THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME IX NO. 2 DECEMBER 1967

CONTENTS

PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd

Annual Subscription £1.8.0 (U.S. $4) post free
Single copies 15s ($2.25)

Applications for subscription should be addressed to the Managing Editor, The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 55 New Cavendish Street, London W1

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD
FROME AND LONDON

BOOKS REVIEWED

NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Papers submitted to *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* should be addressed to the Managing Editor at *55, New Cavendish Street, London, W.1.* The papers must be original and should not have been published previously. When a paper has been accepted for publication, the author may not publish it elsewhere without the written consent of the Editor of the *J.J.S.*

MSS. should be typewritten on one side only and double-spaced with ample margins. Pages, including those containing illustrations, diagrams, or tables, should be numbered consecutively. All quotations should be within single inverted commas; quotation marks within quotations should be double inverted commas.

NOTES should follow the style of this *Journal* and should be given at the end of the article in numerical sequence according to the order of their citation in the text.

Bibliographical Details:

(*a*) *Books*

Give author, title, place of publication, year, and page reference. Underline all titles of books.

(*b*) *Articles*

Titles of articles should be within single inverted commas. The title of the book or journal in which the article appears must be underlined.

In the case of a journal, cite numbers of volume and part, and year of publication.

PROOFS. Authors making major revisions in proof will be required to bear the cost. Unless proofs are returned to the Managing Editor promptly, authors' corrections cannot be incorporated.

OFFPRINTS. Each contributor receives thirty free offprints of his article.

FREEMASONS AND JEWS

Jacob Katz

I

THE terms 'Freemason' and 'Freemasonry' will have different connotations for different people. Most people associate Freemasonry with secrecy or even the occult—except the Freemasons themselves who, we may suppose, have been initiated and are perhaps familiar with their own history. Even professional historians seldom take the trouble to study the history of Freemasons, mainly because the sources are not easily accessible and their significance not often apparent at first glance. Are the Freemasons not just a band of eccentrics indulging in semi-secret meetings and in the interpretation of strange symbols? If this was always their nature then perhaps historians have been right to ignore them.

I, for one, have overcome these hesitations and have devoted some years of study to the history of Freemasonry, examining it in the perspective of my own interests.[1] What brought me into contact with it was my concern with the early history of modern Jewry: its transition from the traditional ghetto society to modern European society in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[2] I asked myself whether Freemasonry perhaps served as a channel for individual Jews to reach non-Jewish society and whether Freemasonry as a whole has not assisted Jewish emancipation. What I found exceeded my expectations by far. It transpired that the question of accepting or rejecting Jews played an important part in the life of Masonic lodges. The controversy transcended in intensity the discussion on Jewish emancipation and social integration. I shall, in the course of this paper, show the reasons for this intensity.

Freemasonry proper—if we ignore any supposed or real forerunners of it—started in Britain in the second decade of the eighteenth century.[3] It developed out of the craftsmen's associations which, from the seventeenth century, began to accept non-operative or speculative members, that is, people who were not of the craft but found an interest in the social and spiritual life of the members of these craftsmen's associations, which were known as lodges. For these associations were not concerned only with the professional interests of their members.

They provided opportunities for social contact and cultivated a special tradition of doctrine, passwords, and symbols. By 1717 many lodges consisted almost exclusively of non-operative members. In that year four London lodges united to establish a Grand Lodge and, some years later, accepted a new constitution formulated by the Reverend James Anderson and based on some of the old traditions. A printed constitution facilitated the foundation of new lodges on recognized authority.[4] During the next decades the lodges spread, not only in Britain but also in France, Holland, Germany, and many other countries. All the lodges regarded themselves as belonging to the same fraternity, and any Freemasons appearing at a lodge with a certificate of membership were admitted to the work of the lodge and dealt with as brothers who were entitled to hospitality and help in case of need.

Who would, and who could, join the lodges? The first paragraph or 'charge' of the constitution is quite clear on the question of 'who could'. Everyone found to be true and honest, of whatever denomination or persuasion, was to be admitted. The constitution states that, in ancient times, Masons were 'charged in every country to be of the religion of that country or nation'. But at the time the constitution was promulgated it was 'thought more expedient only to oblige them to that religion in which all men agree, leaving their particular opinions to themselves'.[5]

With this quotation we now enter into the heart of our problem. For it sounds like a declaration of absolute religious tolerance. True, atheists and irreligious libertines are explicitly excluded. But avowed atheists were, in 1723, rare birds. The current trend of religious thought was Deism, the postulation of a Supreme Being who can be conceived of by any rational being. In addition, it was assumed that this religion of reason was at the root of every historical religion. The assumption is clearly indicated by the wording of Anderson's constitution.

Did Anderson, the minister of a Presbyterian church, believe in Deism? Or did he just accept the fashionable parlance of the times? This is a question much debated by the historians of Freemasonry.[6] But whatever the personal convictions of Anderson and his associates might have been, the constitution expressed in unmistakable words the intention to ignore the differences of conflicting religious doctrines. Anderson may have been a good Presbyterian and other members of the lodge ardent adherents of other Christian denominations, but they apparently thought it proper that there should be, apart from the chapels and churches, a neutral place where they could meet on the basis of the religious minimum they had in common.

Did they embrace Jews by their concept of the religious minimum? We have no indication whatsoever on which to base either a positive or negative answer. But, taking into consideration the social and cultural status of English Jewry of that time, we can be sure that their possible aspiration to be accepted in the lodges did not influence the wording of

the constitution. They were far too few and too recently arrived. Yet the constitution is worded in a way that includes Jews as possible members. Thus, when a Jew appeared on the scene asking for admission in 1732, one of the lodges in London did indeed accept him. True, some people seem to have had some doubts whether the lodge acted correctly. For some time after his acceptance it was debated in London lodges whether a Jew is eligible for membership.[7] What arguments were put forward we can only imagine. It is, however, certain that the discussion did not result in a negative decision. English Freemasonry accepted the consequences of its avowed toleration, and there was never any attempt, as far as we know, to change or to reinterpret the first paragraph of the constitution. Thus the doors of the lodges remained, in principle, open to Jews.

In principle: it does not follow that there was, in practice, no discrimination against Jews. It was the uncontested right of the old members of the lodges to reject by black-balling any candidate who did not appeal to them. There are traces of discrimination in some of the records of the English lodges. But the general picture is of a comparative toleration of Jews, not only in theory but also in practice.[8]

Good-will and tolerance on the part of the Christian members did not solve all the problems of a Jewish candidate. For the deistic declaration of the constitution did not remove the traces of Christian practice in the life of the lodges. Besides some neutral symbols of Freemasonry, such as the circle and the triangle, he also found the Bible, including of course the New Testament to which a Jew could not be expected to pay allegiance. Two New Testament figures played a special part in the life of the lodges: St. John the Baptist and St. John the Evangelist, whose festivals (24 June and 27 December) were accepted as Masonic celebrations. Some Jews may have been careless; others may have found some excuse to salve their consciences; but there were Jews who put a limit to what they were prepared to accept. In 1756 a collection of Masonic prayers was printed in London. Among these prayers there was one especially for Jewish Masons to say at a lodge's opening ceremony.[9] While the other prayers contained Christian references, sometimes mentioning Jesus by name, the Jewish prayer would fit into any traditional Jewish prayer book. We have to assume, therefore, that by this time there were sufficient numbers of conscientious Jews in the lodges who cared to keep the tenets of their creed within the Masonic fraternity. It may be, even, that they had separate lodges. How this was reconciled with the constitution, which declared that the particular opinions of members were no concern of the lodges, we cannot say. Perhaps we have to reckon with the English genius for compromise. Or was it rather the general climate of the eighteenth century when religious zeal was receding and forbearance became a virtue with rationalists and the enlightened? The ad hoc solution found for Jews

within Masonry was not limited to England. In Holland, in France, and even in Germany a similar approach was to be found. A Berlin lodge accepted a Jew in 1767 and permitted him to take the oath on the Five Books of Moses.[10] Those who accepted such solutions could not have been too deeply involved in the religious issues underlying the situation. This is the reason why the solutions could not satisfy everyone concerned.

The questionable nature of Masonic tolerance came to the fore when attacks were made on it by adversaries. The attacks came from the traditional sections of all religions, who feared the all-embracing intentions of Freemasonry. That the Catholic Church banned—and still bans—Freemasonry, is well known. The prohibition began as early as 1738, when Pope Clement XII promulgated a bull against Freemasonry. The tenor of the papal exhortation was that the admission of members of all religions meant that Freemasonry was, to say the least, indifferent to the special doctrines and rituals of the Church. It was satisfied by a kind of natural morality. That was reason enough for the Pope to excommunicate anyone who joined the Masons.[11]

Objections were not limited to the Catholic Church. Conservatives among Protestants as well as Jews felt the same way, but had no strong method of control such as the Catholic Church was able to impose. I shall come back to the Protestant objection in a moment. As to the Jewish objection, we have it on record that Jewish Masons from England and Holland visiting German Jewish communities in the seventeen-sixties were regarded by these communities as heretics. More than that, we have the story of Rabbi Haim Joseph Azulai, the famous Palestinian bibliographer and great traveller who, while on a visit to Morocco, was approached in secret by Jews there and asked whether they should dispose of some Italian Jews who were Freemasons. The Rabbi was shocked and explained to these simple folk that it was indeed a sin to join the Freemasons, like going to the theatre, but on the other hand, one would not kill anyone for going to the theatre.[12]

We shall be able to appreciate the opposition of the traditionalists to Freemasonry if we consider its emergence as a case of deviation from the customary. Although members of the different denominations lived together in the same town and met for business purposes and even socially, it was the accepted rule that each religious group kept to itself spiritually. A Catholic would attend only Catholic, and a Protestant only Protestant services. The members of each denomination and church were spiritually embodied in their respective religious units. Freemasonry, while not combating the churches, trespassed upon their domain. It offered a kind of substitute, or at least opportunity for spiritual activity not within the church. This could not but be regarded as an imminent threat to the vitality of the churches and the synagogue. I have found this objection most clearly stated by a Protestant, Günther

Hellmund, in Wiesbaden. Hellmund wrote what was most probably the first anti-Masonic tract in Germany in 1741, stating that Freemasonry had to be judged not only by what it was doing actively against Christianity but by what it was committing passively. 'If anyone would seek his *Seelenruhe* [peace of mind] not in the Christian religion or in the word or in the teachings and in the work of Christ' but was looking for other means of satisfaction, he would, by this fact, reject Christ and the Christian religion.[13] Total allegiance to religious institutions was endangered by the appearance of Freemasonry.

But it was just because the time was ripe for a rejection of this total allegiance to institutions that Freemasonry had so conspicuous a success. Lodges sprang up like mushrooms in England, France, Germany, and elsewhere in the fourth and fifth decades of the eighteenth century, and people flocked to them as though in them was to be found the peace of mind they sought. This was part of the general re-orientation in society, the loosening of traditional ties and their hold on the individual. Most of those thus newly oriented were not prepared, as yet, to destroy the old fabric of society based upon divisions of estates and institutions. But many were eager to loosen their ties with them by joining new associations where members of the different classes met. The Freemasons represented such associations, and that is why they attracted people from all areas of the population.

II

The objection of the churches and other conservative elements in society could not hold up the spread of Freemasonry. But this resistance did not remain without consequences. It called forth a reaction in the form of a Masonic apology which, in the main, tried to prove that Freemasonry was not an un-Christian institution. Among the proofs brought to support this argument was the fact that the Masonic fraternity consisted exclusively of Christians: Jews, Muslims, and pagans were not and should not be accepted. This statement appeared in a book published in France four years after the first papal decree of 1738. In France the statement corresponded more or less with the facts. There were in that country no Muslims, no pagans, and scarcely any Jews who would and could aspire to membership in the Masonic lodges. And the few who were accepted could be regarded as the exceptions that proved the rule. The French apology, however, spread to other countries as well, notably to Germany, and here the *Apologie pour l'Ordre des Franc-Maçons* appeared as an appendix to the German translation of the English constitution. The sentence that no Jew, Muslim, or pagan would be accepted[14] assumed, in this way, an authoritative character. The statement of fact was, as it were, turned into a prescription. True, this prescription contradicted the first paragraph of the English constitution.

Much intellectual effort was spent during the following two centuries in resolving this contradiction. Sometimes it brought about a compromise; at other times one of the propositions was fully accepted and the other discarded.

The drive behind these attempts was not, however, simply intellectual curiosity but social forces. For, while in England and Holland, as we have seen, no objection in principle to Jewish applicants existed and in France the objections were swept away with the Revolution, in Germany it persisted and became a major theme of contest and controversy for generations. Let us glance at the main facts.

As we have seen, during the eighteenth century some German Jews were admitted to Masonry, and Jews from other countries visited German lodges. Until the seventeen-eighties there were only a few cases and they occurred at rare intervals. About this time, however, Jewish enlightenment spread, and the Jews who aspired to be accepted in non-Jewish society grew in number. Jewish applications for admission to the Masonic lodges became frequent enough to require more than an ad hoc policy. German Freemasonry, which embraced at this time the intellectual elite of the nation of *Dichter und Denker* was more than ambivalent towards Jewish acceptance. There were some attempts to open the lodges to Jews but these were made mostly by marginal characters. There was no German Freemason of any standing at that time who pleaded for Jewish admittance—not even Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, the intimate friend of Moses Mendelssohn and the champion of religious tolerance in civic life.[15] Some German Jews became Freemasons when travelling abroad in England, Holland, and, particularly, in post-revolutionary France. In Germany itself French or French-initiated lodges were opened during the French occupation of German territories during the time of Napoleon. An outstanding Jewish lodge in Frankfurt was the famous L'Aurore Naissante, authorized in 1808 by the Grand Orient in Paris.[16] These ventures, however, only hardened the resistance of the indigenous lodges in Frankfurt and in other German towns. Some of the Masonic fraternities now introduced a paragraph which excluded Jews outright.

Things began to change only in the 1830s with the emergence of Liberalism which, in its first stages, seemed to embrace large circles of the intellectual and the middle classes.[17] Many an intellectual Freemason now stepped forward in favour of the Jews. Jewish Masons, mostly members of the old Frankfurt lodge and of another lodge established there at this time, joined in. An attempt was made to break the resistance of the adamant lodges. Masons from Holland, England, and France and even from a lodge in New York, who resented the fact that their Jewish members were refused entrance to German lodges, joined in the protest. By 1848 there were some lodges open to Jews, if not as full members, then at least as visitors. The years of the Revolution

swept away, with some other dead wood, some of the paragraphs excluding Jews from the lodges. The Frankfurt Jewish lodges were now acknowledged by their Christian rivals, and the Jews also made an advance in some other quarters.

Yet there was one place where all the pressures and persuasions were of no avail. This was in the Prussian lodges conducted by the mother lodges from Berlin. The Berlin grand lodges commanded the allegiance of all the lodges in Prussian territory in accordance with a law that was in effect as early as 1798 and whereby no Masonic lodge was permitted to function unless joined to one of the three Grand Lodges in Berlin. The Berlin lodges also had affiliations outside Prussia on a voluntary basis. Altogether, these lodges had more members than all the other fraternities in the whole of Germany. In 1840 there were 164 Prussian lodges with a membership of 13,000. In these lodges no Jew could ever be admitted, not even as a visitor. The answer to the appeals and protests of Jews and Masons from abroad, sometimes given in the most courteous terms, always referred to the Christian character of Prussian Freemasonry. We shall see presently how far this reply could claim to be a genuine one. Granted the definition, one would have thought that there was no reason for Jews to aspire to join. None the less, the fight for admission never ceased. It could be asked, of course, whether Freemasonry and Christianity were not mutually exclusive. This question also troubled some members of the Prussian lodges and the fight was also conducted from within. There were many members, and sometimes entire lodges, belonging to the Prussian system who wanted to reintroduce the original English constitution which excludes any attachment of Freemasonry to any positive religion. In the era of the so-called New Regime in Prussia in the sixties and early seventies this tendency made itself felt. In most of the branches Jews were even admitted as permanent visitors, and in one of the branches of the Prussian lodges, the so-called Royal York, the restrictive paragraph was removed in 1872.

This happened just on the eve of the new wave of antisemitism which set in a few years later in the newly-founded Bismarckian Reich. By 1875–76 the lodges changed in mood to assume the language of political antisemitism with a racial undertone. This was the prologue to the antisemitic agitation which was to break out openly under the leadership of Stöcker in 1880. Thus the opportunity given to Jews to join Prussian Freemasonry was of very short duration. Those who had been accepted left during the antisemitic outbreaks, and with them left some of the liberal-minded Christians who had been shocked by the behaviour of their Masonic brethren committed to the ideal of supreme humanity.

These, in brief, are the facts. Let us now return to the question of motivation. What prompted the German, and later the Prussian Masons to exclude Jews in clear contradiction of the original English

constitution? Was it simply an aversion from intimate association with Jews? Or was it the wish to prove that they were Christians in response to their religious critics? Or were there other, and deeper, reasons? The question can, I think, be answered only with qualifications. Aversion from social contact with Jews was deeply ingrained in the German mind. Jews had lived for centuries in Germany but separated by the walls not only of religion, but of custom, culture, and even language. This strangeness, in spite of proximity, created a mutual mental reservation and distrust which persisted even when, at a later period, contact took place. The image of the unsociable or unsavoury character of the Jew who was thought to be incapable of mixing with any but his own kind continued to exist and was sometimes the reason given by Masons for rejecting Jews. This prejudice was often backed by theology. Christian doctrine maintained that Christianity evolved a higher standard of morality than Judaism. As the aim of Freemasonry is the moral elevation of man, it could therefore be argued that it could only be achieved on a Christian basis. The idea of the Jewish character as being intrinsically lower changed only gradually. More and more Masons agreed that some Jews, at least, would be capable of attaining the higher standard required by Masonry, but reservations against Jews on moral grounds were very widespread.

These prejudices were not the only impediments to Jewish admission. Some of the Freemasons genuinely believed that confessing to Jewish or to any un-Christian faith was a disqualification for Freemasonry, which they regarded as a Christian institution. Freemasons, even where they adhered to the original English declaration of neutrality towards positive religion, had not erased the Christian elements of the Masonic tradition. Others even added new rites and rituals of an outspokenly Christian character. This tendency started in France shortly after the establishment of the first lodges there—the so-called Scottish rite connected Freemasonry with the Crusades of the Middle Ages and infused into it elements of Christian tradition. Other branches of Freemasonry did the same, and thus there emerged alongside the comparatively neutral lodges others which were openly committed to Christianity. In France, it is true, all the lodges, so to say, reformed themselves after the Revolution and there Freemasonry became a kind of secular church. Here Jews could freely participate. Adolphe Crémieux was not only a Freemason from his early youth but in 1869 became the Grand Master of the Scottish Grand Lodge in Paris.[18] In Germany and also in the Scandinavian countries many of the lodges retained their Christian rites and symbols, and many of the Freemasons believed that the very *raison d'être* of the Freemasons depended on them. To be sure, this view was contested by those who adhered to the original English constitution, denying a connexion between the Freemasonry and any positive religion. This latter assumed the name of humanistic Free-

masonry. The question whether Jews should be admitted turned basically on the adherence to Christian concepts. It was sometimes not only a question of reluctance to depart from cherished tradition but an issue of religious integrity. One of the vindicators of the Christian version of Freemasonry expressed it in the following way: how can we accept in the Church that salvation is to be had only through the belief in Christ, while in the lodge we declare that one can be saved by mere moral virtues?[19]

True, no branch of Freemasonry was committed to any Christian denomination—though Protestants felt themselves to be more comfortable in it than Catholics. But this was a result of the Church's objection to the whole institution rather than a sense of incompatibility experienced by the participants themselves. Jews, on the other hand, could only join with a good conscience where Freemasonry lived up to its original declaration of being absolutely neutral towards any positive religion. Thus the case of the Jew was dependent upon the definition of the ruling principle of the association. Decision in favour of the humanistic principle paved the way for the Jew, while a leaning towards the Christian version meant his exclusion. This, by the way, was not so different from what happened within the greater institution of the State. Jewish emancipation—or perhaps one should say full emancipation—was dependent upon whether the State retained any Christian commitments or was ready to extricate itself from Christian limitations. But the State being a comprehensive and formal organization, one could with some justification argue that it would function better as a secular institution. A Masonic lodge, on the other hand, was a small and intimate unit established for the moral and spiritual elevation of man. The question whether such an organization would be able to forgo its original religious symbols was therefore well based. Religious symbols, on the other hand, were not neutral but derived from the tradition of the religion to which the founders belonged, namely to Christianity. There was, therefore, an intrinsic impediment to Jewish participation in Freemasonry, and some individual Freemasons and some branches of the association felt in duty bound by their religious concepts to object to Jewish membership.

This, however, is still only one facet of the problem. As against the objection raised on genuinely religious grounds to the admission of Jews by one section of Freemasonry, we have to set the resistance put up by many others as a mere pretext. Berlin Freemasonry is a good example. We have seen that there were three mother lodges in Berlin. One of them, called the Landesloge, was indeed a Christian association. Accordingly, as often as it was approached to accept Jews, the Masons declared in unmistakable terms that the association was a Christian one and reserved, as such, exclusively for members of the Christian churches. The two other Grand Lodges, on the other hand, the Mutterloge and

the Royal York, never had the courage to declare themselves outright Christian institutions, and resorted therefore to all kinds of subterfuges to defend their excluding paragraph. What was behind their resistance was not only conservatism combined with much social prejudice. Even political pressures were not lacking. The Prussian lodges had, from 1840, a royal protector in the person of the Prince of Prussia, later Kaiser Wilhelm I. It was an old tradition in the house of the Hohenzollern to join the Freemasons, not only out of conviction (I think) but also from political expediency. The Masonic fraternities, including elements from the top strata of the population, became attached to the Royal House in this way, and were indeed regarded as a pillar of the whole regime. This function of the Masonic lodges could, of course, be relied upon only for as long as they retained their exclusive conservative character. Anyway, it can be proved by the documents that whenever the question of Jewish admission was discussed in the Grand Lodges, the Royal Protector took steps to ensure a negative decision.[20]

Under the influence of such conservative forces, the social integration of Jews was artificially retarded just at the time when the trend in society was to favour it. This can be said to have taken place between 1840 and 1875, with some leeway on either side. Thus Freemasonry as an important agency of social integration did not realize its intrinsic possibilities even during the period of Liberalism. When the reaction of political antisemitism set in, Freemasonry fell an easy prey to the new movement. It became as antisemitic as any other part of German society.

Is the modern historian permitted to speak of the Nemesis of history? I am not sure, but I cannot help registering the fact that a generation later—namely, at the end of the First World War—Freemasonry itself became more and more identified with Judaism. The slogan 'Juden und Freimaurer' became a battle cry of the right wing, and helped Hitler to incite the German masses and to pave the way for his ascent to power. In the Third Reich Freemasonry was proscribed, and the Gestapo classified Jews and Freemasons as the *Innerfeind*, that is, the enemy within.

In the light of what we have learned about the real relations between Jews and Freemasons in earlier times, this identification of the two is indeed surprising. I can only briefly indicate how it came about. It began in Germany in the 1860s when the restrictions against Jews were loosened and it looked as if all the lodges would soon be open to Jews. Jews and Freemasons were now mentioned together by some opponents as the two undermining agencies of the waning good old order. This combined criticism of the two groups was transplanted to France and there became formulated in the slogan 'Franc-maçons et Juifs'. The slogan appeared in the title of a book as early as 1880[21] and since then has become an antisemitic commonplace. During the Dreyfus Affair it

played a conspicuous part. From France it travelled to some other countries, but not to neighbouring Germany where, at this time, Freemasonry still counted as a conservative or partly antisemitic association. But in the eyes of the new radicals appearing on the scene at the end of the First World War, conservative exclusiveness did not count as a virtue. The radicals and especially the Nazis appealed to the masses and these could be best incited by pointing to certain mysterious but distinguishable groups who were supposed to be responsible for the sufferings of the masses. Jews and Freemasons were such groups. Jewry and Freemasonry were held responsible for the outbreak and the unfortunate outcome of the War. First this criticism was levelled against each group separately, but then the French model of combination became current. This was forcefully promoted by the publication of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, the point of which was just this combination of Jews and Freemasons. The *Protocols* were not published in Germany by the Nazis but by another right-wing group. But when the Nazis observed the magic effect of the slogan, they gladly adopted and exploited it. Thus Freemasonry and Jewry were involuntarily coupled to become the victims of denunciation. Not much praise can be given to Freemasons at this juncture. They were certainly within their rights to protect themselves against their identification with Judaism. But their protests to prove that the identification was unwarranted were often mixed with antisemitic elements. If, in earlier times, they intended to prove their Christianity by rejecting Jews, now they made use of this fact again to prove that they were good German nationals. At the beginning of the Nazi regime it looked, for a moment, as though Freemasonry would be allowed existence in the Third Reich on condition that it introduced the Aryan paragraph, that is, the exclusion of members who were of Jewish origin. The Freemasons were prepared to accept this condition—but the whole matter turned out to be based on false hopes.[22] The final decree of proscription by the rulers of the Third Reich saved them from this disgrace. In any case, the association which began as a promoter of moral elevation and which relied on an enlightened humanity did not stand the test of moral crisis in the hour of the Great Agony.

NOTES

[1] A book on the subject in Hebrew is in press, Mosad Bialik, Jerusalem. An English translation, now being prepared, will be published by Harvard University Press. The present paper was read at Yale University and at the Leo Baeck Institute in New York in the autumn of 1966.

[2] See J. Katz, *Die Entstehung der Judenassimilation in Deutschland und deren Ideologie*, Frankfurt a. M., 1935; *Tradition and Crisis, Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages*, New York, 1961; *Exclusiveness and Tolerance, Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times*, Oxford, 1961, chaps. XI-XV.

[3] D. Knoop and G. P. Jones, *The Genesis of Freemasonry*, Manchester, 1947.

[4] J. Anderson, *The Constitutions of the Freemasons*, London, 1723.

[5] Ibid., p. 50.

[6] D. Knoop and G. P. Jones, 'Freemasonry and the Idea of Natural Religion', *Ars Quatuor Coronatorum*, 56 (1946), pp. 38–43.

[7] See M. Levy, 'Jews as Freemasons', *The Jewish Chronicle*, 16 Sept. 1898, p. 11, and my article (in Hebrew), 'The First Controversy over Accepting Jews as Freemasons', *Zion*, 30 (1965), pp. 172–6.

[8] Ibid.

[9] L. Dermatt, *Ahiman Rezon*, London, 1756.

[10] See my article cited in note 7, p. 178.

[11] Ibid., p. 176.

[12] Cf. Ch. J. D. Azulai, *Magal-Tob Ha-Salem, Itinerarium* (ed. A. Freimann), Jerusalem, 1934, p. 65.

[13] G. Hellmund, *Christliches Bedenken von denen sogenannten Frey-Mäurern*, Wiesbaden, 1741, p. 22.

[14] *Apologie pour l'Ordre des Franc-Maçons*, The Hague, 1742, p. 14.

[15] See my article cited in note 7, pp. 179–81.

[16] J. Katz, 'A Chapter in the History of Relations Between Jews and Freemasons: The Judenloge of Frankfurt' (Hebrew), in Sh. Rosenthal, ed., *Perakim*, Publication of the Shocken Institute, Jerusalem, pp. 57–95.

[17] See J. Katz, 'The Fight for Admission to Masonic Lodges', *Year Book XI of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London, 1966, pp. 171–209.

[18] S. Posener, *Adolphe Crémieux (1796–1880)*, Paris, 1934, pp. 168–73.

[19] J. J. Schrebius, *Ueber den Zusammenhang des Christenthums und der Freimaurery*, Frankfurt a. M., 1844, p. 10.

[20] See my article cited above in note 17, especially the documents quoted on pp. 207–9.

[21] C. C. De Saint-Andrée [E. H. Chabauty], *Franc-Maçons et Juifs, Sixième Age de l'Eglise, d'après l'Apocalypse*, Paris, Brussels, Geneva, 1880.

[22] On this last phase see M. Steffens, *Freimaurerei in Deutschland, Bilanz eines Vierteljahrhunderts*, Flensburg, 1963, pp. 371–83.

STATISTICS OF JEWISH MARRIAGES IN GREAT BRITAIN: 1901–1965*

S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool

1. *Background*

EVER since the Registrar General released data on the number of synagogue marriages for 1952, it has been clear that there is a need for, and a considerable interest in, further information in this field. His figures for that year showed that there had been a substantial fall in marriages since 1934—the last pre-war year for which official statistics had been compiled. Since 1952, the Registrar General has continued publication of these data at quinquennial intervals (as was his practice before 1934), and the figures for 1957 and 1962 have shown further falls.

It was always known that the Registrar's figures were subject to a certain limitation: they related solely to those marriages which were solemnized only in a synagogue and were consequently recorded by the statutory synagogue Marriage Secretary or local Registrar as being 'according to the usages of the Jews'.[1] His figures thus excluded marriages where a civil ceremony at a Register Office preceded a religious ceremony (this omission is necessary from the Registrar General's point of view in order to avoid double-counting in his figures[2]). A further limitation of the Registrar General's figures is that they are available only for certain years; in particular, there are no figures for the important eighteen-year period 1934–52.

Accordingly, when the Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, established a Statistical Research Unit in November 1965, its first task was to expand statistical information on marriages. This paper reports on the information about synagogue marriages which were solemnized between 1901 and 1965; the figures presented here are comprehensive (that is, they include synagogue marriages which were preceded by civil ceremonies). The data have been classified by type of ceremony (e.g., Orthodox, Reform); and incidental information on age at marriage, marital status, place of birth of partners, and place of marriage

* This investigation was carried out by the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, London.

has been compiled (on a limited basis) for the light that this may cast on broader social trends in the community.

2. *A note on sources*

Previous reviews of Jewish marriages in this country have been limited by the lack of basic data.[3] Before the First World War the Board of Deputies attempted to compile comprehensive figures which were published at the time in both the Board's *Annual Reports* and in the *Jewish Year Book*. It appears, on comparison with our new data, that the totals produced by these earlier compilations were generally somewhat lower than our present figures, though occasionally they were higher (presumably because records from some congregations were included in a later year if they were returned too late for inclusion in the earlier year's total).

The statistics presented here have been compiled from records at the Chief Rabbi's office (which cover the bulk of orthodox marriages), the Sephardi synagogues in London and Manchester, the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations in London and Gateshead, other independent Orthodox synagogues, and the Reform and Liberal synagogues in various parts of the country (which were approached individually, as no central records are maintained). In all, over fifty bodies were contacted in order to obtain our total count of marriages.

The supplementary information on, for example, age at marriage and place of birth, was based on samples of approximately 200 marriages taken for each of the years chosen for analysis. For the sake of economy and convenience, the samples at this stage were drawn only from the Chief Rabbi's records; at a later stage it may be worth expanding the samples so as to make them representative of the whole community. As far as age at marriage is concerned, there is a further limitation: the records do not always include this information and, in practice, it is restricted mainly to London marriages.

Very many points of detail arose in consolidating information from the various sources; for the benefit of future research workers a full account of the available sources and methods employed is set out in Appendix A. The basic tables embodying the detailed results of our compilations are gathered together in Appendix B.

3. *The decline in the number of marriages*

In 1965, there were 1,765 marriages in synagogues in the United Kingdom, divided as follows among the main synagogue groups:

Central Orthodox (United Synagogue, etc.)	1,316
Right-wing Orthodox (Adas Yisroel, etc.)	44
Sephardi	67
Total Orthodox	1,427
Reform	196
Liberal	142
Total synagogue marriages	1,765

It is this total, and the changes in it compared with population movements in the past half-century, that are the concern of this paper. To begin with, it is convenient to ignore the fluctuations which may affect individual years, and to concentrate on long-term movements, averages over five or ten years at a time being taken. It is also convenient for the moment to accept the estimates of the Jewish population given in the *Jewish Year Book*, so that comparisons of marriage *rates* can be made with the general population of this country. The results of such calculations are set out in Table 1.

These comparisons confirm what was already suspected on the basis of the partial information hitherto available from the Registrar General: there has been a drastic fall in the rate of synagogue marriages. From the beginning of this century until the last war the rate of synagogue marriages was very similar to that of the general population, sometimes slightly lower and sometimes slightly higher. After the war, and more particularly since 1950, the synagogue rate dropped below that of the general population, and for the last five years—at four per thousand—has been approximately half that of the general population.

TABLE 1. *Jewish (synagogue) marriage rates and marriage rates of the general population*

	Jewish	*General*
1901–10	9·9	7·8
1911–20	8·2	8·3
1921–30	8·0	7·8
1931–40	8·4	8·8
1941–50	7·3	8·6
1951–55	4·9	7·9
1956–60	4·4	7·6
1961–65	4·0	7·5

Rates of marriage as low as this are quite exceptional and demand careful appraisal. First, could there be any serious omissions in the coverage of these marriage statistics? The only Jewish marriages (i.e. where both parties are Jewish) not included here are those which have taken place solely at a Register Office without any subsequent religious ceremony. Some of these might, in years to come, be followed by a religious ceremony, and will appear in our statistics at this later date (our records include a number of religious ceremonies that followed, in some cases, decades after an original civil ceremony). Similarly, marriages between Jews and non-Jews solemnized at a Register Office or elsewhere are excluded.

Our coverage of synagogue marriages we believe to be substantially complete. The data published by the Registrar General were deficient, as was pointed out above, in that they excluded civil ceremonies followed by a separate religious ceremony. These we now find amounted to about 10 per cent of the total (varying between 3 per cent in 1904 and

9 per cent in 1964).[4] The only remaining exclusions of which we are aware may have occurred at the beginning of the century, at periods of high immigration, when there were probably a few religious marriages performed informally, whether in confirmation of foreign marriages or for other reasons. There are also a few cases more recently where properly recorded civil ceremonies were followed by Jewish ceremonies but which, owing to unsatisfactory records, have not entered our statistics. We do not believe that these omissions could lead to an error of more than one per cent in our results.

Our second question must relate to the estimated size of the total Jewish population. Could there be any substantial error here? In calculating synagogue marriage rates we have used the population estimates given in the *Jewish Year Book* and, as is well known, these do not pretend to great accuracy. At a later stage we hope to check these figures and, if possible, to improve them. At this stage we trust it is not too optimistic to expect the error to be within 10 per cent; however, even if the Jewish population were over-estimated by double that, namely by 20 per cent (so that the community at present numbered not 450,000 but only 360,000) the calculated synagogue marriage rate would currently be no more than 4·8 per thousand compared with the general figure of 7·5 per thousand.[5]

Another way of assuring ourselves that we are dealing with a genuine fall in marriage rates, rather than with the result of unsatisfactory estimates of the Jewish population, is to examine the change in the absolute number of marriages between, say, 1935 and 1965. Even the most sceptical would agree that the Jewish population of this country has been augmented by a number of immigrations since 1935; yet the number of synagogue marriages has fallen from 2,638 in that year to 1,765 in 1965, that is, by 33 per cent.

A third question is whether this decline in synagogue marriages could be due to natural factors which equally affect Jewish communities elsewhere. Canadian statistics on the Jewish community may here be pertinent, since Canadian Jewry, like Anglo-Jewry, is a Westernized community, free from the ravages of the last war; but it should be noted that a comparison between our figures and those of Canada is subject to qualification: the crude Canadian Jewish marriage rates apply to *all* marriages, religious and civil, involving Jews (including marriages between Jews and non-Jews). With this stipulation in mind, we find that the crude Canadian Jewish marriage rate in the inter-war period was in the region of 8–10 per thousand; after the war the rate was as high as 9·9 per thousand in 1951, but fell to 7·1 per thousand in 1955,[6] and yet further to 6·4 per thousand in 1961 (when, however, the marriage rate for the general Canadian population, at 7·0 per thousand, was only slightly higher).[7]

Statistics are also readily available for Israel, though heavy migration

would lead one to expect that marriage rates would show abnormal variations there. In fact, the marriage rates for the last decade were not so very different from those in this country generally; for the period 1956–60 marriages averaged 8·1 per thousand, for 1961–5 they averaged 7·6 per thousand, compared with 7·6 and 8·0 for the general population of England and Wales for those periods respectively.

These comparisons suggest that the situation in the Anglo-Jewish community is seriously abnormal. It has been suggested that migration to Israel could be one reason for the low recorded marriage rates here. Estimates of the number of emigrants from Great Britain to Israel between 1954 and 1964 range from an average of about 200[8] persons per annum to an average of over 400[9] persons per annum. Even if we suppose that the larger estimate is correct (and not all of these could have been in the marriageable age-groups), it is clear that emigration cannot explain very much of the fall. Various other 'explanations' have from time to time been put forward to account for the decline in synagogue marriages, but in view of the orders of magnitude involved, none of the suggestions could reasonably account for more than a small proportion of the decline. We are accordingly left with only one credible factor to which to attribute the decline: the rise in civil marriages (whether mixed or otherwise). In the nature of the case, we can provide no direct statistics on this phenomenon for the U.K.

4. *Short-term variations during the past half-century*

We turn now to examine the main variations in marriage rates during the period covered by our statistics. Migration from Russia and eastern Europe was particularly heavy in the period before the First World War, and was accompanied by relatively high marriage rates of 9–12 per thousand: rates in that region are not unexpected under these conditions. After the First World War migration was resumed from those countries, though at a slower rate; and migration continued in the 1930s, more especially from western Europe. As will be seen from Figure 1, the Jewish marriage rate exceeded that for the country as a whole for a number of years before the First World War and in the inter-war period.

The high Jewish marriage rates observed here are at variance with general experience among Jewish communities in Europe between the wars,[10] but since continental Europe was subject to emigration, while the U.K. was gaining from immigration, the picture is probably consistent. However, the possible margins of error attached to our population estimates must be kept in mind in making such comparisons, and too much reliance should not be attached here to small differences.

Looking at the short-term variations, we can see from Figure 1 that during both wars the marriage rate fell, and subsequently recovered. The Jewish marriage rate in both wars fell more sharply, and to lower

levels, than the general rate, and after both wars showed a steeper recovery: both in 1920 and in 1947 the Jewish rate exceeded the general rate. This tendency for the Jewish community to react more sharply to changes in the environment was, of course, noted by Ruppin. No sharp fluctuations have been recorded in the past decade, but it is interesting to note that the slight peak in the general marriage rate in 1955 (associated with the boom in that year) is also reflected in the Jewish figures.

There is nothing in the experience of the last five years to suggest a reversal of the long-term downward trend noted in the preceding section, but some retardation in the rate of decline can perhaps be detected.

5. *A polarization of the community?*

In the assessment of the reasons for the overall decline in the number of synagogue marriages, particular interest attaches to the data in Table 2, which show the very varying experience of the different sections of the community: Orthodox, Reform, and Liberal. At the beginning of this century (some sixty years after the establishment of the Reform movement in this country), Reform and Liberal marriages averaged a mere 23 per year, or only one per cent of the total. It is after the last war that the major part of the rise takes place: in the most recent quinquennium, 1961–5, Reform and Liberal marriages averaged 346 per year; that is, 19 per cent of all synagogue marriages. Reform marriages accounted for slightly more than half of the total of Reform and Liberal.

TABLE 2. *Numbers of synagogue marriages by synagogue group (annual averages)*

	Total	*Orthodox*	*Reform*	*Liberal*
1901–10	2,043	2,020	23	—
1911–20	2,100	2,071	22	7
1921–30	2,360	2,306	32	22
1931–40	2,769	2,658	56	55
1941–50	2,876	2,660	130	86
1951–55	2,195	1,925	163	107
1956–60	1,980	1,676	173	131
1961–65	1,823	1,476	192	155

The decline in the total number of marriages is thus confined to the Orthodox section; indeed the decline in Orthodox marriages is absolutely greater than the decline in total marriages. Thus if we compare the period 1931–40 with the period 1961–5, the annual average for all synagogue marriages (i.e. Orthodox, Reform, and Liberal) fell by 946 (from 2,769 to 1,823) while the annual average of Orthodox marriages fell by 1,182 (from 2,658 to 1,476).

