Mr Freedman

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME FOUR 1962

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd, 15-16 Queen Street, London W1

CONTENTS

Alignments and Allegiances in the Jewish Community of Shaarayim in Israel *by Percy S. Cohen* 14
Arieh Tartakower on Jewish Society *by Alexander Manor* 124
Books Received 142, 273
Chronicle *by Paul Glikson* 90, 204
Correspondence *by Abraham A. Weinberg and Gustav Jahoda* 297
Death Rates in New York City by Socio-economic Class and Religious Group and by Country of Birth, 1949–1951 *by Herbert Seidman, Lawrence Garfinkel, and Leonard Craig* 254
Demographic Development of Italian Jewry from the Seventeenth Century, The *by Roberto Bachi* 172
Dutch Jewry: A Demographic Analysis, Part Two 47
Jacob Lestschinsky—On his Eighty-fifth Birthday *by Alexander Manor* 101
Jewish Community of Buenos Aires, The *by Irving Louis Horowitz* 147
Jewish Migration in the Post-war Period *by Ilya M. Dijour* 72
Jewish Population of Great Britain, The *by Maurice Freedman* 92
Jewish Reconstruction in Germany since 1945 by *Hermann Levin Goldschmidt* 127
Jews in Medieval Poland, The *by Adam Vetulani* 274
Jews in the High Atlas Mountains of Morocco: A Partial Reconstruction *by Dorothy Willner and Margot Kohls* 207
Jews in the Soviet Union: A Note on Students and Graduates *by Alec Nove* 107
Minority Status among Jews and their Psychological Adjustment *by Victor D. Sanua* 242
New Orleans Jewish Community, The *by Leonard Reissman* 110
Note on Two Conferences on European Jewry, A *by Shaul Esh* 294
Notes on Contributors 143, 191
Occupation and Social Advancement in Anglo-Jewry, *by Ernest Krausz* 82
On Jewish Humour *by Salcia Landmann* 193
Religion and Capitalism *by Joseph Ben-David* 299
Some Demographic Aspects of Kibbutz Life in Israel *by Alexander Prag* 39
Toynbee and the Uniqueness of Jewry *by James Parkes* 3

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

Bachi, R. 172
Ben-David, J. 299
Cohen, P. S. 14
Craig, L. 254
Dijour, I. M. 72
Esh, S. 294
Freedman, M. 92
Garfinkel, L. 254
Glikson, P. 90, 204
Goldschmidt, H. L. 127
Horowitz, I. L. 147
Kohls, M. 207
Krausz, E. 82
Landmann, S. 193
Manor, A. 101, 124
Nove, A. 107
Parkes, J. 3
Prag, A. 39
Reissman, L. 110
Sanua, V. D. 242
Seidman, H. 254
Vetulani, A. 274
Willner, D. 207

AUTHORS OF SHORTER NOTICES

Andrevski, S. 135
Barnett, J. H. 310
Cannon, I. C. 141
Cohn, H. J. 310
De Kadt, E. J. 138, 140
Fortes, M. 134
Jahoda, G. 133
Kedourie, E. 131, 305
Marshall, T. H. 307
Parkes, J. 130, 136, 308
Perry, Y. 309
Pollins, H. 303
Roth, L. 307
Strizower, S. 136, 304

508

BOOKS REVIEWED

Dayan, Y. ed. *The Promised Land* 310
Field, M. J. *Search for Security* 134
Ginsberg, M. *Evolution and Progress* 305
Ginsberg, M. *Nationalism—A Reappraisal* 305
Hertz, A. *Żydzi w Kulturze Polskiej* 135
Isaac, J. *L'enseignement du mépris, vérité historique et mythes théologiques* 307
Israel, B. J. *Khan Bahadur Jacob Israel, A Personal Sketch* 304
Johnson, H. M. *Sociology* 138
Katz, J. *Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times* 136
MacRae, D. G. *Ideology and Society* 140
Maòr, H. *Ueber den Wiedergutmachung der juedischen Gemeinden in Deutschland seit 1045* 127
Maybaum, I. *The Faith of the Jewish Diaspora* 307
Paret, R. ed. *Die Welt des Islams und die Gegenwart* 308
Ray, D. P. ed. *Trends in Social Science* 141
Rex, J. *Key Problems of Sociological Theory* 141
Rosenthal, E. J. *Judaism and Islam* 308
Samuelsson, K. *Religion and Economic Action* 299
Sonntag, J. ed. *Caravan, A Jewish Quarterly Omnibus* 303
Straus, R. ed. *Urkunden und Aktenstuecke zur Geschichte der Juden in Regensburg, 1463–1738* 310
Tartakower, A. *Jewish Society* (in Hebrew) 124
Tarkakower, A. *Israeli Society* (in Hebrew) 124
Umen, S. *The World of Isaac Lamden* 309
Unsdorfer, S. B. *The Yellow Star* 136
Watt, W. M. *Islam and the Integration of Society* 131
Weinberg, A. *Migration and Belonging, A Study of Mental Health and Personal Adjustment in Israel* 130
Winter, P. *On the Trial of Jesus* 133

TOYNBEE AND THE UNIQUENESS OF JEWRY

James Parkes

I HAVE a very great admiration for the work of Arnold Toynbee. Even if all the criticisms of detail launched by professional historians were true (though I doubt if they are), *The Study of History* is a masterpiece in which the imaginative genius of the author provides even the critic with constant flashes of insight into the nature and balance of human experience. What is more important is that its range and comprehensiveness provide a standard and a basis by which any subsequent attempt to portray even a part of his vast structure can see a whole scaffolding in place, so that it can judge what to strengthen, to omit, or to change. All writing of history will for the foreseeable future be influenced by what Toynbee tried to do and by what he did. Moreover to know him is to know someone who is incapable of insincerity or deliberate prejudice; wherefor I have long been troubled by the apparent exception to everything which I have said when I read his writings or hear his speeches on the subjects of Jews, Judaism, and Israel.

It is not that I am still open to be converted to his views on these three topics. I know enough about the subject to make that impossible, and I think I know enough about Toynbee to realize that whenever he reaches this point in his progress, something extraneous comes in and distorts his vision. That majestic tricycle (whose wheels are knowledge, intuition, and integrity) on which he moves confidently through the mazes of the whole human story and the geography of all continents meets some stone in its path which causes it to wobble wildly, and ultimately throw its rider, once Jews, Judaism, and Israel rise over the horizon. If I have any complaint, it is that it is not until page 620 of Volume 12 (*Reconsiderations*, 1961) that he tells us what that stone is; and this is a little late to confess and expound so important a limitation. We reach it at last in the heading of the First Section of the Fourth Chapter (*Effects of being what one is*) of the Annex (*Ad Hominem*) to main Chapter Two (*The Relativity of a Human Observer's Approach to Human Affairs*) of main Section A (*Philosophical Considerations*). The heading is: IRREVERENCE TOWARDS PRETENSIONS TO UNIQUENESS. So there is the nub of the Jewish offence.

But that is not all. Toynbee speaks very sincerely and wisely of the inevitable bias of a personal background and of the tradition in which a man is brought up. He is himself by birth a Protestant middle-class Londoner. Although a traditional Christian he reacts as vigorously against the claim of the Church that Jesus of Nazareth is 'unique' as he does against the claim that the Jews are 'the chosen people'. But his definition of what a 'higher religion' is, and his choice of the characteristics which it should show, are, quite unconsciously, those precisely of a Protestant middle-class Englishman. He omits the principal characteristic of Judaism by defining the purpose of all higher religions as being to bring the *individual* into contact with Absolute Reality. When further he defines the corporate expression of religion as being by its nature separate from the natural community, he extrudes Judaism still more firmly from any balanced consideration.

He first aroused a storm of criticism from Jewish quarters by his description of Judaism as a 'fossil' of the Syriac civilization, and the footnotes and references in his twelfth volume show that he has since done a great deal of reading, and of reading the right books. George Foot Moore and Travers Herford are quoted extensively, as well as the American scholar and Conservative rabbi, Jacob B. Agus, with whom he has evidently carried on quite a correspondence. Yet the two fundamental matters of debate still remain untouched. Is a society or system to be thrown out of court without further consideration the moment it declares itself, or is declared, unique? and: Is the fact that the natural community is fundamental to Jewish thinking about the purpose of God automatically a blemish? These are the two issues which Toynbee still leaves untouched; and they give rise to the further question: Is Toynbee's substitute for the traditional values of Judaism, that it is a universally significant means of preserving cultural autonomies in diaspora, meaningful and valid?

There is obviously a sense in which we must rightly say that no man or society can claim to be unique in the universe. The extent of human ignorance about the universe makes any such claim inherently absurd. But is there no resting point between that extreme and the casual application of the word 'unique' to anything that is either excellent or unusual? There is a second question: Must we rule in advance that Reality (in which Toynbee avows his belief) is prohibited by its universal responsibility from any action which is not immediately universally apprehended or apprehensible?

I would reject as fiercely as Toynbee that whole section of the traditional doctrines of the 'Judaic monotheisms' which condemns to a hell the majority of created beings because they do not accept a particular—let me use the word at the moment without explaining it—'revelation'. I would equally condemn the belief that there is a 'unique' way from man to God. But it is loose thinking to identify a demand for the inevi-

table variety of universality with a refusal to accept to the full (Toynbee does somewhere give it a grudging admission) the idea that a divine intention may be best communicated first in a single 'unique' event, provided that the event is universally communicable. That is the rock of stumbling. *Historically* the event of Sinai received an immensely complex interpretation through the very peculiar tenets evolved to meet the very peculiar situation of the Jewish community in the worlds of paganism, Christendom, and Islam. *Historically* the event of the Incarnation was interpreted through the medium of the Hellenistic philosophy (with western and oriental variations) of the Church of the first four centuries. If there is no other possible and right interpretation of these two events, so that the experience of Reality in other parts of the world is permanently excluded from understanding or accepting them, then they are not universal or universally significant.

If, however, each event (though not its historic interpretation) can be mediated through the diverse channels of the whole world's search for ultimate truth, then there is nothing derogatory, or meriting contempt, in the event being first mediated in a unique manner.

It is true that such an idea is a novelty to most Christian thinkers, and has not yet come into the purview of corresponding scholars among Jews. This has a very simple contemporary explanation. Christian thinkers are at last being compelled to translate into ecclesiastical and doctrinal terms the sudden collapse of the political hegemony of the West. All through Asia and Africa there are coming to be Churches, Roman, Anglican, or Protestant, which have become autonomous or completely independent, whose hierarchy arises from the soil and is not imported from abroad, and whose faith is judged and defined by synods of believers who are looking at religious truths and doctrines directly from their own standpoints, and not from the Hellenistic expressions of the West. It will take some time before the consequent transformations of accepted dogmas become stabilized, but I have no doubt that they will present the older Christian Churches with many difficult and heart-searching problems. The Synagogue has not yet had to face this situation for obvious historical reasons.

I must define more closely what I mean by the universal communicability of any divine communication (revelation) which was claimed to be unique. And inevitably I must define it from the standpoint of one who believes in the existence of Toynbee's Absolute Reality, and of that 'personal aspect of It which we call God'. It is a reasonable assumption of those who believe in a Creator that this Creator is interested in his creation, that he communicates with it, and that the purpose of that communication is to give to the creature both insight into how to live conformably to the divine plan, and power to help him to do so. This communication I call 'revelation'. The Jew believes that such a revelation took place at Sinai; the Christian in the Incarnation.

The Jew has interpreted that revelation in all that he calls *Torah*, both written and spoken; those who have accepted Jesus as Messiah first put together a group of biographies, letters and history, which they accepted as inspired, and then built on them the doctrines and dogmas of the Christian Church. In both cases this is a description of what the particular people who received the revelations made of it in their particular times and circumstances. Now if the revelations themselves are both unique and universal, then they must be potentially the source of both insight and power to those who are brought into contact with them, even if they knew nothing of the events when they happened, and do not understand or accept the original historic interpretations of them. In other words, to put it rather crudely, they must be able to accept Sinai without interpreting it as involving the non-eating of pork; and they must be able to accept the Incarnation without interpreting it in terms of 'Three persons in one God'. If one asks 'why should one accept them?', then the answer would lie in the realm of a discussion of their influence on human life, not on their expression in a particular orthodoxy or orthopraxis. For undoubtedly Sinai did create a remarkable human society, and Christianity has shown equally remarkable power to transform the life of individuals.

There remains the question: If this be so, then why did not the same Divine Being repeat this essential revelation to all parts of his creation? Why both in Judea? By these *unique* incursions into human affairs was he not unnecessarily allowing a lot of other systems foolishly to emerge, and was he not depriving most of his creation of the means of knowing his purpose? (I apologize for this intrusion of theology, but it is only out of Toynbee's suppositions that one can produce a counter-argument to Toynbee's conclusions. There is no sociological need of, or interest in, uniqueness.) There is a reasonable answer to the question, based on the suppositions of one who accepts the existence of a Reality 'which in Its personal aspect we call God', and who believes that this Being communicates with the creatures for whose existence It is responsible. The answer is that we believe God to be inevitably of such power that, if events such as Sinai and the Incarnation were constantly repeated, there would be a complete end to human free will and human responsibility. They would overwhelm the world. There is a phrase in Christian systematic theology which speaks of *Deus absconditus*, of a divine self-veiling; and the idea is common to all the monotheisms, though with different expression. It is an inevitable recognition that 'as the heavens are above the earth so are my ways above your ways'.

It would not be by their only happening once that the revelations of the monotheisms would stand condemned, but by their happening so carelessly that they were, in fact, incommunicable. And this the thinkers of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam would all claim to be a distortion of the historical—and geographical—facts. They happened, each would

claim, in a 'fullness of time'; and they happened geographically where all the land-masses of the world meet (except for the Americas, and to the issue involved in that I do not know the answer), and so in a place where their communication to others could be prevented only by deliberate human action. The two religions which spread, Christianity and Islam, have reached global communication. That Judaism has not done so is the result of such human action (primarily Christian and Muslim, but Jewish as well), and cannot be blamed on God.

For the believer, then, there is no justification for 'irreverence towards pretensions to uniqueness'. Any such claim is justified rather in asking for serious and scholarly examination. After its credentials have been studied its claim may be dismissed as untenable; but it is not scholarly to dismiss any such claim in advance as impossible. Among the credentials to be examined Toynbee could rightly ask that the first place be given to the universal implications of the claim. Was it a claim to privilege for a few or to service to the rest of the world? Was there any basic exclusiveness which vitiated its claim to universal significance? There would be many matters worthy of study. They would automatically exclude claims to be an *Herrenvolk*; they would reveal in a historic religion all the cross currents and contributing streams of an all too human history. But at bottom Jews have a right to submit their claim to think of themselves as a 'Chosen People', and Christians to consider themselves 'the elect of every nation', because in their very souls, in spite of all the cross-currents of history, the beliefs they profess, and the standard of conduct they have desired to reach, both recognize a universal responsibility, and accept a universal right of entry into the fellowship of their spiritual resources.

It would be a new and rather frightening idea to most theologians from any of the monotheisms that their theology, once it claimed to be universal, must be willing to be subjected to a searching examination by every religion. But it is the necessity for facing such a scrutiny that Toynbee in his universalism could legitimately demand, and not the rather perky (he himself compares his attitude in this matter to a London sparrow or bus conductor), frivolous and unworthy denial of any possibility of uniqueness. I am sure that the effects of such a survey would be enormously salutary. A lot of most offensive and odious doctrines would find themselves quite untenable, and would need a Genizah whence not even a Schechter could possibly resurrect them.

All that being said, what was the power or pattern communicated which explains and asks justification for the Jewish claim to be a 'Chosen People?'

It was certainly not the merit of being a fossil survival of the Syriac civilization. The Syriac civilization was undoubtedly great fun, for it existed in such a nice dry climate that it can constantly be dug up; but

it was not of universal significance, either in time or space. Toynbee's comparisons, when he is trying to deny the uniqueness of Jewish history and Jewish religion, ought (had not all his attention been concentrated on his desperately wobbling tricycle) to have told him that something was wrong in his method. Did he really want a comparison to the Samaritans, then Lady Drower could have supplied him with any amount of parallels from the debris of the Middle East. But there was no real parallel in the Samaritans to a people who, during the present century, had produced a substantial proportion of the world's Nobel Prizemen in quite a number of different subjects.

If the first Jewish offence in the eyes of Toynbee was that they were seen as a Chosen People, the second was that they would not abandon the paradox of particularism and universalism. As I said at the beginning, he has on various occasions demanded firmly that religions, to enter the category of higher religions, must 'find their social expression in organizations of their own' (p. 84, and compare p. 218 that such a religion must not be an 'integral part of the structure of some civilization', but must be 'an independent society of a new kind'). Coming from the general to the particular, he insists (p. 488, compare pp. 496 and 515) that the Jews must choose between 'two incompatible alternatives', and abandon either their concern with the preservation of a natural community, or their pretension that their vision of Absolute Reality is of a God who is of universal significance.

This is another perilous wobble of the tricycle. For it amounts to the statement that the natural community is, as it were, an oversight, or matter of supreme unimportance, in the relations between Creator and creation; and that a religion which gives it a central place forfeits thereby the right to claim to be one of the higher religions of mankind. This is a most extraordinary insistence that the sphere in which Christianity has been a conspicuous failure (witness two world wars arising within the area coloured on the map as Christendom, not to mention a possible third) must not be touched by any other higher religion! O Westerner! Westerner! What a fall is there, *my* Countryman!

The strength of Judaism, yes, its uniqueness, consists just in the paradox of its universalism and its particularism. And its particularism does *not* rest on a Jewish Church as an 'independent society', but on the Jewish people as a whole. In considering this in the present context I do not want to get involved in counter-argument based on the historic fact that Judaism, hemmed in on both sides by Christendom and Islam, *naturally* sought to preserve the people who practised it. That is of the accidents, not the essence of its history. It is the preservation of the natural community *as an essential* that should be emphasized. There are all kinds of curious and otherwise inexplicable contrasts between Judaism and its daughter faith in the West which arise from this Jewish

insistence. Christianity has stressed the unattainable, the vision beyond man's grasp, the city not of this world; and Christians have been tempted to look down on the rabbis as propagating an inferior religion in their insistence on the attainable, on the great words in Deuteronomy xxx, 11–14:

> For this commandment which I command you this day is not too hard for you, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that you should say, 'Who will go up for us to heaven, and bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it?' Neither is it beyond the sea that you should say, 'Who will go over the sea for us, and bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it?' But the word is very near you; it is in your mouth and in your heart, so that you can do it.

Jews have always to think of their weaker brethren, of the men who are neither pious nor intelligent nor given to good works, and remember that they also are bound within the *lulav* of Israel. 'We do not lay on the community burdens too heavy for them to bear,' said the rabbis. And by this very tolerance of human weakness they did build up a community which resisted for fifteen hundred years the temptations to apostasy of all the world's higher religions, all its most seductive cultures, and (for those same weaker brethren) all the comfort of living unpersecuted and untrammelled.

Toynbee seems to believe that it is enough that the great prophets proclaimed the need for national righteousness, for the supremacy of justice, for the sanctification of mercy, in immortal generalizations. But though it be rash to contradict an expert in his own field, the study of history does not confirm this belief. The Christian Churches had all these great generalizations in their Scriptures. Actually one could say that they read and preached upon them more continuously than the rabbis. But natural communities are not changed by the noblest generalizations. European history has shown this to be true throughout; and the men of the Great Synagogue, those anonymous leaders who turned 'the Religion of Israel' into 'Judaism' not only realized that this was so, but found means to act upon it. It is they who for the first time made religion a discipline of the whole community by their insistence on religious education, on knowledge of the Scriptures, and on weekly congregational worship in every place where Jews lived. It is the action which they initiated, and which generations of scholar-leaders developed, that preserved the Jews, not as a church but as a people, through the many centuries between the wars with Rome and partial emancipation in the western world.

The Christian world shares to a large extent the universalism of the prophets of Judaism. But surely for a historian the most interesting and profitable field of study in Judaism is its combination of their universalism with particularism, that is the *unique* power by which it maintained a national community without any means of enforcing

membership. Rabbis had not even the threat of the pains of Hell to quell the wicked and bring back the wanderers into the fold, for their emphasis on individual life beyond death is slight.

The Parsees, interesting though they are, are no parallel; but it is an absurd reflection on the Toynbean comparative method that if somewhere, in some forgotten century or corner of the world, something really parallel had existed, then the Jews would not have incurred Toynbee's wrath and contempt. For their contribution to the total human amalgam would have had exactly the same intellectual and moral content, but would not have incurred the indelible stigma of uniqueness, and Toynbee could have appraised it at its real interest and worth.

But I fear that we have not yet come to the end of Jewish uniqueness. We are concerned not only with the fact that Jews survived as a people but with the moral and cultural content of that survival. For it is the content, not the fact, of their survival which produced the qualities which Toynbee admires, and which produced the stream of Nobel Prizewinners already mentioned. And, *horribile dictu*, Jewry survived not because of the nobility of the prophets, a nobility which all men can perceive for themselves, but because of the Talmud, that strange, incomprehensible, and (I believe) unique amalgam of laws, pithy sayings, tedious lecture notes, half finished reports of discussions, and what not, which formed the moral, recreational, and intellectual pabulum of Jews for a millennium. It is no good the non-Jew digging out its absurdities, blushing at its indelicacies, raging at its exclusiveness; for all that apparently justified contempt is shipwrecked on the plain but mysterious fact that Jewry came into the nineteenth century not a fossil but a ferment, not a solid phalanx of rigid and unadaptable fundamentalists, but a lively and attractive section of the world's life and leadership, and a willing body of followers of every reform and good cause.

The fact which merits the study of psychologist, sociologist, and theologian is that the Talmud did all this. Why it did it is certainly not apparent on the surface. We can see that the rabbis left the mind free where the other monotheisms bound it by the line between orthodoxy and heresy; we can see that they preserved the separation of the Jews without enforcing their isolation; we can see, in fact, that somehow their Talmud gave those services which Toynbee believes the Jewish diaspora could give to the increasingly rootless non-Jewish world. *But* the diaspora was preserved by the Talmud because within its voluminous and confused pages was a root, a unity, an identity, which made it a 'portable *homeland*'. There was no central authority, there was no hierarchy of control, but Jews were identifiable as Jews from China to the Atlantic. For their Jewishness had a common root.

Here is another rock of offence from the Toynbean point of view,

though I do not believe that he would treat it with 'irreverence'. It is indeed puzzling, but it is in no wise contemptible or superficial, for one cannot despise that which comforts a fellow-creature in persecution and distress. That common root of Jewishness was acceptance that they had only one homeland, and that was The Land of Israel, and only one centre therein—Jerusalem. There is no trace of any thought of another land or another city as a permanent home. The head of the great Babylonian community, richer and more extensive than anything the Land of Israel could offer from C.E. 70 onwards, was the Exilarch, the *Resh Galutha*. Every land save one was *exile*. Though the passover greeting was, doubtless, often a mere formality, yet *Next Year in Jerusalem* reflected a perfectly genuine root. The choice of words is deliberate. Jews, wherever they lived, felt that they were *rooted* in Jerusalem, and it would be quite inadequate to say that they 'felt a longing for it' at some future date. Toynbee quotes with great approval the universalism of Deutero-Isaiah. There are more than a score of references to him listed in the Index. But the prophecies of Deutero-Isaiah begin:

> Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people, saith your God
> Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem. . . .
> O thou that tellest good tidings to Jerusalem,
> Lift up thy voice with strength, lift it up, be not afraid;
> Say unto the cities of Judah, Behold your God!

Deutero-Isaiah reflects the paradox of Judaism in just the same way as other Jewish prophets.

Rabbinic Judaism turned away entirely from the welter of apocalyptic eschatology which was much beloved by the eastern Christian Churches. In place of it was this insistence on roots in the Land of Israel, and Jerusalem as a centre for the whole world. If I am right in my conviction on this subject, then I do not think that the ability of Jews to remain a cultural unity in diaspora really provides a key to modern urban needs. They cannot provide for others this sense of belonging which is rooted in their corporate memory.

Without this clue to Jewish survival during the long centuries before emancipation, it is impossible to understand the meaning of Zionism; and it is in Toynbee's misrepresentation of Zionism, and of the significance of the state of Israel that the wobbles become such that he is finally unseated. For it is completely misleading to explain Zionism simply by the nationalisms of the nineteenth century, although those nationalisms largely dictated the form it took for Jews, and in which it was understood by others.

While Jews still lived in the world's ghettoes, one form of Judaism prevailed with but the smallest modifications—though Sephardim thought themselves superior to Ashkenazim, and both looked down on

the Jews in Muslim lands, while Mithnagedim and Chassidim quarrelled and banned each other within the same dimensions of the Pale. But with emancipation and citizenship, each Jew was free to decide in what form he would practise or neglect to practise his Judaism. He could remain a Jew and reject the contemporary expressions of his traditional orthopraxis. The vivid reality of the old centre ceased to be compelling; but the need which was supplied by the traditional centre remained the same. So long as all Jews thought—broadly—alike, the Promised Land existed, as it were, in each ghetto. When all Jews began to think differently, the Promised Land had to be an actual centre to exercise the same attraction.

It does not matter whether this attraction to an actual area of territory which has motivated two returns at an interval of over two thousand years is unique or not. The essential point is that it is real, and that it is ineradicable. In the intervening centuries there had never been an abandonment of the relationship. There were times when perhaps not more than ten thousand Jews actually lived in Palestine; but that was never because only ten thousand Jews could be found who desired to live there; it was because the land could not support more than ten thousand, or because not more than ten thousand could penetrate through all the barriers that had to be overcome to reach it. The new form of return which grew up under Zionism was merely a new form, it was not a new return.

The tragedy of Palestine since 1917 is that it is the fault neither of the Jews nor of the Arabs that a romantic vision turned into a reality resting on naked force. It was not because Zionism can be identified with fascism, as Toynbee asserts, but because of much more deep-seated and complex causes. The two groups were subjected to such different pressures, they were aware of such different areas of tension—Jews in eastern Europe, Palestinian Arabs in the Middle East—that it was only too easy to overlook a basic compatibility of their ideals and desires. Historically there has been no past in which the area of Palestine was exclusively inhabited by Jews; and there is no *panache* in the Arab past save in the periods when they had lived in tolerant symbiosis with other inhabitants of the Middle East, Jewish as well as Christian. Perhaps the British ought to have tried to explain more why they had issued the Balfour Declaration; perhaps it would have been different if the Arabs of Palestine had not been subjected to pressures of a pathetically sterile nationalism elsewhere in the Arab world; surely it would have been different if the Jewish return had been adjusted to the Arab capacity to understand and absorb it, instead of to the growing terror of life in Europe. But the point is that it is as totally unscholarly to lay all the blame for the result on the Jews as it is to lay it all on the Arabs. Jews have as much right to be in the country as Arabs. The question of majority and minority is not in this case determinant on either side.

The rights are equal. In all his treatment of Israel as a modern state Toynbee shows a lack of historical perspective which only the wobbling can explain, and which it certainly cannot excuse.

But there is, alas, for people like myself who hold him in good esteem and affection, worse to come. There is the point at which he is totally unseated, the point at which he identifies the living Arab refugees with the dead millions in the anonymous graves of Hitler's Europe—identifies those who year by year live on the world's charity amounting annually to millions of pounds with those who died without the world lifting a finger to save them. Of course it is absurd for Israel to pretend that she has no responsibility for any refugees; but it is equally absurd to lay on her the whole blame. At a point of bitter contemporary tension, at a point where the outsider has a particular responsibility for seeing the whole field, Toynbee, our greatest philosopher of history, allows his great reputation to be exploited by partisans, whether Arab or anti-Zionist Jew, in a manner which contradicts and defies the whole conception of reality on which his vast structure is reared. Oh! the pity of it, the pity of it. He might have done so much to bring together two sides, each with a just right to maintain to which only a historian could do justice; and the whole weight of his learning has been thrown on the side of division, of misrepresentation, and of falsehood. Oh! The pity of it.

ALIGNMENTS AND ALLEGIANCES IN THE COMMUNITY OF SHAARAYIM IN ISRAEL

Percy S. Cohen

INTRODUCTION

THE aim of this article[1] is to analyse the factors which promote and disrupt social cohesion in a Yemeni community in Israel. The problems raised are of more than mere specific interest. The basic ideological goals of Israeli society are 'the ingathering of the exiles' and the creation of a unified society and culture in which all groups participate equally. This entails the partial breakdown of ethnic and communal allegiances which might impede the formation of national associations and interest-groups, or at least the formation of strong, broad ties which cut across narrow ones.

In the light of this problem, Shaarayim presents a significant case for analysis, because two opposing social forces are at work in it: forces making for internal cohesion, the maintenance of a communal identity, and the defence of communal interests; and forces which promote allegiances and loyalties to the wider society or to associations and interest-groups which extend beyond the bounds of locality and ethnic group. The struggle between these two sets of forces is not simply manifest in conflict between the community and the wider society, but is expressed also in opposition between factions within the community. But even this factional opposition is not simple: it is not merely that one faction is in favour of local and ethnic solidarity while others oppose it. The conflict between narrower and wider loyalties penetrates and therefore disrupts factional allegiance itself. The reason for this is that each of the main factions must, to some extent, seek a compromise between its own ideology and interests and those of its opponents.

A YEMENI COMMUNITY

NATURE OF THE COMMUNITY AND ITS HISTORY

Shaarayim is the name of a Yemeni quarter of the town of Rehovoth. It was once a separate political community, physically distinct and ethnically homogeneous. It is now none of these things. Its physical boundaries have disappeared, and it merges with the other parts of the town of Rehovoth; it is now part of the municipal area of Rehovoth and is administered by the Rehovoth municipal council. It contains about one non-Yemeni in every three people in its present population of about 6,000.

It is a community in only one main sense; its members recognize certain common interests and a common identity, based on locality, ethnic origin, and a social past. Most of the property in Shaarayim, in the form of land and buildings, belongs to the Yemenis; most of the non-Yemenis are tenants. Local associations and organizations exist for, and are largely administered by, Yemenis. Leaders and those who recognize them as such are members of the community. There are a number of strong links—often cutting across one another—between individuals, households, and groups, which give a social cohesion to the Yemenis of Shaarayim and distinguish them markedly from both the non-Yemenis of Shaarayim and other component groups which at present constitute the political community of Rehovoth. Shaarayim is therefore a community in a significant sociological sense, if not in any official one.

The community was founded in 1909 by a group of Yemeni immigrants who had arrived destitute in the port of Jaffa in the previous year. The group had been invited by some of the farmers of the Moshavah (agricultural colony) of Rehovoth to come to work for them. Shortly after, there arrived a second group from a neighbouring district of northern Yemen. The immigrants lived at first in outhouses and shacks on the lands of their Ashkenazi employers; but within a short time they were given land—about one-fifth of an acre per household—by one of the organizations of the Jewish community in Palestine. This land lay alongside the Moshavah of Rehovoth, but was separated from the original colony which had been established fifteen years earlier. The Yemeni men and youths over the age of 12 or 13 worked as labourers for the farmers, while their womenfolk helped in the farmers' houses. In the hours after work the Yemenis built themselves rough houses on their land and set about cultivating their small plots. They were joined, from time to time, by other small groups of immigrants who came to Rehovoth, as well as to other colonies in Palestine, seeking work. In this way, and by natural increase, the community grew from a mere 100 people in 1909 to about 3,000 in 1939, when immigration virtually ceased, and to 4,000 in 1955.

The first two groups came from northern Yemen, but later groups

came from other parts as well, and in particular from southern Yemen, the proportion from central Yemen being rather small. Each of these groups was bound by a number of strong internal ties and common custom which served to distinguish them. Thus, at the outset, Shaarayim really consisted of a number of sub-ethnic communities, each forming an enclave in the wider Yemeni community. The internal bonds of these groups were based on kinship and common ritual activities, largely centring around a common prayer-house attended by the men. For a short while there was even a strong tendency to marry within these groups, and there were few important ties binding the various sub-ethnic groups together into a single community.

There was one communal headman ('Mukhtar') recognized by the Ottoman authorities, and later, for a short period, by the British Mandatory authorities, as well as by the representatives of the Yishuv, the Jewish population of Palestine. The Mukhtar was responsible for the community *vis-à-vis* the wider society, and administered matters affecting the community as a whole—such as the water supply, burial facilities, and the allocation of land. He was not elected but obtained his position by virtue of his previous status in the Yemen. The first Mukhtar had been a headman and rabbi of some prestige in northern Yemen, and, having established his authority, retained his position after the arrival of groups from southern and other parts. He was succeeded on his death by another man from northern Yemen, who was Mukhtar in more than name alone for only a short period.

Apart from the recognition of a single headman and of those few major interests affecting the community as a whole, the only important factor contributing to the formation of a sense of community was the awareness of some common identity in relation to the wider society. This was based on ethnic similarities—physical and cultural—overriding sub-ethnic differences, and on low social and economic status. In fact, social status and ethnic distinctiveness tended to reinforce one another and to become fused, so that after a short while the status structure of Rehovoth was as much a matter of ethnic origin as of occupation.

The recognition of a common identity was in fact the main unifying influence in the community, since the few matters affecting the community as a whole were more likely to be divisive: while the provision of burial facilities did not create or promote conflict, the sharing of water and the allocation of land did.

However, Shaarayim did not persist as a simple agglomeration of sub-communities. In the early twenties, as more immigrants settled, it became increasingly difficult for them to obtain adjoining tracts of land, and groups were broken up. Even more important were changes in the form of immigration and settlement. Previously, immigration and settlement had been carried out in units comprising a number of

neighbouring households or groups of kin, but now they took the form of smaller groups coming to join their kinsmen in Palestine. Though they did in fact join them, in a literal sense, by living in their houses or on their land, this was only a temporary measure. In most cases they later obtained land in other parts of Shaarayim, and as this process continued it had important consequences for the community. Gradually, ties of kinship and sub-ethnic grouping cut across those of present neighbourhood, thus countering the forces of fragmentation which were always at work in the community.

In addition to this, other ties had become increasingly significant. Those who had been longer in residence tended to recognize certain interests in common, and this contributed to the formation of ties amongst newcomers. The younger generation—and in particular those who had been born in Shaarayim or who had come there in their infancy—began to recognize certain common interests which divided them from the older generation; the rebellion of youth, which had been allowed little or no expression in the Yemen, soon emerged in Shaarayim, as in most other immigrant communities. During the late twenties and early thirties yet another factor emerged: differentials in material welfare and social status. These various ties and interests, based on kinship, neighbourhood, length of residence, age, and social and economic status, often cut across one another, facilitating the emergence of communal solidarity and interests, particularly in relation to the wider society.

With changes in the internal structure, size and composition of the community, there occurred simultaneous changes in the relationship between the community and the wider society. These resulted from a number of influences: the arrival of non-Yemenis in Shaarayim; economic development in the wider society; the organization of labour; the organization of religion; the growth of the local administrative organization; and the emergence of political parties.

Non-Yemenis first appeared in Shaarayim in the early and middle twenties. They were Ashkenazi immigrants from eastern Europe who differed somewhat from the earlier Ashkenazi residents of Rehovoth in that they were imbued with the twin ideologies of Zionism and socialism. They went to live as tenants in Shaarayim, working as agricultural labourers in the district. The arrival of tenants was highly advantageous to the Yemenis, and gave rise to a spate of building and land speculation. Large numbers of Yemeni householders built additional rooms on to their small houses, and some even built new houses; a few profited sufficiently from these and other ventures to enable them to acquire more land and to build houses and small blocks of flats. As a result, there gradually emerged differences of wealth within the community.

The Ashkenazi workers competed with the Yemenis in the labour

market, but not with great success. The Yemenis were prepared to work for low wages, as they in turn competed with cheap Arab labour. Competition, however, fed fuel to the fire of social tensions which were produced by the landlord–tenant relationship.

Economic development in the wider society exerted significant influences on the internal affairs of Shaarayim. The most important developments were in the field of citrus packing and processing and the building trade. With these developments, Yemenis were no longer completely dependent on the demand for agricultural and domestic labour in the Moshavah. They became 'proletarianized'. Working as agricultural labourers they were limited in the skills which they could learn and employ; they were also bound by personal, diffuse[2] relationships between themselves and their employers. But when they became employed in industry or building these conditions changed. Some of them learned new skills in the course of their work and began to increase their earnings. The more impersonal conditions of employment also promoted the growth of working-class consciousness, which was fostered and encouraged by labour organizers.

The Histadrut (Federation of Labour) was founded in Palestine in the early 1920s; but its influence was first felt in Shaarayim nearly ten years later. It was largely through the Ashkenazi workers and their leaders that some of the Yemenis were encouraged to join labour unions affiliated to the wider organization; but the response was largely poor. Most of the Yemenis were still agricultural and casual labourers, and the latter are, in most places, difficult to organize. The aims of the unions were to prevent cheap labour practices, to improve working conditions and conditions of payment and employment, and to provide services for members of the Histadrut, such as unemployment and health benefits, as well as educational facilities. An important function of the Histadrut, if not an avowed aim, was also to promote working-class solidarity and allegiance to leaders as part of the national struggle. But it was soon apparent that membership and support of the unions did not benefit all Yemeni workers, at least in the short run. Those who were grossly inefficient, ineducable, or lacking in certain abilities were rendered unemployable (in the absence of conditions making for full employment) at the higher rates of pay; consequently, they resisted the appeal of the labour leaders and accepted lower rewards and inferior conditions. This, after a while, created a division between two ranks of working-class Yemenis in Shaarayim.

Another important consequence of labour organization was political. Until this time leadership in Shaarayim had been relatively unified; factional allegiances had been informal and rather weak. But the newly introduced labour organization attracted some of the leaders, who, by virtue of their new allegiance to an interest-group and association which extended beyond the bounds of community and ethnic group,

were brought gradually into conflict with their associates in local leadership, most of whom ignored or opposed this new movement. The split, though it was more marked and immediate amongst the leaders, gradually penetrated into the lower ranks of the community.

The organization of religion was yet another development which affected both internal and external relationships in Shaarayim. The central rabbinical authority in Jerusalem gradually established religious courts in most districts of Palestine; these were concerned mostly with marriage and divorce, granting exemption from the leviratic obligation, and with the supervision of ritual slaughtering. The principal rabbi of Shaarayim was appointed to the rabbinical court of Rehovoth, and was ultimately taken into the full employ of the rabbinate. This meant that he was no longer simply the appointed religious leader of the community, but was also an official in a bureaucratic system.

The growth of the local administrative organization of Rehovoth also had far-reaching effects. During the 1920s and 1930s Shaarayim received increasing assistance, particularly in the form of welfare and educational services, from the Moshavah and the various agencies of the Yishuv. It had its own school for boys (the Moriah school) which compared unfavourably with other primary schools in the area; the curriculum gave marked priority to religious instruction in accordance with Yemeni custom, and made scant provision for other areas of instruction. But, apart from this one service, little else was provided by the local authority of Shaarayim: local taxes were low—the poorer residents, who were the majority, were unable to pay much, and the leaders were reluctant to impose higher taxes on the better-off; and the leaders of the community paid little attention to the provision of any services other than the water-supply, education for boys, and burial. All the roads in Shaarayim, except one—the main road which passed through Rehovoth and Shaarayim—were little more than sand-tracks. In view of the relative dependence of Shaarayim and other small local communities on the Moshavah, there was pressure from the leaders of Rehovoth and of the Yishuv to form a local council which would represent a number of linked communities. This proposal was approved by the Mandatory government and took effect in 1939. Each of the constituent communities was invited to send representatives to the council in proportion to its numbers. The more conservative leaders of Shaarayim and their followers viewed this development with suspicion and hostility, but, not wishing to be excluded from the deliberations of the council, co-operated.

