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THE STUDY OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

Seymour Martin Lipset

THE researches on Jewish communities around the world presented at this Congress tend to investigate the 'Jewishness' of such communities, and to ask to what extent given communities are assimilating or retaining their 'Jewishness'.¹ Such a point of view may be justified from a religious orientation; that is, one may ask to what extent certain basic tenets and practices of a given form of Judaism are being followed in any community. But from an intellectual perspective it is difficult to defend the position that the study of the Jews should be organized around the maintenance or decline of 'Jewishness'. Rather, I would urge that any effort to develop a systematic study of Jewish communities must be organized in a comparative context. It is impossible to study the sources of variation in the beliefs and practices of comparable sub-groups in different countries without a conceptual framework and methodology which dictates a systematic comparison of the larger societies to which these groups belong.

Some years ago in a comparative discussion of Jewish communities published in *Commentary*, Milton Himmelfarb attempted to revive Heine's Law as a methodological guide to such investigations. Heinrich Heine suggested over a century ago that the only way one could understand the variations in the behaviour of Jews in different countries was by seeing these differences as adaptations to the dominant behaviour patterns within the Gentile community. There is much evidence for this view. Thus British Jewry has a structure somewhat like that of the dominant, high status Church of England; the Chief Rabbi roughly corresponds to the Archbishop of Canterbury. Upper-class Gentile Englishmen are formally, at least, orthodox; they adhere to the traditional Anglican Creed and practice; nonconformist Protestantism has been lower-status in England. In the United States the dominant form of Christianity is congregationalist in organization and 'liberal' in theology. And American Jewry, including orthodox, is also congregationalist in its religious structure. It is true that American Jews attend synagogue less than the entirety of American Protestants attends church. However, well-educated Protestants do not go to church as

frequently as less-educated ones. I would guess that a comparison of American Jews with socially and intellectually comparable Protestants would reveal that the Jews are, in fact, similar in their religious involvement. Similar logic may be applied to the situation in France. There, the Jewish religious organization resembles that of the Catholic Church; it is 'Episcopal'. However, the French Gentile community has been divided historically between a clerical segment, traditionally anti-semitic, and an anti-clerical part, favourable towards Jewish rights. The Jews have been placed by French history in the anti-clerical, or, if you will, non-Catholic community, a community which regards all religious adherence as outmoded. Hence, French Jewry also has been extremely irreligious; in effect, most native-born French Jews have behaved religiously like the rest of the non-Catholic half of France. (The large Argentinian Jewish community closely resembles the French in these respects.) Rather than give further general impressionistic comparisons of this type, I would like to illustrate my general methodological thesis with a discussion of the Americanism of the American Jewish community, for which there is ample evidence.

Many have pointed to the lack of centralized organization within the American Jewish community as a source of weakness. Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan has presented the Reconstructionist proposal for the creation of a *kehilla*, a formal community structure such as once existed in eastern Europe, which would be built around the community centres. The eminent sociologist Robert MacIver, in his famous Report on Jewish organizations made at their behest, also called for more community integration, for greater co-operation, for the merger of organizations performing similar functions, and other integrative measures. Both Kaplan and MacIver, however, were thereby asking American Jews to do something which other Americans refuse to do. The emphasis on achievement, on competition, on individualism, stressed by foreign observers from Tocqueville and Martineau in the first half of the nineteenth century down to recent visitors, affects organizations as it does individuals. Competitive pluralism has characterized associational life within many 'communities' in America. Competition and lack of systematic co-operation is also typical of the American Negro community. More than two decades ago the sociologists Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz concluded their analysis of American fascist groups with the comment that these groups did not constitute an effective threat because of the inability to get together. The factionalism and lack of party discipline of American political parties which so astonishes Europeans is but another example of the same general phenomenon. In a sense, these behaviour patterns may be considered as examples of one of the dominant value emphases in American culture, that of self-orientation as distinct from and stronger than collectivity orientation, to use one of Talcott Parsons's pattern-variables which serve to dif-

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ferentiate societies. And the American emphases on self-orientation and achievement are in turn related to the stress on equality. As Tocqueville well noted, when one thoroughly destroys aristocratic privileges and values, one opens 'the door to universal competition'. To urge the American Jewish community to return to, or to adopt, a community structure derivative from the much more elitist society of Europe is to ignore the interrelationships between sub-group systems and the social system of the larger society.

The various religions in America also reflect the values and pattern of organization of the larger society. Even the Catholic Church with its centralization of theological authority in Rome has been unable to avoid conforming. In the late nineteenth century Pope Leo XIII publicly complained about heretical tendencies within the American Church. He was concerned about the preoccupation with materialistic and Puritanical values. Most recently, the French Dominican R. L. Bruckberger has contended that American Catholics resemble American Baptists or Presbyterians more than they do Mexican or Italian Catholics.² In a recently completed book (*The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, New York, 1963, London, 1964) I report in some detail on the similarities in descriptions and analyses of American religion made from the early nineteenth century down to the present by foreign visitors, both lay and clerical. Almost without exception, such commentators have noted that every American with whom they talked had a religious affiliation, belonged to or supported some denomination. But almost as common is the observation that Americans were reluctant to discuss the content of their own religion or to recommend its advantages to others. The standard American attitude for over a century and a half seems to have been that all religious affiliations and beliefs are good.

Fundamentalist or orthodox true believers have argued that such an attitude reflects a basic secularization of religion, that American religion has no effect on behaviour, that it is merely a weekly conventional ritual. I question this conclusion. In a multi-religious nation, in which no denomination comes close to having a majority of the population among its members, and in which many social situations—school, work, politics—bring together men of differing religions, a general consensus that religious affiliations are irrelevant to other relationships is essential. Even when men believe strongly in their own faith—and there is much evidence that most Americans do so believe—they must be willing to accept the convention that the secular and religious spheres of life are separate, for the sake of an integrated society. This does not, however, conflict with the generally accepted and broadly asserted value, for man and society, of religion in general. One may even urge Americans to fulfil those moral obligations based on religious tenets. But such obligations must necessarily be restricted to the limited

area of 'Golden Rule' morality in which all agree. The alternatives to such a public and common religious creed are limited to those of a national religion with almost universal adherence, intense religious controversy, or a large, often majority, segment of non-believers, the situation most common in present-day Europe. Compared to Jews in most of present-day Europe, American Jews are much more likely to belong to and attend a synagogue, much as American Protestants and Catholics have a higher rate of church attendance than their European co-religionists. It should also be noted that despite greater freedom and opportunity to join the majority culture, American Jewry has had a lower rate of inter-marriage than western European Jews. Thus, American religious communities are properly described as irreligious only in contrast to the orthodoxy inherited by Christians and Jews alike from medieval Europe.

The pattern of shearing away ancient rituals characteristic of various religions in the process of their adaptation to modern America is not a recent phenomenon. In *American Judaism* Nathan Glazer recalls³ that at the founding of Hebrew Union College in 1883 (perceived at that time not as the theological seminary of a distinct Reform movement but simply as an academy to train rabbis), shrimp was served at an opening ceremonial dinner. Almost all the rabbis present remained and only two or three objected and walked out. The tendency to ignore ritual, already dominant in the large community (over a quarter of a million Jews) of the 1880s, was reversed as a result of the mass migration of orthodox Jews from eastern Europe between 1890 and the First World War. The renewed power of orthodox religion simply reflected the export of the religious culture of the Pale to America. It is thus not surprising that with the emergence of an American Jewry, composed increasingly of the native-born, the forces which modified religious ritual before the mass immigration have reasserted themselves.

If we turn to the widely observed tendency of American Jews, as individuals, to obtain higher education and to shift from self-employed business occupations to the more intellectually prestigious though financially less rewarding salaried professions, especially academic and non-academic scientific and culturally creative positions, we see here also a reflection of the predominant national value pattern. An increasing proportion of Americans, currently close to forty per cent of the college-age population, enter institutions of higher learning. Almost ninety per cent of those from higher-status professional and business managerial families do so. Studies of the backgrounds of college students majoring in different subjects reveal that the liberal arts, the more intellectually oriented areas of university education, tend to recruit students from higher-status background, while the more vocational subjects, such as engineering, business, and education (for elementary and secondary school teaching), draw heavily from the upwardly mobile,

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those of working-class or lower-status ethnic background. The propensity of American Jews to send their children to universities, and the increasing trend of the offspring of well-to-do business men and independent professionals to study subjects leading to a creative intellectual or scientific career, rather than to enter the family business, reflects a pattern common among non-Jews as well. Recently, a study by *Fortune* magazine of the way of life of the leading executives in the automobile industry, reported that this group of highly paid leaders of a major American industry, many of whom were of relatively lowly origin, typically boasted to one another about the intellectual accomplishments of their children as nuclear physicists, writers, and academics. The group, almost totally non-Jewish, included many who reported to the *Fortune* interviewer that they were proud of their earning enough to help their \$8,000-a-year academic or research scientist son make his way in the world. Thus the children of the well-to-do New York Jewish clothing manufacturer and the Protestant mid-western vice-president of General Motors appear to have similar aspirations and attainments.

The intellectual achievements of American Jews in the university and elsewhere have sometimes been contrasted with the lesser achievements of English Jewry. Here again, the reduced academic orientation of Jews in Britain reflects the values of the larger society. In the late 1950s only four per cent of university-age English youth entered a university. If one includes, as one should, the various other non-university institutions and types of training in Britain which are contained within universities and colleges in the U.S., the total proportion entering higher education would still be under ten per cent in contrast to close to forty per cent in America. In 1957, only thirteen per cent of the children of men in professional and managerial positions entered British universities, a great contrast with the nearly unanimous pursuit of higher education among those from the same strata in America. And while the large majority of leading English business executives have not attended a university, a 1957 study indicates that 87 per cent of top executives in 287 major American companies have a Bachelor's degree, and 32 per cent have attained one or more advanced graduate degrees.⁴ A study of the most important leaders in American business and governmental life reports that as a group they have much more formal education than the average college graduate. (See W. Bell et al., *Public Leadership*, San Francisco, 1941.) The differences in British and American values and attitude towards education affect not only the Jews of both countries, the bulk of whom are but two generations away from Jewish communities in eastern Europe; they also have sharply affected educational orientations in the liberated colonies of Britain and America. Few have noticed that the two major former American colonies, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, have a much larger college population proportionate to the relevant age group than any country in western Europe. About

fourteen per cent of Filipinos and eleven per cent of Puerto Ricans of college age are in colleges or universities. Former British colonies, including Jamaica, a Caribbean island somewhat comparable in population to Puerto Rico, and Malaya, whose indigenous population is of similar ethnic stock to the Philippines, have fewer than one per cent of the college age group in institutions of higher learning. America's Jews, like the residents of America's former colonies, reflect in their behaviour the national belief that everyone should attend college. And, conversely, groups in Britain or those outside who have absorbed British educational values behave correspondingly. (Of course, in rough comparisons of this kind, one must ignore differences of standard: a British-type undergraduate education differs markedly from one on the American model. But here I am concerned less with quality than with aspirations and social consequences.) It should be noted, of course, that Britain is gradually changing in its educational structure in the process of becoming more equalitarian, and that English Jews like English Gentiles are showing increasing interest in higher education and in thus widening the base of support of creative intellectual and scientific endeavours.

While I have stressed the extent to which the American Jew reflects American society, some sociologists, such as Robert Park and Nathan Glazer, have even argued that the Jews are the *most* American of all groups in the nation, that they exhibit the predominant American traits in a more integrated fashion than any other group. Park, who is one of the major founding figures in American sociology, urged more than forty years ago that courses on the history, culture, and behaviour of the American Jews should be included as a *required* part of the curriculum of all American high schools, that by studying the American Jews in detail, Americans of all backgrounds could learn to understand their nation and themselves. Glazer has argued that Jews everywhere are more sensitive to trends in the larger society than are others, and, being completely free in America to choose their modes of behaviour, they often anticipate the general patterns of the future. Robert Park, who I think would have agreed with Glazer, urged, too, that American social scientists should take as a major topic for research the study of the Jews. (See his reprinted essays, *Race and Culture*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1950.)

Park's two recommendations, courses on Jewish culture and history and intensive social science analysis of Jewish behaviour, were not adopted. The first, of course, was never seriously discussed, while the failure of the second is worthy of detailed investigation as part of the sociology of knowledge. Gentile social scientists, while revealing a considerable fascination with Jewish life, have, I think, avoided studying the Jews precisely because of the large number of Jews in their fields. Sustained contact with Jews suggests to them, I suspect, that Jewish

social scientists would do a better job of understanding the Jewish community than an outsider. But, in fact, with relatively few exceptions, Jewish social scientists with a general reputation in their discipline have also abstained from writing about American Jews. Ely Ginsberg and Daniel Bell of Columbia and Nathan Glazer of the University of California at Berkeley are the major exceptions which come to mind, and only the latter has actually engaged in a major scholarly work on the subject.⁵ (Parenthetically, it may be noted that as far as I know, David Mandelbaum of Berkeley is the only Jewish American anthropologist who has ever written professionally about Jewish communities abroad—other than those in Israel.) The failure of Jewish social scientists to engage in research on the Jews reflects their desire to be perceived as American rather than Jewish intellectuals. To write in depth about the Jewish community would seemingly expose them to being identified as 'Jewish Jews', as individuals who are too preoccupied with an ethnic identity, and who lack the universalistic orientation prized by social scientists and American intellectuals generally. The strength of this attitude among Jewish intellectuals as a group is demonstrated by the comments in a *Commentary* symposium published in 1961.⁶ The editors of *Commentary* asked about fifty young Jewish intellectuals (almost all under thirty-five), many of whom were already prominent, to comment on their attitudes towards being a Jew and to things Jewish. The standard reply of almost all who answered was that they did not see what there was to comment about. They were American Jews, but they felt that the fact of their ethnic or religious background had little to do with their roles as creative intellectuals. It is fairly obvious that these men and women must have little insight into themselves if they really believe this. The fact that they espouse such a conception is, however, what is significant for the purposes of this discussion. American Jewish intellectuals want to receive recognition as individuals, and thus far the larger society has encouraged them in this aspiration. How much this behaviour reflects a capitulation to assimilationist pressures, to a desire to escape from Jewishness in any form, and how much it is an adaptation to the general American convention that each person can and should remain identified with his religious background, with the stricture that such differences should not affect relations in secular roles, remain a topic for future investigation (if anyone is interested in such a study).

To understand the American Jew, it is necessary to be sensitized to factors in American life which used to be discussed in Marxist circles as the problem of 'American exceptionalism'. Given the absence of a socialist movement in America, the limited character of working-class consciousness, the equalitarian social relationships, and the gap in living standards between the American lower strata and those elsewhere, a frequent topic of discussion was whether the analyses and

political tactics fostered by Marxists in other capitalist nations were appropriate to the United States. And, of course, most American Jews, including a majority of those belonging to Zionist organizations, seem to believe that the conditions which bred major antisemitic movements in other nations do not exist in the United States, that 'American exceptionalism' applies to antisemitism as well as to socialism. I have dealt with the sources of various special American characteristics in *The First New Nation*, and I cannot detail my analysis here. I should like, however, to mention two key factors which are particularly relevant to any understanding of the way in which America responds to Jews. Most visible as a special variable is the role of immigration in forming the United States. No other nation has as many religions and ethnic groups whose presence is accepted as a permanent part of the society. In contrast, the Latin American countries have been predominantly Catholic; the English-speaking parts of the Commonwealth are composed largely of descendants of immigrants from the British Isles. For well over a century the United States has sustained a national ideology which defined efforts to emphasize ethnic-religious differences as 'un-American'. The frequent 'nativist' and anti-Catholic movements, which derived much of their strength from the Protestant rural and urban poor, had to be put down by the authority structure. Thus, unlike the situation of Jews elsewhere, those in America were never defined as the largest visible out-group, as one which differed in basic traits from the overwhelming majority. In the United States Jews have been but one of a very large number of religious-ethnic groups, many of whom were subject to some antagonism and discrimination from those who arrived earlier. In Poland, in France, in Germany, and in other parts of Europe, antisemitism has traditionally been the one most important, often almost the only, historic source of internal group prejudice. It has existed in the United States, but as one of many competing prejudices, much less salient on the whole than prejudice against Negroes, Orientals, Catholics, and whichever is the most recent group of impoverished slum-dwelling immigrants, such as Puerto Ricans in New York. Studies of the major post-war right-wing extremist leaders and movements indicate no propensity among their supporters to be antisemitic. Those who believe in conspiratorial theories of politics, such as the belief that Communists control key segments of the American government, do not appear to translate their paranoid beliefs into generalizations about the Jews.⁷

From a long-run perspective on the situation of the Jew, perhaps a more important factor than the impact of diverse immigrant groups is the predominant value system. As many commentators on American values (Louis Hartz, Clinton Rossiter, and others) have urged, the predominant political tradition with which America, as a nation, is identified is a liberal or left-wing one. This stems from the fact that the

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United States was formed out of an anti-colonial revolution, that the Declaration of Independence, its founding document and *raison d'être* as a state, proclaimed the equality of all men, the rights of all to total citizenship and access to power. An American Socialist writer, Leon Samson, seeking during the depths of the Great Depression of the 1930s to explain why efforts to build socialist movements made such little headway, argued convincingly that socialism as an ideology faced the problem of competing with Americanism, a political ideology whose *values* concerning the good society were similar to those of socialism. Samson compared the writings of prominent American conservatives and business men on the nature of preferred social relations with those of leading Marxists, from Marx on down. And he reported that, property relations excepted (the economic content of socialism), the Marxists and the American conservatives agreed in describing the good society as one which stresses equality of interpersonal relations and of opportunity, which urges the necessity for hard efficient work, and which judges each man by his work, not his origins.⁸

The orientations towards men and groups stemming from equalitarian values and the structure of a society composed of many ethnic-religious groups, have given American Jews opportunities for acceptance as individuals such as have never existed in any predominantly Gentile society in history. The Jew can be part of American society in a way that has never been true elsewhere. And this real access, combined with the sensitivity to others resulting from a long history as an out-group minority in other societies, enables the Jew to become, as Park and Glazer suggested, the most American of Americans. I do not want to imply, of course, that there are no basic differences between Jews and other groups, since these persist even when one compares Jews and non-Jews with similar sociological characteristics. A variety of evidence suggests that the intellectual orientation of Jews is greater than that of non-Jews. No other American ethnic-religious group has been as successfully upward-mobile as the Jews. Sociological studies have indicated that Jews differ from various Christian groups on a variety of morality issues, from a relatively low rate of divorce to attitudes towards different types of law violations.⁹ All studies of Jewish political attitudes and behaviour agree that they are far more liberal and even radical on most issues than are others with comparable socio-economic status.¹⁰

The one group of social scientists who have studied Jews systematically are those working on the problem of alcoholism. They are fascinated by the fact that Jews have a much lower rate of alcoholism than any other major ethnic-religious group.¹¹ Jews show different patterns of spending than others at the same level of income. They contribute more to charitable causes; they spend more on the 'good life' for themselves and their families than do Protestants at the same income level.¹² The combination of a positive attitude towards

intellectual activities, relatively greater wealth, and propensity to contribute to worthy causes means that in many cities Jews play a disproportionately important role in supporting major cultural institutions, both as contributors and consumers.¹³

If these comments have any theme, it is that the comparative study of the Jew must be linked inseparably with the comparative study of the Gentile. To focus on the study of the Jews alone is to commit the moral sin of ethnocentrism, but it is also wrong methodologically and will result in erroneous conclusions about the nature of specific Jewish communities and customs. In other words, the renewed efforts to study the Jews in the Diaspora, stimulated by Israeli institutions, should be defined as a special part of comparative sociology, and must be based on the theoretical and methodological procedures of that discipline if they are to prove fruitful, either as a contribution to scholarly knowledge or to political action.

NOTES

¹ This paper in its original version was read at the Third World Congress of Jewish Studies, held in Jerusalem, July-August 1961, in the section 'Contemporary Jewry'.

² See R. L. Bruckberger, trans. C. G. Paulding and V. Peterson, *Image of America*, N.Y., 1959.

³ Chicago, 1957, p. 57.

⁴ See F. C. Pierson et al., *Education of American Businessmen: A Study of University-College Problems in Business Administration*, N.Y., 1959.

⁵ I am ignoring the excellent work done by men employed by Jewish institutions, and by those with specific appointments to posts on Jewish topics, e.g. Jewish History, Near Eastern Languages, Yiddish Literature, etc.

⁶ 'Jewishness and the Younger Intel-

lectuals: A Symposium', *Commentary*, vol. 31, no. 4, April 1961.

⁷ See Daniel Bell, ed., *The Radical Right*, N.Y., 1963.

⁸ See L. Samson, *Toward a United Front: A Philosophy for American Workers*, N.Y., 1933.

⁹ See G. Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, N.Y., 1961, pp. 148ff.

¹⁰ See Lawrence Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1954.

¹¹ See C. R. Snyder, *Alcohol and the Jews, a Cultural Study of Drinking and Sobriety*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958.

¹² See Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958.

¹³ John Gunther, *Inside U.S.A.*, rev. ed., N.Y., 1951.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH: THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY¹

Marshall Sklare

AS WITH other groups in American society the development and utilization of sociological research on Jewry and American-Jewish life is related to a host of social trends, institutional arrangements, political conditions, and scholarly developments. These are in addition to more idiosyncratic factors such as the personal characteristics of strategically-located individuals. While this nexus of influences cannot be analysed in a single paper, sources of research can be reviewed and some aspects of the development and utilization of research can be outlined.²

The development of research on American Jewry takes place against the background of a sub-community which possesses the characteristics of both a religious and an ethnic group. Furthermore this sub-community shares the characteristics of a third type of collectivity: the minority group. I believe that in the case of the American-Jewish community the development and utilization of sociological research is strongly influenced by the fact of—and the feeling about—Jewish minority-status.

I. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF RESEARCH INTEREST AND SUPPORT

In recent years governmental bodies have emerged as a leading source of financial support for social-science research. Continuing an older tradition such bodies also contribute to knowledge by the collection and dissemination of data. Federal, state, or local bodies may collect data on the religious identification of the citizen because they feel that such identification constitutes a significant social characteristic. Another motivation for research-support and data-collection by official bodies is that a given sub-group is believed to pose a problem to the larger society.

An additional source of research stimulation emanates from large foundations dedicated to broad social purposes. Although some have

close government connexions, such agencies function as private bodies. Again, relevant research may be sponsored if a sub-community is felt to constitute a significant segment of the total society, if it is believed to pose some significant policy questions for the national community, or if hostility is being directed against it by significant segments of the general community.

An additional potential source of research-support can be the out-group agency which is hostile to the in-group (i.e. the sub-community) and which seeks to stimulate research in an effort to provide a factual underpinning for its agitational efforts. For our purposes, however, this category remains residual. American antisemitic groups have generally lacked respectability, have possessed limited resources, and have been temperamentally unsuited for the sponsorship of research. Nevertheless, in spite of their sterility as producers of research, such groups may be of significance in the present context. Since they are capable of perverting even the most carefully-stated findings, their existence can work to discourage either the initiation of research or the publication of completed research efforts.

Another source of interest and support is the in-group itself. Jewish agencies may sponsor research as an aid to solving specific problems of programmatic concern or because of a desire to attain a better understanding of the general position of the group on whose behalf they labour.

The fact that while Jews are a numerically insignificant group in the total American population they constitute an important segment of the sociological profession, and especially of its leadership, constitutes an important influence. Thus, Jewish agencies desiring to commission research may discover sufficient talent within the in-group to serve their needs. Jewish sociologists who have contacts within the Jewish community may seek to stimulate interest in research. On the other hand they may constitute an indirect influence; their presence suggests an important human resource which can be tapped for in-group ends.

As with Jews generally, the meaning of Jewish identification to the Jewish sociologist varies from individual to individual. Whatever the identification, we may assume that for the Jewish sociologist research on a Jewish topic has a somewhat different meaning and function from what it has for his non-Jewish colleague.

Some Jewish researchers may utilize their professional talents on in-group-oriented problems because of a pervasive sense of Jewish identification. Others may have strong feelings of alienation from the in-group but, wishing to retain a measure of identification, may proceed to do so by exercising professional skills. For them the sociology of the Jew becomes a means of identification and a functional equivalent to more traditional modes of identification. There are also those whose dominant motivation may be the quest for clarification—wishing to

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identify with the in-group, they may utilize professional skills to clarify for themselves the basis for such an identification. There are others who may be motivated chiefly by curiosity about their origins. An additional group may become involved because their colleagues or academic superiors think it appropriate that they should interest themselves in such matters. Finally there are those who may have strong feelings of hostility to the in-group and whose interest is basically a function of such hostility.³

Motivations of non-Jewish scholars may also be varied. In addition to those whose field of specialization is religious and ethnic groups there are those who are attracted by some of the rather singular features of the Jewish group and of its situation. Others may be motivated by a desire to reduce antisemitism or in other ways to improve the position of the Jewish group. And presumably there are a number of out-group scholars whose attraction to Jewish subjects is explained by hostility to the in-group, although they may present their concern in precisely the opposite terms.

In another category are those investigators, whether members of the in-group or the out-group, whose concern is with a general social problem or process. They study the in-group because they have noticed that their problem or process is notably under-represented or over-represented in the sub-community. They believe that research on the Jews will help them learn more about the central object of their concern.

II. THE GOVERNMENT AND JEWISH RESEARCH

When we turn to a more detailed specification of governmentally-sponsored research and officially-collected statistics it at once becomes apparent that this source has not constituted an important influence in the sociological study of American Jewish life and problems.

In a recent article William Petersen quotes a Dutch sociologist to the effect that every society has its '... sacred subjects, protected from empirical research and analysis by a high wall of magical taboos ... in Holland the sacred area is sexuality, and in the United States it is religion'.⁴ It is difficult to deny that Petersen's statement has some element of truth in the public if not the private sector of the American research economy. Such a taboo grows naturally in a nation where there is emphasis on the separation between the state and the religious groups to which its citizens belong.

In addition to the general reluctance in the United States to give public recognition to religion and to religious groups, there are a number of special features which help explain the lack of interest on the part of official bodies in accumulating data on the Jewish sub-community:

(1) the existence of a liberal society which lacks feudal roots and which has resisted the creation of a Jewish problem;

(2) the existence of a Jewish sub-group which has adjusted very rapidly to the society and which has been in such close harmony with societal norms that the group has not constituted a substantial problem to the society;

(3) the existence of a Jewish sub-group whose loyalty to nations which are hostile, or potentially hostile, to the United States has been minimal (this has been coupled with the fact that the group has lacked loyalties to any country which could be very useful to the nation);⁵

(4) the existence of a Jewish sub-group which has resisted governmentally-sponsored research, especially the collection of official statistics.

In reference to the critical attitudes of Jews themselves it is apparent that such attitudes have been shared—to some extent at least—by a number of other important religious groups. Consequently it is difficult to estimate exactly how decisive Jewish protests have been in blocking such research, particularly since government officials themselves have been ambivalent. At the very least officials have not wished to run the risk of public debate and the exposure of their agencies to possible censure because of a peripheral issue.

National policy has not been an entirely consistent one, however. At certain periods American immigration statistics have included the rubric 'Hebrews' and thus material has been available on the number of Jewish arrivals in the country. Related to such data-collection were the various governmentally-sponsored research programmes initiated several decades ago on the problem of immigrant-adjustment. In both instances Jews were dealt with as a separate group rather than as individuals undifferentiated from those having the same country of origin. Shifting to a contrasting example—this time on the state rather than the federal level and on the contemporary rather than the historical scene—we note the existence in several jurisdictions of marriage-licence forms asking for the religion of the applicant.

Recent attention has focused on the possible use of a question on religion by the Bureau of the Census. Actually included in the Current Population Survey of March 1957, the item was incorporated in preparation for a query on religion in the 1960 Decennial Census.⁶ The controversy surrounding this action highlights the fact that in contrast to many private groups which pressure the Bureau to add items relating to their area of concern, Jewish organizations have been strongly opposed to the inclusion of such a query—one which would undoubtedly produce a rich source of data about the in-group and make available various kinds of demographic information at little or no cost. The Jewish agencies have maintained that the gathering of data on religion should be a private rather than a public responsibility, and that each religious group should itself gather the statistics which it requires. The stress on private initiative is especially surprising, inasmuch as Jews are noted for their lack of resistance to—even approval of—the exercise of

governmental initiative, a stance particularly striking considering the class-position occupied by the group. Furthermore, with the possible exception of one minuscule Jewish agency, it is apparent that Jewish opposition has not been a result of the desire of private bureaucracies to retain traditional prerogatives in the face of an expanding governmental establishment.

The objections of major Jewish agencies have generally been to the effect that data-gathering by the government would constitute a violation of the separation between church and state. While such agencies have been strong proponents of the separation principle as well as of civil rights and civil liberties generally, it is also apparent that they have not taken uniform exception to a variety of practices abhorrent to strict separationists. Jewish minority-status—especially the fear that data would be misused by antisemitic organizations and unfriendly publicists—has constituted a motivation for protest in the present instance which supplements the general objections to practices which appear to conflict with the separation principle. The explanation of minority-status is especially helpful in explaining objections to the release by the Census Bureau of tabulations from the Current Population Survey of March 1957. No principle was at stake, for the data had already been gathered and a start made in their publication. It was felt, however, that the publication of additional findings—especially cross-tabulations on socio-economic status—might imperil group security.

The reaction to officially collected statistics can also be explained on another level: the fear that in spite of the confidentiality of the individual census schedule the welfare of the group may be imperilled by the existence of official records which identify its members. Petersen believes that Nazism has provided group members with confirmation of their fears:

Jewish leaders are not likely to have forgotten the Nazi holocaust that overwhelmed the legal structure of Weimar Germany. This kind of argument is difficult to answer, for logic is overwhelmed by the tragedy of European Jewry. If Jewish leaders practise an exaggerated caution, trusting nothing and no one, can one blame them? Can we be absolutely certain; dare we believe that it can't happen here? ⁷

In discussing what he terms 'an exaggerated caution' Petersen stresses his belief that such a posture has no possibility of truly guaranteeing in-group security:

Let us admit, if only for the sake of the argument, that a Nazi America is possible and ask what has been saved by the lack of a religious census. Most Jews would be known as such through their association with a synagogue or Jewish organizations. Several Jewish agencies . . . have sponsored local self-surveys of Jewish communities, and these lists of identified individuals are ordinarily available to the public. But there may be a person

of Jewish descent, a Jew in 'racial' terms, who has no associations with Jewish organizations, has not a Jewish name, does not consider himself a Jew. Would such a person, in all reasonable probability, have designated himself as Jewish to a census-enumerator, and thus opened the way to later persecution? . . . the lists that the Nazis used to guide their anti-Jewish campaigns . . . were usually the rolls of the Jewish community, not the census lists or even the population registers in the countries where the latter existed.⁸

It is doubtful whether all social scientists, whether members of the in-group or the out-group, would follow Petersen when he labels the position of the Jewish agencies as 'know-nothing liberalism' or when he states that policies of the American Civil Liberties Union and of the Jewish agencies involve these groups ' . . . in a contradiction of their own basic principles'.⁹ Even the most critical would concede that Jewish agencies are not uniformly hostile to official research efforts, especially those done under the aegis of agencies other than the Bureau of the Census and which do not involve ascertaining the sub-group identity of large numbers of individuals. In any case it may be that, while officially collected statistics will not become available for answering important demographic questions, government support for research in other crucial areas may become available especially if such problems can be formulated so as to fit in with on-going research concerns of the federal establishment.

