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MORRIS GINSBERG ז״ל

While this issue was in press, Professor Morris Ginsberg died (31 August).

This is, therefore, the last issue of the *Journal* presided over by its founding Editor. Memorial notices will appear in Vol. XIII, no. 1 (June 1971).

Meanwhile, we briefly record our debt to the great and humane scholar now gone and the gravity of the personal loss suffered by his friends, colleagues, and students.

EDITORIAL

In vol. XI, no. 2 (December 1969) and vol. XII, no. 1 (June 1970) of the *Journal* there appeared five papers arising from the Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies held in Jerusalem in August 1969.

In this issue we publish two more papers from the same Congress, by S. Aschheim and E. Stock.

ADOPTION IN ISRAEL

Eliezer D. Jaffe

V ERY little factual information about adoption in Israel is available, and it is hard to study its trends over the years because of the unstandardized methods of data collection which have been in use until now. In a developing country such as Israel, few social workers have had the time or the knowledge required to undertake empirical studies of adoption. Only recently, with the development of university degree programmes in social welfare, have the practices and ideologies behind child welfare work come under closer observation and testing.

That little is known generally about adoption in Israel is surprising, since the subject is one of more than average interest and has implications that are far-reaching, ranging from inter-ethnic relationships to population increase, both crucial matters for the country. Unfortunately, accessibility to adoption records is so restricted by law that researchers have either been unable to undertake studies of this subject or have had to rely on secondary analysis of the limited statistical data made available to them by the Ministry of Social Welfare.[1]

The Adoption Law and its administration

By way of introduction to the data on adoption in Israel it is important to note that there are no private agencies providing adoption services. Nearly all adoptions are carried out by the social welfare departments of the three large municipalities (Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tel Aviv) and by the Adoption Service of the Ministry of Social Welfare through its district offices. There is as yet no overall co-ordinating unit, and although the Ministry of Welfare strives to keep standards high, practices vary from municipality to municipality.

In Israel the District Court and, when the natural parents, adoptive parents, and the child or his welfare officer agree, the Religious Courts are also competent to make an adoption order. Only children under the age of 18 can be adopted, and, where the adoptee is able to understand the matter, his consent to the adoption is required in writing by

the Court. The present 'Adoption of Children Law' was passed by the Knesset on 9 August 1960, and has had few amendments since then.[2]

Adoptions in Israel can be made by married couples only jointly, unless the adopter is a parent of the adoptee or is otherwise related to the child (and is unmarried, but at least 35 years old). Adopters must be at least 18 years older than the adoptee, unless the adopter is the spouse of a parent of the adoptee. The adopter must be of the same religion as the adoptee, which often restricts Christians from adopting Muslim children, and changes in this clause have been recently suggested.[3]

Natural parents, if the identity of both is known, must consent to the adoption, without their knowing who the adopter is. If the child has a guardian, he too must be heard, but his consent is not necessary. Consent of a parent given before the birth of the child or obtained improperly may be invalidated by the Court. The law permits a parent to withdraw consent until the moment that the adoption order is made. However, the Court can make an adoption order without the parent's consent in the case of abandonment, consistent neglect by the parent, where there is no reasonable possibility of ascertaining the parent's opinion, or where the parent's refusal to consent to the adoption is determined by immoral motives or for unlawful purposes.

No adoption order is made until the child has lived in the adopter's home for at least six months before the order. In some cases the Court can place a child for whom an adoption application has been submitted in the adopter's home for up to two years before making its decision. It should be noted that the Israel Adoption Law gives much latitude to the Courts in weighing the interests of the adoptee; it specifies that the Court may disregard, whenever necessary, the limitations relating to the age of the adopter, the kinship clause, difference of ages between adopter and adoptee, the length of the probationary period, and several other clauses.

A Court can rescind an adoption order if evidence not known at the time of the order comes to light. There can be no adoption order, however, without a written report by a welfare officer (i.e. from a local municipality or from the Welfare Ministry). Proceedings are heard *in camera* unless the Court decides otherwise or decides to invite special witnesses. It is illegal for anyone to give information which may lead to the identification of an adopter, an adoptee, or his parent; the penalty is three months' imprisonment. The only people who have access to the Register of Adoptions kept by the Minister of Justice is the Attorney General or his representative, the Registrar of Marriages, and the adoptee himself upon his attaining the age of 18 years. The adoption law allows the child access to his adoption record, primarily because knowledge of paternal descent can be of crucial importance in the selection of a spouse. Laws of marriage and divorce in Israel come under

the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Courts, not the Civil Courts. According to Rabbinical Law, for example, a man of priestly ancestry, a Cohen, cannot marry a divorcee. Undaunted, such couples usually fly to nearby Cyprus and are married in a civil ceremony. For those who observe Rabbinical Law, however, knowledge as to whether one's father was a Cohen, a Levi, or an Israel can be an important factor in choosing a spouse.

One interesting and novel administrative procedure, by which access to the adoption record is given to the adoptee, requires that forty days elapse between the date on which the adoptee formally requests to see his record and the date on which his request is granted. This procedure was thoughtfully built into the Adoption Law by social workers in the Adoption Service to enable the Chief Adoption Officer to read the record in advance, and to decide whether to invite the adoptee for a conference to prepare him for any surprises he might find in his record. (That one was 'found in a suitcase' or 'abandoned by a prostitute' is not an easy thing to learn about one's past, and the Adoption Service provides whatever support it can to soften the impact.) The Service also tries to help the adoptee think through what use he plans to make of the information, and in some cases helps avoid painful confrontation for mothers who placed their illegitimate infant children for adoption eighteen years before and then went on to marry and make new lives for themselves. Thus, the forty-day interim period has many important clinical and humanitarian uses, and is a basic element of adoption work in Israel.

TABLE 1. *Court petitions for adoptions of relatives and non-relatives decided by District Courts in Israel, 1950–1967**

Year	Number of cases
1950	44
1951	120
1952	123
1953	192
1954	167
1955	154
1956	216
1957	215
1958	228
1959	217
1960	162
1961	181
1962	193
1963	208
1964	210
1965	205
1966	216
1967	257
Total	3,308

* Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1950 to 1968.

In general, the number of petitions for adoption heard by the Courts is relatively small, but it grows every year. The data in Table 1 include all cases heard by the District Courts regardless of the outcome of the case.

Information from the Ministry of Social Welfare, however, estimates the number of adoptions approved by the Courts at more than 90 per cent of the cases heard during the year.[4] (Social Welfare Ministry data before 1960, when the Adoption Law was passed, vary considerably from data from the District Courts, but the two sources converge from 1960 on.) The District Court data do not include cases of adoption heard by Rabbinical Courts, but the number of these cases ranges from 2 (1964) to 7 (1960) per year, hardly enough to change the overall picture.[5] Between 1950 and 1967 the number of adoption cases heard by the Courts increased 5·8 times (from 44 to 257) while the number of children from infancy to 19 years old increased only 1·9 times (from 460,021 to 855,953) during the same period.[6] In other words, the number of children available for adoption has increased far beyond the increase in the population 'at risk'.

Several hypotheses have yet to be explored which might explain the increase of youngsters adopted. We might suspect that there has been an increase in the number of illegitimate births as Israeli society becomes more urbanized, family ties become weaker, and custom loses its social control functions. Another and equally plausible factor in the increase in the number of adoptions may be the policy changes and manpower shifts within the Adoption Service of the municipalities and the Ministry of Social Welfare. In earlier years, for example, long-term institutional care was the fate of many youngsters who today would be considered for adoption. The increase in social workers engaged in adoption may reflect not only the increase in children to be adopted but also new definitions as to who can and should be eligible for adoption. My guess is that both factors are involved, but I suspect that the increase in out-of-wedlock births is the more crucial one.

On the average, 88·1 per cent of the children placed for adoption with non-relatives between 1952 and 1967 were born out of wedlock[7] (see Table 2). Data from the United States concerning the adoption of non-relatives also show a positive correlation between illegitimate births and increased adoptions. In the U.S. in 1962 about 80 per cent of all adoptions of non-relatives were of those born out of wedlock.[8]

One final word concerning the administration of the Adoption Law is in order. While the Law places ultimate responsibility for the adoption decree with the District Court judge (or with the Supreme Court if a rejected applicant chooses to appeal), the opinion and recommendation of the social worker, required for the adoption of both relatives and non-relatives, are honoured in almost every case. Social work evaluations for the adoption of relatives are rather perfunctory since the child

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has usually been living with the adopting family for more than two years in about 84 per cent of the cases,[9] making it rather difficult for the welfare worker to propose an alternative plan at such a late date. In the case of non-relatives, however, the social worker's evaluation is the most crucial factor in deciding which would-be adopting parents are to be approved or rejected. This is true in many countries, but in

TABLE 2. *Children placed for adoption with non-relatives through Welfare Offices in Israel and the percentage of those born out of wedlock, 1951–1966[a]*

Year of placement[b]	Number of children placed	Number born out of wedlock	Out of wedlock placements as percentage
1951	64	—[c]	—[c]
1952	53	43	81·1
1953	89	73	82·0
1954	72	64	88·8
1955	70	69	98·6
1956	66	59	89·4
1957	84	76	90·5
1958	74	69	93·2
1959	78	70	89·7
1960	69	57	82·6
1961	69	60	87·0
1962	67	60	90·0
1963	121	101	83·5
1964	119	104	87·4
1965	88	—[c]	—[c]
1966	117	105	89·7
Averages	81·3	79·6	88·1

[a] Unpublished data, Adoption Service, Israel Ministry of Social Welfare, Jerusalem, December 1966.
[b] Since the number of children born out of wedlock was available for 'placements' and not for actual adoptions made, the focus of this analysis is on placements.
[c] Data unavailable.

Israel the need for clarity in the social work criteria for selecting or rejecting applicants is supremely important since a potential adopting parent has absolutely no recourse to private adoption agencies and will rarely risk alienating the public welfare agency by an appeal to the Supreme Court. Although Mass[10] and Brieland[11] found fairly strong consensus among American adoption workers concerning the reliability of criteria for selecting adopting parents, Brieland was nevertheless disturbed by the degree of disagreement that he did find among social workers and by the methodological problems involved in such research.[12] Until 1967 there were rare instances, known to this author, of Israeli couples rejected by an adoption worker in one city being found acceptable, because of supply and demand as well as different selection criteria, by an adoption worker in another city. These kinds of situation are almost impossible now because of increased co-ordination by adoption workers in district and municipal welfare offices, but there is still

a need for spelling out the criteria for selection of applicants and for devising a formal appeals machinery for rejected applicants that is acceptable to both the applicant, the welfare agencies, and the courts. Gross criteria for the selection of adopting parents, such as good physical and mental health and good social performance, are relatively easily determined, but such criteria fall short when deviations from them are subtle and less obvious. In a situation such as Israel's where the demand for adoptive children outruns the supply, less attention is given to refining the criteria. Kadushin[13] and Bradley[14] found that agencies also tend to be less rigid about the criteria for selection of adopting parents when the allocation of hard-to-place children (i.e. older, handicapped, or minority group children) is involved.

The clientele in adoption

The data presented below give a brief description of the three groups of individuals involved in the adoption process: the natural mother (and father), the child, and the adopting parents. As we noted above, the data are sparse and incomplete, but they are the best available at the present time.[15] We might point out that no detailed base-line study to determine the parameters of adoption clientele and services has yet been undertaken. The one important study to date on the subject of adoptions in Israel is that by Englard, which will be referred to later on in this article.[16]

The natural mothers of adopted children

In 1966, 30·6 per cent of the natural mothers of all children placed for adoption were under the age of 19, 50·9 per cent were between 19 and 25 years old, and the remaining 18·5 per cent were over 25 years old. These figures have remained fairly constant over the past few years, although there is a trend showing an increase in the number of mothers under age 25.

In 1966 over 90 per cent of the natural mothers were Jewish; 63·1 per cent of them were of Middle Eastern origin, 28·1 per cent of European–American origin, and 8·8 per cent of other background.

Although Israel is well known for its tourist industry, it is less known that tourists are one source of adoptive children. In 1966, 5·5 per cent of the natural mothers placing children for adoption had been in the country for less than one year; in 1965 this group accounted for 6·5 per cent of the children placed; and for 8·6 per cent in 1964. In most cases these were unmarried pregnant women who came to Israel to avoid the stigma of having an illegitimate child in their home country. (There is also evidence of women coming to Israel for abortions, which, while illegal for non-medical reasons, are nevertheless amply available.[17])

Data for a recent four-year period (1963 to 1966) show that, on the average, 78 per cent of the natural mothers were single women, about

8 per cent were married, nearly 1 per cent were widowed, 10 per cent were divorcees, 1 per cent were separated, and the marital status of the remaining 2 per cent was unknown.

The educational background of the natural mothers has been changing steadily over the years. In 1963, 18·3 per cent had no elementary school education; the percentage was 9·9 in 1966. However, the general educational level of this group has remained consistently low; only 20·8 per cent had achieved a high school education in 1966, and 18·2 per cent of these studied in secondary trade schools. In 1963 only 11·4 per cent had obtained a high school education.

There is little information on the number of mothers who had previously placed children for adoption, but 13 cases of mothers in this category were noted in 1966.

The adopted child

An accurate presentation of data concerning the characteristics of children adopted in Israel requires us to distinguish between two categories of placement: adoptions by non-relatives and by relatives. Approximately 59 per cent of all adoptions in 1966 were by non-relatives; in 1965 and 1964 the respective percentages were 67·6 and 54·3.

The population characteristics of children adopted by non-relatives seem to be uniform and consistent over the past few years. The great majority were the offspring of Middle Eastern parents (68 per cent in 1964 as against 27 per cent of European–American and 3·3 per cent of Muslim origin). Most of them were born out of wedlock (89·7 per cent in 1966 and 84·3 per cent in 1964). Placement was usually made while the children were in infancy; 53·8 per cent of the children in 1966 were less than one year old when placed, 29·1 per cent were one to two years old, 10·3 per cent were three to five years old, and only 6·8 per cent were over five years of age. As noted earlier, these data may reflect agency policy trends concerning the 'adoptability' of infants and the 'unadoptability' of older children. Kadushin's research,[18] showing an 80 to 82 per cent success-rate for neglected and abused children adopted when five years of age or older, may have significant implications for Israel, where these children are usually found in long-term institutional care.

The most accurate data available concerning children placed for adoption with relatives were collected by Englard who, in a study of 1964 adoptions, abstracted selected information from a random sample of 82 case records representing 33·9 per cent of the total number of cases for which a decree (negative or positive) had been made that year by the Courts. Englard's data included cases from two district offices of the Ministry of Social Welfare and from the Tel Aviv municipal social welfare department. Among the 82 cases studied by Englard were

33 records of adoptions by relatives (that is, 26 per cent of the 129 cases of adoption of relatives heard by the Courts in 1964).[19]

England found three main categories of children adopted by relatives. The first was by a spouse of the child's parent (66·9 per cent). This category included children born out of wedlock whose natural father later married the mother and adopted the child formally (0·03 per cent), children whose widowed parent remarried and were adopted by the step-parent (2·1 per cent), and children whose divorced parent later remarried and were adopted by the step-parent (3·3 per cent). The second category was children adopted by relatives in order not to break up a family (15·2 per cent). This category includes children orphaned of one or both parents, and children born out of wedlock where the child was adopted by a grandparent or other relatives so that the mother might begin anew and find a husband.[20] The final category was children adopted by childless relatives (12·1 per cent). These cases were found predominantly in families of Middle Eastern origin where a prolific parent 'gave' one of his children to a childless brother or sister.[21]

In contrast to the children adopted by non-relatives, relative-adopted children were primarily older children (83·1 per cent over six years of age and 53·5 per cent over the age of ten).[22] It is the general impression of Israeli adoption workers that the majority of these children are of Middle Eastern ethnic origin. However, no data are available on this variable, even in the England study.

The adopting parents

Of the 331 persons who applied to welfare offices to adopt non-related children in 1966, 4·5 per cent were rejected, 52·9 per cent were accepted, 37·2 per cent were still awaiting a decision at the end of the year, and 15·3 per cent voluntarily withdrew their application. The period of waiting, from the time of notification of acceptance of the application for adoptive parenthood to the receipt of a child, was usually under one year (81 per cent of all cases in 1964).

The majority of non-related adopting parents seem to come consistently from a European–American background (67·5 per cent in 1966, 66·9 per cent in 1964), or from a mixed background. Most of the families accepted for adoptive parenthood had no children of their own (85·5 per cent in 1966), some had one child (6·0 per cent), and several had previously adopted a child (8·5 per cent); there were no single or widowed adopting parents. There has been some debate recently as to whether the Adoption Law should be changed to enable mature unmarried women to adopt children in certain circumstances. For example, it is argued that hard-to-place older children in need of great individual care may be much better off in such an adoptive home than they would be in an institution. Many social workers, however, are nervous of this plan, fearing an inevitable emotional trauma for the

child resulting from the absence of a father-figure in the adoptive home. At present the Law allows only married couples to adopt (except in the case of a single person who is a relative of the child).

In Israel, kibbutz parents accounted for 12·0 per cent of the applicants accepted in 1966, 13·2 per cent in 1964, and 14·9 per cent in 1963. This is a significant indicator of policy when one considers that in 1966 only 3·5 per cent of the total Israeli population lived in kibbutzim. The great majority of adopting parents, however, usually come from urban areas (80·3 per cent in 1966, 71·9 per cent in 1964, and 80·2 per cent in 1963). Very few foreign applicants are accepted; none was approved in 1966, and only one was accepted in each of 1964 and 1963. Adoption by foreign citizens is illegal in Israel, but occasionally a non-Israeli will obtain guardianship of a child in Israel, thus acquiring the right to take the child abroad. Once abroad the guardian may initiate adoption procedures in a foreign court. Any parent can grant guardianship status to whomever he desires, the number of these 'private 'adoptions being unknown. The Ministry of Social Welfare, however, awards guardianship of its wards to non-Israelis only in very rare cases.

The majority of successful applicants for the adoption of non-relatives are usually economically well off. England's study of a sample of 1964 adoptive parents rated 65 per cent of the parents as having a 'very good' or 'good' economic situation. On the other hand, England found significantly opposite findings for parents who adopted relatives; only 18 per cent of these were rated as being in a 'very good' or 'good' economic situation.[23] This finding is closely related to the fact that parents adopting non-relatives are usually academics, professionals (23·9 per cent in 1966), clerks (23·1 per cent), or self-employed workers, while couples who adopted the children of relatives usually come from the same low economic stratum as that of the child's parent.

Conclusion

Adoption in Israel is a function of public welfare agencies acting with the almost complete approval of the Courts. Adoptions of relatives occur mainly when one divorced parent remarries and a child of the earlier union is adopted by the new spouse. Adoption workers have relatively little role in the adoption of relatives although they do make a recommendation to the Court as required by the Adoption Law.

The adoptions of non-relatives, ranging from 59 to 68 per cent of all adoptions in Israel, consist primarily of Middle Eastern illegitimate children adopted by childless European–American parents of middle-class backgrounds. Israel is not the only country with the supply-and-demand adoption situation referred to above, but it seems to be less bound by colour and ethnic prejudices in the matching of children and parents from different ethnic backgrounds. Some critics of present adoption practices raise the moral issues involved when one segment of

the population provide children for another segment. Others praise these practices as the highest form of implementing Israeli social values of the 'blending of the exiles' and of the satisfaction of common human needs.

As in other areas of welfare work, we have relatively little empirically tested knowledge about how adoption, inter-ethnic or otherwise, works. No research has been done in Israel concerning who should be selected or rejected as an adopted child or as an adopting parent; about what the agency's role after adoption should be, if any; about when and how one tells the child he is adopted;[24] or about whether there is any difference in the success of kibbutz and urban, relative and non-relative, inter-ethnic and single-ethnic group adoptions, and why. McWhinnie,[25] Witmer,[26] Kirk,[27] and others have provided some excellent clues concerning some of these crucial issues in adoption policy and practice. There is a growing feeling in Israel that adoption and child welfare practices in general must be based somewhat less on traditional knowledge and more on facts and empirical evidence taken not only from the experience of social welfare, but also from the disciplines of law, psychology, and sociology.

NOTES

[1] I record my gratitude to Mrs. Aviva Leon, recently appointed Director of the Adoption Service of the Ministry of Social Welfare, for access to the data presented in this article.

[2] Adoption of Children Law, *Sefer Hahukim*, No. 317, August 1960 (Hebrew). An incisive survey of adoption law in Palestine and Israel before 1960 can be found in A. Livneh, 'Adoption of Children in Israel', *Megamot*, April 1955, pp. 139–147 (Hebrew).

[3] Izhak England, *Adoption of Children in Israel: The Implementation of the Law*, Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1969, pp. 1–36 (Hebrew).

[4] Oral reports from workers of the Adoption Service, Israel Ministry of Social Welfare, May 1969.

[5] Ibid. Unpublished data from the Adoption Service, 13 September 1966.

[6] Data compiled by this author from the tables on 'Population by Population Group, Sex, and Age' appearing annually in the *Statistical Abstract of Israel* for the years 1950 to 1968. The *Abstract* is published annually by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem.

[7] Israel Ministry of Social Welfare, op. cit.

[8] U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *Adoptions in the U.S.: Facts about Children*, Washington, D.C., 1963.

[9] England, op. cit., p. 24.

[10] Donald Brieland, *An Experimental Study of the Selection of Adoptive Parents at Intake*, Child Welfare League of America, New York, 1959.

[11] Henry Maas, 'The Successful Adoptive Parent Applicant', *Social Work*, vol. 5 (January 1960), pp. 14–20.

[12] Donald Brieland, 'The Selection of Adoptive Parents at Intake', *Casework Papers, 1960*, New York, 1961.

[13] Alfred Kadushin, 'A Study of Adoptive Parents of Hard-to-Place Children', *Social Casework*, May 1962, pp. 227–33.

[14] Trudy Bradley, 'An Exploration of Caseworkers' Perceptions of Adoptive Applicants', *Child Welfare*, October 1966, pp. 433–43.

[15] The data presented in this paper, unless otherwise noted, have been abstracted from, or are my own analyses of, statistics provided by the Adoption Service of the Israel Ministry of Social Welfare.

[16] See Englard, op. cit., Table No. 2A, p. 9, for 1964 data.

[17] Roberto Bachi et al., *Fertility and Contraception among the Women of Tel Aviv–Yaffo*, Mifal Hashichpul, Jerusalem, 1960, pp. 3–4, 9–10 (Hebrew).

[18] Alfred Kadushin, 'Reversibility of Trauma: A Follow-Up of Children Adopted when Older', *Social Work*, vol. 12 (October 1967), pp. 22–33.

[19] Englard, op. cit., pp. 2–4, 20–5.

[20] Ibid., p. 23.

[21] Ibid., p. 23.

[22] Ibid., pp. 23–4.

[23] Ibid., p. 27.

[24] For an excellent clinical discussion of the subject of telling a child about his adoptive status see Esther Appelberg, 'How and When to Tell a Child that he is an Adopted Child', *Megamot*, April 1955, pp. 148–52 (Hebrew).

[25] Alexina M. McWhinnie, *Adopted Children: How they Grow Up*, London, 1967.

[26] Helen Witmer et al., *Independent Adoptions*, New York, 1963.

[27] H. David Kirk, *Shared Fate*, New York, 1964.

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RACE

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NATIONAL EDUCATION FOR ARAB YOUTH IN ISRAEL: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CURRICULA*

Yochanan Peres, Avishai Ehrlich, and Nira Yuval-Davis

Introduction

ALL state education systems wishing to instil national values face the following two dangers.

a. *The danger of an exaggerated nationalism*
The less serious manifestation of this problem is an uncritical glorification of both the nation's history and its present attainments, and, at the same time, a neglect of the rights and achievements of other nations. In its most extreme form, this educational approach will reach the point of spreading hatred and disrespect for other peoples, even to the extent of assenting to their expulsion or destruction.

b. *The danger of 'disengagement'*
This danger involves a weakening of the authentic elements in the national culture as well as a loosening of the emotional link between the pupil, his people, and his country.

This dilemma faces the educator particularly in new states which lack a tradition of self-government. In a country where a majority living side by side with a minority determines the social and political set-up, this problem assumes an added dimension. The educational planner must bear in mind his responsibility for the peace and progress of the state as a whole, for the relations between the various ethnic groups, and for the legitimate needs of each individual group.

The education given to the members of the minority group should equip them with the tools to live and prosper in a society whose cultural pattern is determined largely by the majority, as well as with the means to develop their own distinctive identity. The conflicts and tensions existing between these aims make it difficult to conceive of an educational system in which they could be fully reconciled. Nevertheless, it seems to us that these aims form the criterion by which national education should be evaluated.

In this paper we shall deal not with the actual process of instilling national values, but rather with the objectives of the educational authority as expressed in the curriculum.[1]

There can be few cases where an educational authority is faced with a problem as complicated as that of planning a curriculum for the Arab minority in Israel. In this particular case it is necessary to bridge over not only cultural differences but also deep-rooted antagonisms.

To achieve a critical evaluation of the curriculum, we have used a comparative method. In the first instance we compare the curriculum designed for the Arab minority[2] with that drawn up by the same authority for the Jewish majority,[3] and then proceed to compare it with a curriculum drawn up by an Arab government (Jordan) for Arab pupils.[4]

From an analytical point of view, we have a triangle in which a common quality links every two apices:

1. two Israeli curricula;
2. two curricula designed for Arab youth;
3. two curricula designed for the children of the dominant (majority) group.

The comparison between the two Israeli curricula drawn up by the same Ministry (and consequently embodying common concepts) is simpler and more valid than the other two comparisons. We have, therefore, devoted most of our space to it. The Jordanian curriculum served as an additional yardstick enabling us to distinguish between dissimilarities which derive from the different objectives of the planners for the children of the majority and the minority groups, and those which stem from differences between Jewish and Arab culture.

The curriculum planners in Israel were aware at the outset of the difficult situation confronting them in Arab education, as can be seen in the question posed by one of them, Mr. Y. L. Benor: 'How can we encourage loyalty to Israel among Israeli Arabs without demanding a negation of Arab yearnings on the one hand, and without permitting the development of hostile Arab nationalism on the other?'[5] This statement provides a valid criterion for evaluating the curriculum: to what extent does it help the young Israeli of Arab origin to see his path clearly and mould his own identity in a way which maintains a reason-

able balance between his Arab nationalism and his loyalty to the state in which he lives? After suggesting criteria for evaluation (based, as stated, on the attitude of one of the planners), we shall set out the facts. Our own evaluation will be carefully separated from the facts; thus the reader will be able to form his own impressions independently of our interpretation.

Method

Comparative education has developed extensively in recent years and has almost become a discipline in its own right.[6] One of the main impulses behind this development is the scientific-technological competition between the Great Powers, where training of scientific manpower plays an important part. It is for this reason that researchers in this area have concentrated mainly on comparing educational methods and achievements in the natural sciences. Comparison of the teaching of the humanities, however, has been relatively neglected. An additional reason for the scant attention paid to the humanities is the difficulty of comparative analysis in this field. Whereas in the natural sciences one compares different means for achieving the same (or very closely related) ends, in the case of humanistic topics, both the means and the ends may differ from one educational system to another.

We decided to compare curricula intended for secondary and not primary schools in spite of the fact that only a minority of Arab students reach secondary school, because the level of secondary education makes it possible to deal with social, historical, and political problems in a more mature and complete way.

In line with our main objective—a comparison of the goals of the educational authorities in the field of instilling values—we have selected four subjects in the teaching of which one has to deal constantly with problems of social values: history, literature, religion, and civic studies. In each of these subjects we considered the following points:

a. The declared aims of teaching the subject; that is, what contribution it is expected to make to the personality of the students and to the general needs of society.

b. The number of hours devoted to the subject as a whole and to its sub-topics (e.g. the number of hours spent on modern literature and ancient literature in Jewish and Arab schools).

c. In certain instances, the *content* which the planners would like the students to acquire. On this point we met with considerable difficulties: first, the curricula are not always sufficiently detailed, and second, in order to undertake an adequate analysis of the material studied in the various subjects one would need a wide professional knowledge.

History

Aims

The aims of the Jewish and Arab curricula in Israel are formulated along similar lines. It is probable that the planners of the Arab curriculum had the Jewish curriculum before them and worked from the same pattern, making any adjustments they found necessary.

We quote the paragraphs from the two curricula in the following order: first, the paragraph in the Jewish curriculum, followed by the equivalent paragraph in the Arab curriculum (the italics are ours). All quotations from curricula are based on the sources given in notes 2, 3, and 4.

1. *For Jewish pupils:*

To teach pupils to regard the culture of mankind as the result of the combined efforts of the *Jewish people and the nations of the world* throughout the generations; to evaluate correctly our share and that of other nations in creating this culture; to strengthen the recognition of human co-operation and to develop the will for common action for peace and goodwill among nations (3, p. 35).

For Arab pupils:

To teach the pupils to regard the culture of mankind as the result of the combined efforts of the *nations of the world* throughout the generations; to evaluate correctly the part played by the *Jewish and Arab nations and by other nations* in creating this culture; to strengthen the recognition of human co-operation, and to develop the will for common action for peace and goodwill among nations (2, p. 102).

2. *For Jewish pupils:*

To implant a Jewish national consciousness in the pupils; to strengthen their feeling of a common Jewish destiny; to sow in their hearts a love of the Jewish people both in their own country and throughout the world, and to strengthen their spiritual links with the nation as a whole.

For Arab pupils: no parallel paragraph.

3. *For Jewish pupils:*

To instil a recognition in the pupil of the importance of the State of Israel as the means of ensuring the biological and historical existence of the Jewish people; to develop his sense of personal responsibility for the consolidation and development of the State; to implant the desire and readiness to serve the State in all ways.

For Arab pupils:

To instil a recognition in the pupil of the importance of the State of Israel for the *Jewish* people throughout the ages; to implant a feeling of the

common fate of the two peoples, Jewish and Arab, in the past and the present, in order to develop his sense of personal responsibility for the consolidation and development of the State; to implant the desire and the readiness to serve the State in all ways.

4. *For Jewish pupils:*

To mould the character of pupils after the deeds of the *great men of our people* and of the peoples of the world.

For Arab pupils:

To mould the character of pupils after the deeds of the great men of the world, and *in particular the Jews and the Arabs.*

5. *For Jewish pupils:*

To train and accustom him to deliberate and come to conclusions in general terms when dealing with the problems of society, and to try to solve them through independent critical thought.

For Arab pupils: the paragraph is identical.

Evaluation of the differences

1. The Arab curriculum lays special stress on the contribution of both peoples, Jewish and Arab, to the development of world culture, whereas the Jewish curriculum emphasizes only the part played by the Jewish people, the contribution of the Arabs being included among that of 'the nations of the world'.

2. The paragraph on the inculcation of Jewish national consciousness has no parallel in the Arab curriculum.

3. The aim of the third paragraph is the instilling of Israeli patriotism. In the case of both ethnic groups the planner seeks to base the sentiment of patriotism on an understanding of the importance of the State for the existence of *the Jewish people.* This is a logical argument as far as the Jewish pupil is concerned, but what about the Arab pupil? Here the planner relies on the 'sense of the common fate of the two peoples, Arab and Jewish, in the past and present'. The Arab pupil is thus expected to serve the State not because the latter is important to *him* and fulfils *his* needs, but because it is important to the Jewish people with whom the Arab nation is 'linked by a common destiny'. Even those who can accept the rather debatable claim that both nations possess a 'common destiny in the past and present' should be astonished at the kind of logic through which it is hoped to educate Arab children towards Israeli patriotism.

4. Here too there is a marked discrepancy. Whereas the Arabs are required to take an example from the great men of Israel, the great figures of the Arab world are not deemed worthy of special attention in the Jewish curriculum, but are lumped together with the world's great men.

A comparison of the number of hours devoted to Jewish and Arab history in Israel's Jewish and Arab secondary schools[7]

Although 'a definition of aims' guides the teacher qualitatively and expresses the planner's value, the time allotted to the various topics indicates their relative importance to the planner. It is an instruction to the teacher of what to emphasize and what to pass over rapidly. Let us compare, therefore, the time allotted in the curriculum to Jewish, Arab, and world history, in both types of school.

TABLE I. *Hours devoted to studying Jewish, Arab, and world history in Jewish and Arab secondary schools in Israel as a percentage of total hours spent on history*

	Faculty of Humanities		Faculty of Science	
	Arab Sec. School %	Jewish Sec. School %	Arab Sec. School %	Jewish Sec. School %
Jewish history	20·2	38·8	20·6	40·9
Arab history	19·1	1·4	19·5	2·1
World history	60·7	59·8	59·9	57·0
Total hours of history in each faculty	416	416	384	384

Evaluation of differences

The conclusion derived from an analysis of this table is consistent with the goals which were set for history teaching: in Arab secondary education there is a marked emphasis on Jewish history.

A more detailed study of this general conclusion can be made by comparing the number of hours allotted in the two curricula to a study of the pupils' own ethnic group (i.e. Jews about Jews and Arabs about Arabs), and to the study of the other group's history (i.e. Jews about Arabs and Arabs about Jews).

1. *Study of their own group*

Nearly 40 per cent of the total time spent on history in the Jewish secondary school is devoted to Jewish history. In the Arab secondary school, on the other hand, of the total time spent on history only about 20 per cent is devoted to Arab history.

2. *Studying the other group*

According to the curriculum, the Arab schools devote some 20 per cent of their history time to the teaching of Jewish history,[8] while the Jewish schools spend less than 2 per cent of their total history time on Arab history.

If we bring the Jordanian curriculum into this comparison, we find

that they place even greater emphasis on studying their own people: about 50 per cent of their history lessons are devoted to Arab and Jordanian history. In the Jordanian school, the study of Jewish history is limited to one period only, that of Zionism, and is in a sharply hostile vein.

To sum up, the similarity between the Israeli–Jewish and the Jordanian curricula lies in the strong emphasis laid on national history and the glorification of national tradition. There is, however, a difference: the Jordanian curriculum is extremely nationalistic in tone and shows strong antagonism towards Judaism. The Jewish curriculum, on the other hand, tends to ignore the Arabs and their history.

Literature and language

It is difficult to compare the literature and language teaching programmes of two peoples because of the differences in the content and in the relative importance of the different periods and key motifs in the respective cultures. In other words, it is sometimes unclear whether certain differences between curricula stem from the material to be taught or from the educational goals of the planners.

Aims

In the literature and language teaching programmes, unlike the history programme, there is not even a faint resemblance between the manifest aims. The following is the original formulation:

The Jewish curriculum

a. To impart to the pupil a love of the ideals, outlook, and experience of the nation at its various periods of development, and an awareness of the unbroken historical link between the nation, its country, and its culture. Special attention should be paid to the struggles and achievements of our own as well as of recent generations in the spheres of national revival and cultural and social renewal (3, p. 25).

b. To develop good literary taste and an appreciation of great master-pieces.

c. To expose the pupils to the cultural treasures of mankind as an expression of universal human values, and also, as far as possible, to works which express the creative genius of different nations.

d. To bring the pupils into direct contact with the controversial problems and trends of thought of the world at various periods of its history, and with the Jewish people's way of life throughout history.

e. To develop the pupil's ability to express himself correctly, clearly, logically, and accurately, both orally and in writing.

f. To help him acquire an organic understanding of the rules and forms of language and its growth, and the ability to distinguish various literary styles.

g. To equip the pupil with a fund of those idiomatic expressions which

mirror the uniqueness of our outlook, of our relationship with the world and with ourselves, and which create a common form of expression among individuals and generations.

The Arab curriculum

a. Correct reading and an understanding of the written and spoken language (2, p. 1).
b. The clear, precise, and logical expression of ideas and feelings, orally and in writing.
c. The ability to understand and appreciate good literature.
d. To open for the pupil a gateway to a knowledge of literary culture, past and present.

Comparison

1. In contrast to the detailed aims of the Jewish curriculum, those of the Arab curriculum are meagre and insignificant.

2. In contrast to the national emphasis of the Jewish curriculum both in literature and language (paragraphs a and g), the Arab curriculum lacks such purpose and even a mention of the Arab nation.

3. Moreover, even in the teaching aims for *world* literature in the Jewish curriculum, the national trend is linked up with a recognition of the main problems and trends of thought in world literature (paragraph d). In the Arab curriculum, the author contents himself with the casual remark: 'to understand and appreciate good literature' (paragraph c).

This comparison may be supplemented by citing the aims of teaching Hebrew language and literature in Arab schools:

a. To give the Arab pupil a basic, comprehensive knowledge of the Hebrew language, an understanding of all reading material, a functional command of the language, both written and oral, for practical and cultural needs (2, p. 17).
b. To open the way for the Arab pupil to become acquainted with Jewish culture and its values, past and present; to facilitate his understanding of the cultural and social life of the Jewish population in Israel.

Against the background of these aims ('open the way to Jewish culture'), the tendency to ignore Arab national values in the teaching programme of Arabic literature and language is even more apparent.

Our comparison of teaching aims would certainly be incomplete were it not to include the goals set for the teaching of Arabic literature and language in the Jordanian secondary schools:

1. To develop pride in belonging to the Arab peoples, and in Arab heroes, past and present (4, p. 29).
2. To crystallize the concept of a greater Arab homeland, and inculcate this idea in the consciousness of the pupils by studying the best of Arab literary tradition.

3. To educate the pupils towards the lofty characteristics and ideals of the Arabs, for example, aiding one's fellow man, heroism, courage, strong opposition to oppression and cruelty, hospitality, kindness, tolerance, etc.

4. To widen the pupil's views on life and increase preparedness for it.

These goals show a much more nationalistic approach towards literature than do those of the Jewish school. No attention whatever is paid to universal human values, and even when they are mentioned (paragraph 3) they masquerade as purely Arab values.

To sum up, if we were to place the aims of the various curricula on a nationalist–neutral continuum, the order would be: Jordanian, Israeli–Jewish, Israeli–Arab.

A comparison of the hours devoted to the study of literature and language in Jewish and Arab secondary schools in Israel[9]

We shall compare the number of hours devoted to Hebrew literature and language in the Jewish and Arab secondary schools with the time allotted to Arabic literature and language in the Arab secondary schools.

