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ZIONISM AND ISRAEL*

Ben Halpern

IT SEEMS impossible to discuss any topic involving the Jews without concentrating attention upon the exceptional character of the subject. Certainly, the title 'Zionism and Israel' refers to an unusual instance of nationalism in the Middle East; and its exceptional character is not a matter of merely academic interest but is of crucial importance for the political history of the whole area. We shall therefore consider briefly the unusual history of Zionism and the unusual contemporary character of Israeli nationalism, together with the unusual relations that developed between Zionism and Israel and the Arab peoples.

I

The most obvious, and politically the most consequential, peculiarity of Zionist nationalism is that it achieved sovereignty for a people in a land which it had not effectively occupied since ancient times. Historically perhaps, it is just as important a peculiarity that Zionist nationalism, quite unlike other European nationalist ideologies, is not only deeply involved with religious traditions but is in substance little more than a modern political transformation of a traditional religious idea.

The latter peculiarity goes far to explain the former: for the idea of the return of the Jews to their ancestral home survived as a tenet of faith for centuries when it was a political impossibility; and it was a tenet of faith, moreover, not only for the powerless Jews but also for influential groups among the Christian (particularly the Protestant) powers.

The religious idea of the Jewish restoration to sovereignty in Zion did not always remain strictly eschatological—that is, historically inactive—throughout the centuries. Although the dominant mood among Jews, especially after their disillusioning experience with Sabbatian

* This paper presents in a digested form some of the results of a longer study on *The Idea of the Jewish State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961, and London: Oxford University Press, 1961). The argument and documentation from which the present conclusions were derived will be found in that work. The paper was originally delivered as an address at the 'Institute on Nationalism in the Middle East' held by the University of Chicago Research Bureau on Economic Development and Cultural Change in November 1959.

and Frankist pseudo-Messianism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was to leave the Redemption strictly to Providence, the rise of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe had its effect long before the emergence of political Zionism. Under this stimulus, the religious idea of the Return to Zion was once more interpreted in a historic, not merely eschatological sense. It was argued that if Jews, emulating the nationalist revivals of their time throughout Europe, organized to reclaim their homeland by resettlement and by political activities, then they would be performing a religious duty prerequisite to the Divine Redemption.

On the Christian side, not only a general sympathy for nationalist causes but the unstable political situation in Palestine encouraged the notion, particularly among Evangelical enthusiasts of the Jewish Restoration, that the time for the fulfilment of prophecy had come. Moreover, the European powers during the nineteenth century either feared or anticipated the imminent collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, Christian proto-Zionists, while personally motivated primarily by religious enthusiasm or nationalist sympathies, could argue that Jewish settlers in Palestine would prove the most reliable support for the endangered Turkish regime at one of its exposed frontiers; and, on the other hand, it was also argued that the Jews would prove the most trustworthy successors of the Turks and the most effective guardians of the eastern approaches to Suez in alliance with the Christian power which was wise enough to sponsor their settlement in Palestine.

Neither the Jewish nor Christian proto-Zionist stirrings of the nineteenth century had any lasting historic effect. They were no more than episodic incursions of eschatological ideas into the historical framework of the times, such as had occurred repeatedly in earlier conversions of the traditional religious doctrine of the Return. The reason for this is that both Jewish and Christian proto-Zionism were little concerned with solving the contemporary Jewish Problem, and in fact scarcely recognized its existence.

When Zionism emerged as a modern political movement late in the nineteenth century, it produced hardly any ideas of strategy or tactics, hardly any definitions of ends and means which were not paralleled in the doctrines of its Jewish and Christian proto-Zionist precursors. One major ideological difference existed between historically effective Zionism and the proto-Zionism of earlier decades: the idea of the Return to Zion and of the restoration of Jewish sovereignty was now conceived as a solution for the modern Jewish problem. In this new logical and emotional setting, the traditional idea of the Redemption acquired a new historic effectiveness; and, on the other hand, it also posed a new challenge to those whose sympathy for proto-Zionist ideas derived from traditional sources.

The 'Jewish Problem' is a modern conception produced by the

eighteenth-century Enlightenment and particularly by the Emancipation of the Jews in many countries following the French Revolution. It signifies first of all that the traditional status of the Jews before the Emancipation is rejected as intolerable, and that traditional rationalizations by which both Christians and Jews explained the Jews' exceptional position are regarded as outdated or irrelevant. But it also denotes the specific difficulties that arose after the Emancipation in applying the principle that the Jews must be assimilated into political, social, and cultural equality with Gentiles.

Historic Zionism, as distinguished from proto-Zionism, was actively concerned with solving these Jewish problems. In order to accomplish their solution, it brought about the establishment of the State of Israel.

II

The most obvious, and politically the most consequential, peculiarity of Zionist nationalism is, as we have noted, that it achieved sovereignty for a people in a land which it had not effectively occupied since ancient times. Anyone who reads the headlines knows how significantly this fact has affected the international relations of Israel as well as its internal social and political structure. Israel was established and is being continually reinforced by colonization, with Western aid, in spite of resistance by the indigenous Arabs; hence, it is stigmatized in the propaganda of both Eastern bloc communists and pan-Arab nationalists as a bridgehead of imperialism. Israel is made up of a continuous, massive stream of immigrants who, while all Jews, come from the most diverse areas of the world; hence, it faces a task of unexampled proportions and critical importance in creating a viable social and cultural national consensus. In addition, the extra-Palestinian origin and history of Jewish nationalism had equally significant but less familiar effects upon the development of the Zionist movement before the Jewish state was created.

We may take it as a fairly well established general rule that of the standard aims of nationalism—a movement which may be roughly defined as intended to secure for a subject or backward nationality those attributes of the modern nation-state that it may wholly or partially lack—the conquest and unrestricted exercise of political sovereignty is the only absolute and unconditional aim. The other major nationalist aims—such as the exclusive control of the land and natural resources, or the secure establishment of the national language and culture—are often conceived as means, and not only as ends. The pursuit of such aims may be deliberately restricted or suspended for reasons of policy. The independent republic of India, for example, still recognizes the English language as an official language. Anti-Western Iraq permits the continued control of major oil resources by foreign capitalists rather than

nationalize an industry it has not the funds, the skills, or the commercial contacts to develop adequately. On the other hand, it seems to be the very hallmark of a modern nationalist movement, or of a new nation, that it never thinks of its political sovereignty as subordinate to other specific ends. Leaders who incline to 'moderation' in regard to the conquest or exercise of national sovereignty are usually decried as 'lackeys' of colonialism and imperialism, and the nationalist movement, as though by a mass instinct, rejects them in the same way that the logic of a mass revolutionary impulse passed by Kerensky and swept on to Lenin.

To this generalization, Zionism is an outstanding exception. Political sovereignty was not, at all times without exception, an absolute and unconditional purpose in Zionism, the end to which all other nationalist aims were subordinated and all considered as means. As a general rule, Zionism valued national sovereignty not for its own sake alone, but also as one of the instruments needed for the attainment of other ends of the nationalist movement. A Zionist leader like Chaim Weizmann could sometimes propose to moderate, modify, or defer the conquest of political sovereignty without serious loss of popular support. To occupy the land and develop the resources of the Jewish National Home or to cultivate the Hebrew language and restore an active social and cultural national consensus seemed at times to have logical precedence and even emotional primacy over the aim of political sovereignty; and often sovereignty was envisaged as a means subordinate to those other ends.

The reasons for this peculiarity in Zionism are easily understood. Other nationalist movements arose among peoples occupying the land where they wished to be free. Consequently, the nationalist myth of liberation, with its call to expel the foreigner, could appeal to powerful popular feelings of rage and envy arising from the continual frictions that attend the relations between peoples without a common consensus when one rules and the other is forced to be subject. Zionism, however, could not evoke an overpowering wave of popular emotion by a simple outcry against the foreign tyrant, for it proposed not to free the Jews in the countries where they were oppressed but to bring them into a new country.

This, as we have noted, led to the rather peculiar reasonableness characteristic of Zionism and of Israeli nationalism. The word 'reasonable', when used to describe any nationalist movement, can only apply, of course, in a very restricted sense; and I hasten to specify my meaning. The reasonableness of Zionism did not mean that Jewish nationalism differed from other nationalisms in lacking an emotional drive as its most powerful and most significant constituent. Like other nationalist movements, Zionism was a passion before it was a doctrine, a strategy, or a tactical plan. The resemblance to other nationalist

movements is even more specific, for Zionism, too, was originally and primarily a well-defined antipathy before it was a clear intention; it was a revulsion against an existing condition more than it was a detailed vision of a clear goal. But while the condition against which most nationalist movements rebel takes the form of a specific enemy who oppresses the people, Jewish nationalism erected no such concrete, particular target of national hatred so universally and so exclusively the source of Jewish troubles that it could bring to a single focus the manifold resentments of the entire people. Jewish problems were the problems of a people dispersed throughout the world, suffering every degree of oppression from the most tenuous or even neurotic to the most brutally tangible. The sources to which these difficulties could be attributed were necessarily just as diverse as the problems themselves. The variegated oppressions and oppressors could, of course, be brought together under more general heads. Indeed, they were so grouped for ready comprehension and appropriate reaction by Jewish tradition, which recognized in each new foeman the Amalek or Haman of ancient times. But the identification of diverse contemporary villains with a few ancient models of villainy may sometimes serve rather to diffuse and generalize than to concentrate and particularize the resentments one bears against them.

This conclusion is certainly warranted in regard to the foemen against whom the animus of Zionist revulsion was directed. The objects of Zionist *ressentiment* were not only diffuse and general, they were positively abstract; for the core of Zionism is emotional opposition not to an identifiable villain but to certain historical processes and corresponding ideologies, to a thesis and antithesis, of which Zionism conceived itself to be the synthetic resolution. The emotional drive of Zionism is summed up in a dual hostility: on one hand, revulsion against the passive traditionalist acceptance of subjection in Exile and the patient awaiting of a transhistorical Messiah who would redeem the Jews collectively (as well as the world) in God's own time; and, on the other hand, revulsion against the modernist attempt to solve the Jewish problem by the 'enlightenment' and civic emancipation of the Jews severally. Zionism sought to recapitulate the valid criticisms of each of its rivals by the other and transcend both in a new conception of Jewish destiny. The Jewish theorists of Emancipation had denied the traditional view that the Jews must be redeemed by returning to Zion, for they held that civil enfranchisement would relieve the Jews of oppression in their native countries. As against this view, the Zionists reasserted the will to return to Zion, an attitude which brought them back into a consensus with traditional opinion. On the other hand, they agreed with the modernist criticism of traditional quietism and, like the partisans of Emancipation, regarded the difficulties of the Jewish position not as a divinely appointed ordeal that must be piously

endured but as a Jewish Problem that must be solved by active, and specifically by political, measures.

With ideological abstractions, like traditionalism and modernism, instead of the Czarist Russians, Nazi Germans, anti-Dreyfus Frenchmen, or anti-Zionist Arabs, as the objects of revulsion at the heart of the Zionist dynamism, Zionism could hardly concentrate the whole animus of the people in a single myth-image of resentment as other nationalisms do. Only those intellectuals to whom Zionist ideology made a special personal appeal could find in Zionist myth images a full expression of emotional drives that served to give them historic identification. But not only the abstract nature of the *bêtes noires* of Zionism should be noted; for the equally abstract *bêtes noires* of Marxism had, at any rate, a greater universality and scope of emotional appeal for simple proletarians than did the Zionist myth of 'Auto-Emancipation' for simple Jews. The objects of Marxist hostility—the capitalist relations of production, the bourgeois state and morality—were as abstract as those of Zionist hostility. But Marxist abstractions were attached to the persons of actual oppressors, so that simple proletarians, ignoring refinements of ideology, found in the myths of Marxism easily identifiable targets of their own specific resentments. Behind the traditionalist passivity and the modernist defeatism which aroused Zionist passions stood, on the other hand, not oppressors of the Jews, but Jews. For this reason (to mention others would take us too far afield), Zionism from the beginning was unable to achieve that political supremacy among the Jews, sweeping away or absorbing all ideological rivals, that so many other nationalist movements find within their grasp, at any rate during the struggle for liberation. Zionism from the beginning was only one of several ideologies that contended against each other in the forum of the Jewish consensus. And conversely, within Zionism some partisans of many diverse ideologies—religious pietists and anti-clericals, socialist revolutionaries and romantic conservatives—found something that answered to their emotional needs; so that the Zionist movement was not only a party within the Jewish consensus but itself represented a field of consensus within which components of almost all current Jewish ideologies conducted their debate.

Add to these considerations the crucial fact that the scope of possible actions open to Zionism during most of its history was far narrower than the scope of actions that might be planned or dreamed of in order to achieve its aims. It then becomes easy to understand how Zionism became a movement of enthusiasts and visionaries whose energies were channelled into pragmatically 'reasonable' forms of idealism.

III

By this formula I mean to describe the common character of certain outstanding peculiarities of Zionist nationalism. The first of these peculiarities is a consequence of the fact that Zionism sought sovereignty in a land Jews did not effectively occupy in the beginning; and as the way to nationalist achievement by the most direct route was consequently found blocked, Zionist idealism achieved extraordinary results along other roads that were indirect but at least open. The rejuvenation of Hebrew as a spoken tongue and the successful conversion of Jewish city-dwellers and clerks into farmers and labourers are two triumphs of this diversion of enthusiasm into ordinarily subordinate nationalist channels owing to the unbridgeable gap between aspiration and possibilities along the direct road to the nationalist aim in early Zionist history.

The second peculiarity is a consequence of the fact that Zionism, since it did not appeal to a specific national hatred of a single national oppressor as other nationalisms do, was unable to overcome and absorb all rival ideologies among the people. In view of the fact that Zionism was forced also to dedicate itself to ordinarily subordinate nationalist aims and to approach the goal of sovereignty indirectly, it was both necessary and possible for Zionism to enter into collaboration with other Jewish movements and tendencies. The forms and degree of collaboration varied greatly. A rough division may be made between the relationship of Zionists to non-Zionists among Eastern European and Western Jews. In the East, Zionists and their ideological opponents were divided over the issue of Jewish colonization in Palestine, but worked together or along parallel lines for the rights of a national minority and for the preservation and cultivation of Jewish culture, in Hebrew or Yiddish. In the West, Zionists and non-Zionists differed ideologically over the analysis and solution of the Jewish Problem in the Diaspora, but worked together in support of Jewish resettlement in Palestine.

The State of Israel is, accordingly, the creation not only of the Jewish settlers in Palestine, or even of the Zionist movement alone, but also of the world-wide community of Jews. Non-Zionists, particularly in the West, gave generous financial support and important political assistance in the long process of resettlement and international litigation and conflict that created a tangible Jewish claim to constitute a sovereign polity in Palestine and then make that claim good. Non-Zionist support, moreover, was not a matter of an accession of disorganized sympathizers around the periphery of the Zionist organization. It took organized, institutional forms, so that in such a country as the United States support for the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine became an established, regular function of the

entire organized Jewish community, whatever the degree of attachment or opposition to the Zionist idea of some of its members.

The broad commitment of the entire community to the Zionist endeavour was not achieved by an emotional storm wherein nationalism conquered the popular consensus, as in other cases, but by a process of negotiation, of compromises and accommodations worked out between Zionist and non-Zionist organizations. Some parts of the Zionist programme, however, succeeded in dominating the Jewish consensus emotionally as well. In Eastern Europe, though not in the West, the Zionist conception of the Jews as a nationality won such dominance. Throughout the Jewish world, as other doors were closed against Jewish immigration and as the need to get away from Europe grew from urgent to desperate, support for open doors in Palestine for Jewish refugees gained virtually unquestioned emotional dominance over the Jewish consensus.

As the entire Jewish community was committed in numerous and intricate obligations to various aspects of the Zionist endeavour, so the Zionist movement, and afterwards the State of Israel, were committed not only by their own programme but by a web of institutional relationships to numerous obligations towards Jews in the Diaspora. The sovereignty of Israel is, in a sense, still subordinated to these obligations. Thus, Israel (as the Zionist movement earlier) not only has undertaken to admit and colonize in its territory all Jews, virtually without restriction, who desire to immigrate. It permits the regulation of this process to be carried out in considerable part by the World Zionist Organization, an international Jewish organization which is not, in many important respects, fully contained within the sphere of Israel's sovereignty.

Even where no organized, institutional commitment to Jewry beyond Israel's borders exists, there may still be important obligations, affecting Israel's exercise of sovereignty, towards the interests of Diaspora Jewry. These obligations may be felt concerning both the domestic and foreign policies of Israel. Hostility towards Israel in Arab or Moslem countries and in the Communist-bloc states affects the treatment of the Jews who live there. While self-preservation is, of course, an obligation which outweighs all others in determining the policies and exercise of sovereignty in Israel, lesser considerations of self-interest may not always be as decisive, if the interests of Diaspora Jews are also involved in some contemplated action. Thus in determining Israel's policy on such matters as the global East-West conflict or on certain aspects of church-state relationship in Israel (such as the definition of the entry 'Jew' in Israeli documents), the effect upon the interests of Diaspora Jewry are frequently cited in debate and sometimes appreciably influence the decision taken.

IV

Not only did the Zionist movement enjoy the co-operation of non-Zionist Jewish organizations and of the Jewish community as a whole in achieving its object, but it was aided by the co-operation of numerous governments and international organizations. Compromise and mutual accommodation were the principles upon which such co-operation was sustained. The rise and development of the State of Israel took place in a context determined at the outset by the special rights and obligations of the international community in relation to the Jewish National Home. The conflicts which have surrounded the new state since its birth have made even more complicated the involvement of other states and of international organizations in its affairs.

We have noted that religious enthusiasm and a general sympathy for nationalism produced proto-Zionist projects among Christians long before Zionism emerged as an historic movement. While the Christian proto-Zionists were unable to achieve any co-operative understanding with Jews (who often suspected their would-be benefactors of wishing really to convert Jews to Christianity) they did sometimes impress statesmen and rulers with the strategic advantages to be gained for European states by encouraging Jewish resettlement in Palestine. From the 1840s till the late 1870s, England in particular was able to extend protection to Jews in Palestine and facilitate their immigration, for the Ottoman Empire regarded England as its main diplomatic support. The British occupation of Egypt and Cyprus made a great difference in the Anglo-Turkish relationship, so that after about 1880, the Ottomans regarded with suspicion rather than with benevolence Jewish settlers who were sponsored by Britain and might serve as instruments for extending British influence. Thus, in the decades following, British statesmen were likely to consider sponsorship of Jewish settlement in Palestine a diplomatic hazard in their relations with Turkey rather than a potential political advantage as had been the case earlier.

Just at this time the nature of the Jewish movement for the return to Zion altered radically. Until then, despite the influence of contemporary nationalism and humanitarianism, Jewish proto-Zionism had been essentially traditional, a new version of the urge to practise piety by living in the Holy Land that had brought a constant stream of Jewish settlers to Palestine through all the centuries. The movement, even though stimulated by occasional social or political upheavals, had no serious intention of solving the contemporary Jewish Problem; and as the movement had no real political objective prerequisite to its aims, it had no essential interest in gaining the support of Christian powers. In fact, it was the Christian proto-Zionists who often took the initiative in seeking Jewish co-operation; for while their interests, too, were traditional and unrelated to the contemporary Jewish Problem, they

were concerned with the strategic problem of the tottering Ottoman Empire. They conceived of a large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine as an immediate remedy and an ultimate solution for this eminently political question, and consequently advanced programmes that were frequently broader and bolder than those Jewish proto-Zionists would venture. But the increasing pressure on Eastern and South-eastern European Jewry and the waves of Jewish emigration that began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century produced among Jews a new Zionism directly and centrally concerned with solving the contemporary Jewish problem. It became a major concern of the new Zionism, which necessarily took a political cast, to secure the support of Christian powers or the agreement of Turkey to its plans; and consequently Jewish, not Christian, Zionists now took the initiative in seeking co-operation.

As we have noted, by this time it had become a liability rather than a possible advantage in any European power's relations with Turkey to sponsor Jewish resettlement in Palestine. On the other hand, however, Western Europeans who took pride in their advanced and humanitarian civilization now found themselves under new pressure in regard to the Jewish problem. The mass immigration from Eastern Europe threatened to produce a wave of antisemitism in countries like Britain or the United States. Acts of exclusion or restriction aimed against Jewish immigrants might appear to be both effective and justified in part because they avoided just such unpleasant developments; but they nevertheless offended the liberal tradition, and left Englishmen particularly sensitive to Jewish pleas to provide some asylum where the wandering Jews might find a national security. This was a new source of sympathy for Zionist proposals; and when the strategic and diplomatic disadvantages of supporting Zionism prevailed over sympathy, it left, at any rate, a sense of obligation to offer the rootless Jews some other territorial haven. Thus, in the early twentieth century, the British offer to provide houseroom for Jewish colonization in East Africa, if not in Palestine or its immediate environs, was only the first of a series of 'territorialist' projects that became current at that time.

The Zionist movement, however, had fixed its aim upon the ancestral Zion, and its determination was made all the firmer when those Zionists who were ready to consider substitute territories left the organization. In Palestine the Zionist movement understood that it was dependent upon the Turkish government alone; for if no other government wished to risk damaging its position in Constantinople by interceding for Zionism, the Zionists, too, were aware that it would only harden Turkish opposition against them if they appeared as the clients of a foreign power. Especially after the rise of the Young Turk movement, the Zionist tactics were to seek removal of discriminations against Jewish immigration and settlement and a grant of cultural autonomy as a matter of equal rights rather than to seek a charter of special rights

to develop Palestine rapidly on the explicit understanding that a Jewish Commonwealth was to be created there. However, it became clear to most Zionists that the rulers of Turkey were becoming so firmly set in their antagonism to Zionism, in which they feared the prospect of another Armenia, that it would be difficult to obtain the conditions for even a slow growth of the community. During the war, indeed, it became a major objective of Zionist policy in Constantinople and Berlin, with the support of American Jews, to protect the existing Jewish community against the dangers of expulsion and persecution that the hostility of local Turkish commanders repeatedly made imminent.

Turkey's alliance with the Central Powers in the beginning of the First World War caused the Allied powers to reconsider Ottoman policy on a new basis, for, as Prime Minister Asquith immediately noted, this step was enough to make the Allies take the postwar partition of the Ottoman Empire as the assumption on which to base their future Near Eastern policy. This gave Zionists, in the Allied countries at least, the chance to bid for the restoration of the Jews to sovereignty in Palestine as their share in the process of national liberation which was anticipated as a major aim of the postwar peace conference.

The urgency of the Jewish problem in the war areas, and its repercussions in Allied countries as well—especially the effect on Jewish public opinion—made Allied statesmen particularly sensitive to the appeal of a pro-Zionist policy, now that a strategic situation justifying such a policy had developed. Not only the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine as well as the boundaries of the Palestine Mandate, but also the pertinent part of the Covenant of the League of Nations (Article 22) were defined by men who bore in mind the special requirements for solving the Jewish problem by building a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

However, upon the British occupation of Palestine, and especially after the war was won, strategic considerations turned more and more decisively against the Zionist cause. It became increasingly difficult to effect in reality what the Mandate established as a contingent right: the mass immigration and resettlement required for solving the Jewish problem in the Jewish National Home. Even though the Jewish settlers continually increased in their relative numerical and economic strength in Palestine, they represented an insignificant magnitude in comparison with the mass of Arabs that dominated the strategic situation in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean. The sharp rise in the intensity of Arab nationalism, moreover, caused British policy to place increasing restrictions on the relative growth of the Jewish National Home and, in the end, to decide that it must be frozen at the proportion of one-third of the Palestine population.

Against these developments, Zionist politics had two bases of appeal to the international community and the British people, the first moral

and the second legal. They were able to appeal effectively from political to humanitarian motives in England in view of the unprecedented acuteness of the Jewish problem in a world where all doors were closed to Jewish immigrants as Jewish suffering came to its unbelievable climax in the days of Hitler. They were also able to appeal to the terms of the British mandate in Palestine, of which the Permanent Mandates Commission was empowered to give a legal, not a political interpretation.

However, on the eve of the war and during the Second World War, the legal and humanitarian supports of Zionism lost all effectiveness in the face of the paramount importance of strategic considerations in the eyes of Allied powers. The growth of the Jewish community in Palestine was kept to the fixed limits; and not even when the extermination programme in Europe was made public was this policy relaxed in an attempt to rescue the condemned. The Jewish community in Palestine then fell back on its weapons of last resort and, acting virtually as a sovereign national entity, disregarded the restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine and prepared to assert itself as a Jewish state.

V

The question of 'the future government of Palestine', as the British phrased it, or of the national and political complexion of an independent Palestine was forced upon the international community upon the conclusion of the Second World War by certain critical changes in the situation. Among these, two changes in the factors of our preceding analysis must be mentioned here.

First in significance is, perhaps, the conclusion drawn by the Zionist movement that British policy had blocked any opportunity for further advance towards the nationalist goal by the slow road of immigration and settlement, so that the only remaining chance was to take the direct road of asserting the claim to sovereignty. This meant that Britain was faced by two uncompromising challenges to the legitimacy of its mandate—or, at any rate, to its own interpretation of its mandate —instead of by an Arab rejection of the mandate and a Jewish acceptance of it. This, by the way, at a time when Britain, exhausted by war, was drastically reducing its military commitments. The international community, in turn, was faced by a situation in which all three parties —the Jews and the British as well as the Arabs—looked to the United Nations for an essentially political solution of the problem, instead of two, at least, of the three agreeing that a specific document or set of documents governed the situation, so that the solution sought for could, in the first instance, be formulated as a legal opinion.

A second difference of major significance was a change in the character of postwar international organization, in so far at least as it was

involved in the Palestine problem. Generally speaking, in the League of Nations and, in particular, in the Permanent Mandates Commission, to which questions relating to Palestine were regularly brought in the first instance, legal considerations were more pertinent than they are in the United Nations Security Council or the U.N. General Assembly, where the Palestine question is usually referred to an Ad Hoc Political Committee.

We have noted the significant effect of the Jewish problem as a factor in the formation of pro-Zionist tendencies among the European powers. Sympathy, we have noted also, was a force that achieved historic effects when allied with apparent strategic advantage, but none when opposed to it. During the period of the Mandate in Palestine, however, the pro-Zionist feelings of the First World War had a continued influence because the legal documents under which Palestine was ruled had been so framed as to provide for the solution of the Jewish problem, and the situation permitted legal factors to have a certain force. In the days of strategic crisis preceding the Second World War, during the war, and under the new organization of the international community after the war, the prewar documents which gave legal effect to the intention to solve the Jewish problem in Palestine lost most of their effectiveness. The Jewish problem itself reached an apocalyptic height and sympathy for the Jewish refugees rose proportionately. But the Palestine problem was now a sharply political one, so that both post-war international bodies that investigated it, the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, felt obliged to state, in spite of sympathy, that a solution for Palestine could not be equivalent with a solution for the Jewish problem.

Consequently, if the partition of Palestine was adopted as the most reasonable solution by the U.N. Special Committee and by the U.N. General Assembly, it was not humanitarian but primarily political arguments that gave the Zionist movement its claim to its share in the division. Jewish immigration and colonization over the years had outlined a territorial complex where the Jews had a more or less clear majority, and which could under certain conditions be built into a viable polity. More important was the fact that the established Jewish position was too powerful socially, politically, economically, and above all militarily to be successfully contained within an Arab state of Palestine, especially if the Jews were determined to assert and defend their right to independence.

The determination of Zionist nationalism to achieve sovereignty as an immediate goal was, thus, a new element in the situation which tipped the political scales in favour of partition as the solution of the Palestine problem adopted by the international organization. The United Nations proved unable to bring about a peaceable realization of its proposal. Consequently, the Zionist movement had to fall back

on its own will to sovereignty in order to make good its claim under the U.N. recommendation.

The boundaries of the Israel that exists today were, of course, determined not by the U.N. partition plan, for that patchwork scheme could no more exist than it could be born without a complete and unreserved acceptance by both Jews and Arabs of a relation of peaceful symbiosis between them. Under the conditions of warfare and hostility barely short of war that have actually prevailed between the two Semitic peoples, the state of Israel exists within limits determined by a parallelogram of forces in which the opposed forces are chiefly the sovereign wills of the contending states. But while the form and existence of the country of Israel do not depend upon or strictly conform to the 1947 proposals of the U.N., the international community is a third force which is involved in many ways in balancing the tensions between the opposed sovereign wills of Israel and the Arab states.

The frontiers of Israel are defined by a series of armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states and within and around the area defined are included a number of demilitarized, 'defensive', or neutral zones where the international organization on occasion exercises a sort of authority. These borders, and particularly the demilitarized zones, have been the scenes of constant small-scale fighting. Consequently, the Mixed Armistice Commissions, on which the U.N. chairman casts a vote which decides the issues between the Israeli and Arab members, are constantly being called into session in order to pass judgement and issue demands relating to sovereign acts of one or another of the parties. The divided city of Jerusalem, integrated, as it is, into the sovereign realms of Israel and Jordan, was long the subject of discussions by U.N. bodies looking towards the establishment of an international administration there. The U.N. bodies entrusted with the tasks of conciliating the Jews and the Arabs or of repatriating, resettling, or rehabilitating the Palestinian Arab refugees have frequent occasion to examine and seek to influence Israel's policies, as well as those of the Arab countries. In the Sinai peninsula a tiny United Nations force exercises the symbolic function of separating the Egyptian and Israeli armies and guaranteeing free transit into the Gulf of Akaba.

The original concept of most aspects of this far-reaching U.N. involvement between Israel and the Arab states was that it constituted a transitional phase between armistice and peace, and that the U.N. function was to bring the divided nations together until they reached a condition of mutual acceptance such as normally subsists between neighbouring sovereign states. In fact, however, the 'technical state of war' against Israel has been pushed to such lengths by the Arab countries that the U.N. has begun to play quite a different role. Instead of bringing the opponents together, it stands between Israel and the Arab states in virtually every relationship that subsists between them.

The special position of the U.N. in Israel's affairs has certain obvious implications for the exercise of Israel's sovereignty. Not only does it impose a number of unusual restrictions or obstacles in areas where other sovereign nations are free, but it offers a screen behind which the Arab nations can continue to deny the existence of the Jewish state.

So unusual a function for an international organization might perhaps become acceptable if it offered any substantial guarantee of Israel's security and vital national interests; and, indeed, it was on some such understanding that Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip in 1957. But Israelis hardly feel that they can entrust their security and vital interests to the U.N.'s safekeeping. The whole history of their relations with the U.N., from its inability to bring the partition plan into effect to its inability to give effect to its resolutions against the Egyptian ban on Israeli vessels and traffic in the Suez Canal, teaches the Israelis how unwise it would be to depend on the U.N. as a guardian of their safety.

Nor does the record of other international involvements in Middle Eastern affairs give them much assurance. The Tripartite Agreement of the Western powers to outlaw territorial aggression and maintain a balance of armaments between Israel and its neighbours inspired not confidence but apprehension in Israel, as it saw itself threatened by political and military pressures that were loading the balance adversely under this agreement. But the threat of Western support for Israel's hostile neighbours was nothing compared with the threat of support for the Arabs by the Soviet Union, a power which was not inhibited by any political or humanitarian pressures in backing all-out hostility to Israel's very existence.

These circumstances provide a constant impetus to the somewhat unusual tendency that became marked in Israel since its origin. Our rough generalization that movements of national liberation are likely to be dominated by resentment and to give absolute precedence to the conquest and exercise of sovereignty as a nationalist aim holds true, more or less, for new states, with the qualification that after liberation the limitations that existing power relations place upon sovereignty begin more and more to exert a restraining influence. Not only was Zionism before the rise of Israel an exception to this rule—for it did not give such precedence to sovereignty as an absolute, immediate aim nor was it dominated by resentment of a particular national oppressor—but the new state of Israel is also, in certain respects, unusual. The limits to the exercise of sovereignty inherent in existing power relations are as evident, if not more evident, to Israel as to other new states. But the pressure of existing power relations also, in certain respects, forces Israel to give more emphasis to the exercise of sovereignty, rather than less, in comparison with the tradition of its pre-state era.

VI

Compromise and accommodation, principles which Zionism followed to an extraordinary degree for a nationalist movement, were characteristic for a time of Zionist policy towards their direct rivals, the Arabs, who too claimed Palestine as a part of the realm of their sovereignty. During the last years of the First World War and at the peace conference thereafter, representatives of Jewish and Arab nationalism, both dependent upon British sponsorship, came to a form of agreement regarding Palestine similar to that between the Zionists and the British. The reasons why the Jewish-Arab agreement was so short-lived and historically ineffective are too many and too obvious to recite; but certain reasons may be mentioned, since they are related to our previous discussion. First, the terms of initial understanding between the Zionists and Arab nationalists were never based on a sensitivity to the Jewish problem in their own lands among Arabs and Moslems similar to that which created sympathy for Zionism in certain of the Christian countries. Second, the terms of that understanding were never bolstered by a common recognition of any legal institutions applying them, for Arab nationalists not only withdrew their initial recognition of Zionist aims, but also rejected the entire machinery of the Mandate by which those aims were supported. Third, the strategic situation which brought about the initial agreement changed to one which sharply opposed agreement far more rapidly and radically than in the parallel case of the Zionist-British understanding.

The Zionist movement was slow to draw conclusions from the development of its relations with the Arabs. With the collapse of the understanding on a regional basis with Prince Feisal and the failure of negotiations with other regional nationalist leaders, Zionism sought new approaches to a political understanding within the limits of Palestine. It would take too long to recount the various approaches that were proposed, debated, or attempted, from economic collaboration and municipal coalition with Arabs as a basis for grass-roots understanding to proposals of bi-nationalism or communal parity for Palestine as a whole. In the end, however—that is, by the late 1930s—the dominant opinion in the Zionist movement was that no economic benefits, provisional political concessions, or co-operation at the grass-roots level would create a basis for Jewish-Arab understanding. The only recourse was to be successful in creating and defending that which the Arabs were intent on preventing or destroying, a sovereign Jewish polity in Palestine. Only the firm establishment of the Jewish state as an irrevocable fact would provide the basis for an ultimate Jewish-Arab understanding. Thus, in this field as in others, Zionist nationalism came in the end to the affirmation and exercise of its sovereignty as the avowed aim and most reliable instrument of its policy.

Whether this policy will in the long run prove successful and a Jewish-Arab peace result from the established fact of Israel is still an open question. In its immediate impact, the emergence of Israel had another effect which has been generally recognized: it has provided a common foe around which the cause of Arab unity could crystallize.

In certain respects, the situation of Arab nationalism is oddly like that of Zionism. While the relation between nationalism and religion is not as close as that between Zionism and Judaism, Arab nationalism is in many intricate ways a form of defensive reaction of Islamic religious culture against the threat of Western civilization. This blurs and confuses the picture of the national foe upon whom should focus the resentment that must give Arab nationalism both its dynamic force and its broad popular appeal. The picture of the West as oppressor is confused by the fact that there is no single, clearly marked traditional foe who subjugated the Arab nation. Different Western nations played that role for a while in different Arab countries; but England, which was the oppressor in Egypt, figured for a time as the liberator from France in the popular mind of Syria; while the traditional oppressor of Arabs with the most firmly established title to that role in modern times was another power, the Ottoman Turks, whose yoke was removed from Arab necks by the victory of Britain and its allies. (The religious sanction which was enjoyed by Ottoman rule, of course, prevented the development of a characteristic nationalist resentment among Ottoman Arabs.) Like the *bête noire* of Zionism, then, the national oppressor in the mythos of Arab nationalism is not so clearly identified a single foe as to focus a universal grass-roots resentment of all Arabs. The common denominator of the sources of Arab and Moslem resentment is rather something larger and vague, such as Western imperialistic civilization, as in the case of Far Eastern or African nationalism. For this reason, among others of perhaps greater importance, the slogan of pan-Arab unity has had but halting success.

It is a convenience, therefore, for the intellectuals and politicians who form the dynamic core of Arab nationalism that Israel, emerging at the heart of a potential region of Arab national unity and having administered humiliating military defeats to all its neighbouring Arab states in combination, can serve as a kind of *ex post facto* national enemy to unite the movement in its diverse and mutually opposed centres.

However, the picture is one of greater complexity than this. Not only the military victories of Israel over the Arab countries but the primarily military conceptions of Eastern and Western strategists concerning the place of the Middle East in their global plans contributed to the rise of military rule in the Arab countries—a development for which, of course, the political, social, and economic instabilities which afflict the region provide an essential background. Under military regimes, projects for Arab unity were converted into campaigns of subversion,

assassination, and revolution which have set one Arab country against another so sharply that not even the common enmity to Israel has been enough excuse to patch up the differences. In these troubled waters, the Soviet Union has found its store of obsolescent weapons a highly successful bait. But as the East-West conflict became the dominant issue in the area, Israel receded into the background of attention even more, as the arena of nationalist ambition and of national dangers expanded far beyond the Eastern Mediterranean complex of Arab countries at whose centre lies the Jewish state.

This does not mean that hostility to Israel has lost its primary position among the *bêtes noires* of Arab nationalism. The resolve to wipe out the Jewish state still holds pride of place among Arab slogans. But the day has passed when the location of Israel between Egypt and Jordan was held to be an impediment to Arab unity urgently to be removed. During the crisis of the spring of 1958, when Lebanon and Iraq were in the throes of rebellion generally thought to be inspired by the example and support of the United Arab Republic, Israel's location was a factor for which many Jordanians and Lebanese were silently thankful. The determination to wipe out Israel is not as freely discussed now as a preliminary to a territorial union of Israel's neighbours, nor could they conceivably unite, under present circumstances, to carry such a project out. Too many differences between the Arab states involved exist to make such talk popular at the moment. Instead, the Arab campaign to wipe Israel out seeks other methods and shifts to other battlefields. Israel is now fought not through tightening a circle of its immediate neighbours but by seeking to unite the Asian-African world as a whole against a country represented as an agent of Western imperialism—and in this campaign, the Soviet Union lends wholehearted support.

