THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME THREE 1961

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd, 15-16 Queen Street, London W1

CONTENTS

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

AUTHORS OF REVIEWS

BOOKS REVIEWED

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

VOLUME III NO. 1 JUNE 1961

CONTENTS

PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd, 15–16 Queen Street, London W1

Annual Subscription £1.1.0 (post free)—Single Copies 12s 6d net

Applications for subscription should be addressed to the Managing Editor, The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 55 New Cavendish Street, London W1

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD
FROME AND LONDON

TEXTS AND INTERPRETATION IN ROMAN AND JEWISH LAW*

David Daube

TO REDUCE the subject to manageable dimensions, we shall have to confine ourselves to the interpretation of statutes (omitting testaments, contracts, conveyances) and, indeed, on the whole, to such statutes as deal with private law (omitting religion, constitution, crime). Furthermore, we shall have to concentrate on certain periods and trends in the two laws; and we shall select our material with a view to two aims—firstly, to present in outline some dominant notions of each system, secondly, to achieve a little mutual illumination.

The discussion will fall into four parts. Part I, on the Roman *legis actio*; part II, on Pharisees and Sadducees; part III, on Hillel's work to overcome this division; and part IV, on the Samaritans.

I. THE LEGIS ACTIO

The XII Tables were the first major codification of Roman private law. They were intended securely to define the rights and duties of a citizen in relation to others, and in particular to safeguard him against arbitrary exactions. For the next two-and-a-half centuries, in principle, any position in private law had to conform either to the code or some subsequent enactment, and a man was exposed to no claim unsupported by statute.[1]

How was this system possible considering the incompleteness of the XII Tables? For they were very incomplete. It was not only that, with a gradual change in economic and cultural conditions, new needs and problems arose which they could not have envisaged. Nor was it only that often they would speak of a somewhat narrow case, without considering other, similar ones. These are things that cannot surprise. What is remarkable is that, for reasons not here to be set out,[2] they were

* A Special London University Lecture, delivered at the School of Oriental and African Studies on 21 November 1960; a German version was delivered at Göttingen University on 17 January 1961.

silent on topics which must have been of fair importance at the time. Nothing about an obligation to repay an informal loan. Nothing about ordinary damage to property by a *paterfamilias*.

It should not be argued that we may have lost these provisions. We need only point out that a comparable, Biblical codification, the Mishpatim, contained no rule concerning ordinary, direct damage to property, but, much like the XII Tables, regulated damage caused by my cattle or by a pit I have dug or by a fire I have made in my field.[3] Nearly two hundred years after the XII Tables, the *lex Aquilia*, on which the entire classical law of damage to property was to rest, still dealt only with damage to animate objects, slaves and cattle,[4] and the widest Biblical provision in this field, in Leviticus,[5] was confined to damage to cattle. How, then, was it possible to require a statutory basis for all legal business?

One way of filling gaps was, of course, further legislation. Informal loans were made recoverable by a *lex Silia*,[6] and we have just mentioned the *lex Aquilia*, about damage to property. But it is significant that these were measures of great moment. Legislation was less suitable for the continuous day-to-day adjustments called for in private law. For one thing, it involved a cumbersome machinery, as a rule set in motion only for political purposes. In private law, it was something of a last resort.

Among other methods of progress, interpretation—our main concern today—played a prominent part. In general, it followed sound lines from the outset, favouring a reasonable application of the code, neither too restrictive nor too broad. Thus the rule of the XII Tables that, while the normal period for usucaption was one year, it was to be two years for land was extended to buildings, but not beyond buildings to, say, boats.[7] This example shows that there was no difficulty about one kind of gap at least; namely, that resulting from the fact that the XII Tables might confine themselves to the most conspicuous case, without paying attention to other similar ones. Interpretation was fully capable of rectifying this 'casuistic' bias of the code.[8]

A well-known illustration is furnished by the penalty of 25 coins imposed by the code for the cutting down of another man's tree. We are credibly informed of an occasion when somebody whose vines had been cut down claimed the fine. Had he referred to trees in this action, he would have won, but as he referred to vines, he lost.[9] Evidently, interpretation was sufficiently liberal to subsume vines under trees; what could not be admitted was the replacement of a statutory ground of action, the law concerning the destruction of a tree, by a fresh, non-statutory demand concerning the destruction of a vine.

The case is widely believed to reveal the ritualistic, magical character of the procedure of that epoch, with a slip of the tongue entailing irretrievable defeat.[10] This view is mistaken. There is no question of a slip of the tongue. Plaintiff definitely rested his claim, not on the statute,

but on what he considered a rational extension. In a system designed to provide security from arbitrary demands, it is quite understandable that the principle *nulla actio sine lege* should be jealously upheld. There is a great difference between allowing the law concerning the destruction of trees to cover that of vines—this the experts were prepared to do—and recognizing a new independent claim in respect of vines—this they refused to do. In the former case, the starting-point remains trees; once the starting-point is vines, the claim could be extended to strawberries —25 coins a plant. It may not be accidental that the lawsuit in question was presumably between a well-to-do owner of a vineyard and a person of lesser standing. We may add that, though it is quite conceivable that at one time, in the *legis actio*, a slip of the tongue or a careless gesture was fatal, there is not a shred of evidence to this effect in the Roman sources.

What about large, serious gaps? We have already seen that they could be closed by legislation. Could they be closed by means of interpretation—or rather, misinterpretation or re-interpretation? Clearly, if you want to read something into a code which is not there even *in nucleo*, you must do violence to its meaning.

In answering this question it seems that we have to distinguish.[11] Take emancipation, the release of a son or daughter from *patria potestas*. The need for this institution made itself felt some fifty years after the codification; and it was met by an ingenious exploitation of a rule originally not serving this purpose at all. Prior to and at the time of the XII Tables a *paterfamilias* financially embarrassed sometimes concluded a temporary sale of his son or daughter, who would have to work off the debt as the creditor's bondman or bondwoman. The XII Tables ordained that if a father sold his son three times, he was to lose his *patria potestas* over him.[12] (There was no point in legislating against a father who sold a child for good: his *potestas* lapsed anyhow.) This rule was now used to render possible the voluntary release of a son from *patria potestas*.[13] A *paterfamilias* performed three fictitious conveyances to a friend; after the first and second the friend manumitted the son, who thereby returned under the father's power, after the third that power was gone. (Further details need not here be given.) In the case of a daughter or grandchild the procedure was even simpler, only one conveyance being requisite. For it was argued that, as the XII Tables spoke of three sales of a son, they intended *patria potestas* to be destroyed by one sale of a daughter or grandchild.

This treatment of a penal clause of the code as an authorization of emancipation—not to mention the wonderful reasoning *e contrario*, three sales of a son, hence one of a daughter—was neither literal nor liberal interpretation. It was a deliberate twisting of the original pronouncement. So interpretation—misinterpretation—here created an entirely fresh institution.

Two things, however, should be noticed. First, this institution did not affect anyone's security; it subjected no one to a claim, it deprived no one of a right. It enabled a *paterfamilias* to release his son or daughter, of which faculty he might or might not avail himself as he chose. There was no conflict with the chief object of the statute-bound system.

Secondly, in its original meaning, the rule of the XII Tables was probably obsolete within a very short time of being promulgated: disapproval of these repeated sales to relieve one's difficulties was so strong that they just stopped. Now it is far easier to base an innovation on a provision which has, so to speak, become free than on one still operating in its proper area. It can be shown that a thousand years after the XII Tables, when Justinian wanted more statements of principle for his compilation than he found in the classical writings, and often new principles too, and when to this end he generalized and revised classical texts, he preferably took such texts as had lost their own function, had become empty shells. For example, underlying his famous maxim that the Emperor is above the law is an observation by Ulpian that, whereas in general an unmarried or childless person could take nothing or only a part of what was left him in a will, the Emperor might dispense himself from these rules. As these rules were abolished by Constantine, Ulpian's remark concerning the Emperor's privilege had ceased to have any practical bearing some two hundred years before Justinian. It lay ready for fresh use.[14] A paragraph in Deuteronomy[15] lays down that if a woman intervenes in a fight between her husband and another man, striking at the latter's genitals, her hand is to be cut off. No doubt there was a time when this case had to be reckoned with,[15a] but one may question whether there was a single post-exilic occasion for the law to operate. It must have been a dead letter for centuries when, around New Testament times, the Rabbis interpreted it, misinterpreted it, as the Scriptural basis for an entirely non-Scriptural institution, damages for the infliction of indignity: that is to say, if I assault you—I hit you so that you lose an eye—I must make amends not only for the disability that results but also for the outrage to your honour.[16]

This natural predilection of innovating misinterpretation for laws that have lost their currency—natural because by selecting these laws, obviously, much confusion is avoided—does not depend on a theory like that evolved at some stage by the Rabbis, that the Mosaic legislation cannot contain a single superfluous clause. Certainly, such a theory would fortify that natural tendency. But the latter comes first and is far more universal.[17]

The important point, however, about the derivation of emancipation from a penal rule of the XII Tables is the first one: it did not clash with the idea of *legis actio*. By contrast, in matters where innovation brought with it claims not previously enforceable or a loss of rights previously acknowledged, in the period of *legis actio* it could not be effected by mis-

interpretation of this nature. It was a statute which made informal loans actionable, a statute which regulated the liability of a *paterfamilias* who killed or wounded another man's slave or beast. Similarly, the XII Tables had forbidden usucaption by a thief. When it was deemed desirable to extend this prohibition to third parties, even innocent ones into whose hands the object might come, it was done by the *lex Atinia*.[18]

There are indications that, prior to the *lex Silia*, a borrower who did not repay was occasionally sued *qua* thief, embezzler.[19] This can have been only a *Notbehelf*, a most inadequate expedient. He would rarely have had any thievish intent, and condemnation for double the amount of the loan would be unsatisfactory for many reasons. Anyhow, if there were such attempts to squeeze the case in under a different heading, our contention receives powerful support. For they did not succeed, the kind of thing possible in connexion with emancipation was not possible here.

The treatment of the provision *adgnatus proximus familiam habeto*, 'the nearest agnate shall take the deceased's property', is no exception.[20] Certainly, in classical law, the term *adgnatus proximus* was credited with the artificially narrow meaning 'the nearest male agnate'; which, of course, debarred females from a right that the code had granted them. But we are expressly told—and it seems rash to substitute conjecture for information[21]—that for a long time, reasonably, the term had been taken to refer indiscriminately to males and females. It was only from about the middle of the second century B.C. that it was unduly pressed, and even then not at the free initiative of the interpreters, but in order to bring the provision into line with the *lex Voconia*,[22] generally unfavourable to the amassing of wealth by women. Similarly, in classical law, *proximus adgnatus* was declared to mean 'the nearest agnate alone'—so that if he died before accepting or refused, there was no *successio graduum*, the estate was not offered to the next nearest. As Yaron has shown,[23] this is an artificial restriction of the sense of the term, the XII Tables did envisage *successio graduum*. But the restriction was not imposed until the late Republic, when it accompanied the praetorian reform in favour of cognates. This case of *adgnatus proximus familiam habeto*, then, is no evidence of an abolition of existing rights by misinterpretation in the first two-and-a-half centuries following the XII Tables.

What would have happened had the system of *legis actio* continued unmitigated, we cannot say. The fact is that from the second half of the third century B.C. a variety of relaxations occurred, and with the introduction in the second century of the formulary system, under which the praetor had wide powers of bringing the law up to date, an altogether different situation arose. Into this we shall not inquire. It may suffice to say that that security from high-handed measures which earlier on had been achieved by *nulla actio sine lege* was now achieved in

other, more comfortable ways: by the public control over developments exercised through the by now well-equipped and experienced secular jurists, by the possibility, if a praetor supported unpopular interests, of electing one of a different colour the following year, and so on.

II. PHARISEES AND SADDUCEES

When we now turn to Jewish law, we are badly informed about the pre-exilic era, the whole stretch from 1200 to 600 B.C. What little we do know suggests that statutes were interpreted in a perfectly reasonable fashion. Nowhere do we come across any twisting of the sense of a law.

There was probably less need for it than in early Rome. Though a code like the Mishpatim, already quoted, may have pursued aims similar to those of the XII Tables, it is unlikely, considering the political and geographical conditions, that a rigid system of *legis actio* could ever establish itself. Decentralization, the competing claims of different regional and tribal centres, the enormous role of custom, the intervention of oracles and priestly decisions, cadi justice—all these were factors militating against a tidy development like the Roman. But even had there been a *legis actio*, it would not have been cramped like the Roman one: in the small Hebrew tribes, and later on in the two monarchies, it seems to have been easy enough to innovate by means of legislation—witness the numerous legislative components of the Bible.

At any rate, on the return from exile, about the middle of the sixth century B.C., the laws recorded in the Pentateuch were acclaimed as the one and only eternal constitution of Judaism. Not that there were no other binding rules. Far from it. To begin with, for the vast majority of the new community, recognition of the Pentateuch meant only that nothing must be done or taught in conflict with it. It did not prevent the religious leaders and sages from working out and sanctioning additional customs and doctrines. In fact, it appears that the immigrants from exile already brought with them a fair number of such accretions; and the next four centuries saw the erection of an imposing edifice of tenets and norms mostly novel, some of them sound extensions or modifications of Scriptural teachings—say, the prohibition to marry one's grandmother[24]—but others with no basis in Scripture or even, on any objective reading of the text, against it: the belief in resurrection, proselyte baptism, regulations concerning prayer, the washing of hands before a meal, the reformed modes of capital punishment, monetary damages in the place of retaliation.

Essentially, what made this enormous accumulation of novel law binding was the respect for the wisdom and piety of its creators and guardians. They were looked up to as endowed with the faculty of advising safely on the right conduct in all matters, great and small. They were not prophets in the full sense of the Old Testament, speaking

as with the voice of God, but there was still a trace of prophecy in them, their judgement was inspired. The typical ordinance of the Pentateuch had taken the form 'Thou shalt' or 'Thou shalt not'. Now a more subdued form of directive became prevalent: 'One does' or 'One does not do so-and-so'. But even this subdued form was very authoritative, it stated the course you ought to take as the course in fact taken—'One does', 'One does not'—and generally without any reasoning: if you did not comply, you would be simply outside the valid order of things.[25]

We have ample evidence about the way in which, soon after the outbreak of the Maccabean revolt against the Syrians in the second century B.C., the then prevailing law of Sabbatical rest was reformed, so as to allow fighting if the enemy attacked.[26] True, the prevailing law was itself of a non-Scriptural nature: in pre-exilic times self-defence was certainly not prohibited. Again, the circumstances were highly exceptional, and the reformers could point to a tragic experience which showed that resigned conservatism would spell destruction. (A similar experience at the hands of Ptolemy I had not led to reform,[27] and in the case of a private war the right to self-defence was dubious two hundred years after the Maccabean rising.[28]) But what remains of interest is the personal ascendancy of the fiery Mattahias and his band in bringing about a change, and the absence of any appeal to a Biblical text.

Some circles may from the outset have failed to share the enthusiasm of the immigrants and their spiritual heirs for these developments. In the Maccabean period, a serious division came about. On the one hand, as the mirage of political salvation receded, the majority concentrated more and more on the elaboration of the sacred structure. On the other hand, an aristocratic minority questioned more and more openly the force of traditions devoid of Scriptural authority. Finally Pharisees and Sadducees were aligned against one another.

It is a common error[29] to consider the latter to have been literalists, rigorously sticking to the words of the written law. True, they refused recognition to the huge body of oral law observed by the Pharisees. But this did not mean literalism. It meant that, in matters not covered by Scripture, they favoured advance by free, rational proposal and counter-proposal, trial and error. And in matters which Scripture did pronounce on, they favoured genuine, reasonable, flexible interpretation. Josephus notes[30] that 'they held it a virtue to dispute with their teachers'.

That the results of such interpretation were sometimes nearer the Scriptural starting-point than was Pharisaic teaching was due not to any literalism on the part of the Sadducees, but to the often staggering deviation of Pharisaic teaching from Scripture. In the case of deliberate injury the Sadducees upheld the principle of retaliation enunciated in the Pentateuch:[31] 'As he hath done, so shall it be done unto him,

breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth.' The Pharisees went over to monetary damages.[32] The Sadducean interpretation was not narrow, it was sound. It was Pharisaic practice, under the auspices of wise and holy men, which did away with the old principle.

The current misconception is due to the fact that for the past thousand years or so those who have written on Jewish history, whether themselves Jewish or Gentile, have looked at it through Pharisaic spectacles. The Pharisaic results are the accepted ones, and on the whole judged to flow naturally from a vigorous, liberal exegesis. Where the Sadducees differ, they must be sticklers for the letter. The Pharisaic treatment of 'eye for eye' is very popular, always quoted as a splendid example of progress. Progress it was, but the way it was attached to Scripture was not interpretation literal or liberal, but misinterpretation, an *ex post facto* harmonization of the texts with a state of law radically differing from that which they contemplated; it involved the most painful contortions. As if nowadays the Act which makes the murder of a policeman capital had to be shown to mean that the murderer must be sent to university to study moral philosophy.

It is easy to find instances from the same branch of law as 'eye for eye' where the Pharisees stuck to the earlier practice and the Sadducees moved on, though, as already remarked, they never went to the length of those contortions.

The Pentateuch imposes on a false witness the punishment he would have brought on the accused. According to the Pharisees, the witness was to suffer such punishment only if the action had been unsuccessful, according to the Sadducees only if it had succeeded.[33] The Pharisees relied on the clause 'Then shall ye do unto him as he had thought to do unto his brother', accenting the words 'as he had thought'. The Sadducees relied on the concluding sentence, 'Life for life, eye for eye', etc., arguing that this presupposed that the accused had in fact lost his life or eye.[34]

The Sadducean interpretation was far from violent; how little violent may be seen from the fact that some scholars, for instance, Finkelstein,[35] still regard it as correct, and the Pharisaic one as an innovation. It is, however, the harsher, Pharisaic view which was in accordance with the original meaning.

The Pentateuchic provision simply does not consider the case—no more than does the Code of Hammurabi or Assyrian law[36]—where an innocent person has actually been executed or deprived of eyes or hands. For one thing, it is assumed that that case does not occur. We must also remember that, at the time, it would be a case most difficult of regulation. Once the penalty has been carried out, the matter involves not only the parties, but also the judges and indeed all members of the community having taken part in the proceedings. There is a yet deeper factor at work. The crime of the false witness is not an ordinary

attempt to injure or kill. In general, in Biblical law, attempt as such is not punishable at all. It is an attempt availing itself of that public machinery which is created to defend society from its enemies. This machinery you set in motion at your risk. There will be between you and the man you accuse something like a single combat, a duel, an ordeal. According as to which of you is in the right, either he or you will be defeated—but not one after the other.[37] Even the language of the law is a little reminiscent of battle: 'If a false witness stand up'. It does not seem here to mean merely 'to get up in the assembly'; it has a combative sound.[38] The text goes on to speak of 'the two men between whom the controversy is'—meaning the witness and the accused. (Incidentally, in the formula 'life for life', etc., instead of *taḥath*, 'under', 'in the place of', 'in substitution for', occurring, e.g. in Exodus 21.33 f., we find the vaguer preposition *be*. It may have been thought more suitable for this case, where no loss has actually been suffered.[39])

According to Geiger,[40] the Rabbinic sources slip up in depicting the Pharisaic attitude. He contends that to punish a false witness only if he is unsuccessful would be absurd, contrary to all moral feeling; the Pharisees must have punished him both if he was unsuccessful and if his action had led to the accused's death or mutilation. Finkelstein agrees.

But the sources are unambiguous;[41] and Geiger and Finkelstein argue from the standpoint of the nineteenth or twentieth century, leaving out of account the element of combat, the averseness to a formal admission that a court might be wrong in a matter of life or limb, and the importance in ancient times of putting an end to a case before the whole community is engulfed in strife. The medieval Spanish commentators showed insight when they explained the law as resting on the consideration that if a court, having first executed the accused, were then to proceed to execute the witnesses, respect for justice and its administration would decline.[42] In any case, the account of the Rabbinic sources is confirmed not only by comparative law but also by Josephus,[43] who refers to what the wrongly accused 'was about to suffer'. In the case of Susannah and the Elders, to be discussed below, the accusers were put to death having failed in their plot; and there is no record anywhere of false witnesses having been called to account after procuring their victim's death or mutilation.[44]

Undeniably, then, as far as the false witnesses are concerned, it was the Sadducees who rationalized the law, bringing it into line with the general treatment of completed crime and attempted crime. The difference between what they did with this law and what the Pharisees did to 'eye for eye' is that their modernization could be not implausibly read out of the text. The law ends by quoting the formula of talion. This, the Sadducees declared, showed that a false witness was to be punished only where the formula could really apply, i.e. where he had succeeded. A tenable piece of interpretation.

Actually, it is quite likely that the Sadducees, who were early open to foreign influences, preceded the Pharisees by half a century or so in borrowing from Hellenistic theory of interpretation, and establishing a number of acceptable canons to be applied to Biblical statutes. But leaving aside this particular question, what we do know is that they could make excellent use of an argument like *a fortiori*.

In the Pentateuch it is provided that an owner is liable for damage done by his animal. The Sadducees extended this rule to the owner of a slave.[45] Their deduction is preserved. Scripture, they argued, imposes no duties on a man in regard to his animal, whereas it does impose duties on him in regard to his slave—to circumcise him, see that he takes part in the Passover, release him in the seventh year, etc. If, then, the law declares him liable for his animal, in regard to which he has no duties, he must all the more be liable for his slave, in regard to whom he has duties.[46] We need not for the moment go into the Pharisaic reply.[47] Clearly, the Biblical text itself contained no reference to an obligation to make amends for damage done by a slave. The Sadducees introduced this weighty innovation by means of a liberal, maybe excessively liberal, conclusion *a fortiori*. To make them into narrow, Caraite-like advocates of the letter seems utterly mistaken.

Incidentally, at first sight it may seem strange that it was the wealthy Sadducees, more likely to own slaves than the Pharisees, who supported liability for damage done by a slave. It is, however, an interesting illustration of the remark by Josephus[48] that 'the Sadducees are rather savage even among themselves'. This small, distinguished, well-to-do group would incline to strict protection of property. We shall come back to the point.

A grave flaw of the Sadducean position was the insecurity which it entailed. Especially where the written law was silent—and that included large areas—as they assigned no authority to tradition, they must have found it difficult to be reliable and coherent. The Pharisees made the most of this weakness; and a day, probably in January 100 B.C., when a purely Pharisaic Sanhedrin resulted from the inability of Sadducean judges to give well-founded decisions became a festival in the Pharisaic calendar.[49]

On the other hand, the attitude of the Sadducees drove the Pharisees to take increasing notice of Scripture in any changes that became desirable. The legend of Susannah and the Elders, a Pharisaic work of the beginning of the first century B.C. (about the same time as that discomfiture of Sadducean judges), is significant.

Susannah, a virtuous married woman, was charged by two old men whose advances she rejected, with having been surprised by them in the arms of a paramour. Her two accusers, in the ceremonious way we know from the Bible,[50] jointly placed their hands on her head to testify against her. She was sentenced to death, but as she was led out to execu-

tion, 'an angel bestowed a spirit of discernment on a young man'. He exclaimed that the judges had condemned her 'without examining the witnesses and knowing for certain'. He separated the two accusers and asked each in turn under what kind of tree the crime had taken place. One said a mastick tree, the other a holm tree. The contradiction showed their witness false, Susannah was saved and the two Elders suffered death instead. (Nobody has suggested that the young man might have been the paramour.)

The purpose of the story was to secure acceptance of a new method of hearing witnesses, namely, in the absence of one another. This is the method prescribed in later Rabbinic codes,[51] and probably presupposed by Mark[52] when he informs us that the prosecution of Jesus for his utterance concerning the destruction of the temple broke down because 'the witnesses did not agree together'. By the way, while in continental criminal proceedings, witnesses must be heard in the absence of one another,[53] English judges are allowed, if they like, to be content with the pre-Susannah method. Scots law, at one time Rabbinical, has shifted towards English, but it is still possible to object to a witness who was present at a previous witness's examination unless the court is of opinion that he has not thereby been unduly instructed.[54] The English attitude in the matter is no doubt connected with the role of the cross-examination.

On what grounds, in the expectation of the author of the work, would people accept the innovation—apart, of course, from the happy outcome in this case? They would accept it, above all, because the young man demonstrating it had done so in a spirit of discernment granted him by God. Here we have the original basis of all the novel post-exilic customs and doctrines, and a hundred years earlier it might have been enough. But by this time, under prolonged pressure from Sadducean theory, even the Pharisees began to look for Scriptural support for a fresh departure. So we find a little more: the young man maintained that Susannah had been sentenced without examination of witnesses and certain knowledge. He was made to refer, that is, to the laws in Deuteronomy enjoining 'diligent examination' and 'inquisition' with a view to making 'certain'. These laws, he implied, were properly fulfilled only by the new method.[55] To some extent, indeed, his discovery of Scriptural support would itself now be an effect of the spirit God conferred on him.