The Jewish school curriculum is composed of two main sections: 1. Literature and 2. Language. The teaching programme for Arab literature and language in Arab schools, on the other hand, is divided into the following four sections: 1. Grammar and rhetoric; 2. Literary history; 3. Poetry; and 4. Composition.

In order to match these two curricula and make comparison possible, we have bracketed together sections 1 and 4 under the heading *language*, and sections 2 and 3 under the heading *literature*.

The curriculum for Hebrew literature and language in Arab schools is also divided into four sections: 1. Bible, Mishna, and Aggada; 2. Belles-lettres; 3. Theory of language; 4. Composition. In this case sections 3 and 4 were defined as *language*, and section 2 as *literature*.

For a number of reasons, the hours devoted to the study of religious texts—256 hours of Bible and other religious writings, 120 hours of Koran—in the Arab schools, have been omitted here and will be dealt with in the following section.

Evaluating the differences

From Table 2 we learn that the total number of study hours devoted to Arabic literature and language in Arab schools is greater than the parallel total for Hebrew language and literature in Jewish schools. In other words, the emphasis in the Arab secondary school is more on literature and language than in the Jewish secondary school. This trend is especially noticeable in the programme of the Science Faculty of the Arab secondary school, where the hours spent on literature and language (both Hebrew and Arabic) are not fewer than in the Faculty of Humanities. The emphasis on teaching Hebrew literature to Arab students is

so great that the number of hours spent on this subject in the Science Faculty of Arab schools approaches the time devoted to it in the Science Faculty of the Jewish secondary school.

The study of literature in the Israeli–Arab secondary school is

TABLE 2. *Number of hours spent on literature and language in Jewish and Arab secondary schools in Israel, according to faculties*

	Faculty of Humanities			Faculty of Science		
	Jewish school Hebrew	Arab school Hebrew	Arabic	Jewish school Hebrew	Arab school Hebrew	Arabic
Literature	512	340	420	352	340	420
Language	256	172	404	256	172	404
Total	768	512	824	608	512	824

divided into three sub-topics: history of literature, poetry, and world literature. Although we are not in a position to make a content comparison between the Jewish and Arab curricula, we shall try to set out a number of characteristic features of the Arab curriculum.

History of literature

Within the framework of this topic, the following is taught: the development of the traditional forms of Arabic literature (the description, the story, the letter, the speech, etc.), the history of literary criticism, the historical background of Arab literary classics, and the biographies of their authors. This is the traditional method of teaching literature and is still used in some Arab countries. The question arises here: is it desirable that in Israel, too, literature should continue to be studied in this way?

The section of goals and principles in the 1964 literature curriculum for Jewish secondary schools states:

> Neither historical continuity nor literary history has been the main criterion of those who prepared this curriculum; but rather it is the literary value and the worth of its ideas which lead to a work's inclusion. The teacher in his classroom, therefore, should have the literary work alone for elucidation and development through study. Literary works, their uniqueness and identity, are what must be studied and they should occupy the centre of the lesson.
>
> While there are many aspects to every good literary composition, e.g. historical, sociological, psychological, linguistic, etc., one should be wary of overstressing any one of them without relation to the artistic values of the composition . . . In conclusion, in teaching literature, everything originates from the work itself, and everything returns to it. Any substitute, however good, for the literary composition, is essentially invalid (3, p. 5).

It is amazing that these clear statements apparently had no influence at all on the Arab programme planners, who have tried, on the whole, to make their programme compatible with the Jewish one.

In comparing the study of Arabic language and literature in Jordan and Israel, we observe that the structure of lessons in Jordan resembles that of the Israeli–Arab programme (poetry, history of literature, grammar, literary style, composition), but the Jordanians have added selected literary texts, so that the pupil is somewhat exposed to literature itself, rather than only to theories about literature. The Jordanian curriculum seems to be in a stage of transition between the traditional and the more modern approaches to the study of literature. The Israeli–Arab programme, on the other hand, retains the traditional pattern.

Classical and modern poetry

The Israeli–Arab curriculum makes an overall division of Arabic literature into four periods:

1. Early Arabic literature (Gahilia and Islamic)
2. Abbasid literature
3. The period of the decline (1258–1798)
4. Modern literature:
   (a) the Revival (1798–1908)
   (b) Modern (1900 onward).

Modern literature is studied only in the ninth and tenth grades; in grades eleven and twelve only classical prose and poetry are studied. Most of the modern works studied are written in the classical style and rhythm, which are atypical of most contemporary literature.

The selection of the modern poems excludes all poems with any kind of patriotic or nationalistic overtones, although many of the authors studied have written poems on political and national themes. Nor is there a single work by an Israeli–Arab poet or by Palestinian poets, despite the fact that several of them have received considerable public notice (for example, Ibrahim Tukan, Haroun Hashem, Rashid Hussein), and their poetry also includes moderate or politically neutral poems and stories.[10]

In the Jordanian curriculum, on the other hand, there is a greater emphasis on modern poetry and nationalistic motifs.

World literature

We have so far dealt with the teaching of Hebrew and Arabic literature. Let us now consider the place of world literature in the curriculum. The Jewish curriculum recommends 80 hours of world literature for the Humanities Faculty, the teacher selecting works from among the following authors: Racine, Molière, Goethe, Schiller, Balzac, Flaubert, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Dostoevsky, Mérimée, de Maupassant, Babel, Kafka, Camus, and Hemingway.

In the language and literature programme for Israeli–Arab schools

not one of the above authors is recommended. The world literature suggested includes: fables of ancient Egypt, China, India, Persia, and Greece. The teacher is advised also to select excerpts from modern Western literary culture. Oddly enough, a small number of Western masterpieces (*Don Quixote*, Edgar Allen Poe's *The Raven*, Goethe's *Erlkönig*, Shakespeare's sonnets, and Greek tragedies) are studied within the framework of *Hebrew* literature, a fact for which we found no logical explanation.

However, the general trend remains unchanged: while the programme of world literature studied in the Jewish school has a strong leaning towards European culture (especially western European, one of the sources from which every modern culture springs), the main emphasis in the Arab curriculum is on ancient Oriental culture.

The question arises, has not an important educational opportunity been lost here? Opening the doorway to Western culture seems to us to be one of the solid contributions which a Jewish–Israeli inspired education could make to the Arab student. The student would not be asked to accept the culture of his opponent but would widen his horizons and acquire values and modes of thought which could be a spiritual basis common to him and to his Jewish fellow-citizens.

Religious studies

Only in the Jordanian curriculum do religious studies appear as a separate subject. In both the Israeli curricula they are scattered among various other subjects. Since both the Jewish and the Muslim religions have been essential factors in shaping the national identities of Jews and Arabs respectively, it seems useful to discuss their place in the curricula. Studies of a religious nature appear in the Jewish curriculum under the headings *Bible* and *The Oral Tradition* (Mishna, Aggada, Gemara). In defining the study goals for these subjects, the planner emphasizes their importance in the development of a national consciousness and as a basis for national unity, along with the ethical and linguistic values inherent in man.[11]

There is no such guidance, however, given for the study of the Koran, which is studied as a part of Arabic literature and defined as a 'supreme example of literary Arabic' essential for learning and understanding Arabic literature. In the Israeli–Arab curriculum the Koran is included in the 'history of literature', and the Bible comes under 'Hebrew literature'. In the Jordanian curriculum the study of the Koran is included in the study of religion.

In trying to make a quantitative comparison of religious studies recommended in the various curricula, we are faced, as mentioned above, with certain difficulties: in some subjects, the number of hours to be taught is mentioned; in others, what is specified is the number of chapters to be studied. For the sake of comparison, we have estimated

all quantitative directions in terms of the total number of hours devoted to the subject.

TABLE 3. *A comparison of religious studies in Israeli–Jewish, Israeli–Arab, and Jordanian schools*

Type of School	Total no. of hours devoted to:	
	Bible (and other Jewish religious texts)	Koran (and other Muslim religious texts)
Israeli–Jewish	640	None
Israeli–Arab	256	120
Jordanian	None	360*

* The estimate of 360 hours is based on the Jordanian curriculum provision that the Koran and other Muslim religious texts should be taught 3 hours weekly. There are about 30 weeks in a school year; pupils attend for 4 years.

Evaluating the differences

Given the possibility of slight error in our estimates of time allotted, two general conclusions stand out:

A. A fairly wide knowledge of Jewish religious texts is required of Israeli–Arab pupils. On the other hand, there is *no* attempt to give the Jewish pupils any systematic knowledge of texts of religions other than their own.

B. Muslim high school pupils in Israel receive Muslim religious study on a relatively limited scale. They are required to spend twice as much time on Jewish holy scriptures as on their own religious writings. For Christians (who constitute a considerable proportion of Israel's Arab pupils) there are no special religious studies; they are exempt from studying the Koran without any substitute being offered.

Generally, the proper place of religion in education remains an unsolved problem, but whatever one's position may be on this issue, it is difficult to justify the unusual stress placed on religious values for *Jewish* students coupled with the impoverished state of religious studies for *non-Jewish* students.

Civic studies

In contrast with the lessons in citizenship in the Jewish secondary school, no goals are outlined for the citizenship teaching programme in the Arab secondary school. Since the same textbooks[12] are recommended for both schools, we can presumably list the aims of the Jewish curriculum alone:

1. An explanation of the emergence of human society and of its present-day structure (3, p. 73).

2. Developing critical thought while eliminating prejudice.
3. Explaining the principles of democracy, the Israeli system of government, and the rights of the citizen, while encouraging a desire to serve the State.
4. Widening the knowledge of the status of the Jewish people in Israel and in the Diaspora, and of their problems, while encouraging the will to participate in their solution.
5. Explaining Israel's particular situation and projects, while fostering the desire to realize her visions.

Thus far the goals. The time devoted to civic studies in the Jewish secondary school is two hours per week in the last year of studies. The time allotted in the Arab school is one hour a week in the eleventh grade. Since the curriculum does not specify the time to be spent on each topic, we shall compare below the topics studied in civic studies in Jewish and Arab schools.

A comparison of subjects of study

The paragraphs dealing with the definition of a modern state and its structure of government and that of Israel are similar in both teaching programmes. A special chapter in the Arab curriculum is devoted to the achievements of the Druze and Arabs in Israel, the main emphasis here being on attainments in education and standards of living. The programme does not touch at all on any of the problematic aspects of minority status in Israel.

The above are the parallel paragraphs in the two programmes. In addition to these, two long chapters (about half of the total material) in the Jewish curriculum deal with the demography and the sociology of the Jewish people in the Diaspora, as well as the problems of anti-semitism and the absorption of immigrants. Neither of these chapters is included in the Arab curriculum.

An evaluation of the differences

Civic studies present, perhaps, the most direct challenge in educating the children of minority groups. How does the Israeli curriculum meet this challenge?

A. *A 50 per cent cut in the number of hours*. The problematic nature of the subject for Arab children, instead of bringing about an attempt to widen the study, has produced a time cut.

B. *Presentation of an over-optimistic and one-sided picture of the status of the Arab minority in Israel*. The civic studies programme deals little with the special status of Arab citizens in Israel, although this is a central topic occupying the Israeli public. Only the positive and constructive aspects of the life of the Arab minority are mentioned.[13]

The importance of the developments in agriculture, education, health, and social welfare among the non-Jewish minorities in Israel

should not be ignored. However, it is misleading to pretend that minority life in Israel is composed of achievements alone.

Obviously, difficult and even tragic contrasts between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority come to the Arab student's awareness. The question is whether a one-sided presentation like this can counterbalance the influences of home and street, and whether such a presentation is likely to gain the student's trust and guide him to face his problems.

Conclusion

We opened our discussion by mentioning the two dangers which confront any education for national values: exaggerated nationalism on the one hand, and a disengaged individualism on the other. We have shown that Israel's educational planners were aware of the difficulties of maintaining a balance between these two poles. In the light of the material presented here, we can now ask: To what extent did the planners succeed?

Exaggeration

The Israeli–Jewish curriculum does, indeed, avoid spreading hatred, and encouraging aggression, but it is not free of uncritical glorification of Israeli society and culture while failing to recognize fully the contributions of other peoples.[14]

The Jordanian curriculum, which was only briefly examined, is sunk in nationalism to the point where it almost denies to other peoples the right to exist.

Disengagement

In the light of our findings, it appears that the Israeli–Arab school curriculum has not achieved a balance between 'Arab national aspirations' and 'loyalty to the State', as its author hoped it would. Instead, it has fallen victim to a tendency to blur Arab nationality and to educate the Arab student towards self-disparagement *vis-à-vis* the Jewish majority.[15] These tendencies are revealed, in the main, in two ways: (a) the goals of various subjects are formulated with a disregard of the nationalist elements in the Arab pupil's consciousness; (b) a wide and profound knowledge of purely Jewish subjects (for example, Jewish history, Bible) is demanded of the Arab students at the expense of their own culture. This tendency is even more conspicuous against the background of an almost total absence of the Arabic language and culture in the Jewish pupil's education.

The above comments are not meant to assert that the planners of this curriculum *consciously* intended to undermine the national identity of the Arab pupil or to implant in him feelings of inferiority. However, what

is important here is not the *intention* of the planners, but the *result* produced. The questions which arise are: what concrete results are likely to follow this curriculum in the Arab secondary school, and to what extent will these results conform with the original intentions of the planners?

Disregard for Arab national aspirations in the Israeli school does not eliminate these aspirations. The Arab student who does not find answers to his problems within the school may seek and find political leadership elsewhere.

NOTES

[1] The curriculum is only one expression of the educational aims laid down by the government. Other expressions are: the policy of selection and promotion of teachers, headmasters and supervisors; written directives issued from time to time; textbook selection, etc.

[2] *Curriculum for Arab Secondary Schools,* The State of Israel, Ministry of Education, the Department of Education for Arabs, 1968 (Arabic).

[3] *Proposals for Curricula in Secondary Schools,* Ministry of Education and Culture, Department of Secondary Education, Jerusalem, 1957 (Hebrew).

[4] *Curriculum for Secondary Schools,* The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Education, 1963 (Arabic).

[5] I. L. Bener, 'Arab Education in Israel', *The New East,* vol. 3, p. 318, 1951–2 (Hebrew).

[6] See among others: Bereday, G. P., *Comparative Method in Education,* N.Y., 1964.

[7] In counting the hours at the Jewish secondary school we have borne in mind the main faculties (science and humanities) but not the minor faculties (e.g. oriental studies) which include only a small percentage of pupils.

[8] Arab pupils devote more or less the same number of hours to the history of their own people and to the history of the Jewish people.

[9] This section is based on a new edition of the Programme for Literature teaching which was published in 1962. This programme does not include a list of aims, and we have therefore assumed that the aims in the earlier programme are still valid. See: *Proposed Curriculum for Hebrew and World Literature in Secondary Schools,* Ministry of Education and Culture, Department of Secondary Education, Jerusalem, 1962 (Hebrew).

[10] A. Yinon, 'Some Focal Topics in the Literature of Israeli Arabs', *The New East,* vol. 15, 1961 (Hebrew).

[11] This is what we find in the aims of Bible teaching, for example: 'To evoke a consciousness of the unique status of Israel among the nations' (para. 2).

[12] The Citizenship Study Programme gives the following source books (for the teacher): (a) M. Ziv, ed., *The State of Israel and the Diaspora in our time,* Yuval Publications, 1962 (Hebrew); (b) Shulamit Aloni, *The Citizen and his State,* Ma'arachot Publications, 1962 (Hebrew); (c) H. Ormian, *The Development of the Political Idea,* Kiryat Sefer, 1962 (Hebrew).

[13] The reader can find a picture slanted in the opposite direction in S. Jerais's book, *The Arabs in Israel,* in which the author scoffs at achievements in these areas and tries to deny Israel's part in them. See: S. Jerais, *The Arabs in Israel,* El Itihad Publications, 1966, pp. 108–68.

[14] Some pedagogues have already criticized Israeli curricula on these grounds. See, for example, the comprehensive article by Z. Adar on state curricula for elementary schools, *Megamot,* 7, 1956–7, pp. 41–77; and also the comments of H. Adler and L. Adar in the pamphlet *Educating for Values in Schools for Immigrant Children,* School of Education Publications, 1964 (Hebrew).

[15] An amazingly extreme example to the point of 'complete identification' with the Jewish people and Zionism can be found in the following poem, whose author, Sammy Mezijat, was a supervisor in the Ministry of Education in Israel. The poem was published in a Reader (*Sanabil min Kul Il-Adab*) for the top classes of elementary schools. The following is a free translation:

Israel

A light spread in the eastern skies;
Is it a comet guiding the fire-worshippers?

Or Israel, whose light is shining?
Founded on the land of her forefathers,
Reviving the glory of ages past,
Leading a people from exile
To build a land with courage and
patience.

Her right hand calls for Peace
And a sword in her left awaits the
aggressor.
Her deeds outshine those of bygone days
And her praises will be inscribed in the
scrolls of history.

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'INDIVIDUAL' AND 'COLLECTIVE' VALUES OF ISRAELI STUDENTS: THE IMPACT OF YOUTH MOVEMENTS*

Rina Shapira and Eva Etzioni

Introduction

PIONEER youth movements have constituted a major component of the educational system of the Jewish *Yishuv*[1] in Palestine especially since the beginning of the nineteen-twenties. These youth movements, organized by, and under the sponsorship of, various Kibbutz and labour movements, have fulfilled several major inter-related functions for the *Yishuv*.[2]

First, they have educated a large group of youngsters[3] in collectivistic values: service to the collective is to be preferred to private gain and the fulfilment of personal wishes. They have educated them in the appreciation of physical labour and in the ideology of Zionism, identification with the land of Israel, the importance of settlement on the land, and the pioneering way of life.[4] Thus they have developed their members' readiness to fulfil tasks that were essential for the existence of the *Yishuv*.

Second, and as part of this, they have supplied a cadre for the recruitment of manpower for the kibbutzim[5] which, in turn, have been of major importance for the construction and survival of the *Yishuv*.

Third, they have served as a training ground and cadre of recruitment for the various elites such as the *Palmach* volunteers later turned army commanders, or second-generation writers and journalists. They

were able to do so because the collectivistic values with which youth movement members were imbued were also the dominant values of the society, perpetuated and reinforced by the various elites.

With the establishment of the State of Israel and the influx of a large number of immigrants within a short period of time, the stature of pioneer movements in Israeli society has gradually declined. This might be due to the fact that although present-day Israel is still a society characterized by strong emphasis on collectivistic value orientations, secondary orientations of an individualistic nature have also made themselves felt and the values of career advancement and raising one's standard of living have gradually gained in importance. Consequently, an organization which emphasizes collectivistic values to the exclusion of anything else may seem somewhat less attractive to Israeli youth today than it did in the past. The relative decline in importance of youth movements may also be due to the fact that state and municipally organized activities, such as pre-army training and youth clubs, have assumed some of the tasks formerly carried out exclusively by the youth movements.

The weakening of the youth movements' position has become evident from the fact that a smaller percentage of youngsters in the appropriate age groups now tend to be active long-term members of pioneer youth movements.[6] At the same time a largely unorganized and spontaneous 'youth culture', which was not conspicuous in the *Yishuv* era, has gained in importance.

The question thus arises: To what extent do pioneer youth movements in Israel at present still fulfil the functions they fulfilled in the pre-State period? Or, given the changes in Israel's social structure and value system and in view of the increased heterogeneity of the Israeli population since the influx of a large number of Jews from Afro-Asian countries, is it perhaps possible that youth movements now fulfil somewhat different educational tasks? The present study tackles one aspect of this question in one specific context. The aspect it deals with is that of the function of youth movements in education in values; the specific context is that of a university. The basic problem of this study is thus: What, if any, is the impact of past youth movement membership on the values of Israeli students?

The problem in a research perspective

An assumption of the present analysis is that pioneer youth movements[7] are striving, as they did in the past, to foster certain values among their members, especially Zionist identification, service to the collective, and a pioneering way of life and socialism.[8] The question, however, arises as to the extent of their success. The present study deals with the question: To what extent do persons who belonged to a pioneer youth movement reveal greater affinity with values which the move-

ment advocates than do those who have never belonged to any youth movement?

In a study by Adler and Peres[9] comparing the attitudes of members of pioneering youth movements with those of non-members, it was found that although there existed a general system of values common to all Israeli youth, there was a significant difference between members and non-members in the degree of emphasis placed on certain elements within this general system. Members of youth movements more than others emphasized a modest way of life and modest aspirations and were more sensitive to public and national requirements. To quote: 'In the light of this examination, it may be stated that, on the whole, certain differences among the groups emerge that are linked to affiliation with youth cultures, and that these differences are uniform and consistent in their trend. On the other hand, it is evident that these differences do not exceed tendencies revealed by all respondents. For example, members of youth movements as compared with "non-members" are of a more collectivistic orientation, although responses pointing to collectivistic and nationalist values are widespread among all respondents.'[10]

Following this conclusion the question emerges: Do these differences in patterns of value, as apparent between members of a youth movement and those who are not members, exist also between *former* members of youth movements and those who were never members, even several years after the former members have left the movement? Another question is whether any differences between former members and those who did not belong stem from additional causes, particularly from a dissimilar process of socialization owing to a different socio-cultural background.[11] Furthermore, Joseph Ben-David in his article 'Membership in Youth Movements and Social Status'[12] concludes that, in certain cases, the youth movement constitutes a framework for the creation of a status image that complements that of the family, or even acts as a substitute for it. One may, therefore, expect that the movement would perform a different function in fashioning the status image of persons of varying status of origin (Western against Oriental), and would consequently have a different impact on their values.

To sum up, the general problem of this research concerning the impact of movement membership on values may be divided into the following more detailed questions:

a. Will the divergences found to exist between members of youth movements and non-members appear also between former members and those who never belonged, even several years after the former have left the movement?

b. Can one attribute these divergences to the actual past membership in a youth movement, or are they rather due to overall

divergences inherent in the socio-cultural background of the two groups?

c. Are the implications of membership in a youth movement different for persons of different statuses of origin?

Since this study was undertaken among students, who form only a part of all youngsters who have been members of youth movements, we are faced with the problem: To what extent are the conclusions of this study also pertinent to former members of youth movements who are not students, since it is evident that in certain respects students are not typical of all past members. For example, past members of a movement who have become students are likely to manifest a higher level of aspiration than the average member and their intellectual ability is likely to be above average. But, whereas in certain matters (such as aspirations regarding status) that are directly connected with entering a university, students who were members of youth movements cannot be regarded as representative of the average members, in other areas (such as political attitudes or national affinities) there is no reason to expect fundamental differences between them and former members who did not become students. One can therefore assume that, in this respect, the present study can reach more general conclusions.

To answer the research questions presented above, a comparison was made between students who had belonged to youth movements and students who had not, with regard to two domains: 1. values pertaining to the *collective*: a. affinity with the country of Israel, and b. political sympathies; 2. values pertaining to the *individual*: a. status aspirations, and b. occupational choice.[13]

The research project

The present report is based on a more encompassing research project concerning the social background, scholastic achievements, and value-orientations of students in an Israeli university. During the second trimester of the academic year 1966–67, a postal questionnaire was sent to a stratified random sample of first-year Tel-Aviv University students of three faculties: natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. From among the 1,100 students in the original sample, 784 (approximately 70 per cent) responded. From among this population the following research groups are dealt with in the present analysis:

1. Students who had not been members of youth movements—210.
2. Students who had belonged to pioneer youth movements for a period of a year or more—387.[14]

Table 1 lists the sample according to three background variables: father's education, father's occupation, and country of origin.

TABLE I. *Students, former members of pioneering youth movements (a year or more) and students who had never belonged—by father's education, father's occupation and country of origin (in percentages)*

Background characteristics	Former youth movement membership	
	Former members (a year and above)	Non-members
Father's education		
Elementary school or below	21	27
Vocational and high school	52	47
Higher education (including teachers' college)	27	26
Total in %*	100	100
Total in numbers	301	156
N/A	86	54
Father's occupation†		
'Low'	29	34
'Middle'	30	31
'High'	35	41
Total in %*	100	100
Total in numbers	308	163
N/A	79	47
Country of origin		
Oriental countries‡	12	21
Western countries§	88	79
Total in %*	100	100
Total in number	328	170
N/A	59	40

* For all tables, the calculations of percentages were made according to the sum total of replies received, without the N/A, which explains certain discrepancies among the totals in the various tables.

† Father's occupation was classified according to an occupational scale constructed by M. Lissak. See M. Lissak, *Occupational Trends of Urban Youth in Israel*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1961.

‡ This category included all respondents who were themselves born or whose fathers were born in any Afro-Asian country, excepting South Africa.

§ This category included all respondents who were themselves born or whose fathers were born in Europe, America, or South Africa.

The table shows that those who were members of youth movements tend to be relatively 'higher' than non-members with respect to several aspects of the status of origin as measured by criteria accepted by Israeli society. The difference is salient in the category 'country of origin'.

Whereas 12 per cent of former members of youth movements are of Oriental origin, among students who had never belonged to a youth movement 21 per cent are of Oriental origin. A similar though smaller difference exists with respect to father's occupation. Among former members of youth movements, 21 per cent are sons of fathers with elementary education and below, as opposed to 27 per cent who are sons of fathers of similar educational level among non-members. Similarly, with regard to father's occupation only 29 per cent of former movement members, as opposed to 34 per cent of non-members, are sons of fathers who belong to a 'low' occupational stratum.

This table reveals the well-known general tendency of persons of Western origin of middle and higher strata to join youth movements in the course of their adolescence at a much higher frequency than persons of Oriental origin. Some 70 per cent of students of Western origin have spent a year or more in a youth movement, as compared with only 52 per cent of students of Oriental origin. The prominent representation of Oriental groups among non-members might also explain the relatively low educational and occupational level of this group. It may also help to account for some of the divergences between former members and others that will be demonstrated below.

The findings

The principal finding of this study is that students who have been members of youth movements differ substantially in values in the collective area from those who have never been members. On the other hand, in values in the individual area, there are much less pronounced differences between the groups. Values in the collective area will be first discussed.

I. Values in the collective area

A. Affinity with Israel

It was assumed that it is the educational aim of the youth movements to enhance affinity with the country of Israel. Affinity with Israel was measured by the degree of acceptance of the following statement: 'The place of every Israeli is in Israel, and he should remain in the country no matter what happens.' Those who 'fully agreed' or 'agreed', were defined as 'high' on affinity with Israel. Those who 'disagreed' or 'totally disagreed' were defined as 'low' on this count.

It is clear from Table 2 that a positive relationship exists between former membership in a youth movement and affinity with Israel: 'high' affinity with Israel is more frequently expressed by persons who had been members of a youth movement for at least a year. Furthermore, affinity with the country increases as length of membership extends.

TABLE 2. *Students' affinity with Israel by length of stay in the movement (in percentages)**

	Former youth movement membership				
Affinity with Israel	*Did not belong to movement*	*Less than a year*	*1–4 years*	*5–7 years*	*8 years or more*
Show high affinity with Israel	32	35	37	44	53
Show low affinity	68	65	63	56	47
Total in %	100	100	100	100	100
Nos.	205	71	204	123	57
N/A	5		1	2	

* The differences were statistically significant: $P < 0.05$. In all tables the χ^2 significance test was used. All χ^2 calculations were made in absolute numbers.
The analysis in Tables 2 and 3 is based on all three research groups, including those who spent less than a year in a youth movement.

Table 2, pointing to a positive relationship between length of stay in a movement and affinity with the country, also strengthens the conclusion that differences of values between former members and non-members are indeed the outcome of the deliberate influence of the movement. Those who participated for a longer period and were therefore subject to its influence for a longer time, are those who reveal more frequently values that are in line with the youth movement's orientation. Nevertheless, one should not overlook the possibility that those who adhered longest to the movement may have done so because the movement's values were, to begin with, better suited to their tendencies, their social background, and the process of their socialization. There might be a reciprocal effect of both factors: persons whose values coincided with those of the youth movement tended to stay on for more years, and these persons were also exposed longer to the educational impact of the movement.

B. Political affinity

It was assumed that education in pioneer youth movements is directed towards inculcating and enhancing a 'leftist' political bend. Political affinity was examined by means of a right–left continuum on which the respondents were asked to place themselves:

Left | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Right

Those who located themselves in the three right-hand spaces of the continuum (1, 2, 3) were defined as 'tending towards the right', those who located themselves in the three left-hand spaces (5, 6, 7) were

defined as 'tending towards the left', while those who located themselves in the middle (4) were defined as 'tending towards the centre'.

Table 3 specifies the relationship between political affinity and past membership in a pioneer youth movement. Evidently a positive relationship exists between past membership and a 'tendency towards the left', while those who were never in youth movements tend slightly more to the centre and particularly more to the right. The findings also indicate that the tendency to the left increases as the period of adherence extends. Here too the findings may be interpreted as resulting from an interaction between two processes: those to whom the movement's values were closer tended to stay for a longer period and were also exposed longer to the educational impact of the movement.

To sum up, there are distinct differences between students who were members of youth movements and students who were not, as far as values in the collective area are concerned, with those adhering longer revealing stronger affinities with values promoted by the movement. Thus it becomes evident that, at least in the collective domain, the differences between members and non-members are present not only during the actual time of membership, as appears from Adler and

TABLE 3. *Students' political affinity by length of stay in the movement (in percentages)* *

| Political orientation | Former youth movement membership | | | | |
	Did not belong to movement	Less than a year	1–4 years	5–7 years	8 years or more
Tend to right	53	49	39	34	30
Tend to centre	31	25	31	26	18
Tend to left	16	26	30	40	52
Total in percentages	100	100	100	100	100
Nos.	193	68	200	115	54
N/A	17	3	5	10	38

* The differences were statistically significant: $P < 0.01$.

Peres's work, but that these differences persist even several years after members have left the movement. The discussion now turns to values in the individual area.

II. *Values in the individual area*

A. *Aspirations to socio-economic status*

It was assumed that as part of their advocating a pioneering way of life, youth movements aim at moderating the status aspirations of their members. This section deals with a comparison of the status aspirations of student past-members of youth movements and those students who

were not members. These aspirations were examined by means of the question: 'What do you think will be your social status ten years after the termination of your studies?' The choice was between 'upper', 'upper-middle', 'middle', 'lower-middle', and 'lower class'. Table 4 shows that there is no difference in the level of aspiration between those who were and those who were not members of a youth movement. In both groups the majority (65 per cent, 67 per cent) believe that they will belong to the upper-middle class.[15]

TABLE 4. *Students' expected social class by past membership in movement (in percentages)*

	Former youth movement membership	
The class to which the student expects to belong	*Past members of youth movements (a year or more)*	*Non-members*
Upper class	12	12
Upper-middle class	65	67
Middle class or below*	23	21
Total in %	100	100
Nos.	356	197
N/A	31	13

* Only three respondents stated that they expected to belong to a class lower than the middle class.

B. Choice of occupation

The assumption was that the movement spurs its members towards 'collectivistic' occupations that are intrinsically of public interest, as against occupations the main object of which is personal advancement.

Occupational choice was examined by means of the following question: 'What do you think your occupation will be after the completion of your studies?' The occupations chosen were classified into 'collectivistic', stressing public interest (such as teacher, youth guide, kibbutz member, etc.) and 'individualistic', stressing individual goals (such as business man, insurance agent, industrialist, etc.). Table 5 provides the result of the comparison between former movement members and non-members in this regard. It indicates that former members of youth movements tend to select 'collectivistic' occupations more frequently than those who were never members, although the divergences between the two groups are small. Unlike the case of 'affinity with Israel' or 'political affinity', the students' occupational choice is not affected by length of stay in the movement.

To sum up the findings so far: there are clear differences between former youth movement members and 'non-members' with regard to political orientation and affinity with the country of Israel. The differences are less pronounced with regard to choice of occupation, and no

differences at all exist with regard to level of status aspirations. In other words, the differences are more pronounced in the collective than in the individual area.

TABLE 5. *Students' choice of occupation by past membership in movement (in percentages)* *

Occupational choice	Past members of youth movements (a year or more)	Non-members
Collectivistic occupation	77	70
Individualistic occupation	23	30
Total in %	100	100
Nos.	328	176
N/A	59	34

* Not statistically significant at the level of 0·05.

C. Values and socio-cultural background

The question now arises: Are the differences between former members of movements and non-members due to the former's exposure to the movement education, or do they stem from other sources?

In the description of the research population it was stated that differences of socio-cultural background, especially country of origin, existed between former members of youth movements and persons who had not belonged. Socio-cultural background may be expected to have a strong bearing on attitudes and values. Hence, the differences between members and non-members reported above raise the following questions. First, do the respondents differ in their value orientations according to their socio-cultural background? Second, do these differences explain the differences in values found to exist between past members and non-members of youth movements?

Examination of the data reveals that divergences do exist in students' value orientations according to country of origin. Thus, with regard to affinity with the country of Israel, whereas 40 per cent of Western students reveal a 'high' affinity with Israel (as measured by the present question[16]), only 30 per cent of Oriental students show the same affinity.

Students of Western and Oriental origin show a more or less similar trend to the left, although considerable differences exist as to their tendencies to the right or centre. Students originating from Oriental countries tend more to the right than students originating from the West, who tend more to the centre.

There is also a relationship between country of origin and status aspirations. Students of Oriental origin tend to focus their aspirations on 'middle class and below' to a greater extent than students of Western origin, whose aspirations tend to focus on higher classes.

As to choice of occupation, students of Oriental origin tend to select 'individualistic' occupations more frequently than students of Western origin: 36 per cent of Oriental students selected 'individualistic' occupations as opposed to 23 per cent of Western students.

To sum up: Oriental students tend more to the right in their political affinity; they tend to express lower status aspirations, less affinity with Israel, and to select more 'individualistic' occupations than students from Western countries.

In view of this, the question arises: Could it be the country of origin (and *not* the adherence to a youth movement) that explains the differences in attitudes and values between former members of youth movements and non-members? Perhaps the movement itself does not constitute an active factor in fostering sets of values, but merely consolidates attitudes and values acquired in childhood during the early phases of socialization? In order to tackle this problem, a comparison was made between the attitudes of past members and non-members of youth movements who were of the same ethnic background. This made it possible to check whether the differences of attitudes and values between former members and non-members continue to manifest themselves even when ethnic background is *controlled* and can no longer serve as the determining factor in these differences.

D. *Values, socio-cultural background, and former membership in youth movements*

A comparison between the values of former members of youth movements and the values of non-members in homogeneous groups of origin shows the situation to vary with regard to the different values. As to affinity with the country and political orientation, the divergences

TABLE 6. *Percentage of students expressing 'high' affinity with Israel, by past membership in movement and country of origin*

	Youth movement membership	
Country of origin	Past members of youth movements (a year or more)	Non-members
Western origin	42 (100% = 288)	33 (100% = 129)
Oriental origin	30 (100% = 37)	31 (100% = 36)

between former members and non-members continue to exist on a statistically significant level among Western students, but diminish considerably or even disappear completely among students of Oriental origin. This tendency is exemplified in Table 6, on affinity with the country of Israel.

The opposite situation exists with regard to occupational choice and status aspirations, as becomes evident from Tables 7 and 8.

TABLE 7. *Percentage of students selecting 'collectivistic' occupations, by past membership in movement and country of origin*

	Youth movement membership	
Country of origin	Past members of youth movements (a year or more)	Non-members
Western origin	78 (100% = 246)	73 (100% = 110)
Oriental origin	73 (100% = 30)	48 (100% = 31)

TABLE 8. *Percentage of students who expect to belong to the 'middle class and lower', by membership in movement and country of origin*

	Youth movement membership	
Country of origin	Past members of youth movements (a year or more)	Non-members
Western origin	21 (100% = 268)	15 (100% = 130)
Oriental origin	23 (100% = 35)	42 (100% = 33)

These tables illustrate that with regard to occupational choice and status aspiration, the divergences between former movement members and non-members of Western origin become attenuated, whereas divergences among Oriental students become significantly more prominent, with Oriental students who have belonged to youth movements tending to 'collectivistic' occupations and higher status aspirations more frequently than do students of Oriental countries who have never belonged.

The data point to the conclusion that neither membership in a youth movement by itself nor ethnic background by itself can explain the differences between former movement members and non-members in respect of their attitudes and sets of values; a combination of factors is at work. It further becomes evident that the divergences between former members and non-members among Western students are more pronounced in the collective realm, while the divergences between former members and non-members among Oriental students are more accentuated with respect to the individual realm. One can perhaps infer from these data that Western students tend to relate to the youth movement chiefly as an ideological reference group with respect to values pertaining to the collective. Therefore, among persons of Western origin, those whose principles are compatible in this domain with those

of the movement are especially attracted to it and/or the movement influences them especially in this domain. According to this interpretation, Oriental students on the other hand relate to the movement mainly in terms of its contribution to their personal status and, therefore, their joining and/or membership has implications for their orientations especially in this area.

The data in Table 8 sustain this line of thought. They demonstrate that the divergences in the level of aspiration between former members and non-members in the two groups of origin are in opposite directions: Western students who have belonged to a youth movement tend to reveal slightly lower status aspirations than other Western students, while *Oriental students who have belonged to a movement tend to have higher status aspirations* than those of their peers who had never belonged to a movement. This finding seems to reinforce the above interpretation: persons of Western origin whose status is relatively 'higher'[17] are less dependent on a youth movement as a status framework (namely, as a social unit which provides a substitute for their status of origin or as an anchor for their status image). The movement has, therefore, only a slight moderating effect on their status aspirations. Persons of Oriental origin, on the other hand, whose concept of the movement is one of a social body which can offer them a higher personal status relative to their status of origin, either join the movement because their aspirations are higher and keener than those of their fellows or else the movement exerts an influence on them (not in accordance with its declared objectives) towards the raising of status aspirations. Membership in a youth movement seems, therefore, to have some unanticipated consequences with respect to the aspirations of its Oriental members. This interpretation of the findings is further strengthened by the fact that it concords with Ben-David's analysis, according to which the movement may serve as a complement to, or a substitute for, the family's status image.

The data indicate that Oriental students who have been members of youth movements are apt to select 'collectivistic' occupations but, at the same time, reveal high status aspirations more frequently than Oriental students who have never belonged to a movement. This raises the possibility that Oriental students consider 'collectivistic' occupations such as teaching, social work, youth guidance, etc., as occupations of a relatively high status.

