4 Vols as Mr. GLICKSON

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME SIX 1964

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd, 15-16 Queen Street, London W1

CONTENTS

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

AUTHORS OF SHORTER NOTICES

BOOKS REVIEWED

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME VI NO. 1 JULY 1964

CONTENTS

PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd, 15–16 Queen Street, London W1

Annual Subscription £1.1.0 (post free)—Single Copies 12s 6d net

Applications for subscription should be addressed to the Managing Editor, The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 55 New Cavendish Street, London W1

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD
FROME AND LONDON

THE JEWISH POPULATION OF POLAND IN 1931*

S. Bronsztejn

IN THE 1930s Poland was one of the largest Jewish centres in the world: Polish Jewry came second only to the Jewish population of the United States in absolute numbers, and to that of Palestine in relative numbers. This group and its problems were the subject of a number of academic studies and monographs, but the most thorough source of material about various aspects of Jewish life in Poland was provided by the two inter-war population censuses. The first of these was made in 1921, the second ten years later.

The 1931 census was carried out in accordance with modern methods and the published results enable one to investigate various cross-sections of the different groups in the population, including the Jews. The final results of this census were published only in 1939, but Fogelson, Bernstein, and Chmielewski had started on a detailed analysis of them before the actual outbreak of war.

The war interrupted this work and also made it impossible to carry out the resolution passed at the annual session of the Executive and Central Council of the Jewish Scientific Institute (YIVO) in Wilno in December 1938. This resolution had recommended that a group of experts should prepare a statistical study under the title 'The Jews in Poland', to be based on the 1931 census.

In the inter-war period much was written about the Jews in Poland. The literature ranged from serious academic studies by scholars of the calibre of Szulc, Schiper, Bornstein, Tartakower, and Leszczynski (Lestschinsky), to scurrilous publications whose value and objectivity is indicated by their titles: 'In Jewish Bondage', 'The Restoration of Confidence and the De-Judaisation of Poland', 'How the Jews Dominate Us', and so on.

Before 1939 there were vigorous protests from every liberal and progressive quarter in Poland against the increase in antisemitic propaganda and incidents. These came from the representatives of different social strata: from peasant students in the Folk University on the one side and Professor Tadeusz Kotarbinski on the other; Adam Prochnik and Maria Dabrowska; Leon Kruczkowski and Bishop Chomyszyn.

* Translated from the Polish.

The political convictions of various groups in Polish society could be gauged by their attitude to the Jews. But little was known about the Jews themselves; Jaroslaw Iwaszkiewicz, an eminent Polish writer and a good friend of the Jewish people, made the apt comment: 'We lived with these people under the same roof for many centuries. Yet we knew them so little and saw them in a distorting mirror.' [1]

On the twentieth anniversary of the Wilno resolution I undertook, so far as my modest means allowed, to carry out the wish of the last session of the YIVO Central Council to be held in Poland. It was my hope that the material assembled and analysed here on the demographic, occupational and social characteristics of Polish Jewry in the inter-war period might be useful to students both of Jewish life and of the social and economic problems of pre-war Poland.[2]

Poland between the wars was a plural state in which 'national minorities' (in the Polish usage) made up over one-third of the total population. Each national group differed considerably from the others in such features as the degree of territorial concentration, rural or urban residence, demographic processes, occupational, social and economic indices, and so on. If to these we add differences of religion and varying degrees in the operation of traditional forces, we can understand the psychological differences between the groups.

The distinctive character of the Jewish population was developed over a thousand years of history. The long story of the Jews in Poland abounds in elements which link the two peoples inhabiting a common homeland: suffering and struggle, the poverty and insecurity of the immense majority of the working classes, periods of upsurge and decline; internal dissension and strife, mutual resentments and accusations. All these elements are commonplace in every large human community in which national or ethnic groups are differentiated by class. The iron logic of the working of unity and the clash of opposites are conclusively shown here. The population of every multinational state constitutes on the one hand a compact whole and on the other hand is disturbed by a number of inner contradictions.

The process of Jewish settlement in Poland was facilitated by the comparative political liberties which they enjoyed there, as well as by favourable economic conditions. On the other hand, the economic function assigned to the Jews by the ruling classes made the group's occupational structure, and eventually the social and demographic structure, extremely unbalanced. In consequence, every historical cataclysm which has visited Poland, every change in the country's economy, left its mark on the situation of the Jews. As a result of the lack of political, economic, and social stability in the country, each Jewish generation has had, not just one legendary 'just man', burdened with all the sufferings of his people, but a host of sufferers for sins committed and uncommitted, doing penance for their own and other people's sins.

The situation of the Polish Jews can be more fully understood by considering it within the larger economic structure in which they lived. For owing to historical and political factors Poland between the wars was one of the most economically backward European states. After the country regained its independence in 1918, economic reconstruction had to start by making up the immense losses which the economy had suffered during the First World War and by setting up an integrated internal market out of the three sectors which had long been part of the economics of the three partitioning powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Poland's industry lagged behind that of most other European countries. Even in the better years output never reached the ceiling of 1913, and the quality of production was held back by obsolete equipment; this led to high production costs and thus to an unfavourable balance of trade. Additional elements influencing Poland's economic situation were: immense over-population in the rural areas, low wages and a low internal demand, permanent budgetary deficits, and a high rate of natural increase. Bartel, many times Premier of Poland, described the country's situation succinctly: 'Internally, Poland was and is a land of paupers'.[3]

THE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWISH POPULATION IN POLAND

In 1931 there were 3,113,933 Jews in Poland. This was an increase of 258,615 (8·9 per cent) over the 1921 figure, but the percentage of Jews in the total population decreased over the same ten-year period from 10·5 to 9·8 per cent. The reason for this decrease lay in the different rates of natural increase in the national groups and in the higher Jewish migration rate.

Both these features merit further consideration. With all the reserve required in a study of the population figures of this group, there is no doubt that both natality and mortality, and in consequence the natural increase, were much lower for the Jews than for the rest of the Polish population. According to Fogelson, the average annual coefficients of the natural increase for the total population of Poland were: for the years 1921–5, 16·2 per cent; for the years 1925–30, 15·5 per cent.

The corresponding figures for the Jewish population were 12·0 per cent and 10·3 per cent.[4] Without entering into further discussion of these figures, I should point out that for the two periods cited the decline in the natural increase rate was over three times larger for Jews than that for the country's population as a whole.[5]

At the same time the exodus of Jews during the intercensal period made up about 34 per cent of the total net emigration, a percentage more than three times greater than the percentage of Jews in the total population of Poland.[6] The basic cause of the different form of

demographic development found among the Jews was increasing pauperization.

In order to substantiate this view we shall cite some facts from the period. Bornstein shows that on an average 50 per cent of Jews were excused from paying their contributions to the religious congregation, while another 30–35 per cent paid only token dues. Thus we may conclude that between 80 and 85 per cent of the Jewish population were in a state of poverty.[7] The same economist also reports that during the issue of trading licences, which cost between 50 and 70 zlotys, about 70 per cent of all small tradesmen applied for loans to the Interest-Free Loan Banks.[8]

Analyses of household budgets carried out in a number of localities show that on the average Jewish families spent barely 10 zlotys a week on subsistence.[9] Reviewing the material situation of Polish Jewry, J. Leszczynski maintained that between 20 and 25 per cent lacked any real means of existence,[10] while other estimates put the percentage even higher, up to 30.[11] Finally, as a change from listing tedious figures, we may quote the National Party leader, Roman Dmowski, who was far from being pro-Jewish: 'The small-town Jews in Poland are falling into increasing destitution. No attention is paid among us to their complaints. Few people read the Jewish press, and even if the complaint were occasionally to reach the Polish masses, not much notice would be paid. But this time the complaints are more than justified. The rapid impoverishment of the Polish small-town Jews, who were in any case always poor, is an irrefutable fact. The small Jew, already poor, is becoming even poorer and fallinginto ever more appalling destitution.' [12]

The effects of pauperization, lack of regular sources of income and constant uncertainty about the future, were aggravated by antisemitic propaganda and even by pogroms (for instance, in Lwow in 1929, in Zloczow and Radom in 1931). The combination of all these pressures drove many Jews to leave the country and delayed the setting up of families. Of the total number of women of child-bearing age in Poland, 55·4 per cent were married, while for Jewish women alone the figure was only 48·2 per cent. Later marriages also led to a reduction in fertility, which is correlated with age. Other factors also played their part in producing the lower natural increase rate among Jews. One of these is found in the widely differing patterns of rural and urban distribution between Jews and non-Jews: in 1931 76·4 per cent of Jews lived in towns, whereas the corresponding figure for non-Jews was only 22·0 per cent. Urban residents are often under greater economic and other pressures to limit their families. Moreover, the Jews were still the pioneers of family planning in Poland, as a consequence of their wider contacts with other countries and their speedier emancipation from traditional bonds.

Unlike the other national groups in Poland, which lived in terri-

torially compact settlements, the Jewish minority was scattered unevenly over the whole country. Its territorial distribution was conditioned by the operation of a number of economic, political, and social factors of long standing. (See Table 1.)

TABLE 1. *The distribution and degree of concentration of the Jewish population in Poland according to the censuses of 1921 and 1931*

Provinces and cities (separately enumerated)	*Percentage of Jews*	*1931 Degree of concentration* (%)	*1921 Degree of concentration* (%)	*Coefficients of decrease in intensity of concentration* (%)
Poland	100·0	9·8	10·5	6·7
Warsaw (city)	11·3	30·1	33·1	9·1
Warsaw	7·0	8·7	9·6	9·4
Lodz	5·6	8·7	9·5	8·4
Lodz (city)	6·5	33·5	34·5	2·9
Kielce	10·2	10·8	11·8	8·5
Lublin	10·1	12·8	13·7	6·6
Bialystok	6·3	12·0	14·9	19·4
Wilno	1·8	5·2	5·2	0·0
Wilno (city)	1·8	28·2	36·1	21·9
Nowogrodek	2·7	7·8	9·2	5·9
Polesie	3·6	10·1	14·3	29·4
Wolynia	6·7	10·0	11·4	12·3
Poznan	0·2	0·3	0·4	25·0
Poznan (city)	0·1	0·8	1·1	27·1
Pomorze (Polish Pomerania)	0·1	0·3	0·3	0·0
Silesia	0·6	1·5	1·5	0·0
Cracow	3·8	5·6	6·0	6·7
Cracow (city)	1·8	25·8	24·8	−4·0
Lwow	7·8	8·6	9·4	8·5
Lwow (city)	3·2	31·9	35·0	8·9
Stanislawow	4·5	9·4	11·2	16·1
Tarnopol	4·3	8·4	8·0	−5·0

Several points in the table should be emphasized. In the first place, every fourth Jew in Poland lived in one of the five big cities: Warsaw, Lodz, Wilno, Cracow, and Lwow, as compared with only 6 per cent of the non-Jewish population. A further striking feature is the considerable proportion of Jews who lived in the most economically backward areas: the eastern and south-eastern provinces known by the sad but justified designation of Poland 'B'. Three out of every ten Jews lived in that area.

When we come to compare the percentage of Jews to the total number of inhabitants in the two census years, we note that it decreased over the ten years in almost all the territorial units listed. Exceptions were the city of Cracow and the province of Tarnopol, where the number of Jews increased slightly, and the provinces of Wilno, Silesia, and Pomerania, where the number remained unchanged.

The data given in the last column of the table enable one to compare the rates of decrease in the concentration of Jews in the various areas.

Differences between particular provinces were determined by the divergencies in demographic trends and migratory movements between the population as a whole and the Jewish group. Let us recall the major trends which produced the greatest divergencies during the decade in question. The Ukrainian and White Ruthenian minorities which predominated in the eastern parts of Poland had the highest rate of natural increase in the country. In the city of Poznan and in Poznan province, there was, in some years of this period, a decrease not only in the relative but also in the absolute number of Jews, amounting to 6·8 per cent for the city and 36·3 per cent for the province. A similar phenomenon, though it was caused by other factors, was noted in the province of Stanislawow, where the Jewish population decreased over the ten-year period by 1·6 per cent. Nor was Jewish emigration evenly distributed, the Jews from particular provinces being over- or under-represented in the emigration totals. For example, the ratio for Polesie province was 192 per cent, for Bialystok province 187 per cent, and for Wolynia province 119 per cent; for Silesia, however, it was only 17 per cent, and for Cracow province 54 per cent. To sum up, then, the changes which occurred in the degree of concentration of the Jewish population in various parts of the country were to be attributed to the differences in their economic situation in those areas.

The special occupational structure of the Jewish population in Poland determined their distribution between rural and urban areas.

TABLE 2. *The Jewish population in Poland by rural and urban settlement in the years 1931 and 1921*

	Year	Urban and Rural Areas	Urban Areas			Rural Areas
			Total	(a) over 20,000 inhabitants	(b) 20,000 inhabitants and fewer	
Percentage change in population between	1931 & 1921	108·9	111·1	122·1	97·3	103·5
Percentage structure	1931	100·0	76·4	46·6	29·8	23·6
,, ,,	1921	100·0	75·0	41·4	33·6	25·0
Percentage of total population	1931	9·8	27·3	26·4	28·8	3·2
,, ,,	1921	10·5	30·8	30·3	31·4	3·4

Over the decade 1921–31 there was an increase in the urban as well as the rural Jewish population, but the percentage increase of the latter group was nearly five times smaller than that of the non-Jewish population (17·2). The increase in the urban Jewish population occurred in the larger towns, but was accompanied by a contraction in the smaller towns. These changes, of course, produced corresponding shifts in the

group's distribution according to place of residence, the increase of the urban population being offset by a corresponding drop in the number of those residing in small towns and villages. The Jewish population was evolving in the same general direction as the total population, but the shifts were more intensive among non-Jews and they took different courses. This also affected the degree of concentration of the Jewish population. Its percentage of the total population in various types of settlement showed the largest drop in the big cities (12·9 per cent), the smallest drop in the villages (6·0 per cent). The changes in local distribution amongst the Jewish population which we have been considering were influenced not only by the dissimilar forms of natural movement and overseas migration already mentioned but also by the process of urbanization and internal migration. These questions deserve rather more attention. Sixteen Polish towns which were in the 'under 20,000 inhabitants' category in 1921 exceeded this total in 1931 and were consequently transferred from the 'small town' to the 'large town' category; this automatically caused all the indices for that group to rise. In 1921 the coefficient of concentration of Jewish population in those towns was 22·8 per cent—considerably lower than the country's average for small towns (31·4 per cent). During the next ten years their population increase was primarily due to the increase in the number of non-Jews, as is shown by the further decline of the coefficient of concentration of the Jewish population in these towns of 16·7 per cent in 1931. As they had already been included in the 'large town' category this produced a general decline in the degree of Jewish concentration in that type of settlement. If we were to assume that the process of urbanization in question had not taken place, we should obtain: total population of towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants, 5,107,000; Jewish population in the same towns, 1,385,000. The percentage of Jewish inhabitants would then have stood at 27·2 per cent, when in reality it was only 26·4 per cent.

In times of peace the gravitation of the small-town and rural population towards the large towns is a permanent process. At the same time the growth of the urban population is furthered by the incorporation of adjacent suburban areas into the cities. Thus Poland's urban population increased throughout the period despite the country's economic stagnation.

As Table 3 shows, the most dynamic changes occurred in the largest towns, of which many had a relatively small percentage of Jews: examples of such towns were Poznan, Bydgoszsz, Czestochowa, Katowice, and Sosnowiec. This was another reason for the relative decrease of the Jewish population in the large towns.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the rate of emigration from the larger towns was higher among Jews than among the rest of the population. This can be seen from the data on emigration from Warsaw.

TABLE 3. *The urban population of Poland by size of urban area (in each census year) in percentages of the total population*

Year	*Total*	*Towns numbering in thousands*			
		less than 5	*5–20*	*20–100*	*100 and more*
1921	24·6	3·8	6·8	6·2	7·8
1931	27·2	2·9	7·3	6·5	10·5

Thus, in the years 1927–9 emigrants from this city constituted 1·8 per cent of the total number of emigrants, whereas the population of Warsaw was 3·7 per cent of the country's population in 1931. The same indices for Warsaw's Jewish population were 14·7 per cent and 11·3 per cent. If, therefore, the proportion of 'large town' dwellers in the total Jewish population nevertheless continued to increase, it did so at the expense of the smaller towns.

The concentration of Jewish population in the larger towns was described by Wasilewski in the following words: 'The Jewish population from the villages moves into the small towns, from them to the larger ones, and forms strong concentrations in the largest centres.' [14]

Was this gravitation of the Jewish population towards the big cities attributable to the same reasons as those which affected the population as a whole? Undoubtedly economic factors were foremost in forcing the Jewish population to abandon their native small towns with their everlasting stagnation and crushing emptiness. But the matter does not end here; the conservative way of life in the small towns and their economic stagnation meant that survivals of the feudal past were slow to disappear; this particularly affected the situation of small-town Jewry.

In the larger towns industry developed more rapidly, and the processes of urbanization, increased productivity and proletarianization of the masses favoured the rise of a sense of civic equality amongst the Jews and also encouraged their class polarization. The character of the goods which they produced also changed with increased mechanization and factory production methods; machine-made goods carried no minority tag and their anonymous producers could therefore easily evade the boycott nets in periods of intensified antisemitism. The desire to achieve a real equality of rights with the rest of the population was thus an additional stimulus to Jews to settle in the larger towns, because they were centres of capitalist forms of production.

It should be emphasized that a secondary effect of urbanization was an increase in the number of Jews gainfully occupied within the Jewish community and a widening of their occupational range. This in its turn constituted a form of self-defence against various kinds of economic boycott, which struck primarily at persons occupied outside the community.

POPULATION STRUCTURE BY AGE AND SEX

Classification by age and sex holds a central position in demographic analysis. This classification serves both to indicate the demographic potential of various population groups and to provide valuable information about social progress, by characterizing the ageing processes of the population. Table 4 shows the structure of the Jewish population in Poland in relation to that of the rest of the population.

TABLE 4. *Distribution of the population by age and rural/urban residence in 1931 (in percentages)*

Type of locality	*Jewish population*				*Non-Jewish pop.*			
	0–14	*15–49*	*50–64*	*65 and over*	*0–14*	*15–49*	*50–64*	*65 and over*
Urban and rural areas	29·6	49·8	11·3	5·3	34·1	51·3	9·8	4·8
Total for urban areas	28·6	54·7	11·3	5·1	27·8	57·0	10·5	4·7
Principal cities (*a*)	25·9	58·4	11·1	4·4	23·0	60·8	11·4	4·7
Towns with a population of 20,000 and over (*b*)	29·5	54·6	10·9	4·9	27·9	57·6	10·1	4·3
Towns with a population of 20,000 and less	31·0	51·6	11·4	5·8	31·4	53·1	10·0	5·4
Rural areas	32·9	50·1	11·1	5·9	35·8	49·6	9·6	4·9

(*a*) Warsaw, Lodz, Wilno, Cracow, and Lwow.
(*b*) Without the cities mentioned in (*a*).

Table 4 shows clearly that the lower demographic potential of the Jews was conditioned by their geographical distribution. The immense predominance of rural dwellers among non-Jews was associated with a higher overall percentage of children among the latter. The situation was different in the five largest centres of Jewish population and in the other large towns where the proportion of children was higher among the Jews. This was because these centres attracted a large-scale influx of non-Jews from rural areas in search of work. These newcomers had not yet had the time to settle down or found families, and therefore had fewer children. This factor, together with the higher rate of Jewish emigration from the towns, accounts for the fact that in all types of urban areas the age-group 15–49 was proportionately smaller among Jews than non-Jews. The position was reversed in the villages, where the relatively smaller Jewish emigration rate accounted for the slightly higher proportion of this age-group among Jews than non-Jews. Because of the lower mortality rate, there was a larger percentage of Jews in the older age-groups. Only in the five largest cities, where life was harder and emigration had been proceeding for a longer period, was this percentage smaller.

Given such a structure the Jewish population obviously had a higher average age than the rest of the population. Within the Jewish group

there was a clear association between the size of the intermediate age-group and the type of settlement: the percentage was highest in the larger urban areas, lowest in the rural areas, where a larger percentage of children and very old people were to be found. This indicates the direction of Jewish internal migration.

If we compare the age structures of the urban and rural Jewish populations and that of each of these groups with its non-Jewish counterpart, we get the following indices:

Rural Jewish population Urban Jewish population	0–14 = 115%; 15–49 = 91%; 50–64 = 98%; 65 and over = 116%
Urban Jewish population Urban non-Jewish population	0–14 = 103%; 15–49 = 96%; 50–64 = 108%; 65 and over = 109%
Rural Jewish population Rural non-Jewish population	0–14 = 92%; 15–49 = 101%; 50–64 = 116%; 65 and over = 120%

These indices clearly show that there was a wider divergence between the structures of the urban and rural Jewish population than between the structure of Jewry and that of the rest of the population, a situation which seems to confirm Fogelson's thesis that 'the structural differences between the Jewish and the total population of Poland are basically of the same nature as the structural differences between the urban and the total populations in Poland, and in most other countries; in other words, the Jewish population presents the typical demographic structure of a strongly urbanized population'.[15]

Since the demographic potential of particular sections of a society is evidenced primarily by the proportion of children in the total number of persons, it is worthwhile correlating this index with the territorial distribution of the Jewish population. Having made one deviation from the accepted classification of the provinces by including Bialystok province in the eastern group,[16] to which it bears numerous resemblances, we obtain the following disposition of the marginal values of indices for the Jewish population.

TABLE 5. *Fluctuations in the proportions of children in the Jewish population of Poland in 1931 (by groups of provinces)*

Group of Provinces	*Urban and Rural Areas*	*Urban Areas*	*Rural Areas*
Central	31·5–34·9	30·7–33·3	34·8–37·5
Eastern	29·8–32·3	29·0–30·3	30·4–34·3
Southern	25·9–27·5	25·9–27·7	26·2–28·5

In all three groups of provinces we find the same kind of sequence in the percentages of children from urban to rural areas. Among more material reasons, it is worth mentioning the strong influence of the

traditional centres in the provinces of Lublin and Kielce, a factor which no doubt accounts for the high percentage of children found there. This high proportion of children was also influenced by the distribution according to size of settlement.

The evolution of the age pyramid of the Jewish population in the period between the censuses was unfavourable from the viewpoint of demographic potential.

TABLE 6. *Percentage of children in the 0–5 age group in the total Jewish population of Poland in 1921 and 1931*

Years	*Urban and Rural Areas*	*Urban Areas*		*Rural Areas*
		Total	*Over 20,000 inhabitants*	
1921	10·7	10·6	10·3	11·4
1931	9·6	9·1	8·5	11·3

In settlements of all sizes the indices for 1931 were lower than for 1921, the differences being accentuated in the larger centres. This change is all the more significant in that the data of the first census covered the group born during the war or immediately after it; that is, at a time when the country could hardly yet be regarded as enjoying full political stability. In his analysis of the working of the demographic laws of war in Poland, Professor E. Rosset stressed that in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the country, and to a certain extent in the central districts as well, the war against the newly-established Soviet Union had a destructive influence on the usual post-war rise in the birthrate.[17]

It should be pointed out that among the general urban population of Poland the situation was much the same: the index in question was 10·3 per cent in 1921 and 9·6 per cent in 1931. In the villages, however, the proportion of children in this group was different: in 1921—12·5 per cent; in 1931—13·6 per cent. But because the rural population in Poland was larger than the urban, the overall proportion of children in 1931 under 5 years of age was higher (12·5 per cent of the population) than in 1921 (11·9 per cent).

The ageing of the Jewish population and the similarity of its age structure to that of Western European countries is shown in the changing percentage of persons over 50 years old: in 1921—14·8 per cent; in 1931—16·6 per cent. For the population as a whole the indices for these two years were 14·9 per cent and 14·8 per cent. It will be noted that there was a slight decrease in the proportionate size of this group; this contrasted with development in the highly developed countries of Western Europe; in England, Scotland, and Wales, for instance, this group increased over the 20 years between 1911 and 1931 from 16·0 per

cent to 22·6 per cent of the total population; in Belgium, during the same period, from 17·7 per cent to 22·8 per cent; and in Switzerland, from 16·9 to 21·3 per cent.[18]

The correlation between the age and sex structures of the Jewish community and those of the total population is illustrated in Table 7.

TABLE 7. *Number of women per hundred men in Poland in 1931*

Type of locality	*Age—Jewish population*				*Age—total population*			
	0–14	15–49	50–64	65 up.	0–14	15–49	50–64	65 up.
Urban and rural areas	96·8	115·1	110·7	106·4	97·5	110·6	115·1	118·7
Urban areas	96·6	117·0	110·0	111·4	97·2	116·8	118·9	138·0
Towns with over 20,000 inhabitants	97·0	115·0	110·0	116·1	97·3	119·1	119·9	154·9
Towns with 20,000 inhabitants and fewer	96·6	116·6	112·0	105·6	97·0	115·0	118·5	129·7
Rural areas	97·5	112·0	107·8	93·5	97·5	108·0	109·0	111·3

In all sizes of settlement the structure by sex of the total population was found to accord with forecasts based on the mortality tables: from the fifteenth year of life the number of women per 100 men increased in each higher age-group. In the Jewish population, however, the position was different. The index in question reached its peak in the 15–49 age-group. This was undoubtedly due to the higher emigration rate among Jews as compared with the rest of the population, as is confirmed by the fact that in the Jewish population the highest index—123·4—was achieved by the 30–34 age-group.

This particularly high preponderance of Jewish women in the 15–49 age-group, compared with the position in the total population, aggravated the difficult social situation of these women and hindered the development of normal demographic processes among Polish Jews. The number of Jewish women per hundred men in the two oldest age-groups was lower than the figure for the overall population; this could be attributed to the fact that there was a smaller divergence between the mortality of the two sexes in the Jewish population and also to the relatively smaller losses suffered by Polish Jewry in the wars in which soldiers recruited from Polish territories had taken part.

A peculiar fact worth noting is that among rural Jews the number of women in the over-65 age-group was smaller than that for men. This is a phenomenon not found among other population groups. Among rural Jews, however, it was neither exceptional nor accidental. In the eight Polish provinces examined by Dr. Rafael Mahler for the year 1764, there were only 92·4 women to every 100 men in the rural areas.[19] In the Duchy of Warsaw in 1808 the index was 93·4, according to Grossman.[20] It is true that the 1921 census showed 108 women per

100 men in the rural areas, but in the 50–59 year age-group the proportion dropped to 97·8, and among persons more than 60 years old even as low as 91·1.

There were a number of reasons for this state of affairs. The excessively early marriages by rural Jewish women in the nineteenth century, the high birth-rate, and the immoderately hard work which they had to perform in agricultural and other rural occupations sapped their strength more rapidly, allowing a smaller number of women than men to reach an advanced age. In the population figures taken as a whole the relatively high degree of Jewish urbanization meant a higher predominance of women over men (108·7) than was found in the general population. But in the towns, and especially the larger ones, the situation was reversed. For instance, in the five largest cities the index for the entire population was 119, while for the Jews it was only 109·2. These proportions indicate a large influx of non-Jewish population into the cities.

The changes which took place in the sex-ratios between the two censuses are shown in Table 8.

TABLE 8. *Jewish sex-ratios in Poland, 1921 and 1931*

Type of area	*1921*			*1931*		
	0–14	*15–49*	*50 and over*	*0–14*	*15–49*	*50 and over*
Urban and rural areas	100·2	113·9	103·9	96·8	115·1	108·8
Urban areas	100·3	107·0	104·4	96·6	117·0	107·3
Rural areas	100·0	120·2	94·7	97·5	112·0	103·1

The data for the two years are not fully comparable, because the 1921 material on the age-structure of the population was treated with reserve by a number of demographers. Nevertheless, the general trends are clear. The relatively small number of births and the increased mortality of infants and children during the war made for an excess of girls over boys in the 0–15 age-group in 1921. By 1931 the two sexes had returned to proportions normal for this age-group. The changes in the 15–49 age-group which occurred over the ten year period suggest that emigration from the urban areas increased but that it decreased from the rural areas.

EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS FOR THE JEWISH POPULATION IN POLAND

The subject of education can be studied from two viewpoints: in a general way, in terms of literacy; or in a specific way, in terms of the

amount and type of education achieved. The census report of 1931 contains an answer to the first question, but attempts to carry out the more specific kind of study from this and the preceding census ended in failure.

The degree of literacy among Jews, as compared with that of the rest of the population, is given in Table 9.

TABLE 9. *The population of 10 years and over according to ability to read and write (in any language)—1931*

	Jewish Population					*Non-Jewish Population*				
	Total	*Able to read and write*	*Able to read only*	*Unable to read or write*	*Unknown*	*Total*	*Able to read and write*	*Able to read only*	*Unable to read or write*	*Unknown*
Urban and Rural areas	100·0	82·9	1·4	15·4	0·3	100·0	71·2	4·5	24·0	0·3
Urban areas (Total)	100·0	84·5	1·3	13·9	0·3	100·0	85·5	2·5	11·7	0·3
Towns with over 20,000 inhabitants	100·0	86·2	1·2	12·3	0·3	100·0	87·1	2·5	10·2	0·2
Towns of 20,000 and fewer inhabitants	100·0	81·7	1·6	16·4	0·3	100·0	83·0	2·6	14·1	0·3
Rural areas	100·0	77·2	1·8	20·7	0·3	100·0	66·6	5·1	27·9	0·3

The percentage of persons able to read and write in any language (for such was the wording of the census form) was higher among Jews than among the rest of the population. As Table 9 shows, this was influenced by the urban and rural distribution of both population groups, by the small proportion of rural Jews, and by the fact that even amongst rural Jews there was a lower percentage of illiterates than among non-Jews.

On the other hand, the table suggests that in all the urban groups the Jews had a lower percentage of literate people. Was this actually so? In fact it is a statistical illusion, since the overall index for the country also reflects the situation in the western sector, where the percentage of literacy was very high—more than 96 per cent. Data from a territorial cross-section of the three remaining parts of Poland, in which about 99 per cent of the Jewish population lived, show that only in the larger and smaller towns in Lublin province, in the small towns (20,000 and under) in Kielce province, and in the larger towns (more than 20,000 inhabitants) of Polesie was there a smaller percentage of Jews than of non-Jews able to read and write. These exceptions to the rule were attributable mainly to the obstructive influence exerted on educational progress by orthodox Jewish circles in Lublin and Kielce provinces. The speed of education was also held back in Polesie by widespread poverty among the Jews.

In the urban centres in other provinces and in rural areas all over the country there was a higher percentage of literacy among Jews than among their co-citizens. It should be noted that in the towns, especially the largest ones, the differences were insignificant. But the appallingly low percentage of literacy in the rural areas of the east and south-east has created immense differences between the two population groups.

Within the whole urban and rural Jewish population the proportion of men who could read and write was higher (86·8 per cent) than it was among women (79·3 per cent). Since the numbers of those who could read but not write in the two groups did not differ appreciably (it amounted to about 1·5 per cent), illiteracy was clearly more prevalent amongst women than men. Almost every fifth Jewish woman was illiterate, and in the rural areas the number rose to as much as one in every four. Illiteracy among Jewish women was particularly prevalent in the rural areas of Lublin province (37·3 per cent) and those of Kielce province (35·1 per cent).

Table 10 gives the proportion of illiterates in different age-groups, thus correlating literacy and the age factor.

TABLE 10. *Percentage of illiterate Jews by age-group and sex*

Age	*Men*	*Women*	*Age*	*Men*	*Women*
10–14 years	4·6	2·6	30–39 years	10·7	17·8
15–19 ,,	6·0	4·3	40–49 ,,	13·9	26·4
20–24 ,,	7·0	7·0	50–59 ,,	17·2	35·8
25–29 ,,	8·7	11·3	60 and over	26·2	51·3

The percentage of illiterates rises with the higher age-groups, and it is characteristic that there are more illiterates among young men than among young women. This situation changes in the older age-groups; Jewish men were supposed to know the alphabet in order to be able to read the prayers, but this did not apply in the case of women. The indices are particularly unfavourable for rural women in the two oldest age-groups. For example, in the 50–59 year group 47·7 per cent of women were illiterate and in the 60 and over group 63·6 per cent. It may be noted that of the Jewish women in the 60 and over age-group in Lublin province 78·2 per cent were illiterate, and 67·9 per cent in the province of Warsaw. Corresponding indices for Catholic women were 63·7 per cent and 62·0 per cent.

In orthodox Jewish families girls were less zealously shielded from modern education than boys. Thus if the census form had enquired not about ability to read and write in any language but about literacy in Polish or one of the languages of the former partitioning powers (Russian or German), the figures for illiteracy would certainly have been more favourable to the women. This is suggested by some data

from the 1921 census on type of education: 23·4 per cent of men reported that they had been educated at home and only 17·8 per cent of women. But for those with primary and secondary education the proportions were different: for men the indices were 31·8 per cent and 5·0 per cent, for women 32·2 per cent and 6·0 per cent. By way of a gloss on these statistics, it is worth remembering that the numerous conflicts that arose in many families because of the more permissive attitude in letting girls attend state schools attracted the attention of Polish writers: instances are the characters of the mother from the drama *Malka Szwarcenkopf* ('Malka Schwartzenkopf') by Zapolska, and of Maria from the novel *Glosy w Ciemnosci* ('Voices from the Darkness') by Stryjkowski.

The relatively small percentage of illiterates in the younger age-groups (Table 10) suggests that between 1921 and 1931 the situation had improved. A comparison of the results of the two censuses confirms this supposition. Whereas in 1921 the percentage of illiterate men was 25·2 and that of illiterate women 31·0, ten years later these indices were 11·6 per cent and 18·8 per cent respectively.

In one of his studies J. Bornstein remarks that the results of surveys showed that in some towns after the 1914–18 war, the number of Jewish pupils attending secondary schools was eight times higher than before the war.[21]

As a consequence of compulsory primary education and urbanization the problem of changes in Jewish primary education is less interesting than the situation in secondary and higher education. These two types of schooling deserve closer consideration.

The Jewish eagerness for learning is universally known, and after the First World War the number of young Jews in educational institutions went up considerably. Yet during the period between the two censuses the percentage of Jewish pupils in secondary schools fell from 23·1 per cent in the 1921–2 school year to 21·2 in 1930–1. Among higher students the percentage drop was even more striking: from 24·3 per cent in 1921–2 to 18·5 per cent in 1930–1. But the real changes occurred in later years. For instance, in 1936–7 the proportion of Jewish pupils in secondary schools was only 16·5 per cent and in the higher academic institutions 11·8 per cent (in 1937–8 it was even less—9·9 per cent.) What caused this incessant decline in the number of Jewish students in the Polish school system? The real causes were to be found in the social situation of Polish Jewry in the period between the two World Wars. But the immediate factors were diverse: about 70–80 per cent of Jewish pupils attended private schools which were, of course, much more expensive than the state gymnasia. As pauperization spread among the Jewish population the number of people in a position to bear such expenditure decreased, especially since it opened up no real prospect of a better future for the young students. Their movement into such

university faculties as philosophy, law, and the political and economic sciences, where the *numerus clausus* was not strictly applied, was nevertheless restricted by the insuperable practical difficulties of finding employment in the educational system, in the central and municipal administration, and in the legal profession. On the other hand, the restrictions on admission to the medical and technical faculties considerably reduced the number of Jewish students. Thus the impasse in which Polish Jewry found itself in the period between the wars was the main brake on the diffusion of learning among its members.

THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF POLISH JEWRY

The economic structure of Jewry, that is to say, its occupational and social stratification, and the economic activities based on it, was the product of overwhelming external historical pressures. Without looking too far into the past, we may recall that on the eastern borderlands of Poland one came across villages with such names as Zydow, Zydowo, Zydowska Wolga, Kozara, Kozani and so on. These names indicated that Jews had been engaged in agriculture, but Jewish agriculture was not a lasting phenomenon. At various times legislation forbade Jews to acquire agricultural land, to lease agricultural property, or even to live in the countryside. The bans imposed on Jews in agriculture were not the only restrictions which determined their economic structure. In the crafts and trades as well they encountered various forms of restriction and discrimination at different periods. If politics is in general the expression of the economic aspirations of the ruling classes, it has also in turn determined the economic structure and material situation of the Jews throughout the long history of the Diaspora. On the hierarchical ladder of feudalism the Jews were an alien body in every respect, from a social, political, and cultural viewpoint. They were unable to merge with any of the social classes because, in the words of Lesczynski 'one of them was too high, the other too low'.[22] They therefore occupied a place between the classes. The genesis of the economic function performed by the Jews is described by Sartre, among others, in one of his treatises on the Jewish question: the medieval church cast the 'accursed' Jews in accursed (but indispensable) economic roles.[23]

While the Jews remained an alien and homogeneous body in relation to the general society, they nevertheless exhibited a high degree of stratification and financial differentiation within their ranks. Because of their role in manufacturing, the prototypes of the bourgeois classes developed among them at an early stage. At the same time, however, traditional elements continued to exert a strong influence. In spite of strong class antagonisms, this traditional influence helped to shape the ideological and mental make-up of the Jews to a much stronger degree than those of other nationalities in later periods as well. In one of his

pamphlets attacking antisemitism, Marchlewski described the source of the power of the traditional factor among Jews:

> The Jewish capitalist and proletarian have both come out of the milieu of that 'Jewishness', the small-town multitude, and even when they have isolated themselves from it, they do not at once break away from its influences. And the milieu of those small-town Jews, who have grown up in a ghetto, burdened with a hereditary legacy of bloody persecutions, a legacy of being deprived of their elementary civic rights, still exists among us to this day and exercises its influence on the ideology of the immense majority of Jews.[24]

A consciousness formed in such a way was undoubtedly also an internal fact that impeded the development of the economic structure of Jewry. It is not therefore surprising that all the attempts to effect a restratification in the Jewish community and to resettle it on the land, which was undertaken both in Poland and abroad, ended in failure. For they were based on legislation which failed to take into account the conditions under which the group lived, whereas a long-standing historical process can be turned in another direction only when there is a favourable economic basis for such a change.

In Poland capitalism was a latecomer and such conditions arose relatively late. As soon as they came into being, however, the development of the economic structure of the Jewish population began in a systematic way. Without going into such familiar historical facts as the pioneering role played by Jews in the development of those sections of the economy which were so essential to capitalism as industry, communications, or foreign trade, we shall show the direction of change in their occupational structure during the period between the two censuses.

TABLE 11. *Jewish occupational structure, 1921–31*

Year	*Total*	*Agriculture, Horticulture, Forestry and Fishing*	*Mining and Industry*	*Commerce and Insurance*	*Communications and Transport*	*Public Service and Professions*	*Household and Personal Services*	*Persons of unknown Occupation and persons not living on earnings*
1921	100·0	5·8	39·5	41·2	3·5	4·1	2·3	3·7
1931	100·0	4·4	42·2	36·6	4·5	5·1	1·8	5·4

Despite the relatively short lapse of time between the two censuses, the differences are obvious. In the first place, commerce lost its lead to industry. The changing stratification of the Jewish population could be attributed to the following causes, *inter alia*: low internal consumption, disproportionately high taxes, growing competition from the co-operative movement in marketing food and agricultural products and from the expanding commercial and industrial activities of the municipalities, and the enactment by the central and local administrations of a number

of sanctions and ordinances which undermined the livelihood of the small and middle merchant classes. The change was, however, spontaneous and too slow; it should be regarded as an expression of the economic aspirations of the Jews rather than as a factor capable of improving their material conditions substantially.

Among other noteworthy changes in the ten-year period, one should mention the increase in the percentage of the final category, persons of unknown occupations and those not living on earnings, and the decrease in the percentage of persons working in agriculture and related sectors. The reason for this was that during the war and the years immediately afterwards, when much land lay uncultivated and could easily be had on lease, there was a spontaneous influx of Jews into agriculture. For instance, in the territory of the former Kingdom of Poland the percentage of Jews working in this sector rose from 2·7 per cent in 1897 to 9·5 per cent in 1921. As early as 1923–4, however, the number of Jews in agriculture was again compulsorily decreasing.

In spite of the changes in the occupational structure of Jewry, the degree of Jewish concentration in commerce continued high, especially in the three parts of the country with a large Jewish population—the central, the eastern and the southern sectors.

TABLE 12. *Degree of concentration of the Jewish population in sectors of the national economy in the central, eastern, and southern sectors of Poland, 1931 (in %)*

Horticulture, fishing, forestry	*Mining and industry*	*Commerce and insurance*	*Communications and transport*	*Civil service, social and similar organizations*
5·6	25·5	61·9	15·5	8·2

Schools, education and culture	*Medicine and hygiene*	*Domestic work*	*Not living on earnings*	*Persons of undefined occupations*
20·5	26·8	5·9	11·2	12·5

Just as unequal concentrations of Jews were found in the various sectors of the national economy, so there was strong differentiation within each of these sectors. In the first of these sectors, which employed only a minimal proportion of the total of the Jewish working population (0·3 per cent), horticulture on the whole predominated, though it was perhaps represented more weakly in the southern provinces alone.

Far more important to us, however, is the internal composition of the next sector—industry. Almost every second Jew (46·7 per cent) worked in the garment industry. While the rest of the country's population was

equally represented in absolute numbers, these were only 17·5 per cent of the total. Consequently, the concentration of Jews in the garment industry was very high.[25] A higher proportion of Jews was found only in the leather industry (52·4 per cent), but this industry employed only a small percentage of the total number of industrial workers (among Jews—3·2 per cent; among non-Jews—1·1 per cent). Apart from this, two other branches of industry had a high concentration of Jews: the food industry, in which every third person was Jewish, and the printing industry, with 40 per cent of Jews. In the remaining industries, apart from their role in the general structure of the Jewish population, the degree of concentration was lower and fluctuated from 2·5 per cent in mining and 3·1 per cent in electricity, gas and water installations, to 21·2 per cent in the timber industry or 24·4 per cent in paper manufacture. It should be stressed, however, that even in industries with a lower concentration of Jews, certain branches were dominated by them. We shall name by way of example watchmaking and the jewellery trade (71·4 per cent), and tinsmithing (60·6 per cent). 83·7 per cent of Jews in wholesale commerce were employed in the marketing of manufactured goods, while the corresponding figure for the rest of the population was only 48·9 per cent. In consequence, the concentration of Jews in this branch of industry was as high as 73·5 per cent, and it was even slightly higher than in the brokerage business (73·2 per cent).