(The laws are Deuteronomy 13.15, 17.4, 19.18. The allusion in Susannah 48 is to 13.15 rather than 17.4 and 19.18—no need here to go into the reason for this preference. As the concordances show, *anakrino*, 'to examine', corresponds to Hebrew *ḥaqar*, which is in 13.15 only; and *saphes*, 'certain', to *nakhon*, which is in 13.15 and 17.4, but which the LXX omits from the latter verse. Kay translates *saphes* by 'truth',[56] which is not quite accurate. To be sure *'emeth*, 'truth', also

occurs in 13.15 (and 17.4), but the LXX has *alethes* for it. It is noteworthy that in the Mishnah *ḥaqar* is the technical term for the vital examination of witnesses as to time and place of the crime.[57])

III. HILLEL

Half a century later, about 30 B.C., the greatest Pharisaic scholar of all times, Hillel, not without some difficulty, convinced his party that the main Sadducean point had to be conceded: in principle there could be no binding law independent of Scripture. But the way he convinced them was by showing that nothing would be lost; and that by energetic and systematic interpretation, the entire mass of traditional observances, sanctioned over the centuries by the religious leaders and sages, could be derived from the Pentateuch. Indeed, he explained that it was possible to recover in this fashion even forgotten parts of the oral tradition—say, the rule that the Passover must be offered even if the date should happen to be a Sabbath, which was otherwise to be scrupulously kept. One might, for example, argue *a fortiori*: Scripture does not threaten with extirpation him who fails to bring the daily offering, but it does him who fails to bring the Passover.[58] As Scripture expressly lays down that the daily offering takes precedence over the Sabbath,[59] the Passover must all the more take precedence.[60]

In a previous lecture I had the honour to deliver in this building, I enlarged on the Hellenistic-rhetorical elements noticeable both in Hillel's general approach to the problem of written law and oral law, and in the seven modes of interpretation he promulgated—the reasoning *a fortiori*, from analogy, from context, from the sequence of general and special terms and so forth. At the same time I emphasized the thorough Judaization which such foreign notions as he found useful underwent at his hands. Even though after an interval of twelve years the risk of anyone remembering what I said is small, I do not wish to repeat these and allied points.[61] Here attention need be drawn only to some consequences of his victory which bear on a comparison with Rome.

As a result of his victory, it became the task of the Rabbis—towards which steps had indeed been taken for some time—to rest on the Pentateuch all the regulations that had accumulated outside it as well as any new ones as they became necessary. At first sight this idea is highly reminiscent of that underlying *legis actio*; but it was extraordinary in the circumstances, as will be manifest when we contrast the Jewish situation with the Roman.

At Rome, the requirement of a statutory basis for any position and claim characterized a relatively early period, 450 to 200 B.C., when the community was small, chiefly agricultural and self-contained; as these conditions changed, the system was replaced by the flexible, formulary

one. Jewish law became statute-bound at an advanced, Hellenized, urbanized, commercialized stage, about 30 B.C. At Rome, even during the period of *legis actio*, at a pinch reforms could be effected by adding fresh statutes to those existing. The Jewish system established by Hillel, though there were a few loopholes, was closed, without a legislature. At Rome, the statutes on which, during the *legis actio*, any position and claim had to be based were of more or less recent date. By the age of Hillel, considerable portions of Pentateuchic law—the Mishpatim, for example—were about one thousand years old, and it was four hundred years since the final acknowledgment of the Pentateuch by those returning from exile. Yet the Pentateuch was to carry the whole weight of law, religious and secular, which prevailed among Jews around 30 B.C. plus any further developments at any given future date. With a little exaggeration, we might say that it was as if Paul or Justinian had decided that all law present and future must rest on the XII Tables, and that it was in fact possible directly to derive from them innominate contracts, *fideicommissa*, the formulary system or *cognitio extraordinaria*, the rights of the Emperor and his wife, the legal status of the Christian Church, etc. etc. The point is that we must not, because of the strong, superficial similarity, lose sight of the profound difference in aim and direction between *legis actio* and Hillel's adherence to statute: whereas *legis actio* was conceived as a guarantee against measures which the community had not accepted, Hillel sought to gain the bindingness of statute law for a body of rulings which had long enjoyed the *de facto* recognition of the majority, but which a stubborn minority repudiated.

It will not surprise that a very great deal of Rabbinic exegesis under this regime was of the type exemplified at Rome by emancipation, the twisting of a penal provision of the XII Tables into an authorization of a new institution. That is to say, it was neither literal nor liberal interpretation of the texts, but misinterpretation. Take fighting on a Sabbath, proselyte baptism, the washing of hands before a meal, the reformed modes of capital punishment and monetary damages in the place of retaliation.

That a siege once begun by a Jewish army need not be interrupted on the Sabbath was proved from Scripture by Hillel himself. This was indeed a more generous concession than that granted by the Maccabees —the right to ward off a direct attack. He quoted Deuteronomy: 'Only those trees which are not for meat, those shalt thou cut down and build bulwarks against the city that maketh war with thee until it be subdued.' 'Until it be subdued', Hillel explained, meant without desisting on the Sabbath.[62] Later on, we find a large number of texts pressed into the service of the more general proposition, that human life is more important than the Sabbath. For example, 'Wherefore the children of Israel shall keep the sabbath, to observe the sabbath throughout their

generations.' 'Throughout their generations' was taken to mean 'each man during his generation'; so you must, if it is necessary to save a man, desecrate the Sabbath, in order that he may observe other Sabbaths for the rest of his life, during his generation.[63] Or again, 'Ye shall keep my statutes, which a man shall do and shall live in them.' 'He shall live in them'—not die, so no life may be sacrificed for the sake of the Sabbath.[64]

The Bible makes no mention of proselyte baptism; it came up after the return, when in the case of women above all, the mere fact of marrying a Jew was no longer enough.[65] None the less the Rabbis found it in the Bible—in the chapters about the entry of the Israelites themselves into the Sinaitic covenant; and occasionally, the Biblical rules concerning contact with a corpse or tomb were invoked, the proselyte's state prior to conversion being likened to life among the dead.[66]

The washing of hands before a meal was one of the extra-Scriptural customs sanctioned by tradition, as we know from the New Testament. It always remained problematic, and one Rabbi was apparently placed under a ban for doubting whether; in the absence of a text, the authority of the sages was adequate in the matter of uncleanness of hands. An attempt to base it on the exhortation 'Sanctify yourselves' only underlines its precarious nature.[67]

The Biblical modes of capital punishment are stoning and burning. Towards the end of the pre-Christian era, owing to the stress laid on bodily resurrection, Pharisaic practice switched over to strangulation as the normal mode: this left the skeleton intact. It was the same movement that accounts for the concern of the Fourth Gospel in the legs of Jesus having remained unbroken.[68] How did the Rabbis get Scriptural support for strangulation? By the following deduction: the Bible often speaks of God punishing a sinner with death. Just as in this case there may be no visible damage to the body, so there must be none where it speaks of the death penalty to be inflicted by man.[69]

We have already cited the Pentateuchic law prescribing retaliation for deliberate injury: 'As he hath done, so shall it be done unto him, eye for eye' and so on. The Pharisees substituted money damages. But they had to prove that it was money damages that the original formulation envisaged. It was not easy. They made much of the fact that the law happens to stand together with a provision concerning reparation for killing another man's beast—clearly monetary. So it must also, they argued, be monetary in the case of injury to a man. That, however, gave rise to the further question why the Bible, though having in mind monetary damages, used a formulation at first sight pointing a different way; and more subtleties had to be introduced.

It is largely on account of this wide use of misinterpretation and the resulting complications that Rabbinic discussion seems so hopelessly muddled to the ordinary modern reader. To be able to cope, you must

either be brought up in it, so that you accept the far-fetched as natural, or understand the historical setting, so that you see how the need for the far-fetched arose and what purpose it served.

Let us look at one more example, from damage to property. We observed towards the beginning that in the ancient Biblical code which deals with private law, damage done by a man in person is not regulated; the code regulates only damage caused by a man's cattle or by a pit he has dug or by a fire which spreads from his field on to the neighbour's. The Rabbis rested on this code the greater part of the law of damage to property, including damage by a man in person.[70] The code distinguishes between an ox which does damage for the first time, with the owner liable for half the loss, and an ox known to be aggressive, with the owner liable in full. The Rabbis interpreted the aggressive ox as standing for any animate being likely to cause damage. Man was brought under this heading. And it was under this heading that his liability in full for any damage done by him in person had its Scriptural basis.[71]

Think of it. A legal system in which, if you do damage *corpore corpori*, you are liable *qua* attested ox, *qua* ox of which it is certified that he had done harm before.

The remarkable thing is that all this worked. Pharisaism's way of life and doctrines were strengthened so as to survive the destruction of the Temple, the loss of the State, the vicissitudes of dispersion, good fortune and ill fortune; while the Sadducees, their principal demand met (however speciously), rapidly lost in influence. Moreover, the Rabbinic amalgamation of written law and oral, though a labyrinth to the uninitiated, proved eminently practicable, adaptable to change and stimulating throughout the ages. It just shows that, in jurisprudence as in poetry, you can make the rules of the game almost as hard as you like—if only you find big enough geniuses to handle them, the product will be satisfactory. And, of course, in Jewish history, it is usually the fantastic which succeeds.

We do not wish to give the impression that legal advance in Judaism was exclusively of this kind—the substantial innovation first and its attachment to Scripture *ex post facto*. Obviously, there was a very great deal of genuine following out, elaboration, refinement of Pentateuchic precepts. For hundreds of years before Hillel, that sacred revelation had been read and re-read, studied in every detail, with no law left unscrutinized both as to its plain meaning and as to its relation to other laws. There is nothing artificial, for example, about the extension of the rules speaking of damage done by or to an ox to damage done by or to other cattle, to which case we shall return in the next section, on the Samaritans (though, even here, the precise mode in which the Rabbis justified the extension need not be ancient). Even the Sadducean extension of the rules concerning damage done by cattle to damage

done by slaves might owe something to an intensive occupation with the original provisions.

Nevertheless, between the return from exile and Hillel extra-Scriptural reform played an enormous role. It is a fact that the Pentateuch contains no reference, explicit or implicit, to the circumstances in which you might or might not fight on the Sabbath, to proselyte baptism, to the washing of hands before a meal, to strangulation as a mode of capital punishment, or—another question to be taken up in the next section—to bodily resurrection; it is a fact that the Pentateuch demands retaliation. The extremely forced character of the connexion which the Rabbis postulated between their view and the texts confirms the suspicion that we have to do with legitimation *per subsequentem interpretationem*. As for damage to property done by a *paterfamilias* himself, it is a fact that it is not regulated by the Mishpatim. But it is impossible to assume that, while he had to pay up if fire spread from his field to his neighbour's or if his cattle pastured on another man's land, he was free if he himself damaged another man's plough; and no less impossible that liability in this case was from the outset based on the notion of man as an attested danger, as an aggressive ox. This was the basis supplied around New Testament times to a longstanding practice. (It is so artificial—one asks oneself whether the Rabbis could not have found a more plausible one, say, the provision in Leviticus[72] ordaining compensation in the event of a man killing another man's beast: it would not have been beyond their powers to prove that this provision applied to inanimate goods as well. At a later date they did in fact broaden its scope. But, in their first systematic efforts to provide private law with Scriptural backing, they proceeded from the only major private law collection of the Bible, the Mishpatim, and just made do with what was available there.[73])

The Rabbis were not unaware of the nature of their work, its delicacy, its vulnerability. The Mishnah, redacted about 200 A.D., declares that whereas the prevalent rules concerning incest and other prohibited intercourse have firm Scriptural support, those concerning the Sabbath are 'as mountains hanging by a hair':[74] a vast number of them founded on a few sketchy texts.

Some hundred years before the redaction, a Rabbi Jose ben Taddai tried to reduce *ad absurdum* the entire Rabbinic system of interpretation, by proposing an argument *a fortiori* which culminated in the prohibition of marrying a girl while her mother's marriage was still on. Here is his argument.[75] Scripture debars me from marrying my daughter. As I am debarred from marrying my daughter, with whose mother I may have intercourse, I must all the more be debarred from marrying a girl with whose mother I may have no intercourse, i.e. whose mother's marriage is still on. Ergo I am confined to marrying one whose mother is a widow or a divorcee.

Gamaliel II, of Jabneh, President of the Sanhedrin at the time, placed the rebel under a ban. Not, however, without having produced a beautiful refutation. He pointed out that Scripture states in so many words that the high priest 'shall take a virgin to wife'.[76] Now the high priest is not only, like anyone, forbidden to have intercourse with a married woman; he may not even marry a widow or divorcee.[77] Consequently, if he is to marry at all, he must of necessity marry a girl whose mother he may not take. Yet Scripture in the verse just quoted does enjoin or allow him to marry; and if the high priest may marry a girl whose mother he may not take, an ordinary Israelite must certainly be permitted the same. So I can marry a girl while her mother's marriage is still on, Jose ben Taddai's argument runs counter to an express directive in the written law.[78]

Though we do not intend here to go into the language of Rabbinic discussion, we may perhaps just mention that, in the original, the defence of Gamaliel consists of one sentence: 'Go out and provide for the high priest about whom it is written, He shall take a virgin, and I will provide for all Israel.'

What is more relevant to our topic is a significant difference between the way Gamaliel refuted Jose ben Taddai and the earlier refutation by the Pharisees of the Sadducean argument *a fortiori* concerning slaves. The Sadducees, it will be recalled, had argued that as Scripture declares a man liable for damage done by his cattle, though he has no duties in regard to his cattle, he must all the more be liable for damage done by his slave, in regard to whom he does have duties. The Pharisaic reply was that one could not argue from cattle to slave, since the latter had understanding and might, if his master was liable, deliberately ruin him by doing extensive damage to a third party. This was a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*: according to the Pharisees, in an extreme case the Sadducean proposal would lead to an insufferable result.[79] When Jose ben Taddai advanced his argument *a fortiori*, it would apparently no longer have been good enough to point out that its acceptance would make marriages rare and chancy affairs. On the contrary, he knew this and proposed his argument precisely in order to demonstrate what insufferable results might be advocated if one accepted the wide use of deduction *a fortiori*, from analogy and so on entailed by the Hillelite system. It was by proving him to be in conflict with the written law that Gamaliel had to silence him.

Finkelstein, incidentally, asserts that it was because of their belief in equality that the Pharisees opposed a master's liability for his slave: one man could not answer for another. But he overlooks the express quotation of their reason in the Mishnah: 'If I (the master) provoke him (the slave) to anger, he may go and set fire to another's stack of corn.' That is to say, they feared that a master might be at the mercy of an ill-intentioned slave. The Romans solved the problem by way of

noxal liability: a master could always avoid payment by handing over the wrongdoer. But there were systems (some Germanic ones, for instance) with unrestricted liability of the master, so that the risk pointed out by the Pharisees did exist, and systems with no liability.[80]

Finkelstein says that the Pharisees, not in general wealthy enough to keep slaves, had no interest in a master's liability. But surely, a Pharisee's property might be damaged by the slave of a Sadducee. In fact, if most slaves belonged to Sadducees, it is the latter whom one would have expected to be against liability. The truth is that, while the Pharisees, representing the ordinary middle-class citizen, were afraid of the sudden catastrophe such liability might bring, the Sadducees did not mind some risk for the sake of a rigorous protection of property: small bourgeois mentality over against aristocratic harshness, exactly as Josephus has it in the passage quoted above. No doubt the Sadduccees felt, too, that a man ought to be able to keep his slaves under control. However, the question does not affect our main point regarding the Sadducean *a fortiori* and the way it was rebutted.

In the epoch starting from Hillel, then, in general, for a rule to acquire binding force it was no longer enough that it should be traditional practice and enjoy the approval of wise and holy men. Certainly, as Hillel himself had stressed, some reliance on tradition was indispensable for an orderly development. That is the point of his acceptance of a proselyte who made it a condition that he need submit only to the written law.[81] On the first day Hillel taught him the Hebrew alphabet in the right order. On the second, he jumbled up the letters, to which the proselyte objected. Whereupon Hillel told him that if he trusted him in the matter of the alphabet, he ought to trust him equally as to the oral law. But observe how carefully chosen the parallel was. For, ultimately, the proselyte would be in a position to verify from the texts the alphabet taught him by his master.

Again, the personal authority of the sages undeniably remained high. They were credited with miracles, and when they debated the air would be filled with flames.[82] Yet they must justify their opinions by giving chapter and verse and the grounds of any inference drawn. The young man proclaiming the correct method of hearing witnesses had been inspired by an angel at the command of God. Legal evolution was less and less thought of in these terms. Towards the end of the first century A.D. Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah, when his opponent in controversy was supported by supernatural signs and, in the end, by a voice from heaven, successfully refused to yield:[83] the law was to be discovered with the help of intelligible argument and counter-argument, settled finally by the decision of a majority of experts. Underlying this rational claim, there was the confidence that deliberations carried on in the right spirit had the blessing of God and must arrive at the right result:[84] divine guidance, though less direct than formerly, was not excluded. We

should not omit to mention that the Rabbi, of course, based himself on Scripture, referring the voice to a passage from Deuteronomy:[85] 'For this commandment is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off, it is not in heaven' and so on.

IV. THE SAMARITANS

We must now go back to the fifth century B.C., when the Jews returning from exile began to rebuild life in the holy land on the basis of the Pentateuch and observances brought back from the host country. From the outset, the latter were a stumbling-block to the Samaritans; the neighbours in the north who had not shared the exile and who, from a mixture of Israelites and heathens, had become a monotheistic community claiming to be the true heirs of the covenant. They acknowledged the Pentateuch alone.

If that had been all, they would not call for separate treatment, since we could simply say that what is true of the Sadducees is true of them; and, in fact, the two had very much in common, in many departments of law and creed taking the same line.[86] There was, however, a vital difference. Whereas the Sadducees, as we saw, interpreted Scripture in a reasonable, free manner, the Samaritans adopted a most literal approach—cut off as they were from the main body of Judaism, and also, perhaps, in exaggerated opposition to the dominant system which included so much that was not represented in Scripture at all.

As an example of Samaritan exegesis we may take the Passover injunction: 'Seven days shall no leaven be found in your houses.' The Samaritans never extended the prohibition from houses to yards; according to them you might have leaven in your yard on Passover—very narrow.[87]

Not infrequently, indeed, they succeeded in introducing progress by taking a word capable of several meanings in that meaning which was more convenient, even though not envisaged by the original. Thus the levirate, i.e. the duty of the brother of a deceased husband to marry the childless widow, became the duty of a friend or less close relation of the deceased. Hebrew *'aḥ*, 'brother', like its English equivalent, occasionally denotes a remoter connexion. An earlier way in which they had mitigated the levirate was by rendering 'the wife of the deceased shall not marry without, i.e. outside his family, unto a stranger' as 'the deceased's wife who is still without, i.e. not yet married but only betrothed, shall not marry unto a stranger'. That is to say, they treated *haḥuṣa* as an adjective instead of an adverb; with the result that the deceased's brother had to marry the woman only if her union with the deceased had not yet been consummated. Still, unlike both Pharisees and Sadducees, they consistently rejected inferences *a fortiori*, from analogy and so forth.

The view, sometimes met in modern literature,[88] that the Sadducees agreed with the Samaritans as to the abolition of the levirate is quite baseless. There is no hint at such agreement in the sources. Moreover, the Rabbis, while seeing in the Samaritan attitude an obstacle to intermarriage,[89] never extended this scruple to intermarriage with the Sadducees. Above all, the Sadducean king Alexander Jannaeus contracted a levirate marriage with the widow of his brother Aristobulus.[90] Sadducean interpretation of Scripture was not of the Samaritan type.

The source of the error is an otherwise most valuable and pioneering article by Geiger.[91] He thought that the Sadducean question to Jesus about bodily resurrection implied rejection of the levirate.[92] But the opposite is the case. Had they rejected it, they could not have used it as an argument against resurrection. But they did so use it, claiming that resurrection was irreconcilable with it. It was resurrection alone which they were out to refute, as the story makes quite clear: 'the Sadducees which say there is no resurrection.' (Their opposition to this dogma is mentioned also in Acts;[93] on this, they were indeed at one with the Samaritans.) In fact, their choice of the levirate for the attack is typical. They did not put the simple case of a woman marrying several times. To this, the repartee might have been: All right, a woman had better marry once only. They spoke of a woman marrying several times as bidden by the law, and indeed by the written law recognized by them no less than by the Pharisees: 'Moses wrote unto us, If a brother die' and so on. (Mark and Luke are preferable to Matthew, who has 'Moses said'. But even Matthew does not provide the slightest justification for assuming that the Sadducees repudiated Moses.) The dogma of bodily resurrection, they maintained, ran counter to an institution of Scripture —for it was, of course, unthinkable that, on resurrection, a woman would have several husbands at the same time. It was a very clever and very serious argument. That they put it in a scoffing tone[94]—giving the woman seven husbands though two would have done to make the point—should not deceive us as to its seriousness.

There was an interesting result of Samaritan literalism: they were driven to alter the actual text of the Pentateuch. If you stick to the words of a code, without admitting any adaptation to new circumstances by means of exegesis, inevitably in the course of time a revision will become a necessity. Justinian's case is no doubt very different. But still, when he decided to use for his great legislation the classical works several hundred years old, he openly empowered the commission to make any modifications required. How far the Samaritans, when making their amendments, believed they were restoring the genuine text we shall here leave undecided.

Several famous alterations concerned religious matters. In Deuteronomy 11.30, the Samaritans added to 'the oak of Moreh' the further detail 'near Shechem', in order to have it in the text—what Jewish ill-

wishers had been inclined to deny[95]—that this was the place where they had (and still have) their cultic centre, to them the only true one.

Again, according to Deuteronomy 11.9 God has sworn to the patriarchs to give the land 'unto them and to their seed'. As the patriarchs were dead by the time of the entry into Canaan, the Pharisees claimed that a promise of the land 'unto them' must imply an assurance of resurrection. This was of course a misinterpretation designed to represent their dogma as Scriptural. In the original there is assumed a unity between ancestors and descendants, and the settlement of the latter in a sense includes the former. However, we have already offered other examples of this Pharisaic method, and in the important matter of resurrection quite a few texts were twisted. Jesus in combating the Sadducees relied on God's revelation to Moses, 'I am the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob':[96] as God must be a God of the living, these words prove that the patriarchs cannot be dead for good. For the Samaritans who, as pointed out above, were not above pressing a text in the same way, these passages were most awkward. Hence in Deuteronomy 11.9 they struck out the offending 'unto them', so that God has sworn only to give the land 'to their seed'—no resurrection of the patriarchs.

These two cases are of particular interest because they were considered by the Rabbis to bring out the futility of falsification.[97] The addition of 'near Shechem' the Rabbis ridiculed as superfluous since even without it, it was possible to prove that Shechem was meant, namely, by one of Hillel's methods of exegesis—an appeal to another text, Genesis 12.6, in which the oak of Moreh recurred and its localization was plain. As for the elimination of 'unto them', that did not help, the Rabbis said, since there remained other allusions to resurrection in Scripture, such as Numbers 15.21. Here we are warned that the sinner with a high hand 'shall be utterly cut off, his iniquity shall be upon him'. Once he is cut off, dead, the Rabbis argued, how could his iniquity still be upon him? He would have to answer for it on the day of resurrection.

A major revision of the private law deserves attention.[98] Very likely for some time after the return from exile, Jews and Samaritans felt free in this area to advance with the times. The few Biblical provisions were hardly of great concern to the religious leaders—except, indeed, where they impinged on religious matters. Long before Hillel, however, even the private law of the Pentateuch must have acquired a special status, and what happened when the Rabbis treated it as enshrining an answer to every problem we saw from the example of direct damage to property. That, none the less, large tracts of the private law never achieved the sanctity of, say, the rules concerning marriage or the Sabbath is a phenomenon we need not here discuss.[99]

The Samaritans, literalists, just could not rest content with a code

like the Mishpatim, the principal private law section in the Pentateuch, dating from around 1000 B.C. They modernized it. They widened the old narrow cases, writing instead of 'If one man's ox push another's ox': 'If one man's ox or any other beast of his push another's ox or any other beast of his', or instead of 'an ox wont to gore': 'a beast wont to hurt'. Similarly, they replaced antiquated institutions, writing instead of *'elohim,* which refers to decision of litigation by oracle, the Tetragrammaton, *yhwh,* by which substitution they introduced the oath.

The Samaritan version unquestionably offers better law than the Jewish one. But that does not, as was at one time believed by critics, speak for its priority. On the contrary, we have to apply a somewhat extended principle of the *lectio difficilior*: we could never explain why anyone should have turned the more practicable Samaritan rules into the archaic Jewish ones, while, obviously, the Samaritans had every reason for bringing the archaic law up to date. There are additional proofs: for example, the Samaritans, when introducing 'cattle' which is feminine in Hebrew, might yet leave a masculine adjective standing, which had gone with 'ox' in the original.

Nothing could underline more forcefully than this textual revision the difference between Samaritans and Sadducees we are postulating. The two were in many ways alike. But the Sadducees were, so to speak, internal Samaritans. They never dreamt of such a revision. They were far less rigid in their handling of the law, and an extension, say, of the provision concerning damage by an ox to damage by other beasts they would find easy by means of ratiocination, interpretation according to the spirit, use of analogy and the like. As we have seen, they held that an argument *a fortiori* warranted the application of these rules to damage done by a slave.

The Samaritan revision pursued no radical aims; and, needless to say, the improvements obtained by these changes in the text were all derived by the Rabbis from the original with the help of exegesis. For the extension of the rules about an ox to other cattle, the Sabbath commandment was invoked, the Deuteronomic version making it plain (the Rabbis argued) that what applies to the ox must apply to the rest: 'Thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle.'[100] Actually, in post-Hillelite interpretation, it became an accepted thing that a Biblical law might confine itself to the most usual case, say, damage by an ox, with the intention of thereby covering all the less usual, similar ones even in the absence of supporting evidence from other passages.[101] Once this idea prevailed, the 'casuistic' formulation of the ancient statutes no longer created any problem.

Again, the Rabbis left *'elohim* standing, but they interpreted the word as meaning 'judges'; they adduced an allied type of litigation where the question is exactly the same, whether a man 'hath put his hand unto his neighbour's goods',[102] and where the Bible itself prescribes an oath

by the Tetragrammaton; and they arrived at the conclusion that this was the law here also.

