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BOOKS REVIEWED

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AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL NOTIONS OF AMERICAN JEWS: CONVERGENCES AND CONTRADICTIONS

Daniel J. Elazar

Introduction

ACCOMPANYING the revival of Jewish political life in the past two centuries there has been a growing concern among Jewish scholars and laymen alike with the relationships of Jews as individuals and of Jewish communities to political matters. To date, much of this concern has been with the manner in which Jews have acquired political rights as individuals in their various countries of residence and as a community in the land of Israel. Secondarily, there has been a concern among Jews with questions of ideology, particularly with the ideologies of the Left.[1]

With the virtual conclusion of the struggle for political rights and the decline in importance of nineteenth-century ideologies since the Second World War, new problems present themselves for consideration, among them the relationships between the political attitudes and behaviour of Jews and those of their fellow citizens in the various countries of the Diaspora and the connexions between Jews living in different countries with differing political patterns. These new questions are closely related to the larger study of political culture which has begun to concern political scientists in general and which should interest students of contemporary Jewry as well.[2] This article represents an attempt to explore some of these new questions concerning the Jews and politics in order to begin the examination of the problem of political culture within the world Jewish community.

The immediate question posed here is related to a larger underlying theme, a problem of great significance for the study of contemporary Jewry—and for the determination of the character of world Jewry in the future. Given the integration of Jews as individual citizens into their respective countries of residence and their loss of any separate political or corporate status as members of a separate community, is there

anything markedly distinctive about their political ideas or attitudes to distinguish them from their fellow non-Jewish citizens and unite them with other Jews elsewhere regardless of citizenship? If there are such ideas or attitudes, what produces or has produced them? Is their origin distinctively Jewish in any way or do they stem from other sources? Do they relate in any way to the classical Jewish political ideas found in the Bible and the Talmud? Indeed, are there such things as 'distinctively Jewish' political ideas or attitudes, or, at the very least, political ideas and attitudes with a distinctively close relationship to the Jewish world view? Can any distinctively Jewish political ideas or attitudes be maintained in an environment that is not Jewish, where there are no significant Jewish political institutions affecting the general Jewish population? And, one might add conversely, are such ideas or attitudes maintained even when there is a Jewish environment and Jewish political institutions?

These questions are not easy ones to answer. They pose serious problems for the investigator, problems of temporal change over millennia and problems of 'national character', to mention only two of the most difficult ones. This article will hardly do more than raise these questions and outline the manner in which they manifest themselves in one situation, and in a preliminary way. The effort is made with incomplete —even inadequate—data simply in order to begin the study.

The American case is the 'hard case' when it comes to trying to answer any of the above questions. The Jews are, in all probability, better and more completely integrated into American society and political life than in any other diaspora country, now or in the past. Moreover, American political theory draws more heavily upon classical Jewish sources than that of any other nation (perhaps including Israel), and American values and aspirations generally coincide with Jewish ones in significant ways.[3] If any positive answers to the questions can be discovered in the American case, we may believe that there are good grounds for discovering positive ones in other cases as well.

This article will concentrate on the exploration of those political notions common to American Jews and their relationship to the classical political ideas of the United States. The exploration here is necessarily quite limited, not only for lack of space and data, but also because any full explanation would be dependent upon a number of questions of first importance relating to the study of society and Jewish history that are not even stated here.

Before beginning the analysis, we need to understand several of its limitations.

(1) Unless otherwise indicated, the American Jews referred to in this article are those who have come to the United States since 1881 from eastern Europe, and their descendants. The Jews of this group form the bulk (over 80 per cent) of the American Jewish community.[4] Conse-

quently, their attitudes dominate American Jewish life. This is not to minimize the degree to which the earlier waves of Jewish immigration (the Sephardi-western European and German-central European elements) and their descendants have shared the same ideas or contributed to American Jewish life. In fact, the most notable Jewish contributions to American public affairs have been made by the descendants of those earlier waves but, with few exceptions, the contributions were made by individuals whose impact on the ideas of American Jewry came as a consequence of their public recognition but who themselves reflected ideas acquired from a predominantly non-Jewish environment. There will be specific reference to these earlier immigrants where their influence has been relevant.

(2) Furthermore, this study considers American Jewry in the aggregate, disregarding the obvious differences that can be found among them. Consequently, the discussion of American Jewish political notions is couched in the most general terms. No significant effort is made to draw lines of distinction between the notions of different Jews or Jewish groups. Limitations of space demand this approach, and lack of sufficient data as to the nature of the difference reinforces it. Of course, generalization at the level presented here is inevitably over-simplification. Moreover, generalizations of the type presented here tend to lead to questions of 'national character' always difficult to resolve by empirical study.

(3) The discussion of American political ideas is similarly couched in the most general terms. It represents an effort to present the basic or mainstream political ideas shared most widely by the American people and is based on my continuous study of these ideas over the past decade in an effort to extract those basic to the American political system.[5] Except where specified, the discussion here ignores the nuances of change in those ideas over time. Unless qualified, the reference to 'American political ideas' is invariably to the classic ideas of the American political tradition formulated and expressed in the first century of American independence. Twentieth-century modifications of these ideas are specified within the body of the paper where necessary.

(4) The summary statement of classical Jewish political ideas is also presented here in general terms without corroborating evidence, for lack of space. It represents my present assessment of the political ideas expressed explicitly and implicitly in the Bible and the Talmud as developed through a preliminary (and continuing) exploration of the basic Jewish texts for their political implications.[6]

(5) 'Political ideas', in the sense used here, refers primarily to conceptions of the political process and secondarily to the purposes of politics. Thus we shall be less concerned with abstract conceptions of social justice than with notions about the best political order for the achievement of justice.

I

The thesis presented here is a simple one. Though classical American political thought owes much to classical Jewish political ideas, the most that can be said of the great majority of the Jewish immigrants (who came to America with little political knowledge or concern) is that their Jewish heritage predisposed them to be perhaps tangentially receptive to the fundamental American political ideas. Moreover, those politically conscious Jews who came with formed political ideas espoused notions substantially different from those either of the United States or of classical Judaism, based as they were on continental notions of elitist democracy and socialism. Finally, such political ideas as were brought from Europe by Jews of all persuasions and levels of political interest had been developed in response to the political experiences of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly those produced by the French Revolution; experiences which ran in paths quite different from those of America. Consequently, the immigrant Jews and their descendants have had to adapt themselves to American political ideas, either as a matter of desire or simply out of necessity. That process of adaptation is still going on. Its successful completion may have the paradoxical effect of bringing American Jews closer to classical Jewish political ideas (albeit unknowingly) than at any time in the past seventeen centuries while, at the same time, breaking down previously shared political attitudes that have linked Jewries in the United States and in other countries in a common frame of reference.

Classical American political ideas are derived in part from the liberal 'natural right' tradition developed as part of the scientific revolution that ushered in the modern age in the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment that gave the modern age its intellectual tone in the eighteenth.[7] They are derived to an equal or greater extent from the English and American interpretations of Biblical (or, in their terms, Old Testament) political ideas, particularly those of the Torah and the Former Prophets, in the same centuries.[8] Both streams came together in the formation of the United States. The former was dominant among the new nation's intellectuals of the squirarchy and the liberal professions, particularly in the middle states and the South, and the latter was dominant among the nation's intellectuals of the church and the academy, particularly in New England and the West; but both were shared to some degree by all elements involved in the development of America from the Revolutionary era until the Civil War.

For our purposes, we may identify four key idea complexes that have shaped American politics.

(1) *Tradition (as opposed to Ideology)*. This is the sense that there exists an American tradition supported by a general consensus of all Ameri-

cans within which American politics is conducted. It is to this tradition, rather than to any ideology (or ideologies), that Americans turn to justify current political interests or notions, even though crypto-ideologies may exist on the American scene from time to time. In practical terms, this reliance on tradition allows Americans to be pragmatic in their approach to specific political problems, at least up to the boundaries of the tradition itself. It also discourages the advance formulation of grand programmes.[9]

(2) *Agrarianism* (*as opposed to Urbanity*). American political values look to the vision of a commonwealth that supports and encourages the agrarian virtues of individual self-reliance and family solidarity within the framework of a co-operative community and the agrarian ideals of classlessness (or minimal class distinctions), religiosity, and ownership of private property by those somehow involved in its use. Qualities of urbanity, sophistication, and cosmopolitanism (despite their undeniable attractiveness) have been rendered secondary to the agrarian virtues where the American public has consciously faced crucial choices over the years. In practical political terms, this has meant that Americans have preferred to keep the role of government as limited as possible but as active as necessary in any given age to maximize the possibilities of individual freedom, opportunity, and choice, and to help maintain life styles that reflect agrarian values.[10]

(3) *Federalism* (*as opposed to Centralism*). Federalism is the fundamental principle governing the structure and process of government in the United States. The federal idea of individuals and communities linked by a constitution or covenant under the rule of law in such a way that each member of the covenanting community retains his (or its) ultimate integrity and a measure of power under the covenant law, with its consequent political implications of power dispersed among many centres rather than concentrated (even theoretically) in one, is a principle which has been maintained in the face of many pressures over the years. In practical applications of this principle, Americans have sought to maximize local control where government has had to act, within the framework of national consensus, and to maintain a separation of powers between the federal government, the states, and the local governments, even as all these separate centres of power are expected to co-operate with one another in partnership.[11]

(4) *Messianism* (*as opposed to Fatalism*). American politics is animated by a messianic vision of the meaning of America and of the role the United States is destined to play in the improvement of humanity. This messianism is based on the notion that Americans have their own covenant with the Almighty to do good works. It stresses the unique character of America and its institutions, but it also encourages Americans to take an optimistic attitude regarding the possibilities for significant improvement in mankind as a whole. Thus it is politically incumbent

upon Americans to use politics for such improvements at home and abroad as appear to be possible at any given time.[12]

These four elements have their roots, wholly or in part, in the political ideas of the Bible. The ancient Israelite tribal confederacy was bound together by the unique tradition of Sinai and the covenant which demanded that the Jews maintain a civil society based on agrarian virtues in order to serve as witnesses to the ultimate achievement of a messianic order of world-wide scope.[13] The Jews who came to the United States were not only unacquainted with the non-Biblical sources of the American political tradition but, despite the infusion into their lives of Biblically-rooted values, were further removed from a political understanding of the Bible than their non-Jewish hosts whose school civics texts until recently cited Biblical sources to justify fundamental American political ideas.[14]

II

Because of the circumstances of Jewish life in Europe, the overwhelming majority of the Jews arriving in America came from highly apolitical backgrounds; and nowhere were they more apolitical than in eastern Europe. In no country in Europe had the Jews had a share in the government, either because they were excluded as Jews or simply because they came from countries where only the inner circle of the aristocracy participated in politics. However, most of the Jewish immigrants from western and central Europe came after their countries of origin had felt something of the impact of modern republicanism. Eastern European Jews did not have even that experience. While their communities had a substantial measure of internal autonomy, by the nineteenth century Jewish self-government had become little more than the narrow legal construction of the Codes by rabbinical authorities or had degenerated into a form of oligarchic rule in which the rabbis and the rich shared power.[15] In the wake of the European revolutionary eruptions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, some Jews had managed to acquire a limited political education—limited in the sense that it was primarily revolutionary, concerned with tearing down old regimes, but extraordinarily naïve about the problems of erecting new ones or maintaining a post-revolutionary political order. Most of their brethren, however, had to acquire political knowledge along with political experience after arriving in the United States.

Since the French Revolution (and its subsequent 'heirs') gave most Jews their first opportunity to participate in politics after some seventeen centuries of exile from the political realm, the Jews became and remained partisans of that revolution, persisting in their partisanship to our own day.[16] When the Jews began their great migration to the United States at the end of the nineteenth century, they brought modi-

fications of European revolutionary ideas with them in various guises (ranging from Jacobin liberalism to Marxism). While the American experience softened most of the more radical expressions of those ideas, they remained a strong influence even among many of the more assimilated and prosperous Jews.[17]

If the idea complexes behind the political notions of the Jewish immigrants were to be fitted into a four-point framework analogous to that set forth above for their American counterparts, one might find that over the years tradition had been abandoned as a source of political ideas and replaced by ideology, particularly the ideologies of the left. The agrarian virtues and ideas had been replaced by a kind of urban liberalism based, on one hand, on the great socio-economic differences between groups and, on the other, on an elimination of political distinctions between individuals. In place of federal notions, expecting the diffusion of power among many centres in civil society, there was a general expectation that government, good or bad, would necessarily be monarchical, at least in the original Greek sense of centring attention on a single head of state as the primary political decision-maker, perhaps within some constitutional framework. This notion persisted even among the revolutionaries. Finally, though the messianic idea had persisted among the immigrants, it was completely secularized and redirected to this-worldly economic advancement (individual or collective), even losing the political elements of the older, religiously-inspired vision.[18]

Important manifestations of these idea complexes can be seen reflected in the political ideas of subsequent generations of American Jews.[18] Normally quite sophisticated in worldly matters, even those highly attuned to questions of political ideology have retained a curious lack of sophistication in matters of political organization, structure, and policy. In practical terms, this has meant that the Jews have reacted to the institutions of government, the forces of politics, and the development of issues in ways different from those characteristic of the American people as a whole.

In the beginning, relatively few Jews understood the structure of the American federal system—something which requires a certain amount of political sophistication—and even today relatively few appreciate it on its own terms. Since an understanding of the system has required some sense of local (meaning, in this case, state) involvement as well as national concern, this may be partly accounted for by the Jews' lack of attachment to particular states, even where they have developed ties to certain large cities.[19] More significantly, the immediate past experiences of the Jewish people did not prepare them to appreciate the subtleties of a political system based on the diffusion of power among several centres and placing maximum emphasis on local control.

In the first place, Jews have been used to focusing attention on the

single political leader, be he benevolent or malevolent, as the source of all significant political decisions, because in the Old World their communities existed on the sufferance of, and were beholden to, king or emperor.[20] Coming to the United States, they transferred this attention to the President. Thus *siddurim* published in the United States by Jews of east European ancestry merely substitute a prayer for the President and Vice-President while completely ignoring such important elements of American Government as the Congress or the States which, strictly speaking, should receive equal mention in such prayers.[21] Coming to America, they and their descendants have persisted in looking to the national government as the source of all good.

The founders of the United States sought to strengthen the liberties and political rights of all individuals through a system of limited, locally-centred government whose scope of activity was hedged in by a federal system designed to keep power diffused among a number of centres. The pattern is still considered to be the ideal one by most Americans. Even as subsequent generations have modified that pattern in substance, they have sought (with considerable success) to preserve its spirit.[22] The Jews of Europe, on the other hand, found locally-centred government rooted in the communitarian values of the *ancien régime* a barrier to their enfranchisement as citizens because it reflected the quasi-feudalism of pre-revolutionary days. They supported the French Revolution's assault upon those institutions in the name of collectivism and centralized government based on Jacobin notions of democratic consent via the 'general will' rather than via influence from many local sources.[23]

Government, to most American Jews, has tended to be a matter of law and law enforcement rather than politics. Nowhere is this more evident than in the characteristic channelling of active Jewish political participation through the courts. As a community, American Jewry has left its mark on American government in the courtrooms rather than the legislatures or the bureaucracies. The great figures of Jewish origin in American politics have tended to be jurists more often than not. Moreover, Jewish organizations with American political missions, such as the American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League, have conducted the greater share of their political activities in the courts. While the nature of the issues which interest them is influential in directing them to the courts, the tendency to literalness in viewing the law also leads them to reject political solutions with their built-in demands for compromise based on broad interpretation of the statutes and constitutions.[24] Lying behind these phenomena is a conception of politics-as-law no doubt traceable to the character of Jewish self-government in Europe, where the notion that men could make laws through the political process was unknown. Law came from God and Torah and such changes in the law as were made came from quasi-

judicial proceedings dominated by rabbinical judges who claimed to be no more than interpreters of the law.[25] Mainstream American notions, on the other hand, have always held law to be a matter of legislation. Even the Constitution, whatever its ultimate connexion with 'higher law', is viewed as a humanly willed document subject to change through the legislative process. Hence politics is of the essence even under a highly law-oriented system.[26]

Finally, the Jewish immigrants, with their strong penchant for the left, included among their number a considerable leavening of people seeking radical changes in the established order. Unlike most American reformers, they did not start with the view that the political system in which they were located was basically good and that the changes required revolved around a restoration of the proper balance of power within it.[27] While the socialists, anarchists, and communists of various shades remained a minority among the immigrants, they did much to set the political tone in the new Jewish communities. They edited the Yiddish periodicals, dominated the speakers' platforms, and organized the first Jewish-dominated political action groups.[28] As part of this sympathy for those interested in radically changing the world, American Jews have had a penchant for messianic internationalism not only working for greater American involvement in world affairs, but often seeming to place greater faith in such international organizations as the United Nations than in the representative institutions of the United States.[29]

In several ways, the political notions brought from abroad were strengthened by the experiences of the new immigrants and the political interests generated thereby. The first and foremost political interest of the Jews was to become fully accepted as members of the American body politic.[30] In spite of the bias towards equal acceptance within the American political tradition, the Jews, like other immigrant groups outside the Anglo-Saxon or Nordic cultures, encountered some immediate hostility, usually in the form of social and economic discrimination. Thus the Jews had to engage in a struggle for acceptance which, though it was child's play as compared to the European experience, served nevertheless to reinforce European political notions. Even in America, the liberals and the left had the most appeal for the new immigrants and offered them the greatest degree of acceptance; so the Jews, like the others, went left or stayed with the liberals. Then, too, the first direct and continuing contacts between the Jews and government came over questions of church-state relations. At least at the local level, American governments were concerned with questions of social morality in the Biblical spirit, though with an obviously Christian orientation. Sunday 'blue laws' seemed to prevent Jews from making a livelihood while observing their Sabbath; public schools where Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer were common inflicted Christian beliefs

on Jewish children; radical prohibitionists among the Protestant fundamentalists threatened the Jewish ceremonial use of wine. In response to these challenges, the Jews adopted a militant secularist position also akin to that embraced by the European left, and began a battle (which still continues) for removal of those 'offensive' signs of their minority status.[31] Thus the Jews were to be found in the paradoxical position of opposing essentially Jewish ideas as to the religious purposes of civil society in order to attain equal rights as individuals.

The way in which all these factors made their appearance (or the way in which the appearance was perceived) tended to persuade Jews to turn to the federal government for relief, encouraging a version of the European notion that centralization equals democracy. While, in actuality, the non-centralized character of American politics aided the Jews by increasing the value of their votes in key states such as New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, the Jews saw national figures—invariably presidents such as the two Roosevelts, Wilson, and Truman—as their champions. They accepted state and local political rewards as their due and coveted national political recognition; then transferred their sympathies to the national government without appreciating that it was their local strength that qualified them for consideration in national councils.[32] Moreover, in church-state questions, the possibility of successfully appealing to the United States Supreme Court had an important impact on Jewish attitudes. The Court, which had the additional attraction of being a place where politicking was carried on through the law in a manner familiar to the Jews from their own European experiences and one which they were able to master from the start, has responded favourably to most of the Jews' secularizing demands, thus reinforcing the notion that the federal government is more friendly to 'democracy' (as the Jews define it) and that law is preferable to politics as a means of gaining democratic goals.

Finally, the fact that most Jews were first exposed to local politics in its worst form in the United States—in the big cities dominated by the crudest forms of city bossism—also turned them towards Washington. The moralistically-inclined Jews settled in the nation's biggest cities when those cities were morally at their nadir. They were not happy with the ward politics they saw around them, and, in rejecting them, rejected local government as a democratic instrument generally.[33]

By holding the ideas they did, the Jews did not stand outside the broad spectrum of legitimate American political ideas so much as they stood along its outer limits. In each specific case, they could find company with other groups safely ensconced within American society, but in no case did they stand close to the mainstream.

In one sense, the Jews fitted into a certain pattern of American politics immediately. The Jews' attachment to reform was not only based on perceptions of self-interest, but also reflected the fundamental moral

concern which is part and parcel of the Jewish attitude towards politics. Here too, the evidence available is less than systematic or comprehensive, but its overall thrust is clear. Politics, even to the Jews who came to America from an unpolitical environment, was considered to be a matter of morality, a device for achieving justice and establishing the good commonwealth. The overwhelming majority of Jewish immigrants could not conceive of politics as a business or a means for personal economic advancement, nor would they accept instructions from any authority or institution (religious or political) as to the casting of their votes. In this respect, the Jews demonstrated from the first that they shared the same political culture as the old line Yankees, what I have called elsewhere the moralistic political culture.[34] In the United States, this moralistic political culture is one of the nation's three basic political subcultures (the other two being the individualistic and the traditionalistic). These political subcultures reflect differences in political attitudes and outlook that cut across such factors as the date of immigration to American shores, tying together long established ethnic groups and those more recently arrived with common bonds.[35] The moralistic political culture is clearly the most respectable of the three in the United States but, at the local level, it is confined to a minority of the population. The attachment of both the Jews and the heirs of the Puritan tradition to the moralistic political culture is not simply a coincidence. In both cases, the view that politics is a tool to achieve moral ends (rather than simply a means for material advancement or the maintenance of traditional ways of life) comes from the same Biblical source. For the Jews, this provided an *entrée* into the American political system at a level appropriate to their interests and background.

III

Whatever the contradictions between American political ideas and Jewish political notions born out of circumstance, they did not affect the political involvement of the Jews as citizens and voters, perhaps because they did not reflect differences in underlying values. For, despite the apolitical background of the Jewish immigrants to America, no group became involved in the exercise of the rights of American citizens more rapidly than the Jews. The Jews who came to the New World were not peasants like so many of the other immigrants; the great majority were literate and began to follow politics with almost religious zeal because they sensed that political participation was one important way to become Americanized, while it was also good in and of itself in the light of their larger values. As soon as possible, Jews became citizens and voters in the New World, and, having acquired the right to vote, they continued to make use of it in proportions far in excess of the

national average and even in excess of the average in comparable socio-economic groups.[36]

The Jews were involved in politics as progressives or liberals from the first.[37] This, indeed, was true of the earlier Jewish immigrant groups as well. The predominantly Sephardi or Sephardicized Jewish community of the late eighteenth century strongly embraced the American revolutionary cause and then, after the establishment of the United States, became staunch—and in some cases prominent—Jeffersonian Democrats. Jews also followed Andrew Jackson and his persuasion a generation later. Fuchs claims that Jewish ties to the Democratic Party reached their peak in the administration of Martin Van Buren, Jackson's heir to the presidency. The decline of Jewish attachment to that party reflected a general shift of the progressives to the Republican Party. It is very likely that a majority of the German Jews became Republicans from the first. Coming at the time when the struggle over Negro slavery was reaching its peak, their generally anti-slavery sympathies led them into the newly organized G.O.P.

With the emergence of the conflict over laissez-faire in the last years of the nineteenth century, a majority of the Jews again chose the progressive side. Most of the members of the established Jewish community sympathized with the progressives, even if they stood on the right wing of the reform movement. Among the new immigrants there were many socialists who attempted, at first, to transfer their Old World ideas to the American scene. In time, most of them became supporters of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the New Deal, and the Democratic Party. The bulk of the new immigrants ultimately arrived at the same position, though not via socialism. As early as 1900, the Jews of New York City voted solidly for William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic candidate for President, despite his erstwhile associations with the supposed nativism of the greater West. The next year, the Jewish voters of that city were instrumental in electing a reform administration, joining with the uptown 'blue bloods' in a fusion movement.[38]

From the 1890s until the early 1930s, when both the Democratic and the Republican parties contained active conservative and progressive or liberal wings which struggled within each party for control, the Jews voted independently, choosing candidates for their personal stands rather than following one party or the other consistently. Thus the Jewish vote went for both Bryan, the Democrat, and Theodore Roosevelt, the Republican, on the basis of their progressivism without regard to their party differences. As the progressive-liberal coalition won greater power in the Democratic party and the conservatives increased their hold on the G.O.P., the Jews moved towards the former.[39]

By the 1930s, American Jews had given their full commitment to the Democratic Party, which not only offered a prospective solution to the problems of the depression, but also offered eastern European Jews the

kind of political recognition previously accorded only to Sephardi and German Jews.[40] This commitment to the Democratic Party has persisted, but less today for ethnic reasons so much as for reasons of ideology. The Jews of the 1960s vote Democratic because they are liberals in the way their fathers voted Democratic because they were Jewish.[41]

In any case, the commitment of the Jewish voters to liberal candidates and causes has been consistent and overwhelming. Such statistics on the matter as are available show that from 75 to over 90 per cent of the Jewish voters have supported the Democratic ticket in national elections in the last generation. And, in every case, this support has included Jews from economic levels that among non-Jews have continued to vote Republican.[42]

Whatever their early difficulties, the history of the Jews in the United States has been one of unparalleled success in expressing their basic socio-political instincts as a function of their securing full membership in a predominantly non-Jewish society. The facts of that success are well-known and need not be documented here. The reasons for that success are somewhat more conjectural, but even they are reasonably familiar.[43] I would suggest that three reasons of first importance should be accepted, at least one of which is directly related to the points made in the previous section.

(1) American society has traditionally been an open society that has valued some measure of pluralism. It has no ruling group with a widely accepted prior claim to Americanism, and it came into being with no established feudal institutions to militate against full integration of non-Christians into 'the American way of life'.

(2) America has had a dynamic society with a continually growing economy offering new opportunities in every generation. The nation has never been forced to redivide the same economic pie, but has been able to give new groups a share in an economy that is ever-expanding. Moreover, those (like the Jews) who have been able to contribute significantly to the nation's growth, have been especially welcome to share in the growing economic pie.

(3) The basic values, both positive and negative, of the American and Jewish civilizations are quite similar, encouraging a measure of convergence and identification not present in other civilizations that have been hosts to Jews. That is to say, the great moral values of American society are directly related to the great moral values of Jewish tradition and, indeed, are taken predominantly from that tradition as it is expressed in the Bible. At the same time, various negations of those values, particularly those which have gained popularity in the twentieth century, are found in large measure among Jews (one might even say that they are typically Jewish negations) often in exaggerated form. Frequently Jews are in the forefront of those who seek to justify these negations intellectually and morally.

Successful Jewish integration into American society has been coupled with great successes in the economic and intellectual realms. In the former, the Jews as a group have achieved the highest level of material prosperity of any single ethnic group in the country while at the same time making important contributions to the American economy as a whole. In the latter realm, individual Jews have, in recent years, become the nation's pace-setters.

In politics and governmental service, however, the Jewish record has been distinctly mixed. In the political realm, Jews participate as individuals everywhere, holding every office except the very highest in the land, and even that office is no longer considered unattainable. Yet, unlike members of other immigrant groups such as the Irish and Italians, few Jews sought to advance themselves through politics, preferring to follow business, professional, and intellectual pursuits for economic and social advancement. Thus, despite a measure of Jewish activity in numbers out of proportion to their three per cent or less of the total population, Jews have not been nearly as visible in public life as in other fields. Take, for example, the employment pattern of Jews in Detroit in 1935. Less than one per cent of the gainfully occupied Jews in that city were engaged in the public service, including female secretaries and clerks in public offices. Whereas, the Jews constituted 5·9 per cent of the gainfully employed in all industries, they constituted only 1·7 per cent of those in the public service—less, if women are excluded.[44] In a survey of 234 cities, conducted between 1948 and 1951, John P. Dean found that 'the participation of Jews in politics or in public office appears to be relatively limited, compared for instance, with that of Irish, Italian or other immigrant descended groups'; that 'participation is somewhat greater in appointive offices . . .'; and that 'the most common type is the appointment of lawyers to positions such as assistant district attorney, civil service commissioner, or housing commissioner'.[45]

Until very recently, even those Jews who later became political leaders all entered public life after having made careers elsewhere. Moreover, the Jews of the last migration and their descendants have been distinctly under-represented as a group among those Jews who have been leaders in political affairs. The Sephardi Jews with their prior background in Western societies (even though they never constituted more than a few thousand souls) produced numerous men who entered public affairs as early as the seventeenth century; and they continued to do so for three centuries. The German Jews, within one generation of their arrival in significant numbers, contributed political figures who were able to compete in national politics. Eastern European Jewry is only now beginning to produce men of recognized importance, after three generations.[46]

The Jews have expressed their political concern in other ways,

however, primarily through voluntary service in the cause of radicalism or reform. In the early years, this involved activity in specialized or fringe organizations. Then Jews became active as amateurs or volunteers in mainstream political groups, with increasing success in recent years. This volunteering spirit persists today, most recently in the civil rights movement in the South, where the number of Jews may exceed 50 per cent of the white participants, and the Peace Corps, where the Jews are reported to compose 60 per cent of the volunteers.[47]

IV

Looking at the relationship between the political notions of the American Jews and the political ideas of America generally over time, one sees that there has been a general tendency for the bulk of American Jews gradually to Americanize their political notions, but with an interesting and important cleavage in their manner of doing so. The general Jewish population has done so uncritically, simply as part of their overall assimilation into American life. The Jewish intellectuals, on the other hand, have either fought that Americanization or have sought to alter the American political ideas themselves. While this distinction has had interesting consequences for the United States as a whole, its Jewish significance is limited and will not be discussed here.

What is important is the way in which the Americanization of the Jews accompanied a leftward shift in the political notions of the American majority as well, as a result of the pressures of twentieth century war, depression, and technology. In sum, while the American Jews today resemble the American majority in their overt political behaviour more than ever before, the Jews reached their present political position by turning from an even more leftist one (either socialist or strongly inclined towards the left), while the American majority has turned towards an acceptance of the welfare state, with considerable reluctance, from an earlier limited or anti-government position. The difference in their respective directions of evolution reflects a difference in immediate political ideas and is also a reflection of different social experiences.

In reality, despite the uniqueness of the Jewish experience in America, one sees marked similarities between their support of the liberal left (or left-liberals) and the general tendency of Jews the world over to support the same groups in their respective countries since the French Revolution. These common attitudes appeared and were grounded in the Jews' immediate political experiences all over the western world in the century following emancipation. To the extent that the liberal-left has been an agent for the achievement of greater social justice, the favourable attitudes have been reinforced by Jewish tradition (there is some evidence that this reinforcement was direct wherever the two streams

came into contact); but the simple sociological fact of Jewish interest in emancipation and equal rights and the promotion of that interest by the left is sufficient to explain this leaning leftward by a people noted in other respects for its conservatism.

What of the relationship between contemporary Jewish political ideas and classical Jewish political thought? I believe that there is such a thing as classical Jewish political thought even though, in the course of so many centuries of absence from political life in the normal sense, the Jews have virtually forgotten its existence even when it speaks out to them from the pages of their sacred texts, particularly the Bible and the Talmud. The contents of classical Jewish political thought cannot be set forth in any detail here. Basically, the political thought of the sacred texts looks to two things: (1) government by and through a covenant system, and (2) politics as a form of moral action. From the first, flow several principles of political organization, and from the second, several principles of political purpose, all of which (and their various applications) were discussed either directly or through illustration in the Bible and the Talmud. Using the terminology of today's political science, we may say that the first leads to ideas of constitutionalism, limited and republican government, and dispersal of power among different centres (both public and private) in a manner reminiscent of federalism or derivatives of the federal principle. The second leads to notions of the activist state with overtones of public regulation of individual enterprise on behalf of the common good and for the protection of individuals as well. A summary of the prophetic vision of the ideal commonwealth as presented in the Book of Joshua reveals all of this clearly. There, in the course of an idealized description of the Israelite conquest of Canaan, the author presents a vision of a tribal federation (1) operating under a Divine constitution with (2) a national government led by (3) a strong charismatic leader who is the servant of God (not a sovereign in his own right) and is thus bound by the constitution to obey its terms and to consult with (4) the national assembly which is representative of the tribes and embracing (5) tribal and local governments structured along republican lines under the national constitution; a social order in which every man sits under his own vine and fig tree, where his rights are protected by law, and in which he joins with the authorities to protect the rights of his neighbours.[48]

Reading the statement presented here in its simplicity, we might conclude that classical Jewish political thought is virtually identical with the American political tradition. Though, in a broad sense, there are clear similarities, there are certain points of equally clear contradiction between the two, and there are others in which unresolved problems could indicate potential points of disagreement. Classical Jewish political thought, for example, starts from the premise that the truth is given to man by God and that properly qualified authorities must

protect that truth by suppressing certain kinds of error. There is certainly an element containing this view within the American political tradition, but American liberalism does not accept it and the liberal view has been dominant. On another level, the American notion that every man is free to choose his religion and his citizenship cannot easily be squared with the Jewish notion of national and religious inheritance. Of course, there are also great differences in the level of sophistication of the political institutions developed out of the two systems.