Israel is not a conceivable focus for nationalist hatred of the whole Afro-Asian complex; but, on the other hand, it is by no means impossible or even particularly difficult to obtain a consensus of coolness against Israel as a white, imperialist intruder. The Moroccans, after joining the Arab League, turned to a policy of greater severity against their own Jewish communities. Asian and African countries were easily moved to adopt resolutions hostile to Israel at Bandung and Casablanca. But the further the extent to which the anti-Israel campaign is stretched, the less intense the hostility that can be evoked. Nor does the anti-Jewish fervour of Egypt, to name the prime mover, fail to overreach itself and appear here too, as among its closer Arab community, as an expression of a will to dominate others rather than to free itself.

Zionism, in the beginning, conceived its role in the Middle East as that of bringing the benefits of modern technique and culture without the plagues of foreign domination and exploitation, for it was a movement of settlers, not of absentee owners and managers. Owing to the

hostility that now dominates Arab-Jewish relations it cannot play that role in its immediate region, the Middle East; and, as a consequence, it has developed a pattern of trade mainly directed to Western and industrial countries. However, it has begun to play the role it originally proposed for itself by developing its contacts with other Asian and African countries, such as Burma and Ghana, Cyprus and Liberia. These are the contacts Egypt is now trying to break by diplomatic pressure and through enforcing its Suez blockade. The latter tactics now affect adversely not only Israel or the Western maritime nations but, from time to time, Asian and African countries. Moreover, it is fairly clear to all concerned that Israel will not be wiped out by such methods, but that they serve primarily as a sop to Egyptian pride or a demonstration of President Nasser's nationalist fidelity, aimed to give him a propaganda advantage over his rivals in the Arab world.

For this purpose, the Suez blockade may be effective, but it also has the effect of irritating other nations, including Asian and Africans, among whom hatred of Israel is not a national fixation. Moreover, to conduct a cold war against Israel is to court the outcome that awaits all cold wars: they can only lead to co-existence, never to surrender.

When unrecognized co-existence becomes a nuisance to third parties, and not merely a morbid indulgence of one or both parties concerned, the pressure to end it by mutual recognition and peace mounts. Not only great powers, whose cold wars are a universal nuisance, but small powers, whose cold wars may be a local or minor nuisance, can resist such pressure with great stubbornness. But an animosity which cannot vent itself in hot action ends by freezing its own springs of passion and sooner or later must cease to make sense.

SMALL-TOWN JEWS AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS IN THE UNITED STATES*

Peter I. Rose

FOR many years social scientists and historians have been trying to piece together a composite portrait of American Judaism. Owing to their predominant pattern of city residence, research has been focused on the urban dwelling Jews; and the Jews of the United States have been characterized as a metropolitan people. There is, however, a scattered minority of American Jews living in little hamlets and rural villages who do not fully fit this urban image. Such people do not reside in old style ghettoes, in ethnic neighbourhoods, or in modern homogeneous suburbs. Unlike their urban co-religionists, they are not members of on-going Jewish communities. They are strangers in alien territory.

Critical examination of Jewish life in the small community would seem to be a logical extension of research in the study of American Judaism and the nature of Jewish-Gentile relations. Yet, while the literature offers a wealth of information about the urban Jews in America, there is a dearth of published material about his 'country cousin'. And what there is is limited to sketchy life histories, journalistic descriptions, and anecdotal recollections of the experiences of individuals who have lived in, visited, or passed through little villages appearing in such publications as *Midstream*, *Commentary*, and *Congress Weekly*.[1]

It was, therefore, in an attempt to add to the general literature on Jewish life on the American scene, to assess Jewish-Gentile relations in this neglected setting, and to re-examine the ubiquitous concept of 'marginal man' that an extensive study of the small-town Jews of New York State was conducted in 1958.[2] Because the small-town Jew is so often cast in the role of being an ambassador of 'his people' to the Gentiles, a parallel study was simultaneously carried out with non-Jewish small-towners also living in upstate New York.

Data were gathered to seek answers to several questions. To what extent do group traditions persist in cases of relative isolation? Does

* This article is an expansion and revision of a paper presented at the annual Eastern Sociological Society meeting on 24 April 1960, in Boston, Massachusetts.

identification wane when unsupported by fellow members of one's own group? How intensive are relationships between the stranger and the world in which he has chosen to live? What kinds of adjustments does he have to make? And, finally, to what extent does interpersonal contact with an isolated minority member influence the stereotypic conceptions and misconceptions held by the majority group members about him?

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Investigation was confined to one particular area of the country: 'rural' New York State. Operationally, 'rural communities' and 'small-town Jews' were defined as follows:

> Rural communities are those communities with fewer than 10,000 permanent residents, in non-metropolitan counties of New York State, excluding all towns in the Catskill mountain region, in Westchester county, and on Long Island.
>
> Small-town Jews are persons identifying themselves as being Jewish living in 'rural communities' having 10 or fewer Jewish families.

The first of the two studies was an attempt to document and analyse the background, beliefs, and behaviour of small-town Jews and to study and record their attitudes relating to the communities where they reside. We were particularly anxious to explore the areas of religiosity, community satisfaction, associations, and patterns of socialization.

Respondents were located through initial contact with twenty individuals who were known to the writer; each lived in a small town in one of twenty different counties. These persons provided the names of all the Jews they knew who fit the criteria established for designating 'small-town Jews'. These persons, in turn, supplied additional names. This technique, called 'pyramiding', provided 180 names in two weeks.

Of the 180 names twenty names were randomly selected; and these individuals and their families, together with the original key informants, were personally interviewed in the Spring of 1958.

The 160 in the remaining group were mailed detailed questionnaires which asked a number of questions about origins, family life, satisfaction with small-town living, religious beliefs and practices, organizational affiliations, and attitudes about their relative isolation.

In *every* instance—whether in the interview setting or in responding to the survey—respondents were told that research was being conducted on Jews living in small towns and that *their* help was needed to tell *their* story accurately. In no cases did those to be personally interviewed refuse to co-operate; and in the case of the mail survey, 80 per cent responded.[3]

The second study was designed to gather information on the impressions

and attitudes of small-town community leaders about themselves and their images and attitudes about minority groups. Data were collected on the relationship between generalized prejudices and attitudes toward Jews, Negroes, and 'foreigners'; the extent to which isolated Jewish persons might influence stereotypes; and the nature of interpersonal contact and socialization between Gentiles and Jews in rural communities.

The names of community leaders were obtained by writing to the mayor or clerk of each village selected and asking that a form designating 25 statuses of leadership—in business, the professions, in government and politics, in education and social service, and in agriculture—be filled out with the appropriate names and returned.

Twenty towns were included in this second survey. All had fewer than 5,000 residents. Ten towns had from one to three Jewish families; the remaining group had *none*.

In all, 315 questionnaires which complemented those sent to Jewish participants were mailed. With two follow-up appeals a total of 60 per cent were returned.[4]

JEWISH LIFE IN THE RURAL COMMUNITY

Dealers and Doctors. Almost to a man the Jews of New York's rural areas are outsiders and not native sons. Most are urban-emigrants who settled in small towns after having spent the early part of their lives in American or European cities. Only 4 per cent were born in the communities where they now live. Of the remaining majority half were born in one of the large American metropolitan centres and 12 per cent in middle-sized cities in the United States. Thirty per cent were born in Europe, many of them refugees from Nazi-dominated Germany and Austria.

How did these urban Jews happen to settle in such hamlets? Two-thirds came for business reasons. These respondents are, in the main, second generation East European immigrants. Many began their careers as travelling salesmen and pedlars who settled down and started a little general store in one of the towns along the circuit. Here they remained and here they prospered.

In addition to these 'dealers', the other major group are refugee physicians who fled to America only to find it difficult to establish practices in urban areas. A large number of such doctors were placed in small towns by refugee agencies or professional groups.

Besides these two major groups, there are several lawyers, teachers, insurance brokers, cattle dealers, and farmers to be found within the sample group.

When asked to place themselves into the upper, upper middle, lower middle, or working class, 74 per cent marked 'upper middle'. Only

three respondents felt they were 'working class': two teachers and one tenant farmer. It was from the ranks of the professional people that the greatest percentage of 'upper class' self-ratings came.

The high self-evaluation of socio-economic status is reflected in the relatively high incomes of the small-town Jews. In response to the question 'Roughly, what was the total income for your family last year?', 30 per cent said their income exceeded $20,000, 37 per cent gave $10,000–$20,000, 30 per cent $5,000–£10,000, and only 3 per cent indicated that they made less than $5,000 per annum.

Owing to the large proportion of professional Jews in the sample (36 per cent), it is not surprising to find a high level of education. Seventy per cent of those questioned hold at least a Bachelor of Arts degree or its European equivalent. The small-town Jews indicated, however, that only 11 per cent of their parents had college diplomas and 56 per cent said that their parents had gone to the eighth grade or less. As for their own children, nine out of ten parents in the sample indicated that one or more of their children would (or did) obtain at least a college degree.

When asked about their political affiliations 27 per cent said they consider themselves Republicans 'in most political matters'; 29 per cent are Democrats and the rest marked 'independent'. However, it is interesting to note that a number of 'Republicans' wrote in the margin of the questionnaire saying that they were 'registered Republicans whose loyalty lies in the Democratic camp'.

Finally, respondents were asked the following question: 'Basically, do you consider yourself more a rural person or more an urban person? Two-thirds of the group said 'urban'.

Once a Jew. . . . Eighty-six per cent of the small-town Jews placed themselves in some 'Jewish' category: orthodox, conservative or reform. *All* expressed some feeling of religious and/or cultural identity with Judaism. Those who said they did not fit into any of the three categories are not apostates as their response to this particular query might appear to suggest. Rather they tended to qualify their answers with statements like: 'I'm a liberal Jew', 'My family are ethical Jews', or 'We're Jews, that's all'.

Three-fourths said they belonged to some religious congregation. At the same time almost all persons said they 'rarely' or 'never' attend religious services since the synagogue to which they belong is too far away. (Estimates ranged from 15 to 100 miles.)

While they are too isolated to establish some form of Jewish communal existence, many keep traditional observances at home. For example, over half celebrate the Passover holidays, 25 per cent never serve bacon or ham, and 15 per cent maintain strictly kosher homes importing meat from distant cities. The attempt to maintain the traditions of the faith is found in both the 'immigrant' and 'refugee' groups.

The latter, however, is less likely to display Jewish and Israeli artifacts in the home.

The deep-seated sense of Jewish-identification is evident in the following random excerpts from several interviews:

I came to this community from New York. There I was raised in a real ghetto. All my friends and associates were Jews. I went to *heder*, to *shul*, etc., like everybody else. This was our way of life. Although I wanted to get out of the city and away from the ghetto, I never wanted to forget I was a Jew. This is my fate and I try to live up to it in every way.

Another respondent phrased it this way:

Although I was born in the city I have lived in a small community practically all of my life. Here there are few Jewish families, but when you get right down to it I'm sure I prefer being with people of my own religion. I guess being a Jew is in my blood and in my soul.

And a third:

Most people like us are city-folk living in rural areas. While our homes are here, our roots are somewhere else. . . . We bring the past with us when we go into upstate communities like this. Part of this past is our religion. We see ourselves as Jews and so does the community. . . .

All told, most small-town Jews maintain some affective connexion with their religion even when they leave the geographic boundaries of the urban Jewish community.

A housewife summed up the expressions of many when she said:

We're not what one might call observant Jews. Yet there are certain traditions we like to keep. We have a *mezuzah* in the doorway and a *menorah* on the mantle. We celebrate some of the holidays like the High Holy Days and Passover. We light the *Shabbas* candles and things like that. And, I must say I like a good piece of *gefilte* fish when I can get it. Yet we eat pork, work on Saturday . . . why sometimes I even go to Midnight Mass with my friends.

'Irrespective of whether you follow religious practices or attend synagogue, do you consider yourself a religious person?' Each person answered this question by placing himself somewhere along a continuum of 'very religious' to 'not religious at all'. Five per cent considered themselves 'very religious', while 62 per cent felt that they were 'moderately' so. Thirty-six per cent said 'somewhat religious' and 7 per cent said they were 'not religious at all'.

A strikingly high correlation appears when one compares the degree to which a person considers himself religious with the extent to which he practises religious observances, and with the nature of affiliation, that is, whether orthodox, conservative, or reform. Taking these three items together we constructed the Religiosity Scale[5] which allowed us to simplify analysis by using this single measure of 'traditional' reli-

giousness. Respondents were broken into three groups: high, medium, and low on religiosity.

In communities having several Jewish families the presence of co-religionists tends to reinforce religious identity and to support religious practices. Table 1 graphically illustrates the fact that in towns with more Jews, religiosity is higher among Jewish respondents.

TABLE 1

Religiosity and the Number of Jews

Religiosity	*Number of Jewish Families in Town*			
	1	*2*	*3–5*	*6–10*
	%	%	%	%
Low	66	62	59	42
Medium	27	32	26	26
High	7	6	15	32
	100	100	100	100
	(31)	(21)	(44)	(24)

In addition to this demographic factor it was found that religiosity is correlated with several background factors. Those highest in socio-economic status (by self-rating and income) are lowest in religiosity. In relation to occupation, those in the medical arts (mainly of the refugee group) are most apt to be low in this expression of religiousness, while those in agriculture tend to be the highest. This was borne out in the interviews. We spoke to the daughter of an immigrant from Russia, a man who became a cattle-dealer in a small upstate community where he raised his family. She related:

> Our religion was very important to us. We sang Hebrew songs and spoke Yiddish in the house. I couldn't speak English until I first went to school. . . . To my father the family was the core of Jewish life and so we learned about Jews and our religion through discussions at home, through books, through stories. We were always very Jewish.

And a Jewish farmer had this to say:

> It's funny, but though we're really out of touch with Jews we're the ones who try to keep up the traditions. . . . We think of ourselves as more Orthodox than anything. You know, the Gentile farmers around us are pretty religious too. If you can't go to church, then you have to bring religion into the home.

Furthermore, we found that small-town Jews who are low in religiosity are more apt to see themselves as more 'urban' than 'rural' even though these very people live, most often, in the tiniest hamlets. And those low in religiosity tend to feel Gentile members of the community consider them 'different from' rather than 'typical of' most

Jews while those highly religious stress the reverse; they feel non-Jews think they are typical of Jewish people.

Although respondents were asked the difficult question of telling how they felt others saw them, it seems that they answered mainly in terms of their own self-images. Among those who said they felt they were viewed as 'different' the following kinds of reasons were given: 'don't conform to stereotypes', 'better assimilated', 'differ in physical features', 'gentler and less crude', 'quieter'. Most of the adjectives were related to personal demeanour. Moreover, this group felt that Gentiles considered them as 'unique' Jews and suggested that they were more likely to be seen as exceptions to commonly held beliefs.

Those who felt they were seen as 'typical' tended to give quite opposite reasons; reasons which were related to *positive* stereotypic images. 'I'm wealthy and well-educated', 'I still maintain the traditions and practices of Judaism', 'have a Jewish name'. In other words, these people felt they were viewed as recognizably Jewish, and most expressed the belief that their behaviour was, for Gentiles, typical of Jews.

Ambassadors to the Gentiles. Being strangers in a Gentile world, many respondents appear to be more conscious of being Jewish than do their urban cousins who live in the centres of ethnic communities. In one form or other *every* respondent indicated that there are times when he is called upon to represent *the Jews*. Here, as several stated, they are 'ambassadors to the *goyim*'. Most often this occurs when interfaith functions are held in the community. There the local priest and minister are accompanied by the Jewish merchant to 'give balance to the programme'.

Frequently the Jew serves as a 'representative of his people' in less formal settings. He is called upon to give 'the Jewish point of view' or to explain why Jews do one thing and not another. When the townsfolk turn to the Jews for information, the respondents related that they often feel a deep sense of responsibility and of inadequacy.

For example, one man told me:

> You know, we're curiosities around town. The people always heard about Jews but never met one. Then we appeared. Real live Jews. After some hesitancy they began to ask us all kinds of questions. . . . Often I wished I could answer all of them. . . .

A housewife allowed:

> My children have been asked to explain about *Chanukah*, to tell the story of Moses, to explain what the *Mogen David* is. They wanted to know and my kids were the likely ones to ask.

And a merchant had this to say:

> 'I can't understand it. As kids we learned that the Jews killed Christ. Tell me, [respondent's name]', he says to me, 'is it true?' As a Jew, and the only one this guy ever knew personally, I'm supposed to have all the answers.

Small-town Jews were asked: 'Are you most conscious of being Jewish when you are with other Jewish people or when you are among non-Jews?' Those who were most conscious of being Jewish when with non-Jews were those most isolated, that is, those in smaller communities having few, if any, other Jewish residents. 'Religious or not', said one real isolate, 'we're curiosities around here'.

Friends among Neighbours. In small towns Jews find that there are few limitations on formal and informal social participation and interaction. All but 17 per cent indicated that they were members of some mixed organization. Over 45 per cent said they belonged to professional, business, and social groups. In addition, one-third are members of fraternal orders like the Masons or Elks.

When asked which organization (national or local) gave them the most satisfaction, almost every respondent listed some local (thereby non-Jewish) group. A druggist had this to say:

> I think I've been a member of every damn organization in this town. From member of the volunteer firemen to president of the school board. Discrimination? Not in any organizations, that's for sure.

And the owner of a small chain of department stores said:

> This is my community. These are my people in many more ways than Jews are. After all, our neighbours are friendly, all the organizations accept us, so we make friends here. This is home. When I join an organization they know they're taking in a Jew but it doesn't make any difference. . . . I've been President of Rotary, on the Chamber of Commerce, a member of the Masonic Lodge, and Secretary of the Rod and Gun Club.

This reflects the attitudes of most people interviewed.

We asked questions about discrimination against Jews. Eighty-seven per cent said they could not think of any community organizations they would not wish to join because of antisemitic feeling. In addition, 81 per cent said they knew of no discrimination of any kind being practised in their communities.

However, it is important to note that while most say they personally have not experienced antisemitism, many are of the opinion that they are being exempted from commonly held stereotypes about Jews. Many respondents feel that latent antisemitism exists among some community members, but that Gentiles view *them* as being 'different from other Jews'. Fortunately we are able to compare these expressions with those of non-Jews. In the second study we found that what the Jews feel as the true pulse of community sentiment is not always the reality of the attitudes of Gentiles.

In predicting what we would find along the lines of socializing between Jews and non-Jews we hypothesized that close proximity to Gentile neighbours and the lack of opportunity to have day-to-day contact

with members of a Jewish community would lead to a degree of intimate interfaith socializing unparalleled in larger communities. The majority of persons who were interviewed substantiated this prediction. For example:

> Everyone has close friends. In the city Jewish people tend to cling together. But in the rural village, when you are a minority of one, you associate completely with Gentiles. While it's rare in the city for Jews and Gentiles to be invited to one another's home for informal visiting, this is an everyday occurrence in the little community.

In the small town Jews are more than participants in formal community functions. In most instances they are an integral part of the social life of their towns. For the adults this includes such activities as parties, trips, dances, bridge clubs, and just plain 'dropping in'. For the children this often means playing together, going to parties, and frequent instances of dating.

In over 50 per cent of all cases small-town Jews designated a Gentile person as their closest friend. Yet, 30 per cent said they feel 'more comfortable' with Jews than with non-Jews, especially in social situations. Those highest on religiosity identifying most strongly with traditional Judaism, are most apt to feel this way.

And the Next Generation. That the strength of identification with Judaism plays a major role in determining patterns of and feelings about informal socializing with Gentiles becomes even clearer when we examine the attitudes of Jewish parents toward their children. Since 90 per cent of our respondents are parents, we were able to get reactions to a number of questions; reactions which indicate a firm conviction that Jewish identity should not only be maintained but intensified. Thus, while a high degree of informal interaction is practised, the small-town Jews, like their urban co-religionists, are anxious for their children to keep the faith and to marry Jews. As a result they send them to Jewish summer camps and, when they are through with high school, encourage them to attend large, metropolitan universities. And, although they themselves are satisfied with rural living, few expect their children to return to the small town after graduation.

Here is the opinion of a retired business man:

> We've lived here ever since the children—I have three—were born. They grew up among Gentile people. I don't think they ever met another Jew until they were fifteen or sixteen. In no case were they ever discriminated against. My son was captain of the basketball team and played ball for the local Altar Boys Baseball Club. My daughters always went around with local kids and dated boys from school. I can't say I was happy about this, but I didn't try to stop them. Yet, despite a number of crushes on certain fellows, they never got real serious about any of them. . . . When they graduated from high school they all went to college in the city. There they met Jewish people. . . . I'm really happy that my children all married Jews. It's easier that way.

It seems safe to say that the small-town Jew is similar to the city-dwelling Jew to the extent that he wants his children to remain Jews. He is firmly opposed to inter-faith marriage. To him this represents either the confrontation of too many social problems or alienation from Judaism; both are considered highly undesirable. Complete assimilation into the Christian community is not the goal of the American Jew. This means giving up a part of himself, a part that sometimes even he cannot explain. Rather, the Jew in New York and 'East Nothing' wants to remain a hyphenated American, sharing the 'best of both'. No better example of this is to be found than in the rural hamlet.

The Best of Both. Stonequist, Park and others have characterized the Jew as a disturbed marginal man,[6] an eternal stranger[7] unable to reconcile the traditions of his people with the counter-forces of the majority world; 'one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely different, but antagonistic cultures'.[8] One might expect to find ample support for such a definition among the small-town Jews who live away from the mainstream of Jewish life. Yet, rather than being on the periphery of two cultures, the ex-urban Jew seems to have internalized the best of each. He is more a part of his community than he is apart from it. He is far more assimilated to the Gentile milieu than his urban cousin. But, as indicated above, he remains a Jew.

While he strongly identifies with fellow Jews—a reference group he can 'feel' rather than 'touch'—and in many ways expresses a feeling of kinship with his people, he has adapted himself to the folkways of the small town in a variety of ways. He enjoys the advantages of sharing two 'cups of life' and, in a word, is bi-cultural. This duality (rather than marginality) causes the majority of respondents to come to agreement with one who stated:

> You see, we feel we have the best of both . . . Judaism with all its tradition, its stress on culture, on learning, on freedom. . . . And the fact that we live in a small town with nice people and good, clean air. . . . We wouldn't trade either for the world.

All told, those who can reconcile the past with the present find that they can share a little of each of their different cultures. Those who find satisfaction in the small community generally seem to agree with one woman who said:

> It's funny. I never thought a city girl like me would like small-town living. But I've changed. I honestly enjoy the lack of sophistication at Home Bureau meetings, the knock-down-drag-out fights at school meetings, the gossip that never escapes anyone. I love the scenery, the simplicity, and the lack of formality here. Sometimes I miss the city. A good play, a concert, a corned beef sandwich! But we get away each year and spend a few days in New York. After about three days I've had enough. I'm ready for home. I want to go back to. . . .

And with a lawyer originally from New York City:

I guess having been raised in the city makes you appreciate a community such as this even more than if you were born here. It's just nice not to have to be on the go all the time. . . . There was a time when I would have laughed if somebody suggested that I might wind up in the sticks. But here I am and loving every minute of it. People accept you for what you are, not who you are. . . .

Naturally those who gave such enthusiastic testimonials for small-town living were among the most satisfied with their lives in the rural community. Yet only 14 per cent of all respondents expressed true dissatisfaction. Two main reasons were most frequently given for disliking the small town. First, there was general dissatisfaction with rural living. 'This town is too provincial for me.' 'Progress is nil. I just wish we could get out.' 'I'd take the impersonality of the city any day over the gossipy closeness of this burg.' The second kind of dissatisfaction related to isolation from other Jews. 'Frankly I would be much happier if we could be with Jews more often.' 'My wife is not happy here. She'd much rather be some place where she can pick up the phone and talk to the girls. We miss Jewish contacts.' 'If I had it to do over again, I surely wouldn't move out to the sticks. I'd rather be where there are more Jewish people.'

Why do not they move out? The answer is provided by a merchant:

We always plan to leave here for a larger community. My business keeps me here, as it furnishes me with a good income. If I could leave, I would. The small town is too backward for me.

It must be remembered that the dissatisfied residents are deviant cases. The majority of respondents express some degree of satisfaction with their communities. They were either 'very satisfied' (50 per cent) or 'somewhat satisfied' (36 per cent).

Satisfaction seems to depend upon whether or not town people are cordial and accepting of strangers. In most cases isolated Jews are, as several interviewees put it, 'curiosities and strangers'. Generally the burden is on the Jew himself; at least he thinks so. If he accepts the ways of the rural village in which he resides, that is, if he joins the local lodge, contributes to the funds, buys his food and some clothing in town, takes an interest in community affairs, he is 'in'. According to a storekeeper:

The secret of a Jew living in a small town—happily—is to assimilate as soon as possible—but, always to remember he's a Jew.

And a doctor said:

In small rural towns one is accepted for what he is. Religion plays a minor fact in your being accepted. If one is honest and equitable in his dealings with others, you are placed in the forefront of things. . . .

Minority Adjustment. The brief description of the findings of our study of Jewish life in the small town are but excerpts from the original report. Yet it is hoped they shed some illumination on the life of the isolated member of one minority group and indicate the role of the ethnic ambassador. From this first study several generalizations are suggested. (1) Those who leave the confines of the ghetto or ethnic community are frequently anxious to seek economic and social betterment, to find acceptance in the new setting without loss of ethnic identity. (2) Once the minority member enters the new 'alien' situation, he finds himself in the position of representing his 'people' to the community at large. As a stranger his ethnic identity becomes particularly salient to the community and to himself. More often than not, consciousness of minority membership increases when one becomes an isolate. (3) The minority member who lives in the milieu of the majority has infinitely greater opportunity to adapt himself to the folkways of the dominant group than does one who lives in the middle of the ethnic community.

OPINIONS OF COMMUNITY LEADERS

For that part of the research which was designed to tap the attitudes of the majority group we chose to get reactions of community leaders. Such individuals were selected because it was felt that they would have the greatest opportunity to have contact with the widest number of persons in their towns. In addition, being in positions of formal leadership in such small villages (average population 2,500) meant that these same persons would most likely play informal leadership roles as well; they would be the pace-setters for community opinion. It also seemed logical to assume that a higher percentage of community leaders would have closer contact with Jews than rank and file citizens.

Many of the same kind of questions used in the first section of the study were asked of respondents in the second. In addition, a number of items referred directly or indirectly to attitudes about Jews and other minority group members.

Piecing together the varied comments of several different Gentile opinion leaders, all of whom live in one village in central New York State, we have a rough image of 'native' small-towners, their attitudes toward the community, general prejudice, and the effects of contact with minority representatives.

I have lived in this town all my life. . . . I feel that in the small, rural community people are friendly to one another. A common greeting is 'Hello Joe' . . . truly a warm feeling, one of belonging. . . . I love it here.

Well, I'm an American, since before the War of 1812. I guess I feel this makes me a little better. I'm not prejudiced. I just prefer to be with my own kind and I'm sure they'd [Jews, Negroes, and foreigners] prefer to mix together too. . . .

There are only two Jewish families here and they are highly regarded—one man is a business man. The other is a very fine attorney. No comparison with New York City Jews. They're different. . . .

I run a store and come into contact with salesmen of different races. I have three Jewish salesmen, all three are good men. There is none of this pushing and trying to sell stuff you don't need like in the city. . . .

The Natives. While the small-town Jew is generally an outsider who migrated to the rural community, most of the Gentile respondents were born and raised in their towns or in similar small villages. Only one-fifth of the total group were born in cities and a mere 2 per cent were born abroad. Like the Jews, some who came from the outside came for business reasons. But unlike the Jews, most 'newcomers' settled down in small towns because of marriage to a community member, because of cheaper housing, or for health reasons.

These people are mainly of old 'Yankee' stock with 38 per cent claiming that their families—that is, their father's father's family—came to America before 1800. Members of this group tend to call themselves 'American', 'Scotch-Irish', or 'Holland-Dutch' in their self-descriptions. Those whose families immigrated during the nineteenth century are more apt to be of German or Irish descent. The most recent group are most often of Italian origins.

The occupations of these respondents are widely varied, ranging from farmers to bankers, from ministers to mill-hands. Like the Jewish small-towners, most place themselves in the upper middle class. Their average annual family income is, however, half of that of the Jewish respondents, i.e. $7,500. Half of the Gentile participants are self-employed as compared with 80 per cent of the Jewish group.

Thirty-nine per cent of the Gentiles said they had a college education or had gone beyond college; 64 per cent had at least a high school education. Like the Jews they too have high aspirations for their children. Seventy-six per cent of these persons are Protestant (the remainder Catholic); two-thirds are Republicans; and two out of every three see themselves as more 'rural' than 'urban'.

When asked about satisfaction with their communities the most typical response was 'This is home'. By and large the respondents were highly satisfied with their communities (68 per cent) and an additional one-fourth expressed moderate satisfaction. For this group community satisfaction is dependent upon such variables as length of residence, the ties one has to one's home town, and the progressiveness of the community.

When asked for comments a highly satisfied respondent wrote:

This is a small, rural, closely knit community where newcomers have to make every effort to become an insider. The effort, however, I feel is well worth it. We are not too far from a large city (but far enough to be away from the clatter), our school is excellent and religious relations in this community

are excellent. While this town is pretty conservative, I find a great deal of satisfaction in the slow, easy-going pace. I've lived here since I was a boy and wouldn't leave for anything.

For contrast here is the comment of a dissatisfied resident of the *same* community.

Passivity, complacency and a sheer lack of or neglect of economic intellect in this community has been responsible for the apparent degeneration of atmosphere and attitude in all things related to even a reasonable degree of progress. This, of course, offers nothing of value to the high school generation. It offers nothing to newcomers. All in all, a community which was once great is slowly but most certainly annihilating itself.

Ethnocentrism and 'The Good Old Days'. In some instances dissatisfaction with one's town is unrelated to whether the community is a good place to live and work or not; rather it seems to depend upon the image of what the town itself should be (or what it might have been) and what it has become.

Although the lack of change or progress appeared the most significant factor for dissatisfaction with community life, there were some residents who have *become* dissatisfied precisely because changes have occurred. Not the least of these changes is the influx of outsiders to a number of small towns. In almost every village included in our sample there were two or three respondents who longed for the old days, who resented the intrusion of newcomers, who could not accept change as progress.

Several examples serve to illustrate their attitudes:

I am sure foreign people make a mistake in keeping customs of their own land alive and featured in this country. If this country meets their expectations, they should forget the folklore of Europe, St. Patrick's Day Parades, German Days, and get behind American things. If they can't do this they should be returned to the land they love. This country is supposed to be the world's melting pot. If they won't melt, they should not belong.

We have a lot of foreigners here. . . . They're all right, keep in their own place, go to their own church. But I must say it isn't really the same any more. This town has a great heritage, it was settled before the Revolution. . . . I don't mean to imply that I am prejudiced or that I dislike foreigners. We all have our place in this great country of ours. I just think it a shame that outsiders like those who live here, have to keep their old ways. It makes it harder for them to be accepted.

These persons were among a small group of respondents (21 per cent) who agreed with the following statement: 'This country would be better off if there were not so many foreigners here.' They were also in agreement with 'Religions which preach unwholesome ideas should be suppressed', as were 56 per cent of the sample group; and with the

statement 'Americans must be on guard against the power of the Catholic church', with which one-quarter of all respondents also agreed.

Such attitudes indicate ethnocentric thinking. A Scale of Ethnocentrism[9] based upon responses to the first two questions cited above and one which stated 'Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?' was used to assess general prejudice.

A high degree of ethnocentrism is, in most cases, highly correlated with poor paying jobs, low educational attainment, small-town origins, occupations involving working with 'things' rather than 'people', and 'old family' status. If one is ethnocentric, one tends to be more 'success-oriented' and less apt to want to be 'independent'. The highly ethnocentric individual is more likely to indicate a need to belong and express a strong desire to be accepted by others. Those who see themselves as being *upper class* and those who feel they belong to the *working class* are higher in their distaste for outsiders than 'middle-class' individuals. Little difference is found between Catholics and Protestants or along political lines.

Does the opportunity to interact with minority members affect the general prejudice expressed by the small-town Gentile? Without a panel study over time it is virtually impossible to answer this query. However, the data do indicate that contact is related to the amount of generalized ethnocentrism one feels, but *only* when this contact is close enough to permit social interaction to occur. As will be noted in Table 2, those who have close association with Jews and Negroes have a much lower degree of ethnocentrism than those who rarely communicate with members of these two groups or have no contact in the community at all.

Attitudes towards Jews and the 'Exemption Mechanism'. Prejudice against Jews is more prevalent in the attitudes of the Gentiles (at least among community leaders) than the Jews themselves imagine. Many of the community leaders subscribe to traditional stereotypes about Jews. For instance, 83 per cent agree with the statement 'Jews tend to be more money-minded than most people'; 80 per cent agree that 'Jews tend to be shrewder business men than most people'; and 77 per cent agree that 'Jews tend to be more aggressive than most people'. These figures are *not* significantly altered when the nature of contact—'none', 'impersonal', 'personal'—is used as a control.

Thus most of the respondents feel that Jews in general possess these 'characteristic traits'. Whether or not a Jew lives in town is not crucial for changes in stereotyping. Merely buying in a 'Jewish store' or visiting a Jewish physician may only perpetuate generalized images of Jews. Many of the small-town Jews in New York State do, in fact, fulfil several of the classic stereotypes; especially for those who never get to know them individually. As a group, they are frequently in business.

TABLE 2

Ethnocentrism and the Nature of Contact with Jews and Negroes Living in the Community

Degree of Ethnocentrism	*Jews*			*Negroes*		
	*No Contact**	*Impersonal Contact†*	*Personal Contact‡*	*No Contact**	*Impersonal Contact†*	*Personal Contact‡*
	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	32	33	10	30	50	13
Medium	34	32	36	36	14	31
Low	34	35	54	34	36	56
	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(88)	(46)	(39)	(124)	(14)	(39)

* 'No Contact' means that respondents say there are no members of this group living in their community and also includes those who 'don't know' whether or not the group is represented in their town.

† 'Impersonal Contact' refers to respondents who say they know members of this group but only 'to speak to' or someone they 'see around'.

‡ 'Personal Contact' refers to respondents who say they know members of this group who call *them* by their first names, to whom they can say what they really think, or close friends with whom they can discuss confidential matters.

They are more liberal politically. They do tend to possess an urbane demeanour and are thus natural recipients of the traditional suspicions of 'city slickers'. And their children, being strongly motivated, do tend to do especially well in school. Here there is ample support for the 'kernel of truth' hypothesis.

Yet expressions of attitudes and actual behaviour are sometimes contradictory. Close examination of the data disclosed the fact that when interaction takes place at an *equal status* level, community leaders, even those with negative images of Jews as a group, tend to accept individual Jews as exceptions to the rule. They see them as being 'different'.

In general, respondents who have personal and intimate contact with local Jews view their close acquaintances as less clannish, quieter, less flashy, and less radical than they imagine Jews to be. Here are three excerpts of statements appearing on the last page of the mailed questionnaire.

My experience as to Jewish residents of this community is probably not typical. A high-class, wealthy, cultured, refugee Jewish family came here in 1940 and we have been very close friends ever since then, both professionally and socially. They seem, to me, very different from most Jews.

Frankly, I'm not too fond of Jews. I've heard too much about how they stick together, how they can chisel you, how they try to get ahead. Yet, here in —— there is a Jewish family who are not at all like this. They are fine, intelligent, honest citizens and very close friends of ours.

When the —— came to this community everyone was suspicious. We knew what Jews were like and we didn't like what we knew. After a while we found that they were pretty nice folks. We looked at them as a different kind of Jew. They didn't seem the Brooklyn type. Thinking about it now I have the feeling that our children build their image of what a Jew is supposed to be from the contact they have with the children of this Jewish family. Sometimes we have warped ideas about what we think is true. . . .

Repeated *personal* and *informal* contact in the home and around town can serve as a significant factor leading towards the ultimate reduction of prejudice against Jews. Exemption is perhaps an important intermediate step in breaking down predispositions towards minority groups. One further statement serves to illustrate this proposition:

When a Jewish family first moved in we wanted them to prove themselves to us. It must have been hard on them but they came through like troopers. They became an important part of the community. They showed us a different kind of Jew. No Shylock. Knowing them for twenty years now when I think of Jews I think of them. I used to think about some mean, hook-nosed character.

Majority Reaction. The following generalizations are tentatively offered based upon the study of the community leaders of twenty small towns in New York State. (1) In the small community the minority group member is constantly in direct contact with the majority group. As he gets to know their ways, they cannot help but get to know him. He stands upon the threshold of influencing deep-seated images. He can reinforce such images or aid in the recasting of these by those with whom he interacts. (2) The isolated minority member rarely constitutes a threat to the established order and community members are often willing to accept the individual outsider despite articulated expressions of prejudice. (3) Repeated and intensive contact and personal association often tend to change the mental picture of the isolate from being 'different from' to be 'typical of' the group he represents. Exemption is viewed as an instrumental step in the ultimate reduction of prejudice.

A FINAL NOTE

On the basis of the two studies reported here, it is logical to predict that increasing interaction with Jewish 'representatives', especially those who have spent their early years in the small town, would have a decided effect on changing the overall attitudes of Gentiles toward Jews. A study of the children of small-towners would provide the information needed to test this hypothesis. But any research of this kind would necessarily have to be conducted in the very near future.

As is stated in the summary of the original report:

Another prediction is, unfortunately perhaps, in order. With the tremendous rate of post-teen out-migration on the part of the offspring of Jews living in rural communities we wonder whether the small-town Jew is, in reality, a disappearing type in the spectrum of American Jewry. Most Jews who settled in small villages did so prior to World War II. Since that time few have chosen to live in such communities. Now the children are grown and rapidly leaving the nest to live in larger centers. Although some children will return to run the business, our studies suggest that small as it now is, the population of American Jews living in small communities will increasingly diminish in the years to come. . . .