III. THE FOUNDATIONS AND JEWISH RESEARCH

While the giant foundations of the 'public affairs' type stress that they support investigations of problems which are too controversial or 'advanced' for governmental agencies, there has been no Jewish parallel to the Carnegie grant of twenty-five years ago for the purpose of studying Negro-white relations, or to the current grant given by the same institution to the University of Notre Dame for the purpose of surveying the Catholic parochial school system. Various Jewish agencies have attempted to interest the foundations in their problems. Undoubtedly one of the reasons for the lack of responsiveness which they have encountered is the feeling that Jews do not constitute a significant enough problem to the general society to necessitate inquiry. It is apparent, however, that even during the most critical periods in the history of Jewish-Gentile relations in the United States support for research on the problem of antisemitism has had to come almost entirely from Jewish sources. Informed observers note that, while some foundation executives and boards have conceded the importance of such research, they believe that support should be forthcoming from in-group sources.

There are nevertheless examples of projects supported by large out-group-dominated foundations which have accumulated important

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findings which would not otherwise be available. Such knowledge has been accumulated because Jews formed part of the sample being investigated and because religious identification was thought to be a significant background variable. A recent example is 'The Family Growth in Metropolitan America Study', sponsored by the Milbank Fund with grants from the Carnegie Corporation and other agencies.¹⁰ Another recent example—the study of Communist influence on American life sponsored by the Fund for the Republic—is perhaps more instructive for our purposes, although the problem with which it was concerned is of less permanent significance. Since the Fund's study plan called for assessing the impact of Communism on various religious, ethnic, and racial groups, material on the involvement of Jews was accumulated. Significantly, there is no record of Jewish protest to the Fund's study plan. On record, however, is the concern of the researcher himself about a subject of such sensitivity:

. . . [there] is the important matter of the uses to which such material may be put by anti-Semites, who are not interested in understanding a problem, but in using the material . . . as a weapon of attack. . . Any responsible writer must ask himself whether this is a subject that may be discussed publicly. I believe that no detailed understanding of the impact of Communism on American life is possible without an analysis of the relationship between American Jews and the American Communist Party. As to whether such an analysis is required for any general, popular understanding of Communism, I think it is not. There are certain special reasons in the history of the relatively small Jewish Communist group that led it to play a disproportionate role in the American Communist Party. . . In writing a general history of Communism, its relationship to Jews would be a relatively minor matter. But in the United States this was not a minor matter, and does require analysis.¹¹

While Glazer presents the problem solely as one relating to his scholarly conscience rather than any personal group loyalties, his sensitivity to the Jewish minority-group situation is apparent.¹²

IV. JEWISH AGENCIES AND JEWISH RESEARCH

The limited contribution of public bodies and foundations might be compensated for by activity originating in and sponsored by the sub-community itself. At first glance it would appear that the Jewish community offers a highly favourable environment for research. The fact is that if the general community does not feel that Jews are a problem, Jews—for different reasons of course—hold to this position. The notion that being Jewish is a problem characterizes a significant segment of American Jewry just as it did post-Emancipation European Jewry. Further reinforcement for research is provided by the attitude that the solution to the problem of being Jewish should be in the direction of

survivalism rather than assimilation. Given this attitude the profession should presumably be charged with such challenging tasks as periodically locating the position of the group on the survival-assimilation continuum as well as continually measuring the success of particular survivalistic programmes.

The climate for research should further be improved by the fact that American Jewry is increasingly composed of well-educated persons, as well as the circumstance that most Jews—whatever their education—tend to be highly responsive to changing tastes, shifting brow-levels, and the impact of fashion. To the extent that social science is attractive to middle-brow and upper-middle-brow groups, Jews might be concerned with it. The agencies supported by the group might turn to research because they want to improve their operations, learn more about a problem they are charged with solving, investigate new areas for programmatic efforts, reinforce or improve their 'image', produce data which will be useful in substantiating their claims, or be able to point to activity in lieu of the initiation of efforts toward effecting social change.

What then is the actual status and utilization of research in the Jewish agency? While the situation varies from agency to agency and from one field of service to another, the conclusion that research is exceedingly modest both in quantity and quality is not difficult to defend.

Does this conclusion indicate that favourable factors have not really been operative, or that they have been present but have been dominated by counter-forces, or that researchers themselves have found that problems which are of interest to the agencies are not easily researchable, or that in fact research has been initiated but that board members and staff have not authorized further efforts inasmuch as their expectations of the research have gone unfulfilled? Or has the problem been located on a different level—that of a profession becoming alienated by board members and staff who have been responsible for the creation of an uncongenial atmosphere? If alienation is present, has it been quickened by the ready availability to the researcher of many alternative sources of research interest and support?

It is difficult to decide between these choices and to assign proper weight to each; all of them have undoubtedly been present in one situation or another. Generalization is further complicated by the variability in agencies and in fields of service. For purposes of clarifying the issues we shall analyse a number of fields closely related to the programmatic interests or responsibilities of leading Jewish agencies. These fields include philanthropy, religion, and intergroup relations. First, however, we shall survey the situation in the area of demography and social characteristics, a field already touched upon in connexion with governmentally sponsored research. In all four examples we shall

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focus upon agency-sponsored efforts rather than upon research initiated by private scholars and conducted under their own auspices.

V. AN OVERVIEW OF FOUR FIELDS OF STUDY

(a) *Demography and Social Characteristics*

Perhaps the most notable aspect of Jewish demographic research is that protests against the collection of data by official bodies have not given rise to the establishment of an appropriate agency conducted under in-group auspices. One attempt was made to establish such an agency. Known as the Office of Jewish Population Research, the agency was established in 1949 but closed after only six months of operation because of financial problems. In the absence of a specialized scholarly institute, the editors of the *American Jewish Year Book* have attempted to stimulate the preparation of summaries of demographic information and thus inform non-specialists of findings which would otherwise be known to only a small body of experts. They have asked scholars to abstract and synthesize the locally-conducted surveys described below as well as to cull relevant material from general demographic studies. In spite of the position of the Jewish agencies, they have also attempted to utilize whatever data have been available from official sources.

Inasmuch as there has not been any major research effort on a nationwide scale, the local Jewish population survey constitutes the main scholarly resource in the field. Sponsored by individual Jewish federations such surveys have been conducted in a number of middle-size and small communities. Of the four largest Jewish communities in the nation (New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Chicago) only Los Angeles—the single city characterized by a rapidly-growing Jewish population—has been surveyed.

The ostensible objective of the Jewish population survey is that of gathering data which will be useful for planning purposes. The emphasis is on discovering such facts as the age-profile of the population, the size of the family, occupational distribution, and whether families plan to remain in their present place of residence. In recent years there has been a tendency to broaden interview schedules so as to include items on involvement in Jewish and general organizational life, on the observance of Jewish rituals, and on attitudes toward Jewishness.

While it has become customary to consult with a national agency—the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds—population surveys are locally directed and financed. In middle-size communities a member of the staff of a local university is generally placed in charge of the study. The sociologists, psychologists, and economists so employed have differed widely in their general competence, their familiarity with survey techniques, and their knowledge of the unique problems of the Jewish population survey. Because of these and other factors, such as the

amount of time given to the project by the director as well as the size of his budget, surveys have varied considerably in the elaborateness of their design, the sophistication of their questionnaires, and the accuracy of their results. In some of the studies an attempt is made to enumerate each household while in others some type of sampling procedure is utilized.¹³

Whatever the quality of these surveys a review of survey reports makes it apparent that they generally fail to provide anything approaching an exhaustive treatment of the data which they collect. Furthermore, students who have attempted to integrate findings from more than one report have encountered such obstacles as a lack of clarity about sampling procedures, variations in questionnaire wording, and the use of different intervals or categories in data-collection or tabulation.

The scholarly shortcomings of the surveys aside, an equally crucial issue is the reaction of agencies which have sponsored surveys. This is difficult to assess. It is also difficult to delineate and evaluate the process by which survey recommendations are formulated and eventually implemented. What is apparent is that these activities are generally carried on in an informal manner; in many cases recommendations are not included in the formal report of the survey. In demonstrating the uses to which they put surveys federations most commonly cite assistance in the location of new facilities. They also cite cases in which building programmes were modified on the basis of survey findings. However, the utilization of surveys for even these limited purposes may create resistance, especially in cases where affiliated agencies have attained considerable prestige.¹⁴

Whether or not the fullest use has been made of such surveys for local planning purposes it is readily apparent that the surveys have not been utilized for the purpose of clarifying problems which are of a long-range and persistent character. Furthermore, even if the number of surveys should increase and their quality improve, the difficulty of utilizing a local approach for the analysis of issues which are essentially nationwide in scope would remain. Examples of such issues include the number of Jews in the United States, the extent of movement from the in-group to the out-group and from the out-group to the in-group, the internal migration and the residential mobility of the Jewish population, the fertility of the group, and the income of the Jewish population.

(b) *Philanthropic Behaviour*

While exact statistics are lacking it is probable that more Jews contribute to Jewish philanthropies than belong to synagogues. Furthermore, while it has been demonstrated that Jews compare unfavourably with most other religious groups in respect to their degree of religious involvement and belief, it has also been discovered that (with the exception of a number of sectarian groups) they exceed members of other

religious groups in respect to philanthropic giving. As a consequence, the size of the Jewish philanthropic establishment bulks exceedingly large and is out of all proportion to the group's numerical size and wealth. Thus, while in other ethnic-religious groups consideration of religious behaviour would most appropriately follow analysis of demographic and social characteristics, for the Jewish group philanthropy may constitute a more logical priority. . . .

A review of the literature suggests that although out-group-sponsored research has provided some data about the proportion of Jews and non-Jews making philanthropic contributions as well as about the comparative size of their gifts, this research is richer in providing statistical information than it is in clarifying motivational factors. Since Jews constitute such a small proportion of the population-at-large, samples are generally too small to allow for a detailed analysis of Jewish attitudes and behaviour.¹⁵

For understandable reasons in-group-conducted research on Jewish philanthropic behaviour has been almost entirely the responsibility of agencies rather than of private scholars. In the light of the size of the Jewish philanthropic establishment the amount of research which has been conducted has been small. As we have seen, the federations have succeeded in providing some data about the demographic and social characteristics of American Jewry but they (and other Jewish fundraising agencies) have done very little to clarify problems in the area of philanthropic behaviour. While some of the population surveys have included relevant items on their questionnaires, little has been learned from this source.¹⁶

In recent years two communities (St. Louis, Mo., and Essex County, N.J.) have commissioned studies of their contributors. Conducted by Social Research, Inc., and the National Opinion Research Center respectively, these studies differ in methodology and in the specific problems to which they are addressed. Neither study, however, has been the subject of thoroughgoing discussion in lay and professional circles. Some have indicated their belief that St. Louis and Essex County constitute problem communities and that these survey findings, therefore, have strictly local implications. This sentiment is reinforced by the lack of comparable research in middle-size communities in which campaign results have exceeded those attained in St. Louis and Essex County.

As we noticed in the section on demographic and social characteristics, should the number of studies in middle-size communities increase the problem of the handful of giant cities where the majority of American Jews reside would remain. One little-known but relevant study in such a community has been conducted by Paul Lazarsfeld. In collaboration with Hans Zeisel, Lazarsfeld studied attitudes of federation contributors in New York City. Having a very limited budget, Lazarsfeld and Zeisel confined their interviews to individuals

who had recently either raised or lowered their contribution to the federation. They proceeded on the theory that: 'By comparing the two extreme groups of increases and decreases . . . the main psychological factors would be brought more clearly into relief.' ¹⁷

Some years later the same agency commissioned A. J. Wood and Company to conduct a more ambitious study of their contributors. It was found that: ' . . . an emotional appeal stressing the protection of the name of the Jewish community and the need for taking care of our own people would have the strongest motivating influence in persuading the public to contribute to Federation'. ¹⁸ This recommendation ran counter to the thinking of some of the agency's staff and supporters, oriented as they were to serving both the out-group and the in-group. The Wood study, now a decade old, constitutes the most recent effort to study philanthropic behaviour in one of the giant communities.

(c) Religious Behaviour

What is known about Jewish religious behaviour is primarily the result of the work of private scholars, of those conducting general investigations on Jewish attitudes, or of graduate students whose dissertations are relevant to the area. The absence of agency-sponsored Jewish research contrasts strongly with the situation in Protestantism. The disparity is sharpened by the fact that in many respects Protestantism has served as a model for the reshaping of Jewish religious institutions. It is true that the research conducted by the metropolitan Protestant church federations, by the Protestant denominational agencies, and by the national Protestant co-ordinating bodies has been criticized by both insiders as well as outsiders for its service-orientation and for its limited level of sophistication and abstraction, but it is also correct to state that no parallel research efforts have been undertaken in the Jewish community.

Since Reform has attained the highest level of both acculturation and bureaucratization we should expect that it would lead the way. The surveys issued by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (the congregational union of the Reform group) make it apparent that acculturation and bureaucratization have to some extent taken effect. These surveys, released at regular intervals, give a detailed picture of certain aspects of the operation of local Reform congregations. Membership statistics, sources of income, nature of expenditures, types of congregational activity, religious school organization and administration, personnel policies, and confirmation practices are some of the areas covered in the surveys. The material however is of limited utility since it merely summarizes the statistical data submitted by congregations: presentation of the data is more descriptive than analytical. Nevertheless the Union's surveys are exceptional, for neither the Conservative nor the Orthodox group work along these lines.

While the Union has confined itself to fact-finding it has given serious consideration to more ambitious types of research. The agency has been pushed in this direction by the state of the contemporary synagogue, especially by the fact that attendance at religious services has remained precariously low in spite of the considerable growth in synagogue affiliation. As the group which has made the maximum number of revisions in the traditional religious services Reform has found this condition especially troublesome. The assumption of Reform revisionism has been that the traditional service places overwhelming barriers in the way of the achievement of religious satisfaction by the modern Jew. It was expected that modifications such as changing the musical modes employed in the service, shifting the language of the prayer book and modifying its content, and shortening the number and duration of services would result in increased satisfaction and more regular attendance.

During the post-Second World War era the temples have flourished in spite of minimal interest in religious worship. The belief then grew that some further changes must be instituted to bring attendance at religious services into better balance with affiliation. But what should these changes be? And what assurances were there that changes would produce the desired result? To clarify the issues and to gather data on which to base new reforms it was decided to institute a series of research projects. Three committees were named to formulate and to review a programme of research. One consisted of leading laymen, rabbis and members of the Union's staff; another of important Jewish scholars; and a third of social scientists. The last-named committee included well-known Jewish sociologists, psychologists, and psychoanalysts as well as a considerable number of eminent academicians of Protestant background. A number of staff members of leading Protestant seminaries were included on the social science committee.

The sophisticated and long-range projects suggested by the scientific group were far different from anything previously encountered by the Union. While the leadership of the agency gave their general approval to the recommendations of their social science consultants, they were not convinced that the projects held the key to their problems and they consequently recommended that extra-budgetary sources should be located to support the programme.

Another agency, the United Synagogue of America—the congregational union of the Conservative group—completed a survey (actually a number of small related surveys) during the period 1950-3. The research, however, represented more a personal project of an executive of the agency than a commitment of the entire organization. Accordingly, it was conducted with a small budget and with a minimum of outside assistance.¹⁹

A study of the results of the survey makes apparent the existence of

a wide gulf between the norms of Conservative Judaism and attitudes and observances of the Conservative laity, including the officers and the board members of the congregations. The survey results were not widely disseminated. No additional surveys of the Conservative movement have been sponsored by the agency during the past decade.

(d) *Antisemitism*

It is customary to say that research on intergroup relations generally, and on antisemitism specifically, is neglected. However, the statement is based largely upon comparisons with such rapidly-growing fields as small-group theory or medical sociology. Admittedly, research on antisemitism is at a comparatively early stage in comparison with other specializations, but the important point in the present context is that agency-sponsored efforts have been extensive in comparison with the study of Jewish demographic, philanthropic, and religious behaviour.

Research on antisemitism also differs from these fields on certain qualitative as well as quantitative grounds. Thus, in contrast with the study of demographic, philanthropic, and religious behaviour, the field of antisemitism has been characterized by a sharing of interest and responsibility as between the Jewish agencies and private scholars. Scholars have continued certain lines of thinking originating in agency-sponsored projects, while agencies have maintained close contacts with the academic world. Examples are encountered of former participants in agency-supported efforts who hold a favourable image of the agency which subsidized their research. For example, in recalling his association with the American Jewish Committee, which subsidized research leading to the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality*, Nevitt Sanford praised the agency in very warm terms. His positiveness is undoubtedly related to the freedom which the agency allowed him—freedom which he believes was crucial to the success of the effort:

They [A.J.C.] never asked for . . . any statement of a research design, nor were they offered more than a general idea of the kinds of findings that might be made. They knew only that approved quantitative methods were being used and that the thinking of the group was guided by psychoanalysis and by the broad social theories of Drs. Horkheimer and Adorno. They never indicated what they wanted us to do or what they hoped the research would find out. Thus, the group members were always free to pursue hunches or to follow up whatever was suggested by a particular finding. Full advantage was taken of this.²⁰

Jewish agencies have sponsored research on a variety of aspects of antisemitism and have utilized a diversity of approaches in studying this problem. Examples include research on the size and effectiveness of antisemitic organizations, public opinion research on the pervasiveness of antisemitism, studies of the psychodynamics of antisemitism,

investigations of crucial historical episodes in Jewish-Gentile relations, and research into the dynamics of intergroup living. Investigation of strictly methodological problems—such as that of interviewer bias—has also been carried on. Furthermore, evaluation studies have been done for the purpose of pre-testing items designed for mass distribution or in order to measure the effectiveness of propaganda themes. The extent of the research is considerably larger than is reflected in the published literature.²¹

One important problem in the field has been that of variability in the level of financial support. This has been a reflection of the changing amounts of money available to the agencies as a whole, normal shifts from one programmatic emphasis to another, and, finally, shifts in regard to the utility of research as a tool for combating antisemitism. The agency which has operated most consistently in the field, the American Jewish Committee, has itself experienced the impact of these factors. The Anti-Defamation League—currently sponsoring a wide-ranging investigation of antisemitism—has worked in the field more on an episodic than a consistent basis. The American Jewish Congress, which at one time operated in an ambitious way, discontinued its programme several years ago.²²

How can we account for the greater interest in the study of antisemitism than in other fields of study? One possible explanation is that antisemitism constitutes the most deeply felt, most threatening, and most manifest of all in-group concerns. Thus, if any inclination towards research exists antisemitism receives highest priority. Related to this is the fact that inasmuch as it is the out-group which is antisemitic, antisemitism constitutes a phenomenon fundamentally different from other areas of concern. Since control of the out-group is difficult to achieve, the in-group may be inclined to seek guidance from unusual sources.

Research on antisemitism is also increased by virtue of the fact that there is no danger of creating instability in in-group agencies. Such research does not pose problems for the in-group agency which could have dangerous consequences; it ordinarily does not present issues which the agency feels might be threatening. Thus we have noted that findings about the level of Jewish income inevitably involve the question of what biased individuals will do with this information; we have observed that research on religious attitudes and behaviour is thought to create institutional instability. To mention a research area we have not considered, the investigation of the problem of intermarriage would inevitably involve the awkward question of what steps should be taken to reduce or contain this process.

Such considerations are absent when it is the out-group which is being studied. It is true that *strategy* may dictate that the results of a particular investigation on antisemitism be suppressed. For example, if the level of antisemitism is found to be abnormally high, it may be

thought that publication is inadvisable because of the possibility of creating a 'bandwagon effect'. While such restrictions may ultimately affect the morale of the researcher they do not interfere with research in any direct way. In contrast to other areas which we have examined, then, existence of a problem—antisemitism—serves as a stimulant to research rather than as a depressant.

We must also be aware that, for the member of the in-group, research about antisemitism usually rests on the individual's orientation to research generally. Unless that orientation is strongly negative, and unless the problem of antisemitism is viewed as minor, research may well receive a sympathetic hearing. Furthermore, individuals of diverse value-orientations may be able to reach agreement about the importance of research on antisemitism. For example, the in-group oriented individual may be agreeable both because of his desire for personal security as well as his interest in group maintenance. The out-group oriented person may also be co-operative: in addition to his desire for personal security he may want to create a social situation in which assimilation will be more feasible. Consensus about the need for research in other areas, however, is not so easily achieved; there is rarely a common ground where divergent value-orientations may meet.

What use has been made by the agencies of the research which they have sponsored? An adequate answer must await the publication of definitive histories of the agencies as well as analyses of the various techniques which they have utilized to combat antisemitism.²³ Nevertheless, the general result of the research is clear: it has been in the direction of increasing agency sophistication. The ideas once shared by some laymen and professionals which research has modified include the following: antisemitism is a phenomenon which can be combated by the distribution of materials containing accurate information about the in-group; prejudice is a reaction to particular qualities or actions of the in-group; the predisposition towards anti-Jewish sentiment grows as rapidly at one stage in the life-cycle as another.

One additional aspect of research on antisemitism is of interest. The field has not only been broad enough to give rise to different approaches to studying the problem of antisemitism but it has also been characterized by a tendency observable in scholarship generally: a tendency to challenge well-established lines of investigation. George Lundberg has been the pre-eminent example of this trend. He has held firmly to the concept that prejudice is a reaction to particular qualities or actions of the in-group. According to him:

It is only when a sub-group fails to serve the purposes of the larger community and appears to be developing a higher loyalty to its own sub-group, or even engages in activities believed to be hostile to the larger community, that hostility on the part of the larger community toward the sub-group appears.

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Lundberg's ideas attracted the attention of an in-group agency, the American Council for Judaism. Funds were made available by the A.C.J. to the Public Opinion Laboratory of the University of Washington for a series of investigations ('Project Concord') designed to test Lundberg's ideas.²⁴ The project was placed under the supervision of his long-time associate, Stuart C. Dodd.

The findings of Project Concord have not been made available. The single published source is clearly sympathetic with A.C.J. views.²⁵ Nevertheless, the A.C.J. has not found Project Concord helpful in formulating concrete programmatic activities. According to its executive director: 'We are therefore relying to a far greater extent, for practical results, on the current research programme involving historical and legal study.'²⁶

VI. FUTURE RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION

Will research develop more rapidly in the future than it has in the past? A case can be made for a positive response to this question. The background for such a response is the possibility that antisemitism will continue to diminish and that with such diminution in-group problems may shift towards questions of group adjustment and survivalism. This shift may not only encourage attention to a new and challenging area, but by reducing sensitivity to the Jewish minority situation it may also help to create a more permissive atmosphere for research.

The general rise in sophistication and the impact of a research-oriented culture may also result in an increase in the number of studies devoted to the measurement of agency problems, especially the effectiveness of agency techniques and programmes. If imaginatively handled some of this research may throw light on the newer problems of group adjustment and survivalism.

What conditions will have to be met in order for research to proliferate? It will obviously be necessary to add research personnel to agency staffs and to create appropriate conditions for the utilization of such personnel. But research will not flourish if confined to the agency setting. Advance will also involve the interesting of a number of academicians in concerning themselves with Jewish problems as a long-range interest and in conducting relevant research projects as part of their normal academic routine. Furthermore, given the present state of organization and development in the social sciences, the establishment of one or more research institutes will be required in addition to individual efforts by members of university staffs. Such institutes will be charged both with the development and implementation of long-range research strategy as well as that of engaging in research projects on a contract basis.

Certainly the proliferation of endowed chairs at out-group publicly

sponsored universities points to a general receptivity on the part of the academic community. Almost uniformly, however, such chairs have been devoted to the classical fields of Jewish scholarship such as Biblical and Talmudic studies, linguistics, religion and philosophy, and Jewish history, rather than to the area of our concern.

More significant for the future may be in-group-sponsored institutions of higher learning, chiefly Yeshiva and Brandeis. Until very recently American Jews did not follow the Protestant and Catholic model and establish a network of colleges and universities.²⁷ At Brandeis the Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies is considerably larger than in other institutions of similar size, but as in the case of the chairs established at general universities the emphasis is strongly classical. Brandeis's Florence Heller Graduate School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare is, however, conducting on a contract basis a small-scale project relevant to in-group concerns.

Another category of in-group-sponsored institutions which may have potentialities for the future consists of schools devoted to the training of rabbis, scholars, and teachers. While some of the institutions in this category differ radically from the traditional *yeshiva* in curriculum and scholarly orientation, as yet they have done little to stimulate sociological research on contemporary problems.²⁸

It is possible that rabbinical seminaries, whether because of the stimulus of Protestant and Catholic models or because of other factors, will expand their area of concern to include social science. It is also possible that Jewish-sponsored institutions of higher learning, having fully established their academic respectability as general institutions of higher learning, may move in the direction of seeking to emphasize the distinctive character of the institution and thus may encourage scholarship on the contemporary Jewish community and its problems. It is also possible that if such institutions already have this character they may supplement their support of classical scholarship with this newer emphasis. It is further possible that individual scholars may also be increasingly receptive to topics of Jewish interest—attraction to such topics out of alienation from or hostility towards the in-group may be encountered less in the future than it was in the past.²⁹

Should greater agency interest become manifest, should scholars be increasingly ready to work in the field, and should appropriate institutional frameworks be established, the burden of proof will then be shifted. Social science will be confronted with the question of whether it is equal to the tasks being thrust upon the discipline.

SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

NOTES

¹ An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 57th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C., 31 August 1962. The paper was developed in keeping with the theme of the meeting: 'The Uses of Sociology'.

² The symposium edited by Harry L. Lurie and Max Weinreich, 'Jewish Social Research in America: Status and Prospects', Vol. IV (1949) of *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* (pp. 147-312), contains material which is still pertinent to a current understanding of problems in this area.

³ The Jewish orientation of the Jewish social scientist has been discussed briefly by Seymour M. Lipset ('Jewish Sociologists and Sociologists of the Jews', *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 [July 1955], pp. 177-8) and by Joshua A. Fishman ('American Jewry as a Field of Social-Science Research', *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science*, Vol. XII [1958-9], pp. 70 ff.).

⁴ William Petersen, 'Religious Statistics in the United States', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. I, No. 2 (Spring, 1963), p. 165.

⁵ The Jewish attitude toward Israel has posed a unique problem: on the one hand it is sympathy for a country which is strongly pro-American, but on the other hand Israel has been under attack by its neighbours. As a consequence Jewish sympathy for a pro-American nation has not always been esteemed in official circles but rather has sometimes been seen as complicating the achievement of the nation's foreign-policy objectives.

⁶ For an instructive analysis of the controversy engendered by this action see Charles R. Foster, 'A Question on Religion', University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1961. (This publication is No. 66 in the Inter-University Case Programme series.)

⁷ Petersen, op. cit., p. 176.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 176-7.

⁹ Ibid., p. 178. As we would expect, it is the demographers who have been the most critical of the Jewish position. Objections have ranged all the way from the cautiously worded statement of the president of the American Statistical Association, Philip M. Hauser ('On the Collection of Data Relating to Race, Religion and National Origin', *The American Statis-*

tician, Vol. XVI, No. 2 [April 1962] pp. 123-4) to the blunt declaration of Donald M. Bogue in his *The Population of the United States* (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1959, p. 709): 'It is to be hoped that the Bureau of the Census will give a high priority to this item [a question on religion] in 1970, as penance for the policy forced on it in 1960.'

¹⁰ See C. F. Westoff, R. G. Potter, Jr., P. C. Sagi, and E. G. Mishler, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961).

¹¹ Nathan Glazer, *The Social Basis of American Communism* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), pp. 131-2.

¹² In connexion with our previous discussion regarding the government and Jewish research, it should be noted that Glazer's footnotes point to the possible existence of some confidential government research on the role of Jews in the Communist Party.

¹³ It is perhaps significant that the survey which appears to come closest to observing professional standards is that of Washington, D.C. (see Stanley K. Bigman, *The Jewish Population of Greater Washington in 1956* [Washington, D.C., The Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, 1957]).

Of the academicians who have been employed by the federations Albert J. Mayer of Wayne State University is of special interest both because of his continuing relationship with the Jewish Welfare Federation of Detroit and the possible utility of his procedures in other metropolitan communities.

¹⁴ An analysis of the shortcomings of institutional location in Chicago has been developed by Erich Rosenthal: 'This Was North Lawndale', *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (April 1960), pp. 79-82. While no community-wide survey has been attempted, several years ago the Chicago federation established a planning department.

¹⁵ As an example of this problem see the sophisticated study by James N. Morgan, Martin H. David, Wilbur J. Cohen, and Harvey E. Brazer, *Income and Welfare in the United States* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962) especially pp. 257-87.

¹⁶ For some further details about the state of research in this area see Marshall

Sklare, 'The Future of Jewish Giving', *Commentary* (Vol. XXXIV, No. 5), November 1962, pp. 416-26.

¹⁷ Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel, *A Study of Giving to Federation*, Office of Radio Research, n.d., p. 2.

¹⁸ A. J. Wood & Co., 'A Comprehensive Analysis of the Activities of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York City', Philadelphia, 1952, p. 166. The Wood study is limited in scope: the sample is confined to those who already contribute to the agency, the total philanthropic behaviour of such contributors is not examined, and the analysis is generally confined to the variables of age, income, and religious affiliation (Reform, Conservative, or Orthodox). Both Lazarsfeld-Zeisel and Wood encountered difficulty in gaining access to respondents, and thus the refusal rate in both studies was high.

¹⁹ Dr. Emil Lehman conceived and directed the survey. Babette Kass, then on the staff of the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University, provided technical assistance.

²⁰ Nevitt Sanford, 'The Approach of the Authoritarian Personality', in *Psychology of Personality*, ed. by J. L. McCary (New York, Grove Press, 1959), pp. 262-263.

²¹ A reasonably complete inventory is difficult to compile since the agencies have not published listings of their unpublished studies. Full bibliographies of the books and articles which have grown out of their published studies are also not readily available.

²² An important difference between the American Jewish Committee and the other agencies is that research at the Committee has been a concern of top-level staff. This is manifest in John Slawson's *The Role of Science in Intergroup Relations* (New York, Institute of Human Relations Press, 1962).

²³ In this connexion see Goodwin Watson, *Action for Unity* (New York, Harper and Bros., 1947), and Robert M. MacIver, *Report on the Jewish Community Rela-*

tions Agencies (New York, National Community Relations Advisory Council, 1951).

²⁴ The quotation from Lundberg is contained in his address entitled 'Pluralism, Integration, and Assimilation' delivered to the Annual Conference of the American Council for Judaism in April 1957.

²⁵ See William R. Catton, Jr. and Sung Chick Hong, 'The Relation of Apparent Minority Ethnocentrism to Majority Antipathy', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1962), pp. 178-91.

²⁶ Personal communication from Leonard R. Sussman, 9 July 1962.

²⁷ While Yeshiva University is older than Brandeis, in its present form it is a comparatively young school. As the name indicates Yeshiva emerged from an academy of higher Jewish learning. For several decades it was basically just such an academy together with a men's college.

²⁸ A number of agencies exist in the Jewish community for the purpose of stimulating research, especially research on modern Jewish life. Perhaps the most notable such agency is the Conference on Jewish Social Studies. While the Conference has at one time or another commissioned or subsidized research its resources have generally been sufficient merely to cover publication costs of its journal *Jewish Social Studies*. Another relevant agency is the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research. Unlike the Conference YIVO was established overseas. It has had a host of problems relating to the relevancy of its programme and linguistic orientation to American Jewry and has succeeded in eliciting support from only a narrow segment of the Jewish community. Current hopes for financial support centre around the Foundation for Jewish Culture.

