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THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE ANGLO-JEWISH POPULATION, 1960-65*

S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool

1. *Introduction*

THE official census of population in Britain does not collect information on religion, though this is done in certain Commonwealth and European countries; consequently (and as is well-known) the only available population statistics relating to Anglo-Jewry are based on uncertain inferences of one sort or another. The major object of the present paper is to add precision to existing estimates of the size and structure of the Jewish population of Great Britain by means of an analysis of mortality statistics recently compiled by the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies. This compilation forms part of the Unit's programme of gathering comprehensive statistical information on the community, and follows earlier work on marriage statistics (Prais and Schmool, 1967, referred to subsequently as the 'Marriages Study').

The method adopted in the present paper has previously been used in estimating the size of the London Jewish community for a number of earlier years: for 1931-33 by Kantorowitsch, for 1929 by Trachtenberg, and (as part of a more involved analysis) by Rosenbaum for 1901. The estimate by Kantorowitsch, with certain subsequent rough adjustments, has formed the basis of the usually quoted figure for London over the last thirty years; one of the main tasks of this paper may be said to be to bring Kantorowitsch's estimate up to date, as well as broadening its scope to cover the whole country.¹

Although the method of estimation is approximate, and has certain limitations, it has the advantage of being economical in resources and time, and of providing valuable comparisons with estimates for the earlier years mentioned.

In addition to estimating the total size of the community (section 3), further evidence is given in this paper of its rate of decline (section 6);

* This investigation was carried out by the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, London.

the paper also examines its geographical distribution (section 7), and degree of synagogue affiliation (sections 5 and 8).

The definition of the community for statistical purposes provides certain well-known problems, since there is a complex of 'fringe' elements, more or less attached to the community, and which—according to the precise definition adopted—could be either included or excluded in the estimation of its size. The definition adopted here is governed by the data at our disposal: our estimates relate to all those persons who, whatever their way of living may be, sufficiently identify with the community to be buried (or cremated) under synagogue auspices at the end of their lives. An attempt is made to estimate, as part of this broad class, the size of one particular 'fringe' group, namely, those who are not formally affiliated to a synagogue during their life; these topics are explored in section 4.

Our Marriages Study covered the 65-year period 1901–65; but, owing to the greater volume of compilation involved, the present study has necessarily been restricted—in the main—to the recent, and shorter, period 1960–65. Further research on mortality data is in hand, and will be reported in due course.²

2. *Notes on method*

The basic compilatory work involved in preparing the estimates has been the collection of data on burials and cremations from synagogues, burial societies, and certain cemeteries and crematoria. Information relating to the numbers dying, classified by age and sex, for the six years 1960–65 was supplied by approximately a hundred organizations in Great Britain. This information was obtained in full for the London area, the Board's research staff abstracting the required data from the original records; information for the provinces was generally obtained by postal questionnaire but, in order not to place too great a burden on voluntary correspondents in the provinces at this stage, the number dying each year was requested as classified by sex only (and not by age). In future years, when the reporting system has become more routinized, it is hoped to receive age distributions from provincial communities as well.

The central assumption in calculating a population estimate on the basis of the number of deaths is that the mortality rate for the Jewish population is comparable to that of the general population. From pre-war evidence (Ruppin, 1934, pp. 83 ff.) it is, however, known that Jewish mortality tends to be lower than that of the general population, and hence the use of general mortality rates, without any adjustment, would lead to an underestimate of the Jewish population. To provide a correction factor, a study was made of some post-war census data for territories (Switzerland and Montreal, Canada) for which official data could be obtained without too much difficulty (Prais, 1967). This

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indicated that Jewish mortality is between 5 and 15 per cent lower than general mortality, and we have accordingly increased the population estimate by a round 10 per cent to allow for lower Jewish mortality. Studies of further countries are clearly desirable; in the meantime a margin of error of ± 5 per cent should be kept in mind with regard to this adjustment.

The procedure has therefore been to inflate the numbers dying in each age-sex group by the mortality rate for that group (by using rates for England and Wales, 1962), and finally to adjust the grand total upwards by 10 per cent, to reflect the available evidence on lower Jewish mortality. For the provinces, since no age breakdown was available at this stage, we used an overall death rate based on the assumption that the age distribution for each sex in the provinces was the same as in London.

The use of a six-year period of mortality (1960-65) as the basis for the estimates rather than, say, a single year requires a further word of explanation. It will be appreciated that the shorter the period, the smaller is the number of deaths occurring, and the greater the opportunity of chance fluctuations both in that number and in the consequent estimate of population size. In order to gain precision, the 'period of observation' has therefore been extended to cover the six years 1960-65. The measure of uncertainty in the estimate due to chance factors, usually summarized in terms of a 'sampling error', has also been calculated here, following the procedure of Trachtenberg (1933, p. 93).

Fuller details of the sources and methods of the study are given in Appendix A; tables setting out the basic data compiled are gathered together in Appendix D.

3. *Total population*

The calculated average Jewish population of Great Britain for the period 1960-65, by the use of the method of estimation outlined, totals some 410,000. This divides into a total of 280,000 for the London region, and 130,000 for the provincial communities.³ The London region is thus estimated to account for just over two-thirds of the total community.

Our estimate for London conforms with that given in the *Jewish Year Book* (also 280,000). The latter is presumably⁴ founded on Dr. Neustatter's work (1955, p. 73) which, starting from the estimate for 1931-33 by Kantorowitsch based on mortality data, was extrapolated to 1950 by the use of rough estimates of the rates of migration and natural increases for the intervening period. For the provinces, however, the *Year Book's* implied total of 170,000 is very different from our figure of 130,000; we therefore looked for the sources of this discrepancy, with the following results.

The populations of the towns individually listed in the *Year Book*

(1964) total just under 125,000; to this there is implicitly added a very rough estimate of 45,000 for those living in scattered places, not individually identified, a total of some 170,000 being reached.

Our estimate of 130,000 for the provinces would be consistent with the *Year Book's* estimate of 125,000 for the enumerated towns, if the number living in scattered places, not individually identified, amounted only to some 5,000. The question, therefore, reduces itself to this: on what does the *Year Book* base its figure of 45,000 for the scattered places?

On investigation, there does not appear to be any very solid basis for the latter figure. It is a residual figure between the total *Year Book* estimate of 450,000 and that for the individually listed towns. Thus, it was the national total of 450,000 that required investigation. Its foundation had to be traced as far back as 1901, when Rosenbaum, using methods analogous to our own, estimated the Jewish population of the United Kingdom at 240,000.

Dr. Redcliffe N. Salaman subsequently (1921) took that estimate as his starting point for saying that in 1914 the population was 'probably over 300,000', after allowing for natural increase and migration, which (again following Rosenbaum) were roughly put at 5,000 and 6,000 a year respectively. This was clearly intended to be a very rough estimate.

For her more recent estimate, Dr. Neustatter (1955, p. 73) started with Dr. Salaman's figure of 300,000 for 1914, halved the assumed rate of natural increase to 2,500 a year (giving 90,000 over the 36 years intervening), and added a rough estimate of 60,000 for immigration, to yield the total of 450,000 that now appears in the *Year Book*. In other words, for the past 60 years rough estimates of annual increase in total national population have been welded successively on to Rosenbaum's figure for 1901. The estimates of annual rates of increase in the intervening period may have been of the correct order of magnitude: but gross errors can clearly cumulate when such rough annual estimates are added together over such an extensive period of time. It is apparent, therefore, that there has been no sound basis in recent decades for an estimate of the total size of *provincial* Anglo-Jewry; accordingly we have little hesitation in putting forward our lower estimate despite its substantial reduction on the hitherto commonly accepted figure.

The statistical sampling error associated with our population estimate for the whole country is $\pm 1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent; for the London population it is ± 2 per cent, and for the provinces as a whole, on the assumptions made, it is ± 1 per cent. The uncertainty due to the mortality rate assumptions, as already noted, should be set at ± 5 per cent; this is the more important source of uncertainty as far as the population for the whole country is concerned while for individual towns, each covering a smaller population, the sampling error would become more important.⁵

Could the accuracy of these estimates be improved by using some

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other method, for example (as is often argued), a household sample survey? Such a sample would probably be drawn from community lists, the comprehensiveness of which would be subject to margins of error which might exceed those just quoted: an area-sample⁶ might be used in order to improve the coverage, but would be inordinately expensive and, in practice, also subject to serious inaccuracies. Accordingly, so long as religious affiliation is not included among the questions in the official national census of population, it would appear that margins of error of the size quoted must inevitably be kept in mind.⁷

An independent—though rough—check on our provincial population estimate is provided by the returns of male membership made by synagogues to the Board of Deputies, in connexion with the elections to the Board in 1967.⁸ These returns are subject to certain qualifications: they vary in accuracy (some being given only to the nearest hundred); they are calculated on varying bases (referring, according to differing synagogue practices, to heads of households only, or to males over 25, etc.); and there is some overlapping due to multiple membership. Yet they are of interest in that they show provincial membership in 1967 as 30 per cent of the national total, which is quite close to the 32 per cent given by our population estimates.

The male synagogue membership returned for the country as a whole numbered some 88,000, indicating that there are just under five persons in the population for each male member; this is of the order of magnitude to be expected, non-membership (discussed in the next section) being allowed for.

On the basis of our estimate, the growth of the London Jewish population from the beginning of this century can now be traced more or less consistently as follows. For 1901 Rosenbaum, using a combination of burial and marriage statistics, arrived at an estimate of 144,000. For 1931-33, we have Kantorowitsch's estimate for Greater London of 234,000. Our estimate for 1960-65, as already said, is 280,000, and suggests a rather modest increase in the intervening generation in the face of substantial immigration.⁹

Looking at the broad picture over the past 60 years, we see that the London population has thus doubled. The provincial population has, however, grown more slowly; for 1901 we have Rosenbaum's implied estimate of 90,000, and this has now grown (on our estimate) to no more than 130,000, that is, by some 50 per cent.

Whilst preparing the population estimates we examined the data to find whether they indicated any imbalance in the community's sex ratio. The investigation turned out to be somewhat laborious and, though interesting, not conclusive in all respects. It has therefore been relegated to Appendix B. The brief conclusion drawn there is that there are no grounds for suspecting the sex ratio for the community as a whole to be seriously out of balance.

4. *Communal affiliation*

We turn now to examine more closely the limits of the population covered in our estimate of 410,000. It will be obvious that the estimate inevitably excludes anyone who is completely outside the community, even though he might be considered Jewish on certain technical criteria (for example, someone born of a Jewish mother—even without any prior marriage ceremony—may be Jewish according to religious law but, if he had no formal link with the community during life, or at death, he would not be covered in any communal statistics). With substantial intermarriage taking place, there must be many such persons,¹⁰ but we are not in a position to estimate the order of magnitude involved.¹¹ In other words, our estimates relate solely to those connected in some way with the organized community.

There is a small exception to this rule, in that within the London area we have been able to identify, and include in the estimated total, a small portion of the unaffiliated community; this section corresponds to those persons who are cremated privately (that is, not under the auspices of a Reform or Liberal synagogue). Such a cremation may be recognized by the crematorium as being of a Jew if, for example, a Jewish minister of religion is recorded as having attended informally. Such cremations amounted to some 2½ per cent of all London deaths and, after grossing-up by mortality rates, represent some 2 per cent of the estimated London Jewish population. We are not able to estimate the size of the iceberg, the tip of which these 2 per cent represent, but, having identified this section, we have included it in our estimated grand total, though we appreciate that it could equally validly be excluded.

Further, within the estimated total of 410,000, it is possible to distinguish those who do not belong to a synagogue at the time of their death yet are buried with Jewish rites and under synagogue auspices.¹² This group consists of persons who, to varying extents, are outside the synagogue-affiliated community. Some may be non-practising Jews; but others may have a pattern of life similar to that of synagogue members (for example, they may attend synagogues as frequently) but may be prevented by poverty or illness from acquiring formal membership, or may consider formal attachment unnecessary, perhaps because they are not married.

The statistical enquiries so far undertaken to estimate the extent of non-membership relate to London, and to only two years: to 1961 (which was chosen because the distribution of deaths by age in that year most nearly approached the pattern for the total period, 1960-65, under review), and to 1933—roughly a generation earlier. For 1961 it was discovered that 34 per cent of all burials under synagogue auspices related to non-members; after grossing-up by mortality rates these were found to represent 39 per cent of the population. Some of these non-

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members were found to have contributed to Friendly Societies which have special arrangements with the West End Great and Western Synagogues.¹³ This group accounted for 4 per cent of all burials under synagogue auspices, representing 3 per cent of the population. Thus, the proportion of synagogue burials relating to persons not formally affiliated to the community (that is, neither to a synagogue nor to a Friendly Society), may be put at 30 per cent, accounting for 36 per cent of the population.

The picture changes very slightly if cremations carried out without formal synagogue recognition (discussed above) are considered together with synagogue burials; in that case 32½ per cent of all deaths relate to persons not formally affiliated to the community, and account for 38 per cent of the total estimated London Jewish population.

That over a third of the estimated population should be found unaffiliated to a synagogue seemed to us to require further investigation. We therefore gathered some additional descriptive information about this group. A small sample, consisting of one in every five male non-members dying in 1961, was drawn from the burial registers of the United Synagogue, and information was gathered on these persons from notes on the registers, discussions with burial society officials, etc. The sample is too small to provide results that are statistically reliable, but is perhaps adequate to indicate some of the major social characteristics of this particular group.¹⁴

First, it was discovered that a substantial portion (about a third) of the non-member sample lived in East London (a declining area from the Jewish point of view), and generally followed working-class occupations. Second, non-members were frequently found to be pensioners, or to have received national assistance, or to have suffered a protracted illness which prevented their working. Thus we seem to have a broad class which may be precluded by financial reasons from joining a synagogue, and which must be expected to have a style of life rather different from the middle-class Jewish stereotype. Third, there were indications that non-members may be to some extent isolated from the main community, either geographically (by living in areas where they are perhaps the only Jew or Jewish family), or socially (perhaps through marriage to a non-Jew). Fourth, it was found that though certain non-members were not affiliated to the synagogue under whose auspices they were buried, they may have been members of other synagogues. However, the proportion found to be affiliated to other synagogues was not substantial, amounting to about 2 per cent of all deaths; accordingly, the proportion of persons without formal communal affiliation should be reduced from 38 to 36 per cent of the total estimated population. Within the total population, the proportions affiliated to a synagogue should thus be put at 61 per cent, and to a Friendly Society (only) at 3 per cent.

In summary, we obtain the following outline of the London community by degree of attachment:

	<i>per cent</i>
Formally affiliated to a synagogue	61
Not a synagogue member but subscribes to a Jewish Friendly Society	3
Not a member of a synagogue or a Friendly Society, but family, friends, or institution arrange for Jewish burial	34
Cremation not under synagogue auspices, but Jewish minister present informally	2
Total	<hr/> 100

5. *Rise in synagogue membership since 1933*

In an attempt to discover whether the extent of synagogue membership in London had changed over the past generation, the records for 1933 were similarly analysed for synagogue (and Friendly Society) membership. It was found that 55 per cent of all persons then dying did not belong to a synagogue, accounting for 65 per cent of the total Jewish population. Of these, about 4 per cent (of the deaths and also of the corresponding population) were affiliated to a Friendly Society; 61 per cent therefore had no formal affiliation to a synagogue or Friendly Society. Thus, over the past generation, the proportion of the community formally affiliated to a synagogue has risen from 35 to 61 per cent—a striking change.

Over the same period (1934–62), the number of places of worship in England and Wales registered as synagogues with the Registrar General rose from 310 to 400, compared with a rise in the Jewish population from 297,000 (*Year Book* estimate) to 410,000 (our estimate); that is, the rises for the country as a whole are parallel, indicating a rough constancy in the number of synagogues per thousand of the population. General impressions suggest that the average size of synagogues has, however, probably increased, though no numerical data are available to confirm this.

For the London region, the number of synagogues listed in the *Year Book* has risen more sharply over the period, from 132 to 230 (by 74 per cent), compared with a population rise estimated (section 3 above) at 20 per cent; thus, for London the number of synagogues (or at least, of the type of synagogue that has its address in the *Year Book*) has risen substantially in relation to the population, in conformity with the trend in synagogue membership shown by our mortality statistics.

There remains an important question of interpretation: does the rise in synagogue membership necessarily indicate a growth in religious interest and participation, or could there be other, less religiously-oriented, reasons for the rise? It has already been noted that whether a person belongs to a synagogue may depend on his ability to pay membership fees; membership might therefore be expected to rise simply because the material standing of the community is higher now than it was in the depressed 1930s. Conversations with synagogue secretaries,

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ministers, etc., also suggest that people now often join a synagogue mainly to secure burial rights for themselves and their families.¹⁵

In addition, it must be remembered that, in many parts of the Continent, synagogue and community membership were distinct, the latter being automatic and the former voluntary. Immigrants on reaching this country may not necessarily have felt any traditional need to join a synagogue. Early synagogue organization in this country also limited full membership ('free-members') to the wealthier strata of society,¹⁶ and it is not clear to what extent junior membership ('seat-holders') from the poorer classes was actively encouraged. The distinction between different classes of members has now been virtually abolished, and synagogue membership today has probably a rather different social and moral connotation from what it had a generation or two ago.

It is not possible to go further into these matters without exceeding the scope of this paper; and, therefore, though there are reservations, it must be accepted that the rise in synagogue membership is one of the more positive changes to have occurred in recent decades. Irrespective of what may have been happening to the fringe of the community or, indeed, to the community as a whole, it appears that its core is now in certain respects more closely affiliated to synagogal institutions than it was a generation ago.

6. *The rate of decline*

In the Marriages Study it was found (p. 151) that the number of synagogue marriages had declined in recent years, and that the synagogue marriage rate was now low, at about a half, or at best two-thirds, that of the general population. These facts indicated that the Jewish population of this country (or, at least, that section that celebrates its marriages in a synagogue) is declining at a substantial rate.

By a comparison of marriage and death statistics, the rate of decline and, more particularly, its variation among different sections of the community can be examined more closely for the past few years. The basis of these comparisons is as follows: for a population that is not changing its size, in any given period the numbers born, marrying, and dying will be about the same. If the population is growing steadily, the number born will tend to be greater than the number marrying, which will be greater than the number dying; and the reverse will hold if the population is declining.

In practice, even in a stationary population, the number of persons marrying will differ somewhat from the number of deaths since, on the one hand, not everyone marries and, on the other hand, some persons marry more than once. To take England and Wales, 1962, as an example, the number of marriages was greater than the number of deaths by about a quarter, resulting from a fair proportion of second marriages (1 in 10)¹⁷, combined with a slightly rising population trend.

For Anglo-Jewry we find that the number of marriages is, on the contrary, *lower* than the number of deaths by nearly a quarter; so that the Jewish community is—to say the least—declining in relation to the general population. The precise data are set out in Table 1.

TABLE 1. *Number of persons marrying and dying, England and Wales, 1960-64; and Anglo-Jewry, 1960-65 (annual average)*

	<i>England and Wales.</i>	<i>Anglo-Jewry</i>
Number marrying	695,000	3,664
Number dying	559,000	4,678
Ratio of marriages: deaths	127%	78%

The deficiency of persons marrying (in relation to the number dying) in the Jewish community may be due partly to demographic factors, such as a low birth rate a generation ago, and partly to changes in communal cohesion leading to marriage out of the group and, more generally, the replacement of religious by civil marriage ceremonies. But changes in social habits and religious observance must also be expected to affect the numbers recorded (in burial society records) as dying, as the practice of burial under religious auspices declines. Indeed, it is conceivable—to take the extreme case—that the numbers recorded in communal statistics as marrying and dying are equal in each year, though both decline from year to year. A comparison of the numbers marrying and dying for any given year would not, in that case, reveal a decline; only a comparison over time would show the true state of affairs. The absolute shortfall of marriages recorded in Table 1 (of some 1,000 persons a year) thus probably understates the true rate of decline.

Despite the limitations noted, the ratio of marriages-to-deaths is a convenient diagnostic measure and has been used in the following sections in comparing one part of the community with another.¹⁸

With regard to the true measure of the community's current rate of decline in numerical strength, the present data can add little to what is to be deduced from the trends noted in the Marriages Study. The last year in which the synagogue marriage rate might be considered adequately close to the general marriage rate was 1948, when 6,800 persons entered into a synagogue marriage; that figure provided a comfortable excess over the number dying (which, on the basis of Table 1, we may put at 4,700; the number of deaths is unlikely to have varied much in the intervening period).¹⁹ Since that year, synagogue marriages have declined at a rate of between 15 and 20 per cent per decade (the precise figure depending on the year chosen for comparison), leading to the current low ratio of marriages to deaths.

Neither the affiliated nor the total population will yet be declining at that rate (there being a period of some fifty years between the average age of marriage and the average age at death). All that may strictly be

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said, therefore, is that the rate of intake into the affiliated section of the community is declining at 15 to 20 per cent per decade.²⁰

7. *Geographical distribution*

Our estimates of the distribution of provincial Jewry by major geographical regions have been compared with those in the *Year Book* for 1964 (only enumerated settlements being taken) and no very major discrepancies arise; the figures are set out in Table 2. One must remember, however, that the *Year Book* estimates, in principle, exclude persons living in scattered places not associated with the enumerated towns, whereas our estimates include them in so far as such persons would be subject to Jewish burial; our estimates consequently should, if anything, be slightly higher.

Only three small comments are required on the figures in Table 2. First, the East and South-East region is probably underestimated by us, since certain burials originating in that region are carried out in London (our London estimate is correspondingly high).

The second discrepancy occurs in the North-West region where Manchester and Salford, with an estimated population according to the *Year Book* of 28,000, is the dominating settlement. The latter estimate is due to Dr. I. W. Slotki (1965), who based it on a census of Jewish children at school, inflated by the ratio of adults to children in the general population. It is not surprising that this method should yield an estimate lower than ours, since Jewish fertility may be lower than general fertility, and his census of children may be subject to greater omissions than our census of burials. Our estimate for the Manchester and Salford district comes out at 36,000, and while this may be slightly overestimated, we suspect it to be nearer the truth.²¹

Third, our estimate for the East and West Ridings of Yorkshire—at 25,000—is lower than the *Year Book* figure; the discrepancy relates to Leeds, where there has been doubt for some time as to the correct figure. For many years, until 1964, the *Year Book* quoted 25,000; in

TABLE 2. *Geographical distribution of provincial Anglo-Jewry, 1960-65*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Main towns</i>	<i>Our estimate</i>	<i>Year Book estimate (a)</i>
Scotland	Glasgow	15,000	15,000
North	Newcastle	6,000	5,000
North-West	Manchester, Liverpool	49,000	42,000
East and West Ridings	Leeds	25,000	30,000
Midlands	Birmingham	10,000	10,000
East and South-East	Brighton, Southend	13,000	13,000
South	Bournemouth	5,000	4,000
South-West and } South Wales }	Cardiff	7,000	5,000
		130,000	124,000

(a) Enumerated towns only, as given in the statistical tables of the *Year Book* for 1964, supplemented with estimates for a few small settlements mentioned in the text but not appearing in the statistical tables.

1965, following the publication of Dr. Krausz's study (1964) it was revised to 20,000; in 1967 it was further reduced to 18,000, bringing the *Year Book* estimate in line with the findings of a survey carried out by Leeds Jewish Representative Council (1966). According to our estimate, this latest revision was overdone and a slightly higher figure would seem more probable. Using our method, we estimate the Leeds population at 19,400 (± 600); the main reason for the increase over the Representative Council's figure is that, using an implied death-rate for Anglo-Jewry (calculated on the basis of our London data), we have made some allowance for differences between Jewish and general mortality.²²

An indication of the rates of growth, or decline, of the various regional centres was obtained by comparing the number of marriages and deaths in each region. This exercise leads us to conclude that the general decline in communal size, noted in the previous section, is somewhat more marked in the provinces than in London. In the provinces, marriages (in the sense of the number of persons marrying) are 72 per cent of deaths, compared with 81 per cent in London. This difference is presumably due partly to assimilatory tendencies being stronger in smaller settlements, and partly to the general drift of the younger population to the London region.²³

Table 3 sets out the comparisons for the main regions; it will be noted that in no region is there any suggestion of marriages being high enough to replace the number dying; the highest proportion is found in East and West Yorkshire where it is 92 per cent (but even this is not very high—the national proportion for the general population, as noted in the preceding section, is 127 per cent). The lowest regions are the Midlands, at 54 per cent, and the South at 53 per cent. The 'retirement resorts' in the South and South-East may explain the deficiency of marriages there, but no such explanation is to hand for the Midlands. It is clear that certain parts of the provinces are in the nature of problem areas and warrant closer study.

TABLE 3. *Number of persons marrying and dying, by region, Anglo-Jewry, 1960-65 (annual average)*

Region	Number marrying	Number dying	Ratio of marriages: deaths %
Scotland	120	171	70
North	49	67	73
North-West	406	569	71
East and West Ridings	263	286	92
Midlands	62	114	54
East and South-East	90	148	61
South	32	60	53
South-West and South Wales	48	68	71
All provinces	1,070	1,483	72
London region	2,594	3,195	81
Total	3,664	4,678	78

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8. *Synagogue groups*

Our data can be broken down by synagogue group (orthodox, liberal, etc.), and so provide an indication of the populations associated with the various religious factions. A distribution of marriages among synagogue groups has already been given in our previous paper but this, of course, relates to the younger, marrying, age-groups. Burial statistics, on the other hand, tend to relate to the older age-groups; but the synagogal distribution of our derived population estimates may be presumed to reflect the present (live) strengths of the groups. In practice, however, there is relatively little difference between the distribution of our population estimates and that of the burial data.²⁴ The distributions are compared in Table 4.

TABLE 4. *Distribution of Anglo-Jewry by synagogue group, 1960-65*

	<i>Marriages</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Burials</i>
	%	%	%
Orthodox	81	90	90
Liberal	8	4	5
Reform	10	6	5

It will be seen that the orthodox sector is predominant, accounting for 80-90 per cent of the total, according to all distributions. The trend for younger persons to move to the Liberal and Reform sections is, however, equally clearly indicated by the high proportion of marriages in these groups, taken in relation to their population proportions. The same trend is to be observed in the comparisons made, in Table 5, of the numbers marrying and dying, by synagogue group: the Reform group shows a marked excess of persons marrying, the Liberal group has a milder excess marrying, but the orthodox group has a deficiency of persons marrying.

TABLE 5. *Number of persons marrying and dying, by synagogue group, Anglo-Jewry, 1960-65 (annual average)*

	<i>Number marrying</i>	<i>Number dying</i>	<i>Ratio of marriages: deaths %</i>
Orthodox	2,984	4,105	73
Liberal	298	243	123
Reform	382	248	154

The excess of deaths in the orthodox group may be due partly to a substantial number of unaffiliated persons being buried under their auspices. There may also be a section of the community that marries in Liberal and Reform synagogues but whose death rites are not carried out under synagogue auspices, which would lead to an artificial excess

of recorded marriages in these groups. These possibilities are just two examples of complications that undoubtedly exist and which must, to some extent, qualify any over-simple interpretation of the data. However, we have no evidence for thinking that such qualifications could be quantitatively significant.

The above evidence of the continuing current rise of the Reform and Liberal sections, and the decline of the Orthodox sections of the community, parallels that of the longer-term trends in marriage adduced in our previous paper. Comparing the number of synagogue marriages in periods a generation apart (the average in 1961-65 with the average in 1931-40), we found that Reform marriages had grown by 242 per cent, Liberal marriages by 182 per cent, while Orthodox marriages had declined by 45 per cent.

The statistical evidence quoted so far is clear and consistent. We now turn to examine the various divisions of the orthodox groups where the evidence, however, is not so clear. In our analysis of marriage trends, we found that, despite the general decline of the orthodox group, there was some growth in two small sections: the Sephardi and the Right-wing orthodox (Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, etc.) groups. A comparison of marriage and death statistics confirms the continuing growth of the Sephardi section of the community (an average of 104 persons a year married in 1960-65, compared with 88 burials); recent immigration from oriental and North African communities has obviously contributed towards this growth.

We have, however, been unable to confirm that the long-term rise evidenced in its marriage statistics is still continuing among the Right-wing orthodox group. There now appears to be a deficiency of marriages compared with the number of deaths (in 1960-65 an average of 62 persons married, compared with an average of 87 deaths of members), and the deficiency does not appear to be any smaller (proportionally) than for the central orthodox group.²⁵ A small amount of migration from areas of predominantly Right-wing orthodox settlement to areas having only a central orthodox synagogue might account for the observed deficiency; as younger families move to the newer suburbs, they may well have no convenient alternative to joining an existing United or Federation synagogue (there are, after all, no sharp doctrinal differences between the Right-wing and the central group, of the type that exists between the central group and those further left). We have not looked for further evidence on this point, since Right-wing families account for only some 3 per cent of the London population and, at this stage of our enquiries, we are interested in outlining the general picture rather than its details.

We conclude by giving in Table 6 a summary account of the London Jewish population by its degree and nature of synagogue affiliation. The first column shows the number of male members as usually reckoned by

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the synagogue group concerned,²⁶ the second column gives estimates of the total population that we have calculated to be affiliated to these synagogues—it consists of the 60,000 members numbered in the first column plus their immediate families, estimated at 104,000, giving a total of 164,000. The third column includes (in addition to those in the previous columns) 113,000 persons who are not members of synagogues, but who would nevertheless be buried under the auspices of the synagogue noted at the left; the final item in that column relates to the small section (5,000 persons) of completely unaffiliated persons that we have been able to identify.

TABLE 6. *London Jewish population by synagogue group and degree of affiliation, 1960-65 (in thousands)*

	<i>Male membership roll (a)</i>	<i>Members and their families (b)</i>	<i>Population incl. non-members (b)</i>
United Synagogue	30	84	137
Federation	10	36	48
Independent (c)	5	14	32
Central Orthodox	45	134	217
Right-Wing	2	6	9
Sephardi	1	2	9
Total Orthodox	48	142	235
Liberal	5	10	16
Reform	7	12	21
Non-affiliated (d)	—	—	5
Total population	60	164	277

(a) As returned to Board of Deputies, 1967, with additions for synagogues not represented on the Board

(b) Estimates, subject to sampling error

(c) Includes Commercial Road Talmud Torah

(d) Estimates based on Jewish cremations not carried out under synagogue auspices

9. Summary

Following our previous compilation of marriage statistics of the Anglo-Jewish population, this paper presents statistics of Anglo-Jewish mortality for the period 1960 to 1965. These statistics have been analysed for the light that they cast on the size and structure of the community. The main conclusions are as follows.

- (a) Anglo-Jewry is currently estimated to number some 410,000, of whom 280,000 are in the London region, and 130,000 in the provinces.
- (b) It is estimated that 61 per cent of the London community are affiliated to a synagogue; a further 3 per cent are affiliated to a Friendly Society; and 36 per cent are not affiliated to either of these institutions.

- (c) The proportion of the community affiliated to a synagogue has risen markedly over the past generation; this rise is probably related to the reduction of poverty in the community which allows a greater proportion to pay membership fees.
- (d) The community is currently declining, in that the intake into the affiliated community (as measured by the number of persons marrying in a synagogue) is insufficient to offset the number dying. The rate of intake is declining at 15-20 per cent a decade.
- (e) The provincial communities are declining more rapidly than the London community, and certain of them appear to require special attention.
- (f) The Liberal and Reform Sections of the community are gaining in numbers; the Orthodox section—though still predominant—accounts for the general decline.
- (g) Within the Orthodox section, the Sephardi community (3 per cent of the London community) shows a rise, probably owing to recent immigration.

APPENDIX A

Sources and methods

The Survey was divided into two parts, namely, (a) an examination of Jewish burials and cremations in the London area for the period 1960-65 (inclusive), and (b) an examination, in rather less detail, of Jewish burials for the remainder of Great Britain for that period. The sources of the data were the records of Jewish burial societies, and of certain municipal cemeteries and crematoria which were discovered to be concerned with the burial or cremation of Jews.

(a) LONDON SURVEY: In the Greater London area eight Jewish burial societies were contacted. Of these, six are ancillary organizations of the corresponding London Synagogal Groups, namely, the burial societies of: the United Synagogue, the Federation of Synagogues, the West London Synagogue of British Jews, the Liberal Jewish Synagogue (the latter two cover, respectively, all Reform and Liberal Synagogues in the area),²⁷ the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, and the Spanish and Portuguese Synagogues. These burial societies do not confine their activities to the burial of members only, but also bury non-members when requested. The remaining two burial societies are attached to the (independent) Western and West End Great Synagogues. The latter two societies operate in conjunction with certain individual synagogues (which may or may not be independent of the major synagogal groups) and with Jewish Friendly Societies. Certain synagogues in the Federation of Synagogues and six divisions of the Workers' Circle Friendly Society have burial rights with the West End Great Synagogue, while the Western Synagogue arranges burials for the New London Synagogue, St. George's Synagogue, Walthamstow and Leyton Synagogue, and for the Association of Jewish Friendly Societies.²⁸ In addition, both these societies bury non-members.

(i) *Burials*: All London societies also arrange burials, when requested, for Jewish communities of certain towns in the Home Counties and beyond: for example, persons dying in Brighton, Bournemouth, or Reading may be buried by one of the London Burial Societies if the deceased has been a member of that society or if the town in which he lived does not have a Jewish burial society.

Records of all burial societies (except that of the Western Synagogue—see below) contain the name, age, and date of death of each person buried or cremated under its auspices. All societies, except that of the Spanish and Portuguese community, indicate in their records whether or not the deceased had been affiliated to the synagogue or an associated Friendly Society (as appropriate) during his lifetime.

The Western Synagogue society's records include details of the name, address, and burial society membership; information about the age and place of death was obtained, in this case, from the certificate of burial, which is issued by the local Registrar to the person registering a death and which is kept by the burial society.

For the Spanish and Portuguese community information about membership status was obtained from the files of the Bevis Marks synagogue and from the records of other synagogues in the group.

(ii) *Cremations*: Cremation is not an Orthodox Jewish practice, but the Reform and Liberal societies arrange for cremation when requested. The sextons of the latter societies expressed the view that there were other cremations of Jews carried out by municipal authorities; consequently, crematoria in the London area were approached and asked whether they could provide information on the number of Jews cremated by them during the period under review (these could be recognized if a rabbi or other Jewish official had been present at the cremation ceremony).

Twenty crematoria were contacted in the London area and, of these, ten were able to provide information about Jews cremated during the period under review. Of the remaining ten, four were unable to trace the religion of persons cremated, and six said that they had not arranged for the cremation of any Jew.

(iii) *Analysis*: The records of the burial societies were analysed in two stages. As a first step, a complete count was taken of all entries in the records of each society; these were classified by sex and age (in quinquennial groups). It was assumed that all burials in the London area were of persons who had some connexion with the London Jewish community wherever the person might have died.²⁹ To a certain extent our population estimates for Greater London will be overestimated at the expense of certain areas in East and South-East England (particularly towns such as Southend and Brighton). It is hoped, in due course, to rectify these mis-allocations on the basis of a sample of deaths for 1961, which will be analysed with the help of the Registrar-General's Office, and which will enable the place of death of each person to be ascertained accurately.

At the second stage of the analysis, a separate count was taken, for each burial society, of the age and sex of all non-members³⁰ who were buried in 1961. That year was taken as a representative year, since it showed least variation from the average pattern of deaths by age in the total period 1960-65.

The records for 1933 were analysed for membership status in a similar way.

(b) *PROVINCIAL SURVEY*: As a preliminary to the survey, questionnaires were sent out to 142 provincial synagogues³¹ in order to discover which synagogue had a burial society or some comparable organization. All synagogues providing burial facilities were then contacted and asked to state for each of the years under review how many men and how many women were buried under their auspices. The instructions in the questionnaire requested that all persons buried by the society should be included, whether or not they had been members of the synagogue, and that members buried by another society should be excluded. Liberal and Reform synagogues were asked to include the numbers of cremations in their annual total. Where necessary, municipal cemeteries and crematoria were approached, if they (and not the synagogue) kept records of Jewish deaths.

In total, some 90 provincial organizations were approached for information. This number would have been somewhat larger had it been necessary to

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approach all synagogues in the Manchester area, but fortunately the Manchester and District Synagogue Council keeps a record of all burials through Jewish burial societies in the area (free of duplication through multiple reporting), and was thus able to provide the necessary information for the whole of the Manchester area.

APPENDIX B

The balance of the sexes

There are a number of issues concerning the balance of the sexes in a population such as the Anglo-Jewish community which are of general scientific interest, as well as being of interest to the community. This appendix reports on certain calculations we have carried out to elucidate the trends in the sex-ratio.

We begin by distinguishing various factors that affect the sex-ratio. First, improvements in medical care etc., over recent decades have extended life differentially in favour of females;³² so long as this differential improvement proceeds, the number of female deaths is reduced in relation to male deaths, and there is a correspondingly larger female than male population alive (the slight excess of males at birth has not been sufficient to correct the sex-ratio in the live population but is, of course, also a factor leading to fewer female than male deaths in the long run). Second, the effects of such improvements have in the past manifested themselves in the Jewish communities in Europe somewhat before they have appeared in the general population,³³ and Jewish female health may therefore have benefited in this country somewhat earlier, and perhaps somewhat further, than has female health in the general population. If, however, this differential advance of female longevity were to slow down, or to cease, as it ultimately must, it might equally be expected to slow down first in the Jewish community. The consequences of such a slowing-down would be that the ratio of female to male deaths would tend to rise. Third, men marry out of the community more frequently than do women, and one might therefore expect the ratio of females in the affiliated community to show a rise. Fourth, the community has to a varying extent consisted of immigrants (cf. Marriages Study, p. 156), and immigrants tend to have a sex-ratio biased towards males;³⁴ as the population becomes to an increasing extent native-born, the sex-ratio approaches normality again.

Thus, some forces tend to lead to a higher male proportion in the community, and others to a higher female proportion; and some of the forces tend to reverse themselves as time proceeds. What are the facts? For the period of our enquiry we find that the ratio of females at death among Jews is slightly lower than that of the general population. In England and Wales, 1960-64, the ratio of female to male deaths was 96 per cent; for the Jewish community, 1960-65, it was 3 per cent lower, at 93 per cent (for the London community, 94 per cent; for the provinces 92 per cent). At the beginning of the century, Rosenbaum's analysis for London (United Synagogue only, 1899-1903) showed a rather larger difference: the ratio of female deaths among the Jewish community was 85 per cent against 94 per cent generally; that is, a difference of 9 per cent.

For the intervening period, data are to hand for 1929 relating to London, compiled by Trachtenberg, and for 1945-49 relating to London and major provincial centres, compiled by Dr. Neustatter. These two sets of data fall between those of Rosenbaum and of the present study, suggesting that the statistics bear witness to an objective trend.³⁵ The four sets of data are summarized in Table B1 below (where, for convenience of reference, the qualifications relating to the precise area covered, noted above, have been omitted; and central dates have been given instead of the precise extent of the periods covered).³⁶

TABLE B1. *Ratio of female to male deaths, general population of England and Wales, and Anglo-Jewry*

Year	General %	Jews %	Source
1901	94	85	Rosenbaum
1929	96	86	Trachtenberg
1947	96	89	Neustatter
1962	96	93	This study

The contrast between Jewish and general experience is evident. The ratio of females in the general population has shown only slight movements in the past half-century, whereas among the Jewish community the ratio has risen steadily. The low female ratio among Jews in earlier generations can probably be attributed to immigration, and to the differential improvement in female life expectancy referred to above. The subsequent continuous rise in that ratio may be due entirely to the falling proportion of immigrants in the community; but another factor may also be at work. Female mortality among the general population, and among Jews, having already fallen to very low levels, it is possible that we are now witnessing a fall in male mortality among Jews—a fall which has yet to reach the general population. There is some fascinating, if partial, evidence in favour of this proposition.

The difference between male and female mortality in England and Wales currently is quite striking, male mortality being more than half as great again as for females. This can be shown by calculating a standardized mortality rate, by the use of the combined age distribution, which leads to a ratio of 17 per thousand for males, against 11 for females (the data are for 1962). For the purpose of our main analysis (namely, the preparation of estimates of population based on mortality data) it is, of course, important to know whether a similar differential can be expected to hold for the Jewish population.

We first note two sample surveys carried out in the United States (Gorwitz, 1962, and Goldstein, 1966); the communities studied, St. Louis and Providence, Rhode Island, are relatively small (with Jewish populations of 60,000 and 26,000 respectively), so that substantial sampling errors are probably attached to the results. In both cases, a smaller sex-differential was found for the Jewish than the general population; more particularly, male Jewish mortality was lower than the general male mortality, and female Jewish mortality was higher than general female mortality.

We have searched for further evidence on this subject from official data for other countries but, so far, no suitable data have come to hand where both religion and sex are distinguished in both population and mortality statistics.³⁷

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We had therefore to content ourselves with a comparison of Jews in Israel with the general population of England and Wales. It has already been noted (Prais, 1967, pp. 69-70) that, both sexes being taken together, the standardized mortality rates of these two populations are not far apart; we have now calculated standardized mortality rates for each sex (using the combined age distribution in England and Wales, 1962, as the standard) with the remarkable results set out in Table B2.

TABLE B2. *Standardized mortality rates, by sex, general population of England and Wales, and Jewish population of Israel*

	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
England and Wales, 1962	17.3	11.1
Israel (Jews), 1965	12.2	10.6

These figures agree with the U.S. sample findings in showing mortality among Jewish males as particularly low. The mortality difference among females is small enough to be ignored in the present context. The difference between Jewish and general mortality appears to be substantially confined to males; and instead of drawing the broad conclusion that Jewish mortality (i.e. for both sexes combined) is some ten per cent lower than the general mortality, it may be more precise to say that, in present-day Western society, male Jewish mortality is below general male mortality by about a quarter, whereas female mortality is at the same level as general female mortality. Such a finding is of obvious general interest as indicating the considerable potential improvement in general male life-expectancy.

We may now revert to our central theme, which is to interpret the available evidence on the balance of the sexes in the Anglo-Jewish community. The proportion of females at death is 93 per cent of males; by the application of an unmodified general mortality rate to each age-sex group, an estimated sex-ratio for the live population of 137 females to 100 males is derived from the calculation: this ratio is unreasonably high. If, however, the ratio of male to female mortality in the Jewish community here were as in Israel, rather than as among the general population of England and Wales, the estimated number of males in the population would rise, and of females would fall. Applying the statistics in Table B2 above,³⁸ we find that the calculated female surplus disappears and, in fact, the numbers of females and males come very close to equality—a rather more reasonable and acceptable result.

The above discussion may be summarized as follows (though, in view of the limited information so far available, it will be clear that all conclusions are to a certain extent speculative). First, at the beginning of this century there was a low ratio of female to male deaths, probably owing to a preponderance of males in the immigrant population, and to relatively better health among females; female mortality now is probably similar among Jews and non-Jews. Second, there is some indirect evidence that male health in the Jewish community has been improving in a marked way, and that Jewish male mortality is now substantially below that of the general population. Third, taking all age-groups together, we have found no evidence of an imbalance in the sex-ratio in the community, though this does not, of course, exclude the possibility of imbalance in particular age-groups.

APPENDIX C

The Statistical Committee of the Jewish Health Organization

In view of various references in the literature to statistical research on the Anglo-Jewish community undertaken by a body known as the Jewish Health Organization, we thought that a short account of that work, on the basis of records that we have discovered so far, would be of interest.³⁹

The Jewish Health Organization⁴⁰ was established in June 1923 to further the ideals of the world-wide OSE movement, namely, 'preserving and improving the health of Jews';⁴¹ it adopted a programme of work among the Jews in England which comprised:

- (1) regular courses of free popular lectures on subjects relating to health;
- (2) investigations of the health and sanitary conditions in the schools and workshops; and
- (3) the publication and distribution of propaganda literature on health topics.⁴²

In December of the same year, the Organization set up a sub-committee to collect and publish Jewish vital statistics. The Health Organization and its Statistical Committee flourished until about 1942, when its work ceased, apparently because of war-time and other difficulties.⁴³

The records indicate that between 1923 and 1937 the Statistical Committee undertook 22 studies, not all of which were published. The research programme was guided by a panel of distinguished scientists and doctors (thus, during its existence, the Statistical Committee numbered amongst its members Mr. S. Rowson, Dr. R. Salaman, Dr. L. Isserlis, Prof. H. Levy, Dr. E. Miller, Dr. A. Sourasky, Dr. L. Sourasky, Prof. M. Ginsberg, and Mr. P. Quass) and the topics investigated were:

- (1) Population statistics
- (2) Comparative intelligence and attainments of Jewish and non-Jewish schoolchildren
- (3) Mental deficiency
- (4) Hygienic and sanitary conditions in Talmud Torahs in London
- (5) The incidence of visual defect among Jewish schoolchildren
- (6) The incidence of cancer among Jews
- (7) Statistical studies on juvenile delinquency (by members of the East London Child Guidance Clinic)
- (8) Economic and social conditions.

As can be seen, the scope of these studies was very wide with an intended bias towards investigations into health and hygiene. The population studies and surveys of economic and social conditions (with which we are here especially concerned) were to some extent peripheral to the main interests of the Committee. However, the JHO, concerned as it was with improving the community's health, appreciated that action should be based on empirical data and regarded population studies as a first step in providing essential

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information about the social conditions of the community. The following studies of the population were accordingly sponsored by the Committee:

- (1) Estimate of the Jewish population of London in 1929 (Trachtenberg, 1933)
- (2) Jewish population in Stepney 1929 (Trachtenberg, unpublished)
- (3) Note on the number of the Jews in Germany (Yule, 1933)
- (4) Estimate of the Jewish population in London in 1929-1933 (Kantorowitsch, 1936)
- (5) On the Statistics of Jewish Marriages in England and Wales (Kantorowitsch, 1936)
- (6) The Alleged High Fertility of Jews (Sourasky, 1928)
- (7) An enquiry with regard to the proportion of Jews in certain professions (unpublished, 1937).

Other studies conducted into various aspects of health in the community were published in medical and other academic journals (such as the *British Journal of Psychology*).

It appears from the traceable correspondence that the Statistical Committee from the time of its inception was interested in, and drew up plans for, wider sociological research; however, we could find little detailed information about these proposed studies. Our main evidence on this point rests on (1) a Report of a conference of representative Jewish organizations in London and the provinces called in 1932 to discuss the establishment of a Statistical Bureau, and (2) a Memorandum on the statistical aspects of the defence campaign (sent to the President of the Board of Deputies in September 1936). The emphasis of the latter document, as would be expected from its title and date, is on the need to provide information to counter Fascist assertions about the Jewish community.

Within this framework, the Memorandum reviews the work carried out by the Statistical Committee, deplores the lack of foresight shown by the community in not sponsoring and financing a Statistical Bureau, and notes that shortage of funds had prevented the JHO carrying out its suggested national population studies and its planned surveys of the occupational structure of Anglo-Jewry.

The Statistical Committee does not appear to have sponsored any research after 1937, for reasons that are familiar to research workers: lack of financial support, lack of communal interest in the Statistical work of the JHO, and little co-operation from the provinces in providing regular statistical returns.