Nevertheless, the convergence between the two systems is remarkable, especially if we consider the great gulf in time and space that separates their points of origin. This convergence can be explained historically, but for our purposes here it is sufficient to recognize its existence, particularly in the light of the considerable contradiction between the political notions brought to America by the Jews and the ideas of the American political tradition.

Today, American Jews are edging away from the political notions of their immediate ancestors. In some cases the change is almost a caricature of assimilation, as when Jews in Texas become supporters of the radical right like their non-Jewish neighbours, and Jewish doctors back Barry Goldwater because they fear the possibility of socialized medicine (or, conversely, when Jewish intellectuals advocate legalization of various abnormal sexual practices in the name of liberalism and freedom). In most cases, however, the change is one of newly found interest in commitment to a political tradition now unreservedly theirs.

The decline of the issues of the French Revolution in contemporary politics has given most American Jews a chance to relate to the very different political ideals of America. Curiously enough, in doing this, they may be returning—albeit unconsciously—to political ideas more closely related to those endorsed in the classical Jewish sources (the Bible and the Talmud), such as federalism, communitarianism, and republican government within a democratic context—the very ideas which the Americans initially derived in large measure from Biblical sources.

NOTES

[1] A good general summary of the political concerns of Jews from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-twentieth century can be found in Howard M. Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History*, New York, 1958.

[2] Political culture has been defined by Gabriel A. Almond as the 'particular pattern of orientation to political action' in which groups or political systems are embedded. See his 'Comparative Political Systems' in *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18, 1956, pp. 391–409.

[3] Much has been written on this convergence, generally in the way of Jewish apologetics. Despite the slight disrepute which may adhere to the subject because of that, the convergence remains sub-

stantial. See, for example, Will Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, rev. edn., Garden City, N.Y., 1960.

[4] In the absence of accurate statistics on the composition of the American Jewish population, the figure is an estimate and probably a low one. See Nathan Goldberg, 'Jewish Population in America', *Jewish Review*, Jan–Dec. 1948, and 'The Jewish Population in the United States', *The Jewish People: Past and Present*, New York, 1948, Vol. II.

[5] See Daniel J. Elazar, 'The United States Political System' (mimeo., 1964) for a summary statement of those basic ideas.

[6] Unfortunately little has been done to isolate the political ideas of the classical Jewish texts. Before our own time, Jews were barely concerned with things political within the Jewish community, and most contemporary writing on the subject has taken the form of apologetics, seeking to show that Judaism and democracy (variously defined) are cut from the same cloth. Characteristic of the latter type is the essay by Milton R. Konvitz, 'Judaism and the Democratic Ideal' in Louis Finkelstein, ed., *The Jews: Their History, Culture, and Religion*, Philadelphia, 1949, Vol. II, pp. 1430–51. For more systematic efforts to isolate these ideas, see Harold Fisch, *Jerusalem and Albion*, New York, 1964; Robert Gordis, *The Root and the Branch*, Chicago, 1962; and Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York, 1944, chap. II. Yehezkel Kaufmann discusses the political ideas of ancient Israel in *The Religion of Israel*, Chicago, 1962.

[7] See Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, New York, 1940, and David W. Minar, *Ideas and Politics: The American Experience*, Homewood, Ill., 1964.

[8] Discussions of the influence of Biblical ideas with particular reference to England can be found in Edwyn R. Bevan and Charles Singer, eds., *The Legacy of Israel*, London, 1927, particularly the essays by Smith, Box, Isaacs, Selbie, and Roth. For their influence in the United States, see Joseph Gaer and Ben Siegel, *The Puritan Heritage: America's Roots in the Bible*, New York, 1964; Perry Miller, *The New England Mind*, New York, 1939, particularly 'The Seventeenth Century'; and Oscar S. Straus, *The Origin of the Republican Form of Government in the United States of America*, New York, 1926.

[9] For a discussion of this, see Daniel Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics*, Chicago, 1953.

[10] For a discussion of agrarianism as a persistent influence in the United States, see Henry Bamford Parkes, *The American Experience*, New York, 1947, and Anselm Strauss, *Images of the American City*, New York, 1961, especially chap. 10.

[11] See 'Federalism', *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York, and Elazar, *op. cit.*

[12] See, for example, David Noble, *Historians Against History*, Minneapolis, 1965, and also President Lyndon B. Johnson's inaugural address.

[13] For a survey of the Biblical discussion of these four elements, see John Bright, *A History of Israel*, Philadelphia, 1959, particularly chapter 4, and Kaufmann, *op. cit.*

[14] See Ruth Miller Elson, *Guardians of Tradition: American Schoolbooks of the Nineteenth Century*, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1964, for a biased but thorough account of the contents of the school texts. By the same token, the politicization of the Jews once they came to the United States led them to begin to see the political elements in the Bible. See, for example, *Jewish Tidings*, 14 December 1886, for an explicit reference in this regard.

[15] See Sachar, op. cit., and Salo W. Baron, *The Jewish Community*, Philadelphia, 1942, particularly Vol. II.

[16] Sachar, op. cit., and Ismar Elbogen, *A Century of Jewish Life*, Philadelphia, 1944, provide the best discussions of the overall Jewish movement to the liberal-left. While studies of Jewish voting behaviour in Europe are few, those that exist confirm this. See, for example, Walter B. Simon, 'The Jewish Vote in Vienna' in *Jewish Social Studies*, XXIII, 1, January 1961.

[17] See Sachar, op. cit., Chapter XVI; Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews*, Glencoe, Ill., 1956; and Werner Cohn, *Sources of American Jewish Liberalism—A Study of the Political Alignments of American Jews*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1956.

[18] See Baron, op. cit., Elbogen, op. cit., and Sachar, op. cit., particularly chaps. V, VI, XIII, and XIV, for a survey of the development and functioning of these idea complexes, particularly in European Jewry. Ben Halpern presents a discussion of the ideological roots of American

Jewish attitudes to Judaism in *The American Jew: A Zionist Analysis*, New York, 1956.

[19] Unfortunately, research to this effect is hard to come by. The sense of the situation becomes apparent, however, when one examines the standard sociological studies of American Jewry. See, for example, Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958. Perhaps more impressive is the pattern of Jewish historical writing. Focusing on either national or community histories, only the Jews of the transmississippi West have produced histories of the Jews of particular states, as a rule.

[20] See Baron, op. cit.; Heinrich Graetz, *History of the Jews*, Philadelphia, 1891, vols. III, IV, and V; or any specialized history of the Jewish communities of medieval Europe, for discussions of this relationship.

[21] This is true even in such Americanized *siddurim* as that of the United Synagogue. Contrast the American Sephardi *siddur* which refers to 'the President and Vice President of the United States of America, the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the people of this State represented in Senate and Assembly, and the magistrates of this city'. David de Sola Pool, ed. and trans., *Book of Prayer According to the Custom of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews*, New York: Union of Sephardic Congregations, 1941, p. 204.

[22] William Anderson discusses this in *The Nation and the States: Rivals or Partners?*, Minneapolis, 1955.

[23] Cohn, op. cit., discusses the antipathy between the Jews and locally centred government.

[24] See, for example, the publications of the American Jewish Congress regarding civil rights legislation and court action. I have found some evidence to support this in the responses of my students.

[25] See Louis Finkelstein, *Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages*, New York, 1964, 2nd ed.

[26] See, for example, Herbert Agar, *The Price of Union*, Boston, 1950.

[27] The Jewish attitude is discussed in Abraham Menes, 'The Jewish Labor Movement' in *The Jewish People, Past and Present*, New York: YIVO, 1955, Vol. IV. The American attitude is exemplified in Russel B. Nye, *Midwestern Progressive Politics*, East Lansing, Mich., 1951.

[28] Menes, op. cit., and Sachar, op. cit., chap. XVI.

[29] Lawrence H. Fuchs, 'Sources of Jewish Internationalism and Liberalism' in Sklare, op. cit., pp. 595–613.

[30] Anita Libman Lebeson, *Pilgrim People*, New York, 1950, presents a standard view of this overriding purpose and the accepted chronicle of how it was achieved.

[31] The so-called 'defence' organizations, beginning with the American Jewish Committee and including the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Congress, have all adopted this posture despite the differences among them on other issues that are judged from the 'conservative-liberal' perspective. The chronicle of their efforts is available in *American Jewish Year Book*, published annually by the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Publication Society since 1891.

[32] Despite the attention they gave their radicals, the Jews did gain power politically when they used their 'muscle' as voters in particular states and localities. Thus the Jews of New York's East Side took a major step forward when they elected Meyer London to represent them in Congress in 1914 (Sachar, op. cit., pp. 324–5). It has been suggested that even the great Brandeis achieved national office only after he developed roots in the Jewish community, and thus filled the political requirements which President Wilson had to accept; cf. Yonathan Shapiro, 'American Jews in Politics: The Case of Louis D. Brandeis' in *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, LV, 2, December 1965.

[33] Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan discuss this in the case of the largest Jewish community in the United States, in *Beyond the Melting Pot*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, pp. 137–80. See Charles Bernheimer, ed., *The Russian Jew in the United States*, New York: Young People's Missionary Movement, 1905, for a contemporary discussion of east European Jewish political experiences in the Old World and involvements in the New.

[34] Daniel J. Elazar, *American Federalism: A View From the States*, New York, 1966, chap. IV.

[35] Briefly, the moralistic political culture views politics primarily as a means to advance the public good; the individualistic political culture accepts politics as a means for individuals to advance

themselves economically and socially; and the traditionalistic political culture views politics primarily as a means to support an established social order.

[36] Bernheimer, op. cit., Fuchs, op. cit., Glazer and Moynihan, op. cit., and Sachar, op. cit. See also Stuart E. Rosenberg, 'Notes on the Political Attitudes of the *Jewish Tidings*' in *Jewish Social Studies*, XVII, 4, October 1955.

[37] The following paragraphs are based on Cohn, op. cit., Fuchs, op. cit., and Lebeson, op. cit.

[38] Bernheimer, op. cit., pp. 256–79.

[39] Until the New Deal, the Orthodox Yiddish press was generally Republican, partly in opposition to the dominant Jewish socialists of the lower East Side and partly as a reflection of their predilection for conservatism in politics as well as religion. The German Jews were also predominantly Republicans in this period; see Cohn, op. cit.

[40] The New Deal brought the Jewish socialists into Democratic ranks, too. See Cohn, op. cit., and Bernard D. Weinryb, 'The Adaptation of Jewish Labor Groups to American Life' in *Jewish Social Studies*, VIII, 4, October 1946.

[41] Recent studies to this effect include Maurice G. Guysenir, 'Jewish Vote in Chicago' in *Jewish Social Studies*, XX, 4, October 1958, and Edgar Litt, 'Status, Ethnicity, and Patterns of Jewish Voting Behavior in Baltimore' in *Jewish Social Studies*, XXII, 3, July 1960.

[42] This is not to say that there is absolutely no correlation between economic level and voting behaviour among American Jews. Among those Jews earning in excess of $20,000 annually, there appears to be a clear tendency for nearly a majority of them to vote Republican. See Judith R. Kramer and Seymour Leventman, *Children of the Gilded Ghetto*, New Haven, 1961, which indicates that this was the case for the Jews in Minneapolis in the 1956 presidential election.

[43] The recent literature on American socio-religious pluralism discusses this question in some detail. See Herberg, op. cit.

[44] Henry J. Meyer, 'The Economic Structure of the Jewish Community in Detroit' in *Jewish Social Studies*, II, 2, April 1940.

[45] John P. Dean, 'Patterns of Socialization and Association Between Jews and Non-Jews' in *Jewish Social Studies*, XVII, 3, July 1955.

[46] While no overall calculations are available for the nation as a whole, a survey of the names associated with political affairs in the standard histories of American Jewry will confirm this observation. See, for example, the names cited in Lebeson, op. cit. For more specific examples, see the names listed in Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner, *The History of the Jews of Milwaukee*, Philadelphia, 1963, Appendix 32, 'Milwaukee Jews Who Held Public Office', pp. 514–518. In the Necrology lists of the *American Jewish Year Book*, volumes 62–6, covering the period from 1 July 1959 to 3 December 1964, 26 Jews are listed as having held public office, appointive or elective. One was of Sephardi origin, seven of eastern European birth or parentage, and eighteen were descended from German Jews.

[47] The author received this information from confidential sources.

[48] Yehezkel Kaufmann makes a case for the classical character of premonarchical political ideas in the Jewish tradition. See, for example, his chapter, 'Israel in Canaan', in Leo W. Schwarz, ed., *Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People*, New York, 1956, particularly pp. 38–53. See also the sources cited in note 6 above for further discussion of these ideas and their classical character.

A STUDY OF THE ADJUSTMENT OF SEPHARDI JEWS IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA

Victor D. Sanua

IT has been estimated that the total Jewish population of the United States is approximately 5·5 million. No one knows the number of Sephardi Jews among them. It is roughly estimated that they total 60,000 in the whole of the United States, with 40,000 residing in the New York City area. Literature on Sephardi Jews in the United States is scarce. Bernardete [1] has written a chapter on Sephardi Jews in the U.S.A. in his book *Hispanic Culture and Character of the Sephardic Jews.* Other published papers [2, 3, 4, and 6] have reported on the Sephardi Jews, but none provides empirical information obtained by interviews and questionnaires.

The purpose of this paper is to present background information on Sephardi Jews in the New York City area, and to present preliminary data derived from interviews with, and questionnaires administered to, Jews originating from Syria and recent newcomers to the United States: Jews from Egypt.

The original group of Sephardi Jews who came to the New World about 300 years ago have lost their traditional Sephardi characteristics. At the beginning of the present century, during the great immigration from Poland and Russia, a small number of Sephardi Jews came to the United States. Because of the political upheavals and rising nationalism in the Ottoman empire, Ladino-speaking Jews from the Balkans, and later, Arabic-speaking Jews, primarily from Aleppo, emigrated to the United States, impelled by a desire to seek security and to better themselves economically. Before 1908 a trickle came to the United States, but the bulk came during the years 1908–24.

As in the case of the east European (Ashkenazi) Jews, life in the New World was hard, especially since they had little knowledge of the language, and few of the skills needed in an industrial society. A further handicap was that they did not speak Yiddish, and were cut off from the larger Jewish community as a consequence. On their arrival in the United States, Sephardi Jews segregated themselves along language

lines, and even by cities of origin. While they were familiar with several languages (Spanish, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, and French) only a few had received advanced secular education from the Alliance Israélite schools.

During their first years of settlement in the lower East Side of New York City, Ladino-speaking Jews made a living by operating coatroom concessions in hotels, fruit and vegetable stores, or becoming contractors for mass-produced ladies' dresses. Now many are owners of large-scale factories for dresses and children's wear and in some instances are listed on the stock exchange. Syrian Jews are mainly self-employed in businesses ranging from small retail stores to very sizable import firms dealing in textiles, linens, and clothing. Approximately 75 per cent of the Syrian Jewish families still speak Arabic at home, and the rest speak English exclusively.

Initially, the life of the Sephardim was a continuation of life in the Old World. After working-hours, males congregated in coffee houses where they talked, drank strong coffee, and played taboli (backgammon). After their initial adjustment in the lower East Side, Ladino-speaking Jews moved to the Bronx and the New Lots section of Brooklyn, while the Syrian Jews moved to the Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn. Today Syrian Jews live predominantly in Brooklyn, except that they have moved to better neighbourhoods, and both groups also have communities on Long Island and in Westchester.

The most recent arrivals from the Middle East, Egyptian Jews, are either Ladino or Arabic-speaking; most of them were educated in French schools. Very few are of Ashkenazi origin. Those who are of Syrian origin tend to settle in the Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn, while the Ladino-speaking Jews from Egypt tend to settle in the Forest Hills section of the Borough of Queens.

The first social organization for the Ladino-speaking and the Syrian Jews was a burial society, which bought land for a cemetery. There are numerous fraternal organizations among the Ladino-speaking Jews, and the focus of their communal activities seems to be the Sephardi Old Age Home in Brooklyn, a modern institution for which they raise funds. Syrian Jews have several congregations stemming from the first Magen David Congregation. Communal activities revolve around the congregations, in varying degrees, from fund-raising for the Talmud Torahs to publication of a newspaper which prints local news. There is also considerable support for the Magen David Yeshiva, the first Sephardi Yeshiva in the United States.

Before the 1956 Suez Campaign the number of Egyptian Jews in the United States was very small. The quota for Egyptians to the United States, irrespective of background, was 100 per year. Because of the ill-treatment of Egyptian Jews in Egypt during and after the Suez hostilities, a group of Jews from Egypt living in New York, who usually met socially, banded together to see what they could do on behalf of

their friends and relatives. They contacted the American Jewish Congress, and with the advice of Dr. Phillip Baum, a lawyer from the A.J.C., organized themselves as the 'American Jewish Organization for the Middle East, Inc.' for the major purpose of rescuing Egyptian Jews. (We wish to express special thanks to Mr. M. Ribacoff for providing us with the historical background to the settlement of Egyptian Jews in the U.S.A.)

All known Egyptian Jews were sent a circular letter asking them to supply a list of their relatives in Egypt, and requesting them to cite incidents of ill-treatment that their relatives had undergone. The sole purpose of this request was to prepare documentation of the plight of Egyptian Jewry, which was then submitted to Congressional hearings on changes in the U.S. immigration laws to enable the victims of persecution to enter the United States. Senators Case, Ives, and Lehman sponsored the bill, which was passed in 1957, providing for the entry of 25,000 refugees into the United States. Many other nationality groups took advantage of this special legislation.

The American Jewish Organization for the Middle East, Inc., before the enactment of the law, tried to obtain visas for Egyptian Jews to enter the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Brazil. Only later did Brazil open its doors, with few restrictions, to Jewish immigrants.

Many Egyptian Jews expelled from Egypt held French or British passports, and many were stateless. Rich Jews were able to settle in Switzerland; others went to Australia, Canada, France, England, and Italy and were permitted to work. Many went to Israel. When the Refugee Bill was enacted in the United States, Egyptian-born Jews who were in Europe, and who had not by this time settled in permanent jobs, requested visas to come to the United States.

Most of the Egyptian Jews are fluent in several languages, French in particular. The HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society) arranged for the settlement of these refugees in different cities in the United States, and discouraged their concentration in New York City. Homes and jobs were made available in Cleveland, Seattle, Louisville, Houston, Atlanta, Los Angeles, San Franscisco, Buffalo, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington. In Seattle and Atlanta, Egyptian Jews were absorbed by the existing community whose members had come much earlier from Turkey.

In New York City two groups of Egyptian Jews were formed, one in Queens and the other in Brooklyn. The Queens group approached the Shearith Israel Congregation (the first Sephardi congregation in the U.S.) to obtain their assistance in establishing a synagogue. It was started as a store-front meeting place, later moved to a former dance studio, and eventually with a great deal of assistance from Mr. Ivan Solomon, the group built their own synagogue, which opened for services in 1963. However, the structure is far from complete. This congregation,

while started by Egyptian Jews, includes in its membership other recent newcomers from Italy, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Algeria, Iran, Afghanistan, and some who originate from Bukhara (Soviet Union). It is a Sephardi congregation rather than a purely Egyptian Jewish congregation. With the help of the Shearith Israel Congregation, a Talmud Torah was opened. The synagogue is well attended during the High Holidays and follows the same liturgy as in the old country, with oil lamps and traditional Sephardi chanting. The synagogue building is also used for social purposes. An interesting sidelight is the problem the group faces in the shortage of women for marriage. According to our informants, many of the males travel to Israel, marry women with the same cultural background, and return with them to the United States.

The second congregation of Egyptian Jews was established in 1960 by approximately eighty families in the Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn, where Syrian Jews have lived for many years. Within the last two decades, Syrian Jews, achieving higher economic status, as indicated earlier, started moving to better neighbourhoods. It is estimated that at this date the Egyptian Jewish congregation numbers 175 families. Syrian Jews helped the Egyptian Jews in their initial settlement by employing them in their businesses. They were given synagogue and Talmud Torah facilities, and they organized themselves as a separate congregation. While most of the Egyptian Jews who settled in Brooklyn were themselves of Syrian origin, they preferred to maintain their own identity. They were reluctant to merge with the dominant Syrian community, partly because of a difference in the liturgy between the two groups.

It did not take too long for the Egyptian Jews to become self-sufficient. Many of them opened businesses, or sought employment in large companies, which was facilitated by their knowledge of many languages. It should be noted that the two Egyptian communities in New York have very little contact. Initially, Egyptian Jews found life somewhat hard in the United States, but they have since prospered.

Iraqi Jews who have recently settled in the United States are still somewhat unorganized as a group. Since Iraqi Jews were not allowed to leave Iraq following the 1948 Israel War of Liberation, those who emigrated to the United States came by way of Iran where a large number had settled before 1948. Many of the older-settled Iraqi Jews are in banking and manufacturing.

Empirical data on Egyptian Jews

During the summer and autumn of 1964, a study of Egyptian and Syrian Jews living in the New York metropolitan area was undertaken under the auspices of the Wurzweiler School of Social Work, Yeshiva University. For the Syrian Jews, we used a sample of 150 families out of

a total listing of 1,500 names from a general mailing list maintained by a senior employee of the mother congregation, Magen David, and kept up to date by him for over twenty-five years. As for Egyptian Jews, a master list was accumulated through the 'pyramiding effect'. A total of 15 Egyptian Jews were requested to list the names and addresses of their relatives and friends whose whereabouts they knew. These original 15 subjects were also requested to mail a blank sheet to their relatives and friends so that they, in turn, could provide the investigator with additional names of Egyptian Jewish families living in the New York City area. On the basis of this process, names and addresses of 450 such families were listed.

During the summer of 1964, interviews were conducted with 36 Egyptian families who were selected at random. However, owing to the tedious process involved, it was decided to collect data on additional subjects by the use of a schedule which was mailed to the rest of the sample. This schedule, consisting of a seven-page questionnaire, was prepared on the basis of responses recorded during the interviews with the original group of subjects, and was mailed to 150 subjects who were selected at random. Fifty-four subjects in this group returned the completed questionnaire. It should be noted here that of the original group who were interviewed in person, only two refusals to participate in the study were encountered.

Thus, data were obtained on a total of 90 families, which included the 36 subjects interviewed in the pilot study, and 54 subjects who completed and returned the mailed questionnaire. A comparison of the socio-economic status of these two samples failed to reveal any differences. They were, therefore, combined and considered to be representative of the Egyptian Jewish population in the New York Metropolitan area.

The schedule included items relating to present employment status and highest educational level achieved by the head of the household. Both items were designed to evaluate the socio-economic status of the family, based on Hollingshead and Redlich's classification. An evaluation, based on such criteria, showed that these Egyptian Jews belong predominantly (90 per cent) to middle and upper socio-economic classes. It seems that despite their recent arrival in the United States, Egyptian Jews have made useful contributions to the economy of the country by their professional and business skills. Undoubtedly, their economic adjustment was facilitated by their familiarity with several languages (50 per cent of the males spoke fluent English before their arrival in the United States) and their high level of formal education.

Eighty per cent of them were born in Egypt, and 50 per cent had an Egyptian passport at the time they left Egypt. Only 12 per cent of the Egyptian Jews own their homes; they live mostly in rented apartments. Approximately 25 per cent of the respondents have lived in other areas

outside New York State and have moved to New York City, thus indicating that despite HIAS efforts to spread Egyptian Jews outside New York City, they prefer to live in the metropolis. Only 8 per cent indicated that they had relatives living outside New York City.

Seventy-five per cent of the males are employed full-time, while the rest are self-employed; 30 per cent of the wives hold part-time or full-time jobs. Eighty-eight per cent of Egyptian Jews have regular contact with other Sephardi Jews, 62 per cent with non-Sephardi Jews and 36 per cent with non-Jews. It would seem that Egyptian Jews in New York City have more contact with non-Jews than Syrian Jews have in spite of the latter's longer settlement in the U.S.A.

Thirty-eight per cent of Egyptian males have had more than six years of religious education; 40 per cent of the women have some type of religious education. Only 10 per cent of Egyptian Jews have their children in yeshivas (day schools). Despite the fact that the conservative or reform movement did not exist in Egypt, 42 per cent indicated that this was their Jewish affiliation; about one-third felt that they were just Jewish, and one-third described their family as Orthodox. Only half of the group belonged to a synagogue, equally divided between Conservative and Orthodox. However, 44 per cent of them indicated frequent attendance at synagogue services. Compared with the Syrian Jews, Egyptian Jews are less observant in religious practices; only half of the group light Friday night candles regularly, while 80 per cent light Chanukah candles. (New York Sephardim appear to have forsaken altogether the use of oil lamps in their homes.) Fifty per cent buy kasher meat, while 32 per cent use separate dishes for meat and dairy foods; only one-third of the group are unwilling to eat non-kasher food outside the home.

Adaptation to life in the United States

Approximately half of the group indicated that they were better off financially in the United States, while the other half thought that they were worse off. At the time of the survey, half of the Egyptian Jews had American citizenship.

Respondents were asked about their first impressions when they arrived in the United States. Only 12 per cent were disappointed; 40 per cent were pleasantly surprised; while the other half found the United States as expected. By and large, most parents found that their children had adjusted well to life in the United States. Most of the Egyptian Jews (85 per cent) socialize with friends and acquaintances they had known in Egypt. When respondents were asked about the most difficult problem that confronted them when they arrived in the United States, two major problems loomed: (1) a sense of social isolation; and (2) adaptation to the fast American tempo. Thirty per cent stated that they had no problems whatsoever, while sixty per cent commented that they liked the

sense of security and freedom which they felt. However, they thought that there was not enough social life; 70 per cent said that social life in Egypt was more pleasant while 22 per cent found it to be the same. On the other hand, 88 per cent indicated that they had been able to get adjusted to life in the United States, while the remainder stated that they were still having some difficulties or were uncertain about their adjustment.

Demographic information on Syrian Jews

The socio-economic status of the Syrian Jews is somewhat high, since not a single respondent was lower than Class III, and they tended to concentrate in Class II. Approximately 60 per cent of them have their own business. Approximately 70 per cent of the houshold heads are native-born Americans, but their grandparents or parents came primarily from the city of Aleppo, with a few from Damascus. Fifty per cent own their homes, and prefer to live in Brooklyn. A very small percentage of their wives work. In 46 cases who responded to the questionnaire, there was only one instance of intermarriage; this contrasts with the 17 per cent which we have found in an earlier study among non-Sephardi Jews [5].

Social contacts and marriages with non-Sephardi Jews are increasing in frequency. We found that 70 per cent of the Syrian Jews have social contacts with non-Sephardi Jews. However, spending a summer or a vacation in the Catskills ('Borsht Belt'), which is a popular vacation spot for New York Jews, is not very popular with Syrian Jews: only 30 per cent stated that occasionally they might go to the Catskills. There is one beach resort (Bradley Beach, N.J.) which attracts many families, who are now buying summer homes there. As for social contacts with non-Jews, only 10 per cent indicated that they have any regular contacts.

Religious Activities

In general, Syrian Jews have had an intensive religious education. More than 15 per cent have attended yeshivas or Hebrew day schools; 85 per cent of the men have had more than six years of religious education of any type, while only 40 per cent of the women have had any Hebrew education. Approximately half of the parents have placed their children in yeshivas or Hebrew day schools. Practically 100 per cent of the Syrian Jews who responded are members of Orthodox synagogues. Conservative Judaism has had no impact on the group. Attendance at religious services is rather frequent: approximately 65 per cent of the household heads attend religious services frequently (19–49 times a year), with 25 per cent of them attending at least 100 times a year. Religious practices at home are rather intensive: 50 per cent of the families light Friday night candles, and another 25 per cent do it some-

times. Ninety-five per cent light Chanukah candles; 100 per cent buy kasher meat; and with one exception, all respondents use separate dishes for meat and dairy foods. Sixty per cent will eat only kasher food outside the home. All have mezuzoth on their doors. Eighty-five per cent contribute to Jewish philanthropies. Of those who contribute, 40 per cent give annually less than $99 while the rest give more than $100.

Summary and discussion

Our study shows that Ladino-speaking Jews and Arabic-speaking Jews, despite their early limitations in the New World, have adjusted themselves to life in America, and have managed to become financially successful at a much faster pace than other ethnic groups, including non-Sephardi Jews. Until today they have been able to maintain their own identity and still speak of themselves as Spanish or Syrian Jews, and thus both function as ethnic groups. The Syrian Jews tend to live in the same neighbourhood and go to the same resorts. They have many synagogues, a community centre, a yeshiva, a B'nai B'rith Lodge, a Masons group. These are American Jewish organizations, but their purpose is to serve the Syrian community. Intermarriage outside the group is discouraged.

The probability that the Syrian Jews will ultimately merge with the dominant Jewish group is very remote, since they maintain very close contacts among themselves, which discourages assimilation.

While we have not conducted a survey of Ladino-speaking Jews, our conversations with some leaders of the community reveal that they are very much concerned that the traditional Spanish characteristics are losing their strength, in view of marriage outside the group and with non-Jews. It would seem that the melting pot concept has had more effect on the Ladino-speaking Jews than on the Syrian Jews. Undoubtedly this is due to the fact that Syrian Jews have very strong ties to the Jewish religion and its practices.

Egyptian Jews who have recently settled in New York City are themselves of Spanish or Syrian origin. It would seem that the French culture in Egypt has, to a certain extent, replaced the traditional practices which are still found among the Spanish and Syrian Jews living in the New World. Acculturation to the European ethos seems to have proceeded in a non-Western environment such as Egypt much faster than in the modern metropolis of New York.

Our data show that within the eight years during which 82 per cent of Egyptian Jews arrived in the United States, they have reached an unusually high social and economic status, and that, by and large, they are satisfied with their conditions.

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ETHNIC PREFERENCES OF JEWISH YOUTH IN JOHANNESBURG[1]

H. Lever and O. J. M. Wagner

IT is generally acknowledged that Jews in the Diaspora adopt many of the cultural characteristics of the groups among whom they live. Mannerisms, language, moral values, manner of dress, manner of speech, habits, beliefs, and attitudes vary from one diaspora community to the next. If the behaviour and attitude of Jews is affected by the environment in which they find themselves, an interesting problem arises for South African Jewry. Ethnic attitudes are firmly woven into the fabric of South African society. This has occurred to such an extent that the name 'South Africa' is frequently regarded as synonymous with ethnic attitudes of a particular type. Lewin has pointed out that understanding of behaviour should not be confined to a study of the specific forces operating in a given social field at a particular period of time. Each field contains its 'time perspective'.[2] The time perspective of the Jews includes its history as a persecuted group. How does the time perspective of the Jews as a group subjected to discrimination interact with the tendency to conform to the views of the general White community in South Africa?