Table 8 also illustrates that, whereas among those who were never members of youth movements, a wide divergence exists between Oriental and Western students with respect to status aspirations, these divergences between the groups tend to be ironed out among members of youth movements. Possibly the very time spent in a joint framework increases the similarity in the level of status aspirations among members of different ethnic groups. Nevertheless, an examination of other tables

indicates that in other domains the movement does not exert an influence in the direction of levelling out patterns of values among the various groups.

Conclusion

The principal conclusions of the present study are as follows.

a. Former members of a movement who attend a university tend, even several years after leaving the movement, to accentuate more than other people attitudes and values that accord with the movement's influence in the 'collective' domain. On the other hand, in the individual domain, the differences between them and others diminish or even disappear. Thus, the implications of membership in a youth movement are more durable in the collective than in the individual area. This at least is the case for the majority of students who are of Western origin.

b. Membership in a youth movement may fulfil different functions for members of different groups of origin. For persons of Western origin, it may serve as a frame of reference for the crystallization of collective values; for persons of Oriental origin, whose status is considered relatively 'lower', it may serve as a framework for the crystallization of an individual's status image.

We must now return to the problem posed in the introduction. To what extent do youth movements still fulfil the function they fulfilled in the *Yishuv* of educating in collectivistic value orientations which in turn might predispose members towards service to the collective?

Despite the restricted context of the present study and even though no definite conclusions may be reached on the actual results of the youth movements' educational programme, it becomes clear that for some major groups the pioneer youth movements serve at present, as they did in the past, as a framework for the crystallization of values, albeit mainly in the collective, public, and not so much in the individual, private area. They do so by attracting youngsters with appropriate predispositions and/or by imbuing them with the values they advocate. This task seems to be of significance for Israeli society in so far as some of the values advocated are of a collectivistic nature, concerned with identification and attachment to Israel.

At the same time, it seems that the youth movements have adapted, or have been adapted, to the changing composition of Israeli society by adopting functions which are of special significance for a group of relative newcomers to Israel, students of Oriental origin.[18]

It is of special significance that the traces of the effects of membership in the youth movements exist even several years after departure from the movement. Thus, even though somewhat weakened, the youth movements are certainly not obsolete in Israel and there is a likelihood that they will acquire new educational tasks as Israeli society develops.

NOTES

[1] The term applied to the Jewish community in Palestine during the pre-State period.

[2] For a penetrating analysis of youth movements in the *Yishuv* and in Israeli society, see S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*, London, 1967.

[3] It is estimated that 20–30 per cent or even more of all Jewish youngsters, in the pre-State era, were members of youth movements. See Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 240.

[4] They have also traditionally educated their members in the values of socialism and left-wing political orientations; see J. Peres, 'Youth and Youth Movements in Israel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. V, no. 1, June 1963.

[5] It is estimated that 20–25 per cent of the pioneer youth movement graduates settled down in Kibbutzim permanently. See Peres, op. cit.

[6] See Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 256.

[7] The present study refers only to former members of 'pioneer' youth movements (Hashomer Hatzair, Hanoar Haoved Vehalomed, the Scouts, Machanot Olim), as compared with students who never belonged to any movement. Persons who served in other (non-pioneering) youth movements were excluded from this analysis. Bnei-Akiva, though a pioneer youth movement, was excluded from the analysis, as it was thought that the variable of religiousness, which distinguishes Bnei-Akiva from other pioneering youth movements, might introduce an uncontrolled bias into the results. Hereafter, for the sake of brevity, 'pioneer youth movements' will be referred to simply as 'youth movements'.

[8] This assumption is based on an analysis of the educational goals of pioneer youth movements set out by Peres, op. cit.

[9] H. Adler and J. Peres, 'Tnuat Hano'ar Vehahevra Hasalonit, Nituah Hashvaati Shel Defusei Tarbut No'ar Beyisrael', *Hinuch Vehevra Beyisrael*, S. N. Eisenstadt *et al.*, eds., Jerusalem, 1968.

[10] Ibid., p. 377 (translated by the authors of this article).

[11] For a comparison of the socio-cultural background of past youth movement members and others, see below, Table no. 1.

[12] *Megamot*, vol. 5, no. 3, spring 1954.

[13] It should be noted that the distinction between values pertaining to the collective and values pertaining to the individual is not identical with the distinction between *collectivistic* and *individualistic* value orientations. Both in the collective and the individual domain, value orientations may be either collectivistic, individualistic, or neutral. Thus, choosing an occupation which is of major importance to the collective would be a manifestation of a collectivistic orientation in the individual domain.

[14] A third research group, comprising 71 students who had spent less than one year in a youth movement, was excluded from most analyses, as it was assumed that the movement could not have exerted any substantial influence on them. Entirely excluded from the examination were all students who had been members of non-pioneering youth movements such as 'Maccabi'.

[15] It should be noted that a relatively high aspiration level was to be expected on the part of both groups, since the sampling was taken among students. It is possible that because of this, real differences, in so far as they exist, do not emerge from the data.

[16] It should be noted, however, that when 'Israeli identification' rather than affinity with the country of Israel is examined, no such differences appear. Possibly this is so because 'Israeli identification' is on a more abstract and general level than affinity with the country of Israel, which latter might have certain implications for concrete action.

[17] Despite strong egalitarian tendencies in Israel's official ideology, persons of Western origin enjoy a somewhat higher status in Israeli society than do persons of Oriental origin.

[18] It should be noted that this discussion of the functions of youth movements may also be of relevance to other countries in which youth movements of an 'ideological' character exist. The present findings, if sustained by comparative research on a larger scale, would point to the conclusion that youth movements may constitute one source of influence on youngsters' values. The results further hint at the conclusion that the tasks of youth movements may be adapted to a changing social structure and to the special requirements of different social groups.

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CHANGE · AND CHALLENGE IN JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Jerry Hochbaum

JEWISH community relations in the United States in the last quarter-century have changed not only in their scope and structure but in their central character. Twenty-five years ago the community-relations agencies had as their major responsibility—indeed, as their major preoccupation—the combating of antisemitic defamation and canards. Their aim was to ensure the survival of Jews and of Jewish institutions in the United States and abroad. However, after the War as a result of changes within the Jewish community itself and the wider society of which it was a part, community relations evolved from defence and the exposing and counteracting of antisemitism towards a greater emphasis on education and then on intergroup co-operation. Jewish agencies united with other groups to eliminate discrimination and prejudice and to engage in social action, recognizing that only by strengthening and enhancing the democratic order and by reducing the gap between the American creed and the realities of American life could Jewish welfare be assured. Furthermore, the Jewish community came to realize that the rights of no group were secure until the rights of all were safe.

This expansion of aims developed concurrently with the fusion of two concepts long seen as polar ideas and defined as incompatible with each other: the theory of the melting pot and American pluralism. These two concepts are two independent visions of American society, but each was woven into the Jewish experience in the United States. The melting pot theory, as it was adopted in the 'defence' phase of community relations, stressed the complete Americanization of the Jew and the protection of his individual rights. Pluralism, which replaced it, envisaged as the proper mode of participation in American democracy the interplay of all groups—religious, racial, cultural, and ethnic —each maintaining its own values and pursuing its own interests within a basic structure guaranteeing freedom for all.

In the evolution of Jewish community relations, group rights did not

in fact replace individual rights. Rather, the two concepts were fused and the goal became to afford all individual members of the society full and equal participation in the life of the society without regard to group affiliation, and at the same time to foster the conditions that encourage creative group living for all groups. Individual integration and distinctive group separateness were not seen as conflicting ends; they were regarded as fully compatible with, and indispensable for, the full flowering of a plural society.

Thus, Jewish 'community relations' moved from the attempt to overcome the disadvantaged status of individual Jews and of the Jewish community towards the full realization of the capacity of American Jewry as a group. (Put another way, Jewish 'community relations', once the defence department of the Jewish community, now also became its state department.) It continued to work towards maintaining the security of the Jewish community against external threats, but it now also became engaged in attempting to enlarge the pluralist framework of American society to allow for the most favourable balance between individual integration and distinctive group life, thereby making it possible for the Jewish community and its institutions to develop to their fullest potential. It is this concept which in the last decades has guided Jewish community-relations agencies in their policies and programmes in all phases of community-relations concerns: the maintenance of those conditions which allow the maximum enlargement and maturation of Jewish communal life.

The Jewish community became involved in the problems of the cities and in the struggle for equal opportunity long before they became the major item on the agenda of America's domestic concerns (the 'urban crisis'). It recognized that the problems of our cities and the economic, social, political, and psychological pathology that festers within them is a source not only of profound concern for the wider society but also for the Jewish community. The ravaged urban landscape and the increasing unmanageability of city life and government are part of a much more fundamental danger to American society: the gradual weakening and incipient erosion of its consensual base, the normative and social unity of American life. Second, the increasing visibility of the inequalities of American society and the inability or unwillingness to face up to them squarely are generating among the lower classes a growing loss of confidence in the democratic process as a means for the resolution of group differences and as an instrument for social change. Jewish community-relations agencies foresaw long ago that both these processes, if allowed to continue, would threaten the fundamental democratic character of American society, which had produced the ambience in which the Jewish community had been able to flourish. Their involvement in energizing the democratic and legislative processes to respond to the fundamental causes of the urban crisis was recognized

as the only way to prevent the erosion of that framework. Unless that framework was preserved, revolutionaries on the left could be expected to bay louder for the destruction of the establishment, which would obliterate the hard-earned advances and achievements of the Jewish community in the United States. In counteraction, radicals on the right would demand not only repression, but the cessation of the change and orderly process so necessary for the progressive evolution of the society, and, in their extreme formulation of law and order, sow the seeds of incipient fascism. History has taught the Jewish people well the bloody price this polarization exacts. Incipient revolution or fascism? Anarchy or authoritarianism? These are real alternatives confronting the Jewish community as the revolutionary ferment spreads and spills over to previously undisturbed sectors of American life. The response of the Jewish community-relations agencies has been to invest their energies in strengthening the processes and self-correcting devices that inhere in the American body politic to allow and accelerate the necessary accommodation and modification that must occur, ensuring at the same time that the Jewish community will be maintained and grow and play its vital role in the orderly evolution of American democracy.

The efforts of Jewish community-relations agencies in the last decades in the area of interreligious and intergroup co-operation have generated and supported another set of conditions for maximizing the potential of American pluralism and thereby the maturation of the Jewish community. They have succeeded in creating a climate allowing the Jewish community to assume its own independent posture and stance on all the vital questions confronting American society. The hope that all differences between groups will be ironed out if only men of good will get together has now been largely discarded; that illusory hope has been replaced by the realization that the interests of different groups are at times irreconcilable. The Jewish community's objective in interreligious and indeed all intergroup relationships has been not to obscure or gloss over these differences, but to create the setting in which they can be respected and in which disagreement can exist agreeably. Thus, Jews have demanded parity with all other groups while retaining their distinctiveness and they have achieved a reasonable measure of such acceptance. Although a mere three per cent of the population, they have achieved full partnership status in America's religious community—one-third Protestant, one-third Catholic, one-third Jewish—and they co-operate jointly with the other religious groups for the purposes all have in common. But where Jews are moved by their values or interests, they have also learned to speak out on issues as Jews and from a Jewish perspective.

Other fundamental elements of the pluralist framework that has been established have no precedent in Jewish historical experience. The

Jewish community-relations agencies have exerted enormous energy in the past decades to eliminate discrimination, foster religious liberty, and preserve the right to dissent for all individuals and groups in the United States. Their position has been unequivocal: no one should be deprived of his rights as a citizen whatever his race, religion, or national origin; every American should be free to practise and express his religious and moral convictions as he understands them; all persons have the freedom to express their views, however much they may deviate from the majority position. The concept of a pluralist American society rests on this trinity of principles. The status thus achieved by American Jewry is, to say the least, unusual. Throughout the long centuries of communal life, Jews have rarely had complete freedom to practise their religious traditions; where they did, they were unlikely to possess the rights of all citizens; even where this was possible, their freedom of expression was always severely limited. It is only in this century in the United States, as Salo Baron has pointed out, that real and complete emancipation has been achieved. There have been, of course, glimpses and small parcels of such opportunity in the past in different epochs in different places, particularly in the Western world in the last century. But the relevant forces have converged fully only in the United States, especially in the last quarter-century, to make possible a sociological, political, and religious umbrella for freedom. No other Jewish community in history has had an equal opportunity for self-expression and realization. The Jewish community through its community-relations agencies has attempted to keep that umbrella in shape to weather the periodic storms and eruptions in our society.

This pluralist framework is a major cultural achievement of the United States. But because it has been successfully established, the pressures on it continue to mount for the extension to the groups still not integrated into the society of those rights most Americans now take for granted. The demands made are legitimate, but because they are perceived as threatening by those who already enjoy what is asked for, and because they occur in a context of confrontation, they evoke, at the worst, fear and backlash, and, at the best, a turning inward and a demand to protect and pursue one's own group interests. Certainly the Jewish community and the community-relations institutions must recognize and defend these interests. However, the community-relations institutions are also aware that Jewish interests and the larger social responsibilities of Jews do largely converge. But they must identify the parameters of that convergence and interpret its character to the Jewish community (specifically, any dilution of the democratic processes which have allowed Jews to enter the mainstream of American life and any erosion of the democratic framework which is most destructive to the most fundamental Jewish objective, maintaining the conditions in society that can protect Jewish welfare and security). On the threshold

of an era that may be either revolutionary or repressive, this is a major challenge to Jewish 'community relations'.

There is another facet of American pluralism that raises threats of a different kind and magnitude to the Jewish community. A social milieu that allows maximum opportunity for individual integration into society creates also the possibility and danger of complete assimilation, the erosion of Jewish values, and alienation from the Jewish community, unless the delicate balance between group distinctiveness and individual integration is truly upheld. To achieve that group distinctiveness may be the ultimate responsibility of the cultural and educational agencies of the Jewish community—the Jewish community's Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. But there is a unique and crucial role that Jewish 'community relations' can and must play. Just as 'community relations' is the concern of the entire Jewish community, so too, 'community relations' must also reflect the values of the Jewish community, helping to sustain them, indeed articulating them, in policies and programmes and generally in the stance taken towards American society. A link must be forged between the values that animate Jewish life internally and the relationships Jews fashion with their external environment. Jewish 'community relations', then, adds its active and dynamic support to American pluralism, because its thrust grows out not only of contemporary American liberalism, but from a base in Jewish tradition.

The fine balance between Jewish distinctiveness and individual integration does not occur in a vacuum; given the interdependent character of our multi-group society, it is in great measure a function of the common aspirations shared by the other groups that compose our society. To the extent that other groups define themselves in American society in a similar way and move in co-operation towards attaining this vision such a balance is facilitated for the Jewish community. This, indeed, is the great challenge of the black revolution to American pluralism, and simultaneously its greatest opportunity. The basic objective of a pluralist society is the complete economic and political integration of all groups within the mainstream of American life. Separate black political parties and even black capitalism (apart from the question of whether the latter can truly resolve the Negro's economic problems) must therefore be rejected. The argument that some groups have not yet fully achieved integration is no valid reason for creating separate racial and ethnic economic and political structures. Restructuring the whole institutional network of American society to achieve this separatism would undermine the pluralist vision of America and its ideological foundation which protects the legitimate self-interest of all groups.

However, American pluralism has a new opportunity to strengthen itself by accommodating another sectarian group, not religious but

racially sectarian, physically marked by skin colour but held together by a growing sense of community, common destiny, and new-found hope. The chance for such a victory is a chance for Negro and Jew—and for America. The special relationships of Jews with the Negro and other minority groups need not be based on common enemies or common history, but on the common purpose to teach America what pluralism is really all about. Thus, to make room for the Negro in the pluralist framework is another way, however indirectly, of expanding the opportunity for Jewish distinctiveness.

Finally, the climate of Jewish community relations in the United States has been profoundly expressed and conditioned by another factor, always present in the past, but which has now acquired an increased force—the condition of Jewish communities around the world. In and after the Six-Day War, the bonds that unite the Jewish communities in the Diaspora with Israel penetrated more deeply than ever before, and permeated Jewish consciousness, and these bonds and the empathy they provoked have been amplified for Jews in the Arab countries and no less dramatically for Jews behind the Iron Curtain. The Jewish community in the United States raises enormous funds for them; organizes demonstrations and protests, and exercises political influence on their behalf; and now seeks to interpret to American public opinion the continuing need to support and sustain the rights of Jews all over the globe. But American Jewry is coming to recognize that their security in the world now and in the decades ahead, if not connected with its survival, is an essential part of maintaining and enhancing its own group distinctiveness. Defence of their physical, spiritual, and cultural survival is an integral part of American Jewry's own dynamic evolution and continuity as a Jewish community. One hopes that the community-relations model that has been adopted for the American Jewish community may ultimately be generalized to world Jewry through the creation of a framework for international pluralism and a world order that would allow and maximize conditions for dynamic Jewish survival throughout the world.

STATISTICS OF MILAH AND THE JEWISH BIRTH-RATE IN BRITAIN

S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool*

1. Background

FOLLOWING the compilation of statistics on marriages[1] and on deaths[2] for the Anglo-Jewish community, the Board of Deputies' Statistical and Demographic Research Unit has taken steps to compile statistics on male births by means of returns from Mohalim. These three series (births, marriages, and deaths) are essential for any assessment of the community's demographic trends, and it is hoped that their compilation will be maintained on a routine basis in the years to come.

The co-operation eventually obtained from Mohalim was better than initially expected, and the statistics based on their returns are—in our opinion—adequate for a first report to the community on this important subject. It must, however, be said that the quality of the information is not in all respects as satisfactory as that in our earlier reports on marriages and deaths.

Three main difficulties have arisen. First, the Mohalim are not required by statute to keep records, nor does any administrative procedure automatically lead to institutional record keeping (as in marriage and death records respectively). Some five years ago the Initiation Society, to which the great majority of Mohalim belong, asked its members to record all Milot they performed, but co-operation has not been whole-hearted, especially in the earlier years. Consequently the returns received from Mohalim have not always been complete, and estimates have been inserted where necessary.

The second problem is that some parents employ doctors rather than Mohalim for the operation.[3] Among Orthodox families this practice is presumably rare. Further, it is understood that the Reform and Liberal communities generally, though not invariably, call on the services of Mohalim where the latter are permitted to operate (that is to say, if the

mother is born Jewish or, if not born Jewish, has been converted by an orthodox Beth Din). The issue is thus confined to discovering the proportion of Liberal and Reform circumcisions which are carried out by doctors; these are not explicitly covered in this survey, but a rough indirect estimate has been attempted below.

The third point to consider is whether the returns made by the Mohalim are subject to bias; thus, it has been suggested that some of the busier Mohalim may not have been giving complete returns for various reasons, or may be covering a wider population than strictly permitted according to Orthodox precept (for example, the mother may have been converted by a non-Orthodox rite).

The aggregate effect of these difficulties must not however be exaggerated, and our judgement (based on discussion with Mohalim and others) is that it would be covered by attaching a margin of uncertainty to our figures of about 3 per cent; this would not affect the conclusions drawn below. As our data-gathering becomes established on a routine basis, and better records are kept by Mohalim, we would expect accuracy automatically to improve.

. The publication of the present information on births marks the completion of the first stage of the Unit's programme of work—the object of which was to obtain a reliable indication of the size and composition of the community as a whole. This is the first time that data on births have been compiled for the whole country, although figures, relating to parts of the country only, were published in the Annual Reports of the Board of Deputies before the First World War. Apart from assisting our understanding of basic demographic issues in Anglo-Jewry (whether the community is reproducing itself), the present data will be of value in forecasting the population of school-age in years to come, and so assist in formulating educational policy. A paper on the latter topic is in course of preparation by the Unit as part of its programme of more intensive studies of particular fields.

2. Number of births

The number of male births returned by Mohalim in 1968 totalled 1,892, and in the previous three-year period 1965–7 averaged 1,779 per annum; the average for the four-year period 1965–8 is 1,821. This information was obtained from some 80 Mohalim in Great Britain who had been practising in that period, and includes estimates where the information supplied was deficient; these estimates are based on enquiries made to Ministers of local synagogues and others, and relate to an estimated 5 per cent of Milot, over the period 1965–8.[4]

. Broadly speaking, the Mohalim fall into two groups: a small number who have over 100 cases a year, and the large majority who have under 10 cases a year. The four Mohalim with the largest practices account for over half the Milot in the country.

. As is well known, the London-based Mohalim travel to surrounding provincial communities as necessary, and this is reflected in our statistics. These show that Mohalim who live in London performed 84 per cent of all Milot whereas, according to our previous estimates, only 68 per cent of the Jewish community live in the London area, and only 71 per cent of the marriages take place there.

Information on the number of circumcisions was requested for the six-year period 1963–8, but owing to lack of record-keeping in earlier years—especially by the major practitioners—it is not possible to attach significance to the year-to-year movements in the figures, and we prefer to quote only the figures given above.

One might take the discussion a step further by speculating as to the number of non-orthodox circumcisions performed by doctors. Non-orthodox synagogue marriages formed 20 per cent of all synagogue marriages during the period under review here: suppose that three-quarters of these—that is, 15 per cent of all marriages—would be eligible for marriage under orthodox rules ('eligible marriages'), and that one quarter—that is, 5 per cent of all marriages—would not be so eligible ('non-eligible marriages'). Of the offspring of the 15 per cent of 'eligible marriages' we may suppose that one-third are attended by doctors; and of the offspring of the 5 per cent of 'non-eligible marriages' we may suppose that Mohalim attend on one-fifth of such cases, and that four-fifths are attended by doctors. On these assumptions it would follow that something like 9 per cent of male births are attended by doctors;[5] the total number of male births, would, consequently, be increased from our recorded 1,821 to an estimated 1,985.

3. Comparison with the number of marriages

The number of synagogue marriages recorded in this country in the same four-year period 1965–8 averaged 1,813 a year. The estimated number of male births in that period, at 1,985, thus exceeded the number of synagogue marriages by 9 per cent.

For the general population of Britain, the number of legitimate male births exceeded marriages by 6 per cent in the same period. The general population of the country is slowly increasing at the moment, and it would seem—on the basis of this comparison—that the section of the Jewish community that marries in synagogues is increasing at a very similar rate.[6]

Pre-war studies by Ruppin,[7] and others, generally showed the Jewish birth-rate to have been rather low; our finding of a birth-rate that is adequate to ensure replacement is surprising, and requires careful appraisal.

. First, we compare our findings with the results of a survey, conducted by Dr. Krausz in 1962, of 382 Jewish families living in Edgware. This is an area densely populated with Jewish families (about one in

four families is Jewish, according to Dr. Krausz's survey) and it must be presumed that the local community will have a heavier weight of affiliated persons;[8] also there may be a bias towards families with young children in view of the type of house, rental levels, etc., there. The following data extracted from his study (p. 95) are pertinent; they relate to the average number of children born to a couple within the first ten years of their marriage, and comparisons are made with the Registrar-General's data for the general population for the whole country:

No. of children born within ten years of marriage

Year of Marriage	Jews	General	Ratio (Jews/General)
1935–9	1·70	1·67	1·02
1940–4	1·57	1·73	0·91
1945–9	1·98	1·83	1·08
Average	1·75	1·74	1·00

It appears that, in this area, Jewish fertility was slightly higher than general fertility for the cohort that married immediately before the war, and again for the cohort that married immediately after the war; but the cohort marrying during the war had a slightly lower fertility, for reasons that are easily appreciated (greater political fears, more effective family planning; it also appears from this survey that Jewish families are more widely spaced, in that relatively more of the children are born in the second quinquennium of marriage—but this is incidental to our interest here). Taking the three cohorts together, Jewish fertility is very close to general fertility levels.

The suggestion in the Edgware survey that after the war Jewish fertility was higher then general fertility is consonant with our findings; however, not too much should be made of this support in view of the small size of the Edgware sample.[9]

Secondly, it is necessary to consider more carefully whether the figures returned by Mohalim may be subject to over-statement. It seems possible that some of the children dealt with may have parents who were not married in a synagogue, and if this were significant it would throw out our comparisons of births with synagogue marriages. We accordingly made further enquiries of a sample of senior Mohalim. They told us that a certain number of children on whom they had operated were the offspring of unmarried mothers, or were adopted children (in addition they reported that they had attended on children of parents married abroad, but these should be ignored here as being substantially offset by migration in the other direction). But neither of these categories can account for much numerically. We were, however, also told of a substantial number of Milot for the sons of parents—both

Jewish—who had married in a Register Office without subsequent Huppah; these were parents who could not afford or could not justify the expense of what has become the conventional 'Jewish marriage' —they were working-class people, or students of limited means, who were still interested in maintaining their child's affiliation to his people. The proportion involved was, on the average, in the neighbourhood of 4 per cent, but it will be clear that this is based to some extent on impressions only.

It appears, therefore, that the picture given above of adequate fertility for those marriages taking place within the affiliated community has to be slightly qualified, and the 9 per cent excess of births over marriages should be reduced to an excess of some 5 per cent. Even so, the excess remains close to the national average of 6 per cent. It is well-known that the general population passed through a long phase of inadequate fertility (from the point of view of population replacement) in the 1930s, and there were still doubts on the adequacy of the general birth-rate during and after the war (eventually leading to the setting up of a Royal Commission on Population which reported in 1949); this phase was followed, not merely by a post-war 'baby boom', but by a long period of high fertility which is still continuing. Many reasons have been suggested for this reversal, amongst which the greater prosperity of recent years and the lowering of the average age of first marriage have frequently been stressed. These reasons undoubtedly apply also to the Jewish community and may account for our findings; in addition, the greater general political stability of the present post-war era, as contrasted with the 1930s, may well be an even more important factor for the Jewish than for the general population, and may be the over-riding cause of higher Jewish fertility today.

The above discussion, it has to be emphasized, refers in the main to the affiliated community, which we estimate to number some 260,000 out of a total of 410,000 persons.[10] It will, however, be recalled from our earlier study[11] that the total number of synagogue marriages is much lower (only a half or two-thirds) than that to be expected in a community numbering 410,000 persons; our new evidence on the number of births in the community is equally only consistent, in the long run, with a correspondingly lower total size of community.

4. Comparison with the number of deaths and population estimates

The most direct way of seeing whether the size of the community is increasing or decreasing is to compare the number of births with the number of deaths. In making this comparison for Anglo-Jewry a serious difficulty results from the substantial margin of unaffiliated, or semi-affiliated, Jews already referred to; a larger proportion of these have Jewish burial than concern themselves with a synagogue marriage, or possibly, with Milah, so that the group to which the statistics refer is

not consistently defined throughout. Nevertheless, the comparison must be set out.

In the four-year period 1965–8, the number of male deaths averaged some 2,400 a year, of which 1,600 are estimated to have been affiliated to synagogues or friendly societies during their lifetime. The reported number of Milot, at 1,821, compares favourably with the latter figure relating to affiliated persons; but when the *total* number of male births (that is, including circumcisions performed by doctors) which we estimate at 1,985, is compared with the *total* number of male deaths, it appears that the community is declining by some 400 males annually, or approximately 800 males and females. This calculated decline, it will be clear, is not necessarily or solely the result of low fecundity; it could be the result of a decline in observance (Jewish burial being more widely practised), or there may be progressive assimilation (the younger generation not observing at all, while the older observant generation dies off). Whatever the reason, it is clear that the number of reported Milot is inadequate to maintain a total community of 410,000 persons, though it appears adequate to maintain the synagogue-affiliated portion of the community.

If we confine ourselves to the synagogue-affiliated portion, numbering some 260,000, some interesting ratios can be calculated. Relating the number of synagogue marriages to this smaller population figure, a marriage-rate of 6·4 per thousand is arrived at, which compares not too unfavourably with a national rate of 7·6 per thousand (in 1961–5); and if we relate the number of Milot also to that population figure, we arrive at a male birth-rate of 7·6 per thousand, which is close to the national average of 8·5 (legitimate) male births per thousand.

5. *Conclusions*

The number of male births in the Jewish community in Great Britain in 1965–8 is estimated to have averaged close on 2,000 a year. This figure is based on returns received from some 80 Mohalim in all parts of the country, together with an estimate of the small number of circumcisions carried out by doctors who are not authorized Mohalim.

This number of births is consistent with the number of synagogue marriages (at an average of 1,813 a year), and with the number of deaths of synagogue and friendly society members (at 1,600 a year), in suggesting that the *synagogue-affiliated* section of the community is probably maintaining itself.

When the number of births is compared with the total number of Jewish deaths (that is, both of synagogue members and of others buried as non-members—totalling 2,400 a year) a deficiency of about 400 males a year emerges. This deficiency arises mainly from the unaffiliated, or partially affiliated, sections of the community, about whom little information is available.

NOTES

[1] S. J. Prais and M. Schmool, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901–65', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. IX, no. 2, Dec. 1967.

[2] S. J. Prais, and M. Schmool, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population, 1960–65', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. X, no. 1, June 1968.

[3] About a quarter of all Mohalim are also qualified medical practitioners. Where the term 'doctor' is used in this paper, the reference is to such practitioners who do not have a Mohel's diploma.

[4] One Mohel, in particular, is responsible for the greatest part of the deficiencies in our statistics; he has consistently refused to give any figures despite many approaches.

[5] That is, one-third of the 15 per cent, and four-fifths of the 5 per cent. The above argument also assumes that there are no significant differences in fertility between Orthodox and other marriages.

[6] It is difficult to be more precise without making assumptions as to relative rates of illegitimacy, etc.; this is hardly worthwhile in the present state of our knowledge.

[7] A. Ruppin, *The Jewish Fate and Future*, London, 1940, ch. V, section 8. See also his *The Jews in the Modern World*, London, 1934, ch. V.

[8] Dr. Krausz found that 82 per cent of his sample were members of a synagogue. (See E. Krausz, 'The Edgware Survey; Demographic Results', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. X, no. 1, June 1968.)

[9] The 1945–9 cohort consisted of 44 families. Dr. Krausz also reported on a subsequent cohort of 52 families marrying in the period 1950–4 for which he was able to compare, with the general population, the number of children born in the first five years of marriage (rather than ten, as in the text above). This showed somewhat lower fertility, but, in view of the wider spacing of children in Jewish families, we do not think this qualifies our results. (See Krausz, op. cit., p. 95.)

[10] This division is based on proportions for the London community applied to the whole country. (See Prais and Schmool, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population', op. cit., p. 12).

[11] 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages . . .', op. cit.

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IN THE ABSENCE OF HIERARCHY: NOTES ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

Ernest Stock

NOTWITHSTANDING the higher visibility of the national organizations, the centre of gravity of American Jewish community organization is to be found on the local level. Moreover the links that connect the lower (local) with the upper (national), echelons of the communal structure are not so much chains of command as channels for information—which moves both ways. Only infrequently does the flow of communication express a power-based relationship between the two levels. The national organizations may act autonomously of their local constituencies, but then they are also ineffectual in imposing their policies locally. Or they may act as the instruments of local constituencies, in which case their freedom to act on the national (or international) level is strictly circumscribed.

There is no single nationwide organization which can claim to speak for American Jewry as a whole, except when its competence is limited to a special field of activity. Among the best known examples are those concerned with overseas goals: the United Jewish Appeal, the Israel Bond Drive, and the Joint Distribution Committee which, as the recognized authority for overseas relief, is a partner in UJA. Among those organizations active in the U.S. are the American Association for Jewish Education, which is looked to as qualified to advise on educational questions (but not to decide on questions concerning individual schools in particular localities), and the National Jewish Welfare Board, which represents the interests of the community centres, and serves the religious needs of Jewish soldiers. Each of the synagogue movements—orthodox, conservative, and reform—has its organization, as have the rabbis in each group. There is also a joint body of the three separate religious trends which acts as their common spokesman in areas where their interests coincide and it is agreed that all religious Jewry should be represented by a single voice.

The last-mentioned groups and others in the same category are in effect 'roof organizations' constituted by local bodies to provide them

with services, including representation on the national level, with the constituent groups continuing to exercise control over the national body's actions. The balance of reciprocal influence as between local and national groups may fluctuate, subject at any particular time to the views and personalities of the individuals in positions of leadership. But as a rule the activities of the roof organizations are watched over and circumscribed first by the member organizations which contribute the budget; then by other groups in related fields which are jealous of their own prerogatives; and also by the individuals who make up the constituencies of the member organizations. When the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, roof body of the Reform synagogue, announced plans to set up an office in Washington for 'social action' it met with adverse reaction within its ranks. Many members of congregations felt that their roof organization was exceeding its assigned task and navigating in uncharted waters. Only after protracted argument did the advocates of the proposal win out.

Another type of national body was constituted in response to specific situations, going on to consolidate its influence and to reach local public opinion by forming branches in various cities. Examples are the American Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Committee, each with headquarters in New York and chapters in the provinces. These organizations were formerly called defence agencies, as one of their main functions was defence against antisemitism. But eventually their aims became broader and they preferred to be known as community-relations agencies. From concern with the status of the Jewish individual in the community, they extended their activities to the area of human rights on a larger plane, particularly the Negro struggle for equality. Here, too, memberships were divided over how far their organizations should go. In the American Jewish Congress one faction maintained that a Jewish group should not be in the forefront of the struggle for Negro rights; another insisted just as firmly that it was its duty to do so.

The fact that there are several agencies in the field of community relations serves as a check on tendencies by any one agency to claim exclusive jurisdiction or representation. Thus an informal system of checks and balances is built into this sector of the community structure. But the plurality of agencies also tends to bring about duplication of effort. In the forties, an attempt was first made to overcome this through the creation of a national advisory body in which all the community-relations groups participated. When the advisory council proved ineffective, Professor Robert MacIver, the Columbia sociologist, was brought in to study the matter and submit a plan for action. His recommendation was that the field be divided into its component parts, and that these be assigned among the several agencies. The advisory council should become a co-ordinating body to implement

the plan. But the proposals were rejected by two of the major agencies, who were wary of the concentration of authority in the co-ordinating body. The proposed division of functions was never implemented. More recently, following years of negotiations, the two objecting groups rejoined the National Community Relations Advisory Council under strictly defined conditions which did not comprise Professor MacIver's recommendations.

Far from being able to speak for American Jewry as a whole, national organizations sometimes do not even have a clear mandate to speak for their own local branches. An episode which illuminates the degree of local autonomy from national control occurred in the late 1950s in a New England city. A dispute arose over the distribution of moneys raised in the local welfare fund campaign. The United Jewish Appeal, as the major partner, felt it was being treated unfairly. That in itself is not an uncommon situation. In the bargaining that goes on continuously between the national UJA and the local welfare funds over the proceeds of the campaigns there is frequent acrimony. But in most cases an amicable agreement is reached. In this instance, however, the dispute led to a declaration by the UJA that it would refuse to accept its intended share of the local drive and would conduct an independent campaign of its own in the town.

To support the UJA's position, the various Zionist organizations with chapters in the community asked their local adherents to withhold cooperation from the annual welfare fund campaign. But the chapters refused to be guided by their national officers. All of them stuck by the local campaign organization in its conflict with the UJA. In the end a compromise was reached, and the UJA remained a partner in the local drive.

The episode points to another salient feature of the American Jewish communal structure. In contrast to the lack of decision-making machinery on the national level, there is an effective potential for consensus and its implementation on the level of the local community. Here Jews work and give of their money; here they are known to their neighbours and belong to organizations that are rooted in the community, whether they be religious, fraternal, charitable, or educational. The average Jewish citizen is a member of several groups, and he wishes to avoid conflict among them, especially as regards the raising of funds. Therefore he encourages efforts at co-ordinating their activities. Out of this desire to see order in the local Jewish community there have arisen, first, the federations and welfare funds which co-ordinate the programme of the various social agencies and the money-raising for them; and second, Jewish community councils (sometimes called community-relations councils) whose task it is to seek a common approach to the general community.

Although the same aspiration for harmony exists among Jewish

individuals with respect to the organizations operating on the national level, the channels reaching up to that level are too tenuous to permit effective control. In the absence of such control, local communal bodies are reluctant to grant national organizations power to speak or act on their behalf (except on clearly defined issues, as stated above).

Part of the reason may also be sought in the distrust of centralized power among Americans generally, and in their fear that it might be abused. It is a distrust permanently embedded in the constitution, and in its system of checks and balances, not only among the branches of federal government, but also between the states and the central authority. In the Jewish community there is, of course, no formal system of checks and balances, but some of the relationships described above have the features of an informal one. Distrust of power in the Jewish community is also expressed in the frequent rotation of organizational offices and setting up of elaborate boards and committees to supervise the actions of the officials to whom executive prerogative is entrusted. Moreover, the historic reluctance of Americans to see the exercise of power geographically removed from its source (as reflected in suspicion of 'the man in the White House' and government in Washington generally) has its counterpart in the unwillingness of local Jewish communities to see power concentrated in New York. Thus the 200 or more Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, the most influential groups on the local scene because of their role in the allocation of philanthropic funds, limit their national Council's scope by retaining control of the annual General Assembly which lays down Council policy, and by keeping a tight rein on its budget.

There also exists in the very influence of the welfare funds on the local scene a potential for the exercise of power nationally which is not lost on other groups determined to prevent accrual of such power to any one body. In the 1940s, the welfare funds had urged the institution of a system of 'national budgeting', whereby a committee affiliated with the Council was to suggest the size of allocations by the local welfare funds to national organizations. This proposal, like the MacIver report on community relations, ran into strenuous opposition by the national agencies which would have been affected. Instead of the proposed budgeting machinery, an advisory body called the Large Cities Budgeting Conference, again with strictly circumscribed competence, was eventually established.

Added to the reluctance to endow any particular organization with power there is mistrust of the individual who purports to speak for all Jewry, lest he use the leverage of the community for ends on which there is no formal consensus. It is true that the men who are generally accepted as leaders of the American Jewish community are those who hold positions of influence in the national organizations, rather than locally, for to be a national leader one must be nationally known,

and only the national organizations have the public relations apparatus to see to this (in those cases where the individual is not already a public figure when he enters upon the Jewish arena). But it is one thing to become a nationally known figure, and from that position to exercise a certain amount of influence on the community as a whole, and quite another to be endowed by the community with power to act. That prerogative the American Jewish community (meaning in effect the aggregate of local communities) is loth to grant to an individual any more than to any central body.