²⁹ The most recent development in the field is the announcement by Brandeis of the establishment of the Philip W. Lown Graduate Center for Contemporary Jewish Studies.

THE ADULT PROGRAMME OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTRE IN THE UNITED STATES

Samuel D. Freeman

THE functions of the Jewish Community Centre¹ have been repeatedly discussed.² Its special nature is perhaps best typified by its adaptability to change³ as a function of its democratic character. When in the latter half of the nineteenth century the major needs of its Jewish constituency were those related to 'the purpose of cultivating a better knowledge of the history, literature and doctrine of Judaism . . .',⁴ these were substantially reflected in the lectures, debates, and dramatics which formed a substantial proportion of its activities. Oscar Janowsky makes these purposes the first in his threefold classification of the history of Jewish Community Centres and YMHAs:⁵

- (a) The early literary society period (1850-80), in which programmes included lectures, debates, dramatic performances, and social activities;
- (b) The settlement house period (1880-1920), in which the needs of the tidal waves of Jewish immigrants overshadowed the original purposes of the YMHAs and;
- (c) The Jewish Community Centre period (1920 to the present), in which the Centre was conceived of as an all-embracing Jewish community agency, with varying emphases upon its Jewish survival purposes, non-sectarian character, and neutrality in social, religious, and political issues.

Another aspect of its character is to be seen in the variation of programme from Centre to Centre and region to region. These variations (which are based upon the size of the Centre, in terms of budget, membership, or size of the Jewish population as well as the differences in background of Centre leadership) are inter-related with the adaptability of the Centres, for it is only the monolithic institution which resists change. And it is also true that the introduction of changes in programmes is markedly influenced by what the other Centres do as

well as the general cultural milieu. A Centre in Los Angeles is as much affected by the development of an Israeli Trade Fair in Newark as it is by the much-discussed cultural explosion in America.

The nature of the Centre is rooted in its American character. One has only to visit Jewish Community Centres in Latin America, Europe, and Israel to see the extent to which the American imprint has been transferred; an imprint readily identifiable in terms of democratic control, use of trained professionals, programming as a tool of personality development, etc. When these characteristics are manifest, they are unfailingly attributable to lay or professional leaders who have been influenced by American standards. These characteristics are best summed up in the one quality 'adaptability'.

While it is easier to demonstrate this quality in the broader sweep of history during the past hundred years, it is still possible to determine the directions of the Centre's programme and in this case, more specifically, the adult programme, during the past decade. In 1953 an intensive study of the adult programme in the Jewish Community Centres was completed,⁶ and another survey has just been completed giving us comparable statistics to which reference will be made to substantiate conclusions with respect to the way in which the Centre's adult programme demonstrates its adaptability.

What must the Centre adapt itself to? Obviously, to the changing character of its adult constituency. Manheim Shapiro has called our attention to the increase in its educational level. This is reflected in the phenomenal growth of adult classes in Centres. Eleven years ago none of the Centres had more than five classes in their programmes, while today 30 per cent reported from six to fifty-four classes in their Centres, more specifically in the large or large-medium Centres. There has also been a marked rise in the quality of committee leadership. The new breed of young well-educated intellectuals who give leadership to adult programmes now are able to deal with more abstract concepts and to develop more complex programme ideas.

A further result has been an increase in the use of volunteers in the leadership of discussion groups. Volunteers now account for 88 per cent of the total number of discussion leaders in Jewish Community Centres. This suggests that Centres will continue to explore the intellectual resources of the community in the development of the discussion-group programme. Some idea of the extent of the growth which has already taken place in the past eleven years is gained by comparing the 44.5 per cent of the Centres offering discussion programmes in 1950-1 with the 74.6 per cent today.⁷

Manheim Shapiro has made reference to the political liberalism of the Jew and the congregating of the Jewish community around urban centres; and he has urged that American Jews be assisted to live as full equals and partners in the total American society. In no area is this

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need caught up and dealt with more dramatically than in the Centres' growing concern with public affairs. As early as 1948 Janowsky reported: 'The Jewish centre field . . . is no longer content to remain a neutral service facility. The majority wants the Jewish centre to take a position or to sponsor action on issues which affect Jews directly, and over 40 per cent want such involvement even on general issues. The slogan, "neutrality", is reserved for those questions which one does not regard as urgent and compelling. And the urge for action is particularly evident among the professional staffs of the Jewish Centres.'⁸ Two years later, however, in a survey of Jewish Community Centres, 85 per cent reported no social action programmes of any kind.⁹ Those Centres which reported or described their social action programmes referred to activities carried on by Centre groups rather than the Centre as an entity. Of the twelve activities described, five were limited to discussion in educational meetings, one involved the collection of food, and four actually involved the mailing of letters to Congressmen, contact with a local judge regarding a traffic light, petitions, resolutions, mass meetings, or delegations.¹⁰

This gap between the aims or interests of the leadership in Centres and the actual programme was far wider than is normal for other activities. However, the roots of public affairs activities have been nurtured in the intervening years by the public affairs institutes conducted at Jewish Welfare Board Section meetings and Biennial Conventions, by the interchange of information among Centres, the rise of an alert lay and professional leadership, and a more favourable climate of opinion regarding participation in public affairs.

While it is true that about half of the Centres (48.5 per cent) today have some type of public affairs programme, it is also true that one-quarter of these have political action programmes, i.e. activities involving the passing of resolutions, letters to Congressmen, mass meetings, etc. In eleven years the percentage of Centres with social action programmes has thus risen from 15 per cent to 28 per cent. Over half of these programmes (55 per cent) entail participation in community councils or committees and community service projects. The latter include such projects as a college student loan fund, Red Cross Blood-mobile, crippled children special crafts programme, and mass polio inoculation. Practically all (83 per cent) the social action programmes¹¹ are to be found in the medium-medium to large size centres. The conclusion to be drawn is that smaller Centres find it more difficult to engage in activities in which the Centre as an institution takes an independent position on a political or social issue.

While almost half (48.5 per cent) of the Centres studied have public affairs programmes of one kind or another, most of these (78 per cent) are devoted to discussions of public issues. They were distributed as shown overleaf.

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	<i>Per cent</i>
Election forums	7.2
Local political issues	7.2
National political issues	24.2
International issues	19.3
Social, educational, and cultural problems (not related to specific legislation)	24.5
Specifically Jewish issues (Sunday closing, religion in the public schools, Eichmann Case, etc.)	6.0
Miscellaneous	9.6

The very large proportion of topics of general interest is ample evidence of the concern which Centre adults show for issues of every variety. We may conclude that the Centre adult programme continues to an ever-increasing extent to develop within its membership a concern for, and an understanding of, the problems of modern life which are the responsibilities of all citizens of the country and the world. Whether we like it or not, the community at large will react to the position taken by Jews and Jewish institutions on these issues. One has but to read the works of James Baldwin or Louis Lomax to see how the re-awakening American Negro scrutinizes the role played by Jews and Jewish institutions in their struggle for equal rights.

Jewish Community Centres are increasingly represented, and in many instances take leadership positions, in public affairs or community service councils or inter-organizational committees of a general community-wide character. Eleven years ago about 20 per cent¹² of the Centres under study reported that they belonged to such community groups as Citizens Unity Council, Conference of Christians and Jews, and Festival of Friendship. Today this proportion has increased somewhat to 27 per cent with similar types of councils represented. There is now introduced, however, the participation in a Council of World Affairs or the American Association for the United Nations. In some (21 per cent) instances the Centre acts as co-ordinator of the community-wide inter-organizational council. In contrast, the Centre acts as co-ordinator in most instances (89 per cent) of Jewish inter-organizational activity.

In 1950-1, 24 per cent of the Community Centres studied participated in Jewish inter-organizational councils or committees, whereas today the percentage has risen to 80. Some of these are culturally oriented: Jewish forums, Warsaw Ghetto Memorial Observances, Yiddish Culture Committee, Jewish Book Month, and so on. Others are organizationally oriented towards common concerns such as leadership training, Jewish issues, or the maintenance of a community calendar. This growth in inter-organizational enterprise is, of course, viewed with

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satisfaction by those who seek co-ordinated effort towards the achievement of common goals and accept a Jewish community which 'cherishes and fosters diversity and variety' but 'recognizes that the totality of "the Jewish" consists of many components and that various members of the group will emphasize varying components and live happily with these differences'.¹³

These inter-organizational councils have, however, not yet come to grips with some of the basic problems reflected by the character of the adult constituency of the Centre as well as the Jewish community. We are told that 'while synagogue affiliation is growing, synagogue attendance remains limited both absolutely and compared with other religious groups; it [the American Jewish group] lacks "belief" and is most uneven in "observance"; it is ignorant of the specifics of the religious and cultural heritage of Judaism; its children are sent to religious schools, where they receive at best a superficial Jewish education but which outstrips that of their parents, and which is unsupported by what goes on in the home'.¹⁴ It is obvious that a problem of this magnitude—and it is a problem to those who would influence the character of the Jewish community of the future—can be dealt with adequately only by means of a coherent long-range community-wide plan, developed and supported by all Jewish organizations in concert. But how has the Centre's adult programme come to grips with this problem, which it has recognized since the very inception of the Centre movement in America?

One of the ways in which the Centre has approached this problem is through a marked development of its family programme. In the past eleven years the percentage of the Centres showing evidence of such activities has risen from 72 to 83.¹⁵ In the distribution of Centres by the *number* of family activities in the programme, the statistical mode moved from *two* activities to *four* in the same period. One Centre in the present study reported as many as 25 family activities, whereas eleven years ago the highest number reported was eight.

An analysis of the family programme to determine its components shows that Purim parties have risen from a rank of 4·5 to first place in terms of frequency of occurrence. Bazaars and fairs in general have dropped from first place to a rank of 4·5, while Chanukah celebrations have retained the same rank since these have always been popular as an occasion for family programmes. The Passover party and the Third Seder have increased in rank: the former from 18·5 to 14 and the latter from 11·5 to 10. In addition, new foci for family programme activities have been introduced, such as the Jewish music festival, autumn holiday fair, and the Israeli fair. Eleven of these changes can be directly attributable to the increased emphasis on the introduction of Jewish values. Whether these advances are of sufficient magnitude to cope with a problem whose immensity has thus far not been measured is a debatable question. Other new foci for family programmes are:

summer recreation, folk guitar, theatre, vocational guidance, and teenage drivers. What is noteworthy about these is the continuous character of the activity in contrast with the higher frequency-ranked single-occasion events. Any significant developments in the extension of the family programme will occur in the continuous activities. The Centre through its adult programme does not hope to make up for all of the deficiencies in the Jewish education of the adult membership. It does, however, aim to establish the appropriate attitudes which foster self-motivated study rather than to sermonize or bludgeon adults by attempting moral coercion. And this aim is achieved through a varied educational programme which serves adults in both large and small groups, in single mass events or through continuous classes or special interest groups.

Since 1948 when Janowsky¹⁶ reported that 49.2 per cent of the Centres conducted lecture and concert activities, there has been a steady increase until today there are 65 per cent with such programmes (57.8 per cent have lecture programmes and 72.2 per cent have concert programmes). An examination, however, of the distribution of the aggregate programmes of the two periods (1950-1 and 1961-2) shows the following proportions:

	<i>Per cent</i> <i>1950-1</i> ¹⁷	<i>Per cent</i> <i>1961-2</i>
Lectures on general topics	11.5	23.8
Concerts in general	18.8	20.0
Lectures on Jewish subjects	19.7	24.2
Jewish concerts	50.0	31.8

The decrease in the percentage of Jewish concerts is offset by a substantial increase in the percentage of general and Jewish lectures. In the area of Jewish lectures, the proportion of the aggregate on religion, customs, and traditions doubled (from 8 to 15.7 per cent). There was an almost similar increase in lectures on world Jewish problems (8 to 14.1 per cent). Israel and Zionism continued at the same high level (29 per cent), but interest in Jewish literature was cut in half (21 per cent to 10.9). Lectures in Jewish history and education continued to occupy a minor place in the forum programme: Lectures on 'problems of American Jewry emerged as a subject of some interest (6.2 per cent).

In the Jewish concert field¹⁸ the percentage of 'monologists' presented decreased slightly in the eleven years; however, the Jewish humourist seems to continue to be an integral part of Jewish life. The percentages of vocal soloists and dance programmes have similarly declined slightly. On the whole, the relationship among these activities continues in the same way, with the vocal soloists most frequently scheduled (33.4 per cent), followed by the monologist (22.6 per cent), the dance (17.8 per cent), the instrumental ensemble (10.7 per cent), choral music (7.1 per

cent) and instrumental solos (1.2 per cent). A new element, the theatre, has been introduced (7 per cent) and is attributable in large measure to the development of a travelling Jewish theatre by the Farband, the Labour Zionist Fraternal Order. An interesting sidelight here is the increasing extent to which Yiddish cultural groups rely upon the Centre to sponsor activities which heretofore individual local Yiddish groups were able to sponsor individually. Yiddish is slowly but surely losing ground as a cultural medium. The Farband Theatre, which was formerly all Yiddish, now includes English in its programme presentation as a means of attracting larger audiences.

In the forum programme, the reduction of sizes of audiences has resulted in greater use of local resources as an economy measure. Further evidence of the increased use of local resources is the increase in the proportion of rabbis of congregations who participate in Jewish Community Centre forums (13 per cent to 24.2 per cent). Adult classes in Jewish subjects have shown an increase in number from 39 per cent to 84 per cent of the Centres studied. Although 84 per cent have classes in Jewish subjects about half (52 per cent) have only one such class while 4 per cent have seven classes. The most popular course continues to be Hebrew.¹⁹ Peculiarly enough the number of classes in Yiddish, however small, has risen from 3.7 per cent to 9 per cent of the total number of Centres. The number of Centres which conduct 'schools or institutes of Jewish studies have remained about the same, about 7.5 per cent of the Centres studied'.

A unique development is the reported number (7.5 per cent) of general Jewish study groups. These informal study groups are similar in character to the B'nai B'rith parlour study groups which pursue a wide variety of subjects, with the group itself remaining intact. The same group after it has completed a series of sessions devoted to one subject then proceeds to another which the group itself selects. The growth of the classes in general has been phenomenal and, as is to be expected, the general topics are more extensive than those of a Jewish character. The median number of general classes per Centre is three, while the median of Jewish classes is one. The significance of this relationship can only be evaluated after resolving the question as to the method of introducing Jewish character into the Jewish Community Centre adult programme.

There are those who favour the development of identifiable Jewish activities such as the class in Talmud. There are also those who would emphasize the introduction of Jewish elements into the more generalized activities, such as the introduction of Jewish art in a course in general art. And there are, of course, the eclectic who would make use of either method depending on the situational need.

Even more noteworthy than the development of adult classes is the extent of the growth of discussion groups. In 1950-1, 44.5 per cent of

the Centres offered such activities; but in 1961-2, the corresponding percentage was 74.6. These discussion groups for the most part (22 per cent) centred about public issues; however, the proportion of discussion series devoted to Jewish subjects remained relatively high, 42 per cent as against 44 per cent in 1950-1. Some of the Jewish topics which were covered in discussion groups were: 'Jewishness and the young intellectual'; 'Can Judaism be understood only in religious terms?'; 'Israel and the lively arts'; 'The Jewish attitude toward labour'; 'The Jewish concept of charity'; 'The MacIver Report'; 'Israeli investments'; 'Contemporary Jewish thought' (a series); 'The Blooms in Joyce's *Ulysses*'; and 'So you're going to Israel' (a series).

These comparative statistics serve to prove that there continues to be a recognition on the part of Centres of a need to serve the Jewish component of the adult Jewish membership, but what is more impressive is that these programme activities represent the will of the adult activities committees which are responsible for the planning of the adult programme. As stated above, this democratic character of the Centre is one of the factors which make it unique not only historically, but also in terms of the American scene. These adult programme committees have not increased²⁰ significantly in number during the past eleven years (57 per cent to 65.5 per cent) when the Centre picture is viewed in its totality. However, on examining the changes which have occurred within the classes of Centres of different size, one is struck by the phenomenal change in the large Centres. Whereas in 1961-2 80 per cent of these Centres had adult programme committees, only 50 per cent had such committees eleven years ago. On the other hand, the small and small-medium Centres have, on the whole, tended to drop adult activities committees as too cumbersome for the size of their adult programmes. The tendency here has been to allocate the planning function to overall programme committees or to committees which deal with specific activities, such as a forum committee. Thus, the present survey reveals that in the 41 per cent of the Centres where there are no adult activities committees, their functions are lodged in an overall programme committee.

The proper functioning of these committees depends to a large extent on the services rendered by a professional Centre worker, and, as is to be expected, the growth of the adult programme has resulted in a larger number of workers who are concerned with it. About 41 per cent of the Centres in the present survey had one or more adult workers as against 14.8 per cent eleven years ago.²¹ This increase in adult programme personnel is merely a reflection of the pressure of the remarkable increase in the Centres' adult membership from a little over a third (34.9 per cent) in 1950 to almost half (49.1 per cent) of the total membership in 1960.²²

Now, the question which naturally presents itself is whether the

increase in personnel has kept pace with the need. When one realizes that there are still over a tenth (10.6 per cent) of the large Centres which do not employ a full-time adult worker, the answer is obvious. Budgetary difficulties, the lack of understanding on the part of lay leadership of the need for trained personnel in this field, the setting of inadequate salary levels for an adult programme director, all contribute to the necessity in some Centres to engage part-time workers or those who require on-the-job orientation. In some cases, executives feel that the only way to demonstrate this need is to develop a full-blown adult programme. But how is such a programme to be developed when there is no staff to nurture it? This is the dilemma of the Centres engaged in under-developed or unsuccessful adult programmes.

But what is success or lack of success, and how has our understanding of the criteria changed in the past decade? Attendance, even for small group activities, continues to be the major criterion in measuring success or failure. Eleven years ago Centre directors were asked to indicate which activities were regarded as successful or not, the basis upon which this judgement was made, and the factors which contributed to success or failure. Almost half (47.8 per cent) based their judgements on attendance with respect to all activities, large and small group.²³ And in 1961-2 exactly half made attendance the basis of their judgement. Second in importance was 'enthusiasm and interest' displayed by the participants, which accounted for 23.8 per cent of the responses in 1950-1. Eleven years later this percentage dropped to 16.7 and a new criterion made its appearance: financial success. Of the activities regarded as unsuccessful, 8.3 per cent of the failures were so regarded because they failed to bring in the amount of income anticipated. These were some of the criteria for lack of success then and now.

When asked to analyse the causes for failure, Centre directors in 1950-1 regarded 'poor talent or poor staff' as the most frequently occurring factor (14.7 per cent). 'Insufficient staff time' (13.4 per cent) and 'no precedent for the activity in the community' (11.7 per cent) were second and third in the order of frequency. However, what was first in importance as a factor eleven years ago is now third. What are now first and second in frequency as factors which cause failure are 'low interest' and 'the existence of similar programmes in the community'. These are factors which are brought into play in the absence of community-wide planning, and particularly in those communities with widespread adult educational activities sponsored by a number of organizations.

Since attendance plays such an important place in evaluating programmes, an effort was made to determine what is meant by 'good' attendance. A distinction is obviously drawn between the small group activities like classes and the special interest groups and mass activities. Supervisors of adult programmes want to know at what point in a

decreasing attendance record they should discontinue a class. With the expansion in the number of classes and the greater tendency to take into consideration the time and interest requirements of the membership, there is a greater willingness to accept the validity of smaller classes. Whereas slightly less than three-quarters of the aggregate number of classes eleven years ago²⁴ had fewer than twenty participants, today 85 per cent fall in this category. About half of all the classes have from ten to nineteen participants. More than a third have average attendances of fewer than ten.

With respect to mass programmes, such as forums and concerts, in 1950-1 the attendances considered good ranged from less than 100 to more than 1,000 with an almost linear relationship with the size of the Centre; but the median for all Centre forum and concert programmes was 300.²⁵ Medians for different size Centres were tabulated as follows:

Large Centre	354
Large Medium	333
Medium	205
Small Medium	175
Small	187

Today, therefore, the median for all attendances considered 'good' is 214. There has evidently been a willingness on the part of Centres to develop forums and concerts, or for that matter any mass activity, for smaller audiences.

These trends are symptomatic of the growing recognition of the individual differences in interests of the membership and the acceptance of smaller groups as valid programming. Per capita costs are still scrutinized, but, as has been indicated, volunteer or local leadership together with new small group methods of financing have been developed to avoid higher per capita costs which might result from lowered attendance norms.

Basic or long-range evaluation of the adult programme is, however, carried out against the backdrop of objectives. To determine the extent to which Jewish Community Centres throughout the country adhere to a common set of aims three questions were asked of Centre directors:

- (a) What are some adult needs which the Centre should meet?
- (b) Which activities receive priority in terms of emphasis or support?
- (c) Which adult activities would you like to develop in your Centre?

The assumption was made that these emphases and activities are indications of Centre objectives, since they were in many instances related to programme activities. The most frequently encountered expressed adult need, according to Jewish Community Centre directors, is the need to develop a sense of belonging through 'socialization' or 'social activities', particularly for newcomers. However, among those activities which receive the highest priority, it is the cultural activities,

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including art and music, which rank highest, with Jewish programmes (the two are not mutually exclusive) a close second.

In view of the fact that over ten per cent of the reported needs dealt with the developments of more Jewish awareness and over eleven per cent with cultural matters, it seems that there is a drive on the part of a large segment of the Centre movement to build an adult programme which serves general cultural and Jewish educational purposes. The stated needs on the other hand reflect less of a concern for those objectives which would provide the opportunity to train for leadership or for objectives which would improve understanding and co-operation among various religious, racial, and cultural groups. This inference is based not only on the expressed needs but also on the relative absence of well-developed programmes related to these objectives.

A reinforcement of these findings is to be found in reviewing the percentages of response to questions on the adult activities to which priority in emphasis is given by the Centre. Here too it was found that the cultural activities (drama, music, etc.) far outweighed any other category of programme activity while 'Jewish programmes' were second (28.1 per cent and 14.6 per cent respectively). Again, these two categories are not mutually exclusive. These emphases are further borne out by the report on activities which the Centres would like to develop. It was here that Jewish activities ranked the highest (18.8 per cent) as an expression of interest and desire on the part of Centre directors. The arts did not rank as high, in all probability, because they are already well represented in the programmes of many Centres. Which aspirations of Centre leadership are to grow to fruition and which role the Centre's adult programme will play in shaping the future character of the American Jew will ultimately be determined by the democratic will of its membership. They demonstrate their will not only by the leadership they elect but by the activities they support.

NOTES

¹ In this paper reference will be made from time to time to the various sizes of Jewish Community Centres. In order to make the Centre classifications of the Adult Programme survey done in 1961-2 comparable with the one in 1950-1, the following classifications were used:

Size of Centre	Budget Range, in dollars	
	1950-1	1961-2
Small	0-24,999	0-49,999
Small Medium	25,000-49,999	50,000-99,999
Medium Medium	50,000-74,999	100,000-149,999
Large Medium	75,000-99,999	150,000-199,999
Large	100,000 & over	200,000 & over

² Sanford Solender, *The Unique Function of the Jewish Community Center*, National Jewish Welfare Board [abbreviated hereafter as JWB], 1955.

³ Bertram Gold, 'New Directions for the Jewish Community Center', *JWB Circle*, March 1963, p. 2.

⁴ Benjamin Rabinowitz, *The Young Men's Hebrew Associations 1854-1913*, JWB, N.Y., 1948, p. 6.

⁵ Oscar Janowsky, *The JWB Survey*, N.Y., Dial Press, 1948, pp. 237-57.

⁶ Samuel D. Freeman, *Adult Education in the Jewish Community Center*, 2 vols.

(typewritten), Teachers College, Columbia University, 1953.

⁷ Freeman, op. cit., vol. II, Table 44.

⁸ Janowsky, op. cit., p. 286.

⁹ Freeman, op. cit., vol. II, p. 290.

¹⁰ Ibid., vol. II, Tables 58 and 59.

¹¹ 'Social action' is used as the wider term to include political action, community service, and participation in community councils and committees as tabulated in the present survey.

¹² Freeman, op. cit., Table 61.

¹³ Manheim Shapiro, 'An Appraisal of Current Jewish Communal Needs', Preliminary Draft Outline, 1963, p. 1.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 2 III C.

¹⁵ Freeman, op. cit., vol. II, Table 46.

¹⁶ Janowsky, op. cit., p. 188.

¹⁷ Freeman, op. cit., vol. II, Tables

70-3.

¹⁸ Freeman, op. cit., vol. II, Table

73.

¹⁹ Ibid., Table 40.

²⁰ Ibid., Table 21.

²¹ Ibid., Table 14.

²² *JWB Yearbook. The Jewish Community Center Field*, vol. XI, Appendix Table 3.

²³ Freeman, op. cit., vol. II, Tables

47-50.

²⁴ Ibid., Table 39b.

²⁵ Ibid., Table 67.

CHRONICLE

Prepared by

Paul Glikson

The Jewish population of Morocco has decreased by 40,000 during the past three years and now totals 120,000. Although the latest figures issued by the Moroccan Central Statistical Bureau do not give a breakdown of the population, it is known that large numbers of Jews have emigrated, together with Europeans and many Algerians. In 1960 there were 160,000 Jews in Morocco, 151,000 of them in urban areas.

*

The Cultural and Social Association of Jews in Poland has stated that over 8,000 Polish Jews, or one-third of the total community's strength, are affiliated to it. Of this total nearly one-third are regular subscribers to the Book Club which publishes at least one volume in Yiddish every month. So far the Yiddish Book Club has published 1.5 million copies of 300 volumes.

*

Israel's population had by April 1963 reached a total of 2,363,800, of whom 267,000 are non-Jews, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics in Jerusalem. Besides showing that Israel's population has increased by immigration, the figures indicate that there was a high birth-rate among the non-Jewish sections of the population, most of whom are Muslims. The non-Jewish population has risen from 100,000 to 276,000 in fifteen years.

The net annual natural increase in the Jewish population of Israel, excluding immigration, is about 1.1 per cent, while that of the minorities is 4 per cent. This means that if the current fertility rates of Jewish and non-Jewish women continue, the Jewish population (excepting immigration but not emigration) will grow by

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about 130,000 to stand at 2,200,00 by 1967, while the minority communities will increase by about 60,000 to 320,000, or about 13 per cent of the total population.

According to the Bureau's figures, which are based on the 1961 population census, the average number of children born to Jewish women by the end of their child-bearing period (45-49) was 3.1. The corresponding average for non-Jewish women in the same age group was 7.4. Among Jewish women this average fluctuated in accordance with their country of origin and length of time in Israel. The smallest number of children were born to women who came from Europe after 1948: an average of 1.9. Next were women who came from Europe before 1948: 2.3; followed by those born in Israel whose fathers came from Europe: 2.9; then women born in Israel whose fathers were also born there: 3.3; locally born women whose fathers came from Asia or Africa: 5; women who came from Asia or Africa before 1948: 5.6; and women who came from Asia and Africa after 1948: 6.1.

Thirteen per cent of the Jewish population of Israel aged 14 and over have had no schooling at all; eight per cent have had less than four years; while at the other end of the scale 26 per cent have had 11 or more years of formal education. In the minority sector, 50 per cent of those over 14 had never been to school.

Employment figures for those over 14 show that 77 per cent of the country's men and 28 per cent of its women are employed in civilian occupations. While only 24 per cent of all married women are employed, they still account for more than two-thirds of all working women. Persons coming from Asia and Africa form a smaller percentage of the labour force than persons of European or American origin, especially among the women, though this discrepancy narrows in the second generation.

*

According to the Federation of Jewish Communities in Yugoslavia, the total number of Jews registered as members of Jewish communities on 1 July 1962 was 6,495, distributed as follows:

	1962	1952
People's Republic of Serbia	1,705	1,557
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina	1,150	1,097
Autonomous Region of Kosova and Metohija	38	19
People's Republic of Croatia	2,033	2,033
People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,354	1,267
People's Republic of Macedonia	106	99
People's Republic of Slovenia	109	100
People's Republic of Montenegro	—	3
Total	<u>6,495</u>	<u>6,175</u>

The largest communities were in Belgrade, with a Jewish population of 1,548 (1,389 in 1952), followed by Zagreb (1,408; 1,478 in 1952), Sarajevo (1,087; 1,190 in 1952), Subotica (520; 525 in 1952), and Novi Sad (320; 275 in 1952). The majority of Jews in Yugoslavia live in large towns.

*

On the basis of the last South African census of population taken in September 1960, the Bureau of Census and Statistics has calculated that the number of Jews in South Africa was at the time 116,065. This figure was arrived at from a 10 per cent sample of the actual returns, and it is believed that it gives a fairly close approximation.

According to this figure the Jewish population rose by 7,568 in the nine and a half years following the 1951 census, when the total was 108,497.

As will appear from the figures below, the rate of increase in the Jewish population has fallen continuously in the past quarter of a century, mainly as a result of the considerable drop in Jewish immigration in that period. The following table shows

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the Jewish population in South Africa and the percentage it has constituted of the entire White population since 1904 when the first all South African census was made:

Jewish Population of South Africa, 1904-60

<i>Census Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Percentage of White Population</i>
1904	38,101	3.41
1911	46,919	3.68
1918	58,741	4.12
1921	62,103	4.09
1926	71,816	4.28
1936	90,645	4.52
1946	104,156	4.39
1951	108,497	4.11
1960	116,065	3.75

*

The YIVO institute for Jewish Research (1048 Fifth Avenue, New York 28, N.Y.) announces the establishment of a Clearinghouse and index to Jewish subjects in current American humanistic and social research. All scholars engaged in research (including doctoral dissertations and M.A. theses) in which Jewish topics or materials are separately identifiable are invited to fill out a brief questionnaire which will be supplied upon request. Co-operating scholars will receive an annual list of studies registered with the Clearinghouse as either completed or in progress.

*

The Anglo-Jewish Archives, which function under the aegis of the Jewish Historical Society of England (33 Seymour Place, London, W.1), are concerned with the gathering together of all manuscripts likely to be of value in the study of Anglo-Jewish history. The Committee would be glad to hear from synagogues and other communal bodies, from business houses and from private individuals who have in their possession (or are aware of the existence of) any such material in the form of private papers, minute books, old lists of members, or indeed any manuscript material which could assist a student or historian in his researches. Manuscripts handed into the custody of the Archives are, if found suitable, immediately housed in the Mocatta Library in University College, London, where they are categorized and stored by a professional archivist. The Committee is also interested in learning of manuscripts whose owners, although reluctant to part with them, would allow them to be examined and their contents recorded.

AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF ANTISEMITISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

Stanislav Andreski

ONE of the chief contributions of Karl Marx to our understanding of society was his insistence on the necessity of explaining political struggles and ideologies in terms of conflicts of economic interest. In the more moderate form suggested by Engels, which admits the possibility of a reflexive influence of an ideology upon the conditions which nurtured it, this idea is very helpful. It does not explain everything, but it does explain a great deal. There is no reason, however, to assume that struggles for economic prizes must always be fought between classes—that is to say, collectivities differentiated principally in virtue of their economic positions.

