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DEFINING JUDAISM: SOME GROUND-CLEARING[1]

Raphael Loewe

THE following thoughts are offered as an attempt not so much to answer basic questions regarding Judaism and Jewish identity as to clarify them. Discussion of the problems is frequently bedevilled by fallacies of equivocation and by misunderstandings arising out of the imprecision and paucity of the terms in which it has hitherto been conducted, both in European languages and in contemporary Hebrew, together with either an ignorance or a summary dismissal of the Hebrew and Aramaic terms and categories employed in the rabbinic approach to the practical aspects of the subject—it is often assumed that these are too circumscribed to be currently useful, without investigation and, still less, assessment of their validity. All that I endeavour to do here is to distinguish terminologically between sundry aspects generally grouped together as 'Judaism': in the hope that if all or some of my terms can sustain examination, they may henceforth be adopted in serious discussion both by professional students and by the wider public, both gentile and Jewish, that is aware enough that some of the issues here considered are real and indeed pressing, but is still unable to formulate them articulately.

My distinctions will, of course, presuppose certain premises. Since these will be reflected clearly enough in what follows, and will be summarized in my tentative definition of Judaism at the end, I see no point in anticipating them here otherwise than by declaring at the outset my qualifications, and disqualifications, for presuming to address myself primarily to specialists in a discipline other than my own. And I would wish to begin by avowing a factor in the human equation which I naturally endeavour, but which I may sometimes have inadvertently failed, to exclude. I am myself a Jew; and although I identify myself with no Jewish party or position, I regard the rabbinic interpretation of Judaism as being in its essentials sound and as capable of reassessing and broadening its horizons sufficiently to find room within them for contemporary Jewry and its new situation. Jewish tradition consequently retains my personal allegiance, and its practical requirements elicit from me what would be regarded, by contemporary standards, as a relatively high degree of conformity. I state this in order that readers

may make the necessary correctives if, in what follows, I have ever lapsed without realizing it from a purely academic standpoint.

My own business is with Hebrew scholarship, as revolving round texts in Hebrew and other relevant languages, and also round the thought-categories implicit in Hebrew linguistics and the fate of these when they are subjected to translation.[2] More specifically, I am concerned with Jewish thought as reflected principally in the symbolism of its institutions, in interaction with its environment—particularly in late antiquity and western medieval Christendom, in both of which God-consciousness was as marked as it has been in Judaism. Obviously, the sociological dimension is here prominent: but I emphasize that my proper concern is with the history of abstract ideas themselves, and their institutional reflections as they have been subjected to human stress and tensions in society, and that I am not primarily concerned with the study of man, whether as an individual or as a member of a social organism, or with the way in which he may deliberately handle his inherited institutions so as to adopt, adapt, reinterpret, pervert, or reject the underlying ideology. Consequently, while I must take account of the findings of the archaeologist, anthropologist, and sociologist, these will be for me no more than a control, precisely as, say, a student of England's survival in 1940 must take into account the sociological and similar evidence, even though that evidence will not, in itself, lead him to an adequate interpretation of the facts. If any of these disciplines say 'no' to my assertions on the basis of demonstrable evidence, obviously I accept their verdict. If, however, they advance objections on the basis not of evidence but the interpretation of evidence in the light of parallels from elsewhere, I naturally take seriously their hesitations—which they may claim are in fact a refutation: but I shall not necessarily feel obliged to abandon my case, since I am of the opinion that the Jewish situation, when taken as a whole, is a unique one, even though many (perhaps each) of its elements can be shown to have anthropological and sociological parallels.

Lest misconceptions arise, let me explain what I mean in this context by Jewish 'uniqueness'. I am prepared to be told by sociologists, first, that this means very little, inasmuch as no social organism is an exact carbon copy of any other so that each is unique in respect of its individuality. Moreover, it is perhaps not ruled out that research might expose a society with a pattern and history so close to that of Jewry as to make no difference. For myself, Jewish uniqueness consists in the combination of an ideology—which, for brevity's sake, may be labelled ethical monotheism—with an ethnic culture pattern and a marked survival capacity, together with a self-conscious genius for the correlation of all these three components. I am aware that this thesis is open to the objection that if the Jewish capacity for survival is marked, it is none the less relative: and that some 25,000 years hence Jewish ideology,

tradition, and ritual, together with those of Christianity and indeed much else of contemporary familiarity, may well be as forgotten and as meaningless to our successors as now are, to ourselves, the beliefs and cults of the men who could see some point in crawling at great discomfort through tunnels in the rock in order to perform those rites that were in some way connected with the hunting scenes depicted on the walls of their caves. The objection may be noted: and the following suggested by way of rejoinder. First, it is not an objection of great substance on the Jewish theological plane (and the theological dimension, as already implied by my reference to ethical monotheism, is integral to my argument). Second, within the terms of reference of the sociologist, the survival capacity of Jewry, if not indeed unparalleled (e.g. China), has already a long enough history to justify me in treating it as one of the factors of which my argument has to take account.

* * *

'Who is a Jew?' is a question fairly commonly discussed nowadays. Although responsible Jewish leadership down the ages has constantly had to resolve practical problems to which this question is integral, the matter has of late been hoisted into the headlines because of the urgency of sundry new aspects that it has assumed with the appearance of Israel as a sovereign state. Most of the public discussion of the issue when Mr. Ben Gurion raised it some years ago remained on a superficial level.[3] Since then, the topic of Jewish identity and identification has begun to engage the attention of a few writers capable of appreciating the fact that the question '*Who* is a Jew?' is not, invariably, congruent in import with the question '*What* is a Jew?'. A great deal of modern Jewish perplexity revolves, I suspect, round the fallacy of neglecting the distinction between these two questions, or round an emotional determination not to permit any such distinction to be drawn. Indeed, where conviction of the irrelevance of that distinction becomes an article of religious faith or ideological assumption, it leads to the staking of rigid political positions and so to the progressive aggravation of perplexity: those whose opinions are less definite being subjected to a psychological offensive by the committed, who call upon them to choose between various starkly over-simplified alternatives. The tragedy of the typical Zionist philosopher and the average contemporary rabbi alike is that whereas the mental framework against which both have been educated is a post-scholastic one, each of them proceeds, for the purposes of this discussion, from a premise of a scholastic type, namely that it is possible to frame a single definition of a Jew that will simultaneously be both universally valid and universally useful. I shall myself be attempting, at the end of this article, to frame a universally valid definition of Judaism; but since in any case any definition of Judaism can serve a very limited purpose, I shall not claim that mine is also universally useful. And as

regards *Jew*, I confess myself unable to produce even a definition that will be universally valid.

But even though the question 'Who is a Jew?' is one which cannot, in my view, be answered when posed like that, it is not a question that may be evaded when it is properly framed. Indeed, no Jew can with integrity take refuge in passing on the question (as most of Ben Gurion's respondents did) as being the task of the rabbinate, or Israeli politicians or civil servants, or Jewish communal officials to resolve. For the Jewish public has a say in the appointment of all these, and every Jew is potentially a Jewish leader or Jewish public servant. On the other hand, it is possible that the anthropologist and sociologist would consider that the question 'Who is a Jew?' is, in that form, a meaningful question; but even if that is so, I do not imagine that either would feel that he is yet in a position to answer it satisfactorily. The sociological study of Jewry is still in its infancy, and even the fact-finding stage has scarcely begun.

In general, however, there is some practical consideration behind raising the question; and that being so, the question is meaningful in my view (*pace* the social scientist) when, and only when, certain specific terms of reference are adjoined: e.g. 'Who is a Jew for purposes of automatic entitlement to an Israeli passport, or regarding eligibility to be married in synagogue *x*, or regarding potential membership of synagogue *y*?'. Social organisms are as unstable chemically, so to speak, as are biological ones, and it is not realistic to expect answers to this sort of question to be either permanent or final; but, as I hope will transpire from the latter part of this article, acknowledgement of the inevitable fluidity of this aspect of the matter need not preclude a definition of Judaism that is, in its essential requirements, adamantly rigid. I can, indeed, envisage circumstances in which a valid answer to '*Who* is a Jew?' is that any person is a Jew who has been victimized by antisemitic forces on grounds of his being of Jewish origin, whether those grounds are substantiatable or not. An obvious instance is the case of Father Daniel, alias Oswald Rufeisen. Although his claim to Israeli citizenship as of right under the Law of Return was rejected by an Israeli civil court with one dissentient opinion, his entitlement would be acknowledged by a few (amongst whom I include myself), who are never the less quite clear that by virtue of his conversion Father Daniel has ceased (perhaps temporarily only) to be a Jew in any sense that is of ultimate significance to themselves: his right resting on the fact that he falls, without doubt, within the class of beneficiaries of the existence of a Jewish state intended by those whose endeavours rendered the emergence of that state possible. Father Daniel's case is, of course, a *cause célèbre*: but in less spectacular ways the issue is constantly arising. And since a liberal outlook can provide some of the necessary oil for administrative machinery, I would myself regard it as being socially benign to frame

answers to questions 'Who is a Jew for the purposes of *x*, *y*, or *z*?' as broadly as possible.[4] General terms have little significance here; but many predictable situations, at least outside Israel, corresponding here to *x*, *y*, and *z* could, I think, be met by the application of the following three-fold test, each condition of which obviously has to be fulfilled simultaneously:

(1) The assertion of the party concerned, in good faith, that he or she is a Jew, by parentage or formal conversion.
(2) Neither practice of, nor unavowed adherence to, any theistic religion other than Judaism.
(3) The evincing of some positive indication, according to circumstances, of solidarity with the Jewish people.

It should be observed that although I presuppose here that Judaism is a theistic religion, the foregoing definition of '*Who* is a Jew?' does not insist on assent to it. Conversely, none of the three clauses of this definition gives any clue towards answering the question '*What* is a Jew?'. All they do give us is an indication of whether a claim to personal status as a Jew is to be acknowledged or denied; and I propose that as a description of that status we apply, and reserve, the term *Jewishness*.[5]

It would follow that within the context of the Jewish community itself, the Jewishness of members of the community ought,[6] where social conditions are healthy, to be presumed in default of any positive evidence to the contrary; and that for one member of the group gratuitously to impugn the Jewishness of another would be a socially unethical act. Where Jews form a minority, the non-Jewish majority may or may not be particularly concerned with the question from a social point of view; but it will almost invariably be concerned from an administrative one, since for its own purposes (e.g. registration of marriages) it may require certifications of Jewishness. Since such certification necessarily has to issue from the internal Jewish administrative machine, the same considerations of social ethics in acknowledging a presumptive Jewishness ought, presumably, likewise to hold good.

* * *

Jewish popular tradition and sentiment have endorsed the halakhic (that is, Jewish jurisprudential) axiom that *Jewishness* is not something which can be repudiated at will by those who possess it by right of birth. But this conviction has not prevented Jewish communities from sometimes imposing an ostracism, of varying intensity, on individual Jews who have acted or behaved in a manner felt by the parent community to be socially intolerable or (in view of the prevailing Jewish situation) dangerous. This ambivalence, understandable enough emotionally, is by implication an acknowledgement on Jewry's part that even though

the question '*Who* is a Jew?' may be primary and at times crucial, the answer to it will not tell one *what* a Jew is. How, then, are we to address ourselves to a question that looks at something beyond the mere status of being a Jew?

Conventional Jewish approaches to this question have been typically pragmatic, endogamy (as a matter of principle) being probably the chief criterion. Beyond this, Jews have looked for a minimal Jewish observance, while never the less often turning a blind eye to the non-conformity of those whose solidarity with the community has not been in doubt. The extent to which this 'Nelson touch' has been applied has varied; but until quite recent times one minimal gesture that the community has generally required of a non-observant Jew has been that he should at least not promote his own ultimate burial otherwise than according to Jewish prescriptions. It would seem, therefore, to be agreed (or at least implied) that in order to fall within the terms of any qualitative definition of a Jew, one must do certain things and refrain from others. But is this all? An involvement, to a greater or lesser extent, in an idiosyncratic culture pattern, or even a psychological or emotional dependence upon the continued operation of a specific social rhythm—a kind of chasing of one's own tail in a Hebrew (or Yiddish) *perpetuum mobile*: does this type of activity, in itself, establish that its agent is a Jew, and are any mental attitudes that accompany it of no relevance? In other words, is assent to any propositions, or belief in any dogmas, essential, or is it not?

My own view is that something of the sort is indispensable, even though Jewish thinkers, long before Maimonides[7] as well as after his own formulation of Thirteen Principles, have strenuously endeavoured to restrict this element to the absolute minimum. But that some sanctions in outlook and belief are essential is not only taken for granted, e.g. by *Isaiah* 29, 13, but was already demonstrated in the eleventh century by the first Jewish moralist, Baḥya ibn Paquda, from the explicit statements as well as the implications of a triple source—reason, scripture, and talmudic tradition. It thus becomes evident that the answer to '*What* is a Jew?' will depend upon a definition of Judaism. My own preliminary answer, to be reformulated below, must therefore be that he or she only is, in any qualitatively meaningful sense, a Jew, who is both referred to as a transmitting agent in the tentative definition of Judaism that I propose at the end of this article, and who also subscribes either to that definition itself or to some other, possibly narrower and more specific, which can nevertheless be comprised within my own.

I postpone defining Judaism, however, as the attempt to define it may be less unsatisfactory if we have first dealt with the intangible *residuum* that characterizes (or may characterize) the so-to-speak 'de-judaised' Jew. What, in other words, is there left to account for if a Jew withdraws, or withholds belief and assent, from whatever it may be that

constitutes the essential tenets of Judaism as a theistically based system? That there is some such *residuum* seems clear enough from the capacity, sometimes, indeed, the insistence of a gentile environment on identifying as Jews those who have repudiated Judaism as a faith by formal apostasy (e.g. Heine, Disraeli), or have dissembled it in thoroughgoing assimilation (e.g. many German Jews of the professional classes before 1933). We may illustrate this gentile sensitivity to a non-religious element in Judaism by the following, not atypical phrase, drawn from a review in *The Times Literary Supplement* (30 April 1964, p. 381) of an Israeli novel: '. . . the Jewish mystique is impressive and dominant throughout'. The gentile world, which has sometimes felt constrained to admire Jewish steadfastness in faith and Jewish doggedness in self-identification, has with exiguous exceptions not, so far, discerned in post-biblical Judaism anything spiritual that is worthy of its attention; and not surprisingly, therefore, it has not felt it to be necessary to attempt any serious analysis of what this 'Jewish mystique' comprises. It has contented itself with acknowledging the actuality of it and with attempting to come to terms with it both politically, and through such literary and aesthetic media as *The Merchant of Venice*, Joyce's *Ulysses*, and Rembrandt's portraiture of Jewish types. Until recently, Jewish thinkers have shirked the issue no less eagerly, by-passing it with one of two assumptions: either (i) that a religiously non-conformist Jew is a 'bad Jew' (in Hebrew terminology, *yisra'el she-ḥata'* 'an Israelite who has sinned—*sc.* but an Israelite for all that'), or (ii) that Jewish religious 'self-expression' is a rapidly disappearing phenomenon, and one which will be succeeded by whatever other form of 'self-expression' the 'Jewish consciousness' may chance to assume. Of course, on the mere administrative level at which the question '*Who* is a Jew?' may have to be resolved practically, a deliberate obtuseness to any possible difference between Judaism and its *residuum* is entirely reasonable. Any withholding of assent to Judaism may conveniently be ignored by a Jewish administrator, rabbinical, communal, or governmental alike: if he is himself at all concerned with such questions, he may dismiss the situation as being but an 'immature' piece of attitudinizing; and if he is a conscientious servant of the public, he will in any case be bound to take the view that matters of heart and conscience fall within the province of any God who may exist, and are not the concern of a Jewish administrative official, however bureaucratic his temperament. But at a speculative level the difference between Judaism and its possible *residuum* has got to be faced. There are instances (such as Henri Bergson) where the intellectual stature and moral probity of the individual concerned constrains us to take seriously their implicit, or constructive, or demonstrative disavowal of Judaism. It is no answer facilely to read such individuals out of a qualitative definition of Judaism and to assume that the matter is thus disposed of; for Jewry certainly, and therefore Judaism

presumably, accords a positive value to society and to the type of Jewish social solidarity that some of these 'recalcitrants' have displayed —that is, in specific terms, the value of *Jewish peoplehood.*

My own view is conditioned by the circumstance that the notion of *penitence*, which, according to Jewish treatment of it, involves an act of the mind as well as something in addition, is also recognized by Judaism as a positive value. The act of disavowal or abdication of Judaism is, consequently, always a reversible one. At the level of the qualitative question, I therefore regard those who have contracted out of Judaism as being, *for the meantime*, no longer Jews in so far as their case has to be viewed from the human and Jewish angle. I emphasize the 'human and Jewish' standpoint here: first, because it is obviously the only one from which I, no less than the social scientist, can and must assess the situation, once the possible *Jewishness* of the person concerned has been granted, and dismissed as no longer relevant to the argument; and second, because I do not presume to assert that it is impossible for the Deity, whose relationship (assuming such to exist) with the Jewish people must be deemed to transcend not only intellectual but also mystical categories, to continue paradoxically to regard persons who have repudiated Judaism as still being, in some qualitative sense, Jews.

I find the pyramid a helpful model to illustrate this, with God at its apex *G* (see diagram), and the base *HIJK* representing the Jewish people. (It is, of course, acknowledged that this pyramid will be of negligible significance theologically unless it is conceived as standing beneath a larger one, dependent from the same apex but based upon the totality of humanity; but this larger pyramid does not concern us here, except to emphasize, as my tentative definition of Judaism will again enunciate, that the smaller pyramid which alone concerns us now is of some potential relevance to the larger one that contains it.) From any point on *HIJK* a line can be constructed to *G*, representing the link (however it be defined) between God and the Jew. Point *I* thus represents an individual Jew whom, for simplicity's sake, I shall identify with myself. Let us now suppose that another individual Jew, *L*, disavows his Judaism either from the first moment of his capacity to consider it at all, or else after having previously accepted and endorsed its theological and metaphysical propositions. In other words, he either ignores *G*, to the extent that he repudiates it, or he compromises *LG* by modifications of his own regarding what Judaism can assert and must deny regarding *G*; that is, he rejects the possibility of the present line *LG* existing within the pyramid that here concerns us. (He may, of course, if he adopts some non-Jewish theistic system, allow that some line *LG* does exist, but within a more broadly based pyramid.) Let us, however, be quite clear about the fact that *L* need not, in invalidating or ignoring the line *LG*, deny the validity of the existence of a special relationship between him-



self and other Jews; and that he quite possibly does not conceive of himself moving away at all from his original position, which I designate L^1. Since, however, my own answer to the question '*What* is a Jew?' involves a relationship to *G* expressed in certain specifically Jewish categories, I am unable to concede that *L*, after either a disavowal of these or an act of self-deception in which he convinces himself that they are compatible with certain extraneous religious concepts (e.g. acknowledgement of a co-divine incarnation in Jesus), remains in his notional place at L^1, that is, within the area *HIJK*. I must needs move him to point L^2, outside that area but on its same plane. In other words, for both *L* himself, and possibly for a large number of Jewishly inarticulate Jews contained within *HIJK*, the move from L^1 to L^2 is but a party game of my own devising, since *L* and many other Jews may not be conscious of a marked change within their relationships. And it may be that not only *L* and his friends will be laughing at me up their sleeves; but conceivably their amusement may be sardonically shared by the

Deity Itself, which may consider the dotted line GL^2 as being essentially no different from the continuous line *GI*. True, the pyramid so modified as to cover the extended base $HIJL^2K$ has become markedly asymmetrical when viewed from round the base or within it; as seen from the apex, however, the lack of symmetry may be of no great significance.

Although it is appreciated that the social scientist will formulate this situation otherwise and will regard theological and metaphysical terms as being inapposite, the contention of this whole section of my argument is that there does exist an ideological dimension to the problem of which the sociologist, no less than the speculative thinker, is bound to take serious account; and that, conversely, neither the Jewish theologian nor the philosopher of Judaism is entitled to close his eyes to the circumstance that a Jew who repudiates Judaism may very well retain a lively interest in the welfare of the Jewish community. This may be the case whether or not he continues to believe himself to be an integral part of it; and such a one may very likely continue, and perhaps indeed feel impelled to continue, work for the advancement of those ethical values that Jews seem traditionally to have regarded as matters for which they carry a marked responsibility, in virtue of being members of the Jewish community and so the product, at least in part, of Jewish history. One has only to think of such matters as the application of modern science and technology to the improvement of public health; the promotion of education; the development of the communication industries, to which the Jewish contribution since the industrial revolution has been notable; the defence of free speech and of a free press; the spreading of equality amongst those economically underprivileged, etc. These things are all, of course, liberal values, and it might well be argued that any promotion of them by Jews who evince no specifically Jewish religious interests springs exclusively from the liberalism of the individuals concerned. But account has (I suggest) to be taken of the circumstance that to many such causes the contributions made both by individual Jews and by Jewish groups have been marked. And one whom we may describe, without intending thereby any pejorative nuance, as a delinquent from Judaism, may very well continue to work for such objects, while feeling himself inspired to do so either by purely humanistic considerations, or by the example of Jewish history as viewed without taking Judaism itself into account. Such, it would seem, is the motivation of many Jewish workers, most of them non-religious, in the cause of Negro integration in the United States, and against *apartheid* in South Africa. Moreover, the so-called delinquent from Judaism may quite likely make a deliberate choice of a Jewish context in which to invest this kind of endeavour, e.g. the material building up of the State of Israel by his own personal labour, or the promotion of the sale of Israeli bonds in countries with capital to invest.

Can, then, devotion of this kind to things Jewish be held to negate, for

the purposes of the present argument, any disavowal of Judaism itself? The answer must surely be no: for a Gentile can, and indeed some Gentiles do, engage in precisely these same concerns without the sanction of Judaism, and a particular attraction to Jewish affairs may conceivably enlist gentile efforts for specifically Jewish enterprises; a fair example is Mr. Lowdermilk's Jordan water scheme. But this interest—be it the outcome of intellectual curiosity, goodwill, sympathy, a stricken conscience, or of love in its purest manifestation—does not make Jews of those affected by it. On no conceivable definition of the term could such good friends of Jewry as Arthur Balfour, Orde Wingate, Travers Herford, or James Parkes (none of whom has been a proselyte) be reckoned Jews.

That is not, however, to say that we can here ignore as irrelevant de-judaised Jewish interest in ethical values; particularly since it sometimes happens that they appear to be transmitted by something which cannot, scientifically, be described as heredity, but which gives an illusion of heredity, so that they occasionally survive not merely any assent to the propositions of Judaism, but even consciousness of a Jewish genealogy itself. This elusive element (about which I, at any rate, do not feel competent to predicate more) is, surely, one of the things comprised within the so-called 'Jewish mystique' referred to above—that is, a consciousness of otherness which may be expected to be felt by the Jew and the 'ex-Jew' in their relationships with Gentiles, and conversely to be sensed, in some degree, by Gentiles themselves in their relations with Jews. We are not here concerned to evaluate that sense of otherness; it will suffice to say that its consequences are, in my view, not necessarily all negative or socially malignant. And the fact that a marked social conscience and ethical interest on the Jewish pattern is, apparently, capable of surviving a Jew's own disavowal of Judaism and consciousness of his Jewish origins is surely one of the more positive aspects of that Jewish sense of otherness.

We badly need a term to describe this component; and the term that I propose to use for it is *Judaicity*.[8] *Judaicity* is intended to include all actions and behaviour that are 'in character' with the ethical values enunciated by the classical Jewish sources and traditionally promoted by Jews, as well also as possible motivations for such actions and behaviour, when those motivations keep company with a deliberate rejection of Judaism as a theistic faith, in spite of a consciousness on the part of the agent himself that there is a Jewish connexion of some sort between himself and what he is doing. In other words, Judaism, with its premises and sanctions, may and indeed ought to inspire those who assent to them to engage in and foster ethical acts that are, externally, identical with acts approved and possibly encouraged by *Judaicity*; but conversely, ethical actions that must command our applause may well be performed by Jews from motivations other than the only one which

the theological axioms of Judaism can recognize as valid. And even if *Judaicity* may often amount to no more than the gearing up of liberalism to a greater degree of intensity and self-dedication, the fact that it does so is surely something of which we must, in this sort of investigation, take account.

Let us take a practical illustration. A Jewish journalist may choose to go to prison for contempt of court rather than betray a journalistic confidence. If he reaches his decision solely on the basis of his professional ethics, that decision is an act of *Judaicity*—or at any rate may be. If, however, his decision is motivated either primarily, or in some degree consciously, by a sense of his responsibility, as a Jew, towards traditional Jewish teachings and requirements together with their theological sanction in the Bible, etc., regarding the sanctity of promises and the expectation of straightforwardness in business dealings, then *Judaicity* will be an inadequate description of his behaviour; for he will have been implementing his Judaism. It scarcely needs to be added that although the circumstance that the journalist is known to participate in Jewish communal activity and synagogal life may raise the presumption that his courting of a prison sentence springs from Judaism, to infer from the circumstance of his known non-participation that his ethical standards cannot, or have not been inspired by Judaism, and must therefore be reckoned as *Judaicity*, might well be a false inference. If the individual has previously made clear, by some explicit statement or overt gesture, that he does not subscribe to the propositions of Judaism, no misconception will of course arise—his act is one of *Judaicity* only. If he has not made this clear (or even if he has secretly come to regret a prior statement or gesture in that sense), then the borderline between Judaism and *Judaicity* may be a tenuous one and must be left to his own introspection, the privacy of which is to be respected. It may consequently be asked whether we have, after all, gained very much by our elaborate distinction between *Judaicity* and Judaism. The value as I see it of distinguishing terminologically between the two lies less in any rule-of-thumb application that can be made of the distinction, than in its making possible clear and candid thinking on the part of those who are undaunted at the prospect of possibly finding that, for all their own emotional ties with what they have hitherto lumped together as 'Judaism', they really stand apart from Judaism itself.

It is salutary to check our orientation here, as we did in the case of *Jewishness* (see note 5), by looking for a Hebrew equivalent of our terminology. If we look for the Hebrew for *Judaicity* we shall, of course, not find it—precisely because the literary sources spring from premises that would deny the validity of non-theistic sanctions for ethical action, and indeed roundly opprobriate them.[9] The fulfilment of precepts (*miṣwoth*) with an ethical content otherwise than because they are either divinely ordained or divinely approved, or for any ulterior motive

(*shello lishmahh*), is regarded by the sources as unworthy, or at the very least as unsatisfactory. Regarding this no equivocation is possible, notwithstanding two passages that are quoted more by some modern, external assessors of Judaism than by the rabbinic sources themselves. The first is a *dictum* of Rab (third century C.E.) which conditionally recognizes practice engaged in otherwise than for its own sake as valid, 'since through doing it from the wrong motives one will come ultimately to do it for its own sake'.[10] In the other R. Hiyya b. 'Abba (slightly later) twists *Jeremiah* 16, 11 to make the Deity say, 'if only they had forgotten Me, yet kept My Torah, the light of the latter would have put them right (or, would have brought them back to Me)'.[11] Neither of these texts does more than evince an educational pragmatism that would condone somewhat controversial methods for the sake of ultimately achieving a specifically Jewish theistic *Weltanschauung*, regarding the indispensability of which for the Jew neither of the rabbis named entertained a shadow of doubt. In spite of this, we shall, I think, find that something fairly close, but not indeed identical with what I style *Judaicity* is granted a *de facto* recognition by the rabbis, within the category of *custom* (*minhag*). *Minhag* is a category upon which so positive a value is set that it is allowed, in certain circumscribed and adequately authenticated cases, actually to take precedence over *halakhah* (= institutional ordinance).[12] The implicit recognition here that *minhag* may give expression to values which Judaism cherishes, and may in a non-doctrinaire idiom echo some of Judaism's fundamental principles, permits the partial analogy which is here drawn between *minhag* and *Judaicity*; even though, in its external manifestation, *minhag* corresponds to another facet of the subject, to which I now turn.

I refer to the remaining positive aspect of being Jewish, where neither Judaism nor *Judaicity* is present in a given individual or undertaking of a Jewish group. This last vestige can take many forms—from a smattering of Yiddish and a taste for chopped liver (or smoked salmon), to an occasional showing up at synagogue for the sake of appearances. Whether the loss of Judaism and *Judaicity* be regarded as emasculation or as a beneficial purge, what survives will depend for its self-justification either on aesthetic arguments or on the claim that it constitutes an almost biological method of self-preservation through self-identification. Those who consider it valid on the latter ground will not need to be concerned that self-identification, as an end in itself, is but self-seeking, and will see no reason to feel any sense of shame (if they are themselves Jews) over a fellow-Jew who, out of gastronomic habit, observes the Jewish dietary regulations with consistency while openly scorning as many of the Ten Commandments as frustrate his pursuit of what he probably calls self-realization. The Jewish background here is purely cultural, and scarcely need concern us further in the present context: in so far as we need to classify it, I propose to call it *Jewish Culture*,

translating thereby the conventional Judaeo-German *Jüdischkeit* ('Yiddishkeit'); and as indicated above it is covered in Hebrew (together with something extra) by the category of *minhag* (custom). It is, of course, true that those who speak of *Jüdischkeit* often imply (or try to imply) that Jewish folklore, music, proverbs, food customs, inner languages, etc., invariably carry with them a built-in sense of responsibility for Jewish ethical and other values. It may be doubted whether that was ever true to more than a very limited degree; and my point is that at any rate today, the incidence of a Jewish culture independent of any Jewish ethic or religious belief is not merely possible, but commonplace. There must, one suspects, be many a Jewish adulterer who has made a supper of *gefilte fish*.

* * *

To sum up our results so far: having isolated from *Judaism* (however we propose to define it) three potentially independent elements which we have distinguished respectively as *Jewishness*, *Judaicity*, and *Jewish Culture*,[13] we may now reformulate our answer to the question '*What* is a Jew?' and give it a sharper focus than we did at a preliminary stage. As with the reply to the question '*Who* is a Jew?', the test is threefold and each condition must be simultaneously fulfilled.

(1) Acknowledgement of the uncompromisingly absolute monotheistic sanction for Jewish ethical behaviour, *including acknowledgement of its binding validity for oneself* (the italicized qualification is essential, in order to distinguish between a Jew and a non-Jewish academic student of Judaism equipped with an adequate insight into its workings).
(2) A sense of the meaningfulness of Jewish history.
(3) An appreciation, which may be intuitive and not necessarily articulate, of the fact that Judaism enunciates its doctrines for the most part symbolically and by implication, using Jewish social self-regulation (that is *Halakhah* = procedure, 'law') as its principal medium.

Of these three clauses, it is (I suggest) the last one that can usefully give us our bearings in the final stage of this inquiry, as we attempt the summit—viz., a definition of Judaism that will be at once comprehensive enough, and exclusive of things incompatible with Judaism, to stand up to scrutiny. It is imperative to appreciate the significance of the circumstance that the Jewish pattern of behaviour and action will convey by implication, more often than by articulate assertion, the truths that are specific to Judaism. Unless we have grasped this, we shall be liable to fall into the mistake of identifying the Jewish message with its means of expression. It is true enough that exponents of Judaism have often been reluctant to distinguish between the two, but they have been

capable of accepting the distinction where the alternative would be a *reductio ad absurdum*; and it is likewise a pitfall against which the classical philosophers of Judaism have in general guarded themselves. But the fact that popular Judaism has on the whole been insufficiently sophisticated to make the distinction has bequeathed an unfortunate legacy to those philosophers of Zionism in whose thinking a sentimental attachment to Jewish Culture (± a *tertium quid*?) has been a significant component. The generalization may here be risked that a failure to distinguish between *matter* and *form* vitiates most of what passes for Zionist philosophy today: a better example of that particular fallacy could scarcely be found than the public utterances of Mr. Ben Gurion.

It is, of course, feasible to start from the assumption that the mechanics of Jewish life constitute an end in themselves, which it is legitimate, or even desirable, for enthusiasm so to intensify as to produce a whirl of intoxicating giddiness that is oblivious of (or abdicates) any responsibility to face up to such uninviting problems as the reality of evil, or the fact that natural disasters daily claim an apparently quite amoral toll of innocent victims. These and similar matters are things (the assumption would imply) with which the Jew, *qua* Jew, has no *a priori* reason to concern himself. If this assertion is granted, Judaism will have to be defined, in broad terms, either as the constitution of a 'trade union' drawn up by Jews for Jews; or else as the rules of the most exclusive club in the world, from which resignation (though deprecated) is feasible, but to which admission is possible provided only that one's forebears have been without exception members; or again (if we wish to dodge the question), as a 'way of life'; or as a fate, unfortunate perhaps, but ineluctible; or even as a neurosis. If the distinction between medium and message is ignored, any one of these answers becomes defensible and some of them plausible. If it is once granted that form and matter have got to be distinguished, they all reveal themselves as inadequate, and discussion then becomes possible as to what here is, in fact, matter and what is form. Are the so-called teachings of Judaism merely the gloss which it suits the apologist, or the scholarly interpreter, to place upon certain hard biological and sociological facts? Or have social self-regulation, and a method of transmission largely by descent, been consciously and deliberately chosen by people to whom certain ideological considerations were paramount, as affording them the most efficient (or at any rate the least inefficient) medium for the enunciation and perpetuation of sundry truths and values?

Let us rapidly dispose of those descriptive categories that will not accommodate 'Judaism' tidily. Clearly, Judaism is not (merely) a religion: it can apply no truly effective dogmatic tests, can enforce no ritual observance, and will at most penalize socially a failure to implement a few of its basic institutions such as circumcision, the spiritual and religious dimension of which the Jewish public has largely forgotten.

'Religion' in the conventional modern sense is clearly not the term by which to describe the ideology of a group that may frequently apply social ostracism to those of its members who marry outside even though their spouses have been formally admitted by a religious ceremony of conversion, while ignoring or condoning assertions or constructive demonstrations of atheism by one of their own number. Nor, indeed, will 'civilization' do; many, perhaps most Jews in the world today are completely ignorant of Hebrew, Jewish history, and even folk culture. A political movement bent on self-determination in its own sovereign territory? But the Zionist programme has been implemented thanks to the devotion and determination of but a fraction of Jewry—a fraction that enjoys, it is true, the goodwill of a wider section, but which was (at any rate during the crucial phases) a matter of complete indifference, or in some cases even active opposition, to an even larger number of those who, on the widest count, have certainly to be reckoned Jews, inasmuch as their title to *Jewishness* as defined above is good.

Obviously, none of these categories is sacrosanct; and if Judaism fits neatly within none of them, we have no legitimate grounds for complaint—human undertakings on a large scale are not normally tidy logical entities. Jews themselves have consequently been inclined to dispense with such labels so far as internal purposes are concerned; it is significant, for instance, that their biblical description as a 'holy (i.e. reserved by separation) people' (*'am qadosh*) has penetrated the Jewish liturgy, but has never ousted the name 'Israel' as a description of Jewry by Jews at any other level of Hebrew usage. For self-identification vis-à-vis the outside world, Jews have merely adopted—nonchalantly for the most part, but sometimes with an emotional conviction engendered by self-delusion—whichever semi-accurate label has, according to time and place, been most convenient: 'religion' in mid-nineteenth century Europe, 'nation' in the twentieth.

In so far as all the foregoing categories are applicable in part, but in part only, there are (I suggest) reasonable grounds for cavilling if Jews (and those who talk about Jews) settle for one of them as a matter of convenience, for external labelling purposes only, while at the same time prosecuting internally the sort of facile self-analysis that takes 'Judaism' for granted, concerning itself merely with the Jew's 'Judaism' in the light of his human situation either in Israel or as a member of a Jewish minority. Self-analysis of that kind cannot lead to Jewish self-knowledge unless Judaism, instead of being taken on trust, is subjected to the sort of examination that we have been conducting in this paper. That is not, I hope, the mere frustrated cry of an academic specialist whose laboratory specimen is proving unco-operative: the objection may reasonably be shared by all interested in promoting in any way the spiritual, moral, social, political, and material progress of those who are Jews. For it will be an assumption of all those who are not governed

by a confessedly anti-Jewish animus that Jewish progress on all the aforesaid levels is, in varying degrees, desirable: and if such progress is to be achieved on any single one of them, it is imperative for promoters and intended beneficiaries alike to be clear in their own minds that the various planes are, in point of fact, distinct and distinguishable and that the blurring of their distinctions will generally inhibit progress, even though it may, occasionally, assist it by by-passing logic.

An example will help. It may be understandable, in the light of history, that a Jew who submits to Christian baptism may be regarded by another Jew as a traitor to his people, even though the Jew who chooses to regard him as such neither subscribes to any theistic propositions, let alone any specifically Jewish ones, nor maintains any Jewish observance or even cultural activity. If condemnation of the convert is forthcoming from such a standpoint as this, it is both inaccurate and unhelpful that it should be expressed in terms of apostasy—inaccurate, because apart from the incongruity of such a reproach being voiced by a professed or constructive atheist, Jewish jurisprudence does not acknowledge the feasibility of apostasy—acceptance of Christian baptism may be deplorable enough, and possibly to be stigmatized by sundry social sanctions, but (on halakhic premises) it nevertheless lacks all legal efficacy, for Jewishness cannot be repudiated at will. And it is also unhelpful, because one result of the insistence on applying to political and administrative matters such categories as Jewish religious faith(fulness) or apostasy may well be (as in the case of Father Daniel) to impede the progress of Jewish social welfare. Or, to look at the same kind of situation from another angle: it is an arguable case, and one which many Israelis are straightforward enough to avow, that there neither is, need be, nor should be any connexion between response to Judaism as a theistic system, and Jewish peoplehood and individual Jewish status as these are conceived by those same Israelis to be; others, both in Israel and the Diaspora, while privately concurring with that view, oppose the public acknowledgement of it that would have been implied by granting Father Daniel Israeli citizenship on his own terms. In other words, the essential practicalities of Jewish life, however negative they may be, and their negative corollaries, are indispensable, and must be preserved—but by someone else. Again, we have the phenomenon of the intense interest, and degree of informed knowledge regarding biblical archaeology that is to be found among Israeli Jews, to many of whom the theistic presuppositions of Judaism (and therefore of its Bible) are meaningless. Archaeology has consequently been described as the new religion of the State of Israel, or as the national hobby —recently, indeed, as being almost the national sport. As a factual description of Israeli archaeological enthusiasm the term 'religion' is not perhaps altogether inapt. It is not, however, mere pedantry to object to the serious application here of a descriptive term the normal reference

of which is to that area of concern which lies at the centre of such non-material concerns as both affect and transcend the *ego*: for the modern Israeli, conceivably national patriotism occupies that position, but biblical archaeology, however great the degree of enthusiasm that it elicits from him, patently does not. The general effect of this confusion of categories (be it casual or deliberate) is to create an illusion that Jewish response to an ethical challenge conceived of as divinely proffered, and Jewish response to a complex and possibly arduous enterprise calling for enthusiasm, determination, and technological expertise, do not merely fall on to the same plane of endeavour, but are actually alternative (and therefore interchangeable) means of evincing a Jewish consciousness. And no less a degree of confusion can be caused where there is no question of the substitution of alleged equivalents, but a shift of emphasis has in point of fact taken place despite the circumstance that those most closely concerned would deny that this is so. For example, the essence of genuine Hasidism is the cultivation of *devequth*, i.e. mystically achieved close cleaving to God. Although there is no reason to doubt that many contemporary *ḥasidim* do indeed bend their best endeavours to the pursuit of that ideal, I suspect that an impartial and competent investigator of modern Hasidism, both from the ideological and the sociological point of view, would be unable to find that *devequth* constitutes today the centre of hasidic gravity. Although no *ḥasid* would admit as much, it is probably none the less true (in general terms) that the place of *devequth* has been usurped by a psychology founded on inner-group solidarity, that is, membership of a hasidic sub-group for its own sake, combined with both some xenophobia and a holier-than-thou attitude towards the members of the next hasidic sub-group, let alone the non-hasidic Jew.