NOTES

[1] See, for example, Toby Shafter, 'The Fleshpots of Maine', *Commentary*, 7 (January–June 1949) 60–7; Earl Rabb, 'Report from the Farm', *Commentary*, 8 (July–December 1949) 475–9; Harry Golden, 'The Jews of the South', *Congress Weekly*, 31 December 1951; Lee J. Levinger, 'The Disappearing Small-Town Jew', *Commentary*, 14 (July–December 1952) 157–163; Louise Laser, 'The Only Jewish Family in Town', *Commentary* (December 1959) 489–96; and a letter to the Editor from Gerald M. Phillips, 'Jews in Rural America', *Commentary* (February 1960), 163.

[2] This research was sponsored by The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 515 Madison Avenue, New York City. The original manuscript is entitled *Strangers in Their Midst, A Sociological Study of the Small-Town Jew and His Neighbors*, Cornell University, 1959. The project title was that of the 'Cornell Community Studies'. (Permission to use Cornell's name was granted by Vice President for Research, Theodore P. Wright.)

[3] Approximately 25 per cent of those who did not respond were randomly selected and attempts were made to interview each. Of this group two persons claimed they were no longer Jews and refused. Both were German refugees and had married non-Jews *prior* to their immigration to America. Two persons were deceased. The remaining group all identified themselves as Jews. Four permitted themselves to be interviewed and the information gathered was consistent with that of the less reluctant respondents. One individual refused to be interviewed and expressed the general feeling that such a study could do little to enhance Jewish-Gentile relations.

[4] That slightly less than two-thirds responded suggests the possibility of a selective bias in the second part of the study. Time and budget did not permit the personal follow-up of non-respondents similar to that in the first study. At present efforts are being made to gather data from a selected number of these reluctant participants.

[5] The Coefficient of Reproducibility is ·98.

[6] Everett V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man: A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict*, New York, 1937; and Robert E. Park, 'Human Migration and the Marginal Man', *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(1928), 881–93.

[7] Georg Simmel, 'The Stranger', *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, Kurt H. Wolff, trans., Glencoe, Illinois, 1950, 402–8; and Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chicago, 1921, 286.

[8] Park, 'Human Migration . . .', op. cit., 891.

[9] The scale itself breaks down in the following manner. Those 'high' on ethnocentrism have a low faith in people and agree with the statements that America would be better off without so many foreigners and that some religious groups are inferior. Those 'medium' were negative on one of the three items. Those 'low' did not agree with the latter two and were of the opinion that 'most people can be trusted'. The Coefficient of Reproducibility is ·96.

[10] Rose, op. cit., 279–80.

JEWISH EDUCATION: A PARTIAL LIST OF AMERICAN DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS*

Franklin Parker

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DUTCH JEWRY: A DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS

Part One

FOREWORD

THE Committee whose task it was to report on the demography of Jews in the Netherlands after the Second World War was organized jointly by the Foundation for Jewish Welfare Work and the Ashkenazi and Sephardi Religious Communities in the Netherlands.

The Report was originally published in two issues of the Quarterly Bulletin of the Bureau of Statistics of the City of Amsterdam and subsequently put out in book form by the Joachimsthal Publishing and Printing Company, Amsterdam. Both publications were in Dutch. The present English edition of the Report is published so that the results of the study may be readily available outside the Netherlands. We express our appreciation to the translator, Mr. B. Kolthoff.

The Report was initially drawn up by the late Mr. Ph. A. Sondervan, the first Hon. Secretary of the Committee. We owe a debt of gratitude to him. We are particularly indebted to Dr. H. Emanuel, who in the capacity of Reporting Secretary processed the material scientifically and drafted the final Report, for the contents of which the Committee as a whole bears full responsibility.

We are deeply grateful to several organizations and persons who freely gave us the benefit of their invaluable services, experience, and recommendations, and without whose very kind co-operation this study could never have been completed.

The Bureau of Social Affairs of the City of Amsterdam made available to us the services of two persons under its employment programme for intellectuals.

We received the wholehearted assistance and co-operation of the staff of the Bureau of Statistics of the City of Amsterdam. We should like to mention specifically its former Director, Professor P. de Wolff, and his

successor, Dr. J. Meerdink. Our particular gratitude goes to Dr. Meerdink, who, in addition to all his work on behalf of the study proper, arranged for its appearance in two Quarterly Bulletins of his Bureau.

Highly valued suggestions were also received from the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics relating to the arrangement of the questionnaires and other forms used in the study as well as to the shaping of the Report.

In conclusion, we wish to thank the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany for the financial support which it generously made available to the Committee.

For and on behalf of the
Committee for the Demography
of Jews in the Netherlands,
A. VEDDER, M.D., Chairman.

EDITORIAL NOTE: The schedules used in the inquiry and some of the diagrams and tables have been omitted in this English version. They may be consulted in *De Joden in Nederland na de tweede Wereldoorlog, Een demografische analyse*, Amsterdam, 1961.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 *Reasons for the Study*

The development of Jewish social work and other activities after the war posed a number of difficult problems for the organizations responsible for carrying them out. Perhaps the most difficult of these related to the development of future needs and requirements. Quantitatively, they depended primarily on the number of people for whom the activities, social or cultural, would need to be performed. However, both the size and the composition of the Jewish group were unknown. Although some data were available, they were too haphazard to allow any definite conclusions to be drawn. Moreover, it was felt that the figures might not be highly reliable.

The results of a study of the size and composition of the Jewish population in the Netherlands is especially important to the following organizations.

(*a*) Jewish social institutions concerned with setting up programmes for social services, particularly where capital investment is involved.

(*b*) Religious and cultural institutions which need to be aware of future needs in their field, particularly in respect of education.

(*c*) Institutions engaged in collecting money to finance Jewish activities in the widest sense, both for expected future expenditure and for determining the number of persons to whom financial appeals could be made.

1.2 *Composition of the Committee*

In June 1952 the Council of the Jewish Social Work Foundation decided to set up a committee whose task it would be to make inquiries into the demography of Dutch Jewry. The desirability of such an investigation was also expressed by the Executive Board of the Cefina-Jewish Social Work Foundation (the fund-collecting organization of Jewish Social Work). The Committee accepted a proposal to subsidize this work. The Ashkenazi and Sephardi Communities in the Netherlands were also invited to participate in the work of the Committee, and each of them assigned two members.

The Committee was composed as follows: Dr. A. Vedder, M.D., *Chairman*; Ph. A. Sondervan (now deceased), *Secretary*; B. W. de Jongh; Dr. A. Pais; Jacques Pais (now deceased); J. Reijzer; Dr. A. Veffer; and L. Vega.

After Mr. Sondervan's death Mr. Reijzer took charge of the secretariat. Dr. H. Emanuel was appointed rapporteur to the Committee and drew up the draft Report.

1.3 *Who are Jews?*

The first problem was the question of who should be considered Jewish for the purposes of the investigation. This question has historically been answered in different ways. In the 1930 Census those who claimed membership in one of the Hebrew religious communities were considered Jewish. Even then, their number did not correspond to the number of those who called themselves Jewish or were considered so by others. It will be shown that this discrepancy is very much greater today. Actually, the peculiar nature of the Jewish group makes it difficult to formulate a definition which covers all its members. This becomes clear upon consideration of the multitude of criteria which have been applied. Those used in the past include descent, common history and circumstances, and social, religious, and general cultural and/or anthropological characteristics.

The following principles were the main basis for recent statistical inquiries into the Jewish population in the Netherlands:

(*a*) *Declared religious association:* In the 1930 and 1947 Censuses all those who declared that they belonged to the Ashkenazi or Sephardi religious community were listed as Jewish.

(*b*) *Descent:* Under the registration of Jews ordered in 1941 by the German invaders all those were designated as Jews who either had at least three Jewish grandparents, or had two Jewish grandparents and/or belonged to a Jewish religious community, or had a Jewish spouse. In addition, all persons having one or two Jewish grandparents had to report. The data based on this registration have been statistically processed.

(*c*) *Voluntary registration:* After the Second World War a Jewish Co-ordination Board was established which requested Jews in the Netherlands to report themselves and those Jews they knew to be alive. The Board published lists of names of survivors. The decision to register was influenced by sentiments of historical unity and solidarity, cultural or religious ties, and social considerations.

All these criteria had to be carefully weighed as a possible basis for the study, and with a view to comparison with the past. In addition, careful consideration had to be given to another criterion:

(*d*) *The criterion used by the Jewish religious communities:* The Ashkenazi and Sephardi Communities in the Netherlands both take a formal position, derived from the religious code, by which anyone born of a Jewish mother belongs to the Jewish community, whether or not he gives evidence of wishing to belong to it. The only exception is in the case of those who have gone over to another religion.

In selecting its definition the Committee was in fact guided by the availability of registration material at the offices of the religious communities. By using this material the Committee started implicitly from the criterion adopted by the religious communities. However, the Committee is of the opinion that this method entails a number of advantages:

(1) *The use of the broadest possible definition,* which was desirable in view of the purposes of the study. The definition according to (*d*) is broader than those under (*a*) and (*c*), in that people who are Jewish by extraction but do not wish to be considered so are listed as Jewish in the former case but not in the latter two cases, and broader than the one mentioned under (*b*) because it considers as Jewish those children of mixed marriages in which the mother was Jewish. On the other hand, the fact that those who have accepted another religion are considered non-Jewish under definition (*d*) and Jewish under definition (*b*) constitutes a limitation.

(2) *The comparability with data gathered according to the criterion of descent.* Since the statistics for 1941 contain separate data concerning mixed marriages, distinguished according to sex, and also specify persons having one or two Jewish grandparents, it is possible—even though these data are not reliable in every respect—to make an approximation of the persons born of Jewish mothers. It is impossible to establish this relation for data based on the denominational principle (as used in population censuses) or on voluntary registrations.

(3) *Recent and adequate data.* All other sources—the registration data of the Jewish Co-ordination Board mentioned above and the 1947 Census—are of older date and also present the difficulty that they were compiled for different purposes. By using the data available from the religious communities, our research was in a better position to obtain relevant and up-to-date information.

To balance these advantages there is a possible objectionable feature.

The definition selected implies that children of mixed marriages in which the mother was Jewish are considered Jewish. This consequence may fit perfectly into the framework of religious norms from which the definition was derived, but it certainly does not do justice to the views of Dutch society at large,[1] according to which such children are in fact regarded as 'mixed' and not as Jewish; and it is according to this rule that these children generally behave, just as, for that matter, the children of mixed marriages in which the father is Jewish.

The Committee felt that this possible objection was not of paramount importance. It should be borne in mind that this group of children—insofar as they are still living with one or both parents—can be differentiated in the basic material, so that it is also possible to collect figures covering the Jewish population exclusive of them.

1.4 *Demographic studies covering the period until 1945*

For the purposes of the present investigation it is not necessary to give a complete survey of all the literature published before and during the Second World War on the demography of the Jews in the Netherlands. It will be sufficient to refer to those publications which may supply comparative data.

Mention should first of all be made of the work of the former Alderman of Amsterdam Dr. E. Boekman, *Demografie van de Joden in Nederland* (Amsterdam, 1936). He used data from the official censuses from 1830 to 1930.

As we have pointed out, the population censuses start from membership in one of the religious communities. This starting-point, therefore, is more limited than that of the present study, which regards as Jewish not only those affiliated to one of the Jewish religious communities but also all those who, although not members of a Jewish religious community, were born of Jewish mothers and do not profess a non-Jewish religion.

This difference was pointed out by Boekman,[2] but it was his opinion that until about 1900, with a few exceptions, the census data comprehended all Jews in the latter sense as well. This is so because the number of 'churchless' persons in the censuses was relatively small until 1900. On the other hand, only 0·7 per cent of all Jewish men and 0·5 per cent of all Jewish women gave an affirmative answer to the question asked in the 1920 Census whether, belonging to a religious denomination through birth, baptism, confirmation, or circumcision, they no longer wished to be numbered among its members. If we may attach any value to these figures, they would indicate that as late as 1920 the proportion of non-denominational Jews was still very small.

This proportion increased appreciably between 1920 and 1930 (from 7·8 per cent to 14·4 per cent), particularly in a large city like Amsterdam, where the greater part of the Jewish population resided. In consequence, a comparison of later data, collected according to either the

criterion used by the religious communities or that of descent, with those of the 1930 Census can only be made with proper reservations. Even though it is plausible[3] that the number of Jews stating no religious affiliation must still have been relatively small in 1930, the possibilities of comparison are nevertheless restricted owing to extensive immigration, especially of Jews from Germany, between 1930 and 1940.

On the other hand, it is also difficult to make a comparison between the census data before and after 1930 because of the relative growth of the group of Jews who claimed no affiliation with one of the Jewish religious communities.

A source which is not subject to these failings is the registrations of Jews decreed by the occupation authorities in 1941. This important source has been processed statistically in two publications. Dr. A. Veffer published for the Jewish Council *Statistische gegevens van de Joden in Nederland, Part I, Statistische gegevens van de Joden in Amsterdam, waarin reeds opgenomen enkele voorlopige cijfers van de Joden in Nederland* (Amsterdam, 1942) which deals with the situation as it was in March–April 1941. The other publication, *Statistiek der bevolking van Joodschen bloede in Nederland* (The Hague, 1942), describes the population later in the same year. In both cases the criterion of descent is applied. The second publication is somewhat more detailed as far as national data are concerned; Dr. Veffer's, however, supplies a number of valuable supplementary tables relating to the significant Amsterdam group.

Few or unreliable demographic data are available for the years before 1830, but some specific periods of that time have repeatedly been subjects of investigation. Some sources are:

1. BOEKMAN, E.: 'De bevolking van Amsterdam in 1795', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis:* 278 ff. (July 1930) (I); 'Demografische en sociale verhoudingen bij de Joden te Amsterdam omstreeks 1800', *Vrijdagavond 6* (Part I): 72, 89, 103 (1929) (II).
2. BRUGMANS, H., and A. FRANK (editors): *Geschiedenis der Joden in Nederland*, Part I (until about 1795) (Amsterdam, 1940).
3. GREWEL, F., and C. VAN EMDE BOAS: 'De Joden in Amsterdam', *Mens en Maatschappij 30* (No. 5): 295 ff. (1955).
4. KOENEN, H. J.: *Geschiedenis der Joden in Nederland* (Utrecht, 1843).
5. KRUYT, J. P., in: *Antisemitisme en Jodendom*, edited by H. J. Pos (Arnhem, 1939).
6. ROSA, J. S. da Silva: *Geschiedenis der Portugeesche Joden te Amsterdam 1593–1925* (Amsterdam, 1925).
7. STENGERS, J.: 'Les Juifs dans les Pays-Bas au Moyen Age', *Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Belgische Academie, Klasse der letteren en der morele en staatkundige wetenschappen*, Boek 45 (Brussels, 1949).
8. ZUIDEN, D. S. van: 'De Joodsche bevolking van Nederland in het jaar 1809', *Vrijdagavond 4* (Part II): 82 (1927).
9. ZWARTS, J.: *Hoofdstukken uit de Geschiedenis der Joden in Nederland* (Zutphen, 1929).

II. DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT UNTIL 1945

2.1 *Origins of the Jews in the Netherlands*

It is possible, although unlikely, that descendants of Jewish traders under Julius Caesar may have settled during the early Middle Ages in what is now Netherlands territory. The oldest data about the presence of Jews in the Northern Netherlands relate to the early years of the thirteenth century. Everything indicates that they had moved rather recently from the Rhineland to this area (as well as to the Southern Netherlands) as financiers, and that they numbered very few persons. In all probability, only the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel, as well as possibly the city of Utrecht, had Jewish inhabitants. On the basis of data mentioned by Stengers,[4] their total number for the year 1339 may be estimated at seventeen established 'families' and five itinerants who may have been accompanied by relatives. If a family is assumed to consist of an average of four or five persons, the number of Jews residing in the Netherlands at that time might have been of the order of magnitude of 100 persons.

After the Black Death—the plague epidemic from 1348 to 1350—and the attendant persecution of Jews by the flagellants, no Jews are found in the Northern Netherlands. It is not until 1385 that mention is again made of Jews; they also came from the Rhineland. Their number again remains modest, especially because in the later years of the fifteenth century Jews were forbidden by decree to settle in the most important centres, which were Nijmegen and Utrecht. Stengers[5] estimates their peak number, which was reached towards the middle of that century, in the Duchy of Gelre (Gelderland) at twenty to thirty families, which constitutes an order of magnitude of about 120 persons. With the addition of remaining parts of the Northern Netherlands, there may have been a total of about 150 to 200 persons.

During the final years of the fifteenth century and the greater part of the sixteenth there were probably almost no Jews in the Northern Netherlands, except for the province of Zeeland. Although Marranos (Spanish Jews who had been forced to become Christians) had settled in Antwerp at the end of the fifteenth or in the early years of the sixteenth century and had grown into an important colony,[6] they did not come to the northern provinces until late in the latter century, with the exception of Zeeland,[7] where rather large Marrano as well as openly Jewish settlements had been established in such towns as Arnemuiden and Middelburg towards the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. There is evidence of the appearance of Marranos in Amsterdam around 1590, but it was not until the beginning of the seventeenth century that a number of Marranos started openly professsing their Jewish faith in Amsterdam as well as in such towns as Alkmaar, Haarlem, and Rotterdam. More than a decade later (1617),

High-German Jews first settled in Amsterdam, and they were followed by immigrants from Poland.

We are poorly informed statistically of the steady development, from that time until 1830, of immigration to the Netherlands, although it is known that the Ashkenazi group soon surpassed the Sephardim numerically. The following estimates have been taken from Boekman,[8] Koenen,[9] Grewel and Van Emde Boas,[10] and Kruyt.[10]

TABLE 1. *The Jewish Population of the Netherlands until 1800*

Year	*Amsterdam*			*Remainder of the Netherlands*	*Netherlands*
	Sephardim	*Ashkenazim*	*Total*		
1610	400	—	400	—	—
1674	2,500	5,000	7,500	—	—
1780	3,000	19,000	22,000	8,000	30,000
1795	—	—	21,000	—	—
1797	—	—	23,104	—	—

2.2 *The Jewish population of the Netherlands until 1942*

More reliable and detailed information[11] is available only after 1830, in which year the first official census—since repeated about every ten years—was held.

Although this was a census according to the principle of religious affiliation, it may be said that until after about 1900 it was an exception for Jews not to register as belonging to one of the Jewish religious communities (see Section 1.4 above).

These census data have been extensively treated by Boekman. Tables 3 and 4 have been taken from his study or are based on his figures.[12] The development from 1830 to 1930 can be characterized by:

(*a*) a decreasing relative growth, which first surpassed that of the total Netherlands population but lagged behind it in the course of the twentieth century; a decreasing growth which was interrupted between 1870 and 1890, probably on account of a high influx of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe;

(*b*) an increasing concentration in Amsterdam and a reduction in the number of municipalities where Jews resided—a tendency which, as appears from the estimates specified, must date from the initial stage of emancipation for earlier years;

(*c*) a persistent and gradually increasing surplus of women, which in later years was relatively high as compared to the total population—a characteristic of all denominational groups in the Netherlands in contrast to non-affiliated persons, so that it may be surmised that this phenomenon is, at least to some extent, connected with a greater amount of apostasy among men than among women;

(*d*) a rise in average age;

(*e*) a reduced birth rate.

The very small increase in the numbers of Jews counted in the population censuses between 1899 and 1909 and the decrease between 1920 and 1930 cannot be attributed to a reduced birth rate alone but are definitely also a consequence of emigration and apostasy. The latter phenomenon perhaps makes the figures of the censuses after 1899, and certainly those of 1930, of dubious value as a standard for the development of the Jewish group in our sense.

From 1933 on there was large-scale immigration of German Jews and Jews who had been declared stateless; later, on a smaller scale, Austrian, Czech, and Polish Jews also came in. In so far as they did not leave the country before 15 May 1940, the statistics of the 1941 registration give an idea of their numbers.

These statistics are also valuable in that they make possible a better approximation of the number of Jews than the 1930 census, since they are based on the principle of descent, even though corrections are necessary because children of Jewish mothers and non-Jewish fathers are regarded as half Jewish in these statistics.

The data contained in Tables 5 to 9 have been taken from *Statistische gegevens van de Joden in Nederland, Part I*, compiled by A. Veffer for the Jewish Council and relating to March–April 1941, and from *Statistiek der bevolking van Joodschen bloede in Nederland*, which describes the situation as it was on 1 October 1941. The former statistics are slightly less complete since they did not cover all registrations; the latter probably contain more inaccuracies as regards the descent of the persons registered (soon after the beginning of registration efforts were made to 'aryanize' grandparents, and sometimes not without success, as the statistics indicate).

According to these data, 140,001 persons were counted as 'full' Jews in October 1941. In order to approximate the number of Jews according to the definition used by us, the following deductions should be made from this figure:

(1) Persons affiliated with a religious community other than Jewish: 1,915 persons.

(2) The remaining persons with three Jewish grandparents and no Jewish maternal grandmother; the number of non-Jews among this group with three Jewish grandparents may, for lack of more precise details, be estimated at 25 per cent of this group, i.e. 25 per cent of 1,339, or 335 persons.

(3) The remaining persons with two Jewish grandparents and no Jewish maternal grandmother. The number of non-Jews among the group with two Jewish grandparents can best be determined on the basis of the ratio of Jewish men to Jewish women who had non-Jewish spouses (Table 7). This ratio is found to be about 11 : 7. It may be

assumed that the ratio was also valid for the generations from which the persons having two Jewish grandparents and living in 1941 were born. In such cases it may be postulated that about $\frac{11}{18}$ of the persons counted as Jewish and having two Jewish grandparents (and who had not embraced some other religion) should not be considered Jewish. The computation yields 994 persons.

On the other hand, the following groups should be added:

(4) Persons with no religious affiliation and having two Jewish grandparents, who were considered half Jewish by the occupation authorities, but had a Jewish maternal grandmother; on the basis of the same postulation as under (3), $\frac{7}{18}$ of this group with two Jewish grandparents, or 3,877 persons, should be counted among this group.

(5) Persons with one Jewish grandparent not considered Jewish by the occupation authorities, even though she was the maternal grandmother, the persons in question not having gone over to a non-Jewish religion. The best estimate is that such people form 25 per cent of the group with one Jewish grandparent and no non-Jewish religious affiliation, i.e. 65 persons.

From this computation it follows that the number of Jews according to the definition used here—that of membership in the religious communities—may be put at 140,699 persons for 1 October 1941, which is only a little more than the number of persons counted as fully Jewish according to the standard applied by the occupation authorities.

The following facts are outstanding in these data:

(*a*) The difference between the number of Jews according to the 1941 count and the 1930 Census, about 28,000 (cf. Tables 3 and 5), is almost as large as the sum of the number of immigrants after 1933, about 16,000, and the number of persons counted in 1940 born after 1930, about 13,500. Immigration was not extensive between 1930 and 1933, and, furthermore, a number of those born after 1930 belonged to the group of immigrants. For the period from 1931 to 1941 the total mentioned therefore cannot have been much larger than indicated. However, emigration and deaths should be set against immigration and births. It is no longer possible to determine these figures for 1931–1941, but it is clear that the net increase of the Jewish population between 1930 and 1941 must have been much smaller than 28,000.

If we put the emigration during these years at 1,500 and the annual deaths at about 11 per cent (which is equal to what Boekman[13] found for the years around 1930 for Amsterdam), we arrive at the conclusion that, of the difference of 28,000 between both counts, only about 15,000 can be explained by net immigration and excess of births over deaths, and that the remaining 13,000 should be attributed to the fact that the 1930 Census was based on religious affiliation. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that about 12,500 persons out of those who had been counted as 'full' Jews in 1941 stated that they had no religious affiliation whatever.

(The total number of unaffiliated Jews in 1941, by the definition of the religious communities, including those counted as 'half' Jews by the occupation authorities, can be estimated at about 16,500 with the use of the conversion factor of $\frac{7}{18}$ used under (3) above.)

(*b*) In 1941, 57 per cent of those counted as fully Jewish lived in Amsterdam, which is a little less than the number found by Boekman for 1930 (see Table 4). The trend to concentrate in Amsterdam in the period from 1849 to 1920 did not, therefore, continue. This is even more evident when we also consider the group of persons counted as 'half' Jewish, a much greater percentage of whom live outside Amsterdam (Table 5).

(*c*) In 1941 there were about 106 women to every 100 men among the group of persons counted as 'full' Jews. This excess of women is somewhat smaller than in 1930 according to the Census (Table 3), so that the continuous increase of the excess of women in the period from 1859 to 1899 and its subsequent stationary condition of 108 to 109 during the years 1899 to 1930 were then followed by a decline. (See however, Chapter IV.)

(*d*) Although it is difficult to compare the 1941 with the 1930 figures because the latter do not include non-members of the religious communities, it is still possible to arrive at the fact that the Jewish population had again greatly aged in the period between 1931 and 1941.

Comparing the Jewish population according to the 1930 Census with those counted as 'full' Jews in 1941 (Table 6), we see that the numbers in the age groups below 30 years increased much less than did the older age groups; the age group from 0 to 9 years even declined numerically. However, this comparison is not quite correct, because on the one hand some of those counted in 1941 as 'full' Jews, according to the standard used in this report, did not belong to the Jewish group (mainly baptized persons and non-Jews of partly Jewish descent married to Jews), and, on the other hand, some of those counted as 'half' Jews at that time should, according to the same standard, be counted as belonging to the Jewish group. (Because of their small number, we are leaving out of consideration the persons counted as 'quarter' Jews.) The age distribution of the first category can no longer be ascertained; since it contained a high percentage of married persons, a relatively high proportion of it must belong to the age groups above 30 years. For the persons counted as 'half' Jews, however, the 1941 statistics specify separate data. Of this group, only those should be designated Jewish who were not baptized (9,938 out of 14,707; see Table 8) and were born of a Jewish mother (about $\frac{7}{18}$ of this number, i.e. about 3,900 persons; compare 4) above). On the assumption that the age distribution of these 3,900 is proportional to that of the overall number of persons counted as 'half' Jews, the age distribution of those counted as 'full' Jews can be corrected.

TABLE 2. *Numbers of Persons counted as 'Full' Jews (1930 and 1941)*

Age Group	*1930 Census*	*Counted as 'full' Jews in 1941*	*Difference from 1930*	*Counted as full Jews + persons counted as 'half' Jews in 1941*	*Difference from 1930*
0– 9 years	15,234	13,597	−1,637	14,821	−413
10–19 years	17,656	18,761	1,105	19,816	2,160
20–29 years	17,481	20,223	2,742	20,886	3,405
30–39 years	16,761	22,503	5,742	22,904	6,143
40–49 years	16,272	21,765	5,493	22,007	5,735
50–59 years	13,769	19,740	5,971	19,892	6,123
60 years and over	14,744	23,412	8,668	23,534	8,790
Total	111,917	140,001	28,084	143,860	31,943

TABLE 3. *Number of Jews in the Netherlands, 1830 to 1930 by Affiliation and Sex**

Year	*Total*	*Sex*		*Number of women per 100 men*	*Affiliation*		*Number of Jews per 10,000 inhabitants*
		Men	*Women*		*Ashkenazi*	*Sephardi*	
1830	46,397	—	—	—	—	—	178
1840	52,245	—	—	—	—	—	183
1849	58,626	28,846	29,780	103	55,412	3,214	192
1859	63,790	31,412	32,378	103	60,750	3,040	193
1869	68,003	33,180	34,823	105	64,478	3,525	190
1879	81,693	39,885	41,808	105	78,075	3,618	204
1889	97,324	47,465	49,859	105	92,254	5,070	215
1899	103,988	50,106	53,882	108	98,343	5,645	204
1909	106,409	50,825	55,584	109	99,785	6,624	181
1920	115,223	55,406	59,817	108	109,293	5,930	168
1930	111,917	53,685	58,232	108	106,723	5,194	141

* Source: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

TABLE 4. *Number of Jews in Amsterdam, 1849 to 1930**

Year	*Number of Jews in Amsterdam*	
	Absolute	*Percentage of the total number of Jews in the Netherlands*
1849	25,156	43·1
1859	26,725	41·9
1869	29,952	44·0
1879	40,318	49·4
1889	54,479	56·0
1899	59,065	56·4
1909	60,970	57·3
1920†	67,249	58·4
1920‡	68,758	59·7
1930	65,523	58·6

* Source: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.
† Before annexation of surrounding areas.
‡ After annexation.

TABLE 5. *Persons who reported, by Provinces, 1941*

(Numbers according to data of occupation authorities)

Province	*'Full' Jews**			*'Half' Jews**		
	Total	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*
Groningen	4,682	2,318	2,364	434	217	217
Friesland	851	417	434	73	37	36
Drente	2,498	1,506	992	145	104	41
Overijssel	4,345	2,254	2,091	326	171	155
Gelderland	6,633	3,249	3,384	604	317	287
Utrecht	4,147	2,022	2,125	673	337	336
North Holland	87,026	41,936	45,090	6,620	3,294	3,326
South Holland	25,617	12,586	13,031	4,969	2,461	2,508
Zeeland	174	94	80	69	36	33
North Brabant	2,320	1,179	1,141	387	219	168
Limburg	1,394	695	699	208	110	98
Netherlands	139,687	68,256	71,431	14,508	7,303	7,205
Amsterdam alone	79,410	37,977	41,433	5,359†	2,672†	2,687†

* According to the criteria of the occupation authorities.
† 1 October 1941.

TABLE 6. *Persons who reported, by Age Groups, 1941*

(Numbers according to data of occupation authorities)

Age Group	*'Full' Jews**			*'Half' Jews**		
	Total	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*
0– 4 years	6,853	3,552	3,301	2,662	1,347	1,315
5– 9 years	6,744	3,492	3,252	2,054	1,027	1,027
10–14 years	8,254	4,177	4,077	2,002	1,024	978
15–19 years	10,507	5,336	5,171	2,067	1,055	1,012
20–24 years	9,927	5,004	4,923	1,460	751	709
25–29 years	10,296	4,955	5,341	1,096	542	554
30–34 years	11,238	5,491	5,747	870	445	425
35–39 years	11,265	5,592	5,673	677	349	328
40–49 years	21,765	10,848	10,917	934	449	485
50–59 years	19,740	9,395	10,345	587	286	301
60 years and over	23,412	10,209	13,203	486	235	251
Total	140,001	68,051	71,950	14,895	7,510	7,385

* According to the criteria of the occupation authorities.

TABLE 7. *Persons who reported, 1941, Married to Jews and Non-Jews*

Designation according to criteria of occupation authorities	*Married to*					
	Jews			*Non-Jews*		
	Total	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*
'Full' Jews	49,739	24,011*	25,728*	18,886	11,498	7,388
'Half' Jews	441	171	270	3,296	1,668	1,628
'Quarter' Jews	106	41	65	1,304	653	651
Total	50,286	24,223	26,063	23,486	13,819	9,667

* The numbers of Jewish men and Jewish women married to a Jewish spouse are not equal. This is because some of the spouses were abroad.

TABLE 8. *Persons who reported, by Religious Affiliation, 1941*

(Numbers according to data of occupation authorities)

Religious affiliation as of 1 October 1941	*'Full' Jews**			*'Half' Jews**		
	Total	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*
Roman Catholic	690	357	333	1,848	926	922
Dutch Reformed	591	279	312	1,894	986	908
Other non-Jewish affiliation	634	301	333	1,027	509	518
Total non-Jewish	1,915	937	978	4,769	2,421	2,348
Ashkenazi	121,409	59,014	62,395			
Sephardi	4,301	2,031	2,270			
No affiliation	12,564	6,188	6,376	9,938	4,970	4,968
Total	140,189	68,170	72,019	14,707	7,391	7,316

* According to the criteria of the occupation authorities.

TABLE 9. *Immigrants to the Netherlands after 30 January 1933, who reported, by Nationality, 1941*

(Numbers according to data of occupation authorities)

Country of Origin as of 1 October 1941	*'Full' Jews**			*'Half' Jews**		
	Total	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*
Germany	14,886	7,359	7,527	633	344	289
Austria	618	312	306	57	26	31
Poland	144	52	92	2	2	—
Czechoslovakia	105	50	55	8	5	3
Other countries	35	14	21	15	7	8
Total	15,788	7,787	8,001	715	384	331

* According to the criteria of the occupation authorities.

These figures clearly indicate a relative lag of the age groups below 30 years (especially that of 0 to 9 years) and the relatively pronounced increase of the category over 60 years.

(*e*) The number of mixed marriages (Table 7) was remarkably high: about 20,000. There is good cause for viewing this figure with some suspicion. A number of persons, appreciating the meaning of the measures taken by the occupation authorities, were undoubtedly able to mask their Jewish descent partly or entirely, so that a number of Jewish marriages were listed as 'mixed'. It should be further borne in mind that there were a number of baptized persons among the Jewish spouses in

mixed marriages, and that they could not be counted as members of the Jewish population. We shall return to the value of this figure in the next section.

It is interesting to note the disparity between the numbers of Jewish men and Jewish women in mixed marriages in 1941. In the years before the war it was apparently easier for a Jewish man than for a Jewish woman to contract a mixed marriage, or men were more readily inclined to do so than were women.[14]

(*f*) We shall also note (Table 8) the small percentage among those counted as 'full' Jews who listed membership in a non-Jewish religious community (1·4 per cent) and—because of the concentration of the Jews in Amsterdam, a highly non-religious city—the comparatively small percentage of unaffiliated persons. The latter aspect is also pointed out by A. Veffer in his publication for the Jewish Council.[15]

These results imply that the affiliations listed should be regarded primarily as an indication of formal membership and not of the persuasion of the persons counted.[16]

2.3 *The influence of deportation on the composition of the Jewish population*

The occupation of the Netherlands by the Germans meant a disaster of unprecedented proportions for the Jews. The destruction was relatively higher than in any other Western European country. This will be clear from the following numbers of losses: France, *c.* 85,000; Belgium, *c.* 27,000; Norway, *c.* 700; Denmark, *c.* 1,500; Italy, *c.* 9,000.[17]

According to an estimate by the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (National Institute for War Documentation)[18]—tentative and offered with all proper reserve—at least 110,000 persons were deported from the Netherlands. Only about 5,450 returned, so that the number of victims must have amounted to about 105,000.

The following estimated figures for the Jewish population of the above countries[19] before 1940 will contribute to a better understanding of the catastrophe: France, 225,000; Belgium, 60,000; Norway, 1,500; Denmark, 7,000; Italy, 50,000; Netherlands, 140,000.

The decimation, as will be shown, has profoundly affected the structure of the Jewish population. We shall discuss in some detail a few of the causes of this structural change.

With regard to deportation some groups were in a more or less 'privileged' position. This was first of all true of Jewish spouses in mixed marriages. Although they were subject to discriminatory measures, they were in many cases not affected by the extermination policy of the Nazis. This has naturally entailed a very important relative increase in the number of mixed marriages. The National Institute for War Documentation estimates their number for 1945 at about 8,000, a figure appreciably lower than that specified in the 1941 statistics (cf. Table 7), i.e. about 20,000.

A second 'privileged' group was formed by those who were deported to the Bergen-Belsen and Theresienstadt concentration camps (especially the latter), a total of 8,300 persons. There the percentage of survivors was much higher than it was for those who ended up in a *Vernichtungslager* like Sobibor, Auschwitz, or Mauthausen. The category referred to consisted largely of intellectuals, persons with so-called 'Palestine papers', Jews who had adopted another religion, etc., all of whom in general belonged to the upper social strata. Of the 'privileged' persons about 1,700 returned, half of whom were Netherlands citizens.[20]

Similar remarks can be made with regard to persons who went into hiding. Generally, those who lived in relatively close contact with their non-Jewish fellow-citizens had the best chances of hiding. Circumstances were therefore very unfavourable for the large Jewish agglomerations who lived mainly in Amsterdam but also in other towns and cities. Property also was an important factor affecting the possibility of hiding. It probably was also influenced by the particular time when the forced evacuations started. For example, in 1930 the Jews of the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, and Drente, which were the first to be made *Judenrein*, constituted 6·2 per cent of the total number of Jews in the Netherlands; in 1954 this figure was reduced to 2·5 per cent (see Table 12).

Finally, there were the factors of sex and age. Women could frequently be given shelter more easily than men; children and old people could be hidden with more ease than the groups in between. About 8,000 persons returned from hiding.[21]

A limited number of Jews managed to escape to England or Switzerland during the occupation, or to find relative safety in Belgium or France. Their number, for the period after October 1941, may be estimated at about 2,000.[22]

In summary, the above figures produce the following estimate of the number of Jews present in the Netherlands in the middle of 1945:

Returned from camps	5,450
Returned from hiding in the Netherlands	8,000
Returned from neutral or Allied territory or from hiding in other occupied countries	2,000
Jewish spouses of mixed marriages	8,000
Total	23,450

When we add to this number the death roll of 105,000, we fail to arrive at the number of 140,000 Jews who according to the statistics mentioned above should have been present in 1941. Unspecified changes during the period from October 1941 to mid-1945—such as births, normal deaths, deaths in the Netherlands due to abnormal causes (underground resistance, persons shot when caught in hiding, suicide, death in concentration camps, and others)—are too small numerically to serve as an explanation for the difference.

Since the 1941 figure of 140,000 should be considered too low rather than too high, there are three possible reasons for the discrepancy of about 11,500 persons:

(*a*) The death figure of about 105,000 was in reality higher.

(*b*) The number of mixed marriages was higher than 8,000.

(*c*) The number of persons who returned from hiding was higher than 8,000.

