THE
JEWISH JOURNAL
OF
SOCIOLOGY

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BOOKS REVIEWED

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EDITORIAL

In the last issue of the *Journal* (Vol. XI, no. 2, December 1969) we published a paper by Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Reconstitution of Jewish Communities in the Post-War Period'. That paper was presented at the Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies held in Jerusalem in August 1969. In the present issue we publish four more papers from the same Congress: by A. Antonovsky and D. Katz, A. Arian, A. A. Kessler, and C. S. Liebman.

In the next issue of the *Journal* we hope to publish further papers from the Congress.

DIFFERENCES AND PERCEPTION OF DIFFERENCES AMONG JEWS IN FRANCE

A. Memmi, W. Ackermann, and N. and S. Zoberman

Introduction

THE present paper outlines part of the results of a general research project on 'Jewishness and the social contexts of Jews in France', conducted among some six hundred subjects. The field work was carried out under the auspices of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, as part of the programme of the Seminar directed by Professor A. Memmi.[1]

We started from the hypothesis that perceived differences offer the basis, the opportunity, and the apparent reason for the dominance of the majority (or more powerful) group over the minority (or weaker) group. Thus, it may be that in the absence of such characteristic traits, the dominant group imposes them upon the dominated group, or simply assumes that the traits are there. In any case, the importance of such assumed peculiarities in the typing of dominated groups, and therefore in their segregation, on the part of the dominant majority, stands out. The repercussions of this typing and the manner in which the differences are apprehended by one group or the other are similarly obvious.

Here we shall deal only with the results of our own field work, although we are confident that our results would be helpful in an analysis of other group relations. We have attempted to set out side by side the criteria used by Gentiles in their typing of Jews, and the manner in which the Jews themselves feel they are perceived by Gentiles.

We have used, for the purpose of this comparison, the results of an enquiry by the I.F.O.P.[2] about the reactions of Gentiles. As for the Jewish group, we have naturally used our own research material.

A. Analysis of the criteria used by Gentiles to classify Jews

The I.F.O.P. enquiry starts by placing the Jewish group in the context of the other minority groups living in France: 'There are in France people who are not of the same religion, the same nationality,

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or the same race as the majority of the population. Could you give me one or more examples?'

The spontaneous reaction of the respondents was to classify Jews among religious minorities, where they come after Protestants (32 per cent) but before Muslims (11 per cent): the Jews are mentioned in 20 per cent of the responses. On the other hand, Jews are not spontaneously mentioned as belonging to racial or national minorities, in contrast to Arabs who are thus classified by 42 per cent of the respondents. Nevertheless, an unconscious ambiguity is apparent: among the 20 per cent who characterize the Jewish group by the criterion of religion, 15 per cent speak of them as Jews and five per cent as 'Israélites' or 'Israéliens'.

As soon as the questions begin to deal with the definition of a Jew, categories appear which had previously been ignored. In reply to the question, 'What, for you, is a Jew?' the responses were as follows:

30 per cent mentioned religious peculiarities;
11 per cent mentioned aspects of integration (isolationism, dispersion, statelessness, Jewish solidarity);
7 per cent mentioned a national origin (Israeli, Palestinian);
7 per cent mentioned occupational status (trade and commerce);
5 per cent mentioned peculiar mores;
21 per cent thought that 'Jews are just like other people';
6 per cent made flattering or sympathetic comments;
20 per cent made critical comments (the Jews and money; the Jews and business; etc.);
13 per cent gave no definition at all.

It is surprising that the 'racial' criterion was not mentioned in the spontaneous responses to the question. It may be that it was not used because such a criterion requires perceptible differences which stand out strikingly; and Jews in France are not easily identifiable. The wide span of the definitions given by the respondents is striking, but two aspects are mainly stressed:

belonging to one religion: 30 per cent
a Jew is like any other person: 21 per cent.

On the other hand, 13 per cent cannot define what a Jew is. Moreover, the analysis of the definitions given by respondents, even when these are classified in an appropriate rubric, clearly reveals that Gentiles are profoundly ignorant about Jews. In the detailed responses about a Jew's religion the following statements were made:

'A man who has a religion, like any other religion'
'A man who still believes in the coming of the Messiah'
'A man who does not believe in the Holy Virgin'
'They are Christians who do not think as other Christians'.

Admittedly, these replies deal specifically with religious belief, but

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they exhibit a poor knowledge or only a partial knowledge of the religious belief of Jews. Other responses reveal some oddities:

'A Jew is a man who has no religion'

'He is a person who does not believe in God'

'He is a man who, for historical or social reasons, became converted to Judaism in the Middle Ages'.

According to J. Isaac,[3] religious characterization should not lead to such confused ideas. Isaac assumes that Catholicism plays an important role in the evolution of antisemitism, and he distinguishes three determining themes:

1. The Dispersion of the Jews, which is the retribution exacted by Providence.

2. Judaism as a religion which degenerated at the time of Christ.

3. Jews as deicides.

However, these three themes are not exhibited in the responses of the subjects who gave a religious characterization of the Jew.

Since the respondents use such limited and arguable definitions of Jewishness, it is not surprising that they find it difficult to categorize immediately some individuals as belonging to the Jewish group. In fact, the points of reference are sometimes even vaguer. Under the rubric of 'integrational aspects' we find symbolic definitions where 'Jew' becomes synonymous with

'hunted out'

'stateless'

'a chap that comes from everywhere and nowhere'

'thrown out of every country'.

It is, nevertheless, worth noting a reference to being accursed: 'A man who belongs to an accursed people and who must redeem his ancestors.'

If we made use of the data on racial peculiarities, would we discern more clear-cut or definite elements? It does not seem so. If the Jew is, as one respondent asserted, 'a man like any other from the human point of view, but often endowed with a big nose and a great thirst for money', there is no doubt that a great many individuals of all races and religions would fall into this category and therefore be classified as 'Jews'. Even more so, if a Jew is 'a man of swarthy complexion' or 'a man with a peculiar facial aspect', or if Jews are distinguishable by 'their exterior appearance, the colour of their hair, and their nose', one is bound to make a wrong diagnosis in nine cases out of ten with the use of such criteria.

But are the criteria of 'national origin' more precise? 'They [the Jews] now have a nationality, a State.' 'They are people who come from Tel Aviv or thereabouts', or again, 'They were born in Arabia'.

There are also the 'occupational criteria' which are, most often, the expression of prejudices linked with the theme of the 'Jewish merchant':

The Jew 'manages trade, money, and the large department stores';

he is 'a banker or a Government Minister'; he is 'usually a man who lends money'.

Such general definitions leave us unenlightened on the subject of the way Gentiles immediately identify Jews in France. On the other hand, the criteria of peculiar mores when they are used—and it will be remembered that they were mentioned by only five per cent of the respondents—are sometimes more exactly expressed: a Jew 'is a person who has certain traditions'; 'on Saturdays he must not touch fire, he must not [*sic*] eat chickens which have been slaughtered'; 'they are circumcised and have a special language'.

One reply summarizes well enough the position of some Jews: 'A person who has a certain tradition which he either follows or attempts to reject; he either will have nothing to do with the Jewish people or else he identifies with it.'

Finally, under the rubric of absence of peculiarities, it is worth noting that the responses do not always stress an absence of peculiar characteristics. Side by side with the statement 'he is just like me (c'est mon égal)', we come across definitions such as, 'He is a man like any other who has assimilated himself (qui s'est adapté)'; or 'nothing at all; as far as I am concerned I consider that Jews no longer exist, they have become assimilated'; or again, 'he is like any other man, he does not worry me'.

When we look at the laudatory comments made by respondents, they appear to complement the critical responses. For instance, is the description 'he has a profound feeling for humanity, could lead the world towards good' so very different from 'they have a feel for organization, for work, one finds them in the higher occupations'? This latter description was considered as reflecting a critical attitude towards Jews in the original I.F.O.P. study.

Before completing this portrait of Jews as perceived by Gentiles, we must mention that 16 per cent of the respondents think that there are differences between *Juifs* and *Israélites* while 25 per cent do not know whether such differences exist.

Thus Gentiles do not seem to have clear criteria which would allow them to recognize Jews. We do not wish to attribute a determining role to this aspect of 'visibility', but it seems to us useful to point out that, in contrast with the case of other minorities in France, Jews are at the very least not easily discernible or correctly identified by Gentiles. Does this apprehension of Jews or Jewishness, which seems to be so difficult for Gentiles, come more easily to the Jews themselves?

B. Criteria used by Jews for self-definition

Our own data are not based on responses to questions phrased in the same terms as those in the I.F.O.P. enquiry outlined above. It would have been interesting to ask respondents the simple question, 'What does being Jewish mean for you?' But the analysis of the responses would

have been practically impossible. However, the replies to another question are illuminating:

Do you consider yourself

	per cent		
not at all Jewish	9·88 ⎱	16·75	(N = 100)
very little Jewish	6·87 ⎰		
a little Jewish	4·35 ⎱		
Jewish enough	6·54 ⎬	27·81	(N = 164)
moderately Jewish	16·92 ⎰		
very Jewish	9·55 ⎱		
enormously Jewish	8·21 ⎬	53·10	(N = 314)
completely Jewish	35·34 ⎰		
don't know	0·33 ⎱	2·34	(N = 14)
no response	2·01 ⎰		

The qualitative analysis of the responses enables us to get a glimpse of how Jews think of themselves, both in terms of *self-identification* and in terms of *belonging* to the Jewish group.

We come at once to a definition in religious terms, such as was found among Gentile respondents. We then note another criterion, that of 'education', which is somewhat vague; do the respondents think only of religious education, or are they speaking in more general terms of all the educational practices peculiar to Jews (including tuition in particular languages), or do they have in mind some cultural traits which are considered worth transmitting? They often refer to 'Jewish values', and some comment that they themselves are not 'as Jewish as they would wish to be' because they have not received a 'Jewish education' or because they are not as observant as they would wish to be.

Other definitions seem somewhat tautological: 'I am very Jewish, this has to do with my family (Je suis très juif, cela tient de famille).'

Sometimes the definition in religious terms is rounded out with a definition in racial terms, without further details being furnished; many respondents did not elaborate or comment upon their statement. In general, the religious factor seemed to be the most obvious criterion used for self-identification.

The qualitative analysis of the questions dealing with antisemitism, as it is experienced and evaluated, enables us to grasp how the respondents react to the criteria used by Gentiles. The analysis was based on the responses to the following questions:

1. Is there antisemitism in France?
2. Why is there antisemitism in France?
3. How is it manifested?

4. Do Gentiles consider you as:

not Jewish; very little Jewish; Jewish enough; moderately Jewish; very Jewish; enormously Jewish; completely Jewish?

5. What is the incidence of antisemitism in your life?

The subjects feel themselves excluded; this sentiment is revealed by the use of personal pronouns to refer to Gentiles: ' "They" must say what "they" wish.' This feeling of rejection is sometimes more sharply felt: the respondents suspect that Gentiles do more than express antisemitism, that they are more positively or actively antisemitic:

'They do not want us here.'

'I am hurt when they make me feel that I am different (Je suis sensible lorsque l'on me fait sentir que je suis différent).'

The respondents feel that they are considered foreigners in the national society. Other replies stress that aspect:

'I feel different from, and inferior to, "them".'

'He is Jewish, one does not visit him (Il est juif, on ne va pas chez lui).'

'I do not tell them about myself because their attitude would change if they were to learn that I am Jewish.'

These replies show that for some of the respondents who voiced their attitudes, the feeling of being excluded overrides or goes hand in hand with the feeling of belonging to a community.

We have seen that those Gentiles who put forward 'the equality of Jews and non-Jews' reveal attitudes which might lead one to suppose that this equality flows from a sense of superiority over Jews. We find a similar complex of attitudes among Jews themselves, who turn their exclusion or rejection to good account by endowing it with favourable implications: antisemitism is explained by 'the jealousy of others', by 'stupidity', by 'ignorance'. They react to the attitudes of Gentiles with contempt. One respondent spoke of 'the jealousy of the superiority of the Jews'; he stated that antisemitism does not affect his life, and stressed: 'I don't care, I assert myself.' When antisemitism is attributed to a bad 'reputation' in the context of usury, they throw the ball back to the accusers: 'We have the reputation, the Gentiles do the deed (Nous avons la renommée, les non-Juifs ont la pratique).'

Some respondents expressed disenchantment: 'After all that has happened, one would have thought that it would be over and done with (Après tout ce qui s'est passé, on pourrait penser que ce serait fini).'

Often, however, there is an attempt to exonerate Gentiles:

' "They" are not racists.'

'Those who make antisemitic comments would be the first to hide us.'

'It is after all getting easier to live.'

Thus one even finds some optimism: men can become perfect, or should; Gentiles are not after all as antisemitic as they appear to be. Sometimes respondents blame only one section of the Gentile group for

their rejection: 'The working classes are not antisemitic; the middle classes are antisemitic because they are ignorant.'

Some of the responses to questions dealing with the awareness of being different show that there is a correlation between one's alleged experience of antisemitism and one's own subjective impression of being different. One respondent who considered that 90 per cent of people are antisemitic feels that he stands out among Gentiles: 'it is not the same (ce n'est pas pareil)'.

However, the fact that one is aware of antisemitism, of being excluded, does not necessarily imply an awareness of being different. One respondent who is made to feel inferior in situations where he suffers from antisemitism asserts that he is 'a Jew without complexes, who does not feel different'. For others, differentiation is interpreted as such only when the respondent experiences inferiority. Two respondents replied to the differentiation question as though differentiation implied inferiority: they do not feel themselves to be different: 'We are the chosen people'; 'I do not feel different, we are better than they are (Je ne me sens pas différent, on est mieux qu'eux).'

So we move from the exclusion which is resented or endured to a sort of voluntary segregation resulting from an asserted superiority: it is an inversion made by the victim of the real or alleged exclusion by Gentiles. Although they do not define themselves unequivocally, the respondents are aware of a significant exclusion. This is so in spite of the fact that, as we saw earlier, the Gentiles do not consider Jews to be as visible as other minority groups and have great difficulty in expressing unequivocal criteria which identify the Jewish minority.

How does one analyse quantitatively the experiences of the two groups: the exclusion expressed by Gentiles and the exclusion felt by Jews and, on the other hand, their self-identity? That is to say, how are we to consider at the same time the negative and the positive aspects of Jewishness?

Table 1 shows the distribution of the Jewish population we studied with respect to felt antisemitism:

TABLE 1. *Felt antisemitism*

N = 137 Little antisemitism: 23%	N = 253 Average antisemitism: 42%	N = 210 Strong antisemitism: 35%

If we compare this with the antisemitism expressed by Gentiles in the I.F.O.P. enquiry mentioned at the beginning of this paper, we see: No antisemitism: 70 per cent; No declared antisemitism, but antisemitic reactions: 20 per cent; Declared antisemitism: 10 per cent. It is clear that, at the level of opinion polls, Jews consider themselves to be

victims of antisemitism and of exclusion more frequently than Gentiles overtly, or consciously, express such antisemitism.

We then asked ourselves if this felt exclusion, so over-estimated as far as expressed exclusion had revealed, could serve as a means of characterizing the 'negative' Jew. The 'positive' Jew would then be the individual who identified himself by his attachment to religious and traditional values.

Bearing this in mind, we have correlated 'felt exclusion' with
1. religious observance (of Holy Days).
2. Jewish self-assertion in relation to felt antisemitism. Two groups should be distinguished: those who are acutely aware of antisemitism, to be contrasted with those who observe the Holy Days. The former would be 'negative' Jews, while the latter would be 'positive' Jews. Table 2 sets out this division:

TABLE 2. *Observance of Holy Days*

Felt antisemitism	Yes		No	
little	25%	n = 30	22%	n = 93
average/strong	75%	n = 89	78%	n = 337
Total	100%	n = 119	100%	n = 430

There is no significant correlation between observance and felt antisemitism. Whether they are or are not observant, the existence of antisemitism tends to be over-estimated by our respondents.

Could the self-assertion of Jews, which characterizes what we have called the positive aspect of Jewishness, help us to distinguish two separate groups of Jews when it is compared with felt antisemitism? Table 3 shows that this second method is no more successful than the first.

TABLE 3. *Felt antisemitism and Jewish self-assertion*

Expressed antisemitism	No		Yes	
little	26%	n = 32	23%	n = 101
average/strong	74%	n = 89	77%	n = 346
Total	100%	n = 121	100%	n = 447

- Antisemitism is felt irrespectively of whether one asserts oneself as being Jewish. It would therefore seem that felt antisemitism is a constant factor typical of Jews whether they are observant or not, and

whether they assert themselves as Jews or not. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of those who feel or do not feel exclusion. Whether they are 'positive' Jews by their attachment to Jewish cultural values, or 'negative', they almost always feel excluded.

Nevertheless, we considered that it might be interesting to examine a third aspect related to self-assertion, which can be considered as an expression of Jewish consciousness: how Jews think their own Jewishness is perceived by Gentiles. This would then enable us to analyse the correlations between:

estimated antisemitism
Jewish self-assertion
perception of own Jewishness, attributed to Gentiles.

TABLE 4. *Jewish self-assertion correlated with the perception of own Jewishness attributed to Gentiles*

Gentile perception of own Jewishness	Little		Average		Strong	
little	76%	n = 76	31%	n = 38	11%	n = 29
average	12%	n = 12	49%	n = 60	30%	n = 79
strong	12%	n = 12	20%	n = 25	59%	n = 159
Total	100%	n = 100	100%	n = 123	100%	n = 267

Table 4 shows that when one considers oneself to be only a little Jewish, one attributes to others a weak perception of one's own Jewishness; when one has an average degree of Jewish self-assertion, one grants to Gentiles a perception of average Jewishness; and, finally, when one is sharply aware of one's Jewishness, one thinks that the others also see one as being very Jewish.

A comparison between the three attitudes considered up to now enables us to draw up the table as shown overleaf.

In the first place, when we break down further the categories of self-assertion we note that as the estimated degree of antisemitism grows, so does the number of respondents who describe themselves as being very strongly Jewish. Hand in hand with the growing perception of anti-semitism there is also an increase, although less marked, in the number of respondents who attribute to Gentiles an acute perception of their own Jewishness. It is worth pointing out, however, that these two correlations are not as marked as that between the degree of Jewish self-assertion and the attribution to Gentiles of awareness of the Jewishness of the respondents.

Moreover, when we look at the link between the attribution to others of perception of own Jewishness and the subject's perception of anti-

TABLE 5. *Felt antisemitism correlated with Jewish self-assertion and perception attributed to Gentiles*

Felt antisemitism: weak

	Weak	Average	Strong	Total
self-assertion	26%	29%	45%	100% n = 105
perception attributed to Gentiles	36%	28%	36%	100% n = 105

Felt antisemitism: average

	Weak	Average	Strong	Total
self-assertion	18%	30%	52%	100% n = 220
perception attributed to Gentiles	28%	38%	34%	100% n = 220

Felt antisemitism: strong

	Weak	Average	Strong	Total
self-assertion	20%	16%	64%	100% n = 165
perception attributed to Gentiles	26%	24%	50%	100% n = 165

semitism at each of the three levels of self-assertion we have distinguished, we note that the weak positive correlation mentioned above (Table 5) is confirmed in fact most clearly at the level of the weakest assertion of Jewishness, while it becomes attenuated at the stronger levels of Jewish self-assertion.

The variations noted in the various correlations show some interesting aspects. Table 6 presents the correlation between the perception of own Jewishness attributed to Gentiles and Jewish self-assertion, but only for those respondents who state that they are aware of the existence of strong antisemitism. (The percentages in the table refer therefore to the proportions of respondents who assert that there is strong antisemitism in France.)

We note that there are the same correlations as in the earlier tables (particularly Table 5), but the effects of self-assertion and of awareness of own Jewishness attributed to Gentiles are not cumulative: the per-

ception of antisemitism does not lessen or increase uniformly as a result of one or of the other.

(*a*) Those who have a weak degree of Jewish self-assertion, but who attribute to Gentiles an acute degree of perception of their own Jewishness, account for the largest proportion of respondents who are aware of strong antisemitism (58 per cent).

(*b*) Then come those who present a strong Jewish self-assertion, but

TABLE 6. *Strong antisemitism felt as a function of Jewish self-assertion and of the perception of own Jewishness attributed to others*

Perception attributed to Gentiles	Weak	Average	Strong
weak	30%	13%	48%
average	25%	22%	29%
strong	58%	32%	44%

attribute to Gentiles a weak perception of their own Jewishness (48 per cent of this group perceive strong antisemitism).

(*c*) Only after these two groups come those who exhibit a strong Jewish self-assertion and also attribute to Gentiles an acute perception of their own Jewishness (44 per cent of them perceive strong anti-semitism).

We may therefore conclude, on the basis of the data presented here, that there are various types of equilibrium between the two aspects of felt exclusion and self-assertion, the three principal varieties being those mentioned above.

Conclusion

To be a Jew in France means first of all to belong to a minority group. This means that one has not only special relationships within one's own group, but also special relationships with the majority group and the national society. To be Jewish therefore means to have, in varying degrees, an awareness of this double set of relationships.

1. It seems that Jews somewhat over-estimate the exclusion practised by Gentiles towards them. The social condition in which Jews believe themselves to be is therefore not the exact reflection of the situation in which they, in fact, are.

2. However, all the respondents—whatever their degree of attachment to traditional cultural values (and whether or not these values are religious in nature), and whatever the degree of their religious observance—seem to be aware of the negative aspect of being Jewish in France. In this context, one cannot evolve a Jewish typology and speak of a 'negative' Jew, or of a *Juif de condition*, who is aware only

of the negative aspects of his situation, and who could be contrasted validly with a 'positive' Jew or *Juif de culture* not so sensitive to the negative aspects and asserting himself as Jewish simply by associating himself with his cultural tradition. There is a sense, therefore, in which one can say that all the Jews in France are *des Juifs de condition*, situational Jews.

3. Inversely, we find a great awareness of the positive aspects of being Jewish, even among situational Jews, and even if we do not confine ourselves to those Jews who are observant. Reference is made to a wide cultural framework, even if it does not include special observances and practices—languages, attitudes towards education, particular habits, etc., to which one must nowadays add, in varying degrees, a feeling of solidarity with Israel. All the factors need not be present simultaneously for the cultural framework to operate. In other words, the negative aspect of the *condition juive*, that is, the relationship of exclusion, does not suffice as a full definition of Jewishness any more than an analysis of cultural values suffices to define a flesh and blood Jew.

4. We should like to ask a further question, to take, so to speak, our research one stage further: how can one explain such a recurrent correlation between the sense of exclusion and the sense of self-assertion? Or in plainer terms, how can one explain this comparative loyalty to Jewry, those frequent references to its cultural tradition, this sense of belonging to a minority group (which is, by definition, a group more or less set apart by the majority)? How can one explain the fact that these traits are found even among respondents who seem to care little about this tradition and about this community?

Many hypotheses could be suggested, some of which might deal—as one would expect—with the relations between Jew and Gentile, and others with the Jew's relations with his own self, with his group, and with his tradition. Among the former group of hypotheses, one might state that even when a Jew is looked down upon and excluded, Judaism, that is, the totality of Jewish values (whether they be religious or secular values) still enjoys a certain prestige among Gentiles. In the second group, one might find the suggestion that the negative conditions of his existence, his devalorization, or his exclusion, are not enough to ensure that a Jew survive as a Jew: to be a member of a minority group is not enough to prevent a Jew from being finally assimilated into the society of the majority group. Hence the paradox: the danger of ceasing to be a Jew increases with the relaxation of the threat of exclusion, with the disappearance of the perception by Gentiles of his Jewishness. Hence the need to discover other ways in which he can assert himself. Religion has traditionally played this role and continues to play it in very many cases; but it is accompanied or even replaced by other frames of reference, the latest of which is the recognition of the State of Israel.

Thus the awareness of being Jewish, negatively and positively, might only be the expression of this enduring effort to survive. In a forthcoming paper we shall attempt to verify or invalidate some of these hypotheses.[4]

NOTES

[1] See (1) 'Recherches sur la judéité des juifs en France' in *Revue Française de Sociologie*, January–March, 1965 and (2) 'Spécificité et sentiment de la différence chez les juifs' in *Revue Française de Sociologie*, April–June, 1969.

[2] Institut Français d'Opinion Publique.

[3] J. Isaac, *L'enseignement du mépris*, Paris, 1962.

[4] The present paper is translated from the French by Judith Djamour.

SYNAGOGUE MARRIAGES IN
GREAT BRITAIN 1966–8*

S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool

1. Introduction

FOLLOWING our study (1967) of 'Statistics of Jewish Mar-
riages in Great Britain, 1901–1965' (in Vol. 9 of this *Journal*), we
have continued to compile annual statistics of synagogue marriages
using the same methods as in the original study.[1] The present paper
presents the findings for the three years 1966–68; it also examines
possible reasons for the fluctuations in numbers since the beginning
of the decade, and discusses expected trends and problems in the ensuing
quinquennium.

2. Fluctuations in marriages

The figures for 1966 showed a rise of some 5 per cent over the previous
year's total; this was followed in 1967 by a decline of just under 2 per
cent and, in 1968, by a slight rise of one-third of 1 per cent.

TABLE 1. *Number of synagogue marriages 1960–68*

	Number of marriages
1960	1,876
61	1,883
62	1,812
63	1,864
64	1,792
65	1,765
1966	1,846
67	1,817
68	1,823

As can be seen from Table 1, such movements are not unusual—
there were slight increases in earlier years, notably in 1963, which were
also followed by declines. Moreover, although in 1966 the increase was
substantial, it did not bring the total above that for 1963. Nor were

* The research on which this paper reports was carried out in the course of the work
of the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews,
London.

these recent fluctuations great enough to reverse significantly the general downward trend which became apparent in the early 1950s. The downward trend nevertheless appears to have relaxed its pace; this is shown by the three-year averages set out in Table 2, where the number for the most recent period, 1966–68, is 1 per cent higher than that for the preceding period.

A comparison with the experience of the general population of England and Wales, also set out in Table 2, suggests that this recent rise may be due to general demographic factors; as will appear in Section 4 below, fluctuations in the number of marriages a generation ago are

TABLE 2. *Numbers of marriages, and their rate of change, Jews and general population of England and Wales, 1951–68 (three year averages)*

| | Synagogue marriages | | England and Wales | |
	Number	% change	Number '000	% change
1951–53	2,251	—	352	—
54–56	2,080	−8%	351	−0%
57–59	2,000	−4%	342	−2%
60–62	1,857	−7%	346	+1%
63–65	1,807	−3%	361	+7%
66–68	1,829	+1%	393	+6%

probably the cause of the present fluctuations. Examining each three-year period in turn, we can see that synagogue marriages have fallen more sharply or have not risen as fast as marriages in the general population. Taking the period as a whole, that is comparing the most recent three-year period, 1966–68, with the earliest period in the table, 1951–53, one can see that marriages generally in England and Wales have risen by 9 per cent, while synagogue marriages have fallen by 19 per cent. A gap of 28 per cent between these two populations has manifested itself over a fifteen-year period; in other words, synagogue marriages have been declining at the rate of about 2 per cent a year in relation to marriages in the general population.

There is thus no sign of any recent reversal in the decline of synagogue marriages when taken in relation to movements in marriages generally.

3. *Synagogue group movements*

The distribution of marriages among the various synagogue groups has shown a slight 'shift to the right'. The period 1966–68 being compared with the period 1961–65, the number of Liberal marriages has declined, while the number of right-wing orthodox marriages has risen; the other groups (Central Orthodox, Sephardi, and Reform) are barely changed: the figures are set out in Table 3.

The lack of change in Central Orthodox marriages is notable, since previous periods had shown a consistent decline. The end of this decline was first apparent in our statistics for 1966 (when 1,414 Central Orthodox marriages were recorded, compared with an average of 1,373

in the previous five years). The nature of our enquiries does not permit us to give definite reasons for this reversal; but we have to note that a serious public controversy regarding the validity (from an orthodox point of view) of Reform and Liberal marriages was reported and discussed at length in three successive issues of the *Jewish Chronicle* at the beginning of 1966 (7, 14, and 21 January).

A further possible contributory factor to the change in Central Orthodox trends is the rise of the New London Synagogue since 1965;

TABLE 3. *Marriages according to synagogue group, 1961–65 and 1966–68 (annual averages)*

	1961–65	*1966–68*
Central Orthodox	1,373	1,381
Right-wing	39	55
Sephardi	64	64
	1,476	1,500
Reform	192	195
Liberal	155	134
	1,823	1,829

this may be placed in the synagogue spectrum between the Reform and Central Orthodox groups, and has here been included in the Central Orthodox section. The average number of marriages performed under its auspices in the three years 1966–68 was 13, which is comparable in magnitude with the rise in Central Orthodox marriages between the periods compared (a rise of 8, from 1,373 to 1,381).

The decline in the number of Liberal marriages by 21, from an average of 155 a year to 134, is perhaps the most significant feature in the table; the recent average is below the figure attained in any of the years 1961–65.

4. *Effects of the Second World War on current marriages*

Fluctuations in the number of persons now reaching marriageable age must, to some extent, mirror fluctuations in the numbers marrying a generation ago, that is, around the time of the Second World War. In common with marriages generally, synagogue marriages fluctuated violently in the years following 1938; in round figures, they reached a peak of 3,600 in 1939, fell dramatically to 2,300 in 1943–44, then rose equally dramatically to 3,800 in 1947.