There has been much speculation on the ethnic attitudes held by Jews in South Africa. Some of this speculation has been of a biased nature, appearing in the reader's column of an Afrikaans daily newspaper a short while ago. A reader calling himself 'Leser'[3] alleged that Lenin was Jewish. The innuendo was that Jews are at the root of 'subversion' and 'communism'. In the South African context, 'subversion' and 'communism' signify a closer sympathy with the aspirations of non-Whites than is considered 'proper'. The political 'stakes' were high and contestants for both sides were not slow in participating in the correspondence. Another correspondent, signing herself 'Leseres',[4] replied that the name of Lenin's mother was Maria Blank and that she was of German descent. Leseres maintained that Lenin had no Jewish or Russian 'blood in his veins'. Leser's reply was that Lenin was married to a Jewess, by name Krupskaya. For good measure, he added that all the chief leaders of the Russian Revolution were Jewish. Another reader replied saying that although Lenin may have associated with persons of

Jewish origin, this did not affect his activities. In a further letter, Leser stated that he was not convinced by these preceding arguments, and that Lenin was, in fact, Haim Goldmann, a Jew. 'Matie-leser' traced the genealogical tree of both Lenin and Stalin and concluded that their descent had nothing to do with their activities. 'Leser' was not to be outdone. He took his critics to task for hampering the 'cause of anti-communism'. He challenged 'Leseres' to prove that Lenin's mother was not Jewish. Leser wrote two further letters. In one, he mentioned Trotsky. In the second, he returned to the theme of Lenin's mother and wife. The editor of the newspaper concerned permitted this correspondence to be protracted over a period of some four or five months. In the meantime, passing shots had been fired in the columns of other newspapers. The ancestral trees of a number of prominent Jews were scrutinized.

At the other end of the political continuum some criticisms of the ethnic attitudes of Jews were reported. Arthur Goldreich criticized the attitudes of Jews. He considered that luxurious living in the Republic had led Jews to be complacent and predisposed towards government policies. He regarded Jews as being in 'Verwoerd's camp'.

Thus, on the one hand, Jews are taken to task for being too sympathetic to the aspirations of the non-Whites, while, on the other, they are regarded as being too antipathetic. Historians should not experience difficulty in finding parallels of contradictory viewpoints ascribed to Jews.

Procedure

In 1959 the Social Research Unit of the Department of Sociology and Social Work of the University of the Witwatersrand initiated a study of youth in Johannesburg. The aims of the Youth Survey were the study of:

(*a*) Family and school life.
(*b*) Occupational aspirations.
(*c*) Moral values.
(*d*) Future outlook and ideals.
(*e*) Ethnic attitudes.

It was not the intention to isolate Jewish respondents for particular study. However, this was possible since a representative cross-section of young Jews was obtained in the sample.

Statutory provisions in the Transvaal province require compulsory attendance of White children at school until they reach the age of sixteen years. It was, therefore, considered convenient to confine the study to White pupils attending high schools within the area known as Greater Johannesburg; that is, the municipal district of Johannesburg and its immediate environs. The largest single concentration of Jews in South Africa is in Johannesburg; according to the 1961 census, there

were 57,707 Jews in Johannesburg out of a total population of 116,066 Jews. In other words, a little less than half the Jews of South Africa live in Johannesburg.

With the approval of the Transvaal Education Department, the principals of the high schools were approached for permission to make use of their pupils as subjects. The principals of forty-four high schools, having a total enrolment of 23,139 pupils, agreed to co-operate. The principals of eight schools, with a total enrolment slightly in excess of 2,000 pupils, declined to permit their pupils to participate in the survey. The failure of these eight schools to participate was not considered likely to affect the validity of the sample of Jewish respondents, particularly as seven schools were private schools run by religious Christian institutions. The eighth school, an English-medium school under the jurisdiction of the provincial authorities, was known to have a Jewish pupil population, although its size was not known. This school did not differ in any important sociological characteristics from the remaining English-medium provincial schools. Failure to include pupils from this school was not likely to affect adversely the representativeness of the sample.

The principals of the forty-four schools participating in the survey made their school registers and class lists available for the purpose of extracting a sample. Within each school a 10 per cent simple random sample of pupils was selected by means of Tippett's Table of Random Numbers. In other words, the sample was a stratified random one with each school, for convenience, being regarded as a stratum of the total pupil population. The method of selection of the sample ensured that constituent groups in the population were represented in the sample in approximately the same proportion as they were in the population.

Religion was accepted as the sole criterion of 'Jewishness'. As only 0·6 per cent of the total number of respondents indicated that they had no religion, this was regarded as a satisfactory criterion.

A questionnaire dealing with the main areas of investigation was administered to the sample of pupils during the period May to September 1959. Pupils within each school were assembled together in a school hall, or other convenient room, on a pre-arranged date and presented with the questionnaires. The purpose of the investigation and the method of completing the questionnaire were explained to them by a supervisor from the Social Research Unit who remained in attendance. The questionnaire contained a modified Bogardus social distance test requiring the respondents to indicate their first feeling reactions towards the members of the following respondee[5] groups: English-speaking South Africans, Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, Jews, Natives,[6] Hollanders, Coloureds,[7] the British, Germans, and Indians. The categories of the social distance test, and the values assigned to each category were as follows:

Category	*Value*
To close kinship by marriage	1
To my home as personal friends	2
To my school, university, occupation or profession	3
To citizenship in my country	4
To live and work in my country	5
Would exclude from my country	6

The test was found to have an average co-efficient of reproducibility[8] of 97·2 per cent and a Richardson-Kuder coefficient of reliability[9] of 0·74. The procedure described by Hartley[10] of allocating a score based upon the most intimate category of social distance endorsed by the respondent, was adopted. Thus, if a respondent indicated that he would be willing to admit the members of a particular ethnic group to his home as friends (scale value 2) or to citizenship (scale value 4), but not to his school, university, occupation, or profession (scale value 3), he was assigned a scale value of 2. Social contact distance indices (arithmetic means of social distance)[11] were computed for each respondee group. A low social contact distance index indicates social closeness, and a high index social remoteness.

Characteristics of the sample

The sample of 2,302 White high school pupils in Johannesburg included 372 pupils who were Jewish. That is, Jewish children formed 16·2 per cent of the sample.

Table 1 presents the distribution of Jewish pupils in Johannesburg according to school standard. In South Africa, high school education commences at standard 6 and terminates at standard 10 (matriculation). The general age range of pupils in high school is from 11 to 19 years.

TABLE 1. *Distribution of Jewish youth in Johannesburg according to school standard*

School standard	*Number*	*Percentage*	*Per cent Jews in total sample*
Standard 6	98	26·3	13·5
Standard 7	114	30·7	16·1
Standard 8	72	19·4	15·6
Standard 9	47	12·6	20·2
Standard 10	41	11·0	23·7
Total	372	100·0	

A large number of pupils leave school after standard 8. Table 1 suggests (the last column) that fewer Jews than non-Jews leave school after standard 8. However, in relation to non-Jews, the tendency for Jews to remain in school is not a very strong one.

The 372 Jewish pupils were 173 boys and 199 girls.

The overwhelming majority of Jewish pupils were born in South

Africa; only 3·2 per cent were born outside South Africa. 88·4 per cent of Jewish pupils were born in Johannesburg itself. However, a substantial proportion of Jewish respondents had one or both parents who were born outside South Africa (see Table 2).

TABLE 2. *Distribution of Jewish youth in Johannesburg according to place of birth of their parents*

Parents' birthplace	*Number*	*Percentage*
Both born in South Africa	149	40·1
Both born outside South Africa	90	24·2
One born outside South Africa	112	30·1
No information	21	5·6
Total	372	100·0

Information was not obtained on the country of birth of the respondents' parents. However, it is likely that the majority of the foreign-born parents were of east European or German origin, and only a small proportion of British origin.

An indication of the socio-economic status of Jewish youth may be obtained from the occupations followed by their fathers. Table 3 shows the distribution of Jewish pupils according to their fathers' occupations. Occupations were classified according to the United Nations International Classification of Occupations.[12]

TABLE 3. *Distribution of Jewish youth in Johannesburg according to father's occupation*

Father's occupation	*Number*	*Percentage*
Professional	72	19·3
Managerial	205	55·1
Clerical	15	4·0
Sales	45	12·1
Agriculture	4	1·1
Mines and Quarries	0	0·0
Transport	0	0·0
Skilled workers	23	6·2
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers	0	0·0
Service workers	1	0·3
No information	7	1·9
Total	372	100·0

Jewish pupils in the sample are seen from Table 3 to be of relatively high socio-economic status. Almost three-quarters of them had fathers in the professional or managerial occupations. This was higher than any other group in the white high school population of Johannesburg.

Table 4 shows the level of education of the fathers of Jewish pupils. The following four main categories of educational attainment were distinguished:

Standard 6 or lower standard.
High school education beyond standard 6, but not matriculated.
Matriculated.
Attendance at a university or post-matriculation college (irrespective of whether the course was completed).

TABLE 4. *Distribution of Jewish youth in Johannesburg according to father's education*

Father's education	*Number*	*Percentage*
Standard 6	34	9·2
High school, not matriculated	76	20·4
Matriculated	81	21·8
University or college	92	24·7
No information	89	23·9
Total	372	100·0

Jewish children have a fairly large proportion of relatively well-educated fathers.[13]

Ethnic preferences

The ethnic preferences of Jewish boys and girls are set out in Tables 5 and 6. The respondee groups are arranged in decreasing order of social contact distance indices. With the exception of the social contact distance indices, all numbers in Tables 5 and 6 are in percentages. The percentage totals are generally less than 100. This is due to the fact that respondents who failed to indicate their feeling reactions towards one or more ethnic groups are not included in the tables. The first five categories of the social distance scale are cumulative; for example, Table 5 shows that 16·8 per cent of Jewish boys were willing to admit Afrikaans-speaking South Africans to close kinship by marriage. The percentage willing to admit Afrikaans-speaking South Africans to their home as personal friends is 50·3 (i.e. 16·8 + 33·5). The percentage willing to admit Afrikaans-speaking South Africans to their school, university, or profession is 81·5 (i.e. 16·8 + 33·5 + 31·2). And so on.

The influence of the South African environment on the ethnic attitudes of Jewish youth is evident from Tables 5 and 6. From these tables it will be seen that respondents place the members of their own group at the apex of the hierarchy of ethnic preferences. English-speaking South Africans and the British are assigned positions near the apex of the hierarchy. In South Africa, non-Whites are generally given a low rank-order in the ethnic preferences of Whites.[14] Tables 5 and 6 show that Jewish children have placed the three non-White groups, that is Natives, Coloureds, and Indians, at low positions in the hierarchy. However, the 'colour barrier' has been penetrated by the low placement of Germans.

TABLE 5. *Ethnic preferences of 173 Jewish boys**

Ethnic group	*Would admit to close kinship by marriage*	*Would admit to my home as personal friends*	*Would admit to my school, university, or profession*	*Would admit to citizenship in my country*	*Would admit to live and work in my country*	*Would exclude from my country*	*Social contact distance index*
Jews	93·7	2·9	1·7	0·0	0·0	0·6	1·09
English-speaking South Africans	36·4	43·9	16·2	2·9	0·0	0·0	1·86
British	31·8	43·9	19·6	1·2	1·2	1·2	1·98
Afrikaans-speaking South Africans	16·8	33·5	31·2	4·6	4·0	8·7	2·71
Hollanders	17·9	31·2	26·6	4·6	7·5	11·0	2·85
Natives	1·7	12·1	30·6	17·3	27·2	9·8	3·86
Coloureds	4·0	8·7	27·2	15·6	30·0	12·7	3·99
Germans	11·6	14·4	13·9	6·4	5·2	46·8	4·22
Indians	2·9	8·7	21·4	13·9	24·8	27·2	4·32

* With the exception of the social contact distance indices, all figures are in percentages.

TABLE 6. *Ethnic preferences of 199 Jewish girls**

Ethnic group	*Would admit to close kinship by marriage*	*Would admit to my home as personal friends*	*Would admit to my school, university, or profession*	*Would admit to citizenship in my country*	*Would admit to live and work in my country*	*Would exclude from my country*	*Social contact distance index*
Jews	98·0	0·0	0·5	0·0	0·5	0·5	1·06
English-speaking South Africans	48·2	39·4	12·1	0·0	0·0	0·0	1·64
British	39·7	41·2	16·1	1·0	0·5	1·0	1·84
Hollanders	22·1	31·6	25·1	6·0	6·0	7·5	2·64
Afrikaans-speaking South Africans	18·1	30·6	32·7	8·5	5·0	4·5	2·65
Natives	1·5	16·6	33·7	16·6	21·1	9·0	3·67
Coloureds	3·0	12·1	30·1	18·6	24·1	12·1	3·85
Indians	3·0	18·1	25·6	12·1	21·6	19·6	3·90
Germans	12·1	9·0	16·1	2·0	7·0	52·8	4·43

* With the exception of the social contact distance indices, all figures are in percentages.

Although it is usual for respondents to place the members of their own group in a position of social nearness, it is advisable in the case of Jewish respondents to look for evidence of self-hatred. Self-hatred is a phenomenon which is not peculiar to Jews; it is characteristic of groups which have been objects of discrimination. Lewin has described the dynamics of self-hatred in an article[15] which is a classical exposition of the phenomenon. Lewin pointed out that self-hatred may be directed against the whole group, against part of the group, or simply against Jewish institutions, mannerisms, customs, language, or ideals. He rejected Freud's theory that Jewish self-hate can be explained by the 'death instinct' or the drive to self-destruction. In order to explain self-hatred, Lewin distinguished forces attracting the individual to the group (positive valences) and forces driving him away (negative valences). Positive valences include identification with the group, the desire on the part of other members to keep the individual within the group, and the simple desire of preferring the group to being alone. The greater attraction of another group may be regarded as a negative valence. In a minority group the desire of the individual to discard his subordinate status and attain the status enjoyed by the majority group is a negative valence. However, the individual's attempts to improve his status may be frustrated by discrimination. Genotypically, therefore, the sociological setting for self-hatred is found in the case of the minority member whose attempts at upward mobility are frustrated. The aggression stemming from frustration is not directed at the source of the frustration (the majority group) but the individual's own group. In such a case the individual regards membership of the Jewish group as a handicap to his aspirations. He does not remain in the Jewish group because he desires to be there, but because he is kept there by external circumstances. Self-hatred is accentuated by the tendency on the part of minority group members to accept the stereotypes and values which the majority group has developed or assigned to them.

In the present investigation, self-hatred is operationally defined in terms of the social distance test administered to respondents. A desire to exclude Jews from the two most intimate categories of social distance ('to close kinship by marriage' and 'to my home as personal friends') may be regarded as an index of self-hatred. The suitability of the Bogardus social distance test as a measure of self-hatred may be questioned. Herman's study of Jewish students at the University of the Witwatersrand, however, suggests that the social distance test is a satisfactory measuring instrument for this purpose. Of the five research techniques employed by Herman, the clearest evidence of self-hatred (albeit slight) was produced by the social distance test.[16]

It will be seen from Tables 5 and 6 that an almost negligible proportion of Jewish pupils were unwilling to admit Jews to close kinship by marriage or to their homes as personal friends. It would appear,

therefore, that self-hatred is not a characteristic of Jewish youth in Johannesburg.

Several theories may be suggested to account for the absence of self-hatred. It may be argued that there is no self-hatred because there is no discrimination. Saron maintains that Jews 'enjoy full equality in South Africa'.[17] The writers agree that there is no official or public discrimination against Jews. However, there is evidence of unofficial or private discrimination in the social and economic spheres.

The writers are of the opinion that the absence of self-hatred on the part of Jewish respondents can be accounted for in terms of their relationships to the dominant White groups in South Africa. Lewin's analysis of self-hatred involves a conception of a minority group member seeking to obtain status in a single majority group. He did not have to deal with a situation where there were two or more majority groups. In South Africa there are two dominant White groups: English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans. Jews in Johannesburg and in the other urban areas of the country are adapting themselves to the culture of the English-speaking community, and not to the culture of the Afrikaans-speaking community. The fact that there was not a single Jewish child in the Afrikaans-medium schools provides partial confirmation of this. The similarity of the ethnic attitudes of Jewish and English-speaking South African children is further confirmation of this (Table 7). The Youth Survey showed that the most unfavourable attitudes towards Jews were expressed by pupils in Afrikaans schools.[18] English-speaking non-Jews expressed relative social closeness to Jews. The social remoteness expressed by Afrikaans-speaking South Africans did not constitute a barrier or frustration to Jews, since the goals of Jewish youth were oriented to the culture and ideals of English-speaking South Africans. Self-hatred might have resulted if English-speaking South African youth had adopted an unfavourable attitude towards Jews.[19]

The favourable position assigned by Jewish children to English-speaking South Africans and the British is of some interest. MacCrone points out that, as far as South African Jews are concerned, English-speaking South Africans cannot adequately be described as either in-group or out-group.[20] MacCrone analysed the responses of Jewish subjects to the 'marriage' category on the social distance scale. Respondents were required to indicate their feeling reaction on a five point rating scale: that is, would admit any, most, some, few, or no member of the ethnic group concerned to close kinship by marriage. As far as endogamous marriages were concerned, the distribution of responses approximated to a normal curve. In their attitudes to Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and Germans, however, the distribution of responses took the form of a J-curve. MacCrone, therefore, regarded the normal curve as an index of in-group feeling and the J-curve as an index of out-group

feeling (negative identification). In the case of attitudes towards English-speaking South Africans, the distribution of Jewish responses was the result of a combination of the normal curve and J-curve. 'The conventional distinction between in-group and out-group,' says MacCrone, 'is inadequate as a basis for the classification of groups since it fails to provide for those groups, such as the English-speaking South Africans, which as in this case belong to neither the in-group nor the out-group category. As an intermediate group, the English-speaking South Africans may best be described from the point of view of our subjects as an allied group who fall on the third point of a triangular relationship.'[21] He goes on to say that both positive and negative identification are at work in determining the attitudes of Jews to English-speaking South Africans. The attitude is, therefore, ambivalent. It would appear that MacCrone's remarks are applicable, although to a lesser extent, to the attitudes of Jews towards the British. Tables 5 and 6 show that a large proportion of Jewish children were willing to admit English-speaking South Africans and the British to close kinship by marriage. It will be observed that a greater percentage of Jewish girls than boys were willing to admit English-speaking South Africans to close kinship by marriage. One of the findings of the Youth Survey was that Afrikaans-speaking girls were more inclined than boys to admit English-speaking South Africans to close kinship by marriage. According to Bogardus, women are more reserved than men in entering into intimate relations with persons outside their group.[22] It would appear that Bogardus's observation needs to be qualified. It is suggested that where the respondee group is of high positive valence, there is a greater tendency on the part of females than males to enter into intimate association with members of that group.

As appears from Tables 5 and 6, Afrikaans-speaking South Africans occupy the fourth and fifth ranks in the order of ethnic preferences. It is of some interest that Jewish children prefer a foreign group, the British, to Afrikaans-speaking South Africans. Jewish children appear to have associated Hollanders with Afrikaans-speaking South Africans. The social contact distance indices of Jewish girls in respect of Hollanders and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans are almost identical. Jewish boys show a slight preference for Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, although fewer of the Jewish boys are willing to admit Afrikaans-speaking South Africans than Hollanders to close kinship by marriage.

Natives, Coloureds, and Indians are seen to be placed at low positions in the order of ethnic preferences. Very few Jewish children of either sex were willing to admit anyone belonging to these ethnic groups to close kinship by marriage. Most Jewish children were willing to admit the members of these groups to citizenship in the country. By South African standards, comparatively few Jewish children desire to exclude

Natives or Coloureds from the country. However, more than a quarter of Jewish boys wished to exclude Indians from South Africa. Indians were the most unpopular non-White group for Jewish respondents. They were also regarded as the most unpopular non-White group by English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking children.

Lewsen maintains that Jews are characteristically South African in their approach to the 'Native and Colour problem'.[23] This view needs some qualification. Jews follow the characteristic pattern of South African Whites in assigning non-Whites to a low position in the hierarchy of ethnic preferences, but Jews are more favourably disposed towards Natives, Coloureds, and Indians, than are the members of any other White group. Jews were found to be consistently more tolerant than any other group in their attitudes to non-Whites. In general, the differences between the social contact distance indices could not be attributed to chance. It is possible that the experience which Jews have had of discrimination has induced in them a feeling of sympathy for other underprivileged groups. Herman[24] and Pettigrew[25] both agree that the characteristic response of South African Jews to discrimination is one of sympathy and not of antipathy.

One does not need to look very far for an explanation of the unfavourable attitude which Jewish children have to Germans. Herman has reported that Jews tend to associate Germans with Nazis.[26] Approximately half the Jewish children in Johannesburg feel that Germans should be excluded from South Africa.

Sex differences

In general, Jewish boys and girls were not found to be significantly differentiated in their ethnic attitudes. Mention has already been made of the greater readiness of girls to admit English-speaking South Africans to close kinship by marriage. Jewish girls were more favourably disposed towards English-speaking South Africans than Jewish boys. A t value of 2·739 for the difference between the social contact distance indices of the sexes was found to be significant beyond the 1 per cent level for 368 degrees of freedom.

Although Jewish girls had a lower social contact distance index than boys in respect of Natives, the difference between the indices was not found to be statistically significant ($t = 1{\cdot}427$, $p < 0{\cdot}20 > 0{\cdot}10$, d.f. $= 365$).

The only other difference between the sexes concerned the attitudes towards Indians; Jewish girls were more favourably disposed towards Indians than were Jewish boys ($t = 2{\cdot}746$, $p < 0{\cdot}01$, d.f. $= 368$). Although Tables 5 and 6 show little difference between the sexes in their readiness to admit Indians to close kinship by marriage, Jewish girls are less inclined than boys to exclude Indians from the country.

Comparisons of ethnic attitudes

Do the ethnic preferences of Jewish youth resemble those of English-speaking South Africans or Afrikaans-speaking South Africans? The answer to this question has already been anticipated in this paper. The data upon which a conclusion can be based are set out in Table 7. The social contact distance indices of English-speaking pupils in private schools have not been included in this table.

TABLE 7. *Social contact distance indices of Jewish and non-Jewish youth in respect of nine ethnic groups*

Ethnic group	*Jews*		*Non-Jews in English-medium provincial schools*		*Non-Jews in Afrikaans-medium provincial schools*	
	Boys	*Girls*	*Boys*	*Girls*	*Boys*	*Girls*
Jews	1·09	1·06	2·38	2·27	4·26	4·05
English-speaking South Africans	1·86	1·64	1·16	1·09	1·80	1·64
British	1·98	1·84	1·24	1·26	2·89	2·91
Afrikaans-speaking South Africans	2·71	2·65	2·00	1·92	1·08	1·13
Hollanders	2·85	2·64	2·37	2·06	2·18	2·07
Natives	3·86	3·67	4·45	4·45	5·43	5·47
Coloureds	3·99	3·85	4·66	4·47	5·42	5·46
Indians	4·32	3·90	4·75	4·54	5·67	5·67
Germans	4·22	4·43	2·54	2·52	2·68	2·48

Table 7 shows that the ethnic attitudes of Jewish children differ considerably from those of Afrikaans children. The only similarity between the ethnic attitudes of these two groups is found in their attitudes towards English-speaking South Africans. Jewish children hold English-speaking South Africans at the same social distance as do Afrikaans children. Jewish children are more favourably disposed towards Jews, the British, Natives, Coloureds, and Indians than Afrikaans children. Afrikaans children are more favourably disposed towards Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, Hollanders, and Germans than Jewish children. Since a six-point social distance scale was used, the differences between the social contact distance indices of Jewish and Afrikaans children can be regarded, in most cases, as being very large.

The ethnic attitudes of Jewish children bear a closer resemblance to those of pupils in the English schools than to those of children in the Afrikaans schools. There are, however, two large differences to which attention should be drawn. These concern the attitudes towards Germans and Jews. Non-Jews in English-medium provincial schools are more favourably disposed towards Germans and less favourably disposed towards Jews than are Jewish respondents. Mention has been made of the fact that Jewish children were more favourably disposed

towards Natives, Coloureds, and Indians than non-Jewish children in the English-medium provincial schools. None the less, the differences between the social contact distance indices were not as large as those between Jewish and Afrikaans children. In general, there is a similarity between the ethnic attitudes of Jewish respondents and those in the English schools.

NOTES

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[2] K. Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science*, London, 1952, pp. 43–59.

[3] 'Leser' is an Afrikaans word meaning 'Reader'.

[4] Literally translated from the Afrikaans as 'Reader-ess', a woman correspondent.

[5] The term 'respondees' was used by S. C. Dodd in 'Social Distance Test in the Near East', *American Journal of Sociology*, 41: 194–204, 1935, to refer to the persons towards whom the attitudes were expressed.

[6] Sometimes referred to as 'Africans' or 'Bantu'. The term 'Natives' was used as it was thought that respondents would be most familiar with this term.

[7] In South Africa, 'Coloureds' is generally understood to refer to non-Whites of 'mixed blood' or non-Whites who are neither Natives nor Asiatics.

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[13] Cf. H. Lever and O. J. M. Wagner, 'Father's Education as a Factor Affecting Social Distance', *Journal for Social Research* (South Africa), 14: 23, 1965.

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[16] Cf. S. N. Herman, *The Reaction of Jews to Anti-Semitism*, Johannesburg, 1945, pp. 70–6, 99.

[17] G. Saron, 'The Organization of South African Jewry and its Problems', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 5: 37, 1963.

[18] The findings of the Youth Survey on ethnic attitudes are to be published in book form by H. Lever under the provisional title of *Ethnic Attitudes of Johannesburg Youth*.

[19] The subject of self-hatred, and the theory advanced in this article on the

absence of self-hatred among Jewish Youth in Johannesburg, are expanded upon in Lever's forthcoming book, op. cit.

[20] I. D. MacCrone, 'A Note on the Attitudes of a Group of Jewish Subjects Towards Inter-Marriage', *South African Journal of Science*, 49: 352–5, 1953.

[21] Ibid., pp. 354 f.

[22] E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes*, Boston, 1928, p. 185.

[23] P. Lewsen, 'The South African Jewish Community', in G. H. Calpin, ed., *The South African Way of Life*, London, 1953, p. 41.

[24] Herman, op. cit., pp. 48–9.

[25] Pettigrew, op. cit., p. 251.

[26] Herman, op. cit., p. 43.

JACOB LESTSCHINSKY: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY

Paul Glikson

BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

ON 20 March 1966 (1 Adar 5726) Jacob Lestschinsky passed away in Jerusalem in the eighty-ninth year of a life devoted to serving the Jewish people. He has been called the 'dean of Jewish sociologists' and was an outstanding practitioner in the fields of Jewish demography and statistics, social research, economic history, and historiography. Together with Arthur Ruppin he laid the foundations of the sociology of the Jews as a distinct branch of study. In his long life he witnessed, recorded, analysed, and evaluated the stormy, painful, and often tragic transformation of the Jewish people the world over and its readjustment to the social, economic, and political realities of the twentieth century. But he was not a scholar shut up in his study. He took a leading part in the political controversies which raged in Jewish public life over the last sixty years, and was several times imprisoned for his political and literary activities. He saw the birth of the Zionist idea and its culmination in the establishment of the State of Israel; he witnessed the birth and decline of the Diaspora-oriented Jewish socialist movements. He belonged to that great generation of Russian-Jewish intellectuals whose dreams were shattered by the impact of the Revolution. He fought fearlessly against antisemitism in Germany, in Latvia, and in Poland, being expelled from one country after another; and he constantly warned his contemporaries of the danger before it became a terrible reality.

Lestschinsky was born on 26 August 1876 in Gorodischtsche, a small Ukrainian town near Kiev. He received a strictly orthodox education until the age of eighteen, but under the influence of the *Haskalah* movement he turned away from religion. In 1898 he left his home town for Odessa, where he supported himself precariously by giving Hebrew lessons and studying at the same time for an external matriculation. He became a devoted follower of Ahad Ha'am and an ardent propagandist of the *Bnei Moshe* movement. He knew Ahad Ha'am's writings by heart and was famous for his exclusive use of the Hebrew

tongue; he even used to speak to tram conductors in Hebrew. In 1901 he went to Bern to study at the University. He became acquainted there with the ideas of Russian socialists and soon returned to propagate the Zionist-socialist movement in Warsaw and in other towns of the Russian Empire. His first political tract, a stencilled circular in Hebrew, 'The Avant-Garde of Russian Revolutionaries', dates from that time. He was arrested and imprisoned several times, but continued his political activities. He supported himself by running, together with his brother Joseph, a modernized *heder* in Gorodischtsche which became famous for its excellent Hebrew tuition. In June 1903 he took part in the historic meeting of Poale Zion in Vilna, at which he joined the minority left faction, advocating that the Poale Zionists should participate actively in the political struggle of the country. He was elected a Zionist delegate from Warsaw to the sixth Zionist Congress in Basle in 1903 (the famous 'Uganda congress'), in which he supported the territorialists. He later left the Zionist organization and was one of the founders of the Zionist-Socialist (S.S.) Party, becoming one of its leaders and contributing extensively to its publications, at the same time writing for other Jewish newspapers and periodicals, mainly on economic matters, under the pen-name Ahad Ha-kannaim.

Lestschinsky's first serious sociological study appeared in Ahad Ha'am's *Ha-Shiloah* in 1903. It was his famous essay, 'Statistics of a Small Town', a penetrating economic and sociological analysis of Jewish life in his native town, based on statistical material which he himself had collected and collated. A year later he published, in Peretz's *Yidisher Bibliotek*, 'The Jewish Worker in London', a description of the sweated labour system, and in 1906, 'The Jewish Worker in Russia'. These two studies were a pioneering attempt to apply Marxist analysis to the economic and social conditions of the Jewish working population. They established him in the forefront of economic historians of the Jewish people.

Although he participated in the Zionist-Socialist Party congress in Vienna in 1910, he virtually stood aloof from party politics after 1906. Shortly before the congress he was given the opportunity to leave Russia and study in Zürich. While at Zürich University he co-operated with the official Zionist organ *Ha-Olam* in which he published many valuable papers on Jewish economics and demography. Of particular interest was a series of articles on 'Conversions in Different Countries' (1911), and on 'German Jewry' (1912).

Before the outbreak of the First World War, Lestschinsky returned to Russia and for a time ran an employment exchange for Jewish refugees in Warsaw on behalf of ORT. After the February revolution he again became involved in party politics, being one of the founders of the United Jewish Socialist Party and a member of the editorial board of its organ, *Dos Neie Zeit*. He did not neglect, however, his scientific work,

publishing in 1917 *Dos Ekonomishe Lebn fun Yidn in Rusland farn XIX Yorhundert*, and (1920–1921) *Dos Yidishe Ekonomishe Lebn in der Yidisher Literatur*.

In 1921 Lestschinsky left Russia and settled in Berlin as correspondent of the Yiddish daily *Forward* of New York, with which paper he was to co-operate for over forty years. A year later he published his important study *Yidishe Folk in Zifern*, which set Jewish demography in a worldwide perspective. He helped to establish in Berlin an Institute for Research into Contemporary Jewry and Judaism, and between 1923 and 1925 edited an important periodical, *Bleter far Yidishe Demografie un Statistik*. In 1926 there appeared his classic study *Probleme der Bevoelkerungs-Bewegung bei den Juden*, one of the most brilliant investigations into the problems of Jewish demography ever published. He directed the economic and statistical section of YIVO, and in its publications, such as *Ekonomishe Shriften*, *Yidishe Ekonomik*, and *YIVO Bleter*, there appeared innumerable studies, monographs, surveys, and reviews from his pen.

It was not given to him, however, to pursue his scientific work in peace. On 30 January 1933 Hitler came to power, and Lestchinsky was almost immediately imprisoned for his despatches to *Forward* denouncing the Nazi regime; within a few weeks he was expelled from Germany. He went to Czechoslovakia, thence to Riga, and in 1934 he settled in Warsaw. He was expelled in 1937 for his articles on the plight of the Jewish population in Poland. He lived for a short time in Switzerland and in France, and in 1938 left for the United States.

He spent the war years in New York; he continued to write for *Forward*, and also published papers on Jewish demography, sociology, and economics in YIVO publications and other learned journals. He was one of the first to study the Holocaust period, and his books, *Die Yidishe Katastrofe* (New York, 1944), and *Crisis, Catastrophe and Survival* (New York, 1948), remain of basic importance. He also co-operated with the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress for which he prepared surveys, monographs, and papers on the situation of the Jewish people in the post-war period.