Not much can be said about possibilities (*a*) and (*c*) because of the lack of more precise data; there is reason, however, to regard the death figure indicated as a minimum.[22]

A little more can be said about the number of mixed marriages.[23] It was mentioned before (Section 2.2) that the statistics of the registration forms put the number of Jewish spouses in such marriages at about 20,000 for October 1941. This might give rise to the assumption that perhaps the post-war estimate of 8,000 is too low. Another fact raises strong doubts as to the value of the 1941 statistics in this regard. A later registration, in September 1942, of those who had children from an existing or earlier mixed marriage and of all Jewish women married to non-Jews produced no more than 8,610 persons.[24] The number of persons in this group actually married has not been established. With regard to the number of childless Jewish spouses in mixed marriages, the only available estimate is a specification which Rauter gave to Himmler on 24 September 1942, in which mention is made of 6,000 persons. In another source, however, the above-mentioned number of 8,610 is given as that of the total of Jewish persons having contracted mixed marriages. There also is a note by the German *Referent* Calmeyer (probably of 6 October 1942), according to which the original returns of 18,000 were to be considered incorrect and must be replaced by about 10,000 on the basis of the later registration. In a speech in February 1944 Rauter finally mentioned the figure of 9,500 for the total number of Jews in mixed marriages.

This is a confusing mixture of contradictory data, making it highly probable that the 1941 statistics were wrong. It is not clear in what way the statistics are incorrect. Did a number of single Jews or Jews having a Jewish spouse register as having a non-Jewish spouse, or were there double counts or counting errors? In the former case the number of single persons or persons with a non-Jewish spouse would be too low; in the latter case the numbers specified would not necessarily be incorrect. However, in view of the later corrections by the Germans, it would seem that processing errors were responsible rather than deliberately made classification errors.

On the other hand, we may have reason to doubt the correctness of the figure of 8,000. A number of Jewish spouses in mixed marriages were deported (for instance as punitive cases) and never returned. For this group, however, it was easier than for others to find protection in hiding

or by other means, so that their proportion of survivors was much larger than that in the total Jewish population.

Some of the childless mixed marriages were dissolved by separation or divorce; this occurred rather frequently in the course of 1941. From 1941 to 1944 this group was further reduced by natural deaths. These factors were not balanced by new marriages. The decrease caused by divorces and deaths, however, cannot have been extensive.

Considering that, in 1941, $\frac{11}{18}$ of the Jewish spouses in mixed marriages were men, and assuming that this ratio applies likewise to the childless and that the number of 6,000 specified for them by Rauter was approximately correct, we see that it follows that approximately $\frac{11}{18} \times 6{,}000 = c.\ 4{,}000$ childless Jewish men married to non-Jews are not contained in the results of the September 1942 registration.[25] On this assumption, the number of Jews married or formerly married to non-Jews in September 1942 would have been roughly 12,600.

Because of this, we believe that the number of mixed marriages in 1945 may have been higher than 8,000, possibly as many as 10,000. The number of Jews present in the Netherlands in 1945—when we consider the numbers 8,000 and 10,000, in the absence of more precise data, as limits for the true number of mixed marriages—could then be estimated at not less than 23,450 and not more than 25,450.

III. METHODS USED IN THE INVESTIGATION

3.1 *1947 Census Data*

Figures relating to the Jewish population of the Netherlands after the Second World War became available in various ways. In the first place, the number of survivors can be estimated—as indicated in the preceding section—with the aid of 1941 statistics and figures of the losses due to deportation. This method, however, leads to no more than the total number of 23,450 already mentioned and a single demographic subdivision (into persons married to non-Jews and others), the quality of which is still dubious. This approximation cannot lead to an understanding of the further demographic characteristics of the post-war Jewish population.

The second source is a voluntary registration undertaken by the Jewish Co-ordination Board. The Board published lists of survivors, and at the end of 1945 21,674 persons had registered. Except for nationality and, frequently very temporary, residence, these lists do not allow any further specifications. Moreover, it is certain that not nearly all Jews then residing in the Netherlands responded to the request to register.

The 1947 Census data constitute the third source. One might ask if the Jewish population of the Netherlands could not be sufficiently evaluated on the basis of the Census. The Committee has answered this question in the negative for reasons already hinted at.

Three broad categories of 'Jews' can be distinguished who, for the purpose of the Census, registered as not belonging to one of the Jewish religious communities:

(*a*) Those not belonging to a Jewish religious community and not interested in Jewish life in general. They frequently do not have many Jewish ties; a large percentage of those who are married to non-Jews can be counted among them.

(*b*) Those not belonging to a Jewish religious community but interested in Jewish life and affairs. Persons in this group make use of Jewish institutions and facilities in certain circumstances.

(*c*) Those who, although belonging to one of the religious communities, failed to mention this in the Census because of 'registration phobia' or other reasons.

The Committee felt that these three groups should be drawn into the investigation, and it was to be expected that it would thus arrive at appreciably higher figures than the Census, an expectation which turned out to be justified. In anticipation, it may now be said that the Committee established the presence of a total of 23,723 Jewish persons in the Netherlands for 1 January 1954, as against 14,346 persons according to the 1947 Census, despite an emigration surplus during the intervening period. The Census figure can be definitely stated as being too low.

Whenever possible, the Committee took the Census results into account, despite the incompleteness of the figures. To that end, use was made of two reports drawn up at the request of the Board of the Jewish Social Work Foundation by Ph. A. Sondervan and Dr. A. Vedder (not published), and an article by A. Pais in the *Joodse Wachter* of 25 January 1952.

Advantage was also taken of other data from the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (hereafter referred to as N.C.B.S.), namely the facts known about the church affiliation of newborn children (and their parents), deceased persons, persons who were married, and immigrants and emigrants during the 1946–58 period. These data are derived from the population records of the municipalities. They are naturally based on the denominational principle so that their value for the present study is limited.

3.2 *Selection of the statistical material*

The Committee carefully considered how the investigation should be carried out. The first idea was to draw up a list of all known Jewish addresses in the Netherlands and then have all these addresses visited by investigators. Apart from the almost prohibitive cost of such an inquiry, the Committee felt that many of the persons to be questioned would be unwilling to co-operate.

This possibility was therefore rejected. The remaining possibility was

to seek information where most data were still available, i.e. at the various Jewish communities all over the country. These were visited by two investigators, who completed inquiry forms for all living persons, those deceased since 1945 and those who had emigrated after 1945 of whom details were found in the files.

Various difficulties were encountered. Most Jewish communities were immediately found willing to co-operate in every way. Some raised objections, but these were satisfactorily met after consultation. It was more difficult to overcome another problem: the fact that the records of the communities were far from complete. This was true even for such communities as the (Ashkenazi) *Nederlands-Israëlitische Hoofdsynagoge* and the Portuguese-Hebrew (Sephardi) Community in Amsterdam, both of which have excellent files of Jews residing in Amsterdam, both members and non-members. Evidence of incompleteness, especially in regard to non-members, was found when the Committee made a few spot checks. This was even truer for many smaller Jewish communities, where adequate records are frequently not maintained. Although people are likely to know each other better in small communities, it should be borne in mind that they frequently cover extensive areas and that the information available about the presence of Jews in places outside the centres of such communities is frequently scant. This incompleteness is encountered especially in places characterized by a marked increase in population due to migration, such as the commuter towns in the western provinces and the districts with growing industries.

Because of these facts, it can be established even now that the figures obtained as a result of our count are appreciably below the real figures. It will be shown that there is no adequate method to correct them.

The following remarks should be made about the Jewish communities where the data were collected. In the Netherlands there are three Hebrew religious communities: the *Nederlands-Israëlitische Kerkgenootschap* (Ashkenazi), the *Portugees-Israëlitische Kerkgenootschap* (Sephardi), and the *Verbond van Liberaal Religieuze Joden in Nederland.* The last congregation was not willing to supply data. However, the Committee believes that the inaccuracy thus caused in the figures is of only limited significance, because a large percentage of the members of this Society appears also in the files of the other two religious communities.

The Committee has not divided the data obtained according to Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews. Even with regard to the 1930 Census, Boekman remarked that the considerable differences between the two denominations (mainly of a social nature) lost much of their significance during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, and that at present they really form one group. He felt that the small number of really active Portuguese Jews in the Netherlands was responsible for this phenomenon.[26] These circumstances had much greater validity and significance in 1954 than in 1930.

3.3 *Design of the inquiry forms*

Three forms were designed for recording data; a general form, a form concerning people dying after 1945, and a form on people who emigrated after 1945.

The Committee attempted to make the general form as comprehensive as possible. However, several questions considered of importance were not included because it was certain beforehand that it would be impossible to gather sufficient information about them. This applies to such data as income and profession. Even of various questions included in the form it was doubtful if they would be answered in a satisfactory manner. This suspicion was eventually confirmed.

'Member J(ewish) Community': The answer to this question was *Yes* when the person in question had acknowledged in any manner his wish to be a member of the religious community. In case this concerned the head of a family, the remaining Jewish members of the family were also considered as belonging to the community, in accordance with the usual practice of the community; *no* when the person in question had declared emphatically, through formal resignation or otherwise, that he did not wish to belong to the local Jewish community; *unknown* when neither the one nor the other applied.

'Solemnization of last or present marriage': By asking this question the Committee hoped to collect some details on religious interest.

With the 'composition of the family', a complication arose about mixed marriages. If the husband had married a non-Jewish wife, he was marked as head of the family but no other family members were listed, except in cases where there were children from a previous Jewish marriage. If the wife was Jewish, the composition of the family was listed on her form, but she herself was not listed as head of the family but as wife.

'Circumcision of own children, stepchildren, and foster children': The purpose of this question was to sound religious or community interest.

IV. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE JEWISH POPULATION ON 1 JANUARY 1954

4.1a *Number*

The enumeration commissioned by the Committee indicated that 23,723 Jews resided in the Netherlands on 1 January 1954, of whom 11,506 were men and 12,217 women. Given the births and deaths during the years 1947 to 1953 established in the study, as well as emigration and immigration during the same period—based partly on the figures of the study and partly on N.C.B.S. figures—the number of Jews present in May 1947, starting from the total figure for 1954, must have been at least 26,000. However, as we remarked in Section 3.1, only 14,346 Jews registered as such in the Census of 31 May 1947. This demonstrates con-

vincingly the relative value of the Census figures for a demography of the Jews in the Netherlands.

Meanwhile the question remains as to the extent to which the number of 23,723 established by the Committee reflected the real situation. Different calculations can contribute to an answer to this question:

(*a*) Calculation of the number of Jews present in 1945 from the figures for 1 January 1954, with the aid of the available data on births, deaths, emigration, and immigration, and comparison of the result with the outcome of other estimates of the number of Jews present in 1945.

(*b*) Comparison of the composition—from specific points of view—of the Jewish population according to the statistics for 1 January 1954 with that derived from other sources.

The method mentioned under (*a*) consists of estimating on the basis of the number of persons on 1 January of a given year the number on 1 January of the preceding year by adding to the former number the number of deaths and emigrants in the past year and deducting the number of births and immigrants in that year.

This method cannot be followed entirely on the basis of the study carried out by the Committee because of the lack of data on immigration.[27]

In this respect, some support was derived from the N.C.B.S. statistics of foreign migration, which contain a division according to religion for the years from 1952 on (aliens have been included only from 1953 on). Also useful were the migration figures according to country of origin presented by these statistics from 1948 on (aliens from 1950 on) because it may be assumed that emigrants to and immigrants from Israel belong almost completely to the Jewish group. According to these data the immigration of Jews was a not unimportant phenomenon. From 1950 to 1953, 369 persons from Israel arrived in the Netherlands; according to the same statistics 868 persons emigrated to Israel during that period. (According to the data collected by the Committee: 814 persons; according to data supplied by the Netherlands Bureau of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: 819 persons.) According to the N.C.B.S. statistics, 1,524 Netherlands citizens emigrated to Israel during the period from 1948 to 1956, and 711 persons returned during the same period. Even if during the years of illegal emigration to Israel, 1946 and 1947, the balance of migration to Israel had a higher numerical value, these figures nevertheless indicate the importance of immigration from Israel as compared to emigration.

Similar conclusions are reached with regard to the total immigration of Jews, although the figures for it are much less complete because the corresponding N.C.B.S. data, as mentioned above, were compiled only from 1952 on and include aliens only from 1953 on. These statistics enumerate 271 Jewish immigrants for 1953, which is about twice the number of immigrants from Israel.

The same ratio of 1 : 2 between immigration from Israel and the total number of Jewish immigrants is also encountered for the years 1954 to 1956. However tentative this information may be as a basis for extrapolation, the best approximation is probably obtained by assuming the total Jewish immigration during the years 1948 to 1952 to be equal to twice the total immigration from Israel.[28]

Another problem occurs with regard to the extent of Jewish emigration during the years 1946 to 1953. The available data are those of the Committee and N.C.B.S. figures relating to Jewish foreign migration which date from 1952 (aliens included from 1953).

For the year 1953, the only year for which both sources are available, the Committee counted 509 emigrants, but the N.C.B.S. 699. This difference may have been caused by a different procedure in dating emigration, but it can also point to an underestimate of the emigration when using the Committee investigation as starting point. The latter cause is also suggested by the fact that, according to the investigation, 987 persons emigrated to Israel in the period from 1948 to 1953, whereas according to the Netherlands Bureau of the Jewish Agency for Palestine this number amounted to 1,501.

There is cause, therefore, to base the retrospective calculation of the size of the Jewish population in 1945 upon two alternative estimates of the annual emigration figures: first, upon the numbers produced by the investigation; second, upon numbers which are 40 per cent higher.

The results of both calculations are shown in Table 10.

The number of Jews present on 1 January of a given year (t) has in

TABLE 10. *Size of the Jewish Population in the Netherlands, 1946 to 1953*

Date	*Number according to*			
	*Estimate I**	*Estimate II†*	*Estimate III‡*	*Estimate IV§*
1 Jan. 1946	25,588	27,415	30,188	34,415
1 Jan. 1947	25,739	27,434	—	—
1 Jan. 1948	25,472	26,900	—	—
1 Jan. 1949	25,361	26,599	—	—
1 Jan. 1950	25,305	26,305	—	—
1 Jan. 1951	24,771	25,586	—	—
1 Jan. 1952	24,224	24,613	—	—
1 Jan. 1953	23,986	24,176	—	—
1 Jan. 1954	23,723	23,723	26,623	27,923

* Emigration according to inquiry; immigration as in estimate II.

† Emigration according to 1953 data of N.C.B.S. (according to religious affiliation); estimated at 1·4 times emigration according to inquiry for years prior to 1953. Immigration estimated at twice that from Israel according to data of N.C.B.S. from 1948; estimated at zero for years prior to 1948.

‡ Estimate I corrected for underestimate of number of mixed marriages according to assumed minimum. (Mixed marriages in 1945: 8,000.)

§ Estimate II corrected for underestimate of number of mixed marriages according to assumed maximum. (Mixed marriages in 1945: 10,000.)

each case been computed according to the formula: number present on 1 January of the following year ($t + 1$) minus births in year (t) minus immigration in year (t) plus deaths in year (t) plus emigration in year (t), starting with the outcome of the investigation carried out by the Committee for 1 January 1954.

By this procedure the estimated number of Jews in the Netherlands on 31 December 1945 becomes 25,600 to 27,500. In Section 2.3 the number of Jews present in 1945, starting from the 1941 statistics and known data about war losses, was estimated at 23,450 to 25,450. The results of the calculation just discussed are only slightly higher. This would seem to speak for the reliability of the results of the Committee's investigation.

If, however, we consider the composition of the Jewish population on 1 January 1954 as it appears from the investigation—the method mentioned above, under (b)—we soon reach the conclusion that the number of Jews resulting is too low. In the first place the number of mixed marriages is too small. According to the investigation, this number was 3,110 on 1 January 1954. Earlier, however, we saw (Section 2.3) that the number of mixed marriages in 1945 can be estimated at about 8,000 or 10,000. Hence it follows that the count for 1 January 1954 underestimates at least the number of mixed marriages. It is true that some of the mixed marriages of 1945 were dissolved through death or divorce during the period until 1 January 1954. The investigation gives no information on their number, but even if we assume an annual dissolution rate of 5 per cent,[29] the corresponding reduction of the number of mixed marriages during the said period cannot have amounted to more than about 3,000, or, on the basis of the higher estimate, about 3,700.

The reduction actually was smaller, because during the same period new mixed marriages were contracted (either as first or subsequent marriages). Of these marriages, too, the exact number is unknown because the data on duration of marriages in the study are highly incomplete. We do know that on 1 January 1954, 526 Jewish spouses in mixed marriages had been born in 1920 or later. These were at most 21 years old early in 1941. We probably do not greatly err when we assume that almost none of them was married at that time. In view of the prohibition of mixed marriages for the remainder of the war, almost all persons constituting this group must have married after the war. To this we should add an unknown number of post-war marriages of persons born before 1920, among whom were almost all cases of 'subsequent marriage' among the mixed marriages; there were 372 of them according to the study. Because of these figures, it does not seem unreasonable to estimate the total number of post-war mixed marriages—in so far as they were still intact on 1 January 1954—at about 1,000.

On 1 January 1954, therefore, the number of mixed marriages should have amounted to about 8,000 + 1,000 − 3,000 = 6,000, or, on the

basis of the alternative estimate, about 10,000 + 1,000 − 3,700 = 7,300. The Committee counted only 3,110, which constitutes a negative difference of about 2,900 or 4,200, as the case may be. For the date mentioned, the size of the Jewish population therefore should be estimated not at 23,723, but at least at 26,600 or 27,900. This difference is to be attributed to imperfections in registration by the Jewish communities. It is furthermore plausible that, although these imperfections receive greater emphasis for the group who contracted mixed marriages, they can hardly be restricted to that group. It is therefore quite possible that the number of Jews in the Netherlands exceeded 30,000 on 1 January 1954. It will be shown in the course of the present section that there are indications that, especially outside the large cities, the study underestimated the size of the Jewish population. A more accurate determination of the number of Jews residing in the Netherlands, however, was found to be impossible within the scope of this study.

While the number of Jews in 1954 was higher than is apparent from the Committee census, it follows conversely from the results of this census that the estimate of the number of Jews present in 1945—about 23,450 or 25,450—must have been too low. This is so in the first place because the study indicates (Table 10) the presence of 25,600 to 27,400 Jews on 1 January 1946. When we add to this the equivalent for 1945 of the deficiency in the count for 1 January 1954 of 2,900 or 4,400 mixed marriages (this equivalent may be put at about 4,600 or 7,000 Jewish persons by analogy with the above estimates), the result for late 1945 is found to be over 30,000 persons.

4.1b *Geographical distribution*

For the Jewish population on 1 January 1954 we first detail (Table 11) the figures for the number of Jews by province, while the three largest cities are shown separately. For comparison, the 1947 Census figures are given in addition to those established by the Committee.

The figures in Table 11 indicate that the number of Jews in the three largest cities according to the 1954 count was considerably higher than appears from the 1947 Census, in accordance with our preceding statements. However, the converse is shown by the remaining data. For instance, of the cities of over 100,000 inhabitants not referred to above Utrecht alone shows a rise. All the others show a decline, except Arnhem, where the figure remained constant.

What can be the cause of this remarkable phenomenon? It would seem obvious that migration within the country is involved, all the more so since migration to the large cities, even many years before the war, was appreciably greater among Jews than among the remainder of the population. This, however, can never be the full explanation.

According to the figures for 1954, it appears that no higher percentage of Jews lived in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants than in 1930, namely,

81·1 per cent or 80·9 per cent.[30] The 1954 percentage, however, is higher than that for 1947, which was 67 per cent.[31]

The fact that the 1947 percentage differed so greatly from that of preceding as well as subsequent years may have been caused by the circumstance that many persons in the aftermath of the war did not live in their original places of residence in 1947 but eventually returned to them. However, we do not believe that this migration was so extensive. On the contrary, our conclusion is that the low 1947 figures for the large cities—Amsterdam in particular—are to be attributed to under-registration due to non-membership in the religious communities, lack of interest, and 'registration phobia'. On the other hand, the relatively low figures for 1954 for Jews living in municipalities outside the larger cities were probably caused mainly by lack of sufficient data on the number of Jews residing in the municipalities—especially in respect of those married to non-Jews—in the files of the Jewish communities.[32]

Table 12 shows the distribution of the Jews over the entire country.

The percentage of Jews residing in Amsterdam was: in 1930, 58·5 per cent of the total number of Jews living in the Netherlands; in 1941, 56·7 per cent; in 1947, 36·7 per cent; in 1954, 59·2 per cent. The figures for 1930, 1941, and 1954 display remarkable stability in the percentage

TABLE 11. *Distribution of the Jewish Population, by Province and Three Largest Cities, 31 May 1947 and 1 January 1954*

Province or city of residence	*1947**	*1954*	*Difference*
Groningen	328	242	−86
Friesland	168	155	−13
Drente	146	180	34
Overijssel†	1,094	945	−149
Gelderland	1,150	997	−183
Utrecht	916	848	−68
North Holland (except Amsterdam)	1,359	1,378	19
South Holland (except Rotterdam and The Hague)	635	580	−55
Zeeland	39	59	20
North Brabant	686	620	−66
Limburg	407	297	−110
	6,928	6,301	−627
Amsterdam	5,269	14,068	8,799
Rotterdam	852	1,323	471
The Hague	1,283	2,031	748
	14,332	23,723	9,391
Central Population Register	15		−15
Netherlands	14,347	23,723	9,376

* N.C.B.S. Census (persons who stated membership in one of the two Jewish religious communities).

† Including Northeast Polder.

TABLE 12. *Per Cent Distribution of the Jewish Population, by Province*

Province or municipality of residence	*Jewish Population (Percentage of total number)*				*Share of total population, per area (Per mille)*	
	*1930**	*1941†*	*1947‡*	*1954§*	*1930**	*1954§*
Groningen	3·9	3·4	2·3	1·0	11·1	0·52
Friesland	0·8	0·6	1·2	0·7	2·3	0·33
Drente	1·5	1·7	1·0	0·8	7·4	0·61
Overijssel	3·3	3·1	7·6	4·0	7·0	1·30
Gelderland	4·7	4·7	8·0	4·2	6·3	0·89
Utrecht	1·5	2·7	6·4	3·6	4·1	1·39
North Holland (except Amsterdam)	3·3	6·1	9·5	5·8	5·2	1·28
South Holland	20·1	18·3	19·3	16·6	11·5	1·56
Zeeland	0·2	0·1	0·3	0·2	0·8	0·22
North Brabant	1·5	1·6	4·8	2·6	1·8	0·47
Limburg	0·7	1·0	2·9	1·3	1·4	0·38
Total	41·5	43·3	63·3	40·8		
Amsterdam	58·5	56·7	36·7	59·2	82·5	16·38
Netherlands	100	100	100	100	14·1	2·25

* Censuses N.C.B.S.
† Statistics of registration forms (those counted as 'full' Jews).
‡ Including Northeast Polder.
§ Committee census.

of the Amsterdam Jews in the total. We believe that the appreciable deviation for 1947 is to be attributed to the causes mentioned above.[33]

The proportion which the Jewish population constitutes of the total population in each of the provinces—with Amsterdam left out—fluctuates less than might have been expected. It is relatively high in the provinces of Overijssel, Utrecht, North Holland, and South Holland.

In conclusion, we offer a few remarks about the number of municipalities in which Jews reside. In 1930 there were 406 such municipalities.[34] The 1947 Census indicated a reduction to 336.[35] However, this reduction was much smaller than the total decline of the Jewish population, so that the average number of Jews per municipality declined from 275 in 1930 to 43 in 1947. In the Committee census the names of the municipalities were not always correctly specified on the registration forms. For 87 persons counted it was afterwards found impossible to establish the municipality of residence. According to Table 13, the remaining persons counted were distributed over 214 municipalities, so that the number of municipalities where Jews lived on 1 January 1954 must have been between 214 and 301. This is a good deal less than the figure in the 1947 Census, although the latter arrived at a much lower national total for the Jewish population. We have already noted that the 1947 Census specifically underestimated the Jewish population of the large cities and that the Committee count probably yielded the largest shortage especially for the smaller municipalities. In agreement with this

TABLE 13. *The Jewish Population on 1 January 1954 by Number of Jewish Inhabitants per Municipality*

Municipalities with	*Number of municipalities*		*Jewish inhabitants*		
			1 Jan. 1954		*1930**
	1 Jan. 1954	*1930**	*Number*	*Per cent*	*Per cent*
1 to 50 Jewish inhabitants	180	325	1,788	7·5	3·4
51 to 100 ,, ,,	14	22	1,005	4·2	1·4
101 to 200 ,, ,,	10	27	1,384	5·8	3·2
201 to 300 ,, ,,	3	9	615	2·6	2·0
301 to 500 ,, ,,	4	11	1,422	6·0	3·9
501 to 1,000 ,, ,,	—	—	—	—	4·0
1,001 and more ,, ,,	3	6	17,422	73·5	82·1
Unknown number of Jewish inhabitants	0 to 87	—	87	0·4	—
Total	214 to 301	406	23,723	100	100

* 1930 Census, N.C.B.S.; cf. Boekman, op. cit., p. 37.

there is an apparent decrease of the number of municipalities with Jewish residents. This also implies that the Census data on the number of municipalities with Jewish residents are probably more realistic than those based on the Committee investigation. The latter, however, give a more realistic picture of the distribution of the Jewish population over Jewish population concentrations of different size. The high local concentration of the Jews in the Netherlands is clearly typified by the fact that only 7·5 per cent live in Jewish centres of 50 persons or fewer, and almost three-quarters in the three largest municipalities (centres with 1,000 and more Jews). Yet this concentration appears to have been even stronger in 1930, when only 5 per cent of Dutch Jews lived in centres of 50 or fewer Jews, although the number of these centres was then greater (325 versus 180 to 267 now).

4.2 *Sex and age*

Boekman[36] has already pointed out the remarkably high excess of women over men in the Jewish population. On the basis of the census figures, there were, per 100 Jewish men: in 1899, 107 women;[36] in 1909, 109 women;[36] in 1920, 108 women;[36] in 1930, 108 women;[36] in 1947, 109 women.[37]

These counts are based on religious affiliation. As we have seen in Section 2.2, the 1941 count, which was based on the criterion of descent, produced 105·5 women per 100 men. The 1954 count also resulted in an excess of women: 106 women per 100 men. It is interesting to compare this with the figures for the overall population of the Netherlands on 31 December 1953: 1,007 women per 1,000 men.[38]

These figures should not lead to hasty conclusions about deviant biological characteristics among the Jews. It should be borne in mind, first of all, that the Census figures relate to a group which is defined denominationally and not biologically. Now it is a fact—Boekman[36] has mentioned it for earlier Censuses, and the 1947 figures likewise point to it[37]—that all church or religious communities show an excess of women, whereas the group without formal religious affiliation includes more men than women (in 1947: 886 women per 1,000 men). This demonstrates that the phenomenon is at least partly due to the fact that, generally, women are more strongly committed to organized religion than men. For the smaller churches and sects, the average excess of women in 1947 was even appreciably higher than within the Jewish population. It was lower in the larger communions and churches.

This connexion can be further illustrated by studying the sex ratios of children and adults. One would expect the difference in the numbers of males and females not to manifest itself among children, and the 1947 Census figures[39] do indeed indicate that for all religious denominations among persons below 15 years of age there even exists a small excess of males.[40] This is also true for the Jewish population. For the group of persons not affiliated to any religious community, the excess of males increases along with advancing age.

The Jewish population is characterized furthermore by a relatively low proportion of the youngest age groups in the total population. An adjustment of the age structure of the Jewish group to that of the total Netherlands population would, according to the 1947 Census figures, cause the Jewish excess of women to drop from 109 to 106. If we compare with this the number of women per 100 men in 1947 for the Dutch Reformed (104) and for the Calvinists (105)—two groups of which the age structure is well in agreement with that of the total Netherlands population—we see how little excessive this Jewish surplus of women really was.

With regard to the 1954 Committee count, we cannot say that the resulting excess of women can be explained by stronger religious ties in women than in men, because this count was not based on religious affiliation. Nevertheless it produces (Table 15) the same picture as the Census: a relatively high excess of women in the age classes between 15 and 44 years and over 60 years; and an excess of males for children up to age 14 and for the groups between ages 45 and 60. It will be shown that this excess of women is wholly concentrated in the large cities, and that the remaining municipalities show an excess of men. Now this count (Section 4.1) also contains a deficiency, particularly due to an underestimate of the number of mixed marriages. Earlier we estimated this shortage, as far as mixed marriages are concerned, at about 2,900 to 4,200. Of the 3,110 Jewish spouses in mixed marriages recorded in the count, 1,893 were men and 1,217 women. Assuming this sex ratio also

TABLE 14. *Corrected Estimates*

	Alternative I			*Alternative II*		
	Men	*Women*	*Total*	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*
1954 count	11,506	12,217	23,723	11,506	12,217	23,723
Plus Jewish spouses in mixed marriages	1,740	1,160	2,900	2,520	1,680	4,200
Total	13,246	13,377	26,623	14,026	13,987	27,923

TABLE 15. *The Jewish Population by Age (in 5-year classes), according to Sex, on 1 January 1954, in comparison with the Overall Population of the Netherlands and of Amsterdam*

Year of birth	*Age*	*Jewish population*				*Total*	*Netherlands population* 31 Dec. 1953*	*Amsterdam population† 31 Dec. 1953*
		Total	*Men*	*Women*	*Number of women per 1,000 men*			
		(*Absolute numbers*)				(*Numbers per thousand*)		
1949–1953	0– 4	1,319	701	618	882	56·2	106·0	82·8
1944–1948	5– 9	1,891	983	908	926	80·6	108·7	94·1
1939–1943	10–14	1,426	737	689	934	60·7	83·5	67·1
1934–1938	15–19	1,406	694	712	1,026	59·9	75·9	61·8
1929–1933	20–24	1,147	566	581	1,026	48·9	75·5	70·8
1924–1928	25–29	1,246	571	675	1,178	53·1	72·7	76·9
1919–1923	30–34	1,626	712	914	1,284	69·2	71·8	78·6
1914–1918	35–39	1,849	874	975	1,116	78·8	63·6	71·4
1909–1913	40–44	2,120	941	1,179	1,253	90·3	62·8	69·5
1904–1908	45–49	2,127	1,066	1,061	995	90·6	59·3	67·4
1899–1903	50–54	1,867	970	897	925	79·5	53·0	63·5
1894–1898	55–59	1,559	791	768	971	66·4	46·4	58·3
1889–1893	60–64	1,390	654	736	1,125	59·2	38·5	48·5
1884–1888	65–69	1,084	500	584	1,168	46·2	31·6	37·1
1879–1883	70–74	669	311	358	1,151	28·5	23·6	
1874–1878	75–79	477	204	273	1,338	20·3	15·7	52·4
Prior to 1874	80+	271	103	168	1,631	11·2	11·4	
Unknown		249	128	121				
Total		23,723	11,506	12,217	1,062	1,000	1,000	1,000

* Monthly Population Statistics, N.C.B.S., Vol. II, Utrecht, 1954, p. 93.
† Quarterly Bulletin, Amsterdam Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 1953, p. 236.

to apply to some of the Jewish spouses not included in the count,[41] we arrive at the figures shown in Table 14.

It will be seen that, with this group of Jewish spouses in mixed marriages, there is no longer any question of a pronounced excess of women among the Jews: there are 991 to 1,010 Jewish women per 1,000 Jewish men. Naturally these computations include a number of uncertainties. It is, however, at least doubtful whether there really is a pronounced excess of women in the Jewish population as defined by the Committee.

Age Structure of Jewish Population and Total Netherlands Population



The great extent to which the Jewish age structure deviates from that of the general population is also apparent from the figures shown in Table 15. Since the Jews are very largely city dwellers, the figures for Amsterdam have also been listed for comparison. For the sake of simplicity, they are not subdivided according to sex.

When these three sets of figures are compared it is striking that the Jewish deviates in the same manner as the Amsterdam population from the total Netherlands population. In both, the lower age groups are relatively smaller and the higher age groups relatively bigger than in the total Netherlands population. The 'transition point' lies for the Amsterdam population at about 25 years, and for the Jews at a somewhat higher age (for men at about 35 years, for women at about 30 years).

The Jewish age structure is therefore markedly less favourable than that of the Netherlands population as a whole: quantitatively, the youngest age classes among the Jews will be appreciably less capable of eventually replacing the adult age groups. This phenomenon, however, is not a new one. Boekman[42] devoted his attention to it. During the entire period from 1899 to 1930 the youngest age classes (under ten years) were consistently less filled among Jews than in the total population. Among them, furthermore, the share of these classes in the population declined more rapidly than in the total Dutch population (Table

TABLE 16. *Proportion of the Age Groups up to 10 Years in the Jewish and in the Total Netherlands Population, 1899 to 1953*

*Year of enumeration**	*Share of 0 to 9 year-old in*	
	Jewish population	*Netherlands population*
	%	%
1899	21·1	24·3
1909	18·2	24·0
1920	16·1	22·7
1930	13·6	21·1
1954	13·7	21·5†

* 1899 to 1930: Census figures; 1954: for Jewish population, figures of the Committee on Netherlands Population, N.C.B.S.
† At the end of 1953.

16). It is remarkable that this latter development has not continued after the Second World War: in 1954 the share of the youngest age group in both populations was about equal to that in 1930.[43]

The data given in Table 15 and in the diagram, specified for five-year age groups, might lead to the conclusion that the age structure of the Jews, although less favourable than that of the total Netherlands population, guarantees the continuance of the Jewish group for a rather indefinite period.

This could follow from the fact that the number of children of age 0 to 4 years is larger than the number of adults in each of the two five-year groups who contribute most to reproduction: 20 to 24 years old and 25 to 29 years old. The children of the 0–4 year-old group will produce the population increase of twenty to twenty-five years hence. As long as their number, modified by the number of deaths in infancy and childhood (which is a relatively low one), exceeds that of the five-year groups whose fertility now largely determines the growth of population, we may assume that the Jewish population will continue to grow in size if there is no compensating decline in marriage fertility and if emigration does not exceed immigration. If, however, we study more closely the figures for the individual age groups below the age of 10, we discover more reasons for alarm; the Committee count indicates a strikingly low proportion for the youngest age groups (Table 17).

The number of children under one year old is even lower than the number of children aged 8 or 9, born in 1944 and 1945, the lowest point in the demographic development of the Jewish population. As will be shown in Section 5.1, the official birth registrations of children belonging to one of the Jewish religious communities likewise show this downward trend after 1953.

TABLE 17. *Proportion of Children of Jewish Mothers and Non-Jewish Fathers in the Combined Total of these Children and Children of Jewish Marriages, 1 January 1954*

Year of birth	*Age in years*	*Total*	*Jewish mother and*		*Number of children of mixed marriages*
			non-Jewish father	*Jewish father*	
		(*Absolute*)			%
1953	0	170	23	147	13·5
1952	1	217	38	179	17·5
1951	2	234	44	190	18·8
1950	3	328	43	285	13·1
1949	4	370	54	316	15·0
1948	5	431	71	360	16·5
1947	6	504	80	424	15·9
1946	7	577	74	503	12·8
1945	8	200	40	160	20·0
1944	9	179	58	121	32·3
Total		3,210	525	2,685	

The following factors may have contributed to this unfavourable development:

(*a*) a real decline of births by Jewish women;

(*b*) delayed registration of some of the new-born children in the files of the Jewish communities, leading to 'under-reporting' in the Committee's inquiry into the youngest age groups;

(*c*) a relative increase in the number of Jews who are not registered by the Jewish communities: many of those married to non-Jews, persons who move to new industrial districts or to commuter towns, etc.;

(*d*) the unequal number of men and women married to non-Jews.

The main factor is the real decline of births. It is certain that this did take place because the number of those who were between 20 and 30 years old on 1 January 1954, naturally constituting the most fertile group, was smaller than that belonging to the age groups between 30 and 40 years old, which number in turn was smaller than that of the group between 40 and 50 years old. During the preceding years, therefore, a decline in the number of births must have taken place.

Although absolutely no data are available which point directly to delayed registration (factor (*b*) above), it seems nevertheless probable that this factor is present to some extent, but it certainly cannot completely explain the great differences between the figures for the eight youngest age groups.

A little more can be said about the significance of the factor of non-registration (*c*). It appears from the N.C.B.S. data (cf. Section 4.4) that in the years 1946 to 1953 there was a great increase in the number of mixed marriages as compared to that of Jewish marriages. The per-

centage of children born of mixed marriages according to the Committee census does not, however, show any systematic increase for the 1946–53 classes (Table 17). This is not plausible.

Apart from a continuation of the downward trend of marriage fertility, already noted before the war, war conditions and migration could also have affected the age structure unfavourably.

Of some significance in explaining the small proportion of children in the post-war Jewish population is undoubtedly the fact (*d*) that so many more Jewish men than women had or have non-Jewish spouses. 525 children aged from 0 to 9 years were counted for the 1,217 women married to non-Jews.[44] No data relating to the children of men married to non-Jewish women are available. If the ratio were the same, the 1,892 Jewish men who contracted mixed marriages would have produced about 814 children. It may be postulated that if all these men and women had been married to Jewish spouses, the number of children in the age group from 0 to 9 years would have been about 300 higher. Actually this number is a considerable underestimate because, first, the number of mixed marriages on 1 January 1954 must have been about twice as large as that which resulted from the Committee inquiry (Section 4.1), and, second, it is an established fact that the fertility of mixed marriages is not nearly as high as that of Jewish marriages.[45] The low figures for the youngest age group has therefore partially sociological rather than biological causes and is, specifically, one of the effects of assimilation which are readily encountered in a small minority group in an 'open' society. These phenomena naturally constitute a serious threat to the continued existence of the group.

We see that, apart from a reduction of the number of Jewish births due to mixed marriages, a real decline in the number of Jewish births cannot be ruled out. Its extent cannot be established with certainty because of the simultaneous phenomenon of non-registration, the extent of which is likewise unknown. Although non-registration is partly symptomatic of disintegration, which has as unfavourable a significance as a declining birth rate, it should be considered to be of so great importance for a correct understanding of the situation that in the course of the next few years the course of the Jewish population in the Netherlands must be submitted to further study.