As may be expected, interpretation, being alive and capable of subtle discrimination, was often superior in its results to revision. According to the Mishpatim, a master who kills his slave is committing a capital offence. The formulation of the offence is narrow, 'casuistic'; 'If a man smite his servant with a rod and he die.'[103] The Samaritan revisers eliminated the detail 'with a rod'. The Rabbis left it in, but declared that it had to be read in conjunction with the chapter in Numbers about murder and unintentional homicide. There it is laid down that it is murder if you use 'an instrument of wood suitable for killing'.[104] They concluded that the mention of the rod in the Mishpatim served to require murderous intent, served to confine capital punishment to the deliberate killing of a slave.[105]

We must close. As far as Roman law is concerned, we singled out the evolution prior to the advent of the formulary system in the second century B.C., as for Jewish law, that prior to the codification of the Mishnah around A.D. 200. In both laws, the later developments are no less remarkable, and still await full exploration. Perhaps, in yet another twelve years' time, you will ask me to continue.

NOTES

[1] D. 1.2.2.6, Pomponius singulari enchiridii, G. 4.11.

[2] See Daube, *Symbolae Friburgenses in honorem Lenel*, 1933, 256, *Revue Historique de Droit Français et Etranger*, 4th ser., 15, 1936, 352, *Cambridge Law Journal*, 7, 1939, 32, *Tulane Law Review*, 18, 1944, 374, 384 ff.

[3] Exodus 21 f. See Daube, *Vetus Testamentum*, 11, 1961, 257 ff.

[4] Daube, *Law Quarterly Review*, 52, 1936, 253 ff., *Studi Solazzi*, 1949, 98 ff.

[5] 24.18 ff.

[6] G. 4.19. Once recoverable by *legis actio per condictionem*, they most probably fell under *sacramento* as well; so that Gaius, unhistorically, in 4.20 puts the question why *per condictionem* should be needed. Admittedly, even before the *lex Silia*, occasionally a borrower may have been sued by *sacramento* as thief; see below, p. 7 in this article.

[7] G. 2.42, Cicero, *Top.*, 4.23, *Pro Caec.*, 19.54.

[8] To this extent we agree with Schulz, *Roman Legal Science*, 1946, 29 f. What we cannot accept is his—in our view simplifying—assumption (partly based on Kaser, *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung*, 59, 1939, Rom. Abt., 34) that there is a straight temporal difference between this free interpretation and that underlying, say, emancipation. As will be seen presently, in our opinion the two types of exegesis co-existed almost from the start. Incidentally, in discussing sacred formulas, Schulz remarks (p. 28) that if Jephthah had inserted in his vow a saving clause such as 'according to my meaning', he need not have sacrificed his daughter. But this is to accept unhistorically a late Rabbinic re-interpretation of the vow which is designed to exonerate Jephthah, and which has gained currency in popular editions of the story. According to this re-interpretation Jephthah vowed 'whatever would first come to meet him on his return from victory', and he was thinking not of a human sacrifice but of a goat or dog. When the first being to meet him was his daughter, it was only the careless wording, 'whatever', that forced him to sacrifice her. However, if the Hebrew is translated properly, he vowed to sacrifice 'whoever would first meet him'; and

indeed, a vow of a goat or dog would not have been very grand. The tragedy was that the first person was his only child.

[9] G. 4.11. This case, incidentally, is conclusive evidence in our view that in the action *sacramento* the cause had to be named.

[10] Even the recent, masterly work by Lévy-Bruhl, *Recherches sur les Actions de la Loi*, 1960, over-emphasizes this aspect.

[11] Here we differ from Schulz, Kaser and other modern authorities.

[12] We are not convinced by Lévy-Bruhl's different explanation of the clause in *Nouvelles Etudes sur le très ancien Droit Romain*, 1947, 80 ff.

[13] G. 1.132.

[14] D. 1.3.31, Ulpian 13 ad legem Juliam et Papiam; see Daube, *Savigny-Stiftung*, 76, 1959, 176 f., 261 ff.

[15] 25.11 f.

[15a] Cp. Assyrian laws 8.

[16] Mishnah Baba Kamma 8.1; see Daube, *The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism*, 1956, 263.

[17] This point is not properly brought out by Daube, *New Testament*, 263. It would be interesting to investigate the relation between the treatment of entire provisions which have become 'free' and that of isolated words which are or appear to be superfluous. The concept of *muphne*, for example, is far from sufficiently analysed. Cp. also Daube, *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 50, 1932, 158 n. 34, 159 n. 45, 49, 55.

[18] Daube, *Cambridge Law Journal*, 6, 1937, 217 ff.

[19] Kaser, *Das Altrömische Ius*, 1949, 286 ff.

[20] G. 3.14, 23, 29.

[21] P.S. 4.8.20 (22), I. 3.2.3a, C. 6.58.14.1, Justinian A.D. 531. de Zulueta, *The Institutes of Gaius*, pt. 2, 1953, 122 f., takes a line we cannot follow. Buckland, *Text-Book of Roman Law*, 2nd edn., 1932, 369, is sound; in fact this section is a good example of his power of setting out in a few terse and crystal-clear sentences a long and complicated development, including all the necessary scholarly reservations.

[22] That is the meaning of *Voconiana ratione* in P.S. The *lex Voconia* must have contained a provision with which the right of the nearest female agnate was difficult to reconcile, so the jurists interpreted this right away.

[23] *Tijdschrift Voor Rechtsgeschiedenis*, 25, 1957, 384 ff.

[24] Mishnah Yebamoth 2.4, Bab. Yebamoth 21a. We do not agree with Epstein, *Marriage Laws in the Bible and Talmud*, 1942, 236, 254 ff., that the grandmother was permitted until prohibited by the post-exilic sages. Her omission from the Biblical codes is explained by the fact that, as even in those times a grandmother must have been her grandson's senior by some forty years, this was a most unlikely case of incest: Lolita in reverse. The Samaritans, who did not recognize the teachings of the sages, may none the less have had the prohibition of the grandmother; at any rate we never find the Rabbis charging them with disregard of it. As they were literalists, one may wonder in what text they saw the prohibition, if they had it. Possibly they pressed the term 'mother' (to be met twice in Leviticus 19.7) and claimed that it included the grandmother. On a case where they held that 'brother' signified 'kinsman' and in fact did not cover brother in the narrow sense, see below, p. 21.

[25] Daube, *New Testament*, 90 ff., cp. *Proceedings of the Oxford Society of Historical Theology*, 1944/5, 36 ff.

[26] 1 Maccabees 2.39 ff., Josephus, *Ant.*, 12.6.2.276 f., 13.1.3.12 f.

[27] See Josephus, *Ant.*, 12.1.1.4 ff., *C. Ap.*, 1.22.210 ff.

[28] Josephus, *Ant.*, 18.9.2.322 f.

[29] Shared by Daube, *New Testament*, 255. The particular argument based on this misconception is not tenable; fortunately the main thesis is not thereby affected.

[30] *Ant.*, 18.1.4.16.

[31] Leviticus 24.19 f.

[32] E.g. Mishnah Baba Kamma 8.1, Mekhilta Nezikin, ch. 8, on Exodus 21.24.

[33] From some date, even the Pharisees required that, for a false witness to be liable, sentence against the accused must already have been pronounced—though not yet carried out: see below, p. 27.

[34] Deuteronomy 19.16 ff., Mishnah Makkoth 1.6, Bab. Makkoth 5b.

[35] *The Pharisees*, 1940, 1, 144.

[36] Hammurabi 2 ff., Assyrian laws 18 f.

[37] In Exodus 22.8 litigation between depositor and depositee is decided by oracle (see below, p. 24), and perhaps double payment is imposed on 'whichever of the two they find guilty'.

[38] In the preceding 19.15 the verb

occurs twice, the first time in a sense midway between 'to rise in the assembly' and 'to rise to fight', the second in the entirely different sense of 'to be established': 'One man shall not rise up . . . at the mouth of two witnesses shall the matter be established.'

[39] See Daube, *Studies in Biblical Law*, 1947, 130.

[40] *Urschrift und Übersetzungen der Bibel*, 2nd edn., 1928, 140.

[41] For example, Mishnah Makkoth 1.6: 'his (accused) brother is still alive'.

[42] Hoffmann, *Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 5, 1878, 12 f. If Maimonides already took this line, it may account for his view that, in the case of monetary penalties or flogging, a false witness is punishable even if he has succeeded: here the man originally condemned can be indemnified or rehabilitated, and there is no risk of undermining public morale. There is some historical truth even in this inference, but we cannot go into detail.

[43] *Ant.*, 4.8.15.219.

[44] In one point the Pharisees introduced a precision not in the original law: they held a false witness punishable only from the moment that sentence had been pronounced against the accused—which confined punishability to the interval between sentence and execution of the sentence. The story of Susannah fits this scheme (no wonder, being a legal legend of the Pharisees): she was already sentenced but still alive when her accusers were proved false. Josephus knows the rule, defining as punishable him who 'having borne false witness was believed'. (This is the right translation: Hoffmann, *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 6.) It is also noteworthy that there is no indication that the false witnesses of Matthew 26.60 ff., Mark 14.55 ff., were proceeded against: no verdict against Jesus was delivered on the strength of their testimony. But the restriction is certainly not Biblical.

[45] Exodus 21.35 ff., Mishnah Yadaim 4.7.

[46] The exact formulation of an argument *a fortiori* may vary. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the same variety (*'eno dhin*) appears in this Sadducean application, in the prototype of the Hillelite *a fortiori* in Tosephta Pesahim 4.2—on which see below, p. 14—and in the argument *a fortiori* advanced by Jose ben Taddai to show up the fallacy of the argument, Derek Eretz Rabba 1—see below, p. 18.

[47] See below, p. 19.

[48] *Bell.*, 2.8.14.166.

[49] Megillath Taanith; see Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden*, 5th ed., 1906, 3 pt. 1, 126 f., pt. 2, 567 f.

[50] Leviticus 24.14, I Kings 21.13. It is true that in Leviticus 24 the formal testimony is part of the execution, and in I Kings the laying on of hands is not mentioned.

[51] Mishnah Aboth 1.9, Sanhedrin 5.4. It should be noted that Simeon ben Shetach's saying in Aboth 1.9 goes beyond the new regulation. The new regulation is to separate the witnesses in order that one of them may not take his cue from the other. Simeon here says that, in addition, the judge himself ought to be careful not to drop a hint.

[52] 14.56, 59.

[53] See e.g. for France, art. 102 of the Code de procédure pénale, art. 316 Code d'instruction criminelle, and for Germany, § 58 of the Strafprozessordnung.

[54] W. J. Lewis, *Manual of the Law of Evidence in Scotland*, 1925, 120 f.

[55] See Daube, *Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité*, 2, 1949, 201.

[56] In Charles's *Apocrypha*, 1913, 650.

[57] Aboth 1.9, Sanhedrin 5.1 f.

[58] Numbers 9.13.

[59] Numbers 28.10.

[60] Tosephta Pesahim 4.2. It may not be accidental that this prototype of the Hillelite *a fortiori* was of particular force, in that the Passover is not just one of many cases where extirpation is threatened. Whereas in the vast majority the penalty is imposed on the breach of a prohibition, there are only two cases, circumcision and Passover, where it is imposed on failure to observe a positive commandment. See Mishnah Kerithoth 1.1 at the end.

[61] See *Hebrew Union College Annual*, 22, 1949, 239 ff., with a continuation in *Festschrift Lewald*, 1953, 27 ff.

[62] Deuteronomy 20.20, Tosephta Erubin 4.7. It will be noticed that Hillel made use of a little clause which, on an objective reading, contributes nothing to the law and which, before him, had probably remained unused; cp. above, p. 6. That a Jewish army might not begin a battle on a Sabbath is presupposed also in Josephus, *Ant.*, 14.4.2.63, *Bell.*, 2.21.8.634, *Vita*, 32.159. The rule was

disregarded on the occasion described in *Bell.*, 2.19.2.517 f.

[63] Exodus 31.16, Mekhilta, Shabbata, ch. 1, on Exodus 31.13, Bab. Yoma 85b.

[64] Leviticus 18.5, Tosephta Shabbath 15.17, Bab. Yoma 85b.

[65] Compare the attitude reflected in Ezra 9 f. and Nehemiah 13.23 ff. with the simpler ancient one in, say, Deuteronomy 20.14, 22.10 ff., or the Book of Ruth.

[66] Daube, *New Testament*, 106 ff.

[67] Leviticus 11.44, 20.7, Matthew 15.2, Mark 7.3, Luke 11.38, Mishnah Eduyoth 5.6 towards end, Bab. Berakoth 53b.

[68] Daube, *New Testament*, 303 ff., *Studia Patristica*, Oxford, 1957, 2, 109 ff.

[69] Mekhilta, Nezikin, ch. 5, on Exodus 21.15, Bab. Sanhedrin 52b.

[70] Daube, *Symbolae Friburgenses*, 257, *Tulane Law Review*, 374 f., 404.

[71] Mishnah Baba Kamma 1.4, 2.6.

[72] 24.18 ff., quoted above, p. 4.

[73] See Daube, *Tulane Law Review*, 18, 371, *New Testament*, 264 f. In the latter study we argued that damages for insult were first based on the Mishpatim, Exodus 21.24—which phase of development is still reflected in Matthew 5.38 f. —before being assigned to another part of the Pentateuch, Deuteronomy 25.11 f.

[74] Hagigah 1.8.

[75] Derek Eretz Rabba 1.

[76] Leviticus 21.14.

[77] Ibid.

[78] None the less it was only because of his motive that he incurred the ban. The mere fact of putting an argument contrary to Scripture, without evil intent, would not provoke this reaction; cp. e.g. Mishnah Pesahim 6.2.

[79] Cp. Daube, 'Le raisonnement par l'absurde chez les jurisconsultes romains', Lecture delivered at the Institut de Droit Romain, Paris, 1958.

[80] For literature on comparative law, see Kaser, *Das Altrömische Ius*, 228.

[81] Bab. Shabbath 31a, see Daube, *Hebrew Union College Annual*, 244.

[82] Daube, *New Testament*, 206 f.

[83] Bab. Baba Metzia 59b.

[84] Mishnah Yadaim 4.3 at the end.

[85] 30.12.

[86] Mishnah Niddah 4.2, Epiphanius, *Haer.* 14; see Schürer, *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes*, 3rd edn., 2, 1898, 18.

[87] Exodus 12.19, Pal. Pesahim 27b.

[88] E.g. J. A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans*, 1907, 187.

[89] Bab. Kiddushin 76a.

[90] Josephus, *Ant.*, 13.12.1.320, *Bell.*, 1.4.85. See Epstein, *Marriage Laws*, 90.

[91] *Jüdische Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft und Leben*, 1, 1862, 27 ff.

[92] Matthew 22.23 ff., Mark 12.18 ff., Luke 20.27 ff.

[93] 4.1 f., 23.8.

[94] On this aspect, see Daube, *New Testament*, 158 ff.

[95] They maintained that the Gerizim and the oak of Deuteronomy 11.29 f., connected with blessings, were to be distinguished from the Samaritan Gerizim near Shechem and the oak of Genesis 12.6.

[96] Exodus 3.6, Matthew 22.32, Mark 12.26, Luke 20.37.

[97] Pal. Sotah 21c, Siphre Deuteronomy, ch. 56, on 11.30, Mishnah Sotah 7.5, Bab. Sanhedrin 90b.

[98] Daube, *Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 50, 1932, 148 ff.

[99] See Daube, *Tulane Law Review*, 359 ff.

[100] Deuteronomy 5.14. It is probably not accidental that they invoked this clause in preference to others—like Exodus 22.9—mentioning 'ox or any cattle'. In the parallel version of the Ten Commandments, in Exodus 20.11, we find only the general term, no reference to ox or ass: 'Thou shalt not do any work nor thy cattle.' It seems to have been held that the difference had a purpose, namely, to emphasize the wider application of laws speaking of an ox only.

[101] Mishnah Baba Kamma 5.7, Eduyoth 1.12; Daube, *Hebrew Union College Annual*, 250.

[102] Exodus 22.10.

[103] Exodus 21.20.

[104] Numbers 35.18.

[105] Mekhilta, Nezikin, ch. 7, on Exodus 21.20.

THE ABSORPTION OF NORTH AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS IN AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL

D. Weintraub and M. Lissak

IN THE following pages we attempt to sum up Israel's experience in the agricultural absorption of North African immigrants, or, more precisely, in the settlement of these immigrants within the specific framework of the *moshav*, the smallholder's co-operative village, which, for reasons we shall explain later, was chosen as the major instrument for mass-absorption and colonization.[1] As is well known, the *moshav* form had been founded and developed by rigorously selected and organized groups, characterized by high ideological consensus and social solidarity, and possessing an agricultural background; while the post-war mass immigration from North Africa, which was to constitute the population of the new *moshavim*, had almost no pioneering nuclei, and was non-selective as to age, fitness, family structure and vocational training. At the basis of this report, therefore, lies the conception of the absorption of this immigration as a process of confrontation and mutual adjustment between the *moshav* as an economic, social, political and ideological structure on the one hand, and the way of life of the newcomers, on the other; and the essential problem which we accordingly wish to pose is the nature of the synthesis of the two, and of the social conditions liable to further or hinder it. This approach in turn requires that the discussion be divided into three main parts:

1. A brief description of the character of the smallholders' co-operative village, and the demands it makes on the settlers.

2. The socio-cultural background of the immigrants, and the circumstances of their coming to Israel in general and of their settlement on the land in particular, as factors determining their ability and readiness to integrate within the *moshav*.

3. The actual meeting between the two patterns and their mutual influence, the various forms this process has assumed, and the different results it has achieved.

A comprehensive treatment of this problem along the lines suggested

is clearly beyond the scope of one paper. Our aim, therefore, will be essentially analytic, and within the limited space at our disposal we shall present only a small fraction of the descriptive material and the statistical data on which the analysis rests.

I. THE MOSHAV AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM

In order to sketch the basic principles which define the formal structure of the *moshav*, and to analyse the wider social implications of this structure, it is necessary to refer to its classical image; that is, to the original blue-print and prototype of all the settlements of this kind, the recent immigrant village included. As all references to the ideal and the stereotype are bound to be, such an analysis will suffer from omissions and over-simplifications. This is especially so since the model conceived by the founders of the *moshav* movement has since undergone a process of significant change and differentiation, and its pure and absolute form has certainly not served as the immediate and direct basis of post-war mass settlement. Two sets of factors have in fact combined to effect this transformation: tensions immanent in the ideological pattern itself, and broad social trends acting from the outside. And the process of solving internal contradictions and of adjusting to external developments has been reflected in the formal institutionalization of new forms and procedures, and in various local innovations devoid of official sanctions. Both types of social change have, in this way, affected production, social structure and other spheres; they have by now become the rule rather than the exception, and they clearly constitute part and parcel of the living *moshav*. However, and precisely because of the development of many variants and the existence of several forms, a reference to a basic and common point of departure is indicated; the more so as this point has not, essentially, been lost from view, and as it has also largely determined those villages which are of direct concern to us in this context.

Formally, then, the *moshav* is primarily a co-operative society with limited liability, established to promote farming as the sole occupation and source of living of its members. The nuclear family constitutes its basic social and economic unit, but the various households are closely bound together by mutual solidarity and aid, as well as by common agricultural, credit, supply, and marketing services. The village economy differs, of course, from place to place, and is planned according to general economic considerations and local agricultural and market conditions (there are at present five basic farm types, as well as several variations within each type); in each *moshav*, however, an equitable division of the means of production (chiefly in respect of the size and quality of plots, and water allocation) is maintained. There is also little differentiation between the various developed villages themselves, the

farm types being constructed so as to require a generally similar capital and manpower input, and to provide a like level of income.

In addition to being an agricultural co-operative and to upholding a specific way of life, the *moshav* also constitutes a cell of local government, with the function of providing various municipal services. The authority over all these aspects of the village structure lies in the hands of the general assembly of the adult settlers, which decides upon matters of principle and lays down the general policy. The implementation of this policy is entrusted to the village council, assisted by various committees and by an administrative staff. The mandate of the council derives from the power vested in it by the assembly in free, universal and secret elections. The two constitute, in fact, the executive and the legislative body respectively; and their separation, together with the principle of democratic representation and responsibility, is an integral part of the *moshav* value-system.

The smallholders' co-operative settlement is a multiple social structure, comprising several levels and spheres of activity within a small territorial and functional framework. Because of its complex character, this structure demands a great deal of inner co-ordination between its several constituent aspects. These aspects are, in fact, interdependent to a very high degree; and each of the spheres of activity—the economic, the social, the cultural, and the municipal—is not only in itself a direct and central objective to be achieved by the *moshav*; it is also a means of and a condition for the attainment of the other objectives. Hence, a noticeable divergence of any of these facets is liable to affect the structure as a whole, unless of course there is also a parallel change and adaptation in the others. The resources which such a structure expects of its members are obviously very great, and the question which must be asked is what were the reasons which led to the choice of this form as a major absorptive tool, and what special modifications were introduced into it in order to meet the new situation.

There was, primarily, the overall consideration of national existence and development: the security principle of settling the borders and of dispersing the population, the political consideration of staking out claims to uninhabited areas, the desire for independence in food production and other economic factors, and of course the ideological emphasis on deurbanization and 'productivization' of the Jewish community. All these pointed to rural settlement and agricultural production on a large scale. The last of these reasons obviously also applied to the new immigrants as such; while the newly projected agricultural jobs offered occupational opportunities. And both these complexes of factors combined to determine the channelling of a significant number of the newcomers into farming.

Within this absorptive and colonizing project preference was then given to community farming rather than to private ownership pure and

simple. As is well known, the Jewish community in Palestine had developed several types of collective and co-operative villages, and by the time the State was established they had become the most common and acceptable forms of agricultural organization. They were, therefore, ideologically and traditionally sanctioned, and could also provide experienced personnel; while the country-wide movements in which they were associated might relieve the central settlement authorities of some of the administrative problems involved. Completely independent farming, moreover, was not considered practicable for newly arrived, culturally heterogeneous and vocationally untrained immigrants; not only would such immigrants find it difficult—if not impossible—to assume sole responsibility for their holdings, but they had also to be integrated in a wider sense than the merely occupational. And this again seemed to point to a closely knit and centrally supervised community, within whose framework the agricultural training and absorptive facilities could be provided.

Finally, it was the smallholders' co-operative village which of all the existing examples[2] of this general type was considered to be the most flexible and therefore the most suitable for the purpose at hand. It was of course realized (though in fact to a lesser extent than the circumstances required) that this permissiveness, while relatively high, was nevertheless insufficient. The pressure of mass absorption precluded, however, a more careful and variegated planning, as well as a more gradual implementation; and the specific modification introduced into the *moshav* structure as described above was thus primarily twofold: it provided for the inclusion in each new village of a team of agricultural and 'socio-cultural' instructors, and it allowed greater liberty and longer time in the achievement of a fully-fledged community pattern. To what extent this has proved a success or a failure, and why, is the subject of the sections that follow.

II. THE PREDISPOSITION OF THE NORTH AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS

The significance of the immigrant's confrontation with the new surroundings[3] will, in the last analysis, depend upon (*a*) the extent to which his social and cultural background parallels these surroundings, that is the 'distance' between his past and his present, and (*b*) the extent to which he is ready and willing to change, and to bridge the distance where it exists. In order to analyse these basic predispositions of the immigrant we refer primarily to the social structure of his country of origin and to the position of the Jewish community there. For obviously it is his former way of life—as determined by his position in the Jewish and the general society—which will have initially formed not only his conception of the new situation, but also his needs and expectations of it. Each such specific pattern of life encompasses, of

course, the whole broad fabric of social reality; but it seems that there are some central analytical concepts which help qualify it and define its bearing upon the novel circumstances. In our report we shall refer primarily to two such major factors:

(*a*) The essence of the ultimate human and social image which has evolved in the given society, and the attainment of which constitutes its basic values and aims.

(*b*) The actual roles existing in this social structure, through which these aims are attainable.

Both these factors take part in every differential evaluation made by any member of society of the norms, roles and situations with which he is confronted—and especially of those to which he has to relate in his capacity as an 'adult', as a 'citizen', and as a 'wage-earner', as 'head of a group', etc. This constant process of a selection of aims and means expresses aspirations on the ideological level as well as the extent of acceptance or rejection of concrete spheres of activity, such as family, occupational, cultural, political and social. Extreme caution must of course be exercised in relating any type of these images to groups of origin in general, and to ethnic units in particular; and one of the aims of our studies is indeed to determine the validity of these concepts, in the terms referred to above, in the process of change. It appears, however, that the more homogeneous the background of such groups, the greater the identity of their images, and the easier also the analysis of the individual in reference to them. Our first task, therefore, has been to see if and how such groups can be systematically analysed in the terms suggested and to classify those with which we are here concerned.

In order to do this, that is to define the nature of different social structures and of the basic images characterizing them, it is convenient to adopt the method of opposing two extreme types—the 'modern-occidental' one, and the 'traditional-oriental' one. The two 'pure' types do not, of course, do justice to the varied social reality; and it would be difficult to find an immigrant not endowed with a mixture of both 'western' and 'eastern' traits. Thus the 'oriental' urban immigrant from Iraq or North Africa will often in significant aspects be more 'westernized' than the small-townsman from Eastern Europe or the Balkans. Nevertheless, and in spite of the many variants actually existing within each type, this method of analysis enables us to place each group, in general or in respect to different aspects, in relation to the two analytical poles. In 'desperate brevity', the basic dimensions through which we define and distinguish the various stages of the 'oriental-occidental' continuum are the following:

(i) The type, salience, and rank-order of the societal and individual goals and needs, and of the values (or images) connected with them.