But the story is not a simple one of a general 'move to the left'. Within the Orthodox sector we are able to distinguish two groups that have shown some advance: the Sephardi (the old-established Spanish

Figure 1



and Portuguese and the more recent oriental) communities, and the communities affiliated to the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations together with the independent 'right-wing' congregations (sometimes called the 'ultra-orthodox' communities, here termed 'the right wing'). The figures are summarized in Table 3, from which it can be seen that marriages among the Sephardi communities amounted to 2–4 per cent of orthodox marriages throughout the period and have tended to rise slightly, more especially in the last decade; 'right-wing' marriages have risen more sharply, although they even now account for only 2·5 per cent of Orthodox marriages. The decline in the Central Group of Orthodox marriages is therefore somewhat greater than indicated in the preceding paragraph—while the annual average of all Orthodox marriages fell by 1,182 between 1931–40 and 1961–65, the annual average of Central Orthodox marriages fell by 1,233 over the same period.

TABLE 3. *Numbers of Orthodox marriages by synagogue group (annual averages)*

	Total Orthodox	*Central Group (a)*	*Sephardi*	*Right-wing*
1901–10	2,020	1,982	38	—
1911–20	2,071	2,021	50	—
1921–30	2,306	2,260	39	7
1931–40	2,658	2,606	44	8
1941–50	2,660	2,584	45	31
1951–55	1,925	1,854	45	26
1956–60	1,676	1,593	56	27
1961–65	1,476	1,373	64	39

(*a*) United Synagogue, the Federation, and other synagogues not elsewhere specified.

These figures illustrate the tendency for a polarization of the community, which has been noted on a number of recent occasions in the communal press. In view of the very diverse trends in the community (increases in marriages among the Reform, Liberal, Sephardi, and 'right-wing' communities, but decreases in the Central Orthodox Group), it is not surprising that commentators have hitherto been unable to present a clear picture—the facts were not available to allow any balanced reckoning. The present statistics make it clear that, though the decline is confined to the Central Orthodox group, the overall decline is so substantial that it must give concern to all sections of the community.

6. *Place of birth of marriage partners*

The changing character of the community is brought out very clearly by examining the place of birth of brides and grooms as given on the marriage authorization forms. Table 4 shows the results of sample analyses of the Central Orthodox records (relating to some 200 marriages each year) carried out for three years—1904, 1934, and 1964—which are approximately a generation apart from one another.

TABLE 4. *Place of birth of marriage partners (percentage of total)*

	1904	*1934*	*1964*
	%	%	%
Great Britain	26	82	90
Abroad	71	17	9
Not stated	3	1	1

In 1904 nearly three-quarters were born abroad; a generation later four-fifths were born in Great Britain; and by 1964, 90 per cent were born in Great Britain. There has thus been a reversal in the ratio of native-born to foreign-born persons of marriageable age; naturally, the community as a whole changes more slowly than the figures for this single age-group would suggest.

Research in the United States and Canada has shown that the proportion of those marrying out of the community rises with the number

of generations that a family has been resident in those countries. It is therefore worth considering whether there could be any connexion between our observed decline in synagogue marriage rates and the rise in the native-born proportion of Anglo-Jewry. Using a broad brush for a moment, we may say that the generation marrying in the first decades of this century consisted largely of immigrants; those marrying in the 1930s were the second generation, the children of immigrants; and those marrying in the 1960s are the third generation, having been born in this country of native-born parents.

The decline in synagogue marriage rates does not appear to have taken place until the 1950s. It is thus entirely credible—we cannot say more—that so long as the parents were born abroad, the children tended to marry within the community; but where the parents were born and educated in this country, the tendency for their children to marry outside the synagogue becomes stronger.

The figures quoted by Rosenthal (1963) in his study of intermarriage are relevant here. Using data originally gathered by Bigman (1957) for a wider study, Rosenthal notes that in Greater Washington, for first-generation marriages the level of intermarriage for men 'was 1·4%; the second generation had a level of 10·2%, and the third (and subsequent) generations had a level of 17·9%. Similarly, the intermarriage rate of Jewish women rose from 0·1% for foreign-born to 6·9% for native-born women of foreign parentage.'[11] For third (and subsequent) generations, intermarriage among women dropped to 2·9 per cent; Rosenthal assumes that the expected rise is masked in the statistics because some 10 per cent of intermarried women may have entirely abandoned their identification with the Jewish group.

Canadian experience is also of interest. The intermarriage rates of Canadian Jews increased from 5·3 per cent in 1933 to 18·5 per cent in 1963, while the percentage of Canadian-born among the Jewish population in Canada increased from 43·8 in 1931 to 59·4 in 1961, and the percentage of foreign-born Jews who had lived in Canada for thirty years or more increased from 3·5 to 19·3 of the Jewish population over the same period.[12]

7. *The balance of the sexes*

At times of migration it is usual to find a preponderance of men, especially unmarried men, who naturally find it easier to move. On arrival in their new country they may marry and, owing to the relative shortage of immigrant brides or for other reasons, immigrant males are more likely to marry native-born brides than *vice versa*. These tendencies are illustrated in Table 5, which relates to our sample for 1904 (of the original sample of 198 marriages, 13 were excluded from this table as the place of birth could not be ascertained; the table thus relates to 185 marriages).

TABLE 5. *Number of marriages according to birth-place of bride and groom, 1904*

Bride / Groom	Gt. Britain	Abroad	Total
Gt. Britain	33	3	36
Abroad	27	122	149
Total	60	125	185

We first notice in this table that the number of English-born brides is two-thirds greater than the number of English-born grooms (60 as against 36). Yet the normal presumption would be that approximately equal numbers of locally-born males and females reach marriageable age in any year; where have the remaining English-born grooms (i.e. the remaining 24 out of a presumed 60, or 40 per cent) gone to? Secondly, it will be noticed from the table that the converse holds among immigrants (149 grooms born abroad as against 125 brides born abroad); this is in accordance with our expectation regarding the sex-ratio of immigrants. Further, it will be noticed that, of the foreign-born grooms, 27 married brides born here; while of the foreign-born brides, only 3 were married to grooms born here.[13]

Immigration thus leads to a disequilibrium, in that there remains an excess of locally-born young men of marriageable age. Disequilibria of this kind due to migration occur in many societies and can usually be corrected by alterations in the average age of marriage (in this case, for example, one would expect the average age at marriage of grooms to rise and that of brides to fall).

There is, however, a factor working in the opposite direction (that is, leading to a deficiency of males of marriageable age). Though we cannot provide any statistics for the Jewish community in this country, research elsewhere[14] has shown that where intermarriage is of any significance, it is found that more men than women marry out; broadly speaking, approximately twice as many men marry out as do women.

As far as the balance of the sexes at the age of marriage is concerned, immigration therefore acts as an antidote to the effects of intermarriage. Immigration was substantial until the Second World War and presumably helped to maintain high marriage-rates. Since the war immigration has been negligible and, in view of the figures presented in Section 3 above suggesting substantial intermarriage today, one must also expect that there is today a substantial net excess of women unable to find marriage partners within the community.

8. *Average age at marriage*

The traditional rabbinic view recommended eighteen as the age for

marriage for men and sixteen for women. Our figures show higher average ages, in the region of 25–30 for grooms and 23–6 for brides. As will be seen from Table 6, at the beginning of the century the mainly foreign-born, and probably more tradition-oriented, Jewish community had a lower average age at first marriage than had the general population. By the 1930s, the position had been reversed, and Jewish bridegrooms and brides tended to be slightly older than their counterparts in the wider society. This reversal was perhaps due to the Jewish community reacting more violently than the general population to the economic conditions of the time.[15] The average age at marriage rose further over the war-period, as is shown by our figures for 1951; but since then we find that age at marriage has tended to fall for both grooms and brides, although it remains higher than that of the general population. The general population, as is well known, is experiencing a fall in age at marriage, and the same factors (for example, increased prosperity among young earners) are probably responsible in recent years for the falls among both Jews and non-Jews.

TABLE 6. *Average age at first marriage, Jewish and general population*

	Grooms		*Brides*	
	Jewish	*General*	*Jewish*	*General*
1904	25·1	26·9	22·9	25·4
1934	28·0	27·3	25·6	25·6
1951	29·1	26·8	25·6	24·4
1961	28·1	25·6	24·6	23·1
1965	27·2	25·0	23·9	22·6

The fall in age at marriage in Jewish grooms has been slightly more rapid than that of the general population, with the result that by 1965 the difference between the Jewish and general populations has been slightly reduced. Nevertheless, at first marriage, Jewish grooms remain on average 3·3 years older than their brides, compared with an age difference of 2·4 years for the general population.[16]

9. *Marital status*

We might expect the decline in age at first marriage to be accompanied by an increase in the proportion of persons marrying for the first time. This has been the pattern for the general population since the end of the Second World War, but our figures suggest that the situation is slightly different in the Jewish community: the proportion of marriages involving spinsters and bachelors has fallen by 4 per cent since 1947. This decline is accompanied by an increase in the proportion of persons remarrying after divorce, more particularly brides.[17] Whereas in 1947 one per cent of Jewish brides had been divorced, in 1964 four per cent of brides were in this position.

TABLE 7. *Proportion marrying for the first time, Jewish and general population*

	Grooms		*Brides*	
	Jewish	*General*	*Jewish*	*General*
	%	%	%	%
1934	88	92	94	95
1947	87	85	96	95
1952	90	86	94	88
1957	89	89	90	90
1964	85	89	89	89

Our figures may reflect an increase, which is not quite so marked for the general population, in the rate of Jewish divorce. (Marriages in which at least one of the partners had been divorced accounted for, on average, 5·5 per cent of all marriages among the general population between 1957 and 1963, and for 6 per cent of all marriages in 1964.) However, the proportion of marriages in which at least one of the partners has been divorced is still lower for our Central Orthodox group than for the general population of England and Wales. This may mean that, although divorce is increasing, it is not yet as widespread among this group of Jews as among the general population.

10. *Place of marriage*

The Registrar General's figures provide a classification of synagogue marriages by county, and thus give an indication of the geographical dispersion of Anglo-Jewry. Our own figures do not add greatly to what is already known from that source. Moreover, it is difficult to produce significant data in view of the continuous growth of the Greater London Conurbation, and of occasional changes in the administrative definitions of that area. The main results may be briefly summarized as follows (the detailed tables are in Appendix B). First, the Greater London area has accounted for between two-thirds and three-quarters of all synagogue marriages throughout the period. Second, as the London community moved to the suburbs, the number of marriages in Central London (i.e. the former London Administrative County) fell and that for the rest of Greater London rose. However, our figures for 1964 suggest that this tendency has been slightly checked and that more marriages are again taking place in the Central London area. Third, there has been an absolute increase in the number of Reform and Liberal marriages in the Greater London area; since the end of the war, as the Reform and Liberal movements have spread through the country, these have accounted for a smaller proportion of all Reform and Liberal marriages. Finally, as we expected, there are indications of an increasing drift of the marriageable population towards London: in 1904, 2 per cent of Central Orthodox marriages took place in London between a resident of the provinces and a resident of London; in 1934, 4 per cent of marriages were in this category, and in 1964 the proportion had risen to 7 per cent.

11. *Summary of findings*

This paper presents a new annual statistical series of synagogue marriages in Great Britain from 1901 to 1965. The following are the main findings based on the new information:

(*a*) Until the Second World War, synagogue marriages moved more or less as did marriages generally in this country; since then, the synagogue marriage rate has fallen, and is now only half that of the general population.

(*b*) The number of marriages solemnized by the Reform and Liberal communities has risen; and there have also been rises in the numbers solemnized by the Sephardi communities and by the 'right-wing' communities. The fall in marriages is thus confined to the Central Orthodox Group.

(*c*) Brides and grooms marrying in synagogue are now predominantly born in Great Britain, whereas at the beginning of the century the parties were mainly born abroad. This reversal had been substantially completed by the 1930s.

(*d*) It is suggested that intermarriage rates have remained low among those born abroad, and among the children of those born abroad; but that intermarriage rises markedly in the third generation (i.e. among the children of English-born parents).

(*e*) The average age at marriage of synagogue partners is about two years above that of the general population. The general tendency towards younger marriages is also apparent in synagogue marriages.

(*f*) Since 1947 the proportion of synagogue marriages involving bachelors or spinsters has declined; the proportion of marriages with at least one divorced person is increasing.

(*g*) Greater London has accounted, and still accounts, for the major portion of all synagogue marriages. The tendency for an increasing number of marriages to be celebrated in Greater London, as opposed to the London Administrative County, would appear to have been checked. Reform and Liberal marriages are becoming geographically more dispersed.

APPENDIX A

Sources and methods

We have distinguished five main religious groups: the Chief Rabbi's office, the Sephardi synagogues, the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, the Reform Synagogues of Great Britain, and the Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues—each of which has its own method of keeping marriage records.

The *Chief Rabbi's marriage records* have been kept in their present form since 1880. They cover all marriages solemnized in Orthodox (Ashkenazi) synagogues in England, Scotland, and Wales, except those celebrated in the Adas Yisroel (Parent) Synagogue, the Hendon Adas, the Gateshead Synagogue, and the Machzikei Hadass Synagogue in Manchester. The records contain the name, address, marital status, place of birth, and religion of mother of both parties, and the date and place of marriage. A note is also made of whether or not the parties were previously married by civil law. The records since 1951 include information about age at marriage, but this is not given for all provincial synagogue marriages.

The *Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue* in London has records of Ketubot from the seventeenth century onwards.[18] A record is kept at Bevis Marks Synagogue of all Sephardi marriages in London (except those solemnized at the Holland Park Synagogue, but including the few at Ramsgate)—either in the Ketuba Book only or in both the Ketuba Book and the statutory marriage register. The Ketuba Book is written in Hebrew and marriages are recorded according to the Hebrew date of marriage. The statutory records naturally provide demographic particulars of all persons marrying, but the Ketuba Books do not. The Spanish and Portuguese congregations in Manchester and the Holland Park Synagogue keep their own records in a similar fashion.

Of the forty-six constituents of the *Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations*, the Adas Yisroel (Parent) Synagogue, the Hendon Adas, and the Gateshead Synagogue do not seek the authorization of the Chief Rabbi for their marriages.[19] The records of the Adas Yisroel go back to 1919 but it is difficult to determine with complete accuracy how many people were married under its auspices in the period 1919–47. This is because certain individuals wrote their own Ketubot (as opposed to using the printed Ketuba of which a copy is kept by the synagogue), and if there was a Register Office wedding prior to the religious ceremony there would, in such cases, be no record either in the synagogue's statutory marriage register or in the printed Ketuba Book.[20] Since 1948, however, details of all marriages taking place at the Adas Yisroel or the Hendon Adas have been notified to the Chief Rabbi's office and an accurate total count of these marriages is now kept there. The Gateshead Synagogue and the Machzikei Hadass, Manchester, keep their own records and also inform the Chief Rabbi's office of marriages solemnized under their jurisdiction.

Neither the *Reform Synagogues of Great Britain* nor the *Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues* co-ordinate, in any central office, the records of marriages celebrated in their constituent synagogues. Each individual synagogue has its own marriage register, and each also keeps a separate record of

'separate civil registrations'. This dispersion of records would make any detailed analysis a time-consuming operation: either marriage secretaries would be required to send duplicates of their records to the Unit, or a local research officer would have to be recruited, and trained, to analyse the records of all Liberal and Reform synagogues in his area.[21] Alternatively, records of marriages notified to the Registrar General could be examined at Somerset House if the names of the bride and bridegroom were supplied to the Unit.

The geographical dispersion of sources and differences in the amount and type of information available from each source led us to divide the survey into two parts:

(1) a direct count of the total number of synagogue marriages performed between 1901 and 1965; and
(2) an analysis of a representative sample of marriages authorized by the Chief Rabbi in certain years.

The full records of the Chief Rabbi's authorizations, and of marriages celebrated under the auspices of the Bevis Marks Synagogue, were made available for analysis to the Unit's staff who abstracted the particulars required. These records cover all synagogues except those of the Adas Yisroel (with the Hendon Adas), the Reform and Liberal groups, and the Sephardi communities in Manchester and at Holland Park. These last four groups (together with the New London Synagogue, the Gateshead Synagogue and the Machzikei Hadass Synagogue, Manchester) total some fifty synagogues, each of which was individually contacted by post and telephone, and the information was abstracted by the synagogue marriage secretary. The marriage records of the Chief Rabbi are kept in date order, in numbered ledgers, according to date of authorization. The total number of marriages *authorized* in any one year was calculated very simply by subtracting the serial number of the last entry for the previous year from the serial number of the last entry for the year in question. An allowance (in the region of one per cent) was made for cancelled authorizations and incorrect entries. For the sake of speed, the number of marriages authorized in any one year was assumed to equal the number of marriages solemnized in that year. The task of counting every single marriage by year of solemnization would have been formidable as many of the marriages authorized at the end of one year are not solemnized until the beginning of the following year.

The number of marriages solemnized under the auspices of Bevis Marks was calculated by a slightly different method. As already explained, there are two sets of marriage records at Bevis Marks: one in English according to the English date and one in Hebrew according to the Hebrew date. The total per annum was computed from each set of records by the method used for the Chief Rabbi's records (in this case it was unnecessary to allow for cancelled or incorrect entries). The count was completed by Hebrew year (in order to include 'separate civil registrations') and the totals per Hebrew year were apportioned to the secular year on a straight time basis (by adding three-quarters of the marriages in the current Hebrew year to a quarter of the marriages in the next Hebrew year to give the estimate for the secular year).

The individual Liberal and Reform Synagogues, and those orthodox

(Sephardi and Ashkenazi) synagogues which neither seek authorization from the Chief Rabbi nor notify him of their marriages, were requested by letter to give details of all marriages celebrated in the synagogue either since 1901 or since the year when the first marriage was solemnized if this was after 1901. Marriage secretaries were provided with forms which were to be completed by stating, for each year, the number of marriages notified to the Registrar General and the number of marriages not so notified. The covering letter explained exactly which marriages should be included in which category. Reminders were sent to those marriage secretaries who did not reply within three weeks, explaining that the co-operation of each individual synagogue was vital to the success of the venture. This process, supplemented where necessary by telephone calls, was repeated until all synagogues had returned their questionnaires.

The Adas Yisroel (Parent) Synagogue gave its data in a somewhat different form. For the years 1919–47 it provided the numbers of marriages notified to the Registrar General and the numbers of Ketubot issued. The higher number given for each year was taken to represent the total number of marriages solemnized in that year. For the years 1948–65 the total of the Adas Yisroel marriages was calculated from the details kept at the Chief Rabbi's office.

It was decided to restrict the *sample analyses of the Chief Rabbi's* records to particular years: 1904, 1934, 1947, 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1964. The years 1952, 1957, and 1962 were selected for further study because these are the last three dates for which the Registrar General has published details of Jewish marriage; 1904 was chosen as being the first year this century for which data were published by the Registrar General; and 1934 was selected because in this year Jewish marriages, as notified to the Registrar General, reached their peak. 1947 marks the apex of the boom in Jewish marriage after the Second World War; and 1964 was the last complete calendar year at the time when the study was begun.

A systematic sample[22] of the marriages solemnized in each of the years under review was selected and details of age, marital status, country and town of birth, address at time of marriage, place of marriage, and information about any previous civil ceremony were transferred from the record to an analysis form. The data were then analysed for each year in order to estimate the average age at marriage, the geographical dispersion of marriages, the place of birth of brides and bridegrooms, their previous marital condition, and the proportion of Central Orthodox marriages which were not notified to the Registrar General.[23] In order to be sure that the final statistics applied to persons marrying only in the year under review, any 'separate civil registration' which had been legally registered in a year other than that in which the religious ceremony took place was excluded from the final sample.

APPENDIX B

Tables

I: All synagogue marriages by religious group, England, Scotland and Wales, 1901–65. Synagogue marriage rates, England, Scotland, and Wales; general marriage rates, England and Wales, 1901–65.

II: Orthodox synagogue marriages by synagogue group, 1901–65.
III: Synagogue marriages 1844–1962; as published by the Registrar General and the Board of Deputies.
IV: All synagogue marriages by method of civil registration, Central Orthodox Group and all other groups, selected years.
V: Previous marital status of persons marrying, Central Orthodox Group and general population of England and Wales, selected years.
VI: Mean age at marriage by previous marital status, Central Orthodox Group and general population of England and Wales, 1904, 1934, and 1951–65.
VII: Place of marriage by year of marriage, Central Orthodox Group and all other groups, selected years.
VIII: Country of birth of persons marrying by year of marriage, Central Orthodox Group, selected years.
IX: Place of birth of native-born persons marrying by year of marriage, Central Orthodox Group, selected years.

Notes to Tables

1. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number and may not, in some cases, total 100 per cent.
2. '0' denotes less than one half of a unit.
3. Data relating to the general population of England and Wales were obtained from the Statistical Department of the General Register Office.
4. 'N.A.' denotes that data were not available.

TABLE I. *All synagogue marriages by religious group, 1901–65. Synagogue marriage rate; and general marriage rate for England and Wales*

Year	Synagogue Marriages				Jewish Population '000s (a)	Marriage Rate per thousand	
	Total	Orthodox	Reform	Liberal		Synagogue	General
1901	2,019	1,989	30	—	160	12·6	8·0
1902	2,110	2,087	23	—	179	11·8	8·0
1903	2,025	1,997	28	—	188	10·8	7·9
1904	1,942	1,919	23	—	196	9·9	7·7
1905	2,137	2,112	25	—	227	9·4	7·7
1906	2,293	2,261	32	—	229	10·0	7·9
1907	2,162	2,144	18	—	220	9·8	8·0
1908	1,902	1,888	14	—	220	8·6	7·6
1909	1,903	1,883	20	—	238	8·0	7·4
1910	1,940	1,922	18	—	241	8·1	7·5
1911	1,991	1,970	21	—	243	8·2	7·6
1912	2,052	2,031	14	7	245	8·4	7·8
1913	2,080	2,050	25	5	245	8·5	7·9
1914	2,131	2,113	14	14	245	8·7	8·0
1915	2,720	2,689	23	8	246	11·1	9·7

TABLE I (*continued*)

Year	*Synagogue Marriages*				*Jewish Population '000s (a)*	*Marriage Rate per thousand*	
	Total	*Orthodox*	*Reform*	*Liberal*		*Synagogue*	*General*
1916	1,619	1,599	13	7	257	6·3	7·5
1917	1,406	1,389	11	6	259	5·4	6·9
1918	1,481	1,451	21	9	270	5·5	7·7
1919	2,380	2,341	31	8	276	8·6	9·9
1920	3,133	3,088	43	12	286	11·0	10·1
1921	2,606	2,557	37	12	287	9·1	8·5
1922	2,671	2,631	32	8	287	9·3	7·9
1923	2,319	2,267	38	14	294	7·9	7·6
1924	2,191	2,139	32	20	297	7·4	7·7
1925	2,190	2,143	29	18	297	7·4	7·6
1926	2,242	2,187	33	22	297	7·5	7·2
1927	2,223	2,172	23	28	297	7·5	7·9
1928	2,405	2,338	37	30	297	8·1	7·7
1929	2,352	2,289	34	29	297	7·9	7·9
1930	2,404	2,337	27	40	297	8·1	7·9
1931	2,324	2,258	26	41	297	7·8	7·8
1932	2,487	2,412	42	33	297	8·4	7·7
1933	2,533	2,437	46	50	297	8·5	7·9
1934	2,592	2,505	46	41	297	8·7	8·5
1935	2,638	2,552	45	41	333	7·9	8·6
1936	2,691	2,583	48	60	333	8·1	8·7
1937	2,777	2,638	58	81	333	8·3	8·8
1938	2,723	2,588	71	64	333	8·2	8·8
1939	3,597	3,408	107	82	370	9·7	10·6
1940	3,332	3,198	77	57	385	8·6	11·3
1941	2,708	2,605	59	44	385	7·0	9·3
1942	2,750	2,591	93	66	385	7·1	8·9
1943	2,295	2,147	85	63	385	6·0	7·0
1944	2,290	2,117	101	72	385	5·9	7·2
1945	2,840	2,625	144	71	385	7·4	9·4
1946	3,330	3,074	149	107	385	8·6	9·0
1947	3,768	3,479	170	119	385	9·8	9·3
1948	3,411	3,119	175	117	385	8·9	9·1
1949	2,894	2,633	149	112	400	7·2	8·6
1950	2,475	2,207	173	95	450	5·5	8·2
1951	2,458	2,206	152	100	450	5·5	8·2
1952	2,217	1,967	146	104	450	4·9	7·9
1953	2,077	1,811	174	92	450	4·6	7·8
1954	2,069	1,788	158	123	450	4·6	7·7
1955	2,158	1,855	186	117	450	4·8	8·0
1956	2,013	1,718	179	118	450	4·5	7·9
1957	2,063	1,773	192	98	450	4·6	7·7
1958	2,042	1,659	185	198	450	4·5	7·5
1959	1,896	1,649	126	121	450	4·2	7·5
1960	1,876	1,576	179	121	450	4·2	7·5
1961	1,883	1,527	215	141	450	4·2	7·5
1962	1,812	1,491	165	156	450	4·0	7·5
1963	1,864	1,468	213	183	450	4·1	7·5
1964	1,792	1,464	176	152	450	3·9	7·5
1965	1,765	1,427	196	142	450	3·9	7·8

(*a*) Estimates taken from the *Jewish Year Book*.

TABLE II. *Orthodox synagogue marriages by synagogue group, 1901–65*

Year	*Total*	*Central Orthodox*	*Sephardi*	*Right-Wing*	*Year*	*Total*	*Central Orthodox*	*Sephardi*	*Right-Wing*
1901	1,989	1,959	30	—	1936	2,583	2,535	39	9
1902	2,087	2,056	31	—	1937	2,638	2,579	50	9
1903	1,997	1,963	34	—	1938	2,588	2,521	58	9
1904	1,919	1,890	29	—	1939	3,408	3,350	50	8
1905	2,112	2,085	37	—	1940	3,198	3,137	56	15
1906	2,261	2,218	43	—	1941	2,605	2,552	33	18
1907	2,144	2,087	57	—	1942	2,591	2,517	42	32
1908	1,888	1,853	35	—	1943	2,147	2,083	29	35
1909	1,883	1,836	47	—	1944	2,117	2,064	33	20
1910	1,922	1,880	42	—	1945	2,625	2,559	37	29
1911	1,970	1,925	45	—	1946	3,074	2,996	47	31
1912	2,031	1,973	58	—	1947	3,479	3,378	58	43
1913	2,050	1,990	60	—	1948	3,119	3,017	57	45
1914	2,113	2,065	48	—	1949	2,633	2,538	57	38
1915	2,689	2,648	41	—	1950	2,207	2,135	53	19
1916	1,599	1,559	40	—	1951	2,206	2,116	55	35
1917	1,389	1,352	37	—	1952	1,967	1,903	45	19
1918	1,451	1,407	44	—	1953	1,811	1,746	35	30
1919	2,341	2,276	61	4	1954	1,788	1,713	46	29
1920	3,088	3,016	68	4	1955	1,855	1,790	46	19
1921	2,557	2,505	46	6	1956	1,718	1,644	47	27
1922	2,631	2,582	43	6	1957	1,773	1,691	57	25
1923	2,267	2,220	40	7	1958	1,659	1,569	59	31
1924	2,139	2,090	42	7	1959	1,649	1,553	65	31
1925	2,143	2,093	46	4	1960	1,576	1,506	48	22
1926	2,187	2,143	34	10	1961	1,527	1,434	56	37
1927	2,172	2,132	31	9	1962	1,491	1,390	71	30
1928	2,338	2,294	35	9	1963	1,468	1,371	59	38
1929	2,289	2,245	35	9	1964	1,464	1,351	66	47
1930	2,337	2,290	40	7	1965	1,427	1,316	67	44
1931	2,258	2,222	31	5					
1932	2,412	2,369	34	9					
1933	2,437	2,390	38	9					
1934	2,505	2,468	32	5					
1935	2,552	2,488	55	9					

Note: The 'Central Orthodox Group' consists of the United Synagogue, the Federation of Synagogues, and other synagogues (mainly in the provinces) not elsewhere specified. The 'right-wing' group includes the Adas Yisroel (Parent) Synagogue, the Hendon Adas, the Gateshead Synagogue, Golders Green Beth Hamedrash, and the Machzikei Hadass Synagogue, Manchester.

TABLE III. *Synagogue marriages 1844–1962; as published by the Registrar General (a) and the Board of Deputies (b)*

Year	*Registrar General's Returns*	*Board of Deputies' Returns*	*Year*	*Registrar General's Returns*	*Board of Deputies' Returns*
1844	175	—	1891	—	1,077
			1892	—	1,079
1849	229	—	1893	—	1,150
			1894	1,129	1,206
1854	287	—	1895	—	1,287
1856	—	311	1896	—	1,386
1857	—	306			
1858	—	217	1898	1,666	1,517
1859	324	321	1899	—	1,765
1860	—	305	1900	—	1,770
1861	—	263	1901	—	1,879
1862	—	305	1902	—	2,086
1863	—	315	1903	—	2,097
1864	349	—	1904	1,815	2,042
1865	—	360	1905	—	2,030
1869	336	340	1906	—	2,208
1870	—	351	1907	—	1,948
			1908	—	1,842
1871	—	402	1909	1,760	1,858
1872	—	424	1910	—	1,768
1873	—	486			
1874	456	463	1911	—	1,797
1875	—	472	1912	—	2,089
			1913	—	2,035
1876	—	452	1914	1,973	2,064
1877	—	440	1915	—	2,641
1878	—	503			
1879	460	460	1919	1,861	—
1880	—	472			
			1924	1,972	—
1881	—	493			
1882	—	535	1929	2,088	—
1883	—	550			
1884	601	—	1934	2,233	—
1886	—	679	1952	1,876	—
1887	—	648			
1888	—	929	1957	1,713	—
1889	867	899			
1890	—	954	1962	1,549	—

(*a*) *Statistical Review of England and Wales*, 1962, Part II.
(*b*) *Annual Reports* for years 1856–1915. These numbers, which cover England, Scotland, and Wales, were not published for the years 1864, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1884, 1885, and 1897.

TABLE IV. *All synagogue marriages by method of civil registration, Central Orthodox Group and all other groups, selected years*

Year	All Groups		Central Orthodox Group (a)		All other Groups (b)	
	Religious and Civil Registration combined	Separate Civil Registration	Religious and Civil Registration combined	Separate Civil Registration	Religious and Civil Registration combined	Separate Civil Registration
	%	%	%	%	%	%
1904	97	3	97	3	98	2
1934	90	10	90	10	82	18
1947	91	9	93	7	70	30
1952	90	10	94	6	68	32
1957	88	12	91	9	73	27
1962	88	12	92	8	72	28
1964	91	9	95	5	78	22

(*a*) These figures are based on the sample investigations described in Appendix A.
(*b*) These figures are based on the total count described in Appendix A.

TABLE V. *Previous marital status of persons marrying, Central Orthodox Group and general population of England and Wales, selected years*

Year	Bridegrooms					
	Central Orthodox Group			General Population of England and Wales ('000s)		
	Single	Divorced	Widowed	Single	Divorced	Widowed
	%	%	%	%	%	%
1904	97	—	3	92	*	8
1934	88	2	10	92	1	7
1947	87	5	7	85	8	7
1952	90	3	7	86	7	7
1957	89	2	9	89	5	6
1962	89	4	7	89	5	5
1964	85	5	10	89	6	5

Year	Brides					
	Central Orthodox Group			General Population of England and Wales ('000s)		
	Single	Divorced	Widowed	Single	Divorced	Widowed
	%	%	%	%	%	%
1904	98	0	2	94	*	6
1934	94	0	6	95	1	4
1947	96	1	3	86	7	7
1952	94	1	6	88	6	6
1957	90	2	8	90	5	5
1962	96	0	4	90	5	5
1964	89	4	7	89	6	5

* The Registrar General's records for 1904 do not distinguish divorced persons. These are included with bachelors and spinsters.

TABLE VI. *Mean age at marriage by marital status, Central Orthodox Group and general population of England and Wales, 1904, 1934, and 1951–65*

Year	Central Orthodox Group				General Population of England and Wales			
	Bridegrooms		Brides		Bridegrooms		Brides	
	All	Bachelors	All	Spinsters	All	Bachelors	All	Spinsters
1904	26·2	25·1	23·4	22·9	28·5	26·9	26·3	25·4
1934	31·0	28·0	27·5	25·6	29·1	27·5	26·4	25·6
1951	31·1	29·1	27·3	25·6	29·3	26·8	26·3	24·4
1952	30·9	27·9	27·2	25·6	29·4	26·7	26·4	24·3
1953	31·0	28·4	26·7	26·2	29·2	26·0	26·2	24·2
1954	30·2	28·6	26·6	26·0	29·1	26·5	26·1	24·1
1955	29·9	28·4	26·5	25·7	28·9	26·3	25·9	23·9
1956	29·5	27·8	25·0	23·7	28·7	26·2	25·7	23·7
1957	32·1	27·3	28·5	25·0	28·6	26·0	25·6	23·6
1958	30·0	27·4	27·3	25·4	28·4	25·9	25·4	23·5
1959	29·8	27·9	25·7	24·3	28·4	25·8	25·4	23·4
1960	31·6	28·8	28·2	25·9	28·3	25·7	25·3	23·3
1961	31·4	28·1	27·6	24·6	28·2	25·6	25·2	23·1
1962	29·9	26·9	25·8	24·1	28·1	25·5	25·2	23·0
1963	29·6	27·2	24·8	22·9	28·0	25·4	25·1	22·9
1964	29·7	27·0	26·2	24·8	27·9	25·2	25·0	22·8
1965	29·7	27·2	25·0	23·9	27·6	25·0	24·8	22·6

TABLE VII. *Place of marriage by year of marriage, Central Orthodox Group and all other groups, selected years*

Place of Marriage	*Year of Marriage*													
	1904		*1934*		*1947*		*1952*		*1957*		*1962*		*1964*	
	Central Orthodox Group	*All Other Groups*	*Central Orthodox Group*	*All Other Groups*	*Central Orthodox Group*	*All Other Groups*	*Central Orthodox Group*	*All Other Groups*	*Central Orthodox Group*	*All Other Groups*	*Central Orthodox Group*	*All Other Groups*	*Central Orthodox Group*	*All Other Groups*
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Scotland	4	—	3	1	5	0	1	0	5	0	3	0	5	0
East and West Ridings	5	2	2	—	3	0	7	0	8	0	8	0	10	2
North-West	9	4	12	6	15	10	11	9	12	12	12	9	11	8
London Administrative County	77	94	74	93	49	85	44	78	44	69	41	64	45	65
Rest of Greater London	—	—	4	—	22	3	28	7	26	14	29	16	20	19
South-East	0	—	—	—	0	0	1	1	2	1	0	3	0	3
Wales	1	—	0	—	1	—	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	—
Rest of England	4	—	5	—	6	1	6	3	3	2	5	7	5	3

Notes: (*a*) Figures for the Central Orthodox Group are based on sample investigations (see Appendix A); figures for all other groups are based on the total count.

(*b*) 'London Administrative County' covers the City of London and the former London Metropolitan Boroughs; 'Rest of Greater London' includes (1) all the former county of Middlesex; (2) the former Essex boroughs of East Ham, West Ham, Barking, Redbridge, Chingford, Dagenham, Ilford, Leyton, Waltham Holy Cross, Walthamstow, and Wanstead and Woodford; (3) the former Hertfordshire boroughs of Barnet, Bushey, Cheshunt, East Barnet, and Elstree; (4) Beckenham, Bexley, Bromley, Chislehurst and Sidcup, Crayford, Erith, Orpington and Penge from Kent; and (5) Croydon, Banstead, Barnes, Beddington and Wallington, Carshalton, Coulsdon and Purley, Epsom and Ewell, Esher, Kingston-upon-Thames, Malden and Coombe, Merton and Morden, Mitcham, Richmond, Surbiton, Sutton and Cheam, and Wimbledon from Surrey.

TABLE VIII. *Country of birth of persons marrying by year of marriage, Central Orthodox Group, selected years*

Country of Birth	*Bridegrooms: Year of Marriage*						
	1904	*1934*	*1947*	*1952*	*1957*	*1962*	*1964*
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Great Britain	20	83	79	80	81	85	90
Eastern Europe*	74	12	9	8	9	5	3
Western Europe*	3	1	9	7	6	4	3
Palestine/Israel	—	1	0	0	—	1	0
Other	—	2	2	4	4	4	3
Not stated	3	1	—	1	—	—	1
Country of Birth	*Brides: Year of Marriage*						
	1904	*1934*	*1947*	*1952*	*1957*	*1962*	*1964*
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Great Britain	30	80	82	89	89	89	91
Eastern Europe*	60	14	8	3	5	1	3
Western Europe*	4	3	9	6	4	2	3
Palestine/Israel	0	—	0	0	1	3	3
Other	0	2	1	0	1	4	—
Not stated	5	1	—	1	—	—	—

* Eastern Europe is here taken to consist of all countries east and north of Austria and Germany, including Russia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; Western Europe is here taken to consist of all countries west of, and including, Austria and Germany.

REFERENCES

BARNETT, L. (1949), 'Abstracts of Ketubot or Marriage Contracts of Congregation from Earliest Times to 1837', *Bevis Marks Records*, Part II, London.

BIGMAN, S. K. (1957), *The Jewish Population of Greater Washington in 1956*, Washington D.C.; The Jewish Community Council.

KEHILA OF BUENOS AIRES (1962), *Die Chosonos bei der Kehila von Buenos Aires* (Marriages in the Buenos Aires community), Buenos Aires.

PRAIS, S. J. (1959), 'Statistical Publications on the Jewish Population of Great Britain: A bibliography', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 136–8.

—— (1964*a*), 'Statistical Research: Needs and Prospects', in *Jewish Life in Modern Britain*, eds. J. Gould and S. Esh, pp. 111–26, London.

—— (1964*b*), Review of *Intermarriage and Jewish Life: A Symposium*, ed. W. J. Cahnman, in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, pp. 146–7.

ROSENBERG, L. (1959), 'The demography of the Jewish Community in Canada', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 217–33.

—— (1965), *The Jewish Community in Canada, 1931–1961*, Montreal: Canadian Jewish Congress.

ROSENTHAL, E. (1963), 'Studies of Intermarriage in the United States', *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 64, pp. 3–53.

RUPPIN, A. (1934), *The Jews in the Modern World*, London.

—— (1940), *The Jewish Fate and Future*, London.

TABLE IX. *Place of birth of native-born persons marrying by year of marriage, Central Orthodox Group, selected years*

Place of Birth	*Bridegrooms: Year of Marriage*					
	1934	*1947*	*1952*	*1957*	*1962*	*1964*
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Scotland	2	4	4	4	3	6
North	—	2	1	1	3	3
East and West Ridings	—†	2	7	8	8	9
North West	4†	9†	7†	10	10	10
North Midlands	—	—	—	—	1	2
Midlands	0	—	—	0	1	1
East	—	—	—	0	—	5
London and the South East	62†	58	68	72	67	53
South	—	0	—	0	—	2
South West	—	—	0	—	1	0
Wales	—	0	2	1	2	2
England (unspecified)	31	23	9	2	2	5

Place of Birth	*Brides: Year of Marriage*					
	1934	*1947*	*1952*	*1957*	*1962*	*1964*
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Scotland	3	4	2	4	3	7
North	—	—	2	0	2	2
East and West Ridings	—†	2	8	8	9	10
North West	4†	7†	6†	8	12	13
North Midlands	—	0	0	—	0	3
Midlands	—	0	—	1	0	2
East	—	0	—	1	6	6
London and the South East	60	62	70	73	54	50
South	—	0	2	2	4	3
South West	0	—	—	—	0	1
Wales	2	1	0	0	2	2
England (unspecified)	31	21	9	2	6	2

† These figures are probably understated because many persons who simply gave 'England' as place of birth were married in these areas.

NOTES

[1] Details relating to the legal requirements governing the registration of marriages will be found summarized in the *Jewish Year Books*, London; see, for example, the issue for 1964, pp. 28, 45–6.