There is today prevalent enough a tendency which has perhaps been in some degree a constant of Jewish history, that is, the transmutation of the spiritual-ideological-ethical values of Judaism into a different currency—a currency in which belief and conviction are replaced by sentimentality as the obverse of the coin, with self-love and self-interest as its reverse. It would be disingenuous to deny that Judaism is being kept alive today largely by sentimentalism, as a museum of folk-custom: the so-called *Yiddishe Neshoma*—the supposedly dewy-eyed and grandmotherly Jewish soul—is being allowed to do duty for Judaism, with results that, on the non-material plane, are as erosive as are those of assimilation on the material one. At the same time, a Jewish sense of vocation to concentrate on producing, under God, an ideal society that may be a light unto the Gentiles, can become, without its promoters realizing what is happening, a preoccupation with Jewish individual and communal welfare—material welfare and, on its own terms, spiritual welfare. A 'toranocentric' *cosmos* is replaced by a judaeocentric universe, at the centre of which there stands not the Jew in the sim-

plicity of his personal religious faith or existential confrontation: but rather the party-conscious member of a Jewish political or parapolitical organization.

* * *

Jewishness, *Judaicity*, and *Jewish Culture* do not, between them, add up to Judaism, even if Judaism presupposes their content and cannot realize itself without resorting to them for self-expression. Since, however, the term *Judaism* as conventionally used is entirely vague, each of the three sometimes masquerades as Judaism; and I have therefore felt constrained to strip off their theatrical costumes before myself offering a tentative definition of what Judaism is. What I propose is no more than a working definition; as such, it is framed as widely as is consistent with those elements which (as will by now be evident) I regard as integral. The definition is, as I realize, exposed to the criticism that it is insufficiently specific; to which my reply is that if, for the sake of greater specification, we define Judaism in terms of its own institutions, we shall in fact end up not with a definition, but with a piece of circular description. And I fancy that any other, more specific, definition of Judaism which, like my own, insists on absolute monotheism as an indispensable sanction for the whole, will be found patient of being subsumed in what here follows.

Judaism, then, is a complex of faith and social ethics, of universal significance and possibly of universal relevance, resting upon the sanction of uncompromised and absolute monotheism; expressing itself mainly through a pattern of religious symbolism the cultural features of which are predominantly concrete, and the transmission of which is predominantly by descent; and having as its object the general sublimation of the material concerns of humanity, by pervading them with such spiritual considerations as will not compromise the monotheistic basis of the whole.

As a starting-point for further discussion that definition will, in my view, serve; but I do not credit it with much inherent value. I consider it as no more than a touchstone, by which examples of character and behaviour, of ideas, ideals, and endeavours which clearly evince Jewishness, a sense of Jewish peoplehood, Jewish culture, or Judaicity may be tested, to see whether they also contain an element of pure ideological Judaism; and I would merely add that, in my view, this last element may, paradoxically enough, sometimes be present despite the vigorous and possibly indignant protests of the individuals under consideration that it is not.

A definition sets out to be neither portrait, cartoon, nor caricature: and in so far as creatures of flesh and blood are concerned, our dominant question here has been not 'Who?' but 'What?'. The fact, therefore, that this definition if clothed with flesh and sinews would neither produce

a programme for living resembling very much that of the average Jew in the street, nor, indeed, perhaps be very meaningful to him, is beside the point. Our approach has been otherwise oriented; and it is put forward in the hope that it has taken sufficient account of factors relevant to social scientists for the latter to feel that it is worth subjecting to scrutiny, and considering whether the categories herein proposed can be usefully acknowledged within their own approach to the study of Jewry and its concerns. As I see it, no definition of Judaism (as opposed to definitions of *Jewry* or *Jewishness*) can by-pass the significance of *Torah* and *Qedushah* ('holiness', i.e. specialized vocation through reservation) as motivations behind Jewish behaviour and endeavour. The notion of *Jewish peoplehood* is, in my view, equally indispensable, but it can neither be expressed adequately in biological, ethnological, or nationalist terms, nor permitted in effect to monopolize a definition of Judaism. For Judaism cannot, I consider, be shown to be a meaningful expression at all, unless it can also be shown to continue to be potentially meaningful to a Jewish astronaut who volunteers, out of a scientific devotion to cosmological research, to man a space-ship in perpetual orbit outside the solar system.

APPENDIX

I give here the terminology suggested by Albert Memmi (see note 13) for the sociological study and analysis of Jewry and its concerns, together with his own definition of the meanings of his terms. I also indicate the relationship of his terminology to that suggested by myself in the foregoing article, as well as the correspondence (or lack of it) of both his terms and mine with categories native to Hebrew.

Memmi's Terms

(i) *La judaïcité.* World Jewry or any given local Jewish community (*'l'ensemble des personnes juives*; soit, au sens large, la totalité des Juifs éparpillés à travers le monde; soit au sens étroit un groupement juif donné, géographiquement localisé, par exemple: la judaïcité française ou la judaïcité de New York').

The Hebrew for this concept is *kelal Yisra'el* = world Jewry, and, for the local community, *qahal* [*qadosh*] *P* ('the (holy) congregation *X*'). My own article of course presupposes both these entities but had no occasion to define them. I have, however, quite independently of Memmi, coined the term *Judaicity*, which I use in a sense quite different from *judaïcité* (see note 8). Judaicity symbolizes a concept indispensable to my approach, and conceivably applicable within Memmi's also, at a later stage. I would therefore urge that *Judaicity* be allowed to contract a 'marriage by capture' with *la judaïcité* for future purposes, and that we

replace *judaïcité* as hitherto used by *W*[orld] *J*[ewry], and *L*[ocal] *J*[ewish] *C*[ommunity] = *C*[ommunauté] *J*[uive] *M*[ondiale], *L*[ocale].

(ii) *Le judaïsme*. Judaism, i.e. a collectivity of beliefs, institutions, systems of self-organization, etc. ('*l'ensemble des doctrines, croyances, et institutions juives*, fixées ou non, écrites ou orales; en sommes, les valeurs et l'organisation, qui constituent et règlent la vie d'un groupe juif; ou encore la culture juive au sens large: traditions, rites et pratiques; religion, philosophie, juridiction et art').

Although this includes approximately the content of my own definition of Judaism together with that (potential) component thereof isolated by me as *Jewish Culture*, it does not distinguish Judaism from *Judaicity*. Conceivably, Memmi's *judaïsme* could be claimed to be the equivalent of (in Hebrew) '[implementation of] the 613 Commandments (*Taryag miṣwoth*)', which would be an inadequate rendering of my *Judaism*: the Hebrew for the latter (as distinguished from *Judaicity*) would properly be '*Torah* + the Commandments (*Torah u-miṣwoth*)', as for example in Mishnah, *Makkoth*, end, H. Danby's translation; p. 408. The use of the Hebrew *Yahaduth* in this sense is quite recent, and an imitation; see note 5; and my Judaicity = (tentatively) the Hebrew *minhag*.

(iii) *La judéité*. The circumstances of an individual's being a Jew, and its consequences regarding his behaviour, outlook, etc. ('*le fait et la manière d'être juif*; l'ensemble des caractéristiques, vécues et objectives, sociologiques, psychologiques et biologiques, qui font un Juif . . . la manière dont un Juif vit, à la fois son appartenance à la judaïcité et son insertion dans le monde non-juif'). Since I have here been trying to disentangle some of these elements, I have used nothing approximating to *judéité*, which may well be a concept at present useful to the social scientist, but which precision on the lines attempted in this article ought in due course to render obsolete for a sociological approach no less than for a speculative one. Since, however, it is apparently needed for the moment, I would suggest avoiding 'Judeity' as an English equivalent, as being confusingly close to *Judaicity* as well as being inelegant; and would tentatively propose the symbol *TJC* = *T*[otal] *J*[ewish] *C*[haracteristics].

It is significant that Hebrew categories cannot provide a translation for *judéité* = TJC—a concept which classical Jewish thought would not naturally separate out from *Torah u-miṣwoth* (= Judaism). Presumably, *judéité* = TJC differs from *Judaism* in conceding that the non-ideological components may sometimes legitimately enjoy supremacy over, rather than (at the most) parity with the ideological components of Judaism. To express anything approximating to this would be difficult (see notes 10 and 11) in Hebrew; but it might be done by explicitly appending to *Torah u-miṣwoth* (= *Torah* + the Commandments) two expressions

which they would normally subsume, viz. (i) *halakhah* = [established] *procedure*, as it occurs for example in the formula of the traditional Aramaic marriage document, 'according to the procedures (*hilkhoth*) regularly implemented by Jewish husbands': and (ii) *minhag*, i.e. *custom*.

The relation of my terminology to Memmi's:

(*a*) Loewe's *Jewishness* (Hebrew, concretely, [*ben*] *yisra'el*) covers *part only* of Memmi's *judéité* (mainly its biological aspects).

(*b*) Loewe's *Judaicity* (Hebrew *minhag*, custom) corresponds to further aspects of Memmi's *judéité* together with those aspects of Memmi's *judaïsme* that can survive independently of any ideological sanction founded upon the theological propositions of Judaism itself.

(*c*) Loewe's *Jewish Culture* corresponds to other items, homogeneous with those last mentioned and likewise subsumed by Memmi under his *judaïsme*, but evincing a more markedly aesthetic value.

(*d*) *World Jewry*, presupposed but not emphasized in Loewe's approach, corresponds to Memmi's *judaïcité*.

NOTES

[1] A preliminary version of this article, embodying its substance but simplifying the argument at a more popular level, was completed in May 1964 and appeared in *The Jewish Quarterly*, Vol. 12, no. 4 (44), Winter 1964–5.

[2] For an example, see note 5 below.

[3] My own contribution appeared in the *Jewish Chronicle*, 5 June 1959. A succinct summary of the ingredients of the problem in its contemporary Israeli form is given by J. L. Talmon, 'Who is a Jew?', *Encounter*, May, 1965, pp. 28 f.

[4] I deal more fully with this and related questions in a forthcoming article entitled 'Potentialities and Limitations of Universalism in the Halakhah', to appear in *Studies in Memory of Leon Roth*, edited by myself and published by Routledge and Kegan Paul. See also below.

[5] It may be noted that the Hebrew term *Yahaduth*, used nowadays as a Hebrew translation of 'Judaism', was first formulated to express exactly what I am here styling *Jewishness*. The earliest instance recorded by E. Ben Yehudah's Hebrew *Thesaurus* (3, 1993) comes from Isaac of Barcelona (born 1043), who uses *shem yahaduth* = the reputation of being Jewish. Of crucial importance is its use by Rabbi Jacob b. Me'ir Tam, died 1171 (not listed by Ben Yehuda: see *Tosaphoth* to T.B. *Yebamoth* 47a, s.v. *be-muḥzaq*), who employed the term to mean exactly *Jewishness* in my sense. The first instance listed by Ben Yehuda of its meaning 'Judaism' is by Raphael Meldola of Amsterdam (d. 1748); and the link seems clearly to be formed by its use in a formula of asseveration, *'al yahaduthi* = [I pledge this] on [the acknowledgement of] my [unchallenged reputation of my] being Jewish', the first recorded instance of which is from Solomon b. Abraham Cohen, who lived in Salonica in the late sixteenth century. As the quite anomalous Hebrew preposition *'al* betrays, this is pretty obviously a calque on Christian formulas current in Europe ('by, or on, my faith as a Christian'), for which the operative preposition in both Spanish and Judaeo-Spanish is *por* (cf. French *par*, German *bei*), ascending to the Latin usage of *per* (and occasionally *pro*) in such formulas, both pagan and Christian (cf., for example, B. Brissonius, *de formulis et sollemnibus Populi Romani verbis*, Paris, 1583, p. 381, quoting from Vegetius the military oath as modified for use by Christians, *per deum et christum*). There being no simple preposition in Hebrew corresponding to *per* and Spanish *por*, *'al*

(shortened for *'al yedey* = through the instrumentality of) is a likely rendering of a literal sort. In Memmi's proposed terminology, discussed in the Appendix to this article, there is no French term corresponding to *Jewishness* as here defined.

[6] I interject here that although I write *ought* and *social ethics*, it is not my intention to express a value judgement. By *ought* I mean rather that if my proposed definition of Jewishness is valid and acceptable, then certain corollaries follow which could not be ignored in practice with logical consistency.

[7] See, for example, Babylonian Talmud, *Makkoth* 23b–24a, quoted in C. G. Montefiore and H. Loewe, *A Rabbinic Anthology*, London, 1938 (reprinted, U.S.A., 1960), p. 199.

[8] It should be stressed that *Judaicity* is not the equivalent of Memmi's *judaïcité*, which he defines as meaning *world Jewry*, or any given local Jewish community. My *Judaicity* is something like Memmi's *judéité*—the practical aspects of being a Jew and living as one; but Memmi does not, as far as I can tell, intend to draw any ideological line between *judéité* thus defined and his *judaïsme* = a complex of institutions, beliefs, values, traditions, and practices. See Appendix to this article.

[9] For example, *Isaiah* 29, 13.

[10] Babylonian Talmud, *Pesaḥim* 50b.

[11] Palestinian Talmud, *Ḥagigah* 1, 7, and *Lamentations Rabbathi*, *Pethiḥta*, 2.

[12] Palestinian Talmud, *Yebamoth* 12, 1 and *Mass. Sopherim* 14, 18, where see J. Müller's note 72, p. 202.

[13] The first version of this paper (see note 1) was completed a year before the appearance in the *Revue française de Sociologie* (Vol. VI, no. 1, 1965, pp. 68 f.) of an article by Memmi entitled *Recherches sur la judéité des Juifs en France*, in which certain terminological distinctions are proposed and explained, having been previously put forward in Memmi's *Portrait d'un Juif*, 1962 (which I have not seen). Memmi's terms are naturally oriented somewhat differently from mine, but with slight modifications the two sets are possibly complementary. I have correlated them in the Appendix to this paper; and since, in particular, my *Judaicity* means something other than Memmi's *judaïcité* (see note 8), it is desirable (I would suggest) that some convention be established with regard to the use of all the terms proposed by Memmi and myself in any future discussion of the subject.

AN ORTHODOX JEWISH COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A MINORITY WITHIN A MINORITY

Nancy J. Schmidt

IN their study of the Jewish community in North City, Judith B. Kramer and Seymour Leventman used sociological interview techniques to determine the changes which were taking place as the second and third generation Jewish community became acculturated to American life.[1] Their emphasis was largely upon the changes that were taking place as the persons moved away from the Northside of North City to the suburban areas. They mention casually that there was one parochial school in the Jewish community; a footnote states that the name of this school is Torah Academy and that it has 75 students. None of their respondents sent their children to the Torah Academy.

The present study[2] was conducted among the persons directly connected with the Torah Academy: its teachers, students, parents of its students, and friends and supporters of the school. The persons who support this Orthodox Jewish school represent a small segment of the North City Jewish population (approximately 450 to 500 of the 20,000 Jews who live in North City and its suburbs). However, this is just one segment of several which the Kramer and Leventman study did not sample, and, as will soon become evident, these other Jewish people differ in some ways from the second and third generation Jewish families interviewed by Kramer and Leventman. By investigating the behaviour and attitudes of this Orthodox minority of the Jewish minority of North City, it will be possible to obtain a view of the kinds of people who support a Hebrew Day School, and to determine in what ways the most devout members of the Orthodox Jewish community differ from the Jewish community at large. It will also be possible to indicate the degree of persistence of Orthodox Judaism in the American acculturative setting, for as has been pointed out[3] in reference to the *shtetl* of Eastern Europe,

> Response to the impact of other cultures is one of the inseparable components of Jewish culture. The resulting flexibility is one of its salient characteristics.

AN ORTHODOX COMMUNITY

This study is an anthropological study carried out by a non-Jewish participant observer. The data were collected during a two-year period (1960–62) when the investigator was a teacher of 'English' subjects in the Torah Academy, a worker in two camps of the Jewish Community Center of North City, and a participant in some social functions and family activities of the Northside of North City. The study was not planned in advance, but rather grew from participation in the life of the Northside community. It was only as the religious practices and cultural problems of this community became formulated in my mind as of anthropological importance that the systematic recording of data was begun.

Observations were made almost daily and recorded at the end of the day or at the end of the week, as time permitted. Statistical data were obtained from the records of the school and community centre to which there was free access for employees of these institutions. Many persons within the small community told me of personal and community problems, and these statements were also recorded, as were my observations and interpretations of the activities of the school and of school members in the community. The members of the community were fully aware of my interest in sociology and anthropology, and therefore I assume that they treated me as they would any other college-educated non-Jewish person who participated actively in their community. My main concern was with the segment of the Jewish community in which I was employed, yet as time passed, differences between my observations and those of Kramer and Leventman became so evident that some comparison with their study seemed warranted.

Kramer and Leventman thought it an advantage that they were Jewish investigators studying a Jewish community; however, there are also equal advantages for a non-Jewish investigator. Although I was familiar with Reform Judaism, I had had no previous contact with Orthodox Judaism; I was not therefore carrying the kind of unconscious bias which might easily be held by a Jewish person. Regardless of the biases which I doubtless carry owing to my own background, I believe that it has been possible for me to take a fresh approach to the Jewish community and see things as any observant outsider might. That I was an outsider was of some importance, since members of an in-group often do not see themselves in the same ways as members of the out-group do.

Whereas some persons responded to Kramer and Leventman's questions only because they were Jewish, others responded to my questions because I was not Jewish. For example, things were discussed with me which were never mentioned to the rabbinical personnel in charge of the school, and dissatisfaction with the school and difficulties of adhering to Judaism in America were expressed to me precisely because I was not Jewish. It was thought that I might understand and be sympathetic to

such attitudes which, if told to the rabbis, would lead to strong pressures to alter them. There can be no doubt that some of the personal conversations which I had would never have occurred if I had been Jewish; on the other hand, information was sometimes withheld from me because I was not a full member of the community.

As a participant observer, I was able to see the differences in behaviour towards members of the immediate Orthodox community and outsiders, both of other Jewish persuasions and non-Jews. Merely because I spent the better part of most weekdays with the same people in a variety of different situations, I was able to observe small, purposeful changes in behaviour, as well as disparities between verbalized ideals and actual behaviour. As an employee of two Jewish institutions, I was also able to observe many conflicts and problems which the personnel of the institutions would not verbally admit, even to other members of their own community. The routine, day-by-day situations were an excellent source for observing problems to a depth (and within the context of Jewish life in general) that surveys and brief interviews cannot reveal.

Kramer and Leventman used questionnaires and some interviews to determine the attitudes and behaviour of the second and third generation families in their sample. They were concerned with only some 200 families in their sample, all of whom belonged to a lodge or country club. They assume that these families are typical of North City Jewish families, but many sociological studies of joiners and non-joiners should have suggested to them that they were in fact sampling one sub-group of the Jewish population, and that the very sub-group which would be most likely to support their hypothesis! Of course, such a sample was probably chosen because it was easy to draw up and the people were readily accessible for interviewing; yet this does not make it representative. I would suggest that the Orthodox community is not the only sub-group which is different from that studied by Kramer and Leventman; there are at least two other sub-groups: those too poor to join a lodge or club, and those who are so secure that they do not feel that such membership is necessary or desirable.

The method of participant observation has weaknesses, just as does the sociological interview method used by Kramer and Leventman. As an employee of an institution struggling to keep in operation, there might be a tendency to weigh observations in terms of their immediate importance, rather than their long-term significance. Furthermore, an employee in a small, close group does influence the situations which are being investigated. And finally, by being involved in a school community, it is easier to become thoroughly familiar with the opinions of school personnel, community workers, children, and mothers of children in the community, but not with the fathers and members of the community who have no children of school age or who do not care to send

their children to a Hebrew Day School, even though they may support it.

I believe that, in spite of its disadvantages, the participant observer method of study has made it possible to provide data additional to those recorded by Kramer and Leventman. The new data include some factors which support their theories about the changes in the Jewish population of North City, and bring into sharper focus the role of a minority within the minority. They illustrate the importance of close personal relationships in the formulation of attitudes of the members of a small community, and show how the participant observer method can be used to advantage in studying sub-groups of one's own culture. In the remainder of this paper, data about Torah Academy and the surrounding community will be presented and then related to the findings of Kramer and Leventman in *Children of the Gilded Ghetto*.

History of the School

The Hebrew Day School Movement in the United States began in 1935, with 17 schools and an enrolment of about 3,000 pupils. Pupils in Hebrew Day Schools spend approximately half the school day studying Hebrew subjects and the other half studying English subjects (those usually included in the public school curriculum).

The Torah Academy of North City was established in 1945, with an enrolment of 12 elementary school pupils and 2 teachers. Its peak of development was reached in 1960, with 94 kindergarten, elementary, and junior high school pupils, and 9 teachers. The Academy by that time had a Yeshivah Department, had sent 19 boys to a Yeshivah, had a correspondence department for Orthodox Jewish persons in rural communities in the five states near North City, and planned a series of monthly lectures for adults on topics of religious and current events interest.[4] Since that time the enrolment has fallen slightly each year and there were only 8 teachers in 1964.

At the time of this study the staff of the school consisted of 4 rabbis, one of whom is American-born and educated. The rabbi who serves as principal is also a qualified teacher. However, he spends about two-thirds of his time away from the Academy soliciting school funds from communities throughout the western half of the United States, and rendering religious services to Orthodox persons in the five state area around North City where there is no rabbi. Another of the rabbis teaches half-time and serves as assistant principal the remainder of the time. The foreign-born rabbis have been in the United States from one to eight years, and in the North City community from one to six years.

The three English teachers of the elementary and junior high departments are not Jewish. Two are employed full time, and the other teaches on a half-time basis. The kindergarten teacher is the principal's wife, and she teaches both Hebrew and English subjects. In 1960–1 the

ninth member of the staff was an art teacher who came one day each week, but due to his inability to volunteer his services in 1961–2, the teaching staff decreased to eight. A volunteer worker, but not a teacher, assisted in the kindergarten in 1961, mostly in the field of arts and crafts.

Two other members of the school staff, the secretary and custodian-bus driver (both of whom were non-Jewish until a staff change was made late in 1961), have considerable influence on the disciplining of the pupils and on the daily operation of the school. These two persons seem to bear the chief responsibility for handling all the petty details necessary to keep an institution running. They give far more time and assume far more responsibility than persons in such positions usually do, which is probably a result both of their individual capabilities and of the lack of familiarity of the school principals with the details of American business procedure and culture in general. The children seem to respect these two persons as much as their teachers, and many parents rely heavily upon them for information about the Academy.

The school has been in financial difficulties almost since it was founded; this is reflected in the sub-standard school facilities and the many unpaid bills. The annual tuition fees are quite low for a private school, ranging from $250 for kindergarten to $325 for junior high school. In addition, many of the pupils are on scholarship, thus further restricting the revenue obtained from tuition. Of the budget of $44,000 for 1960, about $16,000 came from the Friends of Torah Academy, an organization composed primarily of members of the North City community. All other funds must be solicited from outsiders, or obtained from the sale of Kasher products to the Northside community, from the Parent-Teacher Association, or the student council projects.

The staff are paid irregularly and poorly by North City standards, where the minimum teacher's salary is $4,400. The salaries at the Academy range from $1,700 (for half-time) to $6,000, which doubtless partially accounts for the difficulty of recruiting teachers. The turnover of teachers is large, with two years being the average length of employment, if we exclude teachers (and there are many) who do not remain for the whole of the first year. Rabbis usually leave for better paying jobs in the eastern part of the country; among the English teachers, retirement or better opportunities account for changes. On the other hand, many of the English teachers have been retired teachers who have been hired by the Academy on a part-time basis; since they usually had pensions, they were able to accept low salaries. Among the younger English teachers, lack of certification to teach in North City public schools has probably accounted for their accepting a post in the Academy; none of them was Jewish.

The children who attend the Academy all speak English (with widely varying degrees of proficiency), and can read Hebrew. About

half of them come from families with at least one foreign-born parent, and six of the pupils were born overseas. In almost one-third of the families, Yiddish is spoken at home, in addition to English, and in a few cases it is the main language of parent–child communication. This brief background and the following tables indicate the outline structure of Torah Academy, which is supported by the Orthodox Jewish community of North City.

TABLE I. *Native country of parents**

Country	*Number of parents*	
U.S.A.		44
Foreign countries		37
Poland	9	
Germany	6	
Russia	4	
Sweden	4	
Canada	3	
Czechoslovakia	1	
Egypt	1	
Israel	1	
Peru	1	
No information	7	
Total		81

* Since there were no records available on the kindergarten, the total number of pupils covered is 86. The numbers will not tally with the theoretical number of parents for 86 children (172), since parents with more than one child in the school were not counted more than once. The countries of origin are not always the same ones from which the persons emigrated: several of the families came from England, Israel, Canada, and Italy, but were not born there. There were 42 families; three of these had only one parent.

TABLE II. *Languages spoken at home*

Language	*Number of Students*
English	94
Yiddish	29
German	3
Polish	2

Why children go to Torah Academy

There are several different kinds of reasons for which North City parents send their children to Torah Academy. The Hebrew Day School Movement aims to preserve and perpetuate a Jewish social entity in the United States, in accordance with the belief that the presence of such an entity is necessary for the perpetuation of Jewish ideals. The existence of a Jewish community is regarded as essential for education of the peoples of the world in righteous and just behaviour, so that the Kingdom of God may be realized. However, this religious belief (expressed by rabbis and devout persons) is not the primary reason why most parents send their children to Torah Academy; their reasons are generally much more practical.

The principals of the school, other rabbis, and a few devoutly religious persons believe that it is essential that the children be taught about their

Jewish heritage from the earliest possible age. By isolating the children from the larger community in their earlier years and teaching them Jewish beliefs and practices in an environment where there is a minimum of conflict, they believe that the children will retain their faith when they enter the larger community at the conclusion of their schooling. They have sent their own children to the school for this reason, and they try to persuade other families to do so. However, this reason in itself is not sufficient to persuade most families.

The most common reason for sending children to the Academy, which parents openly express, is that they want their children to know that they are Jewish and to know what it means to be Jewish. Since only about half of the parents who send their children to the school are Sabbath observers in the Orthodox sense, it appears that the perpetuation of Orthodox practices is not the main purpose in sending children to the school. Most parents wish their children to become sufficiently familiar with Hebrew to understand the reading of the Torah in the synagogue. Also, a small minority of couples want their children to learn to read Hebrew well enough to please their parents or grandparents, to whom the language is very important.

The general concern of the parents to have their children know of their Jewish heritage is qualified in many ways.

One foreign-born mother, who is not a strict Orthodox observer and whose first husband was not Jewish, but is now married to a foreign-born, strict Orthodox observer, said:

> I want my child to have enough education to know what a Jew is. Then when he is older and on his own, he can decide for himself. I cannot make my son a Jew, if he does not feel that he wants to be one.

A recent immigrant to the United States who speaks broken English, but cannot write English, sends her four children to the school. She said:

> All I want is for my children to know they're Jewish. It is English that is really important. No one uses Hebrew any more.

A father of a kindergarten child, who was trying to decide whether to continue sending his child to Torah Academy for the first grade or to the local public school and the Talmud Torah, expressed doubts shared by many American-born parents, who have some knowledge of the educational requirements for success in the United States. He said:

> I am not sure how much Hebrew education my son should have, for he must know how to be an American too.

The Jewish religion is not always the major religious factor in sending children to the Academy. For example, a mother who sends three of her children to the school, but sends them to Talmud Torah for Hebrew

instruction because she believes it is better there, and also sends them to a Lutheran camp in the summer, says that she is sending them to Torah Academy to learn about 'a religion':

> After all, it is the same God who looks after us no matter what religion we have. I want my children to associate with everyone, not just with Jews. After all, I was born in this country, not in Europe, and I know what my children must do. We are not snobs and do not think we're better than other religions.

Then there are children who are in the Academy (as there are in any private school) because of disciplinary or academic problems in the public school; the parents hope that a smaller school with a religious discipline will help their children. Finally, there are several younger girls in this school because the local elementary school is attended by some of the worst problem children in North City, and the parents do not want the girls exposed to the rough treatment and coarse behaviour often found there.

There are, therefore, a variety of verbalized reasons for sending children to the Academy, ranging from the interest in perpetuating Judaism, to teaching the children of their Jewish heritage, to helping the children overcome personal problems, and protecting them from adverse social influences in the public schools. While stressing the importance of religious education, some parents indicate that they also want their children to receive a good English training.

Religious duties expected of the children

Many persons, including Jews, have expressed amazement that there are still Jews in America who adhere to kashrut and strictly observe the laws of the Torah.[5] So that the role of Torah Academy and its community can be more accurately seen within the context of life in North City and the U.S. in general, a few of these religious observances will be discussed, especially as they affect the school-children and their families. The following discussion does no more than give a brief hint of the extent to which the laws of the Torah penetrate daily life, since it is focused mainly on activities connected with the school and on the children as individuals. Of course, the daily religious observances of the family as a group are of equal importance.

Three religious practices observed at Torah Academy, which are expected of the children at all times are: keeping the laws of kashrut, saying prayers at the proper times, and wearing the yarmelke whenever outdoor hats are not being worn. None of these practices is difficult to enforce at school, but it is harder to ensure their observance after school hours.

Boys are always required to wear their yarmelkes, both in the school and when the children go on supervised school excursions to non-Jewish places like concerts, the public library, or museums. Should the boys

forget to wear them, they are reminded to do so and extra yarmelkes are available for those who may lose their own or leave them at home. Many boys avoid wearing yarmelkes outside school, which is not surprising since people often stare at them, and the boys squirm with self-consciousness. Even at activities of the North City Jewish Community Center, at which attendance is mostly Jewish, although not predominantly Orthodox, the boys do not wear them; in this respect they do not differ much from their fathers and older brothers, most of whom wear yarmelkes only at the synagogue. The rabbis are fully aware that many of the boys wear them only in the school and synagogue. The rabbis, of course, wear yarmelkes at all appropriate times. On one occasion, on a sub-zero, snowy, winter day, the principal attended a luncheon for North City educators and absent-mindedly left his yarmelke at the Academy instead of wearing it under his winter cap; since he could not be seated at the luncheon table or eat without his yarmelke, another member of the school staff had to leave his classes and drive several miles to the location of the luncheon to bring it.

In accordance with Orthodox Jewish practice, prayers are said at the Academy in the morning, after the noon meal and in the middle of the afternoon. In the morning, the rabbis, some of the fathers of the children, and the boys who have become Bar Mitzvah, say their prayers in the synagogue. All the children at the school (except Bar Mitzvah boys) are supervised in their prayers (whereas they would say them alone if they were at home), and the grace following the noon meal is led by a rabbi or a Bar Mitzvah boy. Preceding the noon meal, ritual washing, praying, and silence before eating are observed. Prayers and associated observances are carried out in the children's homes according to the degree of Orthodox strictness of the parents. A devout Jew must interrupt his activities at the prescribed hours of the day for prayers. The principal prays in his office and the rabbi-teachers do so during the afternoon recess. At work, men are supposed to stop for prayers and at school functions the men gather in a separate room, or in one corner of a room, to pray. The children who are not supervised do not follow this practice usually; at the camps and programmes of the North City Jewish Community Center, I never saw one of the Academy students stop for prayers, wash appropriately before eating, or say grace after eating. At times when I observed the children away from school during meals, the largest percentage (excluding the children of rabbis and Bar Mitzvah boys) neglected washing and saying grace unless forcefully prodded to do so. (This general neglect of praying and religious observances when there is no supervision is not uncommon; it is true of children in Catholic, Presbyterian, and Mennonite schools and camps in which I have worked.)

Kashrut is carefully and closely observed at the Academy. The hot lunches are always dairy lunches and milk is served; those who bring

their own food are urged to bring dairy lunches. Should a child bring a meat lunch, he may not have milk; he is sent to an upstairs classroom to eat. The children are urged to buy their food from kasher stores and to read the list of ingredients on the labels of unfamiliar products. The older children know which ingredients are not kasher, and which candies and ice cream products they can safely eat. When younger children are in doubt about candies or cookies in their home-packed lunches, they ask the rabbis before eating them. In contrast to this behaviour in the Academy, the Orthodox children in the Jewish Community Center camps never refused to eat food which they knew to be non-kasher or prepared in non-kasher conditions.

Strict adherence to kashrut is very difficult and expensive, especially for the poorer families of the North City community. Kasher food is costly mainly because it is handled by small delicatessens and is not available in supermarkets. Furthermore, many of the families cannot afford to own two complete sets of cooking utensils and dishes, so that economic factors may prevent some devout families from observing kashrut. Since for economic or other reasons a considerable number of families do not observe kashrut, some degree of conflict exists between what the Academy teaches and practises and what is practised in the children's homes.

In a playful, childish way, the children at Torah Academy joke about wanting to try certain non-kasher foods, or even brag that they have tried some of them. The main object of their interest seems to be the ham sandwich, which is so frequently mentioned in stories or advertisements.

When kashrut is strictly observed, as it is by a few of the families of the Northside community, some interesting and inconvenient practices result. Eating in restaurants or homes other than those of observant Jews is virtually impossible; this means that participation in business and social functions centred around meals is limited. Kashrut restricts travel to a large degree, since persons who travel almost anywhere (except along the eastern coast of the U.S. where some kasher restaurants exist) must carry their own food with them unless they can count on being invited by an Orthodox Jewish family at mealtimes. Should a trip be taken that includes the Sabbath, food for the whole Sabbath must be prepared in advance and carried along. This is what the principal usually does when he travels to serve Orthodox persons in the North City area, and when he goes to solicit funds for the school, and what all families must do when they travel to places where no kasher facilities are available. Kashrut also limits contacts between Jewish and non-Jewish playmates in situations where food is involved, so that common childhood pleasures like after-school snacks, birthday parties, or supper parties cannot be shared with non-Jews unless special provisions are made. Kashrut also restricts the activities of high school and

college-age young people at parties and in 'going out for hamburgers with the gang', unless the whole group is willing to go to a kasher restaurant on the Northside.

The Academy also provides instruction about Sabbath observances in addition to, and in support of the training which is received at the synagogue and in the home. The strict observance of the Sabbath as a day of rest is stressed; it is forbidden to use electric lights or appliances of any kind, including the telephone, radio, or television. No riding is done in cars or any other mechanized vehicle; this means that Orthodox families must walk to synagogue services. Nothing is carried on the Sabbath, no books, papers, or loads of any kind.

Mention of only these few Sabbath restrictions is sufficient to indicate how difficult they are to keep, not only because America is such a mechanized country, but because the Jewish Sabbath occurs on a day when the remainder of the community is in full operation. An Orthodox Jewish shopkeeper must close his shop on Saturday, which until the advent of evening shopping hours was the day on which most stores did their largest volume of business. Since electric switches may not be handled, all the lights which one wants to use on the Sabbath must be turned on before sundown on Friday and left on until sundown on Saturday. For example, when Sabbath classes are held at the Academy, the lights are left on at the close of school on Friday so that they will be on for the Saturday classes, and they remain on until the Sunday classes, unless someone happens to be in the school on Saturday night to turn them off.

Since riding is not permitted on the Sabbath, if one wishes to visit a friend or attend a Bar Mitzvah in a distant part of North City or in neighbouring South City, one must stay with friends in the area. In the event that a whole family must spend the Sabbath in another area, they will probably stay in a hotel in the neighbourhood of the synagogue they will attend, and carry all their food with them; if it is summer, they must provide some kind of refrigeration for their food. They will also have to carry their own crockery, glasses, silver, Sabbath candles, etc. Such inconvenience and expense frequently limit week-end travel, but trips are necessary when there are definite obligations to be fulfilled, such as the school principal attending the Bar Mitzvah of one of his students. Families usually prefer to be together on the Sabbath, since the father conducts services for the whole family, so that it is common for a whole family to travel on the Sabbath to fulfil the obligation of one person.

For most Torah Academy pupils, the Sabbath is a quiet day devoid of all mechanical pleasures and conveniences; although all the families do not observe all the Sabbath restrictions, most at least maintain the spirit of the day. However, where the children leave the Academy to attend the local public school for junior high or high school, they are

faced with increasing conflicts. Many school functions are held on Friday and Saturday evenings, and the all-important sports events (especially for the boys) are held on Friday and Saturday; there are also other occasions on which the children feel that the Sabbath restrictions interfere with their lives as young Americans. Eventually, either the parents relent and permit some exceptions to the Sabbath restrictions, or considerable friction occurs between the young people and their more Orthodox parents over the attendance at school functions and dating in particular, as well as over the keeping of kashrut.

It is true that the school and synagogue can to a degree teach young children the correct behaviour for the Sabbath, when they should pray, wear the yarmelke, how to observe kashrut, and so on. But there is no guarantee that the pupils will take more than a superficial, pre-adolescent interest in such matters. When most of them are thrown into the outside community they are in their early teens and insecure, and their adult habits have not yet been formed. The parents, especially those who are foreign-born and function within their own community to a much greater degree than do their children, often cannot understand the conflicts which the latter are facing. In this sense, the Orthodox training which the children are given at Torah Academy in isolation from the larger community in the hope that a Jewish social entity may be preserved in America, is in many respects causing huge tensions within this entity. This is especially true of the relations between the older and the younger generations; and of course it is the young who are to perpetuate some sort of Jewish society.

The students of Torah Academy

In accordance with the purpose of the Hebrew Day Schools to protect the children from the larger community while they are being taught the foundations of their religion and heritage, the Academy administration advocates the avoidance of conflict with all secular facts whenever possible, and prefers to have other religions, and other kinds of Judaism, introduced to the children officially by the rabbis in comparative religion courses taught during their high school years. However, since the pupils also study an English curriculum from books used by the larger community and participate at least to some degree in the mass culture media of our times (which in America can hardly be avoided), they are aware of conflicts with Judaism from a very early age.

Most of the children at Torah Academy are more sheltered from American life than the average American child, since most of their social relationships are with Orthodox friends within the Orthodox community. All of them are aware that Jews are a minority group and have been subjected to many hardships throughout history. Despite differences in personality and family background, there are some similarities in the behaviour and attitudes of the children which could

be gleaned from observing them at work and play and analysing what they have written and said about themselves. (Although only a small number of cases are mentioned in the following discussion, the whole student group has been studied.)

It was possible to assign the students exercises in which they expressed their attitudes about their lives and their religion without their being aware that they were engaged in anything but a routine assignment. (The exercises were in fact standard school procedures, the only difference being that the teacher analysed what was written in addition to grading the papers.) Therefore, it can be assumed that the students freely expressed their ideas, although they may have presented them in a special way to impress the teacher. In addition, I became acquainted with many of the children in camping or recreational activities in the Jewish Community Center, where their behaviour was different and my relationship with them was much less formal. I also became very friendly with some of the junior high school students for whom I provided transport. Their conversation in the car was quite uninhibited, regardless of what had happened in the classroom a few minutes earlier. (I was amazed at the free nature of their conversation, but think that perhaps the children treated me as they did their rabbis and other adult members of the community. To a large degree among the Orthodox community, family and personal problems are also community problems and affairs. Perhaps this also indicated their acceptance of me as a member of the community.)

A. Classroom experiences

Routine classroom assignments such as essays on life aims or summer plans are sources of information about children's activities and attitudes. Classroom discussions about literature, history, science, and other subjects are also useful. An additional source was overhearing conversations among students or between students and other adults; in the old building which housed the school, overhearing conversations was not very difficult. In the following sections, the children's attitudes as revealed in these ways will be discussed, as will be some implications of the double curriculum (Hebrew and English) which the students are required to study.