Jewish births probably showed equally marked fluctuations, but no direct statistical data are available. However, it is known that Jewish bachelors have recently been marrying at an average age of about 27, so that those marrying, for example, in 1966 will have been born (on the average) in 1939; their brides marry at an average age of 24, and will have been born (on the average) in 1942.[2] Since very little precise

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information is available on Anglo-Jewish fertility, all that can be done at present, in an attempt to understand recent fluctuations in marriage numbers, is to carry through an exercise assuming that the fertility of Jewish marriages (in the sense of the ratio of births to marriages each year) moved at the time of the Second World War in the same way as the fertility of marriages in general in England and Wales.[3] This is no more than an assumption; but the error involved is probably small in relation to the sharp fluctuations that have taken place in the number of marriages. Hence the results of our calculations may be relied upon in so far as they show substantial movements.

On this basis, the expected number of Jewish male and female births has been calculated, for the appropriate years, by multiplying the number of synagogue marriages by the ratio of male or female births to marriages in England and Wales for that year. From these figures the expected number of couples (that is, the number of men reaching 27 in each year and the number of women reaching 24 in that year, divided by two) reaching the average age of first marriage has been calculated. This number is termed the 'expected number of first marriages'.

For example, given that synagogue marriages in 1939 numbered 3,597 and that the ratio of male births to marriages in England and Wales was 0·72, the number of Jewish male births in 1939 was calculated at 2,590; this number of men was assumed to have reached their 27th birthday in 1966. Similarly, with 2,750 synagogue marriages in 1942 and a female fertility ratio for England and Wales of 0·86, 2,365 Jewish females were calculated to have reached the average age at first marriage in 1966. The expected number of first synagogue marriages in 1966 was therefore calculated at 2,478.

On the further assumption that the expected number of *first* synagogue marriages accounts for 90 per cent of *all* expected synagogue marriages,[4] the expected total numbers of marriages, and the year-to-year changes in those numbers, was calculated for each year of the present decade. These figures are compared with the actual numbers of marriages in Table 4 (the figures have been rounded to the nearest ten[5]).

It will be seen that this 'model' correctly forecasts the direction of change for each year, though the magnitudes of the actual fluctuations are generally smaller than expected. Thus, for the most recent three years, a substantial rise was to be expected in 1966, to be followed by a decline in 1967, and a rise in 1968.

In particular, the year 1966 showed the sharpest rise in the series of expected marriages, and the highest expected absolute level for the decade. This particular rise is attributable to a high number of births in 1939, which provided a rise in the number of potential grooms in 1966, combined with a revival in fertility in 1942, after its fall at the begin-

ning of the War, which led to a coincident rise in potential brides in 1966. The peak number of marriages recorded in 1966 is thus seen to be the result of the exceptional circumstances of the previous generation. The slight fall in marriages recorded in 1967–68 may be regarded as an 'echo' of the decline in marriages immediately following the outbreak of the Second World War (leading, in particular, to a reduction in the number of potential grooms in 1967).

The rise in marriages in 1963 was also to be expected on the basis of the above calculations. The increase in that year (both 'expected' and

TABLE 4. *Numbers of actual marriages and expected numbers, 1960–68*

			Annual Change	
	Expected	Actual	Expected	Actual
1960	2,560	1,880	—	—
61	2,590	1,880	+40	+10
62	2,560	1,810	−30	−70
63	2,640	1,860	+80	+50
64	2,490	1,790	−150	−70
65	2,440	1,770	−50	−30
1966	2,760	1,850	+320	+80
67	2,580	1,820	−180	−30
68	2,680	1,820	+100	+10

'actual') was less marked than in 1966 but was due to the same cause—the rise in marriages in 1939—which in 1963 affected the number of potential brides (the number of bridegrooms was stable in that period).

The calculations have been extrapolated to give an idea of expected future trends, with the following results:

	Expected marriages
1969	2,700
1970	3,340
1971	3,950
1972	3,190
1973	3,550

These figures are substantially higher than the expected figures for recent years, and are a consequence of the post-war 'baby boom'. We ought thus to expect the number of synagogue marriages to rise steadily over the next few years; but if such a rise takes place, it must be assessed against the full background of marriage trends before it is taken as a sign for optimism.

An equally important point that emerges from a scrutiny of Table 4 is the consistent shortfall of the actual number of synagogue marriages below the number to be expected; for the period 1960–65 the shortfall amounted to 28 per cent, and for the more recent three years 1966–68 the shortfall amounted to 31 per cent. The average shortfall for the whole period 1960–68 was 29 per cent.

Certain qualifications to the discussion above must be noted. First,

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the 'expected number of first marriages', as calculated, is a theoretical figure based solely on the offspring of marriages that took place in this country. There will, in addition, have been births to couples who married abroad and immigrated, of which there must have been large numbers in the 1930s; such offspring are omitted from our calculation (and there does not seem to be any precise way of bringing them into account). This omission is to a small extent offset by the emigration both of couples married in Great Britain and of their offspring; nevertheless, one should perhaps add a net 10–20 per cent (depending on one's estimate of the proportions migrating) to the numbers calculated above as reaching marriageable age at the beginning of this decade. Immigration became a rather smaller influence after the Second World War, and its effect on our estimates will be of smaller significance towards the end of this decade.[6]

It follows that the true shortfall of actual marriages is greater than so far indicated: adding 10–20 per cent to the expected number of marriages for the period 1960–68 would increase the calculated shortfall from 29 per cent to 36–41 per cent.

Broadly speaking, therefore, it may be said that one marriage in three appears to be missing from current statistics of synagogue marriages; this is probably to be attributed to a rise in civil marriages.[7]

5. *The balance of the sexes*

The sharp fluctuation in marriages during the 1939–45 War, combined with the relatively large differences in age at first marriage of Jewish grooms and brides, must be expected to lead to an imbalance of the sexes at marriageable age. An indication of the situation emerges from our calculations of the number of expected marriages on taking the difference between the number of men reaching the age of 27 and the number of women reaching 24 each year (to emphasize the roughness of the approach the numbers are shown only to the nearest hundred):

	Number of potential grooms less potential brides
1960	+200
61	0
62	0
63	−100
64	+400
1965	+400
66	+200
67	−400
68	−600
69	+100
1970	−500
71	−1,100
72	−900
73	+700

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For the period 1964–66 there is a calculated excess of potential grooms (say, an excess of 300 grooms per year in 2,000 marriages, or about 15 per cent), but since more young men than women marry out, the excess of grooms probably never became a problem of practical significance.

For 1967, the situation reversed itself, and suggests a deficiency of grooms; this is followed by a more marked deficiency in 1968. The deficiency of grooms is expected to continue until 1972. The calculations (being based only on a single average age at marriage without allowing for the 'buffering' effect of the spread of age at marriage) may exaggerate the extent of the deficiency but, the differential loss of grooms due to intermarriage being taken into account, the total deficiency shown seems serious. This deficiency of grooms may limit the number of marriages unless marriage ages become more flexible.

The problem is more serious among the Jewish community than generally and, as already noted, is the result of the greater difference between the ages of the bride and the groom.[8]

At present Jewish bachelors are marrying at about 27 years of age compared with an average, for the general population, of 25; if Jewish grooms were to marry earlier in the coming years, so that their average age at marriage was brought down by, say, half a year, to $26\frac{1}{2}$, an additional 1,500 grooms would marry, and the expected deficiency of grooms would be much reduced. It will be interesting to see whether such a move takes place.

6. Conclusions

The paper brings up-to-date the annual series of marriage statistics presented in our earlier paper on 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain, 1901–65'.

The figure for 1966 showed a sharp increase on that for the previous year. This was followed by a small decline in 1967, and a small rise in 1968. There have been slight shifts away from Liberal marriages, and towards the right-wing orthodox group.

It is suggested that fluctuations in the total number of synagogue marriages reflect sharp oscillations in the marriage experience of the community a generation ago, which was affected by the Second World War. Our calculations suggest that in the next few years the level of synagogue marriages will be somewhat higher than in the earlier part of the decade. There is, however, nothing to indicate any reversal of the longer-term trend of a declining rate of synagogue marriages.

Our calculations also suggest that the period 1968–72 will be marked by a serious excess of females reaching marriageable age.

NOTES

[1] See Appendix A, *op. cit.* Since September 1966 the Federation of Synagogues has been issuing separate marriage authorizations; these have consequently been collected separately and are still included in the Central Orthodox Group. The New London Synagogue continues to be treated in our statistics as part of the Central Orthodox Group.

[2] See Prais and Schmool, 1967, p. 170, Table VI. The discussion above relates to first marriages only, which account for some 90 per cent of all marriages.

[3] First steps have been taken by the Unit to compile numbers of male births, and preliminary results indicate that the above assumption is substantially correct; Dr. Krausz's study of 382 Jewish families in Edgware also confirms that the differences between Jewish and general fertility have been small: E. Krausz, 'The Edgware Survey: Demographic Results', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, 1968, p. 95.

[4] This is based on our findings (1967, p. 169) relating to the Central Orthodox Group, on which more extensive investigations were carried out than was possible elsewhere, owing to the limitations of our resources.

[5] The year-to-year changes have been rounded after differencing the unrounded numbers; hence 1968 shows a rise of 10, being the rounded difference between 1,823 and 1,817 (see Table 1).

[6] Two further minor qualifications may be noted: we have made no allowances for infant mortality or for the small proportion who never marry.

[7] Cf. Prais and Schmool, 1967, p. 153.

[8] Prais and Schmool, 1967, p. 159.

DIMENSIONS OF AUTHORITY
IN THE CONTEMPORARY
JEWISH COMMUNITY

Charles S. Liebman

THE social scientist seeks, first of all, understanding. The 'Jewish' question, for the social scientist, is the problem of explaining Jewish survival. The question may be approached from the perspective of the individual Jew, his self-perception, and his definition of Judaism. From this perspective, the concept of *identity* serves as the most convenient tool for undertaking investigations into the nature of Jewish life.

An alternative approach would begin with the Jewish community rather than the individual Jew. Community, by definition, involves the surrender of certain prerogatives by its constituents. A community may be voluntaristic in that its members retain the option of leaving it. Such an option, of course, will influence the structure and activities of the community. But no community is voluntaristic in the sense that its constituents retain all the prerogatives they exercised or could have exercised outside the community.

Jewish communities exist throughout the world. They are worthy of research precisely because they are communities, that is, not voluntaristic in an ultimate sense. It is not surprising, therefore, that they do not include all those who were born Jews or even all those who define themselves as Jews. By the same token, Jewish communities must not be defined so narrowly as to focus exclusively on formal institutions.

The recent growth of behavioural-political studies has drawn attention to dimensions of politics beyond the confines of institutional forms. Such studies have alerted us to the fact that descriptions of communal structures are quite inadequate to explain the dynamics of community life. If we are to understand Jewish community life we must go beyond the description of formal institutional patterns of the community and answer more fundamental questions concerning the nature of the Jew's relationship to his formal and informal communal institutions, the interrelationship between community organizations, and the policy-making or decision-making process within these institutions. One of

the most convenient tools for treating these problems is the concept of *authority*. In Herbert Simon's definition, authority has to do with the willingness of a person receiving a proposal to carry it out without necessarily being convinced of its merits.[1] The concept of *authority* can be as useful to the study of the Jewish community as the concept of *identity* to the study of the individual Jew.

Whereas the demise of the traditional *kehilla* as a centralized and compulsory corporate entity complicates the problem of communal political studies, it makes it all the more necessary to move beyond a description of formal structural categories. For example, membership in the traditional *kehilla* automatically implied a host of obligations, rights, and responsibilities. The reality behind the category *member* was basically the same for all Jews. Today, membership in a Jewish organization or a Jewish community tells us almost nothing because we have no idea what such membership means. Is it simply a form of Jewish identity? Is it exclusively a vehicle for social-expressive activity? Does it signify assent to the policies of the organization or the central community? Most critically, to what extent can the organization or the community mobilize individuals by virtue of their membership?

These questions lead us back again to the central question of authority and authority relationships within the community. The Jew perceived the traditional *kehilla* as exercising authority which was legitimated religiously and could be imposed coercively. Of course, there were no doubt other bases upon which the authority of the traditional *kehilla* was exercised and legitimized, but the religious and coercive aspects were so obvious that one did not necessarily look beyond them. But upon what basis do the contemporary Jewish communities or Jewish organizations legitimate their authority? They lack coercive authority and in many, if not most, cases, religious legitimacy as well. We are, therefore, necessarily led beyond the formal basis and structure of the Jewish community if we are adequately to appreciate its operation.

Before we move to the specific question of authority it might also be as well if we first abandoned the traditional meaning of pluralism as a description of Jewish communal life within the context of the larger society. Pluralism, in societies such as the United States, has often implied a general society formed by sub-communities of a religious or ethnic-cultural nature. The facts of life are such that, at least in countries of the Diaspora which resemble the United States, it is not simply that the society is pluralistic but rather that the individual himself is defined by his pluralistic affiliations in cross-cutting groups. They, in turn, may and often do have mutually exclusive goals. Thus, membership in a Jewish organization or even a centralized Jewish community is only one form of emotional, social, philanthropic, and even religious, expression. This proposition is best demonstrated by examining it at the point where it appears least tenable. Let us take,

for example, the case of the United States where Judaism tends to be defined in its narrowest form, as a religious counterpart of Protestantism or Catholicism; that is to say, where the definition of Judaism tends to be most functionally specific. Even there, the synagogue, which is surely the primary institution of Jewish identification, does not monopolize the expression of religious sentiment on the part of the Jew. The national state, its symbols, its holidays, its central personalities, even its political parties and cultural institutions serve as both inculcators and outlets for the expression of religious ideals and sentiments. Neither the synagogue nor the larger Jewish community necessarily serves as a conduit or intermediary between the individual and the larger society in all matters of a religious nature. Of course, the individual does not relate himself directly to the mass society, but the significant groups which do perform this function may include schools, professional associations, fraternal groups, and age groups (formal and informal) where Jewishness may be quite irrelevant. Needless to say, the pluralistic basis of individual affiliation is even more obvious with respect to other functions such as welfare and philanthropy or culture.

It is only after we appreciate the ostensibly tenuous nature of Jewish affiliation that we can meaningfully explore the nature of community life. The very tenuousness of Jewish affiliation makes the existence of a Jewish community and its exercise of authority all the more remarkable. The absence of any obvious function of, or need for, a Jewish community in countries such as the United States should force us to look beneath surface manifestations to discover those remarkable forces operating in favour of the continued survival of Jewish life. Without committing ourselves to any predictions about the prospects for Jewish survival in the Diaspora, we ought really to turn the perennial question about the future of Judaism on its head. Instead of asking whether Judaism will survive, we should seek an explanation for the anomaly of the community's present existence. The fact is that Jews do not act out their Jewishness in isolation from one another; they feel themselves bound to the institutions of the community, and they sense authoritative relationships within the community, even when they reject them.

We have already suggested that a convenient methodological tool for exploring Jewish community life is to be found in the concept of *authority*, the willingness of an individual receiving a proposal to carry it out without necessarily being convinced of its merit. Initial studies should focus on the authoritative relationships between Jewish organizations, their immediate constituents (members), and the broader constituency (the total Jewish community) which they often claim to serve and whose activity they often seek to mobilize. Beginning with and then elaborating Herbert Simon's types of authority, we can suggest the applicability of this concept to the Jewish community in two

ways: first, in regard to the nature or sources of authority within the Jewish community and in defining who are the authoritative leaders within the Jewish community, and second, how they exercise their authority. Examples are drawn from American communal life.

The nature or sources of authority within the Jewish community

Why do people accept the authority of Jewish institutions or organizations? Several concepts may help to answer this question.

A. The authority of confidence

1. Confidence flowing from the functional status of an individual or group.

a. We may have confidence in certain individuals by virtue of their position in an organization or in the community. For example, we may unquestioningly permit the professional staff of an organization to determine the agenda of Jewish organizational and communal concerns because this is presumably one of the functions for which they are employed. The rabbi who is asked to resolve a question of Jewish law is exercising a functional authority of confidence.

b. Functional authority of confidence may perhaps extend to organizational status within the total Jewish community. The meaning here is somewhat different from that intended by Simon.

There is a paradoxical quality about the functions of Jewish organizations in the United States and their relationships to their members. On the one hand, complexity, professionalization, and the division of labour have had their impact on communal life. Jewish organizations tend to specialize in an activity which is most salient to their members and most congenial to their professional staffs. Thus, there are organizations specializing in Zionist activity, fraternal activity, Jewish–Christian relations, church–state relations, and, of course, religious services. Organizations may change their area of specialization, but at any given point in time they are identifiable by their major focus of concern. On the other hand, there is an increasing tendency for one Jewish organization or another to provide the major and often the exclusive focus for an individual's Jewish concerns and identity. Consequently, Jewish organizations have increasingly staked out claims for themselves in spheres of Jewish life outside their particular area of specialization. Most national organizations have added religious specialists, provided adult education of a general Jewish nature, involved themselves in activity on behalf of Israel, engaged in philanthropy, and so on. Frequently, the functionally specific character of the organization is clearer to the observer at the national level than it is to the individual member at the local level. But virtually every organization engages in activity beyond that which an observer might consider its special area

of competence. The question is, do these organizations, or their members, take their cues from other Jewish organizations when they engage in activity outside their special area of competence? That is, what are the authoritative relationships of functional confidence between organizations? For example, in the United States, do non-Zionist organizations defer to Zionist organizations in adopting strategies and policies in support of Israel? Do non-religious organizations defer to religious organizations and outstanding religious personalities in developing religious programmes, in defining the religious tradition, or engaging in inter-faith dialogue?

2. Confidence flowing from the hierarchical status of an individual or group.

a. Jewish organizations have presidents and vice-presidents, they have executive councils, local chapters, regions, and national officers. Organizational charts exist in which hierarchical arrangements are specified with some clarity. We may assume that in the typical voluntaristic organization, relationships between hierarchical levels are less authoritative than the lines of the organizational chart would suggest, and that local chapters exercise far greater autonomy than the national officers would like to admit. On the other hand, we may also assume that as long as the individual member has any stake in the existence of any hierarchical arrangements (perhaps because he hopes to be near the top of the chart himself some day), any proposal emanating from someone higher on the organizational chart will be received with special deference.

b. Simon's notion of hierarchy is that there is an authority of confidence inhering in the individual's formal status within the organization. However, there are points at which the organizational model is too confining for an understanding of the Jewish community. It would be useful to extend the hierarchical authority of confidence to confidence inhering in an individual's social status as well as his role and status in the non-Jewish world.

3. Charismatic leadership is the final form of the authority of confidence. There have been and are charismatic leaders in Jewish communal life. The authority of personalities such as Judah Magnes, Louis Marshall, Stephen Wise, or Abba Hillel Silver rested in the belief by many of their followers that they possessed certain unique gifts or talents which evoked intense personal loyalty and devotion. Within the community today there is one *role*, that of rabbi, which for many Jews is *ipso facto* charismatic. The question is, how extensive and diffuse is the authority of charismatic leaders or charismatic roles? Is it limited, for example, to the rabbi's congregants? Is it limited to religious activity? Is there an authority of charisma among rabbis themselves or between rabbis and major personalities in their former seminaries?

B. The authority of identification

1. Members of an organization may accept its proposals by virtue of their identification with the organization. That is, by virtue of identification, the individual comes to accept the organization's proposals and goals as his own.

2. As a result of continued identification with the organization, an individual may also come to internalize the survival goals of the organization and raise them to a position of pre-eminence within his own value system. This process is abetted by the fact that as Jewish organizations become foci for Jewish identity, their survival may be viewed as basic to Jewish survival. This may also be reinforced by echoes of the religious legitimacy from which the traditional *kehilla* benefited.

C. The authority of legitimacy

Simon defines legitimacy in a special way. He sees its expression in the notion that one *ought* to go along with the organization or the communal leader. One's very membership in a group or community, where such membership is not compulsory, implies the acceptance of certain group decisions. It also implies that, other things being equal, one is more likely to accept proposals that come from within the group than those which originate from without.

From a broader perspective, legitimacy in its more popular usage underlies all authority in Jewish life. In the absence of an authority of sanctions, that is, coercive authority, any exercise of power or influence within the Jewish community must rest to some extent on an authority of legitimacy. But forms of legitimacy (rational, traditional, charismatic, etc.) are themselves values in which Jews are socialized and which they ultimately internalize from other sources of authority within the Jewish community or from sources outside it. Although our concern is with the internal structure of the Jewish community, any study which focuses on authority relationships must ask whether the ultimate legitimacy of one form or another of authority does not derive from cultural norms present in the non-Jewish society. Traditional religious authority no longer has the same legitimacy it once had in Jewish life because in part it has lost currency throughout modern society.

D. The authority of sanctions

We have suggested that the community lacks an authority of sanctions. Realistically, however, we might expand the definition of sanctions to include the conferring or denying of status rewards and on occasion even of economic rewards (for example, the use of business or

trade councils in Jewish fund-raising suggests the possibility of economic sanctions against those who contribute less than is expected). In that case, the authority of sanctions also exists within the Jewish community.

Authoritative leaders within the Jewish community

Along with the exploration of the nature of sources of authority within the Jewish community must come the study of types of authority leader. Again, using the United States as an example, we find the following types of leader.   _

1. Professional administrators and administrative leaders of Jewish organizations. One thinks, for example, of the executive directors and executive vice-presidents of major Jewish organizations whose names are more familiar to the general public than those of its lay leaders. On the international scene the pre-eminent administrative leader until most recently was Nahum Goldmann. But there are many other prominent professionals in Jewish organizations throughout the world. The authority of these individuals rests in part upon their ability to manipulate a bureaucratic apparatus, and on their control of information as well as other resources such as time, effort, and money. To the extent that the influence of professional administrators has increased it may be a function of the increased complexity of Jewish life and/or the lack of interest of most Jews in issues of Jewish concern.

2. Businessmen and lawyers. The successful businessman plays an important role in every organization of Jewish laymen. His influence, relative to that of other authority figures, is of interest. Our concern should also be with evaluating the extent to which this influence is a function of the businessman's material contribution, his financial resources which free him to devote time to the Jewish community, or a value system that awards high recognition to a successful businessman. I would think that lawyers may represent a special case, and where possible it would be interesting to trace the relative influence of businessmen and lawyers. Among the certain talents which good lawyers develop is an ability to relate their client's problem to its broader environmental setting. The lawyer, in many instances, is the conduit between the client or organization which he represents and the political as well as legal institutions of the society. A relative rise in the importance of lawyers in Jewish organizational life may suggest a growing interrelationship between Jewish organizational interests and general societal interests. Or, the relative influence of lawyers in one organization as opposed to businessmen in another, may suggest the relative insulation of one organization from the general society as opposed to the other.

3. Pulpit rabbis. A subject deserving careful attention would be the limits of authority and the area of recognized competence of the pulpit

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rabbi. Is his authority diffuse or specific? Is the rabbi considered competent in the specialized area of religion, or does his authority extend to other aspects of Jewish life? Is the growing tendency of Jewish organizations to hire rabbis as professional administrators a reflection of the organization's need to include religious or diffuse authority figures within their ranks, or is it rather the rabbi's flight from the pulpit to a more secure or less demanding position?

4. Academics and intellectuals. Jewish intellectuals and academics enjoy a very high status within the Jewish community. Writing a book is probably as good a way of becoming a board member of most Jewish organizations as a contribution of several thousand dollars. Has this always been the case? It appears sometimes that if academics who happen to be Jewish took the time or interest they could dominate Jewish organizational life. But appearances may be deceptive. Are the contributions of academics indeed welcome, or are intellectuals wanted as window dressing? Is the status of intellectuals a function of Jewish esteem for scholarship or Jewish esteem for those who have made their mark in the Gentile world? To what extent has the status of intellectuals been transformed into real authority? Finally, is the contribution of those Jewish intellectuals who are active participants in Jewish life any different from that of non-intellectuals?

5. Jewish scholars. One of the more dramatic changes in Jewish life since the emancipation is the decline in the authority of the *talmid haham*. Marked changes have recently taken place in his status within the Orthodox community, where the *talmid haham* in the person of the *Rosh Yeshiva* exercises greater authority than ever before. On the other hand, we also need to understand the role and authority of the *Wissenschaft* type of scholar—his relative influence and status and his contribution to organized Jewish life. Finally, what is the relationship in the perception of contemporary Jews between the roles of the two types of scholar? Did the *Wissenschaft* scholar benefit from a transference of prestige, or did he suffer because he came to the fore at precisely that period when the status of the *talmid haham* was in decline? Has the scholar eschewed a role of authority figure, or was it denied to him? Are conditions changing?

6. Gate-keepers. This term denotes individuals who by virtue of their position in the general community, usually in government, play a special role in relating the organized Jewish community to the general political society. The role is reminiscent of that of the *shtadlan*, except that it is no longer a formal one. In the United States, the preeminent gate-keeper until a few years ago was Arthur Goldberg. One is struck by the status and authority, real and potential, which he exercised and might have exercised within Jewish life by virtue of his position in political life.

About these six types of authority figure, and others which may be

identified, we want to know their relative influence, what if any are the special areas in which they exercise authority, the extent to which different segments of the Jewish community have different authority figures, the value system which supports each type of leader, and the economic, social, political, and cultural factors which contribute to their relative authority.

The answers to these questions should be pursued both by intensive case studies of particular organizations and by comparative studies of a number of organizations in one country or a number of countries. One thing is clear. There is more at stake in such studies than expanding our knowledge and understanding in the social sciences. The very quality of Jewish communal life, the politics of Jewish civil society, depends on the dissemination of knowledge concerning the actual functioning of Jewish communal organizations, their potential, and their limitations.

We 'begin with the disgrace and end with the glory' according to the *Mishna*.[2] We began with the dimensions of politics to which behaviourists call our attention. We end with the dimension to which Leo Strauss alerts us, with political philosophy, the highest form of political study. Ultimately we seek more than an empirical understanding. Above all we seek 'to acquire knowledge of the good life and of the good society',[3] at least in so far as it pertains to Jewish life and society.

NOTES

[1] For a fuller elaboration, see Herbert Simon *et al.*, *Public Administration*, New York, 1954, pp. 180–201.

[2] *Mishna Pesahim*, X, 4.

[3] Leo Strauss, 'What is Political Philosophy? The Problem of Political Philosophy', *The Journal of Politics*, 19 (August 1951), p. 343.

THE JOURNAL OF JEWISH STUDIES

CONTENTS

CONSENSUS AND COMMUNITY
IN ISRAEL

Asher Arian

I

ISRAEL has been referred to as a Jewish State. Would it be very useful to think of Israel as a Jewish community? At first this seems like an easy, if not a trivial, question, but upon reflection it is clear that the question raises many of the traditional bugaboos of definition, including, of course, 'Who is a Jew?' and the meaning of being a Jew. There are many Jewish communities scattered around the world. How many of them are in Israel? One? Some? Many? All? (More than one answer may be circled, since each of the answers, and perhaps all of them, at varying levels of abstraction, can be sustained.) When Jewish communities in Israel are referred to, the emphasis is usually upon the last geographical territory in which the group sojourned before arriving in Israel. In this usage, at least, the basic distinction of categories between community and state seems to hold. And so we speak of Jews of Polish or Moroccan origin now living in Israel. It would be enlightening to study the community organization of those groups, but the scholar who begins this task would probably define his population in terms of their ethnicity and not in terms of their Jewishness. Many Israelis are familiar with this situation: Harold Isaacs pointed to the anomaly of referring to first generation Americans of Russian-born parents who emigrate to Israel as 'Anglo-Saxons'.[1]

My own predisposition is to label the attempt of portraying the Jewish population of Israel as a Jewish community as ill-conceived. The basic distinction between community and state, which this attempt overlooks, makes the fruit of these efforts highly questionable. The perceptual, behavioural, and organizational results of more than twenty years of statehood have been the generation and strengthening not of a sense of Jewish community but of Israeli statehood. I do not intend to raise the difficult question of the relationship between Jewishness and Israeliness,[2] nor do I wish to enter into a discussion of the conceptual problems regarding community and statehood. The feeling of community in Israel is strong, but it remains an open question

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whether that feeling is associated with Jewishness or Israeliness, although my guess is that the latter association is dominant. Jewishness is also important, but the independence and autonomy granted by statehood have transformed the notion of Jewishness into a common denominator which can be assumed and often ignored.

If identification with community often stems from the perceived need to strengthen the in-group in the face of threat from outside forces, it is clear that the relevant feeling of identification for many Israelis will be with the State rather than with those Jews living within the State. The relationship is inclusive; identifying with the State does not preclude and generally includes identifying with co-religionists living within the territorial boundaries of the State. The relevant in-group for Israelis is conceived of in terms of the military and political position of the State. The State, and not the Jewish community in Israel, offers the mechanisms, such as the representation in foreign capitals and the defence establishment, which promise hope of defending the position and interests of the group.