In communications, the civil service, education, the medical profession, and related sectors, Jews were found in large numbers only outside the state and municipal organizations, that is to say, in establishments where employment depended on a display of personal initiative. 96·5 per cent of the Jews in communications and transport were coachmen, cab-drivers, and porters. In the public service sector, 71·8 per cent of the Jews employed worked for denominational organizations, at the bar, or in private advisory bureaux. In education most of the Jews worked as private teachers, preparatory tutors, and in various forms of extra-scholastic education. Among non-Jews the proportion of such educationists was 3·5 times smaller. The considerable concentration of Jews shown in medical and allied professions is to a large extent attributable to the fact that this group covered only doctors in private practice; those employed in hospitals, sanatoria, and state health centres were enumerated in the 'public service' sector. In general, therefore, we can say that the internal structure of these three sectors affords evidence of discriminatory practices in the employment of Jews.

The movement of the Jewish population into the industrial labour market was followed by a change in the degree of economic activity. In 1921 there were 209 inactive for every 100 persons economically active; by 1931 the figure had fallen to 166. However, even the latter index was a third higher than that among the non-Jewish population, and therefore deserves somewhat closer examination.

Economic inactivity can be a sign of opulence as well as of poverty in a population. In rich societies the more affluent sections of the population can afford a higher percentage of economically inactive people, while an excessive number of such persons in poor countries is evidence of pauperization in the population groups concerned.

One of the main reasons for the high proportion of inactive persons among the Jews was undoubtedly the group's occupational structure. The number of inactive to every 100 active persons among persons earning their living in the communications and transport sector was 257; in commerce and insurance, 166; and in industry, 159. The corresponding index for the medical profession was 102; in teaching and related professions only 76. The former three sectors, as we know, provided the livelihood of more than 80 per cent of the Jewish population.

Other important factors in determining economic activity are the demographic aspects—the age of the population, the number of orphans, the percentage of those receiving higher education, that is of people who have reached working age but do not yet participate in economic life; and considerations of psychology, sociology, custom, religion, and so on. Of immeasurably greater importance for the economic activity of the Jewish population in Poland, however, was the group's socio-economic structure. This is illustrated by Table 13.

TABLE 13. *The socio-economic structure and economic activity of the Jewish population earning a living in non-agricultural occupations in Poland, 1931*

Social group	*Percentage structure of the economically active*	*Number of inactive per 100 active*
Total	100	166
Independent earners employing hired labour	6·7	187
Independent earners not employing hired labour	55·5	186
Non-manual workers (professional and white collar)	8·2	122
Manual workers	24·7	107
Home workers (cottage industry)	2·0	176
Undefined position	2·9	—

The lowest number of economically inactive persons was found in two groups in which the proportion of Jews was small: manual workers and hired labourers. As a result, whereas their proportion was 32·9 per cent among the occupationally active, they constituted only 21·2 per cent of the total non-agricultural Jewish population.

These questions attracted considerable study. One investigator, Ormicki, pointed out in his analysis of the material situation of the Jewish population that the owners of small workshops, in particular, were burdened with an excessive number of inactive persons.[26] Bornstein also emphasized that the training period, which is longer in the

crafts than in industry, increased the percentage of inactive people among Jews.[27]

The social structure of the Jewish population was a reflection of the occupational structure, and thus resembled it, in being to a large extent one-sided. From Table 13 it will be seen that the totalled percentages of all the proletarian groups, i.e., the non-manual workers, the manual workers, and those employed in cottage industries, came to only 34·9 per cent among Jews. Among the non-Jewish population, the total was more than 70 per cent in the same period. At the same time, there were important structural differences between Jews and non-Jews within the particular proletarian groups. Every second Jewish non-manual worker was employed in private industrial and commercial enterprises. The corresponding proportion for the rest of the population was half this; but instead they were employed to a much larger degree in the public services, teaching, and communications. This state of affairs was, as we have already pointed out, the result of the discrimination practised against Jewish candidates for public posts.

The distribution by sector of Jewish manual workers was less differentiated from that of the rest of the population. Two sectors, industry and commerce, provided employment for 87·4 per cent of Jews and 61·3 of non-Jews. It should be stressed that in the industrial sectors in which the bulk of Jewish workers (73·2 per cent) were employed, they worked mainly not in large-scale industry but in small workshops. The largest industrial enterprises employed only 3·5 per cent of the total number of Jewish workers as against 35·6 per cent of non-Jews; smaller undertakings of an artisan or allied character employed 81·5 per cent of the Jewish group and 43·5 of the non-Jewish group. This feature constituted an essential difference between Jewish and non-Jewish workers. Among the factors which helped to produce this situation from the very beginnings of the capitalist system in Poland, one may list the following: fear of working in larger firms because of the possibility of encountering antisemitism among fellow-workers; a psychological association with the middle classes; religious considerations such as the interdiction of work on the Sabbath; and physical degeneration caused by chronic poverty. Such were the most important factors which created a gulf between the Jewish proletariat and the large industrial enterprises. In later years, as antisemitism increased in Polish society, it became extremely difficult for a Jewish worker to find employment in a big factory, even a Jewish-owned one.

What were the consequences? The material situation of the Jewish worker was worse than that of his Polish fellow-worker. 'In general there can be no doubt', wrote Julian Marchlewski during the earlier period, 'that the condition of the Jewish worker is in many respects even worse than that of the Polish worker, who, it need hardly be said, is far from being lapped in luxury'.[28] The burden and the crisis weighed more

heavily on Jews than on others, as the higher Jewish unemployment rate showed. According to the 1931 census the percentage of unemployed Jewish workers was 28·2 per cent, as against 21·2 per cent among non-Jewish workers.

Incidentally, it is worth noting that because of the absence of an industrial proletariat there existed among Jews no working-class aristocracy; this undoubtedly favoured the spread of radical tendencies among them.

The most numerous group within the Jewish population, that of independent earners employing no hired labour, together with the much smaller associated group of independent earners who did employ hired labour, constituted about 60 per cent of the total number of Polish Jews. This was the typical petit-bourgeois stratum. The size of this group undoubtedly reflected the low level of economic relations and the remaining survivals of feudalism in the sectors in which many Jews worked, as even official publications had to admit. The most important characteristic of the Jewish population, its high proportion of independent earners, was primarily the result of the concentration of this population in the most backward sectors of work and of its minimum participation in the modern sectors.[29]

The economic structure of the Jewish population meant that the situation for a considerable majority of it was worse than that of the remaining urban population of Poland. In this connexion two questions arise. First, what was the social utility of the economic functions performed by the Jews? Second, what road could lead to a real improvement in the material and social conditions of the Jewish population?

To answer these questions one must start with another set of questions which was evoking intense interest in Poland at that time. Was the high percentage of Jews engaged in commerce the result of economic or non-economic factors, and did Poland have an over-dense commercial network attributable to the Jewish population? First of all it must be said that Polish society as a whole had an incorrect approach to economic questions. One of the outstanding authorities on the economic problems of Poland between the two World Wars, the Cabinet Minister Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, declared that the problems of commerce, which in other countries were a matter of particular concern, for a long time aroused no wide interest in Poland. Only when the many unhealthy phenomena which were the inevitable consequence of the period of inflation began to be strongly felt by the population 'did a certain resentment of all commerce as such infect public opinion. This resentment was soon expressed in practical forms, principally in the denial that there was any need for an aid programme; for instance, credits to commerce not directly connected with production.'[30] The resentment was primarily directed against the Jews who dominated the commercial sector. However, a comparison with the density of the commercial network in other

countries carried out by Ludwik Landan[31] showed that the situation in Poland was not exceptional, but similar to that found in other countries with similar economic characteristics. The urban density of the commercial network in three sections of Poland did not differ much from the situation in countries with a relatively small Jewish population and was conditioned exclusively by such economic factors as: the degree of industrialization of the country, the communications network, the size of the labour reserve, and, finally, the general cultural level of the people employed in commerce. The gravitation of the Jewish population towards commerce for motives of a non-economic nature played an accessory role only. There can therefore be no question of some special Jewish predilection for commerce, nor of their having caused an excessive expansion of commerce. This is borne out by numerous statistics.

TABLE 14. *Density of the commercial network, turnover, and concentration of Jewish population in commerce*

Provincial Groups	*Number of inhabitants*	*Annual turnover in zlotys*	*Turnover in zlotys per head of population*	*Percentage of Jews in Commerce*
	Per each commercial establishment			
Western	61	50·570	829	6
Central	64	38·270	598	56
Southern	68	22·980	338	68
Eastern	88	20·680	233	73

As one passes from the more highly to the less industrialized parts of the country there is a drop in the density of the commercial network and, simultaneously, a decrease in the turnover and sales per head of population. When these data are considered alongside those showing the degree of concentration of Jews in commerce, it can be seen that they predominated neither in commercial enterprises with the highest profitability, nor in areas where the density of the network was at its highest, but in places where their activity was needed as a result of existing conditions.

A similar situation prevailed in other sectors as well. Industry is a case in point. The Jews flocked to industrial work not only in areas of relatively high industrial development but also in those where industry was still barely developed. If we were to express the degree of industrialization of particular parts of the country by the number of persons employed in industry per 1,000 inhabitants of the territorial unit in question, this index would, with a level of 79·5 per cent for the country as a whole, reach only 27·7 per cent for Nowogrodek province, 28·4 per cent for Polesie, and 30·6 per cent for Wolynia. In these provinces the

percentages of Jews in the total numbers of industrial workers were very high (45, 49, and 41 per cent respectively).

Jews were employed in the crafts to an even more marked degree. For instance, they constituted between 70 and 80 per cent of the total in the following provinces; in Polesie 81·1 per cent, in Nowogrodek 77·1 per cent, in Bialystok 76·1 per cent, and in Wolynia 72·6 per cent. In the provinces of Kielce, Lublin, and Warsaw more than half of the total number of artisans were Jews. The percentage of Jewish artisans for the country as a whole was 39·7 per cent.[33] The importance of this group for the national economy is attested by the painful effects of its loss on the present Polish economy.[34]

In an entirely different field, that of medicine, Jews played an extremely important role. While in 1935 the number of doctors stood at 3·7 per 10,000 inhabitants for the country as a whole, there were only 1·9 doctors per 10,000 in Kielce province, 1·6 in Lublin, and 1·5 in Wolynia. The percentage of Jews among these doctors was very high: 60·7 per cent in Kielce, 50·3 per cent in Lublin, 73·0 per cent in Wolynia. There seems to be no need to give any more proofs of the important economic function fulfilled by the Jewish population in Poland; it performed the role of a middle class, carrying out all the tasks performed by the urban middle class in all capitalist countries.

At the same time, however, the economic structure of the Jews, in conjunction with the general economic and political situation of the country, led to a systematic deterioration in their material situation and social position. What was done to counteract this? On the Jewish side there were efforts to change the structure, and advantage was taken to promote emigration. In government circles, however, only the latter way seemed worthy of attention. As late as 21 January, 1939, the acting Prime Minister Slawoj-Skladkowski, replying to the demands made by the Oboz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (the League for National Unification), in a parliamentary question put by General S. Skwarczynski and 116 other M.P.s of this group, declared:

> The government of the Polish Republic agrees with the view of the members who put the question that for the solution of the Jewish question in Poland one of the most important means is a considerable reduction of the number of Jews through emigration. Emigration is indispensable not only for political reasons but, primarily, for considerations of population and economy, since the economic processes and the pattern of the occupational and social structure of the population must and will be adapted to suit the measure of responsibility of the Polish Nation for the destinies of the State.[35]

This viewpoint was supported, in a more or less camouflaged form, by all political groups, from the PPS (Socialists) and the Stronnictwo Ludowe (Peasant Party) to the ND (National Democrats).[36] But lofty

declarations were unable to change the course of history. The way to an improvement of economic and social relations in Poland was not through an exodus of the Jews, but radical change in the political system. This, however, could not be contemplated by the government of the period. Their fantasies of a Greater Poland, their reactionary internal and foreign policies, led to a tragic epilogue.

NOTES

[1] J. Iwaszkiewicz, Introduction to *Notatki Komiwojazera* (Notes of a Commercial Traveller), by Sholem Aleichem, P. J. W., Warsaw, 1958, p. 7.

[2] In this article (which is part of a doctoral thesis based on the data of the population census of 9.12.31), I shall confine myself to an appraisal of the basic parameters characterizing the situation and structure of the Jewish population in Poland for that year, in relation to the country's total population and as compared with the results of the 1921 census.

[3] K. Bartel, *Mowy Parlamentarne* (Parliamentary Speeches), Warsaw, 1928, p. 43.

[4] S. Fogelson, 'The Natural Increase of the Jewish Population in Poland', from *Problems of the Nationalities*, Warsaw, 1937, p. 4.

[5] The coefficient of the decline in natural increase is calculated by the equation: $W = \frac{P_1 - P_0}{P_0}$, where P_1 is the natural increase in the years 1926–30, and P_0 is the natural increase in the years 1921–5. For the total Polish population W = 4·3 per cent, for the Jewish portion W = 14·2 per cent.

[6] Calculated on data contained in the works of A. Tartakower: *Jewish Emigration from Poland*, Institute for Research on Problems of National Groups, Warsaw, 1933, p. 22; of A. Zarycht, *Polish Emigration in 1918–31 and its Meaning to the State*, The Maritime and Colonial League, Warsaw, 1933, table 1.

[7] J. Bornstein, 'The Budgets of Jewish Denominational Congregations in Poland', *Statistical Quarterly*, Warsaw, 1929 Vol. VI, No. 3, p. 1380.

[8] J. Bornstein, 'The Problems of the Pauperization of the Jewish Population in Poland', *The Jews in Reborn Poland*, Vol. II, Warsaw, 1934, p. 398.

[9] Ibid., p. 407.

[10] J. Leszczynski, *Resettlement and Regrouping of Jews in the Last Century*, Warsaw, 1933, p. 14.

[11] J. Zieminski, *Problems of Jewish Emigration*, Warsaw, 1937, p. 30.

[12] R. Dmowski, *The Post-War World and Poland*, Warsaw, 1931, p. 322.

[13] *The Concise Statistical Year Book*, 1939, p. 34.

[14] L. Wasilewski, *Nationality Problems in Theory and in Life*, Warsaw, 1929, p. 69.

[15] S. Fogelson, *The Demographic Structure of the Jewish Population in Poland, Ethnic Problems of National Groups*, Warsaw, 1938, No. 6.

[16] The accepted division was as follows: Warsaw, Lodz, Kielce, Lublin and Bialystok provinces were included in the central group; Wilno, Nowogrodek, Polesie, Wolynia provinces in the eastern group; Poznan, Pomerania (Pomorze), Silesia provinces in the western group; and Krakow, Lwow, Stanislawow and Tarnopol provinces in the southern group.

[17] E. Rosset, *The Demographic Laws of War*, Lodz, 1933, pp. 31–40.

[18] *Concise Statistical Year Book*, 1939, p. 20.

[19] R. Mahler, *The Jews in Old Poland in the Light of Figures*, Warsaw, 1958, p. 67.

[20] H. Grossman, 'The Socio-Economic Structure of the Duchy of Warsaw, 1808–1810', Warsaw, 1925, *Statistical Quarterly*, Vol. II, p. 12.

[21] J. Bornstein, 'The Occupational and Social Structure of the Jewish Population in Poland', *Problems of the Nationalities*, Warsaw, 1939, Nos. 1–2, p. 64.

[22] J. Leszczynski, op. cit.,'p. 3.

[23] J. P. Sartre, *Thoughts on the Jewish Problem*, Library 'Po Prostu', Warsaw, 1957, pp. 63–4.

[24] J. Marchlewski, *Anti-semitism and the*

Workers, 'Ksiazka', Warsaw (3rd. ed.), 1920, pp. 68–9.

[25] In all tables, where it is not said explicitly that statistics of the economic structure of the Jewish population are for the country as a whole, the tables deal only with areas previously mentioned.

[26] W. Ormicki, 'The Conditions and Possibilities of Jewish Emigration', *Problems of the Nationalities*, Warsaw, 1937, p. 283.

[27] J. Bornstein, *The Occupational Structure*, p. 61.

[28] J. Marchlewski, op. cit., p. 48.

[29] Results of the General Census of 1921 for the City of Warsaw, *Result and Critical Analysis*. Published by Statistics Department of the City of Warsaw, Warsaw, 1928.

[30] E. Kwiatkowski, *The Economic Progress of Poland*, Warsaw, 1928, p. 30.

[31] L. Landan, *The Density of the Commercial Network in Poland*, selected writings PWN, Warsaw, 1957, pp. 324–5.

[32] Source of the data on network density and business turnover for the year 1928: E. Kwiatkowski, *Disproportions*, Society for Popular Education, Cracow, 1931, p. 207.

[33] J. Bornstein, *Jewish Crafts in Poland*, Institute for Research on Problems of Nationality Groups, Warsaw, 1936, p. 14.

[34] Czeslaw Bobrowski, 'The Economy on a Panoramic Screen', *Przeglad Kulturalny* (Cultural Review), Warsaw, 1959, No. 46/376.

[35] Slawoj-Skladkowski, 'Answer to a Question put by General Skwarczynski', *Problems of the Nationalities*, 1939, No. 1–2.

[36] Cf. J. Borski, *Jewish Affairs and Socialism*, published by 'Robotnik', Warsaw, 1937, and the programme of the Peasant Party (SL), adopted in 8.12.35

LOCATING MINORITY GROUP MEMBERS: TWO BRITISH SURVEYS OF JEWISH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS[1]

Emanuel J. de Kadt

STUDIES of Jewish population groups generally need to cope with two substantial initial difficulties. The first is the *definitional* problem: who is a Jew? The second, emerging as soon as the first has been overcome, has to do with the means of *locating* the population for the purpose of the inquiry. In most countries no convenient sampling frame exists from which the Jewish population can be extracted. Electoral registers carry no data on religion or ethnic status—assuming for the moment that the definitional problem has been solved—although some countries, for example the Netherlands, have a 'Register of Population' in each municipality which does include data on religious status.[2] In England and the United States, official enquiry into a person's religion is politically taboo; in this kind of situation no official data can help even in arriving at population estimates, let alone in providing a sampling frame.[3] Ingenious methods have been devised to arrive at such estimates, but no fully satisfactory solution has been found to the problems relating to adequate coverage of the Jewish population.[4] The most frequently employed method, that of using the membership or mailing lists of Jewish organizations, supplemented with any other known Jews, has the obvious and serious drawback of missing precisely the 'marginal' Jews, and the same is true of studies concentrating on neighbourhoods of a pronounced Jewish character.[5]

Occasionally a fortunate alternative presents itself: the analysis of data relating to Jews in a general population sample, feasible in the case of inquiries which identify their subjects by religion or ethnic status. American scholars have employed this method with success; some of the most interesting sociological data on Jews derive precisely from such secondary analyses.[6] Ideally, of course, one would like to participate in the planning stage of an inquiry which is to yield specific data on the Jewish population. But even where the data have been collected by investigators concerned with problems quite different

from those which seem particularly important for the student of the Jewish sub-group, it may be rewarding to re-analyse the material. But we should note that in these cases the definitional problem looms large. An otherwise perfect sample may be useless because of the way in which subjects were identified as Jews—especially, once again, if the identifying question *ipso facto* excluded those who are un-religious or otherwise marginal Jews.[7] Another circumstance which can spoil a promising situation is the absence in the sample of a sufficient number of Jews to make the analysis worthwhile. As in most societies Jews form merely a small minority in the population, this is perhaps the main hazard of the method.[8]

AIM AND METHOD OF THIS PAPER

This paper will concern itself with data deriving from two studies relating to the social background and social characteristics of Jewish university students in Great Britain. The first study has been previously published and was conducted by Mr. Raymond V. Baron for the Inter-University Jewish Federation of Great Britain and Ireland (IUJF), during the course of the academic year 1954–5.[9] The population frame for this inquiry was obtained through the Secretaries of Jewish student societies: it included all members of these societies and all known Jewish students who were not members. A postal questionnaire was sent to all students thus located; after non-Jews and non-students originally included by mistake had been eliminated, the population reached numbered just over 2,000 students. The number of valid returns, on which the results of this survey are based, was 1,124—about 55 per cent of those reached. It should be noted, however, that this was less than 40 per cent of the total number of Jewish students estimated by Baron. Just over 800 of the respondents were U.K. full-time students, about one-third of the estimated number. The rest were 'associate students' (mainly part-time students and non-university students) and students from abroad. This survey will be referred to in the rest of this paper as *IUJF*.

Baron does not attempt to assess the representativeness of his respondents, and he does not explicitly consider the possibility of systematic bias.[10] My misgivings about the bias of this otherwise admirable survey made me search for a way to check Baron's results against data which were less doubtful in respect of representativeness. This was found in the secondary analysis of a nation-wide survey of British university students who started their undergraduate studies in 1955. This secondary analysis, then, is the other study with which this paper is concerned.

All undergraduate applicants to U.K. universities in 1955 were asked, on behalf of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals

of the Universities of the United Kingdom, to fill in a short questionnaire dealing mainly with simple personal data, father's occupation, previous education, and career preference. The results of this survey were published in what is generally known as the Kelsall report.[11] The inquiry, however, did not end here. The Sociological Research Unit (SRU) of the London School of Economics and Political Science conducted a follow-up survey of a sample[12] of the U.K. entrants to first degree courses. This involved two postal questionnaires, the first sent in the Spring of 1958, when most subjects were still at university and none had graduated, the second sent in the first half of 1961, when most subjects—apart from all medical, dental, and veterinary students, and some post-graduates—had left university.[13] It was in this latter questionnaire that three short questions were included on religion which made it possible to identify the Jewish students. The two crucial questions for this purpose were: 'Into which religious denomination (if any) were you *born* or *baptized*? Please specify, even if your membership was, or has become, purely nominal. If none, write in "none" '; and: 'Are you *now* a member of a different religious denomination? If yes, please specify.' It seems a reasonable assumption that virtually all those whom we might wish to consider Jewish, including the marginal individuals, would have identified themselves by means of these questions. In any case it can be argued that anyone who did not specify Jewish in reply to either question should, in fact, be excluded from the analysis.

Be that as it may, the secondary analysis of the SRU survey (henceforth referred to as *SRU*) is based on this self-identification of the Jewish students; they were located by inspection of the actual schedules of the entire sample. Thus we have an opportunity to compare data gathered by Baron for the Jewish students who were reached and replied early in 1955 with data referring to the cohort of Jewish students who entered university late in 1955. The data, then, do *not* refer to the same individuals: there is no overlap between the two populations. This presents certain problems, referred to below. There are, moreover, substantial areas in which the data are not comparable; some of the findings from *SRU* will therefore be analysed separately.

Before we proceed to further analysis, the basic composition of the *SRU* sample must be indicated. The total number of schedules identified as Jewish, after elimination of converts to Christianity (three cases) and addition of converts to Judaism (one case), was 115; of these 86 were men and 29 were women. But in order to arrive at meaningful computations a weighted sampling procedure had to be used (see note 12). Each actual case was therefore either counted twice (for medical students and/or students from manual backgrounds) or five times (for non-medical non-manual background students). The adjusted number of 'respondents' came to 400, of whom 290 were male and 110 female. (In the later analysis five actual cases were eliminated, because of in-

completeness in the relevant data, so that most tabulations below refer to the schedules of 82 men and 28 women, reconstituted into 280 male 'respondents' and 105 female 'respondents'.) Although this method leads to a substantial decrease in the statistical significance of small differences between sub-groups—as the cases are not all independent—and makes it impossible to use *absolute* numbers, it is the only way in which accurate *percentages* can be stated. When in the following the number of cases to which percentages refer in *SRU* is given, e.g. as $n = 385$, it should be remembered that this represents the calculated number of cases in the reconstituted population, not the actual number of cases in the available sample. 'Respondents' will be used without inverted commas in the rest of this paper to refer, for *SRU*, to this adjusted number of cases.

Checking the Estimate

Although the results of *IUJF* were based on the replies of fewer than 1,000 full-time students, Baron preceded his analysis with an estimate of the total number of Jewish university students in the U.K., arrived at with the aid of the estimates of the Secretaries of the Jewish student societies. These estimates, for Great Britain and N. Ireland, were as follows: total number of Jewish students, 3,000; total number of full-time Jewish students, 2,430. In each case the figure includes students from abroad; no estimate of their number is given. Among the replies to *IUJF* 11·3 per cent were of students from abroad; virtually all these are likely to have been full-time students. If we assume that the non-identification and non-response rates are the same for students from abroad as for U.K. students, we arrive at a corrected estimate of 2,160 full-time U.K. Jewish university students.[14]

We can now attempt to derive an independent, and comparable, estimate from *SRU*. It has been noted that the total number of Jewish respondents to the 1961 questionnaire was 400, of whom 290 were men and 110 women. The response rate to this 1961 *SRU* questionnaire was for men 74 per cent of the original sample of entrants, for women 82 per cent. Assuming that Jews responded neither more nor less to this questionnaire than non-Jews, we arrive at an entering Jewish student group of 390 men and 130 women, a total of 520. The over-all total of entering full-time U.K. degree students was 19,950—the Jewish proportion represents 2·6 per cent.

If we were to take this percentage of Jews among the entering students and apply it to the total number of students, thus assuming that the proportion of Jews among entrants was identical with their share in the over-all student body, we should conclude that the total number of Jewish students was, at that time, 1,950.[15] But such an assumption would be false, because Jewish students were substantially over-represented in fields of study (particularly medicine) in which it takes

longer than normal to finish the course. Thus while Kelsall reported 10 per cent of male students and 9 per cent of female students (over-all 10 per cent) entering medicine, the proportions in our Jewish sample were respectively 23 per cent and 8 per cent (over-all 18 per cent). For dentistry the general figures for men and women were 3 per cent and 1 per cent (over-all 2 per cent), but among the Jewish students they were respectively 9 per cent, 5 per cent (8 per cent). Among the non-medical (etc.) students the general and Jewish proportions staying on for graduate work were similar, though the Jewish students were slightly under-represented. Thus in 1958, 21 per cent of the Jewish non-medical respondents were at university as post-graduate students, in 1959: 15 per cent, and in 1960: 11 per cent. The proportions for the over-all non-medical student body were respectively 24 per cent, 16 per cent, and 11 per cent (unpublished *SRU* data).

By using a different set of data from *SRU* we can come to a more definite estimate, which, as we shall see, corroborates the suggestions of the preceding paragraphs. Information is available from the 1961 questionnaire about the activities of the respondents from 1958 to late 1960. Hence we can calculate the total number of years spent at university for each respondent. We shall assume that a respondent still at university, e.g. late in 1960, did not interrupt his studies but had been at university without a break for six years. Although, of course, some students do leave for a period of time, returning a year or so later to resume their studies, others stay on for longer than the maximum number of years (six) which can be traced in these data. These two errors approximately cancel each other out.

The total number of respondent-years was 1,212 for male students, 431 for female students. Taking into account the response rate of 74 per cent for men and 82 per cent for women, we arrive at 1,640 man-years and 525 woman-years, a total of 2,165. This figure can be taken as an estimate of the total number of full-time U.K. Jewish university students during the approximate period 1955–1958, as it is unlikely that there was any significant fluctuation in Jewish intake during those years. It represents 2·8 per cent of the total number of full-time U.K. university students.[16] The correspondence with the *IUJF* figure is remarkable. Whether or not the method used by Baron is a generally commendable procedure, it certainly yielded a result which must have been very close to the true figure for 1955.

SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Social Origin and Career Plans

The social origin of Jewish students differs in some respects markedly from that of the over-all student population. In accordance with the generally known and well-documented middle-class nature of the U.K.

Jews, the parents of Jewish students are found (to a much larger extent than is the case for the over-all student body) in non-manual occupations, particularly in the professions.[17] Table 1 gives the breakdown for all full-time U.K. students entering in 1955 (source: Kelsall), and for the Jewish students in our *SRU* sample. Those whose father's occupation was uncodable have been excluded in both cases.

TABLE I

Occupation of Fathers of Students entering in 1955 (SRU)

	Men		*Women*	
	All students	*Jewish students*	*All students*	*Jewish students*
	%	%	%	%
Medicine, Dentistry	4	13	4	2
Law	1	2	2	—
Church	2	2	3	5
Teaching (all)	6	4	10	12
Other non-manua	60	66	62	74
Manual	27	14	19	8
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 14{,}356$	$n = 272$	$n = 5{,}947$	$n = 101$

The category 'other non-manual' is, of course, very vague and includes rich self-employed business men as well as low-income white-collar workers. The notable features, however, are to be found in the more specific categories. The proportion of manual workers among Jewish fathers was half of that among all fathers. The proportion of medical men among the fathers of the Jewish male students was three times as large as that among all students. The other occupations had few differences. The pattern among the women's fathers reversed that of the men in some cases. One can only speculate that this may have some connexion with the fact that traditional Jewish attitudes to learning differ in respect of men and women, but this point cannot be taken further with the data available.

We have already commented upon the large proportion of Jewish medical students. But the discrepancy between the proportion of Jews entering medicine and the over-all proportion choosing a medical career was not the only notable difference in career choice. Figures are available for the general sample of *SRU* in terms of career choices of those who were not medical, dental, or veterinary students.[18] The categorizations used in Table 2 are in some respects a little ambiguous, and this table will have to be read with caution. The medical (etc.) group which has been excluded comprised some 14 per cent for the men and 10 per cent for the women in the general sample, against 33 per cent and 18 per cent for Jewish men and women respectively. These career choices were those made in 1958, when all respondents were still

at university. Those whose course of study could not be classified have also been excluded from this analysis.[19]

TABLE 2

Career choices for all Students and for Jewish Students in 1958 (non-medical) (SRU)

	Men		*Women*	
	All students	*Jewish students*	*All students*	*Jewish students*
	%	%	%	%
University teaching	3	3	2	—
Other teaching	21	9	60	28
Research	17	19	8	13
Civil Service	2	1	1	—
Church	4	—	[a]	—
Other professions	33	40	11	—
Industry/commerce	18	16	5	—
Social Service/personnel	1	6	12	13
Other/uncodable	[a]	5	[a]	45
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 6{,}080$	$n = 165$	$n = 2{,}080$	$n = 53$

[a] Fewer than 0·5%.

For men outside the medical sciences the main difference appears to be that Jews substantially underchose non-university teaching. For women the pattern was more differentiated, but it was again the marked shift away from non-university teaching which accounted for much of the difference.[20] A surprising fact is the large proportion of Jewish women whose career choice either could not be classified into the given categories—'other' careers—or was uncodable. As Table 3 indicates some of these women will have ended up in other professional careers, and some will have gone into teaching. The total number of female respondents in this analysis is, however, rather small.

We can now compare the career choices of respondents given in *IUJF* with those found in *SRU*. Table 3 shows these choices. For *SRU* two sets of data are available: careers as chosen in 1958, when all respondents were in their third year at university, columns (b) and (e), and careers as chosen in 1961, columns (c) and (f), when 70 per cent of the men and 81 per cent of the women had left university.

It is clear from this table that, particularly among women, career choices varied considerably at different points in time, especially in the categories 'other teaching', 'social work', 'other', and 'undecided'. Some uncertainty remains as to whether the categories in the two surveys were sufficiently similar to make a detailed comparison of this nature valid. This is particularly true for the categories 'research' and 'professions'; when they are taken together, the differences between them in *IUJF* and *SRU* (1958) disappear. The under-representation of non-university teachers in *IUJF* was, however, substantial—also in the case of the more career-certain men. We have seen that non-university

TABLE 3

Career choices of Jewish Students

	Men			*Women*		
	(*a*) *IUJF* (1955) %	(*b*) *SRU* (1958) %	(*c*) *SRU* (1961) %	(*d*) *IUJF* (1955) %	(*e*) *SRU* (1958) %	(*f*) *SRU* (1961) %
Medical	22		23	17		8
Dental	8	32	9	5	16	5
Vet.; other med.	5		1			5
University teaching	3	2	3	5	—	5
Other teaching	2	5	6	9	29	19
Research, including technology	21	16	14	11	7	9
Professions:						
Law	14	23	17	3	—	—
Accountancy	3					
Industry/Commerce	7	11	10	5	—	7
Civil Service	3	1	—	3	—	—
Social Service/personnel	—	4	—	13	11	2
Other	4	3	9	9	23	18
Undecided	8	4	10	21	14	24
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 649$	$n = 280$	$n = 280$	$n = 184$	$n = 105$	$n = 105$

teaching is, in a sense, an 'un-Jewish' career. The under-representation of this category in *IUJF* may well be due to the likely bias in its sample towards the more 'Jewish' Jews.

Distribution over Types of Universities and Lodgings

Baron had devised four categories of university, namely 'London', 'Ancient' (Oxford and Cambridge), 'Large Provincial' (Birmingham, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, and Manchester), and 'Small Provincial' (the rest). The reason, as stated in an unpublished note, for the separate tabulation of the data for the third group was that at these universities there were 100 or more Jewish students (estimated), large and thriving Jewish student societies, and large Jewish communities. Comparing the distribution, in Table 4, over these four university types, we see that Oxbridge was noticeably over-represented in *IUJF*, at the expense of the other groups.

TABLE 4

Distribution of Jewish Students over Universities

	IUJF %	*SRU* %
Ancient	27	21
London	29	30
Large Provincial	29	32
Small Provincial	15	17
	(100)	(100)
	$n = 833$	$n = 385$

The proportions of women among the respondents were for *IUJF* and *SRU* respectively 22 per cent and 27 per cent; women were particularly under-represented in *IUJF* in the Large Provincial universities (20 per cent as against 31 per cent in *SRU*) and in the Small Provincial universities (25 per cent as against 32 per cent in *SRU*).

The data regarding the distribution of the over-all student population are not available in this particular breakdown, but we do have the figures for London and Oxbridge. These indicate that Jews were heavily over-represented in London (over-all percentage for London in 1955 was 18 per cent), and about proportionate in the Ancient universities (over-all proportion was 20 per cent) (Source: Kelsall). It is likely, but it cannot be demonstrated, that they were over-represented in the Large Provincial, and under-represented in the Small Provincial universities.

The distribution of the respondents in *IUJF* and *SRU* over the different types of lodgings was, on the whole, quite similar. From *SRU* data we have been able to distinguish (1958 questionnaire) between those who lived for two or three years in college ('college'), those who lived for two or three years at home ('home'), those who lived for two or three years in lodgings or a flat ('lodgings'), and 'others'—those who were lodged differently each year, uncodable, or living in other types of accommodation (hostels, settlements, etc.). *IUJF* provided an analysis for one particular term—that of the inquiry. Here 'home' included *c.* 1 per cent who lived in the houses of friends or relatives, while 'others' in this case included an unspecified, but small, number of respondents living in flats. It should be noted that in the original (unpublished) tabulation a distinction was made between Jewish lodgings and non-Jewish lodgings; about 7 per cent of the men and 5 per cent of the women in *IUJF* lived in Jewish lodgings.

TABLE 5

Accommodation of Jewish Students

	Men		*Women*	
	IUJF %	*SRU* %	*IUJF* %	*SRU* %
College	19	22	19	9
Home	49	50	51	53
Lodgings	23	20	14	20
Other	9	8	16	18
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 649$	$n = 280$	$n = 184$	$n = 105$

The only substantial discrepancy is to be found in the case of the female students: *IUJF* underrated the proportion living in lodgings and overrated the proportion living in college. This was clearly a result of

the over-representation in *IUJF* of women from the Ancient universities: while in *SRU* merely 10 per cent of all Jewish women were at Oxbridge, in the former case 20 per cent of all female respondents were studying there.

The pattern of accommodation differs for the four university groups, not only, of course, for the Jewish students. In London and the Large Provincial universities Jewish students lived preponderantly at home (the similarity from the Jewish point of view between London and these other cities which have substantial Jewish communities is borne out in this analysis). In Oxbridge they lived mainly at college, while in the Small Provincial universities the pattern was mixed. Table 6 shows this analysis by university type.

TABLE 6

Accommodation of Jewish Students, by University Type

	Ancient		*London*		*Large Prov.*		*Small Prov.*		*All*	
	IUJF %	SRU %	IUJF %	SRU %	IUJF %	SRU %	IUJF %	SRU %	IUJF %	SRU %
College	62	58	1	4	[a]	2	8	26	18	18
Home	[a]	—	78	70	72	86	38	14	50	51
Lodgings	31	33	11	14	16	9	31	34	21	20
Other	7	9	9	12	11	4	22	26	11	11
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n=226$	$n=79$	$n=245$	$n=116$	$n=241$	$n=124$	$n=121$	$n=66$	$n=833$	$n=385$

[a] Fewer than 0·5%

Data are available for the whole student body in *SRU* relating to the students' accommodation in the year 1958.[21] These data are, strictly speaking, not entirely comparable with those used for the Jewish students, because in the latter case the data referred to accommodation over three years. Minor discrepancies between the findings for the overall student body and for the Jewish students could well be due to this difference between Jewish data for three years and general data for one year. But there is no reason to assume that major discrepancies could also be explained in these terms. And a major discrepancy is indeed found. In Table 7 all medical (etc.) students have been eliminated, as well as the category 'other' for accommodation, which included in the case of the Jewish men largely students whose accommodation had been different each year, and in the case of the Jewish women students whose accommodation could not be coded under the given categories.

TABLE 7

Accommodation: General Student Body and Jews (SRU)[a]

	Ancient		*London*		*Rest*	
	All students %	*Jewish students* %	*All students* %	*Jewish students* %	*All students* %	*Jewish students* %
Home	1	—	27	77	24	55
Lodgings	48	37	41	16	47	28
College	51	63	32	7	29	17
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 2{,}310$	$n = 59$	$n = 1{,}832$	$n = 75$	$n = 6{,}797$	$n = 114$

[a] Excluding medical, dental, veterinary students, and students in 'other' types of accommodation.

The differences in the case of the Ancient Universities were probably due to the above-mentioned discrepancy in the data. But for London and the Rest of the U.K. this could not have been the case: the home-boundness of Jewish students stands out without any doubt, although the differences would perhaps have disappeared in part if we could have controlled for parents' place of residence.

RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT

Jewish Society Membership

One of the important aims of *IUJF* was, understandably, to find out more about the participation of Jewish students in the activities of the university or college Jewish societies. A question invited them to state whether they were 'very active members', 'active members', 'members, but not active', or had 'little or no interest'. *IUJF* found, among its respondents, that 83 per cent were members of their Jewish society, although some 40 per cent (almost half of the total membership) were 'not active'. The largest percentage of the actual membership which was 'not active' was found in London (57 per cent), the smallest in the Small Provincial universities (28 per cent).

The proportion of members among the respondents to *IUJF* was substantially higher than the proportion among the *SRU* population of those who stated in 1958 that they were, or had been, members of their Jewish student society (cf. Table 8). This latter percentage is likely to overstate the actual proportion of members at a particular moment, because it includes all those who had *at any time* during their first three years at university joined their college Jewish society. This over-representation of Jewish society members in *IUJF* leads us to suspect that the survey was biased in favour of those students who were more strongly identified as Jews. I have already briefly alluded to this fact in the section on careers; further evidence will be presented in the following analysis of religious beliefs.

TABLE 8

Proportionate Membership of Jewish Student Societies

	IUJF %	*SRU* %
Ancient	73 n = 225	50 n = 79
London	82 n = 233	57 n = 116
Large Provincial	93 n = 241	71 n = 124
Small Provincial	83 n = 105	55 n = 66
Total	83	60
	$n = 804$	$n = 385$

In the case of *SRU* we can analyse these data further, and attempt to see whether living in different types of lodgings had any bearing on Jewish society membership. Living in college apparently led to low Jewish society membership: in the Ancient universities 41 per cent of those living in college for two or more years have been members at some time during the three undergraduate years ($n = 46$), as against 64 per cent for those living outside college for two or more years ($n = 33$). The same is true for the Small Provincial universities, the other type where a considerable proportion lived in college. The numbers were small but the differences substantial: 35 per cent of those living in college ($n = 17$), but 61 per cent of the others ($n = 49$), joined at some stage. In London and the Large Provincial cities living at home went with a substantial membership proportion: 64 per cent ($n = 81$) and 70 per cent ($n = 106$) respectively. There was no clear pattern in these two university types for those living neither at home nor in college: 39 per cent ($n = 18$) in London were members, while 87 per cent ($n = 16$) in the Large Provincial cities were members. The numbers were again very small; not too much can be made of this analysis.

Judaism and its Importance

We have already seen that in the case of *SRU* the questions of Jewish relevance—apart from Jewish society membership—were framed in terms of religion. The data, on the whole, thus concern the students' attitudes to *Judaism*, not to the more general conception of *Jewishness*. We shall, however, see later that, because of certain spontaneous comments, some inferences can be drawn regarding the latter factor too. *IUJF*, directed as it was at the Jewish students as such, covered the wider area of Jewishness much more thoroughly: there were questions on Jewish education, attitudes to Zionism and intermarriage, intentions regarding future degree of Jewishness, and anti-semitism. Here we shall have to disregard these aspects, because no

comparison with *SRU* can be made. But the questions in *IUJF* concerning Jewish religious beliefs and practices offer fertile possibilities for comparative analysis.