Every week the fifth and sixth grades had to write sentences or stories with their spelling words. When 'religion' was included in the list of spelling words, 9 of the 14 students made specific references to their own religion, whereas the other 5 used the word in a very general way. The following sentences are representative of the main ideas expressed by these children, who are 9 to 11 years old:

The Jewish religion is very difficult to keep.
Our religion is very important to us.
Our religion is completely different from theirs.
I am a member of the Jewish religion and very proud of it.

When the same students used 'worship' and 'pray' in sentences, they all made some reference to their own religious habits. In these sentences and many others written both by these and older students, the word 'God' was frequently used. However, Orthodox Jews are not permitted to write the word in full, but instead must write G—d. Since the children used this word many times when another word or expression could have been used just as appropriately, one might presume either that God has great importance for them or that the children gain some pleasure from writing a forbidden word.

Every school day included numerous conflicts between the Orthodox Jewish teachings and the English subject matter, in spite of the fact that the curriculum was adjusted to provide the least possible amount of conflict; there are few school subjects in which Christian or secular references do not occur. The continuous presence of such conflicts not only introduced a large degree of confusion into the educational process, but tended to heighten the students' awareness of their minority position within the larger American society.

Every day the children write two dates at the top of their papers, the date of the Christian era and the date of the Hebrew calendar. It is no simple matter to remember both Hebrew and English dates, since the English and Hebrew calendars do not correspond from year to year. Frequently the students place the date and their whole assignment on the back of the paper, instead of the front, since Hebrew is read from right to left. The difference between the Hebrew and English calendars also means that Jewish Holy Days come at a different time each year in the English calendar. Since both American legal holidays and Jewish religious Holy Days are observed at the Academy, this introduces more variability into the Academy school calendar than exists in that of the public schools. The resulting very long or very short spans of time between school holidays have a definite bearing on the ability of the teachers to implement a well-coordinated curriculum, and on the psychological well-being of the students. The spacing of school holidays means in fact that in the autumn (at the beginning of the school year), there are many holidays close together and it is difficult to get classes going and to maintain continuity in teaching. In the late winter and early spring there are long months with no school vacation, and the children get restless and lose interest in their work.

The calendar also has a role in the teaching of subject matter in the classroom. The B.C.E–C.E. system of dating seems confusing and illogical to the children when compared to the Hebrew calendar, which is numbered consecutively from a zero point. To the students, the Hebrew calendar has definite significance in terms of their religious heritage, whereas the English calendar's connexions with the Christian Era are relatively meaningless. Such distinctions cause the students some problems in working arithmetic problems, a frequent stumbling block

being the concepts of 'week' and 'work week'. Since the Jewish Sabbath is a day of rest, and occurs on Saturday, it is not considered either a 'week day' or a 'work day'; likewise, Sunday is a 'week day' during which work is permitted. Most of the children consider the week as lasting from Sunday to Friday, rather than from Monday to Saturday; such distinctions lead some pupils to make errors in their work.

In books for all school subjects, there are numerous references to holidays which the Jewish children do not observe, and which the rabbis do not want emphasized in the classroom. Therefore, holidays like Christmas, Easter, Valentine's Day, and Halloween are almost unknown and meaningless to the students, although much poetry, literature, and art connected with these holidays are studied in most American classrooms. The mention of the holidays in books almost always evoked comments from the students, yet by not discussing them, their understanding of the text was somewhat limited. For example, the literature in the junior high school curriculum included Benet's *The Devil and Daniel Webster*, which requires familiarity with the concepts of the Devil, purgatory, and the eternal existence of the soul (in the Christian sense); Longfellow's *Evangeline* is concerned with priests, nuns, missionaries, and the ideal of Christian charity; and *King Arthur* is meaningful only if one knows about Christ, the Holy Grail, and Christian symbols like the cross. Stories which are a commonly accepted part of every American child's cultural heritage, like Dickens' *Christmas Carol* and folk tales about holidays in other lands are dropped from the curriculum. It is interesting to note that a few of the children consistently substitute the word 'Chanukah' every time the word 'Christmas' appears in a school lesson. Undoubtedly they note a parallel between the two holidays, which usually occur in December, involve gift-giving, and are school holidays.

The literary background of the children at Torah Academy is therefore different from that of children attending the public schools. Most of the children read rather extensively outside school, mainly Hebrew religious literature and non-fiction. The reason for this is probably that American children's literature is not available in their homes, where family reading and story telling are centred around Biblical and Jewish stories. Many of these stories have served as subjects of television and film shows, a fact which has provided additional stimulation. The manner in which Christian references are understood and interpreted, helps in some way to form the Jewish child's opinion of Christian beliefs and American culture, from which he is isolated to a large degree. Even when he reads the same books or magazines as other children, he does not gain the same view of American culture from them.

Christian ideas influence the teaching and understanding of history as well as literature. In American history, which by state law must be taught three times during the elementary years, it is difficult to explain

the motives of the early American settlers and the differences between the early colonies if the teacher cannot assume some general understanding of Christian concepts. Equally difficult to clarify are some of the ideas related to the conversion of the Indians, the fight against slavery, and the westward expansion. Certain phases of world history and geography which are included in the elementary curriculum like the Crusades, the fifteenth and sixteenth century explorations of the world, the extent and degree of Spanish influence in Latin America, the development of the white man's attitude towards the coloured peoples of Africa and the Far East, and the attitude of Communist Russia towards religion also require an understanding of some aspects of Christianity. The Academy students, lacking this understanding, thus have a viewpoint of history which differs from that of their age peers in the larger community.

In the study of science the conflicts with religion are far too numerous to be enumerated. A frequent source of conflict arises when food and health are studied, pork being one of the nutritious non-kasher foods frequently discussed; moreover, in almost all balanced meal plans mentioned in science books, meat and milk products are mixed. Whenever a study of diet or foods was made in class, the question inevitably arose as to adequate substitutes for non-kasher foods and as to whether the children should answer the questions according to what the book taught or according to what they were allowed to eat. Topics like evolution, which enters into the study of prehistoric life, developmental processes in rock formation, and the plant and animal kingdoms, cannot be taught. However, references to such topics are frequent, the students read from the sections of the books that are not assigned, and their curiosity is aroused; they are often puzzled because they have no adequate way to evaluate this kind of material.

The total result of many religious contradictions in school studies introduces a sizable element of confusion in the Academy education. The children are aware that they are not supposed to know about certain things, yet their normal childhood curiosity continues. Their knowledge of subjects in the English curriculum tends to be superficial, both because of their incomplete understanding of it and of the burden of studying two completely different curricula in two different languages (a burden that few average children can bear). On the whole, the older students find English subjects more interesting than Hebrew subjects, and claim that time passes more quickly for them when they study English subjects, because they contain more variety. The comments of numerous parents confirm this increased interest in English studies as the children get older; it may be that as awareness of the larger community and life in general increases, so does a desire to learn about it. The concern with secular life appears to be well-established before the children leave Torah Academy, in spite of the fact that they have been

discouraged from acquiring this kind of knowledge. Unfortunately, since there are few Academy graduates now attending a public school, we cannot discover whether this interest in secular life increases significantly once the students are no longer under close religious supervision.

B. How the students view themselves as members of the North City community

In compositions about their life aims, none of the nine junior high school pupils mentioned a religious goal as primary (see Table III), and only three mentioned Judaism in their discussion.

TABLE III. *Life aims of junior high students*

First choice occupation		*Mention of a Jewish goal*	
Engineering	2	Jewish President	2
Accountant	1	Serve Jewish community	1
Artist	1		
Mechanic	1	Total	3
Pilot	1		
Nurse	1		
Spaceman	1		
Teacher	1		
Total	9		

The goals which the students (six boys and three girls) stated are very similar to those which one might find in any junior high school class. Of some interest is the fact that the three girls all discussed careers rather than homemaking, an outlook which is wholly contrary to the Orthodox ideal of early marriage and a life devoted to homemaking. (The assignment was carefully designed so that life goals would not be equated with a profession or future education; a similar assignment, given to another group of junior high school students in a public school in a different district, did result in many of the girls writing about marriage and homemaking.) In fact, since most of the Orthodox Jewish families do not even contemplate college for their daughters, the replies indicate that the three girls had already accepted the American middle class ideal for education.

Although religious ideals were not of primary concern to these junior high school students, their essays showed that they were fully aware of the importance of their religion; for example, one boy with excellent mathematical aptitudes stated:

> Since my father is a clergyman and I have been brought up in a religious atmosphere at home, and in the all-day school where I am taught the Talmud and Torah, it would be appropriate to follow in my father's footsteps and make it my profession. But maybe, when I grow up I will not want to be a clergyman. In my case I have two fields that I might turn to, science or engineering.

Another boy who will be continuing his high school education at a Yeshivah gave engineering as his first of several occupational choices. He has an avid interest in history and current events, and made a comment which clearly shows both his grasp of political principles and his awareness of the marginal position of many Negroes who also live in the Northside of North City:

> I would also like to become a politician. My goal would be to become the first Jewish President of the United States, if one isn't elected before me. I would choose for my running mate a prominent Negro, so I could win the confidence of the Negroes.

As will be indicated shortly, other children are also aware that they share some problems with the Negroes.

One of the girls, a twelve-year-old who has a keen mind and is more familiar with the commonplaces of American culture than most of her classmates, wrote a very fanciful essay which could have been written by almost any school girl of her age. She made no mention of family or home-life, even though her father is a rabbi; she began her essay:

> I have often wondered what I will be when I am grown up. Many ideas come to my head, and I dream of being artist, teacher, scientist, astronaut, first lady and Jewish President of the United States and many others.

From this group of children (three of whose parents are employed in the professions, five in business, and one of whom is retired from wage work), it appears that parental occupations have not greatly influenced a child's choice. Several of the parents are most anxious that their children obtain jobs which will be better than their own, and this fact may have affected the pupils' aims or daydreams. But, for the most part, occupations of current interest to twelve- and thirteen-year-olds seem to be dominant among their first choices. From this group of students, three (perhaps five) will be going to a Yeshivah for high school, although only one will be doing so by his own choice. Apparently, by the time the children have reached junior high school, they have not internalized their religious teachings to such a degree that they give them precedence over secular goals, although they are fully aware that they are Jewish and that this fact will remain important in their life.

Behaviour outside the classroom can also reflect the children's view of themselves as members of a social community. Since the school is located in a rapidly changing district which is occupied by whites (Jewish and non-Jewish) and Negroes, racial and religious incidents occasionally occur among the children. Some incidents have been caused by school loyalty, since the public grade school is just across the road, while others have been the result of antisemitic feelings. Apart from brief periods of radical antisemitism, when Swastikas were painted on several nearby synagogues, most of the children's animosity has taken

the form of name-calling and occasional fighting. The yarmelke is a frequent source of ridicule by boys from the public school, especially when it is secured with a hairpin. As a rule, when name-calling occurs, the children either ignore it or tell one of the rabbis; but by the time a rabbi comes to investigate, the name-callers usually have disappeared and the insult is quickly forgotten. On one occasion, however, when two Negro schoolboys called two small boys 'filthy Jews', a fight followed, which was broken up by one of the rabbis. Immediately afterwards in a discussion among the older boys about name-calling and its effects, most of the boys said that they were much more hurt by being called names than by fighting. At the end of the discussion, one of the boys who had been fighting commented:

> You really can't blame the Negroes for doing things like that. They really have a hard time and people are very nasty to them.

This understanding of the Negroes' position shown by the school-children is in direct contrast to the attitude of the old people who belong to a club of the Jewish Community Center; every time their bus drove through the Northside they made derogatory comments about the Negroes and their presence in the Northside. Some also objected strongly to the inclusion of Negro children in the activities of the Center which was open to all residents of the neighbourhood.

C. The students as religious participants

The religious roles of the Jewish children are influenced by their total environment, both religious and secular. One of the most important events in the life of an Orthodox Jewish boy is his Bar Mitzvah, which occurs at a time when most boys are in junior high school. At the official synagogue ceremonies the boy must read and explain a portion of the Torah and give a sermon or short talk. Among the Academy boys the event caused obvious emotional strain, regardless of intellectual ability or temperament. The most obvious signs of changed behaviour were an increasing amount of nervousness, irritability, insecurity, and reduced effectiveness in school work. Hand-wringing and a general sense of malaise were evident in all the boys, and two of them who had very good speech began to stutter shortly before their Bar Mitzvah. Most of these symptoms were evident for at least three months before the day of the ceremony; there was a tension which was in sharp contrast to the generally permissive environment in which they had lived both at home and at school prior to their preparations for the Bar Mitzvah. Now, no excuses for failure were accepted. The parents were anxious that the boys do well in the synagogue, so that the family might be proud of them, while the rabbis were equally anxious that the boys' achievement reflect the high standard of religious education in the Academy. Therefore, both parents and rabbis were prodding the pupils, giving them extra Hebrew lessons, and constantly reminding them of

how they were expected to perform. In addition, the English teachers expected them to carry on their ordinary studies, while their friends expected them to play just as often and as long as they always had. (In a small school the absence of even one playmate is quite noticeable.) The boys could not possibly fulfil all these demands; consequently, they earned the displeasure of individuals with whom they had frequent daily contact. All the boys chose to devote their greatest energies to the preparation of the Bar Mitzvah service, and they placated the English teachers and their friends as best they could. However, their families and the rabbis were not always satisfied with the result.

Once a boy has become Bar Mitzvah he is expected to attend the synagogue each morning with his father; he must also assume more responsibilities for rituals at home, in the synagogue, and at school. In assuming new responsibilities at school, the boys seemed uncomfortable when they had to order other children or to rebuke them for failing to perform certain religious duties, which not long before they themselves had been neglecting. This greatly increased responsibility, and their awareness of the generally free existence of most Americans in their early teens, did not make them enthusiastic about their new roles. Once they had become Bar Mitzvah they had no excuse for shirking any religious duty; they probably felt some sense of guilt when they listened to the transistor radio or indulged in other youthful pursuits at times when they should have said prayers.

As in many groups which hold transition rites between youth and adulthood, there is not always a correspondence between the chronological age at which the rites occur and the actual maturity of the persons involved. For these boys, the Bar Mitzvah was not the beginning of full adult responsibilities in either a legal or a social sense, but it did initiate new religious responsibilities and it made the boys think about the new role that they would be assuming in the future. Nevertheless, about a month after most of the boys had become Bar Mitzvah, their behaviour became more relaxed and most of them behaved in much the same manner as in the period preceding their preparations for the Bar Mitzvah.

The girls, like their mothers, remain in the background of the religious community, for their most important religious roles are centred around the home. However, it takes training to assume even a somewhat passive role in the community, especially in America where there is so much emphasis on the equality of women. In all Orthodox synagogues, the men sit apart from the women; sometimes a wall or curtain separates them, or else the women sit in the balcony. Young children are permitted to sit anywhere. One ten-year-old girl commented:

> I used to sit with my father at services. But when I learned that women are supposed to sit apart, I did it too. Now, I'm afraid to go into the men's part of the synagogue.

The behaviour of other girls suggests a similar attitude, for many will not enter the men's part of the synagogue, even if permitted to do so when they have important messages for their fathers. In their general behaviour and in their conversation, girls tend to show much greater respect for paternal than for maternal opinions and authority. In families where the mother follows the traditional role of subordination to her husband, the reason for such an attitude is obvious, yet it is notably different from the role of women in American culture, who seem to be acquiring increasing authority in the home.

In general, we can say that the older pupils at Torah Academy are aware of their Jewishness, although it has not yet become the primary consideration in their lives. Their knowledge of, and participation in general American life are restricted because of religious beliefs and practices, but nevertheless they are curious to learn about secular life in the larger community. Their awareness of being different from other children of their own age, and their role as a minority within a minority group influence their approach to both their religious and their daily lives. By the time they reach puberty, they are secure in neither the religious nor in the secular community. They hold some ideals which are quite different from those of the adult members of their religious community, although they follow religious observances as long as they are under strict parental and rabbinical influence.

The adult community

The parents of the children who attend Torah Academy are almost all followers of Orthodox Judaism, although a few families follow Conservative practices (see Table IV). Although the school is located in the Northside of North City, some families who live in the Southside of North City, the suburb of West Parricus, and in neighbouring South City, send their children to the school; bus transport is provided for all those who do not live in the Northside.

TABLE IV. *Comparison between Kramer and Leventman and Schmidt samples*

	Kramer and Leventman per cent	*Schmidt* per cent
Orthodox Jewish	28	97
Observe kashrut laws	18	30
Attend Synagogue daily	—	25
Belong to a Lodge	100	—
Professional or Management	4	8
Self-Employed	68	40
Engaged in Trade	60	30
Scrap Business	60	5

The percentages in the above table from the Kramer and Leventman sample are found in *Children of the Gilded Ghetto* (pp. 66, 78). The percentages for the Schmidt sample are rough estimates based on the data

available; since occupational data were incomplete and the sample small (86 pupils), the occupational percentages have been rounded off. The purpose of this table is only to provide a general comparison between the two samples. Obviously, a change in occupation of two or three families in the Orthodox community could alter the percentages considerably.

The most active supporters of the Torah Academy are by no means all first generation Americans, as one might expect from the result of the Kramer and Leventman study. The most important supporters belong to three major groups: rabbis, well-established third generation American families, and recent immigrants. Each of these groups makes different contributions to the school. The rabbis obviously lend religious support; they are also teachers, administrators, fund-raisers, providers of publicity, and they make fruitful contacts with the Jewish community in the whole of North City. Most of the rabbis are foreign-born; they loyally send their own children to the Academy even if it causes great inconvenience. A very notable exception involved the daughter of one of the rabbis. Because she was considered quite mature for her age and certainly more mature then her classmates, she was sent away to a Hebrew boarding school. Her absence gave rise to comment, especially when parents were annoyed with the shortcomings of the Academy or when students felt that the rabbi's attitude towards them was unsympathetic. The rabbi who directs the Talmud Torah sends his children to the Academy as an expression of the unity of the different segments of the Jewish community. The well-established third generation families are devout adherents of Orthodox beliefs; they provide the major local financial support for the school, as well as the main contacts for the school with the northside community at large. These two groups (the rabbis and the third-generation families) form a social in-group which dominates the activities of the Academy.

The largest number of pupils, mostly on scholarship, are the children of recent immigrants to the U.S. The majority of the immigrants speak broken English, have little or no command of written English, and are either employed as wage workers or are frequently unemployed. They have had the equivalent of an elementary or high school education in their native country. Persecution by Hitler or by communist governments, or unsatisfactory working conditions, have caused them to come to the U.S. Their ties with the Jewish community are their main source of security during their first years in the U.S. When they arrive in North City, they settle in the inexpensive houses on the Northside, where they attend the synagogue as a means of entering into the life of the community. The rabbis try to persuade them to send their children to the Torah Academy, so that they will become more closely associated with the Orthodox Jewish community. In accordance with their traditional respect for their rabbis (and also because they are unfamiliar

with the North City community), many enrol their children in Torah Academy. However, their own educational level, interests, and command of English differ so much from the other supporters of the school, that they do not fully participate in the social life of the community, but merely in the activities centred around the synagogue. They seldom leave the Northside of North City, buy mostly from kasher groceries and Jewish merchants in the Northside, and seldom belong to social clubs in the Northside. Their social activities are largely restricted to synagogue services and celebrations of religious festivals.

This group of families and the Conservative families who send their children to the Torah Academy form the lower social group of the school community. The parents are not represented on the school board or among the P.T.A. chairmen, nor do they organize or participate in the fund-raising projects of the school. Some of those who are chronically unemployed are hired for small jobs around the school or in the homes of the more fortunate members of the school community. The occupations of the men are chiefly in crafts or unskilled labour, while some women take on a variety of domestic jobs to supplement the family income. Life for most of them is a continuous economic struggle; the children are often poorly dressed, lowly motivated to excel in school work, and seldom are included in the social activities organized by the more fortunate members of the student body. They are not elected as officers of student classes, rarely serve on the student council, do not deliver addresses at graduation or other school gatherings, and rarely have outstanding academic records in either Hebrew or English subjects. At the end of the sixth or eighth grade, if not sooner, these children enter the public schools; none of them has attended a Yeshivah. For the most part, both parents and children in this group seem resigned to their position.. The parents are grateful for whatever help the school and community have given them, although some are dissatisfied with the way their children are treated in the school.

The mother of one of the Conservative Jewish students said:

> My son has never had the same treatment in this school as B. We feel at home in the Conservative Synagogue, but we do want our son to have a good Jewish education. Not many of them will be coming to his Bar Mitzvah on Saturday because they do not approve of the way we sit in synagogue. They think we are wrong because the women are allowed to sit with the men. I don't think they treated him the same as the other boys because they do not approve of our synagogue.

The mother's prediction about the attendance at the Bar Mitzvah was fulfilled. Even though the synagogue was within easy walking distance of the Northside homes of the school community, the Bar Mitzvah was attended by only one of the rabbis and a few of the schoolchildren, but by none of the boy's own classmates. This was in marked contrast to

almost the whole community turning out for most of the Bar Mitzvahs of the boys who attended Torah Academy.

Another mother in the lower social group felt that her children were snubbed by other pupils because of their social position, and she withdrew her eldest child from the school as a result. She said:

> Even though A has been in class with those girls for 4 years now, they have never mixed with her. This is not right in such a small school. She is too old for the girls in the lower classes, so she plays with the boys whenever she can. I don't like her to be a tomboy. She wouldn't be one either, if the others had tried to be nice to her.

This comment was consistent with the girl's position in the school community; the child was excluded from the group of older girls, all of whom belonged to the upper social group of the school. Her suggestions for play were never accepted; she was not included in lunchroom or recess groups; she was not on the staff of the school paper, which was run solely by the older girls. Since this girl was quite likeable and outgoing, in contrast to the boy mentioned before who was pleasant, yet shy, it seems that she, as well as the two younger members of her family who were treated in the same manner, were excluded on a social basis.

The upper social group of the school community is divided into two parts. The larger and most influential group in most school affairs is that composed of rabbis and well-established families in the Northside and in South City. ('Well-established' here implies financial comfort and a secure job, not wealth, since none of these families would be considered upper class or even upper middle class by the standards of North City.) In this group, most of the men have had some college training, and are either in one of the professions (teaching or medicine), have established their own businesses (petroleum distribution, hardware, or scrap metal), or hold a senior position in a business firm. All contribute to the finances of the school in addition to the tuition fees of their own children. A few members of this group no longer have children in the Academy, but continue to participate in school activities; they control the P.T.A. and are represented on the school board; they organize the school's fund-raising projects such as carnivals, bake sales, rummage sales, and candy sales. They regularly attend the synagogue and hold positions in synagogue clubs as well. Many are interested in current affairs, and attend the evening lectures sponsored by the Academy; they also enjoy music and art, attend concerts or plays in other parts of North City, visit museums, and use the public library. Many of them own their own homes, in which they have, among other things, small libraries of Hebrew and English books. They meet informally when no school or synagogue activities draw them together, and sometimes take trips to visit Orthodox friends in other cities. They have a few non-Orthodox and non-Jewish friends in the nearby community,

who are considered friends of the community. Such friends include educators, settlement house workers, and businessmen.

Their children are close friends and exchange visits after school or for the Sabbath. In school they give the graduation speeches, hold class offices, are members and officers of the student council, are appointed as monitors as occasions demand, run personal errands for the rabbis, eat lunch together, publish the school paper, organize games at recess, and are usually leaders in play groups. Many of them are good students and attend a Yeshivah after they have graduated from Torah Academy. In the summer, most of these children go to a Jewish resident camp, whereas the children in the lower social group may go to a day camp or to no camp at all. Most of them have visited other cities, and have attended youth theatres, cinemas, skating rinks, or concerts in other parts of North City or South City. The girls associate almost exclusively with members of their own social group, whereas the boys are more likely to mix with other boys in the school, but associate only with boys of their own group outside school.

The smaller segment of the upper social group of the Torah Academy parental community are mostly third generation, American-educated younger persons who live in the suburb of West Parricus. Most of the men and women have had some college education. The men are professionals, businessmen, or salesmen, and are under thirty-nine years of age. Their children are in kindergarten and the first three grades of the school, the grades in which the largest number of drop-outs occur. Their social lives centre around the West Parricus suburban community, and they seldom join in the social functions in the Northside of North City or participate actively in the P.T.A. or school fund-raising projects. Since they are a relatively new and young element in the school community, they are not represented on the school board. Although they do not make large financial contributions to the school, they at least can pay in full their children's tuition fees.

Most of these young people are not strict observers of the Sabbath and of the laws of kashrut. They have more non-Orthodox and non-Jewish friends than the older members of the upper social group of the school; this is probably due to the fact that they live in an area where many of their neighbours are not Jewish. They seem to have no desire to form a separate Jewish section within the suburban community. Of all the school supporters, this small group seems to represent the trend that Kramer and Leventman described as fleeing from the old Ghetto and seeking the amenities of life that are enjoyed by the larger community. They are not even considered as part of the school community by the lower social group. In fact, as a result of residential separation, age, and educational differences, as well as of the fact that the children are transported to and from the school on a bus at regular hours, these two groups have little contact.

It is this group of parents who are not sure about how much Hebrew education their children should have; however, they are quite sure that they want their children to have a good American education. In some ways their children are different from many of the other children at Torah Academy. Few of them have both a Hebrew and an English name, while most of the other children have given Hebrew names which are used much of the time (but not in their English classes). They also do not observe kashrut laws at home and do not observe the Sabbath so strictly. Rather than a Sabbath of complete rest, many of them have a Saturday social life that includes television, riding in a car, and activities common to the general suburban community. Most of them started at the Academy in kindergarten, which was then located in West Parricus. (It was moved to the Northside in 1961, and the attendance fell by one half.) Their parents were then persuaded to send them to the first grade at Torah Academy as well. However, after the first grade, many of the children left to attend the public grade school in West Parricus, which is new, well-equipped, and convenient for their homes. These differences between the Academy and the West Parricus School are significant in kind and quality. For example, Torah Academy uses books that have been discarded from the public schools, has no facilities for science experiments, gymnastics or art, and no library. In contrast, the West Parricus School has the most modern facilities, accelerated programmes for good students, remedial classes, foreign language training in the lower grades, etc.; after school many pupils attend the Talmud Torah, along with other Jewish children (many of whom are not Orthodox).

The influence of this small, relatively young group of school supporters, who are no longer strictly Orthodox, has been relatively great. The inadequacies of the present school, plus the movement of Jewish people away from the Northside, convinced the school board several years ago that a new building should be constructed in an area where the greatest number of Jewish families could be conveniently served. Land for a new school has been acquired in West Parricus in the hope that parents will continue to send their children to the old school, while the new one is under construction. Although the attitude of the West Parricus families has not been the sole determining factor in the location of the new school, the families had a great influence on the decision to buy the land before any funds for building the school were available.

There seems to be less chance for the success of Torah Academy in West Parricus than in its Northside location. Kramer and Leventman indicate that the Jewish people of West Parricus do not attend the synagogue regularly and are, for the most part, only Holy Days observers of their religion. They tend to associate fairly freely within the larger community, and not to restrict their social activities to Jewish friends. Their patterns of social behaviour are much more similar to the larger community than to the ideal Jewish social body which the

Orthodox Jews want to recreate. The task of the Academy will be to try to insert Orthodox teachings into an environment which is moving rapidly towards an adjustment between religious beliefs and a suburban cultural environment, which lacks the social reinforcements found in the Northside community. The suburban atmosphere surrounding the new school will provide many more religious and secular conflicts with the Orthodox teachings of the Academy than the Northside environment. Furthermore, the scattering of Orthodox families within the suburban community and the absence of Orthodox synagogues nearby will make the continuation of Orthodox observances very difficult for the families of Academy students.

It is doubtful if the non-suburban supporters of the Academy will support the school in the new location. The devout families who support the school and wish for its success, also shy away from the secularism of suburban life. Since they are well-enough established in pleasant homes near their synagogues, they do not need to move to West Parricus to better themselves. Even if they continue to give financial support, distance would probably greatly reduce their important personal support of school activities. The addition of still another hour to an already long school day may prove a deterrent to the South City families who send their children to school in the Northside. (Their school day is now from 7.30 a.m. to 4 p.m. for the grade school and until 6 p.m. for the junior high.) However, it is doubtful if the lower social group would send their children to West Parricus, both because of the greater distance and of the increased fees (an inevitable by-product of the new building). Therefore, both the secularism of American culture and many practical problems will be pressing heavily upon this small Orthodox Jewish School, and the community which supports it, when it moves into its new suburban environment. The school finally opened in the new location in September 1964, but sufficient time has not elapsed to assess its success. The purchase of the land was made in 1963.

Summary

Although several years had elapsed between the time that the data for this study and the study by Kramer and Leventman were collected, the time lapse was short enough to warrant the assumption that the Jewish community was generally the same and, therefore, the data are generally comparable. The universe of the study by Kramer and Leventman was second and third generation Jewish Americans who belonged either to the West Parricus Country Club or to the Silverman Lodge in the Northside. Since they selected for their sample men who were interested in joining a club, their data cannot be said to apply equally to the whole Jewish community of North City. In contrast to their sample, the universe of this study was all persons who supported

the Torah Academy, regardless of the length of their stay in the U.S. or their social affiliations. There is no overlap between the two samples because none of Kramer and Leventman's respondents sent their children to Torah Academy. The data from the two studies therefore describe different parts of the North City Jewish community.

Among the lodge members interviewed by Kramer and Leventman, 28 per cent were Orthodox, yet none of them sent their children to the Jewish parochial school in the Northside. Among these Orthodox Jewish persons, about 18 per cent observed kashrut laws and none of them attended synagogue daily. In contrast, the supporters of the Torah Academy were 97 per cent Orthodox, about 30 per cent observed kashrut laws, and about 25 per cent attended synagogue daily. Therefore, it appears that the strictness of religious observances is one (rather obvious) factor which helps to determine whether a man sends his children to the Jewish parochial school and whether he decides to join a club which is not connected with the synagogue. Members of the school community probably did not belong to a lodge, either because they were strict religious observers and centred their lives around a synagogue, were too poor to join, or lived in other parts of North City or in South City, which would make attendance at lodge meetings in the Northside or West Parricus inconvenient.

The economic characteristics of the supporters of the Torah Academy also differ from those of the lodge members interviewed by Kramer and Leventman. Whereas 4 per cent of the lodge members belonged to the professions or were in managerial positions, 8 per cent of the supporters of the school are in this group. (The large number of rabbis who send their children to the Academy accounts for the relatively large number in the school community.) Another noticeable difference between the two groups is the number of self-employed persons, of whom there are 68 per cent among the lodge members, but 40 per cent among the supporters of the Academy. The presence of many first generation Americans who are employed as labourers, or have no permanent jobs, probably accounts for the difference. The same factor also probably accounts for the presence of fewer men engaged in trade (30 per cent of the school supporters compared to 60 per cent of the lodge members), and the smaller number in the scrap business (60 per cent of the lodge members compared to 5 per cent of the school supporters).

There is a larger number of first generation Americans in the school sample; few of these men have had time to establish their own businesses. Among those who have done so, scrap companies and tailor shops are most common, but school supporters also own their own grocery, hardware, and petroleum businesses. Apart from reflecting the generation distribution of the two samples, these economic differences also probably indicate the tendency of the established businessmen to join a club which can improve their business contacts; it is likely that these men

would prefer to send their children to a public school that will prepare them adequately for a business career.

One of the major observations of the Kramer and Leventman study was that the longer the Jews lived in the U.S., the more they were influenced by American culture; they tended to become more like American suburbanites than to remain Jews who have long been confined to a Ghetto. They found that people flee from the Ghetto of the Northside to the suburbs as soon as possible, and that their religious practices become modified in the process. On the basis of the Kramer and Leventman study one might expect the supporters of a Jewish parochial school to be first generation Americans, which in fact 46 per cent of them were. However, one would not anticipate finding that 54 per cent of the supporters were second and third generation Americans, since the Kramer and Leventman study indicated that these groups had become considerably lax in their religious practices. Among the school supporters, 8 per cent were third generation families; all these families were devout and strict observers of their faith. Their religiousness probably accounts for their not having been lured from the Northside by the glitter of the suburbs. The welfare of the Jewish community and a good Jewish education are very important to them, and they all have had sufficient economic success to become comfortably established in some of the more desirable sections of the Northside and South City. As was previously mentioned, this small group of families and the rabbis constitute the core of the school community. Not only would their numerous religious activities (centred around the synagogue) preclude their membership in the lodge, but also the large amount of time spent in working for the Academy and the Jewish community would leave them little leisure for such an organization.

The second generation families in the school community seem to be divided into two groups. One group have characteristics much like those of the third generation families, and seem relatively satisfied with their location in the Northside and with the education their children receive at the Academy. However, the larger segment of the second generation families are similar to those in the Kramer and Leventman study. They measure their success and Torah Academy education by the standards of the whole North City community; they are keenly interested in new and good facilities for the school and in extra-curricular activities. Some are hesitant about leaving their children in the Academy for fear that its English education will put the children at a disadvantage when they finally enter the public schools. Fewer of them than the other group of second generation families observe kashrut laws strictly or attend synagogue regularly. Therefore, they share many similarities with the second generation lodge members, even though they are not themselves lodge members.

Few of the families in the school community speak about wanting to

move to West Parricus, although some might be anticipating a move in the future without saying anything about it at the present. Both the poorest and the most economically secure families live in the Northside, and those who live in other parts of North City and South City are comfortably settled. Therefore, among the school supporters who do not already live in West Parricus, either money or motivation to move is lacking. Although the school community is not oriented towards escaping from the Northside for cultural reasons, they have decided that a move was necessary in order to secure sufficient funds for the school's survival. Thus, a series of secular considerations is forcing the school to move away from the Northside where the Orthodox community has its greatest strength.

Although it should by now be clear that the Orthodox community is composed of Jewish families of different degrees of Orthodoxy and Americanization, it appears that either the trend of the Jewish community as a whole to become merged with the secularized American community, or the pervasiveness of American culture itself, is forcing the Orthodox group to become Americanized too. Regardless of the external pressures, however, there will probably always be some families who will continue their Orthodox practices, just as the devout second and third generation families and rabbis are now doing. Even though these devout persons may form cliques which are characteristic of American culture, and share in many of the economic benefits of the secularized society, they will probably remain in a close religious community. How long this particular core of devout families can remain at the centre of a community that supports an Orthodox Jewish parochial school is difficult to predict. The answer will depend largely upon how much economic success is experienced by the first and second generation families who now support the school, and the degree to which the Academy can meet the demands of the adults of the community to provide an adequate English, as well as Hebrew, education for their children.

The presence of this group of Orthodox Jews in the Northside of North City clearly shows that there are still Jews in North City who wish to perpetuate their traditional faith, and that the whole Jewish community is not being acculturated rapidly. Regardless of the many ways in which the small community is being influenced by American culture, its orientations are still predominantly religious, not secular. A severe test of the strength of its orientation will come now that Torah Academy has moved to the suburb of West Parricus. The next few years will determine whether the desire of a small Orthodox minority is sufficient to perpetuate the traditional faith of the Jewish community within the secularized atmosphere of the Gilded Ghetto.

NOTES

[1] Judith B. Kramer and Seymour Leventman, *Children of the Gilded Ghetto*, New Haven, 1961.

[2] The study is based on data collected in 1960–1962. I wish to express my thanks to James L. Gibbs, who encouraged me to prepare this study for publication.

[3] Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog, *Life is With People*, New York, 1962, p. 430.

[4] *The Torah Academy Souvenir Journal*, 11 December 1960, p. 5.

[5] A National Opinion Research Center Poll in 1945 reported that of all American Jews, 32 per cent never attended a synagogue, 9 per cent attended once a week and 24 per cent attended once a month. Cited in Marshall Sklare, *Conservative Judaism: An American Religious Movement*, Glencoe, Ill., 1955, p. 39.

ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JEWISH ARTISAN CLASS

Werner J. Cahnman

THE economic activities of the Jews in the post-exilic period are usually considered as having been primarily, and even exclusively, commercial in nature. Whether the Jews are seen as 'international bankers' of the type of the Rothschilds or as miserable pedlars in the image of the 'old clo'es Jews', whether they are described as a *Pariavolk* by Max Weber,[1] or as the epitome of a 'marginal trading people' by Howard Becker,[2] the near-unanimity in this respect of proverbial saying and fairytale, of political pamphlet and scholarly treatise, remains impressive. Jewish authors, perhaps because they have been preoccupied with ideological and political matters, have not challenged, or even scrutinized, this view seriously—so much so that, a great many valuable monographs notwithstanding, a comprehensive economic history of the Jews, written by a Jewish scholar, is still lacking. Professor Wischnitzer's *A History of Jewish Crafts and Guilds*,[3] therefore, fills a gap in our knowledge and affords a welcome opportunity to test the thesis of the essentially commercial character of Jewish economic activities.

The task is complicated by the fact that the aims of the historian and the sociologist, in approaching the same topic, are not the same. The historian, once he has chosen his subject matter, aims at telling a story that may range from the earliest to the latest manifestations of a phenomenon, without much consideration for related phenomena the recording of which is left for another story. The sociologist, on the other hand, is interested not so much in the story itself as in the categories which it contains. In addition, he is not concerned with phenomena, but with relations between phenomena. Where the historian records and interprets what he is recording, the sociologist compares the recorded data with other recorded data and attempts to arrive at a systematic view of their interrelationships. In the present case, Mark Wischnitzer tells the story of Jewish artisanship from its beginnings until the late eighteenth century and up to the threshold of the industrial era. Within the time covered, he has recorded the activities of Jewish artisans and the structure of their guilds in many lands. He has shed light on the question as to what position Jewish artisans have occupied in the Jewish community and in the larger society. He has followed up the struggles of the Jewish artisans against the dominant Christian guilds

and the struggles of the journeymen within the Jewish guild system. But it was not his intention to relate Jewish artisanship to the concept of the Jews as a 'marginal trading people' or to any other concept. Nevertheless, in presenting the data, he has made it possible to order them in such a way as to enable us to check previously held notions with newly ascertained facts and to confirm or modify them according to the findings.

What conclusions do the data permit? Historically speaking, we discern two periods in Wischnitzer's story. The earlier period covers the formation of Jewish artisanship and the establishment of craft guilds in ancient Palestine and extends from Palestine into the oriental and Mediterranean Diaspora. The later period fills the modern centuries and has its locale chiefly in northern and eastern Europe. In the earlier period, the ancestors of the Jewish people grew from a wandering tribe into a settled community in their own land, where they developed agricultural skills and the traditions of craftsmanship. These skills and traditions were carried over into the neighbouring Middle Eastern and Mediterranean territories to which the Jews of Palestine migrated. These territories may be called the countries of the first migratory settlement, or the first Diaspora. In them, the social structure of the Palestinian Jewish community was largely preserved. The transfer of craftsmanship was most immediate in regard to Babylonia into which country Nebuchadnezzar had transported especially those artisans who, he feared, might have recreated an independent armaments industry if they had stayed behind in Palestine. However, agriculture remained for a long time as important as artisanship among the descendants of the exiles.

This situation continued under Persian overlordship and came to an end only after the Moslem conquest of the Sassanian empire. In Christian lands, a similar situation lasted well up to the period in which the Roman Church established its hold on the society of the Mediterranean area. Concerning Mesopotamia, then the centre of the Diaspora, Wischnitzer reports that the Jews abandoned farming only from the end of the eighth century onward.[4] The reason was not, as Max Weber assumed, that agriculture was incompatible with the growing religious orthodoxy, but rather that agricultural pursuits by Jews were incompatible with feudal obligations. The land taxes imposed by the Caliphs were onerous and Jewish owners were more heavily taxed than others. In addition, political unrest and brigandage, the brunt of which was borne by the minority populations, made the countryside insecure and drove farmers into the cities. The Jewish artisan class in the urban centres increased therefore considerably, swelling the established groups of artisans with masses of newcomers. In Christian countries, ecclesiastical obligations and frequently outright bigotry exerted the same kind of pressure. Such was the case in early medieval Sicily and in Visigothic

Spain.[5] As a result, Jewish farmers either accepted baptism and stayed on the land or they remained Jews and migrated to the cities.