Within Israel the situation is different. But here too the relevant in-group is not co-terminous (at least until the Six-Day War) with the range of religious identification. Ethnicity, length of residence in the country, occupation, education, and political affiliation are much more relevant sources of cleavage than is the fact that a citizen does or does not identify with the Jewish community. Since 'everyone' is Jewish, Jewishness takes on less importance in social relations. A much more important variable is religiosity or degree of observant behaviour. This factor tends to determine where you live, with whom you socialize, where you send your children to school, and how you vote. Considering the conciliatory mood within Israel today and the history of the *status quo* arrangements regarding religious observance, it may be too strong a phrasing to say that religiosity represents a major axis of cleavage within Israeli society. None the less, it is clear that the traditional use of the concept 'community' is much more relevant to the religiously observant, for example, than it is to the entire community of those Jews living in Israel.

The Six-Day War has put the question of Jewish community in Israel in new focus. One result of the war was to reaffirm with startling clarity the tradition of the minority position of the Jew—even in his own homeland. Whereas for some twenty years before the war the question of Jewish community organization in Israel was largely irrelevant, since the war the relations between Jews and other groups under the jurisdiction of Israel have resulted in important changes. This is well demonstrated by the impact of the war on the lower class in Israel. In a relative sense, their position has been raised by the introduction of a large population of unskilled, barely educated, non-Jews into the society. While the two groups resemble one another from a

demographic point of view, official policy and the identification with the State by the Jewish lower class have raised their self-perception and fortified the importance of identification with the Jewish community.

I have argued that to conceive of the Israeli Jewish community as yet another Jewish community in the world would be unrewarding. I have, however, hinted that many of the characteristics normally associated with communities, such as ties arising from neighbourhood and common interest, along with shared experiences and patterns of perception, characterize the Jewish population of Israel. My claim has been that it is a sense of nationhood and not Jewishness which leads to this consensus within the population. Yet to talk about consensus or 'the typical Israeli' is likely to lead to a sense of discomfort for anyone even slightly familiar with Israel's demographic statistics, and even more so for anyone who has travelled in the country. In the remainder of this paper, I shall reflect upon the nature of this consensus and report some findings relevant to the theme.

II

The operation of a political system must be understood in relationship to the history of that system and to the internal arrangements characterizing it. One of the most important factors which influence the outcome of an issue in the political process is the degree of consensus already existing within the polity and society. Consensus represents a base of widely shared attitudes which predispose their holders to support the system. Consensus provides the foundation upon which a government or social institution can build and develop. The dimensions of consensus indicate the outer boundaries beyond which no social group or political party can venture without peril.

Usually consensus relates to the attitudinal and ideological levels. Broadly based agreement on a specific issue or general orientation is the cornerstone of consensus. But this discussion of consensus would be incomplete if it did not relate the ideological dimension to the perceptual and behavioural ones. Ideological consensus is generally predicated on a widely shared perception of social and political reality. When social, economic, or political gaps and cleavages are perceived to be great, ideological consensus is threatened. Another aspect of this same dimension is the way in which people perceive the world around them and their place in it. Ideological consensus is fortified by the absence of major cleavages in perception of power and status distribution and of the reality world in which groups and individuals exist.

If consensus is enhanced by the fact that people believe and perceive in ways which are not greatly influenced by the social or political groupings to which they belong, it is also promoted by certain types of behaviour. First, individuals and groups must act in accordance with

agreed-upon norms, the rules of the game. Lip-service alone is usually not sufficient. Any great gaps in behaviour which appear to upset the agreed-upon arrangements may have a negative impact on the existence of consensus. Abrupt moves to change the accepted and expected division of benefits can reverberate in unpredictable ways. A major suggestion underlying this discussion of consensus is that it is a pattern of behaviour which fosters relatively peaceful perpetuation of the system. The pressures towards consensus stem from a desire to continue reaching political and social solutions in a non-violent manner. Other threats to the existence of the system, especially external threats, tend to strengthen the important role of consensus in the fabric of the society. Consensus acts as an internal mechanism to prevent external threats from upsetting delicate balances; when the system faces external threats, this internal device of consensus is generally concentrated in order to forestall the danger confronting the system.[3]

The model of consensus presented here relates attitudinal and ideological dimensions to perceptual and behavioural ones. These dimensions are interrelated in a complex fashion in which each element is obviously influenced and reinforced by others. Each operates as a contributory factor in producing a consensus which is associated with tranquil social, political, and inter-group relations.

Israel in the 1960s fits this model of consensus. The reality worlds of Israelis—the way in which they perceive the world around them and the hopes and fears they express regarding that world—are amazingly similar. This similarity is especially noteworthy when compared with the actual heterogeneity of the population. It seems to me that there are three major reasons why homogeneity in perceptions of reality worlds can be discerned against a background of such diversity.

First, Israel is a Jewish society. Whatever the diversity in the specific cultures in which most adult Israelis were brought up (and over three-quarters of adult Israelis were born abroad), being 'Jewish' is a major factor almost all shared, irrespective of how it was expressed. Above all, this involved a two-thousand-year experience of relationship with Gentiles. On coming to Israel, a Jewish society, one could relax—a word, incidentally, which has no fully adequate translation as yet in Hebrew. Not only the neighbour, but also the policeman and tax-collector were Jews. The more central being Jewish was to one's life, the greater the personal significance of living in a Jewish society. And for most Jews who came to Israel, being Jewish was a very major part of their identity. One can expect that, as time goes by, the comfort and sense of solidarity which stem from this source will wear off. But for the time being, it is one factor which shapes the reality world of most Israelis.

Second, the extreme diversity of the countries of origin of Israelis began only with the founding of the state in 1948. Until then, the waves

of immigration were overwhelmingly European and many of the earlier immigrants were familiar with, if not motivated by, the appeal of Zionist ideology. The formation of the State indeed led to major institutional change, particularly in government and the military. But even those institutions which underwent change were overwhelmingly dominated, as were those which were little modified, by the old-timers. The Israel of 1948 was not a *tabula rasa*; since then, the society has developed rapidly, but always with the imprint of the dominant Europeans and, subsequently, of their Israeli-born children. There was, in other words, a mould into which newcomers were strongly pressured to fit.

In this experience, as well as in their contacts with other public and governmental administrative units, the immigrants were exposed to a series of benefits and demands which put a premium on internalizing the values and behaviour patterns of the veterans. Flexibility and accommodation with the new patterns were the surest tickets to moderate success in the new country. These socializing experiences—from language to how to get along with a civil servant—were often transferred to that segment of the population which was not directly exposed to Israeli society and culture by those that were. The pressure cooker, as it was put in the first years of the State, has been far from a perfectly efficient instrument, but it is not to be disregarded.

The third, and perhaps the most important reason to expect homogeneity is found in the extremely difficult security position which the small nation has found itself in ever since independence. Measures taken to provide for the defence of the country quickly led to mobilization of the able-bodied. A far-reaching process was thereby initiated in which the defence establishment became one of the primary agents of socialization into the norms and behaviour patterns of the new immigrants. Since most of the cues were given by members of the veteran community, the old was perpetuated rather than the new being mingled with the old and in the process changing both.

The security situation has had a homogenizing affect in another sense. The intransigence of the threat posed by its Arab neighbours has provided the cement at the political level which might have been lacking (in quieter times) at the social level for proceeding rapidly with the process of nation-building. Security considerations have led to the mobilization of more than the able-bodied for service in the armed forces; Israel has mobilized much of its economy and of its intellectual resources because of its difficult defence position. The important point for us is not only that sometimes political goals which are worthy of debate are on occasion approved in the name of defence; also important is the development of consensus—a widely-shared attitude which supports the establishment of its efforts to maintain the high level of defence effectiveness. For the society, the importance of this consensus

is the development of a mechanism which fulfils a vital function: it provides a union of identity between the various members of the body politic which allows them to share a common cause even while pursuing their own divergent ends in other fields.

Not only did Israel in the 1960s have an ideology which was supported by the overwhelming majority of the population, conditions of life were such that perceptions of economic and social reality were largely unaffected by the differences in background which characterized the citizens of the country. The two great levellers in Israeli society were the difficult security position which the country faced and the generally egalitarian social policies which its governments enacted. Almost all groups were equally exposed to these two aspects of Israeli life; initial advantages which loomed relatively large upon immigration were gradually reduced over time. The educated eastern European immigrant and the less-educated North African immigrant were both absorbed by the defence establishment and introduced to Israeli usage and reality in the army. Differences between them remained, but they were less pronounced after the first period of adjustment, and were not given much consideration in computing salaries. The wage differential in Israel was one of the lowest in the world; the chances of serving actively in the armed forces one of the highest.

III

There is little doubt that the ideological basis and external threat presented in the model of consensus developed here existed in Israel during the 1960s. In addition to this, there seems to have developed within Israel, despite the high levels of heterogeneity, a homogeneous pattern of perceiving 'the aspirations, fears and preoccupations of individuals . . . which are related to the demands they make on the socio-economic and political systems under which they live'.[4] Conceived in this fashion, aspirations and fears become expressions of an individual's reality world. The subjective perceptions of people about themselves and their nation provide the foundation upon which they lead their everyday lives and relate to their government and their society.

In order to obtain a composite of the hopes and aspirations, the fears and anxieties of people, which, on the one hand, is mediated minimally by the investigator's structuring and, on the other hand, is capable of allowing quantitative comparisons, the following simple technique was used. The respondent was asked to talk freely about his wishes and hopes for the future, to describe his personal future in the 'best possible light' he could imagine.[5] The interviewer, avoiding any suggestive phrases, urged as full a response as possible, and recorded what was said verbatim. When the subject had been exhausted, the

respondent was asked about his fears and worries about the future, to describe his future in the 'worst possible light'. Subsequently, the respondent was again asked the same set of two questions but with reference to his hopes and fears for his country. After these data on the Israeli population had been gathered, and to allow quantitative comparisons, an extensive coding scheme for personal and national hopes and fears was developed. Coding was based on a binary system: for each code category, each respondent was coded either as having mentioned that item or not.

A capsule statement of the typical Israeli response would be as follows:

> First and foremost, that my children turn out happy and successful. If I know that their future is assured, I shall be happy. I should also like to have a decent standard of living, to know that my income is enough to provide for my family. What do I mean concretely? Well, for one thing, it would be nice not to have to live under such crowded conditions. Then, of course, there's the matter of health; if you and your family aren't healthy, you can't enjoy anything else.

If pushed further, he is likely to add:

> A happy family life, everybody in the family helping each other and happy with each other. It would also be nice to have the time and money and energy to go on trips, especially out into the countryside, or abroad, to take it easy and enjoy life.

And if he were asked 'What are your fears and worries about the future?' he would probably say:

> Above all, that I or my family get sick. And because I am sick, I won't be able to work, or that for some other reason we don't make a living, and we won't know where our next meal is coming from. It would also be terrible if war with the Arabs breaks out.

Asked to describe the reality world of the nation, we would expect the Israeli to respond along the following lines:

> Everything else except peace fades into the background for me. War is the nightmare, and peace the dream. And I don't particularly mean world war and world peace. Not that I don't think about these things, but they are far away. When I talk about peace, I mean peace with the Arabs. Of course, we have to go on living meanwhile. To do this, the country must develop whatever resources it has, raise its level of technological development, and above all, turn the wastes of the Negev into a productive area. If we can do this, we shall be a prosperous country, which is important to me.
>
> Anything else? Just really one more major hope: Jewish immigration. Only a small part of the Jewish people lives here as yet. We need them to come, and they need to come.

With all these data in hand, the patterns of response generated by key variables such as ethnicity, period of immigration, occupation, education, religiosity, and political trend were studied. That is, responses on personal and national hopes and fears were considered, for example, by education, and over and over the following question was asked: Can we make any systematic generalizations that take the form of 'The higher the educational level, the higher . . . ?' The most significant conclusion of this exhaustive (and exhausting) technique was that far fewer such statements were possible than the heterogeneous Israeli population or the folklore of Israel would lead one to expect. Put another way, the variables used were not nearly as successful in ordering the data as one might expect. Certain patterns were found and certain generalizations were possible, but they were fewer than might have been expected.

I must call attention to the special way in which consensus is conceptualized here. What we are discussing is consensus in perception, similarity in defining the important, critical areas of life—both for the individual and for the nation. This perceptual consensus—how one's reality world is structured—is found to exist across most groups in Israel in the 1960s. It should be clear that we are not referring to an ideological dimension, since antagonistic viewpoints about public issues certainly characterize the Israeli polity. My concern with consensus is on a level far more inclusive and encompassing than political ideology. We are concerned with the existence of a dominant pattern whereby citizens place themselves and their nation in the reality worlds which they perceive. In a sense, ours is an attempt to ascertain the existence of a single culture of perception within a national community. If, upon analysis, many cultures appear, consensus is shown to be lacking. This is not, as yet, sufficient evidence to claim a state of emergency, for the absence of consensus does not necessarily imply dissensus. Dissensus would be characterized by radically different response patterns for groups in the same nation. An example of this found in our data would be the difference between the kibbutz population and the rest of the Israeli population. Their patterns of response are extremely different; partly this is explained by the differing social and economic structures of the two communities. The effects of this dissensus are of course mitigated by the physical separation between the two communities and by the precept of the ideology which tends to glorify the kibbutz movement for its past contributions and communal service.

The absence of polarized differences among groups in the way in which they perceive the world about them is conducive to social and political stability. The absence of this extreme distribution, though, must not be confused with homogeneity. The way in which we use the term consensus refers to random unordered distribution over the

variables considered. In the transition of the concept of consensus to the empirical level in Israel, this usage seems reasonable, especially against the background of extreme demographic differences within the population. In the paragraphs which follow, I shall summarize the findings regarding consensus, presenting a number of variables in decreasing order of their ability to generate patterns within the data.

Ethnicity. The clearest patterns of response were provided by the ethnicity variable. On the basis of a five-fold classification scheme distinguishing between those born in Israel, eastern Europe, central Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, the following conclusions were reached.

1. Clearest differences were found between the Israeli-born, European-born, and Middle East–North African groups. In general, the eastern European–central European distinction adds little to the analysis. The Middle East–North African distinction is more useful, but their patterns are more similar to each other than they are to any other group.

2. The Israeli-born generate a pattern which is between the European and Middle East–North African groups.

3. Members of the Middle East–North African group tend to mention 'traditional' concerns (fears and hopes regarding health, family, children, etc.) more often than the European-born, whose rate is in turn higher than that of the Israeli-born.

4. The converse relationship holds only in part. Israeli-born manifest more concern on 'modern' issues (self-improvement, modern conveniences, etc.) than do other groups. Here too, as well as on the 'traditional' concerns, Afro-Asians—and, among them, North Africans to a somewhat greater degree—are more vocal about their concerns than are the Europeans.

5. On national issues, ethnicity is much less of a useful predictor than it is on personal issues. Where differences are found, Europeans are most removed from Afro-Asians. North Africans are the group furthest removed from all other groups, with Israelis tending to be quite close to the Europeans.

Social Class. Social class was tested in three ways: by occupation, education, and subjective social class. We reach similar results using each of the indicators.

1. The higher the class, the greater the number of concerns expressed; the higher the class, the greater the salience of national concerns.

2. The lower the class, the greater the concern with economic affairs which impinge on one's personal life (employment, standard of living, etc.); no pattern is present for non-economic concerns (children, family, health). For broad concerns (technological change, population expansion), the lower the class, the less concern is expressed.

Period of Immigration. Foreign-born respondents were broken down

into four groups: pre-Second World War, September 1939–May 1948, June 1948–1954, and 1955 and later.

1. The later the period of immigration, the more concern with personal economic matters; for non-economic personal concerns, this pattern holds, but less strongly.

2. On the whole, the two pre-State groups tend to be similar to each other; they are more similar to each other than they are to the patterns of the two post-State groups.

3. For national concerns, period of immigration does not serve as a very useful predictor.

Religiosity. From the answers to the question 'Do you observe the religious tradition?' four groups of respondents with varying degrees of religious behaviour were obtained.

1. Expression of concern about the nation decreases as religiosity increases.

2. The religiosity variable is more powerful in explaining private (health, family, etc.) than public-related patterns of response.

Political Involvement. Six groups were considered; the left, the centre, and Herut were the three major groups representing the left–right continuum. In addition, three groups emerged from the response: Mapai—a label which a small number of respondents insisted on using rather than identify themselves as leftists; those of the religious tendency; and those who said that they had no interest in politics.

1. The response patterns generated by the left and centre group are almost identical. Compared with the Herut group, the former two groups cluster together.

2. While the continuum is extremely ineffective in predicting response patterns for both national and personal concerns, it is a bit stronger when applied to national concerns, while the pattern of clustering is more evident for personal concerns. (For example, hopes for peace with the Arabs and expressions of concern about prosperity and education and adequate housing all increase along the range from left to right.)

3. Those respondents who identified their political tendency as Mapai tended to generate a pattern of response similar to that of members of the Herut group. (For example, on the issues which showed the most sensitivity to the left–right continuum, Mapai's position is adjacent to Herut's but with the centre group always intervening between Mapai and the left.)

4. Those who mention the religious affiliation and those who express no interest in politics generated a pattern of response which does not fit on the left–right continuum in any meaningful manner.

We have seen that the more powerful the variable, the more likely it is to distinguish between patterns of response on personal concerns, but not on national concerns. Put another way, we find that the

discriminatory power of these variables (when high) relates to bread-and-butter issues. And even then the saliency of the issues is determined by the place of the respondent in the hierarchy associated with the variable. For example, lower-class people are more likely to be concerned about economic matters of a very personal nature, as are those who came after the founding of the State. That these variables do not generate consistent patterns of response for national concerns indicates that the stimuli for these concerns are likely to be equally effective, regardless of such things as class, political tendency, or religiosity. In other words, a very high degree of consensus exists in the population on the priority and structuring of the fears and hopes of the nation.

The fact that some patterning is found in personal concerns supports the assumptions behind the decision to look at the data as distributed by the variables. The potent variables were especially effective regarding personal concerns; almost all the variables were equally weak regarding national concerns. Political tendency, especially in view of the heat generated by ideological debate in Israeli politics, was surprisingly ineffective. Space limitations do not allow exposition of the reasons for this poor showing by the variable, but it was especially noteworthy to find political tendency unable to discriminate between personal and national concerns. What we have found seems to lead to the conclusion that there is no widespread disagreement on issue-areas within the polity at the national level. The parameters of political controversy seem to be well set by the consensual reality world which exists.

IV

Our being concerned with the way people perceive their world naturally led to an attempt to assess the degree of frustration, on the one hand, and the sense of past and potential progress, on the other, *felt* by those interviewed. Such terms as 'frustration' or 'progress' only make sense in subjective terms. Individuals whose objective situations may be similar may have widely varying feelings of satisfaction, depending on, among other things, their aspirations and values. Similarly, people of very different objective worlds may assess their realities similarly. A Jew whose central desire in life was salvation through migration to the land of Israel may now be extremely happy and optimistic; his neighbour, whose life may appear similar to the outside observer, may be utterly unsatisfied because his greatest desire —social mobility—has not been achieved.

To test levels of aspiration, each respondent was shown a ten-rung ladder and was told that the top of it represented the best possible life as he had just described it, the bottom the worst life as he had described it. He was then asked where on the ladder he thought he stood today,

where he had stood five years before, and where he thought he could be five years from now. After he was asked about hopes and fears for himself, the ladder device was again used to determine the respondent's perception of his country's position, at the three points in time, with respect to the reality world he had defined.

In evaluating where he and his nation stand as measured against his reality world, the typical Israeli can be described as a guarded optimist. In both his personal life and in that of the nation, some progress is perceived from the past to the present (the time of the 1962 interview); the anticipated five-year period will, he expects, show even more rapid progress. If in the past, his personal situation was more satisfying than that of his nation, the two rank about the same in the present and, looking ahead, the national rating is higher than the personal.

TABLE : *Mean ladder ratings*

| | Personal | | | National | | |
	Past	Personal	Future	Past	Personal	Future
Israelis[a]	4·7	5·3	6·9	4·0	5·5	7·5
Kibbutznikim	6·3	7·0	7·9	4·5	5·3	6·5
Americans	5·9	6·6	7·8	6·5	6·7	7·4
Brazilians	4·1	4·6	7·3	4·9	5·1	7·6
Egyptians	4·6	5·5	8·0	3·5	5·9	7·5
Israelis, June 1967[b]				5·0	7·5	8·0
Israelis, spring 1968				3·8	6·5	7·5

[a] See note 5.
[b] See note 6.

The pattern of response for the Israeli sample is compared in the Table with the response patterns of other national groups and with a special kibbutz sample. In addition, an interesting insight into Israeli life is obtained from a modified use of the ladder device. In June 1967, immediately after the Six-Day War, the three ladder questions were put to a national urban sample of Israeli Jews. This was repeated in the spring and again in the early winter of 1968.[6] In these studies, the question about the past referred to Independence Day 1967, when the pre-war tension was beginning to build up, or before the war. In the 1967 survey, the question on the future referred to one month ahead; in 1968, to one year ahead. In both surveys the 'Egyptian' pattern is evident: the bulk of the expected improvement from past to future is seen as already having been achieved. In the June 1967 survey the euphoria of the tremendous victory is evident; even the picture of the tense Independence Day situation takes on a relatively rosy hue. In both 1968 surveys, the past again seems blue, the mean of 3·8 being just below the mean national rating for the past in the 1962 study. Similarly, the future rating is identical (in spring) or a bit lower (in winter). The difference between the 'normal' situation of 1968 and that

of 1962 lies in the mean present rating, Israelis recently being considerably more optimistic than they were in 1962, although the winter survey suggests that this may not be stable.

The ladder ratings add an interesting dimension to the earlier discussion regarding the discriminatory power of the various background variables. On the whole, as is seen in the Table, Israelis tend to rank their personal past higher than the national past, the national future higher than their personal future, while starting from a rather similar base. But this is only a general picture. A characteristic summary of the patterns found when one studies the ladder ratings by variable distribution follows:

1. the lower the class, the lower the sense of personal satisfaction;

2. the lower the class, the greater the optimism for one's personal progress in the future;

3. the lower the class, the higher the sense of satisfaction with the state of the nation;

4. the lower the class, the greater the optimism for national progress in the future.

Similar patterns are evident for other groups; for example, the same kind of finding holds for religiosity—substitute for 'the lower the class', 'the greater the religiosity', in the four statements above. The ethnicity variable generates a similar kind of finding with the statements listed above most relevant to the North African respondents.

In general, there appears to exist a compensation mechanism whereby groups which evaluate their personal positions relatively poorly tend to compensate for their anxieties by inflating the position of the nation in defining its position. All of the following 'marginal' groups demonstrate this pattern: lower social class, North African-born, the very religious, and even the older male kibbutz generation. In a sense, each of these groups is marginal in its sub-society. This pattern of inflating the relative importance of the nation appears to be associated with marginality. The suggestion that marginal social position leads to unusual investment in the national future is by no means novel. But if it holds for the Israeli case, an interesting measure of a group's perception of marginality has been uncovered.

V

A continuing process is in operation to form one Israeli nation out of many Jewish communities. Among the most significant components of this process is the external threat; this often becomes a contributory factor in such varied issues as foreign policy, university curriculum, fiscal and monetary policy, games children play, the continuing coalition with the National Religious Party, and the independence of the Press. The extent of the consensus on this issue has been demonstrated

in earlier portions of the paper. As a corollary to this, it must be remembered that the population has been exposed to twenty years of government by consensus, government by conciliatory coalition where the primary rule of partisan politics was not to be too partisan or too political in order to maintain the reality—and more important, the semblance—of consensus. Also, the country is small. Patterns, rumours, methods, products, innovations and life-styles quickly envelop most of the population and penetrate most groups. If the country is not socialistic, it is at least social; my impression is that privacy and anonymity are relative luxuries and that conformity (in a gentle sense) is widespread. The structuring of the activities of the country in such a way that its resources and manpower can be quickly mobilized has resulted in a close-knit 'family'-type society. It is not very surprising that members of this 'family'-type society—whether or not they speak to one another—display many characteristics of homogeneity and consensus.

Also at work is the mechanism of compensation referred to earlier. It affects groups which are behaviourally or perceptually farther from the Israeli mainstream than most. The general mood calls for consensus on national concerns; the compensation mechanism seems to pressure marginal groups into that same stream even when they are outside the reach of the popular mood.

On more personal and bread-and-butter issues, we find that the Israeli consensus is less developed. Lower income groups are naturally more concerned with day-to-day existence, and that is what they talk about. Concern for children is a function of age; in those age groups where children are young and developing, the concern is expressed often, and so on.

In general, I think it can be said that the community in Israel is established on a solid foundation of similarity in perception of the reality world. One dominant perceptual culture exists and provides the basis for consensus. Perhaps Jewish community identification and organization were prerequisites for the emergent Israeli consensus. It is hard to see, however, how the process can be reversed. Israeli nationhood does not appear to be analytically or empirically divisible into component parts. The super-patriotism now evident in Israel may have been nourished by cultural and religious sources originating in Jewish communal life. But now that it is under way, it is hard to imagine it taking any form familiar to students of the Diaspora. There are indeed Jewish aspects of Israeli life, but Israeli life is primarily concerned with living and livelihood, and only then with Jewish living.

NOTES

[1] Harold Isaacs, *American Jews in Israel*, New York, 1967.

[2] For example, see Georges Friedmann, *The End of the Jewish People?*, London, 1967, p. 215.

[3] The history of various war scares tends to bear out this contention. This consensus, however, does not preclude the possibility of the existence of cleavages in the society. In fact, Coser suggests that in some societies multiple conflicts between groups are important for promoting integration. Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Glencoe, Ill., 1956, pp. 79-80.

[4] Hadley Cantril and Lloyd Free, 'Hopes and Fears for Self and Country', *The American Behavioral Scientist*, October 1962, supplement.

[5] The empirical data reported in this paper are from a forthcoming book by Aaron Antonovsky and me on social consensus and dissensus in Israel. The data were collected by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Science for Hadley Cantril and his colleagues at the Institute for International Social Research. In the early 1960s Cantril conducted a study in which data were obtained from some 20,000 interviews conducted in 13 countries. These data are reported in Hadley Cantril, *The Patterns of Human Concerns*, New Brunswick, N.J., 1965. In Israel, the project was carried out in 1961-62 under the direction of Antonovsky. The sample consists of 1,170 Jewish adults forming a representative cross-section of the population; in addition, a special 300-person sample was taken of the kibbutz population.

My feeling is that the trends towards consensus in the Israeli population evident from the data collected in the early 1960s have, if anything, been strengthened during the decade. Except for continuing observation of the Israeli social and political scenes, however, no test of the state of Israeli consensus is available. It should be clear that Antonovsky and I have discussed the data and their meaning at length; however, the responsibility for the analysis in this paper is mine alone.

[6] Tsiyona Peled, *Changes in Public Concerns and Opinions* (mimeograph, Hebrew), Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem, 1968, p. 12.

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

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A NOTE ON YIDDISH AS THE LANGUAGE OF SOVIET JEWS IN THE CENSUS OF 1939

Harry Lipset

ALL those who have studied or written on the socio-economic or cultural status of Russian and Soviet Jewry are faced with a major gap in their sources of information: the population census of 1939. The three other censuses which were executed in the Russian Empire or Soviet Russia—1897,[1] 1926,[2] and 1959[3]—are our major (though, of course, not our exclusive) sources of information on the social, economic, cultural, and linguistic situation of the Jews within the borders of the state. The results of the 1939[4] census were published only in part. The information that made the other censuses so valuable was absent.

One of the most important missing links in our knowledge of Russian Jewry caused by the absence of the 1939 data is information on the language that the Jews spoke. In the census of 1897, 97·26 per cent of the Jews spoke Yiddish; in 1926, 72·6 per cent; and in 1959, 14·3 per cent.[5] However, in order to interpret the 1959 data adequately and, especially, to use them to study the situation of the Jewish population of the Soviet Union residing within the pre-1939 borders, it is necessary to have the 1939 data which were taken before the incorporation into the Soviet Union of the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, and Western Belorussia.

Although the data have not been directly published to this day, it is possible to arrive at them indirectly from another source. In a brochure on the results of the 1959 census published in 1964 a table was published giving the rates at which the various minority nationalities spoke Russian in the censuses of 1939 and 1959.[6] In 1939, 54·6 per cent of the Jews spoke Russian. If we add to this an estimated 4·4 per cent who spoke languages such as Georgian, Tadzhik, Tat, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and others[7] we get to 59 per cent, which would mean that 41 per cent of the Jewish population were Yiddish-speaking in 1939.

We see that there has been a rapid and precipitous drop in the rate of Yiddish-speaking since 1897. The Yiddish school system and the

other cultural institutions of Soviet Jewry were brutally suppressed in the late 1930s. The Yiddish theatre and the publication of Yiddish literature were allowed to continue until 1948. However, it is clear that the low rate of Yiddish-speaking in 1939 and the evident continuing rate of linguistic assimilation did not bode well for the future of those institutions even in the absence of persecution. The incorporation of the new territories did not basically change the picture, because most of the Jews there were killed by the Germans and the small number remaining was not such as to change the historical pattern of linguistic assimilation.