In 1947 he visited Israel for the first time to participate in the First World Congress of Jewish Studies in Jerusalem, and in 1959 made his permanent home in Israel. He continued to write in the last decade of his life; a number of his books appeared in Hebrew and in English, and many papers were published in periodicals both in Israel and abroad.

In spite of his great age, he took a keen and active interest in all matters pertaining to Jewish life. He was Honorary President of the Association for Jewish Demography and Statistics, a consultant to the World Jewish Congress, and a member of the advisory board of this *Journal*. In July 1965, on the occasion of the Fourth World Congress

of Jewish Studies, he expressed his pleasure in accepting the honorary chairmanship of the section on Contemporary Jewry and sent a message of greetings to its opening session.

His library and rich archives, which he managed to preserve through all the vicissitudes of his wanderings, found a permanent home at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

Lestschinsky's studies will remain a source from which future scholars will draw knowledge and inspiration. A new generation of Jewish social scientists has appeared; some may be equipped with keener analytical tools and have a subtler and more sophisticated approach, but none has surpassed him in breadth of vision or bettered his knowledge of Jewish life and love for his people.

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

The present bibliography contains but a small selection of Lestschinsky's published work. I have included his books, chapters in collective volumes, articles in encyclopaedias, papers and monographs published separately; and also a selection of articles in learned journals, most of them not listed in other bibliographies of Lestschinsky, viz.:

1. Materials for a bibliography of Jacob Lestschinsky's works (in Yiddish) published by J. Anilowicz in *YIVO Bleter*, Warsaw, 1936, No. 10, pp. 327–39. This contains an almost complete register of Lestschinsky's published writings up to 1936, including articles in daily papers and periodicals.
2. *Bibliography of the Publications of the Yiddish Scientific Institute—YIVO 1925–1941* (New York, 1943), and Vol. II, 1942–1950 (New York, 1955) which include a full list of Lestschinsky's studies, articles, and reviews in various YIVO publications.
3. *Jewish Demography and Statistics—Bibliography for 1920–1960* compiled and edited by O. Schmelz with the assistance of R. Shebath, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry (Jerusalem, 1961), in which many of Lestschinsky's writings dealing specifically with demographic problems are to be found.

   Compare also 'Demography of the Jews' (in Hebrew) by O. Schmelz and P. Glikson published in *Bitfutzot Hagola*, Jerusalem, 1964, Vol. VI, Nos. 3 and 4 (30 and 31), pp. 346–72.
4. *Current Events in Jewish Life* (in English and Yiddish) prepared by Jacob Lestschinsky. In this quarterly, published by the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress in New York since 1948, there appeared many surveys and studies by Lestschinsky dealing with Jewish communities the world over. A cumulative index for the first ten years is available.
5. *Gesher—Key to the years 1954–1964* (in Hebrew), published by the Israel Executive of the World Jewish Congress (Jerusalem, 1966), lists all the monographs and articles which Lestschinsky published in that Hebrew periodical.

Many additional bibliographical references are to be found in Alexander Manor's study, 'Jacob Lestschinsky—the Man and his Work' published in Hebrew by the Israel Executive of the World Jewish Congress (Jerusalem, 1961). (See also, Alexander Manor, 'Jacob Lestschinsky—on his Eighty-fifth Birthday' in this *Journal*, Vol. IV, No. 1, June 1962, pp. 101–6.)

It is to be hoped that one day a full bibliography of Lestschinsky's writings will be published. It will be an invaluable source of reference for all those who are interested in the history of the Jewish people in the first half of this century.

To show the range and versatility of Lestschinsky's scholarly work, the publications listed in this selection are given in the original languages, the Russian, Yiddish, and Hebrew titles being romanized. Within each linguistic group the material is arranged chronologically, and within each year in alphabetical order.

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ON THE BRAIN DRAIN FROM ISRAEL

Avner Hovne*

LONG before the existence of a formal interest in the economics of development, thoughtful men observed a tendency for the rich to get richer and for increasing poverty to chase the poor. In our day this tendency is sometimes observed in the relations between nations. Private capital which is amassed in the poorer countries tends to get transferred to the richer rather than be invested where it is so needed, at home. So with talent. Many physicians, scientists, and engineers whose service may be sorely needed in their homes in Africa, Asia, or Latin America tend to find satisfying employment only in the richer countries to the north. Even within the family of richer countries there is a significant flow of highly educated persons from countries lower on the economic ladder to those higher.

What of the brain drain from Israel? The question is debated in a lively fashion in the Israeli press. Most literate Israelis must be convinced that the brain drain from Israel is dangerously large. Students and professional workers in the United States and western Europe who happen to have a number of colleagues from Israel may agree.

From a purely subjective point of view, for many Israelis the matter is scarcely open for discussion. Consider a couple who devoted their lives to striking roots in the Jewish homeland, whose highly trained son or daughter—in whom so much love has been invested by the whole community—goes and stays abroad. Even one such *yored* (literally, 'one who descends'), is a serious loss, and when they number hundreds the flow is bitterly regretted.

However, it is possible to put aside subjective feelings and to view the matter objectively—as it is viewed in countries where the words for 'immigrant' and 'emigrant' refer only to lateral and not to vertical movement. In this article, this cold approach is attempted.

The chart shows some major elements we ought to take account of in thinking about the brain drain from Israel. This chart could be used to

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analyse the migrational activities of any particular population or of the population as a whole. In this article we are interested in that particular population which, following a modified Israeli usage, we call 'academics'. It consists of (*a*) university undergraduate students plus (*b*) all persons who have a first university degree and are actively studying or employed.



The chart shows four stocks (I, II, III, and IV) and eight flows between stocks. Two of the flows, A and B, are simple direct migration; academics from abroad come to Israel as immigrants, and Israelis emigrate. The remaining six flows are part of more complicated migration patterns. Non-Israeli academics come to Israel temporarily to study or to work. Many have no intention of staying permanently. Some may intend to stay but choose not to declare this from the start. Still others are, in some measure, trying Israel out. All these together form the

population labelled IV. From this population there is a regular flow in two directions: return abroad, D, and a transition of status to that of new Israeli, E. (Just what this latter may mean is discussed below.)

Israeli academics who go abroad temporarily to study or to work (II) are a mirror-image of the non-Israelis who are temporarily in Israel. Many have no intention of staying permanently; some intend to stay but choose not to declare this intention; some are trying out life abroad. Whatever their original intentions, there are regular flows from this population: return to Israel, G, and a transition of status to that of ex-Israeli, H.

In the light of this simple model, what do we mean by the brain drain?

1. At its simplest, it is direct emigration, B. More meaningfully, it also includes H to embrace all Israeli academics who give up their basic Israel attachment, circuitously as well as directly.

2. In many of the discussions in Israel, the brain drain refers to all Israeli academics who go abroad, whatever their apparent intentions (B plus F). This seems to me a much less sensible concept than that defined just above (B plus H), because it includes in the brain drain Israelis going abroad temporarily who will, in future years, return with flow G.

3. There is more point in lumping together, for certain purposes, all academics, Israeli and non-Israeli, who physically move from 'in Israel' to 'outside Israel' (B plus F plus D). This concept is analogous to the economist's 'gross export' which indiscriminately includes goods and services of both local and foreign origin.

The three definitions of the brain drain which are described above have this in common: they deal only with outflows. But surely it is more meaningful to consider inflows too, and to strike a balance. The numbers by which the outflow surpasses the inflow (if it does surpass it) is then the brain drain.

4. One useful way of striking such a balance uses the 'gross export' concept which was described in the paragraph numbered 3 and sets against it the 'gross import' (A plus G plus C). The difference between these two sums is the *current migration balance.*

5. Another attractive way of striking a balance takes no account of physical movements but focuses on shifts in basic attachment. It consists of the outflows (by basic attachment) as described in 1. above (B plus H) balanced by the inflows (A plus E). The difference is the *permanent migration balance.*

Still another kind of balance will be described shortly.

Not everyone would agree that it is most meaningful to concentrate on the balance between all inflows and all outflows. As suggested above,

most Israelis feel a pang at the loss to Israel of locally brought up youngsters, a loss for which the gain for Israel of a person with exactly equivalent abilities (though greatly desired in itself) is inadequate compensation.

By a radically different view, held by many scientists and economists, the *net* flow may be less important than the *total* flow: the sum of the inflow and the outflow. They consider that a high total flow has an invigorating effect on the quality of scientific work and of production, and, within limits of course, they would prefer a higher total flow with a less 'positive' net to a lower total flow with a more 'positive' net.

Another reservation to the approach to the brain drain taken here is this: the quality of the particular academic is of crucial importance—the level of his ability, his particular field of specialization, and to some extent his age. No distinctions of this kind have been attempted here, although they are obviously needed if one wants a rounded evaluation of a country's migration balances of academics.

With due regard to all these reservations, I think nevertheless that the last two concepts described above, the current and the permanent migration balances of academics, have considerable use. The current balance is the more useful, I think, because it focuses our attention on the rise and fall in the stocks of highly educated people who are, in fact, working in Israel. The permanent balance is important mainly for adding a future time dimension to our understanding of the current balance; if the current balance and the permanent balance are moving in sharply different ways, the trends in the current balance must be considered unstable. Together these are two key indicators of the country's economic capacity, security, and quality of life.

When we try to flesh out the two chosen concepts with actual numbers, we are in difficulty. I shall not burden the reader with technical statistical matters, and shall limit this discussion to a few figures of particular interest, general methods of making estimates, and conclusions. It should be clearly understood that the numbers given here are, in many cases, merely best guesses, subject to revision.

First, let us consider the current migration balance. We have estimates available for the following flows for the year 1965.

TABLE 1. *Academics—available flow figures, 1965*[1]

Outflow F (Israelis going temporarily abroad)	700
Outflow B (Israelis emigrating)	200
Total, F plus B	900
Inflow G (Israelis returning from abroad)	450

To complete the current migration balance we need estimates also for

the third outflow, D, and for the other two inflows, A and C, but none of these figures concerning non-Israeli academics is available.

One thing we can do with the figures we have is to combine them, to obtain a net outflow of 450. This might be identified as the brain drain by a sixth definition, the current migration balance of Israelis. The major virtue of this definition is that we can give it a numerical value. It is a more sophisticated version of the definition in 2. above, and therefore is, at first glance, of special interest to Israelis who are concerned with the loss to Israel of locally brought up youngsters. However, taken by itself, it can be grossly misleading without some knowledge of the dimensions of the flow H to the status of ex-Israeli.

In any event, this approach is a dead end, at the present, for the calculation of the current migration balance as a whole. So we try an indirect approach.

We first estimate the size of the academic population in Israel in 1965 and subtract from this figure a similar estimate for 1964. The result, 8,000, is the growth in the academic population over the year (the net growth of stocks I and IV). This growth must have been due to the combined action of two factors: (*a*) net migration of academics; and (*b*) local changes. It is possible to estimate the local changes: the pool of academics was augmented mainly by 6,000 first-year university students, while it was reduced by 1,000 women who, on leaving studies, took up full-time domestic activities and 1,000 active academics who retired or died. With local changes accounting for a net growth of 4,000 in the academic population over the years, it follows that net migration must have accounted for the other 4,000.[2] Leaving a wide margin for errors, I should suggest that the sum of inflows of academics across the Israel border in 1965 surpassed the sum of outflows by at least 2,000.

A similar exercise for earlier years leads to this conclusion: from the viewpoint of the current migration balance, there was no brain drain from Israel.

When we try to flesh out the concept of the permanent balance we encounter the very difficult problem which was hinted at at the start of the analysis: what can we *mean* by the transition of status from that of temporary visitor to that of new Israeli (or ex-Israeli)? I have at hand no answer to this question. One way to an answer may be to count changes in legal status from visitor to temporary resident, or to permanent resident, or to citizen. Another way may be to determine a certain number of years as the maximum for an academic to be outside his own country on temporary status; thereafter he is, by definition, a new Israeli (or an ex-Israeli). Both these approaches, in their simple forms, leave much to be desired. For example, more than 10 per cent of all Israeli academics who returned to Israel in recent years had been abroad eight years. But can the *general* cut-off year for a temporary resident's stay be beyond the eighth? Furthermore, we do not have

available a balanced set of figures under either of the two approaches suggested.

So I have no numerical estimate for the permanent migration balance for 1965 (or any other year). However, if we ask whether this balance *could* have been negative, we come to the conclusion that it was extremely unlikely.[3]

While there is no past evidence of a brain drain from Israel (by any broad balanced definition of the phrase) it is conceivable that there may be one in the future, even in the near future.

Israel is now experiencing an economic recession. Since mid-1965 there has been a rapid flattening out of the formerly sharply rising curve of employment and a marked rise in general unemployment. A particularly sharp rise in unemployment among academics has been one aspect of this recession. In recent years, when unemployment in general was about 3·5 per cent of the labour force, unemployed academics probably numbered at any one time no more than 100 to 200, producing an unemployment rate of under 0·2 per cent. Today, with unemployment well over 9 per cent, the unemployed academics number around 1,000 or 1 per cent of the academic labour force.[4]

Building construction, which was the lead industry in the boom, is now the lead industry in the recession. Engineers, architects, and all others whose jobs depend on building activity, have been the first and the most severely hit. But they are not alone; by mid-1966 the recession was quite general.

One effect of this downturn in the employment market for academics was an increase in the numbers going abroad, whether temporarily or permanently.

TABLE II. *Current migration balance of Israeli academics*

	1963	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
Going abroad (temporarily or emigrating)				
Undergraduate students	600	600	600	600
Graduate students	300	300	300	600
Total	900	900	900	1,200
Returning to Israel, total	150	280	450	600
Net current out-migration	750	620	450	600

According to these estimates, the recession did not affect the number of undergraduate students going abroad, but it led to a doubling of the number of graduate students and highly educated employed persons who left temporarily or permanently.

At the same time, there is reported a continued increase in the rather rapid rise in the flow of academics returning. What explains the rising return flow? It is the increased attention and assistance being given to

the Israeli academics abroad, according to the Director of the Office for Professional Workers of the National Employment Service. Possibly, also, a contraction in particular employment opportunities abroad, such as those for electronics engineers in the United States, has had an influence.

Even excluding the possibilities of 'pushes' back to Israel as a result of unfavourable conditions abroad, and assuming the continuation of the recession in Israel, we may say that it is not at all impossible that the return flow of Israelis should, nevertheless, increase over the next few years. Let me explain why I think this.

The academic, Israeli or non-Israeli, who would like (usually for quite non-economic reasons) to work in Israel, faces a difficult market for his talents. It is true that for so small a country there is a wide variety of academic talents employed, but for many of the special branches the numbers may be extremely small. So it is only by luck that the highly trained person will have waiting for him, at any given moment, the right opening.

However, the whole array of tiny markets for academic skills is quite dynamic. At present, no less than in 1965, there exist side by side unemployed academics and vacancies for professional workers—sometimes in what appears to the layman to be practically the same field. True, the sum of the unemployed has greatly risen and the sum of the vacancies has gone down; but still today vacancies exist and fresh vacancies continually open up.

So, if a highly trained person who wishes to come to Israel is willing to wait, something will often turn up. In normal circumstances he would have to do his waiting in Israel, in direct contact with his potential market, in order to get the job. Even with strong non-economic motivations, few academics can do that. That is where the role of a special and highly efficient international employment service comes in. I assume that, whatever the improvements in the Israeli services in the past few years, there is probably room for a good deal more improvement.

Assuming, as we are here, a continuation of the recession for a few years, we must expect the outflow of Israeli academics going abroad to continue to rise. The rise can be slowed down by the provision of special employment projects for academics (as is being done) and of active retraining programmes (as is also being done now to fill openings for librarians and safety engineers). In the longer run, the outflow of academics can be reduced by accurate forecasting of future job requirements in Israel and the provision of powerful incentives to students to acquire skills which will be needed here. But with continued general recession, a continuation of the rise seems most likely. I am suggesting that this rise can be offset by a rise in the return flow as a result of good employment information and active employment services. It is easy to

suppose that in such circumstances the flow to the status of ex-Israeli among Israelis temporarily abroad would also be curbed.

With shrinking employment opportunities, however, it is only for a few years that the outflows can be offset by lubrication of the inflows. In the long run it is the trend in economic opportunities that will mainly determine the flows and balances of academic migration. The positive balances of the past rested, in considerable measure, on non-economic factors, particularly on immigration with a flavour of rescue. But, in part at least, the balances were so positive because of Israel's outstanding performance in terms of economic growth and expanding employment. Barring unforeseen events, the existence of attractive opportunities for work in Israel will, in the not distant future, be decisive.

It is generally agreed among economists that the Government of Israel has a few years of grace in which to work out its international trade balance. These are also years of grace in which to develop new opportunities for academics on a broad front.

NOTES

[1] Source: Table II, p. 63. Following is an alternative calculation:

F plus B	4,000
G	2,700

giving a net outflow of 1,300 Israeli academics instead of 450. This calculation is obtained by taking 4 per cent of all residents leaving Israel (97,000) and of all residents returning (68,000) in 1965, as shown on p. 101 of *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1966*, No. 17, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. The 4 per cent figure reflects two assumptions: among all residents departing and returning—as in the population as a whole—(*a*) about one third of all persons are economically active, and (*b*) about one eighth of the economically active are academics.

I think the figures given in the text may be too low, but the figures derived above are not necessarily more accurate, resting as they do on strong assumptions.

[2] All these figures are derived from the *Statistical Abstract*, op. cit., mainly pp. 298 and 605, and from unpublished estimates of the Labour Force Survey of the Central Bureau of Statistics.

[3] If we accept that the net inflow on current balance was 2,000, this is equivalent to accepting that I plus IV gained 2,000 more than did II plus III during the year. We now ask under what conditions III could nevertheless gain as much as, or more than, I.

The condition is that IV gained 2,000 more than II. Now, we can make a rough estimate for the gain in II, which was 450 to 1,300 (Note 1 above). So the critical condition is that IV gained 2,000 plus 450 to 1,300, that is from 2,500 to 3,300.

Total outflow from IV, Flow D plus Flow E, though hard to estimate, was surely more than zero. So the condition under which the permanent migration balance was negative is that Flow C was somewhat more than 2,500. But temporary residents arriving in 1965 totalled 8,000 men, women, and children (*Statistical Abstract*, op. cit., p. 101); it is quite possible that more than 3 per cent were academics but quite unlikely that more than 30 per cent were.

[4] The general estimate of unemployment is from the Labour Force Survey; the estimated unemployment of academics is from the Office of Professional Workers.

A NOTE ON STANDARDIZED MORTALITY RATES FOR SOME JEWISH COMMUNITIES

S. J. Prais

THE lower mortality rates experienced by Jews, as evidenced by statistics compiled over the past century or so,[1] have always attracted interest; urbanization, a higher standard of living, and the dietary and hygiene requirements of Jewish tradition, as affecting both domestic and public life, have often been cited as causes. The statistics available in the past, however, have generally been on a 'crude' basis; that is to say, the comparisons between the Jewish and non-Jewish populations have made no allowance for differing age-distributions.[2] Some interesting post-war statistics have now come to hand for two westernized Jewish communities, namely, Switzerland with a Jewish community of 20,000, and Montreal (Canada) with a Jewish community of 100,000 in both of which the official census distinguishes religion, and for which age-specific mortality rates are thus available.[3] These allow *standardized* mortality rates to be calculated, on the basis of which comparisons can be made free of the disturbing effects of varying age-distributions. It perhaps hardly needs saying that age-standardization is of especial importance at present because of the ravages inflicted on European Jewry by the Germans, and the associated migrations before and after the war.

The immediate interest in this subject arises from proposals to estimate the size of the Jewish community in Great Britain on the basis of a count of Jewish burials, which would be multiplied by the reciprocal of age-specific mortality rates for England and Wales as published by the Registrar-General. If Jewish mortality (at each age) were on average lower than general mortality, this method would tend to underestimate the size of the Jewish population; the comparisons made in this Note are intended to provide a basis for an overall adjustment to the calculation to allow for any difference in Jewish mortality experience.

1. *Some comparisons of crude rates*

The comparisons made by Ruppin[4] for the pre-war period, using

crude mortality rates, might lead one to expect that Jewish mortality is 10–30 per cent lower than general mortality. Some typical examples are:

		Death Rates	
		Jews	*Non-Jews*
Bulgaria	(1934)	10·2	15·6
Czechoslovakia	(1933)	12·8	13·9
Hungary	(1935)	13·9	15·8
Yugoslavia	(1933)	12·7	17·5

For the post-war period a comparison of crude rates gives a contrary picture. From the data in Table 1, it might be thought that Jewish mortality in Switzerland is more than half as high again as that of the Protestant and Catholic communities (and of the latter two, that the Catholic community is the healthier); and, for Montreal, that the Jewish mortality rate has been rising and now exceeds that of the non-Jewish population. It will be seen below that, after standardization for age, the reverse of these propositions is nearer the truth.

TABLE 1. *Crude death rates for Jewish and non-Jewish population, Switzerland and Montreal (Canada), 1940–62*

	Protestant	*Catholic*	*Jews*
		Per mille	
SWITZERLAND			
1940–46	11·9	11·2	17·1
1947–54	11·0	9·8	16·3
1959–62	10·8	8·2	15·7
	Total Population		*Jews*
MONTREAL			
1941	10·8		7·6
1951	9·7		7·3
1961	8·4		9·3

2. *The basis of standardization*

A word on the methodology of standardization may not be out of place. A standardized mortality rate summarizes for purposes of comparison, in a single figure, the mortality experience of a population. To make such comparisons free of the disturbing effects of varying age-distributions, it is necessary to fix on a particular age-distribution to be used as the Standard. For example, in comparing the mortality experience of a town such as Brighton with that of the whole of England, it would be natural to take the age-distribution of England as the Standard of comparison; the 'standardized mortality rate for Brighton' would then give the number of deaths in that town, per 1,000 of the population, that would occur if it had the same age-distribution as the country as a whole.

In our case we are interested in comparing a number of Jewish com-

munities in various parts of the world, and at different dates, and it must be said at the outset that the choice of age-distribution to be used as the Standard is not necessarily unique or obvious. In view of the main object of the exercise, the age-distribution for England and Wales in 1951 was used as the Standard; this population is probably as 'normal' as any and—what is important for the analyst—the Census information for that year is now fully analysed and published.[5]

No doubt, a case could be made for using some other population as a Standard but, so long as the population chosen is not too abnormal in its age-structure, it is not to be expected that very different results would emerge in the comparisons made below.[6] Israel would provide an example of an abnormal age-distribution, which might lead to curious results if used as a Standard in comparisons of this type.

In principle, demographic comparisons can be refined by standardizing for any number of variables apart from age. In fact, it is quite usual to standardize for age and sex simultaneously. Information on sex was not available to allow this to be done here; but it probably does not matter too much, for the following reason. As already said, Jewish populations at the moment may be expected to have rather abnormal age-distributions and, since mortality varies strongly with age, it is important to standardize for it. On the other hand, the sex-ratio for Jewish communities is probably far less abnormal; also, mortality is not so very different for the sexes, and the effect of standardization by sex (if the information were available!) cannot therefore be expected to be of great consequence.

3. *Comparisons of standardized rates*

TABLE 2. *Switzerland: Age-specific death rates, per mille*

	1940–46			*1947–54*			*1959–62*		
	Protestant	*Catholic*	*Jews*	*Protestant*	*Catholic*	*Jews*	*Protestant*	*Catholic*	*Jews*
0*	36·1	46·7	45·7	28·2	36·8	26·3	19·5	23·0	10·2
1–4	3·1	4·0	2·1	1·8	2·1	1·0	1·2	1·3	0·6
5–14	1·0	1·3	1·6	0·7	0·8	0·6	0·4	0·5	0·4
15–19	1·6	1·8	1·5	1·0	1·0	0·8	0·8	0·8	0·9
20–29	2·6	2·6	1·8	1·5	1·6	1·7	1·1	1·0	1·0
30–39	2·9	3·1	2·7	2·1	2·3	1·9	1·5	1·4	0·9
40–49	5·2	5·6	6·6	4·1	4·4	4·9	3·3	3·4	3·2
50–59	12·0	12·6	15·6	10·2	10·5	10·8	8·5	8·8	8·7
60–69	29·6	30·4	33·6	25·8	26·4	28·6	21·8	22·3	23·1
70+	101·0	100·8	103·7	87·9	88·9	86·5	82·2	84·9	83·7

* Per thousand live births

TABLE 3. *Montreal: Age-specific death rates, per mille*

	1941		1951		1961	
	Total Population	*Jews*	*Total Population*	*Jews*	*Total Population*	*Jews*
0–4	21·8	7·4	11·5	2·8	6·1	1·8
5–9	1·5	0·9	0·7	0·8	0·5	1·0
10–14	1·1	0·5	0·4	0·5	0·3	0·3
15–19	1·7	0·9	1·0	0·6	0·6	0·2
20–24	2·3	1·9	1·0	—	0·7	0·5
25–34	3·1	2·1	0·7	0·9	1·0	0·9
35–44	5·3	2·9	3·4	2·3	2·4	1·6
45–54	11·0	7·8	8·9	5·9	7·9	5·4
55–64	24·2	26·4	23·1	20·4	18·3	16·6
65–69	47·9	38·1	40·6	38·3	38·5	25·5
70+	104·5	79·3	96·5	89·6	85·1	79·3

Table 4 sets out the results of calculations made from the basic data presented in Tables 2 and 3. Figures are included for England and Wales, 1941–61, to provide an example of general trends in mortality in a further European country; these figures show a steady decline in mortality, the rate of decline averaging about 1½ per cent a year. Despite the war, there does not seem to be much difference between the decline in the decade 1941–51 and the decline in the subsequent decade, 1951–61 (of course, the figures for 1941 relate only to civilian deaths).

Without exception, the standardized figures shown in Table 4 for Switzerland and Canada, for each of the communities distinguished, also show declines and at roughly the same rate.

TABLE 4. *Standardized death rates for Jewish and non-Jewish populations, Switzerland and Montreal (Canada), and England and Wales, 1940–62*

	Protestant	*Catholic*	*Jews*
		Per mille	
SWITZERLAND			
1940–46	13·6	14·2	14·9
1947–54	11·4	11·8	11·7
1959–62	10·0	10·3	9·9
	Total Population		*Jews*
MONTREAL			
1941	16·8		12·6
1951	13·8		11·6
1961	11·6		9·7
	Total Population		
ENGLAND AND WALES			
1941	14·6		
1951	12·5*		
1961	10·7		

* This population is taken as the basis for age-standardization; see text.

The effects of the war on the Jewish community are apparent in the standardized rates for Switzerland; in the period 1940–6, Jewish mortality was higher than for the Protestant and for the Catholic communities of that country, presumably owing to weak and ill refugees from Germany. By 1947–54, Jewish mortality had fallen, and was *between* that of the Protestant and Catholic communities; and by 1959–62 it had fallen further, and was somewhat lower than the mortality of both those communities.[7] It is remarkable that the rate for Swiss Jews for this last period, at 9·9 per thousand, had already fallen below that for England and Wales, 1961, by about a tenth.

For Montreal, the standardized rate for the Jewish community is, throughout the period, below that of the general population (contrary to the crude rate, which shows a surprising rise in 1961 to a higher level than for the general population; this rise in the crude rate may be presumed to reflect an ageing of the population). By 1961, the standardized rate had fallen to 9·7 per thousand, which is very similar to the latest figure for Switzerland.

It is clearly of interest to ask how these standardized rates for the Jewish communities of Switzerland and Montreal would compare with the Jewish population of Israel, despite its different ethnic composition (about half the population being of oriental origin), and the different economic and climatic conditions. Surprisingly, a standardized rate for 1965 of 9·7 per thousand was found—very close indeed to the 9·7 and 9·9 found for Switzerland and Canada respectively.[8] The 'younger' age-distribution in Israel makes the crude rate there exceptionally low, at 6·4 per thousand.

In view of the limited aims of the enquiry, I did not systematically pursue the question whether the difference between Jewish and general mortality varied with age; the general impression to be derived from the data, however, is that the difference is somewhat greater at younger ages (the greatest difference being in infantile mortality), and narrows at older ages (though it does not disappear even for the group aged over 70). The data show some variability and the matter deserves further enquiry; to yield results of any reliability it would be necessary to examine data for more countries than were here available.[9]

4. *Conclusions*

(i) After a rise in the war period, as shown by Swiss statistics, Jewish mortality has now fallen again to levels below that of the general population. In Switzerland, the difference is not, however, very great, amounting to between 1 and 4 per cent; in Montreal, the difference is greater, as much as 17 per cent, but the mortality rate for the general population there seems high (at least in comparison to experience in England and Wales), and a difference as large as this is probably not widespread.

(ii) The latest available figures (1960–5) for standardized Jewish

death rates for Switzerland, Montreal, and Israel, now all lie in a narrow range of 9–10 per thousand.

(iii) The main object of the present investigation is to provide a reasoned guess of the extent to which Jewish mortality in England differs from that of the general population. The evidence available is clearly not extensive, but it may be said that it presents a consistent picture. First, it is clear that Jewish mortality in England must be expected to be lower than general mortality. Secondly, as to the extent of the difference: since England did not have as great a post-war immigration of refugees as Switzerland, Jewish mortality in England is probably lower than in Switzerland; further, English general mortality exceeds that in Switzerland. Hence the difference between Jewish and general mortality in England probably exceeds that in Switzerland. Thirdly, in view of the high mortality of the non-Jewish population in Montreal, the difference of 17 per cent found there might be regarded as an upper limit. I would therefore guess that Jewish mortality in England falls below that of the general population by 5 to 15 per cent, that is, I think it unlikely that the difference is less than 5 per cent, or more than 15 per cent. This is about half the difference suggested by Ruppin's comparisons for the pre-war period.

NOTES

[1] See, for example, A. Ruppin, *The Jews of Today*, London, 1911, *The Jews in the Modern World*, London, 1934, and *Jewish Fate and Future*, London, 1940.

[2] One must exempt from this stricture the comparisons made of infantile mortality rates; but, though very convincing, that is only a small part of the story.

[3] My thanks are due to Professor H. Guth of the University of Basel, and to the Swiss Federal Bureau of Statistics, for their kindness in supplying special tabulations for Switzerland supplementary to those in the Bureau's 1959 publication, *Statistische Quellenwerke der Schweiz: Bevölkerungsbewegung in der Schweiz, 1949–1956/57* (Bern); and to Dr. L. Rosenberg, of the Bureau of Social and Economic Research of the Canadian Jewish Congress, for special tabulations for Montreal. I am also glad to acknowledge the help of Mrs. Marlena Schmool, of the Statistical Research Unit of The Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, in the preparation of this note.

[4] *Jewish Fate and Future*, p. 79.

[5] Whereas the Registrar-General has not yet published his Decennial Supplement for the 1961 Census.

[6] I rely on the proposition that, in calculating weighted averages, small errors in weights are usually unimportant.

[7] It will incidentally be noticed, as hinted in section 2, that the Swiss Catholic community has a higher standardized mortality rate throughout the period than does the Swiss Protestant community—the reverse of the impression given by the *crude* rates. The lower crude rates for the Catholic community reflects their 'younger' age-distribution which is probably the result of heavy temporary immigration of young Italians (on short-term labour permits).

[8] Strictly speaking, an allowance should be made for the lapse of four years between the calculation for Israel (1965) and for the other two countries (1959–62 and 1961); on extrapolating the last observed rates to decline, the expected figures in 1965 for the Swiss and Canadian Jewish communities would be 9·2 and 9·0—putting mortality in Israel slightly higher.

[9] I understand from Dr. O. Schmelz, of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, that some analyses of European pre-war data have been carried out there; the publication of these calculations would be of great interest.