In a way, the interpretation presented here might be described as a synthesis of the thesis of Marx on the economic nature of all conflicts, with the antithesis of Gumplowicz, which emphasized the paramount importance of struggles between races. Gumplowicz who lived in the empire of the Habsburgs, abounding in ethnic, racial, and religious divisions, had ample opportunities for making observations which supported his theory.

On the basis of the following analysis of antisemitism, with some references to analogous phenomena, I propose the following thesis. The strength of popular movements and currents of animosity directed against a non-dominant minority is stimulated by the following factors:

1. the conspicuousness and indelibility of the distinguishing marks;
2. the coincidence of cultural and religious and racial dividing lines;
3. general poverty and, particularly, the process of impoverishment;
4. the ratio of the minority to the majority, and, particularly, the process of increase of this ratio;
5. the minority's share of the total wealth, and particularly the process of growth of this share;
6. the extent to which economic complementarity is absent; and
7. absence of common foes.

Among the movements and currents of animosity directed against various racial, religious, and ethnic minorities antisemitism has been

without any doubt most thoroughly studied. In the writings on it two kinds of approach predominate: one is psychological, the other is through the genealogy of ideas. The latter is wholly inadequate. We can throw light on causes of historical processes by investigating the genealogy of ideas when we deal with ideas which are difficult to conceive, such as the ideas of science, technology, or of the art of organizing, whereas anything so primitive as ideological justifications for the dislike of strangers can occur spontaneously to any untutored mind. Ideas of this kind are always being proclaimed by somebody, and the important question, from the point of view of social causation, is to discover which social circumstances enhance their appeal. It is of little help in understanding the rise of Hitler to be told that he got his notions from Nietzsche or Houston Stewart Chamberlain, because if he did not get them from their writings he could have got them from many others, including the Old Testament. It is ethnocentrism with its ingredients of pride and hatred that has been common throughout the history—not its opposites. The real problem is to explain why among the Germans in the thirties of the twentieth century these commonplace sentiments turned into an insane passion.

The psychological approach is more fruitful. Unquestionably, sadism and the scapegoat mechanism operate among human beings, and play a large part in the persecutions of minorities. These psychological factors must be taken into account, but any interpretation solely in terms of them is bound to be inadequate because it cannot explain the variations. There are grounds for believing that sadistic propensities—as distinct from indulgence—are an ineradicable feature of the human species. There is probably a little sadism in all men (though perhaps not in all women), and in any population there is a sizeable number of downright sadists who will use every opportunity for venting their lusts. The existence of a non-dominant minority may provide them with such an opportunity, for the obvious reason that its members are handicapped in defending themselves. Naturally, sadism breeds sadism, but there is an apparently irreducible core of it which it is very difficult to relate to general social conditions even with the aid of frustration-aggression theory, for it appears even among populations whose material needs are fully satisfied and where there is no institutionalized brutality. This does not prove that the theory which explains sadism as a form of aggression generated by frustration is wrong: there are many forms of frustration possible even when the material needs are provided for, the most obvious being the sexual. It may not have been accidental that the burning of witches began soon after celibacy had been enjoined upon the clergy, and that the most ardent inquisitors were recruited among the monks; but on the other hand wealthy spectators at Roman circuses savoured gruesome sights in spite of indulging in sexual pleasures to the limits of physical capacity. We might still rescue the theory by pointing

out that these people had to endure frightful humiliations and insecurity, which might have accounted for their unbridled and perverse sybaritism. There are, however, many cases described by psychiatrists which do not reveal any forms of frustration beyond what is the inescapable lot of all human beings. We must, then, draw the conclusion that, in trying to discover the social circumstances which stimulate the hostility against minorities, we must consider sadism as a factor which is always present, at least potentially, and which is partially independent of social conditions.

The frustration-aggression theory purports to explain displaced aggression, that is to say aggression directed at objects other than those which cause the frustration. Unquestionably, such aggression is very important in social life and particularly in persecutions of minorities, but equally important is simple aggression—rational in a way—which assumes the form of attempts to wrest from the minority goods which some or all members of the majority covet, or to prevent the minority from obtaining these goods in the first place.

The scapegoat theory is very enlightening. It can be interpreted as a special application of the frustration-aggression theory, and can be likewise related in some measure to the economic fluctuations. It enables us to understand some spectacular events like the massacres of Jews after the epidemics in the Middle Ages, as well as the customs of human sacrifice, but it fails to account for one important feature of the currents of animosity towards minorities: namely, their connexion with numerical proportions between minorities and majorities.

The stress on the irrational psychopathic elements in antisemitism is due to the concentration on the phenomenon of Nazism which was essentially a mass psychosis in spite of its economic and military conditioning. For this reason Hitlerism differed profoundly from the more prosaic and less cruel antisemitic currents which prevailed in eastern Europe. Furthermore, Hitlerite antisemitism was ordained by the charismatic leader. Before the rise of Hitler there was antisemitism in Germany, but it was weaker than in Poland and Hungary: its relative strength corresponded more or less to the relation of the proportion of the Jews in the total population of Germany to the equivalent proportions in other countries. The cruelty of the persecution of the Jews in the Third Reich was probably due to the stronger than usual streak of sadism infused into the Germans by disciplinarian social relations, to the tradition of unquestioning and dutiful obedience, to its ruler's insane hatred and his scheme to bind the German nation inescapably to himself by involving it in a complicity in an enormous crime. In the milder antisemitic movements in eastern Europe these features were not present; in Hungary Horthy did try to divert popular discontent into this channel, but in Poland the government tried to contain it within the limits of the law equal for all citizens.

Persecutions ordered by governments must be clearly distinguished from those which surge spontaneously from the masses. We must remember, however, that all concrete cases present inextricable mixtures of both of these ideal types, though in very varying measures. This distinction is very important for attributions of causal efficacy because a course of action which is decided upon by a small number of persons is less determined by social conditions than an action which is the result of a large number of independent decisions. For this reason acts like the expulsion of the Jews from Spain and quasi-expulsions from Russia are not easily explicable in economic terms: less bigoted monarchs might have left them alone. Ferdinand and Isabella as well as Alexander III ascended their thrones by succession which had nothing to do with their views on this matter, whereas Hitler rose to power in virtue of the appeal of his propaganda in which antisemitism figured in the first place. So it cannot be said, that given the social situation, Hitler's personal inclinations were the cause of the persecutions—they determined only the severity.

Even if we consider only the behaviour of the masses we must take into account a factor which we can hardly call economic: namely, the desire for invidious self-esteem, practically universal among humanity. We assign importance to various criteria of excellence in accordance with what we excel in. One of the most accessible ways of satisfying this desire is to disdain strangers. This tendency, however, though very important in preserving any existing discriminatory institutions and attitudes, and in facilitating their establishment, cannot be regarded as a factor which initiates variations affecting whole societies. There are no reasons to think that this tendency varies greatly from one society to another, although individuals differ greatly in this respect. Among individuals whose desire for invidious self-esteem is of more or less equal strength, and whose economic interests are similar, those are most prone to espouse the cause of racial or ethnic discrimination who have least other grounds for the feelings of superiority, given the scale of values prevalent in their environment.

We have thus delimited the field: what is to be explained are the variations in the intensity of spontaneous mass currents of animosity to ethnic and/or racial and/or religious non-dominant minorities. Antisemitism will be treated as a case which throws light on this general issue.

A comparative survey suggests that (like other minorities) the Jews can live unmolested only where they are few—which does not mean that where they are few they must be unmolested. The only exception to this rule is New York, but there they are too powerful to be persecuted. Moreover, the enormous wealth of the United States makes economic competition less lethal than it is in the poor countries. For this reason psychological factors (other than simple desire to satisfy

elementary needs) play a more important role in the causation of racial and ethnic frictions in the United States than is the case in the indigent societies, whilst the opposite is true of the strictly economic factor of the struggle for the division of wealth. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the great wealth available to the citizens of the United States, there seems to be more hostility and discrimination against the Jews there than in England or France where they are proportionately fewer.

If we take Europe in the twentieth century we see that the differences in the intensity of antisemitism roughly corresponded to the ratios of the Jews to total populations. It was most intense in Poland (where more than 10 per cent of the population was Jewish), Hungary, and Roumania. It was less intense in Czechoslovakia, where they were fewer and which was more prosperous, and in Germany until Hitler whipped it up. Although the tzarist government deliberately used the Jews as a scapegoat for the wrath of the populace, antisemitism was less deeply rooted in Russia proper than in Poland, Roumania, and Hungary because the Jewish population was proportionately much smaller, and the country offered greater economic opportunities. The government pushed most of the Jews into Poland and Ukraine, thus intensifying antisemitism there. Antisemitism afflicted least the prosperous countries of western Europe where Jews amounted to less than 1 per cent of the population.

As an approximate rule, there is a critical ratio which is most conducive to popular persecutions, and which seems to lie around 10 per cent. With this ratio the non-dominant minority is very conspicuous, has many points of friction with the majority, but is still small enough to be persecuted with ease. Harassing a minority of 30 or 40 per cent often entails great danger, whereas a minority of 1 or 2 per cent (provided that it is not particularly conspicuous for other reasons) can more easily escape the attention of the majority unless it is put into the lime-light by organized hostile propaganda. Naturally, even a majority of 99 per cent can be cruelly oppressed, but this can be done only with the aid of the entire apparatus of the state—not by unorganized crowds.

The ratio is important. Nevertheless the numerical factor explains neither Hitlerism nor why antisemitism was stronger in eastern Europe in the twentieth century than earlier, which shows that it is not a simple matter of numbers. One reason why a century ago there was less incentive to violent attacks upon the Jews was that they were kept in inferior positions by the laws. An exactly analogous consideration explains why in South Africa there are no lynchings as there have been in the southern states of U.S.A.

Everywhere there are more aspirants than good places. The struggle for the good things of life goes on all the time. Its intensity depends primarily on how much there is to share out. This struggle is waged with all kinds of weapons, and one can view racial or religious or

ethnic discrimination simply as a tool for eliminating some of the rivals. The larger the ratio of the minority to the total population, the more numerous are the points of contact and therefore opportunities for friction. It is clear, however, that the intensity of the hostility cannot depend on the frequency of contacts alone. As far as the conflict of economic interests is concerned, the number is important above all because it determines the total amount of wealth held by the minority—for any given level of opulence of its members. A mass movement aiming at spoliation needs a prospect of booty of some size. Although usually this size is grossly magnified in the imagination of covetous or necessitous multitudes, there is normally some relation between the reality and the image.

Eastern Europe between the wars was, as it still is today, a poor and over-populated area. The Jews had succeeded in monopolizing certain lucrative trades, and in entering certain attractive professions in very large numbers. For example, about 60 per cent of the doctors and lawyers in Cracow (and more in some smaller towns) were Jews. Something like 95 per cent of the trade in hides and furs in Poland was in the hands of the Jews. This of course does not mean that all the Jews were rich (actually most of them were desperately poor) but they did own a sufficient slice of the total wealth to excite the envy of the others. Clearly exaggerated estimates being disregarded, it seems that it amounted to about 20 per cent. Under these circumstances it would be surprising if some of the non-Jews did not hit on the idea that they could make a better living if the Jews were eliminated or despoiled, or at least fettered. The rioting students, for instance, demanded that Jews should not be admitted into universities in numbers larger than their proportion in the total population. In a way, eastern European anti-semitism was an attempt to counteract the economic superiority of the Jews by the fists of the greater number.

The superior economic prowess of the Jews in eastern Europe was due to a number of causes, of which the first was the increase in importance of the activities traditionally allotted to them: in consequence of urbanization and industrialization commerce was continually gaining in weight as a source of income in comparison with agriculture; and in this field the Jews possessed not only the advantage of acquired positions but also the tradition of necessary skills. Being a closely knit community, they often combined to try to keep the Gentiles out of their ground, thus defending, in fact, the status quo sanctified by tradition. Apart from the very rich families who acquired the habits of the nobility, the Jews were not impeded in attaining success in business by a proclivity to conspicuous and ruinous consumption such as that instilled into the Poles and the Hungarians by the example of their nobility who regarded lavish spending as one of the chief virtues.

In the intellectual occupations the success of the Jews was connected

in the first place with the tradition of reverence for knowledge and the book, and secondly, with the stimulus to the desire to excel produced by a combination of inner conviction of superiority with exposure to outward humiliations. Furthermore, the tradition of parental solicitude and family solidarity seems to be particularly strong among the Jews, and, together with the readiness of mutual help within the Jewish community, it provided a counterweight to the hindrances of anti-semitic discrimination. As far as the intellectuals in the strict sense are concerned, the prominence of the Jews in their ranks was, in addition, due to the marginal social position of unorthodox Jews: being suspended at cross-roads of loyalties, beliefs, and customs always stimulates curiosity and independence of thought.

In the old Polish kingdom there was an ethnic division of labour: commerce was a Jewish occupation. In the regions which now form part of Poland both the peasant and the nobles were of Polish ethnic stock. In the eastern territories there was a proper ethnic stratification: the nobility was Polish, the commercial class Jewish, and the peasants Ukrainian. As Gumplowicz pointed out eighty years ago, the situation in Java was very similar, the homologous elements being the Dutch, the Chinese, and the Javanese. The same can be said about the English, the Indians, and the Africans in south-eastern Africa. In the two latter cases, however, the ruling race retained in its hands the largest-scale business, which just did not exist in old Poland, and where consequently the nobility remained purely rural. The attitude of the Polish or Ukrainian peasant to the Jew was similar to that of the African peasant to the Indian: a mixture of disdain with admiration for the cleverness of the trading race, of resentment at their pretensions to superiority and their economic exploitation. Sometimes this resentment turned into burning hatred, and led to outbreaks of violence.

The pogroms of the Jews in eastern Europe, the recent attacks on the Chinese in Indonesia, and the anti-Indian riots in Africa, were truly popular movements. Even in such cases as the Durban riots in 1951, or the post-1905 pogroms in Russia, the police provided only a few *agents provocateur* and turned a blind eye to what was going on—it did not hire or command the assailants. The explosive material was there—the *agents provocateur* acted as a spark. As mentioned earlier, there is in all such phenomena a constant element: in any human mass, particularly if it consists of uncouth young men, there are many who will jump at the opportunity of beating up somebody with impunity. Being constant, however, this factor explains neither the timing nor the dimensions of the outbreaks. These can be understood only if we take into account the economic processes.

Money flows into the hands of those who manipulate it, and in all cases of co-existence of peasants with traders and money-lenders, the peasants fall into debt and the others increase their share of wealth. This

is a well-known process, already described in the Bible as well as in modern economic studies of India and other countries. On very large estates the conflict between the Jew and the peasant was aggravated by the practice of rent-farming: big landowners, who could not supervise their estates, sometimes gave their Jewish 'factors' the right to collect the rents in exchange for a lump sum. Like the Roman tax-farming, or the sale of offices, this practice produced some of the worst forms of exploitation. In the Ukraine, where the largest estates were to be found and where the big peasant wars were fought, the slogan of the rebels was 'Kill the lords and the Jews'. The smaller pogroms however, which did not form part of peasant uprisings, did not aim at the elimination of the Jews. In so far as they had an aim, it was cancellation of debts.

The nobles were in a peculiar position: on the one side they had superior force; on the other, many of them were indebted to Jewish money-lenders. This ambiguity led to an erratic behaviour in which patronizing friendship and even humble entreaties alternated with insults and assaults. Anyway, the nobles and the Jews lived in a symbiosis: the nobles relied on the commercial services of the Jews and protected them. Indeed, the decisive fact in the history of Poland was that the nobles succeeded in suppressing the Christian commercial class and replacing it by the Jews who, being isolated from the rest of the population, were more docile. This explains the downfall of the royal authority: the kings were unable to resist the encroachments of the nobility because—unlike their counterparts in western Europe—they could not use the bourgeoisie as the counterweight. The erratic symbiosis between the nobles and the Jews was somewhat undermined since the partitions by the policy of 'divide and rule' pursued by the tzarist government, but in the main it continued until the appearance of the non-Jewish professional commercial classes. Antisemitism as a mass movement appeared when economic competition replaced economic complementarity.

If we follow the history of the expulsions of the Jews from various places in western Europe, which took place towards the end of the Middle Ages, we find that whether we take England or the Rhineland these expulsions were preceded by the growth of a non-Jewish commercial class. The princes of eastern Europe welcomed the Jews—and the population did not oppose them—because, owing to the paucity of native traders, they were economically complementary. There was one medieval case which did not fit this rule: the Jews were expelled from Spain in spite of being economically complementary. This expulsion, however, was prompted not so much by mass antipathy as by the bigotry of the kings. Moreover, it occurred in the aftermath of the victory in a war against the infidel which lasted several centuries. In so far as there was popular hostility to the Jews, it was due to what the psychologists call nowadays 'stimulus generalization', and what they

used to call association of ideas: the war against the Moslems made all infidels odious. For nowhere in medieval Europe were the Jews less racially distinguishable or more assimilated culturally. Whereas eastern European Jews spoke Yiddish (derived from German) some of the Sephardi Jews, whose ancestors had lived in the Orient ever since the expulsion from Spain, spoke Spanish at home until their arrival in the new State of Israel. This example proves that persecutions can occur in spite of economic complementarity, but it does not disprove the thesis that economic complementarity is a necessary condition of the lack of persecutions. This proposition was first advanced by Leon Petrajitski (Petrazycki) forty years ago in a memorable essay which, unfortunately, is available only in Polish. It can be formulated as follows: in any society composed of cohesive, ethnically heterogeneous sections, a relative absence of conflict is possible only if these sections are economically complementary.

The foregoing considerations allow us to view the growth of anti-semitism in eastern Europe as a consequence of the erosion of economic complementarity. The abolition of serfdom and the increase in the density of the rural population led to an influx of young peasants to towns. Most of them became servants or journeymen or industrial workers; some took up petty trade (which some of their descendants succeeded in developing) where they came up against the Jewish monopoly. On the other side, the Jews liberated from their legal disabilities began to flock into liberal professions where they entered into competition with impoverished nobles and the 'mobiles' from below. Apart from the argument from co-variance in time, an examination of the class composition of the antisemitic organizations in Poland between the wars also supports this view. This interpretation is applicable to the equivalent movements in other countries of eastern Europe.

The Polish Socialist party, supported in the main by the industrial workers, was not antisemitic. In Russian Poland before the First World War about one-third of its members were Jewish: and many remained even after the specifically Jewish parties came into existence. The relatively small amount of antisemitism which existed among its supporters could be accounted for by the fact that very many of the employers were Jewish, and by irradiation from other sources. Although the peasants rioted against the Jews sporadically, their organizations were certainly not to the fore in demanding that the Jews be deported to Palestine or locked up in ghettos. As the peasants sold their produce mostly to the Jews, they blamed them for low prices. As far as the industrial workers are concerned, the explanation is not, of course, that their occupation generates superior virtue: there are many examples from all over the world of how xenophobic industrial workers can be when it comes to admitting foreigners into their kind of job. The reason

for the relative weakness of the antisemitism among Polish industrial workers was that, although there were Jews in this occupation, they were relatively few, and did not present a serious threat to employment. The political circles connected with the land-owning nobility did not propagate antisemitism either: they maintained the tradition of patronizing tolerance. There were two parties devoted to the cause of antisemitism. One was the Radical National Party—a small body of violent men whose admiration for Hitler's methods and outlook verged on anticlericalism. (Its former leader, incidentally, is now persona grata with the communist regime, and heads the National Catholics, who defy Rome.) It attracted all kinds of desperadoes and delinquents. In so far as its recruitment tended towards any class, it seems to have been what some German marxists called *Lumpenintelligenz*: failed students with no private means. This party was born at the nadir of the economic crisis. By far older and bigger was the traditionalist and clerical National Party.

Owing to the existence of multi-national states, in central and eastern Europe citizenship is clearly distinguished from nationality in the sense of belonging to an ethnic collectivity. So, by calling itself 'national', the party proclaimed that it was against co-citizens who were not co-nationals. The word 'national', incidentally, has the same connotation when it figures in the name of the ruling party of South Africa. It must be added that the overwhelming majority of the Jews in eastern Europe were not merely distinguished by religion and physical traits but had a special kind of customary dress, spoke Yiddish and were neither considered, nor considered themselves, as belonging to the Russian, Polish, Hungarian, or Ukrainian nations. With the exception of the Ukrainians, each of these nations had its 'assimilated' Jews. In Poland people whom the antisemites classified as Jews comprised the following categories: (1) Jews resident in Poland who did not know Polish and lived in complete segregation; (2) Polish Jews who spoke Polish (though not always well) and had strong links with the Polish nation without identifying themselves with it; (3) Poles of Jewish faith who did not speak Yiddish and regarded themselves as belonging to the Polish nation in spite of the humiliation to which they were subject; (4) persons of Jewish origin who cut themselves off from the Jewish community and identified themselves wholly with the Gentile Polish nation—they were either converts to Catholicism or free thinkers; (5) persons of partly Jewish origin who had no links with the Jewish community, although they would be branded as Jews by the antisemites if their antecedents were known.

Assimilation occurred as a rule only among the educated or the rich. For this reason it was more extensive in Great Russia, where poor Jews were fewer, than in the western provinces of the Russian empire. In the old kingdom of Poland converts to Christianity came exclusively from

among the rich Jews who desired to enter the ranks of the nobility. Notwithstanding the temptation of ennoblement as the usual reward for conversion, very few Jews abandoned their faith. In later times, when the spread of religious scepticism made more of them willing to do so, they were pushed back by the rising tide of antisemitism. The fact that antisemitism assumed extreme forms precisely at the time when increasing numbers of Jews were abandoning their ghettos and their special dress and even ceasing to speak Yiddish, proves that its chief roots lay in the growing acerbity of economic competition rather than in sheer heterophobia.

The National Party in Poland drew its strength mainly from the artisans and traders, with a large ingredient of members of the class which used to be, and still is, called 'intelligentsia' which was the section of the society consisting of families who gained their livelihood from employment as civil servants, teachers, and army officers, or from the liberal professions. In order to qualify as a member of the intelligentsia, a person had to have academic, or at least secondary, education, do non-commercial work for which such education was at least formally necessary, and have the requisite manners. The antisemitism of this group was also economically conditioned: it became acute after the establishment of universities in a number of towns, and the consequent increase in the number of graduates beyond what could be absorbed by the market. It became frantic during the economic crisis of the thirties when redundancy hit even its well-established members. Before independence Polish universities existed only in Austrian Poland and then there were only two. Even in Warsaw higher education was only intermittently available before the First World War. In German Poland the people who corresponded occupationally to the intelligentsia were mostly Germans, and did not form a class segregated from the business sectors: they belonged to the fairly unified middle class of the western European type, which had no equivalent further east. In any case, there were very few Jews there, because after the incorporation of these regions into Prussia the Jews who lived there migrated in mass to economically more advanced parts of Germany. In western Poland antisemitism passed from latency to virulence when after the re-unification the Jews from the eastern parts began to arrive. To come back to the intelligentsia: in Russian Poland there was relatively little antisemitism in this class: primarily because of the weakness of economic competition, and secondly because of the existence of a common enemy in the shape of the tsarist government which oppressed the Poles and the Jews alike. Two factors explain the weakness of competition in the fields of the intelligentsia in Russian Poland: the first was the smallness of the supply, itself the consequence of the virtual non-existence of institutions of higher learning. Second, in spite of being oppressed at home, the Poles with professional qualifications

of any kind had ample openings in Russia itself, where often they were even given preference over the Russians, owing to their reputation for being more reliable and less addicted to dissipation.

Unlike the persecution of the Jews in Hitler's Germany, the anti-semitic outbreaks in independent Poland were entirely unofficial, and the government tried to repress them—with fair success, for they never turned into massacres, and were normally confined to shouting and breaking windows. The police beat the demonstrators as much as these beat the Jews. Pilsudski (the dictator from 1926 to 1935) represented the old traditions of the nobility which regarded the Jews as a natural part of the body of citizens. The chief and the most effective slogan against him was that he sold the country to the Jews. After his death his heirs begun reluctantly to make concessions to the mood of the masses: though still maintaining the prohibition of violence, they allowed organized boycott. To understand the situation, one must take into consideration the odd circumstance that in spite of being a dictatorship with a developing taste for totalitarian paraphernalia, the government could not control the masses very well: in fact, in some places it was dangerous to admit that one was pro-government. In the university of Poznan, for instance, the few students who belonged to the pro-government organization were exposed to intimidation and chicanery from their fellows, as well as to victimization from some of the professors. Some professors from various universities, who did not conceal their anticlericalism or disapproval of antisemitism, had to endure whistles and shouts in lecture rooms, and on some occasions were pelted with rotten eggs. Sometimes the students started riots which assumed the proportions of battles against the police.

The curious feature of the National Party was the anti-capitalist streak in its ideology. In this it resembled the National Party of South Africa, and for the same reason: the big industrialists were not of their stock. In Poland they were mostly Germans or Jews, and some of the biggest establishments were owned by foreign companies. Similar circumstances have given an anti-capitalist tinge to nationalist ideologies in a number of Latin American and ex-colonial countries. The Polish National Party fought battles on many fronts, one of them being that of small and middle business against big business. It remains to be noted that even the wing whose programmes and values could without exaggeration be described as fascist, and whose members admired Mussolini and Hitler, was violently anti-German. Obviously the creed of sacred national egoism provides no basis for an international.

To understand the whole situation one must bear in mind the extremely hard economic conditions, which did not yet last long enough to induce despondency: not fatalistic lethargy, but aggressive resentment was the prevailing mood of the people. This was combined with the tradition of disobedience and wilfulness, bred by centuries of dis-

order and foreign rule, and the inclination to violence in everyday life, unparalleled in western Europe. These pent-up animosities would probably have discharged themselves in a civil war, had it not been for the German invasion.

The most general conclusion which emerges from the present analysis of the economic roots of antisemitism is that preaching alone will not extirpate them, and that they cannot be attenuated if the economic conflicts do not abate. The lesson for social engineering is plain.

Economic conflict is not a necessary condition of ethnic and racial animosity but it is a sufficient condition. As the position of the Negroes in the U.S.A. shows, the animosity may exist without serious economic conflict, but it is inevitable where such conflict is bitter.

When goods grow scarce men will fight for the shares, but whether they will divide themselves on class lines or according to religious, ethnic, or racial distinctions, depends on the relative strength of the various kinds of social bonds: a fissure usually occurs along the line of least cohesion. The difficulty of harmonizing conflicting interests will be greatest if more than one distinguishing mark coincides: if, for instance, class positions correspond to differences in religion, language, culture, and physical traits. Obversely, where such differences cut across the stratification they tend to prevent the crystallization of conflict along the class lines.

The part played by the struggle for shares in wealth in exacerbating antagonisms between collectivities in no way ensures that the movements thus generated offer a real solution to economic ills. Normally the contrary is the case: strife aggravates instead of alleviating poverty, and a vicious circle comes into existence.

AMBIVALENCE AND SELF-IMAGE AMONG ORIENTAL JEWS IN ISRAEL¹

Walter P. Zenner

AMBIVALENCE towards the heritage of the Diaspora is characteristic of all segments of Israeli society. Much has been written about the way native Israelis of European background view their ancestors as belonging to a parasitic and cowardly group; the boredom which the *sabras* often feel when they study the panorama of Jewish history between the Bible and the Establishment of the State has caused concern to many older Israelis.² Among the Oriental Jews, such emotional dualism is sharpened when the culture of their Diaspora is considered by themselves and by the Ashkenazim as 'primitive' and 'inferior'. Their attitudes are not ones of total rejection, for they contain a measure of pride in their own past. Oriental Jews, in a variety of ways, strive to retain elements of their inherited culture. This essay will confine itself, in the main, to the Syrian community in Jerusalem.

The investigation on which this paper is based was a field study. It aimed to uncover the role that identification with Syrian origin and with the larger Oriental segment plays in the lives of Syrian Israelis. Information was elicited through interviews as well as through observation in Syrian synagogues and households. The persons interviewed belonged to several occupational groups: clerks, merchants, rabbis, and labourers. They included young, old, and middle-aged adults, both religious and non-religious. While the research was conducted primarily in Jerusalem, visits were made to Syrians living in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and *kibbutzim*.

This particular ethnic group (*edah*) is made up of people who have in general been in Israel from fifteen to fifty years. They came mostly from the large cities of Syria, particularly Aleppo, where the majority had been engaged in commercial occupations. During the Mandatory period, both in Syria and in Palestine, Syrian Jews were subject to Western influences, such as French education, commercial connexions with Europe and the New World, Zionist youth movements, and a cultural feedback from the emigration of many of their relatives to the Americas. At the same time, there was a movement of Jews from the smaller towns on the Syro-Turkish border, such as Gaziantep, Urfa, and Killiz, to Aleppo and to Palestine.

ORIENTAL JEWS IN ISRAEL

In Aleppo itself after the First World War, Jews were moving out of the older and poorer sections of the city into newer quarters. The traditional way of life had been shaken, but it had not been destroyed. Family ties were quite strong. While strict religious observances may have declined, most still conformed to the tradition in such matters as synagogue attendance on the Sabbath and observance of the dietary laws. The power of the rabbinic courts, however, had waned.

The move to Palestine was less radical for Syrian Jews than was migration for the Moroccans or the Yemenites, since contacts were always closer. In addition, most Syrians went from one city to another, whereas many more recent immigrants have moved from an urban commercial setting to a village-agricultural area.³ By now the vast majority of Syrians are *vatikim* (old-timers) in Israel; most of the younger people under the age of thirty-five grew up in Israel, even if they are not *sabras*. They are part of that small segment of the Sephardi-Oriental population who were already part of the *Yishuv* in 1948. This group is intermediate in its socio-economic features between the Ashkenazim on the one hand and the new immigrants from Asia and North Africa on the other. It has mixed feelings towards both groups.

Certain changes occurred in the lives of the Syrians as a result of their integration into Israeli society. First of all, there has been a tendency, especially on the part of the younger ones, to move out of occupations, such as those of merchant, goldsmith, and pedlar, into occupations such as those of truck-driver and clerk. In the second place, modern educational institutions have replaced the old *kuttab*, which resembled the East European *heder* and which emphasized the rote-learning of traditional texts. European schooling had been introduced into Syria during the nineteenth century by Christian missions and by the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*. During the Mandatory period some of the schools of the *kuttab* type began to change to a more modern curriculum. Zionist youth movements had some influence upon Syrian Jewry after the First World War. With Israeli independence, modern education and youth movements became more fully accepted by the Syrians in Jerusalem, and their effects were felt even by the most conservative and traditional families.

These traditional conservatives, who include many of the Halebi (Aleppo) rabbis, accept many of these educational innovations. There is a definite feeling that the *kuttab* with its frequent use of corporal punishment is better replaced by schools in which teachers use 'diplomacy' in dealing with children. The need for play by schoolboys, which was frowned upon in Syria, is now recognized. There is also full acceptance of new gadgets, such as tape-recorders and cameras. One rabbi is collecting photographs of the rabbis of the East. A conservative cantor recently held the equivalent of a jam-session in his home with the aid of a tape-recorder, when a number of singers came together one evening

to sing traditional songs. While older *hakhamim*⁴ are still frequently attired in their robes, the same rabbis may wear morning coats, part of the rabbinic uniform in Israel, on other occasions. Even these traditionalists have mixed feelings towards their past.