APPENDIX D

Tables

Note: Figures in the text of the paper do not always agree exactly with those in this Appendix owing to rounding.

TABLE I. *Burials and cremations by sex, Great Britain, 1960-65*

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
1960	4,713	2,369	2,344
1961	4,632	2,414	2,218
1962	4,614	2,381	2,233
1963	4,768	2,482	2,286
1964	4,685	2,471	2,214
1965	4,658	2,405	2,253

TABLE IIA. *Number of burials and cremations of men by age at death, Greater London, 1960-65, and annual average*

<i>Age</i>	<i>Annual average</i>	<i>Year of death</i>					
		<i>1960</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1962</i>	<i>1963</i>	<i>1964</i>	<i>1965</i>
0-	18.7	27	17	14	14	26	14
1-	4.3	6	1	10	4	4	11
5-	2.0	3	-	2	4	2	1
10-	3.5	6	4	2	2	5	2
15-	4.7	3	6	4	4	7	4
20-	7.2	5	8	12	6	8	4
25-	5.0	6	2	8	8	4	2
30-	6.5	7	5	6	8	7	6
35-	13.2	12	13	15	14	17	8
40-	22.8	24	21	21	28	22	21
45-	49.0	66	50	51	54	41	32
50-	92.3	101	101	103	96	88	65
55-	158.3	166	168	157	169	160	121
60-	205.5	185	209	208	212	216	203
65-	235.2	227	247	222	243	232	241
70-	262.2	274	274	258	263	252	252
75 and over	550.2	506	518	537	553	538	649
Not stated	7.2	4	2	5	12	13	7

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TABLE IIB. *Number of burials and cremations of women by age at death, Greater London, 1960-65 and annual average*

Age	Annual average	Year of death					
		1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
0-	16.8	14	18	26	15	14	14
1-	3.3	-	4	3	6	6	1
5-	2.8	3	1	3	4	3	3
10-	2.8	4	2	2	5	1	3
15-	3.7	3	5	3	5	4	2
20-	3.7	5	5	6	4	1	1
25-	3.8	4	4	4	3	4	4
30-	7.8	9	7	10	8	8	5
35-	11.5	12	13	15	13	5	11
40-	20.5	33	17	19	13	20	21
45-	41.3	42	50	43	36	41	36
50-	66.8	78	67	64	63	60	69
55-	106.5	125	97	96	102	101	118
60-	149.5	142	124	164	156	145	166
65-	186.5	209	182	190	193	167	178
70-	225.8	213	259	233	227	210	213
75 and over	687.5	730	640	676	720	699	660
Not stated	6.0	2	3	3	10	12	6

TABLE III. *Burials and cremations by Burial Society, Greater London, 1960-65 (annual average)*

Burial Society	Total	Males	Females
United Synagogue	1,472.8	765.2	707.7
Federation	650.2	323.0	327.2
Adath Yisroel	195.5	103.8	91.7
West End Great	189.7	93.3	96.3
Western	133.9	70.2	63.7
Bevis Marks	88.0	48.7	39.3
Liberal	206.7	106.8	99.8
Reform	176.3	95.7	80.7
Independent crematoria	81.9	41.3	40.5
Total	3,194.8	1,648.0	1,546.9

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TABLE IV. *Provincial burials and cremations by standard geographical region, Great Britain, 1960-65 (annual average); provincial population by region, Great Britain, 1960-65*

Region	Burials		Population	
	Male	Female	This study '000	Year Book '000
Scotland	91.8	79.5	15	15
North	37.2	30.2	6	5
North-West	291.7	277.3	49	42
East and West Yorkshire	149.0	137.2	25	30
North Midlands and Midlands	58.0	55.5	10	10
East and South-East	78.0	70.0	13	13
South	31.8	28.0	5	4
South-West and South Wales	35.0	32.7	7	5
All regions	772.5	710.4	130	124

NOTES

¹ Kantorowitsch and Trachtenberg worked in association with the Jewish Health Organization which functioned in the period 1923-43. Having discovered the files of that organization we give (in Appendix C) a short account of its statistical work, for the interest of future research workers.

² We should like to express our thanks to the members of the Special Committee of the Board of Deputies for sponsoring this research, and to them and to Professor R. Bachi (Jerusalem) for their many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Our thanks are also due to the many correspondents throughout the country who co-operated in providing the basic data on which the analysis rests.

³ If we assume that Jewish mortality is only 5 per cent lower than general mortality, the estimated population would be 385,000 for the total community, consisting of 263,000 for London and 122,000 for the provinces. If, on the other hand, Jewish mortality were 15 per cent lower, the estimates would be 421,000, 287,000, and 134,000 respectively.

⁴ This is our presumption; the *Year Book's* figure for the whole country was revised in 1950 from 400,000 to 450,000, and at that time Dr. Neustatter was

working at the *Jewish Chronicle* offices (where the *Year Book* is edited). The *Year Book's* estimate for Greater London was revised in the following year, from 234,000 to 280,000; Dr. Neustatter's final figure for London was slightly higher—289,000 (see Neustatter, 1955, p. 77), but this was never incorporated in the *Year Book*.

⁵ For example, if a population estimate for a town of some 5,000 Jews were based on the mortality experience of five years, and the mortality rate were 10 per thousand, the sampling error would be some 6 per cent.

⁶ This involves approaching all households in a sample of clearly defined geographical areas with a view to elucidating whether any members of the community reside there. However, questions on religious affiliation, in the social context of this country at any rate, are not entirely straightforward topics of investigation, and refusals to reply must be expected to lead to difficulties of interpretation, especially with respect to the marginal members of the community.

⁷ This is the view to which we have come, and the above paragraph provides only a brief summary of our argument. In all fairness, the reader should, however, be cautioned that other views hold elsewhere. Thus, in the United States

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the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (1965) put forward proposals for a national sample study of the Jewish population, costing approximately \$645,000 (see also Nathan, 1966).

⁸ Our total includes male members of certain synagogues not represented on the Board. Enquiries were made at these synagogues to ascertain the numbers involved. As a general rule, only synagogues with over fifty members are entitled to elect a representative to the Board.

⁹ Kantorowitsch's estimate makes no allowance for lower Jewish mortality; if an adjustment were made for this, also by adding 10 per cent to his estimate, the calculated increase over the past generation would be lower still, at some 20,000.

¹⁰ There must also be many 'half-Jews' (persons born of a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother) who would be regarded as Jews by some religious organizations but not by others. In so far as they are buried under the auspices of one of the synagogue bodies, they are included in our estimates.

¹¹ The only way of reaching a representative sample of such persons would involve an area sample; it is not obvious that even this would be satisfactory, nor that the expense of such an exercise would be warranted (see also section 3 above, and note 6).

¹² The group treated as members includes the immediate family of a person who is on the membership roll; thus the term 'non-member' comprises persons who are not members in their own name and, in addition, have no spouse or parent on the membership roll.

¹³ See Appendix A.

¹⁴ We are, of course, aware that the unaffiliated sectors of the other synagogal groups might have a different social profile.

¹⁵ In some sections of the community non-members secure burial rights by paying in advance—either a lump sum or instalments—and there are indications that they do so because they are unable to afford synagogue membership fees.

¹⁶ Thus, in the middle of the nineteenth century on admitting someone to the status of 'free-member', it was not unusual to require payment of a five guinea fee which, allowing for changes in price levels and standards of living, could be compared today to a sum of between £50 and £100.

¹⁷ See Registrar General (1962), Pt. II, p.74.

¹⁸ In view of comments received following the circulation of an earlier draft of this paper, it should perhaps be stressed that the comparisons in this paper of the numbers marrying and dying are used to indicate communal increase (or decrease) only because communal data on births are not available (had they been to hand we should have compared births and deaths directly, as is usual in demographic analyses). We have examined statistics of births, marriages, and deaths for a number of 'Western' countries and (with one small exception) they confirm the assumption, made in the text above, that in a growing population the number born exceeds the number marrying which, in turn, exceeds the number dying. It is possible to picture a situation where the number marrying is lower than the number dying, but where the population is nevertheless increasing, e.g., owing to the exceptionally high fertility of those marrying; this possibility is realized in only one small country—Eire, which has special problems (this is the exception referred to above). But, Jewish fertility being low, this exception is of no relevance. The ratios of marriages to deaths in the countries examined are as follows (the data are taken mainly from the *UN Demographic Yearbook*, 1964): Belgium, 107; Czechoslovakia, 166; Denmark, 167; France, 122; Western Germany, 154; Eire, 91; Northern Ireland, 125; Netherlands, 198; Norway, 133; Portugal, 145; Spain 168; Sweden, 140; Switzerland, 155; U.S.A., 182; Israel (Jews), 246 per cent; the average of these countries (excluding Israel, owing to its special circumstances) is 147 per cent. In England and Wales the ratio, noted in the text above, is 127 per cent; the additional data quoted here confirm the pathological state of the Anglo-Jewish community with a ratio as low as 78 per cent.

¹⁹ As noted above, limitations of resources have prevented us extending this study as far back as was possible in the Marriages Study; but we have data for the United Synagogue and the Federation of Synagogues for 1948 which put the number of burials for those organizations at 2,054 compared with 2,123 per annum in 1960–65, a negligible difference in the present context.

²⁰ Even this statement is an over-generalization since, for example, the child of a Jewish woman married only according to civil law may be entitled to orthodox synagogue membership; consequently some of the offspring of civil marriages may find their way back to the affiliated community, and the ultimate rate of decline of the community may thus be mitigated. It is beyond the province of this article to speculate whether assimilatory trends have in the past been as strong in Anglo-Jewry as they now are but have been masked by successive waves of heavy immigration which have now ceased. The topic is undoubtedly of great interest but is not one on which the data so far at our disposal can cast much light.

²¹ Our estimate includes Stockport (which the *Year Book* estimates at 220) and other small Lancashire communities. The reason for accepting the possibility of a slight overestimate is that we have, as yet, no age-distribution for deaths in provincial communities, and have had to assume it to be the same as for London. If, as we suspect, provincial communities had a heavier weight of older persons, our estimate would be slightly high.

²² Both our estimate and that published by the Representative Council relate to the Leeds area; an analysis of burials according to place of residence suggests that some 10 per cent resided in neighbouring towns, such as Harrogate, and the population within the Leeds postal area (according to our estimate) is thus 17,500.

²³ It might be thought that a tendency to hold marriage ceremonies in London, on grounds of general convenience, even where the bride's normal place of residence was in the provinces, would artificially lead to this bias in favour of London. A special analysis has therefore been made of marriages in the Central Orthodox group for the period 1952-64, comparing the place of residence of the bride immediately before marriage with the place of the ceremony. It was found that while some London brides (1 per cent of the total) had ceremonies in the provinces, rather more provincial brides had ceremonies in London (2 per cent of the total): the net effect was that London showed a recorded gain of about 1 per cent of total marriages. If this 1 per cent is re-allocated to the provinces, the provincial ratio is altered

to 74 per cent (from 72 per cent in the text above), and the London ratio to 80 per cent (as against 81 per cent in the text). The difference noted in the text is thus slightly reduced, but remains significant.

²⁴ Equally, there is in practice little difference (no more than 1 percentage point) between the distribution of the total population and that of the population affiliated to a synagogue; this distinction has therefore been ignored in the main text.

²⁵ The burial statistics of the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations have had to be analysed with some care owing to the joint arrangements that exist with the Commercial Road Talmud Torah, the character of whose membership is closer to that of the Central Orthodox group. The details are as follows: an average of 196 burials a year took place under the Union's auspices in 1960-65, of which 87 related to Union members, 82 to CRTT, while 27 were non-members. It was not possible to ascertain whether the non-members were of the type that had a tenuous attachment to the Union, to the CRTT, or to neither. The deficiency of marriages noted in the text above—being related to only 87 burials—is clearly a minimum figure; some allowance for non-membership should strictly be made if comparison with other groups were to be pursued. In Table 6, the average of 27 non-members has been allocated equally to each group, and the resulting total for the CRTT grouped with the independent congregations in the Central Orthodox group.

²⁶ For certain qualifications see section 3 above.

²⁷ The South London Liberal Synagogue has recently opened its own cemetery, but did so after the period under review.

²⁸ Since 1966, the Western Synagogue has arranged burials for Walford Road Synagogue.

²⁹ Cf. Trachtenberg (1933) p. 96.

³⁰ For the purposes of this study a 'member' was defined as a person who had burial rights with a society either because he paid (for himself and for his family) to a synagogue or because he or she acquired rights through a parent or deceased spouse.

³¹ Those listed in the provincial section of the *Jewish Year Book* (1966).

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³² See Registrar-General (1962), Pt. III, Table LVI.

³³ See Ruppin (1934), p. 83.

³⁴ Cf. Gartner (1959), p. 283.

³⁵ While Dr. Neustatter (1955, pp. 102 f.) noticed the existence of a problem surrounding the data, the reader should be cautioned that her interpretation of the data is marred by certain curious faults (e.g. her reference to 126 male deaths per 100 female deaths in the U.K., 1936-40, when the correct ratio was 106).

³⁶ The ratios quoted for England and Wales relate to the quinquennium nearest to the central years noted, and are taken from Registrar-General (1964), Pt. I, Table III.

³⁷ Data for Northern Ireland, 1960-1965, were examined since census information is available. The Jewish Community there is too small, however, to allow any statistically reliable conclusion to be drawn.

³⁸ That is, the estimated ratio of 137 has to be divided by the ratio of the mortality rates for Israel, and multiplied by the corresponding ratio for England.

³⁹ This note has been prepared from Annual Reports, minutes, and other

records of the JHO which were deposited with British OSE (Organisatio Sanitaria Ebraica) when the JHO ceased operating. The available records are incomplete, many having been lost or destroyed in the course of the Second World War. Our thanks are due to Mrs. Howard of British OSE for allowing us access to the remaining material.

⁴⁰ The Organization began officially as the London Organization of the OSE but appears to have had little contact with the world-wide organization. We can trace no formal connexion between the JHO and British OSE.

⁴¹ Annual Report, JHO 1923-4, p. 3.

⁴² Ibid., p. 5.

⁴³ It is difficult to pinpoint the exact date. In 1940, the JHO vetoed a suggestion to amalgamate with OSE. Those records which we were able to trace date no later than 1943, and the last available Annual Report is for the year 1940. Mrs. Howard has indicated that she believes the lives of the two organizations may have run parallel for the early years of the Second World War but that the JHO ceased to exist some time before 1945.

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A JEWISH CHRISTIAN ADVENTIST MOVEMENT

Stephen Sharot

ONE minor, but interesting, result of the German persecution and massacre of the European Jews was the development of an adventist religious movement calling itself the Jewish Christian Community.¹ A small number of Jews, who believe in Christ and eagerly await the Armageddon and Christ's return to earth, form the core of the movement. They explain the persecution of the Jews in terms of the crucifixion and rejection of Christ by the Jews, and maintain that antisemitism will increase in the world until Christ sets up his Kingdom and the Jews accept him as their Messiah. The adventist beliefs of the Jewish Christian Community are very similar to the exegesis of other Christian adventist sects, but the members of the Community emphasize their Jewish identity and continue to practise a number of traditional Jewish rituals in their services.

The Jewish Christian Community differs from modern Jewish movements, which have tended to de-emphasize rather than re-emphasize messianism. Religious adventism has been declining among western and central European Jews since the end of the eighteenth century. The emancipated and economically upwardly mobile European and American Jews in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries prayed far less fervently than their ancestors for the coming of the Messiah and the return to Zion. The religious services of the Reform and Liberal Jewish movements represented the most radical of the major Jewish religious adjustments to emancipation and mobility; a number of traditional Jewish practices were either modified or deleted from the services and a number of Protestant practices, such as the choir and organ, were introduced. The Reform and Liberal movements removed the particularistic messianic passages from their prayer books and substituted a secular, universalistic and humanistic 'Messianic Age'.² The messianic passages have remained in the prayer books of the Conservative and 'modern' Orthodox movements, but the majority of Conservative and Orthodox worshippers neither regard the messianic events as imminent nor display any great enthusiasm for them. Unlike the case in Western Jewry, adventist beliefs continued to have important

compensatory functions for the deprived eastern European Jews in the nineteenth century, but in the last two decades of the century an increasing number of these Jews transferred their enthusiastic adventism to the secular Jewish Socialist and Zionist movements.³

A number of marginal Jews in Europe and America have joined non-Jewish religious movements, such as Unitarianism, Universalism, and Christian Science, which had come to reject any type of literal advent. These movements draw their members from the middle classes, and they tend to be this-worldly and optimistic. Christian Science, for example, probably appealed to many second-generation Jews in America because it confirmed the righteousness of possessions and accepted the value-orientations of a secular society.⁴ In 1924 a 'Society of Jewish Science' was formed in New York; its 'Rabbi' announced that it offered 'health and happiness to the Jew through his own religion' and that the Jewish faith would be applied to daily experience 'so as to eliminate worry, fear and illness'.⁵

The Jewish Christian Community is, of course, not the only modern Christian group with a social and cultural Jewish distinctiveness. Small numbers of baptized Jews have sometimes joined together to form 'Hebrew Christian' churches. In 1813, for example, an 'Episcopal Jews' Chapel' was opened at Cambridge Heath in the East End of London, and Church of England services were performed there in Hebrew. Hebrew Christian groups have usually been small non-millennial religious movements composed of similarly placed marginal individuals who are faced with the dilemma of being Christians as well as Jews in a Christian society. The members of Hebrew Christian groups were often converted by Christian missionaries but were treated as Jews when they tried to assimilate into Gentile Christian churches.⁶ The members of the Jewish Christian Community, however, were not converted by missionaries; although some of them have had experiences similar to the Hebrew Christians in Gentile Christian churches, the failure to assimilate into Christian churches was not an important factor in the initiation and growth of the movement. The Jewish Christian Community was rather a response of a small number of acculturated Jews to physical and mental deprivation⁷ and stress under conditions of antisemitic persecution.

Only a small percentage of the survivors of the German destruction of European Jewry have found solace in religious adventist beliefs. Rabbi Joseph Schneersohn of the Lubavitcher Hassidic dynasty, which has a sizeable following in the United States, proclaimed until he died in 1950 that the holocaust was a prelude to the coming of the Messiah and called upon Jews to atone for their sins.⁸ The members of the Jewish Christian Community also expect the imminent coming of the Messiah, but their adventist beliefs radically differ from the traditional adventist beliefs of the Hassidim. Thus the Jewish Christian Community

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is a relatively unique movement since it combines adventist beliefs with extremely syncretistic religious orientations.

Abram Poljak, the leader of the Jewish Christian Community, was born in Russia in 1900, but in 1905 Poljak's family fled from the Russian pogroms to Germany. Poljak became a journalist and participated in anti-Nazi activities in the early thirties. He claims that in 1933 he faced death in a German prison but was discharged by mistake. In prison he 'came fully to the faith in Christ' and maintained that his mistaken discharge from prison was the work of God. In 1935, on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem, he recognized that his 'life's calling' was to form the Jewish Christian Community. He attempted to form a 'Jewish Christian Union' in Jerusalem with two friends, but one friend died and the other left him. In 1936 he gained a few followers in Vienna but came up against police prohibition. In 1937 he organized a small group with a few German Jewish immigrants in London, but in 1940 the group disbanded when Poljak was interned. After his return in 1944 Poljak established the first 'Christian synagogue' or 'Jewish church'. In 1945 Gentile Christians were admitted to the movement to form an 'outer circle' called the 'Jerusalem Fellowship' to the 'inner circle' of Jewish Christians in the Jewish Christian Community.

The movement grew numerically in 1946. Over forty individuals attended the movement's London conference in January 1947 and between fifteen and twenty individuals participated in the weekly services that the group held in London. Nearly a hundred people attended another London conference in December 1947 and the English version of the movement's journal *Jerusalem* had nearly a thousand subscribers in twenty-two countries, even though only between ten and eighteen individuals were participating in the weekly services in London. A community was formed in Palestine in 1947 and twenty adherents (seventeen Jewish Christians and three Gentiles) attended its first conference; in November of that year, the Jerusalem community was holding regular services with twenty-four worshippers. In 1948, meetings were held in Blaby, Manchester, Birkenhead, and London where the first all-England conference attracted a hundred and eighty individuals, but since that date the sect's conferences in England have been less successful. At the end of a London conference in 1951 a number of members offered their homes for prayer; prayer 'circles' were set up in Bristol, Wirral, Blaby, Canvey Island, Bognor Regis, Boscombe, Bournemouth, Liverpool, Manchester, Westcliff-on-Sea, and Leeds. The large proportion of prayer circles on the south-east coast reflects the fact that a large proportion of members were elderly German Jews in retirement. In 1953 there were about sixty prayer circles in Germany, France, Switzerland, England, and Australia. Since the early fifties the number of Jews in the movement appears to have declined. Subscriptions to the magazine were acknowledged to be falling off in November

1956, and this was attributed to the death of several supporters. In 1953 there were only between eighteen and twenty members in the Jerusalem community with another six in Tel Aviv, Petah Tikvah, and Haifa. When Poljak visited Jerusalem in 1963 there were ten community members present at the Friday night service. At its peak (at the end of the 1940s and in the early 1950s) the total Jewish membership of the sect was probably no more than two hundred individuals.

The movement has attracted a larger number of Gentiles than Jews, particularly in Germany. Jews have always been in the minority at the sect's European conferences. At a conference in Stuttgart in 1953, the sect's journal claimed that between four and five thousand attended a Sunday session. This was contrasted with the 1953 conference in London where fewer than a hundred attended. Although the sect's conferences in Germany attracted more people in the early 1950s, they have continued to attract large numbers. The journal asserted that about eight hundred attended the 1964 Whitsun conference in Germany. Even if these figures are overestimates, the movement has obviously attracted a comparatively large number of German Christians.

The turnover of members in the Community has been high, especially in its early years. It is difficult to assess the number of committed and consistent adherents because the Community has not established a central organization to which supporters may become affiliated. A person has been considered a member if he was a subscriber to the journal and participated in the movement's activities, such as the prayer circles. Like many other Christian sects the Jewish Christian Community has ideologically opposed the development of a formal organization. Its journal has stated that the movement must guard against becoming a 'unit of organization' or an 'established church'.⁹ A constitution was, however, adopted in January 1946 which ruled that the Community was to be directed by a Council in which members were expected to have 'full confidence'.¹⁰ In 1947 the Council agreed on a number of rules which were declared to be binding on all the members of the 'inner' Jewish circle of the Community: members were not to belong to any political party; they should obey all the laws of the state as long as they did not contradict Christian principles; they should reject all acts of violence; they should not fight in wars but could join medical units; and they were not to sue anyone before a secular court. It was maintained that the laws were necessary in order that the members in Palestine should not be drawn into the political passions or 'satanic stream'.¹¹

All Council decisions had to be unanimous and power was not to be vested in a single person. Poljak was, however, a strong and active leader. He held together a movement which had both a loosely affiliated and dispersed membership, and which was subject to conflicting Jewish and Christian pressures arising from the marginality of its orientations

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to the two religious traditions. Poljak was not a charismatic leader, and on several occasions his actions were criticized and his power considered excessive. He made no provisions for a successor, preferring to 'leave it to God',¹² and since his death in 1963 no new leader appears to have emerged. Without a strong leader the future of the movement is very uncertain.

Poljak formulated a large part of the movement's belief system. He wrote that after the fall of man from paradise into sin, God appointed the Jews to carry His prophetic spirit, but with the rejection and crucifixion of Christ by the Jews God transferred the gift of prophecy to the Gentile churches. The time of the Gentile churches is now coming to an end and the members of the Jewish Christian Community are preparing for the return of God's grace and gift of prophecy to the Jews. The World War period which began in 1914 will end with the imminent Third World War, the Armageddon, when the Anti-Christ will come to earth in an attempt to destroy the remaining Jews. The Anti-Christ will be defeated by Christ who will then set up his Kingdom on Earth.¹³ All the events in the real world are interpreted by the Jewish Christian Community in relation to its eschatological belief system; the weather, earthquakes, the destruction of Jewish communities, the creation of the State of Israel, the Arab-Israeli wars, international tensions, atom bomb tests, etc. are all interpreted as 'signs of the times' foreshadowing Armageddon.

Although the belief system explains all events in the world, it developed as a response to the German destruction of European Jewry which the members were unable to explain by their previous belief systems. Thus Hitler became the agent of Satan, the forerunner of the Anti-Christ, and, through him, the Nazi party and then the whole of Germany became demonized. Only with these beliefs were the members able to 'explain the unbelievable happenings in the German concentration camps and the Nazi terror in the occupied countries'.¹⁴ The majority of members were born in Germany, and many had relatives who were killed by the Germans. The belief system probably had a therapeutic value since it explained the radical traumatic changes of circumstance which the members had experienced. One member wrote: 'Why was there so much destruction, unhappiness, struggle and strife? There seemed to be no answer, no explanation, no reason in it all. But I became conscious that behind all the chaos and the turmoil of human affairs there was an immutable law and order governing the universe'.¹⁵

The belief system was a response to conditions which no longer existed but subsequent experiences and world events have been explained and interpreted in terms of the basic precepts of the belief system. The movement believes that antisemitism will increase in the world up to the Armageddon but since antisemitism has decreased in Europe the movement has focused its attention more on Israel which is

seen as the centre of the coming battle between Anti-Christ and Christ. The Arabs are 'tools in the hand of Satan' so that 'the senseless and almost boundless hatred against Israel displayed by the Arab nations thus finds its explanation'. Antisemitism will increase until the Armageddon 'when all the nations of the World, under the leadership of the Anti-Christ will swoop down upon Israel with the intent of finally destroying the Jewish people'.¹⁰

The decline of the Jewish membership of the movement in recent years reflects the change in the particular conditions in Europe in which the movement arose. Unlike the majority of adventist sects, which are religious responses to various kinds of more or less persistent socio-economic deprivation within certain strata, the Jewish Christian Community was a response among a small number of Jews to severe deprivation over a comparatively short period. The members responded to persecution and the loss of their families and relatives by internalizing a particular segment of the antisemite's legitimization system. The members blamed themselves for being persecuted since they maintained that they were guilty of the crucifixion of Christ. They believed that they were preparing the way for the return of Christ by repenting for the sins of the Jewish people and praying for the Jews' acceptance of Christ. The central prayer of their Friday night service is the 'prayer of repentance' which includes the following words:

'We repent for our sins and as Jews for the crime of our fathers who delivered thee into the hands of the heathen and caused Thy crucifixion. Then they cried that Thy blood should be on them and on their children. Thus they brought a curse upon the whole Jewish people . . . Hasten Thy return Lord Jesus and establish Thy Kingdom in our time. Fill us, the Jewish Christian Community, more and more with Thy Holy Spirit and enable us to be Thy servants, the herald of Thy second coming'.

The members reject all racist theories. The internalization of racial antisemitism could only result in self-hatred and possible self-destruction, but the internalization of religious legitimations for antisemitism need not necessarily result in self-hatred because the 'guilt' can be expiated by repentance and preparation for the return of Christ. The members call themselves 'Christian Zionists' and reject assimilation into the Gentile churches. The 'return' of many Jews to Israel is seen as a sign of the returning grace of God to the Jews and the impending conversion of the Jews to Christ. A few members have emigrated from Europe to Israel.

Although the majority of members have lived in a society where antisemitism was legitimated largely by racist ideologies, they have internalized the historically older religious justification of antisemitism. The description by Poljak of the pogrom he experienced at the age of five shows the close association he made between the crucifixion of Christ

and the persecution of the Jews. He states that the pogrom began after a stone was thrown at a picture of Christ in a Church procession and the cry, 'The Jews have done it'. The internalization of guilt for the crucifixion can be psychologically functional since it allows the channelling of the guilt that the individual feels for his own persecution and/or the death of members of his family and primary groups. In some cases the belief may be a functional substitute for a neurotic symptom. A South African Jewess who visited Germany in 1936 made the following statement at one of the sect's conferences:

I came to look for my relatives who were among the first of Hitler's victims. Some I found in hiding, others had disappeared without leaving a trace behind . . . I was filled with horror, fear and shame, a helplessness that led to despair . . . I hated Christianity because of the crimes perpetrated by a so-called Christian nation . . . I felt completely lost. Then, in my despair, Jesus revealed himself to me. From one moment to the next I was transported from the depths of despair to the heights of joy.¹⁷

The members' attitude towards antisemites has varied somewhat. Although they maintain that their own guilt resulted in their persecution, they also state that their persecutors were the 'tools of Satan' and that all antisemites face sure destruction. The movement's journal alternates between warning antisemites of their imminent destruction and asking God to forgive them. In 1947 a passage was added to the prayer of repentance asking for the enemies of the Jews to be forgiven, but the crushing of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 was explained as a result of the antisemitism in Hungary over the previous thirty years.

The members of the Jewish Christian Community include many who are old, lonely, and suffering from illness. A member who visited the English prayer centres in 1954 found that they were very small, often composed of two individuals, and sometimes only one. Among the members of the prayer centres he found 'the lame, the blind, the widows, the aged. Several are over eighty years of age, some cannot leave their beds, others cannot leave their rooms. . . .'¹⁸ The movement has held regular 'intercession' services for healing since its earliest years. In 1960, shortly after suffering a severe stroke, Poljak composed a special liturgy for healing: the central prayer is a prayer of repentance for the sins of the Jewish people. It includes the following words: 'The Jews are persecuted and hunted, hated and trodden down, driven out by many and received by but few. Lord, have mercy upon them. Take away the curse that has been on them, bind up their broken hearts, renew their spirits, heal them from their sicknesses and lead them to life everlasting.' Thus the members' deprivation is also explained by the curse on the Jewish people resulting from their crucifixion of Christ, and this deprivation is dealt with (and possibly alleviated) by their confession of guilt and adventist beliefs.

The members are not promised a privileged place in Christ's

Kingdom or any great compensation in the millennial period for their present deprivation. Instead, there is a greater emphasis on the joys and happiness of the deprivation itself; suffering from persecution and illness is a sign of grace. The following appeared in the sect's journal in 1947: 'The reward which we Jewish Christians expect for our labours for the Kingdom of God is suffering and death, slander and persecution, extradition, internment, prison, etc. Some of these pleasures we have already experienced; their repetition, continuation and increase will not surprise us. Only if the persecution does not come will we be surprised; and that would bring before us the question whether we are still serving God loyally and in the right way.' When four members of the community in Jerusalem were detained and questioned in prison in 1948 as suspected British spies, the movement's journal reported that 'they all thought of it as a privilege, a divine favour and considered it their happy lot'.¹⁹ This masochistic attitude enables members to expiate their introjected guilt but it is rather inconsistently maintained together with prayers for the alleviation of illness. The belief in the joy of persecution and illness is perhaps more closely held by the more active leaders of the movement.²⁰

The majority of adventist sects draw their members from maladjusted communities or occupational groups,²¹ but since the members of the Jewish Christian Community are Jews they are scattered over large areas. Even in the largest Jewish communities the movement only attracts a very few; in the smaller communities, members may be isolated. In 1947 a need was expressed in the movement's journal for contact between fellow believers, but since the sect is against centralized organization, it left the formation of local centres to the readers of its journal. The formation of prayer circles was an attempt to overcome the isolation of many members. Readers of the journal would form a prayer circle by writing to the journal to find the addresses of other readers in the area and then contact them to arrange a meeting.

The liturgy for the sect's Friday night Sabbath service was written by one Nathan Whycer in 1944. Whycer, who at one time had studied to become a rabbi, was dwarfed and humpbacked as a result of a childhood accident, and he suffered from asthma and prolonged insomnia. Until his death, in 1945, he officiated as 'rabbi' at the sect's services in London. The liturgy is an attempt to combine elements from both the Christian and Jewish religious services. In addition to the central prayer of repentance the service includes the kindling of the Sabbath lights, readings from the scriptures and addresses on them, thanksgiving over wine, psalms from the Jewish prayer book in English, a Hebrew hymn, the Lord's prayer, and the Aaronic blessing. The Saturday Sabbath morning liturgy includes a portion from the Pentateuch and Prophets, a chapter from the New Testament, an address or discussion, the Lord's prayer, and the Aaronic blessing.

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The sect has attempted to synthesize other Jewish and Christian religious practices. They claim that both the Jewish Pesach and the Christian Easter have lost their significance but that their own festival 'Easter-Pessach' is 'the great festival of the King'. Christian practices are reinterpreted in Jewish forms, and vice versa. Baptism and Communion are transformed into their 'original forms': ritual immersion (Mikveh) and Kiddush. The members are called upon to keep circumcision, the Sabbath, and the Jewish holy days. Thus the members attempt to retain a Jewish identification and differentiate themselves from Gentile Christians. They claim identity with the first Christians who, they point out, were also Jews; they maintain that separation from Gentiles is necessary in order to carry out their mission which is to act as a vanguard for the conversion of Israel. The movement has made no attempt, however, to carry out missionary activities among Jews. They maintain that their task can only be carried out by a few, and that these few will be led to the movement by God rather than by efforts to enlist members. It is maintained that it is good for them 'to remain small, poor and despised'.

Since the early 1950s the movement's emphasis on specific Jewish practices has declined. This development is related to the movement's success among Gentiles rather than Jews. The interest in the movement by a comparatively large number of Germans, particularly those in their early fifties, is perhaps not difficult to understand. A number of Germans who have attended the movement's conferences and joined the Gentile part of the movement may have found consolation in the belief that it was the Jews themselves, rather than the German people, who were ultimately guilty of the destruction of European Jewry. The movement also provides a setting for some Germans to confess their own guilt before a number of Jews. At a conference in Basle in 1951 a German woman stated: 'What we Germans have done to the Jews we can never make good again. God has punished us severely for it and yet will punish us more. We have deserved the disaster and misery which has come over Germany. I cannot consider myself free from the German guilt'. The movement's conferences and meetings provide a setting in which both guilt-ridden Jews and Gentiles can exchange expressions of guilt to their mutual satisfaction.

At the Basle conference in 1952 a Gentile missionary suggested that the Gentile part of the movement should be called the Jewish Christian Brotherhood of the Kingdom. Poljak objected to the inclusion of the words 'Jewish Christian' since Jewish Christians were only a small minority within the Brotherhood of the Kingdom, but he was defeated by several hundred votes to two on the issue. The Gentile Christians wanted to take upon themselves the 'shame of Israel'.²² At an early stage of the movement's history, the incorporation of Gentile members had been legitimated by reference to the first Christian movement which

had developed from a particularistic sect composed only of Jews to a universalistic movement which included Gentiles, and the Jewish Christian Community's greater success among Gentiles has resulted in the formulation of a more universalistic ideology. The definition of a 'Jewish Christian' has become broader; he is no longer a Christian born of Jewish parents but a person who accepts the beliefs of the Jewish Christian movement and possesses the Jewish Christian 'spirit'. The numerical predominance of Gentiles in the movement has also resulted in a new emphasis on missionary activities. After his defeat at the Basle conference Poljak changed his attitude and he accepted that 'the message of the Kingdom must be given to all nations'. The Brotherhood has established a small number of settlements which serve as Bible schools and community centres. At present there are three settlements in Mottlingen (Germany), Lugano (Switzerland), and Upie (France). At the foundation of the first settlement in Mottlingen in 1954, it was maintained that the imminent war and destruction was not an excuse for idleness and that the settlement was a 'witness in the hour of judgement'.

It is possible to interpret these developments as logically inconsistent with the belief that the period of grace to the Gentile churches was coming to an end, and in 1966 a leading Jewish member wrote that the activities in Germany represented the last phase in the period of grace of the Gentiles. Not surprisingly pressures in Israel have been in the opposite direction to those in Europe. In 1948, members of the Jerusalem community attempted to make the community more Jewish by excluding many of the more Christian symbols and practices. Poljak opposed this 'satanic manoeuvre', dissolved the community, and in March 1949 claimed that the difficulties in the Jerusalem community had been overcome.

The Jewish Christian Community was a product of a tragic period of history for the Jewish people. In the past, increases in persecution and suffering have strengthened the Jews' expectations of the coming of the Messiah and the return to Zion, but before the emancipation the isolation of the Jews ensured that these expectations would be expressed in specifically Jewish religio-cultural forms. The traditional explanation for the sufferings of the Jews was that they had not kept the ritual minutiae of the Law. This explanation was possibly not available to the acculturated members of the Jewish Christian Community, and even if it had been available the majority of members would have found it very difficult to integrate into a Jewish traditionalistic community which would have required a total change in their behavioural patterns. Christian eschatological explanations were more available to the members and they only required conformity to a number of beliefs and religious practices rather than conformity to a completely strange behavioural life pattern.

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NOTES

¹ The main source of information on the Jewish Christian Community is the movement's journal, *Jerusalem*.

² For a history of the Reform movement in Germany and America see David Philipson, *The Reform Movement in Judaism*, New York and London, 1907.

³ G. Aronson, 'Ideological Trends Among Russian Jews' in J. Frumkin, G. Aronson, and A. Goldenweiser, eds., *Russian Jewry 1860-1917*, London, 1966, pp. 144-71.

⁴ In the early 1920s it was estimated in the Jewish press that there were in New York City 60,000 Christian Scientists who were Jews. See *Jewish Chronicle*, 29 December 1922 and 29 August 1924. I am grateful to Dr. Bryan R. Wilson for pointing out that the figure of 60,000 is probably a gross overestimate. In 1926 there was a total number of 11,530 Christian Scientists in New York State (see C. S. Braden, *Christian Science Today*, London, 1958, p. 270), and it is very doubtful whether a large percentage of these were Jews. For a sociological analysis of Christian Science see B. R. Wilson, *Sects and Society*, London, 1961.

⁵ *Jewish Chronicle*, 29 August 1924.

⁶ I. O. Glick 'The Hebrew Christians: A Marginal Religious Group' in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, pp. 415-31.

⁷ See C. Y. Glock, 'The Role of Deprivation in the Origin and Evolution of Religious Groups' in R. Lee and M. E. Marty, eds., *Religion and Social Conflict*, New York, 1964, pp. 24-36.

⁸ Maurice Carr, 'Chassidism Lives On', *Jewish Chronicle*, 23 March 1951, p. 13.

⁹ *Jerusalem*, January 1947.

¹⁰ *Jerusalem*, October 1946.

¹¹ *Jerusalem*, April/May 1947.

¹² *Jerusalem*, July/August 1960.

¹³ There are some general similarities between the eschatology of the Jewish Christian Community and the exegesis of Christian fundamentalist sects. The belief that the Anti-Christ seeks to destroy the remaining Jews is probably unique but other sects have given the Jews a special place in their eschatology. The Christadelphians maintain that only the Christadelphians and Jews will emerge triumphant after the battle of Armageddon. (See Wilson, op. cit.) The Exclusive Brethren maintain that they will be drawn out from the world before

the 'time of troubles' but that the Jews will inherit the concrete world after the advent. See B. R. Wilson, 'The Exclusive Brethren' in B. R. Wilson, ed., *Patterns of English Sectarianism*, London, 1967, pp. 292-3.

¹⁴ *Jerusalem*, May 1945.

¹⁵ *Jerusalem*, December 1949.

¹⁶ *Jerusalem*, May 1957.

¹⁷ *Jerusalem*, March/April 1953.

¹⁸ *Jerusalem*, December 1954.

¹⁹ *Jerusalem*, December 1948.

²⁰ Masochistic attitudes and behaviour have been present in a number of Christian sects and especially in the Russian sects of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Perhaps the most extreme case was the Skoptsy movement which imposed castration on its members. See Werner Stark, *The Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 2: *Sectarian Religion*, London, 1967, pp. 190-97. Unlike the masochistic Russian sects the members of the Jewish Christian Community have not imposed suffering on themselves. Instead, they legitimate their present suffering, and believe that they only have to wait for suffering to be imposed by outside bodies. Christian sects usually relate the need for suffering to 'original sin' and man's 'evil' sexual nature. In contrast, the members of the Jewish Christian Community maintain they have to suffer because of the Jewish crucifixion of Christ. In common with other Christian sects the Jewish Christian Community also consider suffering a sign of election by God. The Christadelphians like to consider themselves persecuted and refer to themselves as 'the sect everywhere spoken against'. Wilson, *Sects and Society*, op. cit., p. 353.

²¹ B. R. Wilson, 'An Analysis of Sect Development', *American Sociological Review*, 24 February 1959, pp. 3-15.

²² Other groups who have identified with the Jews include the Christadelphians, a number of Negroes in Harlem, and a group of Southern Italian peasants. See Wilson, *Sects and Society*, op. cit.; Howard Brotz, *The Black Jews of Harlem*, London, 1964, and Elena Cassin, *The Story of San Nicandro*, London, 1957. The small group of peasants in San Nicandro did not at first have any knowledge of modern Jews. They identified themselves with the pastoral Hebrews of the Old Testament.

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CONVERSION AND AMERICAN ORTHODOX JUDAISM: A RESEARCH NOTE

Albert Ehrman and C. Abraham Fenster

IT is a remarkable fact of history that, despite so many pressures to the contrary, Gentiles of all persuasions—pagans, Christians, Muslims, and others—have throughout the ages been converted to the Jewish faith. Two recent illustrious converts to Orthodox Judaism, for example, have been the Scottish Jesuit, Abraham Carmel, and the Japanese Shintoist, Dr. Abraham Kotsuji.¹

In 1954, Dr. D. M. Eichhorn, a Reform Rabbi, comprehensively surveyed the incidence of conversion to Liberal (that is, Conservative and Reform) Judaism in America.² His findings indicated that Liberal Judaism was making between 1,500 and 1,750 converts annually, and that the number of these converts was increasing steadily. Since the greatest number of these conversions are halachically invalid,³ no one can as yet foresee what problems these converts will create in the structure of Orthodox Jewish Life in America and Canada. In the present study,⁴ however, our interest lies in examining the incidence of conversion to Orthodox Judaism in order to understand its long-range halachic and sociological significance.

On 1st June 1965, and again on 1st February 1966, we sent out a questionnaire to all the 850 members of the Rabbinical Council of America.⁵ Of the 500 practising Rabbis within the Rabbinical Council of America, 126 (25 per cent) sent replies. The ten points raised by our questionnaire will now be discussed in order.

1. *How many candidates for conversion to Judaism have come to you for counsel over the past*

(a) 10 years

(b) 5 years

(c) 3 years?

Over the ten-year period studied (1955–65), some 980 non-Jews approached a Rabbi of the Rabbinical Council of America with a view to conversion to Judaism. Since only 25 per cent of the practising Rabbis of the Rabbinical Council of America responded to our questionnaire, and since there are a considerable number of Orthodox Rabbis who are

not members of this organization, it is impossible for us to estimate the total number of converts to Orthodox Judaism in America. But we shall analyse the data we have.

We believed that there would be great variations in the number of candidates for conversion interviewed by each Rabbi. Our expectation was confirmed. Thirteen of our responding Rabbis (10·3 per cent) interviewed twenty or more candidates for conversion as follows:⁶

	<i>Number of candidates</i>
1. Anonymous	100
2. Rabbi A, Illinois	50
3. Rabbi B, California	50
4. Rabbi C, Michigan	45
5. Rabbi D, New York	35
6. Rabbi E, California	30
7. Rabbi F, New York	30
8. Rabbi G, California	25
9. Rabbi H, Missouri	23
10. Rabbi I, North Carolina	20
11. Rabbi J, New York	20
12. Rabbi K, New York	20
13. Rabbi L, Manitoba, Canada	20

These 13 Rabbis, or 10·3 per cent of our respondents, handled 47·8 per cent of the total number of candidates. In contrast, 50 per cent of our respondents dealt with 0-4 candidates during the ten-year period studied.

Reference to the above list suggests that, while all geographic areas of the United States and Canada are represented, intense conversion activity is taking place in California and New York. It should also be noted that conversion to Orthodox Judaism seems to have increased steadily during the ten-year period. Of the Rabbis who had been practising since 1955, 41 filled in their replies to this question. Accordingly, we have computed the average number of candidates *per annum* who sought conversion to Judaism from any one of these 41 Rabbis:

	<i>Candidates per annum</i>
1955-60	40·2
1960-62	46·5
1962-65	62·3

2. *Do you counsel the candidates yourself, or do you refer them to another Rabbi? If you refer the candidate, to which Rabbi do you refer?*

While many Rabbis are confronted by numerous individuals who are seeking conversion to Judaism, not all converts are readily accepted. In fact, some 28·6 per cent of our respondents said that they chose to have nothing to do with converts, and referred all candidates for conversion to another Rabbi or to a Rabbinical organization. 'Referral'

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organizations or individuals mentioned more than once by our respondents are listed as follows:

	<i>Referrals</i>
1. Rabbinical Council of America	12
2. Agudath Harabanim	3
3. Chicago Rabbinical Council	3
4. Vaad Harabanim of Detroit	3
5. A Los Angeles Rabbi	2
6. A Bronx Rabbi	2
7. A Brooklyn Rabbi	2

It should be observed that, in spite of the numerous 'referrals' mentioned, 65 per cent of the responding Rabbis counsel the candidates themselves: they refer the candidates to no other Rabbi or agency.

3. *What is the distribution between male and female candidates?*

(a) *Male* (b) *Female*

The sex distribution of the candidates was as follows:

	<i>Number of candidates</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Male	306	31.2
Female	635	64.8
No details	39	4.0

Thus we see that female outnumber male candidates by slightly more than 2 to 1. While the reason for this is not readily apparent, one might speculate that this phenomenon is related to the social psychology of marriage, since 'courtship and marriage' provided the most frequent motivation for conversion to Judaism (see Question 7). Indeed, the data suggest that men are more frequently able to get their non-Jewish prospective spouses to convert to Orthodox Judaism than are women. It may be that, at least during the courtship period, men have more control over decision-making than do women; but, of course, this is only a tentative hypothesis.

4. *What is the distribution in the educational level of the candidates?*

- (a) *Primary Education*
- (b) *Secondary Education*
- (c) *College Education*
- (d) *University Education*

The distribution of the educational levels of the candidates was as follows:

	<i>Number of candidates</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Pre-school and Primary Education	254	25.8
Secondary Education	329	33.6
College Education	323	33.0
University Education	74	7.6

Educationally speaking, there was only a hair's-breadth difference between the number of high school and of college graduates. In all probability, the educational level of the Gentile candidate for conversion is higher than that of the Gentile population as a whole, and is probably about equal to that of his Jewish (prospective) mate.⁷ The 25.8 per cent listed for 'Pre-school and Primary Education' consisted primarily of adopted children of pre-school or elementary-school age.

5. *What are the candidates' former religious backgrounds?*

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (a) <i>Protestant</i> | (c) <i>Agnostic-Atheist</i> |
| (b) <i>Roman Catholic</i> | (d) <i>Other</i> |

The distribution of the former religious backgrounds of the candidates was as follows:

	<i>Number of candidates</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Protestants	519	53.0
Catholics	179	18.3
Agnostic-Atheists	42	4.3
Others, unknown and unspecified	240	24.4

It will be noticed that candidates definitely identified as Protestants outnumbered those definitely identified as Catholics by a ratio of 3 : 1. This ratio is in keeping with the findings of the Gallup Poll of the 'religious preference' of adult Americans conducted in 1955. According to that survey, 71 per cent identified themselves as Protestants, while 23 per cent identified themselves as Catholics (a ratio of 3 : 1).⁸

In contrast to both these groups, however, only a negligible percentage of the candidates identified themselves as formally 'agnostic' or 'atheistic'. This may be partially accounted for by the fact that, in any religious survey, only about 4 per cent of the American population identify themselves as not believing in the Almighty.⁹ Furthermore, it is probable that these individuals, being so militant in their renunciation of organized religion, have little intimate contact with devoutly observant Jews.

