other citizens, in opposition to a basic tenet of the Police Service, they are in fact practising a negative form of discrimination.

BOOK REVIEWS

Lambert's section on children is a warning that if immigrants and their children are continually forced to live in areas of high crime and social disorganization, their crime rate will eventually match that of the area's population. Given the many forms of discrimination immigrants now suffer, and will probably continue to suffer, this bodes ill for the future.

Nevertheless, despite its faults, Lambert's book is a contribution to criminology and literature on the British police. The police have been too long neglected by sociological researchers. This book both raises some interesting questions and points to problems for future research.

KENNETH D. KEMPER

PHILIP MASON, *Race Relations*, vi + 181 pp., Oxford University Press, London, 1970, cloth 90p, paper (Opus no. 53) 45p.

It will not be long before race relations is established as a subject in British schools and universities. Its form will owe a great deal to Philip Mason's work as a synthesizer, an historian, and a promoter of research. These are convenient aspects from which to examine his present volume which is conceived as an introduction to the embryonic subject.

Mr. Mason's ability to assimilate the findings of specialist research and express them in graceful English is well displayed in the early chapters on the biology of racial differences and on psychological studies. They include a simple but up-to-date discussion of genetic variation, the meanings of 'intelligence', and the controversy re-ignited by Jensen. There is then a review of the 'Pressures from Within' which predispose men towards aggressiveness, before Mr. Mason the historian takes over to examine the social record. He briefly summarizes evidence about several pre-industrial societies to argue that 'human progress was for long usually accompanied by increasing stratification, which in its turn usually led to expansion and some form of dominance by the more advanced, more highly organized, and more stratified societies'. Afterwards came a new phase in human development. The social distance between members of the European imperial nations and those of their colonial dependencies was greater than in the earlier forms of domination. For a time the rulers allowed democracy to develop at home while prohibiting it overseas. Young colonials were taught to believe in values which were already a subject for mockery in the centres from which they had sprung, and from this grew a great sense of betrayal. Believing that 'the true understanding of the present state of any society will depend upon understanding its previous state', Mason keeps this historical interpretation well to the fore here. Readers will find it elaborated in his contemporaneous treatise *Patterns of Dominance*.

The last two full-length chapters briefly analyse 'Some Modern Situations' and make suggestions for 'Disentangling the Causes'. Mr. Mason maintains that most situations can be classified as Paternalist, Dominant, Competitive, or as exemplifying Fluid Definition; he finds that the numerical proportion of groups has little to do with fluidity but is related to rigidity. Kinds of migration, the nature of the territory, the cultures of the groups are considered, and there is a fascinating table which lists for sixteen situations the

BOOK REVIEWS

social attitudes towards marriage, concubinage, sexual exploitation, and the group ascription of anomalous children. The proffered explanations are excellent, but they are answers to a limited range of questions, and in a book that sets out to introduce a subject that is a weakness. Mr. Mason's focus is always on societies as units and he does not consider the alternatives. Histories do not have to be about states of society; they can be about smaller-scale phenomena. New knowledge in race relations will come in large measure from dividing up the field into units more manageable for study. There are now many research students engaged in this enterprise, but though Mr. Mason has been active in promoting research, he nowhere shows how his kind of approach can be linked to their small-scale investigations. The next step for him will be to review what social anthropologists have written on the 'micro-macro problem', that of relating theories about states of society to the observation of interpersonal relations and vice versa. It may induce him to modify his belief that the study of race relations must be concerned with 'the total behaviour of men' rather than with particular aspects of it, as is usual in the social sciences. I hope he can be persuaded to move on to this problem and suspect that he will then be ready to concede that the new subject will have to be even bigger and more varied than this admirable prospectus acknowledges.

MICHAEL BANTON

G. V. OSIPOV, ed., *Town, Country and People*, viii + 260 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1969, £2.75.