IUJF used the following categories of belief in the questionnaire ('Your religious belief') and in the analysis: 'Orthodox Jewish—Moderately orthodox—Reform—Liberal—Theist—Agnostic—Atheist—Indifferent', and the following categories of practices ('Your observance of Jewish practices'): 'Strictly orthodox—Orthodox, but not strictly so—Moderately orthodox/moderate—Reform—Liberal—Nationalist—Little—None'. Of the latter the first three were strictly defined in the accompanying letter; anyone answering in terms of these first three categories may be considered to have been a person in whose life religion played a definite part—thus 'Moderately orthodox/moderate' was defined as 'practising many of the major commandments of Judaism (e.g. Shabbat and Kashrut), but not on all occasions (e.g. as do many members of Orthodox synagogues)'. Reform and Liberal were, for the question on practices, defined as 'corresponding to the practices of the Association of Synagogues in Great Britain' and of 'the Liberal Synagogue' respectively—clearly a much less satisfactory definition. Here no account was taken of deviations from officially prescribed practice. One suspects that the students in *IUJF* who filled in, on practices and beliefs, 'Reform' or 'Liberal' constituted a heterogeneous group from the point of view of the role religion played in their lives.

SRU, of course, did not make such fine distinctions. It asked the respondents to assess whether the current importance of religion in their lives was 'very important—intermediate—moderately important—intermediate—of no importance'. Quite a number of respondents specified, under 'comments', that they were agnostic, merely nominally Jewish, or atheist. Some stated that religion had general importance to them, but not specifically Judaism; others held that being a Jew was important, but not in a religious sense.

Our first task was to attempt to reduce the disparate categories in each of these three tables to one common set, so that comparisons became possible. In the case of *IUJF* we have to reconcile the data on beliefs and practices; the problem here is to find combinations of belief-categories each of which is comparable in terms of religious involvement with a particular combination of categories of practice.[22]

In view of the nature of the data available, it seemed most appropriate to establish three categories of involvement in or importance of religion: at least moderate importance (1), slight importance (2), and no importance (3). On the *IUJF* belief side 'orthodox' and 'moderately orthodox' clearly fit into (1), while 'atheist' and 'indifferent' should obviously be classed (3). 'Theist' is most appropriately regarded as (2). On the practices side 'orthodox to moderate' is (1), 'little' (2), and 'none' (3). 'Reform and Liberal' present a problem in either case: it is

TABLE 9

Jewish Students' Religious Belief: IUJF

	Men %	*Women* %	*Total* %
Orthodox/moderately orthodox[a]	12/34 } 46	9/32 } 41	11/34 } 45
Reform/Liberal	13	17	14
Theist	12	13	12
Atheist	8	8	8
Agnostic	17	17	17
Indifferent	5	4	5
	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 641$	$n = 179$	$n = 820$

[a] Small figures: top line orthodox; second line moderately orthodox.

TABLE 10

Jewish Students' Religious Practice: IUJF

	Men %	*Women* %	*Total* %
Orthodox/Moderate[a]	6/13/32 } 51	4/16/23 } 43	6/14/29 } 49
Reform/Liberal	8	14	10
Little[b]	26	27	26
None	14	16	15
	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 645$	$n = 182$	$n = 827$

[a] Small figures: top line orthodox, decreasing to moderate.
[b] Includes 'Nationalist', 2% in all columns.

TABLE 11

Importance of Religion: SRU

	Men %	*Women* %	*Total* %
Jewish: very important—moderately important[a]	7/9/24 } 39	29/7/9 } 45	14/8/20 } 41
Jewish: intermediate	15	13	15
General importance of religion + Agnostics: any importance	7	10	7
Jewish: of no importance	27	17	24
Agnostics: of no importance	12	13	13
Atheists	[b]	2	1
	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 276$	$n = 105$	$n = 376$

[a] Small figures: top line very important, decreasing to moderately important.
[b] Fewer than 0·5%.

not unlikely that they were used by some respondents of high involvement, but also by others for whom religion was merely of slight importance. I have decided to split this group into two equal parts, and to allocate half to (1) and half to (2). The 'agnostics' were also, probably, a mixed group. Some of them, no doubt, worry a great deal about religion, and some may well continue to practise certain aspects of Judaism. In *SRU* one quarter of those who specified 'agnostic' or 'nominal' still considered religion to be at least of some importance to them. For lack of any better criterion I have used this information and allocated one quarter of the 'agnostics' in *IUJF* to (2) and the rest to (3).

The allocation of respondents to this threefold division is less ambiguous and *ad hoc* in the case of *SRU* than was true for the first survey. 'Jewish: very important to moderately important' were classed as (1); 'Jewish: intermediate', those for whom religion had general importance, and the 'agnostics' for whom it had some importance as (2), and the rest as (3). Having made these decisions, we can combine the last three tables into one: Table 12.

TABLE 12

Students' Religious Involvement, Combined Categories

	(*a*) *IUJF Practice* %	(*b*) *IUJF Belief* %	(*c*) *SRU Religion* %
At least moderate importance	54	52	41
Slight importance	31	23	22
No importance	15	26	38
	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 827$	$n = 820$	$n = 381$

The differences between practice and belief, columns (*a*) and (*b*), for the two least involved categories, cannot be attributed to the decision made regarding the 'agnostics'' distribution. If half of the agnostics had been allocated to 'slight importance'—which would not, I believe, have been justified—the percentages for 'slight importance' and 'no importance' in (*b*) would have been respectively 28 per cent and 22 per cent. The conclusion seems therefore in order that belief had been more affected by secularism than practice.[23] Each points probably to a different aspect of Jewish identity: beliefs to the religious aspect, practices perhaps more to a diffuse ethnic sense of Jewishness. Some support for this view can be found in the replies to another question in *IUJF*: 'Your intended future degree of Jewishness and closeness to the Jewish community: very strong, strong, fair, little, none.' Though statements of intention are notoriously poor predictors of actual future behaviour, they do provide good indicators of the present state of

mind. With a total of 40 cases of no answer eliminated, 'very strong' and 'strong' accounted for 51 per cent, 'fair' for 33 per cent, 'little' for 13 per cent and 'none' for 4 per cent ($n = 793$). This accords very closely with column (*a*) in Table 12; practice seems, then, to be a good indicator of Jewishness if not of Jewish religiosity.[24]

A comparison between columns (*b*) and (*c*) raises the problem whether the categorizations are, in fact, equivalent. In other words: would the respondents to *IUJF* who classified themselves as one of the shades of Orthodox, or half of those who mentioned Reform or Liberal, have stated in response to *SRU* that religion was at least moderately important to them? And would the Theists and the other half of the Reform and Liberal respondents have marked the second 'intermediate' in reply to *SRU*? There is no way in which this question can be answered—but it can hardly be argued that the entire difference between columns (*b*) and (*c*), or even, I believe, a major part of it, should be attributed to such a lack of equivalence. It seems beyond doubt that the proportion of less religiously involved Jews reached by *IUJF* was substantially lower than their true proportion in the population.

Importance of Religion and Jewish Society Membership

In *SRU* the proportionate distribution of the importance of religion was substantially different for members and non-members of Jewish societies (see Table 13). One would expect a similar difference to occur in the case of *IUJF*; unfortunately no break-down of religious characteristics for members and non-members of Jewish student societies is available. In this context, however, it becomes important to remember that one of the main biases in the inquiry of *IUJF* related to the higher proportion of members of Jewish societies in that sample than in *SRU* (83 per cent as against 60 per cent in the latter). The two samples can be made comparable by computing the distribution of religious importance in *SRU* for a hypothetical population in which 83 per cent are members of Jewish student societies (as was the case for *IUJF*). We then arrive at a distribution of religious importance for *SRU* which has been 'standardized' for Jewish society membership with *IUJF*. The correspondence of this standardized *SRU* distribution in Table 13 with that found in Table 12 for *IUJF* beliefs is closer than that of the non-standardized distribution. But a distinct difference remains: the *IUJF* sample continues to be more religious than the *SRU* sample.

It is difficult, with the available material, to explain this fact confidently. Three suggestions seem worth considering. In the first place it is possible that further bias existed in *IUJF* towards the inclusion of more religious students. Alternatively it is possible that the difference is after all due to lack of equivalence of the categories used to compare *IUJF* and *SRU*. But a quite different line of speculation seems worth

TABLE 13

Importance of Religion by Membership of Jewish Societies (SRU)

	Members %	*Non-members* %	*Tota* %	*Total 'standardized' with IUJF*[a] %
At least moderate importance	49	29	41	[45]
Slight importance	23	21	22	[22]
No importance	28	50	38	[33]
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 230$	$n = 151$	$n = 381$	[$n = 381$]

[a] For explanation, see text above.

indicating. At least some of the respondents to *IUJF* may, in fact, have replied to Baron's questions from within a different 'frame of mind' from that in which they would have responded to the *SRU* questionnaire. It is possible that the whole context of the specifically Jewish *IUJF* inquiry 'salienced' for them their Jewishness, or Jewish identity, not normally very strong, while *SRU* brought responses from people like this which were less bound to a specifically Jewish identity. A potentially fruitful research problem, which can link up with previous work on reference groups and identity, seems indicated by this analysis.[25]

Religion, Age and the Life Cycle

It is regrettable that no analysis is available for *IUJF* of religious beliefs and practices by age or by year of birth. Religious experience tends to vary with age; more especially the suggestion has been made that for many individuals the nature and intensity of religious experience shows a marked discontinuity at the close of adolescence.[26] The fact that in *IUJF* almost 40 per cent were under 20, and almost 60 per cent under 21 years, while no one in *SRU* was under 23 years when the questions on religion were asked, may well have been a confounding factor of some importance.

Another factor which might have had some influence on a post-Second World War group of Jewish students is year of birth. Those who were old enough during the war to understand the news of the tragedy in Europe, and thus to have experienced it personally rather than vicariously through later accounts, might have been expected to have stronger attachments to Judaism than the younger students. The *IUJF* data, again, do not help us on this point, and the *SRU* data are not really appropriate for this analysis, as there are very few older respondents in that sample. A test of this hypothesis was nonetheless attempted. *SRU* respondents were divided into two groups: those born in 1935 and after ($n = 338$), and the older group, born in 1934 or before ($n = 38$). No consistent or statistically significant difference was found between these groups. Although 45 per cent of the older group

held religion to be at least moderately important, against 41 per cent for the younger group, 44 per cent of the older group thought it of no importance, against 36 per cent for the younger group. Slight importance was given respectively by 10 per cent and 24 per cent.

Although no comparable data exist for *IUJF*, it is of some interest to reproduce the analysis of the *SRU* data for respondents of differing marital status. The differences were small, but pointed to a noteworthy phenomenon. Of the single respondents ($n = 286$) 18 per cent stated that they had become agnostics or atheists, of the married respondents ($n = 99$) 14 per cent stated that they had become agnostics or atheists. For the married respondents without children ($n = 58$) this percentage was 16 per cent, for those with children ($n = 41$) it was 12 per cent. It seems, then, that marriage, and more particularly the founding of a family, had the effect of reducing the number of people specifically identifying themselves as agnostic or atheist.

But the distribution of single and married people over the three constructed categories of importance of religion also differed markedly (see Table 14). Further analysis revealed that the married people with children had a sharply higher 'score' on religiosity, although the marriage factor *alone* had a slight opposite effect.

TABLE 14

Importance of being a Jew and the Life Cycle (SRU)

	Single	*All married*	*Married no children*	*Married with children*
	%	%	%	%
At least moderate importance	39	45	32	66
Slight importance	23	18	30	5
No importance	38	34	41	29
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)
	$n = 284$	$n = 99$	$n = 58$	$n = 41$

I should point out, however, that almost half of the 'no importance' respondents among the married without children volunteered the information that being Jewish had *social* importance for them, a fact recorded for 40 per cent of the married with children in this category. Among the single respondents who stated 'no importance' this occurred merely among one tenth. '*Rock-bottom*' *no importance* was thus found among 34 per cent of the single, among 23 per cent of the married people without children, and among 17 per cent of the married people with children. At the other extreme being a Jew was considered very important by 10 per cent of the single, none of the married without children, and by half of the married with children.

This correlation between marital status (parenthood) and Jewishness can be interpreted in causal terms. One is inclined to infer that marriage

(parenthood) caused an increase in Jewishness or religiosity. But as there are no data for Jewishness before and after marriage and parenthood for the same individuals, some doubt as to the validity of this inference remains. Moreover, it is likely that in the case of some of those respondents for whom religion was very important this fact led to early marriage, thus reversing the suggested causal sequence. But the greater incidence of '*rock-bottom*' *no importance* among single respondents seems best explained in the former way. Thus our analysis tends to confirm the frequently reported fact that raising a family leads to the disappearance of the rebellious values found among adolescents, and a return to more traditional norms and patterns of behaviour.[27]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This analysis has brought to light some interesting new facts about Jewish students, such as their highly deviant accommodation pattern. It has also given fresh evidence for previously documented findings, regarding, for example, their preferred careers, their religious beliefs, and their social origins. It has found that the proportion of 'non-Jewish Jews' declines when people start founding families. It has suggested a rather intriguing problem regarding identity-activation. But all these aspects were, in a sense, incidental to the main object of this paper. This was to draw attention to the fruitfulness of secondary analysis, an alternative to surveys directed specifically at the Jewish population. The nature of this latter type of investigation is such that it almost inevitably yields results which are systematically biased, because of the non-inclusion of less fully identified members of the Jewish community. These people are Jews too—and in many respects data about them, about their social characteristics and their social attitudes are crucial for a proper understanding of the make-up of the Jewish community.

The principal advantage of secondary analysis is that it covers a sample of the entire population, in which the Jews can be located. But it can hardly supply the answer to all one's questions. Often the data which have been collected for the original purpose of the inquiry are irrelevant to one's own main interest. The next step, then, is to plan research in such a way that this location through over-all coverage becomes possible. Other sociologists are interested in different minority groups—in Catholics, for instance. It may be appropriate to conclude with the suggestion that research undertaken in co-operation with such others may be of substantial benefit to all concerned.

NOTES

[1] Financial support for this study, given by the Social Research Division of the London School of Economics, is gratefully acknowledged.

[2] But even in that case some problems remain. Thus in Holland the invasion of religion into many spheres of social and political life has resulted in a higher percentage declaring themselves—partly in protest—as 'without religious denomination' (Census 1960: 18 per cent). Many religiously alienated Jews likewise do not declare themselves Jewish. See, e.g., 'Dutch Jewry, A Demographic Analysis, Part One', *Jew. Jn. Sociol.*, III : 2 (1961), p. 214.

[3] In Britain, Maurice Freedman has written, 'always in theory and largely in practice Jews . . . are simply citizens without any special status such as would call for their separate enumeration': 'The Jewish Population of Great Britain', *Jew. Jn. Sociol.*, IV : 1 (1962), p. 92. In the United States the issue of separation of Church and State is ideologically hypersensitive. A single question on religion, added by way of experiment to a monthly Census Bureau sample survey (see below, note 6) touched off a major controversy and left certain Jewish organizations highly indignant. This prevented the planned inclusion of a question on religion in the national census of 1960.

[4] The only really satisfactory method would be to do a full-scale (sample) survey of the entire population, thus ensuring inclusion of the Jews. The expense of such an operation is likely to be prohibitive, unless one can join forces with investigators interested in other minorities. I am aware of one instance where such a full-scale sample survey was, in fact, carried out. Cf. Stanley K. Bigman, *The Jewish Population of Greater Washington in 1956*, Washington D.C., 1957. For an evaluation of the other methods see C. Morris Horowitz, 'The Estimated Jewish Population of New York, 1958', *Jew. Jn. Sociol.*, III : 2 (1961) and Louis Rosenberg, 'The Demography of the Jewish Community in Canada', *Jew. Jn. Sociol.*, I : 2 (1959) p. 220.

[5] There are some interesting variations on these methods. See, e.g., the article by Ira Rosenswaike, 'The Utilization of Census Tract Data in the Study of the American Jewish Population', *Jew. Soc. Stud.*, XXV : 1 (1963), which uses the high correlation of Russian-born individuals and Jews to arrive at certain demographic data. Such a method cannot, however, be utilized in areas without such recent Jewish immigration. In any case the poverty of demographic data relating to the British Jews has been widely commented upon. The most eloquent proof of this is furnished by the estimates (supplied by the Board of Deputies) of the total number of Jews in Britain, as published in the *American Jewish Yearbooks*. For the last ten years this figure has stood at 450,000; in all the other cases of major Jewish communities the estimates have been revised at least once.

[6] In the countries where census data exist by religious or ethnic group, scholars concerned with Jewish demography have done such secondary analysis. See, e.g., Alvin Chenkin, 'Jewish Population in the United States, 1958', *American Jewish Yearbook*, Vol. 60, 1959, for an analysis of the ('freak') nationwide sample mentioned above; Louis Rosenberg, loc. cit., for Canada; Ira Rosenswaike, 'The Jewish Population of Argentina', *Jew. Soc. Stud.*, XXII : 4 (1960). Other types of study subject sociological survey data to a secondary analysis; an excellent example is S. Joseph Fauman, 'Occupational Selection among Detroit Jews', in Marshall Sklare (ed.), *The Jews, Social Patterns of an American Group*, Glencoe (Ill.), 1958. Then there have been numerous studies of voting behaviour, some analysing only the Jewish patterns—such as Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews*, Glencoe (Ill.), 1956, some concentrating on the Jews after taking a general sample—e.g. Maurice G. Guysenir, 'Jewish Vote in Chicago', *Jew. Soc. Stud.*, XX : 4 (1958), others incidentally reporting interesting data on the Jews in the context of a wider analysis by ethnic or religious background, e.g. Edward A. Suchman and Herbert Menzel, 'The Interplay of Demographic and Psychological Variables in the Analysis of Voting Surveys', in P. F. Lazarsfeld

and Morris Rosenberg, *The Language of Social Research*, Glencoe (Ill.), 1955. The same principle is also successfully applied in Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, Garden City (N.Y.), 1961, and by Andrew M. Greeley, in 'Influence of the Religious Factor on Career Plans and Occupational Values of College Graduates', *Amer. Jn. Sociol.*, LXVIII : 6 (1963).

[7] Thus the earlier mentioned sample survey of the U.S. Census Bureau simply asked 'What is your religion?', while in other cases respondents are requested to state their 'religious preference'.

[8] The small numbers of Jews make most of the few British studies dealing with religion of students worthless from our point of view. See, e.g., The Survey of 900 Cambridge Undergraduates by R. Warren Evans, reported in *Cambridge Opinion*, Vol. 16 (1959). In most cases, the Jews end up on the heap of 'other religions' in the analysis. Sometimes it is possible to combine the data of a number of surveys. This was done by Bernard Lazerwitz, for his 'Some Factors Associated with Church Attendance', *Social Forces*, 39 : 4 (1961).

[9] Raymond V. Baron, 'IUJF Survey of Jewish University Students, 1954/55', *The Jewish Academy*, Winter 5716—1955–6. I have also used the original unpublished tabulations of this survey, which were put at my disposal by Mrs. A. Klausner of the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress. I should like to thank Mrs. Klausner sincerely for her assistance and encouragement.

[10] It is interesting to note that surveys of other student minorities are faced with the same problem of bias. Cf. Audrey G. Donnithorne, 'Catholic Undergraduates in the Universities of England and Wales', *The Dublin Review* 478, Winter 1958, and the synoptic discussion in Michael S. Fogarty, 'The Rising Tide. Growing Numbers of Catholic Students', *The Dublin Review*, 484, Summer 1960.

[11] Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom, *Report on an Inquiry into Applications for Admissions to Universities*, by R. K. Kelsall, London, 1957.

[12] This sample consisted of two subsamples. Of the students from manual workers' homes and of the medical, dental, and veterinary students one in two was taken; of the non-manual and non-medical students one in five was taken.

[13] Although some aspects of the analysis have been made available in mimeographed form, the data are still largely unpublished. I am grateful for the permission of the SRU to proceed with this secondary analysis and to use some of the unpublished data. I am greatly indebted to Mr. J. G. H. Newfield, Mrs. Christina Holbraad, and Mr. David A. Howell for their valuable help over a long period of time, and for their patience in putting up with often probably most unwelcome interruptions.

[14] According to figures of the University Grants Committee (U.G.C.) the proportion of full-time non-U.K. students at British Universities in 1954–5 was 10·4 per cent. See *Annual Abstract of Statistics*, 1957, pp. 101 and 103. It is hard to decide whether the *IUJF* figure of 11·3 per cent was biased through differential identification or differential response of Jewish students from abroad. This is, of course, possible: these students may have been more 'visible' *and* more identified with the Jewish student sub-group (which possibly represented for them a familiar reference group in strange surroundings) than U.K. Jewish students. I have in any case rounded off the percentage to 11 per cent.

[15] Based on U.G.C. returns of a total of 75,200 full-time U.K. students (including those reading for a diploma). See *Annual Abstract of Statistics*, 1957, loc. cit.

[16] The share of the total Jewish population in the population of Great Britain is somewhat less than 1 per cent. No reliable figures are available regarding the size of the Jewish age-group of university age. A comparison of the proportion of the age-group 15–19 (who would have been of undergraduate age four years later) in a sample of the Jewish population in 1950–2, with the proportion of this age-group in the general population, shows little difference. See Hannah Neustatter, 'Demographic and other Statistical Aspects of Anglo-Jewry', in Maurice Freedman (ed.), *A Minority in Britain*, London, 1955, Table IV, p. 249, and *Annual Abstract of Statistics*, 1954, p. 9.

[17] Exact figures are hard to come by, but the following papers may be consulted, also for further references: Hannah Neustatter, loc. cit., V. D. Lipman, 'Trends in Anglo-Jewish Occupations', *Jew. Jn. Sociol.*, II : 2 (1960), Ernest

Krausz, 'Occupation and Social Advancement in Anglo-Jewry', *Jew. Jn. Sociol.* IV : 1 (1962).

[18] D. A. Howell, *The Student's Choice of Career*, mimeographed, 1963.

[19] Note that figures quoted for the general *SRU* sample refer to the adjusted population in the same way as do those for the Jewish subgroup.

[20] Greeley, loc. cit. pp. 664–6, finds a similar disinclination towards non-university teaching among Jewish men in his re-analysis of a nation-wide American survey of college graduates. American Jewish women, however, appear *more* inclined than their non-Jewish counterparts to choose an educational career.

[21] C. Holbraad, *The Accommodation of Third Year University Students and their Performance at Final Examinations*, mimeographed, 1962.

[22] A difficulty is that no data for individuals exist. Thus we have to compare group distributions, and these correlations might or might not accurately represent the correlations of the two sets of data concerning the same individuals. Nevertheless I do not believe that this has led to serious distortion, as the variables involved have a great deal of *prima facie* similarity. See, on this problem, W. S. Robinson, 'Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals', *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 15 : 3 (1950).

[23] See the interesting discussion on the problems of practice and belief, and attitudes and behaviour in Bernard C. Rosen, 'Minority Group in Transition: A Study of Adolescent Religious Conviction and Conduct', in Sklare, op. cit., pp. 336–46.

[24] The definition of Jewish identity in terms of Jewishness or Judaism has been widely discussed. For the research problems involved see Bernard Lazerwitz, 'Some Factors in Jewish Identification', *Jew. Soc. Stud.*, XV : 1 (1953), Ludwig Geismar, 'A Scale for the Measurement of Ethnic Identification', *Jew. Soc. Stud.*, XVI : 1 (1954), and Marshall Sklare *et al.*, 'Forms and Expressions of Jewish Identification', *Jew. Soc. Stud.*, XVII : 3 (1955). Cf. also the series of papers of the Hebrew University Group under Simon N. Herman, referred to below.

[25] See specifically the first synoptic discussions by Robert K. Merton, in his *Social Theory and Social Structure*, 2nd ed., Glencoe (Ill.) 1957; and the papers of both theoretical and Jewish interest by Simon N. Herman & Erling O. Schild, 'The Stranger Group in a Cross Cultural Situation', *Sociometry*, 24 : 2 (1961), 'Ethnic Role Conflict in a Cross-Cultural Situation', *Human Relations*, 13 : 3 (1960), and Simon N. Herman, 'American Jewish Students in Israel', *Jew. Soc. Stud.*, XXIV : 1 (1962). The most interesting analysis of the concept of identity is found in Erik H. Erikson, 'The Problem of Ego Identity', *Jn. Amer. Psychoanal. Assoc.*, IV : 1 (1956). See also an excellent recent discussion in Erving Goffman's *Stigma, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Englewood Cliffs (N.J.), 1963.

[26] Erikson, loc. cit.: see also by the same author, *Childhood and Society*, New York, 1950, partic. Part IV, and *Young Man Luther*, New York 1958, a psychoanalytic historical study where the adolescent's religious crisis looms large.

[27] For a similar finding for Jewish subjects cf. Abraham G. Duker, 'Some Aspects of Israel's Impact on Identification and Cultural Patterns', *Jew. Soc. Stud.*, XXI : 1 (1959), p. 30, and Bernard Lazerwitz, op. cit., p. 306.

JEWISH SCHOOLING IN GREAT BRITAIN

Bernard Steinberg

THE following account seeks primarily to trace the historical background to the development of the Jewish school system in Britain and to survey the facilities as they have existed since 1945. The term 'schooling' is used deliberately, since the emphasis here is not upon education in general, but rather upon the institutions providing and administering the education for the children of the community. In addition, the end of the Second World War is a most significant point with regard to this study, for, as in so many other respects, it marks the great historical watershed from which the current system directly stems. Nevertheless, a brief account such as this must also examine the broader historical background of the system, and this it must do in the context of the community as a whole.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND UP TO 1939

Since the Resettlement of 1656 the community has developed by a series of waves of immigration, starting with the original Sephardim, culminating in the great influx from Eastern Europe between 1880 and 1914, and followed by subsequent influxes of refugees from the Continent. The process has followed a marked pattern. Generally speaking, each new wave of immigration has provided a spiritual transfusion greatly needed by the community. When, for example, Jews came to these shores from Poland and Russia, their intense Judaism was incompatible with the comparative laxity of the anglicized Jews of Victorian England, of whom the Anglo-Jewish historian Lucien Wolf wrote: 'The whole intellectuality which rose above mediocrity, ran in non-Jewish channels, while the best minds left Judaism altogether.' Today it is obvious that few Jews in this country can trace their British ancestry back to anywhere near the Resettlement of 1656. Indeed the majority of Jews in present-day Britain are descended from the post-1880 immigrants.

The tradition of education in Anglo-Jewry goes back almost to the very date of the Return. There are records that in 1657 the small new

community in London established its first Talmud Torah, and in the 'Ascamoth' of 1664 of the Sephardi congregation specific provisions for the religious education of children were laid down. By the eighteenth century at least two schools were already well established by the Sephardim. One was the Shaare Tikvah school, a development of the original Talmud Torah, and the other was the Villa Real school which was founded in 1730 for the daughters of poorer members of the community.

In the eighteenth century the immigration of Ashkenazi Jews began to increase, and the newcomers, although less organized than the Sephardim, were not slow in establishing their own educational institutions. An orphan charity school was founded in 1712, and a 'Chevra Kadisha Talmud Torah' in 1732. It was the latter institution that was subsequently to develop into the famous Jews' Free School.

By the nineteenth century certain marked features were very apparent in Anglo-Jewish education. Firstly, the schools, in common with those of other religious denominations, were primarily charitable foundations meant for the poorer children of the community. The children of richer families were almost invariably taught by private tutors, whilst their Jewish education was in the hands of *melammedim* or rabbis. In addition to this feature, and what is even more important and far-reaching, the Jewish schools were then concentrating on the secular subjects of the curriculum, inevitably to the detriment of the Jewish studies. There was a significant reason for this development. By now Anglo-Jewry contained many families which had already been well established in the country for several generations. The newcomers from the Continent, with their outlandish ways and more stringent standards of Jewish observance, were a source of embarrassment to their longer-established, anglicized co-religionists. Thus the Jewish schools tended to adopt a more anglicized outlook, and to become a means of assimilating the newcomers.

The only momentous and far-reaching event to counteract this drift away from Jewish learning and culture occurred in 1860 when the Rev. Barnett Abrahams, significantly enough an immigrant from Poland, founded the Jewish Association for the Diffusion of Religious Knowledge. This was to become the parent body of the subsequent Jewish Religious Education Board, established in 1894.

In terms of quantity, the nineteenth century was one of great development in Jewish day schools, which, apart from London, were established in Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, and Hull. Moreover, with the opening in London of the Jews' Free School in 1841, in addition to the Jews' Infants Schools, the Westminster Jewish School, the Borough Jewish School, the Bayswater Jewish Schools, the Stepney Jewish Schools, the Norwood Orphanage, and the West Metropolitan Jewish Schools, Anglo-Jewry in the second half of the last century was

extremely well endowed with elementary educational institutions of a high standard.

The provision of these schools, it must be added, was not primarily for the purpose of anglicizing Jewish immigrants. In many cases they also owed their establishment to the desire to counteract the increasing activities of Christian missionaries amongst the poorer Jews. For example, the 'Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews' had established two free schools in the East End of London in 1807 and 1811.

By the middle of the last century increasing numbers of middle-class Jews were sending their children to the better non-Jewish schools, such as University College School and the City of London School, in which there was no insistence upon Christian denominational doctrine. Thus when Jews' College was established in 1855, a Grammar School attached to it survived for less than twenty-five years, largely because it lost its potential intake to such schools as the City of London.

The turning-point in the history of English education in the last century was the great Education Act of 1870. This, among other provisions, set up the Board Schools as non-denominational institutions which were to be supported by public rates. In addition, the 1870 Act contained the important 'Conscience Clause' which stipulated that no specific denominational doctrine should be taught in any of the Board Schools.

The effect on the already existing Jewish schools was far-reaching. Being charitable institutions and receiving only comparatively small grants from public funds, they now had to compete with schools without financial problems. This factor was indeed a difficulty that also faced the voluntary schools of the Christian denominations. In addition, the Conscience Clause now removed any remaining impediments to Jewish parents sending their children to schools not maintained by the community. The sum total of the 1870 Act, as far as Anglo-Jewry was concerned, was the beginning of a decline in its day schools. There was a marked drop in numbers on the rolls, and a lowering of Jewish standards.

Providentially, in this connexion, another great turning-point in the nineteenth century came soon after the implementation of the 1870 Act: from 1882 there was the great influx of Eastern European immigrants. The newcomers, fleeing from the notorious 1881 May Laws of Czarist Russia, brought with them an intensity of Judaism unknown to the older-established community. The newcomers were steeped in Jewish learning, and if they did not at first merge harmoniously into the existing Anglo-Jewish community, at least they provided a source of badly needed spiritual regeneration.

What is especially important is that the children of the newcomers began to fill the Jewish voluntary day schools, thus reversing the trend of falling numbers. The fact that at the turn of the century the Jews'

Free School had 4,500 pupils was a direct result of the very high proportion of children of recent arrivals. The influx of East European immigrants was the main inspiration behind the founding of the Talmud Torahs in London, Manchester, and Leeds. It is significant that the inadequate provisions for Jewish education in the day schools were supplemented for these children by classes held during weekday evenings and on Sundays.

The newcomers, more often than not in the direst poverty, willingly supported the Talmud Torahs, or paid for their children's tuition under a *melammed*. Talmud Torahs are one of the bases of the tradition of part-time Jewish education that has become such a characteristic of this community. Two other movements sponsoring part-time classes were also established about this time. These were the Jewish Religious Education Board, founded in 1894, and the Union of Hebrew and Religion Classes, inaugurated in 1907.

Henceforth, the pattern of Jewish education was largely to follow the part-time system which is all too familiar today. In the course of the earlier years of this century, as the number of new immigrants declined, so did the rolls of the Jewish voluntary schools and part-time classes.

In 1920 the Central Committee for Jewish Education was set up with the purpose of promoting and co-ordinating Jewish Education in London, the Provinces, and the Empire by means of inspections, advice, grants, and the provision of books and other equipment. The Committee provided the ideal means of establishing co-ordination in the somewhat disorganized system of the time. However, since all the organizations affiliated to it maintained complete independence, the Committee's function was merely advisory and it was thus without any real power to introduce significant innovations and reforms. A Director of Jewish Education, Herbert M. Adler, was appointed in 1922 by the Central Committee, and for the next seventeen years he diligently carried out his superhuman task of organizer, inspector, and adviser.

One need only mention such names as Rabbi Dr. Victor Schonfeld, Rev. J. K. Goldbloom, and Dr. J. S. Fox to show that there were far-sighted individuals even in the early decades of this century who realized the vital role of day schools in the preservation of the community. In 1905 Dr. Fox established the Liverpool Jewish Higher Grade School, which in the seventeen years of its existence reached a high standard both in Jewish and secular subjects. The pioneer work of J. K. Goldbloom at Redmans Road Talmud Torah in the East End of London dated back to 1901 and lasted over half a century. This Talmud Torah was the forcing ground of the *Ivrit beIvrit* system, and as such attained standards unequalled by other similar part-time institutions. Rabbi Dr. Victor Schonfeld's work in this field started in 1910, but it was not until seventeen years later that his first day school opened. A cardinal principle at Victor Schonfeld's school was the

insistence on placing the Jewish subjects at least in a position of parity with the secular ones.

Unfortunately, the work of these pioneers was carried out in a climate of growing indifference to Jewish education. The inter-war years marked a further decline both in standards and numbers. By the middle of 1939 the *Jewish Chronicle* (Editorial, 23 June) summed up the situation thus: 'Despite the devoted efforts of a number of ardent workers it is notorious that large numbers of Jewish children in this country are growing up without attending religious classes—a potential danger to the communal future. Others acquire the merest smattering of religious instruction, which will serve them ill, or not at all, in their contacts with the world.' The voluntary day schools were affected amongst other things by shifting Jewish communities as well as the indifference of parents. With the part-time system of Jewish education an established principle, there existed with it the inevitable disadvantages of such a policy.

For example, there were the ever-recurring financial crises; there was also the fact that pupils had to be drawn to the classes in the face of other attractions, such as boys' and girls' clubs. Most of the Talmud Torahs were housed in dingy premises—hardly an attraction to potential pupils.

Thus it was officially estimated in the middle 1930s that at least 50 per cent of the Jewish child population of school age in Great Britain were not receiving any Jewish education whatsoever.[1] Several Jewish day schools were on the verge of closing down, and indeed did not survive the 1939–45 war.

THE WAR-TIME CRISIS, 1939–45

From the point of view of Anglo-Jewish education alone, the war could not have come at a more critical time. The system, disorganized and inadequate as it was, now faced a new and seemingly insuperable crisis. The prospect of impending evacuation and its massive attendant problems were enough to confirm the fears of the pessimists. In May 1939 a meeting was convened of the representatives of the three main London educational organizations (The Jewish Religious Education Board, The Union of Hebrew and Religion Classes, and The Talmud Torah Trust) together with the Central Committee for Jewish Religious Education, which was the body largely concerned with education in the Provinces. Plans were drawn up to meet the challenge of the coming war-time emergency. The most radical consequence of this meeting was the decision to pool the funds, resources, and personnel of the organizations concerned. This was, incidentally, the first positive attempt at setting up a unified system of Anglo-Jewish education.

When war came, and with it evacuation, the expected difficulties

arose. The crucial problem was to trace children scattered over every part of Great Britain, sometimes in large groups, but all too often in tiny isolated groups. At the same time, during the months of the 'phoney war', with the coming and going between the safe areas and the large cities, the problem was aggravated. The struggle of the Jewish education authorities in this respect has been appositely described as a 'war on two fronts'.

In addition to all this, financial problems were becoming more and more serious; a corresponding shortage of qualified teachers and suitable premises only added to the problem, even when children were traced and brought into the classes. Great credit must be given to many teachers who voluntarily took it upon themselves to organize rudimentary facilities for Jewish education in evacuation areas. By dint of the hard work on the part of the new unified movement, progress was made in the face of appalling difficulties. By December 1939, sixty-five schools for part-time Jewish education were opened in reception areas for a total roll of approximately 3,600 children.[2] In London, new classes were opened for the increasing number of returned children, and by December 1939, thirty-seven Synagogue classes had a total attendance of about 850 pupils.

Yet the problems soon appeared insurmountable, especially in the years 1940–41, when the community at large was pre-occupied with the generally accepted priorities of war. It must be emphasized that this state of affairs was very much in accordance with conditions as they affected the general education system of the country. For example, it was officially admitted in the House of Commons in February 1940 that of about one and a half million children in London, 27·6 per cent were not receiving any schooling whatsoever.[3] Against this background the unified organization strove hard to build up a system of Jewish education.

Classes met in all manner of premises, and many teachers spent hours travelling to isolated spots all over the country. The new body, now called the Joint Emergency Committee for Jewish Religious Education, was impeded by financial difficulties which were only partially solved at the end of 1940. Yet as a result of its positive progress it had by 1942 organized 360 centres in London and the reception areas; it had 360 teachers, including ninety full-timers; it also had about 10,500 children on its rolls, and this number was steadily rising.[4] The first great lesson learned through the establishment of the J.E.C. was that a unified and co-ordinated educational system was in itself preferable to the state of affairs that had existed up to 1939.

In February 1941 there was held at Oxford an informal conference on education, attended by representatives from London and the Provinces. It was agreed to expand the work of the Joint Emergency Committee to cover the whole of Great Britain. Henceforth the J.E.C. pointed the way to a desirable post-war structure. Besides its admirable

organizational work it issued a series of useful publications and periodicals. It also organized education weeks in 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943, coinciding with Chanukah, in order to bring home to an apathetic Jewish community the importance of education as the keystone of Anglo-Jewry and its effective survival as a thriving entity.

The best indication of the success of the Joint Emergency Committee was perhaps the number of children on its rolls; whereas this totalled 8,000 in December 1941, and 10,500 in the following year, it had increased by 1943 to over 11,000.[5] Admittedly the figure was still comparatively low, but given the difficulties of war-time conditions it represented a positive achievement. One result of the work of the J.E.C. was the formation of the Jewish Youth Study Groups, which was the first serious attempt in many years to tackle the problem of indifference towards Jewish matters among children in secondary schools. The success of the movement and the fact that it is still flourishing today are sufficient testimony of this aspect of the Committee's work.

Surely the culmination of its activities and the criterion of this success was the fact that in the closing months of the war there were actually more children on the rolls of its classes than there were on the combined rolls of the pre-war organizations.

In addition to the work of the J.E.C., mention must be made of Solomon Schonfeld's Secondary School which maintained its independent existence in evacuation. Similarly, a number of children's hostels in country areas were opened, notably under the aegis of the Habonim movement, and these were a great success. Given the facilities to open an even wider network of hostels for evacuated children, even greater achievements might have been recorded; for example, at the existing hostels many children were brought into contact with Judaism although their own home backgrounds were devoid of any Jewish content.

At the end of the war Anglo-Jewry was presented with a unique opportunity to put its educational system into some sort of order. History has shown that one of the consequences of wars is the radical reshaping of educational systems, and of this process the 1944 Education Act stands out as a great example in Britain. By the provisions of the Act, religious denominations were able to establish and maintain schools under conditions considerably more favourable than before, and to be given voluntary-aided status for their schools. With many Jewish day schools either defunct or moribund, Anglo-Jewry could now have gone ahead with a radical programme of educational reconstruction. In the words of the late Professor Brodetsky at the beginning of 1944, with reference to the impending Education Act: 'Jewish Religious education must rise to the level prescribed for the general education of the country.'[6]

POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

Events since 1945 have shown the extent to which the Anglo-Jewish community has taken advantage of this unique opportunity, particularly with regard to the consolidation of its day-school system. The war-time crises had shown that, given the proper control and its due priority, Anglo-Jewish education could under peace-time conditions fulfil its proper purpose. The view was indeed unanimous that there should be no return to pre-1939 conditions, with the unnecessary multiplicity of educational bodies and the ever-present financial problems.

Moreover, a further factor precluded a return to pre-war conditions. This was the drastic change in the residential pattern of the larger communities, mainly as a result of war-time air attacks. For example, London's East End was no longer the largest centre of Jewish population in the country, and similar dispersions took place in Leeds, Manchester, Liverpool, and Glasgow. One result of all this was that the Talmud Torahs and other centres in these areas became largely obsolete and were never to regain their pre-war numbers. The need now arose for establishing new centres in the new areas of Jewish population, usually the suburbs of the large cities. The task was now greatly hindered by a criticial shortage of suitably qualified teachers.

The day schools returned to London with their numbers greatly depleted. At the end of evacuation the once-great Jews' Free School was unable to return to its bombed premises, and as a result had to close down. Similarly, three other London Jewish schools—The Jews' Infants School, the Westminster Jews' Free School, and the Borough Jewish School—did not survive the war. Thus of seven state-aided Jewish day schools that existed in London in 1939, only two—the Stepney Jewish School and the Solomon Wolfson (Bayswater) School—were still functioning at the end of the war. The provincial day schools —those of Manchester, Liverpool, and Birmingham—were in a somewhat better position, but nevertheless faced falling numbers as a result of the dispersion of local Jewish communities. In brief, whereas in 1939 there were fourteen Jewish day schools with a combined roll of 4,900 pupils, in 1945 there were only seven schools with fewer than a thousand pupils.[7]

As a background to these details was the stark reality confronting Anglo-Jewry that after the annihilation of over six million of its brethren in the Nazi death camps, it remained the only substantial and intact Jewish community of Europe. No longer could the community rely, as in the past, upon the former great Jewish centres of continental Europe for its inspiration and cultural manpower to bolster up its strength against the forces of assimilation. At this crucial point, with its educational system severely disrupted after over five years of war, it was now faced with the gigantic task of reconstruction.

Coming at this point in the fortunes of Anglo-Jewish education, the 1944 Education Act impinged upon all plans and projects for the future. Yet at the end of the war the community had no unified educational authority to represent its interests, and, worse still, the signs were that Jewish interest in general was only lukewarm. Nevertheless the Joint Emergency Committee, incidentally with only a temporary mandate for its existence, sought to evolve a post-war policy and to arouse interest. In addition, the Education Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, re-inaugurated in 1944, strove to achieve some unity of policy within the community.