This situation continued until 1948, when the State of Israel was founded and Rehovoth became a municipality, an event which had even more profound effects on political allegiances in Shaarayim than previous developments; though it can be seen as a further step in a

process which had been going on for some time. As long as Rehovoth had been merely an agglomeration of communities participating in a single local district council, each of the constituent units had been guaranteed representation; but with total amalgamation this condition no longer obtained. The national and local electoral system of Israel, one of pure proportional representation, was responsible. Under this system there are no constituencies or wards; only parties are represented in proportion to the number of votes which they obtain in the political community as a whole, which is treated as a single constituency. In these circumstances a constituent community could only obtain representation by forming itself into a party, and this is in fact what happened in Shaarayim, testifying to local-ethnic solidarity.

At first there was only a single party, though not all those eligible to vote supported it; but later this party, which had contained two factions—the 'conservatives' and the supporters of the labour movement—split into two. And these two were rivalled by other, national, parties.

Political parties had played no important role in Shaarayim before 1948, though there had been growing support for the labour federation in a section of the community.

The 1940s saw the emergence of another quite different form of political activity in Shaarayim: support for the terrorist organization Irgun Zvai Leumi ('I.Z.L.'). In retrospect, it is not surprising that this organization received considerable support, both moral and active, from the Oriental Jewish communities in Palestine. Support for a terrorist movement served a number of functions, particularly for the younger generation: it provided a means of identifying with a section of the wider society; it simultaneously provided an avenue for expressing hostility to the leadership of the Yishuv on the part of a group which strongly resented its inferior status in the wider social context; it furnished a means of dramatically affirming nationalist aspirations on the part of those who were, to say the least, ambivalent in their attitude to the Yishuv. All these factors were closely interconnected. After the foundation of the State, support for I.Z.L. was replaced in Shaarayim, as elsewhere, by support for the extreme right-wing party Heruth. Party-political allegiance was also affected, particularly after 1948, by the emergence of religious parties. For a short while, these enjoyed considerable support in Shaarayim, partly because the official religious leaders were employed by the rabbinate, and within this organization there was strong pressure to support one or other of the parties.

Thus shortly after 1948, when Shaarayim was fully incorporated into Rehovoth, there were several forms of political allegiance, based on a number of different principles: local and ethnic solidarity; allegiance to the labour movement; allegiance to organized religion in its struggle with secularism; and right-wing extremism. Each one of these principles could have appealed to a large section, if not an overwhelming

majority, of the population of Shaarayim. Most adults eligible to vote were (and still are) strongly devout in religious ritual and belief; more than 60 per cent of them were wage- or salary-earners, and could be classed as workers; and some of the conditions which stimulated the appeal of local-ethnic solidarity and right-wing extremism applied to a large section of the community. Despite this, all forms of allegiance were present; though in many cases, party-political allegiance differed as between local and national elections. Some people expressed particular preference in national elections by voting for, say, the religious parties, while supporting the local-ethnic party in municipal elections. The reasons why different groups preferred different forms of political alignment will be discussed later. But the existence of such differences testifies to the conflict between parochial and extensive allegiances, which accompanied the intrusion of wider organizations and associations into communal life and the absorption of the community into a larger unit.

DEVELOPMENTS OF FORMS OF LEADERSHIP IN SHAARAYIM

The conflict between two or more forms of political alignment in the community can be seen as a reflex of the changing relations between it and the wider society. In this process, local-ethnic solidarity constitutes an attempt to arrest the breakdown of communal and group distinctiveness, to conserve group identity and to emphasize group interests.

These developments cannot be fully understood without our considering the more complex pattern of leadership which gradually emerged. For leadership is seldom the mere product of social circumstances but is itself an agent in maintaining or transforming social relationships.

At first the pattern of leadership in Shaarayim was simple or undifferentiated. There was a Mukhtar who mediated between the community and the outside world, and administered some of its internal affairs; there were also religious leaders of each of the sub-groups, though their duties were largely confined to matters of ritual. The next change of any importance was the arrival of a rabbi, a Yemeni who had been raised and educated in Jerusalem, which he left during the 1914–18 war, who was appointed religious leader, the Mukhtar confining himself to secular affairs. During the 1920s there was considerable agitation from the various sub-groups within the community for a wider and more representative form of leadership. A committee was formed—each group nominating a representative—together with a number of sub-committees for the handling of specific problems: the founding and administration of a school, the administration of a bank, the water-supply, supervision of burial facilities, etc.

No other major changes occurred until a local branch of the labour

federation was formed when one and then several members of the community became officials representing the local branch. Later, some of these officials were returned in elections to the local labour council of Rehovoth, and so even more became agents of a wider organization rather than simply local leaders. Roughly parallel to this development —in form if not in time—was that of the official installation of the local rabbi in the nation-wide rabbinical organization. And this process, whereby local leadership roles became increasingly intermeshed with wider administrative systems, was further advanced by the participation of leaders in local district and municipal councils. This latter development was accompanied by representation of political parties in the local community.

This outline of some aspects of the history of Shaarayim provides a background for the analysis of cohesion and conflict in the present-day community.

PRESENT FACTIONS IN SHAARAYIM

There are three main ingredients of factional alignment in Shaarayim:[3] loyalty to the community; loyalty to a wider interest-group; and compromise loyalty. In a sense, the last is not a separate ingredient, but a compound of the other two: but I mention it as it is an important element in its own right.

'Pure' communal loyalty, in so far as it exists, is expressed in support given to the local-ethnic party, Lemaan Shaarayim. This party, which claims to represent the interests of the Yemenis of Shaarayim and, to some lesser extent, other Yemenis of Rehovoth, is a purely local party, in that it does not contest national elections. However, it is unofficially associated[4] with two national parties: Hitachduth HaTemanim, the 'Union of Yemenis' and the General Zionist Party. The first is a party which largely contests national elections alone; the second is a national moderate-right-wing party, which contests both national and municipal elections. Both the leaders and the supporters of Lemaan Shaarayim are members of the local community of Shaarayim.

'Compromise' loyalty, in its purest form—if I may be forgiven a paradoxical expression—is expressed in support given to the party known as Mapai-Shaarayim. This party is affiliated to the national moderate labour party, Mapai; but it is more than just a local branch of that party; it submits its own separate list in municipal elections; however, it receives its funds from the parent party, and its list is approved by the leaders of the local Rehovoth branch of Mapai. (Mapai-Shaarayim was formed as a breakaway from the original Shaarayim party which represented the community on the local district council and, later, in the first municipal elections. The Shaarayim party had consisted of two factions, one of which expressed loyalty to

the labour movement.) The party is also a purely local one, in that it does not contest national elections; its leaders and supporters are drawn almost entirely from Shaarayim.

Loyalty to a wider interest-group or party takes three main forms: uncompromising support for the labour movement—this in itself can take the form of simple support for Mapai, or for one of the more extreme socialist parties; support for one or other of the right-wing parties —this too can take the form of support for either the moderate General Zionists or for the extreme Heruth party; or support for one or other of the religious parties—this too can take the form of support for the workers' faction of these parties or for the other faction; by and large it is for the workers' faction, a party known as Poel HaMizrahi.

Although there is only one true 'compromise' party, the ingredient or element of compromise may in fact be present elsewhere. The reasons for this are as follows: few of those who support Lemaan Shaarayim in municipal elections also support the national Yemeni party in national elections; some support Mapai or the religious workers' party but many support the right-wing parties, particularly Heruth; consequently, the readiness to distinguish separate areas of political activity and to emphasize different allegiances in these areas is a form of compromise. Furthermore, some of those who support parties like Heruth in municipal elections are strongly sympathetic towards the traditionalist 'conservative' leaders of Shaarayim; and they may even support another party simply because there is a Yemeni well placed on its electoral list.

On the other hand, it should not be assumed that, because there is only one true local-ethnic party, communal identification is not expressed in support for other parties. The existence of Mapai-Shaarayim as a separate party from Mapai testifies to the strength of communal loyalty among a large section of those supporting the labour movement; and many of the supporters and some of the leaders of Mapai-Shaarayim see it as a vehicle for the advancement of the community as a community. This is even true of some of the supporters and leaders of the religious parties; they too see their party as an instrument for the preservation of ethnic tradition through the defence of religion.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE PARTIES

The most important party in Shaarayim, at least at the local level, is Lemaan Shaarayim, the pure local-ethnic party. It is supported by about 35 per cent of all those eligible to vote. It is succeeded in importance by the parties of the right, Heruth and the General Zionists, which, taken together, are supported by about 15 per cent. Next comes Mapai-Shaarayim, with about 14 per cent, the other labour parties, with about 13 per cent, and the religious parties, with about 7 per cent

support. The political allegiances of the remaining 15 or 16 per cent are either other than those mentioned or unknown.

By combining some of these figures in different ways we can show that almost 50 per cent openly express some loyalty to the community, while less than 35 per cent[5] avow their solidarity with the working class and only 7 per cent express their support for organized religion as a supra-communal and supra-ethnic force—this, despite the fact that over half of all the adults between the ages of 18 and 60, both male and female, can be classified as agricultural and industrial workers, and even more are devoutly orthodox.

The important question to be tackled is this: what are the factors which affect or determine the forms of political allegiance?

DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE

The various factors which might help to explain different forms of allegiance and support are as follows: occupation and other economic factors; social and economic status; age; sex; kinship and sub-ethnic grouping; length of residence; political consciousness; influence of leadership; and relationships with the wider society. However, some of these factors are less important than others, while some are of almost no importance.

1. *Occupation*

The adult residents of Shaarayim can be divided into four main categories: those who are primarily salaried or wage-earning; those who are self-employed or rentiers; those who are both self-employed and salaried or wage-earning; and those who are, for the most part, unemployed and are dependent on public assistance or that of their kinsmen.

The proportions of household heads in each category are as follows: 56 per cent are salaried or wage-earning; 19 per cent are purely self-employed or rentiers; 9 per cent are wage-earning and self-employed; the remaining 16 per cent are virtually unemployed.

The occupations of those who are wage-earning (or salaried) are as follows: agricultural labourers—14 per cent; citrus-packers etc.—12 per cent; building workers—9 per cent; menial workers—8 per cent; factory-workers—5 per cent; drivers, mechanics, etc.—3 per cent; clerical workers, civil servants, religious officials, labour officials, etc.—3 per cent; others—2 per cent. The total is 56 per cent.

The occupations of those who are self-employed, etc., are as follows: scribes, ritual slaughterers, makers of ritual objects, etc.—5 per cent; small shopkeepers, stall-keepers, etc.—4 per cent; drivers, mechanics, etc.—3 per cent; rentiers—3 per cent; farmers, etc.—2 per cent; arti-

sans, etc.—1 per cent; builders, etc.—1 per cent. The total is 19 per cent.

The usual occupational pattern among those who are both self-employed and wage-earning is either agricultural or industrial labour combined with farming, or citrus-packing combined with skilled artisanship.

The third group are not the only people who work at two or more occupations; many people do. The reason is that some of the most important occupations are seasonal.

Agricultural labour, citrus-packing, and building are all, to some extent, seasonal occupations or subject to irregularity. This means that nearly 35 per cent of all household heads in Shaarayim are subject to seasonal or irregular employment.

Agricultural labourers in Shaarayim—though not necessarily elsewhere in Israel—may in fact be guaranteed a large number of work-days per year; but this will depend on the goodwill of their employers, so that personal relationships between individual Yemenis or Yemeni families and Ashkenazi farmers is of profound importance.

With regard to citrus-packing and building the situation is different. Work here is obtained through the labour exchange, so that relations with labour organizers, particularly in citrus-packing, are of major importance.

Factory-workers, drivers (if they are not self-employed), clerical workers, religious officials, and even menials (street-sweepers, for example) are brought, through the conditions of their work, into contact with those major organizations and associations which emanate from the wider society: with trade unions, government, and other bureaucratic organizations.

But the self-employed (with the possible exception of some stall-keepers, who obtain their licences through the social welfare department, if they are disabled or otherwise prevented from obtaining work in the labour market) have little contact with these external organizations.

The influence of occupation on political allegiance takes several forms. Success in some occupations is partly dependent upon relationships with agents of wider associations and organization. Those who achieve success in these occupations (who get highly paid jobs and/or relatively regular employment) will be more likely to express their support for the labour movement; and those who do express such support are more likely to be favoured by local agents or others. On the other hand, the less successful will exhibit less enthusiasm for the labour movement, and vice versa. What the actual causal connexion is in both cases is difficult to specify, but there is little doubt that one exists. The correlation between success in employment among wage-earners with support for the labour movement is quite high.[6]

Agricultural labourers, because of the tie between employer and employee which exists in most cases, are less prone to express loyalty to the labour movement. On the other hand, they are aware of the nature of the relationship—that is, of their dependence—and this produces discontent, which is easily channelled into support for the local-ethnic party.

The self-employed are least likely to express their support for the labour movement. But their political attitudes, if one is considering the effects of occupation alone, are not the same as those of the less successful wage-earners. The latter have reason to resent the labour movement, while the self-employed merely ignore it. Whereas hostility drives people into an opposing camp, apathy leaves them, more or less, free-floating or tradition-bound. However, occupation is not the sole determinant of political allegiance.

2. *Income, Material Standards, and Status*

The community can be divided into roughly three categories with respect to income-levels, living-standards, and status. These three categories, known as the 'well-off', the 'poorly-off' and the 'social cases', are recognized to some extent by the members of the community. The 'well-off' constitute about 28 per cent of the total number of households, the 'poorly-off' about 56 per cent and the 'social cases' about 16 per cent.

Of the first group, about half are salaried or wage-earning, about one-third are self-employed, while the remainder are both self-employed and wage-earning. People in this category are either regularly employed, or else earn at relatively high rates during the employment seasons of the year. Some constitute households where the ratio of breadwinners to dependents is high.

Of the second group, about three-quarters are salaried or wage-earning. In this category, most people receive low wage-rates, and in some households the ratio of dependents to breadwinners is high. But the main factor is a combination of low wage-rates and irregular employment; or infrequent employment at the higher wage-rates, which drives people into the lowest-paid occupations, or to accept low pay in certain occupations, such as agriculture.

The third group is made up of households where there is either no breadwinner at all or where the breadwinner(s) earn(s) insufficient for the minimum needs of the household. In both cases, help is given either by kinsmen or, more usually, by the welfare agency.

Although these status levels can be characterized largely in terms of income and material circumstances, they can also, as a rule, be characterized in terms of style of life, level of aspiration (particularly for offspring), and social attitude. But status is also, in some cases, a function of age; a young married couple can be classified as 'poorly-off' even

though their parents are not. When age is a factor, then level of aspirations does not necessarily correspond to present status. Young people who are 'poorly-off' might view this circumstance as temporary; while older people are, understandably, less likely to do so.

Social and economic status affects political allegiance considerably. This can be shown by comparing the party preferences of the three groups.

Amongst the 'better-off', support for Lemaan Shaarayim (the pure local-ethnic party), Mapai-Shaarayim (the compromise local-ethnic party), the other labour parties, and the right-wing parties, is about equal: roughly 20 per cent for each. Support for the combined 'parochial' parties amounts to about 40 per cent and support for the workers' parties (i.e. Mapai-Shaarayim, the other labour parties, and the religious workers' party taken together) amounts to about 50 per cent.

Among the 'poorly-off' the pattern is rather different. Support for Lemaan Shaarayim amounts to about 50 per cent of the group; support for Mapai-Shaarayim amounts to only 13 per cent, for the other labour parties only 9 per cent, and for the right-wing parties 12 per cent. Support for the 'parochial' parties amounts to 65 per cent, while support for the workers' parties amounts to only 27 per cent.

Among the 'social cases' the pattern is hard to detect. Over a third seem to have no political allegiances at all—or if they have I do not know them—but in the remainder support seems to be roughly the same for Lemaan Shaarayim, the other labour parties, the religious workers' party, and the right-wing parties, with a slight preference in favour of the latter. Only about 20 per cent support the two 'parochial' parties.

The 'better-off' are, on the whole, more prone to align themselves with outside interest-groups than with the community; the 'poorly-off' are more prone to align themselves with the community than with outside interest-groups.

The 'better-off' are much more in sympathy with the workers' parties than with right-wing parties, but they show more sympathy with both right-wing and workers' parties than do the 'poorly-off'.

The explanation of these tendencies can be fully offered only when further factors have been considered. But a partial explanation can be suggested now. The 'better-off' are those who have achieved success in one of two main ways: either through the labour movement or privately. The former tend to support the workers' parties, the latter the right-wing parties. Success is both a means and a consequence of establishing wider sets of social relationships, for wage- and salary-earners, so that it tends to undermine a sense of local and ethnic loyalty and to promote wider loyalties; and most of the 'better-off' are wage- and salary-earners. Lack of success among the 'poorly-off' wage-earners can explain their relative lack of enthusiasm for parties other than the

'parochial' ones; but it cannot of itself explain the existence of 'parochial' allegiance. It can explain a negative source of political disinterest; but not a positive source of political support.

3. *Property*

The most important property in Shaarayim is in the form of houses. There are about 750 Yemeni household heads in Shaarayim; of these, some 650 own the houses in which they live; and, of these latter, about 160 let rooms to tenants, some of whom are Yemenis, but most not.

Of those who own houses, both with tenants and without, about two-thirds can be classed as 'poorly-off'. This means that the latter have a relatively powerful vested interest in property. Of course, the 'better-off' also share an interest in property; but most of them are as much if not more affected by their vested interest in work, and by the fulfilment of their growing occupational aspirations, which increase with added success. Property, at least in the form of real estate, assumes a large significance in the lives of those who are less successful in the labour market.

However, the 'poorly-off' are not the only ones with a vested interest in property. A small section of the 'better-off' share this dominant interest; and most of the latter are the leaders of the 'conservative', 'parochial' party. These people, who are among the richest in the community, derive most of their income from land and houses. A vested interest in property establishes a strong tie between a section of the 'better-off'—in fact a section of the 'élite'—and the majority of the 'poorly-off'.

Property is an important factor at the level of local politics. Local rates and taxes, levied by the municipal council, are on property, not income.

Thus, the ownership of property, which is in so many social situations a divisive element, is, in this situation, a potentially unifying one.

4. *Age*

In situations of relative social stability age is not necessarily an important factor in the determination of political allegiance. The unity and solidarity of the family tend to promote continuity in most social relationships. In fact, such continuity can be said to be a defining quality of social stability.

But Shaarayim is a community undergoing constant, disruptive change, and change is often, if not always, connected with rivalries between succeeding generations.

If we divide the adult section of the community (i.e. the section eligible to vote in elections) into three age-groups, the differing patterns of political allegiance can be observed. The first group consists of those over the age of 40; the second consists of those between the ages of 25

and 40; and the third consists of those between the ages of 18 and 25. The oldest and the middle group each comprise about 40 per cent of the total, while the youngest comprises about 20 per cent.

Among the oldest age-group the pattern of party allegiance is as follows: about 40 per cent support Lemaan Shaarayim; about 10 per cent support each of the following three parties: Mapai-Shaarayim, the other labour parties, and the religious workers' party; while about 15 per cent support the right-wing parties. The total support for the 'parochial' parties amounts to about 50 per cent; while the total support for workers' parties amounts to about 30 per cent.

Among the middle age-group the pattern is as follows: about 40 per cent support Lemaan Shaarayim; about 20 per cent support Mapai-Shaarayim; about 15 per cent support the other labour parties; only 5 per cent support the religious workers' party; and about 10 per cent support the right-wing parties. The total support for 'parochial' parties amounts to about 60 per cent; while the total support for workers' parties amounts to about 40 per cent.

Among the youngest age-group the pattern is rather different: about 15 per cent support each of the two 'parochial' parties; about 20 per cent support the other labour parties; only 5 per cent support the religious workers' party; while nearly 30 per cent support the right-wing parties. The total support for 'parochial' parties amounts to only 30 per cent; and the total support for workers' parties amounts to 40 per cent.

It seems, then, that the main differences and similarities between the three age-groups are as follows:

Among the oldest and middle age-groups there is roughly an equal tendency to be influenced by 'parochial' sentiments or interests; whilst in the youngest group there is a far weaker tendency to be so influenced.

Among the youngest age-group there is a greater tendency to express a wider solidarity, and though this is strongest in relation to the workers' parties, it is by no means insignificant in relation to the right-wing parties.

The middle age-group is more prone to support the workers' parties than is the oldest.

Support for 'parochial' parties can be seen as an expression of conformity to the values underlying communal solidarity; support for the workers' parties which, taken jointly, constitute the most powerful political force in the wider society, can be seen as an expression of conformity to the values of a broad section of the wider society. In view of this, the oldest age-group exhibits the greatest degree of narrow conformity; the middle age-groups exhibit the greatest degree of compromise between narrow and wider expressions of conformity; and the youngest age-group exhibits the greatest degree of opposition to both types of conformity.

This characteristic of the youngest age-group requires explanation. I suggest that the younger people, of whom 75 per cent were born and raised in Shaarayim, aspire most ardently to full acceptance in the wider society, and that they are acutely aware of the disparity between aspiration and achievement. Their partial failure to achieve full acceptance is linked with the low social status of the group to which they belong; they therefore rebel not only against their own group membership,[7] but against the authority of the wider society. This dual rebellion is adequately expressed in support for at least one of the right-wing parties (Heruth) whose ideology of extreme nationalism and opposition to the labour movement is aimed at every discontented and frustrated group in the society. In view of the opposition to 'parochial' allegiances which is found amongst the youngest age-group, it might be suggested that this indicates a possible future trend. But younger people often shed their rebelliousness as they get older and become more successful, so that 'parochial' loyalty might well re-assert itself; though it may take a different form.

5. *Sex*

There is little or no connexion between sex and political allegiance. In most cases women follow their husbands in these matters. This is not the place for an analysis of family structures in Shaarayim, but the following broad generalization can be made. In traditionalist families women tend to accept the influence of their husbands; in the more modern, 'democratic' family, there is a fair degree of consensus on political and other matters; and in the mixed type of family, tensions between spouses is not expressed in political terms.

Amongst the unmarried, generation differences and other factors override considerations of sex.

This is not to say that there are no differences in opinion between spouses in some families; but these differences tend to cancel each other out.

6. *Kinship and Sub-ethnic Grouping*

Kinship is of no mean significance in Shaarayim. Almost every person is related, cognatically, affinally, and often agnatically, with a large number of other people, who may live either in Shaarayim, or in another Yemeni quarter of Rehovoth. But there are no large factions based on ties of kinship. The obligations of close kinship are expressed in many forms of assistance; but those of more distant kinship are confined largely to ritual matters.

The reasons for this are twofold. The Yemenis do not have a strong tradition of factional cleavage based on broad ties of kinship;[8] and other factors, such as income, status, age, and occupation, are divisive with respect to broad kinship ties.

This does not mean that kinship plays no role in local politics. A large number of the leaders are linked by kinship ties. But even amongst the leaders, political allegiance cuts right across kinship ties.

Membership of a sub-ethnic group, like kinship, has, at present as opposed to the past, little effect on political allegiance in Shaarayim. Sub-ethnic ties are still important in ritual matters, at least among the older generation; but they are of little importance among the younger people.

7. *Length of Residence*

Of the adult population in Shaarayim (those over the age of 18) about 65 per cent were born in Yemen and the remainder in Palestine.

About 25 per cent of these adults have lived in Shaarayim for thirty years or more; about 50 per cent have lived there for twenty years or more; and more than 90 per cent have lived there for ten years or more.

Differences in length of residence affect political allegiance, but only slightly. Indirectly, the effect is produced by its influence on occupational attainment and mobility. An effect is produced more directly in so far as the more recent immigrants are less prone to accept the authority of the older, 'conservative' leaders. But the direct influence is very slight in that the more recent immigrants are represented, to some extent, by 'conservative' leaders. Furthermore, the two sets of influences, direct and indirect, tend to offset each other. In so far as more recent immigrants find it more difficult to succeed in the occupational sphere, they will tend to support 'parochial' leaders; in so far as they feel themselves opposed to the interests of the older immigrants, they will tend to support others. Consequently, length of residence cannot be considered as a major determinant of political allegiance.

8. *Political Consciousness*

Political consciousness is not, in any positive sense, a major factor contributing to the pattern of political allegiance; but it is a factor in a negative sense. In short, party-political apathy and ignorance are very common in Shaarayim, and these conditions are well suited to the maintenance of traditionalism and parochialism.

The pronounced state of apathy is due partly to the widely shared view that the Yemenis are treated as inferiors, and that Shaarayim is neglected by the authorities; it is also due to the suspicion that Shaararyim was incorporated into Rehovoth in order to satisfy the Machiavellian desires of the Ashkenazi leaders of Rehovoth; it is due to the fact that party politics have only recently come to influence the lives of people in Shaarayim; and it is due to the suspicion that parties exist to benefit a few at the expense of others.[9]

There is a small section of the community which exhibits some degree of positive party-political consciousness; these are the leaders, particularly the leaders of the labour movement. Apart from them, some of the supporters of the labour movement, who, like their leaders, have attended lectures and courses arranged by the local workers' council, also display some degree of ideological commitment; some of the latter have been members of the labour youth movement, which provides some ideological training. Finally, there are the leaders and supporters of Heruth and the religious parties, whose party-political enthusiasm and ideological commitment are often very strong. But all these constitute a minority.

9. *Influence of Leaders*

There are three main areas within which leadership is exercised: nation-wide bureaucratic organizations and political parties; municipal administration; and internal communal associations and organizations.

Within the first area there are three types of leadership: labour leadership, religious leadership, and political party leadership. Within the second area, there are two forms of leadership: membership of the municipal council and membership of a special committee in local government. Within the third area, there are a large number of leadership roles: membership of local political party committees; membership of the committees of the local bank, the local burial and religious association, the local school, and the local football clubs; and finally, membership of the so-called 'municipal committee' of Shaarayim.

(*a*) *Leadership within nation-wide organizations.* Leaders of this type exercise varying degrees and form of influence. *Labour leaders* have a great deal of direct power: they can assist people to obtain work and they can, through their status in the labour organization, assist people who wish to obtain skilled training for themselves or their children. Both these forms of assistance are of paramount importance; the first, because of the relative scarcity of well-paid or regular jobs; the second, because of the relative lack of formal and technical education among the Yemenis.

Labour leaders are agents of a wider organization and are therefore spokesmen of its ideology. Though they are appointed to some of their positions by the local workers' council—and do not, therefore, depend for these on communal goodwill—they can only be democratically elected to the workers' council itself. To achieve this, they *are* dependent on the goodwill of the local community who compose a large proportion of the electorate in Rehovoth. Thus, there is a duality in these leadership roles. Even the labour leader, if he is to achieve high status in the workers' organization, must compromise between loyalty to the labour movement and loyalty to the community. As spokesman of a

wider ideology, he must adapt it to the circumstances. Only in this way can he exert influence through his powerful position.

Religious leaders are appointed to their positions by the rabbinate and the ministry of religious affairs. They are spokesmen of the ideology of religious parties, of which they are forced, by pressure, to be members.

Their actual party-political influence, regarding local politics, is slight. There are several reasons for this: the religious parties can offer few material rewards to supporters or potential supporters; there is strong antagonism between Yemenis and the religiously orthodox section of the Ashkenazi population of Rehovoth; one of the religious leaders, the rabbi, is unwilling to become involved in politics, for fear of damaging his prestige and authority—in any case he avows strong loyalty to ethnic traditionalism and so must compromise between wider and narrower loyalties. The few who do support the religious parties are among those who, on other grounds, oppose the local leaders, other than the religious leaders.

Party-political leaders, particularly those connected with the extreme left-wing and right-wing parties, exert some influence: i.e. they stimulate the potential interest and sympathy of those who are opposed to 'parochial' loyalty and identification, but who wish to affirm their opposition to the established powers of the wider society.

(*b*) *Leadership within municipal administration.* Shaarayim has three Yemeni representatives on the municipal council, which has fifteen members. Two represent Lemaan Shaarayim, while the third represents Mapai Shaarayim.

The majority coalition of the council is made up of eight members, representing Mapai, Mapai-Shaarayim, other workers' parties, and the religious workers' party. The representative of Mapai-Shaarayim therefore supports the governing coalition, while his fellow-Yemenis oppose it.

The main aims of all the three Yemeni representatives are: to secure more and improved services, particularly the various forms of welfare assistance, for the community; to obtain physical improvements in Shaarayim, which is in many parts a slum; to seek a reduction in the rating valuations placed on property in Shaarayim; and to protect the interests of the Moriah school of Shaarayim, which is attended almost entirely by the children of local Yemenis and is looked upon as a bastion for the community's survival.

The representatives of Lemaan Shaarayim publicize their protestations and their activities in defence of the community, thus promoting and stimulating the belief that Shaarayim is neglected and exploited by the Moshavah. People are made constantly aware of the 'facts' that the rates are inordinately high and that Shaarayim 'receives fewer services than it pays for'.

The representative of Mapai-Shaarayim cannot adopt the same

methods, as he is a member of the coalition. He must seek to counter these allegations, but at the same time pay lip-service to the ideas and sentiments behind them. There are times, exceptional though they may be, when he must even vote with the opposition against the rest of the coalition; he once did this on a matter concerning the continued existence of the Moriah school in its present form; had he not, he would have been considered a 'traitor' to the community. The duality and ambivalence inherent in his status is most pronounced.

The representative of Mapai-Shaarayim, being a member of the coalition, is eligible for membership of the committees concerned with specific areas of local administration. He is chairman of the social welfare committee. This puts him in a highly equivocal position: he as well as the Moshavah can now be blamed for inadequate welfare provisions. This tends to strengthen the sentiments of 'pure' local-ethnic solidarity; but it does increase the prestige of those who seek a compromise. As a consequence, the rift between the two factions is emphasized.

(*c*) *Leadership within internal associations and organizations.* Leaders of the two local political parties, i.e. the members of the party committees, exert their main influence at election times. They engage in many forms of publicity: they hold meetings, put up posters, canvass, and tour the area with loudspeakers. These activities are necessary: though many people are disposed to support these parties, they have to be reminded of the importance of, and of the reasons for doing so; widespread apathy would probably result in very low polls. It is largely at election times that people are reminded that Yemenis 'suffer prejudice and discrimination', and that 'Shaarayim is neglected'; though they are also reminded of the need to support the workers' movements, if only in compromise form.

Members of the committees of the local bank, burial and religious association and school are all, with a few notable exceptions, supporters and leaders of Lemaan Shaarayim. This tends to maintain or enhance their prestige in the local community, which in turn enables them to exert influence.

Leaders of the football clubs exert little or no direct influence in political matters. However, the fact that these clubs exist to represent Shaarayim does probably lend strength to, and expresses, a degree of communal identity.

Members of the so-called Shaarayim municipal committee, which has no official status whatsoever, try to maintain a semblance of local autonomy in order, no doubt, to bolster their belief in themselves as local leaders. This committee and the sentiments behind its existence are reminiscent of a nativistic cult. It is a sign of a hankering for the past. Possibly the existence of a committee with this name (which is almost entirely concerned with the discussion of local affairs, and with the tactics of opposition to the Moshavah) does influence a few of the

older people into believing that their leaders do represent something real.

In general, leadership in Shaarayim has two aspects: practical and symbolic. The practical aspect largely emerges as a form of mediation between the community and the organizations of the wider society; the symbolic aspect emerges largely in the defence of communal interests, or in the promotion of solidarity. Both areas of leadership have significant effects on the forms of allegiance.

10. *Relations with the wider community*

The final factor to be considered in analysing the determinants of allegiance concerns the different relationships which exist between the Yemenis of Shaarayim and other groups in Rehovoth.

The total population of Rehovoth is about 25,000; of these about 16,000 are Ashkenazim; about 2,500 are Sephardim or other Oriental ethnic groups; and about 6,500 are Yemenis. At present these ethnic groups are fairly distinct, as there has been little intermarriage either between Ashkenazim and Yemenis or between Yemenis and other Oriental or Sephardi groups. The inter-ethnic marriages that have occurred have been, by and large, between Yemeni women of Rehovoth (including Shaarayim) and men from outside Rehovoth.

Of the 6,500 Yemenis in Rehovoth, about 4,200 are in Shaarayim; the remainder live in Kfar Marmorek, which was founded in 1935, and which lies alongside Shaarayim, and in Shkhunath Ephraim, which borders on Marmorek.

Of the 16,000 Ashkenazim, about 4,000 are recent immigrants—people who came after 1948—while the remainder are established residents. The latter are of two types: the founders of Rehovoth and their descendants; and those who came after 1918.

The Yemenis of Rehovoth constitute a significant proportion (about 25 per cent) of the total population. In some respects the main factors which affect relationships with Ashkenazim apply to all Yemenis in Rehovoth. But in other respects the relationships are specific.

There are five main sets of relationships which need to be considered: between Yemenis of Shaarayim and the original families of the Moshavah; the second group of Ashkenazi immigrants; the recent Ashkenazi immigrants; the Ashkenazi residents of Shaarayim; and the other Yemenis of Rehovoth.

(*a*) *Relations with the original families.* These relations vary considerably. It is common to find a strong bond between a particular pair of families, where the Yemenis have been employed by the Ashkenazim. This relationship is marked by great familiarity in work situations; but in informal situations it is marked by a patronizing attitude on the part of the Ashkenazim.

The attitude of most Yemenis is ambivalent: they will emphasize

positive personal relationships, but also complain of 'exploitation' and 'inferiority' in the inter-group relationship. Yemenis combine cultural and social admiration with resentment. Those who support the labour movement will refer to the farmers as 'exploiters of cheap, black labour'.

(*b*) *Relations with later Ashkenazi arrivals.* Relations with those Ashkenazim who came to Rehovoth after 1918, who lived as tenants in Shaarayim, and many of whom are now settled in the Moshavah, are complex. Some of these later arrivals now exercise considerable power in the town, as political leaders, labour leaders, administrative officials, etc.

They too tended to treat the Yemenis as inferiors in the past, and were often unable to compete with their cheap labour. But their attitude was not softened by personal or family contact and patronage. However, it was due to them that many of the Yemenis were organized in the labour movement and able to improve their economic status.

Those Yemenis who have not benefited through the labour movement, together with those who have improved themselves as men of property, tend to resent this section of the Ashkenazi population. Since this section is also now largely in control of civil administration, it can be blamed for the 'neglect of Shaarayim'.

(*c*) *Relations with the most recent Ashkenazi immigrants* are almost entirely those of mutual contempt. These people, who come mostly from Eastern Europe, are all devoutly orthodox and constitute a tight-knit community. They live on a housing estate alongside of Shaarayim which was founded by Poel HaMizrahi, the religious workers' party.

As recent immigrants, with an insecure status in the society, these people consider the Yemenis as social and cultural inferiors, and their assumption of superiority is coupled with hostility. They refer to the Yemenis as 'blacks', to their rabbis as 'black rabbis', to their ritual slaughterers as 'black shohtim', etc. They question the qualifications of Yemeni religious officials, and so on. Furthermore, they strongly resent any attempt to persuade or compel them to send their children to the religious school of Shaarayim.

Most of the Yemenis return in the same coin, and some express strong feelings of hatred against these Ashkenazim, a reaction which emerges most clearly in the case of certain Yemeni leaders. The latter exploit the situation in order to persuade people not to support the religious parties.

It is by no means certain that this hostility was originally due to the Ashkenazim, though it seems likely. However, the Yemenis may well have resented the arrival of a substantial group of devoutly orthodox immigrants who are certainly more sophisticated in the interpretation of doctrine and law.

(*d*) *Relations between Yemenis and the Ashkenazim of Shaarayim* itself are fairly characteristic of landlord–tenant relationships, which, in poor

communities (to say nothing of rich), are often tense. Where quarrels occur, they often lead to ethnic insults. But quarrels between Yemeni neighbours are just as frequent, and lead to other forms of insult. To some extent there is competition for work between the two groups. But this is not a major factor. Very often the Ashkenazim seek work outside of Rehovoth itself.

(*e*) *Relations between Shaarayim and other Yemenis of Rehovoth.* For some purposes the whole Yemeni population of Rehovoth can be considered as a unity. The physical boundaries which once existed between them have disappeared; and they share certain common interests. The leaders of Shaarayim often claim to represent the interests of all Yemenis. And there are kinship and sub-ethnic ties which cut across those of locality.

Despite these facts, each community still has a separate identity. Marmorek has often tried to return its own representatives to the municipal council and to the local workers' council, though with less success than Shaarayim. The existence of a large number of diffuse cross-cutting ties within each community tends to mark off one from the other. In Shaarayim there is a stronger feeling of community, which results partly from a longer period of existence.

CONCLUSIONS

The community of Shaarayim has developed through a series of stages which have been marked by an increasing degree of absorption in the wider community, and an increasing degree of intrusion of external organizations.

These processes, together with increase in size, have resulted in a degree of internal differentiation which has been reflected in changes in the number and types of leadership role.

The community is divided along a number of different lines: occupation, status, economic interest, kinship, sub-ethnic grouping, and age. These lines cut across one another, each one, to *some* extent, off-setting the other. Each segment of the community is drawn into different degrees and types of relationship with sections of the wider community and society.

To *some* extent, certain interests and a sense of identity unite the community in opposition to the wider community and society. But the unifying tie is strained by other ties which pull groups of people into increasingly powerful relationships with interest-groups and associations extending beyond the bounds of community and ethnic group. These two opposing forces are reflected in the forms of political allegiance, which are in turn inter-related with the dominant forms of leadership.

NOTES

[1] The material presented in this article is based on research carried out in this community between 1955 and 1957. It was conducted under the joint supervision of the Henrietta Szold Foundation of Jerusalem and the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University, and was sponsored by the Israel Ministry of Social Welfare. I should like to acknowledge my great debt to these three organizations, and in particular to Dr. J. Ben-David and Mr. A. Zloczower of the Hebrew University, to Dr. Miriam Hoffert of the Ministry of Social Welfare, and to Dr. M. Smilansky of the Szold Foundation. I am also indebted to Dr. E. Katz, of the University of Chicago, who was visiting lecturer at the Hebrew University between 1956 and 1958.

[2] I use the term 'diffuse' to suggest that there were *several* elements in the relationship between farmer and labourer. (See T. Parsons, *The Social System*, pp. 65–6, where 'diffuseness' in social relationships is distinguished from 'specificity'.)

[3] The description and analysis of conditions in this community are presented *as though* they referred to the present. In fact they refer to the period between 1955 and 1958. Since then a number of changes have occurred.

[4] This unofficial association takes the following forms. There are strong personal ties between some of the leaders of Lemaan Shaarayim and those of Hitachduth HaTemanim; consequently, the former do try to encourage their followers to support the latter in national elections. The link with the General Zionist Party is of more direct relevance to local affairs, where the leaders of Lemaan Shaarayim support the General Zionist representatives on the municipal council in opposing the governing coalition.

[5] Throughout this article figures referring to *total* support for parochial parties are obtained by adding the figures of Lemaan Shaarayim to those of Mapai-Shaarayim; while those referring to *total* support for workers' parties are obtained by adding together those of Mapai-Shaarayim, other labour parties, and the religious workers' party. Consequently, the figures for Mapai-Shaarayim may appear twice in any one context. This is justified on the grounds that Mapai-Shaarayim is both a workers' party and a parochial party.

[6] About 65 per cent of those who are successful in employment support the labour movement.