(ii) The nature, structure, relative importance and autonomy of the various social groups and roles, in which the societal goals and values are institutionalized.

(iii) The character and functioning of the various allocative mechanisms which mediate between the various roles and regulate the flow of resources and rewards among them.

In terms of these components, the *moshav* itself clearly embodies broad traits of the 'modern' way of life and social structure. And it is easy to postulate that there is initially bound to be a wide gap between it and immigrants of traditional background.

True, except for extreme cases of sickness, debility and weakness, the oriental immigrant is used, if not to farming, then at least to manual labour and to the rural way of life; his family is more often than not abundant in manpower, accustomed to a low standard of living, and not likely to suffer a profound shock upon finding that hard work is to be its source of livelihood and the isolated village its home. However, such an immigrant will find it difficult to assimilate the image of the 'homo economicus' and the 'homo politicus' which characterizes western society and stands at odds with the more traditional religious and familistic image. And he will also find it difficult to acquire the techniques of modern farming, especially those connected with the market system and with the principles of financing and investment; and to accept the social and organizational pattern of co-operative life in an universalistic framework.

And conversely, the more western the background of the North African immigrant, the more 'bureaucratic' and modern in his training he is likely to be, and the wider and more universalistic his economic and public experience and attitudes. By the same token, however—and it will be remembered that this is not a pioneering immigration—he is liable to reject the very emphasis on the moral-ideological consecration, individual and social, which is basic to the *moshav*. His images will, on the contrary, be mostly of a different nature; they will refer to occupations related to 'urban' economy and services, and expect a high status based on these occupations and the standard of living they afford, and not on solidary-expressive rewards. And he will undoubtedly imagine that the concrete opportunities for the achievement of these aims are to be found in the city and not in rural surroundings and in agriculture.

To sum up the argument so far: we have suggested that the nature of the *initial and immediate* confrontation of the immigrant with the new surroundings should be primarily traced to the distance between these surroundings and his *specific and personal* background in the country of origin. This direct distance, however, while indeed most significant in the early phase of the absorptive process, represents but one aspect of

the situation, as defined by the predispositional factor. It is obvious that the predisposition of the immigrant in the broader sense of the word includes not only that limited social and occupational experience which has been his as an individual, but also—at least *potentially*—the whole range of manipulation of aspirations and of the means to their achievement inherent in the given social structure as a whole. That is to say, the immigrant will be distinguished also by the extent to which he has assimilated into his make-up the awareness of the possibility and the legitimacy of such manipulation and choice, whether in respect to the preference of one sphere of activity over another, or as regards the concrete alternative roles existing in each sphere—in other words, by his potential ability to change. In terms of the variables mentioned above, this ability may be defined as *rigidity* or *flexibility* of image, the difference signifying orientations which are self-contained and narrow as against those which are open to redefinition and contain elements considered to be changeable. (The qualities of rigidity and flexibility apply, of course, both to ultimate aims and aspirations and to concrete means and situations, and a systematic analysis would require each case to be identified on the two levels separately; in the present context, however, we cannot enter into such details, and we shall refer to this variable generally, as if on one plane.) It is accordingly necessary to distinguish in each predisposition between the dimension of range, and between the type of its contents as mentioned earlier on. Thus we have —subject to our own reservation concerning sweeping statements—the more comprehensive typology of predispositions to absorption, seen as a product of the two facets discussed: the rigid 'oriental' immigrants as against the flexible 'oriental' one; and the rigid 'occidental' immigrant in contrast to the flexible 'occidental' one. Formally, the relationship between the dimension of rigidity-flexibility and the ability to integrate in a new situation is fairly clear; and we can thus approach the problem of absorption as a twofold process of building upon the immigrant's basic images on the one hand, and of utilizing and developing his ability to change, on the other. Actual identification of the second factor in the individual background is, however, much more difficult than that of the first one. And this is so because the relationship between social structure and the individual is here much more complex, and also because the factors of chance and personality here play a much greater role. This set of socio-psychological problems has not yet been adequately analysed within any migration study, and especially limited is our knowledge of the conditions which make for the transference of the open image orientations as developed in specific situations and frameworks, to *different* social structure and surroundings. Some factors, which we are now further exploring in the Israeli situation, seem nevertheless most significant in this respect.

The ability to adapt to novel and essentially different circumstances

seems of course to depend primarily upon the qualities of abstraction and generalization. Sociologically speaking, and in reference to the specific subject at hand, these qualities may be identified as the capacity of analysing each new social situation as to: (*a*) the distinction between its primary and secondary aspects (that is, the values behind it and the means and ways to their attainment); (*b*) the understanding of the extent and principles according to which the first are institutionalized through the latter, and (*c*) the conception of their fundamental relationship to the individual's own basic images; that is, of approaching the new circumstances through a rational, conscious process—thus facilitating, other conditions being equal, the utilization of elements which are similar or irrelevant to basic images on the one hand, and of manipulating those which are of secondary importance on the other. To go a step further, this ability is again related to the immigrant's broad socio-cultural background, but to an analytically distinct aspect; namely, to the extent to which his images had not been determined and legitimated in an overwhelmingly traditional and heteronomous way, but on the rational and autonomous level. This, in turn, implies that the given society had (*a*) developed this approach in the first place, and that (*b*) this approach had not remained a property of an exclusive cultural elite but had been diffused through broad strata of the population, which means that there was in this society a high degree of cultural specialization of a specific type together with a relatively limited differentiation of cultural roles. The nature and structure of the communicative process in the country of origin are obviously of special import as regards the oriental, traditional type; and here it might be possible to distinguish between a 'purely' traditional pattern (like that broadly characteristic of the first North African group analysed later on), and the 'traditional-rational' pattern generally prevalent, for example, among Yemenite Jewry).[4]

In addition to the aspect just mentioned and those previously discussed, there are of course other factors which older studies have shown to be significant for the ability to change.[5] Here we shall specifically mention two of them, namely (*a*) the stability and the continuity of the family as a source of solidarity and personal security (the nature of this family such as nuclear or extended—depending upon the society involved), and (*b*) the integration of the wider social framework of the immigrant—and especially the extent to which there has developed in it an active community leadership and the authority and identification this leadership commands. Since the stability of the immigrant's primary groups does not in itself necessarily contribute to the acceptance of change, but can also result in a greater power of resistance to it, these factors are of a neutral nature; and their weight and significance in the absorptive process will accordingly be determined by the other variables analysed, that is, the extent and focus of the expected change

and the 'preparation' for it. Be that as it may, without them the basic conditions of personal and group maturity and activity, necessary for the performance of social roles in general and in a situation of change in particular, will be absent.

In the preceding pages we have suggested a schematic typology of 'predispositions' to absorption; and it is on the basis of this typology that we must now classify the immigrants from North Africa. We cannot discuss each of the actual types distinguishable by this method with any degree of completeness (our analysis of the extreme oriental group, for example, does not sufficiently differentiate in respect to the dimension of cultural flexibility, however small its range); and we have selected for discussion those aspects which in each case seem most characteristic and significant.

As is well known, immigrants from North Africa constitute a large section of the recent newcomers to Israel in general and of those settled on the land in particular. And like the other immigrant groups, their villages have experienced success as well as failure.[8]

TABLE 1. *The Proportion of North African Moshavim in New Immigrants' Settlements**

Administrative Area	*Total Settlements*	*Settled by North Africans*
Grand Total	281	82
Northern Area	53	13
Central Area	75	16
Jerusalem Sub-Area	35	11
Galilee Sub-Area	56	15
Lachish Area	29	13
Negev (southern) Area	33	14

* We have defined villages as 'North African' where at least half of the households belong to this group.

TABLE 2. *Immigrants Placed in Agriculture by Year and Origin*

Origin	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	Total
Grand Total	—	4,086	7,265	1,609	1,942	1,457	2,487	2,340	1,818	1,118	645	24,767
North Africans	—	460	805	450	430	290	958	1,467	1,107	57	59	6,143
Per cent North Africans	—	11·2	11·9	28·0	22·1	19·9	38·5	62·7	60·9	5·1	9·1	24·8

TABLE 3. *Immigrants who have left Agriculture, by Year and Origin**

Origin	1951–52	1953–54	1955	1956	1957	1958	Total
Grand Total	864	738	707	327	328	288	3,252
North Africans	219	318	397	281	290	222	1,727
Per cent North Africans	25·3	43·1	56·1	85·9	88·4	77·1	53·1

* These data refer only to those who have left agriculture through 'the proper channels', that is, have been officially helped to resettle elsewhere.

As will be seen, while Jews from North Africa constituted 20·7 per cent of all the immigrants in the years 1948–58, in agriculture their average weight during this period was 24·8 per cent. 28·1 per cent of the members of this group placed in co-operative settlements did not become absorbed in them; and this should be compared with the overall average of 24·8 per cent, and the average of other groups of origin of 8·2 per cent.

In the tables all the North African immigrants are treated together as a single group, because more precise statistics are not available. It must be emphasized, however, that sociologically they do not constitute one body at all; nor is it legitimate to treat as homogeneous the various 'national' groupings—that is, those coming from Tangier, French and Spanish Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Tripolitania (Egyptian Jewry is here altogether excluded). In fact, in determining the place of the North African immigrants along the traditional-modern continuum we have delineated, we find three basic types (the second of which is again divided in respect to the ability to change), each presenting a different face to the *moshav* reality. They are:

1. *The traditional rural society* (comprising primarily the inhabitants of the Atlas mountains in French Morocco, the people of the island of Djerba off the Tunisian coast, and the 'cave-dwellers' of Tripolitania). In agricultural settlement in Israel this group looms very large, although its relative weight in the countries of origin has lately been steadily decreasing. (The Atlas Jews, for example, up to the French conquest, constituted about 40 per cent of the entire Jewish population of the territory, as compared to 20 per cent since.)

2. *The semi-westernized transitional urban society*, which may be divided into:

(*a*) the 'stable' communities of the middle-sized cities, communities of long standing and deep roots in their places of residence, whose initial steps on the road to westernization were taken without drastic changes in the traditional social structure and organization (this type is best

exemplified by some groups from the Moroccan cities of Meknes, Rabat and Fez, as well as from several Tunisian and Algerian towns).

(*b*) The 'mobile' transitional groups, that is, former rural or semi-urban inhabitants who migrated to larger urban centres. This migration, and the consequent process of urbanization and partial westernization, resulted here in the breaking up of their traditional social frameworks, but did not lead to integration within either European society or the local Jewish communities. Social isolation and anomie may in fact be said to have been the main characteristic of this group prior to its immigration to Israel (and it could be found chiefly in the great 'cosmopolitan' and dynamic cities of Casablanca and Marrakech in Morocco, and Oran in Algeria).

3. *The western group*, which actually assimilated European (chiefly French) culture; members of this group (including a small part of the Jews of Casablanca and a few other Moroccan centres, and a significant segment of the cities of Tunis and Algiers) have immigrated to Israel in very limited numbers, and their share in agricultural settlement is of necessity very insignificant.[7]

We must now elaborate more fully the types sketched, in terms of the *moshav* expectations; see how the two actually interact; and, last but not least, examine the functioning and influence of the absorptive institutions, frameworks and teams.

III. THE ABSORPTIVE PROCESS—THE DIFFERENT NORTH AFRICAN GROUPS AND THE MOSHAV

The absorption of the rural community. The rural community of the North African Jewry[8] was in many aspects strikingly parallel to the extreme 'oriental' prototype of Jewish social structure in the Diaspora. It was characterized by groups of great homogeneity and high solidarity, with a culture as yet almost unaffected and unbroken by elements external to it, or more precisely, by suddenly introduced drastic innovations. The population of this type was brought up to manual labour; and while not directly agricultural itself, it was set in farming surroundings and lived by an exchange of services with them. Several forms of land leasing—direct ownership being forbidden to Jews—were also employed. The contact of this rural society with the amenities of modern civilization was extremely limited; it did not know much of the alternative urban way of life with its attractions and opportunities, nor did it develop a yearning after the special, efficient and modern public services and utilities characteristic of the city. In agricultural settlement in Israel members of this group were indeed found to be basically adjusted to farming work, to be easily satisfied as to housing conditions, and to require little variety in consumption goods and recreation. They were, furthermore—provided patience and understanding were shown

for their opinions and customs[9]—also easy to get along with and eager to co-operate with the absorptive teams. Their low level of aspirations as regards material comforts has in fact enabled them to exist and hold on in hard living conditions; and those relatively few families among them who have left their settlements have done so for other than economic reasons and more often than not merely transferred to another agricultural village. To sum up: it is obvious that at least in some fundamental respects the expectations of this group have constituted a suitable predisposition to *moshav* life. In other aspects, however, their essentially limited experience and often inflexible orientations have made the absorptive process more painful.

In fact, in spite of their positive attitude to work, agriculture, and rural life, the performance of the agricultural role as sketched in the first part of this report has been fraught with difficulties. The demographic structure of the family of this type has, it is true, enabled the allocation of large manpower resources to the task at hand. But—since the size and returns of the farm are by nature of the overall plan limited and in fact designed to provide for smaller units—this has resulted in an imbalance between productive potential and needs on the one hand, and production and consumption on the other. The latter of these was, as has been said, initially redressed by the low level of material expectations of this group; but the former has contributed to a feeling of under-employment and to the undermining of working habits. The *moshav* structure has also been at odds with the family work patterns and allocation of roles common in this community. In the society described the woman has since time immemorial been given a specific place and a narrow scope of activity, embracing actually only the 'kitchen and the children'. The economic role of the woman in the Atlas mountains accordingly did not transcend the domestic sphere; at most she engaged also in cottage industry (chiefly weaving), meant primarily for the use of the extended family which constituted the unit of production and consumption. The structure of the farm in the *moshav*, and especially of the types characterized by an uneven work curve, has thus required a reorganization of the family pattern described; and this reorganization has meant not only a transition from the extended to the nuclear household, but also a re-definition of the roles based on differentiation according to sex—that is, the entrance of the woman into the productive process proper, and her inevitable participation in the authority due to the bread-winner. This development, actually far from completed as yet, has been accompanied by considerable tension, and has adversely affected the motivation for agricultural work in general and for the full cultivation of the farm in particular.

Additional difficulties, perhaps even more fundamental, have emerged in relation to the understanding and acceptance of the principles of modern production and market economy, and especially

as regards the financing of expansion projects and rentability calculations. Most immediate, though of course more temporary and superficial in character, have been the problems on the technical-informative plane (it must be remembered that modern farming is connected with a certain level of general education and accumulation of knowledge, acquired in our society in a long period of study).[10] Of special significance, however, has been this population's lack of a realistic time perspective in rational-economic terms,[11] and of the ability to persevere in the light of deferred rewards. During the initial period of consolidation and absorption the instructors' team fulfils these requirements for the settlers. But without their internalization by those settlers themselves, there can be no full family production, and certainly no autonomous assumption of authority and responsibility for the complex activities of the village co-operative. This is especially so in the light of the price crises which break out in agriculture from time to time; these crises further undermine the confidence and feeling of security of the farmer who does not understand their background, causes and temporary nature—and that in spite of the basic immunity which is his by dint of those positive predispositions enumerated earlier on.

The flexibility of this group being relatively small, the greater the distance between the immigrant and the *moshav*, the greater also the difficulty of bridging it. As might thus be expected, the social sphere is a field of basic conflict between opposite images and role-conceptions. The *moshav* as such obviously requires a certain balance between universalistic and particularistic orientations and principles, both of which are inherent in its structure. This primarily refers to the prevention of a situation in which a division is created between total and exclusive sectors, which do not allow for an overall identification with the community in general. The population described is, however, characterized by a very strong particularistic tendency—i.e. by the limited scope of its social contacts, by an attachment to ascribed frameworks (such as the extended family or the lineage group), and by lack of confidence in, and the capacity to work together with, people from outside these frameworks. It is also natural that in the process of migration, and especially in the light of the revolutionary change this process has entailed, the individual falls back even more upon groups of this kind. And it is for this reason—strange as it may seem at first glance—that the *moshav* has not only strengthened some links of the traditional structure which had weakened in the country of origin, but also caused them to assume functions hitherto outside their competence. This is especially true of the so-called *hamula*.[12] In examining the tasks of this structure in the Atlas villages we find that they related primarily to the crystallization of solidarity, to education and philanthropy, to the performance of religious rituals, and to the arrangement of marriages. Political and economic functions, on the other hand, were largely outside it, the

first having been in general very restricted or haphazard in the organization of this community, and the second exclusively in the hands of the households. In Israel, by contrast, the horizons in these two spheres have vastly broadened, and in the *moshav* there is a permanent public (economic and political) apparatus, with considerable power over the distribution of resources and rewards to the individual households, and with the last say on the general development of the community. The immigrant has, not unnaturally, transferred the organizational principles and frameworks known to him to the new situation; and the *hamula* has become the main political unit in the village, internally, that is *vis-à-vis* the other groups, and externally, that is as the representative and champion of its members *vis-à-vis* the absorbing society and its various organs. This has necessitated a tightening-up of the *hamula* and its infusion with new strength, and also endowed it with a clearer sanction. Long 'lost' members of the original groups have therefore been sought out all over the country and 'drafted' to settle in the villages concerned; and cases of wholesale 'exchanges' of population between various *moshavim* have been known to happen, causing ties already previously loosened to be tightened up again. This process of social reconstruction and absorption by way of internal selection and on the basis of narrowly ascribed criteria has infused the traditional particularistic orientations, divisions and opposition with new vigour. And this tendency of the Atlas immigrants to fall back upon themselves could not but be strengthened by the fact that they did not find in Israel old-established and integrated people of their own kind to help them along—as has been the case with East European newcomers on the one hand, and with the 'magic carpet' Yemenites on the other. The main characteristic of the absorption of this group has accordingly been the presence in it of two interrelated but contradictory aspects. The first, that of continuity of social institutions and forms, could give the settler the feeling of belonging and the initial tool of absorption along familiar lines. The obverse of the picture, that is the strengthening of social frameworks not generally legitimate and viable, might, on the other hand, not only clash with the accepted social image but also preclude the performance of roles requiring a different kind of orientation and organization. Hence also the fundamental dilemma facing the absorbing authorities in general and each specific team in particular as regards this group: how, to what extent and at what speed can the desire to change the particularistic social image and orientations be accomplished without upsetting too early the stability of the immigrant group as such; stability which the newcomer so absolutely requires and which must therefore be made to serve the end of its own transformation. This situation obviously contains the germs of a vicious circle, and an inordinate amount of intelligence and patience is required to break it so as not to bring about also the disintegration of the *moshav* as a social

structure. The solution of this problem is, interestingly enough, made still more difficult by the nature of the political system and activity in Israel itself: the large number of political parties, the sharp ideological differences between many of them, the political 'stability' of the old-established population, all these combine to make the newcomer a key in the balance of power and an object of intensive electioneering. And this electioneering tends to fasten on the traditional groups which command votes, strengthens them, perpetuates the tension between them, and accords them, as it were, the official sanction of the general society.

Thus many factors continue to suggest the need for great flexibility and moderation in the approach to the 'traditional' society—especially since this society has in its own way and by its own means achieved some of the basic aims of agricultural settlement: lacking Zionist and pioneering ideology it has brought an alternative motivation to farming and hard life; it has taken care, through the *hamula*, of the problem of welfare and mutual help; and this same *hamula* has also been often instrumental in the organization and maintenance of specialized agricultural services. In fact, however, both the theory and the practice of absorption have been authoritative and rigid, rather than flexible and moderate; and it seems that this should be significantly changed. Such a change can of course imply two different levels of approach: the ideological one, advocating the broadening of the country's social and cultural patterns and of giving the 'ingathering of the exiles' a wider and more permissive meaning; and the instrumental one, favouring the tested and the sanctioned forms, but recognizing the requirements of a period of transition. It is not our function, of course, to advocate the one or the other. But whatever their relative merits, concretely both would mean the relaxation of the pressure for complete or immediate conformity; a relaxation which might, for example, tolerate a village political system based on ascription and not on democracy, and minimize inter-group contacts and tensions instead of binding the community in general ties and relations.

This, again, is far from easy; neither is there a magic sociological formula for doing it. Two major foci of tension are, in fact, inevitable in the course of this process, and both can be solved only by compromise. On the one hand, there is the problem of supporting the immigrant's institutions and the autonomy of his leadership, while vesting the necessary administrative and executive authority in the absorptive team. And on the other, there is the question of the young generation, stemming directly from the confrontation of the traditional structure with modern economy and organization, and in particular related to the *moshav* conjunction of the family and the occupational roles. It is natural that the absorbing society should see in the immigrant youth the instrument of more complete integration, in respect to himself and

the whole group. He is accordingly painstakingly educated and guided, the more so as in the modern society participation in the educational process is in itself a major role of this age group. Intergenerational differentiation and gaps are thus inevitably created; and it will be impossible to support the traditional structure without at the same time 'clipping the wings' of the young and causing them serious disappointment. Nor, conversely, will it be possible to maintain the farm and the village without those skills and abilities which they have acquired. The only solution to this dilemma seems to be a division of authority and the separation of the various spheres of acitivity.[13]

We have discussed some of the basic problems of the absorbing authorities as it were *in medias res*, subordinating them to the analysis of social structure and orientations. It is obvious, however, that the sharpest conflict in the process of confrontation emerges over the incompatibility of the two value-systems involved. It is superfluous to restate at length all the points of difference existing between the images of a fundamentally familistic and religious society, and those of a secular and universalistic one, upholding such values as the primacy of the economic functions, the equality of the sexes, and others. A brief discussion of the political values involved might, however, serve as a fuller illustration of the difficulties of this group's acculturation. The 'constitution' of the *moshav* movement has, as is known, developed a basic image of the political system, containing all the fundamental principles of modern democracy. In the traditional pattern, on the other hand, power is vested in ascribed groups; they allocate the public roles to be filled and are motivated by the legitimation of their total and exclusive interests. Election and rotation of personnel on the basis of personal achievement, measured in rational and universalistic terms, is here rejected out of hand; and by the same token this pattern is incapable of differentiating the various spheres of activity and the criteria characteristic of each of them.

The clash of basic aims and aspirations is, in turn, related to the problem of leadership.[14] The significance of the *moshav* authority structure is by no means confined to the organization of the co-operative and of the various municipal services. It implies, over and above this, a full agreement with the ultimate targets behind this organization, and a self-confidence as regards their proper representation and implementation. In the immigrant *moshav* as such this obviously is not the case. Moreover, the traditional values themselves have lost some of their vitality and validity during the process of acculturation. They are no longer capable of fully explaining reality in their own terms, nor of being upheld in it; while there has as yet been no general assimilation of the new alternatives. In other words, a situation of social anomie has been created, with a consequently ambivalent attitude to the entire role-complex of the settler. To break out of this anomie, and to guide

the village along the narrow path between the two diametrically opposed sets of principles, obviously calls for a clear-minded, dynamic, and unusual type of leadership; namely, for institutionalized or personal charisma from the point of view of the settler, and for ability to act on the new terms from the point of view of the general society. That is to say, the immigrant *moshav* must have an élite group characterized by certain personal and social traits, among which the most important will be: (*a*) understanding and acceptance of the basic images of the absorbing society and the ability to communicate them to the settlers; (*b*) orientation towards these settlers as the leader's membership group, i.e. the faithful representation of their interests and aims, and disregard of possible external mobility channels; (*c*) legitimation by both frameworks. The fact that the society described has not put forward a leadership of this type is undoubtedly the main obstacle to its absorption. It seems that two interrelated factors have prevented the emergence of such an élite:

(1) The very limited and specific social experience in the country of origin, together with a lack of flexibility in terms of the factors discussed above. These qualities largely characterized the community in general, as well as the leadership élite. In the new situation this élite was accordingly unable to acquire with the necessary speed and confidence the knowledge, the orientations and the skills necessary to the process of mediation, while the more 'modern' young generation could not, in this social structure, obtain the legitimation of the community.

(2) The lack of support, and often even active opposition, of the absorbing society to the traditional leadership. This has been the case on the ideological and the instrumental levels alike, and has in some cases resulted in the undermining of all internal authority in the village.

To sum up. In no settlement of this group has an autonomous and stable organizational structure embodying and implementing all the basic aims of the *moshav* developed as yet. In some places the traditional elements have succeeded in organizing and maintaining several spheres of activity; while in others there has been apathy, withdrawal from roles, and even disintegration. We have tried to indicate the main factors which have determined this situation. In general, we have not been able to attach to each of them its relative weight; in respect to the difference between partial success and almost total failure, however, the greatest importance clearly lies in the extent to which inflexible pressure for conformity has been exerted.

The stable urban community. This type of immigrant is much more varied than the preceding one. That is to say, it spreads over a much longer section of the oriental-occidental continuum, and thus requires a greater analytical differentiation than that previously offered. In this paper we cannot of course do full justice to this variety, and we propose

instead to concentrate on the average, to which, indeed, most of the group's members belong.