[2] Such marriages are termed 'separate civil registrations' throughout this paper.

[3] References are given in the survey paper by Prais (1964*a*), p. 126.

[4] See Appendix B, Table IV.

[5] It has been brought to our attention by Dr. J. Braude that, if one accepts 450,000 as the present size of Anglo-Jewry and 6–7 per thousand as the Jewish marriage rate, it can be calculated that, currently, 60–67 per cent of Anglo-Jewry marry in synagogues whilst 33–40 per cent marry at a Register Office only. Thus the proportion of Anglo-Jews who have only a civil wedding roughly approximates the percentage of Jewish

children in Britain which, Dr. Braude has calculated, receives no Jewish education whatsoever. (Calculations have now been provisionally completed on an estimate of the Jewish population of Great Britain based on mortality statistics. This estimate suggests that the correct number is in the region of 410,000, so that the synagogue marriage rate in 1961–5 would be 4·4 per thousand.)

[6] See Rosenberg (1959), p. 217.

[7] We are indebted to a private communication from Dr. L. Rosenberg for the data for 1961.

[8] *Statistical Abstract of Israel: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1966*, Table D17, p. 106.

[9] Statistics provided by the Aliyah Department, Jewish Agency, London.

[10] Ruppin (1940), p. 85, shows Jewish marriage rates in Europe in 1929–34 at about 7–9 per thousand, and about a point lower than general marriage rates.

[11] Rosenthal (1963), p. 19.

[12] Rosenberg (1965).

[13] The data in Table 5 may be difficult to grasp at first sight. It may therefore be helpful to set them out in the following alternative way:

	Born in Gt. Britain	*Born abroad*
Brides	60 (33)	125 (3)
Grooms	36 (33)	149 (27)

Figures in brackets indicate marriages to a British-born partner. We owe this suggestion to Dr. Braude.

[14] See the review by Prais (1964*b*) for some figures on Jewish communities abroad.

[15] Our findings for that period appear to be consistent with what is known of the Jewish communities in Europe between the wars. Ruppin (1934), p. 80, for example, quotes 29·0 as the average age of Jewish grooms in Warsaw in 1927 compared with 27·3 for Christian grooms; and 27·3 for Jewish brides compared with 24·6 for Christian brides.

[16] The study of marriage by the Kehila of Buenos Aires (1962), p. 6, shows similar differences when the average age at marriage of the Jewish community as compared with that of the total population. For marriages celebrated between July 1960 and June 1962 Jewish grooms were on average 4 years older than their brides, whereas, in general, grooms in Buenos Aires were 2 years older than their brides.

[17] See Appendix B, Table V.

[18] See Barnett (1949). The first recorded marriage was between Joseph Bernal and Sarah de Abraham Rodrigues Gomes on 7 Tishri 5447 (September 1686).

[19] Many of the synagogues in this group are small congregations which gather in one room for prayers. Union weddings are thus usually solemnized at one of the three main synagogues mentioned.

[20] Mr. R. Hirsch, secretary of the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, estimates that perhaps one per cent of all marriages at the Adas Yisroel or the Hendon Adas are Register Office weddings followed by religious ceremonies for which the parties write their own Ketubot. The actual number of such marriages is thus probably negligible—about 0·3 of a marriage per annum on average.

[21] This applies also to the records of the various orthodox synagogues, both Ashkenazi and Sephardi, which do not apply to the Chief Rabbi for marriage authorizations.

[22] So that the sample would cover approximately 200 entries each year, in 1904 one in every ten entries was taken, in 1934 one in every twelve, in 1947 one in every seventeen, in 1952 one in every ten, in 1957 one in every nine, and in 1962 and 1964 one in every seven.

[23] This last detail was not forthcoming from the direct count of the Chief Rabbi's records because of the different method used to calculate the annual totals for the Central Orthodox, as opposed to all other groups.

NEGRO JEWS IN HARLEM

Ruth Landes

FOREWORD

THE following account is a summary, written after the Second World War, of a long paper I wrote in 1933. The original paper was accepted for publication by the late Professor R. Thurnwald, editor of *Sociologus*, published in Berlin. Professor Franz Boas, then my teacher at Columbia University, had chosen *Sociologus* out of a fondness for German publication. Directly afterwards, the Nazis began the book-burnings, and they started with his great anthropological works at Heidelberg University. *Sociologus* was shut down and my manuscript, sponsored by Boas, disappeared. But I still possess the 1933 letters planning the publication. One of these, from Thurnwald (10 March 1933), who was already living in New York State, describes plans for 'a small booklet' because the subject would 'draw general interest'.

In the United States at that time, Jews and Negroes, especially in Harlem, besides individual scholars, knew of the Jewish and Islamic 'store-front' developments among poor or vagrant Negroes of Harlem, Brooklyn, Chicago, and Detroit. These developments were condemned savagely by upper-class Negroes, in print and sermon; theirs was a class bias expressed also in loud assertions (in my hearing) that they wouldn't be caught dead in Negro night-clubs or around Negro jazz music performed publicly. Jews everywhere, however, were touched, partly by the pathos of the situation amid Nazi and Negro tragedies. Great and modest Jewish individuals came to watch the group I describe, to teach and otherwise to help them. I myself heard of them purely by chance, from a stranger, one afternoon at a Broadway theatre when attending a new George Gershwin musical with my father. Near us sat a blond young rabbi turned lawyer, named Harold Roland Shapiro. Was it Gershwin's genius for Negro themes that led him to tell us that he had been attending Black Jewish services?

This accident, more than the rising and brilliant 'Negro Renaissance' of the intellectuals, stirred my imagination. So for a few years I studied the West Indian followers of the Jamaican 'Black Nationalist' leader

Marcus Garvey, who asserted their Judaism after Garvey was discredited by the United States and Great Britain. German-Jewish refugees and challengers of Hitler, including the famous dramatist Ernst Toller, visited the strange congregation sympathetically at the same time as I did. So did the Polish archaeologist and Zionist, Dr. Jacques Faitlovitch, who had rediscovered the contemporary Falashas early in this century; he was moved, if also sceptical, when the group's leader or 'rabbi' declared that the African Hebrew heritage belonged to blacks only and included Falashas, the Queen of Sheba, and tribes of West Africa.

Such Black Hebrewisms were a scholarly vogue then, as Thurnwald's 34-year-old letters now remind me. In one he mentions 'Merker's theory about the Masai, of their Jewish origin . . . [in] *Die Masai*, 2d edition, 1910'. And he offers me a work by Father Joseph J. Williams because it follows the latter's *Hebrewisms of West Africa* (New York, 1930). There were other works too.

My Harlem research introduced me to Professor Boas and so to a lifetime of anthropological interests. Happy chance returned me to this start upon reading Howard Brotz's recent book, *The Black Jews of Harlem* (New York, 1964). His study describes still thriving Negro Jews whose leader, Rabbi Matthews, was linked to the Rabbi Ford I describe in the following pages. Dr. Brotz describes the movement, whose beginnings constitute my study, in a post-Second World War phase and, implicitly, contradicts my view that the cult was bound to fail. However, this Judaism has never become significant in the Negro life of the United States or elsewhere; and it has been hardly more than a curiosity to American (white) Jews. It has made no impact on social institutions or values, though it can matter in some personal lives. The organization described in my account has disappeared entirely. I am grateful to Dr. Brotz for his suggestion to publish.

* * *

The Negro section of Harlem is a black ghetto created by the strains of the post-war industrial demands and of the traditional colour cleavage of the South.[1] Negroes were needed in northern industry because manpower was needed. The residential and social segregation, though not required by statute or tradition, was a tacit concession to the South, supported equally by most Negroes and whites.

The population of the ghetto has increased enormously since the [First] World War, at present [1933] totalling about 350,000, while the area of the ghetto has increased only slowly. These large numbers are drawn from all parts of both hemispheres, representing a great variety of social, national, and physical types. They have in common only one thing, a Negro ancestry that precludes full status in the American community.

New York and other industrial centres of the northeast are un-

accustomed to Negroes and have no firm traditional attitudes to them, but at times respond morbidly to them under the influence of their status in the South. Consequently, some people reject Negroes in the Southern fashion while others who are 'liberal' cultivate an uncritically romantic appreciation of them. It was in the 1920s that the liberals created and rode high on an exuberant wave of exaltation of Negro artists[2] and the Negroes gloried in themselves as 'New Negroes'.[3] Less well known to the outside world are the activities of tens of thousands of the common people of the ghetto, followers of Marcus Garvey, of Father Divine, and of men known as Black Jews.

Although the group as a whole has the same fundamental problem to face—the winning of status in the American community—the different classes within it are not equally equipped to handle the problem. A very small minority possesses real advantages, such as higher education, physical traits of the white group, friends among upper-class whites, wealth, opportunities for demonstrating ability; while the majority lacking these assets are quite disabled. It is even possible that the favoured minority is allowed a degree of personal fulfilment superior to that enjoyed by many whites of equal endowments. But the majority find practically no support from the white world and its social system and are driven to test their own slight, untutored, resources. They encourage the emergence of certain restless personalities, men born of them who most eloquently symbolize their strivings. The Jamaican Marcus Garvey and the American named Father Divine are the two such leaders best known to the white world. Besides these there are a number of minor leaders, supported by small and usually short-lived followings.

Most revealing of the ghetto's stresses and activities has been the outburst of small groups calling themselves Black Jews.[4] One group emerged in 1917, and from that time until the present [1933], Black Jews have appeared in different parts of Harlem. Some groups are American, mainly from the South; some are West Indian, mainly from the British islands. They have different leaders, usually rivals, sometimes closely concerned with one another's doings, sometimes indifferent. Some have strictly religious ends, some political ones, but all have some gainful interest for the leaders. Whites and middle-class coloured people (these are the upper class of the Negro group) have condemned them generally as false; one group of Black Jews was exposed by Mr. Ira de A. Reid in an article called 'Let Us Prey!'[5]

But it is possible to trace a thread of psychological sense in the garbled pretence of the Black Jews. The ordinary people of Harlem are originally country folk, illiterate, used to intimate neighbourly ties, and adjusted to the lowest economic standards. Suddenly they are uprooted from their centuries-old rural adjustments by the demands of industry, a process facilitated by the drastic decline of the plantation economy,

and packed into urban centres where alterations in their traditional values disorient them thoroughly. Their presence also disconcerts the whites, and consequently the character of their relations with the general community is unpredictable. They live among the upper class of their group, and close to whites, though not in the same streets. American Negroes are thrown among West Indian and African Negroes in numbers. Rural, Southern, West Indian, and West African sanctions are crippled, for the urban world imposes new and difficult standards that determine survival. The Negro masses grow bewildered and frightened, and like other masses in a comparable situation, they stampede. One flight leads repeatedly into Black Judaism; another impulse led to Garveyism; the most recent has led into the rich pastures of Father Divine. The people flock to the most understanding spokesman of their panic.

Black Judaism has followed two courses in Harlem, and these have varied with the backgrounds of the leaders and their followers.[6] The great differences occurred between the groups led by Americans and those led by British West Indians. In general the West Indians were concerned with the whole racial situation of the Negro in American life, and they sought political devices for bettering it. But the American peasantry, with only an other-worldly tradition to guide them, transported their established evangelical interests to the city, and in their distress turned away from political worries to the shelter of Jesus. The character of American Black Jews and the character of West Indian Black Jews were each differentiated accordingly, although at times there appeared a crossing of the different currents in Harlem.

The first and most powerful of the American groups was organized in 1917 in Harlem by a Southern vagrant with evangelistic experience, named Roberson.[7] Branches appeared later in at least five cities. The group was called alternatively 'Temple of the Gospel of the Kingdom', 'Ever Live and Never Die', and 'Black Jew'. The last title was supposedly based on the following syllogism: 'We who are black worship Christ; Christ was a Jew; therefore we are black Jews.' The creed was: Believe in Jesus; believe that Roberson is the Messiah, the Christ (later he became God); then you are saved and will never die. Services were 'holy roller', with the usual 'shouting', ecstasy, faintings, and revelations.

Roberson's career had not begun in New York. For years he had been wandering in the South conducting 'shout' meetings, expounding revelations, convinced that the mantle of the prophet had fallen upon him. New York meant only an extension of his Southern operations. He became enormously successful, and rumour credited him with a fantastically large following, and always with a firm support of three hundred disciples. At the height of his power he is said to have been strong enough to wield political influence in Harlem; the same is now said of Father Divine.

Roberson's appeal lay in bringing the country camp meeting to the

city, for this old landmark made the people's exile and confusion easier to bear. Wherever he travelled in the Northern ghettoes he appealed to the same need. People gathered to him and in the organization that evolved insensibly, they experienced an identity. The organization had to be a church, for that is the ubiquitous development among the American Negro peasantry. It had to be an outlaw or 'fringe' church[8] because Roberson was only a rough vagrant and he and others of his group had serious jail records; and because the members were unskilled workers who had no status elsewhere.

Roberson's reward was great, and the glory touched his following. He handled his flock as though the setting were still the rural South, and inadvertently profited from certain urban conditions, such as density of population. All the money owned and earned by members was turned in to the management under the general direction of Roberson. Members lodged in the houses owned by the group, and served in shops communally owned. (This entire general set-up is said to obtain now in the organization of Father Divine.) Marital ties were forsworn, all becoming nominally brothers and sisters. The women were supposed to have been held in common, but were said to have been reserved actually to Roberson's assistants, and in time largely to Roberson alone. Pregnant women were kept on a 'baby farm' owned in New Jersey. The high mortality, especially of infants, the sexual immorality, and the financial and other exploitations of the group attracted the attention of the Federal government, and in 1922 Roberson was sent to Atlanta prison. This 'calvary' momentarily heightened the leader's prestige among his people. When he died in 1932 he promised his followers that he would rise, as had the first Jesus, and a faithful following kept his body hidden for days—some said for months—refusing to surrender it to the authorities.

The group had no Jewish observances, for they were Christians, though undenominational. However, living in heavily Jewish Harlem, they did not hesitate to approach local Jews for alms. But they also approached non-Jews, such as the Catholic Italians for whose benefit they ordered stationery carrying letterheads in Italian. They were said to avoid pork (though this seems extremely unlikely), and they grew long hair on head and face (people said Roberson first adopted this as a disguise after release from one of his prison terms). They also designed stationery carrying Jewish letterheads, which I saw, and circulated appeals among Harlem Jews to support the (non-existent) Negro Jewish orphan asylum.

The group disintegrated after Roberson's sentence to Atlanta, although it has not yet altogether disappeared. Shortly after, a group of British West Indian Negro Jews appeared. Their initial impulse was derived not from Roberson but from Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (usually abbreviated to U.N.I.A.).[9]

Their leader, named Arnold J. Ford, had been choirmaster in the U.N.I.A. until personal clashes with Garvey led to his expulsion in 1923.[10] People said that he dreamt of rivalling Garvey, and that he had been guilty of mishandling the payroll of the choir. When after his expulsion he organized his following under the Hebrew title of *Beth B'nai Abraham* (House of the Sons of Abraham), abbreviated to B.B.A., he outlined for them a political programme that departed in no respect from the political programme of the U.N.I.A.[11] When in 1923 the Federal government convicted Garvey on the charge of using the mails fraudulently to sell watered Black Star Line stock, Ford saw himself as the destined leader of the Negro's political future. His following, though small (never more than thirty-five, and at times as low as ten), supported him uncritically. Like Garvey, Ford thought in the twin terms of politics and religion. But where Garvey was a Catholic and clung to the established church, Ford stemmed from an evangelical sect led by his father in Barbados, and in Harlem repudiated all Christian doctrine. Ford's anti-Christian feeling can be seen as a logical consequence of the anti-whiteness thundered forth by Garvey and incorporated in U.N.I.A. doctrine where the Catholicism that persisted was painted black (as it is conventionally in Brazil), through African, Moorish, and Negro figures and hagiography. His anti-Christianity found a partial vent in Judaism, cued on the one hand by Roberson's success, and on the other by the prominence of philanthropic Jews in the American Negro world and more immediately in Harlem. Ultimately Ford's bitter feeling towards whites led him to say that the only true Jews were the blacks, and that white Jews were merely European offshoots of the original black African Hebrews. Always, however, Ford's religion served his politics; his Judaism or Hebraism—as he later preferred to say—served the African nationalism elaborated in the U.N.I.A.[12]

Marcus Garvey was a Jamaican black who suffered in his own home because of his physical type and the low social position that accompanied it.[13] He came to the United States during the last years of the [First] World War, partly at the request of Booker T. Washington. He viewed the American scene no differently from the Jamaican one, where colour affected class, and three classes existed.[14] These classes were the small ruling group of whites, the larger middle group of mixed-bloods called 'coloured', and the largest and least privileged group composed of full-bloods called 'blacks'. This situation is general throughout the British West Indies, dividing the Negro population against itself and leading the blacks in particular to view the coloured as traitors to the race. Garvey, a black, thought the same of the American mixed-bloods, particularly when they occupied superior social positions. Consequently, his appeal was frankly to the masses, the disinherited blacks with whom he belonged. He succeeded fully in alienating from himself the middle-class Negroes, and even aroused their active hostility.

But the disillusionment following the World War allowed Garvey to be given an enthusiastic hearing by American 'blacks'. His programme blazed through the country, fostered by the general reaction to the aggravated racial abuses. Race prejudice had increased with the war hysteria and the unaccustomed presence of huge numbers of Negroes in the Northern cities. Various programmes sprang up directing the restlessness: programmes of protest, defence, offence, reconstruction, and revolution.[15] A favourite one proposed a self-contained Negro economy involving black banks, black industry, black retailing, and black patronage. This was favoured by Garvey; but where the Americans planned a black economy in the United States that would exist alongside the white economy, Garvey demanded that blacks move out of the western world to Africa. He said, 'There is no place for a black man in a white man's country'; western civilization must be chastised by the re-establishment of black sovereignty in Africa. Most Americans parted company with Garvey over this issue, but a substantial minority supported him, and his word spread through the Caribbean and touched West Africa.

So the U.N.I.A. was born. Large membership and wealth dazzled Garvey, and his ambitions soared madly. He established shops, factories, banks, a Negro merchant marine, the 'African Legion', the 'Black Cross' nurses, and a court of nobles and ladies. The patronage of all members was ensured. He bought real estate and supported an enormous body of hangers-on. (Roberson was doing similar things at the same time.) Respectable Negro organizations composed of whites and middle-class Negroes considered him a threat to the expansion of their influence.

After six or seven years, with Garvey's conviction, the U.N.I.A. collapsed. But belief in the programme persisted, and was re-crystallized repeatedly in various small and ephemeral organizations, of which Ford's was one. While he was still connected with the U.N.I.A., Ford had met a Negro vagrant named Herman.[16] Herman was well known in the Jewish quarters as a beggar and a pedlar of Jewish religious articles; he professed Judaism, and in alleged proof he spoke some Yiddish and grew a scraggly beard. The success of the U.N.I.A. drew him to Liberty Hall (Garvey's Harlem headquarters), where he sought pupils whom he could 'instruct' in Hebrew, of which he knew practically nothing. Upon Ford's expulsion, Herman urged him and his followers to amalgamate with him and an associate in establishing a Jewish church.

Ford agreed. He said that at the time his plan was to develop a professional singing group. Thus the 'Moorish Zionist Church' appeared towards the close of 1924. Some local white Jews gave their patronage, Ford particularly winning their attention. Soon the Church split over dissensions between Ford and Herman. Ford insisted on the title of

Rabbi and expected complete freedom to take his group on professional concert tours. Herman had no following and no popular appeal, and he claimed that Ford took advantage of him. Thus Ford and his choir established their own organization, the congregation *Beth B'nai Abraham*, or B.B.A. Herman nevertheless carried on as the Moorish Zionist Church with the aid of a bearded Southern Negro named Sledge, who later Hebraized his name to Mordecai. Sledge and Herman said they held services and conducted Hebrew schools in Harlem and Newark. I never found a single worshipper or a single service. But they secured money from Harlem Jews, claiming to be 'Ethiopian' or 'Egyptian' or 'Abyssinian' Jews. They increased their smattering of Yiddish and Hebrew, wore skull caps, denounced Negroes, and circumcised Herman's son (although six and a half months after the ritual period had passed). Then Sledge and Herman fell out.

After the B.B.A. was launched, the members systematically began to develop the dogma that they were blood Hebrews. One of them told me in 1930 that they had reasoned at the time that Jews owned all the money in the world, and that if they claimed to be Jews they would win similar fortune. They wanted money individually, and they wanted money to finance their nationalistic plans in Liberia. But they came to feel obliged to rationalize their motivation; and like Roberson and Herman they soon insisted that they had ancient title to the claim. In fact, they said, they were born Hebrews for they were Africans, and Africans had never been Christian but traditionally Hebrew. They claimed that fragments of Hebraism persisted among them, although slavery had disturbed the traditions and exposed them to the alien influences of the New World. They asserted that an honest reading of the Old Testament reveals the 'true' religion to be Hebrew, and that 'old-time' Negroes stressed the identities between their traditions and Hebrew ones.[17]

Ford now asserted a hereditary right to the office of rabbi. Thus self-sanctioned, he assembled 'evidence' of the identity or close relation of Hebrew theology and language with the African or 'Ethiopian'. He claimed that the African language is Arabic (influenced probably by the Arab dominance in West Africa). He said that the original Hebrews were the ancestors of the present (Islamized) Hausa-speaking peoples; that the ancient path of Jewish migration was from 'Ile Ife' or Nigeria eastward to Egypt and thence north to Palestine.[18] He said that 'Ife' means 'garden of Eden', and 'Ile' means 'land, island', and that Nigeria was the cradle of the Hebrews. But Nigeria is not the true name, he said, for the name was originally 'Akkra', an empire. He knew that 'Akkra' is the historical name of a seaport on the Gold Coast [now Ghana], but asserted that it was the name of a city in Palestine. (Inconsistencies or non sequiturs like this aroused no criticism from his following.) He said that some whites are Jews because of ancient settle-

ment in Nigeria, but that dark Nigerians are really white people burnt by the sun. (Apparently he could not lose his white standards.) At another time Ford said that the history of Carthage was the history of the Hebrews. He claimed that his mother was of Carthaginian descent, and that she passed the traditions on to him. He announced that these traditions can be transferred only orally, being 'cabbalistic',[19] and that they contain knowledge that white Jews have lost. He could not reveal this to me for 'the Truth and Wisdom can be understood only by bearded men'. He said that people from the northern Mediterranean married with the Carthaginians and produced the white Jews, who were mixed-bloods. At another time he tried to show that 'Judaism' has roots in the 'African concept of Sinye(?)'. This belief dates from his Mende mother (though she was not a 'bearded man' and was earlier described as Carthaginian!). She had said that 'Sinye is Arabic for Sinai', the mountain whence Moses gave the Torah; and that 'Sinye means Torah' and functions as the native law of the Sudan (though Carthage and Hausa both lie outside this stretch of country). At another time he said that West Indian Negroes had become Jews following intermarriage with eight hundred white Jews who had fled from the Inquisition to the Indies. At intervals he reiterated that his 'Mende' mother (in Harlem it was said that she was a native of Barbados, like her son) lived as a Jewess simply by living as an African. It was not till Ford came to Harlem and observed Jews that he realized he was one. His favourite refrain was that Africans are the only 'real' Hebrews, for the Bible calls Ethiopia the land of Hebrews. He pointed out that Sheba was Ethiopian and that Solomon said 'I am an Ethiopian'. He sought support in the book of Esther and called Jews and western Negroes alike 'slaves in Mizraim'. He said that his creed was divergent not because of ignorance but because it was based on recondite sources, chiefly 'the [unwritten] book of Esdres'. He said that the story of Adam and Eve is Ethiopian, that Adam is Arabic for 'mankind', that Adam and his family are not historical figures but purely symbolic ones.

The unique superiority of Judaism was Ford's constant theme, and this led to pronouncements that Negro Africa produced Judaism, founded Egypt, and indirectly established Europe. He claimed that Africans, or Hebrews, intermarried for centuries with south Europeans, diffusing their blood and culture. He said that Canterbury Cathedral, for example, is named after the Hebrew 'Kohan', a functionary in the Jewish hierarchy, because several 'Kohans' lived in the borough or 'bury' protected by Tories. Also the 'decane' of the Christian service grew out of the Hebrew requirement that ten men intone after the cantor.

Ford would go on to say that imperialism has not destroyed the Hebrew culture of Africa. The motif of the Shield of David (six-pointed star) is still found on the Old Calabar river and westwards, and is even

imprinted on British West African copper coins. He said that the stool of the West African kings functions like the ancient Jewish sanctuary. He said that tribal Nigerians bear facial markings (cicatrices) that are the Ten Commandments; although they have no written Torah since the Europeans burned all their books, 'they have the Cabbala, which is the Truth of the Spoken Word'.

He boasted that Africans show the Hebrew's high moral and intellectual character. Thus, they do not employ the European credit system because they trust one another. They do not worship fetishes like other peoples, but use them only as symbols, and deliberately make them grotesque in order to deter worship.

Ford came to reject the appellation 'Jewish', insisting on 'Hebrew'. For 'Jewish', he said, applies only to western whites converted by blacks. On this question the congregation later split.

The congregation was given some instruction by white Harlem Jews (whom I interviewed). A few of these Jews were genuinely interested in the task although they did not understand the peculiar motivations of their pupils. Some exploited the opportunity, for the Negroes paid their teachers and also bought wares. Some were white drifters disowned by their own people, but welcomed by those of still lower status. Thus the group evolved a garbled Judaism biased to serve the U.N.I.A. type of nationalism. Inaccuracies, omissions, borrowings (such as the Muslim fast of Ramadan) were sanctioned by the Rabbi as African. In fact, Ford soon announced himself as a repository of Hebrew learning of the African school.

The B.B.A. persisted for six years. Increasingly, Jews noticed the group, and on the roster of visitors that I kept for two years, some prominent names appear. The Rabbi tried to persuade the visitors to sponsor the 'B.B.A. corporation' (whose charter I read). This corporation 'was the secular limb of the B.B.A.' congregation. It offered stocks for sale to develop industry in and commerce in, and with, West Africa. It had already bought two houses in Harlem, which, however, were lost after two years. Ford secured some promises of support, and B.B.A. members tried to match them (as appeared in minutes of the corporation). But the West African 'Princes' involved bungled or betrayed the corporation. Ford persisted, and was negotiating with a 'Prince' and a great Jewish banking house when the Prince suffered some mental derangement and the scheme fell through. Then the European patron of the Abyssinian Falashas, a rich Jew interested in proselytizing in the U.S.A., urged Ford to foster a Negro Jewish centre in Harlem. But this could not rouse the Rabbi, for he wanted men for Africa.

Apart from the attraction of the women members to Ford, the real preoccupation of the B.B.A. was African nationalism. The members were largely British West Indians who supported Garvey and consequently supported Ford. They felt that they had no place in America,

and none thought of taking out citizenship papers. During the two years of the investigation, ten members sailed for Africa as pioneering skilled labourers. Members bought shares in several corporations that supported commerce with Africa and handled real estate in the Liberian hinterland. At services they never omitted U.N.I.A. songs, many having been 'composed' or arranged by Ford when he had been U.N.I.A. choirmaster. At high services they wore turbans, imitating Africans. They planned classes in 'mechanics, mathematics, Arabic, Hebrew, and the Bible' to prepare them for work in Africa.

In their services, lectures, and songs, hatred for the white race was manifest. The term 'Negro' was tabooed, for Ford said that there were no pure races, and 'All I recognize by "Negro" is an African or person of African descent whose mind is a by-product of European civilization, but has no traditions of its own. Hebrews are not "Negroes".' Each member bore a Christian given name which was called the 'name in slavery', and a Hebrew one adopted with membership in the B.B.A.

Matters went badly with the B.B.A. Individuals grew to criticize Ford invidiously. Some were evidently jealous of him as he had been of Garvey, and Herman of him. Then there was the inevitable conflict among natives of the different islands, as between men of Jamaica and those of Barbados. Ford, for example, spoke of his debtors as ''Maicans'. Others called Ford 'high-handed', and the minutes of meetings showed that Ford waived proceedings or sanctioned undertakings arbitrarily. Members criticized him for prohibiting the use of Yiddish, arguing that with this language they could win the sympathies of Jews. Ford firmly insisted that Yiddish was European and only Hebrew was African. (Ford may have been systematizing his dogma or he may have discovered that the rich German Jews rejected Yiddish.) He said that the centuries had modified the Ethiopian's vocal apparatus so as to limit it to Hebrew or Arabic, and besides Hebrew was needed in investigating the sources of African history. The Jamaicans took advantage of an absence of the Rabbi to start a Yiddish class, but upon his return Ford terminated it in a fury.

Some Jamaican members left the congregation about four years after its organization, asserting that Ford was unscrupulous generally. They said he misled women and 'broke homes'; that he had placed himself improperly in exclusive control of the bank account that members maintained jointly in the name of the congregation. Ford accused members of disloyalty. Wives generally did not belong to the B.B.A. (women members generally had no husbands), and their husbands complained of quarrels at home over the time and money consumed by B.B.A. And so on.

The Jamaicans who left drew up a new charter of incorporation. But nothing happened, except that they sent their children to a large white school for Hebrew instruction in Harlem. The pupils were apt and at

least one girl became valedictorian for her graduating class. Originally the adults had applied for admission to the classes, but had been refused on grounds of colour. The children brought their systematic knowledge home and so caused their parents to adopt the practices of eastern European Jews. One father said, 'We think the Jews are a great people! They have gone so far in spite of persecution! They own all the money in the country. Their religion did that for them, and may be it will do the same for us. They may help us to get jobs; Jews should help one another.' This man was more honest than the others who persisted in their claims of inherited Judaism.

About six years after its organization, the B.B.A. became acutely embarrassed financially, the members lost hope, and the Rabbi planned to abandon them. All but two of the men left him, complaining that he confined his attention to the women. But meetings and African plans continued. Another spurt of membership appeared briefly. There was a final collapse in 1930 and all the property was lost. Then Ford and his common-law wife, who had been his aide in the B.B.A., sailed for Africa with no definite plans except that they hoped to become converted to Islam.

Shadows of the B.B.A. and of the U.N.I.A. lingered. The remaining members organized again under the leadership of an old U.N.I.A. man designated by Ford. Bare reminders of Judaism persisted: in the skull cap worn by the leader, in the Shield of David emblem, in a couple of songs and the Hebrew greeting 'Peace!'. The rest was U.N.I.A. nationalism, the essential matrix of the B.B.A. Judaism had touched the B.B.A. only as an arabesque, a signature of Ford's genius. It took no hold although the B.B.A. had carried its pretensions further than any Negro Jewish sect preceding or following it.

Negro Jewish groups come and go in Harlem and Brooklyn. But they are not primarily concerned with healing the Negro ego. One of them, the 'Commandment Keepers', operates now in Harlem with the blessing of Ford. It had grown during the B.B.A. period and was chiefly West Indian. For long Ford had considered the leader, 'Bishop Matthews', a presumptuous rival. During my early visits to this group, the small membership was singing from a Christian hymnal and calling upon Jesus while Matthews called upon Moses and Judaism, being encouraged by shouts of 'Praise God! . . . Hallelujah! . . .' The services became more coherent under later instruction from Ford, and, before he left the U.S.A., Ford ordained Matthews a rabbi. Since then Matthews uses the chants and songs of the defunct B.B.A., and expounds the same dogma of Ethiopian, Jewish, or Hebrew ancestry. He denounces Christianity, but does not touch upon the nationalism that was so dear to Ford. Some effort is made to teach Hebrew language and history, African history, and French.

Another Jewish group appeared some years ago in the Williamsbridge

section of Brooklyn, organized by rebel Jamaican members of the B.B.A. It drew Sledge of the Moorish Zionist Church, and fresh adherents from the neighbourhood and Harlem; it also drew the support of some local white Jews who mistakenly identified them with the Abyssinian Falashas. For a time it had some financial success. Then it disintegrated with the growing mistrust of the members. It supported no African interest.

In Harlem, 'The Reverend St. Bishop the Vine', reputedly an old Garveyite, in Muslim costume, is said to have Hebrew connexions. About four years ago his rival was the then little known Father Divine, whose reputedly 'Jewish' doctrine was simply 'God is within man'. At the same time, an old associate of Roberson's revived meetings of the remnants of the first Black Jews in Harlem.

Black Judaism is now almost an exhausted theme in Harlem, having yielded to the non-sectarian influence of Father Divine. But its mainsprings are still active: general social and economic insecurity, providing fertile soil for the growth of all mushroom organizations. The Negro masses drift among religious sects, among healing cults, among lodges, among political clubs seeking stimulation and substance, and each group has the chance to live for a day. The leaders win economic advantages which often they are unfitted to obtain in the labour market, and prestige which they covet. Under such circumstances, accident and the personality of the leader largely determine what the platform of the organization will be.

Roberson and Garvey, and now Father Divine, achieved conspicuous successes. They had outstanding ambitions and talents, and the times had provided them with an unsettled, disgruntled mass on which to operate. Roberson and Divine, Americans, gave the people the opiate of a supernatural faith; Garvey, British West Indian, gave them a concrete plan of social reconstruction, a secular and political occupation. Besides these two choices, Ford offered a third that fused the two, taking up Judaism where Roberson had left off and hooking it up to U.N.I.A. nationalism. Later, Islam appealed to Ford, but it won no popular reception probably because no one in Harlem knew enough about it to present it.

After Roberson, none of the 'Jewish' organizations reached large proportions or influence. There was a general quiet in the Negro community, perhaps owing to momentary loss of faith in popular leadership, and to some adjustment to Northern conditions. After 1930 came violent distress and the haven offered by Father Divine.

There is a large number of cult leaders in Harlem, and most have only a tiny following, if any. The personnel changes constantly as was the case in the B.B.A. Generally, women revolve about the male leaders and are the chief supporters, for they are the chief wage-earners. In the B.B.A. there was a constant centripetal sex-attraction inducing female

membership, and a centrifugal jealousy threatening disintegration. Few children were attached to the B.B.A., and this is true of all the small groups. The B.B.A. thought little of educating the young, being a fleeting mirroring of adult difficulties. To women it meant a certain emotional and sexual adjustment. To two American women, frightened away from a Baptist church by the creed of hell-fire, the B.B.A. was a spiritual haven since it denied any after-life. To some it was a retreat of West Indian compatriots. To a few it was a field for exploitation. To others it was a passing show. To all it offered status in a promised land. It failed because it was rooted in confusion.

NOTES

[1] See Chas. S. Johnson, *The Negro in American Civilization*, New York, 1930; J. W. Johnson, *Black Manhattan*, New York, 1930; Sterling Spero and A. L. Harris, *The Black Worker*, New York, 1931; E. K. Jones, 'Negro Migration in New York State', *Opportunity*, Jan. 1926; E. A. Carter, editorial, *Opportunity*, Sept. 1929, p. 270, discussing the American Negro view of race relations; Chas. A. and Mary R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, Vol. 2, New York, 1927; Mary W. Ovington, *Half a Man*, New York, 1911.

[2] As an instance, see the whole issue of *Survey Graphic*, Vol. VI, New York, March 1925.

[3] See Alain Locke, ed., *The New Negro*, New York, 1925.

[4] I studied these groups in Harlem from 1929 to 1931, associating most closely with the cult group Beth B'nai Abraham, visiting others, interviewing people of different classes, and consulting Negro and Jewish newspapers and journals, published chiefly in New York.

[5] *Opportunity*, New York, Sept. 1926.

[6] This is my own interpretation based on the field data presented in this paper.

[7] The following data about this group are based on information current in Harlem and in the files of the New York City Negro newspaper *The Amsterdam News* from 1920 to 1932; and I have drawn on special data filed in the New York City Children's Court.

[8] See Harold M. Kingsley, 'The Negro goes to Church', *Opportunity*, March 1929. This discusses the churches of each Negro class, including the 'fringe' or 'mushroom' churches.

[9] Writer's findings.

[10] As reported by himself and others to me during the course of my field investigation (1929 to 1931).

[11] This was the cult group most intensively studied during the investigation.

[12] See the U.N.I.A. organ, *The Negro World*.

[13] E. F. Frazier, 'Garvey Movement', *Opportunity*, Nov. 1926; 'Mind of the American Negro', *Opportunity*, Jan. 1928; Chas. S. Johnson, 'After Garvey—What?', *Opportunity*, August 1923; W. A. Domingo, 'The West Indies', *Opportunity*, Nov. 1926; 'The Tropics in New York,' *Survey Graphic*, op. cit.; E. K. Jones, E. Brown, *et al.*, 'Symposium on West Indian-American Relations', *Opportunity*, Nov. 1926.

[14] W. A. Domingo, articles cited.

[15] See Spero and Harris, op. cit., and A. P. Randolph, 'The Negro and Economic Radicalism', *Opportunity*, Feb. 1926.

[16] All the following is based on my field data. But see also the article 'Rabbi Ford' by Sidney S. Kobre in the journal *Reflex*, Jan. 1929, p. 26. See also the New York Yiddish dailies *Forwards* and *Day*, and the New York Negro weekly *Amsterdam News*, for accounts published frequently from 1924 to 1931.

[17] In this connexion compare Lobagola's *An African Savage's Own Story*, New York, 1930, supposed to be the autobiography of a 'black Jew' of the African Sudan.

[18] There are similar reconstructions in J. J. William, *Hebrewisms of West Africa*, New York, 1930, and Allen L. Godbey, *The Lost Tribes, A Myth*, Durham, North Carolina, 1930.

[19] According to *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 4th edn., 'a kind of occult theosophy or mystical interpretation of the Scriptures among Jewish rabbis and certain medieval Christians'.

THE JOURNAL OF JEWISH STUDIES

Vol. XVI, Nos. 3-4 EDITOR: J. G. Weiss 1965

CONTENTS

15s. ($2.50) *per issue*

Published

30s. ($5.00) *per annum*

BY

JEWISH CHRONICLE PUBLICATIONS

in association with

THE INSTITUTE OF JEWISH STUDIES, THE SOCIETY FOR JEWISH STUDY AND THE CULTURAL DEPARTMENT OF THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS

OLD CONFLICTS IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT: A STUDY OF A MOROCCAN ATLAS MOUNTAINS COMMUNITY TRANSPLANTED TO ISRAEL

Moshe Minkovitz

DURING the last few years many sociological and anthropological studies have stressed the decisive part played by traditional groups and ways of life in the process of adjustment to changing social and economic conditions.[1] These works, dealing both with small-scale societies such as the Guatemalan community analysed by M. Nash[2] and the two Indonesian communities studied by C. Geertz,[3] and with vast social settings (as in the much stressed example of Japan[4]), have tried to abandon the assumption that the traditional organization obstructs change and modernization.[5] The idea of preserving traditional structures to ease adjustment to change has become an important item in sociological thinking, which in turn has influenced social engineering projects.[6]

In this context I should like to discuss another influential thesis which does not necessarily coincide with the argument above, but which yet falls into the same class of problems. This is the thesis that when groups which are socially homogeneous become subjected to forces making for change, the homogeneous 'organic' community structure provides better support for individuals and assists the group to meet the resulting painful difficulties. It is a remarkable fact that the Israeli policy to get immigrants absorbed into rural communities (after 1948), which at the beginning tried to realize the social ideal of the melting-pot, was to a large extent influenced and modified by sociological conclusions on the importance of community homogeneity.[7] In Israel, social homogeneity in the composition of village communities[8] has become almost an unquestioned requirement, and, indeed, an ideal. It is thought to be one of the most important conditions for the

satisfactory adjustment of immigrants to the new social and economic environment. In this paper I intend to test these two assumptions (viz., that traditional structures and social homogeneity facilitate change) by the data on an immigrant community of Moroccan Jews transplanted to Israel.[9] These immigrants were brought into the flow of social and economic changes under the apparently advantageous condition of a relatively well preserved traditional structure marked by social homogeneity. But the events which have taken place in their process of adjustment to the new environment are in sharp contrast to the usual assumptions. The community is beset by an acute conflict which prevents the settlers from making the expected adjustment to the new social, political, and economic conditions. It is of the utmost importance to be aware of the limitations of such hypotheses especially when they tend to influence social planning.