Interestingly enough, candidates for conversion were not all formerly Protestant, Catholic, or Agnostic-Atheist: there were also 2 Greek Orthodox Christians, 1 Mormon, and 1 Muslim.

6. *Into what age groups do the candidates fall?*

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| (a) <i>Under 21</i> | (c) <i>36-50</i> |
| (b) <i>21-35</i> | (d) <i>51 and over</i> |

The distribution of the age groups of the candidates was as follows:

<i>Age</i>	<i>Number of candidates</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
(a) <i>Under 21</i>	286	29.2
(b) <i>21-35</i>	605	61.7
(c) <i>36-50</i>	51	5.2
(d) <i>51 and over</i>	10	1.0
(e) <i>Unidentified</i>	28	2.9

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The number of candidates in the 21-35 age group led all others; over 60 per cent of our respondents fell into this age bracket. The finding is in harmony with the responses to Question 7 that 'courtship and marriage' constitute the primary motivation of candidates seeking conversion to Orthodox Judaism. The only other significantly large age group was the 'under-21' persons who accounted for 30 per cent of the candidates; this group contains a fair number of young persons who might be contemplating marriage, as well as numerous adopted children.

7. *What are the determining factors which lead the candidates to seek your counsel?*

(a) *Courtship and Marriage*

(b) *Study and Reflection*

(c) *Other*

(Please explain)

The 'determining factors' which led candidates to seek the counsel of an Orthodox Rabbi are summarized as follows:

	<i>Number of candidates</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Courtship and Marriage	666	68.0
Study and Reflection	80	8.2
Other and Unspecified	234	23.8

As might be expected, the number of candidates applying for conversion for reasons of courtship and marriage led all others. We may note that this figure is significantly below that reported in the Eichhorn study. According to Eichhorn (p. 310), no less than 94 per cent of all candidates appearing before the Reform Rabbinate, and 96 per cent applying to the Conservative Rabbinate, were motivated by considerations of marriage.

It is also noteworthy that more than 8 per cent of the converts were said to have been motivated by 'study and reflection', independently of any involvement with a prospective Jewish spouse. In the case of the 23.8 per cent motivated by other reasons, the primary motivation was the adoption of Gentile children by Jews. This latter, it might be noted, was a motivation not considered by the authors in planning their study; its effect became readily discernible when the responses were analysed.

8. *Describe the procedure you follow with male candidates.*

9. *Describe the procedure you follow with female candidates.*

All of our respondents, without exception, followed the requirements of the *Shulhan Arukh* in their conversion procedures. All male candidates were required to undergo *Brit Milah* (circumcision), *Hatafat Dam Brit* (the extraction of a drop of blood when a non-religious circumcision had already been performed), *Tvilah* (ritual immersion), and

an examination before a qualified *Bet Din* (religious tribunal). All female candidates were required to undergo *Tvilah* and an examination before a qualified *Bet Din*. This was in sharp contrast to the halachic requirements which the Conservative and Reform Rabbis felt obliged to follow; Eichhorn reports (p. 309) that only 'two out of 461 Reform and 33 out of 247 Conservative Rabbis stated that they required a male convert to be circumcised'. Concerning *Tvilah*, he adds (loc. cit.): 'None of the 461 Reform Rabbis required converts to undergo ritual immersion.'

10. *Do those candidates whom you have accepted into Judaism become faithful Sons and Daughters of the Synagogue? Please explain.*

Once converted, do the converts remain faithful Jews? Many diverse and conflicting responses were received to this question. 36 Rabbis (or 28.6 per cent) expressed a generally negative view of the converts' subsequent Jewish observance. One Queens Rabbi cogently expressed this feeling when he wrote, 'I have never accepted even one convert and I do not regret this fact. I believe the time is not [propitious] for [converts].' This Rabbi's feelings were shared by a Brooklyn Rabbi who stated, 'In the congregations that I have served there have been Orthodox-performed conversions. It is interesting that not one has persisted in Jewish observance.'

In contrast, however, 45 Rabbis (35.7 per cent) expressed a generally positive view of the converts' subsequent Jewish way of life.¹⁰ A Manhattan Rabbi said that all his converts were 'fully, happily, consistently' observant Jews and Jewesses. A Connecticut Rabbi wrote of a college-educated Roman Catholic woman, who had been converted after several years of marriage to a Jewish husband; he stated that she was now a shining example of a Jewish wife and mother. She observed the Sabbath, *Kashrut*, and *Toharat Ha-Mishpaha* (the purity of family life) strictly, and sent all her children to *Yeshiva*. He concluded: 'Her conversion and faithful adherence to Judaism have been most gratifying to me.'

Many Rabbis wrote of the great bitterness and disillusionment experienced by many converts whose Jewish spouses remain non-observant even after their own conversion. One such case was reported to us by a Jewish Chaplain in the U.S. Army; he wrote of a 'wife of a Jewish sergeant who came to me complaining that her husband refused to attend Synagogue on Saturdays even when he was free to do it. In this particular case the convert remained loyal to the Jewish faith, in spite of her husband's neglect of duties toward his faith.'

On the other hand, there have been instances where the convert actually returned the native Jewish partner to a life of Torah observance. One such interesting case was reported from Springfield, Mass.; it concerned a convert's husband 'who came from an Orthodox home and

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had wandered and has now returned to a life of observance. She has complete acceptance in his family.'

All Rabbis concurred in accepting adopted children for conversion. A Cincinnati Rabbi summed up the feelings of his Rabbinical colleagues in this matter. After informing us that he had converted three non-Jewish women, he added: 'In each case there were minor children involved with great likelihood that these children would marry Jewish partners eventually. My reasoning was that there was nothing to be gained and a great deal to be lost in not converting the non-Jewish women and their children. Even if "Gerus" [conversion] did not help for the adult, it would help for the child (*Ger-Koton*). I consulted a noted *Rosh Yeshiva* on this problem and followed his advice.'

NOTES

¹ Both men have written their autobiographies: A. Carmel, *So Strange My Path* (New York, 1964), and A. Kotsuji, *From Tokyo to Jerusalem* (New York, 1964).

² D. M. Eichhorn, 'Conversion to Judaism by Reform and Conservative Rabbis', *Jewish Social Studies*, Oct. 1954, pp. 299-318.

³ See discussion of Questions 8 and 9.

⁴ The authors would like to thank the Rabbinical Council of America, and especially Rabbi Dr. Melech Schachter, for their generous help and support in the present study.

⁵ The membership of the two other leading Orthodox Rabbinical organizations—The Rabbinical Alliance of America and the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada—was not included in the present study.

⁶ All geographical locations of Rabbis quoted in this study are taken from the *Rabbinic Registry* (1965) of the Rabbinical Council of America.

⁷ W. Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, New York, 1960, p. 225, n. 5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-5, n. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 91, n. 1.

¹⁰ 45 Rabbis, or 35.7 per cent, expressed no opinion on this matter.

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THE STATUS OF THE ANGLO-JEWISH RABBINATE, 1840-1914

Michael Goulston

DURING the last fifty years the position of the Anglo-Jewish ministry has often been unfavourably compared with that of the rabbinate in other centres of Jewish life, notably Germany and the United States. This article is an attempt to explain why the English rabbinate occupied a low status, by tracing the changes in rabbinic role, and evaluating them in the context of Anglo-Jewry's own adaptation to the host culture. It is hoped that a study of religious leadership from an economic, cultural, and social perspective will not only resolve the question of ministerial status, but also contribute to an understanding of the role of ecclesiastical institutions in the general processes of the acculturation of a minority group.

The Status of the Rabbinate, 1840-1880

The status of the rabbinate in the period between 1840 and the arrival of the immigrants in the 1880s was intimately connected with the growing consolidation of the institutions of Anglo-Jewish communal life. The instruments of change in the status of the rabbinate were two-fold: a striving towards conformity which we associate with the institutional processes of Anglo-Jewish life, and the weight of popular opinion which guided the rabbinate into a role acceptable to the expanding middle classes.

On 18 April 1845 the following advertisement appeared in the *Jewish Chronicle*:

Wanted by the Manchester Hebrew Association, a competent Lecturer and teacher. The duties comprised in this office, are to deliver Religious Discourses in English at the Synagogue, and to conduct the Hebrew and English school connected with the Association. Salary, £180 per annum.

'A competent Lecturer . . . to deliver religious discourses in English at the Synagogue': these were the hallmarks of the so-called 'Anglo-Jewish Ministers of the modern type', or the 'preacher-Ministers', whose prototype was assiduously laboured in the Anglo-Jewish press. Although the

role of preacher was traced to Talmudic times, the first English exemplar was taken to be Rabbi Tobias Goodman.

Tobias Goodman—'Rabbi' as he describes himself . . . preached sermons in *English* . . . on the death of . . . Princess Charlotte of Wales and Saxe-Coburg [1817] . . . this was the first sermon delivered in English, in a London [German] synagogue . . .¹

This preaching role in the synagogue, as much else in Jewish life at the time, was related to the question of political emancipation. A *Jewish Chronicle* editorial of 1849 commented:

It is therefore obvious, that the want of lecturers can only be provided for among ourselves; we indispensably require an institution to educate men for the pulpit. . . . We are anxious to obtain full emancipation; and would it not be a disgrace if we were told by our Christian opponents, that the Jews of England are so ignorant that they cannot find a lecturer in their community?²

The institution which the *Jewish Chronicle* required was not to become a reality until the founding of Jews' College in 1855, but from the New Chief Rabbi (Nathan Adler) on, men were regularly preaching before that date. Apart from the Amsterdam-born *hazan* of Bevis Marks, David Aaron de Sola, and the Swedish M. J. Raphall at Birmingham, there was a small group of English-born preachers, mainly educated at the Jews' Free School: D. M. Isaacs at Manchester and Liverpool, H. A. Henry at the Western Synagogue, and A. L. Green at Bristol Synagogue and later the Central Synagogue.

Despite the varied pleas for preacher-ministers which echoed through the popular press, the office of minister or preacher only slowly evolved from the more traditional *hazan*, reader or leader in prayers. In 1846 we read in a literary magazine that the 'readers or so-called officiating ministers are, with a few exceptions, elected for their vocal capabilities',³ but Franklin, editor of the *Voice of Jacob*, could in 1845 claim 'the system of operatic embellishment to be already exploded, at least in all respectable synagogues'.⁴ Nevertheless, the college he had demanded—the so-called Montefiore Institution—for turning out 'duly ordained preachers' was not to be realized for many years to come.

Notwithstanding all the polemics of the *Voice of Jacob* and the *Jewish Chronicle* on behalf of the new type of preacher-minister, and even after the establishment of Jews' College itself, the idea of pulpit preaching did not take deep root. In 1853 the *Jewish Chronicle* bewails the fact that there are still no preachers and that 'Pulpit instruction has made no progress'.⁵ In 1863 the idea of a synagogue minister other than reader or rabbi was still a little novel. The Rev. A. L. Green, the witty and eloquent preacher at the Great Portland Street Synagogue, officially filled the position of *hazan*. The Bayswater Congregation was therefore in advance of the times when it determined to appoint a lecturer,⁶ the

penchant for *hazanuth* as the criterion for appointment being strongly entrenched. The members of the Board of the Borough Synagogue were in 1867 reminded by Barnett Meyers that they 'should engage a minister not a mere singing one'.⁷ In this case the plea was successful; and Simeon Singer, upon his appointment in September 1867, invited other ministers or students at Jews' College to preach at the Borough Synagogue.

In the minds of the proponents of preaching ministers the matter was one of prestige and respectability. The *Voice of Jacob* in 1841 and 1845 sets the tone:

The anomalous state of our ministry demands our first consideration. It has . . . been doubted, whether the English congregations can be said to have a ministering clergy properly so called . . . The first step towards making religion respected, is to provide that its teachers be respectable.⁸

The *Jewish Chronicle* in an editorial of 1861 rounds out that initial theme to its full development and carries the relation of preaching to ministry to its apogee:

The culture and status of the Jewish minister is an exact measure of the culture of his community: . . . the qualifications of a minister should extend beyond the beauty of his voice . . . the exertions of the minister *par excellence* reserved for his more particular function of exhortation and admonition . . . To expound the principles of Judaism from the pulpit in choice and earnest language . . . [The] lay readers of a community cannot respect their minister . . . unless he is equally cultured with themselves . . . the Jewish minister must have a general education equal to the highest type of his community . . . we expect its [Judaism's] exponents to be scholars. . . .⁹

The modern type of ideal Anglo-Jewish minister was to be a fluent preacher, a cultured gentleman with 'English-like habits'; the culture of the minister would be an index of the culture of the community, while his position in society would be equivalent to that occupied by the minister of other religious bodies. As the *Voice of Jacob* expresses it in 1842:

. . . the necessity was recognised of training a Jewish ministry qualified not only as leaders of our devotions, but as our religious guides and instructors and occupying, for the conservation of our sacred institutions and for the wise direction of our community generally, a position similarly influential to that occupied by our ministry of old, and still held by the ministry of all other denominations around us . . . such an influence can only be generally accorded to those whose training will qualify, not only for literary acquirements, but for an equivalent station in society. . . .¹⁰

Scholars and gentlemen . . . pastors . . . officials to be revered and courted, not a class which *can* only be tolerated or patronised . . . clergymen through whom strangers shall learn to know and respect the Jewish religion and polity.¹¹

The image of the desired minister, and the expressed wish to grant him at least a solid middle-class status, emerge with clarity, and by the late 1870s were partially realized.

There was one man who was generally recognized as conforming to (and perhaps helping to create) this ideal image, and another who came close to doing so. A comment on their qualities will be useful in giving depth to the expressed ideal. The former was Simeon Singer of whom the *Jewish Chronicle* said after his death: 'dwelling on the life work of a single Jewish minister we will be led to embrace the whole profession of which he was so distinguished an ornament'.¹²

His scholarship, both Jewish and secular, was of a high order. He had a very wide and penetrating knowledge of English and foreign literature. . . . It was this power of reconciling the old with the new which made him so great a master of pulpit exhortation. [He preached weekly] as a result of repeated request on the part of the worshippers. . . . While the pulpit was his first responsibility, he recognized the place of the Reading Desk, and delighted in the performance of the office of Reader.¹³

In a special memoir following his death in August 1906, the *Jewish Chronicle* commented:

His disinterestedness was a striking feature of his congregational work. A high sense of dignity of his office and person . . . combined with most simple and unaffected amiability. . . . Possessed of a dignified and refined presence, he knew how to place himself on a footing of social equality with the most highly-placed of his congregants. . . . With the exception of the Chief Rabbi, probably no Anglo-Jewish preacher has occupied so many different pulpits.¹⁴

Simeon Singer maintained scholarly activities and was responsible for the *Authorised Daily Prayer Book* which early ran to many editions. The *Jewish Chronicle* for months after his death carried tributes relating to his exemplary life.

While Simeon Singer was the ideal Anglo-Jewish minister, there was none to match the sparkle of the Rev. A. L. Green:

Amiable personality, powerful and witty preaching, decorous rendering of the service . . . excellent *chazan*, delivered a sermon every week, and as a rule preached extempore. Especially successful with his appeals for charitable funds . . . the Central Synagogue owed its prominence in the community as much to the remarkable personality of its minister as to the social status of its worshippers . . . no man of his generation was more intimately connected with all the interests of English Judaism . . . education, religious culture, state of the poor, revival of Hebrew literature, closer union of Jews . . . uplifting of the religious tone of the community.¹⁵

Many years later his nephew, the Reverend A. A. Green, could say of him, that it was he 'who, more than any other man, created the position of the Jewish minister in this country'.¹⁶

While the burgeoning West End Jewry saw the fulfilment of its ideals in the Reverends Singer and Green, there was a darker side to the English ministry. For although the West End and its synagogues may have been the hub of Anglo-Jewish life, there were, even before the immigration of the 1880s, wide areas of Jewish life which stood outside its physical confines, even if not beyond the pale of its influence. There was the disturbing picture of the provincial minister, while London itself housed iniquities which aroused a chorus of protest, demand for change, and varied interpretations of the poverty of the minister's lot.

Much of the trouble was attributed to the lack of suitable candidates. Outside the West End the call for preachers and 'suitable English gentlemen' as opposed to 'German or Polish gentlemen'¹⁷ was shrill:

Why are English-Jewish institutions generally so badly served, but because respectable Englishmen of business have found no inducement to train their children for places which afford no respectable living . . . [but only a] genteel beggary of a public appointment, for which there is no future but pauperism. . . .¹⁸

The theme of 'donating a son to holy orders' is taken up again at the end of the pre-immigrant period, this time in a letter-writer's reference to the need for 'good blood' to secure a high position for the ministry in the English community and overseas.

. . . have they [the clergy] yet reached, or are they on the road to reach, the station so necessary to our wants? . . . [How is all this met, but by] training of a son to the ministry, and rendering him to a certain extent beyond the necessity of a salary. . . . The peer is not peerless. He devotes his third son to the ministry. Hence their *locus standi* in the Church. When shall we Jews act likewise? Until we do our ministers will still hold the secondary position they now do. . . .¹⁹

Not money but good breeding alone could secure the high status of the Anglo-Jewish ministry. Many synagogues were staffed by 'foreigners', especially in the provinces. There was a 'dearth of clergy';²⁰ there was no 'passion for ministry'.²¹ In the popular press the newly founded Jews' College came in for its share of blame.²² Other observers turned upon the synagogues themselves, aiming their darts mainly at the City synagogues,

[which] remain without a preacher. . . . What encouragement is given to our College [Jews' College] students who are spending their best years in training for the ministry, if important congregations show no desire for their services?²³

The *Jewish Chronicle* seized upon a solution in the form of enhanced ministerial co-operation with the newly formed and expanding United Synagogue, stating in 1880:

. . . the minister ought to co-operate with the executive, by striving to give effect to their just desires. . . . There cannot possibly be any loss of

dignity in co-operating . . . with those who have been placed at the head of affairs.²⁴

For the *Jewish Chronicle* the United Synagogue could achieve miracles, cutting the Gordian knot by securing both an adequate salary and relative independence for the Anglo-Jewish ministry. It sums up its hopes in an editorial of 1881:

. . . the time is not so far distant when . . . [it] depends in large measure upon the character of the congregation which particular function of the minister is made prominent . . . in England the possession of a good voice was regarded as a principal, nay, the only qualification for the post of minister. . . . The general rise of intelligence in the community and the courageous efforts of a few ministers, among whom the Rev. Dr. Hermann Adler, and the Rev. A. L. Green should be honourably mentioned, have rendered it impossible today that anyone should be appointed to an important post who does not possess adequate preaching power and general culture. . . . The rise in the status of the Jewish Clergy must be a gradual one. It must take some time before a generation of Jewish youths can be trained for the ministry on a sounder system . . . before all English congregations shall have risen above the temptation of preferring a singer to a scholar as their minister. . . . It may be anticipated that, as the *shamas*, or beadle, now performs the duties which once belonged to the *Sheleach Tsibur*, so the function of the *chazan* will be delegated to a minor official. Then the Jewish Clergyman will become once more the Rabbi, the learned in the Law who instructs his fellow-Jews in their duties and in the lessons of Israel's history . . . [It is necessary] to organise some machinery which shall render the position of the Jewish ministers at once more independent of their own congregation and yet amenable to some check . . . Here, as elsewhere, the United Synagogue affords the *via media*. It has often been remarked that the Church of England has better clergymen than any body of dissenters, because the former does not put its pastors under the direct government of their flocks. Similarly, now that the right of dismissal is controlled by the General Council of the United Synagogue, the tone of the Jewish ministry will probably be greatly raised.²⁵

With the suggestions contained in this editorial statement we have completed the full cycle of an epoch. From the rabbi as a silent servant or 'foreign singer' to the aristocratic City congregations, we have progressed to the Jewish minister as preacher and pastor to middle-class congregations under the aegis of the United Synagogue.

The rabbi adapted his role to an increasingly compact and well organized community with a distinguished lay leadership. Of the institutions with which he had to interact, the foremost was the Chief Rabbinate.

The institutions and their effect on status

The prestige and strength of the Chief Rabbinate, the centrality of the United Synagogue, the character and development of Jews' Col-

lege, all stem from the personality and power of Dr. Nathan Marcus Adler, elected after the death of Dr. Hirschel in 1842. Nathan Adler's vigour and modern spirit made themselves felt from his inaugural sermon onwards. Combining a modern and classical university education with a strict orthodoxy, he was, in the words of Lucien Wolf, 'not a mere *Yeshiba Rabbi*'.²⁶ Almost his first act after his induction was to issue a detailed questionnaire on communal activity, education, and synagogal practice. In 1847 he issued his *Laws and Regulations for all the Synagogues K. K. Ashkenazim in the British Empire*, sending it not only to the London congregations, but also to the nineteen provincial congregations which had participated in his election. Among its statutes were the following:

The duty of superintending the Synagogue, as far as religious observances are concerned, devolves on the Chief Rabbi, when present.

The erection of a new Synagogue must have the sanction of the Chief Rabbi; and the formation of the new Congregation must have the sanction of the Chief Rabbi, besides that of the Board of Deputies.²⁷

In this and other respects the supremacy of the Chief Rabbi in ritual and religious matters is made crystal clear.

Making good his pre-election pledge concerning education, Nathan Adler used his initiative in the foundation of Jews' College. After his death its council commented:

He conceived the idea of founding an institution which should send forth trained and cultured ministers, preachers, readers and teachers of religion for the service of the Anglo-Jewish community in all parts of the world.²⁸

The founding of Jews' College was an attempt by the Chief Rabbi to fill vacant pulpits in Britain and her colonies with suitable incumbents, but not the only one. In 1846 the *Voice of Jacob* commented on the appointment of Dr. Krüger as lecturer to the Manchester Congregation and headmaster of the Hebrew Association School:

. . . His election to be preacher to an English Synagogue was very properly made subject to his obtaining a letter of licence from the Rev. Dr. Adler. This we think is the first election of the kind, since the accession of our Chief Rabbi . . .²⁹

This precedent was followed not only with regard to a preacher or *hazan*; on occasion Adler would ask to see the credentials of a teacher. In 1847 the Hebrew Congregation of Dublin in advertising for a *hazan* stated 'It will be indispensable that moral character and qualifications be testified by the Rev. the Chief Rabbi.'³⁰

Nathan Adler not only secured his authority in relation to synagogal appointments, but also extended it through his part in the founding of the United Synagogue, 14 July 1870. Although this new union was

legalized in accordance with English law by an Act of Parliament, the power of the Chief Rabbinate was not endorsed in full:

In the charter [of this Act] . . . an attempt was made to give the Chief Rabbi autocratic powers over the doctrines to be taught in the Jewish communities throughout the British Empire. But Parliament, which had recently disestablished the Irish Church, did not feel disposed to establish the Jewish Synagogue, and the clause was stricken out.³¹

The portions which the charity commissioners had eliminated as being unsuitable for parliamentary legislation were, however, included in a *Deed of Foundation and Trust*. This gave weight to the dominant position of the Chief Rabbi in 'Anglo-Jewry'. This document apart, there were other powers (not the outcome of a written grant) which in the course of years came to be associated with the office of the Chief Rabbinate: the power to license marriages, to certify the fitness of ministers, to license *shohetim* and bakers of *matzot*, to certify a congregation as a preliminary to the appointment of a marriage secretary, to grant *get* and *halitza*, to receive converts, and to confer rabbinical diplomas.

Although the Chief Rabbi's exertions and participation in the founding of Jews' College, the Board of Guardians, and the United Synagogue gave these institutions a particular character, it is not clear to what degree the United Synagogue, at least, remained under his control. Within two years of its foundation we read that at a meeting to frame a new code of laws to regulate burial, the United Synagogue did not refer to the Chief Rabbi and there were murmurings of 'undue priestly authority'.³²

Agitation for ritual changes in the synagogue was a constant theme throughout the period. It seems that the example of the Burton Street schism (the first Reform synagogue) was a haunting reminder of where inflexibility could lead.

Despite his vouchsafed orthodoxy the Chief Rabbi early made concessions . . . [with reluctance] allowing morning services on Sabbath and festivals to be separate at the Central Synagogue.³³

Agreement was given to the confirmation of children of both sexes at the Bayswater Synagogue after 1864,³⁴ and following agitation in the *Jewish World* and *Jewish Chronicle* ten years later, the Chief Rabbi finally agreed in 1881 to sanction schemes of ritual revision drawn up by a conference of special delegates appointed by the United Synagogue.

Certainly compromises were made on both sides in these ritual questions, but they lead us to doubt the actual power and independence of the Chief Rabbinate. Whether there was friction or not between Nathan Adler and his ministers, it does not show itself in the available

sources, but at least one anonymous letter-writer sheds some light by his observation that

... the clergy would not be the weaklings and say nothings which I regard them to be. Men who have known no organization among themselves and who are perfectly content with their anomalous condition, cannot be regarded otherwise than as servants.³⁵

A docile clergy which, apart from a few sparkling preachers, largely failed to satisfy the lay image of the anglicized pastor; a powerful Chief Prelate who held tightly to the ecclesiastical reins with the backing of enlightened, beneficent, and aristocratic lay-directed institutions—this was the condition which determined the status of the Anglo-Jewish ministry from 1840 to the 1880s when the great eastern European immigration began.

Income and status

Although a man's income is not the only ingredient of status, it nevertheless reflects some significant estimate of value. In Western culture high status and low remuneration rarely go together. Salaries offered for synagogue officials in the years between 1840 and 1882 provide a consistent pattern in which stipends follow the wage levels for the United Kingdom as a whole. In this period the wage index rose just over 20 per cent, maintaining a steady rise with occasional setbacks and one rapid and unevenly distributed rise between 1870 and 1874, followed by a slow decline to the 1883 figure.³⁶

In advertisements appearing in the *Jewish Chronicle* during the 1840s, 1850s, 1870s, and early 1880s, salaries offered in congregations are found to mirror this wage index. In the case of the inflationary wage and price spiral of 1870–4, synagogue salaries reached their highest advertised peak for the entire period. It is noteworthy that the quantity of advertised ministerial positions in the year 1872 suggests a high placement turnover, possibly indicative of congregational stress resulting from the general economic situation. In keeping with the new ideal of the preacher-minister, the largest financial inducements were, with few exceptions, offered to candidates capable of fulfilling the role of preacher or lecturer.

Although salaries of ministers maintained a parity with wage indices in the country as a whole, there is no evidence that they can be used to indicate adequate remuneration for professional work. In the absence of exact knowledge of the Anglo-Jewish ministers' total income (there were various perquisites such as a free house and free fuel which might add as much as £200 per annum to the salary of a reader and £75 to a second reader), we can say that in the majority of cases they were, in terms of income, lower-middle class.³⁷

Assessment of status

The Anglo-Jewish minister enjoyed a different and in many ways inferior position and role in Jewish society, as compared with his counterpart in other western centres. Public opinion gave various explanations for his unique predicament, ranging from pauperism, the failure of Jews' College, and the refusal of the upper and middle classes to enter their children for the ministry, to the poor treatment meted out by the synagogues.

No attempt will be successful unless the religious functionary is seen against the background of the assimilative nature of Anglo-Jewry. Scholars have remarked upon the exceptional sensitivity of Anglo-Jewry towards opinion in the nation as a whole. What has been called the 'goldfish bowl mentality' arose from the historic conditions of Jewish suffrage in England, in particular the fact that although social equality was achieved at an early stage, political emancipation came late, having been hard contested. English society was not constitutionally the enforced blending of autonomous groups, but a hierarchical system inherited from the Middle Ages, which managed to maintain its structure across the turmoil of the industrial and social revolutions. The parliamentary system and the industrial revolution evolved earlier in England than elsewhere and were accompanied by a comparatively slight rupture of the fabric of existing institutions.

The image of the English gentleman, the bourgeois ethic, and the hierarchical nature of institutions, including the church, were all factors with which the Jew, wishing to be English, had to reckon. He could not take refuge in his own legalized autonomy, as was the case in the United States, for, with the exception of Roman Catholic immigrants after 1840, the Jews in England were unique. They could not see themselves as one of many immigrant groups attempting to make a way for themselves. Casting around for behaviour patterns and institutional models, they found the established Church of England an adequate example. The vertical and centralized authority structure of the community, from Parliament to the Board of Deputies and through them to the Jewish ecclesiastical authorities, bears a strong resemblance to the English ecclesiastical structure.³⁸ That the English community should model its institutions upon the dominant pattern is understandable, but the effect upon the servants of those same institutions was far from satisfactory.

The United Synagogue as 'the church', the rabbinate as the 'clergy' and, by implication if not writ, the Chief Rabbi as someone akin to an Archbishop, may have produced an acceptable image to the outside world, but it also set up precedents which were harmful to the ministry. The community paid a price for its successful adjustment to national life. Its unity, epitomized by the United Synagogue, resulted in increas-

ing lay control of synagogal affairs. The rabbinate, modelled on the Anglican clergy, were poorly paid for their pastorate, and power tended to concentrate itself in the hands of the Chief Rabbi and a few lay leaders. With a strong Chief Rabbi, a balance of powers was established which maintained itself throughout the pre-immigration period of Anglo-Jewish expansion and prosperity. With the death of Nathan Adler, the decline of national power and wealth, the collapse of European Liberalism, and the coming of mass immigration, another and stormier era was in sight.

The status of the rabbinate 1881-1914

The criticisms of the more orthodox immigrants, the demise of two Chief Rabbis, and the perplexities involved in the election of Dr. Hertz, acted as incentives for the Anglo-Jewish community to conduct a searching self-examination. Many of the discontents which had been smothered in the well-being and optimism of the Victorian era suddenly bubbled to the surface, and rendered that earlier epoch liable to criticisms which it itself had never dared or cared to make. This communal self-evaluation provided a postscript to the first period which could have been written only under the stress of more turbulent times. When Rev. A. A. Green wrote in the *Jewish Review* in the spring of 1911 that 'all the old system of ecclesiastical government and ecclesiastical training was fundamentally wrong', he was not an embittered older man showing resentment at a hard apprenticeship, but rather a critic giving typical expression to the tenor of the times through which Anglo-Jewry was passing.

The influx of east European immigrants brought not only strains and stresses to the carefully constructed fabric of Anglo-Jewish institutional life, but a moment of truth to the popular image of the ideal minister. The more leisurely and opulent years of the Victorian era had produced and nurtured the idea of the Anglo-Jewish pastor, a cultured gentleman in clerical attire, ministering to his middle class flock. The coming of the immigrants shattered this image and tilted the balance sharply in favour of a more traditionally oriented rabbi. The watershed in the old ideal of preacher-ministers had been reached by A. L. Green and Simeon Singer, but the very type which these men represented now became the object of severe criticism. There appeared no portent of the storm which was to come in the address of Claude G. Montefiore at the annual distribution of prizes at Jews' College on a spring day in 1895. In similar vein to his nineteenth-century predecessors Montefiore spoke of the students' 'broad and human and modern training of which ministers of modern men in western lands stand so pre-eminently in need' and again of the oft-repeated ideal that

... no minister can really influence his flock—at least, by his words—who is not their equal all round, who is not at home on all sides of their

lives, who is not a cultured and cultivated Englishman as well as a cultured and cultivated Jew.

Turning to the 'East' (the residential area of the new immigrants from eastern Europe), Montefiore predicted that wide general and cultural knowledge would also find its reception there because

you are quite wrong if you think that the East is only the home of conservatism, that a minister there must be trained above all, and trained only, in all the lore of a minister of a hundred years ago, trained to answer questions on the minutiae of ritual carried up to him by conscientious men and women living on a plane of their own.³⁹

Montefiore had made his point in favour of the old ideal, but it was those 'conscientious men and women living on a plane of their own' who were indirectly and by their cumulative effect to make greater inroads into the ministerial image than the earlier period of consolidation could ever have envisaged. Unfortunately, just as the 'minister-preacher' had taken so much time and criticism to evolve from the *hazan*, so now the 'minister-rabbi' made slow progress towards public favour. Those concerned with the status of the rabbinate and the unity of the community were in the vanguard, but the majority continued to conceive the ministerial functions as

... to preach simply, decently and in good English and not above the heads of the congregants, to read the Law correctly, to assist in the reading of prayers, to engage in charitable work, to keep books [account books], render synagogue bills, and to be all things to all men.⁴⁰

The report of the advisory committee of the United Synagogue of 1910 set out the requirements of a minister in the following fashion:

(a) to preach efficiently (b) to teach Hebrew and religion (c) to read the prayers in synagogue including the Law with proper intonation (d) to help their congregants with advice and sympathy (e) to engage actively in and organize the charitable work which formed so large a portion of the duties devolving on the United Synagogue and (f) to aid if necessary the routine administrative work of their congregation.⁴¹

One of the senior ministers of the United Synagogue, the Rev. A. A. Green, had a somewhat different view. 'The community', he commented, 'required very much from its clergy. The minister was expected to be a preacher, a Hebrew scholar, a generally cultured man, a reader in the synagogue, a labourer in various fields of communal activity and a worker among the poor, and in some places a competent accountant.'

Both the popular and the official images apparently placed little emphasis upon scholarship, and it is with this in mind that at the end of the period Waley-Cohen reported:

The community is clamorous for cultured gentlemen of whose secular and aesthetic accomplishments they are quite ready to pronounce them-

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selves judges, whilst they are complacent in respect both of their Judaism and Hebraic learning.⁴²

Others were more biting in their condemnation of the status of the ministry, the neglect of Jewish scholarship, and the serious confusion of roles which seemed to have taken place between *hazanim*, rabbis, ministers, and preachers. Following the first conference of Anglo-Jewish ministers in 1909, at which the title, function, and status of the Jewish minister were for the first time officially aired, the *Jewish Review* commented:

... it [the Conference] might have raised an effective protest against the recommendation of a 'saving ignorance' of Jewish learning, and against the degradation of the position of the wise and honoured teacher of the community to that of a combined preacher, synagogue official, and charity visitor. We look to the Conference as well as to Jews' College in future to save us from all that tends to the production of a peculiar order of Anglo-Jewish ministers and a consequently peculiar Anglo-Judaism. [Abroad] the position of the rabbi is defined. He is a master of Jewish science . . . [Here] the position of the minister, however, is undefined.⁴³

The outspoken Solomon Schechter had this to say of ministerial status:

[The Jewish clergyman] labouring under a cruel system, reducing man to a mere plaything of politico-economic forces, is rapidly losing touch with the venerable rabbi of Jewish tradition, whose chief office was to teach and to *learn Torah* . . . in his capacity as full Reverend he is expected to divide his time between the offices of cantor, prayer, preacher, book-keeper, debt-collector, almoner and social agitator . . . imitating the establishment in which . . . the man of business or the great organizer has of late years gained ascendancy over the man of thought and learning . . . looking upon our ministers as a sort of superior clerk in whom business-like capacity is more in demand than any other virtues they may possess.⁴⁴

The image of the 'preaching minister', which had seemed so attractive to the nineteenth-century congregations, had suddenly foundered and been eclipsed by the appeal to produce religious leaders who could minister under the more traditional title of 'rabbi'. It was not that all the elements in the older concept of 'minister' were inherently faulty, but rather that the Anglo-Jewish community itself had undergone change and now made new demands upon its religious functionaries. As in the earlier period, there were some popular explanations of the unsatisfactory state of affairs. These were in the main repetitions of older suggestions, namely, poor remuneration and 'one-class' recruitment:

... the scandal of men being paid less than the wage of navvies . . . should cease. In a community such as ours it was recognized that the raising of the status of the Ministry was closely allied to the raising of the remuneration under which they laboured.⁴⁵

An editorial of 1910 on ministerial reform and charity put it this way:

... it is necessary so to increase the pecuniary attractions of the pulpit as to make it worth the while of men of ability to enter the ministerial profession ... the centralization of the ministerial salary-list ... [create a] single remuneration-fund from which all salaries would be paid. [The advantages would be] ... equalizing [of] salaries, thus making the way of the talented beginner less hard ... weakening the cash nexus between minister and his honorary officers ... [which would] add to the ease of mind, sense of dignity and personal power of the ministers.⁴⁶

Morris Joseph in an article in the *Jewish Quarterly Review* said:

... the Anglo-Jewish preacher is shamefully underpaid. It should scarcely need to be pointed out that if religion is to be respected, those who administer it must be invested with a certain degree of social dignity and this can only be secured by the payment of liberal salaries ... as people are constituted they are impressed more by outward comfort than inner worth.⁴⁷

This last reflection was endorsed in a lament by the *Jewish Chronicle* following the death of Simeon Singer:

... the world is often apt to judge a man by the quality of his clothes or the size of his establishment. So few worldly prizes does the ministry offer, that the profession fails to attract a sufficient number of able men.⁴⁸

The Rev. A. A. Green condemned the reluctance of prosperous Jews to make their sons clergymen:

I have in my time had some strong things to say concerning the fact that the Jewish clergy is drawn in such overwhelming proportion either from the poor or the humbler working classes, and I have offered reproachful criticism of a community which does not seem to regard the ministry as even a possible career for the sons of the commercially prosperous. As time has gone on, and my outlook upon things has somewhat widened, I have seen reason to modify, to an appreciable extent, my earlier opinions upon this subject. Of my criticism of a communal attitude which takes it for granted that the ministry is no career for the sons of the well-to-do, I desire to say that I feel as strongly as ever, and do not take back one single word. But I recognize that in many respects there is incalculable good to be derived from the fact that so many men assume the office of a minister of religion with a personal experience of struggle and sacrifice, and with a sympathetic and intimate knowledge of conditions of life, which call for religion at its best, and have the best effect upon a personal character.⁴⁹

For others it was the old question of incentives, and this panacea specifically suggested itself with reference to the vacancy left by Simeon Singer at the New West End Synagogue:

... There is not very much clerical preferment in the Jewish community because the positions are, none of them, prizes in emolument or in dignity,

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while those showing even any approach to standing of any kind are very few and far between . . . See what has happened and what is happening in reference to the greatest piece of clerical preferment which has been available for a quarter-of-a-century in the Jewish community. . . . The methods of the New West End Synagogue were not those of the Church of England [which chose the Bishop of Stepney, Dr. Cosmo Gordon Lang, to be the Archbishop of York] . . . It would have been easy to find such a man . . . to reward him and uplift the whole of his colleagues by so doing. But it was not done, and now . . . the position is again advertised as vacant, and the young man [Hochman] who has been a year in office on a sort of hire system has to continue preaching the word of God in a spirit which bids him, in his own interests, to do battle in the pulpit against all-comers. And his colleagues in the clergy are invited to compete with him and try to oust him from his position.⁵⁰

Just before the turn of the century the *Jewish Chronicle* made its own contribution to this question by commenting that:

It is useless to ignore the fact that the ministry is not a popular profession with us Jews. Parents of the wealthy class never dream of selecting it as a career for their sons . . . lads who do study for the ministry are almost exclusively drawn from the lower social strata, which is in itself an undesirable thing . . . At the present moment there are important pastorates vacant, or on the point of becoming vacant, in English-speaking congregations, and practically no men in sight able to fill them worthily. . . . [The ministry has become] a mere opportunity for bread-winning that is seized upon by poor lads in default of anything better.⁵¹

The institutions and their effect on status

While Nathan Adler maintained the hegemony of the Great Synagogue over the expanding Anglo-Jewish community and helped to found its central institutions, Hermann Adler, his son and natural successor, carried the prestige of the office to its greatest heights. Despite the clear line of succession from father to son, the demise of the elder Adler was made the occasion for an evaluation and eventual change in the powers and duties of the Chief Rabbinate. An indication of the stresses which had existed beneath the surface of the administration of Nathan Adler now made themselves felt, the floodgates of controversy were opened, and the columns of the Jewish press were filled to overflowing with discussion on the future ecclesiastical policy of the community. Such questions as 'Where should the Chief Rabbi live, in East or West London?' were raised. 'Should there be a Chief Rabbinate at all?' 'The powers of the Chief Rabbi', it was suggested, 'should be modified in questions where alterations to the synagogue service were concerned.' One proposal was that greater power be given to the Beth Din.⁵²

The Rabbinate Conference of 1890 attempted to deal with these

various questions and to reconcile the disparate forces. According to the *Deed of Foundation* all who subscribed to the Chief Rabbi's fund were entitled to representation at this Conference, but on this occasion Berkeley Street and the Sephardim refused to send representatives. A letter was received signed by F. D. Mocatta, Sir Philip Magnus, Samuel Montagu, and others which favoured the principle of divided authority, and a petition signed by 500-600 people under the name of Louis Davidson also favoured this principle.

The Rabbinate Conference did not in fact interfere with the prerogatives of the Chief Rabbi in questions of *shehita*, *get*, the issuing of marriage licences, and the granting of certificates of competency to candidates for ministerial appointments. As in the time of the hegemony of the Great Synagogue, he was to continue to perform all weddings.⁵³

A decision was made that the Chief Rabbi should not in future be dependent upon fees, but that his salary should be a fixed one. His salary was in fact finally entered at £2,200, out of which he had to maintain a residence and pay his secretary, etc.

Several minor changes were made in the functions, powers, and duties of the Chief Rabbinate, but according to contemporaries the most important was concerned with forms of worship in the constituent synagogues. Agitation and a considerable correspondence in the Jewish press had favoured some liturgical changes. When the question of appointing a new ecclesiastical head arose, Lord Rothschild, as president of the United Synagogue, conferred with him on this matter. As a result, it was decided that whenever a demand should be made by any synagogue for alterations in the form of worship or ritual, the Chief Rabbi, before giving his decision, was to consult with a committee of the preachers of the synagogue in question. This need for consultation would be waived if he were prepared to authorize the alterations on request.

Despite the unanimity of his election, Hermann Adler found himself in a difficult position as Chief Rabbi. A Westerner by training and temperament⁵⁴ he found control of the immigrant Jewry a difficult task, as the struggles with the Machzike Hadath surely testifies. It is not without interest that the final letter of his life had in it a charge to the community to appoint a successor who would be able to appeal to both 'East and West'.

The death of Hermann Adler on 18 July 1911 immediately opened up the question of the future ecclesiastical administration of the community. Within a week, the standing committee of the Conference of Anglo-Jewish Ministers had addressed a letter to the council of the United Synagogue on this question. Letters and leading articles on the subject began to proliferate in the Jewish press. In general, the question of the vacant Chief Rabbinate became the focal point around which

both clergy and laity could organize and express their opinions on the question of ministerial status. It appears that each change of Chief Rabbi became an occasion for the expression of hitherto suppressed feeling, usually taking the form of calls for administrative reform.

This was already in evidence at the second Conference of Anglo-Jewish Ministers which met in the month preceding the death of Hermann Adler (June 1911), the central paper being delivered by the Rev. J. F. Stern on 'The Future Religious Government of the Community'. It contained, among other things, the suggestion that it was necessary to establish an ecclesiastical board for Great Britain and Ireland on a proper legal basis and to frame a constitution so that in certain religious matters its decisions would be paramount and binding. The Chief Rabbi would be a sort of chairman who would operate through this ecclesiastical board and a central consistory. 'In its present form the Chief Rabbinate undoubtedly implies an autocracy, and it is not given to *all* autocrats so to act as to gain the affection and esteem of their subjects.'⁵⁵ It was further proposed that in future ministers should have a voice in the election of the Chief Rabbi.

The Conference itself was marred by a schism between the preacher-ministers and the *hazanim* in which the anomaly and confusion in the ministerial role became very apparent. It appears that the preachers assumed a superior status which the *hazanim* resented. Accordingly they proclaimed that they too were 'ministers', adding 'we will bow to rabbis, but not to ministers'. The result of this internal struggle was a break-away movement which formed a Preachers' Union, and future conferences were in fact called Conferences of Anglo-Jewish Preachers. The effect of this squabble was severe enough to lead the *Jewish Chronicle's* Mentor to bewail that the

... megalomaniac egoism . . . [and] . . . miserable small spite . . . [had tended to] excuse the community to itself for its attitude towards our Ministry . . . and just at a time when the Conferences were regarded as a real hope for securing higher status for ministers. . . .⁵⁶

The call for decentralization and limitation on the powers of the Chief Rabbinate which formed the burden of the ministerial case for ecclesiastical reform was embodied in a memorandum sent to the Rabbinical Conference of the United Synagogue in January 1912. The reception of these proposals by Lord Rothschild was scornful ('irresponsible frivolity'); they would 'place the Chief Rabbinate in slavery and chains'; and Lord Rothschild went on: 'I am perhaps very old-fashioned, but I do not know at the present moment that we officially recognize the position of ministers.'

In the opinion of the *Jewish Review* this refusal by the Rabbinate Conference to consider the question of religious organization (as raised

by the Conference of Anglo-Jewish Ministers) prior to the question of the Chief Rabbinate

. . . played into the hands of those who are determined to have a Chief Rabbi who shall be personally and directly responsible to the community, i.e. to the communal leaders.⁵⁷

Despite the obvious ministerial discontents engendered by the near-certainty that the Chief Rabbinate would be filled by a candidate from abroad, it is still worth considering their complaints. Apart from the various calls to appoint a Chief Rabbi from among the English clergy, the main lament was the undue power of the central authority. Samuel Daiches, in a letter in which he hoped to make up for the inadequate press coverage of the Second Conference of Anglo-Jewish Ministers, claimed that it was the

almost unanimous opinion of the ministers assembled that the Chief Rabbinate in its present form, has outlived itself [and after the retirement of the present holder, should cease] . . . it was the general view that the Chief Rabbinate has crippled the community, has destroyed the sense of responsibility in congregation and minister alike, has been responsible for the fact that many congregations have ministers not able to be the spiritual guides to their flocks. It was the general feeling of the Conference, that if Judaism in this country is to be vitalised, every congregation must have its own absolutely independent spiritual head.⁵⁸

The strongest support for the ministerial position came from the *Jewish Review* which, in the years of controversy over the election, constantly and consistently pleaded for the postponement of the appointment of a Chief Rabbi pending consideration of the whole communal organization of Anglo-Jewry:

The status of the Jewish minister is dependent far more on the responsibility, and the sphere of activity, than on the salary which attaches to the office. The limitation of these must militate against the entry of men of capacity into the service of the Synagogue . . . a simple solution is being sought along the lines of delegation of duties, from the Chief Rabbinate to various ministers. . . . The key to the problem, it seems to us, is in the status of ministers *vis-à-vis* the Chief Rabbi . . . the authority who ruled alone, as well as supreme; . . . there was no gradation within the ministry. If more influence was exercised by one or two individuals than by the rest of their colleagues, it was due entirely to their personality, and, constantly there militated against them the lack of distinction in status.⁵⁹

Earlier, the editors had seen the Chief Rabbi's powers in these terms: 'the energy whereby he concentrated so many activities in his own person no doubt limited the opportunities of service which his collaborators enjoyed'.⁶⁰ More pointedly the *Jewish Review* claimed that the

. . . religious spirit of Anglo-Jewry is annexed to the Chief Rabbinate . . . he stands between every congregation and its minister, to deprive the congregation of all powers and the minister of all influence,

Perhaps, they went on to suggest, a Chief Rabbi was not needed at all as . . . the absence of a Chief Rabbi has by no means so affected Anglo-Jewish life as to demonstrate that such organization is not possible. The need for a Chief Rabbi is not urgent.⁶¹

The 'organization' to which they made reference called for a decentralization with a separate head for *Beth Din*, *shehita*, etc.,⁶² while 'rabbis at heads of local communities would meet the needs of internal administration . . .'.⁶³ A *cause célèbre* in the struggle for status was provided by the Rabbinical Diploma controversy. In view of the conflicting reports about its conferment before the First World War it can be asked who actually received it.⁶⁴ The *Jews' College Jubilee Volume* of 1905⁶⁵ records that the rabbinical diploma was awarded to Rev. Francis Lyon Cohen (1905), Rev. Asher Feldman (1899), and Rev. Moses Hyamson (1899),⁶⁶ but the same volume reports that the Rev. Professor Hermann Gollancz received the rabbinical diploma in 1897, and the Rev. Simeon Singer in 1890. (In both these latter cases the diploma was awarded by authorities outside the United Kingdom.) Another source⁶⁷ reports that the first examinations following the changed curriculum of 1901 were held in 1908, when the diploma was conferred on the Rev. Barnett I. Cohen. All these men were ex-students of the College, with the exception of Barnett I. Cohen who only took up his appointment at Sheffield Synagogue in 1908, thus becoming the first student to receive the rabbinic distinction while still at the College. This confirms the *Jewish Review* report that 'up to the present (1910) only 5 persons have received the rabbinical diploma, only one prior to leaving the College'.