Even the middle of the road immigrant of this type is in many significant aspects different from his country fellow. While in the Atlas Jew we have seen qualities basically appropriate to the rural way of life and occupation, here agriculture was foreign to experience and ideology alike. The urban population had long maintained itself chiefly by trade and handicrafts, usually within the local Jewish community or at least in the confines of the city of residence. It had almost no contacts with the hinterland; and the occupational changes which recently affected it in the direction of more specialized and trained trades further lowered the symbolic value of manual labour in general and of farming in particular. These occupational trends and the general economic development also raised the standard of living and increased the desire for constant improvement in the level of consumption and in the variety of recreational facilities. And all these combined to create a status and role image intimately connected with the urban way of life. Other aspects of this westernization, however, had different effects. Social and political horizons broadened, secularization spread, and general education (at least on the elementary level) got its first hold; and the multiple process potentially prepared the group in question for the *moshav* in its aspect of a modern economic and municipal structure. To be sure, this transformation was as yet limited in scope and restricted in character; it served, however, to develop what we have called ability to change, as determined by broader and more open images on both levels mentioned —that is, ultimate human and social values, and concrete role images. Several factors seem to have brought about this development. There was, first of all, the meeting with a varied and multiple social and cultural reality, resulting from the process of transition as such. This, of course, provided the experience, or rather the conception, of legitimate general change as well as individual and group mobility. Limited though this mobility might have been upwards, the very existence of alternative aims and roles and the very possibility of change, opened horizons and created flexibility of outlook and the ability to analyse new situations. And above all there was also the participation in the modern educational system, the chief characteristic of which is perhaps the development of rational and autonomous orientations and judgement. Of paramount importance in terms of our analysis was, of course, the fact that the process described did not bring about, or was not connected with, the disintegration or the relinquishment of the traditional community structure, but was rather carried within it and in reference to it. On the one hand, this kept in check inordinate or unreal mobility aspirations which might (as we shall see later on) result in an extreme gap between expectations and achievement. And on the other it maintained the solidarity and the stability of primary groups, a stability

which has continued, though in a different way, in the period of migration and initial absorption. Not that the communities in question, like those of the former type, came to Israel together, or as wholes (the upper economic and professional strata in fact almost invariably remained behind), or that they have necessarily settled in large groups of extended families. But already in the country of origin the function of these frameworks was of a more limited nature, having been mostly divided between the household, the community organs, and various interlinking spheres; and the split and diffusion of the larger group consequent upon migration has neither affected the separate and individual units, nor precluded these units from themselves sustaining the process of absorption.

Nevertheless, the settlement of these immigrants[15] in the *moshav* constituted a situation of crises, stemming from the consciousness and the actuality of the change involved, and reflecting the primarily urban orientations and aims. In themselves, most of these basic images have not weakened to this very day; and in this fundamental respect at least change on the level of ultimate values cannot be said to have been effected. The reasons for it are not far to seek. Apart from the very difficulty of such change in a short time, urban orientations are being constantly reinforced and validated by the social processes of the Israeli society in general. Nor is it impossible to define certain essential aspects of agriculture—apart from the specific *moshav* ideology—chiefly in terms of the universal modern values, such as vocational proficiency, economic achievement, and others. This having indeed been here the case, acceptance of the proposed way of life depends primarily upon the acquisition of the belief that it presents adequate economic and occupational opportunities, and that it does not contradict the basic status image and social mobility aspirations. From the subjective point of view, this role-reorientation has indeed already taken place, if only partially. Objective circumstances, however, make this more difficult than it might otherwise have been. For though the higher level of general education and experience prevalent among members of this group has facilitated the learning of the necessary agrotechnical and managerial skills, it has also increased the possibility of making other arrangements. And by the same token it has added to the susceptibility to and the awareness of those basic weaknesses of the *moshav* farm, namely the demographic imbalance as regards the large 'oriental' household, and the frequent surpluses and price crises. In consequence, a distinctly ambivalent attitude to agriculture has developed, and that in spite of the initial open-mindedness; and farming as an occupational role is often regarded as temporary and transitional, to be exchanged for a better one when opportunity arises. Until it is relinquished, however, it is much more often than not performed fully and properly.

In the social sphere, on the other hand, the difficulties have been

smaller and the achievements greater. True, the average community of this type initially adhered to, or evolved, particularistic divisions, cutting totally across the settlement as a whole. This phenomenon, however, essentially resulted from the unfamiliarity of the new situation; it has not assumed a permanent and general character, and at present ascriptively determined groupings are both infrequent and transitory as well as restricted in scope. Universalistic criteria and generalized frameworks of activity have developed also in the political organization of these villages. During the early period, political power and positions derived, true enough, from ties based on kinship or place of origin. However, with the growth of personal acquaintance and interaction, and with the gradual separation of spheres of activity, the authority structure has come to represent also the rational criteria of professional and public qualifications.

And this brings us directly to a brief consideration of the value system evolved in villages of this type. As we have said before, change on this level has not been significant. There is no total identification with the *moshav* ideology, and certainly no militant desire to uphold it directly and propagate it among others. The city exercises a strong attraction, expressed in the preference for commercial urban entertainment to that offered by communal frameworks, and in an insistence upon various services common in it. Agriculture is by no means the sole, or sometimes even the main, occupation, and this derives not only from the objective needs to supplement the meagre farming income, but also from the attraction of urban work and occupations. The principles of equality do not constitute here a necessary or even an important focus of social structure; in fact most of the communities are *a priori* stratified by education and ability, and consequently often also by economic rewards. And finally, there is a large percentage of families who have left agriculture entirely and entered upon the road to re-urbanization.

All this notwithstanding, it can be said that these villages are among the most successful and stable ones not only as regards immigrants from North Africa, but also among new settlements in general. They have developed the productive process, individual as well as co-operative, obtained social integration and stability, extended the necessary municipal services, and—last but not least—achieved full internal autonomy over their affairs. They have, of course, experienced economic crises, population exchanges, and other difficulties; and even today a large percentage of people yearn for the city and are ambivalent in their attitude towards the role of the settler. This, however, is also the case in some of the old-established *moshavim*; and the problem is one of agriculture and of the *moshav* movement in general, rather than of this specific type in particular.

Finally, a few words on the leadership of these villages and the role it has played in their relatively successful absorption and integration.

As we have hinted above, the emergence of local élites capable of performing the functions required by them has been neither smooth nor rapid. It was in fact accompanied by sharp conflicts and strife for power, by a far-reaching disregard of the 'rules of the game', and by frequent changes in the group and personal composition of the local government organs. This, however, has proved to be a selective process of high benefit, as a result of which élites capable of the mediation discussed above have come to the fore. Of course, the gap which these élites have had to bridge seems in many respects much narrower than that confronting the group previously discussed; and this has enormously simplified their task. This success, however, was due not only to the relatively smaller distance to be covered, but to other factors as well:

(1) This *type* of leadership, oriented to change in general and to 'modernization' in particular, was already known and recognized in the country of origin, even within the relatively traditional urban communities. It developed, in fact, side by side with the older kind, and its claim to authority in Israel did not have to be asserted drastically and by external pressure.

(2) The existence of the active 'westernizing' groups, apart from and in addition to the overall social trends which we have mentioned, of necessity 'softened' the naturally more 'conservative' traditional leadership, and imbued it with greater tolerance. This leadership, therefore, while not itself promoting or catching up with recent developments, did not actively or indiscriminately oppose them.

(3) This background, and the general open-mindedness of the community, have enabled it to integrate under the leadership of what might be termed middle-range élites—the only kind to have come to Israel from among the population described.

The 'mobile' transitional society. This type has recently been the focus of attention and discussion,[16] and we shall therefore mention only those aspects which most directly relate to its confrontation with the *moshav*. In the country of origin members of this group were characterized by the great gap between their high mobility and achievement expectations and the success which they actually attained. Having left their original structures both as membership and as reference groups, they developed a strong orientation to the culture and the society of the colonial nation; but though they acquired some general education, and drew closer to cosmopolitan urban centres, they in fact slid into marginal positions in the economic, social and public life. By inclination, knowledge and also partly by experience they nevertheless obviously approximate to several basic characteristics of the western social structure; and in our typology they should certainly be considered 'midway' at least. Actually, however, this has proved a liability rather than an asset, owing to an extremely rigid and inflexible approach to absorption, which can only be

understood in relation to the social instability, isolation and adversity of their former existence.

The absorptive difficulties accordingly did not result from any unfamiliarity with modern economy and modern bureaucratic and political organization, or from an inability to acquire quickly the necessary vocational skills; but rather from an absolutely negative attitude to the rural way of life, and an intransigent identification with urban roles and surroundings, alone considered capable of conferring the hoped-for high social and economic status. Agricultural settlement has accordingly been considered as a severe crisis, conflicting with the fulfilment of the ultimate self-image; a crisis, in fact, which reminded them of the situation which already once before had prevented the realization of supreme aspirations. In other words, this type's lack of social roots and anchorage has significantly restricted its psychological and social capacity of self-manipulation, adjustment and change; it has evolved a conception of absorption in terms of and by reference to its former conflicts; and this has applied not only to the level of values and aspirations, but also to the concrete ways and means of their implementation.[17]

This rigid orientation, regarding *moshav* life as degrading and degenerate, has been sharply and unambiguously reflected in all villages to which members of the type described were sent.

Firstly, little attempt and effort has been made to cultivate the allotted farm; in fact, any outside employment—even the temporary and low-paid Public Works jobs—has often been preferred to the expenditure of the time and capital in agriculture. To the extent to which the farm is being developed, priority is given to those branches in which the investment is quickly realizable (such as beef cattle, milch cows and poultry), and which do not therefore tie the settler down. By the same token, branches requiring long-range planning and development (chiefly various fruit orchards), are extremely rare, even in those areas in which land and climatic conditions favour them most. Externally, this phenomenon appears similar to that encountered among immigrants of the rural society; here, however, it clearly stems from entirely different factors.

A similar state of demoralization is evident also in the other spheres of the *moshav*. Socially, the sharp orientation outwards has intensified the atomization of the population; and lack of almost any general interaction and cooperation, as well as of any identification with the community, characterizes most of the people concerned. This orientation likewise underlies the attitude towards the assumption and performance of public roles. There is here no lack of potential administrative and managerial material, at least on the technical level; the ability to fit systematically into a definitive organizational framework has not, however, developed in a parallel way; nor has, of course,

any basic motivation to take up and perpetuate the *moshav* structure as such.

It is thus no wonder that a very large percentage of these settlers has continuously been flowing from the country to the city. There is no doubt that the attempt to direct them to agriculture, and especially through the indiscriminate and direct 'ship to village' method, has proved one of the greatest mistakes and failures of the colonizing and the absorptive programmes alike.

CONCLUSION

We have obviously tried to lead the reader to accept two basic conclusions: that it is scientifically inadmissible, and concretely unrealistic, to speak onesidedly of 'good immigrant material' or 'bad immigrant material', instead of differences in cultural patterns; and that while it might be possible—from the specific *moshav* point of view—to speak of greater or lesser functional suitability, such a suitability cannot be identified with North African immigrants, or in fact with any 'ethnic' group as such. We would like, however, to end this report with some additional general remarks.

The analysis of the successful or partly successful settlements gives rise to feelings of satisfaction with achievements accomplished in the face of great objective difficulties. These achievements cannot, and should not be minimized; we would nevertheless like to emphasize the darker side which has not hitherto been sufficiently illuminated. From this avowedly critical point of view, the absorptive and colonizing experience with North African immigrants has not been an unmixed success. This has of course largely resulted from insufficient resources, as well as from the inability—under the immense pressure of time—to identify and take into account different types of predispositions and plan accordingly. At the same time it seems that the process of absorption has too often combined good intentions, devotion, and perseverance, with ignorance, naivety, and even prejudice. The interaction of the settlers and the absorptive team has inevitably always been a factor of primary importance in the villages; and the immigrant's ability to adjust to the new situation has often been determined by the extent of the harmony between the two. This factor has been especially important, of course, in the 'weak' settlements, and particularly in times of crisis. Here the stability of the community has from the beginning hung delicately in the balance, and a careless move of an instructor might easily tip it, just as an especially capable team might have the opposite effect. This is perhaps too heavy a responsibility to be placed squarely upon small and often inexperienced groups of people, with no special personal, pedagogical and sociological qualifications, obviously required by the situation. But this, again, is an inevitable result of rapid and continuous

settlement. Be that as it may, a certain proportion of the vocational and socio-cultural instructors, social workers and teachers working in these villages, have been characterized by the attitude of a missionary towards a backward and 'primitive' population; and this attitude has prompted attempts at a swift and drastic acculturation. Whether this has been done in an authoritative way, or in the spirit of 'paternalism', the usual response has been one of spontaneous resistance. The focus of the situation has here accordingly been one of incessant pressure and demand, sanctioned by an intense identification with values taken from an entirely different social system—that is to say, absorption has in no significant degree been interpreted as a two-way process, and this has characterized the field and the top levels alike. The analysis of the actual historical background and development of Israel shows, on the other hand, that each successive wave of immigrants evolved a specific and distinct colonizing form,[18] often against the opposition of those already existing. And it seems thus both legitimate, and perhaps inevitable, to allow the latest wave to do the same. Any new form thus brought into being will necessarily include the fundamentals of rural life and farming, and will to a large extent continue the tradition developed previously; it will also innovate, certainly in so far as cultural patterns are concerned, but most probably also organizationally. This, in fact, has been happening all the time. And the various changes which the *moshav* structure has undergone at the hands of the settlers described, should it seems, at least partly be considered as innovations rather than as deviations. We are not, of course, concerned here with the ideological or the practical implications of this situation; sociologically, however, it seems to show that it is possible to achieve a certain synthesis between traditional patterns of life and a modern social structure, without either of the two becoming of necessity completely transformed in the process.

NOTES

[1] This paper is based largely on material gathered in the course of a research project on the absorption of immigrants, carried out during the last few years by the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University (in which the authors have taken an active part). Use has also been made of the work and publications of other institutions and research workers, among whom special mention should be made of the Szold Institute for Child and Youth Welfare and of the rural sociologists of the Land Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency.

[2] The other types were: (*a*) the *Kibbutz Artzi*, the most rigorous of all the collectives, in which almost all activity is communal, including such spheres as the early socialization of children, and personal property and consumption; (*b*) the somewhat less rigorous *Kibbutz* and *Kvutza* of the *Ihud* on Hakibbutz Hamchohad; (*c*) the *Moshav Shitufi*, similar to the smallholders' cooperative in many respects, but distinguished by the non-parcellation of plots to the individual households and fully co-operative farming.

[3] In this context we offer only a brief summary of this problem, and chiefly emphasize the more recent findings of the project. For a more comprehensive

and general discussion of the process of migration see: S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, London, 1954; J. Ben-David, 'Ethnic Differences or Social Change?', *Between Past and Future*, C. Frankenstein (ed.), The Henrietta Szold Foundation, Jerusalem, 1953, pp. 33–52; C. Frankenstein, 'The Problem of Ethnic Differences', *ibid.*, pp. 13–32.

[4] This variable has indeed been of some value to us in determining the predispositions and in predicting the ability to change in various groups of origin. We cannot develop it here, but we hope to be able to report on it more fully and in a comparative framework at a more advanced stage of our work.

[5] S. N. Eisenstadt, 'The Place of Elites and Primary Groups in the Absorption of New Immigrants in Israel', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57, 1951, 'Sociological Aspects of the Economic Adaptation of Oriental Immigrants in Israel', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1955; D. Weintraub, 'Some Problems of Absorption in New Immigrants' Co-operative Settlements' (in Hebrew), *Megamoth*, Jerusalem.

[6] The statistics included in this report are based on the raw data of the Land Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. These data are not always accurate or complete, and we allow for a 10 per cent margin of error.

[7] We should like again to emphasize that this typology is generalized and simplified. It is, in fact, oriented specifically to the subject of the confrontation with the *moshav*, and does not by any means attempt to encompass the whole complex and varied social reality in the country of origin. In particular, this typology does not reflect the differences which existed from place to place in respect to local customs, dialects, the colonial culture prevalent, etc.; nor the social stratification cutting across the urban population. This stratification is, of course, by no means identical with the concept of westernization; for example, there are, especially in Morocco, several non-westernized local 'magnates', who are significantly different from their communities as a whole, but who cannot —within the limits of our classification —be distinguished from the broad mass of type 2(*a*). This, undoubtedly, is a serious flaw in the method of description and analysis employed (but one which can be corrected only in much longer and more detailed reports); we think, however, that it is unlikely to affect the specific argument of this paper, the more so as members of the upper stratum mentioned, like those of type 3, have come to Israel in extremely small numbers. The reader who would like to study the social structure of the North African Jewry more closely is of course referred to the publications of Dr. André Chouraqui, and especially to his *Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord*, Paris, 1952.

[8] In this report reference is made chiefly to immigrants from the Atlas mountains.

[9] This, of course, is a fundamental condition, and we shall discuss it more fully later on.

[10] Courses for farmers of this type have accordingly included such elementary items as the multiplication table and fractions.

[11] Of interest as an illustration might be a village for which the introduction of a new branch—milchcows—was planned. Some time before the actual implementation of the plan the settlers were issued with fodder to be stored in advance against future use. When the cows themselves arrived, however, the settling authorities found the fodder had been sold for cash, the settlers not being able to adhere to a longer term project when immediate gains were in view.

[12] Properly speaking, the origin of the *hamula* lies in the Mediterranean patrilineage. In Israel, however, this specific criterion of membership has been blurred, and groups combining several extended families, not necessarily of common descent, have formed. This has been due not only to the weakening of the traditional *hamula*, recently begun in the country of origin, but also, and chiefly, to the fact of their having often been split in the process of migration and settlement. In this context, therefore, the term *hamula* denotes the groups actually functioning in Israel today, rather than the historical ones. In any case, the orientations characterizing both types are similar, though 'voluntary' ascription has sometimes replaced ascription by descent.

[13] As we shall see later, this is extremely difficult to achieve, being contrary to the fundamentals of the social structure involved. In some villages,

however, it has been partly tried and worked out, with the youth assuming responsibility for the technical-managerial side, and the traditional leadership (family and community) maintaining ultimate authority and upholding the basic traditional values.

[14] For previous work on the subject see M. Lissak, *New Immigrants' Settlements in a Situation of Crisis* (in Hebrew), Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, The Hebrew University, Jersualem, 1956.

[15] This analysis does not apply to the relatively few pioneering nuclei established by these immigrants in the country of origin, and selected and trained along the lines of the original pioneers.

[16] See R. Bar Yoseph, 'Wadi Salib, The Background of the Problem' (in Hebrew), *Molad*, No. 131, Jerusalem, 1959.

[17] For the extent to which these aspirations have again been unrealistic, see R. Bar Yoseph, *op. cit.* The great majority of those who left agriculture have no vocational skills and, at least in so far as regular employment and income are concerned, they might have fared better in farming.

[18] The first *aliya* brought with it the individualistic agricultural village; the second and the third created the various collectives, and a part of the latter the classical *moshav*; while more recently the immigrants from Nazi Germany evolved the *moshav* of the middle class, midway between the cooperative farm discussed and completely private ownership and cultivation.

AMERICAN JEWRY—SOME SOCIAL TRENDS

Julius Gould

I

THE sociology of the Jews can, and should, take a variety of forms. Some of these forms are conventionally 'minority' studies—naturally so. For everywhere outside Israel the Jews form 'minority' groups embedded in the social systems of the 'majority' and acculturated within those systems. The 'minority' questions which thus arise are important and familiar. How coherent and self-conscious is the minority? How marginal is it to the majority culture? Does the 'minority' member feel overwhelmed by it or does the minority tradition, in part or in whole, appear to him significant or superior? What impact does the minority have on the surrounding society? How does the status accorded to the 'minority' member (by law or convention)—and the 'minority's' self-image—reflect leading features of the wider social system? Are there different kinds of answer to these questions if we classify 'minority' members by age, sex, or length of settlement among (or contact with) the majority? These are the kinds of question which are bound to arise from any serious minority study. And if Jewish life in the diaspora is scrutinized in this way, it soon becomes clear that, to large measure, each diaspora community can only with caution be compared to other such communities. For to scrutinize Jewish life in this way makes us focus our attention on to the wider social system—its structure, history, and prevailing ideologies. In this way specialized 'minority' studies can be, in practice and in theory, integrated into general sociology.

Ancillary to such essays in sociology are a variety of problems which are, broadly speaking, statistical. They are concerned with demographic and, more widely, with occupational data. In the case of some minorities such work may be facilitated by the available census data. Such data on the Jews are not generally available;[1] and, in the absence of national census data available on a cumulative basis, demographic data are fugitive and the inferences drawn from them highly speculative. Criteria of Jewishness are neither so clear nor uniform as to make for

ease in counting and assessment. Yet, for methodological and substantive reasons, demographic insights, and evidence on occupational distribution and status, are basic raw material for social analysts. In addition there is a practical demand, articulated keenly by Jewish institutions, for such demographic data as will help them to plan ahead. The supply of adequate data seldom satisfies this requirement, not to speak of wider appetites for insight into the 'survival chances' of Jewry. Yet the efforts to fulfil the demand partially answer some questions and help to raise others. There is a third form of inquiry of great and obvious importance. These inquiries attempt to survey the structure of Jewish life and institutions among the population described by itself and others as Jewish. What forms of voluntary associations survive, arise and maintain themselves? And, since the Jews are not simply a social group but inherit a religious tradition, what do they make of this tradition? What elements are adapted to the pressures of the wider social system? Is the traditional always the dependent variable acted upon by 'social' factors? Or do some elements within the tradition have a dynamic of their own as autonomous, independent factors? What, in short, happens to the religious tradition in new institutional settings? If acculturation means disintegration of an earlier structure of ideas and practice, what factors, internal and external to that structure, limit the break-down?

There is a fourth area of study which is equally important and about which there is a remarkable lack of hard data or verified knowledge. It might be called the social psychology of the Jew—but the borderlines between sociology and social psychology are hard to draw and need not be too closely demarcated for our present purposes. Here we inquire about the character and personality of the Jew—and more particularly about his motivations. What prompts him, often surprisingly, to say that he is Jewish? What religious significance does this have for him in a modern, predominantly secular, culture? How does he act out this religious significance—and what does it mean to him in other socio-cultural contexts, i.e. how does being, or feeling, Jewish (at various 'strengths' of commitment) affect or determine his standards in public or private life?

II

These problem-areas, difficult to survey and to integrate, arise with regard to all Jewish 'minorities' large or small. They arise with especial vigour and interest in the study of contemporary Jewish life in the United States. Here an estimated Jewish population of over five million persons constitutes the largest single Jewish settlement in the world. The very size of the field is intimidating—even though the vast majority of these five million Jews live in a relatively small number of urban

metropolitan regions. To set American Jewish life in an ordered pattern in the light of the questions we have raised would be a lifetime work for an interdisciplinary team. Naturally, and unfortunately, no such team exists. In recent years, however, there has been an accumulation of serious studies of Jewish life in America—much of it sociological in intention and execution—from which some important trends of development clearly emerge. While it is true that no full-dress history of Jewish life in America is yet available, for many purposes Mr. Nathan Glazer's short, compact book *American Judaism*[2] admirably fills the gap. Mr. Glazer records the development of American Jewry from its seventeenth-century beginnings—patterning it to the story of successive immigrations, the German immigration of the early and mid-nineteenth century and the East European immigration which gathered force from the eighteen-eighties. Central to his narrative is the social mobility of the East European Jews and their descendants, their 'internal migration' from generation to generation. If Mr. Glazer is, for the most part, concerned to trace the movement *into* suburbia, Dr. Gordon in *The Jews in Suburbia*[3] paints a picture of present-day Jewish life which, for all its discursiveness, yields useful information and insights. Two books for which Dr. Marshall Sklare is responsible are equally informative and, in a more stringent way, sociological. In his study of *Conservative Judaism*[4] Sklare has produced an admirable account of the growth and evolution of a peculiarly American pattern of Jewish life, the social sources of its strength, and some of its inner tensions and weaknesses. It provides a remarkable case study of the adaptation of a religious tradition to wider social developments—and if, at times, he appears to overstress the degree of adaptation which has taken place, his approach has the merit (among many others) that it is both cogent and revealing. In the volume *The Jews—Social Patterns of An American Group*[5] Dr. Sklare has assembled a rich, and only occasionally indigestible, bill of fare. Historical analyses are combined with essays on demographic and occupational data available for Jewish research. There is an especially useful study of suburban life, a pioneer of its genre, provided by Mr. Herbert Gans. There is some attempt to delineate features of Jewish attitudes and personality as well as some further data on the changing significance of the concept of the 'Rabbi'. There is included a shortened version of a well-known study by Mr. Glazer on the sources and direction of the middle-class orientation of American Jews. Throughout the volume concern with detail is blended with a careful attention to the wider American social scene.

We have discussed these works in rather summary terms. In what follows an attempt is made to present some of the leading features which emerge from these, and other, contemporary analyses.