Some of the most important clauses of the 1944 Act concerned the status of voluntary denominational schools, with the provision of appropriate grants. This new state aid was of special importance to the Jewish community with its depleted day-school system. To qualify for voluntary-aided status, governors or managers of such schools needed to provide half the cost of improvements and alterations necessary to bring the premises up to required standard, and maintain them as such. In return, the central authority was willing to shoulder all other financial responsibility, leaving the governing body full freedom to give religious instruction according to the original trust deed, and full freedom in selecting staff.[8] Additional clauses within the Act made provision for transferred or substituted status—this was of special relevance to Jewish schools adversely affected by migrations of Jewish communities.[9] In addition, Jewish pupils in the county primary and secondary schools were directly affected by the clauses dealing with religious instruction. These permitted withdrawal classes for this purpose to be arranged for any time of the school day, instead of the beginning or the end of each session as hitherto, although this provided additional staffing problems. These classes could now be conducted in the school premises, instead of in another building.[10] With the proposed raising of the school-leaving age to fifteen years, Jewish education by means of the withdrawal class was now within reach of a larger number of Jewish children.

Apart from this the 1944 Education Act had, of course, no direct effect upon the part-time Hebrew and Religion Classes. The community was therefore concerned mainly with two aspects: first, the more advantageous terms of state aid for existing and new denominational day schools, and second, the more favourable conditions for religious instruction for Jewish pupils in council schools.

Here indeed were two opportunities that should have been grasped. However, subsequent events have shown that whereas wholehearted endeavour went into the organization and provision of teachers for the withdrawal classes, the record of post-war revival in the day-school field was more unsatisfactory. In this connexion it is worth while contrasting the official Jewish attitude at the time with that of the Roman

Catholic community in Great Britain. Whereas the Catholics were uncompromising over the day-school issue, striving for 'Catholic schools where our Catholic children shall be educated in a Catholic atmosphere by Catholic teachers approved by a Catholic authority',[11] there was no comparable pronouncement from any official Jewish circle. A further relevant factor was the apathy and indifference within the Jewish community as a whole, of which the *Jewish Chronicle* wrote at the time: 'On the subject of Jewish education British Jewry as a whole is obstinately apathetic, however valiantly a minority strive to awaken it from its torpor.' [12]

Anglo-Jewry's reaction to the post-war challenge was thus a rather slow one. The most momentous step in this connexion was the Communal Conference on the Reconstruction of Jewish Education in Great Britain, but this did not take place until November 1945. The conference has been regarded as the most important and far-reaching event in the history of Jewish education in Britain. Prior to it a number of committees were delegated to examine such questions as finance, organization, and education, and to present their reports to the conference.

No account of the 1945 Conference can be complete without mentioning the work of Dr. Nathan Morris, Education Officer of the Joint Emergency Committee. It was he, for example, who led the campaign for communal taxation for education, as opposed to charity finance, and who also drew up many of the plans and much of the data upon which the proceedings were based.

The outcome of the conference determined the future of Anglo-Jewish education. Firstly there emerged from it two bodies, one for London and one for the Provinces, which, in theory at least, were to comprise a comprehensive system, in contrast to the unwieldy pre-war proliferation. The first of these new bodies was the London Board of Jewish Religious Education, which was to supersede and absorb the pre-war Union of Hebrew and Religion Classes, Jewish Religious Education Board, and Talmud Torah Trust. It was to take responsibility for organizing part-time Hebrew and Religion Classes, as well as withdrawal classes, in the Greater London area. In addition the London Board was to assume responsibility for the Jewish Non-Provided Schools that had closed down since the outbreak of war. The second post-war body was the new Central Council for Jewish Religious Education, whose functions were those of an advisory and co-ordinating body for provincial Jewish educational organizations, which were not necessarily obliged to be associated with the Council. In brief, its functions were 'To co-ordinate, promote and assist religious educational activities throughout the community. . . .' [13]

The second important outcome of the 1945 Conference was the official policy of communal taxation, largely by means of Synagogue

contributions, for the provision of educational facilities. This was a radical departure from pre-war conditions, when Jewish education depended largely upon the unsatisfactory and unreliable practice of charity finance.

Thirdly, the conference accepted the report of an Education Commission which had drawn up a series of comprehensive syllabuses, ranging from Infants' to Teacher Training Classes. In content the syllabuses presented nothing revolutionary, since those who compiled them were deeply conscious of the need to preserve the age-old traditions of Jewish education. It was more with method that the report took issue. In the words of Dr. Nathan Morris, one of the members of the commission, 'Let us not only recount to the children the praises of Judaism, but seize every chance to bring it within their reach and grasp.' [14]

Apart from this, many aspects of the conference were to prove eventful not so much with regard to their positive nature, but rather to their omissions. For example, the comparative underplaying of the part of the system concerned with youth and adolescents was to prove a great mistake. In addition, the absence from the conference of the more extreme orthodox elements on the one hand, and the Liberal and Reform representatives on the other, was to prove ominous. As events were to turn out, their subsequent condition of separateness was to underline the fact that the unity achieved was only partial.

Finally, over the question of the day schools the conference presaged a period of official vacillation and uncertainty, in that it readily accepted the somewhat non-committal report of its Voluntary Schools Sub-Committee. This report acknowledged the decline of the London Jewish Non-Provided Schools, which it attributed to the shift of Jewish population, the lack of enthusiasm amongst Jewish parents, and the decline in the birth-rate. In emphasizing the first two of these factors, the report advocated that they should be borne in mind when new day-school policy in London was being formulated. The report, however, recommended the establishment of a centrally situated multilateral Secondary School, and of primary schools in north and north-east London. Thus over the question of day schools, the official policy was, to say the least, one of extreme caution and deliberation. The impetus and initiative for day-school development was left largely in the hands of bodies and individuals who were not represented at the Reconstruction Conference. Of these, the most outstanding protagonist was Rabbi Dr. Solomon Schonfeld, who, as early as 1943, had written: 'It is admitted that parents will need a great deal of reorientation before they fall in with the training of their children. But in a matter which so intimately affects the Jewish future the effort is surely worthwhile. Anglo-Jewry needs fifty Jewish day schools, and Empire Jewry probably requires a similar number. British Jewry! What are you going to do

about it? You have resources for elaborate houses, private and communal, for tombstones, furs, diamonds and pleasures. What about the well-being of your children and the future of your people?' [15]

THE POST-WAR SYSTEM

Since 1945 and the Conference on Educational Reconstruction the system that has evolved has been in the form of a dichotomy. On the one hand there are the 'establishment' organizations—these are firstly the London Board of Jewish Religious Education, serving metropolitan Jewry, and secondly those provincial organizations directly connected with the Central Council for Jewish Religious Education. On the other hand, a substantial part of Anglo-Jewry's educational system has been described in such terms as 'separatist', 'independent', or 'non-conformist'. For example, the Jewish Secondary Schools Movement, the so-called 'ultra-orthodox' schools, the Zionist Day Schools, as well as the Hebrew and Religion Classes of the Reform and Liberal Movements, provide facilities for a very high proportion of the children of the community, yet they all constitute virtually self-contained and independent educational systems within Anglo-Jewry. The dichotomy extends to the fields of Teacher Training, in which together with the 'establishment' Institute for the Training of Teachers at Jews' College there also exists the 'ultra-orthodox' Gateshead Jewish Teachers' College, whilst the Liberal and Reform Synagogues each make their own arrangements.

One transcending factor in all post-war developments in Anglo-Jewish education has been the State of Israel. Since its foundation it has exerted a dynamic influence in all fields, from the planning of policy and organization, down to the content and method in the classroom.

For a dual system as described above to function with perfect smoothness and efficiency has been indeed difficult, and the post-war years have been marred even by occasional disagreement and friction. It was particularly in the field of day-school education that the 'independent' organizations provided the impetus for development. Thus, in the day-school field, the number of pupils has increased from 4,400 in 1954 to nearly 9,000 in May 1963. (See the *Jewish Chronicle*, 26 February 1954 and 3 May 1963; the statistics were collected by Dr. J. Braude.) For their part, the London Board and the education authorities of the larger provincial communities concentrated upon part-time and withdrawal classes, although they have also participated in day-school activity. The most publicized and long-drawn-out educational controversy occurred in London in the early and middle 1950s; it concerned the substantial Trust funds of the defunct pre-war Jewish day schools. The officers of the London Board intended using a large proportion of these funds towards establishing a large comprehensive school in Camden Town. In this policy they were actively opposed by a

number of 'separatist' schools under the leadership of Rabbi Dr. Schonfeld, who wanted the funds earmarked for helping their own financially weak institutions. The dispute was not settled until May 1954, when it was agreed that part of the trust funds be handed over to existing Jewish day schools.[16] These, in return, accepted the principle of establishing the new secondary school in Camden Town—it was opened in 1958 at the J.F.S. Secondary School. The delayed opening of this school was in itself an unfortunate result of the controversy, but at least as bad is the subsequent consolidation (and virtually official acceptance) of a dual educational system in London, perpetuated by the agreement of May 1954.

Of all the educational bodies of the Jewish community, the London Board of Jewish Religious Education is by far the largest. At the end of 1962 it administered eighty-nine part-time centres with a roll of 10,924 pupils; it organized withdrawal classes at twenty-three local authority schools for 2,252 pupils; it was the parent body of one day school, the J.F.S. Secondary School, with 525 pupils.[17] Being concerned primarily with providing part-time education after school hours and on Sunday mornings, the London Board has had to face most of its problems in this sphere. In any system which is non-compulsory, part-time, and independent the problem of attendance is inevitably in the forefront. The annual reports of the London Board have always acknowledged this, and the Board has constantly striven to maintain higher standards of attendance. Yet in 1962 of the combined roll of 10,924 in the part-time classes, given above, the total average weekday evening attendance was only 3,641, whereas that for Sunday mornings was 7,304.[18] The plain fact is that part-time Hebrew and Religion Classes have to contend with such counter-attractions as school homework, preparation for the omnipotent 11+ examination, ballet or elocution lessons, television, youth clubs, and a host of other activities. Another difficulty facing the London Board is the comparatively early leaving age; thus of the numbers on the rolls given above only 480 boys and 242 girls were over thirteen years of age.[19]

Further problems besetting the London Board have been the shortage of suitably qualified teachers and a series of financial crises. The above emphasis on problems is not intended to draw attention to any particular shortcomings, but rather to put in clearer perspective the positive achievements of the Board. In this connexion one important criterion is the actual education standards in the classes. Over the past few years results at examinations set by the Board in conjunction with Jews' College have shown a steady rate of improvement in standards. Nevertheless, all achievements have come about in spite of the perennial problems of the Board, and the indications are that these problems—attendance, finances, and shortage of suitable teachers, to name but the outstanding ones—are likely to persist in the future.

The withdrawal classes organized by the London Board in council schools in the Greater London area constitute a further important part of its work. In these classes the problems of attendance and the early 'leaving age' do not arise, and thus the Board has met with some success, particularly in the secondary schools.

From the geographical point of view alone the provision of Jewish schooling in the heterogeneous communities up and down Britain presents even greater difficulties than those outlined above. Thus the main function of the Central Council for Jewish Religious Education has very wisely not been one of tight control, but rather to provide assistance and advice. As part of this policy local effort and autonomy have indeed been encouraged. On the whole it has been the smaller provincial communities that have benefited from their link with the Council, notably by means of periodic visits of inspection. The larger communities—Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow, Birmingham, and Liverpool—have maintained their own composite systems, but have still availed themselves of the facilities of the Central Council.

Standards within the provincial communities naturally vary, and are difficult to gauge. However, one statistical survey on attendance carried out in 1959 by Harold Levy, the Central Council's inspector, estimated that approximately 63·4 per cent of Jewish children between the ages of five and fourteen years were on the rolls of the Hebrew and Religion Classes.[20] With regard to part-time centres in the Provinces, those hardest hit are smaller and more isolated communities.

The record of some of the larger provincial communities has been impressive, both in the field of part-time Jewish education and in the development of day schools. For example, the endeavour of the Liverpool community has preserved its Jewish state-aided primary school, and has led to the opening of the King David Bilateral Secondary School (also state-aided) in 1957. Both these schools have a proportion of non-Jewish pupils. Apart from Liverpool, state-aided Jewish day schools exist in Manchester and Birmingham.

One of the great features of post-war educational development in Anglo-Jewry has been the rise of a number of day-school movements and unattached day schools, which today contain a substantial number of pupils within the system. Several reasons for this development have been propounded. One view is that they fill the void created by the inaction of communal authorities at the end of the war. Another view is that they owe their inspiration largely to Jews who came to this country comparatively recently, 'elements who have come to England in the last thirty years', who are more anxious about the specifically Jewish aspects of the education of their children. If there is one factor that all these movements and individual schools have in common, it is a strongly determined quality of individualism on the part of their founders. In all cases the difficulties encountered—that is, with regard

to obtaining adequate funds and other resources, and attracting the sympathetic attention of the local communities—have required perseverance and determination. The prototype of such movements is the Jewish Secondary Schools Movement, comprising three primary schools and two secondary grammar schools.

Another schools system owes its existence to the Zionist Movement. Zionists in Britain have always regarded education as an important facet of their activities, but it was not until the mid-1950s that the first specifically 'Zionist' schools functioned as such. Today there are four of these schools in the Greater London area, one in Leeds, one in Glasgow, and one in Westcliff-on-Sea, which are affiliated to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland.

A number of other day schools were founded since the war as a result of local initiative and effort. These are perhaps the nearest approach to what can be described as Jewish parochial schools. In London and Manchester these schools, unattached to any movement, have achieved success and high esteem within the community as a whole. The epitome of their success has been in many cases the attaining of state aid, in itself a solution to many material problems, while at the same time they have preserved the Jewish purpose that inspired their foundation. One such school, the Broughton Jewish Primary School in Manchester, drew praise from Her Majesty's Inspectors, who admired the policy of close integration and correlation of Jewish and secular subjects.[21]

In 1948 the late Rabbi Dr. Kopul Rosen founded Carmel College, of which he became the Principal. Carmel is a boarding establishment which today is generally recognized as the Public School of Anglo-Jewry. Today, in addition to Carmel, there are several other boarding schools, in the main private-venture establishments.

Yet another important sector of the post-war system is occupied by the schools of the so-called 'ultra-orthodox' section of Anglo-Jewry. The self-contained nature of such communities as Gateshead, or the groups gravitating around the Lordship Park area of North London, reflects the desire of such Jews not to compromise their religious practices in the face of present-day conditions. As a result the curriculum of their schools places great emphasis upon Jewish studies, to the detriment, it can be said, of the secular work. Of such schools there are two in London, one in Manchester, and one in Gateshead. All acknowledge that it is the general practice of their pupils after leaving school to go on to Yeshivah in order to continue their Talmud studies. Anglo-Jewry possesses a number of Yeshivahs conducted as part-time, full-time, and boarding institutions. The most famous of these is in Gateshead, and there are others in London, Manchester, and Sunderland.

Finally, reference should be made to the part-time Hebrew and Religion Classes of the various congregations of the Liberal and Reform Movements. It is only comparatively recently that both movements

have centralized the organization of their classes; the number of their pupils has grown hand in hand with the growth in the membership of their Synagogues. By 1960 the Liberals had a total of 1,700 pupils on the rolls of their Religion and Sunday Schools.[22] No corresponding figures have been available for the Reform Synagogues, but their largest congregation, the West London Synagogue of British Jews, increased its classes roll from 122 in 1950 to 318 in 1959.[23]

CONCLUSION

This survey cannot, of course, present within such a short space a comprehensive description and historical account. Instead it has attempted firstly to trace the main outlines of the development of the system up to the present, and secondly to sketch the salient features of it as they exist today. No assessment of the Anglo-Jewish educational scene can be complete without a fuller account of the problems and controversies. For example, an examination of the attitudes of parents with regard to day schools and part-time Hebrew Classes would be most relevant. Again, since the Jewish and Catholic communities in this country have much in common with regard to aims in the provision of educational facilities, a comparative survey of their respective achievements in this field would be most enlightening. For a community of fewer than half a million souls, Anglo-Jewry has not one but really several educational systems, complex, disunited, and uncoordinated. Since it is an axiom that a community such as Anglo-Jewry flourishes or stagnates along with its educational system, it must surely re-examine its system and its acknowledged shortcomings if it is to be assured of a future as a viable entity.

NOTES

[1] Conference on Jewish Education, reported in *Jewish Chronicle*, 27 Sept. 1935.

[2] Report by Herbert Adler, Director of Jewish Education, on the work of the Central Committee, 12 Dec. 1939.

[3] H. C. Dent, *Education in Transition* (1943), pp. 18 seq.

[4] Nathan Morris, *Jewish Education in Time of Total War*, p. 41.

[5] *J.E.C. Second Report* (Aug. 1941–Dec. 1942), p. 16.

[6] *The Education Bill*, pamphlet published by the Board of Deputies of British Jews, Jan. 1944.

[7] *Communal Conference on the Reconstruction of Jewish Education in Great Britain—Report of Proceedings*, p. 24.

[8] Education Act, 1944—Part II, Section 24.

[9] Ibid., Section 16.

[10] Ibid., Sections 26–9.

[11] Bishop of Hexham and Newcastle, Advent Pastoral Letter, 1942.

[12] *Jewish Chronicle*, 10 March 1944, p. 8, Editorial 'The Price of our Future'.

[13] Draft Scheme for the Creation of a Central Council for Jewish Religious Education, para. 5.

[14] Nathan Morris, *Curriculum and Method in the Hebrew Class* (1946), p. 32.

[15] Solomon Schonfeld, 'The Call for Jewish Schools and Jewish Self-respect' (taken from *Jewish Religious Education, 1943*).

[16] 'Jewish Education in the London

Area'—agreement signed at New Court, 11 May 1954.

[17] *London Board of Jewish Religious Education, Thirteenth Report*, p. 3.

[18] Ibid., pp. 28–9.

[19] Ibid.

[20] *Central Council for Jewish Religious Education—Inspector's Report, 1958–1959*, p. 9.

[21] *Broughton Jewish Primary School—11th Anniversary Celebration Brochure*, 1959, p. 8.

[22] Union of Liberal & Progressive Synagogues—Positions of Constituent Synagogues as at 1st January 1961.

[23] *West London Synagogue of British Jews—Annual Reports, 1949–1950* and *1958–1959*.

SOCIAL TOPOGRAPHY OF A LONDON CONGREGATION

THE BAYSWATER SYNAGOGUE 1863–1963

V. D. Lipman

TROLLOPE in *The Small House at Alington*, in a chapter published in November 1863, describes the area for whose Jewish residents the Bayswater Synagogue had been opened a few months earlier.

> A residence had been taken for the couple in a very fashionable row of buildings abutting on the Bayswater Road. . . . The house was quite new, and the street being unfinished had about it a strong smell of mortar . . . but nevertheless it was acknowledged to be a quite correct locality. From one end of the crescent a corner of Hyde Park could be seen, and the other abutted on a very handsome terrace indeed in which lived an ambassador —from South America—a few bankers' senior clerks, and a peer of the realm.

The history of the Bayswater Synagogue provides an interesting example of the influence of topography on the development of a congregation. To appreciate this, it is necessary to relate the spread of London Jewry to the building up of this part of London and to analyse the places of residence of members of the congregation at different periods, which can be done from the printed membership lists.

Until about 1820 most of London Jewry lived in the City, the Whitechapel area to the East, and the area around the Strand to the West. By 1840, however, the wealthier members had largely moved into the West Central area, extending to the New or Marylebone Road in the North and to the Edgware Road and Hyde Park in the West. The Central Synagogue in Great Portland Street, which it was decided to found in 1849, served this area, as did the branch of the Spanish and Portuguese Congregation opened in Wigmore Street in 1853, and the Reform Synagogue, transferred from Burton Street to Margaret Street, Cavendish Square in 1849. But fashionable Jewry continued to move westwards and by the 1860s had already crossed the Edgware Road into what was then known as Tyburnia.

The area north of Hyde Park had, in fact, begun to develop somewhat earlier, although as late as 1820 there was still only the isolated



The Bayswater Area in 1885 (the Synagogue is just north of Royal Oak Station, at left-centre of the map).

village of Paddington, nestling around its Green on the rural road to Harrow. In 1825 the gallows at Tyburn (Marble Arch) was removed and from 1827 began the process of laying out the elegant squares and crescents of Tyburnia, in the angle between the Edgware and Bayswater Roads. This was followed by a similar development of the Lancaster Gate area from 1850 onwards; the planned development of Ladbroke Grove was somewhat earlier, about 1840. However, in the early 1860s building intensified and the still vacant spaces between the earlier squares and crescents filled up, as Trollope described. With the influx of people with businesses in the City, communication was provided by the first underground railway, with its western terminus at Bishop's Bridge Road, opened in 1864, the same year as the Bayswater Synagogue.

It is said that Bayswater had taken 'a whole congregation' from Great Portland Street; but, if so, they had already moved their homes first. Out of the 224 original members in 1863, 110, or practically half, lived in the area north of the Park and Kensington Gardens, but south of the Harrow Road (equivalent to the present W.2 and the adjacent part of W.11 postal districts). The main axis of the congregation lay along Westbourne Terrace, but a considerable number lived in the most fashionable area of all, to the east of Leinster Square and Cleveland Square. Very few, about 5 per cent, still lived in the central area around Great Portland Street. This area was ceasing to be the height of fashion, as Trollope mockingly wrote in the passage already quoted: 'We know how vile is the sound of Baker Street and how absolutely foul to the polite ear is the name of Fitzroy Square [although] the houses in those purlieus are substantial, warm and of good size.'

As to the area of Maida Vale (roughly equivalent to the W.9 postal district), which can be defined as a triangle between the Maida Vale Road, the Harrow Road, and Walterton and Cambridge Roads, this had relatively few Jewish residents in 1863; about 55 members of Bayswater, a quarter of the membership, lived there. Only the southern parts of Maida Vale, such as Blomfield Road and Warwick Avenue, were then built up, although building had begun about 1830.

Why the founders of the congregation chose Chichester Place is not yet clear. One would have expected them to find a site further south, in the midst of the Bayswater area proper between Harrow Road and the Park, where the greatest number of original members lived. It may have been that they were influenced by the proximity to Paddington Green, the traditional administrative and ecclesiastical focus of the whole area; or they may have foreseen the future growth of Maida Vale. In the next twenty years two major developments occurred which altered the whole character of the congregation. First, in spite of extensions soon after the Synagogue was opened, it was not large enough for the potential membership. A group of members living in the Park area,

led by Samuel Montagu and his brother-in-law Ellis Franklin, obtained a decision to build a Synagogue near the Park but further west, and this was opened as the New West End Synagogue in 1879. Second, the area in Maida Vale north of the canal was further built up: Portsdown Road (now Randolph Avenue), Warrington Crescent, Randolph Crescent, Clifton Road, and Clifton Gardens were completed by about 1870, although there was still some open land north of Sutherland Avenue; and Elgin Avenue and Lauderdale Road were not filled with more modern, smaller non-basement houses and blocks of flats till about 1900. The Maida Vale area attracted a considerable middle-class Jewish settlement. As a result of these two factors the membership in 1890 showed a very different pattern of distribution from that of 1863. By far the largest group—250 out of 438, or more than half—now lived in Maida Vale; only 102, a smaller number than in 1863 and less than a quarter of the total membership, now lived in the Park area. The attraction of members from this area to the New West End Synagogue, and the growth of Maida Vale, had thus turned the congregation into one predominantly serving Maida Vale rather than Bayswater proper: one can see this symbolized by the fact that Dr. Adler, Minister till 1891, lived in Queensborough Terrace, by the Park; his successor, Sir Herman Gollancz, lived in Clifton Gardens in Maida Vale.

This change in the area of residence of members in the 1880s had important social connotations. Novelists of the period have described, or purported to describe, the life of the Jews of Bayswater and Maida Vale in the 1880s. Their accounts are distorted, but that these were two separate areas, clearly distinguishable to contemporary eyes, is evident. Amy Levy makes a snobbish contrast between the 'mean houses' of Maida Vale (which she unfairly typifies as Walterton Road) and the splendours of Lancaster Gate. She refers to the Maida Vale family to whose 'eminently provincial minds' their Bayswater relations 'were very great people indeed, and they derived no little prestige in Maida Vale from their connexions with so distinguished a family'; and she refers to Whiteley's as the 'neutral territory where Bayswater nodded to Maida Vale and South Kensington took Bayswater by the hand' (the quotations are from *Reuben Sachs*, published in 1889). The novel by Julia Frankau ('Frank Danby') *Dr. Phillips; A Maida Vale Idyll*, also published in 1889, deals exclusively with the Maida Vale community. The criticism of the Jewish community is so overdone that, although the author claims to speak from local knowledge, one cannot rely on the factual accuracy of the description: the central character, who lives in Portsdown Road, and his neighbours are scarcely recognizable as people like our predecessors. However, one can see the extent to which this had become a Jewish area: 'that new Jerusalem which they have appropriated, with their slow and characteristic walk . . . congregating in Clifton Road, in the gardens of Sutherland Avenue, in Warrington

Crescent', with their card parties followed by suppers of smoked beef and cucumber, and their devotions at the Bayswater Synagogue. They must have been concentrated because their numbers, to judge from Synagogue membership, would have been over 1,000, possibly 2,000, in an area with (according to the breakdown of population in the Booth Survey of London Life and Labour) about 10,000 total population. The Booth Survey map shows most of this Maida Vale area in 1888 as 'middle class—well to do', with only Sutherland Avenue, Warrington Crescent, Randolph Crescent, Clifton Gardens, and part of the Maida Vale Road as 'upper middle-class or upper-class—wealthy'. On the other hand, nearly all of the Park area is shown as 'upper middle-class or upper-class wealthy' and relatively little of it as plain 'middle-class'.

From 1890 onwards there were two new factors, which to some extent counteracted. First, Maida Vale was one of the earliest places to see substantial building of flats (Cunningham Mansions, 1892; Aberdeen and Blomfield Courts, 1903; Biddulph Mansions, 1907; Delaware Mansions, 1908, etc.). These flats tended to keep in the area older people no longer needing a large house, who might have moved elsewhere, and later attracted newcomers into the area. The other development was the trend to move into St. John's Wood and into the newer areas of Hampstead, Kilburn, and Brondesbury. In 1863 only seven out of 224 members lived in St. John's Wood and five in Hampstead. In 1890 out of 438 members, there were 16 in St. John's Wood and 17 in Hampstead, Brondesbury, and Kilburn. By 1914, however, there were 47 in St. John's Wood and 58 in the other North West Districts. As a result of this movement to the North West, while the total membership in 1914 remained about the same at 456, and the number in the Park area still remained about a quarter at 115, the number living in Maida Vale had begun to decline and at 187 was less than 40 per cent of the total membership.

The decline in the proportion of members living in Maida Vale continued between 1914 and 1939, as conditions in the Maida Vale area became less attractive. In 1939 only 91 of the total membership which had fallen to 386 lived in Maida Vale—about 25 per cent. The number of members living near the Park fell to 73, or less than 20 per cent. On the other hand, residents of St. John's Wood were now 35, or nearly 10 per cent; and 66 (or 20 per cent) lived in the north-western suburbs. Thus the number of those living in the vicinity of the Synagogue, whether in Maida Vale, the Park area, or St. John's Wood, was little over 200—or not much more than half the membership.

Recent years have however seen more changes. Membership rose well into the 500s during the 1950s, and while it had fallen again to 514 in 1962, this was well above the 1939 level, and even above that of 1914. The proportion living near the Park, about a fifth, was not dissimilar from that of the previous seventy or eighty years. With some rebuilding

and rehabilitation in Maida Vale and the general trend for those who could to move back into inner London, the number of residents of Maida Vale had increased to 226 or 40 per cent of the total. 10 per cent of the members lived in the north-west suburbs and another 10 per cent —50—in St. John's Wood. This also reveals a curious fact. Whereas only 50 residents of St. John's Wood are members of Bayswater, the St. John's Wood Synagogue membership includes about 130 residents in Maida Vale. Thus for every three Jewish residents of Maida Vale who are members of Bayswater, there are two who are members of St. John's Wood. Presumably distance and the character of the immediate surroundings of the Bayswater Synagogue have had some influence on this choice. In any case, the increase in Maida Vale membership has not been proportionately reflected in regular Synagogue attendance, and there would be a long way to go to restore the intensely traditional Jewish atmosphere of Maida Vale between 1880 and 1914.

To sum up, the development of the Bayswater congregation has been greatly influenced by its original location, between the Park and the Maida Vale areas, and by the subsequent foundation of the New West End and St. John's Wood Synagogues. What the future holds in store is beyond the scope of this study, but it is hoped that it has shown that useful material for Anglo-Jewish history can be drawn from the analysis of membership lists, and the relation of a congregation to its topographical setting.

ANALYSIS OF MEMBERSHIP LISTS

(including Lady Members in their own right)

Year	*Park Area (W.2, W.11)*	*Maida Vale (W.9)*	*St. John's Wood (N.W.8, N.W.1)*	*North West (N.W.2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11)*	*Elsewhere*	*Total*
1863	110	55	8	5	46	224
1890	102	249	16	17	54	438
1914	115	187	47	58	49	456
1939	73	91	35	66	121*	386
1962	113	226	49	51	75	514

* Includes 17 in W.1, 28 in other W. districts and 25 outside London.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The main source used has been the collection of membership lists in the offices of the United Synagogue, Woburn House, London and the writer is indebted to Mr. A. H. Silverman (Secretary) and Mr. J. Julius (Membership Officer) for their help in connexion with them.

For the general development of London Jewry, reference may be made to the writer's *Social History of the Jews in England 1850–1950* (London, 1954). For the topographical background, use has been made principally of N. Pevsner's *London* volume in his *Buildings of England* series and H. P. Clunn, *The Face of London* (5th edn., 1934).

A NOTE ON ARGENTINE JEWRY TODAY

Natan Lerner

IN October 1963 the new President of the Argentine Republic was inaugurated in his office. In December of the same year the Congress resumed its work in Buenos Aires. Thus Argentina seems to be re-embarking upon the normal pattern of its political life, after an interruption which began when the armed forces removed President Frondizi from office.

The political stabilization came as a result of elections whose outcome had strongly been feared, for lack of hope in a democratic solution. These elections brought to power the Union Civica Radical del Pueblo, one of the two sectors in which the old Radical Party was divided when the other sector decided to support Frondizi. Its general philosophy can be considered as that of a left-to-centre party. Its affiliates and leaders mostly belong to the middle class. As it is a party with a not too strict political and ideological discipline, it is possible to find among its leaders visible differences of approach with regard to political, economic, social, and religious matters.

The main problem confronting the new Government is the economic situation. Commerce and industry are going through a difficult crisis. Hundreds of thousands of workers have lost their jobs since the beginning of the political crisis that erupted upon the fall of the Frondizi Government. Bankruptcies and the closing down or paralysing of industries reached tremendously high figures after the middle of 1962. Inflation and the high cost of living are daily topics of conversation.

In his inaugural address the new President recognized the seriousness of the problems he would have to solve, singling out particularly the financial deficit in the budget, which is estimated at about 70,000 million pesos (approximately $500,000,000). Illia announced that his essential aims would be to attain a continuous process of economic growth, as well as an active share of the working people in a more equitable distribution of the national wealth. The first step would be to try to eliminate unemployment and to defend the value of the Argentine currency.

Dr. Illia's Government will have to overcome tremendous obstacles in order to lead the country out of its present difficulties, including

those of a political nature. The strongest opposition stems from the Peronists, who still enjoy the support of broad working masses, as was evident at a meeting held in December, under the auspices of the powerful General Confederation of Workers, dominated by the Peronists. The Communists are trying to infiltrate the workers' organizations, but it seems that they are unable to take over the positions held by the Peronists. Frondizi's sector emerged split from the crisis, one of the reasons for the split being the controversy about the idea of establishing close co-operation with the Peronists.

From a Jewish viewpoint the results of the elections did not imply any particular issue. Jews were elected on the ballots of the different democratic parties, and the Jewish community as such was and is above the political party strife. There are several Jewish legislators, but no top Jewish officers in the executive branch of the administration. The President, the Vice-President, and various members of the Cabinet are friendly towards the Jewish central organizations and have shown great interest in Jewish affairs. Owing to this friendly attitude, the presence of the Vice-President at a dinner given not long ago in honour of the editor of one of the most outspoken antisemitic publications in Argentina (to whom the Foreign Minister, too, sent greetings) caused surprise and disappointment. The important daily *El Mundo* associated this episode with the absence of the Foreign Minister from a celebration organized by DAIA,[1] in connexion with the 15th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, despite the fact that he had formerly accepted the invitation. It is true that the journalist in question, Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo, was feted not because of his antisemitism but because of his alleged defence of Argentine economic nationalism.

It is premature to judge how the present political stabilization of Argentina will influence the different antisemitic groups which are active in the country. In spite of the fact that by a decree, issued early in 1963, two of the most conspicuous antisemitic groups, Tacuara and Guardia Restauradora Nacionalista, were banned, the antisemitic groups seem to have no intention of abandoning their activities. In November 1963 several Jewish buildings, among them the main offices of DAIA and the Jewish Community of Buenos Aires, were subjected to violence, in a wave which affected not only Jewish organizations. The groups which participated in the several aggressions that occurred at that time identified themselves as 'Peronist Youth', 'Guardia Restauradora Nacionalista', 'Movimiento Argentino Nacional' and 'Movimiento Tacuara'.

The antisemitic groups are divided and act under various names. The

differences among them are sometimes of an ideological character and sometimes connected with the social origin of their members. Very recently it was learned that one of the best known leaders of Tacuara, José Baxter, had taken over the leadership of a so-called leftist sector within Tacuara and had just been invited by the representatives of the Arab League to visit Algeria and Egypt.[2]

In the meantime, antisemitic literature is being disseminated as usual. The announcement that the priest Julic Meinvielle, author of anti-Jewish books, was likely to be appointed a professor at the Catholic University aroused a feeling of bitterness in liberal Catholic circles, although the appointment was not made. Another widely criticized measure was the decision to give a public school the name of Gustavo Martinez Zuviria, a former Minister of Education who, being an admirer of Fascism and Nazism, wrote, under the pen-name of Hugo Wast, a series of antisemitic novels.

The fact is that the banned antisemitic organizations are still alive, that other neo-Nazi organizations are still active, that antisemitic literature is still being published, and that it seems quite probable that the international contacts of the anti-Jewish groups are on the increase.

Several events have recently contributed to darken further the picture of antisemitism in Argentina. It has been disclosed that Arab emissaries are behind some of the anti-Jewish activities. Meetings of an unmistakable Nazi nature have been held in Buenos Aires. DAIA announced a continuous series of anti-Jewish attacks, and its authorities, while appreciating the Government's efforts, deemed it necessary to stress the dangers involved. The seriousness of the recent developments was recognized by the Argentine Minister of Defence when he met a delegation from the World Jewish Congress in New York. He then stated again that his government was determined to prevent any illegal, racist agitation.

The present Jewish position in Argentina cannot be separated from the far-reaching transformations which the as yet unsettled political and economic crisis produced in Argentine life and society. It is no exaggeration to say that the years 1962–3 constituted the most dramatic period in the history of Jewish life in Argentina. The antisemitic wave in 1962 had a repercussion whose psychological implications were much stronger, and possibly much more far-reaching, than the practical consequences of the events proper. After all, what happened in 1962 was not a new development in Argentina. For years there had been antisemitic outbursts in Argentina, and, even before June 1962, uninterrupted acts of aggression gave rise to a feeling of restlessness and preoccupation among Jews in Argentina. Jewish schools, synagogues, clubs, Zionist organizations, stores, periodicals, and individuals were

the targets of the activities of antisemitic groups in Buenos Aires, as well as in other towns of the country. However, it was after June 1962, when a girl named Graciela N. Sirota was assaulted and a swastika was tatooed on her body, provoking a chain of events which were publicized throughout the world, that unrest among the Jewish population increased to its highest point. The unrest among the Jewish community and the absence of effective action against the Nazi groups induced the DAIA, the political representative of the Jewish community and affiliate of the World Jewish Congress in Argentina, to proclaim a suspension of all public and private activities of the Jews in the country for half a day. The strike was a complete success and called universal attention to the determination and discipline of the organized Jewish community in Argentina.

As has been said, the psychological implications of the events were much stronger than any political or practical aspect of the question. It is difficult to describe in detail the feelings of the members of the community, which had just celebrated the hundredth anniversary of its existence. Among the elements which constituted that feeling were rage, bitterness, physical fear, disappointment, surprise, and also combativeness. The Sirota case, as well as several other events that followed later, was a tremendous shock, particularly to those Argentinian Jews born in the country and sometimes sons of native parents, for many of whom this was the first occasion on which they were compelled to meditate and ponder on their destiny as Jews and as individuals. Attention was called to the fact—not a surprising one—that the feeling of outrage seemed to be stronger among Jews who had, until then, been far from Jewish activities than among those who were active in Jewish life.

These events coincided with the political and economic crisis that followed Frondizi's removal from power. The value of the peso dropped sharply (from 83 to the dollar to more than 150; today it is near to 140 pesos per dollar). The names of Jewish business men or of companies associated with Jews appeared in considerable numbers on the lists of bankruptcies. A few Jews were accused of being involved in some cases of improper financial affairs, and the antisemitic press took advantage of it in the usual manner. In the light of this complex reality, a certain number of Jews decided to emigrate, principally to Israel. Non-Jewish newspapers even devoted articles to what they termed 'a new exodus'. To appreciate the phenomenon in its real perspective, it is necessary to state that this was not a multitudinous process. According to figures published in some magazines, about 4,500 to 5,000 Jews left Argentina for Israel within a year. There is no official information on the number of Jews who emigrated to other countries, but we have to assume that a certain proportion of the approximate number of 6,000 persons who emigrated in that period from Argentina to the United States of America were Jews. In any case, the important emigration is that which was

directed to Israel, constituting on the one hand a significant sociological event which ought to be considered and studied in a serious vein. On the other hand, it is not a massive trend and it is absolutely clear that, if the present course of events continues as hitherto, the Jewish community in Argentina, estimated at about 450,000 souls, will not suffer any considerable decrease in its number.[3]

However, it is not only in the field of emigration that an important transformation is being felt in the Jewish population in Argentina. There is no doubt that the general situation of the country had an intensive repercussion on the social structure of the Jewish community in Argentina. The economic crisis naturally affected Jewish business men. It is perhaps too early to judge to what extent that crisis substantially and definitively affected large sectors of the Jewish population. But many small Jewish business men and regular minor industries owned by Jews were destroyed by the unexpected economic upheaval. The not too considerable surplus of the Jewish proletariat also felt the impact of the situation. For instance, one of the most affected branches of industry was that of textiles—one of the few fields where a significant number of Jews are employed as workers. For the first time, the existence of a Jewish poverty, affecting a not too small sector of the Jewish population, came to a broader public attention, and not only to those who have a good knowledge of the welfare work of the community.

The Argentine Jews are still a well-organized community, both in the internal and external political aspects. It has a profound feeling of Jewish solidarity and discipline, as well as of strong identification with Israel. This feeling has not been weakened at all by the persistent assaults on the part of the antisemites, who intend to show the Jewish community as an alien element in the Argentine body, labelling its close ties with Israel as a case of double loyalty. The network of the Jewish day-schools is still one of the best in the Diaspora, despite the fact that the number of students seems to have diminished of late. Yiddish is still spoken, written, and read possibly more than in any other part of the world. Hebrew has made tremendous progress, particularly among the youth, since the establishment of the State of Israel. Zionism is a prevalent factor in the community and its ties with the rest of the Jewish world are very strong. Hence Argentine Jewry has sufficient internal sources of strength to be in a good position to preserve its identity. But the general consensus is that the present is one of the dangerous—if not the most dangerous—moments of its life.

Argentina has numerous peculiar problems, particularly of a political nature, which are, in general, not the same as those of the rest of the Continent. But Argentina is part and parcel of Latin-American life and its future destiny will essentially be determined by the future destiny of

Latin America as a whole. One hundred years after the beginning of what was a flourishing chapter in the history of Jewish contribution to the progress of countries, Jews in Argentina were compelled to indulge in a process of deep reflection on their place in Latin-American society and their fate as individuals and as Jews. It may be presumed that definite answers will not be the product of a pure intellectual effort. These answers will be given by the real facts of life, in a region which is now considered one of the most critical in the world, in an era when radical and even revolutionary changes occur with an unprecedented giddiness.

NOTES

[1] DAIA (*Delegación de Asociaciones Israelites Argentinas*) is the central political body of Argentine Jewry.

[2] The 'leftist' group of Tacuara was recently charged by the police with having committed robbery in order to get funds. This followed a period of new terrorist activities which included bloodshed in Buenos Aires and in Rosario. Leaders of DAIA hailed the Government for measures taken against the terrorist groups, but stressed that only the left wing of the banned movement was being prosecuted. At the same time, Argentine newspapers charged that the Nazi groups 'enjoyed protection'. Even the Minister of Defence said in a newspaper interview that *Guardia Restauradora Nacionalista* had infiltrated into police circles (JTA, 1 April 1964).

[3] It is still too early to judge the effects on the emigration trends of the stricter foreign-exchange regulations adopted in April 1964.

THE MEASUREMENT OF RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE AMONGST JEWS[1]

Raphael Raymond V. Baron (Bar-On)

INTRODUCTION

THE development of Jewish statistical social studies over the last fifty years has been hastened by the problems of Jewish communities everywhere under modern cultural and social pressures, and the serious concern since the Hitlerian massacres as to the continuance of Jewish communities *per se* outside Israel. Methodological advances in all the social sciences have given rise to many studies of the characteristics of Jews as individuals, as groups, and as communities.