If a nomenclature is sought, the structure on the national scene might be called intentional non-centralization—a condition which corresponds to the self-image of their group held by most American Jews. American Jewry does not care to be considered as a bloc on the political scene. It would rather see itself represented as a variegated group, consisting of labour elements and business men; small-town people and city dwellers; Democrats and Republicans . . . all with specific interests related to their particular position but not necessarily their Jewishness. The consensus has been that an inclusive national structure would hurt the interests of the community more than it would advance them, by running counter to its image as a congregational religious and/or ethnic group without political status or aspiration to it. In accordance with that image, the structure should be primarily local, with a religious or philanthropic base; and on the national level, specifically functional rather than general.

In the absence of a clearly articulated hierarchical pattern, attempts at a federated structure linking together the main groups on the national level have had only passing success, corresponding to the *ad hoc* character of the stimulus which called the attempt into being. An early example was the American Jewish Congress, formed at the close of the First World War to send a representative delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. But it soon lost its representative character and became just another organization. During the Second World War the American Jewish Conference was called together to present a common front at a time of supreme danger; it too ended in failure when the prestigious American Jewish Committee left it. The Committee's refusal to adhere to the Presidents' Conference, set up in the 1950s to co-ordinate relations with and concerning Israel, has been a handicap to this latest attempt as well.

The effort is apt to be more durable if it is directed towards a specific goal and is limited in time as well as in purpose. This is the case with the Conference on Soviet Jewry, convened in 1964 and still in being.

Are we to conclude that the absence of an articulated centralized structure is a major shortcoming of American Jewish community organization? Since organizational unity is not a goal which American Jews in the past set for themselves, it is hardly a fair criterion of the

effectiveness of their community organization. A more relevant criterion would be whether the organizational structure serves the community's interests as it perceives them.

It is true that some of the organizations overlap in their scope and programmes of activity, and that the results overall are often not commensurate with the volume of activity generated. But then their activity is to some extent an end in itself. Organizations are secular foci of Jewish life, and affiliation with and activity in them is an expression of identification with the Jewish community. The organizational paraphernalia, the bestowing of honours and the rotation of office, all have a function directed inwards towards the membership, side by side with the aim the organization may pursue towards the outside world. The continuous calendar of conventions, meetings and conferences which take place on the national level each year is in the nature of a secular ritual designed to provide inspiration and stimulus to the delegates.

The function of the national organizations remains marginal in relation to the individual's Jewish identity. He belongs to the lodge of B'nai B'rith rather than to the national order; he spends his leisure hours at the local community centre, contributes to the local federation campaign, and worships at the local synagogue.

None of this should be construed as an apologia for the present stage of community organization in America. The point is that its character reflects that of its environment, its non-centralized structure that of voluntarism in the general community. In this respect 'the American Way' has its replica in Jewish America.

But as American society finds itself on the threshold of the 1970s with the prospect of profound changes in its institutional and value system just ahead, the Jewish community too will be facing major challenges. Up to now its loose, rather amorphous structure has proved itself adequate. But its most severe test will be its adaptability in a radically changing environment.

THE COMMUNAL ORGANIZATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN JEWRY

Steven E. Aschheim

MOSHE Davis's observation that the Jews of Argentina, Canada, and the United States '. . . committed to the Jewish Tradition and the Jewish People, experiencing on the whole analogous internal Jewish needs and problems, are building indigenous institutions in their respective localities to ensure their future as Jewish communities'[1] holds equally well for South Africa. The South African Jewish community has, in common with all organized Jewish communities, a desire for survival; it must also cope with the problems of a rapidly changing multi-racial society. Gustav Saron has well described South African Jewry as 'a unique blend resulting from the interaction of Litvak and British elements with the emergent South African way of life'.[2]

The present study[3] is concerned with the internal workings of South African 'Jewish civil society' and will refer to the wider social and political context only in so far as it relates to this central focus. Implicit in this study is the methodological assumption that only an examination of both the 'formal' and 'informal' aspects of communal organizations and their particular relationship will provide insight into the dynamics of corporate Jewish life.

In Daniel Elazar's scheme of Patterns of Jewish Community Organization[4] South Africa is classified as a 'representative board' type—that is, a community identifiable by virtue of an overall 'umbrella' communal organization. This, however, should be considered merely as a form of classification—under the heading 'representative board type' we assume no *a priori* model of community functioning. It may well be that this designation simplifies, or serves to conceal, the more complicated patterns of community life.

Historical and demographic background[5]

The initial formative period of communal life began in the early nineteenth century and continued until 1880. The first Jewish settlers, consisting mainly of English, German, and Dutch immigrants, initiated

'the first groping efforts towards creating organised Jewish group life: small numbers of individuals formed themselves into Hebrew Congregations, consecrated burial grounds, built synagogues, established philanthropic institutions and laid the foundations of a corporate Jewish life'.[6]

Throughout the period 1869–86 (the respective dates of the discovery of diamonds and gold) intermittent immigration contributed further to the development of communal institutions. Even then the outline of the particular pattern of Jewishness which was to characterize South African Jewry was beginning to be perceptible. 'On the whole these Jewish pioneers of Johannesburg were not pious and observant Jews. . . . Yet, despite this, there was an unexpressed and perhaps even an unconscious but nevertheless real determination among the great majority not to lose their Jewish identity and to hold on tenaciously to their faith. When the High Festivals came, in town and in village, in mining camp and in newly established settlement, there was a strong urge to unite in congregational prayer. . . . In a remarkably short time this developed into a comprehensive system of communal activity, regular Sabbath and Festival services, synagogues and schools, social, educational, religious, philanthropic and Zionist organizations—in short, a complete, if not full-blooded, Jewish life from the cradle to the grave.'[7]

It was the subsequent mass eastern European immigration of 1880–1901, however, that was to have a decisive impact on the style and development of South African Jewish civil society. It was these arrivals 'generically described as the "Litvaks", who by their weight of numbers and their closeness to traditional Judaism, set their stamp upon the broad pattern of South African Jewish life, adapting it to local conditions and the dominant "English" culture of the times'.[8]

The Lithuanian influence can be understood only in relation to previous patterns of authority and community organization. The character of institutions had tended towards the British model as a result of the virtual monopoly by 'English' Jews in controlling leadership positions. 'They were at the head of the synagogues, of charitable organisations, of the Board of Deputies, of the Zionist societies and of many other institutions.'[9] Close ties were maintained with the English 'homeland', especially on the congregational level which, at this stage, provided the basis for most community activities. (The opinions of the British Chief Rabbi were then largely respected, his authority real.) It should be noted here too that the Zionist nature of the community was not *exclusively* a result of the eastern European immigration. Many of the English Jews were themselves Zionists and over the years Zionist organizations and societies had developed.

The eastern European immigration ushered in a period of communal conflict. Russian Jews considered the English 'heathenish' and 'ignor-

ant'; the English found their new communal partners crude and un-
mannerly. Institutionally the conflict was first reflected in the religious
sphere where congregations often split. 'In Cape Town, Port Elizabeth,
Durban, Johannesburg and other places, the newcomers hived off to
establish congregations of their own. Since the newcomers were not a
homogeneous group, but had strong parochial ties with their home
towns and villages, a large number of independent *landsmannschaften*
came into existence.'[10] The conflict spread to other spheres of the com-
munity where it assumed more explicit political overtones. Community
affairs, the immigrants felt, were run in 'dictatorial' fashion, English
emphasis on 'manners' and 'procedure' being merely a power device.
A move to split the Chevra Kadisha was quashed at the last moment.
'. . . when steps were taken soon after the Anglo-Boer War to set up a
representative Jewish body in the Transvaal—the Board of Deputies—
the Russian Jews were at first unwilling to accept the leadership of an
·anglicised Jew like Max Langermann'.[11]

The meeting of the 'English' and 'Litvak' streams was to determine
much of the corporate character of South African Jewish life. The
conflict had its roots in real differences: it was a reflection of varying
social and economic statuses within the community, of diverging tradi-
tions and attitudes towards 'public' questions of Jewish life as well as of
differing notions and perceptions of the wider society of which it was
a part. Saron has well described the resolution of this conflict: '. . . in
the long run it was the Anglo-Jewish pattern which, at any rate in its
externals, prevailed in South Africa, although it underwent important
changes in its spirit and inner content. . . . It was a case of pouring
Litvak spirit into the Anglo-Jewish bottles.'[12] In Australia the eastern
European immigration resulted in a wide diversification of the institu-
tional forms of Jewishness; in South Africa it was more a case of the
revitalization and democratization of already existing forms.

Until the Second World War—my study concentrates on the post-
war period—there was both consolidation and development of the
institutional structure described above. Today the conflict and the
ethnic divisions underlying it are hardly remembered. *Landsmannschaften*,
their purposes fulfilled, have, to all intents and purposes, disappeared.
With the centrality of Israel to Jewish life in South Africa and the
gradual weakening of political and cultural ties linking the Republic
to Britain, the impact of English Jewry is today negligible. The present
community is largely South African-born and is responding as such
to a series of problems peculiar to the post-war Jewish communities
of the world[13] in an especially perplexing local context. Like other
Western Jewish communities, South African Jewry, in a particularly
favourable economic context, has experienced rapid upward mobility.
Although Jews have seldom penetrated the 'commanding heights' of the
economy, such as mining and insurance, they constitute a highly

affluent middle-class community. With the rest of the white population they have full political rights. Their occupational structure is tilted in favour of commerce, industry, and the professions, although a small minority is engaged in farming and in university and school teaching.

There are approximately 118,000 Jews living in South Africa. Roughly half live in Johannesburg (57,707); Cape Town is the second largest centre, with about 24,000 Jews. The remainder are spread all over the country, from substantial Jewish centres such as Durban and Port Elizabeth through to the smaller rural communities.[14]

The South African community is often acclaimed as one of the most Jewish-conscious and well-organized in the world. Let us now proceed to examine it.

The structure of Jewish communal organization in South Africa

The community is organized on four levels: countrywide, provincial, urban-local, and rural-local.

(a) *Countrywide*: The key institutions here are as follows.

(i) The South African Jewish Board of Deputies. This organization acts as the authorized spokesman for the Jewish community in its relations with the state, the government, and other ethnic and religious groups. The Jewish Board of Deputies for the Transvaal and Natal was founded in 1903 and a similar organization was established in the Cape in 1904. They were united as 'the South African Board' after Union in 1912.

(ii) The South African Zionist Federation is the official body of South African Zionism with control over all Zionist affairs. It was established in 1898 and was the first countrywide institution in the community.

(iii) The South African Board of Jewish Education, founded in 1929, is the body responsible for the educational policy, financing, and co-ordination of the greater part of South African Jewish education.

(iv) The countrywide religious bodies are the Federation of Synagogues of South Africa (Orthodox) and the Union for Progressive Judaism.

(v) The Union of Jewish Women of South Africa.

Between them these bodies cover the major fields of organized Jewish communal efforts on a countrywide scale.

The structure of authority in the countrywide organizations is parallel, not hierarchical. That is, institutions usually possess actual as well as formal autonomy within their own sphere of communal responsibility. In Charles Liebman's phraseology,[15] 'the authoritative relationships of functional confidence between organizations' are well established. Non-Zionist organizations (usually) *do* defer to Zionist organizations in Zionist matters. The same applies to the conduct of non-religious bodies with respect to religious affairs, and so forth.

However, this has not always been the case: the present situation is the product of a long and often stormy development in the history of South African Jewish communal institutions. The delineation of separate functional responsibilities was a gradual process. In the pioneering days of the community it was the synagogue that performed most of the communal tasks usually associated with other institutions. Thus it carried out educational, financial, and social functions as well as strictly religious affairs. Later on, towards the end of the nineteenth century, it was the Zionist Federation (the only organization with institutional links throughout the country) that concerned itself with extra-Zionist activities. It saw itself as the guardian of Jewish interests in South Africa and as the vital force in local community affairs, and undertook immigration and naturalization work. It is hardly surprising, then, that when the idea of a Board of Deputies (which would carry out these functions not strictly speaking within the scope of the Zionist organization) was mooted, it met with opposition. The 1905 Zionist Conference Executive report stated that '. . . Zionists are instructed to take part in all Jewish work and to care for all Jewish interests, in order to accustom governments to regard them as the representatives of the Jewish people. The establishment of other associations to deal specifically with the safeguarding of Jewish political interests is thus not compatible with the policy of the Federation.'[16]

When, after much conflict, the Board was finally established it took a number of years before the respective functions of the two bodies became clear. The Federation continued to insist on its right to take parallel action with the Board. Eventually the delineation of functions became clearer and more accepted, especially during the 1930s when the growth of political antisemitism in South Africa and the urgent question of accepting German Jewish refugees from Nazism made the issue of 'Jewish defence' a community priority. Today there is mutual recognition of their respective functions (though, as we shall see, some differences of outlook on certain issues persist).

(b) *Provincial*: There are usually Provincial Councils which duplicate the countrywide institutions at this level. Thus the provincial bodies of the Board are the Cape Board, the Eastern Province Council, and the Council for Natal Jewry. Transvaal, significantly, has no such council; the national office (situated in Johannesburg) is charged with the responsibility for this province. The Zionist Federation has a similar structure.

The intensity of provincial activity differs from province to province. Thus the Natal Council of Jewry has established a powerful coordinating structure, while the Transvaal has relatively few functional responsibilities. Often, however, what are deemed 'provincial' matters are in reality confined to the one or two main centres of the province. Thus the differing strengths of provincial bodies may relate to the

power of leading local communities and their varying desires for independent communal activity. Nevertheless, the provincial institutions should be viewed on the 'formal' level rather than as being possessed of effective authority and capacity to involve the wider Jewish community in their affairs. The pattern here is of national authority and dominance (although neither the provincial nor the countrywide organizations would categorize their relationship in such terms as 'authority' and 'dominance').

A possible exception to this configuration of authority, however, is the Cape–National relationship which in turn reflects the strengths of the local communities of Cape Town and Johannesburg.

The dynamic centre of both national and Jewish life in South Africa is undoubtedly Johannesburg. Given the demographic structure—half of South African Jewry lives in Johannesburg—the fact that all the national institutions are housed there should come as no surprise. Cape Town's status, however, as legislative capital and first South African city, and its longer Jewish tradition combined with the sheer physical distance from Johannesburg, are all factors which have contributed to the long history of its misunderstandings and conflicts with the national centre. The Cape community, Johannesburg leaders complain, is 'a world of its own'. The Cape desire for autonomy is reflected at the institutional level: the Cape Board of Education is separate from the South African Board of Education and functions as an autonomous body. Similarly, the United Hebrew Congregations of the Cape is a separate body independent of the control of the Federation of Synagogues of South Africa. (The *South African Jewish Year Book* lists these two *Cape* institutions under the heading 'National Institutions'.) Although the Board of Deputies and the Zionist Federation include the Cape under the same organizational umbrella, relations here are also often strained. Nevertheless, the conflict has never reached proportions sufficiently great to prompt an overall split.

(c) *Urban-local*: For our purposes we can define an 'urban-local' community as any town which has an organized network of communal institutions. On this plane there is usually a veritable proliferation of organizations and activity. Some of the organizations may be purely local (for instance, a sports club) while others may relate to either provincial or countrywide institutions. It is at this level that volunteer affiliation and activity are most intense.

(d) *Rural-local*: Though they are gradually disappearing in a rapidly industrializing society, a special pattern of communal organization can still be observed in the rural communities. Out of a widely scattered rural Jewish population estimated at about 9,000 people 'there are close to forty fully functioning Hebrew congregations in the rural areas of the Republic. Each of these congregations has a Minister-Teacher, a synagogue, a Hebrew school and maintains regular congregational

facilities: there are weekly Synagogue services, Zionist and charitable societies, social functions—in short, an organised Jewish life.'[17]

A special department to serve and relate these communities to the wider community has been established by the Board of Deputies; it concentrates on the more isolated rural towns out of reach of local centres.

What emerges from this picture of communal structure? A profusion of organizations at all levels does not necessarily mean a 'pluralistic' power structure along American lines where it is difficult to locate the source of decisions affecting the overall community. According to the evidence in hand, the South African case is a clear example of structured 'centralized' power: it is the countrywide institutions (each within their specific sphere of functional competence) that formulate policy. These institutions are not merely the sum of their parts: to a large degree they initiate, co-ordinate, and control. In a homogeneous community this transmission of authority downwards is, within certain limits, effective. Within this structure the provincial aspect is the least important in functional terms. The importance of the local plane appears to lie in its capacity for 'community-involving' activities. Whereas the national institutions are more centrally concerned with community questions of power and decision, it is within local organizations that individual identification is given scope and where personal involvement of the rank-and-file is most intense, though clearly all these elements play a part in communal activity on all planes: we are concerned here with their respective proportions.

Possible reasons for, and implications of, this particular national-local configuration will be discussed in the conclusion.

The key institutions: Structures, functions, and issues

(i) *The Board of Deputies*

'The South African Jewish Community' as such has no legal status. Based as it is on the voluntary principle of association, no statute or, as far as I am aware, Common Law precedent exists which confers legal status on the community. Nevertheless, the primary function of the Board is to act as the community's 'representative' within South African society. 'In South Africa the Board of Deputies has been accepted by both Jew and non-Jew as the authorized spokesman for the community.'[18] In this case 'authorization' implies not legal empowerment but rather legitimation of a quasi-legal kind through consensus.

The Board acts as spokesman for the community on matters of Jewish interest. It is concerned with both general vigilance against, and with specific incidents of, antisemitism. It attempts to foster better group relations between Jews and non-Jews. It is also formally

concerned with co-ordinating Jewish communal work. The United Communal Fund, which helps to finance various Jewish organizations, is administered by the Board.

As the name implies, the Board was established with the British model in mind. However, it subsequently diversified its functions. Thus the Board operates a welfare department which deals with personnel problems, unemployment, naturalization, etc. 'It promotes adult education programmes. Together with several other bodies, it provides religious and educational services to the small, isolated country communities. It maintains a communal archive and a well-stocked library of up-to-date Jewish information, and also fosters research in S.A. Jewish history. Recently it has begun to promote programmes for Jewish youth and university students. . . . In embracing so wide a range of activities, the South African body has moved far from its British prototype, which is largely confined by tradition and precedent to functioning in the spheres of Jewish defence and foreign affairs.'[19] (The degree of success of such attempts to become more 'community centred', as well as possible motivations for this diversification of functions, will be discussed later.)

The Board relates to the community through its constituent organizations. Affiliation is conditional on the single clause, that it be 'any group of Jews organized for an authentic Jewish object'. There is an affiliated membership of about 330 organizations comprising the whole range of institutional life. Its executive structure is determined by a biennial Congress where delegates (appointees of the various affiliated organizations) elect the Executive Council. Provincial Councils are similarly elected by constituent bodies in their respective areas. At both the national and provincial levels the specific areas of functional responsibilities are discharged by committees formed for that purpose.

The changing nature of issues which inform such Congresses is instructive.

Before the Second World War there was a serious but unsuccessful attempt by a group of Jews identified with the left wing to 'take over' the Board and use it as a mouthpiece for their political activities. The story is of intrinsic interest, but it does not fall within the period of the present study. What is relevant is that such conflicts are virtually non-existent today. This reflects the general trend of the political 'homogenization' of South African society. The Jewish community, a marginal and highly visible historical group in an already fragmented multi-racial society, is under great pressure to conform.

The tragic dilemma of conscience confronting South African Jewry has been amply documented elsewhere.[20] Suffice it to say here that the pressure towards conformity has been reflected in changes in official Jewish attitudes, as expressed by the Board, towards the governing Nationalist Party.

Before its assumption of power in 1948, the Nationalist Party was overtly antisemitic and had certain connexions with overseas fascist organizations. The attitude of the Board to the still-in-opposition Nationalist Party was uncompromising. It openly declared its opposition to racial discrimination and to the Nationalist Party policy of apartheid on both moral and practical grounds. Thus the January 1948 *Jewish Affairs* (monthly organ of the Board of Deputies) described apartheid as 'a policy which the social and industrial realities of the day reduce to hopeless contradiction'.[21] It went on to say that although it was doubtful that there was a specific Jewish viewpoint, 'something, nevertheless, can be expected of the Jew. On racial issues he should take as liberal a view as possible. He should be profoundly sensitive to injustice arising from discrimination based on race or caste. He can and must be progressive.'[22]

Upon the accession to power of the Nationalists a perceptible change in official Jewish attitudes occurred. The constantly reiterated posture today is that the Board is a non-political body with no opinions on party issues or the various race policies which are advocated. The individual Jew is urged to vote according to his conscience and to his perception of what constitutes a just and harmonious South Africa. 'The documentation shows that under the government of General Smuts and his United Party the Board allowed itself certain beliefs on issues of color and discrimination which it jettisoned once the National Party was firmly in power.'[23]

This is not meant as a condemnation of South African Jewry; from the community point of view the doctrine of corporate non-involvement in South African politics may be the prime defining condition of survival. However one evaluates organized Jewry's acquiescence to apartheid, it cannot be explained in terms of Jewish commitment to the political, economic, and ideological status quo. While this may account for individual attitudes, as Edward Feit points out, '. . . above all else a community and its responsible leadership has to decide issues in terms of its vulnerability and prospects for survival'.[24] Communities seldom consciously risk, let alone request, persecution. Nevertheless this change, imperceptible to most of the community, is given as an example of the kind of forces which are, in part, determining the quality of Jewish life and the particular way in which 'issues' affecting the larger South African society have been dropped from the community's corporate agenda. A tacit agreement as to the limits of legitimate 'political' discourse and action within the community has been developed.

The Nationalist Government in power has not adopted an antisemitic policy (although this may be a function of Jewish political quiescence) and the Board has, to date, dealt mainly with isolated incidents. Apart from the concern which such incidents evoke, the unprogrammatic 'social' nature of South African antisemitism has not

become a 'political' issue within the community. There is today a broad consensus regarding the Board's policy towards, and management of, the problem.

The kinds of internal 'political' issue which are the concern of the Board today have thus become more inward-centred. Most of the issues revolve around the effort to introduce greater co-ordination and planning in the community and turn upon rather academic debates and commissions concerned with the nature of the Board's representativeness and its constitutional limits. Underlying these debates is an awareness of community apathy regarding the Board's work and an attempt to re-energize participation through structural reform (such as the proposal to create a system of individual franchise in place of the prevailing 'organizational representation' system). To date, the structure has not been changed.

(ii) *Zionism and the South African Zionist Federation*

'The impact of the Zionist Movement has probably been greater on our community than upon any other of the English-speaking communities.'[25] How do we explain this phenomenon? A common (and tempting) explanation of Zionist strength within the South African Jewish community is to postulate that, at base, it is a function of the insecurity of living in a potentially antisemitic and explosive multiracial society. Amongst others, Howard Sachar has expressed this 'insurance-policy' theory whereby South African Zionists 'in their identifications . . . expressed the unspoken belief of perhaps the majority of their co-religionists in the "beloved country": Zion was more than a cultural centre for World Jewry; for the threatened Jews of South Africa it was nothing less than a reserve homeland.'[26] This may indeed be the unconscious stimulus underlying the South African Jewish psyche's predisposition to Zionism. Yet this theory should also take into account the fact that the Zionist Movement in South Africa is, more often than not, weakened by unstable situations. Although a number of Jews emigrated to Israel in the wake of the 1960 Sharpeville riots, the number of people who disaffiliated from the Zionist ranks was striking. Furthermore recurrent 'dual loyalty' accusations by government spokesmen—often prompted by Israeli condemnations at the United Nations of the country's racial policies—have been a major source of concern for both the Zionist Federation and the general Jewish population. It is also an open empirical question whether—faced with a critical situation—the mass of this affluent community would choose Israel as a place of residence (above England, the United States, or Switzerland).

There are, I think, other factors which may throw a different light on the phenomenon. The strength of Zionism in South Africa must be seen within the broader sociological context, a context which has direct

bearing on the strong Jewish identity of the community as well as the forms of Jewishness within the community. The multi-racial texture of South African society and the Anglo-Boer struggle are probably the main factors which have combined to produce an explicit philosophy of, and rationale for, ethnic group differences. Separate group identity is constantly encouraged and emphasized. Economic concerns apart, there is a tendency for the different ethnic groups to provide an almost self-sustaining social, cultural, religious, and often educational frame-work of institutions for their members. Social contacts are for many pro-vided exclusively according to this community pattern. South Africa is not a 'neutral society'; to a large extent it works according to a system of closed options.

Zionism should be viewed as a key option in a small community possessed of limited expressive communal resources. Within this con-text the strength of South African Zionism can be explained by the deep Litvak Zionist orientation having been transformed into a vener-able tradition within the community and the Federation's role as the first 'national' institution combining Zionism with a deep involvement in local community life. Samuel Goldreich, Chairman of the Zionist Federation, recognized this as early as 1911: 'When was Zionism strongest in South Africa? When we were doing beneficial work locally for our people here . . .'[27] One is not born into the Zionist Federation in South Africa but into the Zionist tradition.

The Federation is not only the 'representative umbrella' body of South African Zionism; it centralizes and co-ordinates, formulates policy, and initiates activity. Its organizational efficiency has been commented upon by many overseas observers. The Federation's func-tions are manifold. It manages the main fund-raising appeals for Israel and propagates and implements *aliyah* (the number of *olim* relative to other Western countries is high—in this respect South Africa differs from America where only now the signs of a 'legitimization' of the concept of *aliyah* are emerging). It encourages Israel tourism and conducts Zionist propaganda through its national weekly newspaper and other publications; it runs educational and cultural activities for all age groups. There are also Medical and Maccabi Councils.

South African Jewry also differs from sister English-speaking com-munities in the effectiveness of its Zionist youth movements. A very large number of the community's children will have at one time or another been in their ranks. These movements are also the most fertile source of 'mass *aliyah*' from South Africa. There are over 6,000 regis-tered members in the different movements which are co-ordinated through the Zionist Youth Councils. Their high rate of *aliyah* points to the significant fact that these movements are able to hold people of university age. Their leadership consists mostly of university students. 'Committed' youth in South Africa have few choices: where the choice

of 'idealistic' activity is between liberal politics and the very real dangers attending its pursuit, and the externalization of such idealism to Israel, a large degree of activistically minded middle-class South African Jewish youth will probably turn towards this 'legitimized' form of revolution. (Here I refer of course only to the comparatively few who form an elite of such socially conscious individuals. The vast majority of South African Jewish youth fit into the established way of life. A small minority of this elite do take the road of political activism in South Africa. More often than not, however, this leads to some form of disaffection from the Jewish community.)

As with the Board, the various affiliated Zionist parties, organizations, and societies (through their delegates) elect the Federation's executive council at biennial conferences. Membership of the Executive, however, is determined by a 'party key'. The main groupings of the Federation still revolve around traditional party categories. Thus there are the Mizrachi, the Labour Zionists, the Revisionists, etc. The principal internal conflict in the Federation in the past few years has been over the desirability of eliminating the party system and giving the Federation a non-party structure. Opinions have polarized. Thus far the conflict has not been resolved; party members with vested interests in the present system have effectively managed to employ the constitution and their weight of numbers to prevent change. Those who oppose the party system complain that categories of party are hopelessly outdated and irrelevant to the present needs of South African Zionism. They argue that only a change in structure will facilitate the recruitment of new and young leadership into the Federation. (It is instructive to note here that even those who are against the party system—the ex-General Zionists—have formed a 'non-party Party'! The only slight dent in the system occurred when the present Chairman of the Federation took office on condition that some of the older party people entrenched in important positions be replaced. This, however, was a change of personnel, not structure.)

(iii) *The South African Board of Jewish Education*

The Board is an autonomous body and provides an interesting example of the role of changing priorities and innovative leadership in the community. Initially formed by a small determined minority who perceived the need for community education long before it penetrated community consciousness, it was beset for years by community apathy and financial difficulties. Changing community conceptions as to the place of education in communal life were to a large extent a product of the effective lobbying of the Board's leadership. Today there is a separate education campaign and the Board has begun to make headway in its work though (as analysed below in the section on community finance) serious deficits still persist.

The Board, Lewis Hotz comments, 'has brought a new atmosphere into Hebrew education in South Africa. It has helped to create a net-work of educational services ranging from nursery school to the second-ary school and the teachers' training institution. Its inspection staff also serves Hebrew schools not directly under its control, thus ensuring uniformly high standards of teaching. In 1966 the Board . . . was im-mediately responsible for 33 primary schools with an enrolment of 2,100 pupils, for 32 Talmudei Torah in Johannesburg . . . with 1,900 pupils, and for 48 Talmudei Torah with 1,965 scholars outside Johannesburg.'[28]

A critical development of the last two decades has been the rise of the Jewish day schools. Fifteen such schools, with over 6,000 pupils, have been established in the major Jewish centres: their effectiveness has to date not been systematically examined.

Day school educational policy is designed along 'national traditional' lines with Jewish subjects taught alongside the prescribed secular syllabus. By national traditional is meant an integrated approach to the main forms of 'positive Jewishness' found in South Africa: in effect the programme comprises a knowledge of Jewish history, religious instruction, Hebrew studies, and the development of a positive attitude towards Israel. The great success of these schools is also partly explained by the very high standard of secular education they provide. Their 'private' nature, incidentally, provides relative protection from the cruder racial features of the State 'National Christian Education' programme.

The rise to prominence of education as a communal priority is re-flected in a recent issue in which large sections of the community were involved. Over the last few years the day schools have sent certain senior classes to Jerusalem for a 3-4 month *ulpan* (an idea which is now being explored by other Western Jewish communities). The issue arose when Sde Boker was suggested as a venue for the most recent *ulpan*. Some sections of the community, especially the rabbis and some Mizrachi members, deemed its atmosphere not sufficiently 'Jewish'. Much debate ensued. The community's pragmatic style of conflict resolution which undercuts ideological considerations of this kind is illustrated by the manner in which the issue was settled. For 'practical' reasons half the children were sent to Sde Boker and half to Jeru-salem.

It should be noted here that both the Orthodox and Progressive bodies also have their own educational institutions which are educa-tionally and financially autonomous and independent of Board control. (These include the Yeshiva College and various nursery and primary schools.) This autonomy has also been an issue of debate within the community.

(iv) *Fund-raising institutions and communal finances*

The structure of South Africa's communal finance differs fundament-ally from the American Federation system. It is ironic that while the 'pluralistic' American Jewish structure has evolved a centralized financial framework, 'centralized' South Africa has only a limited degree of co-ordinated finance.

Until a late stage there was no centralization of local fund-raising whatsoever: each organization was left to its own resources. 'A big step forward . . . was taken when the United Communal Fund for South African Jewry was created in 1949. The intention at that time was to set up a single fund-raising instrument for major South African needs, to parallel united fund-raising for Israel. The U.C.F. . . . brought together for fund-raising purposes the Board of Deputies, the Boards of Education, the Federation of Synagogues, and other organizations—fifteen in all. It was a bold experiment, inasmuch as it included both "National Traditional" and "Reform" religious and educational institutions.'[29]

The U.C.F. campaigns alternate every other year with Zionist fund-raising. The U.C.F. itself is an autonomous organization (although intimately involved with the Board of Deputies, which is virtually dependent for its entire budgetary allocation on this institution). In 1950 a separate Women's U.C.F. was established. Today there are sixteen beneficiaries, although the greater part of the allocation goes to the Board of Deputies.

It is significant, however, that the Fund has been unable to raise sufficient money to meet the budgets of its beneficiary agencies. This has been especially felt in the context of Jewish education. The day schools are given no state-aid, and until recently have had to main-tain themselves through tuition fees and voluntary contributions. Deficits were often made up by the Board of Deputies and the Federa-tion. As mentioned earlier, a separate Education Fund has been established.

To a large extent, however, the structure of communal finances can-not be understood by examination of the U.C.F. The basic pattern is for particular institutions (welfare, religious, social, etc.) to be self-supporting by means of their own 'private' campaigns, special dona-tions, and membership subscriptions. Clearly, this system has produced a noticeable inequality of wealth between institutions: which institu-tions are richer, and why, are in themselves subjects for research.

Funds collected for the Zionist cause are a good indication of the strong Zionist orientation of the community. It is claimed that, per capita, South African Jewry has contributed more to Israel than any other community despite the ineligibility of charity money for tax-exemption. The 118,000 strong South African Jewish community

contributed 25 million U.S. dollars at the time of the Six-Day War. (Until the Israeli condemnation of South Africa's apartheid policy at the U.N. the South African Government had given special concessions with regard to the country's foreign currency regulations which allowed the Federation and other bodies to transfer money and goods to Israel. These were then rescinded. There are hints, possibly as a result of improved South African–Israel relations, that the present restrictions may be somewhat relaxed in the future.)

The major structure for the collection of these funds is the United Israel Appeal. This main fund combines in one drive contributions for the Keren Hayesod and other major Israel funds. Nevertheless there are various additional drives: WIZO, the Magen David Adom, and various *yeshivot* conduct their own campaigns.

There has been much debate as to the desirability of greater co-ordination in communal financial affairs. Those who support the status quo argue that a combination of major drives with separate efforts produces the greatest yield and that a Federation system would lower the overall contribution; their opponents point to the urgent need for rationalization of a chaotic situation where the most needy institutions are not necessarily those best served.

(v) *Other institutions*

Apart from these key institutions various other functional bodies catering to numerous communal needs proliferate in the community. These include the mass-based Union of Jewish Women which engages in a large spectrum of work ranging from inter-racial welfare through to educational programmes and public relations. Independent welfare bodies of all kinds operate. And, 'As new needs have emerged, secular Jewish bodies have developed, such as the Lodges of the Hebrew Order of David . . . and especially the Jewish sports clubs.'[30]

Religious life and institutions

Despite the strength of Zionism, religion is the central source of institutional identification in South Africa. 'National' definitions of Jewishness, as we have seen, lay people open to the explosive accusation of dual loyalties. Moreover, they may not accurately describe the emotions of most Jews towards South Africa. 'Good South Africans, good Jews' may not merely be a public relations catchword. As in most Western societies where nationality becomes coincidental with citizenship, the main area of 'legitimate' or 'official' Jewish self-definition is the religious one. (Non-whites in South Africa do not possess citizenship rights as they are not 'nationals'—they are 'temporary migrants from their own homelands'!)

The central role of religion as a means of identification is supported by figures of synagogue membership and attendance. Although the

figures cannot be taken as strictly accurate, they reveal that a clear majority of South African families are members of congregations, however irregular their attendance may be.[31] Although synagogue membership and attendance ratios do not establish the religiosity of South African Jews, they do point to the centrality of the synagogue as a source of communal identification. The only institution in South African Jewish life to command such a wide following is the synagogue.

In its emphasis on the building of imposing synagogue structures the South African community does not differ from other middle-class Western communities. Nevertheless, a need for more is expressed by Rabbi J. Newman who observes that 'by the time 1960 arrived, the total number of synagogues in Johannesburg amounted to 35, 32 of which were Orthodox and 3 Reform. The total seating capacity in established synagogues amounted to 17,000. By then the Jewish population of Johannesburg was over 50,000.'[32] Today there is seating for 18,000 out of a Jewish population of 57,000. Synagogue facilities did not keep in step with the influx of Jewish people into Johannesburg. Cape Town has two Reform temples and twelve Orthodox synagogues; Pretoria, Durban, and Port Elizabeth each have at least two synagogues. There are at least another forty congregations in the country.

Let us now examine the institutional framework of the two religious streams represented in South African Jewish life. The Orthodox Movement was developed in Johannesburg by the initial formation of the Johannesburg Hebrew Congregation, which originally consisted of one synagogue and was eventually joined by two others. The Chief Rabbi had jurisdiction only over these congregations, even though, during the years, congregations had sprung up in all the areas of Jewish settlement. In order to rectify this situation, the Federation of Synagogues of South Africa was established. A relatively recent innovation, it is a loose coalescence with little sense of collective purpose. Although the office of the Chief Rabbi now extends over all its affiliated synagogues, his institutionalized role remains different from that of his British counterpart. In Britain the Chief Rabbinate is an extremely powerful office. It would seem that in the South African case the man may be as important as his office in determining his authority over both religious and communal affairs (that is, the 'diffuseness' or 'specificity' of the Chief Rabbi's authority will depend to a large extent on his 'charismatic' presence and not on the institutionalized prestige of his office).[33] In the case of the congregational rabbi, authority is clearly specific. The community leadership has sometimes effectively made this clear. Thus in 1968 the Chairman of the Board of Deputies, at a meeting of the Board, stated that 'we on the Board of Deputies have always upheld the right of rabbis in their sermons and their statements to their congregations to say what their conscience dictates. But we do appeal to the individual rabbis in their public statements to

exercise restraint and not to say things and urge things which may result in exacerbating divisiveness. . . . Certain functions are clearly the preserve of the rabbinate. On the other hand, there is tacit agreement that other functions are reserved for the *Baalebatim*. Rabbis should be cautious about using strong language in the pulpit which reflects on the management of communal affairs by the lay leadership.'[34]

Of course, there are a few 'local' rabbis who, by virtue of their presence, exercise a strong influence on the community, but the general pattern (that the rabbi's main authoritative field of competence is religion in the narrow sense) is clear.

The Federation of Synagogues has its own youth movement and is responsible for the functioning of the Beth Din. There is, however, little co-ordination of congregational life or synagogue planning. It is seldom able to act as a concerted pressure group within the community. An exception to this was the delegation of Federation leaders to the Board of Education to demand more religious education in the day schools. In their 'specific area of religious competence' it is the rabbis and not the religious lay leadership who relate directly to the wider community.

Much of this is, perhaps, explicable in terms of the 'local' nature of congregational life. That is to say, congregations are by character designed to cater to the needs of particular localities: viewed in the context of the wider community, synagogues function mainly in suburban-bound milieux. In addition, synagogue affiliation differs as a mode of membership from that of, say, the Zionist Movement. Rabbis are seldom able to receive Federational or congregational 'mandates', as the mass synagogue membership holds diverse communal attitudes, and commitments cut across many more strata of opinion than is the case in other specific goal-oriented institutions.

The looseness of the Orthodox Movement's structure is further compounded by the fact that the Cape has a separate and autonomous Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations with its own Chief Rabbi— an office that at the time of writing has been left unfilled pending discovery of a suitable candidate.