The focus here will be on the self-image of the Syrian Jew as a Sephardi-Oriental and as a member of a smaller *edah* within that segment: the *Halebim* (Jews from Aleppo, North Syria). Among the younger people there are many for whom the *edah* identification is vaguely remembered, but they know that they are *Frenkim*. *Frenk* is the common slang-term for Sephardi-Orientals with some pejorative connotation, equivalent to the term *Yekke* for German Jews or *Shiknozi* and *Vus-vus* for Ashkenazim.⁵ It is a word with a strange history. Originally West Europeans in the Eastern Mediterranean were called Franks. Thus it came to be applied to the Spanish and Sicilian Jews when they migrated eastward during the sixteenth century. In Aleppo, Jews of Spanish and Italian descent were called *Signores Francos* or *Faranji*, the latter being the Arabic word for European. It became a term specifying Sephardi Jews. Evidently by the early twentieth century Ashkenazi Jews used the term first for the Sephardim proper and then transferred it to the larger non-Ashkenazi group, whether of Spanish, Arabic, or Persian speech. Today one may hear a second-generation Kurdish Jew refer to himself as a *Frenk*, even though he is not descended (ascertainably) from the Jews of Spain. For the purposes of this article, the terms Sephardi, Oriental, and *Frenk* will be considered synonymous.

In any self-image a person tends to identify the larger group of which he is a member with the small group of his own experience. When a New Yorker speaks about America, he often talks about the reality of New York. When a Halebi speaks about Syrian Jews, he means Halebim. A Halebi will often say: 'Syrian Jews and Damascenes.' Damascus Jews will say: 'Syrian Jews and Halebim', since the two groups consider themselves to be separate *edot*. In like manner, a Sephardi-Oriental *sabra* will talk about *Frenkim* in terms of his own background.

There is a general, mutually-held, stereotype of the *Frenk-Shiknozi* pair. Such images, which are common to both groups, are made up of many elements. One such feature is the attribution of 'modern' traits to the European-Ashkenazim and 'folksy' characteristics to the Sephardi-Orientals, which we shall discuss below. This attribution, however, is marked by one exception. The term Ashkenazi is also used as a simple designation for the ultra-orthodox Jew with a beard, earlocks, and fur-covered *shtreimel*. During some recent demonstrations and counter-demonstrations over certain religious issues between the League against Religious Compulsion, a secularist organization, and its religious opponents, Oriental Jews on a number of occasions referred to the religious simply as 'the Ashkenazim', although the League and its supporters were also largely of European background.

The general tendency, however, is to see the Ashkenazi or the European as the man in such middle-class neighbourhoods as Jerusalem's Rehavia or North Tel Aviv, as the businessman, the doctor, or the influential bureaucrat. To the Ashkenazi is attributed the quality of living well; both husband and wife work;⁶ they have a comfortable large modern apartment and do not have many children. Their family planning, some will tell the observer, is motivated by the desire to maintain a high standard of living and to be able to afford to send their children to secondary school and university, both of which charge fees. Since the wife works, she spends little time at home, hires an *ozeret* (domestic help), and serves simple meals. As for hospitality, the Ashkenazi, it is thought by some Sephardim, will turn away unexpected guests if they come at an inconvenient hour. He may even delay eating his own dinner, rather than serve an uninvited guest. Such a stereotype is a composite of many statements made; many an informant will deny this or that element of the stereotype. But that is, of course, the nature of this form of generalization.

As can be gathered, the Sephardi-Oriental self-image is the converse. The Oriental has many children, either because he does not know better (as some will say about their past selves) or because he wants them. His wife generally does not work after marriage, or even if she works she does not hire an *ozeret*. (In fact, domestic help is an occupational speciality of certain groups of Oriental women.) She is more dedicated to household work, to cooking, and to her family. Orientals are very hospitable, though less so than the Arabs. They will receive guests at any time; they will tell you that they like and enjoy guests. An Oriental will feel hurt if a person does not eat in his house. The Orientals are less educated than the Ashkenazim; they have smaller homes and larger families and a lower standard of living.

The Sephardi-Oriental veteran settler, who has been in Israel from before the founding of the State, perhaps born there, feels superior to the new immigrant from an Asian or North African country. He is more up to date. A Sephardi supporter of *Herut*,⁷ for instance, may assert that Mapai, Ben Gurion's party, is helped by the fact that it can rely on the votes of 'new immigrants' who do not know any better. The word for 'new immigrant' may be used as a synonym for 'ignoramus'. Certain origin-groups, such as the Halebim, feel superior to other Oriental groups in these regards as well. On the other hand, the Sephardi-Oriental veteran may on occasion share the feelings of the North African newcomer that Sephardim are discriminated against.

In the Ashkenazi stereotype of the Sephardi-Oriental there is an element of attributing 'Levantinism' to the latter. 'Levantinism' is the boggy word of post-Independence Israel.⁸ It comes from the phenomenon of the 'superficially Europeanized' Middle Easterner in entrepôts such as Alexandria or Beirut, who might have contempt for his native

culture and imitated the ways of the foreigner. Maugham's Mr. Know-it-all or Romain Gary's Habib in *Roots of Heaven* are literary examples of this slick rootless type. He has lost his native culture without becoming a well-grounded citizen of European civilization, to which he can make no 'contribution'. In European literature the Jew is sometimes identified with the Levantine-Oriental segment of humanity. This image comes out in the writings of Disraeli, Shaw's characterization of Mendoza in *Man and Superman*, and in popular works such as Sax Rohmer's *Fu Manchu* series. The psychosocial implications of this picture for European Jews who come into contact with their brethren who are labelled 'Levantine' and 'Oriental' await investigation.⁹

In Israel there is a fear of 'Levantinization', the fear of becoming a small insignificant state with declining standards of education and civic morality. This fear refers to more than the problem of educating new immigrants from Asia and Africa. Some may claim that an 'ex-yeshiva bohur' from Bialystok who has not acquired the dignity of a 'gentleman' is a Levantine, as much as a boy from Casablanca. Nevertheless, even the simple word contains a reference to the Levant, the Eastern littoral of the Mediterranean, and it has a distinct connotation of making the immigrants from Asia and North Africa scapegoats for the presumed decline in Israeli standards of idealism and morality.

In the Oriental stereotype of the Ashkenazi, there is also an ambivalent element with wide social significance. The desire for a higher standard of living is quite clear, as is the connexion between having many children and a poor economic level. Both persons who have many children and those who have few will say this. Any large family with a low income and a boy or a girl of secondary school¹⁰ age is faced with a dilemma. In some cases, a youth may receive a stipend to continue his education but it may be considered insufficient and his family decides not to send him to high school. The desire for modern furniture, refrigerators, fireplaces for the winter, and washing-machines is clear.

Traditional values do not, of course, disappear entirely. The way hospitality is regarded has been noted. The view of the 'Frenk' girl as a better wife is a commonly held stereotype; its corollary may be the idea of the Ashkenazi male who helps around the house and is a more desirable mate than the Oriental with his ideas of the wife serving her spouse. This stereotype has been referred to in a newspaper article concerned with intermarriage and social mobility as they relate to the amalgamation of the various ethnic groups.¹¹

The strength of these stereotypes can be shown by their repetition by one member or other of a mixed Ashkenazi-Sephardic couple. In two homes where Halebi men had married Ashkenazi women it was asserted (in one instance by the wife, in the other by the husband) that Sephardim receive guests more warmly than Ashkenazim do. The image of the

Sephardi woman as a better wife was given in an interview with a couple where the wife was of Sephardi-Oriental origin.

The desire to change partially in the European direction is one component of the Sephardi view of the Ashkenazim; a feeling of being discriminated against is another. The complexity of the discrimination issue is heightened by the difficulty of distinguishing conscious and direct discrimination from the use of objective criteria, owing to the lack of certain qualifications by Oriental applicants for posts. One reporter¹² finds that even high public officials of Sephardi origin give quite vague answers to questions on discrimination. Ashkenazim as well as many Sephardim will deny that there is any conscious discrimination, but that in job placement, for instance, too few competent Oriental Jews are available. As to the areas of higher education and economic advantages, the Ashkenazi will say that he would like to see the Sephardi succeed in obtaining them. Indeed, in the area of stipends for secondary education there is official discrimination in favour of those whose ancestors came from Islamic countries. This is done to give them an opportunity to get ahead.

Nevertheless many Sephardim will still talk about discrimination. One Sephardi publication refers to 'those *edot* discriminated against consciously and unconsciously'.¹³ Such complaints are not consistent among the veteran residents. One day a woman complained about how prejudiced the Europeans were against the *Frenkim*, while on another occasion she told me that what some European families had achieved in material terms they deserved to get, because they had worked hard for them. In general, one finds a definite desire to achieve a higher standard of living and for gaining posts of prestige within the society, but on the other hand, frustration. Among those Sephardim who have 'arrived' in these terms, there is a tendency to deny the existence of discrimination and to blame the Oriental Jews themselves for their failure to get ahead. These people see a definite and positive good in the blurring of distinctions between *edot*. Indeed, among Jerusalem *Halebim* this view of the amalgamation of the various origin-groups is not uncommon.

There is another type of 'discrimination', more subtle, present in the Sephardi-Ashkenazic relationship. Because the Ashkenazim are the dominant group, it is the Sephardim who feel it, though they do not always express their feelings. This is the often blithe assumption by Ashkenazim that their way of doing things is 'the way', or at least the 'Jewish way'. One radio broadcast about the way the Shabbat is observed in a children's institution made the statement that on Friday evening *gefilte* fish is served, followed by chicken soup and then chicken, 'as in every Jewish home'. That evening I ate a Sabbath meal in a Syrian home where we were served, as is usual in that family, with rice and meatballs and a tart soup with the meat-filled dumplings known

as *kubbeh*. One Sephardi told me how he fought the blandness of *kibbutz* cooking twenty years ago by always putting a lemon in his pocket before each meal and then squeezing it on all the dishes. For this he received the nickname 'Itzig the Lemon'. He also told me of newly immigrant boys from Mediterranean and Eastern lands who refused to eat the strange food in the *kibbutz*. This type of 'discrimination' may, in a situation of stress, be viewed as being personally directed. It is based upon ignorance and lack of sensitivity to the expectations of the Oriental Jews. In some cases, as in musical education, it may result in the rejection, by schoolchildren, of a part of the parental tradition, such as love of Arabic songs. Feelings regarding Ashkenazi hospitality also point to these feelings.

The positive pride which the Sephardi may take in certain values, such as hospitality, indicates that willy-nilly he is interested in retaining aspects of his parental culture. Nevertheless, the desire for change is quite strong. In the process of selection terms such as *primitive* and *modern* play their role in indicating what is positively and negatively valued. *Primitive* as used in Israel may refer to anything crude, unrefined, possibly naïve. It seems to me that this word is used more frequently in Israel than in the United States. It is not uncommon to find a group of Oriental Jews referred to as *anashim primitivi'im* (primitive men). An Oriental Jew may use the term in talking about his own *edah* as well as others. All kinds of qualities may be regarded as 'primitive' in different contexts: loud talking, severe corporal punishment of schoolchildren, Arabic music, belief in miracle tales, heavy drinking. One person referred to a group of rather refined rabbis as 'primitive' in the sense of naïvely accepting certain legends about miracles, though the speaker would not dream of attributing to them such 'primitive' qualities as pugnacity or drinking.

There is a definite distinction between people who are considered *atsilim* (noble) and those who are considered *peshtim* (ordinary). One quickly learns that *pashut* in reference to people can be a derogatory word; a man who drinks heavily, is uneducated, likes to fight, perhaps is even a petty thief, may be called *pashut*. (This particular usage may be peculiarly Oriental.) *Modern* is not exactly the opposite of primitive. One woman said that while her parents were not modern, in the sense of being modish, they were definitely not primitive or *pashut*, but merely old-fashioned. The word *modern* is used frequently with regard to contemporary tastes in foods, cakes, and furniture.

It is significant enough that the desired value of modernity is associated by Oriental Jews with their European neighbours, while the non-modern and primitive aspects of life are found in their parental heritage and among their fellows of Sephardi-Oriental origin.

With all the negative evaluation of certain elements of the Oriental heritage, an individual will still have some pride in his own *edah*. The

degree of specific identification with an *edah* may vary. In conversation the term *edah* is also used vaguely. A person may refer to the large division between Ashkenazim and Sephardim or to smaller divisions such as between countries or regions of origin, e.g. Moroccans, Kurds, Persians, or Spanioles (Sephardim in the limited sense of the speakers of Ladino). Among the Syrians, the *edah* is in effect identified with the major cities: the Halebim or Aleppo Jews are one *edah* and the Damascus Jews are another. Jews from Gaziantep, Antioch, and related communities in south-central Turkey tend to identify with the Halebim, possibly speaking a similar dialect of Arabic, while many Lebanese Jews identify with the Damascus community, although there are also Lebanese of Aleppo origin. The significance of this identification today may be no more than that in the knowledge a second- or third-generation American Jew has about his Litvak or his Galizianer grandparents.

Some Halebi families have a clear self-image of themselves as *atsilim* (noble) and quiet. Halebim, they say, do not interfere in the affairs of others and mind their own business. Unlike certain other *edot*, Halebim do not like to quarrel. One man told of an incident when a 'crazy' neighbour threw something at his wife, in her seventh month of pregnancy, causing her to have a hemorrhage which ultimately led to her death. He said he did not report the incident to the police, preferring to mind his own business, because he does not like trouble. He prefers to keep to himself, since he is a Halebi.

On the other hand, members of one *edah* from south-eastern Turkey, who are related to the Halebim, are noted for their love of fighting and their physical courage. This origin-group is the Urfali, from the city of Urfa (formerly Edessa). Many Urfalim migrated to Palestine via Aleppo, and in recent generations there were commercial relations between the two cities. One man of Urfali origin spoke with pride about the many Urfalim who had served in the underground terrorist organization, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (Etzel), during the British Mandate. Of course there were Halebim in the *Etzel*, too, but this particular display of courage was considered by him to be a specifically Urfali trait.

The Halebi takes pride in the large numbers of Aleppo rabbis. The Jews of Aram Sobah (Aleppo) considered themselves the most rabbinically learned in the East. This is partially substantiated by the important role certain Halebi rabbis play in a large Sephardi *yeshiva* and in the rabbinic courts of Israel and rabbinic posts elsewhere. One Jerusalem-born Halebi said that among Sephardim the Halebim contribute more money to Jewish institutions and are more interested in Jewish education wherever they are than other *edot*. Even the less religious take pride in these achievements of their *edah*.

Mingled with this pride, which refers particularly to the rabbinic

families, there can be an element of indifference to the history of the group and to efforts to distribute charity or go to synagogues on the basis of the origin-group. Some say that whatever greatness the Halebim had is all now past; today is a period of amalgamation.

But the specific Halebi self-image extends to other areas. The custom of getting up early (2-3 a.m.) Saturday morning and of singing *baqashot* is considered by many to be peculiarly Halebi, though other *edot* participate as well. The *baqashot* are poetic prayers written in Hebrew to fit Arabic musical forms, sometimes even to fit the tune of a particular Arab or Turkish song. The people who attend these sessions of song are from many origin-groups, including Urfalim, Sephardim, and Persians. The Damascus Jews also claim this custom of singing, and the form of the poems is not only that of those used as *baqashot* nor is it confined to Syrian Jewry. There are some non-religious young men who maintain an active interest in this as well as other forms of Oriental singing. The writing of new *baqashot* to the tunes of current Arabic popular songs also has continued.

The fact that an individual raised in a Halebi home should find pleasure in the Halebi sense of humour or should prefer the Halebi cuisine is almost self-evident. One boy who lived on a *kibbutz* for six years and married a Yemenite girl said that his wife had to learn to cook in the Aleppo style, which is quite different from the Yemenite style, in order to please him. Certain foods which typified *kibbutz* cuisine, such as jam and bread, he has not eaten since he left the army.

The stereotypes and statements of evaluation reported here are an indication of the way in which one small group of Israelis views its parental heritage and the ways of their neighbours. They show a desire for change and even assimilation, but with certain reservations which point to the conservation of certain Sephardi and even more particularist traits and patterns. In this case, the desire for an affluent way of life and for positions with more power and prestige seem to motivate the assimilative trend, whereas the more conservative attitudes find some expressions in patterns of music, hospitality, or cuisine. The relations between the Ashkenazim and the Sephardi-Orientals, both veteran and newcomer, are also marked by the European-perceived threat of Levantinization and the Sephardi feelings about discrimination and unfair treatment.

Because of his social position and the more recent secularization of the Sephardi groups, the Sephardi-Oriental's ambivalence towards his parental heritage has a different quality from that of the Ashkenazi *sabra* in that it is more marked by inferiority feelings about his present. This difference deserves further exploration.

ORIENTAL JEWS IN ISRAEL

NOTES

¹ The investigation on which this essay is based was supported by a pre-doctoral fellowship from the National Institute of Mental Health and was carried out during thirteen months in 1961-2. The author also wishes to acknowledge the help which Mrs. Phyllis Palgi and Dr. Jack J. Cohen gave him by reading earlier drafts of his paper. He alone, of course, is responsible for the present form.

² Cf. Y. Kaufman, 'Anti-Semitic Stereotypes in Zionism', *Commentary*, 1949, 7: 239-45, and Melford E. Spiro, *Children of the Kibbutz*, 1958, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 383-98. Also Robert Alter, Introduction to *Israeli Stories* (ed. Joel Blocker), 1962, N.Y.

It is the feeling of the author that the shock of recognizing a negative evaluation of their past by the natives of a Jewish state has often blinded observers to the positive side. This may take a whole variety of forms, including pride in the accomplishments of parents and other ancestors, a taste for cantoral music, etc.

³ Cf. P. S. Cohen, 'Alignments and Allegiances in the Community of Sh'arayim in Israel', *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 4:1:14-38, and A. Weingrod, 'Reciprocal Change: A Case Study of a Moroccan Immigrant Village in Israel', *American Anthropologist*, 1962, 64:1:115-131, for specific studies of Yemenite and Moroccan adjustment respectively. For a more general discussion cf. J. B. Schechtman, *On Wings of Eagles*, 1961, New York: 355-73.

⁴ *Hakham* is the title for a Sephardi rabbi.

⁵ *Ashkenazi* is the term applied to German and East European Jews. *Sephardi* technically applies only to Jews whose ancestors lived in the Iberian Peninsula, but it has been extended in usage to apply to most Jews from the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas.

⁶ Phyllis Palgi called my attention to a new stereotype of the Ashkenazi woman of leisure who spends a good part of her day in an expensive café. This type may still be limited to the more affluent areas of Tel Aviv or Haifa. Affluence when applied to the Israeli scene is relative prosperity and consumption, since wage differentials in Israel are still relatively small and taxation is still high.

⁷ *Herut* is the extremely nationalist party which succeeded the underground Irgun Zvai Leumi as successor to the ideology of Vladimir Jabotinsky. It has widespread support among urban Sephardi-Orientals. *Mapai*, the Party of the Workers of *Eretz Yisrael*, is the moderate Socialist party, which has led every coalition from 1948 to the present (1963).

⁸ For a fuller discussion of the desire by Oriental Jews for a higher standard of living, the European fear of Levantinism, and the ambiguities of apparent discrimination, cf. Alex Weingrod, 'The Two Israels', *Commentary*, April 1962.

⁹ This point was suggested by Abraham Rosman. For further references to the 'Levantine-Oriental' traits in the European stereotype of the Jew, cf. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (rev. ed.), 1958, N.Y., ch. 3 (*passim*; pp. 58, 72-9).

¹⁰ Fees are charged for secondary schools, but stipends are provided for the needy, particularly those of Asian and African origin.

¹¹ Cf. G. Spigel, 'Ma'amatsim, Hinukhiyim, Hesbertiyim v'Kalkaliyim L'mizug Galuyot', *Davar*, 8 August 1962, No. 11, 305, p. 4.

¹² Aryeh Rubenstein, 'Israel's Integration Problem', *Midstream*, 1962, 9:1:46-59.

¹³ Editorial, *B'Ma'arakha*, Jerusalem (*Va'ad HaSephardim*), August 1962, II, No. 14, p. 1.

THE HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF ZACHARIA FRANKEL

David Rudavsky

I. FRANKEL'S LIFE AND TIMES

Biographical Sketch

THE life of Zacharia Frankel (1801-75), renowned Jewish scholar and founder of the so-called Historical School in Judaism, spanned the turbulent decades of the nineteenth century, when Jewish religious life in Germany was in ferment as a result of the sharp clash between traditional Judaism and the liberal tendencies of the Emancipation and Enlightenment. Out of this conflict emerged the Reform movement, which represented a rebellion against so-called Orthodoxy. By the 1840s this new alignment, led by its foremost theorist, Abraham Geiger (1810-74), entered upon an extremist phase and produced a radical ideology. Orthodox¹ Jews, dubbed by the Reformers as *Altgläubigen* or 'Old Believers', generally remained unyielding in their rigorous attitude towards tradition, though the Neo-Orthodox² element, headed by Samson Raphael Hirsch, adopted a more conciliatory position towards secular culture and the spirit of modernism, in the earnest belief that it was an essential means of strengthening traditional Judaism. Between the two extremes of the traditionalists and Reformers, the Historical School, founded by Frankel, steered a moderate middle course, attempting to preserve tradition while also advocating a degree of adaptation of Jewish religious doctrine and practice to the changing conditions of the times.

Born in 1801 in Prague to a well-to-do family, Frankel combined a thorough Talmudic training in the local Yeshiva with a good secular education. In 1831 he earned his doctorate in classical languages at the University of Budapest. That same year he also received his rabbinical ordination and subsequently accepted a call as *Kreisrabbiner* or District Rabbi of Leitmeritz, and as rabbi at Teplitz, the leading congregation in his district. Later, in 1836, Frankel assumed the post of *Oberrabbiner* or Chief Rabbi of Dresden which he occupied for eighteen years until 1854, when as the 'man of the golden mean' he was elected to the presidency of the newly-founded Jewish Theological Seminary at

Breslau, in preference to Abraham Geiger, the scholarly leader of Reform. At that institution, which he headed until his death, Frankel prepared rabbis and scholars who were imbued with his ideas and ideals and made significant contributions to various phases of Jewish history and literature.

Frankel wrote prolifically. His special field of interest was the *Halacha* or rabbinic law which he regarded as the structure and framework of Judaism. In his doctoral dissertation entitled *Preliminary Studies in the Septuagint*, Frankel investigated the status of the Jewish legal tradition in this early period (third century B.C.E.). This study foreshadowed his life-long interest in the development of Jewish law. As professor of Talmud at the Breslau Seminary, Frankel recognized the need for a text to be used as an aid in the study of Talmud and accordingly, in 1859, he published a Hebrew work entitled *Darkei Hamishna*, i.e. 'Methods of the Mishna'. It was a history of the Halacha and it stimulated others to pursue further research in this field. Frankel's suggestion, borrowed from Krochmal,³ that the oral law was of rabbinic and not Sinaitic origin evoked a storm of protest on the part of Samson Raphael Hirsch and the Orthodox rabbinate.⁴ His other major Hebrew work, the *Mavo Hayrushalmi*, dealt with the Jerusalem Talmud, which had long been neglected because of the far greater devotion of scholars to the Babylonian Talmud.⁵

In order to stimulate interest in Jewish science, Frankel in 1844 launched a journal, the *Zeitschrift für Juedische Religiöse Interessen*, which lasted only three years. Later, in 1851, after he had placed his Seminary on a firm footing, he established the *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums*. Frankel edited the latter publication for eighteen years until 1869 when he turned it over to his colleague, the noted Jewish historian, Heinrich Graetz, then Professor of Jewish History and Biblical Exegesis at the Breslau Seminary.⁶ As a leading Jewish scholar in modern times, Frankel made a lasting contribution to Jewish thought and learning.

Romanticism and Jewish Science

Frankel was exposed to the strong Romantic currents which permeated various phases of intellectual life in nineteenth-century Europe, particularly in Germany, France, England, and Italy. The term Romanticism is rather vague and denotes diverse tendencies, all of which have in common a change from the classical outlook in religion, philosophy, science, literature, and other fields. It represents essentially a revolt against the rationalism of earlier generations; a reaction against the general assumption that all human activities, even politics and morality, are subject to the mechanical and arbitrary laws of nature. Romanticism rejects this view; instead it stresses individualism and introspection, the freedom of man and his ability to transcend and rise above

the natural level and strive for the Infinite. It regards man as a complex creature endowed not only with reason but also emotion, imagination, and intuition, who must utilize all his faculties in his search for beauty and truth. In so doing he is not to be encumbered by formal rules, precedents, and artificial restraints.

Frankel was a child of the Romantic age and susceptible to its influences. The impact of Romanticism is evident in his frequent emphasis on the feelings and sentiments of the Jewish masses towards tradition, which he insists must not be overlooked. The same tendency is reflected also in his exhortations to the Reformers not to apply undue rationalism to the solution of the religious problems confronting them. He often reminds them that by excluding sentiment from Judaism they dilute it. Reason is as cold as the north wind, and although it appeals to the intellect, it cannot satisfy the emotions or console or bring peace of mind or happiness. True Judaism, however, genuinely inspires and brings happiness.⁷

In contrast to the Classicists' reverence for the ancient civilization of Greece and Rome, the Romanticists adopted as their model the culture of the Middle Ages with its devout religious faith, unbridled supernaturalism, and mysticism. While the rationalists looked upon the medieval period condescendingly, *de haut en bas*, the Romanticists glorified it. This attitude towards history gave impulse to the *Juedische Wissenschaft* or Jewish Science Movement in Germany, initiated by Leopold Zunz (1794-1886), which purported to investigate the Jewish past through the use of critical and objective methods of study. In Jewish Science, Romanticism was compounded with its opposing rationalist current, the former element providing the motivation and the latter the objective approach. In his programme for the Breslau Seminary, Frankel noted that both components were essential and that while the plan of research to be used there was to be concerned in securing the objective facts, it would also reckon with 'the yearnings of the heart'.⁸

The period probed by the scholars of the Jewish Science Movement, in the main, embraced post-Biblical times and extended generally from the Talmudic and Gaonic period up to the Spanish expulsion, a much longer period than that covered by the general Romanticists who concentrated primarily on the medieval period.⁹ Frankel devoted his talents to the Talmudic era. Moreover, unlike Zunz, he believed that the prime function of the Science of Judaism was to advance Jewish learning and enhance Jewish consciousness and Jewish prestige rather than to achieve more practical ends.¹⁰ Despite this, one of Frankel's studies, *The Jewish Oath in Theological and Historical Context*, published in 1840, served a useful purpose; it helped to convince the government of Saxony that there was no valid ground for the *More Judaica*,¹¹ the special oath required of Jews testifying in court proceedings. The Jews

were obliged to take this odious oath because they were presumably absolved each year from binding obligations and commitments by the Kol Nidre ritual,¹² recited as a preliminary to the Yom Kippur eve service. As a result of Frankel's efforts, Saxony and later other German states abolished this offensive procedure.

The German and Jewish Historical Schools

The fundamental idea of the *Jus naturae* or natural law is to be found in Aristotle¹³ who spoke of it as a product of the rational nature of man. It was carried by the Stoics into the Roman era and into the Middle Ages. It was developed in modified form by Hugo Grotius¹⁴ (1583–1645), the great Dutch jurist, who defined this concept of the law as 'a dictate of right reason and social impulse, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity'.¹⁵ Thus Grotius saw natural law as sanctioned by human morality, rather than by divine command as in the case of the Decalogue, the Mosaic law, and the laws of other ancient peoples. To him and his disciples, natural law is the eternal, ideally just law, fixed, static, and unalterable and eternally valid for all people everywhere. As such, it should serve as a norm or objective standard against which all positive or enacted law and legal institutions could be measured.

The German Romantic tendency affected the fields of philosophy and law and helped to shape another doctrine in legal philosophy. Under the influence of the German philosopher Friedrich W. J. von Schelling (1775–1854), the jurist Gustave von Hugo (1768–1844) rejected the theory of natural law as a metaphysical abstraction and laid the groundwork for the Romantic conception of the Historical School. Friedrich K. von Savigny (1779–1861) and his disciple G. F. Puchta (1798–1846) and others developed this idea further. They viewed the law through the prism of history and formulated the notion that the law of a culturally advanced people, like its language, customs, and manners, has originated as far back as prehistoric times in the unique popular character or spirit (*Volksgeist*) of a nation, as the result of the operation of silent and unconscious forces. Customary law¹⁶ which is the outcome of custom, practice, or popular belief is only a manifestation of that spirit. Law is thus not the gift of legislators, but rather the result of the organic life of the group; 'it grows and develops with the people and declines when the people lose their individuality'. For this reason, the law cannot be codified or changed. It is, however, different with legal scholars who understand the *Volksgeist* and may, therefore, be said to be authorized by the community to interpret or apply it. The law is, accordingly, an expression of dynamic group life, as well as a branch of knowledge to be cultivated by a body of erudite specialists who are charged with the bounden 'sacred duty' of keeping alive the historical

link between a nation's present and past, as a vital part of the nation's spiritual life. The object of legal history 'is to trace every established system of law to its origins and thus discover an organic principle, whereby that which still has life may be separated from that which does not, and must therefore be relegated to the realm of history'.¹⁷

A thoroughgoing critique or evaluation of the theory of the *Historische Rechtschule* or Historical School of Jurisprudence is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that it has a number of fundamental flaws. Though a people's peculiar characteristic might affect its legal system, it can hardly be said that the sole or even major source of a nation's law is its popular spirit. The complex aspects of law, among other elements, may hardly be attributed to the *Volksgeist*. A nation's economic, social, and cultural conditions tend to shape its law. Moreover, Savigny's theory¹⁸ might lead to the conclusion that an ancient tradition, which is presumably embedded in a people's *Volksgeist*, is superior to later legal enactments. Actually, too, Savigny regarded the law, like language, as a phase of a nation's organic development—but the fact is that language is not generally a distinct national product, for many of its ingredients have other origins. It was no doubt romantic and mystical to extol the *Volksgeist*, and this may have suited well the nationalistic mood that prevailed at the time Savigny propounded his views, for this was the period immediately following Napoleon's downfall, but this does not make the doctrine any more correct or true. Notwithstanding its romantic fallacies, Frankel, like the intellectuals of his day, was impressed and influenced by it, and he attempted to apply its principles to Jewish religious law and practice, thereby creating the Jewish Historical School as a parallel to Savigny's *Historische Rechtschule*.

Among the basic dynamics in Frankel's thought which resembles that of the German Historical School is the nationalistic factor. Frankel pointed to the Jewish people as the source of Jewish law and tradition. Out of this view later emerged the principle of *Kelal Israel*, the totality of Israel, as the arbiter of change in Jewish practice, advocated by Solomon Schechter, the architect of the Conservative movement in America and the heir to the Historical School. Frankel himself, in line with one of the underlying ideas of the Historical School, devoted his life to a study of the evolution of the Halacha and its roots in early times, as a means of discovering his people's *Volksgeist*, and the true essence of Judaism. He also hoped to evolve from his investigation a criterion by which dead elements in his people's past could be separated from those that retained their vitality; the former were to be discarded, while the latter were to be preserved in Judaism. He determined that Hebrew, the Mosaic hope, and other values, belonged to the category of fixed and eternal components in Judaism. This is the foundation of his philosophy of Positive Historical Judaism. Frankel also challenges the rights of individuals to change Jewish practice, unless they can be

regarded as the authorized representatives of the Jewish community. An analysis of these principles, their implications, significance, and application, constitute the subject of the ensuing pages.