III

It will be convenient to set out first of all some of the demographic evidence to be found in Dr. Sklare's volume *The Jews* and to relate it to collateral evidence that has subsequently appeared. No attempt will be made here to summarize in full the two demographic studies contained in *The Jews*—the essay 'Some Aspects of Jewish Demography' by Ben B. Seligman and A. Antonovsky and the companion piece by Seligman on *The Jewish Population of New York City: 1952*. We shall for the most part examine the evidence on age structure and fertility—two areas in which some new and later data are available. Seligman is quite frank in declaring that 'little is really known of the dynamic changes in Jewish population growth. For this information on birth rates and death rates is essential.'[6] Only tentative conclusions may therefore be derived from the analysis he offers of the attempts made by a variety of U.S. Jewish communities to arrive at population estimates and the techniques and methods (the Yom Kippur method, the death records method, community sample surveys, etc.) employed in these calculations. Special attention is given to the data available for 13 communities which were studied between 1947 and 1950. A marked feature visible in these studies is the well-known feature of 'hollow classes' in the age structure. The Census data for the total population reveal this phenomenon among the young and teen-age groups. But the evidence assembled by Seligman shows that for the Jewish communities it 'seems more marked and appears to extend beyond the 20-year group . . . often . . . to the 35-year group'.[7] This was noted also in Seligman's separate study of the 1952 Health Insurance Plan study for New York City.[8] Here the 20–24 year age-group for males and the 15–19 year age-group for females were 'hollow' in this way, especially when contrasted with the relatively large age-groups born from 1943 onwards. The dynamics of this are of course obscure—but the 'hollow class' phenomenon is evidently related to the unfavourable economic conditions of the 1930's and the impact of these conditions on the white population as a whole. There seems ground for the view that the Jewish middle class reacted somewhat more strongly to these conditions than the general white population. Another way of looking at the age structure is to look at the differential pattern of 'aging'. Despite the wartime and post-war boom in births this phenomenon is visible in the overall national statistics: but the Seligman study shows that this feature is accentuated among the Jews.[9] This is even more marked in the New York City study where Seligman draws attention to the fact that the Jews of New York are 'structurally' older than they appear to be elsewhere. It is not clear how much of this difference is the result of migration from New York to the suburbs—but this factor is clearly substantial. The main trend in these analyses has since been confirmed

by data of an unusually reliable and comprehensive nature. In March 1957, as a supplement to its monthly employment survey, the U.S. Bureau of the Census included a question on religious preference in interviews with its national sample. Some of the results were published in February of the following year[10] and some further results were made available in a later volume, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1958.[11] From this material it is clear that the age-groups between 45 and 64 were, in 1957, significantly (7 per cent) larger in the Jewish population than in the country's white population taken as a whole.[12]

The topics of fertility and of family or household size are especially difficult in Jewish demography—given the general absence of reliable cumulative data. Seligman clearly recognizes the limitations of the material which he analyses on these fields. No conclusive evidence can be provided on the much discussed possibility of a declining Jewish rate of reproduction. In all but two of the 13 studies he discusses the average Jewish household size appears lower than in the general white population: the 1952 data for New York City are not dissimilar to those found in these eleven communities. Fertility ratios (the number of children under 5 per 1,000 women of childbearing years) also show, in Seligman's account, lower indices for Jewish females as contrasted with the general white female population. The Census Bureau data for 1957 to which we have referred show that in the age-groups from 15 to 44 (and in the older age-groups as well) the number of children born per 1,000 Jewish women is markedly lower than for Protestant and Catholic women and that these differences are, as expected, associated with the general Jewish propensity for urban residence. Some additional material is now available on this topic. This may be found in the report of the 'Growth of American Families' study, based on a sample drawn from 17 million white couples with wives between the ages of 18 and 39. This study was conducted in 1955: it examined by interview a sample of 2,713 women, 74 of whom were Jewesses. It is reported in *Family Planning, Sterility and Population Growth* by R. Freedman, P. K. Whelpton and A. A. Campbell (McGraw Hill, 1959). The subsample of Jewish women is too small for many of the more refined analyses: but some of the material is highly relevant. The most striking new evidence relates to the family-planning habits of Jewish couples: 'Jews are much more likely to have completely planned fertility'.[13] The proportion of those couples using some method of avoiding conception is highest among the Jews.[14] More than eight out of ten Jewish wives started birth control measures before the first pregnancy—for Protestant wives the comparable figure is 57 per cent and for Catholic wives only 32 per cent.[15] The authors comment

> the proportion of Jews with completely planned fertility is so large that it will not be surprising to find that the average family size is considerably smaller for them than it is for Protestants and Catholics[16] [and] the Jewish

couples covered expect significantly fewer children (2·4) than either Catholics (3·4) or Protestants (2·9). Unfortunately the small size of the Jewish sample . . . makes detailed comparisons impossible. The low fertility of the Jews in the United States as a whole is apparently attributable in large measure to their concentration in large cities where the fertility of all groups is low. In the 12 largest cities included in the sample the Jews and the Protestants expect the same average number of births (2·3) while the Catholics expect 3·1. In the large cities the Jews and the Protestants are alike in wanting fewer children than do the Catholics and in using more effective methods of preventing conception.[17]

IV

From this demographic material we will now turn to some historical and sociological issues. Three propositions about the Jews of America will surely go unchallenged. Firstly, they have survived as a distinctive social group. Secondly they have 'acculturated'—they are, as is rightly made explicit in the very title of Dr. Sklare's collection of studies, 'an American group'. And, thirdly, the America into which they have acculturated has been, and remains, a unique and complex setting for diaspora life—a kind of civilization which, in all its changes, is unique in world history let alone in the experience of the Jews. About the acculturation there can be no question—the only questions that arise are questions about its processes and its limits. The whole history of Jewish life in the United States, especially since the beginning of the present century, turns upon the spread of acculturation among successive generations. Today even the spokesmen for Orthodoxy at times speak the language of advanced acculturation and examine their problems from its perspective. Rabbi Rackman, for example, urges that in order to present its case to American Jews 'Orthodoxy must have leaders who are not only articulate in English but also masters of Western thought and its temper.' That is why Yeshiva University and the Hebrew Teachers' College advocate the mastery of all western thought in order to create an ultimate synthesis with Jewish learning. Dr. Rackman is convinced that this goal will be attained 'as more of the graduates of these schools and other Yeshivoth become expert in the natural and social sciences'.[18] With the practicability of this ambitious programme we need not here be concerned. It may well be that Dr. Rackman, for all his distinction, is not a 'typical' Orthodox Rabbi. Nevertheless the spokesmen for moderate Orthodoxy, in England, for example would feel neither able nor obliged to couch their programme in such 'modern' terms—terms which have about them so authentic an American ring.

Well before the formative years of mass immigration the Jews of the United States were being moulded by a unique environment. Mr. Halpern in his essay in *The Jews* pinpoints this uniqueness and scrutinizes

its sources. In the first place 'Emancipation was never an issue'[19] among American Jews. There has never, in the short history of the United States, been a 'Jewish Question' on traditional European lines nor the occasion for familiar Jewish reactions to the 'problem'. Secondly from the 'openness' of American society, from the fact that America at the time of the heaviest Jewish immigration was a nation of immigrants, it followed that America enjoyed no fixed corporate framework into whose subtle modes of exclusiveness the Jews had to be accommodated. From the perspective of the closing decades of the nineteenth century it was unclear whether the Jews would be assimilated or acculturated. But there was a still more open question to be asked at that time 'Into what kind of society will such acculturation or assimilation take place?' Jews, like so many other immigrants, were moving into a future which had no definable shape. On the one hand the norms of White Anglo-Saxon Protestant America were to retain their vitality and, very largely, their primacy. On the other hand these norms were to be blended with those of the European immigrants, Catholic as well as Jewish. They were to be modified by new and unprecedented developments of industry and urbanism. They were to be affected in a myriad of ways by cultural novelties and fashions not yet dreamed of: and they were to be modified by the social mobility, for groups and for individuals, which decades of economic growth were to bring in their train. The tensions between freedom, privilege, and equality have never been unknown in America[20]—the status preservers are as old as, if not older than, the status seekers. Yet as Mr. Halpern's essay reminds us 'the initial status is that of freedom'—and, we might add, this is so in a variety of spheres and senses. So far as the Jews were concerned, they were to be freely acculturated—once they became willing to abandon the more obvious signs of foreignness. Multiple social and economic pressures were working in that direction—even if countervailing pressures were to make for social segregation and to discourage any tendencies towards social assimilation.

A second sense in which America was to be different was in the extent and speed with which one generation's proletariat became the next generation's middle class. The white population was to enjoy a high measure of social mobility—not, perhaps, as high or as uniform as has often been supposed but none the less substantial. This mobility was the consequence of unprecedented economic growth, modernity, and differentiation—and enjoyed the support of powerful normative traditions. Of these opportunities the Jews were to take full advantage. Mr. Glazer cautions us against reading too much into comparisons of Jewish with non-Jewish social mobility. He points out[21] that if compared with high status groups of long standing such as Presbyterians and Episcopalians the Jewish headway over the last fifty years may seem less conspicuous. Yet the evidence from communities of all sizes

shows,[22] as he himself demonstrates, a remarkable concentration of the Jews in self-employment and in the 'open' professions. There are important differences reported from New York by Seligman—here skilled and unskilled workers were up to 28 per cent of the Jewish labour force—and here too there was a higher proportion than elsewhere of Jews who were in private employment rather than self-employed.[23]

Glazer, like many other commentators, stresses the rapidity of this Jewish advance to middle-class status and incomes—and observes that in this context, as in so many others, the Jewish minority followed general American patterns, only faster and more energetically. He interprets this aptitude in terms of the traditional Jewish concern for learning and education and the urban trading background which the East European Jewish proletariat, uniquely among the immigrants, brought with them to America. Dr. Sklare adds the significant point that, since this mobility was group-mobility and so rapid in its tendencies, the traditional religious framework had no possible chance to modify itself through the niceties of gradualism. The challenge to traditional Judaism, already latent in the change of scene and in the early tensions between the generations, was thus reinforced by the spatial, as well as the social, mobility of the Jews and by the growth of new aspirations to status. Dr. Sklare sees in this process of movement the major sources of Conservative Jewish institutions—and to this point we will later return.

There are special features of the modern American middle-class style of life by which Jewish life is constantly moulded. To these features a good deal of sociological attention has, of recent years, been directed. High standards of living, suburban life in a mobile society, the values of achievement and success, child-centredness in family patterns, 'democratic' permissive family relations, new opportunities, sanctions and tensions—all these have come under the sociological microscope and macroscope. These values are in part deeply rooted in American culture and their novelty should not be exaggerated. But in recent decades they have become more articulate and, probably, more dominant than hitherto—and, as we shall see, they present especial problems and conflicts for the Jewish middle class.

A third important sense in which America was to be 'different'—and quite uniquely so—remains to be cited. Nowhere but in America is there a semi-formal acceptance of three great religious communities—Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish—as providing a socially recognized pattern of group difference and group distinctiveness. This phenomenon has been much debated in recent years—much of the debate being inspired by Mr. Herberg's important book, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*. Mr. Herberg, like other religious commentators, was concerned to trace the origins of this phenomenon in American history and to

explore it in the light of the religious 'revival' of America in the nineteen-fifties.[24] He also relates the phenomenon to the growing tendencies within the three major faiths towards convergence—in a watered down, packaged allegiance to a common creed of Americanism. All the practicality and moralism long noted in American religion was to be reinforced in the mid nineteen-fifties—moulding all religious institutions to a new and disturbing norm. Another writer has complained that

> For the American citizen, the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish faiths tend to furnish a psychological resting place. This is in contrast to the sort of faith which allegedly enshrines the final truth of God, a being to whom men ought to commit themselves quite independently of specific 'good' consequences that may follow. Protestantism, Catholicism and Judaism combine with less institutional aspects of American folk piety to form a body of religion distinguished and limited by elements of utilitarianism, this worldly activism . . . surrounded by an atmosphere of religious pluralism, tolerance and optimism.[25]

And the editor of the *Christian Century* has inveighed against 'the wearing waters of generalized religion', a sanctioned 'national religion-in-general', lacking any sense of inner tension or struggle. This national mood often leads Americans to assume that God is a good fellow with whom they may 'collaborate' in a gently permissive manner. Its hallmark is externality and mediocrity—and it has come in for consistent attack by thoughtful critics, anxious to examine what has often looked like a major religious boom.[26] Jewish life has been clearly influenced by this trend. The suburban Jew is, as some may argue, often consciously Jewish or actively Jewish because religious affiliation is generally 'acceptable' in middle-class circles and one is expected to 'belong'. But the significant point is not the accusation of 'conformity'—nor, indeed, the reality. The prevailing national ethos has given Jewish community and institutional life an added source of vitality. Contrary to the patterns of earlier decades this life now clusters around the synagogue and the rabbi. As Sklare and Glazer both point out, in the prewar period a sense of Jewishness with no trace of attachment to formally religious bodies was not only possible but, in the circumstances, natural. This is no longer the norm—and the retreat from this norm is in part the result of the general American expectation that cultural or ethnic differences may be socially approved and encouraged within a *religious* community. It may well be that, for all its shallowness and bias towards mediocrity, this ethos will continue to act as one barrier against Jewish assimilation and to reinforce the others.

V

The special forms which have developed in American Jewish life all involve departures from the standards of East European orthodox

practice which, ideally, demanded the most exact adherence to the provisions of the Shulchan Aruch and prescribed a body of ritual to be observed rather than a set of mandatory, theologically formulated beliefs. There are, of course, important creedal items within orthodox Judaism—but it has been ritual which has predominated. In traditional Judaism of the East European mode, the religious leader, the Rabbi, has been a student and expositor of the Talmud rather than a synagogue functionary, preacher or cleric. He has enjoyed the status of a legal expert—pronouncing, within the closed circle of Jewish settlement, upon ritual questions and upon disputes over family status, property rights and kindred topics. Rabbis of this kind had never flourished in America before the East European immigrations—nor were they to do so subsequently. Neither the social nor the legal status of the Jew were favourable to this role.[27] Over time the American term 'rabbi' has come to cover a vast range of functions which are quite new and exacting. He has become a synagogue official rather than an independent scholar or a community expert on Jewish law. This change mirrors the prevailing congregationalism of American Jewry. The European Kehila was never transplanted to the United States. Congregationalism was the American norm—one which America's Jewish immigrants found congenial.[28] A national framework for Jewish life has been equally repugnant—and all attempts to build one have been foiled by the congregationalism, by the consequences of new immigrations, as well as by personal/factional or ideological blocks. A third distinctive retreat from the orthodox pattern has been in the growing role of the women within the congregation—the disruption of the Eastern element in Jewish practice which, for example, prescribed segregation of the sexes at places of worship and assigned to women relatively few, though important, ritual duties. We shall subsequently discuss the evidence which recent studies have provided upon the impact of these changes—especially within the suburban setting that has added an impact of its own. But these structural changes—all part of a sustained departure from the orthodox pattern—have long been functionally connected.

The background to this structure is amply illuminated by Dr. Sklare's *Conservative Judaism*—for, despite the earlier shifts promoted by Reform Judaism, it was the Conservative movement that came to focus, in a special set of ways, the adaptation of Judaism, and Jewish practices, to the American scene. It is not necessary here to trace in detail the development of American Jewish religious institutions. Mr. Glazer's[29] account rehearses with great succinctness, the familiar story. He tells of the first American attempt, from the mid-nineteenth century on, to modernize Judaism—of the advance of, and resistances to, Reform Judaism, from the eighteen-forties a developing movement among the German Jews. Reform has not been halted—but its pace and

character was to be affected, like everything in American Jewry, by the arrivals from Eastern Europe. The social distance between the Germans and the East Europeans was great. Even so economic, professional, and philanthropic relationships brought the older settlement into contact with the new. And, as Mr. Glazer acutely observes, the effect of this contact upon the Reform-oriented German Jews was to stem the movement towards naturalism and extreme Protestantization.[30] The Reform position, and its status barriers, made no serious impact upon the newcomers. They were otherwise preoccupied—and where they were not religiously indifferent, agnostic or atheist, they clung to a kind of Orthodoxy which reminded them of their East European past. To their needs and, ultimately, to the needs of their children, another approach, the Conservative approach, had greater affinity. As Dr. Sklare records, the Conservative movement antedated the arrival of the East Europeans. It was a reaction against the sweeping alterations of mood and ritual inherent in the Reform position—but it had made little headway. The students graduating from the Conservative 'Jewish Theological Seminary' were graduates into an uncertain future—and 'at the turn of the century the school was in virtual bankruptcy'.[31] It revived because its leaders sensed the new opportunities—an uncovenanted consequence of Russian pogroms. The processes of acculturation and mobility were to create a demand for the kind of 'middle way' for which Conservatism stood. From this time on Conservatism was to have an East European slant. Unlike old-line Reform it never stood aloof from such concerns as Zionism. In matters of religious observance Conservative leaders were to advocate such non-orthodox arrangements as mixed seating in the synagogues and to stress the need for greater 'decorum' at times of worship. They were to recognize that the daily cycle of ritual and prayer had broken down. Yet they were careful to stress that the changes were changes of form rather than content—a distinction that is always difficult to establish—and to claim that 'the traditional ritual has been retained in all its essentials'.[32] Modified traditionalism of this kind did not make easy a coherent advance in matters of ideology or religious policy. Many observers have noted, not always with approval, the reluctance of the Jewish Theological Seminary to make rapid modifications of Jewish Law.[33] Indeed, as Sklare shows, this middle-road position makes for some inner conflict within the rabbi's mind as well as interesting debates when the rabbis meet. They occupy a middle position themselves—between the laity who are not too preoccupied with the sanctity of tradition and the Professors of the Seminary who are aloof from the mundane concerns of the typical congregation. For all its dilemmas the movement has been able to reap the fruits of eclecticism. Rejecting in large measure the full force of the innovations proposed by Mordecai Kaplan, it has followed him so far as was necessary to bridge the gap between the community centre and

the synagogue—a gap which, as we shall see, yawned in the areas of second settlement but which has been largely closed in the suburbs. It has long concerned itself with the changing character of Jewish educational needs—both for the direct purposes of raising existing low levels of 'Jewish knowledge' and for more long-range ends of institutional self maintenance and perpetuation. And as Jews moved into the suburbs, with the old controversies between Germans and East Europeans irrelevant and dead, Conservatism has set benchmarks for all Jewish activity—including that of the Reform groups. The ideological and institutional vested interests remain very powerful—but at a period of rapid overall advance, peaceful coexistence is the order of the day. Such coexistence is, also, to some measure a reflection of the general American pattern of religious life which de-emphasizes the kind of theological exclusiveness and rancour so prevalent, historically, in many other societies.

VI

We turn now to the place where these trends have met and, by meeting, been intensified—the suburbia whose Jews form the subject of Dr. Gordon's book and whose life-style is dominant among American Jews. We have already noted the spatial mobility of the East European Jews and their descendants—concomitant with their rise to middle-class status and their prosperity. This mobility has been a two-stage affair. Firstly the ghettoes were deserted for better areas—which were to be second-settlement zones of a transitional kind. Then, in the interwar years and more rapidly since 1945, there has been a further movement to the fringes of the great cities and beyond their formal limits. Thus in New York City 'in 1940 only one Jew in every eight in the region was living in the suburbs: in 1955 over one in five was living in the suburbs: and in 1965 one in every three Jews in the region will be living in the suburbs'.[34] There is no question but that this migration has altered the entire perspective of Jewish life. The second-settlement areas were heavily populated by Jews: there was little need to be over-conscious of one's Jewishness—it was in the air. The religious bodies in such areas were mainly Orthodox in character—but with declining religious observance they had no wide significance either for most of the Jews or for the predominantly low-status non-Jews who lived in such neighbourhoods. The Jews were able to live a life which had many powerful Jewish overtones: they did not mix socially with non-Jews; they could belong to Jewish social or cultural or political organizations without any synagogal bias or connexion whatsoever. Very often there was a Jewish community centre in the district which was quite distinct from the synagogue and sometimes in conflict with religious leaders. Jewish education was not typically a synagogal responsibility—being con-

ducted by a number of distinct bodies, on a community basis or following one or another of the non-religious movements which at that phase flourished among the Jews. When the children of the original immigrants moved on into third-settlement areas, they found that the whole context had changed. They had little or no synagogal attachments: those who did could not always even attempt to reproduce the limited Orthodox patterns to which they were accustomed. Orthodoxy had about it an aura of foreignness and of the low-status past. Middle-class acculturation required them to turn their backs upon the past—even where they had some nostalgia for the good old days. . . . It was in these areas that the Conservative synagogues were to be liberally established—here the middle road was the only viable one.

There is no typical suburb. Even a cursory glance at the variety of areas surveyed by Dr. Gordon would suffice to show this. They differ in the manner of their settlement, in their inner structure, and the accidents of their local history. But Dr. Gordon's evidence and much other material is of a kind which enables something of a suburban profile to emerge. The first element is the return to the synagogue—not by every Jew but by at least five out of ten American Jews. Secondly, this return to the synagogue does not involve any widespread revival of religious observance or, indeed, vastly increased attendances at worship. Thirdly, the impulse to return to the synagogue is associated with the coalescence around the synagogue of a variety of social and educational activities to which a great deal of time and attention is devoted—and the synagogue's function as a place of prayer is largely subordinated to these other functions. The separate Community Centre gives place to the synagogue centre. Fourthly, the return to the synagogue is child-centred to an extent which is not uniform but is generally apparent. The child's needs for Jewish indoctrination is a matter for anxious, explicit concern in such suburban settings. The religious import of this indoctrination is secondary—despite recent and fairly general efforts to upgrade this aspect of Jewish education. Much evidence supports the view that it is the children whose future as Jews bring their parents, often ignorant of Judaism or reluctant to become too 'involved', into a minimal relationship with the synagogue. There is evidence that this child-centredness in the American setting is bound to make a return to old-time religious forms more than implausible but that, interestingly, it is linked with parental fears about intermarriage as a risk to be contained. Fifthly, there is no doubt that at present social intimacy and mixing between Jews and non-Jews is still remarkably rare. There is a good deal of social self-segregation—even in those suburbs whose Jewish population is a relatively small proportion of the total. Sixthly, the suburbs are places where Jewish women spend their days while their husbands work elsewhere. The Jewish father has less and less direct responsibility for bringing up his children on Jewish lines.

The perspectives of the next generation of Jewish adults are thus dominated by the roles at present played by their mothers. These mothers now have the leisure, opportunity, and money with which to engage actively in the life of the synagogue centre. And finally the role of the rabbi, as has been indicated above, has been drastically altered. He is now less and less free to pursue scholarly avocations. He is expected not only to preach and teach but also to be a pastoral counsellor, to have skills as an educational administrator and general bureaucrat, to be a promoter of an expanding enterprise, in harness with well-intentioned but often narrow and ignorant laymen, and to act as a representative of the Jews at those interfaith occasions so dear to the American heart.

There is an illuminating study by Mr. Herbert Gans, included in the volume on *The Jews*, in which some, but not all, of these developments are mirrored.[35] Mr. Gans studied the 'village' of Park Forest near Chicago shortly after its foundation in 1948 and again, more briefly, in 1955.[36] At both times the Jewish families numbered about 10 per cent of the total number of families in the suburb. The first stirrings of community life came with the early foundation of social clubs for men and women. The first great controversies arose over the need felt by the parents of young children that, in the new environment, the youngsters should receive a 'Jewish education'. The mothers were at once playing a dominant role—and were adamant in promoting a child-centred Jewish institution. 'They wanted,' said one of the embattled men, 'a non-sectarian Sunday school.' And they got what they wanted. They were anxious to ensure that, as far as possible, the adults would be free to 'abstain from religious-cultural activity and involvement in the community'.[37] The result may be illustrated by the undertaking given by the community school to the parents:

> The children will not be taught that parents have to light candles: the children will be informed of the background of candles. . . . We're teaching the child not that he must do these things: we just teach him the customs.[38]

There was no majority support at that time for a synagogue but what support there was also stemmed from a feeling that it would be good for the children but either not necessary or unimportant for the adults. The adults felt the need to give their children a sense of Jewish identity and being unable to do it themselves wanted simply, in the American way, to hire an expert in these affairs and then to be left alone. Eventually, after several years, those actively desirous of a synagogue succeeded in establishing one, with aid from the developer of the suburb, a prominent national Jewish figure. Typically this synagogue, following 'warm Reform' patterns of worship, embarked upon providing a school of its own, to bring education into closer relation to Jewish *practices*. This too aroused a complex controversy of a subtle kind—but when

Gans paid his second visit to Park Forest the congregational school was well established. The Rabbi was facing the task of reaching a balance between his own view that children should be educated as potential adult congregants and the prevailing sentiment in favour of child-centred procedures and activities.

This child-centredness has several results. One of them, of course, is the high level of American Jewish concern with Chanukah. This has become a child-oriented festival *par excellence* and it is celebrated variously as a kind of articulate counter to Christmas or as an uneasy ancillary to it or through the invention of symbols which possess some of the flavour of both holidays. A more important structural consideration is, of course, that many parents are in fact drawn into synagogal life through their children. For one reason—Park Forest is an example—the system of fees for education makes it an economy for parents to join the temple themselves and get free or reduced-cost education for their children. Temple officials have been quick to utilize this pressure. Secondly, the child-centred family offers many opportunities for the children to influence their parents—such influence is more likely to confine itself to externals and the introduction of *some* minimal Jewish customs into the home rather than in any deep spiritual unease or renewal.[39]

Despite the fact that the study relates to a Canadian suburb (near Toronto) and not to an American one, the study *Crestwood Heights* by J. R. Seeley and others is very relevant here.[40] This study was not in its main emphasis a *Jewish* community study. It had wider theoretical and practical concerns than has been the case with the bulk of Jewish community portraits. But as 'Crestwood Heights' has a large and growing Jewish population the book's insights are relevant to our present theme. Its authors present what is at once the most acute and most dispiriting of all the analyses of religion in suburbia. They stress the dominance of the values of 'maturity' and 'democracy' within the family—and the values of success, health, happiness, peace of mind which are general to the suburban middle class. They make the interesting point about the middle-class outlook in North America. '. . . to many of its members [it is] a mere stepping stone . . . a precarious resting point, in a vertical movement in which upward hopes and downward fears have, or are felt to have, a very high probability of realization.'[41] One wonders whether the urban and other traditions of the Jewish new middle class insulate them from these tensions to any extent: and one is reminded that since Jewish mobility in America has been an *upward* movement of a group we hear nothing of the causes or amount of *downward* movement.

In this middle-class environment at 'Crestwood Heights' religion, like the school which is in the foreground of the study, aims 'to gird the child with the minimum of spiritual armour which can be shed easily in favour of other defences, should it be experienced as obsolete or cumbersome'.[42] It is 'rather a guide to a style of behaviour than to any

particular line of conduct'.[43] 'Parents asked again and again whether a given theological teaching was "bad for the child", that is, damaging to his personality or the likelihood of his success in any one of its innumerable meanings—*excluding* salvation.'[44] With this instrumental view of religion it is hardly likely that even when parents are obliged to become themselves 'involved' they will bring to the home any practices which might unsettle the child or conflict with the permissive directives so important for success in the wider world. The evidence from 'Crestwood Heights' does not point to a pattern of *deep-seated* religious conviction and revival.