The Reform Movement, whose co-ordinating national body is the 'Union for Progressive Judaism', is a relatively recent phenomenon in South African life. The first Reform congregation was established in 1933. There are ten Reform congregations, and it is estimated that the Reform Movement's adherents constitute about 10 per cent of South African Jewry. Although it is making some headway, the Movement has not encountered fertile ground in the community. Some factors responsible for its difficulties may also provide insight into the ideological underpinnings of the South African community.

In the first place, the community has to a large extent inherited the 'traditional' Lithuanian approach to religion as well as a certain resistance to change which departs too radically from established

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postures. Neither is the broader religious context favourable—the growth of Reform may be impeded in part by the 'State' Dutch Reform Church ethic: puritan and extremely traditional. Finally, there are the comparatively low rates of assimilation of South African Jewry, whereas assimilation is a condition classically associated with the rise of the Reform Movement.

The late emergence of Reform opened up an inevitable debate which had raged and been more or less resolved in Europe and America a number of years before. The Beth Din has often acted as the trigger of such debates. Thus when an Orthodox Rabbi (significantly a young American) sent greetings to a neighbouring Reform Temple, the Beth Din publicly condemned the act. There followed a controversy in both the Jewish and general press. The issue was aggravated by a later Beth Din proclamation in effect excluding Reform from the community by a regulation of non-fraternization. The usual ideological slogans ('assimilationists' and 'fanatics') were used by the respective sides. Nevertheless the danger of a community split was never serious: apart from the cardinal principle underlying the community's philosophy of internal and political affairs (that community solidarity in all matters which concern survival be the paramount consideration), the conflict never really became a mass rank-and-file issue. Modes of religious membership would seem to be predicated more on traditional affiliations than fundamental categories of religious observance. In the last few years there has been relative peace between the groups, although incidents periodically occur.

In which way, then, can we define the religious 'Orthodoxy' of South African Jews? Obviously, I refer here to the rank and file, not the spiritual leadership. Officially, of course, the Orthodox movement is based upon the principles of Torah Judaism. To what extent do congregants measure up to this ideal? Except for a small minority, individual observance is better classified as fitting into a 'Conservative' pattern. The vast majority of worshippers drive to synagogue on High Holy Days, work on the Sabbath, and eat in non-kasher restaurants (even if they observe *kashrut* at home). Unlike the American structure of Orthodoxy, one would be hard put to it to grade different congregations along a scale of observance such as 'extremely observant', 'less observant', etc. Few congregational differences apply, although clearly such a scale could be constructed to gauge individual differences of observance. To a large extent, then, South African Orthodoxy is more a widely accepted form of identification than it is a matter of disciplined observance. The rabbinate, of course, deplores this situation but, by dint of necessity, has come to terms with it. It has been challenged by the statement alleging that the only difference between Orthodox Judaism and Reform Judaism is that Reform Jews are not 'hypocrites'. The rabbinate's reply is that in Orthodox Judaism there is, at least, an

ideal towards which its adherents can aspire—an ideal which, it claims, is conspicuously absent from Reform observance requirements.

An exotic exception to this pattern of observance is the small Adas Yishurun group. This group, as far as I am aware, is the only South African Jewish sub-community that cannot be considered as a part of the organized Jewish polity. (The South African community has no local equivalent of the American Council of Judaism, or breakaway Bundists, etc.) The Adas Yishurun is ultra-orthodox and maintains its own complete religious framework; strictly separatist in orientation, it is not affiliated to any countrywide communal organization. The Adas group is attempting to organize its own school network; to date their children have attended secular (not Jewish) schools and have received intensive Jewish education under their own *heder* system in the afternoon.

As with other aspects of South African communal organization, religious institutions cater for the functional needs of their members. The Beth Din supervises community *kashrut* and inspects Jewish institutions to ensure their conformity with religious standards. Its ecclesiastical courts are the sole authorities for conversion to Judaism and the issuance of Jewish bills of divorce. They are also able to settle disputes involving consenting parties.

The synagogues provide scope for youth activities, education, and sometimes for cultural and social activities. Yet 'it is significant . . . that the American idea of a fully-fledged synagogue centre has not taken root'.[35] Perhaps this is a function of the socializing patterns of the community: informal friendships are overwhelmingly Jewish even at the university level. At the present time a dynamic (American) rabbi attached to a powerful congregation is attempting to create such a centre. It is being 'discouraged' by some rabbis on the grounds that scope for socializing within the community is provided in a multitude of organizations and that the function of religious institutions is religion. It remains to be seen whether this experiment will succeed.

The dynamics of community government

I intend in the following sections to go beyond formal structural analysis and enquire into some of the dynamics that determine community character. At this explorative stage I am still searching for the correct conceptual tools. It should be stressed, moreover, that the following analysis is not based on field research and is therefore only intended to highlight some of the approaches that I think may be useful in such future studies.

(i) Community leadership

What patterns of leadership can be discerned in the community? In the first place the homogeneous nature of South African Jewry, in combination with its small size, means that not only are leaders drawn

from the same social stratum but also that their lines of communication are relatively uncomplicated. The accompanying 'circulation of elites' on both the social and institutional planes may be a conflict-reducing factor.

Unlike the case in the United States, the top leadership is, by and large, not drawn from industrialists and business men. Leadership is primarily recruited from the professional ranks with a noticeable bias towards lawyers. This does not mean to say that business men are not active in community affairs; at present, attempts are being made to recruit them for positions of top leadership through fund-raising activities.

Obviously the status of leadership in different institutions is dependent on communal perceptions of the relative importance of both the institution and the personalities involved in it. In certain cases the 'image' of an institution can undergo a change of status if it has a dynamic leader (the Board of Education is an example). On the other hand, prestigious institutions can confer authority on their leaders merely by virtue of the office.

There are other important questions to be studied. For instance, why do certain institutions lose their attraction for elites and what determines the elites' choice of subsequent institutional activity? Let us take the case of the synagogue in South Africa.

Before the Second World War there can be little doubt that one of the most coveted positions in the community was that of President or 'Gabbai' of one of the central synagogues. Today this is not the case (even though the synagogue remains the central source of communal identification). There has been a noticeable trend towards the decline of the quality of religious lay leadership. The prestigious jobs now lie elsewhere. Perhaps this is explicable in terms of the gradual secularization of the South African Jewish community since the war: more status is now accorded to 'cosmopolitan' activities, that is, attaching to those positions which emphasize 'community-wide' activity and not 'local' concerns.

There may also be variations in the modes of leadership from one institution to another. Thus, it would seem that there is a tendency for the top Board of Deputies leadership to be recruited by virtue of their general standing within South African society and not as a result of their previous roles in other communal institutions. (Of course this is only a tendency—a number have held positions in synagogue affairs and perhaps in other organizations.) It should hardly come as a surprise that in this the most 'public' institution, constantly beset with numerous delicate legal problems, lawyers of high social standing and in strategic public positions should gravitate towards the leadership.

The leaders of the Federation, on the other hand, seem to enjoy prestige more by virtue of their office than of their general or pro-

fessional standing in society. (Again this is only a tendency, a notice-able exception to it being the present Chairman of the Federation.)

How do these two major institutions and their leadership relate to one another?

'The relations between the Board of Deputies and the Zionist Federation, as might be expected, have varied with the temper of the times and the leadership of the respective bodies. For many years now, however, . . . [no] basic ideological differences divide the two bodies, in a community which is so essentially Zionist in orientation. There has been an overlapping and sometimes an interchange of personnel in the leadership of the two organizations. . . . There have even been a few projects conducted under joint auspices, such as . . . joint sponsor-ship of the programme for Jewish university students. Although it is inevitable that differences in emphasis should in some measure persist —especially among their individual members—each organization recognizes the separate sphere of the other and they normally comple-ment each other well.'[36]

In its broad outline this picture is accurate. Apart from a number of hangers-on from another generation, few lay leaders approach com-munity affairs or institutional conflicts in overtly ideological terms. As mentioned before, affiliation at both leadership and rank-and-file levels is cross-cutting: there are few cases indeed where membership of one institution in principle precludes membership in others. In a com-munity as small as South Africa, Jewishness from the institutional point of view is somewhat eclectic: Reform Jews in South Africa are as Zionist as their Orthodox counterparts. There is membership 'spread'. (This, of course, has not always been the case: today, however, institu-tional expressions of Jewishness are usually defined in community-wide terms.) With some exceptions, the lay leadership is by and large more likely to attempt resolution of conflicts by an eclectic approach which would attempt to satisfy all the major Jewish interests in the com-munity through compromise and avoid any community rifts of serious proportions. More often than not religious, Zionist, and local needs will not be perceived as different interests but as part of a greater unity.

It is here hypothesized that it is the professional leadership in South Africa which is more likely to view institutional conflict in ideological terms. Their full-time involvement in a particular institution's activities, goals, and administration is a different mode of relationship from, say, that of the lay leaders to their institutions. As we have seen, it is usually the Rabbis (and perhaps some Mizrachi members) who are at the centre of controversy in religious disputes, while both the general and religious lay leadership seek to prevent debate on this level (usually by arguing that such disputes endanger communal unity). The same may be said of Board–Federation relationships. The very combined student

programme which Saron cites as an instance of common interest and action, for example, developed into an issue. But to a very large extent it was defined as such by the respective professional sides and, furthermore, in explicitly ideological categories. (The Board implied that the Federation was intent on building an 'elite' movement whose only concern was to mobilize student *aliyah* and as a result de-emphasize the local needs of the mass of students, while the Federation feared an anti-Zionist bias in the Board's approach thereby denuding it of any 'meaningful' Jewish challenge.)

Of course, this does not mean that on every issue the professional leadership will bring ideological pressure to bear. Given their critical location, they are also acutely aware of the dangers inherent in a serious community split. It should be noted here too that the very small core of executive professional leadership in South Africa plays a great part in making policy and maintaining the efficiency of the communal institutions. The nature of the executive professional's role in the community is in need of study, as is the relationship between lay and professional leadership and the decision-making process.

(ii) Institutional strength and authority

The question of comparative organizational strength is a particularly perplexing one. As yet I have not found tools of sufficiently heuristic value to make a valid comparative analysis possible. The criteria used here such as 'necessity for affiliation', 'provision of community leadership and spokesmen', 'capacity for community mobilization', 'perceived strength' (evaluations by community members), and amounts of money raised for particular institutions do not allow for comparative statements of institutional strength.

Comparisons of affiliation are difficult because modes of affiliation differ. Thus while synagogue and Zionist affiliation is 'individual', attachment to the Board is 'organizational'. The fact that almost all of organized Jewry is affiliated to the Board, however, does not necessarily tell us much about its strength within the community, as this affiliation is usually rather 'formal' and its active expression confined to biennial Congresses.

The same problem pertains to the criterion 'capacity for mobilization'. Types of mobilization will differ from one institution to another. The sense in which the Board 'mobilizes' the community for representational purposes is perhaps different from that of the synagogue which mobilizes for different purposes and usually in different (that is, 'local') contexts. The Zionist Federation also has a different mode of mobilization. It is far more noticeable, overt, and 'cosmopolitan' than the others. Unlike the synagogue and the Board, such mobilization of community resources is a prime function of the Federation.

It should be noted that the Federation is very effective in actively

galvanizing the mass-base of the community not only in times of emergency (such as the Six-Day War) but also during the biennial campaign. Although this capacity is clearly based on the power of the Zionist idea and not on mass fidelity to the Federation as such (as elsewhere, the institutional face of South African Zionism has become somewhat tarnished and it remains an open question whether or not the proposal to create a non-party structure will improve its 'image'), what is important here is that the Federation is effective as the institutional expression of the idea during such times. In the South African context it is the Zionist idea alone which can produce 'charismatic' moments.

Perhaps within the South African Jewish community, then, these are the wrong questions. As we have already noted, to a large extent institutions 'defer' to each other: the 'authoritative relationships of functional confidence between organizations' are well established. Furthermore, there is a tendency for the different institutional expressions of Jewish life to reinforce one another: Zionists are active in local affairs, the overall stance of the Board of Deputies is positive both to Zionism and to Orthodoxy and Reform, while the synagogue is overwhelmingly pro-Zionist in orientation. If any conclusion can be drawn from this analysis it is that the community is so organized that strength is spread to a large degree according to the specific distribution of functional competence. .

Communal dilemmas: Planning and welfare

'Despite the existence of various organizations exercising a coordinating role in specific fields—such as the Board of Deputies, the Boards of Jewish Education, the Federation of Synagogues, the Union of Progressive Judaism, the Union of Jewish Women, and the Jewish Welfare Council, and several others—there is a tendency for our institutions to function in "water-tight" compartments. They are unable or reluctant to think in terms of overall communal needs and to subordinate themselves to communal planning. Conditions are somewhat better at the local level, as exemplified in the "United Hebrew institutions" which exist in some towns. . . . On the national level, we are still groping, rather tentatively, towards the concept of total communal planning.'[37] The various commissions on planning have led to little tangible results.

This proliferation of organizations is best understood by a concrete example. In the field of welfare there is a large range of institutions. These include the Chevra Kadisha (the largest welfare society in Johannesburg, it is a unique institution established by the 'Litvak' immigrants; it has the dual role of burial society and general welfare agency), various orphanages, Old Age homes, benevolent and visiting societies, employment services, societies for the Jewish handicapped and

the deaf, etc. Under the 1947 National Welfare Act, seventy Jewish welfare organizations were registered.

Apart from the resistance of these bodies to the co-ordination of their activities, there has been a marked reluctance to professionalize their services. The formation of the Transvaal Jewish Welfare Council, established in 1946, with a membership of thirty-four affiliated organizations, has rationalized the position to some extent, but to a large degree organizational separatism and resistance to professionalization have remained.

Various experts have given advice on the Welfare situation in South Africa, and most (after giving due praise to the traditional Jewish sense of responsibility to the 'less fortunate') comment on the disadvantages of this traditionalism. They argue that the prevalence of traditional forms of organization such as the Jewish Helping Hand Society, the Gemilut Chasidim, the Bikkur Cholim, the Hachnoseth Kalah Society, Ort-Oze, and Landsleit, all date back generations, and that it is precisely this peculiar traditionalism, often intensely valued by the community, which renders Jewish welfare agencies stubborn to change.

Clearly there *is* a need for change. But perhaps this conflict between 'traditionalism' and 'efficiency' can only be resolved by jettisoning the remarkable way in which South African Jewry relates itself to institutional activity: a very large part of community work is based on the principle of active voluntary participation. South Africa is a model of the involved 'volunteer' type community. Relative to the institutional network of activity, the number of professional functionaries is strikingly small. Large areas of community life are to a great extent manned by its members. This contrasts with perhaps the greater efficiency of some other Western communities where the institutions are predominantly professionally managed. But in many cases this greater efficiency has resulted in possibly more 'passive' membership patterns. To paraphrase Charles Liebman's hypothesis,[38] to the extent that the influence of professional administrators has not increased, it may be a function of the interest of a high percentage of Jews in issues of Jewish concern.

South Africa and the quality of communal Jewish life

Any study which examines the total picture of Jewish civil society must relate the institutional structure to the purpose for which it was constructed: the quality of Jewish life. It should address itself to the following kinds of question. What is the Jewish 'content' of communal activity? What is the role of ideology in the community? Do institutions and leadership contain or facilitate qualitative change? What is the 'dynamic' of the community, that is, those forces (internal and external) which sustain, inhibit, and mould both personal and institutional expressions of 'qualitative' Jewish life?

We realize the dangers of such an analysis. Subjective interpretative evaluations here are unavoidable. Yet in not attempting such an assessment, however tentative it may be, we shall be skirting the central question underlying this whole study. Let us try to examine the South African community in this context.

It is here postulated that an evaluation of South African Jewry will have to take account of what I. Horowitz, in another context, calls the 'disequilibrium between organization and ideology':[39]

To give an illustration of what is meant here let us begin with Henry Katzew's analysis which, although already somewhat dated, attempts to outline the gulf between 'activity' and 'content' in organized South African Jewish life.

The Board and the Federation, he says, 'are careful not to tread on each other's toes and never clash—that is, not openly. It is not only that the leaders have a distaste for public controversy and cherish the prized communal unity—there is the less flattering truth that there are few men who hold convictions strong enough to make a worthwhile controversy. What differences there are, are settled round a common table. Both organizations are conservative, frozen forms of communal expression. . . .'

Most of the leaders of the Zionist Federation 'enjoy running the show, betray no disposition to widen the base of representation'.

Of the Board of Deputies, Katzew comments that 'the centrality which once belonged to it in the mind of the community has vanished. This is no unique fate for a once powerful organization. Two inferences are usually drawn from this: either the community's need for the organization has declined or, alternatively, the organization has failed to meet the challenges of a new day.'

'The second conclusion more nearly applies to the S. African Jewish Board of Deputies. The nettle of apartheid has reduced it to silence. It is absent from the field of community relations which ought to be its main function. It does not think about other groups. It draws no inferences from Jewish experience for South African problems. It was the first Jewish casualty of apartheid. Its wounds are largely self-inflicted. The story is not one of dishonor but of bafflement and resourcelessness.'[40]

Parts of this analysis are dated (at present there *are* serious attempts to widen the Zionist Federation's base of representation) and unclear (why shouldn't differences be settled around a common table?). What constructive 'thinking about other groups' the Board could make within the restrictive political South African atmosphere without self-exposure is not made clear. Yet there is a kernel of truth in the assessment.

Perhaps we should put it differently. For the Jewish population as such there can be little doubt that the Board has lost a certain centrality

that it once possessed. But perhaps this is a function of the changing nature of issues confronting the community. 'Defence' issues related to the rise of political antisemitism and the rescue work of German Jewish refugees in the thirties have become less important. Since the rise of the Nationalist Party too, there has been a tendency for community issues to be more inward-centred.

Fundamentally the Board's function in the community derives from this kind of 'watch-dog' activity. Possibly as a result of the decreased centrality of such activities within the community the Board has attempted to diversify its functions. The Board's insistence on the need for community co-ordination and planning can perhaps be seen in this light. These attempts in such fields as welfare, education, youth, etc. have not really penetrated community consciousness or fundamentally restructured institutional life. (This is not to assert that planning and co-ordination may not be a real communal need. All that is being formulated here is that the factor of self-interest and the search for a new, more 'community-involved' role are aspects of the situation.)

The South African Jewish community, like all other Jewish communities, cannot be divorced from its social setting. The static intellectual climate of South African society combined with the 'conformist' atmosphere inherent in the Government's implementation of apartheid (to whose pressures the marginally situated Jewish community must be especially sensitive) have led to a highly organized Jewish community; but it is a community in which creative Jewish thinking does not flourish. All this is not said by way of condemnation—it is merely an attempt to understand why the 'ideational' base of the community is so weak. There seems to be little or no knowledge of relatively new trends in Judaism (such as the Reconstructionist Movement in the United States). It is doubtful whether the large mass of the community are familiar with the names (let alone the work) of, say, Heschel, Rosenzweig, Kaplan, or Kook. The intense institutionalization of activity may lead to the 'organization man' mentality in the conduct of internal affairs. .

Given this wider framework it would seem that the 'conservatism' of the corporate structure of South African Jewry is not a function of power, of an entrenched leadership exerting its authority to keep a restless rank-and-file in check. It is not a question of the leadership restraining a mass demand for change: in most respects the leadership reflects the community rather faithfully.

Conclusion

What then can one broadly conclude from this analysis of South African Jewry and its communal institutions?

How useful is the classification of the community as a 'representative Board type'? There can be little doubt that the Board—notwithstand-

ing methodological difficulties in assessing comparative institutional strength—is one of the key organizations of the community. It *is* the only body to which most other Jewish organizations are affiliated even if such affiliation often takes place only on the formal level. In the minds of both the general and the Jewish polities, the Board is accepted as the legitimate Jewish public spokesman. Yet it is precisely the 'diplomatic' nature of the Board's work which forecloses it as an area of mass participational activity. In this sense the Board is more 'of' the community than 'in' it. It has been noted earlier that thus far the Board has been relatively unsuccessful in mobilizing community interest and participation by emphasizing its function *within* the community. Daniel Elazar's general characterization of 'Board type' communities fits the South African case: '. . . the Jews in those communities are less prone to accept the "umbrella" role of their representative Board. Rather, they tend to create . . . organizations which, while nominally associated with the Board, are, for all practical purposes, independent of and even equal to it in stature and influence. The Board, in such cases, tends to be pushed in the direction of becoming the ambassador of the Jewish community to the outside world rather than its governing body. . . .'[41] Having classified the South African Jewish community as a 'representative Board' type one should be aware that this *remains* a classification and does not imply a particular model of community functioning.

Let us now turn to a more general problem—one that is infrequently analysed despite its great importance—and see what light the South African case can cast upon it. This is the problem of the relationship between individual Jewish identity and Jewish institutional structure. The tendency in Jewish sociology has been to concentrate on either one or the other. Seldom have analyses been made of the particular ways in which identity and institutions interweave; even less have there been attempts to examine the effects of one upon the other. While this topic would require a study of its own, a few observations may be in order here.

In order to understand this problem one must begin by placing it in the correct broad context conditioning, to some extent, both the nature of individual Jewish identity and communal structure in South Africa. Organized South African Jewry cannot be understood in isolation from the multi-community and racial structure of the wider society. In large measure the intensity of Jewish consciousness in South Africa can be seen as a function of the prevailing 'plural' national ideology. Pluralism in this context differs from the general liberal conception current in social science.[42] The latter model refers to essentially 'open' societies in which individuals can (and do) belong to a series of diverse groups. These groups are held to be associational rather than communitarian with membership loyalties resting upon utilitarian and not 'traditional' considerations. Whatever the merits of this model,[43]

pluralism in South Africa refers almost to its opposite—to a plurality of *types of community* divided by history, economic and social status, politics, and culture. The present strategy of the South African government, by emphasizing the historical and racial differences between groups, has been to develop a normative ideology whereby groups are encouraged to define themselves along communitarian rather than associational lines, employing traditional rather than utilitarian criteria. Whatever its patent irrationalities in theory and contradictions in practice (the Afrikaner often underplays white group differences in the interests of racial unity), this development clearly has its impact upon South African Jewry. There is little pressure upon the Jew 'to become an "unhyphenated" South African—because, in fact, there is no general pattern of South Africanism which requires the submergence or disappearance of the individual's identification with his group'.[44] The 'crisis of Jewish identity' which besets so many Western Jewish communities has left South Africa relatively unscathed.

It is here perhaps that the interweaving of identity and institution becomes apparent. With the 'givenness' of Jewish identity in the South African context the community must provide an almost self-sustaining social, cultural, religious, and increasingly educational framework for its members on both the formal and informal levels. 'Jewishness' in South Africa can be viewed as a phenomenon approaching a 'way of life'.

But how has individual Jewishness been 'institutionalized', along what lines has the generalized Jewish consciousness been given concrete communal expression?

Clearly the most obvious link between identity and institution is religious identification. Yet this factor does not exhaust individual Jewishness in South Africa nor does it explain the gradual decline in prestige of religious lay leaders and the trend towards emphasis of 'cosmopolitan' (usually secular) activities over 'local' ones. In South Africa where, more often than not, synagogue affiliation seems to take precedence over considerations of observance, religious identification should be seen perhaps as one of the means towards a more general Jewish and communal identification. Perhaps this sense of inclusive Jewishness is reflected in the institutional structure by the phenomenon of membership 'spread' where membership in an organization seldom precludes membership in another. It is a case of mutual feedback where, to employ Charles Liebman's categorization,[45] membership of organizations is at one time both a manifestation of social-expressive activity and of Jewish identity.

The community's 'inclusive' approach to Jewishness is perhaps given best concrete expression in its ideological manifestations. There are notably few 'ideologues' in the community; few Jews define themselves in strictly 'religious' or 'secular' terms. This may indeed be a general

trend of post-war Jewish communities where '. . . the ideological struggles of the modern era, whether involving emancipation, secularism, socialism, or Zionism, either have vanished or are vanishing from among the concerns of communal decision-makers . . .'[46] Yet it would be a misreading of the South African Jewish situation to confuse a pragmatic style with an 'end of ideology'. Formulations of Jewishness are now simply less sectarian and more eclectic. The ideological 'bag' has merely been expanded to incorporate the sum total of communal activities, be they religious, Zionist, or purely secular. This fundamentally conciliatory approach to the different Jewish streams may have undercut ideological conflict within the community. Yet it is the very absence of such conflict which points to the overriding 'ideological' concern of the community: to ensure its survival as a corporate entity.

If South African Jewry is not beset by the crisis of identity, it is, paradoxically, its strong Jewish consciousness which poses a potential threat to its survival. The oft-heard accusations of 'dual-loyalty', remarks by various government authorities that proportionate to their number more Jews are 'liberals' and 'communists'—all these are pressures of which the rank and file of South African Jewry are aware. In situations of potential conflict Jewish South Africans must not emphasize the hyphen!

The particular formation of communal institutions is well adapted to this sort of pressure. The development of a single 'community spokesman' and the general predominance of national over local institutions in terms of decision-making may, in no small way, be a product of this situation. In a 'closed' society pressures for united communal positions are great.

It should be restated that much of this analysis was made on the basis of secondary materials and is exploratory in nature. Before any firm conclusions can be drawn, much field-research is required to fill up the large lacunae in our knowledge of the community. Almost no rigorous empirical studies have to date been conducted in the areas central to this study. Work needs to be done on the place of the synagogue in communal life; the role of leaders, their patterns of recruitment and relations between professional and lay leaders, etc.; the entire communal decision-making process; the Jewish press; the role of ideology in the community; and many other subjects. Until such studies are made we shall not greatly improve our understanding of the South African Jewish community.

NOTES

[1] 'Centres of Jewry in the Western Hemisphere: A Comparative Approach', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. V, no. 1, June 1963, p. 13.

[2] 'The Organization of South African Jewry and its Problems', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. V, no. 1, June 1963, p. 35. Saron is one of the few

people who have undertaken serious research into the history and communal structure of South African Jewry. As General Secretary of the Board of Deputies for many years he has been, and remains, in direct contact with community developments. I have relied heavily on his work throughout this paper (although not necessarily always agreeing with his interpretations).

[3] This paper is based upon preliminary research into the corporate life of South African Jewry. It is part of a world-wide 'Study of Jewish Community Organization' sponsored by the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress, London, and the Center for the Study of Federalism of Temple University, Philadelphia. My study is still in its formative stage, and I have relied mainly on secondary sources for this presentation. I have not yet undertaken any fieldwork, but I have personally interviewed a number of community leaders. Much of the following analysis should be considered tentative in nature.

[4] Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Reconstitution of Jewish Communities in the Post-War Period', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XI, no. 2, December 1969. See especially pp. 203 f.

[5] As this is not an historical essay, I shall deal only with those broad background factors which may illuminate some general characteristics of the contemporary community. Since I have not undertaken any first-hand historical research the bulk of this section will appear in the form of quotations.

[6] G. Saron, 'The Making of South African Jewry—An Essay in Historical Interpretation', *South African Jewry, 1965–66*, Johannesburg, 1966, p. 11.

[7] L. I. Rabinowitz, 'The Transvaal Congregation' in G. Saron and L. Hotz, eds., *The Jews in South Africa: A History*, Cape Town, 1955, p. 166.

[8] L. Hotz, 'The Jewish Community in South Africa' in Paul Glikson and Shlomo Ketko, eds., *Jewish Communal Service: Preliminary Survey of Jewish Communal Organizations and Services throughout the World*, Jerusalem, August 1967, p. 125.

[9] Saron, 'The Making of South African Jewry', op. cit., p. 15.

[10] Ibid., p. 21.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., p. 17.

[13] See Elazar, op. cit., for a general statement on 'post-modern' communal problems and responses.

[14] This demographic information is extracted from an article by E. Bernstein, 'A Bird's-Eye View of South African Jewry Today', *South African Jewry, 1967–68*, Johannesburg, 1968.

[15] Charles S. Liebman, 'Dimensions of Authority in the Contemporary Jewish Community', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XII, no. 1, June 1970.

[16] Quoted in G. Saron, 'The Long Road to Unity', in Saron and Hotz, eds., *The Jews in South Africa*, op. cit., pp. 232 f.

[17] E. J. Duschinsky, 'Jews in the Platteland', *South African Jewry, 1967–68*, op. cit., p. 91.

[18] Saron 'The Organization of South African Jewry', op. cit., p. 41.

[19] Ibid., p. 42.

[20] For extremely critical accounts of Jewish political behaviour in South Africa see the editorial 'Are the Jews Still in Golus?' in *The Reconstructionist*, vol. XXXI, no. 13, 29 October 1965, pp. 5–6; and the editorial by Professor Rabbi Jacob Neusner in an American Jewish newspaper, *The Jewish Ledger*, 8 December 1966, entitled 'South Africa Again'. Perhaps the most reasoned and sympathetic account of the dilemma is to be found in E. Feit's 'Community in a Quandary: The South African Jewish Community and Apartheid', *Race*, vol. 8, no. 4, April 1967, pp. 395 f.

[21] *Jewish Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 1, January 1968, p. 4.

[22] Ibid.

[23] H. Katzew, 'Jews in the Land of Apartheid', *Midstream*, vol. VIII, no. 4, December 1962, pp. 68 f. This section is almost entirely based on Katzew's pioneering analysis of the organized community's response to the Nationalist regime. It is unlike most of the other critical accounts in its scrupulous attention to detailed analysis. It deals with the apartheid quandary, the role of Israel as a source of conflict between the Government and the community, anti-semitism in South Africa, as well as some aspects of the quality of Jewish life as it is affected by the above forces.

[24] E. Feit, 'Community in a Quandary', op. cit., p. 400.

[25] Saron, 'The Organization of South African Jewry', op. cit., p. 39.

[26] Howard M. Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History*, London, 1958, pp. 509–10.

[27] Quoted in Saron, 'The Long Road to Unity', op. cit., p. 234.

[28] L. Hotz, 'The Jewish Community in South Africa', op. cit., p. 128.

[29] Saron, 'The Organization of South African Jewry', op. cit., p. 45.

[30] Ibid., p. 38.

[31] See Bernstein, 'A Bird's-Eye View . . .', op. cit., p. 17.

[32] J. Newman, 'Jewish Religious Life in South Africa', *South African Jewry, 1967–68*, op. cit., p. 53. The number of synagogues and their seating capacities may prove a good quantifiable index of the importance of religious identification as a community factor.

[33] Liebman, op. cit.

[34] *Jewish Affairs*, vol. 23, no. 12, December 1968, p. 43.

[35] Saron, 'The Organization of South African Jewry', op. cit., p. 38.

[36] Ibid., pp. 42–3.

[37] Ibid., p. 45.

[38] Liebman, op. cit.

[39] Quoted in Moshe Davis, 'Centres of Jewry in the Western Hemisphere', op. cit., p. 14.

[40] Katzew, op. cit., pp. 66–7.

[41] Elazar, op. cit., pp. 203–4.

[42] For examples of this usage of 'pluralism' see W. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe, Ill., 1959, and S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*, Garden City, N.Y., 1960.

[43] The model itself has been criticized as another form of ideology. See M. P. Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy*, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1967.

[44] Saron, 'The Making of South African Jewry', op. cit., p. 47.

[45] See Liebman, op. cit., for categories of membership of organizations in modern Jewish communities.

[46] Elazar, op. cit., p. 218.

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WHO IS A JEW IN ISRAEL?[1]

Mordecai Roshwald

A. The ideal definition of a Jew

ONCE upon a time a Jew was a man with a long beard, praying three times a day, resting on the Sabbath, celebrating the various holidays by feasts and additional prayers, abstaining from food on fast days, strictly observing the dietary laws, blessing the Lord before any activity, and praising Him after every meal. The life of a Jew was permeated, from morning until night, with awareness of the special relationship between the Jew, as an individual and as a member of the Jewish community, and the Almighty.

The Jewish awareness had another dimension in the relationship between the Jew and the Holy Land. This relationship was invoked in the daily prayers and on holidays and was thus constantly present in the mind of the Jew. One hardly need provide examples from the prayer-book: '. . . assemble us from the four corners of the world'; 'Return in mercy to thy city Jerusalem and dwell in it'; 'May our eyes behold thy return to Zion'. The relationship between the Jew and the Holy Land was bi-dimensional—both spatial and temporal. The Holy Land existed somewhere in a remote corner of the earth, or rather in the elevated centre of the world, from which all but a handful of Jews were far and distant, scattered as they were in the four corners of the world. But the Holy Land was not only, and not primarily, a place existing in the present; it was a land which had existed in its full glory in the past. The present land was merely a shadow of its past glory, of a time when the Jews and their Land and their God lived all together in perfect harmony. Hence the ardent prayer: 'Turn us to thee, O Lord, and let us return; renew our days as of old.'

The relationship to the golden past, to the religious-territorial-national synthetic entity, expressed in the notion of the Land of Israel, was not a mere nostalgic sentiment. It was a feeling enlivened by the belief that the past was due to recur in the future, that the glory lost was bound to be a glory regained. Indeed, the belief was that the future held in store a perfection surpassing the past; for it was expected to be eternal and absolute—undimmed by the cataclysms which had

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brought the glorious past to an end, and elevated to a bliss of a super-natural order.

Thus the life of the Jew was suspended between the past and the future: these provided the emotional support, the life-sustaining dreams, while the present consisted of the meticulous observance of religious routine, unquestioned and unquestionable if one was intent on getting to the blissful end of days.

B. *The spectrum of Jewry today*

During the last few generations the form and contents of Jewishness have undergone profound and far-reaching changes. Under the impact of various historical factors, Jews in various countries have relinquished both their religious and national characteristics to a great extent. Thus, being a Jew today is, in most cases, quite different from being a Jew one hundred years ago.

Yet this difference in substance does not obliterate the historical con-nexion between the Jews of the past centuries and their present descend-ants. Sociologically and historically the present-day Jews remain Jews, even if their Jewishness retains little of what Jewishness meant some generations ago—a point which, significantly, is admitted even by the traditional orthodox Jews.

Modern Jewishness can no longer be defined in the old way. It must be conceived in the light of the novel social reality. Yet this is much more difficult than defining Jewishness in the past. For not only has Jewishness often become diluted in contents and intensity, but it has not followed a single pattern in the dilution. There is a spectrum of Jewishness today and it involves both quantitative and qualitative differences.

In fact, one could say that we witness today what may be called 'selective Judaism'. The old tradition and the new philosophies of Judaism provide many varieties which are chosen, or created, according to individual predilections and social circumstances.

There are the orthodox who adhere to the formal-traditional ways. There are the Reformists who stress the religious and ethical quint-essence of Judaism and embellish it with a ritual which is not quite traditional. There are those who stand somewhere between the two. Then there are the cultural Jews for whom the revival of Hebrew —as a secular language, encompassing all forms of cultural activity— is the core of Jewishness. There are the 'folklore Jews' for whom Yiddish—though essentially the language of eastern European Jewry—is the essence of being a Jew. While these have diminished in numbers, because eastern European Jewry has shrunk and because of competing trends in Judaism, there is a 'shadow-folklore Judaism' thriving in the United States. For many Jews in America the symbol of Jewishness would seem to be a few Yiddish words occasionally inter-

twined with English and some Jewish delicatessen foods, which not only Biblical Jews but many a contemporary Jew would not associate with Jewishness at all. *Lox* and *beigel* may be trivial and arbitrary symbols, but in the consciousness of many Jews they represent a link with the former generations and thus symbolize ethnic-cultural awareness. There are those who discard any symbols, because they are not interested in Jewish consciousness, but who do not actively deny being Jews. For these, being a Jew means having been born into a family which was Jewish in a somewhat more positive sense than they are. These assimilated Jews do not opt out of Judaism because, not being religious, they do not want to adopt another religion; and this, by commonly accepted notions, leaves them as Jews—one could say, Jews by default. There are also those who become converted, and then, only then, would they usually be regarded as no longer Jewish. Significantly, even the converts would be viewed by some Jews (whether orthodox or not)—and by some non-Jews as well—as remaining Jews in a certain, not always specified, way.

The upshot of it is that Jewishness is today defined in the most lax and permissive way. The yardsticks for determining a Jew have been stretched to include a variety of categories which may have relatively little in common, save perhaps some consciousness (however vague in extreme cases) of common and ancient origin and rather unusual history.[2]

C. *The new meaning of a Jew in Israel*

Into the modern spectrum of Jewishness, which often retains little substance and sometimes borders on absence of positive meaning altogether, a new and solid notion is introduced by modern Israel. The notion and the type of the Israeli Jew are so novel that it has been suggested that Israelis and Jews (outside Israel) are two different entities. Though nobody can deny their historical and emotional links, it has been argued that the two types are essentially different and even possess contradictory characteristics. As so often, this argument can be heard among Jews—both in Israel and outside Israel—and among non-Jews who have had contact with both types of Jew.

What are the essentials of the new Israeli Jew? For one thing, one realizes that he is a much more monolithic individual. Unlike other Jews who are almost continuously aware of the problem of the relationship between their Jewishness and their Americanism, or Britishness, or Frenchness, as the case may be, the Israeli Jew feels that his Jewishness does not create problems of this sort, or rather he feels that his life as an Israeli is his fulfilment as a Jew.

This is not a mere boast, for there is a considerable amount of new substance behind this feeling. It has cultural, social, political, and, for some, also religious content.

The predominant cultural aspect of Israeli Jewishness is the revival of the Hebrew language as the all-purpose means of communication. The language in this case has a significance reaching even beyond the normal function of language in a national society. For it connects modern Israel with ancient Israel, the Israel of the Bible, which, by and large, is comprehended because it was written in the same language. Though, of course, it would be a crude simplification to see in modern Israel a direct continuation of Biblical Israel, his command of Hebrew provides for the Israeli an insight into the old civilization which goes beyond a mere academic comprehension and which constitutes a significant link across millennia. This link with Jewish antiquity is, to a great extent, a matter of historical choice on the part of modern Israel. Out of the long history of the Jews, antiquity is emphasized more than other periods, both because it was a time of Jewish independence and because it is documented in texts—collected in the Bible—written in Hebrew, and in a forceful and beautiful manner.

