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AN ASPECT OF THE JEWS AND ENGLISH MARRIAGE LAW DURING THE EMANCIPATION: THE PROHIBITED DEGREES

Israel Finestein

INTRODUCTION

FOR all the social emancipation enjoyed by the higher ranks of Anglo-Jewish society in the eighteenth century, the Jews in the early decades of the following century were essentially a separate and distinct people. Great assimilatory advances had certainly been made by 1830, but much remained to be done by way of anglicization. The Jewish emancipationists were acutely aware of the peculiarity and separateness of the Jewish community in English life and lost no opportunity of emphasizing that in reality and despite appearances there was no difference between the Jews and their fellow-subjects other than one of religious denomination.

The reign of George III coincided with a revolutionary movement against aristocratic privilege and corporate prescriptive rights. This democratic assault on the establishment affected European and American society[1] and found its most destructive and creative phase in the French Revolution. Its principal idea was civic equality and its central aspiration was to assert in practice the doctrine of inherent rights. The movement was given purpose and shape by the emerging, self-conscious, and politically discontented bourgeoisie, thriving economically on industrial and commercial expansion. The Jews were politically identified with them, and indeed formed a prominent segment of the rising middle classes. Jewish emancipation marched in step with the political advance of the middle classes.[2] Political and civic emancipation was accompanied in the mid-nineteenth century in England by assimilation in speech, dress, education, and world outlook. This process was encouraged by the increase in the native-born proportion of the Jewish community and by the profound desire on the part of the Jewish bourgeoisie to show themselves worthy of, and equal to, the fullest emancipation. No feature of Jewish life impinging upon

English society was left untested by the criterion of its favourable or adverse impact upon Jewish emancipation.

These trends of thought and action may be detected, among many other fields, in the Anglo-Jewish approach in the nineteenth century to the English marriage law as affecting the Jews. The emancipationists, while naturally anxious to preserve the legal recognition of Jewish marriage, wanted, if possible, to divest the Jews of any further special legal category in matrimonial law. The various issues involved may conveniently be grouped into four main compartments. One question concerned the status in English law of a rabbinic divorce. In spite of the efforts of the Chief Rabbi and Board of Deputies, the Government, influenced by Sir David Salomons and Lionel de Rothschild, abandoned the clause in the Matrimonial Causes Bill of 1857 which would have exempted Jewish marriages from dissolution by the civil Divorce Court first set up by that measure.[3] Related to the topic of rabbinic divorce was the problem of the clandestine marriage. In December 1847, the Board of Deputies warned all congregations against participating in or countenancing such marriages, which nevertheless continued to be performed from time to time largely through ignorance of the requirements of the Registration Act of 1836 or because no prior divorce had been obtained valid in English law or because the marriage fell within the degrees prohibited in English law.[4] The third main question was connected with the position of the non-orthodox congregations in relation to the registration of marriages.[5] The fourth broad issue revolved round the disparities between the prohibited degrees of marriage in English and rabbinic law, with which this article is concerned.

SPECIAL POSITION OF THE JEWS

The first statutory recognition of the special status of Jewish marriages in England was contained in Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753.[6] The object of that Act was to prevent clandestine marriages by requiring all marriages to be solemnized in church and to be preceded by the publication of banns or the granting of a licence. Among the exceptions incorporated into the Act were marriages between Quakers and between persons professing the Jewish religion. As far as the Jews were concerned, this exception was no more than an acknowledgement of their special and anomalous position since the Resettlement. They were a relic of the Commonwealth, protected by royal favour and justifying their presence by their commercial and financial utility and by their loyalty. They infringed the ancient doctrine of uniformity. They lived in England by way of toleration, and they retained religio-national aspirations and exhibited national characteristics which set them apart from the run of English folk. Yet necessity required that

their marriages—that is of persons professing the Jewish religion and married according to the usages of the Jews—should be recognized. Jewish life would otherwise have been rendered impossible. Even before 1753, the law in practice recognized Jewish marriage, despite the possible requirement of the common law that a Christian clergyman should be present at the ceremony of marriage.[7] That requirement was in practice dispensed with in respect of Jewish marriages.[8] To insist upon such a stipulation would have been to impose a farce. Express authority for the continued presence of the Jews was afforded by James II's Order-in-Council of 1685 that they may 'quietly enjoy the free exercise of their religion, whilst they behave themselves dutifully and obediently to his government'.[9] This decree survived its ill-fated author. The legal recognition of the right of the Jews to marry in accordance with their own religious tenets was an irresistible implication of the Order-in-Council.

Entwined in this recognition was an assumption as to the essentially alien character of the Jewish community. It was that assumption which the emancipationists sought to root out and which led many of them, as occasion offered, to preach limits to the extent to which the Jews should claim an exceptional status in matrimonial law. Frequent expression was given to this assumption. In *Vivegena and Silveira* v. *Alvarez* (1794), Sir William Scott in argument observed: 'As to Jews, it was unreasonable to maintain that their marriages according to their own rites should not be valid. They had existed always as a separate community and in some respects on the footing of aliens, and were entitled to have their marriages tried by their own laws. . . .'[10] In 1821, in giving judgement in *Ruding* v. *Smith*, Scott, who in the course of this case was created Lord Stowell, spoke of the Jews in the following terms: 'In our own country and in many others, there is another body . . . who though native subjects under the protection of the general law are in many respects governed by institutions of their own and, particularly, in the marriages; for it being the practice of mankind to consecrate their marriages by religious ceremonies, the differences of religion in all countries that admit residents professing religions essentially different, unavoidably introduce exceptions in that matter to the universality of that rule which makes mere domicil the constituent of an unlimited subjection to the ordinary law of the country . . .; the exceptions, when admitted, furnish the real law for the excepted cases; the general law steers clear wide of them. The matrimonial law of England for the Jews is their own matrimonial law. . . .'[11] 'This exception to the general law', wrote one authority at this time,[12] in relation to the validity in English law of Jewish marriages, 'has probably arisen from the peculiarities attending the state of the Jewish nation in England, having always been looked upon as a distinct people and having for a long time been treated rather as aliens than as native subjects.'[13]

Such declarations never went so far as to state that Jews in England were entitled to marry within the degrees prohibited by English law. There is no doubt that Jewish marriages of that kind did take place. The reported cases in which Jewish marriages were upheld or in which the right of the Jews to marry in accordance with their own usages was discussed, concerned the formalities constituting or attending the marriage. Questions of legal capacity to marry were not in direct issue. The widest judicial observations were probably those of Sir William Scott in *Goldsmid* v. *Bromer* in 1798. 'The Jews,' he said, 'though British subjects, have the enjoyment of their own laws in religious ceremonies; and the Marriage Act acknowledges this privilege by excepting them out of its provisions. To deny them the benefit of their own law upon such subjects, would be to deny a distinct body of people the full benefit of the toleration to which they have long been held to be entitled.'[14] That case was concerned with whether the proper forms as required by rabbinic law had been observed in the marriage ceremony and whether the marriage was valid and binding in Jewish law. No question of the legal capacity of the parties to the marriage arose. Later judges declined to read into Scott's words any special status or exemption of the Jews in relation to the English prohibited degrees. However, no judical decision expressly denied Jews the right to marry within the degrees allowed by the rabbis. Until 1835 the right of the Jews to marry validly in English law in accordance with their own rules as to the prohibited degrees does not appear to have been put in issue or indeed openly debated.

LORD LYNDHURST'S MARRIAGE ACT

Section 2 of Lord Lyndhurst's[15] Marriage Act of 1835 was comprehensive. 'All marriages', it ran, 'which shall hereafter be celebrated between persons within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity shall be absolutely null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever.' Formerly, such marriages were not void but voidable by the Ecclesiastical Courts in the lifetime of the parties. Save for the express exclusion of Scotland, the Act allowed of no express exceptions from its operation. Its wording was not conducive to implied exceptions. The object of the Act was principally to render void a marriage between the widower and his deceased wife's sister.

The Act of 1835 did not define the prohibited degrees. It took for granted the rules which had been incorporated into English law from Canon Law. They were the subject of legislation during the Reformation and were set out in the Book of Common Prayer and expounded by Sir Edward Coke in the second volume of his *Institutes*. The basis of the rules was scripture. 'All persons', said Henry VIII's governing statute of 1540, 'be lawful that be not prohibited by God's law to marry', by

which was meant the eighteenth and twentieth chapters of Leviticus as interpreted and extended by the Church. The prohibition against marriage with the deceased wife's sister was established by analogy upon verse 16 of the eighteenth chapter which excludes a brother's wife. This analogy was not drawn by the rabbis. Neither the Mosaic code nor rabbinic law excludes marriage with the deceased wife's sister. In 1907, after seventy years of contention,[16] Parliament finally legalized marriage with the deceased wife's sister, and in 1921 legalized marriage with the deceased husband's brother. Likewise, ecclesiastical law, adopted into English law, prohibited marriage between uncle and niece, a union not prohibited in the Mosaic code or by rabbinic law. In 1931, Parliament legalized marriage with a niece or nephew by marriage, but marriage with the niece or nephew of one's own blood remains void in English law.[17]

BOARD OF DEPUTIES OF BRITISH JEWS

The Board of Deputies, representing in fact the major metropolitan Synagogues, was by tradition committed to watching the legislative scene to protect the interests of the Jewish community. It was a leisurely and informal body of fluctuating initiative. In practice, its efficacy and influence were adventitious and depended upon the personal weight of its leading members with those in authority in public life. Although its principal members were prominently identified with the campaign for Jewish emancipation, the dominant personalities in that campaign, notably Sir David Salomons and Sir Isaac Lyon Goldsmid, were usually out of accord with the somewhat cautious official approach of the Board, and tended to pursue the goal of emancipation independently of the Board. In the realm of matrimonial law, Moses Montefiore, who became President of the Board in 1835, and Nathan Marcus Adler, who was appointed Chief Rabbi in 1844, represented those who were anxious to retain in all respects the special Jewish status. Salomons was the main champion of the view that this exceptional status in English law should be strictly limited.

The Board's reaction to Lord Lyndhurst's Act was late and half-hearted. On the face of it, the Act did not concern the Jews as such. No Jewish question arose in the lengthy debates to which the measure was subjected in Parliament. There was no officer at the Board charged with the particular duty of watching the Parliamentary scene. The Board at this time was in any event occupied with the formulation of its first Constitution. In 1835 it met on three occasions, each time in the Park Lane home of Montefiore. There is no reference in the minutes of those meetings to any pending legislation. At the first meeting, on 8 April, the Board appointed a special committee to prepare a draft constitution, which was lengthily considered by the Board at its third

meeting, on 7 June. At the intermediate meeting, on 11 May, the resignation was announced of Joseph Cohen as Honorary Secretary owing to ill-health, and David Brandon was temporarily appointed to that office. It was not until 1838 that the Board finally appointed a professional Secretary, in the person of Sampson Samuel. The absence of such an administrative officer had further limited the effectiveness of the Board. Lord Lyndhurst's Act was introduced into the House of Lords and given its first reading on 1 June 1835. By the end of August it had passed through all its stages, and received the Royal Assent on 31 August. When Montefiore perceived that the Act could be construed as including the Jews in its provisions and consequently as barring Jews from validly marrying within degrees permitted by Jewish law but prohibited by English law, he strove for an amendment to the Act or for an authoritative opinion in support of the contrary construction of the Act. It was in connexion with this Act that on 9 July 1837 he significantly wrote in his diary: 'I am most firmly resolved not to give up the smallest part of our religious forms and privileges to obtain civil rights.'[18]

The first reference in the Board's minutes to the Act of 1835 occurs on 7 March 1836, the date of the Board's first meeting since 7 June 1835. The Board assumed that the Act applied to the Jews. It was resolved that 'every effort should be made to relieve the Jews from [its] provisions' so that marriages valid between Jews under the Mosaic code might be recognized in English law even though they infringed the English prohibited degrees. A committee was appointed to take such measures to that end as they thought necessary, and comprised the President, Solomon Cohen, Louis Lucas, S. I. Waley, David Brandon, Benjamin Cohen, and Solomon Cohen junior.[19]

The Board devoted much of its time in 1836 to the consideration of the Marriage Act and Registration Act of that year. Not only did these measures restrict the attention which the Board might otherwise have paid to the Act of the previous year, but the Marriage Act of 1836 seemed to some to offer grounds for construing Lord Lyndhurst's Act as not affecting the Jews. The object of the Marriage Act was to provide for those who wished to avail themselves of it a new and alternative form of marriage, namely marriage by civil registration. Section 2 of the Act declared that Quakers and persons professing the Jewish religion '*may continue to contract* and solemnize marriage *according to the usages* of the said Society and of the said persons respectively and every such marriage is hereby declared and confirmed good in law—provided that notice to the Registrar shall have been given and the Registrar's certificate shall have issued in manner hereinafter provided'. The Registration Act of 1836 laid down a code of rules relating to matters of registration. Section 30 required the Registrar-General to furnish marriage registers 'to every person whom the President for the

time being of the London Committee of Deputies of the British Jews shall from time to time certify . . . to be the Secretary of a Synagogue . . . of persons professing the Jewish religion . . .'. The Secretary of the Synagogue was required to record therein the marriages solemnized, and was to see to it that the ceremony was valid according to the usages of the Jews. In the performance of these important statutory duties the Secretary acted in a sense on behalf of the Registrar-General.[20] In connexion with this legislation, Solomon Hirschell, the aged Chief Rabbi, and David Meldola, the acting Haham, attended the meeting of the Board of Deputies on 15 March 1836 to convey their views upon the proposed wording. They and the Board were content with the final form of this legislation. No action, however, appears to have been taken by or on behalf of the Board in respect of the Act of 1835. The view seems to have gained ground that that Act after all might well not apply to Jews. The committee appointed in March 1836 appears to have been dormant from its inception.

But the matter was, by reason of the broad terms of Lord Lyndhurst's Act, far from free of doubt. On 12 December 1836, the Board expressed the view that 'it is highly important that a Bill be obtained in Parliament to relieve all doubts as to Jews being affected by the Act [of 1835]'.[21] The Board directed that its Solicitor, Pearce, be consulted as to the best course to adopt and 'as to its probable expense'. On 22 December 1836 at a meeting held in Montefiore's room at the offices of the Alliance Assurance Company, the Board referred the question to yet a further committee, namely a committee which had been appointed on 13 March 1836 to assist the (abortive) Emancipation Bill of that year. The committee was authorized to confer with the 'appropriate authorities' with a view to procuring an amendment to the Act of 1835.[22]

An appropriate Bill was ultimately introduced into the House of Commons in June 1837 by Stephen Lushington, the renowned ecclesiastical lawyer, and Thomas Buxton, the prominent Liberal. The aim of the Bill was to provide that marriages between Jews were to be impeachable by reason of consanguinity or affinity only if such marriages were in breach of the degrees laid down by Mosaic law 'according to the interpretations accepted by the Jews'. At the Board's first meeting in 1837, namely on 26 June, the Board's Solicitor described what was being done to advance the measure, and three days later the House of Commons adopted the Bill in Committee. The prorogation of Parliament on 17 July terminated the Bill, with all other pending business. But it had already become evident that the Bill's chances of success were slender. Montefiore was unable to find a sponsor for it in the House of Lords. On 9 July, the Board had resolved that 'all necessary measures be resorted to for promoting the success of the Bill', and authorized him 'if so advised' to present a petition in its favour to the

House of Lords signed by him or by the Deputies as a whole. No such petition was prepared. On the day of the prorogation, it was reported to the Board that the Bill had failed.[23] The Board took no action to revive the measure in the next session, and no further attempt was made to procure an amendment to Lord Lyndhurst's Act. The Board's effort was dilatory and, save for Montefiore, the Board and its relevant committees showed little or no enthusiasm to press the matter forward.

Those Jews who thought that the Jewish community should not seek an exceptional status in the matter of the prohibited degrees were supported in practice by those who believed that in any event the law already afforded the Jews that status. Neither group thought it necessary or wise to press for an amendment to the Act. The former group doubted whether it was in the best interests of the Jewish community to press for a recognition which would make all the more evident the peculiarity of the Jewish enclave in the State. It would offer a further illustration to the opponents of emancipation and to the waverers, of Jewish separateness and difference in society. The second group was fortified or perhaps consoled by Lushington's written opinion of 19 March 1838 on a particular case submitted to him by the Board's Solicitor regarding a proposed marriage between maternal uncle and niece. Hirschell had refused to perform the marriage ceremony. Linked to the question of the validity in English law of the proposed marriage were certain questions relating to proposed property arrangements, including a settlement upon the bride by her father. Lushington was of the opinion that if the marriage was valid in Jewish law it would be upheld in the Courts. He added that before 1835 he had entertained no doubt on this matter and that it was his belief that the Act of 1835 would be held not to apply to Jews.[24]

VARYING OPINIONS

The parliamentary climate of opinion in the 1840s proved somewhat more favourable to the cause of Jewish emancipation than during the preceding decade.[25] This improvement tended to weaken the Board of Deputies' inhibitions in regard to seeking a clarification of the Jewish position under the prohibited degrees. If the law of the land accorded the Jews certain rights and privileges, albeit arising out of, and evidencing, the peculiarity of the Jewish position in English society, it was not for the Jews to disdain to avail themselves of them. The declining years of Hirschell's Chief Rabbinate were not the most propitious in which to pursue these matters. His successor was a vigorous advocate of the right of the Jews to marry in accordance with their own rabbinic rules. Judicial dicta in *R.* v. *Millis* (1844)[26] which, to some minds, cast doubt generally on the technical validity in English law of Jewish marriage

prior to 1836, were a further spur to the movement for setting at rest the uncertainties.

On 29 April 1844, Louis Lucas, a representative of the New Synagogue, moved a resolution at the Board that early consideration should be given to the law relating to Jews and the prohibited degrees. On 6 May 1844, eighteen months after Hirschell's death, the Board, on Lucas's motion, resolved by ten votes to five to appoint a committee charged to procure the best legal advice on the question.[27] The opinions were sought of the Attorney-General (Sir William Follett) and of Sir John Dodson and Jesse Addams, distinguished ecclesiastical lawyers. Follett declined to advise on the issue on the grounds that he had decided to restrict his activities to matters connected with his public office. Dodson and Addams expressed the opinion that the marriages of British Jews and other Jews resident in England within the English prohibited degrees would not be held valid. This opinion was based upon the comprehensive terms of Lord Lyndhurst's Act. Addams applied his mind to the implication which some sought to import into the provision of the Act of 1836 acknowledging the right of the Jews to contract marriages according to their usages. It was contended that the recognition of this right inherently involves a recognition of the right of Jews to marry within the Jewish degrees. Addams, however, stated that 'on the whole' he did not think that the Act of 1836 derogated from the comprehensive effect of the legislation of the previous year.[28] On the strength of these authoritative opinions, the Board on 4 June 1844 decided to issue a warning to all Jewish congregations not to countenance marriages within the English prohibited degrees 'until a judicial decision or legislative enactment shall settle the state of the law as to Jewish marriages within the prohibited degrees'. Synagogue Wardens were directed to withhold their sanction.

In 1850 the Board again found itself engaged in the task of searching for a clarification of the law on the question. It was known that Adler favoured a more robust stand than that indicated in the resolution of 4 June 1844. The new situation was thrust upon the Board by the enterprise of Jonas Spyer,[29] a City solicitor of English birth who wished to know whether his daughter was entitled in English law to marry her uncle, one I. Henry. Spyer preceded his approach to the Board by a series of private submissions to eminent Counsel, including, in addition to Lushington and Addams, R. B. Crowder and G. J. Turner, prominent members of the Common Law bar and the Chancery bar respectively (and both later appointed to the Bench). The four Counsel were of the view that the Courts would uphold the marriage if it were valid in Jewish law, even though it infringed the prohibited degrees of English law. Addams's change of opinion resulted from his reconsideration of the use of the term 'contract' in the Marriage Act of 1836, which he now construed as extending to capacity.[30] The principal ground on

which the other Counsel rested their conclusion was the traditional and exceptional status granted to the Jews as disclosed in reported cases.[31]

Spyer broached the matter with the Chief Rabbi, who, after several days' consideration, intimated that, subject to the Board's prior sanction, he was willing to give his assent. On 27 November 1850, Spyer wrote to Montefiore and sent him his impressive correspondence with Counsel for the study of the Board. Montefiore lost no time. He convened a special meeting of the Board, which assembled on 4 December. In spite of the weighty opinions laid before the meeting, the Board decided by eleven votes to two against departing from the policy laid down in 1844. It was reported in the *Jewish Chronicle* two days later that proceedings were contemplated by way of an application for *mandamus* in the Court of Queen's Bench to oblige the Wardens of Spyer's Synagogue to show cause why they should not authorize Adler to give his assent to his daughter's proposed marriage. In fact, no such proceedings were taken.

The Board's caution appeared to be justified by the Registrar-General's letter to Montefiore on 23 December 1850 stating that, in the unanimous opinion of the Queen's Advocate, the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, the proposed marriage would be invalid in English law, whatever its status in Jewish law, and that the Registrar-General must accept that view. The general opinion of the Board of Deputies was that it was not in the wider interests of the Jewish community to make a public issue of this 'disability'.

Some support for Adler's and Montefiore's aspiration came from a perhaps unexpected quarter. On 25 February 1851, the House of Lords debated the second reading of the latest and abortive Bill, this time introduced by Lord St. Germain, to enable a widower to marry his deceased wife's sister. Several speakers commented on the fact that while the scriptural ground for the prohibition was contained in the Old Testament, the Jews had never interpreted the relevant passage so as to impose this particular exclusion. Samuel Hinds,[32] Bishop of Norwich, expressed a certain sympathy with the Jewish community. 'It does seem hard', he observed, 'and it savours of religious intolerance that we should put an interpretation on the marriage laws of the Jews contrary to theirs and compel them to abide by it.' While opposing Lord St. Germain's Bill, Hinds added that if the Bill had in effect consisted of an exemption clause limited to the Jews or for any other particular 'body of religionists' whose religious tenets differed from the general law in this matter, he 'would not have been indisposed to support the Bill'.

The Bishop of London, Charles James Blomfield, who likewise opposed the Bill, went further in regard to the Jews. He appeared to take the view that no burden fell upon them. He thought that the Courts, in adjudicating upon the validity of a Jewish marriage, were

merely concerned with the question whether the marriage had been correctly solemnized in the eyes of the Beth Din. He referred to the reported judicial decisions of Lord Stowell and was of the opinion that the principles there enunciated extended to the capacity of the parties as well as to the forms of the marriage ceremony.

FINAL ATTEMPTS

The last time the Board was formally involved in a consideration of the matter was in 1855. The Government was contemplating the introduction of matrimonial legislation, and the Registrar-General was engaged in eliciting from the various denominations and other interested groups information as to areas of the law where reform might be desirable. On 24 January 1855, Thomas Mann, Chief Clerk to the General Register Office, submitted to the Board a series of questions relating to Jews and the marriage laws. In effect, he wanted to know the frequency with which the Jews in England contracted marriages outside the English permitted degrees, if at all, and, should such marriages be prohibited by the Act of 1835, whether such prohibition is 'generally regarded by the Jewish community in England as a grievance which they desire to have remedied'.[33]

In reply to the Board's request for guidance, Adler informed Montefiore that as far as he knew no such marriage had been celebrated in this country since his accession to office in July 1845. Adler added that he knew of eight such marriages by members of metropolitan congregations since that date which had been solemnized abroad. As to 'legal doubts' concerning the effect of the Act of 1835, Adler stated: 'I have no doubt that as these marriages have been allowed from time immemorial, the great majority of the Jewish community do regard the prohibition (if it exists) as a grievance and desire that it be remedied. . . . I have not the least doubt but that the Jews, as a body, would consider it a great boon to be allowed to retain the privilege of intermarriage within all the degrees which are allowed under the Jewish law.'[34]

Encouraged by Mann's inquiry and the unequivocal views of the Chief Rabbi, Montefiore deemed the occasion ripe for a further effort to secure a favourable settlement of the 'legal doubts'. On his initiative, the Board's Solicitor on 31 January 1855 obtained from A. F. Bayford, an eminent ecclesiastical lawyer and well-known draftsman, the draft of a clause to amend the Act of 1835. On 1 February 1855, the Board declared by resolution that it would be 'consonant with the wishes of the Jewish community in this country' and that in the Board's opinion it would be expedient that in any future matrimonial legislation, the Act of 1835 be amended to exclude the Jews expressly from its provisions. This resolution and Adler's statement were dispatched to the

Registrar-General. But the issue was not pressed, nor was any matrimonial legislation introduced during that session. Had such an amendment been mooted in Parliament, it would certainly have met with strenuous opposition from Salomons. Nor did Adler resume the attempt. In 1866 the Chief Rabbi informed the Royal Commission on the Laws of Marriage that among the preliminaries necessary 'in order to render the marriage normal and valid according to Jewish laws', it must be 'fully ascertained that the persons between whom the marriage is to be contracted do not stand within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity prohibited by the Jewish laws or the law of the land'.[35]

It was not until the end of the century that the 'legal doubts' as to the current state of the law were set at rest. In 1867 the Registrar-General informed the Royal Commission on the Laws of Marriage that 'eminent lawyers disagree' on whether or not a Jew could lawfully marry his niece in England. 'It seems desirable', he added, 'that on this subject all doubts should be removed.' As late as 1887, J. T. Hammick stated that 'there is a strong feeling among the Jewish community that at least the marriage of a widower to his deceased wife's sister ought to be permitted'.[36] From time to time the Jewish press inveighed against the restriction and urged the superiority of the Jewish law over the needless restriction imposed by English law. But these comments were less concerned with suggesting an exceptional law for the Jews than with advocating a general legislative change affecting society as a whole in respect of the deceased wife's sister. There was no movement for a legislative amendment to declare an exceptional status for the Jews. It became tacitly assumed that the existing law in fact applied to Jews. In *De Wilton* v. *Montefiore* (1900), it was laid down that the special status of the Jews in the marriage laws of England related solely to their right to marry in accordance with their own usages as to the forms of ceremony and did not extend to their own rules as to capacity.[37] As to legal capacity to marry, the Jews were governed in the eyes of English law by the English prohibited degrees alone. This was the judicial decision awaited by the Board in 1844, and it was adverse. It was the first case in the century in which the particular issue as to capacity arose for judicial decision.

Adler and Montefiore were unwilling to abandon lightly those consequences of the Jewish enclave which would entitle the Jews to follow the Mosaic law. Of German birth and training, the Chief Rabbi, formerly Chief Rabbi of Hanover, was mindful of the advantages of the continental forms of Jewish autonomy in matters of religious law. Montefiore, a staunch traditionalist whose attitude was conditioned by the recollections of the eighteenth century, was, in spite of his intimate identification with the campaign for emancipation, a child of the pre-emancipation era. To these men, the Jewish *nation* was a reality, whose religio-national laws and *mores* had the sanction of antiquity and divine

authority. To preserve the body of Jewish observances intact was an end in itself. Emancipation, though desirable, was a matter of convenience rather than an end in itself. Against this attitude was ranged an alliance of Reform and a brand of progressive orthodoxy. Salomons, a member of the orthodox community, regarded emancipation as a goal of contemporary Jewish history. It was the destiny of the Jew to become an Englishman or a Frenchman or whatever might be the case. Jewish national aspirations were either to be discarded as impractical or postponed to a later age outside the realm of calculable human affairs. The Jews were to constitute one of the great nonconformist sects in English life, and their relationship to the Established Church was to be on the same footing as that of any other dissenting group. As far as possible, they were to be governed by the same laws as affected the rest of the nation. Salomons thought the time had come for the entire abrogation of the rabbinic power of divorce in England. The English Jew should marry as an Englishman, subject to the same laws applying to all Englishmen, save that the ceremony should be in conformity with Jewish religious requirements. It was a natural part of his philosophy that he should advocate that the Jews, like all other Englishmen, should be bound by the prohibited degrees of the law of the land.

The Board of Deputies, under its energetic and stubborn President, and influenced by the Chief Rabbi who was with the Haham the Board's official guide in matters of religion, was nevertheless affected by Salomons's outlook. It was a divided body. The strength of its advocacy of Adler's opinion depended in part on its assessment of the current state of emancipationist opinion. It was reluctant to embarrass the principal emancipationists by pressing forward a measure enhancing or confirming the special status of the Jews at times when Parliament was engaged upon the many successive Emancipation Bills in the 1840s and 1850s. In the 1850s Salomons's outlook became the accepted outlook of Jewish leadership. In the generation which followed the admission of Jews to the House of Commons in 1858, there emerged the self-conscious Jewish Englishman as Salomons had envisaged him. That generation of leadership was not interested in pursuing so out-dated a measure as had been urged by the Chief Rabbi in his early years of office. It ceased to be a live issue.

NOTES

[1] For recent studies, see R. R. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution*, Vol. 1: *The Challenge* (1960); and E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848* (1962).

[2] For Anglo-Jewish opinion during the struggle for emancipation, see the author's paper thereon in Vol. XX, *Trans. Jew. Hist. Soc.* (1964).

[3] For an account of this episode, see the author's article on 'Anglo-Jewry and the Law of Divorce' in *Jewish Chronicle*, 19 April 1957. The legal recognition of rabbinic divorce was not a necessary corollary of the legal recognition of Jewish marriage. The state of matrimony having once been entered into, by whatever forms, that state carries with it

certain consequences impinging upon public policy, in such realms as succession, legitimacy, affinity, and the binding character of the marriage tie. Parties may bind themselves by forms which satisfy their consciences, whereas to loosen the bonds once created involves social issues and public considerations. 'Marriage is the fulfilment of a contract satisfied by the solemnization of the marriage, but marriage directly it exists creates by law a relationship between the parties and what is called a status of each': per Brett L.J. (later Lord Esher M.R.), *Niboyet* v. *Niboyet* (1878) 4. P.D.1. 'Marriage in its origin is a contract of Natural Law. It is the parent not the child of Civil Society': per Sir Travers Twiss, 'The Conflict of Marriage Laws', VIII *Law Magazine and Review*, 4th Series (1882), pp. 1–11.

[4] The extent of the incidence of irregular marriages varied in direct proportion to the rate of immigration. The Board repeated its warning periodically during the next sixty years. 'The parties to these marriages are almost always foreigners . . .': H. S. Q. Henriques, *Jewish Marriages and the English Law* (1909), p. 55.

[5] In 1856 the West London Synagogue of British Jews was given statutory recognition for the purposes of marriage registration, the Board's ecclesiastical authorities having refused to recognize that Reform congregation as a synagogue of persons professing the Jewish religion, and the President of the Board having accordingly refused to certify a secretary for marriages thereat. Salomons became the principal critic of the Jewish provisions of the Registration Act of 1836. For his points of criticism, see his evidence to the Chelmsford Commission on the Laws of Marriage in 1865; pp. 10–11 of Appendix and pp. 83–7 of report of evidence in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867–8, Vol. 32, and Reports from Commissioners, Vol. XVII. The Marriage and Registration Acts, he observed, were intended to afford civil registration of every marriage, leaving it to the parties to marry according to their own religious views, 'without any heed or interference of the State . . .'. 'This principle is abandoned in the case of the Jews for they—in compliance with those Acts—are required to marry according to their usages. . . . The Acts have been so administered as to make the adhesion of synagogues to an orthodox Jewish ecclesiastical standard the very substance and condition of registration.' For Adler's memorandum in support of the legislation of 1836, see p. 45 of Appendix. The Commission adopted Salomons's proposal that all synagogues should be given the same means of obtaining state recognition for their secretaries as marriage registrars as were given to nonconformist congregations desirous of having their places of worship registered for the solemnization of marriages: pp. xxxvi–xxxvii of Report. Their recommendation was not acted upon. In 1959 Parliament extended to the Liberal Synagogue the recognition given to the Reform Synagogue in 1856.

[6] For Jewish marriages in English law, see R. S. D. Roper, *Treatise of the Law of Property Arising from the Relations between Husband and Wife*, 2nd ed. by E. Jacob (1826), Vol. 2, pp. 475–6; and Leonard Shelford, *A Practical Treatise of the Law of Marriage, Divorce, Registration, etc.* (1841), pp. 67–73 and 155–7; J. T. Hammick (late Secretary of the Registrar-General's Department), *The Marriage Law of England*, 2nd ed. (1887), pp. 158–65; Henriques, *supra*; J. Jackson, *The Formation and Annulment of Marriage* (1951), pp. 161–2 and *passim*; *Latey on Divorce*, ed. W. Latey, 14th ed. (1952); *Halsbury's Laws of England*, 3rd ed. (1957), Vol. 19, 'Husband and Wife'; and *Rayden on Divorce*, eds. J. Jackson and others, 9th ed. (1964).

[7] *R.* v. *Millis:* see Note 26.

[8] In *Andreas* v. *Andreas* (1737), the Ecclesiastical Court, in a wife's action for restitution of conjugal rights, rejected the husband's plea that as the marriage was a Jewish marriage the Court could take no cognizance of it: 1, *Haggard's Consistory Reports*, Appendix, p. 9. But perhaps the validity of the marriage was not in issue at the trial. The Ecclesiastical Courts, which were staffed by judges familiar with Canon Law, the Civil (i.e. Roman) Law and in some cases current foreign systems of law, were, prior to the creation of the Divorce Court in 1857, the forum for matrimonial law. Lord Campbell in *R.* v. *Millis* (1844) observed: 'I believe it is universally allowed that Lord Stowell was the greatest master of the civil and canon law that ever presided in our courts.'

[9] For the circumstances of the Order-in-Council, see H. S. Q. Henriques, *The*

Jews and the English Law (1908), pp. 152 etc. and Cecil Roth, *History of the Jews in England*, 3rd ed. (1964), pp. 182–3.

[10] *Haggard, supra*, Appendix, p. 7.

[11] 2, *Haggard*, pp. 384–5. Stowell added that the 'English Court Christian', in examining the validity of an 'English Jew marriage', would 'examine it by that law [i.e. Jewish matrimonial law] and by that law only, as has been done in the cases that were determined in this Court on those very principles'. If it be a rule of Jewish matrimonial law, commented Stowell, that the marriage is vitiated by the fact of a witness thereto 'having eaten prohibited viands or profaning the Sabbath day', the English Court would give it that effect when duly proved. It would appear from the Judge's examples that his observations as to the exceptional status of Jewish marriages were limited to matters of form and did not extend to questions of capacity. *Ruding* v. *Smith*, which was not a Jewish case, was a husband's action for nullity on the grounds that the marriage, which took place in the Cape, did not comply with the local, namely Dutch, law either as to forms or as to capacity. The issue in the case was whether, in the circumstances of the case, Dutch law applied at all, the parties being British subjects and having been married by a local British chaplain in territory under British dominion. Stowell held that Dutch law did not apply and that the marriage was good.

[12] *Roper, supra*, p. 476.

[13] In *R.* v. *Millis* [10 Clark & Finnelly (843–4), p. 534] C. J. Tindall observed that 'it is well known that in early times the Jews stood in a very peculiar and excepted condition. For many centuries they were treated not as natural-born subjects but as foreigners and scarcely recognized as participating in the civil rights of other subjects of the Crown. The ceremony of marriage by their own peculiar forms might therefore be regarded as constituting a legal marriage, without affording any argument as to the nature of a contract of marriage *per verba de praesenti* between other subjects': p. 673. See note 26 below.

[14] 1, *Haggard*, p. 324. See I. Finestein, 'Goldsmid *v.* Bromer', *A.J.A. Quarterly*, 1956, No. 4, pp. 126–9. Scott's judgement in *Lindo* v. *Belisario* (1, *Haggard*, pp. 216–261) in 1795 was also expressed in wide terms. 'The Ecclesiastical Court', declared Scott, 'has an undoubted jurisdiction upon the general law of marriage, so far as the legality of that contract is constituted by the law of this country. It also examines questions of foreign marriages in cases of British subjects, and sometimes of aliens . . . with the satisfaction of knowing that the principles which regulate English marriages are such as are also generally applicable to marriages of foreign Christian countries; the marriage law of England being founded on the same general principles and having for its basis the ancient canon law. . . . This is a question of marriage of a very different kind . . . between persons governed by a peculiar law of their own and administered to a certain degree by a jurisdiction established among themselves. . . . It has been said truly that the law of Moses stands very much on the law of nature; that it has not prescribed any formal ceremony of marriage. It is clear however that there are legal institutions to which the Jews adhere in practice and which I must consider as having the force and effect of laws, materially bearing upon the present question, and those are the laws derived from the institutions of the Rabbis.' The issue in *Lindo* v. *Belisario* was whether *kiddushin* (betrothal) alone is sufficient to create a binding marriage in Jewish law, without *ketuba*, *chuppa*, or consummation. Solomon Lyon (a 'Rabbi of the German Jewish Nation') and Solomon Mordecai Ish Yemene ('one of the students of the College of the Portuguese Jews' and formerly 'High Priest' of the Portuguese Jews of Hamburg) testified to Scott in the affirmative. The *dayanim* of the Sephardi congregation in London, namely David Henriques Julian, Hasdai Almosnino and Isaac Delgado, testified that *kiddushin* did not create the *vinculum conjugale*. The *hazan*, Daniel D'Azevedo, was not sure, while his brother concurred with Lyon and Ish Yemene. Scott, after examining the authorities, including Maimonides, held in the sense put forward by the *dayanim*. In affirming Scott's decision in the Court of Arches, Sir William Wynne described the case as the first in which the validity of a Jewish marriage was put distinctly in issue before the Ecclesiastical Court: *Appendix*, p. 7. In *De Wilton* v. *Montefiore* (1900 2 Ch. 481) it was argued that, although *Lindo* v. *Belisario* was not concerned with capacity, Scott's language was wide

enough to extend to capacity as well as to forms. See note 37 below.

[15] Lord Lyndhurst (John Copley 1772–1863) was an attractive and interesting personality. Born in Boston, Mass., he was a prominent Tory who distinguished himself as lawyer and parliamentarian. He was thrice Lord Chancellor. In 1837, he married the daughter of Lewis Goldsmith, a political journalist of Jewish origin and of erstwhile republican views.

[16] Numerous Bills to permit marriage with the deceased wife's sister were moved from the Liberal benches. One of the most strenuous opponents was Matthew Arnold. He particularly attacked the doctrine that such a union must be proper in the absence of any express biblical prohibition. Arnold based his opposition less on the Bible than on 'reason' and 'human nature' and he denounced Liberal champions of the measure as 'rigid Hebraisers': *Culture and Anarchy* (1869), ed. J. Dover Wilson (1932), pp. 181–4. The *Jewish Chronicle* was a persistent advocate of the proposed reform and condemned the restriction as a 'hideous law' in contrast to the 'code of Moses' wherein 'a marriage law of a rational character was laid down': *J.C.*, 24 November 1871.

[17] The present prohibited and permitted degrees in English law are set out in the Marriage Act 1949, as amended by the Marriage (Enabling) Act 1960. For prohibited degrees among Jews today, see J. H. Hertz, *Pentateuch in English Translation with Commentary*, 2nd ed. (1963), Note B to Leviticus, p. 559; and Note E to Deuteronomy on 'Marriage, Divorce and the Position of Women in Judaism', pp. 930–5. See also M. Mielziner, *The Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce* (Cincinnati, 1884), and judgement of Sir Jocelyn Simon in *Cheni (orse Rodriguez)* v. *Cheni*, 1963.

[18] L. Loewe, *Diaries of Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore* (1890), vol. 1, p. 111.

[19] Board of Deputies Minute Book No. 2 (March 1829–January 1838), pp. 100–1.

[20] See note 5 above.

[21] Minute Book, *supra*, p. 110. As late as 1887, one authoritative author wrote: 'That marriages which would be invalid if now had in England between Christians, but which are permitted by Jewish ecclesiastical law, ought to be recognized as valid when both the parties are of that religion, may or may not have been the intention of the legislature; but nothing short of the clearest statutory provision to that effect would justify the conclusion that Jewish marriages are to be excepted from the operation of Lord Lyndhurst's Act. . . . Whether marriages of Jews are within the above Act may be regarded as still admitting of some doubt': per J. T. Hammick, *supra*, p. 164.

[22] The Committee consisted of Montefiore, Louis Lucas, S. I. Waley, John Levy, I. H. Helbert, and David Brandon. It does not appear to have been discussed at the Board as to whether or not there was any inconsistency between a campaign to amend the Act of 1835 and the campaign for political emancipation. In connexion with the abortive emancipation Bill of 1836 the special committee of the Board worked closely with Salomons, who was unlikely to extend his practical support to any agitation to amend the Marriage Act. For an account of the emancipation campaign, see Henriques, *The Jews and the English Law*, *supra*, chs. IX and X.