In the area of first settlement, the Jews were part and parcel of an indigenous population. Such was the heritage of the Roman and Sassanian empires and the consequence of the intermingling of populations in the rapidly growing urban centres. In this area, the Jewish artisan class continued to be an important segment of the total artisan class and, at the same time, a conspicuous element within the Jewish community. This was true in Mesopotamia and Egypt, in the Byzantine lands, in Italy, in Provence, in Spain, and in North Africa. Even in Salonica and other Turkish Jewish communities which grew into prominence after the expulsion from Spain, that is, in a period when Jews everywhere were footloose and humiliated, this *character indelibilis* of Mediterranean Jewry was maintained. Jews either had their own guilds or, among Moslem populations, were admitted into Moslem guilds.[6] In some places, as in Thebes in Greece, in Lucena in Spain, and in Salonica under the Turks, they held a virtual monopoly of guild membership.

Quite different was the situation as it evolved in the area of second settlement, or the second Diaspora. The Jews became estranged from handicrafts during the middle ages and in northern Europe, where they appeared as latecomers, outsiders, and strangers. There, Church ideology and the interests of the native middle classes worked hand in hand to exclude the Jews from the Christian guilds, to prevent the formation of their own guilds, and to relegate them to the position of petty traders and moneylenders. The image of the Jews as an economically restricted and socially depressed caste of hucksters and usurers is of northern and central European coinage. This image was not modified until much later, when a new Jewish artisan class arose in what may be called an area of third settlement in eastern Europe. This further development culminates in the modern Jewish Labour movement and in the Zionist colonization in Palestine.

The historical considerations are borne out by statistical analysis. To be sure, the scarce statistical data which the sources yield are merely illustrative in nature.[7] The important thing is whether a Jewish settlement constituted a small minority or a large minority within a total territorial society. By a small minority, we mean a community amounting to only a few per cent (occasionally less than one per cent) of the entire population of a country and rarely more than between ten and fifty families in any particular locality. Such was the proportion in the territories of northern and western Europe. The Jews of England, France, Germany, and northern Italy played a more or less important role in the economic life of their respective countries, but their numbers remained small. It will be observed that these are the countries where the Jews were excluded from the guilds and where the permission for them to establish a 'holy congregation' was predicated upon their being

relegated to purely commercial activities, especially in connexion with pawnbroking and the extension of consumption credit. In such countries, Jewish artisans were chiefly confined to crafts of a ritual nature, such as bookbinding and illuminating, printing, *tallith* (prayer scarf) weaving, barbering, butchering, and the like. They catered to a predominantly, even exclusively, Jewish clientele and consequently there were very few of them. Only where larger Jewish communities existed do we find a Jewish artisan class of considerable size and diversity working for a wider market. This was the case in many oriental and Mediterranean communities, from Babylonia to Spain and from Yemen to Salonica, and likewise in eastern Europe from the fifteenth century onward. Especially where economic conditions deteriorated within the Jewish group while at the same time its numbers were swelling, did a large Jewish artisan class come into existence. In other words, the size of a Jewish artisan class stands in direct proportion to the size of a Jewish community, but in inverse proportion to its prosperity.

A sociology of the Jewish artisan class would have to consider the position of the Jewish artisan within the Jewish community as well as the role which he plays within the general community. Contrary to Max Weber's assumption about the preference of rabbinical Judaism for the money trade, talmudic literature, as quoted by Wischnitzer, abounds in admonitions to learn a craft and in the praise of craftsmanship. Since scholarship was considered a sacred service rather than a profession, many of the sages of Palestine and Babylonia were humble craftsmen who lived by the work of their hands and sat in the houses of study after their work was done. Their learned piety was appreciated, but this does not mean that craftsmen as such enjoyed high prestige. More often than not, the opposite was the case. Apart from crafts that were capable of producing for wider markets (such as the brewing of date wine and goldsmithing in Babylonia), and apart from learned crafts that attained professional status (such as cartography, pharmacy, and medicine in medieval Spain), manual labour and artisanship retained the marks of low status.

The reasons are not far to seek. In Babylonia, as in other countries of the Near and Middle East, the number of craftsmen increased through the migration into the cities of dispossessed villagers, causing a surplus of hands seeking employment. At other times and places, the influx was caused by restriction in commercial activities and by outright expulsion from neighbouring localities or distant countries. Whenever the influx was of considerable magnitude, as in Salonica in the sixteenth century, the moneyed aristocrats of the Jewish communities had to set up employment opportunities for their poorer brethren or to provide relief. These social problems are reflected in rabbinic writing. Juridical opinions and decisions form an impressive body of social legislation in favour of the working man. To be sure, the

craftsman, or labourer, had to render an honest day's work, repair damages he caused, provide for a substitute in case of absence from work, and so forth, but it is a distinguishing feature of Jewish legislation, as compared with similar legislation elsewhere, that the labourer's interests were no less protected than those of his employer. For instance, the working man's right to insist upon immediate payment, which is established in the *Mishnah*,[8] is unique. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that some of the privileges of a religious nature accorded to working men, such as the permission to shorten the prayer of grace after meals in order to save time or the permission to work until noon on the day before Passover, are negative privileges, denoting a lowered status. Wealthy men, having more leisure to learn, could accumulate more *mizwoth* (meritorious deeds). In this regard, Max Weber is vindicated. However, whether the merchants and financiers availed themselves of the opportunity for pious learning which their affluence afforded them, is another question. In times of stress, especially when confronted with the threat of confiscation of their earthly goods, the rich were prone to desert their faith in order to preserve their status. Salomon Alami, a Spanish scholar who witnessed the pogroms of 1391, blamed the rich for 'the ruin of their people' while he expressed high regard for the steadfastness of the artisans.[9]

The antagonism between the upper and the lower classes, a continuing theme in Jewish history, has never been adequately described. A history of Jewish artisanship, while not primarily centred on that theme, affords an opportunity to discern the internal class struggle at many points. As a rule, the Jewish communities in the Diaspora were dominated by commercial interests. But the heritage of nomadic equality in ancient times and the fervent message of social justice propounded by the prophets were elaborated by the sages of pharisaic and talmudic Judaism to such a degree that the welfare of the labouring man was sufficiently protected. Accordingly, Babylonian Jewry in the period of the great academies achieved a considerable measure of social equilibrium; the task of formulating the rules of Jewish living after the loss of political independence overshadowed everything else. But the more the Jews migrated westward and northward from the Palestinian and Babylonian centres, and the more they became thereby exposed to peripheral pressures, the more firmly established became the predominance of the men of means. We know of Jewish communities which were preponderantly communities of artisans, but their status was either depressed, as in Yemen, or they failed to stand up to the vicissitudes of fortune, as in Greece and Sicily. The Jewries of southern Italy and Sicily are a case in point.[10] In the reign of Emperor Frederick II of Suebia, the silk-weavers and dyers of these territories were fashioned into a state monopoly, but when that organizational device crumbled, the artisans were left without effective leadership. At the

time of the Spanish expulsions, the Jews of Sicily, by then almost exclusively a community of craftsmen, were too impoverished to maintain intellectual activities and a vigorous community life.

The prime examples of heightened class antagonism are found in medieval Spain and in eastern Europe, especially in the old Kingdom of Poland. Before the emancipation movement of the nineteenth century, Spain had been the country in which individual Jews climbed highest on the ladder of socio-economic success. The court and the Jews were in firm alliance and the Jewish courtiers participated in the splendour of their noble connexions. Spanish Jewry comprised also a broad middle class of traders, artisans, and their apprentices who, as all of Spain, depended on the King and enjoyed patronage, protection, and autonomous status; but in the Jewish community councils, or *aljamas*, the influence of wealthy financiers and entrepreneurs predominated. This changed to some degree after the pogroms and anti-semitic campaigns of 1391 and 1412–14. So many frightened men of means deserted the Jewish faith that the *aljamas* lost the majority of their administrative and juridical officers, and artisans had to replace them. However, as documentary evidence from the city of Saragossa shows, the baptized ex-Jewish gentlemen retained sufficient contact with Jewish affairs to sneer at the ignorant 'tailors and strapmakers' and to remain at the disposal of the King when he called upon them to restore a competent conduct of affairs.[11] The contrary testimony of Salomon Alami was mentioned above.

The story of class antagonism within the Jewish community can be illustrated by examples from many lands. In Italy, in the seventeenth century, two different sorts of 'Jewry-Law' existed, one for the privileged loan bankers and one for the *università degli ebrei*, a miserable proletariat of pedlars, second-hand dealers, wool-carders, and rag-pickers.[12] In the Bohemian registrations of the eighteenth century, artisans ('wretched tailors') figured at the very bottom of the list following merchants, lessees, and traders.[13] But it is only in Poland, likewise in the eighteenth century, that we find instances of actual class struggle. Contrary to the situation in Spain, the Jewish craft guilds in eastern Europe were not autonomous, but depended on the elders of the Jewish communities for confirmation. Wischnitzer reports controversies and violent clashes between the Kahals (*Kehillot*), the official Jewish communities, and the Jewish craft guilds.[14] The Kahals of Minsk, Vitebsk, and other cities, which were dominated by businessmen, were accused by the representatives of the artisans of arbitrary taxation and other abusive practices, even of floggings and capricious arrests. The offices of the Kahals were physically attacked by the artisans, but the wealthy householders retained the reins of power. Even more depressed than the status of the masters was that of the journeymen, who grew increasingly restless as they failed to gain representation

even within the Jewish guilds. Wischnitzer's story grows dramatic at this point, which is a turning point in Jewish history. We are here witnessing the first stirrings of the Jewish labour movement. Jewish villagers fleeing before Ukrainian pogromists and Jewish traders succumbing to competition swelled the ranks of the artisan class to such an extent that it grew into a proletariat. Subsequently, in the socialist and Zionist movements of the nineteenth century, the impoverished masses, under secular-intellectual leadership, fashioned for themselves new ideologies.

In terms of Jewish-Gentile relations, a number of statements can be made. Wherever a sizable Jewish artisan class existed, the typical antisemitic image of the Jew as an idle exploiter and a money-monster could not arise. To be sure, this did not prevent discrimination, persecution and expulsions, but it forestalled their congealment into a devil-ideology of Jewish existence. This devil-ideology grew into predominance in Germanic lands where it corresponded to the actual anomaly of Jewish status. In this regard, then, the Jewish artisan appears as the antagonist of the Jewish moneylender. In a structural view, however, the existence of a Jewish artisan class is not contradictory to the theory which characterizes the Jews as a 'marginal trading people'. The Jewish artisan, as a rule, is not a merchant or trader, but he shares in the intermediacy of the trader's social position and role.

In order to substantiate this thesis, we shall have to review the list of Jewish crafts that can be drawn from Wischnitzer's text. One group of crafts and craftsmen has to be excluded, however, namely those that serve exclusively the internal needs of a Jewish community. Among these are butchers, bakers, winemakers, soapmakers, barbers, embroiderers, *tallith* and *tzizit* weavers, parchment-makers, scribes, bookbinders, printers, and similar trades. Occasionally, engravers and gold- and silversmiths may be added to that list. All these trades have one thing in common, namely, that they are more or less ritualistic in nature; they are necessary for the conduct of a 'holy congregation'. Consequently, these are the trades which were represented even in countries where powerful Christian guilds excluded Jews from membership. Some of the trades mentioned were carried on in Jewish homes as a sideline, some, like the scribe's or the *shochet*'s (ritual slaughterer's) trade, were regarded as holy vocations. None of them is part of the power structure of a Jewish community, none is in any but the most superficial communication with the outside world. However, the borderline is hard to draw, as in the case of the butchers who, at any rate, have to dispose of the ritually unclean hind-parts of animals and who have usually enjoyed a reputation for quality meats among the Gentiles.

Turning to the crafts that work for a wider market, one encounters those that are connected with the position of the Jews in the fields of monetary and cultural exchange. To the monetary group belong minters, jewellers, gold- and silversmiths, and medal engravers; to the

cultural group belong bookbinders, illuminators, papermakers, printers, cartographers, designers of nautical instruments, pharmacists, and medical practitioners. These are the privileged crafts that come closest to banking and the international trade in metals and precious stones on the one hand and to artistic and professional activities on the other. The Jews at all times dealt in gold and precious stones, because of the easy transferability of this kind of capital investment. Throughout the Mediterranean region and the countries of the Near East, they traded in these and related commodities. This brought them in contact with the courts, the nobility, and even the monasteries, either as providers of luxury articles and utensils or as creditors who took such articles in pawn. The artisans who worked on the material of precious stones and metals were closely connected with that trade. They brought techniques from afar, worked to specification and refashioned according to local taste. Spanish Jews excelled in this field and some oriental Jewish communities, such as those of Libya and Yemen, specialized in it. Even in Central Europe, otherwise an area of stunted Jewish craftsmanship, the Court-Jews of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries supplied Jewish jewellers and engravers who then worked for their high-born clients. The connexion of Jewish minters with monetary activities is obvious.

The Jews were intermediaries in the cultural field as well as in the world of finance. The foremost example is provided by the Jews of Spain who, along with the Moors, brought to Christian Spain the scientific knowledge of the Greeks in Arabic garb and many of the techniques of the older civilization of the East. The Jews had a tradition of learning and utilized it for making a living in fields where scholarship and manual skill had to be combined. Linguistic and mathematical knowledge was utilized in calligraphy, cartography, the making of astronomical and nautical instruments, and linguistic and naturalistic knowledge in such highly professional skills as pharmacy and medicine. The Cresques family in Majorca gained fame as mapmakers. The Jewish printing enterprises which were established in Italy, Bohemia, and the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries served, along with internal Jewish purposes, the needs of Christian Hebraists and thus contributed to the spread of intercultural contacts. Similarly, Jewish musicians in eastern Europe entertained both at Jewish weddings and at parties of the Bohemian and Polish nobility.

Mentioning the symbiosis of Jews and nobles does not exhaust the topic of privileged Jewish crafts. The insecurity of the social position of the Jews, which made them dependent on the protection of Moslem and Christian rulers, lent itself to fiscal exploitation and the promotion of monopolistic industries. The fact that the Jews of southern Italy and Sicily held an important position in the various branches of the silk industry, made the Norman and Suebian rulers of these regions intent

on using their skills as a source of income. Roger II of Sicily, during his raids on Byzantium, went so far as to carry away as captives Jewish silkworkers of Thebes and other Greek cities in order to employ them in his royal factory in Palermo.[15] As the industry took root, the Hohenstaufen Emperor Frederick II transformed it into a state monopoly, with Jews as administrators, buyers, supervisors, and workers. The profit flowed into the Emperor's treasury. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the armies of the Turkish Sultans were clad in uniforms produced by the Jewish woollen manufacturers in Salonica.[16] At the same time, Jewish armourers provided the Turkish army with weapons.[17] Similarly, in early capitalistic Europe, Jewish capital and skill were used in the establishment of state monopolies and new industries. The capital employed was venture capital in enterprises in which the guild merchants were disinclined to invest, such as the Austrian tobacco monopoly. By the same token, Jewish manual skill found an outlet in these industries, which were not organized in guilds. This is true with regard to diamond cutting and tobacco dressing in Holland and such fine arts as seal engraving, gold and silver embroidery, and the like in eighteenth-century Prussia. In the nineteenth century, such new industries as the manufacture of cotton fabrics, ready-made garments and tobacco products employed considerable numbers of Jewish workers in Russia.

Numerically more important than the privileged crafts, and sociologically as significant, are the depressed crafts. Since Jewish economic activities were frequently interstitial in nature, Jewish craftsmen found themselves often relegated to despised, dirty, and unhealthy work, repair work, and finishing work. In numerous instances, various of these characteristics were combined. For example, the tanning and dyeing trades formed a Jewish monopoly in many Mediterranean countries because the Gentile population did not care for the dirty work. In Greek cities, tanners were isolated and shunned. In Morocco, where the degradation of the Jews reached its nadir, Jews were occupied as scavengers and as cleaners of latrines, and they were charged with disposing of the corpses of executed criminals.[18] Tailoring, which has remained a Jewish occupation through the centuries, is likely to be unhealthy work, carried on in cramped quarters and associated with cramped postures. A typical Jewish occupation in the Italian ghettos was the sewing and mending of old clothes and the remaking of used mattresses, activities which led to diseases of the eye and skin, to headaches, coughs, and consumption.[19] Also detrimental to health were the glassblowers' craft, which was plied in the countries of the Near East, and the work of housepainters and furriers, in which many Jews in eastern Europe were employed.

Repair work means employment in auxiliary and subservient occupations. Italy was not the only country in which Jewish craftsmen were

thus employed. Jewish men in Yemen used to spend the week in specified Arab villages where they tinkered and hammered and fused and mended until they returned to their homes and families on Friday. This is reminiscent of the Jewish pedlar's role among the peasants in Central Europe. Tradesmen or craftsmen—the functions are identical. But the analogy goes even further. Wischnitzer reports that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Jewish pawnbrokers and second-hand dealers in Bohemia began to patch up old shoes, bags, trousers, furs, and other damaged articles which they had acquired and to sell them at reduced prices to their clientele.[20] The process seems to be best documented for Prague, but it assumed historical importance in the Kingdom of Poland. The second-hand trade and the repair business were the soil out of which the emerging Jewish artisan class in Poland drew a large part of its sustenance.

Generally, it must not be thought that the occupation of a Jewish craftsman and the historical function of the Jew as a creditor are contradictory. True, Jewish artisans were frequently engaged in manual occupations which did not entail selling of the product and delayed payment for services rendered. The Jewish silk weavers, dyers, potters, leather and metal workers in the Mediterranean countries and, in later centuries, the woollen and clothing workers, the armourers, porters, and longshoremen of Salonica are examples. But the Jewish working men were employed exclusively by Jewish employers and these, in turn, stayed in contact with the non-Jewish community to whom the products of their industries were sold. The same applies to the Jewish working classes in eastern Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and to the New York garment industry. We do not know a historical example of a Jewish working class being employed by non-Jewish employers. Hence, the image of the Jewish working man remained remote to the Gentiles.

However, the above cited examples notwithstanding, Jewish artisans in the majority of instances were individual entrepreneurs, selling their products in their own booths, stalls and shops, and extending credit to their customers. Indeed, in the pawnbroking business, which had become the mainstay of Jewish economic activities in many parts of central and eastern Europe by the close of the Middle Ages, credit operations were of the essence, and the repair crafts that grew out of them were secondary in nature until, by the end of the eighteenth century, the roles appeared reversed. By then, the Jewish artisan class, soon to emerge into a modern working class, had become a factor in its own right. However, a particularly potent example for what we have in mind is provided by one of the most typically Jewish crafts in eastern Europe, namely, distillery and inn-keeping. Polish noblemen leased to Jews the right to distil brandy on their estates and the liquor was then sold to the estate's peasants on credit. Here, the craftsman and the

creditor are fused in one and the same image and the intermediate and interstitial nature of this kind of Jewish craftsmanship is clearly evident.[21]

A last point remains to be clarified. We have seen that Jewish crafts were widespread and their exercise uncontested in the area of first settlement, in the Near East and in the countries around the Mediterranean, and that they were stunted in the area of second settlement, in northern and western Europe. How, then, did the new growth of Jewish artisanship in the area of the third settlement, in eastern Europe, come about? If powerful Christian guilds succeeded in excluding Jewish artisans from membership and consequently from the exercise of their crafts in England, France, Germany, and northern Italy, and if they further succeeded in stifling or utterly cutting down the growth of Jewish guilds, as in Spain, how is it that effective Jewish guilds and a Jewish artisan class were capable of a new and independent development in eastern Europe? The answer is that Poland, Lithuania, and large parts of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia had no native middle classes and that the Jews were called upon to fill a void in the social structure of these countries.

The rulers of Poland, Lithuania, and Turkey welcomed Jewish immigrants to promote trade and the useful crafts and to provide much-needed revenue. The Jews were all the more welcome because there were competitors on the scene. The Turks, having swallowed Byzantium, had become dependent in commerce and in the crafts as well as in administration on the ever-present but unreliable Greeks; they used their new Jewish subjects as a politically innocuous counterpoise. The situation in Poland and Lithuania was not dissimilar. The Jews settled in the cities and towns of these countries alongside German burghers who were considered indispensable for purposes of economic development, but at the same time feared as political antagonists. Hence, the Sultans and the Grand Dukes and the Kings fostered Jewish economic activities and protected the Jewish guilds. In the Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian parts of Poland, again, Jewish artisans along with Jewish traders were useful as revenue producers and economic auxiliaries to the crown and the nobles. When the power of the crown declined and the by then Polonized Christian urban middle classes asserted themselves, the nobles continued to encourage Jewish artisans to settle in the localities (streets, districts, private towns) which remained under their control. These localities were exempt from the jurisdiction of the municipal councils.[22] The Jews and their guilds profited from a doubly and triply interstitial position. This was the reverse side of the coin whose obverse was political powerlessness and exposure to violence.

Additional circumstances furthered the growth of a Jewish artisan class and their guilds. The growing numbers of the Jewish population in Poland and Lithuania constituted an internal market of

considerable magnitude. In this respect, conditions had never been so favourable for Jewish artisanship since the days of the Sassanian empire. The Jewish community in Poland and Lithuania grew away from the caste-like aspect of Jewish existence and assumed the character of a society. By and large, Jewish customers sustained many Jewish artisans. On this basis, some of them, like the lace-makers of Cracow and the furriers of Lwow along with Jewish carpenters, glaziers, and house-painters, gained clientele among the Polish nobility.[23] But their decisive advantage was that Jewish artisans could undersell the guild-monopolists and thus serve a mass clientele of Christians as well as Jews. The Jews were forced into this revolutionary avenue by a variety of circumstances. Fiscal discriminations in the field of commercial activities and the general impoverishment of the Jewish community in the wake of the Ukrainian pogroms in the seventeenth century drove the Jewish masses into manual occupations, sometimes in connexion with petty trade. These marginal craftsmen had to earn a living by hook or by crook. Having learned their craft by trial and error, frequently with the assistance of runaway Christian journeymen, their work was likely to be of a shoddy quality and had to be sold at a reduced price. Wherever a craft grew out of the pawnbroking business and the trade in used goods, the refurbishing of worn and damaged merchandise added another incentive in favour of doing business by price-cutting. That the Jew at any rate was expected to grant credit added the final touch to the mechanism which had been set in motion. The modern economic role of the Jews in catering to the needs of a growing mass market is thus adumbrated in the history of the Jewish artisan class in eastern Europe.

To summarize, the history of Jewish artisanship and craft guilds disposes of the prejudicial image of Jewish economic activities as chiefly those of hucksters and usurers—with an upper layer of bankers—which had grown out of the earlier fixation of social historians on the history of the Jews in central Europe. If the history of the Jews in the Mediterranean countries, on the one hand, and in eastern Europe, on the other, is taken into proper consideration, the importance of Jewish artisanship, besides commercial activities, becomes obvious. Lack of documentary evidence prevented Wischnitzer from consideration of the history of Jewish artisanship in the *Maghreb* (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), in Libya, and in Yemen, and his untimely death prevented him from carrying the story of eastern Europe farther into the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the picture that emerges is one of a remarkably wide spread of manual skills and craft activities. The textile and clothing crafts, especially tailoring, but also leather work, and the food and beverage trades predominate, but hardly any activity of the human hand is unrepresented. There is no such thing as a 'racial' disinclination of the Jews to engage in manual labour. However, the general characterization of Jewish economic activities and of

their role in the larger society as intermediate and interstitial is not invalidated by that statement. Invariably, the Jews form a middle layer in the societies in which they live, between the aristocracy and the labouring classes, and Jewish artisans are a part of that middle layer. There is one proviso, however: when the middle layer is numerically small, the Jewish artisan class is also small. When the middle layer, that is, the Jewish population, grows in numbers, the Jewish artisan class tends to grow into a broad working class. In this sense, the existence of a large Jewish artisan class appears as the prerequisite for the emergence of Jewish peoplehood and national consciousness.

NOTES

[1] Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie*, Tuebingen, 1923; Vol. I, p. 181; Vol. II, pp. 11–13; Vol. III, pp. 2, 351–79, 392, 434; *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons, London, 1930, p. 115; *The Religion of India*, trans. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale, Glencoe, Ill, 1958, pp. 11–13; *Ancient Judaism*, trans. and ed. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale, Glencoe, Ill, 1952, pp. 3, 336–43, 375, 417; *Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft*, Tuebingen, 1922, pp. 282–3; *The Sociology of Religion*, trans. Ephraim Fischoff, Boston, 1963, pp. 108–10; *Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Munich and Leipzig, 1923, pp. 175–6, 305–7; *General Economic History*, trans. Frank H. Knight, New York, 1961, pp. 151–2, 362–5.

[2] Howard Becker, *Through Values to Social Interpretation*, Durham, N.C., 1950, pp. 109–13.

[3] Mark Wischnitzer, *A History of Jewish Crafts and Guilds*, Jonathan David for Yeshiva University, sponsored by The Conference on Jewish Social Studies, New York, 1965. An abridged version of the present paper will be published as an introductory chapter to Wischnitzer's book. The present paper is published by kind permission of Jonathan David Publishers Inc.

[4] Wischnitzer, op. cit., chap. V; cf. J. Mann, 'The Responsa of the Babylonian Geonim as a Source of Jewish History', *Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S., X, 1919–1920, pp. 310 ff.

[5] Georg Caro, *Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Juden in Mittelalter und der Neuzeit*, Bd. 1: *Das Fruehe und das hohe Mittelalter*, Frankfurt a. M., 1924, p. 35.

[6] The non-Moslem members of the Moslem guilds were in an anomalous position because of the religious character of the guilds, but they were not excluded from membership; apparently, the intention was to facilitate the peaceful conversion of the artisan class to Islam. Cf. Hamilton A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West; a study of the impact of western civilization on Moslem culture in the Near East*, Part I, London and New York, 1957, p. 294.

[7] Cf., for instance, the census of the population of Rome (1526) and the census of 1,000 Jewish men, women, and children in Prague (1546); Wischnitzer, chaps. XIV and XV.

[8] *Baba Meziah*, IX. 12; for other pertinent passages, cf. Wischnitzer, op. cit., chap. III.

[9] Salomon Alami, *Iggeret Mussar* ('Letter of Moral Instruction'), quoted by Wischnitzer, op. cit., chap. XII.

[10] Julius Guttman, 'Die wirtschaftliche und soziale Bedeutung der Juden in Mittelalter', *Monatsschrift zur Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 51 Jahrg. (Neue Folge: 15 Jahrg.), 1907, pp. 288–289; and Cecil Roth, *The History of the Jews of Italy*, Philadelphia, 1946, pp. 228–61.

[11] Yizhak F. Baer, ed., *Die Juden im Christlichen Spanien, Urkunden und Regesten*, Part I: *Aragonien und Navarra*, Berlin, 1929–36, p. 318; cf. Wischnitzer, chap. XII.

[12] Cecil Roth, op. cit., p. 340 et passim.

[13] Koestenherg, 'Mifkad 1724', *Zion*, 1944, p. 23, and 'Toledot ha Kalkalah shel Yehudei Behm Shemechuz i Prag Bamea ha 17 weha 18', *Zion*, 1947, n. 64, quoted by Wischnitzer, chap. XVI: 'Expansion of Jewish Artisanship in Bohemia and Moravia, 1650–1780.'

[14] Wischnitzer, chap. XXIII: 'Relationship between Jewish Guilds and Jewish Community Councils in Poland–Lithuania, 1600–1800.'

[15] Joshua Starr, *The Jews in the Byzantine Empire, 641–1204*, Verlag der Bysantinisch Neugriechischen Jahrbuecher, Athens, 1939, p. 223.

[16] Isaac Samuel Emmanuel, *Histoire des Israélites de Salonique; histoire sociale, économique et littéraire de la ville mère en Israel*, Vol. I, Thomon, 1936, p. 111; Evliya Efendi, *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia and Africa*, trans. Joseph Ritter von Hammer-Purgstall, London, 1834, Vol. II, p. 166.

[17] Nicolas de Nicolay, *Les navigations, pérégrinations et voyages, faits en la Turquie*, Antwerp, 1577, p. 245; cf. Wischnitzer, chap. XIII: 'Jewish crafts in the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1800.'

[18] José Benesch, *Essai d'explication d'un ellch*, Paris, 1940.

[19] Cecil Roth, op. cit., pp. 371–2, 374.

[20] Wischnitzer, chap. XV: 'Jewish Artisans in Bohemia and Moravia from the early Middle Ages to the end of the Thirty Years War.'

[21] In Islamic countries, the fact that the Jews had a monopoly on liquor making carried a particular meaning. For while Moslem law forbids the consumption of alcoholic beverages, a number of individual Moslems, some of them high-placed, could not do without wine and spirits which they obtained only from Jews. Alcoholic beverages thus became a means of bargaining and of blackmail, almost the functional equivalent of an insurance policy. Cf. Carleton Coon, *Measuring Ethiopia and Flight into Arabia*, Boston, 1935, p. 235.

[22] Wischnitzer, chap. XIX: 'Jewish Artisans in Poland and Lithuania, 1350–1650.'

[23] Wischnitzer, ibid.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND JEWISH FERTILITY*

Calvin Goldscheider

INTRODUCTION

CONTEMPORARY sociologists and demographers have reached two interrelated conclusions concerning the changing relationship of socio-economic status to the fertility patterns of American couples. First, socio-economic groupings have become more uniform in their fertility behaviour and class-fertility differences are in the process of further contraction. Second, as a result of this convergence and contraction there has been a partial reversal of the traditional inverse relationship of education, occupation, and income to fertility.[1] These changes, observed since the Second World War, have been explained by two opposite trends: one, the rise in the fertility of groups with higher status and the changing desires of these groups for larger families; and two, the decline in fertility of groups of lower status with their increasingly extensive and successful use of contraception.[2] Some demographers have predicted the disappearance of the social class differential in fertility patterns of developed countries[3] while others have suggested that future social class differences may be directly rather than inversely related to fertility.[4]

Furthermore, it has been speculated that part of the contraction of social class differences in fertility may be due to different relationships between socio-economic status and fertility for Protestants and Catholics, and the widening religious differences in fertility.[5] Results of the Princeton fertility study show that, regardless of the measure of socio-economic status, fertility was inversely associated with socio-economic status of Protestants and directly related to the socio-economic status of Catholics.[6] Thus, the authors of the Princeton fertility study suggest that the traditional inverse relationship between fertility and socio-economic status in the United States may be primarily an association among the Protestant population.[7] Similar findings are reflected in the Growth of American Families study (GAF) of 1955 and 1960. Data from the 1955 GAF national survey indicated that fertility expectations—minimum, most likely, and maximum—were lower for college than

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grade school educated Protestants, while for the Catholic population, fertility expectations were higher for college educated than for those who completed high school, attended but did not complete high school, and who only attended grade school.[8] Limited published data from the 1960 GAF study confirm these findings for fertility expectations. Although there was a definite inverse relationship of wife's education and family size expectations for the Protestant group, college educated Catholic women expected significantly larger families than Catholic women who attended high school.[9]

Despite the observation, common to every recent study of fertility, that Jewish fertility is unique, little if any depth information is available. None of the available fertility studies has had a sufficient number of Jewish couples in its sample for detailed or extensive analysis. The existing data are not consistent on the relationship between measures of socio-economic status and Jewish fertility. Some limited studies have found no relationship between occupation and Jewish fertility.[10] Nevertheless, Engelman's study in 1938 of the Jewish community of Buffalo, New York, clearly showed an inverse relationship between occupation and Jewish fertility—the average completed family size of professional Jews was 2·9 in contrast to the family size of business men 3·2, artisans 3·5, and pedlars 3·7.[11] Based on a small number of Jewish couples, the Princeton fertility study found little association of occupation and Jewish fertility, although professionals tended to desire slightly larger families than managers or salesmen.[12]

When socio-economic status is measured by education, similar inconsistent findings have been reported. Greenberg, in a limited survey of the fertility of the parents of Jewish college students, found an inverse relationship between education and Jewish fertility—college educated Jews had smaller families than those with only grammar school education.[13] The Princeton study reported no association between education and family size preferences for Protestants, but for Catholics and Jews there was a definite positive correlation. Moreover, despite the exercise of effective control in family planning, better educated Jews desired larger families.[14] In the re-interview stage of the Princeton fertility study, the authors reported a higher positive correlation between number of children desired and education of wife among Jews than among the other religious groupings.[15]

Whether there is a pattern of relationship between socio-economic status and Jewish fertility is an unsolved empirical question. Furthermore, trend data are not available to measure change. Most of the speculation seems to be that there is little or no socio-economic differential in Jewish fertility. Goldberg suggests that 'there is apparently no correlation between socio-economic status and the birth rate in the case of the Jewish group'.[16] Indirect evidence seems to suggest that there has been contraction of socio-economic differentials in Jewish

fertility. In the Princeton as well as the GAF study, religion was found to be a more significant differentiator in fertility than class. In the former study, class yielded significant differences *in all religious groups in the survey except the Jewish group.*[17] Furthermore, David Goldberg in his study of fertility in Detroit and in his reappraisal of the Indianapolis fertility study, found that when farm migrants are separated out of the 'urban category' socio-economic differences in completed family size were small and inconsistent, with no distinct inverse or direct pattern.[18] Since the proportion of Jews with farm backgrounds is very low, it follows that socio-economic differences in their fertility would be small. However, the recent Princeton study pointed out that rural background affects the relationship of socio-economic status in Protestant fertility but does not at all affect the Catholic population.[19]

From the above review, certain hypotheses can be deduced.

(1) There has been a convergence of differences in the fertility pattern of socio-economic groupings within the Jewish population. Thus, in examining generational changes we should expect the largest fertility differences among status groupings in the first generation and the smallest differences in the third generation.

(2) Shifts have occurred in the direction of relationship of socio-economic status to Jewish fertility.[20] We should expect that, for the older generations, socio-economic differentials would be inversely related to Jewish fertility. This follows the pattern observed in the work of Engelman and Greenberg. Furthermore, higher status groupings of the older generation were upwardly mobile, rejected the 'ghetto' way of life, and broke with the traditional culture of their contemporaries. This acculturation pattern, it is hypothesized, would lead to lower fertility. The lower status groupings of the earlier generations were less socially and economically mobile and were associated with Eastern European 'ghetto' culture. These factors would result in their higher fertility.

It is further hypothesized that this inverse relationship of socio-economic status to Jewish fertility will not characterize the younger generations. Following the suggestion of the Princeton fertility study, we may expect that younger Jewish couples in higher status positions will have higher fertility than those in lower status positions. This conforms to patterns of the socio-economic differential in the fertility of couples who rationally plan their families and efficiently use contraceptive methods. For example, the Indianapolis study found a negative association between socio-economic status and fertility for the total sample of Protestants but a positive association for couples who had planned their fertility successfully.[21] This finding was recently confirmed by the Princeton fertility study for Protestant couples, but among Catholics socio-economic status and fertility correlate positively in the

total sample as well as among successful planners.[22] Considering the rationality with which Jewish couples plan their families, we may hypothesize that lower status socio-economic groupings will have smaller families than higher status socio-economic groupings.

STUDY DESIGN

The data to be presented are based on a random sample of 1,603 Jewish households in the Providence (Rhode Island) metropolitan area. The sample represented 25 per cent of the total Jewish population in the area. Fertility information was collected as an integral part of the general survey.[23] The interviewing took place between May and July 1963, with a response rate of 91·3 per cent. A variety of evidence suggests that the sample data are representative and, with limitations, can be generalized to the general Jewish community in the United States.[24]

The fertility data collected include: (*a*) total number of children ever born; (*b*) age of women at marriage; (*c*) months between marriage and first and second child; and (*d*) months between first and second child.[25]

Three measures of socio-economic status were used: education of women; education and occupation of husbands.[26] Fertility surveys in the United States have shown that of the three, education of women is the best measure.[27] The measure of occupation utilized in the present study has an additional limitation not characteristic of education. The survey obtained information only on current occupation at the time of the interviewing. Since occupation is not constant throughout the life cycle, caution should be used in inferring that current occupation for the older generations accurately reflects the same occupation during the childbearing period. Thus, the *ex post facto* nature of current occupation for the older population should be interpreted with care.[28] Education, on the other hand, is generally stable during and after the childbearing period and does not have this limitation.

The data will be presented by four age-generational groupings. First generation was defined as women 65 years of age and older; second generation as women aged 45–64; older third generation as women between the ages 35–44; and women below 35 years of age were categorized as younger third generation. The use of age as an indicator of generation allows for a trend analysis and separates complete from incomplete families.[29]

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

First generation. The hypothesis stated that in the first generation we should expect Jews with more education and in higher status occupations to have the lowest fertility, and Jews with the least education and in lower status occupations to have higher fertility. Examination of the

fertility patterns of the first generation by the three socio-economic measures (Table I) reveals that the data confirm the hypothesis. Those who had at least completed high school[30] had significantly smaller

TABLE I. *Fertility by education of couple and by husband's occupation for the first generation*

	Number of children ever born			*Age of wife at first marriage*		*First birth interval (months)*		*Second birth interval (I)* (months)*		*Second birth interval (II)* (months)*	
	Mean	*Per cent Childless*	*Number*	*Mean*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*
Education of women:											
Completed high school and over	2·3	11·5	52	24·0	49	30·5	33	78·0	27	50·8	26
First to 11th grade	2·6	7·9	88	22·0	82	16·5	59	64·5	44	43·5	46
None	3·6	0·0	50	20·6	47	12·8	32	57·7	28	33·5	30
Education of husband:											
Completed high school and over	2·3	12·5	24	25·1	24	30·5	20	78·3	18	61·0	17
First to 11th grade	2·4	7·7	39	23·2	37	24·5	32	77·0	28	41·0	29
None	3·3	0·0	27	20·7	27	12·1	22	49·5	16	34·8	16
Occupation of husband:											
Professionals	2·1	10·0	10	25·7	11	25·0	9	63·0	7	54·0	7
Managers	2·8	4·4	45	22·3	43	31·3	36	72·0	31	39·0	31
Clerks and salesmen	2·5	15·0	20	23·7	20	20·0	15	71·0	11	38·0	11
Blue-collar	3·0	0·0	27	20·3	24	12·5	21	67·0	19	43·0	21

* For this analysis second birth interval (I) refers to months between marriage and the birth of the second child; second birth interval (II) refers to months between the birth of first and second child.

families than those with less education, and professionals had the smallest families of any occupational group. Wives and husbands with no education had the largest families—one child more than those who at least completed high school. Similarly, blue-collar workers had larger families than any white-collar group.[31] Concomitantly, women who at least completed high school and wives of men who at least completed high school had a higher proportion of childless families, married later (statistically significant at the 0·01 level), and spaced their first and second child at longer intervals than those with less education. Although regular patterns appear on all the fertility variables for the various educational levels, this is not the case for levels of occupation. However, blue-collar/white-collar differences in fertility are significant and pronounced. Wives of blue-collar workers married earlier and spaced their first child at shorter intervals than wives of white-collar workers. The small number of cases and the *ex post facto* nature of data

on current occupation suggest that more confidence can be placed on the pattern found when education and Jewish fertility are related. Thus, it is clear that the inverse relationship of fertility and socio-economic measures characteristic of the total population was found for first generation Jews.