[7] It has been argued in a recent article that young Yemenis in this community do *not* exhibit marked opposition to the older generation or to the community, but are surprisingly identified with it. (See Elihu Katz and Awraham Zloczower, 'Ethnic Continuity in an Israeli Town', *Human Relations*, Vol. 14, no. 4, 1961, pp. 293–308). It would seem that there is a fundamental inconsistency between these findings of Katz and Zloczower and my own argument that the youngest of the three age-groups *is* in rebellion, both against the community and the wider society. But there is no inconsistency at all. Katz and Zloczower are writing about 24-year-olds, whereas my youngest age-group consists of those between the ages of 18 and 25. I suggest that the seeming inconsistency can be explained in the following way: young Yemenis *do* rebel against the older generation and against communal identification; but much of the force of this rebellion is spent by the time they reach the age of 24 or 25, and possibly even a little earlier; this change is associated with marriage or preparation for it. This argument is plausible on general sociological grounds; but there is also some internal evidence for it. In the first place, my own findings confirm the view that rebelliousness is often a phase of development; secondly, the figures on political allegiance confirm this view; the degree of parochial allegiance is higher in the middle age-group than in the youngest.

[8] This has not altogether prevented the emergence of kin-based factionalism in newer Yemeni communities, particularly in Moshavim. But there the circumstances are such as to strengthen rather than weaken these ties, which are mobilized when quarrels, which are very frequent, occur.

[9] This view is not peculiar to the Yemenis of Shaarayim, but is very widespread in Israel—and, no doubt, in other countries also. What tends to lend strength to it in Shaarayim is the sentiment, shared by older people in particular, that political parties are associated with the wider society, and have little or nothing to do with the local community.

SOME DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF KIBBUTZ LIFE IN ISRAEL

Alexander Prag

ALTHOUGH the agricultural settlers in Palestine were called upon to make many sacrifices—to work hard in a difficult climate, to make do with little money, to face hostile forces superior to them in numbers and resources—they were never left to overcome their problems on their own. For they were the concern of the organized Zionist movement, which sought the welfare of the pioneers. And this not only for practical reasons. A new way of life was to be created, of which the collective settlement was the highest expression. Complete co-operation in production and consumption, independence of the material return to be made by the collective from the individual's contribution of work, constant joint endeavour to raise the level of living for all members, general social insurance liberating the individual settler from anxiety for his own and his children's future, the provision of prolonged education for the young, inspired by collectivist ideals, complete sexual equality for the working woman, the freeing of the family from dependence on economic conditions—these were the basic principles which were to provide an impetus to the establishment of a rich and exciting form of social life.

The Israeli *kibbutz*, unlike many other communal experiments in different parts of the world, has not suffered from isolation from society as a whole. It has been constantly exposed to the dangers of utopianism —self-enclosure and estrangement from the wider society—but it would have long since become an anachronism if it had not taken pains to ensure that it remained closely connected with the activities and ideals of the greater community.

For many decades the *kibbutz* movement represented Jewish pioneering *par excellence*. *Kibbutzim* reclaimed and settled whole areas which could not have been exploited by other kinds of agricultural community because of the great difficulties in natural and security conditions. Moreover, the *kibbutzim* have formed an excellent base for the development of new agricultural techniques.

But the collective settlement has also left its mark in other fields. It facilitated recruitment to the Jewish fighting forces in Palestine and

later to the Israel Defence Army. It helped 'illegal' immigration. It took on so many public functions that it formed the backbone of Zionist enterprise. *Kibbutz* membership has never exceeded 8 per cent of the total Jewish population, yet the imprint of the collective settlements is noticeable in virtually every aspect of the greater society.

At the same time, the *kibbutz* cannot remain oblivious of the fact that its external social environment is in some respects hostile to it. Private property and 'free' competition in economic life are antithetical to its interests, however favourably people outside may view the *kibbutz*. It is not to be wondered at that the movement has felt constrained to become more closely knit in the face of conditions that oppose it. It is regrettable that this ideological integration has been accompanied by a rift within the movement that prevents its total unity, but it is only by insisting on the wholesale absorption of the individual that the collective way of life can make its contribution to solving the problems faced by the Jewish people today.

The collective settlements have so much to offer and so much criticism to face that it is important for us to get a clear and unbiased view of its present state and prospects. This paper, however, is not concerned with every aspect of *kibbutz* life but only with certain sides of its social and demographic character.

We may well begin by considering the size of the *kibbutz* population.

TABLE I

Kibbutz Population as compared with General Jewish Population in Palestine and Israel at various Periods

Year	(*a*) *Kibbutz population*	(*b*) *General population*	(*a*) *as percentage of* (*b*)
1914	180	85,000	0·2
1922	735	83,790	0·9
1927	3,909	148,000	2·6
1931	4,391	174,610	2·5
1936	16,444	370,990	4·4
1941	27,738	474,183	5·85
1947	47,408	630,019	7·5
1951	67,618	1,404,392	4·7
1959	81,946	1,858,841	4·4

It will be seen that the *kibbutz* percentage of the total population has declined sharply during the years of mass immigration. But this crude fact does not tell the whole story. The direct influence of the *kibbutzim* is much wider than these figures suggest, because numbers of people, probably exceeding the total of the current adult *kibbutz* population, consist of immigrants and others who once lived and were educated in the collective settlements and now live elsewhere.

The *kibbutz* population forms 24·2 per cent of the rural population of

the country, but, as Table 2 shows, the regional percentages vary widely.

TABLE 2

Rural Population (in thousands)

Location	*(a) Kibbutz population*	*(b) Jewish population*	*(a) as percentage of (b)*
Northern District	41·7	81·6	51·2
Haifa District	9·25	45·5	20·3
Central District	13·8	119·7	11·5
Tel Aviv District	0·3	3·1	9·7
Jerusalem District	1·35	15·05	9·0
Southern District	11·5	56·2	20·5
Total	77·9	321·15	24·2

Although these data are not detailed enough, they show that the collective settlements were founded mainly in frontier districts, where conditions were generally very harsh, and that in the neighbourhood of the large cities the *kibbutzim* comprise only 10 per cent and less of the rural population.

Figures for recent years on the division of labour (excluding domestic work) in *kibbutzim* are given in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Occupational Structure

Type of work	*Kibbutz %*	*Total Jewish Population %*
Agriculture	53·8	15·1
Industry	19·7	23·4
Construction	4·0	9·7
Electricity, water	0·4	1·9
Office work, commerce, banking	0·4	12·7
Transport	4·4	6·6
Government, official business	0·9	7·6
Education, health, religion, social work	16·4	13·0
Entertainment and recreation	—	0·6
Personal services	—	9·4
Total	100·0	100·0

Owing to their high rate of productivity the *kibbutzim* make an economic contribution to the country which is far greater than their strength in numbers would suggest, as Table 4 indicates.

TABLE 4

Kibbutzim in the Israel Economy

Part of general Population	4·0%
Part of Jewish Population	4·4%
Agricultural and Industrial Production	12·1%
Number of Earners	7·2%
Part of net National Product	6·4%
Part of National Investment	7·1%
Agricultural Production	28·0%
Industrial Production	5·8%

The total *kibbutz* population consists of nearly 82,000 people living in 223 settlements. A breakdown of this population is given in Table 5.

TABLE 5

Kibbutz Population, 1959

Members and Candidates	39,836	
Temporary Residents	4,936	
Total Workers	44,772	44,772
Kibbutz Children	28,016	
Outside Children	3,363	
Youth Aliyah	2,723	
Israel Youth	581	
Parents and Relatives of Members	2,492	
Total Dependents	37,175	37,175
Grand Total	81,947	81,947

Children make up a third of the *kibbutz* population. If we take into account Youth Aliyah and outside children educated in the collective settlements, the percentage of children in the *kibbutzim* roughly corresponds to the percentage of children in the Jewish population of Israel as a whole.

Many changes have occurred in the composition of the *kibbutz* population during the last thirty years. The majority of the members joined the settlements when they were young and unmarried, very few families becoming members in the early days, although a small number of them joined later on as a result of the efforts on the part of the various *kibbutz* organizations and the Jewish Agency to attract families among both immigrants and the established urban population. In large part, the collective settlements have depended for their growth on natural increase and the intake of young people.

Since 1937 the number of workers in the *kibbutzim* has increased four

and a half times, the number of children tenfold, and the number of members' parents and relatives fourfold.

The age structure of the *kibbutz* population is compared in Table 6 with that of the total population and of other kinds of agricultural settlement.

TABLE 6

Age Structure

Age	*Kibbutz Movement*	*All Israel*	*Urban Population*	*Rural Population*	*Moshavim*	*Rural Settlements*
0–1	5·0	5·3	4·9	6·7	8·2	7·3
2–12	26·6	26·4	25·4	29·7	32·2	30·9
13–18	16·4	8·3	7·5	11·1	8·1	8·7
19–64	50·1	55·2	57·0	49·3	48·8	49·0
65 up	1·9	4·8	5·2	3·2	2·7	4·1
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0

As a result of the low average age in the *kibbutzim* their membership differs from the general population in its marriage and divorce rates. The marriage rates for the members of the collective settlements and the general population are 12·6 and 8·3 respectively. The national divorce rate is 1·2 per thousand; the corresponding rate for the *kibbutzim* is 1·1.

Again because of the low average age in the *kibbutzim*, the birth rate is higher than average and the death rate lower, so that the rate of natural increase is high. The rates per thousand for the year 1959 are set out in Table 7.

TABLE 7

Birth and Death Rates

Birth Rate		*Death Rate*		*Natural Increase*	
Kibbutz	*Jewish Israel*	*Kibbutz*	*Jewish Israel*	*Kibbutz*	*Jewish Israel*
25·2	24·3	3	5·8	22·2	18·5

It will be seen that the natural increase in the collective settlements is about 20 per cent higher than in the general population.

Infant mortality in the *kibbutzim* is also unusually low as a result of the high standards of infant care for which the settlements are renowned.

During the last two years the growth of the *kibbutz* population has stopped. Indeed, the 1959 figures show a drop of 1 per cent (757 people).

A trend to urbanization has set in in Israel, but it has in fact affected other kinds of agricultural settlement more than the *kibbutzim*, for in 1959 the *moshavim* (settlements made up of individual farms) lost 3 per cent of their population (3,791 people) and the *moshavim shitufim* (co-operative settlements) 7 per cent (306 people). We should not be justified, therefore, in speaking of a crisis peculiar to the *kibbutzim*. We should expect considerable fluctuation during a period of social acclimatization.

For every 100 people leaving the *kibbutzim* during the year 1957 the percentage distribution of their duration of stay was as follows:

up to 2 years	31%
2–5 years	23%
5–10 years	37%
more than 10 years	9%

The temporary stagnation is retrogressive, and everything retrogressive in the *kibbutz* movement tends to be exaggerated both in and outside it. Overcritical *kibbutznikim* discuss their problems publicly, while everything concerning the collective settlements arouses a special interest in the widest circles among friends and opponents alike. But the vital statistics on *kibbutz* life, because they cover too short a span of time, often mislead observers, and it would be rash to draw firm conclusions from data relating to a few years only.

Before the likely future development can be seen more clearly a good deal of statistical investigation will need to be carried out. No exact forecast can be made now, but certain possible changes may be reasonably predicted.

The prognosis is favourable in respect of economic viability. Despite an increase in the number of persons per family, the number of work days per family is on the increase. The general increase in labour potential, though gradual, indicates a process of development calling for long-term planning in investment, in outside employment, in regional economic projects, in transport, in handicrafts, and in industry.

Table 8, based on an average of thirteen *kibbutzim* founded in the years 1930–5, compares the demographic composition for 1957 with that forecast for 1976. In the course of twenty years the number and percentage of working settlers will have risen considerably, while the burden of educating children will have become far less heavy.

Table 9 is based on a group of *kibbutzim* ten years older than those used in the previous table.

Here again the burden of education will have considerably decreased, despite the greater natural increase, to which the second generation is already contributing. The percentage of working settlers will have fallen because of the increase in old people, but the productive power of the collective economy is growing with the years. The statistics do not take into account the fact that old and experienced people are

TABLE 8

Population Growth in Thirteen Kibbutzim

	1957		*1976*	
Average of 13 Kibbutzim	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
Settlers of working age	223	49	364	53·5
Children	233	51	238	35
Settlers over working age	—	—	78	11·5
Total	456	100	680	100·0

TABLE 9

Population Growth in Twelve Kibbutzim

	1957		*1976*	
Average of 12 Kibbutzim	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
Settlers of working age	267	52·5	386	50
Children	239	47·5	289	37·5
Settlers over working age	—	—	97	12·5
Total	506	100·0	772	100·0

economically useful; and in any case they do not require the care needed for raising the children.

It may be useful to consider briefly the social consequences of such demographic changes. The first question to raise is whether there is an upper numerical limit for a viable *kibbutz* and, if so, whether that limit is being approached. Experience suggests that no special difficulty will be encountered in maintaining a population of 600 and more, provided that collective democracy is preserved, the principles of the commune are safeguarded, vital questions are openly discussed, and a healthy public opinion is fostered by means of honest and well-organized information. The tables given above indicate that in twenty years even the oldest of the *kibbutzim* (apart from such giants as Ein Harod, Afikim, Givat Brenner, and Yagur) will still be far short of populations of 1,000, at which point signs of demographic saturation may appear, although the corrective of a higher death rate will come into play.

The *kibbutz* is not dependent for its viability on any given size of membership, although at various stages of its development it should not exceed certain maxima. But within the given limits, which will ultimately be fairly extensive, growth in vitality is assured by the adding

of layer upon layer of groups of members of similar age and background. As each new group comes in it widens and diversifies the framework of the *kibbutz* and endows it with vitality. To this day the *kibbutz* movement is largely composed of young people, for in the early days it was unable to create normal villages in which the old and the young, in reasonable proportions, might live together.

When a settlement is founded the membership is very young. After some years, when the number of children increases and their education calls upon an excessively large part of the available labour (and this at a time when various agricultural branches of activity are undergoing expansion), it is essential that the community be reinforced by new members. And the need for reinforcement will recur from time to time. We may well assume that in its final phase of development the *kibbutz* will be several times its original size. Growth, to a considerable extent, will be due to recruitment from outside. In order that its population may attain a normal structure, the new members who join in groups must be of suitable age. In other words, in general, the *kibbutz* must admit progressively younger groups. But stability in social and economic life can be achieved only when, after the passage of decades, three generations live side by side to form a normal population. The ultimate numerical shape of the various settlements need not, of course, be uniform, but it is beyond doubt that a *kibbutz* will complete its process of growth only after fifty to sixty years from the time of its establishment.

Many conclusions follow from these statements with respect to the building of *kibbutz* society, the admission of reinforcements, and the development of different branches of the economy. An immense burden falls on the movement, but, when the *kibbutzim* have reached the final phase of their demographic development, they have bright social and economic prospects. The crucial question is how the *kibbutz* will make use of its economic superiority, but this problem does not concern us here. We shall content ourselves with the statement that the *kibbutz* will ensure its existence if, in the austere conditions of today and the affluence of tomorrow, it moves along the road prospected by the pioneers of every generation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CH. DARIN-DRABKIN, *Ha'Hevra Ha' Aheret* (*The Other Society*), Tel-Aviv, 1961.

A. GERTZ, 'Kibbutz Movement in Israel', *Focus*, Jerusalem, 1957.

CH. GVATI, 'Production in Kibbutzim', *Focus*, Jerusalem, 1958.

A. HAKOHEN AND M. VARDIMON, 'Kavim B'hitpathut Hademographit Shel Ha'Kibbutz' ('Features of the demographic development of the Kibbutz'), *Hedim*, Merhavia, 1959.

M. SARELL, 'The Second Generation in the Kibbutz—"Conservatism" vs. "Innovation" ', *Megamot*, Jerusalem, 1961 (in Hebrew).

DUTCH JEWRY: A DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS

Part Two*

V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JEWISH POPULATION 1946 to 1953

5.1 *Births*

Before the war the birth rate among the Jews in the Netherlands was relatively low and showed a downward trend.[53] This can be shown from the declining percentage of the whole of the group formed by young persons. The phenomenon cannot be explained by migration, nor can it be attributed to loss of cohesion within the Jewish community which, although partly responsible, was a relatively unimportant factor in the years before 1940.

TABLE 31. *Number of Ashkenazi Jews under the Age of 10 Years*[54]

Year	*Boys*	*Girls*
	Percentage of the total number of, respectively, male and female Ashkenazim	
1899	22·1	20·1
1909	19·5	17·3
1920	17·1	15·3
1930	14·4	12·9

The corresponding percentages for the Sephardi Jews were generally slightly lower, but this hardly affects the total figure.

The 1941 publication by Dr. A. Veffer[55] indicates that the downward trend continued through the following decade. His data demonstrate that in 1940 the percentage of persons under the age of 10 years was 12·7 for men and 11·6 for women. It is remarkable that the extensive immigration of Jews from Germany after 1933 produced only temporarily an absolute rise in the birth rate, and even this was small.

It may therefore be concluded that the birth rate of the Jews before the mass deportations had been considerably below the average birth rate of the total population for several decades, and that the Jews had a more than proportional share in the general decline of natality.

* Part One appeared in Vol. III, no. 2, of the *Journal*.

The numbers of births during the years 1946 to 1953 established by the Committee's study are shown in Table 58 (not printed). Also listed, for purposes of comparison, are the 1946–58 birth statistics for Jews according to the N.C.B.S.† (based on data from the population registers).

These figures indicate for the postwar years as well a continuing decline in the number of births.[56] The N.C.B.S. data show, until about 1954, a similar pattern, although in this case the decline is of a lesser magnitude and does not continue after 1954.

TABLE 32. *Births per 1,000 Jewish Inhabitants,* 1946 to 1953*

Year	*Births in Jewish population*	*Births in Netherlands population*
	Per 1,000 members of the population	
1946	27·1	30·2
1947	23·9	27·8
1948	20·4	25·3
1949	17·3	23·7
1950	14·8	22·7
1951	12·4	22·3
1952	9·6	22·4
1953	7·1	21·8

* Average size of the population during the year

Table 32 compares the birth figures per 1,000 members of the population for both the Jewish and general populations. Initially the figures were of about the same order of magnitude, but in the course of the years the level of Jewish births lagged more and more behind that of the total population. We may speak of a considerable and even spectacular decline in Jewish natality.

This decline is in part related to changes in the age structure of the group of women responsible for these births. In this group—in the reproductive ages from 17 to 45 years—the older ages constituted an ever-growing element during the period under consideration. This is also apparent from the age distribution for 1 January 1954 (Table 15). It can be calculated that from 1946 to 1953 the number of women between 17 and 45 years declined by about 470 or 9 per cent (including the balance of emigration), but that the number of women between 20 and 30 years declined by about 465 or 27 per cent. This must certainly have affected the number of births in view of the fact that the latter group is responsible for most of the births.[57] As will be demonstrated later, it is possible—starting from the age distribution established and on the assumption that the rate of mortality by age and by sex as calculated for the Netherlands population is also applicable to the Jewish group—to

† National Central Bureau of Statistics.

arrive at a 'forecast' of the figures in the years after 1953 of the female age groups between 17 and 45 years. This 'forecast', in addition to what has been said above, leads to the conclusion that the decline of the number of Jewish women from 20 to 30 years came to a halt after 1953, and in 1960 gave way to a rise.

For this reason, a rise in the number of births might be expected to take place in the near future. The fact that the number of Jewish births after 1953 specified by the N.C.B.S. has been more or less stationary could be a reflection of this situation.

There is yet another reason for not drawing any rash pessimistic conclusions for future years from the decline of Jewish natality during the period investigated. As already mentioned, the registration by the Jewish communities, on which the Committee counts are based, shows important gaps. Now nothing would be more plausible than an under-registration of births: first, because of delay in registering births in families of non-members or non-active members; second, because it is a difficult and frequently impossible task to register the children of those who, although formerly in contact with the Jewish community and therefore in many cases known to the local congregations, have eventually severed all relations with that community.

This is one of the reasons why we have not devoted a detailed discussion to marriage fertility in the Jewish group. The theoretical basis for such a discussion would have been narrow because the main data at our disposal consisted of figures describing a particular situation, and the data available per family were not sufficient for more than a very rough analysis. In addition, the reliability of the material at our disposal was quite inadequate.

5.2 *Mortality*

The downward trend established for births in the years 1946 to 1953 is not encountered in the mortality data for that period. On the contrary, there was an increase in the number of deaths among both men and women. A comparison of the Committee figures with the N.C.B.S. mortality figures (available only from 1948 on) indicates that this increase is not evident in the latter.

The remarks in the introduction to this Report on the incompleteness of data apply in large measure to mortality. The reason is that after the war many Jewish communities only gradually brought their membership files up to date—if they were at all available—and clearly the odds were that persons who died before that time were not entered, especially in the case of those who were not members of a Jewish community.

This is also apparent from the fact that the N.C.B.S. figures, though based on religious affiliation, are higher than those gathered by the Committee. It can also be demonstrated from the Committee figures: when we divide the number of members of Jewish communities alive

at the end of 1953 by the number of persons dying from 1946 to 1953 who had been members of a Jewish community, we arrive at a percentage of 6·8. This corresponds to an average annual mortality of slightly over 8 per cent, which is not incredible. However, the same calculation for those for whom the question whether they were members of a Jewish community was answered by 'no' or 'unknown' results in a percentage which is hardly above 3. This clearly cannot reflect reality.

Such a great discrepancy can be explained only on the basis of incompleteness of data. This should make us particularly cautious in our attempts to draw conclusions from the available material. It is, specifically, not possible to determine whether mortality among Jews is higher than, equal to, or lower than that of the total population.

In Table 33, the mortality figures for the Jewish and general populations are juxtaposed; this has been done with all proper reserve; it lays no claim to reliability. It can only be said that in the later years of the period considered—when the under-estimation of mortality as mentioned above must have been relatively small—the Jewish and general mortality figures, as they appear in the table, come very close to each other.

It does appear from the figures that mortality among men reaches higher values than that among women, although the oldest age groups —responsible for a large part of the deaths—contain a high excess of women (Table 15). In most years there were more deaths among men than among women. It is indeed a general phenomenon that women have lower death rates, age for age, than men.

To complete the picture, Table 34 shows the excess of births in the Committee figures and in the Netherlands population according to the N.C.B.S. data. In view of the inaccuracies inherent in the birth and death data, the trend of these figures has only a very limited significance.

5.3 *Immigration and emigration*

Both immigration and emigration by Jews have been particularly extensive in postwar years.

Figures relating to immigration were not collected because it would have been impossible to extract them in a reliable manner from the material which was available. During the first years after the war, immigration consisted mainly of displaced persons (of whom a few hundred were admitted in 1947), a group of about 500 children, and a few smaller groups (excluding those who in 1945 returned from concentration camps and those who before or during the war had fled to Allied or neutral territory and then returned). In the later years we also find among the immigrants many persons who emigrated in the years 1946 to 1949 and subsequently returned.

In studying the emigration figures we should bear in mind that among

TABLE 33. *Deaths per 1,000 Jewish Inhabitants,* 1946 to 1953*

Year	Death rate of Jewish population according to Committee data	Death rate of Jewish population according to N.C.B.S.†	Death rate of Netherlands population
	Per 1,000 members of the population		
1946	3·6	—	8·5
1947	4·7	—	8·1
1948	5·3	7·6	7·4
1949	6·3	7·7	8·1
1950	6·6	7·4	7·5
1951	6·5	7·4	7·5
1952	7·7	8·2	7·3
1953	8·2	8·6	7·7

* Average population.
† Annual number of Jewish deaths according to N.C.B.S. data per 1,000 Jewish residents at the beginning of the year in question according to Committee data.

TABLE 34. *Excess of Births per 1,000 Jewish Inhabitants,* 1946 to 1953*

Year	Excess of births in Jewish population according to Committee data	Excess of births according to Committee data deaths according to N.C.B.S.†	Excess of births in Netherlands population
	Per 1,000 members of the population		
1946	23·5	—	21·7
1947	19·2	—	19·7
1948	15·1	12·8	17·9
1949	11·0	9·6	15·6
1950	8·2	7·4	15·2
1951	5·9	5·0	14·8
1952	1·9	1·7	15·1
1953	−1·4	−1·8	14·1

* Average population.
† Number of Jewish births minus Jewish deaths per year; births according to Committee count, deaths according to N.C.B.S. data, per 1,000 Jewish residents at the beginning of the year according to the Committee data.

the emigrants there were, apart from those who were to return (mainly Dutch citizens), many persons—especially aliens and stateless persons —who during the first postwar years had entered the Netherlands and left again, after a shorter or longer time, either for Israel or the United States or Canada. This remark does not apply to the 500 children who in 1948 left for Israel, because they are not included in the emigration figures.

Figures have been collected about emigration (Table 37). They add up to a total of 4,453 for the years 1946 to 1953. There are various indications that this number is an underestimate, among other reasons

because of the incompleteness of the material in a large number of smaller Jewish communities. It is in particular remarkable that 3,682 persons should have emigrated from Amsterdam during the period from 1945 to 1953 and only 810 persons from the remainder of the country, so that 80 per cent of the total would be from Amsterdam, whereas less than 60 per cent of the total Jewish population resides in that city (cf. Section 4·2). Since in our opinion there is no indication whatever why the number of emigrants from Amsterdam should have been so much larger than from the remainder of the country, the inference would be that outside Amsterdam the material about those who permanently left the Netherlands cannot have been complete.

Incompleteness in the figures is also apparent from the data on emigration to Israel. According to the Committee count, 987 Jews emigrated to Israel in the years 1948 to 1953. However, according to the Netherlands Bureau of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1,501 Jews emigrated to Israel during that period, i.e. over 50 per cent more.

The latter figure is supported by the statistics of foreign migration of the N.C.B.S. (Table 38): according to this source 1,272 persons (excluding alien emigrants in 1948 and 1949) emigrated to Israel in the years 1948 to 1953; it may be assumed that this figure relates almost exclusively to Jews; for the years 1948 and 1949 it may have been influenced by delayed registration of the emigration of those who went to Palestine under the so-called *Aliyah Beth* (illegal immigration to Palestine in the years of the British Mandate). The same statistics, based on the principle of religious affiliation, give for the years 1952 and 1953 such a high number of Jewish emigrants that this is another reason for concluding that the Committee figures are incomplete.

The N.C.B.S. immigration figures (Tables 37 and 38) indicate that immigration (frequently in the form of re-immigration) must have been considerable in the years 1948 to 1956. The absence of immigration data in the Committee's study should therefore be considered a serious gap. Probably the trend of the Committee emigration data gives a more accurate picture of the trend of the balance of migration in those years than of the development of emigration as such. This should be taken into account in all further interpretations of this material.

The destination of the emigrants in the years 1945 to 1953 according to the Committee study was as follows (cf. Table 39): United States 1399, Israel 1209, Canada 440, Australia 286, South America 186, Indonesia 128, Netherlands West Indies 74, South Africa 56, New Zealand 31, other countries 648, and unknown 35 (total 4,492).

The high rate of emigration to the United States is remarkable. The number of Jews who emigrated from the Netherlands to that country is relatively considerably higher than that of the non-Jews. It is well known that the regulations for immigration into the United States are rather strict. The fact that they affected Jews to a lesser extent is in all proba-

bility to be attributed to the greater ease with which stateless and displaced persons were enabled to leave for America.

It is not surprising that *aliyah* (emigration to Israel) was considerable; it was also relatively high in comparison with that from other Western European countries.

It is interesting that the greatest emigration to the United States took place in 1947. In 1949, the year after the Jewish State had been established, Israel was the main country of destination of emigrants. Later the relative interest in Israel declined again and, especially in 1951 (owing to Korea?), Canada, Australia, and New Zealand began to play a greater part as countries of immigration in addition to the United

TABLE 35. *Excess of Women among Jewish Emigrants, 1945 to 1953*

Age	*Men*	*Women*
up to 40 years	1,262	1,450
over 40 years	866	914
	2,128	2,364

TABLE 36. *Average Age of Jewish Emigrants, 1946 to 1953*

Average age in years	*1946*	*1947*	*1948*	*1949*	*1950*	*1951*	*1952*	*1953*
All emigrants	34	34	32	32	30	28	29	30
Ditto, excluding ages 0–5 years	35	35	34	34	33	33	33	33

TABLE 37. *Jewish Emigration and Immigration, 1946 to 1956*

Year	*Emigration according to Committee investigation*	*Migrations according to N.C.B.S.*		
		Emigration	*Immigration*	*Balance of migration*
1946	338	—	—	—
1947	676	—	—	—
1948	471	—	—	—
1949	602	—	—	—
1950	474	—	—	—
1951	796	—	—	—
1952	522	457*	—	—
1953	509	699	271	428
1954	—	514	331	183
1955	—	389	318	71
1956	—	405	353	52

* Exclusive of aliens.

States. Other countries also began to attract immigrants, but this development did not reach its peak until 1952. It is clear that these shifts were influenced both by current political problems and by changes in the migration policies of the various countries. The enthusiasm for Israel reached a peak in the years 1948 and 1949; Israel opened its gates and there were large groups of people who intended to emigrate there. In later years the emigration policy of the Netherlands Government became increasingly active. At first it was mainly directed towards the newer countries of settlement, but later it looked for other outlets as well.

The emigrants of the years 1945 to 1953 consisted of (Table 40) 2,128 men and 2,364 women. An excess of women of any significance among the emigrants is present only in the years up to 1948 (this is true for emigration to Israel as well as to other countries). Among the emigrants to Israel, women continued to form a majority in later years as well, although not nearly so great as in the years 1946 and 1947. (This is confirmed by the N.C.B.S. emigration statistics; cf. Table 38.)

A closer analysis of these figures indicates that the excess of women among emigrants occurs in all age groups. However, for persons over 40 years old the excess is considerably lower than among those under that age, as shown in Table 35.

A more detailed analysis of the age of emigrants is possible from the classification of the emigrants according to age and year of emigration. It appears that in the course of the years the average age of emigrants lowered somewhat (Table 36), but this is substantially due to a relative increase of the number of very young children (0 to 5 years old) among the emigrants. In the years from 1950 on especially the number of emigrants aged between 20 and 44 years was large as compared to the age structure of the total population (Table 15), namely, about 3 per cent

TABLE 38. *Migration from and to Israel, 1946 to 1956*

Year	*Emigration according to investigation Committee*			*Emigration according to N.C.B.S.*			*Immigration according to N.C.B.S.*
	Total	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*	
1946	68	23	45	—	—	—	—
1947	142	51	91	—	—	—	—
1948	159	72	87	237*	108*	129*	68*
1949	297	141	156	167*	73*	94*	31*
1950	164	73	91	25	13	13	12
1951	171	80	91	386	184	202	91
1952	75	31	44	242	104	138	132
1953	100	53	47	215	104	111	134
1954	—	—	—	175	82	93	167
1955	—	—	—	183	84	99	151
1956	—	—	—	163	57	106	177

* Exclusive of aliens.

TABLE 39. *Jewish Emigration to Principal Countries of Destination, 1946 to 1953*

Year	*Total*	*Israel*	*U.S.A.*	*Canada*	*Australia and N. Zealand*	*Remaining countries*	*Unknown*
1946	338	68	108	7	7	139	9
1947	676	142	334	2	25	166	7
1948	471	159	144	13	29	120	6
1949	602	297	167	12	17	109	–
1950	474	164	120	9	57	121	3
1951	796	171	187	187	107	140	4
1952	522	75	152	93	46	153	3
1953	509	100	163	102	26	116	2

TABLE 40. *Jewish Emigration by Sex, 1946 to 1953*

Year	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*
1946	338	139	199
1947	676	277	399
1948	471	205	266
1949	602	297	305
1950	474	243	231
1951	796	403	393
1952	522	262	260
1953	509	256	253

per year. In the younger age groups the average emigration figure was about 2 per cent; in the age groups over 44 years it amounted to approximately 1 per cent.

VI. SOME DATA ON THE TIES WITHIN THE JEWISH POPULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS

6.1 *Membership of Jewish religious communities*

The data collected on different aspects of Jewish orientation in the Netherlands—i.e. the extent to which those who belong to the Jewish group give evidence of their being Jews—make no claim to be exhaustive[58] because of the great deficiency of the basic material. They do not allow many conclusions, so that this chapter is largely confined to a concise statement of such facts as became available.

The most obvious criterion of Jewish orientation is membership in one of the Jewish religious communities. Although such membership says little about the measure of religious interest, it does usually indicate that people wish to maintain a tie with the Jewish group. Of the 23,723 persons counted by the Committee, 13,845 were members of the Ashkenazi and Sephardi Communities, 1,916 were not members, and of the

remaining 7,962 persons the membership was not established. The last group mainly covers persons who made no clear statement about their membership; a number of them probably did not wish to consider themselves members.

6.2 *Solemnized marriages*

The data on the percentage which religious marriages form of all marriages are very incomplete. (In the Netherlands, only civil marriages are legal so that any religious ceremony must come after the civil formalities.) In more than half the cases, no pertinent details were available at the local Jewish communities (Table 41). This applies in particular to those who had lost their husband or wife. For this group, it was known in only about 25 per cent of the cases whether their marriage had been religiously solemnized.

It is interesting to note that the number of times this question was answered in the negative was practically the same as the number of mixed marriages. It was established of only 186 persons who had not married non-Jews that their marriage had not been solemnized according to the Jewish rite. Leaving the mixed marriages out, we find that, of the total of 8,833 persons having a Jewish spouse, 3,063 are known to have had a religious marriage ceremony; 186 were not so married; and for the remaining 5,584 persons no data are available. These data are so incomplete as to make it impossible to draw many conclusions from them.

Of the large group for whom the question on marriage solemnization could not be answered it may be observed that it probably consists largely of persons who were married before the war and persons who were married at a place other than where they resided at the time of the census. In this connexion it may be said that as late as the years 1931 to 1933 the proportion of solemnized Jewish marriages in Amsterdam amounted to 92 per cent.[59]

TABLE 41. *Solemnization of Existing Jewish and Mixed Marriages, 1 January 1954*

Type of marriage	*Total*	*Number of persons with*	
		Jewish spouse	*non-Jewish spouse*
Civil and religious	3,063	3,063	—
Civil only	3,296	186	3,110
Unknown	5,584	5,584	—
Total	11,943	8,833	3,110

In conclusion, Table 42 lists the data of the Amsterdam Jewish communities on marriages solemnized during the years 1945 to 1953.

6.3 *Circumcisions*

The data obtained on the number of circumcisions are also so incomplete as to be useless. In the first place, the question related only to the circumcision of children forming part of a household. But even this information was received in a very incomplete manner: of the total of 3,654 male children (which included own children, stepchildren, and

TABLE 42. *Marriage Solemnizations in the Jewish Religious Communities in Amsterdam, 1945 to 1953**

Year	*Marriages solemnized*		
	Total	*Ashkenazi*	*Sephardi*
1945	38	36	2
1946	121	114	7
1947	110	98	12
1948	99	89	10
1949	60	52	8
1950	45	41	4
1951	52	42	10
1952	34	29	5
1953	33	28	5
Total	592	529	63

* Source: Ashkenazi and Sephardi Communities.

foster children) 1,058 had been circumcised, 219 had not been circumcised, and for 2,377 the answer was 'unknown'.

The supposition is justified that a large proportion of the children of whom it was not known whether or not they were circumcised actually were, except in the case of sons of Jewish mothers and non-Jewish fathers.

To this we may add that, according to Boekman,[60] less than 10 per cent of the Jewish boys had not been circumcised in 1934, the last pre-war year for which figures are available.

6.4 *Burials in Jewish cemeteries*

According to Boekman,[61] the great majority of Jews dying in Amsterdam in the years 1929 to 1933 received Jewish burial. The figures which have now become available indicate that this has been the case to a much smaller extent since the war, even though the figures are not entirely comparable, since the Committee in its investigation used a standard which was different from Boekman's.

It was known of 76 per cent of the total number of deceased counted for the years 1945 to 1953 that they had been buried in Jewish cemeteries. The figure was 88 per cent for those who had been members of a Jewish religious community (Table 43).

It is striking that the question whether people had been buried in Jewish cemeteries was answered in the negative in only 18 cases and by 'unknown' in 281 cases. This is at variance with experience, so that there is reason to believe that a large part of these 281 cases relates to persons who either received a non-Jewish burial or were cremated.

TABLE 43. *Jewish Deaths, 1945 to 1953, by Type of Burial and Membership of a Jewish Religious Community*

Member of Jewish religious community	*Buried in a Jewish cemetery*							
	Yes		*No*		*Unknown*		*Total*	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
Yes	449	390	6	2	61	49	516	441
No	21	10	3	2	27	14	51	26
Unknown	40	28	4	1	78	52	122	81
Total	510	428	13	5	166	115	689	548

It is remarkable that of the 280 persons who were not members of a Jewish religious community, or of whom this was unknown, as many as 99, or about 35 per cent, had been interred in a Jewish cemetery.

6.5 *Destination of emigrants*

In addition, Jewish orientation can also be inferred from the direction of emigration. This is especially true of *aliyah*, which, according to our incomplete data, amounted to 1,209 persons of the total of 4,492 emigrants during the period from 1946 to 1953. This accounts for well over 25 per cent. Although nothing is known of the reasons which motivated emigration, it is somewhat surprising that only a quarter of those who left the Netherlands went to Israel.

It is conceivable that among those who selected the United States there were a number of persons who went there motivated by the knowledge of finding a large Jewish community.

6.6 *Gifts to Jewish Institutions*

Because the collection of funds for Jewish institutions is mainly centralized in three organizations—the *Centrale Financierings-Actie voor Joods-Sociaal Werk* (Cefina-J.M.W.), the *Collectieve Israël-Actie* (C.I.A.), and the *Joods Nationaal Fonds* (J.N.F.)—it is possible to obtain a general idea of the course of the funds which have become available for Jewish purposes in postwar years (Table 44). For Cefina and C.I.A. the numbers of donations are known as well. The available data relating to the years 1946 and 1947 are too incomplete to be included.

It should be borne in mind that these details can convey only a limited picture of the willingness of Jews to make donations for Jewish purposes, so that they also should be interpreted with caution as a symbol of the cohesion of the Jewish population. Specifically, the available data do not cover the returns of taxes assessed by the Jewish religious communities; a few less important items of benefit to community life are also excluded; the amounts collected are not only the

TABLE 44. *Donations to Jewish Institutions, 1948 to 1959*

Year	Total	Institution			Number of donations	
		Cefina-J.M.W.*	C.I.A.†	J.N.F.†	Cefina-J.M.W.*	C.I.A.†
	In thousands of Dutch guilders					
1948	1,711	488	955‡	268	3,200	2,650§
1949	1,211	441	575	195	3,140	3,630
1950	1,405	496	671	238	3,522	4,056
1951	1,446	483	646	317	4,082	4,314
1952	1,265	425	460	380	3,833	3,608
1953	1,093	408	473	212	3,859	3,263
1954	1,129	425	482	222	3,921	3,282
1955	1,261	440	585	236	3,904	4,770
1956	1,213	494	483	236	3,872	3,542
1957	1,418	537	525	356	4,040	3,497
1958	1,412	579	517	316	4,068	4,103
1959	1,505	545	748	212	4,019	4,205

* Source: Cefina-J.M.W.
† Source: Annual Reports Netherlands Zionist Association (N.Z.B.).
‡ Hagana and Keren Hayesod (the then most important collection funds).
§ Keren Hayesod.

result of campaigns directed at private persons but have been obtained in part also by testamentary dispositions and from Jewish institutions and communities in the Netherlands; relatively smaller amounts have come from Jewish institutions and persons abroad as well as from non-Jewish sources.

The year 1948 shows the largest total for the three institutions. The foundation of the State of Israel and the war which followed apparently served as strong incentives. After 1951 there was an overall downward trend of income which reached its lowest point around 1953. Thereafter the total of monies received has consistently increased, and the Cefina results from 1956 on have clearly been even better than in 1948.