II. BASIC DYNAMICS OF FRANKEL'S HISTORICAL SCHOOL

Sources of Judaism

In conformity with his Romantic viewpoint, Frankel defined Judaism in natio-ethnic terms, as the religion of the Jews, implying thereby that Judaism as the historical achievement of the Jewish genius is lodged primarily in the Jewish people, rather than in the principles of ethical monotheism that lie at the foundations of the Jewish faith. Judaism may thus be regarded as the sum total of the doctrines, values, and outlooks on life which the Jews have developed in the course of their history and retained as their spiritual heritage. The Jews were the beneficiaries early in their career of a directly communicated supernatural one-time Divine Revelation at Sinai, recorded in the Written Torah. There is, however, another, indirectly transmitted, Divine Revelation, continuous and natural in character, which is manifested in the consensus and will of Israel to accept, disseminate, preserve, observe, and expand the Revelation represented by the Written Torah. The subsequent Revelation is an extension of the earlier one; it is incorporated in the Oral Law which is the result of man's reason and experience.¹⁹ Strictly speaking, the Written Law is too sacrosanct to be tampered with by man or subjected to the normal process of change, while the Oral Law, though also divinely inspired, but of human origin, may be accommodated to the needs of the times. The heteronomous Written Law embodied in the Holy Scriptures thus appears to differ from the autonomous Oral Law contained in the rabbinic texts, primarily in regard to source and permanence;²⁰ the former, being of divine origin, transcends the impact of time, while the latter does not.

The distinction between the two kinds of law is, however, actually nominal rather than real. The Torah can have meaning only in so far as it is applied to the life of the Jewish people who have guarded and clung to it steadfastly. Without Israel to interpret it and give it concrete expression, the Torah is an abstraction. It has permeated the consciousness of Israel through a process of elucidation and adaptation to practical situations. At times this method of development, through clarification or enactment, added to the stringency of the Scriptural regulations, by erecting numerous *Syagim* or fences around them, and at others it lightened and relaxed them. An illustration of the latter result is the punishment of the culprit whose victim suffers a loss of limb by money damages rather than the infliction of like injury in accordance with the literal construction of the Biblical provisions (Ex. 21:24, Lev. 24:20). Thus, the two levels of legislation—the

Divine and the human—have been fused organically into a unified Code so closely identified with the Jewish group as to give Judaism an ethnic character. Judaism may thus be said to comprise the triad of basic value—components noted in the dictum in the Zohar (Lev. 73a) which describes them as ‘intertwined one with the other; viz. the Holy One, blessed be He, the Torah and Israel’.

Professor Solomon Schechter (1847–1915), an outstanding Jewish scholar, the founder of the Conservative movement in America, explained the relationship of Bible and tradition as seen by the Historical School in the following terms:

it is not the mere revealed Bible that is of importance to the Jews, but the Bible as it repeats itself in history, in other words, as it is interpreted by Tradition²¹ . . . The Talmud . . . lends some countenance to this view by certain controversial passages, in which ‘the words of the scribes’²² are placed above the words of the Torah. Since then, the interpretation of Scriptures or the Secondary Meaning is mainly a product of changing historical influences; it follows that the centre of authority is actually removed from the Bible and placed in some *living body*, which, by reason of its being in touch with the ideal aspirations and the religious needs of the age, is best able to determine the nature of the Secondary Meaning. . . .

Another consequence of this conception of Tradition is that it is neither scripture nor primitive Judaism, but general custom which forms the real rule of practice. Holy Writ as well as history, Zunz tells us, teaches that the Law of Moses was never fully and absolutely put in practice. Liberty was always given to the great teachers of every generation to make modifications and innovations in harmony with the spirit of existing institutions. . . . The norm as well as the sanction of Judaism is the practice actually in vogue. . . .²³

Another outstanding scholar and ideologist of the Conservative movement, Professor Louis Ginzberg (1873–1953), writing in a similar vein, says of the Historical School:

For an adherent of this school, the sanctity of the Sabbath reposes not upon the fact that it was proclaimed on Sinai, but on the fact that the Sabbath idea found for thousands of years its expression in Jewish souls. It is the task of the historian to examine into the beginnings and developments of the numerous customs and observances of the Jews; practical Judaism on the other hand is not concerned with origins, but regards the institutions as they have come to be. If we are convinced that Judaism is a religion of deed, expressing itself in observances which are designed to achieve the moral elevation of man and give reality to his religious spirit, we have a principle, in observance of which reforms in Judaism are possible. From this point of view, the evaluation of a law is independent of its origin, and thus the line of demarcation between biblical and rabbinical law almost disappears.²⁴

These comments demonstrate an attitude of the Historical School towards tradition and change in Judaism which is opposed to that of

both the Reformers and the Orthodox. The Reformers were concerned primarily with the present in Jewish life and were ready to repudiate the past in order to bring Judaism into rapport with modernism. The Historical School, like the Orthodox, placed its accent on the past, stressing the role of Torah, Talmud, and later rabbinic works as vital links in the development of Judaism. The traditionalists, however, regarded the past chiefly as a decisive stage and its customs and traditions as fixed and unalterable, while the Historical School viewed the past as a fluid, formative period. It considered Judaism as a dynamic and evolving historical force, a perennial stream exemplified in the Mishnaic metaphor of a 'spring flowing with ever greater strength', but the Orthodox thought of it as a 'cemented cistern that does not lose a drop' (Abot 2:11). Accordingly, the latter considered the usages, doctrines, and observances of Judaism as not subject to the tenor or mood of the age; the former, on their part, believed that Judaism may be adapted in a measure to modernism. Progress and change in Judaism must, therefore, start and reckon closely with tradition. Frankel applied this principle as a guideline in his approach to the problem of modifying Jewish ritual and practice to suit the climate of the age.

The Hamburg Temple Dispute (1842)

Frankel entered the polemical arena in the dispute on the Hamburg Reform prayer book, a revision of which appeared in 1841. This new edition was actually less drastic in its departures from the traditional Siddur (prayer book) than the earlier one published in 1818, but it still omitted a number of passages considered vital by the Orthodox. The Chacham Bernays,²⁵ Chief Rabbi of the Hamburg Orthodox congregation, warned that the ban issued some twenty years earlier on the Reform prayer book was still in force and that those using it did not discharge their religious obligation of worship. Frankel, together with twelve other rabbis, was invited to give his opinion in the controversy, and he did so in a long statement in the *Orient* (1842) chiding both parties to the dispute.

With Bernays's ruling that one who employs the Reform prayer book does not discharge his religious duty Frankel disagreed. The primary question, he insisted, was not whether or not the prayer book conformed to the legalistic requirements set down by authorities, for the implications of this question transcended the immediate or the local issue. Public worship was a matter which affected the Jewish people as a whole, and should be viewed from this angle. Bernays, on his part, should not have denounced or interdicted the prayer book in the manner he did. The Templeites were justified in resenting and resisting suppression and persecution in matters of conscience and principle, nor was it fair to brand them as atheists or as destroyers of the faith. Such tactics might result in unduly curbing the spirit of freedom and progress

and lead to mechanical and insincere piety and obscurantism. The excessive zeal displayed by Bernays was bound also to cause an irreparable rift in the ranks of Judaism. Persuasion rather than coercion should be resorted to in matters of this kind, Frankel urged.²⁰

But Frankel did not spare the Reformers either. It was true, he declared, that not all customs and practices were God-given, nor were all precepts sanctioned by divine authority; yet the extreme ardour for change displayed by the liberals was fraught with the danger that they might be impelled to go beyond the bounds of propriety and licence, particularly since they had no acceptable criterion for selecting or rejecting rituals or practices. The Reformers lacked a sense of history; they failed to understand that in questions of public worship, one was to be concerned with the spirit and tradition of the people, which could not yield to dispassionate reason and logic. To determine whether or not the modification of a portion of the liturgy was proper, one must probe the attitude of the Jewish people towards it; one must bear in mind that human beings and their emotions were not rooted in the present alone, nor only in the spirit of modernism; they were deeply entrenched in sentiment and historic experience. It was, therefore, wrong to delete the Avodah, the account of the sacrificial service in the Holy Temple on the Day of Atonement, included in the traditional liturgy of the solemn day, for these passages roused sacred memories in the worshippers of the ancient days, when the national Sanctuary existed in all its glory. The Avodah service, too, had become ingrained in the consciousness of the people. 'Our centuries-old history supports Bernays,' Frankel concluded. No single group or institution might take it upon itself to modify tradition, for to do so would destroy its value as a common bond in Israel. Only the people as a whole, not the officials of one Temple or another, might institute changes in custom or ceremonial; only the community of Israel as such might discard or revise a religious usage.

Jewish Nationalism

Frankel had also criticized the Reform Hamburg Temple for having deleted the prayers for the restoration of Zion from its liturgy. This question had become a stormy issue between the traditionalists and the Reformers. The belief in a personal and nationalistic Messiah and the re-establishment of the idealized Davidic dynasty was deeply embedded in Jewish hearts and had brightened the long dark centuries of exile, ghetto, and persecution for the Jews, and had inspired them with a will to survive. The Jewish people were, therefore, reluctant to surrender it. There were, however, those who regarded this ideal as thoroughly inconsistent with the Jewish aspiration for political emancipation, equality, and citizenship in Germany and other lands. This was true then to a far greater extent than today, when civic loyalty, particularly

in Germany, was regarded as being so completely exclusive as to require the severance of even ethnic bonds with Jews in other lands. The Reformers, therefore, replaced the nationalistic and particularistic implications of the Messianic ideal with a broad universalistic construction, thereby nullifying its cherished traditional connotation. This new idea, the so-called Doctrine of the Jewish Mission, made the Diaspora a norm of Jewish existence, willed by God. In support of their position the Reformers adduced the Talmudic doctrine 'The Lord did a kindness to Israel by scattering them among the nations' (Pes. 87b), indicating that exile was not a penalty imposed on the Jews for their sins, as Jewish tradition had it, but rather that the dispersion was providential, in order to enable the Jews to become a 'light among the nations' (Is. 42:6) and teach them the true meaning of ethical monotheism as promulgated by the Hebrew prophets.

Frankel was outspoken in his protest against the omission of the prayers for the rebuilding of Zion by the leaders of the Hamburg Reform Temple, asserting that:

The idea of an independent Jewish homeland is in itself ennobling and full of vitality. There is nothing wrong in the aspiration to re-establish our nationality in a corner of the globe, associated with our most sacred memories, where it could again stride forward freely, and gain the respect of the nations, which sad experience teaches us, is extended only to those who possess worldly power. In this hope, there is no inkling of hate or disparagement of our present Fatherland; nor should it arouse a suspicion that we regard ourselves as aliens in the Fatherland and that we desire to flee from it. . . . This merely proves that despite millennia of suffering and oppression, we have not yet despaired and we are still in a position to grasp the idea of independence and regeneration. In any case, this is a far loftier concept than the constant subservient accommodation of our people to external conditions, an attempt which frequently culminates in a vapid, superficial cosmopolitanism.²⁷

Gotthold Solomon, preacher of the Hamburg Temple, challenged Frankel to reconcile this view of nationalism with the struggle for complete enfranchisement waged by German Jewry. Like the extremist Reformers today, he raised the spectre of dual loyalty. Frankel defended his position, pointing to the parallel of the Greek citizens of Austria who participated actively in the movement for the liberation of Greece from Turkish domination, without anyone casting suspicion on their loyalty to the Hapsburgs. Similarly, Frankel argued, 'Why should Jews not desire the creation of a Fatherland for their unfortunate brethren suffering in Sardinia, Czarist Russia, and elsewhere?' As far as Germany is concerned, he explained, the Jews there had a Fatherland; they were in a far better position politically and economically than those in Eastern Europe and other countries, for in Germany, Jews now enjoyed almost complete egalitarian rights. However,

should conditions in Prussia, for example, where Jews had been accorded almost full legal equality by the Edict of 1812, deteriorate or retrogress to what they had been during the oppressive period of post-Napoleonic reaction, the Jews there might also need a land of their own where they could live undisturbed and unmolested. But, as matters stood, the German Jews differed from their Protestant and Catholic fellow-citizens primarily in their religion. For this reason, Frankel intimated, the Jewry of Prussia rejected the plan of King Frederick William IV who, upon ascending the Prussian throne in 1840, had proposed that he would grant them special national rights but not full equality. 'Wherever the Jew finds a Fatherland which recognizes him as a legitimate son', Frankel declared, 'he renounces his Jewish nationalism; he must renounce it, if he wishes to regard himself as a true son of the Fatherland; he himself demands of the Fatherland that it grant him this status—and once this is granted, his Jewish nationalism ceases of itself, for Jewish nationalism is something imposed from without.'²⁸

As we can see from the above statement, Frankel's notion of Jewish nationalism was quite confused;²⁹ or perhaps he felt that he must be cautious in what he said, in order not to prejudice his correligionists' case in their struggle for emancipation. It is possible that for this reason he spoke of Jewish nationalism as something negative, forced on the Jew from without, by their oppressors and denigrators who sought to treat them as aliens and intruders, rather than as a positive sentiment fostered by the Jewish group. In this view, Frankel, moreover, failed to arrogate to Jewish nationalist aims any affirmative meaning, such as the establishment in the Jewish homeland not only of a refuge for oppressed Jewry but also of a cultural centre, a 'refuge for the Jewish spirit'. Such an objective was suggested as early as 1805 by one of the early proponents of Reform in Hungary, Rabbi Aaron Chorin (1755–1844)³⁰ and formulated in a clear and articulate manner towards the end of the century by the East European Jewish thinker, Asher Ginzberg, better known by his pen name, Ahad Haam (1856–1927).³¹

It is evident that Frankel failed to distinguish as we generally do today between the concepts of nationhood and nationality; the former term designating a political entity, while the latter connotes merely an ethnic or cultural group, such as the various language groups in the Swiss Confederation. Before they attained independent Statehood, the Irish were a nationality as the Welsh still are today, a part of the British nation. According to this viewpoint, the fact that Jews of Germany belonged to the German nation in no way contradicted their separate nationality and religious, spiritual, and ethnic affinity with their fellow-Jews throughout the world. Only one's political affiliation is exclusive; but neither that nor one's citizenship is in conflict with membership in a variety of family, community, religious, or ethnic

groups, all of which tend to exercise a broadening influence upon the individual.

Frankel's idea of Jewish peoplehood was only the core of Zionist ideology as later formulated and crystallized. To Frankel, the idea of the return to Zion was not, as has been suggested, a mere religious belief to be confined to the prayer book but not to be translated into actuality, for Gotthold Solomon³² and others of Frankel's opponents were ready to agree to such a compromise, in order to avoid a cleavage and a schism in Jewry on this question. Of course, Geiger and the radical Reformers objected to such a concession, as not being consistent with what they claimed was a purer and broader religious concept and higher truth. Frankel also advanced another principle, that Zionism, particularly in the West, later adopted. As a compromise between the traditional view of *Kibbutz Galuyot*, the Ingathering of Exiles, i.e. the resettlement of the Jews of the entire world in Zion, and the Reform negation of the traditional aim of the Messianic redemption in its totality, Frankel advocated that the Jewish homeland should be rebuilt primarily for the homeless and persecuted segment of Jewry. A similar thought had been advanced at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Aaron Chorin.³³ Western Zionism later adopted this viewpoint.

The Frankfort Conference took a definite stand on the issue of the inclusion in the liturgy of the prayers for a personal Messiah as well as the broader problem of Jewish nationalistic regeneration. The majority supported a resolution to the effect that 'the Messianic idea should receive prominent mention in the prayers, but all petitions for our return to the land of our fathers and for the restoration of a Jewish State should be eliminated from the prayers'.³⁴

The Frankfort Conference

The first conference of Reform rabbis in Germany was convened in 1844 in Brunswick at the instance of Ludwig Philipson, founder and editor of a German Jewish weekly, for the purpose of strengthening the Reform movement through a substantial measure of co-ordinated action on doctrine and ritual. The second conference of the liberal rabbis was held the following year (1845) at Frankfort. Frankel was not expected at this gathering, because he had criticized the earlier one severely; but he came in the hope of exercising a moderating influence and curbing the aggressive designs of the extreme Reformers.

To understand the mood of the Frankfort Conference, it is necessary to note the atmosphere in which it met. At the time, the currents of German nationalism had penetrated the German intellectuals as well as the liberal religious circles. A movement had arisen for the creation of a separatist German Catholic church detached from the Church of Rome. Similarly, the so-called rationalistic *Lichtfreudliche Gemeinden*³⁵

(Communities of Enlightened Friends) among the Protestants repudiated the doctrine of the Trinity and other Christian dogmas and undertook to establish a nationalist Protestant Church. The radical Berlin Temple Vercin (Union), organized two months before the Frankfort Conference, issued an *Aufruf* or appeal to the Conference 'to redeem Judaism, our most precious heritage, from all antiquated forms'. The thoroughgoing radical constituency of the new congregation and its declared intention to institute drastic changes in the liturgy, led many to believe that it was planned as the Jewish component of the nationalistic German religious movement. The extremist tendencies of the group were manifested in the adoption of a ritual almost completely in the vernacular; the introduction of the practice of worship with uncovered heads, and the shift of the principal service from the Sabbath to Sunday.³⁶ Despite these innovations, it turned out that the Berlin Temple did not actually plan to join the contemplated German nationalist religious tendency. The Reform rabbis at the Frankfort Conference, however, gained courage and boldness from the aggressive attitude displayed by the ultra-radical congregation³⁷ which sent a delegation to the Conference.

A major issue at the Frankfort meeting concerned the place of Hebrew in the synagogue service, a question that had specific nationalistic overtones. Geiger, the leading spirit of the Conference, argued that Hebrew was not and could not be considered indispensable in Jewish worship since language is a national element, while Judaism is not a national but a universal religion; moreover, Hebrew is a segregating influence and should, therefore, be eliminated. Others who shared Geiger's views pointed to a precedent for the use of the vernacular in the liturgy, in the fact that important prayers like the kaddish, recited by mourners, were composed in Aramaic. The *tehinot*, the devotions of pious Jewish women, were in Yiddish not in Hebrew. It is a disparagement of the lofty ideals of Judaism, they maintained, to insist that Hebrew must have so high a priority in the synagogue, despite the fact that it was so little understood by the people. The sages, too, they insisted, had not declared Hebrew to be the obligatory language of worship—quite the contrary: the Mishna and Talmud distinctly declared that even the Shema might be uttered in any language (Ber. 13a); moreover, the Shulchan Aruch maintained that 'one can pray in any tongue one desires' (Orach Hayyim Hilchot Tefila 101:4) and the Book of the Pious specifically stated (588, 785) that it was better not to pray at all than to pray in a language one did not understand. Actually, the Reformers claimed, the use of the vernacular in the service was bound to strengthen rather than weaken the pillars of religion. The language did not sanctify the prayers; the converse was true. German, too, if used in the service might eventually also become a hallowed language, through such use, the Reformers contended.

Frankel expounded the role of Hebrew in public worship in an entirely different light. Religion was in itself abstract and Hebrew was the concrete form in which it was expressed; it was an integral and organic ingredient in Judaism, for it was the holy tongue in which the doctrines, concepts, and ideals of Judaism had been created and preserved; it also added the aura of a mystic element to the religious service. Terms like *Adonay* (Lord) could not be adequately translated, because of the subtle meanings and overtones they had acquired in the course of the centuries. If Hebrew was omitted from worship, it was bound to lose its place in religious education as well, and this would have a disastrous effect on Jewish survival. This had actually been the case in the period of Philo (50 C.E.) when Greek superseded Hebrew,³⁸ and Philo himself had resorted to the Septuagint for his allegorical explanations, a number of which, based on almost ludicrous mistranslations of the original,³⁹ had turned out to be distortions which vitiated the traditional precepts. Greek influence, too, had led Philo and his school to approach the Scriptures from the vantage point of philosophical speculation, unlike the sages who examined philosophy in the light of the Scriptures. Judaism had its unique cherished values, symbols, and institutions that distinguished it, yet a dissenter could attack any of them on the specious ground that it could not conceivably depend on one or another custom or practice, to the extent that it might eventually be reduced to a mere creed, which, of course, is untenable and alien to its very nature. Worship in Hebrew is also a sacred bond uniting scattered Jewry. There must be historic continuity as well as unity in Judaism and 'he who objects to the preservation of our hallowed tongue, actually destroys a vital historic element in our religion', Frankel concluded.

The views of Geiger and his followers on this question were upheld by a vote of 15-13 of the rabbis present with three abstentions, though they unanimously agreed that for the time being it was 'advisable' that Hebrew be retained in the service. Frankel strongly objected to the position taken by the majority and in protest he and a colleague, L. Schott, dramatically left the meeting and withdrew from the Conference. In a letter he published subsequently he explained that he did so because the decision of the assembly of rabbis violated the principle of 'positive historical Judaism' to which he was committed.

Positive Historical Judaism

At the Frankfort rabbinical conference, Frankel insisted that Judaism could be meaningful only if it pursued a 'positive historical' approach. He did not explain this rather vague term which became the shibboleth of the Historical School and later of its American outgrowth, the Conservative movement. Frankel revealed a clue to the meaning of this phrase in his exposition to the Frankfort meeting of the role of Hebrew in public worship. His view on this question differed from that

of both Reform and Orthodoxy. The Reformers insisted that Hebrew as the medium of Jewish prayer must give way to the *Zeitgeist*, the spirit and needs of the present generation which, they claimed, required that it be replaced by the vernacular. The Orthodox conceded that though, strictly speaking, according to the Halacha this was generally permissible, long custom and usage banned the spoken tongue. Frankel, however, agreed to the introduction of non-Hebrew prayers into the liturgy, but he demanded that the service should remain predominantly Hebraic, in deference to the principle of 'positive historical Judaism'.

Accordingly Frankel implied that in the historical experience of the Jewish people, the Hebrew language had become a positive, that is, a firmly entrenched value. It was the soil in which Judaism was nurtured in the past and the only one in which it could flourish in the future. Though Hebrew had become associated with Judaism in the course of history (that is, within the process of time), it had ultimately become a permanent feature in Judaism, transcending time. Thus, Hebrew which had served as the external form in which Judaism was articulated, had become as timeless as the essence itself. It was not then the letter of the law or fixed tradition which determined what was basic in Judaism, as the Orthodox would have it, as much as the unique place a given usage had attained in the consciousness of the Jewish people. By the same token, it was not the rationalistic spirit of the age that served as the yardstick as to what was to be preserved or discarded in Judaism, but the sentiments of the people. This was true not only of Hebrew but of other institutions in Judaism as well.

The outward forms were of particular importance in Judaism, Frankel maintained, because Judaism was a religious code—a complex of affirmative and negative precepts, not a system of theological speculations and beliefs. The basic doctrines and principles of Judaism could best be grasped through loyal adherence to its commandments, for Judaism was essentially a religion of action and deed, and not a creed. Judaism possessed no dogmas such as those of Christianity; the will of God in Judaism was expressed through obedience to its ethical and ceremonial laws. The praxis in Judaism delineated the path of moral and ethical conduct for the Jews; without it Judaism was inchoate and abstract. In this, Frankel was in agreement with the Orthodox position. The latter, too, regarded ritual and ceremonial observances as inseparable from the doctrines with which they were interlocked. The Reformers, however, had discarded the practices in Judaism as externals, as mere shells; they purported to retain only the inner kernel or core of ethical ideas—an approach which they regarded as liberal and progressive.

But if one facet of the historical process in Judaism comprised its inrooted eternal patterns which withstand the impact of time, another yielded to it. In its centuries-old experience, Judaism had come to grips

with other cults and cultures; it had rejected those currents of thought that clashed with its tenets and doctrines, but it had accepted others that conformed to its nature. Moreover, in the course of its development, certain of its laws and customs had undergone modification in accordance with the spirit of a given era or epoch. Frankel combated the reluctance of the Orthodox to acknowledge that there was room for change in Judaism and need for it to adjust to the modernist outlook. His contemporary, Samson Raphael Hirsch, the founder of neo-Orthodoxy, however, averred that it was not Judaism that had to conform to the spirit of the age, but rather the spirit of the age to Judaism. To Frankel, however, an attitude which made precept and ritual rigid, inelastic, and an end in itself, spelled a form of paganism and idolatry.

Judaism, Frankel indicated, had never considered all of its laws immutable. Through interpretation, and sometimes through the enactment of new regulations, the ancient rabbis modified practice in accordance with the needs or views of a given era. Thus, Hillel found a legal means of circumventing the Law of Release (Deut. 15:1)⁴⁰ when the conditions of the age demanded it. The importance of this policy in Judaism was evidenced in the dictum in a classical historical work, which among other subjects, deals with the controversy between the Sadducees and the Pharisees. The Sadducees, it will be recalled, were literalists who insisted on a rigorous construction of the Scriptural law, while the Pharisees were liberals who believed in the pliancy of Biblical precepts. 'That day', it is asserted, 'was a festival for Israel, when the Pharisees prevailed in their interpretation of the law of "an eye for an eye" . . . "a hand for a hand" (Ex. 21:24) rendering this verse in terms of monetary compensation rather than retaliation in kind' (*Megillat Taanit*, ch. 4). The triumph this celebration marked did not lie in the humanitarian aspect of the rabbinical version, important as that might be, Frankel explained, but rather in the fact that it established the principle that not the letter but the spirit of the law must prevail and that this spirit must raise the law to a level where it could serve as a suitable guide for man who is himself endowed with the divine spirit.

In sum, Frankel's concept of positive historical Judaism envisages a bipolarity⁴¹ of values and institutions in Judaism; its hallowed tenets or practices belonging to either a primary or a secondary category. Among the first are the inner, positive, or preservative principles and observances in Judaism which cannot give way to an ephemeral *Zeitgeist*, or the test of rationalism, or to mere convenience. This group includes the permanent components of Judaism which though they have evolved as a result of the temporal process, have transcended it. Among these usages and concepts are Hebrew, the Sabbath, the Messianic hope, and numerous other basic ideals which have been hallowed by the Jewish people for generations.

The secondary category, in contradistinction to the primary one, contains the external and transitory doctrines and practices in Judaism; those that may be said to be subject to the fluctuations inflicted by time. The Reformers, however, place all the tenets and practices of Judaism in this secondary group only, on the ground that since all elements in Judaism have been generated at a point in time, they are exposed to its normal effects. Thus, they deny the notion that there is a primary cluster of ideas and observances in Judaism endowed with everlasting existence. The factors of rationalism and change implied in the evanescent present and ephemeral *Zeitgeist* are the controlling ones in Reform. The Orthodox also see only a single rank in the observances in Judaism, the primary one, which is fixed and constant and beyond the influence of Time. Frankel sought a balance or mean between the two classes of elements in Judaism, the fixed and the fluid ones.⁴² This was one of the chief dilemmas confronting him and his school of thought.

Change in Judaism

But how can change be implemented in Judaism, even in the subordinate category? According to Frankel, this may be done on the basis of critical inquiry into Jewish law, lore, and history, for the purpose of ascertaining how deeply rooted a given practice or usage has been in the Jewish past, how sanctified it has become in the heart of Jewry, and the extent to which it functions as a strengthening and binding force among the people. Frankel, however, cautioned that 'Jewish science is not a mere autopsy on the corpse of Judaism. By means of it we must inquire into the principal foundations of Judaism from ancient times, for the preservation of which we must wage a determined struggle. We may not tamper with these fundamentals. They are memorials that have been acquired at the cost of blood and great sacrifice.'⁴³ From this angle, the origin or even nature of a ritual is of far less importance in resolving whether or not it should be retained, than the place and significance it has attained in the Jewish tradition.

The aim of contemporary Judaism, Frankel goes on to say, is to preserve tradition, and yet to forge ahead on the road to progress; to this end we must find the golden path between the two seemingly contradictory goals. We have no right to modify practices that the people cherish, even on the strength of the results of scientific inquiry into the nature of these practices. 'Any Jew is at liberty to pursue independent thought or investigation, but only the Jewish community as a whole has the right to bring about reforms in Judaism. What has been fully accepted by the people and sealed in its history is sacred.'⁴⁴

This attitude accords with Frankel's view of Judaism as a uniquely nationalistic religion in which the few cannot act for the many. Only

those modifications in practice introduced by the people in its entirety may be countenanced on the principle of *vox populi, vox dei*. No group of rabbis may exercise such authority, for the rabbis do not constitute a sacerdotal class in Judaism. This democratic principle, Frankel believes, will safeguard Judaism. The body of Jewry will not admit reforms lightly, on impulse; it will shun anything that may lead to its injury or destruction. Actually, of course, in the past, the rabbis did effect changes and innovations in practice, through the process of interpretation or enactment, but in doing so they served as representatives of the community; they had the confidence of the people that they would reflect their views and sentiments. The Reform rabbis, however, Frankel contended, were not concerned to strengthen but rather to weaken the role of the *Mitzvot* and doctrines in Jewish life; as a result they shocked the religious sensibilities of the majority of Jews. Consequently, the Reform rabbis lacked the confidence of the Jewish public and, therefore, had no right to presume to act for it. Quite the contrary, the Jewish masses regarded them as unrestrained transgressors of the law and its precepts, who must be checked and curbed.

The Talmud, too, maintains the view that the will of the people is a vital factor in Jewish law. A Talmudic principle advises those who would ascertain the law, to 'go and see how the people comport themselves' (Ber. 45a). It also maintains that 'a custom supersedes a law' (Jer Yevamot 82a); moreover, no decree may be imposed on the community unless the majority is able to abide by it. The practice of the people is to prevail, the sages hold, even in the case where the use of a prohibited item has spread during a period of stringency among the majority of Israelites (Avodah Zarah 36a).

Frankel's opponents at the Frankfort Conference objected to his contention that only the people and not they, a group of rabbis, had the authority to effect changes in Jewish practice. They claimed greater competence to do so than the rank and file of Jews, for they understood better the trend and the spirit of the times. For the same reason, they were not bound to reckon with the sentiments or opinions of the masses. Only demagogues, who were not sincere and responsible spiritual leaders with definite and well-considered ideas of Judaism, could pursue Frankel's line.

In his references to the people who were to decide on changes in Judaism, Frankel made it clear that he had in mind, not the entire Jewish community, a large portion of which might be ignorant of Jewish law or indifferent to it, but rather the teachers, scholars, and those who were concerned with the preservation and advancement of the Jewish tradition and heritage. Frankel's stress on the authority to be exercised by the Jewish people indicates that he thought of Judaism as a pluralistic rather than as a private concern—and in this regard, Judaism differs from Christianity; more especially Protestantism, which

emphasizes the role of the individual in religion. The Sinaitic Revelation was a collective experience; the Hebrew prayers are formulated in the plural; public worship is preferable to private and requires the participation of a *minyan*, or quorum of ten. Numerous other doctrines and practices in Judaism can be adduced in support of the view that Judaism is a group discipline. Geiger and his colleagues, however, believed that individuals with a specific plan and outlook are competent to mould the image of Judaism in accordance with what they deem to be its fundamental principles and outlooks. The Reformers, moreover, appear to have accepted the religious divisions in Jewry as a fact and were, therefore, ready to rely on a segment of the community to institute innovations in Judaism.⁴⁵ This approach may have been influenced by the Protestant view of religion as an individual affair; but Frankel in his basic outlook aspired for a strong and unified Jewry.