[23] Minute Book, *supra*, p. 128. Among those approached by Montefiore for support were Blake, who was legal adviser to Richard Whateley, Archbishop of Dublin; and Thomas Spring-Rice, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1835–9) and sponsor of the Bill of 1836: *Diaries*, Vol. 1, p. 111. These approaches were of no avail. In particular, Whateley, a consistent advocate of Jewish emancipation, refused to sponsor the measure in the House of Lords. See note 30 below. The Board's dilatoriness in seeking to procure an amendment to Lord Lyndhurst's Act was much criticized, even by some who were not necessarily in favour of pressing for the proposed amendment. 'Even when a measure was in progress which it was more especially the province of the Deputies to watch because it was a legislative measure thought by some to interfere to a degree with the religious opinions of the Jews and imposing on them restrictions to which they have not previously been liable, the Deputies procured no information about the matter until the Bill had passed and it was too late to do anything except to make an attempt to get the Jews excepted from its operation, which if made when the law was in progress might perhaps have suc-

ceeded, but being deferred till the next session was unavailing . . .': per I. L. Goldsmid in 1838; Lionel Abrahams, 'Selections from I. L. Goldsmid's correspondence . . .', Vol. IV, *Trans. Jew. Hist. Soc.*, pp. 116 f. James Picciotto, generally an uncritical laudator of Montefiore and the Board, wrote in 1875 that 'it is to be regretted that the Deputies did not display more vigour and energy at the proper time, when, not impossibly, Jews might have been exempted from the action of this obnoxious law. As it was, the Deputies proceeded on the principle of shutting the stable door after the flight of the steed': *Sketches of Anglo-Jewish History*, ed. I. Finestein (1956), p. 121.

[24] Lushington's opinion is enclosed in Minute Book, *supra*.

[25] These years were marked by the growth of the Liberal Party out of the Whigs and by the emergence of a certain open-mindedness among some of the close Tory associates of the pragmatic Peel on the issue of Jewish emancipation. The shrievalties of Salomons (1835) and Montefiore (1837) and the growing influence of the Nonconformists and of City opinion contributed to the change in the parliamentary climate.

[26] See note 13. Millis's case, which was a bigamy prosecution, raised the question whether a certain marriage in Ireland according to Presbyterian rites was valid. The parties to the marriage were a member of the Anglican Church of Ireland and a Presbyterian. As Lord Hardwicke's Act did not extend to Ireland, the question had to be considered on the basis of the common law. The issue to be determined was whether the common law required the presence of an episcopally ordained clergyman to effect a valid marriage. The House of Lords being equally divided, the decision of the Irish Court of Queen's Bench was upheld, namely that the marriage was not valid. The status of Jewish marriages was much mooted in the case as illustrating the possibility of marriages recognized by the common law in the absence of any priest. Lord Lyndhurst, the Lord Chancellor, who held the Irish marriage to be invalid, declared that the Jews, by reason of their entirely special position, did not constitute a real exception to the common law: '. . . they are treated . . . as a distinct people governed as to this subject by their own religious observances and institutions' (p. 864). On the other hand, Lord Campbell, holding the Irish marriage to be valid, said: 'It comes to this, that marriages of Jews and Quakers, excepted from Lord Hardwicke's Act, are valid at common law and prove that at common law there might be a marriage without the intervention of a priest . . .' (p. 797). The uniqueness of the Jewish status was indirectly emphasized by Lord Cottenham. He concurred with Lyndhurst but expressed regret that Quaker marriages had not been the subject of investigation as had Jewish marriages in such cases as *Lindo* v. *Belisario* and *Goldsmid* v. *Bromer*. Had there been such cases in favour of Quaker marriages on the grounds that prior to 1753 contracts *per verba de praesenti* constituted valid marriages, such decisions, he implied, would have carried greater weight than the Jewish cases. The decision in *R.* v. *Millis*, requiring the presence of a priest as far as the common law was concerned, threw doubt upon the validity of Jewish marriages before the Marriage Act of 1836. It was concerned with forms, not with capacity. In 1847, Parliament passed a Bill, introduced by W. D. Christie, 'to remove doubts as to Quakers' and Jews' marriages before certain periods'. This short Act was obviously concerned with affirming the validity of Quaker and Jewish marriages prior to 2 March 1837, that is from the beginning of the operation of the Marriage Act of 1836, and indeed that was the date cited by Christie in his speech in the House of Commons on 13 April 1847. Curiously, the Act of 1847 in its terms declares valid marriages prior to 1 July 1837. See note 31. During the passage of this unopposed measure, Christie said that the Home Secretary, Sir George Grey, had assured him on high legal authority that no doubts existed as to the validity of the marriages in question but that in view of judicial dicta there was no objection to the Bill. Without prejudice to the binding effect of the *Millis* decision, it is now agreed to be 'historically erroneous': per Sir Jocelyn Simon in *Merker* v. *Merker* 1963, p. 295.

[27] The Committee consisted of Montefiore, Louis Lucas, Hananel de Castro, Louis Cohen, Emanuel Lousada, and J. H. Helbert. For their report, dated 4 June 1844, including the case prepared by Sampson Samuel and submitted to Dodson and Addams, see Minute Book,

No. 5 (May 1841–February 1846), pp. 278 ff. For minutes of the Committee's three meetings, see Committee Minutes 1844–56, pp. 3–8.

[28] Dodson's and Addams' Opinions in Minute Book, ibid., pp. 284–6.

[29] Spyer, of 3 Lansdowne Place and practising from 30 Broad Street Buildings, was described in the *Jewish Chronicle* on 6 December 1850 as 'a gentleman of fortune'. He was admitted in 1817. Between 1831 and 1835 he also practised in Brighton. From 1876 he was in partnership in the City with his son, Salomon.

[30] Addams' Opinion, dated 5 November 1850, in Minute Book No. 6 (March 1848–December 1850), pp. 194–5. Addams commented that the Bill of 1837 'did not pass only as I have reason to believe from its being considered unnecessary'.

[31] Joint Opinion of Addams, Crowder and Turner, ibid., p. 299. In a further Opinion dated 3 December 1850 on the effect of the Act of 1847, Addams observed to Spyer that the Act was 'oddly framed' and 'apparently drawn up by someone who did not know what the doubt was for the purpose of which the Act was passed'. 'On the whole,' concluded Addams, 'if the Act of 1847 does nothing else, it fortifies me in the opinion which I have already twice given that the proposed marriage will be legal and valid' (see note 26). The Act of 1847, although undoubtedly prompted by the reactions to judicial dicta in *R.* v. *Millis*, on past Jewish marriages, was taken by some as pointing to the validity of future Jewish marriages within the Mosaic degrees, and Spyer sought to add to his case such sanction as that Act gave. In his case to Counsel, Spyer observed that prior to 1835, 'a great number' of Jewish marriages were between uncle and niece. 'I am of the opinion', wrote Lushington to Spyer on 24 April 1836, 'that considering the principles on which Jewish marriages have always been tried, this Act (of 1835) would not affect the Jews': ibid., p. 293. Spyer also consulted Counsel as to whether, should the answer to the main question be in the negative, the proposed marriage would be held valid if the parties went through the Jewish ceremony of marriage in France, Germany or Scotland. The reply was that if the marriage of these English-born and English-domiciled parties was invalid here, it would remain invalid here, wherever the ceremony might be performed.

[32] A former pupil of Whateley at Oxford and one-time Chaplain to him when Archbishop of Dublin. His objection to the Bill was that in his view the proposed marriage would tend to lower the tone of morality and in that sense was contrary to the 'principles of scripture'. He did not necessarily accept the particular prohibitive interpretation of the relevant scriptural passage on which the opposition generally rested. 'I would not', he declared, 'trust a Jew for the meaning of a doctrinal scripture or for the interpretation of a prophetic scripture; but the presumption in favour of his rightly interpreting a scripture direction respecting marriage customs is such as would require some very strong internal evidence to overthrow it.' Whatever his sympathy, he felt obliged to oppose 'relieving the few at the cost of the mass of the community'.

[33] Minute Book No. 7 (March 1851–February 1855), pp. 318–20. Mann expressly asked whether the Board thought it expedient that in any amending Act provision should be made to put Jews into a position as if the Act of 1835 had not been passed.

[34] Ibid., pp. 321–3.

[35] Parl. Pps. 1867–8. Vol. 32: Reports from Commissioners, vol. xvii (1868), App. p. 45. Also *Hammick*, pp. 158–9. Adler's use of the word 'normal' is significant.

[36] *Hammick*, p. 164.

[37] See note 14. The Court had to decide whether or not Joseph Gompertz Montefiore was the legal personal representative of the testator's daughter and so entitled to share in the residuary estate bequeathed by the testator. That depended on whether he was lawfully married to the daughter at the time of her death. J. Stirling held that the marriage being between maternal uncle and niece and the parties being domiciled in England, the marriage which took place abroad was void in English law as being within the English prohibited degrees. The marriage was good both in Jewish law and according to the *lex loci celebrationis*. Professor Dicey, who represented Montefiore—H. S. Q. Henriques appeared on the other side—relied principally on judicial dicta in *Lindo* v. *Belisario* and *R.* v. *Millis* and on the argument that neither the 16th century

legislation nor the Act of 1835 contemplated the Jews, and contended that the Jews were not within the ambit of the law relating to prohibited degrees. Stirling J., who refused to treat the judicial dicta concerning the special position of Jewish marriages as extending to capacity, felt bound by the comprehensive terms of Lord Lyndhurst's Act and gave his reasons for refusing to read into the Marriage Act of 1836 any abridgement of the effect of the earlier Act.

THE HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITIES: A FIELD FOR THE JEWISH HISTORIAN[1]

Lloyd P. Gartner

IN UNDERTAKING to examine the history and contemporary life of the Jewries dispersed across the North American continent, the Jewish researcher of traditional bent may feel sceptical and perhaps confused: in the terms long customary in Jewish historiography, do we really have a 'history' here? For these Jews have suffered very little as Jews. Not only was concern for Torah not their main business in life, but it was cast aside and little noted, at least until recent days. Moreover, North American Jews never underwent a difficult struggle nor even a sharp debate to acquire equal rights.[2] Materially and politically, theirs is a 'success story', a genre of which post-Biblical Jewish history, with the dazzling exception of reborn Israel, is rather suspicious. All this being granted, what is the meaningful substance of the history of the many North American Jewish communities? For want of a true answer, we may do what was once done by Jews in Western Europe, and now in North America to a considerable extent: bathe in reminiscence, and erect pious literary monuments to the local past. This method conveys a quality of pleasant sentimentality, but hardly that of history. No sense of a problem or of historic tension is conveyed. In our day, such writing, however pleasing to its authors and sponsors, neither arouses general interest nor aids the serious understanding of Jewish history.

The sociologists who dealt with these Jewish communities have been more fortunate. The pioneer sociologists of the Jews, like Jacobs, Ruppin, and Lestschinsky, were interested in the vast new Jewish settlements of North America, if only as receptacles for masses of immigrants from Eastern Europe. They viewed these recent branches of Jewry as inevitably subject to the same processes of assimilation and anti-semitism as they found regnant in European Jewry. Not entirely dissimilar was the vision of American sociologists, including a fair number of Jews, who personally desired and predicted with assurance the assimilation of the Jews to the point of complete absorption. Yet all these sociologists did study Jewish life seriously, although not always carefully, and sought to reckon with its deepest problems.

Native Jewish communal leadership had use for both the sentimental chroniclers and the social scientists. The forecast of assimilation satisfied

them and was used to reassure others that Jewish immigrants would indeed acculturate thoroughly.[3] From another standpoint, data from history emphasizing Jewish patriotism and contributions to the public good were welcomed as the armour of self-respect and a shield against antisemitic derogation. Jewish nationalists, however, regarded the sociologists' predictions as scientific basis for their own convictions, while the sentimental chroniclers only aroused their ridicule.[4]

The time is past for renewing debates which are now stale. Both the historian and the sociologist will observe today that the Jews of North America feel that they live at home, in their own country, and fully intend to remain there. They are not driven so to believe for fear of the Gentiles, nor as a consequence of a debate concerning their fitness as strangers for citizenship and equality. In these respects we see an emancipated Jewish society probably without parallel.

With little *lernen* and less *leiden*, and lacking either the sense or the reality of Exile, and without descending to the enumeration of Jewish notables and their accomplishments, what then is the substance of the history of emancipated Jewish communities in North America? We may answer that emancipation itself is the history—not the comparatively trivial effort of attaining it, but the rich history of employing it. To what extent were emancipated Jews truly free, legally and in the psychological sense defined by Ahad HaAm,[5] and what were the shortcomings and obstacles? How was Judaism redefined at home in exile? I think it would be difficult to muster an array of questions more significant for research. Some most penetrating light may be shed by close investigation of the history of local Jewish communities in North America.

The survey of the dozens of large North American Jewish communities has often overcome readers with tedium. There was always 'the first Jew', a pedlar, storekeeper, or tailor, or perhaps all three. Not long after appear a cemetery and synagogue—usually in that order—followed by time-honoured institutional forms of education, charity, and mutual aid. Following the German generation of founders come the East Europeans, bearing with them Zionism, Socialism, Orthodoxy, a labour movement, and a Jewish 'aroma' which pervades one particular section of every city. Many such communities may be named, and the whole of communal history at first sight may appear nothing more than a single history with different rubrics. But by making the point of departure not the development of Jewish communal life but rather the unique historically and geographically conditioned character of each city, we shall readily see how that uniqueness in every case has impressed itself upon the local Jewry. We are likely to arrive at far more stimulating interpretations of local Jewish history and of the historic unfolding of emancipated Jewish life. As examples, I have selected three Jewish communities: Milwaukee in the Middle West, or Old

Northwest of the United States; Los Angeles on the Pacific shore; Montreal on the Eastern coast.[6] We may well begin with some brief population statistics:

	Milwaukee		*Los Angeles*		*Montreal*	
	Jews	*Total*	*Jews*	*Total*	*Jews*	*Total*
1870	1,800	71,440	20 families	5,728	(1871) 500	115,000
1900	7,000	285,315	2,500	102,479	(1901) 6,941	328,172
1920	20,000	457,147	43,000 (1923 figure)	576,673	(1921) 45,802	747,462
1950	28,000	637,392	330,000	1,970,358 (city) 3,996,946 (area)	(1951) 80,788	1,395,400 (metropolitan)

The tempo of population growth, varying drastically from city to city, alone suggests that the growth of Jewish population depends not only on immigration from Europe, or on natural increase, but also on the rate of urban development and intra-urban migration.

The historic origins of our specimen Jewish communities differ as radically as their rates of numerical growth. Montreal had existed over one hundred years when a handful of Jews settled together with the British conquerors. They remained little more than a handful for a century. Middle Western Milwaukee began its development as a city during the 1840s. From the outset, there was a very good number of Jews, probably as many as 1,000 at the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861. They formed a significant segment of the German immigration which created in Milwaukee an important centre of German culture. In these respects, the city resembles numerous Middle Western cities during the first half of the nineteenth century heavily settled by Jews and Germans: Cincinnati, Louisville, Minneapolis, St. Louis, and others. Los Angeles' beginnings could hardly be more different from Milwaukee's and Montreal's. For generations it was a placid sun-baked settlement of Spanish sheep herders and wine-growers, until its rural life was overborne by a horde of traders, many of whom were adventurers and rogues. A stable Jewish community was long delayed in coming, and a firm foundation was laid only in the 1890s. While Jewish Germanism had its heyday back East, Los Angeles was the genuine Wild West, where pioneer Jewish merchants and bankers struggled for their economic and even physical survival. Two generations later, Los Angeles was the centre for those stupendous entrepreneur-gamblers, the Jewish fathers of the film industry. Montreal, a port city, receives the produce of fields and forests, serving as mid-point between Canada, the United States, and the 'mother country'. From its banks came financing for commerce and later for industry. Milwaukee at first was similarly a centre for agricul-

tural produce and an inland port—until the wheat trade moved to Minneapolis and the port lost its business to the railway lines focused in Chicago, its victorious competitor. Thenceforward, after 1880, the Wisconsin city became an important manufacturing city for beer, leather, knitting, and machinery, by employing the skills brought by foreign immigrants. Yet, different as are these three cities, it strikes the eye that their Jewish economic stratification was astonishingly similar: tradesmen at all levels, beginning with the itinerant pack pedlar and ending with the merchant prince; clothing manufacturers, and some Jews among clothing workers; a few professional persons, mainly lawyers and doctors. The Jews dealt in consumer goods, whether ladies' dresses or talking films. Such resemblances are best appreciated when set against their cities' utterly different backgrounds.

Jewish immigration to the three communities of Milwaukee, Montreal, and Los Angeles, also presents widely different aspects. Milwaukee had no Sefardim, nor did Montreal, its 'Sefardi' congregation notwithstanding; Turkish and Rhodian Sefardim came to Los Angeles in the twentieth century. The main stream to Montreal before the 1870s was Anglo-German Ashkenazi, and immigrants frequently played the classic role of English colonists: they left England to get rich and returned rich many years later. Interestingly enough, Jews who made their fortune in early Los Angeles sometimes acted similarly, leaving the primitive town to settle in stately San Francisco. Milwaukee, however, is more typical of the United States. German Jews came there to live out their lives, and so far as possible to recreate their German environment. It may be that Milwaukee exhibits the tendency known in Buffalo, where German Jews from one town—Ihringen—clustered together with Ihringers who had preceded them.[7] We do know of Russian and Polish Jews early in the twentieth century, natives of Kapulye and Slutsk, who concentrated their settlement in Milwaukee,[8] but material proof that Jews from one or another Bavarian or Posen town concentrated there forty or fifty years before has not come to light. For fifty years, from 1875 to 1925, a wave of Jewish immigrants flowed in from Eastern Europe, together with masses of Poles, Hungarians, Italians, Greeks, Slovaks, and Negroes from the American South. This is the immigration (except the Negroes) which also reached Canada, whose vast reaches contained fewer Jews in 1875 than did Milwaukee. From 1,100 Jews in 1881 and 2,300 in 1891, Montreal became a 'city and mother in Israel' for 45,000 Jews in 1921. This increase occurred somewhat in proportion to the industrial development of the Province of Quebec, great numbers of whose French farmers (*habitants*) were also drawn to Montreal.[9] Los Angeles, however, stands out as a constant example of migration within the United States. Its 'neo-landsmannshaftn' bear curious witness: the Jewish community had several dozen clubs for former residents of Omaha, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Chicago, and so

forth, who kept up ties with the old home town and extended hospitality to fresh arrivals. The contrast with the usual 'landsmannschaft', of which, to be sure, there were some, is piquant. What the existence of 'neo-landsmannshaftn' only suggests is broadly confirmed by the statistical finding that 61·7 per cent of Los Angeles' 315,000 Jews in 1952 had lived there less than five years.[10]

Our three cities exemplify three stages of Jewish immigration. Immigrants came directly from shipboard to Montreal. To Milwaukee usually came those who had lived in America from a few months to several years, often with the aid of the Industrial Removal Office, which sought to transfer Jews out of the stiflingly overcrowded immigrant neighbourhoods of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. Finally, internal migration of acculturated Jews transformed Los Angeles after the First World War from a distant Jewish settlement into a large community, and made it skyrocket after the Second World War. Internal migration took place across the United States and Canada as a unit, no differently from the 'mingling of the Canadian and American peoples' conceived by Hansen and Brebner.[11] North American Jewish communities have been shaped as much by internal immigration, particularly in recent decades, as by foreign immigration before the 1930s.[12]

Continuous migratory movement also typifies the economic structure of the Jews in North America. The distribution of the Jews within the economy as a whole differs from that of the general population, as may be said of every ethnic and even religious group. From its status some sixty years ago as one of the poorest ethnic bodies (save the small German-Jewish upper crust), the Jewish group has emerged today nearly the wealthiest—an economic and social achievement unparalleled even in America.

The cultural profile of the cities under discussion, and the place occupied by Jews, also will interest the researcher. Milwaukee, the *Deutsch Athens* of America, may be called the capital of American Germanism during the nineteenth century. Newspapers, worship, sermons, theatres, clubs, beer gardens, instruction in the tongue to nearly all school children, signs in the streets, testified to the German environment which virtually enveloped the city or large neighbourhoods within it. During the decades between the 1850s and 1890s the Jews were a sphere within the Germanic sphere. To be sure, the latter divided into that of the conservative German Protestant and Catholic churches, where Jews had no place, and whose alliance with the language and culture was subordinate to the religious bond; and liberal, free-thinking Germanism, tending to anti-clericalism, wide open to Jews. From Milwaukee Jewish origins came German journalists, actors, teachers, singers, supporters, and benefactors. Even the rabbis lent a hand; thus Rabbi Elias Eppstein (originally from Alsace) at the German Order of the Sons of Hermann field day in 1874:

> We are Germans by tongue; Germans by will of reasoning our way onwards; . . . Germans by the desire to seek knowledge and wisdom, and foster them; Germans by uniting in social life; and Germans by assisting each other in times of need . . . We are Americans, but German Americans, who are willing to amalgamate the good which we have brought from Europe with the good which we found here. . . .[13]

But Germanism on the shores of Lake Michigan came to its end. Not only was there assimilation of the German American environment as a whole, but antisemitic tendencies in the now-unified homeland tended to alienate Jewish sympathies. Above all, the stream of East European Jews, who rapidly became the majority of the Jewish community, had no background or interest in German culture. German Jewish refugees during the 1930s did nothing to revive Germanism, which by that time was a home for many Nazi sympathizers. On the other hand, the Polish Jews of Milwaukee had few if any dealings with the sizeable local Polish community; they were two peoples with one territorial origin.

Some of the cultural choices made by Milwaukee Jews find a parallel in those of Montreal. That foremost city in Canada, set in the midst of French Quebec, has always seen English Protestants have the upper hand notwithstanding their numerical minority. No Jew has cast his lot anywhere but with the English Protestant side, despite European parallels which might hint that at least a few would search for an independent Jewish position. Such has not proved the case, at any rate until lately; Jews are allied with the English side, even in such matters as the education of their children, for which they have been taxed without representation on the Protestant School Board.

Los Angeles was culturally disoriented even before the glare of films added to the confusion. In the trenchant words of a recent social historian:[14]

> Southern California, still the hygienic and Protestant 'American Mediterranean' of the pre-Hollywood era, looked askance at corrupt, Bohemian San Francisco. For a long time it had been making strenuous efforts to create a unique culture. The result was perhaps the country's most eloquent lesson in the dilemmas of regionalism. So far Southern California higher culture was a bizarre and unbelievably innocent mixture of Mission Days and Chatauquas, fiestas and Ebell Clubs, false exoticism and genuine uplift.

In the tension between the exoticism of life in the film colony, or at least the appearance of exoticism, and the multiple regional standards brought by waves of migrants to Southern California, Jews seem to have done little in the cultural sphere of Los Angeles.

Finally, I wish to touch the fringe of the universal problem of antisemitism. While it definitely exists in our three communities, the historic backgrounds and social tensions of each city must also be taken into account. Antisemitism in Los Angeles has been the product of

social and cultural strains between ethnic and immigrant groups in a painfully new city, where extremism in politics and religion is endemic. In Milwaukee, antisemitism has a longer history. It was brought in the baggage of many Germans and, later, Poles. We hear an echo of German antisemitism of Bismarck's time (the sources are not satisfactory in this respect), while that of the Nazi period was better organized and infinitely more dangerous. When antisemitic influences flowed from Polish sources, it was in the spirit of the conservative Catholic Endeks (National Democrats) in the homeland. The pogroms accompanying the reconstitution of Poland in 1919 brought about severe tension between Jews and Poles in Milwaukee. Similar but muted were feelings over Polish official antisemitism during the 1930s, and upon Poland's partition at the close of the Second World War. In Montreal, the inferior social and economic status of French Catholics in their own land must be understood. Antisemitism there is also a reaction to the 'winds of change' of industrialism and urbanism which have been breaking up the old society, and has been led by members of the old French Canadian elite. Although primarily English Canadians are 'guilty' of the perilous economic transformations, they are remote, large, respected entrepreneurs. The Jew, however, is close at hand, and involved in petty trade and small-scale industry more or less in competition with the Frenchman. In a latter-day medieval Catholic society, the Jew, a hated symbol from time out of mind, comes now to symbolize the changes which inspire fear in a people tense for survival.[15]

Of course, antisemitism has common qualities wherever it exists, transcending differences among localities. It is only being suggested that antisemitism will not be adequately understood in general without detailed attention to specific conditions in particular cities.

In conclusion: I have emphasized differences and varieties between the Jewish communities of several cities. Many more may readily be added. But it is not mere sentimentality to remark that Jews in Montreal, Milwaukee, and Los Angeles feel themselves part of one Jewish entity. Their bonds of union are conscious and avowed. It would be important, too, to show how local particularisms and differences are overcome for the bonds of Jewish peoplehood to endure. May that be a subject at another Congress.

NOTES

[1] A translation and revision of a paper delivered before the Section on Contemporary Jewry at the World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, July 1961. I am much indebted to Mr. Reuben Kaufman and Professor Moshe Davis for their aid.

[2] On such struggles, so far as they went, see the major documents in Joseph L. Blau and Salo W. Baron, *The Jews in the United States; A Documentary History 1790–1840*, 3 vols., Philadelphia, 1964, I, pp. 14–55, and notes ad loc., especially n. 40; Benjamin G. Sack, *History of the Jews in Canada: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, I, Montreal, 1945, pp. 76–107.

[3] Characteristic of such thinking at its

highest level is Charles Reznikoff, ed., *Louis Marshall: Champion of Liberty*. Introduction by Oscar Handlin. 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1957, I, pp. 109–243. Commonplace are Samuel Walker McCall, *Patriotism of the American Jew*. Foreword by Charles W. Eliot. New York, 1922; Madison C. Peters, *The Jew as a Patriot*. Introductory Essay by Oscar S. Straus. New York, 1902. See also Moses Rischin, *The Promised City: New York's Jews, 1870–1914*, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, pp. 195–220 and passim; and John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925*, New Brunswick, N.J., 1955, pp. 106–30, 234–63, and passim.

[4] See the highly stimulating essay by Gershom Scholem, 'Hirhurim al Hokhmat Yisrael' (Reflections on Jewish Studies), *Luah ha-Arez* 5705 (1944/1945), pp. 94–112.

[5] The reference is, of course, to 'Slavery in Freedom', in Leon Simon, trans. and ed., *Selected Essays by Ahad Ha-'Am*, Philadelphia, repr. 1936, pp. 171–95.

[6] Data and interpretations concerning these three cities are drawn from materials assembled at the American Jewish History Center of the Jewish Theological Seminary, where comprehensive histories of those Jewish communities are in preparation. One has already appeared: Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner, *The History of the Jews of Milwaukee*, Philadelphia, 1963. See also the comprehensive demographic studies by Louis Rosenberg issued by the Canadian Jewish Congress, and particularly his *Canada's Jews*, Montreal, 1939.

[7] Selig Adler and Thomas E. Connolly, *From Ararat to Suburbia: The History of the Jewish Community of Buffalo*, Philadelphia, 1960, pp. 55, 111, 273. In 1872, Berthold Auerbach (1812–82), the German Jewish writer, was very pleased to learn that his former fellow-townsman of Nordstetten in Bavaria had founded a 'New Nordstetten' in Wisconsin. See his *Briefe an seinen Freund Jakob Auerbach*, 2 vols., Frankfurt am Main, 1884, vol. II, p. 120.

[8] Ephraim E. Lisitzky, 'Reshitah shel Tekufah' (The Beginning of an Era), *Moznayim*, N.S. IV, No. 4 (March 1957), pp. 241–2. Late in 1917 the Milwaukee Yiddish newspaper appealed to natives of Kapulye resident in Milwaukee to present any reminiscences they had of the recently deceased 'Reb Mendele' (*Milwauker Wochenblat*, 21 December 1917). This was the town's most famous son, Mendele Mokher Sefarim.

[9] Everett Cherington Hughes, *French Canada in Transition*, London, 1946; Mason Wade, *The French Canadians*, Toronto, 1956, pp. 862–5; J. Bartlett Brebner, *Canada: A Modern History*, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960, pp. 349–65, 423–42.

[10] Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles*. Los Angeles: Jewish Community Council, January 1953 (mimeographed), p. 20, Table 13. For the five years ending in 1959, the proportion dropped to 11·3%; Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles 1959*. Los Angeles: Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation-Council, 1959 (mimeographed), p. 12, Table 9.

[11] Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 136, Table 92; best seen against the broad background in Marcus L. Hansen and John Bartlett Brebner, *The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples*, New Haven, 1940, pp. 244–63.

[12] One little noticed reason for the stagnation of Jewish population in the Middle West during the last two decades has been the otherwise widely discussed emigration to Southern California. This reason may be inferred from Fred Massarik, *Report . . . 1953* (*supra*, note 10), p. 22, Tables 15 and 16.

[13] *Milwaukee Sentinel*, September 8, 1873, cited in Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner, op. cit., pp. 113–14; cf. Rudolf Glanz, *Jews in Relation to the Cultural Milieu of the Germans in America up to the Eighteen Eighties*, New York, 1947.

[14] Henry F. May, *The End of American Innocence*, New York, 1959, p. 89.

[15] Everett Cherington Hughes, op. cit., pp. 76, 135, 214; Mason Wade, op. cit., pp. 865–912, 978–90.

A RESEARCH NOTE ON JEWISH EDUCATION ON MERSEYSIDE, 1962

Mervyn Goodman

THE purpose of the survey reported here[1] was to provide accurate information about Jewish education on Merseyside. In fact, little information was supplied by the smaller communities bordering on Liverpool although they have problems as great, if not greater, than those of Liverpool.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Liverpool was one of the first English provincial communities to establish a Hebrew day school: in 1841 the Liverpool Hebrew Educational and Endowed Schools were formed. The prime purpose of the schools was to provide an English education for the children of European Jewish immigrants, although the provision of some Hebrew instruction has always been included in the curriculum. From 1903 to 1923 there existed the Hebrew Higher Grade School in Liverpool which provided a secular curriculum of secondary school standard and a Jewish curriculum with Hebrew taught as a living language. With the successive Education Acts, the Hebrew Educational and Endowed Schools (Hebrew Schools) became a state-aided denominational elementary school for children up to the age of fourteen. The Education Act of 1944 provided for universal education of children until the age of fifteen with children over the age of eleven receiving their tuition at a secondary school. This led to the building of the King David Bilateral (with grammar and modern streams) School which is also state-aided and which was opened in 1958.

Part-time Jewish religious education was originally given by private teachers who taught individual pupils in their homes and groups of pupils in the teachers' homes. In 1894 the Liverpool Talmud Torah Schools were formed; they offer free Hebrew instruction to all children in the community. In 1914 the Yeshiva Torat Chaim (now called the Liverpool Talmudical College) was opened. Apart from these bodies the only other religion classes until 1928 were those provided by the Old Hebrew Congregation (Princes Road) and the Hope Place Hebrew Congregation, both of which met on Sunday mornings only.

The outward movement of the Jewish population from the Brownlow Hill area led to the establishment of the Sefton Park Hebrew and Religion Classes in 1928. These later became absorbed in the Greenbank Drive Synagogue Classes in 1937. In the following year the Childwall Synagogue was opened and with it the Childwall Synagogue Classes. These synagogue classes provided Hebrew instruction on two week nights and Sunday mornings compared with the classes on four week nights and Sunday mornings provided by the Talmud Torah and the Yeshiva.

On the outbreak of war in September 1939 large numbers of children were evacuated to the reception areas of North Wales. To cater for the religious needs of these children, most of whom were evacuated with their schools and without their parents to places where there was little or no Jewish life, the Merseyside Standing Committee for Jewish Religious Education was brought into being. After a few months of the 'phoney War' the evacuation problem resolved itself by some children returning to Liverpool and others settling in reception areas with their parents who established Jewish communities. This committee changed its name to the Merseyside Committee for Jewish Religious Education (M.C.J.R.E.), but during its continued existence did little active work.

In 1946 a group of members (of whom the author of this paper was one) of the University of Liverpool Jewish Students' Society carried out a survey of the facilities for Jewish education in Liverpool under the guidance of Professor Louis Rosenhead, C.B.E., F.R.S. The results of this survey were presented to the M.C.J.R.E. and to the Merseyside Jewish Representative Council (M.J.R.C.) but no action was taken on them. The synagogue classes, which soon included those of the newly formed Allerton Hebrew Congregation, continued to provide education for the majority of the children, while the numbers attending the Talmud Torah and the Yeshiva declined. Appreciating the plight of Jewish education on Merseyside the M.J.R.C. in 1962 recommended the dissolution of the M.C.J.R.E. and its replacement by an Education Committee of the M.J.R.C. on which there would be representatives of synagogues, educational institutions, cultural organizations, and the M.J.R.C. itself. At the first meeting of the new Education Committee, in October 1962, the undertaking of this survey was authorized.

METHOD

Two types of questionnaire were prepared. The one relating to religious instruction of children was based on the form used in the 1946 survey. This consisted of twenty-nine questions occupying three sides of foolscap paper. Organizations were asked to give an outline of their history, aims, and composition of their governing body as well as the

TABLE 1. *Institutional Jewish Education*

Institution	*No. of classes*	*No. of teachers*	*Below 8*			*8–13*			*13–16*			*Over 16*			*Total*			*Average hours of tuition*	*Average attendance (per week)*	*Fees (per week)*	*Attendance at day schools*		
			B	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*				*E*	*H*	*J*
Talmudical	Full time — Part time	1 (x)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	1 (6)	– (–)	1 (6)	1 (6)	– (–)	1 (6)	—	% —	None	–	–	–
College	4 (5)	2 (3)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	5 (–)	– (–)	5 (–)	10 (17)	– –	10 (17)	1 (3)	– (–)	1 (3)	16 (20)	– –	16 (20)	6½ (8½)	80 (84)	None	1 (–)	9 (1)	6 (19)
Allerton	6	6	12 (–)	12 (–)	24 (–)	22 (–)	17 (–)	39 (–)	2 (–)	1 (–)	3 (–)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	36 (–)	30 (–)	66 (–)	4 (–)	89 (–)	4/– (–)	44 (–)	10 (–)	12 (–)
Childwall	13 (5)	11 (3)	34 (6)	37 (5)	71 (11)	63 (33)	55 (22)	118 (55)	40 (4)	9 (6)	49 (10)	2 –	1 –	3 –	139 (43)	102 (33)	241 (76)	4 (4)	85 (84)	4/6 (2/6)	157 (43)	15 (2)	69 (31)
Greenbank	4 (7)	4 (7)	10 (30)	8 (25)	18 (55)	22 (40)	18 (20)	40 (60)	– (25)	– (10)	– (35)	– –	– –	– –	32 (95)	26 (55)	58 (150)	5½ (6)	72 (x)	5/– (2/–)	41 (40)	11 (20)	11 (90)
Princes Road	4 (x)	5 (x)	11 (x)	13 (x)	24 (x)	18 (x)	19 (x)	37 (x)	3 (x)	2 (x)	5 (x)	– (x)	– (x)	– (x)	32 (x)	34 (x)	66 (x)	3½ (x)	46 (x)	2/6 (x)	43 (x)	3 (x)	20 (x)
Talmud Torah	3 (6)	3 (3)	6 (7)	3 (0)	9 (7)	13 (42)	4 (6)	17 (48)	– (7)	– (0)	– (7)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	19 (56)	7 (6)	26 (62)	7 (7½)	76 (88)	2/6 (1/9)	4 (18)	21 (34)	– (10)
Total	1962	32	73	73	146	143	113	256	55	12	67	4	1	5	275	199	474				290	64	118
	1946	16	43	30	73	115	48	163	53	16	69	9	0	9	220	94	314				101	57	150

TABLE 2. *Jewish Day Schools*

Institution	*No. of classes*	*No. of teachers*	*Age Groups*																		*Average hours of tuition (per week)*	*Fees*
			Below 5			*5–8*			*8–13*			*13–16*			*Over 16*			*Total*				
			B	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*	*G*	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*		
Carmel kindergarten	2	1	–	–	24	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	24	—	£9/9/0 per term
Hebrew primary schools	9 (x)	5 (9)	– –	– –	– –	35 (39)	23 (26)	58 (65)	51 (60)	63 (40)	114 (100)	– (13)	– (14)	– (27)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	86 (112)	86 (80)	172 (192)	$4\frac{3}{4}$ ($7\frac{1}{2}$)	1/– (3*d.*) per week
King David school	17	3 full time 8 part time	–	–	–	–	–	–	60	50	110	68	99	167	19	5	24	147	154	301	Min. $4\frac{1}{2}$ Max. $7\frac{1}{2}$	2/6 per week
Total 1962		17	–	–	24	35	23	58	111	113	224	68	99	167	19	5	24	233	240	473		
Total 1946		9	–	–	–	39	26	65	60	40	100	13	14	27	–	–	–	112	80	192		

TABLE 3. *Total Figures of Jewish Education*

Type of institution	*No. of teachers*	*Age Group*																	
		Below 5			*5–8*			*8–13*			*13–16*			*Over 16*			*Total*		
		B	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*	*B*	*G*	*T*
Day school	17 (9)	x (–)	x (–)	24 (–)	35 (39)	23 (26)	58 (65)	111 (60)	113 (40)	224 (100)	68 (13)	99 (14)	167 (27)	19 (–)	5 (–)	24 (–)	233 112	240 80	473 192
Classes	32 (16)	– (–)	– (–)	– (–)	73 (43)	73 (30)	146 (73)	143 (115)	113 (48)	256 (163)	55 (53)	12 (16)	67 (69)	4 (9)	1 (0)	5 (9)	275 (220)	199 (94)	474 314
Survey Total 1962		(x)	(x)	24	108	96	204	254	226	480	123	111	234	23	6	29	408	439	947
Survey Total 1946		–	–	–	82	56	138	175	88	263	66	30	96	9	0	9	332	174	506

TABLE 4. *Finance*

Institution	*Income*			*Expenditure*			*Balance*
	Fees	*Misc.*	*Total*	*Salaries*	*Misc.*	*Total*	
Allerton	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Childwall	2,200	150	2,350	1,010	270	1,280	plus 1,070
Greenbank	400	—	400	580	50	630	minus 230
Princes Road	320	—	320	80	180	260	plus 60
Day Schools	880	4,490	5,370	2,690	2,810	5,550	minus 130
Yeshiva	—	1,420	1,420	460	820	1,280	plus 140
Talmud Torah	120	880	1,000	1,200	200	1,400	minus 400
Total	3,920	6,940	10,860	6,020	4,330	10,350	

Note. The terms 'plus' and 'minus' represent profit and loss respectively.

Key to Tables

Figures in parentheses refer to the results of the 1946 survey.

- – Not applicable
- x No information supplied
- A Adult
- B Boys
- C Cultural activity
- E Elementary School
- F Fund raising activity
- G Girls
- H Hebrew Day School
- L Social activity
- M Men
- P Meeting of a professional nature
- S Secondary School
- T Total
- W Women

The frequency of meeting in Table 5 is given as a fraction:

1/52 weekly 1/12 monthly 1/4 quarterly

Those figures not given as a fraction represent the number of meetings per annum.

factual information which will be described in this paper. All the organizations in Liverpool replied, but only one completed questionnaire was received from the outlying communities.

Adult societies were sent a simple form of questionnaire but the response from these bodies was poor.

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

Total number of children receiving Hebrew education

The survey can only determine the actual number of children receiving institutional Hebrew education. To these figures must be added those children who receive private tuition; no attempt has been made to estimate them, but the number must be very small and not statistically significant. Most of the private teachers also teach in the institutions and their available time for private tuition will therefore be limited.

There is no available figure for the absolute total of Jewish children

who fall within the scope of this survey. An attempt to estimate this figure has been made as follows:

Total number of Jews in Liverpool	7,500[2]
Birth rate (between 1948 and 1960 this varied between 15 and 17·8 per thousand)	15/1,000[3]
Estimated total	1,238 (age range 5 to 15)

In 1960 a census of Jewish youth was carried out. 2,348 circulars were posted, 50·3 per cent of which were returned completed. The completed forms showed that there were 647 Jewish children between the ages of 6 and 16. By doubling this figure (as only half the forms were returned) a theoretical total of approximately 1,300 children between 6 and 16 is obtained.[4] From these two sets of figures a rough idea of the total number of Jewish children covered by this survey can be gauged.

As in the 1946 survey, it has been impossible to account for the theoretical total. In 1946 the discrepancy was about 330 whereas in this survey some 830 children have been accounted for, leaving a discrepancy of about 400 (32 per cent). This number is calculated as follows:

Total children in Table 3	947
Deduct children attending both Hebrew day schools and part-time classes	64
	883
Deduct children under 5 and over 16	53
	830

The reasons for this discrepancy are:

(1) 400 children are not in receipt of Jewish education (some children receive private tuition).
or (2) The total Jewish population in Liverpool is less than 7,500.
or (3) The proportionate distribution of children in the Jewish community is smaller than in the population generally.

It is known that after Bar Mitzvah the number of children attending Hebrew classes falls considerably.

Attendance

Attendance at the day schools is compulsory and is therefore very high. 'Voluntary' attendance at the part-time classes has led to a lower average attendance. There is also a marked difference in attendance on Sundays from that on weekdays. In most of the synagogue

classes, and to a lesser extent the Talmud Torah, the weekday attendance is far lower; in some classes it is only half the Sunday attendance. There are three reasons for this: (1) the pressure of secular studies; (2) the difficulties of transport to and from the classes; and (3) the indifferent attitude adopted by parents towards Jewish education and Jewish matters in general.

The introduction of the 11 plus examination and the intense competition for places in Grammar schools (and later in universities) have necessarily altered the parents' attitude to religious instruction. Pressure on the child may begin to be applied as early as its eighth or ninth birthday (or in the case of entrance to 'private schools' much earlier) and persists throughout the remainder of the child's school career. This problem of religious instruction taking very much a 'second place' to secular studies has, to some extent, been alleviated by the opening of the King David Secondary School.