Second generation. Although the inverse relationship of fertility and socio-economic measures was hypothesized for the first generation, it was hypothesized that Jewish couples of more recent generations would be characterized by a tendency towards a direct relationship of socio-economic measures to Jewish fertility. Data in Table II only partially substantiate this hypothesis. For the second generation, when the

TABLE II. *Fertility by education of couple and husband's occupation for the second generation*

	Number of children ever born			*Age of wife at first marriage*		*First birth interval (months)*		*Second birth interval (I)* (months)*		*Second birth interval (II)* (months)*	
	Mean	*Per cent Childless*	*Number*	*Mean*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*
Education of women:											
Graduate or professional school	1·9	3·4	29	25·2	28	26·0	26	67·5	18	37·0	18
Completed college	2·1	9·5	42	24·4	42	31·0	37	78·0	25	35·5	24
Some college	1·9	10·5	95	24·4	94	26·8	80	74·4	60	49·0	59
Completed H.S.	1·8	11·4	271	24·1	264	27·7	219	77·3	157	49·4	157
Ninth to 11th grade	1·9	14·3	56	23·2	55	25·3	42	74·3	31	43·5	32
Eighth grade and below	2·0	17·2	64	22·2	60	23·2	50	72·5	40	42·5	40
Education of husband:											
Graduate or professional school	2·0	8·7	69	24·2	68	31·4	62	79·5	48	47·0	47
Completed college	2·2	8·0	50	24·3	50	28·5	43	65·8	34	38·5	34
Some college	1·7	6·2	65	23·8	64	37·8	58	82·5	40	46·5	40
Completed H.S.	1·9	12·0	150	24·0	147	24·3	118	76·5	86	51·0	86
Ninth to 11th grade	1·8	14·5	69	24·6	68	30·0	53	71·5	34	39·5	34
Eighth grade and below	2·0	14·3	84	23·2	82	22·3	69	70·3	57	44·0	57
Occupation of husband:											
Professionals	2·0	9·3	75	24·2	74	29·5	67	83·5	48	47·0	48
Managers	2·0	9·5	232	23·7	231	26·3	99	72·5	148	42·5	145
Clerks and salesmen	1·8	17·0	106	23·8	105	28·2	82	85·0	61	53·5	60
Blue-collar	1·8	10·7	84	24·9	73	21·7	59	72·0	42	45·0	45

* See note to Table I

fertility of various educational levels was examined, few family size differences were large or significant. The smallest families were for women who completed high school and husbands with some college

education, and the largest families were for those who completed college. Age at marriage regularly increases to a high point of 25·2 years for women having attended graduate or professional schools—three years older than those having less than some high school education. This pattern does not appear when education of husband is considered. Differences in birth spacing of various educational levels in the second generation does not follow any consistent pattern. When fertility by occupation of husbands of the second generation is examined, a slightly different pattern emerges. Professionals and managers had slightly larger families than salesmen, clerks, or those in blue-collar occupations.[32] Furthermore, wives of blue-collar workers married at higher ages than any other occupational group, but had shorter first and second birth intervals. One possible explanation for the lack of discernible patterns in the second generation might be the economic and social conditions of second generation Jews. Their struggle for upward mobility, rejection of 'ghetto' life, and the economic depression of the thirties may have led to an homogenization of fertility in a group that rationally planned their families. Nevertheless, one thing is clear, the inverse relationship of fertility to socio-economic status describing first generation Jews does not characterize Jewish couples of the second generation.

Third generation. The relationship of education and fertility for older third generation Jews is puzzling. There is no clear pattern of inverse or direct relationship, but a tendency for the high school graduates to have smaller families. Differences are small and exceptions are noted. No differences in fertility appear between various occupational groupings in the older third generation. Data on the younger third generation are limited since this group have yet to complete their childbearing cycles. However, internal comparisons between educational and occupational levels can be made. The results, however, are not clear. On the one hand, those with less education had more children and married earlier and, on the other hand, blue-collar workers had the smallest families, married later, and had their second child at longer intervals than those in white-collar occupations.

In summary, although socio-economic differentials in Jewish fertility for first generation Jewish couples are clear, few consistent patterns for the second and third generations appear. There was a tendency noted in the second and older third generation for the 'middle' educated group (those completing high school) to have smaller families. However, this pattern does not appear for other fertility variables. Possibly, the socio-economic homogeneity of the Jewish group resulted in a lack of consistent patterns. Nevertheless, it is evident that there has been a contraction, generationally, in the fertility patterns of socio-economic groupings within the Jewish population. As with the general population, this contraction is the result of an increase in family size of higher status socio-economic groupings as well as a decrease in family size of

TABLE III. *Fertility by education of couple and husband's occupation for the older third generation*

	Number of children ever born			*Age of wife at first marriage*		*First birth interval (months)*		*Second birth interval (I)* (months)*		*Second birth interval (II)* (months)*	
	Mean	*Per cent Childless*	*Number*	*Mean*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*
Education of women:											
Graduate or professional school	2·4	6·1	33	23·0	32	32·8	30	68·8	27	32·3	28
Completed college	2·5	0·0	45	23·0	45	24·8	44	58·8	38	34·0	39
Some college	2·2	2·8	71	22·4	70	28·5	68	64·7	57	38·3	58
Completed H.S.	2·2	5·7	157	22·2	157	25·9	143	68·0	119	41·3	122
Did not complete H.S.	2·3	5·6	18	21·4	18	17·0	17	66·0	14	38·5	14
Education of husband:											
Graduate or professional school	2·4	5·3	75	22·7	75	28·8	69	64·8	62	35·5	64
Completed college	2·4	2·0	51	22·6	51	26·6	50	64·5	39	39·0	39
Some college	2·1	6·9	58	22·5	57	25·4	52	60·5	47	37·7	49
Completed H.S.	2·2	4·8	104	22·2	104	28·5	97	73·3	79	43·7	80
Did not complete H.S.	2·6	0·0	26	22·1	26	13·5	26	44·0	23	33·0	23
Occupation of husband:											
Professionals	2·2	6·3	79	22·8	79	32·3	72	66·3	64	34·7	66
Managers	2·3	1·6	126	22·1	125	25·4	121	62·5	99	39·5	101
Clerks and salesmen	2·2	8·6	81	22·4	81	25·0	73	66·0	61	42·6	62
Blue-collar	2·3	0·0	29	22·8	29	23·0	29	68·0	28	36·5	26

* See note to Table I

lower status socio-economic groupings. The increase in the fertility of higher status groupings can be clearly seen in the comparison between second and older third generation Jewish couples; and the decrease in the fertility of lower status groupings is evident in the comparison of first and second generation Jewish couples.

Social class index

While a clear inverse relationship of socio-economic status (however measured) to fertility appears for the first generation, few patterns that are consistent for each measurement appear for the second and third generations. Incongruities are found both for various fertility measures when one measure of socio-economic status is used, for the same measure of fertility by different socio-economic measures, and when the second and third generations are compared. Because of the problems in measuring socio-economic status with three variables, it was decided to combine the three measures available into a 'social class index' and to

TABLE IV. *Fertility by education of couple and husband's occupation for the younger third generation*

	Number of children ever born			*Age of wife at first marriage*		*First birth interval (months)*		*Second birth interval (I)* (months)*		*Second birth interval (II)* (months)*	
	Mean	*Per cent Childless*	*Number*	*Mean*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*
Education of women:											
Graduate or professional school	1·7	25·6	39	22·1	39	22·0	29	50·0	23	26·5	24
Completed college	1·8	4·4	45	21·7	45	19·8	42	50·5	28	33·5	28
Some college	1·8	15·1	86	20·6	85	19·3	71	51·5	58	27·0	59
Completed high school or less	2·1	10·3	87	19·7	86	21·5	75	56·0	58	32·3	59
Education of husband:											
Graduate or professional school	1·9	15·4	78	21·4	78	20·0	65	53·0	49	27·3	50
Completed college	1·9	10·6	66	20·8	66	22·5	59	52·5	47	30·3	47
Some college	1·7	14·3	56	20·4	55	22·0	45	53·2	32	33·3	33
Completed high school or less	2·0	12·0	50	20·3	49	18·0	43	52·3	35	31·3	36
Occupation of husband:											
Professionals	1·8	16·4	61	21·0	61	22·5	50	51·0	35	27·5	35
Managers	2·0	11·7	94	20·6	93	19·7	80	52·9	68	31·2	70
Clerks and salesmen	1·9	10·4	77	20·7	76	21·3	69	51·0	52	29·3	52
Blue-collar	1·4	23·5	17	21·2	17	18·3	12	58·0	7	37·5	8

* See note to Table I

examine its relationship to fertility by generation. This afforded the opportunity to compare the fertility of those couples who rated consistently high on the three measures with those who rated consistently low on the three measures.

As can be seen by glancing at the number of cases in various categories in Tables I–IV, generational changes have occurred in the distribution of Jews in various occupational-educational groupings. In addition, it should be noted that contemporary Jewish couples have a very high level of education and very few are employed in blue-collar jobs. On the other hand, earlier generations were less educated and few were professionals. Thus, in the construction of an index of social class, different criteria were used for various generational groupings. The intention of the index was to combine education of the couple and occupation of husband into one meaningful measure. The index of social class as used and formulated is a measure of *relative* socio-economic status among Jewish couples in our sample by generation.

The criteria used for various social class indices by generation are as follows. The highest social class for the third generation (including the

younger and older groups) was labelled Social Class I. Professionals and managers who had at least completed college and whose wives had some college education were placed in this social class. The lowest social class (Social Class III) in the third generation consisted of low white-collar workers (clerks and salesmen) and blue-collar workers where at least one partner had only a high school education. Social Class II consisted of professionals and managers who had not completed college and whose wives did not attend college. Also included in this group were husbands in low white-collar or blue-collar occupations who with their wives had a college education.

Somewhat different criteria were used for the second generation. Here Social Class I consisted of professionals and managers who with their wives had at least some college education. Social Class III consisted of low white-collar and blue-collar workers who with their wives had at most a high school education. Social Class II consisted of professionals and managers in families where at least one partner did not attend college and, in addition, low white-collar and blue-collar workers in families where at least one partner had some college education.

The first generation Social Class I consisted of professionals and managers in families where at least one spouse completed high school. Social Class III were low white-collar and blue-collar workers where at least one spouse did not finish high school. On the other hand, professionals and managers who with their wives did not complete high school, and low white-collar and blue-collar workers who, with their wives, at least completed high school were included in Social Class II.

Social Class I, therefore, represents professionals and managers who, with their wives, had high education; Social Class III represents low white-collar and blue-collar workers, who, with their wives, had low education; and Social Class II consists of professionals and managers with low education and low white-collar and blue-collar workers with high education. This last category represents status inconsistency in contrast to the highest and lowest social classes which were consistent on the three dimensions. It should be made clear that the index represents relative social class, objectively measured, within the Jewish group under study and within generations. The social class index by the various fertility measures, with generation controlled, is presented in Table V.

The pattern of high fertility with low social class clearly appears in the first generation. Social Class I of this age-generation group had an average of 2·4 children compared with 2·7 for Social Class II and 2·9 for Social Class III. However, this inverse pattern changes to a direct pattern in the second generation, and continues with this trend for both the older and younger third generation. Differences for all the generations, while following consistent patterns, are small, and in most cases are not statistically significant. Social class differentials in child-

TABLE V. *Fertility by social class index by generation*

Social Class Index	*Number of children ever born*			*Age of wife at first marriage*		*First birth interval (months)*		*Second birth interval (I)* (months)*		*Second birth interval (II)* (months)*	
	Mean	*Per cent Childless*	*Number*	*Mean*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*
First generation:											
Social Class I	2·4	8·3	24	25·4	24	31·5	22	72·0	19	52·5	18
Social Class II	2·7	5·7	35	21·4	34	26·0	25	73·0	21	40·0	22
Social Class III	2·9	4·8	42	21·8	41	12·9	34	63·0	28	36·5	28
Second Generation:											
Social Class I	2·0	5·1	78	24·5	78	35·0	73	78·0	55	43·5	54
Social Class II	1·9	11·0	290	23·6	288	26·3	243	73·4	178	46·6	176
Social Class III	1·8	16·4	122	24·6	117	24·1	90	82·5	66	52·0	68
Older third generation:											
Social Class I	2·4	1·4	74	22·7	74	31·3	72	64·8	64	34·8	65
Social Class II	2·2	5·9	153	22·3	152	25·5	140	64·2	116	38·0	119
Social Class III	2·2	4·6	87	22·3	87	24·8	82	66·2	70	41·5	71
Younger third generation:											
Social Class I	1·9	15·7	89	21·3	89	19·8	75	51·0	59	27·5	60
Social Class II	1·9	8·9	112	20·5	111	21·9	98	52·6	76	30·3	77
Social Class III	1·7	18·8	48	21·2	48	17·8	39	53·3	28	33·0	29

* See note to Table I

lessness in the first and second generation highlight this change from an inverse to a direct relationship. The highest proportion childless in the first generation characterized Social Class I with gradual decreases to a low point of 4·8 per cent for Social Class III. The complete reverse is found in the second generation. The lowest social class had a high proportion childless (16·4 per cent) decreasing to a low point of 5·1 per cent for Social Class I. The older third generation follows similar patterns with the lowest proportion childless in the highest social class. Other data, not shown in Table V, confirm this trend. Social Class I of the first generation was characterized by the lowest proportion of births of the fourth or higher order (12·5) compared with the middle class (22·9) and the lower class (28·6). In striking contrast to this pattern is that observed for the younger third generation. Almost 7 per cent of the women in the younger third generation in Social Class I had four or more children compared with 5·4 per cent of those in Social Class II, and none of the women whose families were classified in Social Class III had four or more children.

The change from an inverse to a direct pattern is not reflected in the data for age of wife at marriage. Except for wives in the second generation, those in Social Class I married later than those in other classes.[33]

In the first generation there was a four-year difference in age at marriage between Social Class I and lower classes. Such large differences do not appear for the other generations, lending weight to the idea expressed earlier of a general convergence of differentials for contemporary Jewish couples. This may reflect to some extent the relative social class homogeneity of contemporary Jewish social structure. Progressive changes from high to low age at marriage when Social Class I is compared with the other social classes do not occur. Spacing of the first child follows an orderly pattern, similar to age of wife at marriage rather than number of children, for the first, second, and older third generation. The pattern shows that those in higher social classes have longer first birth intervals than those in lower social classes. This is not the case for the younger third generation. Here, Social Class II couples have the longest first birth interval of all the social classes. Spacing for the second child, on the other hand, follows the pattern of number of children and not age at marriage or first birth interval. For the first generation, the first social class had a longer second birth interval (52·5 months) than the middle class (40·0 months) and the lower class (36·5 months). A different pattern characterizes the second generation and both age groups of the third generation, the upper-classes having the shortest intervals and the lower-classes the longest intervals.

The relationship of social class and fertility among Jews is far from clear. The findings for the first generation are as expected—high status Jews have smaller families, marry later, and space their first and second child at longer intervals than middle or lower status Jews. This was true not only for the social class index but for the individual variables making up the index. The pattern for the second and third generations varied by the measure used, although there was a tendency for those completing high school to have the smallest families. Data based on the social class index, however, showed a general reversal of the patterns characteristic of the first generation on two fertility measures—number of children and second birth interval. Upper-class Jews of the younger generations had more children and shorter second birth intervals than lower-class Jews. However, they married and had their first child at later ages.

One explanation for the different patterns of age at marriage and first birth interval compared with number of children and second birth interval may lie in the fact that Social Class I as measured required high education among women, which in turn is related to delayed marriages. Nevertheless, with the still early age at marriage (early twenties), a delay may have been necessary before having the first child. This, however, does not necessarily result in smaller families or shorter birth intervals for the second child in the long run.

Several things, nevertheless, should be clear about the relationship of social class and contemporary Jewish fertility. There has obviously

been a general trend to convergence among the socio-economic groupings. Contemporary Jews (at least the group under study) are probably more homogeneous than had been expected. Differences, while significant for the first generation, tended to diminish greatly in the later generations. This follows the trend observed for the general population in the United States of convergences in the fertility of various socio-economic groupings. The inverse relationship of social class to fertility characterizing the first generation does not describe second or third generation Jewish couples. It appears that the inverse relationship of socio-economic status to Jewish fertility found for the first generation has tended to change for more recent generations to a direct relationship, at least for number of children and second birth interval. This is understandable if one recalls the exceptionally rational family planning that characterizes contemporary Jewish couples.

EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND FERTILITY

The primary focus of this paper has been the examination of socio-economic differentials in the fertility patterns of Jewish couples. Unfortunately, since United States census data do not include information on religion, we cannot make a comparison of differentials in Jewish and non-Jewish fertility. Recently, some data have been published from national samples taken in 1962 and 1963 which interrelated family size and education for Catholics and non-Catholics. An opportunity was available, therefore, to compare our sample data on the Providence Jewish community with these national data. The comparison to be presented has certain limitations. First, the data for the national samples are limited to average live births with no information on the range of family size. Second, the national data are presented by two age groups —18–29 and 30–39—with no data on age at marriage or proportion childless. For these young age groupings, these two items of information are essential when comparison between religious groups is made. Third, the national data are presented by two categories, Catholics and non-Catholics, the latter containing an unknown proportion of Jewish couples. Finally, the three-fold categorization of education used in the national samples is broad and may mask important distinctions. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the data are presented for their suggestive value. The comparative data are presented in Table VI.

(1) If we examine the totals of each religious grouping, the pattern of religious differentials in American fertility is clearly observable. For both age groups, Catholics had the largest families, Jews the smallest, the non-Catholic group having an intermediate position.

(2) These family size differences remain between the three religious groups when education of wives and husbands is controlled. Catholics have higher fertility than non-Catholics for each educational level for

TABLE VI. *Mean Number of Births by Religion and Education for White Married Women 18 to 39 Years Old, 1962–3, and the Jewish Population 1963*

	*Catholics**				*Non-Catholics**				*Jews*			
	18–29		30–39		18–29		30–39		18–29		30–39	
Education	*Mean Births*	*N*	*Mean Births*	*N*	*Mean Births*	*N*	*Mean Births*	*N*	*Mean Births*	*N*	*Mean Births*	
Total	2·2	343	3·2	464	1·8	1097	2·7	1209	1·4	146	2·3	250
Wife's Education:												
Under 12 Years	2·7	87	3·3	143	2·2	322	3·0	388	—	5	—	7
12 Years	2·1	154	3·2	199	1·7	412	2·6	402	1·6	43	2·3	90
Over 12 Years	2·0	98	3·0	119	1·4	349	2·5	409	1·4	98	2·4	153
Husband's Education:												
Under 12 Years	2·4	84	3·3	182	2·1	329	2·9	461	—	4	—	8
12 Years	2·1	114	3·1	135	1·8	323	2·5	286	1·8	21	2·2	57
Over 12 Years	2·0	142	3·1	143	1·5	432	2·5	444	1·4	114	2·4	180

* Data on Catholics and non-Catholics adapted from Ronald Freedman, David Goldberg, and Larry Bumpass, 'Current Fertility Expectations of Married Couples in the United States: 1963', *Population Index*, 31 (January 1965), Table 8, p. 14: 'Subcategories do not always sum to the total number of cases because of a small number of NA's for the independent variables.'

the two age groups, and non-Catholics have higher fertility than Jews in six of the eight comparisons. The two exceptions are in the younger ages, perhaps reflecting the later age at marriage of Jews or differential birth-spacing patterns. However, in the 30–39 age group the Jewish population has consistently the smaller family size.

(3) Within the Catholic and non-Catholic populations there appears to be a definite inverse relationship of education to family size except for the 30–39 age group when the college and high school educated are compared. However, for the older age group (30–39) in the Jewish population the more educated have larger families. The inverse relationship of education and family size among younger Jews may again reflect birth-spacing and age at marriage differences for education levels within the Jewish group.

(4) The variations in Jewish fertility by education, where comparisons are possible, are as great as within the Catholic and non-Catholic populations. Thus, although differences are small they cannot be dismissed.

CONCLUSIONS

The data presented in this paper indicate that the inverse relationship of socio-economic status to fertility of first generation Jewish couples does not characterize more recent generations. Owing to con-

vergences in the fertility of socio-economic groupings of the second and third generations, we can only tentatively conclude that there was a tendency towards a direct relationship of socio-economic status and Jewish fertility for these generations. These findings may have broader implications for the future fertility patterns of socio-economic status groupings in the general population of the United States. The rationality with which Jewish couples plan their families, well documented in the Growth of American Families and Princeton Fertility studies, may be the model towards which the Protestant majority are moving. The direct pattern of relationship between socio-economic status and fertility characteristic of Jewish couples as early as the second generation may foreshadow what may, in the future, characterize the Protestant population. Authors of both the Princeton and GAF studies have indeed made this speculation.[34] Moreover, data from the Indianapolis and Princeton surveys cited earlier have shown that among the Protestant population who rationally plan their families there was a direct relationship of socio-economic status to fertility. It is in the rationality of family planning and its consequences for fertility that the Jewish population may be a model for the majority community in the United States.

Although the *pattern* of Jewish fertility may foreshadow other groupings that are characterized by successful family planning, this does not necessarily imply that these groupings will have the *actual* level of low fertility characteristic of Jewish populations in many western countries. On a limited basis, a comparison was made between national data on religion, education, and family size with similar data for the Jewish population. These data showed that for the older age group, with education controlled, Jews had consistently the smaller family size. This raises the question as to whether the uniqueness of Jewish fertility lies in the matrix of social and economic attributes which characterize the Jewish population (i.e. urban residence, college education, and concentration in white-collar occupation)[35] or is the result of their cultural values and minority status. The assumption of the 'characteristics' approach is that the explanation of the fertility of Jews resides in their peculiar combination of social, economic, and residential characteristics. Both limited data that were presented and a variety of data reported by the Princeton study empirically challenge this assumption. Furthermore, low fertility patterns characterize not only contemporary Jewish couples in the United States but have been documented to apply to Jews compared with non-Jews as early as 1880 in the United States and in many western countries for at least the last century. The 'characteristics' approach would have to assume that Jews in other western countries have the same matrix of characteristics as Jews in the United States or that other factors unique to their social situation contribute to their lower fertility. Furthermore, an assumption would have to be made that Jews in most western countries were historically

characterized by high social and economic standing—an assumption which the empirical evidence available clearly refutes. The 'characteristics' approach represents an *ad hoc* explanation which fails to utilize existing evidence on other forms of Jewish social behaviour and generates little in the way of meaningful hypotheses.

An alternative and perhaps more fruitful framework for the explanation of Jewish fertility is the analysis of the social-psychological implications of minority status of Jews, their cultural values, and, more broadly, the changing nature of Jewish social structure in the process of acculturation.[36] This approach treats the Jew *qua* Jew in the social structure, as a member of a minority group with perceptions of discrimination, feelings of insecurity, without full acceptance in the non-Jewish community, and with a set of cultural values. These factors in combination may be the key to understanding the low Jewish fertility over time and in many countries. Undoubtedly, research concerned with a meaningful analysis of the nature of Jewish fertility and, more generally, the meaning of religious differentials in fertility patterns, should not, as in the past, overlook the social structural and social-psychological context. This would place the analysis of fertility in a cogent and coherent sociological frame of reference which would tie together the uniqueness of fertility behaviour with other unique social behaviour which characterizes the Jewish population.

NOTES

[1] For evidence on the contraction of socio-economic differentials in American fertility see Ronald Freedman, Pascal K. Whelpton, and Arthur Campbell, *Family Planning, Sterility and Population Growth*, New York, 1959; Charles Westoff *et al.*, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1961; Charles Westoff *et al.*, *The Third Child*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1963; Wilson Grabill, Clyde V. Kiser, and Pascal K. Whelpton, *The Fertility of American Women*, New York, 1958, pp. 173–84; Clyde V. Kiser, 'Differential Fertility in the United States', in *Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton, New Jersey, 1960, pp. 77–112; Charles Westoff, 'Differential Fertility in the United States: 1900–1952', *American Sociological Review*, 19 (October 1954), pp. 549–61.

[2] Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell, op. cit., p. 318; Westoff *et al.*, *The Third Child*, p. 129.

[3] Dennis Wrong, 'Trends in Class Fertility in Western Nations', *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 24 (May 1958), pp. 216–29.

[4] Westoff, op. cit., p. 561.

[5] Westoff *et al.*, *The Third Child*, p. 129; Charles Westoff, Robert Potter, and Philip Sagi, 'Some Selected Findings of the Princeton Fertility Study', *Demography*, 1 (1964), p. 133.

[6] Westoff *et al.*, *The Third Child*, p. 239; Westoff, Potter, and Sagi, 'Some Selected Findings of the Princeton Fertility Study', p. 133.

[7] Westoff *et al.*, *The Third Child*, p. 111.

[8] Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell, op. cit., p. 289, Fig. 9–2.

[9] These data were reported in 'New Patterns in U.S. Fertility', *Population Bulletin*, 20 (September 1964), pp. 127–8, Table IV.

[10] Erwin S. Solomon, 'Social Characteristics and Fertility', *Eugenics Quarterly*, 3 (June 1956), p. 101; Myer Greenberg, 'The Reproductive Rate of

the Families of Jewish Students at the University of Maryland', *Jewish Social Studies*, 10 (July 1948), p. 230.

[11] Uriah Z. Engelman, 'A Study of Size of Families in the Jewish Population of Buffalo', *The University of Buffalo Studies*, 16 (November 1938), p. 29, Table XVI.

[12] Westoff *et al.*, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America*, p. 185, Table 41.

[13] Greenberg, op. cit., pp. 231–2.

[14] Westoff *et al.*, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America*, pp. 215–16.

[15] Westoff *et al.*, *The Third Child*, p. 115, Table 60.

[16] Nathan Goldberg, 'Demographic Characteristics of American Jews', in Jacob Fried (ed.), *Jews in the Modern World*, New York, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 699–700.

[17] Westoff *et al.*, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America*, p. 80.

[18] David Goldberg, 'The Fertility of Two-Generation Urbanites', *Population Studies*, 12 (March 1959), pp. 214–22; 'Another Look at the Indianapolis Fertility Data', *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 38 (January 1960), pp. 23–36.

[19] Westoff, Potter, and Sagi, 'Some Selected Findings of the Princeton Fertility Study: 1961', p. 134.

[20] For a similar argument on religious divisional differentials in Jewish fertility see Calvin Goldscheider, 'Ideological Factors in Jewish Fertility Differentials', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, VII, 1 (June 1965).

[21] Pascal K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser (eds.), *Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility*, Vol. 5, New York, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1958, pp. 1331–41.

[22] Westoff, Potter, and Sagi, 'Some Selected Findings of the Princeton Fertility Study: 1961', p. 134.

[23] The general survey is reported by Sidney Goldstein, *The Greater Providence Jewish Community: A Population Survey*, Providence, 1964. Fertility data were extensively analysed in Calvin Goldscheider, *Trends and Differentials in Jewish Fertility*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1964.

[24] See Goldscheider, 'Ideological Factors in Jewish Fertility Differentials', and Goldscheider, *Trends and Differentials in Jewish Fertility*, pp. 65–8.

[25] For an elaboration of these measures see Goldscheider, 'Ideological Factors in Jewish Fertility Differentials'.

[26] The latter two measures were appropriate only for couples, and thus the number of cases in the tables to be presented vary slightly depending on the measures examined.

[27] The importance of education of wife has been documented by both the GAF and Princeton Study. See Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell, op. cit., p. 290; Westoff, Potter, and Sagi, *The Third Child*, op. cit., p. 117, Table 61.

[28] A similar methodological limitation in the use of data of an *ex post facto* nature was encountered in the Indianapolis fertility survey. See Kiser and Whelpton, op. cit., pp. 1366 f.

[29] For an elaboration see Goldscheider, 'Ideological Factors in Jewish Fertility Differentials'.

[30] The criteria for selecting the various levels of education were empirical in nature. The very broad category of 'first to eleventh grade' should be subdivided into those who completed and who did not complete grammar school. The small number of cases in the older generation prevented such a subdivision. Nevertheless, when the subdivision was made the patterns were consistent for wife's education but not husband's.

[31] Differences are statistically significant at the 0·01 level for both education of wife and husband. With managers and professionals combined, the relationship to fertility was inverse: 2·3 to 2·5 to 3·0 with statistical significance at the 0·05 level.

[32] Differences are not statistically significant at the 0·05 level.

[33] Statistically significant differences at the 0·05 level were found only for the first and older third generation.

[34] Ronald Freedman, Pascal Whelpton, and John Smit, 'Socio-Economic Factors in Religious Differentials in Fertility', *American Sociological Review*, 26 (August 1961), p. 608; Westoff *et al.*, *The Third Child*, pp. 121–2.

[35] Freedman, Whelpton, and Smit, op. cit.; Erich Rosenthal, 'Jewish Fertility in the United States', *Eugenics Quarterly*, 8 (December 1961), pp. 198–217.

[36] For a similar explanation see Nathan Goldberg, 'The Jewish Population in the United States', in *The Jewish People Past and Present*, New York, 1948, pp. 28–29; 'Jewish Population in America', *Jewish Review* (January–December 1948), pp. 30–55.

A NOTE ON ATTITUDES TO RISK-TAKING OF OBSERVANT AND NON-OBSERVANT JEWS

Y. Rim and Z. E. Kurzweil

THE Jewish attitude to life flows from the fundamental Biblical doctrine according to which man was created in the image of God and is endowed with a soul which is imperishable and eternal. To preserve life is the categorical imperative of Judaism. Man is not the owner of his own life; God is a partner in every creation of life, and life is given to man in trust. Therefore, man must not in the course of ordinary daily living do anything that may endanger his life or that of any other person. Hence, the scriptural demand for precautionary measures against danger lurking anywhere—in a person's private sphere, in public places, and wherever human beings congregate. Foolhardiness is, therefore, inimical to the spirit of Judaism. The Jewish legal codex forbids any action that, however remotely, may endanger human life, unless taken with the intention of saving the life of another human being.

The attitude of Judaism to property is characterized by the fact that the Torah does not recognize absolute ownership of immovable property. Man can only hold property on trust; he is, as it were, a leaseholder of property. Hence, every jubilee year, land, the basis of a person's wealth, is returned to its original owner, and is redistributed amongst the population of Israel. The same applies to money; the Biblical teaching of the cancellation of debts every seventh year is an expression of this idea.

To sum up, it may be expected that people who are deeply imbued with Jewish values would show great reluctance in taking risks involving danger of life, unless the risks are taken in the process of saving individual life or safeguarding national existence, that is, in time of war. In their attitude to material goods, religious Jews might be expected to show readiness to risk loss, certainly no less than other persons, unless of course they are inspired by motives other than those emanating from Jewish teaching. Whether or not their attitude to risk-taking differs from those not guided by religious values can only be determined by research.

We have undertaken this research and submitted questionnaires to groups of Israeli Jews of secular outlook and way of life as well as to a number of groups of Jews who were Orthodox by faith and way of life, and found in fact no marked difference between their attitudes to risk-taking.

With regard to the religious groups investigated, we should like to point out that they consisted of practising Orthodox Jews who not only considered themselves Orthodox, but were on the basis of their educational background well aware of, and committed to, the Jewish teachings set out at the beginning of this paper. They were young rabbis, principals of religious schools, and active members of a religious Community Centre.

The following account describes our procedure and results.

Over the last few years some research has been undertaken to find out more about the conditions under which decisions involving risk are taken by individuals and groups.

Stoner's (1961) discovery that group decisions are more 'risky' than individual decisions is, as Marquis (1962) comments, 'contrary to the common belief that committees are typically cautious, compromising and conservative, and that authority or decisions in a business enterprise should, therefore, be given to a responsible individual rather than to a group'.

Marquis (1962) confirmed the basic finding that individuals tend to shift their decision preferences after group discussion in the direction of greater risk-taking. The results of his experiment also indicate that the shift in the 'risky' direction is characteristic not only of unanimous group decisions but also of personal decisions made by designated leaders and of individual decisions made by members who had no assigned responsibility.

Marquis concludes that personal shifts towards greater risk-taking are not governed by group decision since these personal shifts also appear when there has been discussion without group decision. 'The best lead at the moment is that the members whose initial decisions were the more risky are disproportionately more influential. But why? Are they more respected? Do they have more information? Do they talk more? Are they more persistent, or more argumentative? Or are the more cautious members more susceptible to influence from others?'

The present paper reports on some relations between personality characteristics of group members and their risk-taking behaviour. We should like to emphasize that these are the results of a series of experiments carried out on groups some of which consisted of practising religious Jews. Specifically, we examine whether certain variables of personality and interpersonal behaviour are related to risk-taking before and after group discussion and to shifts in risk-taking due to

group discussion. In addition, we attempt to find out whether certain personality traits distinguish those who influence others to take greater risks from those who are influenced to take such risks.

PROCEDURE

Measures of risk-taking behaviour

Six out of the twelve problems developed by Wallach and Kogan (1959), some or all of them also used by Stoner and Marquis, were employed to obtain measures of risk-taking.

A typical problem reads like this:

> Mr. A., an electrical engineer who is married and has one child, has been working for a large electronics corporation since graduating from college five years ago. He is assured of a lifetime job with a modest, though adequate salary, and liberal pension benefits upon retirement. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that his salary will increase much before he retires. While attending a convention, Mr. A. is offered a job with a small, newly founded company with a highly uncertain future. The new job would pay more to start and would offer the possibility of a share in the ownership if the company survived the competition of the larger firms. Imagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below are several probabilities or odds of the new company's proving financially sound. Please check the *lowest* probability that you would consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. A. to take the new job.
>
> | | |
> |---|---|
> | 1 in 10 | 6 in 10 |
> | 2 in 10 | 7 in 10 |
> | 3 in 10 | 8 in 10 |
> | 4 in 10 | 9 in 10 |
> | 5 in 10 | Mr. A. should not take the new job, no matter what the probabilities. |
>
> A subject's score of risk-taking consisted of the sum of the lowest probability designated by him on all six problems. [The other five problems are published elsewhere (Marquis, 1962).]

The subjects recorded their individual decisions in the six decision problems (initial score). Then the group was asked to discuss each problem in turn, arrive at a *unanimous* decision, and record it on different copies of the same set of problems (group-decision score). The groups had no leader or chairman, and the experimenter did not interfere in the lively discussions. After the recording of the unanimous decision, each subject recorded again, on a third copy of the set of problems, his private personal decision ('after-score').

Having found out what kind of subjects change more, we tried to discover what kind of subjects bring about the change in the 'risky' direction; in other words, whose initial scores are nearest to the final group-decision scores. It may be assumed that it is these subjects who

bring about the shift, that is, who persuade the other group members to adopt their risk-taking behaviour.

Difference scores were therefore calculated, reflecting the extent to which any subject's initial score differed from the group-decision score (D_1). The lower this score, the nearer is the subject's initial score to the final group-decision score.

It was also thought of interest to compare the group-decision score with every subject's 'after-score', in order to find out to what extent different subjects are influenced by the group decision or stick to their initial score. It will be recalled that this 'after-score' was recorded by the subject as his personal attitude after he knew the group decision. Accordingly, difference scores (D_2) were calculated, reflecting the extent to which any subject's 'after-score' differed from the group-decision score.

Subjects

Over 750 subjects, in 150 groups of five, four, or three subjects each took part in the investigations reported. They were students, teachers, school principals, nurses, foremen, army officers, members of a kibbutz, etc.

There were 50 Orthodox subjects in 10 groups of five. All Orthodox groups consisted of men. About one-third of the non-Orthodox groups consisted of women. No significant differences were found between subjects engaged in various professions.

The first investigation was concerned with finding out the relationship between neuroticism and extroversion (two important dimensions of personality) and risk-taking. The results showed that highly extrovert subjects were more inclined to take risks than others in their initial decisions, and also to be influential in the group situation. They persuaded the other group members to shift their decisions in the 'risky' direction. In addition, it was found that subjects scoring high on Neuroticism are the least influential.

The aim of the second study was to investigate the relationship between risk-taking and the need for achievement. The latter was measured by the subject's ranking of eight job incentives, in terms of how important each incentive would be for him in selecting a job and feeling satisfied while doing it. The four incentives defining the need for achievement were:

1. Opportunity to learn new skills.
2. Freedom to assume responsibility.
3. Good prospects for advancement.
4. Recognition from supervisors for initiative.

The results showed that those subjects for whom the above four

incentives were most important tended to be both 'riskier' in their initial decisions as individuals, and influential in the group situation.

The next investigation was concerned with the relationship between social attitudes and decisions involving risk. Eysenck (1954) showed that social attitudes can be regarded as being determined by two factors. One of these factors is the well-known Radicalism-Conservatism continuum (R-factor). The other, which is quite independent of the first, was called Tough-mindedness versus Tender-mindedness (T-factor). Detailed experimental analysis disclosed that while the R-factor could truly be called a major dimension of social attitudes, the T-factor appeared essentially as a projection on to the field of social attitudes of certain fundamental personality traits. Eysenck showed that there is a close relationship between Tough-mindedness and Extraversion on the one hand, and between Tender-mindedness and Introversion on the other. It was also found that there was a distinct tendency for Tough-mindedness to be associated with both aggression and dominance.

We found that those high on Tough-mindedness and average on Radicalism-Conservatism were more inclined to take risks than others in their initial decisions; those influential in the group situation, however, were above average on both Radicalism and Tender-mindedness.

In the fourth study, the relationship between dominant interests and risk-taking was investigated. The Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values (1951) was administered; this questionnaire estimates the relative prominence of six basic interests or motives in personality: the theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and religious.

The results indicate that individuals whose theoretical, economic, and political interests are high, tend to be more inclined to take risks than others in their initial decisions, and that those influential in the group situation, that is, bringing about the shift in the 'risky' direction of the attitudes of those more cautious, have high theoretical interests, above-average economic, and low social interests.

Another investigation focused on the relationship between risk-taking and Tolerance vs. Intolerance of Ambiguity. Budner (1962) defined intolerance of ambiguity as the tendency to perceive, that is, to interpret, ambiguous situations as a source of threat. Ambiguous situations are identified as situations characterized by novelty, complexity, or insolubility.

The results indicate that those individuals who are tolerant of ambiguity tend to be 'riskier' in their initial decisions, and also to be influential in the group situation. It was legitimate to assume that those individuals with leadership qualities would tend to both be more 'risky' than others and influential in a group situation; several experiments were carried out to verify this assumption. Therefore, in the next investigation we were concerned with interpersonal values. We used

Gordon's (1960) Survey of Interpersonal Values, which was designed to measure certain critical values involving the individual's relationships to other people or their relationships to him. The six values measured were: Support, Conformity, Recognition, Independence, Benevolence, and Leadership.

It was found that those whose highest values were Recognition and Leadership tend to be more inclined to take risks than others in their initial decisions, and are the influencers in the group discussion, leading the other group members' shift in the 'risky' direction. Recognition and Leadership are defined by Gordon as follows:

Recognition: Being looked up to and admired, being considered important, attracting favorable notice, achieving recognition.
Leadership: Being in charge of other people, having authority over others, being in a position of leadership or power.

Next we studied the relation between risk-taking and Machiavellianism, a disposition to manipulate interpersonal relationships. The Machiavellianism scale consists of statements and paraphrases taken from Machiavelli's books, *The Prince* and *The Discourses*, and was constructed recently by Christie (1958). The results showed that high initial risk is taken by subjects scoring at both extremes of the scale, that is, very high or very low. However, only the high scoring subjects, that is, those holding the Machiavellian attitudes, are influential in the group situation.

Another series of experiments was devoted to the relation between Inner- vs. Other-directedness and risk-taking. Riesman's (1950) theory of social character asserts that, in general, human beings can be grouped into three major types of social character. Tradition-directed people are oriented to the traditional ways of their forefathers; inner-directed people turn to their own inner values and standards for guidance in their behaviour; while other-directed persons depend upon the people around them to give direction to their actions. Two measures of Inner-Other-directedness were used: a questionnaire developed by Kassarjian (1962) and the ranking of adjectives 'according to their importance for you', some of which are characteristic of Inner-directedness, others of Other-directedness. The adjectives Decisive, Forceful, Imaginative, Independent, and Self-Confident were assumed to be characteristic of Inner-directedness. The results showed that the inner-directed subjects tended to take high initial risks and to influence others to follow them in this direction.