Frankel's Historical School did not form a separate movement in Germany as did the Reformers, yet it gained many supporters in Germany and elsewhere. Frankel did not formulate a set ideology or programme; his main contribution having been to restrain Reform and adapt traditional Judaism in a measure to the spirit of modernism. He thus steered, as was previously observed, a middle course between the principles of stability advocated by the Orthodox and those of flexibility and change upheld by the Reformers; but in pursuing this compromise he became a target for both camps.

NOTES

¹ According to H. D. Schmidt, this word was first used as a pejorative term to refer to what they considered the backward majority of pious Jews. It appeared in the Berlin *Monatschrift* in 1795 (Vol. XXV, p. 30). See his essay, 'The Terms of the Emancipation (1781-1812)', *Yearbook I*, Leo Baeck Institute (1956, p. 30). The common notion has been that the term was coined by Furtado, President of the Assembly of Notables at its session in 1806.

² Actually, Neo-Orthodoxy was not a new trend in Judaism, but a reversion to the kind of Judaism practised in Arab Spain where Jews were active in the general life and culture about them. This is generally the brand of Orthodoxy prevailing in America and Western countries.

³ *More Nebuchei Hazman*, Warsaw ed., 1894 (Gate 13), pp. 195 ff.

⁴ The Orthodox rabbis objected to Frankel's reassertion of Krochmal's view that the oft-quoted Talmudic phrase, *Halacha L'Moshe M'Sinai* (law received

from Moses at Sinai) refers to ancient regulations, some even antedating the Theophany, the origin of which was forgotten. For this reason, they were credited to the Sinaitic Revelation, though they were not actually a part of it. The Orthodox insisted, of course, on a literal rather than a liberal interpretation of this as of other traditions. They adhered to the dictum (Meg 19b) that 'God showed Moses the inferences of the Torah and the inferences of the Scribes and the innovations which were to be introduced (in the future) by the Scribes'. A similar statement appears in the Jerusalem Talmud (Peah 6a) to the effect 'that even what a competent student is bound to innovate was already said at Sinai'.

⁵ He also published several treatises of the Jerusalem Talmud for which he wrote a commentary he called *Ahavath Zion* (Love of Zion) as a token of his faith in the idea of the restoration of Zion, in opposition to the Reformers.

⁶ The *Monatschrift* continued without interruption until almost the period of the Second World War.

⁷ *Monatschrift*, 16:19.

⁸ Cited in Rabinowitz, Shaul, *Rabbi Zecharia Frankel*, (Hebrew), Warsaw, 5658, 1897, pp. 209 ff.

⁹ Joseph Klausner, *Historia Shel Hasi-frut Haivrit* (2nd ed.), Jerusalem, Ahiasaf (1952, p. 18).

¹⁰ Within the Jewish community the Jewish Science Movement helped to curb the two extreme fringes—the ultra-pietists and the assimilationists. The liberal attitude of free investigation implicit in the Jewish Science Movement resulted in moderating the extreme traditionalist views of the ultra-pietist segment. On the other hand, the new esteem which Judaism gained from the efforts of the Jewish Science School helped to strengthen the loyalty of many who saw little reason for Jewish continuity.

¹¹ With some variations, the Jews' oath was administered throughout Germany in the synagogue in the presence of a tribunal of three or a *minyan* (a quorum of ten male Jews required for public worship). The deponent was required to wear a *talith* (prayer shawl) and *Tephillin* (phylacteries) and, sometimes, even shrouds, and invoke upon himself the curses of Lev. 26:16 ff. and Deut. 27:13 ff., the Ten Plagues of Egypt as well as the leprosy of Naaman 2K 5 ff. and 2K 5:27, and similar imprecations.

¹² The Mishna (Yoma 8:9) specifically declares that for transgressions between man and God, the Day of Atonement effects atonement, but for transgressions between man and his fellow man, the Day of Atonement effects atonement *only if he has appeased his fellow man*. Accordingly, the Kol Nidre cancels only *religious* but not civil obligations.

¹³ Nichomachean Ethics, Book V, chap. 7.

¹⁴ Aristotle differs from Grotius in that he speaks of natural law as being changeable and not uniformly unchangeable 'as fire which burns here as well as in Persia'. It is accordingly an ever-present force which prods man on his path of cultural progress. Grotius, however, thought of it as a rather rigid, static element in culture.

¹⁵ Edgar Bodenheimer, *Jurisprudence*, New York and London, 1940, p. 130.

¹⁶ An example of customary law is the common law symbolic transfer of the physical possession or ownership of real property known as *Livery of seisin*. The seller, either actually on the land or in sight of it, delivers a twig or clod to the purchaser as a token of his sale. This is suggestive of the ancient method of transferring title to a field, by the removal of a shoe, described in the Bible (Ruth 4:7, 8). After this practice fell into disuse, a kerchief passed from the seller to the purchaser became the symbol of a completed transaction in the sale of real or personal property. This custom is still practised today among pious Jews.

¹⁷ Hayward, *Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence*, London (1831), p. 131, a translation of Savigny's famous work *Vom Beruf unser Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft* (1814).

¹⁸ H. Kantorowicz, 'Savigny and the Historical School', 53 *L.Q. Rev.*, 1937, pp. 326 ff.

¹⁹ Isaac Heinman, *Taamei Hamitzvot B'sifrut Israel*, Chapter V, 'Zacharia Frankel', pp. 161 ff.

²⁰ *Zeitschrift*, II, 12; *Monatschrift*, 1:2.

²¹ Schechter explains 'tradition' and 'Secondary Meaning' in the Scriptures in the following passage: 'Jewish tradition or . . . the Oral Law as we may term it (in consideration of its claims to represent an interpretation of the Bible) the Secondary Meaning of the Scriptures, is mainly embodied in the works of the Rabbis and their subsequent followers during the Middle Ages' (*Studies in Judaism*, First Series, Introduction, p. xv).

²² The Scribes were the early interpreters of the Torah from Ezra (c. 450 B.C.E.) until the Tannaitic teachers recorded in the Mishna. The Mishna was compiled by Judah the Prince (c. 220 C.E.).

²³ *Studies in Judaism*, First Series, Introduction, pp. xvii-xix.

²⁴ Essay on 'Zachariah Frankel' in *Students, Scholars and Saints*, J.P.S., 1945, pp. 206-7.

²⁵ Bernays is thought to have assumed the Sephardi title of 'Chacham' rather than the Ashkenazi 'rabbi' as a means of distinguishing himself from the traditional rabbis, who, unlike him, did not possess a University education.

²⁶ *Der Orient und Literaturblatt des Orients*, III (1842), No. 7, 8, 9.

²⁷ *Literaturblatt des Orients* (1842), p. 363.

²⁸ *Literaturblatt des Orients* (1842), p. 362.

²⁹ The viewpoint of the liberal Gabriel Riesser (1806-63) who hoped to gain Jewish emancipation as part of the general struggle for political democracy was more frank and logical. He did not associate the struggle for Jewish emancipation with Jewish nationalism but simply indicated that since German Jews generally gave up their Jewish national interests, there is little point in praying for the return to Zion. He insisted, however, that there is nothing contradictory in such a prayer with the ideals of German patriotism. So long as a man is a German citizen, he owes his complete allegiance to Germany, but if he wishes to leave his native land and adopt another, it is proper for him to relinquish his citizenship there and transfer his loyalty to the new land.

³⁰ Aaron Chorin in one of his letters in *Tzitz Neaman*, Prague, 1830, p. 14.

³¹ Essay on 'Lo Zeh Haderech' (1889) in *Al Parashat Drachim*, Vol. I, Berlin, Juedischer Verlag 1921, Leon Simon trans. 'The Wrong Way' in *Ten Essays on Judaism and Zionism*, 1922.

³² See Bernfeld, *Toldot Ha Reformazion B'Yisroel*, Warsaw, 1908, p. 169.

³³ Loc. cit.

³⁴ David Philipson, *Reform Movement in Judaism*, 1907, p. 255.

³⁵ Graetz, *History of the Jews*, J.P.S. 1895, Vol. V, pp. 682-3.

³⁶ It may be of interest to note that in denouncing the Berlin Temple's adoption of the Sunday service, the traditionalists pointed to the fact that the Jewish Christians in the early centuries had taken a similar step in order to distinguish themselves from practising Jews.

A critic of the Berlin Temple, Moses

Mendelssohn of Hamburg, ridiculed the substitution of Sunday for the Sabbath worship in a parody he composed on Alkabetz's liturgical poem, the *L'cho Dodi*, recited at the traditional Sabbath eve Service:

'Come, my beloved, with chorus of praise
Welcome Bride Sunday (Sabbath) the
Queen of Days.'

³⁷ The Berlin congregation remained the only congregation in Germany that followed so extreme a course.

³⁸ Zachariah Frankel, *Darkei Hamishna*, p. 21, *Monatschrift*, 16, pp. 270 ff.

³⁹ E.g. 'And thou shalt be buried at a ripe old age' (Gen. 15:15) is translated 'Thou shalt be supported in ripe old age ...' See also Jacob Gorov in *Hadoar*, Vol. 43, No. 12 (18 Jan. 1963), p. 192, for a reference to other errors.

⁴⁰ The *prosbol* (Gr. 'before the court') suspended the operation of this law which provides that on the seventh year all debts are to be released or remitted. This law was evidently suited to the earlier agricultural economy of Israel, but, by discouraging credit, it could only result in paralysing the commercial economy of later days. Hillel created the legal device which practically amounted to an abrogation of the law. According to the biblical provision, he said, an individual could not collect a debt, but the court could do so, if it is a witness to the transaction.

⁴¹ Nathan Rotenstreich, *Hamachshavah Hayhudit Baet Hahadasha*, Tel Aviv: Am Oved 5705 (1945), pp. 107 ff.

⁴² *Zeitschrift für Religiöse Interessen*, I, p. 25.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ *Monatschrift*, Vol. X, p. 272.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 112.

DO JEWS LEARN FROM HISTORY?

Jacob Lestschinsky

I AM NOT concerned here with the wider question of whether nations learn from their historical experience. I am proposing to look at one sector of the human race, the Jews.

The Jews might have been expected to have a better historical memory than other people—and to be keener to learn the lesson. Yet, surprisingly, it is not so. To be more accurate, there are two trends in Jewish life, both leading to survival but remaining contradictory all the way: on the one hand a remarkable collective memory stretching across two thousand years, and on the other a tendency to forget recent experiences, a complete blank in regard to what has happened in the Diaspora over a few generations.

Let me deal with the Long Memory first. Every day of his life, from early morning until late at night, a Jew never ceases remembering Zion. He is lamenting the fate of the exiled from the Holy Land, and consoled by his unshakeable faith that redemption will one day come. This state of mind has found its expression not only in prayer but also in contemplation. Even though the Babylonian Talmud serves as the main text of Talmudic studies, the actual process of study makes the student live an imaginary life within the confines of Eretz Israel. In previous generations there was a kind of magic about Jewish learning: from his early childhood a Jew lived in a 'Jewish state', with specific legal, economic, and social problems. They used to poke fun at old-fashioned Jews who prayed for rain all through a rainy winter and spent years of their life studying the laws and regulations of *Masser*, *Shikschah*, and *Peah*, the rules that governed farming and social service in ancient Israel, while in reality they might be shopkeepers trying to find customers for their wares. This attitude of mind was but an expression of the longing to return to Zion and the faith that one day it would come to pass.

It has made it possible for Jews to return to Eretz Israel, reclaim the neglected land and transform the country into a place fit for people to live in. This transformation of the country by Jews in a comparatively short time is one of the miracles of human history.

But as soon as we switch our attention from Israel to the Diaspora, to the chronicles of pogroms and massacres, persecution and torture, the picture changes radically. No more memory!

Let us leave out of account for a moment the *cherem* on Spain—it is no doubt an exception in Jewish history. If we consider events closer to our time, such as the massacres of Chmielnicki, which lasted a whole decade and claimed hundreds of thousands of Jewish lives, we find that only some twenty years later, towards the end of the seventeenth century, Jews were once again dwelling in all the places where the massacres had occurred and where so few had been left. To this day we have no exact figures for the victims of 1648, still less an estimate of the material losses.

The pogroms of Petlura, 1918–21, claimed between 75,000 and 100,000 victims. Between six and seven hundred Jewish communities were destroyed. And yet, by 1926, there were Jews in all the places of the pogroms. The chronicles of these pogroms, diligently collected by Dr. Eliahu Tscherikover at great risk to himself, are still in their crates, and there are still no funds available for the publication even of the volume which Tscherikover has left in manuscript.

This poor memory for persecution and even massacres is a healthy sign in itself. It prevented Jews from falling into utter despair. There was no remedy for the situation. Jews had to continue their lives in the Diaspora, to struggle on for existence. And the self-preservation instinct of the Jewish people told them that it was advisable not to ponder too much on the tragedies of the past, so as to prevent the coming generations from being engulfed in tragic memories. At the same time, the deep and abiding hatred of the Diaspora and all that it stood for was sublimated in the positive faith in redemption, and in the unshakeable belief that the Messiah would arrive, even though his advent might be delayed. The instinct of forgetfulness did not diminish in the least the burning hatred of Diaspora life in all its forms. There was no making peace with the *Golah* even for one brief moment, as far as pious Jews were concerned. To believe in the perpetuation of *Golah* existence until the end of time was tantamount to heresy and conversion, to base treachery and betrayal of the holiest traditions of the Jewish people.

Only the advent of the emancipation brought in its wake theories which viewed the Diaspora not as a curse but as a blessing, as a kind of special privilege for a holy people whom history has endowed with a mission. As time went on even national movements looked upon the *Golah* situation as a normal one. In other words, the dream of the ingathering of the exiles was an empty one, and the prayers for the return to Zion were in vain.

The establishment of the State of Israel poses some searching questions. How deeply did assimilation penetrate the Jewish soul? How far has the theory taken root that one could be a complete Jew in the *Golah*? I refer here to a mentality, a will to make an end to Diaspora life, a longing for Israel as the only country where a Jew can observe the main *Mitzvah*, to live among Jews. To a large extent the future of the

Jewish State will depend on the recognition by all Jews that it is their spiritual home, the spiritual home of the whole of the Jewish people, and that life in the *Golah* is, to say the least, psychologically undesirable and spiritually unsatisfactory, a sad state caused by material considerations of a transitory nature.

Nagging doubts often assail me when I think of the theories and moods that prevail in large Jewish communities which are permeated with this kind of assimilation—an assimilation that renounces the dream of redemption and makes peace with eternal exile. It is even sadder to think that some Zionists are in favour of educating the coming generations to the belief and a feeling that their native country is their real and only home, spiritually as well as physically, and that Israel is but a country for whom they should harbour an attitude of sympathy.

May I make a confession here? When I hear from people about their burning love for, and abiding devotion to, cultural work in the *Golah*, I have a sneaking suspicion that these sentiments are motivated more by a genuine addiction to the *Golah* and a desire to remain there than by an anxiety about the fate of the next generation deprived of a Jewish education. It may well be that we do not realize ourselves how deep-seated is our subconscious assimilation and attachment to the *Golah* countries, their languages and their cultures.

But let me go back to my main theme. Do we learn from history?

Let me begin from assimilation, because this movement was the first to lend our exile the dignity of eternity and to break with our tradition of belief in the eventual return to Zion, however long it might take.

Assimilation, for our purposes, should be taken in its widest and deepest sense, which means not only a linguistic and cultural adaptation to strange surroundings but also and chiefly the putting down of such deep roots into alien soil as to acquire a complete feeling of at-homeness. Such a state of affairs entails, of course, loss of connexion with the historical background and renunciation of the historical homeland for all time. It means giving up any idea of ever leaving voluntarily the native country in order to go to the country where the roots of the people had been planted in the dawn of history.

This was the case with German Jews. In fact, German Jews were the inventors of this theory as well as its implementors. It must be stressed, for the sake of historical accuracy, that German Jewry achieved rich and rewarding results from a short-term point of view. There is no other country where Jews took such deep roots and, in turn, made such a great contribution on all levels.

One could not dismiss this phenomenon with the phrase 'slavery within freedom'. German Jews reached such heights of Jewish creativeness on German soil that to explain it thus would be unreal and untrue. Naturally, one can doubt the veracity of the assertion of Hermann

Cohen that the Jewish spirit was akin to the German spirit. Nevertheless, we need not doubt his sincere belief that this was so. He was not only a considerable philosopher but also a warm-hearted Jew. That one of the greatest Jews of his generation could sincerely hold such views must be a result of the true and deep involvement of German Jews with their spiritual surroundings.

At the same time, German Jews both as a group and as individuals benefited a great deal from the association with German culture. *Juedische Wissenschaft* is a creation of German Jewry. It should be noted that German Jews were almost exclusively creative in branches of art and learning which are in the realm of theoretical inquiry and philosophical contemplation, and almost totally absent from fields referred to as personal and intimate. This goes to show that Jewish life had faded to such an extent that there had been no resources left for intimate personal writing. The few known exceptions are embedded in the past and detached from the present.

Apart from Poland, there was no other country in the world where the non-Jewish population was so used to having Jews in its midst. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a Germany without Jews. The outcries of Heine and Boerne, two children of the ghetto, against German reaction has the hallmark of utterances by men fully entitled to speak for the whole of the German people. These phenomena show how deeply rooted German Jews were in their country even before their complete emancipation.

It is, therefore, common ground that German Jewry was from the eighteenth century part and parcel of German cultural, economic, and political life.

How quickly has this union come to an end and how dearly has the weaker partner paid for it! There is a great lesson in this for assimilationists of all types, and a warning to Jews in all countries of the globe.

And yet, the lesson is apparently being completely ignored. A million excuses are being advanced. In the first place we are told that there is no comparison between different countries. Actually, people refuse to face the truth. Naturally, you cannot come to a Jewish community and threaten it with Hitlerite murder and desolation. But Jewish communities might have been expected to take some notice of the Hitler catastrophe. To say the least, they might have come to the conclusion that assimilation is no guarantee of safety. They might have been expected, too, not to repeat the familiar assertion of the German assimilationists: 'We are not in exile; it cannot happen here.'

The awakening of the masses in all European countries towards the end of the nineteenth century made a tremendous impact on the Jews. They were suddenly pulled out of their traditional isolation in the ghettos. New political and social ideas took hold of them. They were soon in the front ranks of the fighters for freedom and a new social order.

Over half the Jewish people, two-thirds of European Jewry, lived in Czarist Russia. This was in a way an advantage. The atmosphere of the freedom movements in Russia was cleaner and healthier than of those in other European countries, where reality had already tarnished some of the ideals. The mood of the Russian revolutionary movement, with its martyrs and its deep humanity, which permeated Russian literature, made people believe that Messianic times had arrived and that the medieval order would soon disappear for good. Jews in turn believed that the Jewish people, and not only individual Jews, would be redeemed alongside the rest of humanity. Unlike Western Europe, where the Jews were dispersed in small pockets, in Russia they lived in large groups, and 95 per cent of them dwelt among oppressed peoples who were themselves fighting for their national freedom.

This large concentration of Jews in a few areas of Russia also provided a background for an individual way of life. Assimilation was reduced to minimum proportions. The Jews developed an appetite for culture and progressive ideas, not for an alien way of life.

In the census of 1897 over 97 per cent of all Russian Jews gave Yiddish as their mother-tongue. Because of a number of historical circumstances, spiritual emancipation preceded political emancipation among Russian Jews. This fact brought in its wake an interesting development. The accumulated spiritual forces in the ghettos looked for outlets within the framework of Jewish life; not outside it, as was the case in Western Europe. It led to self-emancipation. Jews absorbed modern culture, joined political struggles, fought for a better social order. In this sense they were emancipated in Russia and Poland as far back as the nineteenth century. But they were still sufficiently self-contained as Jews not to lose their historical memories and their Jewish identity. Russian Jews removed the fences that surrounded them, tore down the medieval partitions that divided them from the outside world. Modern knowledge became permissible, but all this was accomplished not by embracing the non-Jewish world indiscriminately; it was an organic growth. Escape from the ghetto was a thing almost unknown to Russian Jews.

The chief instruments of mass-enlightenment were Hebrew and Yiddish—much more than Russian. Naturally, the Russian language played a big part in spreading knowledge among the Jewish masses, but their reading remained largely confined to the two national languages of the Jews, whose literatures made colossal strides in this period.

The Jewish masses looked upon pogroms, expulsions, quotas in schools and universities, and other forms of persecution as the last vestiges of the Czarist regime which would soon disappear for good. Even staunch Zionists, who accepted the view that assimilation means national death, though not by violent means, adopted at Helsinki a comprehensive programme for Diaspora activity. This programme

implied a clear intention to evolve—or expand—Diaspora institutions of an educational, cultural and social nature, and especially local and central community organizations.

We may be permitted to ask what the result of all this was.

The Hitler catastrophe must not blind us to the tragic position of the Jews in Eastern European countries in the years between the wars. The Jews had helped in the freedom movements and fought for national independence together with the majority of the population. Yet all the promises and undertakings to do right by the Jewish minorities were scrapped in no time. In Poland, the country which inherited her Jews from Russia and Austria, there were bloody pogroms before the honeymoon of independence was out. The Lithuanians, the Latvians, the Rumanians, the Hungarians—all of them poisoned the life of their Jews. There was a difference of degree in cruelty and in the impetus of persecution of Jews, but the basic purpose was the same.

True, Jews went about the rebuilding of their own lives despite persecution. In Poland, in Lithuania, and in Latvia Jewish schools and Jewish institutions grew up in a short time. Democratic community organizations were established, and the Jews fought desperately not only for physical existence but also for the right to spiritual development. This was a heroic chapter in Jewish history. In Poland it was written—literally—in the blood of the Jewish masses. The accumulated Jewish revolutionary energy during the struggle against the Czarist regime had lost little of its impetus, and thus there was enough left for the new struggles, hopeless though they were.

A serious analysis of this betrayal leads to the inevitable conclusion that its basic reasons were economic. There were, of course, political and national considerations, but the decisive reasons were the economic ones just the same. The new nations needed the Jewish economic positions for their own people. Their peasants, who had gravitated to the towns, looked for a living in commerce and in the crafts. The children of erstwhile unskilled labourers acquired education and could fill the economic positions held by the Jews. The professional classes coveted the positions of the Jewish professional men.

Again, I grant that it may not be wise to come to Jewish communities and threaten them with the fate of the Jews in the new European countries after the First World War, even though the situation in some countries reminds us of the first stage in Europe, and in some cases has already reached the second stage. It may not be a good idea to threaten Jewish communities, but one might have expected Jews who had gone through the European calamity to act differently in new places. We were entitled to hope, too, that Jews who had been persecuted in pre-Hitlerian 'normal' times would be a little more pessimistic and not so soon forget outrageous anti-Jewish taxation, pickets outside their shops, ghetto-desks for Jews at universities, and demolished market stalls.

But no, Jews who went through so much are not even prepared to help the Jewish State.

For assimilationists, democracy was always a handy system. They could melt into the social, economic, and cultural background of the majority. This suited them because they refused to accept the idea of a Jewish people with its own language, culture, way of life and institutions. In Western Europe it was foolish, but at least understandable. In Eastern Europe there was never genuine democracy between the wars, and realistic Jews felt that Jewish national culture could survive only in such circumstances. If the majority population were to treat Jews on genuinely equal terms, the process of assimilation could not be halted, not even in Poland. Of course, it is a bitter truth to swallow that the threat of antisemitic persecution is the most important factor in our national life in the Diaspora. But it is a fact.

Now we are witnessing a new development among Jews in the largest and the most powerful democracy in the world. In order to consider American Jewish life, we must first attempt to answer the following question. What is *Golah*? Is it only slaughter and massacre? Does it mean only pogroms and expulsions, persecution and oppression? Is it to be understood only as ghetto-life and deprivation? Of course not. Our fathers have always understood exile to mean much else, to imply many more things. It was always taken to mean that not only the Jews but also the *Shechina* (roughly, the divine inspiration) were in exile. Our fathers maintained that a complete Jewish life in exile was unthinkable; that religious inspiration was impossible outside Eretz Israel. In both cases it meant that the Jewish people, as a national entity, was unsafe in the midst of strange peoples with alien cultures.

As to American Jewry, let me make reference to the strange fact that this is the most unconcerned Jewish community in regard to the Jewish future—strange because it is a young community, still imbued with the Jewish heritage it carried with it from Eastern Europe. It seems that American Jews do not worry at all about the *Shechina* being in exile.

This placidity is not a result of an absolute assurance about the Jewish future of the coming generations of American Jews. It seems that American Jews are drunk with their democracy, which affords so much personal freedom, and addicted to American economic progress, which provides so many of the good things of life. This attitude of mind, if it does not change, may well lead to the national disintegration of American Jewry, and so we may witness a remarkable development—political and economic blessing turning to national curse.

In connexion with the perennial debate about dual loyalties, the question is posed whether American Jews are in exile or not. What is frightening about such questions is that even leading Zionists do not seem to be worried about the Jewish future of American Jews, which is

in grave jeopardy. That this is so will be evident from the following facts.

The Catholic educational institutions of America have some five million pupils. Some two-thirds of all Catholic children of school age go to Catholic day schools. The number of pupils in Catholic schools has doubled since 1920, and it is still increasing. These figures are for the whole of the United States. They do not convey the real intensity of the educational effort of American Catholics. In New York, 90 per cent of all Catholic children of school age go to Catholic schools. The figures for other places on the East Coast are in the seventies and eighties. Catholic colleges and universities have about half a million students. This means that a Catholic child can go through its whole education, kindergarten to university, in Catholic institutions.

I know, of course, the difference between the Jews and the Catholics. The Catholics are a group composed of many nationalities. Nevertheless, these figures do show that there are wide possibilities in America for group education and for separate schools. It is not only that the American Constitution allows such facilities; public opinion in America is also tolerant towards such a policy and does not take minority schools to indicate a betrayal of the American way of life or a deviation from true patriotism. These figures also illustrate what can be done in America in this respect, provided the will to do it is there.

In our case, even the Zionists hesitated for a long time to say clearly that we must educate our children in our own schools. Even the Jewish orthodoxy in America, which might have been expected to follow the Catholic example more readily than anybody else, has come round to this idea only in recent years. Now they realize that our children need a school with a Jewish atmosphere for the whole of their school time—and not a visit to a Sunday school for a couple of hours a week in order to survive as *Jews*.

In 1920 there were in America more than three million Jews, but only five Jewish day schools. In 1935 there were four million Jews and about twenty day schools. Today we have well over five million Jews with two hundred and thirty day schools in which some fifty thousand children are being educated. But this is barely eight per cent of all Jewish children who receive some sort of Jewish education; and slightly less than three per cent of all Jewish children of school age. This effort is twenty times smaller in proportion than the effort made by the American Catholics for the education of their children.

The Hitler catastrophe brought to America hundreds of rabbis and thousands of other orthodox Jews. It needed a rabbi of Lubavitch to awaken in some American Jews an urge for repentance. But the fear of isolation, the dread of being accused of national separatism, soon damped this enthusiasm. Even if we take into consideration the improvement in Jewish education of the last few years the situation is still

pretty grim. Even today, half the Jewish children in America remain without any kind of Jewish education.

American Jews are even more concentrated than Russian Jews used to be. In New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia are concentrated one-half of all American Jews. In Russia, in the year 1900, Warsaw, Odessa, and Lodz, the three most populous Jewish communities, had between them only about half a million Jews, which was only some ten per cent of Russian Jewry. The density of the Jewish population in some American regions is as great as that of some Russian regions before the First World War. Thus the basic conditions for Jewish schools and other religious and national institutions, Sabbath and Jewish holidays included, are there, and they could flourish in America, too, perhaps in larger measure than in Russia of old. But there is a difference. In Russia, the Jews were surrounded by backward people; in America they live within a highly developed culture. In Russia, the Jews were confined to a ghetto existence in specified areas; in America they are, of course, free to move around and scatter among the general population. Finally, in Russia, only few Jews could find places in the schools of the country; in America education is, of course, accessible to them. All this makes for assimilation.

We cannot come to American Jews and try to persuade them to give up their paradise and move to Israel as *chalutzim*. Yet, we might expect American Jews to feel the pangs of *Galuth Hashechina*, of the spirit in exile. We might have expected that some people among the intellectual élite of American Jewry would be prepared to make sacrifices in the fight against assimilation. Moreover, there is greater satisfaction to be derived from such a sacrifice now that there is a Jewish State.

But what do we find?

The national will of American Jews has been weakened to such an extent that even Zionists are optimistic about the chances for Jews to survive in the *Golah* as Jews, and refuse to face realities. It seems Zionism is something for other people but not for themselves or their children. This is American Zionism. In essence it is assimilation *in extremis*, because it offers the *Golah* as a home for their children and children's children for all time, and it renounces the idea of the ingathering of the exiles which is a tenet of our faith.

I know American Jews still look Jewish, by and large. There are in America Jewish papers and books, Jewish cultural organizations and institutions. Indeed, Yiddish is still widely spoken in America and they have also made a start in Hebrew. But this does not justify notions of a bright Jewish future in America.

We are hopeful that American democracy will be stronger than European democracy proved to be. But optimism about prospects of physical existence does not justify optimism about the retention of a Jewish content in Jewish life. In other words, the weekdays may be

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secured, but this does not automatically guarantee us the *Sabbath* days. Actually, the higher the material standards the lower the spiritual tension among Jews.

The base for the resistance to such tendencies of national suicide is the State of Israel. This must be the true mission of Zionism in our days. Zionism was the child of Jewish anguish when the *Shechina* was in exile; it must remain true to its origins. In this sense, it still has a great task to accomplish.

BOOK REVIEWS

BELLEVILLE, FRANCE, AND BEYOND

Herbert Tint

Review Article

TWO recently published books about Jews in France have titles which suggest that they are complementary studies: Rabi's *Anatomie du Judaïsme Français** looks like differing only in its wider scope from Charlotte Roland's essay in micro-sociology, *Du Ghetto à l'Occident*.† In fact, totally different conceptions underlie these two books. That of Charlotte Roland is precisely documented and closely reasoned. It is also objective. It is as 'scientific' as a sociological work is likely to be. Rabi's book is both more and less than its title promises. Its author has drawn on his great knowledge of Jewish traditions to provide the reader with innumerable, sometimes lengthy, asides, whose relevance to the declared subject matter is not always compelling (e.g. pp. 213-31). Possibly as a result of this and for reasons of space, Rabi's main theme periodically quickens away into a catalogue raisonné (e.g. pp. 102-6). This is annoying—not so much because the lists make tedious reading, but because one knows how much more Rabi could have given us of what the title actually says we are going to get. And this too has to be faced: Rabi has in some respects written a profession of faith rather than an objective study. The book is almost as much about its author as about Judaism.

Of the many fictions about the French that seem to survive despite countless proofs to the contrary, that of French immunity to racialism is one of the most persistent. It finds expression in both books. But in *Du Ghetto à l'Occident* it comes from the pen of Professor Louis Chevalier who wrote the Preface, and not from Madame Roland. Although he hails Madame Roland's book as one of the first in his country to have concerned itself with the collection of precise data about the life of the immigrant in France, Professor Chevalier gives voice to the same old fiction regardless of the paucity of data in its favour: '[The Parisian knows all about ethnic differences] il les aime ou ne les aime pas et, quand il ne les aime pas, il les corrige à sa manière: qui est souvent d'offrir à boire et "d'expliquer le coup" au bistrot du coin'

* Rabi, *Anatomie du Judaïsme Français*, Paris, Les éditions de minuit, 18 NF, pp. 326.