In most such studies it has been tacitly assumed that there is an identifiable group of 'Jews' forming the community to be studied, and possibly to be compared with other Jewish communities or the surrounding 'non-Jews'. In recent years the variety of attachment to Jewishness has been appreciated, and the inadequacy of any rigid definition of 'Jew'.[2] The need has thus arisen for qualitative measures of 'Jewish Identification' ranging from the most 'strongly identified' to the 'most assimilated'.[3] Such qualitative differentiation is valuable for the analysis and comparison of Jewish communities and for forecasting their future; these statistics can also be used to judge the need for administrative programmes (e.g. religious education) and to evaluate their success. With demographic factors (natural increase and migration) of comparatively small net effects, assimilation (active and drift) forms the main problem in most countries of the Diaspora.

One of the principal factors in Jewish Identification is generally accepted to be *religious observance* (at least outside Israel). Other important factors today are Zionism, attachment to Jewish communal organizations, identification with Jewish history and culture, social linking with Jews, and reaction to antisemitism. These are liable to vary under changed circumstances more rapidly than religious observance, and many would denote religion as the sole factor in the survival of the Jewish People over the centuries.

The observance of Jewish religious commandments and customs presents an interesting but difficult and somewhat controversial subject

for statistical measurement and analysis. The continuance of some religious observances after all others have been dropped, and the formation of new Jewish customs both in Israel and in the Diaspora, are of special interest. The ultra-orthodox groups demand the observance of *all* the commandments, and frequently decry even the slightest departure from their standards as a total loss of Jewishness. For statistical and sociological analysis, however, it is necessary to recognize a variety of gradations of observance of different commandments rather than a simple dichotomy into 'observant' and 'non-observant'—or a subjective trichotomy into *meshuga frum*, 'good Jews' (of about the same level as the definer!) and 'back-sliders'.

A number of different indicators may be used for the statistical study of religious observance. With each indicator are associated statistical problems of defining the concepts, formulating appropriate questions, and collecting and analysing the data. It is all too easy to come to startling sociological conclusions on the basis of unclear or 'loaded' questions, unrepresentative samples or inappropriate comparisons, and this paper endeavours to suggest suitable indicators and to clarify some of these statistical problems.

TYPES OF INDICATORS AND THEIR COLLECTION

Some outstanding characteristics are appropriate to speedy visual study. For example, the lack of head-coverings or beards amongst a group of men indicates that the religious observance is lower than in a group from the Mea Shearim quarter of Jerusalem. This method is valuable in the hands of experienced travellers.[4]

For more scientific study, two main groups of indicators should be considered:

(A) Statistics of individual and family observance.
(B) Communal statistics of religious observance.

Examples of such statistics are given for British Jewry,[5] for the Jews of Greater Washington,[6] and for a specific group, the Jewish University Students in Britain.[7]

STATISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL OBSERVANCE

These need to be obtained from the individuals themselves—by observation, interview, or self-enumeration questionnaire. Some interesting statistics can also be obtained by asking individuals about their relatives (especially their parents or children), but the data may be less objective.

Individual statistics enable comparisons of different indicators of observance and their correlation with age, parental influences, educa-

tion, socio-economic class, and present environment, etc. Study of the extent of the individual's Jewish religious education (years, hours per week, type of school, etc.) and its correlation with this observance are also of value in evaluating educational programmes. It is also possible to establish *scales* of 'general religious observance' based on different indicators.[8]

There are considerable problems of definition to be faced to ensure that the respondents understand the questions precisely and uniformly; general questions such as 'Do you keep *Kashrut*?' are liable to result in misleading answers, especially as regards the 'marginal' groups, which need more specific questions.

The following are some suitable indicators of individual (and family) observance:

(1) *Synagogue and Prayer*

- (*a*) Synagogue Membership (by type).
- (*b*) Synagogue Attendance (number of times per year or pattern of attendance—Day of Atonement, *Shabbat* mornings, etc.).
- (*c*) Active functions in Synagogue service.
- (*d*) Private prayer (laying of *Tefillin* a more detailed criterion).
- (*e*) Grace before and after Meals (daily or only on *Shabbat*).
- (*f*) Mourning (Observance of *Shiva*, *Kaddish* throughout a year, and *Yizkor*).

(2) *Observance of Shabbat*

The generic question 'Do you keep *Shabbat*?' is not very meaningful, and it is preferable to ask particularized questions:

- (*a*) *Shabbat* Candles.[9] Frequently observed in absence of any other observance of *Shabbat* (perhaps women are more traditional than men). Flowers are now customary for *Shabbat* in Israel, even in homes without candles.
- (*b*) *Kiddush* and Grace after Meals (on Friday night: additional questions may be asked as to lunch-time).
- (*c*) *Havdala* (considerably less frequent than *Kiddush*).
- (*d*) Abstention on *Shabbat* from:
  - i. Work (the spread of the five-day week has reduced the value of this indicator).
  - ii. Smoking (it is necessary to know if respondent smokes during week to evaluate the answers).
  - iii. 'Riding' or travelling[10] (perhaps the clearest single indicator of *Shabbat* observance).
  - iv. Use of electricity and money, or writing.

(3) *Festival Observance*

- (*a*) Fasting:
  - i. Day of Atonement (frequently without prayer).
  - ii. Other Fasts (e.g. Ninth of Av—useful indicator of observance amongst 'moderately orthodox').

(*b*) Tabernacle (*Succah*) } frequently motivated by children's demands
(*c*) *Chanuka* Candles } rather than by continued annual observance.
(*d*) Passover:
  i. *Seder.*
  ii. Abstention from Bread.
  iii. Special Utensils.

(4) *Observance of Kashrut*

Distinguishing the many cases of partial observance requires a battery of questions.[11]

(*a*) Observance at home:
  i. Avoidance of pork, shell-fish, etc.
  ii. *Kashrut* of meat.
  iii. Milk/meat utensils.[12]
  iv. *Kashrut* of soap and other non-food products.
(*b*) Observance away from home (in restaurants and canteens, at school and university, and on holiday).

(5) *Religious Ceremonies*

(*a*) *Brit Mila* (Circumcision).[13]
(*b*) *Pidyon Ha'Ben* (Redemption of first-born male)—A useful indicator, since less widely observed.
(*c*) *Bar-Mitzva* (or Confirmation).[14]
(*d*) Religious Wedding: important indicator (non-religious wedding frequently associated with a non-Jewish partner).[15]
(*e*) Religious Burials (possible to ask respondent if he/she *intends* to be buried according to Jewish law or cremated, and as to his parents).

(6) *Dress and Appearance*

(*a*) Headwear. In the Diaspora, depends on general social conventions (e.g. uncommon in non-Jewish office); in Israel, good indicator—although may sometimes be worn for 'business reasons'. The carrying of a skull-cap in case of need forms an intermediate stage.
(*b*) Dress. Specially Orthodox male dress now rare[16] though orthodox men may take care in avoidance of *Shatnes* (mixed fibres).[17] Wearing of *Tzitzit* a useful indicator.
(*c*) Beards and Side-Locks (*Peyot*).
(*d*) *Sheital* (wig for married women).

(7) *Other Commandments and Customs*

(*a*) *Mezuzot.*[18] A good criterion in the Diaspora, although influenced by district lived in and by potential antisemitism.
(*b*) *Mikve* (Ritual Bath).
(*c*) Abstention from birth control. A delicate question; important for demographic studies.[19]

COMMUNAL STATISTICS

Communal statistics are generally available from the principal religious and communal organizations. The records can usually be regarded as *objective*, except where fund allocations depend on numbers or 'estimates' are obtained from communal officials, when upward biases are liable to appear in the size and effectiveness of their organizations. It is frequently possible to gather communal statistics for sub-groups of the Jewish community, e.g. different cities and areas, and different organizational groups, although the difficulties of obtaining answers to standardized questions from Jewish communal organizations (or, frequently, even of discovering whom to ask) should be mentioned.

Historical communal statistics may often be gathered from the same records, though care must be taken to ensure that there have been no substantial changes in definition or coverage.

Statistics of Jews and Jewish organizations may sometimes be derived from national official statistical records (some countries ask 'religion' as a census question, though few insist that every family be registered with some religious group).

Where official statistics are lacking, many of these communal statistics have been used in order to estimate the number of Jews in a country or in different towns. Demographic studies thus suffer from the limitations of these statistics, and of 'estimates' for non-observance or non-affiliation.[20] The comparison of different communal statistics on religious observance can throw light on the demographic estimates, as well as on the average 'intensity' for different aspects of observance; on the other hand, good measures of observance from individual studies can be used to improve demographic estimates from communal statistics.

INDICATOR	COMMENTS AND PROBLEMS
1. *Synagogal*	
(*a*) Numbers of Synagogues by type (Orthodox, Reform, Bukharian, etc.)	Official censuses and historic series obtainable (e.g. England, 1851; U.S.A., 1936). Considerable variation in size of synagogues and their degree of utilization.
(*b*) Membership of Synagogues	Varied definitions of membership (age/sex limitations) make comparisons difficult. Different types of membership possible (seat-holder, associate, burial rights only); formal (non-praying) membership not uncommon. Some duplication and over-estimation, e.g. membership retained at old *shul* or near place of work, delays in clearing removals or deaths from membership lists.

(*c*) Synagogue Attendance:	
(i) Day of Atonement	Frequently special 'overflow' services arranged; seat reservations may provide statistics. Private groups (*minyanim*) and 'occasional' synagogues (High Festival use of halls, hotels, etc.) difficult to identify.
(ii) *Shabbat*	Friday night attendance greater than *Shabbat* morning for many U.S. congregations. Desirable also to study special and Children's Services. Relative Synagogue attendance is of interest—Day of Atonement 1,200, *Shabbat* 250, week-day 15, in one London Synagogue known to the author.
(iii) Weekday	
(*d*) Activity of Participation in Service by the Congregation	Judgement by communal officials, or by visitor to strange district or congregation, can be valuable (though subjective).
2. *Vital Events and Religious Ceremonies*	
(*a*) *Brit Mila* (Circumcision)	Need to organize statistics from all or representative sample of *Mohelim* (and to exclude non-Jewish circumcisions). Useful as estimate of Jewish male births (but see note 13).
(*b*) *Bar-Mitzva* (and *Bat-Mitzva*)	Separate synagogal records available. Also possible to study from local Jewish Press (and caterers).
(*c*) Religious Weddings and Divorces	Communal statistics readily available, including ages and frequently occupations, nationality, etc. Difficult to establish *total* numbers of weddings and divorces of Jews, including those carried out by the Civil Authorities, as needed for study of out-marriage: local knowledge indicative.
(*d*) Religious Burials	Current and historical statistics fairly easily collected. Once could be relied on to give all Jewish deaths: today cremation is popular in many Western Jewish communities (its extent can often be estimated from local Jewish Press).
3. *Kashrut*	
(*a*) Kosher Butchers	Possible to collect statistics by towns (though kosher sections of super-markets are also becoming common).

(*b*) Kosher Restaurants, Hotels, and Caterers	Statistics obtainable through *Kashrut* Authorities. Comparative data on 'Jewish-style' (non-Kosher) establishments from Jewish Press or local knowledge.
(*c*) Observance of *Kashrut* by Communal Organizations	For example, extent to which the canteens or restaurants of communal organizations or communal banquets are Kosher.[21]
4. *Religious Education*	Statistics of classes, hours, pupils (by sex), and examinations readily obtainable.[22]
(*a*) Full-time schools	More difficult to study age distribution, especially problem of post-*Bar-Mitzva* study or total number of years studied by individual pupils.
(*b*) After-school classes	
(*c*) Sunday schools	
(*d*) Divinity classes in 'mixed-religion' schools, etc.	No communal statistics available of private tuition.
5. *Communal activities* Avoidance of infringing *Shabbat*	Can be studied from communal press and organizations' programmes. Five-day week eases problem of organizing meetings, etc. other than on *Shabbat*, though Friday night very popular in U.S.A. (where travel is generally not regarded as infringement).
6. *Religious Observance at School and University*	
(*a*) Jewish Prayers in Schools	Possible to gather information from headmasters, both for Jewish and 'mixed-religion' schools.
(*b*) Special Arrangements for Kosher Meals	Also obtainable from headmasters (some Jewish communities in Britain send hot Kosher meals to pupils at 'mixed' schools).
(*c*) Arrangements for keeping of Sabbath	Headmasters can report on number of Jews not participating in school activities on Saturdays. Universities in Britain provide facilities for 'invigilation' of students not wishing to be examined on *Shabbat* (rarely taken advantage of).
(*d*) Absentees on Festivals	Day of Atonement absentees may be nearly all the Jewish students. Absenteeism on other Festivals forms a good guide to 'relative' observance, especially regarding second-day Festivals in Diaspora.
	Similar statistics may also be obtained from selected employers.
7. *Other*	
(*a*) *Mikve* (Ritual Bath)	Numbers and attendance measurable.
(*b*) Rabbinic Courts	A variety of statistics obtainable of their activities.

STATISTICAL ERRORS CONNECTED WITH THE MEASUREMENT OF RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE

(*a*) *Response errors due to unclear questions*

It is essential that each question be clearly defined in terms easily and uniformly understandable by the respondents and also by the enumerators (in the case of personal interviews). It is also desirable that the questions be 'neutral' and not 'loaded', if the respondent is to give a representative and truthful answer. It may be best to use 'closed' questions, i.e. to present the series of possible answers arranged in a logical order; this order should be changed from question to question, e.g. once from observant to non-observant, and once the reverse.

Generic questions on religious observance can also be useful, especially to compare children and parents, but it is important to define the terms clearly. An individual's degree of observance may also differ from his religious beliefs. (See, for example, the questions used in, and the results of, the British Students Surveys. Cf. note 7.)

(*b*) *Exaggeration and over-statement*

Respondents to questions on religious observance frequently wish to show themselves in a better light than the true picture, especially if they feel that they *ought* to observe more than they in fact do. This effect is liable to be stronger in the case of interviewer-conducted inquiries, and may be influenced by differences in age and outlook between the interviewer and the respondent.

Postal questionnaires have the advantage of letting the respondent ponder more deeply and weigh himself up, and there is more chance of an honest reply to the questions and replies to all the questions (if a reply is obtained at all, the response rate to postal questionnaires being often low).

Whichever method of inquiry used, it is essential to word the questions and the accompanying instructions and explanations in the detail appropriate to the population surveyed (school children, students, synagogue members, general adult population, etc.) and also to gain their confidence; a guarantee of confidentiality of the individual data and the use of outside staff is in general desirable.

Under-statement is usually a negligible problem, although it may be of importance regarding the respondents' views on the religious observance of *others* (e.g. the students' views on the orthodoxy of their parents and their communities).

(*c*) *Unrepresentativeness of Population lists*

It is difficult to obtain full lists of communal organizations (synagogues, schools, etc.) for the collection of communal statistics. The better-known organizations included may not be fully representative

of the totality, and it is also difficult to make numerical estimates for those missing and their members.[23]

It is even more rare to obtain a complete and up-to-date list of Jews in a particular area for inquiries on individual observance; usually the best available list is that of synagogue members, possibly supplemented by some names from other organizations (master-lists) and local knowledge. Such lists and samples based on them will give too high estimates of the extent of religious observance among the whole Jewish population. Area-sampling (i.e. coverage of all the Jewish households in sampled areas) is desirable for representative statistics.

(d) Differential non-response

In any postal inquiry a fairly high rate of non-response must be expected, especially as it is not easy to offer an incentive to answer intimate questions such as those on religious observance.[24] Communal organizations are also liable to delay or withhold replying to postal questionnaires.[25] In interviews, too, a certain degree of non-co-operation is to be expected.

The non-response is liable to be of the *less observant*, who may be more assimilated and with weaker Jewish identification, thus introducing further biases into the results. It is also possible that some of the very orthodox will refuse to co-operate in such studies.

Corrections can sometimes be made by stratifying the population in advance into more and less observant groups (e.g. synagogue or Jewish society members and non-members) and inflating the effective replies from the samples drawn from the two strata (possibly drawn with different sampling fractions) to represent the known strata populations. It may also be desirable to draw a sub-sample of the non-respondents to a postal survey for further study, e.g. by personal interview, from which some knowledge can be gained of the biases introduced, and corrections made.[26]

NOTES

[1] Based on a Paper delivered at the Demographic Section of the Second World Congress of Jewish Studies in Jerusalem (July 1957). The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author alone; the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Hebrew University bear no responsibility for them.

[2] Abraham A. Moles, 'Sur l'aspect théoretique du décompte de populations mal définies', *Colloque sur la Vie Juive dans l'Europe Contemporaine*, Brussels (Sept. 1962).

[3] See, for example, Bernard Lazerwitz, 'Some Factors in Jewish Identification', *Jewish Social Studies* (Jan. 1953); Ludwig Geismar, 'A Scale for the Measurement of Ethnic Identification', *Jewish Social Studies* (Jan. 1954).

[4] See, for example, Israel Cohen, *Travels in Jewry*, London, 1952.

[5] See Hannah Neustatter, 'Demographic and other Statistical Aspects of Anglo-Jewry' in *A Minority in Britain* (ed. Maurice Freedman), London, 1955.

[6] *The Jews of Greater Washington*, Washington Jewish Council (1957). Other Community Surveys have been conducted in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and other U.S. cities.

[7] Raymond V. Baron, 'Jewish Students —a Survey (1949/50)', *The Jewish*

Chronicle (16 and 23 Feb. 1951); 'I.U.J.F. Survey of University Students, 1954/55', *The Jewish Academy* (5716—1955/56); and unpublished reports to the Inter-University Jewish Federation and to the World Jewish Congress on the above two Surveys.

[8] Uriel G. Foa, 'An Equal-i Scale for the Measurement of Attitudes towards Sabbath Observance', *Journal of Social Psychology*, 27 (1948).

[9] The Washington statistics (see note 6) indicated the following percentages lighting *Shabbat* candles:

Always	29%
Sometimes	19%
Never	50%
(Not Stated	2%)

[10] Amongst British Jewish Students in 1955 (see note 7), 16 per cent of the males and 13 per cent of the females stated that they did not ride on *Shabbat*.

[11] See Howard M. Brotz's description of the possible gradations, in 'The Outlines of Jewish Society in London' in *A Minority in Britain*, op. cit.

[12] Only two-thirds of the self-defined 'Orthodox' in Washington kept the milk-meat separation.

[13] While the non-circumcision of children has always been a strong indicator of assimilation, C. Bezalel Sherman notes in 'Patterns in American Jewish Life', *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, V, 1 (June 1963) that 'Even circumcision is veering away from its religious moorings and taking on the form of a hygienic operation . . .'.

[14] 80 per cent of the Washington boys (see note 6) underwent *Bar-Mitzva* or Confirmation, and 30 per cent of the girls *Bat-Mitzva* (not practised in Orthodox communities).

[15] Over one-third of the British Jewish students in 1955 had experienced a marriage to a non-Jew in their immediate family (brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts).

[16] Mea-Shearim and other areas of Israel, Williamsburg (U.S.A.), etc. The strong emphasis on 'modest' women's dress (e.g. long sleeves—though less attention is paid to the skirt-length) in religious quarters of Israel should also be noted.

[17] Montague Burton maintains a special 'Kosher' Department for English Jews requiring non-Shatnes suits.

[18] 15 per cent of Washington Jews had *mezuzot* on all their doors, 27 per cent on some or one. It is interesting to note that metal door frames formed a technological reason (or excuse) for not fixing *mezuzot*.

[19] Neustatter (see note 5) quotes from a small sample of 76 Jewesses in 1950: percentage using birth control: 69 per cent of those married 1930–9, 49 per cent of those married since 1940 (this lower proportion may be due to the latter being young war brides). Roberto Bachi and Judah Matrás report 40 per cent practice of contraception amongst Israel mothers, in 'Contraception and Induced Abortions among Jewish Maternity Cases in Israel', *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XL, 2 (April 1962).

[20] E.g. the addition of 15 per cent for the Jews not affiliated to any Jewish organization in Dr. Neustatter's estimate of the Jewish population of Britain (see note 5).

[21] The recent controversy over the *Treifa* kitchen planned for the new ZIM liner 'Shalom' may be recalled.

[22] Attention should be paid to the difference between the number of pupils *enrolled* and those actually attending. Dr. Neustatter (op. cit., p. 118) states 'average attendance at Synagogue classes and Talmud Torahs held under the auspices of the London Board of Jewish Religious Education is on Sundays 70 per cent of the total number of pupils enrolled and on weekdays 49 per cent'.

[23] One field in which local knowledge might be expected to give full lists was that of Jewish students in British Universities, but even here the coverage (in terms of detailed names and addresses) was only 70 per cent of the total number of Jewish students as estimated by correspondents at each university.

[24] 53 per cent of the British students responded to the 1954/5 postal survey; the non-response was higher among non-members of the Jewish Students' Society than among members.

[25] Dr. Neustatter (see note 5) states that only 55 provincial Jewish Communities out of 110 in Britain replied to a postal questionnaire. The response rate for the household questionnaire was even lower—1,666 out of 12,000.

[26] For further methodological points see, e.g., M. H. Hansen, W. N. Hurwitz, and W. G. Madow, *Sample Survey Methods and Theory*, 1956.

AN IRAQI JEWISH WRITER IN THE HOLY LAND

Emile Marmorstein

AFTER the publication in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* (Vol. I, no. 2, December 1959) of my analysis of volumes of short stories by the two Jewish writers who have remained in Iraq, my attention turned—for purpose of comparison—to Jewish writers who have left Iraq for the Holy Land but continue to write in Arabic. Newspapers and anthologies contain a certain amount of their poetry and a great deal of translation and journalism but comparatively little in the way of short stories; and in those only slight traces of the influence of the new environment of the writers could be observed. The poets may experiment a little more freely and the short-story writers adopt a faintly bolder tone in their denunciations of social evils; but as they aim at a mixed audience of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim readers of the Arabic press, they have tended to maintain that convention of undenominational anonymity to which Jewish writers in Arabic script have invariably conformed. Yet when I had almost abandoned my quest for lack of novelty, I discovered in the Jaffa daily *'al-Yaum* (29 April 1960) an Arabic short story in which the author and his characters are openly identified as Jews. Its quality and content—apart from the sensational nature of a breach of a literary convention—prompted me to attempt a fairly literal English version and an analysis of it. Whether it could have been written in Iraq is doubtful: it could certainly not have been published.

The author, Shalom Darwish, was born on 18 June 1913. A lawyer by profession, he was employed in Baghdad as Secretary of the Jewish Community; he now practises law in Haifa. Though he has never been a prolific writer, two slender volumes of his short stories that were published in Baghdad, *Freemen and Slaves* (*'aḥrār w'abīd*) in 1931 and *Some People* (*ba'dhu'n-nās*) in 1947, gained him a substantial reputation in Iraq. The first of these volumes was warmly commended by that eminent Arabist, the Carmelite Father Anastase.

Even after his departure from Iraq, a critical study of the short story in modern Iraqi literature (*'al-qiṣāṣ fi'l-'adab'il-'iraqīy 'il-ḥadīth*, Baghdad, 1956) devoted a section to him; the Muslim author, 'Abdu'l-Qādir Ḥasan 'Amīn, went out of his way, with commendable courage and

generosity under the circumstances, to praise his work. During the past decade, he has published about twenty stories. All of them deal with Iraqi Jews in their old or new homes.

Like those of most Arabic short stories, his plots have an old-fashioned air about them. Populated by characters capriciously exalted or buffeted by fate, the contemporary Arabic short story still has more in common with the work of Thomas Hardy than with the concern for the emotional interplay of autonomous human beings that marks the fiction of our own time and place. If there is a moral—and more often than not there is—it is a straightforward one: the story might aim at the remedy of abuses or plead for the fulfilment of aspirations in terms vigorous enough to leave no room for doubt as to the author's attitude. Darwish stands out in two respects. Firstly, he is uncommonly aware of evil—moreover of human evil that is not essentially connected with social or political doctrines, institutions, conditions, or conflicts. Secondly, his stories have an allegorical flavour. For instance, his later volume of stories contains an account of the journey of a widow with a number of young children and a she-goat to which they are devoted, from a small country town to the capital in search of educational opportunity, and of their grief at separation from the she-goat in deference to the protests of the owner of the wretched room in which they found shelter. It is left to the reader to decide whether to confine his emotions to the pathos of a moving story or to extend it to the sacrifice of human values demanded by modernization, the clash between spontaneous affection and a mixture of hostility and self-interest. Again, a simple Muslim might be merely entertained by the story of the tribesman who has been plagued by a ridiculous name given him as a result of his father's oath at the time of his birth and who, on appealing for relief to the Shaikh of his tribe, is given—in a flash of envy and malice—an even more opprobrious name; but a sensitive Jew might detect a symbolic allusion to the deterioration of the condition of his co-religionists during the years preceding their emigration. It is with this point in mind that the following story may be read.

In 1953 I had already taken up the post of Ministry of Religions liaison officer in the north of the country. One day in August I was in a car making for an Arab village with a view to inspecting the state of its mosque. It was a northern village and I had to pass Nahariah and stop at a transit-camp for newcomers near there. When my car was getting near the town, I felt a terrible thirst of the kind that can only be quenched by fresh water. I did not, therefore, ask the driver to stop at a soda-water kiosk; instead, I told him to drive as slowly as possible. For we had arrived at the wooden huts occupied by the newcomers, and I began looking right and left for one of the inhabitants whom I could ask for a little water. Suddenly I saw about ten metres away a man squatting and hammering at a piece of wood. When I called to him, he turned his head towards me

without changing his position. The man was blind in one eye and there was something familiar about his face. Who? When? Where? I did not know.

'A drink of water please . . . I'm thirsty.'

'With pleasure.'

After that, he turned from me and, while he went on hammering his piece of wood, called out: 'Toya . . . Toya.'

The head of a woman with red hair then looked out of a window of a wooden hut. In an agitated voice, she shouted: 'What's the matter, Yusuf, what do you want?' 'The man in the car wants a glass of water; pour some out for him.' Then the head turned in my direction and I saw a freckled face which also seemed to be known to me, and the owner of the face smiled and nodded her head and immediately disappeared inside the wooden hut.

Once again I asked myself who she was. I knew her. They both spoke the Arabic dialect of the Jews of Iraq and the sound of her husky voice was certainly not new to my ear. Yet though my mind made an effort to remember, my memory betrayed me and neither the face of the one-eyed man nor the freckled face nor the red hair nor the voice could restore to my memory reminiscences of the remote past about these two individuals.

I waited a little, looking at the door of the wooden hut for a glimpse of the owner of the freckled face and the agitated voice; but before my mind could exhume more buried memories, the owner of the red hair emerged from the door of the hut. In her hand was an old-fashioned teacup with a broken handle. She made her way towards me as if she were walking on eggs. I looked at her and saw a broad-bosomed, thick-waisted and heavy-shouldered woman with red hair and a freckled face. Her gait, with her fleshy thighs held apart, resembled that of a cow in calf. When she reached the car, she put the cup in through the window and I saw her freckled hand with its long fingers and narrow red-stained nails. Before I looked at her face again, a cry arose from her throat: 'Darwish . . . Darwish . . . Don't you know me? . . . Have you forgotten me? . . . Heavens, have I changed so much? Look what they've done to us . . . Don't you know your neighbour Toya. Have you forgotten her? And this is Yusuf my husband . . . Don't you remember, don't you remember the day of the wager when 'Isa tried to get one of his eyes? Wouldn't you care to come inside? I'll make you some tea . . . tea quenches thirst. For the Lord's sake do come in.'

Taken aback, I accepted her invitation and followed her into the hut. So this was our neighbour Toya! How could I forget . . . how? And how could this fleshy, flabby woman who walked like a cow be the fleet gazelle that had pillaged hearts and ravished minds? Was it possible that nature which had formed such a fascinating creature should afterwards play with the work of its hands as a child plays with a beautiful picture which he disfigures? And why? But the hand of nature playing games with the beauty of this woman could not—how could it?—rob her mouth of its sweet bewitching smile or her eyes of their sparkle.

Yes, she was our neighbour when I was only ten years old. Many

years had passed since then and she was now nearing the fifties. But Toya was not our next-door neighbour. It would be more correct to say that she was the neighbour of 'Abu Tamrah. We lived opposite her in Bani Sa'id, a quarter in which Jews and Muslims lived in proximity to one another. The only thing about the house that remains in my mind's eye is her window at which she used to sit from morning to evening . . . looking like a beautiful picture in a frame.

Her real name was Victoria and they only called her Toya as a pet name. Slender, red-haired, freckled, grey-eyed, crimson-lipped . . . When we moved to our house opposite her, she was sixteen with all the freshness and bloom of youth and I was still at the primary school. I would go off in the morning to school, and when I left the house she would favour me from her window with a glance and a smile; and when I returned at noon, I would look up at her window and she would again refresh my thirst with a smile. Arriving home, I would eat the midday meal, bolting my food without chewing it. When my mother asked me the reason for this, I would say that I was in a hurry because I wanted to revise my lessons and prepare my homework for the morrow; while the others hastened to the cellar to seek refuge from the scorching heat, I would go up to my room on the second floor to sit at the window facing her window at which she would sit and work at her sewing-machine. She was so experienced in her work that there was no need for her to look at the place of the needle while she stitched her seam on the garment. It was easy for her to regulate the speed of the machine with her right hand while her glance was directed at us. At us? Yes, we were two, not one. My brother, who was two years older, used to do exactly the same as I did. In the scorching heat of Baghdad he would go upstairs with me in order to sit facing her under the pretext of study and doing homework.

When she bestowed her smiles and glances on us, each one of us would return the glance, thinking that the other was unaware of what he was doing. She would smile at the same time at some of the young men of the quarter who were passing, Jews and Muslims. As she was preparing to go out, she would stand in front of her window to drape herself in front of us in her *'aba* and she would posture and pirouette and flirt with us before drawing the black transparent veil over her face. When she lowered it, she would remove it from one side of her face and from one of her laughing, fascinating eyes. Then she would lower it again and turn round and disappear. We would watch the door for her to reappear and we knew she was exchanging looks with us from behind her veil and we would smile at her until she turned round and went. We would continue to watch her when she was walking. She had her own special walk, short quick steps, a cat's walk. I could have picked it out even if she had been among a thousand girls. Whenever we met by chance while she was walking and twisting and turning, we used to sing the song 'The gazelle of the valley has turned'.

The family of 'Abu Tamrah which lived next door to Toya was a Muslim family. The head of it was distinguished for manliness and the eldest son for physical vigour. He was tall and broad in stature with knotted

muscles and remarkable strength. He would put fear into the hearts of his rivals because he could hold any one of them, lift him up, wave him in the air and throw him some metres away. This was Mūsa. The younger brother was called 'Isa. 'Isa had a large flabby body that was not at all firm. He was the leader of the boys of our quarter, deriving his strength and his power from the imposing residence of his family and from the strength and authority of his brother Mūsa. 'Isa was under twenty and the boys whom he claimed to lead were about that age or less. Toya did not withhold from 'Isa a measure of attention. He was in the habit of looking up at her window whenever he passed by, to get his share of her smiles but when she went out, she knew how to avoid his company. 'Isa was certainly aware of this innocent flirtation between us and Toya: the impudence of it irritated him and he naturally tried to nip this childish relationship in the bud.

How can I forget the day when I returned from school as usual, looked up at the window and did not see Toya. Her place was unusually desolate and empty. I entered the house intending to go upstairs. I found my mother waiting for me in the courtyard. There was an expression of intense displeasure on her face and a frightening anger in the tone of her voice. I heard her say:

'Where are you going?'

'I want to revise my lessons.'

'Without eating?'

'I don't feel hungry. I shall eat after finishing my homework.'

'You can revise your lessons below with us in the cellar. I don't want you to revise any other lessons.'

'What lessons?'

'Shut up, you impudent boy.'

'What have I done, Mummy?'

'What have you done? Where were you yesterday or the day before? With her in Ghazi Park?'

'With whom?'

'With Toya, you wretch. And what were you two doing? You were kissing and cuddling her . . . a newly hatched chicken like you.'

'What park? What Toya? Who told you that?'

' 'Isa 'Abu Tamrah. It was he who saw you in the park. He came to me, warning and threatening that if he saw you again he'd wring your neck and break your bones and grind them to a powder. Do you hear?'

'Lies, lies . . . lies!'

'Whether it's lies or truth, from now on you'll not go out in the evening and you'll do your homework here in the cellar. I'll stop your brother too. You know what the proverb says: "The eloquent cock crows in his egg." That applies to you. Ten years old and you begin chasing girls. You rascal!' My mother pulled me by the ear and forcibly dragged me, to the accompaniment of abuse, to the cellar and deposited me on the damp floor where I lay howling.

My affair with Toya spread around the quarter. Fingers were pointed at me and I grew ashamed of myself. I was afraid that if I met 'Isa in some

quiet place, he would do what he'd threatened and pulverize my bones. I did not see her any more at the window. My mother had obviously been active and complained to the neighbours of the conduct of their daughter. I do not know what Toya said and how many tears she poured out or whether her family believed or disbelieved her; and my brother began to nag at me as the cause of his having to do his homework in the cellar and abandon the heat of the room and the hot flirtation.

After I had been forbidden her in this way, I secretly continued to look at her window but to no purpose. I did not even see the sewing-machine and I thought they had decided to compel Toya to work right inside the room. As a result of this, and of the winks and hints and jeers that were aimed at me everywhere, I began to grow thin. I walked about, a prey to dark thoughts. I neither enjoyed my food nor slept at all well. I got paler and weaker. My mother noticed this and began to worry about me. I thought that she seemed to be between two fires, between satisfaction at my separation from Toya though I was wasting away in front of her eyes, and the thought that if she allowed me to meet her, I should become a tasty morsel in the mouth of 'Isa and his companions.

My mother obviously preferred to restore me to life; when I heard her sing in the dialect 'They brought good news of those who are absent, they are coming to us safe and sound', I knew that she wanted to give me the good news that Toya had returned from visiting her relations in Ba'qūbah where her family had forced her to go, and that she had returned safe and sound. While my mother repeated this line a few times, she would look at me now and again with a smile rising to her lips. When I'd hurried into the road, I found Toya standing by the window. On my way home from school, I saw her in the distance and recognized her from her walk. I felt my heart melt into my stomach and the blood course in my veins and my heart-beats thud in my ears until we drew near one another. Then I heard her say something which I did not understand. Perhaps it was a greeting. My reason had fled. My tongue did not help me to reply nor did my knees help me to stop. I went on my way without a halt until I arrived home and I heard my mother say: 'What's the matter, boy? Why are you so pale?'

'Nothing, mother . . . I only want a drink of water. Da'ud the son of Hājah 'Aliyah followed me and aimed his catapult at me so that I had to run away from him.'

'Da'ud the son of Hājah 'Aliyah . . . the horror! I'll go this evening to the Hājah and report him to her.'

'No . . . that wouldn't do any good. He'll only bear a grudge against me if you do and he'll stir the other boys of the quarter up against me. I'll make it up with him myself. That would be better.'

My mother reluctantly agreed.

One result of 'Isa's fabrication of the slander against me was that Toya's parents felt that it was time for her to be married. Although Toya was beautiful, she was poor. There was no dowry to encourage suitors. As a result, she was not left with much of a choice. She had to be satisfied with anyone who was satisfied with her. The man who was satisfied with her

was a youth with a fair complexion who lived in the adjoining quarter and was a carpenter. He too was poor. Her parents wanted to be freed from her shame at any price, and as soon as possible; and her shame still lurked in her vicinity and threatened her in the person of 'Isa who had begun to pester her a bit, spending more time at her window and inventing pretexts for coming to the house whenever he wanted to. At the same time, 'Isa had done nothing to warrant a complaint to his father or his brother. However, fear of eventualities had instilled a sense of panic in the parents and they decided to give her in marriage to Yusuf the carpenter.

He was then about twenty-five, fair-haired, pale-faced, phlegmatic and dull-witted. He was the very opposite of the kind of husband to cope with Toya's fire and vitality. But Toya was beyond all this. She was a girl who recognized reality and its decree and she had to give her consent. So she accepted her fate as long as her fate accepted her and she was conducted in marriage to her bridegroom. We were all seized with dismay and astonishment, expecting something terrible to happen—an earthquake, the sun darkening, or the eclipse of the moon. How could nature agree to this goat getting this gazelle? Days passed in which the quarter was plunged in something like mourning and ears were listening to the news of the adjoining quarter where the gazelle resided with the goat. We were wanting to hear that Toya had rebelled and that she had chased Yusuf the carpenter away or fled from him, and we were convinced that she would inevitably do it.

News spread among the people and tongues wagged to the effect that Toya had actually done something like it, that she had demanded from Yusuf clothes and trinkets that were not in his power to give. They said that in the last few days she had asked him for twenty-five dinars so that she could buy clothes appropriate to her charms and that she had driven him out of the house after forbidding him access to her couch as long as he did not bring her in cash the amount which she had demanded of him. No one could intervene. The news spread and reached 'Isa who began trying to taunt Yusuf. Yusuf hurried away whenever he met him because he did not want to listen to him. 'Isa would say to him: 'So you can't sleep with her before you get twenty-five dinars? I'm ready to pay fifty and a thousand fifties for a night with her . . . Where do you sleep now, you lout? In the public bath? In the carpentry shop or in the water-closet? Give her to me for a night, one night, Yusuf, you're a goat not a man, you're not worthy of her, you wet slab.'

A week passed and we knew that Yusuf was sleeping in the carpenter's shop. Then 'Isa took a decision and laid a plot against Yusuf. When he met him and Yusuf quickened his pace to get away from him, 'Isa did not enrage him with a taunt but got close to him and took his arm in a friendly and flattering way. 'Listen to me, Yusuf. Why are you afraid of me? I'm your friend and your wife was our neighbour and neighbours have obligations towards one another. We all know that she wants twenty-five dinars from you and that you haven't got them. Look, I've worked out for you a means of lawful gain. You know Da'ud the son of Hājah 'Aliyah? This silly young fellow claims that he's the best shot with the catapult and that he can hit anyone's eye at a distance of twenty metres. Have you ever

heard such a tale? I've been thinking of you a great deal, Yusuf, and I challenged him to test his art and his skill. I bet him twenty-five dinars, which the loser must pay to anyone who agrees to stand as a target for Da'ud's catapult. If you do it, you'll be the only winner. Here's twenty-five dinars.' At that, he stuffed the amount in Yusuf's pocket and went on: 'This very night you can go to her, Yusuf, for the first time since she deprived you of herself, my boy. Tonight, tonight, tonight . . . Do you think that Da'ud can hit your eye at twenty metres? He'll miss the whole of your head and the pebble will hit the wall. Don't be afraid. At the worst, you might get a slight wound on the forehead, for instance. And what would it matter?'

'Isa went on chattering without any response from Yusuf who walked with him in the direction in which he was going. Yusuf did not put his hand in his pocket nor did he try to give back the twenty-five dinars. He just went on walking with 'Isa as if in a dream with 'Isa talking a great deal. Had Yusuf listened to him his whole being would have been shaken. Yusuf did notice that 'Isa was grinding his teeth and was hissing like a snake in his excitement: 'I'll ride her . . . I'll ride your mare . . . Once, only once.' While he said this, he was grinding his teeth and shaking his fist in the air. Yusuf looked at him in confusion. Fear had deprived him of the capacity for action or speech.

The two reached a place where 'Isa's gang had congregated and among them was Da'ud the son of Hājah 'Aliyah. 'Isa together with Yusuf joined the crowd and spoke to Da'ud: 'Yusuf agrees to stand at a distance of twenty metres so that you can try your skill on him. Are you ready?' 'Yes I'm quite ready.' Amid the tumult that followed, they rushed Yusuf to the wall and stood him there like a man facing a firing squad. One of the young men went forward in order to place Yusuf's head against the wall but he did it with a blow on the forehead so that the back of Yusuf's head met the wall with a hefty crack. All Yusuf did was to hold his head firmly against the wall. Another youth came forward to measure the distance, beginning at the place where Yusuf stood and going on to where Da'ud stood playing with his catapult and examining the pebble which 'Isa had given him. The youth began his task of measurement by treading on Yusuf's instep; he then began taking long strides, regarding every two paces as one metre. Then there was a discussion and argument about every aspect of the wager. Which eye, right or left? Had Yusuf the right to shut the eye that was not the target? Could the pebble be small or had it to be big, and other details. Da'ud stood in front of Yusuf at a distance of forty of the paces measured out by the youth.

Silence prevailed, necks were craned for a glimpse of Da'ud pulling back the rubber. He then closed one eye and opened the other, moving his hand a little here and there in order to aim the pebble at Yusuf's right eye after Yusuf had been allowed to cover his left eye with his left hand. Da'ud then claimed that Yusuf was moving his head and he was quite right about that because Yusuf was trembling and shaking and his teeth were chattering. Consequently, the two parties to the wager agreed that two of those present should take up their positions, one to his right and the other to his left so that each one of them could take one of Yusuf's ears and

hold it to prevent him from moving his head. Naturally, the two volunteers seized this rare opportunity to give Yusuf's ears a painful pull. But Yusuf remained silent without protest or complaint. Minutes passed and a large crowd had gathered to look on and jeer. When the pebble flew, many cries of wonder went up. As for Yusuf, a dreadful groan rose from his throat before he sank to the ground with the blood streaming from his eye after his two guards had let go his ears. The crowd cried out: 'His eye has been put out . . . his eye has gone.' For the blood had covered the eye completely and Yusuf was lying face upwards on the ground. He had fainted. The blood had covered his right eye so that it could not be seen. While the crowd was straining for a glimpse of the man lying on the ground, the sound of the slap administered by Mūsa 'Abu Tamrah to his brother 'Isa was heard; and those who had noticed Mūsa's arrival hurriedly dispersed to avoid trouble. Yusuf remained on the ground until the police came and transferred him to the hospital where it was found that the pebble had hit the lid of the right eye and that the blood flowing from the wound had covered the eye so that it appeared to have been put out. . . .