This is the second of a series of papers by Soviet sociologists, prepared for the western market by the *Novosti* press agency in Moscow. This one, like its predecessor, has been edited and supplied with an introduction by Maurice Hookham. The result is well worth reading, both as a guide to the style and pursuits of Soviet sociologists and as an introduction to some of the problems of Soviet society. To be sure, one is uneasily aware that some attitudes and theories would find no reflection in such a volume as this. 'We are told to do empirical research, but just try to present data which fail to show that people have a more positive attitude to their work under socialism!' These words, uttered by a Soviet scholar off the record, remind the reviewer of the constraints under which Soviet research operates. There is also the probably unintended effect of citizens' mistrust of authority on replies to questionnaires. Let us by all means accept that Mitrokhin's paper on the survival of religious beliefs is entirely sincere. But the likelihood is that replies from believers might not be true: it might seem safer to avoid a straight answer. The author advocates the need for creating a feeling of confidence between subject and interviewer, but this cannot be easy.

The book does indeed contain some 'negative' data. Thus a paper on 'collective attitudes among agricultural workers' refers to an episode in which a work team refused to allow machinery to harvest flax because payments for harvesting by hand were high. In general, though presented as rare, the figures given by the authors show that such attitudes are more common among peasants than among workers.

BOOK REVIEWS

Some of the papers deal with demography, marriage, and divorce. Some of the most striking of the published work on migration, and especially on the conflict between state labour plans and the inter-regional movement of labour, are unfortunately omitted from this volume. So are most of the investigations into the causes of low birth rates. One statistical table does provide evidence, which is all the more significant because the author of the paper saw nothing odd about it. The question, 'What, in your opinion, is the main condition for a stable and happy marriage?' was put to 500 couples, and only *three* answered 'children'. Surely with us the figure would have been much higher?

The same paper (by Kharchev) provides a little statistical evidence on mixed marriages. Incomplete and ambiguous though it is, even such data as these are rare. They relate to a sample survey in Leningrad. Out of a total sample of 500, 86 were mixed (that is, 17.5 per cent of the sample). Of the 86 mixed marriages, the following involved Jews:

- 6 Russians married Jewish women;
- 8 Jews married Russian women;
- 1 Ukrainian married a Jewish woman; and
- 1 Jew married a Belorussian woman.

Jews were thus involved in 16 out of the 86 mixed marriages, making 18.8 per cent. But Jews form, according to the 1959 census, just over 5 per cent of the population of Leningrad. So we could say that *if* the Jews are proportionately represented in the sample, then 500 marriages mean 1,000 people and 50 of them are Jews. 16 of these Jews, 9 women and 7 men, married non-Jews. *Ergo* 34 Jews married each other. This would mean a mixed marriages percentage of 32, which sounds plausible, but it must again be emphasized that there is a large margin of error here.

Also of interest are data on mixed marriages between Central Asians and Europeans: 'of the 10,500 marriages in Tashkent in 1958 . . . 600 [were] between members of the local population and Europeans', and of these only 130 involved Asian *women*. There were 1,400 mixed marriages between 'Europeans', and these doubtless included Jews marrying Russians and others, but no figures are cited.

A. NOVE

U. O. SCHMELZ and P. GLIKSON, eds., *Jewish Population Studies 1961-1968*, 174 pp., Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, Jerusalem-London, 1970, £1.05, \$2.50, IL8.00.

From the title of the book one could never tell the important contributions it contains. For the practising demographer its bibliography (Part III) of nearly 300 titles is indispensable and its reports on the status of current research (Part II) in about a dozen countries most informative. The chapters on sources of Jewish population statistics and on the advantages and limitations of a variety of methods and techniques used in the enumeration of Jewish population groups (most of Part I) are an excellent aid in developing professional competence for the demographer-in-training. Everyone will

BOOK REVIEWS

benefit from studying the first chapter, which is a substantive contribution and attempts to draw conclusions concerning the future growth or decline of Jewish populations in diaspora countries and in Israel. Taking into account current fertility, mortality, and intermarriage, Dr. Schmelz comes to the conclusion that 'the future growth of Jewish Diaspora populations . . . must not be taken for granted'. By contrast, the fertility of the Jewish population of Israel, though lower than her neighbours', appears to guarantee future population growth.

It is to be hoped that the Institute of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University will continue to encourage and monitor the field of Jewish demography and present another report after the 1970 decennial general censuses of population have been published. Since these official documents can only be identified with difficulty and are only available at highly specialized libraries, it is to be hoped that a future report would include a section in which the tables dealing with the Jewish population would be reproduced. (Cf. Erich Rosenthal, 'Jewish Populations in General Decennial Population Censuses, 1955-1961: a Bibliography', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XI, no. 1, June 1969.)