The number of gifts did not follow the pattern of amounts received. Especially as far as Cefina is concerned, a stable level is observed from 1951 on. Any decrease in the number of Jews in the Netherlands therefore is not manifested in the number and amount of contributions to

Jewish institutions. In view of the number of households and single persons established, the number of donations per institution may be said to be high.

VII. FORECASTS OF THE POPULATION FOR 1960, 1965, AND 1970

7.1 *Selection of the method followed*

The choice of the method to be used for a population forecast depends on its purpose and the quality of the available data.

For the Committee, the chief interest of such a forecast lay in obtaining some insight into the needs to be expected in the foreseeable future—until about 1970—with regard to the social care of children and old people. In addition, it hoped to provide in a more general way a picture of the future structure of the Jewish population in the Netherlands.

It follows that it was not enough to carry out a simple extrapolation from the development of the whole population as observed in the past or to prognosticate the total of births, deaths, and migrations; it was also necessary to aim at separate projections by age group because this is the only possible method which permits an opinion on future population structure.

Apart from that, there is no basis for a direct extrapolation from the growth of the population in the recent past. First of all, the enormous disruption in structure caused by the deportations was followed until 1954 by a development which certainly cannot be considered 'normal'; furthermore, not enough reliable data on births and deaths are available for the said period, which in addition is extremely slender as a basis for extrapolation. The absence of a reliable starting point naturally applies also to the more refined methods which, as far as natality data are concerned, are based on age-specific fertility figures and, with regard to mortality, on age-specific death rates. It was therefore necessary to introduce a number of radical assumptions.

The population trend after a given starting date (in our case, 1 January 1954) can be considered the resultant of the following components:

(*a*) The distribution by age and sex on the starting date;
(*b*) The chances of survival by age and by sex;
(*c*) The development of the birth rate;
(*d*) The development of emigration and immigration;
(*e*) The development of the number of mixed marriages.

Now we have attempted, by means of reasonable postulations as to factors (*b*) and (*c*) and with the aid of the data mentioned under (*a*),

to arrive at a detailed forecast by age group and by sex. In addition, we have tried to apply corrections to the total figures for factors (*d*) and (*e*).

In the first place, it has been tentatively assumed that the number of Jews counted by the Committee is correct. It has furthermore been assumed that the chances of survival for the Jewish population in the period from 1954 to 1970 by age and by sex are equal to those for the general Netherlands population which are specified in the mortality tables for the Netherlands, 1947 to 1949, N.C.B.S., The Hague, 1950.[62] Although this is the only possible practical assumption, it is not quite without drawbacks. In earlier years (cf. E. Boekman, op. cit., pp. 106 ff.) mortality among the Jews was indeed appreciably lower than in the general population. This was no longer so after 1910, so that there is no question of a general trend. The well-known deviation in urbanization and occupational structure of the Jews might even now have entailed differences in relative death rates per age group. Again, however, any supposition other than that of equal chances of survival would have no actual basis in fact.

In arriving at suppositions regarding the trend of births after 1 January 1954 no use could be made of marriage-fertility figures simply because they are not available. The pronounced downward trend of the birth figures according to the Committee count for the years 1948 to 1953 would lead to the expectation of a continued decline in the birth rate for subsequent years also. Such an expectation, however, would conflict with the trend of Jewish births from 1954 to 1958 according to the N.C.B.S., which shows a more or less stable birth rate (an average of 112 births per year). Although these figures are too low, because they cover only the children of Jews who could be recognized as such in the vital statistics by the mention of religious affiliation, their trend does give an idea of the trend of the real birth figures. If we supposed that natality actually declined constantly between 1953 and 1958, this would imply—because of the stable N.C.B.S. figure—that during this period an increasing percentage of Jewish births had been reported as such in the population registers. This is unlikely because the percentage during the period from 1948 to 1953 actually diminished continuously, according to the Jewish birth figures in the Committee count and N.C.B.S. data.

In view of these figures, the most likely supposition is that the actual number of Jewish births between 1954 and 1970 will have been stable[63] and should be between 125 and 200, i.e. 10 per cent and 75 per cent more than the N.C.B.S. average figure for the years 1954 to 1958. This leads—together with the starting points referred to before and the supposition that the ratio of births of boys and girls will be equal to that of the boys and girls of 0 to 4 years old counted on 1 January 1954 (Table 15)—to a minimum and a maximum forecast (for 1960 an

TABLE 45. *Forecast of Jewish Population in the Netherlands, by Sex and Age Group (excluding Balance of Migration), 1 January 1960, 1 January 1965, and 1 January 1970*

Alternative I (Minimum)

Age in years	*Absolute numbers*			*Percentages*		
	1 Jan. 1960	*1 Jan. 1965*	*1 Jan. 1970*	*1 Jan. 1960*	*1 Jan. 1965*	*1 Jan. 1970*
	A. *Men*					
0– 5	400	333	333	3·6	3·1	3·2
6–10	695	400	333	6·3	3·7	3·2
11–15	980	693	399	8·8	6·5	3·9
16–19	553	889	483	5·0	8·3	4·7
20–24	761	637	1,090	6·9	5·9	10·6
25–29	551	751	633	5·0	7·1	6·1
30–34	556	547	750	5·0	5·1	7·3
35–39	698	551	542	6·3	5·0	5·3
40–44	749	687	545	6·8	6·5	5·3
45–49	970	735	674	8·8	6·8	6·6
50–54	995	942	714	9·0	8·8	7·0
55–59	969	949	901	8·7	8·8	8·8
60–64	764	904	887	6·9	8·4	8·6
65–69	606	682	807	5·5	6·4	7·8
70–74	410	501	565	3·6	4·7	5·5
75–79	} 421	298	362	} 3·8	2·8	3·5
80 and over		213	255		2·0	2·4
Total	11,078	10,712	10,273	100	100	100
	B. *Women*					
0– 5	350	292	292	3·0	2·6	2·7
6–10	613	350	292	5·2	3·1	2·7
11–15	905	613	349	7·7	5·5	3·2
16–19	519	811	451	4·4	7·2	4·2
20–24	745	607	966	6·4	5·4	9·0
25–29	599	743	604	5·1	6·6	5·6
30–34	628	597	738	5·4	5·3	6·9
35–39	864	623	592	7·4	5·5	5·5
40–44	926	854	616	7·9	7·5	5·7
45–49	1,157	910	840	9·9	8·1	7·8
50–54	1,048	1,131	890	9·0	10·0	8·3
55–59	894	1,011	1,089	7·7	9·0	10·1
60–64	739	843	953	6·3	7·5	8·9
65–69	675	670	763	5·8	6·0	7·2
70–74	488	565	563	4·2	5·0	5·2
75–79	} 537	362	417	} 4·6	3·2	3·9
80 and over		278	332		2·5	3·1
Total	11,687	11,260	10,747	100	100	100

TABLE 46. *Forecast of Jewish Population in the Netherlands, by Sex and Age Group (excluding Balance of Migration), 1 January 1960, 1 January 1965, and 1 January 1970*

Alternative II (Maximum)

Age in years	*Absolute numbers*			*Percentages*		
	1 Jan. 1960	*1 Jan. 1965*	*1 Jan. 1970*	*1 Jan. 1960*	*1 Jan. 1965*	*1 Jan. 1970*
	A. *Men*					
0– 5	635	530	530	5·6	4·8	4·8
6–10	695	635	530	6·2	5·7	4·8
11–15	980	693	633	8·6	6·2	5·7
16–19	553	889	483	4·9	8·0	4·4
20–24	761	637	1,090	6·7	5·7	10·1
25–29	551	756	633	4·9	6·8	5·8
30–34	556	546	730	4·9	4·9	6·8
35–39	698	551	542	6·2	4·9	5·1
40–44	749	687	545	6·7	6·2	5·1
45–49	970	735	674	8·6	6·5	6·2
50–54	995	942	714	8·8	8·5	6·6
55–59	969	949	901	8·5	8·5	8·3
60–64	764	904	887	6·8	8·1	8·1
65–69	606	682	807	5·4	6·1	7·3
70–74	410	501	565	3·5	4·5	5·2
75–79	421	298	362	3·7	2·6	3·2
80 and over		213	255		1·8	2·1
Total	11,313	11,148	10,901	100	100	100
	B. *Women*					
0– 5	565	471	471	4·7	4·0	4·2
6–10	613	565	471	5·1	4·8	4·2
11–15	905	613	563	7·5	5·3	5·0
16–19	519	811	451	4·4	6·9	3·9
20–24	745	607	966	6·3	5·3	8·5
25–29	599	743	604	5·0	6·3	5·3
30–34	628	597	738	5·3	5·2	6·6
35–39	864	623	592	7·3	5·4	5·2
40–44	926	854	616	7·7	7·2	5·4
45–49	1,157	910	840	9·7	7·8	7·5
50–54	1,048	1,131	890	8·8	9·7	7·9
55–59	894	1,011	1,089	7·5	8·7	9·6
60–64	739	843	953	6·2	7·2	8·5
65–69	675	670	763	5·7	5·8	6·9
70–74	488	565	563	4·2	4·9	4·9
75–79	537	362	417	4·6	3·1	3·6
80 and over		278	332		2·4	2·8
Total	11,902	11,654	11,319	100	100	100

estimate) for 1 January of the years 1960, 1965, and 1970. These are shown in Tables 45 and 46 as 'Alternative I' and 'Alternative II'.

7.2 *Results of the forecast*

According to the forecasts specified in Tables 45 and 46, the number of Jews in the Netherlands will have receded from 1954 to 1970 from 23,723 to between 21,020 and 22,220, i.e. by 1,500 to 2,700 persons. It will be clear from what has been said in previous chapters that it is necessary to apply a number of radical corrections to these estimates. We shall return to this question in the course of the present section after a discussion of some developmental trends which can be inferred from Tables 45 and 46 and which are not affected by the said corrections.

The results of the forecasts indicate a very considerable ageing process during the years until 1970. The proportion of all age groups up to 60 years, both male and female, will show a downward trend. An exception is formed by the age groups 20 to 24 and 30 to 34 years (in the case of women, also the group 55 to 59 years), all of which show a rather sharp increase. In the youngest age groups, up to 15 years, the number in the period mentioned would drop from 4,965 to a number between about 2,000 and 3,200, i.e. to about half its original value.

The number of persons aged 70 years and over, on the other hand, would increase during the same period from about 1,400 to 2,500, i.e. by about 75 per cent.

The number of women in the reproductive age groups, i.e. from 16 to 44 years, would decline somewhat, from about 4,200 to 4,000. The number of women in the age groups 20 to 34 years, by whom the majority of children are borne, would increase from 1,849 in 1954 to about 2,300 in 1970, i.e. by about 25 per cent. This implies an appreciable rejuvenation within the group of fertile women, naturally entailing a rise of the birth rate above the values assumed above.[64]

As noted earlier, a number of corrections should be applied to the above forecasts; however, since it is impossible to specify them by age and by sex, they have not been processed in the detailed forecasts.

In the first place, it should be taken into account that, as demonstrated in Section 4.1, the number of Jews on 1 January 1954 was higher than 23,723, possibly by as much as 6,000 to 7,000; the forecast figures would then have to be increased proportionately.[65] Furthermore, the increase of the birth rate which may be expected to take place in the years immediately before 1970 would also lead to an increase in the numbers of the younger age groups.

On the other hand, there are two other factors which would lead to lower forecasts. The first is the balance of foreign migration. It is not possible to make any sound or reasonable statement about its future course. The N.C.B.S. has published figures relating to Jewish emigration and immigration for the years 1953 to 1956 only (Table 37). From them

we might conclude that the balance has greatly receded, namely from 428 persons in 1953 to 52 persons in 1956. Although the reliability and the relevance of these data leave much to be desired, there is nevertheless no reason to put the balance of migration for the years 1957 to 1970 at less than an annual number of 50 to 100 persons. It can be calculated that, with the births from emigrants taken into account and the N.C.B.S. data used as starting point, the forecasts for 1970 would have to be reduced, by about 1,650 to 2,400 persons.

A rise in the number of mixed marriages would affect the forecasts in a similar manner. It is well known (cf. Table 27) that the average number of children of mixed marriages is lower than that of Jewish marriages. There are reasons to expect such a rise for the period from 1954 to 1970, but no data are available from which its extent might be reasonably inferred. It is furthermore to be expected (cf. Table 25) that the relative number of Jewish women married to non-Jews will rise more sharply than the relative number of Jewish men entering into mixed marriages, a development which naturally would entail an increase in the number of Jewish births. In the circumstances, it seems best to assume that the development of the number of mixed marriages will not affect the Jewish birth rate.

On the basis of these assumptions—which are inherently very rough—the number of Jews in the Netherlands by 1970 might be estimated at 25,000 to 28,000. As compared to 1954 (cf. Section 4.1), this would be a decrease of about 2,000 to 5,000 persons, i.e. 7 to 17 per cent.

VIII. SOME CONCLUSIONS

8.1 *Characteristics of the Jewish population of the Netherlands*

Despite the incompleteness of the material collected, it is possible to draw some conclusions.

To begin with, it is evident that the group of Jews who survived the years of the occupation (about 30,000) is a mere fraction of the prewar Jewish population (about 140,000); furthermore, it shows to an increased extent the trend of reduction which was apparent even before the war; it is probable that the number of Jews in the Netherlands will continue to decrease between 1945 and 1970. According to the rough estimating methods which have had to be used, the 1945 figure of over 30,000 may be expected to decline to between 25,000 and 28,000 by 1970. The primary cause of this reduction is a relatively low rate of birth, which showed a continuous decrease after 1946 and seems to have become stabilized since 1954; a contributory factor has been the high excess of emigration over immigration, especially in the years 1947 to 1954.

The structure of the Jewish population is furthermore characterized by a relatively high proportion formed by the older age groups and by

a relatively low number of women of reproductive age. The population pyramid (see Part One of this article) thus presents a highly abnormal picture, with a constriction at the ages between 20 and 30 years. Moreover, the ageing process has been and will continue to be very considerable in the years after the census conducted by the Committee (1 January 1954), all the more so because emigration quotas for elderly persons will be small. The probability of an increase in the number of old people therefore will have to be taken into account for a number of years to come.

A sociological threat, with biological implications, lies in the marked increase in the relative number of mixed marriages. This number is much greater than it was before the war and applies both to those who married for the first time and to those who entered into a second or subsequent marriage.

The growing number of mixed marriages is not necessarily a sign of a conscious tendency towards assimilation. Additional contributory factors are that the annihilation of almost 80 per cent of the Jewish population has greatly impaired its internal structure; that many of the Jews who returned found themselves in a predominantly non-Jewish environment; that the group which survived contains a relatively high percentage of persons belonging to the intellectually and economically superior strata who even before the war established contacts with non-Jews more easily than others; and that Jews who spent the war years in hiding formed many new ties with non-Jews. It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been such an upsurge in the number of mixed marriages.

Mixed marriages almost always entail for their issue a separation from the Jewish community, and if no such separation occurs there is, at best, a situation of conflict: for children of Jewish fathers because they are no longer considered Jews even by the Jewish community, and for children of Jewish mothers because in their non-Jewish environment they are not looked upon as Jewish.

Another—biological—consequence of mixed marriages is related to the fact that men statistically contract more mixed marriages than do women. Because of this, a relatively large number of Jewish women have remained single or have not remarried after the war. This phenomenon necessarily keeps the birth rate down. A decrease in the birth rate is inherent in an increase in the number of mixed marriages Historically, Jewish marriages have always had higher fertility rates than mixed marriages.

In connexion with our remarks about mixed marriages, the Jewish population contains a relatively high percentage of single persons and childless couples or households.

Even before the war, the Jews were characterized by a relatively high concentration in Amsterdam, where about 60 per cent of all Jews

resided. The war has brought about no change in this situation; the percentage of Jews residing in Amsterdam is about the same as it was before. Despite the annihilation, the number of municipalities where Jews live has undergone comparatively little change. Many rural municipalities, however, have no more than one or two Jewish families left, or one or a few single Jewish persons not living with Jewish families, so that there is no possibility of any Jewish communal activities in such places. There is no doubt that this phenomenon is very much more pronounced than it was before the war.

With regard to other characteristics which constitute a means of cohesion for the Jewish community—such as membership in Jewish congregations, religious marriage ceremonies, circumcisions, number of burials in Jewish cemeteries, contributions and donations to Jewish charities and institutions—the data available are very incomplete.

It is likely that a relatively large proportion of the Jewish population (about one-third of those counted by the Committee) do not desire to be considered members of a Jewish religious community. On the other hand, at least 75 per cent of those who died in the period from 1946 to 1954, in so far as they are included in the Committee's census records, received Jewish burial, while the number and the amount of donations to Jewish institutions are relatively high, considering the number of Jewish families and single persons.

Therefore, although the Jewish group has shown certain phenomena of disintegration of a demographic as well as of a sociological nature in postwar years, and will undoubtedly undergo a still further numerical decline in the course of the present decade, there is no question of a catastrophic process of deterioration. Certainly the numerical decline is serious in itself and constitutes, at least outside the larger towns, a real menace to the preservation of community life within the group, but it is not certain that the social causes of this decline, of which mixed marriages and emigration are manifestations, will assume the same significance in the course of the next few years as they had in the period from 1946 to 1954. Should these social causes lose some of their significance in the years ahead, it is even conceivable that the Jewish population of the Netherlands may again increase somewhat. In such a case, the greatly increased birth rate during the years 1946 and 1947 certainly would positively affect the reproduction rate of future years. The Jewish community seems to have sufficient cohesive power to absorb such an increase in the spiritual sense as well.

8.2 *The significance of the expected development of the population for future welfare work*

During the period from 1953 to 1958, and certainly also in the years after, the need for Jewish child welfare declined sharply. For example, the number of children living in Jewish children's homes diminished

from 93 on 31 December 1953, to 62 on 31 December 1958. The total number of active contacts of the welfare department of the Gefusioneerde Joodse Instellingen voor Kinderbescherming (Joint Jewish Institutions for the Protection of Children) rose from 258 in 1953 to 291 in 1956, then dropped again to 224 in 1958. This decrease is wholly a consequence of the continuous reduction in the number of minors among the war foster-children, namely from 1,219 at the end of 1953 to 803 on 31 December 1957. The data shown in Table 47 have been taken from the Annual Reports of the Joint Jewish Institutions for the Protection of Children.

TABLE 47. *Resident Children in Jewish Homes, 1953 to 1958*

Situation on 31 December of the year	*War foster-children in homes*	*Children, non-orphans, in homes*	*Total children in homes*
1953	90	3	93
1954	85	3	88
1955	63	27*	90
1956	46	38*	84
1957	37	41	78
1958	22	40	62

* Minimum.

There has even been a constant increase in the number of non-orphaned children residing in homes and institutions. Table 48 reflects the same trend.

TABLE 48. *New or Renewed Contacts of Welfare Department* with Jewish Foster-Children outside Homes and Institutions, 1952 to 1956*

Year	*War foster-children*	*Non-orphaned children*	*Total*
1952	35	50	85
1953	34	60	94
1954	21	71	92
1955	17	73	90
1956	54	73	127

* Annual Report for 1956 of the Joint Jewish Institutions for the Protection of Children.

The influence of the decreasing birth rate of the preceding years is not shown in the figures for the number of non-orphaned children who received welfare care. This is understandable, for the number of these children is also conditioned by factors which were more than normally active during the period mentioned. Among these factors should be counted the problems of mixed marriages and the numerous postwar

marriages the basis of which proved unsteady. Owing to these circumstances, it is difficult to infer the future needs of Jewish child welfare work from the present figures on child welfare and the probable trend of the birth rate. Since the phenomenon of war foster-children will definitely disappear and the number of other children requiring welfare or protection is not likely to rise to a figure higher than that for the years 1956 to 1958,[66] there is the possibility that, in view of the above figures, the requirements in this area, including spare capacity, may drop to about 50 places at children's homes and the need to handle approximately 80 newly active cases of child welfare per year.

A little more certainty can be obtained on the future need of old-age assistance. It has been shown before (Tables 15, 45, and 46) that the number of Jews 70 years of age and over will probably increase from 1,417 on 1 January 1954 to approximately 1,860 by early 1960, and to about 2,500 by early 1970.

TABLE 49. *Number of Residents and those on Waiting Lists of Old-Age Homes*[67]

Mid-June of the year	*Residents*	*Waiting lists*	*Need*
1953	215	132	281
1959	278	190	373

As appears from information received from spokesmen for the Boards of Jewish old-age homes, it may be assumed that roughly 60 per cent of those on waiting lists may be regarded as actively interested applicants. The last column of Table 49 has been computed accordingly. The numbers therefore comprise the actual residents plus 60 per cent of those on waiting lists.

In the middle of June 1953 this need appears to have amounted to 16·9 per cent of the number of persons aged 70 years and over counted on 1 January 1954, and in the middle of June 1959 the need was 20·1 per cent of that category counted for 1 January 1960. Using the mean of both percentages as an estimate of the corresponding percentage for 1 January 1970, and taking into consideration the number of 2,500 old persons for that date as estimated above, we arrive at a need of about 460 places in homes. This is naturally a very rough estimate.

8.3 *Some suggestions for further study*

Attention has been repeatedly called to gaps in the data obtained by the Committee in its census. These relate specifically to mixed marriages, the numbers of Jews residing outside the large cities, those who moved to new industrial municipalities (like Eindhoven and Enschede), immigration, mortality, marriage fertility, and the indices of Jewish

community life (religious marriage celebrations, circumcisions, and membership of the Jewish Communities).

Further investigation is therefore urgently needed. Such a study would need to have a permanent basis and should be founded on a continuous registration of the population so as to attain a reasonable measure of reliability and completeness of the data as well as a sufficiently wide range of data, specifically with regard to births, deaths, and migrations. Such vital statistics should include not only personal data, but also such family relations as are required to make possible a study of marriage fertility. This continuous registration could be supplemented by decennial censuses, so as to make it possible to correct registration errors and to collect data on such additional characteristics as occupation, education, and the spiritual and religious orientation of the Jewish population.

However, these hopes can materialize only if it proves possible to fulfil certain conditions. It would be necessary first of all to standardize and co-ordinate to the greatest possible extent the registration systems of the Jewish communities.

In addition, a small permanent body would have to be set up, equipped to perform such demographic and sociological investigations and authorized to make use of the population accounts created. This body would also need to maintain contacts with other statistical and social research institutes.

NOTES

[53] E. Boekman, op. cit., p. 74, Table 27.

[54] E. Boekman, op. cit., p. 133.

[55] *Statistische gegevens van de Joden in Nederland*, Part I.

[56] This phenomenon did not reduce the proportion of the youngest age groups in the Jewish population as compared with 1930 (cf. Section 4.2), which is due to the fact that the highly increased birth rate of the years 1946 and 1947 has also affected these youngest age groups.

[57] Cf. also the statistics of the course of population from 1938 to 1954, Table 4, p. 18, N.C.B.S., 1955.

[58] An exception is formed by the data yielded by the 1947 Census for the Jewish group. They, too, may be deemed to supply, to some extent, a standard for the measure of Jewish orientation if they are related to the Committee census data.

[59] E. Boekman, op. cit., p. 68, Table 25.

[60] E. Boekman, op. cit., pp. 104–5.

[61] E. Boekman, op. cit., pp. 119 and 120.

[62] Mortality tables have in the meantime also been published for the periods from 1950 to 1952 and 1953 to 1955, but the pertinent calculations had then already been carried out. Recalculation of the later chances of survival would theoretically have been more correct, but would actually have constituted—in view of the objections to the procedure as such—an unwarranted refinement.

[63] This supposition does not take into account the fact that the female survivors of the high birth rate of the years 1946 and 1947 will continue to contribute to reproduction some years prior to 1970, while the continuous increase between 1954 and 1970 of the number of women in the age groups from 20 to 34 years will naturally lead also to a rising number of births. In reality, the selection of various possible alternative suppositions has little influence

upon the forecast for 1970 and earlier years because the children born after 1954—the starting point for the forecasts—form only a small portion of the total Jewish population until that year. We have also abstracted the consequences of any possible changes in nuptial trends.

[64] From the figures in Tables 45 and 46 it might also be inferred that the excess of women over men would recede from 1,064 in 1954 to between 1,024 and 1,046 in 1970. This, however, is exclusively a consequence of the incompleteness of the 1954 figures (cf. Section 4.2).

[65] This proportionality naturally would apply only in so far as it may be assumed that the age structures of the registered and non-registered portions of the population are identical.

[66] In the case of a steady birth rate (cf. Section 7.2) and the disappearance of various postwar phenomena interfering with family life.

[67] Annual Reports of the 'Joodse Invalide' and communications from members of the Boards of the other homes and institutions in Amsterdam. The Hague, Rotterdam, Enschede, and Arnhem.

JEWISH MIGRATION IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD*

Ilja M. Dijour

MIGRATION has always been the decisive factor in the survival of the Jewish people, but never before had it reached such a magnitude as during the lifetime of the last two generations. 5,450,000 Jews have left their homes since 1880, which is half the present world Jewish population. The tragic loss of six million victims of Nazism during the war did not stop this movement. On the contrary, the flow of Jewish immigration continued in greater measure than ever after the Second World War.

The four million pre-war Jewish immigrants were responsible for the creation of the dynamic Jewish communities of North and South America, Australia and South Africa. One million of the 1,355,000 post-war Jewish immigrants were instrumental in the creation of the State of Israel.

In round figures this entire movement can be summarized as follows:

Jewish Migration, 1881–1960

Period	*To all Countries*	*To Palestine—Israel*	*Per cent to Palestine—Israel*
1881–1914 (*a*)	2,750,000	50,000	1·8
1919–1939 (*a*)	1,200,000	345,000	28·8
1940–1944	145,000	45,000 (*b*)	31·0
Total 1881–1944	4,095,000	440,000	10·7
1945–1960	1,355,000	1,055,000 (*b*)	77·9

(*a*) A. Tartakower, *In Search of Home and Freedom*, London, 1958, p. 90.
(*b*) *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1959/60*, No. 11, Jerusalem, 1960, p. 69.

The presentation which follows concerns only the post-war movement, namely the 1,055,000 immigrants to Israel and the 300,000 to other countries.

The overwhelming majority of Jewish immigrants to Israel arrived after the creation of the State on 15 May 1948—956,726 persons up to

* This paper was originally a document prepared for the World Conference on Problems of International Migration, convened by the World Council of Churches, in Leysin, Switzerland, June 1961.

the end of 1959. They arrived from all continents and from almost all countries. It is significant, however, that the majority (56 per cent) came from Asian and African countries, and the minority (44 per cent) from Europe, the Americas, and Oceania.

The monumental task of transferring and integrating such a mass of immigrants in so short a period of time was accomplished by the Jewish Agency and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, in co-operation with the Israeli government. It became possible only with the fundamental Law of Return which provided that 'every Jew has the right to come to the country as an "Oleh" ' (i.e. as an immigrant). During the period from 1945 to 1953, the A.J.D.C. was responsible for the transportation of 504,208 Jews to Israel, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the International Refugee Organization, and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. This included the evacuation of the major portion of Jewish communities in countries such as Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The most spectacular movement was the 'Operation Magic Carpet', an airlift organized by the A.J.D.C. which transported 46,243 Yemenite Jews to Israel during the period from December 1948 to June 1950.[1]

Since 1953 the Jewish Agency alone has been responsible for the emigration to Israel from all countries, including North Africa, Egypt, and Eastern Europe.

The absorption and initial resettlement of over a million newcomers by 600,000 inhabitants in a new, undeveloped country represents an unprecedented task. It required the pooling of all human and material resources in the country, as well as vigorous financial support from Jewish communities the world over. It is impossible to attempt to describe this entire movement, but we may summarize the functioning of the absorption process.

Upon arrival in Israel the immigrants received temporary shelter at numerous reception centres, the largest and most important being Sha'ar Aliyah at Haifa. There they were registered, underwent medical examination, and were given a test of professional skill.

Then they were divided into the following categories:

(1) Immigrants not requiring assistance from the Jewish Agency (i.e. those joining relatives or friends, those having their own means, and holding a labour contract), were released from the reception centre immediately.

(2) Young immigrants for whom the pre-migration work had been done by Youth Aliyah were dispatched to the kibbutzim or other settlements directly upon arrival.

(3) Chronic invalids, unaccompanied immigrants over 55 years of age and other social cases were cared for by M.A.L.B.E.N., a special organization financed and administered by A.J.D.C.

(4) Immigrants following a needed trade were admitted to Ulpanim, schools for adults with intensive courses in Hebrew and general knowledge of Israel.

(5) All other immigrants were sent to the Ma'Abarot or transit centres, from which they were transferred to planned villages in townships in accordance with the over-all colonization programme.

This method of receiving and placing the newcomers was not rigid and changed during the years. Greater emphasis was subsequently placed upon a direct transfer from the boat or aeroplane to the homes and jobs in rural and industrial areas. The balance of immigrants remaining in the Ma'Abarot was the index of the success or failure of the integration effort in any period.

As immigrants to Israel have been admitted on a non-selective basis with regard to occupational or educational background, the rapid growth of the economy created a need for skilled workers and professionals. Therefore an important task of the Jewish Agency and the Israeli government in regard to immigration is to attract such skilled immigrants as are to be found mostly among the Jewish communities in Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

A scholarly description of the extreme complexity of absorption and integration problems in Israel is to be found in detail in the book by Dr. Samuel Noah Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, published in London in 1954.

The assisted immigration of Jews to countries other than Israel is the responsibility of United Hias Service and its predecessors, the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (H.I.A.S.), United Service for New Americans (U.S.N.A.), and the Migration Services of A.J.D.C. From the end of the Second World War up to 1954 these three organizations worked separately in the fields of emigration and immigration, co-ordinating their efforts only in certain situations. In 1954 the three organizations merged into United Hias Service, which has responsibility for assisting Jewish emigration to countries other than Israel.

Approximately 300,000 persons were assisted in their emigration and initial resettlement during the period from 1945 to 1960. (See Appendix I.) The resettlement by main areas of destination was as follows:

Area of Immigration	*Number*
United States	165,000
Latin America	36,000
Canada	24,000
Australia	16,000
Other (*a*)	45,000
Total	286,000 (*b*)

(*a*) Mainly Western Europe.

(*b*) In addition, we estimate that five per cent were assisted by other organizations, making a total of approximately 300,000 assisted.

United States

The estimated total of Jewish immigrants admitted into the United States in the post-war period is close to 190,000, which represents about six per cent of the total immigrants admitted in this period. However, the percentages differed from year to year depending on emergency situations and resulting special legislation.

As recently as June 1960 the United States Senate issued a report according to which a total of 711,212 displaced persons, refugees, and parolees were admitted to the United States for the period from 1946 to 1959 under emergency legislation. Computing the corresponding figures on Jewish immigrants admitted during the same period under the various laws, we arrive at a higher percentage of Jewish participation in most of these refugee groups than in general immigration. The average percentage of Jews among the admitted refugees was twelve per cent, as against six per cent for general immigration (see Appendix II).

The Jewish organizations in the United States and abroad adapted quickly to the requirements of each emergency. They responded vigorously to the innovation of the 'corporate affidavit' first introduced in President Truman's Directive in 1946. The U.S.N.A., in co-operation with the A.J.D.C. Migration Services in Europe, under-wrote such corporate affidavits for 7,792 Jewish inmates in the displaced persons camps. H.I.A.S. did the same for 4,857 refugees. As a result, the number of Jews admitted under the Truman Directive was about 32 per cent of the total.[2]

With the D.P. Act of 1948 as amended in 1951, the situation was more complicated. It required an agreement between the U.S.N.A. and the H.I.A.S. whereby the former handled mostly blanket assurances from Jewish community groups, whereas the H.I.A.S. concentrated its activities on individually-sponsored cases.

'Believing that the community-type sponsorship better served the interests of the refugee, U.S.N.A. concentrated on the blanket type of assurance. Jewish community groups provided these blanket assurances on the basis of estimates of the housing and job opportunities available in the localities. Lists of skills available among the displaced persons were in turn circulated about the communities. Actual matching of assurances and jobs was done by A.J.D.C.–H.I.A.S. overseas.' Under this arrangement the U.S.N.A. brought into the United States 38,327 persons and 197 orphans under the D.P. Act. H.I.A.S. was instrumental in effecting the immigration of 20,788 D.P.s. Together with those sponsored by other agencies or directly by relatives the percentage of Jews among the immigrants under the D.P. Act as amended reached 18.[3]

Under the Refugee Relief Act 209,000 refugees were authorized and 188,950 were actually admitted. The majority of those admitted were Italian relatives of United States citizens, Dutch, and Far Eastern and

Chinese refugees. 3,701 Jewish refugees were actually admitted. As the implementation of this Act started at the end of 1954, the sponsorship, transportation, and initial resettlement of this entire group was organized by United Hias Service in co-operation with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (I.C.E.M.), the United States Escapee Program (U.S.E.P.) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.). With regard to resettlement in the United States, United Hias Service continued the policy of co-operating closely with community services throughout the country and the New York Association for New Americans (N.Y.A.N.A.) in New York City.

The next two emergency groups admitted were the Hungarian parolees in 1956 and 1957, and the Egyptian refugees under Section 15 of Public Law 85–316, passed by Congress in 1957. In the table in Appendix II we use figures only on those Hungarian parolees who adjusted their status, in order to follow the table published in the Senate report. In reality, the total number of Hungarian escapees admitted to 31 December 1957 was 38,000 and the corresponding number of Jewish Hungarian escapees was 5,069.

As is generally known, the procedures applied by the U.S. and other governments during the Hungarian emergency were a considerable departure from usual practices. The extreme speed and the availability of immediate transportation, and governmental concern over reception and initial resettlement, contributed to a rapid and effective handling of this particular group. The 5,069 Jewish Hungarian escapees were resettled in 31 states and the District of Columbia. The enthusiastic support by the Jewish communities of this particular programme made up for the almost complete absence of the usual preparatory work which was simply not possible just because of the speed of the operation.

Entirely different was the case of the Egyptian refugees. They could be processed mainly under Section 15 of Public Law 85–316, which meant that in order to be eligible these refugees had to find a way to leave Egypt to some country of first asylum. U.H.S. European Headquarters succeeded in making arrangements with the governments of some Western European countries in order to facilitate this exodus. But, in view of the extreme complexity of this entire procedure, out of a total of 8,014 assisted Egyptian Jewish refugees, only 1,734 proceeded to the United States. The resettlement of this group has not met with any particular difficulties because of the relatively favourable occupational composition of these refugees.

The 85,000 Jewish refugees admitted under the emergency legislation were recognized as refugees in terms of the respective laws. However, in our estimation the overwhelming majority of the remaining 80,000 assisted Jewish immigrants who entered under the regular quota laws, mostly on the basis of family reunion, were actually refugees from all types of oppression and persecution.[4]

Latin America

The area next in importance for Jewish immigration in the post-war period was Latin America. Here it is difficult to make a country-by-country statistical comparison of general and Jewish immigration for some twenty countries.

With regard to Latin America, the division of the post-war period into two parts has particular significance. Although the majority of the 36,000 assisted immigrants—namely 28,000—arrived before the creation of United Hias Service in 1954, and only 8,000 since that date, the difference is not so much in quantity as in the quality of services rendered. Whereas in the earlier period it was mainly a question of family reunion, of war and Nazi victims and their kin who emigrated to various Latin American countries before the Second World War, the second group was composed mostly of refugees from Hungary, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern countries, whether or not they had relatives in Latin America. Out of the total of 8,300 in the period from 1955 on, 1,500 were Hungarians and 3,800 Egyptians. The overwhelming majority of the immigrants (about seventy per cent) were received by Brazil, and the remainder were dispersed in other countries. The reception and resettlement in Latin America were far more difficult than in the United States or other English-speaking immigration countries. The Jewish communities were not sufficiently organized and prepared to integrate the newcomers. It was not enough for United Hias Service to help the immigrants to reach their destination and then turn them over to relatives or local communities. The community agencies themselves had to be strengthened both financially and organizationally. Professional workers were brought over from the United States and other countries, or trained locally. Lay leaders of the communities were induced to accept social service and casework methods in handling newcomers.

During the six-year period from 1955 to 1960 the full success of the new methods was registered: both major groups, the Hungarians and the Egyptians, in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America, became self-sufficient in a period from three to six months, in most cases. Relatively few needed supplementary assistance for a longer period of time and even the number of 'hard-core' cases was reduced to a minimum.

Special programmes for housing, vocational guidance and placement, medical assistance, and the education of immigrant children were undertaken in close co-operation with the respective Jewish community services. In some of these programmes the cost was shared by United Hias Latin American Headquarters with the communities.

With the help of A.J.D.C., the Jewish Colonization Association (J.C.A.), and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, special loan funds were set up in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay for

the purpose of facilitating the integration through the establishing of small businesses or acquiring tools for artisans or professionals.

All this could be achieved through the favourable attitude of Latin American governments, especially that of Brazil. However, much more remains to be accomplished in order to assist the existing Jewish communities in Latin America to absorb more newcomers from new areas of distress.

Canada

Numerically the Jewish share in the over-all post-war immigration to Canada was rather modest, roughly 60,000 as against 2,000,000, or three per cent. However, it represented a substantial increase in the Jewish population of Canada, which is now a quarter of a million. The Jewish immigration was organized and financed by the Canadian Jewish Congress, the representative body of Canadian Jewry, together with the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services (J.I.A.S.) of Canada. Both organizations frequently obtained from the Canadian government relaxation of immigration regulations affecting the admission of certain categories of immigrants and refugees such as orphans, close relatives, and workers in certain trades. Thus in the early period, from 1947 to 1951, 1,041 Jewish war orphans were admitted under the sponsorship of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the United Jewish War Relief Agencies. In subsequent years, 3,880 Jewish tailors, furriers and milliners and their dependants were admitted following petitions made to the government by the respective labour unions.

In the later period, from 1955 to 1960, the largest single group was Jewish escapees from Hungary, close to 4,000; next in number were immigrants from North Africa (Morocco and Tunisia) with over 1,000, and then Egyptian refugees numbering about 300. All these special groups, as well as regular immigrants, were assisted in their reception and integration by J.I.A.S. during the first year after arrival, and when necessary subsequently by the family, child care, and the vocational agencies of the local Jewish communities throughout Canada.

The 24,000 Jewish immigrants of the post-war period indicated in Appendix I were assisted both on departure by United Hias Service and its predecessors and by J.I.A.S. and the local Jewish communities upon arrival.

Australia

The Australian Jewish community showed a spectacular increase in its population during the post-war period. The census of 1947 indicated a Jewish population of 32,019. The Jewish population in 1960 is estimated at 65,000. The major part of this increase came through immigration. Over 16,000 immigrants of the post-war period, indicated in Appendix I, were assisted both on departure, by United Hias Service, and on arrival, by the Federation of Australian Jewish Welfare Societies.

The overwhelming majority of Jewish immigrants to Australia came from Eastern Europe, joining relatives most of whom had arrived in the period between the two world wars.

The Federation of Australian Jewish Welfare Societies carried the burden of pre- and post-migration assistance to the newcomers. This included: intervention with governmental authorities for issuance of immigration permits, both on individual and community assurances; reception; temporary shelter; permanent housing; vocational, medical and educational services; in addition, services of specially created loan chests were used to lend money to newcomers out of a fund constituted by contributions from American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Jewish Colonization Association, and the Claims Conference. These loans greatly facilitate the economic adjustment of the immigrants.

Europe and other Destinations

Close to 45,000 assisted migrants to Western Europe and other destinations include Jews from Eastern Europe, North Africa, and Egypt who managed to make their way to Western European countries and settled there permanently. Those who came from the same areas to Western Europe in transit to overseas destinations are not included in this total.