THE MILLENNIAL INTERPLAY OF JUDAISM AND JEWRY

James Parkes

THE announcement that the applicant for the new Chair of Religion in the University of Lancaster might himself be of any religion or of none opened doors to many speculations. If it meant that the new professor might be free to examine religion from the standpoint of either a theist or an atheist, then it would be of little interest to anyone except the professional propagandists of the two sides. But if it means that the University considers religion in itself to be an appropriate subject for objective, academic study, since, whatever one's personal attitude, it has so far been an important aspect of every human society, then extremely interesting perspectives are opened.

Primitive religion is an obvious part of the anthropological study of primitive peoples. But it is when the subject touches more developed societies that, I confess, I do not know of a similar interest. Assyria and Babylon offer a fascinating contrast with Egypt. But I do not know whether one could turn easily to a source for a discussion of whether the contrasting religions of the Mesopotamian and Nilotic valleys explained the differences in their societies, or whether scholars would hold that the different temperaments of Mesopotamians and Egyptians explain the differences in their religions. Greece and Rome offer a similarly absorbing contrast. But I do not remember as a classical scholar—I admit half a century ago—any discussion of whether the different temperaments of two different ethnic mixtures created the contrast between the *gravitas*, solemnity—and fundamental superficiality—of Roman religion and the profound and perpetually enquiring religious philosophy of the Greeks. There was reason in the frequent remark of Charles Singer that the Chinese was the only great civilization that did not have an equally great religion or philosophy at its root. But was the subject of the intersection of religion and society a fully developed discipline before the provocative but stimulating suggestions of Toynbee's *Study of History*?

I am not, however, primarily interested in extinct societies. This seems to me an absorbingly important aspect of the contemporary scene. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism have all been obvious parts of distinguishable human societies. The same is true

of Marxism. In contrast with them all is the levelling influence of modern 'Humanism' and agnosticism. Japanese airlines may dress up hostesses as Geishas—or what Gilbert and Sullivan would recognize as the equivalent—but I suspect that the airfield of Tokyo is indistinguishable from that of Baghdad or Minneapolis. But all these separate facts raise the question whether a society creates its ideology or religion, or whether a religion or ideology creates an appropriate society, or whether, indeed, a modern society needs to trouble itself about the matter at all. This is quite a different subject from Comparative Religion, as it is sometimes treated. When comparative religion and sociology are joined—as at the London School of Economics—both are enriched. But to get the full flavour, there should be the same evaluation and critique from the theological point of view as from the sociological, and that means delicate treading!

It is to be hoped that the newly created Lancaster Faculty of Religion really concerns itself with this field, and not with the sterile argument between theism and atheism. Nor need Lancaster be alone in its study. The Sussex project for the analysis of 'collective psychopathology' should have immensely valuable contributions to make. For the formative influences, the ideologies, the spiritual backgrounds which make possible Nazism or Fascism are obviously more important than the momentary economic or political conditions which enable them to seize control of the destinies of great societies like Germany, Italy, or any other country. Southampton too has a new Chair of Religion, and it will be interesting to see whether it seeks to create a copy of the Oxbridge tradition, or joins in the adventure of a new and broader approach to the subject.

The reference to Marxism really raises a separate subject all by itself, and I can only touch upon it here. Communist Russia and Communist China offer an admirable field for study. Are the differences between Russia and China due to the fact that Russian Communism grew up in a society already moulded by the Orthodox Christianity of Tsarism whereas Chinese Communism had no such foundation on which to build or conflicting ideology to combat?

Again, one can ask what will be the alternative to religion or ideology as the creator of the arts in the societies of the future? I suspect that the world will soon tire of the idea that all the artist has to do is to express himself and his own feelings, an idea which presupposes that an artist has automatically an immensely interesting self which all the world will be fascinated reverently to observe. But if he does not express himself, what factor common to him and his environment does he express? And with how much freedom?

To return to the subject of *theistic religion* and society: is Toynbee right in assuming that a 'higher' religion must stand over against the society in which it is practised? Is there a single rule that it is a society

which creates its religion, or is the truth always the reverse? Or is there a constant interplay with the initiative coming now from the principles of the ideology, now from some factor, geographic, political, or economic, in the contemporary society? One can probably at once rule out the Toynbeean thesis. For while it is true that Christianity has always been embodied in a Church, there have been long periods when Church and society were considered to be coterminous, and Rome is only just beginning to accept religious freedom in societies which have large Catholic majorities, such as the Irish Republic or Spain. There the Catholic faith did not 'stand over against' its society; and the same was true, not only of the whole of medieval Europe, but of Protestant Germany or the Republic of Geneva. Moreover, neither Judaism nor Islam, which are certainly 'higher religions', have 'Churches' in the Christian sense embodied in their traditions. A 'higher' religion may, or may not, stand over against the society in which it is practised.

In the same way there is no single answer as to which came first, the society or the religion. One could, perhaps, deduce that the pressure to *change* would usually have its origin in the society, while the pressure to *preserve* originated in the ideology. But one would still have innumerable examples to consider on their own merits. Economics probably had a potent influence in leading to success the campaign for the abolition of the slave trade, and then of slavery, but would economics have done it without Wilberforce and the Clapham Sect? The Churches, Protestant and Catholic alike, certainly acted as a brake on the humanizing of law from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth; but was it really their theology of the divine origin of every law of the Bible, or was that a convenient smoke-screen for the desire of the ruling classes to retain their privileges—and their pheasants? And where does one fit the witch trials into this picture? There is in the Parkes Library at Southampton University a rare seventeenth-century pamphlet, an anonymous *Address to the Jurymen of England*, pleading that the old women being tried at that time were not the witches described in the Old Testament. If they were, then the author admits that God himself says that they are to be burned, and there is no alternative. But he argues ingeniously that they are not, and that juries are consequently free to find a lesser penalty. Was the unknown author typical or exceptional?

One could go on multiplying individual examples in which the answer is not immediately obvious to an objective study; and one would have another extremely interesting field in considering the situation when an already established society changes its religion or ideology. In Asia and Africa this has happened in innumerable cases through western Christian missionaries, but it is also an important aspect of the study of the foundations of Europe, which had great pagan civilizations before it became Christian, just as Russia had a great Christian civilization before it became Communist.

Those who know my writings will realize that my own interest in this topic stems from the fact that I believe there is an almost perfect 'control' for the study of this complex, important, and beguiling subject in the picture presented by the interplay of Judaism and Jewish history for the nearly three thousand years from the eighth century prophets up to the period of emancipation at the beginning of the nineteenth century. We are fortunate, both in the length of the period in which we have contemporary written records, and in the variety displayed alike by the religion and the people. It is a truism that there would be no Judaism if there were no Jewish people. It is equally true that there would be no Jewish people if there had been no distinctive and autonomous Judaism during the period involved. But there is more in it than that. The interplay between people and religion is so close that a religious Jew can say with complete scholarly objectivity that the presence of a divine guidance throughout a fantastic and unique history is evidenced by the survival of the Jewish people, not as a fossil but as a creative and dynamic society; while at the same time the agnostic sociologist can accept the same facts as evidence of the instinctive creation of the appropriate ideology in a people which is adequately in control of its destiny and determined to survive. Of course, if either side insists that their point of view can be 'proved', the identity is forfeited. But it is only a minority today which either demands that religion should cease to be a 'faith' and become a matter of proof, or insists that any view of ultimate reality is a matter of scientific demonstration.

It is most appropriate to begin with the great prophets, because from that point there is no question but that, however much backsliding there may have been, two principles were henceforth accepted as part of the religion of Sinai. The first was that an ethical monotheism was of universal significance, and not just the privilege of a single people. They might be a nation of priests, but of priests serving the whole world; they might have a unique relationship to the one God, but it was as a responsibility not a privilege—'you only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities' (Amos iii. 2). The second, expressed in modern terms, is that there is no such thing as a separate and *automatically* privileged 'Hebrew race'. Of course, the ancient Israelites did not think in these terms. But the prophets are frequently insisting on the equal care of the one God for all peoples—'are you not as the Ethiopians unto me?' says Amos (ix. 7); 'Israel shall be third after Egypt and Assyria,' says a prophecy in the book of Isaiah (xix. 24); 'thy father was an Amorite and thy mother a Hittite,' says Ezekiel. That such impartiality was difficult for ordinary men to achieve or accept is obvious; but there was no religious authority for a belief in an automatic privilege attaching to a 'chosen people'. And it must be remembered that, while the voice of Amos or Ezekiel was

the voice of only one man, it was not an individual decision of one man that the works of Amos and Ezekiel should be preserved, and later brought into the canon of Holy Scripture.

For those who accept the critical study of the Bible, the book of Deuteronomy is the superb edition of the guide lines of the righteous community, as it was expressed in terms of profound theology and morals by the great prophets. Coupled with the transference by the reforms of Josiah of all sacrificial worship to the Temple at Jerusalem, Deuteronomy offers an initial example of the leitmotif of the whole subsequent story. The closing of the ancient high places was necessary for the religious discipline of the people; the restatement of the mass of ancient legislation in tune with prophetic insights was necessary to assist popular obedience to the basic religious authority of Sinai.

In the first of these reforms we have an interesting parallel with the weaning of Europe from many forms of paganism to medieval Christianity. For the Christian clergy often took the opposite line. They accepted sacred springs and woods, holy sites and customs, and strove to render them innocuous by baptizing the ancient pagan divinity of the shrine or custom. It would be interesting to analyse which worked the better for the new faith. Certainly neither succeeded immediately. In fact some have not succeeded yet. Fifty years ago in Guernsey I saw its two famous Phoenician goddesses, now placed outside parish churches, decorated at the same time that the church itself was decorated. What was important for the future in the Jewish case is that the local priesthood was preserved when the shrines were closed, and given a place by rotation in the service of the central shrine at Jerusalem.

The introduction of Jerusalem into the picture presents an appropriate place for the mention of the extraordinary *mystique* which attaches to that city in both Judaism and the Jewish people. It is quite unscholarly to say either that it is the Temple which makes Jerusalem holy or that it is Jerusalem which makes the Temple holy. In the awesome vision of the abandonment of his people by the Deity, embodied in the tenth and subsequent chapters of Ezekiel, it is difficult to say whether Jerusalem is abandoned because of the idolatry of the Temple, or the Temple abandoned because of the sins of the inhabitants of the city. The mystique of Jerusalem is unique, and only partially to be explained by the natural desire of a homeless people to embody the idea of home in some concrete memory, for it began long before the total dispersion of the people. The psalms are full of it; the prophets are conscious of it; it alone explains the sacrifices that were willingly endured to preserve it during the siege of 1948.

The armoured lorries that fought their way to the city bore the cry of the Babylonian exiles—'if I forget thee, O Jerusalem . . .'—and it is the Babylonian exile that provides the next chapter of the story. For it

shows the religion initiating fundamental novelties because of the needs of the people. I refer, of course, to the emergence of the synagogue, and of a worship without sacrifice, without clergy, and without taboos. We can probably add the development of a canon of sacred Scripture, or, at least, the astonishing concept of a sacred canon coupled with a human agency of selection and editing. For the book of Chronicles reveals that the Babylonian exiles took with them a considerable number of books which were subsequently not admitted to the canon. It refers again and again to both historical and prophetic books used for its compilation, but which have not been preserved. A typical example is the closing sentence of the biography of David: 'now the acts of David the king, first and last, behold they are written in the book of Samuel the seer, and in the book of Nathan the prophet, and in the book of Gad the seer' (1 Chron. xxix. 29; cf. 2 Chron. ix. 29).

We have not long to go before the next revolutionary activity of people and religion, and here occurs the first recorded example of the obvious fact that there are always some who do not like revolutions and prefer the old ways. The revolutionary this time was Ezra the Scribe, a man whose greatness is almost always ignored in traditional Christian scholarship, but whom the rabbis estimate more justly in saying that he would have been worthy to receive the revelation of Sinai had it not been already given to Moses. Ezra brought back to Jerusalem from Babylon a further revision of the divine law, and caused it to be read to the whole people and translated and explained in the vernacular for its better understanding (Neh. ch. viii). This reading was not a single unrepeated event. It was to be followed by a regular reading of Scripture in all local centres where Jews lived, and this reading was to take place twice a week.

Ezra, like his contemporaries, believed that exile had been a punishment for the sins of the people, and, in initiating a system by which every Tom, Dick, and Harry should have the opportunity of understanding what were his obligations towards the God of Israel, Ezra set the seal on the insistence that the religion of Israel concerned, not a priestly caste, but the whole people of Israel. Judaism was not a 'Church', and the obligations of its religious leaders extended to the whole of the people. It is the maintenance of this fundamental idea through more than two millennia that makes the interplay of Judaism and Jewry so creative a study.

The reforms of Ezra provoked a reaction from the conservative inhabitants of the territory, in particular from the Samaritans. This opposition seems to have taken some time to crystallize, but was finally centred in three points: the site of the Temple, the legitimacy of foreign wives, and the extent of the sacred scriptures and their interpretation. It is this last that suggests that the conflict lasted a long period, for the Samaritan Pentateuch rests on the latest edition of the Jewish

Pentateuch; so that it is evident that the Samaritans still had relations with Jerusalem when they accepted it. Likewise, the Samaritan system of interpretation suggests a considerable period when there was a tradition of interpretation common to both peoples. The attempt of the Samaritans to get the returning exiles to recognize that the Gerizim shrine was older and more authentic than the Jerusalem innovation, and the insistence of Ezra on reversing the practice of Solomon in taking wives from other peoples and allowing their religious practices, date, however, from the generation of the return. In these spheres the break between revolutionary and conservative was immediate.

The period which followed, the period of 'The Men of the Great Synagogue', consolidated the work of Ezra and his pioneers. The local priesthood almost certainly was called in to fulfil the new role of local religious teacher. Because this regular local reading required the copying out of a very large number of scrolls of Torah, these local teachers became known as the scribes, since the copying was one, though only one, of their functions. Our documents for the period which intervened between Ezra and the Maccabees are almost non-existent, but for our purpose the curt summaries of *Pirqe Aboth* are immensely illuminating. For the Men of the Great Synagogue are described as advising their successors 'to be deliberate in judging, to raise up many disciples, and to make a hedge about the Torah'.

There is no doubt that the great prophets intended their exhortations and warnings to reach the whole people. The measures taken by Ezra and his successors ensured that their reforms should actually do so. Both the religion and the people are involved. Rabbinic law—if one may use a completely anachronistic phrase, for 'rabbi' is a much later word—was, if not an innovation, at any rate a standardization, of the concept of there being a complete written code whose interpretation lay with the judges of each case and generation. It was made acceptable by the 'myth' (to use a word popularized by contemporary German theology for a genuine religious symbol) that it embodied an already existing tradition, given to Moses in full, and transmitted by him to Joshua, thence to the judges, and thence to the prophets who transmitted it to the generation of the Return. 'Demythologized', it states that there was continuity and legitimacy in the development of the religion as the way of life for a people, a fact which we would all recognize.

The people had naturally had local courts and local judges from the earliest days, for such things are of the essence of social life in its most primitive forms. But we know almost nothing of the ways in which such judges were selected, or such courts administered. What is interesting in the reforms of the Men of the Great Synagogue and their successors is the gradual assumption that the teachers of Torah should also be judges of Torah. A number of aphorisms of *Pirqe Aboth* deal with the work of a judge, and this is our main evidence that these judges were

teachers of Torah, i.e. scribes. This is in line with the next injunction that the teachers should 'raise up many disciples'. In the later days of the rabbis, students had a recognized place in the court proceedings. The 'disciples' referred to here were their predecessors. But this training of disciples was, in fact, transforming the profession from a hereditary one (for the priestly and levitical castes were hereditary) into one for which training was necessary. In fact at this period a form of ordination was introduced as a guarantee of fitness, and this has survived in various forms to modern times.

If in these two matters the traditions of the religion were being modified, the third recommendation imposed a new discipline on the people. A hedge or fence was to be erected round the Torah to safeguard its observance by a generation which would find observance increasingly difficult as their life moved from that of a national community inhabiting its own land and forming the overwhelming bulk of its population, to the situation of a dispersed people which, even in its own land, saw many foreign elements in its cities and on its roads. The fence about the Torah enabled the average Jew to be loyal to his religion in these new conditions. We must remember that many of the foreign influences to which he became subject were both intellectually and aesthetically alluring, as well as economically profitable. The clear-cut permissions and prohibitions with which the teachers of Torah gradually surrounded the vaguer generalizations of the written Scriptures were of supreme importance.

Rabbinical Judaism was formed during these largely unknown centuries. Superficially the centre of the religion of the people of Israel was the great Temple at Jerusalem. But actually that became more and more a façade protecting a small but wealthy group of families of correct descent, while the real religion of the people moved from central Temple to local synagogue. The move was aided by the fact that the Temple became also the centre of the conservative reaction to the constant innovations forced on the teachers of Torah, as in both market place and local court they emended, developed, or abandoned the strict letter of tradition in accordance with their overriding obedience to the divine command to meet the spiritual needs of the people as a whole. At the same time, it must not be thought that they were consciously 'using' religion for 'national survival'. These are modern terms. But they certainly recognized, as their innovations multiplied, that they had not merely to proclaim the truth, but to make it acceptable to their contemporaries. This, no doubt, was a gradual process. Our evidence is all later. But the Christian Gospels make it evident that by the first century of the common era, the Pharisees were accused by their enemies of evolving traditions which negatived the plain words of the written Scriptures (Mark ch. vii). The 'myth' that all interpretations were already known to Moses at Sinai doubtless made it easier for them to

reconcile their activity with the words of Deuteronomy that 'ye shall not add to the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish aught from it' (iv. 2). But Joshua b. Hananiah was able to state categorically that 'we do not impose on the community a hardship which the majority cannot endure' in relation to mourning for the destruction of the Temple in 70 C.E. (T.B., Baba Bathra 60b). The last survivor of the Men of the Great Synagogue handed down this triple aphorism: 'upon three things the world standeth: upon Torah, upon worship, and upon the showing of kindness'.

The leaders of Jewry during these centuries had their reward when the orders of Antiochus Epiphanes made religious life impossible. It was not the high priesthood which dared to disobey. It was the ordinary rank and file of the people who produced the Maccabean martyrs. There were the women who had had their children circumcised; there were those who refused to eat of forbidden meats. 'Wherefore they chose rather to die that they might not be defiled with meats, and that they might not profane the holy covenant; so then they died' (1 Macc. i. 63). The same thing happened when the troops of Antiochus attacked the pious rebels on the Sabbath. They simply allowed themselves to be killed. This led the religious leaders to an immediate adjustment of their Sabbath fence. They allowed resistance, a fact which must have surprised the Syrian troops at the appropriate moment.

In the two centuries which intervened between the Maccabean rising and the fall of Jerusalem reaction to the steady increase of interpretation by the teachers of Torah (now organized as the Pharisees) produced an opposition party, the Sadducees, centred in the Temple. The latter accepted the divine revelation of the written Scriptures, but refused to accept the authority of interpretation. The Pharisees were more realistic, recognizing that, from the practical point of view of court decisions, there could be only one category of authority. The Sadducean alternative offered either increasing harshness, if the written law was literally carried out, or confusion. The Pharisees, on the other hand, endowed their interpretations with the same authority as the words of the written Torah. To do this they must have had some adequate system for guaranteeing coherence and responsibility. It is a pity that we know practically nothing of the procedure by which they trained their disciples and regularized their interpretations. I suppose the university of Al Azhar in Cairo offers the nearest parallel to how a Pharisaic academy must have worked.

The next great test came with the simultaneous destruction of the autonomy of the state, the worship of the Temple, and the central position of the land of Israel as the dwelling place of Jews. When Judea changed its name to Palestina in 135 C.E., there were almost certainly more Jews in Babylon and Alexandria than there were in Judea. Their Judaism was all that was left to identify a scattered people, without

political identity, without Temple or priesthood, without any ruling class. For seventeen hundred years, or until emancipation, the term *Judaismus* means equally the Jewish people and their religion, according to the context. It could be said of either that it alone preserved the identity of the other. But for either that preservation was a voluntary act. At any time a Jew could quit the community and merge into the environment without sacrificing his monotheism. He could become either a Christian or, after the seventh century, a Muslim. And Judaism itself could have accepted the claims of its two daughters that they had preserved and enhanced those spiritual qualities which had once marked out Jews as a divinely chosen people.

During this long period we have basically to consider only one type of Judaism, that of the rabbis, rooted in the doctrine of interpretation, and expressed in the Mishnah, the Talmuds, and their commentaries. It is legitimate to query whether such a monolithic form would be natural to the religion of a free people, able to enjoy a relatively complete security. But we are not here dealing with a free people; and the early struggles of the rabbis to establish their absolute authority were justified by history. For *the Jewish people* emerged into emancipation capable of meeting its new challenges. Nothing was more foolish or blind in the original Toynbeean analysis of Jewry than to describe it as a fossil of something else. *Judaism* was less fortunate. Emancipation led to conflicting religious developments.

It is important to realize that there was a long and bitter struggle before the authority of the rabbis was recognized. The desire to be 'like all other peoples' is not a product of modern agnostic Zionism. It was the reasonable attitude of the *amme ha-aretz* of the second century. They had no intention of deserting the basic tenets of Judaism, its monotheism, its Sabbath, its festivals. But an adequate loyalty, they felt, could be achieved without all the regulations the rabbis were constantly proposing. They wanted a reasonable give-and-take between themselves and their Gentile neighbours, without continual attention to possible pitfalls in good-fellowship. It was their very reasonableness which so exasperated the rabbis that one was reduced to declaring that it would be an act of virtue to murder an *am ha-aretz* on the Day of Atonement falling on a Sabbath! But the rabbis were right. Had the nation as a whole accepted a gentlemanly give-and-take with the Gentile world, neither Judaism nor the Jewish people would have survived.

For the two to survive the whole people had to be the decisive factor in determining the direction of rabbinic discussion and decision; but equally the claims of religion had constantly to determine the occupations and ways of life open to the people. For these two potentially conflicting developments to live in peace together, it was essential that an ordinary Jew should enjoy being a Jew, even though it meant every kind of external difficulty. I doubt whether either rabbi or ordinary

Jew ever consciously defined the situation in such terms. But they remain fundamentally true. Jewry and Judaism survived *only* because it remained basically more attractive for an ordinary family to remain Jewish than to quit the struggle.

I would put first among the necessary conditions for such enjoyment the basic intellectual freedom of Jewish life in a world full of narrow theological orthodoxies—whether one lived in a Christian or a Muslim environment. Jewish theological orthodoxy went little further than the *Shema*; the religion was an orthopraxy, and that is intellectually much less circumscribing, especially as any *praxis* was subject to discussion and redefinition in due course. It is difficult for a modern man who has abandoned the discipline of religion to recognize that a life by the *mizwoth* of the rabbis—the concrete actions which resulted from obedience to Torah—was, in its environment, a life of freedom and coherence. It was all very well for Browning among the Spanish monks to proclaim that

> I the Trinity illustrate
> Drinking watered orange pulp—
> In three sips the Arian frustrate

which might be considered a reasonable Christian *mizwah*, but a large proportion of the practices of Christian and Muslim daily life arose in long pre-monotheistic days, and they were superstitiously devoted to placating every kind of demon, avoiding every kind of tabu, and seeking the succour of many other gods than were recognized by Church or Mosque. Jewish folklore has the very unusual quality of being enfolded within the legends of Jewish monotheism, as can be seen from the inexhaustible stories in Louis Ginzberg's *Legends of the Jews*.

Jews were a literate and intellectual people and, in their natural condition, every bit as fond of intellectual adventure as the ancient Athenians. It was then a satisfying state that rationalist and mystic could live side by side, that gradually the science, medicine, and philosophy of the Greeks became available to them, together with the geography of the Arabs. In their own rabbinic literature they had in the Talmuds and their commentaries every kind of intellectual food, not merely what a modern man would regard as religious; while in their worship they had liturgical matter of great depth and beauty. Finally they lived a life which was humane by contemporary standards. They did not hunt animals for sport; they regulated strictly the method of killing animals for food. They were constantly encouraged to practise kindness, gentleness, and good neighbourliness. They looked after their poor and sick. They concerned themselves with the education of their sons. There were many everyday factors which made Jewish life attractive.

The rabbis linked this daily life with the revealed will of God by their use of the concept *Derek Eretz*—literally 'the way of the world'. It was in accordance with *Derek Eretz* to be kind and courteous, to remember good manners in dealing with a wife or neighbour; but it was also in accord with *Derek Eretz* to behave in a practical manner. Underlying the details was the conception that God, in making man, wished him so to live that standards of common sense, of practical morality, of mutual give-and-take were also fulfilment of the will of God, of the admonitions and exhortations of Torah. We can realize some of the importance of *Derek Eretz*, at any rate in a Christian environment, if we remember the enormous place which original sin played in Christian thinking, of the power of penance and indulgence in sustaining clerical authority and the exaltation of renunciation and ascetism above normal life in Christian practice. It was not merely that the parish priest possessed a spiritual authority which set him apart in a way in which a rabbi was not set apart, but that a monk or nun was assigned a higher level of Christian sanctity than a parish priest. Had a Christian theologian been asked about *Derek Eretz*, he would, I imagine, have replied either that it was vitiated by the Fall, or that its virtues were totally irrelevant to religion. After all, the *Thirty Nine Articles* of the Church of England proclaim that good works not done out of Christological belief are positively displeasing to God! *Derek Eretz* in its linking of the practice of religion with the practice of common humanity has had too little place in Christian thinking.

The rabbis ensured that it was not only good to be a Jew when life went smoothly, they recognized that there were concessions to be made in times of danger. No religion with such a roll of martyrs ever ranked martyrdom as less desirable. They took their stand on the verse that a Jew was to *live* by his faith. Live, they argued, not *die*, so that in danger of death a Jew might violate all lesser commandments, provided he refused to worship idols, shed blood, or commit incest and adultery. In line with this attitude was their acceptance that all the many regulations which surrounded Sabbath observance could be ignored if life were in danger. The Gospel story of Pharisaic indignation at the healing of a woman during a Sabbath service (Luke xiii. 10 ff.) may be true of the early first century C.E. when Pharisaic standards were still being hammered out, but the definition of what constituted a danger to life was constantly enlarged so that such a healing would probably not have aroused protest a few generations later. The adjustment of law to life was a continual process, based on experience and a good deal of common sense.

The long period of total, unemancipated, dispersion can be divided in a number of ways. In the beginning there was a centre of authority, probably moral more than executive, at first in the patriarchate at Tiberias and then in the Gaonate in Babylon. Things changed when the

Babylonian community was overwhelmed by the invasions of the Tartars; and thereafter authority resided in no office, but in the personal standing of an individual as scholar and saint. One can also place the division between the great half-autonomous Jewish communities of Babylon, Muslim Spain, and Egypt, where it was possible to live in an almost wholly Jewish environment, and the small communities of medieval Europe where Jews were dependent on non-Jewish neighbours for most of their daily needs. Then there are distinctions between an environment which was pagan, and one which, while not Jewish, was monotheistic.

To this last distinction belong those Talmudic regulations which forbade a Jew to follow any occupation which encouraged idolatry. He might not make or deal in wine which could be used for pagan sacrifice. He might not enter into any business relations with a pagan neighbour so many days before and after a pagan festival. He might not eat with a pagan neighbour. These were sacrifices which religion demanded of life. In return, during the whole period, religion recognized the need for regularizing relations of business or law with the non-Jewish world by conceding that 'the law of the land is law'. There were various qualifications which limited this general provision. But basically a Jewish business man knew that a contract or agreement entered into by the law of the land was recognized as binding by the rabbis. An action which was criminal by the law of the land was not protected by Jewish law, and so on. As international trade became a very Jewish occupation at the threshold of the Middle Ages (seventh to eleventh centuries), this recognition of the authority of non-Jewish law was a very important factor in Jewish life. It was seconded by the willingness of the rabbis to modify, or abolish, laws, whether biblical or rabbinic, which seemed to them to imperil legitimate business or social activities. The techniques by which this was achieved varied; but the object was the same: to adjust the claims of religion to the necessities of life.

The second period was one of widely dispersed minorities linked in their daily lives to their non-Jewish environment. The central authority of Babylon had disappeared, and there had grown up a system of *Responsa* from various individual scholars. A natural consequence was that there was often variety in the manner of Jewish life in different places. Seeing that substantial Jewish communities had come to exist in monogamous Christian Europe, Rabbi Gershom of Mainz decreed in the tenth century that Jewish marriage also must be monogamous. But in Muslim countries it remained legal for Jews to follow the biblical patriarchs in their polygamy. This decree of Rabbi Gershom is in interesting disagreement with the general policy of the missionaries of Christian churches when they come to convert communities in Africa and elsewhere which had had completely different marriage laws. They have insisted on the Christian convert limiting himself to one wife,

without regard to the tribal tradition which they were, very likely, wrecking.

The way in which it became correct for a Jew to recognize that Christianity was not to be identified with pagan idolatry, and therefore subject to the regulations for dealing with idolators in *Abodah Zara*, is an amusing example of the overriding needs of life. Among the leading Jews of the different European communities the most favoured occupation came to be merchant; and the centre of a merchant's professional activity came to be the great annual fairs held at different times throughout Europe. These fairs, often originating in a monastic or episcopal licence, usually took place at an important local festival. By Talmudic law, therefore, Jews should have abstained from them. But abstention would not only have been commercially ruinous, it would also have deprived Jewish leaders of their most obvious opportunities for joint meeting and discussion. The way out was for the rabbis to declare that these festivals were not idolatrous feasts. Christianity, therefore, achieved a limited recognition that it was not idolatry, in spite of its doctrine of the Trinity. Likewise at such a fair a Jewish merchant might sell wine and cattle to a Christian, since it was certain that they would not be offered as a pagan sacrifice.

Other laws, especially those of the tractate *Abodah Zara*, were abolished under the general rubric that much could be sanctioned 'for the sake of peace' or 'for the sanctification of the Name [of God]'. *Abodah Zara* even encouraged a Jew to overreach a Gentile. Medieval Rabbis forbade it. If anything, a Gentile must be treated even more generously than a Jew 'for the sake of peace'.

It must, however, be added that each of these decisions was, as it were, an *ad hoc* decision, not involving the formulation of a new principle or abolishing the previous regulation *in toto*. This is the general situation, but it is worth mentioning that a remarkable scholar, Menahem ha-Meiri, appeared in fourteenth century Provence and proclaimed that there was a new type of Gentile nation, not known to the rabbis of the Talmud, which 'accepted the restraints of religion'. This covered both Christianity and Islam. Prohibitions and dual standards accepted or suggested in *Abodah Zara* and other Talmudic tractates simply did not apply to relations with Christians or Muslims. The result is a tolerance and good-will in the decisions of ha-Meiri which go beyond what one could expect ordinary scholars to achieve when one considers the general attitude of medieval Christendom to its Jewish minorities.

At the same time ha-Meiri would have agreed with his predecessors and contemporaries in distinguishing the friendliest business relations from the intimacies of social contact. A Jew might buy and sell wine with a Gentile. But he still should not drink with a Gentile. The sphere in which this important distinction was most difficult to define and observe was in the daily life of the home. Much food which in the

previous period a Jew would have obtained from Jewish sources, he had now to obtain from Gentiles. The same applied to his clothing. It applied also to his home. He could no longer buy a pagan slave and circumcise him. He depended on Gentile servants to maintain his house, often to nurse his children and cook his food. This, moreover, had to be done under the watchful eye of the Church which would at once have punished him if he had attempted to upset the religious faith of the domestic. The solution was a fictional sharing of all domestic work or cooking by the Jewish housewife.

All these concessions safeguarded the final right of the Jew to be different, to remain loyal to the God of Israel. The fact that the whole society of which Jews formed a part was accustomed to a plurality of laws, for there was a merchant law, a law governing clerics, and so on, prevented it from appearing intolerably paradoxical to either Jew or Christian that there was a barrier in Jewish life which the Christian might not cross. No fundamental tenet of Judaism was compromised by this continual and perpetually changing adjustment of the details of practice to the necessities of the exiled situation of the Jews. For all the changes were properly made by rabbis authorized to make them.