ERICH ROSENTHAL

LOUIS SCHNEIDER, *Sociological Approach to Religion*, vii + 188 pp., John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1970, £2.65.

Over the past decade the sociology of religion has accumulated a more than ample supply of textbooks, and the time has passed when a book in this field might easily be welcomed as filling 'a gap in the literature'. Schneider's book, however, is a rather special type of text, which seeks to integrate the sociology of religion and the general perspectives of structural-functional analysis, and to use this approach in a few selected areas of enquiry. Whilst accepting a modified and weakly-stated intellectualist approach to religion, Schneider is at pains to point out the Christian bias of the cruder intellectualist theories of classical anthropology. This perspective he seeks to combine with a sophisticated employment of functionalism, particularly as presented by Parsons, and here he goes considerably beyond the use of concepts such as values, norms, and integration, in using the ideas of system-interchange, hierarchy, and control that are developed in Parsons's later work. Functionalism is shorn of its static implications, as Schneider discusses structural differentiation in the development of universal religions from folk religion. He is particularly suggestive in focusing on 'arrests' in this process, with Judaism depicted as for a long time intermediate between the two polar types of his folk-universal continuum.

Schneider honestly acknowledges that grand theory has as yet not gone far in solving the theoretically stated problems of the sociology of religion: one might doubt, given the difficulties that Schneider himself acknowledges of establishing even a satisfactory definition of religion, whether it ever will. The author is more optimistic, bringing the reader to the point at which established theoretical problems remain unresolved with a confident note that more work on these issues will take our theoretical formulations further.

BOOK REVIEWS

One may legitimately wonder whether the formulation of necessarily more abstract concepts to embrace a widely disparate range of cases will ever really heighten, beyond a certain point, our understanding of social reality and social change. Nonetheless, even the sceptic will benefit from Schneider's lucid presentation of the issues.

The last three parts of his book are devoted to three discrete and more limited problems—the Protestant ethic; religion viewed as culture; and a less readily integrated section which covers both religious organizations and a discussion of secularization. Dispersed as these themes are, Schneider succeeds in sustaining important strands of argument developed in his earlier and more theoretical chapters. His survey of the Protestant ethic thesis, which pays special attention to the Mertonian propositions concerning the relation of Puritanism and the development of natural science, is, if short, nonetheless a valuable survey of the debate, in which Schneider pursues the more problematic aspects of the analysis in terms of interchange.

In a swift but adroit comparison of aspects of contemporary Buddhism, American pragmatic religion, and the new sects of Japan, the author opens up a number of important propositions about the cultural significance of religion, picking up, in respect of the United States, themes that he earlier developed in his study of American inspirational religious literature. Although his final discussion of secularization is short, here as elsewhere the author puts his finger deftly on the key issues in a way which those concerned with substantive aspects of religion should find no less stimulating than those whose core interests are in sociological theory and social structure.

BRYAN R. WILSON

GRAHAM WATSON, *Passing for White, A Study of Racial Assimilation in a South African School*, xi + 130 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1970, £1.80.

Despite its title, Dr. Watson's book is less about the problems of a Coloured in South Africa and the conflict and tension aroused by passing for White than it is about the effects on a school of being in a racially mixed working-class neighbourhood.

The author studied a high school for white children in Cape Town. The school is situated in an area of the city characterized by uncertainty as to its racial classifications in terms of the Group Areas Act, and predominantly semi-skilled and skilled manual in class composition. This leads to two conflicts: the first between the middle-class ethos of the school and the working-class attitudes of scholars and parents, and the second between the status of the school as white and the racially mixed character of its surroundings. Although Dr. Watson gives some details on how the school committees and the headmaster attempt to screen out racially suspect pupils and the problems this raises, it is in dealing with the first conflict that the book is most informative and interesting. There are many English and American studies documenting the problems of a middle-class school system in dealing with intellectually uninterested pupils from working-class families and it is surprising that this information is not incorporated into the work. Dr. Watson

BOOK REVIEWS

rather takes as his point of comparison, when he looks beyond the structure of the school he studied, the traditional English Public School from which his particular high school is very far removed.