The integration of these migrants was greatly facilitated by the welfare activities of A.J.D.C. throughout Europe and the constant amelioration of economic conditions within the Jewish communities in Western Europe. As a matter of policy, United Hias Service turns over the responsibility for the reception and initial resettlement from its own offices to such Western European Jewish communities as the British, Dutch, Swedish, and Swiss, which are fully equipped to carry out these functions.

CONCLUSION

In the summing up of this brief survey of the assisted post-war Jewish migration to countries other than Israel, it should be noted that United Hias Service, as well as its predecessors, attempted to assist Jewish migration, relying on the close co-operation of existing Jewish community organizations in the emigration and transmigration countries, and especially in immigration areas.

On the other hand, all the activities described above on behalf of the approximately 300,000 assisted Jewish migrants were greatly facilitated, both operationally and financially, by the major intergovernmental agencies active in the field of migration in the post-war period. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (U.N.R.R.A.), International Refugee Organization of the United Nations (I.R.O.), and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees of the United Nations, entered into contractual agreements with United Hias Service predecessors A.J.D.C. and H.I.A.S. during the early part

of the post-war period. The same close co-operation continued after 1954 with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (I.C.E.M.), the United States Escapee Program (U.S.E.P.), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.).

The close ties on the national level with the respective Jewish communities and voluntary agencies of other faiths, and on the international level with governmental and intergovernmental agencies, made it possible for United Hias Service to do its migration work on an international casework basis, and to develop the necessary flexibility to respond quickly to new and unexpected emergency situations. The latest such areas of need are the Congo and Cuba where, despite the extreme political complexity of the situation, United Hias Service has been able to offer needed assistance to Jewish refugees.

APPENDIX I

Jewish Migrants assisted by United Hias Service and its Predecessor Agencies, 1945–1960

Year	*Area of Destination*					*Total*
	U.S.A.	*Latin America*	*Canada*	*Australia*	*Europe and Other*	
1945	4,160	395	343	—	2,878	7,776
1946	12,774	1,713	563	639	10,805	26,494
1947	29,274	4,309	2,080	1,518	9,868	47,049
1948	17,581	8,714	4,183	4,296	2,813	37,587
1949	41,222	4,515	2,103	752	4,096	52,688
1950	12,679	3,052	1,663	453	8,247	26,094
1951	17,271	2,108	3,492	1,964	213	25,048
1952	7,315	1,000	1,018	360	193	9,886
1953	4,009	650	742	94	228	5,723
1954	2,155	914	354	197	313	3,933
Sub-Total 1945–1954	148,440	27,370	16,541	10,273	39,654	242,278
1955	1,728	272	323	340	178	2,841
1956	4,338	559	1,130	453	795	7,275
1957	4,905	3,982	4,075	2,711	2,121	17,794
1958	1,954	1,369	769	1,307	1,580	6,979
1959	2,035	951	496	658	510	4,650
1960	1,211	1,153	318	569	573	3,824
Sub-Total 1955–1960	16,171	8,286	7,111	6,038	5,757	43,363
Grand Total 1945–1960*	164,611	35,656	23,652	16,311	45,411	285,641

* Figures for 1961: U.S.A.—3,725 (including 2,000 refugees from Cuba); Latin America—950; Canada—465; Australia—580; Europe and other—1,365 (including emigrants from Tunisia to France); Total—7,085.

APPENDIX II

Immigration to U.S.A. on Basis of Emergency Legislation (1946–1959)

Emergency Legislation Type and Period	*Total Emergency Immigration (a)*	*Jewish Emergency Immigration*	*Percentage Jewish to Total Emergency*
Truman Directive 1946–8	40,324	12,849 (*b*)	31·9
Displaced Persons Act 1949–52	352,260	63,407 (*c*)	18·0
German ethnics	53,766	—	—
	406,026		
Refugee Relief Act 1953–7	188,950	3,701 (*d*)	2·0
Act of September 11, 1957 (85–316) 1957–9	9,910 (*e*) 39,391	1,455 (*f*) —	14·7 —
Act of September 2, 1958 (*g*) 1958–9	1,187	—	—
Hungarian parolees (adjusted status) 1958–9 (*h*)	25,424	2,922	11·5
1945–59	711,212	84,334	11·9

(*a*) Calendar No. 1714, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. Senate, Report No. 1651, 22 June 1960, p. 5.
(*b*) *The Refugee in the Post-War World,* Jacques Vernant, London, 1953, p. 522. The chapters on the United States and Canada were written by Jane Clark Carey and Ilja M. Dijour.
(*c*) *The D.P. Story—The Final Report of the U.S. Displaced Persons Commission,* Washington, D.C., 1952, pp. 248, 366.
(*d*) United Hias Service Statistical Abstract, Fourth Quarter 1957, p. 5.
(*e*) For admission of certain groups of refugees including Egyptians under Section 15.
(*f*) United Hias Service data.
(*g*) For admission of victims of Azores disaster and Dutch Indonesians.
(*h*) Notification to United Hias Service from Immigration and Naturalization Service. Only notifications of I.N.S. about changes of status from parolee to immigrant are counted. The actual number of admitted Hungarian refugees was 38,000, of whom 5,000 were Jews.

NOTES

[1] J.D.C. Statistical Abstract 1953, pp. 12–13, 15.

[2] *The Refugee in the Post-War World,* edited by Jacques Vernant, p. 522.

[3] See *The D.P. Story—The Final Report of the U.S. Displaced Persons Commission,* pp. 282, 284, and 248.

[4] Books on the integration of immigrants in the U.S. published by U.H.S.: *Visas to Freedom—The History of H.I.A.S.,* by Mark Wischnitzer, New York, 1956; *300,000 New Americans,* by Lyman C. White, New York, 1957; *The Displaced Person and the Social Agency,* by David Crystal, New York, 1958; and *Adjustment in Freedom,* by Helen L. Glassman, New York, 1956.

OCCUPATION AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT IN ANGLO-JEWRY

Ernest Krausz

THE object of this paper is twofold: first, to investigate the occupational distribution of the Jews of this country, and in particular to draw attention to the important changes of the last hundred years and to observe the more recent trends; second, to throw some light on the social consequences of these changes.

Peddling and hawking were the staple occupations of the Jewish population until the middle of the nineteenth century. 'Peddling [however] declined in London and later in the Provinces because the retail network gradually covered the land.' [1] Other outdoor occupations, such as glaziery, lingered on until the end of the century,[2] while street-trading has remained to the present day a calling in which many Jews are engaged. The economic group above the outdoor traders was composed mainly of shopkeepers. At the top was the small group of the very rich, who as a rule were concerned with international trade and banking.

The mass immigration which started in the 1880s brought about significant changes. The east European immigrant's staple occupation was tailoring, and the setting for it was the notorious sweat-shop. Other typical immigrant trades were boot and shoe making and furniture making.[3] Whatever their calling the great majority of immigrants belonged to the working class. The proletarianization of the Jewish community resulted in widespread trade union and socialist activity. Lloyd Gartner gives a very useful account of the development of Jewish 'movements of protest and improvement' in this country.[4] Proletarianism, however, was short-lived. As the immigrants consolidated and improved their position, and particularly as the first generation born here became Anglicized, a diversification in occupations took place. Large numbers opened their own businesses or workshops; others entered the professions or became black-coated workers. With the influx of refugees from Nazi Europe before the Second World War, again new businesses and industries were established, as a result of which openings in a great number of skilled and clerical occupations became

available. The Jewish community was becoming increasingly middle-class.

What picture can we draw of the occupational pattern of Anglo-Jewry in the post-war period? Despite the paucity of statistical data, the few studies that have been carried out, such as those by Barou and Neustatter, suggest the following salient features. First, the total of gainfully occupied persons over the age of 15 is smaller in the Jewish minority than in the general population—46 per cent for the former as against 58 per cent for the latter.[5] Second, the percentage of persons working on their own account is far greater in the minority than in the general population—the lowest estimate for the minority is 15 per cent compared with 6 per cent in the general population.[6] Third, although there has been a diversification in occupations and a shift away from the traditionally Jewish trades, it is still true to say that Jews concentrate in certain economic spheres, particularly those connected with the manufacture and distribution of consumer goods.[7]

The first two statements prompt us to ask whether a relatively smaller working population and a larger percentage of self-employed are signs of generally greater Jewish wealth. The smaller working population among Jews appears to be due in large measure to the small percentage of Jewish women who go out to work, particularly when married—11 per cent as against 34 per cent in the general population.[8] This, it is suggested, is mainly the result of the traditional Jewish view, still prevalent, that the woman's place is in the home. Thus, it is said that 'Jewish working-class men tend to deprive themselves of luxuries rather than allow their wives to share the wage-earning burden'.[9] To a lesser extent, the smaller percentage of gainfully occupied Jewish persons is due to the relatively greater number of Jewish young people staying on at school after the age of 15, and subsequently entering University.[10] Thus, the I.U.J.F. Survey, 1954–5, estimated that Jewish students made up 2·8 per cent of the total number of full-time University students in Britain, although the Jewish proportion in the general population was only about 1 per cent.[11] It is often maintained that this is due to the traditional Jewish respect for learning and the sacrifices Jewish parents are prepared to make for their children. It would not be unreasonable to suggest, however, that the factors we have mentioned so far are not the only explanations for the disparities which exist between Jews and non-Jews in respect of the number of working women on the one hand, and young people continuing with their studies on the other. Without the greater affluence of the minority these differences would of necessity be much smaller.

The large percentage of Jews who work on their own account is a phenomenon which at least partly is a product of circumstances, such as the obstacles the Jewish immigrant often encountered in his efforts to obtain employment, or his religious requirements.[12] These factors

have, however, largely disappeared, for today's standard of religiosity of the majority of Jews in this country is not such as to prevent them from entering any occupation. Again, there is now no difficulty in finding well-paid jobs. Yet the Loan Department of the Jewish Board of Guardians had the following to report in 1955: 'The Committee continue to find that the high wages being offered do not seem to lessen the number of prospective borrowers, who prefer being their own masters, rather than take jobs which might give them more money.' [13] It may be that this wish for economic independence, even when it does not seem to offer better material prospects than employment, is really the after-effect of historical conditioning. This may well mean that, whereas in the past greater economic independence has invariably led to greater wealth, today the small independent trader or artisan is often merely exposing himself to the fierce competition of the vast commercial enterprises and industrial organizations, without attaining a standard of living higher than that of better-paid workers. Nevertheless, the fact that the Jewish minority has a large percentage of people working on their own account means in effect that it has a large trained reservoir of business men; and those who are likely to undertake big business ventures will be drawn from the ranks of this entrepreneurial class, rather than from the employee group. In the professions the fields most popular, such as medicine, law, and accountancy, are those where the person can establish his own practice, and can expect a higher income than that of the salaried professional man. In these ways it is undoubtedly true to say that the greater size of the self-employed group has had the effect of enhancing the wealth of the community.

Let us now consider the statement dealing with the distribution of Jews in various economic roles. If we first take people in the employee group, we see that the earlier concentration in a few typically Jewish crafts was followed by diversification, but the latter gave way, particularly in recent years, to a drift into the black-coated occupations. This is evident from the post-war reports of the Jewish Board of Guardians and the Sabbath Observance Employment Bureau, the two agencies in London concerned with placing Jews in occupations. While these are specialized bodies, the former dealing primarily with young people and the latter being concerned with the provision of jobs where the Sabbath can be observed, their experiences and observations are valuable as indications of the recent trends in the choice of occupations.[14] Thus, thousands of workers are leaving annually the clothing and furniture trades,[15] and they are not replaced by new Jewish entrants into industry. Hairdressing, electrical engineering, and jewellery are popular occupations, but a very large proportion of Jews in them are becoming clerks, bookkeepers, secretaries, and salesmen.[16] Perhaps even more impressive is the considerable number entering the professions. The girls have a great preference for office work and the showrooms.[17]

One of the principal reasons for this new trend away from the traditional occupations is the fact that parents, who experienced long periods of slackness in the so-called Jewish trades, 'prefer their children to enter business, offices, and the professions, and many are the sacrifices they are prepared to make to achieve this end'.[18] Again, many of them are better off materially than before the war, and they are more concerned about the choice of a good career for their children, often projecting on to the latter their own ambitions and ideas.[19]

Turning to the Jewish role in the business and manufacturing world, we find that concentration in certain spheres still exists. Concentration must not be regarded, however, as being synonymous with domination. If we take finance, for example, while Jewish participation in merchant banking is still important, Jews can hardly be found in commercial banking.[20] Again, Jewish 'take-over' financiers are active mainly in the fields of the manufacture and distribution of consumer goods, and in the field of property. Israel Cohen in his book on Contemporary Jewry goes in fact so far as to say that 'the part played by Jews in the financial world of Great Britain is comparatively unimportant',[21] a statement that some may be reluctant to accept. On the other hand, it is generally recognized that Jewish participation in heavy industry is rather insignificant.[22] Moreover, even in the manufacture of consumer goods, only certain lines, such as clothing, are to a large extent in Jewish hands, while in such other fields as electrical goods, confectionery, not to mention for example the motor-car industry, Jews are of little importance. Similarly, regarding departmental and chain stores, a wrong impression may be gained as a result of a few large and well-known Jewish concerns.[23] Although it is important to prevent grossly exaggerated ideas of Jewish wealth, this is neither to deny the prominent part played by Jews in industry and commerce, where they have contributed richly to advancing Britain's standards,[24] nor to deny the rapid rise of many a pauper immigrant or his descendant to the rank of an economic magnate.

Paul Emden enumerates the qualities that brought success to the destitute immigrants. These newcomers were 'industrious, thrifty, of intellectual keenness and an indomitable self-confidence. All their energies were concentrated on two objects: to develop the industry with which they were associated and to raise themselves in the social scale.'[25] As he gained economic independence the competitive spirit of the immigrant increased, and to achieve success he had to be more enterprising and less conservative. He was a self-made man whose motto became the reverse of 'What was good enough for my father is good enough for me'.[26] In fact it is not only true to say with Emden that 'the Jews have succeeded in bettering their own status more rapidly than any other group of immigrants',[27] but also that in a relatively short period of time they have surpassed the general population in

reaching upper- and middle-class standards, i.e. proportionately to their numbers more of them will be found in the higher-income groups.

In seeking explanations for this rapid 'bourgeoisification', we ought to point to a few characteristic features of the Jewish population. First, the higher proportion of self-employed persons and the stress on education proved definite advantages in enhancing the socio-economic rise. Second, the fact that Jews were often pushed to the periphery of the economy, i.e. into light industry and retail distribution, proved very much of a blessing. For it was comparatively easy to expand quickly and successfully in this type of business where little capital but a great deal of enterprise was needed, qualifications often possessed by Jews. Third, we find the Jewish population to be more thoroughly urbanized: of the total Jewish population in the U.K., 62 per cent live in Greater London, and 80 per cent live in the six largest cities; for the total general population in the U.K., the figures are respectively 16 per cent and 24 per cent.[28] Greater urbanization was conducive to the increased number of business men, people in the professions, and those in black-coated occupations, so swelling the ranks of Jews in the middle and upper classes.[29] Fourth, the minority status of the Jew gave a further impetus to his aspiration to rise in the social scale. As a result of these factors the Jewish community has had a higher degree of upward social mobility than the rest of the population. Unfortunately, we have no data which would enable us to analyse in a precise manner the differences in social mobility between Jews and non-Jews.

I shall now consider some of the consequences of the socio-economic changes that have occurred in the community. The higher standard of living and the movement towards the upper and middle classes have produced the accepted outward expressions of higher status. These can be observed in connexion with behaviour, dress, the ownership of certain objects which are symbols of high status, and the taking up of appropriate recreational activities. Perhaps the most impressive external sign of upward social mobility has been the great population shift from the older and poorer areas of settlement to the residential suburbs. Jewish society is in fact fast becoming a 'green-belt society'.

The quest for material comforts on the part of Jews who have entered the higher-income groups, and their efforts to lead a style of life associated with the upper classes, has exposed them to sharp and often cynical criticism. It is true that, because of the rapid rise in the social scale, the individual may have lived much of his earlier life in circumstances typical of the lower-income groups; hence the lack of intimate knowledge of the upper-class pattern of living would result in his 'efforts of stylization becoming identified with consumption activities',[30] which assume far too great an importance. Brian Glanville maintains that 'a competitive anxiety to spend' is noticeable among Jews, and that 'keeping up with the Cohens is a more taxing business than keeping up

with the Joneses'.[31] But it is interesting that, as Howard Brotz points out, 'among the mass of Jews there is a widespread phenomenon of one Jew regarding the efforts of another Jew at stylization not as proper at all but as "ostentation" '.[32] It must be emphasized, however, that the existence of possession of wealth as a criterion in social stratification, and the great demand for material comforts, are true of the general society in which the Jews live. Furthermore, the stress on education and the esteem in which the educated person is held continue to exist in Jewish society, although it is true that the attribute of wealth has assumed an even greater importance. But the Jew in this sense is not atypical of the environment in which he lives, for Western industrialized society is pervaded with materialism and it encourages aggressive competition for status. In fact, because of his more thorough urbanization and greater adaptability to the changing conditions of a fluid social and economic system, the Jew approaches more nearly the 'ideal-type' individual of Western society, with its stress on achievement and the possession of material wealth.

The high degree of social mobility has had its effects on leadership, and has wrought changes in the pattern of social stratification. Brotz, who maintains that Jewish society is still essentially stratified into two social classes, the old-élite[33] and the rest, admits that a process of incipient differentiation is taking place among the newer immigrants and their descendants.[34] This is so in spite of the fact that the lower-income groups, particularly the more refined and educated, do not recognize the newly rich as their superiors, the latter being regarded as lacking in refinement, culture, good taste, etc. Although there is still a high degree of egalitarianism[35] among those labelled by Brotz as 'the rest', he discerns, nevertheless, an emergent stratification. It is particularly true that the issue of the newer immigrants, who have acquired wealth or education, have entered into the leadership of most communal organizations.[36] Whether it was because of the money of the newly rich or the ability of the new professional man, the old élite had to accept them as their colleagues, and the ordinary membership had to recognize them as their leaders. The present trends in the stratification of the Jewish community seem to point to the merging of the old-élite with the newer wealthy elements and the higher professional men to form the upper class, the majority attaining middle-class standards, and the working class all but disappearing.

There is yet another interesting aspect to the rise of the immigrant in the social scale. This is the way such a rise has affected his relationships with the host society and consequently the attitudes of his own group to this phenomenon. The success of the new immigrant in improving his living conditions often gave rise to antisemitism. As Robb puts it: 'One of the most obvious features of the Jewish community appears to have been the number of individuals who succeeded in

rising from a position of abject poverty to a condition which, in the East End, was regarded as tolerably comfortable, and this success was resented by their Gentile neighbours'.[37] The accusations most common in the immediate years after the mass influx of immigrants, that they pushed out the Gentile from his employment by accepting low wages,[38] was followed in later years by accusations of unfair methods of competition practised by Jewish business-men.[39] This type of indictment was taken up seriously by the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Trades Advisory Council. There has been a general tendency in the community to think in terms of the existence of a corporate responsibility for deeds of individual Jews, and to stress the importance of safeguarding the good name of Anglo-Jewry.[40] Divergent opinions have been expressed, however, with regard to the more recent activities of well-known Jewish tycoons. Thus, those who criticized the methods of these tycoons have been accused of timidity by the leader of the Jewish Defence Committee, who at a general meeting of the Trades Advisory Council had this to say: 'When I read in the financial columns about the sphere of influence commanded by [Jewish tycoons] I feel not fear but a sense of warmth and identification with these men which makes me proud.' [41] This attitude was severely attacked by some sections of the community, and it was argued for example that 'the blazoning headlines about enormous take-over bids . . . do not really add anything to the Jewish name',[42] and that even when the Jew was strictly within the law he ought to be moderate in his actions so as to safeguard the welfare and good name of the community as a whole.[43]

From the above we can discern quite clearly the different reactions aroused by the existence of prejudice against the minority, or the awareness of its possible occurrence. On the one hand there are those minority members who will openly fight any prejudices, and defend the rights and privileges of Jews. To this category belong also the Jews who, experiencing discrimination and non-acceptance by the host society, will strive to outdo the non-Jews through achievement in the economic, political, and cultural fields, and through ostentatious behaviour in the realms of fashion, recreation, place of residence, etc. On the other hand there are those who will advocate the necessity to treat the Gentile in a manner so as to reduce his hostility, and to avoid, for example, eliciting his prejudices by ostentation. Their aim is to eliminate prejudices or situations that can bring them about.

Having sketched the major changes in the economic life of the Jewish community, and having considered some of the social consequences, what conclusions can we reach? There are two main aspects to the impressive success story of the once destitute immigrant group which are of particular interest to the sociologist. First, although egalitarian sentiments still linger on in the community, definite plutocratic tendencies have established themselves. This is seen in the manner in

which the wealthy and the top professional people are to a very large extent in the effective leadership of the community. It is also seen in the way the upper strata set the standards of values, which those in the income groups below them tend to emulate. Second, although there persists a minority community with distinctive religious and cultural values, and with the social distance from the host society largely maintained, its members have proved in the economic field to have the very qualifications that are essential for successful living in the urban milieu of industrialized society. The Jew in this sense has become the prototype of the twentieth-century man in Western society.

NOTES

[1] Lloyd P. Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870–1914*, London, 1960, p. 59

[2] V. D. Lipman, 'Trends in Anglo-Jewish Occupations', *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, No. 2, November 1960, p. 202.

[3] Gartner, op. cit., pp. 63–99; and Lipman, op. cit., pp. 209–11.

[4] Gartner, op. cit., chap. IV, pp. 100–114.

[5] H. Neustatter in *A Minority in Britain*, ed. Maurice Freedman, London, 1955, p. 125.

[6] Lipman, op. cit., p. 213.

[7] Neustatter, op. cit., p. 128. See also N. Barou, *The Jews in Work and Trade*, London, 1945, pp. 5–7.

[8] Neustatter, op. cit., p. 125.

[9] Ibid., p. 126.

[10] Ibid., p. 132.

[11] Raymond V. Baron, 'I.U.J.F. Survey, 1954–5', *The Jewish Academy*, London, 1955–6, p. 9.

[12] Lipman, op. cit., p. 202.

[13] Jewish Board of Guardians, *97th Annual Report*, London, 1955, p. 26.

[14] See *Annual Reports* of the Jewish Board of Guardians, London, sections on Boys' Industrial Dept., also Girls' Welfare and Industrial Committee, for the years 1946–59; and *Annual Reports* of the Sabbath Observance Bureau, London, for the years 1952–6.

[15] See Jewish Board of Guardians *Annual Report*, London, 1959, p. 36.

[16] See *Reports* mentioned in note 14.

[17] Ibid.

[18] See *Annual Reports* of the Sabbath Observance Bureau, London, 1955, p. 5.

[19] See *Annual Reports* of the Jewish Board of Guardians, London, 1958, p. 35, and 1946, p. 50.

[20] Paul H. Emden, *Jews of Britain*, London, 1943, p. 496. See also Israel Cohen, *Contemporary Jewry*, London, 1950, p. 107.

[21] Cohen, op. cit., p. 107.

[22] Bernard Harris, 'The People Who Do Not Worship Today', *Sunday Express*, London, 16 Nov. 1958. See also V. D. Lipman, *Social History of the Jews in England, 1850–1950*, London, 1954, p. 174.

[23] Emden, op. cit., p. 478; Neustatter, op. cit., p. 129.

[24] See a series of seven articles entitled 'Advancing Britain's Standards' in *The Jewish Chronicle*, London, between 30 Sept. and 11 Nov. 1960. See also Bernard Harris, op. cit.

[25] Emden, op. cit., p. 475.

[26] Ibid., p. 476.

[27] Ibid., p. 475.

[28] Sources: *Annual Abstract of Statistics*, No. 97, London, 1960, pp. 8, 11; *The Registrar General's Annual Estimates of the Population of England and Wales and Local Authority Areas*, London, 1959, p. 8; *The Jewish Year Book*, London, 1959, pp. 44, 101, 110, 114, 117, 135, and 138.

[29] For the effects of urbanization see: S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, Berkeley, 1959, p. 217; see also W. Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, New York, 1956, pp. 229, 230.

[30] Howard M. Brotz, 'An Analysis of Social Stratification within Jewish Society', unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, Jan. 1951, p. 159.

[31] Brian Glanville, 'Anglo-Jewry's North-West Passage' in *The Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, London, 31 Jan. 1958, p. 11.

[32] Brotz, op. cit., p. 160.

[33] The old-élite is composed of 'families which have become the lay leaders of English Jewry before the mass influx from Eastern Europe and have typically a lineage in England which they can trace from the 18th century', ibid, p. 107.

[34] Ibid., p. 166.

[35] Ibid., p. 261. The factors to which the egalitarianism is due are enumerated in Brotz, pp. 261, 262, etc.

[36] Ibid., pp. 122, 123.

[37] James H. Robb, *Working-Class Anti-Semite*, London, 1954, p. 200.

[38] See *Report from the Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (Foreigners)*, London, 1889, pp. ix, xix, 45, 70, 79.

[39] See Maurice Freedman (ed.), *A Minority in Britain*, London, 1955, pp. 212–23.

[40] Ibid.

[41] See 'Methods of Tycoons', *The Jewish Chronicle*, London, 28th Oct., 1960.

[42] See 'Tycoonism', *The Jewish Post*, London, 18 Nov. 1960.

[43] Ibid.

CHRONICLE

Prepared by

Paul Glikson

ORT is to step up sharply its vocational training and other economic assistance services in France in the light of large-scale immigration of Jews from North Africa.

Professor William Haber, President of ORT, announced that his organization would soon open a new technical training school in Marseilles, where the recent influx from North Africa has increased the size of the Jewish population from 4,000 to 40,000 in the last seven years. Other ORT schools in Paris, Lyons, and Strasbourg will also increase their activities.

*

The Jewish Agency Executive has announced a budget of IL.371 million for 1962 and 1963, instead of IL.278 million adopted before the devaluation which raised the exchange rate from IL.1.80 to IL.3 per dollar, and has pushed up the Agency's pound income derived from funds received from abroad.

The Executive is to spend over IL.77 million on immigration, absorption, and Youth Aliyah, IL.61 million on immigration and housing, and IL.80 million on agricultural settlements.

*

A pamphlet by Hans Lamm, 'Der Eichmann Prozess in der Deutschen Oeffentlichen Meinung' (published by Ner Tamid, Frankfurt/Main, 1961) contains several interesting comparisons of the German reaction to the trial on the one hand, and that in Great Britain, the United States, and Switzerland on the other.

A comparison of the results of the Gallup poll in the three last countries with that of EMNID, the German public opinion poll, reveals the following percentage figures on the question 'What would be the correct way to handle the trial?':

	Gt. Britain	*U.S.A.*	*Switzerland*	*Germany*
Trial by an Israel court	44	44	53	28
Trial by a German court	3	6	3	25
Trial by an international court	32	31	36	32
Let him go free	4	1	2	4
No opinion	17	18	6	11

On the question whether it was good or bad to remind the world about the terrors of the concentration camps, the replies were as follows:

	Gt. Britain	*U.S.A.*	*Switzerland*	*Germany*
Good	56	62	70	34
Bad	29	18	19	45
No opinion	15	20	11	21

Thus it appears that both as regards Israel jurisdiction and, in particular, the usefulness of the trial, German opinion is by far less favourable than that in the other countries. The highest figures both in favour of the trial and of Israel jurisdiction were in Switzerland.

*

The Jews had 'too much influence' in the Federal German Republic according to 18 per cent of a representative sample of the West German population questioned in a sociological survey released by EMNID. 15 per cent declared that the Jews had not enough influence; 25 per cent said that the Jews had just the right amount of influence; and 42 per cent had no opinion on the subject. In comparison, the survey showed that 46 per cent of the population questioned felt that the Catholic clergy had too great an influence; 8 per cent said the same about the Protestant clergy; 37 per cent blamed the trade union leaders; and 59 per cent the banks and large industries.

*

According to statistics compiled by the Central Welfare Agency of the Jews in Germany, the total membership of the Jewish communities in West Germany, including West Berlin, as of 1 July 1961, was 21,685: 11,690 men and 9,995 women.

The total of 21,685 was distributed by age groups as follows:

0–3	4–6	7–15	16–20	21–30	31–40	41–50	51–60	61–70	over 70
439	524	2,011	488	1,167	2,996	3,812	4,434	3,679	2,165

The total of 21,685 was distributed as follows by Laender or community associations:

Baden	682	Nordstein	2,020
Bavaria	3,577	Rhineland-Pfalz	619
Berlin	5,937	Schleswig-Holstein	91
Bremen	124	Westphalia	1,035
Hamburg	1,393	Württemberg-Hohenzollern	698
Hessen	3,246	Saar	412
Cologne	1,153		
Lower Saxony	698		

Besides Berlin, Hamburg, and Cologne, the larger communities were:

Munich	2,236	Hanover	439
Frankfurt	2,658	Dortmund	403
Düsseldorf	952		

*

A survey of Arab education in Israel made by a Knesset committee found that compulsory elementary education is observed by 95 per cent of boys and 75 per cent of girls. Altogether 51,000 boys and girls attend classes at 167 elementary schools and 141 kindergartens established in each of the 138 Arab villages in Israel. The survey emphasizes the need for raising the level of Arab teachers and cites the fact that some 7 per cent of those employed are not fully qualified. It recommended an increase in capacity among Arab teachers, and that the Minister of Education should provide refresher courses for veteran teachers.

The level of secondary-school education was a cause for concern and the survey urged the Minister of Education to effect special measures to raise standards. The survey also recommended the increased publication of textbooks in all elementary and high-school subjects.

*

Since 1948 some 10,000 Jews from Latin American countries have settled in Israel: 5,200 came from Argentina, 1,500 from Brazil, 1,000 from Chile, 500 from Cuba, 30 from Mexico, and the rest from other Latin American countries. At the beginning most of the newcomers came to work in the *kibbutzim*, though later the majority left and settled in the towns. Among the recent arrivals there were a number of people with academic training, mainly medical, and most of them are at present working in the Negev district.

THE JEWISH POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN[1]

Maurice Freedman

ONE of the most significant things about Jews in Britain is that we do not know how many there are. It is usually supposed nowadays that they number something like 450,000 in a total population of about 53 millions, but the ways in which estimates of Anglo-Jewish numbers are arrived at involve a good deal of guesswork. (The *Jewish Year Book* gives figures for the Jewish population of various centres and a number of partial surveys have been made.[2]) Our ignorance of the precise dimensions of Anglo-Jewry springs from the very nature of the society of which it is a part. Nobody has counted the Jews in Britain because, neither as followers of a religion nor as members of an ethnic group, have they any specific relationship to the political system. I do not mean, of course, that the state does not recognize that Jews require special treatment in certain circumstances; the courts of law may support the Jewish religious authorities in the performance of their duties *vis-à-vis* the Jewish public; Jewish dietary needs were accommodated during food rationing; government offices may sometimes make use of Jewish communal organizations; and so on. But always in theory and largely in practice Jews in Britain are simply citizens without any special status such as would call for their separate enumeration. Nor, on the other hand, is there a Jewry in Britain which is so differentiated from the rest of society and so organized internally as to make it possible for Jews to count themselves. The demography of Anglo-Jewry is vague precisely because Anglo-Jewry as a structural entity is vague.

In such social circumstances as are given in Britain one would expect the rather tedious game of defining the Jew to flourish. And indeed it flourishes, bringing out very clearly how Jews see the ambiguity in a term which can never embrace a discrete segment of the population of Britain. Even if there were ritually and ideologically one Jewish 'church' (which there is not), many people calling themselves Jews would slip through the net of a definition of Jewry by religious criteria. Religion apart, there is no such thing in Britain as a Jewish culture involving the greater part of the 450,000 individuals commonly accepted as being

Jews. There is no general Jewish language. Even among the immediate descendants of the immigrants from Eastern Europe Yiddish has largely disappeared as an unbroken language. Ladino speakers are numerically negligible. Hebrew as a modern tongue is sparsely known and used. Nor, except in a very limited sense, could one say that Jews have developed their own brand of English. Jewish cultural habits there are in plenty, but they are not integrated or widespread enough to constitute a specific way of life peculiar to all or most Jews.

I am not proposing here to play the game of defining the Jews. All that can usefully be said in a short paper is that Anglo-Jewry is a category of people in which every individual shares some Jewish characteristics with many other individuals but which is not uniform in its Jewish properties. In what follows I shall try to show very briefly how this category of the British population is distributed geographically and occupationally and how far its demographic and social circumstances are likely to ensure its survival.

Jews living in Britain are concentrated in the large urban centres. All but about 15 per cent of them are to be found in London, Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow, Liverpool, and Birmingham, Greater London by itself accounting for about 65 per cent of Anglo-Jewry. Within the cities they inhabit Jews tend to congregate in certain areas and to create for themselves there conditions which are less than those of the 'ghetto' and more than those of the ordinary Gentile environment. The synagogues, Jewish voluntary associations, *kasher* butcher shops, and Jewish groceries are not the centres of compact Jewish sectors, but rather the nuclei of Jewish populations which live interspersed with non-Jewish neighbours. These areas of concentration may take on a decidedly Jewish flavour, but they are not large Jewish quarters in the same way as the East End of London and some districts of the provincial cities were once Jewish enclaves. The mass influx of Eastern European Jews into Britain in the last decades of the nineteenth century set up the East End and some provincial centres as replicas of the continental compact settlements. At the height of the immigration East London held about 90 per cent of metropolitan Jewry. But the English 'ghettoes' were not to last. As far as London is concerned, early in this century (and especially after the First World War) Jews flowed out of the East End along a northern route which marked various stages in the process of social as well as physical mobility. As they grew more prosperous they moved further north, not, as Dr. H. M. Brotz has correctly argued,[3] because they were running away from their fellow-Jews, but because they were seeking a Jewish environment of a higher social standing. In our own day Golders Green, Hendon, and Edgware have marked terminal points of the migratory route from the East End.

If I may linger for a moment more on the general London movement in search of a good address, I should like to stress that the northern

route does not show a procession of 'ghettoes' but a line of Jewish areas which are evaluated partly by their standing in the wider English world. The status of an area depends in large measure on what non-Jews think of it, and if an area becomes too wholly Jewish and loses value in non-Jewish eyes then it ceases to be completely desirable to Jews. One of Dr. Brotz's informants commented on Golders Green: 'Ha! This isn't such a marvellous place any more. You know what they're calling it now? Goldstein Green.'[4] This is one index of the essential character of Jewish life in Britain: Jews like to be among Jews but not to the extent of cutting themselves off from the wider society, in which they wish to circulate freely and equally.

When the East European Jews arrived in large numbers in the 1880s they changed the complexion of the small Anglo-Jewry which had evolved since the Resettlement in the latter part of the seventeenth century. This long-established Jewry had become anglicized and made for itself many comfortable niches in the economy of the country. The new immigrants were not only exotic; they furnished Anglo-Jewry with a sizeable poor class.[5] Yet within a couple of generations this poor class had disintegrated along with the East End and provincial 'ghettoes'. Exploiting the business opportunities open to them and making good use of the public education freely available, many Eastern European Jews rose to middle-class status and moved to the new Jewish areas.

I do not, of course, mean that no Jewish working class remains; indeed it does; but Jewry in Britain has as a whole a decidedly middle-class complexion. Moreover, the occupations of working-class Jews rarely fall within the range of those with the lowest income and prestige in society at large. I cannot offer to present a clear picture of Anglo-Jewish occupational structure, because the data are quite inadequate. But I can try to bring together a number of pointers which indicate how the economic life of Jews differs considerably from that of their non-Jewish neighbours.

Jews in Britain are usually thought to be characteristically business men of one sort and another. The popular notion is of course exaggerated, but business, especially on a small or medium scale, certainly plays an important part in the economy of Anglo-Jewry. In the immediate post-war period there was some reason for thinking that between 15 and 20 per cent of gainfully occupied Jews were in trade and industry on their own account,[6] while another estimate of 'Britain's Jewish traders and businessmen' made them account for about one-seventh of the Jewish male population over the age of 15.[7] It may well be that these figures are considerable underestimates,[8] and it is certain that in the smaller Jewish settlements the business men play a prominent role. Certainly, owing to the Jewish attachment to small-scale business, Jews working on their own account are proportionally several times more numerous than non-Jews working on their own account.

Jewish economic life tends to be specialized, falling largely within the field of the manufacturer and distribution of consumer goods. The role of the Jews as entrepreneurs and workers in the clothing industry, for example, is so well known as to need little stressing. In 1932 there were some 40,000 Jewish workers in the industry,[9] although this number has declined in recent years.[10]

Anglo-Jewry also reflects the tendency for Jews in the diaspora to find their way into the professions when these occupations are open to them and opportunities for training are available. There appears to be a high proportion of Jews studying in the universities, and it is likely that the professionalization of Anglo-Jewry has not yet reached its peak. On the basis of an estimate made in 1954–5 it would seem that, while Jews form less than one per cent of the total population there was one Jew in about every thirty university students.[11] Medicine, law, and accountancy attract Jews in considerable numbers, but some also engage in research and teaching in the sciences and humanities. In a paper published after the war, Redcliffe Salaman showed that Jews had gradually increased their proportion of the Fellows of the Royal Society until in 1948 five per cent of the Fellows were people of full Jewish parentage.[12]

I turn now to the demographic aspects of my subject. Up to the present the Jewish population has shown a steady rise in numbers and has managed to increase its proportion of the total population. During this century the percentage of Jews in the total population has doubled. But of course the numerical progress of Anglo-Jewry has been the product of immigration from Eastern and Central Europe. Now Anglo-Jewry can no longer look to a great accession from abroad, and even the few Jews who trickle in merely compensate for the few who leave the country. As the Jews have become a stabilized population without prospect of large additions from abroad, people have begun to wonder whether they can maintain their numbers by natural increase. In her survey of population questions Dr. Neustatter has argued that at least during the last decades the natural increase of Jews has been negligible, 'if in fact there has been any at all'.[13] Jews in Britain continue to set a high value on the married state (although they seem to marry later than both their forebears and their non-Jewish compatriots in general), but they do not appear to bring up enough children to ensure that the future Jewish population will be able to stand at the same level. The pattern of fertility in Anglo-Jewry follows that prevalent in middle-class Britain in general, but it seems to exaggerate the tendency towards the deliberate restriction of child-bearing. Anglo-Jewry may be on the point of numerical decline. If this conclusion from admittedly imperfect data is correct, then clearly we need some careful research to show us why Jews in Britain have become relatively infertile parents. The reason cannot be simply that Jews are highly urbanized

and middle class, because their urbanization is nothing new and it is possible that they are less fertile than the Gentile middle class. I shall merely mention, without implying that I have any supporting evidence, the possibility that the low replacement rate may be connected in some areas of Anglo-Jewry with a state of uncertainty and insecurity.

The threat of the low replacement rate is a demographer's preoccupation. From the public point of view the menace to Jewish numbers comes from mixed marriages, and there is sometimes lamentation about the extent to which Jews marry non-Jews in Britain. Owing to the emotional implications of intermarriage, people characteristically often confuse the issue of population loss which results, or may result, from marriage out of the faith, with the breach of group integrity which follows even from marriage with converts to Judaism. If intermarriage regularly occurred with converts Jewry would not be likely to suffer a loss. However, partly owing to the difficulties which are put in the way of the Christian who wishes to be converted to Judaism (at least in the orthodox congregations), most Jewish-Gentile marriages are outside the faith as well as outside the group.