An attempt was made by the Yeshiva to solve the problem of school homework interfering with Jewish education (or vice versa) by making the children come directly from school and have tea in the Yeshiva. After tea they did their homework and, only when this was finished, settled down to their Hebrew work. The system was unsatisfactory in that the children varied in the length of time they took to do their homework, making it difficult to organize the classes. This approach is not practicable in a large set of classes.

The Liverpool Jewish community has moved rapidly in a south-westerly direction since the war and now is more dispersed. Consequently, families live further away from the synagogues where the classes are held. The increased distance, together with the rise in the incidence of traffic accidents and in the number of crimes of violence, especially against young children, is one of the reasons why parents do not send their children for mid-week religious instruction. The classes begin at about 5 p.m., which is an inconvenient time for mothers, especially those with younger children, and it is before their fathers have returned from work. Only one set of classes organizes transport to bring the children on week nights.

Tuition

There are three important factors in education: the technique and experience of the teacher, the ability of the pupil, and the time available for tuition.

(*a*) *Teacher.* The general standard of teaching is poor in the community. Apart from the day schools, only four out of thirty-two teachers (Table 1) were trained teachers, although a further eight were loosely described as 'having experience', but little importance can be attached to this term. The possession of knowledge does not *per se* qualify a person to teach. A rabbinical diploma, a minister's certificate, or a

B.A. degree is not synonymous with a teaching diploma. In Jews' College only the Diploma 'A' of the Institute for the Training of Teachers includes 'pedagogics' (*sic*) in the syllabus, and even this is limited to one weekly period for one year, there being no mention of any practical instruction.[5]

(*b*) *Pupil.* Modern educationalists grade the pupils according to the 'Three A's' (age, aptitude, and ability). The small number of pupils in any one set of classes makes such a grading virtually impossible. In only one set of classes was there any attempt to grade children. Except for this one set of classes, there is an inadequate number of class grades. During the eight years which the average child now spends on Hebrew tuition he is likely to spend two or more years in the same class. This means that in his second year he will be learning much the same things he was taught in the first year, and this process may recur as often as four times during his Hebrew career. Thus the limited time available is not used to the best advantage and the child becomes bored and, as he grows older, feels that he is wasting his time. This has resulted in a not inconsiderable number of children leaving *cheder* at the earliest opportunity.

The inability to stream the children means that the bright child is held up because of the slower child, or the slower child cannot keep abreast of the brighter child. This too means that the most is not being made of the available time.

(*c*) *Time.* The average time spent by children in Liverpool on Hebrew instruction was 5 hours (range $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 7 hours) in the classes and $4\frac{1}{2}$ hours in the day schools. Dr. Schonfeld[6] has recommended a minimum of 4 hours per week and an average of 7 hours. Reference has been made to the fact that the available time has not been used as well as it could be.

(*d*) *Day schools.* As both the primary and secondary Hebrew day schools are state-aided, any places not taken by Jewish pupils are given to non-Jewish children. The King David Secondary School, however, has two additional problems. Although entry to the Modern stream is by application, that to the Grammar stream is on the results of the 11 plus examination, which means that not all the Jewish applicants will gain admission to the Grammar stream as some places will be given to non-Jews. In addition, children entering the King David School have reached different levels of Jewish education.

In both day schools part of the religious instruction is integrated with the general timetable and part is given outside 'normal' school hours. In the primary school additional periods are held during the lunch hour at midday, and at the secondary school three periods of religious instruction are included in the general curriculum and four periods are given either during the luncheon break or after school. The different standard in Jewish education, compared with a general level of secular

education, achieved by the pupils and the presence of 35 per cent non-Jewish pupils prevent the complete integration of religious and secular studies. A school with a large number of non-Jewish pupils can easily become a school at which Hebrew education is given rather than a Hebrew school. The advantages of the former type of school are the observance of Jewish holidays, and the provision of kosher meals and Hebrew education on the premises. The disadvantages are the fact that not as much time is spent on Hebrew education as there would be in a Hebrew school, and that a relatively large number of teachers is needed when religious instruction is given simultaneously rather than staggered over the whole day.

Accommodation

Not only is there a shortage of teachers but there is also a shortage of accommodation, and in many classes the available accommodation is not really adequate. In the one set of classes where there is streaming of pupils the lack of classrooms has resulted in the children receiving fewer hours of tuition.

Two part-time classes meet in the King David Secondary School, where there is adequate accommodation.

Government

All the part-time classes are governed by lay committees elected by the subscribers or by the synagogue councils (which themselves are elected by the general bodies). The day schools are governed by managers (primary) or governors (secondary), half of whom are appointed by the local education authority and half elected by subscribers. On all the committees the headmasters are present at meetings in an advisory capacity.

Syllabus and examination

There is no uniformity of syllabuses among the institutions, hence the standards will vary. There is no yardstick by which these standards can be measured other than by the results of an external examination. Those institutions which enter pupils for external examinations (e.g. Jews' College, G.C.E.) will work to the requirements of those examinations, but only the King David School and one set of classes enter their pupils for such examinations.

Most institutions have annual written examinations and terminal, or more frequent, oral examinations. There is no standard examination covering all the institutions for a given age. There was no mention of a *Bar Mitzvah* or *Bath Mitzvah* examination or ceremony, although the King David School stated that it used the 'Eshet Chayil' syllabus for girls but gave no indication as to whether the examination was taken.

Finance

There are two clear groups of teachers as far as payment is concerned. One group comprises the stipendiary ministers of the synagogues and the other the part-time teachers. In the part-time classes the highest pay is £4 per week and in the day schools £6 10*s.* 0*d.* No organization can afford to pay a staff of teachers who teach at the most only seven hours a week, a living wage. Similarly teaching will not attract people of the necessary calibre unless a living wage is offered. The only solution to this problem is either the close integration of the day schools and the part-time classes, so that teachers can be shared, or a more intensive practical education course included in the ministers' training.

The scale of fees is given in Table 1 and the broad financial bases of the institutions in Table 4. The Hebrew Schools have to provide about 85 per cent of the money for religious instruction in addition to which there have been appeals for capital funds for the building of two new schools.

The cumulative current accounts (excluding capital appeals and mortgages) show a net profit of £500. That there is a slight margin of profit rather than deficit is due to the large number of stipendiary staff employed in the synagogue classes. If all the part-time classes were amalgamated about twenty teachers would be needed, of whom seven are ministers already available. If, of the remaining thirteen teachers, six were employed on a full-time basis and paid £1,500 per annum, and the remaining seven employed as part-time teachers, a sum of £20,000 would adequately cover the complete education system in Liverpool for both day schools and part-time classes. If each child in Liverpool received Hebrew instruction and paid 5*s.* per week, this would raise £15,000, and if only the 830 who are at present receiving tuition paid this fee £10,000 would be realized. Alternatively, by imposing an education levy of 25*s.* per annum on every male member of the community the cost of education would be covered adequately, allowing free Hebrew instruction for all.

Miscellaneous factors

Most of the institutions have a library and the majority of these lend books to the pupils and to members of the community as a whole. Of the 883 children receiving institutional Hebrew education only 92 are known to belong to Jewish youth organizations. Such organizations can play an important part in Jewish education, being complementary to the more formal system of Jewish education. Most institutions appear to take little or no interest in the extra-curricular Jewish activity of their pupils.

Smaller communities

The problem of the smaller Jewish communities has recently become a national topic. Their problems with regard to education are more difficult than those of the larger communities. They have fewer children but these have an age-group spread as wide as the larger communities. Frequently they have no minister, and even where there is one it is impossible for him to teach all the children at the same time. The alternative solutions are education by correspondence courses under the supervision of an interested and knowledgeable adult or the arrangement of transport to take the children to a central point at least on Sunday mornings.

ADULT EDUCATION

TABLE 5. *Adult Education*

Organization	*Member-ship*	*Average attendance*	*Frequency of meetings*	*Nature of meetings*	*Annual subscrip-tion*	*Age of organiz-ation*
Synagogues						
Childwall	451	18	1/52	C		24
Crosby	37	x	x			x
Non-Zionist organizations						
Jewish graduates	75	40	2/12	C S	21/–	13
Jewish forum	80	45	2/12	C S	20/–	8
Medical Society	150	x	1/12	P S	21/–	29
P.T.A. (Primary School)	152	x	1/12	C S F	3/6	6
Zionist Societies						
Chug Ivri	30	17	1/12	C	7/6	x
Herzlia Group	28	20	1/12	C S	12/6	3
Huldah Zionist Circle	280	20	1/52	C F	14/–	x
J.P.A. Committee	45	26	2/12	C F	–	20
Mizrachi	30	x	5 p.a.	C S F	20/–	60
Young Mizrachi (Women)	18	24	11 p.a.	C S F	20/–	12
Young Wizo	100	x	2/12	C S F	14/–	6
Liv. Zionist Society	150	40	2/12	C	20/–	40
Z.C.C. T'nach Shiur	x	x	1/52	C	x	x
Z.C.C. Hebrew Classes	60	x	1/52	C	x	x

Synagogues

Only one synagogue supplied all the information requested and one other submitted some information but this was inadequate. The terms '*shul*' and 'synagogue' are hardly appropriate today. These buildings are no longer the centres of adult education nor are they meeting places. The term *Beth haMedrash* (house of learning) is now given to a small room where weekday services are held. Only two synagogues hold a *shiur* (study circle) and these are held on *shabbat* afternoon between *mincha* and *ma'ariv*. The remaining six congregations in Liverpool and

all those in the outlying districts appear to have no education programme for adults.

The ideal is for synagogues to provide cultural facilities for all their congregants on Jewish topics both Zionist and non-Zionist. In this way there is some hope of the synagogue again becoming the central point in Jewish communal life. The incentive for this must come from the religious leaders of the congregations but, unfortunately, more and more ministers are undertaking secretarial duties in the congregation at the expense of their pastoral duties.

Non-Zionist organizations

These societies may include Zionist subjects in their programme and they may also include non-Jewish topics. Eight societies were sent questionnaires and five replied. The figures relating to attendance were not given in three of these replies, so that no significant percentage can be calculated.

Zionist societies

The programmes of these societies are based on matters associated with the State of Israel and its development, but other subjects, especially modern Hebrew, are also included. This group accounts for the majority of people receiving adult education (in its widest sense) but many members are only nominal. The average attendance at meetings is 25 per cent (range 8 to 80 per cent). Eleven replies were received out of the fifteen sent out.

The Zionist Central Council, the co-ordinating body of Zionist Societies, organizes a *T'nach* (Bible) *shiur* as well as a number of modern Hebrew classes. For the more advanced Hebraist there is a *Chug Ivri* (Hebrew-speaking circle).

The total number of people who participate in Jewish cultural activities cannot be estimated as there are probably many duplications in Table 5 (i.e. a person may belong to more than one society). What is apparent is that only a small proportion of people participate in any Jewish cultural activity, and the majority of those who do, do so under the aegis of extra-synagogal bodies.

YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

The statistical information received is analysed in Table 6 and compared with the position in 1946. The decline in membership of these groups, in particular the Zionist ones, reflects the position in the adult community and is in no small measure due to the indifference of adults and educational institutions to these activities. One of the observations in the 1946 survey was: 'Attempts to inculcate an appreciation of the present position of Jewry in the world seems to be made only by youth

TABLE 6. *Youth Organizations**

Organization	*Membership*	
	1962	*1946*
Bachad	—	16
B'nei Akiva	x	75
Greenbank Drive Jewish Youth Society	60	—
Habonim	x	190
Harold House Youth Club	418	—
Jewish Students' Society	85	82
Torah v'Avodah	—	45
Young Zionist Society	—	120
Total	563	528

* The estimated total covered by this age group is in the region of 1,400.

organizations. They would be made effective and their instruction might be made more mature in outlook if the organizations were supported in a larger measure by older members of the Community.' These comments remain true today.

The establishment of the State of Israel removed many of the leaders of the Zionist youth organization from Liverpool, and combined with this is the fact that much of the Zionist effort has been directed to the important work of fund-raising. Without the stimulation of youth to an interest in Zionism this latter work will be self-limiting.

Harold House was not functioning in 1946 and it is now the largest youth organization in the community, but the actual Jewish content of its programme is very small. The Jewish Lads' Brigade, which has also been revived since the end of the war, appears to have no Jewish content in its programme.

In this field the synagogue has also been found wanting. No synagogue caters individually and specifically for its young children, although at least one organizes activities for its 'teen-agers'.

POSTSCRIPT

In September 1964 the Hebrew Primary School, which had been situated in the centre of Liverpool since its foundation more than a hundred years ago, moved to a new building in Childwall. The new site is adjacent to the King David Secondary School and in the midst of the Jewish community.

The full effect of this transfer was not expected to be felt for about five years, as parents would not move children from the primary schools they were already attending to the new school and the school would have to depend mainly on five-year-olds for its new pupils.

In the summer of 1964 the Education Committee of the Liverpool City Council proposed changes in the pattern of secondary education in the city. These included the abolition of Grammar schools, with the exception of denominational ones, by combining them with Secondary Modern schools to form comprehensive school units—not necessarily in one building. As the King David Secondary School would not be affected by these changes, it became a more popular choice with Jewish parents, many of whom had preferred the secular Grammar schools. It became apparent that the King David School might not be able to accept all the prospective pupils, in which case preference would be given to children from the Hebrew Primary School. At the end of the Summer term 1964 many pupils left the secular primary schools and enrolled at the new King David Primary School. In the Autumn term of 1964 there were 296 Jewish pupils in the new primary school out of a total of 373, and only 133 of these had come from the old Hebrew Primary School in Hope Place.

Associated with this influx was a drop in the number of children attending part-time classes. The figures for the part-time classes during the Autumn term of 1964 were:

Allerton	39
Greenbank Drive	59
Old Hebrew Cong.	70
Childwall	149

The mid-week attendance at Childwall is about 55 per cent of the total roll and at the other three classes it is not more than 25 per cent. These figures include the children who attend the Hebrew Day Schools and part-time classes and only attend the classes on Sunday mornings. There are now about 40 pupils at the Talmud Torah Schools, most of whom attend on four week nights and Sunday mornings.

In 1963 the proposal to amalgamate the part-time religion classes was rejected by the individual congregations, but the effect of the opening of the new primary school has led to a change of heart. In October 1964 representatives of Allerton, Greenbank Drive, and the Old Hebrew Congregation met under the auspices of the Merseyside Jewish Representative Council and agreed to unite their classes. Approval has now been received to use the Hebrew Schools as the venue for the new classes and it is hoped that they will begin to operate in May 1965.

NOTES

[1] This paper is an abridgement of a report to the Education Committee of the Merseyside Representative Council.

[2] *The Jewish Year Book, 1962*, London.

[3] Registrar-General's Statistical Review, Part II, various years.

[4] Report of Youth Centre Planning Committee, January 1961, Merseyside Jewish Representative Council.

[5] This was the situation in 1962.

[6] *Jewish Religious Education, A Guide and Handbook with Syllabuses*, National Council for Jewish Religious Education, London, 1943.

PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN IDEOLOGY AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN ISRAEL

Moshe Lissak

FOCAL POINTS IN THE IDEOLOGY OF THE PRE-STATE SOCIETY

FROM the very beginning the Jewish community in Palestine was remarkable for the wide variety of opinions held concerning the social and cultural character of the future society which was to be built up in the country. It was a society made up of many groups, differing from one another in the ideological criteria guiding their practical and spiritual life. The nature of the social structure (in particular the character of classes and status groups and the relations between them, as well as their basic principles and goals) was a keystone in the formulation of the ideological foundations of the various sectors constituting the Jewish community in Palestine. Furthermore, as in every society with a social mission, its ideological formulation had a direct and powerful influence on broad social processes, on the one hand, and on the judgements, motives, and behaviour patterns of the individual on the other.

The aim of this paper is to outline several of the changes which have occurred in class ideology and in the actual configuration of society since the establishment of Jewish settlement in Palestine.

In order to clarify the changes which have taken place since the 1920s I have chosen as a convenient chronological dividing line the standard division between 'the pre-state period' (up to 1948) and 'the period of statehood' (from 1948 on).

From the point of view of the topic under discussion, the pre-state society had two distinguishing characteristics. First, there was a clear trend toward the nullification in practice (or at least the diffusion and neutralization) of ethnic differences, coupled with the relatively successful prevention of the breakdown of the multifarious waves of immigration into concentrations of specific professional, social, or political sectors. Thus in a relatively short period of time significant numbers of immigrants, including those originally identified by the distinguishing characteristics of country of origin and profession (e.g. the Russian 'intelligentsia', the German 'professionals', i.e. doctors and lawyers, and the Polish merchants) became more or less dispersed

throughout the whole range of professional, political, and cultural activities characteristic of the pre-state society.[1] Systematic statistical proof of this statement is not available, but some partial evidence can be found. For example, in a census of the Jewish workers in Palestine in 1937 it was found that 12·4 per cent of all the Jewish workers (craftsmen, construction workers, farmers, etc.) were newcomers from Germany. Their proportion of the other sectors of the society was only 8·9 per cent. The author concludes that up to March 1937 the relative number of the newcomers from Germany who had shifted to 'productive work' was much greater than among the newcomers from other countries.[2] In another investigation which took place in 1936 among 236 newcomers from Germany it was found that 54 per cent had changed their occupation.[3] Second, in theory at least, the dominant faction of the pre-state elite emphasized the need for a complete separation between (or the maintenance of the independence of) the individual's economic potential and his opportunities for achievement in professional, intellectual, and civic spheres of activity. From this point of view, the expectations of an 'open' and mobile society were in fact quite realistic.

SOCIAL IDEALS IN THE PRE-STATE SOCIETY

These special qualities of the pre-state society derived directly from the values and norms that reflected the majority of the people's images of the form of the society which they had helped to create. The changes which occurred in the 'period of statehood' cannot be understood, and the conflict between ideology and reality already existing in the pre-state society cannot be explained, without our discussing the several aspects of these 'social ideals'.

From the wealth of social ideologies which have dealt with the fundamentals of the existence and function of class and status group in pre-state society, I have chosen one central aspect as definitive: the form that social stratification should ideally assume and the course of the progress toward this ideal. What were supposed to be the fundamentals and focal points of crystallization of the different social groups which reached the country in the various waves of immigration?

(1) The withholding of approval from association and stratification on a particularistic basis (religious, tradition, country of origin, etc.). In other words, the existence of congruent spheres of activity bringing about separation and exclusiveness of strata or groups of individuals was considered to be a destructive force working against the integration of all the waves of immigration into one unified national framework.

(2) The dominant social images were those of an open, egalitarian, and mobile society, receptive to change and non-separation, preferring the productive fusion of individual talent with the collective task to all

other qualifications. This ideology (together with other basic factors deriving from the existence of a state of crisis in the politics and security of the pre-state society) contributed greatly to the creation of points of agreement on essential tenets among the many political currents. Side by side with youth organizations established along party lines, and schools organized around an ideological trend (the result of the crystallization of groups on the basis of political orientations), the need arose for joint action in the areas of politics, national security, and community service.

The seeds of later changes in these ideological patterns were already deeply implanted in the pre-state period. They had their source, *inter alia*, in the conflict existing between the socialistic conception of sociopolitical organization which was the inheritance of the largest section of the ruling political and cultural elite (at least since the start of the thirties), and some of the processes of economic development which characterized the pre-state society after 1930. These processes were manifested in the increase in national income, in the burgeoning of a middle class, in the extension of services, and in a certain modification of the evaluation of manual work. This development created new needs, and social groups which were particularly active in the economic sphere pressed for greater attention to be paid to the universal laws of economic growth and to the possibility of greater exemption from external political and ideological control. One of the results of this development was that, parallel with the systematization of the dominant principles and mechanisms for the distribution of social benefits (in particular of prestige, political power, and economic advantages), there was a gradual development of other principles and mechanisms. The dominant principles dictated a certain hierarchy of rewards, preferring prestige and power derived from connexion with 'collective enterprise'. But immediately following the establishment of these parallel principles (the influence of which was felt even in the labour sector, and certainly in the 'bourgeois' sector), it was already possible to detect among the younger generation a tendency toward services, white collar work, and other activities of a nonpolitical, voluntary nature, which, in any event, had less association with the collective framework (see Table 1).[4]

(3) There is an important conclusion to be drawn from the nature of this approach to class structure and from the active career of this ideology as a programme to be translated into action. This conclusion concerns the prestige bestowed on the different professions and on the means and conditions of (upward) mobility by the individual. There was approval of identification with those social processes seeking to nullify the influence of economic components, such as income level, and of inherited ascribed components, such as membership in a certain ethnic group, as prerequisites for advancement in the professional and intellectual spheres and in civic affairs. While the application of this

TABLE 1. *Distribution of Occupations of the Second Generation and their Fathers, 1937*

Occupations	*Sons*	*Fathers*
	%	%
Services	10·5	4·8
Craftsmen and Production Process Workers	26·0	25·1
Construction Workers	8·9	5·5
Transport and Communications	6·0	2·4
Farmers	21·6	15·7
Traders	0·2	24·5
Administration	16·5	7·7
Professionals and Scientific Workers	5·5	6·1
Miscellaneous	4·8	8·2
Total	100·0	100·0

Source: B. D. Weinryb, *The Second Generation in Palestine and its Occupational Choice* (in Hebrew), London, 1954, p. 83.

social dictum met with only limited success, once applied it promoted the bestowal of approval on a more or less defined 'profile' of the social status of the individual in the pre-state society. This profile might be termed 'unbalanced' (or 'inconsistent') status.[5] These ideas were put into practice to such an extent that many people ascended the professional and economic ladders or rose in the sphere of economic activity by relinquishing those economic benefits naturally sought in any society not having a mission for which it demands sacrifices. Moreover, this mobility was not always based on qualifications of formal education and knowledge (e.g. a diploma); in many cases an ideological commitment and membership in a collective group were preferred. As has been noted above, parallel with this profile, another variation of the unbalanced status profile began to develop, even though in its essential nature it was antithetical to the dominant or at least favoured profile. As we have said, one of the sources of this variation was the rapid economic development which began in the thirties (with the 'German Immigration') and reached a peak during the Second World War. This process made possible the rapid accumulation of wealth, but without the corresponding intellectual and professional mobility.

A large section of the earlier religious orthodox settlers and many members of the Jewish oriental ethnic groups did not fall within either one of these two 'profiles'. Income, education, and professional skills within these sectors were on a low and underdeveloped level. If we add to this that their 'style of life', in the broadest sense of the term, was also considered 'backward', they become clearly identifiable within the framework of the above schema of concepts as representative of 'balanced' (or 'consistent') status, even if this status is low in terms of the scale of social prestige. However, these two groups were in a socially

isolated position. It was this social atmosphere which contributed to the crystallization of a single unified social orientation (at least until the early forties) toward the prestige of the different occupations. Also derived from it was the great respect given to those heading the hierarchy of occupations according to this conception: to the farmers, to professional artisans and craftsmen working in collective groups, and also, to a certain extent, to teachers and doctors.[6] At the centre of this hierarchy were grouped all those occupations the members of which, although earning respect for their individual talents, enjoyed an essentially lower prestige and did not figure in the framework of the national mission. (I refer to professions such as those of lawyers, engineers, and even scientists.) All the professions and occupations found at the bottom of this ladder were placed there owing either to their particular character or to their having been commonplace among the Jews of the Diaspora. It was because of these groups that the well-known demand arose to reverse the pyramid of occupations of Diaspora Jewry and thus normalize the economic and social bases of the Jewish nation.

Substantial agreement prevailed as well on the legitimate channels of mobility and the bestowal of prestige. Predominant in the spheres of national security and agricultural settlement, and to a smaller degree on the urban scene, were occupations involving 'pioneering'. These patterns of mobility gave a 'heterogeneous' form to the status which carried prestige in the eyes of the elite of the pre-state society.

CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY SINCE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

The general feeling expressed in various local publications dealing with social problems, and corroborated by sociological researches, is that some far-reaching changes have occurred in the class ideology and in the actual configuration of Israeli society during the past decade. The changes in the structure and ideology of stratification are part and parcel of the complex structural alterations and the shifts in the value patterns which were triggered off by the achievement of political independence. The following four characteristics, which are not always compatible with one another, have marked Israeli society during this period; their combined effect has strongly influenced the changes which I intend to discuss.

(*a*) *Economic and Social Differentiation*

The central factor bearing on economic and social differentiation is uninterrupted economic expansion. Since 1952, in spite of certain short-lived recessions, the economy has been characterized by a continuous rise in national wealth, in both national revenue and real wages (see Table 2). This has led to an unprecedented rise in the standard of

living, accompanied by greater inequality in the distribution of income (see Table 3).

TABLE 2. *Growth of National Wealth, 1950–54*

	1950	*1951*	*1952*	*1953*	*1954*
Net wealth*	100	141	260	376	546

* After allowing for depreciation and obsolescence.
Source: *The Hebrew Encyclopedia*, Vol. 6, p. 744.

TABLE 3. *Distribution of Personal Income, Urban Wage and Salary Earners' Families, 1950 and 1956–57*

Income group	*Personal income*	
	August 1950	*1956–57*
	%	%
Bottom tenth	5·5	3·2
2nd tenth	7·0	6·0
3rd tenth	7·3	7·2
4th tenth	8·6	8·2
5th tenth	8·6	8·2
6th tenth	10·1	10·1
7th tenth	10·5	10·3
8th tenth	11·4	12·0
9th tenth	13·3	14·4
Top tenth	17·7	20·4
Total	100·0	100·0
Average monthly income (IL)	73·8	274·2

Source: Giora Hanoch, *Income Differentials in Israel*, The Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, Fifth Report, 1959 and 1960, Table 2.

In presenting the table dealing with personal family income the author notes that the table shows 'that the proportion of the total income earned by families in the lowest deciles dropped in the six years between 1950 and 1956, while the proportion of those in the highest deciles rose. The change was particularly noticeable in the lowest decile, whose share in personal incomes dropped by 2·3 per cent and in the highest decile, whose share rose by 2·7 per cent. The average real income of the lowest fifth declined by 4 per cent in contrast to a 47 per cent rise in real income in the highest fifth, while the overall real average rose by 29 per cent. Inequality in income distribution was extremely narrow in August 1950. There is reason to assume that there has been a considerable widening of overall inequality among wage and salary earners' families since 1950.'[7] This development was connected

with a noticeable extension of the occupational spheres. The achievement of independence opened up new occupational spheres which, in varying degrees, had been closed to the Jewish sector during the Mandatory period. Prime among these were the governmental and military spheres, and then the emergence of new industries and new levels of services and the broadening of the scope of the old spheres of occupation. The immediate result was a new division of the population according to economic branches and vocations. From this point of view, a comparison between the Mandatory period and the statehood period highlights the following changes:[8] the substantial growth of personal services and the civil service, and the decline in the number of agriculturalists and traders (see Tables 4 and 5).

TABLE 4. *Occupational Structure of the Jews in Palestine, 1931, 1936*

	1931		*1936 (estimate)*	
		%		%
Agriculture	27,000	18·0	56,000	15·0
Industry and Crafts	37,100	24·7	83,000	23·0
Transport	9,600	6·4	21,000	6·0
Construction	13,300	8·8	36,000	10·0
Trade	28,700	19·1	75,000	21·0
Civil Service	3,400	2·2	12,000	3·0
Liberal Professions	17,500	11·6	48,000	13·0
Income from Rent	8,600	5·7	22,000	6·0
Services	5,300	3·5	10,000	3·0
Total	150,500	100·0	363,000	100·0

Source: Alfred Bonné, *Eretz-Israel, Ha'aretz Ve-Hakalkala*, Tel-Aviv, 1938, p. 221.

TABLE 5. *Jewish Employed Persons by Occupation, 1963*

	Absolute Numbers 1963 (average)	*Percentages 1963 (average)*
Not known	5,100	—
Services, Sport and Recreation Workers	92,000	12·5
Craftsmen, Production Process Workers	180,400	24·3
Construction Workers, Quarrying and Miners	58,200	7·8
Workers in Transport and Communications	40,600	5·5
Farmers, Fishermen, and Related Workers	87,600	11·8
Traders, Agents and Salesmen	62,500	8·4
Administrative, Executive, Managerial, and Clerical Workers	124,500	16·8
Professional, Scientific, Technical, and Related Workers	95,700	12·9
All Employed Persons	813,200	100·0

Source: The Government of Israel, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1964*, Table K/14

(*b*) *Changes in Political Structure*

The stratification structure was influenced by the political sphere, in which changes occurred after independence. The dimension of power

and authority gained a new perspective or, in any event, a perspective different from that which had existed in the pre-state period. The wide range of interference on the part of the political elite and the great intensity of manipulation by the political force which characterized Israeli society after the establishment of the state suddenly turned a host of old and new political themes into bones of contention between groups and parties (for example, the wage policy in particular, and the welfare policy in general, the direction of educational activity, and the relation between the state and religion). Thus the control and monopoly of positions of power became one of the central rewards in present-day Israeli society.

(*c*) *The Internal Differentiation of the Elite and of Voluntary Associations*

Another fundamental feature of the pre-state society was the relatively small differentiation within the elite. At that time it was possible to detect a noticeable proliferation of functions in the hands of certain individuals and a continual rotation of members of the elite in political, economic, and cultural roles. Moreover, these exchanges prevented the crystallization and institutionalization of the differences between the exponents of values and those transmitting them. This schematic pattern was characteristic of all sectors of the pre-state society, although the contact between the elites of different sectors was slight and limited essentially to the political security sphere. As time passed basic changes occurred in the intermingling of political, cultural, and economic functions, on the personal and on the civic-collective level. The primary reason for these changes was the economic and institutional differentiation and, consequently, the partial emancipation of different economic and social spheres from political and ideological direction and regulation. We are able to witness, in any event, the struggle of the spokesmen of these spheres for relative autonomy from the political sphere and for the right to take into consideration more relevant professional factors, as opposed to the more diffuse corporate considerations of the pre-state period. This phenomenon is also linked with the proliferation of paths of social mobility, combined with a certain restriction on the possibilities of exchange between these various paths.[9]

Today, we can easily discern 'one-dimensional' elites (for example, purely economic elites or elites active only in the cultural sphere), which were less common before statehood. On the civic-collective level the processes of change have a composite and more complex nature. At the establishment of the state, concurrently with the end of the situation where a single individual fulfilled several different elite functions, there was a revitalization of the process of sectorization which had been typical of the pre-state period, and it was possible to see a clear trend of optimal autarchy in each and every sector. This was manifest, for example, in the attempt of different parties and organizations to

supply their members and sympathizers with employment, housing, cultural needs, education and, of course, *Weltanschauung*.

There are several indications that these 'neo-feudal' processes, as they might be termed, lost their impetus at the beginning of the second decade when the government appropriation of the different civic functions which had formerly been in the hands of voluntary and semi-voluntary organizations (such as the 'Histadrut', The General Federation of Labour) reached sizable dimensions (for example, in the establishment of compulsory education, state employment agencies, etc.). This does not mean that the cancellation of economic and political sectors was at that time already clearly envisaged (and whether this cancellation is necessary is another question). We may simply note that the boundaries of the sectors changed or became blurred. One of the phenomena accompanying this blurring was the crystallization of the feeling of solidarity among social groups which were connected then, as they are today, with different sectors: for example, groups within a single stratum of the elite which cuts across the traditional sector lines. Today, this stratum embraces the various university graduates (salaried and freelance), industrialists, exporters, administrators (in the government, public, and private sectors), high-ranking army officers, and a part of the political leadership. While this is true, it is not to be assumed that this beginning of mutual solidarity will in the near future compensate for disunity of party and ideology. Nevertheless, as long as this disunited group is the proponent of the struggle for the enlarging of the wage differential and for radical changes in the balancing of rewards, suitable conditions are created for its unification.

Other signs of the crystallization of a new elite stratum are visible at present in the recognizable intergeneration continuity of the sons of the old elite in occupational roles and functions similar to (but not necessarily identical with) those of their parents. We cannot from this arrive at any far-reaching conclusions concerning the possibility of members of lower classes being barred from entry into this social stratum. It is to be recalled that a parallel and even stronger tendency still exists which maintains that admission to the highest posts should be based on universalistic qualifications.

In the pre-state period, voluntary societies represented one of the important frameworks for the organization and crystallization of status groups. Nearly all these societies were associated with political organizations and supplied 'services' which the political organizations considered vital, and a large proportion of the members of these organizations carried out the obligations imposed on each individual. It is possible to attribute the focus of the voluntary organization in the pre-state society to the decisive attachment to and dependence on the society-wide sphere of political solidarity in all areas of life. Every voluntary organization which removed itself from this framework and

was connected with other commitments and needs placed itself outside the 'organized community'. This is the source of the dualism, or dichotomy, of communication situations in the pre-state society, where there was one situation characteristic of the 'organized community' and another of the marginal sectors (the Oriental groups, the early orthodox settlers, and part of the 'bourgeois' sector).

In the pre-state period the dominant function of the majority of voluntary organizations was associated either directly or indirectly with political activities. Today, new roles and activities have been created which do not require conjunction with the political framework. As a result, newly established chambers of commerce, Rotary clubs, Freemasons, and other philanthropic organizations flourish. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the type of voluntary organization characteristic of the pre-state period has disappeared from the scene. Several of the fundamental conditions of economic and political security have not changed. The difference lies in the fact that a sizable portion of the different organizations which were previously proponents of social values have developed into interest and pressure groups.

(*d*) *The Partial Institutionalization of Congruence between Economic and Occupational Classes and Ethnic Divisions*

The influx of immigrants from underdeveloped countries who had less education and fewer occupational skills than the European population (the Ashkenazim), and were consequently inferior to them in economic power, made the congruence between class and ethnic division more salient than it had previously been. This congruence, which was relatively insignificant during pre-state period, has emerged as one of the most conspicuous social problems confronting Israeli society. Today, veterans of European descent dominate almost the entire range of social, political, and cultural spheres, as they had dominated them during the previous four or five decades. During the same period, the non-Ashkenazi sector has grown from about 15 per cent of the Jewish population in the thirties to almost 50 per cent at present. This has focused attention upon the convergence of economic class and ethnic origin (see Tables 6, 7, and 8).

The increasing economic differentiation, the emergence of a large self-conscious professional class, the intensified manipulation of political power and rewards, and the crystallization of a large low-status group identified in terms of ethnic origin have had the combined effect of widening the gap between the 'class ideology' and the 'social ideals' of the pre-state period and today's rather ambiguous and equivocal values which, though confronting veterans and newcomers alike, are especially potent for the second generation.

One of the fundamental traits of a sample of young people which was studied with regard to the nature of their professional aspirations and

trends was the consensus on the order of importance of professions and occupations from the point of view of prestige (both as regards the 'objective hierarchy' or 'public scale' [see Table 9], i.e. the order of

TABLE 6. *Jewish Employed Persons by Occupation, Continent of Birth, and Period of Immigration*

	Average 1963					*Total*
	New immigrants		*Veterans*		*Born in Israel*	
	Europe America	*Asia Africa*	*Europe America*	*Asia Africa*		
All Employed Persons						
Absolute Numbers	202,400	214,900	168,900	30,000	130,800	747,000
Percentage	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Workers	14·4	4·8	16·6	4·1	21·2	12·9
Administrative, Executive, Managerial, and Clerical Workers	16·3	7·1	26·2	15·1	21·7	16·8
Traders, Agents, Salesmen	10·9	6·1	10·9	13·8	4·2	8·4
Farmers, Fishermen	8·5	19·2	8·3	6·8	10·6	11·8
Workers in Transport and Communications	4·3	4·0	5·6	17·8	9·1	5·5
Construction Workers, Quarrying and Miners	6·8	12·5	5·0	10·9	4·7	7·8
Craftsmen, Production Process Workers	25·8	30·3	18·1	22·7	20·4	24·3
Services, Sports and Recreation Workers	13·0	16·0	9·3	18·8	8·1	12·5

Source: Government of Israel, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1964*, Table K/16.

TABLE 7. *Employment Income of Family Head, by Continent of Origin and Duration of Residence, Urban Wage and Salary Earners, November 1956–April 1957*

Group	*Total*
IL. per month Average Income	
Total	253·1
Asia–Africa	
Veterans	212·5
New Immigrants	192·1
Europe–America	
Veterans	298·7
New Immigrants	237·3
Israeli-Born	258·3
Income ratios (per cent)	
Asia–Africa / Europe–America Ratio	
Among Veterans	71
Among New Immigrants	81
New Immigrants / Veterans Ratio	
Among Asia–Africa	90
Among Europe–America	79

Source: Giora Hanoch, op. cit., Table 11.

TABLE 8. *Jewish Population by Continent of Birth and Education of the Head of Family*

Continent of birth	*Total %*	*Illiterate or less than 8 years of education*	*8–11 years of education*	*12–14 years of education*	*College and University*	*Others*
Total	100·0	20·1	42·8	25·7	8·6	2·8
Israeli-born	100·0	9·1	48·4	30·5	10·0	2·0
Asia–Africa	100·0	47·6	35·4	9·8	2·3	4·9
Europe–America	100·0	10·2	45·3	31·8	11·1	4·5

Source: *Survey of Family Savings 1957/8, A joint report with the Central Bureau of Statistics, Bank of Israel and the Institute of Applied Social Research*, December 1959, Table 10.

importance attributed to the general public, and as regards the 'subjective hierarchy' or 'ego hierarchy' [see Table 10], i.e. according to the personal perspective of each individual in the population studied).[10] As we learn from Table 9, the upper portion of the 'public hierarchy' includes most of the academic professions and also those holding power in the political sphere (the member of Parliament and the diplomat, but not the professional politician, who occupies a rather low rung on the ladder). At midpoint there is a variegated group of professional categories. Included among them are those which are characterized or accepted as affording a high standard of living and high income (the banker and the industrialist fall in this category) or occupations connected with artistic abilities in the broad sense of the term (the painter, the musician), and officials of intermediate rank (whether in government or private employ). At the bottom of the ladder is manual labour, and in particular all those occupations not connected with extensive training.

Among the many indices testifying to the changes of values which have taken place in recent years, perhaps the most important is the presence at the bottom of the ladder, in all the different social frameworks in which it is performed (the *kibbutz*, the *moshav*, and the *moshava*), of agricultural labour. The comparison between the two hierarchies is very interesting. At the time of the comparison very high correlations were found,[11] a fact which itself testifies to the essential identification of the personal outlook of the young people with the outlook which they ascribed to the public as a whole. At the same time, several very symptomatic and systematic deviations are revealed around this case of identification. Thus the *kibbutz* member and the mechanic are always placed higher in the 'ego hierarchy' than in the 'public hierarchy', while the banker, the lawyer, and also the rabbi are placed lower.

There is no doubt that these processes are indicators of far-reaching changes in the social structure of Israeli society. It is, however, significant that only minor changes can be discerned in the official ideology.

TABLE 9. *The Hierarchy of Occupations as perceived by the Sample Population (the 'Public' Hierachy)*

Rank	*Occupation*
1	Scientist
2	Diplomat
3	Physician
4	Member of Parliament
5	Flight Officer
6	Engineer
7	Author
8	Lawyer
9	High School Teacher
10	Banker
11	Army Officer
12	Industrialist
13	Artist (painter, musician)
14	Rabbi
15	Athlete
16	Public Servant
17	Trader (businessman)
18	Party Functionary
19	Clerk (in a private firm)
20	Farmer in *Moshava* (private ownership)
21	Mechanic
22	Locksmith
23	Member of a *Kibbutz* (collective settlement)
24	Member of a *Moshav* (cooperative settlement)
25	Teamster
26	Waiter
27	Usher

TABLE 10. *The Hierarchy of Occupations as perceived by the Sample Population (the 'Ego' Hierarchy)*

Rank	*Occupation*	*Rank*	*Occupation*
1	Scientist	15	Banker
2	Physician	16	Member of a *Kibbutz*
3	Diplomat	17	Farmer in a *Moshava*
4	Engineer	18	Member of a *Moshav*
5	Author	19	Locksmith
6	Member of Parliament	20	Athlete
7	Flight Officer	21	Clerk
8	High School Teacher	22	Public Servant
9	Artist (painter, musician)	23	Trader (businessman)
10	Lawyer	24	Teamster
11	Army Officer	25	Party Functionary
12	Rabbi	26	Waiter
13	Industrialist	27	Usher
14	Mechanic		

Some of the difficulties and contradictions arising from the confrontation of the official ideology with the social processes described above are reflected in the following phenomenon. It will be recalled that we have associated pre-state society with attempts at the neutralization of ascribed qualifications and conditions. Similarly, we have described the nature of the struggle against any cultural or professional factionalism of a permanent nature, whether based on country of origin, ethnic group, or any other ascribed characteristic (with the exception of length of residence in the country). As was to be expected, this mechan-

ism of neutralization functioned within a social framework which was basically homogeneous (that part of the population originating from Eastern Europe). There was some attempt to extend the effective scope of this principle beyond the homogeneous framework, but without any appreciable success. In this respect, the official ideology did not change nor did its success increase. This partial failure is even more pronounced at present after the recent absorption of hundreds of thousands of individuals from Middle Eastern countries. While this tendency to extend the scope of the principle of neutralization continues on a long-term basis, steps have been taken which contradict this principle on a short-term basis. A typical example is the guidance programme of the Ministry of Education and Culture, the purpose of which is to encourage and foster the learning and culture of the Oriental community. But for all the attention to, and moral and social recognition of, the need for this programme, it is still not clear how this principle of selection and particularistic guidance fits into comprehensive, universalistic mechanisms such as compulsory and free education, government employment agencies, etc. In any case, it seems that the simultaneous attempts at the expansion of the principle of neutralization of ascribed criteria in the occupational and public spheres, on the one hand, and the activation of more particularistic principles of selection in the educational and socio-political spheres, on the other (e.g. the necessity for slates of candidates by ethnic groups at election time) give rise, at least on a short-term basis, to new problems no less complicated than those which they attempt to solve on a long-term basis.