The last investigation was concerned with leadership attitudes. The two leadership dimensions 'Consideration' and 'Structure', as measured by Fleishman's Leadership Opinion Questionnaire (1960), are defined as follows:

Structure: Reflects the extent to which an individual is likely to define

and structure his own role and those of his subordinates towards goal attainment. A high score in this dimension characterizes individuals who play a more active role in directing group activities through planning, communicating information, scheduling, trying out new ideas, etc.

Consideration: Reflects the extent to which an individual is likely to have relationships characterized by mutual trust, respect for subordinates' ideas, and consideration of their feelings. A high score is indicative of a climate of good rapport and two-way communication. A low score indicates that the supervisor is likely to be more impersonal in his relations with group members. The subjects taking part in this experiment were head nurses (women) and foremen and supervisors in industry (men). The results showed that those subjects scoring high on both Structure and Consideration tended to take high initial risks and to influence their colleagues in the group situation.

In summary, then, it seems that the risk-taking individual who is disproportionately influential in a group situation is extrovert, has a high need for achievement, is tolerant of ambiguity, above-average in Radicalism and Tender-mindedness; his theoretical, economic, and political interests are high, as are his interpersonal values of Leadership and Recognition; he is good at manipulating interpersonal relations; he is inner-directed and high in Consideration and Structure.

Our experiments showed no significant difference in the attitude towards risk-taking between observant and non-observant Jews, which may lead to the conclusion that the above-mentioned personality traits are more pervasive than any influence attributable to the Jewish religious doctrine set out at the beginning of this paper. Moreover, the experiments conducted by us would appear to show that the assimilation of a minority group such as the Orthodox Jewish proceeds on its own accord in spite of the group's conscious effort to preserve its spiritual identity and the characteristic attitudes which emanate from the Jewish doctrine which the group endeavours to uphold.

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A QUESTIONNAIRE INQUIRY INTO THE JEWISH POPULATION OF WROCŁAW*

Szyja Bronsztejn

INTRODUCTION

BETWEEN the Wars Poland had one of the largest Jewish populations in the world, 3,114,000 Jews having been enumerated in the census of 1931. This was a large Jewry, distinguishable from the rest of the population of Poland in a great number of respects, and culturally very much alive. Many studies were made of its economic problems and social characteristics.

The Second World War shattered it, for the German extermination of the Jews left few survivors on Polish soil. What proportion of Polish Jewry survived the tragedy it is very difficult to say. According to one estimate the remnant amounted to 300,000;[1] other calculations put the figure at 350,000.[2] And it is even more difficult to determine the present number of Jews in Poland, for some of the survivors settled permanently in the U.S.S.R., some left Poland between 1946 and 1949, and others left after 1956 as a result of the programme of family reunification which started in that year. We are not helped in this matter by the post-war censuses, for none of them divides the Polish population up according to nationality, because, whereas in the inter-war period national minorities made up about one-third of the total population, Poland is now almost entirely a uninational state. To have tabulated the population by nationality would not have been of any great use and would have considerably raised the cost of preparing the census results.

We are, of course, faced by a methodological difficulty in deciding to investigate a nationality. In demographic inquiries the question aimed at sorting out different nationalities can be put in different ways. We might ask: (1) what is the nationality to which a person considers himself to belong, or (2) what language he considers to be his mother tongue or the one he uses daily. Neither question is rigorous and each allows considerable latitude in interpretation and subjective choice. In some of the capitalist countries the question could be put in terms of religion,

* Translated from a paper which appeared in *Rocznik Wrocławski*, vol. VI, 1963.

but this criterion is also insufficiently precise, and in the conditions prevailing in Poland today, when religion has become a personal matter for each individual citizen, this method of inquiry is completely unacceptable. Things being as they are, anybody interested in national minorities must undertake his own investigation, and for investigations of this kind the questionnaire method is very appropriate.

In order to inquire into various aspects of Jewish life in Lower Silesia we prepared a questionnaire containing the following groups of questions:

(1) on personal data relating to the respondent;
(2) on the respondent's family;
(3) on the respondent's parents, next-of-kin, and spouse;
(4) on the respondent's occupational training and present occupation;
(5) on social problems and level of living;
(6) on cultural problems; and
(7) on social activities and processes of integration.

This sevenfold grouping contained a total of 130 questions. A feature of the inquiry that caused difficulty while the questionnaire was being prepared was the need to obtain answers not only about the respondent but also about his family. In practice the task of drawing up a family questionnaire was almost impossible, and some questions were therefore omitted in order to avoid overloading the questionnaire with detail.

When we cannot study a whole population we can obtain representative data on it only when the sample chosen is large enough and contains due proportions of all the groups in the total entity. It will be asked whether our sample has fulfilled these conditions. It must be stated (as I have already emphasized) that the number of the Jewish population is unknown. We were forced to resort to an estimate, making use of two figures: the number of repatriates of Jewish nationality and the number of subscribers to the Yiddish periodical *Folks-Shtimme* (*Głos Ludu*). If we assume that among our respondents the proportions of repatriates and subscribers to *Folks-Shtimme* are the same as their proportions in the total Jewish population, then we arrive at a total of 1,325 families (on the basis of the number of repatriates among the respondents) or 1,065 families (on the basis of the number of subscribers to *Folks-Shtimme*). The first figure must be considered too high, because the repatriates were, in general, more reluctant than others to fill in the questionnaire. The second figure, on the other hand, seems to be too low because when the questionnaire was being distributed subscribers to *Folks-Shtimme* were much more easily reached than others. On balance, we consider a reasonable estimate of the Jewish families in Wrocław to be 1,200.

254 completed questionnaires were returned, which we may take to represent just over 21 per cent of the relevant Jewish population. The

sample may be considered satisfactory as long as we are satisfied that it embraced, in the right proportions, all social groups within the total Jewish population.

But before dealing with the last assumption we should make it clear that there were many different reasons why people did not fill in the questionnaire. In the first place, there is the well-known aversion on the part of our people from all kinds of questionnaires, and in particular from those containing questions of a personal nature. Other obstacles were the difficulty people had in understanding some of the questions and the failure to explain them on the part of those responsible for the distribution. Some people were reluctant to answer questions on their income and to mention who among their relatives had left Poland. It would be difficult to enumerate all the remaining reasons. It is necessary to add that some people were unwilling to reply because they feared that their response might be taken as establishing a link with the Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland. The point is made quite clear by a member of the liberal professions who, instead of sending back the questionnaire, wrote a letter which included the following passage:

> Not being acquainted with either the Yiddish language or culture, I have never had any close and real contact with the Jewish population—except for family ties, of course, and emotional ties which I esteem very highly. In such a situation to take part in the inquiry, which you kindly invited me to do, seems to me not only superfluous, but also pointless.

We quote this fragment of an interesting and fairly long letter because the arguments used in it are certainly typical of a large number of intellectuals of Jewish origin.

It seems that the reasons preventing many people from responding to the questionnaire were so varied that we cannot speak of a single bias in the results we obtained. The range of people who responded is shown in Table 1.

We succeeded in reaching people in almost 90 establishments and institutions, but it is impossible to determine whether we have in fact included all occupational groups in the sample. But it is worth noting that, as far as the sex ratio of children in the surveyed families is concerned, there was a satisfactory balance, for the data show 194 boys and 195 girls.

It is necessary to say something about the way in which the questionnaire was sent out. The distribution was done mainly by members of the Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland,[3] who handed out the copies of the questionnaire in establishments and institutions employing considerable numbers of Jews as well as in the Jewish club named after Joseph Lewartowski. To those people who could not be reached in any other way, questionnaires were sent by post along with a letter of explanation. The Press gave the inquiry much attention.

TABLE 1. *Respondents by branches of the national economy*

	Branch	*Number of establishments and institutions*	*Number of respondents*
1		2	3
1	Industry and crafts	34	117
	state establishments	13	24
	co-operative establishments	10	82
	private establishments	11	11
2	Building	4	4
3	Transport	3	4
4	Trade	14	19
	socialized establishments	9	14
	private establishments	5	5
5	Housing and local administration	1	1
6	Education	8	21
	higher education	4	9
7	Culture and art	3	3
8	Preventive medicine and hygiene	12	16
9	State and communal administration and courts of justice	5	5
10	Political, social and religious organizations	3	9
11	Practising lawyers	4	4
12	Rentiers	—	45
13	Unspecified occupation	—	5
	liberal professions	—	1
	housewives	—	1

A total of 870 questionnaires were sent out, nearly 30 per cent of which elicited replies. In view of the scattering of the Jews in a city of almost half a million inhabitants, we may take the results to be quite satisfactory.

This paper reports a preliminary inquiry into present-day Polish Jewry; no other investigation of the kind has been carried out since the end of the Second World War. The paper presents an analysis of the most characteristic of the data gathered in the questionnaire inquiry, adding a few explanatory notes. It is not intended to present an exhaustive analysis or set out to analyse the changes that have taken place in the population under investigation or to compare it with other populations of this or other periods. These comparisons will be made after data on other towns of Lower Silesia have been processed.

THE ROAD TO WROCŁAW

In order to characterize the Jewish population of Wrocław we need to start the account with an analysis of its origin by regions and types of settlement. Table 2 shows where respondents lived in 1939.

Two features of the data need to be stressed. First, the information is

TABLE 2. *Structure of respondents by residence, 1939*

Region; country	%	
Poland within 1939 boundaries		90·8
Central region	38·6	
Eastern region	10·7	
Western region	3·6	
Southern region	37·9	
Abroad		9·2
U.S.S.R.	6·8	
Total		100·0

derived from individual informants, a fact which accounts for the high proportion of people living in the U.S.S.R. in 1939. Second, the proportion of the respondents from the eastern part of Poland is much lower than the proportion of the Jewish population living there in the inter-war period. A more detailed characterization is given by Table 3 in which the respondents are traced to settlements of different size. Only one respondent in five came from a small town or village, a fact which may help explain why the Jewish population was able speedily to adapt itself to the living conditions of a large city.

TABLE 3. *Structure of respondents by size of settlement inhabited in 1939*

Type of settlement	%
Towns	
over 100,000 inhabitants	41·2
100,000–50,000 inhabitants	8·8
50,000–10,000 inhabitants	29·8
less than 10,000 inhabitants (including villages)	20·2
Total	100·0

The flow of the Jewish population into Wrocław has been continuous, but we may distinguish three main phases of the influx. 54 per cent of the respondents arrived in Wrocław in the years 1945 to 1948. 19·6 per cent were people who had come from other towns in Lower Silesia (and to a small degree from other regions of Poland) in a continuous flow since 1948—a process which has not stopped. 26·4 per cent of the respondents were repatriates during the period 1956–60.[4] The data show that the majority of the population being investigated has been connected with Wrocław for a long time. It is interesting to note that, just as in the inter-war period, so now too, there is a steady movement of Jews towards the large towns. One-third of the sample population came to Wrocław either in the first period (1945–8) via smaller settle-

ments and not direct from their original places of residence, or in the years 1948–60.

Table 4 shows where the respondents were during the German Occupation.

TABLE 4. *Structure of respondents by place of residence during the German occupation*

	%
U.S.S.R.	88·8
Territories occupied by the Nazis	5·6
Concentration camps	3·2
Ghettos	0·8
Other countries	1·6
Total	100·0

The majority escaped death only because they found themselves in the U.S.S.R. It is worth noting that almost 6 per cent of this group had been demobilized from either the Red Army or the Polish People's Army before reaching Wrocław. During the German Occupation nearly 6 per cent of the respondents had been in hiding (some behind 'Aryan papers') or had fought in partisan units. Only 4 per cent had been in concentration camps and ghettos.

The experience gained during the war by the people who found refuge in the U.S.S.R. (where they witnessed the heroic struggle of the Russian people) exerted an enormous influence on the minds of the Jewish population. The appalling German atrocities, which to us are only sad statistics, were to them immediate experiences.

TABLE 5. *Losses among close kin* suffered by the Jewish population of Wrocław*

	Percentage of persons who perished during the Occupation							*Total*
	All perished	*100–80*	*80–60*	*60–40*	*40–20*	*20–0*	*Nobody perished*	
Percentage of respondents	48·4	19·0	11·2	10·0	3·9	1·4	6·1	100·0

* Parents, brothers and sisters, spouses, children.

Almost half the respondents and their spouses lost all their relatives. Almost nine-tenths suffered the loss of more than half their relatives, and it should be explained that the majority of those relatives who survived had gone abroad before the outbreak of the Second World War.

This tragic remnant explains many of the facts which follow and makes us realize that a population which suffered so grievously cannot

be identified with the inhabitants of pre-war Nalewski Street or Solski Square, or with the Jews of the small towns where 'the shoemaker was a poet, the watchmaker a philosopher, the barber a songster'. The population with which we are dealing is not only a mere remnant of pre-war Polish Jewry but also a radically different entity.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

The wartime and post-war movements of the population left an indelible mark on its demographic composition. Beginning with the question of sex ratio, we may note the predominance of males. They form 57 per cent of the population investigated. For every 100 males there are only 75 females. The imbalance is explained by the fact that men were quicker in deciding to leave their homes and to try to flee before the flood of Hitler's barbarity. The influence of the war on the sex ratio becomes even more evident if we limit ourselves to the replies of people who were adults (20 years old and above) when the war broke out. Among them, for every 100 males there are only 45 females. Fig. 1 displays the age-pyramid of the sample population.

It should be noted first that children and young people up to the age of 20 form 43·1 per cent of the sample. But the numbers in this group are not evenly distributed. After an intense compensatory post-war increase in births there was a considerable decline; the age-group 10–19 represents 29·3 per cent, while children up to the age of 10 form only 13·8 per cent. These parameters show that there was a great decrease (by more than half) in the number of births. In the second place, the proportion of people in the age-group 20–40 is comparatively small. For both sexes it is only 17·5 per cent.

TABLE 6. *Civil status of the Jewish population of Wrocław**

	Married %	*Single* %	*Widowed* %	*Divorced* %	*Total*
Males	77·3	20·6	2·1	—	100·0
Females	71·9	24·1	3·0	1·0	100·0

* Persons aged 15 and over.

Table 6 shows the sample population distributed by civil status. The proportion of married males is higher than that of married females despite the fact that the sex ratio is 100 : 68 among people over 15. The disparity is accounted for by the high incidence of nationally mixed marriages, illustrated in Fig. 2 and Table 7.

As Table 7 shows, mixed marriages were very infrequent before the war. During and after the war such marriages considerably increased. Clearly, the nationality of the non-Jewish partner depended to a great


AGE STRUCTURE
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20
30
40%

FIG. 1

extent on the period during which the marriage was contracted. During the war the majority were Russians, after the war Poles. Of these mixed marriages the vast majority (94·7 per cent) were contracted by Jewish men. We should note that mixed marriages did not take place in any one social stratum. They were found in all social groups. If we divide the sample of mixed marriages by educational attainment we get the



FIG. 2

following distribution of mixed marriages (Table 8). It should be added that the educational structure of those who are partners in mixed marriages does not differ significantly from that of the total sample of the adult Jewish population of Wrocław.

The small size of respondents' families is shown in Table 9. The average family size is 3·24 persons and certainly small. The size of the Jewish family was decreasing even before the First World War, but the process of reduction was intensified by the Second World War. Our respondents tended to marry quite late in life: the median age of marriage was 33·2 for men and 26·1 for women.

TABLE 7. *Marriage partners by nationality*

Nationality of the marriage partner	*Marriage contracted (percentages)*		
	before end of 1939	*1940–1945*	*1946 and later*
Jewish	96·5	65·1	57·4
Non-Jewish	3·5	34·9	42·6
Polish	3·5	12·7	31·9
Russian and Ukrainian	—	22·2	7·4
German and Greek	—	—	3·3
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0

TABLE 8. *Educational attainment of respondents with non-Jewish spouses*

	Elementary		*Intermediate*		*Higher*		*Total*
	Not completed	*Completed*	*Not completed*	*Completed*	*Not completed*	*Completed*	
Percent structure	19·5	23·4	18·2	16·9	3·8	18·2	100·0

TABLE 9. *Family structure by size*

	Number of persons in the family								*Total*
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	
Percentage of families	12·2	12·2	26·8	40·1	5·9	2·4	—	0·4	100·0

EDUCATION

The analysis made here of the educational attainments of the Jewish population of Wrocław is largely confined to the people who have completed their education.

In this table 'veterans' are distinguished from repatriates. Among the repatriates there were fewer people in the first and last categories (i.e. of people who failed to complete their elementary education and of people who have had a higher education). This difference is balanced by the number of repatriates who completed their intermediate education. In the sample as a whole, one-fifth of the respondents did not complete their elementary education. This last point needs to be examined more closely, for the level of education reached must depend to a large degree on the age-structure of the sample.

TABLE 10. *Educational attainment of respondents, spouses and grown-up children**

	Elementary %		*Intermediate general* %		*Intermediate technical* %		*Higher* %		*Total*
	Not completed	*Completed*	*Not completed*	*Completed*	*Not completed*†	*Completed*	*Not completed*	*Completed*	
Total sample	19·4	25·7	7·3	11·1	10·8	7·6	4·8	13·3	100·0
'Veterans'	21·7	25·5	6·0	8·5	11·3	7·1	5·0	14·9	100·0
Repatriates	13·9	26·1	10·4	17·4	9·6	8·7	4·3	9·6	100·0

* Children living with their parents and no longer at school.
† Including those who had completed elementary technical school.

TABLE 11. *Age of persons with no elementary education*

Age group	*Percent structure*
Less than 30 years of age	1·5
30–39	5·9
40–49	39·6
50–59	42·6
60 and over	10·4
Total	100·0

In Table 11 more than half of the people who have had no elementary education are more than 50 years of age. (The median age is 50·7.) Only 7·4 per cent of the population in this table are under 40. In these circumstances it is very doubtful whether action aimed at improving the level of education would be successful. A large proportion of people in this group are artisans and tradesmen, a group for whom it is very difficult to provide any sort of adult education programme. The group also includes a number of people who describe themselves as being self-educated.

We must now turn to the question of vocational training and professional education, beginning with higher education.

Table 12 shows training in law, medicine, and economics to be dominant. The first two kinds of training reflect traditional Jewish inclinations, while the high percentage of people choosing to study economics is an aspect of social and economic change in Poland and of Jewish participation in that change. The small number of people with a training in agriculture is due not simply to the slight interest shown by Jews in this branch of study but also to its lack of relevance to people living a highly urbanized life. A similar line of reasoning cannot, how-

TABLE 12. *Persons who completed higher education by course of study*

Course of study	%
Technical	5·7
Agricultural	5·7
Legal	20·8
Economics	20·8
Humanities	11·3
Maths-physics	7·5
Medical	20·8
Not specified	7·4
Total	100·0

ever, explain the small number of people with a technical education, most of whom have now left the country.

Table 13 shows the distribution of adults who have received a primary or intermediate education.

TABLE 13. *Courses taken in elementary and intermediate technical education*

Courses	%	
Technical		48·0
building	8·2	
mechanical	8·2	
electrical	4·1	
Economics		17·8
Education		8·2
Health services		5·5
Clothing		6·8
General		2·7
Artistic		1·4
Not specified		9·6
Total		100·0

Almost half the people shown in Table 13 received a technical education, in contrast to the small percentage revealed in Table 12. In this connexion it is important to mention the education programmes conducted in recent years by O.R.T. (the Jewish organization for crafts and technical training). Of all respondents to the questionnaire and their spouses (including non-Jewish), 17·8 per cent took part in various courses organized by O.R.T. after its re-establishment in Poland. The courses were very popular among the repatriates. 27·2 per cent of the adult members of this latter group completed O.R.T. courses, while of the people who settled in Wrocław before 1956 the percentage of those who had completed such courses was only 14·5. Women formed almost three-quarters of those who attended O.R.T. courses. Table 14 shows the distribution over the various courses.

TABLE 14. *People who have completed O.R.T. technical courses*

Type of course	%
Cutting and sewing	37·4
Leather articles	12·0
Staymaking	7·2
Knitting	7·2
Book-binding	4·8
Electro-technical work	4·8
Weaving	3·6
Ladies' hairdressing	3·6
Bookkeeping	3·6
Plumbing	2·4
Carpentry	2·4
Driving	1·2
Chemical laboratory work	1·2
Linen manufacturing	1·2
Brushmaking	1·2
Purse-making	1·2
Cosmetics	1·2
Not specified	3·6
Total	100·0

It will be seen that over 45 per cent of all the O.R.T. trainees attended sewing and tailoring courses (including dressmaking and corset-making). To a large extent these courses provided skill for use in the home, for 71 per cent of the people who completed them did not earn their living. The same can be said of the courses in cosmetics and ladies' hairdressing. But the opposite is the case with trainees in plumbing, cabinet-making, and electrical work. All the people who completed these courses are at work in the trades for which they were trained, as are the great majority (83 per cent) of the trainees in leather work, book-binding, knitting, and textiles. These people were employed in the first instance by co-operatives set up under the auspices of the Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland. 53 per cent of the trainees are at work in their newly acquired trades, although in this respect the 'veterans' differ from the repatriates. The percentage among the former is only 44, but among the latter 67.

The great majority (69·6 per cent) of the children of our respondents fall outside the scope of the inquiry into education; they are either not yet at school or only at an early stage of elementary education. Of the secondary school pupils the majority attend schools which provide an all-round education. The types of higher schools most favoured by Jewish students in Wrocław may be better illustrated by the distribution of the scholarships awarded by the Social and Cultural Association of the Jews in Poland than by data drawn from the questionnaire inquiry (see Table 15).

The most popular choice is medicine, one-third of the students opting

TABLE 15. *Students in receipt of scholarships given by the Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland in the academic year 1960–1*

Courses of study	%
University	24·5
maths, physics, chemistry	10·5
Institute of Technology	28·1
communications	14·0
Higher School of Agriculture	7·0
Higher School of Economics	3·5
Medical Academy	33·3
School of Music	1·8
Academy of Arts	1·8
Total	100·0

for this course of study. Medicine is followed by polytechnical studies. It is also worth noting the interest shown in the natural sciences: 10 per cent of all the recipients of scholarships are studying mathematics, physics, or chemistry.

OCCUPATION AND LEVEL OF LIVING

Data on employment occupy a central position in the information collected in the course of this inquiry. Occupational structure and working conditions determine many other parameters characteristic of a given group.

We may begin the review of problems relating to employment by attempting to arrive at the general degree of economic activity. The value of such an index calculated as the ratio of economically passive to economically active persons, lies in the fact that it allows us to state how many people without a source of income are dependent on a person who is either employed or has some other source of income (e.g. rent, retirement pension, etc.). In the families of our respondents (including non-Jewish spouses) there were 358 economically active and 461 economically passive people. The index of economic activity ($\frac{461}{358}$) is 1·29. This is a very low index indeed and can be explained only by the small size of the respondents' families and by the quite considerable percentage (14·5) of rentiers among the economically active.

But it must be emphasized that the index calculated for the 'veteran' inhabitants of Wrocław is radically different from that calculated for the repatriates. For the former group it is 0·86 and for the latter 2·57. The basic reason for this striking divergence lies in the different age-pyramids of the two groups and their different structures of civil status and family size. The majority of the repatriates are young people, most of them married; only 7·1 per cent of this group are single. Among the



FIG. 3

'veterans' the percentage is nearly twice this figure (13·9). Furthermore, the majority of the repatriates' children are of school or pre-school age, a fact which prevents their mothers from taking up employment.

14·5 per cent of the economically active 'veterans' and 14·4 per cent of the economically active repatriates are rentiers. Consequently the employment indices of the two groups do not differ significantly from their indices of economic activities. The employment index (the ratio of employed to non-employed) is 1·17 for the 'veteran' inhabitants of Wrocław and 3·16 for the repatriates. For the whole of the population investigated the figure is 1·67; that is, for every ten persons nearly four are gainfully employed.

We come now to the kinds of occupation taken up by the respondents and members of their families (excluding non-Jewish spouses). There is very nearly a perfect balance between white-collar workers and manual workers (51 and 49 per cent respectively) among those working in nationalized establishments and institutions, in social bodies, and the liberal professions. But (see Fig. 3) the 'veterans' and the repatriates

TABLE 16. *Occupational structure of the Jewish population of Wrocław*

Occupation	%	*Occupation*	%
Industry and building	56·3	Transport (including railways)	1·9
Leather and shoemaking	12·7	drivers	1·2
furriers	4·6	Trade	6·1
shoemakers	1·8	salesmen in socialized establishments	3·5
gaiter makers	1·4	private traders	1·8
leather goods	3·9	Housing and local administration	0·5
Clothing	12·4	Education, science and culture	9·9
tailors	8·8	research workers	3·9
Textiles	3·3	teachers in intermediate schools	2·1
weavers	1·4	general and technical manual workers in schools	0·7
Printing	2·9	white-collar workers in schools	0·7
book-binders	2·1	journalists	0·7
Woodwork	2·6	Health services*	6·1
carpenters	1·8	doctors of medicine	2·5
Meat industry	0·8	doctors of stomatology	1·8
Brush-makers	1·2	Public administration and justice	3·3
Electro-technicians	3·3	lawyers	1·8
Plumbers	1·9	Political, social and religious organizations	2·9
Metal-workers	1·5	Hairdressers	2·6
Industrial and building painters	1·5	Manual workers (work not specified)	1·5
Transport workers	0·8	White-collar workers (work not specified)	9·9
Industrial workers (occupation not specified)	1·6		
Engineering-technical workers	1·2		
Administration in industry and building	4·9		
economists	1·4		
book-keepers	0·7		
store-keepers	1·1		
supplies and sales	1·1		
White-collar workers in industry and building (type of work not specified)	3·6	Total	100·0

*Excluding research workers in the Medical Academy.

differ markedly in this respect. Manual workers predominate among the repatriates, while there is a slight majority of white-collar workers among the 'veterans'.

We need finally to turn to the occupational structure of the sample. Certain cautions must be entered. First, we do not know how far we succeeded in reaching all sub-groups of the relevant population. Second, the questions put in the questionnaire did not provide sufficiently precise definitions of the kinds of work performed; in consequence, we cannot determine the character of the occupations of a large group of people.

It will be seen from Table 16 that we are unable to place just over 11 per cent of the sample in a particular branch of the economy. Within industry we cannot place just over 8 per cent in a particular sector or occupation. But this shortcoming, while casting some doubt on the indices calculated, does not invalidate the generalizations to be made from the data.

We may deal first of all with the hierarchy of sectors of employment according to the number of Jews employed. In industry (including building, in which a negligible number of Jews are employed) we find six out of every ten employed persons. One-tenth of the sample is employed in education, science, and culture. The next two places in the hierarchy are taken by the health services and trade. Before the war, trade played a preponderant role in Polish Jewish occupational structure; it has now greatly receded.

Of the industrial workers the most frequently represented are tailors, furriers, leather workers, and electrical technicians. The first pair of these occupations are traditional among Polish Jewry; the present role of the second pair shows how change has taken place. It is also worth noting that the representation of medical practitioners and scientific research workers in the sample is comparatively large.

TABLE 17. *Length of employment*

	Length of employment period, in years (percentages)									*Total*
	Less than 1 year	*1–3*	*3–5*	*5–10*	*10–15*	*15–20*	*20–25*	*25–30*	*30 and over*	
Total sample	7·5	16·6	5·9	5·3	16·0	13·3	8·1	5·9	21·4	100·0
'Veterans'	6·6	9·6	4·4	5·9	19·8	14·7	5·9	7·3	25·8	100·0
Repatriates	9·8	35·3	9·8	3·9	5·9	9·8	13·7	2·0	9·8	100·0

Table 17 shows the length of time spent in present occupations. It will be seen that very few of the respondents are newcomers to their present occupations. Almost 65 per cent of the sample have been employed in the same occupation for over ten years, but there is a marked difference in this respect between 'veterans' and repatriates. The median length of employment for the 'veterans' is 16·3 years, that for the repatriates only 5. The difference is due not only to the younger average age of the repatriates but also to the fact that most of them had to be trained and to start a new trade when they got to Wrocław.

Are our respondents satisfied with their present jobs? 77 per cent of them said they were. Of those who said they were not satisfied, the majority were repatriates, 30 per cent of whom said they were dissatisfied, as against some 20 per cent of the 'veterans'. The reasons for dissatisfaction are varied. Of the dissatisfied, 60 per cent expressed the wish to change their employment. The vast majority of the dissatisfied are people not employed in the jobs for which they were trained. For example, a repatriate shoemaker who has been working for the past year as a leather-worker wants to return to his original trade; a white-collar worker would like to work as a motor mechanic, and has indeed started to learn this trade in an O.R.T. course; a shopkeeper would like

to go back to his work as a building technician; a repatriate cashier who has had a higher education says that he would like to be a librarian.

Some people are dissatisfied because they find the work too heavy, as in the case of a taxi-driver of 63. Some people want to change their jobs because of low wages. For example, a storekeeper earning 1,500 zl. a month, on which he has to keep a family of six, says that he would like to take any job which would give him a living wage for his family. A repatriate worker with three people to support and earning 700 zl. a month expressed the same desire. (It should be noted that the questionnaires were completed before the general increase in wages on 1 August 1961.)

TABLE 18. *Families by average monthly income per person*

	Income in zl.								*Total*
	Up to 400	*401 to 600*	*601 to 800*	*801 to 1,000*	*1,001 to 1,200*	*1,201 to 1,500*	*1,501 to 2,000*	*Over 2,000*	
Percent of families	15·3	28·0	21·6	16·1	5·8	7·0	2·9	3·3	100·0

The distribution of incomes is given in Table 18. The data show that the median income per person is 663 zl. per month. More than 40 per cent of the families do not have more than 600 zl. per month for the maintenance of one person, while only about 20 per cent receive 1,000 zl. per month per person. Is the material reliable? Data on income, and not only those derived from questionnaire inquiries, give rise to all sorts of misgivings, but there is in fact nothing to suggest that the indices derived from our data are more erroneous than those derived from other inquiries of the same kind. There seems to be no reason, therefore, to question the validity of our data. Let us turn to the discussion of the levels of monthly income postulated by our respondents. The answers received to the question, 'What sum, in the respondent's opinion, is necessary to maintain his family?' were quite uniform. All the respondents understood that the question concerned the income needed to secure a minimum standard of living. The median level of postulated

TABLE 19. *Incomes postulated for support of one person per month*

	Postulated incomes in zl.								*Total*
	Up to 400	*401 to 600*	*601 to 800*	*801 to 1,000*	*1,001 to 1,200*	*1,201 to 1,500*	*1,501 to 2,000*	*Over 2,000*	
Percent of respondents	—	12·4	28·0	30·6	9·3	11·4	4·7	3·6	100·0

income is 863 zl. per month, that is to say, 30 per cent more than the income received, a difference which does not seem very great. There is a strong relationship between the income postulated and that received: higher postulated incomes correspond with higher received incomes, as Fig. 4 shows. With one exception (due.probably to the small number of families in this group: 17) the curve of postulated incomes rises with that of incomes received.

Before we conclude the review of this part of our survey it is worth seeing how the respondents evaluate their present jobs and incomes in relation to their previous conditions. More than half the repatriates

TABLE 20. *Comparison of working conditions in Wrocław with those in previous place of residence*

	Opinion of working conditions			*Total*
	Worse	*The same*	*Better*	
Total sample	31·4	6·8	61·8	100·0
'Veterans'	23·4	7·0	69·6	100·0
Repatriates	51·0	6·4	42·6	100·0

consider their present working conditions worse than those of their earlier homes. In contrast, two-thirds of the 'veterans' are satisfied. As one might have assumed *a priori*, the complaints come mainly from those who have moved from the towns of Lower Silesia.

A similar picture emerges from the replies on earnings. About 70 per cent of the repatriates in Wrocław earn less than before, and only one person in five says that his material position has improved. Among

TABLE 21. *Wages and salaries in Wrocław compared with those in previous place of residence*

	Level of present income is			*Total*
	Lower	*The same*	*Higher*	
Total sample	46·5	4·5	49·0	100·0
'Veterans'	37·6	2·4	60·0	100·0
Repatriates	68·6	9·8	21·6	100·0

those longer settled in Wrocław the situation is somewhat different, although those now earning less are more numerous than those whose working conditions are worse. Among those whose earnings are now smaller, 64 per cent are immigrants from other settlements in Lower Silesia. It is clear that the continuous flow of the Jewish population into


RECEIVED AND POSTULATED INCOMES FOR MONTHLY UPKEEP OF 1 PERSON
INCOMES POSTULATED
zł.
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
0
300
500
700
900
1100
1300
1500
1700
1900 zł.
INCOME RECEIVED

FIG. 4

Wrocław is due in the main to the amenities and cultural and scientific attractions of a large town.

CULTURAL INTERESTS

Let us begin with the readership of daily papers and periodicals. The respondents mentioned over a hundred papers and periodicals read regularly. Among the papers and periodicals mentioned were not only those in Polish, but in Yiddish, Russian, English, French, German, Hebrew, and Esperanto. Of the Wrocław dailies, *Gazeta Robotnicza* is more widely read (158 respondents) than *Słowo Polskie* (129 respondents). (Some respondents mentioned both papers.) Of the Warsaw dailies, the most popular is *Trybuna Ludu*, read by 69 respondents; it is followed by *Kurier Polski*, taken by 29 respondents. The Yiddish paper *Folks-Shtimme* has the largest number of permanent subscribers among our respondents.

Among the Russian dailies the most popular is *Pravda*, which is read by five times as many respondents as *Izvestia*. *Przekrój* is the most popular of the magazines (mentioned by one in four of the respondents), followed by *Panorama* (32 readers). One in six of the respondents mentioned the women's weekly *Przyjaciółka*. The following literary and cultural periodicals are read: *Polityka*, *Przegląd Kulturalny*, and *Nowa Kultura*.[5] Very few people read the Wrocław literary periodical *Odra*. On the other hand, the atheistic *Argumenty* enjoys wide popularity. Among political periodicals *Nowe Drogi* is widely read. The Yiddish literary periodical *Yiddishe Shriftn* is regularly read by 35 respondents. Naturally, nearly all the lawyers mention *Państwo i Prawo*, the doctors *Służbę Zdrowia*, and the economists *Życie Gospodarcze* and *Ekonomistę*.

We did not ask the number of books recently read, but we did ask the number of books bought (excluding textbooks) and whether the respondent or a member of his family made use of the public libraries. The median number of books bought in the course of the previous year is 15. It is interesting that the repatriates, having a smaller number of intellectuals among them and being worse off materially, should buy

TABLE 22. *Families by number of books* bought in the course of the previous year*

	Number of books bought (percentages)							*Total*
	0	*1–5*	*6–10*	*11–15*	*16–20*	*21–30*	*31 and over*	
Total sample	21·4	7·5	9·5	12·4	14·9	15·3	19·0	100·0
'Veterans'	24·3	7·7	10·5	10·5	15·6	14·3	17·1	100·0
Repatriates	13·1	6·6	6·6	18·0	13·1	18·0	24·6	100·0

* Excluding school textbooks.

more books than the 'veteran' inhabitants of Wrocław. The influence of age structure on readership is shown in this apparent paradox. One-fifth of the whole sample do not buy books at all, but it does not follow that they do not read them. 57·3 per cent of the repatriates and their families use the public libraries. It is again worth noting that the proportion is higher among the repatriates (62·9 per cent) than among the 'veterans' (55·5 per cent).

TABLE 23. *Families buying books in various languages in the course of the previous year*

	Percentage of books bought in given language							*Total*
	Language of publication	*0*	*0–25*	*25–50*	*50–75*	*75–100*	*100*	
Total sample	Polish	12·8	12·3	27·9	22·4	10·2	14·4	100·0
	Yiddish	32·7	10·7	24·0	16·0	6·4	10·2	100·0
	Russian	55·7	25·1	12·3	5·3	1·6	—	100·0
	Other	80·2	17·1	1·6	1·1	—	—	100·0
'Veterans'	Polish	8·9	6·7	26·7	25·9	12·6	19·2	100·0
	Yiddish	40·0	11·1	20·0	14·1	5·9	8·9	100·0
	Russian	65·1	20·8	11·9	1·5	0·7	—	100·0
	Other	78·5	17·8	2·2	1·5	—	—	100·0
Repatriates	Polish	23·1	26·9	30·8	13·4	3·9	1·9	100·0
	Yiddish	13·4	9·6	34·7	21·2	7·7	13·4	100·0
	Russian	30·8	36·5	13·4	15·4	3·9	—	100·0
	Other	84·6	15·4	—	—	—	—	100·0

TABLE 24. *Attendance at theatres, operas, and concerts*[6]

	Frequency					*Total*
	None	*Very rare*	*Rare*	*Frequent*	*Very frequent*	
Total sample	20·3	17·3	12·9	12·9	36·5	100·0
'Veterans'	20·7	15·4	9·5	12·4	42·0	100·0
Repatriates	19·1	22·2	22·2	14·3	22·2	100·0

Table 23 shows the percentages of books bought in various languages. Most of the families buy Polish books. In only 12·8 per cent of the questionnaires is this language not mentioned. Naturally, among the 'veterans' the percentage is even lower. The proportion of those buying only Polish books needs to be emphasized. The large number of books bought in Russian, especially by the repatriates, is not surprising. Apart from books in Polish, Yiddish, and Russian, people mostly buy books in English, but also in French, German and Esperanto.

We may now turn to attendance at the theatre, opera, concerts, and the cinema. A special question was put about attendance at the State Yiddish Theatre from Warsaw which comes to Wrocław as a guest company. It will be seen from Table 24 that one-fifth of the respondents

are not interested in the theatre at all, while one in six attends performances very rarely. On the other hand, there is an almost equally large group of people (36·5 per cent) who go to the theatre very often, and a considerable proportion of this group do not miss a single performance. On some of the questionnaires returned by people who do not go to the theatre at all, we noted such remarks as 'Tickets are too dear for us'. The expense explains to a great extent why the proportion of those not attending the theatre or attending only rarely is almost similar in both groups ('veterans' and repatriates), a marked divergence appearing only among those who go to the theatre very often.

Table 25 shows attendance at the State Yiddish Theatre. If we com-

TABLE 25. *Attendance at the State Yiddish Theatre*[7]

	Frequency					*Total*
	None	*Very rare*	*Rare*	*Frequent*	*Very frequent*	
Total sample	9·1	5·2	13·3	23·7	48·7	100·0
'Veterans'	11·2	5·9	12·4	24·9	45·6	100·0
Repatriates	3·2	3·2	15·8	20·6	57·2	100·0

pare Tables 24 and 25 we see that the Yiddish Theatre is more popular. It will be noted that almost half the respondents go regularly to the Yiddish Theatre, which is especially popular among the repatriates.

We come now to cinema attendance. About one-third of the re-

TABLE 26. *Cinema attendance*

	Average per month				*Total*
	Once or less	*2–3*	*4–5*	*6 and more*	
Total sample	31·4	29·0	26·5	13·1	100·0
'Veterans'	32·6	32·6	24·8	10·0	100·0
Repatriates	28·1	18·8	31·3	21·8	100·0

spondents go to the cinema sporadically. Almost 40 per cent are regular cinema-goers. Of course, the spread of television has lowered cinema attendance markedly; one family in every five in the sample owns a set.