† Charlotte Roland, *Du Ghetto à l'Occident: Deux générations de Yiddiches en France*, Paris, Les éditions de minuit, 19.50 NF, pp. 292.

(p. 12). It is a homely picture. It is a picture that has to be reconciled with the deportation from France during the last war of one-third of its Jewish population, with the delivery to the Germans of one hundred thousand men, women, and children. The fiction survives even in Rabi who, kindly, speaks of the 'bottomless stupidity' of the French antisemite: 's'il fait du mal, c'est plutôt par sottise que par cruauté' (p. 57). And yet it is Rabi who tells again of the organizationally enviable record of the French police in the tracking down of Jews for delivery to the Germans; it is Rabi who throughout the book (like Madame Roland, he does not give the reader the benefit of an index) tries to account for the antisemitism of Catholics, of Jews converted to Catholicism, of agnostics, of atheists; it is the same Rabi who also writes about those war years: 'Et pourtant, je le dis tout bas, pendant ces quatre mortelles années, nous avons été seuls, terriblement seuls' (p. 141) and who says (p. 128) that had the Vichy regime lasted ten years the average Frenchman would probably have been an antisemite.

Although Rabi knows quite well why the Jews in France have helped to perpetuate this fiction, he seems in part to be taken in by it. To the Jews the French have appeared marvellous because they had to appear marvellous. The Jews had to take the French odes to mankind over the last two centuries at their face value or return hopelessly to their past of being everybody's scapegoat; even though—to adapt Shakespeare's Henry V—the French love of humanity was often such that they refused to give up control of a single member of it. But for every Duc de Richelieu who since the Revolution has married a rich Jewess there were a hundred underprivileged Alsatian Jews. For every Crémieux who succeeded in reaching the highest positions in the State, a hundred Jews were vilified by the countless antisemites who followed Fourier, Proudhon, and their like. For every defender of Dreyfus there was someone who, like Barrès, 'concluded from the man's race that he was a traitor'. And so on, until 1940.

And since. Of course Poujade's little shopkeepers have classical Fascist tendencies, of which antisemitism is but one. But they *are* French, and they *were* numerous not so very long ago. And one is told that Michel Debré is/was a Jew, and one is *not* allowed to forget that Monsieur Pompidou was closely connected with the Rothschilds.

The point is of course not that the French are antisemites to a man, but that their treatment of minorities is just as contingent on their economic, social, and political circumstances at any given moment as is that meted out by most other majority groups. Thus the Germans noticed that Pétain showed more reluctance to part with his Jews after the first serious German reverses in 1942. And Rabi should know. He was there. After the Wehrmacht had withdrawn from Paris,

Je marchais dans les rues de ma ville. Je reprenais lentement possession de ses pavés, de ses arbres, et des rives du fleuve. Le vrai Paris était celui que j'avais porté en moi durant ces lentes années de l'enfance et de l'adolescence, puis pendant ces quatre années d'absence. C'était la bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève où j'avais lu, lu jusqu'au battement des tempes, et les ruelles secrètes de la Place Contrescarpe, c'était les interminables pérégrinations nocturnes, et cette odeur de feuilles mortes qui se dégageait du jardin du Luxembourg, c'était les longues confidences de l'amitié, c'était tout ce que j'avais porté en moi pendant ces quatre années, de

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souvenir et d'évocations. J'allais me laisser aller au délicieux abandon du retour quand, sur les mur de la ville libérée, je vis inscrits, d'une craie récente, les mots: Mort aux Juifs (Rabi, p. 148).

Le *vrai* Paris . . . The real Paris like the real France also at times reminds its minorities that they are minorities. The considerable part played by the Catholic Church in the perpetuation of antisemitism in France is painfully demonstrated by Rabi (e.g. pp. 74-5, 182-3, 200 et seq.).

The desire to merge unobtrusively with the population that had in principle accorded them equality since 1791 had prompted large numbers of Jews to forsake their own culture for that of their environment. There is nothing new or surprising in this information, but it exercises Rabi considerably. He wants the Jews to retain an independent culture. But he knows that, like their aversion from Zionism, the desire for integration (apparently 'assimilation' has become a dirty word) on the part of French Jews is 'motivé par la crainte de voir remis en question un statut durement acquis' (p. 86). He also speaks with some feeling about their dilemma in the face of the hard-won independence of Israel, although the relative ease with which this dilemma can be resolved seems to elude him.

Throughout the book it is clear that Rabi sees a future for Judaism only in terms of what he calls its messianic function. And that presupposes, in the first place, the cultivation of some of the characteristics that had hitherto distinguished Jews from the rest of mankind. But, as Rabi sees, Judaism has been kept alive in France since 1791 largely through the immigration of underprivileged Jews from Eastern Europe. They at least had not been lured away from their culture because, in the lands from which they came, the environment was hardly congenial enough. Most French Jews—in so far as they still thought of themselves in those terms—were not grateful for this unsolicited opportunity of a spiritual renaissance. In fact they viewed the massive immigration from 1881 onward with dismay, 'affolés par cette invasion' (p. 79). They kept themselves very much apart from it. And when in the thirties Jews fleeing for their lives from the Germans arrived at their gates, many of their French brothers were heard to clamour for a quota system. Rabi reminds the reader that Léon Blum was among the many honourable exceptions to this. However, none of this argues in favour of the thesis that French Jews were living in a racial paradise.

But if Rabi wants the Jews to play a distinctive part in France, rather than seek an oblivion their environment seems so steadfastly to deny them, he does not make it very clear just what this part ought to be (admittedly, a very difficult question). He deplores their drift towards the political Right (pp. 243, 247), so presumably his Messiah belongs to the Left. And he takes Raymond Aron (p. 251) to task for his relativistic views, so that Rabi's Messiah would also appear to be absolutist: 'Peut-on demeurer neutre lorsque l'homme est bafoué?' (p. 233). He wants the resultant 'historical activism' to be in the service of traditional Jewish values and, despite his realization that these are various, he does little to specify precisely what they are to be. If one connects this 'historical activism' with his fatalistic acceptance of the perennity of antisemitism (p. 186), and with his refusal to go to Israel, then the whole concept sounds like an invitation to martyrdom. Why should a country accept with equanimity the *militant*

non-conformism of a minority that refuses to 'integrate' and yet also refuses to emigrate?

Madame Roland's *Deux générations de Yiddiches en France* seems to conform to a pattern less complicated than Rabi's. In 1956-7 she analysed the fate of the first two generations of Eastern European Jews in the XX^e arrondissement of Paris, normally—if inaccurately—known as Belleville. Painstaking and intelligent though her inquiry is, there is little to occasion surprise in it. Many of her findings tally with or amplify Rabi's. For instance, the desire to be independent in their work on the part of even the first-generation immigrants; the alienation of the second generation both from their fathers—of whose Gallic inadequacies they are resentful—as well as from Judaism, coupled with a feeling of guilt about their revolt as a result of which they cannot quite 'integrate'; the wholesale integration of the third generation, so that Madame Roland could find only two generations to analyse in Belleville; the large numbers of mixed marriages from the second generation onward, conversions, the dispersal of Jews far outside their usual urban centres which encourages integration still further.

All these facts pose for those Jews in France who want to remain both Jews and French, and who want Judaism to thrive, the same problem that Jews in other liberal countries have to face. If they do not want to go to Israel and do not want wholly to 'integrate' and do not—as is often the case—want to heed their religious traditions then, as Rabi puts it, 'Juif pour quoi faire?'. There are not many more immigrants to come who can continue the salvaging function unwittingly performed by those who within fifty years had tripled the Jewish population in France from its figure of 80,000 in 1880. Today the place of the Eastern Jews in Belleville is being filled by immigrants from North Africa. It is tomorrow that worries Rabi, despite the brave optimism of his conclusion.

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SALCIA LANDMANN, *Jidisch: Abenteuer einer Sprache*, 469 pp. Walter Verlag, Olten and Freiburg, 1962, 48s.

Salcia Landmann's *Jidisch* with a preface by the non-Jewish Yiddish scholar Franz Beranek who is teaching the subject at the University of Giessen, is a useful compendium containing (a) a brief history of the language and literature from its early beginnings in the Middle Ages, (b) a vocabulary with many explanatory notes on Hebrew and Slavic idioms in Yiddish, (c) one hundred jokes and anecdotes both in Hebrew and Latin characters, as well as in German translation, and (d) an interesting discussion of German underworld slang and its relation to Yiddish, as well as an analysis of their essential difference—probably the most provocative portion of the book. A glossary of such slang expressions derived from the Yiddish, and about a dozen bibliographical references round out this volume of about 470 pages. The author's previous work on Jewish wit has been well received in sociological circles, and has enjoyed several editions.

In general, the author displays an adequate knowledge of her subject and has apparently engaged in linguistic research involving Yiddish, but the conspicuous gaps in the treatment of the more recent developments will create a wrong impression so far as the reader is concerned. In the nutshell history of Yiddish literature, only about a score of names are presented with a paragraph or two on each. Manger is the last to be mentioned, and one may gather that between him and Peretz the only Yiddish literati were Frug, Ansky, Rosenfeld, Asch, and Bialik, who is rightly categorized as a Hebrew poet, even if she does admit that not all the Yiddish poets were enumerated. No reader could guess that over 8,000 people have written in Yiddish, and that there are close to a thousand Yiddish writers today, after the holocaust of over 500 pen men and women by the Nazis and Stalin.

The Yiddish of the jokes, sayings, and anecdotes is so Germanized that the translation is practically superfluous, especially as the specifically non-German words are explained in footnotes. Much of the material in this section savours of Jewish humour, but there are a few, like no. 44, which are scatological, or at any rate in bad taste. No. 45, although not exactly elegant—far from it—is more or less humorous at least. That cannot be said of 44, and a few following it.

In the bibliography we read that a branch of the YIVO (Yiddish Vissenshaftlecher Institut) was to be found in Minsk. That is doubtful since Minsk belonged to the U.S.S.R. and its scientific institute was a section of the White Russian Academy. Both of the Institutes, in fact, engaged in sharp polemics, although at the very beginning there had been some co-operation and collaboration in their respective journals.

Nor is it quite true that the YIVO was a 'linguistic academy' only. It published economic, historical, statistical, and pedo-psychological volumes too. Literature and bibliography were also represented among the researches it sponsored.

The bibliography at the close of the book is rather skimpy. Stutchkov's monumental thesaurus of Yiddish, the journals *Yiddische Filologie*, *Yiddish far Alle*, and the current periodical *Di Yidishe Shprakh*, should have been listed as well as a number of recent books on Yiddish like the *Field of Yiddish*, *Di Imperye Yiddish*, let alone the many Yiddish grammars (besides Birnbaum's) and dictionaries. Even Harkavy's is ignored.

The style is perhaps the best feature of the book. It is written with verve; and the tempo carries one along, particularly because the content is fascinating.

What is most deplorable in this *omnium gatherum* is the pessimistic note which is sounded here with utter indifference. The author seems to be certain that Yiddish is dying rapidly, but that is what Wiener predicted in 1899 and the *maskillim* even before that time. When Wiener died, about twenty-five years ago, Yiddish was flourishing as

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a literature as it had never done before. According to his forecast sixty-five years ago, it should have now been dead as a doornail; but battered and besmirched, it marches on. The Gentile, Beranek, maintains a healthier outlook. In our age of depth psychology and depth history, it is fatuous to prophesy the death of this or that, and especially of a language and literature of a global people, steeled against the onslaughts of adverse events. As well may Dr. Landmann tell us that the Jews are moribund; for without Yiddish in the Diaspora they surely will assimilate eventually, while in the Middle East, there will probably remain a small state consisting of Israelis, including Arabs and other ethnic elements.

A. A. ROBACK

SCHIFRA STRIZOWER, *Exotic Jewish Communities*, 157 pp., Thomas Yoseloff, London and New York, in conjunction with World Jewish Congress, British Section, 1962, 7s. 6d.

This book was written at the invitation of the Popular Jewish Library and it might be thought unfair to review it as a contribution to anthropological scholarship.

However, the publishers state on the back cover that the author has 'combined her professional skill as a social anthropologist with historical research'. Would that she had simply used her undoubted skill as an anthropologist to write a book—even a popular one—about the Jews of India. For the two chapters on the Bene Israel of Bombay and the Jews of Cochin, which together comprise a little over half the book, show the signs of genuine sociological understanding which stems from first-hand knowledge, even though the descriptions are too short to do full justice to the subject; while the chapters on the Jews of Yemen, the Karaites, and the Samaritans present a number of facts which are already available in other popular accounts, and few of which tell us much about the way the communities actually functioned. The author can be excused for not telling us much about the social life of the Karaites and the Samaritans, and she can equally be excused for not having investigated Yemeni Jewish social structure herself, but she can hardly be excused for not using the available literature on the social structure of the Jews of Yemen.

The two chapters on the Jews of India are of great interest, particularly for their analysis of the caste-like distinctions which exist, within each community, between 'whites' and 'blacks', and of the legends and group characterizations which legitimize these distinctions. The reader might have benefited from a more detailed and clear-cut examination of the differences between Bene Israel and other Jews, in view of the author's belief, as stated in the preface, that the storm which raged over their Jewishness in Israel might otherwise have been avoided.

PERCY S. COHEN

WILL HERBERG, *Judaism and Modern Man*, 313 pp., Jewish Publication Society & Meridian Books, New York, \$1.45.

Will Herberg is a philosopher who overcame the present deadlock at which Western philosophy arrived by becoming a theologian. That is exactly according to the advice which Franz Rosenzweig held out to the post-Cartesian philosophers, when, in his *Stern der Erlösung*, he demanded a 'union between philosophy and religion'. Too much, in my view, has been said about Herberg's dependence on the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Herberg himself expresses his gratitude to this American Lutheran. But having carefully read Herberg's book I think it a mistake to see Herberg and Niebuhr as belonging to an identical school of thought. Socrates wanted to be 'the midwife' who helps his pupils to bring their own thoughts to articulate expression. Niebuhr did no more than render this midwifery to Herberg. Niebuhr is a Christian of the Kierkegaard-pattern, overcoming despair through an ascent into the spiritual realm; this 'vertical ascent' as Niebuhr's master, Karl Barth, called it, loses sight of the wide horizon of reality in which man as creature is rooted and of which Scripture says: 'And God saw everything that He had made and, behold, it was very good.' Niebuhr is a Christian, spiritualizing tragedy, and apprehending it as salvation through a perspective rendered to him by the Cross. Herberg is a Jew and

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remains, notwithstanding his perusal of existential philosophy, a Jew. In this respect I find him even more independent than Martin Buber. Herberg gives us an exposition of Judaism, not a construction of ideas which I and any God-believing, Synagogue service-attending, and *Mitsvot*-performing Jew would have difficulty in relating to Jewish life. Herberg stands back humbly and lets Jewish life speak. Of course, as anyone who 'merely speaks', he is an interpreter. If Herberg's interpretation is so successful, it may be more Milton Steinberg and Solomon Schechter than anybody else who helped him in his approach. A typical example is Herberg's transformation of Kierkegaard's principle of the 'leap of faith'. It is, Herberg writes, 'not a leap of despair but rather a leap made not in order to search blindly for an unknown God somewhere on the other side; it is a leap, because—wonderfully enough—God has already been found' (p. 39). I gladly agree. But I think this is not an interpretation of Kierkegaard but a transformation of his thought according to the Jewish conception of faith. In this conception we find trust an even better word than faith as translation of the Hebrew words *emunah* and *bitachon*.

Speaking as a minister who performs marriages, officiates at funerals, and preaches to those who care to come to listen to his sermons, speaking on the strength of my everyday experience, I see the transformation of humanism as the most urgent task of our generation. Humanism need not be abandoned; it can be a 'carrier' of both, Judaism and Christianity. A Jewish humanism would be a carrier of Judaism. Without Judaism, our humanism inevitably follows a development which is now the world-wide danger: from humanism to nationalism and ultimately to barbarism. Will Herberg's book is an effective weapon against this danger.

IGNAZ MAYBAUM

HENRIK F. INFELD, ed., *Essays in Jewish Sociology, Labour and Co-operation in Memory of Dr. Noah Barou, 1889-1955*, xiii + 167 pp., Thomas Yoseloff, London, New York, 1962, 30s.

Noah Barou was a man of many parts. He combined a passionate interest in Jewish affairs with deep intellectual involvement in the problems of the trade union and co-operative movements. A keen student of the British scene, he was known as the Fabian Society's expert on the Soviet Union. An active political leader, he devoted a great deal of time to research in problems of sociology. A man of action, he indulged in discussions on theoretical issues. A fighter by nature, he was not free from sentimentality. A staunch opponent in public affairs, he was a good friend in private relationships. A brief assessment of Barou's personality is not easy; he was inclined to work in too many fields.

Two simple questions have to be answered today, eight years after Barou's death: What did he stand for, and what heritage did he leave behind?

The first two decades of Barou's active public life were closely connected with the Zionist Socialist Movement. In a message to the 'Memorial Volume' the late Israel President Ben Zvi wrote:

I knew Noah Barou from his childhood days in Poltava. He joined the ranks of the Poale Zion while still at high school. As a young man he was one of the active members of the Party in Czarist Russia, and he remained faithful to the Movement after the Revolution.

In a moving tribute to his school friend Professor Kalugai of the Haifa Technion speaks of Barou's illegal activity; about his part in the Jewish self-defence organization against the anti-Jewish pogroms; and of his arrest and expulsion from Kiev University. A revolutionary by nature, he never lost his sense of loyalty to his family and his people. He was a student of Marx's dialectical materialism and a true pupil of Ber Borochov. He knew by heart the various revolutionary theories of religion. But explaining them to his friends he could not help making the following typical Barou remark: 'But what am I to do about my grandmother? She insists that I should pray and observe the religious laws.'

Barou knew that the 'secret weapon' of true leadership is to show an example. He did not just preach ideas; he believed in deeds. He was arrested three times for Poale

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Zion activity; he was deported by the Czarist authorities and spent fifteen months in Pinega—a township in the frozen north of Russia, where he made the acquaintance of many who were destined to play an important part during and after the Russian revolution (1917).

Barou was always an 'activist'. His role in the Poale Zion movement during the fateful years of 1914-42 was ample proof of his dynamism. In 1914 he became general secretary of Poale Zion in Russia. After 1917 he threw himself heart and soul into both Jewish activity and general political work. He was active together with other socialist leaders in the 'Congress of the Soviets'. He was elected one of the general secretaries of the Ukrainian Trade Union Congress. He knew Stalin and Trotsky, Martov and Abramovitz. He was in the centre of every Jewish and revolutionary activity. In 1917 he collaborated with Ber Borochov, fought the Jewish Communists, clashed with the Bund. During the first years of the Russian revolution Barou was to be found wherever there was Jewish activity, socialist action, or just an ideological battle on vital issues.

At the end of 1922 Barou left the Soviet Union. Many of his Russian contemporaries when transplanted abroad felt themselves completely lost and unable to do any constructive work; not so Barou. He was always in need of a cause. For him his brief period in Berlin and his thirty years' stay in London were just a continuation of the public activity which he began as a youngster in the Ukraine. In England he became one of the pillars of the Workers' Circle; an 'activist' on the Board of Deputies, a fighter against Fascism and antisemitism. But his greatest contribution was made to the World Jewish Congress. Barou the revolutionary became a staunch fighter for Jewish world-wide co-operation. An apt explanation of this transformation was given by Dr. Nahum Goldmann:

He loved all people but only God can embrace all people in active love. You have to limit your love if you want to do something. Noah Barou chose his Jewish people, not because he was so imbued by Jewish tradition or Jewish civilization, but because Jews suffered more than any other people. If there had been no antisemitism, no Hitler I am not sure that he would not have worked for other 'under-dogs'. But in his generation he knew that it was the Jew who needed him most. This remained his dominating motive to the last. Because it was so he tried to assume all the worries of the Jewish people himself.

This is why he devoted himself heart and soul to the rescue of Jews during the Second World War; that is why he made the cause of the Belsen inmates his own; this is why he took the initiative in the negotiations over Jewish material claims against Germany.

In spite of his many preoccupations with Jewish affairs Barou never lost his interest in the general socialist movement. He was always engaged in new studies dealing with labour problems.

Barou had many friends in Israel. He took a great interest in the country and its development. But it is somewhat puzzling why he kept, more or less, aloof from the World Zionist Movement. He could have occupied an important place among its leaders. If Barou had settled in Israel he would have left his mark on its public life. But he preferred to concentrate his main efforts on Diaspora affairs.

The Memorial Volume brings to light not only Barou the public figure but also Barou the man: a dynamic personality and a fighter for causes. It is regrettable that from those who pay tribute to Barou are absent some who knew him best, among them A. L. Easterman and A. Steinberg; they could have enlightened the reader on many features of Barou's complex character.

The volume contains four parts: one devoted to Barou; the other three to Jewish affairs, labour problems, and co-operation.

Of great interest is Dr. Nahum Goldmann's article on 'Jewish Unity in Our Time'. He is deeply concerned about the future of the Diaspora. Emancipation has brought great advantages to our people but it was achieved at the price of great disintegration. An intense effort is needed to keep alive Jewish consciousness and, according to the writer, 'to achieve unity and to convince more and more of our people of their common heritage so that they may act together—this is the great and permanent task of the World Jewish Congress'. Dealing with the problem of the Diaspora from a

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different angle, Dr. A. Tartakower believes that the dominating factor in Jewish life today is the State of Israel without which no Jewish nationalism could be conceived.

The German Reparations Agreement is discussed by Dr. Nehemiah Robinson and Erich Ollenhauer, the leader of the German Social-Democratic Party; they provide some interesting material for the future historian.

The articles contained in the last two sections of the book dealing with labour problems and co-operation, although interesting and written by distinguished contributors, are somewhat dated and do not form an organic part of the Memorial Volume, the main interest of which lies in its attempt to recapture the unique personality of Noah Barou.

S. LEVENBERG

BENJAMIN J. ISRAEL, *Religious Evolution among the Bene Israel of India since 1750*, pp. 22, Chetana Book Centre, 34 Rampart Row, Bombay, 1963, 1s.

Readers of Mr. Israel's moving biography of his father will take up this essay of his with a sense of expectation. Nor will they be disappointed. He writes clearly, frankly, and modestly, disclaiming the qualifications required for participation in the controversy over the marital status of the community of which he is undoubtedly a highly articulate member. His account of the community's decline from the intensification of the influence of Cochin in the second half of the eighteenth century to widespread secularization towards the end of the nineteenth merits careful study. Exposure to missionary friendship and, particularly, to the content of the Scriptures to which the Marathi version first introduced the Bene Israel, would appear to have served as the catalyst. Subsequently, with an increase of support from external Jewish groups, the Bene Israel have been outwardly fashioned in the images of their twentieth-century patrons—the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of India affiliated to the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, the United Synagogue of India affiliated to the World Council of Synagogues of the 'Conservative' movement in the U.S.A. and the Jewish Religious Union of India affiliated to the World Union for Progressive Judaism. The third of these, according to Mr. Israel, who adheres to it, is numerically insignificant and, owing to its adoption of English rather than Marathi, deprived of 'the opportunity of influencing the bulk of the community' (p. 18) while the other two are separated from one another by personal rivalry alone.

What is refreshing about Mr. Israel's analysis is his awareness of the purely sociological character of the Judaism of the Bene Israel. His dissatisfaction with it, judging from his unfavourable comparisons with the achievements of the Roman Catholic Church in India (pp. 16, 17, and 19), is also obvious; but when he comes to propose remedies, they too are exclusively sociological—more Jewish literature in Marathi, communal primary schools, more money, more paid social workers and the presentation of Judaism 'in a form which will not create an internal conflict of loyalties... It must be consistent with the whole complex of beliefs and values which our intellectual and cultural milieu presses on us'. His aspirations might well be satisfied by the provision of trained Marathi-speaking ministers and teachers who subscribe to the source of contemporary Asian wisdom, the *New Statesman*.

EMILE MARMORSTEIN

HUGO MANTEL, *Studies in the History of the Sanhedrin*, xv + 374 pp., Harvard Semitic Series xvii, Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1961, 62s.

For centuries the Sanhedrin was the spiritual centre of the Jewish people—the fount 'whence instruction went forth to all Israel'. And when Jerusalem and the Temple lay in ruins, the Sanhedrin became the rallying-ground of Jewry, and its authority was recognised to the utmost ends of the Diaspora.

Where did the Sanhedrin meet? Who were its leaders? How were they appointed?

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What were their functions? Dr. Mantel examines some of the suggestions already put forward and, at the same time, proposes answers of his own.

Though one gets the impression that all the publications relating to the subject have been consulted, the author is nowhere overcome by his learning or his loyalties. It is a valuable book.

SCHIPRA STRIZOWER

R. J. Z. WERBLOWSKY, *Joseph Karo—Lawyer and Mystic*, xv + 315 pp., Scripta Judaica, Vol. iv, Oxford University Press, 1962, 63s.

Was Joseph Karo, the great codifier, the author of the kabbalistic diary, based on revelations from a celestial mentor (Maggid), the *Maggid Mesharim*? As is well known, Graetz assumed that he was, using the assumption as a basis for the attempt to belittle the famous code. Graetz's opponents retorted with a refusal to accept Karo's authorship of the disconcerting diary.

Now Dr. Werblowsky supports Karo's authorship. Moreover, he points out that knowledge of the circle from which the diary emanated may be of even greater importance than the identification of the author. 'If the *M.M.* is indeed by Karo, then we can situate it in the Alkabets-Cordovero circle and it may become a valuable aid to our understanding of sixteenth-century non-Lurianic (or pre-Lurianic) kabbalism' (p. 6).

The book under review provides fresh insight into the mystical life of the circle to which Karo belonged.

'To account for the existence of *maggidim* one would need more light than is at present available on the psychopathology of mysticism and of phenomena of dissociation in general.' Admitting the risks involved in long-range diagnoses through the centuries, Dr. Werblowsky nevertheless ventures to suggest that Karo 'probably was an epileptoid type, affected by a chronic hallucinosis but with perfect maintenance of the total personality'. Karo's mystical states were a means to an end. 'The means were visible testimonies of divine election and favour in the form of celestial messages. . . . The end was the maintenance of a psychological equilibrium' necessary for his great intellectual and spiritual endeavours (pp. 282-3, 284, 289).

On the evidence which Dr. Werblowsky presents one finds it somewhat difficult to agree with his high estimate of Karo's personality. This may partly be due to the way in which the material is arranged. For example, Dr. Werblowsky waits until p. 279 before emphasizing that Karo's conscience, as represented by the Maggid, had often reproved him not only for eating more food and drinking more water than was strictly necessary but also for graver lapses such as anger and pride.

Again, I am intrigued by the apparent contradiction between Karo's desire for a martyr's death and his acceptance of the maggidic message that he owed his life to the vicarious death of many worthy people (pp. 98, 150). I wish the author had thrown some light on this problem.

SCHIPRA STRIZOWER

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(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

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- Cahnman, Werner J. (ed.): *Intermarriage and Jewish Life, a Symposium*, The Herzl Press and the Jewish Reconstructionist Press, New York, 1963, pp. 212, \$5.00.
- Charles, Gerda: *A Slanting Light*, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1963, 317 pp., 21s.
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- Keen, Michael Atzmoni: *Out of The Desert; Dramatic Composition in Three Acts*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1963, \$3.75.
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- Runes, Dagobert D.: *Despotism, a Pictorial History of Tyranny*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1963, 269 pp., \$12.50.
- Safran, Nadau: *The United States and Israel*, Harvard University Press, 1963, xvii + 341 pp., 48s.
- Smith, I. Evelyn (ed.): *Readings in Adoption*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1963, 532 pp., \$7.50.
- Steinberg, Aaron (ed.): *Simon Dubnow, The Man and His Work*; a Memorial Volume on the occasion of the centenary of his birth (1860–1960), published by the French Section of the World Jewish Congress, Paris, 1963, 256 pp., 42s.
- Wdowinski, David: *And We Are Not Saved*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1963, 123 pp., \$3.75.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

- ANDRESKI, Stanislaw Leonard, M.Sc. (Econ.), Ph.D.; Senior Research Fellow, University of Ibadan, in charge of Port Harcourt Branch of the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research. Formerly: Lecturer in Sociology, University of Manchester; Lecturer in Sociology, Brunel College of Technology; Professor of Sociology, School of Social Sciences, Santiago, Chile. Author of *Military Organization and Society*, 1954; *Elements of Comparative Sociology* (in press); *Parasitism and Subversion in Latin America* (in press). At present engaged in studying social aspects of urbanization in Nigeria.
- FREEMAN, Samuel D., M.S., M.S.S.W., Ed.D.; Director, Adult Program Services Dept., National Jewish Welfare Board. Formerly: Director, Jewish Center Lecture Bureau; Director, Program Dept., Armed Services Division, National Jewish Welfare Board; etc. Author of *Factors which Contribute to the Success or Failure of Lecture and Concert Programs*, 1949; *Adult Education in the Jewish Community Center*, 1953; *An Evaluation Scale for the Adult Program in the Jewish Community Center*, 1955; etc.
- LESTSCHINSKY, Jacob, see 'Notes on Contributors', Vol. II, No. 2, p. 265.
- LIPSET, Seymour Martin, Ph.D.; Professor of Sociology and Director, Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley. Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Recipient of 1962 MacIver Award of American Sociological Association. Author of *The First New Nation: The United States in Comparative and Historical Perspective*, 1963; *Political Man*, 1960; (with Earl Raab) *Prejudice and Society*, 1959; (with Reinhard Bendix) *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, 1959; (with Martin Trow and James S. Coleman) *Union Democracy*, 1953; *Agrarian Socialism*, 1950; (with Leo Lowenthal) ed., *Culture and Social Character*, 1961; (with Neil Smelser) ed., *Sociology: The Progress of a Decade*, 1961; (with Walter Galenson) ed., *Labor and Trade Unions*, 1960; (with Reinhard Bendix) ed., *Class, Status and Power*, 1953. At present working on problems of the developing countries.
- RUDAVSKY, David, M.A., LL.B., Ph.D.; Associate Professor, Hebrew Culture and Education, New York University; Chairman, National Education Committee, Zionist Organization of America; Co-chairman, Higher Education Division, United Jewish Appeal. Formerly: Executive Director, Jewish Education Association of Essex County, Newark, New Jersey; Principal, Marshalian High School of Greater New York; President, National Council for Jewish Education; President, National Association of Professors of Hebrew. Associate Editor, *Hebrew Abstracts*; Contributing Editor, *Jewish Education Magazine*. Author of *Current Jewish Religious Philosophies and Movements* (in press) and many papers in Hebrew and English on education and religion.
- SKLARE, Marshall, M.A., Ph.D.; Director, Division of Scientific Research, American Jewish Committee; Lecturer in Sociology, Yeshiva University, New York. Author of *Conservative Judaism: An American Religious Movement*; editor of *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group*.
- TINT, Herbert, Ph.D.; Lecturer at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Author of *The Decline of French Patriotism* (in press), and many articles in *Review of Politics*, *Sociological Review*, *French Studies*, etc. At present preparing a book on French ideologies since 1944.
- ZENNER, Walter P., M.A., M.H.L.; Instructor, Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, Ill. Has published in *The Reconstructionist* and the *American Anthropologist*. At present engaged in research on Syrian-Jewish acculturation in Israel and the U.S.A.