The drop in the rate of Yiddish-speaking from 72·6 per cent in 1926 to 41 per cent in 1939 is a very rapid one, for 13 years in the life of a

TABLE 1. *Rate of Yiddish-speaking among Jews within the territory covered by the Soviet state between 1923 and 1939*

1897	97·26%
1926	72·60%
1939	41·00%
1959	14·30%

TABLE. 2. *Rate of Yiddish-speaking among Jews within the borders of the Russian Empire and Soviet Russia.*

1897	96·90%
1926	72·60%
1939	41·00%
1959	17·90%

people is not a very long time. It is especially surprising that this decline occurred during the period of the peak of the Yiddish school system and the other Yiddish cultural institutions. In Belorussia the percentage of Jewish children studying in Yiddish reached 64 in 1932–33; in the Ukraine, close to 60; in the Russian Federation, about 12.[8] It seems, therefore, that the Yiddish school system had no influence whatsoever in preserving Yiddish as the spoken language of Soviet Jews. This astonishing conclusion is inescapable from the data.

An indication of the rapid linguistic assimilation and the failure of the Yiddish school system to produce people who would regard Yiddish as their language of daily use was the low rate of circulation of Yiddish newspapers. There were many Yiddish newspapers in the U.S.S.R. in the 1930s, but the number of copies sold was very small. For whatever reason (and many can be thought of) the Jewish population was not interested in them.

We must conclude that the future of Yiddish in the Soviet Union as a living spoken language is very bleak. It is true that the death sentence has been passed on Yiddish many times and, as the saying goes, the report of its demise has been found to be greatly exaggerated. This

time, however, the executioner's patient wait seems on the verge of being rewarded.

The recent upsurge in Jewish national feeling among Jewish youth in the U.S.S.R. has not been accompanied by any feeling of the need to reinvigorate Yiddish as a living force. The singing of Yiddish songs and a sentimental feeling for the language of one's grandfather is not a revival of Yiddish. The revival of Jewishness among Soviet Jews has been directed into a desire to emigrate to Israel or to learn Hebrew.

NOTES

[1] The results of the 1897 census were published in over 70 volumes. The information on the Jews has been summarized by Boris Brutskus in *Statistika Evreiskago Nasleniia*, St. Petersburg, 1909, and in *Professionalnii Sostav Evreiskago Nasleniia*, Moscow, 1908.

[2] The 1926 census information on the Jews can be found in L. Zinger, *Evreiskoe Naslenie v SSSR*, Moscow–Leningrad, 1932, and in the same author's *Dos Banayte Folk*, Moscow, 1941. The original volumes totalled 17.

[3] The information on the Jews from the 16 volumes of the 1959 census has been brought together in Mordchay Altschuler, *Hayehudim Bemifkad Haokhlusim Bevrit Hamoatzot, 1959*, Jerusalem, 1963. All tables and descriptions are given in English.

[4] For the sketchy results of the 1939 census see Zinger, *Dos Banayte Folk*.

[5] The percentage of Jews who gave Yiddish as their mother tongue in the census of 1897 for the entire Russian Empire was 96·9, and in 1959 for all the area of Soviet Russia was 17·9. The figures of 97·26 per cent and 14·3 per cent are for approximately the areas which composed the Soviet Union before 1939. For a discussion of 'mother tongue' in the Soviet context, see Mordchay Altschuler, 'Kavim Ledmuto Hademografit Shel Hakibutz Hayehudi Bevrit Hamoatzot', *Gesher* (47–48), September 1966, p. 22.

[6] A. A. Isupov, *Natsionalnii Sostav Nasleniia SSSR*, Moscow, 1964, p. 34.

[7] The figure was slightly higher in 1959, probably because the rate of natural increase of the Oriental Jews is higher and because fewer were killed in the catastrophe.

[8] For Belorussia see S. Dimanshtein, ed., *Yidn in FSSR: Zamelbukh*, Moscow, 1935, p. 262. The rates for the Ukraine and the R.S.F.S.R. are my estimates based on a slight rise from the 1927–28 figures of 53 per cent and 11·1 per cent respectively: *Natsionalnaia Politika VKP (B) v Tsifrakh*, Moscow, 1930, p. 278.

YIDDISH IN MELBOURNE

F. Klarberg

UNTIL recent times it was common for Jewish communities to develop their own dialect of the local language whether it was Persian, Arabic, Spanish, or German. There have even been suggestions of the development of a Jewish form of English among some groups in New York, though it awaits full documentation. In order to communicate ideas related to Jewish culture, words and phrases not readily available in the local language were often borrowed from Hebrew. The growth of distinct forms of speech also helped to distinguish the Jews from their neighbours. Thus, two major social functions of language—solidarity and separation—were present.[1]

Since the emancipation of the Jews of Europe in the last century a search developed for the major factor of Jewish identity. Religion, language, culture, and nationalism were all suggested in various forms, both singly and in combination. One approach postulated that Jews could become an integral part of the new secular society while still maintaining Jewish identity through the Yiddish language and its secular culture. While these assumptions were widely debated in eastern Europe, adherents of all views established themselves among the immigrant communities in Australia. Between totally secular Yiddishism and ultra-orthodox Judaism, which also shows a strong preference for Yiddish, the largest group of Australian Jews form an undemarcated middle sector who value Yiddish as part of the total cultural baggage which they brought with them from Europe.[2]

Since the Second World War, the Australian government policy of boosting immigration has led to considerable interest in the adjustment and integration of immigrant groups. An assessment of the level of language maintenance is of prime importance in an appreciation of the Jewish community, since half its members are post-war immigrants or their children. Both individual and group studies of the community have been made.[3] These show that over 80 per cent of Melbourne's Jews have some acquaintance with Yiddish. However, no study of Yiddish language maintenance within the Jewish community has yet been undertaken.

Scope of investigation

For a full survey of the level which Yiddish maintains in Melbourne today, one would have to investigate the whole of the Jewish community's language habits—in homes, businesses, social clubs, synagogues, and religious and secular day schools. In addition, one would wish to find the extent to which Yiddish is known by non-Jews, and its effect on English—whether by vocabulary or other linguistic influence. However, only the institutional environment is considered here, because it is the predominant setting of social activity.

Yiddish was the language of the Jewish masses of eastern Europe before 1939. A recent survey[4] disclosed that over 25 per cent of Melbourne Jews spoke Yiddish at home, about 55 per cent claimed various degrees of knowledge of Yiddish, while the remainder were children of non-Yiddish-speaking parents. The last group represents those who are not of immediate eastern European descent. The 1966 census showed 33,000 Jews to be living in Melbourne.

There are two groups in the community which maintain organizations in which Yiddish is used extensively: the ultra-orthodox and the secular.[5] Among the ultra-orthodox, the frequent personal contact resultant from daily synagogue attendance and other religious observances tends to strengthen language maintenance, thus creating factors not present in most immigrant groups.[6] On the other hand, the members of the secular sector identify themselves as belonging to a Jewish culture which expresses itself principally through the medium of the Yiddish language. There seems, therefore, to be more justification for comparing these last with other European immigrants who do not regard religion as being in any way associated with a national language or culture.[7] These secular Jewish groups maintain a number of distinctive Yiddish cultural institutions, which are also patronized in varying degrees by members of the middle sector. It is this patronage which makes the functioning of a regular Yiddish theatre possible.

In addition to the secular institutions, I considered it important to include the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies and Jewish Press. They serve all sections of the Jewish community and follow a policy of using both Yiddish and English. Through them, the Yiddishists maintain contact with Melbourne Jewry and try to influence its policy and development. As a result, the following were investigated:

1. the Yiddish schools
2. the Jewish Press and literature
3. the Jewish National Library 'Kadimah'[8]
4. the Yiddish theatre
5. Yiddish clubs
6. the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies.

Interviews conducted with the leading personalities in these in-stitutions yielded important information and insights into the types of people involved. Publications were also obtained; however, it became apparent that the importance of Yiddish lay more in its use as a spoken language than as a literary medium.[9]

The Yiddish schools

The oldest Yiddish school, Peretz School, was founded in 1935 in Carlton, an inner-industrial suburb, where most of the Jewish immi-grants concentrated between the wars. In 1938 the present headmaster[10] took over; the school then had 35 pupils. It expanded steadily, moved to its present spacious premises in 1956, and in 1961 reached its peak enrolment of 262 pupils.[11] This rise in enrolment is in inverse propor-tion to the trend of the Jewish population in the area during the period 1947–61. There was an overall growth in the Jewish population in Victoria (mainly in Melbourne) from almost 15,000 in 1947 to almost 30,000 in 1961. Nonetheless, the Jewish population of the inner, eastern, and northern suburbs from which the Peretz School drew its pupils, fell not only proportionally (from 31·7 per cent to 14·2 per cent), but even absolutely (from 4,650 to 4,200).[12]

Relationship to Jewish population

The growth of the Peretz School was, then, unrelated to overall population figures. It must be explained by the trend not uncommon in poor immigrant areas in all countries.[13] While the older and better integrated settlers who were not greatly interested in Yiddish moved elsewhere, they were replaced by newcomers who found that the area provided them with readily available Jewish communal facilities, cheap rent traditional in immigrant neighbourhoods, and proximity to the city centre which made it easy to travel to work. These people, mostly D.P.'s from eastern Europe, had spent the post-war years in the ghetto-like environment of the refugee camps. There they used Yiddish as the lingua franca, irrespectively of whether Yiddish or some local national tongue had been their first language at home. The Peretz School found more supporters among them than among the old-established Jewish inhabitants, so that despite the reduced Jewish population, school enrolment actually increased.[14] After its peak of 262 pupils in 1961, enrolment dropped to 110 in 1968. This is the result of the con-tinual exodus by immigrants as soon as they are financially able to move.

With the growth of the Jewish population south-of-the-Yarra,[15] a need was felt for the teaching of Yiddish. At first, it was expected that the Peretz School would establish a branch; when this proved admini-stratively inadvisable, a committee of interested parents in St. Kilda founded the Sholem Aleichem School in 1946. Teachers were drawn

from graduates of the Peretz School who had attended a teachers' seminar led by the headmaster of the Peretz School, and also from among Polish immigrants. A committee to coordinate instruction was established, so that children being transferred from one school to the other might be able to find an appropriate level. Both schools now teach a uniform syllabus, which is designed to provide supplementary Yiddish education at primary and secondary level for pupils receiving their general education elsewhere. By 1960 the Sholem Aleichem School had reached its optimum level of 200 pupils, allowing the full span of eleven classes to function. It has maintained that level since. The total number of children receiving instruction in the Yiddish language has dropped during the last eight years, from 450 to 300. This constitutes about 7 per cent of all Jewish children who attend Melbourne Jewish educational institutions either part-time or full-time,[16] as compared with 3 per cent in the United States.[17] This is not surprising, since the Melbourne Jewish community has a higher proportion of post-Second World War immigrants than American Jewry.[18]

Teaching of Yiddish

The children attend every Sunday morning from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m., with a twenty-minute break. The best proof of the appeal of the school is the fact that teenagers preparing for School Leaving and Matriculation examinations attend regularly, although they can obtain no formal credit for their work. Nevertheless, conversation between the youngsters during breaks is carried on exclusively in English. In the first four grades (6–10 years age-group), the children are taught Yiddish through conversation and by the use of a textbook and workbook imported from the United States. They are also told Bible stories in Yiddish, so that an introduction to Jewish culture is presented. In grades 5–7, textbook language-learning is continued, but extracts from Yiddish literature are also read and discussed. Some of the prophetic books of the Bible are read in Yiddish translation. Jewish history from Biblical times up to the present day is also taught in the upper grades.[19]

The standards of fluency and cultural awareness are well demonstrated in a wall-newspaper at each school, regular contributions by pupils to the Yiddish press, and occasional school publications. Thus, among twenty pages of essays and poems contributed by pupils of the Sholem Aleichem School to its twenty-year Jubilee celebration magazine published in 1967,[20] we find discussion on such subjects as prophecy, child labour, and the State of Israel, besides many essays based on Yiddish literature. Though these are show-pieces by the most outstanding pupils, they indicate the standard towards which the school is striving. In fact, the standard of written expression is high. An inspection of essays which had been corrected ready for return to the pupils at the Peretz School revealed very few spelling errors. This is so because

of the simplicity of the spelling system. The few errors were of two types: those due to lack of knowledge of Hebrew, and those due to dialectal deviation from the standard Lithuanian Yiddish. The errors due to dialect influence seem to indicate that these children, like those of the Sholem Aleichem School,[21] are largely from homes where Polish–Yiddish is a living language. Syntactical faults seemed more common, and appeared to be chiefly due to interference from English.

For special occasions such as Passover and end-of-year, the schools stage functions where recitations are made, songs sung, and playlets are performed by the pupils in Yiddish. The Jewish community as a whole also often requests their participation in public functions, as, for instance, at the annual Warsaw Ghetto Revolt commemoration held under the auspices of the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies. (The Commemoration is organized by members of the Kadimah and associated groups of Polish Jews.) Even more, the State Zionist Council of Victoria, although it regards the spreading of Hebrew in the community as one of its prime objectives, considers it appropriate to incorporate an item by the Yiddish schools in the annual Israel Independence Day celebration.

All this does not ensure that the next generation will speak Yiddish, but it does preserve some form of attachment. There is a parallel here with the situation in the United States.[22] It is interesting to note that the Peretz School, faced with a drop in enrolment which might close the school in the foreseeable future, has acquired a property in Balwyn— a north-eastern outer suburb—and is establishing a branch there. If the school manages to become established in Balwyn, its pupils will be drawn from English-speaking homes. This is bound to affect the teachers' approach, and to lower the standards of achievement, but it would ensure some continuity of Yiddish teaching and preserve the possibility of a stronger future interest.

Generational patterns among the pupils

A questionnaire[23] was administered to the 11 students in the highest class of the Sholem Aleichem School. Aged 14–17 years, five of them were born in Australia, four in Poland, and two in Israel. Their parents were all born in eastern Europe (19 in Poland, one each in Latvia, Russia, and Czechoslovakia). They arrived in Australia between 1948 and 1962. The responses indicate that the parents almost invariably speak to each other and to their children in Yiddish, and often the children also reply in Yiddish. However, 8 of them speak to their brothers and sisters in English—5 always did, and 3 mainly did. One claimed to speak Yiddish 'always', yet 'mostly' English; one speaks an 'other language', while one has no siblings. The replies seem to indicate that English will probably be the language they will use in their own homes, and that they will not pass Yiddish on as a living tongue to their

children. Since this group is what a member of the Zukunft Youth organization described as the 'hard core' of Yiddishists, the outlook for the future of the language is not very promising.

Jewish Press and literature

Press

Gilson and Zubrzycki[24] state that the only study of the Jewish press in Australia was published in 1913. Up to the year of that study,[25] all Jewish publications had been in English. *The Australian Jewish News* was founded as *Australier Leben* in 1931; it was a Yiddish publication, and became bilingual under its present name two years later. *The Australian Jewish Herald*, founded in 1870, first added a supplement in Yiddish in 1946. It was called *The Australian Jewish Post* and took some years to reach the scale of *The Australian Jewish News* Yiddish section. Thus during the war years and immediately thereafter, *The Australian Jewish News* monopolized the Yiddish market, and so gained an advantage over its rival, becoming the leading Australian Jewish newspaper: it reached practically every Jewish home. The goodwill of the immigrant readers had been established and was maintained when they started to read English. *The Australian Jewish Herald*, after changing hands a number of times, finally ceased publication in August 1968, amidst widespread political controversy.

Being weekly publications, the Yiddish and English sections of *The Australian Jewish News* supplement the daily press in their coverage of events of specifically Jewish interest overseas, and particularly of matters concerning Israel. Topical news is absent from both sections, indicating the fact that the editors expect their readers to keep themselves informed by way of the general daily press; the Yiddish reader, then, is assumed to be bilingual. The more interesting aspect of comparison between the Yiddish and the English sections lies in the difference that while the English section consists mainly of reports of communal happenings and the activities of the clubs, synagogues, and organizations, the Yiddish section may be compared with the weekend supplements published by the dailies. The English-speaking section of the community apparently gets its culture elsewhere, while the Yiddish speakers prefer to read political comment, ideological debate, and literary criticism in a weekly devoted to their own culture. Although ideological and cultural matter is part of Yiddish journalistic tradition, it would appear to me that consumer demand is the most important factor. While both the readers of the English and Yiddish sections can, and do, read the English dailies, those of them whose first language is English can also read the cultural section of the dailies, and require *The Australian Jewish News* purely as a social notice-board. The others, however, whose first language is Yiddish, find that they must make an effort to read the

news in the daily papers, and prefer to read cultural matters in their mother-tongue.

The Australian Jewish News, it should be noted, is not secular Yiddish-ist, but addresses itself to all sections of the Jewish community. There are Melbourne and Sydney editions of both the English and Yiddish sections. The Melbourne edition serves all states other than New South Wales. The following are the circulation figures supplied by the paper in June 1968:

	English	Yiddish
Melbourne edition	9,500	4,000
Sydney edition	6,100	1,000

As a result of the closing of *The Australian Jewish Herald* in August 1968, these figures are likely to rise.

In addition to the weekly *Australian Jewish News*, there are two quarterlies—*Der Landsman* which has been published by the Federation of Australian *landsmanshaften* since 1965, and a Bundist publication called *Unzer Gedank*. *Der Landsman* contains articles on Israel, the Holocaust in Europe, short stories, essays and reviews.

Literature

Many books have been published in Yiddish in Australia. Some of the authors, such as Herz Bergner, have been translated into English. An interesting piece of Australiana is a Yiddish translation of a Hebrew travelogue[26] which describes a visit to Australia and New Zealand in 1861–62 after the Gold Rush.

The first Australian Jewish Almanac appeared in 1937, and a second one in 1942. The *Third Australian–Jewish Almanac*[27] appeared in 1967. With the exception of one article in Hebrew, it is a compendium of Yiddish cultural-activities in Australia. The first of its five sections deals with Kadimah's activities. The second deals with Jewish life in Australia, and is written by Australian writers; this section includes a fifteen-page article covering the history of Yiddish literature since the first Yiddish writer arrived in 1928 up to the present time. Further sections include 'As others see us' (by overseas writers who have recently visited Australia) and 'Stories, Poems, and Drama'. One section consists of essays on contemporary life; these are mostly on topics involving Jewish life. However, as in the United States,[28] the local scene has had a strong influence on writers. There is even an essay in the Almanac which discusses the Aboriginal problem.

These books must find their market overseas, and even locally, by private sale: the three Jewish bookstores in Melbourne report selling only 'two or three' Yiddish books annually. Yiddish gramophone records, however, are extremely popular.

Spelling

Yiddish spelling was not standardized until 1936–37. Previously it had been the subject of heated controversy which had religious and political significance. The major question to be settled was the spelling of words of Hebrew (and Aramaic) origin. These traditionally retain their original spelling, which is at variance with the widespread, but unstandardized, Yiddish spelling based on a phonemic system. The retention of etymological spelling was felt to be a form of identification with Hebrew, reflecting a bond with Jewish religious literature whose authoritative texts are Hebrew or Aramaic, and with Nationalist (Zionist) aspirations. In 1936, YIVO (Yiddish Scientific Institute) in Vilna adopted a reformed spelling.[29] Silent graphemes were dropped, the spelling of all non-Hebrew words was rationalized, but the etymological spelling for morphemes of Hebrew origin was retained, even when incorporated in Yiddish words having affixes of Germanic origin. In Communist countries, phonemic spelling was adopted even for the words of Hebrew/Aramaic origin. The Australian publications follow YIVO spelling.

Kadimah

The Kadimah is the central organization for the furthering of Jewish culture. It was founded in 1911 to provide a forum for Jewish debates, cultural activities, and to set up a 'national' library. Its fifty-sixth annual report (in Yiddish and English) shows its important contribution to cultural life. Concerts and lecture evenings are arranged on numerous occasions; memorial evenings are held for important departed leaders of Yiddish cultural life. In 1967, the library added 98 books, reaching a total of 8,743—5,770 in Yiddish, 2,379 in English, and 594 in Hebrew. There are still over 100 active readers but the number of books read fell from 920 in 1966 to 767 in 1967. Not a single new member joined in 1967, and membership is falling owing to death, emigration, and other causes; there are 1,379 subscribing members listed. The library is open twice a week. It has bought a cinema close to the Sholem Aleichem School in Elsternwick—a southern suburb—and in October 1968 moved from its premises in Carlton. In the past, institutions have been established in new neighbourhoods where there was sufficient demand, but only two institutions had actually abandoned their earlier site. The Carlton Synagogue also closed down in 1968. If we assume that there is a parallel between the situation in the United States and in Australia, the Kadimah librarian's hope that the move to the south will revitalize his library might not be realized. Fishman, who deals mainly with a community of second-generation immigrants, hardly mentions Yiddish libraries.[30] A swing to Anglo–Jewish culture would appear to be the only prospect of Kadimah's continued activity. A change in this direction appears to be envisaged by some.

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Yiddish theatre

The Kadimah provides a major Yiddish cultural service to a wide-spread public through the David Herman Theatre Group, which it houses. There are usually two seasons annually, each of 10–12 performances. Plays performed include original Yiddish scripts, as well as translations from English and Hebrew dramatists. The group consists of local Yiddish actors and other theatre enthusiasts, who spend many evenings throughout the year preparing and rehearsing for their two seasons. They also stage occasional performances at the Jewish Home for the Aged, and for other charitable purposes. The needs of this group governed Kadimah's choice of a cinema for its new premises. The theatre is supported by over 3,000 regular patrons.

Yiddish clubs

The Bund, Zukunft, Skif

The Bund was founded in 1897 as one of the many socialist groups in Russia. It soon broke with the extreme left, and has since been the sworn enemy of the Communists. Its ideology consists of two basic doctrines. These are, first, that Jewish culture can be maintained, based on the belief that 'Yiddish can flower in any place where Jews live', and second, the political doctrine that 'socialism is the best form of government'. The Bund conducts various cultural evenings, talks, discussions, and readings, and encourages Zukunft—a group of university students and young adults—to do likewise. In addition to the normal range of cultural and political topics which are debated by intelligent young people, Zukunft meetings often discuss topics related to Jewish affairs. However, with the exception of discussions on Yiddish literature, all meetings are held in English. The reason, I was informed, is that 'it would take us twice as long to say what we think in Yiddish'.[31] This is an example of a sociolinguistic phenomenon of interest. When Yiddish came to Australia, it had not developed the style necessary to deal with the discussions of the milieu in which these young people gained their experience. As they are not sufficiently at home in the language to develop it, they feel the need to use English. On subjects of Yiddish literature, however, they feel Yiddish to be the better vehicle of expression.

The members of Zukunft lead a youth group called Skif, where Yiddish is officially encouraged (but, in fact, not used at their weekly meetings). I was told that at summer camps which the organization runs, the daily line-up and announcements are made in Yiddish. Internal publications are mostly in English, and the Yiddish programme for a cultural evening to be presented by the group for their elders was transliterated into roman type.[32]

Landsmanshaften

There are numerous associations known as *landsmanshaften*, which are joined by immigrants hailing from a common town in Poland.[33] These hold occasional cultural functions and fund-raising activities, and many of them conduct an annual memorial evening on the anniversary of the Nazi slaughter of their townsfolk and relatives. All their functions are conducted in Yiddish.

The Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies

The Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies is a 'roof organization' which attempts to represent the Jewish community. Though it has no official status, and there are a number of Jewish organizations not represented on it, it is joined by most bodies which qualify (minimum requirements being existence for two years and a membership of 250). In fact, the Bund is not officially represented, but the Yiddish schools and Kadimah are, and further, as a result of the election of direct representatives by members of the Jewish public who care to register as voters by paying a levy, a number of Bundists are on the Board. The 'Yiddishist' group form quite a strong vocal bloc. When, in 1948, the Board embarked on its greatest enterprise, the establishment of Mount Scopus College[34]— a day school which was intended to cater for the children of all sections of the community—this group was strong enough to enforce the provision of Yiddish as an elective subject. In fact, the school soon abandoned Yiddish classes because of insufficient demand.

At a meeting in March 1960 the Chairman ruled that in future 'no translation of Yiddish speakers will take place where the speaker in the opinion of the Chair, could express himself properly in English'. Debate ensued on a motion dissenting from this ruling. The members of the Yiddish bloc felt that they all had the right to address the Board in Yiddish, even those who had a fluent command of English. Their opponents (with the support of the Chair) felt that it was wasteful of the Board's time to have such speeches translated into English. Though the minutes are rather sketchy, the atmosphere of the meeting is indicated by the note following the defeat of the motion. We are informed that 'a number of Yiddish-speaking delegates then withdrew from the meeting'. This apparently was followed by lobbying, for the following minutes report the rescission of this ruling and the reversion to the practice of a member of the Board giving an English summary of Yiddish speeches.

A meeting at which I was an observer was attended by over 100 delegates. The reason for this unusually full attendance was the subject of the debate: the demise of *The Australian Jewish Herald*, in which some members of the Executive were involved. Seventeen speeches of varying length were made. Three members of the Yiddish bloc spoke, and the youngest of these, a gentleman of about forty years of age, spoke in

English. In contrast, an elderly Zionist delegate spoke in Yiddish. A number of other speakers used occasional Yiddish words or phrases. A university lecturer, who made a number of interjections, chose Yiddish and English, according to circumstance. At least at Board meetings, where Jews of many backgrounds come together, Yiddish seems to have a quite definite social function. While the older generation of immigrants may use Yiddish simply in order to express their thoughts and feelings with greater freedom, the young people, who express themselves more easily in English, deliberately throw in phrases of Yiddish in order to identify themselves with their parents of the eastern European tradition, which they regard somehow as superior to the Judaism of western European tradition. Even when they reject the ideology of the secular Yiddishists, they use Yiddish as a form of identification with the eastern European tradition.

Discussion

It is noteworthy that there is a considerable overlap among the Yiddish organizations. Most of the members of Zukunft are graduates of the Yiddish schools. The secretary of the theatre group is a sub-editor of the Yiddish section of *The Australian Jewish News*; the headmaster of the Peretz School is a member of Bund, while some of the contributors to *The Australian Jewish News*, and many of the above, will be found among the delegates to the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies. These people form the core of the Yiddishist groups.

This leads us to a hard-core-periphery analysis:

Yiddish weekly paper circulation	4,000
Yiddish theatre patrons	3,000
Yiddish library members	1,374
Yiddish school pupils	300
active Yiddish book borrowers	100

It is very difficult to determine to what extent the Yiddish section of *The Australian Jewish News* is read. In some families, it is likely that two or more of the older members will read it. In others, it may hardly be glanced at—one pays only two cents extra for it to be delivered with the English section. According to the 1967 survey,[35] 30 per cent claim to read it. The figures for theatre patrons, on the other hand, are more accurate, as the tickets sold represent actual visitors to the theatre. However, one requires much less linguistic ability to understand a Yiddish play than to read a Yiddish newspaper. Library membership entitles one to vote at annual meetings, so that it may indicate political affiliation rather than cultural activity. The active Yiddish book borrowers and the Yiddish school pupils, though two generations apart, clearly belong to what an informant described as the 'hard core'. These

same people arc to be found among the leaders of the Bund and its youth organizations.

It is interesting to note that in the United States Yiddish has fared worse than other comparable immigrant languages.[36] Perhaps the competition with Hebrew, as the language which Jewish schools have traditionally found necessary to teach, is a factor. A more basic factor is the 'low' status of Yiddish as a language. Rarely has a secular institution of higher learning used Yiddish as the language of instruction. A few secondary schools did, but this situation existed only for a short period in some countries by virtue of the provisions for ethnic minorities in the Treaty of Versailles, which were ignored more often than not. Furthermore, it is nowhere a language of government. A number of informants were apologetic about the use of Yiddish. One, a columnist on the defunct *Australian Jewish Herald*, pointed out without my prompting that 'after all, English is also a language which has developed from a number of languages'.

Finally, it seems that in Melbourne, Yiddish is, relative to the size of the Jewish community, better known and more widely used than is the case in the United States. This is because a greater 'proportion of the Jewish community consists of first generation Australians',[37] while the problem of adjustment is still with us. However, in view of its non-use by the younger generation, even of the hardcore, it could well be that it is losing ground faster than it did in the United States among all but the ultra-orthodox group.

In his introduction to the Yiddish translation of *Iben Safir*, H. Munz suggested that the closed doors of the Ballarat[38] Synagogue, and of other country-town synagogues of the last century, proved that those early Australian Jews, by approaching Judaism as a religion and ignoring Yiddish culture, had missed the essence of Judaism, thereby making their assimilation inevitable.[39] Less than twenty years later, every publication by Yiddishist organizations bears marks of the ideological dilemma in which they find themselves. They want their children to retain their Jewish identity, yet are painfully aware of the fact that their children prefer to speak English, even within their own closed circle. On the other hand, one can still meet many of the country-town Jews and their city-born descendants regularly attending synagogue—not in Broken Hill or Shepparton[40] of course, but in the Melbourne suburbs of Caulfield and St. Kilda. The drift to the city is a widespread phenomenon of the twentieth century. Remarkable evidence of this was offered at the centenary celebration of Ballarat's synagogue in 1961. It was preceded by articles on the history of the community in both the Yiddish and English sections of the Jewish press. The Yiddish article in *The Australian Jewish News* dwells purely on the nineteenth-century history. However, the English article by N. Rosenthal, a Melbourne University lecturer who himself grew up in the Ballarat Jewish com-

munity, brings the story up to date and points out that 'many of the families who became associated with it in one way or another are names well known in the Melbourne Jewish Community'. He concludes with a list of family names.[41] The following week the paper reported the function as being attended by members and ex-members of the Ballarat congregation. 'The old synagogue was thronged to capacity with many people having to stand . . .',[42] despite the 60-mile distance from Melbourne. *The Jewish Post*[43] estimated attendance at 230, though only 12 Jewish families resided in Ballarat. Urbanization then, not lack of Yiddish, closed the doors of the country synagogues.