Commenting on the role of the women in American Jewry, Dr. Gordon suggests that 'no synagogue in America could function well these days if it were not for the women . . . who support it with their devoted efforts'.[45] 'The wife has become the modern matriarch of Jewish suburbia. Her ideas, opinions and values clearly dominate.'[46] He praises their devotion and loyalty—but is evidently uneasy about their dominance. He expresses two main sources of unease. Firstly he is anxious about the consequences for Jewish family life of the present day dominance of the suburban mother. On the one hand there is the risk of maternal over-protection: on the other there is a decline of the father's authority and his physical absence from the suburbs for long periods of each day. In the absence of reliable evidence based upon systematic study of Jewish families of varied types, it is difficult to assess the results of this changing pattern of parental roles or to compare the consequences of this pattern with those of earlier patterns. The Jewish mother has always been a powerful force in the lives of her children and it is hard to measure whether we are witnessing a change for the 'worse'. The second source of Dr. Gordon's unease is the fact that the level of her education in Jewish matters is low and she is not, in his view, really prepared for the kind of leadership roles she is assuming. We would add a third reason for unease. Surely the women are bound to mould yet further the role and personality of the Rabbi—and perhaps add to the problems which beset him. The kind of Rabbi who is appointed and becomes successful must now be the kind of man who is acceptable to the ladies. After all he will see more of his female congregants in many cases than he will of his male. A reform Rabbi recently said aloud what many other Rabbis must long have felt. 'There is a great personal anxiety arising out of this suburban constellation. Have we in Suburbia been spending too much time with the women of our temple? How will Judaism be affected if we continue to tailor it to fit the needs of our female congregants?'[47]

We have mentioned earlier the new and exacting tasks which the American 'Rabbi' performs. In their essay 'The American Rabbi'[48] Carlin and Mendlovitz distinguish seven rabbinic roles as found in the U.S.A.—the traditional rabbi, the free-lancer, the modern orthodox

rabbi, the intellectual reform rabbi, the social reform rabbi, the traditionalistic reform rabbi, and the conservative rabbi. Within this typology the roles of the modern orthodox, traditionalistic reform, and conservative rabbis converge at salient points. They all aspire to the scholar-saint role of traditional rabbi but they are pre-eminently organizers, performers of priestly functions, teachers, pastoral counsellors and spokesmen for the Jews in the wider community. This, say the writers, is the core of an emerging common rabbinic role. Within this role there is no place for the skills in talmudic disputation once characteristic of the Rabbi—nor is the Rabbi needed as a legal expert. The Rabbi's position, so far as he works within the limits tacitly or explicitly imposed by his flock, carries considerable status—this is drawn in part from his prestige within the Jewish community as *the* expert, a kind of surrogate through whom the bulk of the Jews maintain an often vicarious contact with a centuries-old tradition, and in part from the Rabbi's standing in the non-Jewish community. As Herberg pointed out in his *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* the Jewish zeal for 'corporate self-validation' is reflected in 'the extraordinary high salaries Jewish rabbis receive in comparison with those received by Protestant ministers of equal status and service'.[49] These rewards may be some compensation for the tensions which, according to Sklare, are built into the Conservative rabbi's role—they are certainly not rewards for sinecures. Allowing for a certain measure of exaggeration, there can be no doubt that in the 'revived' synagogues of the suburbs the Rabbi is a very busy man, with little time to read or think.[50] He is incessantly involved with *human relations* and in the suburbs this can be very time-consuming. He must, as many Rabbis increasingly argue, fight for the time needed for reflection and scholarship. Much evidence supports the view that modern rabbis value, often guiltily, the older scholarly norm and its intellectual rewards.[51] But human relations, especially counselling work, are more central to the role. One Rabbi prides himself: 'I am now one of the best known lay practitioners in the field of personal problems . . . I've reconciled more couples who were going into divorce and sent more people to psychiatrists than any other minister in town.'[52] There are all sorts of suburban tensions which the Rabbi may help to resolve.[53] To do so he may himself turn to psychiatry and psychotherapy—primarily to become better equipped to handle counselling work. One is sometimes tempted to suggest that this concern with psychotherapy is an index of rabbinical uncertainties, an expression of his feeling that his seminary training and/or his religious beliefs require supplementation. It would be interesting to survey those Rabbis who have themselves been psycho-analysed and to assess whether they have emerged as more committed less problem-haunted occupants of religious roles or whether they are now practising a kind of applied psychiatry from a synagogue office.

VII

Is all this *really* Judaism? We can make no attempt here even to summarize the widespread debate there has been on this question—or on the related question—'Have American Jews a Jewish Future?'[54] Only the briefest conclusions are possible here.

(*a*) There has not been a *religious awakening*—if by that term one means a return to traditional practices or the penetration of daily life by a religious ethic. All the data suggests that, in matters of formal observance and worship, Jews are secularized even more than most other Americans.

(*b*) The return to the synagogue has been the result of the suburban migration as well as the other features of middle-class American life to which we have referred. In the suburbs, as Mr. Glazer puts it, Jews are a captive audience for the synagogue centre and for professional religious experts. But one feels that Mr. Gans, for example,[55] may be wrong to suggest that the revival is largely 'a transfer to traditionally intense ingroup sociability patterns from the informal groups in which they were practised in the cities to a set of formal organizations in the suburbs'. This is to underrate the importance of formal organizations—and the loyalties and vested interests which they build up over the years. Nor do we yet know what will be the result of the increased emphasis in recent years upon Jewish education. Amid all the externality of Jewish life in the suburbs there is a small thin voice of commitment—an anxiety, even among adults, to 'know more' about Judaism. It may well be that the answer to this demand is supplied in a conventionally packaged American form, and that the pervasive smoothness of popular culture—including religious culture—seldom rises above mediocrity. But there is, as yet, no way of assessing the long-run effects.

(*c*) Mr. Glazer is right to see in the return to the synagogue something more than conformity or the need to belong. Belongingness is an empty category: while men are not entirely free to choose *how* to belong and *to what* they will belong, there is *some* range of freedom. Some 40 per cent of America's Jews exercise this freedom by joining no synagogue—even if they occasionally enter one. The greater numbers who do belong are often 'joiners' for a variety of superficial reasons—as Dr. Gordon's survey records—but they may not always be aware of their deeper motivations. The result is—and here Mr. Glazer is surely correct—that they are choosing to relate themselves to a particular set of values and to co-operative activity with Jewish people. They have not become so acculturated as to relax the traditional Jewish barriers against exogamy. (The data on intermarriage are, like all the demographic material, inadequate—but the rates of intermarriage reported in various surveys do not spell Jewish extinction.)[56] Nor for the most part do they spend their leisure time with non-Jews.[57] The zeal for identification as Jews has, as we have seen, many apparent causes.

Social self-segregation, endogamy, Jewish education for the children, the growth (and acceptance by non-Jews) of a 'Jewish' popular culture[58] are all likely to strengthen this identification in the decades ahead. This pattern of Jewish life does not lack its critics. Not only the habitual cynic will question some of the co-operative activity in which Jews indulge. There is, for example, no special merit in playing bingo with Jews rather than with non-Jews. Indeed there may be greater merit in not playing it at all. Nor is there any obvious virtue in Jewish theatre parties to Broadway productions—even when, as often, such productions have a mediocre, shallow or perverse Jewish content. Yet this triviality need not be mistaken for the total picture. Further trivialities will, no doubt, emerge. Much that is basic to American life seems to exclude significance from the cultural sphere. Yet none can say that a new thoughtfulness or awareness cannot arise. This may happen in many spheres of American life—and only a dogmatic cultural determinism can deny the possibility.[59] So far at least, there are millions of American Jews who, though not profoundly religious, are maintaining contact with some significant Jewish traditions. Can we exclude the possibility that, at some levels of consciousness, they feel that Judaism is not only 'different' but also 'better'? Perhaps for many this *is* excluded by ignorance and by its frequent corollary of cultural relativism. But they may not constitute a permanent majority. There are even some who, as Mr. Glazer observes in his concluding paragraph, have shown 'a readiness to listen', however indirectly, to 'the voice of God'.[60]

NOTES

[1] An important exception may be found in studies of the census data on religious preference available in Canada. See L. Rosenberg, 'The Demography of the Jewish Community in Canada', *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, No. 2, 1959.

[2] N. Glazer, *American Judaism* (University of Chicago Press, 1957).

[3] Albert I. Gordon, *Jews in Suburbia* (Beacon Press, 1959).

[4] M. Sklare, *Conservative Judaism* (Free Press, 1955).

[5] M. Sklare (ed.), *The Jews—Social Pattern of an American Group* (Free Press, 1958).

[6] See *The Jews*, p. 99.

[7] Ibid., p. 53.

[8] Ibid., p. 95 et seq.

[9] Ibid., p. 97.

[10] U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports: Population Characteristics, Series P-20, No. 79, 2 February 1958. This study confirms the overall estimates of the total Jewish population as of the order of five and one quarter millions strong. There is a useful discussion of the material in *American Jewish Yearbook*, Vol. 60, 1959.

[11] See Table 40 in that volume.

[12] If the data are adjusted to increase their comprehensiveness, it appears that 27·8 per cent of the Jews were in this age-group as compared with 20·8 per cent in the total white population. For the older group (those over 65) the Jewish proportion was 10·1 per cent as contrasted with the white population's proportion of 9 per cent. It may be noted that all the more general indices confirm Seligman's view on the relatively greater 'aging' of the Jewish population of New York City.

[13] Freedman and others, op. cit., p. 112.

[14] Op. cit., p. 104.

[15] Op. cit., p. 110.

[16] Op. cit., p. 115.

[17] Op. cit., pp. 287–8.

[18] See Dr. Rackman's contribution to *Jewish Life in America*, ed. by T. Friedman and R. Gordis (Horizon Press, 1955).

[19] Ben Halpern, 'America is Different' in *The Jews*, ed. M. Sklare, p. 24.

[20] Mr. Vance Packard in *The Status Seekers* often appears to suggest that the existence of class and status barriers was first revealed in recent sociological research and argues that there has been a hardening of status lines in recent decades. He is wrong on both counts. His book does however provide a popular account of the social restrictions under which American middle-class Jews, despite acculturation, still labour.

[21] N. Glazer in *The Jews*, p. 146.

[22] This evidence is familiar and need not be laboured. See the table of data from thirteen communities in Seligman's article 'Some Aspects of Jewish Demography' in Sklare (ed.), *The Jews*, pp. 76–7.

See also the article by D. Goldberg and H. Sharp in the same collection, p. 107 et seq., on 'Some characteristics of Detroit Area Jewish and non Jewish Adults'. They report that in 1955 Jewish family heads were very largely (75 per cent) in white collar jobs '. . . particularly clustered in the "proprietor, manager and official" classification. The proportion of Jews in these "tradesman" jobs (42 per cent) is between three and four times greater than that for Catholics or white Protestants. . . . an intermediate position between the relatively proletarian Jews of New York City and the virtually complete white collar concentration of Jews in some of the smaller communities of this country', op. cit., p. 113.

[23] B. Seligman, 'The Jewish Population of New York City' in *The Jews*, ed. Sklare, p. 102.

[24] W. Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* (first edition, 1955: second and revised edition, Doubleday, 1960).

[25] A. Roy Eckardt, *The Surge of Piety in America* (Association Press, 1958), p. 57.

[26] See Martin E. Marty, *The New Shape of American Religion* (Harper, 1959), *passim*—particularly pp. 26–7 and 73.

[27] For a fuller discussion of this see J. E. Carlin and S. H. Mendlovitz, 'The American Rabbi: A Religious Specialist Responds To Loss of Authority' in M. Sklare (ed.), *The Jews*, pp. 377–82.

[28] For a useful discussion on 'congregationalism' the reader is referred to the study by Joseph I. Blau, 'The Spiritual Life of American Jewry, 1654–1954' in the *American Jewish Yearbook*, Vol. 56, 1955, p. 112 et seq.

[29] N. Glazer, *American Judaism*, chapters III–V.

[30] N. Glazer, op. cit., p. 99 et seq.

[31] M. Sklare, *Conservative Judaism*, p. 161.

[32] *United Synagogue Recorder*, VIII, 1 February 1928, 25, quoted in M. Sklare, op. cit., p. 113.

[33] See the recent paper by M. J. Rottenberg in *The Reconstructionist*, Vol. XXVI, No. 11, p. 19 et seq., and No. 12, p. 14 et seq.

[34] *Jewish Population Trends in New York* (Federation of Jewish Philanthropists Report, January 1956).

[35] H. Gans, 'The Origins and Growth of a Jewish Community in the Suburbs' in M. Sklare (ed.), *The Jews*, p. 205 et seq.

[36] Park Forest gained a wider celebrity as it was featured as a suitable example of modern suburbia by William H. Whyte, jr., in his study of *The Organisation Man* (1956).

[37] See Gans, op. cit., p. 215.

[38] See Gans, op. cit., p. 217.

[39] It is of interest that the study of *The Jewish Population of Greater Washington* (by S. K. Bigman, 1957) inquired into the reasons for *non-membership* of congregations: over 53 per cent of the families studied were non-affiliated. No tabulation of the answers was apparently made but the most frequent answers made reference to the age of the family's children, e.g. 'We won't join until our children are old enough for Sunday school' or 'Our children are grown up now, so we no longer need to belong', p. 93.

[40] J. R. Seeley, R. A. Sim, and E. W. Loosely, *Crestwood Heights* (Basic Books, 1958).

[41] Ibid., p. 356.

[42] Ibid., p. 215.

[43] Ibid., p. 239.

[44] Ibid., p. 240.

[45] A. I. Gordon, *Jews in Suburbia*, p. 65.

[46] Ibid., p. 59.

[47] Rabbi Alvan D. Rubin of Long Island, Central Conference of American Rabbis, 69th Annual Convention, *Yearbook*, Vol. LXVIII, 1958, p. 177.

[48] *The Jews*, ed. M. Sklare, pp. 377–414.

[49] W. Herberg, op. cit., p. 240. Mr. Herberg later (p. 250) notes that in 1958 Protestant clergymen's salaries averaged $4,432. According to Carlin and Mendlovitz (in *The Jews*, p. 411), 'If we include perquisites, the average Conservative Rabbi earns between $10,000 and $12,000.' They add that there are insufficient Conservative rabbis to fill all the openings available.

[50] Even so a number do find time to write papers and books.

[51] Of course the failure to study may often be the result of the rabbi's activist preferences. Certainly the recent expansionist phase has made activism indispensable. One can, however, see a defensive undertone in the recent hope of a distinguished Reform rabbi that 'when our rabbis are less preoccupied with the construction of buildings and the organization of new groups, they will surely give more time to study' (Dr. B. J. Bamberger, at Central Conference of American Rabbis, 69th Annual Convention. 1958, *Yearbook*, Vol. LXVIII, p. 268).

[52] See Carlin and Mendlovitz, op. cit., p. 396, also Gordon, op. cit., p. 89 et seq.

[53] See R. E. Gordon and others, *The Split-Level Trap*, Geis, 1961, for a useful account of these problems.

[54] This is the title of a perceptive recent article by Dr. Marie Syrkin in *Jewish Frontier*, January 1961, p. 7–12.

[55] See Gans in *The Jews*, p. 247.

[56] There may be, as Dr. Syrkin suggests (*Jewish Frontier*, January 1961), a differential rate of intermarriage. Jewish intellectuals may have a greater tendency to marry out; and this may impair the quality—let alone the quantity—of the Jewish population. But there is no means of knowing whether this will be so.

[57] The survey evidence on this is quite impressive. See, for example, H. Gans, loc. cit., p. 226, for the Park Forest data: elsewhere in *The Jews* (p. 311 et seq.) for data on Elmira reported by J. P. Dean. For evidence on commensalism in the Greater Washington area see S. K. Bigman, *The Jewish Population of Greater Washington*, pp. 80–1.

[58] The success which greets the efforts of Mr. Harry Golden is only one of innumerable instances. Equally significant are such plays as *A Majority of One* in which Jewish and Japanese practices are compared with a view to showing how 'alike' they are. Plays like *The Tenth Man* are more subtle in their presentation and, some might add, misrepresentation of Jewish themes. Films like *Exodus* combine the mood of the conventional Western with a Zionist flavour—a sure recipe for box office success.

[59] Some conflicting evidence on this possibility may be found in the symposium 'Jewishness and the Younger Intellectuals' in *Commentary*, April 1961, p. 306 et seq. Many of the contributors sound complacent and superior persons—with an inclination at times to boast their ignorance of Judaism and their distance from it. Remarkable too is their overall failure to recognize the positive contribution (especially cultural and philanthropic) which Jews now make to American life. But interestingly one of the writers in the symposium, Miss Sonya Rudikoff, in a perceptive glance at the future, leaves open the possibility that '. . . the Jews, whose very existence speaks of history, are necessary to American life not in the old way but in some relation that is still to be revealed. Religion may become more significant than culture' (*Commentary*, April 1961, p. 353).

[60] N. Glazer, *American Judaism*, p. 149.

AMERICAN JEWISH EDUCATION: AN ENGLISH VIEW

Chaim Pearl

THIS ESSAY will attempt a description of Jewish education in America, a subject about which outside that country comparatively little is known even by experienced Jewish educationists. The subject by itself is of real interest, but it may also be of some practical importance in our efforts to evaluate Jewish education in England and improve its standards. After Israel, we have most to learn from American Jewry, while in the field of Jewish education the American pattern is considerably more relevant than any other. For both there and here we deal with children whose native tongue is English and for whom Hebrew is often a difficult foreign and unknown language. Moreover we deal with two communities of the Diaspora where conditions of complete freedom and material prosperity have introduced serious problems compelling minority groups to battle for survival within the prevailing cultural civilization. These and several other important factors which the American and Anglo-Jewish communities have in common make a survey of American Jewish education a fruitful subject of study.

The General Picture

All authoritative observers are agreed that there is much to support the thesis that the present generation of American Jewish children receive a better Jewish education than their parents ever did. Like most other special aspects of American Jewish life this has to be examined within the general background of the development of the whole of Jewish life in that country. For there can be no doubt about it whatsoever, American Judaism is today enjoying a degree of popularity and intensification that was sadly absent in the previous generation. The masses of immigrants from eastern Europe who came to the country at the end of the last century and the beginning of this came with a strong loyalty to orthodox Judaism. In spite of the severe economic and social difficulties which most of them had to face they generally remained loyal to the old standards of observance. Not so their children, who

broke away in extraordinarily large numbers from the traditions of Judaism. American Jews still refer to these children of the original east European immigrants as 'The Lost Generation'. It was left to the third generation, the children of this 'Lost Generation', to find their way back to a worthwhile content of Jewish life. That they have done so with much energy, enthusiasm, and even real material sacrifice will, I believe, constitute the framework of an extremely proud chapter in modern American Jewish History.

Not least among the areas of American Jewish life is the effort now being made in the field of Jewish education. Fifty years ago there was virtually only one kind of organized public Jewish educational institution and that was the Talmud Torah. Today there is a flourishing network of schools and classes of every type—kindergarten, Sunday school, Hebrew school, day school, orthodox *yeshivah*, conservative *yeshivah*, Hebrew High school, Teachers' Training College, educational camps and various other kinds of formal and informal educational agencies to cater for most children and young people, and embracing every variety of religious affiliation and non-affiliation. In addition, there has been marked progress in the number of children enrolled, in the modernization of the schools, in the degree of professionalization, and in the financial support which all schools are able to claim from the communal purse.

Statistics

The following figures were confirmed by the American Association of Jewish Education and by the Director of the Education Commission of the Union of Hebrew Congregations. There are in America about 635,000 children of elementary school age, that is between the ages of seven and thirteen or fourteen years. Of these, it is again estimated that about 42 per cent are receiving a formal Hebrew and religious education. This by no means suggests that the majority of Jewish children in America have never received any Jewish education. It means that at the present moment about 42 per cent of the children are attending for such instruction, but in fact many thousands of children have in addition passed through the Hebrew schools and classes at one stage or another but are not included at the moment on the active roll. It would be fair to assume, on the basis of official reports issued by the A.A.J.A., that roughly 80 per cent of all American Jewish children have at some time or another received a formal Jewish education. Dr. Eamanuel Gamoran put this figure at 70 per cent and indicated also that the total number of Jewish children now at a Hebrew school or class was no more than 40 per cent of the total number of elementary Jewish schoolchildren. Even on the basis of the slightly lower figure given by Dr. Gamoran, the results so far achieved are not unimpressive and would seem to compare very favourably with the present situation in England. The comparable

figures for Jewish children attending Hebrew schools and classes in this country have been compiled by the London Board for Jewish Religious Education, by the Central Council for Jewish Religious Education, and by various independent students. These statistics are easily examined in the official reports from which it would appear that at any time the percentage of Jewish children receiving formal Jewish education is also around the 50 per cent mark.

In the higher age group there are about 330,000 Jewish High School students from fourteen to eighteen years of age, of whom about 10,000 attend Hebrew colleges and classes for further Jewish education. This is just about 3 per cent, but it is fair to point out that a number of experts regarded this proportion as an underestimate of the true position. Even taking the lower figure as reliable, we see that it represents no small achievement when we bear in mind that many of these older students are in the sixteen to eighteen years of age group and that they come several times each week for intensive Jewish study following a full day at the secular high school. This figure does not of course include the professional students at full-time Hebrew colleges or seminaries. The overall impression is that in post-*Barmitzvah* education America does better than in England qualitatively and quantitatively.

Of the number of elementary school children receiving Jewish education at the present time, about half attend a Sunday school. Of the remainder, 36 per cent attend a Congregational afternoon school and 14 per cent attend a day school. In this respect the situation is not very dissimilar from that which obtains in England where half our enrolled children attend on Sunday only and about 12 per cent of the total are enrolled in day schools.

The Sunday School

This type of school is mainly organized by the Reform congregations, although a number of Conservative and Orthodox congregations also offer facilities for a Sunday school education. But in the case of the Conservative and Orthodox Sunday school it always runs parallel with a weekday school meeting several times a week. That is to say that the children attending only on Sundays are very strictly separated from those attending several evenings a week and the syllabuses of both groups are quite different. In the case of most Reform congregations the Sunday school is still the only Jewish educational agency offered to the children, though it is becoming increasingly evident that Reform educators are not satisfied with the situation any longer and a number of them have already organized mid-week classes for the older children of the Sunday school.

The Sunday schools of the Reform group are all organized through the National Commission on Jewish education and the syllabus and textbooks are uniform throughout the Movement. The very interesting

and obvious difference between the American and the English Sunday school is that the former institution does not attempt to teach Hebrew. This applies to the Conservative Sunday school as well. The truth is that educators in neither group would be prepared to underestimate the importance of Hebrew, but they resolutely refuse to include it in the syllabus of the Sunday school on purely realistic grounds. As one educator has put it, 'If parents are sincere enough to want their children to learn Hebrew then they must be prepared to send them several times a week. If they send them to a Sunday school only, then it is proof that their educational objectives are lower'. It must be admitted that by excluding all Hebrew language and texts from the syllabus, the Sunday school is able to concentrate on the things it can really achieve and avoids the heartbreaking task of cramming a few verses of *Chumash* into children who have forgotten the small amount they learn on one Sunday by the time they arrive at the classes in the following week. By concentrating on the minimum and achieving it rather than by vaguely hoping that a smattering of an extensive syllabus designed for a weekday school will stick to children attending only one morning per week, the Sunday school has created a realistic programme.

I know that sound advice is given to English Hebrew classes along these lines and that where possible efforts are made to separate those children attending only on Sundays—providing them with a workable syllabus which deliberately aims at lower standards. The result might be to encourage children and parents to aspire to higher things than are possible on Sundays only. Further, it will avoid the present waste of time for teachers and pupils who have to go over the weekday work again and again on Sundays for the benefit of those who come only on Sundays. In America there is little chance of such a sad situation arising in the classes.

The teachers are drawn mainly from public school teaching staff and are therefore people with experience in teaching, though many I saw seem to lack a sound Jewish knowledge. At all events, the chief qualification for teaching in the Sunday school is the ability to hold the children's interest and enthusiasm. Most of the schools were very bright, well equipped, and blessed with colourful and most attractive text books which would be the envy of any Jewish child or teacher in England.

The average Sunday school spends a certain amount of time each week with audio-visual aids. The National Commission maintains a complete department in its organization which deals with this all the time. The result is that there are numerous audio-visual aids of a most attractive kind available for every school organized by the Commission. I saw one or two film strips on Bible stories and was very impressed; and so were the children. The larger Sunday school also has a musical director on its staff whose job it is to teach the children the melodies

appropriate to the Festivals as they approach. An ample supply of records is available to assist in this type of work.

The overall impression I took away with me from an examination of the American Jewish Sunday school is that although the content of instruction is necessarily superficial, the children have grown up to enjoy their lessons and to approach all things Jewish with great happiness. If the Sunday school's chief task and objective is to train its children towards a happy approach to Jewish values then in large measure the school has succeeded. The more recent development in which a mid-week lesson is now added for the older pupils is a very important step in the growth of this kind of school and should bring more substantial results.