The lines of conflict and co-operation between the various sections of the school staff—permanent and temporary, of long standing or relatively new, Principal and Vice-Principal—are well discussed. These relate to the problem of passing for white only tangentially. The sequence can be drawn as follows: being in a racially mixed neighbourhood, in a society intent on the rigid separation of racial groups, leads to flux and anxiety in the white residents and tends to attract lower-paid workers unable to afford the cost of accommodation in more acceptable areas. This reduces the overall population from which pupils are drawn. Selectivity on the basis of intellectual capacity and educational commitment is impossible. The overall status of the school (determined by its academic success rate) declines, staff recruitment becomes more difficult, and the status of those already at the school diminishes. This in turn affects their attitudes to both school and pupils.

It is in its documentation of this process that the book is interesting, although one is not always clear about the points the author is making. Despite the fact that much of the text is devoted to a discussion of passing for white, the view that this is central to the structure of the school is not convincing. One remains with a sense that this is only one factor in a complex situation and perhaps not even the main factor. Research elsewhere has uncovered problems similar to those discussed by Dr. Watson and without the complication of racist ideology and apartheid.

BERYL A. GEBER

WERNER WEINBERG, *Die Reste des Jüdischdeutschen*, 116 pp., W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1969, n.p.

This book is about the form of language used by a sector of the ill-fated German Jewish community in the thirties of the present century. Though enough scattered remnants of *Jüdischdeutsch* have survived, in the recollection and usage of its equally scattered surviving speakers, for the author—with the aid of the very considerable literature in and on *Jüdischdeutsch* which the useful bibliography reveals—to reconstruct its essential features, it is nevertheless clear that its natural geographical focus and its social and historical *raison d'être* have gone for ever. These were located, according to Weinberg, in the middle and lower orders of the German Jewish community, among the wine merchants, the corn and hop merchants, the horse and cattle-dealers, the shopkeepers and travelling salesmen, the craftsmen and hawkers. Of these, it seems that it was above all the horse and cattle-dealers who most frequently used the idiom, preserved and developed it, and in the course of their travels spread the knowledge of it: this accounts for one of its alternative names: *Viehhändlersprache*, 'cattle-dealers' language'.

The present account consists of a brief preface (pp. 7–8) by the author, a descriptive sketch (pp. 9–44), a glossary (pp. 44–111) with standard German equivalents and etymological notes, a short excursus on Jewish German words of non-Hebrew origin (pp. 111–12), another on the Jewish

BOOK REVIEWS

German pronunciation of German words (pp. 112-14) and a bibliography of some 70 entries (pp. 114-16). The largest section of the book is therefore the glossary, which consists mainly of items of Hebrew derivation.

Indeed, to the extent that Jewish German functioned in the thirties as a distinct code, it seems to have done so above all by virtue of its special vocabulary, and it is this which makes it necessary to distinguish it quite clearly from Yiddish. The phonology (sounds, sound sequences, syllabic structure, stress patterns) of the Hebrew element in Jewish German, and to a lesser degree the morphology (for example, some Hebrew plurals retained) remain distinctive, but we are told (pp. 112-14) that the pronunciation and morphology of the German element are, with some revealing exceptions, virtually the same as those of the surrounding non-Jewish *Umgangssprache* or dialect according to social level. The same holds good for the syntax, which is in all essentials German.

The slightest acquaintance with Yiddish, on the other hand, reveals it to possess a well-developed phonology, morphology, and syntax of its own, with its own dialectal variants. It is historically speaking a form of German, but it has a long, eccentric, separate development of its own behind it; the Hebrew elements in the vocabulary take their place alongside the Slavonic and other accretions. We are faced with the somewhat paradoxical situation that Yiddish, a full-blown linguistic code with a long and separate history, is more easily understood by a Germanist with no knowledge of Hebrew than is Jewish German, which linguistically is more like a mere technical vocabulary embedded in modern German.

The explanation is not hard to find. Both Jewish German and Yiddish served, among other functions, as concealment codes. Whereas Yiddish speakers, however, lived mainly amongst non-German speakers, speakers of Jewish German lived amongst German speakers. For the first, a German-derived structure in itself went a long way towards meeting the need for concealment; for the second group, an extensive special vocabulary was necessary (even though, as Weinberg tells us, some Gentiles—farmers, for instance, and household servants in Jewish families—themselves became proficient).