The Jewish population is characterized not only by an unfavourable ratio (compared to the total Dutch population) of the youngest age groups to those in the fertile years, but also by relatively high figures for the older age groups, especially those between 40 and 55 years. A natural consequence of this is that the proportion of those no longer belonging to the occupationally active population must rise rather rapidly in the years to come, reaching a maximum by about 1970. Care for the aged thus will doubtless constitute an increasingly heavy burden. As far as such matters are determined by purely demographic factors, a

possible reduction of the need for social care for children will almost certainly be offset by an increase in the requirements of care for the aged.

Another interesting aspect is the difference in Jewish age structure between Amsterdam and the remainder of the country. Both population pyramids show by and large the same general picture with a double constriction: once at the first year of life, and once between ages 20 and 30. The bulge at the central ages (for men between 40 and 45 or somewhat older, for women between 40 and 45) is markedly more pronounced for the Amsterdam Jewish population. Another deviation is the marked excess of women among the Jews of Amsterdam. This excess is present in the three largest cities, and outside these only, to a slight extent, in the cities of Arnhem and Enschede and in the provinces of Friesland and Overijssel.

4.3 *Civil status; first and subsequent marriages; duration of marriage*

Tables 19 and 20 summarize the data on civil status by sex and age. Before the war the percentage of married persons was considerably higher among the Jews in the Netherlands than among the total population. Boekman attributed this to the difference in age distribution.[46] If this is true, the continuing relative aging of the Jewish population must have led to a continuous rise in the percentage of married persons, which rise, furthermore, must be greater than it is for the total Dutch population. The former is indeed the case; the latter is true for men only.

Even before the war the number of previously married women was relatively high, but it has now become much higher, whereas the per-

TABLE 18. *The Jewish Population by Civil Status in comparison with the Netherlands Population, in Percentage*

Civil status	*Men*				*Women*			
	Netherl. 1930	*Jewish population*		*Netherl. 1954*	*Netherl. 1930*	*Jewish population*		*Netherl. 1954*
		*1930**	*1954*			*1930**	*1954*	
Single	58·2	49·4	41·1	53·3	56·0	49·0	38·0	49·9
Married	38·5	46·9	54·7	43·3	38·1	42·6	46·2	43·3
Previously married	3·3	3·7	4·2	3·4	5·9	8·4	15·8	6·8
	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0

* For 1930, only Ashkenazim, not Sephardim.

TABLE 19. *The Jewish Population in the Netherlands, 1 January 1954, by Sex, Age, and Civil Status*

Year of birth	*Age*	*Total*	*Single*	*Married**			*Widowed*	*Divorced*	*Unknown*
				First marriage	*Subsequent marriage*	*Total*			
MEN:									
1939–1953	0–14	2,421	2,421						
1934–1938	15–19	694	693	1	—	1	—	—	—
1929–1933	20–24	566	515	50	—	50	—	—	1
1924–1928	25–29	571	326	234	3	237	1	5	2
1919–1923	30–34	712	181	470	34	504	8	19	—
1914–1918	35–39	874	102	662	75	737	6	27	2
1909–1913	40–44	941	92	725	89	814	16	17	2
1904–1908	45–49	1,066	84	833	104	937	23	19	3
1899–1903	50–54	970	75	753	97	850	25	18	2
1894–1898	55–59	791	63	624	58	682	36	9	1
1889–1893	60–64	654	41	518	54	572	32	6	3
1884–1888	65–69	500	33	372	42	414	46	5	2
Prior to 1884	70+	618	57	390	35	425	131	5	—
Unknown		128	41	72	2	74	—	1	12
Total		11,506	4,724	5,704	593	6,297	324	131	30
WOMEN:									
1939–1953	0–14	2,215	2,215						
1934–1938	15–19	712	703	9	—	9	—	—	—
1929–1933	20–24	581	436	139	1	140	1	3	1
1924–1928	25–29	675	244	393	14	417	3	9	2
1919–1923	30–34	914	159	631	64	695	35	20	5
1914–1918	35–39	975	141	643	101	744	64	23	3
1909–1913	40–44	1,179	109	773	130	903	129	36	2
1904–1908	45–49	1,061	138	667	74	731	163	27	2
1899–1903	50–54	897	112	538	52	590	163	31	1
1894–1898	55–59	768	86	426	32	458	199	23	2
1889–1893	60–64	736	93	385	20	405	219	18	1
1884–1888	65–69	584	63	262	11	273	225	18	5
Prior to 1884	70+	799	92	214	4	218	472	16	1
Unknown		121	30	61	2	63	11	1	16
Total		12,217	4,621	5,141	505	5,646	1,684	225	41

* Including separations but not divorces.

centage of previously married men has remained almost unchanged. The fact that a larger number of previously married women than men returned from the concentration camps and from hiding has doubtless been a factor.

In this connexion it should be noted that the percentage of married persons among women in all age groups and among men between 15 and 60 is lower for the Jewish than for the total Netherlands population.[47] Parallel to this, the percentage of single persons in the younger

TABLE 20. *The Jewish Population in the Netherlands, 1 January 1954, by Sex, Age, and Civil Status, in Per Mille by Age Group and by Sex*

Year of birth	*Age*	*Single*	*Married*	*Widowed*	*Divorced*	*Unknown*
MEN:						
1939–1953	0–14	1,000			—	
1934–1938	15–19	999	1	—	—	—
1929–1933	20–24	910	88	—	—	2
1924–1928	25–29	570	415	2	9	4
1919–1923	30–34	254	708	11	27	—
1914–1918	35–39	117	843	7	31	2
1909–1913	40–44	98	865	17	18	2
1904–1908	45–49	79	879	21	18	3
1899–1903	50–54	77	876	26	19	2
1894–1898	55–59	81	862	45	11	1
1889–1893	60–64	62	875	49	9	5
1884–1888	65–69	66	828	92	10	4
Prior to 1884	70+	92	688	212	8	—
Total		411	547	28	11	3
WOMEN:						
1939–1953	0–14	1,000				
1934–1938	15–19	989	11	—	—	—
1929–1933	20–24	750	241	2	5	2
1924–1928	25–29	362	618	4	13	3
1919–1923	30–34	175	760	38	22	5
1914–1918	35–39	144	763	66	24	3
1909–1913	40–44	92	766	109	31	2
1904–1908	45–49	121	698	154	25	2
1899–1903	50–54	135	648	182	34	1
1894–1898	55–59	112	596	259	30	3
1889–1893	60–64	127	550	298	24	1
1884–1888	65–69	108	467	385	31	9
Prior to 1884	70+	115	273	591	20	1
Total		380	462	137	18	3

age groups (men up to 44, women up to 40), the percentage of widowed persons in the younger age groups (widowers up to 60, widows up to 40) and the percentage of divorced persons (men up to 55, women all age groups) are consistently higher than in the corresponding age groups of the total Netherlands population. The average age of marriage therefore is perhaps higher for the Jews than for the general population, which might constitute a factor in determining the level of marriage fertility. The low percentage of married women per age group has certainly also been caused by the greater ease with which Jewish men contract mixed marriages.

The large number of widowed and divorced persons is naturally also one of the consequences of the war. Table 19 indicates that 1,048 men and 2,414 women had been previously married. Of these, 593 men (57

TABLE 21. *Number of Previously Married Persons and Proportion of Remarried Persons, 1 January 1954, by Sex and by Age Group*

Year of birth	*Age*	*Men*		*Women*	
		Total previously married (absolute)	*of whom now remarried %*	*Total previously married (absolute)*	*of whom now remarried %*
1919 and after	-34	70	52	150	53
1914–1918	35–39	108	69	188	60
1909–1913	40–44	122	73	295	44
1904–1908	45–49	146	71	264	28
1899–1903	50–54	140	69	246	21
1894–1898	55–59	103	56	254	13
1889–1893	60–64	92	59	257	8
1884–1888	65–69	93	45	254	4
Prior to 1884	70+	171	20	492	1
Total		1,045	57	2,400	21

TABLE 22. *Percentage of the Total Number of Married Persons having contracted a Mixed Marriage, Jewish Population in the Netherlands, 1 January 1954, by Geographical Area*

Province or municipality of residence	*Married*	*of whom Jewish spouses in mixed marriages, in % of the total number of married Jewish inhabitants per area*
Groningen, Friesland, Drente	288	8
Overijssel	468	4
Gelderland	477	11
Utrecht	409	11
North Holland	7,816	30
South Holland	1,977	25
Zeeland, North Brabant, Limburg	508	15
Total	11,943	26
Of which:		
Amsterdam	7,145	32
The Hague	1,042	25
Rotterdam	624	28

per cent) and 505 women (21 per cent) had been remarried by 1 January 1954. Apparently, therefore, women had much poorer chances of remarrying than men. This trend becomes increasingly marked as a function of advancing age (Table 21), approximately from age 40 up; the chances of men remarrying decline only after age 55.

The year of marriage could be ascertained for only 6,924 of 11,943 married persons (58 per cent). The data available therefore are too incomplete for useful processing.

4.4 *Mixed marriages*

One of the most important and difficult parts of the present study related to marriages between Jews and non-Jews. Boekman[48], discussing the phenomenon in great detail, observed that he could statistically process only those mixed marriages of which one of the spouses declared that he or she was Jewish. The cases in which the Jewish spouse stated that he had no religion could not be included in his study. This difficulty appeared only partly in our investigation because the data available from the Jewish communities relate to those who are Jewish by descent, i.e. they had been registered from their birth, independently of any statement of preference on their part.[49] It should be borne in mind, however, that this is only true for the few large communities which have sufficient data available (cf. Table 23).

This difference in approach will naturally produce an increased percentage of Jewish spouses in mixed marriages. On the other hand, in cases where one spouse registered as Jewish and the other spouse, although also of Jewish descent, stated that he or she had no religion, such a marriage was considered mixed according to the 1930 Census but Jewish in the present study.

However, there are some completely different causes which have led to an important relative increase in the number of mixed marriages. Reference has already been made to a purely negative cause, namely, that during the war Jews married to non-Jews survived to a greater degree than the others. Another cause is the relatively sharp increase in the number of mixed marriages after the Second World War, both among the younger groups and among those who remarried (cf. Tables 24 and 25).

A study of the figures collected by the Committee reveals first of all (cf. Tables 22 and 23) that the relative number of mixed marriages is much greater in the three largest cities than elsewhere—another strong indication (cf. Section 4.2) that the number of mixed marriages, especially outside the three largest cities, has been underrated in the figures from the investigation.

Particularly interesting data are supplied by Table 24. They indicate in the first place that the percentage of persons having contracted a mixed marriage is higher among those who remarried—largely after the war, presumably—than among those who married for the first time. Furthermore, among the group of persons who were married more than once, the percentage of those who had a non-Jewish spouse in their first marriage is appreciably lower than the percentage of those who at present are married to a non-Jewish spouse. The tendency to contract a

TABLE 23. *Proportion of the Total Number of Married Persons in the Jewish Population having contracted a Mixed Marriage in the Netherlands, 1 January 1954, by Size of Jewish Communities*

Municipalities with	*Married persons*	*of whom married to non-Jewish spouse (%)*
1– 50 Jewish inhabitants	934	12
51– 100 ,, ,,	468	13
101– 200 ,, ,,	722	10
201– 300 ,, ,,	305	11
301–1,000 ,, ,,	703	13
1,000 and more ,, ,,	8,811	31
Total	11,943	26

TABLE 24. *Classification of Married Jewish Persons by Type of Marriage (Present or Previous; Jewish or Mixed), 1 January 1954*

Present and previous marriage	*Total*	*Jewish marriage*	*Mixed marriage*	*Unknown*
	(absolute numbers)			
Present marriage:				
Persons for whom this is:				
the first marriage:	10,845	8,107	2,738	—
a subsequent marriage:	1,098	711	372	15
Total	11,943	8,818	3,110	15
Previous marriage:				
Persons now married for the second or subsequent time:	1,098	889	161	48
Persons now widowed:	1,998	1,536	111	351
Persons now divorced:	356	228	97	31
Total	3,452	2,653	369	430
	percentage per category			
Present marriage:				
Persons for whom this is:				
the first marriage:	100	75	25	—
a subsequent marriage:	100	65	34	1
Total	100	74	26	—
Previous marriage:				
Persons now married for the second or subsequent time:	100	81	15	4
Persons now widowed:	100	76	5	18
Persons now divorced:	100	64	27	9
Total	100	77	11	12

mixed marriage has therefore been greater since the war than it was before. In this respect, a trend shown by Boekman[50] has been continued.

It is remarkable that this trend is noticed only faintly when married persons are divided by age (Table 25), and most markedly so for women. This table also indicates that the phenomenon of a greater preparedness among men than among women to marry a non-Jewish person, still highly pronounced in 1941, is now disappearing among the youngest age groups.

TABLE 25. *Proportion of the Total Number of Married Jewish Persons having Contracted a Mixed Marriage, by Sex and Age Group, 1 January 1954*

Year of birth	*Age*	*Men*		*Women*	
		Total married	*of whom with non-Jewish wife*	*Total married*	*of whom with non-Jewish husband*
		(*absolute*)	%	(*absolute*)	%
1929 and later	–24	51	41	149	43
1924–1928	25–29	237	36	417	28
1919–1923	30–34	504	26	695	24
1914–1918	35–39	737	26	744	24
1909–1913	40–44	814	32	903	20
1904–1908	45–49	937	33	731	21
1899–1903	50–54	850	31	590	22
1894–1898	55–59	682	26	458	21
1889–1893	60–64	572	37	405	16
1884–1888	65–69	414	31	273	18
Prior to 1884	70+	425	23	218	11
Unknown		74		63	
Total		6,297	30	5,646	22

TABLE 26. *Marriages Contracted with Jews, 1946 to 1958**

Year	*Total*	*Marriages contracted*		
		Both spouses Jewish	*Husband Jewish*	*Wife Jewish*
1946	546	299	171	76
1947	417	233	123	61
1948	345	204	86	55
1949	246	120	69	57
1950	222	112	64	46
1951	169	91	52	26
1952	144	63	46	35
1953	132	58	30	44
1954	127	58	39	30
1955	119	57	32	30
1956	131	49	47	35
1957	144	62	47	35
1958	119	47	37	35

* Source: N.C.B.S.

Since 1946 the N.C.B.S. has also supplied data on the number of marriages between and with Jews. These statistics are compiled on the basis of data supplied by the municipal population register and, as such, are based on the principle of religious affiliation. Although they do not, therefore, match the Committee data,[51] it is interesting to note (Table 26) that they also display the tendency mentioned, i.e. a relative increase of the number of mixed marriages, especially among women.

4.5 *Composition and size of households*

Table 27 gives a survey of Jewish households for 1 January 1954. The total number was 11,150, among which were 3,104 single persons. In addition, there were 869 persons who lived in institutions. A recapitulation of the households and single persons is given in Table 27. In prin-

TABLE 27. *Single Persons and Households of Different Composition by Size of Household in the Jewish Population in the Netherlands, 1 January 1954*

Composition of the household	*Number of Jewish persons per household*							
	Total	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7 or more*
Single men	934	934						
Single women	2,170	2,170						
Couples with or without children and/or others	4,387		1,794	1,081	1,031	355	93	33
Husbands of non-Jewish wives with or without children and/or others	1,893	1,831	47	11	3	1	—	—
Wives of non-Jewish husbands with or without children and/or others	1,217	649	208	210	80	32	20	18
Men with children and/or others	65		40	21	4	—	—	—
Women with children and/or others	484		282	146	45	8	2	1
Total	11,150	5,584	2,371	1,469	1,163	396	115	52

ciple, the concept of household has been defined in the same manner as is done by the N.C.B.S. in its censuses of the population and of dwelling units.[52] It was impossible, however, to use a foolproof counting rule so that deviations are possible. Further, the result of the count cannot be used for simple comparison with the results of similar enumerations of the Netherlands population because of the group of mixed marriages.

Table 28 compares the Jewish population, both including and excluding mixed marriages and their Jewish descendants, with the total Netherlands population. The relative number of households (including single persons) with only one Jewish member is seen to be much larger than the percentage of single persons in the Netherlands population.

This is only partly a consequence of the inclusion as one-person households of most Jewish men who married non-Jewish wives: even when the mixed marriages are left out, the number of single persons among the Jews is much larger than in the total Netherlands population (38·6 per cent versus 11·4 per cent). The proportion of two-person households is found to be about the same in both populations. Large families (especially those of five persons and more) hardly occur in the Jewish group, whereas they are important in the general population (five persons and more: 5 to 6 per cent versus 21 per cent). The distribution of both populations according to household composition (Table 29) is likewise widely divergent. Comparability is affected by the existence of mixed marriages, but apart from that there are two striking differences: the high percentage of single persons (already referred to) and the high percentage of childless marriages among the Jews as compared to the general population. Early in 1954, therefore, the Jewish group counted just over one child 'per household and single person' on the average as against $1\frac{2}{3}$ children for the Netherlands population in the middle of 1956.

Further, the enumeration included 253 foster children living with families, of whom 173 were in Amsterdam, 10 in The Hague, 10 in Rotterdam, and the remaining 60 in about 38 municipalities, distributed as follows over the provinces: Groningen 5, Drente 1, Overijssel 7, Gelderland 4, Utrecht 8, North Holland 21, South Holland 2, Zeeland 4, North Brabant 6, Limburg 2. However, the fact that this count is far from being complete is apparent because, according to the Annual

TABLE 28. *Households and Single Persons in the Jewish Population, 1 January 1954 (excluding Persons in a Mixed Marriage), and in the Netherlands Population, 30 June 1956, by Size*

Number of persons per household	*Number of households and single persons in*	
	Jewish population, exclusive of persons in a mixed marriage, 1 January 1954	*Netherlands population, 30 June 1956*
	(Percentage of the total number of households and single persons in the corresponding population)	
1	38·6	11·4
2	26·3	24·6
3	15·5	19·7
4	13·4	17·5
5	4·5	11·1
6	1·2	6·6
7 or more	0·5	9·1
Total	100	100

TABLE 29. *Households and Single Persons in the Jewish Population, 1 January 1954, and in the Netherlands Population, 30 June 1956, according to Composition*

Composition of the household	*Jewish population, 1 January 1954* (*Percentage of total number of households and single persons in the corresponding population*)	*Netherlands population, 30 June 1956** (*Percentage of total number of households and single persons in the corresponding population*)
Single	27·7	11·4
Couple	16·3	20·2
Men with children and/or others	0·6	2·9
Woman with children and/or others	4·3	6·9
Couples with children and/or others	23·3	58·5
Women married to non-Jews	5·7	
Women married to non-Jews with children and/or others	5·1	
Men married to non-Jews with or without children and/or others	17·0	
Total households and single persons	100	100

* Source of basic figures: Results of the General Enumeration of Dwelling Units, 30 June 1956, N.C.B.S.

Report for 1953 of the Joint Jewish Institutions for the Protection of Children (p. 15) there were in the Netherlands on 31 December 1953, 868 Jewish war foster children, of whom 412 were boys and 456 girls; 457 children under Jewish guardianship; 358 under non-Jewish guardianship; and 53 children not yet under any guardianship. Of these children, 404 had been placed with Jewish families, 358 with non-Jewish families, 90 in Jewish homes and 16 in non-Jewish homes or institutions. (See also Table 47.) This incompleteness in the enumeration was to be expected in view of the fact that many of these children had been placed with non-Jewish families. It should also be realized that it was not always perhaps possible to identify foster children as such in the Committee census.

4.6 *Age distribution of the heads of households*

It would have been useful to have a survey of the duration of the existence of households. However, as mentioned in Section 4.3, the required data on the duration of marriages were too incomplete for statistical processing. We did find it possible to draw up a distribution of single persons and heads of households by age groups and to compare this with that for the total population (Table 30).

It should be observed, however, that the data for the Jews relate to 1 January 1954, and that those for the general population have been derived from the Enumeration of Dwelling Units, 30 June 1956. Classification of the years of birth in the Jewish investigation could not be so adapted that complete comparability of both distributions resulted.

It appears that among the Jewish single persons and heads of households there are, relatively, slightly more older persons than among the general population, especially among persons born between 1900 and 1909. When we differentiate between heads of households and single persons, it is remarkable that the Jewish group includes relatively many heads of households born between 1900 and 1909 and relatively many single persons born between 1900 and 1919.

TABLE 30. *Heads of Households and Single Persons in the Jewish and in the Netherlands Populations, by Age Groups*

Year of birth	*Jewish population 1 January 1954*			*Year of birth*	*Netherlands population* 30 June 1956*		
	Total	*Heads of households*	*Single persons*		*Total*	*Heads of households*	*Single persons*
	(%)	(%)	(%)		(%)	(%)	(%)
1930 and after	1·2	0·4	2·1	1931 and after	2·8	2·0	8·3
1920–1929	11·6	10·2	14·6	1921–1930	19·2	19·9	10·5
1910–1919	20·9	24·1	14·4	1911–1920	21·8	23·3	6·8
1900–1909	25·9	29·6	17·6	1901–1910	21·1	22·0	11·0
1890–1899	20·9	21·2	20·8	1891–1900	17·6	16·9	19·4
1880–1889	13·6	11·0	19·1	1881–1890	12·2	12·4	26·8
1879 and before	5·9	3·5	11·4	1880 and before	5·3	3·5	17·2
Total	100	100	100		100	100	100

* Source of basic figures: Results of the General Enumeration of Dwelling Units, 30 June 1956, N.C.B.S.

NOTES

[1] Cf. also F. Grewel, 'De Joden van Amsterdam; II. Demografische gegevens', *Mens en Maatschappij*, 30 (No. 6): 340 (15 November 1955).

[2] E. Boekman, op. cit., p. 22.

[3] This is also pointed out by Dr. E. Boekman (op. cit., pp. 34 ff.), who in this connexion refers to the apparent decrease in the number of Jews between 1920 and 1930, especially in Amsterdam, a phenomenon which certainly cannot be interpreted solely on the basis of a decreased birth rate.

[4] J. Stengers, op. cit., pp. 17 ff.

[5] Ibid., p. 31.

[6] Dr. J. J. Dahlberg in H. Brugman and A. Frank, op. cit., pp. 165 ff.

[7] Dr. Jac. Zwarts, op. cit., p. 389.

[8] Loc. cit., I and II.

[9] Op. cit., p. 390.

[10] Loc. cit.

[11] An enumeration performed by the 'Upper Consistory' in 1809 arrived at about 49,000 Jews, of whom 31,500 were in Amsterdam; cf. D. S. van Zuiden, loc. cit., and Jac. Zwarts, op. cit., p. 265. This large concentration in Amsterdam as compared with 1830 might indicate that, in view of the better economic possibilities in rural areas and as a consequence of emancipation, a large proportion of Amsterdam Jewry settled in smaller places. However, the 1809 figure for Amsterdam is also much higher than that of 1795, which is rather surprising because exactly during that period a great depopulation of the city took place, while it would be plausible that from 1795 to 1809 many Jews also moved to the provinces for the reasons mentioned above for the 1809–1830 period. The only explanation for the 1809 figure might lie in high immi-

gration figures. Although there are indications that such immigration did take place, there is no certainty as to whether it actually assumed the size as outlined. Therefore, the figure of 30,500 for Amsterdam should, for the time being, be considered somewhat doubtful. The figure of 49,000, which is high in comparison with the number for 1830 (46,397; see Table 3), likewise arouses suspicion of the reliability of these data, although conceivably such a decrease might have been caused by migration of Jews from the northern provinces to Belgium after the secession.

[12] E. Boekman, op. cit., pp. 17 and 33.

[13] E. Boekman, op. cit., p. 112.

[14] It is not impossible that this difference between the numbers of men and women who married non-Jews is also due to a greater possibility of anonymity for women than for men in regard to being Jewish; however, the figures do not allow us to deal with this phenomenon. The difference between the number of men and that of women married to a Jewish spouse is not so surprising as it seems. It should be borne in mind that in a number of cases one of the spouses resided abroad. Of course, the statistics can also contain errors in enumeration.

[15] Loc. cit., p. 29.

[16] Dr. A. Veffer, loc. cit., p. 27, starts from the opposite view.

[17] Taken from G. Reitlinger, *The Final Solution*, p. 501 (London, 1953); for France from L. Poliakov, 'Quel est le nombre de victimes?', *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, pp. 91–2 (October 1956). The basis of all these estimates is shaky.

[18] We are deeply grateful to Professor A. E. Cohen, then head of the Department of Source Publications of the National Institute of War Documentation, for his permission to quote these figures.

[19] Taken from *Philo-Lexikon*, 4th ed., Philo-Verlag (Berlin-Amsterdam, 1937), entry 'Statistik', estimates for 1937. For the Netherlands, the 1941 figure.

[20] H. Wielek, *De oorlog die Hitler won*, pp. 335 ff. (Amsterdam, 1947).

[21] Source: National Institute of War Documentation, tentative data.

[22] According to the National Institute of War Documentation.

[23] The following remarks rest entirely on communications from Professor A. E. Cohen (see note 18).

[24] 5,088 men and 3,522 women.

[25] Approximately 2,000 childless women married to non-Jews are included. This implies a number of about 6,600 persons with children married to non-Jews and about 6,000 childless persons. This ratio is fairly well in agreement with the high percentage (52 per cent) of childless mixed marriages in the years 1921 to 1930 computed by Boekman, op. cit., pp. 97 ff.

[26] E. Boekman, op. cit., pp. 21 and 66. For some separate data on this group, see a paper by A. Pais in *Habinjan* (organ of the Sephardi Community) for December 1950.

[27] Data are likewise lacking with regard to the number of persons baptized in the years 1945 to 1953, but it may be assumed that this loss to the Jewish group was relatively small during the period concerned.

[28] As far as is known, the 1948 and 1949 statistics include only those immigrants having Dutch nationality. Immigration during 1946 and 1947 had to be put at zero because of the absence of data.

[29] For the Netherlands population, the corresponding figure in that period was less than 2 per cent (Statistics of the Course of Population in the Netherlands, 1938, 1954, Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, 1955, p. 41); the number of divorced persons, however (cf. Section 4.3), in the Jewish group was relatively twice as large as that in the Netherlands population, so that there is reason to put the number of divorces likewise twice as high.

[30] Cf. E. Boekman, op. cit., p. 31.

[31] Cf. Twelfth Census, 31 May 1947, Series B, Part 5, The Hague.

[32] The supposition that the decrease which occurs here both relatively and absolutely would have to be attributed to emigration must be rejected, because the emigration figures for Amsterdam alone accounted for 82 per cent of the total Jewish emigration. The 1954 percentage is naturally somewhat too high because of the underestimation of the number of Jews in Amsterdam to which reference has been made; this underestimation, however, is much smaller than that in 1947 relating to the large cities.

[33] It is not improbable that the relatively low 'under-reporting' of the number of Jews in the 1947 Census for the smaller places is connected with the

smaller possibility there for the Jews to hide their identity from the census takers. In small places most inhabitants generally recognize the Jews in their midst as such.

[34] Cf. E. Boekman, op. cit., p. 36.

[35] Twelfth Census including enumeration of dwelling units, 31 May 1947, Part B5. Principal figures by municipality and religious affiliation. N.C.B.S., The Hague.

[36] E. Boekman, op. cit., p. 38.

[37] Twelfth Census including enumeration of dwelling units, 31 May 1947, Series B. Principal figures by municipality, Part 5, Religious Affiliations. The Hague, 1950, pp. 28 ff.

[38] *Statistisch Zakboek 1954*, Table 7, N.C.B.S.

[39] 1947 Census, loc. cit., p. 28.

[40] This is not unusual because the mortality among boys is slightly higher than among girls.

[41] The established ratio of the numbers of men and women married to non-Jews is essentially equal to that according to the 1941 registration statistics (cf. Table 7).

[42] E. Boekman, op. cit., pp. 39 ff.

[43] However, cf. Section 5.1.

[44] Including children of women who had been married to non-Jews.

[45] Cf. Table 27 and E. Boekman, op. cit., pp. 93 ff.

[46] E. Boekman, op. cit., p. 47.

[47] For the Netherlands population, see Monthly Population Statistics, N.C.B.S., 1954, July 1954, p. 110.

[48] E. Boekman, op. cit., pp. 57 ff.

[49] Except those who adopted another religion, who in principle have not been recorded in this registration.

[50] E. Boekman, op. cit., p. 59.

[51] For instance, marriages between Jews of which one spouse was not registered as Jewish have been included as mixed marriages in the statistics; and actually mixed marriages of which the Jewish spouse was not registered as Jewish, as well as marriages between Jews where this applied to both spouses, have been entirely excluded from the statistics.

[52] For a definition of the concept of household, cf. the enumerating instructions for the 1956 General Enumeration of Dwelling Units, published by W. de Haan, Utrecht.

(*To be continued*)

THE ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION OF NEW YORK, 1958: A STUDY IN TECHNIQUES

C. Morris Horowitz

IN ORDER properly to evaluate its programme of supporting social service agencies in New York City, the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York organized the 'Federation-Demographic Study Committee'. The writer, who is on the Faculty of the Department of Economics of Brooklyn College, in Brooklyn, New York, and was also Consulting Statistician of the Jewish Education Committee of New York, Inc., at that time, was invited to direct the study. In order to do this, he received a partial leave of absence from the latter agency, which is also a beneficiary of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies.

Choosing a Technique

In the United States, population statistics are not collected by religious classification. The closest approach to this resulted from the creation in 1850 of the United States Census of Religious Bodies.

The Census of Jewish Congregations of the United States Census of Religious Bodies is probably the oldest method employed for collecting Jewish religious data. The first official religious statistics, collected as the American Census of Social Statistics, came under the Act of Congress of 23 May 1850. This census was taken every ten years to 1890. After a lapse of sixteen years, it was again taken every ten years from 1906 to 1936.

One may infer the scientific accuracy with which this was done from the official instructions which indicated that the facts 'may be obtained . . . from the pastor or clergyman . . .; in case of his absence, application should be made to a warden, elder, or trustee . . . from official documents, from records of . . . churches . . .' [1]

From one census to another some minor changes were made. Basically, however, it was a census of church property, seating capacity, and membership.

The 1926 Census of Religious Bodies, however, introduced a rather revolutionary innovation. The new instructions advised each 'organization to report the number of its members according to the definition of member used in that particular church'.[2] Accordingly, Dr. H. L. Linfield, who was the special agent of the Census of Religious Bodies for Jewish Congregations, now broadened the definition of members of a Jewish church and considered as such 'all persons of Jewish faith living in communities in which local congregations are situated'.[3]

For all practical purposes, therefore, Jewish congregational membership and Jewish population became synonymous. A Jewish person, regardless of sex, age, or religious conviction, who resided in a community where there was a Synagogue, was now counted as a member.

Even if this Census of Religious Bodies had continued, it would still fall short as a technique for supplying the Jewish community with demographic data. It may be criticized along four main lines: the fact-gathering techniques, the non-comparability of so basic and fundamental a term as congregational membership, the incompleteness with which the questionnaires were answered, and lack of demographic details.

In view of the complete absence of any data, then, the first problem faced by the Federation-Demographic Study Committee was to decide, within the limitations of time and manpower, and with full cognizance of the desired results, which technique to employ. Among those which had been used with different degrees of success in Jewish demographic work in the United States are the following:

1. The Master List
2. The Jewish Name Method
3. The Birth and Death Rate Techniques
4. Interpolation from Census Data
5. United States Census Bureau Matching
6. Census—Complete or Sample
7. The Yom Kippur or School Attendance Method

Briefly, these techniques may be described and evaluated as follows:

1. THE MASTER LIST

Description. The Master List Method, with numerous variations, starts the ball rolling with a basic list of Jewish people. This list is usually made up of membership lists of different Jewish religious, social, fraternal and/or cultural organizations, as well as from lists of donors to such financial campaigns as Welfare Funds, United Jewish Appeal, Federa-

tions, etc. With the Master List as a starting point, either a postal questionnaire or a home interview is employed. The people thus approached are asked for information as to names and addresses of other Jewish people; these, too, are added to the basic list. The size of the community and the amount of time and money allotted for making the estimate determine whether the list as a whole, or a sample or stratified sample, is used.

Evaluation. The Master List Technique may result in duplication of names. It assumes that all Jewish persons are affiliated. If that is not so, then it assumes that the non-affiliated persons have the same characteristics as the affiliated ones. If stratified samples are used, no scientifically obtained information is in advance available to define strata. Any membership or donor list is one of financial stratification, and as we know, financial strata have a very definite relationship to demographic characteristics. Furthermore, in a city the size of New York, it is next to impossible to apply this technique. As director of the Federation-Demographic Study Committee, the writer rejected this as a possible technique.

2. THE JEWISH NAME METHOD

Description. The Jewish Name method is based on the recognition of typically Jewish names. First, a list of typically Jewish names is prepared and then the incidence of these names in a predetermined listing, such as a telephone directory, a voters' directory, etc., is determined. It is then assumed that the proportion of Jewish people in the entire population is the same as it is in the predetermined list.

For example, if it is 'found' that 10 per cent of the predetermined list (e.g. telephone directory) is Jewish, then it is assumed that 10 per cent of the entire population of 50,000 people, or 5,000 people, are Jewish.

Evaluation. This technique involves the recognition of the Jewish name and is therefore fallacious from the very start. It is impossible today to recognize Jewish names. It is not at all unusual for many Jewish people to change their 'Jewish sounding' names in order to enter certain professions, gain employment with certain firms, or establish themselves within certain social strata.

Even if there were such a thing as a typical Jewish name, the preparation of such a list would be an extremely subjective technique. The choosing of a scientific sample to study the frequency of such names may be acceptable, but the use of a predetermined listing is biased before one starts. A telephone directory, for example, would not include the names of the lower economic strata, and if the Jewish people are not represented proportionately in each of the strata, then this would immediately introduce an element of bias. Furthermore, it offers no demographic data. The writer, therefore, rejected this as a possible technique.

3. THE BIRTH AND DEATH RATE TECHNIQUES

Description. These two techniques are based on the determination of a Jewish birth rate, or an age specific birth rate, or a death rate, or an age specific death rate. This is done either by studying some sample or segment of the Jewish population and determining what the rate is, or by assuming that the rate for the Jewish population is the same as the rate for some stratum or segment of the general population, the rate of which is known.

In determining the number of Jewish births, a study is made of the names on birth certificates, the names of parents, etc. In determining the number of Jewish deaths, a study is made of the names on death certificates, the name of the undertaker, the cemetery, nativity, and other related information.

Once the Jewish birth rate (or death rate) and the number of Jewish births (or deaths) are estimated, the size of the Jewish population may be estimated.

Evaluation. Why should the Jewish Name method, described above, which is exceedingly doubtful in identifying a living person, be accepted as more accurate in identifying a dead one? The time involved in examining a birth or death certificate is too costly. Even if a rate were established, it would be valid, if at all, for only a very short time, because a changing population also undergoes changing rates. When the rates of some strata of the total population are assumed to be identical to those of the total Jewish population, the basis of the assumption is more than questionable.

At best this method would yield data on the order of magnitude of the Jewish population, without furnishing any of the details.

4. INTERPOLATION FROM CENSUS DATA

Description. Interpolation from Census Data is another technique that had been employed in Jewish demographic research in the United States. When an area is known to be densely populated by Jews, it is assumed that the characteristics of the Jewish population of an even wider area are similar to the characteristics of this general limited area. In some communities where it was 'known' that the Russian born population, because of immigration, was predominantly Jewish, the characteristics of this Russian population, as yielded by Census Bureau reports in this community were assumed to hold true for the Jewish population in general.

Evaluation. The general criticism of this technique includes important considerations. It is from previous knowledge that the assumption is made that an area is densely populated by Jews. Furthermore, it is

also on the basis of previous knowledge that the assumption is made that the Russian-born population is predominantly Jewish. This previous knowledge is of dubious scientific quality. Furthermore, the almost complete cessation of immigration and the increasing proportion of native born among the Jewish population invalidate this technique and its application.

5. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU MATCHING

Description. This technique has been developed by the United States Census Bureau. For a list of names and addresses of individuals, or from a scientifically prepared sample of such a list, the Census Bureau will pull out the I.B.M. punch cards of the most recent census and run them off for any of the information collected by the Census Bureau. This method, as applied to Jewish demographic research, involves the preparation of a complete list of names and addresses of Jewish people in a community. The Bureau will then pull out the cards for the entire list, or prepare a sample from this list. In this way, Jewish demographic characteristics may be ascertained.

Evaluation. The shortcomings of this technique are, however, numerous. But let the Census Bureau speak for itself: '. . . there are several weaknesses in the data we can supply . . . First of all, the information would refer to the characteristics of one group of persons as of April 1950 and would thus be three[4] years old. Secondly, it is not always possible to locate particular individuals in our census files due to such factors as different spelling of names, mailing addresses in some cases being different from the usual place of residence at which the individual has been enumerated, etc. In addition, if a list contains current addresses, the persons who have moved to their present locations within the past three years would probably also not be located in the Census files. Consequently, it would be reasonable to speculate that perhaps half of the names in any group whose census records are being sought, would result in matches. Of course, the characteristics of the persons who cannot be located in the Census fields would not be included in our tabulations. To the extent to which these persons differ from the rest of the individuals in the group, the tabulations based on persons whom we are able to find, may not give a representative picture of the entire group. . . .[5]

In addition, all shortcomings inherent in the preparation of a list of Jewish names, and discussed above, are characteristic of this method as well. The writer rejected this method.

6. CENSUS—COMPLETE OR SAMPLE

Description. The ideal method would of course be the taking of a complete door-to-door census of the entire population, or at least a census of a scientifically prepared sample of the population.

Evaluation. Without doubt, this would be the appropriate technique to use. For a community the size of New York, however, in terms of financial considerations, this would be prohibitive. The writer feels, however, that with proper direction, an interdenominational committee, representing the Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, could be organized to accept the responsibility of directing and financing such a study. For the purpose of the Federation-Demographic Study Committee, however, this would be an impossibility.