There was, however, one occasion on which it was not orthopraxy but orthodoxy which was involved in the constant problem of adjustment. In the middle of the twelfth century a fanatical North African sect, known to history by the Latinized name of the Almohades, conquered Muslim Spain as well as their native province. They refused to tolerate either Christians or Jews within their dominions. Many Jews accepted nominally the religion of Islam, considering that their pure monotheism was not thereby compromised, and that no particular harm was done by the admission that Muhammad was a prophet. The family of Maimonides itself at one time accepted this concession. But a few Jews accepted martyrdom, and Maimonides later came to the conclusion that compliance could only bridge the period to as rapid a departure as possible. The rabbis themselves were not prepared to accept the compromise.

The general form of Islam with its sacred book and its tradition of interpretation seemed so much akin to Judaism, whereas Christianity with its Trinity and its constant battles over heresy seemed so alien, that Jews fortunately failed to recognize that they were separated from Christian theology by matters of metaphysical definition, whereas the difference between the Jewish and Muslim idea of God—especially when the Muslim theology was presented in Almohad form—was fundamental. For the doctrine of the Trinity only made explicit those paradoxes beyond human understanding within the Godhead which were common to Judaism and Christianity, while the founder of the Muslim sect was convinced that even to give objective substance to the divine attributes was to fall into a polytheistic heresy.

As the period of restriction, denigration, and persecution 'like a wounded snake dragged its huge length along', the standards of Jewish intellectual and commercial life quite inevitably deteriorated. The wonder is not that the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries is so depressing, but that the collapse of rabbinic Judaism, and the Jewish life which it had stimulated and sustained, had been so long delayed. The occupations which Jews followed were somewhat increased, but, except for the *Hofjuden*, they were almost wholly occupations on the edge of respectability and viability, which posed no new problem of Halachic adjustment. There were exceptions in eastern Europe, where Jews were in close contact with Christians as innkeepers and carriers who could not keep the Sabbath without considerable difficulty, and as tenants or overseers of manorial estates, who had to maintain a normal production, which naturally included pigs among the livestock. But, by and large, they got on as best they could in an age which was generally lax and complaisant.

What is interesting for the future is that the rabbinate began to some degree to assume the appearance of a 'clergy', remote from the practical problems of their 'laity'. In spite of his saintly humility and asceticism, the Gaon of Vilna was less in touch with the needs of the eastern European ghettoes than the Besht. *Pilpul* provided no spiritual sustenance to counteract the degradation of Galician village life; and though many of the Hassidic leaders came to be profound Talmudic scholars themselves, it was not their scholarship that saved the vitality of eastern European Jewry, but the acceptance—or argumentative condemnation—of the new impulses Hassidism created. Argument about Hassidism was stimulating and creative, a sterile *pilpul* was not.

When emancipation began to come, and a small intellectual elite of western European Jewry was able to take its place in western European society, the rabbinate was unable to perform the task which it performed for the people nearly two thousand years earlier. It may well be said that they were not given the time to adjust; events moved so rapidly that a religion which had been compressed and distorted by centuries of ghetto conditions and the sad effect of continual denigration could not be expected to understand the new demands which were being made upon it. But, whatever the reason, the fact is that, for the first time, the Jewish people in their religious aspect came to be represented by a 'Church', a body of fixed beliefs and practices which 'stood over against' the laymen who led the march to emancipation. Yet there was never a period when a vital Judaism was more needed by a Jewish generation which was trying to bridge centuries in a single lifetime. Many of the leaders of emancipation, or their children, found no home in the synagogue; and they passed either to a formal baptism or to a genuine religious conversion which brought them within the non-Jewish community whose interests were more akin to theirs.

It may be easier for a Christian than for a Jew to examine this period in which a fundamental change was coming over the organization and maintenance of Judaism. For it is obvious that, in saying that Judaism had now become a typical Church, I am not intending an abusive phrase. For all forms of Christianity are expressed in Churches. I am, and hope to remain, a minister of the Church of England. I may not be in agreement with this or that attitude of my Church leaders on particular subjects. But I fully recognize that they must always consider in each controversy whether their primary task is not to maintain traditional standards 'over against' contemporary demands. And they may rightly do this while recognizing that such standards would be too difficult for the generation of their contemporaries to accept. This has, for example, obviously been the case in all the discussions about sex. The extent to which a Church should be prepared to make adjustments is the subject of lively controversy, and it is obvious that all the right is not on one side or the other. But it is also evident, in both Christian and Jewish life, that in an age such as this a Church is in continual difficulty. Fidelity to its traditions leads to its inescapable desertion of many it would like to help. All through the nineteenth century many Jews, who had no desire to quit the Jewish community, found no spiritual satisfaction in membership of any synagogue accessible to them. Those who attempted reformed practices were sometimes too hasty and ill-advised in their omissions and commissions. Neither their heroic efforts, nor those of men on the traditional side, such as Samson Raphael Hirsch, ever had a chance of healing the breaches which had developed. The century witnessed a series of Jewish Churches, some more some less traditional. It was left to Zionism to offer again a centre of dynamism and loyalty for the whole people. But Zionism, with all its factions, could not paper over the cracks created by centuries.

The situation in Israel is obviously so different from that in the Diaspora that they need to be considered separately. In the Diaspora, general Jewish needs have been met by the emergence, internationally and in different countries, of lay organizations more or less representative, which have undertaken the defence of Jewish rights and the adaptation of Jewish needs to the non-Jewish environment. There are such bodies as the British Board of Deputies, the American Jewish Committee, and the Anti-Defamation League. There is the World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Agency. In all these bodies a rabbi *qua* rabbi has no special status or privilege.

In such a world the statements made by the new Chief Rabbi in his letter to the *Jewish Chronicle* of 16 December 1966, may well turn out to be, literally, epoch making. One can easily recognize that the nineteenth century Chief Rabbinate and United Synagogue owed much in their formulation to the organization of an Anglican diocese. Dr. Jakobovits speaks very courteously, but quite categorically in the

manner of a bishop entering upon his episcopal authority. He asks for 'support for the religious policies chiefly and traditionally determined by my office'. He allows the *Jewish Chronicle* to criticize, provided the criticism 'is offered with the respect due to my office'. These phrases provoked the immediate response from that doughty orthodox propagandist, Trude Weiss-Rosmarin, that 'respect for an office, institution etc. is not a Jewish concept' (*Jewish Chronicle*, 23 December). But it may be legitimate in the high ecclesiastics of a Jewish Church.

If, as appears likely, Jewish self-consciousness and the instruments for its maintenance are entering a new epoch, it behoves both Jews and others to be patient. On fundamental principles there cannot safely be compromise. There can be different relations only when there has been a change in convictions. Sad as it is to an observer, it is not likely that an ecumenical spirit will quickly develop in the Jewish Churches. Christians should remember that the century after the sixteenth-century Reformation was not one in which brotherly toleration was conspicuous between the Churches of Europe. Give-and-take requires a substantial period to measure its functions and mark out its spheres of operation, and it takes also considerable maturity to accept. Meanwhile many of the tasks, which one could call 'spiritual' in the broadest sense, can better be performed by non-synagogal bodies which command a general support rather than fall into the divisions which have befallen synagogues. British Jewry has such organizations if it wishes to use them. The American picture is somewhat different; and synagogal bodies have had to develop separately their own institutions to mediate the traditions of Judaism even in the new fields of social and international activity opened by full citizenship.

In Israel the situation is completely different. There an extremely rigid traditionalism possesses a monopoly and full legal authority for its enforcement. It demands a recognition identical with the pre-Vatican II position of the Roman Church in Spain. It is a most unhappy position, because it is one in which only a genuine change of attitude could be effective; it is not one in which there could be compromise 'for the sake of peace' or to 'sanctify the Name'. For it is not Gentiles who are deprived of rights by this rigidity, but Jews, and inter-Jewish religious tolerance is something which does not yet exist. So long as the traditionalist Jew, English, Israeli, or other, insists that it is impossible to accept *as expressions of Judaism* those forms from which he disagrees, so long will gestures of friendship, such as Dr. Jakobovits wishes to extend, be relatively powerless. For friendship and denigration are uncomfortable bed-fellows.

As soon as Jewry accepts the situation that its religion is now expressed in a number of Churches, representing different interpretations of its role in human life, then Jews will be able to adjust themselves to what is a considerable revolution in their affairs. But religion is still

a considerable influence in social life, and Judaism will have to feel towards a new manner of expressing that influence. The British Council of Churches, the World Council of Churches, and now the Roman Catholic Church after Vatican II, are all still feeling towards a way to exercise influence in a world which is unlikely to accept the exclusive claims of any one interpretation of ultimate truths. Reform and Conservative Judaism in America have already made considerable strides in the same direction, and have the co-operation of some orthodox communities in their activities.

The position is still one to interest the sociologist, and those concerned with a new approach to religion and society. For it still remains true that the survival of a Jewish people is not something inevitable and automatic. Even with an Israeli state, it is something planned and consciously carried out. But what was once the simple relationship of two entities is now a far more complex structure. But not far less important. It is still a matter of concern to an intelligent Gentile that that human amalgam which made, and makes, Jewish history should not perish from the earth. Jewish contributions, intellectual, aesthetic, and social, are too numerous and too valuable for any reasonable being to contemplate their disappearance with indifference.

One thing is certain. These issues are going to torment Jewish life until a solution, based on the actualities of today, is found. Those who believe that an exhaustive knowledge of traditions, which admittedly related in their formulation to a very different state of affairs, is an adequate guide for today have still to convince the Israeli public or the diaspora communities that they are right to maintain their stand. They may be. It may be right in both institutional Christianity and institutional Judaism for some to insist that the present age is far too chaotic and uncertain to be able to judge rightly on such issues, and that therefore to maintain in its integrity, unmodified, 'the faith once delivered to the saints' is the responsible action to take. A future age may be better able to see things in perspective, and they should have the whole Catholic faith—Jewish or Christian—before them, not a mere shadow of it, pruned by what may then be seen to be an outdated scepticism. But whatever the right decision, it is going to be a costly one. For neither Judaism nor Christianity is a private affair for those who like it, but a statement about ultimate truth as it affects the whole of humanity.

Bibliographical Note

I have especially used George Horowitz's *The Spirit of Jewish Law*, Brooklyn, 1963, and Solomon Zucrow's *Adjustment of Law to Life in Rabbinic Literature*, Boston, 1928. For the medieval period I have used the two volumes of Jacob Katz's *Exclusiveness and Tolerance*, London, 1961, and *Tradition and Crisis*, Glencoe, Ill., 1961. Max Kadushin's

Worship and Ethics, Evanston, Ill., 1964, was my expositor of the difficult concept of *Derek Eretz*. For the influence of Judaism on the contemporary American scene I used Albert Vorspan and Eugene J. Lipman's *Justice and Judaism*, 4th edn., New York, 1959.

THE ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE, 1860–1960

Elie Kedourie

(*Review Article*)

THE title of M. Chouraqui's copious and important study* calls to mind Narcisse Leven's earlier history of the *Alliance israélite universelle, Cinquante ans d'histoire* (2 vols., Paris, 1911–20), and immediately invites comparison between the two books. The earlier work devotes over one thousand pages to the first fifty years of the *Alliance*, while the later work, roughly half the size of its predecessor (even when allowance is made for the somewhat smaller type in which it is set), deals with a period which is longer by fifty crowded, difficult, and generally catastrophic years. A re-reading of Narcisse Leven's work confirms one's first impression that of the two it is the more spacious and leisurely, and that its unhurried exposition and patient marshalling of detail allow the reader a more satisfactory glimpse into the political transactions of the *Alliance* and its remarkable educational enterprise. Again, the present work devotes much space to a quick and potted review of recent Jewish history; it would have been perhaps preferable for the author to assume his readers' familiarity with the main lines of modern Jewish history and to devote this space to a more detailed history of the *Alliance* itself. Lastly, the scheme of the book may also perhaps be queried. Of its five parts the first gives an account of the foundation of the *Alliance*, the second is entitled 'Adolphe Crémieux and Political Emancipation', the third 'Narcisse Leven and Salvation through the School', the fourth 'Sylvain Lévi and the Crisis of European Judaism', and the fifth 'René Cassin and the Promotion of the Rights of Man'. There is, of course, no gainsaying the prominence of these personalities in the life and fortunes of the *Alliance*, but it is doubtful whether the history of such an organization is best periodized in terms of personalities.

In the first part of his work, M. Chouraqui describes the circum-

* André Chouraqui, *Cent ans d'histoire: L'alliance israélite universelle et la renaissance juive contemporaine (1860–1960)*, xvi + 528 pp., Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1965, 30 F.

stances, the outlooks, and the motives of those French Jews who came together to found the *Alliance* in 1860. They belonged to the first and second generations which followed the emancipation proclaimed by the French Revolution. They were liberals in politics and religion, and believed that it was necessary for French Jews, who enjoyed civic and political equality with their Christian compatriots, to take the initiative in defending and advancing Jewish rights everywhere. The well-known statesman Adolphe Crémieux (1796–1880), who himself served as President of the *Alliance* shortly after its foundation, was their exemplar and inspiration. M. Chouraqui sketches the portraits of some of his collaborators, and the details he provides give us some idea of the problems they faced and how they reacted to them. One of the founding members was Isidore Cahen (1826–1902); he was a graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure who in 1849 was appointed to teach philosophy at the lycée of Napoléon-Vendée and rejoiced that he, a Jew, would be able to teach philosophy to Christian youths. But the Bishop of Luçon took exception to the appointment and, in a charge to his parishioners, wondered how 'wise and prudent statesmen could have conceived and executed the project of sending to one of the most religious and believing areas of France a Jewish professor, and one moreover given to the teaching of philosophy'. The Bishop demanded his replacement by one 'imbued with truly Christian sentiments, and a sincere Catholic'. The Minister of Education gave in to this pressure and transferred Cahen to Tours where, moreover, he was to teach literature and not philosophy. Cahen refused to accept the transfer, resigned his post, and devoted himself to journalism in the *Archives israélites*, of which he became the editor.

M. Chouraqui quotes passages from Cahen's editorials (p. 32) which show his views on Judaism and Jewry in the modern world. 'In the French polity', he writes in 1857, 'there are only Frenchmen; the Jews no longer form either a nation or a race or a freemasonry, or even a commercial association; they are no longer anything but believers . . . when they believe.' 'We have become the scattered links of a religious community', he writes again, 'and we are no longer the dispersed members of a dissolved nationality; since the misfortunes to which they are collectively subject and the extortions which they suffer bring the Jews together, they have the right to consolidate their community by developing a solidarity to confront injustice.' Another founding member was Elie-Aristide Astruc (1831–1905), a rabbi of Sephardi origin who advocated a rationalist and reformist theology of a kind which a fellow-rabbi denounced as '*le rationalisme vulgaire et brutal*'. Yet another was Jules Carvallo (1819–1915), a distinguished engineer who was placed first of his year when graduating from the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées; he was a Saint-Simonian and considered, remarks M. Chouraqui, perhaps too favourable to Christianity since he entertained the idea of Jesus having a

providential mission. Finally we may mention another of these founding members, the poet Eugène Manuel (1823–1901), who drafted the first manifesto of the new society; his latitudinarian point of view may be gathered from the following lines (p. 33):

Trois peuples m'ont donné ce qu'il me faut pour vivre,
Les Romains et les Grecs et mon peuple hébreu.
Rome m'apprit le droit dans son code et le livre,
Athènes la beauté,
Jérusalem son Dieu.

The immediate occasion which precipitated the foundation of the *Alliance* was the Mortara Affair of 1858, when papal gendarmes in Bologna forced their way into a Jewish household and abducted a child six years old on the pretext that he was a Christian. A Catholic servant in the Mortara household had secretly baptized the boy when he was gravely ill in the hope that, should he come to die, his soul would be saved. The child survived, but later on her own death-bed the servant confessed the deed to a priest. The ecclesiastical authorities then proceeded to abduct the child. Many, including Napoleon III and Francis Joseph, appealed to the Pope to release the child, but the Church would not give him up. He was brought up a Christian, ordained as a priest, and died a canon. These events, it would seem, led this intelligent and public-spirited group of French Jews to found the *Alliance* as a world-wide association for the defence of Jewish interests. The name of the new society was inspired by the Universal Evangelical Alliance which had been founded in London in 1855 and which had actually invited Jews to its membership in the belief that they were necessary to the divine economy of salvation.

The objects of the society are succinctly and precisely described in the first article of its statutes. These objects are:

1. To work everywhere for the emancipation and the moral progress of the Jews.
2. To provide efficacious aid for those who suffer because of being Jews.
3. To encourage the publication of works contributing to these ends.

As M. Chouraqui's work makes amply clear, very soon after its foundation the *Alliance* began to take action and make representations to governments wherever Jewish rights and interests were involved; its example encouraged the setting-up of affiliated or similar bodies in Great Britain, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. That the *Alliance* was able to accomplish so much, in the first fifty years of its existence at any rate, was clearly a consequence of European dominance in the world, and of the willingness of European statesmen to use their influence in the

cause of civic and political emancipation. The political climate in which the *Alliance* operated before 1914 and the unstated assumptions which its officers and those to whom they appealed took for granted may be illustrated by a letter from Crémieux to Beaconsfield at the time of the Congress of Berlin (p. 85): 'You are going', he wrote on 21 June 1878, 'to ensure for the Christians, against persecution by the Muslim, the freedom of Christian worship, security for their persons, for their families, for their property. . . . What I, president of the *Alliance israélite universelle*, ask in the name of the Jews of the world, is that you would ensure for the Jews, by a similar decision, against persecution by the Christian, the freedom of Jewish worship, security for their persons, for their families, for their property.'

It is, of course, idle to suppose that the European powers who lent a favourable ear to the pleas of the *Alliance* were moved by pure altruism. It is more accurate to say that they saw in the protection of Jewish communities in the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere a profitable, as well as a legitimate, exercise of their power and influence. At the very beginning of its history, the *Alliance*, as M. Chouraqui remarks (p. 152), attempted to persuade the French government to place all Jews in Muslim lands, and particularly those of North Africa, under French protection. This kind of approach, whatever its advantages, necessarily made the *Alliance* a supporter of French interests abroad. M. Chouraqui allows as much when he remarks (p. 58) that 'the close and, so to speak, organic relations' of the *Alliance* with the Quai d'Orsay were a secret for nobody. It would have added much to the interest of this history, let it be said in passing, if M. Chouraqui had expanded somewhat this cryptic and suggestive remark. There was, of course, nothing wrong in French citizens promoting French influence in the world, but the *Alliance* had in fact set out to be a supra-national organization, and 'close and, so to speak, organic relations' with the Quai d'Orsay, as the German Jews repeatedly complained, somewhat detracted from this claim.

Consideration of the official activities of the *Alliance* also reveals something painfully paradoxical in its situation. The *Alliance* could do so much for Jews in the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa because it could persuade the French and other European governments to give it help and support. And yet, these European countries and very frequently their official and ruling classes spread in the non-European world the traditional perniciously systematic anti-Judaism so characteristic of European thought, and its no less characteristic modish successor, the so-called 'scientific' antisemitism. France is a case in point. Some twenty years before the foundation of the *Alliance* it was the French Consul in Damascus who, in 1840, fabricated the blood libel against the local Jewish community. No argument or pressure would make him abandon his murderous campaign, and he was throughout supported

by his government. (See the full discussion of the Damascus Affair by A. M. Hyamson in the *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, vol. XVI (1952), pp. 47–71.) Some fifty years later the Dreyfus Affair showed the fragility of official goodwill towards the Jews, and fifty years after that the Vichy régime (which can be looked upon as a delayed eruption of all the malevolence and rancour spread and accumulated during the *Affaire* and its aftermath) actually decreed that the French Jews of France and North Africa were aliens in their own country. To rehearse these episodes is useful because, as has been said, they serve to underline the paradoxical situation in which the *Alliance* had to act. M. Chouraqui himself is perhaps not sufficiently struck by this paradox, and at times he gives the impression of being quite unaware of it. Thus he says (p. 240) that the French presence in North Africa 'has not always been sufficient to prevent antisemitic disturbances, particularly in Tunisia and Algeria.' The fact is of course that antisemitism in North Africa was introduced and propagated by French settlers and officials.

Until the advent of Nazism the *Alliance* was resolutely non-Zionist, not to say anti-Zionist. Indeed Professor Sylvain Lévi (1863–1935), President of the *Alliance* from 1920 until his death, is a familiar figure in Zionist demonology. M. Chouraqui quotes copiously from his letters and from his famous address to the Peace Conference in order to clarify and illustrate his attitude (pp. 223ff. and *passim*). He also reproduces in an appendix (pp. 470–2) a letter from Jacques Bigart (1855–1934), Secretary of the *Alliance* from 1881, written to a correspondent in Salonica in May 1918. Lucid, shrewd, and far-sighted, the letter shows that the objections of the *Alliance* to Zionism were generally neither frivolous nor malicious nor—as the Zionists have usually alleged—instigated by French ambitions in Palestine. The objections were, on the contrary, reasoned and reasonable, and some of them are still valid today. 'Palestine', he observed, 'has fewer than 100,000 Jews and 500,000 Arabs. The governments of the Entente pride themselves on allowing national self-determination. Is it allowable, under these conditions, to have the majority governed by a small minority?' 'They also say:' he continued, 'today we are a minority, but in x years by means of immigration we shall be a majority. Having regard to the Arab awakening to which the Entente gives support, and which tomorrow perhaps will play an important rôle in the Asiatic provinces of Turkey, is there not a great danger in confronting it with a politico-national "Judaism" the followers of which are recruited *abroad* (and in what circles!)? This is the point of view of many Frenchmen who are very favourable towards the Jewish element but who, having studied the Arab problem, observe an incompatibility between Zionist demands and the ambitions of the prominent leaders of re-awakened Arabia.' In view of this attitude, consistent and held over a long period, it is

curious to see M. Chouraqui, in describing the educational activities of the *Alliance* in Palestine before 1914, remark (p. 365) that it was preparing the native Jewish population 'to receive the new spirit which the great movement of the Return was to breathe into the whole country'! We may here also take up another curious remark of M. Chouraqui's which again seems irreconcilable not only with the assumptions and policies of the *Alliance*, but with the actual facts themselves. This is when he refers (p. 339) to a so-called law whereby the attainment of sovereignty by a Muslim state is accompanied by the disappearance of its Jewish community! How do the cases of Turkey and Iran, or of Morocco and Tunisia fit this law? Egypt attained full independence in 1936, but its Jewish community continued until the 1950s; Iraq became fully independent in 1931, and it was only in 1951 that the Iraqi Jews were pressured into leaving for Israel. Is it not more accurate to say that it was the existence of Israel which put Jewish communities in Arab (not Muslim) countries at risk?

We have not yet mentioned that for which the *Alliance* is best known, namely its justly-renowned educational network, principally in the Middle East and North Africa. The first school under the auspices of the *Alliance* was opened at Tetuan at the end of 1862. By 1900 the network comprised 100 schools in which some 26,000 pupils were being educated; by 1914 there were 188 schools with some 48,000 pupils. The catastrophes which engulfed Jewish life after the First World War arrested this progress, and in 1960 there were 131 schools with 45,000 pupils. According to M. Chouraqui, some 600,000 pupils have passed through the *Alliance* schools in the last hundred years.

What adds further lustre to this great achievement is that the education which these schools provided was remarkably thorough and solid. As early as 1867, the *Alliance* founded its own teachers' training college, the *Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale*, which has produced a continuous supply of high quality teachers—themselves for the most part recruited from the Middle East, the Balkans, and North Africa—who, with uncanny and economical skill, managed to impart to pupils, through the medium of a foreign language (French) the ability to think with precision and to express themselves with clarity. One such teacher, M. Eli Capon, by whom I had the good fortune to be taught, exemplifies in my mind the methods and achievements of the *Alliance*. Rigour and clarity of thought, and a spare and elegant style in which to express it: these were the hall-marks of his teaching, and its beneficent influence is always apparent to me whenever I have occasion to put pen to paper. There is little doubt that this exemplary achievement was in some way linked to the fact that French was the language of instruction, that French text-books could be used, and traditional French pedagogical methods—with their emphasis on solid academic achievement—could be applied. Since the end of the Second World War, political pressures

in the countries where the *Alliance* operates have forced the abandonment of French as a language of instruction, and the *Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale* must now concentrate, as M. Chouraqui observes (p. 195), not on training French schoolteachers as hitherto, but rather teachers of French in foreign countries (*non plus des instituteurs français, mais plutôt des professeurs de français à l'étranger*). M. Chouraqui does not tell us how this radical modification of tested pedagogical methods affects the quality of education in *Alliance* schools.

The educational activities of the *Alliance* raise the fundamental issue of Western influence in non-Western lands and the reactions which this influence provoked. In the eyes of the founders and administrators of the *Alliance*, it was a wholly beneficent enterprise. They had no doubt that a good Western education would liberate the energies of their Eastern correligionists and ameliorate their conditions. At the same time, they were also aware—or perhaps they were made aware by the opposition which their schools evoked in some communities—that there was incompatibility between the new outlook they were introducing and the norms and beliefs of these traditional societies. M. Chouraqui has a passage (p. 157) in which he contrasts the traditional *Talmud Torah* teacher with the product of the *Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale*. 'The one', writes the author, 'was the heir of two millennia of Israel's exile, trained in the Talmudic disciplines which had impressed on the depth of his soul the lessons of Israel's wisdom which is entirely given over to the worship of God and the knowledge of His law. He was the product of a sacral world in which the dominant preoccupation was the incarnation of the Torah in everyday life, whilst waiting for the coming reign of a transcendent God, who is present in the mind and heart of His children. In this life of usually ascetic renunciation, one hope shone, that of the triumph of the Messiah who will deliver Israel from the slavery of exile and restore Jerusalem in glory. On the other hand, the *Alliance* schoolmaster had already in the depth of his being broken with the traditional legacy of the synagogue. He was a product of the dominant European culture. Voltaire and Rousseau, the Encyclopaedists and the Romantics nourished his thought more than did the Prophets and the Talmudists. He believed more in the light of reason than in God's salvation, in the benefits of progress more than in the Messiah's redemption, more in man's creativity than in God's providence. The traditional teacher could not but see in the *Alliance* schoolmaster the product of a foreign world. On his side, the schoolmaster could not help being shocked by the appearance of the Talmudic teacher, whose heir he was setting himself up to be, and who lived in a world so different from his own.' The archives of the *Alliance* must be full of material bearing on this crucial issue, and it is somewhat regrettable that M. Chouraqui has not utilized them more fully in order to illustrate with specific and concrete instances the clash which he so

eloquently describes. Here too, it would seem, his predecessor's account has virtues which we miss from this work. Leven's second volume in particular abounds in descriptions of clashes within Oriental communities between traditionalists and innovators in the nineteenth century, clashes which were the direct consequence of the activities of the *Alliance*. His full account of communal strife in Istanbul and Adrianople, in Jerusalem, Baghdad, and Damascus, throws much welcome light on these communities, whose history in modern times is still largely unknown. The historian who will write it will no doubt find the archives of the *Alliance* one of his most precious sources.

In the meantime, we have M. Chouraqui's important study which not only throws new light on the origins of the *Alliance* and the character of its founders, but is also a substantial study of its activities for a century.

ISRAEL'S ETHNIC PROBLEM

Percy S. Cohen

(Review Article)

THE existence of an ethnic problem in Israel is scarcely denied by any informed person. However, not everyone agrees on the nature and causes of the problem. One view is that the Orientals —a term which refers to all Jews of Near Eastern, Central Asian, Far Eastern, and North African origin or descent—are not always worse off than the Europeans (or Ashkenazim); and that when they are, this is due to their large families, their lack of western education, and their particular habits. The other view is that they are almost always worse off than Europeans and that this is largely due to inequality of rights.

Michael Selzer is an adherent of the second view. He accuses Israel's Ashkenazim, particularly those in positions of power, of deliberately discriminating against Orientals and of destroying their culture. Mr. Selzer is a trained social anthropologist, and one would expect his indictment to be based on a sound analysis of the problem. However, it seems that the pamphleteer has been carried away by his mission of preventing 'cultural genocide' and fighting injustice, and has, consequently, produced an unbalanced, if not misleading, account of the problem.*

Mr. Selzer's argument is this. The Zionist pioneers, who became the leaders of modern Israel, brought with them from Europe an ideology which ranked European civilization above all others; consequently, they tended to treat all Orientals, whether Arabs or Jews, as inferiors; hence their policy towards the Oriental Jews has been to deny them certain privileges and at the same time to rob them of their cultural heritage, in the arrogant hope that this treatment will produce a single Israeli culture based on that of the modern West. This arrogance towards Oriental culture is also partly the result of the insecurity which Eastern European Jews feel about their own acquisition of modern western culture; for they were themselves treated in the past as 'easterners'. The Oriental Jews are denied access to positions of responsibility because of their cultural 'inferiority', and they therefore have little say in matters

* Michael Selzer, *The Outcasts of Israel: Communal Tensions in the Jewish State*, 43 pp., an Oriental Israel Pamphlet. The Council of the Sephardi Community, Jerusalem, 1965, 2*s*. 6*d*.

affecting their own welfare and chances of social advancement. For their improvement, they are offered an educational system which is scarcely adapted to their cultural needs; for this reason, and also because they are poor and cannot afford secondary and higher education, which are not free, the Orientals suffer a low rate of social mobility. Mr. Selzer's solutions to these problems are: first, to alter the system of education so that it is suited to the cultural requirements of all groups; second, to abandon the unified culture policy and to allow cultural pluralism; and third, to encourage the persistence of distinctive Oriental characteristics.

There *is* ethnic prejudice in Israel; many Ashkenazim have unfavourable stereotypes of Oriental Jews, particularly those from North Africa. For that matter, some Orientals have unfavourable stereotypes of Ashkenazim and of other Oriental groups, while many Ashkenazim have prejudiced views of other Ashkenazi groups. To some extent such prejudice is simply a function of the coming together of people from a variety of cultures who are led to identify themselves, and others, in ethnic terms. But the dominant form at present expresses the superior status of Ashkenazim in relation to Orientals: the latter are culturally and, often, anatomically 'obvious', and in addition, they tend to be poorer and often to engage in lower status occupations than the Ashkenazim.

But what does prejudice amount to? It is very well known that ethnic prejudice does not in itself lead to ethnic discrimination and oppression, and that it is often, though not always, the product of a system in which discrimination and oppression are preserved in the interests of a privileged class or other status group. It is not easy to substantiate claims of widespread ethnic discrimination in Israel. There have been incidents in which applicants for jobs who used fictitious Ashkenazi names were interviewed while those using obviously Oriental names were not. In addition, there are many plausible rumours of discriminatory incidents: it is likely that an Ashkenazi housing or labour official would give preference to his 'own kind'. One could also argue that it is equally likely that an Oriental official would do the same things; the difference is that there are usually more Oriental applicants for the kinds of favours which officials dispense.

It is commonly assumed that if one ethnic group is less privileged than another, this must be due to the advantages which accrue to some group as a result of inequality. Thus, it could be argued that inequality in Israel was intended all along by the Ashkenazi leaders; or, alternatively, it could be said that this unintended situation benefits the less privileged Ashkenazim. The first view is almost certainly false, though no doubt *some* Ashkenazim intended to benefit from the low status of Orientals; the farmers in the old *moshavot* welcomed and encouraged the immigration of Yemeni Jews to replace the cheap labour of Arabs;

but the Histadrut strongly opposed this 'exploitation', if only because the existence of cheap Yemeni labourers weakened the power of all labourers.