Typical of the concealment function of Jewish German is the use of Hebrew numerals—of considerable importance to dealers discussing prices and wares in private. This may indeed be seen as a development diametrically opposite to the normal course of linguistic 'interference' in contacts between 'natural' languages. In these, it is often the case that dates, amounts, and all numerals beyond the integers are borrowed by the linguistic minority from the language of the majority environment; in particular, arithmetic tends to be performed in the majority language to the extent that it is also the language of the school. Hence, English fulfils this function for most Welsh speakers, French for Breton speakers, Italian for German speakers in Sauris, Sappada, and Timau, and for Slovene speakers in Val Bruna, Val Resia, and other border valleys of N.E. Italy, German for speakers of Slovene (*Windisch*) in S. Carinthia, and so on.

The analysis of German gender assignment to Hebrew substantives (pp. 31-36) is of general linguistic interest. Gender assimilation is determined partly by morphological and partly by semantic analogy, but there are

BOOK REVIEWS

instances where the German gender is determined by the Hebrew gender even where this results in gender conflict with the most obvious German equivalent. Examples are *der aulem* (*die Welt*), *der käl* (*die Gemeinde*), *der knass* (*die Strafe*). The coincidence that *-e* is a common marker of feminine gender in substantives both in Hebrew and in German determines the feminine gender in Jewish German of substantives in *-e* from Hebrew even where German equivalents are masculine (for example, *die milchome/der Krieg*, *die lewōne/der Mond*) or neuter (for example, *die mitte/das Bett*, *die tewie/das Getreide*).

It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for the use of Hebrew elements where Jewish German had them, and their absence where vocabulary of German origin was retained. Of the adjectives, it can perhaps be said that a cursory semantic inspection suggests that Hebrew adjectives were predominantly of the kind which involve value assignments and judgments (concepts like dignified, clever, handsome, ugly, cheeky, unsuitable) and frequently pejorative or indiscreet (crazy, lame, pitiful, low-down, mean, bankrupt, pregnant, diseased). Of the substantives, Hebrew items cover many of the concepts associated with commerce and dealing in general, and of course with Jewish social life. For other substantives, however (for example, *der aulem* world, *die lewōne* moon, *die milchome* war), and for many verbs, no obvious explanation suggests itself. Wider contextualization, towards which the glossary goes some way, would doubtless be more revealing.

Sociolinguistically, the most striking thing about Jewish German is perhaps the number of its Hebrew-derived words which gained more general currency in German. Many of these had specifically Jewish (and usually pejorative) connotations: *meschugge*, *mispoche*, *lineff*, *schofel*, for example. But at any rate for a small random sample of this reviewer's German-speaking informants, the German Jewish origin of *Stuss*, *schmusen*, *G'seres* (*gesēires*) *mies*, *pleite*, *Ganowe* and *Moos* (*Geld*), was news.

The formal integration of the Hebrew elements into the structure of Jewish German, incomplete as it is, is a classic example of how elements of the most disparate linguistic origins can co-exist in a code which meets a specific social need at a given point in human history. The author deserves our gratitude for the lucidity with which he has documented and located in social time and space one of the more interesting varieties of speech to have arisen from the impact of one culture on another.

NORMAN DENISON

ALAN WELLS, *Social Institutions*, x + 298 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1970, £2.

It is refreshing to come across an introductory sociology text written with a truly comparative perspective—refreshing, because this approach has been badly neglected as a result of the onrush of empirical sociology. The founding fathers and famous scholars are being redeemed, for this book brings to mind, although in a somewhat lower key, the works of Weber, Durkheim, Westermarck, Ginsberg, and others. Unlike these predecessors,

BOOK REVIEWS

however, Wells could have relied more on contemporary sociological research now available in addition to the anthropological and historical material he so skilfully uses.

To illustrate this point, we can take religion as one of the social institutions to which he devotes part of his book. The basic definitional problem is tackled succinctly; the typologies are stated; speculations regarding origins are discussed; on the whole a wide spectrum is covered including even a discussion of Hasidism, but when it comes to the contemporary scene of modern industrialized society the material is thin. Thus, the analysis of secularization is treated inadequately and important contributions on this topic by American sociologists, such as Peter Berger, are completely missing.