The Hebrew language, besides providing a link with the chosen past, also serves as a means of connexion among the different Jewish immigrants who, otherwise, would have found themselves in a linguistic Babel in Israel. It also enlivens the religious life of those who observe the ritual, by the use of the same language for addressing God and fellow-men. Moreover, it serves as a national vehicle for cultural and educational activities and institutions. Books, newspapers, theatres, schools, universities, the whole fabric of mental activity, is expressed and conducted in Hebrew. Such a use of national language is, of course, a self-evident phenomenon in the cultural life of the English, the French, the Italians, or the Japanese, but in the case of the Jews (for whom Hebrew was reduced and limited to sacred usage for nearly two millennia) the successful revival of the old tongue still retains the aura of a near miracle.

The social aspects of Israeli Jewishness are characterized by the life of Jews in a community of their own. While it is true that Jews have tended to congregate in their own communities, whether out of choice or out of compulsion, through a major part of their history outside Israel, their inner social ties did not preclude daily contacts with non-Jews—primarily in economic functions, but also in the framework of social and political institutions. With the emancipation of the Jews these contacts increased considerably and many individual Jews have found themselves detached or semi-detached from Jewish communal life. The Jewish community in Israel—even before the establishment of the State—was in an entirely different situation. There Jews have lived with other Jews not only for historical, religious, or sentimental reasons. They have lived together also for economic, social, and cultural reasons, with relatively negligible and incidental contacts with non-Jews. In brief, they formed a self-sufficient society (in a broad sense of the term)

in the same manner as any other national society is self-contained. As does Hebrew culture, this normal situation—normal for the English or the French—still retains the feeling of novelty for Jews.

The most prominent feature of this social aspect of Israeli Jewishness is the disappearance of minority consciousness among the Israelis. Minority consciousness is not limited to the Jews; it is typical of virtually every minority. However, in the case of the Jews, who for nearly two thousand years persisted as minorities amidst different societies, the consciousness is very deep and prevalent indeed. The Israeli Jew, living among other Israeli Jews, is noticeably free of that consciousness and exhibits a rather notable air of self-confidence. It is, perhaps, an exceptional fact not only against the background of minority Jews, but against that of other nationalities. An Israeli outside Israel is often regarded as cocksure, over self-reliant, in a way in which a Frenchman or an Englishman outside his own country is not. Perhaps, in this respect, the newly attained social emancipation is still consciously enjoyed and cherished.

This social emancipation reached its apex in political independence. To form not merely a Jewish community in the cultural, economic, and social sense, but also to create a political framework for such a community, adds to the feeling of total emancipation. Being a Jew in an independent Jewish State means to the Israeli both normalization of Jewish life and a salutary solution of the perplexities of Jewish history. The achievement is sufficiently new to make him aware of it in this double sense: he enjoys being a 'normal' person in the sense that an Englishman or a Russian is normal; and he believes he has resolved the problem of the abnormal, agonized, Jewish history in the best way. His political awareness is, in this sense, both spatial-geographical and temporal-historical.

For the religious Israeli Jew there is the additional dimension that his prayers, his craving, his longing, have come near fulfilment. True, the realities of Israel are not up to the Messianic vision. Nonetheless, he is living in a land which is for him holy, he is living in a place which, in some ways, is the special abode of God, he has returned to the Promised Land. There is for the religious Jew in Israel in this sense a feeling of a substantial religious fulfilment.

It should be noted that the Israeli Jew, as analysed above, is not in every respect a self-made type. In a certain sense, one could say, he was prefabricated outside Israel. The renaissance of Hebrew as a secular language started in Europe not only before the establishment of the State of Israel, but even before the beginning of the Zionist settlement in Palestine. Jewish poets and writers, notably in eastern Europe, produced works in Hebrew throughout the nineteenth century. The Hebrew renaissance, however elitist in its nature, led also to the establishment of a selective Hebrew educational system in eastern

Europe which shaped minds and forged ideals from kindergarten to maturity. This cultural renaissance became intertwined with political Zionism which was, as is well known, conceived in Europe as well.

Thus one can regard the image of the Jew shaped in modern Israel as the entelechy, to borrow an Aristotelian concept, of a development which originated in eastern, and to some extent central, Europe. The entelechy may, of course, deviate from the original image, the final stage may differ from the incipient tendency; for the circumstances of the emergence of Israel, of the economic, political, social, demographic conditions, had their impact on the forging of the Israeli Jew.

The Israeli Jew today—Hebrew-speaking, devoid of minority consciousness, regarding himself as a member of a once-more normal nation—is again a full-blooded Jew of substance. He is very different from his grandfather, or great-grandfather, also a Jew of substance, who led a Jewish orthodox life in almost total withdrawal from the alien society around him. He is different from the half-Jews, and quarter-Jews, and High Holidays Jews, and all kinds of professors of selective Judaism, who have thrived, or decayed, ever since the emancipation. He is a new Jew and the novelty has not yet worn off for the outside onlookers, both Jews and gentiles.

D. *The practical problem of Jewishness in Israel*

While the Israeli Jew represents a new and substantial image of Jewishness, one must bear in mind that not *every* Israeli conforms to this image. Israel is a country of immigration and as such absorbs Jews from all over the world. Some of them, especially those with a Zionist background or knowledge of Hebrew, or both, tend to be easily absorbed into the new Israeli Jewishness. Others, especially if they reach Israel in mature age when they are already shaped by another civilization, are less easily assimilated.

Yet, if many individuals in Israel are not Israeli Jews in the full sense of the term, there can be little doubt that they are proceeding in that direction. The process of acculturation is rather fast, and in the case of the generation born in Israel it is total. Thus, however heterogeneous Israel is and may remain for some time, it is progressing towards the clear and homogeneous implementation of its image of Jewishness—allowance being made for the admixture of strict religious observance in the case of some Israelis. This does not mean that Israel is becoming a uniform society. Differences in education, wealth, taste, and political party persist; but the *Jewishness* of the Israelis solidifies into one distinctive form.

Had Israel been a self-sufficient nation—self-sufficient in its national consciousness—we could have ended the present analysis at this point. But Israel, having been established by Jewish immigrants from abroad and regarding itself as the fulfilment of Jewish history, cannot and will

not easily detach itself from the rest of Jewry or from historical Judaism. However conscious Israelis are of being different from the Jews of the diaspora, they cannot deny a certain relationship with them. However aware Israelis are of having drastically changed the course of Jewish history, they cannot ignore the past. Here are the roots of Israel's attitude to world Jewry.

Though Israel aims at and attains an intensive and comprehensive fulfilment of Jewishness, it is rather lax in the requirements it makes of Jewish immigrants. Had Israel applied the *de facto* characteristics of an established Israeli Jew for the *de jure* admission of an immigrant into its community, very few would have qualified—at least during the first years of residence. The test of knowledge of Hebrew, not to mention other more subtle traits, would have excluded many new-comers. Such rigorous tests have not been required, and immigrants are admitted into the land, given full citizenship, and absorbed into the life of the country with a minimum of requirements, unprecedented in any country of immigration. The guiding principle evidently is that while the immigrants may, by factual Israeli standards, be no more than shadow-Jews, eventually they, or at least their children, will become fully-fledged Israeli Jews. Unlike other countries, where pro-longed residence is a condition for citizenship, Israel accepts the Jewish immigrant as a citizen from the moment of his arrival in Israel,[3] the assumption being that the actual transformation into an Israeli will follow in due course.[4]

Nor is this a matter of mere expediency on the part of Israel, an allurement for Jews to settle in Israel. It is primarily a matter of belief: Israel sees itself as the refuge for any and all Jews and as the country where full Jewish life is being restored; therefore it must remain open and welcoming to any Jew who decides to settle there.

But Israel is a state and as such cannot rely on a sentiment, however widely accepted and cherished. It must define such a sentiment in a legal way. This is done, primarily, through the Law of Return, with some other amplifying laws. Yet full integration into the Jewish community means not only immigration to Israel, but also the legal ability to found a family. This aspect is covered by the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, which—and this is a crucial point—leads further into rabbinical laws pertaining to the definition of a Jew and to marriage of Jews.

The existence of two separate law systems, each dealing with the issue of Jewishness, be it in different (yet not unrelated) contexts, is a potential source of conflict. Moreover, the intentional laxness on the part of Israel in respect of the substance of the immigrant's Jewishness can also lead to difficulties when the Jewishness of the immigrant is so marginal that it can become questionable. The rabbinical laws of marriage encounter their own marginal cases as well. In short, a legal

formulation all too often runs into difficulties when it encounters and deals with intricate social situations. These may be negligible quantitatively, but significant qualitatively, in that they invariably touch on the central problem of who is a Jew and what it means to be a Jew, a problem to which the nationalistically conscious society of Israel is particularly sensitive.

However, before we can tackle these marginal, yet revealing, cases, we have to explain the nature of the pertinent laws.

E. *The lay laws for absorption of Jews*

The chief legal instrument for acceptance of Jews into the community of Israeli Jewry is the Law of Return (1950). It states that 'every Jew has the right to immigrate to Israel'. It further specifies that 'the immigration shall be effected through an immigrant's visa', and 'an immigrant's visa will be granted every Jew who expressed the desire to settle in Israel, unless in the opinion of the Minister of Immigration [later the Minister of the Interior[5]] the applicant is working against the Jewish people or is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State'.[6] Alternatively, 'a Jew who came to Israel and after his arrival expressed the desire to settle there, may receive an immigrant's certificate while in Israel' (subject to the aforementioned reservations). The implementation of the law is entrusted to the Minister of Immigration (later the Minister of the Interior).[7]

The absorption of immigrants into Israeli Jewry is facilitated by the services of the World Zionist Organization, or the Jewish Agency. This organization is much older than the State of Israel, going back to 1897 when it was founded with the aim of establishing a new Jewish homeland. Yet its function did not become obsolete with the establishment of the State, for a need was felt for liaison between the State of Israel and the Jews elsewhere. This liaison naturally concentrates on the function of assisting in the process of Jewish immigration to Israel. The relations between the World Zionist Organization and Israel were formalized in the World Zionist Organization–Jewish Agency (Status) Law, 1952, and in the Covenant Between the Government of Israel and the Zionist Executive called also the Executive of the Jewish Agency (26 July 1954).

The said law[8] reaffirms that the gates of the State of Israel 'are open . . . to every Jew wishing to immigrate to it', and it acknowledges that the World Zionist Organization 'carried the main responsibility for establishing the State of Israel'. This organization continues to take care of 'immigration and directs absorption and settlement projects in the State'. It is also expected to promote the unity of 'all sections of Jewry' in the diaspora, which is necessary in order to achieve the building up of Israel and assisting immigration.

Without going into the multifarious activities of the Jewish Agency,

it is worth mentioning that, in the specific case of an individual Jew's intention to immigrate to Israel and settle there, his first step is to approach the representative of the Agency. This representative, in turn, gets in touch with the Israeli consulate to obtain for the interested person an immigrant's visa in accordance with the Law of Return. The Agency may also help financially and otherwise in providing for the passage to Israel and in preparing the immigrant for settling there. In case it has doubts whether the person qualifies as an immigrant under the Law of Return, it will make inquiries in the Jewish community to ascertain whether the person is Jewish. Of course, a person may go to Israel otherwise than as an immigrant and eventually ask there for an immigrant's status, in which case it is the Ministry of the Interior which judges whether he qualifies under the Law of Return.

The relationship between the World Zionist Organization, or Jewish Agency, and the State of Israel is unique in the world. Israel is a sovereign state and as such it has customary diplomatic and consular representation abroad. Yet the immigration of Jews to Israel is taken care of by a voluntary organization with branches in various countries, which has a special relationship to, and function in, Israel and which is recognized as such by the law of Israel. This law, as already mentioned, even acknowledges the State of Israel's indebtedness to this organization when it specifically mentions that it 'headed the movement and efforts of the Jewish people to realize the age-old vision of the return to its homeland and . . . carried the main responsibility for establishing the State of Israel'. In this sense, the State and the Law of Return become a means for attaining the goal of the organization, rather than the organization being a means for the objectives of the State. In fact, both these relations exist simultaneously, for the two partners—different as they are in structure, power, and status—are working towards a common goal through a peculiar symbiotic relationship.

The uniqueness of this relationship, while it may appear as anomalous to the student of international relations, in fact only reflects the peculiar historical situation of the Jews in our era. In legal abstraction a state does not exist until it becomes nominally sovereign, and the moment a community reaches that stage it becomes a legal and political entity whose authority is limited to its own territory and population. In sociological and historical reality the situation is different. The State of Israel was not created by a mere legal *fiat*; it *grew* out of several decades of Jewish settlement in Palestine, reinforced by successive waves of immigration. After the State was nominally established, its existence and development—especially because of adverse political circumstances—necessitated outside help. It was natural that the organization which had initiated the movement aiming at the establishment of the Jewish homeland and which had sustained it for decades

should continue to support this homeland after it had reached the stage of political independence and national sovereignty. As the homeland, both for ideological and practical reasons, must continue its relationship with world Jewry, a special organization—the World Zionist Organization—remains the natural institutional framework for fulfilling this function.

While the Law of Return, as well as the World Zionist Organization Law and the Covenant between the Government of Israel and the Zionist Executive, are all very clear and emphatic about the right of Jews to come to and be absorbed in Israel and aim at the practical implementation of this right, they all remained conspicuously silent —until March 1970—on the subject of who is a Jew, what being Jewish means, and the criterion for being accepted as a Jew. The Minister of the Interior (formerly the Minister of Immigration), put in charge of implementing the Law of Return, was not told how to decide whether a person wishing to become an immigrant qualified as a Jew. Nor was there any statutory guidance on the yardstick of Jewishness in the Population Registry Law 1965, which requires *inter alia* the registration of each individual's nationality (in the ethnic-cultural sense) and religion.[9]

This situation was radically changed on 10 March 1970, when the Knesset enacted an Amendment to the Law of Return, explicitly stating that 'For the purposes of this Law, a "Jew" is a person born to a Jewish mother, or converted to Judaism and who does not belong to another religion.'[10] This criterion is meant to apply also to registration as a Jew in accordance with the Population Registry Law.

While this definition somewhat restricts the confines of Jewishness, the Amendment contains another provision which has an opposite effect. For it extends the rights of the Law of Return to non-Jews related to Jews by marriage or descent. Specifically this includes the non-Jewish spouses of Jews and their children and grandchildren, as well as the spouses of these, excluding anyone of them who was a Jew and was converted out of Judaism of his own will. These rights entail not only immigration but also automatic Israeli citizenship. Thus it can be said that, for the practical purpose of absorption into the Jewish community in Israel (at least in the legal-political sense), individuals who, though technically non-Jewish, are actually related to Jews through close family ties are treated as Jews. This is the case, as the Amendment specifically states, even if the Jew on account of whom these rights are claimed is not alive and irrespective of whether he himself immigrated to Israel or not.

This new law puts an end to some, though not all, of the intricate marginal cases which occasionally emerged before its enactment and which reveal the ambiguity of Jewishness. True, in most cases the Jewishness of the prospective immigrant did not constitute a problem.

As already mentioned, if the representative of the Jewish Agency had any doubts about the prospective immigrant, he made inquiries in the local Jewish community to ascertain whether the candidate was Jewish before recommending him to the Israeli consulate for the granting of an immigrant's visa. If, however, doubts persisted about the Jewishness of the intended immigrant, their resolution could lead to considerable complications. These became prominent when the case occurred in Israel itself, where any refusal by the Ministry of the Interior to accept a person as a Jew could lead to a court procedure which discussed and decided on the issue in public.

For it was the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, which had the legal authority to decide who is a Jew for the purpose of the Law of Return and such other relevant laws as that of the Population Registry, as long as no statute clearly defined it. The Minister of the Interior, or the entire cabinet for that matter, despite their executive powers, must abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court.

However, the Supreme Court took action only if and when a case was brought before it by an individual who considered himself mis-defined (if a word may be coined) by the Ministry of the Interior. The Court may have accepted the Executive's judgement or may have rejected it, but it did not commit itself to a strict criterion or set of criteria for determining a person's Jewishness. This was done, ultimately, by the legislative body in March 1970.

Before this legislative step the general practice of the Minister of the Interior, sometimes decided upon by the entire cabinet, did not seem to reveal a strict criterion either. True, a *bona fide* declaration by a person that he was a Jew and not an adherent of another religion seems to have been the accepted criterion at one time, according to a Government decision.[11] However, the authority of the Government thus to interpret the law could have been, and actually was, contested in court.[12] Moreover, if the *bona fide* declaration did not correspond to the 'objective situation' as judged by the Ministry of the Interior, the official of this Ministry sent the applicant to the Ministry of Religious Affairs which, in turn, accepted the criterion of the orthodox Rabbinate —now endorsed in substance also by the 1970 statutory Amendment. On the other hand, the Samaritans, who are not regarded as Jews by the Rabbinate, have been accepted as such by the Government for the purpose of the Law of Return and for Registry. As we shall see, there are other individual cases in which the religious criterion and the lay decision did not, or do not, coincide.

However, further analysis of the issue requires a prior understanding of the religious position.

F. *The rabbinical laws relating to the absorption of Jews*

Marriage, as the legal foundation of the family, is a fundamental means for the building of, and integration into, a society. If a person lives within a society, but is prevented from legally marrying a member of that society, he or she cannot become fully integrated into it. The marriage laws, therefore, while not nominally controlling acceptance into a society, in fact are a powerful factor in this regard and cannot be ignored.

In most modern societies, marriage law is a matter for the civil authorities. In Israel, which follows in this respect in the paths of the Ottoman and British Mandatory laws,[13] marriages and divorces come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the relevant religious communities. As regards the Jewish community in Israel, this system is spelled out in the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953. This law states that 'Matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel, being nationals or residents of the State, shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical courts.' Further, 'Marriages and divorces of Jews shall be performed in Israel in accordance with Jewish religious law.'[14]

This means that no religiously mixed marriages are possible. For not only will a rabbinical authority refuse such a marriage on religious grounds; it also lacks the (lay) legal authority over a person of a different religious denomination. Thus, the Jewish community remains clearly separated from non-Jewish individuals, unless these become converted. (The same holds true also for other religiously defined communities in Israel.)

This also means that the rabbinical authority wields a substantial power in deciding who may be integrated into the Jewish community in Israel. Immigration into Israel as a Jew does not automatically guarantee integration with the community in the concrete sense of being able to marry into it. It is the rabbinical authority which, by deciding whom it may join together in wedlock, also determines whom it will pull asunder from the Jewish community.

Unlike the Law of Return which until recently did not include a legal criterion as to who is a Jew (a situation leading to disputes and controversies), the religious Jewish law, which the rabbinical authorities strictly follow, has all the time provided a yardstick. The yardstick, at least superficially, is quite simple: a Jew is a person born of Jewish parents, or, at least, of a Jewish mother.[15] A child born to a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother is not considered Jewish.

There is an obvious reason why the criterion here is so simple and clearcut, when compared with the confusion which has beclouded the determination of Jewishness in respect of the Law of Return and Population Registry, at least until the recent Amendment. For the

intention of the lay legislators was to encompass the maximum of potential Jews, and this ideological intention hesitated to reach a formal definition which might not fit some cases of social reality. The religious definition, on the other hand, is not, at least not consciously, motivated by ideology and intentions, but is determined by the letter of the law as interpreted in former generations. And this law, for reasons which can perhaps be historically explained but which are irrelevant to the orthodox Jew, lays down the rule unequivocally. If it is the nature of a legalistic approach to adhere to the letter of the law, this is so much more the case if the law is religious and considered sacred.

True, the dogmatism of this approach is not as exclusive as it might conceivably have been. For one thing, it accepts as Jews people born of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father—a considerable concession if one keeps in mind the total devotion and commitment to a way of life which orthodox Judaism demands. And then there is always the door of conversion open to a non-Jew, whether born of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother or of a non-Jewish couple. However, such a conversion is not a mere formality, but must be based on a religious conviction (at least a well-pretended conviction) and a ritual immersion in the case of females and ritual immersion and circumcision in the case of males. These requirements may bar some individuals who, while determined to become Jews in the national, cultural, and ethical sense, or being members of a family where the father alone is Jewish,[16] are not ready to betray their agnostic or atheistic convictions by a verbal and ceremonial pretence of religiosity. Moreover, not every conversion is accepted by the rabbinical authorities in Israel. A conversion by a Reform rabbi—whether in Israel or abroad—is not held as valid, as it does not insist on all the ceremonial requirements, and thus will not enable the convert to be married in Israel.

There is another significant category of individuals who will not be married by a rabbinical authority in Israel and will thus be precluded from a *de facto* absorption into the Jewish community there. These are the people who fall under the category of 'bastards' or 'possible bastards'. The prohibition to marry a bastard is based on the Biblical proscription: 'A bastard shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to his tenth generation shall he not enter into the congregation of the Lord' (Deuteronomy 23:3 in the Hebrew Bible; 23:2 in the King James translation). The implied meaning of the Hebrew text is that he will not become a member of the (national-religious) community (of Israel). In this sense the proscription has clear social-national implications which make it pertinent to the marriage laws of modern Israel. In the rabbinical interpretation of the Biblical text, the person to be excluded from the community cannot be married to a member of the Jewish community. That person, in the original

Hebrew, is designated as *mamzer*, a term the original meaning of which probably was not bastard. We do not have to go into the matter of what *mamzer* might have precisely meant, as, for our purpose, it is the Talmudic interpretation, accepted by the Rabbinate for practical legal guidance, which is relevant. According to this interpretation *mamzer* is *not* a person born out of wedlock, but a person born out of forbidden intercourse, that is to say, either by an adulterous woman or out of incestuous relations.[17]

Such restrictions, on the face of it, should not constitute grave social problems, whether because they are concerned with rare occurrences, or. because such occurrences are not made publicly known. However, they do constitute an issue and, paradoxically, do so where the transgression is quite innocent. In the case of Jews coming from some exotic communities, where the rabbinical laws of divorce were not strictly known, or may not have been strictly observed, an occasional divorce may not have been a legal divorce and the woman thus 'divorced' was upon marrying technically committing adultery. Her subsequent children would thus be *mamzerim*. As adultery, including such 'adultery', is not diluted over ten generations, certain Jewish communities may face the problem of being barred from acceptance into the Israeli Jewish community through marriage because of the doubt involved. This was, in fact, the problem besetting the Bene Israel from India some years ago, which was ultimately resolved, and this is the problem now facing the Karaites, whose divorce practices differ somewhat from the rabbinical ones (though in their case it is a matter of a conscious and deliberate difference in the interpretation of the religious divorce laws).

G. *Jews classified by lay and rabbinical criteria*

If we apply the yardsticks of the lay laws, as well as those of the rabbinical authorities in Israel, to the problem who is a Jew and can be accepted into the Jewish community in Israel (including acceptance through marriage), we shall get seven or eight categories. (1) The first one is those people—undoubtedly the overwhelming bulk of the Jews residing in or immigrating to Israel—who are Jews and acceptable to the community by all the yardsticks of the lay and the religious laws. (2) The second category is those who, though accepted as Jews by the lay laws and by the religious law, do not qualify for marriage because of the doubts about their divorce practices. Here the outstanding case are the Karaites. The Bene Israel from India are a borderline case in this category in that individual inquiries are made about the occurrence of divorcee marriages in the history of the family. (3) The third category is those who are accepted as Jews under the Law of Return and for the purpose of Registry, but rejected under the rabbinical law and, therefore, cannot marry into the Jewish community

without formal conversion. In this category belong the Samaritans.
(4) The fourth category is those individuals who were born to a Jewish
father and a non-Jewish mother (who had been married outside
Israel). While the Jewish status of these persons was a matter of con-
troversy for some time, they are now treated as Jews for the purpose
of immigration but not for registration or by the religious law (even
if born in Israel and integrated into modern Hebrew culture). (5) The
fifth category is the non-Jewish spouses of Jews, or the spouses of the
children and grandchildren descended from a Jewish man and non-
Jewish woman. These are treated as Jews for the purpose of the Law of
Return, but not for registration or by the religious law. This, in fact,
puts them now into the same category as the children of non-Jewish
mothers and Jewish fathers, but this is so only owing to the recent
Amendment to the Law of Return. (6) Converts to Judaism form a
category of their own. For, though essentially they would belong to
the first group, namely be considered as Jews by any standard, the issue
becomes intricate when the validity of the conversion is questioned.
(7) The seventh category is individuals who, originally Jews, became
voluntarily converted to another religion. Though not considered Jews
by the lay laws and not married by a rabbinical authority, they
remain, according to the rabbinical law, Jews. (8) A possible eighth
category is those people who, like the Falashas, may have an objective
claim to being Jewish and yet are recognized as such neither by the
Government nor by the rabbinical authorities. Obviously, they can
marry into the Jewish community only after conversion. More must
be said about each of these categories.

(1) The liberal, perhaps even lax, attitude towards the bulk of the
Jewish immigrants and inhabitants should be realized. As already
mentioned, the Zionist image of a full Jew, to be attained in Israel,
does not preclude the acceptance of individuals who, by these rigorous
standards, could hardly qualify as Jews—because of the absence of
Jewish background and education and because of assimilation into
another culture. The *intention* of these individuals to settle in Israel is
taken as a commitment to become full Jews, and is essentially sufficient.

If this is the basic attitude behind the Law of Return and of the lay
authorities in Israel, it is also noteworthy that the religious criteria, in
respect of the great majority of cases, are rather liberal as well. In
general and for the purpose of marriage, the rabbinical law recognizes
as Jews those individuals who are not only ignorant of religious laws,
but who profess agnosticism or atheism and who deliberately ignore or
contravene the religious proscriptions and do not follow the prescrip-
tions. Such individuals are regarded as sinners, but even a sinner is
assured of being included in the Jewish community, in the religious
sense, by the principle that 'Even though he has sinned, he remains
Israel [a Jew].'[18]

(2) It is the liberality of the religious approach which makes the excluded cases so much more difficult to understand, from the lay point of view. The exclusion from marriage of the Karaites, and the cautiousness in respect of Bene Israel of India, both of whom are accepted as Jews by the lay authorities *and* by the rabbinical authorities, on the ground of questionable divorce practice, seems to an outside observer as bizarre—to put it mildly. This is so much more the case as these groups, by and large, tend to be much more religiously observant than most of the other Jews in Israel. Again, to an outsider, it seems odd that an alleged mistake in interpretation or application of religious rules (on the part of Karaites and others) should constitute a graver obstacle than a deliberate sin (on the part of irreligious and anti-religious Jews).

Of course, from the point of view of the religious law, all these moral and commonsense lay considerations are hardly relevant. The law is the law, especially if it is divine, and, however deplorable some of the consequences may be, there is little that human beings can do about it—save perhaps by finding some canonically acceptable way out.

This problem is particularly grave in the case of the Karaites who cannot marry into the bulk of the Jewish community. While a non-Jew, or a questionable Jew like a Falasha or a Samaritan, can become converted and then be acceptable for marriage, a Karaite, already being a Jew, cannot be converted. The fact that the Falashas (or the Christians or Moslems) may have had divorce procedures which the rabbinical law does not accept, and consequently may seem to be in the same category of possible *mamzerim* as the Karaites, is irrelevant, because the divorce practice before conversion to Judaism does not matter. The conversion, so to say, erases the possible transgressions in this respect. The Karaite, *because* his Jewishness is in no way questioned by the rabbinical authorities, does not have this avenue to integration with the larger Jewish community.

It is noteworthy that in the case of the Bene Israel from India, who from the point of view of the rabbinical law are a marginal community in that their divorce practices in the past are questioned, the rabbinical courts after a prolonged crisis found a way out. They now agree to marry them after checking in each case whether the bride or the bridegroom is not a descendant of a divorced woman in her second marriage.

(3) The Samaritans, who have stuck to their traditional ways for over two and a half millennia, if the count is started from the fall of the ancient Kingdom of Israel, and who observe the Jewish religion as formulated in the Pentateuch (though not the rabbinical interpretation thereof), are naturally accepted as Jews by the State of Israel. Whether they are the actual descendants of some of the lost tribes, or merely adopted the Israelitish creed twenty-seven centuries ago, does not really matter. Nor is it important that in any case they are not,

strictly speaking, Jews—the descendants of the tribe of Judah. If they are ready to see themselves as a part of the new Israel and settle there, their right to qualify under the Law of Return is admitted and they do register as 'Jews'—or as 'Samaritan Jews', if they so wish.

However, from the point of view of the rabbinical law they are not Jews, either by descent or in their religion. Thus, if they wished to marry into the Jewish community a formal conversion would be required of them.

With the new Amendment to the Law of Return, defining a Jew as one born of a Jewish mother, the problem of the registration of a Samaritan as a Jew, or his immigration under the Law of Return, could be raised. It could be argued that a Samaritan's mother is Samaritan and non-Jewish in the rabbinical sense, while the Samaritan would argue that she is Jewish (or Israelite) by virtue of adhering to the Jewish religion and being a descendant of the ancient Israelites. Thus, the problem as to who is a Jew would not, in this case, be resolved by the Jewishness of the mother, for this Jewishness itself would require a definition of another kind. (Obviously, the claim of the Jewishness of the grandmother could not resolve the dispute.)

While, to our knowledge, this particular issue has not been raised yet, it would seem that it could be resolved along the lines accepted before the recent statutory definition of 'Jew'. This definition follows the rabbinical criterion in *substance* when it determines one's Jewishness by one's Jewish mother; it does not follow it *formally*, that is to say, it does not announce that the rabbinical law will decide who is a Jew. Therefore, the Government of Israel is within its legal right to act on the assumption that the Samaritan mother is Jewish, just as it can assume, contrary to orthodox opinion, that a convert by a Reform rabbi is Jewish.

(4) The problem of the Jewishness of children of a mixed marriage in which the mother is not Jewish has been a matter of a fierce and bitter controversy in Israel. For not only have there been actual cases of this sort, but potentially such cases may recur in the future as Israeli Jews, during a stay abroad, marry non-Jewish women and return with them to build their homes in Israel. Naturally, they bring up their children in Hebrew schools and in the Jewish community and view them as Jewish—at least in the national, ethnic-cultural, if not religious sense. A prominent case of this sort which illustrates the issue was that of Major Binyamin Shalit. It therefore deserves a more elaborate recounting.

Major Shalit is a Jew born in Israel and a career officer in the Israeli Navy. As a native Israeli Jew, educated in Israel, he is one of those new Jews which Israel has shaped. Thus, he exemplifies not merely a potentially full Jew, an intended new Jew, but a Jew whose mother-tongue is Hebrew and whose fundamental concepts and attitudes are

coloured by modern Israel. Major Shalit, while studying in Edinburgh, married a Scots girl who did not become converted to Judaism, and they settled in Israel. They have two children, born in Israel: a boy called Oren, five years old, and a girl Galia, three years old. Incidentally, both names are quite typical modern Hebrew names. On the birth of each child, in compliance with the Population Registry Law, the Major, reporting on the birth, specified the religion and nationality of the child. Referring to the religion, he put a dash (that is to say, no religious belief or affiliation), and referring to nationality he stated 'Jewish'. However, the registry official did not accept these statements and wrote in the case of the boy: 'Religion: Jewish father, foreign mother. Nationality: Not registered.' In the case of the girl it was religion which was marked as not registered, while nationality was described as 'Jewish father, foreign mother.'

For Major Shalit this was a matter of principle: he regards his children, born in Israel and to be brought up there, as of Jewish nationality and his wife evidently agrees with him that they should be brought up in Israel's Hebrew culture. His persistent arguments failed to move the Ministry of the Interior and he took the case to court. The Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as High Court of Justice, in a majority decision of five to four, decided against the Minister of the Interior and for Major Shalit, namely that the nationality of his children should be registered as Jewish, according to his statement.[19]

The judges in the majority were circumspect in avoiding in their judgement any definition of who is a Jew, or making a decision whether the two children of Major and Mrs. Shalit were Jewish or of Jewish nationality. Their decision was explicitly limited to the apparently technical question as to whether the registry official has to accept the statement of the father in such a case, or whether he may employ some other yardstick in registering these details. They decided that the Government official and the Minister of the Interior must accept the *bona fide* declaration of a parent and register the children as of Jewish nationality.

While the limitation of the judgement to the boundaries of a technicality of registration may seem as sidestepping the fundamental issue, nonetheless it is an indication of a more basic attitude on the part of the majority of the judges. There can be little doubt that essentially they felt that the new social reality must dominate over the rigid religious notion which considers a child of a gentile woman not Jewish, irrespective of the real circumstances, besides refusing to make a distinction between religion and nationality. As one of the judges, Mr. Justice Berinson—referring to an actual case—put it: 'According to this doctrine [that of the religious law], the head of the terrorists in Eastern Jerusalem, born of a Jewish woman and a Moslem father, who tried to kill and annihilate the State of Israel, is considered as Jewish

by religion and nationality; while the family of a Jewish Major, fighting the wars of Israel, is considered devoid of Jewish nationality. One's soul is really frightened to think about such an outcome in the State of Israel.'

This decision of the Supreme Court produced a considerable controversy in Israel and led to new legislation, enacted less than two months later, which, though not retroactive, will prevent a similar decision in the future. As already stated, Amendment No. 2 to the Law of Return accepts the essentials of the religious definition of a Jew also for the purpose of the Population Registry Law. While Major Shalit's children remain registered as of Jewish nationality, the statutory amendment will preclude such registration in a similar case in the future.

However, for the purpose of the Law of Return, such technically non-Jewish children of a Jewish father, and even the grandchildren of a Jewish grandfather, are accepted as immigrants as if they were Jews. In other words, the conservative *definition* of a Jew for the purpose of the Law of Return and of the Population Registry Law is counterbalanced in the same Amendment by the institution of a more liberal *practice* of the Law of Return. While the new Amendment commits itself to a strict definition of a Jew, it does, *in fact*, adopt a double standard by forgoing the conservative criteria where immigration is concerned. The assumption that non-Jews related to Jews and deciding to settle in Israel should be welcomed and the belief that eventually they are likely to be absorbed into the Jewish community is expressed in this new application of the Law of Return.

Needless to say, for the purpose of the rabbinical law and marriage, children of a non-Jewish mother, whether before or after the Amendment, are regarded as gentile and require conversion to be married to a Jew in Israel.

(5) The non-Jewish spouses of Jews immigrating to Israel, or the gentile spouses of Israelis who married abroad, were, of course, allowed to settle in Israel as well. This was done on an individual basis and not on the force of the Law of Return, until the recent Amendment. Also, according to the Nationality Law of 1952, the spouse of an Israeli citizen is entitled to such citizenship.[20]

With the amendment to the Law of Return, the *de facto* practice was elevated to a *de jure* recognition. This is no mean achievement in that it encourages viewing the gentile spouses of Jews as immigrants to Israel as of right. By regarding them virtually as Jews for the purpose of the Law of Return, it creates a powerful psychological incentive for these immigrants to become absorbed in the Jewish community in Israel.

If such an incentive may be viewed as superfluous in the case of spouses of Jewish husbands (or wives) who had made up their minds

to settle in Israel anyway, the new Amendment is of undisputable and concrete significance when it extends this privilege also to spouses of children and grandchildren of a Jewish person (not to mention the children and grandchildren themselves), and does so even if the Jewish member of the family is no longer alive and whether he (or she) immigrated to Israel or not. The implication of this is that the invitation to settle in Israel is extended to non-Jews related to Jews even in a rather indirect manner (say, the gentile wife of a man whose grandfather was Jewish, his father 'half-Jewish' and his mother gentile), if they are willing to make their home there.

It is noteworthy that as recently as 1969 the Ministry of the Interior refused an immigrant's status in accordance with the Law of Return to an American, Mr. Lawrence Goldberg, whose father is Jewish and mother gentile, and who claimed that he had always regarded himself a Jew. Now Mr. Goldberg and the non-Jewish wife he married in Israel can both claim the right to reside in Israel as immigrants on the force of the amended Law of Return.[21]

Needless to say, this liberality of the Law of Return does not resolve the problem of marrying into the Jewish community in Israel. Thus, had Mr. Goldberg (assuming he decides to settle in Israel) wished to marry a Jewish girl, he would have had to be formally converted to Judaism first.

(6) As already mentioned, converts to Judaism are like Jews for the purpose of any law, whether lay or religious. However, the problem arises as to what constitutes a conversion. The orthodox rabbinical authorities in Israel do not accept a conversion by a Reform rabbi, whose competence they question and on the ground that such a conversion does not involve all the ritualistic details prescribed by the religious law. Thus, a person converted by a Reform rabbi will not be married to a Jew or a Jewess in Israel, where only the orthodox rabbis have the authority to unite them in wedlock.

As far as the State attitude is concerned, the situation seems different. The Second Amendment to the Law of Return accepts a convert to Judaism as a Jew *without* specifying how or by whom he is converted. Moreover, the Minister of Justice made it clear that a conversion by *any* congregation (that is to say, including a Reform one) will be accepted as valid for the purpose of the Law of Return and for registration as a Jew.[22] This, however, is not accepted by all the members of the present coalition Government—notably not by the National Religious Party, whose member is the Minister of the Interior and thus in charge of executing the Law of Return and the Population Registry Law. The final decision as to whether Reform conversion is conversion for the purpose of the Law of Return and of Registry rests with the Supreme Court of Israel and is likely to be positive. For in a recent case in which a Reform convert challenged the Government

to be accepted as Jewish, the lawyer representing the government did not even contest the challenge. The crisis within the Cabinet and outside it, caused by this case, was averted at the last moment when the Reform convert was persuaded to undergo a second, orthodox, conversion and drop the legal suit.[23]

As things stand now it would seem that two criteria—not to say a double standard—of conversion are relevant to the situation: orthodox for the purpose of marriage, and orthodox or Reform for the Law of Return and Registry.

(7) The seventh category is perhaps the most bizarre one, not least because here the lay judgement seems less liberal in its notion of a Jew than the religious law. This is the case of people, born Jewish (possibly even brought up in Jewish culture and regarding themselves as Jews in the national, cultural, and historical senses) who out of religious conviction were converted to another creed.