While Toya hurried to the hospital, Yusuf was still unconscious; but when he woke up, he saw Toya pouring out tears at his side and kissing his hand and he heard her say 'Thank God you are all right and your eye has been saved . . . Forgive me Yusuf . . . Thank God, thank God.' Yusuf replied: 'All right, all right, don't cry. The twenty-five dinars are in my jacket pocket. Take them and buy the dress . . . Wear it in health.'

I entered the hut with Toya. Its contents indicated not only great poverty but also meticulous cleanliness and sound taste. When we'd finished drinking tea, I looked at Toya and saw on her face the lovely smile which had captivated me when I was a little boy. Then I heard her say: 'Perhaps you'd like to ask me about Yusuf?'

'Yes, I remember that the pebble had only injured the eyelid. Wasn't that so?'

'Yes, of course, of course . . . Do you know that I've thought a great deal about the matter and I've arrived at the view that fate had destined him to be one-eyed and that the Perforator (*'an-nāqirah*) had been created with him, grown up with him and matured and that it was always waiting for the opportunity to perforate his eye. There was no escape. After the Perforator had failed on the day when 'Isa failed to achieve his aim of putting out his eye, it went on watching for an opportunity. When we returned [*sic*] to Israel, the Perforator was on the 'plane with us and stayed with us right here and succeeded here where it had failed there. In this very place my husband stumbled and fell on the ground striking his head against a board from which a nail stuck out. By the time I had hurried to him to help him get up from his fall, I found that the nail had already penetrated his eye and put it out, the same right eye about which 'Isa had made a bet in order to put it out.'

With a sigh she again repeated that fate had decreed for him the loss of an eye and that when Yusuf had escaped from the pebble thrown by the son of Hājah 'Aliyah, the nail had lain in ambush for him; and that if

the nail had not succeeded, the cock would have pecked out his eye. She quoted the proverb: 'What has been decreed upon the eye, the eye must see.'

And through the tears which dropped from her eyes, I saw, while she was taking from my hand the tea-cup in order to fill it up again, her sad fascinating smile light up the gloom of the hut.

Now, this story, unconvincing though it may seem to a Western reader, has a limited basis of plausibility. Written in the first person singular, genuine place names are used in it and social conditions are described more as they were than as they ought to have been. Yet, taken purely as a straightforward tale, it is a little hard to understand why an intelligent man, who appears to write only when compelled to seek relief from the burden of his thoughts, should have troubled to write it. It will not, therefore, seem too fanciful to identify Toya and Yusuf with the Jewry of Iraq, Toya representing its warmth and excitement and Yusuf its sober virtues of industry and endurance, and to discern in the relationship between the two symbols of the Muslims, 'Isa and Mūsa, the differentiation in the minds of Iraqi Jews between the envy and brutality of nationalist youth and the more decorous older generation from whom help and protection could be expected. The preservation of Yusuf's eye from 'Isa's designs can then be taken to represent the escape of the Jews of Iraq from nationalist malice, the subsequent loss of his eye to mirror their depressed condition after their delivery, and the moral of the story to reflect in allegorical fashion a secularist view of the inevitability of the process in which they were helplessly involved.

For the identification of the agent of this process, our author has employed the Arabic word *'an-nāqirah* which I have rendered as 'the Perforator'; and the fact that his story is entitled *ḥadīthu'n-nāqirah* ('the story of the Perforator') indicates the central position held by this word in the plot. It certainly calls for a comment. The basic meaning of the Arabic root *nqr* is to make a dent with a beak, and it is commonly used in the sense of piercing or making a hole. Seeing that this root is used in Hebrew (Numbers 16. 14, Judges 16. 21, 1 Samuel 11. 2 and Proverbs 30. 17)—though not in Arabic—to denote blinding the eyes, one might be tempted to suspect a Hebraism. Such a temptation should be resisted. The root could have been applied similarly by Arabic writers without the slightest knowledge of Hebrew. Our author's choice of the feminine participle of the first form of this root is far more likely to have been dictated by its ambiguity. As it also bears the derived meaning of 'misfortune', the writer was enabled to introduce his story as a straightforward, dramatic tale of doom and only towards the end personify the cause of the trouble as a malevolent spirit whose designated victim cannot avoid its blows.

Through this characteristic literary device of his, Darwish has

revealed more than artistic skill. The historical impression illustrated by his contrived ambiguity is sound and the metaphor appropriate. His community's brief pilgrimage from emancipation to exodus was punctuated by a series of sharp jabs. They inflicted more or less serious wounds before they culminated in panic and conveyed the author to the Holy Land where he is the most eminent survivor of that adventurous and talented assembly of Iraqi Jews who first crossed over from traditional to secular modes of thought and patterns of living. In Iraq, he and his fellow writers had served to assure their co-religionists that they too had a share in the world of letters and to guide them in favour of social change. Apart from the capacity to express his experience in an attractive form, what has he to offer them now? His traditionalist predecessors, the preachers of Baghdad whose talent in composing ingenious as well as edifying tales should not be underestimated, would have moulded a story such as this to illustrate the justice of divine retribution: they could hardly have refrained from quoting the Sages to the effect that the Philistines blinded Samson because we went after his eyes (T.B. Sota 9b) or from insisting on the sinfulness of ultimate despair in the face of a temporary triumph of evil. A Marxist writer would divert it to the course of dialectical materialism, a nationalist to the path of national revival. Darwish falls back on secularized folklore, on a destiny that plays about arbitrarily and aimlessly with human lives. He persists in his scepticism: he knows only what has happened to his community but not why it happened; and if he cannot submit to the authority of Heaven, he is at least steadfast in his refusal to bow to the Ba'alim. With Matthew Arnold he would appear to be saying:

> Enough we live:—and if a life,
> With large results so little rife,
> Though bearable, seem hardly worth
> This pomp of worlds, this pain of birth.

Yet his final outburst of admiration for Toya's residue of battered charm, her loyalty to her mutilated spouse and the tasteful interior of her humble dwelling may even symbolize a ray of hope of eventual salvation through the practice of the old virtues and the survival of the old vitality.

To end on a personal note, I must confess that my interest in the Arabic short story is mainly confined to what I can extract from it for the purpose of my studies in the sociology of religion. In this respect, granted, of course, the validity of my interpretation, Darwish's allegory seems particularly illuminating. It faithfully conveys the climate of the mission field over which campaigns in the *Kulturkampf* are being fought on sacred soil. Not that the mission field is exclusively inhabited by Oriental Jewry. Nevertheless, the considerable numbers of Oriental

Jews who had access to secular education in their native lands constitute the most influential section of its population. They had abandoned their hold on the sacramental faith and, largely, on the sacramental life of Judaism in response to the vision of the Enlightenment as it first appeared in all its original purity and splendour before their eyes. Owing to developments well beyond their control, the fulfilment of that vision—which to them meant equality of opportunity for able and energetic people to advance socially, culturally, economically and philanthropically—now appears in their judgement to have become not less desirable but more remote. So they concentrate on survival which both the collectivist versions of the Enlightenment that sought to replace the original vision, and the faith that the vision had supplanted, seem to them more likely to hamper than to promote. But sometimes they see Toya's 'sad fascinating smile light up the gloom of the hut' and such glimpses bring comfort and, with it, hope.

SOUTHERN JEWS: THE TWO COMMUNITIES

Theodore Lowi

INTRODUCTION

AN ATTEMPT was recently made by Peter Rose to add another piece to the puzzle of the life and ways of American Jews.[1] One can only agree with Dr. Rose that the image of Jewish life portrayed by life in the eastern metropolis is incomplete indeed. Not all the conditions of life in the big city extend to non-metropolitan environments where many Jews live. Thus, Rose argues, 'Critical examination of Jewish life in the small community would seem to be a logical extension of research in the study of American Judaism and the nature of Jewish-Gentile relations'.[2]

Rose's survey of two small towns in upstate New York adds, as he hoped, a few pieces to the puzzle, but its limitations are as suggestive as its contributions. First of all, he is dealing with a very small segment of American Jewry, and he is leaving out a large slice of life in the larger but non-metropolitan towns and cities, particularly in areas outside the Northeast. Second, in many respects the small-town rural New York Jews are really very special cases in comparison with all *but* the metropolitan Jews of the Eastern seaboard. By Rose's own count, over 90 per cent of the Jews in his two rural towns were fairly recent immigrants from other parts of the eastern United States and abroad. Only 4 per cent were locally born and bred; over 60 per cent hailed from other American cities; and 30 per cent were refugees from Nazi-dominated European countries. Beyond the fact that so many were newcomers, identification with and commitment to the town were quite weak; many in all age-groups displayed strong aspirations for residence elsewhere. Rose has an interesting subject and some significant findings, but his base for generalization is limited. At least it leaves one wondering whether truly non-metropolitan Jews, particularly in groupings sufficiently large to constitute sub-communities, are in any way significantly different.

The study offered here is not meant to be a description of all Southern Jews. This would hardly be possible. It is, rather, a participant-observation inquiry into some of the peculiar consequences of the adaptation of Jews in the South. The case involves the entire community of

Jews in a middle-size Southern city. The issue was perceived by all the participants as one of the few vital issues ever faced by them as Jews; their behaviour confirmed their assessment that the stakes were high and the outcome a matter of intense interest. Given this degree of importance attributed to the issue by the participants themselves, I became convinced that the case was sufficient to reveal some of the basic attitudes of the Jewish community as well as to suggest some of the major attributes of its social structure.

Conditions in Southern towns are in many respects quite special. They are clearly unlike conditions in all American metropolitan centres, and are probably equally dissimilar from those of towns of the same size outside the South. And in these towns the Jewish community, while always a fairly small unit, is a substantial one both in numerical and economic terms. Many of the Jewish families have been located in the South for two, three, even four generations. Along with them are Jewish families much more recently Southern. They live together in a common social and usually identical institutional milieu. Yet they also live apart from one another, sufficiently apart to be thought of as constituting not one but two communities; and there is a clear pattern in this living apart. What is the basis of the two-community pattern and what are its causes and its consequences? What is its significance for our notions about Jewish life in particular and ethnic and other types of identification in general?

The Setting

Iron City[3] is a steel, rubber, and textile town of some 60,000 people. Located in the hilly north of one of the Deep South states, Iron City is blessed with many natural resources but not with much new investment in the past decade. Its population has for some time been stable both in number and composition. The white community is homogeneous, particularly in comparison with non-Southern and Southern seaboard cities. Jews and Catholics are recognized as white minorities. However, their minority status is seldom a problem, the reason perhaps being that Negroes constitute about 30 per cent of the population. Until quite recently even relations between Negroes and whites were stable. Except for some labour violence in the distant past, Iron City has little in its past to cast doubt upon the civic boasts of the civic boosters.

The Case

Early in 1958 on a quiet Saturday night the city of Birmingham, Alabama, was shaken by a blast which tore off a wing of its largest synagogue. Most of the residents of Iron City reacted with mild shock and short-lived indignation. But the Jews of Iron City were deeply disturbed by the bombing, the first such desecration close to home in any of their recollections. All felt strongly that something ought to be done,

but there was little agreement among them as to what should be done. After many weeks of informal discussion, the entire congregation—for all Jews in Iron City were members of one congregation—was crystallized around a proposal made by two brothers, the Kahns, owners of a prosperous retail store. The Kahns sponsored a motion to make a contribution, in the name of the synagogue, to the Birmingham reward-fund, which by that time had accumulated many thousands of dollars. The Kahns got their motion on the agenda of the third regular monthly meeting of 1958 and were quietly campaigning in its favour.

Practically every member of the congregation of fifty to sixty families attended the meeting. Fully aware that the congregation treasury was almost empty, owing to recent expenditure on redecoration, the Kahns proposed to give the sum of $250 to the treasury on condition that it be sent to Birmingham in the name of the Iron City synagogue. As the Kahns' proposal would cost the congregation or an unwilling member not so much as a dollar, there would seem hardly to have been any issue at all. But every Iron City Jew knew that there was a most important issue to be settled, and that issue came through as simply and clearly as if it had been so stated in the motion: Resolved [in effect], that the Jews of Iron City identify themselves as Jews and as a congregation of Jews with the Jews of Birmingham and elsewhere outside Iron City. Aye or Nay?

The debate opened with a short but impassioned speech by Kahn the elder. It was essentially a for-whom-the-bell-tolls speech, stating firmly that to maintain the respect of the Gentile community as well as their own self-respect, they must all take their stand as Jews. The opposition, even more impassioned, was voiced first by the owner of the largest retail clothing store in town and then by the wife of the owner of the third largest retail clothing store in town. They were self-appointed spokesmen, for there was no opposition caucus prior to the meeting but only a strong awareness of consensus in the majority. The opposition recalled the Ku Klux Klan horse-whippings of some Jews and Catholics in the 1920s and stressed a well-enough-alone philosophy, which at the time of the debate was very well indeed. The proponents argued that German Jews had suffered because of their lack of identity as Jews. The opposition answered, with equal conviction, that for years they had been 'treated all right'; in fact, relations with non-Jews would suffer to the extent that Jews identified with other Jews rather than with their home town as home-towners. The opposition cited such matters as equal treatment in the country club, the high school football teams, and other matters of social significance.

The case for the motion was altogether remote, academic, hypothetical; that against was immediate, concrete, compelling. The question was not called; a vote was never taken. At a point close to violence the brothers Kahn withdrew their motion. The meeting was gavelled

to a close amidst considerable shouting. As it was strictly a civil ceremony, the rabbi did not attend the meeting.

Not unlike the United States Senate, the congregation was seated strictly along party lines, the opposition on the right well beyond the centre, the proponents in the remaining seats to the left. As there was no aisle of separation, the demarcation line was made by two almost unbroken columns of husbands running elbow to elbow from the Chair backwards to the rear of the room. For debate, this is a natural arrangement; however, it is made noteworthy by the fact that the columns of husbands also separated the 'old' Jews from the 'new' Jews. As far as could be determined during the meeting and for days thereafter, there were no exceptions. The new Jews favoured the motion and sat on the left; the old Jews without exception opposed the motion and sat to the right and centre. Here were the two communities in congregation assembled.

As the analysis proceeds, I hope to show, first, that there are two separate social structures among the Iron City Jews and that the separate social structures both reflect and maintain some quite profound differences in what it means to be a Jew. Second, I hope to show that these differences exist within an even stronger set of identifications common to all Jews. Both propositions and the fragmentary support to follow should provide a basis for hypotheses about Southern Jews in particular, and American Jews, minority relations, and value systems in general.

SOME FEATURES OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE: HOME, CLUB, AND CAMPUS

The distinction between old and new is not an easy one for an outsider to draw, but although it is implicit, the Iron City Jews appear to understand it well enough and to behave accordingly. Roughly, there are two dimensions in the distinction, one of time and one of place, and both are vague, shifting, *ad hoc*, fortuitous. Not all the old Jews have been residents of Iron City for over a generation; and many of the new Jews can at least claim to have seen the Depression come and go in their present businesses. In composite form, an old Jew is one whose family has lived somewhere in the *South* for as far back as memory serves and whose family has been at least self-supporting and free of bankruptcy for a generation (perhaps longer, for one does hear of stories about such-and-such an old Jew whose father or grandfather was a 'fourflusher'). The new Jew, in contrast, is one who himself came to town from 'the North'. (Very few in the past forty years or so came to town directly from Europe, except for three refugee German young men in the early 1940s who stayed for only a short time and were considered arrogant and rather zany.) The new Jew and his family may claim twenty-five

years or more of respectable residence in the town, but he came directly from some metropolitan centre outside the South, his speech is not so colourful with local drawl and patois, and he has hosts of relatives in New York, Chicago, and the like. Jews of Eastern European ancestry are more likely than not to be of the community of new Jews, but this is not an important factor distinguishing the communities. The basic distinction is in degree of Southernness. By virtue of immigration patterns, most of the Jews in both communities are of German origin with a few of Iberian ancestry among the old Jews and a few of Eastern European ancestry on both sides, according to degree of Southernness. There is, then, a middle group, perhaps Eastern European but definitely Yankee, who at least were born in the South, probably around the First World War or after. They are acceptable as old Jews if they are in acceptable businesses and are thought not to be too 'pushy' or too 'kikey'. (One of the most prominent Jews in town, for example, was of German origin with strong Southern ties, but had lived in New York, had strong business ties to New York textile interests, was involved in some union trouble, and was owner of an incorporated business. He was an old Jew but one towards whom other old Jews were always strongly ambivalent.)

It may be difficult for the outsider to understand how two communities could be based upon so superficial a distinction as degree of Southernness. But I think it should be clear from the reward-fund debate, or it should become clear presently, that over the years many quite profound differences were related to the quality of Southernness or actually developed as a consequence of Southernness. The separation into two communities probably arose out of superficial differences of culture and personality traits (a direct connotation of the term 'Southernness'), and the separation is maintained by the friendship patterns that arose as a consequence. And, as the separate friendship patterns emerged, largely owing to the resistance if not outright hostility of the established old Jews, they acted in the manner of a self-fulfilling prophecy to maintain the differences. Over the years the differences have congealed.

Only a superficial acquaintance with Iron City Jews is necessary to detect two separate communities in ordinary social activities. The most reliable index is the frequency of exchange of social calls among and between old and new Jews. It is difficult to find cases of frequent exchanges of social calls between an old and a new Jewish household. There must certainly be numerous instances, but they are clearly exceptional. An old Jew will often identify the name of a new Jew (when presented to him in conversation) as that of a friend; but, when pushed, he can seldom recall the last time their families gathered in each other's living rooms. If one could draw a flow chart between old and new Jewish families, shaded and sized in terms of frequency of exchanges of

social calls, the arrows between sets of new Jewish families would be wide and dark, between old Jewish families the same, and thin and wan across community lines. The arrows would converge from both sides on a scant two or three families, one by virtue of the personality of a wife in an old Jewish household and the other families probably by virtue of an 'intermarriage' of an old and new family. If these particular households are channels of amity and communication, they are not the sources of leadership. Each community has its spokesmen for issues such as choice of rabbi, teaching of Hebrew, etc., and the congregation presidency tends to alternate between the two, although this office is often filled on a 'most available' basis.

Since there is only one country club in town, many Jews are members; a few are actually charter members. Thus, one possible manifestation of separateness is hidden. However, there was an attempt some years ago to start a Jewish country club which failed after several unsuccessful attempts to enlist the support of a number of the old Jews. Many said they could not afford to be members of both clubs and were unwilling to give up their stake in the non-sectarian one. On the other hand, in one of the larger Deep South cities there is but one Christian country club and two Jewish clubs whose membership is divided along the lines of 'old' and 'new'. Years ago, so the story goes, one of the 'pushier kikes' was blackballed from the established Jewish club. Being a man of some means, he started another. In those Southern towns large enough to support more than one synagogue, the difference in composition of membership tends to be 'old' versus 'new'.

Differences in the marital patterns of the two communities are more difficult to discern because they become submerged in extremely strong family solidarity and hidden from the observer. However, a few things are known. There are more marriages outside the faith among children of the old families, but the greater significance here lies in their small numbers and the reaction of the old Jews to such marriages. More will be said on the latter presently. The gulf between the two communities is best indicated in this respect by the rarity of marriages that connect old Jewish families *of Iron City* with new Jewish families *of Iron City*. When a marriage does take place between children of old and new Jews, one of the partners is almost without exception an 'import'.

Families in both communities have many connexions in other Southern towns, some far beyond their home base. When they visit another Southern town, the Jews of Iron City are expected to stay with or to look up and spend some time with an Aunt Sophie or a Cousin Abe or some friend-called-cousin. Wherever they go in the South, particularly the old Jews whose roots in the South are so deep, they almost never really leave the family. Thus, not only do there appear to be two communities in town after town, but this phenomenon is extended beyond to create a *dual Southern Jewish society*.

Besides family ties beyond Iron City, there are certain institutions that have helped maintain a dual Southern Jewish society. For example, such annual events as the Falcon Picnic in Montgomery, the Jubilee in Birmingham, and other events of the same sort in Atlanta and New Orleans were supported precisely for the purpose of having nice boy meet nice girl, usually by arrangement among families of old Jews. These were most often intensive four-day affairs over the Fourth of July, Labour Day and other holiday weekends. And gala and elaborate affairs they were, with tea dances, formal dances, garden parties, and the like, involving the country club (of the old Jews) and the finest Jewish houses. For many of the new Jews—but far from all of them—the elaborate Bar Mitzvah has performed the same function.

That the annual 'picnic' has declined in importance is probably due to the more efficient functioning of the college fraternity through which the two communities maintain and extend their separateness. Zeta Beta Tau and Phi Epsilon Pi were always sought after and pledged by sons of the old Jews from Houston to Savannah. It is significant that these two fraternities are rarely found on the same Southern campus competing for the same types of boys. Note on the chart that among States of the Confederacy there has been only one campus where chapters of both fraternities co-existed, and Phi Epsilon Pi abandoned that campus in 1958. (It had probably been on the decline for some years before 1958.) It is only in the Border States that the specialization of campuses does not appear. (Note that even in the case of Florida, the fraternities co-exist only on the northernized campus. At the University of Florida, in the northern, therefore 'southernmost', campus, only one of the fraternities has a chapter.) The trustees of both fraternities are from similar backgrounds and, apparently, have had no will to compete for the same types of boys, much less the incentive to recruit *all* Jewish students on the campus.

There is another order of fraternities for the sons of new Jews. These have been, among others, Tau Epsilon Phi and Alpha Epsilon Pi, houses for the new Jews and what was in times past referred to by sons of the old Jews as the 'new money' or the just plain 'kike Yankees'. Perhaps in the middle somewhere one finds an occasional Sigma Alpha Mu or Pi Lambda Phi chapter with some 'nice Southern boys and the better class of Yankees'. Friendship and dating patterns as well as prejudices towards the 'others' are passed along these channels. Girls tend to be known as and identify as 'ZBT' girls or 'TEP' girls. (Similar distinctions can be found among Jewish fraternities on Northern campuses, but, in the guise of animosity toward New York, the distinction has a much stronger flavour of Western versus Eastern European ancestry.) Admittedly the system was never rigidly adhered to, but the differences are sufficiently distinct to contribute to the maintenance of the dual society and the two communities.

Zeta Beta Tau and Phi Epsilon Pi Fraternities: Specialization among Southern Campuses

States of the Old Confederacy				*Border States*			
State	*Campus*	*Zeta Beta Tau*	*Phi Epsilon Pi*	*State*	*Campus*	*Zeta Beta Tau*	*Phi Epsilon Pi*
Alabama	U. of Ala.	1916	—	Florida	U. of Fla.	—	1960
	Auburn	—	1916		Miami U.	1946	1929
Arkansas	U. of Ark.	—	1932[1]	Maryland	U. of Md.	1948	1959 or 1960
Georgia	U. of Ga.	—	1915				
	Ga. Tech.	—	1916		Johns Hopkins	1958	1920
Kentucky	U. of Ky.	1942	—	Texas	Houston	—	1956
Louisiana	Tulane	1909	—	Virginia	U. of Va.	1915	1915
	LSU	1911	1933[2]		W. and L.	1920	1920
Mississippi	U. of Miss.	—	1935				
North Carolina	U. of N.C.	1927	—				
	N.C. State	—	1949				
	Duke	1935	—				
South Carolina	U. of S.C.	—	1928				
Tennessee	U. of Tenn.	1942	—				
	Memphis St.	—	1949				
	Vanderbilt	1918	—				

[1] Discontinued 1941. [2] Discontinued 1958.

TWO IDEOLOGIES

The Jews of Iron City are politically unimportant. They do not live in one part of town, they do not constitute a majority in any district, and they are not thought of politically as a distinguishable unit. No individual Jew speaks politically as a Jew, and there is no single—or double—voice for Iron City Jews as a group. And there is no sign of change. To illustrate the point, practically all Jewish sons and daughters (old and new) of Iron City go to college, *but in a generation not a single one has studied for the law.* In fact, there are no Jewish lawyers at all in Iron City; the one Jewish holder of the LL.B. is an 'import' who by marriage is owner of the *second* largest retail clothing store in town. A check in several other small towns in the area revealed that an occasional Jew does go to law school, but his practice is found to be in Birmingham, Atlanta, or some other large metropolitan centre. The Jews of Iron City have thus avoided the one profession which typically becomes charged with controversy—not only political controversy but controversy over estates, divorces, and the like that can be so noticeable and divisive in small towns. No Jews have ever sought or held public office in Iron City or beyond, and it is rare to find Jews publicly committed to a candidate in a wide-open election. Candidates seek their support, and they are often contributors to campaigns, but quietly.

The Jews of Iron City are politically silent. Many hold strong opinions, and many enjoy positions of informal opinion leadership without

regard to religious affiliation. But they are silent. And for much the same reasons they are conservative. Iron City is a 'redneck town'. A large part of its population, attracted by jobs in the textile, steel, and rubber mills, migrated completely unequipped from nearby farms not more than thirty years ago. Local prohibition and a hundred neon-crossed tabernacles bear witness to their fundamentalist majority. As they are virtually all merchants, the Jews of Iron City are especially susceptible to reprisal by informal conspiracy, and they justifiably fear the unpopular view. But the same would be true of the Christian with liberal tendencies.

If all the Jews of Iron City displayed considerable anxiety about politics and open controversy, it would still be too easy to overdramatize the 'dilemma of the Southern Jew'. Practically all Jews in Iron City are publicly conservative, but easily a majority are privately conservative as well. Thus, it is difficult to gather firm evidence for assessing the differences in ideology between the two communities that both reflect and maintain the spirit of two communities. The old Jews probably enjoy higher status in the social structure of Iron City proper, but there are no gross economic disparities between old and new Jews that would invite jealousy and continuous conflict. More important, the manifest values of Jews, as suggested above, are homogenized under the pressure of Southern consensus on the most important political and social issue of all. One must, then, look for differences in propensities and predispositions, the distributions of which are always matters of scholarly controversy. With these problems in mind, let us look at some rough indices of difference.

On matters of partisan politics, the Jews of Iron City reflect the Southern tradition. Almost all of them are Democrats, and both communities are predominantly liberal on economic questions. Further in harmony with recent Southern trends is a growing Republican sentiment among the younger fathers, particularly in old Jewish families. The development was cut short in 1962 because the entire Jewish community of Iron City was repelled by a Republican state-wide candidate of that year. This home-grown product had paid the bail for the juvenile bomber of Iron City's own synagogue in 1960, and his campaign was intensely racist. Less rabid Republican candidacies in the future could, however, restore the trend among many of the young educated old Jews.

The best indices of contrasting ideology, however, can be found in the rare instances of conflict among Jews themselves. Probably the only such conflicts before the 1958 reward-fund debate were those over Zionism from time to time before and during the struggle for Israel. Internal cleavage then was the same as in 1958 and for precisely the same reason: all of these controversies involved the question of the nature and meaning of identification with Judaism. Even more than the

reward-fund contribution, Zionism *would define the Jew by his ethnicity.* To support a Jewish homeland or to react with uncommon sympathy to a remote synagogue bombing is virtually to expose the fact (or, to the old Jew, *create the spectacle*) of the Jew as somehow separate from home town and local traditions. Deep in the idiom of the intelligent old Jew is the distinction 'Judaism is a religion, not a nationality'. Zionism has become a dead issue with the founding and success of Israel. But the meaning of Judaism, or Jewishness, still divides. Perhaps here is the whole mystery of the two communities in a nutshell. Certainly it shapes ideology, propensity, and predisposition.

As all of this should suggest, the new Jew reveals the greater capacity to identify with Judaism as such, to define himself as 'minority' and to generalize, however incompletely, about 'minority'. As a consequence, the new Jew has the more liberal tendencies on a variety of issues. On the question of segregation the political sentiments of the two communities differ, although again it would be too easy to overdramatize and misrepresent it. Since the passing of Zionism, it is here that the old Jew most willingly shows his hierarchy of identifications, as Southerner first, Jew second, and 'minority' or 'ethnic group' last (if such a concession is made at all). Typically, the new Jew can be pushed to concede the inevitability of desegregation; the old Jew can only be pushed to anger. Not a man on either side would join or otherwise condone a White Citizens Council (knowingly referred to as the 'Klan in the Gray Flannel Suit'). But an old Jew, regardless of age, will use the rhetoric of states' rights, of Plessy v. Ferguson, and, if pushed, of race superiority and biblical sanction. The new Jew will not. The old Jew either bears no sense of guilt on the matter, or he deeply represses it. The new Jew is distinguished by a concern with and an only poorly repressed sense of guilt about Negro problems. The old Jews will make the inevitable adjustment to integration more easily and more quickly than their white Christian brethren, but they will verbally support segregation to the end. New Jews are less likely to give verbal support to segregation but will never openly support integration. However, private expressions of guilt or concern for an underprivileged minority serve still further to separate the two communities.

ONE IDENTIFICATION

It seems to me, therefore, that there is enough evidence to suggest the existence of two communities or subcommunities of Jews in Iron City and probably in other non-metropolitan Southern cities. Further, it appears that the phenomenon has important consequences in ideology or predisposition which, in turn, support the dual structure. Impressions suggest further differences in customs, aspirations, and general life-style, but to elaborate them would call for more systematic study.

However, it must be added immediately that there is at least as much to suggest that above and beyond the two communities is a set of identifications strongly held and shared by all. Factors in this phenomenon are as significant for theories of value maintenance and minority adjustment as was the earlier section for theories of American Jewry. What is significant is not that the new Jews maintain certain identifications but that the old Jews do as well. It is for this reason that the present section emphasizes most particularly the patterns of identification among the old Jews.

If the reward-fund debate or any related indices were interpreted as a case of strong versus weak identification, it would be totally misrepresented. New Jews may favour more strongly the teaching of Hebrew, the observance of a larger number of holidays annually, the contribution to the Birmingham reward-fund. They may have a slightly better record of attendance at Friday night services. They definitely appreciate Yiddish and old country humour more than the old Jews. But much vital evidence suggests that old and new Jews differ only slightly, if at all, in strength of identification. The difference between them—and the crux of the argument of the last section—*lies in what the identification means*. The one is no less a Jew than the other.

That there is great strength of identification in both communities can be seen clearly in marital and related patterns. There are more marriages outside the faith among old Jewish families, but the greater significance lies in their rarity and in the reaction of old Jewish heads of family to such marriages. While one seldom finds any concerted opposition by old or new Jewish parents to a mixed marriage of son or daughter, both communities seem to require some later act of identification—for example, sending the children to Sunday school. (Rarely does one find Saturday schools in non-metropolitan Southern cities.) Old Jews as well as new are capable of 'losing touch' with youngsters who prefer a Unitarian or Episcopal life, and, at the risk of overemphasis, strong if unspoken hostility can be permanent. No members of either community ever seem to forget who the Jews are no matter how long ago the conversion took place. There is at least one instance in which the third generation descended from a converted and inter-married old Jew were still regarded as Jews although few if any Gentiles were aware of the ancestry. In two other cases, Jewish men married Christian girls and allowed their children to be brought up as Christians. On High Holidays one of them comes alone to services, sits alone, and leaves alone. Both have had cordial business relations with other Jews; one, in fact, could not have started his business in Iron City without the substantial support of an old Jewish merchant. But neither was ever truly a friend of any other Iron City Jew.

There is a real workaday permissiveness in the Iron City majority toward white religious minorities. The fundamentalism of the lower

class Christian sects is convertible into antisemitism, and theologically there is little tolerance among them for the Jews' not accepting the Gospel. Yet few local Jews can recall any overt expression of community antisemitism in Iron City. This is why the 1960 bombing attempt on the Iron City synagogue came as such a shock, especially among the younger generation of old Jews to whom antisemitism as well as dietary laws and observances was something in history books. Yet the old Jews are no less Jews. Iron City and other Southern cities are receptive to conversion, and there are sufficient examples of acceptance as a non-Jew to encourage conversion. This only emphasizes how rare indeed are instances of old (and certainly new) Jews discarding their identification. The arm's length at which old Jews hold new Jews is not a rejection of Judaism or Jewishness. To cite an extreme example, there is one very small town in Mississippi where, although there is only a single Jewish family (dating back into the mid-nineteenth century), there is a small synagogue which has been used for the High Holidays, weddings, and funerals. In the past a rabbinical student or young rabbi was imported for these occasions, and they were attended by the few other Jewish families from nearby smaller towns and the open country. Even here the one conversion, now over a generation past, is remembered; figuratively there remains a sign upon the doorpost of the Christianized descendants.

Old Jews are on the average more active and prominent in the noncontroversial civic and philanthropic affairs of Iron City, but this is merely a function of their greater average length of residence. Furthermore, the fact of their Jewish identification is never hidden; old Jews do not use the civic group as a channel of assimilation (in the pejorative sense). And, while old Jews exchange house calls with Christian families more frequently than do the new Jews, neither is this assimilative (in the pejorative sense) if the Christian families know them as Jews. If the old Jew is free to assimilate, he chooses not to do so, or else the possibility never occurs to him. Liberal Christians more readily accept Judaism as a religion that can be changed than do the old Jews themselves.

CONCLUSIONS

Southern Jewry is a special phenomenon both in the particular context of American Jewry and the general context of group relations. The old Jews are cut off from the mainstreams of Jewish culture by more than two generations. They live in relatively small numbers dispersed throughout city and open country in a social milieu which is hostile to Judaism but not to Jews or to conversion. And they are deprived through isolation, disuse and, in many cases, rejection of all but the most superficial of the rituals and ceremonies. Yet the old Jew maintains much of his Jewishness and his Jewish identification.

Here we have a situation of strong identification in the absence of many of those factors presumably necessary to its maintenance. Most conspicuous and interesting in its absence is ritual—the repetition of symbolic acts. The proposition, a negative one, that most immediately springs to mind is that *ritual functions as a value- or identification-maintaining force only where it has functioned in that manner for some time.* In fact, ritual may be important for value maintenance only where treatment of the minority is severe.

Identification can obviously be maintained and reinforced in many ways. Ritual is an institutional force usually attached to a church as a manifest function of a church. The fact that ritual and church have not constituted an important reinforcement for old Jews in Iron City suggests, then, a second proposition: *where the reinforcement of identification is institutionalized or is otherwise made a manifest function of some structure, group identification may come to depend upon the institution.* Since no such pattern of reinforcement is found in this particular case and identification remains strong, we must look to other, informal or latent factors. In the case of the old Jews, the family seems to be the reinforcing factor. Commitments among old Jews to 'being different' were made when their ancestors were newcomers in the nineteenth century and were passed down as part of the family structure. In many respects, the function of family among old Jews is probably not dissimilar from that of the ancient Jewish family before the latent function of family was replaced by the manifest function of synagogue and ritual. This latent function of the old Southern Jewish family, the maintenance of identification, is probably also one of the underlying conditions of its solidarity. Institutions, from churches to big city machines and trade unions, gain solidarity as they add functions, and conversely.

The identification of Southern old Jews turns out in reality to be an ethnic rather than a religious experience. Old Jews display virtually every feature of ethnicity save its acceptance. Ironically, the old Jew is a living refutation of his own argument that 'Judaism is a religion, not a nationality'. Religion is quite superficial to him, but Jewry is not.

The phenomenon of the two communities is the more significant because it does not arise out of rejection of Jewry or Jewishness by the old Jews. In fact, the debate and all of the related materials present a fairly clear picture of a social system characterized at one and the same time by *strong identification and low solidarity.* The differences arise over what the identification means; the difference between old and new Jews lies not in the direction or focus of the identification but in the *substance* of the identification. The general proposition suggested by this is that *identification and solidarity (or cohesion) are independent factors which may be closely related under some conditions and entirely unrelated under others.*

It is commonly assumed in political sociology that the cohesion of

groups is based upon shared attitudes and common goals. Professor David B. Truman, for one, has gone so far as to define *group* as a bundle of shared attitudes.[4] Karl Mannheim in *Ideology and Utopia* hypothesizes that as groups lose homogeneity they also lose solidarity, which gives rise to more vigorous theorizing towards the rediscovery of common goals.[5] Certainly there are many cases to support these hypotheses, but there are also many contradictory cases. The best type of case is the group based upon 'log-rolling' relations. Here the members have absolutely nothing in common; in fact, the very basis of their solidarity is the dissimilarity of ultimate aims (identification). The 'farm bloc' in the United States, highly cohesive in the 1920s and 1930s, was essentially a series of corn-cotton-wheat 'log rolls'. The Southern Democratic-Conservative Republican coalition is an even better example of strong solidarity made possible by the fact that the Southerners have cared little about the economic aims of the mid-West and the mid-West has cared little about the social aims of the South. In contrast, many groups based upon shared attitudes or identifications display real pathologies in organization. This was clearly true of the Jews of Iron City.

An awareness of the different consequences of identification and variations in the bases of group formation opens up many new avenues of theory about group life and group solidarity. It also opens up new possibilities for refining the predictors of public opinion. For, while group membership and identification are functionally related to opinions, the connexion is not nearly so simple or straightforward as opinion studies have assumed. When ethnic group or trade union members are found to be concentrated 70 per cent or 80 per cent on one side of an issue, many important questions are avoided by stressing only the dominant characteristic. The 20 per cent or 30 per cent 'deviant' cases may or may not be 'cross-pressured'; they may be reading the symbols of identification differently.

EPILOGUE

About two years after the Birmingham attack, the synagogue in Iron City was victim of a bombing attempt. It was a spectacular attempt. For the first time, the attack occurred while Friday night services were taking place. Moreover, it was a dedication service for the new wing. The Mayor, the City Commission, many Protestant ministers, and Christian friends were in attendance. After the bombing attempt failed the young madman stood across the street and besieged the place with an automatic rifle before driving away. The younger Kahn and one of the old Jews were shot as they ran out enraged to respond. The injured old Jew, speaking afterwards for the entire congregation, insisted that there be no pictures, no wide press coverage ('Magazine interference has already done the South enough harm') and, once the bomber was

captured, no special grand jury. The arguments of the Kahn brothers had been fully vindicated in the attack, and the entire Jewish community suddenly became aware of its unity. But four years later, the two communities remain.

NOTES

[1] Peter I. Rose, 'Small-Town Jews and their Neighbours in the United States', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III, No. 2, December 1962. My thanks to Professors Nelson W. Polsby, E. H. Mizruchi, L. A. Froman and Lieut. Bertram H. Lowi, USN, for careful reading and criticism of earlier drafts.

[2] Ibid., p. 1.

[3] The names of the town and the participants in the case have been changed to avoid embarrassing my friends on both sides of the issue. Otherwise the events and data are as accurate as possible.

[4] *The Governmental Process*, New York, 1951, p. 24 and Chapter 2.

[5] New York, 1955, p. 131.

A REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN JEWISH COMMUNITIES TODAY AND SOME QUESTIONS FOR TOMORROW*

Morris Ginsberg

I

I SHOULD like to begin by expressing my deep appreciation of the honour you have done me by inviting me to address you. I must confess that the invitation greatly surprised me. I have no personal or first-hand knowledge of the Jewish communities in continental Europe and I felt very doubtful whether I could usefully undertake the task of addressing a body such as this, consisting as it does of leading individuals actively engaged in dealing with the problems confronting these communities, and far more capable than I can possibly hope to be of reviewing their present situation or their hopes for the future.

However, though with misgiving, I did accept your invitation. My main reason for doing so was that twice on previous occasions I attempted to give a broad review of the situation of the Jewish people, namely, in a lecture I gave at the London School of Economics in 1942[1] and in the Barou Lecture I gave for the World Jewish Congress in 1956.[2] I felt that these earlier reports would provide me with a basis for comparison and perhaps enable me to offer some suggestions towards an analysis of the present situation.

Before entering on this analysis I should like at the outset to say that the impression I have gathered by comparing the picture of Western Jewry as seen by observers in the early fifties with the picture today is that European Jews have proved far more resilient and resourceful than was generally expected, even though they would not have been able to achieve as much as they have done without aid from outside. The extent of this aid is impressive and beyond all praise. In his unpublished report presented to the Assembly in 1962 Mr. Jordan drew an analogy between the part played by the Marshall Plan in the recovery of Europe generally and the help given to European Jews by such bodies

* Opening Address to the Fourth Annual Assembly of the Standing Conference of European Jewish Community Services, Geneva, 4 Nov., 1963.

as the A.J.D.C. and the Claims Conference, and he gave it as his opinion that, like the European countries in general, the European Jewish communities had reached a point where they are much better able to stand on their own feet. He went on to bring out some of the implications of this state of affairs for the future policy of the A.J.D.C. and for that of the European communities, bearing in mind the urgent need for help in areas outside Western Europe. On this I will express no opinion, but it is clear from the way in which his remarks were received by the Assembly that Western European Jews have by now sufficiently recovered to be able not only to help themselves but also to help others. The vitality of the Jewries of Western Europe is further evidenced by the coming into being of the Standing Conference and by the widely representative character it is rapidly assuming.

In turning to my main theme, I should like to refer briefly to my earlier surveys. In 1942 I dealt mainly with the situation in Soviet Russia, in the countries I labelled 'étatiste', in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and in Nazi Germany. In Soviet Russia the revolutionary transformation of the entire social and economic structure had resulted by 1940 in a vast displacement of the Jews, both economic and local, on a scale hitherto unparalleled. In Germany the Nazis were steadily pursuing their policy of physical extermination. In Poland and other 'étatiste' countries the view was gaining ground before the war that the Jewish problem could only be solved by eliminating Jews from the positions they had for long been holding in commerce, the handicrafts, and the liberal professions. By 1942 it was clear that whatever the outcome of the war, those Jews who survived the Nazi policy of extermination could not hope for an automatic restoration of anything like their former position.

In my second lecture I attempted to review the situation as reported by observers ten years after the war. As far as Soviet Russia is concerned it was clear that the earlier hopes that the Jews might benefit from the general policy of allowing a measure of independence to national or cultural minorities were not to be fulfilled. Distinctively Jewish cultural activities and institutions were disappearing, though it was not clear to what extent the decay was due to excessive zeal on the part of the Jewish communists, to general lack of interest or apathy on the part of the new generation, or to high policy from above.