7. THE YOM KIPPUR OR SCHOOL ATTENDANCE METHOD

Description. The writer, well aware of the shortcomings of each of the above mentioned methods, recommended to the committee, as Study Director, the Yom Kippur Method. This technique is based on the fact that Yom Kippur is the holiest day in the Hebrew calendar. Consequently, children of the Jewish faith are not expected to attend school classes on Yom Kippur. A comparison between the registration in a school, the number of absences on a 'normal' day, and the number of absences on Yom Kippur, modified by some constant to take account of the number of Jewish children who do attend on Yom Kippur and the number of non-Jewish children who do not, yields, supposedly, a Jewish child population attending public schools. To this figure is added the number of children attending the Jewish All Day Schools and an estimated number of Jewish children who attend private schools. This supposedly yields an estimated Jewish child population aged five to fourteen years.

The next question is, of course, what proportion of the total Jewish population do these five- to fourteen-year-olds constitute? This problem is solved differently by different research workers. An account of how the writer, as director of the Demographic Study Committee, solved these and related problems, follows.

Evaluation. In evaluating the Yom Kippur Method, we must agree that the basic idea, that Jewish children do not attend school on Yom Kippur, is sound. However, we do know that some minimum number do attend. This is especially so in schools where the number of Jewish children in attendance is very small in relation to the non-Jewish children. Furthermore, a certain number of non-Jewish children take the day off too. The reasons for their doing so may be varied: 'We wouldn't learn anything anyhow'; 'My neighbour isn't attending'; 'We'll only have games'; 'My regular teacher will be absent'; etc. All these

reasons for attendance or non-attendance are functions of economic status, social status, sociological and psychological reasons, customs, density of Jewish population in a given school, etc. These variables differ with the district and neighbourhood. Using an over-all constant as a correction factor is thus too much of an over-simplification. The choice of a 'normal' day is not left open to the research worker. In New York State, daily attendance records are kept for the religious holidays and the day preceding such a holiday. It is not too difficult to conceive that many Jewish children extend the holiday by not attending school on the preceding day as well. This would give the estimates a downward bias.

Schools, school populations, and school districts are constantly in a state of flux; thus it is difficult to keep figures within a given neighbourhood. Furthermore, we do not know the Jewish population age distribution. We do have reason to believe that it is not the same as the general population. Even when we assume that it is, we find that public school age grouping (5–13 years) does not coincide with census bureau age distributions (5–17 years) and thus it becomes necessary to interpolate.

In addition, we must assume that attendance bureaux keep correct daily records which are comparable by school, class, etc. Since on Yom Kippur the Jewish teachers are also absent, we must further assume that proper and accurate records of attendance are kept despite the fact that substitute teachers are in charge, classes are combined, and regular schedules are not followed.

Furthermore, this technique could not be applied in years when Yom Kippur is on a Sabbath, occurs on a legal holiday, or before schools open after the summer vacation.

Historical Note. This method was first used in Jewish demographic research by Llewellyn Smith in London in 1892. Bernheimer referred to his own use of this method in sections of Philadelphia and New York in 1904. In 1915, Dushkin applied this method in New York City to estimate the Jewish child population, and in 1920 Rosen used it in Boston. The Jewish Education Committee of New York, and its preceding organization, The Jewish Education Association, used this method for estimating the Jewish Child population annually from 1923.[6]

Defining the Areas. Once the technique to be employed was decided on, the next decision to be made was what areas to use for the purpose of making these estimates. After considering different alternatives, it was decided to use the Revised Statistical Districts as defined by the New York City Planning Commission. Not the least important among the reasons for this decision was the fact that the New York City Planning Commission had already summarized census data for previous years by these districts. This involved a large saving of money in either clerical work or machine tabulations.

The question as to what areas to employ as districts in the three suburban counties of Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester, the writer, as director of the survey, postponed to a later date. In this way, he was able first to study the data in the counties and ascertain the possible existence of a trend or pattern.

It might be interesting to note at this time that in New York City different political subdivisions have prepared contradictory district lines. There are postal districts, health areas, public school districts, census tracts, etc. These boundaries do not coincide with each other, and in addition, are relatively fluid.

Revised Statistical Districts and Public School Locations. The Committee was then faced with the problem of allocating the close to eight hundred public schools in New York City to the Revised Statistical Districts. It must be borne in mind that, since the Committee used data from 1923 onwards, many public schools have already closed down, and others opened or relocated. What was impossible to do because of limitations of time and which should be done when this study is refined, is to study each school individually so that we can learn the exact area from which each school draws its student body. A school that happens to be located near district boundaries may draw its enrolment from several districts. The Public School data for 1923, 1930, 1940, and 1950 were obtained from the files of the Jewish Education Committee of New York, of which the writer was Consulting Statistician at the time this study was made. The data for 1958 were obtained directly from the New York City Board of Education.

Study Areas in the Suburban Counties. After the Yom Kippur data from the three suburban counties were collected, it was decided to divide them into the following study areas. Nassau County consists largely of three Towns, North Hempstead, Oyster Bay, and Hempstead. The school superintendencies in this County also corresponded to these political divisions. The writer thus decided to keep these three as separate study areas.

Because of practical considerations, the writer decided to make three districts in Suffolk, corresponding roughly to the three school districts there. The Eastern Section, the Central Section (including Bayshore, Patchogue, and Sayville) and the Western Section (including Huntington, Lindenhurst, Northport, and Southampton).

The County of Westchester was divided into six districts. The four cities, Mt. Vernon, New Rochelle, White Plains, and Yonkers, constituted individual study areas. The rest of the county was divided into the Northern Section (including the City of Peekskill) and the Southern Section (including the City of Rye).

Collecting Public School Data for the Three Counties. The writer anticipated that collecting Yom Kippur data for each of the public schools in the suburbs would be a relatively simple matter, since these data are

collected by the State Department of Education in Albany. After contacting Albany, the writer learned that Albany would not receive the September 1958 data until after August 1959, after the major part of the study was to be completed. It thus became necessary to contact each and every one of the local school authorities individually. Normally, the committee would have requested from Albany the data for the previous year. But as it happens, Yom Kippur occurred on a Saturday both in 1956 and 1957, and as a result, public schools were closed on that holiday.

Consequently, the writer had to contact directly more than two hundred district superintendents, supervisors, principals, attendance officers, and other school authorities. This meant sending out questionnaires, writing personal letters, making telephone calls and out of town visits. With the exception of those from several principals, all of the data were obtained. Included in this handful of refusals were some principals who thought that making an estimate of a religious group was undemocratic, that it was in contradiction to the principles of separation of Church and State, etc. For this small group, estimates were made for their immediate vicinities by obtaining local opinions of clergymen of all faiths, by making comparisons with school data of previous years obtained in Albany, by making studies of Jewish School enrolment in the neighbourhoods, etc.

Since the suburban data were collected from more than two hundred individual sources, they turned out to represent different grade combinations in different communities. This was also a reflection of the existing school situations there. This meant that the committee was faced with the task of making these data comparable.

The Jewish All Day Schools. This is a type of Jewish school in which the child receives both his secular and religious education, and consequently does not attend public school. This type of school, however, involved a special problem. A child might pass a half dozen Jewish All Day Schools on the way to the one that he or she attends. It is nothing unusual for a Jewish child to attend an All Day School in the other end of the borough or county in which he lives, or even to cross borough lines. This is especially so at the high school level.

For the first time in the City of New York, a special survey was conducted by the Demographic Study Committee of the Jewish All Day Schools to ascertain the answer to the all important question, 'In what neighbourhoods do the children in your All Day School reside?' This special survey involved contacting some hundred schools by mail, telephone, and personal visits.

Since this is the first residence study of its kind, the data were collected with different degrees of accuracy from different schools. At one extreme, the school principal or executive director would estimate for the Committee on the telephone the number of his pupils who reside in different

neighbourhoods. At the other extreme, the All Day School would send the writer a list of names and addresses of its children, so that the Committee could spot each and every child on a map, and thus obtain the appropriate neighbourhood.

The Private Non-sectarian Schools. For all practical purposes, these schools were never before approached for Yom Kippur attendance data. The Committee obtained a list of names and addresses of all private schools and the enrolment in each of them. These schools were then approached by questionnaire and telephone follow-up for data similar to those received from the Board of Education. About seventy per cent of the schools responded. The number of Jewish children was estimated for the responding schools, and on this basis was imputed for the balance of the schools.

After consultations with school authorities, it was decided to credit the estimated Jewish enrolment in the private schools to the neighbourhoods in which the schools were located.

Expanding the Estimated Jewish Child Population into an Estimated Total Jewish Population. In this way, an estimated Jewish child population was made for each of the sixty-nine Revised Statistical Districts in New York City and for the twelve districts in the three suburban counties individually. Now that we have an estimated Jewish child population for each of the eighty-one districts (for 1923, 1930, 1940, 1950, and 1958 for the city, and for 1958 for the suburban counties) how are we going to expand it into an estimated total Jewish population?

Studies made by Mortimer Spiegelman of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics of Canada, and by the writer, seem to indicate that the Jews do not have demographic characteristics peculiar to themselves, but rather that they adapt themselves to the demographic characteristics of their neighbours, and of the socio-economic, occupational, and cultural groups in which they find themselves. A sample study made in 1957 by the United States Census Bureau seems to indicate the same thesis in partial releases which the Bureau has made.

This led the writer to make the following working assumption: the Jews in a given study area have demographic characteristics similar to those of their neighbours. For the years 1923 to 1950, in districts in which the non-white population constituted more than five per cent of the total population, the committee based the Jewish demographic characteristics on those of the white population alone. For the 1958 Jewish child estimates, the committee applied the demographic characteristics of the white population in the individual study areas as reported by the Census Bureau for 1957. (In 1957, the United States Census Bureau conducted special censuses in various communities, including the five boroughs of New York City, and the three counties of Nassau,

Suffolk, and Westchester. In Nassau County, the Special Census covered only 97 per cent of the population covered in 1950.)

How the Computations were made. Let us assume that in a given study area it was found that the total population, according to the Census Bureau, consisted of 25,000 individuals, and that ten per cent of that number, 2,500, consisted of children aged five to thirteen, the elementary school age population. Jewish children aged five to thirteen in that study area were estimated as 500. It was then assumed that these 500 Jewish children constituted 10 per cent of the estimated total Jewish population, which was thus estimated as 5,000.

On the same assumption, namely, that Jewish characteristics are similar to those of their neighbours, the 5,000 total Jewish population was then analysed by age and sex parallel to their neighbours.

The estimated Jewish population for each study area, by sex and age, was then summed for each borough and county, and then for the entire area.

Projections for 1975. For each study area individually, the estimated Jewish Population was projected for 1975. These projections were based on the trend of the Jewish population since 1923 in the particular area, on the trend of the total population, of the non-white population, on building plans, land use, and on total population projections made by the Regional Plan Association, by the New York City Planning Commission for the five boroughs of New York, and by the Planning Boards of each of the three suburban counties.

These area projections were then summed for the city and for the counties, and for the area as a whole.

NOTES

[1] 'Instructions to Assistant Marshals', *United States Census, 1850.*

[2] 'Summary and Detailed Tables', *United States Census of Religious Bodies, 1926,* Vol. I, p. 6.

[3] Ibid., p. 16.

[4] This number depends on the number of years following the most recent census.

[5] Letter dated 3 August 1953, addressed to C. Morris Horowitz and signed by Howard G. Brunsman, Chief, Population and Housing Division, Bureau of Census, Washington, D.C.

[6] Bernheimer, Charles Seligman, *The Russian Jew in the United States,* Philadelphia, 1905.

Dushkin, Alexander M., *Jewish Education in New York City,* The Bureau of Jewish Education, New York, 1918.

JEWS IN AND OUT OF NEW YORK CITY[1]

Bernard Lazerwitz

RECENT studies of United States religious groups have shown that Jewry has attained high levels of education and income and is very concentrated in white-collar occupations.[2] For a variety of reasons, these research endeavours have not touched upon internal differences within this major division of world Jewry. One of the most important of such differences arises out of the very heavy concentration of Jews in New York City. Indeed, data gathered for this article indicate that 44 per cent of the Jews of the United States live in New York City where they form 30 per cent of the population of this great city.[3]

Any contrast between New York City Jews and Jews residing in other United States communities involves three basic sociological factors: (1) numerical density, (2) selective out-migration from New York City, and (3) immigration into New York City of large numbers of Jewish refugees since the mid-thirties.

What effect does their numerical density have upon the social structure of New York City Jews? Jewish publications frequently state that only in New York City does a Jewish 'working class' still exist. Since Jews are such a large proportion of New York City, is it not reasonable to expect that they must work in fewer white-collar and more blue-collar occupations than do Jews in other American communities?[4] After all, even New York City can support only so many doctors, lawyers, and store-keepers.

On the other hand, where Jews are a small part of a community, economic limitations upon the available number of high status occupations would be less of a factor. Such Jews can have a very large proportion of their numbers in professional and other white-collar positions.

Selective out-migration from New York City calls attention to the fact that many economically successful Jews move out of New York City to the suburbs. Also, well educated Jews can, and do, move to any area of the country that offers economic and social attractions regardless of the (initially) small size of Jewish communities in such economically developing areas.[5] Hence, disproportionate numbers of Jews who

are not as well prepared for occupational activity remain behind in New York City.

Thirdly, the immigration into New York City of many Jewish refugees has added an 'under-privileged' sector to its Jewish population. Large numbers of these recent immigrants (as with the preceding waves of Jewish immigrants) are handicapped by language problems, interrupted or inadequate education, and lack of reserve savings.

Therefore, it is hypothesized that New York Jewry, as a whole, has less education, lower incomes, and more blue-collar workers than the rest of United States Jewry.

THE FINDINGS

The information presented here was gathered on three national surveys conducted by the Survey Research Centre of the University of Michigan. Two of these surveys were conducted in the Spring of 1957, and the third was done during November 1958. A description of the nature of these three surveys together with tables of sampling errors can be found in a recent issue of the *Journal of the American Statistical Association.*[6]

TABLE I

Religious Composition of the United States and New York City: December 1957

Religious Groups	*United States*	*New York City*
Protestants	71·4	21·3
White	63·5	9·2
Negro	7·9	12·1
Roman Catholics	22·4	46·0
Jews	3·2	29·6
Other Religions	0·9	1·3
No Religion	2·0	1·7
Religion Not Reported	0·1	0·1
Total	100·0	100·0
Sample Size	5,827	283

Table 1 compares the religious composition of New York City with that of the United States. It shows that New York City is indeed a place of residence for American minority groups. White Protestants just about disappear; Negroes show a 50 per cent increase over their national percentage;[7] Catholics are more than twice as numerous and Jews ten times as numerous as their national averages. Eighty-eight out of a hundred New Yorkers are Roman Catholics, Jews, or Negroes while 64 out of a hundred citizens of the United States are white Protestants.

TABLE 2

New York City Catholic and Jewish Groups contrasted with National Protestant and Catholic Groups and non-New York City Jewish Group by Education

Religious Groups	*N*	*Amount of Education*					
		0–8 Grades	*Some High School*	*4 years High School*	*1–3 years College*	*4 years or more of College*	*Total*
							%
U.S. Protestants	4,185	33	21	27	10	9	100
U.S. Catholics	1,270	34	20	32	9	5	100
N.Y.C. Catholics	132	54	21	18	5	2	100
N.Y.C. Jews	82	29	18	29	13	11	100
Non-N.Y.C. Jews	105	16	8	36	19	21	100

Starting with high school graduates and continuing up the educational scale, non-New York City Jews outrank New York City Jews as shown by Table 2. Indeed, New York City Jews have just slightly more education than the national Protestant figures. Again, New York City Catholics rank below the national Catholic education percentages and are considerably below their fellow Jewish New Yorkers on education.

TABLE 3

New York City Catholic and Jewish Groups contrasted with National Protestant and Catholic Groups and non-New York City Jewish Group by Income

Total Family Yearly Income

Religious Groups	*N*	*Under $1,000*	*$1,000–1,999*	*$2,000–2,999*	*$3,000–3,999*	*$4,000–4,999*
U.S. Protestants	4,185	8	9	11	13	14
U.S. Catholics	1,270	4	7	8	12	17
N.Y.C. Catholics	132	6	6	14	16	19
N.Y.C. Jews	82	4	2	7	13	17
Non-N.Y.C. Jews	105	1	2	4	5	4

Religious Groups	*$5,000–5,999*	*$6,000–7,499*	*$7,500–14,999*	*$15,000 or more*	*Total*
					%
U.S. Protestants	15	12	15	3	100
U.S. Catholics	17	17	16	2	100
N.Y.C. Catholics	19	9	10	1	100
N.Y.C. Jews	15	15	25	2	100
Non-N.Y.C. Jews	15	15	37	17	100

These patterns repeat themselves for the income data in Table 3. New York City Jews earn less than non-New York City Jews, and New York City Catholics earn less than their national grouping. New York City Jews are somewhat above national Protestant income percentages and earn more than their Catholic fellow townsmen.

TABLE 4

New York City Catholic and Jewish Groups contrasted with National Protestant and Catholic Groups and non-New York City Jewish Group by Occupation of Family Heads

Religious Groups	*N*	*Occupation of Family Heads*						*Without an Occupation*
		Professions	*Owners, Managers, Officials*	*Clerical and Sales*	*Skilled*	*Semi-skilled*	*Unskilled*	
U.S. Protestants*	4,185	9	12	10	17	15	10	17
U.S. Catholics*	1,270	8	11	10	22	20	10	15
N.Y.C. Catholics	132	3	6	10	21	19	23	18
N.Y.C. Jews	82	17	23	18	12	15	2	13
Non-N.Y.C. Jews	105	21	38	15	7	4	0	15

* Excludes 10% of U.S. Protestants and 4% of U.S. Catholics who are farmers.

Occupation percentages are shown in Table 4. Obviously, New York City Jews have a considerably higher percentage of skilled and semi-skilled workers than non-New York City Jews do. Once again, the previously mentioned patterns reappear with New York City Jews showing more white-collar workers than the national Catholic percentages which are higher, in turn, than the white-collar figures for New York City Catholics.

TABLE 5

New York City and non-New York City Jewish Groups contrasted by Synagogue Attendance

Religious Groups	*Synagogue Attendance*			
	Once a month or more	*A few times a year*	*Never*	*Total*
				%
N.Y.C. Jews	28	53	19	100
Non-N.Y.C. Jews	38	50	12	100

TABLE 6

New York City Catholics and Jews contrasted with the National Catholic and non-New York City Jewish Groups by per cent Foreign Born

Religious Groups	*Per cent Foreign Born*
U.S. Catholics	16
N.Y.C. Catholics	31
N.Y.C. Jews	44
Non-N.Y.C. Jews	21

Table 5 gives synagogue attendance figures for the two Jewish groups. New York City Jews show slightly less regularity of synagogue attendance than do non-New York City Jews.[8] Finally, Table 6 indicates that both New York City Jews and Catholics have a larger foreign-born percentage than their two comparison groups.

The hypothesis that New York City Jews rank below non-New York City Jews on education, income, and occupation has been verified. In addition, the data indicate an equivalent relationship between New York City Catholics and the educational, income, and occupational achievements of Catholics throughout the United States. The problem, then, becomes one of trying to suggest the causal mechanisms behind these lower rankings of New York City dwellers.

The exact interrelationships among the three factors previously proposed to account for the New York City rankings cannot be obtained from available sources of information. However, some added clarification is possible.

First of all, New York City's Jewish and Catholic populations contain twice as many foreign born adults as do non-New York City Jews or Catholics throughout the United States. Unfortunately, the number of interviews with the foreign born is too small to permit adequate investigation of their age structure. Nevertheless, these foreign born contingents are not all derived from pre-quota immigration days and must include very sizeable numbers of more recent immigrants.

Furthermore, it is well known that for at least a decade the economically 'better-off' New York City Jews and Catholics have been moving out of the five boroughs into the surrounding suburbs. This leaves behind an increasing concentration of economically less successful Jews and Catholics.

Catholics are not more concentrated in New York City than they are in other large communities (such as Boston, Chicago, or Cleveland) that have sizeable proportions of Catholics. Consequently, numerical concentration does not exert more pressure upon New York City's Catholic adults than on United States Catholics as a whole.

Jews are disproportionately concentrated in New York City.[9] But the differentials between Jews in and out of New York City are not unlike those between the two sets of Catholic percentages upon which no differentiating factor of concentration would be operating. Furthermore, Jews do not make up so large a percentage of New York that they would absolutely be forced into a variety of lower status occupations.[10] Apparently, then, the factor of Jewish numerical concentration is least important among the three factors proposed to explain the differentials in the Jewish data.

In short, it is likely that New York City's Jews and Catholics have their relatively less 'desirable' education, income, and occupation distributions in large part because of in-migration of foreign born adults and out-migration of economically more successful adults who possess good education and are white-collar workers.

Note that New York City Jews out-distance New York City Catholics on all three social status variables. Within the social structure of their city, the New York Jewish group ranks at the top on income, education, and occupational status. Nationally, the Jewish group is outranked only by the Episcopalians on these three social status variables.[11] Hence, our two Jewish groups show equal ability to 'get ahead' within their respective social environments.

The Jews of New York City do not appear to be more religiously active than are Jews in the rest of the country, if attendance at services is permitted to serve as the criterion. Even though there are Orthodox extremes in New York, there are enough Jews with lesser degrees of religious attachment to lower frequency of attendance at services.

A final item of interest can be obtained from the slight changes in 'no religion' percentages of Table 1. One cannot claim that the percentage of adults who state they have no religion differs in New York City from the national percentage, despite the much higher percentage of Jews in New York City. United States Jews (both in and outside New York City) are known to be highly secularized and religiously indifferent, but not enough New York City Jews would declare themselves without a religion to raise that city's 'no religion' percentage a noticeable amount. Nor is there any evidence that Jews, in any meaningful numbers, declared themselves Protestants or Catholics.

The willingness of New York City Jews to declare themselves Jews, of course, represents a religio-ethnic reaction to a question on religious preference. In addition, it seems to indicate that almost all Jews, among many ways of reacting to their Jewishness, prefer to choose Judaism to Christianity or complete secularism.

Perhaps the great size of the New York Jewish community promotes greater attachment to the Jewish group. Most non-New York City Jews live as parts of relatively large size Jewish communities so that the added group identification resulting from sheer numbers operates on

them. If small-city or small-town Jews find the road to assimilation easier to travel, they represent a very small portion of the United States Jewish population.

It is easy to make too much out of the small New York City 'no religion' percentage. But if this percentage were three or four times the national average, what interpretation would be given to the data? Clearly, it would be concluded that a sizeable group of New York Jews had declared themselves to be without a religion. Many Jews may not be happy with today's Judaism, but they prefer it to Christianity or nothing at all.

NOTES

[1] The author wishes to thank the Survey Research Centre of the University of Michigan for permission to use its data. Financial support for this project was contributed by the University of Illinois Research Board. Mr. Louis Rowitz was the research assistant for this project.

[2] For a presentation of data on the social status and demographic characteristics of United States religious groups, together with a bibliography of similar studies, see: Bernard Lazerwitz, 'A Comparison of Major United States Religious Groups', *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, September 1961.

[3] For a discussion of New York City Jews, see the chapter by Ben B. Seligman on 'The Jewish Population of New York City: 1952' in Marshall Sklare (Editor), *The Jews*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958.

[4] This assumes a legal structure and a degree of relations between Jews and non-Jews that would permit Jews relatively free access to the total range of community occupations.

[5] This is more of a hypothesis about the migration patterns of United States Jews than a statement of known facts.

[6] Lazerwitz, op. cit.

[7] To confirm the ability of a sample size as small as that employed here to give a reasonably accurate picture of New York City, it may be noted that the 1960 United States Census of Population reported that Negroes compose 14 per cent of New York City's population.

[8] United States Jews are characterized by a low frequency of synagogue attendance. Roman Catholics and members of all major Protestant denominations attend religious services with greater regularity than do Jews.

[9] Of the Jews interviewed on these surveys, 76 per cent resided in large cities. Among the Jews residing in large cities, 57 per cent lived in New York City. Therefore, the contrasts between New York City Jews and non-New York City Jews is not primarily one between suburbanites and 'inner city' residents.

[10] The best series of data would be one comparing Jews residing in cities having decreasing proportions of Jews. Unfortunately, such detailed information does not exist.

[11] Not enough interviews were obtained with New York City Episcopalians to do a separate analysis of the group.

THE DISPLACED JEWS IN THE AMERICAN ZONE OF GERMANY*

D. Drutmann

IN THE spring of 1945 Nazi Germany was finally occupied by the Allied Powers, who found millions of foreigners on German soil. These included Russians and Poles who had been deported to Germany as slave labourers, French prisoners-of-war, and Jews who had been released from concentration camps. These people stood in dire need of food, clothing, and medical care. These needs were supplied by the Allied Powers, who thereafter began the task of repatriation. In 1945 the Allies succeeded in repatriating about six million foreigners. There remained, however, some hundreds of thousands who were unwilling or unable to return to their homelands.

The care of these people was transferred to an international agency known as U.N.R.R.A. (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration).

In mid-1947 this responsibility passed into the hands of I.R.O. (International Refugee Organization). The founding statute of I.R.O. defines a 'D.P.' (Displaced Person) as: 'a person, who as a result of acts of hatred by the Axis countries and their satellites, was uprooted from his homeland, or permanent dwelling place, or a person who was forced to slave labour, or who as a result of racial, religious or political discrimination was driven out of his homeland'.

Of the millions of Jews deported to concentration camps only 50,000 survived to be rescued by the Allies. Of these, 30,000 were in the American Occupation Zone.

These figures are only estimates being based on the first Allied reports, which did not list Jews separately but lumped them together with other nationals according to countries of origin.

The first lists of Jewish survivors were drawn up by the Relatives Search Division of the Jewish Central Committee in Munich some months after the German collapse.

By the summer of 1948 thousands of D.P.s had returned to their countries of origin. Most of the Jews, however, remained in Germany, in the American Occupation Zone. The majority of them felt certain

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that it would not be possible for them to reintegrate into Polish national life. Many of them who returned to Poland in the hope of finding their families and relatives there, found nobody and the few who succeeded in finding members of their families returned with them to Germany. The number of D.P.s in Germany grew bigger and bigger. The source of the increase was principally Polish Jews, survivors of the ghettos and concentration camps, partisans and Jews who had fled to Russia in fear of the German invasion.

The latter group was faced at the end of the war with the alternative of receiving Russian citizenship or returning to Poland within the general repatriation framework. In Poland they found no trace of their families, their homes had been destroyed, and a new wave of antisemitism deprived them of any feeling of security. Thus, group by group, they passed over into the American Occupation Zone in Germany.

Not a few were influenced in their decision to go to Germany by the hope that from there it would be possible to get to Israel. They generally escaped to Austria and were transported by American convoys to Germany.

The general estimate of the number of Jews who escaped from Poland is placed at 120,000. Only a small proportion of them remained in Austria or went over into Italy.

In the summer of 1947 large numbers of Jews began to arrive from Rumania. The reasons for this movement included the fierce antisemitism in their country, its poor economic state, and the nationalization of the Rumanian economy. Apart from this, the Russian border with Rumania was closed. The fear that the western frontier would also be closed, thus preventing the possibility of getting to Israel, caused many Jews to leave Rumania.

The following are some figures on the demographic characteristics of the Jewish survivors. Among Jewish D.P.s there was a surplus of men over women. The number of women per thousand men was 806. This disparity was not apparent in age groups up to 20. In the age groups 20–24 there was even a surplus of women over men expressed as a ratio of 1,125 women per 1,000 men. The male surplus was mostly apparent in the age groups 25–64. This can be explained by the fact that young unmarried women especially were taken for purposes of forced labour.

The great majority of D.P.s were in the working age groups. A survey conducted in one of the camps in the early days following the end of the war showed that of the 900 inmates there was no child under the age of six. There were 27 children between the ages of 6–17 and only two persons above the age of 65. A similar situation existed in the other camps.

This age-structure was an important factor influencing marriage and

birth-rates. The birth-rate among the D.P.s was relatively high and reached 36 births per 1,000 persons. In addition to this favourable age-structure the following factors led to a high natural reproduction rate: (1) the D.P.s came from countries of relatively high fertility; (2) the trend towards increased fertility after a period of suppression; (3) a strong tendency to raising a family.

The mortality rate amongst D.P.s was very low and reached 6·2 per 1,000. The reasons for this are: (1) high mortality begins at the age of 50; only 12 per cent of the D.P.s were in this age group; (2) the D.P.s had undergone a double selection process; first, physical suitability for purposes of Nazi forced labour, and second the experience of the Nazi destruction in which only the fittest survived.

Special attention was paid by I.R.O. to the distribution according to trades, and for this purpose a statistical survey was arranged in order to utilize these facts for emigration purposes, vocational training, and employment in the camps.

The first census was taken in May 1947 and was carried out according to the 'United States Employment Service Dictionary of Occupational Titles'. It included 54,391 Jews in D.P. camps in the American Zone and the results were the following:

	%
Free professions & clerks	20
Skilled & semi-skilled	47
Unskilled	14
Others	19

The D.P.s were faced with three alternatives: (1) to integrate themselves in the German economy; (2) to return to their countries of origin; (3) to emigrate to other countries.

For Jews there was only one possibility—to emigrate, principally to Israel.

At the end of the war, special camps were established for Jews. In these camps the Jews were able to prepare themselves for going to Israel, to receive vocational training, and to give their children suitable education.

DIFFERENCES IN MORBIDITY AMONG JEWISH GROUPS IN ISRAEL*

Gertrude Kallner

THERE can no longer be any doubt that there are differences in pathology and morbidity between the Jews of different geographical origin in Israel. If the problems before us were medical ones, I should take the differences that may be and have actually been established in Israel as the starting point of the discussion and derive from their existence the possibility, and stress the importance, of conclusions in the field of the aetiology and, possibly, prevention of diseases.

However, the approach here has to be a descriptive-demographic one, and the task before us is to add to the many aspects of Jewish demography just one more: the bio-pathological.

If we look at the matter from this point of view we find ourselves confronted with three questions, or rather, a set of questions developing one from another:

(1) Is there a difference in pathology or morbidity between the Jews of the Diaspora and the host populations among which they live?

(2) Is there a difference between the inhabitants of the State of Israel and the inhabitants of other countries?

(3) Is there a difference between the various communities (*edoth*) within the Jewish population in Israel?

The first question cannot be definitely answered here. First of all, I do not feel entitled to offer an answer, being too far removed from the Diaspora. But even those more entitled than I am to deal with the matter are confronted with an intrinsic difficulty that stands in the way of any statistical study of this kind: the bias of the material. Jewish groups all over the world, at least where they exist at all as circumscribed groups, are usually distinguished from their environing groups in more aspects than one. These aspects may considerably affect the reliability of the results of studies in health statistics. To put it simply: in a certain environment Jews may suffer from diabetes because they are exceptionally well-to-do, and tend to over-eat and under-exercise, owing

* This is a revised version of a paper read at the Second World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1957, in the Section 'Demography of the Jews'.

particularly to their sedentary occupations. This has been pointed out by Joslin, the American diabetes specialist, and the point has recently been taken up by Steinitz in Israel. In another place, Jews may, for instance, show an exceedingly low rate of deaths from tuberculosis, explained by Hersh as possibly being due to an exceptionally bad situation over generations which might have drastically cut out the weak individuals. Further, Lyon has blamed inbreeding for an apparently increased occurrence of diabetes.

Thus we see that in some way or other any health-statistical result can be disproved and twisted around to prove the contrary if the unusual situation of the Jewish groups among their host populations is taken into account.

Although it cannot be claimed that the situation of Jews in Israel is an absolutely normal one, even if we knew what a normal situation meant, it is more normal than in the rest of the world and, therefore, I shall try at the end of this study, by a rather circuitous method, to come to some sort of answer to this question.

The second question, as to the difference between Jews in the State of Israel and the inhabitants of other countries, has been studied in conjunction with the third and the most important and crucial one, which, if answered, will give a clue to all the others. This is the question of the differences in pathology and morbidity among the various 'communities' within the Jewish population of Israel. These differences exist and can be proved to be very real.

Israel has been described as a 'melting pot of nations'. Considering the variety of materials that have to go into such a melting pot and be carefully studied before being 'melted', we could also describe it as a laboratory for the study of geopathological questions. The laboratory is provided by circumstances rather than by planned actions, but it is nonetheless effective if rightly used.

Geographical pathology is an expensive science. It requires the despatch of investigating teams to all countries of the world for the study of problems by unified methods. Skimping and economizing and using available statistical material are doomed to produce utterly unreliable results. Bringing the specimens to one central spot is not practicable either. Here Israel and the Jewish catastrophe come in: they have done just that—brought specimens together in one place.

True, just as in laboratory experiment we always make the reservation that the results have been arrived at under laboratory conditions, one might object that a bias follows from the fact that although the individuals come from all over the globe, they are nevertheless living in the same climate under the same form of government, and in other ways share a common environment.

To meet this objection we have to divide morbidity into two parts: the one consisting of diseases and pathological conditions which are

directly affected by the physical environment, and the other consisting of those inherent in the organism itself. To the first group belong the contagious and most infectious diseases; to the other the so-called degenerative conditions. For those who may object that even in the last-mentioned category there must be 'an environmental provocation added to a genetic inclination'—a formulation used by Grew, though in a somewhat different context—or even that these degenerative diseases are the final result of some environmental influence in its widest sense, we may add that such an influence must have exerted itself, if at all, through long periods of time, possibly through generations; and we should then draw the line between those due to short-term and those due to long-term effects, which leaves us exactly with the same classification as before.

Of course, it would be easy to find diseases and conditions belonging neither to the one nor to the other class, or belonging to both, forming some sort of intermediary group. But in order not to confuse the issue it seems preferable to use for our studies the pure and clear-cut categories mentioned earlier.

The material used in this study is on mortality and hospitalized morbidity. For reasons which cannot be discussed here, material from outpatient clinics and general practice is not suitable for this kind of large-scale study. One such investigation, by Yeshurun-Berman, on the Kupath Cholim (General Workers' Sick Fund) material has nevertheless been made with extremely interesting results which I shall use wherever they constitute 'contributory evidence'.

Dealing first with the group of diseases caused by a short-term environmental effect (the group of contagious diseases, most infections, particularly the intestinal and respiratory infections of infants) I should like to quote from a study made in collaboration with Blondheim on the hospitalization material which used broad aetiological groups: 'Orientals are hospitalized more frequently for bacterial infection, parasitic infestation and diseases related to deficient nutrition', the very diseases we are dealing with here. This conclusion was borne out by subsequent investigations of the same material, and by mortality studies, as well as (to some extent) by the Kupath Cholim study mentioned before.

The table below shows the relative disease rates of Jews of Oriental and Western origin. (The term 'Oriental' is used for short to designate the Jews coming from Asia and Africa.) The upper part of the table refers to the group we are dealing with here.

We have here, for instance, an infant death rate from gastro-enteritis which is for Orientals five times that of Westerners, and a hospitalization rate also five times as high, while the Kupath Cholim figures which refer to all ages together show an Oriental rate twice that of Westerners. For pneumonia the death rate is two and a half times, the hospitalization rate about three and a half times higher for Orientals

The Ratio of Oriental and Western Rates of Incidence of Selected Diseases

(1 = the Oriental rate)

Diagnosis	*Mortality Statistics* 1953–4*		*Hospitalization Statistics* 1952–3		*Kupath Cholim Statistics* 1952–3†	
	Age	*Proportion of rates*	*Age*	*Proportion of rates*	*Age*	*Proportion of rates*
Gastro-enteritis	0	1 : 0·2	0	1 : 0·2	All ages	1 : 0·6
Pneumonia	0	1 : 0·4	0	1 : 0·3		
All infections of infancy	0	1 : 0·3				
Poliomyelitis	0	1 : 0·6	0	1 : 0·6		
Dysentery			0	1 : 0·6		
Salmonelloses			0	1 : 0·2		
Malignant neoplasms	65+	1 : 2·17	50+	1 : 2·6		
Correction (*a*)‡		1 : 1·69				
Correction (*b*)		1 : 1·94				
Correction (*c*)		1 : 1·48				
Arteriosclerotic heart disease	65+	1 : 2·34	50+	1 : 3·3	All ages	1 : 11·0 M.I. 1 : 16·0 A.P.
Correction (*a*)		1 : 1·67				
Correction (*b*)		1 : 2·06				
Correction (*c*)		1 : 1·60				
Apoplexy, etc.	65+	1 : 1·25	50+	1 : 1·5		
Correction (*a*)		1 : 1·05				
Correction (*b*)		1 : 1·09				
Correction (*c*)		1 : 0·85				
Art. heart disease plus apoplexy, etc.	65+	1 : 1·68				
Correction (*a*)		1 : 1·32				
Correction (*b*)		1 : 1·48				
Correction (*c*)		1 : 1·15				

* In the upper part of the table (infections, etc.) the years referred to are 1951–4.
† The figures quoted here are only for newcomers.
‡ Correction (*a*): After addition of arbitrary percentage of the respective ill-defined group.
Correction (*b*): After addition of calculated percentage of the respective ill-defined group.
Correction (*c*): After application of index of hospitalization of deaths in the respective age-sex-ethnic group.
M.I. Myocardial infarction.
A.P. Angina pectoris.

than for Westerners. Poliomyelitis shows a difference of 1 : 0·6 between the Oriental and Westerners' rate for infant deaths as well as for hospitalization. All infections of infancy taken together as a group have for Orientals a death rate over three times that of Westerners. Hospitalization for dysentery shows a proportion of 1 : 0·2, as also do the Salmonelloses, i.e. typhoid, paratyphoid, etc., for which the rate for Orientals is again five times that for Westerners.

To quote again from the paper prepared in collaboration with Blondheim, we can summarize as follows: 'The higher morbidity from diseases

caused by infection is probably a result of poor personal hygiene under conditions of poverty in new immigrants.'