No doubt, many Jews did abandon their faith in the small country towns, but this did not destroy the community, nor does it establish the case for Yiddish. On the contrary, only when a distinct way of life exists is there need for a language which can give expression to the unique experiences of the group. Ethnic group survival depends on the presence of a multitude of factors. A minority whose other behaviour patterns conform with the majority will soon abandon its linguistic distinctiveness. Among the ultra-orthodox, then, investigation is likely to show greater fluency in Yiddish, and a more active use of the language among members of the younger generation.

NOTES

[1] Cf. G. Hammarström, 'Zur sozialektalen und dialektalen Funktion der Sprache', *Zeitschrift für Mundartforschung*, vol. 24, nos. 3/4, 1967, p. 205.

[2] I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Mr. B. Jernudd, who supervised my research at Monash University. I have also to thank Professor J. A. Fishman who read this paper in manuscript and made valuable suggestions.

[3] C. A. Price, *Jewish Settlers in Australia*, Canberra, 1964; P. Y. Medding, *From Assimilation to Group Survival*, Melbourne, 1968; and 1967 Melbourne Jewish Community Survey, conducted by the Jewish Social Service Council of Victoria—work for publication in progress under the chairmanship of Mr. W. Lippmann.

[4] 1967 Melbourne Jewish Community Survey, op. cit.

[5] 'Ultra-orthodox' is used for those Jews who take their orthodoxy seriously, as described by J. A. Fishman, *Yiddish in America*, The Hague, 1965, pp. 57–63.

[6] On this point, Medding suggests that the ethnic church most like Jewry is the Greek Orthodox Church. Medding, op. cit., p. 15n.

[7] Moreover, I felt I could be more objective in such a study. I am a teacher in an orthodox school and closely involved in the religious sector. Admittedly this fact could also prejudice my examination of the secular group—but at least I am less involved emotionally in its study.

[8] 'Kadimah' means 'forward' in Hebrew.

[9] I met the principals of both Yiddish schools and some of the teachers, the proprietor of *The Australian Jewish News*, the editor of the Yiddish section, a sub-editor who is also an actor and secretary of the Yiddish theatre, a business man who was writing a column for *The Jewish Herald*, and the secretary of the Kadimah. I had a most stimulating two-hour informal discussion with a group of university students, members of 'Zukunft' (Yiddish for 'future'), who all agreed that, as they do not actively use Yiddish among themselves, their ideology needs rethinking. An evening at a meeting of the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies provided good entertainment, but was also enlightening on the structure of the elite of Melbourne Jewry. The individuals

mentioned were all generous with their time—some preferring to conduct the conversation in English, others in Yiddish. Many of the publications came to my notice in the course of these interviews. I also attended a lunch-time lecture on the Jewish Press by Monash University's Publications Officer, who was the proprietor and editor of *The Jewish Herald* from 1940 to 1960.

[10] At one time Director of the Jewish section of the Latvian Government Education Department.

[11] Despite the foundation of Mount Scopus College which taught Yiddish for some years after its inception in 1948.

[12] Medding, op. cit., pp. 18, 20, Tables 1.1 and 1.2. See Appendix 1.

[13] Cf. Price, op. cit., p. 25.

[14] Mr. Medding has suggested to me in a private communication that this increase may be partly explained by the post-war 'baby boom'.

[15] Medding, op. cit., p. 18, Table 1.1.

[16] Figure derived from statistical information submitted to delegates at the Federal Conference on Jewish Education called by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, 24–26 August, 1968.

[17] Fishman, op. cit., p. 25.

[18] Medding, op. cit., Sklare's Introduction p. xxi. However, pupils at the Yiddish schools in Australia are today drawn almost exclusively from post-war immigrant families. If this is also true of the American scene, it could well be that a higher percentage of post-war immigrants in the United States are sending their children to Yiddish schools than is the case in Australia.

[19] See Appendix 2 for text-books.

[20] There was a delay in publishing.

[21] See Appendix 3.

[22] Fishman, op. cit., p. 25.

[23] See Appendix 3.

[24] M. Gilson and J. Zubrzycki, *Foreign Language Press in Australia*, Canberra, 1967, p. vii.

[25] P. J. Mark, *Jewish Press in Australia, Past and Present*, Sydney, 1913.

[26] Safir, Jacob, *Iben Safir* (Yiddish edition), Melbourne, 1950.

[27] *Third Australian–Jewish Almanac*, Kadimah, Melbourne, 1967.

[28] Fishman, op. cit., p. 35.

[29] Weinreich, Uriel, *Modern English Yiddish Dictionary*, New York, 1968, p. xx.

[30] Fishman, op. cit. There is no section devoted to libraries. The YIVO library is mentioned in passing on p. 44, and the Los Angeles Yiddish Culture Club library on p. 47.

[31] Professor J. V. Neustupny drew my attention to the importance of this statement: the subjective assessment of one's command of a language is an important factor governing usage.

[32] Interestingly, 'helfer'—youth leader —was transliterated as 'helper'. On being questioned, the students laughed with embarrassment, not being certain whether this was a slip or not.

[33] The only non-Polish group known as a *landsmanshaft* is one combining all Latvian and Lithuanian Jews. There is also an 'Association of British Jews' and one of Sephardim.

[34] By 1968, this college consisted of a central primary and secondary school and three branch primary schools. Total enrolment was approaching 2,000.

[35] Melbourne Jewish Community Survey, op. cit.

[36] Fishman, op. cit., p. 69, and p. 72n.

[37] Medding, op. cit., Sklare's Introduction, p. xxi.

[38] Ballarat, established as a result of the Gold Rush in 1850, had a Jewish population of 700 in 1890.

[39] *Iben Safir*, op. cit., p. 6.

[40] Once flourishing rural Jewish communities.

[41] *The Australian Jewish News*, 24 March 1961, p. 11.

[42] *The Australian Jewish News*, 30 March 1961, p. 3.

[43] *The Jewish Post*, 30 March 1961, p. 10.

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APPENDIX 1*

Jewish population of Melbourne 1901–1961

	1901 %	1921 %	1933 %	1947 %	1954 %	1961 %
City of Melbourne	44·4	28·2	31·4	21·1	11·2	5·7
Inner East	19·3	12·5	6·4	2·6	2·4	1·1
Northern	1·7	7·3	8·6	8·0	11·0	7·4
Western	1·9	2·0	1·5	1·4	1·1	0·9
Southern	6·8	5·5	2·8	1·9	1·3	0·9
South-Eastern	23·2	40·7	44·8	57·2	55·6	60·6
Outer South-Eastern	0·1	0·6	0·9	1·3	5·9	8·7
Eastern	2·5	3·0	3·5	6·1	10·5	12·6
Outer-Eastern	0·1	0·2	0·1	0·4	1·0	2·1

Growth of Australian and Victorian Jewry 1901–1961

	Total Australian Jewry	Proportion of Australian Population %	Total Victorian Jewry
1901	15,239	0·40	5,907
1911	17,287	0·38	6,270
1921	21,615	0·40	7,677
1933	23,553	0·36	9,500
1947	32,019	0·42	14,910
1954	48,436	0·56	24,016
1961	59,343	0·57	29,932

* Medding, op. cit., Table 1.1, p. 18 and Table 1.2, p. 20.

APPENDIX 2

Textbooks—I.L. Peretz Yiddish School

Yiddish and Yiddish Literature

Yiddish Children 'A', Melotek, and its Workbook by J. Mark.
Yiddish Children 'B' & 'C', Jefroikin and Mark.
The Yiddish Word, Jefroikin and Bes.
The New Word, Shapiro and Gubkin.
Motl Peisi [sic], *the Cantor's Son*, Sholem Aleichem.
Peretz's Treasure Book.
Kiddish [sic] *Hashem*, Sholem Ash [sic].
Tevia the Dairyman, Sholem Aleichem.
Zelmenianer, M. Kulbak.
Chassidre [sic] *Stories*, I. L. Peretz.
The Golden [sic] *Keit*, Peretz.
The Family Karnowsky, Singer.

Jewish History

My Folk, parts 1 and 2, Naskowitz.
Jewish History Pamphlets, Gudlman.
Jewish History for Home and School, Dubnov.
Torah.
Prophets.
Ethics of the Fathers.

APPENDIX 3

| Linguistics Section | Questionnaire | L III |

(Administered to the 11 students of the senior class of the Sholem Aleichem
School.)

STUDENTS

1. How old are you?   14–17 years

2. Where were you born?   Australia 5, Poland 4, Israel 2

3. a. If you weren't born in Australia, how old were you when you came
   out here?

   OR
   b. If you were born in Australia,
      when did your: FATHER arrive in Australia? 1948–1962

                     MOTHER arrive in Australia? ,,   ,,

4. Where was your FATHER born?   Poland 11

   Where was your MOTHER born?   Poland 8, Latvia 1, Czechoslovakia 1,
   Russia 1

5. When your family has a meal together at home, what language
   a. Do your parents speak to each other?

	YIDDISH	ENGLISH	OTHER LANGUAGE
ALWAYS	5		
MOSTLY	4	1	1
OCCASIONALLY		4	1
RARELY		1	

   b. Do your parents speak to you?

	YIDDISH	ENGLISH	OTHER LANGUAGE
ALWAYS	4		
MOSTLY	6	1	1
OCCASIONALLY		5	2
RARELY		2	

c. Do you speak to your parents?

	YIDDISH	ENGLISH	OTHER LANGUAGE
ALWAYS	2	1	
MOSTLY	4	3	
OCCASIONALLY	4	2	2
RARELY		2	

d. Do you speak to your brothers and sisters (if any)?
(There were only 10 responses to this question—one pupil had no siblings.)

	YIDDISH	ENGLISH	OTHER LANGUAGE
ALWAYS	1	6	1
MOSTLY		3	
OCCASIONALLY	1		
RARELY	2		

6. Write down the name of any clubs you belong to:
(There were 9 responses)
Habonim (Zionist) 3
Skif (Yiddishist) 4
AZA (Zionist) 1
Young Socialist League (non-Jewish) 1
Hashomer Hatzair (Left-wing Zionist) 1
Drama Club 1

FACTORS IN THE ADJUSTMENT TO ISRAELI LIFE OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS

Aaron Antonovsky and David Katz

The concept of adjustment

ENTRY into a new social situation poses the problem of re-adjustment for the individual.[1] The greater the change in the role set (the totality of roles occupied), the more complex is the problem of adjustment. Changes can occur both on the level of occupancy of new roles, as when one changes one's occupation, or in terms of differences in role norms. The situation of the immigrant is perhaps the most radical case in which the problem of adjustment can be studied. Two complementary approaches can be taken in dealing with this concept, which we shall call objective and subjective.

Objective adjustment refers to the degree to which the individual conforms to the norms of the new role or new social system into which he has entered. The focus is on the overt behaviour of the individual in response to the sociocultural requirements of the new situation. Eaton[2] refers to this approach as 'The functional definition . . . [which] asserts that adjustment is best when the individual's behavior, apart from his attitudes toward it, most nearly conforms to the norms and expectations of the society to which he belongs'. Eisenstadt,[3] in discussing the various theoretical approaches which have been taken in the study of immigrant adjustment, refers to one which he calls 'acculturation', which 'is concerned principally with the extent to which the immigrant learns the various roles, norms and customs of the absorbing society . . . the "quantity" of roles and habits learned . . . [and] the success and stability of the lessons learned . . .' Instances of indices relating to objective adjustment that have been used in research on the adjustment of immigrants are: successful entry of the major bread-winner into the occupational system of the host country, social relations with and membership in host groups, and knowledge of the country's language and culture.[4] Among immigrants to Israel, indices such as acceptance of the social functions required by the social

structure and the interaction of immigrants with old settlers have been used.[5]

Subjective adjustment refers to the individual's attitudes and feelings towards his new social situation. Eaton[6] calls this 'attitudinal' adjustment—'. . . the extent to which he expresses himself as satisfied or dissatisfied with the manner of life he has adopted'. Ben David,[7] in his discussion of the adjustment of immigrant ethnic groups in Israel, also stresses 'the degree of satisfaction the individual derives from his social role' as 'the decisive factor'. We deem it advisable to see subjective adjustment in somewhat sharper terms than that of the loose word 'satisfaction', and focus on such issues as a sense of regret at entry into the new situation, a sense of comfort in the situation and in interaction with others, and a modified self-image, incorporating the new identification. Various studies[8] have measured the subjective adjustment of refugees and immigrants using such indices as: satisfaction with life in the host country, acceptance of the host country as one's home, emotional and conscious identification with the veteran population and with the institutions and values of the new country.

It seems to us that, while there will doubtless be found a high correlation between the two types of adjustment empirically,[9] it is important to make the conceptual distinction. It is, further, inadvisable in our view to combine data on objective and subjective adjustment to form one single index, as Weinberg[10] did in his study of new immigrants to Israel. It is, rather, an empirical problem to study their interrelationships. Moreover, it seems to us mistaken to make the *a priori* assumption that one or the other is 'decisive', as some authors seem to do. It is, rather, most appropriate to expect an interactive effect between the two. At any given point in time, we would expect, one's subjective adjustment will have been influenced by one's objective adjustment; the former will, in turn, exert influence on the subsequent objective adjustment.

In any given study, therefore, either of the approaches can be taken legitimately, depending on the purpose of the study. In the present study, which deals with a population of voluntary immigrants, many of whom migrated on a trial basis, and for most of whom the alternative of return to the country of origin was and remains quite feasible, it seems more appropriate to focus on subjective adjustment. It is this, rather than overt success in role performance, which will be decisive in determining the continuation of the individual in the new social system.

Factors associated with subjective adjustment[11]

The adjustment of an individual in a new social situation at any given point in time will, we hypothesize, be determined by the 'baggage', as it were, carried on entry into the situation, as well as by post-entry experiences.

Pre-migration orientations.[12] Merton,[13] who has developed the concept of anticipatory socialization, has shown its relevance to vertical mobility. By familiarizing himself with and adopting the attitudes and values of the social class to which he aspires, the mobile-oriented individual acquires tools which subsequently facilitate his successful coping with the barriers confronting him in the new social stratum. This should also apply to horizontal mobility into a new society.

The umbrella concept 'anticipatory socialization' can be viewed as having three components: overt, *organizational behaviour*; *cognitive orientation*; and *cathectic concern*. With respect to organizational behaviour, an extremely valuable element of anticipatory socialization can be gained through the individual's playing, as it were, a simulated role, participating in a simulated social situation which represents the roles and situations into which he will subsequently enter. By doing so, he gains experience in dealing with the problems he will subsequently encounter. Moreover, these 'real' problems will then no longer be as difficult to handle, since they are not fully new to him. Further, the individual having participated in a simulated social structure, participation in the real structure will be facilitated by his need to reduce cognitive dissonance. He will tend to brush aside aspects of the new situation which do not conform to his 'experience'.

We have called the second aspect of anticipatory socialization 'cognitive orientation'. The more one knows in advance, we hypothesize, about the new social situation one will enter, the better equipped will one be to cope with the obstacles that face one; the more one is likely to see these obstacles in a broader perspective; and the more one is likely to know one's way around, capable of utilizing the resources potentially available to deal with problems.

Third, we hypothesize that the more one has a cathectically positive orientation towards the new social situation, the more successfully will one adjust to it. One will seek out the 'good' things, tend to take the optimistic view of every situation. One will mind roughing it less, because the situation is perceived as inherently positive.[14]

Post-migration experiences. Discussing pre-migration orientations, we have touched on post-migration experiences in referring to problems and obstacles. Whatever the influence of the baggage one brings with one into the new situation in modifying the perceptions of and capacities to handle obstacles, problems will be encountered. In general, we hypothesize, adjustment at any given point in time will be influenced by the extent to which one has encountered difficulties before that time. The more troublesome a time one has had, the less is one likely to be adjusted.

Methods

We have intentionally couched our discussion up to this point in general terms, applicable to the study of movement into any new role,

social situation, or culture, since we consider it useful to study immigrant adjustment within a broader framework. We turn now to the specific details of our study.

The study population. The eligibility list was made up of Israelis invited for medical examination in a study of risk factors in heart disease.[15] This list was compiled after an extensive search had been made to obtain all 'Americans and Canadians' living in Israel at the time of the study, and hence represents what is considered to be a near-total population. Eligibility criteria for the adjustment study were as follows: Jews who had spent at least half their lives, before migration to Israel, in the United States or Canada, who arrived in Israel at least one year before interview, who were over age 18 on arrival, and who were between ages 22 and 65 at interview (March–December 1967). Of all persons meeting these criteria who had been examined, 1,649 (82 per cent) were successfully interviewed. Personal interviews were conducted in the houses of respondents.

Definition of variables. As indicated above, that part of the study reported here involves five major variables:

(1) subjective adjustment (the dependent variable)
(2) organizational behaviour (membership)
(3) cognitive orientation (knowledge)
(4) cathectic concern (interest)
(5) post-migration problems

These were operationally defined as follows:

(1) Three facets of *subjective adjustment* were identified: orientations to the social system *per se*, to other persons in the system, and to one's own role. These were represented by six questions:

> To what extent are you certain about staying in Israel?
> If you were back to the time you came here, but knew then what you now know about Israel, what are the chances you would have come?
> How much would you say you feel at home in Israel?
> How much would you say you feel close to people who grew up in Israel who are about your age and had about the same education?
> How much of a sense of kinship, if at all, would you say you feel with most people in Israel?
> How completely, if at all, do you identify yourself as an Israeli?

Five alternatives were offered to the first of these questions and four to each of the others. A Guttman scale, consisting of seven scale types, was formed after the replies to each item had been dichotomized (C.O.R. = 0·90).

(2) *Pre-migration organizational behaviour* was measured on the basis of two questions, which asked about membership and level of activity in a Zionist organization in the year before immigration. The replies were

combined to form three groups: very active Zionists; Zionists, but not very active; non-Zionists.

(3) *Pre-migration cognitive orientation* was defined in terms of the respondent's knowledge about Israeli life in the year before migration. Three questions were asked:

> How much or how little did you know about the things that make up everyday life in Israel?
>
> How much or how little did you know about Israel in a broader sense—things like political issues, organizational life, the different people that made up the society, and so on?
>
> How much or how little did you really know about what working conditions (including housekeeping) would be like for someone like you on coming to Israel?

The replies formed a scale that was deemed acceptable (C.O.R. $= 0.85$).

(4) *Cathectic concern* was measured by three questions, the replies to which were combined to form a scale (C.O.R. $= 0.85$). The first two items were similar to the first two cognitive items, but instead of being asked how much he knew, the respondent was asked 'How much or how little were you interested in knowing about . . .?' In addition, the following question was asked: 'How closely, if at all, did you during that year [before migration] follow what was going on in Israel?'

(5) A *post-migration problems* score was derived on the basis of replies to up to 85 individual items. Six major problem areas were considered: work, housework, family, relations to the broader community, Hebrew, and social life. Within each area, specific items were formulated, each of which was potentially problematic. Whenever a given area was relevant to the respondent (e.g., housework items were not used for men, single women, or women who had only lived in a kibbutz), he was asked, with respect to each item in the series, whether his experience at any time since his migration up to the present had been 'extremely problematic or disturbing; quite problematic or disturbing; satisfactory or not very problematic; or very satisfactory or not problematic at all'.

Equal weight being given to each item, from one to four, the overall problem score was derived by adding up the item scores and dividing by the number of relevant items. Each individual also received up to six problem area scores, by our adding up his responses to the items in a given area. These subtotals were transformed into octiles of approximately equal frequency.

Hypotheses

In our theoretical discussion above, we have indicated the general reasoning behind the selection of factors presumed to be associated with adjustment. In this section, the specific hypotheses to be tested will be presented and additional comments made.

Hypothesis 1. Very active membership in a Zionist organization before migration, more than not very active membership, more than non-membership, will be positively associated with adjustment.

Shuval,[16] in a study carried out in 1949–50, found that among European immigrants to Israel, active Zionists were less disappointed with Israel than inactive Zionists, who were less disappointed than non-Zionists. The author explains her finding by arguing that internalization of the Zionist ideology gives the respondent a broader perspective, which enables him to view momentary difficulties in a larger context, and he is consequently less disappointed because of these difficulties.

Weinberg[17] also found that among immigrant students in a Hebrew training school in 1954 those with Zionist convictions tended to adjust better to life in Israel. He agrees with Shuval's explanation for this relationship. He adds another possible explanation which implies that a Zionist on arrival may be better informed about the sociocultural, economic, and political conditions of Israel, and 'sees an idealistic goal in working for the development of Israel'.

The active Zionist, then, will be one who has greater knowledge of Israel and can hence cope with the problems encountered more adequately; he feels more warmly about Israel, and is therefore more prone to 'excuse' negative aspects of Israeli life. The pressures of cognitive dissonance lead him to place his problems in their 'proper context'. The predicted association can be explained, however, not only as working through the other variables of this study, but more directly: the active Zionist has played the role of Israeli, in many ways, even before arrival.

Hypothesis 2. The higher the pre-migration cognitive orientation score, the higher the score on subjective adjustment.

The more adequate the knowledge of the new immigrant to Israel, the better equipped will he be to overcome the obstacles that face him. To take a mundane example: the American immigrant who has invested a substantial amount in stereophonic gramophone equipment without knowing that in Israel voltage and cycles are different, will confront some difficulty when he wishes to listen to music. Further, knowledge also facilitates placing difficulties in a broader context, e.g., understanding the great differential between gross and net incomes in Israel is contingent upon familiarity with the security situation. But again, knowledge works more directly: knowing what the norms are allows one to minimize the strangeness of the new society, more easily to feel at home in it.

Hypothesis 3. The greater the interest taken in Israel before migration, the higher the score on adjustment.

On the assumption that interest represents concern, warmth, and identification, the keenly interested immigrant tends to define new

situations as non-problematic. Whatever he encounters becomes acceptable. His anticipatory identification with the country and its people becomes translated into an actual identification once he arrives, because he is emotionally eager for this translation to take place.

Hypothesis 4. The higher the post-migration problem score, the lower the score on adjustment.

The American immigrant to Israel, as any immigrant anywhere, no matter how great the push, has paid a price for immigration in leaving familiar people and surroundings and coming into a world which he has never made and about which he knows little, no matter how well prepared. Over and above this, he will often have made sacrifices, material and social, in making a choice which is rarely dictated by negative pressures. No such choice can be made without an element of ambivalence. For such circumstances, it seems obvious that the more problems and frustrations one encounters—or, rather, perceives that one encounters—the less satisfied will one be, the less will one feel at home, the more will one feel that one has made a mistake.

It should be noted that we do not distinguish in this paper between problems that were being experienced at the time of the interview and those that had already terminated. It seems reasonable to assume that if we find a relationship between problems and adjustment in our study, the relationship would be even stronger in studies where only unresolved problems are considered.

Finally, we propose to consider the associations between the six individual problem area scores and adjustment. We did not, however, see any grounds for expecting that one or another of the areas would be particularly decisive in predicting to adjustment. In this sense, our final hypothesis is a null hypothesis. Our approach suggests that it is the problem level *per se*, rather than one or another specific type of problem, which is important for subjective adjustment.

Findings and discussion

Having elaborated the discussion of the expected results, we may present the findings with relative brevity. Correlation coefficients were computed between each of the four independent variables and the dependent variable, subjective adjustment, with the following results:

Independent variables	Correlation coefficient
Zionist membership	+0·233
Knowledge	+0·186
Interest	+0·246
Post-migration problems	−0·276

Each of these coefficients is statistically significant at well beyond the 0·01 level. These data, then, provide confirmation of our first four hypotheses. Caution, however, should be exercised in inferring that

these data go very far in necessarily showing *causal* relationships. It may well be that the person who, for various other reasons, has adjusted successfully, will in retrospect report that his life in Israel has been relatively unproblematic. He may even exaggerate the extent of knowledge about and interest in Israel which characterized him before migration. On the other hand, one who has adjusted poorly may tend to distort in the other direction.

It is, however, a bit far-reaching to suggest that, having adjusted well, one will report having been a member of a Zionist organization when this was not the case, or that the poorly adjusted will deny Zionist membership. Retrospective judgment of the level of Zionist activity can, of course, more easily be distorted. In this regard it is of interest to note that the difference on adjustment between very active and not very active Zionists is smaller than between the latter and non-Zionists. Thus 43 per cent of the first group, 37 per cent of the second, and 29 per cent of the non-Zionists scored high on adjustment.

There is some indication that the association is strongest between the problem score and adjustment, and least powerful, though still significant, between knowledge and adjustment. This would suggest that the cognitive component of one's pre-migration orientation is less important in subsequent adjustment than is overt behaviour, involving some sort of commitment, or than cathectic orientation. Knowledge can more easily, perhaps, be picked up than experiences and feelings.

Since the pre-migration orientation variables presumably interact with the problem score, we examined (1) the relationship between the problem and adjustment scores when each of the three orientation variables was, in turn, held constant; and (2) the relationship between each of these three variables and adjustment when the problem score was held constant. Partial correlations were used to make these tests. Moreover, the year of migration of the respondent was, in each case, controlled, since this variable shows a very strong association both with adjustment and with each of the other variables.[18]

The results of these computations were as follows:

Variables controlled	*Correlation coefficient between problem and adjustment scores*
Year of migration, Zionist membership	−0·253
Year of migration, knowledge	−0·239
Year of migration, interest	−0·255

It is evident that there is almost no reduction whatsoever in the strength of the correlation between the overall problem score and adjustment score when pre-migration orientation scores and year of migration are controlled.

On the other hand, controlling for year of migration and problem score considerably weakens the correlations between pre-migration

orientations and adjustment, though they all remain statistically significant. These correlations are reduced to $+0 \cdot 139$ (Zionist membership), $+0 \cdot 158$ (knowledge), and $+0 \cdot 194$ (interest).

What these two sets of calculations would seem to mean, then, is that whereas each of the three pre-migration variables indeed bears a significantly direct relationship to adjustment, part of the association is explicable in terms of the relation of membership, knowledge, and interest to post-migration problems. On the other hand, problem score seems to be a variable whose association with adjustment is not affected at all by the pre-migration variables.

Finally, we turn to the question of whether problems in particular areas of life seem to be of greater significance in relation to adjustment than do problems in other areas. As a brief way of considering this question, we compared the percentages of people who were in the highest adjustment group among the high quartile and low quartile problem scorers in each of the six areas, with the following results:

Problem area	Per cent of high-adjusters in			
	High problem quartile		Low problem quartile	
Work	28%	(405)*	48%	(337)
Housework	20%	(153)	46%	(135)
Family	27%	(414)	49%	(371)
Broader community	18%	(391)	50%	(385)
Hebrew	24%	(388)	50%	(368)
Social life	13%	(368)	58%	(305)

* Figures in parentheses represent the total number of persons in a given quartile in a given area. Thus there were 405 respondents in the highest work problem score quartile; of these, 28 per cent scored in the top category of adjustment.

Two things are most strikingly apparent in these data. In each of the six problem areas, those who had relatively few problems were much more often well-adjusted than those who had relatively many problems. Second, the proportion of well-adjusted within each quartile is not very different in one area from that in another. This would seem to suggest that as far as adjustment is concerned, it is not particularly important in which area an immigrant has had problems: the more problems he has had in any area, the less adjusted does he tend to be. The only exception to this generalization refers to the area of social life. The difference between the high and low quartiles is particularly sharp, the proportion of well-adjusted being more than four times higher in the low problem than in the high problem quartile. To what extent this is explicable in terms of the use of a number of items in our measure of adjustment which refer to kinship with other persons in Israel cannot be determined here.

Concluding remarks

The evidence presented in this study of American and Canadian immigrants to Israel supports a multifactorial approach to the study of

immigrant adjustment. Even the four variables which have been considered here, though each separately and the four jointly are significantly related to adjustment, can serve only in part to predict how successfully someone will adjust. Further analysis of data obtained in the course of the study, such as that of motivations for migration, is clearly indicated.

We have also seen that the level of problems encountered—or, rather, retrospectively recalled as having been encountered—seems to be the most powerful of the variables considered. What we have called organizational, cognitive, and cathectic orientations, referring to the pre-migration period, influence, in part, what one perceives as a problem and, in this manner, is related to subsequent adjustment. These orientations, however, do bear a direct relationship to adjustment, without the mediating factor of problems, as was suggested in our theoretical discussion.

Finally, we would call attention to two caveats. First, we have noted the retrospective character of the study, and have noted the possibility of the influence of present adjustment on the reported pre-migration orientations and post-migration problems. Second, it should be noted that the study did not include those American and Canadian immigrants to Israel who, almost by definition, were the most poorly adjusted: those persons who re-emigrated. We have no way of knowing whether the relationships found would indeed hold up had they been included. Thus, for example, it is conceivable that many people who were very active in Zionist organizations before migration to Israel were disillusioned by the reality of life in Israel precisely because of an extreme ideological commitment and consequently left the country. Were this the case, the correlation between organizational membership and adjustment would be seriously affected.