An examination of the curriculum prior to 1900 shows no provision for students to take the rabbinical diploma, which had to await the curriculum changes made effective in 1901. The Chief Rabbi, Herman Adler, gave his particular reasons for the curriculum changes in a paper read at Jews' College in 1905:

There is another function which Jews' College is now called upon to fulfil. When originally founded it was for the purpose of educating ministers and teachers, but provision was not made for training the students to become rabbis. The reasons for this limitation were twofold. As before stated, the subjects then required for the graduate examination were entirely outside the curriculum of a strictly theological College, and the strain of preparing for these tests did not leave the time required for mastering the bulky treatises of the Talmud and the massive ritual codes, a knowledge of which is indispensable for enabling candidates to obtain the rabbinic diploma. Nor indeed was the possession of such *Hatarath Horaah* necessary, as the members of our community, both here and in the provinces, were fully satisfied with the facilities for deciding religious questions afforded by the Chief Rabbi and his Beth Din. This condition has been materially modified during the last quarter of a century. Congregations are springing up in

the Australian Commonwealth, in South Africa, and other portions of the British Empire, which require supervision and guidance of a local Beth Din. Moreover, owing to the unrelenting persecutions in the near East—persecutions of which we are now unhappily witnessing so appalling a recrudescence—vast numbers of the oppressed have fled to our shores. Our brethren who hail from Russia and Poland have been accustomed to consult their rabbis on every detail of their daily life, and to submit to them questions of 'things forbidden or permitted'. At present several communities in the provinces have enlisted the services of rabbis, who, however competent in their own department are as yet ignorant of the vernacular. It is, therefore, felt that it would conduce to the welfare of the community at large if the various congregations would be enabled to obtain English ministers, who, being equipped with the needful rabbinical learning and authority, would be able to command and to secure the confidence of every section of their flock. The College is therefore giving the needful facilities for enabling the advanced students to prepare themselves for the prescribed rigid examination.⁶⁸

This line of explanation was followed by Dayan H. Hyamson:

The chief need fifty years ago was for qualified ministers . . . twenty-five years ago there was an urgent necessity for teachers in the smaller provincial congregations. In recent years the complaint has occasionally been ventilated that the students are sent out too young and immature, raw or half-baked. The age at which they leave has, therefore, been gradually raised. Owing to the Russian persecutions and the consequent large influx of immigrants from the East of Europe, the need has been felt for equipping the minister with the special *Halachic* learning, qualifying him to exercise rabbinic functions. The process is necessarily slow . . . [a] severe and protracted intellectual discipline . . . [but the] community must exercise patience . . . if only a small percentage of the students leave with the *Hatarath Horaah*.⁶⁹

The change in the structure of the community was made the official reason for the introduction of the new rabbinical status, but was this the whole story? In common with other appeals for reform prior to the induction of Herman Adler in 1891, an editorial in the *Jewish Chronicle* had stated:

Jews' College does not at present confer the Rabbinical Diploma on its students . . . [The consequence is that] our Jewish clergy are not, in the strict sense of the words, qualified Rabbis at all . . . the East-Enders . . . think our English minister a very cultured man, no doubt, but would never place him for an instant on the level of a real Rabbi or a *Maggid*. The West-Enders, on the other hand, greatly admire our minister's Rabbinical learning, but regard him rather unjustly as somewhat wanting in *general* knowledge.⁷⁰

The communal situation certainly impelled these comments, but it was the deeds of the two English Reverends which were to spur action. In 1890, Simeon Singer obtained the rabbinical diploma from Lector

Weiss of Vienna. It was commented at the time that there was 'no reason why Jewish ministers in England should form a lower caste than their colleagues on the continent'.⁷¹ 'Singer's motive in seeking this certificate was not personal,' wrote Israel Abrahams in his memoir of Simeon Singer;

he felt that the Jewish ministry in England was drifting into an anomalous position. The discrimination which had grown up between rabbi and preacher was degrading to both officers . . . the absence of the diploma in the case of the great majority of English ministers at the time of which we are speaking, was a far reaching evil. In the minister it tended to produce indifference to learning, and in the laity disrespect of the minister. Singer regretted that there was no English word corresponding to the German '*Rabbiner*',⁷² a newly-coined word which retains the old time-honoured rabbinical flavour, yet indicates the modernity of the conditions under which the Jewish minister must now exercise his functions. Singer's resolve to qualify for the rabbinical diploma, and his demonstration that students educated in England were competent to secure the diploma from the greatest of European authorities, did much to encourage the movement which, it may be hoped, will oust the nondescript 'Reverend' in favour of the characteristically Jewish 'Rabbi', in England as has happened in America.⁷³

The process which Singer had initiated was a few years later carried further by Dr. Hermann Gollancz who obtained his rabbinical diploma in 1897 from Saul Horowitz, Chief of the Rabbinate, Tysmienitz, Galicia.

The acquisition of those 'Certificates of Competence', known as *Hatarath Horaah*, from the said outstanding ecclesiastical authorities abroad, gave rise to a storm in the hierarchical chair which practically ended an anomalous and unsatisfactory state of affairs—there was no *system*—in the Jewish community here, and in reality revolutionized the entire status of the Jewish ministry in England. Once and for all there were defined, by means of a clear-cut syllabus, the requirements in Hebrew and Rabbinics necessary to obtain the diploma of rabbi in this country, which had hitherto not been granted—a stronger term might be used—to any student or scholar, however competent.⁷⁴

Several confirmations of the value of Dr. Gollancz's achievement were forthcoming. The *Globe* of 6 January 1900 commented:

The *Jewish Chronicle* thinks that it has never been sufficiently emphasized that Dr. Gollancz deserves the credit of having been somewhat of a martyr in hastening the consummation of the long-deferred aspiration of the Anglo-Jewish clergy to take equal rank as rabbis with their colleagues abroad, by their obtaining on English soil the only Jewish academic hallmark of competence in Jewish learning, the *Hatarath Horaah*. By subjecting himself abroad, in the very stronghold of rabbinical learning and orthodoxy, to the severest tests of old-world rabbinism, according to the methods

in vogue for centuries, at a time when the avenues to progress were practically closed by the system which obtained here, Dr. Gollancz has deserved well, not only of the students and teachers of Jews' College and others, but of the community generally.⁷⁵

The role of the Chief Rabbinate in determining ministerial status was paralleled by the pressures exerted by the evolving United Synagogue. From the days in the 1870s when the Borough and North London Synagogues became its first members, the United Synagogue had continued to expand its organization. At the turn of the century an associate synagogue scheme was adopted which enabled synagogues in the poorer neighbourhoods to attach themselves to the union without sharing its burdens. By 1903 there were fifteen constituent metropolitan congregations and an annual budget running close to £46,500. Total membership was estimated at 7,273.⁷⁶ This membership was, however, small in the face of a London Jewish population which by 1906 was estimated at 158,000.⁷⁷ Jews' College graduates almost monopolized the metropolitan synagogues of the United Synagogue; so that by 1910 it could be noted that, with two exceptions, every occupant of the office of first minister and preacher in each of the then sixteen London constituents was trained at Jews' College (together with two *Dayanim*).⁷⁸

These factors were to make themselves felt in the debates of the United Synagogue Council in the pre-First World War period.

In 1901 Russell and Lewis pointed out:

He [the English Jew] does not become a paying member of a synagogue unless he reaches a certain level of prosperity and he attends but rarely, except at times of family festivity or sorrow.⁷⁹

And indeed there were reasons for assuming that the United Synagogue was not intended for the poor. At most synagogues the cheapest seat obtainable was £2 2s. *od.* which, together with a burial fee and other expenses of 14s. *od.*, placed it out of reach of many middle-class workers.⁸⁰ Nor was this all, as 'offerings' at most synagogues averaged out at an additional £1 10s. *od.* per year. The comparatively exclusive nature of the United Synagogue was its own prerogative, but it is recalled that for practical purposes it was in control of the communal fortunes of Anglo-Jewry. As we have noted earlier, when the time came for the election of the new Chief Rabbi, these matters of representation and authority were to receive anxious attention.

If the United Synagogue was not numerically representative, what was its authority? There seems no reason to doubt that its power increased with each decade that passed after the death of its founding father, Nathan Adler. Nor can it be glossed over that a good deal of its power derived from its financial position, a fact which some observers were quick to expose. Dr. Buchler, Principal of Jews' College said: 'It impressed one as a great business concern, expecting its officials to work

in the first instance for the balance-sheet.'⁸¹ Ernest Lesser put it in terms of the

persistent propensity of the United Synagogue for assuming fresh duties and responsibilities alien to its main purposes, and on its ingrained and unfortunate habit of measuring the success of its work by the state of its balance sheet.⁸²

The United Synagogue did not dispute the financial aspects of its position, but in response to an accusation of its ruling its synagogues with a rod of iron, claimed that 'the Bond of Union is a slight one—it is only a financial bond' (a point upon which Samuel Montagu disagreed, as he 'could not think it could be stronger, as the United Synagogue was the possessor of the land and buildings of the Synagogues').⁸³

Our central concern is with the status of the Anglo-Jewish ministry and we view the institutions of Anglo-Jewry as they bear on that specific question. However, the financial bonds within the United Synagogue are important. The minister was a salaried employee of the United Synagogue and the financial help of the corporate body and the powers to which its position as employer entitled it were most relevant. We see, for example, that a Board of Management in a synagogue had to apply for permission to increase the salaries of its ministers, and the advertised salaries in the case of new incumbents had also to pass the United Synagogue Council. The signs are that by 1906 the financial position of the United Synagogue had become a source of concern. The number of deficit synagogues was reported to have increased, and gross income to have shrunk, despite the increased assessments of the year before.⁸⁴ In March of that year the number of vacant seats among the constituents was placed at 966.⁸⁵ There were various complaints that the provincial contributions to the Chief Rabbi's fund were diminishing. Even Chaikin's removal from the Beth Din was reported to be connected with 'the straitened condition of the finances of the United Synagogue'.⁸⁶ In the provinces the picture was very much the same. Birmingham, for example, reported an income of £3,337 in 1905 as against £3,421 in the preceding year.

How this contraction of income affected the salaried officials of the United Synagogue can be seen from a report on the Budget night, March 1908. At that time it was reported that the gross income of the United Synagogue for 1907 was £39,289, as against £39,679 in the preceding year; eleven synagogues showed a decreased income. By 1911 affairs had reached the point where it was seriously proposed by the finance committee that the United Synagogue withdraw its £200 annual grant to Jews' College.

During 1911 various Boards of Management applied for increases in the salaries of some ten ministers; in three cases these were rejected by

the finance committee. One salutary effect of the criticism this evoked was the action of the Council of the United Synagogue in adopting certain proposals, among which were some which would provide for an automatic rise in the salaries of officials—ministers, readers, beadles, etc.—and so avoid the disagreeable discussions which took place when increases in salary of various officials was proposed. Under Clause 6, a maximum salary would be reached after twenty years of service.⁸⁷

Income and status

The study of advertisements from three specific years between 1883 and 1914 shows a pattern of salaries which is only a slight improvement on the figures shown for the 1870s. As usual, the discrepancies in salary between the large and small provincial congregations, and between London and the provinces, are most marked. Salaries offered by small congregations are between £65 and £75 per annum, with medium-sized synagogues offering £100–150 in the provinces and in London. Despite the difficulty of computing the extent of perquisites, the figure of about £200–250 per annum is a close enough estimate of the emoluments offered by both the London and provincial synagogues in the top category.⁸⁸ This is borne out in the case of Brondesbury, for example, where in 1910 the salary offered was £250. This last figure stands very close to that which was offered in the earlier period for similar posts.

Some figures are realistic in terms of increased living costs. In 1889, for example, the Federation Minister was engaged at £300 per annum, with no perquisites, and by 1910 the figure stood at £500. In 1910 a *Jewish Chronicle* editorial commented that 'a London minister who gets £600 is near the top'.⁸⁹ (Other evidence confirms this statement.) From information derived from the statements of the Provincial Jewish Ministers' Fund, it appears that Jews' College graduates in smaller provincial towns between 1884 and 1891 were considered reasonably paid at a salary of £150 per annum.

This relatively static picture of ministerial income can be compared with the state of the national economy, in which the height of spending power was reached by the end of the nineteenth century and thereafter stabilized incomes were faced by an increasing cost of living which was maintained until the First World War.⁹⁰

The effect on fixed salaries, as in the case of the rabbinate, must have been most marked, especially as there is no evidence readily available to show that their salaries rose in harmony with general wages between 1880 and 1895 (or 1901).

A further factor must be taken into account, which was hardly evident in the pre-1880 period. There were reports around 1853 of preachers with no outlet for their services, but these cases appear to have been due to a lack of qualifications for the role of the new preacher-minister, rather than to a scarcity of pulpits. The press of many already

trained rabbis (or men capable of securing the Chief Rabbi's certificate, which apparently he was prepared to grant) on to the congregational market tended to increase competition for whatever vacancies occurred. The years between 1900 and 1914 were marked by an exceptional number of removals to overseas pulpits or other occupations, and we may speculate as to how many of these losses were caused by an increasingly competitive market for ministerial positions, remunerations for which were just not keeping pace with a rising cost of living. We must also consider the renewed interest in appointing rabbis rather than ministers, together with the general discontent over the future of the Chief Rabbinate.

The effects of discontent can be seen not only in the 'clerical revolt' at the time of the 1911 election controversy, but also in pulpit turnover. Even if we take into account the increased number of pulpits, the number of synagogues which advertised pulpit vacancies steadily increased in the period from 1890 to 1914. An examination of overseas appointments taken up by ex-students of Jews' College shows that a high percentage of the pulpits were entered between 1883 and 1914; at least twenty-four Jews' College graduates left the country during this period.⁹¹ The tendency has been to assert that there was a mood of discontent and restlessness under the Chief Rabbinate, but the fundamental cause may well have been basically economic distress on a scale higher than was admitted either at the time or subsequently.

As in the earlier period, economic means may provide some indication of rabbinic status. A point of comparison can be found with the non-Jewish clergy: quite half of the parochial clergy, beneficed and non-beneficed, had an income of under £200 a year before 1903.⁹² A survey of the Jewish clergy might reveal a similar percentage.

Conclusion

While it was possible for the 1840-1880 period to point to certain central parallels between the image of the Anglo-Jewish minister and his counterpart in the Christian clergy, his fortunes in the later period appear to have been more heavily dominated by tensions within the Anglo-Jewish community itself. This is not to say that he did not share certain difficulties with his Christian counterpart. Up to 1900, both had ridden the wave of the expanding middle classes, and both now felt the pressures as that class was increasingly pressed by taxation. Church ordination in the later part of the nineteenth century fell off sharply,⁹³ while there was a considerable exodus by rabbis from English pulpits. Here the parallels, which are not central, seem to end. There was unfortunately no move towards an equalization of 'clerical and episcopal stipends' in Anglo-Jewry as was the case by 1914 in the Church. The agitation for return to the nomenclature of 'rabbi' rather than 'minister' seems to mark a new trend towards individuation on the part of the

Anglo-Jewish community, indicative that some of the extreme sensitivity which had marked the pre-emancipation years was beginning to be toned down.

Despite this, the old hierarchical structure still maintained its traditional place, and the strong opposition to watering down the power of a single Chief Rabbi seems to imply that the old formula of control through a central figure was maintained. Certainly, the United Synagogue continued to increase in strength, but the support of a strong Chief Rabbinate by Lord Rothschild provided a limiting factor.

If salary is a mark of status, there can be no doubt that the financial control of the United Synagogue in the pre-First World War years was a damaging factor which must be noted. But perhaps more central than either salary, assimilation, or the power of the Chief Rabbinate was the serious role confusion to which several allusions have been made. Green and Simeon Singer seem to have both created and fulfilled an ideal of the Anglo-Jewish minister dear to the hearts of the nineteenth-century community. With the coming of the immigrants and the strengthening of Jewish identity, the Anglo-Jewish minister found himself curiously placed. He was neither cultured enough nor learned enough Jewishly; nor yet was he definitively functional in the manner of the *hazan*. Twentieth-century Anglo-Jewry, by its ambivalent ideals, had created a ministry whose status was always in question.

NOTES

¹ Matthias Levy, *The Western Synagogue*, London, 1897, p. 11. There are various other references to early English preachers in A. M. Hyamson's *Jews' College, London 1855-1955*, Newport, 1955, p. 15.

² *Jewish Chronicle* (hereafter, *J.C.*), 12 Jan. 1849.

³ *Cup of Salvation*, No. 1, Vol. 1, 5606 (1846), March. Edited by Preacher Rev. D. M. Isaacs and Mr. Moses Samuel.

⁴ *Voice of Jacob*, Vol. IV, No. 105, p. 184, 20 June 1845.

⁵ *J.C.*, 7 Oct. 1853.

⁶ *Bayswater Synagogue, 1863-1938*, London, 1938, pp. 11f. (But see advertisements in *J.C.*, 18 April 1845 and 24 August 1860, where lecturers were called for.)

⁷ M. Rosenbaum, *The History of the Borough Synagogue*, London, 1917, p. 16.

⁸ *Voice of Jacob*, No. 6, 10 Dec. 1841, p. 43.

⁹ *J.C.*, 8 July 1881.

¹⁰ *Voice of Jacob*, No. 8, 7 Jan. 1842, p. 59.

¹¹ *ibid*, No. 9, 21 Jan. 1842, p. 68.

¹² *J.C.*, 31 August 1906.

¹³ Ephraim Levine, *The History of the New West End Synagogue 1879-1929*, London, 1929, pp. 18-19.

¹⁴ *J.C.*, 24 August 1906.

¹⁵ M. Adler, *The History of the Central Synagogue, 1855-1905*, London, 1905, p. 14.

¹⁶ *J.C.*, 24 March 1911.

¹⁷ *J.C.*, 22 March 1873.

¹⁸ *J.C.*, 1 June 1854. As Simeon Singer said, 'the man who becomes a Jewish minister literally takes upon himself the vow of poverty'. *J.C.*, 31 August 1906.

¹⁹ *J.C.*, 22 July 1881.

²⁰ *J.C.*, 1 August 1873. The *J.C.*, in a series of editorials on 'Jewish Ecclesiastical Education' (1-22 August 1873), showed some of the reactions against the preacher minister, and the difficulties of, and hopes for, Jews' College.

²¹ *J.C.*, 15 August 1873.

²² *J.C.*, 11 July 1873.

²³ *J.C.*, 9 April 1880.

²⁴ *J.C.*, 13 Feb. 1880.

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²⁵ *J.C.*, 18 Feb. 1881.

²⁶ Lucien Wolf, *Essays in Jewish History*, London, 1934, p. 340.

²⁷ Cecil Roth, 'Chief Rabbinate in England', *Essays in Honour of J. H. Hertz*, London, 1942, pp. 382-3.

²⁸ Isadore Harris, *Jews' College Jubilee Volume, 1855-1905*, London, 1906, p. xciv.

²⁹ *Voice of Jacob*, Vol. V, 22 May 1846.

³⁰ *ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 17, 7 May 1847.

³¹ *Jewish Encyclopedia*, Vol. V, p. 172.

³² *J.C.*, 17 May 1872.

³³ Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

³⁴ *Bayswater Synagogue, 1863-1938*, p. 7.

³⁵ *J.C.*, 1 August 1879.

³⁶ See Jürgen Kuczynski, *Labour Conditions in Western Europe 1820 to 1935*, London, 1937, and A. L. Bowley, *Wages and Income Since 1860 in the United Kingdom*, Cambridge, 1937.

³⁷ Compare the following church stipends: in 1827, of the 10,533 benefices in England and Wales, nearly one quarter had annual incomes of £20 or less, and over half £50 or less. By 1835 only 297 benefices had less than £50, while one fifth had £100 or less (C. K. Brown, *History of the English Clergy 1800-1900*, London, 1953, pp. 15 ff.). In 1850 there were only 174 stipends of over £1,000 (after all deductions only half that sum was left to meet the cost of living), only 1,000 stipends exceeding £500, and only 8,000 exceeding £300. Elie Halévy, *History of the English People*, Vol. IV, New York, 1961, p. 344.

³⁸ See also in detail V. D. Lipman, 'Synagogal Organization in Anglo-Jewry', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, No. 1, April 1959, pp. 80-93.

³⁹ Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. cii ff.

⁴⁰ Augustus Kahn, 'The Status and Training of Jewish Ministers', *Jewish Review*, Vol. I, No. 6, March 1911, pp. 501 ff.

⁴¹ Hyamson, *op. cit.*, p. 85. Dr. Buchler, Principal of the College, opposed almost all these recommendations and the Council of the College practically ignored them and proceeded on its way. A letter in the *Jewish Chronicle* (29 July 1910) claimed that the Principal of Jews' College had said of the ministers and readers of the United Synagogue that 'their functions are supposed to be to read the prayers (which so few do) preach and teach as little as possible'.

⁴² Israel Finestein, *Three Centuries of Anglo-Jewish History*, London, 1957, pp. 107 ff.

⁴³ *Jewish Review*, Vol. I, No. 1, June 1910, pp. 11 ff.

⁴⁴ S. Schechter, *Four Epistles to the Jews of England*, London, 1901, Epistle No. 3. Also: 'Occasionally rumour spreads about some minister that he neglects his duty to his congregation through his being secretly addicted to Jewish learning, but such rumours often turn out to be sheer malice'. As quoted by Rabbi Lew, *Eighth Conference of Anglo-Jewish Preachers*, London, 1949, p. 38.

⁴⁵ *J.C.*, 23 June 1911.

⁴⁶ *J.C.*, 4 Nov. 1910.

⁴⁷ *J.C.*, 17 Oct. 1890.

⁴⁸ *J.C.*, 31 August 1906.

⁴⁹ Paper read before the North London Jewish Literary Union on 'Clerical Organization', *J.C.*, 9 Nov. 1906.

⁵⁰ *J.C.*, 20 Nov. 1908.

⁵¹ *J.C.*, 7 Nov. 1890.

⁵² Various agitations in 1890 proposed to transfer the semi-autocratic power of the Chief Rabbinate to the Beth Din or the ecclesiastical court of the United Synagogue, a court of which the Chief Rabbi would be merely the head. (See *J.C.*, 5 Jan. 1890; 9 May 1890; 21 Nov. 1890.) By addition to the number of *dayanim*, diverse elements in both the East End of London and the provinces could be drawn into the existing institutional machinery of the United Synagogue.

⁵³ Chief Rabbi Brodie summed up his duties as follows: 'attendance at his office for interviews, answering religious questions, granting authorization of marriage, examination and certification of candidates for the post of ministers, readers, teachers, *mohelim* and *shochetim*, correspondence with the United Kingdom, the Colonies, and in other parts of the globe, presiding at sittings of the Beth Din, superintendence of *shechita* and official attendance at synagogues and preaching therein, pastoral visitation in the provinces, etc.' In addition there were duties of a complex character and 'being not exclusively religious, it may be fairly said they touch upon every point which concerns the religious, moral, and general welfare of the community'. *J. C. Supplement*, 27 Jan. 1956.

⁵⁴ See A. Schischa, 'Herman Adler, Yeshivah Bahur, Prague, 1860-1862', in *Remember the Days*, London, 1966, pp. 241 f.

⁵⁵ *Second Conference of Anglo-Jewish Ministers*, London, 1911, pp. 16 f.

⁵⁶ *J.C.*, 23 June 1911. It is of interest that the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, the rabbis of France, and the Kehilla movement in the United States were also concerned with questions of rabbinical status at this time. *Jewish Review*, Vol. 2, No. 8, July 1911, p. 175.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, Vol. 3, May 1912.

⁵⁸ *J.C.*, 23 June 1911.

⁵⁹ *Jewish Review*, Vol. IV, Jan. 1914.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 9, Sept. 1911.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, Vol. III, May 1912.

⁶² *ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 9, Sept. 1911.

⁶³ *ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 10, Nov. 1911.

There were other specific proposals from various quarters in connexion with the functions of the Chief Rabbinate. At the council of the United Synagogue, Augustus Kahn commented 'that the function of the Chief Rabbi in licensing Ministers who subscribed to a certain theological standpoint, from which they afterwards departed with impunity, led to the creation of an organized hypocrisy and the straining of the conscience of the Chief Rabbi to the uttermost'. *J.C.*, 10 Nov. 1911.

A further editorial note urged a rise in salary for the Chief Rabbi who 'has to be the social equal of the religious heads of other denominations whose stipends are far higher than that hitherto attached to the Chief Rabbi's office . . . such extra expenditure would . . . raise generally the market value . . . of the Jewish ministry as a whole, the members of which, it is notorious, are as a body underpaid. A higher norm of salary would by the natural working of economic law induce many men of talent and ability to join our Ministry'. *J.C.*, 12 Jan. 1912.

⁶⁴ For example the *Jewish Review* reported: 'Up to the present [1910] only five persons have received the Rabbinical diploma—only one before leaving the College . . .'. *Jewish Review*, Vol. I, No. 2, July 1910. And later: 'since [1900] the Diploma has been granted to one student and one ex-student'. *Jewish Review*, Vol. I, No. 6, March 1911.

⁶⁵ Harris, op. cit. See pp. cxliii ff. for 'Rules and Regulations and Subjects of Examination'.

⁶⁶ In 1899 the Chief Rabbi in conjunction with the *dayanim* conferred *Hatarath Horaah* on Asher Feldman and Moses Hyamson, but their diplomas contained a qualifying clause to the effect that they should exercise rabbinical functions only

under the supervision of the Chief Rabbi. *J.C.*, Feb. 1950.

⁶⁷ Hyamson, op. cit. p. 76.

⁶⁸ Harris, op. cit., pp. 16–17.

⁶⁹ *J.C.*, 31 July 1908.

⁷⁰ *J.C.*, 21 March 1890.

⁷¹ *J.C.*, 29 August 1890.

⁷² The German congregations also made the distinction between Chief Rabbi, rabbi, and preacher. These last two terms were employed to end hostility between rabbis—Reform and Orthodox. In Breslau, in 1844, Tiktin was Rabbi, and Geiger preacher.

⁷³ Israel Abrahams, ed., *Simeon Singer. Sermons*, London, 1908, p. xxix.

⁷⁴ *Personalalia relating to Sir Hermann Gollancz*, London, 1928, pp. 25 ff.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p. 26.

⁷⁶ *Jewish Year Book*, 5665 (1904–1905).

⁷⁷ *J.C.*, 30 Nov. 1906. Survey by Rosenbaum. In 1910 the Jewish population of the United Kingdom was placed at 240,500, of which only 10 per cent were on synagogue rolls. *Jewish Review*, Vol. I, No. 2, July 1910.

⁷⁸ *J.C.*, 30 Sept. 1910.

⁷⁹ Charles Russell and H. S. Lewis, *The Jew in London*, New York, 1901, p. 168.

⁸⁰ *J.C.*, 13 April 1906.

⁸¹ *J.C.*, 23 Dec. 1910.

⁸² *Jewish Review*, Vol. I, No. 4, Nov. 1910.

⁸³ *J.C.*, 25 July 1890.

⁸⁴ *J.C.*, 23 Feb. 1906. By 1910 the surplus of income over expenditure was only £6 1s. 3d.

⁸⁵ *J.C.*, 9 March 1906.

⁸⁶ *J.C.*, 17 August 1906.

⁸⁷ *J.C.*, 28 April 1911.

⁸⁸ Birmingham in 1912 offered a minister a starting salary of £250 per annum, but its late incumbent had received £500. The starting salary of the first reader of the Great Synagogue was not to exceed £350, rising to a maximum of £500. *J.C.*, 12 Jan. 1912.

⁸⁹ *J.C.*, 16 Sept. 1910.

⁹⁰ See Bowley, op. cit., pp. xiii ff.

⁹¹ See 'Appointments held by ex-students', *74th Annual Report of Jews' College*, London, 1930, pp. 7–13.

⁹² Elie Halévy, *History of the English Peoples*, Vol. V, New York, 1961, p. 170.

⁹³ From 2,324 in 1886–88 to 1,994 in 1896–98. Kenneth Scott Latourette, *The History of Christianity*, Vol. IV, New York, 1959 p. 398. The number of persons admitted to the Diaconate fell from a maximum of 814 in 1886 to 638 in 1898. Halévy, op. cit., p. 170.

THE EDGWARE SURVEY: DEMOGRAPHIC RESULTS

Ernest Krausz

THIS paper is a report on the demographic results of a survey carried out in 1963 amongst Jews in Edgware.¹ The main characteristic of the survey is its reliance on the technique of multi-phase probability sampling² and consequently its ability to produce primary data which are generally lacking for Anglo-Jewry. Although Edgware, which lies on the north-western outskirts of London, is not as such a representative Jewish district (if there is such a thing), the area resembles in many respects the large number of suburbs which have attracted an ever-increasing number of Jews since the Second World War.

In order to gain a clearer idea of demographic trends among Edgware Jews, I have compared the results with data about the general population of Britain and of Edgware in particular, as well as with such information as was available in this field for Jews in Britain, the United States, and other parts of the world.³

While one of the aims is to compare Jews and non-Jews, this is strictly speaking not possible: the general statistics we have in Britain include the Jewish population. The latter cannot be extracted; if they could be, there would have been no need for the present survey. This anomaly presents a particularly serious problem in Edgware, where Jewish households were found to constitute as much as 38 per cent of the total number of households. However, where significant differences are found between the (Jewish) Survey and the (general) Census data it is certainly logical to argue that, were it possible to separate Jews from non-Jews in the general data, an even greater difference would be found between Jews and non-Jews than the difference between the Jews on the one hand and the whole population on the other. Furthermore, in the comparison of the Jewish population of Edgware with the general population of other suburbs where the percentage of Jews is known to be small, or with the general population of Britain (in which the Jews represent less than 1 per cent),⁴ the effect of the Jewish group on the general figures is obviously negligible. Consequently, in

such cases it is reasonable to regard the comparisons being made as those between Jews and non-Jews.

Households

The general population of Edgware at the 1961 Census, covering 'present' households, numbered 19,888 and occupied 6,040 separate households, thus giving an average of nearly 3·3 persons per household. The 1963 Edgware Survey covered 382 Jewish households (1,290 persons); there was, therefore, an average of nearly 3·4 persons per household. In 1961 the size of the household was 3·13 in England and Wales, 3·01 in Middlesex, and 3·21 in Hendon Borough.⁵ Table I compares the distribution of different sized households of the Jewish population with that of the general population.

Table I: Households by number of persons⁶

<i>No. of persons in household</i>	<i>Jewish households, 1963, Edgware</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Households of gen. pop., 1961, Edgware</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Households of gen. pop., 1961, Hendon</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Households of gen. pop., 1961, Middx.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No. of persons in household</i>
1	11	3	430	7	5,578	12	90,801	12	1
2	80	21	1,634	27	13,961	29	225,690	31	2
3	105	27	1,422	24	10,504	22	170,751	24	3
4	135	35	1,425	24	13,688	29	196,960	27	4
5	44	12	746	12	3,292	8	41,552	6	5
6	6		255						6
7+	1	2	128	6					7+
	382	100	6,040	100	47,023	100	725,754	100	

The table shows that at one end of the scale the percentage of one-person Jewish households is rather small as compared with the general population of the district. Similarly, while in the case of the latter the most frequent household size is 2; among Jews the most frequent size is 4. At the other end of the scale, the two groups level out at households with 5 persons, but the general population has substantially more households with 6 or more persons than is the case with the Jewish population. Similar differences are seen to exist between the Jewish group in Edgware and the general population of Hendon M.B. and of the County of Middlesex. One explanation for this difference lies in the age-compositions of the two populations: as will be shown below, the Jews in Edgware contain a larger group of young married people and fewer in the older age-groups.⁷ Hence there are more Jewish families with dependent children. Another explanation is that, as general statistics for the country show,⁸ single-person households pre-

dominate among the widowed and divorced, and these groups form a greater proportion of the general population of Edgware (6.1 per cent) than of the Jews of the district (4.1 per cent). One could argue that Jewish single-person households may have stood a smaller chance of inclusion in the survey as they may have been missed by being among 'never in' cases or cases where old people refused to co-operate. While this may have led to an under-estimate of Jewish single-person households, information regarding the 10 per cent sample tables of the 1961 Census (on which the general figures of Edgware are based), points to a considerable under-representation of one-person households.⁹ It would appear, therefore, that the difference between Jewish and non-Jewish households in Edgware is in this respect still quite real and substantial.

Another important difference between Jews and the general population of Edgware lies in house-ownership: in the general population only 65.4 per cent are owner-occupiers as against 95 per cent¹⁰ in the Jewish group. For the country as a whole, the 1956 percentage of owner-occupiers was 66.6.¹¹ In Middlesex as a whole, owner-occupiers make up only 50.8 per cent of the total of private households.¹² This surprisingly low figure is probably due to the fact that Middlesex includes many large working-class areas such as Burnt Oak and Tottenham. It may also seem surprising that the Edgware general population is so much in line with the country as a whole; one would have expected a larger number of owner-occupiers in a suburban district. The chief explanation lies in the fact that Edgware includes a substantial number of Council buildings which reduces the proportion of owner-occupiers in the general population. The Edgware Survey has shown, however, that hardly any Jews live in the Council buildings—hence the very high percentage of owner-occupiers among Jews.¹³

Population by age and sex

Table II compares the age distribution of the Jews of Edgware with that of the general population of the district and with the general populations of Middlesex and the country as a whole.

The age-composition differences between the Jews of Edgware and their non-Jewish neighbours point to: (a) a larger proportion of children below the age of five in the Jewish group; (b) a larger proportion of Jews in the age-group 25-44, and in particular among those aged 25-34; (c) a smaller proportion of older people among Jews, especially those aged 65 and over. The main reason for these differences can be found in the historical background of Edgware. Before the Second World War, Edgware was predominantly non-Jewish. The main stream of Jewish settlers came during and particularly after the war,¹⁵ consisting to a large extent of young married couples. This period also coincided with the general increase in the birth rate, in

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Table II: Population by age-groups, in percentages¹⁴

<i>Age group</i>	<i>Edgware Jewish 1963</i>	<i>Edgware general 1961</i>	<i>Middlesex general 1961</i>	<i>England and Wales, general 1961</i>
0-4	10.6	6.9	6.8	7.9
5-9	7.5	7.2	5.9	7.0
10-14	7.6	8.9	7.2	7.9
15-24	13.6	14.4	13.6	13.2
25-34	16.8	11.8	12.7	12.6
35-44	14.9	14.2	13.6	13.6
45-54	14.2	16.2	16.0	14.0
55-64	9.6	11.3	12.8	11.8
65-74	4.3	6.1	7.2	7.7
75+	.9	3.0	4.2	4.3
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

which the Jews seem to have shared.¹⁶ The data regarding the householders and their wives testify to the large number of young marrieds among Jews. Thus, among the male heads of households¹⁷ 39.5 per cent were in the age-group below 39, and 62.9 per cent were below 49. For their wives the corresponding percentages were 47.1 and 69.9. Such a large number of married women still of child-bearing age can have an important effect on the age-composition of the group. The extent of this depends, however, on fertility trends, which will be discussed below.

The scanty material on Anglo-Jewish demography makes a comparison of Edgware with the larger Jewish community difficult. A survey which was carried out in 1950-1952, however, gives some information, although H. Neustatter warns us about the deficiencies of the data.¹⁸ Table III draws the comparison.

Table III: Percentage Distribution by age, Anglo-Jewry and Edgware Jews

<i>Age-group</i>	<i>Edgware Jewish Sample 1963</i>	<i>Anglo-Jewish Sample 1950</i>
0-14	25.7	20.4
15-34	30.4	25.8
35-54	29.1	36.1
55 and over	14.8	17.9
	100.0	100.0

Although there is a large time gap between the two surveys and the Anglo-Jewish survey's representativeness is open to doubt, the picture that emerges is plausible. Edgware, being a somewhat less expensive suburb, may well have attracted a large number of younger married people; a fairly large number of respondents gave as their reason for

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moving to Edgware the fact that they wanted a pleasanter and healthier environment for their children.¹⁹ It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the age groups 0-14 and 15-34 (representing pre-school and schoolchildren, adolescents, and young married people) have larger percentages in Edgware than in Anglo-Jewry as a whole. Similarly, the middle aged and older people (in age-groups 35-54 and 55 and over) figure less importantly in Edgware than in the larger Jewish community. However, it is obvious at the same time that an increasing post-war birth rate extending into the 1950s, as suggested by the Edgware sample, would have swelled the younger age groups by 1963 to a larger extent than by 1950.

In comparing the age-structure of Jews in Edgware with that of Jewish communities in other countries, we encounter a number of difficulties. Apart from the different places of origin of the immigrant generation and a variety of historical backgrounds and differences in socio-economic as well as religious structures, there is little information that distinguishes Jews in suburbs from Jews in the older urban settlements. In the United States a study by B. Seligman, covering 13 communities which were surveyed between 1947 and 1950, gives the following main features: (a) the 'hollow classes' (due to the low birth rate during the depressed economic conditions of the 1930s) in the young and teenage groups are more marked in the Jewish groups than in the general population; (b) the pattern of 'ageing' of the Jewish population is more accentuated than that of the non-Jewish population; and (c) the more recent studies show an expansion in the infant age-groups.²⁰ The pattern in Canada, where figures are more reliable since they are provided by the official Census, shows similar trends. L. Rosenberg summarizes the situation in Canada as follows: 'The age structure of the Jewish population of Canada has changed considerably in the two decades from 1931 to 1951. The proportion of the total Jewish population between the ages of 5 and 14 . . . has fallen from 19.7 per cent in 1931 to 14.3 per cent, as compared with 18.1 per cent among the total population of all origins. The proportion of the total Jewish population above the age of 60 has increased from 4.6 per cent in 1931 to 10.4 per cent in 1951, as compared with 11.4 per cent among the total population of all origins, but the proportion of the total Jewish population of pre-school age, i.e. below the age of 5, has increased from 7.6 per cent in 1931 to 10.6 per cent in 1951, and the twofold process of increase in the number and percentage of children of school age and of persons above the age of 60 is likely to continue.'²¹

The Jews of Edgware do not follow the general North American pattern in respect of the 'hollow classes' which, one decade after the American studies, should be found mainly in the 25-34 age-group. The age-group 20-24, however, does exhibit 'hollowness',²² and this is due to the low birth rate during the war years.²³ (It is interesting to

note that the general population of Edgware shows 'hollow classes' in the age-group 20-34.²⁴) In yet another respect Edgware Jews seem to differ from North American Jews: the 'older' age-groups in Edgware are much narrower than in the American and Canadian communities. In one respect, however, a common trend is noticeable: the swelling of the pre-school age-group. In this, Edgware Jews have been in line with population trends in both Britain and America (whether Jewish or general).

For the present study it is very important to draw a comparison between Edgware and suburban communities in America. If we take the one American Jewish community from the demographic study presented by Seligman, which relates to 1948, where a distinction has been made between the city and the suburb, the similarity with Edgware seems closer, at least in certain respects, than in the comparison of Edgware with American Jewish communities in general. Thus, while in Newark City the Jewish group had a smaller proportion in the age-group below five than the general (white) population (7.5 per cent against 8.5 per cent), in Newark suburbs the proportion of pre-school children was much higher among Jews than non-Jews (12.5 per cent against 8.2 per cent).²⁵ And those over 60 numbered less in Newark suburbs when compared with Newark City and least when compared with the other 12 studies. A more recent survey carried out of the Jewish population of the New York area²⁶ gives comparative figures for New York City and suburbs for 1957. A. Rubinstein²⁷ presents some of these figures, which show that in three suburban counties of New York Jewish children below 5 made up 11.1 per cent while old people over 65 represented 6.5 per cent of the total Jewish population. Respective percentages for New York City are 7.8 and 10.0. As for the age-group 0-14, the suburbs had 31.8 per cent against the city's 22.7 per cent. If we look at the Edgware sample figures we see that the under 5 group represents 10.6 per cent; 0-14, 25.7 per cent; and 65-plus, 5.2 per cent. It is clear that the suburban Jewish group of Edgware exhibits a general youthfulness, with a large number of young children below 5 and with few old people of over 65, similar to that found in the suburbs of New York.

If we compare Edgware with a Jewish community on the European continent, only in certain respects can similar trends be noticed. A survey of the Jews of Basle (1960)²⁸ shows that there, too, the Jewish birth rate suffered during the war (that is, the present age-group 20-24 contains only 6.8 per cent) but that the Jewish birth rate, in common with general trends, increased considerably after the war (the 10-14 age-group had 8.6 per cent and the 5-9 age-group 9.6 per cent), although the preceding age-group 0-4 showed a rather small proportion (only 6.8 per cent of the total population).

Turning to an analysis of sex ratios, we may compare the Edgware

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sample figures with a 1950 study of Anglo-Jewry and with the general population of Edgware and England and Wales (see Table IV).

Both the Edgware sample and the earlier study of Anglo-Jewry suggest that among Jews the proportion of males to females is higher than in the general population. If we take 'all ages', the Edgware Jewish group shows more males than females, Anglo-Jewry is rather evenly distributed, while in the general population there is an excess of females over males, and this situation is rather more exaggerated in the Edgware general population than in England and Wales. Among those aged 0-14, all groups show a preponderance of males over females, with rather similar sex ratios. In the age-group 15-64, however, while

Table IV: Comparative sex ratio figures for Jews and the general population in Edgware and England and Wales (females to 1,000 males)²⁹

<i>Age-group</i>	<i>Edgware Jewish 1963</i>	<i>Anglo-Jewry 1950</i>	<i>Edgware general 1961</i>	<i>England and Wales general (mid) 1962</i>
All ages	975	1,002	1,114	1,060
0-14	953	974	948	949
15-64	971	974	1,129	1,022
65 and over	1,094	1,152	1,700	1,608

among Jews males remain more numerous, in the general population the number of females exceeds that of males. Among older people (65 and over), Jews also have more females than males, but nowhere nearly to the same extent as the general population.

In trying to account for this low sex ratio among Jews we can argue that the influence of immigration still exerts some force. Jewish as well as other immigrant communities in North America, for example, exhibit a high rate of masculinity; this is clear from the studies by Seligman in the United States and by Rosenberg in Canada.³⁰ Our Edgware sample shows that although the proportion of foreign born among heads of households and their wives has been greatly reduced when compared with the parent generation, the foreign element is still of some importance. Thus, 73 per cent of the fathers and 64 per cent of the mothers of householders were foreign born, but only 20 per cent of the householders themselves and 14 per cent of their wives were foreign born.³¹ The proportion of foreign born, nevertheless, can still have some influence on the sex ratio in the Jewish group. It must be stated, however, that the foreignness of Edgware is in all probability lower than that of Anglo-Jewry as a whole; yet Jews in Edgware seem to have an even greater proportion of males. This can be explained by the age-composition of the population. Edgware has a generally younger population, as we have shown above. As our table shows for both Jews and the general population, the proportion of males is

higher in the younger than in the older age-groups. Consequently the two factors, the influence of immigration and that of a younger age-composition, account for the fact the sex ratio of Edgware Jews is lower than that of the general population.

Population growth

The main determinants of the size of a population, and variations in it, are birth rates, death rates, and migration.³² Birth rates depend on a number of factors: the age and sex composition, marital status, age at first marriage, and fertility trends, including the use of birth control. Death rates depend on the age composition of the population as well as on other factors, such as the standard of living and medical care. Migrations affect the size of the population through the net loss or gain resulting from the inflow and outflow of population.

Migration. The Jewish group in Edgware has gained considerably as a result of a strong influx, indicated by the shortness of residence of a large proportion of people in this group: 28 per cent of the sample had lived in Edgware less than 5 years and 52 per cent less than 10 years. While many of the 'older' respondents indicated a wish to return to districts nearer to the West End, the actual present loss is very small, and the net substantial gains made since the Second World War are clearly shown by the growth of synagogal and other Jewish organizational membership.³³ Similarly, the general population of Edgware has gained in numbers very substantially over the last few decades—the population which stood at 5,352 in 1931 increased to 17,513 in 1951, and to 20,127 in 1961.³⁴ This growth has, of course, been enhanced to a very large extent by the influx of Jews.

Death rate. There are estimates for Anglo-Jewry in general and for some provincial Jewish communities.³⁵ As for London, the rate for Jews who belong to the two largest synagogal bodies in the metropolis was 11.1,³⁶ a figure based on records for 1946–9. It is interesting to compare this figure with the crude death rates in areas where most London Jews lived at that period; these were, for 1948: Stepney, 12.3; Stoke Newington, 11.3; Bethnal Green, 10.9; Hackney, 10.5; and Hendon, 9.0.³⁷ The death rate calculated from synagogue burial figures, therefore, did not differ substantially from the general figures in areas where Jews lived.