It would appear that one of the potential results of this trend, especially as it is expressed in the sphere of educational activity, is the existence of two tendencies which appear to be in conflict. At a time when a strong bond is being formed in the labour market between the income component and the other components of status (education and profession), the criteria for entrance into the frameworks where the process of preparation for the labour market is taking place are based on norms which do not always match the current norms or the norms achieving dominance in the lives and outlooks of men.

It is to be assumed that in the distant future these parallel trends will have a great influence on the stratification make-up of Israeli society, and particularly on the mobility patterns of the Orientals. They will lead to the cancellation of the stultifying influence of such external expressions of culture patterns and social standing as length of residence and country of origin on professional, academic, and economic achievements. However, we know that today country of origin and length of residence reflecting material prosperity, level of education, professional training, and style of life, still serve as central factors of division not only between abstract status categories ('working class', 'middle class', etc.) but also between concrete social status groups.

Another instance of a gap between official ideology and public opinion is the issue of the status image. Pre-state ideology and the current elite ideology at its purest have fixed the basis *outside* individual status, necessitating the relating of each and every component of status to an external criterion: service to the collective framework, however it might be defined. This was also the source of the opposition to a fixed relationship, to a certain degree, between the levels of achievement in different components of status (for example, income, education, profession, and political power). The ideology currently accepted in ever-widening circles prefers to set the basis, the point of conjunction, *within* the status itself. In other words, the criteria for both corporate and individual evaluation of achievement—for the investment of money, time, talent, and the like—are the achievements themselves. Such an evaluation tends to place less emphasis on the extent of the contribution of these achievements to the collective account.

Against this background, the frequent clashes between the university graduates and the representatives of the General Federation of Labour and the government become clear. Behind the demands for higher wages, an increase in social benefits, and a separate and exclusive system of grading and job classification, there stands the explicit demand to change the normative principle opposing the combination of the income component with the educational and occupational components of the individual's status.

CONCLUSION: ISRAEL AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY

We have observed the following characteristics of the class ideology in the pre-state period: (*a*) the withholding of approval from association and stratification on a particularistic basis; (*b*) the image of an open, more or less egalitarian, mobile society; (*c*) opposition to interchangeability between personal achievement in the occupational role and material reward. The ideology of the nucleus of the political elite has not been greatly modified. However, as a consequence of the general political and economic processes, the elite has had to yield, in many instances reluctantly, and come to terms with some of the demands of the various sections of society. Nevertheless, the gap between the class ideology prevailing among the veteran elite and that of growing circles of the population is not diminishing. An analysis of the potential consequences of the gap is outside the scope of this paper. Many observers consider Israel to be a developing country now in the higher economic stages of the take-off period. Does this mean that identical developments, as far as the issues presented in this paper are concerned, can be expected in other developing countries? The answer has two aspects: one definitively negative, and the other partially positive. The negative answer is based predominantly on the far-reaching differences between

the starting points and the character of the initial stages of development in other countries.[12]

In sharp contrast to the developing countries of Asia and Africa, in their European countries of origin and also in Palestine itself, the Jewish community had actually passed through what may be called the critical stages of social, political, and cultural take-off. By this we mean that during the first half of the century the functional conditions geared to the necessary mobilization of man-power, materials, and value resources needed for the economic take-off had been developing within the Jewish community. In this respect the development was gradual and balanced. African and Asian states are obliged to carry out the economic revolution simultaneously with the take-off in the political and the social spheres. The legacy of the colonial period and the inability to regulate such complicated processes after independence have created wide gaps between political, cultural, and economic development. Consequently, these societies are exposed to another entirely different set of problems which lead to the taking of drastic measures in order to increase the tempo of progress.

In a paradoxical way it is just these centralization trends evolving in an overwhelming number of developing countries which lead, in a sense, to a point of conjunction that is reflected by the endorsement of central public control of many social and economic activities. This point of conjunction explains the great interest which many of the developing countries are demonstrating in the application of some of the authentic Israeli frameworks (cooperative and collective in nature) to their social context. In this sense some resemblance could be expected between the stratificational processes and ideology of the Jewish community during the pre-state period and those processes burgeoning in Asia and Africa today. Surely there will be more or less identical developments resulting from the unavoidable trends involved in the process of modernization, such as specialization, role differentiation, and universalistic criteria of role allocation. However, it appears that the potential similarity is more formal than substantial. After all, the content of the ideology and the instruments employed for its realization are different. The genesis of the difference lies in the character of the initial stages of modernization in Asia and Africa compared with that of the Jewish community in Israel since the end of the nineteenth century.

NOTES

[1] This description is typical of the majority of individuals in the pre-state society; it excludes the extremely orthodox Jews, many of the immigrants from Middle Eastern countries, and some of the immigrants from Germany. On the concept of neutralization of ethnic differences see Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, 'Mivnehu Ha-sociologi Shel Hayishuv Ha-Yehudi Be-Ertz-Israel', *Molad*, March 1949; 'Israel' in Arnold M. Rose (ed.), *The Institutions of Advanced Societies*, Minneapolis, 1958.

[2] Walter Preuss, 'Ha-Halia Ha-Ovedet

Me-Europa Ha-Maharavit, 1933–1939,' *Ha-Poel Ha-tzair*, Vol. 33, No. 18, 1940, p. 14.

[3] A. N. Poliak, 'Hayishuv Ha-Yehudi Be-Motzahe Ha-Milchama,' *Sifriat Poalim*, 1945, p. 77.

[4] On the occupational trends in the second generation in the thirties and forties see: Dov Weinryb, *Ha-dor Hasheni Be-Rehovot Ve-darko Ha-miqzo'it*, Jerusalem, 1939; *Ha-dor Ha-sheni Be-Eretz-Israel Ve-darko Ha-miqzo'it*, London, 1954; Levy Malinowsky and M. Dauber, *Le-demuto Ha-miqzo'it shel Noar Ha-ironi Be-Israel*, Szold Foundation, Jerusalem, 1947; Eliezer Riger, *Ha-hinuh Ha-miqzo'i Ba-Yishuv Ha-Yehudi Be-Eretz-Israel*, 1945.

[5] Status consistency refers to the extent of consistency in terms of different components of the individual's status in various status hierarchies. See for example, Leonard Broom, 'Social Differentiation and Stratification' in Robert K. Merton, L. Brown, and L. S. Caffrell, Jr. (eds.), *Sociology Today*, p. 430; Milton Bloombaum, 'The Mobility Dimension in Status Consistency', *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 48, No. 3, April 1964, p. 340.

[6] With regard to the ambivalent position of professional workers in the pre-statehood period see: Joseph Ben-David, 'Professions and Social Structure of Israel', in Roberto Bachi (ed.), *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, Jerusalem, Vol. III, 1956, pp. 126–52; S. N. Eisenstadt in A. M. Rose (ed.), op. cit.

[7] See Giora Hanoch, *Income Differentials in Israel*, The Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, Fifth Report 1959 and 1960, p. 46.

[8] An accurate comparison between occupational structure in the pre-state and in the statehood periods is not always possible because of differences in definitions of occupations and economic branches, and inadequate collection of data. Reliable data on the recent period are to be found in the various man-power surveys carried out by the Government of Israel. See, for example, *Statistical Abstract of Israel No. 9*, 1957/8, p. 297. As far as the pre-state period is concerned see, for example, *Pinkas*, No. 8, *Davar* supplement 1938; David Horovitz, *Ha-Kalkala Ha-Eretz-Israelit Behitpatchuta*, Mossad Bialik, Dvir, 1944; Alfred Bonné, *Eretz-Israel, Ha'aretz Ve-Hakalkala*, Tel-Aviv, 1938.

[9] Generally, the interchangeability between the various channels of mobility has recently become more limited, but quantitatively there has been a tremendous increase in the number of potential channels of mobility.

[10] The rank order for the 'Public Hierarchy' is $r = +0{\cdot}98$. The rank order for the 'Ego Hierarchy' is $r = +0{\cdot}99$.

The survey was carried out in 1959. The sample consisted of 450 boys, 16 to 25 years old. For details see M. Lissak, *Occupational Trends among Urban Youth in Israel*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1963.

[11] The rank order correlation is $r = +0{\cdot}88$.

[12] On the concept and some comparative examples of 'initial stages' see S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Initial Institutional Patterns of Political Modernization', *Civilisations*, Part I: Vol. XVI, No. 4 (1962), pp. 461–72; Part II: Vol. XIII, Nos. 1–2, (1963), pp. 15–27.

A CASE OF BREAKDOWN OF MODERNIZATION IN AN ISRAELI IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY[1]

Shlomo A. Deshen

INTRODUCTION

STUDIES of small communities have in the last twenty years been increasingly concerned with the processes of social change and modernization.[2] Different aspects of modernization have been described in various social settings, and lately progress has been made in the systematization of the material.[3] The converse process, however —the resistance to modernization in general, and more specifically, breakdown in the initial steps towards modernization—has so far seldom been subjected to systematic study. Professor S. N. Eisenstadt's paper on the latter subject is probably one of the first attempts to draw attention to this aspect of the problem of modernization.[4]

The following is part of a study of political life in an Israeli immigrant village. The focal point for this research was the attempt to analyse the breakdown of the political modernization that had taken place in this community. Two main types of material will be presented: (*a*) historical material for an understanding of the people in the village and of their predisposition to change; (*b*) an account of the political transformations which have occurred in the village in the last few years. The community we are concerned with is of the Israeli immigrant *moshav* type. Suffice it, for the purpose of the argument that follows, to recall briefly those features of this type of village which are of immediate relevance.[5] The *moshav* is a planned village of 60–90 families, all farming equal plots of land. Land belongs to the State and is leased to the farmer for a 49-year period. Initial essential material investment is gradually made by government authorities, who also supervise the first steps taken by the *moshav*. This supervision entails the introduction of specific agricultural specializations adapted to general market conditions and to local agro-technical limitations. Seasonal farm plans are proposed to each farmer. The individual plans, as well as allocations of land and water, are designed to strike a happy medium. While on the one hand they entail no need to employ hired labour, on

the other they allot the farmer himself a sufficient number of work-days per annum to obviate any need for him to work outside his farm. The allocation of water quotas, the nature and size of loans, and other investments by the authorities, are all linked to the farm plan. Because of the existing complex market and water conditions, farming must be of a high technical standard if it is to provide an income approximating to that of urban workers.

For both organizational and ideological reasons on the national level, the marketing of produce is planned to be communal and organized by the democratically elected *moshav* secretariat. The individual producer receives the income for his marketed produce through this body. The secretariat also acts as the channel the authorities use for their investment in the farms. The system of communal marketing serves as a mechanism of dual control of the farmer: (1) the authorities can secure the return of some of their short-term loans, and (2) the *moshav* secretariat has a source of revenue for the upkeep of municipal services.

Many *moshavim*, including the one with which we are concerned, are peopled by new immigrants from underdeveloped countries. Considerable adaptation is demanded of the new settler to enable him to adjust to the rigid frame of the *moshav*. For an immigrant group from an underdeveloped Oriental country, with the broad social pattern associated with this background, the adaptation demanded is indeed quite radical, and encompasses practically the whole accustomed way of life. For our purpose, the study of political change in such a setting, let us note those spheres of life most immediately affected: (*a*) economy, (*b*) values, and (*c*) polity.

(*a*) In the economic sphere, an occupational change has to be made in the direction of highly advanced farming coupled with physical work. (*b*) Values of the 'Protestant ethos' character are required for people to understand and accept the complex market and financial systems operating in modern Israeli farming. It is essential that the farmer be able to defer immediate satisfactions and develop long-term planning. (*c*) In the political sphere, the immigrant has to learn to play the role of a member in a community built on a democratic basis. In family life, ancient patterns by which the existence of the extended family implied the diffuse allegiance of its individual members, must perforce be modified in a situation where the democratically elected *moshav* officer has to deal equitably with other family groups. Without at least some measure of change in these directions no secretariat can function and consequently the whole financial and municipal side of the *moshav* organization collapses.

These and other relevant characteristics are to be found in varying degrees in different *moshavim*. The factors giving rise to this variety in adaptation have been studied extensively and advances have been made

towards their systematization.[6] In these studies, one of the factors most stressed is that of 'predispositions'. It has been established that the cultural predispositions of the immigrants in their communities of origin are one of the important factors affecting adaptation to the new Israeli *moshav*. This adaptation is a product of (*a*) the distance between the social role dictated for the immigrant by his specific cultural predispositions and that specifically set before him when he is absorbed within the *moshav* framework; and (*b*) the flexibility of the immigrant in overcoming the distance, this again being largely determined by his predispositions.

However, factors other than that of cultural predisposition have not been adequately studied. They include the manifold dynamic social forces operating upon the community during and after its settlement on the land. Some of these forces are: the nature of the immigration and settlement process; the specific confrontation with the absorbing society and its agents; vicissitudes of military and economic security.

The following case-study is illustrative of the relation between cultural predispositions and the adaptation of an immigrant group to the *moshav* environment, and substantiates the thesis elaborated in the work of Dr. D. Weintraub and others on these factors. Our material however also highlights the importance of one of the additional factors mentioned, namely, that of the process of immigration and settlement. The social sphere within the general *moshav* framework which was particularly investigated was the polity, i.e. the immigrants' adaptation to the normative functioning of democratic political institutions—in this instance, the village secretariat.

I shall try to show by an analysis of historical material that the ethnic background of this community was such that positive predispositions towards modernization existed. I shall then give an account of the progress of the community after settlement in the village. From this account it will be seen that the village went through two distinct periods. During the formative years of settlement there was considerable progress towards modernization. After these first years, however, the village underwent a period of steady regression. Developments during this second period characterize our village as a case of 'breakdown of modernization'. The material will make it evident that only by additional analysis of the dynamics of the process of settlement can these facts be brought within a coherent frame.

THE COMMUNITY OF MOSHAV YATZIV

Yatziv is one of the *moshavim* closely approaching the ideal type of immigrant *moshav* sketched out above. The village was established in 1955 as part of the overall settlement project of a semi-arid region. Yatziv has 63 families, of whom nearly all immigrated to Israel within

the last ten years. The majority, 53 families, come from the island of Djerba (pop. in 1946, *c.* 59,000, of whom *c.* 4,000 were Jews), off the coast of southern Tunisia, and its immediate surroundings, while a minority of ten families are from the Atlas mountains region of southern Morocco.

During the first year or two after its establishment, Yatziv progressed quite swiftly towards becoming a stable co-operative farming *moshav*. The community was led honestly and efficiently by an orderly village secretariat, functioning according to the normative financial and political pattern. Within the occupational sphere as well, there was a rapid and smooth transition from irregular work outside the village to farming the settlers' allocated private plots of land.

These developments, which are taken here as indices of modernization, mark the first period of the village's history. A satisfactory adaptation to the type of economic activity demanded by the *moshav* structure was also apparently effected. The agricultural instructors who worked with the villagers during those years report that farming techniques were, relative to other villages, well accepted. Administrative officers of the Settlement Authority reported favourably on the internal management of the village. As to the specific sphere of politics, it is noteworthy that right from the beginning democratic elections were held in an orderly fashion. The elected secretariat worked fairly for all sections of the population, which in return, it is reported, never showed any lack of confidence in its elected leaders. Thus the instructors of the first period cannot report internal friction of the kind reported in the later period. The settlers' portrayal of the first period of their village parallels the instructors' reports. They stress the fact that during the first years of settlement internal relations were smoother than later. The elected secretariat, in a way noteworthy for a new *moshav*, managed to collect its taxes and kept the village finances in relatively good order. This was the result of the secretariat's success in persuading the individual members to market their produce collectively through village channels, thus enabling dues to be deducted automatically from the members' accounts. Moreover, even those villagers who earned their income from jobs outside farming, and who therefore had no produce to market collectively, paid taxes in an orderly fashion. These settlers brought the sums due every month to the mobile Post Office Bank that visited the village. The collection of these taxes by the Post Office Bank, an impersonal institution, was a method which, I was told by the secretary, he had devised in order to soften the painful process of taxpaying. Otherwise he personally would have had to collect the moneys. This would have made both him and the taxpayer prone to bickering about rates and so on at the time of payment. The successful solution of all these financial questions, and the shrewdness in adapting a modern technique in an original manner, point to the progressive direction the

village was taking in those years. In the sphere of work also, Yatziv enjoyed high morale. The settlers made an effort to become farmers as soon as possible and not to depend on non-farming day labour. The instructors report that much energy and personal labour were spent on the settlers' plots in these years.

After the first years of rapid progress, the pace seems to have slackened, and by 1963 the village appeared to be actually regressing. This conclusion was arrived at from several sources. The technical instructors dealing with the villagers at work reported a waning of the original enthusiasm to become farmers and develop better farming techniques. The settlers were said to be less diligent than formerly. The instructors complained of a reduced effort being made towards intensive and advanced farming, and economically of stagnation in the community. The administration, on the other hand, complained of considerable internal bickering among the settlers, and of regular administrative functions running less smoothly than formerly. Squabbles over land demarcation now arose and came before the administrators, whereas formerly such problems either had not arisen or had been dealt with internally. Various grievances that individuals bore towards the elected secretariat were brought into the open with considerable bitterness. Indeed, in subsequent field-work a number of the settlers whom I interviewed made a point of stressing that I should publish their accounts in the newspapers. They were genuinely disappointed when informed of the limitations imposed on me by the ethics of social research. All sections of the population in the course of field-work were equally vocal in stressing how internal relations had deteriorated after the first period of settlement. The most striking index of internal change occurred in the summer of 1963, when the incumbent village secretariat was ousted by a vote of no-confidence in the middle of its year of tenure. This kind of development is quite usual in poorly integrated *moshavim*, but in Yatziv it had never happened before. In the light of the other negative characteristics of the community, some of which have already been mentioned, this latest development was felt by the administrators to be a climax. This then became the starting point for the present study of the community. It was rooted in an administrative problem: a new group came to village leadership in a disorderly fashion during a period of steady regression.

The group that now came to the fore had been characterized in the past by a proneness to irresponsibility towards the community, particularly concerning commitments to co-operative marketing. According to the villagers, the political 'upheaval' was due to the fact that the Djerban settlers in Yatziv were divided into two groups. One group was composed of immigrants from Hara Kebira (pop. in 1946, *c.* 2,500), a Jewish town on the island of Djerba, the other one of immigrants from Hara Sghira (pop. in 1946, *c.* 1,500), a smaller neighbouring

Jewish town on the island. Cleavage along these lines now rose to the surface.

This political cleavage, based on traditional community origin abroad, was new in Yatziv. The developments that gave rise to it had not been evident during the formative years of the *moshav*. It would seem that these had been lying dormant beneath an apparently peaceful social situation, and had now surfaced.

This then is the background to the investigation of this village and its people. The research was restricted so as to afford an adequate commentary on the specific political problem pin-pointed here: the appearance of an internal political cleavage after an initial period of marked unity and stability. This development seems all the more interesting in that apparently we have here the re-emergence of a traditional pattern of socio-political allegiance, after an initial pattern of modern inter-communal co-operation with the concurrent type of modern normative *moshav* politics.

Research was deliberately restricted to what seemed of direct relevance to the problem in hand. This accounts for the omission of any discussion dealing with other phases of life in Yatziv, particularly the economic sphere. In the ensuing argument even the few remarks on the economy will indicate that an analysis of economic developments in the village would explain in greater depth what has been happening in Yatziv politics. Indeed the evidence seems to indicate that a regression in the economic sphere also occurred; the breakdown of modernization was not restricted to political life. This study, however, is based on the premise that although the factors of economic change and change in other spheres are indispensable for a complete understanding of the political problem, nevertheless they are not as central to it as changes within the political field itself. Though the ensuing argument cannot be a complete elucidation of political problems in the village, it certainly can, if it is adequately developed, present the most central and relevant factors.

The following historical account[7] is related to the premise that social change in a traditional society can best be understood with an eye kept on predispositions towards change inherent in that society prior to the onset of radical change.[8] This is difficult in the study of pre-literate societies because of unreliable historical material. However, in cases such as ours, where the community is heir to an elaborate written culture, such an approach is feasible. If indeed sound methods of historical research are judiciously applied, the insight gained may well provide additional perspective to the material collected by more orthodox anthropological tools.

AN ISRAELI IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY

THE DJERBAN BACKGROUND

Jewish settlement on Djerba probably dates back to Roman times. Culturally Djerban Jewry is distinct from that of the two nearest communities of note, namely those of Tunis to the North and Tripoli to the East. Djerban Jews evolved variants of traditions and customs peculiar to their communities. The Great Synagogue of Djerba, an isolated building outside Hara Sghira, was venerated as an ancient holy place. The leading families on the island claimed to trace their ancestry back hundreds, in some cases, thousands of years. In one case 37 generations are separately named. The two Jewish communities of the island lived in Hara Kebira and Hara Sghira, two towns inhabited exclusively by Jews. The communities evolved parallel social and municipal institutions, the most important of which were municipal committees, educational committees, and law courts. These, and other characteristics, led to feelings of local patriotism and allegiance to the community.

In time Djerban Jews founded new communities on the southern Tunisian mainland. These maintained family and religious ties with their communities of origin. Because of the religious prestige of Djerba, members of the new communities were wont to refer to themselves as Djerbans and remembered for many generations the exact origin of their families on the island. The Djerban orbit includes the following communities: Ben Gardane, Zarzis, Médenine, Foum-Tatahouine, and a few marginal smaller communities. Of these all but Tatahouine stem from, and are satellites of, Hara Kebira; Tatahouine orients itself towards Hara Sghira.

An ancient rivalry which existed between the two main communities on the island has not been forgotten to this day, even among the newly founded branches on the mainland. The rivalry stemmed from the fact that, while on the one hand Hara Sghira was originally regarded as the holier community, the venerated Great Synagogue being nearer to its confines, and its population composed largely of *Kohanim* (the ancient priestly caste), on the other hand Hara Kebira was a larger community, and developed more elaborate communal institutions, particularly in the fields of education and law. Being nearer the market town of Houmt Souk, Hara Kebira benefited from trading and manufacturing opportunities offered by the larger, relatively modernized chief town of the island. Hara Sghira had a less differentiated economy, and was less prosperous than its rival.

The traditional study of religious law and literature was highly esteemed in Djerba. Judaism here was in nature akin to traditional European Judaism, and was by and large based on a complex written scholastic tradition. This is in contradistinction to the cultural and religious tradition of most Jewish groups in the Orient whose tradition

is based on direct oral transmission from generation to generation.[9] Although even the most intellectualized European Jewish group has some oral tradition, and the most unsophisticated Oriental group has some written one, many Oriental Jewish groups weight one side of the scales, whereas European Jewry generally weights the other. In this respect Djerba is exceptional and tends towards the pattern most common in Europe. For reasons yet to be ascertained, the zeal for study, and consequently the existence of spontaneous study groups, predominated more in Hara Kebira than in Hara Sghira. The educational committee of the former had more social and financial power than its equivalent in Hara Sghira. Educational activities in Hara Kebira had many ramifications. These included payment of tuition fees for the poor, provision of books, maintenance of the families of professional scholars who devoted most of their time to study, and helping scholars to find suitable positions. It would seem that upon completion of their studies people in Hara Kebira were higher in average intellectual level than those in the neighbouring community. The Hara Kebira community sought to give political expression to this cultural superiority by endeavouring to extend the authority of its institutions over those of Hara Sghira. The extension of the jurisdiction of the Hara Kebira law courts was an issue of particularly bitter contention. Hara Sghira remained on guard for many generations against advances from its larger, more prestigeful neighbour, though the chief rabbis of Tunis intervened on Hara Sghira's behalf.

These facts have implications for the understanding of the present-day vicissitudes of Djerban Jewry. In spite of internal differences between the two communities,[10] the overall predominance of learning and adherence to a written tradition are important factors conducive to smooth modernization, and specifically to relatively easy adaptation to modern *moshav* life in Israel. The organization of life around formalized codes and institutions assures relative continuity when the community is suddenly catapulted into the twentieth-century world in Israel, with its increasing accentuation on formalization of roles and situations. On the other hand, a cultural background centred on a relatively undifferentiated and simple oral tradition, which everyone can grasp intimately and directly, is much further removed from modern life. Here the basic values which move modern techniques in the economy and in modern political institutions are much harder to accept. In the case of Djerban Jewry there exists, then, a basic cultural background which is more amenable to the process of stable continuous modernization than in many other Oriental Jewish communities.

This analysis becomes all the more pertinent when we consider that one of the crucial ramifications of the cultural background is the sphere of family life. Thus where an oral, relatively undifferentiated, culture exists, it very often tends to be carried forward by family elders or by

hereditary ritual functionaries. The position of these family elders, and of the extended family in general, is accentuated in various other social spheres, including that of political activity. On the other hand, in a setting such as Djerba with its relatively differentiated religious and educational values, we find various social institutions relatively detached from familial influence. This accounts, at least in part, for the quite restricted place of the extended family in political life, when compared with the situation in other Israeli Oriental communities.[11] This is an important factor in the development of modern *moshav* politics with all that it entails.

The following analysis of various aspects of communal life in Djerba is intended to give substance to the general thesis that the Djerban cultural background leads to some compatibility with modern life.

Both in population and in the economic sphere, life was relatively undifferentiated; except for very minor groups which had migrated internally or which had come in the past from Tripolitania, the population was indigenous. A few individuals had their origins in southern Algeria. The main occupations were processing the products of sheep-raising (in Hara Sghira), and local trade and various handicrafts (in Hara Kebira).

However, there was an appreciable degree of social differentiation in matters involving communal organization. The two communities were each led by local committees, whose internal power structure has yet to be established. The general Community Committee was clearly differentiated from the Educational Committee on the one hand and from the Law Court on the other. Both the tenure of these offices and their sources of income were separate. Judges were paid a fixed salary by the Community Committee. Further, the judges were also regarded as rabbis in chief, as distinct from rabbis of synagogues and localities who made a living from the tuition fees of the children they taught in their synagogues. Ritual slaughtering was a third clearly separate role. The Educational Committee, like the general Community Committee, consisted mainly of lay leaders.

A network of other, lesser committees apparently webbed the Djerban communities. By their mere existence they gave scope for popular political and social participation. These various committees were active mainly in the spheres of religion and welfare. Usually each district and its synagogue provided a local nucleus for every one of these committees; at this lowest level, they functioned mainly to raise funds for their respective purposes at the community level. For example, the cells of the 'Committee for Helping the Sick' in the various synagogues formed the public base of the overall 'Communal Committee for Helping the Sick'. It seems that social activity within the limited spheres of religion, education, and welfare was quite lively and stimulated many people to work for the public benefit. The extent of differentiation

within this sphere is emphasized by the fact that tension between various committees resulting from conflicting interests did occasionally occur. This was particularly the case with the two most powerful ones, the Community Committee and the Educational Committee.

Though basic allegiance to society was channelled through membership in local ecological groups whose centres were the synagogues, strong elements of allegiance to the community as a whole did exist. The community, as represented by its organs, the judges, and various committees, contrived situations to emphasize its collective values. Thus both communities frowned on the existence of numerous synagogues, and attempted to unite their members in one place of worship. The details of these attempts and their social implications do not fall within the framework of this paper. Suffice it to say that they succeeded, by and large, for a few days in the year (the High Holy Days) when most of the smaller synagogues were closed. Perhaps the most striking endeavour, in this regard, was as follows. Revenue in traditional synagogues was generally derived from vows during prayers. Yet on those occasions when the populace congregated in the larger synagogues, the proceeds from these vows went, exceptionally and symbolically, to the Community Committee chest. The income of the latter on all other occasions was derived from regular direct and indirect taxation. Such an arrangement can be effected only in a society where particularistic local and family allegiances are crossed by overall allegiance to the community as a whole.

We see in the setting outlined here the overt expression of a social situation in which predispositions towards stable transformation to modern life certainly exist. For one of the facets of modern living, especially in a country of immigration like Israel, is its considerable degree of individualization and heterogeneity. Various traditional primary associations are weakened, while there is an accentuation of modern forms of association, such as various specialist groups and, most relevant to our village study, the democratic, individuated, and heterogeneous civic unit, i.e. the *moshav*, the town.

My present account of the social background of Djerban Jewry is focused on those aspects of society which are intrinsically relevant to the study of that society's predisposition to change. The preceding schematic description, as well as the following details, substantiate the thesis that positive predispositions to the modern world were inherent in the traditional pattern. Therefore with the onset of radical change, immigration and settlement in Israel, the settlers could find roots within the ancient accustomed pattern for the new roles they were called upon to play.

Certain local enactments are indicative of the extent of differentiation which existed, albeit only within the religious sphere. Among Jews the consumption of wine is regulated by various conditions concerning

its ritual purity. According to local Djerban Jewish law, ritually pure wine brought from the Tunisian mainland was recognized as such only if someone had accompanied the consignment; this was in order to obviate any doubt about the casks having been exchanged en route. Evidence was acceptable only from someone other than the owner of the consignment. The latter regulation is typical not of a society orientated solely to particularistic values, but of one where the degree of autonomy of various institutional spheres is considerable.

The available facts indicate that whatever degree of differentiation of institutions and formalization of roles and situations had been attained in Djerba, the trend was steadily increasing. These communities did not merely manifest an ancient pattern in which a degree of formalization always existed. On the contrary, the trend to formalization within them seems to have been an ever-growing one. This is important when considered as a condition for 'take-off' into modernization. A pattern of steadily increasing formalization is most desirable for ensuring a process of gradual, unclimactic modernization which itself is, basically, also a process of increasing social differentiation.

The process of increasing formalization can be traced historically, in several spheres, for several years preceding the large-scale emigration from Djerba to Israel which began in 1948.

(1) An important source of income for the community budget was the tax on meat. The tax that the consumer paid consisted of 25 per cent of the value of each purchase. Until 1922 this tax was assessed for every purchase, apparently by the retailer. After 1922 an official assessor was engaged. Here, as in the case of local customs regulating wine import, there is the introduction of an element of formalization at the expense of the particularistic personal element.

(2) In 1940 the benevolent burial society drew up its constitution, and the rights of members were clearly defined in it. The society was divided into two shifts, one functioning during the day, the other at night. In the past, shifts had not been differentiated in this manner.

(3) Around this period (1940) it became established that teachers tutoring in advanced rabbinics were to receive remuneration from their pupils. This issue, as well as that of rabbis receiving salaries for their posts, has been an ancient problem in rabbinical ethics.[12] Until the Middle Ages it was usually considered unethical to accept payment. Only from the late Middle Ages onwards, and in situations of considerable differentiation, has this custom been relaxed. Nevertheless, traces of it remain to this very day in the most conservative branches of Judaism. In Djerba the problem was alive even in our time. On this island of isolated traditionalism, the final adoption of the practice, which had been evolving in Judaism elsewhere for many centuries, is a further indication of the increasing formalization of social institutions.

(4) The practice of judges receiving a fixed salary seems, as far as can

be discerned from the analysis of some Djerban rabbinical literature, to be also relatively new.

(5) Some decades ago a new specialized rabbinical post was established. The position entailed dealing with all ritual questions concerning family purity laws. To date, at least three rabbis have held this position consecutively. Such specialization in internal halachic fields is not usual in the traditional rabbinate, and its emergence signifies increasing differentiation within the religious sphere and greater formalization in general.

During recent decades secularization gained a foothold in Djerba. This secularization accompanied the general process of modernization developing in Tunisia after 1881, when it was occupied and came under growing French political and cultural influence. The problems of secularization found their greatest expression in Djerba in various attempts to introduce modern education. In Hara Kebira, the larger, more learned, and generally more developed community, these attempts were abortive, and no secular schooling whatever was introduced. In Hara Sghira, a small institution teaching the rudiments of modern education was founded. Few children attended, and apparently it had little influence.

On the other hand, the Zionist movement, a second force of modernization, flourished considerably during recent years. Djerban Zionists established a training farm on the island which attracted about 30–40 young men. Even more influential were activities to spread spoken Hebrew. Classes were formed in both island communities, as well as in all mainland branch communities. Significantly, these classes, generally connected with synagogue activities, formed the means whereby the halo of tradition crowned Zionist activities in general. Leading rabbis lent their names to some Zionist activities. Some were themselves active, and one rabbi was even a delegate to one of the Zionist Congresses in Jerusalem.

That leading rabbis gave their explicit approval to Zionist activities is typical of the potential for modernization latent in this community. It is noteworthy that an element of modernization such as Zionism, even though its secular implications were known in Djerba, was accepted. On the other hand, secular education was seen as a serious threat to the traditional way of life, and therefore was accepted most cautiously, if at all. The setting was not a reactionary one, in which innovations are rejected per se; rather it was one where the novel was accepted, but only if it was deemed not to endanger the old and could be accorded traditional legitimization. Zionism, the element of modernization openly accepted, was carried not by deviants, or even mere marginal people, but rather by leading traditional personalities. A situation thus emerged in which the community as a whole, without serious internal cleavage, moved a step into the modern world.

THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT IN YATZIV

The village was originally planned as a homogeneous[13] community of immigrants from Djerba. Because of unforeseen circumstances, resulting from internal difficulties in a neighbouring Moroccan immigrants' village,[14] an extended family[15] of fourteen units had to be transferred to Yatziv. The Moroccan group also had been given to understand that they would be settled in a village inhabited exclusively by immigrants from Morocco. When they came to settle in Yatziv, their expectations were not fulfilled. Under pressure of immigration and settlement, the authorities could not execute their plan for a homogeneous village population.

The first group of immigrants from Djerba was brought to the village on the same day as that from Morocco. The former, comprising about thirty families, had been in a transit-camp (*ma'abara*) in northern Israel for about six months before its final settlement in Yatziv. It was with this group, referred to here as the 'Northern Group', that the various settlement authorities had been in contact during the process of populating the new village. The leaders of the group had visited Yatziv while these discussions were taking place, and in general were given to understand that upon settlement they would be independent leaders of a homogeneous Djerban community. As in the case of the Moroccan group, their hopes were bound to be modified if not frustrated.

The Northern Group was composed of immigrants from various communities in and around Djerba, as well as from towns in central and northern Tunisia. About half the group came from Hara Sghira and Tatahouine, and one-third from Hara Kebira and the surrounding communities; the rest came from towns. As far as can be reconstructed today, the history of the group began in the transit-camp, where the various smaller groups had arrived individually as part of mass immigration to Israel. In the transit-camp these immigrants from Tunisia came for the first time into contact with Jews from other countries. Leaders of the Northern Group today report that the initial confrontation with other immigrant groups, especially with immigrants from Morocco, was an unhappy one. Mutual suspicion arose, which hardened because of competition for the limited work available. Competition for work between individuals of varying ethnic groups was magnified into strife between their respective ethnic groups. Whatever the details of the situation as it then existed, the Northern Group people today report that the rivalry with Moroccans and other alien groups caused some of the Tunisian immigrants to draw together and crystallize into one group. The function of this new body was to represent the interests of its members for work and other needs vis-à-vis the management of the transit-camp.

The present state of my material does not allow a more detailed

description of the circumstances which caused this interesting association to crystallize. Nor do I have sufficiently reliable details as to the more specific functions of the group. However, the available information is significant enough, and its importance for an understanding of later developments in Yatziv is stressed here.

The organization in the transit-camp originally dealt with the needs of its members for work. Its leadership came to voice the interests of its members and to be involved in concrete problems. Today we may assert that the emergence of this type of self-organization later proved to be of great benefit to the development of effective local government in the *moshav*. While they were in the transit-camp, the settlement authorities approached the Tunisian group to settle in a *moshav*. Rudiments of *moshav* life were then imparted to the members of the group in anticipation of their eventual settlement on the land. The group's leadership came to refer to itself as the 'secretariat' (*va'ad*), according to the pattern of the *moshav* institution. Initial tendencies towards autonomy and independent organizations were thus strengthened by the external influence of the settlement authorities. It is also worth noting that the introduction of the term *va'ad* struck a familiar note with the settlers, since the ancient community committees in Djerba had been known by a compound French-Hebrew term, *va'ad ha'comité*.

Thus, we have here at least three forces converging to give rise to the group's self-assertion: (1) the social situation of the heterogeneous transit-camp; (2) the influence of the settlement authorities, and (3) the ancient communal tradition of Djerba.

The nucleus of the Northern Group was an extended family, comprising several individual families from Hara Sghira. This family, though historically stemming from Hara Kebira, had for many decades been prominent in Hara Sghira communal affairs. As well as being very wealthy it had intermarried with an eminent Hara Kebira rabbinical family. Some of its members had studied there. While still in the transit-camp the group crystallized about this family (designated here as 'the important family'). The head of the secretariat was a young man in his early twenties who belonged to this family, had some political experience in his home town, and had been a member of the Community Committee there. His personality and youth made him pliable and responsive to changing situations, whereas because of his background he enjoyed a store of traditional legitimization. Despite the pre-eminence of 'the important family', the secretariat also brought to the fore people who had no tradition of leadership and who did not originate from Hara Sghira. The emerging group thus benefited from two qualities: (*a*) its leadership had the prestige of tradition; (*b*) the organization of the group and its secretariat were not completely traditional in nature. The exigencies of the transit-camp situation were such as to form an all-inclusive Tunisian group, cutting across tradi-

tional lines of community cleavage. Because of their connexions with Hara Kebira, 'the important family', albeit the most traditional element within the Northern Group, had some orientation towards the overall Djerban setting. Moreover, only half the group originated from Hara Sghira. Of the rest, some even came from relatively modernized urban communities in other regions of Tunisia.

The composition of the group's secretariat reflected this heterogeneity. The basic traditional element of communal exclusiveness was therefore comparatively weak. The demographic composition of the group and the type of leadership brought to the fore were relatively amenable to the growth of modern orientations and the type of social organization needed in a modern *moshav*.

Settling in Yatziv, the Djerban group found the Moroccan settlers who had preceded them by a few hours. The initial mutual frustration at being settled in a mixed village caused ill-feeling, which was further accentuated by the recent experience of the Northern Group. The latter had been unfavourably impressed by their confrontation with Moroccan immigrants in the transit-camp. During the first months of settlement in Yatziv mutual relations were tense, and occasionally led to an exchange of blows. However, the situation of outright ethnic strife did not last long. The basic reason for this was the obvious fact that the Moroccan group was essentially an insignificant minority. This, together with the efforts of the settlement authorities, successfully prevented the minority from developing aspirations disproportionate to the size of its group. The Moroccan group realized that the prospects for gaining dominance in the village secretariat were negligible, and any original aspirations in this direction were perforce stifled. The Djerbans on the other hand could afford to be generous towards the minority, once they realized that the latter presented no effective threat to their actual power. The Djerban group magnanimously compromised by assuring a seat in the village secretariat to the Moroccan group. This seat was secured irrespective of the actual numbers of votes cast in general village elections for the Moroccan representative. Thus the question of political representation of the ethnic minority was excluded from the actual political process. The political mechanism whereby representation of the minority is excepted from regular political struggle attests to the flexibility of the Djerban group. In addition to these considerations, and because of the specific situation now existing in the new settlement, the Djerbans' internal heterogeneity acted as a positive factor in allowing the acceptance of the Moroccans in the emerging Yatziv community. As a consequence of their own internal heterogeneity, the Djerbans were able to accommodate a new element of heterogeneity with relative ease. After an initial period of inter-ethnic difficulties, relations between the Moroccans and the Djerban group became stabilized and have remained satisfactory.

Today the only readily observable trace of the former conflict between the two groups can be discerned in the peculiar pattern of personal relations which the two respective leaders maintain between them. The two men are on friendly terms, but their relationship is punctuated by mutual good-natured teasing; one leader pokes fun at the other, and mild practical jokes are played even in public. This is in contrast to the pattern of sober reticence which is usual between individuals in public. The overt joking between the two leaders seems to cover very well the still unresolved tension. The general pattern reminds us of the more formalized joking relationships of primitive societies. The extension of the classical analysis of joking relationship to our specific situation and to analogous situations in modern society in general would be most illuminating, but the problem lies beyond the scope of this paper.

The vicissitudes in the relations between the first groups of settlers in Yatziv fall well within a frame which classifies them as stable developments towards political modernization. In effect, ancient divisions had for all practical purposes been overcome, and both groups participated in the management of communal affairs. Ethnic division, a factor irrelevant to the political process of a normative *moshav* secretariat that has basically to deal with economic affairs, was relegated to the background. Later this trend became even more pronounced as the Moroccan delegate received the votes of Djerban settlers on his own merit, the voters being attracted by his personality and judging the man on his record of public activity.