As in all numerical matters connected with Anglo-Jewry, we have no exact material on intermarriage, but a number of estimates have been made in recent times. At a conference of Anglo-Jewish preachers in 1953 the percentage of marriages by Jews out of the faith was put at 10 and possibly 12·5.[14] It has been suggested that this proportion is exceeded, sometimes considerably, in the smaller Jewish settlements. By questioning fifty Jewish soldiers in hospital in 1944–5 about their marriages and those of their brothers and sisters, Dr. Eliot Slater found that 17·5 per cent of the unions were mixed.[15] Dr. Neustatter, surveying the thin data on the subject, concludes that 12 per cent is a plausible figure for the proportion of out-marriages in all marriages by Jews in present-day Britain.[16]

In Dr. Slater's small sample more Jewesses married out than Jews, but I think we are justified in believing that, in conformity with the general world pattern, Jews in Britain marry out more frequently than Jewesses.[17] We have no studies of the religious and social alignment of the children of mixed marriages, but it is possible that the offspring of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father are more likely to identify themselves as Jews than the children of the opposite kind of intermarriage. When these matters come to be properly investigated people will have to ask themselves about the kinship structure among both Jews and non-Jews to estimate the weight given to the tie between mother and married daughter and the extent to which men are attached to their wives rather than their parents. The children of a mixed marriage may perhaps more readily be thrown in the direction of their mother's than their father's kin.

While mixed marriages apparently occur with some frequency, there

seems to be little doubt that the sentiment against marriage-out in Anglo-Jewry is general and strong. This sentiment is matched by the emotional resistance to converts which, while it may be given a purely religious justification, is equally an aspect of group solidarity. Marriage is an exchange. Groups may emerge in society which maintain their identity by confining certain kinds of exchanges (especially those of a highly intimate and emotionally charged nature) to their own ranks. People who break the rules and marry out are guilty of allowing precious relations and symbols to leak, so to say, out of the group. For this reason intermarriage is regarded as a threat to group integrity and a cause of its decline. In reality, of course, it is more likely that intermarriage is the result of the decline in group solidarity rather than its cause. Individuals doubtless marry out when their ties to their group are already loosened.

But may we conclude that Anglo-Jewry is falling to pieces because of mixed marriage? The general sentiment against it testifies to the existence of a 'community' feeling among Jews, even though, in the circumstances of British society, the Jewish community is difficult to define and delimit. I fancy that, before we have material drawn from thorough sociological study, we should be wary of reading too much into the estimated statistics such as those I have cited. It seems to me that it would be quite wrong to assume on the basis of our present knowledge that intermarriage has opened a door through which Anglo-Jewry will shortly pass into oblivion. Perhaps the situation really is that people are dropping away from the margins of Anglo-Jewry through intermarriage, and it is likely that the erosion is heaviest in the smallest settlements. It is important to remember that the admission of Jews into positions of power and high status has not depended in modern times on the relinquishment of their Jewishness, and that intermarriage is not a condition of 'assimilation'. In earlier days a mixed marriage might be a step in social advancement; at the present there is less need for a Jew to mask his origin when he pursues high status in his society. Indeed, it is even possible that today mixed marriages are more common in the lower class levels of Anglo-Jewry; Jewish solidarity may be stronger precisely among those Jews who have a wider command of power and prestige in society at large.

Let us assume, however, for the sake of argument that both mixed marriages and a low replacement rate are pushing Anglo-Jewry towards a decline. It does not follow that what is most characteristically Jewish in Britain will diminish in the same degree, because it is possible that the losses of population are taking place on the fringes of Anglo-Jewry where Jewishness is least intense. But what does Jewishness mean in the British context and how are we to assess the persistence of Jewish institutions and ways of life?

Obviously we should look first at the survival of Judaism. The figures

for synagogue membership are by no means easy to compile and interpret, but perhaps some third or more of all Jewish adult men are members of synagogues. (The proportion of Jews who make use of the synagogues is of course much larger than this fraction.)[18] Although the character of Judaism in Britain is generally of an orthodox cast, synagogue membership is distributed over a range of congregations which span the ritual and theological gap between extreme orthodoxy and Liberal Judaism. There is some sort of connexion between the practice of the various forms of the religion and general class position, while the shifts in ritual and theology made in the name of reform are aspects of the process of anglicization. Now of course, from the point of view of an orthodox Jew, the practice of less orthodox Judaism is a mark of Jewish decline; from a sociological angle, however, attempts to 'modernize' Judaism and make its practice easier for Jews caught up in a Gentile environment can be taken as evidence that the religion is surviving by adapting. In Britain the process of adaptation has not been taken as far as in some other parts of the diaspora where a good deal of Jewish religious activity seems to have been emptied of much of its Judaism. The situation in the United States, for example, appears to show that Jewish solidarity can be made in large measure to turn upon diluted forms of Judaism. It may be that in Britain as time goes on we shall see a growing recourse to less rigorous forms of the religion, but if this happens it will be as much a sign of Jewish entrenchment as a decline in the purity of traditional orthodoxy. In Britain the choice between being a practising Jew and a secularized Jew is not an easy one to make, because to be a completely secularized Jew where Jewry has no political significance is in a sense to be no Jew at all. There are of course completely secularized Jews in Britain, but they are clearly in an ambiguous position. Less orthodox versions of Judaism in the diaspora are compromises in the cause of remaining Jewish.

There is another way in which a Jew can be Jewish without practising Judaism. He may be a secular nationalist. Yet in Britain the purely secular forms of Zionism are not very conspicuous. Support for Israel from both religious and not very religious Jews there is in plenty, but there is little evidence that secular Zionism furnishes on any considerable scale the basis for solidarity among Jews devoid of Judaism.

To an outside observer, especially one from Israel, the Jewishness of Jews in Britain must often appear a rather queer amalgam of Judaism and a number of Jewish cultural oddities. Some Jews are caught up in the network of voluntary associations which variously serve the vague thing called the community. The Jewishness of other Jews may seem to rest on nothing more than a preference for spending their leisure time in Jewish company and their holidays in certain hotels in seaside resorts. Certainly, Anglo-Jewry is not remarkable for the intensity of its Jewish life and culture. It is perhaps the very openness and free-

dom of British society which, by taking the pressure off Jews to be consistently and continuously Jewish, is largely responsible for allowing its Jewry to perpetuate itself with the minimum of Jewish culture. The tolerance of British society both encourages Jews to stay Jewish and allows them to be less Jewish than traditionalists would like them to be. In an important sense Anglo-Jewry is the product of British society. As it has developed within the framework of this society, Anglo-Jewry has come to have little corporate existence, and its lack of cultural vigour may well be the price it pays for its freedom from the external pressure to constitute a political and legally defined body. In its organization and ideas Anglo-Jewry is very much the child of Britain.[19]

I should like to end this paper with a remark which no doubt will have already suggested itself in every statement of fact I have made. The demography and sociology of Anglo-Jewry have been so little developed that the Jews in one of the most important settlements in the diaspora are, from the point of view of these disciplines, virtually unknown ground.[20] The Jewish minority is well worth investigating as part and parcel of British society; from the standpoint of the diaspora the British variant of Jewry seems to offer some considerable interest; seen from Israel, Anglo-Jewry excites a certain curiosity. It is time that we found some way of getting the demographers and sociologists to work on Britain's Jews.

NOTES

[1] A slightly revised version of a paper read at the Second World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1957, in the section 'Demography of the Jews'. Statements about 'the present' generally refer to the time at which the paper was written.

[2] See Hannah Neustatter, 'Demographic and Other Statistical Aspects of Anglo-Jewry', pp. 63 ff., in Maurice Freedman, ed., *A Minority in Britain: Social Studies of the Anglo-Jewish Community*, London, 1955. See also S. J. Prais, 'Statistical Publications on the Jewish Population of Great Britain: A Bibliography', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, No. 1, April 1959.

[3] 'The Outlines of Jewish Society in London', p. 148, in Freedman, ed., op. cit. In writing this paper I have also consulted Dr. Brotz's paper, *A Survey of the Position of the Jews in England*. The American Jewish Committee Library of Jewish Information, 1957, mimeographed, now published as 'The Position of the Jews in English Society', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, No. 1, April 1959.

[4] Brotz, 'The Outlines of Jewish Society in London', p. 149.

[5] Now, on this subject, see Lloyd P. Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870–1914*, London, 1960.

[6] N. Barou, *The Jews in Work and Trade*, The Trades Advisory Council, 3rd edn., London, 1948, p. 7.

[7] Maurice Freedman, 'Jews in the Society of Britain', pp. 217, 221, in Freedman, ed., op. cit.

[8] Cf. Neustatter, op. cit., pp. 126 ff. Now see a fuller treatment of the whole subject: V. D. Lipman, 'Trends in Anglo-Jewish Occupations', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, No. 2, November 1960, and E. Krausz, 'Occupation and Social Advancement in Anglo-Jewry', in this issue of the *Journal*.

[9] Barou, op. cit., p. 9.

[10] Freedman, op. cit., p. 222n.

[11] Based on the result of a survey conducted by the Inter-University Jewish Federation of Great Britain and Ireland

with the assistance of the World Jewish Congress Cultural Department, under the direction of Mr. Raymond V. Baron.

[12] Cited in Neustatter, op. cit., pp. 131 f.

[13] Ibid., p. 68.

[14] See *The Jewish Chronicle*, 8 May 1953, p. 9.

[15] 'A Note on Jewish-Christian Intermarriage', *Eugenics Review*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, April 1947, and 'A Biological View on Anti-Semitism', *Jewish Monthly*, November 1947.

[16] Neustatter, op. cit., p. 94. See also I. W. Slotki, 'Increase of Mixed Marriages among British Jews', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 January 1956.

[17] Freedman, op. cit., p. 234.

[18] Cf. Freedman, op. cit., p. 230.

[19] On this point see especially V. D. Lipman, 'Development of the Community', and Max Beloff, 'From the Other Side', in *The Jewish Chronicle Special Supplement, Tercentenary of the Resettlement of the Jews in the British Isles, 1656–1956*, 27 January 1956. I should also refer to Dr. Lipman's book, *Social History of the Jews in England, 1850–1950*, London, 1954, and V. D. Lipman, ed., *Three Centuries of Anglo-Jewish History, A Volume of Essays*, London, 1961.

[20] For a recent field study see Ernest Krausz, 'An Anglo-Jewish Community: Leeds', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III, No. 1, June 1961.

JACOB LESTSCHINSKY—ON HIS EIGHTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY

Alexander Manor

FOR the past three years Jacob Lestschinsky, the social and economic historian of the Jewish people, has been living in Israel. During this time he has continued to engage in research and has further enriched our knowledge of Jewish sociological studies. Lestschinsky's voluminous work marks an important advance in Jewish sociology. It embraces nearly all the fields of Jewish learning on Jewish society during the last few generations: sociology, demography, statistics, economics, and historiography. Lestschinsky paved the way for the study of Jewish demography and statistics and laid the foundations for research into Jewish population growth and migration. As a sociologist, he was one of the pioneers of research into the class and occupational structure of Jewish society in the Diaspora. As an economist, he was one of the most important scholars to found a new branch of Jewish learning and put it on a firm basis: the study of the unique economic structure of the Jewish people. Jewish statistics, demography, sociology, and economics, at first studied independently, furnished Lestschinsky with a basis for a new study of Jewish historiography, his unique economic and social history of the Jewish people during the last century and a half.

It is appropriate, therefore, to classify his pioneer scientific achievements into two principal categories, each organically connected with the other:

(*a*) The scientific study of Jewish society in the Diaspora (statistics, demography, sociology, and economics).

(*b*) The social and economic history of the Jewish people during the past few generations.

The Sociologist

Lestschinsky was the first to make a thorough analysis of the social and class structure of Diaspora Jewry. In his first work, *Statistics of a Township*, he had already reached the conclusion that the social and class structure of the Jewish people and its economic structure were

nothing but two sides of the same coin. The occupational and the class structure of the Jewish community stemmed from the unique character of its economy. Thus, for instance, it is impossible to separate the study of Jewish economy from that of the social position of the Jewish worker; the vulnerable structure of the Jewish proletariat in the Diaspora stemmed from the unique Jewish economy.

The first important surveys of the Jewish proletariat in the era of rising capitalism, its birth, position, development, national characteristics, and desperate struggles—all are the fruits of Lestschinsky's pen. He has given us the classic survey of the early period of the Jewish worker in the Diaspora, and has taught us to identify and understand the development of the Jewish workers' movement. He has surveyed the budding of the Jewish proletariat during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first part of this century in its true colours. Similarly, he has described the character of the Jewish bourgeoisie and its unique social position in a nation without autonomy. The study of the social and occupational structure of the Jewish township with which Lestschinsky began his scientific studies encouraged him to continue and to examine social, class, and occupational differences in Jewries throughout the world.

Statistician and Demographer

Lestschinsky was one of the founders of a comprehensive statistics and demography of the Jewish people from a specifically independent national point of view. Until his work the Jewish population had been compared with 'the general population'. Lestschinsky, in his study of Russian Jewry, for the first time broke down the conception of a 'general population' into its national components. Official statistics did not usually take into account the fact that 'the general population' was divided into different nationalities, one of them being the Jewish people.

Thus Lestschinsky opened up new paths in statistical research as he depicted Jewish life in the context of national differences. He painted a picture against the background of complicated national relationships that was altogether unlike what had hitherto emerged. We are suddenly confronted with a living panorama of great clarity, in which Jewish life can be discerned as part of bitter national struggle. This way of looking at things explained many events which until then had appeared strange and inexplicable. The yardstick which Lestschinsky employed was first and foremost ethnic origin and national language.

He perceived that the decisive factor was not the overall figure of the population of a given state, but the ethnic structure of each state: the national composition of particular areas, zones, and places of settlement (cities, towns, and villages). He used Russian statistical material in this way for the first time in order to cover certain national zones and areas. The statistical and demographic material on Jewish life which he col-

lected, collated, organized, and sifted became the basis of the science of Jewish statistics. Lestschinsky turned himself into a one-man research institute, visiting numerous Jewish communities, collecting the material bit by bit, fact by fact.

Thus we can only wonder at the tremendous effort he invested in laying the foundations of Jewish demography. It is a miracle how the problems of birth and death rates, natural increase, and migration and all problems connected with the growth of the Jewish people during the past 150 years were clarified, and how it was possible to draw important conclusions from demographic facts relating to the Jews in various countries. No one who has no direct knowledge of Jewish demography can imagine the difficulties he had to surmount and the bitter disappointments lying in wait for the scholar wishing to draw a faithful and complete demographic picture of Jewish life.

Economist

Before Lestschinsky appeared on the scene Jewish statistics had not dealt with Jewry as a whole, but with stray communities dispersed in different countries. Common features which bound all these groups into a single national-economic-social unit were untreated.

From the very beginning of his scientific work Lestschinsky assumed that there existed a single and distinct Jewish people. He concluded from his researches that Jewish people everywhere had a distinct national cast which distinguished them from the surrounding population. There were differences in age and sex distribution, birth rate, number of illegitimate children, number of still births, mortality rate, marriage rate, number of mixed marriages and their ultimate influence on the offspring of such marriages, the number of sick persons (according to types of illness), mental cases, number of criminals and type of crimes committed, etc.

He began to examine the reasons for these differences more closely. Others had previously sought to explain them as having their roots in racial origin and in the spiritual teachings or moral outlook of Judaism. He, however, postulated neither racial nor spiritual causes to explain the fundamental demographic, cultural, and moral differences to be found. He began to look for economic and political reasons. He examined the realities of the situation of the Jews in various countries. It became clear to him that the unique economic and political structure of the Jewish population to a great extent explained the demographic differences between the Jews and the surrounding population, and that the unique economic-occupational structure common to Jews everywhere was the decisive factor in keeping them together as a national unit, making it possible for the Jews to preserve their unity and develop an independent cultural and spiritual life. It therefore seemed essential to develop a new branch of Jewish learning, a special study of

economics which would examine the Jewish situation and be concerned with the study of the specific economic structure of the Jewish people.

The Jews were generally concentrated in cities and engaged in light industry, trade, clerical occupations, and the free professions. What distinguished the Jewish people was first and foremost their detachment from the soil, their urbanization, their mono-occupational structure, and their concentration into certain particular and specific economic spheres.

In his many scientific works Lestschinsky argued that in all the East European countries almost all the Jews had for centuries been engaged in trade. In the nineteenth century artisan-type industry was intensively developed by the Jews. This development became so pronounced that in many towns and cities the great majority of workshops were owned by Jews, particularly in those sectors of industry (generally termed 'Jewish') such as tailoring, hat manufacture, carpentry, etc., which in many cases were 100 per cent Jewish owned. The fact that a whole sector of industry was in Jewish hands made Jewish life more self-sufficient and less dependent on the surrounding language and culture. Thus the Jewish economy had a direct bearing upon the emergence of social isolation and a national form of existence, and became a source of national and social strength.

Agricultural economy came last in the Jewish economic pattern in every country in the Diaspora, whether it was the most highly or the least developed. Trade and industry (mainly the artisan type) accounted for the highest proportion of Jews everywhere, even in the less developed countries, to the amount of 70 to 80 per cent.

In all sectors of the economy the proportion of independent owners was found to be higher among Jews than among non-Jews. The inclination towards independence and the development of private enterprise and initiative were a phenomenon typical of Jews all over the world. The result was that there were no Jews, or at least only a very small number of them, to be found among the lowest strata of the proletariat, i.e. farm labourers or city manual workers. They took no part, or only a very small part, in heavy industry. They were found to be generally concentrated in small trade, light industry, or the artisan type of industry, where their chances of independence were greater.

This phenomenon, which had a one-sided effect on the occupational structure and the social grouping of the Jews, was the factor that underlay the economic character of the Jewish population in the Diaspora.

Historiographer

The study of Jewish history in the last 150 years was to a great extent one-sided until the coming of Lestschinsky. In general it concentrated upon the spiritual-cultural and legal-political aspects of Jewish life and almost entirely ignored economic and social factors. This omission was

remedied by Lestschinsky's work. He began to examine Jewish history from the economic and class aspect and he interpreted each event that took place in Jewish life on the basis of the social and economic facts.

Lestschinsky began his scientific work first and foremost by accumulating statistical and economic material at first hand. He laid emphasis not on opening up new avenues of theory by facile conjecture or mere generalization, but literally on the amassing of facts about the economic and social life of the Jews country by country, on the accumulation of the bricks with which he could construct a historical-social-economic edifice of the Jewish people. Thus it is impossible to gain a proper understanding of Jewish history during the past 150 years without reference to Lestschinsky's scientific contribution. He recorded the social and economic cataclysms which made their impact on the Jews in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.

He excelled in the art of blending the facts accumulated from the silent records of documents and the facts drawn from living material. The man of science and historian of the social and economic history of the Jewish people on the one side and the painter from real life on the other combined in Lestschinsky in a single personality, whose heart was touched by the sufferings of his people.

His works are historical documents which he assembled with his own hands, by his own ears, and his own eyes. The most important aspect of his surveys is the pictures of Jewish life they contain and, as he himself points out, they are a slice of daily life: Jews in the market-place, in workshops, in factories, in the street, in welfare institutions, Jews fighting over a crust of bread, Jews hounded by antisemitism, organized and unorganized.

In contrast to the scholar of the past immersed in archives and afraid to descend into the vale of tears of the present, Lestschinsky took as the subject of his study the living Jewish present, with its pain and turmoil, and plunged himself into it to the bitter end.

His principal work as historiographer was his comprehensive study covering the stages of the rise and decline of the Jews in Germany and of the Jews in Russia and Poland.

On Lestschinsky's sixtieth birthday Professor Simon Dubnow congratulated him in the following words: 'I should like to congratulate you on your birthday publicly, my dear friend, since all your works have been made public for the past few decades, all your publications so rich in content and your scientific economic and social studies. I remember our walks together in Berlin and how we talked about our literary plans. With what praiseworthy enthusiasm you explained to me your ideas of writing a systematic economic history of the Jewish people in the last few centuries. I encouraged you with some historical examples. In my opinion you are the man to undertake this pioneer work since to you has been granted the gift of being able to breathe life

into history and to penetrate to its soul. We are listening to what you have to say, we are studying your work.

'Guard your health and strength from the strains and stresses of this wicked and ugly world' (*Literarische Bletter*, Warsaw, 27.11.1936).

Dubnow saw Lestschinsky as his successor and one who would complete the study of the history of the Jews.

In February 1959 Lestschinsky settled in Israel and continued his literary and scientific work in his own country. He makes regular contributions to journals both in Israel and abroad. Before he came to Israel Lestschinsky transferred to the Hebrew University his library containing thousands of books and his archival material including rare documents, which he had amassed for decades—a valuable store for the study of the history of the Jewish communities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

We offer our congratulations to the social and economic historian of the Jewish people on reaching his eighty-fifth birthday and hope that he may have many years of life to come.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF J. LESTSCHINSKY'S WORK

[1] *The Jewish Worker in Russia* (Yiddish), Vilna, 1906.

[2] *The Jewish Worker in London* (Yiddish), Vilna, 1907.

[3] *Marx and Kautsky on the Jewish Problem* (Russian), Moscow, 1907.

[4] *Jewish Economic Life in Russia in the 19th Century* (Yiddish), Kiev, 1917.

[5] *The Economic Life of the Jews as reflected in Yiddish Literature* (Yiddish), Minsk, 1919.

[6] *The Jewish People in Figures* (Yiddish), Berlin, 1922.

[7] *The Truth about the Jews in Russia* (Yiddish), Berlin, 1925.

[8] *Jewish Migrations in the Last 25 Years* (Yiddish), Berlin, 1927.

[9] *Problems of Jewish Demography* (German), 1926, Publ. International Congress for Demography, Padua, Italy.

[10] *The Beginnings of Jewish Emigration and Colonization in the 19th Century* (Yiddish), Berlin, 1929.

[11] *Between Life and Death* (*Ten Years of Jewish Life in the Soviet Union*) (Yiddish), Vilna, 1930.

[12] *The Economic Situation of the Jews in Poland* (Yiddish), Vilna, 1932.

[13] *The Economic Fate of the Jewish People in Germany* (German), Berlin, 1932.

[14] *The Jewish People in the New Europe* (Hebrew, Yiddish, French), Paris, 1934.

[15] *The Economic Situation of the Jews in Central and Eastern Europe* (Yiddish, Hebrew), Paris, 1934, Tel-Aviv, 1935.

[16] *Economic Destruction of Jews in Germany and Poland* (German), Paris, 1936.

[17] *The Jews in Soviet Russia* (Yiddish, Hebrew), New York, 1940.

[18] *Where are we going?* (Yiddish, Hebrew), New York, Tel-Aviv, 1940.

[19] *The Jewish Catastrophe* (Yiddish), New York, 1944.

[20] *At the Edge of the Abyss* (Yiddish), Buenos Aires, 1947.

[21] *Crisis, Catastrophe, Survival* (English), New York, 1948.

[22] *On the Eve of Destruction* (Yiddish), Buenos Aires, 1951.

[23] *The National Face of Galuth Jewry* (Yiddish, Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1953, Buenos Aires, 1955.

[24] *The Jews in Galuth* (*The socio-economic development of Jewry in Europe and America in the Last Generations*) (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1961.

[25] *The Dispersion of Contemporary Jewry* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1961.

JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION: A NOTE ON STUDENTS AND GRADUATES

Alec Nove

OUR knowledge of nationality statistics concerning Soviet students has been greatly expanded by the publication in mid-1961 of a new statistical compendium, *Vyssheye obrazovanie v S.S.S.R.* ('Higher education in the U.S.S.R.'). It contains figures on a relatively recent year, the academic year 1960–1, and the following data are derived from this source—except that population statistics are derived from the 1959 census returns.

Republic	*Total students*	*Of which, Jews*	*Percentage of Jews in no. of students*	*Percentage of Jews in population*
Russian Federal Republic	1,496,097	46,555	3·1	0·7
Ukraine	417,748	18,673	4·4	2·0
Belorussia	59,296	3,020	5·1	1·9
Uzbekistan	101,271	2,902	2·9	1·2
Kazakhstan	77,135	837	1·1	n.a.
Georgia	56,322	910	1·6	1·3
Azerbaidzhan	36,017	906	2·5	n.a.
Lithuania	26,713	413	1·6	0·9
Moldavia	19,217	1,225	6·4	3·3
Latvia	21,568	800	3·7	1·7
Kirghizia	17,379	263	1·6	n.a.
Tadzhikistan	19,519	391	2·0	n.a.
Armenia	20,165	52	0·2	n.a.
Turkmenistan	13,151	104	0·8	n.a.
Estonia	13,507	126	0·9	0·5
Total, U.S.S.R.	2,395,545	77,177	3·2	1·1

n.a. = not available

The six republics for which no Jewish population statistics are available contained a total of 95,000 Jews and 2,553 Jewish students, representing respectively 0·4 per cent of the total population and 1·4 per cent of the students.

All these figures include evening and external students. The detailed data show that the Jews tend, in some republics (for instance the Ukraine), to have a below-average share in the number of day (i.e. full-time) students compared

with the share in the less favoured other categories. In the Ukraine, of the 417,748 students, 198,992 were day students, or 47·5 per cent. The others were evening or external students. For the Jews the total was 18,673, of which 7,007 were day students, or 37·5 per cent. In the Russian republic, however, there was no significant difference. About 40 per cent of all Jewish students are women, which is close to the all-U.S.S.R. average among students in general.

It is interesting to note that the absolute number of Jewish students in the Russian republic has fallen since 1956–7, when, as cited in my article in this Journal (Vol. III, No. 1), they amounted to 51,463. As already suggested there, the Russian republic contains a quite disproportionate number of Jewish students (about three-fifths of the total), no doubt because so many of the Jewish population live in Moscow and Leningrad and are on a high cultural level. In the Ukraine, things are much less satisfactory. But even there, and also in other republics where Jews live in large numbers, their share in the student population is well in excess of their share in the total population—though obviously a *numerus clausus* can exist.

The above-cited figures may give an over-favourable impression because the Jews live mostly in the large cities, whence a very large proportion of the total body come; it is quite possible that the Jewish citizens of Kiev or Kharkov find it much harder to get a university place than do other citizens of these towns, even though a larger proportion of Jews than other inhabitants of the Ukraine receive higher education.

Another new table gives the total numbers of 'specialists with higher education engaged in the national economy' on 1 December 1960. The words 'national economy' certainly include medicine, teaching, etc., and the figures can be taken to equal the active population with higher education. The figures are:

	All specialists	*Of which, women*
Total	3,545,234	1,864,644
Of which: Russians	2,070,333	1,190,250
Ukrainians	517,729	259,146
Jews	290,707	141,847

The Jewish percentage of the total, about 8 per cent, is over seven times their proportion in the total population. It represents nearly 13 per cent of the total Jewish population of all ages. The location of all nationalities by republics is also given, which enables one to observe, *inter alia*, that 4,148 Jewish 'specialists' are in Kazakhstan, 1,800 in Lithuania, and so on.

There is indirect evidence that the percentage of Jews in the total number of specialists has rather substantially fallen. This can be deduced from the omission of Jews from the table in the compendium (p. 69) comparing 1941 with 1960. True, most other smaller nationalities are omitted from this table also; but their share probably rose in these twenty years, yet the nationalities listed in this table accounted for 79·0 per cent of the total in 1941 and 87·2 per cent in 1960. In 1960 the Jews numbered 8 per cent of the total, leaving only 4·8 per cent for all the minor nationalities. Suppose these accounted for

4 per cent of the 1941 total, which is a reasonably generous assumption. Then the Jews' share fell from 17 per cent to 8 per cent, and the entire object of leaving them out of the table in question was to avoid having to show this fact. If these figures are roughly correct, the absolute number of Jewish 'specialists' nonetheless increased, from 154,000 in 1941 to 290,707 in 1960. This follows from the very large rise (over $3\frac{1}{2}$-fold) in the total number of 'specialists with higher education' of all nationalities.

In the same volume there are tables showing the national composition of teaching and research staffs. These are confined to 'nationalities of the union republics', and no information of relevance for our present purpose can be gleaned from them.*

* Cf. 'Jews in the Soviet Union', Vol. III, No. 1, and 'A Note on the Proportion of Jews in Republican and Local Soviets, U.S.S.R.', Vol. III, No. 2 of this Journal.

THE NEW ORLEANS JEWISH COMMUNITY

Leonard Reissman

THE Jewish community in New Orleans differs from most others in the United States and especially those outside the South.[1] By its variance, however, it exposes some interesting features of community organization that are worth considering. For here is a Jewish community that seems to stand so close to the larger community in which it is located that there is the danger of its being overwhelmed. More so perhaps than in most other American–Jewish communities, New Orleans appears to give substance to the fears of benign assimilation that have always dominated Jewish history. Yet, in fact, the community has survived and has flourished for well over two centuries.[2]

The impression of social fragility comes with the recognition that the usual community supports are absent from New Orleans. For one thing, there are no solidly Jewish neighbourhoods, no self-created ghettoes that bolster community consciousness by the dense presence of Jews living together. Although more than half of the 10,000 Jews in New Orleans live in an area circumscribed by not more than a three-mile radius, so do most other white, middle-class families. But there is no appreciable ecological massing of Jews within the area.

Neither is there a heavy proportion of Orthodox Jews to create a sense of sharp separation by religious behaviour, language, and diet. On the contrary, over half of the community belongs to the three Reform temples in the city and only one-quarter to the three Orthodox synagogues. This prevailing Reform atmosphere, so different from other American cities,[3] reflects the history of the community that was settled by Sephardic and then by German Jews. Here was the genesis of the Reform tradition in the city, old and well established by the twentieth century. Furthermore, the Eastern European immigration that overwhelmed most other cities early in this century had relatively little effect on New Orleans. The unchallenged dominance of a Reform tradition means, in this context, the appearance of few uniquely Jewish practices that would have separated the Jew from the rest of the New Orleans

community. The practices of Orthodoxy, the secular Jewish culture, the political radicalism, and the culture of the *shtetl* that were the special baggage of Eastern European immigrants made relatively little impact on New Orleans.

Another feature that makes the Jewish community somewhat unique among most American cities is its long continuity. Some 40 per cent of the current population were born in New Orleans, with a large proportion third and fourth generation of New Orleans families. This has meant a significant time spread separating today's community from its immigrant origins. American values in general, and those of New Orleans in particular, are the accepted victors over the immigrant traditions for most of the population and the battle is long since over. The Jewish community has had a long time, as these things go, to adjust itself to New Orleans and to establish the grounds for its own acceptance by the larger community.

The regional culture of the South is yet another unique feature of this community. It has played some part in shaping the character of the Jewish community but the effect is difficult to establish precisely. To be sure, some typically Southern values have been assimilated by Jewish families who have lived as Southerners for generations. It could not really be otherwise. Hence, one encounters a loyalty to the city and the region that is hardly the mark of a *luftmensch*. Or again, attitudes towards race are not unrestrainedly equalitarian but sometimes are hedged by some of the elaborate rationale that Southerners of conscience have evolved to justify segregation. Regional values, especially those of a Southern aristocracy, have affected the Jew in his striving for upward social mobility and in his stance towards a society divided by race. But the Southern tradition has been tempered by a Jewish tradition which has prevented a complete acceptance of that strange orientation mystically called 'the Southern way of life'. The Jew is not an average white Southerner in his general attitudes towards race, aristocracy, or the Civil War. It is difficult to disentangle the separate strands involved here, but I shall have more to say about it because the South is a significant part of the texture of Jewish life in New Orleans.

All in all, these brief clues document a different, perhaps a unique, type among American–Jewish communities. Where others are now moving painfully from an older Orthodoxy to a newer Conservatism, New Orleans began virtually as Reform and stayed that way, thus avoiding some of the turmoil involved in a religious transition.[4] Where other communities are seeking to expand religious identification, New Orleans has a majority already affiliated with a synagogue as part of its traditional pattern.[5] Where other communities are feeling the reawakening of Jewish consciousness among the native-born, in line with Herberg's well-known thesis that this is the first generation secure enough in the American environment to do so, New Orleans has long

since passed that generational bench-mark. Where other communities are reforming their relationships to the larger community, New Orleans has achieved a stable level of integration that only now is being threatened, but in dimensions and with consequences quite different from those encountered by other communities. Before moving on to that part of the analysis, however, a brief sketch of the community's demography will help to provide perspective.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Differences though there are between the Jewish community in New Orleans and in other cities, they are similar in at least the one major respect of their middle-class character. On each of the usually accepted indices the community emerges as strongly middle class. About 25 per cent are in professional occupations, another 40 per cent in managerial and proprietary, and 18 per cent in clerical and sales. The rest hold occupations lower in the prestige hierarchy. The median family income in 1958 was over $10,000 a year, a figure twice that for the U.S. as a whole. Over 60 per cent are home-owners. About half of the population have been to college, and half of them either have graduated or gone on for post-graduate study. These are striking accomplishments, and the more so in a community in which wealth and opportunity have never been or were expected to be distributed with equality. On each of the above measures, the city's general population is dramatically below the level of the Jewish average. In tastes, consumption patterns, and social orientation, the community resembles the general American middle class even though here, as elsewhere, there are finer social gradations within that stratum. Wealth, position, and the length of time one's family has lived in New Orleans combine to develop significant class worlds within this broadly middle-class Jewish community. From the inside, the community is quite heterogeneous, and in its own way fragmented by its own criteria of acceptability.

The Jewish population numbered about 9,500 in 1958 and from earlier data it was estimated to be growing at a rate of from one to two per cent a year.[6] Migration has been partly responsible for the growth, but since 1953 there has also been an increase in the birth-rate[7] as in the U.S. generally. A rise in births and the immigration of young families have lowered the median age of the community from 39·8 years in 1953 to 34·6 years in 1958. Jews comprised about 1·2 per cent of the total estimated population for the New Orleans metropolitan area in 1958 (800,000), and about 2 per cent of the white population (466,000). This small proportion, even if only the white population is considered, was among the very lowest reported for twelve other American cities.[8] It may well be that the relatively small proportion of Jews has eased the adjustment to the larger community, leaving

aside for the moment the many other complex factors that are involved. A group that constitutes little more than one per cent of the total population is hardly large enough to cause discernible pressures, especially if it chooses to adjust as smoothly as possible.

Since 1947 the Jewish population has grown by immigration from other states, within as well as outside the South. The university, particularly its medical school, and commercial opportunities have provided the major attractions. In 1958 the population could be divided as follows: 41 per cent born in the city, 24 per cent resident for 30 years or more, 24 per cent resident from 10 to 30 years, and 11 per cent less than 10 years. The composition of the migration has been significant for the Jewish community. It is my impression that this last group, about 1,000 persons, consists strongly of Northern-born, young, middle-class adults whose Jewish origins stem from Eastern Europe. This is a sharp contrast to the existing tradition in New Orleans. There is some indication that the two traditions make a difference for the membership of organizations in the community and in its leadership, but I cannot gauge how deeply these conflicting orientations go or, indeed, if they are in fact a basis for conflict. At some points, it is true, the newer leadership encounters the older and by now hereditary leadership, but this has not produced any serious or lasting fissures. Whatever the community's composition may have been in the past, it is certainly no longer homogeneous today.

These demographic facts invite a deeper analysis of the dynamic social features that are, in effect, the real community. For that purpose I have divided the features into two categories: the first, those which pertain principally to the Jewish community itself, and the second, those which originate from outside.

WITHIN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The character of Jewish identification and the structure of Jewish leadership have been selected as the best features to convey the social dynamics at work within the community. Both of these are obviously critical supports for the continuity of any community, perhaps even more so for the Jewish community. In the case of identification we must consider a social psychological quality that is vital for community life, ephemeral as it may appear to be. It is the willingness of the Jew to be conscious of and to recognize himself as a Jew among Jews. It is also the intensity with which he holds that consciousness and how far he feels bound to carry it in his behaviour and attitudes. Does he, in other words, stop at the lowest minimal recognition of himself as a Jew, or does he cultivate that sentiment to the point where it effectively directs what he does and what he thinks? Obviously, these are enormously complex dimensions and I do not claim to have probed them deeply

in this study. Yet, the approach and the analysis that was followed have a logic and plausibility that make the conclusions reasonable.

The people who were interviewed in this survey were asked the following question: 'If you were able to emphasize just *one* thing as being most important for the upbringing of Jewish children today, which one of these would you say it would be?' [9] The alternatives from which they could choose and the distribution of their responses were these:

	%
(1) Learning and becoming identified with the Jewish religion	34·2
(2) Learning to appreciate the culture of the Jews such as literature, etc.	15·0
(3) Learning an appreciation of the State of Israel	0·4
(4) Learning an appreciation for the civic activities, welfare concerns, and social justice of Jewish people	11·8
(5) Not emphasizing Jewishness so much as teaching him to get along with other people in the community	30·1
(6) No answer or other answer given	8·5

Because such 'cafeteria-type' questions can be ambiguously interpreted by the respondent as well as by the analyst if taken just as they are, our respondents were also asked to give the reasons for their choice. The added comment provided the means for checking the alternative that had been selected and, it is presumed, for reducing a good deal of the possible ambiguity. Perhaps an illustrative verbatim comment for each of the four most popular alternatives would serve the same purpose here. A most typical comment for choosing religion, the first alternative above, was given by a young woman:

'Religion is the most important because it's easy to lose the sense of Jewishness in a community like this; and not to know the religion will eventually be very unsatisfactory for the individual.'

The second alternative, Jewish secular culture, has much less meaning in New Orleans than, I suspect, it now has elsewhere. Against New Orleans tradition, it is a somewhat alien concept. This choice represents one significant focus for identification, meant to include the products of Jewish culture as that term is popularly understood, such as literature, history, Yiddish and Hebrew, and the fine arts. Within this more restricted meaning, religion would not be included, or at most only as subject matter for what is essentially a secular endeavour. It was not possible to determine just how broadly this conception of secular culture was understood, but those who did select it as the most important thing a Jewish child should learn also seemed to understand

the secular emphasis that was intended. For example, a relatively indicative response was this one:

'Jewish people are *born* Jewish. They can't avoid it and they should learn about their culture to appreciate it. But, they must also know how to live in a world with all people.'

Or, as another respondent put it:

'Because there is so much to be proud of and if you learned about the culture no one could make you ashamed of what you are.'

Civic and welfare activities were considered as cohesive forces in the community and a basis upon which Jewish identification could be developed in the young, as this somewhat syllogistic response indicates:

'There's a place in any community for Jewish civic activities. They would fit in more with the Jewish people. If Jewish people fit in with their community and civic activities, they will gain more respect from other religions.'

Finally, the fifth alternative in the above list which can be called 'social adjustment', seemed to be most clearly intended in the meaning that one respondent expressed:

'Over-identification brings the Jew his own ghetto. I appreciate my country. Judaism is my religion, but first and foremost I am an American.'

Those who selected this alternative intended the same thing as the sample comment just quoted, stressing the need to 'get along with people', to 'learn to live with non-Jews', and to recognize that 'we are Americans and must live like Americans'.

The next step was to discover what kinds of people chose which alternatives, and the subsequent analysis revealed some interesting and understandable relationships that pointed up the patterns of Jewish identification in the city. In a real sense the alternatives contain the spectrum of Jewish identification, and the alternative chosen reflects a valid disposition related to the individual's background. Let us consider only the three most popular responses in order to simplify the presentation: religion, social adjustment, and secular culture.

As might perhaps have been expected, Orthodox Jews chose religion predominantly (41·9 per cent) over any other single alternative. Reform Jews, however, divided almost equally between religion (32·9 per cent) and social adjustment (35·1 per cent) as the most important thing for a child to learn. In fact, the reaction by Reform Jews was quite similar to that by persons without any denominational affiliation (26·9 per cent and 38·5 per cent respectively). Culture was most often (19·2 per cent) chosen by the last group although even for them it was third in preference.