We have no direct death rate figures for either Edgware Jews or for the general population of the district, but figures for Hendon or Middlesex can be used as a guide. The crude 1961 death rate for Hendon M.B. was 10.9 and for Middlesex 10.8,³⁸—a good deal lower than the figure of 12.0 for England and Wales.³⁹ In Edgware both the general population and the Jewish segment have a younger age-composition than Middlesex or England and Wales. In particular we can see how the size of the age-group 65 and over (which proportionately produces

the largest number of deaths), differs in the various populations: Edgware Jews, 5.2 per cent; Edgware general, 9.1 per cent; Middlesex, 11.4 per cent; England and Wales, 12.0 per cent (see Table II above). One could conclude, therefore, that the death rate for Edgware in general, and for the Jews in the district in particular, is lower than that for Middlesex (10.8 per thousand), and certainly than that for the country as a whole.⁴⁰

Birth rate. Of course, the birth and death rates determine the natural increase of a population. This factor is particularly important for two main reasons. I. In a new community where inward migration takes place on a substantial scale, as is the case in Edgware, one may gain a misleading picture, for an influx (if large enough) not only makes up for losses due to a lack of natural increase, but may even lead to a net population gain. Similarly, a low death rate in a young population (as in Edgware), even when linked to a comparatively low birth rate, may allow a net population increase. II. While death rate figures for Jews in England do not seem to differ a great deal from the general rate, it has been suggested that the Jewish birth rate has declined sharply during the first half of this century, indeed more sharply than the general birth rate. Two studies point to a decline in the number of children per Jewish family from about 3 in 1921 to 1.4 in 1950.⁴¹ This shows a reproduction rate which is too low even to maintain the population at a stationary level. In view of the above, we have paid special attention in Edgware to the aspects which reveal the fertility trends in the Jewish group, bearing in mind, however, that our group has certain special characteristics. These are: (a) we found in our sample enquiry that 68 per cent of the householders belong to social classes I and II (that is, professional and intermediary), which according to the 1951 Census figures for the general population show a much lower average number of children per family than social classes III, IV, and V;⁴² (b) on the other hand, the crude birth rate (number of live births in a year per thousand of the population of that year) is bound to be high in a group of young age-composition which Table II above shows to be the case in the Edgware Jewish group; (c) again, the birth rate may further be pushed up by a migration process involving a self-selection of those couples moving to the suburb who in fact already have a large family or intend to have more children; in our sample 14 per cent of the respondents, in answer to an open-ended question asking why they liked the district, stated that it was because they had young children and because they wanted to live near other young families.

There are a number of factors which affect fertility trends. The first we consider here is *marital status*. It is particularly interesting to compare the marital status of Edgware Jews with that of the general population of Edgware and of England and Wales. Our survey shows that in the

age-group 15-24, the percentages of married men in the Edgware general population and in that suburb's Jewish segment (7.6 and 6.7 respectively) contrast sharply with that in the general population of England and Wales: 15.3 per cent. It may be that men in the higher social strata characteristic of Edgware prefer to marry only after they have achieved a level of income or a position which may require several years to attain. On the other hand, the three groups of males in the age bracket 25-54 years exhibit great similarity: the percentage of married males among Edgware Jews is 86.6, among the Edgware general population, 87.2, and in England and Wales, 84.6. When we come to the group of men aged 55 and over, however, we find a greater variation in the percentages of single men: 2 among Edgware Jews, 4.8 among Edgware general population, and 7.7 in England and Wales.

We must now consider the marital status of women. In the group 15-24, 70 per cent of Edgware Jewish girls are single, while the percentage for girls in the general population of the suburb is 79.9, and for girls in England and Wales it is 68.7. In contrast, in the group aged 25-54, the percentage of single Jewish women in Edgware shrinks to a mere 2.5, while more than 10 per cent of women in the suburb's general population and in the general population of the country are single. Finally, among those aged 55 and over, there are no single Jewish females in Edgware; but the general figures for the district show that 16 per cent of females are single, while in the general population of England and Wales there are 14.3 per cent.

The explanation for the latter difference between Jews and the general population may be found in the sex ratio differences (see Table IV above). Jews have a lower sex ratio (a greater preponderance of men over women) than is found in the general population. Again, Jewish culture and the stress on the importance of family life may have some effect.⁴³ While fewer Jews remain bachelors or spinsters in Edgware, there is hardly any difference between Jews and the general population with regard to those who are divorced or widowed. Those widowed (particularly in the group 55 and over) show pretty much the same percentages for Jews as for the general population, while the divorced Jews in Edgware make up just over 0.5 per cent of the Jewish group compared with over 0.6 per cent of divorced in the general population of Edgware (in both cases there are twice as many divorced women as divorced men)⁴⁴ and nearly 0.7 per cent in the general population of England and Wales (the divorced men being over one-third of the total of divorced people). Table V shows the percentages of the married and single for the three groups.

The most substantial difference we see in Table V is in the female group; Edgware Jews have fewer single, and more married, women than is the case either in Edgware generally or in England and Wales.

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Table V: Marital status by sex⁴⁵

	Males		Females	
	married %	single %	married %	single %
Edgware Jews 1963	54.6	43.3	55.7	37.3
Edgware general 1961	54.0	43.7	48.9	41.5
England and Wales 1961	53.2	43.2	50.3	38.7

Looking at the marital status of the heads of households of the Jewish sample of Edgware, we find that of the total of 382 respondents only 2.6 per cent (10 respondents) were single, while 91 per cent (347 respondents) were married. The widowed accounted for 5.4 per cent (21 cases) and the divorced or separated for 1 per cent (4 cases). Most of the widowed and divorced represented the female heads of households who accounted for 6 per cent (23 respondents) of the total of 382 householders interviewed. The very high percentage of married people among heads of households is natural.

Returning to the analysis of marital status, we see that the figures indicate that marriage is even more widespread among Jews than in the general population, and that this is particularly so in the case of women. We now have to consider information concerning the age at marriage of Jews and their family patterns—that is, the number of children born to Jewish women.

Table VI provides information about age at marriage among Edgware Jews. The figures show the trends clearly. Throughout the

Table VI: Age at first marriage of heads of households and their wives, 1935-1962

Year of marriage	Average age at first marriage Females	Average age at first marriage Males
1935-39	24.3	27.5
1940-44	23.8	27.6
1945-49	23.3	27.5
1950-54	22.8	26.7
1955-59	21.9	25.6
1960-62	21.5	25.5

period 1935-62 Jewish men married later in life than Jewish women, but for both sexes the age at marriage has been steadily declining. Furthermore, our information shows that, while in 1935-9 56 per cent of females were under 25 at first marriage, by 1960-2 80 per cent were below this age. The respective percentages for males were 33 and 45. This trend among Jews agrees with the general trend in the population of Britain: among men the average age at marriage was 27.30 in 1931

and 27.72 in 1938, and then declined progressively to 25.68 in 1960 and 25.59 in 1961. Similarly, among women the respective figures were 25.47 in 1931 and 25.58 in 1938 against 23.26 in 1960 and 23.13 in 1961.⁴⁶ When comparing such figures for Jews in Edgware with the general population we must remember that the class compositions of the two groups are dissimilar; proportionately more Jews in the district belong to the professional and managerial groups than is the case in the general population.⁴⁷ As far as the latter is concerned, it has been shown that the brides of men of professional and managerial status are on the average about 1½–2 years older than their working-class contemporaries.⁴⁸ Yet figures for Jewish women in Edgware show that they have been marrying at earlier average ages than women in the general population. This downward trend (reaching 21.5 as the average age at first marriage among Jewish women in Edgware in the 1960s) is a further indication of the possibility of increased fertility.

Actual fertility depends, however, not only on the possible duration of marriage during the child-bearing period, for which reason the age at marriage is important, but also on the extent to which birth control is used. There is information about Jews in Britain, as compared with Protestants and Catholics, contained in the report of the Royal Commission on Population on Family Limitation, 1949,⁴⁹ and data on the subject were obtained from D. V. Glass and quoted by H. Neustatter.⁵⁰ The data show that a higher proportion of Jewish women, married in the inter-war period, applied birth control than was the case in any other religious group, and also that the highest proportion using appliance methods was found among Jews. However, in the case of marriages after 1940 'the proportion of Jewish women using birth control has declined and in one sample it has in fact been lower than for other religious groups'.⁵¹ An American study carried out by Westoff *et al.* in 1957 reveals similarly that contraception is most frequently and earliest used by Jews, when compared with Protestants and Catholics, and that not only do Jewish couples 'rely more exclusively on the most effective methods but they apparently manage these methods with unusual efficiency'.⁵²

Our Edgware sample survey did not cover the aspect of birth control, but we can rely on the fertility table, prepared from the sample data, in order to gain an idea of the trends in family size. Even if information about birth control were available, it would be no substitute for information on the *number* of births.

Table VII sets out comparative figures for the number of children born to women up to the first ten years of marriage among Edgware Jews and the general population of the country. It may be noted here that the average period of child-bearing has been compressed in this century, so that the majority of children are born in the first ten years of marriage.⁵⁴ There is no reason to suggest that Jews behave differently

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Table VII: Mean number of children born to women married once only at all ages under 45, by 5 year cohorts at specified marriage duration⁵³

Calendar year of marriage	Jews in Edgware			General population England and Wales	
	Marriage duration, exact years				
	2	5	10	5	10
1935-39	0·25	0·86	1·70	1·05	1·67
1940-44	0·27	0·84	1·57	1·10	1·73
1945-49	0·42	1·24	1·98	1·26	1·83
1950-54	0·31	1·02		1·24	
1955-59	0·43				

in this respect, for most of the information so far considered shows that Jews as a group follow the general population trends in many cases in a somewhat accentuated form. Our fertility table, therefore, can certainly serve as a useful guide; it shows that the fertility of Jewish women declined sharply during the war years; in 1945-9 it rose, and was higher than in pre-war years; but in 1950-4 a decline set in.

There is, however, some evidence (not shown sufficiently well in the table), which indicates a more recent increase in the Jewish birth rate in Edgware. Thus, if we take the 137 children in the age-group 0-4, who represent births during the period mid-1958 to mid-1963, we find that the average number of births per year was 27.4, which, when related to the total Jewish population covered by the sample (1,290 individuals), produces a crude birth rate of 21.2 per thousand.⁵⁵ These trends among Jews in Edgware can be seen also in the general population of England and Wales, to judge both from Table VII and the crude birth rate figures which were 17.8 in 1948, fell to 15.0 in 1955, and rose steadily to 17.6 in 1961.⁵⁶ The high Jewish figure agrees with their age-composition in the district—higher proportions in the age-groups at a reproductive stage than in the general population (see Table II above).

The Edgware survey throws further light on family formation. Thus, 372 of the 382 respondents were married, and 335 of those (90 per cent) have had children—a total of 654 children. There is a preponderance of small families: 31.7 per cent had one child, 49 per cent, two children, and 19.3 per cent, three or more children. The average number of children per family is 1.76, if we include the childless families but exclude the 'single householders'. If we include the latter but exclude the 53 relatives living in the 382 households covered, we arrive at a family size of 3.2 against the household size (including relatives) of 3.4.

The size of the Jewish family in Edgware seems, therefore, to be not

very different from that found in Anglo-Jewry in 1950 (given by H. Neustatter at 3.4⁵⁷). In Newcastle, 'a medium sized and compact community', the estimate for the size of the Jewish family in 1951 was 3.2.⁵⁸ The size of the Jewish family in Leeds, a much larger community, was found to be 3.3 in 1958.⁵⁹ Similar Jewish family sizes have been shown to exist in other parts of the world: the average size of the Jewish family in Canada in 1951 was 3.2,⁶⁰ and the 1952 data for New York City show an average size of Jewish household of 3.1, although an attempt to estimate the Jewish population in the suburban New York area arrived at an average family size multiplier of 3.5.⁶¹ In the 1960 Basle study the size of the Jewish family was 3.6.⁶² The family sizes considered, including the one for Edgware, do not refer to completed families. Because of differences in the age-composition of the various communities, the family sizes reflect different situations and cannot, therefore, be used to compare fertility trends in the various communities.

Some of the studies mentioned did, however, voice pessimism regarding trends in Jewish communities,⁶³ taking the view that the number of children per family was too small for the replacement of the Jewish population to be maintained. Similar trends were noted in the general populations, for example, in Britain and the United States in the inter-war period and still after the Second World War.⁶⁴ In the last decade, however, the downward trend of fertility has not only been interrupted but there are signs that it has, in fact, been reversed.⁶⁵ Such signs are also noticeable in Edgware: the 1945-9 marriage cohort seems to show a sufficient number of children for replacement purposes (see Table VII). Furthermore, the number of childless marriages appears to be small among Edgware Jews, and it is smaller than the number of such marriages in the general population of Britain. Thus we have seen that the Jewish sample in Edgware threw up 10 per cent of childless families. However, of all those married once-only women under the age of 45 (who contracted marriage in the period 1935-52), 5.6 per cent were childless at the completion of ten years of marriage. If we take the group of women who married after the Second World War (1945-52), the percentage is 5.1, while the 1935-44 cohort shows a percentage of 6.1. Both Jewish cohorts (the 1935-44 characterized by low birth rates and the 1945-52 by higher ones) compare favourably with figures for childlessness in the general population: in 1961 there were 16 per cent childless women who had reached their tenth wedding anniversary, and in 1951 there were 20 per cent childless women among those who were of an age to have completed their families.⁶⁶

Despite these pointers we are not able to predict the future of the Jewish family size in the next generations. Our sample does not provide information sufficiently extensive to work out a refined cohort analysis and to marshal other necessary evidence about trends in family building habits, for example. (It has been pointed out by D. V. Glass and

E. Grebenik that even the national statistics are deficient for such predictive purposes.⁶⁷⁾

Conclusion. In the first place, our survey has made it possible to calculate a reliable⁶⁸ population estimate of Jews in Edgware. There are 6,040 households in Edgware with a total population of 19,888. Our sample survey shows that 38 per cent of the households are Jewish; accordingly, there are 2,295 Jewish and 3,745 Gentile households. With an average size of Jewish household of 3.4, we arrive at a Jewish population of 7,803. The total Gentile population would, therefore, be 12,085 and the average size of the Gentile household 3.23.⁶⁹ It is important to point out that (a) because the main datum in this calculation (that is, that 38 per cent of the households are Jewish) is based on a sample, albeit a random one but covering only 72.6 per cent of the households in the district,⁷⁰ and (b) because of the fact that the average size of the Jewish household is subject to some sampling error however small, the figures given for the Jewish and non-Jewish populations are of course only estimates. These estimates, however, can be stated very confidently, and to say that there are about 7,800 Jews in the district and some 12,000 non-Jews must be very near the truth. These estimates also show that in Edgware, Jews account for 39 per cent of the population, against 38 per cent of households.

As for Jewish population trends, we have seen that on the one hand the average number of children per family is only 1.76, but that on the other hand the Jewish birth rate has been recently very high, as suggested by the large percentage in the age-group 0-4. These facts have to be interpreted in the light of the special conditions obtaining in the Jewish population of Edgware. Thus, the small Jewish family may be due to a number of factors. First, the earlier low birth rate and the possible influence of the class composition of Jews—more of them compared with the general population belong to the higher socio-economic groups⁷¹—account for the small family size. Second, the large number of young married couples who have not completed their families is another contributing factor. This large percentage of young marrieds, however, also at least partly explains the exceptionally high birth rates shown for recent years. The drop in the age at marriage (Table VI) and the improved fertility trends (Table VII) nevertheless lead us to the conclusion that the family building pattern of the younger Jews now in Edgware shows a trend towards a somewhat larger family. It is very difficult to make accurate predictions without follow-up studies and a special attention to migratory movements of Jews out of and into Edgware. Furthermore, it would certainly be useful and desirable to have comparative data for Jews in other suburban districts,⁷² especially in the older Jewish centres and in areas nearer to central London.

NOTES

¹ The survey was the basis of a longer study carried out, entitled *A Sociological Field Study of Jewish Suburban Life in Edgware 1962-63* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London), 1965. In connexion with this section the valuable advice given by Mr. John Hajnal, of the London School of Economics, is gratefully acknowledged. I also wish to thank Mrs. M. Schmol, Research Officer of the Statistical and Demographic Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, for help with calculations of fertility trends (Table VII). The generous support given by the Nuffield Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. I wish also to express my gratitude for smaller grants to the Hillel Foundation and the Central Research Fund of the University of London.

² This is a system whereby a whole area known to include a minority population is scrutinized. The best sampling frame for the area can then be used, and the procedure involves two phases: first, a main sample is taken of the whole universe (this serves to locate the minority and is the filtering process); in the second phase, the minority subsample is studied. For details of the application of this technique see Part V, Appendix A, of my Ph.D. thesis.

³ Special tabulations Scale A were obtained for the general population of Edgware from the General Register Office, Census Branch.

⁴ See *The Jewish Year Book* 1964, for an estimate of the total Jewish population of Britain, or M. Freedman, ed. *A Minority in Britain*, London, 1955, p. 76.

⁵ Middlesex, Census 1961, County Report, Table 23, pp. 167, 177; Table 3, p. 40; and Table 2, p. 14.

⁶ Sources for Table 1: general population, *ibid.*, and Edgware survey covering the Jewish population. The latter did not include a question about lodgers or others who were not permanently living in the household. Most of those in this category would have been non-Jewish domestic workers from Continental countries. The exclusion was due to the fact that the survey's aim was to establish the demographic characteristics of the Jewish population. It is true, however, that the 'Jewish' household would have been bigger but for this exclusion.

⁷ See Table II.

⁸ See A. M. Carr-Saunders, D. Caradog Jones, and C. A. Moser, *A Survey of Social Conditions in England and Wales*, Oxford, 1958, pp. 36 f.

⁹ Written information received from the General Register Office, Somerset House, London, on 23 November 1964.

¹⁰ This figure almost coincides with the distribution of Jews in houses and flats: i.e., while 363 respondents (N = 382) own their houses or flats, 364 (again about 95 per cent) live in houses and the remainder in flats.

¹¹ Carr-Saunders *et al.*, op. cit., p. 45.

¹² County Report, Middlesex, 1961 Census, Table E, p. xx.

¹³ In older Jewish areas (e.g. the East End and Hackney), the number of Jews occupying Council or other rented flats is known to be quite high. There is some evidence regarding this which will become available through a study being carried out by Mr. John Carrier.

¹⁴ Sources: Edgware Survey, Special Census tabulations Scale A for Edgware Ward, and Census 1961, County Report Middlesex, op. cit., Table A, p. xv.

¹⁵ See Chapter II, Ph.D. thesis, op. cit.

¹⁶ The matter is referred to below.

¹⁷ Of the 382 respondents (heads of households) 359 or 94 per cent were men. The 23 women included mainly widows as well as some single and divorced; 19 (more than 80 per cent) of these were 50 and over; the rest were in the 30-49 group.

¹⁸ See H. Neustatter, 'Demographic and other statistical aspects of Anglo-Jewry' in Freedman, ed., op. cit., pp. 66, 97.

¹⁹ See my Ph.D. thesis, p. 176.

²⁰ See Seligman (with the assistance of A. Antonovsky) 'Some Aspects of Jewish Demography' in M. Sklare, ed., *The Jews*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, especially Table II, pp. 54 f. See also Julius Gould 'American Jewry—Some Social Trends', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III, No. 1, June 1961, pp. 58 f.

²¹ L. Rosenberg, 'The Demography of the Jewish Community in Canada', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, No. 2, Dec. 1959, p. 224.

²² See Table II.

²³ See Table VII.

²⁴ See Table II.

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²⁵ See Seligman, op. cit., p. 54.

²⁶ See C. Morris Horowitz and Lawrence J. Kaplan, *The Jewish Population of the New York Area 1900-1975*, Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, New York, 1959.

²⁷ A. Rubinstein, 'The Jewish Population of the New York Area 1900-1975' in *In the Dispersion, Surveys and Monographs on the Jewish World*, No. 3, World Zionist Organization, Research Section, Jerusalem, Winter 1963-4, pp. 71 f.

²⁸ Charlotte Roland-Lowenthal, *The Jews of Basle: Their Demography, Their Attitude Towards Judaism*, Sociological Studies Series, Community, Paris, June, 1963, p. 6.

²⁹ Sources: Edgware Survey; special tabulations Scale A, Census for Edgware Ward; Neustatter in Freedman, ed., op. cit., Table IV, p. 249; *Annual Abstract of Statistics*, No. 100, 1963, Central Statistical Office, H.M.S.O., Table 6, p. 7.

³⁰ See Seligman and Rosenberg, op. cit., pp. 57 and 224 respectively.

³¹ See Ph.D. thesis, p. 94.

³² It should be noted that crude birth and death rates are meant. The rate of population growth depends on natural increases, i.e. the excess of births over deaths, and on the balance of inward and outward migration. See *Royal Commission on Population, Report 1949*, London, H.M.S.O., Cmd. 7695, p. 15.

³³ See my Ph.D. thesis, pp. 22 ff.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

³⁵ Full references will be found in my Ph.D. thesis in footnote 3, p. 43.

³⁶ Ibid, footnote 4.

³⁷ See *The Registrar General's Statistical Review of England and Wales*, 1948, Part II Civil, H.M.S.O., London, Table E, pp. 25 f.

³⁸ See *The Registrar General's Statistical Review of England and Wales*, 1961, Part II Tables. Population, Table E, pp. 12 ff.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Since the above figures are crude death rates and are affected by the age-composition of the populations considered, they are not adequate measures of mortality.

⁴¹ See Neustatter, in Freedman, ed., op. cit., pp. 69 f.

⁴² See Carr-Saunders et al., op. cit., p. 24.

⁴³ Neustatter, in comparing Anglo-Jewry with the general population of 1949, came to the conclusion that 'more

[of Jewish women] get married and fewer remain spinsters or widows or divorcees'. Similarly, she says 'fewer Jewish men in proportion remain bachelors or widowed and divorced'. See Freedman, ed., op. cit., pp. 90 f.

⁴⁴ See Ph.D. thesis, Table VIA, p. 63.

⁴⁵ Sources: Edgware Survey: Special Tabulations, Census Scale A, Edgware Ward; *The Registrar General's Statistical Review of England and Wales*, 1961, Table A3, and *Annual Abs. of Statistics*, 1962, Table 13, p. 14.

⁴⁶ See *The Registrar General's Statistical Review of England and Wales* 1961, Part III Commentary, London H.M.S.O., 1964, Table VIII, p. 21. See also Carr-Saunders et al., op. cit., p. 7 and D. C. Marsh, *The Changing Social Structure of England and Wales, 1871-1951*, London, 1958, p. 35.

⁴⁷ See Ph.D. thesis, p. 68.

⁴⁸ See O. R. McGregor and Griselda Rowntree, 'The Family' in A. T. Welford et al., eds., *Society*, London, 1962, p. 399.

⁴⁹ See *Family Limitation*, Papers of the Royal Commission on Population, Vol. I, H.M.S.O. London, 1949, p. 82 and Table 60, p. 81.

⁵⁰ See Neustatter in Freedman, ed., op. cit., pp. 84 f.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² See C. F. Westoff et al., *Family Growth in Metropolitan America*, Princeton, N.J., 1961, pp. 102, 183-4 and Table 7. As pointed out in the studies noted above, differences between Jews and other religious groups regarding use of contraception may also be related to class and educational differences between these groups.

⁵³ Sources: Edgware Survey and *Annual Abstract of Statistics* 1963, Table 18, p. 19.

⁵⁴ See D. V. Glass and E. Grebenik, *The Trend and Pattern of Fertility in Great Britain*, A Report on the Family Census 1946, Part I, Papers of the Royal Commission on Population, Vol. 6, H.M.S.O., London, 1954, p. 278. The authors point out that some 80 per cent of total marital fertility is achieved by 10 years' marriage duration; hence relatively recent cohorts of marriages may be brought into calculations of fertility trends.

⁵⁵ This is not quite accurate, for the average number of births relates to the period 1958-63 but the total sample figure is true only of 1963. Similar calculations for the general population of Edgware covering the period 1956-61

show a figure of only 13.8 and for the Jews in the district during 1953-63 of 17.7.

⁵⁶ See *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1962*, New York, 1963, pp. 43, 47.

⁵⁷ Neustatter in Freedman, ed., op. cit. pp. 69, 249.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ See E. Krausz, *Leeds Jewry: Its History and Social Structure*, Cambridge, 1964, pp. 8, 43, 44.

⁶⁰ Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 227.

⁶¹ Seligman in Sklare, op. cit., pp. 93, 99.

⁶² This calculation includes a small minority of orthodox Jews with large families: see Roland-Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 12.

⁶³ Neustatter in Freedman, ed., op. cit., pp. 107-8; Rosenberg, op. cit., pp. 230-1; Sklare, op. cit., p. 93.

⁶⁴ See *Royal Commission on Population Report*, 1949, London, 1953, p. 221; see also Westoff *et al.*, op. cit., p. 5.

⁶⁵ See *The Registrar General's Statistical Review of England and Wales*, 1961, Part III, Commentary, London, 1964, pp. 11-14; see also Westoff *et al.*, *ibid.*

⁶⁶ See *The Registrar General's Statistical Review of England and Wales*, 1961, Part III, Commentary, 1964, p. 77. See also Marsh, op. cit., pp. 42, 43.

⁶⁷ See Glass and Grebenik, op. cit., Summary Chapter, p. 12. See also by the same authors: *U.K. Royal Commission on Population Papers*, Vol. 6.

⁶⁸ Tests of statistical significance have been applied, and the results of these were taken into consideration in the analysis of the material and in the drawing of conclusions. See my Ph.D. thesis, Appendix B.

⁶⁹ The average size of the household in the general population of Edgware is 3.3.

⁷⁰ This was due to practical considerations, details of which will be found in Appendix A of my Ph.D. thesis, pp. 210 f.

⁷¹ See my Ph.D. thesis, Chapter 4, Table I.

⁷² It would be particularly interesting to compare Edgware with a suburban Jewish community containing a high percentage of people in the lower-middle, and working classes.

SYRIAN JEWS IN THREE SOCIAL SETTINGS

Walter P. Zenner

I. THE PROBLEM

THE relationship between the organizational structure of an ethnic enclave and the cultural changes which occur in it is complex. Foreign innovations may be adopted even though the framework of the group is rigid, while, on the other hand, the group may preserve important cultural patterns despite a breakdown of the general communal structure—though the latter may be only an unrealized possibility. Several social scientists, including Freed, Clifton, and Milton Gordon, have made attempts to formulate this relationship between group structure and cultural change,¹ but efforts at codification have been tentative.

In this article, my aim is to show how one 'ethnic group', the Syrian Jews, have undergone both structural and cultural changes.² These changes will be seen in relationship to the boundaries that exist between the Syrian Jews and their neighbours in three settings: in Syrian cities, in Israel, and in the United States. These boundaries will be described in some detail and will be explained in terms of a number of factors: economic specialization along ethnic lines, the growth or atrophy of separate ethnic institutions, and the mobilization or lack of mobilization of feelings of 'kinship' with neighbouring groups.

The changes discussed may also be seen as part of the general change from pre-industrial to industrial society. Positive attitudes towards the parental heritage are part of a general traditional ideology. Ethnic economic specialization and corporate organization of the group are also likely to be characteristic of the pre-industrial city and peasant society.³ On the other hand, it will be indicated that changes along these lines are not simple correlates of a more or less economically advanced society, but that they are related to the specific situation of the ethnic enclave.

Viewing the Syrian Jews comparatively, we must understand that this group was part of the general eastern Mediterranean wave of emigration and that it had, at least potentially, the possibility of

becoming a sub-group of either the larger Syrian immigrant population⁴ or of the Jewish community. One observer who viewed it as a Jewish group called the Syrian Jews in the United States a 'minority within a minority'. The group may be seen as equivalent to the speech-groups within the Chinese minorities of Southeast Asia, rather than as a wholly separate grouping. While all ethnic groups have greater or lesser affinity to or kinship with other ethnic groups, the Syrian Jews discussed here have been viewed generally as part of a larger Jewish grouping.

II. THE JEWS OF SYRIA

a. History and population

During the Ottoman period, the largest Jewish communities in what is now Syria were in Aleppo and Damascus. Jews had lived in these communities practically since the beginnings of the Jewish dispersion, as indicated by both the New Testament and the Talmud. Jewish tradition linked Aleppo with Abraham and with the Aram Sobah conquered by Joab, the general of King David. Outside these two cities, Jews also maintained holy places linked with Biblical figures, such as Jobar and Tedif al-Yahud, where Ezra the Scribe is said to have written a scroll of the Law on his way from Babylon to Jerusalem.⁵

In the sixteenth century, the indigenous Arabic-speaking Jewish population of Syria was augmented by the immigration from Spain and Sicily caused by the expulsion of Jews from those countries. If the proportions of Jews from these 'Frank' areas given in the Ottoman records is correct, the Spanish and Italian groups accounted for close to half of the Jewish populations in Damascus and Aleppo, with the indigenous or Mustarib group constituting the other half.⁶ By the end of the Ottoman period, these two groups had fused with only minor traces, in family name and secondary rituals, indicating a 'Franco' or 'Mustarib' origin.⁷

Estimates of Jewish population in Syria are variable. In the early twentieth century, the number of Jews in Aleppo varied between 8,000 and 10,000.⁸ One estimate quoted by Schechtman⁹ claims that at one time, before the great emigrations of the twentieth century, there were 50,000 Jews in Syria. For the period between 1930 and 1943, the estimates varied between about 16,500 and 30,000. These estimates usually included the Jews in Lebanon, many of whom were of Damascus and Aleppo origin. The difficulties in these estimates are many, including the immigration to Syria from Turkey by Jews in the Urfa area in particular, illegal emigration during all this period to Palestine, a back-and-forth flow of Syrian Jews between the Americas, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, and a high birth rate.

b. External and internal organization of the community

The Jewish community in Aleppo and Damascus had many of the characteristics of 'corporate ethnic groups'. The Jewish community was treated as one taxable unit during most of the Ottoman period; its leaders were responsible to the government for payment of taxes and other imposts. Problems arose when Jews moved from one community to another as to which taxroll they were to belong.¹⁰ This problem was particularly acute during the eighteenth century, when leading factions of the Jewish community in Aleppo instituted measures to force resident Jewish merchants of European nationality to pay their share of communal taxes.¹¹ These merchants, known as *Signores Francos*, pleaded exemption from the taxes under Capitulations, although they did contribute to local institutions.

The corporate nature of the religious communities in Damascus and Aleppo can be seen in the rivalry between the various Christian groups and the Jews for certain economic positions, which were apparently government-approved monopolies. These ranged from high positions such as *kashaaf* (customs-house official) and *sarraaf* (banker, in this case, to the Pasha) to button-makers. The history of the *Farhi* family which served as bankers to the Pashas of Damascus is well-known and will not be repeated here.¹² A more humble example is illustrated by a story from Aleppo which was recently published in Israel.

A number of gravediggers had uncovered the grave of a man who had died thirty years previously. It was like the body of one who had died a few days before and it had the aroma of sweet spices, but it was the body of a simple seller of buttons. The gravediggers did not understand and went to consult the rabbi, Raphael Solomon Laniado (a well-known eighteenth-century legal authority). He too did not understand why this man had merited this miracle. That night the dead man appeared to the rabbi in a dream and told him his story. The dead man had gone to work at an early age and had saved his money. One day a *qaimaqam* (a Turkish official) came to Aleppo to collect taxes. Before his arrival, 200 Jewish widows and orphans had worked at making buttons, but now the local Christians asked him to give them the monopoly of button-making. When the widows and orphans learned this, they asked the button-seller for help. After that Sabbath, he put on his finest clothing, went to the *qaimaqam*, and persuaded him to let the Jewish widows and orphans retain their trade by giving him his savings. After hearing this story, the rabbi understood.¹³

The internal affairs of the Jewish community were regulated by Jewish notables and by the rabbis. It appears, from the statements of informants, that these notables were practically self-appointed. In Aleppo in the nineteenth century, the de Picciotto family was quite important, because its members served as consuls to various European

governments and could intercede on behalf of the Jewish community with the weakening Ottoman government.¹⁴ The fact that Jews who were foreign citizens could serve as leaders of the community shows the extent to which Jews in Syria were treated as one unit.

The rabbis came from families with long traditions of leadership such as the HaDayyan family and the Laniado family. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman government revived the post of *Hakham Bashi* (chief rabbi) in Istanbul, and *hakham bashi* were appointed in other major cities, such as Aleppo and Damascus. The rabbis who held this post were in the delicate, but highly authoritative, position of mediator between the local community and the Ottoman government.¹⁵ In addition to the chief rabbi, there were rabbinic courts.

Syrian rabbis have left a rich record of how they dealt with the problems which arose. The variety of cases found in the many published collections of responsa of Syrian rabbis testifies to the degree to which these rabbis were consulted. Cases found in these collections involve marriage and personal status, ritual law, commercial law (especially partnerships and loans), and housing arrangements.¹⁶ The extent of these courts' authority is seen in the fact that bringing a Jew before an Ottoman court (thus making him suffer imprisonment or forcing him to pay bribes) was considered an injury for which the one who had been the plaintiff before the government court had to pay.¹⁷

Even during the Young Turk period and the French Mandate of Syria, the Jewish community appears to have maintained its cohesion, although, according to informants, rabbinic authority had weakened. Some indication that this decline was beginning is indicated in a moralistic work published on the eve of the First World War. Attendance at dances in cafés, transgressions of Sabbath laws, and violation of laws prohibiting usury appear to have become more frequent.¹⁸

c. *Economic life*

As indicated above, certain occupations tended to be monopolies of the ethnic-religious groupings. Informants have indicated that while Jews had their own ritual slaughterers in Aleppo, the butchers who sold the meat were Muslims; Jews would buy whole lambs from these butchers which bore the proper stamp. In Aleppo, there were Jewish goldsmiths, but the silversmiths were generally Armenians. In Damascus, a certain type of copper-engraving was a Jewish craft well into the twentieth century.

The Jews in Aleppo were generally merchants, pedlars, and tradesmen, while more Damascus Jews tended to become craftsmen. According to Braver,¹⁹ Damascus Jewry suffered a severe economic depression in the late nineteenth century, following a series of setbacks including the withdrawal of British protection from a number of important families, the decline of the caravan trade, and the failure of the Otto-

man bond issue in the 1870s. A symptom of the poverty of the Damascus Jews was the rise of a class of dancing girls and prostitutes in their midst. Poverty in both cities was severe and many emigrated, first to Egypt, and later to the Americas, to seek their fortunes.

It is difficult to get evidence of guilds in Ottoman and Mandatory Syria from existing information. There are, however, some indications of their presence. The above examples of an ethnic monopoly of button-making and of butchering are such indications. Informants have also affirmed that the Ottoman authorities recognized a *sheikh* over certain crafts, such as goldsmithing and baking, and certain occupations were located on particular streets or alleys in the market-areas. Laniado has also reprinted an agreement which cheesemakers made before a rabbinic court in Aleppo in the nineteenth century to assure that court that their products would be kasher.²⁰ Nevertheless, despite the existence of such occupational groupings with guild-like arrangements, businesses were often organized on an individual basis, whereby individuals formed partnerships and made loans (the two were often tied together) on the basis of economic interests. While partnerships often had a kinship basis, litigation occurred between kinsmen. There were also partnerships and loans across ethnic lines.

One elderly man of Syrian origin in Jerusalem reported that an ancestor of his had been book keeper to an important family in Aleppo. Another man said that he had learned the printing trade in Aleppo with Christians. Still, cross-religious trust was not high, and most Syrian Jews appear to have gone into business alone or with their kin, rather than with strangers. The very fact that large numbers of Jews were in what might be termed 'Jewish' occupations made this possibility highly probable.

d. Other aspects of social life

Syrian Jews during this period were, generally speaking, Orthodox Jews of the rabbinic tradition. While they shared many aspects of a general Middle Eastern folk religion (such as certain magical beliefs and reverence for holy men), the Great Tradition to which they adhered was that of Orthodox Judaism, including both the Talmud and the Cabbalistic tradition. Hebrew was used in the synagogue and taught in Jewish schools attended, at least, by the boys. Even in the Mandatory period, most Jewish boys went to some sort of Jewish school, whether the Jewish versions of the *Kuttub* (the traditional elementary school) or the schools run by the Alliance Israélite Universelle. According to informants, a school set up by English Protestant missionaries to the Jews of Damascus in the nineteenth century had reached a *modus vivendi* with the rabbis of Damascus. A rabbi was permitted to teach Hebrew to the boys.

As indicated by the schools themselves, Westernization appears in

somewhat different forms for Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Syria. As for the Christians, their contacts with European Christians made them amenable to the West. For Muslims in the Ottoman period, the Ottoman government itself played an important role. In the case of the Jews, the Alliance Israélite Universelle schools helped bring them European culture in a secular French package, a process reinforced during the Mandate. The Palestinian Jews who were exiled in Damascus during the First World War stimulated a small Zionist movement in that city, which resulted in some Damascene Jews settling in kibbutzim in Israel.²¹

In Damascus, most Jews lived in a Jewish quarter. In Aleppo, on the other hand, informants said that many Jews lived in areas which were both Jewish and Muslim, though never Christian. While both Russell (in eighteenth-century Aleppo) and Lady Isabel Burton (in nineteenth-century Damascus)²² indicate that there were gatherings in which Jews entertained non-Jews, the bars to inter-marriage and true commensalism (because of Jewish and Muslim dietary laws) would have made such gatherings infrequent. The folklore of Syrian Jews indicates a great deal of inter-religious hostility and ethnocentrism. The history of Syria and Lebanon in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that this division still persists, and not only with regard to Jews and non-Jews.

Despite the fact that both Jews and Christians were minorities with inferior status in the Ottoman empire and had crucial ties with Europe, they were mutually hostile during this period. The famous Damascus affair of 1840 and the Damascus riots of 1860 show this to have been the case.²³ It seems that Jewish-Christian friendships grew in some ways during the French Mandate, while Jewish-Muslim relations deteriorated. Nevertheless the inter-relations of all these groups appear to have been brittle.

e. Analysis of the group boundaries

In the drawing of the baseline situation, a number of the boundary features appear.²⁴ The demarcation between the Jews in Aleppo and Damascus, on the one hand, and non-Jews on the other, is clear. A Jew is one who is a member of the Jewish community and who practises the Jewish religion (the two having been in the past practically synonymous). It is a simple boundary, since being a Jew or not being a Jew (the same was true of other kinds of membership) was an either-or matter. This boundary was a significant one, as indicated by the number of activities it involved, and it was of cognitive significance. It was a practically impermeable boundary, since there were almost no converts to Judaism. (It was prohibited for Jews and Christians to proselytize in the Muslim world, and it appears that few Syrian Jews were converted in past centuries. If one did become a convert, however, one was cut off entirely from the Jewish community.)

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The boundary between local Jews and other Jews was, however, more complex, vaguer, more permeable, and of less significance. Outside Jews did come into Aleppo from time to time. The reference to Jewish immigration during the sixteenth century and to the *Signores Francos* in the eighteenth century are indications of this movement. Informants indicated that many Jews from southeastern Turkey migrated to Aleppo. There were even Aleppine Jews with European names like Marcus and Goldberg. This permeable boundary, while of less significance when Syrian Jews remained in Syria, became more and more important as Syrian Jews migrated.

As the boundaries indicate, the Syrian Jewish community had the characteristics of a corporate group.²⁵ The community in each city had its leaders and was treated as a unit by the outside. The community was a taxable unit and responsible for its own internal regulation. It had its own 'estate', in two senses: the property of the community as a whole, and the economic interests of Jews who had specific occupational specialities. The corporate quality of the social structure fits what others have observed in pre-industrial urban and in peasant societies.²⁶

III. SYRIAN JEWS IN NEW YORK CITY

a. Origins of the community

When he migrates an individual's status undergoes certain changes. A Catholic from Baden may become a German in Ohio. So it was with people who had been Jews in Syria: now they became Syrians, Syrian Jews, *turcos* (in Latin America), or Sephardim.²⁷ In New York, as in Israel, Syrian Jews compared their behaviour with that of other Jewish groups, not with that of Syrian Gentiles. The possible assimilation into a larger Arabic-speaking or Syrian ethnic grouping was an alternative which was not taken, although the Christians and Muslims of Syro-Lebanese origin in the United States have moved in that direction.²⁸

Syrian Jews in New York were part of the general eastern Mediterranean wave of emigration which flowed from the Levant to the Americas and Africa. Syrian Jews first emigrated to Egypt; some also went to Manchester where they had business connexions. There is a tradition that the first Syrian in New York came in 1900. Miller records the presence of about 100 Syrian 'Hebrews' in New York City around 1903. He reports that these had separated themselves from the largely Christian Syrian community in that city. Like that of the other Mediterranean peoples, the main immigration of Syrian Jews to New York was between 1900 and 1923, when the quota system came into force.²⁹

The number of Syrian Jews and their descendants is difficult to determine. There is no inquiry as to religion in the U.S. Census. In

ordinary census-reporting, second-generation Americans are merely listed as having foreign-born parents. Immigrants are listed simply as being Syrian-born and are lumped together with other Syrians. Rabbis and community leaders in Syrian congregations in Brooklyn gave estimates for Syrian Jews in New York that varied between 8,000 and 20,000. There is also a large Syrian Jewish community in Los Angeles, and small groups of Syrian families are found in many North American cities, as well as in Latin America.³⁰

b. External and internal relations

Whereas in Syria being a Jew or a Christian meant being a member of a community with corporate status, this is not true in the United States where, once an immigrant has arrived, he is treated on an individual basis. A Syrian Jew can choose to associate with other Syrians, other Jews, or with Gentile Americans. We have moved from a world of corporate groups to what Eric Wolf has called 'individual-based coalitions'.³¹ While in their own view and the view of their neighbours, Syrian Jews are a distinctive group, there is no law in the United States or any external customary barrier keeping them together.

A short description of the Syrian Jews in terms of their relationship to other groups is the one used by Steinhardt: 'a minority within a minority'.³² Among those who are the leaders of the community, the orientation is Sephardi and not Syrian. While Syrian Jews have business and other dealings on an individual basis with other Syrian-Americans, the long-standing Jewish-Christian antagonism (typical of nineteenth-century Syria) and the Palestine question have made for a separation between the general Syrian-American groups and the Syrian Jews.

In contrast to the Syrian situation in which there was an organized communal structure, the Syrian Jews in New York have only the skeleton of such a structure. There is an umbrella organization which is said to cover all the Aleppo (and to some extent, the Damascus) Jews in Brooklyn (where most live). This organization includes the Burial Society. One rabbi is considered to be the Chief Rabbi of Syrian Jews in New York, although, in fact, he is only *primus inter pares*. There are several Syrian synagogues, each of which is autonomous, and a community centre. While all these congregations are Orthodox, and follow the Sephardi ritual, several have had American-trained rabbis of European origin, as well as Israel-trained Middle Eastern Jews who were not Syrian. Apart from the rabbis, a great deal of power in the community is held by rich individuals who are interested in the community. One such individual, in particular, is well-known as a fundraiser and contributor to many Jewish philanthropies, both in the United States and abroad. Power and influence among the wealthy are increased by their ability to extend credit to other Syrian Jews.

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In addition to the congregations and the umbrella organization, one finds other voluntary groupings such as social clubs, a Bnai Brith chapter, youth groups, and the community centre previously mentioned. As this list indicates, these organizations are direct parallels of American Jewish organizations, if not direct affiliates. Even the Syrian synagogues which exist in Brooklyn have the appearance of New York synagogues of the appropriate period. The most recently built synagogue, for instance, has the same kinds of auditorium and social hall (for weddings) that are found in Brooklyn houses of worship.

While Syrian Jews of New York have undergone a great deal of acculturation and while they live a life much like that of their neighbours, most still live in a Syrian community. This community has lost some of the rigidity of the older structure and, in fact, parallels the structure of other American ethnic groups. Politically, the Syrian Jews have been relatively inactive and are, in any case, too small a group to play an important role.

c. The economic basis

In New York, Syrian Jews have maintained closely knit economic ties within the group. Most have been involved in a number of connected business fields, including linen, lace, infant-wear, and tourist-trade imports. While most men, whenever possible, open small shops or other businesses in the New York area and elsewhere in the United States, there are partnerships, credit arrangements, and wholesaler-retailer agreements which tie one Syrian Jew to another. Dowries (which are still given to a young man who marries a girl in the community) are part of these arrangements.

When Syrian Jews first came to New York, it seems that many received goods from Syrian Christian importers. Many began as pedlars. Today, according to informants, most accept only other Syrian Jews as partners. It is also common to bring in cousins and other relatives from Latin America, Israel, and Syria itself, to help with the shop. Eventually, the immigrant goes into business for himself. Such immigration is still going on. At the same time, some Brooklyn-born Syrian Jews leave and go into business in Hong Kong, Puerto Rico, and other areas. In the past twenty years the Syrian Jews in New York have prospered.

In the past, few children of Syrian Jews went into the professions. In fact, a number of informants said that their parents were opposed to their going to college. There are some indications that this attitude is changing. A relative of one of the informants is said to have received money to go to college as part of the dowry from his in-laws. It is still too early to tell whether this new trend will result in a lessening of ethnic occupational specialization in certain business lines or in the growth of professional specialists who will strengthen these businesses, such as lawyers and accountants.

d. Other aspects of social life

The Jewish aspect of Syrian Jewish life becomes clear in two areas, in their neighbourhoods of residence and in their marriage pattern. At the same time, their separateness from all other groups also becomes clear.

Since Syrian Jews first arrived in America, they have tended to live in Jewish neighbourhoods. The neighbourhoods in which they have lived include the Lower East Side and the Bensonhurst-Mapleton Park and East Flatbush areas of Brooklyn. The Lower East Side was already being vacated by Syrian Jews in the early 1920s, according to informants. The Syrians have always lived in Jewish sections, though Syrians have preferred homes, whereas Ashkenazi Jews favoured apartment houses.³³

In these neighbourhoods, non-Syrians are aware of the presence of the Syrians and their Jewishness. When asking informants what 'nationalities' lived in Bensonhurst, I was told that there were Jews, Italians, and Syrians. When I asked if the Syrians were Christians, I was told that they were Jews, even very traditional Jews. While the Syrian Jews are faithful to their synagogues, they differentiate between the 'S.Y.' (Syrian) and the 'J-dub' (J-double-U, i.e. Jew). This self-differentiation was partially reciprocated. One Syrian Jew told of how he had been praying in an Ashkenazi synagogue in Chicago. His neighbour began to talk to him in Yiddish. When the Syrian said that he did not speak the language, the other man asked him if he was Jewish, even though he was wearing the prayer-shawl and phylacteries of an Orthodox Jew.

While the Syrian Jews in Brooklyn identify themselves as Sephardim, they have relatively little contact with other Sephardi and Middle Eastern Jewish groups in New York, such as the Yemenites, the Bukharians, and the Greco-Turkish Ladino-speakers.³⁴ Part of this is explained by the fact that these other groups tend to live in different neighbourhoods and speak different languages.

Ashkenazim say that, at one time, Syrian Jews would not permit their children to marry non-Syrians, particularly Ashkenazim. It is said that they mourned children who married Ashkenazi Jews as if they were dead (or had married non-Jews). A Syrian Jew in Jerusalem, who seems to have mirrored the rationalization of these American Syrians, said that in America one had to be careful about marrying American Jews, because some may not be truly Jewish. Despite this disinclination, there are many marriages today between Syrian Jews who remain in the Syrian group and Ashkenazi Jews. According to one Ashkenazi rabbi serving a Syrian congregation in 1963, between one-quarter and one-half of the Syrians who marry marry Ashkenazim.