The Jews of Wrocław also take advantage of the cultural activities organized by the Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland. There are regular 'Friday evenings' of lectures and entertainment, and recreational facilities provided in the Lewartowski Club. Table 27 shows the popularity of the 'Friday evenings'. Over half the re-

TABLE 27. *Number of times in the course of the previous year the respondents attended 'Friday evenings'*

	Number of 'evenings'							*Total*
	0	*5 or less*	*6–10*	*11–15*	*16–20*	*21–29*	*30 and over*	
Percent of families	33·5	23·2	10·5	6·3	6·3	1·3	18·9	100·0

spondents do not take part in these 'evenings', but there is a large number who are regular participants. Table 28 shows the frequency of

TABLE 28. *Number of visits by respondents to the Lewartowski Club during the course of one month*

	Number of visits							*Total*
	0	*1–2*	*3–4*	*5–7*	*8–12*	*13–16*	*17 and more*	
Percent of respondents	35·0	17·3	13·6	7·8	9·0	4·9	12·4	100·0

visits to the Lewartowski Club. Over half the respondents do not go to the Club at all, while one person in four visits it rarely and one in five habitually. It is worth noting that one respondent in six visits some club. It can be seen from the data in Tables 25, 27 and 28 that the theatrical performances are the most popular of the activities designed for the Jewish population.

ATTACHMENT TO WROCŁAW

It is not easy to discover the extent to which particular groups of its population are attached to the city of Wrocław. The links binding people to its life are highly complex and of different kinds. A population made up of people coming from many different parts of the country will undoubtedly become more and more unified, but in the earlier years the various groups of settlers not only lived in isolation from one another but were also mutually antagonistic. A person's attitude is shaped by his past experience, by the milieu from which he comes, and above all by his family and social ties. The society of the immediate post-war years was atomized because of differences in education and occupation. People were cautious in making new friends; they lacked confidence and were sometimes frightened.

The political and economic changes of the last two decades have

exerted an enormous influence on the development of social relationships. Economic factors have undoubtedly been at the root of the process of integration, helping along the development of a sense of belonging to the new urban entity. The most important social bond is work. Working conditions, the attachment of a man to his job, the satisfaction it gives him, relations with fellow workers and managers, and the level of earnings—all these unite the workers with the establishment in which they are employed and help them to form a stable entity. From this attachment flows local patriotism. And it is obvious too that housing conditions play a role.

It would be absurd, however, to see this question exclusively in the light of economic factors. Other elements are involved, such as the formation of new family ties, the making of new circles of friends, involvement in social activities, participation in the cultural and intellectual development of the city, the formation of new sentiments, and so on. And new social ties are made not only by reason of regular contacts but also as a result of occasional encounters.

If the stability of the whole population of Wrocław is a complicated matter, that of the Jews of the city is a hundred times more complicated. The Jewish population was brutally uprooted from its original home by the war. No Jew moved of his own free will. All were forced. Mass extermination led to the total disruption of traditional and family ties, which were eventually replaced by new friendships and by contacts with relatives abroad. It must be stressed that the absence of family ties in the country was not conducive to the stability of the Jewish population. As our material shows, 45 per cent of the respondents and their spouses have their next-of-kin abroad.

The bitterness of the relationship between Poles and Jews in the past had a disturbing influence on the stability of Jewish life in post-war Poland. We must view this problem through the wartime experiences of both parts of the population and in the light of the social and political changes brought about by the destruction of the war. Complexes and animosities that have been formed and cultivated for generations cannot simply be removed by the touch of a magic wand. It is a long business, and neither an act of will by an individual nor a single piece of legislation can remove the trouble; for this reason the course of events has not been smooth. One must be very shortsighted not to see the difficulties, but at the same time one would need to be a malicious enemy of the regime not to see that an enormous change for the better has been brought about since the Liberation of Poland.

Some of the ways in which Jews are tied to the city have already been discussed. The occupational structure shows that the age-old isolation of the 'occupational ghetto' has disappeared. Material and working conditions reveal that the situation of the respondents has been improved. Adaptation to the city has been made easier by the fact that

the majority of the respondents came from big cities and sizable towns; the survey of cultural interests demonstrates that our informants take full advantage of the amenities of a big city.

We must now turn to other matters bearing on the stability of the Jews of Wrocław. Everyone concerned with resettlement knows the importance of housing, and this question must be discussed. The average (median) density per room is 1·26 persons. These conditions are some-

TABLE 29. *Families by average number of persons per room*

	Number of persons per room							*Total*
	0·8 and less	*0·8 to 1·2*	*1·2 to 1·4*	*1·4 to 1·8*	*1·8 to 2·0*	*2·0 to 3·0*	*Over 3·0*	
Percent of families	8·1	34·9	25·5	12·8	13·2	3·7	1·7	100·0

what better than for the city as a whole as established by the population census taken in December 1960. Obviously, the housing of the repatriates is worse than that of the people established in Wrocław before 1956. The comparison between present and past housing conditions is given in Table 30. Two points need to be emphasized. First, contrary to

TABLE 30. *Housing conditions of respondents in Wrocław compared with those in previous place of residence*

	Worse	*Same*	*Better*	*Total*
Total sample	33·0	6·1	60·9	100·0
'Veterans'	31·6	3·8	64·6	100·0
Repatriates	37·0	13·0	50·0	100·0

their experience in respect of earnings and working conditions, the repatriates have improved their housing by coming to Wrocław. Second, among the 'veterans' 60 per cent with worse housing conditions came from other towns.

TABLE 31. *Relations with neighbours*

	Opinion of relationship						*Total*
	Very good	*Good*	*Fair*	*Bad*	*Very bad*	*No relations*	
Families	12·8	71·4	6·0	4·7	1·7	3·4	100·0

A factor closely connected with housing and bearing on the stability of the population is the relations formed and maintained with neighbours. Almost 85 per cent of the respondents state that their relations with their neighbours are 'good' or 'very good'. Some of those who gave opposite answers stated their reasons. One of our informants writes: 'Bad because of a common kitchen.' Another says: 'Get on well with the Poles and badly with the Jews.' As we can see, the animosities which occur in every group make their appearance here. There were a few more specific reasons given. One brief remark was: 'Teasing the child.' A fuller statement read: 'Unfortunately our relations with our neighbours leave much to be desired. The trouble stems, as is well known, from the backwardness of some people who want to look upon me as their inferior. Let us hope, however, that in the end their attitude will change and that we shall respect each other.'

In this context we must ask whether the Jewish population is still

TABLE 32. *Respondents by percentage of Jews among the total number of people with whom they maintain friendly relations*

	100·0	*100–75*	*75–50*	*50–25*	*25–0*	*0*	*Total*
Total sample	19·5	16·5	36·0	21·5	6·0	0·5	100·0
'Veterans'	16·4	16·9	36·6	22·2	7·2	0·7	100·0
Repatriates	29·8	14·9	34·0	19·2	2·1	—	100·0

isolated. The large number of mixed marriages gives a decided answer to this question. We have already referred to this matter and can now offer some additional data. It appears that every fifth informant makes his friends exclusively among Jews; there are practically no respondents who do not have Jewish friends. There is, however, a large group

TABLE 33. *Families among whom the percentage of Jewish friends is less than 50*

	Percentage of families	*Indices*
Type of work		
manual workers	29·5	0·60
white-collar workers	70·5	1·38
Nationality of spouse		
Jewish	42·3	0·65
Non-Jewish	57·7	1·63

(nearly 30 per cent) whose Jewish friends account for less than half their close friends. It was to be expected that the percentages would differ as between repatriates and 'veterans', but it appears that the

proportion of non-Jewish friends depends essentially on two things: occupation and spouse's nationality (see Table 33). The indices shown in the last column of the table express the divergence between the total sample population and the particular sub-group. An index of less than 1 indicates that the size of each sub-group is less than its proportion of the total sample. It is clear that the proportion of Jewish friends is larger among workers and their families in which the spouse is Jewish than in the other sub-groups. It is to be noted that, while Poles predominate (see Table 34) among non-Jewish friends, there are also

TABLE 34. *Proportion of Poles in the total number of non-Jews with whom respondents maintain friendly relations*

	Percentage of Poles among friends						*Total*
	0	*0–25*	*25–50*	*50–75*	*75–100*	*100*	
Respondents	6·2	1·2	4·3	9·3	10·6	68·4	100·0

non-Jewish friends of other nationalities. As a more detailed analysis reveals, the proportion of friends of these other nationalities—Russians, Ukrainians, Greeks and occasionally Germans—depends on the spouse's nationality.

In a moment we shall be considering our respondents' views of their experience in Wrocław. Before doing so we should deal with a few figures on social activities. 25 per cent of the adults are members of the Polish Workers' Party. Of the total number of social activities mentioned in the questionnaires 32 per cent arose from participation in the Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland; 16 per cent of the respondents are secretaries and leaders of the P.O.P. local groups (party units); 10 per cent are members (other than secretaries) of various party units; 4 per cent belong to branches of the T.P.P.R. (Polish-Russian Friendship Society).

TABLE 35. *Satisfaction and dissatisfaction with residence in Wrocław*

	Yes	*No*	*Total*
Total sample	86·7	13·3	100·0
'Veterans'	91·4	8·6	100·0
Repatriates	73·0	27·0	100·0

Table 35 shows how the respondents regard their stay in Wrocław. The data in this table reveal the differences between the 'veterans' and

the repatriates. The repatriates are less stabilized than the Jews who came to Wrocław earlier. The following remarks appear in the questionnaire sent in by people dissatisfied with living in Wrocław: 'I should prefer Warsaw'; 'I am dissatisfied with my flat'; 'I should have liked to join my brothers', the respondent having two brothers abroad.

The process of social integration in the western territory has engaged the attention of many research workers. Two chief problems have emerged in their publications: the adaptation of the rural population to city life, and the co-existence of settlers coming from various parts of the country. Our survey throws but little light on these questions from a quantitative point of view, but qualitatively it has its importance. A fundamental change in small entities is no less significant than a gradual change in large social groups.

The personal motives of the Jewish population for settling and remaining in Wrocław are varied. Some of them made their choice in the inter-war period in order to take part in the fight for social justice, while others came during the struggle against the Nazi invaders. Still others decided to join the fight for a new social justice and fraternity in the difficult post-war period. The formation of a new society is by no means easy. Victories are accompanied by losses. Family ties with people living abroad, alluded to earlier, and the friendships still kept up with people scattered all over the world as the result of the war, were not conducive to the stability of the Jewish population in Wrocław. Equally unfavourable to this stability was the moral shock brought by the exposure of the faults of our party. If, despite all the difficulties, bad traditions, and surviving animosities, the integration of the Jewish population into Wrocław society has been brought about, and if Leninist principles of the co-existence of different nationalities have been triumphant, the success both justifies Marxist ideology and makes evident the tremendous transformation that has taken place in our social consciousness.

NOTES

[1] F. Friedman, 'Zagłada Żydów polskich w latach 1939–1945' (The extermination of Polish Jews 1939–1945), *Biuletyn Głównej Komisji Badań Zbrodni Niemieckich w Polsce*, No. 1, 1946, p. 206.

[2] M. Kopeć, *Zjawiska demograficzne towarzyszące zmianom granic Polski* (Demographic phenomena attending the changes in Poland's boundaries), Cracow, 1946, p. 44.

[3] I should like to express my thanks to all those who took part in the distribution of the questionnaire, and especially to the Secretary of the Association, Mr. Leon Draetwko.

[4] In tabulating the results of the inquiry I have distinguished between two groups: the 'veterans', who moved into Wrocław at various times before the period of repatriation, and the repatriates.

[5] The questionnaires were completed

before *Polityka* (Nos. 20–25, 1961) began to serialize the Eichmann memoirs, which must have considerably increased its Jewish readership.

[6] Excluding the performances by the State Yiddish Theatre. The following scale is employed in the table:—very rare: once or twice a year; rare: 3 to 4 times; frequent: 5 to 6; very frequent: 7 and more times.

[7] Because of the infrequent visits made by the Yiddish Theatre to Wrocław a different scale is used:—very rare: once a year; rare: twice a year; frequent: 3 to 4 times; very frequent: 5 and more times.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE STUDY OF IMMIGRANTS

Percy S. Cohen

(Review Article)

I

IT has become a commonplace of sociology to assert that immigrants move not only from one place but from one social system to another: they abandon one set of rights, obligations, values, symbols, and beliefs for a new one. However, if this were all, the problem of studying immigrants—to say nothing of the problem of being an immigrant—would be much simpler. But this is not all. Firstly, immigrant social life is not merely a prototypical version of that of the host society; immigrants occupy a particular social status, that of newcomers; and the nature of that status is affected by many other circumstances. Secondly, immigrants do not simply abandon their previous culture and social relationships; in fact, they may unwittingly or even reluctantly retain a number of characteristics while abandoning others which they would happily keep. All of this makes for complexity in the pattern of immigrant social life.

Of course, the methodological problems of dealing with complex patterns are not peculiar to the study of immigrants; they are germane to all sociological investigation. Nevertheless, it could be argued that they are more acute in the study of immigrants. In most stable, or slowly-changing societies, there is a strong likelihood that certain factors or features of social life will form typical constellations: for example, differences in images of social rank will be predictably associated with differences in social class itself. This being so, the number of 'factor permutations' to be found in any social situation will be far smaller than that which is mathematically possible. In immigrant societies—or, for that matter, in rapidly changing societies—there is far less likelihood that such predictable constellations will be found; and, therefore, the number of 'factor permutations' will be much greater: for example, it could not be assumed that images are associated simply with social class; the differences within classes—between ethnic groups, for example—may be just as great as those between them.

There are a number of interesting reasons why immigrant social structures are more complex, in this sense, than others. First, it is in the very nature of the process of immigration that social and cultural factors are 'torn' from their original contexts and introduced into a new one in almost random fashion: for example, the members of different ethnic groups may 'carry' different ideologies, family structures, skills, etc., whose coexistence in the new society is largely fortuitous. Second, the conditions which affect immigrant settlement are often subject to numerous chance circumstances: two shiploads of immigrants from the same country of origin may be subject to very different treatment because of changed circumstances. Third, it is a common feature of immigrant social life that it tends, for a while, to be relatively isolated; consequently, the internal conditions of immigrant communal life may, to some extent, vary independently of conditions in the wider society.

The kinds of social factors which may affect the process of immigrant settlement are: the availability, control and distribution of resources, the structure of power and administration, and other institutional features of the host society; the forms of immigrant reception and settlement, the extent and forms of relationships between immigrants and the host society, and between different immigrant groups; the values and beliefs to be found in the host society; the internal structure of immigrant groups; the skills and types of knowledge possessed by immigrants; the expectations, images, and values of immigrants; and so on.

These factors do not merely produce a joint effect; they interact, and each one may produce very different effects, depending upon the presence or absence of other factors in the total constellation. For example, cohesive immigrant groups may be at an advantage in comparison with isolated families, where large-scale co-operation is called for; but they may be at a disadvantage where individual initiative is the main avenue to success.

Sociology has a number of techniques to deal with the problem of complexity, the most important of which is the method of multivariant statistical analysis. However, if this technique is to be used, the number of comparable cases—that is, the size of the sample, or of the total universe, if this is to be used—must be very large to deal with a large number of factors. Where the unit of study is the individual, this presents no serious difficulties, other than finding the time, manpower, and resources for research; but where the unit is not the individual—and in sociological analysis it very often is not—the problem of numbers is often very serious. For example, the application of multivariant analysis to the study of structure and processes in whole communities may call for a minimum number of cases which is even in excess of the total universe.

Consider the following example. One wishes to study co-operation and willingness to co-operate in immigrant villages in Israel. One finds, let us say, that there is more co-operation in village A, which is settled by immigrants from one country, Rumania, than there is in village B, which is settled by immigrants from several countries of the Near East, North Africa, and Europe. How is one to explain the difference? It might be due to greater cultural homogeneity, to greater social cohesion (which is *not* the same thing) or to any number of other features which differentiate the two communities, such as length of residence, age composition, the predispositions of the immigrants, leadership influence, and so on; furthermore, the difference might even be due to 'exogenous' factors, such as settlement policy, or geography; and finally, it might be due not to any single factor taken alone, but to the interaction between several such factors. It is quite clear that even if the two communities have been matched for a number of factors, there would still be a large number of possible ones in which they would differ: any attempt to test an hypothesis suggested by the observation of these two cases would therefore call for a *great* number of additional village studies.

Now it may well be that the number required for accurate and significant statistical analysis is not greater than the number in existence: though in this particular case it would be quite reasonable to consider a minimum of five possible factors, each of which is given only three values; and this would require a minimum sample of 240 villages. Even if it were possible to *find* a minimum sample of this size, the actual task of investigation—assuming that each village study was sufficiently thorough to produce reliable information, an assumption which is often treated rather lightly—would be formidable.

II

One way of dealing with the problem of complexity in the study of immigrants is to abandon controlled statistical comparison of the kind referred to above, and to use the intensive case study method. This has advantages: one can identify and isolate a number of factors, demonstrate the pattern of their interconnexions, and compare a few patterns of this kind; and one can present the data in all their richness. But the obvious defect of the method is that, however convincing the analysis, one must 'take it or leave it': the fact that it 'makes sense' does not compel acceptance. In any case, even if one does accept it, one still does not know how much significance to attribute to one factor rather than to another.

Another solution is to combine case studies with broad statistical analysis. The latter technique can be applied to survey data on units,

such as individuals or families, which can be studied easily in relatively large numbers; and the case studies can provide 'background' material for a qualitative structural analysis within which the more precise statistical data are fitted. While this solution has obvious merits, it also has serious defects: the qualitative material usually lacks the detail and precision to be found where pure case studies are carried out; and the quantitative material has all the deficiencies usually associated with survey techniques.

A third solution is to avoid the problems of immigrant social life altogether, and to concentrate on the subjective characteristics of being an immigrant: this would involve studying social attitudes, for example, rather than social structure itself. The advantages of doing this are overwhelming. One can take the individual as the unit of study, and thereby obtain a large sample; one can use survey methods, for one is not studying the immigrant in social action but in his responses to a questionnaire; and one can quantify and standardize the data with considerable precision. The final attraction of this kind of study to the investigator is that it does allow him to simplify the issues considerably, and to deal with small numbers of variables at a time. The only serious fault in this kind of inquiry is that it does not tell one much about the structure and processes of immigrant social life.

III

This third solution is the one that has been adopted by Dr. Judith T. Shuval, of the Institute of Applied Social Research in Jerusalem, who studied immigrants shortly after their arrival in Israel, and while they were still in camps. A number of concise reports on Dr. Shuval's researches have now been published in a single volume,* with an introduction by Professor L. Guttman, the scientific director of the Institute, whose own contributions to social research technique are widely known, used, and admired.

Dr. Shuval's book deals with a number of seemingly different topics, to each of which a chapter is devoted: the influence of ideology on decision-making; the connexion between ideology and frustration; the effects of unemployment on the morale of immigrants; the early processes of immigrant acculturation; and aspirations for social mobility on the part of immigrants. There is a common link between all these researches, and they are presented together to provide a general picture of 'immigrants in transition'; introductory and concluding sections of

* *Immigrants on the Threshold*, Judith T. Shuval, Atherton Press (70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.), 1963, pp. xxiv + 216, $6.75.

the book, which do not themselves report on research findings, provide a framework for the discussion of immigrant social life in Israel, and into this the findings are fitted.

The main hypotheses which have been tested by Dr. Shuval's findings are as follows:

(i) Immigrants with a Zionist ideology are more receptive to information about Israel than are those without such an ideology.

(ii) Those with a strong Zionist ideology are more prone to disappointment than are those without such an ideology.

(iii) European immigrants are more likely to suffer disappointment with Israel than are non-European immigrants, because their level of expectations, based on ideology or experience, is higher.

(iv) Where an immigrant has a Zionist ideology, an increase in the amount of information available to him enables him to plan more effectively and constructively for the future; but where the immigrant has no such ideology—or even has a hostile one—an increase in the amount of information available to him will have the opposite effect.

(v) Unemployment lowers morale; but its effect in lowering morale is slighter where the level of expectations is lower.

(vi) Non-European immigrants have a more favourable attitude to the ideal values of Israeli society than have European immigrants; they are more likely to seek information from 'veterans', and are less hostile in their feelings towards the new society than are Europeans. In other words, non-Europeans are readier to 'acculturate' than are Europeans; they are more likely than Europeans to 'approach' the new culture, and less likely to 'withdraw' from it.

(vii) Non-European immigrants are readier to 'acculturate' because they are more strongly motivated by a desire for social mobility; they embrace the new norms in their endeavour to 'get ahead'. European immigrants are slower to 'acculturate', despite the fact that their past social experience is closer to the new reality, because they experience greater relative deprivation; in withdrawing from, or rejecting, the new norms they are expressing their sense of misfortune.

(viii) Non-Europeans enjoy greater social mobility than Europeans: this, despite the fact that they are more passive in their attitude to mobility.

There is nothing inherently simple in these topics; in fact the comparative study of rates of acculturation could involve great complexity. It is the questions that Dr. Shuval asks that are relatively simple. She works with great technical elegance: her hypotheses are clearly stated and the evidence, analysed with considerable statistical skill, is unambiguously presented. Dr. Shuval even goes so far as to indicate weaknesses in her data, and to point out where her speculations are unsupported by evidence. However, the fact that she asks simple questions leads her, one suspects, to over-simplified, if not simple-minded

answers. Consider the study of acculturation. In support of her hypothesis that non-Europeans 'acculturate' more rapidly, Dr. Shuval cites the evidence that, over a period non-Europeans learn to seek information from 'veterans' while Europeans, if anything, are less likely to do this. This evidence is interpreted to mean that non-Europeans become more 'out-going' in relation to the wider society, while Europeans become more 'withdrawn' from it. But the same piece of evidence can be interpreted in a very different way. If non-Europeans are, at the outset, less familiar with the ways of the host society, they will have greater difficulty in knowing where to seek information; when they become more familiar with these ways they are more likely to seek information from those who can give it; if Europeans become familiar with the ways of the wider society more quickly than non-Europeans they will also be quicker to seek information from one another than from an official. It could be argued that this piece of evidence actually refutes Dr. Shuval's hypothesis, and that her interpretation of it accords with the viewpoint of officialdom: it would be not surprising if a bureaucrat were to measure acculturation in terms of an immigrant's readiness to consult him. In reply to this Dr. Shuval could argue that this finding is consistent with a number of others which, together, constitute a pattern. But her only piece of really significant evidence is that there is a decline in the European's perception of friendliness over a period of six months, while there is no corresponding decline in the case of non-Europeans. This may be a significant fact, but it does not necessarily support the hypothesis. In any case, the assertion that non-Europeans acculturate more rapidly than Europeans is very much like the assertion that communist societies have higher economic growth rates than capitalist ones: when one starts, as it were, from scratch, this means very little. Apart from this, Dr. Shuval does not show that one type of immigrant actually does acculturate more rapidly, but that this type expresses a willingness to do so: this is not at all the same thing.

It is rather unfortunate, in this respect, that Professor Guttman, in his introduction to the book, refers to these as studies of a 'transition', for the use of this concept implies some knowledge of a future state as well as of a past one; and presumably the future one is that of 'integration'—whatever *that* may mean—in Israeli society. Considering that the later stage has now been reached—the researches were carried out in 1949–50, nearly fourteen years before the book was published—and that the non-Europeans are generally considered to be inadequately integrated, one wonders what the implications of Dr. Shuval's studies really are. An analysis of the actual social situation at the time—however inelegant, in the purely technical sense—might have provided a more reliable basis for prognosis, if not for accurate prediction.

IV

It has become fashionable in some quarters to dismiss as trivial any sociological research which is technically refined, and, indeed, to assert an inverse relationship between statistical precision and significance of content. One need not subscribe to this view in evaluating Dr. Shuval's work. In the judgement of this reviewer it does have several important merits: it demonstrates the usefulness of certain techniques and of the author's skill in using them, particularly in showing how the influence of one variable can alter the relationship between two others; the hypotheses, most of which deal with 'triplets of variables', can themselves be shown to support or refute higher level theories, which are, on the whole, drawn from social psychology; and some of the evidence does challenge vulgar assumptions. A book possessing all these qualities which also asked and answered questions about the actual structure and processes of immigrant social life would indeed merit the attention of all social scientists.

SHORTER NOTICES

O. SCHMELZ and D. SALZMAN, *Criminal Statistics in Israel, 1949–1962, Volume II, Analysis*, pp. clix, 213 tables. Publications of the Institute of Criminology, No. 8, Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1964.

In 1962 Schmelz and Salzman published Volume I of *Criminal Statistics in Israel, 1949–1958*. This brought together for the first time data from many different sources (police, prisons, etc.), processed them to obtain information for uniform categories of offenders and offences throughout, and presented detailed tables covering nearly all aspects of crime in Israel. Despite this immense achievement the figures were of limited value to the foreign researcher because there were no basic data from which to compute crime *rates* (see the reviewer's note on this volume in the *British Journal of Criminology*, April 1963). Volume II, as promised, has made good this deficiency. The authors have provided a detailed and admirably clear commentary to over 200 tables, have brought the data more up to date by including figures for 1960 (and occasionally 1961), have turned raw data to rates per 1,000 of the specific population, and computed many useful percentages. Furthermore they have, at every stage, pointed out changes in the definitions and categories employed which affect the interpretations of the statistics, and written a concise methodological appendix.

The volume is divided into five sections dealing in turn with a general picture of the state of crime in Israel, the demographic and social characteristics of offenders, the types of offences committed, the number and characteristics of recidivists, and the judgements and penalties imposed by the courts. Thus figures are given for all the processes from the recording of offences by the police to the sentencing of convicted offenders. This is certainly a mammoth achievement.

The statistics show a rise in crime per 1,000 of the population in the years 1951 and 1952 following the mass immigration. After that, there was a fall in crime and a stable rate until 1961 when it began slowly to rise again. As the authors point out, this stability is remarkable in view of the widespread social and economic changes that have taken place since the establishment of the State.

By far the most interesting and stimulating chapter to the criminologist is that dealing with the characteristics of offenders. Offenders have been analysed not only in terms of the usual distinctions of age, sex, occupation, and type of offence, but also by religion, country of birth, country of origin if Israeli-born, year of immigration, types of settlement, and sub-district in which living. Israeli criminologists have not fought shy of the difficult problems attending integration by ignoring them in their statistics. Thus a great deal of information has been gathered which is of direct value to those interested in the sociology of crime. Already, another Israeli, Shlomo Shoham, has made use of such data to test culture-conflict theories of crime.

Crime rates are higher (even leaving aside offences against defence regulations) among non-Jews than Jews and especially high among the Moslems. It is also apparent that Jews who have immigrated from Africa and the Orient have much higher crime rates than those from Europe and America. The crime rates of Israeli-born Jews of African extraction are similarly also very much higher than those of European origin. The higher proportion of Jews of African and Oriental background in rural communities and in the new settlements means that Israel has a higher rural than urban crime rate —a pattern quite different from that found in England and America. On the other hand, about half the crime committed occurs in Tel-Aviv, and the urban non-Jews are more criminal than those in rural areas. Rates of crime among African Jews have been particularly high following bursts of immigration (for example, 1955–7). Clearly these Jews from a different culture find difficulty in adjusting to Israeli society. The fact that they continue to remain among the under-privileged with difficult adjustment problems seems to be indicated by the relatively high incidence of crime among Israeli-born adolescents of this origin.

The statistics of offences show a preponderance of dishonest crimes and motoring violations. Robberies and other violent crimes are rare. There are no outstanding differences between the crimes of Jews and non-Jews, or of those Jews with different countries of origin. But the European Jews tend to commit more of the sophisticated crimes of fraud, forgery, and 'economic offences', while the non-Jews and African immigrants account for more of the offences against the person, property, and public order.

The chapter on recidivism shows the proportion convicted in a year who already had convictions recorded against them (or were found guilty of more than one crime at their first court appearance). There is a gradual increase over the years in the proportion of recidivists, until in 1961 they comprised over half those convicted in that year. Again, there were more recidivists among non-Jews and Jews from Africa and the Orient. The chapter is disappointing in that recidivism is not related to the treatment received. There are no figures which would even allow a crude attempt to assess the effectiveness of the penalties imposed by the courts. It is also a pity that the figures showing the decisions of the courts are not tabulated according to whether the offenders were recidivists or not, nor are sentences classified in terms of a detailed breakdown of the offences for which they were imposed. This last section is the weakest part of the volume. When it is revised perhaps it could include some detailed comparative follow-up figures showing the proportions convicted among offenders receiving different sentences.

Professors Drapkin and Bachi (who write an Introduction) repeat their hope expressed in Volume I that the Israeli statistics will provide a basis for further research. It is clear that, apart from the summary of the main findings in the text, the tables in these two volumes provide an outstanding source for criminologists interested in the study of comparative criminality. If other countries were to emulate the Institute in Jerusalem we would be much further forward in our understanding of the crime problem on an international scale.

ROGER HOOD

Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science, Vol. XIII, 310 pp., Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, New York, 1965, n.p.

Most of the contributions to this volume could be viewed as falling into two categories: there are descriptive historical papers dealing with Jews in Eastern Europe, and others which analyse sociologically certain aspects of contemporary American-Jewish life. In the former group we find papers describing Jews in the same region of Russian Poland and living during the same period, but with very diverse backgrounds and activities. Thus, we meet the Hasidim on the one hand and left-wing Bundists on the other. Ita Kalish and P. Schwartz respectively provide useful historical material about these Jews of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Similarly, valuable diarists' material about the Vilna Ghetto during the Second World War and the Polish uprising of 1863 is made available.

There is again diversity in the groups investigated in the sociological papers, for example ultra-Orthodox immigrant Hasidim and second generation secularist Jews. There is, however, a common thread running through these papers, namely a consideration of the state of minority identification among American Jews. I am tempted to regard the ultra-Orthodox group studied by Solomon Poll and the secularist group investigated by Leibush Lehrer as two polar types linking a continuum along which the bulk of American Jews adjust to the kind of minority identification best suited to their background and environment. The over-all wish to retain Jewish identity is brought out in David Rudavsky's paper. The 130 per cent increase in the enrolment in Jewish schools between 1948 and 1959 certainly testifies to this wish. But the fact that nearly half of the Jewish school population in 1958 were enrolled in one-day-a-week classes shows clearly the direction in which American Jews are moving on the continuum of identification.

It must be noted, with a good deal of concern, that the value of some of the papers is marred by serious methodological weaknesses. The kind of weakness is highlighted in a forthright and meticulously dissective critique launched by Nathan Hurvitz on an article by M. H. and D. J. Levinson dealing with intermarriage (see Vol. XII, *Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science* and rejoinder in this volume). To take just one point, despite the intensive interviewing and the various psychological tests applied, it is impossible to see how one can arrive at important generalizations on the basis of a sample of not more than sixteen respondents. Furthermore the main theme of the paper by the Levinsons is the contrasting of two groups of intermarrieds within this miniscule sample, labelled 'reluctants' and 'emancipated', the former sub-group consisting of just four respondents! With a much more respectable sample size of 173 respondents, Leibush Lehrer investigating secularist Jews is likewise on not too strong a ground. For the original universe numbered 425 persons, which means a very high non-response rate of nearly 60 per cent. But not much concern seems to be shown for this. The general lack of care for methodology has elicited Hurvitz's stricture that the paper by the Levinsons represents 'intellectual exercise rather than research effort'. One could certainly not regard some of these efforts as more than pilot studies setting up useful hypotheses.

The final comment must be one of surprise that the editors have not found it necessary to provide an introduction for the early guidance of the reader, which would also have afforded them the opportunity to gather some of the important strands in this volume. Such an introduction, I think, would have greatly improved an otherwise interesting collection of papers.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

J. G. WEISS, ed., *Papers of the Institute of Jewish Studies London*, vol. 1, 210 pp., Jerusalem, 1964 (Distributed in Great Britain, the British Commonwealth, and Europe by Oxford University Press), n.p.

Each of the four contributions to this volume—'The Laws Regarding Slavery as a Source for Social History of the Period of the Second Temple, the Mishnah and Talmud' by E. E. Urbach; 'Faith, Hope and Trust: A Study in the Concept of Bittahon' by R. J. Z. Werblowski; 'The "Plain" Meaning of Scripture in Early Jewish Exegesis' by Raphael Loewe; 'An Unpublished Maqama by Al-Harizi' by S. M. Stern—has a claim to the attention of the serious student of Judaism. But it is the slavery study which is of special interest to the reader of a sociological journal.

Unlike many other students of the subject, Urbach argues, and I am sure with every justification, that the slavery legislation in the Mishnah and Talmud is not just the product of rabbinic speculation as to what Jewish law would have been had this institution still been in existence in Israel; he suggests that, on the contrary, slavery was still very much in existence and, consequently, the laws relating to it reflect something of the life and values of the period in which they were formulated. From a study of the halakhic material on slavery 'we have been able to distinguish three periods—the pre-Maccabaean, that from the Maccabaean wars to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 C.E., and the period thereafter up to the end of the fourth century. The feature common to all of them is the intimate connection between slavery as an institution and the social and political conditions pertaining in each several period' (p. 93).

Urbach suggests that the pre-Maccabaean period was one in which fellow-Hebrews provided the main source of slaves. But 'The very fact of the existence of slavery as an institution within the society of Jewish Palestine in antiquity proved the enemy of the privileges attaching to the Hebrew slave enslaved to fellow-Jews at times when gentile slaves were not to be had plentifully or cheaply, and when adverse economic conditions placed many Jews in the situation where they were only too glad to sell themselves as slaves'. On the other hand, enslavement at home was preferable to slavery abroad—and he holds that 'the low prices paid for slaves from Palestine as compared with the prices in Egypt prove that the supply cannot have been scanty' (pp. 12, 13). Now it is very likely that the state of affairs which existed in the pre-Maccabaean period, that is, between Nehemiah and the Maccabaean War, was not one to encourage the kindest possible treatment of Hebrew slaves; nevertheless, one wonders whether the distinction between Hebrew and non-Hebrew slaves was ever significantly obscured. After all, even in societies where there is a strong social stratification based on the acquisition of wealth, there is an important differentiation in the treatment

of slaves based on their respective sources of origin. For it is not enough for slavery to be economically profitable—it must also be consistent with the social relationships and cultural values of the group. Again, the low prices paid for Hebrew slaves outside Palestine may be attributed not to their quantity but to their defective quality. Perhaps they were not worth much on the foreign market because they were bad bargains—they may have been desirous of observing their own complicated customs or liable to be redeemed by co-religionists or inclined to run away and so on.

During the Maccabaean period gentile slaves were so plentiful that 'it is possible that matters reached such a pass that Jews anxious to sell themselves into slavery could not find Jewish purchasers' (p. 50). Nor is this surprising. For, as Urbach relates, Hebrew slaves were entitled to so many considerations that they were 'not a paying proposition' (p. 49). Is one then to assume that during the Maccabaean period Hebrew slaves regained their privileges and thereby priced themselves out of the market—or rather that they never really lost them and therefore could not compete with gentile slaves when the latter became freely available?

Some gentile slaves came to fulfil Jewish commandments not obligatory upon them; some became rabbinical scholars; some were assimilated into the priestly stock. 'A Jew who killed a slave through negligence was subject to the same penalty as for the negligent homicide of a free man . . . for deliberate murder the penalty was in either case death . . . This absolute equality of slave and free man in all matters regarding the judicial safeguarding of their lives has no parallel in either Greek or Roman Law' (pp. 39–40).

The general decline consequent upon the destruction of Jerusalem contributed towards 'the tempering of the force of social idealism' (p. 93), resulting in a deterioration of the slave's lot. But is it not possible that the deterioration of the lot of the non-Jewish slave is but a reflection of the general deterioration in the relations between Jews and non-Jews rather than lack of compassion for the lot of the slave?

There is a mystifying reference to *Makkoth* viii, 2 on p. 39 which appears to be a mistake for *Makkoth* 8b, and the transliteration of the title of the talmudical tractate dealing with the *levirate* is inconsistent.

SCHIFRA STRIZOWER

DAVID PATTERSON, *The Hebrew Novel in Czarist Russia*, vi + 316 pp., Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1964, 40*s*.

Eighteen novels, by eleven authors, all written between 1868 and 1888, are the subject of a multiple analysis in this readable and penetrating study.

The period is transitional, between the death of Abraham Mapu, author of the only two Hebrew novels 'of any significance' prior to 1867, and the end of the Hebrew movement of Enlightenment, when other ideas began to forge among the Jews of Russia the matrices of their twentieth-century history.

Few readers of this book will feel compelled to search out these novels, let alone plough through their primitive Hebrew. Some were as long as 1,000 pages, and almost all seem to have been written on the level of penny dreadfuls. Their plots and structure, succinctly and often wittily recapitulated by Dr. Patterson, strain credulity with their melodramatic and crude

exaggeration, although the occasional felicitous passage or ray of insight are mercifully discovered for us. However, in spite of Dr. Patterson's preliminary and repeated disclaimers for literary merit in his subjects, and in spite of one's own initial condescension towards them, gradually one's academic interest becomes mobilized on the purely literary level as well as the sociological and historical.

The purpose of these novels was to break through the crust of tradition that stifled the growth of a Jewish culture in its literary language of Hebrew. The undeveloped state of the language, as a modern medium, and the absence of a reading public were partly responsible for the extremism of these stories, as were serialization and lack of literary experience. This last defect was the more important in that pronounced didactic purpose, such as these novels embody, demands greater artistic skill than these authors possessed to save their stories from the oblivion which even Dr. Patterson admits was well deserved. These writers struggled to knit together tales fantastic enough to attract and retain a regular public and realistic enough to induce in their readers a critical attitude to the injustices and excesses of Jewish customs. Dr. Patterson comments on the prevalence of violent themes that they stood 'in striking contrast to the values and . . . behaviour of the society which they purport to describe', and he attributes this paradox to the attempt to impose the alien romanticism of western European literature upon a Jewish background 'which was characterized by sobriety, timidity and—in the case of the emotional and passionate instincts—a rigid self-control and discipline'. This juncture in his book, occurring conveniently in his conclusion, cries out for discussion, and associations spring to mind of Isaac Babel's Odessa, the big-time Jewish gangsters of New York and Chicago, Jewish terrorists and revolutionaries. . . . It will also not escape the notice of readers of this Journal that among the themes of these books, intense, violent, *family* conflicts stand out almost in defiance of the legend of Jewish harmony.

Dr. Patterson brings out the ambivalence of his authors towards the Jewish people, their revulsion from Jewish stagnation, and their impotence to suggest effective measures, and he acknowledges that at times the novels are more revealing of their authors' state of mind than of the sick society they are describing.

There is a wealth of material here, though perhaps what is finally presented is rather the crisis of cultural identity facing Jewish intellectuals one hundred years ago (it is still a favourite topic of sociological discussion) exemplified by eleven forgotten writers, only one of whom, Shalom Abramowitz, better known as Mendele Moikher Sforim, was to reappear as the major figure of mature Hebrew *belles lettres*.

HAROLD SHUKMAN

ANDREW SHARF, *The British Press and Jews under Nazi Rule*, issued under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations, vi + 228 pp., Oxford University Press, London, 1964, 30*s*.

Professor Sharf of Bar Ilan University, Israel, has carried out a survey of British press opinion under the auspices of the Hebrew University and the

Yad Va-Shem Institute for Research into the Destruction of European Jewry. His survey is based upon some 6,500 cuttings from about 150 newspapers and periodicals published in the United Kingdom, covering the period from the time Hitler came to power until the Nuremberg Trials.

The chief merit of the work, which makes for fascinating reading and at times tends to arouse passions, is that instead of being a catalogue of press reports on events affecting the fate of millions of Jews, it shows the reaction of British public opinion as expressed in editorial comment. Dr. Sharf himself admits that there is no way of gauging the British people's reaction to the facts and comments they read in their newspapers or periodicals; neither has he set out to do so. His objective clearly has been to demonstrate how the press reacted. Mr. Philip Mason says in his foreword: 'He is concerned with a phenomenon of vital importance to us: the habit, deeply ingrained in these islands, of making the best of every situation, refusing to believe the worst. From the time the Nazis came into power until 1939, English people tried to persuade themselves that things could not really be so bad as that, that there must be another side to the question, and so on. Every form of evasion was eagerly seized on. It is the psychological machinery of this refusal to believe the uncomfortable that gives his book its special interest.'