Both those difficulties could be obviated in a prospective study, which was far beyond our means.

NOTES

[1] This paper was presented at the Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1969.

[2] Eaton, W. H., 'Alternative Meanings of Adjustment', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1947, p. 77.

[3] Eisenstadt, S. N., *The Absorption of Immigrants*, London, 1954, pp. 12–15.

[4] Shuval, Judith T., 'Refugees: Adjustment and Assimilation', in *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 13, p. 374.

[5] Rieger, H., 'Some Aspects of the Acculturation of Yemenite Youth Immigrants', in Frankenstein, C., ed., *Between Past and Future*, The Henrietta Szold Foundation for Child Welfare, Jerusalem, 1953, p. 91.

[6] Eaton, op. cit., p. 77.

[7] Ben David, J., 'Ethnic Differences or Social Change?', in Frankenstein, ed., op. cit., p. 38.

[8] See Shuval, op. cit., and Rieger, op. cit. See also Cohen, E. *et al.*, *Research on the Absorption of Immigrants in A Development Town* (Hebrew), Department of Sociology, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1962, Vol. 1, pp. 4–6.

[9] The data in Cohen *et al.*, op. cit., pp. 71, 76–7, indicate that the correlation is far from perfect.

[10] Weinberg, A. A., *Migration and Belonging*, The Hague, 1961, p. 65.

[11] The word 'associated' in this subtitle has been used quite intentionally. In a prospective study, it can reasonably be argued that the association between variables measured at earlier points and between adjustment measured subsequently, can be seen as causal. Retrospective data, however, such as those obtained in the present study, are filtered through the memory of the respondent and influenced by his current level of adjustment.

[12] Were we developing a full-scale theoretical model of factors associated with subjective adjustment, we would, at this point, refer to all the resources brought by an individual with him into the new situation. Reference would be made to individual capacities and personality, to material resources, to social contacts, etc. Of this totality of resources, we have selected only one segment: the orientation of the individual.

[13] Merton, R. K., *Social Theory and Social Structure*, new edn., Glencoe, Ill., 1957, p. 265.

[14] Clearly, the three components of anticipatory socialization are interdependent. Organizational participation enhances cognitive knowledge; cathectic concern pushes towards organizational participation; etc. We do not see any grounds for arguing that one or the other is primary. On the other hand, they are by no means coextensive, though they may be highly correlated. Again, this is an empirical problem.

[15] The heart study is directed by Dr. Ascher J. Segall of the Harvard University School of Public Health. We express our gratitude to Dr. Segall for his complete co-operation in making available to us his study population registry, as well as to Mr. Moshe Goldberg, executive director of the Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel, and to the Association, for their extensive assistance at all stages of the study. Our thanks are also due to the Jewish Agency, whose financial support made this study possible.

[16] Shuval, Judith T., *Immigrants on the Threshold*, New York, 1963, pp. 67–8.

[17] Weinberg, A. A., op. cit., pp. 117, 167–9.

[18] The correlation coefficient between adjustment score and year of migration is -0.434. That is, the earlier an immigrant arrived in Israel, the more likely is he to be well adjusted at present. This is hardly surprising. In the first place, it is likely that many of the poorly adjusted among the old-timers have left the country. Second, the very nature of our operational definition of adjustment makes length of stay in the country more a measure of validity than a measure which is a strictly independent variable. Year of migration is also significantly related to Zionist membership ($r = -0.237$) and to interest ($r = -0.159$).

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ON THE STUDY OF THE FINANCING OF JEWISH COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

A. A. Kessler

1. *Introduction*

THE organizational and functional aspects of existing Jewish communities (outside Israel) have hardly yet been subject to systematic study by social scientists using contemporary tools of analysis.[1] These tools include the macro-economic measurements which have become refined and popularized in the period after the Second World War. In the field of contemporary 'Jewish economics', most of the serious analysis concerns the economic status of the Jews as a sub-group in a given locality,[2] rather than the economics of Jewish community organization.

This paper discusses some of the contributions which economic tools of measurement and analysis can make to an understanding of the organization and operation of Jewish communities. Specifically, attention will be focused on measuring the aggregate of monetary resources passing through Jewish organizations, their sources and their uses. Such measurements were carried out by the author for Israel[3] and for Continental European countries.[4] Some of the empirical results of these studies will be considered after a discussion of definitional, methodological, and data-gathering problems. Available series on the finance of Jewish community services in America are discussed in a separate section. This is followed by remarks on some implications of systematic study of 'Jewish public finance'[5] for the question of Jewish identity. The final section makes suggestions for further research in this area.

2. *Definition of Jewish community activities*

Viable Jewish life presupposes the existence of some type of organization or community. In one sense, a Jewish community can be defined as a conglomerate of organizations existing within a given geographical entity whose memberships, formal and informal, overlap and make up the organized Jewish population. Two major characteristics of these organizations are (1) their membership is essentially voluntary[6] and (2) they are not profit-making, although they may be run in accordance

with good commercial practice and they may sponsor commercial enterprises whose profits accrue to the community organizations.

The structuring of the community may be tight (as in the traditional kehilla) or loose. Some of its organizations may serve non-Jews as well as Jews and, over time, may have a predominantly non-Jewish clientele. Likewise, there may be services which are supplied by Jewish-owned commercial enterprises in some communities (for example, burial, local Jewish newspapers) and by community entities in others. At the extremes, there are clearly commercial enterprises which cater exclusively for Jews (for example, kasher butcher shops, Hebrew book stores) and clearly private activities which parallel or supplement community activities (for example, personal direct philanthropy, informal study groups).

In geographical classifications of Jewish community activities, it is usual to distinguish between local, regional, and national activities, and those which are directed towards the support of agencies operating overseas, in Israel as well as in other countries. The inclusion of Israel and other overseas activities leads to a dichotomy between national finance and international finance. This, of course, reflects the reality of Jewish personal and institutional ties all over the world and the flow of resources, both in terms of manpower and money, between Israel and other centres of Jewry. It also points to the fact that the normal activities of the community include not only the provision of services to its immediate members, but also the support of activities carried on by other communities.

To turn to the classification of Jewish community activities by function, an example of a breakdown stressing the end use or service aspect is given in the systematic compilations of the programmes and finances of Jewish communal services in America by S. P. Goldberg of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds:[7] economic aid, migration aid, absorption and resettlement of migrants, health, welfare services, youth and recreational services, community relations, religious agencies, Jewish education, cultural agencies, vocational services, and service agencies.

In terms of finance, it is more relevant to classify organizations by their role in the financing of community activities. A situation where the operating agencies in a community also provide essentially all of their sources of finance should be distinguished from a situation where there is a central fund-raising body or where the operating agencies are departments of an embracing community organization. In the study of European Jewish communities,[8] it was found convenient to distinguish between fund-raising organizations for Israel and for local needs, Communities (*Kehillot*), congregations, and other organizations catering primarily for religious needs, various central and representative bodies, and other organizations (which in some cases were broken

into broad functional groups). The American data[9] cross-classify the national Jewish agencies by function with the major sources of finance: federations and welfare funds, other contributions, and other income.

3. *Methodological considerations*

Considerations as to ease of compilation of data on community financing provide a major constraint in such studies. It is necessary to consider the availability of basic documents and their quality, the limited budgets placed at the disposal of the researcher, the use of sampling techniques, and the necessity of extensive interpolation and extrapolation of data between and beyond benchmark years. A second consideration is the relevance and meaningfulness of the measures used. Obviously, this is relative to the purposes of the study. For example, an analysis of the efficiency of alternative financing methods or the drawing up of a long-term community financial plan would involve, at least in part, the measurement of magnitudes different from those involved in studies of inter-community fund-raising potential. Finally, the comparability and compatibility of the measurements used have to be taken into account. This is obvious in inter-community fund-raising comparisons. If, however, the emphasis were on investigating the share of Jewish organizations within the national expenditure on social services, the choice of measurement units, as well as the final magnitude to be derived, might be different. (Generally, as a desideratum, the possibility of comparing the data developed in studies of Jewish community finance with national magnitudes and social accounting data should also be kept in mind.) Finally, there is the question of relating the data on Jewish community financing to estimates of the income, wealth, and expenditure of members of the Jewish community.

In the Israel and European studies, a flow-of-funds approach was used. With regard to the sources of funds, an attempt was made to distinguish between general receipts, receipts earmarked for capital expenditure, and receipts earmarked for endowment and other types of funds. The distinction between disposable (general) receipts and earmarked receipts is, for many purposes, of the utmost importance. It was found, for example, that in certain communities the apparent annual changes in total receipts were really the result of large fluctuations in earmarked receipts, rather than a shift in trends of ordinary receipts. The distinction between receipts for capital purposes and receipts for funds is also of importance; the former usually represent a temporary addition to monetary assets which is eventually transformed into a different type of asset (buildings, etc.) related functionally to community activities, whereas the latter represent assets which remain as sources of income in the future.[10]

The major breakdown of receipts was: contributions, sales of services,

income from real property and other assets, transfers from government (and public bodies), transfers received from other local Jewish organizations, and transfers received from foreign Jewish organizations. In the European study, a separate category was used for transfers from the Claims Conference/American Joint Distribution Committee, because of the importance of this source of income. In the Israel study, government transfers were broken down into the central government, the National Institutions, and local authorities, and a sharp distinction was made between local contributions and contributions received from abroad.

. As for the disbursement, a distinction was made between the expenditure on the organization's own account (broken down between current and capital expenditures) and disbursements for activities other than the organization's (broken down between transfers to other local Jewish organizations, transfers to Israel organizations, and transfers to organizations in other countries).

The difference between total receipts and total disbursements as defined above was a balancing item which, under certain assumptions, could be taken as equal to the change in the asset position of the organizations supplying the data.[11]

4. *Sources of data*

In gathering data, the basic unit of enquiry was the separate Jewish organization with its independent set of accounts. This could be an independent synagogue or a central fund-raising body. In some cases, it was not a formal organization, but an individual collecting money for a given, usually overseas, purpose. In some European communities —following the Israeli pattern—it was found that informal collections assumed an important part in the total picture of fund-raising for Jewish organizations in Israel. The large number of organizations, their size distribution, and geographical dispersal often pointed to the desirability of sampling. This made the completeness, accuracy, and up-to-date nature of the roster of organizations—including their function, locality, affiliation, and size designation—of crucial importance. Unfortunately, current and fairly complete rosters did not exist in many communities. The background information on the organizations, checked during the process of gathering the financial data, made possible the preparation of summations classified by various characteristics.

As could be expected, the quality of the underlying accounts varied from community to community and from organization to organization. It was often necessary to supplement written accounts with informal exegesis. The use of uniform accounting systems by agencies affiliated to a central fund-raising, social, or community organization often facilitated matters. Unless there is a tradition of full and public disclosure of financial accounts, most operating agencies tend to guard

them as a close secret within an inner circle. This makes the proper and widely based sponsorship of financial studies indispensable. The reality of Jewish community organization in many localities often makes this difficult to achieve. The orientation of financial studies to specific goals (for example, improvement of fund-raising performance) which have wide appeal, the manifest demonstration of respect for the confidential nature of information, proper timing, a good public relations campaign, an insight into community power structure and politics—combined with the right kind of sponsorship—can lead to the opening up of many doors and secret drawers.

5. *The Israel study*[12]

The study confined itself to the financial experience of institutions and agencies for social welfare, health, education and culture, and religious purposes, which solicited funds in Israel to help meet their financial needs. As such, activities in many of the fields which Jewish communities abroad engage in were studied. The emphasis was on voluntary contributions. In order to put contributions into their proper place, a methodology was developed which considered the various components of total income of the organizations. The population included some 5,000 bodies of which more than 4,000 were in the field of religious rites, narrowly defined.[13]

The agencies soliciting contributions were broken down by function, by identification or auspices (general, religious, and Histadrut), and by the geographical area of activities. The estimates covered five years: 1957–61. The share of these organizations in the 'national expenditure' on the activities in which they engaged varied from only two per cent for health to 65 per cent for religious rites. The large share in the latter case is indicative of the weight of the synagogue, while the small share in health activities reflects the overwhelming part played by governmental and Histadrut institutions in providing medical services. (Since these institutions do not solicit contributions, they were not included in the estimates.)

The total income (excluding borrowing) of these agencies amounted to IL 127 million in 1961, of which some 28 per cent, or IL 35 million, came from local contributions. A somewhat similar share came from transfers from public authorities and institutions, about 24 per cent from contributions from abroad, while the remainder derived from the sale to the public of goods and services supplied by the agencies. (A relatively small amount of income from property is included in the latter category.) The study pointed out that total income, as well as all its major components, increased rapidly during the five years under review, an overall increase of more than 80 per cent. The quickest growing sources during this period were income from the sales of services and transfers received from public authorities and institutions. The share of local

contributions held its own, while that of contributions from abroad decreased. The study showed that local contributions in 1961 constituted a high point of 73 per cent of total income in the case of synagogues and other religious rites institutions and a low point of only 8 per cent for institutions of higher education.

The major part of the study concerned itself with voluntary contributions. It was found that an outstanding characteristic of philanthropic giving in Israel is its ubiquitousness; practically the entire population contributes in one form or another. A second closely connected characteristic is the small average size of contributions. This fits in very well with the relatively large number of separate institutions soliciting funds in Israel. Moreover, it was found that business contributions also tend to be diffuse. Income tax played no role in the pattern of contributions in Israel.

In relating these findings to the question of communal activities and their financing, we must realize that the State and the politically oriented organizations in Israel, such as the Histadrut, have taken over many of the functions which are carried out by the Jewish communities abroad. (Moreover, the importance of State finance has increased.) This compares quite dramatically with the situation which reportedly existed in pre-State Palestine, where the Va'ad Leumi, and other voluntary organizations, supplied many of these services for the Jewish Yishuv. Despite profound changes, voluntary organizations are still important in many areas of Israeli life, and they still present many parallels with Jewish community organizations abroad.

6. *The European study*[14]

This study was confined to western continental Europe. The major part was devoted to six countries which were studied in depth: Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland (henceforth referred to as the 'major countries'). In addition, background information was also gathered on seven other countries, and extremely rough estimates on contributions to Jewish organizations were made from it.

The core of the study consisted of analyses of the financial progress of the Jewish organizations within the major countries for 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1964 and, in order to provide a reference point, for 1957. Data were also gathered to provide estimates on demographic movements and features, social and economic conditions, and other important characteristics of the Jewish population in the general setting of the country of residence. Extremely rough order-of-magnitude estimates on the income of the Jewish populations were built up. The quality of these background data, and derived estimates, probably varied more between communities than did the quality of the financial data. Thus, when we compared per capita figures between communi-

ties, the results had to be qualified strongly. For large differences and broad patterns and trends, the data could be useful; small differences, in most cases, had to be ignored. Nevertheless, it could be said that 'from the mass of data there emerges a fascinating picture of the economics of Jewish organizational life, with each community assuming a statistical profile and a socio-economic personality of its own.'[15]

It was estimated that the total consolidated income of the Jewish organizations meeting local needs in the major countries was more than $30 million in 1964; this represents a 50 per cent increase since 1961, and an almost 90 per cent increase since 1957. The share of the various sources of income obviously differed from community to community. For example, in 1964, the share of contributions in total income varied from a low point of 23 per cent in the Netherlands to a high point of 60 per cent in Switzerland. Income from real property and other assets was relatively insignificant for Belgium and France, important in the Netherlands, and very important in Sweden. The share of income from governmental bodies was more important in France, and income from sales of services was more important in the Netherlands than in the other countries. The share of income from foreign sources (including the Claims Conference, the American Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Agency, and others) was relatively the most important in Italy and France, and negligible in Switzerland.

It was found that the forms which the solicitation and collection of contributions (that is, fund raising) take are influenced by the organizational structure of Jewish life, the formal Community (*Kehilla*) being the dominant organizational unit on the Continent, with the important exception of France and, to a lesser extent, Belgium. The shares of contributions for Israel and for local needs differed quite widely. At the two extremes were Switzerland with less than half and France with more than 80 per cent of total contributions going to agencies meeting local needs. The share for local needs in the other four major countries varied between 55 and 65 per cent of the total. Only about one per cent of total contributions was given to Jewish organizations operating in other European countries. The calculations of average contributions in the various communities were revealing. Thus, although France and Switzerland were the two largest contributing countries in absolute terms, they represented the opposite poles with regard to per capita contributions, those in Switzerland being more than 8 times as much as in France. Calculations were made not only at official exchange rates, but also at rates which can be taken to represent the 'purchasing power' of the various currencies: the absolute and relative positions of France and Switzerland were hardly affected, but the relative rank of the four intermediate countries did change somewhat.

It was also possible to analyse the relative shares of the main organizations raising funds for Israel. The Keren Hayesod–United Israel

Appeal (*Magbit*) is the major body in this category. Its share, combined with the next five largest fund-raising bodies, accounted for 72–82 per cent of the total amount of contributions for Israel during 1961–64. The remainder was raised by scores of small Israeli institutions. It was found, as a rule, that high per capita contributions for local needs are associated with high per capita contributions for Israel.

One of the major questions which had to be answered was whether the European Jewish communities were self-supporting, the obverse being whether they were dependent on foreign sources to meet local requirements. By a comparison of Net Foreign Transfers (the funds raised locally for Israel less income from foreign sources received by local bodies) with Total Resources Available (equal to the total of local and foreign resources which would have been at the disposal of the local community if the amount raised for Israel had been retained locally), the following result was obtained: Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands were surplus countries during all the years covered by the study; Italy and France were deficit countries; while Belgium turned from a deficit into a surplus country.

The analysis was carried further by attempting to ascertain whether the increases in contributions kept up with the improved economic status of the population and with the declining purchasing power of money. No general patterns emerged. Finally, an attempt was made to answer the question of the potential for fund raising in 1970 under certain assumptions (extrapolation of past trends, economic growth, inflation, improving performance in terms of coverage, and share of contributions in income of Jewish population). The existence of a large potential was amply borne out by the events at the time of the Six-Day War when unprecedented amounts of contributions poured in from European Jewry.

In the initial design of the study, some thought was given to assessing the quality of Jewish leadership. The importance of this subject is invariably stressed by community organizers from the United States and Canada where lay leadership and the volunteer activities of the rank and file of the community members are considered prerequisites for successful voluntary fund-raising campaigns. No systematic tools were developed by the study to handle this problem, and only impressionistic observations could be made.[16]

7. *Financing American Jewish communal services*

The annual articles in the *American Jewish Year Book* on 'Jewish Communal Services: Programs and Finances' provide a wealth of information on many aspects of Jewish communal services in America. Very detailed information is given on results of Jewish federated fund raising. These campaigns cover local, national, Israel, and other overseas needs. The data on the federations' campaigns include only

maintenance and operating needs, with minor exceptions. They exclude totals for capital funds for endowment drives conducted by federations alone, or together with local Jewish agencies for local needs. Systematic data on local capital fund raising are not available on an annual basis, but there are partial figures available which indicate their magnitude. It is noted that such campaigns are largely conducted by federations outside their annual campaigns. Data are also provided on fund raising by national and overseas agencies. As these often include major capital and endowment fund drives (mainly for hospitals, and educational and religious institutes), they are not comparable with the annual federation totals. The data are shown by activity and by agency. A summary of the results for 1965,[17] for example, shows the following:

Receipts of National Jewish Agencies, 1965

	Overseas programmes	Domestic programmes	Total
Federations and welfare funds	$64,456,157	$6,242,270	$70,698,427
Other contributions	$31,082,377	$57,535,020	$88,617,397
Other income	$7,044,392	$53,346,204	$60,390,596
Total	$102,582,926	$117,123,494	$219,706,420

Estimates are also given for the aggregate value, or cost, of most activities falling in the sphere of Jewish communal services. These are loosely described as 'gross national product' of such services, and minimal estimates are given annually. These estimates are built up from the income side and exclude almost all endowment income of federations and local agencies, all local capital fund campaigns, and all internal congregational operating expenses. They do take into account annual campaigns for contributions, service payments, and public tax funds, that is, transfers from government agencies, and transfers received (mainly by federation agencies) from non-sectarian united funds and community chests.[18]

The large amount of material processed and condensed in these compilations, as well as the analysis on fund raising available in individual cities, provides a store of valuable data for the serious student in the field of Jewish community finance and voluntary contributions. Since this material is gathered by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds and originates in the local federations and the recipient organizations, there are obvious gaps in the data—especially lacking are data from local congregations. In order to guess at the order of magnitude of this omission, it should be pointed out that in 1961 synagogues (and other religious rites institutions) in Israel accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the total contributions to soliciting agencies

(excluding the United Appeal in Israel, fortuitous contributions to other bodies, and contributions to beggars). The European experience in 1964 indicates that the Communities, congregations, and other organizations meeting religious needs in Belgium received one-third of all contributions for local needs, in France 36 per cent, and in the Netherlands over 50 per cent.[19]

The raw data available in America and Canada can be related to other aspects of financing. These will be touched on in the next and final section of this paper.

8. *Implications for Jewish identity*

When properly used and interpreted, data on Jewish community finance can be used as a good measure of Jewish identity, of the intensity of Jewish life and commitment. This measure is not a unique one but it is, perhaps more than any other, one which is comparable over communities and countries and which enables the plurality of contemporary Jewish life to be taken into account.

The resources devoted by a Jewish population to community activities can be related to its income and wealth. Such resources could include all 'voluntary' finance, service income as well as contributions. Differences between communities such as the stability of population, the recent arrival of immigrants and refugees, the occupational structure, and other variables are more or less taken into account since they express themselves in the magnitude of income and wealth. The income allocated to Jewish causes is a good reflection, if properly interpreted, of the value put on things Jewish. Even though inter-group comparisons of income, and income devoted to a given purpose, involve many serious theoretical and statistical problems, international comparisons of identity employing scales of observance of external traditional practices are also not free from similar difficulties.[20]

Data on finance of community services can be used in a more detailed manner. The distribution of expenditure among competing ends expresses the community's sense of priorities of what is more and what is less important among Jewish community needs. It is not only Jewish identity—but Jewish identity for what. Indeed, a comparative analysis of patterns of expenditure and sources of finance could prove to be revealing about the profiles of various communities.

There is another sense in which the study of Jewish community finance is relevant to Jewish identity. In many communities one of the overt manifestations of Jewish identity is participation in fund-raising activities. Whereas many of the traditional *mizvot ma'asiot* (practices) have fallen by the wayside, the giving of charity and personal involvement in activities designed to aid Jewish causes financially seem to have assumed more crucial roles.

In the European study[21] an exploratory attempt was made to

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correlate some objective non-pecuniary criteria of the intensity of Jewish commitment with the actual amount of money raised in the communities: the number of Jewish organizations, the share of contributors in the Jewish population, and the Jewish education of children and youth. The first two measures are obviously crude; a significant statistical relationship was found between them and per capita contributions. Jewish education seems *a priori* to be a less crude measure. An index of intensity of Jewish education was constructed and a fairly high correlation was found between the index and per capita contributions. These measures strengthen the presumption that there is a positive relation between the degree of Jewish identity and the level of contributions.

9. *Further research*

Some areas for additional research can be mentioned. There is the obvious extension to other countries of projects on the pattern of the European study. There is the necessity of tying in the study of community finance with the systematic investigation of other aspects of community structure and operation. Serious work has to be done on the quantitative measurement of the economic development of Jewish populations, and on relating these measures to community finance and other aspects of community life. This basic research, as the Israel and European studies have demonstrated, can yield dividends in terms of increased awareness of the magnitudes involved, in making comparisons possible, in the setting of realistic goals and other aspects of improving fund raising performance. From this basic research it is but a step to efficiency studies, long-term planning, and other practical problems involved in community management.

NOTES

[1] Elazar makes this case from the point of view of a political scientist. Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Pursuit of Community: Selections from the Literature of Jewish Public Affairs, 1965–1966', in the *American Jewish Year Book, 1967*, Vol. 68, New York and Philadelphia, American Jewish Committee and Jewish Publication Society of America, pp. 178–239, especially pp. 178, 196, 198–9, 221. See also Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Reconstitution of Jewish Communities in the Post-War Period', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XI, no. 2, Dec. 1969.

[2] For an authoritative survey, see Simon Kuznets, 'Economic Structure and Life of the Jews', in Louis Finkelstein, *The Jews: Their History, Culture, and Religion*, New York, 1960, 3rd. edn., Vol. II, pp. 1597–1666.

[3] A. A. Kessler, *An Economic Study on Voluntary Welfare Contributions in Israel*, Economic Research Corporation, Jerusalem, August 1963.

[4] A. A. Kessler, *Study of Fund Raising in European Jewish Communities*, Economic Research Corporation, Jerusalem, February 1967.

[5] This term was suggested by Daniel J. Elazar.

[6] Even where Jews must be members of a legally recognized Jewish Community under the laws of their country of residence, the choice of opting out of the Community, viz. renouncing one's Jewishness, is usually still open.

[7] See the annual articles in the *American Jewish Year Book*, e.g., S. P. Goldberg, 'Jewish Communal Services: Programs and Finances', in the *American Jewish Year Book 1967*, Vol. 68, pp. 124–77.

[8] *Study of Fund Raising in European Jewish Communities*, op. cit.

[9] Goldberg, op. cit.

[10] Obviously, fixed assets in use also yield services for which income can be imputed. On the other hand, the income derived from financial assets may be earmarked for purposes on which no expenditure might otherwise have been made; such income is thus not necessarily general income. In terms of alternative costs, the distinction made in the text may be spurious; in terms of accounting reports, it is not.

[11] Certain situations, such as the realization of capital gains, could also lead to changes in the asset position. As a rule, the basic data did not allow such distinctions, and other fine points, to be made.

[12] This study was carried out under the auspices of the Jewish Agency for Israel (Jerusalem) with the co-operation of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds of New York. The American Joint Distribution Committee, among others, shared in the financing of the study. Parallel to my *An Economic Study on Voluntary Welfare Contributions in Israel*, op. cit., a *Survey of Attitudes and Behavior among Potential Contributors* was carried out by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. Mr. William Avrunin,

the executive director of the Jewish Welfare Federation of Detroit, Michigan, served as overall study director for the project.

[13] In addition to examining the organized agencies soliciting contributions, there was an investigation of donations made to beggars and to various public and non-profit bodies.

[14] The study (*Study of Fund Raising in European Jewish Communities*, op. cit.) was sponsored by the American Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Agency, the Keren Hayesod–United Israel Appeal, and the Standing Conference of European Jewish Community Services (now the European Council of Jewish Community Services).

[15] *Study of Fund Raising in European Jewish Communities*, op. cit., p. iii.

[16] Ibid., pp. 91–4.

[17] See Goldberg, op. cit., pp. 175–7.

[18] Ibid., p. 126.

[19] These percentages are taken from the detailed analysis in the country reports and are not shown in my *Study of Fund Raising in European Jewish Communities*, op. cit.

[20] This point is implicit in some of S. J. Prais's comments on the use of household surveys for providing information on communal cohesion; S. J. Prais's review of Sidney Goldstein's *A Population Survey of Greater Springfield Jewish Community* in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, No. 2: December 1968, pp. 294–6.

[21] *Study of Fund Raising in European Jewish Communities*, op. cit., pp. 14, 15.

BOOK REVIEWS

ROLF E. ROGERS, *Max Weber's Ideal Type Theory*, x + 109 pp., Philosophical Library, New York, 1969, $4.50.

The Max Weber *corpus* has proved a rich mine for publishers in recent years. At one extreme, H. P. Secher has made a book from the first section of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. At the other extreme, that massive compilation has been enlarged in translation in the Roth and Wittich edition by adding further parts of Weber's work. Such permutations can clearly go on for a long time yet, but Rolf Rogers and the Philosophical Library have decided that the time is ripe to climb to a higher stage of publishing enterprise, the republication of commentaries on Weber. Rogers selects extracts from discussions of the ideal type concept by Abel, von Schelting and Parsons and adds them to sections from the Shils edition of Weber's methodology.

Apart from translating the selection from von Schelting, Rogers' contribution amounts to some bibliographical notes on the three commentaries, 'a brief outline of Weber's background' (in which we learn of the piety of his mother, that to examine Italian and Spanish references he actually learnt Italian and Spanish, and that 'his last lectures were developed from his students' notes'), and a conclusion in which he synthesizes what his commentators have said. Rogers acknowledges that other discussions of the ideal type concept exist, but those he mentions, by Friedrich and Gouldner, are but the tip of the huge iceberg of literature. It is surprising, after his research for this book, that he fails to mention any of the contexts outside the Shils edition in which Weber discusses ideal types. He says he is unable to follow up Weber's concepts of rationality or of value freedom, or indeed, one might add, anything which could explain the importance of ideal types in Weber's methodology.

<div align="right">M. C. ALBROW</div>

BERTRAM WALLACE KORN, *The Early Jews of New Orleans*, American Jewish Communal Histories, No. 5, xxi + 382 pp., American Jewish Historical Society, Waltham, Mass., 1969, $12.50.