One Syrian informant asserted that more Syrian girls marry Ashkenazi men than vice versa. He said that Ashkenazi men made better husbands and that Syrian girls from poorer families or who were less good-looking had difficulty in marrying Syrian men. In the case of the

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former, they would not bring a good dowry with them. If a Syrian girl were unwed by twenty years of age, she was practically an 'old maid' and frequently would have to marry an Ashkenazi. Syrian men, on the other hand, waited until they were in their late twenties or so and married younger girls.

The adoption of the American dating pattern has also encouraged some marriage with Ashkenazi girls. One Syrian man said that if you dated a Syrian girl more than once, you were practically engaged. Since many Syrian men did not care for this pattern, they dated Ashkenazi girls and sometimes married them.

The widespread adoption of American Jewish patterns which was mentioned above is an indication of salience of the Ashkenazi norms for Syrians. Close relationships may exist in the schools. Because of their neighbourhoods, Syrian children go to schools with the descendants of European Jews and Italians. While there is one Syrian Jewish day school, it is run on the model of American Orthodox Jewish dayschools, and some Syrians go to other American Jewish day schools. Thus one can see a pattern of imitation and parallel. It has even gone so far that there is one kasher delicatessen on American Ashkenazi lines owned by a Syrian Jew that does not have any peculiarly Middle Eastern items on the menu. The clientele, however, seems to include both Syrians and Ashkenazim.

e. Boundaries and peripheral members

So far, the Syrian Jewish community has been discussed as if it were a single entity. The boundaries of the community, however, are neither simple nor clear-cut. A discussion of peripheral members will bring out these features, in addition to the permeability of the group and the fact that it is not always significant in the lives of potential and peripheral members.

Even for fully participating members of the community, the division between the larger Aleppo group and the smaller group of Damascus origin persists. Each group talks about itself as 'Syrian Jews' and the others are called *Halabiye* (Aleppines) or *Shaami* (*Shawaam*, Damascenes). The Damascus Jews have a separate congregation, although there is a great deal of contact between the two groups.

The 'peripheral' and 'potential' members may be seen as being a very mixed aggregate. Some are individuals who have married Ashkenazim and participate rarely in the community, although they live in the neighbourhood. Some are Syrians who live far away from Brooklyn or any other place where there are many Syrian Jews, but would participate if they lived close by. Some have deliberately chosen non-commercial occupations and live in Manhattan or elsewhere and participate solely in kin assemblies such as weddings and Bar Mitzvah celebrations.

This last group includes American-born persons who have chosen

intellectual occupations, often against the wishes of their parents. They are un-religious and do not necessarily participate in general Jewish affairs. This, of course, may vary. The Syrian identification is ambiguous, and such people are not participating members of a Syrian community. For the children of such individuals, Syrianness will merely be an exotic part of their ancestry, whereas for the child of a Syrian-Ashkenazi marriage who has himself participated in the community, Syrianness may be quite important in his identification and group membership.

In the highly charged ethnic politics of New York City, Syrian Jewish identification became an issue in an unexpected way. When William Haddad made a bid for the Democratic nomination for Congressman from a Manhattan district with a large Jewish population, his opponents' supporters evidently suggested that he was an Arab. Up to this point, Haddad had never emphasized his Jewishness and had married a non-Jewish woman. Now, however, he took every opportunity to emphasize that he was a Syrian Jew.³⁵ While Haddad could be considered to be thoroughly assimilated, in one sense, he still was a Syrian Jew.

Although the Syrian Jewish identification is still highly significant in the lives of participating (and rebelling) members of the Syrian Jewish community, it is no longer rigidly bounded. The question of who and what is a Syrian Jew has its complications. The boundaries of the community are permeable, although it is unlikely, under ordinary circumstances, that the child of a marriage between a Syrian Jew and a Gentile would be fully accepted into the community. While there is some organizational cohesiveness, this ethnic group can best be seen as a series of individual-based coalitions in which ethnicity is still quite important, but not coincident with all other boundaries.

IV. SYRIAN JEWS IN JERUSALEM

a. Background

Since there have been constant contacts between Palestine and Syria, any date chosen for beginning a discussion of Syrian Jews in present-day Jerusalem is arbitrary. It appears, however, that there was a substantial migration to Jerusalem by Syrian rabbis around the end of the nineteenth century. Patai³⁶ records the registration of an Aleppo 'community' with the authorities in 1880. It is not quite clear how comprehensive the authority of such communal structures was, but this date coincides with the migration mentioned. This was part of the Jewish migration to Palestine in the nineteenth century which coincided with the beginnings of the Zionist movement and Protestant Templar movement, although most of the migrants to Jerusalem were motivated by traditional Jewish religious values, rather than by the new nationalistic movements.

Small groups of Syrian Jews continued to emigrate to Palestine in

the years preceding 1930. The migration stopped during the First World War and many, in fact, returned to Syria; but then it continued again during the British Mandate. As Arab nationalism and Zionism came into conflict, the increasing pressure on Jews in Syria made for greater migration. While some of these Jews had been part of the small Zionist movement in Damascus, most of the 'pioneers' went to kibbutzim in the Galilee and not to Jerusalem.³⁷

For Israel, our statistics are the best. Before 1948, about 9,100 immigrants from Syria and Lebanon had emigrated to Palestine (presumably this figure includes many who were illegal immigrants), while 5,660 immigrants came from Syria and Lebanon between 1948 and 1958.³⁸ The majority of these came before 1951. Many of the Lebanese immigrants were themselves descendants of Aleppo and Damascus Jews. In the Jerusalem census of 1939, there were 1,996 Syrian Jews (by communal, rather than national, identification), 1,777 of them being of Aleppine and North Syrian origin and the remainder of Damascene origin. In the same year, there were 1,763 Syrian and former Syrian nationals among the Jews of Jerusalem. In 1939, out of the 451 Syrian nationals resident in Jerusalem, 221 had been in Palestine between five and ten years. Of the 1,312 Palestinian nationals of former Syrian nationality, over 35 per cent had been in Palestine more than five years. It thus appears that most of the Syrians in Jerusalem had come in the decade preceding 1939.³⁹ In the 1956 census of Jerusalem, conducted by Schmelz, there were 3,166 Syrians, including the descendants of Syrian immigrants. Schmelz did not differentiate between Aleppo (Halebi) and Damascus Jews, but since the 1939 census shows more Aleppo Jews and there are more Aleppo than Damascus synagogues, the Halebi group appeared to account for the vast majority of Syrian Jews. All but 125 of these were veteran residents (pre-1948 immigrants) and natives of Palestine-Israel.⁴⁰ There is no indication as to how many of these had lived in Jerusalem continuously or the extent of further emigration from Israel by Syrians.

b. The atrophy of ethnic organization

Whereas the Syrian Jews in the United States lead an active life within their own ethnic group, this is not true in Jerusalem in the 1960s. While there have been 'Committees' of the Halebi Jewish group, they have become largely vestigial. There still exist Halebi synagogues, although several of them now have largely non-Halebi worshippers. Otherwise Halebis participate in largely non-Halebi activities side by side with non-Halebis.

The major organizations of most ethnic groups in Israel are those which represent the ethnic group vis-à-vis governmental officials (or their equivalents) and which receive funds and goods from members overseas. Some such organizations, in addition, maintain recreational

and other activities for members. The Halebi Committee in Jerusalem during the height of its activity primarily served the purpose of redistribution, receiving funds from Aleppo Jews in the United States and elsewhere and distributing them to the needy in Jerusalem.

Because of various disagreements and the retirement of the head of the organization, the last Committee became inactive. A number of women who were wives of prominent Halebis decided to take over some of the functions. According to informants, they hired the man who had helped the Committee to distribute goods to serve their 'Women's Committee', and they have continued to receive certain goods, though their work has been limited to minor philanthropy and help in dealing with governmental welfare workers.

The Committee was self-appointed, not elected. Its activities were limited. At no time was it a burial society, a recreational association, or a political organization. While other immigrants' organizations and ethnic group associations have served such wider functions, that of the Halebi group in Jerusalem has not. Even the court of Halebi rabbis which has existed for over half a century is only called in to adjudicate cases with regard to one synagogue. This synagogue was endowed by a Halebi family in one of the older quarters of the New City of Jerusalem. Part of the stipulations of the endowment was a provision that the affairs of the synagogue were to be in the hands of the 'Court of the Rabbis of Aram Sobah (Aleppo) in Jerusalem'. Even though many of the worshippers in the synagogue are no longer of Aleppine origin, three Aleppine rabbis form an *ad hoc* court when issues arise which require it.

The fact that the Aleppine Jews do not have strong parallel ethnic organizations does not mean that they have given up communal activity.⁴¹ The leaders who were active in Aleppine organizations have always participated in activities on behalf of all Middle Eastern Jews in Jerusalem, Aleppine rabbis have served as part of the Sephardi rabbinate, and communal leaders have participated in a Sephardi rabbinical academy in Jerusalem. Younger Halebis have been active in government and in political parties. What is lacking is the specifically Syrian, or Halebi, orientation found in New York.

c. Occupational diversification

Whereas the Syrian Jews in New York are generally in a limited number of occupations, particularly certain lines of retail and wholesale trade, the Syrians of Jerusalem have become increasingly diversified. In Gurevich's 1939 study of the Jewish population of Jerusalem, the greatest number of Syrian Jews were still in the categories he calls Industry and Trades, Finance and Commerce, and Domestic Work (mostly done by women).⁴² In my own interviewing, I found an increasing number of persons in clerical, especially governmental, occupations—most of whose fathers had been merchants, shopkeepers, or

rabbis. This is especially understandable since one of Jerusalem's main economic supports is the government, because it is the capital city.⁴³

Even those who continue to run their own businesses are not specialized in any one line. One finds restaurant owners, real estate agents, printers, proprietors of a paper factory, electricians, and goldsmiths, as well as drapery merchants. Most of these enterprises are modest in size, usually being small shops. One also finds individuals in the building crafts and lorry drivers. For a small ethnic group, such diversity prevents a certain inter-relatedness which has existed in Syria and New York. Together with the lack of parallel institutions, it is a sign of 'institutional dispersal'.⁴⁴

d. Patterns of residence, marriage, and social life

Most of the Syrian Jews in Jerusalem live in the older sections of the New City. They live in areas bordering the market called Mahaneh Yehudah. The areas in which they have been concentrated are within a quarter of an hour's walk of one another. In none of these areas are Syrian Jews the majority, nor do a majority of Syrians live in any one of these areas. While these small 'neighbourhoods' (the Hebrew term for neighbourhood is *shekhunah*) may appear to be such in name only, they do have their own character, and several are identified with particular ethnic groups. The Urfali group, for instance, is concentrated in one such 'neighbourhood' with nearly 1,600 Urfalis out of nearly 1,800 in 1956 living in one neighbourhood. Like the Halebis, the Urfalis are pre-1948 residents of Jerusalem, yet they have remained concentrated in one area. There is also an increasing tendency for Syrians (unlike the Urfalis) to live in the newer neighbourhoods of New Jerusalem.⁴⁵

The relative dispersal indicated by the residential pattern of the Syrian group is found in their patterns of marriage. Israeli marriage statistics indicate only the place of birth of bride and groom, not their origin. The Syrians in Jerusalem who are of marrying age are often Israeli-born and are part of the Israeli-born Oriental category. The number of marriages for Syrian-born brides and grooms will be given for the country as a whole, but the enumerations fit my impressions of the marital patterns of Jerusalem Halebis. In 1956, out of 202 grooms, only 30.7 per cent married brides born in Syria and Lebanon, and 26.7 per cent married Israeli-born brides of Middle Eastern origin, while 6 per cent married brides of European origin. In the same year, out of 169 brides born in Syria and Lebanon, 36.7 per cent married grooms of Syro-Lebanese birth, 16 per cent of Israeli-Middle Eastern origin, and 18.8 per cent of European origin. The remainder married non-Syrians of Middle Eastern origin. In 1961, the percentage of brides marrying Syro-Lebanese-born men was 25.3. In 1961, the percentage of grooms

marrying brides of various European origins was 8.8, while that of brides marrying grooms of European origin was 15.8.⁴⁶

These statistics are crude and they do not indicate in-group marriages with persons of Syrian origin from America, Egypt, or Turkey, and they hide out-group marriages with Lebanese or Syrian-born persons whose parents came from other areas, or even marriages between Halebis and Damascenes. Still, they indicate that, at the most, if we generously count all marriages with Israeli Orientals as being 'in-group', no more than 60 per cent of the marriages are within the Syrian group. The low percentage of marriages out of the Middle Eastern group suggests a fusion of Syrians with other Middle Eastern Jews into a larger Sephardi-Oriental segment of Israeli society.

The high percentage of intermarriages outside the Syrian group but with other Sephardi-Oriental Jews is part of the increasing interaction and fusion of the Syrians with other Jews. As has been indicated, Halebi synagogues and families both now contain non-Halebi participants and members. Apart from these two institutions, there are no identifiably Syrian organizations. Even Syrian cultural complexes, particularly the singing of *baqashot*,⁴⁷ are now part of a general Middle Eastern Jewish heritage and are given recognition by such institutions as the Museum of Ethnology and Folklore in Haifa and the Israel Broadcasting Corporation (Qol Yisrael).

The organizations in which Syrian Jews participate are groups in which other Jews of either Middle Eastern descent only or of mixed European and Middle Eastern descent are active. Political parties, religious groups, social organizations, and the like are of this type. In informal social gatherings, most Syrian Jews find themselves together with both other Syrians and other Middle Easterners. Some participate in more mixed groupings. The situation is one which is individual-oriented. Interaction with non-Jews is minimal, because very few non-Jews live in New Jerusalem and the social boundary between Arabs and Jews in Israel is sharp.

e. The question of boundaries

The boundary between Jews and Arabs in Israel is relatively simple and clear, as well as being impermeable and significant, in that it affects all interaction. On the other hand, the division between different groups of Jews is more complicated. If we look at it from the vantage point of Syrian Jews in Jerusalem, we find that a person of Syrian origin is a member of his origin-group by previous residence in a certain city, for example, Aleppo or Damascus. He is sometimes placed into a larger aggregate of Arabic- and Persian-speaking 'Oriental' Jews, usually, but not always, classed together with Sephardi Jews. This aggregate is divided between native-born, veteran residents, and new immigrants.

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The division between Syrians and others is less significant than the more general division between Middle Eastern and European Jews, or between new immigrants and veteran residents and natives, both in activities and in speech. Many Jews of Syrian origin are not even recognized by acquaintances as being Syrian Jews. This, it should be added, is not necessarily the case with other groupings, such as Iraqi, Yemenite, and Moroccan Jews. Although the rate of intermarriage⁴⁸ among Middle Eastern Jews is low, it is sufficient to indicate the permeability of this highly significant boundary.

V. CONCLUSION

In this article, I have described the boundaries and groupings which Jews of Syrian origin have formed in three different situations. In the Syria of the late Ottoman and Mandatory periods, Jews lived as a distinctive corporate group which had simple and clear boundaries with its neighbours, boundaries which were significant and impermeable. These boundaries were, however, permeable by foreign Jews who might become residents in Syria. In the American and Israeli situations, the permeable boundary with other Jewish groups has become much more significant, but remains complex. The Syrian Jewish group, as such, is no longer corporate and is based on 'individual-based coalitions'.

In Syria, the cohesion of the Jewish community was based, it appears to me, on the congruence of the boundaries with economic specialization, group endogamy, and conformity to group norms enforced by the leadership of the Jewish community. In New York, the occupational specialization and interdependence of Syrian Jews makes the Syrian group relatively cohesive, despite extensive acculturation and a shift from corporate organization to individual coalitions. The growth of parallel organizations has accompanied this. In Jerusalem, the presence of culturally similar Middle Eastern Jews, the lack of occupational specialization, and the lack of parallel ethnic organizations have been coupled with nationalistic movements which have sundered ties between Arabic-speaking Jews and their Arab neighbours. The Zionist movement mobilized Jews of all origins into one grouping.

While the boundary between Middle Eastern and European Jews in Israel continues to be highly significant, the common-religious-cultural-ethnic bond remains, and integration continues to be a goal. The boundary between Syrian and other Middle Eastern Jews, unsupported by economic rewards and strong organizations, has become vague and insignificant.

Wolf's suggestion that the corporate organization of kin and village groups is related to a pre-modern economy may be applicable to ethnic groups as well.⁴⁹ It must, however, be qualified by virtue of the fact that modern nation-states may be viewed as a kind of corporate ethnic

group-organization. As the significance of the Jewish tie in all three situations shows, values, sentiments, and other residues of experiences also play a role in determining with which group a particular ethnic group will fuse or assimilate.

NOTES

¹ Stanley A. Freed, 'Suggested Type Societies in Acculturation Studies', *American Anthropologist*, LVI (1954), 55-68; James A. Clifton, 'The Southern Ute as a Fixed Membership Group', *Human Organization*, 25:4 (1966), pp. 310-27; Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, New York, 1964.

² The author acknowledges the support of research grants and fellowships from Columbia University, the Ford Foundation Foreign Area Training Fellowship Program, and the National Institute of Mental Health (MPM-11, 926) in this research. A more comprehensive treatment of certain aspects of the material in this article will be found in Walter P. Zenner, *Syrian Jewish Identification in Israel*, doctoral dissertation, Columbia University Department of Anthropology, 1965 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc. No. 66-8536).

³ Eric Wolf, 'Kinship, Friendship and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies', *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies* (Michael Banton, ed.), Conference on New Approaches in Social Anthropology, Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth, London, 1966, pp. 1-22.

⁴ On the other immigrants from Syria, see M. Berger, 'America's Syrian Community', *Commentary*, 25 (April 1958) pp. 413-23, and R. B. Winder, 'The Lebanese in West Africa', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IV:3, pp. 296-333.

⁵ 'Aleppo', in *Jewish Encyclopedia*, New York, 1903, I, p. 338; 'Damascus', *ibid.*, IV, pp. 415-21. These traditions were repeated by my informants.

⁶ Bernard Lewis, 'Notes and Documents from the Turkish Archives', *Oriental Notes and Studies*, No. 3, Israel Oriental Society, Jerusalem, 1952.

⁷ From older informants from Aleppo in Jerusalem.

⁸ E. N. Adler, *Jews in Many Lands*, Philadelphia, 1905, p. 166. 'Aleppo' in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Berlin, 1928.

⁹ Joseph B. Schechtman, *On Wings of Eagles*, New York, 1961, p. 132.

¹⁰ David Laniado, *LaQedoshim asher Ba-aref*, Jerusalem, 5712 [1951-52], p. 164. S. E. Dwek, *Emet meEref*, Jerusalem 5670 [1909-10], p. 11b. These cases came up for rabbinic adjudication during Mohammed Ali's occupation of Syria (1832-40), which is the period of the case recorded by Laniado.

¹¹ Alexander Lutzky, 'The *Francos* and the Effects of the Capitulations on Jews of Aleppo', *Zion*, VI, 1940, pp. 46-79 (Hebrew).

¹² On the *Kashaaf*, see Elijah Shamaa HaLevi, *Qorban Ishah*, Leghorn, 5581 [1820-217], Case No. 37, p. 70a, and Case No. 33, pp. 58b-70a. The Works of Shamaa and of S. E. Dwek (op. cit.) are examples of rabbinic legal responsa. This genre of legal writing is described fully by Solomon Freehof, *The Responsa Literature*, Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1955. Along with ethical works, the responsa (which are like case-books) constitute a major source of Jewish social history.

On the Farhi family, see I. Ben-Zvi in *The Jews: Their History, Culture, Religion*, ed. L. Finkelstein, Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1960, 3rd ed., pp. 662-3; and Sheikh al-Maghribi, 'The Jews of Damascus 100 Years Ago', *Revue de l'Académie Arabe*, IX, 1929, pp. 641-54 (Arabic).

¹³ Moshe Rabi, 'By Virtue of Having Saved Lives', *BaMa'arakkah*, Jerusalem, The Sephardi Council, VI (Dec. 1966), 8, pp. 14-15 (Hebrew).

¹⁴ A. J. Braver, 'New Material on the Damascus Blood Libel', *Sefer HaYovel Le Professor S. Krauss*, Jerusalem, 1936, pp. 261-302 (Hebrew).

¹⁵ S. W. Baron, *The Jewish Community*, Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1942, I, p. 199; Zenner, op. cit., pp. 50-2, 68-70.

¹⁶ Shamaa, op. cit., passim (cf. note 12); Solomon Laniado, *Bet Dino shel Shelomo*, Constantinople, 5535 [1774-5];

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S. Dwek, op. cit.; I. Dayan, *Imre No'am*, Aleppo, 5663 [1902-3]; Isaac Abulafia, *Pene Yisrahel*, I, Aleppo, 5631 [1870-1]; II, Leghorn, 5646 [1885-6]; III and IV, Izmir, 5647 [1886-7]; V, Izmir, 5657 [1896-7]; VI, Jerusalem, 5669 [1908-9].

¹⁷ E.g. I. Dayan, op. cit., *Hoshen Mishpat* Section, Case 29, pp. 45a ff.

¹⁸ J. S. Dwek, *Derekh Emunah*, Aleppo, 5674 [1913-14].

¹⁹ A. J. Braver, 'The Jews of Damascus After the Blood Libel of 1840', *Zion*, X (1945-6), pp. 83-108 (Hebrew with English abstracts).

²⁰ Laniado, op. cit. (see note 10 above), p. 165.

²¹ A. Abbas, 'The Halutz Movement in Syria and Lebanon', *Shevet ve'Am*, III, The Sephardi Council of Jerusalem, 1958, pp. 113-23 (Hebrew).

²² Alexander Russell, *The Natural History of Aleppo*, London, 1794, 2nd ed., pp. 69-70. Isabel Burton, *The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine and the Holy Land*, London, 1879, pp. 102 ff, 129.

²³ Braver, op. cit. (see note 14 above). S. W. Baron, 'The Jews and the Syrian Massacres of 1860', *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, New York, 1933, pp. 3-31.

²⁴ In the analysis of boundaries, I shall use criteria suggested by Maurice Richter. The four variables suggested are simplicity of boundary, clarity, permeability, and significance.

²⁵ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. T. Parsons, New York, 1947, pp. 145-57.

²⁶ E. Wolf, op. cit. (see note 3 above). Also see G. Sjöberg, *The Pre-Industrial City*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1960, pp. 324-5.

²⁷ The term 'Sephardi' (plural, Sephardim), originally meant Jews from the Iberian peninsula, which was called Sepharad by Medieval Jews, whereas Germany was called Ashkenaz. Today the term 'Sephardim' has become expanded in meaning to include the vast majority of Jews who are not of Ashkenazi origin (i.e. from Germany and Eastern Europe).

²⁸ Berger, op. cit. (see note 5 above).

²⁹ J. Campeas, 'A Birdseye View of the Magen David Congregation', *American Sephardi* (Yeshiva University), I, Dec. 1966, pp. 9-11. L. C. Miller, *A Study of the Syrian Population of Greater New York*, New York, n.d. (ca. 1903).

³⁰ One study of a Jewish community with many Syrian Jews is Celia Stopnicka

Rosenthal, 'The Jews of Barranquilla', *Jewish Social Studies*, XVIII, Oct. 1956, pp. 262-274.

³¹ Wolf, op. cit. (see note 3 above).

³² Michael Steinhardt, *A Minority within a Minority*, unpublished typescript of a B.A. Honors thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania. (I have a portion of this thesis on microfilm in my possession, W.P.Z.) The information in this section which is unspecified as to source is from informants and from my own observations.

³³ Steinhardt, op. cit.; Campeas, op. cit.; B. Seruya, 'History of the Syrian-Sephardic Community in America', *Nir*, Annual, Teachers Institute, Yeshiva University, N.Y., 1952, pp. 89-92. (Hebrew): L. Herling, *Study of Retardation with Special Regard to the Status of Syrians*, Columbia University, Department of Sociology, unpublished Master's Thesis, 1929.

³⁴ The American-born Syrian Jew still has some knowledge of colloquial Syrian Arabic and uses it for telling jokes, in particular.

³⁵ R. W. Apple, Jr. 'Haddad-Farbstein Campaign Draws Attention to Syrian Jews', *New York Times*, 1 June 1964, p. 21.

³⁶ R. Patai, *Israel Between East and West*, Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1953, pp. 82-3.

³⁷ Abbas, op. cit. (see note 21 above).

³⁸ J. Schechtman, op. cit. (see note 9 above).

³⁹ D. Gurevich, *The Jewish Population of Jerusalem*, The Jewish Agency, Jerusalem, 1940.

⁴⁰ Data supplied to author by O. Schmelz, fully tabulated in Zenner, op. cit. (see note 2 above), pp. 135-9.

⁴¹ The phrase 'parallel ethnic institutions' is from L. Broom and J. Kitsuse, 'The Validation of Acculturation', *American Anthropologist*, 57, 1955, pp. 44-8.

⁴² D. Gurevich, op. cit. Also in Patai, op. cit., p. 90.

⁴³ Zenner, op. cit., p. 175; O. Schmelz, 'The Development of the Jewish Population of Jerusalem during the Last Hundred Years', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, II, 1960, pp. 56-73.

⁴⁴ The phrase 'institutional dispersal' is derived from S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, London, 1954, pp. 11, 13. ⁴⁵ See note 40 above.

⁴⁶ Data supplied to the author by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel);

tabulations are to be found in Zenner, op. cit. (see note 2 above), pp. 383-90.

⁴⁷ W. P. Zenner, 'Ambivalence and Self-Image Among Oriental Jews', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, V, 1963, pp. 215-23. *Baqashot* are Hebrew songs sung according to Arabic musical modes. These songs are sung during the winter in the synagogue from 2 a.m. until the Sabbath morning prayers begin.

⁴⁸ In 1960, 14.5 per cent of all marriages were between European and Middle Eastern Jews. For a fuller evaluation of these statistics and the general situation, see A. Weingrod, *Israel: Group Relations in a New Society*, New York and London, Institute of Race Relations, 1965.

⁴⁹ See note 3 above.

ANTWERP JEWRY TODAY*

Jacques Gutwirth

1. *Introduction*

ANTWERP¹ is one of the largest ports in the world and a major centre of commerce and industry; it has 550,000² inhabitants, of whom some 10,500 are Jews. Unlike the case in many other cities, the large majority of these are, religiously, culturally, and socially, deeply aware of being Jewish. Religion influences the life of every Jew and the observant are many. About 11-12 per cent of the city's Jewish households are adherents of the ultra-Orthodox Hassidic movement. About 85 per cent of all the children attend Jewish schools full time. The Jews who are not observant, as well as those who are agnostics, actively take part in organizations and associations concerned with Jewish political, philanthropic, recreational, or cultural movements.

This intense Jewish identity has in some measure resulted from the events of the Second World War. A further factor is the concentration of the city's Jews in one particular occupation—the diamond trade and industry. This specialization is not accidental, nor is it of recent origin.

2. *Historical outline*

In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, a few dozen Marranos of Portuguese and Spanish origin³ lived in Antwerp, which even then was an important thoroughfare for international trade. During those centuries the Jews engaged in various forms of commerce, but appear to have been especially concerned with the diamond trade. This specialization may have saved them in 1692 from being expelled from the city.⁴ The Spanish and later the Austrian conquerors (who ruled the land until the end of the eighteenth century) were eager to expel the Jews, but local magistrates were reluctant to take such a step;⁵ this tolerance generally endured over the centuries and certainly contributed to the prosperity of the city.⁶

Nevertheless, Jews remained few in number until the end of the nineteenth century: in the whole province of Antwerp there were only 151

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in 1829, and 373 in 1846.⁷ Diamond cutting, which had been a craft practised in the area since the fifteenth century, also expanded little until the end of the nineteenth.

However, from 1900 onwards several thousand Jews were already residents of Antwerp,⁸ and their number steadily increased until the Second World War; the majority were immigrants from eastern and central Europe. They had arrived at the turn of the century with the large flow of immigrants who had stopped in Antwerp on their way to the United States.⁹ The settlement of these Jews in the Belgian port went hand in hand with the expansion of the diamond industry.¹⁰ In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the raw materials had begun to be mined on a large scale in South Africa. However, until the 1920s, Holland—especially Amsterdam—was a much more important diamond trading centre than Antwerp.¹¹ Antwerp acquired diamonds of inferior quality which were cut (for low wages) by peasant-craftsmen of the Antwerp province, and which Jewish immigrants disposed of by trade.¹²

Before the First World War new supplies of raw materials were discovered: in West Africa in 1908 and in the Congo in 1912. The exploitation of these areas was intensified, especially after 1918, and brought on to the world market small diamonds of inferior quality. Because of their size and of their poor quality, they required some special skill in cutting; and the cost of labour was an important factor in the price. The lower Belgian wages, as well as the expertise of Antwerp workers, gave that city an appreciable advantage over Amsterdam. Moreover, in spite of the fact that the British company of De Beers¹³ had acquired a monopoly of the African raw materials, the Antwerp dealers enjoyed one advantage: they had preferential treatment in the buying of diamonds, a large proportion of which were mined in the Congo, a Belgian colony. Finally, Antwerp benefited from the fact that its Jewish dealers (poor immigrants from eastern Europe) were hard-working and had close links with clients throughout the world, the majority of whom were Jewish.¹⁴ These advantages together helped to make Antwerp, from 1918 onwards, the world centre for diamonds. The Belgian city, in spite of some setbacks, has retained this supremacy, while Amsterdam has been steadily losing ground.¹⁵

In the years preceding the Second World War the Jewish population of Antwerp grew steadily, and is estimated to have reached 55,000.¹⁶ However, the German occupation and the ensuing persecutions nearly wiped out the city's Jews. Some of them were able to survive in hiding in Antwerp itself, in the rest of Belgium, or in France; others, especially the rich diamond dealers, managed to escape to more distant lands, but thousands of Jews were deported and perished in Nazi concentration camps.¹⁷

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After the War the Belgian authorities, impelled as much by material as by humanitarian considerations, took active steps to recall the industry's refugees from abroad. The Government also agreed that the port of Antwerp become once again a transit station for Jewish survivors from central and eastern Europe; and, further, several thousand refugees were allowed to settle in the city. In this way, in spite of considerably reduced numbers, a new Jewish community, more closely integrated than before the War, was reconstituted. As a parallel development, the diamond industry regained strength and importance but not the pre-eminent position of the pre-War years; other centres had been developed abroad, often as a result of the settlement of Antwerp Jews who had fled from the War.

During the decade 1957-1966, the number of Jews in the city has remained fairly constant: about 10,000.¹⁸ Twenty-one years after the War, Jewish life exhibits many of its pre-1940 characteristics, but some of these have become more sharply marked: thus, a greater proportion of Jews are now engaged in a shrunken socio-economic sector of the diamond industry and trade. In parallel fashion, daily life has become more turned in upon itself and more dependent upon religious tradition.

3. *Demographic data*

I estimate¹⁹ that in 1966 Antwerp had 10,500 Jews; there were 2,600 to 2,900 households with an average of 3.75 individuals per household. This comparatively large average appears to be due to a high birth rate, especially among observant families. Sixty to seventy per cent of the total population consists of persons who lived in Antwerp before 1940 or who are descended from such residents;²⁰ the remaining number are therefore recent immigrants or the children of these immigrants. Whatever the length of settlement of their parents, the majority of Jews who are less than twenty years old were born in Belgium; so were, of course, many adults. The Jews born abroad, and those who are Belgian-born, can nevertheless be differentiated according to their own country of birth or that of their parents. About 60 per cent are of Polish origin, mainly Galician.²¹ A smaller number (about 20 per cent) are of Hungarian, Rumanian (mainly Transylvanian), and Czech origin, and five to ten per cent are from the Netherlands. Finally, there are small numbers of other foreign descent (Russian, Lithuanian, etc.), as well as a small group of Belgians²² and of Sephardim originally from Greece, Turkey, and the Lebanon.

Nearly all the Dutch Jews had settled in Antwerp before 1940; after 1945, a larger proportion of Hungarians, Rumanians, and Czechs than of Poles arrived. Nowadays the large majority of Antwerp's Jews are Belgian citizens (either by birth or by naturalization);²³ only a small number of immigrants have retained the status of United Nations

Protected Refugees. There are also a few individuals of various other nationalities, including several hundred Israelis.

4. *Language*

Many Antwerp Jews speak the languages of their country of origin, a usual phenomenon among recent immigrants. Nevertheless, the Jews of the city use no fewer than four other languages: Hebrew and Yiddish, which are Jewish languages, and French and Flemish,²⁴ the national languages of Belgium. Hebrew is certainly the least used language colloquially, although it is most intensively taught in the Jewish schools of the city. In fact, the use of Hebrew varies among different groups: for Orthodox Jews and for Hassidim it is essentially a sacred and ancient tongue, that of the liturgy and of the great texts of Judaism, of the Torah in its widest meaning; they employ the Ashkenazi pronunciation. Among other groups, who are less orthodox or traditional, Hebrew is at the same time the language of religion and the living tongue of Israel; and they use the Sephardi pronunciation.²⁵

In the course of many centuries Yiddish has been closely linked with the religious and cultural life of the Jews of eastern and central Europe. In Antwerp it is used for Talmudic commentaries among orthodox and Hassidic Jews; moreover, for these Jews and for many others, Yiddish is also the language of daily life. There is a very lively wit expressed in this medium to underline major and minor events; this is especially so in the diamond world.²⁶ Indeed, Yiddish is pre-eminently the language in which business is transacted, both at the local and at the international levels. As a result, many Jews who were ignorant of the language (for example, the Dutch), as well as some non-Jewish Flemings, have learnt to speak Yiddish with some degree of fluency. The language, being closely linked with religious and economic activities, has remained a living tongue, even among young Belgian-born Jews—a truly remarkable phenomenon since, in sharp contrast to the other three languages, there is very little formal teaching of Yiddish.²⁷

Finally, we must consider the two official Belgian languages: in the Flemish regions, French has been the language of the dominant classes (including the trading and industrial middle class), and many Jews used to speak French rather than Flemish. However, in the last decade, Flemish has gained ground generally and among Jews.²⁸

The language pattern is obviously very intricate. The linguistic kaleidoscope reflects the intermingling at many levels of the different groupings. These groupings enclose one another and yet at the same time overlap. At the heart of the complex there is a mainly religious core whose language is Hebrew, linked through Yiddish into the economic community which itself is tied in with French in the upper social strata; finally, Flemish (the common language of the region)

serves to integrate the Jewish community within the larger national society.

5. *Economic activities*

Before 1940, Antwerp Jews were not exclusively engaged in the diamond industry. There was a large minority of artisans, small business men and employees in various fields. The artisans had their guild, *Jidische Handwerkerverein*; there were branches for bakers, butchers, hotel and restaurant workers, hairdressers, plumbers, carpenters, painters, etc. There was also another association for commercial travellers and itinerant salesmen.²⁹ The Jewish unions no longer exist, since the numbers still engaged in these occupations are negligible.

The proportion of Jews in the diamond industry has grown, and continues to grow, many changing their occupations to join the industry. According to my estimate, there is a minority of no more than 20 per cent which earns its living in other ways. Further, it is important to note that about half of this group (that is, 10 per cent of the Jewish population) are engaged in services to their coreligionists in the diamond industry; they are the rabbis, schoolteachers, and kashrut supervisors, and the shopkeepers who sell kasher foodstuffs and other commodities principally bought by Jews. They supply the traditional infrastructure of Jewish communities. Finally, there are Jews in the liberal professions and in businesses and trades not specifically linked to the Jewish community; this group does not exceed 10 per cent of gainfully occupied Jews.

Meanwhile, compared with 1940, there have also been occupational changes in the diamond industry. Before the War Jews were engaged in the four main occupations of cleavers, sawers, millers, and polishers.³⁰ (These crafts help to transform a rough diamond into a brilliant.) Nowadays, they are only cleavers; in fact this skill has become practically a Jewish monopoly. Cleaving is exclusively a craft, while the other three occupations are more mechanized. Cleavers, as wage earners, are paid twice the amount which the other workmen receive; they can, and do, easily move into the sphere of dealers and employers.

On the other hand, there have been no fundamental changes in trading and manufacture. In the field of the import of raw materials and the export of the finished product (gems for jewellery and industrial diamonds),³¹ Jews continue to be engaged mainly as traders and dealers. It is true that many of them, in addition to their commercial interests, are indirectly involved in manufacture, very often through the medium of entrepreneurs. The latter, as well as factory owners—mainly Flemish—run small workshops; fifty workmen are considered a large number for such workshops, and there are many scattered smaller units.

There are technical and economic reasons which account for this

situation. The four phases require specialist skills which have been mechanized only to a small extent, in spite of some technical advances.³² Consequently, there is no need for large capital investment in machinery, and independent workshops can therefore be established with comparative ease. Further, world-wide competition has led to a paradoxical situation: the Antwerp industry is driven to use to an exceptional extent the most manual technique—that of cleaving. For cleaving is a craft which requires the minimum of tools and which can be carried out in any ordinary room. Moreover, cleaving represents one of the principal factors in the costing of the finished article.

In the diamond industry, therefore, there are no large manufacturers monopolizing production and marketing. On the contrary, it is the merchants (mainly some dozen importers of rough diamonds) and, secondarily, the buyers and exporters of gems and of industrial diamonds, who rule the market. These merchants, most of whom are Jews, enjoy a position of great prestige and their social status reflects the superiority of commercial or merchant capital over industrial capital.³³ Thus, this traditional small-scale industry flourishes in the midst of a highly industrialized society.³⁴ Dealing also follows traditional methods; bargaining plays a very important part, buyers and sellers having constantly to negotiate closely. These methods remain adequate owing to factors closely linked to the nature of diamonds: unlike gold or silver, diamonds are not an immutable raw material, even when they are classified according to firm criteria. Many of the factors (colour, purity, quality, sparkle) require a subjective appreciation. Moreover, especially in the case of rough diamonds, their eventual optimal value largely depends on one or more of the different technical processes—for instance, sawing or cleaving. Other things being equal (for instance, outlets and capital), there is a further important factor—shrewdness and skill. The situation differs greatly from that found in mechanized factories with standardized methods of production. Thus, even in the case of industrial diamonds, the expertise and the personal judgement of buyers are qualities which derive nearly always from intuition and from empirical assessment. Under the circumstances, there is usually very close bargaining, with buyer and seller hoping to win a point or two by fault-finding. Finally, one must bear in mind that the price of diamonds is subject to speculation and to rapid market fluctuation.

6. Occupational structure and the Jewish way of life

A substantial proportion of all diamond transactions take place in the buildings of four diamond Exchanges which, together with commercial offices and some of the workshops, are concentrated within a small perimeter, known as the 'Pelikanstraat' district, in the heart of Antwerp and close to the headquarters of several Jewish businesses and Jewish communal associations. The three principal Exchanges have

respectively 1,500, 1,600, and 1,700 members—all men. (Often, one individual is a member of two, or even of three, Exchanges.) In these three Exchanges are concentrated the major part of business transactions; the Jewish membership varies from 70 to 83 per cent. The Flemish manufacturers and contractors do not attend regularly, while a small number of non-Jewish foreign buyers are seen only for short periods; thus it is mainly Jewish dealers and brokers who frequent the Exchanges. Diamond brokers, whose role as intermediaries should not be underestimated, are almost exclusively Jewish.

The large rectangular halls of the three main Exchanges have lofty ceilings, with a north wall entirely made of glass to provide a neutral light for the examination of diamonds. Although these Exchanges have points of similarity, there are variations in the membership and in the type of business transacted. We shall mention here only the two most active Exchanges—which are, moreover, those with the largest percentage of Jewish members: more than 80 per cent in each case. The *Beurs voor Diamanthandel* (Diamond Exchange) is the most lively and it is also the greatest international centre for dealings in cut diamonds. The *Diamantkring* (usually known as the *Kring*) deals almost exclusively in rough diamonds, both industrial diamonds and stones intended for gems. The *Beurs* is the main outlet for the export trade (the United States being the principal importer), whereas the *Kring*, although it has some export dealings (chiefly in industrial diamonds), serves mainly as a distribution channel to Antwerp's workshops of the raw product imported from the producing countries. It is not very easy to distinguish Jew from non-Jew in the *Beurs*; all members wear western-style clothes, usually with great elegance, and it is rare to see men with hats. In contrast, at the *Kring*, there are great numbers who wear beards, side-locks, and gaberdines. My statistical enquiry reveals that, although there is only a minority of recent immigrants in both Exchanges, the percentage of these is nevertheless higher in the *Kring*. The most orthodox Jews deal mainly in local markets. Moreover, the influence of orthodox Jewish life is much more noticeable in the *Kring* and in the rough diamond trade than it is in the *Beurs* and in dealings in cut diamonds. The hall of the *Kring* is deserted on Saturdays (and in the winter also on Friday afternoons); whereas at the *Beurs* on these days, while there is less activity, there are still appreciable numbers.⁸⁵ On the other hand, on Jewish high holidays both Exchanges are practically empty, while on Yom Kippur they are automatically closed.

The Exchanges are not simply trading centres; they are also forums of Jewish life, where members discuss and comment on the most diverse matters. So it comes about that in the course of informal conversation, decisions are reached and later formally approved by committees of various religious institutions as well as philanthropic, cultural, political, and recreational associations. These institutions and

associations constitute a vast network which, with various branches and off-shoots, catches up the overwhelming majority of Antwerp Jewry. There is a close interdependence between economic and social life; the prosperity of the former helps the latter to flourish, and those who have eminent positions in industry are often also the leaders of the various associations.

7. *Religious life*

Two religious communities, each with a membership of a little more than a thousand households, are in chief control of the religious life of Antwerp's Jewry. One, *Machsike Hadass* ('Defenders of the Faith'), is orthodox, while the other, *Shomer Hadass* ('Guardian of the Faith'), is conservative. However, it must be pointed out that these definitions (which approximate to American usage) are not as precise as might appear. The orthodoxy of the *Machsike Hadass* is much closer to the ultra-orthodoxy of the Hassidim who are members of, and who influence, the community; while the *Shomer Hadass* is so rigorously traditional that it is very similar to the orthodox community of Brussels or of other western cities.

Each community has its own synagogues and *bate midrash*, but they share a common *mikva* (ritual bath); each has its own abattoir for the ritual slaughtering of cattle and poultry; each also has its own kashrut supervisors in shops and restaurants. The revenue of each community is derived in part from the taxes paid for kashrut supervision, from members' subscriptions, and from various donations collected at religious ceremonies. Other sources of revenue are the fees paid for marriages and burials,³⁶ rites to which the overwhelming majority of Antwerp's Jews adhere, whatever the intensity of their religious beliefs.

The Rabbis, assisted by a *Dayan* (assessor), in addition to their spiritual and religious functions, play a comparatively important juridical role. When they sit as a rabbinical tribunal (*Beth Din*), often with the assistance of arbitrators, they give judgement on suits some of which might be within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Many Antwerp Jews, even those who are not observant, prefer to submit to this internal jurisdiction, founded on principles of traditional Jewish laws which do not always coincide with the civil law of the country. However, there are many conflicts which, for various reasons, cannot be settled by the civil courts; in such cases only traditional Jewish tribunals can arbitrate. In the rabbinical courts the procedure is essentially that of conciliation; it is understood that the litigants voluntarily submit their cases and that the rabbi and the community can enforce judgement only by means of religious, moral, and social coercion.

The active Hassidic movement stimulates traditionalism in the *Machsike Hadass* and the *Shomer Hadass*. There are, in fact, six small Hassidic communities, deriving from mystical, charismatic, and ultra-

orthodox Hassidism, to which 300-330 households belong—that is, about 11-12 per cent of the total number of Jewish households in the city.³⁷ These Hassidic households can be demographically differentiated from the rest. They are largely made up of post-war immigrants and their children; at least half of them are of Hungarian or Rumanian (mainly Transylvanian) origin. The Hassidim lead an intensely traditional religious life, and are easily distinguished by their appearance: the men often have long beards, sidelocks, and other peculiarities of Hassidic wear such as gaberdines and fur hats (*shtraimel*). The women often wear a *shaitel* (wig) and dresses with long sleeves. The Hassidim constitute the vanguard of the orthodox community, to which they are mainly affiliated.

The various Hassidic communities differ somewhat in their traditions. Each has its own communal centre, or *Shtiebl*, where the members meet and pray. Five of them (the Hassidim of Belz, Ger, Satmare, Chortkow, and Wischnitz) consist each of the followers of a *rebbe*, a charismatic and thaumaturgic *tsadik*, descended from a more or less ancient dynasty. Not one of these *rebbe* lives in Antwerp. (The names of the dynasties are derived from the town where at least the first *rebbe* used to reside; today most of these leaders live in Israel or in the United States.) The sixth community is evidence of the strength of Jewish traditionalism in Antwerp; it has, in fact, been formed around the leadership of a new *rebbe*, Reb Ytsekl (a diminutive of 'Isaac').³⁸ This religious leader was born in eastern Galicia and emigrated to western Europe after the War; he lived in Paris for some years but later settled in Antwerp where his followers had offered him the opportunity of establishing his own *shtiebl*. His community is now flourishing, as are indeed the other Hassidic communities. The Hassidim not only have a polarizing spiritual influence, they also control several important aspects of religious life in Antwerp. It is from the ranks of the Hassidim (the majority of whom are also engaged in the diamond industry) that are recruited most of the kashrut supervisors and also a large number of shopkeepers who sell kosher foodstuffs and items necessary for prayer and ritual.

Finally, Hassidism exerts its influence within the orthodox community itself. Its most faithful adherents, including most of the members of the executive committee, are regular attendants at a *Beth ha-Midrash*, which is greatly influenced by Hassidism. Prayers in this *Beth ha-Midrash* follow the mystical liturgy of Luria; there is observance of the *yahrzeit* (anniversary of the death) of the *Tsadik* of Sanz,³⁹ and many of the faithful claim to be followers of one or other *rebbe*. It is noteworthy that in this *Beth ha-Midrash* which is on the threshold between orthodoxy and Hassidism, the adherents are nearly all pre-War immigrants, in contrast to the situation obtaining in the six Hassidic communities mentioned above.

The intensity of religious life in Antwerp is further accentuated by the fact that the various *bate midrash* and synagogues are nearly all situated within a limited area, close to one another. The followers of various persuasions constantly meet in the heart of a veritable religious microcosm. This religious microcosm, the delimited area of the diamond industry and trade, the location of kasher shops, and the streets where a large number of Jews reside, are entangled to form a geographical continuum, a kind of *shtetl* (a small Jewish town in central or eastern Europe). However, it must be pointed out that there are many Jews who live outside this geographical area; as a general rule they are the least orthodox and the least observant. Nevertheless, even these Jews tend to concentrate in some specific suburbs or clearly delimited localities, while there are many districts from which Jews are virtually absent. Finally, we must not omit to mention a small religious community of a few dozen families, principally of Sephardi origin, who follow the so-called Portuguese ritual.

The various religious communities just described account for at least 80 per cent of Jewish households, and although they do not all engage daily in intense religious activities, they nevertheless play a very important role in the Jewish life of Antwerp; the schools which they sponsor provide the most important evidence of this role.

8. *Jewish schools*

There are four private (fee-paying) day schools and a boarding school, a yeshiva, which together cater for 2,200 students.⁴⁰ The two largest schools are the Tachkemoni and the Jesodeh Hatorah; the former serves the conservative community, and the latter the orthodox. Together they have an enrolment of about 1,800 pupils. Both are recognized and subsidized by the State; their curriculum therefore includes tuition in Flemish in conformity with official requirements, and they both award diplomas equivalent to the diplomas of other schools. But, in addition, these Jewish schools provide tuition in Jewish studies for several hours a day—in fact, in some cases these studies account for more than half the total time spent in school.