In the satellite countries much the same pattern could be discerned everywhere. The old institutions lay in ruins and those who tried to bring them back to life had to face the vagaries of Communist policy and the feeling of insecurity and apathy of the survivors. The larger communities had been almost completely destroyed, with the exception of Rumania and Hungary where considerable numbers remained. In all cases the remnants were cut off from the mainstream of Jewish life.

In Germany the survey made by the Federal Government in 1955

showed that at that time 27,000 Jews lived in Germany and that of these 18,000 were of German origin and the rest displaced persons from Eastern Europe. The survivors were making strenuous efforts to build up new institutions, but the small size of the communities and the age structure made observers doubt whether the Jewish communities would prove viable. In Austria the outlook was no brighter.

In Holland the demographic survey made in 1954 gives a Jewish population of 27,000 (as compared with about 140,000 in 1942). By 1955 the general impression was that the Jewish communities in Holland had shown great ability in reorganizing their institutions along modern lines and that there was a lively interest in the revival of Judaism and of the Jewish people.

In Belgium the Jewish population in 1955 was probably about 30,000 compared with a pre-war figure variously estimated as 65,000–90,000. The process of rehabilitation met with great difficulties, but by 1952 the situation had greatly improved and there was less dependence on outside aid. Observers noted an intense and active Jewish life, not to be measured by the numbers affiliated to synagogues. As in Holland, the influence of Israel was making itself felt in the sphere of education and more generally in keeping alive the sense of Jewish solidarity.

In France and in Italy the losses in population had not been so great as elsewhere, and by 1955 the communal situation had been largely restored. In both countries, however, observers noted a strengthening of the old forces making for assimilation particularly in the younger age-groups.

II

Coming now to the situation at present, we must begin by noting the following facts:

(1) The proportion of European Jews in the total Jewish population has been reduced from about a percentage of 58 in 1939 to some 30 today, or in absolute figures from 9·5 million to about 4 million. The figures for Europe would have been lower were it not for the recent influx into France of Jews from North Africa.[3]

(2) Of the four million estimated as living in Europe, about two and a half million are in the Soviet Union. The objective conditions as shaped by the dominant policy and more particularly the absence of facilities for Jewish education make survival or revival increasingly difficult. There are signs that the attitude of Jewish intellectuals towards the problem of Jewish identity is undergoing a change, but we have no reliable means of ascertaining how widespread or effective this change is, or whether in the younger generation generally there is an active desire for the survival of Russian Jewry as a distinctive community.[4]

(3) Large-scale movements of European Jews overseas have by now

almost ceased. In some of the satellite countries the numbers have been reduced to those who for one reason or another have decided to stay on. The two largest aggregations are in Hungary where there is an estimated Jewish population of about 75,000 to 80,000 as compared with 400,000 in 1933, and Rumania with an estimated population in 1962 of about 150,000 to 160,000 as compared with 850,000 in 1933. Probably, if restrictions were removed emigration to Israel and elsewhere would be resumed in varying measure from these countries.

(4) In Western Europe the two largest aggregations are in Great Britain and France. The Jewish population in Great Britain is approximately 450,000, including some 60,000 who came from Central Europe impelled by Nazi persecution. In France there are now about 500,000 Jews, including those who came recently from North Africa and from Egypt and Eastern Europe. What happens to these communities is of importance not only to themselves but to the rest of Jewry owing to the significant part they have played and continue to play in the field of international Jewish relations.

(5) This brings me to a point of fundamental importance. In considering particular Jewish communities we must not forget the essential unity of the Jewish people. This unity is due not only to the fact that Jews in different parts of the world are aware of each other and have a sense of solidarity, but to the objective interdependence of the different communities which does not depend entirely on their own volition. I like to think in this connexion of the image used by Condorcet in describing the development of mankind. He adopted the 'happy artifice', as Comte calls it, of treating the successive peoples who pass on the torch as if they were a single people running the race. The image seems to me more appropriate in its application to the Jewish people. For in the course of centuries different centres have arisen which for a time played a predominant role and then passed on the leadership to others. Thus, as Dubnow has shown, from the eleventh to the fourteenth century the Jews in Arab and Christian Spain were in the lead. At the same time the Jews in Southern and later Northern France grew in influence (thirteenth–fifteenth century). Coming to more modern times, Germany and Poland shared the leadership in the sixteenth–eighteenth century. Then at the end of the eighteenth century under the impact of the enlightenment two new centres arose, Germany in the West and Russian Jewry in the East. In more recent times two more centres of immense vitality and importance have arisen, American Jewry and Israel.

In assessing the present situation and future prospects of European Jewry it is necessary to consider the nature of the influence exerted by the three centres last mentioned. First, there can be no doubt that during the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century the eastern wing of the Jewish people was the main source of Jewish

creativeness and vitality. But the circumstances in which Jewish culture developed in these areas were peculiar. In Czarist Russia the Jews lived on the whole in areas which, though under the political domination of the Russians, were not Russian in culture, e.g. Poland, Lithuania, and White Russia. From Great Russia the Jews were excluded and thus deprived of any widespread contact with the politically dominant power. On the other hand, the culture of the other subject populations was not on the whole likely to attract the Jews and appears to have had little influence on them. Furthermore, in areas of mixed nationalities the various cultures struggled with and weakened each other. In short, the divorce of culture and political power, the conflict of cultures in the areas of Jewish settlement and the conditions of economic life favoured and indeed necessitated a self-contained Jewish life. In these centres there developed a distinctive Jewish culture of astonishing energy and vitality. We have it on the authority of Professor Baron that 'On balance future historians are likely to call the first third of the twentieth century the golden age of Ashkenazi Jews in Europe.' [5] The conditions in which this culture arose are not likely to be repeated anywhere else. In any event, the communities in which it flourished have been destroyed by the Nazi massacres, the transformations due to the Russian Revolution, and the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As far as the rest of the world is concerned, this source of recruitment is for the time being exhausted. On the other hand, the extensive migrations before the war and the resettlement of millions that have survived the Nazi holocaust have produced two new centres, namely, those of North America and of Israel. What we have now to consider is their impact on the European Diaspora.

As far as Israel is concerned it has of course itself to solve the problem of welding together immigrants derived from all parts of the world and from communities differing widely in cultural level. How far this can be done by discovering and developing the elements common to them all, or whether in the process one or the other of the types of Jewish culture will gain predominance and what form the emerging culture will take, no one can yet foresee. Meanwhile, the influence of Israel on Diaspora Jewry is already clearly to be discerned. This influence is important mainly, as it seems to me, in two ways. First of all, the astonishing revival of Hebrew as a spoken tongue is beginning to transform the character of Jewish education in the Diaspora, and if this continues it will give new vitality to the ideal of Israel as the spiritual centre of the whole Jewish people. Second, the Zionist movement and the remarkable achievements of Israel, culturally, politically and economically, has led to a revival of interest in Jewish history and culture not confined to, and often independent of, interest in Judaism as a religion. This is of the greatest significance for those Jews who have only slight or no connexions with religious institutions and to whom

religion as such makes no appeal. This impact of Israel together with the heart-searching produced by the Nazi calamities has brought back to the fold many of the younger generation who otherwise would have yielded to the forces making for assimilation.

As to American Jewry, I need not, in speaking to this conference, dwell long on the part it played in the work of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Consider the share of American Jewish organizations in the transportation to Israel of about half a million Jews in the period from 1945 to 1953; the enormous sums they contributed to the work of relief and the reconstruction of religious and cultural institutions not only in Europe but in Moslem countries, the skill and energy which they have shown in helping the devastated communities to start life again and to provide a solid framework for further development. It is not too much to say that without this prompt and massive aid in money and personnel many of the Jewish communities in continental Europe would not have been reconstituted or would have remained in a state of disorganization so long that not much would have been left to save.

That all this was possible points to the existence of a reservoir of energy and vitality in American Jewry which is of great significance for world Jewry as a whole. This impression is strengthened by the revival of Jewish studies in America and the important and lively discussion of the problems relating to Jewish education. If much of this is due to the inspiration of recent European or European-trained immigrants, it nevertheless has a vitality and momentum of its own and may, in turn, exert important influence on the institutional and cultural development of European Jewry.

In considering the various Jewish communities in continental Europe the classification I adopted in my earlier reports is no longer appropriate. The main division is between communities in Communist areas and those in non-Communist ones, and into those that had suffered crippling losses of population and those in which substantial numbers remained. In Communist areas Jewish survival depends mainly on the outcome of two fundamental changes in the general situation. The first is the break-up of the old established institutions, the need to begin anew under completely altered conditions and the change in the economic position of the Jews which formerly acted as a separating or isolating factor. The second is the persistent attacks on religious beliefs and institutions and the rise of what in many ways is a new religion which for the first time may serve to unite Jews with others rather than keep them apart. Whether Communism is properly described as a religion or not, it resembles other religions in that it has a mythology, a ritual and, unfortunately, a claim that apart from it there is no salvation. In these circumstances, the question arises whether, particularly in the case of the numerically small communities, the Jews can withstand the forces making for absorption and assimilation. In different

forms these are the difficulties which the Jewries in Soviet Russia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have to face. Are there any possibilities of a revival of religion, or can appeal be made to other spiritual forces strong enough to sustain a distinctively Jewish way of life?

In Western Jewish communities essentially similar problems arise though in different forms. There too economic changes and particularly the growth of the 'middle classes', especially the numbers engaged in administration, distribution, and the technical services, have tended to break down or greatly reduce the peculiarities of Jewish occupational stratification. In Western societies too the question arises, though not so acutely as in the Communist society, whether the Jews can survive as a distinctive cultural community, and not merely as a religious community, in face of the forces making for assimilation. Can there, in short, be a distinctive Jewish culture in these areas and what precisely is its content? To what extent are the Jewish cultural and social institutions dependent upon or, as some would say, 'parasitic' upon religious institutions, and can they survive the increasing secularization of life?

III

In dealing with these problems as they arise in different communities account would have to be taken of the following factors:

(1) Size of the Jewish population, age and sex distribution, fertility and mortality.
(2) Local distribution, particularly concentration in large urban centres or tendencies towards dispersal.
(3) Occupational stratification.
(4) The composition of the community as shaped by emigration and immigration in different periods.
(5) Level of the environing culture and the extent of cultural pluralism in both the non-Jewish and Jewish populations.

Information on all these points is very incomplete and the evaluation of what there is presents great difficulties. Here I have to confine myself to a brief review of a few communities to illustrate this method of approach. To this end I have selected Germany and Belgium from among the smaller communities and France from the larger ones.

(*a*) *Germany.* The total population is now 25,000. About two-thirds are in the larger towns and there are only eight communities containing more than 500 members. The rest are widely dispersed mostly in communities of 500 to 30 members. Broadly, the German Jewish community contains three strata: firstly, Jews who before the Hitler calamities were highly 'Germanized'; secondly, German Jews who, having left Germany, have come back; and thirdly, a portion which consists of former

displaced persons of Eastern European origin. The communities that have been reconstituted are new formations not really continuous with the older Jewish communities as they had developed in the course of several centuries. The leaders of the German Jews feel that these diverse elements should be welded into one community irrespective of differences of origin and they are making strenuous efforts towards this end. But what is to be the basis of unity? True, they are still united by the memories of their common suffering under the Nazis. But this is hardly an enduring factor. The old designation *deutsche Staatsbuerger juedischen Glaubens* is clearly inappropriate, since it seems that more than a third of the Jews in Germany are not German citizens. They are in short not German Jews but Jews in Germany. There is a feeling, sharpened during the Nazi period, which still survives that Jews are different from or other than Germans. In the view of the *Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland* the Jewish population is likely to decline owing to the low birth-rate and the large proportion of the aged. Further immigration is not now expected. These facts taken together with the high proportion of mixed marriages augur ill for the biological viability of the Jews in Germany. Can religion serve as a uniting factor? There are obstacles due to internal divisions. The majority in whose lives religion still plays a part are 'liberal minded'. The Rabbis on the other hand are, with few exceptions, conservative. Here is a source of divergence of particular importance in its bearing on the younger generation. The *Zentralrat* refer in this connexion to the great importance of assuring an adequate supply of trained teachers and they mention the effort they are making to co-ordinate the work of teachers in the light of a common programme and common principles. It is clear that the Jews in Germany are aware of the dangers of disintegration, and in this there is an element of hope which may yet disprove the gloomy prognostications based on statistical calculations of biological viability.[6]

(*b*) In *Belgium* the importance of the factors I have enumerated as relevant to survival is clearly to be discerned. The Jewish population is estimated as 35,000–40,000 and is concentrated mainly in Brussels and Antwerp. The composition of the population is complex. The older families who originally came from the Netherlands, France, Hungary, and Germany have all but disappeared. The vast majority derive from the East European migration after 1880 and more recently from Germany. The age distribution shows the characteristics found in other communities devastated by the Nazis and by migration, the proportion of the aged being higher and that of the younger generation lower than in the general population. As to occupational stratification, the majority of Jews in Antwerp are still engaged in the industry and commerce of diamonds; while in Brussels occupations are more diversified and the peculiarities of the Jewish economic structure not so marked. There are striking differences between the Jewish communities in Antwerp and

Brussels. The percentage of affiliation with synagogues is 54 in the former and 18 in Brussels. The proportion of children receiving Jewish instruction is nearly 80 per cent in Antwerp as compared with about 22·6 in Brussels and 34 per cent for the whole of Belgium. Mixed marriages are said to be common in Brussels, but almost unknown in Antwerp. It would be interesting to inquire what effects the linguistic and cultural divisions in Belgium have upon the forces making for assimilation as compared, say, with the impact of the more unitary French culture on the Jews in France. Is what has been called 'a third generation' coming into being which takes its Jewishness for granted and is free alike from the excessive self-effacement or the exaggerated self-assertion characteristic of groups unsure of themselves? In any event, observers of Belgian Jewry all agree that there is an intense and active Jewish life and that strenuous efforts are being made to assure greater cohesion within and between the various communities. Here as elsewhere it is difficult to estimate the relative strength of the religious factor as compared with that due to the broader cultural influence of Zionism and the creation of the State of Israel. In an article in *L'Arche*, March 1962, Mr. Joseph Lehrer concludes his interesting analysis with the question 'Who and What are the Belgian Jews? Is there such a thing as Belgian Judaism?' He leaves the question open, but his own account points to many signs of growth and development.

(*c*) *France.* As I have already mentioned, the number of Jews living in France in 1955 was about 300,000 compared with about 320,000 in 1940. M. Georges Levitte, writing in 1960,[7] gave it as his opinion that though the Second World War had changed the geographical distribution, the relative proportion of the different origin groups remained largely the same apart from the influx of some 40,000 Jews from North Africa. This seems to require further investigation. Since about one-third of the pre-war population were annihilated by the Germans, the gap must have been filled by immigrants and probably only to a small extent by natural increase. It is worth noting that in contrast with what happened in Britain, the post-war immigrants to France were mostly of East European origin. In any event the demographic situation has by now been transformed by the arrival of large numbers from Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, and to a smaller extent from Hungary and Egypt. The total Jewish population is now estimated to be 500,000 and is thus larger than the estimated Jewish population in Britain. The largest communities are still in the Paris region but there are several large aggregations in other areas, and in the Midi communities which had disappeared are now coming to life again. Some 30,000 however seem to live in widely scattered small communities.

On the economic side the widening of the range of occupations continues. The younger generations are turning increasingly not only to

the liberal professions but also to technical and administrative positions in the new industries. The drift is thus towards the middle classes and away from the working classes, though, of course, the North African influx has brought in a new working-class element. According to Rabi 61 per cent of them are workers and 28 per cent employees.[8]

Demographically therefore French Jewry faces a new situation. The hope has been expressed that the newcomers will give French Jewry a fresh opportunity for spiritual revival. Thus in his address as President of the F.S.J.U. in 1960, M. Guy de Rothschild urged French Jews to come to the aid of the refugees, 'D'abord et peut-être avant tout parce que les réfugiés sont le renouvellement du judaïsme français.' M. Robert Sommer is quoted as having expressed a similar opinion: 'Les Juifs d'Afrique constituent pour le judaïsme français sa *dernière chance*. Il ne viendra, hélas, plus personne de Varsovie ou de Salonique.' [9]

It will be noted that there is a lack of assurance in the expression of these hopes. The hesitation is, no doubt, due to the important differences in the character of the new immigration compared with the previous waves of migration from Eastern Europe. Firstly, the East European Jews tended to concentrate in a few urban centres and economically to be confined to specific occupations. To these isolating factors must be added the language barrier, since most of them spoke Yiddish. Furthermore, they brought with them a number of active associations and a sustained interest in the rich and varied forms of Jewish culture that had developed in Eastern Europe. None of these factors is present in the recent immigration. The newcomers are more widely dispersed both locally and economically. There is no language barrier and, aside from traditional Judaism, it is doubtful whether they have the cultural vitality of the East European Jews. Everything, therefore, depends on the strength of their attachment to the forms of Judaism which they have made their own, on the possibility of a synthesis between their Judaism and that of other Jews in France, and above all on their power in the new conditions of resisting the all-pervasive forces making for cultural assimilation. Professor A. Neher, writing in *L'Arche*, August/September 1960, sees in the arrival of North African Jews the possibility of a 'spiritual and social symbiosis' of Ashkenazim and Sephardim. But it is not clear whether he is voicing a hope or describing an identifiable trend in the development of French Jewry.

On the whole, the picture of French Jewry today is far more encouraging than that given by observers of the scene in 1955. M. Rabi says he has written an 'anatomy not an autopsy'; M. Georges Levitte tells us that in his view French Jewry has largely passed out of its dismal period into a period of reconstruction. Writing in 1955 M. Arnold Mandel, analysing the organizational side of French Jewry, was rather

pessimistic. Among other disturbing factors he asserted that 'The *Consistoire* was an administrative religious body without an ideology, and that its influence was on the decline'. The situation now is very different. Though the number of its adherents is still small (about 12,000 for the whole of France, representing about 50,000 persons, according to Rabi),[10] the *Consistoire* has greatly expanded its activities, has made strenuous efforts to extend and improve religious education, to establish closer contacts with other organizations, and to welcome and integrate into French life the recent refugees from North Africa and Egypt. Furthermore, the direction is no longer confined to the older French Jewish families, though these still play a leading part in it. All this reveals a reservoir of vitality concealed from the eyes of observers in the early fifties. Additional evidence of this vitality is provided by the work of the *Fonds Social Juif Unifié* established in 1950 and greatly helped in its development by the JOINT. Though it met with difficulties at first is has now succeeded in bringing together many groups and movements and is steadily extending its activities not only in welfare work but also in the field of education and other cultural services.

In taking stock of the situation the following points are relevant. I state them with a good deal of hesitation as I have no first-hand knowledge of the conditions in France and can only give the impression I have gathered from such reports as I have been able to study.

(1) Judged by the extent of Jewish education the proportion of Jews in France taking an active interest in Judaism is small. Hardly more than 25 per cent of children of school age get even the elements of a Jewish education.

(2) In the past the tendency to cultural assimilation in France was to some extent held in check by waves of immigration from areas with a more intense form of Jewish life. As far as Eastern Europe is concerned, this source of vitality is dried up. Furthermore the evidence suggests that the Jews of Eastern European origin now yield more rapidly to the 'assimilative genius' of French culture than formerly. They tend to melt directly into French life instead of passing through the intermediate stage of identifying themselves with the French Jews. The recent Algerian immigration, as we have seen, may exercise an important religious influence, but whether their type of Judaism can be fused with other forms of religious life remains to be seen.

(3) As I have indicated above, there have been important changes in the local distribution of Jews and in their place in the economic system. The Jews still live mainly in large urban centres, but it seems that as a rule they are no longer concentrated in particular districts. Whether there are active communal centres in the new districts or suburbs as is the case in the U.S.A. and whether, where these centres exist, they can continue to exert an enduring influence on the rising generation must remain in doubt. Economically too, as we have seen, the concentration

in particular industries is not so marked as formerly and is ceasing to act as an isolating factor.

(4) On the other hand, owing to the impact of Israel and perhaps also to a widefelt need for reappraisal induced by the calamities of our age, there has been a rebirth of Jewish awareness in France. This can be seen in the efforts to improve the quality of Jewish education, and to unify the organizational framework of the communities, and above all in the growth of a 'third generation mentality' among many in the younger generation who seem no longer to feel the need of concealing their Jewish identity. The self-questioning by Jewish intellectuals tends to be expressed in the language for the time being fashionable among philosophers. An example is the recent book by Robert Mizrahi entitled *La condition réflexive de l'homme juif* which adopts methods of analysis used by existentialist philosophers. How important such efforts are depends on the importance of the philosophy with which they try to come to terms. In any event, however, they provide evidence of spiritual disquiet and an eagerness to find a reasoned basis for the belief in the unity and continuity of the Jewish people. The conceptions offered are, I fear, very hazy. But the difficulties encountered are not peculiar to Jews in France. They are common to all Jewish communities in Western countries.

IV

I will end with a few concluding remarks. European Jewry like American Jewry is anything but moribund. It is everywhere displaying an energy and resourcefulness unsuspected even a few years ago. Nevertheless it is not to be denied that the situation of Jews in the Diaspora has been fundamentally changed by the destruction or decimation of the Jewries in Eastern and Central Europe. Nothing can make up for these losses. Yet if millions have died, their contributions to Judaism have not died with them. The work of Jewish scholars in Eastern Europe, in Germany and in France is now leading to a renaissance of Judaic studies not only in Israel but in Europe and America. It has to be remembered too that it is from Eastern and Western Europe that the pioneers of Zionism were drawn and that it was the mental outlook generated there in the nineteenth and twentieth century that to a large extent shaped the social and cultural character of the Yishuv. Israel is now repaying its debt by the contribution it is making towards the revival and reconstruction of European Jewry. Its influence, as we have seen, is making itself felt in various directions. Firstly, it is intensifying the sense of interdependence among Jews all over the world. Secondly, it is encouraging the hope that Hebrew may come to serve as a common medium in uniting the Jewish communities in all countries with one another and with Israel. Thirdly, it has stimulated inquiry into the

content and purpose of a Jewish education under the conditions of modern life. It may be that the kind of synthesis of Western and Jewish culture towards which the Jews of Eastern Europe were struggling is not one that can be fruitfully pursued in the totally different conditions of Western Europe or America. But whatever new synthesis is attempted is bound to be influenced by the new forms of life emerging in Israel.

The importance of education as a key factor is widely recognized by all those engaged in the work of rehabilitation and reconstruction. In particular great stress is laid on the need to provide a Jewish education not only for children of school age but to revive the old Jewish tradition of education for adults. The reports published by the JOINT and other agencies show what has been achieved and what may reasonably be hoped for. Yet in all these accounts one cannot fail to note a persistent uneasiness. There is a similar malaise in the discussion of the aims and purposes of Jewish education in the U.S.A. It is never quite clear, we are told, what ideal is being aimed at. 'Everybody agrees', says Mr. Eugene E. Borowitz in his essay on 'The problems facing Jewish educational philosophy',[11] 'that the American Jew exemplifies a new form of Jewish living. But is there anything in American Judaism which is both authentic to the Jewish past and integrated in the American present? The absence of a consistent answer is a persistent source of guilt and apprehension among parents and educators.' Perhaps 'guilt and apprehension' are terms too strong to express the widely prevalent ambivalent attitude to Jewish education. In any event, it is clear that in Continental Europe Jewish education reaches only a small proportion, 25 per cent or less of those concerned, and that generally it does not succeed in giving much to those whom it does reach. On the religious side the problem is not confined to Jews. The churches too complain of the failure of religious instruction in schools to attain its proper objects. But in the case of Jewish education we are concerned not only with religion but also with the broader aspects of Jewish culture. The question then arises whether there can be such a thing as a specifically Jewish culture in countries of high cultural level and, if so, what is its content and by what methods can it be further developed and transmitted to future generations. Clearly the question of education cannot be discussed in a vacuum. It raises once more the problem of the relations of the various elements within the community to one another and to the wider culture of which it is a part. Above all it calls for a re-interpretation of what Judaism stands for, or ought to stand for, in the modern world.

NOTES

[1] 'The Jewish Problem', *Agenda*, Oct. 1942; reprinted in World Jewish Congress *Reports* No. 4, Feb. 1943.

[2] 'The Jewish People Today', Noah Barou Memorial Lecture, 1956.

[3] See *The Jewish Communities of the World*, 1963, Institute of Jewish Affairs, p. 5.

[4] Cf. *Jews in Eastern Europe*, Vol. II, No. I, Dec. 1962, pp. 41–50.

[5] *American Jewish Year Book*, 1962, p. 34.

[6] Cf. *Juden in Deutschland*, 1962, published by the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland, and *Ueber den Wiederaufbau der juedischen Gemeinden in Deutschland seit 1945*, 1961, by Harry Maór.

[7] 'Impressions of French Jewry Today', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, no. 2.

[8] *Anatomie du judaïsme français*, 1962, p. 315, quoting A. Moles in *L'Arche*, Oct. 1961.

[9] Rabi, p. 150.

[10] Op. cit., p. 156.

[11] *American Jewish Yearbook*, 1961, p. 150.

CHRONICLE

3,923 Jews were enumerated in the 1956 New Zealand census, the largest communities being in the provinces of Auckland and Wellington. *The Jewish Year Book*, 1964, estimates that recent immigrants from Great Britain, Holland, and Hungary have raised this number to approximately 5,000. New Zealand Jewry is eager to welcome more immigrants from Britain, and the Wellington Jewish Welfare and Relief Society has advertised in the Jewish Press of Britain, offering to sponsor British Jews who wish to settle in New Zealand.

*

Belgian law requires the unemployed to register daily, except on Sundays, to qualify for unemployment benefits. This rule obviously handicapped Sabbath observers, and, as a result of an appeal to the National Employment Office, orthodox Jews may now register on Sundays.

*

Lyons, in France, had a Jewish population of less than 10,000 before 1961. After the Algerian Declaration of Independence, 25,000 North African Jews came to the city to settle, and a Jewish primary school was established for the immigrants with financial assistance from American Jewry.

*

According to correspondents writing in *The Jewish Chronicle* of 10 January and 28 February 1964, the Jewish population of China is now reduced to a few hundred souls. In 1936 there were 13 Jewish newspapers published in the country, and the number of Jews was said to be about 50,000. Shanghai was the main centre of Jewry in China.

Since 1946 JOINT alone has helped more than 20,000 Jews to emigrate. The once prosperous community of Harbin, in Manchuria, used to boast 10,000 members; in December 1963 (according to an old couple who had lived in Harbin for 42 years and went in that month to settle in Israel) there were only 13 Jews left in Harbin.

*

A British Government report, the *Registrar-General's Statistical Review of England and Wales for the Year 1962* (part II), published in March 1964, reveals a steady drop in the number of Jewish religious ceremonies of marriage. There has been a trend over the last few decades for more civil marriages in both Jewish and non-Jewish communities. However, the decline in religious ceremonies has been proportionately greater among Jews than among other religious denominations. Thus, in 1934 nine out of every hundred marriages with a religious ceremony were Jewish; in 1952, the figure was eight, while in 1962 it had dropped to six.

In this context, it is worth noting that between 1949 and 1957 the number of synagogue marriages in Leeds alone dropped by more than fifty per cent.

*

The American Jewish Committee, in a statement in January 1964 about a new law in Iraq said to discriminate against Jewish residents, notes that, whereas there were 120,000 Jews in Iraq in 1950, the community has now dwindled to 5,000.

*

A Warsaw daily has commented on official Polish statistics which state that there are now 31,000 Jews in Poland. The daily notes that the figure refers only to those who declared themselves to be Jewish; it estimates that there are probably an additional 5,000 to 8,000 Jews in the country who stated that they were Polish, deliberately wishing to refrain from officially acknowledging that they were Jews.

*

A correspondent contributed an article on the Jews of Thailand in *The Jewish Chronicle* of 17 January 1964. There are apparently fewer than one hundred Jews in the country, and they include Germans, Iraqis, and some Israelis who are acting as consultants on irrigation projects. Many Iraqi Jews left Thailand for Israel after the establishment of the State, but some of them have returned. There is no synagogue or communal centre, but the Israeli Chargé d'Affaires held a communal Seder on Passover, 1963.

*

In a letter to the quarterly *Judaism* (Fall 1963 issue), the Executive Director of United Hias Service points out that in 1957 the United States Congress passed legislation granting special refugee status to 'persecutees' from the Middle East. John F. Kennedy, then Senator from Massachusetts, was the sponsor of this law. United Hias Service has assisted about 3,500 Egyptian Jews to resettle in the United States, and are persevering in their efforts to assist more.

*

In December 1963 the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic published a book of 192 pages by Trofim Korneyevich Kychko, in Ukrainian. The title has been variously translated as 'Judaism Without Embellishment', 'Judaism As It Is', and so on. The book is an attack on Jewish values and on Jews, and is illustrated by a series of offensive cartoons depicting Jews as swindlers and as lackeys of the Nazis. Captions read: 'The Synagogue is the haven of thieves and swindlers'; 'During the years of Hitlerite Occupation the Zionist leaders served the Fascists'; 'Swindling Synagogue Beadles frequently quarrel over spoils from the sale of religious articles'. The author writes that: '. . . the Jewish ideology is impregnated with narrow utilitarianism, greed, love of money, egotism.'

The book was produced in an edition of 12,000 copies, and the introduction states that the author

> . . . reveals to the reader the real essence of the Jewish religion (Judaism)—one of the ancient religions of the world which has collected within itself and distilled everything that is most reactionary and anti-humane in the writings of contemporary religions. . . . The book is intended for a wide circle of readers.

In 1957 the Ukrainian Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific

Knowledge had published a somewhat less outrageous pamphlet by the same author entitled *Jewish Religion, its Origins and Essence*, which contained similar allegations.

In March 1964 the foreign press published indignant and shocked comment on *Judaism Without Embellishment*. According to Reuters, Western reporters were told by Moscow bookshops that the book was not available, while Moscow's Ukrainian bookshop said it had been sold out. Nevertheless, several copies were obtained by various means, and some of the offensive cartoons were reprinted in the foreign press. The Communist press outside Russia also voiced some protests; perhaps the most forceful came from the Paris Yiddish-language newspaper *Naie Press*. It said in a front-page editorial: 'The Soviet Government must be more alert to such phenomena and react sharply.' It added that it had asked the Soviet News Agency Novosti to provide more details, and printed Novosti's reply: 'In publishing this pamphlet Kychko was utilizing the right given to everyone by the Soviet constitution to conduct anti-religious propaganda, just as the Constitution guarantees the right to religious observance.' Novosti stated, however, that the author had not carried out his task 'in the best way'.

In London, the *Daily Worker* of 28 March 1964 noted that Tass Agency had printed a report of a critical review of the book published in a Kiev Ukrainian language journal. The review had attacked the book for:

(1) selecting the unworthy conduct of individual Jews;
(2) claiming that the ancient Jews made no contribution to industry, farming, or culture when this was 'denied by scientific data';
(3) erroneously saying that all Jews had been gripped by emergent Zionism, when in fact the Jewish proletariat had taken part in the revolutionary movement in Russia; and
(4) extending criticism of Zionism to internal conditions in Israel, a State which in fact has 'democratic progressive organizations of workers'.

The Times of London, on 9 April 1964, published a report that Mr. Adzhubei (the editor of *Izvestia* and son-in-law of Mr. Khrushchev) had been questioned in Paris at a press luncheon the previous day about the Jewish question in Russia as portrayed in the book *Judaism Unmasked*. He had said that all copies of 'this unfortunate book', published in Kiev, had been destroyed; but that it had been reprinted in the United States and widely circulated. 'Why give these offensive caricatures wider currency?' he had asked.

He had said that Jews in Russia enjoyed full liberties and had deprecated confusion between the Jewish religion and people.

*

In April 1964 a twenty-page foolscap report was published entitled 'Report of an International Socialist Study Group on the Situation of Jews in the U.S.S.R.' The Chairman of the Study Group was Alvar Alsterdal (Sweden), and there were four other members: John F. Clark (Great Britain), Professor Mogens Pihl (Denmark), Dr. P. J. Koets (Holland), and Dr. John Sannes (Norway). In addition to the twenty pages of text, there are thirteen pages consisting of: background sources to the Report; a copy of a letter sent to Mr. Khrushchev in December 1963, appealing to him to give Soviet Jews in practice the rights they are entitled to in law, and signed by twelve eminent persons, including Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, and François Mauriac; a copy of a 'Resolution on Jews in the U.S.S.R.' passed in September 1963 by the Eighth Congress of the Socialist International in Amsterdam; and finally, a memorandum dated October 1962 entitled 'On the Discrimination Against Jews in Russia' submitted by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In their Introduction the authors of the Report state: 'Our purpose is not to stimulate anti-Soviet feeling; we are in harmony with their own avowed universalist teachings, and with the officially-proclaimed principles of Soviet policy on national and religious groups.' Their aim was to determine whether Soviet Jews are discriminated against in the fields of religion, education, and culture, and whether they enjoy the same protection as other minority groups against manifestations of hostility and prejudice. The section on 'Culture' notes the sharp decline in Yiddish and Hebrew

publications, and states that reports in the Western Jewish Communist press (since 1956) of the imminent establishment of a Yiddish State Theatre have proved to be without foundation. In the 1930s the Soviet Union boasted the largest Yiddish school system in the world, in striking contrast to the present situation. Further, there is not only a decline in the percentage of Jewish full-time students in the Universities, but also a decline in the absolute numbers of Jewish students.

The section on 'Religion' notes that Baron d'Holbach's *A Gallery of Saints*, an eighteenth-century work, was published in Moscow in 1962 by the State Publishing House of Political Literature in 175,000 copies, at a popular price. The book attacks biblical morals in general and contains many virulently antisemitic passages. T. Kychko quoted these passages with approval in a December 1962 Ukrainian journal. Official declarations as well as statements by Mr. Khrushchev that members of the Communist Party must avoid giving offence to the religious feelings of believers are quoted, but the authors point out that these principles are not always observed. The anti-religious campaign is much more active against Jews than other religious groups.

The section on 'Economic Offences' contains statistical data to show that although Jews account for only ten per cent of the total labour force in commerce and supply, more than fifty per cent of those shot for economic offences since the summer of 1961 have been Jews. The authors add that a great number of articles in the Soviet press depict Jews as corrupt, parasitical, and generally anti-social.

The section on 'Family Reunification' notes that people of Polish, Greek, and Spanish origin were allowed to leave the Soviet Union in order to return to their countries, and urges the Soviet authorities 'to institute a generous policy of family reunification' for Jews who have been separated since the war from their close kin.

In the 'Conclusion', the authors say that according to the evidence they have examined they 'consider that there is discrimination against the Jewish population of the Soviet Union as a national minority group, as a religious community, and as individuals'. They appeal to the Soviet Government to remedy the situation.

*

Reprints of Professor Erich Rosenthal's long article, 'Studies of Jewish Intermarriage in the United States' (published in the *American Jewish Year Book*, 1963) are available from the offices of the *American Jewish Year Book*, 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. Single copies cost 50 cents, while ten or more copies are 40 cents each.

BOOK REVIEWS

RACE IN BRITAIN

Robin M. Williams, Jr.

(Review Article)

IN THIS detailed naturalistic description of West Indian immigrants and of their reception by the settled natives of London,* we have the first comprehensive field work study of the newer patterns of coloured migrant settlements in central areas of Britain's large towns and cities. The present study has its focus in Brixton, an area different in many ways from earlier migrant settlements in the concentrated dockside areas of port cities. The newer influx represents substantial numbers—some 300,000 West Indians in all by mid-1962—but still only a minute fraction of the total population. Under the controls established by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 future immigration of this type will not reach the peaks of the last decade, nor will patterns of adjustment be exactly the same as those of the recent past. But the main features here depicted of the relationships between coloured immigrants and host population are of general and quite enduring interest.

Let it be said at once that this is an excellent study of an important subject. The author has had much first-hand experience in research on race relations. She began the present work in 1955 and she has kept in touch with the developing situation up to the time of the last major revision of the text in 1961. Prior to her studies in Britain she had published two books on South Africa and had conducted a study of Polish immigrants in Canada. She thus brings to the materials a comparative perspective that can be of great value in analyses of intergroup relations.

It is partly on the basis of such a perspective that the study is able to define the situation of West Indian immigrants as one of accommodation, rather than of group integration or of full assimilation. The immigrants have not been absorbed into the majority population by becoming socially and culturally indistinguishable from the host population. Nor have the 'dark strangers', considered as a culturally distinct whole, adapted through organizations of their own to a permanent position of

* Sheila Patterson, *Dark Strangers*, London, Tavistock Publications, 1963, pp. xvi + 470, 65*s*.

societal membership in economic and civic life that is accepted by the receiving society. This latter situation would be a condition of integration or cultural pluralism such as now exists in Canada or Switzerland. As Mrs. Patterson suggests, integration of this kind on an equal basis requires special conditions, including strong social organization within the immigrating population. But it has been a conspicuous feature of the West Indian newcomers during the recent period of unrestricted immigration that their social organization was extremely thin and weak. Many migrants did not intend to stay permanently in Britain; formal organizations were undeveloped and unfamiliar; family groupings were either lacking or were comparatively unstable and amorphous. Furthermore, the mass immigration of West Indians hardly spans a decade—as late as 1951 there were only 15,000 in Britain.

The West Indians, then, are currently developing a *modus vivendi*—a set of minimal relations of *accommodation*—although the process is impeded by the conflict of their high expectations with the quite limited acceptance extended to them by the host population.

Central contentions of the research here reported are that (1) emotional, irrational, and rigid prejudice is rare amongst the host population whereas mild unfavourable predispositions are prevalent; (2) widespread discrimination is '. . . primarily determined not by individual attitudes but by the nature and requirements of the particular social situation, and by generally shared social orientations, values and norms' (p. 22).

It is a consistent theme of this study that the relations of West Indians and Britons in Britain represent an immigrant-host situation rather than a colour or race situation. Admittedly the factor of colour adds to visibility and strangeness—indeed, the study begins with a discussion of 'colour shock' as a reaction involving a profound sense of the unexpected and alien character of the immigrants. Nevertheless, the author sees the very sense of strangeness—felt by hosts and newcomers alike—as a basic difference between the present new and highly fluid situation in Britain and the old-established, more static situations in the American South, South Africa, or the West Indies (p. 5). Moreover, she came to view the relationships of West Indians to resident Britons as basically not 'racial' but rather as immigrant-host relations, made more complex and difficult by colour-consciousness on both sides.

One wonders, of course, whether a close inspection of the volatile situation in the American South in the 1960s really permits the phrase 'old-established, more static' (or, indeed, whether the easy bracketing of the Southern States with South Africa may not be more nearly misleading than clarifying at this point in history).

At any rate, in the case of West Indian immigrants (primarily from Jamaica), colour-differences are associated with marked social and cultural differences. Most of the immigrants enter working-class occupa-

tions at the bottom of the scale and bring with them the working habits, family life, religious practices, and attitudes towards authority derived from a background of rural poverty and colonial history. In all these characteristics, the newcomers differ conspicuously from the settled population of the receiving areas.

Dark Strangers subscribes to the familiar assertion that the greater '. . . the social distance and cultural divergencies between the receiving society and the incoming group, the greater obviously will be the degree of adaptation and acceptance needed to achieve a satisfactory coexistence' (p. 10). If this statement is true by definition, its meaning certainly is obvious. If it is not tautological, however, its meaning may not be self-evident: we are very far from knowing exactly what cultural differences will be felt as most 'divergent' or 'incompatible' or what, precisely, makes for greater or lesser social distance. The difficulty of knowing just how much weight to give to cultural and social 'strangeness' is explicit in Mrs. Patterson's introductory discussion where she contrasts the 'colour-class hypothesis' with the 'stranger hypothesis'. The first attributes social distance and discrimination to the complex of expectations and attitudes growing out of the historic association in British experience of 'colour' and lower-class status and characteristics. Alternatively, the phenomena of group distance and the like are attributed by the second hypothesis to unfamiliarity, uncertainty, and real socio-cultural differences. The author declines to see the two hypothetical explanations as mutually exclusive, holding rather that both are applicable and important. She maintains that in the locale of her research, the Brixton area in south London, the West Indians are regarded as outsiders and strangers *par excellence.* In the specific instance of the work situation: 'Aversion and hostility are undoubtedly present among the local workers, but they are felt more towards the unknown, undifferentiated, and threatening out-group than towards those who have become familiar workmates' (p. 149). Elsewhere we are told that by now most of the initial sense of strangeness has gone and that coloured people have become an accepted part of the British urban scene (p. 387). Yet stereotyping, informal segregation, job discrimination, and attitudes of social distance apparently are still quite widespread.

Where, then, is the emphasis to be placed? It is not entirely clear just how much causal importance should be imputed to factors linked with colour, with class, or with cultural differences. Clearly all are involved. But if colour prejudice should prove to be decisive, Britain will have a 'permanent minority' quite different from a less fixed and more soluble 'class' or 'ethnic' minority. One receives the impression that the author does not attach a great deal of importance to colour prejudice. The weight of her judgement falls upon class and cultural factors.

The Brixton settlement goes back rather more than a decade. How

far have accommodation and acceptance gone during this time? Most of the West Indians have found and kept jobs, primarily in unskilled work, but are still not fully accepted by management or native workers. Labour 'quotas' are practised by many firms. Many problems of housing have been encountered, and the present heavy residential concentration could lead to a coloured 'ghetto'. Social relationships between migrants and the local resident population are still mainly confined to casual contacts in the streets, shops, buses, and public houses. Intermarriage is rare and disfavoured. There is, however, little evidence of friction between local and migrant children who associate in schools and play-groups.

It begins to be quite clear that further penetrating research is needed to ascertain the basis of acceptance or rejection of 'outgroup' persons in various occupations and social situations. The author indicates that traditional hostility among British workers to foreign labour derives in large part from fears of economic harm and fears of losing social status (pp. 143–8). At the same time, she notes that the anomalies of acceptance by the general public of coloured workers in different occupations would make it difficult to construct any scale based on gradations of authority or intimacy (or, indeed, on any one obvious criterion) that would account for the known variations (p. 139). An exactly parallel conclusion has been drawn independently by the Cornell Studies in Intergroup Relations in the United States.