According to the Jewish religious law such a person remains a Jew. A Jew cannot opt out of being a Jew: by conversion to another religion he commits a sin, but he can always repent, and, in any case, 'even though he sinned, he remains Israel [a Jew]'. This, rather peculiar, attitude can be seen perhaps as an indication of the extent to which Jewish religious law has retained the notion of Jews as a nation. One does not opt out of a national culture and historical links by a decision, for these ties are not a matter of conviction but a part of an individual's personality. Thus an Englishman residing in France, or even accepting French nationality, will in some ways remain an Englishman all his life. Apparently the Jewish tradition, because of the intertwined religious and national elements, cannot accept the purely religious notions, which relate religious belonging to religious conviction and observance only, even when it speaks in religious terms. Thus, a converted Jew, whether Christian or Moslem, still remains a Jew, even if in purely religious terms this does not make sense.

While this is the rule of the Jewish religious law, the rabbinical courts in Israel do not claim jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce in respect of Jews converted to another religion and will not, in fact, marry them. This is, of course, an understandable reluctance on their part and it can find support in some legal argument of the religious law.[24]

Significantly, a Jew converted to another religion, whatever his *national* feelings, is not considered a Jew for the purpose of the Law of Return and for Registry, as specifically stated in the recent Amendment No. 2 to the Law of Return. This emphatic exclusion is rooted in the famous Supreme Court judgement of some years ago, which pointed to this way of thinking. This was the case of Oswald Rufeisen, which is worth elaboration, for it sheds considerable light on the problem of Jewish identity in Israel.

Oswald Rufeisen was born to Jewish parents in Poland (in 1922) and received a Jewish education. As a boy he was active in a Zionist youth movement and was preparing to emigrate to Palestine, but was prevented by the outbreak of the Second World War. Imprisoned by the Germans, he succeeded in escaping and then obtaining false papers identifying him as a Christian German. Employed by German police, he used his office to pass information and arms to Jews, thus saving many from annihilation. Most of these now live in Israel. He was imprisoned again, but escaped once more and then joined Russian partisans and eventually received a Russian medal for his activity as a partisan. In 1942, while hiding in a monastery, he became a convert to Christianity and in 1945 he became a Carmelite monk, choosing this order in hope of eventually being able to join a monastery in Israel. After several attempts to get permission to emigrate to Israel, his request was granted in 1958. In his application to the Polish authorities he indicated that, despite his conversion to Christianity, he regarded himself as a nationalistic Jew with profound ties to the Jewish people. Having arrived in Israel he applied for an immigrant's certificate according to the Law of Return, and requested to be registered as of Jewish nationality in the identity card. His requests were rejected by the Minister of the Interior.

Oswald Rufeisen contested this decision in the Supreme Court of Israel, but lost the case. The Supreme Court, in a majority decision of four to one, while recording the devotion of Rufeisen to the Jews, and while realizing that according to the religious law he remained a Jew, determined that for the purpose of the (lay) Law of Return and for the purpose of registration he was not a Jew. In making this decision the Court argued that according to the accepted notions of Jews, whether scholars or simple folk, a Jew who was converted to Christianity is not a Jew. Thus, Oswald Rufeisen—or Brother Daniel, to use his monastic name—is not a Jew in the lay sense of the Law of Return, and for registration purposes he is a man without nationality. This the Court did not see as an anomaly, for if a man could be registered as of no religion, he could also be registered as without nationality (in the cultural and communal sense of the word).[25] (This did not mean that Oswald Rufeisen could not stay in Israel. He had been given this right under another law, but not on the force of the Law of Return, as he had insisted.)

It is noteworthy that the Court in its judgement, while attempting a lay interpretation of Jewishness, found the religious element—at least in the negative sense, of conversion to another religion—as a crucial element in the lay national notion of who is a Jew. Despite the attempt to distinguish nationality from religion (an attempt made explicit here by discarding the rabbinical law pertaining to a convert) the *national* notion of Jewishness was viewed as affected by *religious* elements. On

the other hand, as we have seen, the *religious* concept of the Jew, which refuses to accept conversion as the abandonment of Jewish identity, may well be affected by the *national* notion of Jewishness. Both these attitudes, though colliding in this case, seem essentially faithful to the historical notion of Jewishness which combines nationality and religion and stubbornly refuses to accept the modern doctrinal distinction between the two.

(8) There are people who claim to be Jews and yet are not recognized as such either by the rabbinical authorities or by the Government of Israel. Such are the Falashas from Ethiopia, a handful of whom live in Israel, and there occasionally appear other sects in various parts of the world usually claiming descent from one of the ten lost tribes of Israel. This category is peculiar in two ways. Firstly, the community claiming to be Jewish, while following the essentials of Judaism in belief and practice, differs in various customs, observances, and rituals. Thus, for example, it does not know and use Hebrew for its religious practices in prayer and Bible reading. Secondly, neither the community nor the mainstream of Judaism have records about the historical link between this group and the Jewish nation. The group may claim Jewish descent from Solomon's time, as the Falashas do, or descent from one of the lost tribes, or it may be thought to descend from some ancient converts to Judaism, but no historical record of the link exists. Nor is there evidence that contact was maintained between regular Jewish communities and these groups, except for fairly recent times.

Thus, from both the religious point of view and the standpoint of national history, doubts exist as to the Jewishness of such groups. Yet these doubts cannot obliterate the fact that such groups are closely related to Judaism and that, in some cases at least, this relationship is of a very long standing.

There is no doubt that individuals from such groups require conversion to be regarded as Jews by the Rabbinate. The practice, thus far, of the Ministry of the Interior has been not to view them as Jews, though this does not preclude granting them the right to settle in Israel on an individual basis. It should be added that the practice of the Minister of the Interior has not been challenged in the Supreme Court, and there is no way of knowing what its decision might be. The now accepted definition of a Jew as a person born of a Jewish mother cannot lead to an indisputable resolution of the problem, for undoubtedly members of these sects regard their mothers as Jewish and no criterion for the Jewishness of mothers has been established save that their mothers be Jewish.

The fact that members of these groups can, in their own ways, be much more devout than many a regular Jew, or the fact that an assimilated Jew may not know Hebrew, or pray or read the Bible, not even in English or Russian, does not mollify the attitude to these

groups. For it is the historical link with Judaism which seems the overwhelming factor in the nationalist notions of modern Israel, and the evidence of such a link, or of recorded conversion to Judaism, is indispensable for the rabbinical authorities.

It should be reiterated that, under present practices, the integration of members of such groups into Jewish society in Israel through marriage has much better chances of success if they are regarded by the rabbinical authorities as non-Jews than if they are considered Jews. For as non-Jews they can be converted and then are fully acceptable as Jews for the purpose of the religious law. As Jews, with their different practices and customs, the validity of their divorces would be questioned and thus they could not intermarry because of the fear of *mamzerut*, as is the case of the Karaites. Thus, paradoxically, not being accepted as Jews seems a better status in this case for integration with Jews.

The various categories of Jews, as determined by the various criteria applied in Israel, can well be summarized in the following synoptic table.

Who is accepted as a Jew in Israel

The category of people ↓ / The legal authority →	Law of Return	Population Registry	Rabbinical Law	Marriage Laws (rabbinical, but sanctioned by State law)
(1) Bulk of immigrants	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
(2) Karaites Bene Israel of India	} Yes	} Yes	} Yes	No Yes, but subject to inquiries
(3) Samaritans	Yes till 1970. Unclear now.	Yes till 1970. Unclear now.	No	Only after conversion
(4) Children of Jewish fathers	Yes	Yes before 1970 (March). Not now	No	Only after conversion
(5) Non-Jewish spouses of Jews and of their descendants	Yes	No	No	Would have married abroad
(6) Converts to Judaism	Yes	Yes	Yes, if conversion orthodox	Yes, if conversion orthodox
(7) Converted Jews	No	No	Yes	No
(8) Semi-Jewish sects	No	No	No	Only after conversion

H. *Evaluation and criticism of the system*

The way of deciding who is a Jew in Israel and the actual practice must not only be understood descriptively, but also analysed normatively. The evaluation of the system will rely on three criteria: (1)

consensus of authorities, (2) logical consistency, and (3) agreement with social reality. Each of these criteria will be explained and applied to our problem in turn.

(1) Consensus of authority—which may mean consensus within the legal system as well as among the authorities which administer the law—is usually taken for granted in an orderly state or society. Members of an orderly society, even if occasionally they find themselves in a legal conflict, tacitly assume that the law and those in charge of administering it have the one and ultimate answer which resolves all actual or potential disputes within their society.

However, this is not actually a universal situation. In certain societies the law and the authority do not enjoy such a clear and unambiguous status. This, to give a prominent example, is the case in the United States where the federal structure of government, as well as the emphatic division of powers, all too often create situations in which it is not clear whether the State or the National authority is in charge, or whether the President or the Congress has the ultimate say. To be sure, constitutionally such conflicts are resolvable by the judgement of the Supreme Court; yet not every conflict reaches this stage, and, if it does, it takes considerable time. Thus, various actual problems are left in open controversy, which only exacerbates the conflicts and has an unsettling effect on society. To put it in other words, a clearly defined procedure for the administration of law and resolution of conflicts is, generally speaking, a cohesive factor in the life of a society.

The application of this criterion to our problem will easily reveal the lack of consensus reigning here. In the first place, there are two systems of law concerned with the admission of individuals into the Jewish community: a lay one of the State and a religious one accepted and sanctioned by the State law. These two systems are not based on the same philosophy and, consequently, are not committed to the same notion and definition of a Jew. Therefore cases occur in which a person is regarded as Jewish by the lay authorities but not by the religious ones, and vice versa.

Such conflicting definitions are not merely a sociological or legal curiosity. They can lead to personal and social problems. Thus, to take a concrete example, when Major Shalit's children grow up—and they will grow up in the consciousness of being Jewish, both because their parents are bringing them up in this spirit and because the State registered them as of Jewish nationality—and when they are ready to marry, they will encounter the barrier of the rabbinical law and practice. For the purpose of marriage they remain non-Jewish and consequently they will not be allowed to marry a Jewish person in a religious ceremony, the only ceremony legally available in Israel. It has been pointed out that such a situation (a child growing up in Israel as a Jew who is refused marriage because he is not considered

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a Jew) would lead to a great emotional disturbance for the person concerned and that therefore the ambiguous practice is inhuman. A single and consistent criterion for deciding who is a Jew would avoid such painful situations.[26]

True, the new Amendment No. 2 to the Law of Return aims at a uniform criterion of Jewishness for rabbinical and lay purposes, for marriage and for registration. Yet it does not accomplish its purpose fully. For, first, it does not define conversion to Judaism, and thus leaves open the possibility of a Reform convert being accepted as a Jew for immigration and registration and not for marriage. Moreover (and this in practice may prove a more formidable issue), relatives by marriage or descent of a Jew are regarded as if they were Jews for the purpose of the Law of Return; yet, having taken advantage of this privilege and settled in Israel, they will discover that they cannot be registered as Jews, not to say married as and to Jews unless converted. Thus the emotional upset of being a Jew, or being considered as if one was a Jew, in one sense, but not in another sense, has not been obliterated by the new legislation; it has merely been relegated to another level.

While the fundamental disagreement as to the yardstick of Jewishness remains that between the religious and lay law, we find a considerable amount of controversy within the legal system of the State itself, including the administration of this system. The new Amendment to the Law of Return—essentially accepting the religious definition of a Jew on the one hand, and extending the rights of the Law to non-Jewish relatives of Jews on the other hand—is a manifest expression of opposing tendencies.

That these conflicts dig deep into the lay system of law administration is manifest from the various controversies about the definition of a Jew. For one thing, the Supreme Court of Israel does not necessarily accept the practice of the Minister of the Interior, as the Shalit case emphatically showed. Moreover, the Minister of the Interior may find himself in conflict with the Cabinet of which he is a member. Thus, as already mentioned, a recent case concerning the validity of Reform conversion (of Mrs. Zeidman) nearly led to a crisis within the Cabinet, owing to disagreement between the Minister of the Interior, a member of the National Religious Party, and other members of the Government. At a time when the Minister of the Interior was not a member of a religious party, a disagreement between him and the majority of the Cabinet could have occurred for another reason. Thus, in the case of Oswald Rufeisen, the then Minister of the Interior, Mr. Bar-Yehuda, wrote to the former: 'All I read and heard about you would undoubtedly be sufficient, in my opinion, to acknowledge your right to demand recognition as a son of the Jewish nation . . . But the Government decided otherwise.'[27] Significantly, in the opinion of one of the judges

of the Supreme Court who sat in this case, the Minister of the Interior was mistaken in thinking that the Cabinet decision was binding on him in this case, as the Law of Return gives the authority to issue an immigration certificate to the Minister of the Interior and not to the entire Cabinet.[28] Thus, not only were the Minister and the majority of the Government in conflict, but confusion reigned as to who had the legal authority in such a case. (Possibly the Minister knew his rights, but gave in to political pressure.)

Not only have divisions of opinion on this issue occurred within the Cabinet from time to time, but the Government as a whole has not remained consistent in its definition of Jewishness. Thus, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Sussmann in the case of Major Shalit, the Government had decided in 1958 that 'a man who declares *bona fide* that he is a Jew and not of another religion will be registered as a Jew'; yet these directives were changed by the Government in 1960, thus precluding the registration as Jewish nationals of Major Shalit's children. Such changes, attributed to a different Government coalition, must not—in the opinion of Mr. Justice Sussmann—affect the interpretation of the law. The law must be applied consistently, irrespective of political changes.[29]

One should add that the judges of the Supreme Court, before Amendment No. 2 to the Law of Return, did not agree on the issue of who is a Jew for the purpose of the lay laws either. In the case of Major Shalit the judgement was made by a majority of 5 to 4. In the case of Oswald Rufeisen the judgement was made by 4 against 1.

This picture of lack of consensus, not to say confusion, contrasts sharply with the stand of the rabbinical authorities. There the law that a Jew is a person born of a Jewish mother or a convert to Judaism is interpreted orthodoxly by rabbis, rabbinical courts, and religious commentators in Israel. Needless to say, a monolithic stand does not provide an immunity against criticism on some other ground.

(2) The criterion of logical consistency requires that the principle applied to decide on a certain issue remain constant and be not changed when we confront a situation which, according to our intuitive feeling, or because of another consideration, is considered an exception.

Judged by this criterion, the above mentioned change of government directives for determining the Jewishness of a person, criticized by Mr. Justice Sussmann, can be regarded also as an inconsistency (though it also reflects lack of consensus).

One could also argue that the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Oswald Rufeisen is not logically consistent with the Population Registry Law (Ordinance, at that time). For if in registration a specific distinction is made between religion and nationality, it would seem that a person can choose to be of Christian religion and Jewish nationality, just as he can choose to be an agnostic or an atheist and remain Jewish in the national sense. True, Judaism historically did not make

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a clear distinction between what we conceive today as being national and religious elements in it, and the Registry Ordinance (or Law), unlike the Law of Return, is related not only to Jews but to the general population of Israel; in fact, it seems primarily instituted for state security reasons to enable the identification of persons of Arab nationality, both Moslem and Christian.[30] Thus Jewishness may have been caught accidentally in the net of this distinction between religion and nationality. Yet, once the law is there and is applied to the Jewish population as well, it is somewhat difficult to justify the exclusion-of-belonging-to-another-*religion* as a criterion of Jewish *nationality*. Why should a *religious* element be a factor in determining *nationality*? The definition of a Jew in Amendment No. 2 of the Law of Return did not resolve this inconsistency (if inconsistency it is); it only elevated it to a statutory level.

The determination of a Jew according to the religious law seems, in its inflexibility, logically consistent. Yet, this will not be the impression if we scrutinize, besides the formal legal practice, the *substantive reasons* given for it. The dominant justification of the law that a Jew is determined as such by his mother's Jewishness (though not presented in a categorical way) is that, the mother being the formative influence in the spiritual upbringing of the child, a Jewish mother will shape a Jewish child, a non-Jewish will not.[31] The covenant in the book of Ezra to put away the strange wives *and* their offspring also implies that the heathen mothers made the children follow their abominable practices.[32] However, even if we assume that the mother's educational influence is usually decisive, the argument is not resolved. For, according to the rabbinical law, the Jewishness of the child is decided matrilineally not only in a mixed marriage of a ('biologically') full Jewess, but also over infinite generations. Without going to infinity and to limit ourselves to a concrete example, the child of a woman whose maternal grandmother was Jewish will be Jewish, even if the husbands of all three generations were gentile.[33] It is extremely doubtful whether such a third generation 'technical' Jew would in any way be brought up in the Jewish spirit by a mother whose husband and father are not Jewish and whose mother is ('biologically') half-Jewish. There can be little doubt that a child whose father is Jewish and mother non-Jewish has far better chances of being affected by Judaism than is the case in the above example. Thus, at least as far as this educational argument for matrilineally determined Jewishness is concerned, the orthodox position seems to lack consistency.

The rabbinical practice, by strictly following the letter of the law as it interprets it, reaches certain conclusions which can be termed as super-consistent. This is the case of the Karaites who are excluded from marriage into the Jewish community because of the doubts as to their divorce practices and the consequent possibility of *mamzerut*. Yet

it can be argued that this super-consistency is not applied uniformly to all the Jews. While the rabbinical authorities seem very strict in cases involving persons from certain Jewish sects or communities, they do not raise the problem of the possibility of *mamzerut*, and therefore exclusion from marriage, in the case of West European and American immigrants, even though the practice of civil (and religiously invalid) divorces there may not be so rare.[34]

The fact that a convert to another religion, though considered by rabbinical law as Jewish, is not claimed by the rabbinical courts to be subject to their authority when marriage is concerned, could also be regarded as inconsistency. Though there may be a legal justification for it, the suspicion persists that resentment (quite understandably) is at the source of this practice.

(3) Agreement with social reality as a criterion for the evaluation of law touches on the peculiar problem of the relationship between law and this reality. Law as a normative system does not simply reflect the sum total of prevalent attitudes. Law is not to be equated with the outcome of opinion polls or with the results of general elections. Law tries to impose certain standards, on the assumption that these are more weighty and more durable than the changing and changeable mood of the society. Yet this claim of law to durability, if not permanence, cannot ignore the fact that social attitudes change, and that law may have to be affected by these changes, even if it does not simply reflect them. *Fiat justitia ruat caelum* is not a practicable principle. Law which completely separates itself from the fundamental notions of the society it serves is bound either to be found intolerably oppressive or to be simply changed or discarded.

Moreover, not only do social *attitudes* change, but social *conditions* change as well. Laws enacted for regulating carts and horses will not be adequate for motor traffic. Laws for motor traffic will not be suited for air traffic. The law-maker must observe the objective changes in the conditions of life of a society and adapt the legislation to these conditions. This may involve stricter laws, or laxer laws, or otherwise modified laws.

The rabbinical laws pertaining to the definition of a Jew and to marriage, in certain marginal yet significant cases, seem to ignore both the basic subjective attitudes of the bulk of society of modern Israel and the objective social conditions. Of course, from the rabbinical point of view, both these factors are irrelevant. If the law is *absolutely* right, as religious law usually claims to be, there is no need to modify it under any circumstances. It is up to circumstances to adjust to the standard of perfection expressed by the law. However, anyone looking at the rabbinical law as the expression of *human*, not divine, judgement, will have to evaluate it also by the standard of its relationship to the present-day reality, both subjective and objective.

To bar the Karaites from marriage into the bulk of the Jewish community on grounds which in terms of common sense are irrelevant, besides being a policy harmful to national interests and human relations in Israel, is a striking instance of doctrinal obliviousness of reality. It is the more absurd in that the rabbinical authorities, who would have liked to see the Karaites disappear as a separate sect, do everything in their power to perpetuate their seclusion and to strengthen their sense of identity.

The application of the rigid standard of having a Jewish mother as the criterion of Jewishness, now (March 1970) accepted also by the State Law, may lead to results which are in total disagreement with social reality. As already mentioned, this means that the son of an Arab father and a Jewish mother who does not consider himself a Jew and actively fights against Israel, remains a Jew; while the children of an Israeli Jew and a gentile mother who settled in Israel with the intention of bringing up the children as Israeli Jews, are not considered Jews and are not allowed to marry Jews, unless formally converted to Judaism. Nor can one accept the argument that if the mother or the child is determined to be a part of the Jewish community in Israel, it is a minor issue for them to be converted to Judaism. This is not so, especially if an orthodox conversion is insisted upon. For if these people are agnostics or atheists—as usually is the case—they cannot, honestly and sincerely, commit themselves to the observance of Jewish ritual and go through the conversion ritual as required by the rabbinical authorities. Nor is it easy to justify the observance of religion as a condition for the acceptance of a convert, while born Jews, even when completely ignoring religious ways in private and in public, will remain unquestionably Jews for the religious authorities.

The attitude of suspicion and ill will on the part of the rabbinical authorities to non-Jewish wives and mothers of Jewish husbands and their children, which underlies the rabbinical law, has come under severe criticism by Mr. Justice Hayim Cohen of the Supreme Court of Israel, who undoubtedly represents the opinions of many unorthodox Israelis. Mr. Justice Cohen (at that time the Legal Advisor to the Government of Israel) argues that the gentile women married to Jews in Israel do not divert their husbands and children from Judaism and from Israel, but mostly, after being persecuted by the Nazis, and occasionally endangering themselves to save Jews, immigrated to Israel with the intention of having their children participate in the building of Israel. In Mr. Justice Cohen's opinion, they and their children should be accepted wholeheartedly into the Jewish community.[35]

Indeed, it is hard not to accept this argument. Social reality and public sentiment of most Israelis would indicate that the Jewishness of a child of a mixed marriage should not be determined by a technical criterion, such as the Jewishness of the mother, but by the objective

situation. If one of the parents, whether father or mother, is not Jewish, but the intention of both is to bring up the children as Jews and they pursue this intention in practice, the child should be considered Jewish, and not only for the purpose of immigration and registration, but also for acceptance into the community through marriage. If, however, the parents—whether the father or the mother be Jewish—bring up the child as a Christian or a Moslem, it is not unreasonable to demand formal conversion of some sort, if the child, on growing up, decides to become a Jew.

Thus the criticism of the present religious practice—and the lay law to the extent that it follows it—is not that it is too strict. It is too strict in some cases, too lenient in others. To regard as a Jew the matrilineal descendant of a Jewish mother after ten generations is definitely an example of leniency overdone. The point is that the rabbinical criterion is oblivious of the concrete social situation in its rigid application of a formal principle.

The lay authorities in Israel, unlike the rabbinical ones, try to adjust their criteria to the social reality and public sentiment of modern Israel. Hence the judgement in favour of Major Shalit allowing him to register his children as Jews. Yet their task is extremely difficult. This for two or three reasons.

First, the spectrum of Jewishness which they have to deal with is extremely wide. With all the tolerance of half-Jews and shadow-Jews—to use sociological rather than legal notions—there are marginal cases which are extremely difficult to decide upon. The case of Oswald Rufeisen is exemplary in this respect.

Second, the lay authorities (whatever their decisions in respect of the determination of Jewishness for the purpose of the Law of Return and of Population Registry, decisions which fluctuated over the years) have their hands tied when the problem arises in respect of marriage. There the rabbinical law reigns supreme by virtue of the State law which authorized this rule.

This brings us to the third point, or rather extension of the second one, namely, to the self-restraint of the State law in respect of the rabbinical law (controlling marriage of Jews)—indeed, even acceptance of rabbinical guidance in the now statutory definition of Jew in essentially religious terms. Whatever one's opinion about such *de facto* subservience to (though *de jure* supremacy over) the rabbinical law, it must be admitted that the lay authorities are subject here to a very strong social pressure.

It may seem simple to suggest that the Israeli parliament enact a law transferring matters of marriage and divorce from rabbinical to lay jurisdiction and establish civil marriage. Yet such a law and practice would meet with desperate opposition on the part of the religious part of the population, the National Religious Party, and the

rabbinical authorities. The resentment aroused would also encompass religious Jews and orthodox rabbinical circles outside Israel. For the orthodox it would not be merely a disregard of another religious law. It would mean for them that the Jews in Israel were going to be split within a generation into two nations: the orthodox who accept rabbinical marriage and divorce practices and the others whose (civil) divorces would not be valid and who therefore would be forbidden to marry into the orthodox Jewish community because of the possibility of *mamzerut*. However bizarre such an argument may sound to the outsider, for the orthodox it is of primary significance.

This orthodox stand may be shared by a minority, in Israel and outside it. But in enacting laws and in instituting policies, it is not only the *majority* sentiment that matters, but also the *intensity* of the belief. An ardently held belief, even of a minority, is a significant aspect of social reality which can be ignored only at a great peril. The national unity of Israel cannot, it would seem, take the strain of a decision which, despite the weighty arguments in its favour, would alienate a significant part of Jews and create a rift in the nation. Nor can the rabbinical standards be accepted in their totality without upsetting the majority and some ardent anti-rabbinical minorities.

Thus it seems that the determination of who is a Jew in Israel and acceptable to the community as such in every sense is so complicated not simply because of the inadequacy of law; rather the law is so complex because of the contradictions in social reality and public sentiment. The lack of consensus in the legal system and its administration, which has been criticized, is, in a sense, the result of a sensitivity on the part of the authorities to the rifts within the society on this issue. The criterion of social realism is more decisive here than the principle of clearcut law and authority. A law trying to cut the Gordian knot of this complexity would probably do more harm than good. The knot must untie itself by itself, so to say.

This sounds like expecting a miracle. Yet social realities change, as do public attitudes. Even doctrinal rigidity can become flexible. While the lay authorities—notably the Supreme Court of Israel—have shown a remarkable sensitivity to the difficulties involved in defining a Jew, not least in refraining from a definition for many years, the rabbinical authorities have remained emphatically rigid. Such an attitude has not characterized Judaism throughout its history; there have been periods and individuals whose orthodox concept of Judaism allowed modifications and interpretations of law to fit the circumstances of their time. It is not beyond hope that this less rigid attitude may yet be revived in the orthodox establishment of Israel and thus help to resolve an issue which occasionally results in inequity and causes rifts and bitterness within Israeli society.

NOTES

[1] The initial collecting of material, on which this article is based, was facilitated by a stay in Israel during one term's leave, granted the writer by the University of Minnesota in the autumn of 1969. The writer also wishes gratefully to acknowledge the information and advice given him by various people in Israel—notably, with reference to the legal aspects of the question, by Miss Beela Langsam of the Faculty of Law of Tel-Aviv University.

[2] This does not mean that the yardsticks applied by Jews have necessarily been strict in all past ages; only that through the greatest part of their long history actual Jews did not deviate in such a way from the model of a full Jew. In this sense one *could* have established strict yardsticks and they would have fitted the dominant majority, to say the least.

[3] The Nationality Law, 1952, simply states that 'every immigrant to Israel according to the Law of Return, 1950, will become an Israeli citizen'. It also specifies that a Jew who came to Israel (not as an immigrant) and decides to settle there will become a citizen from the day of receiving an immigrant's certificate. (Cf. also paragraph 3 of the Law of Return, 1950.) For certain modifications of the Nationality Law, dealing with the right to opt out of 'Nationality by Return', see the Nationality (Amendment No. 2) Law, 1968. On the Law of Return, see further, Section E.

[4] Cf. the following comment: 'The concept of a Jew, according to Zionist tendencies, . . . is of a dynamic nature. As is well known, few are the immigrants whose Jewishness is complete, evident, and developed at the time of their immigration to Israel; most of them do not have the knowledge of the Jewish language and culture and many did not even live in a Jewish community before. However, Zionism always thought that the Jewish immigrant's will and his absorption into Israeli society would make his potential Jewishness grow . . .' (translated from an article by G. Tedeschi, 'Who Is a Jew', in *Hapraklit*, a periodical of the Israel Bar Association, vol. 19, no. 2, June 1963; reprinted in *Mi Yehudi—Who Is a Jew*—a collection of opinions on the problem in response to a query by David Ben-Gurion; published in Jerusalem, 1959).

[5] The change was made in the Amendment to the Law of Return, 1 September 1954. See *Sefer Hahukim (Book of Laws)*, no. 163.

[6] The Amendment (mentioned in the last note) also excludes 'a person with a criminal past, likely to endanger public welfare'.

[7] The quoted passages translated from *Sefer Hahukim*, no. 51, 6 July 1950. I have deviated from the authorized translation which follows the Hebrew text rather too literally.

For the transfer of authority from the Minister of Immigration to the Minister of the Interior, see note 5 above.

[8] The following quotations are according to the English version of the law in *The Jewish Agency, Israel Today* pamphlet no. 16, Jerusalem 1960. The pamphlet contains basic information about the Jewish Agency.

[9] The Population Registry Law, though not *meant* to be an instrument for absorption of individuals into the Jewish community in Israel, is *technically* related to the issue in that it requires the specification of an individual's religion and nationality (in the ethnic-cultural sense). Hence actual problems as to who is a Jew are often related to the execution of this law.

[10] Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 1970. The quotation is translated from the Hebrew text. For a brief comment on the Amendment, see Shalev Ginossar, 'Who is a Jew: A Better Law'. *Israel Law Review*, vol. 5, no. 2, April 1970, pp. 264–7.

[11] This Government decision of 20 July 1958 was related to Registry of Population, but was applied also to the interpretation of the Law of Return by the Ministry of the Interior in the case of Oswald Rufeisen. (See next note.)

[12] See Oswald Rufeisen *versus* the Minister of the Interior, High Court of Justice case No. 62/72, *Judgements of the Supreme Court of Israel*, vol. 16, nos. 84–85. The judgement was given on 6 December 1962.

[13] See *The Palestine Orders in Council*, 1922 to 1947, Nos. 51 ff.

[14] *Sefer Hahukim*, no. 64.

[15] See *The Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin*, chapter III, 66b (p. 337 in the

Soncino Press English translation, London, 1936).

[16] The 'mixed' marriage in such a case must have been performed outside Israel. If it was valid in the country where it took place, it is legally valid in Israel, irrespective of the stand of the rabbinical authorities towards such marriage.

[17] See *The Babylonian Talmud, Yebamoth*, chapter IV, 49a ff. (pp. 320 ff. in the Soncino Press English translation, London, 1936).

[18] On this significant principle and its implications in Judaism, see the article by Ya'acov Katz, using the saying for its title, in *Tarbitz*, vol. 23, Jerusalem 1950–1 (in Hebrew); reprinted in *Mi Yehudi*, op. cit., pp. 223 ff.

[19] See Shalit *versus* The Minister of the Interior, High Court of Justice case 58/69, *Judgements of the Supreme Court of Israel*, vol. 23, part 2. The judgement was given on 23 January 1970. A summary of the judgement is in *The Jerusalem Post* of 25 January 1970. A critical Note is to be found in *Israel Law Review*, vol. 5, no. 2, April 1970, pp. 259–263 by Benjamin Akzin ('Who is a Jew? A Hard Case').

[20] See *Sefer Hahukim*, no. 95.

[21] The case of Mr. Goldberg reached the Supreme Court, but was resolved, at that time, by a compromise between the plaintiff and the Ministry of the Interior. Reported in *Davar* (Hebrew daily) of 27 January 1970.

[22] This was stated in an interview preceding the enactment of the Amendment and reported in *Davar*.

[23] The person concerned is Mrs. Helen Zeidman. The impending judgement of the Supreme Court was due on March 16 and Mrs. Zeidman withdrew her suit on the morning of the same day. (Reported in *Ma'ariv*, evening paper, of 16 June 1970.)

[24] I am indebted for the information

about the practice of the rabbinical courts in this respect to Mr. Justice Hayim Cohen of the Supreme Court of Israel (his letter dated 8 June 1970).

[25] The above summary of the case follows the official records of the case of Oswald Rufeisen *versus* the Minister of the Interior, High Court of Justice case 62/72, *Judgements of the Supreme Court of Israel*, vol. 16, nos. 8, 84 and 85, 5 and 10 February 1963 respectively.

[26] See Mr. Justice Moshe Silberg's letter to David Ben-Gurion, then Prime Minister of Israel, dated 4 December 1958, published in *Mi Yehudi*, op. cit.

[27] Translated from the Minister's letter, quoted in the case of Oswald Rufeisen *versus* the Minister of the Interior, High Court of Justice case 62/72, *Judgements of the Supreme Court of Israel*, vol. 16, no. 84, p. 2450.

[28] The opinion mentioned is that of Mr. Justice Berinson, ibid., p. 2451.

[29] Reproduced from report on the judgement in the Shalit case in *Davar*, Tel-Aviv, 25 January 1970.

[30] See the letter of Ben-Gurion of 27 October 1958 in the opening pages of *Mi Yehudi*, op. cit.

[31] For this explanation, see, for example, the statements of Rabbi Y. J. Weinberg and E. Globus in *Mi Yehudi*, op. cit., on pp. 73 and 234, respectively.

[32] See Ezra 10:3 and the context.

[33] This interpretation of the rabbinical law was confirmed to me by the Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi I. J. Unterman, in a personal letter of 11 Iyar 5730 (17 May 1970).

[34] Cf. the statement of Mr. Justice A. Witkon, in Ghitye *versus* Chief Rabbinate and others, High Court of Justice case 359/66, *Judgements of the Supreme Court of Israel*, vol. 22, no. 11, p. 301.

[35] See the letter of Mr. Justice Hayim Cohen of 10 February 1959 in *Mi Yehudi*, op. cit., pp. 88 ff., especially p. 92.

BOOK REVIEWS

LIONEL KOCHAN, ed., *The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917*, ix + 357 pp.,
published for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, by Oxford
University Press, London, 1970, 50s.

The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917 is a collection of essays by distinguished
British, Israeli, and American scholars on the historical, cultural, and eco-
nomic development of Soviet Jewry. The study of the Jews in the U.S.S.R.
confronts the scholar with unique problems of organization, source material,
and methodology. Therefore specialized essays seem to be a better approach
than a general history written by a single author. *The Jews in Soviet Russia
since 1917* is a very important contribution to the subject.

Russian Jewry, both before and after the revolution, has never been a
homogeneous community. The generation before 1917 witnessed intense
ideological disputes, growing rivalry between Hebrew and Yiddish, between
proponents of the *cheder* and the advocates of a modern educational system.
The traditional Jewish *shtetl* was already on the decline. But the Bundist
from Vilna, the Odessa Zionist, and the devout *chasid* from Volhynia all had
one thing in common: a fervent desire to preserve, each in his own way, some
sort of Jewish identity. This made for a complexity in Jewish life which ill-
fitted the simplistic ideologies which a new Jewish semi-intelligentsia began
to bandy about before 1914. Most observers of Russian Jewry were agreed
that there was a sharp upsurge of Jewish nationalism in the years immedi-
ately preceding the First World War. As Simon Dubnow noted, many Jewish
intellectuals even began to question the use of the Russian language at Jewish
meetings in St. Petersburg.

As Professor Samuel Ettinger notes in his essay on 'The Jews at the Out-
break of the Revolution', the events of March 1917 triggered a hectic period
of political and cultural ferment in the life of Russian Jewry. The Bund, for
example, quickly expanded from 500 to more than 35,000 to 40,000 members.
In the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in November 1917,
Jewish parties received half a million votes (Zionists made the best showing),
even though many major centres of Jewish population were at that time cut
off from Russia.

The Bolshevik seizure of power soon changed conditions on the 'Jewish
Street'. The small shopkeeper faced economic ruin, and Jewish political
parties quickly disappeared. But many Jewish socialists found room in the
Yevsektsia which was to play an important role in shaping Soviet Jewish
policy in the 1920s.

Indeed, one of the few disappointments of this collection is the absence of
an essay on the Yevsektsia as such. Still, the contributions by Chimen Ab-
ramsky on Birobidzhan, Joseph Schechtman on Zionism, and Jacob Miller

on Soviet Theory on the Jews, contain some interesting information on the subject. For example, the initial impetus for the anti-Zionist campaign came not from the Soviet government but from the Yevsektsia, which also hastened the demise of Hebrew. Here we see the legacy of the bitterness generated by the pre-revolutionary conflicts between socialists and Zionists, between Hebrew and Yiddish, each language having come to represent for its proponents, with important exceptions, the keystone of a complete ideology concerning the nature and future of the Jewish people. The initial importance of the former Jewish socialists was enhanced by the fact that the old Jewish Bolsheviks had little interest in, or knowledge of, Jewish affairs. Such was the fervour of the former Bundists in the Jewish Commissariat (the forerunner of the Yevsektsia) that they protested against the Commissariat's plan to alleviate the economic misery in the Jewish *shtetl* on the grounds that the organization should perform only 'cultural' functions. Within the ranks of the Yevsektsia, these former Bundists faced competition from the territorialist-oriented former Zionist–Socialists who gained the upper hand during the 1920s. In the event, the Birobidzhan project was not, according to Abramsky, the result of Jewish initiative but 'stemmed from the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and was strongly supported by the Commissariat for Defence and the Agricultural Academy'.

It is a well-known fact that in the light of Bolshevik theory on the nationality question, the Jews found themselves in an anomalous position. They had no territory of their own but did possess a recognized language of uncertain official status. This peculiarity had been the cause of the various twists and turns in Soviet Jewish policy: territorial concentration, extra-territorial cultural autonomy, and assimilation. Besides the essays mentioned above, Soviet Jewish policy is also discussed by S. Levenberg ('Soviet Jewry: Some Problems and Perspectives'), and William Korey ('The Legal Position of Soviet Jewry').

Neither Lenin nor Stalin, much less the Jewish Bolsheviks, believed that the Jews were a nation like the Poles or the Finns. In Bolshevik theory, Jewish identity would disappear along with the Tsarist persecutions and the capitalist system, in which the Jews held an anachronistic economic position. The history of Soviet attitudes towards the Jewish people contains some curious interludes, such as Kalinin's 1926 speech. But, as Jacob Miller points out, 'Lenin's statements with reference to the Jews are particularly pungent, not only because they are made in the struggle against Bundist particularism as a betrayal of Marxism. He and his type saw the Jewish traditional ethos as the extreme embodiment of backward exclusiveness. Assimilation meant more than the emancipation of the Jews. It symbolized the emancipation of mankind for which he fought.' Miller also discusses recent development in Soviet theory on the nationality question, such as the discussion in *Voprosy Istorii* in 1966 and 1967. The only reference to Jews is found in the January 1967 issue, where M. S. Dzhunusov writes that 'owing to its historically formed dispersal and social composition, the Jewish *natsional'nost* cannot develop into a nation . . .'