Present facts and problems

I am dealing with a rural community of immigrants in Israel which I call 'Romema', located in the southern semi-arid zone of the country (the northern Negev), where agriculture is based mainly on industrial crops and winter vegetables. The model of village organization to which this community has been expected to conform is that of the *moshav*. This model was introduced in the 1920s by young Jewish pioneers from Europe who were looking for a new occupational and social way of life. The *moshav* represents a pattern of moderate economic and social co-operation in an agricultural settlement. Each family cultivates its own farm and privately owns its household and farm equipment. The land is nationally owned, and at the outset national agencies give each farmer the same amount of land and facilities. According to the ideology, members of the *moshav* will remain economic equals, but as long as economic success is dependent also on individual effort and talent, economic differentiation may in fact occur.

Mutual help is one of the most important principles of the *moshav*. It is the responsibility of the community to aid families who cannot support themselves properly because of unexpected calamities such as illness. Economic co-operation takes place in many important activities, as in the marketing of agricultural products, the supply of farm and household needs, and the sharing of such services as dairy and granaries. The *moshav* organization deals with plans and policies about crops, marketing, public buildings, education, social welfare, entertainment, etc.

The most important organs of administration are the secretariat, the permanent committee, and the general assembly. There are many other specific committees and tasks in the many spheres of social and economic activities. The incumbents of all offices and the members of committees are elected every year by democratic vote in a general

assembly. (This pattern of settlement, although highly complicated and ideologically oriented, was found to be most suitable for absorbing and settling the very different kinds of people, mostly from Middle Eastern countries, who came to Israel after 1948.[10])

The *moshav* organization in the new immigrants' villages is usually much less complicated and viable than in the old-established *moshavim*. Only the main institutions function. The tasks involved are frequently performed by people from outside. The settlers themselves think that the *moshav* organization consists only of the paid offices, especially those of the secretary, the defence supervisor, and the rabbi (the religious functionary);[11] and in practice these are the only offices filled by settlers in many of these communities. The permanent committee usually functions and the general assembly meets; but they do so with varying degrees of stability, efficiency, and internal agreement.

The settlers in Romema are a segment of a single Jewish community in the Atlas Mountains in Morocco. They arrived in Israel in 1956 and were settled by the absorbing agencies with the rest of their Moroccan community members in another village in the northern part of the country. After some months a part of this immigrant group decided to move to another village. The decision resulted from an internal conflict connected with rivalry over the leading positions in the *moshav* organization, but the settlers said it was because the first village, being connected with a secular *moshav* movement, might obstruct religious education.[12] There is much evidence that this argument was only secondary. It provided some 'moral' conviction for settlers wishing to leave and grounds on which the immigrants got the settlement agencies' approval for a move to another village. Thirty-three families left in July 1957 and settled in Romema, which is connected with a religious *moshav* movement.

Romema was originally planned for forty families. Thirty-three families formed a reasonable number, the potential maturing and marriage of youngsters being taken into account. The settlement department later decided to incorporate in the same village organization another small planned village which was adjacent to Romema, since it lay on the other side of the road. Here there were thirty-eight vacant houses. Only in 1962 were settlers brought to this other part of the combined village.

The thirty-three families which came to Romema were equally divided into three groups which will be named in this paper 'Sebag', 'Biton', and 'Machluf'. Each of these three core-groups consisted in the main of kinsfolk, and a few members from other kinship groups committed themselves to one or other of the cores, so that each contained eleven members. Nevertheless, I shall call them kinship groups, because the cores consisted of relatives. When the three groups left for the new village, their leading members had reached an agreement

about the allocation of the leading positions in the new *moshav* organization. The agreement affirmed in general terms that the representative of one group would be the secretary, the representative of the second group would be the rabbi, and the third group would have the right to the office of the defence organizer. Unfortunately, when they arrived in Romema, only the position of rabbi was available. The settlement agencies were not yet ready to allow the other positions to be filled by unqualified and inexperienced settlers. But worse still, two of the groups had candidates for the office of rabbi,[13] while the third group (Sebag) was against allowing only one group to have a position of leadership. This first failure led to an acute conflict; and it opened a cycle of events which prevented the settlers from agreeing on any nomination even at a later date when other leading and minor administrative positions became available. People from outside have occupied all these offices. The settlers have never elected a permanent committee, and when the general assembly has met there have been scenes of disorder. Relations between the three groups became very strained and quarrels occurred about all matters of public business. Tension especially prevailed in the relations between the Sebag and Biton groups.

These disturbed relations were called by the authorities (and also therefore by the villagers) '*Hamulot* feuding'. *Hamula* is a common term in the Middle East for an agnatic minimal lineage which is a corporate group.[14] Each group in Romema was called a *hamula*: *Hamulat*[15] Sebag, *Hamulat* Biton, *Hamulat* Machluf.

The lack of social consensus and the inability to establish the necessary social and economic institutions of the *moshav* also prevented the villagers from carrying out the tasks of independent farmers. In order to become farmers the settlers were required to sign a contract taking over the responsibility for farming land, equipment, and buildings, an investment which they were supposed to repay over a long term. They would also have had to commit themselves to co-operative marketing and supply, and to planting crops on a plan designed by the experts and instructors of the Settlement Department. (Agricultural planning is based largely on co-operative activities such as control of water and use of machinery.) But instead, the villagers looked for employment outside the *moshav*. In 1961–2 I found the settlers working in five main kinds of occupation, which I present and rank according to their prestige (as assessed by the villagers), income, and permanency:

1. Permanent workers in a factory in the near vicinity of Romema.
2. Seasonal permanent workers in a neighbouring village's orchard.
3. Permanent watchmen in Romema and in a neighbouring village. (This occupation was the subject of the only agreement reached in Romema, under which each group had the right to one watchman in the village.)

4. Temporary daily workers on the farms of a neighbouring settlement.
5. Temporary daily workers in subsidized and unskilled employment provided by the Government and the Settlement Department.[16]

The distribution of the male population of the village according to type of job and *hamula* membership shows a very high correlation.

TABLE 1. *Hamula membership (males) and type of occupation (1962)*

	Factory workers	*Orchard workers*	*Watchmen*	*Farm workers*	*Subsidized workers*	*Total*
a1) *Hamulat* Sebag	5	4	2		1	12
a2) its followers		1			1	2
b1) *Hamulat* Biton			1	4	4	9
b2) its followers				1	1	2
c1) *Hamulat* Machluf			1		6	7
c2) no followers						

Table 1 shows a clear division of labour in the community according to *hamula* membership. The members of the Sebag family and its followers hold the best occupations. Neither of the other groups has succeeded in getting a job in the factory or in the orchard. The Biton family and its followers are similarly but less advantageously placed: only members of this family are employed on the farms of the neighbouring village. This is a low status occupation, but it is highly paid. The Machluf family members are in the worst position, as most of them are engaged in the lowly ranked and badly paid employment subsidized by the State. The Biton and Machluf members bitterly express their resentment against what they call the 'unrighteous' monopolizing of the better occupations by the Sebag members. Some of them even assert that the Settlement Department (which actually has nothing to do with these kinds of occupation) should allocate jobs to the settlers according to family size. At the same time, some members of the Machluf family blame one another for not displaying the helpful and loyal conduct which they think exists in the Sebag (and to some extent also in the Biton) family.

Table 2 shows the demographic and other changes that have taken place in the village population since the settlement in 1957.

During six to seven years some families left and some new ones joined the village. Of those that left, three families were from the Biton group and four from the Machluf. The Sebag group has not suffered any loss. Moreover, its numbers have been increased by the marriage

TABLE 2. *Demographic and other changes in the village population according to Hamula membership.**

	No. of households at the beginning (1957)	*New households*	*Died*	*Left*	*Total no. of households in 1963–4*
Hamulat Sebag	11	3	—	—	14
Hamulat Biton	11	3	—	3	11
Hamulat Machluf	11	—	1	4	6

* See also Figs. 1, 2, and 3.

of three sons. The Biton group has to some extent balanced its losses by the marriage of three sons. The Machluf group has decreased substantially in numbers by losing members without gaining any. These demographic changes and emigrations have not made the villagers willing to accept new settlers, even though in one case I know the candidate was a member of the Machluf family from the original community in Morocco. The other two groups based their refusal on the candidate's advanced age, arguing that he would be a burden on the community. Actually this candidate, who settled in another village, had two grown-up sons, and it is very unlikely that the argument which was used against his admission was valid. It seems as if this policy of resisting the entry of new settlers results from conflicts within the village.

In 1962 thirty-eight new immigrant families, also from Morocco but most of them from other areas of that country, were settled in the second vacant part of the village. This new settlement has entirely failed. As there are many other important reasons for this failure, it is difficult to isolate the specific influence of the first on the new settlers. In general, the two populations remained highly segregated while the newcomers expressed suspicions about the intentions and behaviour of the 'veterans'. Some outbursts of aggression have actually occurred between members of these two unrelated groups of settlers. Many of the newcomers have already left the village.

The question of becoming independent farmers has been raised again during recent years. While members of the Sebag group expressed enthusiasm, doubts and a sense of insecurity were found in the other groups. In these two groups I was frequently asked: 'What will happen if we fail in agriculture?' And actually, while most of the Sebag group signed the contract with the Settlement Department to take over the responsibilities for farm facilities, etc., only a few from the Biton group, and even fewer from the Machluf group, signed.

In their efforts to overcome the settlers' doubts and insecurity, the instructors from the Settlement Department tried to introduce a communal experimental farm on their own responsibility and risk. While

Map 1. PATTERNS OF NEIGHBOURHOOD IN ROMEMA



o Sebag members

□ Biton members

△ Machluf members

· Followers

– Vacant and public buildings

Fig. 1. THE GENEALOGICAL STRUCTURE OF HAMULAT SEBAG
(heads of families)



△ Men O Women = Married ▲● Deceased

(△) Heads of families which were established after the settlement in 1957

* Form one household (parents and a married son)

Fig.2. THE GENEALOGICAL STRUCTURE OF HAMULAT BITON



(△) Heads of families who left the village after the settlement in 1957

Fig.3. THE GENEALOGICAL STRUCTURE OF HAMULAT MACHLUF



(△) Heads of families who left the village after the settlement in 1957

(▲) The head of the household died after the settlement in 1957

the Sebag members were ready to seize this opportunity and were able to organize a corporate work-group, the other families, and especially the Biton families, bitterly opposed the whole plan, and apparently for 'irrational' reasons.

We find the same general picture in the distribution of 'social cases' in the village, that is, people who are officially recognized as unable to support themselves, and families who feel they cannot do so but who have no official endorsement of their claims. While there is not one 'social case' in the Sebag group, there are some in the Biton and Machluf groups.

In summary, it appears that the Sebag group has been the most successful in adjusting to the new conditions. This group monopolizes the best occupations, enjoys the highest degree of stability of membership, and demonstrates greater solidarity and feeling of security. The Biton group is less successful while the Machluf group is in the worst situation.

There are clearly important differences between the three groups, although initially they did not differ in the distribution of members by age, education, significant qualifications, and possessions. Moreover, every settler was entitled to the same rights to obtain materials, work, and social support from the Government and Settlement institutions.

In order to explain these patterns of behaviour and adjustment, it is necessary first to analyse the present-day structural features of the three groups. Then we shall have to look into their past and try to study some features of their social setting before they migrated to Israel.

Some present-day structural features

It seems as if at least part of the explanation for the settlers' different modes of adjustment is to be looked for in the intrinsic characteristics of the three groups. The first clear structural feature in the village is the territorial setting, which also provides an objective index of the definition of the groups. Group membership is reflected in the neighbourhood pattern. When they came to the village, the immigrants settled not as individuals but as groups. The representatives of the three groups cast lots and each of them chose eleven neighbouring houses. Map 1 represents the ecological pattern of the village as it was at the beginning.

From this map it appears that the Sebag and Biton families particularly have succeeded in concentrating their members and followers as neighbours in one line of houses. This pattern is of course an advantage in agricultural co-operation.

Figures 1, 2, and 3 represent the genealogical structure of the three family groups (*hamulot*).

Figure 1 demonstrates clearly that the Sebag group has an extended family structure with a genealogical depth of three generations. The

Biton group (Fig. 2) has a deeper genealogical structure, but its members are less closely related; their links reach back five generations. The kinship ties of the Machluf group (Fig. 3) are the loosest: indeed, its members are unable to reconstruct their kinship links; and they share only the same family name and a vague notion of a common origin.

These findings enable us to place the three groups along a continuous 'scale' according to the closeness or looseness of their kinship networks. While the Sebags have the closest knit kinship network, the Machlufs have the loosest. The Bitons kinship network is of an intermediate degree.

If we construct a 'scale' of adjustment by the groups to the new conditions and set it alongside the 'scale' of kinship networks, there is a remarkable consistency between the two 'scales'. The Sebags, with their closely knit kinship network, are the best adjusted and most successful as judged by occupation, stability of population, absence of social cases, readiness to undertake independent farming, etc. The Bitons have a looser knit kinship network than that of the Sebags, but a closer knit one than the Machlufs; and they also occupy an intermediate position on the scale of adjustment. The Machlufs, with the loosest knit kinship network, are the worst adjusted. They are employed in the worst occupations, are continually losing members, and so on. Since at least at the beginning the groups were almost equal in many other important features, it seems probable that there is some connexion between the 'scale' of kinship networks and the 'scale' of social adjustment. Although I do not have enough data on the actual functioning of kinship relationships, this correlation is striking. It seems that membership of a group with a particular type of kinship structure decisively influences the different modes in which individuals adjust to new conditions.

These findings seem consistent with the descriptions and analyses of simple and traditional societies, where kinship ties constitute one of the principal features and are key symbols influencing social behaviour and social interdependence. In a society where kinship ties largely determine the social pattern, the degree of interdependence and the fulfilment of mutual duties and responsibilities are to a large extent a function of kinship distance. It is to be expected, therefore, that in this type of society a person who can rely on near relatives will be in a stronger position than somebody who can rely only on remote kin.

The community of origin

Having grasped some features of the present-day social structure, we must attempt to understand the original social situation in Morocco. We must make this reconstruction in order to analyse its possible bearings on the present situation.[17]

The three kinship groups in Romema were members of a com-

munity which originally contained seven such groups. Each group, apart from its identification in terms of kinship and its territorial concentration, was differentiated from the others by the main economic activity of its members. Most of the Sebag families were merchants and financed Arab agriculture. The Biton families were mostly smiths and were also engaged in personal services for other Jews. The Machluf families were highly skilled cobblers, and produced embroidered shoes. The members of another family group were carpenters, and so on.

The occupational differentiation also provided the main basis of social stratification in the community. The Sebag families, relatively a small group of 'newcomers' in this community, were the richest. This fact was also taken into account by the local officials of the Moroccan Government which nominated one of the Sebags to represent the community in its affairs with the outside world.

The Machluf family was divided into two kinship segments, Machluf-et-David, and Machluf-et-Shaul. They had high prestige because of their special craft. But one of the segments (Machluf-et-David), apart from its trade, was also distinguished by its high percentage of members qualified in religious learning. Some of its members usually participated in the religious and cultural leadership of the community. The main part of this more distinguished segment remained in the village which our settlers left, while those who came to Romema were mostly members of the less distinguished segment (Machluf-et-Shaul). The Bitons had very low social status in the community of origin. The Sebags' economic and political superiority also found expression in the ownership of more sacred scrolls, which gave them advantages in ritual performances in the communal synagogue. This ritual superiority caused the quarrels which sometimes led the less distinguished Machluf segment and (especially) the Bitons to pray in a private house.

The stratification was also reflected in the system of preferential marriage. The information on the patterns of marriage also provides a more reliable index of the status differentiation of the groups.[18]

Table 3 presents full records of the Sebag males and females and their spouses in the last three generations (including those who are dead, have remained in Morocco, and are settled in other parts of Israel).

Although the present patterns of marriage are under the pressure of vast changes, nevertheless some main features of the system are visible. It is clear from Table 3 that the main trend in the Sebag third generation was to marry inside the group: more than 40 per cent of this generation have done so. Outside marriages in the second and third generations were preferred with the Machlufs, and especially with their more distinguished segment (Machluf-et-David). Marriage with Bitons was very unlikely, as one of the Sebags explained to me: 'Our families were like aristocrats, unlike the Biton families, and it did not

TABLE 3. *The distribution of Sebag family members (males and females) according to generation, place of marriage, and kinship group origin of their spouses*

The kinship group of spouse	*Generation and place of marriage* I *Married in Morocco*	II *Married in Morocco*	III *Married in Morocco*	III *Married in Israel*	*Total*
Sebag			14	5	19
Machluf-et-David		4	5	1	10
Machluf-et-Shaul		3	1		4
Biton			1	1	2
*X		1	2	1	4
X		1	1	1	3
X	1			2	3
X					
From other communities		2	5	6	13
Total	1	11	29	17	58

* One of the other kinship groups in the community of origin which are not settled in Romema and are not discussed in this paper.

suit us to marry them.' In Morocco there was actually one case of marriage with a Biton, but it was a special case of an orphan, a grandchild of the Sebag ancestor's wife's sister, who was brought up and adopted by the Sebag family (this man is even now entirely identified with the Sebag group; see Fig. 1). A second case happened after the settlement in Romema and caused great resentment among the Sebags. The elder brother of the bridegroom explained that the girl had bewitched the boy!

It seems that this social background has had an immense influence on some important developments in the new environment, even though immigration to Israel apparently called for drastic changes in the old social structure of this community. The settlers arrived with hardly any possessions; at the same time they were leaving their old physical and social environment and an occupational structure which provided only a few specific openings for Jews. They were 'absorbed' by agencies which stress equality in material support and in the opportunities for economic and social mobility. They were sent to a co-operative settlement which also required new qualification in the whole community. The wider society into which they have had to integrate acts according to entirely different modes of behaviour. The new emphases are, for example, on the principle of voluntary selection in social grouping, and on actual achievements and qualifications as criteria for social evaluation, mobility, and job-holding. These differ from the ascriptive criteria (kinship relations, social class, etc.) which were emphasized in Morocco.

Actually the first change to occur in the long-established social relations among the immigrants was a dispute between the Sebags and

the leading figure of the distinguished Machluf segment. These groups, as we have seen, were related by marriage ties. The dispute occurred in the village in Israel where they settled on their arrival in the country. According to the settlers' stories, it seems that the Machluf leader, who was nominated as secretary of the village, treated his relatives 'rudely'. This 'rude' treatment actually means that he treated them without favouring them as they expected a relative to do. The embarrassing situation was expressed to me once in this fashion: 'We are connected to the Machluf-et-David as if we are one family. We did not want [in the first village in which they settled in Israel] to begin quarrelling with them and to be mocked by other families.' It also seems that some leading figures among the Sebags, the Bitons, and the Machlufs found themselves deprived in the new situation of the formal leading positions.

The initial agreement on the allocation of the leading positions in the new village and the insistence on equality of numbers in each migrating group are two facts of the utmost importance, reflecting the past and influencing the future.

The Sebag families wishing to leave the village did not have enough members to populate a new village. They therefore had to recruit members from other kinship groups. As they had lost their traditional partners (Machluf-et-David), who remained behind in the first village because of the dispute, they had to meet certain conditions put forward by their new followers. This was especially forced on them since they now had to accommodate to the traditionally inferior Biton families. It seems that the establishing of the new village, in which the Sebags for the first time needed their support, provided the opportunity for the Biton families to improve their traditional social status. The relatively complete transplantation of the old community in the first village could not bring about a rapid change in the traditional social structure, although many of the environmental conditions were changed.

In this framework of relations and expectations it is possible to understand the insistence in the last move that groups must be equal in number and the agreement on allocation of positions of leadership. This policy provided a 'guarantee' for the members of the Machluf-et-Shaul, and especially of the Biton group, that the old social structure would not again be transplanted. Only on these grounds was it advantageous for these members to leave the first village.

But the expectations and agreement were frustrated both by the conditions they found and by traditional behaviour. When they arrived in the new village only the rabbi's position was immediately available. While the two traditionally less respected groups had candidates for the office, the Sebag family was opposed to any nomination before all the offices were available. Although they abided by the original agreement literally, they caused deep disappointment. Their

not allowing the vacant position to be filled as long as they were not given an equivalent position appeared as part of their usual traditional superior behaviour. Without the Sebags' consent, the two other groups could not arrive at any decision; while the fact that there were two candidates provided the Sebag group with some apparent justification for their opposition to any nomination. This dispute, which was later aggravated by other developments (economic, etc.), persisted along the same lines for years.[19] In the meantime the two candidates for the office of rabbi left the village. By their withdrawal the representative of the Sebags lost any chance of getting the other two embittered groups to consent to any nomination.

In the previous section I stressed the correlation between the distribution of occupations, stability of population, etc., and membership of groups with differently structured networks of kinship ties. I gave weight to the kinship structure as producing the other scale of values in the correlation. In this section I try in addition to stress the previous background of the society as a part of the present situation. How far are these different kinds of explanation compatible with each other?

The segregation of occupations with accompanying monopolizing of jobs in Romema has a precedent in the previous social setting of the population. Moreover, the advantageous position of the Sebags is not a new phenomenon in the community. It seems also that the Sebags' success in preserving their superior position is one of the main sources of bitterness and resentment, especially on the part of the Bitons. Even though the Machlufs are nowadays less prosperous than the Bitons, they are usually less aggressive and much more ready to compromise than the relatively prosperous Bitons, who had been in the worst social position in the past.

While the kinship structure explains the different modes of adjustment to the new situation, the previous social structure explains the special attitudes which were developed towards the present differential adjustment. The Bitons, who were previously in the lowest status, stay in the main in the village and oppose any reconciliation which is not on equal terms. The Machlufs, who are at present in the weakest position and are indeed the main losers under the new conditions, react regressively by gradually deserting the village.

Suspicions and quarrels have actually prevented the setting up of any kind of political institution within which agreement between the groups might be required. Moreover, the desire to keep the political status quo has influenced the 'policy' against accepting new settlers. The borders of this small community, which is full of strife and conflict, are rigidly kept. The only changes that occur are brought about by apparently uncontrollable factors, such as natural increase and decrease and the departure of those who become desperate.

The claim for economic and political equality is not so much the

product of the principles and social ideologies of Israel as it is the result of the desire to compensate, first, for social deprivation in the past and, second, for the frustration of hopes of improvement in the present. The policy of equality purveyed by the absorbing authorities was easily adopted by the less successful immigrants as the usual legitimate norm in their new environment. Thus, they have been only defending their 'natural rights' while openly expressing their resentment against the 'illegitimate behaviour' of the more successful members. That is, conditions in Israel have been strikingly conceived in ascriptive terms.

It seems as if the vicious circle of events which has existed in this village for at least seven years and which has prevented the normal development of the village, was set in motion by the disillusionment arising from the frustrating of high aspirations that a social structure which existed in the earlier, traditional, environment would be radically changed. In this way the traditional structure has dominated developments in the quite new situation.

Conclusion

I have tried in this paper to present a case in which traditional modes of behaviour and social structure were found within a drastically changing situation. The first argument dealt with the functioning of some elementary modes of behaviour which are typical of traditional kinship groups. Even though we may say that a strong kinship structure helps its members to adjust (as was the case with the group that had a closely knit kinship network, the Sebags) the process of adjustment provokes resentment in the other groups, which suffer relatively because of their weaker kinship structure. Thus success for one group produces disharmony and conflict in the community as a whole.[20] Moreover, this situation may influence the development of ascriptive particularistic conceptions though they are not appropriate to it. One of the most striking results in this case has been the occupational segregation according to kin membership.

The second argument analysed the developments and conflicts in the community as these were to a large extent influenced by the previous social structure and the different aspirations of the groups involved in that structure. Adjustment to the new situation was conceived to a surprising extent as part of the struggle for status continuing from the past.

This case, which is possibly an extreme one, demonstrates the potential vitality and power of links with a traditional social structure even under the stress of change. I must emphasize that this does not mean that we are confronted here with the same structure with its modes of behaviour and spheres of activity. On the contrary, it is a new kind of struggle with some new rules, and the outcome is a new

social reality. But this turn of affairs has taken its special direction because of an apparently irrelevant influence from the past.

I began this paper by presenting the prevailing assumptions in sociological thinking that traditional structures may facilitate change and that it is therefore desirable to preserve them. Our case shows that changes on the periphery of a persisting traditional setting may also cause competing traditional groups to try to profit from the new situation. It is possible that changes in the direction of social and economic modernization sometimes derive from efforts made by individuals or groups to cope with problems, feuds, rivalries, aspirations for prestige, etc., which originate from the older social structure; that is, the frame of reference in these new activities is still the traditional setting. While the end-product of this course of events may sometimes be desirable in terms of 'modernization', it may also bring about a vicious circle where 'modern items' may be absorbed into a traditional setting. Neglect of this possibility may lead to illusions about the processes of modernization. These illusions may explain why the apparently 'advanced communities', which are thought to have made a good adjustment, suddenly and surprisingly collapse. It is misleading to take superficial changes for actual social modernization, and without considering their meaning for the actors. There must be more balance in the thinking about traditional communities in the process of change: one must be wary both of considering, as many social scientists and administrators have done, that traditional social structures always obstruct change, and of accepting the new tendency to believe in easy transformations and the necessity to preserve traditional structures in the process of social modernization.

This case also stresses that it may be dangerous to assume that social homogeneity in a community always facilitates the process of change. The studies dealing with the argument that social homogeneity facilitates change seem to stress the first stage of adjustment. Thus in Israel, while many of the villages with heterogeneous populations rapidly collapsed, the more homogeneous communities presented greater immediate stability. But a further problem arises: what type of social and economic adjustment really exists in some of these apparently stable homogeneous communities? Unfortunately in an homogeneous community latent or overt conflicts may continue from the past. It is possible that in special social structures, as described by D. Weintraub[21] in villages populated by immigrants from Yemen, the 'institutionalized conflict' may provide a basis for some kind of consensus in the new environment. But at the same time it appears that conflicts which constituted part of the old social structure and which were kept within bounds by some internal or external mechanism of control[22] may be impossible to contain under new conditions.

It appears as if the conditions under which the institutionalized

conflict in the new situation may either provide some source for social consensus or, on the contrary, be the cause of social disturbance, depend to a large extent on the content and structure of the conflict in the past. In the Yemenite communities, as described by Weintraub, the differentiation between the conflicting kinship groups had a ritual content in addition to basic occupational and economic differences. On the other hand, in our Moroccan community the main basis for differentiation and conflict was occupational and economic. And this being so, the differentiation between the kinship groups and its status implication were less legitimized and could be changed. Thus, immigration and the new settlement provided an opportunity to change the traditional relations between the groups. The aspirations arising from 'institutionalized conflict' led to disturbances in the present.

In general, it seems as if homogeneity and acute conflict are not incompatible. It is very possible that in a heterogeneous community the conflict may mainly concentrate around the cleavages between the different types of population, while internal conflicts within each section may remain latent and suppressed. But in a homogeneous community such internal conflicts may become the focus of tensions and disintegrative tendencies even though apparently without objective justification.

Unless we are able to take into account as many variables as possible and all the factors that may operate in communities under change, generalizations about the 'positive' potentialities of traditional structures and social homogeneity may become 'sociological ideologies' which cannot cope with reality.

NOTES

[1] I should like to thank Professor J. Ben-David and Dr. D. Weintraub of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, for their advice and comments on an earlier version. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor M. Gluckman for his invaluable help with the present paper. I should also like to thank Professor P. Worsley, Dr. A. L. Epstein, Mr. S. Deshen, and Mr. E. Cohen for their critical comments.

[2] M. Nash, 'Machine Age Maya', *American Anthropologist*, Memoir No. 87, April 1958.

[3] C. Geertz, 'Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two Indonesian Towns', in E. E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change*, Homewood, Illinois, 1962, pp. 385–407.

[4] M. Levy, 'Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan', in S. Kugnetz, W. E. Moore, and J. J. Spengler, eds., *Economic Growth in Brazil, India, Japan*, Durham, N.C., 1955, pp. 496–537; S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Breakdowns of Modernization', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. XII, No. 4, July 1964, pp. 345–67.

[5] For a recent and one of the most elaborate presentations of this assumption see E. A. Shils, 'The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries', *World Politics*, Vol. XI, October 1958, pp. 1–19.

[6] For an application of the idea see M. Minkovitz, 'Report on the Social Structure of the Ghazvin Area', in *Ghazvin Area Development Project, Reconnaissance Report*, Vol. II, Tel Aviv, 1963.

[7] These conclusions were derived from researches carried out by sociologists studying the Israeli immigrant scene. See R. Weitz, 'The Sociologists and the

Policy Makers—A Case Study of Agricultural Settlement in Israel', *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 59–75.

[8] i.e., homogeneity in regard to the countries and regions of origin, type of settlement in the previous environment (rural versus urban), structure of the settling units (nuclear families, extended families, segments of previous communities), ideological or religious commitments, etc.

[9] The field material was collected in the course of my work as rural sociologist with the Land Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. The main lines of the present analysis were first presented in 'The Adjustment of the Extended Family to the Moshav', *Megamot*, Vol. XII, No. 3, March 1963, pp. 281–4 (in Hebrew with English summary). (Note: In the Hebrew publications, the Sebag family was named 'Levy', and the Biton family was named 'Cohen'. These borrowed names have been changed in order to avoid any suggestion of a possible connexion between the conflict in the village and the special ritual status which is attached in Jewish tradition to these names.)

[10] For a more complete description of the social and economic basis and problems of the *moshav* see J. Ben-David, ed., *Agricultural Planning and Village Community in Israel*, Unesco, Paris, 1964. See also, A. Weingrod, 'Administered Communities—Some Characteristics of New Immigrants' Villages in Israel', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. XI, No. 1, October 1962, pp. 69–84.

[11] This is an office which was not commonly established in the older secular *moshavim*, but it was introduced in most of the new settlements (even in those connected with the secular settlement movement) because the new immigrants were usually religious.

[12] Every *moshav* is connected with one of the settlement movements. Each settlement movement is linked to a political party, which may be religious. The settlements of new immigrants were allocated to movements by an agreement between these movements, based on their proportional power in the past. This allocation theoretically defined a particular village's 'Ideological Commitment'.

[13] Actually these candidates were qualified only as slaughterers according to Jewish law.

[14] See A. Cohen, *Arab Border-Villages in Israel*, Manchester, 1965.

[15] *Hamulat*: in a grammatical relation of dependence (construct state).

[16] This kind of employment was introduced in the 1950s when the influx of immigrants to the country exceeded the supply of employment. It was preferred to support the immigrants with some work, even if this work was unproductive or unprofitable in the short run. The general situation and this method of relieving unemployment gradually changed towards the end of the decade. The policy was thereafter operated only in special social and economic situations.

[17] For a general analysis of this approach see S. N. Eisenstadt, *Absorption of Immigrants*, London, 1954.

[18] Actually, full records are available only for the Sebags, a fact which to some extent limits the reliability of this index.

[19] During my last visits in 1964 the struggle still continued.

[20] For the analysis of the relationship between the solidarity of sub-groups and the solidarity of the community as a whole, see M. Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa*, Oxford, 1956.

[21] D. Weintraub, *Patterns of Social Change in New Immigrants' Smallholders' Cooperative Settlements*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1962.

[22] Gluckman, ibid.

PATRONYMIC GROUPS IN A TRIPOLITANIAN JEWISH VILLAGE: RECONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

Harvey Goldberg

INTRODUCTION

THIS essay is an attempt to analyse certain aspects of the traditional social organization of a rural community of Tripolitanian Jews. The data on which this reconstruction is based were gathered during field research in a *moshav* in Israel.[1] This *moshav* approximates to a transplanted community consisting of immigrants from two neighbouring villages in Tripolitania. I have shown elsewhere[2] that not only was there a transfer of population from rural Tripolitania to the Israeli village of Even Yosef (the name is fictitious), but that a striking continuity in the principles of social organization and in many aspects of the culture was also maintained. For this reason the reconstruction is not based solely on the testimony of informants but also on observed patterns of behaviour as they were found in the context of village life in Israel. With due caution it is permissible to project many of these behaviour patterns backwards in time and attempt to understand them within the context of the socio-cultural milieu of rural Tripolitania.

The specific question posed concerns the meaning and function of the patronymic groups. It is common in Israel to denote groups of patrilineally related families, or groups of families sharing the same patronym, by the term *hamula*.[3] Studies of immigrant villages have shown the *hamula* to be an important economic and political group within the social structure of certain *moshavim*.[4] Less is known, however, about the structure and function of the *hamula* within the traditional social setting. The purpose of this essay is to explore the structure and function of the traditional Tripolitanian-Jewish patronymic group.[5]

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

The community in question lived in the Gharian district of Tripolitania, Libya, which lies directly south of the city of Tripoli. The distance between Garian-town, the capital of the district, and the city of Tripoli is about 100 kilometres. In the days before motor transport the trip from Tripoli to the Gharian took from two to three days. The journey was climaxed by the steep ascent of the Jebel Gharian which towers about 900 metres above the coastal plain.

Garian-town has long been an administrative and market centre. It was, however, very sparsely settled until the recent Italian occupation of Libya. Under the earlier Turkish regime the town was a market and the station of a military garrison, but the people who had business in the town during the day usually resided outside it, for it boasted only a few permanent residents.[6]

The Jews of the Gharian district lived in two villages or hamlets, one four kilometres from Garian-town and the other 14 kilometres away. These villages were known, respectively, as Tigrinna and Beni'abaas. The Jewish population of these villages in 1948 was 464.[7]

From the available data it seems that the Jewish population of the area has numbered well under 1,000 for about three-quarters of a century. The data are shown in Table 1, which gives the population of the region at various dates and indicates the source of the data. I discount the extremely low figures for 1906 and 1931.

TABLE 1. *Census data on the Gharian Jewish community of Tripolitania*

Date	*Population*	*Source*
1885	550	Slouschz[8]
1906	840	Slouschz[8]
1906	60	Zeitschrift[9]
1931	341	Eisenbeth[10]
1931	85	Bachi[11]
1931	350	Slouschz[8]
1944	410	Guweta[12]
1948	464	Chouraqui[7]

It is well known that drought, disease, and hostile political conditions have been responsible for periodically reducing the Jewish and Muslim population of the area. One might also venture the guess that the Jewish population never tended to grow greater than several hundreds of people because the area could only support a limited number of individuals engaged in commerce and the crafts. The market for the products and services of the Jews was spread far beyond the immediate vicinity of their villages in the Gharian.

The Jews of the Gharian were artisans, peddlers, and merchants. Table 2 gives the occupational distribution of the Jews of Tigrinna and

Beni'abaas as listed by one informant. The term 'occupation', however, is misleading in that it conveys the impression that an individual chose a certain occupation, and that this was more or less a permanent choice. This was not the case among the Gharian Jews.

Most members of the community knew tinsmithing, and many others, not listed as blacksmiths, also knew blacksmithing. People would move from one trade to another, depending on the varying economic opportunities. Thus, Table 2 is only meant to give a general picture of the occupational structure. A man's occupation was, in part, a function of the 'domestic developmental cycle'.[13] Frequently, young men (aged 12–20) would work as itinerant peddlers (*tawwaf*). The peddlers would travel hundreds of miles from the Gharian and might be away from home for as long as six months, returning home to celebrate the religious festivals. A young man would make himself a 'junior partner' to an older and more experienced *tawwaf* who would teach him the trade. As the youth neared marriage he hoped to move into an occupation that would not take him from the village for such long periods of time. Furthermore many of the blacksmiths and tinsmiths practised their trade as itinerant craftsmen rather than as 'sedentary' tradesmen.

TABLE 2. *Occupational distribution of the Gharian Jews*

Occupation	*Number of Families*
Blacksmith	24
Shopkeeper	17
Shoemaker	5
Tailor	5
Tinsmith	4
Itinerant Peddler	2
Builder	1
Driver	1

Some of the Jews owned land and flocks. In some cases they would work the land themselves (the main crops were olives, figs, and barley), but the flocks were invariably tended by Arabs who paid a portion of the profits to the Jewish owner. On the whole, the people of Beni'abaas owned more land (per family) than those of Tigrinna, and the latter engaged more in itinerant hawking than did the people of Beni'abaas.

THE PATRONYMIC GROUPS AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

I. The sociological irrelevance of the patronymic groups

The families of Even Yosef (the present Israeli village) constitute three major patronymic groups. Two of these groups, the Hajaaj and the Hasaan, come mainly from the village of Tigrinna while the Guweta come mainly from Beni'abaas. If the present proportional

distribution of the various groups is considered to be an accurate representation of their traditional numerical strength, we may thereby assess the relative size of these patronymic groups in the past. The proportions are presented in Table 3.

TABLE 3. *The relative numerical strength of the patronymic groups in the Tripolitanian villages*

Patronymic Group	*Tripolitanian Village*		*Totals*
	Tigrinna	*Beni'abaas*	
	%	%	%
Hajaaj	39	—	39
Hasaan	28	2	30
Guweta	—	17	17
Others	10	4	14
Totals	77	23	100

A glance at these demographic figures suggests that the patronymic groups might have been significant units within the social organization of the community. The available evidence, however, indicates that these patronymic groups did not correspond to significant social categories within the traditional social structure. Their role in the traditional social organization was, at best, muted.

In the Gharian there were no land or water rights vested in the patronymic group but, instead, these rights were vested in the individual family heads. Inheritance rights did not involve the patronymic group. In the absence of inheriting relatives, a man's property would pass on to the Synagogue. In the memory of the people of Tigrinna there were no major conflicts that divided the community along Hajaaj-Hasaan lines. Finally, there was no preferred marriage within the patronymic group; the village was the important endogamous unit. About 90 per cent of the marriages were within the village, Tigrinna or Beni'abaas, as the case might be.[14]

An inspection of the settlement pattern of the Gharian Jews also leads to the conclusion that the patronymic group was not a significant social unit. The Gharian district has been referred to as the 'country of the cave-dwellers'. This refers to the house-type, specific to the region, of troglodyte dwellings dug deep into the ground.[15] While this house-type seems exotic, mere inspection of the living arrangements and of the organization of the household shows that the Gharian cave-dwellings are a specialized adaptation of the general Middle Eastern 'courtyard' pattern.[16] Each cave-pit, or *haush* consists of a central courtyard from which radiate 6–8 *dar* dwellings. Each *dar* houses one nuclear family. Other rooms which radiate from the courtyard serve as

kitchens, store-rooms, stables, etc. This pattern was common to the Jews and Muslims of the region.

In the village of Tigrinna there were 22 Jewish *haush*, or cave-pits. Frequently Hajaaj families and Hasaan families lived in the same *haush*. Also the owner of a *haush* might rent a *dar* within the *haush* to someone outside his family. Although sons tended to live in the same *haush* as their fathers, this was by no means the universal pattern. Moreover, a son living in the same *haush* as his father might be the head of an independent household. The son could symbolize his independent status by building a separate kitchen in the *haush* or by placing a dog to guard the entrance to his individual *dar*. Norris notes that the centres of the Jewish *haush* tended to be divided into sections, each section belonging to a different household within the *haush*. This division was not found among the Arab *haush* that he examined.[17] This suggests that the individual household among the Jews of the region was more independent of the wider kinship group than was the individual household among the Arabs.

Further evidence of the sociological unimportance of the patronymic group may be gleaned from linguistic data. The lineage among the Tripolitanian Arabs was known as the *'aila*.[18] The family was known as the *bait*. The term *'aila* was also found among the Jews but it referred to the family and not to any larger descent group. When a Gharian Jew said *'ailat Hajaaj* (the family of Hajaaj) he was referring to one particular family and not to all the Hajaaj families. If he wished to refer to all the Hajaaj families he would use the plural form of *'aila* and speak of *'ayaal Hajaaj* (the families of Hajaaj). There seems to be no term, in the Jewish dialect, that corresponds to 'lineage' as the term *'aila* did among the Arabs.