In this well written scholarly work the author explains the uniqueness of the experience of the Jews of New Orleans: while organized Jewish communal life existed and even flourished in colonial cities on the Atlantic coast and in the West Indies, the Jewish settlers of New Orleans failed to establish religious and communal institutions until late in the 1820s and after.

Mr. Korn attributes this phenomenon to the 'frontier' character of New Orleans society and the general indifference towards Judaism of the early Jewish settlers. There was 'no negative pressure upon Jews to create a

congregation or to develop an intensive Jewish life' (p. 228). Rather, New Orleans offered the Jewish settlers 'freedom . . . to be whatever one wanted, including the freedom not to be Jewish' (p. 216).

The author argues that the Jewish settlers did not consciously reject Judaism. He pictures them as being Marranos 'without however, making any effort to preserve their ancestral heritage in secret. In fact they became secularists, because Judaism no longer meant anything to them, and Christianity did not arouse their interest' (p. 41).

As additional evidence of this personal indifference towards Judaism Mr. Korn points out that although most settlers married Christians and had their children baptized, the majority of the early settlers were never converted.

As the size of the Jewish population grew during the 1820s and 1830s there arrived in the city Jews like Jacob Solis (1780–1829) and Gershom Kursheedt (d. 1863) who committed themselves to forming a Jewish community. Solis organized the first synagogue, Shanarai Chasset, in 1827–28. Unable to raise enough money among the richer earlier Jewish settlers in the city, he wrote to New York for financial assistance. The synagogue's charter reflected a conscious effort to adjust to the reality of Jewish life in New Orleans: it stipulated that the children of mixed marriages should not be excluded from the Jewish school, synagogue, or cemetery (p. 196).

By the 1840s the community began to resemble Jewish communities in other cities. The following examples indicate the change. 1. The 1841 by-laws of Shanarai Chasset banned the membership of Jewish men who intermarried. 2. In 1844 the Jews of New Orleans organized a Hebrew Benevolent Society which provided the opportunity for assimilated Jews to express their concern for their Jewish brethren in a non-religious manner. 3. In 1845 Kursheedt organized a second synagogue, Nefuzah Yehudah. But what is also significant here is that he attracted the financial support of Judah Touro who soon became an observant Jew. Although Korn emphasizes Touro's philanthropy to Jewish institutions in his later years, he is careful to point out that before 1847 Touro had taken more of an interest in supporting Christian than Jewish religious institutions. 4. By 1850 there was a third Jewish congregation in the suburbs of New Orleans.

This book is important for many reasons. First, it is a valuable study of the early Jewish settlers in New Orleans. Unlike some Jewish historians, whose romanticized portraits reflect the search for colonial Jewish heroes, Mr. Korn's portrayals are more honest. Furthermore, the 78 pages of footnotes provide a valuable source of reference to works in Spanish, French, German, and English.

Second, as Mr. Korn himself suggests, although unique during this period (1760–1830) the Jewish experience in New Orleans probably was not unique. It represents the Jewish experience of the frontier. This study might serve as a basis for a comparative study of Jewish settlers in other frontier areas. For example, Mr. Korn refers to Marcus's study of the earliest Jewish settlers in Connecticut, which describes a similar pattern of assimilation and inter-marriage. At the same time he states that many American Jewish historians have avoided this subject. Does there exist among American Jewish historians an antipathy towards learning that Judaism might have been irrelevant to the lives of most of the earliest Jews of Boston and New York?

Third, Mr. Korn suggests that these early settlers as a group 'offer a sort of a case study in the tensions between accommodation and continuity which underlie all of American Jewish history' (p. xiv). Perhaps here he understates his case. His study is extremely relevant to the contemporary American Jewish experience as well (and perhaps to other contemporary Jewish communities in certain parts of the world). The problems which Mr. Korn finds in New Orleans in the early eighteenth century are typical of the problems facing many American Jews at the present time. Some, if not many, find that their Jewish heritage is irrelevant to their lives. The societies in which they live are free in Mr. Korn's sense of permitting them not to be Jewish. They too want to define themselves primarily as individuals. Although they often intermarry, they do so not as a conscious rejection of Judaism, since many of those who do marry non-Jews are not converted. It might be that both Judaism and religion in general do not have much meaning for them.

Scholarship and scientific and professional pursuits on the one hand and political activism on the other hand provide for contemporary Jews what entrepreneurial and commercial pursuits provided for the Monsantos of New Orleans—a total way of life. But the problem today is more complex: as Mr. Korn points out in describing the predicament of the eighteenth-century Jews, Judaism offered them only the alternatives of Orthodoxy or nothing; today it offers many alternatives—Orthodox, Reform, Conservative, Reconstructionist, and the broad spectrum of Israel and Zionism. Yet there still are large segments of young Jews who find Judaism meaningless and irrelevant. Perhaps a phenomenon of the modern experience is that in many situations it generates a secular environment without Judaism, only Jews.

Mr. Korn writes that the Monsantos were Jews in a modern sense, that is, they would not be converted and they remained conscious of their sense of being different. This also clearly describes the lives of many American Jews today. Among them are the scholars, the scientists, the Jerry Rubins, the novelists, and the Alexander Portnoys. Yes, especially Portnoy. He is a Jew and representative of many of his contemporaries. The Jewish tragedy of Portnoy is the absence of Judaism in his life—it is irrelevant and meaningless. His entire life seems to be free of positive Jewish experiences. If he intermarries it will not be to escape or reject Judaism, regardless of whether it is explained as a rejection of his Jewish mother. He will never be converted. He will probably feel close to Jews. He will retain a conscious sense of being different; and only in this way does he remain a Jew.

Mr. Korn's task was to explain the uniqueness of the New Orleans Jewish experience and not to explain why it eventually established religious and communal institutions. It would be important to explain the reason for the change. This would require a thorough analysis of New Orleans society during the first half of the nineteenth century. Perhaps the use of biographical sketches underemphasizes the importance of social factors in the general society. Recognizing this, Mr. Korn supplements his biographical sketches of the period before 1815 with an analysis of the frontier society of New Orleans. However, his treatment of the period after 1815 lacks a similar analysis of New Orleans society.

<div align="right">FREDERICK AARON LAZIN</div>

DONALD R. CUTLER, ed., *The World Year Book of Religion, The Religious Situation, Volume I*, xlviii + 992 pp., Evans Brothers Ltd., London, 1969, 126s.

It is a poignant feature of Western life at the present time that we are forced by our categories to think of galloping secularization and religious revival as processes going on together. How to come to terms with the contradiction? The book (or rather, volume) under review might be expected, in opening a series on world religion, to help us to an accommodation by concentrating very heavily on the West (and in the West, on the United States). And to some extent it does, although it appears to have been so randomly assembled as to inhibit the emergence of continuous themes and argument. It consists of twenty-four items, some of them composed of pieces by different hands, and is introduced by a Foreword by Professor Reinhold Niebuhr and an Introduction ('The Religious Situation') by Professor Martin E. Marty of the University of Chicago Divinity School. The auspices, it will be noted, are theological rather than sociological.

Professor Niebuhr points to the 'theme of the religious situation in a secular age' as one considered from several points of view by many of the contributors to the volume. He comments: 'The chief error of modern empirical disciplines is their belief that mystery is merely the realm of the unknown which will gradually disappear when science enlarges the realm of the known by triumphing over all manner of ignorance' (pp. xif). And he goes on to say in his concluding sentence that 'we acknowledge the creativity of cultures which welcome both religious and secular components to this common enterprise of recognizing and preserving the humanity of man' (p. xv). (Of course, it is the very possibility of dividing off the secular from the religious that creates the problem with which this review opens: members of other cultures might well have difficulty in understanding the partition.) In Professor Marty's Introduction we have our attention drawn to the wide range of meaning covered by the word 'religion' in the contributions to follow; this point is made against the background of the fact that in the 1960s the United States was 'experiencing a fundamental relocation of much that goes under the name religion' (p. xxiv).

How the reader will absorb and re-order for himself the mass of writing that follows will depend on his own interests and efforts, for the theme-setting of the introductory matter is too slender by itself to support him along the journey to page 992. American problems loom large: among them, Black Power, the abortion debate, American theology, and urban violence. (The volume is, of course, American, having been originally published in the United States in 1968.) As for the rest of the world, there are pieces on, for example, South India, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. To these parts of the volume a brief review can pay no attention, however important they be.

Sociologists are likely to be attracted above all to the essays by the sociologist Professor Robert N. Bellah ('Civil Religion in America') and by the anthropologist Professor Clifford Geertz ('Religion as a Cultural System'). Both essays were originally published in 1966, but they are made new here by being endowed with commentaries. The burden of Professor Bellah's essay is that alongside the conventionally defined religions of the United

States there exists 'an elaborate and well institutionalized civil religion' (p. 331). Despite some of the criticisms appended to the essay in the form of commentaries, it seems to me to make its case and in a most interesting and perceptive manner. And in doing so it may do something to help resolve the problem of the relation between secularization and religious persistence. One of the most important parts of Professor Geertz's contribution lies in the response it evokes from Professor Talcott Parsons, who writes the commentary. Professor Parsons wonders how far the anthropological approach adopted by Professor Geertz commits him to 'a conception of "cultural relativity" that is a drag on . . . the development of theory in social science' (p. 689). And he goes on in effect to question the sociological character of the essay, for which he has nonetheless a very high regard. Of course, one might take this as a polite tussle between sociologist and anthropologist, but I, for my part, consider it an important struggle between two sociological points of view.

And the Jews? No book so deeply concerned with American problems could ignore them. They appear chiefly in Rabbi Richard L. Rubenstein's 'Homeland and Holocaust: Issues in the Jewish Religious Situation' (which has commentaries by Mr. Milton Himmelfarb, Professor Zalman M. Schachter, Mr. Arthur A. Cohen, and Professor Irving Greenberg) and Professor Emil L. Fackenheim's 'Idolatry as a Modern Religious Possibility'. As for the first of these essays, it is not to be wondered at that the present Jewish 'religious situation' should be seen mainly in terms of the two huge Jewish events of the middle of the century: the destruction of the mass of European Jewry and the establishment/re-establishment of Israel. But of course, these events are susceptible of a number of religious interpretations. Rabbi Rubenstein's radical–theological approach involves him (if I have understood him) in the propositions that 'The death of God as a cultural fact is real and all embracing' (p. 50), and that Jews cannot be said to have been either abandoned by the Deity in the holocaust nor helped by Him in the Six-Day War—on both occasions, one of defeat, one of victory, they stood alone. 'Jewish history has written the final chapter in the terrible story of the God of history' (p. 61). The test of a good theology (to which the main forms of present-day Jewish theology do not, in Rabbi Rubenstein's view, match up) is whether it is 'practical': '*Does it deepen and help to clarify the individual's manifold insights about himself, his community, his religious and ethical values, and his place in the timetable of life in such a way that he can realistically function with minimal conflict between his biological, psychological, and cultural needs, his actions towards others, his beliefs, and his ultimate aspirations?*' (p. 61). One might comment that the clouds of traditional theology can be outdone by those of a radical one. Among the commentaries on this essay, that by Mr. Himmelfarb stands out by its shrewd and clear argument. The commentaries as a whole constitute an informative discussion that bears directly on the concurrent dissolution and rebirth of religion within the Jewish fold—secularization and revival in one.

In the 'idolatry' of Professor Fackenheim's essay (which moves with learning and stately calm through Jewish and Christian religious ideas) the 'idols' include 'no-gods', the internalized non-entities to which the power of ancient idols has now, since the Age of Enlightenment, passed. This latter-day

idolatry may take two forms: the *'elevation of the finite individual or collective self'* and the *'degradation of the infinite aspect of selfhood to a false finitude'* (p. 283). Against the grain of radical theology we are back to God and the worship of God.

, Volume II of the series, we are told, is already in the making. We may await its appearance with impatience or indifference according to the view we take of mixtures of sociology and theology. Each of the disciplines is hard going; when they are interleaved, the task of following the argument (some may think) is made too burdensome.

<div align="right">MAURICE FREEDMAN</div>

HAYYIM J. COHEN, *Hape'ilut hatzionit be'Iraq*, 275 pp., The Zionist Library and the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1969, n.p.

Dozens of books have been written on 'western' Zionism, but this work is—as far as I know—the first systematic piece of research into the history of an 'eastern' branch of the movement. After an introductory chapter describing developments in the life of the Iraqi Jewish Community until the First World War, the author examines the comparatively moderate period of the twenties during which the Movement could operate under the British Mandate. (Readers in Britain may perhaps be interested to learn that the now defunct Colonial Office had a series of files about 'Zionism in Iraq': P.R.O., C.O., 733/268/37606 733/275/75106 etc.) Then comes the change for the worse during the thirties, following the Palestine disturbances of 1929, Iraqi independence, the death of King Faisal I, and the rise of Nazi Germany's influence, culminating in the pogroms after Rashid Ali's ousting. Dr. Cohen then takes us through the phase of the movement's underground existence during 1942–51, ending with its final success when it ceased to exist as a result of the mass immigration to Israel. The author describes all the different aspects of the Zionist Movement in Iraq during these years, its ideology and activities, the changes which took place and the developments, the causes of its weakness, its failures, and its successes.

In the 216 pages of the book (with an additional 47 pages of Appendices, 5 of Bibliography, and 5 of Index) Dr. Cohen succeeds in presenting this extensive, even comprehensive, study of the subject, to which there is almost nothing to add and very little to criticize. However, I should like to comment on two points. First, discussing the opposition of Haham Sasson Kedourie (The Chief Rabbi) to Zionism, Dr. Cohen states (p. 47) that it was mainly based on personal reasons. This appears to me to be an oversimplification. In 1950, when things had already changed, one of the notables of the Baghdadi community, a follower of S. Kedourie, explained to me their 'ideology'. It would have been wrong and totally irresponsible to endanger the comparatively secure environment, continuity, and permanence of the Jewish Community in Babylon, whose existence goes back more than 2,000 years, for the sake of a movement whose ideals and aims seemed to be remote beyond reach and which might, very likely, turn out to be one of those false messianic movements from which the Jewish Communities had suffered so much during their long history. 'No wise man', he said, 'would forsake a bird in his hand,

though very poor it may be, for the most wonderful golden bird on the tree.'

Second, further on, Dr. Cohen poses the question 'Why was this Babylonian diaspora ready to leave its abode of thousands of years, and to emigrate to Israel?' (p. 212), and he goes on to answer the question in a very reserved manner: 'The fact that the State of Israel opened its gates to the mass of immigrants was the main factor in this immigration.' That is certainly so. But a slight change in the text such as 'The fact that a State of Israel exists now, and that it opened its gates . . .' would, I think, have presented things better, because the existence of Israel was the primary cause and the open gates a secondary one. And to quote again the Baghdadi Jew mentioned above who explained why he and most of his friends, though not S. Kedourie, changed their views: 'Now that the State of Israel exists, that it is not a false messianic dream but a living reality, and that on the other hand the future existence of the Jewish Community in Iraq is endangered anyway as a result of the 1948 war, we should go there.'

And this brings me to my final remark. It is interesting to note that though Zionism was mainly a 'western' movement, it was the two 'eastern' communities of Babylon and Yemen which transplanted themselves almost totally to Israel, thus showing perhaps that in Iraq Zionism was not so much an ideology or movement but, when conditions were ripe, more a way of life.

<div style="text-align: right">Y. TAGGAR</div>

Comparability in Social Research, edited by MARGARET STACEY, Heinemann for The British Sociological Association and The Social Science Research Council, London, 1969, pp. 134 + xviii, 10s.

Misgivings about the rapid growth in social research have been voiced on many grounds, not least by social researchers themselves who have recognized in recent years that the situation was getting out of hand. Masses of costly empirical data remained unanalysed, and with the passage of time the material was bound to become untraceable for future social scientists. The answer seemed to lie in the establishment of survey archives and data banks. Many sociologists have argued, however, that the ability to retrieve information and subject it to secondary analysis is only of limited use. It was felt that for a wider application of the material comparability had to be ensured.

The British Sociological Association is to be congratulated for providing the answer to this need. It took the form of a working party whose aims are to investigate the possibility of inducing comparability by suggestions for the standardization of 'key variables' in empirical studies. The Social and Economic Archive Centre revealed, by a count of their collected schedules, the variables most commonly used, and this volume presents the completed papers on the first batch of variables: education by Aubrey Weinberg, family and household by Margaret Staccy, income by Elizabeth Gittus, and occupation by Frank Bechofer. Readers of this *Journal* will be particularly interested to know that work is now in progress on other variables, including religion and race.

To allay the fears of those who might interpret 'comparability' and 'standardization' as nothing less than straitjacketing the researcher into an

ultimately inflexible and unimaginative overall computer programme, it is best to quote Margaret Stacey, who was the convener of the working party. She says that in suggesting that researchers should set forth their data in some agreed standard form 'the working party in no way intend to constrain the activities of research workers who wish to devise their own classifications. Indeed, they feel that such activity is essential to the proper development of the subject. They nevertheless feel that in such cases research workers should *also* classify their data using an existing acceptable classification, in order to achieve comparability.' The guiding principle used in order to achieve such a dual purpose is to make classifications 'collapsible' in a variety of ways so as to enable analysis to be carried out in different directions.

Another principle adhered to was to relate suggestions not only to the empirical determinants of data collection but also to the body of theoretical knowledge; to link the clarification of categories with that of concepts. It is this maturity of approach which gained for this enterprise the blessing of Professor T. H. Marshall who in his Preface describes the work as a mobilization of 'expertise and experience' for the benefit of Sociology as a whole.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

EMILE MARMORSTEIN, *Heaven at Bay : The Jewish Kulturkampf in the Holy Land*, ix + 215 pp., Oxford University Press, London, 1969, 45s.

The problem of Judaism as a religious faith versus a secular-nationalistic interpretation of Jewish destiny is sufficiently far-reaching to demand much serious investigation. In many ways the author of this book is well-equipped to undertake such an investigation. He is a very erudite scholar with a talent for sociological analysis and thoroughly familiar with the issues involved. Yet the book is disappointing, marred by the curious jargon employed, by lack of historical perspective, and by a strong bias.

God's plan for Israel is described as a 'pilot scheme'. The lay leaders of Jewish communities are 'oligarchs', the legal authorities 'nomocrats'. *Hasidut* is 'Pietism' and *Musar* 'Moralism'. (R. Hayyim Soloveitchik is said to be a 'Moralist Sage' whereas R. Hayyim was at the most neutral towards the *Musar* movement and in some ways an opponent of it.) Hasidic *maases* here become 'hagiographical sketches', and Yiddish is always 'Judaeo-German'. The illustration of a principality of observant Jews, with a Citadel manned by zealots, a Metropolis inhabited by less fervent believers and with other people near the Border, is not unhelpful, but it has been allowed to get completely out of hand. There is so much talk of Borderers migrating from the Metropolis and the like that the reader finds himself virtually in Tolkien territory and would not be at all surprised to find a Hobbit suddenly appearing.

Disregarding modern historical studies in the field (including those of his own distinguished father), the author soberly accepts the formulations of Maimonides in his great Code, compiled in the twelfth century, as a factual description of conditions which obtained during the ancient Jewish Commonwealth, the king having to consult the 'Great Court' for example, and spend his leisure hours in study of the Torah.

Mr. Marmorstein's admiration for the most extreme forms of Jewish piety is unconcealed. The most bizarre positions of the Neture Karta are either defended or viewed with the utmost sympathy. He seems to be unaware that it is possible for people to find moral objections to such things as a register of *mamzerim* (who are forbidden to marry other Jews) without being secularists or religious careerists wishing to placate the secularists. His treatment of the struggle on the question of autopsies is typical of his mediaevalism. There are real problems in this area and a very good case can be made out for the wishes of the family of the deceased to be taken into account to a greater extent than appears to be the case. But what are we to make of the following? 'Briefly, the body is kept under close guard from the moment of death, purified to the accompaniment of liturgical readings, and escorted to consecrated ground to await reunion with the soul at the Resurrection; and it is the hope of ultimate revival that inspires not only the protection of the corpse but even the interment of an amputated limb in the grave destined for the remainder of the body.' Mr. Marmorstein is entitled to hold theologically naive views on the Resurrection but he should have known that there is no such thing as 'consecrated ground' in the Jewish tradition, which thinks of a corpse as a source of contamination. Writing of Chief Rabbi Herzog's agreement to the dissection of bodies formally donated by their owners for scientific research, he remarks that this provoked few protests 'presumably because only the bodies of unlikely candidates for resurgence were concerned'. The self-righteousness behind a sentence such as this goes far towards explaining why some of the religious are among secularism's best recruits.

Reading the book I was reminded of the American Conservative rabbi who explained to a member of the Neture Karta the three divisions in American Jewish life. The Neture Karta man replied: 'We have the three divisions here in Israel. We, the Neture Karta, are the Orthodox, the Agudat Israel are the Conservatives, and the Mizrahi are the Reformers.'

<div align="right">LOUIS JACOBS</div>

WERNER STARK, *Types of Religious Man*, xii + 340 pp., Vol. IV of The Sociology of Religion, A Study of Christendom, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1969, £2 5s.

The fourth volume of Professor Stark's vast and impressive enterprise succeeds previous volumes on state-churches, on sects, and on 'the universal church', and it precedes a final volume on the cultural systems fostered by communitarian and associational types of religion respectively. Vol. IV is an exposition of the dialectic between the initial creative thrust of a religion and its subsequent elaboration. It is also a critique of all those theorists (especially Weber) who see this process as one of charisma and its routinization. In brief, Stark sees a necessary element of 'routinization', i.e. tradition, existing at the very outset, and a continuing of the original charisma within the body of the Church. In his view it is simply not true that the lieutenants who follow on betray the ideals of the Master. It is rather a case of a continuing and fruitful tension between the organizational and the inspirational. Law is the precondition of love, however much love may be greater than law.

Werner Stark mounts an attack on all those sentimentalists who set the

letter and the spirit in so gross an opposition that the organizational matrix of religion is automatically impugned. The attack will certainly cause a great deal of irritation, likely to express itself in the accusation that Professor Stark is a self-admitted Roman Catholic. But he is more and worse than that. He accuses sociologists (especially Weber) of being so completely enveloped in an individualistic culture as not even to understand the assumptions of 'corporate' cultures: the essential unity of one and all, across space and over time, and the ontological reality of the group. Beyond this accusation is his own position, which is that of a man who believes in the real (not nominal) character of the group, in the importance of organizational unity in religion, in authority, in hierarchy *and* in the superiority of simple faith over intellectual scepticism. Such a catalogue of sociological heresies may get him put on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum—if the sociologists bother to read his work.

I doubt if many will. His work is typological and historical in a way reminiscent of Wach; he also tends to assume that things are largely what they claim to be. Thus one might read him to find out what the Catholic Church really teaches about itself (e.g. on infallibility): an important quest but not what his critics will regard as 'real sociology'. They will be like a student of mine who, when directed to Wach, said he couldn't find the sociology. And indeed it is true that in Professor Stark's work questions like the *actual* administrative functions of a priest as distinct from his formally defined role are treated as mere 'accidental facts' (p. 263).

Apart from his defence of the ecclesiastical incorporation of Christianity against Weber, Sohm, Lowrie and others, he has a basic thesis (p. 30) which is that after all the various attempts to achieve the freedom of the spirit, there has been a persistent, if partial, reversion to the norms of the Catholic position which illustrated the sociological and religious universality underlying that position. Both in the personal biographies of Luther and Calvin and in the movements to which they gave impetus, he traces this partial reversal. This leads him to ignore the liberalization of Calvinism in its later phases and in English-speaking cultures, and also to leave aside lay, locally autonomous, democratic, individualistic Christianity as the unhappy spawn of the Radical (as distinct from the Classical) Reformation. Indeed, he simply indicates that such religion would be much further down the continuum in the individualistic direction than the 'conservative' phenomena on which he focuses attention (p. 322). Here I would take issue with him: the Radical Reformation (Mennonites, Hutterites, Quakers, etc.) is intensely collectivistic in the sectarian manner of collectivism. It is rather the liberal Protestant *denominations* who have the seeds of individualism in them.

These reservations do not prevent one looking forward to the fifth, final monument to Professor Stark's prodigious industry. One needs people to whom the contemporary Zeitgeist means nothing.

<div align="right">DAVID MARTIN</div>

YIVO INSTITUTE FOR JEWISH RESEARCH, *Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science*, Volume *XIV*, 288 pp., New York, 1969, n.p.

In this volume Mr. Isaiah Trunk publishes his findings on 'Religious, educational and cultural problems in the eastern European ghettos under

German occupation'. It is a well-documented essay on the intellectual and cultural activities of the Jews who lived in the eastern European ghettos before the Final Solution was implemented. The material for the description of the conditions in the ghettos comes mostly from documents concerning Warsaw, Lodz, Cracow, Bialystok, and Wilno.

The Nazi masters of the ghettos were from the start determined to decimate the inhabitants as quickly as possible (by starvation rations, overcrowding with the accompanying epidemics such as typhus, and sometimes, as in Lodz, the introduction of the death penalty for women who became pregnant). They were less sure in their handling of the many aspects and manifestations of a new social cohesion which, paradoxically, the ghetto walls often revitalized or even created. In the beginning the occupants forbade public worship, or forced the Jews to work and open their shops on the Sabbath and even on Yom Kippur. This was meant to bring about the spiritual demoralization of the community. Yet a little later they allowed Jewish theatres (in Yiddish or Hebrew) to open, the formation of orchestras which gave public concerts (twice a week), and the organization of elementary and trade schools (only in Yiddish and Hebrew). It is a fact that for a time (until the beginning of 1942) it was easier for Jews to have an organized social life in the ghettos than it was for the non-Jews on the other side of the wall.

Mr. Trunk's essay is more concerned with giving the facts than in formulating the problems which ghetto life caused to its communities and their leaders. These problems must have been, and we know that they were, of the gravest nature.

Mr. Jacob S. Hertz, an historian of the Jewish socialist movement in eastern Europe, has in the same volume an article under the heading 'The Bund's national program and its critics in the Russian, Polish and Austrian socialist movements'. The author devotes his paper, which was prepared for a Yivo conference on Jewish Participation in Progressive Social Movements, to the debates which took place at the beginning of this century in some European socialist parties on the question of their relations with autonomous Jewish labour movements (mainly the Bund). He aptly quotes the Bund leader Wladimir Medem who wrote: 'The argument between the Jewish Labour Bund and the Russian party is in considerable measure an expression of the struggle among the internal trends in Jewry'. Very often the socialist opponents of an autonomous Jewish socialist organization were Jews themselves, either because they were for cultural assimilation with the majority nation or because they doubted the power of a Jewish political group acting by itself.

The article accepts the orthodox Bundist point of view as self-evidently true.

LUCJAN BLIT

MAURICE KRAJZMAN, *La minorité arabe en Israël, Contribution à une étude socio-démographique*, (5) + 92 + vi pp., Centre National des Hautes Etudes Juives, Brussels, 1968, n.p. (mimeographed).

JACOB M. LANDAU, *The Arabs in Israel, A Political Study*, xiii + 300 pp., Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, 70s.

Israel has in recent years attracted much social research, and the Arab sector has had its fair share. In a way, the Arabs have been luckier than the Jews of Israel, because some of the most intensive investigations have been carried out on their society, economics, and politics. Mr. Krajzman's book attempts to review previous work done in several spheres, particularly the political, socio-economic, cultural, and demographic. Mr. Landau sets himself the more limited, though not less ambitious, task, for the first time to 'expose the special political problems of the Arabs in Israel . . . to systematic research'. He uses published material, newspaper cuttings, and a certain amount of interviewing to produce an original study. To what extent have the two books turned existing literature to good account and advanced our understanding of Israel's Arabs?

At first sight, Mr. Krajzman's book is unprepossessing; it is short, cyclo-styled, and personal, and place-names are misspelled (e.g., *Harpish* instead of *Hurfaish*; many other place-names are corrupted almost beyond recognition). The bibliography is chaotic; it is arranged neither in alphabetical nor in subject order, authors' names are misspelled (in some cases first names are stated as family names, e.g., Aharon, Layish), and some important items have been left out (such as Don Peretz's and Henry Rosenfeld's books). On closer inspection, however, the picture improves, for Mr. Krajzman has evidently assimilated the literature thoroughly and intelligently, and he acknowledges his sources conscientiously. In particular, he has used to great advantage Yoram Ben-Porat's *The Arab Labor Force in Israel*, a scholarly and closely-reasoned work.

Mr. Landau's meticulous Select Bibliography extends to over seven pages. Items are grouped by language, and subdivided into books and articles. Arabic names and titles have been transcribed systematically, though the extension of this system to Hebrew names is unusual (Mr. Toledano, the Israeli Prime Minister's Adviser on Arab affairs, would scarcely recognize the spelling Ṭōleydānō). The footnotes are copious, almost awe-inspiring. It would be sheer pedantry to look for omissions in the bibliography, and yet there is one which is rather curious; it is Subhi Abu Ghosh's unpublished Ph.D. thesis on *The Politics of an Israeli Arab Village*, a study based on intensive field-work. Mr. Abu Ghosh served as Mr. Landau's research assistant, and Mr. Krajzman also acknowledges his help, yet both appear to be unaware of his work.