This inequality is not for the most part the product of discrimination but of the relative failure of Orientals to obtain secondary and higher education. There are a number of reasons for this. First, high-school education is not free in Israel; since many Orientals are relatively poorer than Ashkenazim, they are less able to afford school fees. Second, many Orientals have a higher birth-rate than Ashkenazim; this means that even where Orientals are strongly motivated to pay school fees they cannot do so for all their children. Third, Oriental children do less well in both primary and secondary schools than Ashkenazim; this is partly due to the European character of the educational system and syllabuses, a factor much emphasized by Mr. Selzer; but it is far more due to the lack of facilities in poorer households and to the lack of formal education among lower class parents, who are less able to assist their children. (This is precisely the problem in Britain, where it has little or nothing to do with ethnic culture, but a good deal to do with class cultural differences.)

Mr. Selzer is right in his insistence that educational opportunity is the key to the ethnic problem. But he is quite mistaken in laying the emphasis on the disparity between Oriental and Western cultures. In fact, it is not that the government discriminates against the Orientals by maintaining a European educational system, but that it fails to discriminate *in favour* of the Orientals by ensuring that far more of them obtain a secondary and higher education; and it is not simply the welfare of the Orientals that is at stake; for future development in an industrial society depends upon a high level of education for all; and it also depends upon a degree of political stability which may well be threatened by ethnic hostility.

If this is a major problem for Israeli society it has not been recognized by Joseph Bentwich.* His book on Israeli education contains a useful, if superficial, account of the main facts: there are chapters on the Zionist background, education under the Mandate, the legal basis of state education, syllabuses of primary and secondary schools, education in the kibbutzim, religious education, agricultural education, and so on; but there is scarcely any serious discussion of the ethnic problem and of the relationship between education and social mobility, and of the social and psychological factors which prevent equality of educational opportunity. In fact, Mr. Bentwich seems sure that 'by and large, the differences are being smoothed out' (p. 185). His main general concern is that Israeli education should seek to unite the traditional values of Judaism with those of modern Zionism. At least in this one

* Joseph S. Bentwich, *Education in Israel*, xiii + 204 pp., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965, 24s.

respect—the belief in the possibility and desirability of deliberately preserving a traditional culture—Mr. Bentwich and Mr. Selzer are in agreement; and it is just here that both are least realistic.

For certain questions arise. If the Israeli government were to adopt a feasible policy for ensuring a far greater intake of Orientals into the secondary schools and subsequently into higher education, would this be compatible with the preservation of Oriental culture? And would this attempt at preservation receive the support of Orientals, and which Orientals would support it? Which characteristics would they wish to preserve, and who would decide on these matters?

Many of the so-called Oriental characteristics which Mr. Selzer is so eager to preserve are not particularly Oriental: religious observance, familistic solidarity, participation in traditional arts, may be found in many non-industrial societies. It may be true that there is more traditionalism among Orientals than among Ashkenazim; but this has nothing to do with Oriental culture as such.

But even if there were genuine Oriental characteristics to be preserved, it remains questionable whether a major section of the Oriental population still possess them—if they ever did—and whether they wish to. The immigrants from Morocco are one of the most resentful sections of the Oriental population. But many of them had broken with tradition in Morocco, and it is highly unlikely that they either possess or wish to possess the so-called virtues of Oriental culture; and the young would almost certainly oppose such cultural persistence. The attitude of young urban Moroccans is only an extreme form of that to be found among many, if not most, of the Israeli-born Orientals. The tragedy of it is that the desire to break with traditional culture may well be accompanied by various forms of social and personal disorganization. Mr. Selzer may well reply that this strong incentive to 'modernize' results from the devaluation of Oriental culture for which the Ashkenazim are to blame; but in that case he simply does not understand the modern world.

An irritatingly naïve assumption that Mr. Selzer seems to make is that there is some easily ascertainable Oriental consensus on the preservation of their cultures; but of course there is not. A fairly widespread custom among traditional Oriental Jews is to oblige a young girl to marry the man of her father's choice. (Of course there is nothing particularly *Oriental* about this custom.) Presumably Mr. Selzer would like to preserve this on the grounds that it is customary, that many Oriental men approve it, that the opinions of women concerning the preservation of the custom are not to be consulted since that too would be contrary to Oriental custom, and on the final ground that Oriental women would probably accept the custom if it were not for meddlesome Ashkenazim. Or again, some Orientals consider that it is a father's right to determine the duration and content of his child's formal education. Mr. Selzer could justify the preservation of this custom on

the grounds that children cannot be consulted since they do not know what is good for them and that they, like women, accept the authority of the older male. One could mention a number of other traditional precepts which were at some time or another upheld by Orientals: that adulterous women should be physically punished; that the leviratic obligation should be binding; and so on. Mr. Selzer could reply to these objections that few Orientals still maintain these customs. But some of them might well do so if the law did not prevent or inhibit their conduct.

Those who defend the moral doctrine of cultural relativism never take the trouble to consider its implications. If we are to defend the right of people to preserve their cultures then, presumably, we must also defend their right to dislike other cultures. If, on the other hand, we are to argue that other cultures are not to be condemned or criticized, but that our own culture, which encourages or permits this, is not to be exempt from this rule, then we are somehow implying that the members of our own culture have a moral responsibility to criticize and change it. But if we exempt others from the sort of criticism which we apply to ourselves then we cannot escape the notion that we are their moral superiors! Mr. Selzer thinks that the moral revolution of our time was made by Ruth Benedict and Claude Lévi-Strauss. I think not. The principle of moral universalism requires that if we are to treat all men *as though* they were, for certain purposes, equal, we must not only accord them all the same rights, but require that they be bound by the same moral and legal norms. On this principle, governments should impose laws on their citizens which prevent them from depriving one another of certain rights, even where these rights are legitimized by traditional values; and this should apply even within the family and especially in the protection of minors who may not understand the consequences of their deprivation.

I am not recommending a totalitarian policy of imposing on reasonable adults what is thought by the State to be good for them. In fact, I am sufficiently sceptical of governmental omniscience to insist that such interference be kept to a minimum. On the whole, I agree with Mr. Selzer that Israel should settle for cultural pluralism, if it can have it; this is not because I want to preserve any particular Oriental or cast European cultural traits, but because I do not believe for a moment that a government or people can deliberately create a homogeneous culture worth having. The Zionist pioneers did indeed try their hand at deliberately creating a new culture; but the results are not impressive, and in any case provide little or no safeguard against the influx of modern teenage culture from outside; the only sectors of Israeli society which even try to resist this influx are some kibbutzim where cultural self-righteousness is stifling.

The Israeli authorities have long encouraged the persistence of

ethnic arts and crafts; and leadership in this was given by no less a figure than the late President Ben Zvi. Furthermore, there has been little serious interference with ethnic customs. The charge made by Mr. Selzer that the Ashkenazim have practised 'cultural genocide' is quite absurd. It is, of course, true that the Orientals are patronized for their ethnic culture; and some of them would far rather be rid of the culture itself.

But some questions remain. Can certain Oriental customs be maintained if full equality of opportunity is afforded? And even if they can be maintained, will they be? And who is to decide which of them are worth preserving? My own guess is that if there were equal opportunity to attend secondary schools and universities and to enter occupations carrying higher prestige and power, most of the so-called Oriental cultures would disappear; and if this process were accompanied by a higher rate of intermarriage between Orientals and Ashkenazim both 'groups' would disappear. It is the association of visibility, culture—particularly, and sometimes almost exclusively, dialect—and social status which creates the ethnic divide. It is true that certain institutions of non-industrial society *can* persist after industrialization, even where equality of opportunity is fairly high; one can always point to Japan. But Japan is a special case!

Consider Mr. Selzer's list of Oriental characteristics: 'the permeation of everyday life by the aesthetic element'; 'all-pervasive religiosity'; 'detachment from material benefits'; 'primary importance of the extended family . . . and the subordination of the individual to it'; 'the composition of larger social units not of individuals but of extended families'. The first is doubtless highly desirable, especially in Israel (and modern Britain) where everyday life is permeated by some very ugly urban planning; but is there really more aestheticism among the Orientals than among the Ashkenazim? How does Mr. Selzer explain both the enormous encouragement given to classical composers, soloist performers, ensembles, and orchestras in Israel and the very high standards achieved in music? Perhaps the less said about the 'permeation of life by the aesthetic element' the better.

No one is stopping Orientals from enjoying 'all-pervasive religiosity'; though I have the strong feeling that only the Ashkenazim of Bnei Brak care much for it. Young Orientals seem to prefer the pervasiveness of religion to be confined to a few days a year, like most Jews in Britain.

I do not know where Mr. Selzer spends his time when he is not investigating the cruelties of 'cultural genocide', but he should try the various commercial quarters of Tel Aviv to test the greater degree of 'detachment of Oriental Jews from material benefits'.

Some individuals who have never themselves been subordinated to the so-called extended family are quick to recommend it as a way of

life for others. But it is doubtful whether others appreciate its benefits as much as they are thought to do. It is sometimes said that there are two sorts of people in African towns; those seeking their kinsmen and those seeking to escape them. No doubt the former value the persistence of the extended family. Of course it is often advantageous for the socially mobile to maintain their wider kinship ties; but with industrialization this usually means an end of the joint family proper. (It is questionable whether most Oriental and North African Jews lived in joint family groups before migrating to Israel.) It is not so much that the joint family cannot survive but that some of its members are not strongly motivated to preserve it and, in addition, increasingly prefer the relative privacy of the smaller (conjugal/nuclear) family. Larger social units, such as local communities or neighbourhoods, often survive and even emerge in modern industrial societies; but they are different from the forms which Mr. Selzer has in mind.

An explosive outburst of ethnic hostility in Israel is not to be ruled out in the future. At present a number of conditions operate to contain ethnic tension. First, there is widespread faith that greater equality will come and that governments are committed to rooting out various forms of discrimination as well as improving educational facilities; though how patient the Orientals will be is a matter for speculation. Second, there are a number of other divisions in the society which weaken the ethnic one: there is no absolute congruence of ethnic origin or descent with social class or status (though there is very little good statistical evidence to show exactly how income distribution and occupation do correlate with ethnic origin); political and ideological divisions, between left and right and between the religious and the non-religious, also cut across the ethnic division. Third, there is still a solidarity which derives in part—perhaps in very small part—from a sense of national 'destiny' and attachment to common cultural symbols, which is further strengthened by the constant reminder of hostility from outside. It is frequently said that if Israel were to make peace with the Arabs it would lose any internal unity which it enjoys and that there would be violent expressions of ethnic hostility. There is some truth in this argument, though it underestimates some of the positive binding elements of Israeli society which have enabled it to survive as a genuine democracy for almost twenty years. These positive elements, some of which are the unintended by-product of complex social processes, also owe something to the influence of those political elites whom Mr. Selzer condemns for imposing a European ideology on an unwilling population.

If ethnocentrism has been the price which Israel has paid to preserve democracy there are many who would agree that it was worth paying; some of those would be Israelis from North Africa or the Near East who need not fear that their protests will earn them a term of imprisonment.

This is not to commend complacency: a genuine outbreak of ethnic hostility might well endanger democracy.

Mr. Selzer's naïveté persists to the end. He suggests that a solution of Israel's internal ethnic problem will help to create peace between Israel and the Arabs. The reasoning behind this is as follows: if Israel learns to understand and value the culture of the Middle East it will be able to understand the demands of the Arabs and will itself be welcomed into the 'culture area'. The theory that cultural misunderstanding is responsible for international tension is quite widely accepted in respectable intellectual circles. It sounds plausible and it has the backing of certain cultural (not *social*) anthropologists who feel obliged to stake their claim, along with those of sociologists, economists, and political scientists, as saviours of the world. But for all its plausibility and backing the theory has little to commend it. Misunderstanding can exacerbate international tension; but it might also prevent it; if the Arabs had never understood that the Jews wanted an independent State, not merely a homeland, they might well have ignored them. International misunderstanding very often results from an unwillingness to understand, which is a product of existing tension. What Mr. Selzer perhaps really means is that European Jews displayed the same prejudices in their dealings with Arabs as they did in their dealings with Oriental Jews. This is doubtless true. It is also true that the Zionists dismissed arguments concerning Arab rights and underestimated the nature and intensity of Arab opposition to their own claims. Cultural factors certainly enter the processes of international conflict, particularly in defining the nature of goals and the limits of political allegiance; but they do not usually create conflict or solve it through misunderstanding or understanding.

Social scientists can suggest modes of institutionalizing conflicts and even propose ways of resolving them. The ethnic problem in Israel is probably not one of the most intractable of this kind and can at least be remedied, especially with the aid of sociological enquiry. The latter in turn should be guided by a number of theoretical ideas preferably divested of all ideological and moral imperatives. Mr. Selzer should know that he can best serve the cause of social justice and the promotion of radical change by making the difficult and complex task of analysis his first commitment.

CHRONICLE

It was announced last December that the Israeli Government has conducted a survey in the United States to discover the reasons for the brain drain from Israel to the United States. The Government has established special offices in New York and Los Angeles and is attempting to find jobs, homes, and other amenities to persuade students and professional men to return to Israel. A representative of the Israeli Ministry of Labour disclosed some of the results of the survey. He said that there were 2,000 Israeli students in the United States of whom 1,100 are either graduate students or men and women carrying out post-doctoral studies. A further 1,500 Israelis, who had already completed their studies, were working in the United States; 40 per cent of these are engineers, 10–15 per cent are physicians, and 20 per cent are scientists and artists. The majority of these 1,500 stated that they plan to return to Israel; 85 per cent of them have retained their Israeli citizenship.

In addition to these numbers there were about 1,000 other Israelis in the United States who completed their studies but who, for various reasons, did not reply to the questionnaires sent out to them.

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Campus 1966, Change and Challenge, a B'nai B'rith Foundations publication, states that there are 346,000 Jewish university students in the U.S.A. and Canada. In 1960, Hillel served 140,000 Jewish students on American campuses; five years later, in 1965, the figure had risen to 200,000.

The B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations' Directory in 1966–7 lists a total of 260 Hillel units:

B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation	80
B'nai B'rith Hillel Counsellorships	157
B'nai B'rith Hillel Overseas Units	20
B'nai B'rith Hillel Chairs of Judaic Studies	3
	260

A counsellorship has part-time professional direction. The 'overseas units' are those outside the U.S.A. and Canada; there are four in Australia, eight in Great Britain, two in Israel, one in the Netherlands, two in Switzerland, and three in the Republic of South Africa. The Hillel Chairs of Judaic Studies are in the University of Iowa, the University of Missouri, and in Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee.

In a study by Alfred Jospe, *Jewish Students and Student Services at American Universities*, published by B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations in 1963, there are tables showing college enrolment of Jewish students. In February 1963, Hillel made a survey of 'Jewish enrolment at 850 colleges and universities'.

At the time of the survey there were 4,200,000 students in 850 institutions; 275,000 of these were Jewish, or 6·5 per cent of the total. In 1963 there were Hillel units in 215 colleges in the U.S.A. serving 165,148 Jewish students. In that year, 'a Hillel survey of 600 institutions *not* served by Hillel, of which 539 responded, shows a Jewish enrolment of about 63,000 at these schools. Only 39 institutions reported no Jewish students, 240 reported a Jewish enrolment of 25 or more.'

The first systematic attempt to discover the number of Jewish university students in the U.S.A. was made in 1915 by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. The study was based on reports by congregational rabbis and covered 534 institutions of which 180 reported an enrolment of about 7,300 Jews or 3·1 per cent of the 237,000 students attending college that year. There were ten or more students in only 8 of these 180 colleges.

Several surveys were made later by other Jewish bodies and Dr. Jospe summarizes the findings in the following table.

Total Jewish Enrolment, 1915–1963

Source	*Year*	*Enrolment*			*Number of Colleges and Universities in survey*
		General	*Jewish*	%	
Union of American Hebrew Congregations	1915	237,000	7,300	3·1	180
Menorah Journal	1916	147,352	17,653	11·9	57
Bureau of Jewish Social Research	1919	153,000	14,837	9·7	106
Council of Jewish Student Affairs	1926	236,395	25,348	10·27	67
Hillel–Levinger	1934/5	1,148,393	104,906	9·3	1,319
B'nai B'rith Vocational Service	1946	2,100,000	200,000	9·0	1,534
B'nai B'rith Vocational Service	1955	2,700,000	200,000	7·5	1,610
Hillel Foundations	1963	4,200,000	275,000	6·5	850

*

Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, in the first issue of its newsletter entitled *Brooklyn College Today*, announces that it has established a new Center for Migration Studies. The newsletter states:

'New York City has been one of the world's greatest receivers of migrants, having in 1960 1,558,680 foreign-born residents and 3,785,000 residents whose parents or grandparents were born outside the United States. In 1962 there were 57 foreign language newspapers, published in 26 languages, and 17 languages are used daily in radio programs.

'Despite these large numbers, literature and data on the migrations which filled New York and the United States as a whole is [*sic*] poorly organized. Much of the existing material remains unanalyzed from the standpoint of either social science or social policy. To gather and organize this material, preserve it for posterity and make it available for use by scholars and public education officials, Brooklyn College has established a new Center for Migration Studies. Migration, in this usage, refers to large movements of people, whether internationally or within countries.

'The new center will be at the graduate level and it will involve 11 departments in the social sciences, the humanities, and education. It will assist scholars in different fields to study how migration has figured in their particular disciplines. It will also help clarify present-day problems of ethnic tensions and help solve problems of rapidly expanding populations due to migration processes. Beyond that, it will offer direct help to professionals working with culturally different persons in schools, neighborhoods and institutions.'

*

It was reported from New York last December that Rabbi J. Adler, who had served Tokyo's Jewish community for three years, gave the following details about Jews in Japan:

There are 500–600 Jews in Tokyo and a community of about 150 in the Kobe district; there are also a few individual Jewish families scattered in a number of other cities. The Tokyo community consists primarily of business and professional people with their families; the community maintains its own centre. Rabbi Adler held afternoon classes at the centre for about twenty-five children. He commented that the Jews of Japan had never experienced antisemitism.

*

It is reported that an article appeared in the January 1967 issue of *Nauka i Religia* (Science and Religion), the chief Soviet vehicle for atheistic propaganda, concerning the Jews of Birobidjan. The article, written by A. Vinokur, a Soviet Jewish sociologist, gives details of a sociological survey on the Jewish religion carried out in Birobidjan. 300 Jews from all walks of life were interviewed; only eight said that they were religious believers. The article, entitled 'The Snuffing out of an Ancient Faith', states that there are no facilities in Birobidjan for training rabbis, cantors, or shohetim. Birobidjan has a total population of 172,000 of whom 15,000 are Jews.

*

The Israeli Ambassador to Ghana announced in Accra last December that his Government would be sending two Israeli lecturers to teach Hebrew at the University of Ghana. The Ambassador made this announcement when presenting books and journals to the University; he commented that these gifts from the Israeli Government symbolized a further strengthening of the bonds of friendship uniting the peoples of Ghana and Israel.

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A report to the annual meeting in October 1966 of the Board of Trustees of the American Histadrut Cultural Exchange Institute states that more than $250,000 worth of books were sent to Israeli libraries. The books have been presented by American publishers; they deal with all facets of American life; 20,000 books had already reached Israel and were being distributed in cities, kibbutzim, and development areas. A further 30,000 books were due to arrive in March 1967.

The Institute plans an exchange programme of library experts from Israel

and the U.S.A., as well as visits from Israeli labour leaders who will give lectures in American Universities.

*

The Israeli Government Tourist Office announced that 13,000 West Germans visited Israel in 1966. This represents an increase of 10 per cent over the preceding year. In 1966 Great Britain sent to Israel the highest number of tourists from Europe; France came next and Germany third.

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In October 1966, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Jewish Congress, laid the foundation stone of *Bet Hatfutzot* (House of the Diaspora), in the grounds of Tel Aviv University. The new centre will be concerned with the study of Jewish communities outside Israel.

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The Jewish Agency has announced that 302 familes (1,081 persons) from Iran migrated to Israel in 1966.

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There has been a *herem* on the city of Trent in northern Italy since the sixteenth century, when Jews were alleged to have murdered 'Little Simon', and were massacred in revenge. There have been local rites of veneration of Saint Simon over the centuries.

In February 1967 the Archbishop of Trent announced the decision of the Catholic Congregation of Rites to discontinue the cult of Saint Simon. The Italian Rabbinical Council then met in Rome, expressed gratitude to the Archbishop for his initiative, and declared: 'Having ascertained that the cult of Saint Simon has ceased in Trent, the Italian Rabbinical Council solemnly proclaims the lifting of the *herem* from the city of Trent and its territory, and therefore allows—without any restriction—the Jews of Italy and of all nations to take up permanent residence and to perform any kind of work there.'

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The Israeli Ministry of Agriculture announced in January 1967 that some 400 Israeli agricultural and water experts were currently working in 42 countries; the majority of these experts were employed in African and Latin American countries.

*

The Zionist Organization of Brazil announced that 213 Brazilian Jews emigrated to Israel in 1966; in the course of that year only a negligible number of Jews who had emigrated earlier to Israel returned to Brazil.

*

The Greek Catholic Archbishop in Israel is reported to have stated in an interview in January 1967 that 1,000 members of his community of 55,000

had emigrated in 1966. The majority of the emigrants, who were educated young men and women, had gone to Australia or Canada.

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In February 1967, Israel was represented in 79 countries by 99 permanent missions. These include 67 Embassies, nine Legations, three Representations, 14 Consulates General, and six Consulates. In addition, there were 13 non-resident envoys.

54 nations are represented in Israel by permanent missions; 21 of these are in Jerusalem and the remainder in Tel Aviv.

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The Nobel Prize laureate S.Y. Agnon was informed last February by four Israeli Arab writers that an Arab translation of his works is nearing completion. The aim of the translation was to acquaint the Arabs with Agnon and with the social background of the Jews.

*

The Council of the Sephardi community in Israel has embarked on a programme to bring students from Sephardi communities abroad to study in various religious institutions in Israel. It is hoped that students will come from France, Greece, North Africa, and Turkey, where there are large Sephardi communities.

*

The 'Second Scholars' Conference on Jewish Life in Contemporary Europe' took place in Brussels on 9–13 January 1967 under the auspices of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Institute of Sociology of l'Université libre de Bruxelles.

Papers were presented by scholars from Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the United States of America.

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BOOK REVIEWS

LÉON POLIAKOV, *The History of Anti-Semitism*, Vol. I: *From the Time of Christ to the Court Jews*, trans. Richard Howard, xii + 340 pp., Elek Books, London, 1966, 63*s*.

In this volume Mr. Poliakov deals with antisemitism in the period from the first century of the Christian era to the seventeenth. Volume two is to cover the world of Islam during the same period. Other volumes are to be devoted to the era of emancipation and assimilation and the recrudescence of antisemitism in our own time. We are further promised appendices based on data derived from anthropology, genetics, and social psychology. In this volume the approach is mainly historical, and it is noteworthy for the skilful use made of medieval ballads, folklore, and mystery plays. This enables Mr. Poliakov to give a vivid account of the popular image of the Jew imprinted on the mind of the Christian masses during centuries of vilification and indoctrination, and in this way to supplement the more familiar evidence derived from legal history and the pronouncements of theologians. In a volume covering so long a period the treatment of the various phases is necessarily brief, but the material is handled with easy mastery and scrupulous care.

The conclusions reached are not markedly new. Mr. Poliakov agrees with older historians that in antiquity there were, apart from the disturbances in Alexandria, scarcely any popular attacks on Jews. The elements which were to form the basis of Christian antisemitism become apparent in the early centuries of the Christian era—fear of the continuing attraction of Judaism for Christians, resentment of the favourable position of Jews under Roman rule, and above all, theological doctrines of deicide and divine punishment. In Roman Gaul Jews were numerous and mingled freely and on good terms with Christians and, on the whole, the status of the Jews in the Carolingian empire was favourable. In the tenth century signs of coming disasters begin to appear. The crisis came with the Crusades, and thereafter, every time there was a movement of faith, hatred of the Jews was fanned and was accompanied by wholesale massacres and expulsions. The influence of 'theological anti-semitism' on the masses is unmistakable in this period and persists largely unchanged in later times. As is to be expected, Mr. Poliakov gives a good deal of attention to the fourteenth century—an age of crises and catastrophes in Europe, marked by social upheavals among the peasants and in the cities and by natural calamities such as the famine of 1315–17 and the Black Death. It was in this century, Mr. Poliakov thinks, that antisemitism took on what he calls its classical form, the form which later led Erasmus to declare that 'If it is the part of a good Christian to detest the Jews, then we are all good Christians'. As is well known, one result of the savage attacks on Jews was an exodus to Poland and Lithuania, a movement which was an

important factor in the formation of an East European Jewry, for centuries to come the chief centre of world Judaism.

Mr. Poliakov makes no attempt to estimate the relative influence of religious, economic, and ethnic factors on the growth of antisemitism. He brings out clearly the importance of the political and juridical rightlessness of the Jews once they lost their status as Roman citizens. It was this which forced them to seek the 'protection' of kings or nobles in the form of charters or later as *servi camerae*. The influence of economic factors and of changes in class structure is stressed throughout the book, but perhaps more attention might have been given to the size of the Jewish population at different periods and to the diversification of occupations associated with size. Another factor which might have been discussed more fully is the growth of national feeling among the European peoples. For the period during which the nation-states were in process of formation Professor Baron has put forward the hypothesis that there was a definite connexion or correlation between types of ethnic grouping and antisemitism. Thus in states which included a variety of nationalities but in which no one nationality was a dominant majority, the Jews were less likely to be singled out as 'foreign'. On the other hand, in ethnically homogeneous states or in states struggling towards homogeneity, the position of the Jews was at its worst, while varying between the two extremes were states which included only parts of a nationality. Professor Baron shows at length that the position of the Jews became less favourable as states became ethnically more homogeneous and that up to the seventeenth century this generalization holds good practically without exception (*A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 1937, Vol. II, p. 39). In view of the undoubted influence of intensified nationalism on antisemitism in later periods, an examination of the effects of nationalism in its early stages would have been of great interest.

In the Introduction to his work Mr. Poliakov expresses approval of explanations of antisemitism based on social psychology, especially on the psychology of religion, though he thinks such explanations should also make use of results achieved by other social sciences. His view will no doubt be set out more fully in later volumes, but a hint of the direction to be followed is to be found in the distinction he draws in chapter eleven of this volume between two kinds of antisemitism. There is, first, what he calls mythological antisemitism. This is a composite of hatred and religious fervour whose effects are out of all proportion to its causes and which remains active even where there are no Jews. The second is typified by Polish antisemitism and is found generally in areas where Jews live in large masses and are in continuous contact with their hosts. In these cases the religious hostility remains, but is combined with tensions and conflicts, ethnic and social, not peculiar to Jewish-Gentile relations but found wherever different groups come into contact. The distinction is perhaps drawn too sharply, for in both kinds the central core is the 'strangeness' or alien character of the Jews. On this Mr. Poliakov's account throws a good deal of light. He traces in some detail the factors which led to the mutual segregation of Jews and Christians. A circular causality was at work. The persecutions and expulsions made the Jews increasingly conscious of their 'exilic' existence and, on the other hand, the more frequently the Jews were seen abandoning their homes for unknown destina-

tions, the more deeply did the Christian masses come to feel that the Jews were strangers and wanderers without deep roots even in countries in which they had dwelt for centuries.

Mr. Poliakov modestly explains that it has not been his intention to produce a 'definitive work' but one that would stimulate thought and further enquiry. What is here given whets the appetite for what is to come. It is much to be hoped that the appearance of the later volumes will not be long delayed.

MORRIS GINSBERG

T. SCHRIRE, *Hebrew Amulets, Their Decipherment and Interpretation*, xii + 180 pp., 13 plates, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966, 50*s*.

In this small book, the author has undertaken with commendable courage a large and difficult task. In it he appears as something of a pioneer. The title is a little misleading, as the book deals not with amulets of all kinds, inscribed in Hebrew, whether printed or handwritten, but only with amuletic handwritten inscriptions on parchment, paper, or metal. These are called in Hebrew *kemiyôt*. The wearing and use of such magical devices is of course not confined to Jews; it is common also among Muslims: but it has formed part of the *mores* of innumerable Oriental and North African Jews from very ancient times and spread to Hasidic Jews in Europe in more recent centuries, though the practice was also condemned by other more orthodox groups as superstitious.

The amulets were designed in a pre-scientific age as a protection against sickness or other misfortune, especially the dangers of childbirth, and above all against the Evil Eye (depicted in the Synagogue at Doura-Europos, third century C.E.) and may be traced back to the world of thought of the Babylonians, Assyrians, and Phoenicians and their neighbours. The author derives the tradition through the medieval amulet-writer's handbook, the *Sefer Raziel*, of Rabbi Eleazar of Worms (c. 1230 C.E.), back to supposed origins in the sixth century B.C.E. It is of some sociological interest that the *Sefer Raziel*, after circulating in many manuscript copies, was first printed in Amsterdam only in 1701.

These amulets consist of spells made up usually of variants or permutations of the letters of the name of God or of angels, whose existence in the periphery of later Jewish theology is admitted by the rabbis. There is nothing of demonology or black magic in this practice. The amulet-writers formed hideous-sounding names out of mnemonics compiled from the initials of angels' names, such as Sanvai Sansevai, or Semanglof. Others are formed from the words of passages in certain psalms. These became names of power, to be used in invocation in time of need or in permanent aid. Jewish amulets are classified by the author into six groups: (1) generally beneficial amulets; (2) those for promotion of health; (3) for protection against the Evil Eye; (4) for prevention of miscarriages; (5) for promotion of fertility; and (6) for protection of mother and infant in childbirth. Shapes, colours, arrangement of letters and names of power in different geometrical patterns (squares, triangles, pentacles) all play different parts and are described.

A chapter is included by the author on mysticism and the mystic state and

its alleged relation to the use of amulets, a relation which does not by itself appear to be particularly close. Closer by far is the esoteric form of mystic Jewish learning called Cabbalism, first developed in Spain, in which the manipulation of the Hebrew letters and numbers reached a frenzy of exalted enthusiasm.

There are in this book some shortcomings and inevitable errors and omissions. Thus it is hardly exact to state (p. 3) that Shabethai Zevi took Hasidic Jewry by storm, as the one was a hundred years before the other; (p. 22) for Vernon Gaster, read Vivian Gaster; (p. 69) for 'Samosate' read 'Samosata'; on pp. 130–134 the footnotes are totally missing. The Bibliography, while including a few somewhat irrelevant items, does not include some important items: Ludwig Blau, *Das altjüdische Zauberwesen* (Strasburg, 1898); Reuben Margulies, *Melaché Elyon* (Tel Aviv, 1953); D. S. Sassoon, *Masa' Babel* (Jerusalem, 1955). Nevertheless the book, containing an astonishing amount of information, forms an extremely important and very useful introduction for English readers into a very real side of popular Jewish superstition and magical beliefs otherwise highly inaccessible and designedly obscure.

R. D. BARNETT

GEORGES B. KAVADIAS, *Pasteurs-Nomades Méditerranéens, Les Saracatsans de Grèce*, xii + 444 pp., 109 illustrations, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1965, 50 F.

Communities of transhumant shepherds, known as Sarakatsani, are to be found during the summer months in different areas of the mountains of continental Greece. They remain perhaps the most traditional communities in the Greek countryside. The peculiarities of their dialect, and problems of historical origin, custom, and social structure have already produced four monographs, including the volume under review.

With Lévi-Strauss the author believes the anthropologist must attempt 'à connaître l'homme total, envisagé, dans un cas à partir de ses productions et, dans l'autre de ses représentations'. The study is therefore comprehensive in that three sections treat at about the same length material culture and techniques, social and economic organization and law, magic and religious beliefs and artistic expression. The chapters on material culture, magic and religion are particularly valuable for the presentation of ethnographic material not available elsewhere in a western language and for the author's rejection of the unfounded theory of certain Greek folklorists that Sarakatsani can be described as Christians only in a nominal sense.