One might even question the extent to which members of a patronymic group extended economic help to one another.[19] It seems that among the Gharian Jews the community as a whole took the prime responsibility for lending economic support to the needy. At various times during the year, particularly before festivals, prominent members of the community would solicit funds from those individuals who could afford to contribute to the common weal. The contributions became part of the Synagogue's fund and were redistributed to the needy members of the community. These activities were carried out irrespective of kinship lines. The individuals who were involved in the soliciting and redistribution of funds were selected, in part, for their ability to be discreet and not cause personal embarrassment to anyone.

I also collected data on attitudes towards receiving economic aid when I pretested the Kluckhohn Value-orientation Schedule on a small sample of the villagers.[20] One item in that schedule, labelled 'Help in Misfortune', is designed to elicit values concerning sources of economic assistance in times of need. The respondent is asked to rank three

alternative modes: (*a*) the Collateral mode (help from relatives), (*b*) the Lineal mode (help from an important person in the kin group or the community), and (*c*) the Individual mode (help from an impersonal source outside the community). Table 4 presents the responses to this item and clearly shows that there is a preference for the Lineal mode of securing economic assistance. The Individual mode ranks second and the Collateral mode ranks last.

TABLE 4. *Ranking of responses to 'Help in Misfortune' items*

Rank of Response	*Mode of Securing Help*		
	Lineal	*Individual*	*Collateral*
First Choice	7	4	4
Second Choice	5	6	4
Third Choice	3	5	7

The data indicate that the Gharian Jews would rather seek economic assistance from people of prestige in the community than from kinsmen. This accords with behaviour observed in Even Yosef where people preferred to borrow money from *moshav* funds rather than from friends or relatives. In the Gharian, too, the leader of the community, or *shaikh*, frequently extended financial assistance to individuals. It seems safe to assume, then, that help from relatives was not an important source of economic support.

In general, therefore, the social structure of the community, rather than being based on the balanced opposition of descent groups, was based on the relationship of each family to the total community. Between the levels of the family and the community there existed no significant social or political groups. This agrees with the results of research among other traditional Middle Eastern Jewish groups.[21] The absence of kin-based political groups continues to characterize the social structure of the community of Even Yosef in Israel.[22]

The 'community' was represented to the Jewish villagers, and to the outside world, by the status of the *shaikh*. This was the only significant political status in the village.[23] The term 'political', however, must be used with extreme caution. The small Jewish community constituted about one per cent of the total population of the Gharian district. The security of Jewish life and property was, at best, precarious,[24] being based on the traditional obligation of the ruling Muslim power towards the 'protected peoples' more than on actual political power in the hands of the Jewish community.

Given the fact that the community as a whole was in a precarious political position, it seems highly functional that the community did

not 'distribute' power to the patronymic groups. All the members of the community abdicated, as it were, any claim to power and invested the small amount of power available in the status of the *shaikh*.

The primary duty of the *shaikh*, from the point of view of the community, was to be the main intermediary between the community and the environing society and political authority. The rest of the community preferred to remain ignorant of the social and cultural world about them.

II. Some puzzling data

If the patronymic groups did not constitute important social categories, is there any social-functional reason for their persistence? Are there any occasions in community life in which the villagers pay attention to the categories of Hajaaj, Hasaan, and Guweta? Or, perhaps, these patronyms may best be seen as non-functional 'survivals' of an earlier period in the social history of the community? We might begin our enquiry by asking about the 'history' of the patronyms. As will be seen, this oral history is scanty and raises more questions than it answers.

Slouschz, on his visit to the Gharian in 1906, spent a certain amount of time questioning the *shaikh*, Rabbi Halifah Hajaaj, about the history of the community.[25] From Slouschz's silence as to other sources of oral history we may infer that Rabbi Halifah was the only individual in the community who was in a position to impart this information. In other words, the majority of the villagers knew very little about the history of the Gharian Jews. This was essentially the same situation with which I was confronted in Even Yosef. Only a few old men could make any statements at all about the history of the community, the rest of the villagers were unashamedly ignorant of any knowledge of their more remote past.

Rabbi Halifah reported that his family (Hajaaj) originated from western North Africa (*Al maghrib al aksa*). This opinion was in agreement with that of the few old men in Even Yosef who were willing to make a statement about the origin of 'the Hajaaj'. The Hasaan, on the other hand, had a vague tradition that they originated from Spain. One old man, a Hasaan, provided me with a telescoped genealogical statement in which his great-great-grandfather had lived in Spain. These traditions, known to a handful of old men, played no part in the daily interaction of the majority of the villagers.

Of more general knowledge was the fact that the Hajaaj were the senior inhabitants of the village of Tigrinna. The Hasaan, or at least a certain family group within the Hasaan, had originally lived in another village in the Gharian named Jehishah.[26] It seems that the Hasaan moved from Jehishah to Tigrinna some time during the first third of the nineteenth century. One old man told me that at Jehishah the

Arabs used to put frogs in the pots of the Jews when the Sabbath meal was cooking. It would thus be ruined. Eventually the Jews decided to leave and come to Tigrinna. Another man told me that at Jehishah the Arabs would *steal* the meal and leave Jews without food for the Sabbath. The Jews then decided to trick the Arabs and one Sabbath they placed frogs in the pots. The Arabs ran off with the pots only to find, later, that they had stolen nothing but frogs. Curiously enough, the narrator of the first version of this tale was a Hajaaj while the second version was related by a Hasaan.

Moreover, one of the oldest men of the village related that at first there was some conflict, in Tigrinna, between the 'native' Hajaaj and the 'immigrant' Hasaan. This conflict expressed itself in a dispute over rights to use the water from the Synagogue's cistern. It is required that one wash one's hands before entering the Synagogue. The Hajaaj used the water of a cistern that belonged to the Synagogue but claimed that the Hasaan had no right to this water. The latter were forced to wash their hands at home before coming to the Synagogue. Eventually, the old man said, there was a reconciliation and everyone was given equal access to the Synagogue's water.

Not only were the Hajaaj and the Hasaan differentiated in the ethnohistory of the community, but there seems to have been an occupational differentiation as well.[27] A few informants said that the Hasaan were merchants and the Hajaaj were artisans, particularly blacksmiths. To test this stereotype the various occupations listed above (Table 2) were classified into the categories of 'merchant' and 'artisan', and were then cross-classified as to whether the individual was a Hajaaj or a Hasaan. The resulting data are presented in Table 5 which shows that the Hasaan did tend to be merchants and the Hajaaj artisans.

TABLE 5. *Patronymic group and type of occupation*

Patronymic Group	*Type of Occupation*		
	Merchant	*Artisan*	*Totals*
Hasaan	10	5	15
Hajaaj	4	15	19
Totals	14	20	34

Not only were the Hajaaj and the Hasaan divided along occupational lines, but one informant said that the Hajaaj could be divided into two family groups, the Hajaaj-Eliahu and the Hajaaj-Abraham. The Hajaaj-Eliahu, he intimated, were primarily tinsmiths and the Hajaaj-

Abraham were primarily blacksmiths. This division was recognized by only a few of the older men, so it is difficult to test the accuracy of the stereotype. Nevertheless, it is interesting to pay attention to the existence of *family groups* or categories that are larger than the family but smaller than the patronymic group. No one considers all the Hajaaj or all the Hasaan to be related to one another, but the family group categories definitely refer to groups of people descended from a given ancestor. The Hajaaj contain such family groups as Hajaaj-Humani, Hajaaj-Dada, and Hajaaj-Zubit. The Hasaan contain groups such as the Hasaan-Eiluf and Hasaan-Jarmon. Usually, the founder of a family group is no more than three to four generations above the oldest living member.

Family group names have a certain currency within the daily life of the village. Within the Hasaan-Eiluf there was one family group named Busaba. This name had been given to one individual by virtue of a permanent injury to one of his fingers. Even though the descendants of Busaba have perfectly normal fingers they continue to be known by that name.[28] The name serves a classificatory function. There may be several individuals in the community named Rahamim and even several named Rahamim Hasaan; by referring to a person as Rahamim Busaba the speaker is sure of conveying an unambiguous message to the listener. Everyone in the village, however, knows that Rahamim is a Hasaan as well as a Busaba. The patronyms of Hasaan, Hajaaj, and Guweta seem to have great depth while the family group names are only a few generations deep.

It is also interesting to note that there are a number of ritual customs[29] which differentiate the various patronymic groups and/or family groups. One such custom has to do with the night before Hoshana Rabba (the seventh day of the festival of Succot). During this night it was customary for the Gharian Jews to sit in the Succah and read from an appropriate book (*tikun*). The women would roast the liver and lung of a slaughtered sheep.[30] Along with this the women of Hasaan-Eiluf would prepare a dish called *arisa* (made from barley) and the Hajaaj women would prepare *kuskus*. In the morning the women would distribute dishes of these foods to neighbours and relatives. The Hajaaj distributed *kuskus*, the Hasaan-Eiluf distributed *arisa*, and the Guweta distributed roasted lung and liver. Any family that received such a gift was under obligation to present a gift of food in return. Each family returned a dish in accordance with its own appropriate 'custom'. When a woman from one patronymic group married into another patronymic group she adopted the custom of her husband.

On Purim it is customary for the Hasaan-Eiluf to participate in a round of visiting relatives. Sons of one father will first go to the house of the eldest brother and drink there, and so on until all the married brothers have been visited. While other members of the community

might participate in this custom, it was known as being characteristic of the Hasaan-Eiluf.

During the Counting of the Omer (the days between the festivals of Pessah and Shavuot) the Hasaan wash their clothes with water only and will not use soap. This custom is not found among the Hajaaj. One of the family groups of the Hajaaj will not eat meat on the Sabbath preceding the fast of Tish'a Be-Av; other Hajaaj will eat meat on this day.[31]

Thus far, then, we have seen that patronymic groups and family groups may be differentiated in terms of their historical origin and various ritual customs. Variation in customs among family groups seems to have been present in other parts of Tripolitania.[32] We may also ask if there are any social situations in which the villagers spontaneously speak about social interaction in terms of patronymic groups.

These situations are few but nevertheless suggestive. I once approached a group of four men playing cards and began to enquire about the nature of the game; in the course of explaining it one man jokingly said, 'Two of us are Hajaaj and two of us are Hasaan.'

On the occasion of a wedding, at the conclusion of the ceremony, everyone will attempt to take a sip from the cup of wine used in the wedding ritual.[33] At one wedding a certain man, named Hajaaj, who was eager to take a sip from the wine, shouted across the room to another Hajaaj, 'Hey, Hajaaj, bring it over here.'

When asked if the villagers ever discussed the question of Hajaaj and Hasaan a number of people said, 'Some old men talk about it in the Synagogue, but that's all.' Another reply was, 'When it's raining and people have nothing to do, they may sit around and talk about it, but as soon as there is work to do they forget it.' Neither of these patterns was observed by me directly. One person told me that the patronymic groups might compete in terms of ritual honours within the Synagogue. The testimony of a historical-sociological novel[34] suggests that this pattern was also found in another Tripolitanian village.

INTERPRETATION

The available evidence indicates that the patronymic groups have significance as social categories in three contexts: (1) in relation to historical origins, (2) in relation to leisure-type activities and activities centred on the Synagogue, and (3) in relation to certain ritual customs connected with family groups as well as with patronymic groups. The present section will suggest some lines of analysis with respect to these three areas of social life.

1. Historical origin

It seems safe to conclude that the Hasaan originated from outside

Tigrinna. However, it is impossible at this point to verify whether or not they are descended from Spanish Jews. Given the fact that they do originate from outside Tigrinna, we may ask if the variation in ritual customs simply reflects diverse geographical origins. There are many data to support the contention that each Jewish town (or village) in Tripolitania was distinguished by virtue of some customs not found in other groups.

This geographical-cultural variation may be easily seen by comparing the two Gharian villages of Tigrinna and Beni'abaas. These villages were separated by 14 kilometres but nevertheless were distinguished by a number of traits. The villagers of Even Yosef could cite dialectal differences which set off the *Gharyaanis* (people of Tigrinna) from the *'Abaasis* (people of Beni'abaas). These differences were phonetic and lexical and probably there were also minor grammatical differences. Along with these linguistic differences were slight differences in Synagogue customs, Synagogue melodies (*lahan*), and the family rituals described above. The Gharyaanis and the 'Abaasis now live in one village in Israel and it is clear that the contemporary ritual differences between the Hajaaj-Hasaan and the Guweta are related to their diverse geographical origins.

Moreover, there seems to have been a fair amount of movement in Tripolitania from one community to the next. For example, the Jewish community of Terhuna was reported to be of recent origin (being 'founded' within the present century), and was constituted by migrants from several Tripolitanian towns. Various stories which I collected told how family X came to community Y and cited 'trouble with the Arabs' as the main stimulus to migration (e.g., the story about Jehishah). There is evidence that erratic rainfall patterns, personal misfortunes, and shifting political conditions also accounted for this continual movement between communities. In any event, it can easily be seen how this sort of movement would create a situation in which the various families or patronymic groups in a given village would be characterized by different rituals and customs. Verification of this hypothesis, of course, would require trait distribution studies of Tripolitanian Jewry and parallel studies of Tunisian Jewry. These data, unfortunately, have not been collected.

II. Leisure, synagogue, and prestige

An explanation in terms of historical origins is only a partial explanation. The Hasaan probably came to Tigrinna in the first part of the nineteenth century, and in 1965, in Israel, they were still practising certain rituals that distinguished them from the Hajaaj. How may we explain the persistence of this ritual differentiation? Evidence has already been cited to indicate that the original move of the Hasaan from Jehishah to Tigrinna was accompanied by a certain amount of

conflict and tension. This should be seen as conflict between two communities, originating from distinct localities, rather than conflict between two descent groups. Again, an analogous situation may be seen in the merging of the Gharyaanis and the 'Abaasis in present-day Even Yosef.

When I came into contact with Even Yosef there were no signs of overt conflict between the Gharyaanis and the 'Abaasis. Nevertheless, it is clear that the villagers recognized these as two distinct groups which had a certain potential for political opposition. Under certain conditions this tension might be expected to erupt, but during the period of my field research it was given no concrete expression. One of the conditions inhibiting the formation of political factions along Gharyaani-'Abaasi lines was the fact that the Gharyaanis far outnumbered the 'Abaasis. Another contributing factor was that the executive secretary of Even Yosef was impartial with respect to the various individuals and groups in the village and received the support of all the villagers.[35] Moreover, it was considered desirable by all members of the community that the various groups get along together and display an image of unity towards the outside. This goal has more or less been achieved within the context of *moshav* life in Israel. The Gharyannis elect 'Abaasis to the *moshav* committee at the same time that this action is reciprocated by the 'Abaasis.

There is evidence, however, that there was a certain amount of tension between the two groups in the early years of their settlement on the *moshav*. One issue, relating to ritual honours in the Synagogue, seems to have had the potential of becoming a *cause célèbre*, polarizing the community into Gharyaanis and 'Abaasis. The issue, however, was quickly resolved. There are three Synagogues in Even Yosef, and Gharyaanis and 'Abaasis pray at each of them. When I asked about ritual differences between the Gharyaanis and the 'Abaasis, people would frequently say, 'We forgot all that', and implied that it was wrong of me to bring up 'dead' issues. Similar criticism was directed towards my enquiries about possible conflicts between the Hajaaj and the Hasaan in the history of Tigrinna. Whatever conflicts may have existed in the past were relatively quickly forgotten. It is possible that the building of a new Synagogue in Tigrinna[36] at the end of the last century was related to the 'reconciliation' of the Hajaaj and the Hasaan and their decision to live as one community. Each of the two Synagogues in Tigrinna was attended by both Hajaaj and Hasaan.

It seems, then, that the Gharian Jews recognize the opposition of descent or locality groups as one possible type of political arrangement but clearly prefer a system in which these groups are politically quiescent. Moreover, there seems to have been, historically, a somewhat conscious transfer of political power from subgroups of the community to the status of the *shaikh*. On the other hand, it is suggested,

there still remained an *awareness* of this alternative form of socio-political organization. One might predict that this awareness is in some way made manifest in socio-cultural action.

It is from this perspective that I interpret the social significance of the patronymic group categories. I have already pointed out that these categories are explicitly recognized primarily in the context of leisure-type activities and in activities centring on the Synagogue. The competition between groups, within the Synagogue, should be recognized as a matter of prestige that is not directly related to political power. It might even be said that because these groups have relinquished their claim to power they have become insistent on retaining their due share of prestige. It is as if the Gharian Jews, within the context of leisure and the Synagogue, have given 'symbolic forms to the institutions they might have had in reality'.[37]

III. Family group rituals

The above interpretation, which is admittedly speculative, fails to address itself to the problem of the subdivision of the patronymic groups into family groups. I shall take a different approach in attempting to give a sociological interpretation of the ritual differentiation of family groups.

It is commonplace in anthropological analysis to contrast the 'family' with a corporate descent group with respect to the question of continuity over generations. A family is a unit that is dissolved through the biological growth and death of its members, while a corporate descent group survives the death of individual members. This analytic distinction is particularly important in cases where there is concrete overlap between the family and the corporate descent group, such as one finds in Japan.[38] In this case it is easy to confound the 'household corporation' with the biological family because there may be 100 per cent overlap in the living membership of the two groups. Taking this cue from the Japanese material, one might ask if among the Gharian Jews there is any sense in which families, or family groups, are considered to be characterized by an existence beyond the life of individual members. It is difficult to give an unequivocal answer to the question, but it may prove useful to follow this line of enquiry in an attempt to order certain facts.

The Gharian Jews show the well known Middle Eastern cultural emphasis on progeny, in particular on male progeny—for daughters will not perpetuate the father's 'name'. Men who have fathered only (or even mostly) girls are considered to be dissatisfied with their procreative accomplishments and those of their wives. A man who has no sons is said to have no 'children' (*yeladim*) and is considered unfortunate by the other villagers. In Tripolitania two men married second wives when their first wives had given birth only to girls. Sometimes an older

couple who have no male children are informally 'given' a young boy by one of their close relatives. It is clear that a man has fulfilled the duty and need of procreation only if he has fathered a male child.

One salient cultural model of the importance of male progeny is found in the Biblical story of Abraham. From the Almighty's initial revelation to Abraham to the episode of the 'binding of Isaac' the promise of male progeny is given great importance.[39] It is customary, among the Gharian Jews, on the Sabbath after a wedding, for a second Torah-scroll to be taken from the ark and for the bridegroom to read the portion describing Isaac's birth. The Gharian Jews, like their progenitor Abraham, are highly concerned about male progeny. It is suggested that this concern is linked to a notion of the perpetuation of one's 'family' (or one's 'name') beyond the biological life of its original members.

Perpetuation of the family (in the male line) may also be seen in the custom of a man naming a son after a dead grandfather. In certain cases, when the grandfather is very old, a grandson may be given the grandfather's name during the latter's life; this is only done at the request of the grandfather. Zenner has called attention to the fact that traditional Jews (both European and Middle Eastern) desire sons so that *qaddish* may be said in their names after they die.[40] It is probably true that 'departed souls' are considered to be members of a community, among the Gharian Jews, as much as they are considered to be members of the families constituted by their descendants.[41] Hence the 'ancestors' of a family, or family group, are not counted among the 'members of the household' as they are in Japan. Nevertheless, with respect to an orientation towards *future descendants* the Gharian Jewish family exhibits a sort of supra-generational continuity.

The importance of family continuity and tradition may be seen in another way. As indicated above, most of the villagers of Even Yosef displayed an a-historical attitude towards their own community. This was particularly true of the village youth who had little first-hand knowledge of life in Tripolitania. If I sat at some public place in the village and enquired about various aspects of the community's history, the youth never took any interest in my enquiries. They did show some interest, however, in a different context. On many occasions I interviewed adults in their homes and similarly asked many questions about community history. Most of the adults could not empathize with my concern with the history of the *community*, but were quite eager to tell me about the history of their own family. Frequently, young men were active participants in these family-centred sessions, listening to their family history and also attempting to provide information.

It is hypothesized, then, that it is useful to look at the ritual customs that differentiate family groups in the light of the emphasis on supra-generational aspects of the family. Here we treat the family and the

family group as the same because both are known to be the offspring of a single male progenitor. The performance of these rituals serves to emphasize the uniqueness and unity of the family vis-à-vis the other families of the village. It also serves to emphasize the continuity of the family, over time, giving the individual family member a sense of connexion with his past. The 'past' referred to is not the remote past of the Great Tradition, which is shared by all members of the community, but the more personal past of his immediate forebears.

CONCLUSION

This essay has explored the problem of patronymic groups in a rural Tripolitanian Jewish community. A strictly sociological approach might very well ignore the existence of these groups as they do not seem to function in the major institutional spheres of community life. A traditional ethnological approach, on the other hand, might take note of the existence of customs and folklore which differentiate these groups and compare them with similar traits found in other communities. The approach presented here has attempted to examine these 'traits' in the context of the social life of the village.

I did not address myself directly to these problems while in the field. Had this been my major concern I could have collected fuller and more exact data on ritual variation, community history, etc. The hypotheses put forth about the 'function' of the patronymic groups and associated customs are tentative. Nevertheless, I hope I have succeeded in drawing attention to a certain class of data and in pointing to some avenues of research.

NOTES

[1] The research was carried out from October 1963 to April 1965, and was supported by a U.S. Public Health Fellowship (grant number MH-07876) from the National Institute of Mental Health. I also wish to express appreciation to Walter Zenner and to Michael Saltzman for reading and criticizing earlier drafts of this paper.

[2] Harvey Goldberg, 'Internal Structural Continuity Within Radical External Change: The Case of a Moshav of Tripolitanian Jews', in Henry Rosenfeld (ed.), *Studies in Israeli Anthropology* (forthcoming); H. Goldberg, *Acculturation, Continuity and Youth in an Israeli Immigrant Village*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard, 1967.

[3] Cf. D. Weintraub and M. Lissak, 'Social Integration and Change', in J. Ben-David (ed.), *Agricultural Planning and Village Community in Israel*, Arid Zone Research—XXIII, UNESCO, Paris, 1963, pp. 135–6.

[4] D. Weintraub and M. Lissak, op. cit., pp. 136–45.

[5] I use the term patronymic group in preference to *hamula* because it does not prejudge the issue of the nature of the obligations that bind the members of the group. In another paper, Goldberg, op. cit., I used the term *hamula*.

[6] Mahmud Khuja, 'Garian Town', in S. G. Willimot and J. L. Clark (eds.), *Field Studies in Libya*, Research Papers, No. 4, Department of Geography, Durham Colleges in the University of Durham, 1960, pp. 120–4.

[7] André Chouraqui, *Marche vers l'occident: Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord*, Paris, 1952, p. 127n.

[8] Nahum Slouschz, *Sefer · Hamasa'ot*

(*The Book of Travels*), *Masa'ai Be-Eretz Luv* (*My Travels in Libya*), Pt. I, Jubilee Committee, Tel Aviv, 1937.

[9] 'Die Zahl der Juden in Tripolis', *Zeitschrift für Demographie und Statistik der Juden*, 1906, p. 176.

[10] Maurice Eisenbeth, *Les Juifs de l'Afrique du Nord: Démographie et onomastique*, Algiers, 1936, pp. 61–4.

[11] Roberto Bachi, 'Gli ebrei delle Colonie Italiane: Note statistiche sul censimento', *Rassegna Mensile di Israel*, Vol. X, 1935–6, pp. 385–96.

[12] Amishadai Guweta, 'Kehilat Tripoli U-Mosdoteha' (The Jewish Community of Tripoli and Its Institutions), in Frija Zuartez *et al.* (eds.), *Yahadut Luv* (Libyan Jewry), Committee of the Libyan Jewish Communities in Israel, Tel Aviv, 1960, p. 25.

[13] M. Fortes, 'Introduction', in J. Goody (ed.), *The Developmental Cycle in Domestic Groups*, Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology, No. 1, Cambridge, 1963, p. 2.

[14] H. Goldberg, 'Father's Brother's Daughter Marriage and Demography: The Case of a Tripolitanian Immigrant Village in Israel', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 23, 1967.

[15] M. Khuja, op. cit.; H. T. Norris, 'Cave Habitations and Granaries in Tripolitania and Tunisia', *Man*, Vol. 53, 1953, pp. 82–5; N. Slouschz, *Travels in North Africa*, Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1927, pp. 125 ff.; G. F. Lyon, *A Narrative of Travels in North Africa in the Years 1818, 1819, and 1820*, London, 1821, pp. 28–32.

[16] Norris, op. cit., pp. 82–3.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Norris, op. cit.

[19] Weintraub and Lissak, op. cit., p. 136, assert that membership in the traditional Jewish *hamula* 'implied an obligation to give economic help, hospitality and protection to other members whenever required'.

[20] F. Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations*, Evanston, Ill., 1961. This schedule was pretested on 15 male villagers, both youth and adults. After the pretest I decided to put aside this technique of investigation primarily because of the expenditure of time involved.

[21] D. Weintraub and M. Lissak, loc. cit.; S. Goitein, 'Portrait of a Yemenite Weavers' Village', *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. 17, 1955, p. 20; D. Willner and M. Kohls, 'Jews in the High Atlas Mountains of Morocco: A Partial Reconstruction', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1962, p. 219.

[22] Goldberg, 'Internal Structural Continuity'.

[23] Ibid.

[24] The chronic insecurity of the Jews in North Africa is attested by a stylized refrain among chroniclers who, when extolling the achievement of peace and security, claim that 'a woman and a Jew could go in safety from Sous to Oujda': H. Terrasse, *Histoire du Maroc des origines à l'établissement du Protectorat français*, Vol. II, Casablanca, p. 264.

[25] Slouschz, *Travels*, pp. 134 ff.; Slouschz, *Sefer*. For evidence of the antiquity of the name Hajaaj as a Jewish name in the Gharian, see H. Z. Hirschberg, *Toldot Hayehudim BeAfrika Hatsfonit*, (*A History of the Jews in North Africa*), Vol. II, Bialik Institute, Jerusalem, 1965, p. 177.

[26] Cf. Slouschz, *Travels*, p. 133.

[27] The patronyms of the Gharian Jews did not have occupational referents. Some people suggested that Hasaan means barber, but there were no barbers in the community. Others jokingly pointed out the similarity between the name Hajaaj and the Muslim *haji*. No one could offer an explanation of the name Guweta, which is probably Berber in origin (cf. Chouraqui, op. cit., p. 132).

[28] Cf. E. Peters, 'The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 90, 1960, p. 33.

[29] The term 'custom' is used here to indicate that the variation in ritual and customary behaviour about to be described keeps within the bounds of Rabbinic law as understood and practised throughout Tripolitania. The Hasaan, putatively coming from Spain, are not bound to a set of laws different from the laws of the 'North African' Hajaaj. All the Jewish inhabitants of Tripolitania recognized the authority of the Rabbinic court in Tripoli.

[30] Cf. Frija Zuartez, 'Hayai U-Minhagim Shel Yehudei Luv' (The Way of Life and Customs of Libyan Jews), in Zuartez *et al.* (eds.), op. cit., p. 371.

[31] Zuartez, op. cit., p. 382.

[32] Ibid., pp. 370, 382.

[33] Ibid., p. 393, cites other Tripolitanian Jewish customs that were associated with the cup of wine of the wedding ritual.

[34] Milla Ohel, *Ish Nidham*, Jerusalem, 1962, pp. 41–2, 65, 153, and elsewhere.

[35] Goldberg, op. cit.

[36] Slouschz, *Travels*, p. 134.

[37] Here we paraphrase Lévi-Strauss's interpretation of Caduveo art where he suggests that their art is a symbolic form of social institutions that the Caduveo might have had but did not adopt. Cf. C. Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, New York, 1964, p. 180.

[38] Cf. D. Plath, 'Where the Family of God is the Family: The Role of the Dead in Japanese Households', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 66, 1964, pp. 301 ff.

[39] R. Patai, *Sex and Family in the Bible and the Middle East*, New York, 1959, pp. 72–3.

[40] Walter Zenner, 'Memorialism—Some Jewish Examples', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 67, 1965, p. 482.

[41] Zenner, op. cit., p. 483.

REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SOCIOLOGIE

publiée par le CENTRE D'ÉTUDES SOCIOLOGIQUES—
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE

Vol. VIII, No. 2. avril–juin 1967

Direction, Rédaction:
CENTRE D'ETUDES SOCIOLOGIQUES
82, rue Cardinet
PARIS XVII

Administration-Abonnements:
Editions du C.N.R.S.
15, Quai Anatole France
PARIS VII

4 numéros de 144 pages et 1 numéro spécial

L'abonnement : 30 F
Le numéro : 7 F

C.C.P. Paris 9061–11: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Service des Publications).

RELIGION, CLASS, AND CULTURE IN AMERICAN JEWISH HISTORY

Charles S. Liebman

UNDERSTANDING the sociological dimensions of religion is a difficult task because religion is so deeply embedded in a culture that one often does not know if one has isolated a unique religious factor or a set of cultural artefacts. This is particularly true of Judaism.

Students of religion have distinguished basic structures of religion. One such structure differentiates between religions that historically are confined to a single folk, 'folk religions', and those which have spread among many people, 'universal religions'. In folk religion, the community itself is the carrier of the religion. There exists a vital relationship between the community as a whole and its God or Gods. The content of the folk religion delineates 'the peculiarity of the particular folk involved',[1] and extends the boundaries of religious concern to the total life pattern of the community. In universal religions, it is the individual rather than the collectivity who is the object.

Of course, in the process of religious institutionalization and organization (in other words, as the religious experience becomes objectified in a human institution and develops a specialized hierarchy of administrators, priests, and clergy with their own self interest in organizational survival) certain changes in the universal or folk content of each religion takes place.

As man develops an increasing self-awareness and begins to rationalize his own life independently of his folk or community either through internal social and economic changes within the folk community or because of an external challenge which may destroy the basis of folk ties, the folk member is attuned to a religious message which speaks to his personal condition. Such a message may also appeal to other individuals in cultures other than that of the original folk. Thus, the religious message may become somewhat more universalized and cut across a variety of folk communities. On the other hand, universal religion in its process of institutionalization develops its own community or church. Regardless of what its ultimate goals may be, the church community

may come to resemble in many of its characteristics a folk community. Secondly, the universal religion encounters folk communities as it spreads its message, and in each area it may often take on the peculiar stamp of the community in which it has been accepted.

There are other factors which tend to diminish the radical differences between folk and universal religion in their ideal-typical structure. We might note only one other set of factors. Organized religion may represent objectification and institutionalization, re-enactment and restructuring of a religious experience, but its basis still lies in a subjective experience and a need to relate to the 'wholly other' or to the 'beyond'. It represents man's effort to break through the constraints which are part of his routine of life. Thus, regardless of how intimately man is involved in his folk community, regardless of the degree to which religion is a shared experience related to the total life pattern of the community, its basis remains in personal experience.

> Every woman who bears a child, every man who risks his life, every human being who dies, must pass through the utmost extremity without the help of his fellow creatures who are willing to assist him.[2]

Thus, even folk religion contains within it the seeds of individual self-awareness. On the other hand, no matter how personal a universal religion may be, no matter how indifferent it is in theory to ties of family, kin, community, or nation, it arises within a community rooted in time and place, and appeals to individuals who are part of other temporal and spatial communities. Thus, universal religion inevitably bears the stamp of the folk consciousness or mores out of which it sprang and to whom its initial appeal is addressed.

We have taken some care in distinguishing between basic structures of religion but we have also noted that as universal and folk religion work themselves out, many of their differences fade. Nevertheless, the basic characteristic of either folk or universal religion is impressed on any particular religious group. Traditional Judaism contained universal elements from its very inception but it bears the mark of a basically folk religion in contrast to Christianity.

What this means is that the task of differentiating the Jewish religion from Jewish culture must, by definition, contain an element of artificiality. And yet, there remains for the religious Jew a textual tradition, which, at least from his vantage point, is Divine in origin and hence objective and culturally transcendent. What the religious Jew has often forgotten is that whereas his religious tradition may transcend his culture, he himself may be unable to do so. What the observer on the other hand must not forget is that man's frequent failure to retain the essence of his religion while transforming his culture is a commentary on the psychology or the sociology of man. It has often caused misunderstanding about the nature of religion and religious history.

American Judaism about 1900

The majority of American Jews at the turn of the century were new immigrants of low social class. Whether we define social class as a function of occupation, education, income, or some combination of these, the new immigrants were much lower on the social scale relative to the smaller group of native American Jews and earlier German Jewish immigrants. Social class, as we shall see, is an important dimension and served to dichotomize American Jewry at the turn of the century. A second dimension which dichotomized American Jewry but which cut across social class lines was religious traditionalism. We are suggesting, then, that religious traditionalism, like social class, can be distinguished from broader cultural phenomena and can be dichotomized. The variable which best distinguishes religiously traditional from non-traditional Jews is their attitude towards the *halacha* (Jewish ritual and law). For the traditionalists, the *halacha*, whatever its scope may be, is an absolute; it is a law of binding imperative that may be violated only under extraordinary and even then prescribed circumstances. Now, it is true that for some Jews the *halacha* will include certain mandates which others may exclude, and it is also true that the more limited the number of commandments one feels obliged to perform the more latitudinarian one is likely to be about circumstances under which any *halacha* may be violated. Nevertheless, one's attitude towards the *halacha* is probably the best theoretical measure for distinguishing Jews on a continuum of religious traditionalism. But having accepted this definition rather than a more specifically behavioural measure, such as observing *kashrut* (dietary laws) or attending synagogue, one arrives at a different estimate of the extent of religious traditionalism among American Jews at the turn of the century.

Low social class, low religious traditionalism

Among the older American Jews who were, as we noted, of higher social class, the majority were obviously non-traditional. What is less obvious is that the same is true of the new lower-class immigrants. Contemporary students of Jewish history have been misled on this point because they have associated religious traditionalism with non-acculturation. The immigrant Jews *themselves*, who grew up in eastern Europe within a total Jewish culture where life in all its aspects was associated with religion, were unable to distinguish culture from religion.

Of course, we do not have any data on the attitude of American Jews towards the *halacha* around 1900. But what we do find is that those 'religious' practices which persisted were those most closely associated with the cultural life style of eastern Europe and which were irrelevant to the process of American acculturation. By contrast, practices which were more deeply rooted in the textual religious tradition were readily abandoned.

A preliminary classification might divide the new immigrants into three groups. First, there were the Jews who were anti-religious in orientation: socialists, ardent secularists, products of a religiously rebellious enlightenment who saw the religious tradition as antithetical to their Jewish or universal ideal. The remaining two groups were at least nominally religious. One group of immigrants, probably the majority, made the very easy synthesis between religion and culture. However, their primary attachment was to Judaism as a style of life with its east European overtones which they mistakenly identified as religion. They had what Leo Baeck called *Milieufrömmigkeit.* The third group also associated religion and culture. But their religious attachment was to the *halacha* and religious traditionalism as we have defined it. Only the latter group would we define as religiously traditional.

The fact that the majority of immigrants were not traditional is not surprising when we appreciate who they were and the milieu out of which they came. Although the major impetus for immigration was the deteriorating economic condition in eastern Europe, increased immigration from 1891 to 1900 was also explained by the weakening of religious Orthodoxy 'which had frequently deterred the hasidic masses from emigrating to free America'.[3]

The period around 1900 was one in which traditional Judaism even in the small villages, not to mention the larger cities, was being shaken by enlightenment and secularism. Those who emigrated were probably the least traditional. We might expect as much from the pioneers of any group ready to break their familial and neighbourhood or village ties. But there were more overt religious barriers to immigration which had to be overcome. The rabbis of eastern Europe opposed emigration. Would-be emigrants were warned to stay at home and not to endanger their Judaism. One rabbi announced that 'anyone who emigrated to America was a sinner, since in America the Oral law was trodden under foot'.[4]

The immigrants were religiously illiterate and the community lacked recognized religious leaders. Although an estimated 50,000 Jews immigrated from 1881 to 1885, the leading east European congregation of the time in New York had only a part-time rabbi of meagre scholarship. When 26 Orthodox congregations met to choose a rabbinic leader for New York Jewry, no American was even considered, and in 1887 one rabbinical authority referred to American rabbis as 'improper men'.[5] The few Talmudic scholars who did come 'were without honour or support even in their own poor communities'.[6] One rabbi, commenting on the Talmudic saying that 'the sages are kings', noted that in America this should read 'the shoemakers, tailors and usurers are the sages'.[7]

Israel Rosenberg, one of the leading Orthodox east European rabbis in America, noted the miserable state of Jewish education and com-

mented as follows at the 1924 convention of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis (Agudath Horabbonim):

> To a certain extent the Jews of Europe are also responsible for this situation. When they saw that the stream of emigration to America was increasing, it was incumbent upon them to send us the spiritual giants, those who had it in their powers to influence and to work.[8]

Sabbath observance, unlike *kashrut*, entailed economic hardship for the immigrants and often did not survive the voyage across the Atlantic. A survey of Jewish workmen on the Lower East Side found that only 25 per cent rested on the Sabbath and 60 per cent of the stores were open.[9] Similar conditions prevailed among the immigrants in England where a Jewish minister commented that 'a friend of mine, who refused to work on the Sabbath and suffered on account of his staunchness, told me that he was reproached with being like a "greener"'.[10]

An Orthodox Jew might be expected to provide extensive Jewish education for his child, but as late as 1916 there were only two religious (Yeshiva) elementary schools in the United States. Jews, according to an educator of that period, opposed parochial schools which they felt were harmful to democracy.[11] Less than 24 per cent of the estimated number of Jewish children of elementary school age in New York received any form of Jewish education in 1917, and less than one per cent received any training at the high school age level.[12] Only the elderly or the very poor studied the Talmud, and at a very low level.

Jewish law extends to the most intimate details of family life (laws of family purity) and requires a married woman to immerse herself in a lustral bath (*mikva*) at a specified time following each menstrual period. Writing in 1928 about the immigrant period, an observer commented that lustral baths were simply unavailable and 'the daughters of Israel had ceased to guard their purity'.[13] The Agudath Horabbonim in the first issue of their monthly publication in 1918, noted that family purity had been 'erased from our lives'. Requirements of family purity did not involve economic hardship, but they were an anachronism in the values of middle-class American culture towards which the immigrants aspired.

Many Jews did retain an attachment to the synagogue, but this was a broadly cultural rather than specifically religious commitment. As early as 1887, one commentator noted that the immigrants aspired to beautiful synagogue structures and thereupon felt they had fulfilled their obligation to Judaism.[14] The large majority of Jews 'all year around do not come near a synagogue' except on Yom Kippur (the most sacred day of the Jewish calendar).[15]

A large group of immigrants, who conformed superficially to many Orthodox norms, were viewed as Orthodox by their 'uptown' correligionists. But this second look affords some contrary impressions. We

have already noted the lack of Jewish schools and lustral baths, the absence of Sabbath observance, and the one-day-a-year worshipper. The new immigrants did found countless small synagogues almost immediately upon arrival, but this in itself is no evidence of religiosity. If the function of the synagogue was primarily for worship there was no need for such multiplication, whereas if the primary purpose of the synagogue was to meet the social and cultural needs of small groups originating in the same European community, the multiplication is more understandable. The synagogues were social forums and benevolent societies adapted to the requirements of poor unacculturated people. In other words, the evidence suggests an absence of religious as distinct from ethnic commitment on the part of the eastern European immigrants to the United States. It is, of course, difficult to distinguish ethnicity from religion within the Jewish tradition, but to the extent that such a distinction is possible it permits us to identify a much smaller community than was heretofore imagined that was high on the traditionalism scale and low on the acculturation scale. Before we turn our attention to this community, however, we may note that the Orthodox rabbis of this period did, of course, serve, and saw themselves as leaders of the non-traditionalists within the immigrant group as well, precisely because even the rabbis did not make the distinction between religion and culture.

Low social class, high religious traditionalism

The immigrant traditionalists themselves associated religion with absence of acculturation. The most visible acculturation variable, and the one that took on the greatest additional symbolic meaning, was language. The lower income immigrant groups tended to retain Yiddish, whereas for those who moved up the income ladder English was the language of the home. Oddly enough, Yiddish was eventually to become an instrument of acculturation among working-class groups, but this takes us beyond the present discussion.