Cutting the analysis from another direction, we find that the age of the respondent made a difference for his choice.[10] Older people believed

religion was the most important thing for a child to learn (44·8 per cent) and the proportion progressively decreased with each younger age group. Younger people, on the contrary, gave first priority to social adjustment (34·1 per cent), second to religion (25·7 per cent) and third to culture (19·5 per cent). Those in the middle age group generally expressed a scale of preferences between the old and the young, giving religion the strongest emphasis (34·9 per cent) and secondary emphasis to social adjustment (24·5 per cent).

The educational background of respondents in relation to their choice of what is important is given below. It will be seen that those who had never been to high school, generally the older persons, overwhelmingly chose religion above all other alternatives presented to them. College graduates, at the other extreme, divided almost evenly between all the alternatives, but with slightly more stress on the importance of social adjustment. Generally, the higher the individual's educational attainment the less he emphasized religion as the focus for his identification and the more likely he was to choose social adjustment or Jewish culture instead.

'Most Important Thing for a Child to Learn', by Education of Respondent

Response Given	*Educational Level*			
	No formal or grammar school	*High school*	*Some College*	*College Graduate*
Religion	67·8	33·8	33·3	20·3
Culture	9·7	13·9	15·8	18·8
Civic activities	3·2	12·8	10·5	14·5
Social adjustment	16·1	34·9	31·6	29·0
Other answer	—	2·3	8·8	11·6
No answer	3·2	2·3	—	5·8
Totals	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0

Occupation and income were both related to the choices made. Those in high-prestige occupations tended to give less stress to religion than did other occupational groups. Hence, professionals thought religion was important (31·1 per cent), but not quite to the same extent as those in clerical or sales occupations (38·6 per cent). Among professionals, Jewish culture was considered more important (24·6 per cent) than in any other occupational group; 14·4 per cent of the managerial and 11·4 per cent of the clerical occupations gave it first priority. Social adjustment, on the contrary, was least important to professionals (19·7 per cent), yet much more so to proprietors (32·2 per cent) and clerical people (36·4 per cent). Analysis by income, shown in the table below, showed a similar pattern, in large measure because of the correlation between occupation and income. The greater his in-

come, the more likely was a person's choice to be social adjustment or culture rather than religion. Religion was much more frequently chosen by those with lower incomes.

'Most Important Thing for a Child to Learn', by Annual Income of Respondent

Response Given	*Income Level*			
	Under $5000	*5000–10,999*	*11,000–24,999*	*25,000 and over*
Religion	55·2	45·3	20·3	18·9
Culture	6·9	13·3	18·6	24·3
Civic activities	10·3	6·7	20·3	8·1
Social adjustment	20·7	26·7	32·3	35·2
Other answer	6·9	6·7	6·8	8·1
No answer	—	1·3	1·7	5·4
Totals	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0

A final dimension of this analysis can be mentioned. The level of the person's activity in Jewish as compared with non-Jewish organizations was related to his choice. Those who said they were more active in Jewish organizations most frequently selected religion (40·0 per cent) as the principal focus for their identification. Those more active in non-Jewish organizations, on the other hand, emphasized social adjustment (42·8 per cent) most of all.

In summary then, the young, the economically successful, and the educated segments of the community generally phrased their identification around the need to adjust to the larger community as much as around a special Jewish feature, such as religion or secular culture. Their view expressed itself in the fact that they were as much or more active in non-Jewish organizations, in their emphasis upon social adjustment, and in their generally Reform affiliation. At times, the recognition of a Jewish secular culture also played some part in their identification. Religion as a focus for identification found its greatest acceptance among the older and less successful people in the community. Separateness, not adjustment, lay at the core of their sentiments expressed in their greater activity in Jewish rather than non-Jewish organizations, and in their Orthodox affiliation.

A second perspective from which to assess the dynamics within the Jewish community is its structure of leadership.[11] Perhaps the most significant feature of that structure is its primary division into those who are recognized only within the Jewish community and those whose recognition extends more generally into the New Orleans community. One cannot help but consider this division as one more facet of the bifurcation that characterizes this community as I have described it in other contexts above. The division is one between the orientation that

sees the Jewish community as a separate entity and the orientation that places the Jewish community always within the larger social context of the surrounding community.

Four groups of leaders were identified, two basing their support on the New Orleans community and two more evidently located within the Jewish community alone. Within the first was one group consisting predominantly of older, usually wealthy, but all long-time residents. These leaders once controlled the high-prestige Jewish organizations in the city by their positions on their boards. With age, however, they have become less active and their positions have been taken by a younger generation within the same élite level. It was from this older group that persons were picked by non-Jews for boards and committees that required community-wide representation. In some cases the reputation earned by individuals within this group was national, as evidenced by entries in *Who's Who* or in similar compendia.

A younger generation, but generally from the same background, formed a second leadership group. Some had already succeeded to the leadership posts left vacant by the retirement of an older leader, but at the least all members of this group were being prepared for succession. This process of succession seemed to be orderly and institutionalized as it is in a well-managed élite situation. Although there is something of the aristocratic and hereditary element at work here, it should not be considered as rigid and final for there is the possibility of deviation from the principle as I have described it.

Both old and young leaders tended to consider themselves as living in both the Jewish and the non-Jewish communities. They certainly did not aim at assimilating the Jewish community into the larger community, but neither did they build barriers to separate the two.

The other two groups of leaders were divided from those just described on two counts. First, there was the difference in their relative newness to the city. Second, there was the difference in orientation towards the Jewish community itself. Faced with a somewhat aristocratic barrier, one segment of this group has turned entirely inward towards the Jewish community and has sought its legitimation from within that social boundary. The other segment appeared to be in an ambivalent situation; these people desire the wider recognition of the New Orleans community but at present must be content with a more narrow recognition. Whether or not they will be able to translate their reputation in the Jewish community into one more generally recognized will depend as much on getting accepted in the Jewish élite group as on anything else.

The division of leadership into these multiple groups has not created any serious tears in the fabric of the community. On the contrary, it might even be presumed to function beneficially for the Jewish community as a whole by making a variety of opportunities available.

There is room to support and to satisfy the differing orientations that are present in the community. For leadership, like identification, needs several alternative choices if there is, as in New Orleans, more than one kind of Jewish consciousness and orientation present.

JEWS AND THE NEW ORLEANS COMMUNITY

There is no doubt that the Jewish community has made a successful adjustment within the institutional structure of New Orleans. Its members generally have achieved a striking degree of upward mobility that has rewarded them with relatively high levels of material goods and satisfactions. Although there is ground for dissatisfaction, the community has maintained its Jewish identity and has functioned as a coherent and cohesive social entity. In large measure, these attainments, economic and social, have been effected by a successful community and its leadership. Yet in some ways the Southern setting has had its effect, too, and it is this aspect that now needs discussion.

The sociologically relevant facts about New Orleans can be very briefly given, but the consequences they contain strike deeply into the city's structure and into the Jewish community. The population of New Orleans is about one-half Catholic, about one-third Negro, and constantly alive to its Southern aristocratic traditions. What probably saves the city from the social stagnation and decay to which some of its history might condemn it is its place as the third largest port in the U.S. I do not mean that the economic ties with Central and South America automatically confer a cosmopolitan character upon the city, although they certainly help. Rather, the recognition of the world beyond the city limits that is forced by such trade does help to shape the orientation of the population. The Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico are seen by most people in the city as gateways rather than as barriers, and this impression is reinforced again and again by the mass media. It is the conception that New Orleans wants very much to have of itself. This self-image helps to give New Orleans an economic and social, if not a political, vitality that saves it from the possible erosion of *ante-bellum* Southern romanticism.

Yet the tradition of a Southern aristocracy dies hard. It has been curiously heightened in the hundred years since the Civil War and continues to play a significant role in the social structure of the city. The provincialism of that tradition becomes intermingled with the cosmopolitanism that the city's economy demands. The Jewish community shares in the latter, but the consequences of provincialism have had significant effect as well. In effect, Jews have encountered a status ceiling preventing them from full public acceptance into the social élite because they cannot share in the aristocratic tradition. On all other grounds they possess the necessary qualifications. There are wealthy

Jewish families in New Orleans that possess a measure of economic power that is commensurate with their economic position. Similarly, some Jews are active in both local and national politics and no doubt they exert a significant political influence in the city. Some families can also trace their New Orleans ancestry back a respectable distance into the past. In spite of these economic, political, and genealogical qualifications, however, full membership in the status and ruling élite is not open to them.

The barrier is raised by the Catholic character of the city, reaching its clearest expression in the organization of Mardi Gras and the 'krewes' or associations that stage the festival. Mardi Gras was intended to be the last day of revelry before the solemnity of Lent. I am not concerned here that the festival has become commercialized as a major tourist attraction or that its original religious function has by now been rather generally shunted aside. Mardi Gras involves the entire city in festivities and its importance for the city stems from reasons other than income alone. Mardi Gras marks the peak of the social season for the status élite and for the status pretenders. In the weeks between Twelfth Night and Ash Wednesday those groups organize a costly and almost continuous series of social occasions for the début of their daughters and for defining élite participation. These functions and their timing are organized according to a tight status hierarchy, generally recognized in the city. For example, many krewes parade once during this period and end the parade in an elaborately staged and expensive ball held in the city's only auditorium adequate for the event. The closer a krewe can arrange its celebration to Mardi Gras, the higher is its standing. But the dates are allocated in strict accordance to the status of the krewe, at least in the last days before Mardi Gras. Without any doubt, membership of one of the top three krewes is at once a prerequisite for entry into the élite as well as a recognition of one's élite status.

There is no question that some Jews belong to Mardi Gras krewes, although there is ground to question whether they belong to those with highest status. Whether they do or not, the Catholic complexion of Mardi Gras prevents a Jewish member from making his claim. The Jewish family of means, therefore, generally is disqualified from translating its class position into a commensurate status position. Some families, it is said, leave the city during Mardi Gras, perhaps to avoid what may seem to them an unpleasant confrontation.

The same kind of barrier or ceiling also exists for membership in the élite clubs, which intermesh with the status structure of the krewes. One of the two highest-ranking clubs, it has been said, has claimed that no Jew has ever got beyond the foyer in the building it occupies. Whether apocryphal or true, the statement is indicative of a generally accepted point of view. Given these characteristics about both krewes and clubs, the Jew gains but little status honour even if he does manage to gain

membership, for it brings him doubtful honour in his own community and no publicity in the larger community. If he wishes to maintain his Jewish identification, therefore, he must also come to accept the status ceiling.

I do not wish to give the impression that this situation produces intolerable frustration in the Jewish community, because I believe that it does not really affect the large majority. If anything, the ceiling has worked to set minimum limits for Jewish identification.

Another effect that can be traced to Southern aristocratic traditions, if not perhaps to the status ceiling as well, is the status stratification within the Jewish community itself. As with other minority groups in other places, the Jews in New Orleans have tended to adopt the criteria accepted by the larger community as their own. Hence, one's genealogy tends to be as important as the usual criteria of wealth and position in determining the composition of the Jewish élite group. I have no definite information on this point, but it is my impression that entry into the Jewish élite is as jealously controlled as that into any élite.

A final aspect of the place of Jews in this Southern city needs to be mentioned, one that promises to become severely critical for the Jewish community in a short time. The Jews, as has been noted, are a small proportion of a multi-racial and multi-religious population in New Orleans. It seems to me that in the past antisemitism has been relatively weak, at least compared with Northern cities. To be sure, there does exist the antisemitism expressed by the status ceiling but there has not been much evidence of more aggressive antisemitic actions. A reasonable explanation for the absence of such prejudice can be said to lie in the large proportion of Negroes in the city and their inferior social position as enforced by Southern traditions. It is as if the Negro has been continuously available to take the brunt of prejudice, whether it was expressed in the more genteel manner of the upper-class master towards a slave-become-servant, or in the more violent eruptions of the lower classes generated by their own frustrations and failures. The Jew thereby has avoided a good deal of social conflict. The frustrated lower-class person always has had the Negro, lower yet in the hierarchy, upon whom he could vent his anger in an institutionalized and legitimate form. The upper-class person has never been really threatened by the Jew to whom he could deny access to his own élite level by the irrational expedient of the status ceiling. Nor has the Jew in New Orleans challenged the tradition as much as he has been willing to accept it.

The Supreme Court's decision in the school integration case in 1954 and in subsequent decisions has set into motion a heavy and obvious process of change in the existing patterns of race relations and race etiquette. These repercussions have been felt throughout the South, the Jewish community included. The Southerner feels his status threatened as well as other supports he has depended upon. His reaction in turning

to the extreme right politically, for example, can be explained in terms of the status threat that is becoming more real each day. The Jewish community has been forced to take a position during this period of racial conflict because it is impossible for any person, let alone a group, to remain uncommitted in the South. The commitment has not been forced by moral or ethical reasons alone. Just as important has been the insistence by segregation leaders that people in the community be counted, and not just once but as many times as the occasion demands. The spectrum of race attitudes that was once possible has quickly been condensed into only two choices: either one is aggressively and publicly for segregation, or it tends to follow that one must be for integration. The fine differences and shadings between those extremes, once possible, are no longer tolerated. Caught in a crossfire deliberately planned by segregation leaders acting to make the most political capital out of this period of change, the Jew has come to experience the first signs of open antisemitism. Racial segregation, extreme right-wing conservatism, and now antisemitism are all part of the same pattern, and Southern leaders of this growing movement have relied upon the resources and experience of antisemitic demagogues in other parts of the country.[12] Whatever the private attitude of the Jew may be towards segregation, he finds himself more and more cast into what the Southern extremist thinks of as an integrationist and therefore an enemy. The Jews' sense of morality, of justice, and of equality tends to push them in the direction of integration even though this is not always their wish.

How these events will treat the Jewish community in New Orleans is impossible now to predict because there are many variables involved. One thing, however, is certain: the Jewish community faces change in its relationship to the larger community as surely as the South faces changes in its accepted traditions. The pattern of adjustment that was successful in the past will have to be altered to meet the demands of the present. Given the differences that have been described within the Jewish community, it is also certain that there is no unanimous future course of adjustment that can be set. Different sectors of the community have different degrees of Jewish identification and different degrees of loyalty and attachment to the city. It is possible that the Jewish community can emerge stronger and more unified than ever before; that its sense of identification willy-nilly will be forged by the events forced upon them to produce a newer alloy of greater strength and durability.

NOTES

[1] The statistical data used in this analysis are taken from my study, *Profile of a Community*, prepared for and published by the Jewish Federation of New Orleans in 1958. I wish especially to stress that the views presented here are my own and should not be interpreted as necessarily those of the Federation. Data were obtained by interviewing a 10-per-cent probability sample of all known Jewish households in the city obtained from a master list of organization mem-

bership or otherwise known to the Federation.

[2] One estimate is that the Jewish community is almost 250 years old, which is quite old by American standards. Leo Shpall, *The Jews in Louisiana*, New Orleans: Steeg Printing and Publishing Co., 1936, p. 18.

[3] Compare, for example, the congregational preferences of New Orleans with those of Riverton, an eastern U.S. community reported on by M. Sklare and S. Vosk in *The Riverton Study*, American Jewish Committee, 1957, p. 16.

Congregational Preference	*New Orleans 1958*	*Riverton 1957*
	%	%
Reform	60·6	30
Conservative	11·0	43
Orthodox	24·8	16
None	3·2	4
No Answer	0·4	7
Totals	100·0	100

[4] Not entirely painless, however. For the last few years the attempt by a majority of one Orthodox congregation to institute mixed seating has led to strife and legal action by the other side who insist upon observing the original charter. One related consequence has been the formation of a new Conservative congregation, making it the seventh synagogue in the city.

[5] I realize that membership and identification are not the same thing. Nonetheless, the fact that about 80 per cent of the community does belong to a synagogue cannot be dismissed as only a paper membership.

[6] The figure of 10,000 used above is fairly close to the estimated present size in 1962. Earlier studies used in making the estimate were: Julian B. Feibelman, *A Social and Economic Study of the New Orleans Jewish Community*, Philadelphia, 1941, reporting on a 1938 survey; also Benjamin Goldman, *The Jewish Population of New Orleans, 1953*, New York: Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds.

[7] The fertility ratio—the proportion of children under five years to women aged 20–44 per 1,000 population—was 496·5 in 1953. Five years later this ratio had risen to 509·9. During the same period, the average family size increased from 2·83 to 3·20. Of course, these figures include the effects of families, usually with young children, who immigrated to New Orleans during the period.

[8] Ben B. Seligman and A. Antonovsky, 'Some Aspects of Jewish Demography', in M. Sklare, ed., *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958, p. 51.

[9] I know of no directly comparable data from Jewish surveys in other cities to allow some external assessment of the New Orleans reactions. I believe that the pattern of the responses in New Orleans is a valid reflection of the identification held by the population and I would urge some application of the same question to other populations to check its validity further.

[10] Age, education, occupation, and income were found to be related to denominational affiliation, and it is this relationship that is partly threaded throughout the patterns of choice on this question of Jewish identification.

[11] The description given here is based upon a study by John C. Rosen, 'A Study of Leadership in the New Orleans Jewish Community', unpublished M.A. Thesis, Tulane University, 1960, which I directed. Rosen interviewed those persons who were most frequently mentioned as leaders by those in institutional posts such as rabbis and executive directors of the Federation and similar Jewish organizations.

[12] During the spring of 1961, for example, at the time of the Eichmann trial, there were leaflets and licence plates in evidence with the phrase 'I like Eich' (a reference to former President Eisenhower's campaign slogan, 'I like Ike'). I have seen more antisemitic literature distributed in the last two years than in all of my eight previous years in New Orleans. Additionally, there have been public accusations against the B'nai Brith and its Anti-Defamation League. These, too, are of recent origin. A good deal of the literature distributed is published in New Jersey and California, which indicates some co-operation between the antisemitic leadership in New Orleans and that outside the state and region.

BOOK REVIEWS

ARIEH TARTAKOWER ON JEWISH SOCIETY

Alexander Manor

(*Review Article*)

THE most significant effort to summarize the changes which have occurred in Jewish society in the last few generations, and at the same time to formulate the tasks confronting research workers in this field, has been made in two recent works by Dr. Arieh Tartakower.

The first* is devoted to the sociology of the Jews in the Diaspora. It is a most complete presentation of the essence of Jewish society and of its various phenomena. The author explains the specific character of Jewish social life and the ways in which it has developed. He investigates the basic questions of Jewish demography, migration, economic and political life, assimilation and nationalism, the struggle for Jewish rights, and problems of Jewish survival. The volume is an outstanding example of a sociological analysis in which virtually nothing is left untouched. It is the first book of this kind in Hebrew literature and in sociological literature in general. It is both a scholarly treatise and one which can well be used as a textbook in the upper grades of high schools and in universities.

Dr. Tartakower has also written a parallel volume on Israeli society.† Again, the specific character of this society is explained, and the author presents the outlines of its history and discusses its main features: the various population groups, immigration, economic life, and the essence of Israeli sovereignty and democracy. He concludes with some fundamental remarks on the future of Israel and its human significance.

From a formal point of view *Israeli Society* is the second volume of the treatise on Jewish society, but it is really an independent work which can be read without difficulty even by those who have not studied the previous volume on Jewish society in the Diaspora.

Despite the voluminous literature on the various aspects of social life in Israel which has been published (especially in the last few years), Dr. Tartakower's is the first attempt to present the society of Israel in its totality. It is a courageous pioneer undertaking, the more so in view of the extremely quick tempo of the country's development. What is offered here is very much more than a mere presentation of facts and their explana-

* *Jewish Society*, published by 'Massada', Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, 1957, 382 pp. (Hebrew).

† *Israeli Society*, published by 'Massada', Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, 1959, 278 pp. (Hebrew).

tion: the author has tried at the same time to explain the logic of the development of Israeli society and the modes of its reaction.

A further remark must be made on the method of Dr. Tartakower's work, which again is extremely characteristic of it. The author never fails to compare phenomena of Jewish and Israeli society with those of social life in general. When speaking about Jewish nationalism he explains the general theory of nationalism in its development during the last few generations, and against this background he presents the facts and tendencies of Jewish life. In order to bring the reader to a closer understanding of the essence of the State of Israel, he first presents the outlines of the theory of the state in general, and only then does he proceed to emphasize the specific character of the state established in the land of Israel. The same is true with regard to problems of agricultural settlement, demography, Israeli democracy, and many more. This important method almost automatically shows the connexion between general sociology and the sociology of the Jewish people, at the same time making the specific character of Jewish social life more intelligible.

Dr. Tartakower's sociology gives much more than mere outlines of the existing situation. No less important than the presentation of facts and figures and explanation of their specific character, is the description of their development. This is true for both volumes. The author shows in a convincing way the fundamental difference between the dynamics of Jewish society in previous generations and what happened in the last century and again in the present generation. He also explains the impact of decisive events in Jewish life, such as the catastrophe in the years of Nazi domination and the establishment of the State of Israel, which in many respects have been responsible for new trends in Jewish social life.

The sociology of the Jews is a rather young branch of knowledge. It was born as recently as the middle of the last century. Dr. Tartakower himself informs us that a theory of Jewish social life was first presented in a scholarly way by Nachman Krochmal and Ahad Ha'am, while Jewish demography really began with Jacob Lestschinsky and Arthur Ruppin. To these two personalities Dr. Tartakower dedicates his *Jewish Society*, rightly considering himself as their foremost successor while at the same time trying also to strengthen the theoretical foundations of Jewish sociology.

The treatment of the dynamics of Jewish social life in Dr. Tartakower's two volumes smacks little, if at all, of either exaggerated optimism or pessimism. The author presents a clear picture of the trend of development with its positive sides and its weaknesses. He also devotes much attention to problems of Jewish social policy in its fundamental aspects. He explains first and foremost the historical significance of Jewish statehood. He stresses the positive meaning of the fact that the Jews ceased to be a nation of wanderers. He considers the new aspects of Jewish demography, and especially the fact that the downward trend of Jewish natural increase in the Diaspora disappeared as a result of a more positive approach to life and of a growing belief in the future. He directs our attention to the fact that poverty and the desperate struggle for a livelihood ceased to be a characteristic phenomenon of Jewish social life, as it had been, especially in Eastern Europe, only a few years before. He mentions the progress achieved in organizing the Jewish people and in strengthening its national consciousness.

But the treatment of these positive phenomena has not excluded that of the negative ones. The great dispersion of the Jews, never before known on such a scale, is clearly presented. The grave problems arising out of the growing Jewish concentration in the big cities (the Jewish people in 'Megalopolis') are brought to the attention of the reader. The dangers involved in the anomaly of Jewish occupational structure, despite the present period of 'boom', are stressed; and, last but by no means least, assimilation as the foremost problem of Jewish life is discussed in the volume on Jewish society in the Diaspora with much scholarly attention and ability. The author draws a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of assimilation, which in Hebrew are called by different names. The first one (in Hebrew: *hitbollut*) means assimilation based on clear knowledge and will of the parties concerned. Assimilation here means that the assimilated person accepts not only the culture of another nation, but its peoplehood as well, thus casting aside his former national allegiance. Not so the second kind of assimilation (*tmiah* in Hebrew) which is a more or less automatic process independent of the will of the parties and frequently even beyond their awareness. No change of peoplehood is intended or involved. What matters here is loss of a previous culture and acceptance of another. Assimilation in the first meaning is thus, according to Dr. Tartakower, not only a cultural but a political phenomenon; whereas in the second case it is a cultural phenomenon only. Not very much is left today of Jewish political assimilation which a generation or two ago was considered as one of the foremost problems of Jewish life; but the danger of cultural assimilation is not less evident, especially in view of its ever-growing proportions.

There are, apart from the problem of assimilation, two fundamental facts on which the future of the Jewish people may depend: (*a*) the tempo of Jewish concentration in Israel, and (*b*) the position of the Jews in general society and their ability to play a role in the development of civilization and of new forms of social life. The second factor to a considerable degree depends on the preservation of the unity of the Jewish people. A society of two or even three million Jews in Israel will hardly be able to fulfil its mission among the nations of the world unless backed by millions in the Diaspora in a spirit of common responsibility and common effort.

To these great human aspects of Jewish life, and especially of Israeli society, Dr. Tartakower devotes much attention. He brushes aside the argument according to which a small nation is unable to influence the course of world development and ought to take care of its own interests only. There are proofs enough to the contrary, especially in the history of the Middle East, where in previous generations great nations disappear without leaving any sign, whereas small nations like the Greeks or the Jews influenced the development of mankind in the strongest way. This lesson of history remains valid at the present. Faced with the great task of merging various groups of immigrants into one nation, Israel may at the same time be able to serve as a bridge between East and West and to pave the way towards new forms of human understanding and creative effort.

These concluding chapters by Dr. Tartakower may also be considered as characterizing his approach and vision. His books cannot be recommended too strongly to readers both in Israel and outside.

JEWISH RECONSTRUCTION IN GERMANY SINCE 1945

Hermann Levin Goldschmidt

(*Review Article*)

HARRY MAÒR, born in Munich in 1914, emigrated to Palestine in 1933. He returned to Germany in 1953 and, for three years, was in charge of the Youth Section of the *Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland* (Central Welfare Organization of Jews in Germany). During this period he worked for a doctor's degree and wrote a thesis (accepted by Mainz University in 1961) entitled *The Reconstruction of Jewish Communities in Germany*,* a subject concerned with the immediate past. While this fact may preclude an entirely unbiased approach, it does on the other hand add to the topicality of the work. The varied personal experiences of the author and his statistical and sociological researches—by means of questionnaires, letters, conversations and observation of day-to-day life in Germany—endow this thesis with the importance of first-class historical source material. No future student of Jewish reconstruction in Germany since 1945 will be able to ignore this work; and it is possible to subscribe even now to certain general conclusions, either plainly stated by the author or implicit in the sociological data supplied by him (where, as he puts it, he confines himself to a description of the facts).

Jewish reconstruction in Germany is an incontrovertible fact, though there are differences of opinion regarding both its significance and its likely duration. It already has a history: there was an initial impetus during 1945 to 1948, followed by a downward trend (until 1952); a third stage of renewed progress began in 1953, bringing us to the present stage which started about 1959 when this impetus was again checked (though, outwardly, reconstruction seemed to have achieved more impressive results than ever before). At the beginning of the period under review, the Jewish community of Germany consisted of two distinct groups: the German-Jewish remnant of some 15,000 survivors who after 1945 re-established communities and on 19 July 1950 set up their overall organization, the *Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland* (Central Council of Jews in Germany), prompted partly by devotion to Judaism and partly by the need for protection, support, and compensation; and in addition, the 'East European Jewish refugees' or 'Displaced Persons', altogether some 200,000 Jews, for whose sake world Jewry had to deny itself the satisfaction of breaking off relations with Germany altogether after 1945.

* *Ueber den Wiederaufbau der jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland seit 1945*, vi + 246 pp., Mainz, 1961, DM. 20 (obtainable from the author, Freiherr von Steinstrasse 9, Frankfurt am Main).

While there were hardly any 'German Jews', there were 'Jews in Germany' who, as such, were entitled to pursue a Jewish way of life, and who implemented this right with the tenacity of people who had survived the tortures of the concentration camps.

The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 made possible the dissolution in Germany of the East European Jewish communities whose members, in their vast majority, had in any case looked upon their stay there as merely transitional. As a result, we find that in 1952 there were no more than 17,427 Jews left in the country. But by that time we also encounter the phenomenon known as the 'German economic miracle', a boom in which the Jews participated; besides, also in 1952, the German-Israeli Reparations Agreement was signed, soon to be followed by a return movement of Jews to Germany. Though only a few thousand Jews were concerned in this return, it meant an increase of one-third for the small Jewish community left in the country. By today—1961—the number of these returned Jews has increased to such an extent that they now account for half of the approximately 25,000 members of all German Jewish communities. But around 1959 this re-immigration (63 per cent of it composed of Israelis) came largely to a halt. The check, together with other factors, contributed to a process of disintegration the significance of which has not yet been properly grasped; a process which has hardly been affected by the so-called reconstruction and by no means been halted. It should be added, of course, that this disintegration, which continues to affect and erode Jewish life, is not only rampant among German Jews but among Jewry everywhere today.

Let us look at a few figures. What is the present numerical 'significance' of the Jews in Germany for the country as a whole? We find that they amount to 0·05 per cent of the total population; only in Yugoslavia and Finland (0·03 per cent), Norway and Albania (0·02) per cent, Spain and Portugal (0·01 per cent) do the Jews form an even smaller proportion of the population. As to distribution, there is a pronounced discrepancy between the sexes: a great preponderance of men over women, owing to the fact that more men than women survived concentration camps; as to age groups, 66 per cent of the communities are composed of people over 40 as against the already no longer 'normal' age distribution of German Jewry in 1933 when those over 40 accounted for 37 per cent. In consequence, a total of only 2,478 Jewish men and 889 Jewish women got married in the period 1951 to 1958; of these, 72·5 per cent of the men and 23·6 per cent of the women contracted mixed marriages. The comparative figures for German Jews between 1901 and 1930 were 19·6 and 12·2 per cent respectively—already fairly high figures. According to official statistics, 496 children were born during 1955 to 1958 to parents of whom both were Jews, and 516 to parents of mixed marriages; but only a total of 222 births were registered with the Jewish communal organizations. 'One must inevitably come to the conclusion', Maòr writes, 'that the majority of the children of mixed marriages and a considerable number of those with purely Jewish parents were deliberately not registered with the community.' This and other evidence points to the conclusion, Maòr adds, that

it is only too obvious that the present condition and development of the Jewish community in Germany has reached a point where the community's disappearance as

an independent entity within less than a generation can be foreseen, even though a downward trend in a genetic group does not necessarily imply a concomitant lack of social viability.

Maòr's detailed analysis of present-day communal organization is also very revealing. He shows that the communities are unrepresentative and fail to instil a feeling of pride and strength in their members. Of the trinity upon which, according to Simon the Just, the world is based, i.e. doctrine, religious observance, and welfare work, only the last-mentioned pillar remains standing. No less than 77 per cent of the communities' total budget is spent on welfare and administrative expenses. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that one finds an 'almost complete absence of Jewish intellectuals of any stature' in the Federal Republic.

> There are individual Jewish actors, a few Jewish producers and publishers, hardly any journalists, and not a single editor of an important West German newspaper. . . . One of the three Jewish members of the Bundestag has left Judaism. In mid-1959 there was one Jewish City Councillor each in Cologne, Berlin, Duesseldorf, and Fuerth. The Jews play no part whatever in the leadership of the political Parties.

And 'when we examine the "statistical success" of Jewish appeals, we find that the "upper ten thousand" of German Jewry number—two thousand', Maòr observes with some irony.

We also find that the Jewish community in Germany today is

> largely led by men who did not arrive on the scene until 1945. . . . Only the vestiges of a continuity exist between the erstwhile and present-day communities . . . What dynamism is found at all in the new communities is motivated chiefly by the modern principle of a community of interests shared by a group of people who have suffered losses and been wronged . . . German Jews, in their vast majority, live by trade or on pensions. They do not exercise any particular 'economic function' in Germany. The fact that many communal officers are connected with trade must be regarded as harmful since this lowers the prestige of communal work, and those carrying it out have hardly any status, nor can they act as a stabilizing factor or an impartial authority . . . Since the existence of communities (even when their existence is not, as is frequently the case, fictitious) must be safeguarded, if necessary without any organizational 'apparatus', we find in Germany the phenomenon of paid communal leaders who alone guarantee the functioning of the communities. . . . Such communities are bound to fail in efforts to foster a social sense among the many rootless Jews, unattached and without relatives, who have settled in Germany, a fact which is particularly tragic for the older generation. There is a great danger that the Jews in Germany will fail even in their ultimate aim, an aim approved even by Jews outside and inimical to German Jewry: to offer a refuge to the old and unintegrated re-immigrants . . .

As against these gloomy conclusions may be cited the titles of two of my own books, *Das Vermaechtins des deutschen Judentums* and *Die Botschaft des Judentums*. The universal significance of Judaism which is again being acknowledged, the indomitable living reality of the Jewish people, must, in the final analysis, be an inspiration for German Jewry too. But the basic and universal strength of Judaism can, by the very stimulus which impels it forward, also lead into error, as happens when there is an insufficient realization of the dangers facing it, as at present. We are indebted to Dr. Maòr for a challenging picture and a clarification of the dangers which menace the infinitely precarious Jewish existence of our day.

SHORTER NOTICES

PAUL WINTER, *On the Trial of Jesus*, 216 pp., Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1961, 40*s*. or $5.50.

The trial of Jesus of Nazareth in Jerusalem in about C.E. 29, when Pontius Pilate was Procurator and Caiaphas was high priest, is at once the most famous and among the most obscure of all historical trials. There has been so much written upon it, from so many different points of view, that one would imagine that there was nothing new which could be said. That this is not true has been admirably demonstrated by Paul Winter in his recent book. Even the most seasoned New Testament scholar is likely to find in it some point which he had overlooked, some explanation of its puzzles and contradictions which strikes him immediately as reasonable and illuminating.

Indeed in the present time, when so much New Testament scholarship, especially on the Continent, is rigidly and ridiculously anti-historical, even a theologian can be profoundly grateful for this exact and detailed historical analysis. But the work should interest more than theologians or religious historians. The significance of the trial for a student of Roman history is as great as it is for a student of the nature of evidence. It is a trial which possesses the highest emotional content, which involves all the psychology of relations between an empire and a subject people; and yet a trial which had no eye-witnesses among those interested to record it. The cruder critical scholar of the nineteenth century discovered the contradictions in the Gospels and proclaimed the whole affair unhistorical. The wiser student of the twentieth century knows that nothing would so clearly mark it as an invention as that all accounts of it tallied in every detail. The human mind is not an exact recording instrument, especially when its emotions are aroused.

The theory from which Winter works, and which is acceptable to almost all contemporary New Testament scholars, is this. The earliest communities of Jews or Gentiles who accepted that Jesus of Nazareth was the messiah, were primarily interested in the last week of his life, in his betrayal, arrest, crucifixion, and resurrection. It was on these events that their faith centred. Each church would have its own account, built up from what evidence it could collect. These separate narratives would tend to be elaborated, to be collated with each other, as churches grew and communications developed between them, and as new situations arose and developed new interests. Then, in the third stage, the makers of our Gospels collected and edited what they had received. The result was often that a single event, which two churches had placed at different stages of the story, would become two events. The contradiction is no evidence that the original story is an invention. But at what stage did it happen? An excellent example of Winter's method is to be found in his treatment of just such an incident.

If we combine our present narratives, it would appear that Jesus was mocked and ill-treated five times during the period of his arrest. Luke says that the police picket guarding him during the night was responsible. Mark says that it was members of the high court at their night session. Luke reports a similar accompaniment to an appearance of Jesus before Herod Antipas. John says that he was ill-treated before Pilate sentenced him. Matthew says that he was mocked and scourged after his condemnation, and Mark agrees with him.

Each incident is examined carefully, collated with the others, tested in terms of our knowledge of the treatment of prisoners by the Romans, examined to see what was in the mind of the evangelist and of the traditions behind him, and what part the incident served in the whole tradition. Winter's final conclusion is that the mockery and scourging is a genuine tradition, and that it took place after the condemnation

and judgement by Pilate; and, having reached that conclusion, he turns back to explain how the present stories arose. This one incident is enough to explain and commend his method. The same meticulous, yet rarely pedantic, examination is applied to every part of the story, sometimes—as in the case of Barabbas—with surprising results or suggestions.

All this part of the book builds up an actual picture of what happened. But underlying all the details remains one question which has been of immense significance to the whole Jewish and Christian worlds for nearly two thousand years: Who was responsible for the arrest and condemnation of Jesus Christ? Accepting, as every honest examination must, that he was *executed* by the Romans and not by the Jews, whatever their powers to carry out a capital sentence, there remains the question of *the initiative*. Was it taken by the high-priestly faction, or was it taken by the Romans? And on what basis was it taken—that Jesus offended Jewish law by claiming to be a divine messiah, or that he endangered Roman security as a potential 'rabble-rouser'? Winter comes down on the side of primary Roman responsibility, although the actual arrest was, he thinks, carried out by Roman soldiery under the orders of an officer of the high priest. This would have been a normal procedure, for the high priest was responsible under the Procurator for the maintenance of order and the arrest of malefactors. Among Winter's arguments that there was no trial before a Jewish court, but only the preparation of an indictment, is the fact—which most scholars would overlook—that the texts of the different Gospels make it clear that none of the original traditions knew the name of the high priest involved. This is possible only if he occupied a very secondary role at the beginning. It was only when the Church was trying to ingratiate itself with the Roman authorities—which was just at the period when traditions were crystallizing into our present Gospels—that Pilate tended to be exonerated and 'the Jews' to be blamed.

Winter's is one of those valuable books which are well worth consulting and pondering over, whether one agrees with him on each point or not, for everything is documented, and he appears to have read everything worth examining in a large variety of languages.

JAMES PARKES

W. MONTGOMERY WATT, *Islam and the Integration of Society*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 32*s*.

In this treatise Dr. Watt puts Islam through an interrogatory, the terms of which owe much to the writings of Karl Mannheim. Dr. Watt tries to find what features in Islam have enabled it to 'integrate' a variety of peoples and races and to promote among them 'a strong feeling of brotherhood and a measure of harmony'. But Dr. Watt's concern is not merely with Islam as such; he is also interested in those 'general laws and principles' which may be exemplified in the spread and acceptance of this religion.

Dr. Watt's subject is highly interesting, but we must remember that to examine Islam (or any other religion) in this way is to treat it not as a religion but as an engine for the manufacture and propagation of social solidarity. It is to adopt a sceptical attitude towards religions and towards the claims of divine revelation which they make and which their followers must, of necessity, accept. But the inescapable scepticism which such an inquiry entails is, in this case, accompanied and perhaps modified by a belief, derived from Mannheim, that 'utopian' ideas are beneficial, welcome, and, in a sense, 'true' because they promote social change on the right lines. Thus Dr. Watt writes (p. 52): 'The ideas, then, that are found in Muhammad's preaching contain exaggerations, and to that extent are not wholly true. Their exaggerations, however, do not affect their efficacy as bases for the transformation of Arabian society. They are genuinely "utopian" (in Karl Mannheim's sense), and in this respect true. To put it another way, they are the ideational complement of a social movement which led to a transformation of Arabian society; and we adopt the standpoint that this new organization of society was better than the old, and more harmonious and better adjusted to the environment.' By contrast, for Dr. Watt, the opposition of the Jews of Medina to Muhammad's teaching had an element of the 'ideological', of a deliberate refusal of 'truth' (in Mannheim's sense again); he writes

(p. 63): 'It looks as if a case could be made out for holding that they made use of religious ideas in order to maintain their worldly position; they had once dominated the Medinan oasis, and some probably hoped to recover that position of dominance.' The Jews lost and Muhammad won. Is it legitimate to infer, then, that truth is on the side of the big battalions?

The risks, then, of judging ideas and their worth by their 'ideological' or 'utopian' tendencies should be obvious. Not the least of such risks is that events are made to bear a significance which neither those who took part in them nor their descendants for many centuries discerned. Thus the author compares (pp. 64–5) Islam with other possible catalysts of Arab unity and concludes that only Islam was suitable. 'Arab unity' is, of course, a feature of modern middle eastern politics, but is it not misleading to postulate a concern for this modern invention in the mind of a Messenger who believed himself the mouthpiece of Divine Revelation, or in the minds of his followers who thought themselves to be following the commands of God on this earth for the sake of salvation hereafter? Or is it to be argued that 'Arab unity' was really the fundamental urge in Mecca and Medina, and Islam the mere appearance and phenomenon?