Dr. Kavadias visited eleven different Sarakatsan settlements in widely separated areas of Greece, interviewing over a hundred persons of both sexes and enjoying 'la participation directe' in Sarakatsan life. Thus this is not a study of one particular community. On the other hand circumstances and practices in different areas are not distinguished. Rather the author presents a generalized description of a homogeneous traditional culture from which he appears to exclude traits that may have been locally adopted from other Greek communities. The sociological analysis, sometimes carried out at a level of some abstraction in the manner and terminology of Gurvitch, is

concerned with those traditional techniques, forms, and beliefs which represent what the author believes to be, or to have been, the essential elements everywhere of Sarakatsan society, relatively uncontaminated by change.

This approach may indeed be legitimate. The author is, of course, aware that Sarakatsan society has undergone successive changes since 1920. The precipitating factors and their consequences are discussed briefly in the penultimate chapter. Therefore the reader must understand that he will no longer meet in any existing Sarakatsan community precisely the pattern of life described in this book; nor can he always expect that, in details of custom and behaviour, one community of Sarakatsani will be exactly like another.

J. K. CAMPBELL

HANS TOCH, *The Social Psychology of Social Movements*, xiv + 257 pp., Methuen, London, 1966, 35*s*.

There are at least two main ways of looking at social movements. One is within the framework of particular social structures and in specific historical contexts; the other is by focusing on the individual member, his motives and perceptions irrespective of space, time, and the social order. The author, a psychologist, leans towards the second type of approach. He was fascinated for years by the colourful spectrum of social movements of every kind, attending meetings, rallies, and séances, and immersed himself in their literature. The outcome is this book, which seeks to probe the reasons why people form, join, and abandon a wide variety of social movements.

The basic argument is that a social movement represents a collective effort to solve a common problem. Once the movement is established, an individual who experiences a problem becomes susceptible to appeals from movements claiming to be able to help. Moreover, an individual suffering from unhappiness and frustration will have an increased disposition to accept various kinds of beliefs about the nature of the problem, for which the movement (as distinct from conventional society) provides the necessary social consensus. The first part of the book illustrates with a wealth of detail the manner in which the special needs of certain people are met, and sometimes exploited, by appropriate social movements.

The second part begins with a description of the roots of susceptibility from childhood onwards, and traces the path to later 'conversion'. The effects of membership are discussed in terms of personality changes, followed by an account of the factors which lead a person to defect—leaning heavily on the writings of ex-Communists. The last part begins with a rather curious examination of motives for joining, going on to a more sociological perspective on social movements in relation to a society as a whole, and the problem of their evaluation.

This summary is unfortunately apt to convey a rather misleading impression, like a description of a rich fruit-cake without mention of the fruit. A substantial proportion of the text consists of what the author himself calls 'folksy' examples, drawn from writings by or about Communists, Nazis, Catholics, Protestant sects, Alcoholics Anonymous, TOPS (Taking Off Pounds Sensibly), the Anti-Digit Dialing League, Lonely Hearts Clubs, etc., etc. With great industry and zest, and liberal use of scissors and paste, the

author has unearthed the oddities of life in America and elsewhere. The question one is bound to ask is whether all these are useful and necessary adjuncts of the argument, or whether (to put it bluntly) the argument serves to hold together a patchwork. It is clear that the book lacks the unity and power of a work like Norman Cohn's *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, to which Toch does not even refer. He makes many sensible and interesting observations, but on the whole the interpretations are lacking in depth. For instance, in discussing McCarthyism, he vividly describes how it permeated the atmosphere with suspicion, and how powerful his followers became. 'Finally . . . a televised battle between McCarthy and the U.S. army . . . disillusioned most of McCarthy's moderate followers and left him politically isolated.' Now one is entitled to ask: what about the needs and problems of his followers? How could a single event bring about such a transformation? This is by no means the only occasion where the main argument is quietly abandoned.

This was probably inevitable, given Toch's mode of approach, whose limitations he recognizes. One might go even further and suggest that the psychological aspects of social movements cannot be adequately studied from secondary sources, and demand sharper conceptual tools for their analysis. An example of this would be the work of Festinger and others on a small millennial sect (*When Prophecy Fails*), which is cited by Toch; what he fails to mention is that the whole study was geared to the theory of cognitive dissonance, which might have been used to illuminate some of the other social movements.

Perhaps all these comments are just another manifestation of the besetting reviewer's sin of complaining that the author ought to have written another kind of book. As it stands, the book is well-written and enjoyable; teachers in need of quotations about social movements will find it a goldmine, and it is to be hoped that it will stimulate the more detailed studies which are needed.

GUSTAV JAHODA

ESTHER R. GOSHEN-GOTTSTEIN, *Marriage and First Pregnancy: Cultural Influences on Attitudes of Israeli Women*, xii + 142 pp., Tavistock Publications, London, 1966, 30*s*.

Cultural values and ethnic background are important variables in determining marriage patterns, family formation, and fertility attitudes. The character of immigration to Israel and the process of social and economic development have in many ways created a population characterized by cultural heterogeneity and social differentiation. Consequently, for the social scientist, Israel may be viewed as a unique setting for the study of social and cultural change. This book attempts to examine the relationship between three types of marriage pattern in Israel—traditional, transitional, and modern—and attitudes towards the process of marriage and first pregnancy.

The study population consisted of 159 primiparous women in five antenatal clinics in Jerusalem, and the focused interview was used. The women were categorized into three marriage types based on responses to questions regarding (1) why they decided to get married, (2) type of husband desired,

(3) who decided upon the marriage, and (4) how well the respondent knew her husband before marriage. The substantive material relating to the three types of marriage is treated in two parts. Part one, dealing with marriage background, includes: differential fear of the wedding night, enjoyment of intercourse, subservience to the husband, attachment to mother, willingness to work outside the home, desire for social contact, discussion before marriage, and attitudes towards birth control. The second section encompasses a variety of subjects from differential acceptability of first pregnancy to preferred sex of the child; from intentions regarding breast-feeding to differential pain, vomiting, oral craving, and subjective fears about pregnancy and childbirth.

The findings show the importance of marriage type for most of the dependent variables. Yet the methodological weaknesses of the study are sufficiently serious to cast doubt on the validity and reliability of the conclusions. The description of the sampling procedures and basic socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents is sketchy and inadequate. It is not clear, for example, what the religious composition of the sample was—presumably most, if not all, of the women interviewed were Jewish, although this is never spelled out. Socio-economic status of the three groups of women is mentioned in passing in several places but no data are presented. Basic information on age at marriage or months between marriage and first birth is not presented, yet surely these factors must be considered in the analysis of attitudes towards pregnancy and marriage and operate differentially by marriage type. In order to test the hypothesis that the marriage background is of greater importance than social class or ethnicity in determining marriage and childbirth attitudes, some cross-tabulations controlling for class and ethnicity are necessary. No such tabulations are presented. The strong relationship between marriage background and ethnicity which the author presents in Table 5, as well as the mention of social class correlates, suggests that these three variables must be considered jointly or at least controlled. Among other important factors which are omitted we might list religiosity, length of residence in Israel, urban-rural background, and utilization of contraception. In other research contexts it may not be justifiable to criticize omissions of variables. However, before we can evaluate cultural influences on psychobiological or psycho-social factors associated with pregnancy and marriage and, particularly, before we can argue that cultural factors are primary, it is necessary to equalize, control, or eliminate the effects of other sociological and demographic variables. The absence of such an analysis limits the potential contribution of this volume.

CALVIN GOLDSCHEIDER

DAVID M. EICHHORN, ed., *Conversion to Judaism, A History and Analysis*, xii + 288 pp., Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1966, $5.95. (Contributing authors: Bernard Bamberger, David Eichhorn, Abraham Franzblau, Albert Goldstein, Sidney Hoenig, David Seligson, Abraham Shusterman, Samuel Teitelbaum.)

For a non-Jew this is a very embarrassing book to review. One feels that most

of its authors would appreciate a damning notice to reinforce their evident sense of inveterate Gentile malice. Yet one can only say that almost the only use of these pages is as an index of how some American Jews feel towards their Gentile environment.

One hardly dare say such things without an immediate avowal of friendliness towards Jewish people and Jewish values. Yet even so splendid and important a Jewish value as respect for learning is here offensively distorted in such explicit contrasts as that between 'learned Jew and traditional Christian'. Doubtless such a contrast might—unjustly—appear unusually glaring in the United States, but it is not absolute. For example, this book engages in a wilful and persistent misrepresentation of the Christian doctrine of grace which not only suggests that ignorance is no Christian monopoly but gives ironic point to the statement on p. 246 that in Judaism every man is his own barrister. Moreover it appears that learning is far more than *a* Jewish value: it is *the* Jewish value. The psychoanalytic contribution claims that Judaism creates a way of life 'aimed in the direction which Freud cherished most, the ultimate triumph of the cultured man'. So much for doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly with thy God. So much for Freud on culture.

The psychoanalytic section is somewhat difficult to characterize. Let me simply say that it is a splendid example of psychoanalysis, displaying all the respect for scientific canons of evidence and inference, the regard for logic, and the knowledge of brute historical fact which we have come to expect from analysts.

An exceptional section of the book is written by a sociologist. No one would call it remarkable, but the points made are realistic and factual. It shows that orthodox Rabbis and laymen of most persuasions are not much interested in recovering the world-wide 'mission of Israel' which the other authors are anxious to propagate. It also emphasizes the *mutual* exclusiveness of Jew-Gentile social cohesion, and admits that there are difficulties in a non-Jew gaining social acceptance—a fact elsewhere denied. Even so it barely deals with the structural processes as distinct from the ideological sources involved in antisemitism.

One must end with a query: surely the attitudes paraded here are unrepresentative? At any rate I have not encountered them in England. Has the American promise allied to American powers of absorption created frustrations and fears comparatively unknown over here? At any rate something very odd is going on when Dr. Eichhorn suggests an alliance of Buddhists, Jews and *Muslims* to 'stand between' Christians and Communists. Just like the British at Suez! Let him preach a sermon on that text in Israel.

DAVID MARTIN

LEON RADZINOWICZ, *Ideology and Crime, A Study of Crime in its Social and Historical Context*, xii + 152 pp., Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1966, 21*s*.

This book consists of four lectures in the James Carpentier series delivered in the Faculty of Law at Columbia University, New York, in 1965. As a

series of lectures they cover an immense ground, and are presented in an historical frame of reference. The first deals with the Liberal position, the second with Determinism, and the final two with the so-called Pragmatic position.

It would be difficult for any author to present new material on such a subject, for the historical ground has been gone over many times before. What is of value here is the method of presentation. It is also true that *Ideology and Crime* contains no startlingly original theory of criminal behaviour. This should not be taken as a negative observation, for the history of criminology is littered with the wrecks of novel theories, most of them of the monocausal variety, which have come to grief simply because they attempted to provide universalistic rather than limited and specific interpretations.

There is a great danger that criminology may fall into the same state as certain other branches of social science, and become dominated by the results of highly sophisticated statistical research into particular problems which, though they shed important light upon matters which are the concern of penal policy, tend to lose sight of the fact that crime is a matter of general social concern and its treatment the subject of proper philosophical debate. It is right, then, that Professor Radzinowicz places his subject matter within the historical framework. As a guide to newcomers to the subject this is of considerable value, particularly at a time when more and more members of the community are seeking to become informed about crime and its treatment.

One of the important facts that is frequently overlooked when we are seeking for new ideas in penology is that so much of what is thought to be original has been said before. For although there have been major developments in the subject which resulted in significant alteration in the course of thinking, there is also a discernible thread of continuity that is often ignored. Few students, for example, are consciously aware of the parallels between Tarde's Laws of Imitation and Sutherland's theory of Differential Association, perhaps because nowhere in Sutherland's writings is there anything approaching a reasonable discussion of Tarde's work.

In his discussion of the Liberal position, Professor Radzinowicz goes over familiar ground in describing the beginnings of criminology in the revolt against the unreason of the traditional legal approach to crime and the consequent barbarities of the criminal law. In discussing the Deterministic position, he rightly gives prominence to Quetelet 'like a huge tree, which tended to dwarf its neighbours', not least of them André Guerry, to whom the title of the first systematic criminologist might be given. Professor Radzinowicz tends to give the impression, however, that the impetus of these social statistical researches was to be found in continental Europe alone, and he makes no reference to the considerable number of studies conducted in England after the English translation of Guerry's *Essai de la statistique morale de la France* which appeared in 1833. Guerry's work had a profound influence in England, and the work of writers like Rawson and Fletcher was in fact subsequently rediscovered by Clifford Shaw and his colleagues of the Chicago school nearly a century later. Professor Radzinowicz makes a useful point when he links the determinism of Mayhew and Buret to the neo-Marxism of William

Bonger. The shift, as he rightly points out, in the concern for the condition of the criminal classes was from the assumption of their moral defectiveness to their economic vulnerability in the capitalist system.

Lombroso, who was undoubtedly responsible in large measure for the eclipse of the social statistical approach, is dismissed by Radzinowicz: 'His writings are no longer read and indeed are hardly readable'. Dead and unread though Lombroso may be, his legacy is still very much with us in the form of popular stereotypes of criminals. So deeply ingrained—although in distorted form—are neo-Lombrosian notions in the minds of the general public, that it will take years before the belief that criminals are 'different' from ordinary people in some fundamental way is finally eradicated.

In dealing with what he calls the Pragmatic Position, Professor Radzinowicz sets himself a far from easy task. He is clearly unhappy about the implications of the notion that is central to Sutherland's work and teaching, namely that criminal behaviour, like any other behaviour, is learned. From a theoretical point of view this is without doubt the weakest part of the book in that, although it must of necessity be selective, the discussion is not truly representative. There is no mention for example of Eysenck's work, nor of the substantial attempt by Trasler to produce an 'explanation of criminality'. Where the vexed question of responsibility arises in relation to penal treatment, the author may be said to be sitting on the fence. The objections to a thoroughgoing 'social defence' approach are well known, but Marc Ancel's *Social Defence* does not get a mention although it was published in French as long ago as 1954, and had gone through editions in Spanish (1961) and Serbo-Croat (1962) before it came out in English in 1965. This is a pity, for Ancel's work is a noble attempt at the intellectual rehabilitation of a politically suspect doctrine.

Professor Radzinowicz concludes by saying that we 'distrust philosophizing and call for facts'. This is certainly true, and there has never been a greater need for facts to be available before launching into legal and social reform. The bland resolve with which the present government has decided to modify the jury system in England without having any of the truly relevant facts before it is a classic example. But at the same time, there is no merit in the piling up of facts in the expectation that the answers to the questions of what to do with offenders or what to do about crime will automatically emerge. We must have a penal philosophy, based upon ethical standards which are acceptable to contemporary society. The suppression of crime is not a matter to be dealt with like sanitation or traffic. It concerns human beings, among whom our criminals are numbered.

TERENCE MORRIS

RUDOLPH GLANZ, *Jew and Irish: Historic Group Relations and Immigration*, 159 pp., Waldon Press, New York, 1966, n.p.

By the end of the nineteenth century, massive immigration had made the United States of America an incredibly complex multi-ethnic society. Relations between any two groupings were profoundly affected by the other relationships in which both were involved. The true 'unit' of ethnic relations

was therefore the 'network', not the isolated pair. One facet of this truth is skilfully examined in this work. Relying primarily upon nineteenth century newspapers and other documentary sources, Dr. Glanz has sketched a vivid picture of the changing, ambivalent, and many-storied relationships of Irish and Jew.

The first American-born generation of Irish origin faced Jews as new immigrants to the larger cities. Both groupings had fled from catastrophe—from famine in Ireland after 1847, from pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe from 1881. They had no common history in a European homeland, and their initial images of each other derived largely from religious traditions. Symbolic bases of potential solidarity could be found in a common sense of exile from oppressed homelands, the myth of Irish descent from one or more of the Ten Lost Tribes, mutual respect for cultural and religious integrity, recognition of common fate as objects of discrimination and prejudice, mutual political interests. Potential sources of animosity included the Irish religious tradition with its stereotypes of Jews, economic competition, cultural and social differences, and the tensions and conflicts that were generated by jostling for place in the political and prestige orders.

Many richly suggestive hypotheses can be gleaned from this account, e.g. the idea that Irish immigrants were the target of nativistic attacks that might otherwise have turned towards Jews. The materials presented do not test such insights; that task requires other approaches.

For both Irish and Jews, the great immigration to America created a new centre of identity and influence. And, in turn, the new common base gave both peoples wholly unexpected parts to play in later history.

ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR.

STATE OF ISRAEL, *The Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in Israel. A Report Prepared on the Occasion of the Third United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Stockholm, 9–18 August 1965*, 191 pp., Jerusalem, 1965, n.p.

As might be expected from the title, this is a general description of the legal system and penal services in Israel, in the form of a series of articles by leading people in the services described. The system is, of course, largely based on the British pattern introduced during the Mandate, and the Criminal Code is still fundamentally that introduced by the British in 1936. English common law precedents are still accepted, but there is a gradual process of division as the Israeli Supreme Court finds differently on particular points. Both corporal and capital punishment were soon abolished in Israel, however, and suspended sentences have been introduced. Since 1954, there has been a general parole system for all those serving terms of more than three months. Authority for release between three and six months lies with the Minister, but over this cases are dealt with by a Release Board consisting of a Judge, a prison official, and a doctor or educator. Prisoners are eligible for release after completion of two thirds of their term, but for sentences of two years or over they are released on licence. There are, however, no parole officers and the work is left to voluntary agencies.

The provisions for juveniles are very similar to those in England. The procedure is, however, rather less formal and the offender is allowed to tell his story in his own way; and the care and protection provisions appear to be less stringent. The upper age is 18, and this is also the upper age for female offenders. There is no lay magistracy. Treatment provision covers a very similar range to the English system, but a Youth Welfare Division of the Ministry of Social Welfare is responsible for placing children sent into institutions, with the help of remand and classification centres. An addition made necessary by the range of immigrants coming in is a series of day rehabilitation centres for wayward, neglected, and delinquent juveniles—what used to be called in England Day Industrial Schools, which have, unfortunately, disappeared.

The probation service is well developed, and in recent years it has been experimenting with various preventive methods ranging from street corner work to spotting centres of incipient trouble, in which it co-operates with the police. A Centre for Delinquency Prevention in the Ministry of Social Welfare tries to co-ordinate local efforts to prevent delinquency.

As in other countries, both the rate of offences known to the police and the under-21 rates of convicted are increasing, although the overall conviction rate is steady. As one might expect, the proportion among those born in Asia and Africa is high and rising, but it is interesting that the proportion of adult offenders is higher since 1959 both in European and American born as well as among Asians and Africans. Is this connected with changes in the age distribution, or is everybody, everywhere becoming more prone to criminality? The figures for recidivists show the rapid formation of a group of habitual offenders. The State of Israel, sad to say, has not only proved that Jews can be good farmers and soldiers, but that they can be just as criminal as any other nationality!

GORDON ROSE

SOLOMON DIAMOND, *Information and Error, An Introduction to Statistical Analysis*, xii + 308 pp., Basic Books, London, 1966 (paperback edition), 27*s*. 6*d*.

This book is intended for students of psychology. Little knowledge of mathematics is required and the subject matter is presented in a particularly readable and intelligible form, as the author frequently applies his doctrine that 'a neat proof may be wasted without an apt analogy or an enlivening bit of humour'.

Both the selection and sequence of topics covered by the text are somewhat unusual owing to the attempt made to express every major statistical technique in terms of the extraction of relevant information from the sum of squares and the calculation and interpretation of a ratio of information to error. The use of the null hypothesis in interpreting experimental results is first met with in the introductory chapter. Measures of average and linear measures of dispersion are covered in Chapter 2, the data being assumed to consist of a sample of m scores and the concept of the universe of all such samples of size m, from a population of size n, being introduced. In Chapter 3 the usual computational procedures for calculating $\Sigma(X - \bar{X})^2$ are covered,

but again the chapter ends somewhat unexpectedly, with a discussion of the differentiation ratio and an example of its application to two sets of hostility scores. The following chapter on variance covers both the variance in a sample and the sample estimate of the variance of the universe.

After the usual elementary discussion of probability and the binomial and normal distributions, the sampling distributions of the means of large and small samples are covered, together with confidence limits. Instructions are given for an interesting experiment based on Random Number Tables to test the validity of the formula for the sampling variance of the mean. Chapter 7 covers comparisons of the means of paired and independent samples in a very satisfactory manner, the assumptions involved in each test being clearly stated and some discussion of more general problems of significance testing being included. This is followed by a simple introduction to the analysis of variance. Comparisons of proportions and a fairly extended coverage of the chi-square test are included in Chapter 9, which is followed by two chapters on product moment correlation. Chapter 12, which consists of an exposition of some of the basic ideas and techniques of factor analysis, may well prove too difficult mathematically for many readers. In the final chapter some of the techniques available for handling non-normal data are covered, including transformations and distribution free tests. This chapter concludes with a useful discussion of the power of a test.

Throughout the book quantitative data are assumed to be in the form of test scores and both the numerical examples in the text and the problems at the end of each chapter are drawn from the psychological field. For this reason the book will have most appeal for psychology students, but because of the unusual order of presentation, the entertaining and lucid style, and the relatively low price, it may be strongly recommended to students in all branches of the social sciences.

KATHLEEN GALES

VILÉM BENDA *et al.*, *Prague Ghetto in the Renaissance Period* (Jewish Monuments in Bohemia and Moravia, Vol. IV), 131 pp., The State Jewish Museum in Prague, Prague, 1965, n.p.

These four major studies of sixteenth and seventeenth century Jewish life in Prague are introduced by Mr. Vilém Benda, Director of the Prague Jewish Museum, whose enormously valuable collection was miraculously spared from Nazi destruction. The story of how the old ghetto of Prague was saved is well known, and all credit is due to the Czechoslovak State which helped preserve this monumental historical collection, now one of the very few testimonies of continuous Jewish life in Europe.

From the first historical study by Jan Heřman on the Prague community before the expulsion of 1543, we learn how Jews first came to settle in Prague, in what trades they engaged and how they lived in a city which in a turbulent era acted as a haven of refuge. Coming chiefly from Germany, where their persecution had reached almost unbearable heights, large numbers of Jews settled in Prague. Their increasing numbers and the consequent competition in the money-lending and silver trades, however, resulted in ever mounting demands by the burghers for their expulsion, and the jealousies between the

rival Jewish traders led to a deep conflict within the community itself. All these factors contributed to the eventual expulsion of the Jews from Prague in 1543. The second study, by Josef Janaček, describes the Prague Jewish community before the Thirty Years' War, and its growth after the expulsion when fifteen Jewish businessmen were allowed to stay and from which number another large community grew. From toleration under Ferdinand I, the Jews of Prague enjoyed the full advantages of a prosperous kingdom under Rudolf II, but their peace had to be bought dearly from King and noblemen. Mr. Janaček traces the inner development of the community with skill, condensing a large volume of information in a relatively short chapter which ends with the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War and the rising of the Czech Estates, when the Jews of Prague aligned themselves with the Hapsburgs who eventually held the upper hand.

Otto Muneles and Vladimir Sadek give an account of the spiritual life of the community in the sixteenth century. Prague was then an important centre of scholarship, with its own Hebrew press dating back to 1512, the date of a prayer book fragment preserved in the Bodleian Library. There was a considerable number of great rabbis and scholars, and we are told of their role in guiding the community through their difficult time. This was, of course, the period which saw the great Rabbi Löw in Prague, and in an effort to do the great Rabbi justice the authors deal more extensively with his scholarship and influence on contemporary and later Jewish thinking, mentioning only in an aside the legend of the Golem of which no historical evidence can be found. In addition to the copious religious literature produced in this golden age, there was a great deal of popular writing in Yiddish as well as Yiddish translations of the Bible and of devotional and religious works.

The final chapter by Josef Hrásky is a description of sixteenth and seventeenth century items in the collection of the State Jewish Museum. These serve as illustrations to the whole volume and cover a very wide range of objects: tombstones, tapestries, books, gold, pewter, silverware, maps, documents, etchings, and so on. The photographs (many in colour) testify to the great care and devotion with which these objects are preserved and their description is an excellent study in the history of art of the period.

Special commendation is due to the translator, Ira Drápálova, whose work turns this erudite volume into fascinating reading for scholar and layman alike.

ELIZABETH E. EPPLER

J. P. NETTL, *Rosa Luxemburg*, 2 vols., vol. 1, xviii + 450 pp.; vol. 2, viii + pp. 451–984, Oxford University Press, London, 1966, 126*s*.

Rosa Luxemburg stands out as one of the most fiery, scintillating, outspoken, uncomprising revolutionaries ever to foment a debate in the Second International. She has at last found a biographer equal to the task of presenting the picture of the woman as a living and vivacious personality, against the changing social and political background of the time.

The book covers in detail every aspect of her life, including her organiza-

tional activities in the German and Polish Social Democratic parties, her contributions to the major issues in the International, her relations with the Russian factions, her personal and her love life. Mr. Nettl dwells on the special qualities of the 'peer group' to which she belonged, that élite of dedicated and uniquely emancipated 'Poles' who formed the tiny Polish Social Democratic Party which she led. They included men like Dzierżyński, Hanecki, Radek, Warszawski, Marchlewski, and the great love of her life, Leo Jogiches. The author's chief object is to delineate throughout the book Rosa's great achievement: her renunciation of all loyalty to nation or nationality and its replacement by loyalty to the international proletariat. (An appendix on the national question provides a most valuable and welcome summary of this theme.)

Early on in his study, Mr. Nettl repudiates vigorously the notion that his particular revolutionaries from among the national minorities of Eastern Europe might have been acting in some way under the influence of what he calls 'a neurosis of national dispersion'. There is an element of ambivalence here for, while he produces a good deal of evidence to show the superficiality of Rosa's Jewish background, in a footnote (p. 52) he takes issue with his own evidence and doubts whether she was all that assimilated.

As evidence of her lack of Jewishness the author asserts that 'any self-consciously Jewish atmosphere grated on her at once' (p. 53). On the other hand, she had moments of gloom about her relations with the leaders of the German party which sound exactly like 'dispersion neurosis': she complained that 'they' only run to the Jews when they are in trouble and, when it's over, to hell with the Jews. In spite of such conflicting evidence, or evidence of conflict, the author, as consistently as Rosa herself, maintains his case that the magnetic pole of Marxist internationalism fully displaced that of national feeling in his subject. The stark fact that nearly all her best friends were Jews is easily overcome by the presence in the leadership of the Polish party of some *real* Poles, Dzierżyński for instance. It is not a good example, in view of Lenin's angry observation in 1922 that his Cheka chief took his internationalism to the excess of Great Russian chauvinism.

In spite of the attention lavished on the central figure of this work, those around her emerge with considerable clarity, and indeed they are indispensable to the author's thesis that their internationalism was the binding force of the group. We are constantly warned by Mr. Nettl not to entertain thoughts that Rosa's passionate and lifelong struggle against nationalism had a personal motivation. As we have seen, the evidence on her Jewish background is to suggest its superficiality. The author is at pains to assure us that Rosa's internationalism did not arise from violent rejection of, or by, her family. Nor did it come from any effort of intellect. It came about through 'a genuine objectification of class as a focus for personal loyalties'. But on the other hand we learn that she was a lonely person, cautious in her relations with individuals, as with groups, and even her view of the masses was 'formal'. The class which served to focus her personal loyalties was an abstract conception which she did little to make more concrete.

The Luxemburgist and the historian are occasionally at odds in Mr. Nettl. Thus 'her greatest achievement was in her transference of all the energy and satisfactions of patriotic consciousness on to class consciousness', and she

propagated the 'most extensive and extreme version of the denial of the right of national self-determination'. Yet her position 'could never be divorced from its practical Polish application, however much she claimed universal validity for it'.

A self-consciously Jewish atmosphere would grate on her; she was, for instance, offended by the Jewish jokes and gluttony at the Kautskys (though Kautsky was not a Jew). In 1917 she complained to a friend 'Why do you come to me with your special Jewish sorrows? I feel just as sorry for the wretched Indian victims of Putamayo, the negroes in Africa . . . I feel at home in the entire world wherever there are clouds and birds and human tears' (p. 860). Humanity was something to feel sorry for, but evidently also something she wished to keep at a distance. She was 'given to unrestrained generalizations' when it came to her personal views on national character, finding this man a 'typical' German or that one a 'typical' Russian. According to her biographer, however, she never committed the error of basing her political outlook on such generalizations.

Her Jewishness, we are told, amounted to little more than an obvious ethnic appearance and a certain penchant for the occasional Jewish joke and the pithy Yiddish expression. She shared this taste with that other internationalist *à outrance*, Karl Radek, the Jew from Austrian Galicia who found his spiritual home, and his final resting place, among the Russian Bolsheviks (like the majority of Rosa's friends in the leadership of the Polish party). It seems fair to ask whether Mr. Nettl is not overlooking a significant, shrouded source of national identification, which was all the more important for its being relegated to the level of triviality by those who indulged in it. It is after all a keynote of Rosa's life story that her feelings about nation remained *passionate*. In 1917 she said she could find no place in her heart for the Jewish ghetto. Among her abstract formulations on nationality and its historic role, as on economics, she left out the Jews. Her pithy Yiddish expressions, the jokes, and the passion of her internationalism suggest a private 'ghetto in her heart'. It appears that she manufactured her own external ghetto, too. The overwhelming majority of her intimates were Jews and their muted, 'artificial' Jewishness (the jokes and so on) produced just the right amount of Jewish atmosphere. With great care, she created an environment which she could determine and control exactly as she chose. She emerges perhaps more as a cosmopolitan than as an internationalist.

A certain amount of identification between biographer and subject may be an essential part of any successful biography. In the book under review it could well be the sustaining force which has carried the author, and carries the reader, through such a long narrative. It even appears that Mr. Nettl chose the structure of his book under the influence of Rosa Luxemburg. We are told that with his manifold approach, involving several levels simultaneously, the 'real insights are incidental, and not the carefully considered conclusions of most social scientists—surprises you can see coming a long way off'. Of her method of writing he says, 'as with any good practitioner, her work was self-generating so that she did not always know at the beginning of the article what she would say at the end. This is why so many of the really interesting flashes of insight come not in the main argument but as incidental illustrations.' In this apparently minor detail there may be a hint that the

author has been influenced by his subject's views on more important questions. To what extent has he assimilated Rosa's self-consciously idealistic and idealized views on nationality and patriotism? Is his conclusion, that she and her peer group succeeded in displacing *nation* by *class*, not too close to their own lifelong struggle to convince themselves, in other terms, that this was precisely the case? Had they so completely succeeded in this process of self-reconstruction, it seems more likely that their attitude would have been less passionate, more neutral. Rosa might not then have felt so uncomfortable in a 'self-consciously Jewish atmosphere', or been so unwilling to listen to 'special Jewish sorrows'.

Rosa Luxemburg and her group came from an environment that was both acutely and chronically nationalistic, Jewish and Polish respectively. Nationality for them, like religious affiliation for their fathers' generation, meant a humiliating label pinned on by hostile authority, and it represented an arbitrary limitation of the self by an outside agency. Internationalism represented a counter-attack, which originated in the repudiation of the specific label and culminated in the negation of nationalism as such.

The fact that Rosa's appeals were drowned in the patriotic cacophony of the First World War, or that her campaign for individual self-realization, as a fundamental aim of socialist revolution, was swept aside by the terrorism of the first workers' state, cannot serve as reasons to condemn her. On the contrary, her 'mistakes' elevate her to the level of Utopia and relegate her enemies and critics to that of cynical opportunism at best. She died in the knowledge that the socialist revolution, scarcely begun in Russia, had already been betrayed by Bolshevik disdain for individual freedom. How much of her special unconcern for special Jewish sorrows would have survived Stalin and Hitler it would be unfair even to conjecture.

HAROLD SHUKMAN

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Cazeneuve, Jean, *Bonheur et Civilisation*, 248 pp., Gallimard, Paris, 1966 (paperback), n.p.

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