In time, however, changes occurred in the social composition of the village, and these bring us to Yatziv's second phase—the breakdown of its initial advances towards political modernization. Individuals from various groups left the *moshav*, and new settlers were introduced by the settlement authorities, both in groups and as individuals. The largest new group, numbering eleven families (henceforth called 'the Southern Group'), all loosely related, came from Hara Kebira. They constituted the largest single group absorbed in Yatziv after its foundation. All other new immigrants came either in much smaller groups or as individual families.

The new settlers, particularly the Southern Group, tended to alter the political situation in the village. The Southern Group was devoid of the practical experience of organization in a modern setting, which entails at least some communal heterogeneity. The factors uniting these eleven families were purely traditional, i.e. they (1) all came from Hara Kebira, and (2) were all bound by loose family ties.[16] Only a short period had elapsed between this group's emigration from Djerba and their settlement in Yatziv. During that time they had no occasion to modify seriously their traditional pattern of life and to develop any kind of modern leadership such as the Northern Group had evolved.

The Southern Group's communal experience from the time they left their homes in Djerba until they were resettled in Yatziv was of a nature completely different from that of the Northern Group. The latter had evolved a type of leadership which combined the traditional element with some definite universalistic orientation. As it had roots in the past, the latter element further developed during the transit-camp period. 'The important family', which led the Northern Group, though it had been prominent in Hara Sghira affairs, was intermarried with a leading Hara Kebira rabbinical family. 'The important family' had itself originated from Hara Kebira in the past, and the members of the present generation were somewhat oriented to that community. However, no such elements tending to develop universalistic attitudes compatible with communal heterogeneity operated in the Southern Group.

The chance process of immigration and absorption in Yatziv was such that most immigrants after the first wave of settlement had originated from Hara Kebira and its environs. Quite naturally these gravitated towards other immigrants from their own community whom they found in the village. Thus a new body arose in Yatziv, one whose members originated in Hara Kebira, and who were unified by the factor of common origin. This group, centred around the relatively more particularistically-oriented and traditional Southern Group, developed and further accentuated these traditional characteristics.

Thus, within a few years of the establishment of the village, the social framework had considerably altered, mainly as a result of the process of absorption. Immigrants from Hara Kebira attained a majority of the *moshav* membership, and with them the more traditional and communally restricted group grew in importance. In time these attracted to their ranks members from the Northern Group who originated from Hara Kebira, and who found themselves torn between two opposing social circles in which they participated. Other Hara Kebira people, formerly active in the Northern Group, now became marginal and retired from public activity. The demography of the settlement process described so far is summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1. *Composition of Transit-camp Groups according to Communities of Origin*[17]

Community / *Transit-camp*	*Total*		*Hara Sghira and Tatahouine*		*Hara Kebira and Affiliated Communities*		*Towns*	
	%		%		%		%	
North	100·0	24	54·3	13	29·1	7	16·6	4
South	100·0	11	—	—	100·0	11	—	—
Miscellaneous Places	99·9	18	27·7	5	61·1	11	11·1	2

From this table it will be seen that only half the Northern Group came from Hara Sghira, and the later influx to the village added but few individuals to their number. Those settlers who originated in Hara Sghira had by and large participated in the heterogeneous organization that had been active in the Northern transit-camp before settlement in Yatziv. Consequently they tended not to think of themselves so much as members of a Hara Sghira group, but to view themselves within a general frame of reference built on overall *moshav* interests cutting across ancient communal lines. On the other hand, the relatively new Hara Kebira settlers viewed themselves entirely within a frame of reference taken from the traditional Djerban context.

These factors have clear implications for internal village politics, the existence of which I note here only in passing, but shall return to later.

The emergence of a Hara Kebira group per se had repercussions on the Northern Group. It began to disintegrate into its traditional community components. Some of its Hara Kebira members either joined the Southern Group or became marginal in village affairs. The Northern Group thus became more homogeneous, with a predominance of Hara Sghira people. The outcome of these developments was to revitalize and accentuate latent particularistic communal feeling also among those settlers originating from Hara Sghira. The fact that the Hara Kebira group envisaged the whole social structure of the village as one in which the communal diversity of Yatziv was a central factor, was in itself also a cause for this factor's re-emergence to the surface. The Hara Sghira settlers now also tend, although in a less pronounced manner than the Hara Kebira group, to identify themselves more as emigrants from their Djerban community than as members of the all-encompassing *moshav*. The increasing stress on the traditional communal factor in internal politics in Yatziv may thus be seen as paralleling the numerical increase of the Hara Kebira element in the village.

This analysis of the demography of the settlement process in Yatziv is corroborated by an analysis of the kinship structure of the village. The Djerban settlers in Yatziv are composed of two extended family groups,[18] a number of family groups consisting of two or three nuclear families, and a few isolated nuclear families. One of the extended families, 'the important family', has already been mentioned; it originated in Hara Sghira and formed the nucleus around which the Northern Group evolved its relatively modern characteristics. The second extended family is 'the large family', the nucleus of the Southern Group. In this family, originating in Hara Kebira, there are also several members of the Northern Group, as well as some of those who came to Yatziv in smaller groups. The distribution of kinship groups according to transit-camp groups is presented in Table 2.

Table 2 indicates that, from the aspect of component family groups,

TABLE 2. *Composition of Transit-camp Groups according to Families*[17]

Family / *Transit-camp*	*Total*		*'Important Family'*		*'Large Family'*		*Small and Isolated Families*	
	%		%		%		%	
North	100·0	24	25·0	6	8·3	2	66·7	16
South	99·9	11	—	—	54·5	6	45·4	5
Miscellaneous Places	100·2	18	22·2	4	28·0	5	50·0	9

the Northern Group is the more heterogeneous. 'The important family' contributes but a quarter of the members of the group, whereas in the Southern Group, 'the large family' accounts for more than half the members. Furthermore, the Southern Group is more homogeneous not only because of the size of its prominent family, but also because, as a result of this numerical advantage, other factions within the group tend to be overshadowed. In the village, the Southern Group tends to appear not only as a purely Hara Kebira communal group but also somewhat as a 'large family' kinship group.

This double motif, the communal and the familial, predominant in the Southern Group, served to unite various people coming from Hara Kebira and/or of 'the large family' around the nucleus of 'the large family' in the Southern Group. I note again the influence this has had on the Northern Group. Thus some years after the foundation of Yatziv, a traditional communal-family group emerged in a setting where these factors had originally not been so pronounced. The society of Yatziv swung back towards a traditional pattern after the rudiments of a modern pattern had been evolved.

THE POLITICAL SPHERE

The political development of Yatziv, as we see it here, is largely a function of the demographic process of settlement previously analysed. The following account of political events in the community substantiates that argument.

From the outset until 1963 Yatziv benefited from a stable and responsible secretariat. This secretariat was generally composed of representatives from both the Northern Group and the Moroccan group. Originally the representative of the latter gained his seat as a result of the arrangement whereby the permanent representation of the Moroccan group on the secretariat was agreed. This matter was thus removed from the context of the regular political process. However, in recent years the leader of the Moroccans, mainly as a result of his personality, gained sufficient votes to secure him a seat on the secretariat in his own right. Thus during the short course of six or seven

years, the ethnic problem in Yatziv, of Djerban versus Moroccan immigrants, has been solved, and the leader of the Moroccan group developed into a popular figure among all groups in the village.

Probably the chief reason for this favourable development lies in the demographic fact that the Moroccan group were a small minority in Yatziv. Whatever their initial aspirations to dominate in village affairs may have been, the fact of their minority became apparent to the Moroccans, and they resigned themselves to it. The political situation in which village leadership is vested in the hands of the majority was perforce accepted. However, the majority wisely compromised, and by the arrangement that assured the smaller group's participation in the organ of communal responsibility (the secretariat), it succeeded not only in not alienating the minority but in actually drawing it into the fold.

In contrast to this favourable stabilization of inter-ethnic relations in the village, internal relations within the Djerban group deteriorated steadily. The essence of internal Djerban developments lay in squabbles between the Hara Sghira and Hara Kebira factions. These squabbles became ever more pronounced, and were brought to a climax in 1963 by a change of secretariat leadership. To understand this event some aspects of the secretariat's activities need to be studied.

The Djerban leadership, composed at the outset of members from the Northern Group, strove hard to attain autonomy for the village. These aspirations were manifested in efforts to arrange *moshav* affairs independently of the various settlement authorities. In fact, they were so successful that the authorities allowed the village considerable independence.

The village leadership's aspirations for self-government found further expression in the matter of bringing new settlers to the *moshav*. This of course was related to the initial disappointment that the settlement had not been the homogeneous village the Northern Group had imagined it would be. However, the actual process of absorption as it developed was different from what they wished, as has already been described. The villagers themselves had no control over it, since it was executed solely by official national institutions. Here was ground for serious conflict, but none ripened since relations between the village and the officials were otherwise good. On the whole, one might even say that the limited conflict which did result from the absorption policy actually benefited the social development of the community.[19] It is quite probable that this limited conflict stimulated the community into asserting itself and thus prevented it from slipping into apathy. The latter phenomenon has often, though by no means exclusively, appeared in *moshavim* where the paternalism of the authorities was carried to too great lengths.[20]

The activities of the village secretariat were considerable and tended

to cover much of the field normatively ascribed to the ideal-type *moshav* secretariat. Thus orderly community meetings were held from time to time; the secretariat met regularly and the secretary was efficient. Various sub-committees were formed and their offices were regularly subject to election. Actually these sub-committees were mostly dormant, but the mere fact of their existence is remarkable for such a young and traditional Oriental village. Of those sub-committees which actually did function, special mention should be made of the 'mutual-aid committee', a quite active body that usually functions only in the more developed *moshavim.*

The secretariat also strove for activity in various functional fields. Thus, the *moshav* owned a truck and became partners in the ownership of heavy agricultural implements. The local co-operative store was managed by a Yatziv settler and not, as is often the case, by a shop-keeper from outside. Besides the secretary, the *moshav* had a member who dealt with marketing problems and a treasurer who functioned also as security officer; accounts were kept by a full-time bookkeeper in the village bureau. All these functions were remunerated.

The above positions were held by leading members of the Northern Group, who were also members of the secretariat. This fact leads us to one of the motifs of the internal political struggle. Despite the efficient management of village affairs, the leadership of Yatziv had in the eyes of the general populace become tainted with the characteristics of a clique. For example, it had become accepted that once a week the store was opened after regular hours specially to serve members of 'the important family': the latter preferred not to make their purchases at times when the store was full and catered to everybody. The *moshav* sometimes arranged receptions for important outside officials who had been attracted to the village by its reputation as an efficient co-operative community. On at least one of these occasions, the leadership decided to restrict village participation to themselves and a few of the rank and file. The other settlers took this as an affront, since traditionally festivities are open to anyone who cares to honour them with his presence. The way in which secretariat meetings were conducted was also viewed unfavourably by the rank and file. In similar affairs managed by veteran Israelis, simple refreshments, tea, and perhaps some inexpensive sweetmeats are served. This veteran Israeli practice was adopted at Yatziv meetings, but it was regarded as unseemly hauteur on the part of the village leadership.

These minor matters viewed unfavourably by the community at large no doubt stem partly from some actual remoteness of the village leadership from the community as a whole, and partly from the introduction of some innocent innovations emulating the wider absorbing society.

The fact that since the foundation of the village the secretariat had

been in the hands of a coalition composed of the veterans (the Northern Group and the Moroccans), acted to telescope these trivialities into matters of political significance. The Southern Group reinterpreted the political situation in Yatziv in traditional terms, namely rivalry between the ancient Djerban communities.

The general feeling in the village that the Northern Group tended to act as a clique furthering its own communal (Hara Sghira) and familial ('important family') interests, is strengthened by the distribution of village offices mentioned above. Actually, as has been demonstrated, this feeling is rooted in the facts of the village's social composition as it has crystallized during the course of the last years.

Another factor pertinent to the increasing political unrest in Yatziv concerns economic developments. Paradoxically, it is connected with the settlers' success in becoming farmers. During their first years in Yatziv most of the settlers, despite a very positive attitude towards agriculture, earned the greater part of their livelihood from non-farming occupations. This was mainly due to their inexperience in farming. Only in the last few years has farming gradually become the basic source of income for the community. The economics of modern agriculture generally, and particularly so in the Israeli *moshav*, involve a complexity of marketing and financial mechanisms. In order to master the situation, the farmer has to be capable of considerable long-term calculation. Furthermore, he must be able to handle with dexterity various loans and debts in which he will be involved. Inevitably the farmer finds himself in complicated positions, in which he is both debtor and creditor for longer or shorter periods of time, and concerned with a number of accounts. Such financial intricacies demand considerable adaptability on the part of the settlers who have grown up in a much simpler non-Western economy. It is not always adequately achieved. Yatziv is a case in point. Many of the farmers are quite unhappy at 'being in debt'. In fact, the economic situation of the village, as reported by the agricultural economists who deal with Yatziv, is no worse than average, if not better, and financial affairs are managed satisfactorily enough. However, both as a result of pressure arising from the villagers' misgivings, and within the frame of a general drive for efficiency, a number of village functions were restricted with the intention of lowering communal expenses. Naturally, a number of individuals who had in the past provided the services now curtailed were personally affected. Thus, the village truck was sold and its driver became unemployed. The village's partnership in the tractor of one of the settlers was rescinded. Positions were combined; e.g. the posts of treasurer and security officer. Several, though by no means all the individuals involved, belonged to the Southern Group. This new bitterness in the Southern Group precipitated the overall political development which had been quietly brewing.

The outcome of all this was the crystallization of a definite political group comprising settlers originating in Hara Kebira. These undertook a vigorous campaign in which they individually approached those settlers whose loyalties to the existing secretariat were not explicit. They were successful in drawing to their faction practically all villagers originating from Hara Kebira. A few malcontents among the Hara Sghira people were also drawn in. The latter included marginal cases such as two brothers without extended family in Yatziv, the elder being a sick, embittered man, physically unsuited for farming. One individual from Hara Kebira, also without extended family in Yatziv, who had formerly been very active in the Northern Group, now became politically sterile as a result of the new situation in which he found himself torn between conflicting loyalties. The undercover campaign successfully secured sufficient signatures to demand a special meeting of the villagers. A motion of no-confidence in the incumbent secretariat left the latter with an absolute minority. In fact only 'the important family' element within the original secretariat voted for the coalition. The role the Moroccans played is still unclear to me. Apparently they very shrewdly succeeded in disappearing before the showdown, thus evading the issue. In any case they are now as popular with both winning and losing sides as before, if not more so. A new secretariat was elected at an irregular time of the political year, under circumstances of traditional conflict.

The development had not, however, yet reached the stage where a 'political platform' based solely on the communal motif could bluntly be presented in Yatziv. Instead, the communal motif was brought forward by means of a rationalization that would make a good impression on the settlement authorities. The rationalization took the form of a contention that elected leaders should be farmers only and not derive their income from work outside the farm. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss occupational questions. Suffice it to note that two of the ousted non-farming members of the outgoing secretariat had occupations intimately concerned with agricultural matters and general *moshav* affairs—one was the store-manager, the other the treasurer. On the other hand, the new secretariat included another non-farmer who was actually elected chairman! It is obvious that the occupational issue, though much publicized, was not taken very seriously by anyone. At most, it was secondary to the more important traditional communal motifs in accounting for political differences. The 'Elect Farmers!' slogan was a rationalization useful both for internal propaganda purposes and for presenting a respectable face to an outside world that has little sympathy for such traditionalism in *moshav* political affairs.

At present, the secretariat draws support from a coalition between the Hara Kebira group and the Moroccans. The latter have practically

ignored the changes within the Djerban sector, and have now resumed their old position in village leadership. The steady rise in the number of votes that Djerban settlers give to the representative of the Moroccan group may very well be the result of internal developments within their own groups. The demoralization due to the worsening of the relations among the Djerbans drives many of those marginal in the two Djerban sub-groups towards the Moroccans. It remains to be seen whether this trend will not in the future further modify the political structure by drawing the Moroccan group back to participate in the political struggle.

CONCLUSION

The community described in this paper demonstrates a number of conflicting characteristics. The basic cultural predispositions of the community were found potentially conducive to its eventual smooth metamorphosis into a modern type of society. This potential, inherent in the Jewish community of Djerba as a whole, was brought to expression in the crystallization of the Northern Group in the transit-camp. The existence of personal factors, though not to be exaggerated, should not be ignored at this stage. The crucial factor, however, was that for a relatively long period of time, individuals who were later responsible for the formation of the Northern Group found themselves in a transit-camp where there existed a stage of ethnic heterogeneity and conflict. Though all relevant factors cannot be satisfactorily reconstructed now, this state of ethnic heterogeneity apparently was of prime importance in instigating the formation of an externally homogeneous but internally heterogeneous and hence relatively modernized Tunisian group. Some modern mechanisms of politics also began to emerge. Upon founding their own *moshav* this group further developed some typically modern characteristics in the sphere of politics and organization. In the economic sphere also, initial steps towards farming as an occupation were most promising.

Later the administration populated the village with various other groups of settlers with basically the same cultural background as the first settlers. The differentiating factor lay in the different experiences the two had had from the time they emigrated until they settled. As distinct from the case of the Northern Group, no factor capable of activating the modernizing potential had apparently acted on the latter groups during the interval.

Thus the village came to be populated by two groups in different stages of modernization, with the more traditional group constantly emphasizing traditional elements in the political structure (differing communal origins abroad and family background). The original relatively differentiated and heterogeneous composition of the village was thus further complicated by cleavage along the line of relative moderniza-

tion. The frail social structure could not absorb the shock of this additional complication and a general reversal towards a pattern of traditional politics set in.

The present situation in Yatziv is one in which considerable social differentiation exists. The mechanisms of integration, though adequate for maintaining friendly relations between the Moroccan minority and the majority group, are not as potent in regulating relations between the two sub-groups constituting the majority. The present social problems of the community can be traced to the considerable social differentiation now existing in the village and to the fact that necessary forces of integration have not yet sufficiently developed. It is in this disparity that the root of the present problems of Yatziv are to be looked for. The key to furthering the success of this basically most promising *moshav* lies in tackling the specific problems of insufficient communal integration.

The Yatziv *moshav* community studied here is usually considered a successful *moshav* by the settlement authorities. Sociologically, however, it presents a case of 'breakdown of modernization'. A realistic appraisal of the state of affairs may be of considerable practical value both to the village studied and to other agricultural settlement projects.

As for the community of Yatziv, the study affords an insight into the broader modernization potential inherent in the various groups composing the village. Any long-term planning should take into account general differences between these groups and, what is more important, specific differences between them with respect to their drive to modernization. In our case it would seem that ultimately it is the Moroccan group that will prove most favourable to modernization. Amongst the Djerbans, the Northern Group seems to be losing its initial advance and to have become more akin to the Southern Group in this respect. Thus, when it comes to promoting local leaders, the settlement authorities would do well to promote the Moroccan and Southern Group no less than the Northern Group. Since the Northern Group is steadily losing its initial drive towards modernization there is no point in maintaining the policy of promoting that group.

Two striking features emerging from our study are the dynamic pace and the surprising direction social change can take. In the few years since their immigration and settlement in the village, the pattern of political life of the people of Yatziv has gone through a full cycle. From a traditional pattern abroad a relatively modern pattern evolved. This predominated for a few years. Now a traditional pattern has again come to the fore. Furthermore, it is not unduly speculative to assume that in the future a modern pattern will again reappear. In time to come the drive for political modernization will most likely be focused on the Moroccan group, which has by and large been politically marginal and quite traditional. But internal changes within the Djerbans

are thrusting the Moroccan group to the centre of political activity. Changes in the spheres of family life and of religion,[21] outside the scope of this paper, also point to the decreasing marginality of the Moroccans, as well as to their steadily increasing alienation from religious tradition. Suffice it to point out that in the sphere of religion, secularization seems to be making inroads. As for the sphere of family life, a mixed couple, Moroccan and Djerban, were about to be married when I was working in Yatziv.

The chief cause motivating the change studied in this paper, the change from a relatively modern political orientation to a re-emergence of traditional orientation and cleavage, was the process of settlement which allowed the demographic structure of Yatziv to undergo serious modification within a few years of the foundation of the village. Had the number of immigrants brought to Yatziv from Hara Kebira not been such that they had held an absolute majority over the Hara Sghira people, this change would probably not have occurred.

Hence the importance of a proper demographic policy of settlement cannot be stressed enough. Time and again similar studies in Israel have demonstrated the crucial importance of that stage of settlement process where manpower is directed to a project of agricultural revitalization.[22] Initial mistakes and accidents at this stage tend in time to produce a chain-reaction. Eventually disturbances occur in fields remote from the original cause.[23] Inappropriate demographic policy in the introduction of groups of settlers into villages seems to be one of the important causes of the ultimate social problems and even of the outright failure of some *moshavim*. In spite of the weight of these impressions, the question of the importance of the factor of demographic policy, as well as the problem of the type of mistakes causing chain-reactions, is well worth systematic research. The specification of these generalizations may be of both great practical and theoretical interest.

The course of modernization, as illustrated by Yatziv, is not necessarily a direct one. Neither does the roundabout way of development afford a clear prognosis as to what 'political modernization' will ultimately mean here. A pattern will probably emerge akin to neither that expected by planners nor that predicted by ideologues.

NOTES

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[2] In the field of Indian sociology see particularly: M. Marriott (ed.), *Village India: Studies in the Little Community*, Chicago, 1955; M. N. Srinivas, *India's Villages*, Calcutta, 1955; F. G. Bailey, *Caste and the Economic Frontier*, Manchester,

1957; S. C. Dube, *India's Changing Villages: Human Factors in Community Development*, London, 1958; O. Lewis, *Village Life in Northern India*, Urbana, Ill., 1958. For Africa see: A. Southall (ed.), *Social Change in Modern Africa*, London, 1961; W. Watson, *Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy*, Manchester, 1958; A. W. Wolfe, *In the Ngombe Tradition: Continuity and Change in the Congo*, Evanston, Ill., 1961. For other societies see: R. W. Firth, *Social Change in Tikopia*, London, 1959; C. Geertz, *Pedlars and Princes*, Chicago, 1958; M. Nash, *Machine-Age Maya: the Industrialization of a Guatemalan Community*, American Anthropological Association, memoir 87, 1958; A. L. Epstein, 'The Economy of Modern Matupit', *Oceania*, XXXIII, 1963.

[3] Systematic analyses have appeared in: S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Growth and Diversity*, Bloomington, 1963; C. Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New Nations*, New York, 1963; E. E. Hagen, *The Theory of Social Change*, Homewood, Ill., 1962; K. Deutsch, 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', *American Political Science Review*, LV, 1961; R. Braibanti and J. J. Spengler (eds.), *Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development*, Durham, N.C., 1961; B. F. Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth*, Glencoe, Ill., 1961.

[4] S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Breakdowns of Modernization', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XIII, 1964. Many of the lines of thought below, including the concept 'breakdown of modernization', I owe to the influence of this and other works by Professor Eisenstadt.

[5] General descriptions of the *moshav* may be found in: J. Ben-David (ed.), *Agricultural Planning and Village Community in Israel*, Paris, 1964; Y. Talmon-Garber, 'Social Differentiation in Cooperative Communities', *British Journal of Sociology*, III, 1952. New immigrant *moshavim* are specifically dealt with in A. Weingrod, 'Administered Communities: Some Characteristics of New Immigrant Villages in Israel', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XI, 1962, and 'Reciprocal Change: A Case Study of a Moroccan Immigrant Village in Israel', *American Anthropologist*, LXIV, 1962; also E. Labes, *Handbook of the Moshav*, Jerusalem, 1962.

[6] See particularly, D. Weintraub, 'A Study of New Farmers in Israel', *Sociologia Ruralis*, IV, 1964; Ben-David, op. cit.; D. Weintraub, *Patterns of Social Change in New Immigrants' Smallholders' Co-operative Settlements*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1962; S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Sociological Aspects of the Economic Adaptation of Oriental Immigrants in Israel: A Case Study in the Process of Modernization', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, IV, 1956. See also: S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, Glencoe, Ill., 1954, and 'The Process of Absorption of Immigrants and Institutionalization of Immigrant Behaviour', *Human Relations*, V, 1952; D. Weintraub and M. Lissak, 'The Absorption of North African Immigrants in Agricultural Settlements in Israel', *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, III, 1961.

[7] For the general background of North African Jewry as a whole see A. Chouraqui, *Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord*, Paris, 1952. On the specific background of the Djerba community see N. Slouschz, *Travels in North Africa*, Philadelphia, 1927, and *The Kohanim of Djerba* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1924. There exists no full-scale study of the social history of this or any other Oriental Jewish group. The details of the following section have been accumulated partly from personal interviews with rabbis and other informants who left Djerba for Israel during recent years. I am most grateful to all of them for their patient and cheerful tolerance of my inquisition.

Other items were found in some of the Hebrew and Arabic literature on religious law, homiletics, and local custom written by Djerban scholars in the past and printed on the island. Most pertinent of these are: R. Moshe Khalfon Kohen, *Berit Kehuna*, 5 vols., (Hebrew), Djerba, 1941–61; R. Shlomo Houri, *Heishek Shlomo* (Hebrew and Arabic), Djerba, 1942; R. Massiad Maddar, *Sha'arei Tahara* (Hebrew), Djerba, 1963. Mr. Ephraim Haddad of Kyriat Gat, among others, drew my attention to many other important sources. For accounts of some aspects of the modernization and secularization of immigrants from Djerba in Israel see S. A. Deshen, 'Stability and Change in a Village of Immigrants from Djerba' in *Studies in Rural Sociology in Israel* (mimeo., Hebrew), Hebrew University Faculty of Agriculture, Jerusalem, 1964, and S. A. Deshen and D. Jaeger, *Modern Leadership in a Traditional Moshav*, Kyriat Gat: Jewish Agency Settlement

Dept., 1964 (mimeo., Hebrew). For an insight into the dynamics of traditional European Jewry see J. Katz, *Tradition and Crisis*, Glencoe, Ill., 1961, which is relevant by analogy to a setting such as that of Djerba. See also J. Katz, 'Traditional Society and Modern Society' (in Hebrew with English summary), *Megamot*, X, 1960, where some points of the analogy are elaborated.

[8] On the methodological approach to historical material adopted here see J. Katz, 'The Concept of Social History and its Possible Application in Jewish Historical Research', *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, III, 1956, pp. 292–312. See particularly Weintraub, 'A Study of New Farmers in Israel', op. cit.

[9] See general histories of Jewry, such as S. W. Baron, *Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 8 vols., New York, 1952–60; and studies of individual Jewish communities, e.g. D. Feitelson, 'Aspects of the Social Life of Kurdish Jews', *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, I, 1959; D. Willner and M. Kohls, 'Jews in the High Atlas Mountains: A Partial Reconstruction', *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, IV, 1962; also Katz, 1960, op. cit.

[10] See Deshen and Jaeger, op. cit.

[11] An exception to this thesis seems to be the Yemenite Jewish community. For a discussion of this problem see Weintraub, 'A Study of New Farmers in Israel', op. cit., pp. 33–5.

[12] See S. Schwarzfuchs, *Etudes sur l'origine et le développement du rabbinat au Moyen Age*, Paris, 1957; S. Assaf, *Be'aholei Ya'akov* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1943, pp. 27–65; J. Katz, *Tradition and Crisis*, op. cit., ch. 17.

[13] 'Homogeneous', 'heterogeneous', 'ethnic', and similar terms are used rather loosely. The situation here is not one of groups of varying nationality, culture, descent, etc. in the context of which these terms are usually employed. All groups mentioned here are Jewish immigrants from North Africa. Nevertheless the internal differences and their dynamic ramifications are considerable. For lack of terms specific to our situation, the ones above are freely used; analytically, the two situations, ours and the more usual one, are identical. See also P. Cohen, 'Ethnic Hostility in Israel', *New Society*, 28 February 1963.

[14] This community has been described. See M. Golani, *Changes in the Cultural Pattern of the Moshav Otzem People* (mimeo, Hebrew), Kyriat Gat: Jewish Agency Settlement Department, 1959; M. Kohls, 'Culture Patterns and Adjustment Processes of Moroccan Immigrants from Rural Areas' (in Hebrew), *Megamot*, VII, 1956. For descriptions of the cultural background of the people of this community based on fieldwork carried out in Otzem see Willner and Kohls, op. cit. For some general impressions see R. Guber, *The Signal Fires of Lachish*, Jerusalem, 1964, pp. 178–185. For some similar accounts of Yatziv see Y. Morris, *Masters of the Desert*, New York, 1963, pp. 166–83; R. Gruber, *Israel Today*, New York, 1963, pp. 137–60.

[15] See note 18 below.

[16] See note 18 below.

[17] Tables 1 and 2 do not include the Moroccan group, which now numbers 10 families. This group, after having been assured fixed representation in the *moshav* institutions, is no longer a dynamic factor in internal village politics.

[18] As the term is used here, the 'extended family' is defined to include all individuals tied by any kind of family relationship. This definition is wider than usual (cf. *Notes and Queries on Anthropology*, 6th ed., London, 1951, p. 72). Provisionally, however, it may be satisfactory as a working definition, since there exists no full study of the kinship structure of any Oriental Jewish community to provide a more refined definition. The wide application of the term has some grounds in casual field impressions: (*a*) marriage ties between different families turn out upon scrutiny to be often reinforced by prior remote blood relationship; (*b*) Djerban Jews, especially, have a widespread knowledge of descent for at least four or five generations back.

[19] For an elaboration of this thesis see S. A. Deshen, 'Administrative Pressure and Modernization: An Israeli Case' (forthcoming).

[20] Apathy is here seen as one form of social regression appearing in situations of climactic modernization, as indeed the whole situation of the transmutation of a society from a non-Western to a Western pattern may often be said to be. This type of social regression has been studied in various settings, especially among North American Indians. See, for instance, E. H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, New York, 1950, pp. 98–140. For the Israeli *moshav* scene see Weintraub, op. cit. and Eisenstadt, op. cit.;

also M. Minkovich, *Nevatim: A Village in Crisis* (mimeo., Hebrew), Jewish Agency Settlement Dept., Beersheba, 1963.

[21] For some of these details see S. A. Deshen, 'Absorption and Social Struggle in a New Moshav', *Bi'tefutzot Ha'golah* (Hebrew), Winter, 1964, pp. 108–17.

[22] Most of these studies were carried out by the rural sociologists of the Settlement Dept., and by the Dept. of Sociology of the Hebrew University. For the effects of various demographic policies when populating *moshavim* see Eisenstadt, *Absorption of Immigrants*, op. cit.; Weintraub, op. cit.; M. Lissak, 'Immigrant Villages in Crisis and Stability', in *Researches in Sociology*, I (Hebrew). The Kaplan School, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1956, pp. 5–32. For some case-studies dealing with the effects of lack of a satisfactory demographic policy, see N. Nevo, 'Moshav Shikma', in *Studies in Rural Sociology*, etc., op. cit.; R. Rahat, *Moshav Tzerufa* (mimeo., Hebrew), Jewish Agency Settlement Dept., Haifa, 1959; Y. Pardes, *Community Work in the Moshav* (mimeo.); Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 1963; S. A. Deshen, *Political Struggle in Moshav Zevulun* (mimeo., Hebrew), Jewish Agency Settlement Dept., Kyriat Gat, 1962, and *Moshav Beit Skikma* (mimeo. Hebrew), Jewish Agency Settlement Dept., Kyriat Gat, 1963. On the other hand, for an account of the positive effects of a satisfactory settlement policy see: O. Shapira, *Gadish: A Village of Yemenite Immigrants in the Jerusalem Hills* (mimeo., Hebrew), Jewish Agency Settlement Dept., Jerusalem, 1960. Villages of this type have not often been studied because they are less of a problem from the administrative point of view.

[23] This phenomenon has been observed in studies of *moshavim* which failed to attain satisfactory social and economic standards. For chain-reactions originating in the economic sphere see D. Weintraub, 'Problems of Absorption and Acculturation in an Immigrants' Moshav' (Hebrew), *Megamot*, V, 1954; M. Minkovich, *Nevatim*, op. cit. For a reaction originating from the religio-cultural sphere see S. Deshen, *Stability and Change*, op. cit.

IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS IN JEWISH FERTILITY DIFFERENTIALS[1]

Calvin Goldscheider

INTRODUCTION

ALTHOUGH numerous studies in the United States have pointed to the importance of religious differentials in fertility, there has been little or no attempt to study Jewish fertility in depth. Furthermore, the relationship between the religion of the Jews and fertility has received only a superficial treatment, theoretically as well as empirically. This paper will be concerned with examining the ideologies concerning fertility of the various religious divisions within the Jewish group and analysing unique data that may shed light on the relevance of ideological factors to Jewish fertility differentials.

The Biblical tradition clearly states a preference for large families in the oft-quoted precept 'Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth' (Genesis, i. 28; ix. 1). More important, perhaps, for Jews is the Talmudic-Rabbinic interpretation and discussion of birth-control and contraception.[2] Without entering into an academic discussion of Talmudic sources and post-Talmudic commentary, and with conscious selectivity, let us briefly consider several rabbinic statements which suggest a general tendency in Talmudic thinking on this problem. The Mishna (final edition *c.* 200 C.E.) contains the following discussion between two schools of thought on the question 'when does one fulfil the Biblical injunction of "Be fruitful and multiply"?' The Shammaites say that the birth of two boys satisfies the commandment; the Hillelites say one boy and one girl.[3] Modern scholars draw the conclusion that this represented an historical change from the Biblical period to allow contraception after two children were born.[4] In a direct legal context, birth-control is mentioned only once in the Talmud. When matters of health of the child or of the mother are concerned, Rabbi Meir permits the use of a sponge ('Moch') to prevent conception.[5] Even though rabbinic leaders did not see the use of contraceptives as immoral when matters of health were concerned, there remained an emphatic rejection of birth-control for economic or other reasons.[6]

More important for the present analysis than the legally entangled Talmudic argument is the position taken by the three modern religious

divisions of Judaism—Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform—on the birth-control issue. The Orthodox position on this matter follows the traditional Talmudic prohibition on the use of contraceptives for other than medical reasons. While the Responsa literature is almost inexhaustible, a brief review by Jakobovitz indicates a general agreement that the 'popularity of contraception has opened the door wide to immorality and marital faithlessness and to the eradication of sanctity, refinement and self-control. . . .'[7] The Chief Rabbi of the British Empire stated in 1917 that 'among Jews the use of preventives is strongly condemned as unclean and demoralizing', and called mechanical methods of contraception 'an abomination' and a 'moral sin'.[8] The Chief Rabbi of the Orthodox German community in the United States talks of 'the blessing of having many children' and states:

> The Jewish woman who has self-respect and who is aware of her obligations towards her husband will be able to tell herself that it would be against Nature—that is, against the creative Law of God—for married couples to prevent the possibility of receiving the blessing of God in the form of offspring.[9]

He permits the use of preventives only for reasons of health and not for economic considerations.

In another 'popular' handbook for the young married couple Rabbi Nathan Drazin, an Orthodox rabbinic leader, presents a somewhat different picture. Although claiming that withdrawal 'ought never to be practiced' and the use of the condom 'inadvisable', he emphasizes the need for 'natural methods of birth-control, namely diaphragm'.[10]

In contrast to the position on birth-control taken by Orthodox religious leaders, the Conservative and Reform 'spokesmen' have clearly expressed the desirability of using contraceptives for rational family planning with no preference given as to method.[11] Recently, the President of the national Conservative rabbinic organization pointed out the need for using birth-control techniques when the 'evils of overpopulation' are a factor.[12] Jacob Lauterbach, a past leader of the Reform division, finds justification in the Talmudic literature to permit contraception in any circumstance where the welfare of the mother, child, or the family is at stake.[13]

Several points should be made concerning the above. First, there are no central religious policy organizations for the three religious divisions of Judaism in the United States. Second, although the three religious divisions of Judaism have taken a stand on birth-control, it would be misleading to imply that their positions are widely known among Jews. In fact, from the nature of the sources cited, it should be clear that the 'average' American-Jewish family is not aware of the position on birth-control taken by the three religious divisions. Most Orthodox sources in

the form of responsa are in Hebrew which precludes widespread circulation. In general, the question of the Jewish position on birth-control is, to my knowledge, not considered one of the 'problem areas' of Jewish life in rabbinical training centres, and would be rarely expounded in a weekly sermon from the pulpit or taught in Hebrew schools. Even in the Jewish State of Israel, Matras and Auerbach point out that:

> A religious position with reference to family limitation is not easily determined and indeed rabbis and religious officials [of Israel] . . . have been notably hesitant about publicly stating any religious position for or against family limitation.[14]

Some evidence to support the view that Jews in the United States are more unaware of the position their religion takes on birth-control than Protestants or Catholics can be found in the Princeton fertility study. In the second interview, women were asked what position their religion took on birth-control and family size. More Jewish women indicated that they did not know their religion's stand on birth-control or family size than either Protestants or Catholics.[15]

These factors (the lack of centralized religious organizations and in consequence a lack of awareness of the religious position on birth-control on the part of Jews in the United States) would lead to the suggestion that differences, if any, in the fertility of the members of the various religious divisions of Judaism will *not* be due to an explicit commitment to ideology. One possible clue to the understanding of religious divisional differentials in Jewish fertility might be their social class concentration. The Orthodox group is generally less assimilated in American society, less socially mobile, in lower social classes, and more likely to be foreign-born than Conservative or Reform Jews.[16] In the past these factors have been associated with higher fertility.

As mentioned earlier, there is no reliable empirical evidence available on the religious division differential in American Jewish fertility. However, two available studies arrived at conflicting conclusions concerning the nature of ideological factors in Jewish fertility. These studies are briefly discussed below not to compare their empirical findings but merely to highlight the prevailing confusion concerning the role of ideological factors in Jewish fertility differentials. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that the explanation of their respective findings in terms of ideology is unwarranted.

The first study, carried out during the spring of 1946 with a sample of Jewish college students, obtained information about the fertility of their parents. The questionnaire return rate was only 55 per cent (166 out of 300) and there was no indication as to the representativeness of the sample.[17] Given the methodological weakness of the study, the results should be viewed at best as suggestive. The findings indicate that the Orthodox group had slightly larger families (2·7) than the

Conservative group (2·6) or Reform group (2·4). Religious division was obtained by asking about the synagogue affiliation of the students' parents. Similar results were obtained when the students were asked how they would classify their parents according to ritual performance. Here, the parent 'identified' as Orthodox had an average of 2·8 children compared to 2·5 children for both Conservative and Reform. The author concludes that the 'Orthodox have retained slightly the more traditional Jewish family pattern'.[18] In further explanation of his findings, Greenberg suggests that ideological factors are important and speculates as follows:

> It would seem . . . that there is a tendency for the more religious and observant fathers to have larger families than those who have little connection with organized religion. . . . There is reason to believe that their greater identification with Judaism and their deeper feeling of responsibility for the Jewish people have had some influence in increasing the size of their families.[19]

The Princeton fertility study came to conclusions diametrically opposed to the above. Their conclusions were based on the finding that more religious-minded Jewish couples (measured by formal as well as informal religious orientation) had more success in planning their families than less religious-minded Jewish couples. After testing and rejecting the hypothesis that religious Jews were the more educated, they concluded that non-Catholic religious ideology stresses 'social responsibility in parenthood'.[20] This conclusion is in sharp contrast to Greenberg's explanation that Jewish ideology emphasizes the value of large families.

The second interview of the Princeton study produced similar results. This time, however, more caution was introduced in interpreting the finding of higher fertility among more 'religious' Jews, and the authors suggest that this relationship might be related to socio-economic security.[21] In summary, they add that the relationship of religiousness and Jewish fertility 'is more puzzling' than for either Protestants or Catholics and 'defies simple summary'.[22]

Whatever the merits or weaknesses of the two studies, it appears that explanations in terms of ideology of their respective findings are both conflicting and unwarranted. Their conclusions are conflicting since traditional Jewish ideology cannot at the same time encourage large families and rationally planned small families. It is unwarranted to explain the larger families of Orthodox Jews (Greenberg) and the greater family planning success of 'religious' Jews (Princeton study) in terms of ideological factors that are unknown and inoperative on the personal level or at best interrelated with generation, degrees of assimilation, and social class.

An alternative and more consistent explanation of the respective

findings of the two studies mentioned, the validity of their results being assumed, may lie in the consideration that there have been generational shifts in the religious division differential in Jewish fertility. The pattern found by Greenberg referred to first and early second generation Jews while the Princeton study is mostly concerned with third generation Jews. The explanation of their findings may not reside in the realm of ideology but possibly in the social class concentrations of the three religious divisions of Judaism, and, more broadly, in the changing relationship of the social class differential to Jewish fertility.