The results are not particularly surprising since, as mentioned before, these are diseases produced by short-term effects of the physical environment, probably independent of the patient's origin. The fact that the Oriental sector at present harbours the greater part of the new immigrants, with all the handicaps arising from this situation, accounts, to a great extent, for the differences established.

We may even say that this group of diseases is not particularly interesting for medical, and certainly not for demographic, research. We know their aetiology, at least that of most of them; we have the tools for combating and preventing them; and their higher frequency in one particular sector of the population does not tell us more than that for one reason or another, we have failed to apply our knowledge in this case. The above results are informative from a socio-economic rather than from a biological viewpoint.

Far more interesting is the study of the other group of conditions to which we have already referred as 'degenerative diseases'. I do not want to go into the question as to whether this term is justified. I should like to be allowed to use it to designate that group for which we have not so far found a short-term external influence and which, if it is due to such an influence, is probably due to a very prolonged exposure to it.

We may begin with malignant neoplasms. The lower part of the table shows, in both mortality and hospitalization statistics, a very clear preponderance for the Western sector. (Of course, I have chosen the age groups most characteristic for the particular disease and, therefore, with the greatest concentration of cases.) Mortality statistics show a rate for Westerners over twice that for Orientals, as do hospitalization figures.

Because we were reluctant to accept these extremely important results at their face value we tried to make doubly sure by applying several methods of correction. Our argument was that the more primitive a group in society the greater are the chances that a disease will go unrecognized; in fact, that no diagnosis at all will be made during life and that after death the case will be assigned to the category of 'unknown and ill-defined conditions'. (It is, by the way, a well-established fact that the size of this group in cause-of-death statistics is a direct function of the developmental stage of a country.) We therefore added to the number of deaths from malignant neoplasms an arbitrary but, of course, well considered percentage of the ill-defined group found in the same age and ethnic category. This correction (*a*), though slightly reducing the difference, still leaves us with a proportion of 1 : 1·7.

Another method of correction was to apply a calculated instead of an arbitrary percentage of the ill-defined group, a procedure (correction (*b*)) that again raises the proportion to about 1 : 2.

Still suspicious, we argued that if all deaths had taken place in hospital the relations might have come out differently; in other words, that the lower rate of deaths from malignant neoplasms for Orientals might be the result of a smaller number of diagnoses made in hospital in this sector. An index was therefore calculated to characterize the general degree of hospitalization of deaths in a particular age and ethnic group. The application of this index (correction (*c*)) still leaves us with a proportion of 1 : 1·5.

The same methods were applied to arteriosclerosis in its two main manifestations: apoplexies and other cerebral incidents, and coronary disease. This is a heart disease due to arteriosclerosis of the heart vessels themselves, leading in many cases to sudden death, which has of late been the subject of very much discussion in professional as well as in lay circles all over the world. For this disease conditions are statistically perfectly clear. For mortality, the relation between the Oriental and the Western rate is 1 : 2·3, and no sort of correction brings it down lower than 1 : 1·6. For hospitalization, the relation is as high as 1 : 3·3, while in the newcomer-population of the Kupath Cholim sample the difference grows immensely, to 1 : 11 and 1 : 16. For reasons which cannot be discussed here, this does not in itself allow conclusions as to the difference between newcomers and veteran settlers.

We have so far found a very clear preponderance of Westerners for malignant neoplasms and coronary disease.

Things begin to be different when we come to arteriosclerosis of the brain, apoplexy, etc. There seems to be a certain preponderance of Westerners, though less pronounced than for the two other conditions, but this preponderance is reduced by correction in a way that there remains very nearly no difference at all.

How can these discrepancies be explained? When in conversations with clinicians we come to this point, the same objection is invariably raised: 'But have you ever seen a Yemenite with an apoplexy?' And, indeed, the latest investigations by Brunner, and by Dreyfuss and Toor point to a special physiological set-up in this group. And this brings me to a very important point: neither the Oriental nor the Western sector is an entity, but is composed of a number of very different components. For the demographer and for the ethnologist this is nothing new. But in the bio-clinical field too, we ought to beware of the tendency to oversimplify, and our future studies in this respect should be more concentrated on the individual ethnic groups than on the broader sections.

Of course, as everywhere in statistics, this splitting up of broader groups into particles removes us further from useful information rather than bringing us closer, because now we come dangerously near to the realm of small numbers. Nevertheless, we have made an attempt, of course with all the necessary reservations in mind, to get some information on this point too. As we see in Diagram I, even where we could

MORTALITY RATES (per 100,000 popul.) FOR JEWISH MALES—AGE 65—IN ISRAEL BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH







DIAGRAM I

MORTALITY RATES (per 100,000 popul.) FOR JEWISH MALES IN ISRAEL BY CONTINENT OF BIRTH AND FOR SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES





DIAGRAM II

take together figures for two years (malignant neoplasms) this still left us with some very small numbers which are represented by shaded columns.

Nevertheless, the diagram drawn up for three of the diseases discussed before (in order not to confuse the issue we have chosen only males aged 65 and over) shows very clearly that the average rates for those born in Asia and those born in Europe are composed of very different elements. Thus, for instance, in the case of arteriosclerotic heart disease, Turkey (that is, Israeli Jews born in Turkey) far surpasses the average of all European countries, which is higher than that for the Asian countries of origin among which Turkey nevertheless is included.

In the case of cerebral incidents (that is, cerebral arteriosclerosis) the average for Asia is slightly higher than that for Europe. Nevertheless, two members of the European group surpass this average while, on the other hand, Yemen is lower than both. Similar conditions are found for malignant neoplasms.

All the evidence, therefore, goes to prove that in presenting average rates for the incidence of diseases for Jews of Oriental and non-Oriental communities we may get a hint as regards the general situation, but not more than a hint. If we want to make further headway at all in our geopathological studies, we shall have to concentrate on the smaller groups.

How does all this give an answer to our second question, about differences between Israel and other countries with regard to health conditions and the incidence of diseases? Realizing that the overall figure for Israel is an average of several widely varying elements, we should be presumptuous to deduce from its size conclusions as to the real differences between this country as a whole and others.

Again we have to draw the line between the two categories of diseases mentioned before, and for the same reasons we should concentrate on the second group. Unfortunately, for reasons of definition, of availability of data, and of the smallness of figures for many of the diseases in Israel, only two examples can be given, which are represented in Diagram II. In this diagram it will be seen that the column for all Israel is lower than that for any of the European countries given here. If, however, we look at its two broad components, Asia (Africa could not, for technical reasons, be included here) and the Europe-America group, it appears that the latter comes very close to the European countries themselves. It may be mentioned, though no figures can be given here, that for several localizations of cancer this pattern is even more pronounced and clear.

The same is seen in the second part of the diagram where figures for a very important problem, the early occurrence of arteriosclerotic heart disease (at age 45–64), are given. Unfortunately, only two countries of comparison were available. Here, too, the average for Israel is

appreciably lower than, for instance, for England, but considering the Jewish population of European origin alone, we see that it is almost identical, and a correction of the figures in the way mentioned before would make them even more similar to those of the countries of comparison.

An answer to our second question, therefore, about the differences in morbidity between Israel and other countries cannot unfortunately be given owing to the considerable heterogeneity of the Israel population. It seems, however, that there is an indication—I am saying this with all the necessary caution—that the European part of the population has a certain similarity to the European countries from which they derive.

Having thus come full circle, we can now return to our first question: Is there a difference in intrinsic morbidity problems between the Jews of the Diaspora and their respective host populations?

The fact mentioned just now—that the European sector of the Israel population might be similar to the inhabitants of the European countries where they previously lived, and by analogy the Oriental part might be expected to be similar to the people in whose surroundings they used to live—might be interpreted as indicating that if one could go down to the bare roots of morbidity problems and strip them of all their accidental encumbrances, one might find that no such essential differences exist.

This, in turn, if established would indicate that it is the way of life rather than 'racial' factors that determines the pathological pattern of a people. As pointed out by P. D. White and Keys (quoted from a recent paper by Dreyfuss and co-workers) 'clues to prevention and control might then be found in different ways of life in groups which differ sharply in the incidence' of some disease.

I hope I have made it sufficiently clear that we are still at the beginning of an understanding of these problems. I want to stress again the preliminary nature of these studies and the tentativeness of the results presented here which, at best, can only point out the direction which further research might take if fuller material and larger means should become available.

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ROSE, Peter Isaac, A.B. (Syracuse), M.A., Ph.D. (Cornell); Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, Smith College, Northampton, Mass., and Visiting Lecturer in Sociology, University of Massachusetts; formerly Instructor and Assistant Professor of Sociology, Goucher College, Baltimore; Research and Teaching Assistant Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Cornell University. Since 1959 editor of *Joint Newsletter of Inter-group Relations* published annually by the Society for the Study of Social Problems and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 'Student Opinion in the 1956 Presidential Election', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1957. A book on racial and ethnic relations in the U.S. will be published by Random House in 1962. At present engaged on a study with David J. Kallen on unreached youth, work on isolated minorities, a study of student values in a variety of academic settings, and a study of minority group attitudes towards majority groups.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMMITTEE, responsible for 'Dutch Jewry: a demographic analysis' is a part of the Stichting Joods Maatschappelijk Werk (Jewish Social Work Foundation), one of the organizations affiliated to Cefina—J.M.W. (Central Fundraising Organization). The Jewish Social Work Foundation, established in 1947, is the co-ordinating body for Jewish social work in the Netherlands. Its members include most of the Jewish communal social services and nearly all private Jewish organizations in the welfare field in the Netherlands.

A Note on the proportion of Jews in Republican and Local Soviets, U.S.S.R.*

by Alec Nove

	Republican Supreme Soviet			*All Local Soviets*			*Per cent of Jews in population†*
	Total No. of deputies	*of which Jews*	*Per cent Jews*	*Total No. of deputies*	*of which Jews*	*Per cent Jews*	
Russian Federal Republic	835	1	0·12	97,2004	3,471	0·36	0·70
Ukraine	457	1	0·22	38,1477	1,966	0·52	2·00
Belorussia	407	2	0·45	77,944	853	1·09	1·90
Uzbekistan	444	2	0·44	58,826	261	0·44	1·20
Kazakhstan	450	2	0·44	81,186	337	0·42	n.a.
Azerbaidjan	325	1	0·31	33,120	100	0·30	n.a.
Lithuania	209	3	1·44	33,174	74	0·23	0·90
Moldavia	281	0	0	36,518	210	0·79	3·30
Latvia	200	0	0	20,876	88	0·42	1·70
Kirghizia	329	0	0	17,493	83	0·48	n.a.
Tadzhikistan	300	1	0·33	14,880	50	0·43	n.a.
Armenia	300	0	0	17,882	4	0·02	n.a.
Turkmenistan	282	1	0·36	14,123	38	0·27	n.a.
Estonia	125	0	0	11,731	27	0·23	0·50
Georgia	368	0	0	40,429	62	0·15	1·30

* Source: *Sostav deputatov verkhovnykh sovetov soyuznykh, avtonomnykh respublik i mestnykh sovetov trudyashchikhsya, 1959* (statistical digest), Moscow 1959. Also cf. 'Jews in the Soviet Union', Vol. III, no. 1 of the *Journal*.

† According to the Census returns for January 1959 (n.a. = not available).

Note: This table does *not* include the all-union Supreme Soviet, on which no information is available.

The disproportionate number of deputies elected to soviets in small republics makes it unreasonable to add the figures up to get a meaningful percentage for the whole country.

While the *local* soviets include rural districts, where Jews are relatively few, their very small representation in the *republican* supreme soviets is politically significant. With the one exception of Lithuania, the figure is invariably very far below their percentage share in the population. This is particularly obvious in the first three republics in the above table, where the bulk of soviet Jews live. Also Moldavia, Latvia and Estonia manage to have no Jews whatever in their supreme soviets.

BOOK REVIEWS

AHAD HA-AM

I. Levine

(Review Article)

AHAD HA-AM has been described (by Dr. Mordecai Kaplan, the eminent American exponent of Zionist philosophy) as 'the one person in Jewish history who, next to Maimonides, deserved the title of Guide to the Perplexed'. Weizmann, too, has compared his influence on modern Jewish developments to that of Gandhi or Mazzini. These are some indication of the remarkable achievements of this Russian-Jewish thinker and writer, who lived from 1856–1927. A warm welcome, then, is assured for the first biography in English of Ahad Ha-am.* Its author is Sir Leon Simon, a disciple and later a close friend. Leon Simon has previously published three volumes of translations of Ahad Ha-am's writings, and is joint author with Dr. J. E. Heller of the Hebrew biography which appeared in 1956. He has obviously unique qualifications for the task, and the result, as one would expect, is a scholarly, well-documented, authoritative piece of work, pious and dutiful in the best sense, but never fulsome. It is indeed almost wholly objective, and enhances the reputation of its author, well-known for his previous 'Studies in Jewish Nationalism'.

Ahad Ha-am's importance lies in two closely related fields. One is Zionism and the other Judaism. He was an eloquent and powerful advocate of a Zionism that would be primarily cultural or spiritual, rather than merely political; and he took the essence of Judaism to lie not in theological creed and dogma, but more in humanism and ethical absolutes. Thus he made a direct and immediate appeal to millions of Jews in France, Germany, and even in Eastern Europe, who were becoming more and more disillusioned with the dubious results of liberalism and emancipation.

The Zionist situation may be reviewed first. A Zionist dream had of course been vaguely present for centuries among the Jews of the Diaspora. But with the growth of nationalism in the nineteenth century in Europe the Jewish dream took on a new and less chimerical character. The first stirrings of this new vision occurred in the Pale of Settlement in Eastern Europe, as was perhaps natural, for here lived millions of Jews as a separate group of people

* Leon Simon, *Ahad Ha-am, A Biography*, pp. 350, East and West Library, London, 1960, 30*s*.

under severe restraint, united nevertheless by their way of life, diet, traditions, language, and religion. Were they too not a nation? To the question, What is a nation? many answers have no doubt been given. Geographical, political, economic, and many other factors play a part, but, as Renan urged, and psychologists of group life often maintain, what really constitutes a nation is something of the nature of a sentiment or conviction, and this surely the Jews had never lacked.

Hence the emergence of a growing Zionist hope and consciousness. Early pioneers in the field were such men as Krochmal, Rapoport, and Luzzato, but what made the Zionist idea more urgent was the renewal in the 1880s of large-scale pogroms. (Weizmann, indeed, dates the birth of modern Zionism from this event.) In 1882 Leon Pinsker, a physician in Odessa, put forward, in a pamphlet he called 'Auto-Emanzipation', the plan for a Jewish State in Palestine, and under his presidency there was founded in 1884 an organization known as the 'Hoveve Zion', or Lovers of Zion. When Ahad Ha-am was in Odessa at that time he joined this body and took part in the work of its Central Committee.

Some colonies or settlements of Jews in Palestine were now begun, in the hope of eventually building up a Jewish State there from such modest beginnings. But to Ahad Ha-am this was not the right way to proceed. In his first famous article, in 1888, he described it as the Wrong Way (Lo Zeh Haderekh), signing his article with the pen-name by which he has subsequently been always known. (His name of course was Asher Zvi Ginzberg.) In this article, as his biographer shows, we have already clearly indicated the gist of his whole Zionist philosophy. These colonization attempts (which in fact had not been successful) were doomed to failure. What was first required was to cultivate and establish on lasting foundations a powerful *national sentiment* among the Jews of the Diaspora, appealing to men's idealism, not to their self-interest. The article, as Leon Simon says, was 'a challenge to accepted ideas', and demanded a new and deeper understanding of all that was involved in Jewish nationalism.

It is not surprising, then, that when in 1896 Herzl, supported by Max Nordau, put forward his bold plan for the creation of a Jewish State, this project held no appeal for Ahad Ha-am. True, the ideas of Herzl had gained wide support and roused great enthusiasm, and a World Zionist Congress in Basle, in 1897, was hailed with tremendous anticipation. Ahad Ha-am, personally invited by Herzl, attended this Congress, but only as a visitor. He has described his reaction to the meetings in a famous phrase, saying he felt like 'a mourner at a wedding-feast'. He had no faith in the belief that the Turkish government would agree to further and large-scale colonization in Palestine, and was convinced that to concentrate on political methods of establishing a Jewish State was to misunderstand the whole problem of Jewish nationalism. 'The salvation of Israel', he wrote, 'will be achieved by prophets, not by diplomats.'

Here, then, is the crux of Ahad Ha-am's clash with Herzl. He could not agree that political Zionism would solve the Jewish problem, or that a political or geographical entity, in Palestine or elsewhere, would meet the fundamental needs of the situation. What was essential was to work by every means for a revival of the cultural and spiritual life of the Jewish people. A com-

munity should be established eventually, in Palestine, of course, because of its special historical associations, which would become a national cultural and spiritual centre, from which the Jews of the Diaspora, likely as they were to constitute the great majority of the people for many generations to come, would draw their inspiration and renew their moral and religious faith. What Ahad Ha-am urged, in short, was the need for a cultural renaissance of the Jews, centred in Zion, a centre from which the Jewry of the rest of the world would derive its strength and sustenance.

The other field in which the writings of Ahad Ha-am are so important is that of Judaism itself, and the problems of the modern emancipated Jew. Can he retain his Jewishness in a Gentile society? If he relaxes or abandons his separateness, his special way of life and its traditions, his very identity and conviction of being different, what remains of his being a Jew? It is no answer, he felt, to take refuge in the vague conception of the 'mission' of the Jews, as certain Reform movements have suggested. Nor was the synagogue-Judaism of an assimilated Western community, such as he found in London, where he lived from 1908–22, much better. Leon Simon tells us that English Judaism, from Ahad Ha-am's point of view, must have seemed 'a museum-piece, an affair of tombstones and epitaphs'. Certainly he lived for fourteen years in London without making much impression on Anglo-Jewish life or receiving from it any intellectual stimulus.

His philosophy of Judaism must be understood in the light of his early training and education. Born in the Ukraine, eldest son of a Talmudist, and at first brought up in the traditional fashion of his time and place, Asher Zvi Ginzberg soon reached out for wider knowledge. His father, having prospered in business, was able to provide Asher with a private tutor, when the lad was eleven, and Asher quickly cultivated his intellectual wants. For a time he was content to adhere to the ritual and ceremonials of the Hasidism then prevalent in his surroundings, but soon, reading widely in Haskala literature and medieval Jewish philosophy, he became more independent in his outlook, and by the time he was fifteen he seems to have been 'emancipated'.

His education continued apace, and he read widely in psychology and sociology. He was greatly influenced by evolutionary theory, and by the Positivism of Comte, and his masters were such men as J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, Ribot, Janet, and Tarde. He made several attempts to follow a more disciplined university course of study, in Vienna, Breslau, Berlin, and Leipzig, but for various reasons these were unsuccessful. The resulting frustrations led to a period of severe mental stress, described in the early section of his 'Reminiscences', and the years 1882–3, when he was 26 or 27, were the worst years of his life, he tells us.

Even as a boy, it seems, he was rather lonely and unhappy, with little or no outlet for his emotions, and he lacked self-confidence. He was married when just under seventeen, but his bride could not fully share in his intellectual life, and his marriage, as Leon Simon puts it, 'must be supposed to have sharpened, instead of softening, the sense of spiritual loneliness by which he was oppressed and handicapped all through his life'.

Such was Ahad Ha-am's personal and intellectual background. How, then, did he eventually come to understand the place of Judaism in history and its significance for the future? Like Comte, he based his analysis and general

theory on sociological data, i.e. on an interpretation of Jewish history in factual rather than mystical terms. He finds the essence of Judaism, as he puts it in a letter to Israel Abrahams, to lie in a 'national creative power'. This has hitherto been expressed in a culture predominantly religious, and the problem of the future is how to recall Jewry, under its new secular and emancipated influences, to the ancient moral ideal of the prophets.

Leon Roth, in his recent 'Portrait of Judaism', is critical of this view. What grounds are there, he asks, for the belief that a national creative power must continue to express itself in the future in the same form as it did in the past? Sociological data can establish only the record of how men have in fact behaved, in matters of morals and religion. To postulate an unchanging national creative spirit, and to imply the existence of 'absolute' moral ideals, is to go beyond what is justified on strictly sociological analysis. Further, Roth urges, can we really be content to reduce the God of Judaism to a 'national creative power' or 'national spirit'?

The problems which Ahad Ha-am sought to solve are those which still confront Jewry. For the orthodox the history of Judaism, a religion inspired and dominated by the idea of God, and developed in a close setting of customs, ceremonials, and beliefs, provides its own pattern of future development. But for those who have broken away from orthodoxy, the Westernized or secularized or the non-believers, is there a future at all within a Jewish whole? By taking the essence of Judaism to lie in ethical and cultural values Ahad Ha-am pointed the way to a possible new synthesis, a new expression of Jewish organic unity. As one writer has put it, Ahad Ha-am 'provided the new middle-class Jew with a new framework in which to reconstruct the old Jewish ethics and mores', and his ideas 'have saved for Judaism thousands of its ablest sons'.

Sir Leon Simon has written about Ahad Ha-am in the most admirable way, giving the reader at once detail and perspective. The intrinsic fascination of the subject is enhanced, indeed, by an approach that is at once sensitive and critical, sparing of false heroics or drama, but penetrating, profound, and, above all, scholarly.

SHORTER NOTICES

BRINLEY THOMAS, *International Migration and Economic Development.* 85 pp., UNESCO, 1961, H.M.S.O., 7*s.* 6*d.*

This is the fifth title in the series *Population and Culture* issued by UNESCO; it takes the form of a general survey and a critical assessment of the state of knowledge in the field of international migration. Professor Brinley Thomas has an established reputation as an authority in this field, and he has produced a study of the relevant research, theoretical and practical, which is in every way admirable, well ordered, concise and lucid. It begins with a brief account of the pre-1939 background and goes on to discuss the post-war situation and its economic interpretation. Certain facts relating to Israel are noted, for example that during the mandate four-fifths of all the immigrants were in the productive age group whereas, since the establishment of the state of Israel, the age structure of the immigrant has become like that found elsewhere. The study should be in the hands of all serious students of migration and of the problems to which it gives rise, economic and social.

A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS

J. F. M. MIDDLETON, ed., *International Bibliography of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. III, International Social Science Bibliographies, 410 pp., UNESCO, Paris, 1959, 33*s.* 3*d.*

—— *International Bibliography of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. IV, International Social Science Bibliographies, 341 pp., UNESCO, Paris, 1960, 33*s.* 3*d.*

JEAN MEYNAUD, ed., *International Bibliography of Political Science*, Vol. VII, International Social Science Bibliographies, 354 pp., UNESCO, Paris, 1960, 30*s.*

JEAN VIET, ed., *International Bibliography of Economics*, Vol. VII, International Social Science Bibliographies, 528 pp., UNESCO, Paris, 1960, 53*s.* 6*d.*

International Bibliography of Sociology, Vol. VIII, International Social Science Bibliographies, 319 pp., UNESCO, Paris, 1960, 30*s.*

These bibliographies are a sample of the activity being carried out by the International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation in co-operation with world-wide professional associations of scholars. The International Committee, formed in 1950, undertook to sponsor the four series noted above, in view of the lack of any overall international bibliography in each of these respective disciplines.

The bibliographies appear annually, and each covers one year of publication; thus, those listed, with the exception of the first, are for 1958. The time lapse between the appearance of a scholarly paper and its listing in a volume of the bibliographies is hence less than three years, which is not excessive in view of the immense task of listing, classification, and so forth, before publication. Each volume includes a list of the journals surveyed, an authors' list, a copious index, and a brief guide to the system of classification, all very helpful to the user. Individual items are numbered consecutively, and fall within classificatory categories. Any classification, of course, necessarily lumps together some items which might be classified separately on other grounds. To some extent, categories are cross-referenced, and individual items are also often cross-referenced. Though one can find occasional questionable classifications, the system as a whole seems well devised and practical. Titles of articles and books other than in French and English are translated into English.

For the student of Jewish life and affairs, most important are the bibliographies of sociology and of social and cultural anthropology. For instance, categories F.21 in anthropology (III, pp. 157–9; IV, pp. 134–5, 'Judaism, Christianity') and C.712(2) in sociology (VIII, pp. 114–19, 'Ethnic groups: race relations, descriptive studies by countries, America'), list a wealth of material published in myriad sources, many of them obscure, of interest to the sociologist of Jewry.

These bibliographies will prove their utility over time. UNESCO is to be congratulated for its part in this project, and the editors and their committees in particular deserve the thanks of social scientists the world over.

SIDNEY W. MINTZ

NORMAN W. BELL and EZRA F. VOGEL, eds., *A Modern Introduction to the Family*, xii + 692 pp., The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1960, $7.50.

We needed a modern anthology on the family, and we have got it. The editors of this book have resisted the temptation to produce a collection of pieces fit for mediocre undergraduate classes; that would have been unbearable. Instead, we have a volume which can be taken right out of the world of textbooks and be used by the sociologically educated reader as a guide to recent literature. This is not to say it is perfect; but it is stimulating, and that is a lot to be grateful for.

Apart from the introductory essay by the editors, there are fifty-one pieces, all of

them previously published except for one (again by the editors); they are arranged in four parts (Introduction, The Family and External Systems, Internal Processes of the Family, and Family and Personality) which, by their themes and emphases, show the influence of Harvardian 'social relations'. That influence is also very apparent in the introductory essay in which the editors are working 'Toward a Framework for Functional Analysis of Family Behaviour'; there is a great stress put upon the family as a system in relation to other systems in society. A weakness of this essay is that it shies away from questions of morphology, 'extended family' being defined as 'any grouping, related by descent, marriage, or adoption, that is broader than the nuclear family'. This is a patch of muddled thinking in an otherwise sage and carefully analytical exposition.

The range and quality of the readings are impressive. Part I, for example, includes pieces on the question of the universality of the family (among them are Miss Kathleen Gough's treatment of the Nayar case and Professor M. E. Spiro's discussion of the family in the *kibbutz*). In Part II there are selections on the interactions between family and economy (including Mr. H. J. Habakkuk's 'Family Structure and Economic Change in Nineteenth-Century Europe'), family and polity, family and community (here we find Radcliffe-Brown's classical statement extracted from the Introduction to *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage*, Miss Elizabeth Bott on an aspect of her London study—'Conjugal Roles and Social Networks'—and Mr. R. T. Smith on the Negro family in British Guiana), and family and value systems. Parts III and IV show an equally interesting sample of sociological, psychological, and anthropological writing. This is a book to read in and ponder over.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

KEITH WHEELOCK, *Nasser's New Egypt, A Critical Analysis*, 326 pp. Atlantic Books, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1960, 30*s*.

Dr. Wheelock's book has had a mixed reception in Britain. Its combination of quasi-journalistic presentation and academic approach has grated badly on the ears of Britain's established Middle Easterners. This is a pity as the book is well worth careful study. It has not, it is true, the cultural flair of the Lacoutures' *Egypt in Transition*, nor the careful history of Tom Little's *Egypt*. One cannot extract from it a picture of Egypt's intellectual potentialities nor of her past. But it gives, far more clearly than either of these two books, which were, justly, highly praised in Britain, a clear picture of Egypt's contemporary ruling groups, by setting out what has been done since the Egyptian revolution of 1952 and by whom. In foreign affairs Dr. Wheelock's thesis is familiar—that Colonel Nasser has turned to foreign adventure to avoid a conviction that he had failed to solve Egypt's internal problems, after being pushed into this by the West in 1956. It is an easily defensible thesis and quite acceptable to all but the most ideological of Anglo-Arabs. It would find considerable private support in Arab intellectual and managerial circles today. Dr. Wheelock produces no new evidence to make it any more convincing than it is already.

The really valuable sections of Dr. Wheelock's book are those which deal with Nasser's internal policy; with the agrarian reforms, with education and social development, with industrialization and with 'Nasser's Pyramid', the High Dam. Dr. Wheelock rates the agrarian reforms as a success. About the remainder, his prognostications are gloomy. His analysis is however fair and devoid of the kind of economic predestinationism with which Egypt's finances have so often been discussed. His main conviction is that Egypt is neglecting the main source of her national wealth, her agriculture, for a programme of industrialization too ambitious for her resources to justify. Again the analysis is not wholly new. But Dr. Wheelock has buttressed his with figures rather than prejudices. In all a valuable book, to be firmly if not warmly recommended.

D. C. WATT

ALBERT A. SICROFF, *Les controverses des statuts de 'pureté de sang' en Espagne du XV^e au XVII^e siècle*', 318 pp. Didier, Paris, 1960.

This book appears in a series with the general title 'Etudes de littérature étrangère et comparée' and is published under the joint auspices of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and Princeton University. It therefore promises well. And indeed this work, because of the scrupulous objectivity with which it is written, is the best of those which have recently studied the problem created in the Iberian peninsula by the forced baptism to which the Jews were obliged to submit at the end of the fourteenth century and from the fifteenth onwards. The author considers the theory of so-called 'cleanness' or 'purity' of blood in the light of the controversies to which it gave rise and highlights many facts which have been obscured, more or less consciously and deliberately, by historians of the apologetic school, a group of whom one must be very wary in old Europe. The very fact that the laws which blocked the way to public honours and posts, religious and lay, for the *conversos* shows firstly that, in Spain (and the same could be said of Portugal, though, unfortunately Mr. Sicroff does not deal with that country) there was always opposition to these laws. This opposition was most evident, and at times violent, in those states which sought to impose upon their subjects an impossible uniformity of creed and opinion. Mr. Sicroff begins by mentioning the great conflicts which occurred in the fifteenth century with the *violent* and *illegal* imposition of the first statutes of 'cleanness' and goes on to analyse the best known writings of jurists and theologians who opposed them, such as Diaz de Montalvo, F. Diaz de Toledo, Fray Lope de Barrientos and especially the *Defensorium unitatis christianae* of Alonso de Cartagena, which seems to reduce the matter to its right proportions. But all these well-reasoned writings, which even received Papal approval, did not succeed in cooling tempers, and while the struggle mounted the *cristianos viejos* and the *cristianos nuevos* continued to live in towns and villages and the polemists who supported the statutes went on developing fresh arguments.

It is a pity that Mr. Sicroff does not consider in greater detail the literature attacking the *cristianos nuevos*, which may be truly called 'antisemitic' and point up the contrast between its passionate violence and the calm reasoning of the anti-statute authors. But it is quite clear that the riots in Toledo in 1467 and in Cordoba in 1474 and the complaints of the monastic orders, such as the Jeromians, so inflamed passions that at the end of the fifteenth century the 'Christian unity' of which Alonso de Cartagena, a bishop and himself a convert, had spoken was seriously disrupted, and that not only because descendants of the Jews returned spontaneously to their former faith but also because the *cristianos viejos* interpreted their religion in a strange and exclusivist manner. I think their position must be analysed in the light of 'Neo-Gothic' ideals which seemed at that time to rule courtly circles absolutely, if we are to avoid falling into the sort of paradoxes put forward by those who maintain that the very idea of purity of blood is of Hebrew origin and has been 'inverted'. I must deal elsewhere with the clear and evident contradiction between the concepts 'Judaism' and 'Gothicism' in Spain under the old regime.

It may be said that the book by Don Alonso de Cartagena, which was written in a moment of passion by an anti-statute man, is the last in a period when the controversy was at its strongest. It is followed by a time when statutes multiply in religious orders, university colleges, brotherhoods, cathedrals. Mr. Sicroff draws a complete picture of the vicissitudes created by this proliferation, which culminated in the imposition of the statute in the first church of Spain, Toledo cathedral, by Juan Martínez Siliceo, the famous archbishop who had been Philip II's tutor and who is said to have been a violent individual. The present work also abounds in details of the writings for and against produced by the Toledo statute, the most famous of all writings of this *genre*. Mr. Sicroff examines, for instance, the content of some of the works of the opposition, which are very difficult to come by, such as that of Fray Domingo de Baltanás and others written anonymously. He makes a similarly careful examination of the stoutest defender of the statutes, Diego de Simancas, a prelate who took part in the lengthy trial of Archbishop Carranza and was one of the authorities who was most emulated by Spanish antisemitic writers.

It may be said that during the second half of the seventeenth century the 'statutist'

wave increased and the defenders of the statutes managed to impose their views and thus completely to dominate the will of the majority, who were constantly subjected to threatening arguments.

An exposé of the problem from the strict viewpoint of the controversies cannot give an overall historical perspective. But it is clear that in the seventeenth century the statutes of 'cleanness' were again under discussion owing to the large influx into Spain of Portuguese converts and the increased number of powerful families and of those with members of intellectual standing who were of Jewish descent and who found themselves disabled from taking up posts. In 1623 an attempt was made to reform the spirit of the statutes somewhat. Before that happened, there had again been writers who attacked them violently, such as Fray Agustín Salucio. In Mr. Sicroff's book there is a faithful reference to his treatises and those of others on the application of the statutes in the light of events, from which we can see the difficulties which arose, among them the *Tractatus bipartitus de puritate et nobilitate probanda* of Juan Escobar del Corro and that of Fray Gerónimo de la Cruz. He could have mentioned many others, especially those written by the *arbitristas* and specialist writers on economic matters who saw in the statutes one of the causes of the decline and depopulation of Spain. I am thinking of men such as Francisco de Torreblanca and Murcia de la Llana. But no book can hope to exhaust a theme, however limited it be. And Mr. Sicroff's book more than fulfils what it sets out to do, dealing, for example, with the particular attitude of certain institutions, such as the Jesuits, to the statutes and the literary aspects of the treatment of the problem, which reflects the preoccupation of the theatre, the novel, etc. with the problem of the purity of blood. There is also an analysis of later books, such as that of Father Torrejoncillo, a starchy work which annoyed rabbis such as I. Loeb and which was still read in eighteenth-century Spain. But ultimately the prejudice slowly dwindled into oblivion during the turbulent Spanish nineteenth century, a century in which the country's prestige abroad was low, but which freed it, painfully and violently, from a whole series of heavy burdens and ways of thinking, indeed from those very things against which the disputants, whom Mr. Sicroff tells us about so accurately and eruditely, protested.

JULIO CARO BAROJA

CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, *A World on the Wane*, translated from the French by J. Russell, 404 pp., ill., Hutchinson, London, 1961, 42*s*.

Professor Lévi-Strauss, well known in scientific circles as one of the world's most eminent anthropologists, has also achieved fame among the French literary public since the publication in 1956 of *Tristes tropiques*, which was followed in 1961 by that of a series of broadcast *Entretiens*. Both books have found a large audience among people who knew little or nothing of what was in French called *ethnologie* up to the time when Lévi-Strauss introduced the phrase *anthropologie sociale*.

Tristes tropiques, now translated as *A World on the Wane* (and having lost in the process the alliterative appeal of its French title) is a complex work, not at all easy to describe or define briefly. Despite its wealth of ethnographic data on three Brazilian tribes it is certainly not an anthropology book. Yet it remains an anthropologist's book and also, in part, a book about anthropology. The book jacket speaks of 'a return to the French tradition of the *voyage philosophique*', which found its most characteristic expression during the eighteenth century. The authors referred to were much more *philosophes* than *voyageurs* (some of them were indeed quite sedentary). This is quite consistent with the opening sentence of *Tristes tropiques* where Lévi-Strauss firmly states his loathing of travels and explorers. Still it is a fact that his ethnological research work was, unlike that of some of his French predecessors, done in the field—a terribly distant and lonely field. Travel thus became a quest, and the book is to a large extent the story of this quest.

What Lévi-Strauss finds at the end of this quest is himself, or a new awareness of himself. From this angle *Tristes tropiques*, rather than being a mere autobiography, is the story of an education. At the same time, on another plane, it is a meditation on

Man and the world, both themes joining up in a conclusion simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic, somewhat reminiscent of certain aspects of J. P. Sartre's thought, despite the severity that Lévi-Strauss shows towards existentialism. The argument may in fact be analysed into a chain of dialectical oppositions articulating with one another in a dynamic process well in agreement with the author's admiration for Marx (he is, however, very far from being an orthodox communist). Anthropology plays the part of a tool, an instrument of philosophical thought, in line with an age-old French tradition which can be dated back to Montaigne.

It is impossible in a summary review to give a fair account of the many qualities of *Tristes tropiques*. The book is, in fact, too rich to be appreciated to the full on a first reading, all the more so since its style is often deceptively easy. It well deserves further readings at random—and preferably in French.

In French, because it is a sad fact that the translation is far from satisfactory. I concede that Lévi-Strauss's bitter-sweet irony is seldom easy to render into English, that some of his terminology and much of his reasoning may be difficult to follow for a layman—even a French one. I shall go so far as to condone, in pious remembrance of Edward Lear and Lewis Carroll, the intrusion of a zebra-horn (!—anyway it may have been the printer's idea) in a South American tribe (p. 164). But what can be the excuse for having deleted four whole chapters of the original book? These are chiefly concerned with the author's impressions of Asia (especially India and Pakistan) and, to a lesser extent, of the Islamic world. In my opinion they are essential to a good understanding of the full development of his thought. The countries and peoples concerned cannot properly be considered 'on the wane', but they do belong to the 'wretched Tropics', and their present problems are, as it were, complementary to and, in a way, symmetrical with those of the Caduveo or Nambikwara. It is indeed a pity that one of the most important books published in France since the war should have been presented to the English-speaking public in a castrated version.

PIERRE ALEXANDRE

GUIDO BEDARIDA, *Ebrei d'Italia*, 327 pp., Società Editrice Tirrena, Livorno, 1950, 1,000 lire.

A brief review cannot possibly do justice to the richness and importance of this book. The author, a well-known lawyer and historian, and a leading member of the Jewish community of Italy, is highly qualified to treat his subject. The study is the more important in that only relatively few books have been devoted to the *churban* in Italy. The present volume is divided into two parts: Part I, *History and Polemics*, contains six chapters, which deal with problems connected with antisemitism under Mussolini, with racialism in general, and with the economic, cultural, and intellectual position of Italian Jewry. Part II—nineteen chapters—deals with the contribution of Italian Jewry, particularly during the period 1848–1948, in a great variety of fields—Jewish and humanistic studies, figurative arts, music and the theatre, historical and philosophical studies, education, juridical, socio-economic, medical, mathematical, and natural sciences, geography, travels and exploration, journalism, typography and bibliophily, politics and diplomacy, wars and patriotic movements, and so on and so forth.