In many ways this is an excellent book. The introduction spelling out the problems of 'comparative sociology' and discussing the feasibility of the scientific study of society, and the very clear treatment of half a dozen major social institutions should provide on the whole a more than reasonable grounding to new students. In fact I consider Wells's book preferable as an A-level text to those texts in vogue at the moment. Its value would still be recognized by the first and second year undergraduates towards whom the blurb directs this book.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

CHRONICLE

THE YONINA TALMON PRIZE

The second Yonina Talmon Prize will be awarded in 1972 for an article on 'The Sociology of the Kibbutz and Collective Settlements'. This award carries a stipend of \$450.

A manuscript must be submitted in either English, French, or Hebrew and be an unpublished scientific paper appropriate for publication in a social science journal. Preference will be given to junior scholars.

Candidates should submit six copies of their manuscript and curriculum vitae as follows:

(Hebrew Manuscripts) c/o The Yonina Talmon Prize,
Chairman, Department of Sociology,
The Hebrew University,
Jerusalem, Israel

(French and English
Manuscripts) Mrs. Charlotte Green Schwartz,
164 Gardner Road,
Brookline, Mass. 02146,
U.S.A.

Deadline for the receipt of papers is 1 November 1971. For further details, write to The Secretary of the Department of Sociology at The Hebrew University.

Selection Committee: Yehoshua Arieli, S. N. Eisenstadt, Meyer Fortes, Max Gluckman, Charlotte Green Schwartz, and Kurt H. Wolff.

*

The Absorption Ministry of Israel released the following data last January. In 1970, the total number of immigrants was 41,905, including 4,010 returning residents. Immigration from Asia and Africa fell from 12,939 in 1969 to 10,578 in 1970; there was also a decline in the immigration from Oceania (from 412 in 1969 to 370 in 1970) and from Europe (from 15,236 in 1969 to 14,605 in 1970).

On the other hand, immigrants from Latin America numbered 4,048 in 1970 (2,770 in 1969) and from North America, 7,394 (6,419 in 1969).

There was a sharp rise in the percentage of immigrants with professional qualifications: from 32 per cent of the immigrant labour force in 1969 to 44 per cent in 1970. Engineers, architects and surveyors numbered 1,796 last year (632 in 1969) and doctors numbered 678.

Between January and October 1970 there were 1,582 immigrants who elected to live in kibbutzim.

*

The Director of the Jewish Agency's Aliyah Department is reported to have stated in London last January that about 2,000 persons had emigrated

CHRONICLE

from the United Kingdom to Israel in 1970. There were 86 engineers and technicians among them, and 65 doctors and nurses.

Some 10 per cent of the immigrants had settled in kibbutzim and moshavim.

*

The Housing Minister of Israel is reported to have stated last January that 32,000 new homes had been completed in 1970, compared with 26,000 in 1969—an increase of just over 23 per cent. Moreover, building work was started on 44,500 new homes in 1970, compared with 36,000 in 1969.

Building costs in 1970 had risen by 20 per cent over the previous year; they were 40 per cent higher than in 1967.

*

Last April the Director-General of the Ministry of Absorption in Israel spoke at a meeting of Iranian immigrant students at Ohalo. He stated that about 5,500 Iranian Jews had emigrated to Israel since the Six Day War; there were 250 students among them.

In the first three months of 1971, 340 immigrants had come to Israel from Iran.

*

The Israeli Ministry of Tourism is reported to have stated last January that 436,700 tourists had come to Israel in 1970. The large majority (87 per cent) came by air. It is estimated that income from tourism in that year amounted to \$100m.

There had been 409,000 tourists in 1969; the increase in 1970 was therefore almost 7 per cent. The numbers from Belgium increased by 15 per cent; from Brazil, by 21 per cent; from Germany, by 24 per cent; from Sweden, by 12 per cent; and from the United States, by 13 per cent. On the other hand, there was a decline in the number of visitors from Austria, Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland.

In the first three months of 1971, 98,100 tourists came to Israel—compared with 84,000 in the first three months of 1970. In March 1971 alone there were 48,500—the highest March figure on record.