STUDY DESIGN

To examine empirically the fertility patterns of Jews identifying with the three major religious divisions of Judaism (as well as other differentials within the Jewish group), data were collected on a random sample of 1,603 Jewish households in the Providence (Rhode Island) metropolitan area as an integral part of a general survey of the Jewish population.[23] The sample, representing twenty-five per cent of the total Jewish community, was drawn from extensive lists in the files of the General Jewish Committee, the central agency of the Providence Jewish community. Supplementary to these lists, cross-checks were made with membership lists from over fifty Jewish secular organizations. Furthermore, provisions were made in the interview schedule for asking the respondent for the names and addresses of recent in-movers to the Providence Jewish community. All the 'new' Jewish families were then interviewed. Comparisons of the completed and corrected master lists from which the sample was drawn with lists of Jewish households obtained from independent area samples which included the total population, indicated that the final sample is representative of the total Jewish population living in the Providence metropolitan area and is over 97 per cent complete. The field work was carried out between May and July 1963 and yielded an interview response rate of 91·3 per cent. An evaluation of the occupation and family organization characteristics of those who refused to cooperate and those who could not be contacted, using data available in city directories, showed no biases on these variables.

Although the data collected were limited to the Jewish community of the Providence metropolitan area, fertility patterns of Jews in this community are likely to be typical of Jewish fertility in the United States. The only tangible evidence to support this contention comes from the Princeton fertility study. In investigating the extent to which within the seven metropolitan areas included in the Princeton fertility study the religious groups differed with respect to the variables affecting fertility, the authors found that contrasts proved consistently small.[24] Although this conclusion lends weight to the belief that the findings

about Jewish fertility in Providence are similar and can be generalized to the larger Jewish community in the United States, only as fertility studies of other Jewish communities are carried out shall we know the degree to which such a generalization can be made.

For this analysis, fertility information includes: (1) total number of children ever born, excluding still-births; (2) age of women at first marriage, which was obtained by subtracting the month and year of birth from the month and year of first marriage; (3) first birth interval, obtained by subtracting the month and year of first marriage from the month and year of the birth of the first child; childless couples, and those cases where information on the dates of birth of all children ever born were unavailable, were eliminated; (4) second birth interval which was measured in two ways: (*a*) the month and year of marriage was subtracted from the date of birth of the second child giving the months between marriage and the birth of the second child, and (*b*) months between the birth of the first and second child; both measures, obviously, eliminated the childless and one-child families as well as those cases where data on the birthdates (both month and year) of all children were not available. The information on the birthdates of all the children was obtained by asking for the month and year of birth for the total number of children ever born. The data which follow refer to the fertility of all ever-married women regardless of present marital status.

Although the quality of the data based on internal and external evidence is excellent, the recall of month and year of birth of every child might not have been exact in every case. This seems to be most pronounced for women in the older ages whose children are already grown up. Wherever there was doubt as to the accuracy of response, the case was eliminated in the analysis of the particular variable in question. Furthermore, those cases where information on the birth dates of all children ever born was not available owing to the death of a child were eliminated for the birth interval analysis. Thus, discrepancies appear in the number of cases used to calculate various fertility measures—being more pronounced in the older generations.

The analysis to be presented is based on the response to the question 'Do you consider yourself Orthodox, Conservative, Reform?'[25] and is limited to the woman's religious divisional identification.[26] The question referred to present divisional identification. Shifts over time in religious divisional identification—from Orthodox to Conservative and Reform —have probably occurred for the older generations as a result of changes in social class that have taken place in the life cycle of persons belonging to these different generations, and the more recent fashionability of Conservative and Reform identification in the United States. Nevertheless, an assumption is made that, for the older generations, present identification with Conservative and Reform Judaism serves as an

indicator of less of a commitment to Orthodoxy and greater secularization during the childbearing period.

The data which follow will be presented by generation. Owing to the problems of measuring generation, a procedure was used to find age groupings which most accurately separated the first generation from the second and the latter from the third generation. First, women 45 years of age and older were separated from those less than age 45 to distinguish between completed and incompleted families. In turn, those age 45 and over were subdivided into two age groups—65 and over, and 45–64—which most closely represent the first and second generations. The third generation, which is defined as those women less than 45 years of age, was further subdivided into two groups—those 35–44 and those below age 35. This was done on the basis of other research that found that women in the United States by age 35 have most of the children they are going to have and have ended their childbearing cycle.[27]

The definition of generation by age accomplishes two purposes: one, it allows for a trend analysis and two, it separates the complete from the incomplete families. These age groups differed in a whole series of social characteristics which led to the justification of the use of age as an indicator of generation. It should be clear that the crucial factor in generations as presented here is the common experience of the age group rather than the fact of age *per se*.

The first generation, measured by those 65 years old and over at the time of the 1963 interviewing, is probably biased in favour of the younger elements of that generation and leads to lower estimates of fertility than would have been the case if accurate historical data were available. This is the result of viewing cross-sectional data longitudinally and drawing inferences from the 1963 survivors of first generation Jews for the total first generation.

It is hypothesized that first generation Orthodox Jews will have higher fertility than Conservative or Reform Jews. This will be the case since the latter groups rejected the ghetto way of life, were socially and economically mobile, and desired acculturation. The secularization of Conservative and Reform Jews in the first generation resulted in lower fertility. Orthodox Jews of this generation found security in the maintenance of traditional ghetto values and were less socially and economically mobile. This, it is hypothesized, led to higher fertility. On the other hand, second and third generation Reform Jews will have higher fertility and contemporary Orthodox Jews lower fertility. This is the case since it is assumed that there are no differences among the religious divisions in the degree of rationality in family planning practices. The change from high fertility of first generation Orthodox Jews to low fertility for second and third generation reflects the change in the fertility of lower class Jews. Thus, contemporary Orthodox Jews, being

concentrated in the lower social classes, will have smaller families than Conservative or Reform Jews since it is assumed that they control their family size to within their economic range. The rationality with which Jews plan their families (well documented in the literature) being taken into account, the richer segments will have the children they can afford and the poorer will control their fertility.

FERTILITY, RELIGIOUS DIVISION BY GENERATION

The data presented in Table 1 confirm the hypothesis. They show that first generation women who identify themselves as Orthodox had larger families than Conservative- or Reform-identified women.[28] Women of the first generation who identified themselves as Orthodox had an average family size of 3·1 compared to 2·7 for women identifying themselves as Conservative and 2·5 for women identifying themselves as Reform.

TABLE 1. *Fertility by Religious Divisional Identification of Women by Generation*

Religious divisional identification of women	*Number of children ever born*			*Age of wife at first marriage*		*First birth interval (months)*		*Second birth* interval (I) (months)*		*Second birth* interval (II) (months)*	
	Mean	*% Childless*	*Number*	*Mean*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*	*Median*	*Number*
						First Generation					
Orthodox	3·1	2·3	86	21·7	79	13·0	54	60·3	45	34·5	50
Conservative	2·7	6·7	75	22·1	70	23·0	51	73·5	40	39·0	40
Reform	2·5	12·5	32	23·1	32	14·5	18	79·0	13	51·5	14
						Second Generation					
Orthodox	1·8	16·7	120	24·2	114	20·5	92	61·5	60	39·8	62
Conservative	2·0	8·6	304	23·8	299	27·9	254	74·8	187	49·6	158
Reform	2·0	9·8	112	23·8	109	28·0	97	76·5	77	42·5	76
						Older Third Generation					
Orthodox	2·4	2·8	36	23·2	36	25·0	35	65·5	30	36·5	30
Conservative	2·2	4·3	184	22·6	183	25·7	171	64·9	145	40·8	148
Reform	2·4	3·6	83	22·1	83	30·0	78	65·0	70	36·3	72
						Younger Third Generation					
Orthodox	1·5	33·3	12	21·0	12	42·0	7	—	4	—	4
Conservative	1·8	13·1	160	20·7	158	20·0	137	52·9	102	30·5	103
Reform	2·0	10·5	76	20·6	76	20·3	66	52·3	56	30·2	58

* Second Birth Interval (I) is the months between marriage and second child; Second Birth Interval (II) is the months between the first and second child.

Women of the first generation who identified themselves as Orthodox married earlier and spaced their first and second children at shorter intervals than women identifying themselves as Conservative or Reform. The pattern of highest fertility for the Orthodox-identified and lowest fertility for the Reform-identified holds true for every fertility measure except in those instances where the number of Reform-identified is small. However, when the latter are combined with Conservative-identified Jews the patterns are consistent.

Although the direct relationship between religious divisional identification and fertility is characteristic of first generation couples, this is not the case for the second and third generations. Women of the second generation who identified themselves as Orthodox had smaller families and married later than women who identified themselves as Conservative and Reform. On the other hand, women of the second generation identifying themselves as Orthodox have shorter first and second birth intervals than the Conservative- or Reform-identified.

Patterns of the religious divisional differential in the fertility of the older third generation are not clear-cut. Women in this generation who identify themselves as Conservative had slightly fewer children than the Orthodox- or Reform-identified. On the other hand, Orthodox-identified women in this generation married later and spaced their first child at shorter intervals than the Conservative- or Reform-identified. Nevertheless, the younger third generation clearly reflects the inverse pattern found in the second generation. Orthodox-identified women had fewer children and married later, but had their first child at a longer interval from marriage when compared to Reform- or Conservative-identified women.

From the data presented, we can conclude that there have indeed been generational shifts in the religious divisional differential in Jewish fertility from a direct to an inverse pattern. Assuming that this shift is not a reflection of, nor can be explained by, ideological factors, we turn now to an examination of social class and religious divisional identification.

RELIGIOUS DIVISION, SOCIAL CLASS, AND FERTILITY

It has been suggested that the relationship of religious divisional identification to fertility is a reflection of social class rather than ideological differences. For the present analysis, social class was measured by an index which combined education of the husband and wife and occupation of husband. Social Class I represents professionals and managers who, with their wives, had high education; Social Class III represents low white-collar and blue-collar workers who, with their wives, had low education; and Social Class II consisted of two groups: (*a*) professionals and managers with low education and (*b*) low white-collar and

blue-collar workers with high education. Social Class II represents inconsistencies of the social class components. The degree of 'high' and 'low' education varies with generation, since generational changes have occurred in the degree to which Jews have received higher education.[29] The measure of social class that was employed represents *relative* social class within the Jewish group by generation.

Since the social class index required knowledge of the education of husband and wife and the husband's occupation, the widows, predominantly in the first generation, were excluded, and only those cases where the husband and wife were living together at the time of the study were included. Although no known systematic bias in this approach appeared, the number of cases upon which we could measure social class (especially in the older generation) was less than the number appearing in the preceding table.

An examination of the relationship between religious divisional identification and social class (Table II) shows that for each generation wives identifying themselves as Orthodox were more concentrated in the lower social class, the Reform-identified in the upper class, and Conservatives in the middle class.[30]

TABLE II. *Religious Divisional Identification of Women by Social Class and Generation*

(percentage distribution)

Religious divisional identification	*Number of cases*	*Social Class I*	*Social Class II*	*Social Class III*	*Total*
			First Generation		
Orthodox	45	8·9	40·0	51·1	100·0
Conservative	39	33·0	33·3	33·3	100·0
Reform	11	54·5	27·3	18·2	100·0
			Second Generation		
Orthodox	100	7·0	44·0	49·0	100·0
Conservative	267	14·6	65·5	19·9	100·0
Reform	102	31·4	52·9	15·4	100·0
			Older Third Generation		
Orthodox	35	11·4	28·6	60·0	100·0
Conservative	178	20·8	53·9	25·3	100·0
Reform	81	30·9	46·9	32·2	100·0
			Younger Third Generation		
Orthodox	12	33·3	33·3	33·3	100·0
Conservative	156	32·1	46·8	21·2	100·0
Reform	73	45·2	41·1	13·7	100·0

TABLE III. *Religious Divisional Identification of Women by Number of Children ever born and by Social Class and Generation*

Social class	First generation			Second generation			Older third generation			Younger third generation		
	Mean	% Childless	No.	Mean	% Childless	No.	Mean	% Childless	No.	Mean	% Childless	No.
Orthodox												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	3·2	0·0	18	1·9	6·8	44	2·2	0·0	10	—	—	—
III	2·9	4·3	23	1·8	22·4	49	2·5	4·8	21	—	—	—
Conservative												
I	2·5	7·7	13	2·3	0·0	39	2·5	2·7	37	1·8	16·0	50
II	1·9	8·3	12	2·0	9·7	175	2·1	5·2	96	1·8	9·6	73
III	3·0	7·7	13	1·8	9·4	53	2·2	4·4	45	1·7	15·6	32
Reform												
I	—	—	—	2·3	0·0	32	2·6	0·0	25	2·1	9·1	33
II	—	—	—	1·8	13·0	54	2·4	7·9	38	2·0	10·0	30
III	—	—	—	1·9	12·5	16	2·1	0·0	18	2·0	20·0	10

In view of the above finding, it was decided to examine the social class differences within each religious division to see if social class is a factor in fertility differences among the religious divisions. For illustrative purposes, wife's religious divisional identification was again used. Also, since religious division is related to social class, some cells in the table to be presented are empty. Number of children ever born was used since on this fertility variable the most consistent trends appeared. The data in Table III support the contention that there are social class differences within each religious division and that social class is the key factor accounting for differences between the religious divisions.

Several aspects of these data are noteworthy. First, comparisons by generation show that in the first generation, Social Class III of the Orthodox and Conservative group had the same[31] family size; in the second generation, the same social class within different religious divisions had the same family size; in the older third generation, Social Class II of the Orthodox and Conservative had the same family size, Social Class I of the Conservative and Reform had the same family size, and the same is true for Social Class III. Second, in most cases, the social class differences in number of children within each religious division follows a direct pattern for the second and third generations. The small number of cases prevents comparisons in the first generation.

Thus, social class differences in number of children within religious divisions follow social class trends when the assumption of rationality in family planning is made, and differences between religious divisions almost disappear when social class is controlled. This illustrates the

importance of social class in religious divisional differences in Jewish fertility, and supports the contention that any differences in the fertility of religious divisions within Judaism simply reflect socio-economic factors.

CONCLUSION

From the data presented, it should be clear that there have been generational shifts in the relationship of religious divisional identification to Jewish fertility. Orthodox Jews of the first generation had higher fertility—i.e. larger families, earlier marriages, and shorter birth intervals—than Conservative or Reform Jews of that generation. On the other hand, second and younger third generation Orthodox-identified Jews had smaller families, married later, but had shorter first and second birth intervals. The same was true for the older third generation except that the Conservative-identified had the smallest families.

Illustrative of the contention that religious divisional identification reflects social class differences, two sorts of evidence were presented. First, it was noted that Orthodox Jews in each generation were more concentrated in Social Class III, the Reform in Social Class I and Conservatives in Social Class II. Second, family size differences between those identifying with the various religious divisions almost disappear when social class is controlled. Thus, we may conclude that ideology[32] has little relationship to Jewish fertility and that few differences appear that cannot be explained by social class differences. The analysis, therefore, indicates that explanations of Jewish fertility in general do not point to the importance of ideological factors. The present analysis strongly suggests the importance of social class differentials in Jewish fertility and the need for studies in depth of the social-psychological meaning of this variable for the understanding of Jewish fertility.

NOTES

[1] The present analysis is a revised part of the author's unpublished doctoral dissertation *Trends and Differentials in Jewish Fertility: A Study of the Providence Metropolitan Area*, Brown University, 1964. I am grateful to Professor Sidney Goldstein of Brown University for his critical comments and suggestions.

[2] For a review of the Biblical and Talmudic literature on birth-control and contraception, not entirely unbiased, see N. Himes, *Medical History of Contraception*, New York, 1936, 1963, Chapter III. See also J. Z. Lauterbach, 'Talmudic-Rabbinic View on Birth Control', *Yearbook*, Central Conference of American Rabbis, 37, 1927, pp. 369–84.

[3] Talmud Bavli, *Yevamot*, 61B, 65B.

[4] See Himes and Lauterbach cited in note 2. For a dissenting interpretation, see I. Jakobovitz, 'Artificial Insemination, Birth Control and Abortion', paper read at Yeshiva University Rabbinic Alumni Executive Committee Meeting, March 19, 1959, pp. 6–8 and footnotes 60–73.

[5] Talmud Bavli, *Yevamot*, 12B. Other rabbinic leaders disagreed with this position.

[6] See the discussion by Jakobovitz, op. cit., p. 7 and Ben Zion Bokser, 'Birth-Control Statement', *Conservative Judaism*, 16 (Winter-Spring, 1962), p. 81 (Hebrew).

[7] Jakobovitz, op. cit., pp. 7–8.

[8] See the interview with Rabbi J. Hertz by the National Birth-Rate Commission in England, *The Declining Birth-Rate*, London, 1917, pp. 425–35.

[9] J. Breuer, *The Jewish Marriage*, New York, 1956, p. 65. His argument against 'unnatural' birth-control is reminiscent of Catholic ideology on the subject.

[10] N. Drazin, *Marriages are Made in Heaven*, New York, 1958, pp. 60, 82. Yet, he says, 'of course I am not in accord with those who prefer to practise birth control because of economic reasons' (p. 56).

[11] See the discussion in S. E. Goldstein, *The Meaning of Marriage and the Foundations of the Family*, New York, 1942, pp. 118–28.

[12] I. Klein, 'Science and Some Ethical Issues—The Jewish View', *Conservative Judaism*, 18 (Summer, 1959), p. 37.

[13] Lauterbach, op. cit.; see also J. Monsma (ed.), *Religion and Birth Control*, New York, 1963, Chapter 5.

[14] Judah Matras and Chana Auerbach, 'On Rationalization of Family Formation in Israel', *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 50 (Oct. 1962), p. 419.

[15] C. Westoff, R. Potter and P. Sagi, *The Third Child*, Princeton, N.J., 1963, p. 84, Tables 37–9. The authors indicate that 'the Jewish women are somewhat more uncertain [than other religious groups] about the stand of Judaism on family size' (p. 84). An additional question, left unanswered, is the accuracy of knowledge among Jews of the birth-control position of the various religious divisions.

[16] H. K. Polsky, 'A Study of Orthodoxy in Milwaukee', in M. Sklare (ed.), *The Jews*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, pp. 325–35.

[17] Myer Greenberg, 'The Reproduction Rate of the Families of Jewish Students at the University of Maryland', *Jewish Social Studies*, 10 (July 1948), pp. 227–30.

[18] Ibid., p. 233. No statistical tests of significance were applied to these small differences. What may explain the differential is the slower assimilation into American society of Orthodox families or their lower-class position. Neither control is applied.

[19] Ibid., p. 234. For similar results with a different Jewish population and under different circumstances, see R. Bachi and J. Matras, 'Contraception and Induced Abortion among Jewish Maternity Cases in Israel', *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 40 (April 1962), pp. 223–5.

[20] C. Westoff, *et al.*, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America*, Princeton, N.J., 1961, pp. 196–8. They did not have enough cases to sub-divide the Jewish group into the three religious divisions.

[21] Westoff, Potter, Sagi, op. cit., p. 87.

[22] Ibid., p. 238.

[23] For a more detailed discussion of the sample and general methodological procedure, see Calvin Goldscheider, *Trends and Differentials in Jewish Fertility*, op. cit., pp. 65–72. The larger study is reported by Sidney Goldstein, *The Greater Providence Jewish Community: A Population Survey*, General Jewish Committee of Providence, 1964.

[24] Westoff, *et al.*, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America*, op. cit., p. 26.

[25] Other choices were offered such as Yiddishist, Secular Unitarian, Christian, other. However, due to the small number of cases in these categories, it was decided to retain the threefold categorization.

[26] Husband's religious divisional identification showed similar patterns. When synagogue membership was used in contrast to identification, similar patterns emerged. Wife's religious divisional identification showed the most consistent patterns, and membership was the least satisfactory measure from a theoretical point of view. For a detailed discussion of the various measures see Goldscheider, op. cit., pp. 159–70.

[27] C. Kiser, *et al.*, 'Plans for the APHA Monograph on Fertility in the 1960 Census Period', in *Emerging Techniques in Population Research*, Milbank Memorial Fund, New York, 1963, pp. 97–9; see also references cited by Westoff, Potter, and Sagi, op. cit., pp. 12, 13.

[28] The difference in family size of Orthodox and non-Orthodox (Conservative and Reform) is statistically significant at the ·05 level.

[29] For a more detailed definition of social class, see Goldscheider, op. cit., pp. 123–7.

[30] This relationship was also found when using the husband's religious divisional identification.

[31] The same family size is used here to mean a lack of statistical significance, and in most comparisons, within one-tenth of a child.

[32] The analysis assumes that people are unaware of the Orthodox prohibition of contraceptives for other than medical reasons. In certain Orthodox groups, especially the Hasidim and other ultra-Orthodox sectors, there might be an awareness and enforcement of the traditional position and the present analysis would not apply.

CHRONICLE

At the Twelfth International Conference of Social Work, held in Athens in 1964, the Israel National Committee for Social Service in co-operation with the Ministry of Social Welfare, submitted a Report on Social Progress through Social Planning. The Report gave, *inter alia*, the following data:

1. At the end of 1962, 35·5 per cent of the total population of Israel were under 14 years old, while 64·3 per cent were under 35 years old.
2. There has been, over the years, an increase in the percentage of the aged: in 1951, 4·1 per cent of the population was over 65 years old, while in 1963 the percentage had risen to 5·3.
3. 11·8 per cent of all families consist of 7 or more persons, the average size of the non-Jewish family (5·9 persons) being greater than the average size of the Jewish family (4·1 persons).
4. 22·1 per cent of the country's inhabitants live in rural areas, while the remaining 77·9 per cent live in urban districts; almost half of the urban population live in small towns numbering fewer than 50,000 residents. In 1948, 50 per cent of the population were concentrated in the three main cities (Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, and Haifa); owing to the policy of dispersal, these cities, in 1962, accounted for only 32 per cent of the population.
5. The average size of the family town dwelling in 1959/60 was 2·1 rooms; only 16·7 per cent of the dwellings consisted of three or more rooms. While in 1957, 24·2 per cent of Jewish urban residents shared a room with two or more persons and only 6·1 per cent occupied more than one room, the present respective percentages are 17·8 and 7·8. There has also been an increase in the size of rooms, and an improvement of building standards. About 80 per cent of all housing erected since 1948 has been public housing. 60 per cent of the country's householders are owner-occupiers, 35 per cent are main tenants of rented dwellings, and 5 per cent are sub-tenants.
6. Real wages and salaries rose by 35 per cent between 1950 and 1962; the annual rise in personal expenditure in the last few years has been 5 per cent *per capita*.

7. There has been a growing demand for well-qualified professional and technical workers, who have been awarded better salaries and working conditions by employers in the private sector of the economy. The Civil Service and public bodies eventually followed suit; while before 1954 the difference in salary between the highest and the lowest administrative grades of the Civil Service was 1 : 2·2, it is now 1 : 4·5, before tax deductions.

*

The Board of Deputies of British Jews, at a meeting in December 1964, decided to establish a research unit to study basic demographic data concerning Anglo-Jewry. The unit is to enjoy the co-operation of British and Israeli sociologists. This project was stimulated by the Conference held in London in April 1962 on 'Jewish Life in Modern Britain' under the joint auspices of the Board and of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University. The Conference had expressed concern at the lack of basic demographic data on the Jews of Britain, and had decided to set up a special committee of scholars and of members of the Board.

The first object of the new research unit will be to discover basic demographic facts. There have been a number of local surveys in the past, but these have not always been carried out in a scientific manner. The Board decided to appoint a part-time academic consultant to advise on the methods of gathering the necessary information and to act generally in a supervisory capacity.

*

The Jewish Welfare Board announced in November 1964 that they intend carrying out a survey in London and the Home Counties among Jews aged 30–55 years to determine the extent of loneliness among persons of that age-group. The President of the Board has invited readers of the *Jewish Chronicle* to write 'about their own feelings and experience of loneliness' and has assured them that all communications will be treated in the strictest confidence.

*

Israel's Education Minister is reported to have stated in January 1965 that in the past five years the number of students at institutions of higher learning in the country rose by 80 per cent to reach a total of 20,000. This total is expected to be doubled in the next five years; an additional 1,250 teachers would be required. The Minister proposed the establishment of a Government supervisory body for planning, directing, and co-ordinating higher education; such a body would not prejudice the present autonomy of teaching institutions.

*

In January 1965 the Hebrew University of Israel awarded Bachelor's degrees to 976 students, bringing the total number of degrees conferred by the University since its inception to 10,762. Of the 976 recent graduates, 135 were in the Faculty of Social Sciences.

*

The Director-General of the Department of Absorption of the Jewish Agency stated that in the last four years only 480 out of 250,000 immigrants

had chosen to leave Israel; he contrasted this figure favourably with the percentage leaving Australia after immigration.

*

The Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel has stated that since the establishment of the State to the end of 1963, 100,000 Israelis had emigrated and a further 64,000 had been living abroad for extended periods. In 1963 alone, 2,417 Israelis left the State after declaring that they intended to emigrate.

*

Further details of the 1961 Census of Israel concerning religious affiliation were published this spring. Only 238 Israelis stated that they were atheists or 'of no religion'. Figures published earlier had revealed that there were, on 22 May 1961:

1,932,000 Jews
164,000 Muslims
51,000 Christians
23,000 Druze.

The information recently released gives the numbers of some of the smaller groups as:

332 Karaites
158 Samaritans
156 Bahai
28 Buddhists

It was also stated that 60 per cent of the Jews in Israel were born abroad:

219,000 in Poland,
147,000 in Rumania,
123,000 in Iraq,
118,000 in territories now in the Soviet Union,
112,000 in Morocco

*

In a report of an interview with the head of Iranian Jewry published in the *Jewish Chronicle* it was stated that there are about 80,000 Jews in Iran; of these, 50,000 are in Teheran and 20,000 in Shiraz. The head of Iranian Jewry added that he used to publish a Jewish newspaper with a circulation of 3,000, but the paper has closed. There is now no Jewish newspaper in Iran.

In a letter to the *Jewish Chronicle* of 2 April 1965, the Director-General of the Alliance Israélite Universelle schools in Iran gave some facts about Jewish education. There are about 13,000 Jewish schoolchildren in Iran; 5,000 go to Alliance Israélite schools, 3,000 to Ozar Hatorah, while ORT and communal institutions cater for a further 3,000. The Alliance Israélite has been active in Iran since 1898, and its mission is 'to create good Jews and good citizens'.

*

The Chief Rabbi of Rumania (who was on a private visit to Scotland) is reported to have said in Glasgow, in February 1965, that the Jewish population of Rumania is estimated to number about 130,000 souls, organized into

100 communities; there is a shortage of ritual slaughterers, teachers, and community officials.

*

Moshe Kitron contributes an article on Latin American Jewry to the 1964–65 issue of *In the Dispersion* in the series *Surveys and Monographs on the Jewish World* published by the Research Section of the Organization Department of the World Zionist Organization. Latin America (including the Caribbean Islands) is made up of twenty independent republics and various dependencies under British, French, Dutch, and United States sovereignty; it has a population of over 200 million of whom about 790,000 are Jews. More than half the total Jewish population (approximately 480,000) live in Argentina, while there are 145,000 in Brazil and 45,000 in Uruguay. Thus, these three republics account for more than 83 per cent of all Latin American Jews. There are 35,000 Jews in Chile, 30,000 in Mexico, 12,000 in Colombia, and 10,000 in Venezuela. The other countries and territories have Jewish populations ranging from 5,000 (in Ecuador) to 75 (in Honduras). Mr. Kitron states:

> About 150,000 of Latin America's Jews are of Sephardi and 'Eastern' derivation, another 100,000 are of German and Austrian origin, and all the rest originated in Eastern Europe, which includes—in the peculiar geography of Jewish dispersion—Rumania as well.

Of Argentina's 480,000 Jews, 50,000 are German-speaking and about 70,000 are Sephardim and 'Eastern'. Greater Buenos Aires is the home of two-thirds of Argentine Jewry, that is, of about 40 per cent of all Jews in Latin America.

*

A survey of the Jews of Bolivia carried out by the South American Executive of the World Jewish Congress states that the Jewish community of that country was established during the First World War. It is Central European in origin; only five families are Sephardim. At one time there were 12,000 souls, but this total has now dropped to about 3,000; many have emigrated to Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. Most Bolivian Jews live in La Paz and in Cochabamba. There are a United Zionist Federation, a Cultural Centre, a Maccabi Association, and a B'nai B'rith lodge.

*

The Jewish community of Munich is this year celebrating the 150th anniversary of its foundation. The community numbered about 20,000 before the War. There are now 2,800 Jews registered with the community, and it is estimated that a further 1,000 also live in Munich. It is reported that the city's civic council has invited thirty families of former residents (now living abroad) to return for a few days to Munich to take part in the celebrations of the anniversary.

*

The Association for Jewish Demography and Statistics was founded in 1957 in order to promote the following activities in the field of Jewish demography and statistics:

(*a*) compilation of a comprehensive bibliography on those subjects;
(*b*) accumulation and maintenance of documents and archives;
(*c*) encouragement of professional publications;
(*d*) strengthening of contacts between persons and institutions interested in this field, the co-ordination of activities, and the improvement of the comparability of Jewish statistics.

The Association functions in close contact with the Institute of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University, where a special Section of Jewish Demography has been set up. The considerable practical burden involved in the preparation of a comprehensive bibliography and the building up of a documentation centre has been assumed by the Institute. However, no single university department can hope to cover, by its own unaided efforts, a field as wide as the Jewish Diaspora. Thus the Association is called upon to provide a setting and intellectual meeting ground for all those interested in Jewish demography and statistics—on a world-wide scale, commensurate with the subject itself.

In addition, the Association is instrumental in publishing and circulating material of professional interest. Members receive publications free of charge several times a year. They can also obtain—at reduced prices—other publications (the list of which contains by now some twenty items).

All those interested in Jewish research are cordially invited to become members of the Association. The membership fee is $6.00 per annum or the equivalent in other currencies. Inquiries and applications should be sent to the Hon. Secretary, The Association for Jewish Demography and Statistics, The Hebrew University, Sprinzak Building, Jerusalem, Israel.

BOOK REVEIWS

PREJUDICE AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

Michael Banton

(*Review Article*)

IN 1948 sociologists at Cornell University started a series of studies of intergroup relations in urban areas throughout the U.S.A. With small exceptions, the field investigations were all completed before the end of 1954. Though a variety of smaller publications appeared during the interim, Mr. Williams's book presenting a comprehensive report on the research was published only in 1964.* It is essential to take account of this chronology when attempting an assessment of the volume. When the Cornell research started, the Freudian view of prejudice as stemming from the frustrations inevitably imposed by social life had a powerful attraction for American social scientists; it was reinforced in 1950 by the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* and the widespread interest in prejudice as a precipitate of certain kinds of personality structure. Mr. Williams, however, in his 1947 critical review for the Social Science Research Council, had concluded that '(i) there is need for greater emphasis upon observation of total behavior, not just verbal test results; (ii) there is a need for relating verbal to nonverbal, and test to nontest behavior' (Williams, 1947: 116). The Cornell studies can be seen as an attempt to achieve these difficult objectives. They covered many aspects of the American scene: the structure of minority communities; the attitudes of two minority groups towards each other; minority group attitudes; majority group attitudes; patterns of segregation; social mobility; situational patterning; dimensions of personality, etc. Some of the earlier material is now rather dated, but by the way he has built up this book Mr. Williams has very largely succeeded in overcoming this handicap. He does not simply report on the Cornell Studies, but attempts a synthesis of our current understanding of a variety of topics in which he draws freely upon the

* Robin M. Williams, Jr., in collaboration with John P. Dean and Edward M. Suchman, *Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in American Communities*. Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964, pp. xiv + 434. 72*s*.

work of other writers. In particular—and this reflects the climate of social science in the United States during the 1950s—he tries to relate sociological to psychological contributions in the study of intergroup friction.

Mr. Williams favours a factual rather than a provocative style so that the hasty reader might be misled into thinking that the chief value of his book lies in the mass of new research results it summarizes, and overlook the way in which they are systematically organized round a new theme. The core idea is not startlingly novel, but it has never previously been developed so thoroughly or harmonized with quantitative data about racial attitudes. Where other writers have emphasized either personality structures or the effects of interaction patterns upon attitudes, Mr. Williams asserts that 'prejudice is primarily a response to interaction with *ingroup* members' (p. 77). Most people, he says, create for themselves an 'Indian path—a well-beaten, often trod, social trail, from home to work, back to home, to lodge meeting, back to home, on Sundays to church and back, and then to visit relatives and friends' (pp. 141–2). Here he comes close to the phenomenon that social anthropologists have called a social network (Jay, 1964), but Mr. Williams takes up a slightly different aspect. He observes that on these paths people meet only a few strangers and then usually in specially defined relationships. Their prejudices are expressed most frequently in situations where no minority persons are present and often bear little relation to actual behaviour towards strangers. This sounds like an uncompromising onslaught upon much psychological research. Is it really?

The author would maintain that on the contrary his conclusions are supported by recent psychological research. He shows, with reference to Dollard's theory, how it is now recognized that under certain circumstances men tolerate a high level of frustration; that aggression is often occasioned by fear whereas hostility is a response to threat. Turning to authoritarianism, he recalls that recent investigations have reported F scale means in the Southern states that fall well within the range of means of comparable non-Southern groups. Work designed to discover just what it is that the F scale measures has revealed that much of the high scoring can as well be attributed to conformity or to anomie as to authoritarianism. Furthermore, the mistrust of others that is characteristic of the high scorers can often be seen as a rational adjustment to the circumstances in which they have to live. For many poor people life in America does actually resemble a merciless jungle. These reassessments are supported by the Cornell researches. They lead to the conclusion that 'the importance of the personality dispositions is that they make it possible for prejudices to draw upon extra energies far beyond those that would be aroused by realistic perception of immediate advantage or disadvantage' (p. 110). At the same time it is to be remembered that it is usually personal or family problems, of money,

health or social privilege, that motivate people to get involved in intergroup questions; it is difficult to get most Americans to take an active concern in public issues. This re-evaluation would probably be acceptable to leading social psychologists (cf. Allport, 1962).

Having established his base, Mr. Williams can go on to develop his major theme: 'ethnic prejudices do not really refer to *personal* likings (or preferences for association) at all, but rather to the acceptance of *shared* (*cultural*) *definitions and evaluations of social categories as such.* . . . Interpersonal likings and associational preferences that are oriented only to individual personality compatibilities could never form the *structural* alignments represented by the classification of some 18,000,000 varied human beings as "Negroes" in our society today' (pp. 113–14). As it stands, this statement is unacceptable, for the definitions and evaluations in question are not *uniformly* shared throughout American society. Maybe they are held strongly by some particularly influential group or category of persons and are either forced upon others or spread to them along the lines of distinctive social networks. Who are the gatekeepers? Mr. Williams would recognize the justice of this qualification, for he devotes one of his best chapters, and the longest, to an examination of the relation between peoples' 'social trails' and their attitudes. Sex, age, education, and economic status are four of the main determinants of how often Americans meet people allocated to other ethnic categories, of the spheres within which contact occurs and of the incidence of prejudice, but they do not operate uniformly for all minorities and there are variations between different cities. For example, in two cities there was a close association between occupational status and the social distance expressed towards Jews and Negroes, but the associations ran in reverse directions. The low status people displayed much more distance towards Negroes whereas distance expressed towards Jews increased uniformly with occupational status (pp. 54 and 179). Presumably each category was responding to the group which represented the most actual threat to its own privileges.

Research into questions of this kind constantly runs the risk of going to great length and expense to prove the obvious. But what seems obvious after the event did not necessarily seem so before. Commonsense perceptions usually employ such diffuse terms that they can scarcely ever be falsified. The social scientist has a major task in 'cleaning up' the variables specified by common sense so as to lay the basis for cumulative investigation. Mr. Williams's discussion of interaction constantly verges on the tautologous and the self-evident but he is well aware of this. A great mass of test results is described and reduced to order, resulting in a 'miniature theory', formulated in four complex propositions (p. 221). Not all the lessons that the reader learns on the way can be easily summarized but some at least can be mentioned. Basic to them is the conclusion that while social variables (role and

status) are the most important in determining the opportunities people have for contact with minority persons, it is the personality factors which are the significant ones for predicting what use people make of their opportunities. The individual has more choice about whether or not to form friendships within a situation than whether or not to enter the situation in the first place (p. 163). This distinction between opportunity and interaction is fundamental but the reviewer has never previously seen it explicitly developed. Consider its relevance to sex roles. In all the cities studied, men have more opportunity than women to make interracial contacts (hence it is principally men who share these 'cultural definitions and evaluations' of racial categories), but when this variable is controlled women are as likely as men to form friendships across ethnic lines (pp. 144 and 200).

'In all the surveys in all the communities and for all groups, majority and minorities, the greater the frequency of interaction, the lower the prevalence of ethnic prejudice' (p. 168). Does this mean that interaction reduces prejudice or that only the unprejudiced enter into such interaction? A detailed study in Ithaca, New York, of attitude and interaction changes over a two-year period suggests that as many people were led by new contacts to change their attitudes as were led by their predispositions to change their contacts. The movement was clearly towards increased ethnic contact whereas in the Deep South the increase in inter-racial friendships 'is not occurring at a rate likely to revolutionize the intergroup situation there in anything short of geologically significant periods of time' (pp. 215 and 155). A detailed study of the persons who reported an important change of attitude indicates that such shifts occur most frequently when people experience a major change in their social networks—as by taking a new job, entering military service, moving to a different community, going to college, being promoted, or getting married. Changes in reference groups may be crucial. Similarly, it appears that the kinds of contact most likely to reduce prejudice and loosen stereotypes are those which lead the parties to interact in a variety of different roles. A particularly interesting contribution in this area—one owed to Alice S. Rossi—concerns the relations between interaction and social skills. The pattern of interracial friendship in Ithaca can be attributed, to a considerable extent, to the way some people tend much more strongly than others to participate in social relations of all kinds, and to the way some people can more easily manage interpersonal relations. What renders this finding so interesting is that social participation and social poise are associated with other variables also. In a Protestant community the proportion of Catholics who are highly participant is lower than that of Protestants; persons under 45 years, males, highly-educated persons, and those of high socio-economic status are more likely than their opposites to qualify as 'participants'. The reverse of this pattern is that socially isolated persons

tend to be significantly more authoritarian. Among adults both social poise and participation are strongly related to childhood sociability: those who as youngsters were gregarious are more likely as adults to be socially poised participants making friendships outside their own group (pp. 191–200). These findings deserve to be pursued in a variety of ways for it is the 'participants' who are the key people in social networks and most often define situations for others.

Illuminating as this sort of analysis is, it still leaves unanswered many of the initial questions about the relation between attitude and behaviour. The danger of taking the one as a predictor of the other is underlined by a test reported in the book. The responses of white majority-group persons to hypothetical intergroup situations was compared with what they said about their feelings and actions in actual situations. The results of this and similar studies show that people react much more favourably in practice than their answers to hypothetical situations would suggest (pp. 316–17). Melvin L. Kohn undertook the analysis of a series of experimentally manipulated situations which help considerably to explain why this should be so. For instance, members of the research team took to frequenting a tavern that discriminated against would-be Negro clients; then two Negro colleagues of theirs came in and asked for service. The research workers kept a close watch on reactions and discussed the incident with the people in the tavern afterwards. These experiments demonstrated that in unpatterned situations participants who are confused as to the most suitable course of action actively seek cues from the behaviour of anyone else around. Where, however, someone is caught between two incompatible norms and *has* to choose, he tends to resolve the conflict by exempting the situation from one of the two definitions, by arguing, in effect, that either this event, or this individual, is an exception (pp. 328–31). The nature of the exemption mechanism is explored in a discussion which leads to the conclusion that norm-regulated patterns of behaviour quickly come to be over-determined; behaviour carried out in accordance with the pattern is the outcome of numerous diverse motivations and brings a corresponding array of rewards. The interlocking of interests can be a barrier to change, but if the inter-relations are properly understood in particular cases they can also be exploited to bring about a modification of practices. In view of the evidence provided in *Strangers Next Door* and in other works that most inter-racial contacts occur in work places, and that interaction patterns can more easily be modified in formally structured settings, it is a pity that no attempt was made in the Cornell studies to supplement this part of the programme with an industrial inquiry. It should be possible to formulate in propositional form the implications of Mr. Williams's approach for the definition of patterned situations within organizations. Indeed, the concluding chapter advances in this very direction though its principal object

is to relate the microsociology of discrimination to the properties of large-scale social systems.

The lapse of time between the field investigations and the publication of the book is most evident in the chapters on the patterns of segregation in various cities and on the attitudes found in the (chiefly Negro) minority communities. The former shows how much discrimination is a product of seemingly arbitrary local custom. For example, where Myrdal outlined a white 'rank order of discrimination' related to the intimacy of the contact in question, Williams shows from a national sample of 248 cities that the actual order cannot be explained in simple terms. In eight cities out of ten it can be taken for granted that Negroes may use the same public rest rooms as whites; in only four cities out of ten can the same be said of Negro customers in white restaurants, while in less than one in ten can a Negro reckon on service in that sanctum of white supremacy—the barbershop! (pp. 126–7). Since 1953 this picture has doubtless changed appreciably, though the author hazards no suggestions as to the extent of change.