The Jewish population in the U.S.S.R. is going to decline, according to Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, whose essay on 'The Jewish Population: Demographic Trends and Occupational Patterns' contains a good deal of valuable information. As early as the 1920s, the Jewish population in the former Pale

and in the Russian Republic began to exhibit markedly different demo-
graphic characteristics; the Jews in the interior, very much an immigrant
population with a different age structure, had 'a much lower rate of natural
increase than the Russian population of that Republic' (ten as against thirty
per thousand). Jewish fertility in the western areas was much higher, but
these Jewish communities have been practically wiped out. Nove and Newth
write that a greater proportion of Jews have higher education than other
nationalities, although this advantage will disappear as the other peoples of
the country continue to make progress in this field. While the total number
of Jewish students receiving a higher education has been steadily increasing,
if one excludes correspondence students, a different story emerges. Thus in
1963–64, there were 45,000 Jews or 3·2 per cent of the total student popu-
lation, whereas in 1935 the figure was 74,000 (13·3 per cent). One of the most
useful tables in this excellent survey concerns 'Intellectual Occupations per
thousand of given nationality, 1963–64'. Whereas 1·59 per cent of Russians
are students (higher education inclusive of correspondence courses), 2·14 per
cent are 'specialists in national economy' and 0·32 per cent are scientific
workers, the Jewish percentages are 3·44, 13·45 and 2·12 respectively.

Even when the Soviet Jew writes in Russian, he still experiences a certain
feeling of separation from the Russian world around him. As Professor Fried-
berg observes in his essay on 'Jewish Contributions to Soviet Literature',
'The least expected and yet most striking feature of writings by Soviet Russ-
ian authors of Jewish origin is their non-nationalistic cosmopolitan character
. . . it might indeed be said that it is only vis à vis aliens that a Soviet Jewish
author could, in good conscience, regard himself as a Russian. The aliens
could be foreigners, they could be non-Russians within the borders of the
Soviet Union, they could even inhabit the never never world of fantasy.'
Friedberg goes on to assert that most of the specifically 'Jewish' contributions
to Russian letters in the last half-century 'consisted in broadening the hither-
to rather narrow historical and geographical vistas of the Russian literary
imagination'. Friedberg discusses Babel, Ehrenburg, and many other writers
to support his hypothesis, with which the reviewer agrees. His analysis of
Babel is particularly impressive. Most critics, for example, in discussing Kon-
armiya, have analysed the theme of the Cossack-Jewish intellectual dicho-
tomy. Fewer have noticed, as does Friedberg, that the young Jewish Com-
munist 'is secure in his position as a Russian, a Communist and a soldier of
the revolution only when facing the patriarchal Jews from the old *shtetlakh*, the
Polish gentry and the Roman Catholic clergy . . .'. It would obviously be very
interesting to compare Jewish contributions in American and Soviet literature.

Chaim Shmeruk's essay on Yiddish literature in the U.S.S.R. contains
enough information to deserve a detailed review in itself. Shmeruk surveys
the 1920s with its brilliant Pléiade of the writers grouped around *Eygns*:
Markish, Bergelson, Der Nister, Leib Kvitko, and others. He describes the
resurrection of an older, starkly realistic and 'proletarian' oriented trend in
Yiddish literature in the person of the young Fefer and Kharik. The attempts
by the party critics, such as Moshe Litvakov (who was a leader of the Faray-
nigte party during the revolution) to dictate to the 'fellow-travellers', as
Shmeruk calls them, grew stronger. Yet the 1930s could still see Halkin's *Bar
Kokhba*, the first two volumes of Der Nister's *Der Mishpokhe Mashber* and

Bergelson's *Baym Dnieper*. The Second World War saw the last period of rela-
tive freedom for the Soviet Yiddish writer who, under the impact of the
holocaust, put many of his stories in non-Soviet settings (mainly Poland).
The underlying theme, in Shmeruk's words, was an overwhelming desire 'to
express Jewish wholeness and continuity'. Once again, Zionists and Chasidim
appeared in the Soviet Jewish novel. The climate soon changed and the fore-
most Yiddish writers met their common fate on 12 August 1952. How much
has survived in *Sovietish Heimland?* Shmeruk sees no talent as yet to compare
with that of the liquidated Yiddish writers, but adds that 'it is still too early
to pass judgement on the revival and future of Yiddish literature in the Soviet
Union on the basis of the works before us. It is obvious that the limitations
and caveats pertaining to other Soviet literatures apply here too. . . .'

One of the reasons why Shmeruk's essay is so valuable is that he devotes a
good deal of attention to the developing tensions between the critics affiliated
with the Jewish labour movement and many Yiddish writers with modernist
tendencies on the eve of the First World War. 'The modernists in Yiddish
literature', Shmeruk writes, 'were sceptics and felt the whole complexity of
their people's national and social problems deeply. Arraigned against them,
arrogant and sure of themselves, stood the *littérateurs* and the critics from the
camp of Jewish labour at a time when the labour movement was the main-
stay of Yiddish and its literature.' One of the basic themes of Shmeruk's essay
is that the friction between the Yevsektsia and the *Eygns* group was a carry-
over of a process that had been well marked before 1914. Peretz openly pro-
tested against the political tutelage of Yiddish letters on many occasions. The
words of Sholem Asch's Zachary Mirkin, uttered in a different context, come
to mind: 'Mirkin saw his way clear before him, knew where he stood; his
place was wherever a plough was being driven over the Jewish field, no
matter in what direction. He must shake himself free from the seduction of
theories, programmes, and all other superstitions in various forms; he must
cut himself free from strange idols and have the courage to be himself.'

The remaining essays in this collection include Joshua Rothenberg's 'Jew-
ish Religion in the U.S.S.R.'; Reuben Ainsztein's 'Soviet Jewry in the Second
World War'; Bernard Weinryb's 'Anti-semitism in Soviet Russia'; and Zev
Katz's 'After the Six-Day War'. Dr. Weinryb has chosen a very difficult sub-
ject; one feels that his essay would have been more successful had he not
tried to describe both psychological theories of antisemitism and Russian
antisemitism in the same short essay. It might have been better to devote
more attention to the pogroms of 1905 and 1918–19. Joshua Rothenberg sees
the sharp decrease of Jewish religious observance in the U.S.S.R. as being
the result of 'administrative measures and of official pressure', though an
'erosion of religious practice would have occurred in any case'.

One of the most poignant subjects in the history of Soviet Jewry is discussed
by Yehoshua Gilboa in his essay on Hebrew literature in the U.S.S.R. Gilboa
quotes the poet Abraham Kariv: 'The strangeness all around was boundless
and the existence of a Hebrew world somewhere far away was beyond all
conception. I can say for myself that the Bible was not in my hands all those
years; it was also dangerous to keep it in the room. Time passed and I never
saw a printed Hebrew line . . . Sometimes, while I was alone, writing a He-
brew poem, a strange doubt crept into my mind: am I not the man who in-

vented this language out of his imagination?' One is tempted to recall the last scenes of Mendal Mann's *Bay di Toyrn fun Moskve*, where the Jewish soldier, barely conscious, hears a Yiddish voice. The next day, he searches, but cannot find the person who spoke to him in Yiddish. Jewish longing, Jewish identity in the U.S.S.R. is more readily understood in these personal terms than within the framework of articulate nationalism or religious observance. The latter avenues are very much blocked for obvious reasons. But the sensation of strangeness lingers on. Maurice Friedberg has extracted the following quote from Sinyavsky's *Makepiece Experiment*: '. . . the only Jewish word she knew was tsores, which, in their language, means sorrow or trouble, or a kind of prickly sadness littering the heart. There was a grain of this tsores buried in her like a raisin you could never dig out—immured in her, as it were, mixed into the very composition of her soul.'

This excellent collection is recommended both to the general reader and to the scholar. Published under the auspices of the Institute of Jewish Affairs in London, it contains a good index and several bibliographies.

<div align="right">SAMUEL D. KASSOW</div>

SYLVIE KORCAZ, *Les Juifs de France et l'Etat d'Israël* (Dossier des Lettres Nouvelles), 210 pp., Denoël, Paris, 1969, 18.70F.

This intelligent essay is certainly a landmark in the difficult study of French Jewry. It is based on sociological research and shows evidence of theoretical grasp and insight and of ability in analysis and synthesis. The book is also written in a very personal and dense style.

From the interplay between concepts and sociological data we gain a satisfying view of kaleidoscopic French Jewry (even if some of Mlle Korcaz's classifications seem arguable). There are many differences between Jews in France according to the modalities of their economic, cultural, and social integration into the wider French society: for all those who are aware of some Jewishness, the State of Israel represents a minimal unifying frame of reference. The author distinguishes within French Jewry first, the category of the 'House of Israel': it includes people who have received some Jewish education, who have a sociological and historical awareness of Jewishness, and for whom religious observances are certainly a means of achieving a feeling of community. For this category, the State of Israel represents pleasures and anxieties which affect the individual, the family, and the collectivity precisely to the degree of their Jewish features. Second, there are the situational Jews (*Juifs de condition*); they do not participate in any organized Jewish community life but they have informal Jewish social connexions. They are mainly members of the middle class who have achieved a peculiar balance between total cultural integration and an incomplete social integration into French society. Their link with Israel is strongly correlated with their 'nocturnal experience' of Nazism. Most of them are the children of immigrants, lacking roots in France, and they feel that the State of Israel gives them respectability vis-à-vis the wider society; it acts as a substitute for the 'Poitou ancestors' or 'Berry landowners' from whom so many French nationals claim descent.

We come to the third category, the *Juifs israélites*. These are bourgeois, usually of several generations' settlement in France. They resent the fact that the French Gentile bourgeoisie, which is more or less right-wing and traditional, excludes them because of a peculiarity attributed to them, their Jewishness, which the *Juifs israélites* do not feel exists. They are eager to prove to antisemites that they are French only, French first and foremost; but they are also aware that the State of Israel is seen as a success symbol by those Frenchmen who reject them, and so they come to find a link between themselves and Israel.

A fourth category is made up of eastern European immigrants, mainly artisans and petty traders. Because they dream of a lost and embellished past, they are labelled *Chagallistes* by the author. For them this past is in some way resurrected in Israel; and to them also Israel lends respectability, making up for their foreign accent and their traditionally 'Jewish' occupations.

In the fifth (and last) category the author puts the recent immigrants from North Africa—people mainly of modest economic and social status, with no vocal representation in official Jewish councils. Mlle Korcaz has a particular feeling of sympathy for them. She notes that Jewishness is very important to them; it is an integrative force. These North African immigrants look upon Israel as the trustee of a traditional past, of a community that was lost—and in this they resemble the *Chagallistes*. They have seen at close hand the clash between French colonialism and the Arab fight for independence, and they identify the cause of France with the Israeli cause. Nevertheless these North African Jews do not differ so much from those in the other categories: for all, Israel represents a vision in which contradictions in their own values and representations—Land of Israel or State of Israel, a traditional Jewish universe or a modern society—may be resolved in a compromise.

In the second part of the book the author analyses some 'myths' about Jewish attitudes to Israel. One of these myths is that the Jews of France have a guilt complex because they have not emigrated to Israel! The fact now seems to be that French Jews (or Jewish Frenchmen, as one wishes!) do not differ from Gentile Frenchmen in their desire to emigrate. If and when they do consider emigration, they give, in 75 per cent of cases, a choice of countries other than Israel. It seems as though Jews in France look upon Israel as a country to which they would go if they were forced to emigrate—much as Gentile Frenchmen might consider French Canada in similar circumstances. Another myth is that Israel is seen by French Jews as an eventual refuge. In fact, Israel is seen by them as a danger-point, as the continuation of two thousand years of fragile existence.

The author also analyses attitudes towards Israel and the pattern of Jewish life. She states that the members of Jewish political movements have in fact passed from communal solidarity to some kind of civic and political conscience; they are at the pole of under-assimilation. At the opposite pole, that of over-integration, there are the formal cultural and philanthropic associations led by the Jewish establishment, in which membership is according to social and economic status. Gradual assimilation has eroded the political parties, while the associations are mainly Ashkenazi-centred. The author considers that the Jews from North Africa form the true Jewish communities of France. She grants that at the time of the Six-Day War Jews appeared to

have rediscovered an almost total unanimity, but points out that the events of May 1968 proved the occasion to have been exceptional; for in that month Jews in France reacted according to the pattern of the social group to which they belonged.

Mlle Korcaz then analyses with much insight the roles and functions of the Jewish press, the type of information available about Israel, the significance of gifts to Israel in June 1967, and 'the trip to Israel'.

She concludes that there is no unity in the way Israel is perceived—except that it is not perceived as a state or nation like any other state or nation. Attitudes towards Israel are conditioned by cultural assimilation and social integration. Individual Jews project on to the State of Israel their own Jewishness, past and present, and in the last analysis their attitude to Israel is self-derivative.

The last section of the book deals with methodology and contains tabulated data.

This is a brilliant essay, but there are some flaws. It is regrettable that the author does not relate clearly the statements she makes in the text to the data on which the tables are based—this gives the impression that some statements cannot be fully supported. I also think it regrettable that the author decided not to examine the attitudes of those Jews who were uninterested in Israel; had she done so, she might well have gathered data which could have thrown more light on her own theoretical perspectives. After all, France is known to be a country of assimilation; and to present a picture of French Jewry and of its relation to Israel with one whole segment missing is to present an incomplete or unbalanced picture.

However, the book (and this is yet another of its positive aspects) raises new questions. Sylvie Korcaz writes that, for most Jews, Israel is situated in a continuum made up of all Jewish communities, only one of which is organized as a State. It would be interesting to find out if the representations she discusses are founded on a structural similarity between French and other Jewries on the one hand, and Israel, on the other.

JACQUES GUTWIRTH

HARVEY COX, *The Feast of Fools, A Theological Essay on Festivity and Fantasy*, xii + 204 pp., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969, $5.95.

This book is a deliberate contrast with *The Secular City*, which the author describes as a very 'Protestant' book. Here Professor Cox no longer has—if he ever had—an unconditional enthusiasm for the technopolitan world, either in itself or as the arena of Christian autonomy. Man may be destined according to the imagery of Revelation for a City, but that City is not any technopolis but the place where the wedding festivities are in progress. Hence an emphasis on the 'Catholic' sense of the festive, but one which is allied to the hopes projected in fantasy and the social criticism often implicit in fantasy. *The Feast of Fools* is a title referring back to the medieval festivity which combined the temporary overthrow of work and instrumental activity with symbolic inversions of the social order. This provides a text but not a

model for what is really a lively, contemporary, and imaginative meditation on the proper relation of past, present, and future. The meditation involves a cultural analysis of current trends either to celebrate the present or to be consumed with the possibility of an utterly different future. It also involves a parallel critique of those movements, the radical theology and the theology of hope, which are likewise concerned respectively with one-sided emphases on present and future. His chosen representatives of 'presentism' are various musicians like Cage or the noisy neo-mystics, and of futurism Artaud's theatre of cruelty and politically active militants. All this is very cogently worked out with a wealth of contemporary example, reference, and arresting juxtaposition.

Curiously enough, in spite of the book's evident sympathy for the New Left and its back cover illustrating the festive Cox family in decidedly unorthodox dress, the argument is at root quite orthodox. It is concerned with Him 'who was, is, and is to come', and while it chides Christianity for a lopsided attention to the past, it is not at all blind to the necessity of a festivity which is in historical and human depth. Its emphasis on the comic as the holding of discrepant frames in juxtaposition, and as involvement without total immersion is entirely consonant with the central norms of Christian theology, if not of Christian social reality—it is a way of learning 'to care and not to care'. It should be of interest to people in the Jewish and Christian traditions both for its incisive comment and for its exposition of the comic element they have in common.

<div style="text-align: right">DAVID MARTIN</div>

HENRI DESROCHE, *Dieux d'Hommes. Dictionnaire des Messianismes et Millénarismes de l'Ère Chrétienne*, 282 pp., Mouton, Paris and The Hague, 1969, 84F.

A good dictionary and guide to literature might now be said to be a vital requirement for the growing numbers of students with an interest in messianic and millenarian phenomena. M. Desroche and his collaborators may be said to have gone a considerable way towards supplying this need. This book is particularly strong on the literary manifestations of millenarianism, and is remarkably useful not only for continental sources, but for the considerable adventist theology of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain. The work takes its key terms in the wider sense, however, and includes many references to movements that were not, in the narrow Christian definition, either messianic or millennialist. It also transcends the narrowly Christian context, including such non-Christian movements as Mahdism, Mau-Mau, and Tenrikyo among its entries.

The attempt at such comprehensiveness is in itself commendable, even though it inevitably leads to risk of greater sins of omission. It is strange to find, for instance, the Cherubim and Seraphim Church (Nigeria) included whilst the Aladura Church of the Lord of J. A. Ositelu (extensively documented by H. W. Turner) is omitted, even though it is no less (and no more) millenarian; certainly it is more widely spread. The Contestado movement

in Brazil is included, but the celebrated Antonio Conselheiro movement is not. Joanna Southcott appears, but not her colourful successors, Wroe and Jezreel. Jemima Wilkinson, J. H. Noyes and the Oneida Community, and the contemporary millenarians, Homer Tomlinson and Herbert Armstrong, are not included. There are also prominent absentees among the messiahs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—Georges Roux of Avignon; Louwrens van Voorthuizen in Holland, Oskar Ernst Bernhardt and his *Gralsbewegung*; Henry Prince and his successor, Hugh Smyth-Pigott, of Sproxton, are all missing.

It is perhaps unfair to continue a list of omissions, but one is also a little disappointed at the bibliographic citations. There is too heavy reliance on a few books—the excellent work of Peter Worsley and Katesa Schlosser, the copious compilation of Wilhelm Muhlmann, and the less analytical early book by Wilson Wallis, as well as Lanternari's popular compendium, and (curiously) the strange work of E. Le Roy Froom. One misses, from the Doukhobors entry, reference to the best (perhaps definitive) study of Wood-cock and Avakumovic; on George Rapp the monumental study by K. A. Arndt is unmentioned; on Cherubim and Seraphim the excellent study by J. Y. D. Peel is omitted. Cronin's work on Garvey; Theodore Schwarz's superb study of the Paliau movement; and Marjorie Reeves' work on Joachim, all fail to appear. Consultation of the reviewer's work on the Christadelphians would have provided the editor with a more adequate and accurate picture. These are all unfortunate defects in a dictionary, even though the work includes hundreds of very useful entries. There is a valuable analytical introduction by M. Desroche.

BRYAN WILSON

WALTER L. WALLACE, *Sociological Theory, An Introduction*, xiv + 296 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1969, 50s.

Professor Wallace's book is intended as an 'introduction to eleven . . . current, influential, and explicitly formulated theoretic viewpoints in sociology'. In Part I Wallace presents an 'Overview of Contemporary Sociological Theory' in which he develops a schema for summarizing and systematizing the view-points, which are then illustrated by fifteen selections from the work of major modern theorists in Part II.

Wallace classifies theories according to how they define 'the social ex-planandum', and the 'explanantes' they employ. Theories vary according to whether they view 'the social explanandum' as consisting in 'objective or subjective behaviour relations', as 'micro or macro'. The main dimensions along which the 'explanantes' proposed by theories can be classified are whether the explanatory factors are imposed on the social or generated by it, and whether they operate via 'the medium of the environments of social participants or through the participants themselves'. The dimensions of variability distinguished by Wallace describe a property-space with 128 cells, 'and each cell indicates a possible type of sociological theory'. The eleven viewpoints described in the book 'may be thought of as real instances

that have so far emerged at particular locations in the property-space'. The bulk of Professor Wallace's Part I consists of a discussion of the work of various authors in order to explain and justify the location of their theories in the property-space.

Beyond vague statements of intent such as that the scheme is 'a synthetic integration of theories . . . emphasizing complementarities among different viewpoints' it is not made clear what the logical status and validity of the theories is supposed to be. In fact, it is something of a misnomer to refer to them as 'theories' at all, for they are clearly not theories in the sense implied by the prefatory discussion on the nature of science. Nor is the term 'viewpoint' more satisfactory, for the cells in Wallace's classification are clearly only idealized extreme versions of the positions of actual authors (hence they are labelled 'isms'). The value of classifying 'explanantes' is only heuristic, sensitizing observers to possible causal factors, the weight of which in particular cases it is the task of 'middle-range theories' to hypothesize and of empirical research to test. Theories may emphasize one explanatory variable rather than others, but it is misleading to represent them as single-factor explanations, which is what the cells in the classification are. With regard to the definition of the social explanandum, the treatment here tends to trivialize important issues, for no adequate discussion of reasons for different definitions of the social (for example, as 'subjective or objective behaviour relations') appears, so that the choice appears arbitrary, almost a matter of taste.

There are various detailed faults in the argument, as for instance where it is alleged that 'one class of such methods . . . [logical induction] governs the transformation of empirical generalizations into theories'. This implies, on the logical level, that the derivation of a theory from a lower-level empirical generalization is 'necessary' in the same sense as deductive inference, which neglects the problem of induction in logic. As a description of how theories are actually arrived at, the treatment overlooks on the one hand the 'creative leap', and on the other, the muddled, accidental nature of much theoretical progress, implied by, for example, Popper's term 'conjectures' and Watson's 'The Double Helix'.

In general, the approach adopted in this book seems less satisfactory than, for instance, that of Cohen's *Modern Social Theory*, which tackles questions as such and evaluates rather than merely classifies answers. The collection of articles contains a number of classic pieces, such as extracts from Homans, and Merton's 'Social Structure and Anomie', as well as some important recent pieces such as Scott's 'The Changing Foundations of the Parsonian Action Scheme'. It has the advantage of reprinting complete pieces rather than the usual short extracts, but at the cost of comprehensiveness.

ROBERT REINER

ALFRED SCHUTZ, *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, xxiv + 186 pp., Edited, annotated, and introduced by Richard M. Zaner, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1970, $6.75.

The interest in Schutz and in all the various themes deriving from Husserl is currently very widespread, and it links with a strong desire to recover the

reality of our lived experience without reduction to something else. There may indeed be something more real underlying that lived experience, but that question is to be set aside in favour of an exploration of the 'life world' in terms of its characteristic modes and structures. A whole variety of movements in social science spring from this determination to recover our experience—Burke's 'dramatism', symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, phenomenological psychiatry, and that determination is often not only an academic concern but rests on a claim that intellectual reductionism is rooted in the reduced character of our contemporary living.

Those who wish to grapple with Schutz in a preliminary way may profitably read George Walsh's Introduction to *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, the opening chapters of Berger and Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality*, or this short fragment, together with its Introduction. It takes up the various elements in Schutz's intellectual enterprise and sets them in relation to the focus provided by the notion of relevance. Schutz explored the taken-for-granted world of experience in order to elucidate its unified frames of awareness, its varieties of level, its structures, and its transitions from level to level (e.g. from the modalities of waking to those of dreaming). He did this not simply in psychological terms but embedded his observations in the socio-cultural world, notably as presented to us by the past, its sedimented stock of ideas and means, its proferred typifications and its tradition. In this work he takes his previous formulations and essays an understanding of how the different levels relate and underlie (or overlay) each other in experience, and how the person shifts between levels (for example, between thinking about phenomenology and filling his pen). He shows how one level may be 'thematic', especially the archetypal level of 'working', and how a theme which is major relates to minor themes against the backdrop of the horizons provided by other levels. There may, of course, be a ground bass to which the more apparently relevant themes are ancillary contributors, for example, fundamental fears and hopes. It is this complexity which constitutes the problem of relevance subtly and clearly examined in this book.

DAVID MARTIN

JOSHUA BIERER and RICHARD I. EVANS, *Innovations in Social Psychiatry: A Social Psychological Perspective through Dialogue*, 212 pp., Avenue Publishing Company, London, 1969, 25s.

Professor Evans is a social psychologist who has been filming interviews that he conducted with prominent workers in psychiatry and psychology. He sought in these interviews to get such men as Jung, Erich Fromm, Erik Erikson, and B. F. Skinner to present their views and concepts 'in the area of personality theory' so that their work could be made known to students. The interviews have been transcribed and turned into books. No doubt there is much to be said for this use of dialogue as an aid to teaching, but it is ill-suited to a presentation of Dr. Bierer's thought and achievement. Professor Evans explains that 'Dr. Bierer describes his work in such expressive, colourful terms that it was decided to maintain this informal, spontaneous dialogue

style in presenting his theories, rather than edit his responses into the customary scientific prose. The advantages of this procedure are especially evident in the interesting anecdotal way Dr. Bierer describes his experience.' But colourful language and anecdotal descriptions are the bane of serious writers on psychiatry and dynamic psychology. They betray Dr. Bierer into exaggerated or empty statements: 'psychiatry is the most exact science because it is like a jigsaw puzzle . . .'; 'in my opinion half-truth is just as dangerous as half-knowledge'; when a particular type of patient comes in through the door 'I can be inside him and tell exactly everything about him without ever having seen him.' But more disconcerting than these slips (which could have been sub-edited away) is the discursive exposition which makes it extremely difficult to get a coherent, systematic picture of Dr. Bierer's theoretical position or of the detailed therapeutic procedures and results. Professor Evans repeatedly formulates more rigorously points on which Dr. Bierer has dwelt rather cursorily or imprecisely, but this hardly does justice to the essential value of Dr. Bierer's work. He is justly respected for his achievement as one of the pioneers of social therapy, and it is highly desirable that a man who has accomplished so much should put his working hypotheses and methods forward in such a way that they can be examined and tested by others without ambiguity. His work on 'The Day Hospital' published in 1951 and here reprinted, contrasts favourably with the dialogue presentation: it is more succinct and more readily informative about basic principles and therapeutic procedures.

Scattered through the interviews are vignettes of successfully treated patients: there are very few reports of failure. How the successes were brought about is less clearly conveyed than is necessary. For example, he cites the case of a young man who was severely depressed and unresponsive to various forms of treatment. Dr. Bierer recommended that he should go to work in a kibbutz, in order to be removed from the traumatic influence of his father and instead put in a 'dynamic atmosphere of young people who are guided by strong motivation'. The advice was followed and the ensuing recovery complete: Dr. Bierer adds that the patient's father had 'died in due course'. This is interesting but obviously incomplete: Professor Evans's comment is 'This seems to be a point at which some circularity enters into your theory. In psychotherapy there always has been a discernible tendency for a particular practice to develop without adequate theoretical base by which to justify it.' Elsewhere in this dialogue he remarks on the bold experiments made in group dynamics in the United States, such as: 'Marathon group therapy'; nude group therapy; radical forms of aversive behaviour therapy; 'encounter group training' and others. Though Dr. Bierer's notions are far from radical, Professor Evans rightly points out, 'the bold and dramatic way [he] has carried out his ideas in practice has tended to discourage the objective assessment of their results'.

In spite of the limitations and looseness entailed by the unmodified interview transcript, there is much of direct interest and value for those who wish to copy Dr. Bierer's variety of Day Hospital, Therapeutic Social Club, or 'Self-governed Therapeutic Community Hostel'. Professor Evans's courteous but alertly critical contributions (especially in the balanced final Summary and Critique) are complementary to Dr. Bierer's confident account of his

experience and the framework of his main ideas, which were influenced by Adler, and to a less obvious extent by Freud and other exponents of psychopathology and therapy.

The papers reprinted in this volume include one giving the main facts about the organization and scope of the Marlborough Day Hospital, and another proposing a new educational system. The educational proposal is dated. It may be aligned with the views he expressed to Professor Evans on how to reduce juvenile delinquency: 'when I was a youth-leader for many years, I learned to reorganize some gangs so that they could assume the functions, or part of the functions of the police. . . . It is tremendously important to convince the local authorities that it is possible to reorganize these gangs of youths so that they can exercise auxiliary police duties. And you cannot find people better for the task.'

AUBREY LEWIS

H. S. HALEVI, E. NAOR, and Z. COCHAVY, *Census of Mental In-Patients (July 1, 1964), Final Report*, 234 pp., Ministry of Health, Jerusalem, 1969, n.p.

Ten years ago Dr. Halevi published an informative statistical report on patients admitted to mental hospitals and other psychiatric institutions in Israel during 1958. He disclaimed any intention to analyse the data on medical lines that would warrant practical conclusions, and he entered a plea for co-operative studies by sociologists and psychiatrists. The World Health Organization then gave a helping hand, and experts nominated by its Mental Health Division examined the possibility of carrying out a census of the mentally ill as well as compiling a longitudinal register. They concluded that, in the first instance, the study should be limited to hospital in-patients; out-patients and others living in the community should be included at a later stage. Very thorough preliminary arrangements led up to the actual count of patients in hospital on 1 July 1964. Forty-one institutions were included; 15 of them belonged to the Government and 19 were private clinics. The total number of in-patients (excluding the majority of the sub-normal) was 6,331; 95 per cent of these were Jews. The rate per 100,000 of population was 278 for Jews; this is close to the rate (256 per 100,000) in mental hospitals in England and Wales in 1967. Three-quarters of the Jewish patients had been admitted on a voluntary basis.

Among the patients with organic psychoses 44 per cent of the women and 20·6 per cent of the men had senile or pre-senile disorders; a further 24 per cent of women and 17 per cent of men had circulatory disorders; 18 per cent of the men had syphilis of the central nervous system; and 11 per cent had cerebral trauma. Schizophrenia was far and away the commonest diagnosis: it applied to 65 per cent of all patients, representing a rate of 182 per 100,000 of population. As is common when comparisons are made between the national statistics of different countries, there is wide discrepancy between these figures and the corresponding data in, for example, New Zealand (35·6 per cent and 152 per 100,000 respectively).

A great deal of demographic and social information was elicited regarding the patients. Family status, occupation, educational level, and period of immigration yielded data which had to be closely analysed in relation to age and sex. The rates of hospital care were lowest in those coming from moshavim and highest for the town dwellers, with people from kibbutzim taking an intermediate place. The average age-adjusted rate of patients in mental hospitals, which was 316·8 per 100,000 for all countries, was 394 in Israel. Schizophrenia was higher among men than women for all continents of birth except Israel. Ashkenazim had the highest proportions of schizophrenic and affective psychoses, while the Yemenites had proportionately more neuroses than the total hospital population; the disparity was widened when only those born in Israel were counted. In general it appears that patients born in Israel show the pattern of diagnosis which is characteristic of the ethnic group to which they belong.

Twelve per cent of the Jewish patients had been detained at one time or another for political or racial reasons. Eighty-five per cent of these had been in ghettos or concentration or extermination camps; they had high proportions of schizophrenia and affective disorders, whereas former prisoners of war had a high frequency of paranoid reactions.

The date of immigration proved to be important. The distribution of diagnoses in those who came to Israel during the years of mass entry, 1948–52, was approximately the same as in the total group, but those who came before that period showed a high proportion of schizophrenia and affective disorders, and those who came during the later period (1953–56) had a higher than average proportion of neuroses and personality disorders.

Concluding tables and comment deal with duration of stay in hospital, previous admissions, and presenting symptoms (including suicide).

It is obvious that the information provided by this census is of epidemiological value, and will be of practical use in planning services. It is, however, an inadequate basis for disentangling the various causes and conditions of mental illness in Israel. The population of hospital in-patients, here as elsewhere, is affected by the number and accessibility of beds, the admission and discharge policy, and public attitudes. The effect of these 'nosocomial' factors is plainly to be seen in the disparity between the findings on Jewish and non-Jewish patients in the survey. But, as the excellent commentary makes clear, within recognized limitations the census fulfilled its purpose of providing base line data which could be extended in subsequent inquiries to throw light on prevalence, etiology, and change.

AUBREY LEWIS

CHRONICLE

The B'nai Brith organization set up its first Hillel House in London in 1954. Since that date six more Hillel centres have been set up in England: in Birmingham, Brighton, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, and Sheffield.

A new and enlarged Hillel House has now been built on the old London site at a cost of over £300,000. The building has eight floors, an auditorium for 400 persons, a refectory seating 200, a students' lounge, a library, a synagogue, and limited residential accommodation. The centre will also serve as the headquarters of the Inter University Jewish Federation (the central body of Jewish students in the United Kingdom).

*

It was announced in Jerusalem last July that the Hebrew University of Jerusalem had concluded an agreement with the Haile Selassie University of Addis Ababa for a five-year training programme in microbiology. This is said to be the most intensive foreign aid programme ever undertaken by an Israeli University. Israeli teachers will give courses in Addis Ababa and about one hundred Ethiopian students will be trained in Jerusalem.

*

Last June Tel Aviv University awarded 1,255 diplomas and degrees. For the first time in the history of the university, several Ph.D. degrees were conferred; among these were two in physics, one in biochemistry, and one in botany. There were 120 Master's degrees: 81 in science; 35 in the humanities; and four in business administration.

*

Last June the Haifa Technion held a ceremony for the conferment of degrees. A total of 1,027 degrees (117 more than in the previous year) were conferred.

The President of the Technion announced at the end of June that it would have 4,900 students in the next academic year—an increase of 300 over the year just ended.

The Board of the Technion adopted a budget of IL65 million (about £7½ million) for the 1970–71 academic year.

At the beginning of September it was announced that about 3,000 students sat for a two-day entrance examination at the Technion. They were competing for 1,150 places. There were 1,120 applicants for the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, but only one-fifth of the number could be accepted.

The examinations were held in 14 languages, according to the candidates' choice; there were some Arab and Druze candidates, who used Arabic.

The Technion runs the Technology High School at the University of the Negev in Beersheba; 400 candidates applied for the 240 available places to study electrical, mechanical, and chemical engineering.

*

The new school year opened in Israel at the beginning of September with more than 800,000 pupils. There was an increase of 15,000 over the previous year's total: 9,000 Jewish and 6,000 Arab children.

The school population now includes 98·4 per cent of all children aged six to thirteen years; in the age group 14–17 years, 58·8 per cent attend school compared with 46 per cent of the total group six years ago.

Israel has now about 5,500 schools; 700 of these are in Judea and Samaria.

*

A survey recently published states that there are now almost 60,000 persons in Israel with professional qualifications. Among these, 16,000 hold degrees in the humanities; 11,000 are engineers; 7,800 are physicians; 7,000 are engaged in university teaching and research; 4,500 are lawyers; 4,000 are social scientists; and 2,000 are pharmacists.

*

Last August Israel received the largest single gift ever made to the State by a philanthropist: Mrs. Ivy Judah, of London, donated about £3,500,000. It is reported that the sum will be used mainly for three projects: a school of engineering at the University of the Negev in Beersheba, a residential complex to house new immigrants in Jerusalem, and a network of fifty kindergartens in new towns in Israel.

The cornerstone of the Engineering School Building was laid in the presence of Israeli Cabinet ministers and of the British Ambassador.

It was also reported last August that a London man—who has insisted on remaining anonymous—has given £1,000,000 to develop the University of the Negev.

Two months earlier, last June, it was stated in Jerusalem that a London Jew had anonymously donated £1,000,000 for the rehabilitation of Arab refugees. The amount was handed over to a 'Trusteeship Fund for the Economic Development and Rehabilitation of Refugees'; the Israeli cabinet had approved the establishment of the Fund as a public corporation. It is hoped that further donations will be received from other parts of the world to implement the 'Peres Plan' (devised by Mr. Shimon Peres, the Minister for Immigrant Absorption). The Peres Plan calls for the creation of new jobs in the occupied territories, in addition to general economic development, and for more services in the fields of health, education, housing, etc.

*

The Israeli Ministry of Housing stated last July that the Government has spent IL50 million since 1948 on housing 30,000 Arabs and Druze. The Ministry now plans to establish three residential centres in the Negev for the country's Beduin population. There are about 10,000 Beduin in Israel; each of the proposed centres will house about 1,200 families.

*

The Executive Vice-President of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Service (HIAS) is reported to have stated in New York last September that in 1969

his organization had helped 6,360 Jewish men, women, and children to settle in the United States and other Western countries; they had come from eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and Cuba.

*

The Joint Distribution Committee announced last June in New York that in 1969 it had helped 323,000 Jews in 25 countries at a cost of $23,832,000. More than a third of that amount went to assist about 173,000 Jews in Europe, while nearly one-fifth of the 1969 expenditure was used to help about 45,000 persons in Muslim countries.

The Committee's programmes in Israel were carried out mainly in institutions devoted to sick and elderly immigrants.

*

It was reported in Jerusalem last July that a record number of immigrants from Canada and North America came to settle in Israel in the first six months of 1970: 2,700. This is an increase of 700 over the same period in 1969.

*

It was reported last June that the Israeli firm Tahal has been commissioned to plan two major irrigation projects in South Korea; they will cost about one hundred million dollars. Tahal will also train Korean farmers in advanced methods of irrigation.

*

The Ambassador of the Philippines in Israel stated last June in Jerusalem that a communal farm, patterned on the Israeli moshav, is to be set up in the Philippines as a result of the visit of Israeli experts to his country.

*

The Israeli Ministry of Tourism conducted a survey among tourists in 1969. Some of the findings were published last August: 22 per cent of the respondents stated that they came to Israel because they were interested in Israel's way of life, 17 per cent came to visit holy places, another 17 per cent to see friends and relatives. Ten per cent came for official, study, or business reasons, and 8 per cent to 'find out about settling'. Almost 55 per cent of all the tourists in 1969 were Jewish; one-third of the total were on a return visit; and the average expenditure per tourist was $215 (against $198 in 1968).

Ninety-five per cent of the respondents said that they would recommend similar trips to others when they returned home.

*

In the first eight months of 1970 (January–August) 324,000 tourists came to Israel—compared with 295,000 in the first eight months of 1969; this represents an increase of 10 per cent. Tourism from South America

increased by about 35 per cent; the largest increase was from Brazil, from 1,613 in the first eight months of 1969 to 2,133 in the parallel period in 1970; tourists from Argentina numbered 3,854 in the same period in 1970, as against 3,544 in 1969.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Bergman, Samuel Hugo, *The Quality of Faith, Essays on Judaism and Morality*, trans. by Yehuda Hanegbi, 89 pp., The Youth and Hechalutz Department of the World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem, 1970, n.p.

Cazeneuve, Jean, *Les pouvoirs de la télévision*, 384 pp., Gallimard, Paris, 1970, n.p.

Cutler, Donald R., ed., *The World Year Book of Religion, The Religious Situation, Volume II*, xii + 1091 pp., Evans Bros., London, 1970, 126s.

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