Mr. Landau seems to labour under the misapprehension that anthropological and economic studies are irrelevant to politics. He makes no reference in the body of his book to the work of Ben-Porat, one footnote is given to Henry Rosenfeld, and a few to Abner Cohen, although all three have made significant contributions to political analysis. He appears to attach greater weight to newspaper cuttings and political articles written by Israeli Arabs;

perhaps he considers these as primary sources and the books as secondary ones. If so, I disagree with his point of view, and not simply because Cohen's and Rosenfeld's books are the result of intensive field-work and Ben-Porat's contains unpublished material, but also because these books offer essential background material.

Anthropologists have often in the past been blamed for engaging in micro-analysis, with the twofold implication that they work on small unrepresentative segments of a population and that they do not take sufficient account of the environmental forces shaping the destinies of their subjects of research. The accusation is outmoded. On the contrary, anthropologists observing a selected segment of a society frequently gain valuable insights into forces and processes from outside impinging on the people they study. The old accusation has perhaps made anthropologists particularly sensitive to omissions of this kind. But I do feel that both Mr. Krajzman's and Mr. Landau's studies pay relatively little attention to two major environmental factors: the Israeli authorities' policies on the Arabs, and the effects of the Israeli–Arab conflict. These are, of course, such obvious things that, once stated, they are frequently allowed to fade into the background. But only when they are seen at work in concrete situations can their real significance be appreciated.

How, for instance, do the two books treat the Military Administration? Mr. Krajzman devotes five pages (24–28) to a detailed description of the Emergency Regulations of 1945 which were the legal basis of the Military Administration. He does not say much about the manner in which these regulations were enforced. The reader thus gains the impression that the Arabs were exposed to an arbitrary rule of the worst kind. In reality, the authorities gradually limited the application of the harsher regulations through self-imposed restraints, which were stated in the Knesset on repeated occasions when the regulations came up for annual review. Krajzman does not mention the fact that the actions of the Military Administration could be challenged in civilian courts or in Parliament, and that the system was officially abolished in 1966 (although the Emergency Regulations remained in force).

Mr. Landau devotes only a short passage (on p. 3) to an explicit discussion of the Military Administration. The legal background is sketched out in two sentences, followed by the rather misleading statement that 'these restrictions applied to Jews as well as to Arabs, and, in fact, only a few Arabs and Jews were closely affected'. Mr. Landau clearly attempts to play down the significance of the Military Administration. But an attentive reader will soon discover that the Administration affected all Arabs and intervened in local politics and in other matters. This is perhaps brought out most clearly in the case of the inter-village football matches arranged by the Kafr Qara' sports club (p. 218). Here the Military Administration suspected that the sports clubs were the nucleus of an incipient political organization of Arabs. So on the day of the match the Administration 'forbade entry to or exit from Kafr Qara''. Mr. Landau thus comes much closer than Mr. Krajzman to an appreciation of the Military Administration's impact on the Arabs. But he does not examine it systematically. I believe that such an examination would not only have been fruitful in itself, but would also have improved our understanding of the employment situation, political organization, and so forth. A few examples will suffice.

The Military Administration consisted of a small staff, who bore responsibility for all areas of administration. While all the government departments operated directly in the military zones, the Military Administration could restrict their activities and veto their plans on security grounds; it could even prohibit the entry of civil servants to military zones. It became customary procedure to subject activities, and especially new projects, to the scrutiny of the Military Administration, and this caused delays in execution. Over the years this resulted in inferior government services to the Arab sector. In order to cater for the special needs of the Arab population, as in education, local government and social welfare, the Israeli government had set up minorities departments in some ministries. These departments depended on close collaboration with the Military Administration, and the yardstick of equal service to all citizens could not be applied to their work. The services provided by such departments quite often lagged behind those provided by their Jewish counterparts. The gap widened over the years and, in some cases, the tendency to provide Arabs with a lower standard of services imperceptibly evolved into a policy.

The Arab sector possessed little capital of its own, so that almost no Arab industry developed. Jewish industrialists were not attracted to Arab areas, for the available labour was largely unskilled, local services were of a low standard, and the restrictions imposed by the Military Administration were an added organizational burden. In this fashion, the gap between the Arab and Jewish economies remained wide.

The Military Administration used movement permits as an important instrument of control. Areas inhabited mainly by Arabs were designated as military zones and entry into, or exit from, an area was made conditional on possession of a movement permit. Three military zones were established (initially the area was divided into as many as 19 zones), and Arabs living in one zone who wished to leave it or to enter another zone had to apply for a permit. Whatever may have been the military value of these regulations, they could equally well be used for other purposes. In the early years of Israel, Jewish immigrants arrived in large numbers and work was scarce. Movement permits were then issued to a limited number of Arabs, and only for short periods and for certain areas and purposes, so as not to flood the market with more work-seekers. When the labour situation improved, about 1959, the regulations were gradually relaxed; permits were issued more freely and for longer periods. Arabs soon drifted into seasonal jobs, especially in agriculture and construction. As their place of work changed frequently, as distances from village to town were short and bus services good, and as furthermore they were never certain that they would not lose their jobs as a result of administrative measures, most Arabs, and even those who worked mostly in towns, continued to live in villages. Both Mr. Landau (p. 6) and Mr. Krajzman (p. 46) refer to the fact that 'even those villagers who work in nearby towns, usually return home in the evening or every weekend', and Mr. Krajzman also notes the seasonal nature of the employment; but neither author realizes that this situation was due partly to the administrative restrictions on the free movement of Arabs.

Movement controls were also among the means used by the authorities to prevent Arabs from setting up their own political organizations. The above-

mentioned case of the football matches is an example in point. The Military
Administration considered any kind of organization that was not supervised
by Jewish bodies as a potential security risk, and drew no distinction between
a sports club and an organization whose expressed aims were political. Such
organizations were suppressed mainly by restricting the mobility of their
leaders. Only in 'pernicious' cases, such as the al-Ard group, and chiefly in
later years, had the authorities recourse to direct sanctions. Mr. Landau's
chapter on 'Political Organizations' provides poignant illustrations of this
policy. We learn that over the years there were several attempts to establish
Arab political parties; the earlier attempts went almost unnoticed by the
Israeli public, and Mr. Landau explains their failure as due either to lack of
interest on the part of the Arab public (p. 73) or to lack of public support
because of their political intransigence (p. 74). However, the al-Ard group
attracted a considerable following among the Arabs, from 1959 up to its
outlawing and dissolution in 1964, and apparently succeeded precisely
because of its intransigence (p. 103). In the following year, 1965, the first
political party that was virtually all-Arab was at last established. That was
the new Communist party (*Raqah*), which seceded from the Israeli Com-
munist party. The latter now became an almost exclusively Jewish party.
In the 1965 parliamentary elections, Raqah secured 22·6 per cent of Arab
votes, although it had been set up only three months before the elections.
How are we to explain the fact that the Arab public's political attitudes had
changed so considerably? The matter becomes clearer when it is seen in a
wider context.

The leaders of the earlier attempts to set up Arab political parties had
been subjected to restrictions of movement only, and yet their organizations
disbanded; they had evidently succumbed to relatively slight pressures. The
authorities took sterner measures against the al-Ard group, leading finally
to its outlawing and to the internment of its leaders, and yet it took them
several years to suppress it. And the Arab Communists were at last able to
set up their political party unopposed by the authorities. I believe that these
changes should be seen in conjunction with the gradual weakening of the
Military Administration. While at first it could curb Arab political ambitions
very effectively and quietly with the means at its disposal, later on it had to
obtain the assistance of other organizations in order to suppress the al-Ard
group: the Ministry of the Interior refused its application to register as an
'Ottoman' company, the Attorney-General applied to the courts to wind up
the organization, and its banning was made public in the official Gazette.
And finally, no steps at all were taken against the new Communist party;
by 1965 the Military Administration's powers had been drastically curtailed,
and it sought no more to restrain Arab political activities.

The absence of Arab political parties left Arabs no choice but either to
vote for Jewish parties or to abstain from voting. Many of the Jewish parties
were not inclined to accept Arabs as members or to support their specific
political demands. Yet Arab voting participation was consistently high, as
Mr. Landau points out; it went up to a maximum of 92 per cent in the 1955
parliamentary elections. The vote was split mainly between three parties:
Mapai and allied Arab lists, whose share was regularly over 50 per cent;
Mapam, averaging about 10 per cent of the votes; and the Communists, who

obtained about 20 per cent. All the other parties obtained under 20 per cent
of the votes. Mr. Landau explains that Mapai, Mapam, and the Communists
were the only parties to take a permanent interest in the Arabs, while the
other parties approached them only at election time. This explanation may
apply to the Communist and Mapam votes, but not to Mapai. That party,
which has been in power continuously since the founding of the State, did
not accept Arab members and regularly established allied Arab lists just
before the elections. It had never formulated a precise policy with regard to
Arabs, and its election planks promised Arabs better services and economic
opportunities, but did not answer their political demands, such as the
abolition of the Military Administration or equal employment opportunities.

Mr. Landau's detailed discussion of the six parliamentary elections up to
1965 shows that Mapai has slowly but steadily lost ground among the Arabs.
Still, the proportion of Arabs voting for Mapai has been consistently higher
than that of Jews. The analysis of the election results indicates that Mapai
did better in small close-knit communities, such as Beduin tribes and small
villages, than in the towns and large villages. That is to say, it had better
results when voting could be controlled. Mr. Landau often explains the
election results in terms of contingencies, such as good or bad co-ordination
of election campaigns, squabbles over candidates, etc. But in the discussion
of the 1955 elections he remarks on 'the propensity of many Arab voters to
support a major party, with a decisive say in most matters concerning them'
(p. 120). I believe that this actually is the key to an understanding of the
distinct trends in voting: Arabs have been more dependent on state authori-
ties than Jews; the dependence is gradually decreasing, more slowly in
localities in which governmental supervision is strong than in those where
it is not.

This short discussion of the Military Administration and its effects on
various aspects of Arab society illustrates the basic shortcoming of both Mr.
Landau's and Mr. Krajzman's studies: inadequate treatment of the social
forces impinging on Arab society. Apart from this, the two books differ so
fundamentally in approach and presentation, that I shall not attempt to
compare their respective merits.

Mr. Krajzman's report is based on a limited number of facts spread over
many topics. He tries to make sense of his facts and, although the documenta-
tion is often insufficient, I would go along with many of his conclusions.

Nevertheless, while reading his book, I was constantly aware of a certain
bias. Mr. Krajzman's viewpoint is that of a liberal-minded observer whose
basic sympathies are with the Jews of Israel. He would like to see an ideal
Israel, unblemished by the defects and imperfections of ordinary states. To
him, Israel's treatment of its Arab citizens becomes an issue by which to
judge its moral standards. His position is neatly expressed in the book's
motto, quoting Weizmann, the first President of Israel: 'I am convinced that
the world will judge the Jewish state by its treatment of the Arabs.' It appears
that Israel cannot live up to Mr. Krajzman's high standards, and has not
achieved full equality of Jews and Arabs in the educational, economic, and
political spheres. And while he makes a conscious effort to present an im-
partial and balanced account, there are occasions when his bias comes
through. On p. 59, for instance, he states that 'in many areas of governmental

activities security reasons are advanced in order to restrain the Arab's possibilities of advancement'. He then shows that government departments, including those dealing directly with Arab affairs, are headed, and staffed mainly, by Jews. This statement should have been tempered by a reference to the (admittedly small numbers of) Arab judges, police and army officers, and senior civil servants.

Or take the discussion of Arab primary education on pp. 56–7: the author concentrates mainly on the rates of school attendance and finds that the Arab rate of attendance is still lower today than that of Jews, but admits that the gap is gradually narrowing. He does not, however, dwell on the important fact that the Israeli authorities chose to set up a school system employing Arabic as the language of instruction. Only from a stray reference to the 'penury of school manuals in the Arabic language' (p. 58) can the reader glean the information. Nor does he see the connexion between economic conditions and rates of school attendance.

Statements such as these, implying that Arabs are being discriminated against, should always be set out with the full facts and perhaps put in a wider frame of reference. If that were done, they might be evaluated differently. Mr. Krajzman does not seem, for instance, to take account of the intermittent warfare that has been going on between Israel and her Arab neighbours over the last twenty years. He appears not to consider security as a serious concern of the Israeli authorities, and cannot understand why it lends itself so easily to abuse. The fact that Israel's Arab citizens enjoy civil rights and that many of their disabilities have been removed over the years also goes unnoticed, as does the fact that the Arabs have been loyal citizens of the state under very trying conditions.

Mr. Landau's analysis is accompanied by a wealth of data, including over 50 pages of documents. The detailed case-material on the al-Ard group (pp. 92–107) is an excellent example. A great many of his facts belong to the domain of political ideologies, manifestos, use of mass communications, public image, and election results, whereas slightly less attention is paid to economic and political organization and processes. Such selective presentation is, of course, very common among political scientists and is probably connected with the easier accessibility of this type of material. It often goes hand in hand with a rather abstract approach and the extensive use of professional jargon. Mr. Landau is not primarily interested in abstractions and terminologies. He does not offer glib explanations, but prefers to bring out the intricacies of his subject. In this respect his work is superior to some other studies of Middle Eastern politics. Although his style is plain, the going is therefore not easy. However, the reader who assimilates the complexities of the material may find this a rewarding book.

Mr. Landau has no political axe to grind. Although he may occasionally treat the Israeli authorities too leniently, as in the discussions of the Military Administration and the expropriation of land, in general his evaluations are cautious and fair.

<div style="text-align: right">EMANUEL MARX</div>

ROBERT BURGESS and DON BUSHELL Jr., eds. *Behavioral Sociology. The Experimental Analysis of Social Process*, xiii + 418 pp., Columbia University Press, London and New York, 1970, 113s.

This book is based on the premiss that the notion of 'reinforcement' can illuminate wide areas of sociology and provides a basis for genuine explanatory theories based on the most general psychological propositions. Sociology when regarded as a pursuit *sui generis* in the Durkheimian manner is seen as too rich in concepts and embarrassed by taxonomies masquerading as theories. The programme is stated with characteristic vigour by George Homans in a Prologue which develops his controversial 'On Bringing Men [i.e. psychology] Back In', in the *American Sociological Review*, December 1964. The relation of 'behavioural' concepts to the notion of rational behaviour and to reductionism and to the question of 'emergent' properties is clearly stated. History is seen as the lengthened shadow—not precisely of a man—but of certain very general processes such as norm formation which can in principle be manipulated in the small experimental group. This Prologue should be read in relation to the final article by Richard Emerson integrating 'operant psychology' and Exchange Theory. This tries to embed psychology in notions like coalition and power: who, in terms of ability to reinforce, controls whom, and what opportunity costs are involved in complex reciprocal relations and networks.

There is an article by Skinner on 'Contingencies of Reinforcement on the Design of a Culture', and a behavioural analysis of Hagen, McClelland, *et al.* on the process of social change by J. H. Kunkel. The same analytic mode is applied variously to the work place, home, school, socialization in general, status hierarchies, and criminal behaviour. The editors provide introductions to each section: laboratory experiments, field experiments and more 'speculative' areas of general culture.

<div align="right">DAVID MARTIN</div>

CHRONICLE

The first Yonina Talmon Prize will be awarded in 1971 for an article on Family and Kinship (including sociological aspects of gerontology).

Manuscripts must be submitted in either English, French, or Hebrew and be unpublished scientific papers appropriate for publication in a social science journal. Preference will be given to junior scholars.

Candidates should submit six copies of their manuscript and curriculum vitae as follows:

(Hebrew Manuscripts)	The Yonina Talmon Prize c/o Chairman, Department of Sociology The Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel
(French & English Manuscripts)	Mrs. Charlotte Green Schwartz 164 Gardner Road Brookline, Mass. 02146 U.S.A.

Deadline for the receipt of papers is November 1, 1970. For further details, write to The Secretary of the Department of Sociology at The Hebrew University.

Selection Committee: Yehoshua Arieli, S. N. Eisenstadt, Meyer Fortes, Max Gluckman, Charlotte Green Schwartz, and Kurt H. Wolff.

*

Last March the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption announced in Jerusalem that 71,350 immigrants came to Israel in 1968 and 1969. Almost two-thirds of the total (41,000) were from Western countries while 26,000 came from Oriental countries. A further 4,335 were Israelis who had settled abroad but had now returned. In 1968 there were 2,300 immigrants from Latin America; in 1969 there were 3,000, about half of whom came from Argentina.

The Jewish Agency's Immigration and Absorption Department in the United States has reported that they have recently received each month enquiries from more than 500 heads of households about jobs and housing in Israel. Last year they received an average of 280 enquiries each month.

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The European Council of Jewish Community Services, Geneva, records (in *Exchange Information Service* no. 8, Feb. 1970) the reception in Denmark of Jews from Poland. Of the 11,000 Jews estimated to have left Poland since

the Six-Day War, nearly 1,400 had by February this year found refuge in Denmark, most of them arriving direct from Warsaw. Jews quitting Poland are required to abandon their Polish nationality and indicate their intention of going to Israel, but once out of the country they may in fact go where they can find a home.

Responsibility for the newcomers in Denmark has been taken by agencies for Jewish refugees and the Danish government. Arriving in the country, the Polish Jews are sheltered, fed, and given lessons in Danish. They spend their first three or four weeks in a 'floating hotel' while their cases are being dealt with by the Danish authorities. Leaving the ship, they become the responsibility of the Danish Refugee Council which makes use of government funds to furnish the refugees with accommodation while they learn the language and, with the assistance of the Council, find jobs and housing. The Chairman of the Council is Professor I. Foighel, who is also Chairman of the Danish ORT. To cope with the task, the Council has expanded its staff from 8 to 88.

The influx poses a serious problem to the Danish Jewish community, which is a mere 6,000 strong and must now find the organization to integrate a new population a quarter of its existing size. The problem is complicated by the fact that the newcomers include many who were so assimilated to Polish life and so affected by the Communist attitude to Israel that they appear barely Jewish to Danish Jewry. The community has made arrangements for the needs of those refugees who feel themselves to be Jewish, and a programme is now under way to improve and expand those provisions. A special campaign is being planned to raise the funds necessary to finance the programme.

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The number of Jews from eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, who have sought temporary refuge in western Europe since the Six-Day War and been helped by the American Joint Distribution Committee is put at 14,000; the cost was £1·25 million. There are 1,400 Polish and other eastern European Jewish transmigrants in Rome, where on 1 January this year a programme was launched for the cultural and recreational needs of the transmigrants aged between 16 and 30 years; the group is estimated at about 400.

*

There are 98 Jewish Communities in Rumania; each one was represented at a conference of communal leaders held in Bucharest last March. The total Jewish population of the country is about 100,000; there are 183 synagogues, and nine kasher restaurants which provide free meals for those unable to pay. The Federation of Rumanian Jewish Communities gives assistance to more than 7,000 persons—the majority of whom are aged and ill.

*

Israel's Ministry of Agriculture stated last March that it is expanding its agricultural aid programme to twelve more countries; there will be a total of 140 experts in 58 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Courses are being organized in Israel for 350 trainees from abroad, and there are also courses planned for 350 students in their own countries. The Ministry's experts abroad are engaged in developing water resources and introducing new farming methods; they are also helping to establish moshav-type farming villages.

<p style="text-align:center">*</p>

The Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality published in 1970 its *Statistical Yearbook 1959*. It notes that the population of the city continues to decrease: 384,700 inhabitants as against 388,000 in 1967 and 394,000 in 1963. There has also been a decrease in family size: 3·2 in 1968 against 3·5 in 1962.

On the other hand there has been a marked increase in the number of inhabitants settling in the immediate environs of the Municipality, especially in Bat Yam and Holon. Whereas in 1961, 17·7 per cent of Israel's entire population lived in the Municipality, in 1963, only 16·2 per cent did so, and in 1968, 13·5 per cent. Bat Yam and Holon accounted for 3·7 of the country's entire population in 1961, while in 1968 the percentage had risen to 5·2.

In the Municipality there has been an increase in the proportion of inhabitants aged 65 years and over. They constituted 4·4 per cent of the population in 1948; 6·9 per cent in 1961; 9·2 per cent in 1965; and 10·7 per cent in 1967. There has been a corresponding decrease in the percentage of children under the age of four years; they accounted for 11·3 per cent of the Municipality's population in 1948; 8·2 per cent in 1961; 6·9 per cent in 1965; and only 6·5 per cent in 1967.

Economic activity

The main sectors of economic activity are the productive branch of crafts and industry (which account for 31 per cent of all the Municipality's employees: 74,000 persons); public and personal services (72,000); commerce and banking (47,000); transport and storage (21,000); and construction (15,000).

There has been an increase in the proportion of women engaged in a gainful occupation: in 1961 24·2 per cent of all employed persons were women; by 1968 the percentage had increased to 28·5. Fifty per cent of the total female labour force of 67,600 are engaged in public and personal services; 22 per cent are in commerce and banking; 21 per cent in manufacture; and 7 per cent in other sectors.

More lawyers and engineers have been registered in the city. 959 lawyers in 1969, compared with 874 in 1968; and 377 engineers in 1969 compared with 322 in the previous year.

Housing

In 1968 there were 125,600 homes in the city; the average size of each unit was 49 square metres, excluding verandah space.

In 1969, 2,700 new flats were completed in the Municipality; 62 per cent were three-room flats while 21 per cent contained four or more rooms. The majority of buildings erected in 1969 had four or more storeys.

CHRONICLE

Education

In 1969 there were 482 educational institutions approved by the Ministry of Education, with a total enrolment of 88,300 pupils. Of these, 61,300 are in municipal schools; the proportion of pupils attending the Municipality's secondary schools has nearly doubled: 11·9 per cent in 1970 as against 6·1 per cent in 1960.

Enrolment at Tel Aviv University is increasing rapidly: from 6,730 students in 1967 to 10,690 in 1970. A new Department for training social workers has been opened with 80 students. The sexes are equally represented in the University student population.

Consumer goods

There was a further increase in the ownership of durable goods in 1968, reflecting the rise in the standard of living: two-thirds of the population owned transistor radio sets, as against half the population in 1966; more than 10 per cent of all households had television sets, as against 2·5 per cent the previous year; 26 per cent had a vacuum cleaner compared with 19 per cent in 1966; 24 per cent of households had a private car as against 18 per cent in 1967 and 10 per cent in 1965; in 1960 there were 27 cars per 1,000 inhabitants while in 1968 there were 78. Finally, there are washing machines in 28 per cent of all households in the Municipality.

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It was announced in Jerusalem last January that of the 11,500 Jews who left Poland in 1968 and 1969, only 3,200 had gone to Israel. About 3,000 are in the Scandinavian countries, and a further 3,000 in Italy.

*

The World ORT Union met in Geneva last February and approved an expenditure of £8 million for 1970, the ninetieth year of its existence. ORT's director-general stated that this was the largest budget for the largest programme in ORT's history. The increase of £625,000 over the 1969 budget will be spent mainly for expanding ORT's activities in Israel, France, Iran, India, and Argentina.

In 1969 there had been an increase of 14 per cent in the number of students over the previous year (from 50,196 to 57,205); a total of 14,874 adolescent and adult students had qualified.

*

Israel's Ministry of Tourism last March released figures showing a considerable growth in the country's tourist industry. In 1965, only £2½ million was invested in tourist facilities; in 1968, the figure was just over £6 million; in 1969 it reached £10 million: this represented 25 per cent of all new investments approved under the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment. The number of tourists who visited Israel in the first quarter of 1970 was 84,000—as against 69,000 for the same period in 1969. The largest

number (32,800) came from the United States; 7,300 came from France and 6,700 from Great Britain.

In April 1970, about 38,000 tourists went to Israel from various countries.

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The American Joint Distribution Committee recently sponsored a survey of Jewish Education in Europe; the results of the Survey were published last April. There are 47 Jewish day schools in eleven European countries, with a total enrolment of 9,044 children. There are also children following part-time courses in various classes attached to synagogues or institutions. It is estimated that out of a total of some 135,000 Jewish children in Europe aged between six and seventeen years, only about 28,000 receive any kind of formal Jewish tuition.

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The World Union of Jewish Students held a Seminar in Kiljava, Finland, from 28th December 1969 to 2nd January 1970. The subject of the Seminar was 'Towards an Ideology for the Jewish People'. There were 140 participants at the Seminar; they came from Israel, the United States, Scandinavia, and other European countries.

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The International Sociological Association, sponsored by UNESCO and in co-operation with the Bulgarian Sociological Association, announces that the Seventh World Congress of Sociology will be held in Varna, Bulgaria, from 14th to 19th September 1970. The theme of the Congress will be 'Contemporary and Future Societies: Prediction and Social Planning'.

Further information can be obtained from the International Sociological Association Secretariat, Via Daverio 7, 20122 Milano, Italy—cable address: Isagram—Milano.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

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Dressler, David, *Practice and Theory of Probation and Parole*, 347 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, London, 1970, 90*s*.

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Fernandes, Florestan, *The Negro in Brazilian Society*, ed. by Phyllis B. Eveleth, trans. by Jacqueline D. Skiles, A. Brunel, and Arthur Rothwell, xxv + 489 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1969, $12.50.

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Ginzberg, Eli with Ostow, Miriam, *Men, Money and Medicine*, x + 291 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, London, 1970, 76*s*.

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ANTONOVSKY, Aaron; Ph.D., Senior Research Associate, Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem, and Teaching Associate, Department of Social Medicine, Hebrew University-Hadassah Medical School. Chief publications: (ed.) *Discrimination and Low Incomes*, New York, 1959; (ed.) *The Early Jewish Labor Movement in the United States*, New York, 1961; (ed.) *Poverty and Health: A Sociological Analysis*, Cambridge, Mass., 1969. He is now preparing a monograph of which the paper which appears in this issue of the *Journal* is a part.

ARIAN, Asher; Ph.D., Senior Lecturer and Chairman, Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University. Chief publications: *Ideological Change in Israel*, Cleveland, Ohio, 1968; (ed. with C. Press) *Empathy and Ideology: Aspects of Administrative Innovation*, Chicago, 1966; (with S. Weiss) 'Split-ticket Voting in Israel', *Western Political Quarterly*, June 1969; 'The Role of Ideology in Determining Behaviour', *Sociological Review*, March 1967; 'Voting and Ideology in Israel', *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Aug. 1966. He is now engaged in work on a volume to be called *Electoral Behavior in Israel*.

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KLARBERG, Meshullam; B.A. (Hons.), Senior Hebrew Master, Yeshiva College, Melbourne. Engaged in linguistic research on spoken Hebrew.

LIEBMAN, Charles S.; M.A., Ph.D., Associate Professor, Bar-Ilan University. Formerly Associate Professor, Yeshiva University and Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania. Chief publications: *Suburban Differ-*

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LIPSET, Harry; M.A., Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Tel Aviv University, and Research Fellow, Institute of Diaspora Research. Formerly Assistant Professor of Education, Brooklyn College. Chief publications: 'The Status of National Minority Languages in Soviet Education', *Soviet Studies*, vol. XIX, no. 2, Oct. 1967; 'Education of Moslems in Tsarist and Soviet Russia', *Comparative Education Review*, vol. XII, no. 3, Oct. 1968; 'Social Class and Higher Education among Jews in Tsarist Russia', *Megamot*, vol. XVI, no. 4, Nov. 1969; 'National and Political Views of Jewish Students in Tsarist Russia', in press in *Hatsionut*; 'The Rise and Fall of Jewish Schools in Soviet Russia', in press in *Behinot*. He is working on a history of Jewish students in Russian and Soviet universities.

MEMMI, Albert; Chargé de Conférences, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris. Chief publications: *Portrait du Colonisé précédé du Portrait du Colonisateur*, Paris, 1957; *Portrait d'un Juif*, Paris, 1962; *La libération du Juif*, Paris, 1966; *L'homme dominé*, Paris, 1968; *Le scorpion*, Paris, 1969. He is engaged in work on social psychopathology.

PRAIS, S. J.; M. Com., Ph.D., Consultant to the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London. Formerly Economist, International Monetary Fund; Adviser to the Government of Israel on economic statistics; Assistant Lecturer, University of Cambridge. Chief publications: (co-author) *The Analysis of Family Budgets*, Cambridge, 1955; 'Measuring Social Mobility', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1955; 'The Measurement of Changes in the Cost of Living', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1958; contributor to Tew and Henderson, eds., *Studies in Company Finance*, Cambridge, 1959; 'A Note on Standardized Mortality Rates for Some Jewish Communities', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. IX, no. 1, June 1967.

SCHMOOL, Marlena; B. Soc. Soc. (E.P.S.), Research Officer, Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London. Engaged in a survey of the size and social structure of Anglo-Jewry and in statistical surveys of various aspects of Anglo-Jewish life.

ZOBERMAN, Nicole; licence de psychologie, psychologist in the Ministry of Education, France. Chief publications: papers with A. Memmi and S. Zoberman in *Revue Française de Sociologie*; papers with J. Pacière and G. Rebuffe in *Courrier de la Recherche Pédagogique*.

ZOBERMAN, Samuel; engineer, C.N.A.M., Paris; works in the field of computers and teaches in engineering schools. Chief publications: papers with A. Memmi and N. Zoberman in *Revue Française de Sociologie*; papers on statistics in French scientific periodicals.