The review of minority attitudes establishes that equal-status contact is associated with lower prejudice among Negroes as well as whites. But 'respondents who manifest a militant group pride are significantly more likely to have inter-racial social contact than non-militants and, conversely, those who score high in group self-hatred clearly tend to have less contact than those who are relatively lacking in self-hatred. In other words, it is the individual who identifies positively with his racial group who is likely to have inter-racial contact' (pp. 295–6). It can be argued that Mr. Williams did not appreciate the full significance of this finding. His review of Negro attitudes recalls the orthodoxies of the 1950s rather than the contemporary questioning about the 'Negro revolt'. He may be right, but his inferences merit examination in a wider context. Mr. Williams refers to studies of Negro children carried out in the 1940s which prompt the conclusion that the Negro community has been 'captured' by white standards of judgement. While emphasizing that 'distrust of white people is nearly universal among Negroes who have experienced severe discrimination', Mr. Williams avers that the Negro community as a whole is 'firmly attached to characteristically American democratic ideology and assimilationist and integrationist sentiments' (p. 300). A few pages further on he concludes that 'the greater the extent to which a subordinated ethnic grouping is permitted and helped to acquire the cultural and social characteristics that are highly valued in the dominant grouping, the less likely it is that enforced segregation and systematic discrimination can be maintained'. This is the Myrdal recipe.

Myrdal saw the Negro community as a pathological growth, existing only because of white rejection which itself stemmed from the tardiness of whites in eliminating inconsistencies from the American creed

(Myrdal, 1944: 927–30). The American dilemma was a dilemma for whites: Negroes were spectators. Myrdal subscribed to a unitary view of American culture and overlooked the extent to which social life is built up from multitudinous situations defined in ways that are not mutually consistent. There is a parallel with Evans-Pritchard's celebrated analysis of Zande witchcraft which showed that in each isolated situation people's behaviour could be considered rational, though the system as a whole was not logically coherent. The contradictions were suppressed by beliefs that particular criteria were relevant in certain situations but not in others. Similarly the Dixie politician may be worried about how he can resist federal power but he does not perceive Negroes' moral claims within the same set of categories with which he thinks about white society. When, in 1962, Governor Barnett spoke about 'the people of Mississippi' he thought only of the white people.

The critic of Williams's and Myrdal's position would seize on the finding that the race-proud Negro has most inter-racial contacts to argue that whites will not accept Negroes until they respect them *as Negroes* (however illogical this may seem to the rationalistic sociologist). Howard Brotz has recently argued similarly that the absence of an African heritage hinders rather than helps the acceptance of Negroes (1964: 123). Assimilation is a two-way process and it helps if both parties are seen as having something to offer. Nahum S. Medalia has also attacked the Myrdal diagnosis on this same fundamental assumption but from a different angle. Medalia argues that instead of social change operating in the direction of cultural consistency it tends rather to divide up social domains making situational discontinuity even more important. He shows that Myrdal neglected other value premises and other less idealistic American creeds (1962: 223–7). The unitary model of society, valuable though it still is, often hinders our thinking. It is here that the Cornell studies with their 'Indian path' approach to the structure of the majority society have made a notable contribution; the same sort of insight has still to be deployed in the analysis of the minority groups and in the analysis of certain spheres of group relations. Who is taking a closer view of the values sustained by different sorts of networks within the Negro community? Where is a realistic and up-to-date study of the place of racial conflict in the American social system to be found?

Strangers Next Door is a work of great value not only as an account of completed research and as a teaching manual, but as a worthy target for radical criticism. It should serve, too, as a guide to the new research which others ought to undertake. Melting-pot assimilationism has died unmourned. The fire under the pot, as Charles Wagley has observed, was a belief in the benefits of unrestricted competition in which every individual had a fair chance. This was before the day when the biggest threat to a minority's ambitions could be its school drop-out rate. Writers on intergroup relations must now take into account the impli-

cations of a technical order which may prove very different from that of the present. A social order based upon automated production will probably be less favourable to assimilation. Employment will be reduced, patterns of leisure activity will appear more significant, and many social distinctions will be exacerbated. Sociologists need now to examine the basis for a new kind of pluralism founded upon cross-cutting ties between distinctive ethnic, regional, religious, class and other groups. In some social classes and some circumstances at least, it now seems that strangers may be more welcome next door if they are proud of being different.

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THE SPANISH INQUISITION AND BEYOND

Abdón M. Salazar

(*Review Article*)

JULIO CARO BAROJA'S book, in five parts with 68 appendices and 248 plates,* constitutes the best historical study of the Sephardi community during the epoch from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century when it lived in conflict with, and inside, Spanish society. This study has already been compared[1] to J. Amador de los Rios's *Historia social, política y religiosa de los Judíos de España y Portugal*, and should be read with it as its continuation from the end of the Middle Ages to our own day.

Part I[2] is taken up with the origins of crypto-Jewish society in general and the position of the Sephardi Judaizer in particular. It is, so to say, a preamble to the international 'Jewish Problem' as reflected in the Iberian Peninsula; for the Hispanic Christian-Jewish conflict is posed here as a variant of the wider European conflict, and its characteristics are traced back to various European presuppositions and prejudices: socio-anthropological ('race hatred'), socio-economical ('usury hatred'), etc. However, Caro Baroja believes socio-religious prejudice ('the religious hatred') to have been at the basis of the whole social conflict. Hence, the phenomenon of conversion to and from Judaism running parallel to conversion to and from Christianity, from its remotest beginnings in Europe, is thrown into bold relief in this first part of the book the better to underline the presence of the Christian convert from Judaism in the Iberian Peninsula down to 1492 as a species of the European genus. Moreover, during the modern epoch of European history, the individual Jew in the Iberian Peninsula was forced to go underground as a result of socio-religious hostility, and the former flourishing Sephardi communities of the Middle Ages were reduced to a mere secret society. Crypto-Judaism in Modern Spain thus becomes the main theme of Caro Baroja's great work.

Given the structural approach which Caro Baroja has adopted, it

* *Los Judíos en la España Moderna y Contemporánea*, Ediciones Arion, Artes Gráficas Benzal, Madrid, 1961–2; 3 vols.: 540, 462, 576 pp., 248 plates, maps, charts, diagrams, graphs; 1,800 pesetas.

was to be expected that even in the First Part far more room would be given to a structural analysis of Jewry as a 'ghetto' than to psycho-sociological explanations of Normative Judaism in itself. Also, since his mind is set on Jewry as a hermetic society in Modern Spain rather than as a closed society in the Middle Ages, it was only natural that in Caro Baroja's minute analysis of the socio-religious phenomenon of conversion stress should be placed on the motives and behaviour of the individual within the group rather than on those of the group within Spanish society. Doing this, he has shown not only that he is acquainted with the secondary material, but also that he values personal observation, which makes the evaluation that much more acceptable and puts all readers in his debt for introducing them to the sources.

Part II[3] first describes the position and various situations and attitudes of the Christian convert from Judaism before and after 1492, structurally rather than culturally or genealogically, without the author feeling in the least obliged to go into the structural sequences involved. The position and attitudes of the marrano type of convert (*anus*), that is, the Judaizer or crypto-Jew, are analysed first in all the minutiae of psychosocial life. We can see the crypto-Jew as the member of a body denied legal status by the Spanish ruling powers, or rather as the individual member of a hermetic Jewish community destitute of the most elementary structures for a communal religious life. We meet next the sincere type of convert to Christianity in his attitudes towards Normative Judaism as well as crypto-Judaism, the *mesumad* in contrast to the *anus*, either as an apologist of Christianity and a slanderer of Judaism, or as an informer, *malsin*, denouncing his former fellow-Judaizers to the Inquisition for love or money. Last, we encounter the indifferent type of convert, the *alboraique* as he was popularly called then, or perhaps the *mumar* as he is still styled within Normative Judaism, one who, thinking himself unable to bear the pressure of revealed religion on his conscience and still more of the observances of religious commandments, indifferent to both Biblical Covenants or having no religion, ends up either by integrating with the non-Jewish (Christian or otherwise) society he lives in, or within the ranks of incipient Deism, eventually acquiring some distinction himself among the pioneers of natural religion or scientific humanism.

As in Part I, more room is allotted in Part II to a structural analysis of the social type resulting from mass conversion than to psychological explanations of crypto-Judaism itself, its beliefs and ritual. But, in order to acquire a better understanding of the type of system to which this cryptic society belongs, a structural analysis is made of some of the records, with particular reference to the relations between crypto-Jews and Roman Catholics, and to the secular and religious elements of Jewish traditions, habits, laws and learning as reflected in religious behaviour. Some features of a hermetic society are examined, such as

secrecy and endogamy, and a few facets of crypto-Jewish life such as messianism and redemptorism. Finally, the change caused by the 'rejudaization' of Sephardi crypto-Judaism is discussed, namely the impact on the Sephardi converts of the third and fourth generations by the coming of the Exiled of 1492, the so-called Portuguese 'New Christians', in the wake of the Peninsular Union of 1580, an impact which is one of Caro Baroja's chief discoveries and which is the basis of Parts III, IV, and V. A few sections are also given in Part II to a short outline of 'secret society' in contradistinction to 'secret association', the emphasis being of course on the secret society as a religious sect or faction, since crypto-Judaism is the main topic of research. However, the fact is stressed that by definition such a subject would resist the work of recording, describing, and interpreting its hidden organization and the process of communicating its ideas and beliefs from generation to generation.[4]

In studying Jews in Modern Spain, Caro Baroja has adopted the ethno-historical method with the same structuralist approach he has followed in his ethnological studies of Iberians, Basques, Berbers, and a few other Mediterranean ethnic minorities, as well as in most of the historical reconstructions he has chosen to make since he first set pen to paper.[5] And in the general introduction to the book under review[6] he fervently advocates the intensive structural analysis of complexes of facts of the most disparate institutional kinds, instead of simple psychophysical inferences, for the understanding of social phenomena. My complaint, however, is not against the application of the structuralist approach to the problem of Sephardi crypto-Judaism, but rather against the casual way Caro Baroja uses, or sometimes fails to use, it.

As examples, let me single out, first, the equation he tries to create between Jewry and Ghetto in the Diaspora;[7] second, the double incompatibility between the Visigothic Bishops and the Jews in seventh-century Spain and the Neogothic Inquisitors and the Jews in fifteenth-century Spain; finally, the tracing of the whole inquisitorial procedure and even the Holy Office of the Inquisition to this racial incompatibility, which Caro Baroja wants us to believe is one variant of the so-called aryo-semitic antinomy.[8] But let me reassure the reader at the start that, although the special hypotheses singled out for discussion run counter to historical structuralist analysis, Caro Baroja's general theory of Christian-Jewish social conflict remains wholly right.

To take the first case first, whether the equation is valid for the Mediterranean Diaspora or not I leave others to decide, but it certainly does not work when applied to Jewry in al-Andalus before 1146 or to Jewry in Reconquest Spain before 1212, both of which are social structures of as different a pattern from that of Jewry in Visigothic Spain, and for that matter from traditional Jewry in the Diaspora,

as Ashkenazi Jewry following the eighteenth-century Haskala was different from Central European Jewry before 1791. Indeed, Arabized Judaism from the tenth century on, during the Caliphate and for as long as the petty states into which the mighty al-Andalus was broken up lasted, had developed certain patterns of life very much at variance with that reflected in the Mishna and Talmud, that is, the Oral Law of the pietists of Central European Jewry as well as of the Sephardim before 711. It was in the al-Andalus of this period that a secularized way of life came into being for the first time in Jewish history, affecting the socio-economic structure as much as the life of the people and their culture, literary, artistic, and scientific. It is the 'Golden Age' of the Hispanic cycle of Jewish culture, its greatest in fact in post-biblical times.[9] Now, the growing secularization of social life in the Jewish community and the ever-increasing growth of secular culture plagued Jewry with fundamental differences out of which tense internal social conflicts prepared the ground for mass apostasy a few generations later. The foundations of Jewish existence in al-Andalus collapsed when the Almohades in the forties of the twelfth century, by enforcing social and religious unity throughout Maghreb al-Aqsa (into which al-Andalus had been politically integrated by conquest), compelled those Jews who had managed to survive the sword to renounce their faith, publicly at least. Rabbi Moshe ben Maimun, the greatest name in Jewish medieval history, could survive the sword only by becoming a marrano type of convert to Islam from 1146 to 1165. The forced conversion weighing heavily on his conscience, he decided to emigrate to Egypt, there to return to the old faith. However, before leaving Maghreb al-Aqsa, he wrote his *Iggeret ha-Shemad* ('Letter concerning Apostasy'), a famous *Responsum*[10] in which he sets out to contradict the current doctrine that a Jew who uttered the formula of Islamic confession could no longer be regarded as a member of the Jewish community, thus laying down a confession for many generations to come and the prologue as it were to the long history of the marrano type of converts, the *Anusim* or crypto-Jews of whom he had been one for ten long years.

Maimonides, after all, was only the most famous among Sephardim to flee from al-Andalus to the East. A far larger number had sought refuge in Northern Spain, carrying with them the patterns of social life and culture that had been developed in al-Andalus as the foundations for Jewish existence under Christian rule. Soon the religious conflict flared up between Jews leading a secularized way of life and the traditionalist party who insisted on defending the honour of the Mishna, which rent the Jewish communities during and after the 'Maimunist Controversy';[11] and, as Y. Baer says, more descendants of those secularized Jews were to betray their faith during the period of great trial lasting from 1391 to 1492 than at any previous period of European history; their scions, in turn, would yet be haled before the

tribunals of the Inquisition, charged with professing no positive faith whatsoever.[12]

I come to the second case in point. Caro Baroja, following the lead of Montesquieu, Herculano, and a few others, states that the Visigothic Bishops were all of Indogermanic origins (how do we know?), and the Inquisitors merely pursued the Visigothic anti-Jewish policy as codified in the *Forum Judicum*, XII, 2, 16, on behalf of the Spanish ruling powers, whose representatives claimed in the fifteenth century direct descent from Visigothic stock. We finish up with a 'Gothic Code' vs. 'Deuteronomic Code' social structure, that is, Gothic vs. Jewish conceptions of 'social structure'.[13] Now this is historically inaccurate, to say the least. Both the Visigothic and the Neogothic anti-Jewish Laws are derived (when they are not just copied, as is often the case) from Later Roman Law as it came to be compiled in the *Codex Theodosianus* (438) and in the *Codex Justineaneus* (534) or in Church Law, upon which the Visigothic anti-Jewish legislation of the 'Concilia Toletana' as frozen in the Visigothic mould of the *Forum Judicum* code (655) rests. To try in a review article to trace the Visigothic anti-Jewish legislation of *Forum Judicum*, XII, 2, 16, would be ridiculous; the English reader can do bits of the research himself if he cares to peruse the pertinent legal texts in Marcus's Source Book.[14] It follows that when the Visigothic King Sisebut (612–21) had the resolution passed that left the Jews with no choice but forced baptism, he was enacting a law which was as much ecclesiastical as it was political, a law that can be traced back to Later Roman Law and to Church Law, both of which were hostile to the Jew, ultimately reducing him to the status of second-class citizen or expelling him from Western European Christendom in the course of a few centuries. Or, to come closer to our point, the incompatibility between Visigoths and Jews, although based perhaps on social-anthropological as well as on social-economical presuppositions, is mainly underlined by social-religious prejudices going back as far as the period following the alliance of the Christian Church with the Roman Empire, when Christian theological dogmas began to be frozen in the mould of the Later Roman Law by virtue of which the state rulers began to curtail Jewish rights in accordance with Christian doctrinal teachings and practical legal rules of the Church.[15]

Finally, neither the whole nor part of the inquisitorial legal procedure nor the Holy Office of Inquisition itself has anything to do with racial incompatibility, be it of the so-called aryo-semitic or any other species. To begin with, it is incorrect for an ecclesiastical court in which the public power of the Church is manifested to full capacity to be dubbed 'royal'. The inquisitorial jurisdiction (the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, that is, to deal with the detection and punishment of heretics and other persons guilty of an offence against orthodoxy) can have been delegated only by the Church, since the office of the bishop and *a*

fortiori that of the inquisitor had always been considered to be under the power of the Church. As a matter of interest, the detection and capital punishment of heretics, especially since the tenth century, had been common practice throughout European Christianity, the first of her victims significantly having been the famous Spanish theologian, Priscillian, Bishop of Abula, with six of the leading Priscillianists, burned alive at Trier in 385, by order of the Emperor Maximus. Underlying it was the theory asserting the necessity for capital punishment of heretics by the secular arm, following the rubric 'De edicto Imperatorum in damnationem haereticorum', law 5 of 'De haereticis' in Justinian's *Code*. But the legislation against heretics, in which the penalties of death, banishment, and confiscation of property became formulated within a regular procedure to be followed throughout the centuries, is to be referred to the Emperor Frederick II's imperial constitutions from 1220 to 1239, fully supported by Pope Honorius III and above all Pope Gregory IX (1227–41), who was the first to introduce new methods of inquiry and judgement and to create the Inquisition proper, and who in 1232 appointed the Dominican Alberic with the title of 'Inquisitor haereticae prauitatis' to discover and repress heretics in Lombardy. The 'Officium Inquisitionis haereticae prauitatis' once regularly instituted, its jurisprudence or 'Ordo processus inquisitionis' had to be elaborated by successive additions and subtractions.

As far as the Iberian Peninsula is concerned, it was at the request of Pope Gregory IX's chief adviser on inquisitorial legal matters and his Penitentiary, the famous Catalan canonist, Ramon de Penyafort (1175–1264) (who is on record as having compiled and elaborated for Gregory IX the first inquisitorial jurisprudence, the *Ordo processus Inquisitionis*, 1235) that the Holy Office of the Inquisition was established by the papal bull 'Declinante iam mundi vespere' of 26 May 1232, sent to Esparrac, the Archbishop of Tarragona. The latter's successor, Archbishop Peter d'Albalat, was in 1242 to convene the Synod of Tarragona to decide on the ways and means by which the prescribed 'Ordo processus Inquisitionis' was to be carried out in the Confederacy of Aragonese States. The system of 'inquisition' thus introduced for the Aragonese States was later on developed to such a high degree of technical elaboration by the Catalan Dominican, Nicholas Eymeric (1330–1399) in his infamous *Directorium Inquisitorum* that, having been received in Catalonia first and then in the rest of the Confederacy of Aragon, it was eventually accepted as the Inquisitor's Guide in the whole Iberian Peninsula. Once the instrument of organized mass repression and violent execution had been established, it was soon found to be just the thing to pry into the private life of converts suspected of observing Jewish rites. As early as July 1267 Pope Clement IV had sent the Archbishop of Tarragona the notorious bull *Turbato Corde* to become a directive of the inquisition for the prosecution of converts

from Judaism who reverted to their old faith, of Christians who accepted Judaism, and of Jews who dared proselytize among Christians or Converts.[16] Moreover, mass arrests and prosecutions had only to wait for the general anti-Jewish revolt of 1391 in the whole of the Peninsula, when N. Eymeric, the Inquisitor General of Aragon, started the detection for trial and punishment of those Jews who, having chosen conversion in preference to martyrdom while the troubles lasted, began gradually to revert to Judaism once they were over. So huge were their numbers, indeed, that King Alphonso V of Aragon was prevailed upon to set up the Inquisition in the Aragonese kingdom of Valencia, and Fr. Andrew was appointed the first in a long line of Valencian Inquisitors General on 20 March 1420.[17] He and his successors were soon also to be seen hard at work arresting for trial and punishment thousands of Judaizing Christians up and down the realm of Valencia, and the earliest inquisitorial trials of Sephardi crypto-Jews that have been preserved in the National Historical Archives are those of Valencian Judaizers by the Valencian Inquisitors of the Confederacy of Aragonese States, the first of them dating from 1467 to 1469.[18]

All this time the Confederacy of Castilian States had kept out all papal intervention in point of heresy, even after the era of Jewish decline had set in with the troubles of 1391, and the converted Christians from Islam and Judaism had risen to unmanageable proportions in all parts of the Peninsula. Not until the third quarter of the fifteenth century did the Mendicant Orders begin to pester the Church, the Crown, and the Government to assist them in the introduction of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in the Confederacy of Castile. The debates themselves started about 1461, and then went on for the whole of the reign of Henry IV (1454–74) with no positive results and during the first years of that of his sister and successor, Isabella of Trastamara (1464–1504). The new monarch, however, had in 1469 married the King of Sicily and heir apparent to the throne of the Confederacy of Aragon, Ferdinand of Trastamara, and he also became in 1474 joint ruler of the Confederacy of Castile, which *ipso facto* was turned into a Dyarchy. At the death of his father in 1479 Ferdinand, already Ferdinand V of Castile, inherited the states of the Confederacy of Aragon of which he became the sole ruler under the name of Ferdinand II of Aragon, as he is now known. He was, then, the monarch of the Confederacy of Aragonese States and one of the dyarchs of the Castilian Confederacy. So, as the monarch of a Confederacy of states where the Holy Office of the Inquisition had for so long been successfully tackling the problem of Christian converts relapsing into their old faith, he must have given much thought to the idea of introducing it into the Castilian Confederacy, even though it ran so patently against the trend of policy in Castile, where converts had already been filling the higher ranks of Church and State and, anxious to remove the distinction between 'Old'

and 'New' within the State, were still keener to close its doors to their rivals, the Jews, public and secret. With such a pious woman as Queen Isabella as his wife and other dyarch, consent was probably not hard to come by, and the Church was also willing to oblige, since the scales in the debate were tilting on the Mendicants' side, and the reigning Pope, Sixtus IV (1471–84), was a Mendicant himself. The Pope, ready to act without waiting to be told, issued the bull of 1 September 1478 granting the establishment of the Holy Office of Inquisition in the Confederacy of Castile and authorizing the dyarchs to appoint Inquisitors General where needed according to the procedural practice of the Inquisition. After some delay, the first Inquisitors General for Andalusia were appointed in September 1480. Scarcely had they issued their first Edict (2 January 1481) when most of the suspects took to their heels and went as far afield as Saragossa, while the Judaizers in high office had managed to stage an armed uprising in the house of the most powerful of them, Jacob Susan, and succeeded in sending their agents to the Pope to negotiate a settlement. These facts must have given the Inquisitors of Andalusia, the Dyarchs of the Confederacy, and the Pope a foretaste of things to come, for they all agreed on the appointment of eight Inquisitors General at international level within the Peninsula, that is, with jurisdiction over both Confederacies of which Ferdinand was monarch or dyarch, that they might deal with fugitives wherever they were to be found. By his brief of 29 January 1482, the Pope granted the King the right to appoint to Castile as many Inquisitors at a national level as he thought fit. By his bull of 11 February 1482 eight new appointees to office were confirmed by Pope Sixtus IV, among them the notorious Thomas Torquemada, with jurisdiction confined to the Castilian Confederacy. But by another bull of 18 April 1482, the Pope gave Ferdinand the *placet* for the reformation of the Holy Office of the Inquisition within the Confederacy of Aragon (only in the Peninsular States of Aragon, the Balearic Isles, Catalonia, and Valencia) so that it could be brought in step with what was being set up in Castile and both made to work for the solution of what to Ferdinand appeared to be a problem of international security within the two Confederacies. As soon as the Pope had dismissed the Inquisitors General of each realm within the Confederacy of Aragon, he issued two bulls, one of 2 August 1483 confirming the appointment of Thomas Torquemada as the Grand Inquisitor General for the Castilian Confederacy, and the other of 17 October 1483 confirming his appointment as the Grand Inquisitor General for the Aragonese Confederacy.[19] At Torquemada's death in 1498, the Archbishop of Seville, Diego Deza, his successor, was also separately appointed to each Confederacy. When Isabella died in 1504, at the separation of the two Confederacies each Confederacy got its own Grand Inquisitor General again until, upon the death of Ferdinand of Aragon in 1516, all the Peninsular States except Portugal

having been reunited under his daughter, Joan of Aragon and Castile, Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht (the future Pope Adrian VI), Bishop of Tortosa, reunited in himself the posts of Grand Inquisitor General in the two original founding Confederacies. Around the new Grand Inquisitor General there grew an advisory Council to the Monarch, the Council of the Holy and Supreme Inquisition, its president ex officio being the Grand Inquisitor General. Later, the posts of President of the Council and of Grand Inquisitor General fell to different persons, and to the end of the existence of the Inquisition there were two different offices in the Council under two different secretariats for the two founding Confederacies of the Peninsular Union under the ruling representative of the House of Trastamara.

Having set the stage with a comprehensive analysis of crypto-Jewry and of the position of the Christian converts from Judaism in the context of their conflict with Spanish society, Caro Baroja continues his exposition in Parts III and IV, respectively entitled 'The Judaizer and his Role in Spanish Society' and 'Problems of Integration'; these take up Vol. II, together with which should be read the first five chapters of Part V. Here the behaviour and motives of a large number of individuals of the most variable character are examined. They all belong to that social group of Sephardim who, in the years 1492–96, preferred to stay on where they were Jewish-born Spaniards rather than emigrate to live in a ghetto. All in all, it is the considered estimate of the author that not less than three-quarters of them came back in the end and stayed put in the Iberian Peninsula after 1496, to join the movement of wholesale conversion that had been going on since 1391. Of all the converts about half at one time or another must have been Judaizers.[20]

Of these Caro Baroja has chosen to study a mere sector in the light of the historical structuralist method, so that we can see them as so many examples of the centuries-old conflict between two Hispanic social structures: that of the minority sector of the crypto-Jewish closed secret society, always on the move after 1492, and that of the majority sector of the Christian Establishment. We watch the Hispanic crypto-Jew as he joins in the struggle for final adjustment in the majority sector of the Christian Establishment, or as he rises up the social ladder of power, or as he ends up in complete failure because of inadequate social flexibility or rigid personal repugnance to such exclusive institutions as the nobility test or the clean blood bill imposed on those eager to get in by those already in; the latter were now anxious to draw the line between the faithful and the faithless and close the doors of State and municipal posts on their rivals, their former fellow-faithless crypto-Jews, now considered alien elements. Those who did manage to pass the social barriers soon won wide judicial and administrative powers in various spheres of public life. Caro Baroja presents us with

masterly analyses (based chiefly on their own declarations as witnesses for their partners or in self-defence at their own trials) of a few of the lucky ones among the mercantile crypto-Jews, up to now entirely unheard of in Spanish economic history. And thus an imposing group of leading financiers, so far practically unknown, is rescued from oblivion and thrown into the main stream of European economic history. Outstanding among them are the banker John Núñez Saravia, the big business men Francis López Pereira and Jacob Gómez de Salazar, and the contraband traders of the Cardoso Rodriguez family. We are also introduced to a few politicians and diplomats, of whom Fernández Villarreal (ancestor of Lord Beaconsfield) and Ximénez de Fonseca (ancestor of the notorious Venetian dictator Daniel Manin), among many more, are of particular historical interest. Typical of them all, however, are the Cortizo family,[21] originally pedlars and shopkeepers grown to be State rent-gatherers, tax-farmers, bankers, State contractors, etc., who rose rapidly in Church and State, some to be soon knighted for services to the Establishment, some to be placed in rather queer positions such as that of a Familiar of the Inquisition (an unpaid subordinate official).

The Inquisition trials, in addition to trials proper, recorded their personal circumstances—their ancestry, way of life, religious practices, etc.—and thus it is that for Caro Baroja they have been wonderful vantage points from which to observe the circumstances of the social conflict with which the minority sector of the crypto-Jewish closed secret society had to deal. Unfortunately, he does not analyse the socio-religious institution itself (the Inquisition or the ecclesiastical court outside State jurisdiction which the civil government maintained for the defence of the established religion), about the nature of which he chooses to follow the ideas currently accepted instead of attempting to analyse it from the same historical structuralistic point of view as that from which he has analysed (with remarkable success) its opposite number in the conflict, the crypto-Jew. Only the trials by the Inquisition of Toledo have been drawn upon for the arguable reason that, of all those preserved in the National Historical Archives, they alone are well-nigh complete.

The remaining five chapters of Part V, significantly entitled 'The End of the Conflict',[22] need not detain the reader only interested in social history, for they belong somehow in the field of folklore or, in the most perfunctory way, in the field of ethnographical description, the object in the author's mind apparently being to present Spanish society as it looks without the age-old 'Jewish problem', once the assimilation of the last crypto-Jews was over or their integration complete. The rest of Vol. III is taken up with 68 Appendices, the long bibliographical list of manuscript and printed sources, and five extremely useful indexes. As befits modern social history, the book

appears lavishly illustrated with 248 excellent reproductions, highly illustrative of the text which, in spite of their artistic quality at times, go a long way to suggest that book illustration is less an art than a branch of sociology.

The impartiality, sound method, and the approach adopted and by and large consistently pursued in the development of its specific theme, make this work a landmark in modern Spanish social history, for the author has put on the map almost singlehanded a cryptic society, of which not a few of its members played an outstanding role in shaping some of the social features setting apart the Modern from the Old Regime.

NOTES

[1] See *Insula*, XIX, 1964, p. 11.

[2] Vol. I, pp. 19–270.

[3] Ibid., pp. 271–534.

[4] In a paper read on his reception as a Fellow of the Royal Academy of History and published under the title, *La Sociedad criptojudía en la Corte de Felipe IV*, Madrid, 1963, Caro Baroja has enlarged on this point of crypto-Judaism as a secret society (pp. 16–39).

[5] See his *Algunos mitos españoles y otros ensayos*, Madrid, 1942.

[6] Vol. I, pp. 11–18. Here he announces the forthcoming publication of a course of lectures he delivered during the second term of the 1958–59 session at the University of Coimbra on the structural approach in Social Anthropology (p. 17, note 10). See also the epilogue to the work under review, Vol. III, pp. 215–76.

[7] Vol. I, pp. 26–38.

[8] Ibid., pp. 151–64.

[9] See D. Gonzalo Maeso, *Manual de Historia de la Literatura Hebrea . . .*, Madrid, 1960, pp. 437–572.

[10] B. A. Lichtenberg, ed., *Qobez teshuboth ha-Rambam ve-iggerotav*, Vol. II, Leipzig, 1859, pp. 11c–15b.

[11] See J. Saracheck, *Faith and Reason: The Conflict over the Rationalism of Maimonides . . .*, Williamsport, Pa., 1935.

[12] Yitzhak Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, Translated from the Hebrew by Louis Schoffman, Vol. I, Philadelphia, 1961–5722, pp. 236–42.

[13] See note 8 above.

[14] R. Jacob Marcus, *The Jew in the Medieval World. A Source Book: 315–1791*, Philadelphia, 1960. Compare, e.g., pp. 3–7 with pp. 20–3.

[15] That the European Christian-Jewish social conflict arose out of the Christian social religious totalitarianism from the Fall of the Roman Empire onwards, is shown by B. Blumenkranz's analysis of the anti-Jewish laws enacted by the Christianized Roman Empire and the Early Medieval Church. See his *Juifs et Chrétiens dans le monde occidental, 430–1096*, Paris, 1960.

[16] A. Potthast, ed., *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, Berlin, 1875, no. 20082.

[17] See V. Ferrán, *Fr. Andrés Ros, primer Inquisidor General de Valencia*, Castellón de la Plana, 1922.

[18] *AHN.*, Inq., leg. 538, no. 42.

[19] See B. Llorca, *Bulario Pontificio de la Inquisición española en su período constitucional. . . .*, Rome, 1949. The texts of Pope Sixtus IV's bulls are found in pp. 48–108.

[20] See Vol. I, pp. 177–211.

[21] See the Cortizo genealogical tree in *La Sociedad criptojudía . . .*, pp. 66–7.

[22] Vol. III, chs. VI–X, pp. 146–249.

SHORTER NOTICES

ISIDOR MARGOLIS, *Jewish Teacher Training Schools in the United States*, xvii + 349 pp., National Council for Torah Education of Mizrachi-Hapoel Hamizrachi, New York, 1964, $5.00.

SHELDON S. BROWN, *Guidance and Counseling for Jewish Education*, 88 pp., Bloch Publishing Co., New York, 1964, $2.95.

These two books, both concerned with the provision and training of teachers for Jewish schools in the United States, are very different one from the other. The first is a mine of facts, the second a plea for an idea.

Dr. Margolis traces at length and in great detail the history of six American Jewish teacher training schools, Gratz College in Philadelphia, the teachers' institutes of the Jewish Theological Seminary and of Yeshiva University and the Herzliah Hebrew Teachers' Institute all in New York, the Hebrew Teachers' College in Boston, and the College of Jewish Studies in Chicago. He describes the events that led to the foundation of the institutions, supplies biographies of the founders, notes the curricula, lists the teaching personnel as they came and went, discusses the financial problems and the problems posed by two world wars, and traces year by year the student enrolment. Everything is there, fully documented, the essential mingling with the inessential. The reader is left to do the sifting aided only by the shortest of summaries at the end of each school history and by a list of eighteen conclusions at the end of the book in a short chapter headed 'Summary and Comparisons'.

These conclusions raise questions with which Dr. Margolis hardly deals. We are told that 2,191 teachers graduated from the six schools up to 1950, i.e. in about fifty years. How far does that go towards supplying the needs of United States Hebrew schools? We are told that Yeshiva University graduates pioneered the Hebrew day school movement. That merely repeats a statement on another page. One of the conclusions is striking: in five of the six schools Hebrew has been the language of instruction for a quarter of a century.

Although the curricula of the schools are noted in detail, the data indicate the range but cannot indicate the depth of the studies. Sample question papers might have helped to complete the picture in that respect.

Dr. Brown's book is a sincere, sometimes eloquent, sometimes impassioned, plea for the introduction of *Guidance* into Jewish schools, both day schools and part-time classes. By *Guidance* Dr. Brown means, in the words of a dictionary definition he quotes, 'A process of dynamic interpersonal relationship designed to influence the attitudes and subsequent behavior of a person'. He believes that by *guiding* pupils from the age of about eleven, he will solve two problems. He will combat early-leaving (or 'dropout' as the American idiom has it) and he will provide work that will give part-time teachers a full-time occupation and therefore make the occupation of the Jewish teacher more effective and more attractive.

To prove his point he chose a class of 24 ten- to twelve-year-olds, subjected them to questionnaires, group meetings, and interviews through a school year, visited their homes, made available a selected library and recorded books borrowed, and made case studies. The results, he maintains, justify his method.

It is reliance on this 'proof' that is the weakest part of Dr. Brown's thesis. Twenty-four is a small number on which to base statistical conclusions. There was no control group. The 'proof' in fact amounts to no more than that a small group on which special care was lavished repaid the attention. The smallness of the group makes some of the conclusions read quaintly. It was not surprising that sociograms merely corroborated the author's subjective identification of the aggressive children. He would be a poor teacher who could not pick them out from twenty-four. Nor was it surprising to discover 'a positive relationship between negative attitudes of the children toward religious education and the negative attitudes found in their homes'.

The reviewer was and remains puzzled by the arithmetic. We read, on page 18, that an analysis of a questionnaire completed by the twenty-four students indicated a decrease in the dislike of Hebrew by 23 per cent of them. How many did in fact come to like Hebrew more? If six pupils, then the percentage was 25 per cent; if five pupils then it was 21 per cent.

It would be fairest to conclude that Dr. Brown has made out a *prima facie* case which should earn him an opportunity to have his thesis tested with an open mind, by an objective teacher, in a large school.

HAROLD LEVY

RAPHAEL MAHLER, *Hasidism and Haskalah in Galicia and the Congress Kingdom of Poland in the first half of the nineteenth century* (in Hebrew), 519 pp., Sifriat Poalim, Merhavia, Israel, 1961, n.p.

Raphael Mahler's comprehensive study is an important contribution to the social and religious history of the Jews in Galicia and Poland in the first half of the nineteenth century. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century and beyond, the pattern of Jewish life was still static and traditional. Soon, however, and partly under the impact of the two great formative movements, Hasidism and Haskalah, Jewish life was to undergo deep cultural and social changes which would gradually revolutionize the entire way of life and social behaviour of the Jewish masses in Eastern Europe and herald the renaissance of the latter part of the nineteenth century which culminated in Zionism and Jewish socialism.

In the last two generations or so, Hasidism has attracted a great deal of attention from Jewish writers and scholars who have tried to interpret and explain the phenomenon of this unique religious movement in modern Jewish history. Dr. Mahler's approach to the problem of Hasidism is purely social and economic. He attempts first of all to understand the social climate of the movement and its growing influence on the Jews in Eastern Europe. He sees in the early followers of Hasidism a kind of Jewish proletariat of the socially declassed and economically oppressed, to whom the social message of Hasidism brought new hope.

On the other hand, in the champions of the Haskalah with their rationalistic and utilitarian approach to the acute Jewish problem, Dr. Mahler sees the middle class of East European Jewish society who aspired to emancipation and universal franchise through the medium of secular knowledge and European culture. Dr. Mahler rightly emphasizes the fact that flourishing commercial centres like Lemberg (Lwow), Tarnopol, and Brody became the strongholds of the early Haskalah movement in Eastern Europe and the seats of modern Jewish learning. From here too came the champions of the Enlightenment who fought their unrelenting battle against fanaticism, backwardness, and obscurantism which they saw personified in the main in Hasidism. A special chapter, supported by new documentation, deals extensively with the militancy of Joseph Perl, one of the foremost maskilic writers of that period.

Though a social factor was undoubtedly inherent in the rise and development of the hasidic system of thought, one should, however, take care not to oversimplify matters. Of course, economically the mass of Jews in Galicia and Poland in the early part of the nineteenth century lived on the verge of destitution. Legal discrimination, heavy taxes, and civil disabilities imposed untold sufferings upon the Jewish masses. Hasidism with its social message came as a liberating force to many of the poor and oppressed, but it was essentially a revivalist movement of an incredible intensity of religious feeling and of deep mystical emotion. Although Hasidism took care of the poor and tried to alleviate the suffering of the Jewish masses, it was, it seems, primarily concerned with spiritual regeneration. Classical Hasidism, as Scholem points out, was not the product of theory but of spontaneous religious experience. It was, according to Scholem, 'a burst of mystical energy' and of new religious ideas and conceptions which inspired the ordinary untutored Jew with hope and a sense of joy. Contrary perhaps to the aim of the Enlightenment, the intention of Hasidism was to reform Judaism from within.

In the second part of his study, Dr. Mahler gives us an elaborate account of the social and economic position of the Jews in Poland, their culture and religion, and their political struggle for elementary civil rights under Russian rule in the first half of the nineteenth century. It is a vivid story of frustration and hope. Of particular interest to the student of Hasidism is the chapter on Polish Hasidism in which Dr. Mahler deals in a most competent manner with the two outstanding schools of thought represented by R. Bunem of Pshyshe (Przysucha) and R. Mendel of Kotzk. Here we get for the first time a comprehensive analysis of a system of thought, both original and radical, put forward by these two outstanding spiritual leaders who made their imprint on the later stages of Hasidism and helped decisively to shape it. The personality of R. Mendel of Kotzk is fascinating; he was a man of profound ideas and a keen dialectician, outspoken and uncompromising in his views, who fought a long and grim battle against the conventionalism and formalism which had recently set in in the formerly vigorous movement. Kotzk's was a system of sharp insight, an instrument of psychological analysis and self-knowledge. Kotzk preached the superiority of intellect, a revival of rabbinic learning against a commercialized Zaddikism and the plebeian belief in cheap miracles and wonder-workers. It is, however, very

questionable to assume, as Dr. Mahler does, that this new trend of the learned and highly sophisticated minds of hasidic leadership tended to establish a bridge between the spiritual elite and the new Jewish middle class in Poland who might prefer intellectual discourse and rabbinical learning to the rather popular version of pure Zaddikism. Was Kotzk such a big attraction to the newly emerged well-to-do? The fact is that R. Mendel shut himself up in his room for the last twenty-five years of his life, admitting no one and driving away from his 'court' the rich and the miracle-seekers who besieged his house. Inside sat a lonely old man, grief-stricken and longing for an unattainable goal in his quest for spiritual perfection.

The book is a most stimulating story of Polish Hasidism with its challenge and failings, related on a broad canvas of political and social events, and supported by an abundance of striking quotations and sayings drawn from the rich collections of hasidic writings. The author has also included valuable documents and contemporary material which should serve as a source for the study of Jewish cultural and social trends in Eastern Europe in the last century. It would be a particular service if Dr. Mahler's work were translated into English so that the English reader might have access to a most competent study of modern Jewish history.

J. MAITLIS

JOSEPH KAGE, *With Faith and Thanksgiving: The Story of Two Hundred Years of Jewish Immigration and Immigrant Aid Effort in Canada*, xiv + 288 pp., The Eagle Publishing Co., Montreal, 1962, $5.00.

Jewish immigration to Canada is of importance to the historian and social scientist not only for its own sake, but also for its intimate associations with migration to and from Great Britain and the United States. Dr. Kage, Director of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society of Canada, offers an account of Jewish immigration into his country without, however, paying much attention to these broader aspects. *With Faith and Thanksgiving* is heavily slanted towards the history of immigration law and Jewish communal assistance; in this latter connexion, much space is rightly devoted to Dr. Kage's own organization. As a result, the reader may often be overcome by a feeling that the Jewish immigrant, who is after all the subject of immigration history, is lost amid the communal leaders, government ministers, and social workers who crowd these pages.

Regrettably, the style is infelicitous. Numerous passages are redolent of organization rhetoric: there are too many 'three-pronged attacks' on 'four-fold problems', for which money must be 'mobilized'. Much of the material is barely digested; the author has missed the firm hand of an editor.