The Tachkemoni school (725 pupils) has mixed classes: boys and girls go to a kindergarten, and are later taught the complete official primary and secondary curricula. The Jewish studies include (apart from courses in Biblical and Talmudic commentary) modern Hebrew and the history of contemporary Jewry, especially of Israel. On the other hand, the Jesodeh Hatorah school (1,050 pupils) is much more traditionalist: boys and girls attend separate classes. The girls can have a full secondary education or qualify for a teaching diploma, but there is no provision for a lay secondary education for boys. Moreover, instruction in Jewish studies is almost exclusively limited to religious commentaries in classical Hebrew and in Yiddish. Boys who are over

14 years of age may go to a yeshiva situated in a quiet suburb in a building surrounded by pleasant grounds; the yeshiva has 70 boarders, most of whom come from Antwerp families. All the school buildings are modern and well equipped.

There are two Hassidic schools, with separate accommodation (of course) for boys and girls. About 400 pupils attend these schools. The tuition is markedly traditional in nature, especially for boys; the methods and objectives of the traditional *heder* of eastern Europe are faithfully reproduced. These schools teach only a minimum of lay subjects.

The various schools just described cater for the large majority of the Jewish children of Antwerp—about 85 per cent.⁴¹ These children are, therefore, brought up in an ambience impregnated by religious tradition (in varying degrees) and in isolation from non-Jewish children; but the resulting segregation is voluntary. This state of affairs clearly reflects the concentration and intensity of Jewish life in Antwerp.

9. *Associations*

There are various lay or semi-religious associations which bring together some observant Jews and most of those whose religious commitment is mild or undefined. Philanthropic societies are active in spite of the fact that poverty is practically absent among Antwerp Jews. These societies give assistance to immigrants from central Europe who continue to trickle into Antwerp as transients. Antwerp Jewry is also very proud of its fine old people's home. The community has an international (and well deserved) reputation for generosity; funds are solicited from all over the world for the most diverse causes. The people are faithful to the tradition of *tsedaka* (charity and solidarity), as it was practised in central and eastern Europe.⁴² The philanthropic societies also sponsor functions, including balls and meetings, which are highly valued in some circles.

Political activity lacks intensity, but Zionist feelings are widespread, especially among Jews who are not affiliated to the orthodox or Hassidic movements. (However, most of the orthodox and the Hassidim are not hostile to Israel.) Zionists, whether they be pious, or of the left or of the right, are not very militant; the Zionist movement is mainly a movement of persons merely sympathetic to the cause; Zionist associations do not attract large numbers.

It is not possible here to enumerate the cultural clubs which endure with some degree of success; but it is important to mention the Maccabi, a sports club with well equipped buildings and grounds, which boasts several hundred members. It serves as a centre not only for sports but also for social intercourse; its members are drawn from the least traditional Jews of the city.

10. *General characteristics*

The Maccabi (by drawing together a comparatively assimilated fringe of Jewry) functions as a centre of Jewish social life; but it also leads its members to come into direct, and usually friendly, contact with the Flemish inhabitants in the context of sport. Many Antwerp Jews take part (admittedly, often in the company of Jewish friends) in the various social activities of the city; they go to concerts, theatres, cinemas, and cafés frequented by the general public. The wider society certainly exhibits a number of antisemitic prejudices, but there is practically no organized segregation or discrimination. Nevertheless, the intensity of Jewish life (described in the earlier sections of this paper) leads Antwerp Jews to live in a world of their own, although this is a world without precise frontiers isolating them from the larger society. The community is distantly descended from those communities of central and eastern Europe which flourished from the thirteenth or fourteenth to the eighteenth century when they were organized into *kahalim* obligatorily segregated in a still feudal society.⁴³ Moreover, Antwerp Jews, not only because of their origin but especially because of their way of life, reflect much more faithfully the conditions obtaining in the European *shtetl* in the nineteenth century and to a certain degree in the years preceding the Second World War: the little towns where, in spite of the breaches in the walls which segregated the inhabitants, the atmosphere was impregnated by religious and cultural Jewish tradition.⁴⁴ They are the true heirs of the *shtetl*.

Many historians⁴⁵ have shown that in the late Middle Ages Jews of eastern and central Europe engaged in certain specified occupations as middlemen and also, later, in crafts linked with trade. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries some measure of social and economic stratification arose, especially in the larger cities. In countries where a capitalist economy was only beginning to emerge, the majority of Jews, however, continued both in the large cities and in the small towns or *shtetl* to engage in crafts and in trades and businesses often linked to semi-skilled industries.⁴⁶ As we have seen, the Jews of Antwerp are engaged economically in activities very similar to these; this is no doubt why the immigrants from the *shtetl* were, at the turn of the present century, able to become so easily integrated in the Antwerp diamond trade and industry. It seems, therefore, that the persistence of this community possessed of an intense Jewish identity (an archaic and rare survival in western countries) is related to the perpetuation of techno-economic activities rather similar to those which used to prevail in the *shtetl*.

Although the nature of the diamond industry was favourable to such a survival, nevertheless diamonds played no part in the economy of the *shtetl*, whose inhabitants certainly did not enjoy the prosperity which

today characterizes Antwerp Jewry. As was stated earlier, however, Jews dealt in diamonds in Antwerp and in Amsterdam well before 1900. Diamonds require little space for storage, can be easily hidden or traded, and even in the eleventh century Jews were said to have been engaged in the international trade in diamonds.⁴⁷ Finally, the commerce in cut diamonds was one of several luxury trades in which Jews have played a role throughout the centuries;⁴⁸ at certain periods it was linked to pawnbroking.⁴⁹ The diamond industry nowadays is usually no longer allied to other trades, but diamonds have remained safe assets, easily realizable, and in some respects very similar to gold and hard currency. Because of these advantages, the trade in diamonds is subject to innumerable restrictions and controls both at the local and at the international levels; these restrictions, although they have hindered free circulation, nevertheless have not succeeded in eliminating it (official statistics on the diamond industry far from coincide with the actual facts of the import and export trades).⁵⁰ In such conditions, diamond transactions require a great deal of trust on the part of dealers;⁵¹ trading, moreover, takes place within a comparatively close and limited group: the participants (often linked by friendship) are formed into a loose type of association with its own codes and sets of rules to which they adhere, notwithstanding conflicting economic interests. Yiddish, a true *lingua franca* of the diamond community, emphasizes the confidential nature of the economic arrangements. Thus the industry, which is associated with ancient traditions and is in some measure a world in itself, exhibits further points of similarity with an intense Jewish life.⁵²

It is, moreover, worth noting that although diamond dealers are not subject to rabbinical courts, they have, in their Exchanges, a special procedure for resolving their conflicts. These are largely settled by conciliation or arbitration⁵³—as is the case in rabbinical courts. Admittedly, the final judgements of the arbiters could be flouted by an appeal to the national courts, but it is practically unknown for Exchange members to have recourse to civil law. As is the case with litigants appearing before a rabbinical tribunal, the Exchange members prefer to make use of the national courts of justice only in cases which call for the exercise of coercion (police, prison, etc.), and even then they do so generally after obtaining the consent of the Exchange executive. Again, as with other disputes brought before a rabbinical tribunal, many of the conflicts which arise in the industry could not, in any case, be brought before the national courts; moreover, those that could be brought before these courts might be dealt with according to a procedure and a code (and subject to sanctions) which are quite different from those obtaining in the Exchanges. The latter's methods of coercion—moral, social, and economic—are (as in the case of sanctions imposed by a rabbinical court) dependent upon the voluntary

submission of the members. Even if they are expelled or suspended from the Exchange, the members can, in several cases, continue to engage in their trade or occupation. In this they differ from other professions such as medicine or law where a doctor or lawyer who is struck off the register is barred from practising.

It is interesting to speculate whether the points of similarity between the juridical roles of the Exchanges and of religious tribunals are due to mere coincidence, or whether the Exchanges have deliberately evolved an enforcement machinery based on the procedure in rabbinical courts. It must be remembered that the Exchanges since their foundation at the turn of the present century have been managed largely by Jews; and the second alternative is therefore more probable. Of course, the two alternatives are not mutually exclusive,⁵⁴ since both systems of justice have similar functions and operate in somewhat similar social contexts; moreover, these contexts interlink at many points.

We have seen that the prosperity of Antwerp Jewry, which contrasts so sharply with the poverty of the *shtetl*, is linked to the paradoxical survival of archaic techno-economic conditions and also, of course, to the generally more widespread economic prosperity of the larger society. It is well known that the poverty of the Jews of central and eastern Europe had, since the turn of the present century, led to the disintegration of traditional Jewish life as a result of proletarianization and emigration.

Nevertheless, the diamond trade and industry are neither merely nor wholly archaic; the existing techno-economic conditions may alter and become more susceptible to the prevailing trends of western industrial societies. Similarly, the Jewish marginal groups who are more assimilated might, for various reasons, increase in number. Therefore, it would appear that the strength of Jewish life among Antwerp Jews (a strength which is linked to a complex of factors with a long historical tradition, but which is so oddly conspicuous in the larger western society) is nevertheless vulnerable.⁵⁵

NOTES

¹ The research on which this article is based was carried out mainly in 1966. The methods employed were participant observation, unstructured and open-ended interviews, and the gathering of statistical data, records, etc.

² There are 250,000 inhabitants in the city of Antwerp and a further 300,000 in all its immediate suburbs.

³ See E. Schmidt, *Geschiedenis van de Joden in Antwerpen* (History of the Jews of

Antwerp), Antwerp, 1963, pp. 12-45. See also the article entitled 'Antwerp' in *The Jewish Encyclopaedia*, New York and London, 1924.

⁴ See K. Liberman, 'La découverte d'une synagogue secrète à Anvers à la fin du XVII^e siècle', *Revue des Études Juives*, 1935, Vol. C, p. 39.

⁵ Cf. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-32; W. Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, trans. M. Epstein, with an introduction

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by Bert Hoselitz, New York, 1962, pp. 40-1; and I. S. Revah, 'Pour l'Histoire des Marranes à Anvers', *R.E.J.*, 1963, Vol. II, pp. 124 and 127.

⁶ This liberalism towards the Jews seems to have been a particular manifestation of a general tradition of tolerance in Antwerp: 'nécessité née du port'. Cf. A. Vigarié, 'Les organes de gestion du port d'Anvers', *Cahiers de Sociologie économique*, Le Havre, Feb. 1960, No. 2, p. 176.

⁷ Cf. W. Bok, 'Considérations sur les estimations quantitatives de la population juive en Belgique', in Centre National des Hautes Études Juives—Bruxelles; Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University—Jerusalem, *La vie juive dans l'Europe contemporaine*, Brussels, 1965, p. 102.

⁸ There were 8,000 according to Schmidt, op. cit., p. 226. According to A. Ruppin (*Les Juifs dans le monde moderne*, Paris, 1934, p. 67), there were 10,000 in the whole of Belgium; this figure is quoted by Bok, *ibid.*, Table 2.

⁹ According to Schmidt (op. cit., p. 266), 2,360 Jewish emigrants used Antwerp as a transit port in 1897; 7,748 in 1900, 19,488 in 1903, and 24,479 in 1905. Schmidt does not cite his sources.

¹⁰ The industry employed 4,000 men at the turn of the century (Schmidt, op. cit., p. 106). For a perceptive analysis of the development of the diamond industry in Antwerp, and the role of the Jews in this development, see K. Liberman, *L'industrie et le commerce diamantaires belges*, Brussels, 1935.

¹¹ Cf. K. Liberman, *L'industrie . . .*, p. 29. Jews also played an important part in Amsterdam's diamond industry. In 1808, 600 households (Sephardim and Ashkenazim) had members who were gainfully occupied in the industry. Cf. N. W. Goldstein, 'Die Juden in der Amsterdamer Diamanten-Industrie', *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden*, 1907, Vol. III, p. 180.

¹² Cf. H. Polak, *De Invloed van de Oorlog op de Diamantindustrie*, (The influence of the War on the Diamond Industry) Puurwerend (Netherlands), 1917, pp. 18-19. The author lays stress on the dynamic business enterprise of the newcomers.

¹³ The world's diamond production (for the most part extracted from Africa) is still nowadays largely controlled by De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. The

Company's central sales agency in London distributes the diamonds to the various manufacturing and trading centres.

¹⁴ Cf. Polak, op. cit., p. 19, and Liberman, *L'industrie . . .*, p. 42. It is relevant to point out that the chief directors of De Beers are also of Jewish origin.

¹⁵ In 1920 Belgium had 14,000-15,000 craftsmen in the diamond industry and the Netherlands 11,000. In 1928 the number in Belgium rose to 23,000-25,000 while in the Netherlands it declined to 6,275. (See 'L'industrie diamantaire', *Bulletin mensuel de la Société belge de Banque*, Brussels, 1932, pp. 252-260.) Admittedly, by 1959 the number had fallen in Belgium, but it still accounted for more than half of the total of craftsmen employed in the world—14,000 out of 25,000; in 1959 there were only 700 diamond craftsmen in the Netherlands. See A. Moyer, *L'industrie du diamant en 1958-1959*, Brussels, 1960, p. 88.

¹⁶ Cf. Bok, op. cit., Table 2.

¹⁷ There are no precise figures for the number of missing and deported persons from Antwerp. It is said that on the eve of the War there were a total of 85,000 Jews in Belgium, of whom 30,000 were deported. About five per cent of the deportees were repatriated after the War. Cf. Bok, *ibid.*, p. 95; and Schmidt, op. cit., p. 276.

¹⁸ Cf. Bok, op. cit., Table 2.

¹⁹ The estimate has been arrived at from various sources. 'Jews' are those who identify themselves as being Jewish, or whose parents are Jewish. In the case of mixed marriages, households where the husband is Jewish and the wife non-Jewish have been classified as Jewish households; this is justifiable in Antwerp where such marriages usually result in the households' association with the Jewish community. On the other hand, in the case of mixed marriages where the husband is non-Jewish, it is less frequent for the household to be associated.

²⁰ These percentages have been arrived at by statistical sampling. Therefore, although the influence of the immigrants is far from negligible, it cannot be said that the intensity of Jewish life in Antwerp results from the fact that the more recent eastern European arrivals have transplanted their native traditional Jewish organization.

²¹ In the sample, the criterion used was

the birthplace of the respondent or of the respondent's father.

²² Frequently, these have grandparents of foreign origin.

²³ The qualifications for naturalization have been markedly relaxed in recent years. Before 1940, less than 10 per cent of the Jewish population of Belgium had Belgian nationality. See Bok, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

²⁴ It must be noted that the Flemish spoken in Belgium and the Dutch spoken in the Netherlands are, in fact, one and the same language; there are variations in vocabulary and in pronunciation.

²⁵ In the schools sponsored by conservatives, the Sephardi pronunciation is taught.

²⁶ The sense of humour of the Jews of Antwerp seems to be the outcome of a somewhat critical appreciation due to the ambiguous position of many of the city's Jews. Since these are economically privileged, they constitute an in-group; at the same time they are also an out-group, being aliens oppressed from time immemorial, for whom the possibility of further persecution is ever present.

²⁷ For commentaries on the Talmud, Yiddish is used colloquially in the orthodox school; this is also the case in the Hassidic schools where, moreover, the rudiments of the language are taught for the necessities of everyday use.

²⁸ The two large Jewish schools use only Flemish for the teaching of lay subjects.

²⁹ Cf. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

³⁰ Cleavers and sawers use very different techniques: the former divide the rough diamond with the grain, while the latter do so against the grain. The miller rounds off the stone and, finally, the polisher sets and polishes the facets.

³¹ Diamonds are being increasingly used for tools. Although in Belgium the manufacture of such tools is not as developed as that of gems, nevertheless the trade in industrial diamonds accounted in 1958 for 26 per cent of all diamond exports from the country. Cf. Moyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-2.

³² In the case of small diamonds of sixteen facets (in contrast to the larger stones of fifty-eight facets), the polishing process is semi-mechanized, but the polisher nevertheless has a very important part to play. On the whole, however, extreme division of labour,

automation, and *a fortiori* assembly lines are unknown in the diamond industry.

³³ 'Je unentwickelter die Produktion, um so mehr wird sich daher das Geldvermögen konzentrieren in den Händen der Kaufleute, oder als spezifische Form des Kaufmannsvermögens erscheinen'. Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, drittes Buch, Kapitel 20, in *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels Werke*, Berlin, 1964, Vol. 25, p. 338.

³⁴ 'Capitalism is often regarded as passing through three successive stages, beginning with commercial capitalism, under which large scale operators come to dominate the processes of exchange, running on . . . into the stage of industrial capitalism . . . and then to the stage . . . of finance, or financial, capitalism . . . These stages are not, of course, mutually exclusive: *the earlier do not cease to exist when the later are superimposed on them*'. (My own italics.) G. D. H. Cole, 'Capitalism', C. 3, in *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, J. Gould and W. L. Kolb, eds., London, 1964, p. 71.

³⁵ The Exchanges are closed on Saturday afternoons.

³⁶ When a death occurs, each community imposes a burial fee according to the presumed wealth of the bereaved family. Usually this assessment is not made rashly. The method is very effective, for the families who refuse payment and forgo a religious burial in favour of a civil ceremony are very few and far between. Only the Jews of Dutch origin are exempt, for they have their own mutual aid burial society. However, as their number is small, they have had to establish a link with the orthodox community whose *hebra kadisha* performs the burial rites for them. In exchange the Dutch Jews have undertaken not to admit to their organization any more Jews of central or eastern European origin.

The orthodoxy of Antwerp Jews moreover leads to complex situations. The cemeteries of the two religious communities, as well as that of the Dutch association, are held by them as unrestricted freeholds; they are situated in Dutch territory 21 kilometres from Antwerp, because Belgian law, although it recognizes the grant of perpetual leases, makes them subject to revision; and it is well known that the exhumation and transfer of mortal remains is contrary to Jewish tradition. In the municipal cemetery of

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Antwerp there is a Jewish section; it is a plot reserved for civil burials, or for 'special' cases (mixed marriages, etc.).

³⁷ On Antwerp Hassidim, see J. Gutwirth, 'Hassidim de notre temps' *Les nouveaux Cahiers*, Paris, 1966, No. 7, pp. 56-62.

³⁸ However, he is descended from an illustrious Hassidic figure, the *Rebbe* Elimelech of Lizensk.

³⁹ He was the last of a Hassidic dynasty which became extinct before 1914.

⁴⁰ These are approximate numbers. In 1964-5, the total was 2,137; cf. S. S. Brachfeld, *Het Joods Onderwijs in België* (Jewish education in Belgium), Antwerp, 1966, p. 106, Table 11.

⁴¹ The pupils in these four schools represent 91 per cent of Jewish children following a Jewish curriculum (percentages drawn from figures supplied by Brachfeld, op. cit., p. 106). The remaining 9 per cent attend religious classes in non-Jewish schools. A small number of children have no Jewish tuition whatever.

⁴² See, for instance, M. Zborowski and E. Herzog, *Life is with People*, New York, 1962, pp. 191-213.

⁴³ 'The legal segregation of the Jews and their religious and cultural isolation meant that Jewish individual or communal needs could be supplied internally through Jewish co-operation and mutual assistance. Jewish institutions that banded individuals together in competent associations covering the various spheres of social activities were thus essential. The basis . . . was the local *kehilla*, which bound together all Jews who were permanent local residents' (J. Katz, *Tradition and Crisis, Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages*, New York 1961, p. 79). Cf. also H. M. Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History*, New York, 1963, pp. 31-2.

⁴⁴ 'The small town, the *shtetl*, was the stronghold of this [Jewish] culture . . . Whether among Poles or Russians, Lithuanians or Hungarians, the Jews retained their ways and their language—responding to the environment, assimilating much of it, integrating it into their way of life, yet keeping the core

of their own tradition intact' (Zborowski and Herzog, op. cit., p. 34). Cf. also Sachar, op. cit., pp. 192-3.

⁴⁵ Cf. also Katz, op. cit., chaps. VI and VII.

⁴⁶ Cf. Ruppin, op. cit., pp. 200-2, 214; S. Bronshtein, 'Polish Jewry in 1931', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 1964, Vol. VI, No. 1, pp. 24-7; Zborowski and Herzog, op. cit., pp. 242-3.

⁴⁷ According to a *responsum* discussed by I. Agus, *Urban Civilization in Pre-Crusade Europe*, New York, 1965, p. 71.

⁴⁸ Cf. Sombart, op. cit., pp. 46-7; W. J. Cahnman, 'Role and Significance of the Jewish Artisan Class', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 1965, Vol. VII, No. 2, p. 214.

⁴⁹ Liberman, *L'industrie* . . . , p. 22.

⁵⁰ Cf. Moyer, op. cit., p. 97.

⁵¹ Thefts and frauds can easily occur with this type of article.

⁵² In connexion with a *responsum* of R. Meshullam (910-85), and other *responsa*, Agus, op. cit., p. 65, notes: 'Thus, again, it was the brotherly co-operation of the Jews, their readiness to help and to protect one another, their confidence and trust in each other's honesty that made it possible for them to do business and to gain profit even in the completely lawless circumstances of this period.' Thus the tradition of a closed society converging with Jewry, or at least with some element of it, goes back at least 1,000 years.

⁵³ Except in the cases of minor disciplinary infringements, although even then there are attempts at conciliation. The procedure in the *Beurs* is more legalistic than it is in the *Kring*: the *Beurs* allows lawyers to be present and to advise the litigants and the arbitrators; the *Kring*, on the other hand, follows more traditional methods.

⁵⁴ Cf. A. Leroi-Gourhan, *Milieux et techniques*, Paris, 1945, pp. 426-427.

⁵⁵ After the French version of this paper was printed, it was brought to my notice that D. Wachsstock had also published an article on Antwerp Jewry: 'Jewish Antwerp—A *shtetl* in Transition', in *In the Dispersion*, Vol. 5/6, Jerusalem, 1966, pp. 68-76.

LOOK FORWARD IN PERPLEXITY

S. E. Finer

(Review Article)

THIS moving and fascinating book,* beautifully written, is indeed about the destiny of the Jewish people; but the author's concern with this is rooted in, and was sparked off by, a pre-occupation with the outstanding issues of the pre-War domestic scene in Israel. Today, as I know from a short visit soon after the June War, conversation in Israel begins and ultimately returns to the issues of peace and war or the future of the occupied territories. Furthermore, the War has provided provisional answers for some of these problems and raised new queries over others. Nevertheless, these basic problems are still there, and no book that I know of identifies them so cogently as this one.

So, the book is concerned with two levels: Israeli society and world Jewry. This duality is explicable by the biography of the author. For in 1963 when he first went to Israel to pursue his sociological investigations, Friedmann was what can best be described as a 'Frenchman of Jewish origin'. Therefore, as he himself puts it, 'My encounter with Israel was in fact my first encounter with Judaism. . . . Coming to grips with Judaism, discussing its role and the mission that it attributed to itself in the world, I found myself personally involved in a special way. . . .' Hence this book with its disturbing title: *The End of the Jewish People?*—and note well that question mark at the end. Friedmann has been much reproached for the pessimistic self-questioning of his final pages. This is not fair; because as one reaches these pages one realizes that what has unfolded is a triangle of relationships: between Israel, world Jewry, and the sensitive and perplexed participant-observer, Georges Friedmann himself. The result is a critical account of Israel (which is not the same thing as a criticism of Israel) but one which is sensitized by care, by perceptiveness, by anxiety, and above all by love. Not, one might think, the way a sociologist should treat his data? None of the *wertfrei* and clinical detachment to be expected of the social scientist? Well, there is something to be said for what Wright Mills

* Georges Friedmann, *The End of the Jewish People?*, trans. Eric Mosbacher, 300 pp., Hutchinson, London, 1967, 45s.

called 'the sociological imagination', and the book does not falter either in its clarity or its intellectual honesty for all that it fails to conform to the recommended American standards of scientific hygiene. Certainly, if I had to suggest a first analysis of the problems besetting Israel to a lay reader, then this is the one I should recommend.

The fierce domestic debates of the pre-War period turned on the future of the kibbutz and the top-heavy Histadrut, on the supposed alienation of the sabras, on the surprisingly explosive issue of television, and above all on two great divisive factors—the horizontal cleavage between the 'two Israels' ('Westerners' and 'Orientals'), and the lateral cleavage between the Orthodox and the secularists. The discussion of these topics takes up the major part of the book. If it looks only too formidably complete, in fact (and it is as well to say so at the outset) it is not. It omits one further 'cleavage': the generational conflict, which is by no means the same (though it overlaps) the conflict between the sabras and the rest. And it omits two important integrating factors: the Armed Services, which are perhaps the most potent of the 'socializing' forces in Israel: and its multi-party political system based on tacit principles of conciliation and consultation, which has succeeded to such an extent as to provide Israel with a civilian system of government which is so stable as to reek of immobilism.

Friedmann's chapters on each of the named topics can, and should, be read for their intrinsic interest and value, as explanations of, and observations on, each of the successive problems. But they serve the larger and grander purpose of the book, in that on each one the author fears the collapse of older, established values rooted in the historical past and creating the historical 'Jewish identity', in favour of new and colourless values which would make Jews into a new nation, certainly, but one with no particular claim to Jewishness. The future of the kibbutz is a case in point. Friedmann accurately records the defensive posture into which this movement had been forced in 1963-4—indeed, even in the discussions I had in 1966. It was under attack from one quarter for being economically feather-bedded; from another because so many of the kibbutzim clung to the old-fashioned marxist ideology of Mapam and Hashomer Hatzair; from within because so many settlements had begun to branch (profitably) into light industry; and, above all, because a number of them had taken to hiring labour (for profit) from outside. Could the kibbutzim which now contained a mere 4 per cent of the total labour force survive? Were their values doomed? If so, was this to be deplored or greeted with satisfaction? The Histadrut was a similar instance of change and self-questioning. How was this great lumbering organization to preserve its socialistic values when it was not only the representative of the workers' rights against the employers but had itself become the largest single employer in the country?

Again, was there not something that could justly be called 'the sabra

generation'—a materialistic, pragmatic, realistic social layer who scorned the pioneering values of their elders, who were ill-informed about the outside world and even about the Jews in it, who tended to shrug off their 'Jewish' identity for an Israeli one, and who were restless and alienated from the society they had come of age in? Certainly this view was widely shared among the elders and the *vatikim*—although, as is his wont in this book, Friedmann raises the query rather than provides his own conclusion. Also, superadded to this desertion of ideals by the sabra generation, Friedmann saw an even greater threat in the flattening, denaturing effect of the mass media: here he himself has no doubts but sees it roundly as the greatest of all potential threats to the specific identity of the new Israeli nation.

'Denaturing': this is the theme of all these chapters, this the perpetual threat which Friedmann evokes. The existence of the so-called 'Second Israel' further complicates the picture. Now one third of the population, their integration into the social structure and, above all, the contribution they can and must make to the technological and scientific progress of the state depends on massive expenditure on education on an unprecedented scale. At that time this was not forthcoming; and in Friedmann's view a grim and extensive waste of educational talent loomed.

But did the Synagogue not have a role to play in preserving the traditional Jewish values? Not for Friedmann, at any rate. Brought up in the French Republican tradition of secularism, he excoriates the Synagogue's illiberality, the more so because he denounces its formalism and the absence of a 'social Judaism'. 'The reign of orthodoxy is precarious', he notes. 'A change in the government coalition would suffice to bring it to an end. Unification of the three Labour parties would sound the knell of the privileges orthodoxy has enjoyed since 1948.'

One sees the drift then. Are the old pioneering and socialistic self-sacrificial ideals not being eroded? Has not the Synagogue retired into a carapace of formalism? Has not the advent of the Second Israel complicated the difficulties? Does not mass culture threaten to engulf what remains of a Jewish identity with its own insipid facelessness?

Good questions, and perennial ones for a society which—when not engaged in driving off its murderous enemies—delights in picking itself to pieces. But since then a great war has been fought and in its wake a whole host of qualifications arise. The kibbutzim have re-emerged into the limelight. They provided a vastly disproportionate number of officers to the Defence Forces; the pioneering spirit has revived as new Nahal settlements have become needful; the kibbutzim of the Beisan valley are fulfilling their original purpose as the first-line defence against armed infiltrators from across the Jordan. Again, the sabras have been vindicated, their patriotism and devotion amazing and delighting their elders, late their censors. The Labour parties have united: perhaps the knell of orthodoxy has sounded? On the other hand, for the moment at

least, the War has inflicted what Friedmann would doubtless regard as two serious casualties. It has squashed hopes for a vast expansion of free education; since the first post-War budget, in which still more goes on armament, will not stand for it. And also it has brought about what he and most of 'the establishment' so greatly detested and feared: the introduction of television—another extension of 'mass culture'.

What of the 'Second Israel'? Here indeed is a question. Has a common battle experience, a common victory, at last won the 'Oriental' his parity of esteem? When I last visited Israel this was a question I asked of everybody, but nobody seemed to *know*. Certainly, however, I heard Yigael Allon say this very thing at a press conference—that the War had obliterated every trace of the former prejudice. This is a matter that urgently requires an answer. If it is affirmative, then indeed it may be true that war has its victories no less renowned than peace.

So much for parenthesis. Reverting to the text: it is at this point, when he has explored the changing values of Israeli society that Friedmann shifts to his second and wider level, the future of the Jewish people. Why does he link the two? Because, for him, Israel is proving a true melting pot. Polyglot, divided, multi-faceted though it be, Israel transforms the *olim*: from Jews they become Israeli patriots; but are they still Jews or only—to use his phrase—'Hebrew speaking Gentiles'? The new values that rush into the vacuum left by the departing ideals of kibbutz, Histadrut, and synagogue are a specifically *Israeli* phenomenon. Saved as individuals, the *olim* are lost as Jews. What then of Jewish values outside Israel in the diaspora? Again, argues Friedmann, this too may save the Jews as individuals—but only by assimilating them to the communities in which they live. In either case the Jew is faced with a kind of assimilation; in either case he loses his 'Jewish' identity.

This is the proposition that has roused so much controversy. It is only fair to say that Friedmann does not state it as a fact; he advances it as a strong possibility. He does not rejoice in it; on the contrary, sensitive and full of care, he puts it as an anxious doubt. Indeed, the last chapter is a dialogue with himself over this very proposition; and that is precisely why the title of his book does not end with a full stop but with the question mark.

In fact there is a great deal to be advanced against this proposition. The most obvious retort is to claim that Israel does in fact embody specifically Jewish values and indeed that only Israel can do so. But even if this interpretation be put aside in favour of Friedmann's hypothesis of a 'secular Israelization', it is still dubious whether his argument holds. Is such Israelization (if indeed it is occurring) really an 'end to the Jewish people'; or is it not simply an end to a Jewish public image as history has created it? Friedmann takes the historical image of the Jews as somehow definitional of Jews. But their historical image has altered dramatically, and indeed history supplies not one historical

identity but two. It is precisely the antipathetic co-existence of the two in Israel today that explains the Synagogue-secularist conflict and yields the clue to an ambiguity in Zionist ideology that goes all the way back to the Basle Congress. For most Israelis, Jewish history ended one chapter with the Bar Kochba revolt and did not resume again until the War of Independence; all the interim was 'as a phantasm or a hideous dream'. But as I was sharply reminded by a devout academic in the Jerusalem conference in 1966, there is another strand in Jewish history: Talmud. So, if one seeks an historical identity for the Jewish people, there are in fact two: King David and the Wandering Jew. Which is authentic? If either—or both, why may there not be a third identity, starting from now; an identity founded on the state of Israel and the tradition it creates out of its own experiences? And why should not this be as authentically Jewish as the other two?

And similarly, I think, with this question of assimilation in the Diaspora. What the Six-Day War showed was that for the moment, at least, communities which had largely abandoned their religious observances felt a Jewish identity none the less keenly because they regarded the state of Israel as the *emblem* of Jewishness, as their badge of pride. It is certainly conceivable that if the westernized Jews of the diaspora continued to think in this way, the situation could arise in which they recognized themselves as Jews because they identified in themselves the values of Israel.

This is not a possibility which Friedmann can accept, however; and the reason lies in another and much more debatable proposition of his concerning what he calls 'double allegiance'. Friedmann makes short work of it: too short. He envisages only two alternatives for Jews. Either the 'Israel-centred must go there'; or those who do not go and 'who do not believe that the Jewish people constitutes a national community, must be citizens of the state in which they live like any others, having only one allegiance and one country, however great may be their sympathy with, and interest in, Israel'.

Another casualty of the Six-Day War! For this is, pretty well, the assumption on which General de Gaulle made his notorious speech of defamation. To close the alternatives as sharply as this, overlooking a third possibility, is to make an uncritical and (I would have hoped) grossly unfashionable surrender to the Moloch claims of the absolute nation-state. For there is a third possibility: that Jews who do not want to go to Israel but do believe that there is some kind of entity called the Jewish people of which they are a part, may hold out—whatever their temporary government says or does—for the unimpeachable right of others, who do want to go to Israel, to do so. This obviously entails support for the continued existence of Israel, its security, and indeed some measure of prosperity; and for its continued right to be a country of Jewish immigration. To take up this position is no more anti-national

than supporting the Vietcong against the policy of the government of the day. Moreover it falls far, far short of the implications of French nationalism as expounded by the acolytes of the General. If it is right and proper for French nationalists to proclaim that French Canadians should regard themselves as part of a French *ethnos*, even to the extent of establishing special economic and political ties with France or indeed of even breaking up the Canadian Federation, it becomes ever more difficult to see why French Jews, like Jews in any other country, should not exercise the perfectly innocuous right to hold and to demonstrate a special affection for the State of Israel.

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MICHAEL SELZER, *The Aryanization of the Jewish State*, 126 pp., Black Star Publishing Company, New York, 1967, \$5.00.

This little book is perhaps meant to set one's teeth on edge. Consider the title: *The Aryanization of the Jewish State*. What parallels does the author wish us to draw from the title? With what state should we compare Israel if it is 'aryan'—Britain, Peru, Egypt, Russia? Of course not—with Nazi Germany! In one particularly outrageous paragraph we are told that the European Israelis are 'like the *kapos*, or prison guards, in Nazi concentration camps' (p. 86). After reading passages such as this one, my teeth *are* set on edge.

The title on the book-jacket announces that this is not merely a book but a 'polemic'. What is Mr. Selzer's 'controversial argument'? What Mr. Selzer claims is that Israel is not the genuine Jewish State, but is spurious—a moral failure. He comes to this conclusion by parading an odd mixture of history, psychology, and sociology. The polemic goes as follows. The *Ostjuden* (Jews of central and eastern Europe) became Zionists out of a sense of self-hate. The *Haskalah* movement of the nineteenth century had taught the Jews to despise themselves and their position, and Zionism was a logical outgrowth of this self-hatred. Zionism accepted the antisemite's stereotypes—that Jews were money-grubbers, economic leeches, hook-nosed and frightened—and therefore Zionists sought in Palestine to 'become like all of the nations', and to 'normalize' Jewish existence. What was in particular rejected was the *shtetl*, the *Ostjuden's* historical home, while what was desired was a fully modern state and society. The model of this vision was Herzl's *Altneuland*, a book that we are told had an enormous psychological impact upon the half-civilized *Ostjuden*. Thus in Palestine these *Ostjuden*, driven by their self-hatred, wished to create a state in the Middle East in which they could forget their past: they would all become blonde and blue-eyed, arrogant and 'aryan'. And unfortunately, they succeeded. Now comes the rub! For with the formation of the State hundreds of thousands of 'Oriental' Jews flocked to Israel. How were they met? Not with compassion and brotherliness, but rather with prejudice and hate. In Israel the Iraqis and Moroccans became outcasts, despised people, attacked culturally and psychically punished. Why were the 'Oriental' brethren so viciously attacked? Why were the *Ostjuden* so brutal in their desire to westernize the 'Orientals'? Here is the climax of the polemic: because these 'Orientals' reminded the 'Asiatic' *Ostjuden* of the very past they had struggled so hard to repress! Here their own past was returning—the Yemenites and Moroccans were nothing so much as reminders of the *Ostjuden's shtetl* past. Thus the *Ostjuden*—the *kapos*—sought to 'aryanize' their 'oriental' brothers, little realizing that they might be their very salvation. For had the *Ostjuden* understood that the 'Orientals' were a bridge to the Arabs,

that they were the authentic Middle Easterners and also authentic Jews, they would have elevated 'Oriental' culture instead of seeking to 'aryanize' it. And now the polemic concludes. Since Israel is aryan, it has lost any claim to being the genuine 'Jewish State': it is a moral failure, and deserves neither the interest nor the concern of Jews elsewhere. Jews should rather seek to build their lives in the Diaspora; following the nineteenth-century Jewish historian Simon Dubnow, Mr. Selzer urges Jews to turn to a Diaspora nationalism. And indeed, there is already an excellent example of a genuine Jewish nationalism: American Jewry is in the midst of a new 'Golden Age' ('a new Golden Age has been ushered in for the Jews'—p. 112), and this marvellous era holds infinitely greater promise than does aryan Israel.

So goes Mr. Selzer's polemic. I do not believe that I have distorted the author's intent in this brief outline of his 'controversial argument'. What substance is there to it? What is the truth of the accusation?

The polemic is historical, psychological, and sociological. Let us examine each element in turn. Is Zionism an antisemitic movement? To begin with, Zionism must surely have had more complex aspirations than the wish to escape from the *shtetl* way of life. Zionism, particularly among what Selzer sneeringly calls the *Ostjuden*—the 'Asiatics'—has historic roots in a general movement for political nationalism in central Europe, and most emphatically, in central and eastern European radical socialism. Yet even if one saw that Zionist programmes and mythology did attract antisemitic stereotypes—and I would agree that alienation and self-hate is to be found in the Zionist programme—then what conclusions are to be drawn? That their analysis was wrong? Are we to believe that the Jews of central and eastern Europe (Mr. Selzer's 'Asiatics') were or could have been integrated within Lithuanian, Polish, or Ukrainian society? Had Ben-Gurion, whom Selzer frequently castigates, remained in Plonsk instead of emigrating to Palestine, where would he (and thousands of others) now be? The answer is obvious: they would have gone to the death chambers.

Moreover, if Zionists reacted negatively against their conditions of existence in eastern Europe, if they despised Jewish life in the *shtetl*, are we to conclude that they were wrong? Why must a revolt against one's condition be described as 'self-hate'? Are the anti-colonial movements in Africa or the Middle East also so simply explainable? The *Ostjuden* (as well as the Algerians, the Vietnamese, the Indonesians, the Egyptians, and so forth) were in fact quite accurate in their diagnosis: their condition was despicable.

Mr. Selzer's psychology is as false as his history. What we are asked to believe is that the Jews of Palestine reacted so strongly against the 'Oriental' immigrants because the latter represented the *Ostjuden's* own hateful past. Mr. Selzer rejects out of hand any kind of sociological or cultural explanation for this confrontation—no, it can only be explained in terms of 'deep psychology'. What does this argument mean? What we are asked to believe is that people respond to one another in terms of some 'historical memory': for if, in 1968, those who were born in Israel of European parents hold prejudiced views of Yemenite or Moroccan immigrants, then in Mr. Selzer's view this is because they reject their *shtetl* past. To swallow this we will need a theory of 'collective unconscious', a kind of Jungian psychology, in which certain past experiences mysteriously control the present. Were we to accept

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this view, we should believe that the 'Europeans' in Israel would forever be responding in terms of an ancient experience. Indeed, to subscribe to this theory we must become nothing less than *racists*.

It is Mr. Selzer's sociology that I find most objectionable. Not that his characterization of the relationships between Europeans and Middle Eastern Jews in Israel is always wrong: it is perfectly true that the European segment of the Israeli population has sought to transform the Middle Easterners, to make them European; that this powerful programme of cultural reform has frequently had melancholy, and sometimes destructive, consequences; that there are significant differences in income and education between Europeans and Middle Easterners, and that this stratification is likely to persist; and finally, that there are deep tones of tension and conflict between the two segments. None of this is, of course, very new: the situation has been analysed, described, and deplored in numerous books and articles. Mr. Selzer adds nothing to these analyses; he has done no research on these matters, but rather bases his conclusions on various well-known studies. The description is not wrong—it just becomes warped as it becomes increasingly shrill. Mr. Selzer is not content to describe the sorry state of affairs, he must rather go on (as suits a polemic) to lay bare the true conspiracy. It is simple: the aryan are in control, and although the 'Orientals' are the larger group numerically, the clever aryan successfully persecute the 'Orientals'. For example, the following tale is told on page 106:

A substantial number of Orientals who refused to accept the marginal position allotted them in Israel life but always remained well within the bounds of enacted law were first offered bribes by the government in the form of well-paid jobs and then persecuted if they refused to accept them. They lost their jobs and had great difficulty obtaining new employment. A number of cases of mysterious beatings and even bombings were never cleared up by the police. It is common for such dissidents to have their telephones tapped, their mail censored and in one way or another to be made aware that the Israeli secret-police force has its eye on them.

One must ask: of what cases is Mr. Selzer speaking? When did these events take place? We need some documentation, some reference, in order to evaluate these remarks. To put it bluntly: these are damning accusations, but why should we believe them?

It is this kind of excess that characterizes much of Mr. Selzer's sociology. What makes it particularly unenlightening is that the author shows very little understanding of the 'Oriental' community. Mr. Selzer's invective and anger obviously stem from the injustice he believes he has witnessed in Israel. His sympathy is with the 'Oriental', against the 'aryan'. Bravo! Yet he does not appear to know much about the 'Orientals'. His understanding of the history of the 'Oriental' peoples is deficient. How can he imagine that the history of the Jews in Yemen, or in Morocco, was anything like a 'Golden Era'? He should know that Arab-Jewish relations were frequently bloody and filled with mutual contempt. He should also know that a great many Moroccans and Yemenites have an increasingly larger stake in a Western Israeli society, and that they themselves have often wished to 'become modern' as much as others have pushed them in this direction. This is not to

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deny that shameful and destructive consequences often follow from Westernization in Israel, or that many Middle Easterners feel themselves to be, and are, marginal to the society. But the process has been more one of seduction than of rape. Rather than to depend upon the reports of others, Mr. Selzer might have gone out and learned something about the aspirations of the Middle Easterners and about their own appreciation of their future. Unfortunately, this book adds nothing to our understanding of the very group in whose name the author believes he is writing.

The book-jacket informs us that Mr. Selzer has left Israel, and that he now lives in the United States. He is there, no doubt, to take part in the new Golden Age. Having given up on Israel, he has written this book to expose the true character of the 'country which calls itself the Jewish State' (p. 101). What he has exposed instead is an immature response to the problems of contemporary Jewish life (the book begins and ends with tedious soul-searching regarding 'what is a Jew'), as well as a distorted view of Israeli society. Israel surely has grave internal problems and faces severe moral dilemmas. Yet it should be possible to analyse Israeli life—Israel with all of its warts and wrinkles and blemishes—without becoming wantonly destructive. It is a pity that Mr. Selzer was disappointed in Israel, that he found so much that seemed nasty and wrong. But this is not enough to make one accept his analysis or his conclusions.

ALEX WEINGROD

NATHAN W. ACKERMAN, *Treating the Troubled Family*, xii + 306 pp., Basic Books, New York and London, 1966, 40s.

The expressed purpose of this book is to develop a theory of family 'within the clinical setting'. Dr. Ackerman, a distinguished clinician, and regarded as an authority in the field of family therapy, is particularly concerned with the idea of a positive concept of mental health, an ideal model of the 'good' healthy family, and with developing criteria by which families can be diagnosed and categorized according to their 'mental health potentials'. This 'comprehensive theory of family', as contrasted with the 'ultimate, universal theory', which happily he is not yet ready to tackle, perhaps explains why this book, packed though it is with interesting material, is so tantalizingly unsatisfactory.

What he purports to do is to develop theory from the observation of patients in family therapy and, in turn, to apply that theory in further practice. The structure of the book illustrates this circular process. He starts with a tape-recorded interview with a family. He then goes on to a discussion of his theoretical ideas concerning the family and family therapy. The last part of the book is devoted to further family interviews to illustrate his theory and practice. It is a reasonable and readable arrangement. My quarrel with it is that if, indeed, his ideas derive from the clinical material, it must be by a very circuitous route; on the other hand, the clinical material and his comments on it often seem twisted and strained as he uses them to illustrate his theories.

In his first chapter on theory, 'The Question of Cure', Dr. Ackerman

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spends a good deal of time condemning those earlier theorists and present practitioners who explain a patient's problems solely in terms of intrapsychic disturbance, without realizing the significance of his family in the origin and continuance of his pathology and without recognizing that cure, to be effective, must enable the patient to get along not only with himself but also with his family and his community. In arguing against these hypothetical figures it is hard to know just whom he is aiming at. He often mentions Freud, but surely Freud cannot be thought of as minimizing the influence of the family on the developing child, and Freud's own dictum, 'The aim of the treatment will never be anything else but the practical recovery of the patient, the restoration of his ability and capacity for enjoyment and an active life' (*Collected Papers*, ed. Ernest Jones, Vol. 1, p. 269) is quite as socially oriented as Dr. Ackerman's 'symptom relief, self realization, and integration of the individual into his group'. His statement that psychotherapists by tradition are interested mainly in symptom relief is just not so, except perhaps in the case of the behaviourists, and these are not mentioned. Where this author does differ from many therapists is in his idea that cure must be thought of in terms of an ideal theoretical model and that this ideal must embrace social and ethical values. He points out that, in thinking of analysis in terms of the removal of a pathogenic idea, Freud 'took away' without giving the patients something in return. He himself feels that the 'analyst *must* inject something new, namely the *right* images and emotions to neutralize the patient's *wrong* ones [his italics]'. There is no feeling, as in more humble therapists, that if you can succeed in removing the obstruction the patient may find his own 'right' way. His whole idea that a patient must be good in order to be well ('He may fall ill again if he does not grow into a better human being') is an intriguing one, but the evidence is very slim indeed and, like most of the controversial ideas in this book, one is impressed rather by the force of the author's conviction than by his reasoning.

Since one of his goals is to classify and diagnose families, Dr. Ackerman quite properly sets out to define the family in terms of structure and function. The family to him, in spite of a sweeping reference to its varied forms and character in different societies and in our 'heterogeneous culture', is the model nuclear family in which the extra-familial kin are thought to occupy a fringe position sometimes felt to be 'in-group' and sometimes 'out-group'. What is rather surprising to a clinician concerned with family therapy is that there is no consideration at all of the complex patterns arising from divorce, remarriage, and step-parenthood. Even in England today psychiatrists are often hard put to it to define a particular family group because of such relatives as Dad's ex-wife, Mummy's new husband, or step-sister's Granny. Surely in the United States, where the divorce rate is very high, such varieties of family structure must often be encountered and deserve some sort of place in a 'comprehensive theory of family'.