Dr. Sharf has proceeded according to subjects and not chronologically, and by this method has thrown into sharp relief the different types of editorials. It should be mentioned that from the 150 newspapers and periodicals from which he quotes he excludes—and rightly so—the Jewish and Fascist press, thus avoiding the obvious prejudices of these 'interested' parties. One could argue that it might have been instructive to read contemporary Jewish views on such questions as the Anti-Nazi Boycott or immigration. However, the author's concern was with the unbiased British press-view. On the whole, it presents a sorry picture. Accusations levelled against the Western Allies for their failure first, to understand the true meaning of Nazism and, later, their acquiescence in the fate meted out to millions of innocent people, seem justified. The verdict lies in the quotations from the contemporary press. The newspapers, and through them, the British public were fully informed of the atrocities that were perpetrated by the Nazis. Moreover as early as August 1932 *The Times*, *Manchester Guardian*, and *Daily Telegraph* printed fair and accurate reports of the international conference whose main objective was the formation of a *World Jewish Congress* during which naturally many references were made to the impending danger in Germany. It might be argued that in later years, during the war, the Western powers and the Soviet Union were concerned with winning the war rather than rescuing Jews from certain death at the hands of the Nazis. But nothing can excuse the indifference and at times open hostility shown to the Jewish refugees who clamoured for entry to the U.S.A., Britain, and her overseas possessions, or mandated Palestine. The British Press, though unanimous in the condemnation of what was happening to the Jews under the Nazi heel, stopped short of being so the moment they dealt with the question of refugees. Of the 750,000 Jewish refugees (excluding those who escaped to Russia), the U.K. took not more than 65,000, Australia about 9,000, Canada and South Africa about 8,000 each, while the rest of the Commonwealth admitted very much smaller numbers. The condition of

entry to the U.K. for the vast majority was that the refugees in question had been previously accepted in the immigration quota of some other country. In fact, of the 65,000 admitted, 25,000 left for other countries. Moreover, legal emigration continued from Germany until 1 October 1941 and from unoccupied France until 11 November 1942. The majority of Jewish refugees came to Britain after the Crystal Night of November 1938. Yet already in October 1939 the *Daily Express* published a headline 'Britons help Britons' and the item itself read: 'British Jews are actively resisting the influx of foreign refugees who take jobs which British Jews hold'. The fact that no Jewish paper carried a similar story was not known to the British public at large. Professor Sharf quotes examples on both sides of the fence, those for and those against admitting Jewish refugees. But reading them, one is left with a bitter taste.

Written in a remarkably objective way—except perhaps for the Palestine chapter which seems to have a Zionist's anti-British bias—this work should be read by both the scholar and the layman, Jew and Gentile alike. It is a healthy lesson in history and a valuable analysis of the use of the press as a means of directing public opinion. Above all, it should be read by those who blame the Jewish leadership of those years for failing in their duty to rescue their people or who simply ask why they went like sheep to the slaughter.

E. E. EPPLER

Der Lebensbaum der Wiener Israelitischen Kultusgemeinde 1960–1964, 288 pp., Published by Israelitische Kultusgemeinde, Vienna, 1964, n.p.

In comparison with the era before the *Anschluss* and its disastrous consequences for Austria's Jewry, her Jewish population is now small in size and significance, but it is the largest German-speaking organized Jewish group in Europe. In 1938, 180,000 Jews lived in Vienna, constituting an important element in the cultural, social, and economic life of the city; today 9,166 persons are registered members of the Kultusgemeinde which is an autonomous body recognized in law, authorized to act as the official spokesman of its members, and entitled to levy taxes in order to obtain the funds required to carry out its work.

Notwithstanding the radically changed circumstances, the organizational structure of the Community has remained unaltered. In its Representative Council, elected for a four-year period, the 'Werktaetige', a group with Socialist leanings, originally also influenced by Bundist conceptions, is the strongest party today. It faces an opposition consisting of Zionist, Orthodox, and other elements. But there is actually no longer a controversial ideological issue at stake. All groups are agreed on the need for attending to the day-to-day tasks: religious services, burials and the care of cemeteries, social welfare, education and culture, the fight against manifestations of antisemitism and neo-Nazism, and for indemnification measures to benefit the surviving victims of National Socialist persecution. The Community is also single-minded in its positive attitude to the State of Israel; its leadership cultivates working contacts with the World Jewish Congress and the American 'Joint'.

The official report on the activities of the Vienna Community during the

period 1960–4 differs from documents of this kind which are usually confined to recording facts and figures, by drawing a vivid picture of Jewish communal life as viewed by an efficient and conscientious administration. The amount of work performed under difficult conditions is impressive. It is also worth noting that the total Jewish population of Vienna has remained static over the period. The prophets who foresaw no future for Jews in post-Nazi Europe have been proved wrong. The 'Tree of Life' of Vienna Jewry is unlikely to branch out further and may not produce fruits of outstanding quality, but it has once more taken root in unpromising ground and should, given proper attention, grow in stature. A comprehensive study of Jewish communal life in Central Europe will be greatly helped by such surveys as the *Lebensbaum*.

F. L. BRASSLOFF

THEODORE J. LOWI, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898–1958*, xvi + 272 pp., The Free Press of Glencoe and Collier-Macmillan, London, 1964, n.p.

Professor Lowi's book covers a great deal of ground, and covers it most expertly and attractively. It contains in its pages material for far more than one volume, for his study of patronage and power in New York City since 1898 covers three important features of the city's government. It is a historical descriptive account of the city government, a study of the recruitment of the Mayor's 'Cabinet', and a study of community power relations. The work is centred upon the Mayor's 'Cabinet'—the 77 persons appointed by the Mayor to man the Boards, Departments, and Commissions that govern the city. New York has a 'strong mayor' charter in which ample powers of executive leadership exist, on paper; and it is one of the more important findings of the study to demonstrate that so large a portion of the mayor's discretion is pre-empted by politically irresistible considerations of ethnic, religious, and professional skill factors that he, in fact, presides over a disintegrated administration. Reformers have bent their efforts to kill the dragon of the political machine—because 'machine' meant corruption—so that now the city has no machine at all. And what it now needs is a party-administrative machine to knit together the pluralist activities of its skilled administrators. But in America, unlike England, civil service reform has succeeded in face of constant party hostility. Public opinion and party feeling have rarely if ever pulled in the same direction. La Guardia was highly effective as Mayor because he exploited anti-machine (anti-Tammany) sentiment to build his own 'anti-machine' machine.

One of the special features of American politics in general, and New York City politics in particular, is the way in which ethnic and religious inequalities have been both exploited and accommodated in the open political society. The 'melting pot' is not the reality. Professor Lowi prefers the 'tossed-salad' analogy, and it is much more accurate, for as long as ethnic prejudice stops short of disfranchisement, the Jew, the Italian, the Negro will sit beside the 'old American' elite in political teamwork while still being excluded from the clubs, the banks, and the brokers' offices. Ethnic minorities have long been in the political picture, for they have votes to be delivered

to one side or the other. For the ethnically disadvantaged, politics, with sport and crime was a promising avenue of upward mobility. It was; but today with business and professional careers more open to the children of immigrants, city political life has changed its character. The professions (and higher education) provide alternative avenues of upward movement and the political involvement of the professional middle class in the city is both more informed and skilled and less patient with the traditional manner of playing the political game. Political loyalty is not the be all and end all. Politics is now only one of the many opportunities open to those with a foreign name or a minority religion. But the traditional practices persist to a large degree, and it would be a bold and unwise politician who decided to eschew every possibility of an ethnic appeal.

Having found how to exploit and satisfy ethnic susceptibilities, Mayors then have to contend with the demands made by the guild spirit of teachers, doctors, and social workers convinced (and able to convince others) that the maintenance and pursuit of professional standards is what the city needs to cure its ills. And here, in a land with a high regard for the value of the expert, they will be successful. So the Mayor must juggle and balance party, ethnic, ethnic/religious, ethnic and party/professional considerations when making up his 'Cabinet' to such an extent that the result will leave him with very little of the strong executive direction he is supposed to exert.

The book contains many fascinating tables. On the Board of Education appointed by Mayor Low (1902)—he was a former President of Columbia—17 per cent were from the New York 'Social Register'. Since 1918 the 'Social Register' has supplied none of the membership. Low's 'Cabinet' was over 55 per cent 'American-English', with about 12 per cent Irish and 6 per cent Jews. In Mayor Wagner's 'Cabinet' (1954–57) Jews were the largest element with, in second place, almost equal numbers of 'American-English' and Irish, and Wagner was a German-Irish Catholic. Negroes just gained a foothold (about 2 per cent) in 1914 and under Wagner had about 6 per cent of the cabinet posts. Over the years Jewish and Italian members have steadily increased and it is the Irish and 'American-English' who have had to make way for them. One of the most interesting regimes was La Guardia's (1934–1945), for La Guardia's 'American-English' appointees were 46 per cent—a figure only equalled by the administrations of 1914 and before. Jews also did well under La Guardia, the Irish went down dramatically and the Italians up a few percentage points. What one knows of La Guardia has not left the impression that he was a pillar of an American-English Establishment, but it is his name which misleads us here. He was by birth part Italian, in looks and vivacity most Italian, but he had Jewish connexions and could perform in a Yiddish effective enough for political and social occasions. He acted 'low class' but was not. He had Republican leanings before F. D. Roosevelt made him a New Dealer. He spoke (as American propagandists found out in World War II) execrable Italian—and was, to boot, a Protestant! La Guardia's cutting back from a previous 42 per cent to 7 per cent in Irish membership of his administration was a milestone in the political history of the city. In religious terms La Guardia's largely Protestant regime has shaded down to Wagner's trinity of Protestant, Catholic, and Jew in almost equal proportions.

Professor Lowi is a highly professional researcher who orders his facts in the conceptual settings of modern sociology. He must be congratulated on having quite avoided the stylistic infelicities so often forced upon (or surrendered to, by) writers imprisoned in the prefabricated conventions in current vogue. His book can be read with pleasure.

R. H. PEAR

MORRIS STOCKHAMMER (ed.), *Karl Marx Dictionary*, pp. ix + 273, Philosophical Library, New York, 1965, $6.00.

This is a very odd book, and the list of its publishers might seem to some people also idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, it should not be dismissed, for although the editor has used only some of the best-known of the writings of Karl Marx (there is practically nothing in it from Engels), he has done his scissors and paste work intelligently. It is surprising how often a detached sentence or two can stand out and illuminate the vitality, even in error, of Marx. The alphabetical arrangement is singularly inconvenient as there are no cross-references, so that someone who, for example, consults the entries under 'Rent' has no means of knowing that there is also a single entry under 'Falling Rent'. On some points, such as the Jews and Judaism, this does not matter, but usually it does.

Yet, although it is arbitrary and not widely scholarly, this dictionary is surprisingly enjoyable and I think might prove useful to those who have made some progress in Marxist studies, for it brings together with startling clarity much that is hidden or confused in the general luxuriance of Marxist prose. Whether these 273 pages are worth $6.00 is not for the reviewer to say.

DONALD G. MACRAE

SOL SWERDLOFF and HOWARD ROSEN, *The College and Career Plans of Jewish High School Youth*, under the editorship of Dr. S. Norman Feingold, 64 pp., B'nai B'rith Vocational Service, Washington, D.C., 1964, $2.00.

NORMAN S. FEINGOLD and ALFRED JOSPE, *College Guide for Jewish Youth* (new revised edition), 102 pp., B'nai B'rith Vocational Service, Washington, D.C., 1963, $3.00.

These two booklets bear witness to the interest in, and zeal for, student welfare displayed by the B'nai B'rith in the United States. The coverage extends to certain Canadian colleges and students—but the bulk of the analysis contained in these studies relates to the United States. They highlight the 'college-orientation' of Jewish youth today—a phenomenon not found only in the United States. A rising proportion of Jewish young people now passes through colleges and universities: this reflects and promotes yet further the social mobility patterns characteristic of urban and suburban Jewish populations. The two studies also mirror a profoundly American concern with 'vocational guidance'—with the dilemmas of choice and training which an egalitarian society exhibits and intensifies.

The first of these two booklets is the result of a happy collaboration between professional social scientists and voluntary effort. The B'nai B'rith Women's Chapters in forty different American states (as well as six Canadian

Chapters) were asked to administer a questionnaire on college and career plans to Jewish High School youth. The result was a report based upon the responses from 6,600 young people (60 per cent girls, 40 per cent boys) who were members of various Jewish youth groups. It is important to bear this procedure in mind—for as the report candidly, if infelicitously, admits: 'Affiliation with a Jewish youth organization limits the representativeness of this group to just such youth'. To put it in other words, there is no guarantee that any patterns revealed by this study would also be found in a study of *unaffiliated* youth.

The study showed that parents of respondents were themselves well educated—no fewer than 34 per cent of the fathers and 17 per cent of the mothers being college graduates. About 90 per cent of the young people interviewed indicated that they expected and intended to go to College. (A follow-up survey of 5 per cent of the high school 'seniors' included in the study showed a very close relation between intention and reality.) This proportion of those anticipating entry into higher education is of course far higher than that found in other comparable groups of young people in the United States. Of great importance—as always in a study of this kind—is the factor of parental background and education. The respondents were more likely to go to College if their parents had been there, if their parents wanted them to go, and if their fathers were in professional or in executive positions. Again—as is a fairly common finding in inquiries into educational aspiration—the educational level of the mother seemed to be a stronger influence on student plans than that of the father. Among those who said that they were not intending to go to college 12 per cent of the boys and 13 per cent of the girls said the reason was lack of money. Reasons given for going to college were 'occupational, cultural and economic in that order'. The most popular fields of study for boys were engineering, medicine, business, and law. Of the girls, almost 30 per cent chose education, and 8 per cent social sciences and social work. Conspicuous, of course, was the high level of aspiration of the young people concerned. About 82 per cent of the boys and some 73 per cent of the girls had their eye on professional, managerial, and similar jobs. The extent to which this was so was influenced a good deal by the amount of higher education that the fathers of the respondents had enjoyed. 'Fathers with more than 4 years of college had children who aspired to professional or technical occupations in greater proportion than fathers who had not had any college training. Fathers who were business proprietors had children who were more likely to aspire to be proprietors.' It does not seem—if the results are to be taken at their face value—as if positive pressure by parents was, in general, a primary factor in influencing the choice of occupation. Only some 20 per cent said that their parents influenced them considerably and some 50 per cent said that they would choose a job even if it were one their parents did not approve of. They were also asked about whether their choice had been influenced by the possibility of 'discrimination' against them. The vast majority—some 95 per cent—said that this had not affected their decision. Their assessment of the situation may of course be inaccurate or naive: but it does suggest a measure of self-confidence among American Jewish youth—something which the B'nai B'rith report understandably relates to the success of its anti-discrimination efforts. Interestingly, in selecting

the college they proposed to attend, 55 per cent of the respondents said that the number of Jewish students and organizations in the college would be a factor that involved their choice of college. Almost 20 per cent of those interviewed said that they would be interested in taking up a career in professional Jewish work or service. This too is an interesting finding—one which suggests that the American Jewish community will in future years have less difficulty than, say, the British in meeting the needs of professional social service. Understandably the survey could not allow for the possibility of change in career aspiration—something that is common among university students in all countries. It would be hazardous to use these statistics as a basis for exact prediction, but the main points that they suggest would probably stand. The image of the Jewish student which emerges from these pages is of someone who is independent of direct parental pressure; who sets his professional and career sights very high; who does not fear anti-Jewish discrimination; and who, in quite a proportion of cases, is willing to consider a life dedicated to Jewish professions within the American communal setting. Furthermore two-thirds of the respondents would be willing to go to Israel after training and to work there for a year or two. This seems to me to be a very high proportion indeed and, if taken literally, does imply, as the report notes 'quite a high level of identification with the Jewish people and culture'.

College Guide for Jewish Youth consists of two parts. Part I contains a simple discussion of matters which concern (or should concern) the potential student. The diversity of American colleges and universities is briefly discussed. It is pointed out that in the late 1950s over 50 per cent of the 3¼ million college students in the U.S.A. were accommodated in institutions (some 7 per cent of all colleges) with a student population of over 5,000. The writers go on to discuss the choice of colleges for undergraduate and graduate work. They seem just a shade less sanguine about 'discrimination' than the High School students upon whose views I have just commented. The College Guide says: 'Youth who belong to minority racial or religious groups may face discrimination in gaining admission to college. Under the quota system practised by some colleges the number of students of certain religious, racial or ethnic backgrounds is limited to a set percentage or quota. . . .' It goes on, correctly enough, to point out that 'the tendency, however, is for schools to select students solely on the basis of individual merit'. Chapter II deals with the costs of pursuing higher education. Chapter III comments on 'Jewish Life on the Campus'. Much of this relates to the valuable Hillel activities on various campuses, to the facilities which are made available for the observance of dietary laws and to those national 'fraternities' which are known to welcome Jewish students. Oddly there seems to be no separate listing of the small number of Jewish fraternities and sororities which grew up when some of the National Greek Letter Societies practised anti-Jewish discrimination. In any case, this whole matter is of declining importance. Of wider interest will be the listing, contained in this Guide, of Universities and Colleges which offer 'credit courses' in Judaic studies. Some fifty institutions —in some of which there are Hillel Chairs of Jewish studies—give courses in this field. The list includes institutions of moderate as well as high prestige. It is impossible and unnecessary to assume that all these courses are equally distinguished or exciting. But they do indicate the opportunities for serious

study in these subjects which now exist in the United States. The contrast with, for example, the situation in Great Britain is, to put it mildly, disturbing. Some of the differences are no doubt accounted for by the differing values placed upon higher education in the two societies. Due place, too, should no doubt be given to the greater financial resources deployed by American Jews. But this cannot be the entire story. Despite a few heroic ventures, Jewish intellectual life in Britain has been impoverished by neglect, obscurantism, and complacency. In this, as in much else, we have a lot to learn from the United States.

The second part of the *College Guide* gives a list of over 400 American and Canadian colleges and universities with annotated data on points of interest to Jewish students. Wherever possible, the number of Jewish students attending the various colleges is given as well as the total enrolment. I would not draw any final conclusions from the figures presented—many of them, given the subject matter, must be rather tentative. But we should spare a thought for the nine Jewish young men enrolled among the 1,087 students in the Virginian Military Institute at Lexington, Virginia; or the 68 Jewish students to be found among the 10,300 students at the University of Utah. Clearly their experiences will differ in important ways from that of Jewish students at Harvard where almost one quarter of the students appear to be Jews; or at Columbia where the proportion of Jewish students is over 25 per cent of the total; or at a Liberal Arts College like Grinnell where the proportion is nearly 10 per cent. The information is clearly set out and it is not only the American High School senior who will find, in these pages, some nutritious food for thought.

JULIUS GOULD

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Banton, Michael: *Roles, An Introduction to the Study of Social Relations*, Tavistock Publications, London, 1965, ix + 224 pp., 21*s*.

Baron, Salo W.: *The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets*. A comprehensive history from the earliest settlements to the present time. Macmillan, New York and London, 1964, xv + 427 pp., 55*s*.

Coughlin, Bernard J.: *Church and State in Social Welfare*, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1965, xii + 189 pp., 52*s*.

Davis, Moshe: *The Jewish People in Metamorphosis*, an expanded version of the first B. G. Rudolf Lecture in Judaic Studies, delivered at Syracuse University, 6 March 1963, Syracuse University, n.p.

Einspruch, Henry (trans.): *The good news according to Matthew*, The Lewis and Harriet Lederer Foundation, Baltimore, 1964, vi + 83 pp., n.p.

Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel Patrick: *Beyond the Melting Pot: the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City*, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964, vii + 360 pp. (paperback), n.p.

Huaco, George A.: *The Sociology of Film Art*, Basic Books, New York and London, 1965, vii + 229 pp., 30*s*.

Leibler, Isi: *Soviet Jewry and Human Rights*, Human Rights Publications, Victoria, Australia, 1965, 78 pp., n.p.

Maybaum, Ignaz: *The Face of God after Auschwitz*, Polak and Van Gennep, Amsterdam, 1965 (distributed in Great Britain by Barmerlea Book Sales), 265 pp. (paperback), 13*s*. 6*d*.

Political Systems and the Distribution of Power (= M. Banton, ed., A.S.A. Monographs 2), Tavistock Publications, London, 1965, xlii + 142 pp., 30*s*.

Radzinowicz, Leon: *The Need for Criminology and a proposal for an Institute of Criminology*, Heinemann, London, 1965, xix + 123 pp., 18*s*.

The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology (= M. Banton, ed., A.S.A. Monographs 1), Tavistock Publications, London, 1965, xl + 238 pp., 35*s*.

Schneider, Louis (ed.): *Religion, Culture and Society*, John Wiley, New York, 1964, xvii + 663 pp., 75*s*.

Tartakower, Arieh: *Shivtei Israel* (in Hebrew), vol. I, Yavneh Publishing House, Tel-Aviv, 1965, 217 pp., n.p.

For Max Weinreich on his Seventieth Birthday, Studies in Jewish Languages, Literature and Society, Mouton and Co., The Hague, 1964, x + 527 pp. (pp. 278–527 in Yiddish), Dutch guilders 80.

Weltfish, Gene: *The Lost Universe*, Basic Books, London and New York, 1965, xx + 506 pp., 70*s*.

Zweig, Ferdynand: *The Quest for Fellowship*, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1965, xi + 296 pp., 30*s*.

CHRONICLE

Martin Buber 1878–1965

By the death of Martin Buber the Jewish people lost a theologian and social philosopher of world-wide renown and influence. His writings cover a very extensive area—Zionist policy, biblical exegesis, studies in Hasidism, and comparative religion. But perhaps the central core of his thought is best revealed in his efforts to construct a philosophical anthropology, in the sense in which the term is used by German philosophers. In this he tries to avoid the abstractions of both individualist and collectivist interpretations of human life by concentrating on the relations between persons, the direct encounter of man and man which in his later writings he named the I–Thou relationship. The term may bring to mind the *Beziehungslehre* of some German sociologists, but in fact Buber's aim differs radically from theirs. He is not concerned to enumerate and analyse the different forms of relations among men. He reaches his position by reflecting on his own experience of personal relations, guided by his interpretation of Hasidism and by a critical examination of the work of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Scheler. What precisely the I–Thou relation is eludes definition. It can only be grasped in direct experience by those who share Buber's insight or can be induced to share it by his eloquent exposition and exhortation. Despite its indefiniteness his teaching has been widely influential. It has been applied by his followers to the problems arising in the varied spheres of education, industrial relations, political action, religion, and morals. Buber's thought has many affinities with existentialism, but he avoids the preoccupation with the anxieties of choice and decision characteristic of many existentialists. His more positive

approach has been attributed to the influence upon him of the world-affirming traditions of Judaism. For this reason it has been claimed that his distinctive contribution to contemporary thought consists in a peculiarly intimate fusion of Judaism and existentialism. Those who are most in sympathy with his work, however, would perhaps like him to be remembered best as a distinguished exponent and representative of what he himself called Hebrew Humanism.

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According to Histadrut press releases, 80 student groups (mostly non-Jewish) from Europe and the United States arranged to work on kibbutzim during the summer of 1965. The scheme was organized by the Histadrut (General Federation of Labour in Eretz Israel) in Tel-Aviv. More than 2,500 young men and women were to come under this scheme and spend a working holiday at 40 of Israel's collective villages in order to help during the busy farming season. They were expected to contribute 35,000 workdays; in the summer of 1964 young visitors had given 26,000 workdays. Each student was to live for about 18 days on a kibbutz, working six hours a day in return for board and lodging and pocket money.

Another Histadrut press release stated that registration had begun in the summer of 1965 for the autumn term of the newly established Institute of Labour Studies at the University of Tel-Aviv. Special registration facilities were opened all over the country by the Department for Higher Education of the Histadrut. The Institute will form an integral part of the Social Science Faculty. Fifty students will be accepted every year until the full quota of 150 students is reached by the end of the third year. Successful completion of the three-year course will qualify students for the Bachelor of Arts degree. The Histadrut will award free tuition and scholarships to needy students. The purpose of the University Institute is to prepare future leadership for the Histadrut.

The newest Histadrut Cultural Centre was recently opened in the growing residential quarter of Ramat Aviv on the outskirts of Tel-Aviv. This has brought the number of cultural centres and clubs sponsored by the Histadrut to 250. The General Federation of Labour in Israel now operates 555 libraries which are staffed by some 1,200 qualified librarians. These centres and libraries are situated mainly in new immigrant areas, and the librarians there usually provide the first contact between the new immigrant and Hebrew literature and cultural activities.

*

A Human Rights Seminar on the multi-national society, held in Belgrade in June 1965, expressed a desire that the Secretary General of the United Nations organize other seminars, on a regional or global basis, to consider aspects of the problems of a multi-national society, in particular the problem of attaining equality of treatment for economically developing regions, language problems in developing countries, and such political rights as the right to participate in national affairs and the right to freedom of association.

The main conclusions of the seminar were: (1) That there was general agreement that all governments should promote and protect the rights of ethnic, religious, linguistic, or national groups not only through the adoption of constitutional and legislative provisions, but also through the promotion of all forms of activities consistent with the political, economic, and social conditions of the state or country concerned.

(2) As regards the problem of measures which should be undertaken in the national field, it was agreed that various forms of co-operation based on both bilateral and multilateral agreements should be encouraged and utilized with a view to supplementing measures already being taken to promote as free as possible an exchange at every level in the fields of trade and culture, as well as contacts between individuals, regardless of differences in political systems.

(3) There was general consensus that the member governments of the United Nations as well as the different institutions should undertake more intensive research on ethnic, religious, linguistic, and national problems.

The seminar was sponsored by the United Nations with the co-operation of the Yugoslav Government. The participants were appointed by the governments of 19 countries, but attended in their personal capacity. They included Cabinet Ministers, high-ranking government officials, Attorneys-General, judges of Supreme Courts, and university professors.

The countries represented were Argentina, Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Israel, Italy, India, Jamaica, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Norway, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Greece and Turkey sent observers. There were also observers from 13 non-governmental organizations.

In the discussion on the measures which should be taken to ensure the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all without discrimination, several participants recommended the creation, at the international level, of a United Nations High Commissioner.

*

It was announced in June 1965 that a research fellowship in the study of relations between Christians and Jews is to be financed by the University of Southampton in association with the Parkes Library at the University. The library was set up in 1929 by Dr. James Parkes to encourage understanding of the relationship between the Jewish and non-Jewish faiths.

*

The Franco-Israeli Mixed Commission on Cultural Co-operation in Paris has recommended the establishment of professorships in Hebrew at the Universities of Besançon, Dijon, and Lyons. The Commission has also discussed methods to encourage the study of the French language in Israeli schools and of Hebrew in French secondary schools and universities.

There will be an increase in the number of exchange visits by scientists from both countries, and joint research projects will be conducted by Israeli institutes and the National Centre for Scientific Research of France.

*

A report from Washington, D.C., dated 3 August 1965, states that some 16,000 Israeli citizens have applied to be admitted to the United States as immigrants. They will be admitted if they are individually qualified and if the pending immigration reform bill is passed. The annual quota for Israel was at the time of the report set at 100.

*

In 1964 the United Hias Service aided more than 50,000 migrating Jews. 9,700 Jews were aided to leave Eastern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Cuba to resettle in the United States, France, Canada, Brazil, Australia, and other western countries. More than 20 per cent of the migrants resettled in 1964 went to the United States. About 4,500 refugees from North Africa were assisted to resettle in France, while 1,300 French-speaking Jews from Morocco and Tunisia went to Canada. It was estimated that in 1965 the agency would help 11,700 Jews to resettle and provide a further 40,000 Jews with assistance.

*

The President of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services is reported to have said in Toronto in May 1965 that 3,113 Jews came to Canada as immigrants in 1964. This is an increase on the figure for 1963, when Jewish immigrants numbered 2,180. He predicted that Jewish immigration from Morocco into the Dominion would increase in 1965.

*

The Canadian Jewish Congress held a five-day national conference in Montreal in May 1965. It was attended by 700 delegates from all over the Dominion. There are 254,368 Jews in Canada. The rate of intermarriage has risen sharply. In 1933, it was 2·6 per cent among Jewish men, while the comparative figure for intermarriage among Catholics was 8 per cent, and among Protestants 6·9 per cent. In 1963 the rates had increased to 12·3 per cent among both Jews and Catholics, and to 12·8 per cent among Protestants. The intermarriage rate among Jewish women has also risen during the same period.

*

A correspondent in the *Jewish Chronicle* of 4 June 1965 draws attention to an interesting anomaly in the statistics on Jews in the recent censuses of Canada. The censuses inquire into both 'ethnic origin' and 'religion'. Up to 1941 there was very little difference between the numbers of people in Canada returning themselves as Jews by the two criteria, but more recently the two figures have considerably diverged. In 1961 Jews by religion numbered 254,368, while Jews by ethnic origin totalled only 173,344. The discrepancy has been attributed by some people to an accession of converts, but in fact the explanation lies elsewhere: in the use of mother-tongue as an index of ethnic origin. Until recently, Yiddish was the 'mother-tongue' of the majority of Canadian Jews; with the decline in Yiddish-speakers the number of people classed as Jews by ethnic origin has necessarily declined.

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The Jewish community of Cuba was said to number 2,383 souls in the summer of 1965. This figure is based on the distribution of Passover products sent to Cuban Jews by Canadian Jewish organizations. At Passover 1964, there were 2,785 Cuban recipients of such products. It is believed that no Cuban Jews—even the non-pious—refused Passover food, for there is a shortage of food in the country. The majority of the 1965 recipients were residents of Havana. There were 760 families (1,907 persons) living in the capital, while 211 families (476 persons) lived in the provinces.

Before the Castro regime the Cuban Jewish community numbered 10,000 souls.

*

In June 1965 a group of 570 Jews from South America left Rio de Janeiro to settle in Israel. Among them were 119 Jews from Brazil. The Brazilian contingent included some Israelis who had emigrated from Israel some years ago and had failed to settle in the country. They had now decided to return to Israel under the sponsorship of the Jewish Agency.

*

According to a report in the *Jewish Chronicle* (2 April 1965), a survey of the 146 rabbis ordained in 1963–64 at the seminaries of the three main streams of American religious Jewry shows that 80 became synagogue ministers. Of the others, 27 entered the Forces' chaplaincy, twelve took up education, nine graduate studies, and seven secular studies. The seminaries in the survey were the Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion (Reform), the Jewish Theological Seminary of America (Conservative), and Yeshiva University's Rabbi Isaac Eichanan Theological Seminary (Orthodox).

The Reform movement ordained the greatest number of rabbis, 66, the Orthodox ordained 47, and the Conservatives 33. The Reform movement also led the others in the number of rabbis it sent into the pulpit: 47. The Conservatives sent 18 and the Orthodox 15. Of the 27 rabbis who went into the chaplaincy, six were Orthodox, nine Conservative and twelve Reform. Eleven of the twelve rabbis taking up education were Orthodox. The twelfth, a Reform rabbi, was appointed to the Hillel Foundation. Of the rabbis going on to graduate studies, five were Conservative and four Reform. The men entering secular activities were all Orthodox.

*

The *Jewish Chronicle* on 25 June 1965 published a report of a telephone conversation between one of its reporters and the Chief Rabbi of Moscow, Rabbi Yehuda Leib Levin. Rabbi Levin, who is 71 years old, is also the Rosh Yeshiva in Moscow of the only religious seminary in the Soviet Union. He is reported to have said that there were only four students at the Yeshiva, but that it was hoped to increase this number to twenty after the High Holy-days. He had already requested synagogues throughout the Soviet Union to select suitable candidates, and had 'now received a promise from the Soviet authorities that resident permits will be granted for more students'. (Students outside Moscow require residence permits if they wish to live in Moscow.) Rabbi Levin expected the new students to come mainly from Georgia, the Ukraine,

and Uzbekistan. The length of study at the Moscow Yeshiva would be from three to five years; some of the students would become *mohelim*, *shohetim*, or *hazanim*, while others would receive full rabbinical training.

*

The Zionist Organization of Guatemala has published a booklet on a census of the Jewish population of the country. The data were collected by members of the Organization.

The Jewish community of Guatemala has a total of 1,030 souls, and in addition a floating population of about 25. There are 307 households; 27 of these observe kashrut.

Of the resident population, 980 live in the capital (Guatemala City).

	%
340 men	33
314 women	30·5
167 boys	16·2
209 girls	20·3
1,030	100·0

Note: The adults are those aged 18 years and over and married persons under 18 years.

Age of the Population

	Total
Born before 1870	1
,, 1870–1879	7
,, 1880–1889	32
,, 1890–1899	59
,, 1900–1909	113
,, 1910–1919	94
,, 1920–1929	137
,, 1930–1939	122
,, 1946–1950	75
,, 1951–1958	183
,, 1959–1963	91

Civil Status

	Men	*Women*
Married	253	219
Single	67	28
Divorced	7	15
Widowed	13	52
	340	314

Note: The discrepancy in the totals is due to the fact that there are mixed marriages.

There are in Guatemala 193 unions of Jews and 74 mixed marriages. Of the 74 mixed marriages, 58 have a non-Jewish wife and 16 a non-Jewish husband. Thus 72·28 per cent of marriages are among Jews and 27·72 per cent are mixed marriages.

Place of Birth

Note: The following table does not include children, the great majority of whom were born in Guatemala.

		%
Guatemala	422 persons	70·9
Central & South America	47 ,,	7·9
North America	55 ,,	9·2
Europe	56 ,,	9·4
Middle East	15 ,,	2·6

Occupations

		Men	*Women*
Commerce and Industry		239	37
Professions:		39	27
Engineers and Architects	11		
Medical Doctors and Dentists	8	1	
Chemists	4		
Secretaries		26	
Others	16		
Agriculture		7	
Domestic Duties			211
Students at Guatemala University		19	7

Housing

147 households own their homes
107 live in rented houses
44 live in rented apartments
9 live in rooms.

Language

Note: Only 2 men and 7 women stated that they did not speak Spanish.
Of other languages spoken by the community, *English* is the most frequently known.
Main languages spoken (other than Spanish):

	Men	*Women*
English	201	181
German	128	115
Yiddish	86	57
Arabic	29	31
French	56	48
Hungarian	10	7
Polish	13	6
Russian	12	4

Hebrew

27 men and 11 women speak Hebrew;
45 men and 14 women write it;
115 men and 38 women read it.

The chief languages spoken are:

Spanish in 125 households;
German in 62 households;
English in 31 households;
Yiddish in 24 households;
Arabic in 6 households;
French in 6 households.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

BRONSZTEJN, Szyja, Econ.D.; Assistant to the Statistical Section of the Law Department of the Boleslaw Bierut University in Wrocław. Publications in Polish (among many other scientific and statistical papers): 'The Jewish Population in Poland in the Period Between the Wars' in *Ossolineum*, Wrocław, 1963; 'Questionnaire Examination of the Jewish Population of Lower Silesia: Problems of Demography' in *Biuletyn Z.I.H.* nos. 47–48 (The Jewish Historical Institute Bulletin), Warsaw, 1963, and no. 50, Warsaw, 1964. Has also contributed an article to *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, volume VI, no. 1.

CAHNMAN, Werner J., Ph.D.; Associate Professor of Sociology, Rutgers University. Has previously taught at Fisk, Atlanta, and Yeshiva Universities. Among his chief publications are: *Der ekonomische Pessimismus und das Ricardo'sche System*, Halberstadt, 1929; *Voelker und Rassen im Urteil der Jugend*, Munich, 1965; *Report on Palestine Refugees* (co-author), New York, 1958; *How Cities Grew* (co-author), Madison, N.J., 1961; *Sociology and History* (co-author), New York, 1964; *Intermarriage and Jewish Life* (co-author and editor), New York, 1963.

COHEN, Percy S., B.Sc.(Econ.), Ph.D.; Lecturer in Sociology, London School of Economics. Formerly Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Leicester. Chief publications: 'Alignments and Allegiances in the Community of Shaarayim in Israel', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, volume IV, no. 1, 1962; 'Ethnic Hostility in Israel', *New Society*, 23 February 1963; mimeo Government report (in Hebrew) 'Community and Stability in an Immigrant Town', Jerusalem, 1960. Is completing a book on Israeli communities and preparing one on contemporary social theory.

GOLDSCHEIDER, Calvin, B.A., B.R.E., Yeshiva University, M.A., Ph.D., Brown University; Assistant Professor of Sociology, Faculty Research Associate, Population Research Laboratory and Rossmoor-Cortese Institute for the Study of Ageing and Retirement at the University of Southern California; has participated in the United Nations World Population Conference, 1965, and is on the editorial board of *Sociology and Social Research*. Has published (with Basil G. Zimmer) 'A Further Look at Catholic Fertility', World Population Conference, Belgrade, 1965. At present engaged in research on Jewish population trends in the United States, changes in the American Jewish community, and an analysis of residential mobility of older people in the U.S.A.

KURZWEIL, Zvi Erich, Dr. Phil.; Associate Professor in Education, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa. Was formerly an inspector for the Central Council of Jewish Education in London. Chief publications: *Modern Trends in Jewish Education*, Thomas Yoseloff, New York, London, 1964; *Education in a Technological Society*, Rubin Mass, Jerusalem, 1964 (in Hebrew); *English for Science and Engineering Students*, Girardet, Essen, 1963; *English for Students of Technology*, Girardet, Essen, 1964. Is currently working on a monograph on the Polish-Jewish educator Janusz Korczak.

LOEWE, Raphael, M.C., M.A. (Cantab); Formerly Lecturer in Hebrew, Leeds University; Bye-Fellow, Caius College, Cambridge; Visiting Professor of Judaica, Brown University, U.S.A. Chief publications: *Judaism: Privilege and Perspective*, Parkes Library, Barley, 1962; 'A Jewish Counterpart to the Acts of the Alexandrine Martyrs', *Journal of Jewish Studies*, 12, 3–4, 1961; 'Jewish Scholarship in England', *Three Centuries of Anglo-Jewish History* (ed. V. D. Lipman), 1960; 'The Polarity of "Holiness" ', *Conservative Judaism*, 18, 1, 1963; 'The "Plain" Meaning of Scripture in Early Jewish Exegesis', *Papers* of the Institute of Jewish Studies, 1, 1964 (ed. J. G. Weiss, Jerusalem). Is currently engaged in a study of apologetic elements in Jewish exegesis of the *Song of Songs* and in editing a volume of *Studies in Rationalism, Judaism, Universalism* in Memory of Leon Roth.

RIM, Yeshayahu, Ph.D.; Senior Lecturer in Psychology in the Department of Industrial Engineering, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa. Chief publications: *Selection of Employees* (in Hebrew), Haifa, 1958; 'Machiavellianism and Decisions involving Risk', *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, vol. 4, 1965; 'L'Intolérance de l'ambiguité et l'acceptation du risque', *Revue Suisse de Psychologie Pure et Appliquée*, vol. 23, No. 3, 1964; 'Dimensions of Job Incentives and Personality', *Acta Psychol.*, vol. XVIII, 1961. Is currently engaged in research into the relation between praise or blame and personality variables and their influence on the performance of schoolchildren.

SCHMIDT, Nancy J., Ph.D; Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Wisconsin State University. Has published several articles, including 'Resistance to Culture Change: A Case Study of an Orthodox Jewish Community', in *Proceedings of the Minnesota Academy of Science*, 30, 2, 1963; is currently engaged in an anthropological study of Nigerian fiction.