With all the shortcomings of this book, it is still a genuine, conscientious effort. Louis Rosenberg's inestimable demographic studies aside, no one has yet written anything of substance on Jewish immigration to Canada: for his pioneering we may thank Dr. Kage.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

POUL BORCHSENIUS, *The Son of a Star* (1957, Trans. F. H. Lyon, 1960, 224 pp. 25*s*.); *The Three Rings* (1954, Trans. Michael Heron, 1963, 242 pp. 30*s*.); *Behind The Wall* (1957, Trans. Reginald Spink, 1964, 218 pp. 30*s*.); *The Chains are Broken* (1958, Trans. Michael Heron, 1964, 236 pp. 28*s*.); *And it was Morning* (1960, Trans. Reginald Spink, 1962, 218 pp. 28*s*.). A five-volume Post-Biblical History of the Jews. George Allen and Unwin, London.

Pastor Borchsenius was a vigorous and inspiring figure in the famous operation by which nearly all Jews in Denmark were rescued and secretly ferried to Sweden. But in him the Jewish people found more than a friend in need; they found a modern Herodotus with an inexhaustible fund of anecdotes and character sketches. He is blessed also with a robust and vivid style and has been well served by his translators (though some fall into the usual traps of a translator—for example Ebjonites for Ebionites or Ahasverus for Ahasuerus).

The sheer knowledge of Jewish history displayed in these volumes is immense. It is both detailed and penetrating; and his facts make a unique and immensely readable amalgam with the irresistible passion for the tallest and most improbable stories. Indeed, sometimes these get the better of him; and we hear more of the *Dibbuk* than of the scholarship and influence of Rabbi Loewe of Prague, more of the fantastic legends of later antisemites than of the still more fascinating and incredible true story of Nathan Rothschild and the battle of Waterloo.

The order in which the volumes were composed and translated has been both a strength and a weakness. It has allowed each to be a complete story in itself, but it also militates against the presentation of the strange unity of Jewish history.

The first volume tells in considerable detail of the period from the Roman occupation of Judea to the death of Bar Kochba. There follows the story of the Jews in Roman, Visigothic, Muslim, and Christian Spain. Here one sees the weakness of making separate stories out of Jewish history. The volume opens with a statement of the *complete* departure from Eretz Israel of the whole Jewish people. But in fact there never was a total departure. Jewish life in 'Palestine' is a continuous story. The same weakness appears in the third volume, *Behind the Wall*. It tells the story, little known, from the formal institution of the 'ghetto' in the sixteenth century up to emancipation. This allows no adequate place for the story of the immensely important influence of Christian theology and Christian politics on Jewish history, and leaves out the significance of the *servitudo camerae* and the complete loss of rights in Christendom, a rightlessness lasting well into the nineteenth century. *The Chains are Broken* tells the story of emancipation; and in the last volume Jews return to their ancient land after the bitterest chapters in their whole history.

One of the delights of the volumes is the graphic intrusion of Pastor Borchsenius's own experience and travels to illuminate his pages. The merits of the sustained knowledge and passion of the writing outweigh the defects in order and comprehensiveness. These are volumes easier to pick up than to put down.

JAMES PARKES

LOUIS J. SWICHKOW and LLOYD P. GARTNER, *The History of the Jews of Milwaukee*, xix + 533 pp., illustrations, maps, Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1963, $6.00.

The study of Jewish communities in the United States has already produced many volumes. In the past these have tended to be sociological and statistical analyses of the community as it was at the time of the investigation, although there have also been some notable historical studies (such as Hyman B. Grinstein's history of the Jewish community of New York to 1860). In recent years, however, communal histories, as distinct from communal surveys, have begun to appear in increasing numbers. In particular, the American Jewish History Center of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America is arranging a series of studies: Cleveland, Milwaukee, Los Angeles, the agricultural communities around Vineland, New Jersey, and Montreal. The studies are being undertaken by a partnership of a professional historian from the Center and a local Jewish resident with historical interests. The book under review is the first of this series to be published.

One must emphasize for the benefit of those used to the trivial grubbings in minute-books which pass for local Jewish history in England (and no doubt elsewhere) that these American Jewish communal histories are real histories, not mere dabblings in antiquarianism. The Milwaukee volume, for instance, makes full use of all the available source material, whether in public, communal, or private custody; and has also used oral history (which means tapping the memories of participants in the events described, but using some discretion in evaluating them). The technique followed by the authors of the study was no doubt influenced by the guidance given in the *Writing of American Jewish History*, the proceedings of a conference of historians in 1954 (published in 1957). It is clear that, using these techniques, the history of a Jewish community can provide the subject-matter for real historiography. What matters is that the writer should not look at his local material in isolation, but should relate it to the course of both universal Jewish history and to that of the city or wider community, which provides the environment for the local Jewish group. (The present reviewer has indicated how these principles could be applied to Anglo-Jewish historiography in a contribution to the recently published *Jewish Life in Modern Britain*.)

The study of Milwaukee is a particularly good example of a communal history which relates the development of a Jewish community to its environment. There are two special features about Milwaukee's history and both are fully brought out in the study. First, it was in the nineteenth century a centre of German population and culture. Second, politically it has shown strong left-wing associations: socialism in the city and the La Follette agrarian radical tradition in the State of Wisconsin. These two features tied in with the Jewish history of Milwaukee, which begins in the 1840s. Jewish immigration to America from 1840 to 1880 was largely of Central European origin. This is illustrated, for instance, by a table showing that of 47 Jewish immigrants to Milwaukee in 1844/5, 24 came from German lands, and 20 from the Habsburg empire. It is true that more Jews emigrated from Poland and Russia in the 1860s and 1870s to America than was previously thought (and the Milwaukee evidence provides some confirmation of this). But it remains

basically correct that Milwaukee Jewry, and much of American Jewry, was of German origin in the 1840–80 period.

In Milwaukee, which was then known as the 'German Athens', the Jewish community formed (until the Eastern European immigration) a sector of the German settlement. It was proudly identified with German culture and German associations; sermons were preached in German; and for three years (1880–2) it even published in German a bi-weekly Jewish cultural publication—*Die Zeitgeist*—to which Graetz, Hermann Cohen, and Adolf Jellinek made notable contributions. German was the second language in the city's schools; and German teaching was, in fact, supervised by a Jewish educational official (Bernard A. Abrams).

The Russian immigration of 1883 and later altered all this. It created in the centre of Milwaukee the conventional ghetto district, with its own orthodox synagogues, Yiddish cultural life, benefit societies, and distinctive economic callings and social life. The authors of the study produce new and valuable evidence on how immigrants, after arriving elsewhere in the United States or Canada, were eventually 'moved on' to Milwaukee; and the study throws light on the important role played by the Industrial Removal Office. But in the development of the Russo-Polish settlement also one can see the influence of the local environment. It is not unduly fanciful to associate the radical and socialist tradition of the area with the special strength of left-wing Jewish movements in Milwaukee—the Poale Zion and the Arbeiter Ring (Workmen's Circle) in particular; and with this were associated Yiddish culture and schools. Milwaukee was a centre of Yiddish education and maintained a Folk Shule (which eventually in the 1940s, somewhat improbably, merged with the Talmud Torah). Milwaukee Jews went into American politics at every level and in each of the main parties. But it is significant that the outstanding Milwaukee Jewish political figure was the socialist congressman, Victor L. Berger; and the only Jew to hold municipal office in a city-wide constituency was the socialist City Attorney, Max Raskin. The early life of Milwaukee's most famous Jewish resident, Golda Meir, illustrates something of the history and character of the Russo-Polish settlement. Her father, Moshe Mabovitch, a carpenter, had originally settled in Chicago but was moved by HIAS to Milwaukee—an example of the industrial removals policy; and she herself was a member of the Poale Zion Folk Shule; there is a charming photograph in the book of her in 1916 on a group outing.

The converse of the left-wing strength in Milwaukee can be seen in the relative weakness of religious orthodoxy. Although the original congregations were orthodox, between 1860 and 1880 orthodoxy and sabbath attendance had virtually disappeared in Milwaukee. This was true both of the specifically reform congregation Emanu-El and the older congregation, nominally traditional B'nai Jeshurun. This was in spite of the fact that the majority of Jews in Milwaukee were recent immigrants from Europe. This development illustrates a number of factors: the predisposition of German Jews to reform, the isolation of individual American communities, the influence of Isaac Mayer Wise, and the equation of reform with higher social status. This last point is shown by the formation of Emanu-El in 1869 in the fashionable 'East Side' and the general recognition that reform Judaism was more

attractive socially. As the authors write: 'most leading Jews were affiliated with this synagogue. Influential in civic and fraternal affairs and prominent in commerce, this connexion with the synagogue enhanced the status of membership in a Jewish house of worship. It was the proper choice for respectable and prosperous people.'

The post-1883 immigration produced two separate communities: the 'German' and reform congregations of B'nai Jeshurun and Emanu-El forming a separate community from the closely knit 'ghetto' community of Russo-Polish origin with their orthodox *Hebroth*. There is a difference from the situation in Anglo-Jewry, where the established community was still sufficiently traditional for the new orthodox elements to be willing, in the main, to integrate with it. In Milwaukee, the fusion of the two communities of the 1880–1925 period did take place in the 1920s and 1930s. But it was at least partly due to the decline in religious observance throughout Milwaukee Jewry. Although there was a Jewish hospital, it did not provide kosher food; public communal functions were not kosher; and, in spite of the efforts of individuals, orthodoxy seems to have leaked away as Jews moved out of the old Jewish 'ghetto' district to newer suburban areas.

In the last decades covered by the study (to 1950), Milwaukee seems to be conforming more to the common American Jewish pattern. Religious conservatism, which came late to Milwaukee, has established itself as a central religious trend; there is evidence of a return to elements of Traditional interest in the Reform congregation; the Lubavitch Hasidim are active; and the communal scene is dominated by Israel-oriented organizations. The need to raise funds for Israel, and to take political action in the Zionist interest, as well as natural pride in the new state, have all provided a new cohesion in communal organization. The Milwaukee study gives a mass of facts but the outlines of its main trends show through: it is a model and illuminating history.

V. D. LIPMAN

H. RABINOWICZ, *A Guide to Life: Jewish Laws and Customs of Mourning*, 144 pp., Jewish Chronicle Publications, London, 1964, 12*s*. 6*d*.

Intended primarily as 'an elementary guide for the layman', this useful little book is in effect a manual of instruction to orthodox Jews on the behaviour required of them when bereft of a near relative. Sociologists, unless particularly interested in the ample evidence given here of how Biblical texts have been transformed into minutely-prescribed and intricate rules of conduct, will probably find more scope for curiosity in the narrow circle of relatives for whom full mourning is demanded (it consists merely of parents, spouses, children, and siblings), and in the statement (pp. 47–8) that, in case of mixed marriages, burial in a Jewish cemetery is permissible for the child of a Jewish mother, but not for the child of a Jewish father. The author, possibly because of the audience for whom his book is designed, says nothing about the reasons for this difference; nor, incidentally, does he tell us why his very brief statement on the attendance of women at funerals should form the second paragraph of a section headed 'Plucking Grass'.

I. SCHAPERA

HOWARD BROTZ, *The Black Jews of Harlem*, x + 144 pp., Free Press of Glencoe and Collier Macmillan, New York, 1964, $4.50.

The subject of this book is one which I should have liked to study, and I therefore began reading it with high hopes. They were fulfilled.

The Black Jews of this study are the Commandment Keepers Congregation of the Living God; numbering about 1,000 they form the largest of Harlem's Black Jewish groups. The Commandment Keepers have evolved a kind of worship which 'looks at first sight to a visitor like a Jewish service' (pp. 49–50). They have regular services on Sabbaths and festivals, observe many of the dietary rules and study Jewish history and Hebrew, which they regard as the Lord's language, the holy language, to be held in awe and reverence as a most sacred possession. The group's leader, Wentworth A. Matthew, is a well-known and respected figure who has been frequently written about in Jewish and Negro papers and in the general Press.

The Commandment Keepers are working people. Many of them are in semi-skilled occupations in the commerce and light industry of New York; a few of the men have skilled trades. The older members are West Indians who, at least until fairly recently, tended to look down upon the Southern Negro as servile and lacking in dignity. The group insists on self-restraint; one of its proudest boasts is that it is free from crime and juvenile delinquency. The Commandment Keepers claim descent from Ethiopia whose ancestral religion, they assert, is Judaism. They reject Christianity not only because it is the religion of the whites, that is, those responsible for their humiliation and suffering: they maintain that it is based on an erroneous doctrine, that the true religion is Judaism, and that the Black Jews, the lost tribes of the House of Israel, constitute the Chosen People. (Discussing Christianity, one of Dr. Brotz's informants provides the most striking illustration of the influence of environment on culture that I have heard for a long time. 'When some English missionaries were up with the Eskimos, they told them that if they didn't become Christians, they would go to hell. They all said they'd love to go to a place where there was a little heat', p. 24.)

Now Judaistic movements among the spurned and scorned who long for freedom, self-respect, and dignity, are not unprecedented. But, apart from the redemptive message of Judaism, there is the existence of Jews. Dr. Brotz comments, 'although they often answer in the affirmative when asked whether they experience "anti-Semitism" too, I am not sure they really understand what is involved in this question' (p. 55). How could it be otherwise? To the average Negro, the Jew, so much whiter and so much better off than the Negro, must be an enviable person; and the Commandment Keepers, notwithstanding their claim that true Jews are black and white Jews are frauds, would apparently like to be accepted as legitimate Jews by their fairer brethren. Do they then hope *eventually* to exchange their Negro status for Jewish status?

I am unimpressed by the assertion that, no matter how white Jews view the Commandment Keepers' service, 'the phenomenon of Negroes wanting to be Jews cannot help but make some appeal to Jewish solidarity' (p. 51). Having frequently noted the lack of solidarity between coloured and white Jews—or, for that matter, between Jews of the same colour—I would point to the

failure of any representative body of Jews to take any significant steps to promote fraternization between themselves and Negroes who profess to share their faith. Is it not more likely that some individual Jews are inspired by feelings of guilt towards the Negro rather than by motives of Jewish solidarity?

In the second half of this book Dr. Brotz relates the Commandment Keepers sect to the main stream of the American Negroes' quest for community and identity; that is, to their efforts to overcome the pain of not having a unique culture of their own—'of which a religion and a political history are such characteristically essential elements'—by proclaiming the recovery of a lost religion and a national identity. Intertwined with the myths of the sects which form the subject of Dr. Brotz's study are many elements which are shared by other Negroes. Among these, for example, are the veneration of Ethiopia, until the colonial period in Africa was ended 'the only historic country on that continent which had withstood the partition of Africa among the colonial powers'. Another element which is central to the Black Jews but which has certainly found popular expression outside, is the view that the black man in Africa was the creator of all civilization—'including not only material culture but also moral, religious, and philosophical principles' (pp. 82–3).

But the belief in the 'golden age' prior to enslavement is just as misleading as the view that the Negro has nothing which is not derivative from or dependent upon white culture. For 'Granted that the Negro began his experience in this country in complete subordination to the white man's language and ideas, this has not prevented him from interacting with this out of his experience in his genuinely unique situation to produce, if not a culture, a *style* that is his own'. However, if the Negro is to make his contribution to the perfection of his country he must regain his self-respect. And it is the role of white society, Dr. Brotz argues, to encourage the kind of social and political fabric that would support the Negro's quest—'repayment of the unpaid debt the United States owes the Negro, who was, indeed, as the Black Jews correctly say, robbed of his self-respect' (pp. 130, 132).

This is an immensely stimulating book, valuable to both black and white alike.

SCHIFRA STRIZOWER

LLOYD CABOT BRIGGS AND NORINA LAMI GUÈDE, *No More for Ever: A Saharan Jewish Town*, with Appendices on Physical Anthropology, Demography and Social Structure, pp. xi + 108, Papers of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, Vol. LV, No. 1, The Peabody Museum, Cambridge, Mass., 1964, $5.65.

No More For Ever is a curiosity-stirring title that suits the theme of the book: 'It tells of the ancient Jewish community of Ghardaia in the Sahara, whose members fled the desert and the continent of Africa in May and June 1962 . . . the picture that we saw has been destroyed. A peculiarly distinctive way of life, call it a culture or a social structure if you will, vanished from the face of the earth almost overnight' (p. 3).

Where had this group come from in the first place? The tradition reported by the authors is that four families of Jewish craftsmen from the island of Djerba, off the Tunisian coast, were brought to Ghardaia some six or seven centuries ago to engage in metalwork—work which the Moslems could not or would not undertake themselves. Some two centuries later Ghardaia served as a place of refuge for Jews escaping major pogroms in another part of the Sahara. In the nineteen-fifties the total population of the thousand-year-old desert trading city of Ghardaia, some four hundred miles south of Algiers, was nearly 14,000 of whom 1,250 were Jews.

They lived in a ghetto-like quarter, the *mellah*—a 'peaceful yet somehow faintly oppressive setting' (p. 18). Most of them were engaged in metalwork (indeed, one of them was reputed to be the finest goldsmith in the whole of the Sahara) or were tailors. Some of the most prosperous owned grocery shops; others kept bars where Christians and Jews were served and also 'discreetly dark back rooms where Moslem customers could break the Koranic prohibition against alcohol without attracting undue attention' (p. 18). One of the richest families operated a freight-forwarding business. Freight offices, bars, and most grocery shops were open every day except on Yom Kippur. (And yet the authors talk of the 'extremely rigid orthodoxy' of Ghardaian Jewry! p. 33.)

The study is the result of three programmes of field-work carried out by Dr. Briggs in March 1955, and by both Dr. Briggs and Mrs. Guède, a nurse of twenty-five years' experience with Jewish and Muslim patients in Algiers, from 11 October to 1 December 1961 and from 20 April to 11 June 1962. But Dr. Briggs had visited Ghardaia more or less casually at least once a year since 1949. The authors have produced a fascinating picture, written with such enthusiasm that not only the *mellah* but all Ghardaia springs to life.

Some of their statements, however, indicate unfamiliarity with Jews and Judaism. For example, the authors write, 'Only very seldom do you see an individual whose face evokes the automatic reaction "That's a Jew" . . . The reason for all this is simply that these Jews were not really Jewish physically. Basically, they seem to have been eastern Berbers, that is, archaic Mediterraneans from the coastal area of North Africa, who had absorbed small quantities of immigrant Jewish blood in pre-Roman times, and later, following the expulsion of the infidels from Spain in 1492' (p. 11). They apparently assume physical features common to all Jews. (But, though comparatively few in number, Jews include a considerable diversity of origin. The fact has escaped notice because the majority of Jews in the Western world come from Eastern or South-Eastern Europe and these, because of their numerical predominance, supply the material for the non-Jews' conception of 'That's a Jew'. But they are only a section of Jewry, and their traits are sectional. There are no physical traits that belong to Jews universally.) Again, Sephardi Jews 'consider themselves vastly superior' to Ashkenazim (p. 11). In fact, the opposite is sometimes the case.

The reader is told that the *mellah* was 'a town within a town, a community whose members had no dealings whatever with outsiders or with their next-door neighbours of other faiths except commercially. Even Jews from elsewhere, near and far alike, were looked on as outsiders too. They were not often welcome except as passing visitors' (p. 3). But was the isolation of

Ghardaian Jews from their co-religionists quite as extensive as the authors suggest? For example, were their religious requisites, such as Scrolls of the Law and prayer-books, and their religious personnel, such as rabbis, furnished locally or did they have to rely for these things and services on co-religionists elsewhere? In any case, as there were no priests in Ghardaia, the ceremony of the Redemption of the Firstborn, requiring the services of a descendant of Aaron, involved contact with non-Ghardaian Jewry (p. 26). (The authors are to be congratulated on simply reporting the priestless state of the community without commenting upon its 'uniqueness' or drawing quite unwarranted conclusions from it—as is done by so many others encountering Jewish communities without descendants of Aaron in their midst!) Moreover, on leaving Ghardaia the poor opted for Israel and the rich for France, which surely shows that Ghardaian Jewry had enough contact with the outside to have a pretty shrewd idea of what lay beyond the Saharan horizon.

Were the relations with the non-Jewish world really confined to commerce only? What about the 'occasional discreet visits' by Arabs to the *mellah* in order to persuade the Jews not to leave as the brutal elements that were now harassing them 'would have to be allowed to have their fling but only for a short time'? The argument fell on deaf ears 'for even the most welcome words lose meaning in the face of actions that speak with a much louder and very different voice' (p. 78). But weren't these words prompted as much by friendship as by commercial considerations?

One would have liked to learn more about the relations within the community. For example, 'Three or four consecutive marriages were by no means uncommon for either a man or a woman, while two particularly hardy souls, one of either sex, had each embarked on the uncertain seas of matrimony no less than seven times' (p. 64). The authors comment that divorce was easy to come by. But the Ghardaian-Jewish husband had to return not only the dowry his wife had brought with her but also had to give her in addition twice its value. One wonders how he managed to discharge so difficult a financial burden so frequently.

The authors, who most certainly seem to have overcome Ghardaian Jewry's aloofness towards outsiders, comment on the 'overwhelming joy of being Jewish' and the feeling of 'so much for *them*', the non-Jews, 'what wretched fools *they* will look like on the Day of Judgement' (p. 74). The joy of being Jewish is indeed characteristic of Jewish communities; but there is also the strong Jewish belief in the existence of Righteous non-Jews who will look anything but fools on the Day of Judgement—a rather noble belief, considering the history of the encounter between the Jewish and non-Jewish worlds.

There are appendices on physical anthropology, demography, and social structure, and a number of superb photographs.

SCHIFRA STRIZOWER

JOSEPH BADI, *The Government of the State of Israel*, 307 pp., Twayne Publishers, New York, 1963, $5.00.

Mr. Badi's book has a misleading title, for while more than half of it is devoted to the process of cabinet formation, to the interests and influences

which affect the relative strength of parties and their representation in government, and to the relations between Knesset, the parties, and the cabinet, there is little or no discussion of the relations between central and local government, the division of tasks between ministries, the relations between ministries—often competing for the same resources and for the same domains of power and influence—while the civil service gets all of seven pages.

The book is in five parts: the first deals with the formation of the State of Israel, the second with the legislature, the third with the executive, the fourth with the presidency, and the fifth with the judiciary. In all except the second, information is sparse: there are fifty pages on the executive, most of which deal with the composition of cabinets.

A good feature of this book is that Mr. Badi offers a better and more complete explanation for the large number of political parties in Israel—particularly in the early years—and for the tendency for existing parties, at least those on the left, to divide or remain divided. Two hypotheses are usually offered, and are sometimes combined. The first is that the system of pure proportional representation encourages the emergence and survival of a large number of small parties. The second is the national character hypothesis: Jews are politically opinionated and are therefore prone to disagreement with one another. The first hypothesis is inadequate; for not all countries with this electoral system have as many parties as Israel now has or had fifteen years ago. The national character hypothesis is silly and has, in any case, been applied, in one form or another, to Greeks, Frenchmen, Irishmen, Arabs, and Dobuan Islanders (though not by those who truly studied these people), and fails to explain the considerable differences between them. Mr. Badi's argument—and it is a very simple one—is that these parties and interest groups existed before the foundation of the State, not only in Mandatory Palestine, but in the Diaspora. Their very existence, and the pressures which they exerted, made it necessary to adopt a system of proportional representation—though not necessarily of *pure* proportional representation; the adoption of the pure form was possibly meant as a temporary expedient—in order to secure a reasonable degree of political stability and unity and commitment to the system. Once the system existed, it did tend to encourage the formation of numerous small parties; though it did not take long for almost all except the six main ones—a big enough number—to disappear from the political scene. As for the fissiparous tendencies of the parties of the left, it is well known that ideologically committed groups do have this tendency, particularly, though not exclusively, when in opposition.

Mr. Badi mentions an important and interesting feature of Israeli politics: the complex structure of patronage. But he provides no systematic analysis of its nature and of its effects, particularly its inhibiting effects, in a number of fields of policy and administration. It is a pity that the author cannot make up his mind as to whether he is providing a handbook of assorted facts, or whether his primary task is to engage in the analysis of one or two aspects of Israeli political life which might be considered peculiar to it. The result is a work of mixed quality and of descriptive patchiness. There is a useful bibliography and an index.

PERCY S. COHEN

EILEEN YOUNGHUSBAND, *Social World and Social Change* (National Institute for Social Work Training Series No. 1), 166 pp., George Allen & Unwin, London, 1964, 21*s*.

The National Institute for Social Work Training, *Introduction to a Social Worker* (National Institute for Social Work Training Series No. 2), 105 pp., George Allen & Unwin, London, 1964, 15*s*.

These two books in the new 'National Institute for Social Work Training Series' make interesting, refreshing, and informative reading, particularly for those who may be aware that changes have been taking place in the theory and practice of social work but are unfamiliar with the precise agenda of the debate. They also provide a challenge to complacency and self-satisfaction for those engaged in the profession itself. Academic sociologists and psychologists and trained administrators will find flashes of insight and wisdom, particularly in the first volume, that may give them cause for reflection.

Eileen Younghusband's collection of lectures and essays, most of which have appeared in other contexts since 1952, gains significance from this unity of presentation. They demonstrate something of the extent to which social work has reacted to social change in the intervening years, and of the tendency to be more self-conscious and objective in evaluating its methods and aims. She traces the evolution of the ethos and practice of social work from the motivations of the early pioneers to the present situation where there is an attempt to intensify professional attitudes and comprehend a body of useful knowledge derived from a variety of social disciplines. Her discussions are uniformly calm, systematic, and informed with deep conviction. Few people are more qualified to speak of the changing lines of force in social work, and such chapters as deal with specific problems, e.g. those on the Juvenile Court, are informed with a rich range of first-hand knowledge.

'One of the greatest tasks in social work, as elsewhere' is seen by Dame Eileen as the need 'to lessen the gap between knowledge and its application, and to see that application gets through to the right people at the right point'. A related issue of no less importance is the need for disciplined imagination and the systematic use of research methods characteristic of the social and behavioural sciences in the area of social work. These two needs are seen to arise from the fact that in current conditions of rapid social change and mobility more people are more often subjected to greater stress and insecurity than in previous generations. There is likely to be no shortage of employment for social workers in the foreseeable future. Their training and areas of competence are adumbrated within a historical framework by the author of this book. The fact that the addresses were delivered in places from Finland to Brazil is an indication that though she may have been influenced by developments in the U.S.A., her own impact on the international scene has not been inconsiderable.

The second book, prepared by Florence Mitchell, is the outcome of discussions with practitioners and supervisors of social case work. It is likely to be of considerable value to people who may be considering entry into the profession, but who have only a vague idea of what is involved. It makes a strong plea for a unified profession of modern case work, 'child of the marriage between psychiatry and sociology'. The book combines a discussion of

theoretical aspects with detailed illustrations of case material and shows how the modern caseworker attempts to understand the behaviour of people in situations of stress and to use his skills in effective ways. This emphasis that caseworkers are concerned with the individual in his social relationships carries with it the corollary that social workers have a responsibility to be involved in movements for social reform and for improvements in the social services. Both books and the Institute that sponsored them are symptomatic of the attempt to narrow the gulf between pure and applied social studies.

E. M. EPPEL

OTAKAR MACHOTKA, *The Unconscious in Social Relations—An analysis of unconscious processes in personality, society, and culture*, xxiii + 321 pp., Philosophical Library, New York, 1964, $6.00.

The purpose of this book, as implied in the title and spelled out more specifically in Blumer's sympathetic introduction, to point out 'the role of the unconscious in social life in almost all of its breadth', is highly intriguing. Indeed it might well be regarded as an enterprise of great moment whose accomplishment would be a major contribution to our understanding of the relationship of psychological and social processes. The author is aware that he is setting his sights high and expresses his credo at the end of the book. He maintains that the study of unconscious factors in social life, and of the unconscious establishment and changes of social-psychological configurations, may well be 'one of the approaches which will enable us to grasp certain aspects of the laws governing reality, and may bridge part of the gap between sociology and psychology'.

The proposition may be regarded as impeccable, but despite certain interesting and occasionally novel asseverations and reflections, its working out is sadly defective. 'The Unconscious' is regarded as subsuming everything of which we are not fully aware, and it is perhaps inevitable that with this frame of reference what should follow is a somewhat heterogeneous collection of observations, ratiocinations, and studies whose rationale is somewhat confused and difficult to follow. The conceptual difficulties are increased by the method of presentation of the argument. The book reads like a series of detailed notes for seminars drawing on the contributions of a remarkably wide range of psychologists and sociologists, some of whom are only marginally relevant to the theme, and considerable ingenuity has been exercised to find a place for them. Sometimes they just appear as names or references without further elaboration and the conscientious reader is left to puzzle out their relevance or to refer to the plethora of footnotes, many of which offer little more elucidation than the text itself. These references indicate the breadth of the author's reading, but it is a legitimate requirement of the reader that the author should have provided more systematic selection and evaluation to make this pile of material meaningful. In this connexion, the nadir is probably reached with a ten-page chapter on 'Attitudes' with 65 footnotes. Apart from anything else, there is constant visual distraction in the succession of headings in various sizes of type, the parentheses, and the reference indicators.

Some of the illustrations are mundane or well-known, others, including

observations in Occupied Europe, are original and interesting, and teachers of psychology and sociology could well collect information and ideas that would be useful if they have the motivation and patience to sift through the material loaded into this book. The idea of this study is a good one and some of the insights are subtle and sensitive. It is a pity that the author should have seen fit to present them in a form that is little more than notes towards the definition of a book.

E. M. EPPEL

KARL R. POPPER, *Conjectures and Refutations, The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, xi + 399 pp., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, 40*s*.

Sir Karl Popper's *Logic of Scientific Discovery* presented the method of science as making conjectures and trying to refute them by experiment. His *Poverty of Historicism* offered the view that the doctrine of historical inevitability is not scientific in the above sense. His *Open Society* advocated a reformist social philosophy according to which we may try to criticize our social and political system and to improve it, criticize the improvements, and so on—in perfect analogy with the series of conjectures and refutations which, in his view, is science.

The present volume is a collection of essays most of which were written after these three books. The essays seem—quite mistakenly no doubt—to consist of snippets, of details which somehow failed to find their way into the previous and more comprehensive volumes. The author perhaps reinforces this impression when he suggests in his preface that the unity of this collection is the general theme that runs through them: '*we can learn from our mistakes*'. This thesis, as it stands here, is a platitude; and the author immediately adds that he wishes to incorporate it into a theory of rationality and of criticism. This is more interesting, but still not strikingly new. So he adds that he means to equate rationality with criticism, that there is no room within rationality for any finality in or justification of one's opinions. Here Sir Karl distinguishes himself from the majority of philosophers; but not from all of them, and thus far he does not differentiate this volume from his own previous works. This break is achieved when he adds the very controversial idea that all criticism is constructive: the elimination of error, in science and elsewhere, is in itself progress, a step nearer the truth. The preface does not herald this last idea as a recent achievement. But it really is.

The theory of stages of proximity to the truth, of the approach to the truth through series of theories which are false (though, obviously, they may contain a great number of true empirical statements), this kind of *scientia negativa*, is the culmination of the development of Popper's philosophy. It is certainly adumbrated in his previous writings, yet the idea is new, and very remote indeed from an original section of *Logic of Scientific Discovery* published in 1935, in which the idea of truth is rejected altogether as redundant. The essays in this volume are 'revised, augmented, and rewritten', but the spirit of the alterations is not indicated. In this period of rapid change the author's newest ideas may very soon penetrate the academy; if so, then we may look forward to a few doctoral dissertations in the near future discussing the re-

visions in these essays, distinguishing the stylistic ones from those, if any, necessitated by the author's intellectual development, and so on. All this, however, is secondary.

The essays in this volume are gems. They look like snippets, but, brief as they are, they are themselves great unifying themes. As a first choice of the essays the reviewer would propose that on the three views concerning human knowledge: first as knowledge of the nature of things, second as the achievement of usefulness alone but not truth, and third as the progression towards truth perhaps through an endless series of falsehoods. As second choice, one might take the essay in which the pre-Socratic philosophers are described as the forefathers of western civilization on account of their invention of the dialectic method, namely the method of criticism, in a process of myths developing into bold conjectures which invite criticism. As third choice one might take the essay expounding the author's theory of traditions which, in line with his likening of institutions and their reforms to conjectures and refutations, depicts traditions and customs as more akin to myths than to conjectures. To make things more exciting, one might add the essay on public opinion, which presents *vox populi, vox dei* as a liberal myth which we should reject and thereby reform liberalism.

These and other essays have touches of classical serenity; they are delightful to read, thought-provoking, and very useful as tool-kits for philosophers, social philosophers, and sociologists. Also, they have a touch of the classical in being great in their serious defects. The author's theory of western civilization is purely Greek: the Jewish element is totally ignored. A criticism of his view from a Jewish standpoint should be highly interesting. In previous works he portrays Judaism as a version of the doctrine of the Chosen People, which doctrine he sees as akin to Hegelianism. Consequently, one might expect his views on both tradition and liberalism to be utterly useless for, and irrelevant to the works of, Jewish sociologists and historians. Yet it seems to this reviewer that the author's theory of tradition is best exemplified by a better-informed and less-biased view of Judaism and Jews, and that his view of liberalism and its history needs to be modified so as to allow for the historical fact that Judaism, as a tradition, includes some sort of liberalism as a sub-tradition (to say the least).

There is, then, great interest and challenge in this volume, both generally and from the viewpoint specific to readers of this *Journal*. Another, quite intriguing, aspect of it concerns the development of the author's own philosophy. The volume includes a charming and lively intellectual autobiography, which has immediately and rightly achieved the status of a minor classic. We are also offered a glimpse of a different side of the author's biography in the essay in which we are told about the changes of views of Rudolf Carnap—our author's arch-opponent and the intellectual leader of the Vienna Circle—changes which came about partly because of our author's criticisms. Admittedly this essay is of some biographical and historical interest, especially for those interested in positivism (scientism). But it is of a much more limited interest than other essays, and has a polemical flavour that is very different from that exhibited in other essays. The wisdom of including it in this volume may be questioned. The topic of the essay is the demarcation of science. The author insists that, as usual, he is very ready

to alter his views but only in the light of valid criticism; and this he has failed to find. He demarcates science as series of conjectures and (presumably empirical) refutations. This, it seems, is the source of the title of the present volume. The volume is further divided into two parts, one entitled 'conjectures', the other 'refutations'. These titles seem to present nothing more than a playful idea, a pun: the book is obviously philosophical, and thus obviously not scientific. The thought comes as a shock that possibly the author means his titles literally, that perhaps he considers this volume as scientific: possibly, in spite of all his important arguments against the positivist identification of all (extra-logical) significant ideas as scientific, he is prone to equate all (extra-logical) criticism with empirical refutation, and thus to equate rationality with science, and consequently to view his own work as scientific. At least, this is the impression one may get.

JOSEPH AGASSI

SIMON NOVECK, ed., *Contemporary Jewish Thought: A Reader*, xix + 378 pp., with introductory notes by Simon Noveck, Vision Press, London, 1964, 35*s*.

SIMON NOVECK, ed., *Great Jewish Personalities in Modern Times*, xiii + 366 pp., with introductory essays by Simon Noveck, Vision Press, London, 1964, 35*s*.

These two volumes form part of the B'nai B'rith 'Great Books Series' designed to popularize Jewish knowledge and like others in the series were edited by Rabbi Noveck, former Director of the B'nai B'rith Department of Adult Education. The selection of essays by the nine Jewish thinkers in the first volume has been skilfully made and the essays classified into three main trends: East European, German, and American Jewish scholarship respectively. The second book, whose subject is some Jewish personalities and their role in the evolution of Jewish life in the Diaspora and Israel deals with fighters for Jewish emancipation, religious leaders, two literary figures (Bialik and Sholem Aleichem), and, finally, architects of the Jewish State.

While the first volume, in addition to potted biographies and a brief evaluation, contains excerpts from the work of each Jewish thinker, the second is a collection of essays on the various personalities. The editor has written an introduction to each group explaining the context in which each thinker worked or works. The actual choice of essays is quite clever, as they afford a comparison between the thinking of some of the writers. For example, a comparison between Achad Ha-am and Mordecai Kaplan's essays on the concept of the Chosen People, or Aaron David Gordon and Hermann Cohen on atonement, or Buber and Rosenzweig on education, throws into sharp relief the contrasts or similarities in the thought of these philosophers. My only quarrel is with the title: why 'contemporary'? Surely none of these thinkers is 'contemporary' in the true sense of the word. I suspect the volumes were written for young Jewish readers in the hope that they might be stimulated to further reading; but men long dead or very old are not their contemporaries. The adjective modern—misused to some extent in the volume of biographies—would, perhaps, be more to the point, but then this

might be too pedantic a view as many Jewish historians would probably hold that modern times begin in fact with Moses Mendelssohn.

The only question that remains to be answered is whether these books are necessary or serve a purpose. In the first volume sources are given, at least for the excerpts; in the second, titles are mentioned for further reading. From the wealth of these it would appear that the object of the publication of two more anthologies was to gratify the increasing taste for reading in digest-form. Those engaged in adult education must not pander to this trend.

ELIZABETH E. EPPLER

JACOB NEUSNER, *Fellowship in Judaism: The First Century and Today*, with a Preface by ROBERT A. NISBET, 76 pp., Vallentine, Mitchell, London, 1963, 12*s.* 6*d.*

This is a curiously unsatisfying book. If it be true that it is to be judged as an exceptionally profound example of Jewish sociology (as the Preface alleges), then it underlines the constant statement that Jewish sociology is a very neglected subject. It treats of three ancient groups of members: those who fled from daily life to form the Qumran fellowship; those who separated themselves from their brethren, while remaining inhabitants of the cities of Judea, to form the Pharisaic fellowship; and those who formed the fellowship of scholars after the destruction of the Temple under the leadership of Johanan ben Zakkai.

What is unsatisfying is that at no point do any of the fellowships come alive as being of spiritual or historical significance. Only on p. 73 does the author provide a definition of fellowship which is both interesting and exciting—and the book ends on p. 74.

The most unsatisfactory of the three descriptions is that of the Pharisaic *haburim*; and this perhaps provides a classic example of the inadequacy of purely literary sources, especially when these are not even contemporary. From an exhaustive examination of rabbinic literature Dr. Neusner describes a group concerned only with the precise and literal fulfilment of certain of the Biblical injunctions about food consumption and ritual purity. It is a description which might fit some present rabbinates. But, unlike those contemporary bodies, the Pharisees and the scholars undoubtedly provided the spiritual dynamo which kept the whole Jewish people and the whole religion of Judaism alive through times as perilous as the present; and this finds no explanation in Dr. Neusner's descriptions.

JAMES PARKES

RAPHAEL STRAUS, *Die Juden in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt A/M, 1964, 227 pp., DM 20; paperback DM 12.

This is an historic essay written in the years 1937–41 and published belatedly by the author's widow. Straus, emigrating from Germany to Palestine, tried along with many of his contemporaries to find an answer to the riddle of German Jewry's fate by looking back to its history. Straus's attention is fixed first of all on the field of economics. Jewish activities were in the Middle Ages limited by adverse legislation and this goes a long way to explain their one-

sided occupational distribution even after Jews achieved legal equality. In spite of the limitation, Jews played a pioneering role in German economics. Defamation and persecution are to be attributed to religious and national prejudice and to this alone. Straus, it is true, regards the Jew's lot only as one case of the foreigner who always suffers from misrepresentation and hate. None the less, he feels the need to examine the special features of the case of the Jew which are derived from his religious standing and his national tradition; this is done in the last few chapters of the book.

Although the book is clearly influenced by the situation in which it was composed, it makes rewarding reading even today. The first and greater part is a lucid and enlightening survey of German Jewish economic history: Being first of all a historian of economics, Straus could in this field rely upon his own research contained in his various publications, listed at the end of his book. When it comes to religious issues, Straus is less of an expert, and some of his statements are startling while some of his facts are patently wrong. (The medieval rabbinate's standing on the question of interest cannot be equated with that of the Church. Hillel the contemporary of Jesus is mixed up with a later sage of the same name (p. 144).)

The book will, however, not be read for its details but for its stimulating suggestions. It will also be read as a testimony of the German Jews' endeavour to fathom their own fate.

J. KATZ

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(*Books listed here may be reviewed later*)

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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DESHEN, Shlomo A., B.A., Research Associate in Social Anthropology at Manchester University; formerly Research Assistant, Dept. of Sociology, Hebrew University; among his publications are: 'Stability and Change in a Village of Djerban Immigrants', which appeared in *Studies in Rural Sociology in Israel* (Hebrew, mimeo.), Hebrew University, 1964, and *Political Struggle in Moshav Zevulun* (Hebrew, mimeo.), Kyriat Gat: Jewish Agency Settlement Dept., 1962.

FINESTEIN, Israel, M.A., Barrister-at-law; chief publications: editor, James Picciotto's *Sketches of Anglo-Jewry*, London, 1956; *Short History of Anglo-Jewry*, London, 1957; 'Sir George Jessel 1824–83', *Trans. Jewish Hist. Soc.*, vol. XVIII, 1958.

GARTNER, Lloyd P., M.A., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History, Teachers Institute and Seminary College of The Jewish Theological Seminary of America; chief publications: *The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870–1914*, London, 1960; and with L. J. Swichkow, *The History of the Jews of Milwaukee*, Philadelphia, 1963.

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