The major rabbinical group of the immigrant low social class religious traditionalists was the Agudath Horabbonim, organized in 1902. Although its most active members in the early years were in the mid-west, the organization increasingly came to be centered in New York City where a majority of the organization's members functioned. This change was also reflected in the organization's pronouncements. Whereas their original call had stressed the need for English-speaking rabbis and teachers and a kind of sensitivity to the acculturating Jew outside New York, the Agudath Horabbonim was to become a major defender of Yiddish and denigrator of the English-speaking rabbi. Not only was English decried, but a proposal in 1911 that Jewish afternoon schools should stress Hebrew met with strenuous objection. Rabbi Israel Rosenberg, defending the organization against those who attacked it

for de-emphasizing English and stressing Yiddish, said that only the 'true rabbis' who understand 'the language of the fathers' can reach the older generation and influence them to send their children to Jewish schools. Furthermore, he noted, Yiddish must be kept alive as a generational tie.[16]

The association of religious orthodoxy with non-acculturation is evident in the 1917 figures of the *Jewish Communal Registry of New York*. It estimated a total seating capacity in all synagogues at less than half of the total number of adult Jews. Of these seats less than 10 per cent were in synagogues where English sermons were preached. Although over 95 per cent of the synagogues in New York were Orthodox, less than a third of the seats in those synagogues where English sermons were preached were Orthodox; 97 per cent of seats in Orthodox synagogues were in places where no English sermons were preached.

The major institution of the high traditional lower class Jews was the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary (RIETS), organized in 1896, and which later expanded to become part of Yeshiva College and finally Yeshiva University. Founded as a traditional Talmudic academy, it received scant support from the 'uptown' acculturated traditionalists in its early years.

High social class, high religious traditionalism

Within the older Jewish community of predominantly higher social class, the majority were either identified with Reform or institutionally unaffiliated and well along the road to religious assimilation. Among the minority of nominally religious, however, the same pattern prevailed as among the lower-class immigrants. There were those who were what we might call culturally traditional and those to whom the religious tradition represented a more distinctive aspect of their lives.

The major ethnic-cultural group among the nominally religious were the members of the Sephardi (Spanish-Portuguese) synagogues (preeminent among them Shearith Israel of New York and Mikveh Israel of Philadelphia) who associated their religious tradition with an aristocracy of class. Most of these people, long before 1900, were Ashkenazi rather than Sephardi in origin, but they assimilated and sought to emulate the cultural patterns of the high-status Sephardim. Their identification with traditional Judaism is analogous to the association of the English aristocracy with Anglicanism, although even with these synagogues the desire for changes away from the tradition was noticeable before the turn of the century. Indeed, the Spanish and Portuguese Jews have always been lax in their personal standards of piety relative to the traditionalists of eastern Europe. Their leaders included such men as Henry Pereira Mendes and, earlier, Sabato Morais, both of whom were founders, in 1886, of the Jewish Theological Seminary, an institution whose philosophy and social outlook closely paralleled that

of these Sephardi leaders. Thus, among the upper-class Jews as well, a kind of *Milieufrömmigkeit* functioned. It may be suggested that this was decisive in preventing a linkage among religious traditionalists across class and cultural lines.

A second ethnic-cultural strain within the Jewish groups ranking high on the acculturation and traditionalism scales were a small group of 'Germans'. Most of these 'Germans' probably originated in Poland or Austria-Hungary, but we may identify them as Germans because prior to their coming to the United States they had been trained in German-type schools, spoke in German, and generally felt most at home in German culture. Most of the German Jews in the United States were Reform, and one suspects, although the data are not available, that the traditionalist Germans were more likely to be among the cultural Germans whose origins were in Hungary or Poland. In any event, they did have a few traditionalist congregations.

The representative institution of the highly acculturated but nominally religious Jews at that time was the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Its first President, Sabato Morais, a Sephardi leader, proposed naming the institution 'The Orthodox Seminary'. After Morais's death, the active heads of the Seminary were Bernard Drachman, whom we shall discuss, and Henry Pereira Mendes, the then leading Sephardi rabbi of the country. Besides his role in the Seminary, Mendes was President of the New York Board of Jewish Ministers, a forerunner of the New York Board of Rabbis, which included Reform rabbis but no Orthodox rabbis of the Lower East Side.[17] Mendes's attitude to the east European synagogues is reflected in this public statement:

> We have to choose between striving for learning and culture, or allow these communities to honor learning of but one kind in their own peculiar way, to maintain services which show little love of culture and which repel, methods which fail in the second generation.[18]

His private sentiments on the eastern European traditionalists who resisted acculturation were even more derisive.

The lower-class traditionalists at the turn of the century viewed acculturation and social mobility as a threat to their religious integrity. Most upper-class traditionalists were unwilling to reach down to the lower-class traditionalists perhaps because they thought that the obstinacy of the latter group doomed their future, or perhaps because their own social status would be threatened by such a gesture, but possibly because the cultural and class barriers were really much more important than the religious similarities.

The class differences were reinforced by geographic differentiation. In New York 'uptown' was the home of the wealthier Jews whose religious orientation was predominantly Reform but among whom the few wealthy Orthodox congregations were located. 'Downtown' meant

the Lower East Side and the location of the lower-income Jews, both traditionalists and non-traditionalists. Thus, place of residence was more likely to create a kind of class solidarity cutting through religious differences. As one astute observer of Jewish life at the turn of the century noted, when Russian and Polish Jews made money, they moved uptown and overnight became Germans.[19]

There was one wealthy east European (Russian-Polish) uptown traditional congregation. This was Kehilath Jeshurun which, in 1906, elected Rabbi Moses Z. Margolis (known as Ramaz from the initials of his title and of his first names) as its leader. Ramaz Margolis became one of the representative figures for the downtown immigrant traditionalists and never took part in Jewish uptown life. He was not a secularly acculturated Jew. The crucial acculturation variable, as we noted, was language. Margolis, who was Chief Rabbi of Boston from 1889 to 1906 and leader of Kehilath Jeshurun from 1906 until his death in 1936, never had much facility with English, and there is some question whether he even could speak the language.

Interaction of traditionalists across class lines and class groups across traditionalist lines

Many of the events in the religious life of the American Jewish community are understandable within the framework suggested here. Dr. Bernard Drachman was the interim head of the Jewish Theological Seminary between the time of Morais's death in 1897 and the arrival of Solomon Schechter to head the reorganized Seminary in 1902. Drachman's early Jewish education was in the prestigious Reform Temple Emanu-El of New York and he was sent abroad to complete his Seminary education. But Dr. Drachman underwent a change and came back to the United States as a religious traditionalist. This raised serious problems for him in finding a pulpit. He noted in his autobiography in 1885 that there was really no place for him since almost all synagogues were Reform and there were no vacancies in the 'few Orthodox congregations'.[20] Then, almost as an afterthought, he answers the obvious question, Why could he not serve his equally if not more traditional correligionists from eastern Europe? He says, 'They were strange to me, and I was even stranger to them.' Ultimately his pulpit was secured when his father-in-law bought a synagogue for him. But earlier he had left the pulpit of one synagogue when it introduced mixed seating. At that point, he refused a number of offers since 'due to reasons connected with their location or their type of membership [they] did not seem to be fertile soil for the development of the harmonious combination of Orthodox Judaism and Americanism'.[21]

On the other hand, a kind of Jewish ecumenism reigned within social class groups that is almost inconceivable today. We need not dwell on the support that nominally religious working-class Jews gave

to Socialist-led strikes, or their allegiance to the anti-religious socialist newspaper the *Forward*, despite warnings by the Agudath Horabbonim against purchasing or reading that paper. More remarkable is the religious harmony that prevailed among upper-class Jews. Phillip Cowen, who called himself Orthodox, matter-of-factly relates in his autobiography an incredible incident. Cowen was a founder and first editor of a prestigious weekly, the *American Hebrew*. In the late 1880s his paper absorbed the *Jewish Reformer* which had been established by the radical Reform leaders, Kaufmann Kohler and Emil Hirsch, as a forum for the views of radical Reform which they felt did not receive sufficient coverage in the moderate Reform journal of Isaac Mayer Weiss. However, according to Cowen, Hirsch and Kohler permitted the *American Hebrew* to absorb their paper since they knew 'their cause was assured a proper presentation in our columns'.[22] David Philipson, of the religious left within Reform, tells in his autobiography of an invitation to him to speak to an Orthodox congregation.[23]

In 1896, an Orthodox Rabbinical Council of New York City was formed, it included both uptown and downtown rabbis. The new group was to have included an organization of Orthodox congregations, but the effort soon faltered. Two years later, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (UOJC) was organized with Mendes as President. The call for the UOJC went out from the address of the Jewish Theological Seminary and its purpose may well have been to elicit support of traditional Jews for the Seminary. But the UOJC eschewed that role. The new group did not concern itself with Jewish education, kashrut, authority of the Orthodox Rabbinate, or Orthodox unity 'because of the wide gulf separating the various Orthodox elements in these problems'.[24] Nevertheless, the small synagogues and even many of the larger Lower East Side congregations remained outside the UOJC. According to one of its early leaders, the top leadership did not make any great effort to enlist the East Side congregations; minutes were recorded in English and not in Yiddish.[25]

We have already noted the significance of language difference for the Jews at the turn of the century. The language barrier was a serious one and symbolized a whole network of interrelated values. The UOJC was led by Dr. Mendes who did not even speak Yiddish and who refused to compromise his demands for immigrant acculturation even when such demands were at the expense of the UOJC's growth. As early as 1898 the *Yiddishem Tageblatt*, a Yiddish newspaper whose editor was an active supporter of the UOJC, urged that organization to reconsider its policy of not using Yiddish.[26] Indeed, in 1907, the Agudath Horabbonim made up of Yiddish-speaking Orthodox rabbis, threatened to create a 'real union of Orthodox congregations'.[27]

The Jewish Theological Seminary was in acute financial distress after the death of Dr. Sabato Morais in 1897. It was not surprising, therefore,

that the Seminary appealed to the Jews of New York for money. They requested that a Sabbath in December (Shabbat Hanukah) be set aside for sermons and fund-raising on behalf of the Seminary. How significant, therefore, that this appeal, published by the Seminary in the Yiddish papers in New York, appeared in English.[28] Although the Orthodox Yiddish papers generally supported the Seminary in its early years, one exception was *Haivri*. That paper decried not only the relative neglect of the Talmud at the Seminary, but also minor insults to the immigrant community. One complaint was that Russian or Polish rabbis were never invited to examine students at the institution, although it was the practice to invite outsiders to test students not only in European Yeshivot (Schools of advanced Talmudic study), but at Hebrew Union College (Reform) as well. In 1908 the *Yiddishem Tageblatt* wrote as follows:

> What is the use of lying? The Seminary is not popular among the people. The great Jewish masses look upon this rabbinical school as upon some rich man's 'uptown' institution. Among many and in many congregations, the students of the Seminary are not considered as real rabbis, although this rabbinical school calls itself orthodox and was organized to combat principles on which the rabbinical school in Cincinnati (Hebrew Union College) stands.[29]

Indeed, the Lower East Side was more 'responsive to the Socialist preachers and Ethical Culture teachers who were of their own national origins and who were indigenous to the East Side' than to the Jewish Theological Seminary and uptown Sephardi leaders, much less to Reform.[30]

In 1902 the Jewish Theological Seminary was reorganized and Solomon Schechter was brought from England to head the institution. The new financial benefactors of the Seminary were primarily non-religious-traditionalists (Reform Jews) who viewed the institution and its future rabbinical graduate leaders as Americanizing and acculturating the east European immigrants. It is most interesting that the Reform Jews sought to use a nominally traditionalist institution to reach the new immigrant. However, their own status in American society was threatened by the masses of Jewish immigrants.[31] Indeed, the rising anti-semitism in this period was attributed to the non-acculturated character of the immigrants which reflected unfavourably on the native American Jews.[32] They apparently believed that the Seminary could reach the new immigrants since that institution shared the immigrants' 'commitment' to the religious tradition. Schechter visualized a Conservative Judaism which differed in some respects from Orthodoxy, but both nascent Conservatism and Orthodoxy represented religious traditionalism to him. Schechter's problem was that he was an ideologue of a new religious tendency (Conservatism) yet sought to align his institution with a different tendency (Orthodoxy) from whom he hoped to elicit

support and to whom he was instructed to carry the gospel of Americanism. Dr. Schechter, unlike many of his supporters, both nominally traditional and non-traditional, was more sensitive to the real aspirations and needs of the new immigrants. His views, however, did not prevail.

In 1913, the Seminary leadership and its Alumni Association created a supra-synagogue organization, the United Synagogue of America. This movement was to become the congregational arm of Conservative Judaism whose laity would in time depart from the standards of behaviour of religious Judaism. But at the time of its founding, even the Conservative as distinct from Orthodox nature of the new group was not clear. A projected name for the new organization '"A Union of Conservative Congregations" was objected to . . . as being too sectarian'.[33]

We shall not trace the path that the United Synagogue movement followed after 1913. It has long since parted company with the traditional Judaism of American Orthodoxy. We would, however, argue that the seeds of their division were implicit in the commitment to acculturation and the rather uncritical acceptance of the dominant American values of the period. The break, it is true, was over religious questions. But these religious differences reflected basic cultural differences. Those who continued to call themselves Orthodox and were highly acculturated were loath to see the division occur. For example, some delegates to the UOJC convention in 1913 wanted officially to forbid members to have any tie with the Seminary or the United Synagogue. Pereira Mendes, still president of the UOJC, stated that the Seminary as well as the more Orthodox Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary (RIETS) deserved support.[34] In 1920, Mendes called for a union of the UOJC, the United Synagogue, The Rabbinical Colleges, Gratz and Dropsie College, 'in short, all religious organizations in Jewish life except the Central Conference of American Rabbis and Hebrew Union College [Reform groups]'.[35] Mendes's distinguished successor as leader of the prestigious Sephardi synagogue Shearith Israel was Rabbi David De Sola Pool. This is how he conceptualized the religious history in the period we are discussing and its contemporary application:

> Conservatism was organized a generation ago as a program of hastening the process of Americanizing the foreign orthodoxy of the ghetto. Now, at a slower tempo, orthodoxy is doing the same and it is moving away from the characteristics of Yiddish ghetto (which marked it until recent years). Therefore, today, in the United States, conservatism and orthodoxy often meet, and are sometimes difficult to distinguish from one another.[36]

We already noted the difficulty of 'uptown' traditional Jewry in working with the 'downtown' groups. Significantly, alliances between the acculturated traditional and non-traditional groups did take place against the traditional non-acculturated groups.

The Agudath Horabbonim, representing the east European Yiddish-speaking rabbis, was vehement in its attacks upon the New York City Bureau of Jewish Education and its director, Dr. Samson Benderly. The Bureau, which was led by non-traditionalists, was viewed as threatening the integrity of religious education. Indeed, the Agudath Horabbonim in 1912 had expressed its displeasure with any educational institution that had Reform rabbis or women on its board of education. Nevertheless, the wealthy Orthodox philanthropist, Harry Fischel, sought to reorganize the Uptown Talmud Torah along lines recommended by Benderly. He succeeded, against the opposition of many of the School's Board, when he elicited the support of the outstanding Jewish philanthropist in America, Jacob Schiff. Schiff was a leading figure in the non-traditionalist American Jewish Committee of which Fischel was also a member, and a large contributor to the reorganized Jewish Theological Seminary.

A final note

The traditionalists in both camps were right, albeit for the wrong reasons. The Jewish masses, despite the efforts of their religious leadership, became acculturated, rose in social class, and abandoned their traditional practices, both cultural and religious. That this was inevitable, however, given their cultural rather than religious commitment, has often been forgotten. The Orthodox Jews today often assign the responsibility to these early religious leaders. This is no doubt unfair. The religious leaders were no more able to break through their own cultural perspectives than were the rest of the Jewish leaders, both secular and religious.

The Young Israel movement, born in 1912 on the Lower East Side as an indigenous Americanized, but religiously Orthodox, movement, was ignored by the upper-class religious traditionalists and rejected by the lower-class religious leaders. A handful of far-sighted intellectuals with social sensitivity, Judah Magnes, Israel Friedlander, and Mordecai Kaplan, to mention a few, recognized the potential of Young Israel and similar groups, but events moved too fast for them. By the time Young Israel was ready to expand on a synagogue level, the Conservative movement was already catering to the culturally, as distinct from religiously traditional, masses and had no appeal to the Young Israel members.

They, and a few other 'modern Orthodox' synagogues, were to remain in a kind of courageous isolation from other elements in American religious life. It was this handful of synagogues, however, which sustained the meagre hopes of American Orthodoxy through the lean years of the 1920s and 1930s. The bridges between religious traditionalists across class lines were not constructed until the immediate pre-war and post-war period. It was a new influx of immigrants in this period, many of whom were religiously rather than just culturally committed,

that gave new impetus to Orthodoxy and created at least the semblance of a single community.

Strains of acculturation and class still cut deeply through American Orthodoxy. But the picture today is a radically different one from that of 1900.

NOTES

[1] Curt E. Schwab, 'Folk and Universal Religion', trans. by the editor in Louis Schneider, ed., *Religion, Culture and Society*, New York, 1964, p. 255.

[2] Fritz Künkel, *Einführung in die Charakterologie*, p. 58, cited in G. Van Der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, Vol. I, New York, 1963, p. 242.

[3] Raphael Mahler, 'The Economic Background of Jewish Emigration from Galicia to the United States', *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science*, VII, 1952, p. 267. A recent article which challenges this interpretation is Moses Kligsberg, 'Jewish Immigrants in Business: A Sociological Study', *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, March 1967, pp. 283–318. Kligsberg argues that Jewish immigrants came to the United States because the breakdown of religious values in Europe meant that life in eastern Europe no longer afforded them a sense of purpose. Kligsberg also notes that it was the non-Orthodox rather than the Orthodox who first emigrated (p. 293). His own paper offers an excellent illustration of our theme that the Jewish immigrants were not religiously traditional, but rather culturally tied to traditional styles and values. For example, he cites this passage from the autobiography of an irreligious immigrant:

> My first *Shabbes* in America made a most painful impression on me. My brother-in-law arrived home from work Friday . . . He made *Kiddush*, my sister-in-law had prepared a good, Sabbath, homelike meal. Everything was fine and pleasurable that evening . . . On the morrow—on the morning of *Shabbes* seeing my brother-in-law dress in his overalls, take his saw, and leave for work, the entire Sabbath eve of America turned sour for me (p. 313).

For other evidence of a quasi-biographical nature see David Singer, 'The Rise of David Levinsky: A Note on the Liebman Thesis', *The American Scholar* (forthcoming).

[4] Quoted in Moshe Davis, *The Emergence of Conservative Judaism*, Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1963, p. 318.

[5] Abraham J. Karp, 'New York Chooses a Chief Rabbi', *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, 45, March 1955, pp. 129–98.

[6] E. Lifschutz, 'Jewish Immigrant Life in American Memoir Literature', *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science*, V, 1950, p. 232. Lifschutz is citing the memoir literature in making these comments.

[7] Shlomo Noble, 'The Image of the American Jew in Hebrew and Yiddish Literature in America, 1870–1900', ibid., IX, 1954, p. 87.

[8] Agudath Horabbonim, *Jubilee Volume*, 1927, p. 110.

[9] Cited in Moses Rischin, *The Promised City*, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, pp. 146–7.

[10] Quoted in Lloyd Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England from 1881 to 1910*, Detroit, 1960, p. 195.

[11] Alexander M. Dushkin, *Jewish Education in New York City*, The Bureau of Jewish Education, New York, 1918, p. 21.

[12] Ibid., p. 156.

[13] Agudath Horabbonim, op. cit., p. 16.

[14] Moses Weinberger, *Ha-Yehudim Ve-Hayahadut Be New York*, New York, 1887, p. 2.

[15] Isaac Max Rubinow, 'The Jewish Question in New York City (1902–1903)', trans. Leo Shpall, *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, 49, December 1959, p. 95.

[16] Agudath Horabbonim, op. cit., p. 46.

[17] Eugene Markovitz, *Henry Pereira Mendes (1888–1920)*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yeshiva University, New York, 1961, p. 136.

[18] Quoted in Nathan Glazer, *American Judaism*, Chicago, 1957, p. 73.

[19] Judah David Eisenstein, *Otzar Zichronotai (Autobiography and Memoirs)*, privately printed, New York, 1929, p. 206.

[20] Bernard Drachman, *The Unfailing Light*, The Rabbinical Council of America, New York, 1948, p. 167.

[21] Ibid., p. 206.

[22] Philip Cowen, *Memories of an American Jew*, New York, 1932, p. 73.

[23] David Philipson, *My Life As An American Jew*, Cincinnati, 1941, pp. 399–400.

[24] Markovitz, op. cit., p. 110.

[25] Ibid., p. 111.

[26] *Yiddishem Tageblatt*, 19 June 1898, p. 8. This is cited in Harold Gastwirt, *Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, 1898–1915*, unpublished paper, January 1966, p. 20.

[27] Harold Gastwirt, ibid., p. 42.

[28] Gilbert Klaperman, *The Beginnings of Yeshiva University: The First Jewish University in America*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yeshiva University, New York, 1955, p. 83.

[29] Ibid., p. 87.

[30] Ibid., p. 89.

[31] Marshall Sklare, *Conservative Judaism*, Glencoe, Ill., 1955, pp. 161–5 and 191–3.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Abraham J. Karp, *A History of the United Synagogue of America 1913–1963*, United Synagogue of America, New York, 1964, p. 9.

[34] Markovitz, op. cit., p. 12.

[35] H. Pereira Mendes, 'Orthodox Judaism: The Present', *The Jewish Forum*, January 1920, p. 33.

[36] David De Sola Pool, 'Religious and Cultural Phases of American Jewish History', *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, 39, March 1950, p. 297.

THE IMPACT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS OF JUNE 1967 ON MELBOURNE JEWRY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

Ronald Taft

IN an article on *Israel and American Jewry*, Hertzberg[1] reports his impressions of the unprecedented feelings of involvement in the June Crisis on the part of American Jews from all walks of life. As soon as the crisis broke, volunteers came forward spontaneously to offer money, or their services to raise money, or their labour and persons, for Israel's cause. From contemporary reports in the Jewish press, it appears that the response of Jews throughout the non-communist world was similar to, and in some cases fiercer than, that of United States Jewry. There were waves of rallies to express support for Israel, unprecedently large contributions of funds, and volunteering of services. The most impressive aspects of this involvement by World Jewry was its apparent universality and its clear extension to those groups which are usually lukewarm about any demonstrations of Jewish loyalty—the assimilated élite and the college age youth. For example, Hertzberg reports that many members of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism threw in their lot with Israel.

The response in the city of Melbourne was no exception. Out of a community of 34,000 Jews of all ages, 7,000 attended a public rally to express their moral support for embattled Israel, and 2,500 attended a youth rally. Both meetings were held in the week which preceded the Six-Day War, thus contradicting the facile explanation that the tremendous enthusiasm for Israel by assimilated Jews represented a desire to jump on to the victorious band-waggon. During the youth rally, 400 persons volunteered to go to Israel, and later a further 350 volunteered. In comparing these figures with those for European and American Jews, we must bear in mind the fact that the month of June is in Australia the middle of the academic year, and that volunteering would almost certainly cause the loss of a year of studies.

From Hertzberg's reports of American volunteers, it would appear that the percentage of those who spontaneously volunteered was greater in Melbourne than in the U.S.A. On the other hand, there

were few who offered money spontaneously. Very few Melbourne-born Jews with established wealth contribute substantially to Jewish causes, and the Middle East Crisis had little effect in this respect. Approximately two million dollars was collected in Melbourne for Israel and, while this was more than twice the sum raised in previous appeals, the average contribution per head was low compared with Britain, South Africa, and many other countries.

This paper is based on a survey conducted in Melbourne in the latter half of June; the survey was specifically designed to study the reactions of Jews to the Crisis. Fortunately, a social survey study had been conducted on a large representative sample of adult Jews in Melbourne during a six-month period (December 1966 to the end of May 1967).[2] Thus, we had the advantage of a framework, a group of trained interviewers, and an administrative apparatus that enabled a quick follow-up to be conducted on a sample of the previous interviewers, commencing within one week and finishing within three weeks of the end of the War. It was also possible to carry out a repeat study on some of the questions in the original survey which had been aimed at measuring the respondent's feelings about his Judaism, his attitude towards Israel, and his ethnic identification as a Jew. We had a very rare opportunity for studying the effect of a cataclysmic event on relevant attitudes and sentiments.

The Jews of Melbourne

Melbourne, the capital of the State of Victoria, is a prosperous industrial and trading centre with a population of two and a quarter million. This population has been doubled since 1945, mainly as a result of immigration from Britain and other European countries. The Jewish community consists of approximately 34,000 persons, living in 11,500 households. There have been Jews in Melbourne since the 1840s; they came mainly from English and German backgrounds. There was an influx of immigrants from Russia and other parts of eastern Europe during the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1921 there were 7,500 Jews; a large immigration of Polish and, later, central European Jews, increased the total to about 14,000 by 1940. A generous policy on the immigration of refugees after the War led to the virtual doubling of the Jewish population between 1945 and 1960; the newcomers were mainly from Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, often via Israel.[3]

Further details of the Community are available from the analysis of the demographic data obtained in the social survey of a representative sample of 504 Jewish householders (see below). Only 12 per cent of the sample proved to be second-generation Australians (including Australians with a British parent). Almost one-half of the respondents were born in eastern Europe and one-quarter in central and western Europe.

Of those not born in Australia, one-eighth had lived in Israel (or Palestine) immediately before coming to Australia. Over half claimed they could speak Yiddish and 18 per cent, Hebrew.

The Jewish community is a comparatively prosperous one, with one-half of the bread-winners falling clearly into the upper middle class. Only 20 per cent are blue-collar or low-paid white-collar workers. On the whole the Jews are well educated, and a high proportion have undertaken at least some tertiary level studies. Ninety per cent reported that they had some formal education in Judaism.

The Melbourne Jewish community is well organized, with many educational, religious, welfare, social, cultural, and Zionist institutions, all integrated under the umbrella of the Board of Deputies. Seventy per cent of the adult Jews belong to at least one Jewish organization, and 50 per cent have at least heard of the Board of Deputies. Ninety per cent claim to read the local Jewish press.

On the whole, relations between Jews and non-Jews in Melbourne are good, and organized antisemitism is almost negligible. Only 8 per cent of the respondents in the social survey claimed to have personally experienced a 'great deal' of antisemitism in Australia, in contrast with 60 per cent who had experienced 'a great amount' in other countries. About half the respondents said that Australians were friendly to Jews, and two-thirds said that they were satisfied with life in Australia.

The respondents were overwhelmingly attached to Judaism, although only very few (less than 10 per cent) are strictly orthodox in their religious observances. Over 90 per cent identify positively with being Jewish, and 80 per cent oppose mixed marriages; this may account for the fact that social relations between Jews and non-Jews are superficial. Only one half of the respondents had entertained or been entertained by a non-Jew in their home during the previous six-months period. Finally, the vast majority of respondents expressed themselves as favourable to Israel, and two-thirds stated that they would like to live there if they did not live in Australia.

In view of the fact that half the respondents had been in Australia for less than twenty years, it is worth mentioning the characteristics of those born in Australia. They were less observant than the others and better integrated socially with non-Jewish Australians. Otherwise the Australian-born respondents expressed attitudes very similar to those of the immigrants concerning Jewish identity. They were, however, considerably less pro-Israel.

Sampling in the Original Survey

The sample was selected from the Jewish Communal Register. This is an almost complete record of all addresses at which any Jews live; it was compiled from all possible sources to serve as a basis for various appeals for funds, and the list has been kept up to date. The information

was obtained from other communal lists and from records of births, marriages, and deaths, including the names of family members mentioned in newspaper announcements of these events. Because of the importance of the representativeness of the sample for this study, the members of the Steering Committee tested the Register by compiling lists of Jews whom they thought would most likely have been overlooked because they are extremely peripheral. Almost all of these were, in fact, in the Register. A further confirmation of the completeness of the Register comes from demography: multiplying the number of households in the Register by the average number of Jews per household found in the actual Survey produces an estimated population of 34,000 which coincides with the Australian Population Census.[4]

It was decided to choose the sample at random from the list of addresses and to interview the householder or his wife according to a prearranged schedule. Where there was no respondent of the required sex in the home, the spouse was substituted. Altogether 626 addresses were selected, but these were reduced by excluding persons who were untraceable, absent overseas, or too ill to be interviewed. It was also decided that any persons who claimed that they were not Jewish would be excluded (these represented 2 per cent of the sample). After the exclusion of these cases, the possible sample consisted of 559. Successful interviews were completed with 504 cases, representing 90·2 per cent of the possible.

Sampling in the Follow-up Survey

The sample for the follow-up study was selected from persons who had already been interviewed in the Original Survey. There were actually two samples used in this study:

I. *Random Sample.* In order to be able to report descriptive data concerning the Jewish population, a sample of 65 was selected by using a random numerical method. Of these, six could not be interviewed within the time limit (they were no longer resident in Melbourne, dead, or otherwise unavailable), and five refused to be interviewed again, representing a refusal rate of 8·5 per cent. The remaining sample of 54 respondents were used as representative of the Jewish population as a whole. Although the numbers were small, the care taken in the selection and interviewing of the Original and Follow-up samples should ensure that biases are slight and that the results can be taken as reasonably representative of the total population. Thus, the distributions of the Random Sample by sex, age, place of birth, and close relatives married to non-Jews were very close to those in the Original Sample. (See Table 1 for sampling details.)

II. *Augmented Sample.* Since the proportion of respondents in the Original study who were not identified with Judaism was quite low, a random sample would not produce sufficient non-identified respondents

to enable any conclusions to be drawn. For this reason, the sample was augmented by selecting at random 17 more names of persons who were not opposed to mixed marriages.[5] Fourteen of these respondents were successfully interviewed, giving an Augmented Sample of 68 respondents. (See Table 1 for details.) This full sample will be used for studying internal relationships, but descriptive data will be based on the Random Sample.

TABLE 1. *Details of Original, Random, and Augmented Samples*

	Original	*Random*	*Augmented*
1. Names selected (including replacements)	626	65	82
2. Number of suitable persons contacted*	559	59	75
3. Refusals	55	5	7
4. Refusals as percentage of possible (2)	8·8	8·5	9·3
5. Number of successful interviews	504	54	68
6. Percentage of males	47	48	53
7. Percentage aged > 55 years	39	39	42
8. Percentage Australian/British born	23	26	24
9. Percentage with close non-Jewish relatives (by marriage)	20	22	24

* Excluding persons who were absent from the State, dead, chronically ill, non-Jewish, or who could not be interviewed within the time limit.

Overall emotional reactions and ego involvement

The interview schedule asked for the respondent's reactions to the Crisis in three separate stages: before the outbreak of open warfare; during the War; and immediately after the victory. In addition to these general questions, other more specific ones included:

Was your reaction different from that of non-Jewish Australians? Please elaborate.

Tell me about any unusual *emotional upset that you had.*

Did you find yourself seeking to keep up with the news more than you would on world affairs generally?

Did you seek out the company of members of your family, or other Jews, more than usual?

Did you attend any rallies, meetings, or religious services that you would not normally have attended?

Other questions were asked concerning unusual contributions of money and thinking about volunteering services on the part of the respondent and of other members of the household.

In order to investigate the salience of the Crisis, the interview opened with the question, *What do you think is the most important problem facing the Melbourne Jewish Community?* This was asked before any hint was given concerning the theme of the interview.

The responses to all the above questions were combined into two

overall ratings: *ego involvement* and *intensity of emotional reactions*. These ratings were made independently by two raters who read the protocols and then rated the respondents on 6-point and 3-point scales respectively. Wherever there was any disagreement in the two ratings, the raters agreed on a rating after discussion.

Reliability. In order to measure reliability, a third rater also independently rated the respondents. The degree of agreement was as follows: Ego involvement (6 points); complete agreement: 82 per cent; 1 point disagreement: 18 per cent; 2 point disagreement: nil. Emotional intensity (3 points); complete agreement: 85 per cent; 1 point disagreement: 15 per cent. Whenever there was any disagreement between the third rater and the combined ratings of the first and second raters, I acted as arbiter.

The distribution of ratings is set out in Table 2. The modal rating on ego involvement was 4 ('a fair amount of personal involvement'). This implies that the respondent changed his daily routine in order to keep up with the news, and that his preoccupation with the Crisis led to neglect of his normal interests. Such respondents reported thinking about whether they should volunteer their services to help Israel's cause. The ratings of 5 and 6 were used conservatively, even though more than one-third of the respondents received them. To 'earn' 5, they had to provide ample evidence that their lives were disrupted by the fact that Israel was being tried. Typical comments of those receiving a rating of 5 were: 'Didn't bother trying to work during that week'; 'Had fits of crying'; 'Was distressed that I am too old to volunteer'; 'Attended several rallies to support Israel and worked on emergency committees'. A rating of 6 was preserved for extreme cases. Typical comments were: 'The attack on Israel was like my hand was cut off'; 'After victory I felt like I had recovered from a severe illness'; 'I felt shock—a feeling of both death and life'; 'Didn't sleep or eat'; 'Israel and I want peace'.

The respondents were also asked whether they were *surprised at their own reactions to the Crisis*. Only 15 per cent said that they were surprised, and a further 6 per cent that they were not sure. A typical remark of a 'surprised' respondent was, 'I was surprised how much I wanted to listen to the news'. Another (who said that Israel means 'very little' to him) said: 'I found myself giving more money that I ever thought I would give to anything.' An inspection of the responses of the 'surprised' in the Original Survey suggests that typically they are persons whose interest in Israel had been fairly low before the Crisis, although they usually had other emotional links with Judaism, such as religion, Jewish friends, or familiarity with Yiddish. To sum up, the most notable result on ego involvement was the extremely small percentage of respondents who were only 'slightly involved', even in the sample augmented by those favouring assimilation; and the comparatively high percentage of those who were 'considerably involved'.

TABLE 2. *Overall ratings on ego involvement in the Crisis and emotional intensity of reaction to it (in percentages)*

	Random Sample (N = 54)	*Augmented Sample* (N = 68)
(*a*) Ego involvement		
1. No interest at all	0	0
2. Casual interest without involvement	0	0
3. Slight involvement but somewhat superficial	4	9
4. Moderately involved—some changes in normal routine and definite concern or distress shown	52	50
5. Considerable involvement—marked changes in normal life and considerable concern or distress. Identification of self with Israel. Crisis changed respondent's outlook on life	39	37
6. Very intense involvement—Israel treated almost as a complete projection of self	6	4
(*b*) Emotional intensity		
1. Nil or slight emotional reaction	9	15
2. Definite emotional reaction	49	49
3. Intense emotional reaction	41	36

The ratings on emotional intensity were not independent of those on ego involvement: i.e., persons who showed intense reactions tended to be rated higher on ego involvement, and those who showed little emotional reaction tended to be low on involvement. But there were exceptions; there were those who became emotionally unbalanced by the Crisis, but were far more concerned with their own state of mind than with the events; and there were others—typically males—who were completely absorbed by the Crisis, but who nevertheless remained quite cool. Ninety per cent of the respondents in the Random Sample showed a definite emotional reaction; almost half of these showed an intense reaction. There were no sex differences in these reactions, which were probably determined by ego involvement in the crisis and personal temperament.

Some specific reactions to the Crisis

We must now examine some of the topics that were considered in assessing the overall reactions to the Crisis.

Salience. What do you think is the most important problem facing the Melbourne Jewish Community? Twenty-six per cent of all respondents in the Random Sample mentioned Israel, while only 5 per cent said so in the Original Study before the War. The remaining 74 per cent who did not mention Israel included many who were highly involved in the Crisis, but who either did not perceive this as a problem facing the *local* Jewish Community, or who believed that there were more salient

problems. The most commonly mentioned problem was that of keeping harmony within the Community; this was mentioned twice as often as it was in the Original Survey, while problems connected with assimilation were mentioned only half as often. It would be reasonable to attribute the changes in the salience of these problems to the effect of the Crisis.

Involvement in the Crisis before the War broke out. The interviewers asked the respondents to describe how they felt about the Crisis before the War broke out, whether they became concerned about the safety of Israel, and if so, how much. The responses were rated by using the procedure described earlier; these are set out in Table 3. The results indicate that most Jews felt themselves drawn into the Crisis before the fighting started. It should be noted that a rating of 'involvement' implies that the respondent was concerned about the threat to Israel and not just world peace generally. The results are not surprising when we consider the number of Jews who attended public rallies of support before the War. The only person who had been unaware that there had been a Crisis was visiting his homeland in eastern Europe at the time, and did not notice any news reports on the matter.

TABLE 3. *Involvement in the Crisis before the outbreak of War (in percentages)*

	Random Sample	*Augmented Sample*
Degree of involvement	0	1
Indifferent	2	6
Some interest	2	3
Moderate involvement	6	4
Considerable involvement	15	15
Considerable involvement *and* concern for safety of Israel	76	71

Dependence on news. Everyone in the Random Sample claimed to have listened to the news 'much more' than normal (with the exception of an elderly woman whose English was not good enough).

Seeking social contacts. Respondents were asked whether they had sought out the company of other Jews or of members of their family. Twenty-six per cent answered 'much more than usual' and another 20 per cent 'a little more'; thus almost 50 per cent sought more social contacts as a result of the Crisis.[6]

Attendance at rallies and religious services. Nearly half the number of respondents claimed to have attended at least one rally on behalf of Israel; and half of these (that is, one-quarter of the total) attended two or more. On the other hand, only one in nine attended a religious service which they might not have attended in normal circumstances.

Donations. Ninety-six per cent stated that their household had given a donation to the Israel Appeal and 92 per cent claimed that they had contributed more than usual.

Volunteering services. Did you have any thoughts at all about volunteering your services to help Israel in any way? Volunteering was not confined to offering to go to Israel, but included such services as collecting money or interviewing volunteers. The responses are summarized in Table 4.

TABLE 4. *Volunteering services to help Israel* (in percentages)*

	Random Sample
No thought of volunteering	65
Fantasy thoughts, but no action	13
Serious consideration	6
Actually offered services	17

* Not necessarily to go to Israel.

The interviewers also asked whether any members of the household had actually volunteered to go to Israel; they were told that 11 per cent of all households contained at least one volunteer.[7] Details are given below of volunteering by children of various ages.

Variables associated with the degree of ego involvement

What are the determinants of whether a particular respondent was highly involved in the Crisis or not? To investigate this a number of background and opinion variables were analysed in relation to the degree of ego involvement, and the statistical significance of the relationships was tested by using either bi-serial correlations or χ^2.[8]

Results of the analyses

There were no *age* or *sex* differences, other than the possibly suggestive finding that the three who scored the highest rating on involvement were women. There was an interesting relationship with *socio-economic class*. A positive correlation of ·33 between class level and involvement was highly significant.[9] Business men and their wives, and those in professional occupations, tended to be much more involved than were those in lower-level occupations. There was no relationship to *voting* preferences in Australian politics, nor with feelings of satisfaction with life in Australia.

Place of birth was not a significant determinant of involvement, although there was a tendency for those born in eastern Europe to be more involved in the Crisis than were others. The relationship is statistically significant when those whose *mother tongue* was Yiddish is compared with the remainder.

It might be thought that social integration with non-Jews—commonly called 'assimilation'—would reduce involvement in the Crisis.

As a rough objective measure of this integration, the respondents were classified according to whether there had been a *mixed marriage* in their immediate family, including themselves. The 16 respondents concerned did not differ from the others on involvement; if anything, they were more involved in the Crisis than those with no mixed marriages. Another measure of integration consisted of a composite scale of *assimilation to Australia*, including indices of satisfaction with Australia, knowledge of English, and naturalization status; this scale was also unrelated to involvement in the Crisis.

It was thought that those who believe that there is a good deal of *antisemitism* in Australia would be more involved in the Crisis than those who did not. This time there was a significant correlation of ·25, but it was in the direction opposite to the prediction: the more a respondent perceived Australians as friendly to the Jews, the greater was his involvement in the Middle East Crisis. On the other hand, the more antisemitism a respondent had personally experienced in the course of his life—wherever he may have lived—the higher his involvement; but the highly involved were, typically, Yiddish-speaking persons who had come to Australia after the Second World War, and who had experienced Nazi persecution.