There are two appendices dealing with Italian Jews abroad, and with foreign Jews who made a contribution to Italian culture. Three statistical tables and four indexes complete the interesting picture.

Proofs are given to show that, with very few exceptions, Italy—even 'Fascist Italy'—was never antisemitic, certainly not before Hitler's official visit to Italy in May 1938, a visit followed by the arrival in Italy of several Nazi 'specialists' (including the infamous Col. Kappler) to organize the racist policy of Mussolini's government. The writer of the present review (who was perhaps the last Jew to be received by Mussolini, April 1938) is well aware of antisemitic undercurrents in Fascist circles, but the Italian people as a whole abhorred antisemitic actions. Even the Fascist party and government officially denied the existence of an antisemitic policy or 'a Jewish problem'—at least until the summer of 1938.

Indeed, in 1938 (i.e. after sixteen years of Fascist rule) Italian Jewry, numbering

according to official statistics 57,425, included among its members generals and admirals, numerous university professors, senators and members of Parliament, explorers and scientific travellers, painters, front rank journalists and other leading personalities, in far higher proportion than any other section of Italian citizens.

All in all, this is a valuable book, which will be read with great advantage not only by those interested in the fortunes of Italian Jewry, but also by those wishing to study the tragedy of European Jewry under the Nazi regime.

DAVID DIRINGER

MAURICE PARMELEE, *The History of Modern Culture*, Philosophical Library, Inc., New York, 1960, $10.

I don't know what the English price of this book is. The sterling equivalent of $10 is 71*s.* 8*d.* For that amount of money one could buy between fifteen and twenty first-rate paper-back editions of books on the development of modern culture and still have enough over for coffee and cake in the nearest Espresso. Admittedly, Mr. Parmelee's book is very, very large and embodies an immense amount of work. But anyone who is interested in the subject would, I think, be better advised to invest his money as I have suggested.

What is more, Mr. Parmelee's book is not really about its nominal subject. It contains instead a great deal about all human cultural history from the earliest times. It shows acquaintance with a great deal of sociology, not all of it up-to-date. And it contains long and eloquent pleas for 'gymnosophy'—which I understand to be the practice of self-consciously healthy living while wearing no clothes.

In fact, this book, although widely liberal, well intentioned, and in a sense learned, does not provide a history of modern culture nor a really up-to-date and systematic introduction to contemporary knowledge of how society works. It is a very handsomely produced, but if the reader has $10 or its equivalent I think he will get bigger returns on a different investment.

D. G. MACRAE

SABATINO MOSCATI, *The Semites in Ancient History*, 142 pp. and 1 map, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1959, 15*s.*

This essay, by a leading Italian Semitist, has as its sub-title 'An enquiry into the settlement of the Beduin and their political establishment'. It is, in fact, a little more than this, in covering a very wide field, and at the same time, a little less: since it is really only an outline. Professor Moscati boldly starts by examining the questions 'Who are the Semites? and 'are they a people?' The name of Semites, it is interesting to learn, was first coined by a German, Schlözer, in 1781, for those races, reputedly descendants of the Biblical Shem, who spoke (or speak) a group of more-or-less closely connected languages—Babylonian, Hebrew, Aramaic, Phoenician, Arabic. Professor Moscati examines the evidence on linguistic, religious, psychological and physical grounds, and comes to the conclusion that, in the eye of history, the Semites form 'a unity sufficiently homogeneous to be recognized as a group of peoples'. He defines what he means by a people as 'an aggregate of persons who may be of different race and origin, but who take on homogeneity of character by their community of geographical habitat, of language, and of historical-cultural process' (p. 28). He makes it clear, however, that he follows the view, with some modifications, that these 'Semitic peoples' were formed by the semi-nomadic waves of a basically Beduin society, welling over periodically from the Arabian desert on to the agricultural lands that surround it. The earliest of these waves (or 'irradiations', as the translator, rather unsuitably and repeatedly, terms them) is that which seems to have brought the Semites into Mesopotamia before 3000 B.C.E., and perhaps Phoenicians into Lebanon; the next main wave, that of the Amorites, about 2000 B.C.E., into Syria; then with the end of the Bronze Age, the push of Aramaeans and Hebrews into different parts of the 'Fertile Crescent'. But, as he points out, the process went on in major or minor waves all the time. It culminated with the eruption of Islam.

This is reasonable and well stated enough, though there are still very many uncertainties to be settled in this vast field. The over-scrupulous translator, however, laboriously faithful to the ample periods of the Italian original, often holds up the reader by failing to convey the sense in the concision essential to a good English style.

Nor has the author been too well served by his printers, who have provided the wrong fount for 'z' on pp. 29, 31, 33, 34, 38, 41, 45, and occasionally for 'b', 'r' and 's'.

R. D. BARNETT

SABATINO MOSCATI, *The Face of the Ancient Orient*, xxxii + 328 pp., 5 text figs. and 1 map, Routledge & Kegan Paul and Valentine, Mitchell, London, 1960, 30*s*.

In this far more ambitious work, originally given as a wireless broadcast series, Professor Moscati takes the whole of the Ancient Near East for his canvas. He describes it as 'a comparative study of the essential and characteristic features of the ancient Oriental civilizations', and he claims that it has not been previously tried. In general, this claim is true, since I can think of no single modern work which describes the features of Ancient Near Eastern Life, Art and Literature, with extensive quotations from ancient texts. In this way, this work fills a most useful want for teachers and students alike. Professor Moscati shows an amazingly wide reading and general grasp of the different disciplines, now tending to become more and more separated by increasing specialization. His approach is naturally one which will commend itself to the sociologist, since one gets a view (even if it is only a personal view, so much the better) of the life, thought, art and literature, of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel and their neighbours, and their historical rise and fall. There can be little doubt that this is a really excellent and useful, as well as readable manual of up-to-date information about the Ancient Near East.

R. D. BARNETT

MARTINUS ADRIANUS BEEK, *Geschichte Israels von Abraham bis Bar Kochba*, 169 pp., Urban Bücher, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, DM4.80

The author, a prominent Dutch teacher of Old Testament Studies, gives in brief shape (the book contains only 169 pages) a wealth of information. As the title says, he describes Jewish history in its classical period, the generations that created the Bible and gave Judaism the foundation which enabled it to live through two thousand years of homelessness and bitter persecutions. Everyone knows that the history of Israel can be told in many ways. Mr. Beek has chosen to attach greatest attention to the description of political events. The Middle East was always one of the most important scenes of world politics, a key position to be fought for and won by rival powers. It is so to-day and was so three thousand years ago. These factors deeply influenced the fortunes of the chosen people; they have to be investigated and described as the critical historian does. And Mr. Beek is a writer who is able to build his story upon numerous details in a form so fascinating, that he often casts a spell on his reader. Of course, the same story could have been written from a religious point of view, the events appearing as actions of God Almighty. Judging that method Mr. Beek wittily cites Chesterton's detective novel *The Hammer of God*, where the culprit declares that the murder took place when God with the hammer of His wrath did the killing! And Mr. Beek agrees with the answer of the sceptical police inspector: 'The actions of God are outside the competence of my office.' But what makes this attempt at writing the history of Israel something of an adventure is that the author manages to fuse these two methods together into a unity. Behind the soberminded historical investigation and writing the reader catches glimpses of the tacit basis, the divine secrecy of God's ruling power in the background of history.

It may be said that Mr. Beek ought to have weeded his manuscript once more. In that case the reader would have been freed from irritating details like the following. On page 63 the author places Megiddo *north* of Mount Carmel. On page 168 he lets Eretz Israel be proclaimed on May the 14th, 1948; it should of course have been

Medinat Israel. But such things are trifles compared with the wealth of information the book gives. Luckily Mr. Beek is never anxious to prove that the Bible is right. But the non-biblical texts he abundantly quotes are substantial evidence of the reality of or supplements to the information we find in the Bible; to mention some few out of many: the Lakish finds, the Dead Sea scrolls, papyri from Elephantine, published as late as 1953, excavations from Nippur and Gezer. And I want to quote a striking formulation like this: the apocalypses created more history than they described. Mr. Beek sees a straight line from Psalm 137—the first example in history of zionistic yearning: 'If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning'—to the creation of modern Israel. Rightly the author marks that event as one of the most important facts in our time. Not for nothing does he make his book end in the sonorous words of Psalm 106: 'Many times did he deliver them, but they provoked him with their counsel, and were brought low for their iniquity. Nevertheless he regarded their affliction when he heard their cries: and he remembered for them his covenant, and repented according to the multitude of his mercies.'

Mr. Beek's brilliant book deserves attention. I have read it more than once. And I intend to return to it.

POUL BORCHSENIUS

H. G. RICHARDSON, *The English Jewry under Angevin Kings*, 313 pp., Methuen, London, 1960, 35*s*..

While concerned principally with the reigns of Henry II and his immediate successors, Mr. Richardson's book is in effect a history of medieval Anglo-Jewry. The work, based largely upon his unpublished papers read to the Jewish Historical Society, amply fulfils the author's modestly expressed hope of dispersing some errors of long-standing and making some fresh knowledge available. His success is such that this book at once takes an important place in the current widespread reappraisal of the medieval English scene as a whole. Not the least valuable part of the book are the appendices containing unknown or little known documents.

Whether by refuting the persistent contention regarding wealthy Jewish ostentation, or by applying many new qualifications to the already weakened proposition that the Christian population bore the Jews in England a universal dislike, or by adducing further evidence that the monks were 'happy collaborators' rather than victims of Jewish moneylenders, or in giving new interpretations to old material and making use of fresh sources, Mr. Richardson has redrawn the picture of medieval Anglo-Jewry, particularly in its relations with its Gentile environment.

Henry II and his successors borrowed heavily from foreign Christian moneylenders. The King certainly found further ready capital by taxing the Jews. 'It is very difficult to maintain that Jews, at least in the twelfth century, were, on the whole, more liable to arbitrary exactions than Christians.—In principle there was no discrimination between Jew and Christian' (pp. 45–6). As for Jewish loans, 'there is no reason to suppose', concludes Mr. Richardson, 'that the (Jewish) loans (to the King) represented a large proportion of the King's revenue—borrowing was never a real instrument of finance and there was never much system behind it' (p. 66). The ultimate cause of the 'mounting oppression' of the thirteenth century was not so much royal necessity as the 'organized intolerance' manifesting itself equally against heretics and infidels. In considering the causes of the expulsion, the author comments that 'Edward's conscience had been stirred by his financial necessities' (p. 231).

Mr. Richardson is at pains to point out that the expulsion was not the result of any radical alteration in the country's economic organization whereby the Jews no longer performed their function. The functions of Jewish moneylenders under Edward I 'did not differ in kind from their functions under Henry II' (p. 48). They were not international financiers, like the Flemings and the Italians. 'To suggest', observes the author, 'that in England the Jews were replaced by Italians is to misconceive the course of history' (p. 108). The Jews operated on a wholly different and smaller scale, lending money at many levels of society, and only rarely were any of them big enough to enter into a kind of competition with foreign loan finance. Mr. Richardson reinforces the view that there was very considerable diversification in the economic activities of the Jews and in their modes of livelihood.

This work richly illustrates the special feature of the Jews whereby they alone were both unable to hold the freehold interest in land and yet were able to dispose of land coming to them by way of security. By reason of this anomaly the Jews were an important vehicle for the transfer of land and thereby contributed to the progressive dissolution of the so-called feudal system of tenure and status. But they were far from being the only vehicle, and the market in land continued 'as active as ever' after their departure. The Statute known as Quia Emptores, providing for the alienation of the fee simple without subinfeudation, was enacted in the same year as the edict of expulsion. The Statute hastened the destruction of the old system of land tenure.

Inevitably Mr. Richardson's treatment of the latter part of the thirteenth century tends to be increasingly summary. It is much to be hoped that he will find time to produce as detailed a study of the Jews in the reigns of Henry III and Edward I as he has done for the period immediately prior thereto.

I. FINESTEIN

PATRICE BOUSSEL, *L'Affaire Dreyfus et la Presse*, 272 pp., Collection Kiosque, Armand Colin, Paris, 1960.

The antisemitic movement in France, recently founded by Edouard Drumont, was flagging in 1894. The Dreyfus Affair revived both antisemitism and the fortunes of the declining press. Most newspapers were anti-Dreyfusard, like Drumont's *Libre Parole*, since many of their owners were right wing political leaders. Journalists and cartoonists had also become antisemitic when their profession encountered hard times. The press was therefore responsible for exaggerating the antisemitism which had been only a subsidiary cause of the arrest of Dreyfus, and for magnifying the Affair out of all proportion.

In this volume in the Kiosque series on the influence of the press in history, M. Boussel provides a narrative framework for well-chosen excerpts and summaries from many newspapers. He relates the facts not in the order in which they occurred, but just as the public became aware of them through the press. It would have been desirable to have more explanation by the author of the discrepancies between the press reports and the actual course of events. Nonetheless he succeeds admirably in recreating the highly charged atmosphere of the period, not least by including seventy illustrations of press cuttings, cartoons, handbills and posters. Rumours and speculations about espionage and counter-espionage outnumbered the few balanced accounts of the trial and subsequent fate of Dreyfus, but even a hostile press served his cause by keeping interest in the case alive until it was reopened. Among publications favourable to the Dreyfusards, *L'Aurore* was notable as the medium for Zola's *J'accuse*. This letter marked the final submergence of the issues of antisemitism and of the innocence of Dreyfus in the conflict of the republican parties against the army and its supporters. A few antisemites were even Dreyfusards for political reasons. French antisemitism was the common denominator of the divergent parties of the Right, but not an independent political force, nor the forerunner of Nazi antisemitism.

H. J. COHN

NORMAN BENTWICH, *The Jews of Our Time—The development of Jewish life in the modern world*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1960, 3*s.* 6*d.*

By agreeing to write the story of modern Jewry, with its historical background, in 164 pages, Professor Bentwich undertook an almost impossible task. The last half century in Jewish life has been full of dramatic events and changes, for whose intensity in time and volume there are no precedents in history. Therefore, situations and events which occurred not only in our lifetime but even before our own eyes seem, in retrospect, as remote as those which happened centuries ago. On the other hand, because of the proximity in time, there is a natural inclination to rely too much on one's own knowledge and memory. But a historian, like a lawyer, should never attempt to deal with a situation without checking the source. Such a study on modern Jewry

would require so much work and time that no single person could afford it, unless he regarded it as a lifetime job.

There is no need to dwell on the importance of a brief presentation of modern Jewry for the reading public at large: the ignorance about Jews and the resulting prejudices and biases have been appalling for decades. General books on history deal very little, if at all, with Jews and, in general, do not treat of modern times. For this reason alone Professor Bentwich's endeavour should be highly commended. It is, however, a pity that pressure of time did not permit him to be as exact in his facts and, sometimes, even in style, as one would have wished, for his own and the reader's sake.

In this short review it is impossible to give more than just a few examples of what was said above. The reader is already confronted with it in the short preface: the isolation of Soviet Jewry from the rest of the (Jewish) 'nation' did not occur from 1933 but was a much earlier phenomenon.

Inexact expressions sometimes make one wonder what the real facts are. As an example, we could cite the statement on pp. 33–4: 'In the *seventeenth* century small . . . Holland . . . gave refuge to a number of Sephardi Jews and *from 1600* allowed them to observe Judaism.' The same applies to the last para. on page 34 (Jews found their way to England in the seventeenth century but one of them was executed in 1594). The reader will also wonder what the expression 'religious nationality' (p. 36) means, or what Professor Bentwich has in mind when he says that the Jews in the Soviet Union are the only nationality 'not allowed to use their own language': it is unclear whether he refers to Hebrew, which has been banned, or Yiddish which may freely be spoken.

There are also numerous factual inaccuracies. As a random example one may cite the statement that there were 100,000 Jews in Bulgaria in 1939 (p. 63). The same figures for Holland and Belgium (p. 57) are also incorrect, as are the sentences which follow. To the best of this reviewer's knowledge, there were never any Allied statements during the war concerning compensation for deprivation of liberty, loss of profession, etc. (p. 58), nor could large numbers of 'Hitler's victims' find refuge in Canada between 1933 and 1942 (all in all, only several thousands were admitted), nor have the greater part of the surviving German Jews emigrated to Palestine (Israel). These examples could be multiplied.

Generalizations, unfortunately, also occur. One has become so accustomed to speak of ghettos and the yellow star that Professor Bentwich puts all western and northern European countries (France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway) in one class in this respect (p. 56). Actually, for example, there never were efficient ghetto systems in France or Holland; there were no ghettos whatsoever in Denmark or Norway. The Jewish badge was never introduced in Denmark.

The German restitution and compensation legislation is represented as a uniform measure for all western Europe (p. 54).

The statement on the top of page 52 gives the impression that practically all Jews who lived in Russia on the eve of the First World War wore long kaftans and fur hats —something which no-one familiar with Russian Jewry could say.

In all fairness to Professor Bentwich it should be pointed out that even more comprehensive books of this kind are by no means free of errors.

NEHEMIAH ROBINSON

LEON ROTH, *Judaism, A Portrait*, 240 pp., Faber & Faber, 1961, 25*s*.

If it be true, as Dr. Leon Roth himself maintains, that 'a portrait is not a photograph or a systematic survey' but 'an attempt to catch the spirit of a living thing' it is difficult to imagine a better example of a literary portrait than this most recent study of Judaism.

For Judaism is essentially a 'living thing'. There are, of course, many (Jews as well as non-Jews) who might feel disposed to question this assertion. The Christian caricature of Judaism as an effete and outworn religious system, negative and legalistic in its emphases, is still, alas, very much with us. There are historians who, *pace* Arnold Toynbee, tend to regard Jews, and particularly the Jewish way of life, as a kind of fossilized survival from a remote past. There are even Jews who, because of their preoccupation with, or their despair of, its ritual observances, have lost touch with the

spirit that alone can give life and contemporary significance to the traditions of their fathers.

Not so Dr. Roth. For him Judaism is clearly very much alive—and contemporary. So also is his manner of writing about it. For coupled with a certain 'exuberance of style'—curbed, on Dr. Roth's own admission, by the good offices of a friend, but happily not eliminated—we have the faith of a believer, the wisdom of a philosopher and the insight of a sociologist.

The earlier chapters of the book are concerned with the pattern and composition of traditional Judaism, which, 'so far as it may be said to have a history, is the story of the balance (often an uneasy one) between the universality of the doctrine and the particularity of its transmitters'. And with this observation, quoted from the first page of the opening chapter, we are immediately brought face to face with the inescapable dilemma of the Jew (and for that matter of the Christian) in every generation.

For as Dr. Roth points out—and as too few critics, whether of Judaism or of Christianity, pause to reflect—'it is so easy to claim to be of the chosen people, and to forget that choice means duty, not privilege'. Even so, 'the Biblical appellation of the Jews is not the "chosen" people but the "holy" people, that is, a people set apart with a special vocation. Thus Judaism is not to be considered in terms of the Jews but the Jews in terms of Judaism. Judaism is not what some, or all individual Jews happen as a fact to do. It is what Jews should be doing (but often are not doing) as members of a holy people. Judaism comes first. It is not a product but a programme and the Jews are the instruments of its fulfilment.'

I have quoted this passage *in extenso* because it seems to me, coming as it does at the very commencement of the book, to go at once to the heart of the contemporary no less than the historical problem of the meaning and purpose of Judaism. It is, and always has been, in the failure to recognize the force of this belief that the greatest danger to the Jewish people and to Judaism consists, a danger greater even than that of antisemitism.

This danger, Dr. Roth points out in the later stages of his book, became most apparent at the point early in the nineteenth century when the walls of the Ghetto began to fall and a new situation was created, not only for Jews themselves, but also for Judaism. It was the point at which the community came within danger of being lost. 'Sociologically', writes Dr. Roth, 'the point is familiar. Any community can maintain itself as an independent unit so long as it sees itself as differing from neighbouring groups and so long as it values the difference sufficiently to desire to maintain it. But when the sense of difference and its value fades away, the community fades away with it'.

This is all very well so far as it goes. But there comes a point at which the philosopher and the theologian must take over—or at least bring their contribution to its development. For we are bound sooner or later to ask in what 'the sense of difference' consists; what is its origin—and purpose, if it can be said to have a purpose. And what are the ultimate sanctions for maintaining it?

Perhaps the point at which most Jews and non-Jews are most acutely aware of this 'sense of difference' is in relation to what Dr. Roth (quoting another's witticism) refers to as the ' "pot-and-pan-theism" of a "kitchen-religion" ', with its numerous, and, to many people nowadays, largely meaningless points of differentiation. Are these to be interpreted as mere anachronisms; as examples of the perpetuation of difference for its own sake; or as particular applications of the general principle that all life is 'holy', and that, as Dr. Roth suggests, 'dietary laws and daily prayers, no less than Sabbath and Day of Atonement, foster a life of quality and purpose', not for the Jew alone, but ultimately for all mankind? Are we, in fact, here confronted with the question which perhaps more than any other lies at the heart of the whole meaning and purpose of Judaism; the question of the relation between the particular and the universal, and the working out of that relationship in the everyday, 'down to earth' life of the individual and of the community?

It is precisely in his handling of this issue that the chief interest as well as the abiding value of Dr. Roth's book lies. A philosopher himself, he has an understandable admiration for Maimonides and those other Jewish philosophers who 'long before and long after the Middle Ages . . . contributed to Judaism not new facts or (necessarily) new ideas but a new attitude and a new approach to the old'. Among them all, however,

Dr. Roth maintains that it is 'the medieval Jewish philosophers . . . who hold a unique importance for our guidance in the understanding of Judaism'. And among these, 'the greatest of them all, Maimonides, may be said indeed to have erected the structure and to be the architect of what is known now as Judaism'.

It is, of course, possible that not all his readers will share either Dr. Roth's enthusiasm for Maimonides or his judgement as to the lasting and indeed contemporary importance of this great 'guide of the perplexed'. He who dissents, however, must recognize the obligation of providing alternative suggestions as to where we may reasonably look for guidance in relation to the problems confronting the Jewish people today, both in the Diaspora and in the State of Israel, and in their relations with their neighbours no less than in their own domestic affairs. It is, indeed, the chief merit of Dr. Roth's book that both explicitly and by implication he has laid bare so many of the essential questions of the hour. For the rest, I shall long be grateful for a brilliant survey of the historic development of Judaism, illuminated at all points with the most apt of quotations and the most incisive of interpretative comments.

WILLIAM W. SIMPSON

ANDRE SIEGFRIED, *Itinéraires de contagions, épidémies et idéologies*, Preface by Pasteur Valery-Radot, 118 pp., Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1960.

This little work has appeared after André Siegfried's death. It is his last. His usual publisher, Armand Colin, has ensured its publication, and in a foreword to this little volume, as homage to the author, he recalls the list of the man's publications, justly saying of it that it 'établit la carte de ses itinéraires et illustre l'éventail des ses curiosités'. And he adds that this great humanist of the twentieth century, this methodical scholar, strove to know and to understand everything. André Siegfried's great presence is vividly drawn up before our eyes. The present work, which brings his labours to a close, testifies once more to his limitless curiosity and his desire to know and understand everything, as well as to the extraordinary seriousness he brought to the study of every subject he undertook to treat, however remote it might seem at first glance from his main preoccupations. This little work springs from this characteristic; it is at first sight a medical work, because it deals with great epidemics, based, despite the fact that it is written by a man who was not a doctor, on a profound knowledge of the subject, such that a specialist probably could not have done better; and yet at the same time, by opening up broad vistas, the author has gone beyond a mere study in epidemiology. This is shewn by the heading 'Epidémies et idéologies'; these are studies in epidemiology if you like, but they are also human geography, epidemics and ideologies being shewn to follow the same routes in their diffusion, using the same means of propagation and protection, manifesting many affinities between them.

In his Preface Professor Valery-Radot tells us of the circumstances in which the book was born. It was his custom to ask certain eminent people, chosen from the non-medical world, to give the opening lecture of his courses in order to counter the distressing habit in doctors and their students of looking at the world of the spirit through the prism of medical science. Asked to give one of these inaugural lectures, André Siegfried chose for his theme 'Les routes qu'ont suivies les maladies contagieuses dans leur diffusion', a subject which, he added, bears equally upon human geography, as we have seen. The lecture was given in 1958. From it this little book, alas posthumous, was born.

Obviously there can be no question of trying to summarize, even briefly, all the facts contained in this book about the great epidemics, cholera, Asian 'flu, plague, and yellow fever, the discoveries made progressively about their mode of transmission, and the prophylactic methods which these discoveries have brought about. Although short, the book is from this point of view very rich, instructive both to the doctor and the layman, relying as it does on a broad documentation. The author, who was not of course a specialist, took great pains, as he always did for any question he undertook to study, to furnish himself with the necessary information, which in this case he got in the first place from Professor Milliez. But, to repeat, there is no need here to go into these matters.

It is more important to emphasize André Siegfried's leading idea. This is expressed in the book's sub-title and is subsequently developed in the fourth and last part of the book: 'Diffusion des idées et propagandes'. In this manner the affinity between biology and sociology is established. Our language by itself shows us the connexion. We use the same terms for both the spread of epidemics and the diffusion of ideas: germ, ferment, focus, vector, terrain, milieu, contact, contagion, contamination, epidemic, vaccination, quarantine, and so on. And amplifying this theme the author closes his book: 'There is probably more than a superficial coincidence in this. In both the field of biology and the realm of ideas we notice certain reactions which are common to all living beings'. The paths taken in the spreading of germs are also those which are followed by ideas, religions, social concepts, doctrines subversive and otherwise. These are the high roads of communication which, despite the fact that the speed of our methods of travel has grown in an astonishing manner, have remained the same from ancient times to our own day.

What also makes the book attractive is that the author, quite incidentally and without contenting himself with very general observations, touches on immediate and current problems of life, such as the means taken for the shelter of many doctrines against 'contagion'. He deals in a few lines with McCarthyism in the United States, a veritable paroxysm of this obsession with protection, and elsewhere with the iron and bamboo curtains. He also talks of the 'quarantine' imposed on people who have returned after a more or less prolonged stay abroad, and finally of all the procedures brought into play to shelter from contagion the doctrine which is to be protected: censorship, baggage examination, police measures, religious persecutions, so-called 'psychological' methods of re-education, 'defanatization', and readaptation which are 'the shame of our century'. He speaks also in this way of the persecution of the Protestants at the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, of the Jews at all times, of Armenians massacred by the Turks, terrifying excesses which have been shewn to be ineffective and useless because Protestants, Jews, and Armenians have remained. So that it is necessary to ask up to what point excesses such as these are effective against 'ce germe ailé, souvent invisible, qu'est l'esprit'. And with this phrase, in which we rediscover that 'esprit' which at all times animated André Siegfried, the great humanist of the twentieth century, we may well end the account of this small, but at the same time great, book.

E. MINKOWSKI

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Bloch, Herbert A. (ed.): *Crime in America—Controversial Issues in Twentieth Century Criminology*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1961, $6.00.

Calver, Jean-Yves, S. J. and Perrin, Jacques, S. J.: *The Church and Social Justice, The Social Teachings of the Popes from Leo XIII to Pius XII (1878–1958)*, translated by J. R. Kirwan, Burns & Oates, London, 1961, 42.

Dayan, Yael (ed.): *The Promised Land—Memoirs of Samuel Dayan*, translated from the Hebrew by Sidney Lightman, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, 25*s*.

Elath, Eliahu: *Hebrew and the Jewish Renaissance*, the first Selig Brodetsky Memorial Lecture, Leeds University Press, 1961, 2*s*. 6*d*.

Eliade, Mircea: *Images and Symbols, Studies in Religious Symbolism*, translated by Philip Mairet, Harvill Press, London, 1961, 18*s*.

Friedmann, Georges: *The Anatomy of Work, the Implications of Specialisation*, translated by Wyatt Rawson, Heinemann, London, 1961, 25*s*.

Ginsberg, Morris: *Nationalism—A Reappraisal*, the second Selig Brodetsky Memorial Lecture, Leeds University Press, 1961, 2*s*. 6*d*.

Goldstein, Morris: *Lift Up Your Life—a Personal Philosophy of our Time*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1961, $4.75.

Grant, Frederick C.: *Ancient Judaism and the New Testament*, Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 1960, 21*s*.

Heilbronner, Robert L.: *The Future as History*, Hamish Hamilton Ltd., London, 1961, 32*s*.

Hertz, Alexander: *Żydzi w Kulturze Polskiej*, Biblioteka 'Kultury' Tom LXVI, Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1961, 22*s*.

Hesky, Olda; *The Painted Queen*, Anthony Blond, London, 1961, 18*s*.

Hughes, Philip: *The Church in Crisis, The Twenty Great Councils*, Burns & Oates, London, 1961, 35*s*.

Kaplan, Bert (ed.): *Studying Personality Cross-Culturally*, Row, Peterson & Co., Evanston, Illinois, Elmsford, New York, 1961, $8.50.

Katz, Jacob: *Exclusiveness and Tolerance, Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times*, Scripta Judaica III, Oxford University Press, 1961, 21*s*.

Kluckhohn, Florence, Rockwood and Strodtbeck, Fred L.: *Variations in Value Orientations*, with the assistance of John M. Roberts, A. Kimball Romney, Clyde Kluckhohn and Harry A. Scarr, Row, Peterson and Company, Evanston, Illinois, Elmsford, New York, 1961, $7.75.

Koyama, Takashi: *The Changing Social Position of Women in Japan*, UNESCO, Paris, 1961, 10*s*.

Leach, E. R.: *Rethinking Anthropology*, London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 22, University of London, The Athlone Press, 1961, 21*s*.

MacRae, Donald: *Ideology and Society*, Heinemann, London, 25*s*.

Meynaud, Jean (ed.): *International Bibliography of Political Science*, Vol. VIII, prepared by the International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation in co-operation with the International Political Science Association, UNESCO, Paris, 1961, 25*s*.

Roucek, Joseph S. (ed.): *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1961, $10.

Roucek, Joseph S. (ed.): *Sociology of Crime*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1961, $10.

Runes, Dagobert D.: *Letters to my Teacher*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1961, $2.75.

Samuelsson, Kurt: *Religion and Economic Action*, translated from the Swedish by E. Geoffrey French, edited and with an introduction by D. C. Coleman, William Heinemann, London, 1961, 21*s*.

Spinoza, Baruch: *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy*, newly translated from the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with a preface by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, 1961, New York, $4.75.

Straus, Raphael: *Urkunden und Akten-Stücke zur Geschichte der Juden in Regensburg 1453–1738, Quellen und Eroterungen zur Bayerschten Geschichte*, Neue Volge/Band XVIII; mit einem Geleitwort von Friedrich Beatugen, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munich, 1960, n.p.

Tartakower, Arieh: 'The Decline of European Jewry (1933–1953)' from *The Jews—Their History, Culture and Religion*, third edition, edited by Louis Finkelstein, Harper & Brothers, Publishers, New York.

Theodorson, George A.: *Studies in Human Ecology*, Row, Peterson and Company, Evanston, Illinois, 1961, $8.50.

UNESCO—International Organization in the Social Sciences—a summary description of the structure and activities of non-governmental organizations in consultative status with UNESCO and specialized in the social sciences, revised and augmented edition with an introduction by Jean Meynaud, Paris, 1961, 7*s*. 6*d*.

Unsdorfer, S. B.: *The Yellow Star*, Thomas Yoseloff, New York–London, W. H. Allen & Co. Ltd., London, 1961, 25*s*.

Weinberg, Abraham A.: *Migration and Belonging, a Study of Mental Health and Personal Adjustment in Israel;* introduction by Louis Guttman, Martinus Nijhoff, Studies in Social Life V, The Hague, 1961, 32 guilders.

Wilson, Bryan R.: *Sects and Society, a Sociological Study of Three Religious Groups in Britain*, William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1961, 35*s*.

Winter, Paul: *On the Trial of Jesus*, Studia Judaica Forschungen zur Wissenschaft des Judentums, Band I, Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1961, 40*s*.

CHRONICLE

prepared by

Paul Glikson

According to the official statistics on immigration published by the Canadian Government, half of the Jews who immigrated to Canada in 1960 were from Israel. There were 2,964 Jewish newcomers, of whom about 1,400 came from Israel.

The second largest group of Jewish immigrants came from the U.S.A. (579). 206 immigrants were from Great Britain. Among other countries from which a large number of Jews went to Canada were Poland (133), and France (104).

Not all the Israelis who immigrated to Canada are Jews. Among the 1,474 there were 59 non-Jewish Israelis, mainly of Polish origin.

The statistics also classify the immigrants by occupation. Most of the Jews were listed as professionals, clerical workers, or workers in service industries.

*

The Department of Education and Culture of the Jewish Agency has been expanding its activities in the course of the last year. It now operates in 48 countries.

In the first place, the training of teachers from the Diaspora has been intensified. There are at present 130 teachers in training studying Hebrew and Jewish subjects in Israel. The course lasts one year. It is intended to raise the number to 200. In addition, the Department invited about 500 Diaspora teachers, university lecturers, and social workers to come to Israel for a month's study. Second, there is the enlarged scheme under which 500 Jewish school children will be visiting Israel. Third, the Department will double (to 60,000) the number of school text books and Hebrew readers which it supplies to the Diaspora.

*

Nearly half of Turkey's Jewish population, 47 per cent, still speak Spaniolit (Ladino) at home, according to a social survey published by the Istanbul University. Fifty-three per cent of the older generation speak French at home. However, among the younger Jewish generation, only seven per cent speak Ladino among themselves.

*

The population of Israel on the night of the general census (21–22 May, 1961) was 2,170,082. Professor Roberto Bachi announced these figures, adding that Israel's population is almost exactly two and a half times as great as it was during the last census in November 1948.

The monthly estimates made by the Central Bureau of Statistics on the basis of current information concerning natural increase, immigration and emigration, tally closely with the census results.

Tel Aviv has 387,000 inhabitants, Haifa 180,000, Jerusalem 166,000, Ramat Gan 90,000. The next largest towns in the country are Petah Tikva 53,000, Holon 48,000, and Bnei Brak 47,000. The whole Tel Aviv area comprises close to 700,000 inhabitants. The biggest percentage increase since the end of 1951 by regions is in the south and the Negev, where the population has risen by 169 per cent as against 37.5 per cent for the whole country.

Altogether Israel has thirty-four towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants each, as against ten in 1948.

Statistical information on the population by age, sex, and community will be published in due course, as the material is processed.

*

About 60 per cent of Cuba's Jewish population has left the country since Fidel Castro came to power. Before the revolution there were 10,000 Jews, of whom 8,000 lived in Havana. The reason for the mass Jewish departure from Cuba is that the regime has nationalized all the more important factories and enterprises. However

there was no sign of discrimination against the Jews. Most of the Jews have gone to the U.S.A. which has waived visa requirements for children under 16 and for family reunions. A considerable number are anxious to go to nearby Jamaica. Some 200 persons went to Israel on planes specially chartered by the Jewish Agency.

Cuba has four Jewish congregations: the Reform Synagogue in which American Jews were in the majority; the Sephardi Synagogue, established two years ago; the Comunidad Hebrea which has 800 members, mostly of East European origin, and which is regarded as the principal representative body of Cuban Jewry; and lastly, the five-year-old Conservative Orthodox Congregation.

*

There are at present 933 Jewish papers published in the world: 332 appearing in Israel and 601 in the Diaspora. 34·7 per cent appear in English, 26·6 in Hebrew, 16·4 in Yiddish, 6·6 in French, 4·8 in Spanish and Portuguese, 3·9 in German, and 7·0 in other languages.

Altogether there are 38 dailies, 15 in Hebrew, 14 in Yiddish (13 in the Diaspora countries); there is only one daily in English and one in French, both of them appearing in Israel.

These figures appeared in the fifth revised edition of *The Jewish Press of the World*, edited by Josef Fraenkel and published by the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress.

*

The influence of prevailing social standards on racial and other prejudices was discussed by a group of sociologists meeting at the UNESCO Youth Institute in Gauting, Federal Republic of Germany. The experts who came from eight European countries—Austria, Finland, France, Federal Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom—as well as the United States, analysed the nature of discrimination and prejudice from various viewpoints. There was general agreement that prejudice is not innate and that although psychological factors are important, as well as influences in early life, people generally tend to conform to the behaviour and attitudes accepted by the majority.

The experts stressed the role of the school in combating discrimination, and the importance of training teachers not only to master techniques aimed at fighting prejudice, but also actively to encourage tolerance and impartiality.

The meeting recommended that UNESCO should carry out a sociological survey in a number of countries, which would serve as a basis for a thorough study of all aspects of prejudice and discrimination. This project is to be carried out under the direction of Professor Melvin M. Tumin of the Sociological and Anthropological Department of Princeton University, U.S.A.

The meeting further recommended the establishment of a UNESCO Clearing House on Intergroup Prejudice. This clearing house might, in the long run, set up a library of research and pedagogical data, collect reports of incidents reflecting prejudice in the educational field, and send demonstration teams to various countries to assist schools, and in particular teacher training establishments, in the development of their programmes for combating prejudice and discrimination.

*

34,500 pupils are enrolled in various Jewish day schools in New York; this is an increase of 1,500 over figures taken last year. About one-fifth of the pupils are in the High School Divisions, an overwhelming majority attend at the elementary school level, and 3,500 attend kindergarten and day nurseries.

Over 50,000 pupils are enrolled in Jewish day schools throughout the United States: this number includes New York City. Compared with 1948, the present enrolment shows a threefold increase.

*

More than $28,225,000 was spent by the Joint Distribution Committee last year to aid 232,500 men, women, and children in twenty-five countries. This figure was disclosed in the annual report on the activities of the JDC, which shows an increase of close to 20,000 in the number of persons assisted during the previous year, and an increase in expenditure of $700,000.