But, in any case, what is 'integration'? An individual 'integrated' with his society feels at one with it, secure and unquestioning in his station, at peace with others, and intimately convinced that his universe is both coherent and significant. 'Integration' of this kind should then be best observed in small, isolated, primitive communities of the kinds which anthropologists have traditionally studied. It is doubtful whether such 'integration' can proceed very far in a sophisticated world-wide and complex society such as that of Islam, for it entails a uniformity and conformity difficult to establish and maintain in literate and urban societies open to all kinds of currents and living under a variety of political dispensations. We are left in doubt whether Dr. Watt thinks 'integration' in this sense possible or desirable. In one place (p. 154) he writes: 'The European and American conception of a democratic state requires that all inhabitants of a given territory should have equal political rights. Modern Islamic states which claim to be democracies of the Western type have therefore to give equal political rights to Muslims and non-Muslims. Even when this is done on paper, it remains in conflict with the deep-seated Islamic attitude which restricts full citizenship to Muslims, and therefore is difficult to make effective in practice. The Islamic conception, though it tends to perpetuate the distinctive character of minorities and prevent their assimilation, has much to be said for it; and Western democracies', he concludes, 'are beginning to realize that they cannot function unless a basic ideational system is held by all citizens alike.' Does this mean that Dr. Watt believes religious uniformity to be necessary for the health of society? We cannot be sure, for in another place (p. 277), discussing the respective prospects of Islam and Christianity as world religions, he observes: 'There seem to be objective grounds for thinking that the retention of variety is a good thing. In so far as Christianity is more concerned than Islam about this, it is preferable as an agent of integration.'

This last reflection brings us to a further meaning of 'integration', according to which the question to be discussed is not so much the individual's 'integration' in a society, but rather the whole of humanity's into one society. This preoccupation is well expressed in the epilogue where it is stated that 'nothing short of religion can integrate world society'. The emphasis on the *use* of religion, characteristic of the book, is here once again exhibited.

These fundamental ideas and preoccupations govern the structure of Dr. Watt's book. His examination of Islamic history is conducted with the purpose of finding and laying bare those elements in Islam which have been conducive to 'integration' and those which have not. He thus considers integratory phenomena such as the creation of Islamic mores and Islamic law, and disintegratory ones such as the Kharijite movement and the early Shi'ites. In all that he writes about Islamic history Dr. Watt is painstaking, knowledgeable, and illuminating, and it is only about his general scheme that doubts occur. For not only is there this ambiguity about the meaning of 'integration', but also there is the fact that at the end of his treatise Dr. Watt is still not in a position to indicate—even approximately—those general laws and principles of 'integration' in search of which the project was initiated. And one wonders whether they are to be found; for when one has given their due to accident, circumstance, and

the unintended consequences of actions, how much is left for general laws and principles? Over and above this, are religions engines of 'integration'? It seems hazardous to believe this on the basis of Karl Mannheim's speculations. It may be true in some cases that they helped a disintegrating society to take hold of itself: it is said that Methodism did this (as Islam in Dr. Watt's view did for Arabia) for certain parts of industrial England and Wales, but is this as clear in the case of Mormonism or of Luther's reform?

One last point. Does it not seem unduly indulgent to vulgar prejudices even to speculate, as the author does (p. 257), whether the work of European Orientalists is 'due mainly to the fact that the West has been thinking imperialistically about the Orient and believes that knowledge gives power'?

ELIE KEDOURIE

ABRAHAM A. WEINBERG, *Migration and Belonging, A Study of Mental Health and Personal Adjustment in Israel*, xxii + 402 pp., Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961, 32 guilders.

Problems of migration have loomed large during the past two decades, and Israel is no doubt one of the most promising places for studying the mental health and adjustment of immigrants. Hence one approaches this volume with high expectations, which are unfortunately disappointed. The reason for this failure seems to have been the lack of familiarity on the part of the psychiatrist conducting the study with the social research techniques he decided to use; Dr. Weinberg also appears to have been ill served by his advisers.

The major part of the material was obtained by interviewing about one hundred students attending an Ulpan (institution providing Hebrew courses for immigrants). This interview can only be called a mammoth depth interview, covering over 1,000 questions, and one has to admire the fortitude of those subjected to it, as well as that of the interviewers. The topics dealt with by the questions ranged all the way from conception and birth ('How was the birth?') via childhood, adolescence, and maturity before immigration, to the most minute details of present life in Israel ('What was your gross income from work during the last financial year? What are the deductions from your income?'). The answers were coded and punched on to cards, some of them being used to construct four indices, including mental health and general adjustment; incidentally, it is by no means clear how the crucial index of mental health was actually arrived at.

This mass of data was fed into the statistical mill for the computation of relationships between indices and the other variables. Regrettably, the results which emerged and feature in the tables are marred by all kinds of errors. One concrete example will be given: on p. 68 where the general statistical procedure is explained, there is a table showing the relationship between general adjustment and mental health in childhood. Now, first, the percentage figures in this table contain mistakes; second, some computations based on it are wrong; third, one of the methods applied (excluding the medium responses) is indefensible; fourth, Table 12 on p. 367, allegedly presenting the identical data, contains quite different values of chi-squared. Examples could be multiplied.

After this one becomes sceptical of the theoretical discussion based on such findings. In particular, the author wrestles with the notoriously slippery concept of mental health and tries to relate it to personal adjustment, of which he distinguishes various forms. Handicapped by the need to fit the concepts to the data, one feels that he is driven to take refuge in somewhat ambiguous verbal formulae; e.g. we are variously told that 'Satisfactory mental health is not to be conceived as a static form of mental functioning but as a balanced psychodynamism' (p. 81), 'Mental health . . . is a steady state and personal adjustment is the psychodynamism of the personality in order to defend this steady psychic state' (p. 205) and finally 'Positive mental health is the dynamic steady state of mind . . . characterized by adequate, positive, personal adjustment' (p. 211).

On the credit side, there is a concise summary of previous research on mental health and immigration which workers in this field should find valuable. Moreover, the

frequent appearance of heteroscedastic relations between variables poses some interesting problems for future research; perhaps it ought to be mentioned that this depends on the shape of the percentage distributions, thus being little affected by the earlier criticisms. Altogether, however, one must view this work as an opportunity missed, and can only hope that the expensive lesson has been learnt.

G. JAHODA

M. J. FIELD, *Search for Security: An Ethno-psychiatric study of Rural Ghana*, 478 pp., Faber & Faber, London, 1960, 42*s*.

It would be a poor tribute from a fellow-professional to add yet another uncritical encomium to those already lavished on Dr. Field's book by lay reviewers. Case-records, which make up a large part of the book, even when they are concerned with the mentally sick and are presented as compassionately as these are, unfortunately have an hypnotic attraction for the unscholarly. But they are only the raw material for the hypotheses and generalizations which it is the proper task of scientific study to establish. And in this respect, I feel bound to say, Dr. Field falls short of what we are entitled to expect from her. For she is no ordinary ethnographic specialist. Thirty years of experience of Ghana, as ethnographer, teacher, and student of men and affairs, lie behind this book. The problems investigated in it have been pursued by Dr. Field throughout these years with rare application. How many anthropologists would undergo the grind of a medical and psychiatric training in order to prepare for investigations such as are here recorded? To say that Dr. Field is uniquely qualified by her knowledge of the people and of their language and culture, as well as by her professional skills, her talent, and her devotion, to undertake this enquiry, is an understatement.

The thorough and imaginative field-work set out with such literary felicity in this book testifies to this. What it is weak in is coherence and theoretical penetration. Dr. Field ignores—where she does not implicitly mock at—other scholarly and scientific research in her field. There is a long and irrelevant digression on possession among Biblical prophets, interpreted on the model of Ashanti diviner-priests, but no consideration of the comprehensive and expert literature on shamanism. Mr. Robert Graves is cited as an authority on the hallucinogenic use of mushrooms by the Delphic oracles; Dr. Margaret Murray's debatable views on European witchcraft are adduced; unnamed 'orthodox' anthropologists are credited with naïve notions; and there is one slighting allusion to psychoanalysis. But no reference is made to recent important studies of African witchcraft such as those of Wilson, Marwick, and Mitchell, or even to the pioneer ethnopsychiatric investigations of B. J. F. Laubscher (*Sex, Custom and Psychopathology*, London, 1937). Consistently with this attitude, Dr. Field is content with the established ethnographic and psychiatric categories. Thus she makes no attempts to explain the preponderance of close maternal kin among those attacked in the fantasies of her subjects, nor does she bring out the depth-psychological implications of her observations.

Dr. Field's book is concerned with a cult movement that has spread explosively in Southern Ghana and elsewhere in West Africa in recent decades. Significantly enough, as she notes in her ethnographic introduction, this has occurred in the more urbanized, Christianized, literate, cocoa-exporting areas, and notably among the matrilineal Akan groups. The ideology of witchcraft, which is central to the movement, is alien to many of the non-Akan groups of Ghana, though social change is affecting them equally, and mental illness is presumably not unknown among them. Dr. Field notes this important problem incidentally but does not follow it up. There are, as Dr. Field has ascertained, many thousands of cult centres in Southern Ghana and popular ones may have a hundred supplicants on a taboo day. Shrines dedicated to traditional Akan deities are served by priests who divine in a state of possession. Dr. Field's account of the priest's vocation, training, and self-discipline, and her description of the state of possession, are first-rate. She deals less fully with the newer fetishistic types of cult.

Establishing herself at an Ashanti cult centre, Dr. Field was able to observe and interview many hundreds of the supplicants and patients who sought the protection of the deities. Heavy fees are paid, which makes popular shrines highly profitable.

Supplicants state their problem in public and the possessed priest divines its supernatural causes; and witchcraft is almost invariably imputed, except that adherents of a shrine may have forfeited its protection by breach of its taboos. Help to achieve wealth and success, to preserve health, to defeat supposed enemies, or to allay the fears of unspecified threat from kin and circumstances that seem to pervade Akan social life, is sought by people in all walks of life.

The witchcraft deemed to explain sickness and misfortune of every kind, as elsewhere in Africa, is thought of as a malign, unpredictable, what we should describe as unconscious psychical force. Dr. Field's case-records provide a remarkable and original body of information on this topic. And what is most striking is that the sick and unfortunate are diagnosed to be the victims of *their own*, not, as is commoner in Africa, other people's witchcraft. The treatment requires them to confess their witchcraft crimes of which, of course, they have not till then been aware. These confessions are wholly incredible. They are reminiscent of the fantasies and delusions of the mentally sick in our civilization; but they are, in fact, monotonously stereotyped and conventional. This is another topic left unprobed by Dr. Field.

It is Dr. Field's contention that the majority of the sufferers who solicit help at the shrines are mentally sick people. Her case-records are intended to document this hypothesis. Depression, often connected with organic maladies, is the commonest form of illness she identifies, but schizophrenic illnesses also occur. (They are shown by Dr. Field, in a separate investigation, to have as high an incidence in the area she studied as in civilized countries.) Schizophrenic illness appears to be recognized as madness by the shrine priests whereas depression is attributed by them to self-injuring witchcraft. Dr. Field cites cross-cousin parentage as the main factor in the causation of mental illness in Ghana. But it does not need much knowledge of statistics to have grave doubts about those she gives. She makes no attempt to investigate such sociological and psychological variables as the degree of urbanization experienced or the loss of parents in early childhood, though her case-records contain some information on these topics.

However, the main point for Dr. Field is that she believes mental illness, and primarily depression, to be the source of the witchcraft beliefs she has recorded. Eliminate depressive illnesses, she seems to argue, and these beliefs and practices will disappear; and there is even a hint that this can easily be attained by expanding facilities for electric-shock treatment; which is surely a counsel of despair.

The *non sequitur* in this argument hardly needs pointing out. Normal, ordinary Ghanaians and the cult priests do not regard the witchcraft fantasies of the sick as the ravings of madmen but as admission of facts. An alternative interpretation is that the mentally sick in Ghana make use of the current, socially accepted notions of witchcraft to clothe and express their delusions, just as, in our civilization, they use notions of sin and uncleanness. And what is more, it is through using these notions that they gain access to therapy. Here, too, there is a gap in Dr. Field's analysis. Granted the difficulties such an enquiry would encounter, it would be of no little importance to try to establish how effective the primitive psychotherapy of the cult priests is.

I want to emphasize, again, that this is a notable book. It is a landmark in the development of psychiatry in West Africa, hitherto the most neglected branch of medicine in the whole of Africa. It also provides novel and significant data for anthropological theory. That is why it merits scrupulous and critical examination.

MEYER FORTES

ALEKSANDER HERTZ, *Żydzi w Kulturze Polskiej*, 284 pp., Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1961, 22*s*.

Notwithstanding its title, which suggests that it is concerned with the contributions of the Jews to Polish culture, the book under review deals primarily with the situation of the Jews in Polish society. Only one chapter is devoted to what normally goes under the heading of contributions to a culture, and even this chapter deals mainly with social mechanisms of inter-cultural mimesis, and only secondarily with the contents of the interchange. The factual material incorporated in this rather slender book is

enormous, and in consequence the exposition is highly concentrated—a welcome and rare quality in contemporary sociological literature. The style is free from jargon, and very distinguished throughout. The reflections of the author throw new light not only on the Jewish community but on Polish society as a whole; indeed there are very few studies of equal excellence of any of its aspects.

In order better to understand causes and effects of ethno-religious divisions and strife in Poland, the author leans heavily upon his knowledge of the American studies of equivalent topics, and the resulting comparative remarks constitute a valuable feature of his book; particularly as the author is equally as careful to note differences as similarities. For instance, in comparing American colour-bar with Polish anti-semitism he carefully points out the basic difference between them, consisting in the fact that whereas the exclusion effected by the colour-bar is unilateral, the barrier between the Jews and the Gentiles is supported from both sides. Extremely interesting are the author's remarks about differences between Jews from various countries: he suggests, for instance, that the difficulties of their position fostered, among the educated Polish Jews, iconoclasm, the faculty of incisive and rather cynical insight into human conduct and sardonic wit, whereas these qualities do not abound among the American Jews who, not being harassed, tend towards conformism.

Should this book be published in translation, it would require a considerable expansion because as it stands it assumes a great deal of factual knowledge on the part of the reader; so much, indeed, that even the younger Poles who do not remember pre-war times may find some passages rather puzzling. Their perplexity may be irremediable because there is neither bibliography nor footnotes; many writers are mentioned without an indication of what it is that they have written.

This book is not a product of a research project but a fruit of life-long thought, study and observation.

S. ANDREVSKI

S. B. UNSDORFER, *The Yellow Star*, 205 pp., Thomas Yoseloff, New York, London, 1961, 25*s*.

Even Jewish history can offer no tragedy more terrible than that of the concentration camps. But this is not the usual concentration camp record. For the author's experience is intimately connected with that of his martyred community; and, in fact, the author's father, a rabbi in Bratislava (Czechoslovakia), had deliberately chosen his martyrdom by rejecting a position in the United States rather than desert his community at a critical moment.

This is the tale of a Jew who remained constant in his faith in the valley of the shadow of death. And the account of his struggles to observe religious occasions in the camps—to light a *Hanukkah* lamp, to bake three tiny *Mazoth*, to recite the *Haggadah*—is one of the most moving passages in a moving book.

Judaism is, of course, attuned to catastrophe and there is a wealth of documentation relating to the acceptance of suffering throughout the ages. It sets one wondering how other persecuted minorities have reacted to their tragedies.

SCHIFRA STRIZOWER

JACOB KATZ, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times*, xv + 200 pp., Scripta Judaica, Vol. III, Oxford University Press, 1961, 21*s*.

Medieval men were not necessarily more virtuous than the men of today, but they certainly took much more seriously their religious beliefs and the disciplines consequent thereon, and allowed these beliefs to determine their daily conduct. This applies to Christians and Jews alike, and the results are of particular interest to the sociologist when one—or both—of two conditions present themselves. There is an inevitable social consequence when the religious pattern determines the conduct of daily life, and so impinges on everyday things, whether social or economic. It is, for example, obvious that the Christian control of seasons of abstinence affected the food trades. But the life evolved by rabbinic Judaism went into far greater detail than that,

and determined the behaviour of Jews, and their relation to the non-Jewish life around them, in the minutest detail. A second field in which there are social consequences is to be found when the normal evolution of living is affected or distorted by some clear-cut religious compulsion, and when a precise religious decision determines a matter which otherwise would be considered 'secular'. The result is the production of some casuistic solution which may have immense social consequences. The Christian interpretation of the prohibition of making a profit from moneylending is an excellent example of this; the seventeenth-century witchcraft trials are another.

In the former case, economic development in the twelfth century demanded the possibility of borrowing money to rise from hand-to-mouth subsistence agriculture to a more profitable and specialized rural economy. Because of the attitude of the Church this emergence of a natural and desirable demand produced on one side the unfortunate Jewish moneylender with his uneconomic but fair system of *usury*, and on the other side the preposterous system of Christian *interest*, with a joint by-product of the *montes pietatis*, none of which produced economic stability or creativity. In the latter, a desirable social development and a humanizing of legal practice was forbidden in the interest of a literal fulfilment of a supposed divine command in the Mosaic legislation: thou shalt not suffer a witch to live.

This is the field in which Professor Katz makes his extremely important contribution in the present book. The study of medieval Jewish-Christian relations from the Christian side, or on the basis of the available Christian material, is already considerable. But in the study of it from the Jewish side, from the standpoint of the development of the halakhists and their *responsa* in the European communities, Professor Katz is a pioneer, and this is an indispensable work, at any rate so far as the English language is concerned.

The situation which confronted these scholars was that Talmudic discussion had covered the whole of daily life in meticulous detail, but it had presupposed entirely different conditions of living; as well as a completely different environment. At the time when the Mishnaic tractate of *Abodah Zara* (Strange Worship) had been compiled, and during the whole period when it was being discussed by the Talmudic rabbis, the environment of the Jewries of the East had been pagan, polytheistic, and idolatrous. A new situation arose when the environment was Christian, and it is not surprising that the halakhists could never quite make up their minds whether Christianity was idolatry or not. The problem was a practical and not a theoretical one, for Jews were heavily involved in pawnbroking, and the articles which they received in pledge were often religious. If they were idolatrous, then Jews could not receive them. Hence the need for definition.

Definition was equally necessary because the Talmudists had presupposed a possibility of separation between Jewish and Gentile communities which was completely inapplicable in Europe. In Babylon or Israel Jews had lived in compact masses, largely self-supporting, indeed autonomous, and could pick and choose in their relationships with the world outside. The tiny European communities—often no bigger than the essential minimum for a *minyan*—were in a totally different situation. Jews were not allowed contact with an idolator for three days before and after his feasts. Were the Christian festivals idolatrous? As many of the big fairs of Europe were held at the time of the festivals, the issue was a vital economic one.

Much subtle reasoning was needed to adjust the fact that European Jews, more and more restricted and specialized in their activities, depended on Christians for their food, for domestic service, and for the produce which they bought or sold. Could they deal in wine? Could they drink wine which Christians had grown and made? To what extent could the Jewish housewife allow a Christian domestic to run her house, prepare and cook her food, and look after her children? All these were new issues, and it is fascinating to watch how the scholars dealt with them. With their immense veneration for the oral law as divine revelation they took infinite pains never to give away a principle, but always to find some *ad hoc* reason for making just this or that amendment to practice. The results, from a sociological point of view, are interesting. Respect for a divine authority forced them more and more into a conservative position, and enabled them less and less freely to make creative adjustments to their environment.

In the second part of the book Dr. Katz discusses a number of medieval 'types and attitudes'; and in the third part passes rapidly over the period of almost complete separation which followed the Middle Ages, into the Age of Enlightenment and the problems of a new symbiosis with emancipation. It is a most important study. The ample footnotes with which the book is provided emphasize the increasing importance of modern Hebrew for purely European and historical studies. It is to be hoped that the success of this book will encourage the translation into English of some of the specialized works mentioned in these notes. For they deal with a field which has a wider interest than the purely Jewish, and few of the scholars who would profit from them are likely to know Hebrew.

JAMES PARKES

HARRY M. JOHNSON, *Sociology, A Systematic Introduction*, xvii + 689 pp., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1961, 42*s*.

With the passing of time and the increasing interest in sociological studies, large numbers of introductions to the field have appeared, particularly in the U.S. Nevertheless the complaint is still frequently heard, above all among European sociologists, that no text exists which is acceptable as the main dish for an introductory course in sociology. The publication of Professor Johnson's book, praised in a foreword by Professor Merton as achieving something like an optimum balance between sociological theory and empirical fact, should therefore be of considerable interest to teacher and student alike.

Unfortunately Professor Johnson's book leaves us still without that over-all commendable text for which we seem to be waiting (probably in vain; it is not unlikely that each teacher has to write his own version of the gospel). He does incorporate much of the latest research done in various fields of sociology in an unusually appealing way, he manages to convey many theoretical ideas more lucidly than the original proponents, and he can tie up disparate findings very neatly into a coherent package —but still the book is an uneven one.

The main reason for this seems to be that throughout Johnson's main theoretical guide is the Parsonian scheme of analysis. It must be remarked at the outset that no exegesis of Parsons exists comparable in clarity and usefulness to the present one. All who have struggled hard and seriously with the intentions of Professor Parsons and his epigoni will find that Johnson admirably pulls the different strands together. But then one might come to the conclusion that after better understanding sociological theory in the Parsonian vein it becomes even less acceptable. As Professor Johnson is, on the whole, a clear thinker he takes the implications of social systematics in many cases to their logical conclusion. He also is an acute observer of empirical reality. The result throws serious doubt on the heuristic value of the model: often the discrepancies between theoretical analysis and empirical fact stand out for all (but Professor Johnson?) to see. He then either, nonchalantly, drops whatever guide his theory should provide and writes on the level of empirical generalization (e.g. much of the chapter on social change), or he imports theoretical statements from different sources and contradicts himself when these conflict with the implications of his own scheme (thus the analysis of power in terms of Max Weber's conception clashes repeatedly with what is taken over from Parsons).

At certain points we discover where an (over-) zealous application of the AGIL-scheme can lead. We are thus given to understand that the widespread social change which accompanied the Meiji Restoration in Japan in 1868 was not really 'fundamental' because it merely strengthened the already dominant political values. Generally speaking the most 'important' kind of structural change is considered to be a change in the value patterns of society (p. 627), change, that is, from the dominance of values associated with one functional subsystem (e.g. goal-attainment) to that of values associated with another functional subsystem (e.g. adaptation). When it is realized that in terms of the AGIL scheme Tokugawa Japan and Soviet Russia have (formally) similar dominant values (p. 89)—those of the goal-attainment subsystem, i.e. 'political' values—the arbitrariness of using the level of abstraction of the analytical scheme as the criterion for deciding on the *importance* of social change (or on the comparability of societies) becomes evident. One is strengthened in this convic-

tion when one is told (p. 320) that the societal goals are not necessarily agreed upon by all members of society and that by referring to the goals of governmental activity as the goals of society we should merely understand 'that the government acts to some extent on behalf of all the people, decides on policies that at least *affect* all the people'. This kind of analysis makes one wish that Lockwood's early remarks on 'The Social System'—which Johnson regards as 'valuable to the student of sociological theory' (p. 648)—had been taken more to heart.

There are also examples of the extensive muddles to which social systematics can lead. The concept 'social system' (or subsystem) is used on an infinite number of levels, and moreover there is a highly significant difference between structural subsystems and functional subsystems (which is admirably discussed in chapter 3). Throughout the book no distinction is made between these different uses and there is a constant shuttling back and forth between different levels—often within the same sentence. The following quotation (dealing with contractual relationships) is a typical illustration: 'At the same time that the contracting parties are representatives of distinct social systems, they also compose a social system together; and this system, like any other, has four subsystems' (p. 252). Further examples are to be found on p. 214 (the analytical view of the economy) and in the attempt to determine the functions and dysfunctions of social stratification or religion for different social (sub-) systems. At one point we are even told (p. 461) that a particular movement may be functional 'in the long run'—that is, for a future state of the social system. Unlimited and undreamed-of vistas are thus opened up. . . .

In the analysis of many social institutions the book also follows Parsons's empirical writings closely, supplementing them, however, with a very wide and on the whole very well-chosen range of other material. The reader will find the integration of much monographic material in the text illuminating. Many descriptive and analytical sections are helpful, particularly the chapter on culture, the résumé of Parsons's writings on the American middle-class family, the chapters on the American economy (though the occasional attempt to deal with the criticisms levelled at it from radical quarters is most unconvincing), the many excellent references to the institutions of feudalism, and the description of the American political system. In the discussion of socialization Parsons is again closely followed. It is an interesting and provocative fusion of Freudianism and social systematics, but its explanatory value seems more limited than either Parsons or Johnson realizes: built up around the nuclear family with two children of opposite sex it fails to offer an adequate explanation of the socialization process in all those cases where the composition of the family departs from this pattern (e.g. no father, no mother, no sibling of opposite sex, no siblings at all).

The chapters on social stratification provide an excellent guide to one particular school of analysis, but they present a decidedly one-sided picture of the thinking on the subject. A very short (and not very accurate) account of Marx's concept of class is included as a courtesy to what Johnson apparently considers a completely outmoded approach; not a word is devoted to the refinements introduced by Max Weber, let alone to more recent contributions in this tradition such as those of David Lockwood and Ralf Dahrendorf. The integration of the classical tradition leaves much to be desired at other points: Durkheim hardly emerges during the discussion of anomie, while neither Marx nor Mannheim are mentioned in the chapter on ideology, which in other respects is quite useful. The chapter on religious beliefs and rituals, on the other hand, must be among the best short treatments of these subjects that exist.

Finally a word on those aspects of the book which might be of special interest to readers of this Journal. As a textbook devoting particular attention to the social structure of the U.S., it is disappointing in the sparse use made of material which analyses the peculiarities of this structure in terms of the population's ethnic background. Thus, for example, the vast volume of sociological papers on the American Jews edited by Marshall Sklare was not consulted. It is mainly through good discussions of the writings on antisemitism that we come in contact with contemporary Jewry, and further through a number of references to problems connected with the Israeli *kibbutzim*. Also useful is an excellent discussion, following Max Weber, of the effects of the international political situation on the religion of ancient Israel.

In summary, then, we can say that the book is very useful for two purposes: it

may be selectively read as a textbook, and it provides more advanced students with excellent opportunities to delve into the strength and weakness of Parsonian social systematics.

EMANUEL J. DE KADT

DONALD G. MACRAE, *Ideology and Society*, xii + 231 pp., Heinemann, London, 1960, 25*s*.

In the past ten years or so Professor Donald MacRae has published a substantial number of essays on rather widely divergent topics. Those which have been collected in *Ideology and Society* appeared in many different journals, some readily accessible, some comparatively obscure, and we must indeed be grateful for this opportunity to survey a considerable portion of his work.

The book is divided into three parts: the first deals largely with British social science, although it also contains two rather more general theoretical essays. Part II is concerned, in Professor MacRae's own words, with 'samples of sociology'—it deals with topics ranging from 'Advertising and Sociology', through 'Race and Sociology' to two essays on social evolution. The final section deals with 'the area where personality, ideology and political reality all mingle'; it contains a number of critical semi-biographical essays, the essay on the Bolshevik ideology (probably the best-known essay in the book), a chapter on Sartre, and two on politics, one of which is a review of a number of recent publications.

Professor MacRae is at his best when he writes about subjects which can be dealt with in an historical perspective. The essays on the development of different aspects of sociological thought—whether he deals with a country (Britain) or with an idea (racism)—are contributions which should be read by all who are interested in the now often forgotten antecedents of the subjects under discussion. From Professor MacRae's unusual erudition we can learn a great deal not only about the Scottish philosophers (this is not so remarkable, as he does, after all, confess to being a 'lokal-patriotic' Scotsman), but also about many comparatively obscure European social thinkers, even though one is left with the impression that their obscurity is, on the whole, well deserved. The chapters on Darwinism and social evolution are among the best-written pleas against a wholesale rejection of this tradition in sociological thinking. Lasalle's personality and thought are attractively presented in a short essay (the influence of his Jewish background is well sketched), and in the chapter on Sidney and Beatrice Webb the reader will find not only many biographical facts but also some revealing insights into British Labour politics, the part played in it by the Webbs, and the intellectual and philosophical background of this brand of socialism.

Both essays which deal directly with the analysis of ideology are valuable, particularly the earlier one, 'The Bolshevik Ideology'. It discusses the emotional and political needs met by this peculiar mixture of science and myth and is useful in clarifying, in the context of the example under consideration, some general issues about the status and analysis of ideologies. The changed situation within world communism since 1951 should make us cautious about some of the more extreme rigidities and irrationalities described by Professor MacRae, but as a sociological analysis of certain aspects of Stalinism it is outstanding, and as such by no means without contemporary relevance, particularly for the underdeveloped world.

In the middle group we find some other 'samples of sociology', not all of equal strength. A good analysis of the role of religion in contemporary Africa is followed by a rather indifferent sketch on race relations and preceded by an essay on advertising which may be 'deliberately unfashionable', but which is also rather one-sided in its discussion of the social problems related to this new social force. That it was originally a lecture delivered to a gathering of 'ad-men' makes this perhaps understandable. It is nonetheless regrettable, all the more so because hardly any serious sociological analysis exists in this field.

It is perhaps in the direct and indirect writings on sociological theory that this collection leaves us least satisfied. It is difficult to know whether this is caused by the conscious omission of theoretical writings reserved for publication in a more integrated work which is mentioned in the preface, but even so it is, for instance, disappointing that the discussion of functionalism in chapter 3 is so summary and that the essay on

Social Theory posits convergence in this area without analysing the trends in the U.S. or Europe. Even though this was a conscious limitation of the scope, it reduces the value of the analysis, as in this area little of consequence has recently emerged from Britain. Professor MacRae does make it very obvious that he believes neither in sterile empiricism nor in a sociology which is divorced from man's desire to bring about a morally acceptable social reality (in the light of these repeated pleas his complete lack of sympathy with the concern for the theme of 'alienation'—'a strange God' which 'tempts the younger generation'—is difficult to understand). But his conception of sociological theory *per se* does not emerge with particular clarity from these essays. We may, perhaps, look forward to a more specific discussion in the future.

EMANUEL J. DE KADT

JOHN REX, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, 25*s*.

DONALD P. RAY, ed., *Trends in Social Science*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1961, $4.75.

Controversy so frequently centres on sociological theory that it would be useful to have a synthetic account of the major discussions on recurring problems; Dr. Rex's attempt to produce this is highly laudable. Among the topics discussed are sociology as a science, empiricism, the scope of sociology, functionalism, social change, conflict, and class. The first chapter considers intelligently the relevance of the natural sciences to sociology, and in particular the triad of classification, search for laws and establishment of causal relations. But the other chapters are disappointing: such subjects require a precise, closely reasoned treatment, and the failure to confine argument to the central problem is bound to result in some aimlessness.

Few readers would quarrel with one concern of the author: to make empirical research amenable to substantiation. What is debatable is how much conceptual analysis and theorizing is necessary to obtain precision. Perhaps it is salutary that the author's attempt to construct a theoretical framework falls short of his own demands: he outlines a model for analysing social systems through conflict situations (a potentially fruitful approach insufficiently used), yet he does not offer a definition of 'conflict'; in addition, his seven points for a model are far too vague to use as a basis for empirical investigation.

However, this book does contain some useful discussions, and the only final criticism is that the frequency of author's and printer's errors was a constant irritant.

Most of the contributions to *Trends in Social Science* are claimed to be the result of residence at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. This is a very mixed symposium. An excellent opening essay by Boulding should have been the model for all the contributors; developments in economic theory in this century are skilfully surveyed before considering the factors behind the current movement away from traditional analysis and towards emphasizing the psychological and sociological springs of economic behaviour. Professor Boulding sees the development of sophisticated techniques in these areas as a potent source for innovation in economic theory. Of more limited value is Harold Laswell's imaginative and fanciful 'Research in Politics, Government, and Law'; one's mind begins to go blank at grand schemes of research that science, impersonally, or the reader, personally, is exhorted to adopt. A useful critique is to be found in Professor Tukey's discursive assessment of statistical techniques; this is followed by short, descriptive accounts of interdisciplinary research at the Center, and the sources of social science research funds in the U.S.A.

An imaginative, controversial, yet unsubstantiated article by Edward Shils, suggesting that people are participating more in society, is surely irrelevant in a book of this kind. Such an essay is especially unsatisfactory when history, anthropology, and psychology are explicitly excluded from the symposium on the dubious grounds that only those social sciences were included 'whose methodology indicates a high degree of correlation . . . [and] ought to be acknowledged as the pure social sciences'. If current trends in sociology are to be evaluated by this essay, then the 'Queen of the Sciences' has a long wait for her coronation.

I. C. CANNON

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Abrahams, Gerald: *The Jewish Mind*, Constable, London, 1962, 35*s*.

Bassett, Marion: *A New Sex Ethics and Marriage Structure, discussed by Adam and Eve*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1961, $6.00.

Cox, Oliver C.: *Capitalism and American Leadership*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1962, $6.00.

Falk, Zeev W.: *Marriage and Divorce, Reforms in the Family Laws of German-French Jewry* (in Hebrew), Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University, Legal Studies No. 9, published by 'Mif'al Hashichpal', The Hebrew University Students' Press, Jerusalem, 1961, IL.6.50.

Foerster, Friedrich Wilhelm: *The Jews*, translated from German by Brian Battershaw, Hollis & Carter, London, 1961, 16*s*.

Fuks, Alexander and Halpern, Israel (edited on behalf of the Faculty of Humanities): *Studies in History*, Volume VII Scripta Hierosolymitana, Publications of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem (distributors in the U.K.: Oxford University Press, London), 1961, 50*s*.

Halpern, Ben: *The Idea of the Jewish State*, Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, No. 3, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., Oxford University Press, London, 1961, 48*s*.

Herz, John M.: *Weltpolitik im Atomzeitalter*, Einzig autorisierte Uebertragung des bei der Columbia University Press in New York erschienen Bandes 'International Politics in the Atom Age'; die Uebersetzung besorgte Frau Lili Faktor Flechtheim, Urbana Buecher Bd. 55, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1961, DM.4.80.

Hovne, Avner: *The Labour Force*, The Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, Jerusalem, 1961, IL.3.00 ($2.00).

Kramer, Judith R. and Leventman, Seymour: *Children of the Gilded Ghetto—Conflict Resolutions of Three Generations of American Jews*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1961, $5.00.

Lipman, V. D. (ed.): *Three Centuries of Anglo-Jewish History*, published for The Jewish Historical Society of England by W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., Cambridge, 1961, 25*s*.

Malamud, Bernard: *A New Life*, Eyre & Spottiswoode (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1962, 21*s*.

Mantel, Hugo: *Studies in the History of the Sanhedrin*, Harvard University Press, London, Oxford University Press, 1961, 62*s*.

Maybaum, Ignaz: *The Faith of the Jewish Diaspora*, Vision Press Ltd., London, 1962, 21*s*.

Middleton, J. F. M. (ed.) with the assistance of Britta Eisenreich: *International Social Science Bibliographies—International Bibliography of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, Volume V (works published in 1959), UNESCO, Paris, 1961, 37*s*. 6*d*.

Paret, Rudi (ed.): *Die Welt des Islam und die Gegenwart*, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1961, DM.11.80.

Radzinowicz, Leon: *In Search of Criminology*, Heinemann Books on Sociology, Heinemann, London, 1961, 25*s*.

Ray, Donald P.: *Trends in Social Science*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1961, $4.75.

Reinisch, Leonhard (ed.): *Die Juden und die Kultur*, Eine Vortragsreihe des Bayerischen Rundfunks, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1961, DM.9.80.

Schulman, Elias: *The Fate of Soviet Jewry*, Jewish Labor Committee, New York, n.d., n.p.

Umen, Samuel: *The World of Isaac Lamdan*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1961, $3.75.

Zukerman, William: *Refugee from Judea and Other Jewish Tales*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1961, $3.75.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

COHEN, Percy Saul, B.Com., B.Sc. (Econ.), Ph.D.; Lecturer in Sociology, University of Leicester. Formerly Temporary Research Officer to Henrietta Szold Foundation, Ministry of Social Welfare, Ministry of Health, Israel 1954–7; Tutorial Assistant, Birkbeck College, London, 1959–60. Reports: Community Studies for Israel Ministry of Health and Israel Ministry of Social Welfare. Doctoral Thesis: *Leadership and Politics amongst Israeli Yemenis.* At present associated with Department of Sociology, University of Leicester, research project on 'Young Worker'.

DIJOUR, Ilja M., LL.B., M.Rer.Pol.; Director of Research and Statistics, United HIAS Service, New York; Secretary-General HIAS-ICA Emigration Association, 1927–44; Director, HIAS Operations Germany-Austria, 1945–6. Author of *Modern Mass Migration*, Berlin, 1928; *Dix années d'émigration juive*, Paris, 1936; *United States History and Civics in Questions and Answers*, five editions, New York, 1954–6; etc. At present engaged on research on land settlement among the Jews in Soviet Russia, 1920–39.

FREEDMAN, Maurice, M.A., Ph.D.; Reader in Anthropology, University of London at the London School of Economics. Author of *Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore*, London, 1957; *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*, London, 1958; etc. Editor, *A Minority in Britain, Social Studies of the Anglo-Jewish Community*, London, 1955. Managing Editor, *The Jewish Journal of Sociology.*

GOLDSCHMIDT, Hermann Levin, Dr.Phil.; Director, Jüdisches Lehrhaus, Zurich, First Leo Baeck Prize of the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland, 1957. Publications: *Der Nihilismus im Licht einer kritischen Philosophie*, 1941–1958; *Hermann Cohen und Martin Buber; Ein Jahrhundert Ringen um Judische Wirklichkeit*, 1946; *Philosophie als Dialogik*, 1948–58; *Das Vermächtnis des deutschen Judentums*, second edition 1957; *Die Botschaft des Judentums*, 1960.

KRAUSZ, Ernest, see 'Notes on Contributors', Vol. III, No. 1.

MANOR, Alexander; graduate of the Economics Faculty, School of Law and Economics, Tel-Aviv, 1952; since 1957 Principal, Higher School for Workers, Tel-Aviv; member of the Central Council, Society for Jewish Demography and Statistics. Author of *Fascism, Its Economic and Political Meaning* (in Yiddish), Warsaw, 1934; *Socialism and the Problem of Mankind* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1950; *The National Problem and Socialism* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1956 (also in English), Tel Aviv, 1960; *Jacob Lestschinsky—Thinker and Scholar* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1961; etc.

NOVE, Alexander, see 'Notes on Contributors', Vol. III, No. 1.

PARKES, James William, M.A., D.Phil., D.H.L.; Director of the Parkes Library. Publications: *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue, The Jew in the Medieval Community, The Emergence of the Jewish Problem, The History of Palestine, The Foundations of Judaism and Christianity, Antisemitism: An Enemy of the People*, etc.

PRAG, Alexander; Head of the Research Section, Zionist Executive, Jerusalem; Editor *Bitfutzot Hagolah.* Formerly Chairman of Jordan Valley Block Committee; member of the Central Committee of Agricultural Labour, 'Merkas Hakla'; 'Tnuva' Comptrol Commission. Member of Kibbutz 'Beit Zera'. Author of essays on economic, agricultural, and social problems.

REISSMAN, Leonard, Ph.D.; Favrot Professor of Human Relations in the Department of Sociology, Tulane University, New Orleans; author of *Class in American Society*, and of articles on bureaucracy, the professions, and social stratification. Visiting member at the London School of Economics, 1961–2. At present completing research for a book on industrial urbanization.