Did the more involved respondents have more contact with Israel than the less involved? Strangely enough, the answer is 'No'. There is no relationship at all between degree of involvement and ever having *visited or lived in Israel*, or having *close relatives* and friends resident in that country. Involvement, thus, is definitely not affected by familiarity or by personal ties with the inhabitants of Israel.

Participation in *Zionist* movements also showed little relationship with involvement in the Crisis. Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of participation on a 5-point scale ranging from *no participation at all* to *Zionist activities were paramount in my life*. Ratings were made for three life periods: before 18 years, as a young adult, and now. There was no relationship at all with Zionist participation before 18. There were 12 respondents who had been completely absorbed in Zionism; and of these, two scored 5 (see Table 2 for the meaning of these ratings). There was a trend for those who participated in Zionism as young adults to be more involved in the Crisis, but this trend was significant only at the 0·10 level. There was no relationship between Zionist participation in 1967 and involvement. Not one of the three who scored the highest on involvement in the Crisis had ever been associated with Zionist movements, while three out of the six scoring lowest on involvement had been so associated (see Table 5). It would appear that participation in Zionist activity is largely an 'avocation' which has little to do with deep feelings about the State of Israel.

Finally, what is the relationship between *ego involvement in Judaism* and involvement in the Crisis? In the Original Survey, the respondents

TABLE 5. *Degree of participation in Zionism in whole life and degree of ego involvement in the Crisis (N = 68)*

Zionist Participation at any stage of life	*Degree of ego involvement*			
	Slight (3)	*Moderate* (4)	*Considerable* (5)	*Very Intense* (6)
Nil or slight	3	21	11	3
Fair to very considerable	3	13	14	0

were scored on seven composite indices, each representing a facet of identification with Judaism.[10] These facets are listed in Table 6, together with their correlations with ego involvement in the Crisis. All the indices are positively correlated at a high level of significance with the

TABLE 6. *Correlation between identification with various facets of Judaism and degree of ego involvement in the Crisis (N = 68)*

Indices	*Bi-serial correlation*
Defence of Jewish identity	·45
Social relations	·16
Community institutions	·45
Positive emotional attachment	·53
Religion	·48
Yiddish culture	·34
Israel	·52
Total identification score	·59

exception of the *social relations* scale which bears only a slight positive relationship. This scale refers to proportion of friends who are Jewish and relative feelings of ease in the company of Jews and non-Jews. The low relationship is consistent with the lack of relationship mentioned above between involvement and mixed marriages in the family. The findings for the *social relations* scale suggest that social influences from other Jews played little part in the development of feelings of involvement.

The highest correlations with individual scales were with *identification with Israel* and *positive emotional attachment to Judaism*, and the *total identification* score obtained by summing all of the scales had the highest relationship with degree of involvement for any measure in the study. Not surprisingly, the five respondents who indicated some signs of self-hate (for example, 'I wish that I hadn't been Jewish') were all in the lower groups on involvement, that is, rated 3 or 4. But even these showed some degree of involvement.

By way of summary it might be useful to describe the cases falling into the two extremes on involvement. It should, however, be borne in mind that those described as 'low' on this were in fact somewhat

involved, albeit fairly superficially; indeed, five of the six 'low' respondents admitted to being more involved in the Crisis by virtue of their Jewish background than was the average Australian.

The three most highly involved respondents (rated 6) were all females whose mother tongue was Yiddish, and who had come to Australia after enduring Nazi rule during the War; they were all considerably involved in Judaism and two of them were especially devout. All three reacted to the Crisis with intense emotions, and they each showed mistrust of Gentiles in general; for example, one would not put a Mezzuzah on her door in case of trouble. On the other hand, they were all sympathetic to the Arab people; none of them had ever participated in Zionist movements, but they all had many close relatives living in Israel. One of the three scored fairly low on the *identification with Israel* scale largely because, before the Crisis, she considered that money should be spent to keep local youth from assimilating rather than to build up Israel; after the Crisis, however, she changed her mind about the order of priorities.

In contrast to the above, all the six who were the least involved in the Crisis were fairly low in their identification with Judaism in general, and especially with respect to Israel. Strangely, they tended to be above average in their identification with local Jewish communal institutions; that is, they were aware of, and participated in, these institutions even though they had practically no other attachment to Judaism, not even a formal religious one. To speculate: perhaps these low-involvement respondents have learnt to participate in an activity without giving anything of their emotions or of themselves. In support of this interpretation, only two of the six reported any emotional reaction at all to the Crisis, and their reactions were not intense. The distribution of the other variables with respect to the low-involved group was similar to that of the sample as a whole, except that three of their number were born in Australia, and only one spoke Yiddish. The latter was also the only one who had had experience of a great deal of antisemitism. Four of them, however, believed that there is a considerable amount of antisemitism in Australia.

One particular case of a person who was only moderately involved in the Crisis (rating 4) and who showed little emotional reaction is worth special mention because of the unusual pattern of her responses. This elderly widow, who was born in Poland, had lived in Israel for many years, and intends to rejoin her married daughter there. She refers to Israel as 'we'; and, clearly, highly identifies herself with that country as well as with Judaism in general. Despite this background, she expressed no concern about the safety of Israel before or during the War, did not listen to news obsessively, or discuss the Crisis with others. She had some concern for the safety of her son-in-law who was in the Israel army, and she expressed satisfaction at the victory, but otherwise

her reactions were 'cool'. Since she considered herself an Israeli, one might speculate that her reaction to the Crisis was perhaps more like that of an Israeli than of an Australian Jew.[11]

In contrast to this case, there was a German-born man in his fifties who had also lived in Israel before emigrating to Australia; he too was rated as moderately involved in the Crisis (rating 4), but he had a definite emotional reaction to it. Unlike the woman described above, this man had very low, if not negative, identification with Judaism and with Israel: he is married to a non-Jew, he describes Judaism as 'an impediment of birth', and Israel as 'an anachronism'. Nevertheless, he stated that he had been 'very depressed and worried about Israel's situation' and obsessed with following the news during the Crisis. As evidence of his unexpected involvement he said: 'I even found myself making financial contributions'. He rationalized his apparently inconsistent attitudes by drawing a parallel with his reactions to the Vietnam War, and by declaring that he is 'in favour of Israelis but against Jews'.

Effect of the victory on the respondents' behaviour, attitudes, and identification with Judaism

Apart from an open-ended question on emotional reactions to Israel's victory, there were two questions on whether the victory had any effect on behaviour and outlook on life. The responses were rated strictly, being counted positive only if some lasting change was implied, and not just a feeling of rejoicing: the analysis is set out in Table 7. The findings suggest that nearly everyone felt that the victory had some enduring effect on him, although typically this was described as an increase in self-esteem or feelings of well-being. In one-quarter of the cases the effect was to increase feelings of attachment to Israel or to Judaism.

TABLE 7. *Effect of Israel's victory on the respondents' behaviour and outlook on life (in percentages, $N = 54$)*

	Random Sample
1. No lasting effect (apart from temporary emotional reactions)	8
2. More positive attitude to Israel	9
3. More positive attitude to being Jewish	19
4. Boost to self-esteem, happiness (not just momentary)	48
5. Strengthened character or moral outlook	4
6. Suspicion or resentment of non-Jews; mourning of Jewish dead	12
7. Negative attitudes towards Israel or Jews	1

Some of the comments of the respondents are worth quoting:

'The War made me think that no one is absolutely safe, maybe not even in Australia.'

'The Jews of Israel can now feel free. No one can touch them. Let them live!'

'This war was like a compensation for the slaughter of all those Jews in Europe. I now know that if we would have had guns then, we would have done the same to the Germans as we have done to the Arabs now.'

So far, we have dealt only with the respondents' own descriptions of the effect of the War on them. An objective measure of changes in attitudes due to the Crisis can also be made by a comparison of responses to questions asked in both the Original and the Follow-up studies. It has already been pointed out that there was an increase in the salience of Israel as a problem affecting the Melbourne Jewish Community. A further question was: *What does your being Jewish mean to you personally?* Typical answers mentioned a sense of belonging, ancestry, or a way of life. In the Original Survey only two out of 68 referred to being a member of a nation or people, while in the Follow-up Survey only one more respondent said so. In the Original Survey, 32 mentioned feelings of pride or belonging, but in the Follow-up 29 did so. In the Original study, five gave answers suggesting that their being Jewish was a matter of indifference to them, or, even, something negative; for example, 'It only means suffering'. In the Follow-up study the corresponding figure was also five. Clearly, the Crisis did not alter responses to this question.

Another question asked was: *What does the State of Israel mean to you personally?* The responses were rated by independent judges on a 5-point scale ranging from 'unfavourable response' to one indicating 'exceptionally strong positive identification'. The ratings were made by three judges, and the final decision was made in accordance with the procedure described above. There was complete agreement between

TABLE 8. '*What does Israel mean to you personally?*' *Comparison between Original and Follow-up Surveys*

	Original Survey	*Change in Follow-up*				
		Increase +2	+1	*No change* 0	*Decrease* −1	−2
1. Unfavourable response	1			1		
2. Indifferent	4		3	1		
3. Favourable, but no ego involvement	27	1	17	9		
4. Some positive ego involvement	30		6	18	6	
5. Very strong positive ego involvement	4			1	0	3
Total	66*	1	26	30	6	3

Total change +14

* Two respondents did not answer the question.

the judges on 96 per cent of the ratings, and a discrepancy of one point on the other 4 per cent. The ratings on the Original Survey are presented in Table 8, together with the changes that occurred in the Follow-up study. The percentage of persons who were clearly ego-involved with Israel (rating of 4 or 5—see Table 8) rose from 34 per cent before the Crisis to 65 per cent after it. It will be noted that three of the four highest ratings dropped from 5 to 3, but this could be due merely to conservatism in making the ratings; for example, the response

TABLE 9. *'Does being Jewish play an important part in your life?'*

	Original Survey	*Change in Follow-up*						
		Increase		*No change*	*Decrease*		
		+2	+1	0	−1	−2	−3
1. Plays no part	3			3			
2. Of little importance	7		6	1			
3. Plays an important part	28		5	22	1		
4. Plays very important part	30			24	3	1	2
Total	68	0	11	50	4	1	2

Total change −1

TABLE 10. *'What are your feelings about being Jewish?'*

	Original Survey	*Change in Follow-up*				
		Increase		*No change*	*Decrease*	
		+2	+1		−1	−2
1. Negative feelings	3		1	2		
2. No feelings for or against	5		1	4		
3. Slightly positive	11		6	4	1	
4. Strong positive	25		5	19	1	
5. Very strong positive	24			18	6	
Total	68	0	13	47	8	

Total change +5

'A homeland for Jews' might, or might not, be intended to include the respondent himself. In any case, those who scored the maximum in the Original study could obviously not increase their scores. Ignoring those scoring 1 or 5, we have 61 cases, of whom 27 increased their favourableness, 6 decreased, and 28 remained unchanged. The trend is highly significant,[12] and the finding is consistent with the contention that the Crisis led to increase in the positive involvement of Jews with Israel. The change was especially marked in the case of persons who had viewed Israel before the Crisis as something good for Jews in general, but had not felt personal involvement.

We can apply a similar treatment to two measures of involvement in Judaism. The first is the question *Does your being Jewish play an important part in your life?* (see Table 9). There were some peculiar effects in the Follow-up answers; three of those scoring highest in the Original study scored lower in the Follow-up, two of them changing from 'very important part' to 'plays no part'. These three were all former concentration camp inmates who apparently regarded their Judaism as a cause of personal suffering, and this had made it seem a very important factor. After the Crisis, they changed their minds, but whether this was a direct result of the Crisis cannot be deduced. If we just consider the two middle groups in Table 9 (2 and 3), there were 11 who increased their ratings, one who decreased it, and 23 who remained unchanged. This trend is significant at the ·01 level by Sign Test, although this should be treated as a limited finding in view of the importance of the highest rating which was given by 44 per cent of the respondents. The final relevant question concerned positive or negative feelings about being Jewish (see Table 10). Omitting the lowest and the highest groups (ratings 1 and 5), we find that 12 increased their ratings, two decreased them, and 27 remained the same. The increase is significant at the ·02 level.

To sum up the objective measures of change: there are indications that there were significant increases in the degree and the depth of identification with Judaism, and a considerable increase in positive identification with Israel.

Involvement of the children

The respondents were asked about their children's reactions to the Crisis. These were rated by independent raters on the degree of involvement manifested; the results are set out in Table 11 according to the ages of the children. There was complete agreement between the two raters in 94 per cent of the cases. The group aged 16–24 years were by far the most involved; two-thirds of the population of this age were rated as 'considerably' or 'very intensely' involved, and, according to the parents' reports, 16 per cent of this age group actually volunteered to go to Israel.[13]

TABLE 11. *Degree of involvement of children (expressed as percentage of all children in the age group living at home)*

	up to 10 yrs	*11–15 yrs*	*16–24 yrs*
Not aware of crisis	25	0	0
Indifferent or only slight involvement	54	27	13
Moderately involved	14	47	19
Considerable or intense involvement	7	27	68
Total number of children in age group	28	15	31

To go by the information supplied by the parents, it appears that the late teenage and early adult groups were at least as ego-involved in the Crisis as their parents, if not more so. Their involvement may have been considerably influenced by the fact that at these ages they are either at school or university with other Jews, or are otherwise in close contact with Jewish groups.[14]

Some specific opinions.

In the course of the survey a number of general opinion questions were asked the responses to which are interesting in themselves. These are set out below in terms of percentages (for the Random Sample, N = 54).

How do you think the average non-Jewish Australian felt about the war while it was on?

Sympathetic to Israel	69
Mixed positive and negative	22
Negative to Israel	0
Neutral or uninterested	6
Don't know	4

How did you feel about all the publicity that the newspapers and TV gave about Israel, the Jewish rallies, appeals, and volunteering?

Positive feelings	78
Mixed positive and negative	19
Negative feelings	2
Indifferent, vague, no answer	2

What in your opinion was the main cause of the war?

Arabs closing of Gulf of Akaba	48
Russia	19
Existence of Israel	2
Big Powers, Oil, Cold War	20
Others	4
Don't know	7

Do you feel angry or disappointed now with anyone, or any country, concerning the War?

Yes: 91 per cent, distributed as follows:

Communist countries	48
France	24
Britain	14
U.S.	6
Arabs	7
Israel	1

How do you feel about the Arab people?

Unreservedly sympathetic to Arabs	11
Makes excuses for Arabs ('pushed into it by their leaders')	44
Indifferent	15
Some antagonism expressed	30

What should Israel do now? If Israel continues to demand direct peace talks

with the Arabs before she will withdraw from conquered land, would you agree with her?

Complete support for Israel's stand on occupied territories	89
Support with qualifications	9
Opposition to Israeli stand	2

Discussion

We have established that there was a widespread, almost universal, deep personal involvement in the Middle East Crisis of June among the Jews of Melbourne. This involvement took the form of extreme concern about the safety of Israel, emotional upsets, obsessive seeking of news, constant discussion of events, and spontaneous actions to support the cause of Israel. While some of these reactions occurred in mild form among non-Jewish Australians—especially obsessive interest in the news—the reaction of the Jews was much sharper. Ninety per cent of the respondents believed that their reactions to the Crisis differed from those of non-Jewish Australians, and another 5 per cent were not sure.

The degree of involvement of emotions and self in Israel's struggle was quite intense in almost half of the adults surveyed. This involvement began during the Crisis following Egypt's closing of the Gulf of Akaba, and its effects were still present after Israel's victory in 90 per cent of the cases. The most ego-involved Jews were those who were born in eastern Europe in Yiddish-speaking homes, who had suffered under the Nazis, and who after the War had come to Australia where they had prospered economically. Some commentators have been impressed by the effect of the Crisis on Jews who were on the periphery of Judaism, and we too found such cases of 'conversion'; but the strongly involved people were, on the whole, those who already had been rather fully identified with Judaism before the Crisis. This applied particularly to ego involvement with Israel as a State; those who were ego-involved with Israel before the Crisis became the most involved during the Crisis. The War had a definite effect on most of the respondents; mainly this took the form of a boost in pride, but in several cases it also strengthened their attachment to Judaism and to Israel. It was notable, however, that neither personal contacts with Israel nor Zionist activities were related to a respondent's degree of involvement in the Crisis. In fact, participation in Jewish community life did not seem to have a great deal of relevance, since such participants were to be found at both extremes of involvement in the Crisis. Involvement was more a matter of attitudes than of formal integration into the Jewish community.

Informal social relations and integration with other Jews was also a factor of little importance; the involvement was not the result of social pressures, it was a spontaneous and individual reaction. This inter-

pretation is supported by the fact that the attendances at the rallies before the outbreak of fighting were astounding; the rallies were announced in the press with only a few days' notice and there was little time for peer pressures to operate—with the notable exception of younger people attending school or university. The spontaneous wave of feeling must be a most unusual phenomenon when it is remembered that it occurred in respect of a country other than that in which the respondents were domiciled. The studies reported in this paper can do little to explain the phenomenon. All we can do here is to describe it and to leave it to others to speculate about or to explain. One could, for instance, say that the continued existence of Israel as a nation has accustomed Jews to its presence, and that an affiliative attitude has gradually been built up towards it. When Israel was threatened, these unconscious attitudes came to the fore and their intensity overwhelmed the respondent, sometimes to his surprise. Another, not necessarily contradictory, interpretation, is that there has been an increasing feeling among Jews that it is better to fight for the survival of Israel than to try to save one's life by co-operating with predatory enemies. This attitude may be embodied in uneasy feelings about the behaviour of the Jews in Nazi Europe and in the admiration felt for the Warsaw Ghetto fighters. As a result, there was an immediate defensive reaction to Arab threat; and a feeling of support for Israel's decision to stand up to her enemies: this is clear from the description given by respondents of their feelings and behaviour during the Six-Day War. Whatever the explanation, the June Crisis obviously had a fundamental effect on the Jews of Melbourne, and its repercussions are likely to be felt for a long time to come.

NOTES

[1] Arthur Hertzberg, 'Israel and American Jewry', *Commentary*, August 1967, 44, pp. 169–73.

[2] This study was conducted under the auspices of the Jewish Social Service Council of Victoria and was guided by a steering committee consisting of Mr. Walter M. Lippmann, Mr. A. Bloch, Dr. L. Mann, Professor M. Marwick, Mr. P. Medding, Mr. L. Sharpe, Dr. C. Tatz, and the writer. The other members of this Committee are thanked for their contribution to the planning of the present study, but the writer takes full responsibility for it. Financial support was provided mainly by the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture and the Australian Research Grants Committee with supplementary amounts from the University of Melbourne Research Fund and from various Melbourne Jewish institutions.

[3] An account of the present demographic structure of the Melbourne Jewish Community and its history is included in Walter M. Lippmann, 'The Demography of Australian Jewry', the *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, December 1966. In that, and other studies, references to Jewry in the State of Victoria can be taken as applying to Melbourne, which contains 98 per cent of Victoria's Jewish population.

[4] According to the June 1966 Australian Census, there were 30,461 persons in Melbourne who gave their religion as Jewish. This figure was adjusted by projecting the population to February 1967 by adding 200, and also by adding a figure of 3,250 for persons who declared

that they had 'no religion', or who declined to state their religion. This figure was based on the 10·1 per cent of the respondents in the Jewish survey of Melbourne who fall into these categories. On this basis, the Jewish Community of Melbourne comes to 33,900.

[5] It would have been better to have chosen these subjects on the basis of their attitude to Israel, but to do this would have caused some delays in commencing the interviews. The attitudes to mixed marriages was more readily available, and in any case, this provided a better general index of the respondent's identification with Judaism than that provided by attitudes to Israel.

[6] This compares with findings reported by P. B. Sheatsley and J. B. Feldman, 'The Kennedy Assassination: Easy Thoughts and Emotions', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1966, 28, pp. 189–215. According to these investigators, 54 per cent of their respondents felt like talking to someone about the assassination after they heard about it, and 37 per cent actually did so.

[7] For the Melbourne Jewish population as a whole this would produce something like 1,300 volunteers if we allow for multiple volunteers in one household. This compares with a figure of 750 official volunteers in the community, to which should be added persons who went to Israel without going through the official volunteer scheme. The data obtained in the sample survey are almost certainly a considerable over-estimate, possibly influenced by the definition of a volunteer. The official concept is someone who signed a volunteer form, but the householder's concept was probably someone who said that he had decided to volunteer.

[8] Bi-serial correlations have been used wherever possible. These were preferred to product moment correlations because of the comparatively few cases, and because of the narrow range of the scores on most variables. In each bi-serial correlation, the dichotomized variable was the one with the poorest distribution with respect to range and normality.

[9] With 68 cases, a correlation of ·24 is significant at the ·05 level of probability and a correlation of ·31 is significant at the ·01 level.

[10] The construction and scoring of these scales will be described in detail in a report on the Original study now being written. The differentiation of the scales was made initially by theoretical analysis, and the scoring was based on answers to specific questions. The scores for each of the scales were converted into a normalized seven-point scale before being summed to derive an overall total. An example is given below of one of the component items in each of the scales.

Defence of Jewish identity: 'How much do you desire your grand-children to be Jewish?'

Social relations: 'Do you feel more at ease with Jews or non-Jews?'

Community institutions: 'Have you heard of the Melbourne Jewish Board of Deputies?'

Positive emotional attachment: Respondent's rating of his feelings for or against his being Jewish.

Religion: Type of observance of Sabbath in the home.

Yiddish Culture: Believe that Yiddish should be taught to Jewish children.

Israel: Would like to live in Israel if he left Australia.

[11] The author understands that a comparable study has been made of the Israeli population by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. The speculation concerning our respondent's reaction may be able to be checked against the findings from Israel itself.

[12] Using the Sign Test to compare the increases with the decreases, we find that the difference is significant at the ·001 level.

[13] An analysis of the official volunteer application forms indicates that there were 490 from persons aged 16–24 years. This constitutes approximately 9 per cent of the total numbers of Jews in these ages. Thus the respondents' reports represent a considerable over-estimation (cf. note 7).

[14] The most involved ages were those between 19 and 22. Of this group 11·5 per cent actually volunteered for Israel. More than half of the Jewish population between these ages are full-time students.

CHRONICLE

In its issue of Spring 1967, *Les Nouveaux Cahiers* (published under the auspices of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*) states that Iran has the largest Jewish community in a Muslim state. It is estimated that 75,000 Jews live in Iran; 45,000 of them are in Teheran. The community is not prosperous: the American Joint Distribution Committee is said to give assistance to about 20,000 souls. Recently about 300 families (1,000 persons) have left the country.

The *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, which opened its first school in Iran in 1898, now has an enrolment of 5,200 pupils. French and Hebrew are taught at all levels. In fact the *Alliance* is the only educational institution authorized to teach a foreign language in Iranian primary schools. *Alliance* schools exist not only in Teheran but in several provincial towns: Ispahan, Yezd, Hamadan, Kermanshah, etc.

*

The Joint Distribution Committee, in its annual report published last August, stated that the Committee aided more than 400,000 needy Jews in thirty countries in 1966. Among these were 56,565 Jews in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Iran. Jewish emigration from North Africa slowed down in 1966: there were 101,000 Jews in the three North African countries in 1965 and of these about 95,000 remained at the end of 1966. J.D.C. help went to 35,325—i.e. more than one in three. The report also states that J.D.C.'s welfare and rehabilitation programmes cost $22,594,800 in 1966, which represents an increase of half a million dollars over 1965. However, mainly because of inflation and increased costs in many of the thirty countries in which the Committee operated, 12,000 fewer people were helped in 1966 than in 1965.

*

The Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress awarded this year a Jacob Lestschinsky Scholarship to a student of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The University recommended the award for the student's research in the demography of Italian Jewry. The award ceremony took place on the first anniversary of Lestschinsky's death, in the presence of members of the family of the distinguished demographer.

Jacob Lestschinsky was a member of the Advisory Board of this Journal.

*

The B'nai B'rith Journal for June–July 1967 states that its British membership is steadily growing. B'nai B'rith was first established in Britain in 1910. In 1960, there were twenty functioning Lodges and the number has risen

to over fifty. The Hebrew speaking lodge is the first of its kind outside Israel. *The B'nai B'rith Journal* states: 'We have set ourselves a target of 10,000 members which it is hoped to achieve by the early 1970's. At the same time existing Lodges have set a doubling of present membership as their aim.'

*

It was reported last October that 'Peace and Progress', a department of Moscow Radio, has announced that it broadcasts daily in Yiddish and Hebrew. The aim of these transmissions is said to be 'to acquaint Jewish listeners with all aspects of Soviet life'. Western experts are quoted as saying that the wavelengths of the transmissions make it clear that the broadcasts are designed for listeners outside the Soviet Union.

*

An agreement was signed last April by the Chief Rabbi of Rumania (who is also the President of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Rumania) and the Executive Vice-Chairman of the Joint Distribution Committee. The aim of the agreement is to ensure co-operation in 'a programme to meet special needs of Jewish communities in Rumania'.

After signing the agreement, the Chief Rabbi, Dr. Moses Rosen, and the Joint Vice-Chairman, Mr. Charles Jordan, were received by Mr. Dogaru, the head of the Religious Affairs Department of the office of the Prime Minister. Mr. Jordan expressed his appreciation of the Rumanian Government's policy of religious freedom. He stated: 'Its policy has been more than a mere tolerance of the practice of Judaism. It has given recognition and actual financial aid to the established institutions of the religion and has made it possible for the Jewish community to survive.'

*

There are twenty-four Jewish communities in Switzerland with 5,000 'member families'. Last May the Lucerne community celebrated its hundredth anniversary and the Annual Assembly of the Swiss Federation of Jewish communities took place in that city. The Ambassador of Israel attended the opening session; also present were the civil and religious leaders of the town and Canton of Lucerne.

*

It was announced in Bonn last May that the Jewish communities of West Germany have 26,143 members. There are 45 synagogues; 48 other places of worship; 15 rabbis; and 38 cantors. Religious instruction is given by 64 teachers to 1,024 children aged 6 to 13 years. There are 51 youth groups with 1,648 members.

*

In February of this year Jewish-Christian Amity of Madrid organized a religious meeting in the Church of Santa Rita. For the first time in Spain, Jews and Christians joined in prayer. The gathering was addressed by Father Vicente Serrano and Sr. Max Mazin, Co-Presidents of Jewish-Christian Amity. Sr. Mazin is President of the Madrid Jewish Community.

It was announced in August that a group of experts in Madrid were to revise 159 textbooks used in Spanish primary schools in order to eliminate expressions offensive to Jews.

*

Professor Max Gottschalk has been made a Commandeur de l'Ordre de Leopold II in appreciation of his services in the field of social progress. Professor Gottschalk is Research Professor at the Institute of Sociology at the University of Brussels, founder and Chairman of the National Centre for Higher Jewish Studies, Brussels, and Hon. President of the International Organization for Social Progress.

*

Figures released by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics in October show that of 196,000 Israelis living abroad, 96,000 have officially declared themselves to have emigrated. More than half are European or American born; one quarter are Israel born. On the last day of 1966 there were 2,344,877 Jews in Israel.

*

The following estimates of the Jewish population of eastern Europe have been made by a study mission of the American Jewish Congress.

	1939	*1946*	*1967*
Bulgaria	45–50,000	45–50,000	6–7,000
Czechoslovakia	360,000	55,000	16,000
Hungary	403,000	200,000	80–90,000
Poland	3,250,000	170–190,000	25–30,000
Rumania	800,000	400,000	90–100,000
Yugoslavia	70–75,000	10,500	6–7,000

BOOK REVIEWS

NORMAN COHN, *Warrant for Genocide. The myth of the Jewish world conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, 303 pp., Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1967, 45*s*.

It would be rash to say that there was now no reason for any further book about the Protocols; but one can, with fair confidence, say that the author has explored and presented all that is necessary to enable the ordinary scholar to understand their significance in propagating the myth of a Jewish world conspiracy, and the fantastic and evil success which they achieved during the Nazi period. In fact, Dr. Cohn admits there is more to be done by pointing out that he has gone no further than 1945, and that he has dealt neither with Stalin's obsession about a Jewish imperialist plot, nor with the post-war use of the Protocols themselves by Nasser and by Nazi fugitives in South America and elsewhere.

The immense importance of this book arises from the mass of material which was available to the author and was digested by him. His wife's knowledge of Russian, the archives of the Wiener Library, the papers and information of Boris Nicolaevsky, and, to a minor extent, material I could supply from the Parkes Library, have all enabled him to cover a far wider range than any of his predecessors. The amazing result is that in less than three hundred pages, lucid and elegant in style, this immense mass of material has been welded into a coherent whole.

Dr. Cohn skilfully builds up his particular picture before he reveals what is going to be his interpretation. The result is that a reader, already familiar with the main lines of the story, falls into a series of traps, I am sure unconsciously provided for him. He reads of the nineteenth-century background and says to himself: 'What, no reference to Gobineau and Treitschke, no analysis of the nature of the new electorates of western and central Europe? What about Toussenel and the economic background? How is it that Pastor Stoecker and Canon Rohling are not even in the Index?'

In the end he is wholly convinced that Dr. Cohn is right. The background of the Nazi story is not racialism or conservative reaction, but the belief that there is a secret world conspiracy behind the visible facts of politics. So it is with Barruel and the conspiratorial explanation of the French revolution, as re-expressed by Goedsche in fiction and Gougenot des Mousseaux in Catholic hysteria, that the story opens. We then pass to the identification of the conspirators with Freemasons or Jews, and so to Rachkovsky and the fabrication of the Protocols. In three concise chapters the story is told how the Protocols 'reach Germany', 'circle the world', and are transformed by Germanic racism into the Nazi myth, with the appalling consequences of genocide.

In his final chapter Dr. Cohn argues—convincingly as far as this reviewer

is concerned—that neither nineteenth-century racism nor nationalism explains the vehemence and extent of the malady of Nazi antisemitism. It goes back to the identification of the Jew as enemy and devil in the Middle Ages. It is 'an answer to deep and enduring unconscious needs'. The Jews, 'as a collectivity, are unconsciously seen both as the "bad" son full of murderous wishes towards the father, and the "bad" father, the potential torturer, castrator, and killer of the son'. It is possible to identify the Jew with both the son and the father; that is his peculiar position; that explains the utterly unreasonable nature of antisemitism of the Nazi type. Because the Jews reject the Christian God, they are the bad sons who are parricides. Because Judaism is the predecessor of Christianity, and the Jews as a people are older than any European, they are the bad father. In drawings the Jews who ritually kill the Christian boy are always elderly bearded figures. On the other hand, the Jews are deicides, that is, parricides. Finally the Jews are, as the Middle Ages proclaimed, the poisoners of the Christian, the non-Jewish, world. And that generates not merely hatred but fear.

Thus Nazi antisemitism is *sui generis*. It has many features that anti-colour or anti-anything else does not have. That is the justification for the Sussex University project of an enquiry into the psychopathology of politics, for which antisemitism will be a central, though not the only, issue to be understood.

JAMES PARKES

C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE, *Social Stratification and the Middle East. An Interpretation*, viii + 84 pp., E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1965, 12 guilders.

This short monographic essay consists of seven chapters: I. Introduction, II. Basic Concepts, III. A Middle Class?, IV. Mass or Proletariat?, V. The Top, VI. A Category Aside (Women), VII. Conclusion; and a select bibliography.

As the title indicates, this is not an essay on social stratification in Middle Eastern countries. It does not attempt to give a description of the social and demographic composition of the different social strata and/or occupational categories, or of the patterns and ratios of intergenerational mobility between them or within them.

To attempt such a study today would be a very difficult task because most of the relevant systematic data of the type that are easily available for the majority of European or American countries simply do not exist with regard to most Middle Eastern countries. Even the basic demographic and social statistics are meagre and not very reliable, and there does not exist any abundance of more detailed researches or surveys, although, probably, more are available than those mentioned in the bibliography.

While Dr. van Nieuwenhuijze uses some of the existing survey or statistical materials, he tends to rely much more on historical and anthropological data. Here also, he does not attempt to cover all of them or to present an overall picture of the historical patterns of stratification in the Middle East. Rather he uses the data in order to illustrate what to him is the major point of his analysis, namely, the inadequacy of many of the basic concepts used in

Western studies of classification—such as upper class, middle class, or proletariat—for the analysis of patterns of stratification in the Middle East.

This major point is explained by the non-existence in these countries of what can be called unified strata with some common consciousness, which embrace, within each broad status category (upper class, middle class, etc.), several different occupational and local groups and relate them to one another in terms of a relatively unified—even if sometimes conflict-ridden —image of society.

He traces this to several basic historical facts, and especially to the relative weakness of different occupational, ethnic, and local groups in relation to the central institutions, to the segregated organization of these groups, and to the strong control of the centre over them.

All these combine, in his words, to present the following picture: 'The overall articulation of Middle Eastern Society, then, in so far as it operates through rating, is not a regular stratification system. Rather it is a complex of convergent diversification according to mutually determining rating of categories and social function (not exclusively manifest in occupation) or role.

'In this complex, one distinguishes top categories (primarily distinct *per se* and secondly different from the broad mass of population) and bottom categories (again, primarily distinct *per se* and secondarily different from all members of society who count for full). A further phenomenon, of secondary nature, are the scattered categories that hold a kind of intermediate (as distinct from middle) position.

'These broad categories occur each in the plural; they are not integrated in such a manner that they could be said to constitute, together, a system of stratification with corresponding mobility patterns.

'The analysis has yielded little to warrant the expectation, often repeated these days, of a development towards regular stratification, in which particularly a budding middle class would play a decisive role. Contrariwise, it appears that the phenomena on the intermediary level are likely, by their very nature, to retain an always fluctuating importance for quite some time to come . . . At no time, however, could one consider them as a middle class, without overstating their real importance and simultaneously misrepresenting the overall complex of which they are part' (p. 77).

It seems to me that on the whole his analysis, although written in rather cumbersome style, is valid and constitutes an important addition to the literature of social stratification and provides some important guide lines for the study of Middle Eastern stratification.

I think that he is correct in his indications that many of the accepted concepts of class are based on Western European and U.S. socio-historical experience—in fact he probably does not go far enough in indicating how much they arise from an experience of a unified political community with a rather strong centre to which different groups and strata have rather autonomous access, and in which they can participate. By implication his analysis calls for a revision of some of our approaches to stratification in general, and calls for a revaluation of political and cultural elements as ingredients in the process of strata formation in particular. He is also correct in warning us against the application to the Middle East of many of the accepted terms in

the study of social stratification, and especially against the too easy use of such terms as 'Middle classes'.

It is to be hoped that Dr. van Nieuwenhuijze, or others, will, by taking off from these general critical starting points, proceed to a more detailed systematic analysis of different systems of stratification in general and of the Middle Eastern systems in particular.

S. N. EISENSTADT

G. E. W. WOLSTENHOLME and MAEVE O'CONNOR, eds., *Immigration—Medical and Social Aspects*, Ciba Foundation Report, xii + 124 pp., J. & A. Churchill, 104, Gloucester Place, London W.1, London, 1966, 15*s*.

RONALD TAFT, *From Stranger to Citizen. A survey of studies of immigrant assimilation in Western Australia*, xiv + 108 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1966, 35*s*.

These are two very different books. Taft's summarizes and assesses the work done from 1952 to 1965 by members of the Department of Psychology in the University of Western Australia on groups of British, Polish, Hungarian, Dutch, and Italian settlers. All projects emphasized the psychological approach and immigrant motivations and strivings, and used complicated statistical techniques, native-Australian control groups, and inter-project comparison. The impressive results show what can be achieved when a team of like-minded colleagues systematically attack a problem on a broad front. In contrast, the CIBA book is disjointed, being the very uneven papers and discussion presented at a conference on coloured immigrants in the U.K., by persons variously trained in psychology, psychiatry, sociology, social work, medicine, education, and journalism.

A major difference is basic information. The W.A. group set out to identify the total ethnic population in an area—by using Census data on birthplace, religion, and nationality, school and housing lists, membership lists of ethnic societies, etc.—and then, by sample survey, to draw conclusions valid for the whole. In contrast, the CIBA papers on more general topics bewailed the lack of statistics, especially of census cross-tabulations by Race and of cross-tabulations of births, deaths, and marriages by Race or Birthplace. To one reared in a country where these have existed for decades it is strange to see scholars vainly seeking precision in a situation where sensitivity to 'colour' or 'invasion of privacy' denies society basic information on crucial social problems. The CIBA papers on more restricted topics were much meatier as they created their own basic information from school lists (the Bradford school survey) or from institutional records on T.B., venereal disease, mental health, etc.

The results of the two books are also very different. The CIBA book suggests problem areas where new administrative procedures may help, that special classes for teaching English to children aged 9 years and over help their smooth absorption into the educational system, that a 25 per cent ceiling on coloured children in one school may quieten the fears of native-born parents, that the higher rate of immigrant T.B. and venereal disease may require more stringent health checks before entry to the U.K., etc.

The W.A. study aims not at solutions but at exposing psychological processes. It suggests that, in the assimilation process, newcomers may pass through various levels of satisfaction, identification, and acculturation, and through various stages ranging from acquisition of new skills, through admission to the societies of the host population, to acceptance of expected roles. The study also shows that Western Australian opinion, including that of newcomers, is against cultural pluralism, only partly in favour of immigrant conformation to the present British-Australian culture, and predominantly in favour of both immigrant and native-born working together towards a new common culture. It is a pity Taft wrote up some of these fascinating matters in such a compressed manner and with so many technical terms; the interested general public would have appreciated something a little more leisurely and less cryptic.

For those interested in Jewish studies Taft's book is undoubtedly valuable and important and the techniques and hypotheses therein set out could be applied with advantage to Jewish minorities. Taft is now doing this in the Melbourne Jewish community and his findings should be most valuable.

CHARLES PRICE

WALTER PREUSS, *The Labour Movement in Israel Past and Present*, 239 pp., Rubin Mass, Jerusalem, 1965, n.p.

ALEX WEINGROD, *Israel: Group Relations in a New Society*, vi + 182 pp., Institute of Race Relations, Pall Mall Press, London, 1965, cloth 21*s*., paperback 8*s*. 6*d*.

JUDAH MATRAS, *Social Change in Israel*, x + 211 pp., Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1965, $6.95.

'A problem every square yard' is how Israelis wryly describe their society. The remark is significant not only because it is true, but because it implies with equal truth that Israeli society recognizes and reacts to its social problems instead of sweeping them under the carpet. It is this energetic reaction, and the ingenuity with which many of the problems are tackled, which give Israel that dynamic and bustling character that makes it so reminiscent of what Athens must have been, as well as making it a living laboratory for the practising social scientist.

The three books under review reflect three different methods of analysing these problems. Dr. Preuss's approach is broadly historical. *The Labour Movement in Israel* is the third edition of a well-known monograph, whose first edition appeared as early as 1926 and was subsequently revised in 1936. The Israeli Labour movement and particularly its institutional expression in the Histadrut is unquestionably central to any understanding of the Jewish State. The 'conquest of the land' by agricultural settlement; the ethic of the dignity of manual labour; the emergence from the Histadrut of the Hagana; and, finally, the remarkable interpenetration and interdependency of Histadrut and Mapai, Israel's governing party—all these indicate how greatly current values and institutions flow from this central stream of Israeli history. In this last edition Dr. Preuss has carried the analysis further by looking at the important extensions of the labour movement, in the co-operatives, in the huge construction firm of Solel Boneh, in the sick fund, and so forth. Of late,

however, the old alignment of Histadrut-Mapai has been in flux. Mapai has split; and it no longer commands an absolute majority in the Histadrut. This has opened a vista of changes which are not all necessarily desirable. The Histadrut-Mapai axis guaranteed a fundamental stability in the State, and the supremacy of a certain ethic, not without its nobility. On the other hand, it produced a certain immobilism: it put a premium on 'age and length of service' as prerequisites of high political office and by the same token discouraged the young lions. Issues of this kind are touched on in the last chapters. In summary: as a preliminary to understanding the present situation this sound and informative account is indispensable.