The study provides additional evidence to support a number of generalizations reported in other studies in various parts of the world, e.g., the tendency for hostility to and discrimination against immigrants on the part of native workers to be positively related to the degree of economic insecurity felt by the local working population. Although it is unlikely that anyone will be surprised by such a finding, it certainly is useful to have this additional documentation.

Jobs and housing are the chief immediate concerns of migrants, and are at the same time two primary foci of competition and possible conflict.

The history of unionization, industrial conflict, and unemployment has left workers and trade unions with relatively fixed negative attitudes towards all outside labour. Immigrants generally enter the less desirable occupations and jobs—those characterized by low pay, low status, insecurity, seasonality, or inherent disagreeableness. West Indian workers are in actuality less capable, on the average, than resident native labour —by virtue of a whole series of cultural and social factors (p. 79).

The study notes the familiar facts of situational variation, individual exemption, and the importance of strong 'opinion-leaders' in forming local patterns. Familiar also is the non-discriminatory policy at national trade union level, but coupled with local resistances especially with regard to redundancy and promotions.

The work-connected relationships between white and coloured only rarely carry over into the neighbourhood or to informal social life.

Most West Indian men have found and kept jobs, and are accommodating themselves to British practices. Although a persisting labour shortage facilitated their employment, they have not been given full acceptance by employers or fellow-workers.

'Housing' comprehends both actual living space and the social and cultural contacts and conflicts incident to various residential arrangements. The study was conducted during a period of serious housing shortage. Effects of actual competition for scarce space are accentuated by fears concerning property values and social status. Actual differences in living patterns lead to recognition (and exaggeration) of differences in norms and values. These differences are rendered salient and often noxious '. . . by enforced intimacy between uncongenial groups of people' (p. 198). The housing arena in Brixton strikingly refutes the easy error that close social contact always reduces stereotypes or increases acceptance. 'Local attitudes and reactions towards West Indian neighbours usually become more focused and more critical with increasing proximity' (p. 199).

Further, the study clearly shows how an immigrant 'ghetto' restricts integration and assimilation and, by the same token, tends to become self-perpetuating because of its high visibility (p. 214). The book recognizes the long-term dangers inherent in the consolidation of 'coloured quarters', but holds that the present trend is away from residential concentration. Up to the present, the Brixton settlement has not brought forth any strong in-group social structure. 'Informal and uninstitutionalized forms of association are much more widely spread in the Brixton migrant group than are formal associations' (369). Both recognized leadership and voluntary associations are quite rare. The Brixton settlement lacks an organizational focus—it is a 'quasi-group' or 'aggregate' rather than a well-knit community.

Mrs. Patterson calls our attention to the ambiguity of attributing a 'common culture' to West Indians and the receiving English population. Similarities in language, religion, and citizenship often recede into the background when there is the confronting of divergencies and incompatibilities of values and behaviour in the imperious immediacies of daily living. In fact, the very expectation of similarity and acceptance may render all the more difficult the actual divergence and aloofness.

It is in casual and categorical public contacts that accommodation first appears. The more intimate and informal social relationships develop only slowly, if at all. The author summarizes:

> In the early years of a migrant movement social adaptation and acceptance are . . . minimal on both sides. The receiving society may be fully willing to open factory gates, church doors, welfare agency doors, pub

> doors, and so on. But few of its adult members are willing to open to strangers that ultimate door, the door to their homes. In Brixton this unwillingness is reinforced by the reserve, lack of sociability, and fragmentation that characterize informal social life in large English cities (p. 278).

There is an informative and insightful discussion of intermarriage (actually quite rare). However, the potential opportunity for testing of systematic hypotheses (e.g. those advanced by R. K. Merton more than twenty years ago) is not developed.

On net balance, this work is optimistic concerning the long-term future of West Indian assimilation, foreseeing substantial acceptance, upward mobility, and closer social relationships with the local population (p. 399). It is predicted that in economic affairs the trend will be towards continual greater accommodation and ultimate integration of the newcomers.

Our sampling of the book's substance thus documents our estimate of its solid value. But there are few perfect books in this imperfect world and some of the limitations of the study must be noted in closing.

Although the dust-cover claims that an important feature of the work is a set of case-histories of women immigrants, it is difficult to determine how the individual case-summaries contribute to the findings of the research. The 'cases' no doubt add a certain local colour and air of verisimilitude to the narrative; in this manner they may aid communication with certain readers. But no firm generalizations can be drawn from any particular case and the truth-value of the major findings is essentially unaffected by the inclusion and exclusion of such materials.

The analysis is (necessarily) permeated with quasi-quantitative judgements: 'most' West Indians do not initially intend to settle permanently; 'many' are accustomed to migrant work; 'some' families are stable and well-organized. Note for example, the single sentence (italics added): 'The psychological restlessness that is *often* associated with the mobility enforced on *so many* seasonal labourers by the West Indian economic situation is, in any case, *unlikely* to help their accommodation to British economic life' (p. 79). The sections of the book in which objective data are available on a systematic basis (e.g. public records, samples of employers) only highlight the limitations imposed by lack of systematic sample surveys which would have shown the distribution and intercorrelation of various phenomena concerning which generalizations have been sought. Many of the data from interviews, letters-to-the-editor, and other sources are, strictly speaking, only *illustrative*, for the typicality remains unknown.

Perhaps it would have been well had the author not made quite so much of an alleged contrast between the 'new and fluid British situation' and 'South Africa or the Southern states'. Surely the rapidity of change in the present urban South, U.S.A., is not accurately suggested

by saying that a colour bar has been fixed for generations. Mrs. Patterson seems to me to underestimate the role of 'prejudice' in Britain and to overestimate the part it currently plays in American 'race' relations. In both societies 'colour' comes into prominence as a highly visible symbol of cultural and social differences and of claims and prerogatives concerning power and prestige.

To consider accommodation, pluralistic integration, and finally assimilation as 'phases' in the relationships of host society and migrants is, no doubt, a convenient way to organize data. But it must be emphasized that it is not inevitable that the relationships will pass through all phases (at one point the author slips into speaking of 'stages', p. 6), nor is the order or timing of occurrence rigidly fixed. Integration may occur with little movement towards assimilation; relations may stabilize at the level of accommodation or of integration. The fact that substantial accommodation has occurred is no guarantee that anything else will happen. And, as the experience of the United States has demonstrated on a large scale, a marked degree of cultural assimilation may co-exist with pronounced social separation. There may be sound grounds for supposing that West Indians will gradually 'disappear' into British society, but there is surely nothing inevitable about this outcome. Indeed, as Mrs. Patterson points out early in her presentation, integrated pluralism rather than unitary assimilationism may be the more likely model for many situations in modern societies.

It is apparent that this work deals with basic questions of lively interest. It is a book to be commended for judicious, careful, and sensitive analysis of a vital subject.

NEW YORK'S JEWS

Lloyd P. Gartner

(Review Article)

NO Jewish community has ever existed like the Jewish community of New York City. Four cities once stood as symbols of emancipated Jewry during the nineteenth century: Vienna, Berlin, London, and Paris. In the Germanic cities, the Jews contributed inestimably to the life of science and culture: Berlin particularly exemplified the attempt to fuse the German spirit with the Jewish heritage. But both there and in cosmopolitan

Vienna the Jewish presence was insecure and under sporadic attack, and Jewish personalities and ideologies suffered distortion. Jews in Paris meant little in French civilization, except during the years searingly described in Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (*The Burden of Our Time* in England), while London Jewry was even less a factor in English life—but for the myth of the Jewish banker fostered in both cities. The Jews who participated more or less in the cultural and political affairs of these capitals of nineteenth-century Europe did not shape pliant forms to contours derived from Jewish experience. (Perhaps the Vienna of Freud and Mahler is the exception.) But the million and more Jews who settled in New York City brought the weight of their numbers and the burden of tradition and the passion for improvement to bear upon the elasticity of the New World's metropolis. The results for the Jews and the city all but defy measurement.

There are now about 2,100,000 Jews within the boundaries of the city, and hundreds of thousands more in its suburbs. As rapidly as this number was approached between 1890 and 1930, it increased little afterwards. The vast movement of whites to adjacent suburbs has included great numbers of middle-class Jews and led to a perceptible decline in municipal esprit during the 1950s. The social, educational, and financial problems were unmatched, for the first time in sixty years, by fresh ideas and energies for their solution. The sovereign New York State Legislature, grossly dominated by upstate Republicans suspicious of the teeming metropolis, showed no sympathy for the city's perplexities. Indeed, more concern with the problems of New York City could be expected from a national Administration, even when it was Republican. The mechanism of the Electoral College insures heavy influence to the great cities in Presidential elections, and the electorate must be served. Washington is more responsive to social needs than the state capitals, where urban Democratic Governors must frequently fight with immovable Legislatures. In the State of New York, the hostile intransigence at Albany towards the City's needs has also had something to do with giving New York City more interest in national than in state affairs. The declining vitality of life and politics in the Empire City may be arrested by the upward thrust of the Negro and, probably soon, the Puerto Rican. They now exceed 2,000,000, more than the number of Jews whose causes preoccupied the municipal arena two generations ago. For the sake of the Jewish past and the city's present, a substantial study of New York Jewry is an undertaking to be welcomed.*

The theme of Dr. Moses Rischin's book is not quite the history of the Jews of New York City from about 1870 to 1914. Rather it tells how this mass of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the children brought up by them found their place in the city's economy and moved into the vanguard of social reform and labour movements. The volatile relations between the immigrants and the established native Jews (of whom almost none was other than the son or grandson of an immigrant) is not probed very deeply. The latter helped, led, and exhorted their downtown brethren, and also complained of them and mostly despised them. The immigrants needed and wanted the native Jews, and their complaints against the haughtiness, infirm Judaism,

* Moses Rischin, *The Promised City: New York's Jews* 1870–1914, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1962, pp. xvi+342. $7.50.

or social conservatism they found uptown were not always untinged with envy. In contrast to the interest in immigrant grandfathers, no one, Rischin included, has yet attentively portrayed these native Jews. Are they so assimilated that the regnant conceptions of Jewish history resist their inclusion? Then perhaps we have not come so far from the historiography of *lernen und leiden* as we supposed. A work like Henry F. May's recent *The End of American Innocence*, describing and analysing the rise of modernism in American aesthetics and political thought between 1912 and 1917, contains many Jewish names of German ancestry, although Dr. May does not remark upon this. The old rosters of some principal hospitals and universities, no less than the financial directories, suggest the directions followed by many of these descendants. Sociologists and novelists have already taken them in hand, with faint participation by the few American Jewish historians.

Economists, journalists, sociologists, novelists, and social workers once paid court to the Jews on the East Side of New York. Bohemia, just then ensconcing itself around Washington Square, was interested too. Rischin has perused their writings in full detail, and he has not neglected the reports and statistics amassed by New York State bureaux and private bodies. This corpus of material has laid a solid and richly varied base for *The Promised City*. The book's thread of interpretation and narrative comes above all from the Yiddish *Forverts*, founded in 1897 and controlled by Abe Cahan. Cahan had veered from socialism as a doctrine to radical reform as a programme before he came to the newspaper, and he led it in that direction. By cajolery, persuasion, and ruthless compulsion, Cahan forced his writers to abandon their revolutionary rhetoric—although not completely, not even he—and instead to mirror the people's tastes and instruct them in their needs. Because it sought to copy the tongue of the immigrant plebs, the *Forverts*'s Yiddish was heavily diluted by English words and phrases, to the deep resentment of the many to whom the language had secular sanctity.

With learning and subtlety, Rischin implicitly builds his case that the path taken by the *Forverts* was taken by the Jewish group, which became the army of social idealism and municipal revitalization in New York City. This transition occurred between 1906, when Russian revolutionary émigrés began arriving en masse, and 1915, the height of 'the great awakening' (Rischin's term) of Jewish trade unionism. Full fruition came during the Governorship of Herbert Lehman in New York and the Mayoralty of Fiorello LaGuardia in the city; links with the men and programmes of the New Deal are readily to be discerned. The lessons taught by the settlement houses, Cooper Union forums, the *Forverts*, and uptown Jewish figures like Felix Adler, Henry M. Leipziger, and Judah L. Magnes, were well learned by East Side Jews in their multitudes. Jewish idealism became practical reformism, and messianic radicalism was tamed to empirical politics. The Jewish movement synchronizes admirably with the social criticism and reforming legislation of the Progressive Era. What happened among Jews on the East Side of New York, seemingly isolated from American society and politics, thus really swims in the main stream of American history. Such is Rischin's thesis, if I understand it correctly. It may easily be seen why Abe Cahan, as master of the *Forverts*, occupies so noteworthy a place. In a study which appeared in the *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society* for

1954 Rischin described how Cahan's two years with the lively *Commercial Advertiser* taught him the ways of American journalism. These lessons enabled him to make the *Forverts* a good newspaper of the Progressive Era, in Yiddish.

From Rischin's handling of New York Jewry, it follows that the most significant part of their history was the metamorphosis from a traditional society, by passage through the stages of 'Torah, Haskalah, and Protest', into an American ethnic group. Those who led the break with the past figure pre-eminently in Rischin's gallery, while those who preserved the old, or sought somehow to modify it, receive short shrift. In his preoccupation with this thesis, Rischin rather one-sidedly seems to slight many things which would tend to undermine it. One can hardly expect him to canvass all the Yiddish newspapers, but his concentration on the *Forverts* places in the shade influential newspapers more attached to Jewish tradition, more cautious in their politics, more Zionist, or less diluted in their socialism. Together, they sold far more copies than the *Forverts*. The outlook of a newspaper is not necessarily identical with its readers', and this applies with special force to the *Forverts*, which sought less than its competitors solely to satisfy readers and much more to mould their thinking. The other Yiddish newspapers were probably closer to their readers' real opinions.

While they desired to enter American society, the Jewish immigrants also desired to remain part of the Jewish entity. Certainly they thrilled and despaired to news from Warsaw and St. Petersburg and Vilna, when hardly anything at City Hall or Washington could stir them. Should not this be mentioned in *The Promised City*? It would be difficult but rewarding to learn how East European immigrants shifted the locus of their political interests from Russia to the United States. Dr. Rischin, however, appears to take this shift for granted. In the reviewer's opinion, it did not occur with finality among the politically active before 1907, and perhaps not until the Bolshevik ascent to power.

The directly Jewish factor in voting should not be discounted so readily as Rischin does (pp. 233–235). The contests for Congressman from the East Side between 1906 and 1914 were bitterly fought between Socialists and Democrats. Morris Hillquit, a Russian Jew and a national personage among the Socialists, could not win the seat against the stale Jewish Democratic candidate despite his party's enthusiastic electioneering. Meyer London, also a Russian Jew, did win the seat for the Socialists in 1914. In a study of the interesting campaigns (in the *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society* for 1961) Mr. Arthur Gorenstein demonstrates that the difference between Hillquit's and London's appeals to the overwhelmingly Jewish electorate lay in the latter's willingness to cater to Jewish feelings. During the 1906 election, fought against a background of revolution, pogroms, and mass emigration from Russia, Hillquit would not dissociate himself from the Socialist Party's restrictive immigration policy. The Democrat had only to play upon the concern of East Side Jews for their families and people to undo Hillquit's campaign. Not until the personable Meyer London, lawyer for Jewish labour unions, rivalled the Jewish appeal of the Democrats was the East Side's seat in the House of Representatives filled by a Socialist. Gorenstein concludes that Jewish consciousness transcended Socialist convictions; and the latter had their chance to prevail when the former were properly

respected. How this well-documented interpretation differs from that presented by Rischin illustrates much about the respective points of view.

The direction of *The Promised City* explains its otherwise astonishing omissions. The subjects of communal structure, religious life, Jewish education, Zionism, Hebraism (but not Yiddish, for its association with the theatre, press and trade unions) receive altogether perhaps three pages. Now Dr. Rischin has his rights as author, and he sees little if anything in these topics which links Jewish immigrants to American reform, trade unionism, and liberal politics—and those are his principal themes. His book must pay the price of its omissions, for the immigrants cannot be fitted into so limited a framework. Moreover, some of the excluded subjects might have lent themselves to Rischin's interpretation. Mass abandonment of the *Milieufrommigkeit* (Leo Baeck's term) of the East European small town upon arrival in the great city is a fact, but the struggles of the Jew with his religion hardly ended there. The reconstruction of Judaism subsequent to entry into urban, industrial, scientific civilization, which occurred throughout Europe and America, furnishes problems of the greatest interest to the historian of New York. Consider the simple case of Young Israel, a small, poor, hopeful group of immigrants' sons on the East Side. They sought nothing more than an orthodox worship purged of East European local colour, with English rather than Yiddish the medium of non-liturgical portions of the service. The young men were not learned, and they welcomed the unobservant to their prayers. Yet this unprepossessing group captured the aid and interest of Schiff, Magnes, Israel Friedlander, and others; in Young Israel they thought they saw the seed of that American Jewish traditionalism which neither Reform nor immigrant religion was nurturing. Or take the Kehillah—brushed aside by Rischin in less than one sentence. Far from transplanting the decayed, oligarchic management of Jewish affairs in Eastern Europe, it resembled a Jewish brand of American popular democracy. The New York Kehillah, a major institution, and Young Israel, a minor one, suggest a theme *The Promised City* unfortunately disregards—that the American impact upon East European Judaism did not dissolve it, even in East Side days, but produced a resolute search for new forms. These efforts were followed with no small interest by many long-settled American Jews.

No review, even one with as many reservations as this, may close without paying tribute to the significance of *The Promised City*. Its packed, admirably organized contents and wide bibliographic sweep will guide every future writer, including those who will exploit Rischin's path-breaking researches perhaps to dispute his interpretations and fill his lacunae. This is an original book, a major contribution to American Jewish history and the fields of interest which overlap it.

SHORTER NOTICES

WERNER J. CAHNMAN, ed., *Intermarriage and Jewish Life: A Symposium*, 212 pp., The Herzl Press and the Jewish Reconstructionist Press, New York, 1963, $5.

In February 1960 a conference of sociologists and ecclesiastics was held in New York to discuss intermarriage and Jewish life—a grave issue for all concerned with the future of the community, but concerning which many of the basic facts are unknown or only partially known. This volume brings together thirteen papers presented at that conference. Four are by sociologists and deal with the 'Facts as we know them'; these present the results of many previous researches, and thus form an invaluable source of reference. A further five papers are by rabbis and social workers and deal with 'Special cases'; these illustrate in more practical terms some of the problems entailed: they are well worth reading, even if they do not always lead to any general conclusions. In addition there are two introductory papers, and two under the heading 'Conclusions', which—as Baedeker would say—may be omitted by those who are pressed for time.

The papers undoubtedly raise more problems than they solve, but that is to be expected in the circumstances; indeed, one paper (by Professor J. Maier of Rutgers University) is entirely devoted—and very usefully so—to a survey of problems requiring further research. However, some simple and important general tendencies can be regarded as established and are worth noting in a review. They are based on the full statistical information available for Switzerland and Canada, and are supported by partial studies elsewhere. First, it appears that the tendency to intermarry is about twice as great among men as among women. To quote some examples: in Switzerland in the years 1956–60, 47 per cent of grooms married out, while 21 per cent of brides married out. In Canada, in the same period the average rate of intermarriage was lower, but the same relation holds: 10 per cent of grooms married out, and 5 per cent of brides did so.

Aside from the immediate social and communal problems implied by these figures, there is a further consequence that has to be noted, though not developed in this volume. If the number of men and women of marriageable age in the population are similar—as may be assumed—it necessarily follows from the above that a substantial proportion of young women must remain unmarried. To take the Swiss figure quoted above, it is implied that at least 33 per cent of all women never marry (this is a minimum figure and assumes that all men get married; if, say, 5 per cent of men remained single, then the implied proportion for women is raised to 38 per cent). The problem is thus of tremendous size; and the implications have hardly been appreciated so far.

A second set of figures which deserve further thought come from Dr. L. Rosenberg's paper on Canada: they show very clearly that the smaller the community, the greater is the rate of intermarriage. Thus, in Quebec (main community: Montreal, over 100,000) the intermarriage rate in 1956–60 was 3·7 per cent; in Manitoba (main community: Winnipeg, with close on 20,000), the rate was 6·5 per cent; and in British Columbia (main community: Vancouver, some 7,000), the rate was 26·3 per cent. The figures just given are an average of the rates for men and women; the same trend is also to be observed for men and women separately (the tables are in Dr. Rosenberg's paper, pp. 67–8).

There are of course other factors that affect the rate of intermarriage, such as educational facilities, the extent of other communal organisations, and the closeness to other communities which may facilitate in-marriages. In earlier times, as far as we know, the survival of small communities (of, say, even a hundred families) may not have been threatened by intermarriage, but the Canadian figures provide, I fear, convincing examples of what must today be a general tendency.

They also help us to understand why the intermarriage rate in Switzerland is so

high. The total Jewish population of Switzerland is some 20,000: the largest community is in Zurich with some 7,000 Jews; the remainder are in four main centres. One might therefore expect an intermarriage rate similar to that of British Columbia where the main town also has a community of 7,000; in fact, the rate in Switzerland was 34 per cent (average of men and women) compared with 27 per cent in British Columbia. In other words it appears that, despite the oft-rehearsed difference between the Old and the New Worlds, the conditions and problems of communal life today are substantially, if surprisingly, similar.

It is interesting to speculate on the form of the relationship between community size and intermarriage. On moving from a community of 100,000 in Montreal to Winnipeg, where it is a fifth of that size, the intermarriage rate nearly doubles (from 3·7 to 6·5 per cent); on moving to Vancouver which, with a community of 7,000, is about a third of Winnipeg's, the rate rises fourfold (from 6·5 to 26·3 per cent). It appears therefore that as some minimum size of community is reached, the rate of intermarriage rises sharply. It is not too difficult to understand the reason on the basis of some simple figuring. Suppose marriages take place within three-year age-groups; in a community of 7,000 a young man is thus able to select a mate from some 315 young women (assuming 15 per thousand in each age-group). Suppose, further, that there is some stratification, for example, by three factors such as intelligence, height, and income group; even if stratification is into only three grades ('high', 'medium' and 'low'), there result 27 groups: and, assuming independence between the stratifying factors, the young man's choice is thus reduced to some 12 possible young women. If there are further factors of importance, such as shade of orthodoxy, or section of the town, the possibility of choice may disappear. When the possibility of choice is sufficiently restricted, the proportion of intermarriages must rise steeply; and, if we are to generalize from the few figures available, it appears that a community below about 7,000 must today expect to be a problem community in this respect. For the relatively rare cases at the extremes of the distributions of any of these stratifying factors, the choice is especially limited; thus, for example, it is not surprising to find higher rates of intermarriage among university graduates.

For the United States, which is naturally the main interest of most of the papers, the facts are unfortunately obscure. A survey of the Bureau of Census, carried out in 1957, put a simple question on religion to a representative sample of the population and found that some 3½ per cent of Jews marry out; or, as the Bureau report put it, 'For couples in which one spouse was reported Jewish, 7 per cent of the husbands or wives were reported as Protestant or Catholic'. But this is very much a minimum figure as 'it is not possible to distinguish those cases in which one of the partners changed his religion to conform to that of the spouse'; nor does it include those who, after a mixed marriage, regard themselves as of 'no religion', or where religion was 'not reported'.

Figures based on a more comprehensive definitional basis are available for the United States for certain of the smaller communities only; for these, the figures appear to the reviewer to be not too different from the higher figures available on a firm basis for Canada. For the main community in New York City there are no firm facts and the situation there has special features of its own. In the absence of precise information, and basing themselves presumably on general impressions, certain students, however, remain optimistic (cf. Dr. Nathan Glazer's views as reported in the *Jewish Chronicle*, 15 November 1963, p.8).

The above are some of the reflections raised by a reading of this book. Though the papers vary somewhat in profundity and originality, everyone will be grateful for having so much material on this subject together within one book. It deserves to be widely read both by scholars and the community generally.

S. J. PRAIS

Israel Annals of Psychiatry and Related Disciplines, Vol. I, no. 1, 171 pp., Jerusalem Academic Press Ltd., 1963.

The editors of the *Israel Annals of Psychiatry and Related Disciplines* are to be congratulated on the first issue of their new journal. The journal itself is of a high standard. The contributions are extremely interesting in that they deal with the

problems of cultural variation and its relation to personality development and mental illness. Not only is the journal to be welcomed as a forum for the growing research activities of psychiatrists, psychologists, and sociologists in Israel itself, but it will also become important for social scientists outside Israel to study its contents, since many of the research findings may lead to a reconsideration of our basic ideas about the effect of upbringing on personality and about the genesis and character of mental illness and its treatment. Israel is the ideal ground for examining basic processes since it encompasses within its confines people with widely divergent backgrounds, attitudes, and ways of life. It is difficult to think of a greater contrast than that presented by the educated Western Jew who, being a nonconformist, chose to emigrate to Israel and the Oriental Jew who, though adhering to the Jewish religion, carries with him many of the magical beliefs, views on family structure, and customs prevalent in the country from which he emigrated.

In a fascinating article, 'An Approach to Psychiatric and Mental Health Research in Israel', Dr. Miller, who is the Director of the Mental Health Services of the Ministry of Health, points to the problems that arise in an attempt to integrate very dissimilar people in one community. He outlines the different types of research that are needed so as to find out how to facilitate this process of adjustment. He also, rightly, points to the extent to which new ideas may be generated by the careful charting of the relationship of social institutions and social beliefs to adjustment and personality illness.

Another extremely interesting article, by Dr. T. S. Nathan, Dr. Eitinger, and Dr. Winnik, shows how the effect of the concentration camp upon the individual's later adjustment depended, not only on the experiences within the camp, but also on the context in which the imprisonment occurred. It shows, for example, that the conditions under which Norwegians entered concentration camps were psychologically more favourable, since they were selected nonconformists, than those under which Jews went.

Space does not permit me to go into all the articles, but there is one further one that I should like to mention. This is the article by Coleman and Rosenbaum describing the Walk-In Psychiatric Clinic with which they are associated in New York. The figures they present are impressive, but above all, the article brings out a further intention of the editors: namely, to acquaint the Israeli psychiatrists with different therapeutic approaches which might be of relevance to them.

If the *Israel Annals of Psychiatry* retain the high standard that they have shown in their first number, this will become not only an invaluable journal for Israeli social scientists themselves, but also an important one for social scientists abroad.

The editors may wish to consider how to make the cover of the journal more serviceable; the copy I received was already somewhat frayed and has now come to pieces.

HILDE HIMMELWEIT

T. H. MARSHALL, *Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays*, ix + 348 pp., Heinemann Books on Sociology, London, 1963, 30*s*.

British Sociologists share a number of characteristics. They have little enthusiasm for what is usually called general theory. They are profoundly concerned with the problems of social class (for very obvious reasons: though one sometimes wishes that they could show as much interest in other things). In addition, they have an unashamedly professional interest in social policy.

In so far as some of these characteristics are also virtues, they can be found in the writings of T. H. Marshall, most of which are now contained in a volume which takes its title from the first essay. This is a book in three parts, each one portraying the author in a different role. In the first he is the ardent, subtle, but never nagging advocate of sociology itself. In the second part, he is a distinguished specialist analysing the problems of social stratification. In the third, he is the committed scholar surveying the larger issues of social welfare.

Part One comprises three public lectures on the nature and interests of sociology. The first of these considers the choice between high-flown speculation on the one hand, and theory-less fact-grubbing on the other. Needless to say the author opts for a

middle road and recommends the formulation of modest hypotheses to guide empirical research. (Doubtless someone needed to say this at that time—1946—but it requires an effort to understand why.) The second lecture deals with the general subject matter of sociology, and invites the audience to inspect the concept of social systems. This is the clearest exposition known to this reviewer of the connexion between formal and informal structures of social relationships. The third essay is a plea for a comparative study of modern complex societies, on an international scale, and preferably by a body of sociologists drawn from many societies and cultures.

Part Two, which constitutes the main body of this volume, deals with social stratification in general and social class in particular. It contains three essays which previously appeared in 1949 in the volume *Citizenship and Social Class*, together with five new essays. Of these latter, the most interesting and important is that on 'Changes in Social Stratification in the Twentieth Century'. Here Professor Marshall shows that the study of social class is made increasingly difficult, and therefore more interesting, by the development of different and often competing structures of social status in modern industrial societies; he points out that there is less evidence of 'multi-bonded' class membership and less congruence between the different elements of social class—wealth, power, prestige and culture. In this, as in all the essays of this section, Professor Marshall teases out the various threads and shows us how they are woven together. The ease with which he appears to do this is an achievement of style.

The essays in Part Three make sober reading. Discussions of the Welfare State and the Affluent Society seldom avoid a morally polemic tone. Professor Marshall tries to avoid one and almost succeeds. But even he is capable of momentary lapses, and can baffle the reader with statements like this: '. . . the Affluent Society does not as yet appear to have a soul at all, either to lose or to look for, and is unaware of what it lacks. It is imperative that it should acquire one . . .' (p. 288). If we interpret the term 'soul' to refer to a condition in which the members of a society share both a common purpose and those values which prescribe the manner in which this purpose is to be achieved, we are still left wondering whether the lack of a 'soul' is such a tragic matter, and whether this unfortunate situation can be remedied, in complex societies, by other then totalitarian measures. Perhaps it can: this would make a good subject for Professor Marshall's next essay.

It is a pleasure to read a sociologist who can not only clarify complex problems and apply himself to serious matters of public policy, but do all these things with wit, urbanity, and elegance. But one does regret that the author deals with some of these large issues in too short a space, thereby failing to pursue a more far-reaching inquiry. Perhaps it would not be right if all sociology were like this. Considering that much of it occupies a great deal more space, in much larger volumes, with far less consequences for our understanding, we should be grateful for whatever Professor Marshall gives us.

PERCY S. COHEN

RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM and MORDECAI M. HAUER, *Jews in the Communist World. A Bibliography 1945–1962*, 125 pp., Pro Arte Publishing, 28 East 4th Street, New York 3, 1963, $6.

This is a very useful bibliography of works on the situation of Jews in Russia and in other East European countries. The authors have made no attempt to annotate the works mentioned or to indicate in any way which are serious and which are lightweight journalism. However, it will certainly be of great value to any would-be research in this very worthwhile area of study.

ALEC NOVE

F. MUSGROVE, *The Migratory Élite*, 185 pp., Heinemann, London, 1963, 30*s*.

Nowadays the mention of migration in Britain at once suggests the 'brain drain', but this is only one aspect of the problem with which this book is concerned. In Dr. Musgrove's terminology the élite are those occupying a 'formally defined position in

a hierarchical organization or group', and it is his contention that 'the increasing tendency for local leaders to have moved in from elsewhere constitutes a major social revolution'. 'The future,' he says, 'is with élites without acknowledged family or regional connexions.' Dr. Musgrove gives a valuable and well documented account of British internal and external migration with references to American experience, and goes on to examine the problems involved. The building of the New Society certainly involves much strain, and the analysis of the consequential need for adjustment is interesting and often acute. When he turns to consider what should be done to meet the new situation, his treatment is more summary. He concentrates attention on the grammar schools whence most of the élite come. He praises them for their 'broad humanistic tradition' which 'must not only be maintained but strengthened'. On other grounds he castigates them. 'There is every sign that the character produced is often brittle, timid, suspicious, unadventurous and unimaginative, inadequate in the circumstances of modern professional life.' But this is mere assertion for which no evidence is given.

A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS

ERNEST KRAUSZ, *Leeds Jewry: Its History and Social Structure*, 150 pp., Heffer, Cambridge, 1964, 30*s*.

This important volume has been published for the Jewish Historical Society of England. It is based on a University of London thesis. Mr. Krausz describes the central aim of this study as 'to discover the controlling forces effective in maintaining the minority community under investigation'. He reaches the following conclusions. There has been a decline in religious observance, morals have become 'somewhat looser', there has been a weakening of family tradition, Yiddish is in decline, Jewish literature and 'various customs and folkways' are 'rapidly vanishing', the enthusiasm for the Zionist ideal 'appears to be on the wane', and the individual 'more readily tolerates or accommodates himself to non-Jewish ideas and customs'. While the number of Jewish organizations has increased and they are more efficient, the 'former type of living together in the ghetto of the Leylands' has ended and intermarriage 'has substantially increased'. At the same time, 'the non-acceptance of minority members into the groups of the host society is still widely practised, and generally Jews avoid non-Jewish groups and organizations and socially mix very little with Gentiles'.

This summary of Mr. Krausz's conclusions will probably accord with the general belief and impression gained by interested lay observers of the communal scene. Where then lies the importance of this book? It is not in the trends that its significance lies, but in the extent, depth, and pace of the changes which this kind of case study reveals. It is not curiosity alone which this class of survey satisfies. Its higher purpose is to supply the data on which, where necessary, remedial decisions may be based. The social scientist is either the ally of the social administrator or, despite the contemporary character of his medium, he is in essence an antiquarian. Antiquarianism has its value but its social function is limited. Mr. Krausz is to be congratulated on his attack upon generalization and on his exploration of particulars.

All sampling methods involve two related dangers. First there is on the part of the sampler a series of value judgements which may affect both the nature of his sampling and his interpretation of its disclosures. Secondly, there is the ratio between one sample, such as a statement made to the sampler by a 'typical' member of a particular segment of the investigated society, and the generality out of which the sample is selected. This ratio may not be capable of quantification or assessment until a late stage in the total survey, by which time the choice of samples will long since have been made and their purport assessed. It is then in practice too late to reopen the sampling. Even if one did so, the circular process would be repeated with perhaps the same dilemma.

For these reasons it is desirable that the researcher should precede his sampling by a study of the history of the community with which he is concerned and of the more objective sources to hand, that is to say the published and unpublished records, so that at every stage of his subsequent inquiry he selects and interprets from the inside. This Mr. Krausz has done. For these reasons the best inquirer is the sojourner within and not the stranger. Mr. Krausz writes that in Leeds he was not a stranger

'but thoroughly acquainted with the community and participated in its life'. The pioneer nature of his work encourages the hope that like studies of other Jewish communities in selected parts of the Kingdom may be made possible by persons and bodies interested or active in the synagogal, educational and social life of those communities or of Anglo-Jewry generally.

ISRAEL FINESTEIN

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Badi, Joseph: *The Government of The State of Israel*, Twayne Publishers, Inc., 31 Union Square, New York 3, N.Y., 1963, 307 pp., $5.00.

Baer, Werner: *The Puerto Rican Economy and United States Economic Fluctuations*, Social Science Research Center, Univ. of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico, 1963, 155 pp., n.p.

Ben-David, Joseph (ed.): *Agricultural Planning and Village Community in Israel*, UNESCO, Paris, 1964, 159 pp., 12s. 6d.

Berger, Arthur S.: *The Liberation of the Person*, The Philosophical Library, New York, 1964, 240 pp., $5.75.

Bermant, Chaim I.: *Jericho Sleep Alone*, Chapman & Hall, London, 1964, 218 pp., 18*s*.

Borchsenius Poul: *And It Was Morning, the Story of the Jews in Our Time*, translated from the Danish by Reginald Spink, Allen & Unwin, London, 1962, 218 pp., 28*s*.

Cohen, Y.: *Juvenile Probation in Israel (A Treatment Service)*, Ministry of Social Welfare, Jerusalem, 1963, 36 pp., n.p.

Cuber, John F.: *Sociology, A Synopsis of Principles*, Vision Press, London, 1964, 658 pp., 60*s*.

Davis, Moshe: *The Emergence of Conservative Judaism, The Historical School in 19th Century America*, The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1963, 527 pp., $5.50.

Eckert, Georg (ed.): *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen GmbH, Hanover, Band III, 1963, 610 pp., DM 24.80.

Feingold, Norman S. and Jospe, Alfred (eds.): *College Guide for Jewish Youth* (new revised edition) B'nai B'rith Vocational Service, 1640 Rhode Island Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, 1963, 102 pp., $3.00.

König, René and Winckelmann, Johannes (eds.): *Max Weber Zum Gedächtnis*, Materialien u. Dokumente zur Bewertung von Werk und Persönlichkeit, Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln und Opladen, 1964, 488 pp., DM. 29.50.

Lipset, Seymour Martin: *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, Heinemann, London, 1964, xv + 366 pp., 35*s*.

Markun, Alan Fletcher: *The New Revolution*, The Philosophical Library, New York, 1963, 423 pp., $7.50.

Shuval, Judith T.: *Immigrants On The Threshold*, Atherton Press, 70 Fifth Ave., 11, N.Y., and Prentice-Hall International, London, 1963, xxiv + 216 pp., $6.75.

Swichkow, L. J. and Gartner, Lloyd: *The History of The Jews in Milwaukee*, Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1963, 547 pp., $6.00.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

BARON (BAR-ON), Raphael Raymond Vincent, M.A., Fellow, Royal Statistical Society; Head, Planning Division, Central Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister's Office, Government of Israel (from 1956); external lecturer, Kaplan School, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Author of: 'The Development of Statistical Methods and their Application in Israel' in *Israel Year-Book*, 1960; 'Seasonality in Israel', Central Bureau of Statistics, 1963; and various articles on productivity in Israel, etc. in Hebrew; and papers and reports on Jewish students in Britain. At present engaged on evaluation studies of the Israel 1961 census of population and housing.

BRONSZTEJN, Szyja, Econ.D.; Assistant to the Statistical Section of the Law Department of the Boleslaw Bierut University in Wroclaw. Publications in Polish (among many other scientific and statistical papers): 'The Jewish Population in Poland in the Period Between the Wars' in *Ossolineum*, Wroclaw, 1963; 'Questionnaire Examination of the Jewish Population of Lower Silesia: Problems of Demography' in *Biuletyn Ż.I.H.*, No. 47–48 (The Jewish Historical Institute Bulletin), Warsaw, 1963. At present engaged on a work on the Jewish settlement of Lower Silesia after the war.

GARTNER, Lloyd P., Ph.D.; The American Jewish History Center, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York. Author of: *The Jewish Immigrant in England (1870–1914)*, 1960; (with L. J. Swichkow) *The History of the Jews in Milwaukee*, 1963; etc.

GINSBERG, Morris, see 'Notes on Contributors', Vol. I, No. 1.

de KADT, Emanuel J., B.Sc., M.A.; Assistant Lecturer in Sociology, London School of Economics. Author of *British Defence Policy and Nuclear War* to be published in 1964, London. He plans to spend a year in Brazil in 1965 and 1966. His special fields of interest are sociology of conflict, and the sociology of religion and ideology.

LERNER, Natan, Dr. in Law and Social Sciences; lawyer; Head, Latin American Desk of the World Jewish Congress; alternate representative of the World Jewish Congress to the ECOSOC of the U.N.; former executive member W. J. C.; Vice-President DAIA; first assistant to the chair of International Law, Faculty of Law of Buenos Aires; legal adviser, Israel Embassy at Buenos Aires; member of the editorial boards of *Davar, Jerusalem*, and Jewish magazines in Argentina. Publications: *Esquema del Derecho Israeli; En Defensa de los Derechos Humanos*; several articles on subjects of International Law in the Juridical Encyclopedia *Omeba*; articles on Jewish subjects in several magazines; translator into Spanish of books on Jewish matters.

LIPMAN, V.D., M.A., D.Phil., F.R.Hist.S.; British civil servant; chairman of Publications Committee, Jewish Historical Society of England. Author of *Local Government Areas 1834–1935, Social History of the Jews in England 1850–1950*, etc. At present completing a study of the medieval Jewish community of Norwich.

LOWI, Theodore J., M.A., Ph.D.; Assistant Professor of Government, Cornell University; Social Science Research Council Fellow. Formerly research associate, Russell Sage Foundation Project on New York City; awarded J. Kimbrough Owen Award of American Pol. Science Assn. (1962). Publications: *At the Pleasure of the Mayor—Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898–1958*, 1964; (ed.) *Legislative Politics U.S.A.*, 1962. Contributor to: *American Political Science Review, World Politics, New Republic, The Reporter*, and Twentieth Century Fund Studies of Civil-Military Relations in *Civil-Military Decisions*, Harold Stein (ed.), 1963.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

MARMORSTEIN, E., see 'Notes on Contributors', Vol. I, No. 2.

STEINBERG, B., M.A.; Headmaster, The Kerem School, Hampstead Garden Suburb; formerly Assistant Master, Hasmonean Grammar School for Boys, and Carmel College. At present engaged in research on contemporary Jewish educational systems.

WILLIAMS, Robin Murphy, Jr., M.S., M.A., Ph.D.; Professor of Sociology, Cornell Univ.; formerly at North Carolina State College, Univ. of Kentucky; visiting professor Univ. of Oslo (Norway), Univs. of Hawaii, Oregon, Southern California, Wisconsin, North Carolina (1942–1946: U.S. War Dept.), Past Pres. Amer. Sociological Assn. Publications: *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*; co-author: *The American Soldier*, Vols. I–II; *American Society* (2nd edition: 1960); co-author: *Schools in Transition*; co-author: *What College Students Think*; *Strangers Next Door*. At present completing studies of women's roles and choice of nursing as a profession. In progress: study of factors in choice of military careers.

JUDAISM

SPRING 1964

CONSERVATIVE TRENDS IN AMERICAN JEWISH LIFE

MELVIN M. TUMIN

DISCUSSANTS

MICHAEL WYSCHOGROD — MARSHALL SKLARE
HENRY SCHWARZSCHILD — ARTHUR HYMAN
LEO PFEFFER — JACOB TAUBES
MAURICE FRIEDMAN — STEVEN S. SCHWARZSCHILD

15 East 84th St., New York 28, N.Y., U.S.A.

Annual Subscription: U.S.A. and Canada $4.50,
Foreign $5.50