Having defined his family and outlined its functions, Dr. Ackerman goes on to talk about the 'Breakdown of Healthy Process', and here he borrows freely from theories of individual psychology on the one hand and group psychology on the other without, in the opinion of this reader, illuminating either discipline. He sees the family as mediating between the individual and the larger community and describes it very much as Freud did the ego in its

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position as intermediary between id and superego. He re-defines such concepts as prejudice and 'scapegoating', as well as symptom, defence, resistance, and the unconscious, in order to apply them to the family rather than to the larger group or to the individual. My own reaction to this is succinctly expressed by R. D. Laing:

Just when the sociologists have all but completely abandoned organicism a new medical sociology is arising as the clinician, abandoning his position of one person medical psychologist, is beginning to occupy the old positions of the sociologist with a curious type of medical organicism. The concept of family pathology . . . extends the unintelligibility of individual behaviour to the unintelligibility of the group (Introduction, *Sanity, Madness and the Family*, Laing & Esterson, Vol. 1, p. 9).

It is Dr. Ackerman's contention that, 'Generally speaking, interpersonal conflict in the family group precedes the establishment of fixed patterns of intra-psychic conflict'. From this he concludes that pathological disturbance in the individual can best be resolved by having it 'activated and reprojected into the field of family interaction'. It is this re-activation which is the particular job of the family therapist who is also seen as 'educator . . . true parent figure . . . and a personal instrument for reality testing'. In the chapter on the 'Functions of the Family Therapist' Dr. Ackerman implies that the method he describes is one that is uniquely applicable to family therapy. He points out that other therapists might express themselves in different ways but that the principles outlined remain the same no matter what the personality or 'style' of the therapist. That he considers these principles exemplified by the interviews is attested to by the fact that the film and sound records of two of them have been sent to five hundred centres for the training of psychotherapists. If I interpret these principles correctly, the most significant are:

1. that the therapist be continually aware of non-verbal as well as verbal communication;
2. that the therapist should not think of himself as a *tabula rasa*, but rather as a 'participant observer' engaging in a 'genuine social experience';
3. that he should use his own emotional responses freely, but 'insightfully';
4. that therapy should be problem-oriented, using 'here-and-now' conflicts not only because of their immediate importance but as a way of understanding and mobilizing 'depth material'.

These principles, which Dr. Ackerman contrasts with those of the classical analyst, have been very much discussed, at least since the days of Harry Stack Sullivan and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and they are quite as applicable to therapy of the individual as to therapy of the family. The point at issue is not that the earlier theorists minimized the importance of the family but that they assumed that successful resolution of intra-psychic pathology would enable the patient to cope more effectively with other persons inside and outside his family circle; that a change, even a favourable one, in one person may upset other persons in the family has for many years been taken for granted. If it is true that we often use our children to express some of our own unconscious pathology, and that we choose our mates partly to fulfil neurotic needs, this is an inevitable problem. It was nicely expressed in the

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song popular in psychiatric circles a few years ago: 'I can't get adjusted to the you who got adjusted to me'.

The answer of the orthodox analyst is not, as this book keeps implying, that he thinks interaction between family members is unimportant, but that more than one member of the family may need analysis. It may be that family therapy is actually more effective, and surely more economical, than the therapy of separate individuals; but the case for family therapy is by no means strengthened by arguing about matters which are in no way specific to it—e.g. whether the therapist should reveal his own emotions and opinions, engaging in 'an ongoing struggle with the meaning of value differences and ultimately reaching a conviction as to which values are on the side of growth and health', whether or not it is disadvantageous to have a formal diagnostic interview, etc. These are interesting problems and one is not justified in condemning an author for going off in any direction that interests him. What leads to confusion is that they are introduced not as diversions but as supporting arguments.

More interesting than Dr. Ackerman's theoretical ideas are his actual descriptions of his method. In talking of the 'fascination' of family therapy he says:

... stage by stage as the therapist strips away denials, displacement, rationalizations and other disguises the essential conflicts between and within family members come into clearer perspective . . . acting as a catalyst he provokes increasingly candid disclosures of underlying currents of interpersonal conflict . . . he pierces pathogenic operations by a device I call 'tickling the defenses' . . . this is a tactic of catching the family members by surprise, exposing dramatic discrepancies . . . he challenges empty clichés. . . . It is a method that hits home.

One can hardly fail to be impressed by the aggression in the verbs he chooses: strips, provokes, pierces, tickles, catches (out), exposes, challenges, hits. And it is this aggression which seems to me to be the most striking characteristic of the interviews in spite of his contention that the therapist (in contrast to the 'traditional' sort) is 'more humble, more open . . . there is a greater sense of mutual respect'. For example, the R family come to see him about their nine year old boy who has been having tantrums and nightmares. The boy complains that his parents don't allow him to buy as many comics as he wants. The mother says:

'He doesn't buy regular comics, but those monsters . . . then he gets nightmares.'

Dr. A.: 'Well, he doesn't get nightmares from the comics.'

Mother: 'He does, Doctor.'

In the right-hand column, where the author puts his explanations and interpretations to the reader he writes: 'Here mother opposes therapist with her omniscient way of thinking.'

Dr. A.: 'Who knows better, you or I?'

The parents continue to put opposing arguments, but then they give in: Mother: 'Okay . . . anything you say, I'm willing to do anything as long as it will help.'

The mother and father then start to argue as to which had been the main culprit in depriving the boy of his comic books. Is this what Dr. Ackerman means by reprojecting the conflict into the field of family interaction? It

seems that when he talks of finding a new and healthier resolution he sometimes means solving a problem in the way in which he, the therapist, thinks is right, even on an issue like this one on which the 'experts' are sharply divided.

The interview which opens the book is, I think, a very striking example of both the strengths and weaknesses of his style of therapy. It is the second interview with a middle class family and it is recorded in its entirety. The family consists of Father, a business man, Mother, a speech teacher, and their children, John 16, and Peg, 11. Although the event which caused them to seek therapy was that of Peg's threatening John with a knife, it is John, with his temper tantrums and poor school performance, who has been a problem child almost since birth.

Dr. Ackerman opens the interview by calling their attention to Father's sigh. Father assures him that it is just 'physical' and the doctor retorts, 'Who are you kidding?' Father at no time admits that he may be expressing real feelings in gesture while denying them in words, but the rest of the family seems to get the point. Soon we are on to Mother's belching and here again the other members are quick to see the underlying hostility and apparently enjoy Dr. Ackerman's joking about it, but she continues to repeat her first explanation, 'I swallow air, it's a nervous habit'. It's a short way from belching to bed, but here the children become uncomfortable and try to change the subject. Dr. Ackerman will not have it.

Dr. A.: 'Now every time we concentrate on the love life between Ma and Pa you two kids start cutting up.' John admits, '... because I don't like it one bit.'

Peg, in desperation, shouts that she will tell her brother's secret even though he has threatened to 'murder' her if she does so, for the secret concerns his 'smooching' with his girl friend. Her manoeuvre works. Dr. Ackerman is diverted. But what he does is to make an interpretation about the brother-sister romance. This is too much for John who threatens to leave but, in a rather touching display of his need for help, agrees to stay when Dr. Ackerman turns to him and says he would like him to do so. However, the direct sexual interpretations continue and John runs off, soon followed by Peg. The doctor then turns to the parents and says: 'Hmnn, all right folks, here's your chance to talk in plain English now, about your sex life.'

It sounds as if everyone (and not least this reader) is relieved when the youngsters leave, but it seems to me that the therapist, far from being the 'participant observer' has, in fact, been sucked into one aspect of this family's pathology, namely to communicate a double message (e.g. I want you to stay; I don't want you to stay). How else can we explain the insensitivity to the need of young adolescents (and whom he has only met once before) to protect themselves from awareness of their sexual feelings towards their parents and towards each other?

Dr. Ackerman talks a great deal about the need for plain direct speaking on the part of the therapist, but in practice it seems to mean being ungrammatical and familiar. For example, he calls his patients of any age by their first names, just as house physicians used to do on the wards, but never to the private patients; but they call him Dr. Ackerman. When talking either to adults or to children about their parents he uses Mom, Pop, etc., but without

waiting to find out what their own customary usage is. In the family cited above John calls them Father and Mother. But Dr. Ackerman, in the course of a few minutes has said Pop, Mom, Poppa, Momma, Ma, Pa. He seems to be trying to be 'one of the boys' without waiting to hear what the boys say. In the same vein he talks what he calls 'plain English' to these patients, but it is not the sort of English that these middle class people use themselves, e.g. '... these girls, they treated you pretty sweet', or 'To me, you're a real pleasing woman.'

Isn't this the sort of condescension of the old-time colonial who talked pidgin English to the natives, not distinguishing between those who knew only pidgin and those who were Oxford graduates?

I do not mean to suggest that Dr. Ackerman's technique, his use of confrontation, early interpretation, and outright intervention may not sometimes, perhaps often, be effective; but it seems most unlikely that its effectiveness is due to re-projecting 'intra-physical into inter-personal conflict'; it is probably due to other factors which he emphasizes rather less, that is to his spontaneity, his passionate interest, his willingness to shoulder the responsibility for family decisions, and, above all, what sounds like genuine concern for the people he is treating.

These are not only agreeable qualities, they may be the most significant ones for any psychotherapist; but they are qualities that cannot be taught. What can be taught is the pseudo-intimacy, the early interpretation, based more on one's theories than on the evidence, the willingness to use oneself (presumably because one is so well adjusted or has been so well analysed) as a trustworthy guide for 'reality testing' and as a model in finding 'healthy' values. This is an easy book to read; it is comparatively short, vivid, full of interesting material, and written with the vigour of one who knows he is always right. What rather alarms me is that, at a time when family therapy is becoming one of the new panaceas, it is likely not only to be widely read, but widely imitated.

DORIS Y. MAYER

BERNARD K. JOHNPOLL, *The Politics of Futility, The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, 1917-1943*, xix + 198 pp., Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1967, \$8.75.

A history of the Jewish Bund in English has yet to be written, and any attempt to make available to an English-reading public an account of its Polish phase is to be welcomed.

The bulk of this book is devoted to an account of the Bund's struggle to pursue a Jewish socialist policy, as it understood this, in an increasingly hostile, antisemitic, anti-socialist, independent Poland. The Bund emerges during this period as an entity at odds with every other political configuration in Poland, and indeed in Europe. Vainly it defended its constituents (a portion of the Jewish working class) against the internal predatory forces of Communism, assimilationism, Zionism, and apathy, and the external forces of fascism and antisemitism. And with equal futility the Bund clung to sacrosanct beliefs and doctrine, which rendered it ultimately helpless.

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The Bund arose and developed as an organization of the Jewish working class in the Russian Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. When Poland became independent after the First World War, and the Bolsheviks in the new Soviet Russia saw to it that no other parties should exist, the only area in which the Bund could continue to function was in this new Poland which, while it harboured three and a half million Jews, was not predisposed to allot them a proportional say in the running of the country. Furthermore, virulent anti-bolshevik and anti-Russian feeling among the Poles tended to overflow on to the Jews who were, as an alien group par excellence, regarded as pro-Russian and pro-Bolshevik.

However, there were other socialist parties in Poland which suffered similar and equally unjustified odium, in particular the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). Professor Johnpoll emphasizes repeatedly that the Bund ought to have put alliance with this party at the top of its priorities, for to attempt to survive and be effective on its own was, he claims, the height of utopian futility. This theme is rather confused, since the author also makes it plain that at several junctures the Bund made overtures to the PPS, only to be rejected for fear that an open association with a Jewish organization would damage the Polish party's image with the broadly antisemitic electorate. As an alternative policy he suggests the Bund could have gone into voluntary liquidation and its members into the PPS as individuals, but voicing Bundist aspirations. Again it appears this avenue was closed by excessive loyalty to the old party, and by what the author terms the Bund 'myth', which preserved it as a sort of holy brotherhood.

The Polish background is mainly unfamiliar territory and Professor Johnpoll introduces an air of unreality by relying heavily on Bundist or Yiddish sources when discussing it. For example, on p. 76 he cites a Yiddish (and probably Bundist) source to describe the attitude of the Polish Social Democrats and PPS Lewica to the Bolshevik Revolution. A derivative of this bias is exposed in his rendering of the Polish word *rada* (council), which is plainly mutated through a Yiddish translation and emerges as *Rahde*. Corruption of non-Jewish names in Yiddish materials is quite common so that we get Bakhunin, Lederbour, Tsertelli, Tchekiadze appearing here. (It must be all those Katsenelenboigens and Finkelshteins getting their own back.)

The author imports into his specialized study some remarkable generalizations about the related background. It is not useful to assert, for example, that the 'corruption-infested Russian army was forced to withdraw from Poland in mid-1915' (p. 40). Must we take it on trust, as he evidently does, that the Russian army was as he describes it? Similarly he asserts that 'Polish antisemitism was economic in origin, a result of the country's class structure' (p. 45). This naive rendering of Marxist interpretation owes a lot to Bundist agitational literature, which was never intended for incorporation into learned works.

The author's attitude seems to be determined by his belief that the 'Polish Bund was a political failure' for, in accordance with his 'personal theory of politics'—a theory which he derives from Burke—it is the unavoidable duty of every political party to seek state power, and the Bund did not even attain a single seat in the Sejm.

Having thus accorded the Bund its *raison d'être*, the author proceeds to

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show that it could never hope to achieve its aim, if only because it sought to represent a minority of a minority. This heavy emphasis on failure regrettably deprives the author of any real understanding of what motivated the Bund. As a socialist party its primary aim was not state power, neither ideologically nor in practice. Its aim was to serve the interests of the working class, and within that vague and somewhat pious formula there could be a whole range of possible tasks including, if feasible, the government of the state in the event of a socialist revolution. Since the Bund was not the Bolshevik Party, it did not embrace the concept of the seizure of power by an insignificant minority, but instead remained in its more real world of trade union activity, schools, local government, and other areas of social welfare. As a consequence of the work done at this level the Bund became by 1939 'the strongest party among the Jews of Poland', as even the author himself shows. Why this achievement should be regarded as futile remains a mystery. A better title for the book might have been *The Politics of the Possible*.

This study is nonetheless of interest as an account of the internal complexion of the Bund and its leaders during a period of permanent crisis, but it does not reach the author's own criterion for the proper study of a political party, which should be 'in the context of the political and social system in which it arises' (p. 1).

HAROLD SHUKMAN

BORIS STERN, *The Kibbutz That Was*, vii + 158 pp., Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1965, \$3.75.

ELIYAHU KANOVSKY, *The Economy of the Israeli Kibbutz*, ix + 169 pp., Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs, no. 13, Oxford University Press, London, 1966, 28s.

For many people, the term 'kibbutz' is the symbol of the ideal and pioneering values of Israeli society. But the kibbutz as a form of social organization is not what it used to be. The increase in size of most established kibbutzim, together with economic development and political changes, has brought about a transformation of the internal forms of communal life: there is greater emphasis on privacy and on the conjugal family as a 'sacred' area of social life; there is greater fragmentation into informal cliques; and there is an emerging structure of bureaucratic organization and a concomitant decline in the importance of the collective assembly as a decision-making body. Furthermore, the demands of agricultural 'rationalization' and the growth of industries compel an increasing dependence on hired labour. This last compromise with ideology has been the one most strongly resisted; partly because it meant the extraction of 'surplus value' from the labour of others, which is the ultimate in ideological degradation; and partly because it was easier to resist than other changes.

The title of Dr. Stern's book makes it clear that it is about the gradual disappearance of the ideal *gemeinschaftliche Kibbutz*. The first part of the book deals with the growth of affluence—agricultural progress, the establishment of industries, and changes in patterns of consumption and life styles—while the second deals with politics and ideology, hired labour, education, and the

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future outlook. All of this is based on observation of a large number of communities and on analysis of available statistical evidence. The author is very much concerned with the role of Marxism, and he clearly dislikes what he considers to be the totalitarian character of Mapam—affiliated kibbutzim. Whether his moral outrage is any more justified than his reference to the highly-charged events of the 1950s to demonstrate the pernicious effects of Marxism, is a matter for considerable debate. There has been a great dearth of evidence on this and other matters since the appearance of Spiro's *Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia*. But Dr. Stern's book both informs and provokes; despite the lack of ethnographic evidence, some of the arguments ring true—at least, for this reviewer.

If Stern's analysis hinges largely on the assumption of economic rationalization, Kanovsky's sets out to examine it in great detail and with considerable economic sophistication. The author deals first with the general character of Israeli agriculture, the history of the kibbutz movement, and the nature of the kibbutz as a form of social and economic organization. He then turns to the really interesting and important issues which lie at the heart of the matter: the changing position of the kibbutzim in the national economy; and the degree of efficiency, productivity, and profitability shown in the economic organization of kibbutz ventures. As some of the kibbutz ideologues might say, there is an interesting 'contradiction' here: increasing efficiency is not always, or even usually, accompanied by increasing profitability. (A bourgeois economist would find no 'contradiction' here.) The reasons for this lie in the nature of financing, in the use of manpower, and, ultimately, in collectivism itself. One might say that the relative failure of profitability is simply a small cost to be endured for the sake of the particular way of life. But only a small proportion of Israel's agricultural population seems willing to pay so trivial a price for the benefits which kibbutz life can clearly bestow. But then, perhaps, the real disadvantages have little or nothing to do with economic profitability.

Both these books contain good bibliographical guides; and each is an indispensable item for the student of kibbutz affairs and of collectivist communities.

PERCY S. COHEN

PETER I. ROSE, ed., *The Study of Society. An Integrated Anthology*, xii + 958 pp., Random House, New York, 1967, \$5.95.

Sociological handbooks are improving steadily. They tend to have more illustrations from theoretically-oriented research, and fewer of those tedious items entitled 'What is a Community?' in which the writer not uncommonly comes to the conclusion that a community is, on the whole, a good thing. This one is in line with the trend, and is all the more deserving of praise for being intended for students at various levels of academic development; at least, this should be the case, since some of the articles, such as that of Shils on 'Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties' can be read with profit only by an advanced student, whereas many others are strictly for the sociological 'freshmen'. Some, too—about six or seven out of a total of seventy—might have been excluded without loss to anyone, except possibly the authors.

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The volume is divided into six parts—The Sociological Approach, Culture and the Individual, Social Organization (an unfortunate and ambiguous term), Stratification and Differentiation, Selected Social Institutions, Continuity and Change—each in turn subdivided. The editor has linked the different parts with introductory statements which are helpful and intrinsically interesting; but it is only these which entitle him to refer to the volume as an 'integrated' anthology. There is little connexion between the analysis of 'Cultural Components in Responses to Pain' and 'Affluence in British Class Structure'.

If yet another anthology is to include the Davis and Moore theory of stratification, it should also include at least one critique of it; this one does not.

The editor confesses, in his preface, to a certain ethnocentrism. His defence is that it is a good thing for the American student to study what is unfamiliar within the context of a familiar society and culture. There is strength in this argument, but it is taken much too far—e.g., the only item dealing with caste is one which compares it with negro-white relations in the South. There are some distinguished authorities on caste—and I do not deny this title to Gerald D. Berreman—who would find this misleading. There is little on other Western societies and less on those of the 'developing' or non-developing world.

There are two other forms of disturbing ethnocentrism: the only non-American contributors are three Englishmen and S. N. Eisenstadt—and there is not a single contribution to a volume called 'The Study of Society' by a European (including British) social anthropologist; and all the contributors are 'contemporary'—there is an implied assumption that Simmel, Durkheim, and Weber are both dead *and* gone.

One final criticism: the editor may consider it pedagogically defensible that there are few purely theoretical articles; but why, if he does include a few, do they almost all deal with the nature of culture?

The rationale behind the selection of many of the articles is not obvious. But this is a pleasingly unconventional collection of items, and it is useful for the student to have them between two well-packed soft covers. The author's own introductory summaries of each article, which are clear and precise, are extremely valuable for those who wish to select in terms of their own interests. Readers particularly interested in Jewish social life and allied subjects will find a fascinating account by the editor himself of the relations between small-town Jews and non-Jews in the U.S. (first published in this *Journal*, Vol. 3, 1961), and they will also find a number of other articles dealing with problems of minorities and race relations.

PERCY S. COHEN

OSCAR I. JANOWSKY, ed., *The Education of American Jewish Teachers*, with a foreword by Abram Leon Sachar, xvii + 352 pp., published for the Philip W. Lown Center for Contemporary Jewish Studies by Beacon Press, Boston, 1967, \$8.50.

By enlisting more than a score of the most eminent American Jewish educationists to cover his subject in independent essays the editor risked both

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repetition and omission. To meet this danger he carefully allotted specific topics to his collaborators and even more usefully brought most of them together at a colloquium held at Brandeis University in May 1966, where the papers that are the core of the book were read. Although the editor refrained, perhaps unwisely but inevitably, from pulling the contributions into one flowing narrative and the book remains a symposium, he has presented us with an authoritative and honest account of American Jewish teacher training.

There are twenty-three essays in addition to a foreword and a preface and all cannot be usefully summarized here. We must make do with a sample.

W. I. Ackerman's 'A profile of the Hebrew teachers' colleges' is a good place to begin. The author examines eleven 'accredited' teacher-training schools, their admission requirements, their degree requirements, their enrolment, and much else including the emoluments of the members of their faculties. He frankly doubts the success of efforts to secure a satisfactory standard of admission and he is despondent about the output. He believes that not more than 125 to 150 graduates from the eleven colleges entered the teaching profession during the two years 1964-65 and 1965-66. He is not as disturbed as the reviewer is by the distribution of credits required for graduation. On the average only 12 per cent of the total number of credits is required for education. The rest is required mainly for Bible, Hebrew language and literature, history, and rabbinic literature.

The curricula of the colleges are more closely studied by Samuel Dinin, who is equally frank in recognizing shortcomings. Most of the colleges use Hebrew as the language of instruction. Dinin finds that many entrants, although coming from Hebrew high schools, cannot speak fluently or read without vowels. A lesson in history sometimes becomes a lecture on the meaning of a Hebrew word. Because the entrants come ill prepared it is difficult to prescribe whole books for study and the colleges 'tend to teach a lot of fragments from many authors'. Sadly, though it may be outside his terms of reference, Dinin mourns the fact that few of the graduates read Hebrew books (he means imaginative literature) after they graduate.

Who are these students who so depress Dinin? Alvin I. Schiff in the next essay presents us with a most interesting profile. 897 students in eleven colleges completed four-page questionnaires which he analysed. It is a pity that the complete profile of the typical student cannot be reproduced here but it should be read. The typical student is a 19-year-old unmarried female born in the U.S.A., who attends an orthodox synagogue, and comes from a middle-class home. Sometimes Schiff strains the word 'typical'. 55 per cent of the respondents plan to become Hebrew teachers. Are they demonstrably 'typical'? Incidentally, among males only 23 per cent would choose teaching as a career. Schiff himself doubts the validity of the 'typical' choice of career in view of the fact that in the past decade only 15 to 30 per cent have entered or stayed in Hebrew teaching.

By British standards immense sums are lavished on the training of these typical students. Albert P. Schoolman delves with assurance into the economics. In 1965-66 the expenditure of eleven schools totalled about \$2,500,000. There were 157 graduates in 1965 and 175 in 1966, i.e. 15 or 16 per school per year. The investigator finds that the high expenditure is due

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in the main to the small size of the schools. If that is so in America the prospects for teacher-training colleges in smaller communities are daunting. Both the editor in a footnote and Schoolman himself warn us that the figures need qualification. The colleges fulfil other functions than their proper one of teacher-training, and the amounts directly expended on teacher-training cannot be isolated.

These eleven accredited schools with their vast budgets do not monopolize the field. They send their graduates mainly to the Talmud Torahs and the Hebrew day schools, either to teach or to administer. Many more teachers are required for the 'Sunday classes', the afternoon classes, and the like. Many of these teachers Abraham Segal in an illuminating essay dubs 'non-Hebraic' teachers, because often little more is asked of them than a minimal reading knowledge of Hebrew 'or not even that'. Segal rightly believes that these teachers need and deserve as good a training as their colleagues, but they do not get it. Another author, Leon A. Jack, examines the possibility of making minimal Jewish education viable.

There is much else in the book, discussion of the education of Yiddish teachers, of in-service training, of the part played by Israeli teachers and their preparation for work in the Diaspora, and of Jewish studies in American universities.

Azriel Eisenberg pinpoints one central problem, noted also in passing by some of his co-authors. Good entrants to the teacher-training schools must come from the Hebrew high schools. Only if these are improved can the standard of the training schools be improved.

In one short sentence in a short foreword Abram L. Sachar defines the aim of the training-schools. They are to provide teachers 'well-informed, imaginative, incandescent'. This book will serve a noble purpose by demonstrating to the colleges how far they are from their goal and by directing them towards it.

HAROLD LEVY

MICHAEL A. MEYER, *The Origins of The Modern Jew, Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germany, 1749-1824*, 250 pp., Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1967, \$8.50.

Professor Meyer has set out to answer two important questions. The first, which is general and wisely left without a firm reply, concerns the nature of the characteristics in terms of which Jews in liberal Western societies see themselves as different from their fellow-countrymen. The second, which is specific and whose answer provides the main body of the book, asks how the Jews of Germany saw themselves as a distinctive part of German society from the period of the Enlightenment to the rise of romantic nationalism.

When the enlightened German rulers of the eighteenth century sought to apply the universalist lessons of the rationalists and opened up the ghettos, Jews and Gentiles were faced with formidable problems of adaptation. Centuries of persecution and restrictions had made the Jews clannish and often unsavoury, ignorant of the culture of the host-country, and militant about their own traditions. On the other hand, Gentiles, however enlightened,

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tended to view with distaste the products of their ancestors' intolerance. Intellectual leaders on both sides tried to find the means to overcome the prejudices that lay in the way of emancipation and assimilation.

Professor Meyer is not very interested in Jews who used the opened ghetto doors as mere escape routes from Judaism. He concentrates on the struggle of those who wanted to retain a certain distinctiveness within their now welcoming host-society, a distinctiveness they took great pains to define while eagerly embracing—and soon contributing to—the culture of the country in which they found themselves. Indeed, Professor Meyer shows that it was the evolution of German culture which determined the kind of answer Jewish intellectuals gave about their identity. For example, Mendelssohn's cultural context was the universalism of the Enlightenment with its (frequent) acceptance of natural religion. His belief that the distinctiveness of Judaism lies in its ethics which, according to him, is rationally superior to Christianity is coupled with the thesis that Judaism sums up the basic elements of natural religion. Friedlaender's was the same context, and his outlook differed from Mendelssohn's in its aristocratic pretensions rather than in basic beliefs. If he toyed with conversion it was because he was tempted to draw the logical consequences from his universalist convictions that led him at times to see religion merely as a social phenomenon, and less because his fastidiousness was offended by too many of his fellow-Jews.

As universalism passed through the Kantian phase and finally had to make way for romanticism, Jewish intellectuals had to come to terms with the new outlook. With the end of the Napoleonic wars the time had gone when they could feel entitled to appeal to their political rulers to force recalcitrant fellow-Jews into the cultural heritage of the eighteenth century. Zunz adapted the *Volksgeist* ethos of German nationalism and thus began the process of defensive argument that foreshadowed the renewed isolation in which the Jews were soon again to find themselves. If Zunz wanted the Jews to cultivate their own cultural garden in imitation of the Teutomania that was fast gaining disciples around him, it was left to List to draw the melancholy conclusion that Judaism was a nationality and not a nationalism; the latter presupposed that one had a country. Pogroms restarted in 1819.

Professor Meyer has written a fascinating and intelligent book. His style is economical and his reasoning unexceptionable. If there is a criticism, it is that he uses the word 'rationalism' in so many different contexts that it is emptied of clear significance. As a philosophical term of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries its meaning is clearcut. At least one of his readers was left gasping at the statement that 'The Jewish commitment to rationalism . . . may have been nourished by the Jews' centuries-long activity as merchant and moneylender' (p. 86).

HERBERT TINT

WIJNBURG, S., *De Joden in Amsterdam*, 177 pp., Van Gorcum, Assen, 1967, 14.90 Dutch guilders.

In 1962 and 1963 the author carried out, with the help of some interviewers, an enquiry based on a questionnaire. He took a random sample of 210 per-

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sons from a master list of 12,400 Amsterdam adult Jews. Most of the questions were closed and precoded. The book reveals some quite interesting facts, but it should be stated at once that the methodology of the research lends itself to criticism. The questionnaire allowed little scope for unexpected discoveries, for finding correlations between demographic data, opinions, behaviour, and actual cultural choice. Admittedly, the author took some care in the phrasing of the questionnaire; he has the advantage of personal knowledge of Dutch Jewry and he studied similar enquiries. Nevertheless, it is still difficult to weigh up the questions and the answers—with the result that the structure of the book and the synthesis do not emerge clearly.

These reservations apart, the work is a valuable contribution; the author reveals, with a wealth of detail, the striking decline of Jewish traditions in Amsterdam. Thus, whereas 21 per cent of the respondents light Hanukkah candles, 45 per cent stated that their parents used to do so. There is an inverse correlation in the matter of Christmas trees: 22 per cent of the respondents use them, while barely 10 per cent of the parents did so; moreover, among interviewees who have small children, 45 per cent have Christmas trees. The ritual Friday evening meal was served by 84 per cent of the respondents' parents and is still a practice among 51 per cent of those interviewed; this is remarkable, and may be due to the fact that the sense of family unity is one of the Jewish traditions most highly valued by the respondents. On the other hand, 40 per cent have a traditional Christmas meal whereas 17 per cent of parents did so. Finally, only 47 per cent of the respondents married under a *hupa*, whereas 88 per cent of parents did so.

The author notes that half his sample are engaged in three traditionally Jewish occupations: textiles, diamonds and jewelry, and intellectual pursuits. This group reacts more positively to Jewish customs. He tells us that the socio-economic status of the respondents is higher than that of the non-Jewish Amsterdam inhabitants, but he gives few details about the social and economic characteristics of these 'Jewish occupations'. He does, however, give other valuable data. Only about 4 per cent of the sample are of central European origin; 7 per cent came from Germany, and 85 per cent are Dutch-born. Forty-six per cent of the respondents believe in God, and of these, 23 per cent believe that God gave the Torah to Moses. Although there is a scant degree of religious observance or of knowledge of Jewish culture, there is great interest in Judaism: 87 per cent of the respondents see (or listen to) broadcasts about Jews, and 67 per cent read books with Jewish content. It is worth noting in passing that the percentage of persons who read *books* is remarkably high—this fact alone would merit further analysis.

Although the fate of Israel closely concerns three-quarters of the sample, a bare 25 per cent have ever considered emigrating to the new State.

The research has brought to light a clear sense of community feeling, but it is a feeling often overlaid by nostalgia. Nevertheless, the desire not to present an obviously Jewish appearance is equally strong. The most reprehensible traits among Jews are said to be ostentation, talking loudly, gesticulating, and speaking 'Jewish'. Inversely, there is approbation for those Jews whose behaviour renders them inconspicuous. This attitude notwithstanding, 65 per cent of the respondents declared (but did they truly mean it?) that if they had the choice, they would opt for being re-born as Jews.

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Faced with these contradictions, the author (following Kurt Lewin) concludes that Amsterdam Jews are marginal men, lonely, atomized, and alienated from their traditional culture. He notes, with justification, that Jewish marginality is only a rather special case of a general trend in Western urban society. In these circumstances, he suggests that this alienation might be partly alleviated by parochial-type activities. I have my doubts.

JACQUES GUTWIRTH

GORDON, ALBERT I., *The Nature of Conversion. A study of forty-five men and women who changed their religion*, xii + 333 pp., Beacon Press, Boston, 1967, \$5.95.

Strictly this book is less about conversion than changes of religion in which genuine conversion sometimes takes place. Indeed, there is a basic concern to make these changes of adherence into authentic conversions and Dr. Gordon goes at some length into the preconditions of authenticity. There is a strong prescriptive element here in terms of advice to in-laws, clergy, spouses, etc., as to how they may make straight the path of the potential convert.

All of which is admirable in its own terms, and one would hardly quarrel with it since clearly there is a need for clergy to maintain personal rather than formal contact with the convert, for in-laws to practise rather than profess their religion, and so on. These prescriptions are based on descriptions of forty-five people who changed their religion. There is no pretence that these are representative of some wider American population since most of them have converted to Judaism. They do tell us about converts to Judaism, however, and the broad outlines are probably true of their wider population, e.g. the fact that most conversions are made to maintain family unity and that underlying attitudes are often not much affected. It is also interesting that people tend to 'shop around' the various forms of Judaism until they find a suitably accommodating set of requirements.

But one would really like more analysis at a somewhat deeper level. In fact the case histories give us the clues here. Rabbi Gordon has certainly been sensitive in eliciting these life stories, and the recounters are often remarkably self-conscious in their understanding of the processes they have undergone, and even where not self-conscious they give clear glimpses into the personality and the life-styles of the various religious groups. The author stresses the element of unhappy broken homes in the background of the convert—the desire to find a new stability and the fact that such a background creates less opposition to the change. Yet somehow this is where one would like a little more probing, even speculation, about the family 'dynamics' from which the convert emerges. At one point he says that converts have no conscious desire to hurt, whatever may be true at the subconscious level. Quite, but it is this level which might prove crucial. What is it that makes an individual select a partner whom he knows will cause distress to his parents and drive a wedge between him and his family? Is he sometimes seeking just such a wedge, searching for the crisis that will give him some social distance from his family? Or is he in other circumstances using the symbolic value of 'treason'

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to reproach his parents for the relative importance accorded him in the family, to gain a notice not achieved before? There are a myriad possibilities and it is perhaps a pity that Rabbi Gordon's book, for all its sensitivity and the moving aspects of the case histories, does not pursue them further.

DAVID MARTIN

EPSTEIN, LOUIS M., *Sex Laws and Customs in Judaism*, xxiv + 251 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1967, \$8.95.

Originally published in 1948, this book was planned as a companion to the same author's *Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud* (1942). Its general theme is 'the Jewish standard of sex conduct outside marriage'; the topics dealt with range from 'modesty in dress' and 'sex segregation in public places' to 'rape and seduction' and 'adultery'. In each chapter, and sometimes division of a chapter, the relevant data are presented in chronological sequence, e.g. 'biblical legislation', 'talmudic law', 'post-talmudic law', and an occasional sentence or two on modern times. Since there is no attempt to treat together the different aspects as they were at any one period, the general effect is to make the book seem like a collection of disjointed encyclopaedia articles. It is decidedly useful as a well-documented guide to orthodox teaching from the viewpoint of a pious believer. Its value for the sociologist is diminished by a general failure to relate that teaching to prevailing social conditions, and by the relative paucity of case-histories illustrating how the moral code was actually applied in specific instances.

I. SCHAPERA

CHRONICLE

The Institute for Applied Social Research in Jerusalem recently carried out a survey of religious practice and attitudes in Israel. The following are some of the results and conclusions. 8 per cent of the sample consider themselves unreservedly religious and attend synagogue daily; 18 per cent visit the synagogue only once a year; while 26 per cent never enter a synagogue, even on Yom Kippur; 13 per cent fully respect the Jewish religion, whereas 20 per cent say they are totally detached from it; 48 per cent affirm respect for 'some part of the tradition'.

When asked if they thought it is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that public life in Israel should conform to Jewish religious tradition, 42 per cent said 'no', 26 per cent said 'yes', and the remainder were non-committal.

From the results of the survey it may seem that secondary schooling induces the most religious scepticism: 62 per cent of those with secondary education said that they were completely detached from religion, whereas only 16 per cent of those with a university education said so; 10 per cent of those who had attended university declared themselves to be firmly attached to religion.

Of those who said they attend synagogue daily, 30 per cent voted for the religious parties in the last elections, and 40 per cent voted for the Alignment of Mapai and Achdut Avoda.

*

At a meeting of the Public Services Committee of the Knesset in November 1967, the Minister of Social Welfare reported that some 350,000 children in Israel live in large low-income families. Some 204,000 children in 67,000 families benefit from grants given to large families.

*

At the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development last February, the Governor of the Bank of Israel reported on Israel's financial position. He said that by the application of capital, know-how, and science, Israel's agricultural production went up in one decade (1955 to 1965) by 156 per cent in real terms, while employment in agriculture went up only by 6.5 per cent.

*

There was a marked increase during 1967 in the number of tourists to Israel. In November 1967, 14,281 tourists visited the country as against 12,159 in November 1966; in December 1967, 26,760 as against 17,605 in December 1966; and in January 1968, 13,875 as against 11,405 in January 1967. The major contribution to this increase in tourism is thought to be united Jerusalem, which attracts both Jews and non-Jews.

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A lectureship in social science with special reference to Israeli studies has been created at the School of Asian and African Studies, Sussex University. This has been made possible by an agreement between the Israeli government and Sussex University, and is the first of its kind at a British university. The lecturer will be expected to spend part of his time in Israel on research.

*

The U.S. National Science Foundation awarded Israel over half of the estimated \$62,000,000 allocated by U.S. agencies for research abroad during 1967. The other four leading research grant recipients were Canada, India, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

*

A centre for research into methods of educating pupils of underprivileged backgrounds is to be established at the Hebrew University; it is financed by the National Council of Jewish Women in the United States. This institution will be the first in Israel to conduct research exclusively on problems of education for the disadvantaged.

*

A chair for peaceful uses of atomic energy has been opened at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovoth. 200 American statesmen, scientists, and trade union leaders aided in initiating the project.

*

Two schools on the West Bank, a women teachers' seminary and an agricultural school, have been allocated large grants by the Israeli military government. From 1 March 1968, Hebrew became a compulsory subject in East Jerusalem schools, for both teachers and pupils.

*

The ORT, which serves Jewish educational and humanitarian needs throughout the world, has adopted a record budget of \$15,109,500 for 1968. This exceeds last year's allocation by more than \$1,700,000. At the national conference of the American ORT Federation it was said that during 1967, ORT networks in 23 countries enrolled 47,855 persons, mainly young, people.

*

At the end of 1967, there were 3,500 volunteers in Israel; 1,200 changed their status and have become immigrants or temporary residents; 650 are students, 350 are working full-time, and the remainder are in kibbutzim where they work half-day and study half-day.

*

In the first eleven weeks of 1968, 211 British emigrants settled in Israel, as compared with 123 in the first thirteen weeks of 1967.

*

The Trades Advisory Council in London is planning a scheme to provide facilities for training prospective immigrants to Israel. They would be

CHRONICLE.

trained in Britain for managerial and executive posts and also as skilled technicians.

*

Jews from India living in Israel have decided to federate their immigrant associations; these are the Association of Cochin Jews, the Hitachdut Olei Hodu, and the Bene Israel Immigrant Society.

*

The first seven African students to complete a six-year medical course at the Hebrew University Hadassah Medical School returned to their countries in December 1967. They will be awarded doctorates after a one-year internship at approved African hospitals.

*

The Central Bureau of Statistics in Jerusalem has published a census of *West Bank of the Jordan, Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai, Golan Heights*—a census of population taken after the June 1967 War. There were a total of 994,735 persons: in the West Bank, 598,637; in the Gaza Strip, 356,261; in North Sinai, 33,441; and in the Golan Heights, 6,396.

On the West Bank, Nablus and Hebron each had over 100,000 individuals; but population density was highest in the Tulkarm district with 217.6 persons per sq. km. In the remaining districts the density varied from 88 to 137 persons per sq. km., except in the Jericho district whose population was particularly affected by departures due to the recent war.

POPULATION, AREA, AND POPULATION DENSITY
IN THE WEST BANK, BY DISTRICT

District	Population		Area (Sq. Km.)	Density per Sq. Km.
	Absolute Numbers	Percentages		
Total	598,637	100.0	5,505.0	108.7
Hebron	118,358	19.7	1,056.2	112.1
Bethlehem	49,515	8.3	565.2	87.6
Jerusalem	29,904	5.0	284.1	105.3
Jericho	9,078	1.5	338.1	26.9
Ramallah	88,877	14.8	770.3	114.9
Nablus	152,381	25.5	1,587.4	96.0
Tulkarm	72,229	12.1	332.0	217.6
Jenin	78,295	13.1	571.7	137.0

Israel announced at the United Nations in New York that she will contribute IL1,000,000 to the United Nations Work and Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees to alleviate the plight of Arab refugees in Israel-occupied territory.

*

The foundation-stone of the first synagogue to be built in Spain since the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 was laid in Madrid in March 1968, accom-

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panied by a special ceremony. Many Moroccan Jews have settled in Madrid since the 1950s. The City now has a Jewish school with more than fifty pupils, a kasher restaurant, and organized *shehita*. The completed synagogue building will also contain a *mikva* (ritual bath) and a large hall.

*

It is estimated that there are in Britain 65,600 Jewish children aged between 5 and 17 years. Of these, 22,360 in London and 13,520 in the provinces receive some formal Jewish tuition. It is further estimated that 20,000-27,000 children in this age-group receive no Jewish education whatever. The survey was carried out by the Education Department of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, who have expressed great concern.

*

The Orthodox Rabbinical Council of America intends to send a team of Rabbis, teachers, and social workers to Jewish communities in Latin America. They say that there are many communities, some with as many as 20,000 to 25,000 Jews, without rabbis, youth leaders, teachers, or social workers. As a first step, the Council will send a delegation to Latin American countries to study the specific needs of the Jewish communities there.

*

A statistical study by two Italian Jewish graduate students of Italy's Jewish community suggests that the community is in danger of demographic extinction as a result of a declining birth rate, immigration, and the effects of Nazi and Fascist persecution; about 13,500 Jews left Italy by deportation and emigration. There is a steady internal migration from small and medium-size communities to larger cities. 57 per cent of all actively employed Jews in Italy are in commerce, 16 per cent are professionals, and 14 per cent are workers and technicians.

*

In its issue of 15 March 1968 the *Jewish Chronicle* gave the following data on Jews in Eastern Europe:

Soviet Union. The total population is 233,180,000, of whom 2,268,000 are Jewish.

Poland. The total population is 31,698,000, of whom 20,000 are Jewish. After 1956 Poland permitted emigration to the Jewish State.

Czechoslovakia. The total population is 14,240,000, of whom 14,000 are Jewish. Emigration to Israel has been permitted.

Rumania. The total population is 19,143,000, of whom 100,000 are Jewish.

Hungary. The total population is 10,179,000, of whom 80,000 are Jewish.

Yugoslavia. The total population is 19,756,000, of whom 6,500 are Jewish.

Bulgaria. The total population is 8,258,000, of whom 6,000 are Jewish.

East Germany. The total population is 17,067,000, of whom 1,400 are Jewish.

*

The 1965 Turkish census gave the Jewish population as 39,000, of whom 31,000 live in Istanbul. Like the other principal minority groups, the Greeks

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and Armenians, Jews are mainly engaged in commerce, with a smaller number in the professions.

*

A total of 3,588 Jews emigrated to Canada during the first nine months of 1967; 1,863 of these (more than half the total) were either citizens, or permanent residents, of Israel. The figure for the corresponding period of 1966 was 2,233 Jewish immigrants, of whom 1,077 came from Israel.

*

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- EHRMAN**, Albert; B.A., B.H.L., M.A., history teacher at James Monroe High School (Bronx). Chief publications: 'The Commandment Keepers: A Negro "Jewish" Cult in America Today', *Judaism* (Summer, 1959); 'What Did Cain Say to Abel?', *The Jewish Quarterly Review* (Oct. 1964).
- FENSTER**, C. Abraham; B.B.A., M.S., Ph.D., Assistant Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, and Lecturer, Graduate Division, City College of New York. Currently engaged in a study of masculinity among police officers in New York City.
- FINER**, S. E., M.A.(Oxon); Professor of Government, University of Manchester; formerly Lecturer in Politics, Balliol College, Oxford, Professor of Political Institutions, University of Keele, and Deputy-Vice-Chancellor, University of Keele. Chief publications: *Primer of Public Administration*, 1950; *The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick*, 1952; (co-author) *Local Government in England and Wales*, 1953; *Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby in Britain*, 1958; *Private Industry and Political Power*, 1958; (co-author) *Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1955-59*, 1961; *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 1962.
- GOULSTON**, Michael John; M.A., Rabbi; Managing Editor, *European Judaism*; Minister, Middlesex New Synagogue, Harrow. Currently engaged in a study of Anglo-Jewish history post 1900.
- GUTWIRTH**, Jacques; Licencié ès Lettres; diplômé du Centre de Formation aux Recherches Ethnologiques de l'Université de Paris; Chargé de Cours et de Conférences à l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Section Sciences économiques et sociales. Chief publications: Co-author, 'Haleine, Trois aspects d'une commune de l'Orne', *Etudes rurales*, No. 11, Paris, 1963; 'Hassidim de notre temps', *Les nouveaux Cahiers*, No. 7, Paris, 1966. Currently engaged in a study of a Hassidic community; also in a study on culture and leisure in a small French town.
- KRAUSZ**, Ernest; M.Sc.(Econ.), Ph.D., Lecturer in Sociology, The City University, London. Held Nuffield Foundation Sociological Research Scholarship at the London School of Economics, 1961-1964. Chief publications: *Leeds Jewry: Its History and Social Structure*, 1964; 'Occupation and Social Advancement in Anglo-Jewry', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IV, No. 1. Contributor to J. Gould and S. Esh (eds.), *Jewish Life in Modern Britain*, 1964. Currently engaged in preparing a book on *Sociological Research in Britain* to be published in 1969.
- PRAIS**, S. J.; M. Com., Ph.D., Consultant to the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews. Formerly Economist, International Monetary Fund; Adviser to the Government of Israel on economic statistics; Assistant Lecturer in the University of Cambridge. Chief publications: (co-author) *The Analysis of Family Budgets*, Cambridge, 1955; 'Measuring Social Mobility', *J. Roy. Stat. Soc.*, 1955; 'The Measurement of Changes in the Cost of Living', *J.R.S.S.*, 1958;

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contributor to Tew and Henderson, eds., *Studies in Company Finance*, Cambridge, 1959; 'A Note on Standardized Mortality Rates for some Jewish Communities', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IX, No. 1, June 1967; (co-author) 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901-1965', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IX, No. 2, December 1967.

SHAROT, Stephen Andrew; B.A.; graduate student at Oriel College, Oxford. Currently engaged in research in the sociology of Judaism in England.

SCHMOOL, Marlena; B. Soc. Sc. (E.P.S.), Research Officer, Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London. Has published (co-author) 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901-1965', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IX, No. 2, December 1967. Currently engaged in a study of the socio-economic structure of, and causes of death within, the Anglo-Jewish community; and statistical surveys of various aspects of Anglo-Jewish life.

ZENNER, Walter P.; M.A., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Anthropology, State University of New York at Albany; Research Associate in Anthropology at Northwestern University. Chief publications: 'Ambivalence and Self-Image among Oriental Jews in Israel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. V, No. 2 (Dec. 1963); 'Saints and Piecemeal Supernaturalism among the Jerusalem Sephardim', *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Oct. 1965); 'Sephardic Communal Organizations in Israel', *Middle East Journal* (Spring, 1967); 'The Case of the Apostate Messiah', *Archives de Sociologie des Religions*, No. 22 (June 1966); 'Ethnic Assimilation and Corporate Group', *Sociological Quarterly*, Summer 1967. Currently working on inter-ethnic relations among Arabic-speaking groups in Israel.

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