Alex Weingrod, Professor of Anthropology at Brandeis University, spent five years as Research Director in the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency in Israel. His short and readable book is the best introduction to what he correctly identifies as perhaps the major problem in Israel's social life: the ethnic and cultural diversity of its citizens. Notoriously, Israel is still controlled in all its major social aspects by the 'Westerners', especially those of East European origin. Yet at least one-third of the population are recent immigrants of Middle Eastern and North African origin. Apart from the common link of faith, and common histories of persecution, the Western and the Eastern communities are very dissimilar in family structure, tradition, outlook, and professional skills. It used to be thought that the absorption of the new immigrants would not last longer than a generation—the time it took to educate their children. Experience has shown that it will persist longer than that, for something of a vicious circle is involved. The new immigrants are less well off than the established citizens simply because they are newcomers —this is true of all newly arrived groups; but most of the Orientals are further handicapped by lack of educational and technical skills. They are therefore significantly poorer; this reacts on the children whose home background retards educational achievement, which in turn perpetuates economic and educational inequality. Allied with this is the relative endogamy of the Orientals: the communities tend to stay together but to stand aloof from the others, and the rate of intermarriage between Easterners and Westerners is still relatively low. To a large extent, then, the Orientals form a sub-culture in Israel that looks like persisting for a long time and is, in the meantime, underrepresented economically as well as politically. It is this central problem and its manifestations that Weingrod analyses in an excellent first study.

The topic is also dealt with and further elaborated in Matras's *Social Change in Israel*. As a scientific work this is quite first-class, easily the most accomplished of the three. Its scientific technicality makes it a difficult book to read but whoever persists will be richly rewarded. The sheer technical ingenuity of some of the enquiry compels admiration: for instance, the superb third chapter which manages to establish which social and ethnic groups support each of Israel's numerous parties, and, in the course of so doing, casts a new light on the religious dispute. For Matras is able to prove that although only about 15 per cent vote for the religious parties, about 40 per cent support laws on such matters as Sabbath observance and Kashrut; in short, secular support of the Rabbinate extends quite far and deep in Israeli society. Similar ingenuity characterizes the chapters on the relationship between education, mobility, and the changes in occupational structure; and the last chapter,

which deals with the family, provides a clue to some of the problems which Weingrod has described. It is able to measure, for instance, how far and fast the Orientals shed religious commitments after immigration. It shows that this is far more rapid than one would have supposed, and that intermarriage also is growing at a rate that is likely significantly to affect the seemingly intractable ethnic-cultural cleavages. Altogether this is one of the most revealing books ever written about Israel.

S. E. FINER

HUGO GOLD, *Geschichte der Juden in Wien*, Memorial Volume, viii + 158 pp., Olamenu Publishing House, 7 Frishman Street, Tel Aviv, 1966, $20.00.

The first impression of this book is one of sumptuousness in appearance. On further inspection one notes, however, that the production is far from perfect technically. The many misprints are indicative of a certain slovenliness permeating the whole enterprise. For example, a photograph of the Austrian politician Otto Bauer is followed two pages later by a picture of another Socialist leader also captioned 'Otto Bauer'.

These failings could be regarded as minor blemishes if the text of the book provided a reliable and informative history of Vienna Jewry. This is, however, unfortunately not the case. The work consists mainly of already known material used again without any original interpretation. There are long extracts copied from other sources: names of officers of the community are listed mechanically, without an explanation of their relevance. None of the eminent personalities who played a part in the ranks of Vienna Jewry are brought to life, not even the late Chief Rabbi Zwi Perez Chajes to whose memory the volume is dedicated.

A few examples may show the degree to which the book falls short of elementary requirements. The fact that many Jews left the official community is equated with the assumption that they had forsaken Judaism in order to embrace Christianity. Actually, a considerable fraction of them preferred to remain unattached to any religious grouping. This applied in particular to Jews who found a substitute for religion in Socialism. Anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist tendencies existed within the Austrian Social Democratic Movement, but the Party as a whole was not antisemitic (as the author of the book seems to believe). The Party had a large and loyal following among the Jewish working and middle classes. Exception must also be taken to the allegation that the Mayor, Karl Seitz, had absented himself from a Zionist Congress because 'he had considered it appropriate thus to give expression to his sympathies for the anti-Semitic mob in the streets' (p. 52). Actually, Seitz was a generally respected non-Jew who was frequently subjected to vicious antisemitic attacks.

The volume contains a kind of 'Who's Who' of Vienna Jews all over the world, unreliable as a directory. Many entries refer to persons who cannot be described as Jews from Vienna: others are no longer alive. A striking case in point is that of the late Justice Felix Frankfurter who left Vienna at the age of two, another that of the noted jurist Franz Rudolf Bienenfeld who died several years ago.

This no doubt well-intentioned but unsuccessful attempt at a memorial volume may still serve a useful purpose if it stimulates expert historians and sociologists to combine for a workmanlike study of the history of this once important Jewish community in Central Europe.

F. L. BRASSLOFF

CHARLES HERBERT STEMBER and others, *Jews in the Mind of America*, xiv + 413 pp., Basic Books, New York, 1966, $12.50.
Contributing authors: Robert Gutman, Ben Halpern, John Higham, Morton Keller, Thomas F. O'Dea, Thomas F. Pettigrew, Charles H. Stember, Robin M. Williams, Jr., and Denis H. Wrong.

This most admirable and useful book is a product of the activity of the American Jewish Committee which over thirty years has commissioned opinion polls in the U.S.A. on aspects of antisemitism, and which in 1964 arranged a conference of social scientists and historians to evaluate Mr. Stember's 'Recent History of Public Attitudes' towards Jews and antisemitism in the U.S.A. Here are assembled poll results, essays on American antisemitism, the Contemporary Religious Situation, the Psychology of Prejudice, and a stimulating Introduction by Theodore Solotaroff and Marshall Sklare.

From the polls and the essays a fairly clear picture emerges. The Jew in America has had, historically, to compete with the Roman Catholic as the 'menace' to Americanism so long propagated by the spokesmen of nativist bigotry—and over the years American anti-Catholicism has been the more deep-seated and exploitable hatred. Antisemitism grew in the present century, reaching a high point, as the polls indicate, in 1943–5; and this despite the political coalition of F. D. Roosevelt which brought into national politics for the first time significant numbers of politically minded Jews. The fate of the Jewish millions under Hitler did not bring forth a compensating sympathy for them in America. Two facts may explain this. Firstly most Americans did not know of—or did not believe what they heard about—Hitler's Final Solution. And secondly—and more importantly—for millions of Americans the war against Hitler was Roosevelt's war, not theirs. Theirs was the war to avenge Pearl Harbour. The propaganda of the America First Committee was skilfully managed. It drew upon the sentiments, and the thinking, of many Americans who considered that America *could* and should stay out of Europe's quarrels. F.D.R. could never have taken the U.S.A. into a European war—he could take his country into a World War. Isolation before Pearl Harbour was a perfectly respectable—and most arguable—attitude; and it could be demonstrated that of all groups in America only the Jews had a strong reason for wishing for Hitler's defeat.

Since the 1950s, antisemitism in America has declined most markedly. The reasons for this are not too clear. Overall, important social changes were taking place—which will be mentioned later. But all observers seem to agree that the founding of the State of Israel was an important contribution to this decline: why it was so is not too apparent. To say that America applauds the success of nations rightly struggling to be free and therefore

cheered the Jews, may seem a little naïve. Perhaps the conjunction of real understanding of the Final Solution, the development of the Cold War, and Senator McCarthy's choice of a new scapegoat for America's misfortunes constitute a better explanation. In retrospect, the most astounding thing about the Wisconsin demagogue was that with all the traditional ideological baggage of the small town bigot he did not attack the Jews—or of course the Catholics—but singled out as the weak link in America's security the Eastern, Anglo-Saxon, Ivy League gentlemen—and Cohn and Shine helped him in his weird work. Even the trial of the Rosenbergs did not *increase* suspicion of Jews—though poll informants would pick out, quite frequently, the Jewish names of fictitious 'spies' invented by the pollsters to test the propensity of informants to plump for Jewish names. Social changes, the increasing religiosity of America, white fear of the progress of black Civil Rights agitation, the increasing 'bourgeoisification' of American Jewry have all helped to diminish overt antisemitism in the U.S.A.; while the current vogue for Bellow, Mailer, Malamud *et al.* makes the Jew more acceptable than ever as a neighbour, a colleague, or perhaps even a future spouse. This literary fashion for Jewish writing is the current example of the way in which writers and their publics explore themselves and America—to find the meaning of their lives and of the mores of their country. In the 1920s the national psychiatric couch was located in Chicago and the Mid-West; in the 1930s in the South; then in the 1950s, for a brief period, it was often on the West Coast, or on the road with Kerouac. Now it is in Jewish New York. It is to be hoped that overt antisemitism will now decline to vanishing point. It ought to, for of all the races that have settled in the U.S.A., Jews, by all standards, make the best Americans. Enterprise, hard work, individualism, humour, love of family, a none too rigid belief in God, a devotion to science and learning—Jews have all the virtues needed for goodness and success according to the canons of Americanism. And Jews are following the path of social and technological change. Today young Jews are overwhelmingly professional, academic, scientific, management, and white-collar men. If they are still barred from some W.A.S.P. clubs and firms it is not improbable that such exclusive organizations will become as laughably representative of America as are the Daughters of the American Revolution. Antisemitism is declining; so is Jewishness—and so, demographically, are the Jews. Now some 3 per cent of the population, they will in future be an even smaller percentage. While other Americans have gone over to the 'large economy size', Jews have stuck to the standard size for families.

There are those with long memories who say they have seen it all before in central Europe: Jews accepted in bourgeois circles, becoming ardent German or Austrian patriots, assimilated; but it still did not save them from the holocaust. And there are those who deplore the idea of assimilation *per se*. These matters are not examined in detail by the authors of this volume, for their task was to observe and interpret, not to argue about, the merits of Jewishness in this or any other environment.

A final point which is of great interest to students of American history (and of religious toleration in democracies): America is now publicly far more religious than it was in the days of the Founding Fathers or in the early nineteenth century. When everybody professes to believe in God and most are

at least nominal members of a church, and all are in principle in favour of religious toleration, what can religious controversy—or discussion—be about? Merely which is the 'best buy'? American Jews are not yet out of the woods; they are now well integrated into modern, white, middle-class America. But for a section of American society which has so signally assisted in the encouragement of Negro progress, the pressures of their new white neighbours to slow down, or postpone, Negro integration may require them to make some particularly agonizing personal decisions.

R. H. PEAR

A. TARTAKOWER, *Shivtey Israel* (The Tribes of Israel), in Hebrew, Vol. II, 350 pp., Yavneh Publishing House, Tel Aviv, 1966, n.p.

This volume covers continental Europe. More than in his first volume, which dealt with English-speaking countries (see this *Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, pp. 130–1), the author displays here a great breadth of knowledge. Tartakower marshals much significant detail, without being trapped in irrelevancies, and thus provides the student of social history and sociology with both a source of reference and a comprehensive picture of the variegated backgrounds, social structures, and processes of change in the Jewish communities of Europe.

For presenting his material Tartakower had to choose from several possible frameworks. The one he uses is based on a classification of communities according to the political alignments and characteristics of the countries of Europe. This gives rise to certain odd assortments, such as section 4 where Germany and Austria are lumped together with Spain and Portugal. It is difficult to see deeper political affinities between these countries even though they were dominated by dictatorships in recent decades. But looking diachronically at Spain and Germany one finds the common factor of both having destroyed by ferocious means flourishing Jewish communities in their midst. And the contemporary communities in both are hardly viable. But the same applies to many of the east European communities, in view of which a dichotomy between decaying Jewries and 'developing' communities might have been very useful. The use of the external political framework also relegates Jewish cultural backgrounds to less importance. In this context the Czech Jewish community, which is considered with those of other east European countries, might have fitted better with those of Germany and Austria.

But the author's premise pays off rather well in section 3 where the Jews in the west European democratic countries are considered. Here he argues cogently and displays the evidence skilfully to show that the development of political institutions had a profound effect on the communities in this area. Thus, the existence of equal citizenship in particular, and also the strong pull of mature cultures, such as the French, necessitated no drives to conformity, as for instance those of Russification or the gentler Americanization process, in order to produce a feeling of 'local patriotism' and to intensify assimilation and intermarriage. On the other hand, a serious weakness of the continental democracies, that is, their greater degree of instability when compared with democracy in England, has worked in the opposite direction.

Together with the epochal phenomena of the holocaust and the creation of Israel this has helped to stem the tide of complete assimilation. The question is then posed whether these forces will be sufficient to maintain Jewish identification even though the firmer base of a Jewish culture is almost completely missing. Tartakower concludes on an optimistic note, but one is left with a feeling that his optimism is not based entirely on a hard unemotional appraisal of the future of west European Jewry. It is almost as if he wills these communities to continue their existence.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

EDMUND LEACH, ed., *The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism*, A.S.A. Monograph Series No. 5, xix + 185 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1967, 35*s*.

In June 1964, the Association of Social Anthropologists held a conference to consider the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. Discussions followed a series of papers which have now been brought together in this volume, together with a critical review of *Le cru et le cuit*, a translation of Lévi-Strauss's structural analysis of a myth, *La geste d'Asdiwal*, and an introduction by the conference's chairman, Edmund Leach.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first, Nicholas Mann's translation of the Asdiwal myth precedes and gives additional depth to papers by Mary Douglas, Nur Yalman, and Kenelm Burridge on the structural study of myth. The second part deals with the structural study of totemism in papers by Michael Mendelson, Peter Worsley, and Robin Fox, the latter focusing less on Lévi-Strauss than on Freud, of whose theory of incest a most stimulating re-assessment is made. All the papers are of very high quality; they bring out clearly the issues raised by Lévi-Strauss's thought, whilst at the same time acknowledging the contribution it has already made to anthropology.

The blurb of the book states that the papers are 'designed to provoke controversy rather than to provide information'. Nevertheless, an important body of information is provided. This is not only in the Asdiwal translation (for those who do not read French), but also in the explicit exegesis of Lévi-Strauss such as Mendelson provides for *Le totémisme aujourd'hui*, and Yalman for *Le cru et le cuit*, as well as of course in the comments and criticisms which the authors offer. A short review can only mention two of the points which they raise. One is that the structural analysis of myth leaves out many of the meanings explicit in the myth 'by treating the structural units of the myth as if they were unambiguous' (Douglas, p. 63). Hence, Douglas feels disappointed by the reduction of the myth of Asdiwal into 'anxieties about problems of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage', and suggests other themes present in the myth (p. 59); and Burridge, after analysing a Mambu myth along Lévi-Straussian lines, regrets that the result is only a statement about what Mambu feel about incest, and thinks that the method, when applied to content rather than to form, will yield further statements about Mambu society and thought (p. 109). The other is the feeling, as Leach puts it, that Lévi-Strauss may not be wrong 'but that he somehow gives the impression that the problem is too easy' (p. xii). Worsley, for example, thinks that it is

best to speak of a 'totemic collection' rather than a 'totemic system' for the Wanindiljaugwa aborigines (p. 151); for their totemic compendium cannot be systematized under a binary (or any other) discrimination. This is not because the people of this tribe do not think in this way at all, but because it happens that their totemic classification is not based on this kind of thought, as is for instance their ethnobotanical classification. Rather, the allocation of totems to particular social groups is influenced by unpredictable contingent circumstances, such as rivalries for leadership, or immigration.

As Yalman surmises, Lévi-Strauss's next concern may well be to deal with the above point, by analysing 'the dynamic connexion between the realm of the "superstructure" (myth) and the realm of the "infrastructure" (social organisation, economy, etc.)' (p. 87). In doing so, he would tell us about the relation between the kind of thought which is considered in this book and the kind of thought which has to do with 'more fluid and manipulable matters' (Worsley, p. 156) such as marriage and kinship. Thereby, he would not only carry a step further the fruitful dialogue between British and French anthropologists, of which this book and such articles as that recently published by Audrey Richards (*Man* (N.S.) *2*, 286–99) are examples; he would also permanently change and enrich the subject. That he has already done so is shown by this admirable book, which can be recommended to readers approaching Lévi-Strauss at all levels.

ADRIAN C. MAYER

GORDON ROSE, *Schools for Young Offenders*, International Library of Criminology, Vol. 17, ix + 244 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1967, 52*s*.

Surprisingly little has been written about the English approved school system, despite the fact that there are as many as 120 such schools housing over eight thousand boys and girls. This book provides the first comprehensive account of the structure and administration of the system, and as such it will be welcomed by penologists everywhere. It also offers some hard-hitting yet constructive criticisms of some aspects of the training offered to approved school children, and a very interesting proposal for the future organizational structure of the schools: both of these theses can be expected to arouse lively and fruitful discussions.

The description of the approved school system is generally well and clearly written, though there are some minor flaws—for example, the uninitiated reader would have to reach p. 202 to discover that three home leaves (33 days) *per annum* are normally granted, yet this is a fact of considerable importance in relation to after-care, and gives the lie to some statements on p. 73. In general, though, Dr. Rose seems to excel more at presenting the administrative aspects of the system (e.g., his chapters on staff, control, and finance) than in his account of the regimes of the schools, although here he may simply be the victim of his own unfortunate policy of not naming or describing individual schools. This not only precludes him from discussing special experimental regimes such as that described by Derek Miller in *Changing Concepts of Crime and its Treatment* (Pergamon, 1966, ed. H. J. Klare), but also forces him constantly to generalize, and thus to

make his own narrative sometimes rather dull and flat. Even at a more general level, though, he does not always answer some important questions: for example, how far do the 25 Roman Catholic schools, for long outside the main classification system, have regimes differing from the other schools?

Within these generalized limits, however, Dr. Rose has some very pertinent things to say about the dominant features of the regimes of a good many schools. Too many, he says, are 'obsessed with means to the exclusion of ends; they are content to fill the boy's day with constructive activities in the hope that these will, in some mysterious way, strike a spark in him' (p. 72). Work and sport are not sufficiently regarded as social settings which can be manipulated for gains in diagnosis and personal (as opposed to vocational or 'character') training. There is insufficient individualization—'it appears to be assumed that the right way to deal with the social work side is to have little chats on the football field, during walks, or elsewhere, when the occasion arises, and if nothing else happens to distract attention' (p. 173). At the same time, Dr. Rose shows clearly that he is aware of some of the difficulties of training in an institutional community, and he offers some practical steps towards achievement of the type of regime he regards as desirable, e.g., more regular formal staff consultations, and more decentralization from the headmaster. His remarks in this area are generally penetrating (though they lose some of their force and cohesiveness for being scattered rather randomly throughout the book), but of course it has to be recognized that they need to be tested empirically: penology can no longer rely on *a priori* assumptions, however attractive.

In his final chapter, Dr. Rose essays his own answer to the thorny and topical problem of the future control of the approved schools. He rejects both the Home Office and the local authorities as direct controllers, and so comes out against the 1965 White Paper, which would have merged the senior schools with the borstal system, and handed over the junior and intermediate schools to the local authorities. He puts up a very strong case against local authority control, and reinforces it by his own proposal for greatly strengthened regional organizations within the existing system. However, he does not take sufficient account of the argument on the other side that the approved schools have become too isolated, with a foot in both the educational and penal systems yet largely divorced from the most recent thinking in both. Similarly, he hardly considers the view that it is only sensible to hand over the senior schools to the Home Office since they are for boys and girls who have passed beyond the school-leaving age, and, however much their headmasters may protest to the contrary, are essentially penal and not educational establishments which could, by being added to the borstal system (and all their pupils are within the borstal age-range), increase the flexibility of institutional training for the 15–21s. This view may not be entirely convincing, but surely it cannot simply be dismissed without detailed argument.

It is, indeed, perhaps rather surprising that Dr. Rose, who has made a notable contribution to the research literature on borstals, should offer so few points of comparison of the two systems, for there is much to be gained by such comparison, and much truth too in that hoary examination chestnut: 'Approved schools and borstals are essentially the same; only their histories

explain the differences between them.' It is also arguable that he has paid too little attention to the history of the schools generally, for his brief historical introduction is almost entirely limited to the nineteenth century, yet some of the more recent history (e.g., the Report on the Carlton Disturbances, followed by the 1961 legislation) has had a considerable impact on some features of the system.

Finally, readers of the book are warned that the Index is both rather inadequate in content, and arranged in an odd fashion, with a good many important items appearing only as sub-headings under the major heading 'approved schools'.

A. E. BOTTOMS

JEAN CAZENEUVE, *Bonheur et Civilisation*, Collection Idées, 248 pp., Gallimard, Paris, 1966, n.p.

A stimulating, provoking, disappointing, and enjoyable little book: what is the reviewer to do with it? He could, did space allow, behave as they did in the brave days of *The Edinburgh* and use it as the peg for his own views, his own ethnology and sociology of happiness; or he could—the easiest course—abuse M. Cazeneuve for his rhetoric, his lack of order, his submission to fashion (and saving clauses); or he could praise him for his range, imagination, and the originality of his important, neglected, somehow shocking theme. As I said, the second course is the simplest: consider such a sentence as, 'Il serait sans doute bien excessif de dire que la civilisation phallique traditionelle est éliminée, et que nous sommes à l'aube d'une civilisation clitoridienne.' This is immediately followed by its slightly modified rhetorical expansion and affirmation. There is no real evidence offered. No conclusion follows. One might be tempted to condemn M. Cazeneuve for giving us not *idées*, merely *idées reçues*.

But the third alternative is just. The primary strength of this book is to open an area of investigation too long neglected by the social sciences under the joint, dull reign of scientism and puritanism. How have people conceived happiness, through what dreams, what devices, and under what influences? M. Cazeneuve gives a clear answer in terms of the old Dionysian/Apollonian dichotomy correlated with types of social structure for pre-industrial societies. He is much less happy about modern Europe and America, but even here he has read widely and not all his ideas are banal. On the 'Third World' he is excellent, but far too brief. Admittedly his presentation is muddled and disordered, but, given the vastness and originality of his theme, this is pardonable. I strongly recommend his book. I enormously enjoyed it. I believe it is one of the most stimulating, creative, and interesting contributions to the neglected but growing field—very largly French—of the sociology of culture. Furthermore, it is practically valuable: the reader is forced to examine not only his ideas, but his life in a world of 'secularised leisure'.

DONALD G. MACRAE

WERNER E. MOSSE, ed., with the collaboration of ARNOLD PAUCKER, *Entscheidungsjahr 1932. Zur Judenfrage in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik*, xx + 615 pp., 2nd revised and enlarged edition, Leo Baeck Institute Publication, No. 13, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1966, hardback, DM 43; cloth, DM 48.

This is the second edition of the widely acclaimed symposium on the state of German Jewry just before the Nazi take-over. On the whole the volume deserves the praises lavished on it when it first appeared in 1965. If it seems undeniable that some contributions are both too short and too thin for comfort, others are certainly models of what social and political analysis ought to be. In fact, Professor George Mosse's essay on the German Right is so outstandingly good that, even among several other excellent pieces of work, it cannot be wrong to single it out for special praise. Along with a number of other contributors, Professor Mosse points out that even without the advent of the Third Reich, the position of the Jews in Germany would have deteriorated still further in the 1930s. Indeed one of the main lessons even reasonably well-informed readers may learn from this work is that antisemitism of all kinds had progressed so fast since the First War that the Jews in Germany could be said to have been morally prepared for more difficult times. This does not of course mean that they expected, any more than anyone else, the kind of treatment finally meted out to them by the Nazis, or that they meekly waited for the storm without doing anything about protecting themselves. What this book underlines is that the Weimar Republic was the regime of citizens who on the whole cared nothing for civil liberties and who sought refuge in the wildest forms of mystical mumbojumbo so long as the stark realities of life were thereby hidden from them. It so happened that antisemitism, which had after all been part of the basic credo of romantic nationalists throughout Germany since the nineteenth century, turned out to be the rallying point for an increasing number of its even politically moderate citizens.

The social, economic, and political reasons for these developments are ably analysed by various contributors to this symposium. So are the reactions of the Jews. If many of these analyses remind one of Aristotle's dictum that conclusions of syllogisms need not be new to be valuable but merely need to be proved, it is nevertheless the case that this volume constitutes an impressive piece of scholarship.

HERBERT TINT

CORRESPONDENCE

SIR,

Contrary to what Mr. Percy Cohen says in his review article, 'Israel's Ethnic Problem' [Vol. IX, no. 1], I am not and never have been a trained social anthropologist, nor do I have formal training in any of the social sciences. Mr. Cohen's confusion on this point could easily have been avoided had he been, like all members of his profession surely should be, a regular reader of the journal *Race*. In vol. 8, page 100, Alex Weingrod also reviewed my pamphlet and frankly acknowledged the value of a journalistic treatment of the subject of ethnic tensions in Israel.

In view of Mr. Cohen's strictures on my own scientific methods and abilities, permit me to make the following observations on his own article—whose polemic nature does not seem to me to be in accordance with academic procedures.

On page 105 he writes 'there has been little serious interference with ethnic customs' in Israel. On the following page, however, he states that 'if ethnocentrism has been the price which Israel has paid to preserve democracy, there are many who would agree that it was worth paying'. Not only does the second quote refute the first; it also refutes itself. For I think that not even Mr. Cohen could explain how democracy is compatible with ethnocentrism.

Next, Mr. Cohen maintains that 'there is no absolute congruence of ethnic origin or descent with social class or status'. This is precisely the point I myself made in attempting to demonstrate that ethnic tensions in Israel cannot be explained solely in socio-economic terms but have a cultural basis. Mr. Cohen's doubts as to whether non-Ashkenazi culture could be maintained in the event of its bearers being afforded 'equal opportunity . . . to enter occupations carrying higher prestige and power', is a fairly obviously Darwinistic concept, which posits that non-European cultures are backward and that modernization is synonymous with westernization.

The description which Mr. Cohen attributes to me of the characteristics of non-Ashkenazi culture is in fact, as indicated in my pamphlet, that formulated by Raphael Patai. To that list I had added 'a distinctive literary, musical and aesthetic heritage and material culture'. Mr. Cohen maintains that the Israeli government has long encouraged the 'persistence' of this material culture. At issue is not whether oriental handicrafts can be bought in Israeli tourist shops but whether this culture is to be *incorporated* into the normative cultural apparatus of that country. Such questions as which characteristics of that culture would be preserved and who would decide on this selection, again betray Mr. Cohen's misunderstandings of cultural growth. What I have all along pleaded for (and in this I surely have the support of enlightened social scientists throughout the world) is the creation of a situation in which the Middle Eastern Jews of Israel could adapt themselves to modern circumstances while preserving whatever of their own traditional identity is compatible with those circumstances, in an organic, evolutionary, and liberal

manner: and not by fiat of a government committee comprising, as all Israeli government committees seem to comprise, a majority of east European Jews.

Mr. Cohen states that 'the existence of an ethnic problem in Israel is scarcely denied by any informed person' (p. 100). His quotation from Joseph Bentwich's book in itself suggests the opposite. Mr. Bentwich is a senior official in Israel's Ministry of Education and Culture. There are many other prominent Israeli figures among those who have told me that, in that immortal phrase, *ain bayah*—there is no problem; though they will usually qualify this by referring to the need of bringing 'them' up to 'our' level.

Permit one final correction, if you would, of Mr. Cohen's article. He states that I think that 'the moral revolution of our time was made by Ruth Benedict and Lévi-Strauss'. I have never said, and do not think, that there has been a moral revolution, an opinion which Mr. Cohen's article does much to confirm.

Yours faithfully,
MICHAEL SELZER

Dr. Cohen replies:

I apologize to Mr. Selzer for my erroneous statement that he was trained in social anthropology, but I am pleased to know that I was wrong. I do not, however, apologize for the 'polemical nature' of my review article. Why is this not in accordance with academic procedures? Are academics not permitted the luxury of polemic? I happen to think my polemical position the right one. Anyone is free to challenge it. Mr. Selzer argued a case and I set out to show why I thought him quite wrong.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Ackerman, Nathan W., *Treating the Troubled Family*, xii + 306 pp., Basic Books, New York and London, 1966, 40*s*.

Berger, Graenum, *Graenum Berger speaks on the Jewish Community Center. A Fourth Force in American Jewish Life*, 343 pp., Jewish Education Committee of New York, 426, West 58th Street, New York, 1966, n.p.

Berger, Graenum, *Critical Factors in a Consideration of the Role of Jewish Communal Services in Strengthening Jewish Identification—A World Wide View*, iv + 60 pp., mimeo., New York, 1967, n.p.

Donleavy, J. P., *Meet My Maker the Mad Molecule*, 170 pp., Penguin Books, London, 1967, 3*s*. 6*d*.

Donleavy, J. P., *The Saddest Summer of Samuel S*, 125 pp., Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1966, 18*s*.

Elton, Sam, *A New Model of the Solar System*, viii + 216 pp., Philosophical Library, New York, 1966, $3.50.

Ered, E. *et al.*, eds., *Israel at War, June 5–10, 1967, A Pictorial Record*, Vallentine, Mitchell, London, 1967, 30*s*.

Fraenkel, Josef, *The Jewish Press of the World*, 116 pp., Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress, London, 1967, 10*s*. 6*d*.

Fraenkel, Josef, *Nahum Goldmann*, 47 pp., Biblioteca Popular Judia, No. XI, Grandes Figuras del Judaismo, South American Executive of the World Jewish Congress, Buenos Aires, 1967, n.p.

Friedmann, Georges, *The End of the Jewish People?* trans. Eric Mosbacher, 300 pp., Hutchinson, London, 1967, 45*s*.

Glikson, Paul, and Ketko, Shlomo, eds., *Jewish Communal Service. Preliminary Survey of Jewish Communal Organizations and Services in Selected Areas: Israel, North America, Latin America, Western Europe, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand*, vi + 149 pp., prepared for The International Conference of Jewish Communal Service, Jerusalem, 1967, n.p.

Gottschalk, Alfred, *Your Future as a Rabbi—A Calling that Counts*, 127 pp., Richards Rosen Press, New York, 1967, $4.00.

Halevi, H. S., and Cochavy, Z., *A Survey of Ambulatory Facilities for Mental Cases in Israel*, vi + 37 pp., State of Israel, Ministry of Health (Unit for Medical Economics and Statistics), Jerusalem, March 1967, n.p.

Herz, Israel, *It is time to negotiate. Discussions with the Left on the Middle East Crisis*, 16 pp., Mapam, 37, Broadhurst Gardens, N.W.6, London, 1967, 1*s*. 6*d*.

Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Sprinzak Division, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Study Circle on Diaspora Jewry in the home of the President of Israel). A set of six booklets comprising: R. Bachi, *The Demographic Situation of World Jewry and Research Methods* (in Hebrew), No. 1, 32 pp., 1966, n.p.; Benjamin Akzin, *The Political Status of Diaspora Jewry* (in Hebrew), No. 2, 39 pp., 1966, n.p.; Jacob Robinson, *Disintegration or Continuity in Community Councils in the Nazi period* (in Hebrew), No. 3, 39 pp., 1966, n.p.; Nathan Rotenstreich, *'Galut' in Contemporary American Jewish Thought*, Nos. 4/5, 70 pp., 1966, n.p.; Julius Gould, *Changing Patterns in British Society: their Impact on the Jewish Community*, No. 6, 39 pp., 1967, n.p.; Shulamith S. Nardi, *Literature as Commentary on Modern Anglo-American Jewish Life*, No. 7, 31 pp., 1967, n.p.

Johnpoll, Bernard K., *The Politics of Futility. The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, 1917–1943*, xxii + 298 pp., Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1967, $8.75.

Landmann, Salcia, *Die Juden als Rasse. Das Volk unter den Völkern*, 322 pp., Walter-Verlag, Olten, Switzerland, 1967, n.p.

Lewin, Kurt, *Field Theory in Social Science, Selected Theoretical Papers*, Darwin Cartwright, ed., xx + 346 pp., Social Science Paperbacks in association with Tavistock Publications, London, 1967, 21*s*.

Loewie, Robert H., *Culture and Ethnology*, with a new introduction by Fred Eggan, xiv + 189 pp., 'Classics in Anthropology' series, Basic Books, New York and London, 1966, cloth 40*s*., paperback 17*s*. 6*d*.

Mason, Philip, ed., *India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity, A Symposium*, xi + 311 pp., published for the Institute of Race Relations by Oxford University Press, London, 1967, 55*s*.

Meyer, Michael A., *The Origins of The Modern Jew. Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germany, 1749–1824*, 250 pp., Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1967, $8.50.

Mindlin, Murray, and Bermant, Chaim, eds., *Explorations, an annual on Jewish Themes*, xiii + 305 pp., Barrie & Rockliff (in association with The Institute of Contemporary History and Wiener Library), London, 1967, 35*s*.

Nisbet, Robert A., *The Sociological Tradition*, xiii + 349 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1967, 35*s*.

Philipson, David, *The Reform Movement in Judaism* (a reissue of the New and Revised Edition with an Introduction by Solomon B. Freehof), xxi + 503 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1967, $12.50.

Pradhan, M. C., *The Political System of the Jats of Northern India*, xvi + 275 pp., Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1966, Rs. 25; 37*s*. 6*d*.

Radin, Paul, *The Method and Theory of Ethnology, An Essay in Criticism*, with a new introduction by Arthur J. Vidich, cxx + 279 pp., 'Classics in Anthropology' series, Basic Books, New York and London, 1966, cloth 50*s*., paperback 24*s*.

Rose, Maurice, ed., *The Reconstruction of European Jewish Life and The Conference of European Rabbis*, 123 pp., published by The Standing Committee, May 1967, n.p.

Rose, Peter I., ed., *The Study of Society, An Integrated Anthology*, xii + 959 pp., Random House, New York, 1967, n.p.

Selzer, Michael, *The Aryanization of the Jewish State*, 126 pp., Black Star Publishing Company, New York, 1967, $5.00.

Simon, Ulrich E., *A Theology of Auschwitz*, 160 pp., Victor Gollancz, London, 1967, 25*s*.

Spinoza, Baruch, *Letters to Friend and Foe*, edited and with a preface by Dagobert D. Runes, 109 pp., Philosophical Library, New York, 1966, $3.75.

Steiner, Jean-François, *Treblinka*, preface by Simone de Beauvoir, xiii + 336 pp., Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 36*s*.

Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, *Tel Aviv-Yafo Population (1961–1965)*, xxxii + 56 pp., Department of Research and Statistics, Special Survey No. 23, June 1967, n.p.

Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, *Road Accidents in Tel Aviv-Yafo 1961–1966*, Department of Research and Statistics, Special Survey No. 26, xxvi + 50 pp., September 1967, n.p.

Weinberg, Ian, *The English Public Schools, The Sociology of Elite Education*, xxiv + 225 pp., Atherton Press, New York, 1967, cloth 50*s*., paper 24*s*.

Wolfgang, Marvin E. and Ferracuti, Franco, *The Subculture of Violence. Towards an Integrated Theory in Criminology*, xxiii + 387 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1967, 63*s*., paperback 30*s*.

Youth Service Development Council, Report of a Committee of the, *Immigrants and the Youth Service*, viii + 95 pp., H.M.S.O., London, 1967, 8*s*.

Zlotover, Melisande, ed., *Zlotover Story, A Dublin Story with a Difference*, 96 pp., 34 Rathgar Rd., Dublin 6, 1966, £1 1*s*.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

GOLDBERG, Harvey Ellis; Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Iowa. Formerly, Research Assistant and Teaching Fellow, Harvard University. Chief publications: 'FBD Marriage and Demography among Tripolitanian Jews in Israel', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Summer. Currently engaged in culture and personality research among ethnic minorities in Iowa.

KATZ, Jacob; Ph.D., Professor of Social History, Pro-Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Chief publications: *Tradition and Crisis, Jewish Society at the end of the Middle Ages*, Bialik Institute, Jerusalem, 1958; *Between Jews and Gentiles*, Bialik Institute, Jerusalem, 1960; *Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times*, Scripta Judaica III, Oxford, 1961; *Relations Between Freemasons and Jews*, in press.

LANDES, Ruth; Ph.D., M.S.W., Professor of Anthropology, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. Formerly, Professor of Anthropology at Claremont Graduate School (Calif.), University of Southern California, Tulane University, University of Kansas, and Columbia University. National Representative, Pres. Roosevelt's Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), Washington, D.C., 1941–5. Chief publications: *Culture in American Education*, New York, 1965; *The City of Women*, New York, 1947 (and Portuguese translation, Brazil, 1967); *The Ojibwa Woman*, New York, 1938; *Ojibwa Sociology*, New York, 1937; *Ojibwa Midewiwin*, Madison, Wis., 1967; 'Biracialism in American Society: A Comparative View', *Amer. Anthropologist*, Vol. 57, No. 6, 1955 (reprinted in Chilcott, Greenberg, and Wilson, eds., *Readings in the Socio-Cultural Foundations of Education*, Belmont, Calif., 1965); with M. Zborowski, 'Hypotheses Concerning the Eastern European Jewish Family', *Psychiatry*, Vol. 13, 1950. Currently engaged in research on minority status sub-cultures and education.

LIEBMAN, Charles S.; Ph.D., Associate Professor, Yeshiva University; formerly (1960–3) Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania. Chief publications: *Suburban Differences and Metropolitan Policies*, Philadelphia, 1965; 'Orthodoxy in American Jewish Life', *American Jewish Year Book 1965*, Philadelphia, 1965; 'Changing Social Characteristics of Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews', *Sociological Analysis*, Vol. 27, Winter 1966; 'Left and Right in American Orthodoxy', *Judaism*, Vol. 5, Winter 1966. At present engaged in a study of Jewish political liberalism, and preparing a contribution for the 1968 *American Jewish Year Book* on 'The Training of American Rabbis'.

MINKOVITZ, Moshe; M.A., Research Fellow at Manchester University (Dept. of Social Anthropology and Sociology) and Lecturer at Tel Aviv University (Dept. of Sociology). Formerly, Rural Sociologist in the

Land Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. Chief publications: 'The Adjustment of the Extended Family to the Moshav', *Megamot*, Vol. XII, No. 3, March 1963 (in Hebrew, English summary); co-author, 'The Absorption of the Second Generation in Immigrants' Moshavim', *Megamot*, Vol. XII, No. 4, September 1963 (in Hebrew, English summary); 'Report on the Social Structure of the Ghazvin Area', in *The Ghazvin Area Development Project, Reconnaissance Report*, Vol. II, Tahal (Water Planning), Tel Aviv, July 1963; *From Lineage to Association: Family Organizations in the Process of Adjustment to the Moshav*, to be published by The Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Hebrew with English summary. Currently engaged in fieldwork in a community of immigrants from Morocco.

PRAIS, S. J.; M. Com., Ph.D., Consultant to the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews. Formerly, Economist, International Monetary Fund; Adviser to the Government of Israel on economic statistics; Assistant Lecturer in the University of Cambridge. Chief publications: (co-author) *The Analysis of Family Budgets*, Cambridge, 1955; 'Measuring Social Mobility', *J. Roy. Statist. Soc.*, 1955; 'The Measurement of Changes in the Cost of Living', *J.R.S.S.*, 1958; Contributor to Tew and Henderson, eds., *Studies in Company Finance*, Cambridge, 1959; 'A Note on Standardized Mortality Rates for some Jewish Communities', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IX, No. 1, June 1967.

SCHMOOL, Marlena; B.Soc.Sc. (E.P.S.), Research Officer, Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London. Currently engaged in a survey of the size and social structure of Anglo-Jewry and in statistical surveys of various aspects of Anglo-Jewish life.

TAFT, Ronald; M.A., Ph.D., Reader in Psychology in the University of Melbourne. Among his publications are: 'A Psychological Model for the Study of Social Assimilation', *Human Relations*, 10, 1957; 'Dutch, Polish and Hungarian Immigrants in W.A.' in C. A. Price, ed., *The Study of Immigrants in Australia*, Canberra, 1960; 'The Myth and Migrants' in P. Coleman, ed., *Australian Civilization*, Melbourne, 1962; *From Stranger to Citizen*, Univ. of Western Australia Press, 1965.