*

Last November a group of twelve Marrano families, numbering seventy-one persons, arrived in Haifa to settle in Israel. They were housed in Beer-sheba.

*

Last April the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel released data on the country's publishing trade. During the year ending 31 March 1970, 8.5 million copies of books and pamphlets were printed; there were 3,158 titles. In the previous year there were 9.2 million copies, but fewer titles: 3,075. There were 288 publishers in 1969-70—but 189 of these had issued only one book each; the number of full-time publishers was 55, compared with 54 in 1968-69.

CHRONICLE

In 1969-70, text books accounted for 8.9 per cent of the number of titles published; about 1.25 million copies were printed.

Exports of books and printed matter earned \$5,733,000 in the calendar year 1970, against \$5,020,000 in 1969.

In 1969 there were 24 daily newspapers in Israel; 14 were in Hebrew (including two evening papers); two in Arabic; and one each in Bulgarian, English, French, German, Hungarian, Polish, Rumanian, and Yiddish.

*

It was reported last September in Paris that the Alliance Israélite Universelle runs 72 schools all over the world with a total number of 16,805 pupils. There are 28 schools in Morocco, 27 in Iran, 10 in Israel, three in the Lebanon, two in France, and one each in Syria and Tunisia.

*

The Fonds Social Juif Unifié announced in Paris last January that 300 Egyptian Jews had arrived in France. These refugees were provided with travel documents by the French consular authorities in Cairo, and were being helped in France by the welfare services of the FSJU.

The FSJU further stated that during the first ten months of 1970 about 2,000 North African Jews had come to France and that in the same period there were also 120 refugees from eastern Europe, mainly from Poland.

*

The Joint Distribution Committee held its 56th annual conference in New York last December; it adopted a budget of \$23,112,000 for 1971. The Director-General of the JDC announced that the amount was required to help 300,000 needy Jews in 25 countries in 1971.

In 1970, 35 per cent of that year's expenditure went to help 95,000 Jews in Israel; nearly 20 per cent to help 47,000 Jews in North Africa and in Iran; and about 33 per cent had been spent to help 95,000 Jews in eastern Europe and 65,000 in western Europe.

*

Some data from the Soviet census of January 1970 were released last April. The official number of Jews in the USSR was given as 2,151,000; 2,268,000 Jews were returned in the 1959 census. There has also been a decline in the number of Jews who gave Yiddish as their mother tongue: from approximately 410,000 in 1959 to about 395,000 in 1970.

The largest decline in the official Jewish population has occurred in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (which includes Moscow): from 875,000 in 1959 to 808,000 in 1970. There has also been a decline in the Ukraine, from 840,000 to 777,000; in Byelorussia, from 150,000 to 148,000; in Lithuania, from 25,000 to 24,000; and in Estonia, from 5,400 to 5,300. On the other hand, the number of those who declared themselves to be Jewish has risen in Uzbekistan (from 95,000 in 1959 to 103,000 in 1970); in Georgia (from 52,000 to 55,000), and in Moldavia (from 95,000 to 98,000).

In Latvia the figure has remained unchanged at 37,000.

*

CHRONICLE

Last April the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews released data on births, synagogue marriages, and deaths.

In 1969 there were 3,806 synagogue marriages—an increase of five per cent over the previous year when the number was 3,646. The number of births also rose in 1969: 4,818 compared with 4,433 in 1968.

There were 4,851 deaths in 1969 against 4,943 in 1968. Thus in 1969 the number of deaths came very close to the number of births. In previous years 'deaths exceeded births by an average of some 400 a year. For the general population, on the other hand, births exceeded deaths in 1969 by as much as 40 per cent; so that though the Jewish population appears closer to balance than previously—it is far from the fertility of the general population.'

*

The April 1971 Official Bulletin of the Central African Jewish Board of Deputies, Bulawayo, states that according to the 1969 Census of Rhodesia, a total of 5,194 persons described themselves as 'Hebrew'. In 1956, the number of Jews was 5,718 and in 1961 it was 7,060.

The Bulletin points out that of the total 1969 European population of 228,296 there were 13,701 (six per cent) who failed to indicate their religious affiliation or who declared that they had none.

*

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

MORRIS GINSBERG MEMORIAL ADDRESSES

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