The Weekday School

This is generally known by the term 'Hebrew School' to distinguish it from the Sunday school where no Hebrew language is taught. There are about 120,000 children enrolled in these weekday schools in America which include Talmud Torah schools of the old type meeting every night and also on Sabbaths and Sundays. Many weekday schools meet as often as five times a week, and only a very small number of them meet less than three times. Generally speaking, a Sunday morning session is not included in the time-table. The average session is about two hours, and in view of the frequency of attendance, the educational achievement is good—or at all events seemed to be good in the classes I visited. By English standards, I would say that the American weekday class achieves more than the average Anglo-Jewish Synagogue class catering for the same age group. Of course, the American school suffers from the same kind of problems which often afflict the English scene, and far too many children commence Hebrew school at the age of nine or ten and stay on for only a few years, that is, until after *Barmitzvah.*

It must be said immediately that the American Hebrew school has a very important advantage over its English equivalent because of the fact that many State secular schools in America finish work in the afternoon at 3.30 p.m. or even as early as 3 p.m. This is much too early for the child to come home and be left to his own resources for the rest of the evening—often without parental supervision when both mother and father are at work. Consequently, there is then a very practical domestic reason to strengthen the purely educational motive which takes the child to the Hebrew school.

To return to the standard of knowledge shown by the children. It was not unusual to find youngsters of eleven and twelve who were able to speak a little Hebrew. *Chumash* and *Siddur* are always taught in this type of school, but the textbooks are illustrated and bright. Audio-visual aids are often to be found in the schools, and many of them organized by

congregations use the school room as a workshop for preparing the children for active participation in the Synagogue services.

If the Sunday school is organized chiefly by the Reform movement, the Hebrew or Weekday school is the main educational agency of the Conservative movement. The following comparative table will show the present affiliations of the two kinds of school.

Congregation	*Sunday* %	*Weekday* %
Reform	45	8
Conservative	34	51
Orthodox	13	22
Others	8	19
Total	100	100

The 'Others' in this table cover the Yiddish and secularist schools as well as the 'intercongregational' or community schools which are not uncommon in the very small community.

The All Day School or Yeshivah Ketanah

Without any doubt, the most outstanding feature in the current trends in American Jewish education is the growing popularity of the All Day School, usually known as the *Yeshivah Ketanah*. It is not entirely a new institution in America because the first school of this kind was founded as far back as 1886 and by the beginning of the century there were a few more, but it is of significance to point out that of all the existing Jewish day schools in the country, 80 per cent were founded after 1945. There are probably about 40,000 American Jewish children in this type of school today, and although it represents only about 14 per cent of the total Jewish child population enrolled in any kind of Jewish school, it is important to know that the figure is constantly rising with the expanding popularity of the day school. This figure is not far off the computed figure of Jewish children attending Jewish day schools in this country—a figure of about 12 per cent of all our enrolled children.

Most observers are of the opinion however that the All Day School will never embrace the majority of Jewish children, if only because of the enormous cost of building and maintaining this type of school. The American State does not subscribe any funds for denominational schools and the entire cost must be borne by the sponsoring community. Generally it is the community rather than the congregation which supports the day school, although there are a few schools which I saw which were under the direct control of one particular congregation. The responsibility and the financial burden are usually considered too heavy to be carried except by the full resources of the entire community.

That is why although the schools are strictly orthodox, there are Conservative (and occasionally Reform) rabbis on the Boards of Management. The educational achievements of the day school are very high indeed—much higher than anything we achieve in the Anglo-Jewish day school. This fact is entirely due to the freedom of the denominational school to arrange its own syllabus. The result is that in nearly all such schools as much as one half of the entire teaching time available is devoted to Jewish subjects.

The American Jewish Community is very conscious of the tremendous potentiality of the day school and I often heard it voiced that the future of American Jewry is being completely remodelled as a result of the almost phenomenal growth of these schools. This may be something of an unwarranted piece of optimism. And yet there can be no doubt but that the day school is having and will continue to have an important influence on the quality of American Jewish life. I discussed the position with a group of elderly first generation immigrants who in their time had the advantage of an intensive Jewish training. It is usual for such people to think back nostalgically to the days of their own youth in eastern Europe where Jewish life was particularly intense and to compare the position with the rather poor standards which obtain in the new country. This kind of attitude is not unknown to us in England where the state of affairs in Jewish life is often adversely compared, and justifiably so, with the strong Jewish life in Russia or Poland of the last generation. It was all the more interesting therefore to be told by such a group of people that in their view American Jewish children have never had such splendid opportunities for a sound Jewish education as those which have been created for the present generation. They spoke with satisfaction about the day school *Yeshivah* and the standard of Jewish education which is reached.

Other Groups and Activities

The Jewish educational picture in America is by no means completed by the above three types of schools. There are, in addition, a number of Yiddish schools which cater for children of parents who deliberately wish to preserve the Yiddish culture of an earlier generation. There was a time when the entire curriculum was conducted in Yiddish, but those days have now passed and I was informed by the Dean of the New York Jewish Teachers' Seminary (Yiddish) that a considerable part of their work is now conducted in Hebrew to cater for the changing views of the Community on the relative places of the Yiddish and Hebrew languages. I was not able to inspect any of the work in these schools, but the impression I gained from secondary sources is that the numbers are not large and that they are a dwindling influence in the Community.

In reviewing the educational scene one ought to remark upon the place of a group such as the Torah Umesorah which is under the

direction of the Lubavitcher Chassidim. This organization controls several small *yeshivoth* and publishes a fair amount of educational material for Jewish youth. Its inspiration and vitality is gained from the evangelical zeal generated by the Lubavitcher rabbi and his followers. I spent a weekend in Brooklyn where I was accommodated over the Sabbath by members of the group and was quite impressed with their enthusiasm. Here were American born youngsters (and there were a few thousands like them all over the country) who had made a complete and personal commitment to Judaism. They wore beards and the garb of Chassidim without a trace of self-consciousness and spoke English without an accent. After the first shock of meeting a young bearded American Chassid, one is soon full of admiration for these people who deliberately give their lives as 'missionaries' among their own people. They live a life of religious service and their attempts are constantly directed towards bringing their fellow Jews a little closer to Judaism, with love and sympathy. Every young follower gives up several weeks each year in order to spread the lesson of Judaism in 'non-converted' communities. They ask for no payment. They receive no gift for their services. They refuse any kind of material reward that may be offered by the communities they visit. They come only to give.

Under the heading of other educational activities of a less formal kind one should particularly note the rise and growth of the camp as an educational agency. In America most schools have summer vacations for as long as three months and the problem of what to do with the children during their long holiday is not only an educational problem; it is often a domestic problem as well as a social one. Within this background of real need certain organizations have developed the junior camp movement. A camp site is acquired in a suitable vacation area and children may be enrolled for part of the school vacation, or even for the entire period. From all accounts this activity is becoming increasingly important in the American Jewish Community and educationalists have recognized the great possibilities which are offered by the camp movement. Up till recently most of these camps were run on purely commercial lines by private organizations. Now an increasing number of congregations have their own camp site and programme.

One of the most outstanding camp units is the All Hebrew Camp where the youngsters can live for as long as three months in a completely Hebrew atmosphere. It is not surprising that at the end of this time children return to the city with at least a working knowledge of the spoken language. All children's camps have some kind of educational programme—some more intense than others—and in view of the length of time spent in the camp and the widespread popularity of the movement, the camp deserves consideration as a valuable force for Jewish education.

Secondary or High School Education

An American youngster leaves his primary grades at the age of thirteen or fourteen and then proceeds to a High School for four or five years. During this time he must go through a number of qualifying tests in order to graduate. The system leading up to graduation is a little complicated from the English standpoint, but one thing is universally necessary in all High Schools, and that is the gaining of a required number of credit points in several subjects. The interesting fact in this is that in many places, High School students can gain points for Hebrew subjects in respect of attendances put in at recognized Hebrew educational establishments. Hence there is some incentive for American Jewish High School students to continue attendances at Hebrew classes after the school day. In fact, however, the High School enrolment at Jewish schools is rather small and is still one of the weak points on the educational scene. The highest estimate of the percentage of students enrolled is 5 per cent while most estimates given by informed observers suggested that the figure is really lower than this. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that all these youngsters are well over thirteen years; in England the vast majority of young people have also left the Hebrew classes. In England the proportion of young people over thirteen who continue attendance at Hebrew classes is also about 5 per cent, but this figure fades to a point of disappearance when we reach the upper age levels of over fifteen. If anything, then, the relative situation in America may be better. Certain it is that where High School students maintain their attendance, the standard reached is very gratifying. I had the opportunity one evening to look into the classes at the Boston Hebrew College. This is a communal institution and has no loyalties to any one congregational group. The building itself is most impressive and in its physical facilities compares very favourably with the best corresponding type of secular institution. The college was crowded, on a week night, from 4.30 to 7 p.m., and hundreds of young students were attending classes at different levels. I sat in an intermediate class where the students were studying the Book of Proverbs. This they were doing with Hebrew as the language of instruction. The average age of the boys and girls was fifteen. In another class, boys and girls of about sixteen were studying the Talmud: again the language of instruction was Hebrew. It was a source of inspiration to see modern American Jewry within such a background of real familiarity with Hebrew and classical Jewish literature. The Boston College is not unique in America. In fact there are twelve similar institutions in the large centres all over the country.

Adult Jewish Education

A word may be added here about the efforts being made in the sphere of adult Jewish education. In general, the pattern of the adult education

group is not very different from what one might find in the best and most active of our Anglo-Jewish synagogues, except perhaps that in America they are more intense and are adequately financed. In the main synagogues a special officer undertakes this kind of work as his full-time job. There are the week-night study groups, the 'young marrieds' clubs, the parent-teacher associations, the ladies' classes and the men's breakfast clubs, the brotherhoods and the sisterhoods—all with some aim to cater for the Jewish educational needs of their members.

Under this heading, it is not out of place to refer to the Jewish radio programmes which are a feature of American Jewish life. It must be remembered that the Government insists that every radio network shall devote a certain number of hours each week to non-commercial broadcasting of a cultural kind. The networks are therefore in a position where they can offer time to religious organizations for their own use. In many cases this time is given free of charge. In this way all sides are fully satisfied—the Government, the radio network which fulfils its obligations without cost of special programming, and the guest organization which is able to command vast audiences for its point of view. In Jewish hands the programme opportunities have been well used, and numerous synagogues, religious organizations, and welfare funds have used radio time with great advantage. Perhaps the best Jewish programme is the 'Eternal Light' half-hour, sponsored every Sunday by the United Synagogue and the Theological Seminary. This is a radio script designed to expound in dramatic and interesting form a particular Jewish lesson. It is authoritatively reported that the programme is listened to by millions of people all over the east coast of America, and it is not hard to imagine the cumulative educational effect which this programme can build up in the mind and the hearts of so many regular listeners.

The Problem of Teachers

In England we are not entirely unaware of the problem of teacher shortage and it is not likely to cause surprise to learn that it is this very problem which is causing greatest concern to responsible authorities in America. Dr. U. Z. Engleman of the American Association for Jewish Education reported as far back as 1949 that the estimated shortage of Hebrew teachers was then over 700, and that was before the great advances were made in child enrolment and in educational goals. Today the shortage is clearly more serious. According to official reports on the subject, the number of graduates coming from the training colleges is no more than a hundred each year for the whole country. This is clearly an inadequate number in view of the contemporary development in other areas of the field. There are at the moment twelve training colleges, six in New York, one in each of the cities of Boston,

Baltimore, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia, and two in Chicago. These colleges are highly organized institutions which offer a four-year course. Some award a bachelor's degree or even a higher degree in Jewish education, and official academic status is maintained by the ability of the College to exchange credit points with the universities.

But in spite of this the intake of students is relatively small, and although in 1960 there are about eight hundred students in the Colleges, not all of them will stay the course, and even among those who can be expected to complete the course it is realistically expected that a goodly proportion of them will not enter the profession.

It is clear that the problems are not really different from those which afflict Anglo-Jewish education. The small salary and the lack of social status are still things which the American teacher has to face, and it cannot be wondered at therefore that Hebrew teaching is not regarded as a suitable full-time profession. Most of the Hebrew teaching is done, as it is here, by public school teachers and others who undertake the task in the Hebrew classroom on a part-time basis in order to supplement their main income which is derived from another source.

Educational Agencies

A satisfying feature of the development of Jewish educational effort in America has been the growth of communal agencies which attempt to co-ordinate and centralize educational work for an entire community. This does not mean that individual congregations are not able to plan and execute their work on independent lines in accordance with their own outlook; they certainly do that. But it does mean that the community is already recognizing that responsibility for Jewish education rests with the entire community. And so, while each congregation will direct its own curriculum there is an overall unity with regard to important matters of finance and even independent inspection. There are now well over forty communal education boards in the chief centres of American Jewish life. Each board sets up its various departments to look after the financing of the schools and the inspection and staffing of the various types of schools from the Reform Sunday school to the Orthodox Hebrew school. Generally speaking, however, it was noticed that orthodox congregations are not affiliated to the local education boards but prefer to work out their salvation in a fiercely independent way. The fact that most of these local boards were established only after 1930 while the national organization, the American Association for Jewish Education, was set up in 1939, is an indication of the growing problems facing education which it is felt could be solved only on a communal and national level. Chief of these problems, after the supply of teachers, is that of finance. It has been estimated that it costs between $25–50 a year for each child in the Sunday school, between $50 and $100 for a child at the weekday Hebrew school and between $400 and

$600 for every child attending an all-day school. As we should expect, the budget is higher than that which we find in our own Community. The London Board estimates that it spends about £7 10*s.* 0*d.* per pupil in its classes. This is against the comparative figure of about £20 per pupil in an American school of the same kind. Fortunately, the American Jewish Community is able to give handsomely for worthy causes, and fortunately too the centralization of communal welfare funds enables the community to assess its budget for all purposes including its own local needs. As a result the Federation and Welfare Fund which exists for the purpose of financing all local Jewish needs is able each year to allocate an agreed proportion of its monies for the purposes of Jewish education.

Conclusion

The chief impressions I formed after visiting a score of schools, classes, and colleges from the east coast of New York to the west coast of California, is that American Jewry has developed a very hopeful system which augurs well for the future of the community. The outstanding things to my mind were the remarkable achievements of the *Yeshivah Ketanah*, the vigour of the weekday congregational school, and the development to change the Sunday school into a Hebrew school meeting several times a week. In spite of teacher shortage and general staffing problems, there was a fair degree of professionalism and a noticeable enthusiasm among teachers. Textbooks were nearly always colourful and bright—the kind of thing hardly ever seen here in English classes—and great use is made of audio-visual aids to stimulate interest. The degree of centralization through local boards was impressive and if carried further it may ultimately mean that every Hebrew school in the country will reap the benefit of working under expert professional direction and with the assistance of adequate funds.

AN ANGLO-JEWISH COMMUNITY: LEEDS[1]

Ernest Krausz

THE Leeds Jewish community is typically the product of the persecution of Russian Jewry in the latter half of the nineteenth century. By the beginning of the present century some 10,000 Jews had settled in Leeds, and these immigrants gave rise to the third largest Jewish community in Britain, which at present numbers about 20,000 people.[2] As the community grew, organized Jewish life developed, and the multitude of organizations that sprang up served as a most important force of social control. Much is to be gained, therefore, from an examination of the organizational pattern and structure of the community.

We may divide the organizational field into the following sectors: religious, cultural, zionist, political, economic, and charitable. Quite naturally there is much overlapping in both the membership and functions of the various organizations, but although this makes our division into definite fields rather artificial, it is nevertheless of great value in providing us with a clear picture of the organizational pattern.

Before dealing with those organizations that fit into the above classification, we shall examine two organizations which aim at looking after the needs of the community as a whole, rather than with any one aspect of its life. One such organization is the Leeds Jewish Representative Council which is a body that links the multitude of organizations, covers the field of organizations almost in its entirety, and gives an appearance of unity to the community. From its List of Purposes we see that its main aims are: to provide a central representative body for the community; to guide and co-ordinate communal activities; to foster good relations between Jews and non-Jews; to deal with matters of Jewish interest in general; and to be a centre of information.

In 1959 the number of affiliated organizations was 113 with some 320 delegates. Comparative figures for 1949 were 80 organizations with some 240 delegates. Jewish public representatives, e.g. Members of Parliament representing Leeds constituencies, Aldermen and Councillors, Magistrates, Members of the Board of Deputies, and heads of major institutions, are all ex officio members of the Council.

The Council has been constantly trying to convince organizations and their leaders of the importance of its work. In fact it considers the duty of all to support and extend its activities. There is no doubt that during the last few years the Council has gained in status, and that the interest shown towards it has increased. It acquired its enhanced position simply because the need was felt for such a centralized organization. It is also true that the Council is the most representative of Leeds Jewish communal institutions. Moreover, it has carried out many of its functions efficiently. This is so in the field of representation, e.g. it represents Leeds Jewry upon such bodies as the Council of Social Services, the Area Churches Committee, the Leeds and District Council of the United Nations Organization, etc. Similarly, it brings about co-operation with the larger Anglo-Jewish community and world Jewry, e.g. by supporting the Conference of Provincial Representative Councils and by being affiliated to the Board of Deputies and the World Jewish Congress. Again, it provides a link between the Jewish community and the larger non-Jewish community and also it provides useful information to both organizations and individuals.

But in its most important function, namely that of co-ordinating the work of the various organizations, the powers of the Council are more apparent than real. The only sanctions the Council can take against a member organization are those of cancelling its membership and of providing bad publicity for the organization in question. Short of these acts, no organization can be deterred from taking a completely independent line. A case in point is that of raising funds for some charitable purpose. In this field the Council has attributed to itself the function of 'sole controller' and has advised members of the community to ignore appeals unless they are satisfied that the authority of the Council has been given. Yet fund-raising activities without explicit Council permission have taken place, and although most of these have been on a small scale, there is nothing much the Council could do against some grandiose and well-organized scheme.

Another clear example showing the ineffectiveness of the Council in co-ordinating work is found in connexion with the building of synagogues in the new areas of settlement. At the Annual General Meeting of 1958, the Council came out against indiscriminate and unco-ordinated synagogue building, and set up the Synagogue Advisory Board with the task of putting into effect the plan of the Council to build one large synagogue for the Moortown area, through the joint efforts of the main synagogues. In this task the Advisory Board and its instigator the Representative Council have completely failed, for in fact five separate and completely unco-ordinated synagogue building schemes have come into operation, two of which have already been completed, the others being near completion.

Similarly in other matters, the Council has very little real power and

must always rely primarily on the goodwill, voluntary work, and self-imposed control of member organizations.

Another organization that takes interest in the community as such, rather than limiting itself to any one aspect of its life, is the Bnai Brith. This fraternal organization with high humanitarian ideals, and endeavouring to unite all Jews in common brotherhood, has as its practical tasks the supplementing and promoting of the work of other organizations and the initiating of public service. Thus in Leeds it has been successful in promoting the creation of the Judean Club, the Convalescent Home, the Leeds Jewish Friendship Club, and more recently the Hillel Foundation. Generally after the creation of an organization, the latter becomes an independent body and the Bnai Brith withdraws but remains prepared to render support whenever called upon. Because of the absence of a Representative Council, at times the Bnai Brith took upon itself the task of trying to co-ordinate the work of the various organizations. It is interesting to note that it was the Bnai Brith that made possible the re-formation and reorganization of the Representative Council to which it is now affiliated.

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

The Beth Din. This is an ecclesiastical court having an ultimate say in all religious matters. All the synagogues, with the exception of the Reform, accept its rulings, and so do many organizations, although a good number quietly disregard its requirements. Most of its work consists not merely of rulings but of actual investigatory and supervisory tasks. It is in the main concerned with marriage, divorce, *chalitza*, proselytizations, supervision of *shechita* and *kashrus*. In all these matters the Beth Din has close liaison with the Chief Rabbi's Office in London. Other functions are, for example, the adjudication of disputes (*Dinei Torah*) and the issuing of certificates *upon solemn declarations* to old immigrants, as regards their dates of birth or marriage.

The Beth Din itself is a charge of the Beth Din Administration Committee, which is made up by Executive members drawn from both the Board of Shechita and the Kashrus Commission. The members of the Beth Din have, in ex officio capacity, seats on the committees of most communal organizations.

Synagogues. There are nineteen places of worship with a total synagogue membership of 4,640. Since this is a transitional period in that synagogues in the older areas still exist whilst new ones have already been built to cope with the needs that have arisen in the new areas of settlement, it must be stated that about half a dozen of the synagogues will be closed down shortly, although at least three new places of worship will be opened in the newer areas in the near future.

In view of the fact that the primary reason for synagogue member-

ship is the burial right that it carries with it, note must be taken of the fact that the total membership would be greater but for the existence of the Jewish Workers' Co-operative Society. This organization has a membership of 2,114 for burial rights, although of these 520 are at the same time members of a synagogue which is affiliated to the society. It appears, nevertheless, that we could add approximately 1,600 'would-be' synagogue members which would give us a total of over 6,200. However, in view of two factors: (*a*) the flexible nature of membership, i.e. not all members represent families; and (*b*) the fact that some duplication exists, i.e. some are members of more than one synagogue, the figure of 6,200 must be reduced to about 5,500, if we are to arrive at a total representing the number of Jewish families attached to synagogues and burial societies.

The synagogues are served by thirty-eight full-time and ten part-time officials, as well as by a good number of honorary functionaries. The main activities of synagogues consist of conducting religious services and services connected with burials and weddings. Not all the synagogues have daily services, and if we reduce the nineteen places of worship to sixteen, as some of them are in a transitional period, we find that only eight, i.e. 50 per cent, have regular daily services. Only three of the synagogues have special services for children, but almost all have Ladies' Guilds. The following are approximate numbers attending the various services in all the synagogues: morning, 170–180; evening, 120–130; Friday evening, 230–250; Sabbath morning, 800–850 (including some 180–200 children attending their own services); High Festivals, 7,100–7,200. Except for the latter, attendance at services is, as we see, very poor, and it is made up mainly of the older and more traditionally minded members, a small number of orthodox people, some who are more actively connected with the synagogues, and the mourners who attend for a year. Even the High Festival figure seems low, but it is explained by the fact that children and many teenagers, for whom often no seats are booked, are not accounted for.

All the synagogues are orthodox, apart from one Reform synagogue (200 members), in that congregationally they adhere to the Shulchan Aruch, although the bulk of their members do not observe the rules laid down in that code, with the exception of some of the smaller places of worship, e.g. the Yeshivah, where all the members are strictly orthodox.

In 1947 an attempt was made to bring about a certain amount of co-operation among synagogues and to co-ordinate the religious life of the community, by establishing the Council of Synagogues. The Council had some initial success but within approximately three years it became defunct. The failure of the Council can be said to have been due mainly to the following factors: (*a*) the vested interests in the various synagogues, especially the wish of the leaders to maintain their

respective positions of prestige; (*b*) to some extent a genuine desire on the part of many members to maintain the old group, which is associated with family links usually going back a few generations; (*c*) the fear of domination by the bigger and more powerful synagogal groups, especially the United Hebrew Congregation (2,000 members).

Whilst the smaller synagogues which do not have the financial means to acquire premises in the new areas of settlement have to amalgamate with the larger congregations, it is clear that at least five independent synagogal groups (with a number of branches) will continue to exist within the community, as well as a few smaller places of worship.

CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS

The provision of Jewish education is a basic force of control within the community. The effectiveness of that force will depend on: (*a*) the intensiveness of the education, and (*b*) how extensively the school-going population is being covered by that education. This important force of control is mainly in the hands of the Leeds Talmud Torah Hebrew Education Board. The latter covers a vast field providing evening class tuition at six branches to 704 pupils, and withdrawal class tuition at twenty different branches of schools to 905 pupils. The Talmud Torah estimates that the maximum overlap between evening and withdrawal class pupils is 200. This gives the total of 1,409 pupils, and if we add the 145 pupils in the Jewish primary and nursery schools, and the 55 pupils at the Sinai Synagogue Hebrew classes (not under the Talmud Torah) we arrive at the grand total of 1,609 pupils receiving Hebrew tuition.

In trying to ascertain to what extent the Jewish school population is covered by Hebrew education, we encounter certain difficulties. Thus, we may base our estimate of the number of Jewish school children on general school population figures for Leeds. Since the latter is in the region of 78,000 it is over 15 per cent of a population of 512,000. Taking this percentage, with a Jewish population estimate of 18,000,[3] we arrive at the figure of 2,736 as the Leeds Jewish school population. Even if we consider the following factors: (*a*) that the size of the Jewish family is smaller than that of the non-Jewish family, and that therefore the above estimate of the Jewish school population is too high, and (*b*) that many Jewish children receive Hebrew tuition privately and some are away from Leeds in boarding schools, looking at the number of children receiving Hebrew tuition, which is 1,609, we find that there is an enormous gap not covered by such education. Does this mean that a substantial number of Jewish children do not receive any Hebrew education? If this is not the case, how then do we account for the above gap? The answer is as follows. The general Leeds school population figure of 78,000 includes children under 5 and over 15. However, few

young children attend Hebrew classes, parents maintaining that it is too much of a burden for them at that age. Again, few children of over 15 receive Hebrew instruction. In some secondary schools there is no proper Hebrew instruction, the withdrawal period being used for holding some sort of a service. In fact boys after the age of 13, i.e. after Bar-Mitzvah, do not attend after-school Hebrew classes and many of them do not get instruction even in withdrawal periods. The lack of Hebrew instruction over the age of 13 applies even more so to girls.

In view of the above we see that Talmud Torah Hebrew instruction is provided mainly for the age group 6–13. The latter group in the general school population of Leeds contains 53,650 children. This represents 10·4 per cent of the total population. Taking this percentage we arrive at the figure of 1,872 Jewish children in the age group 6–13. Keeping in mind that the size of the Jewish family is smaller than that of the non-Jewish one, and that a certain number of children do receive Hebrew instruction privately, and taking the figure of 1,609 receiving Hebrew tuition, we see that the gap is much narrower than as it first appeared. Nevertheless the above does show that the Jewish school population is not fully covered by Hebrew education.

As regards the number of children sent to Hebrew classes, the length of time they attend, and with what regularity, much depends on the attitude of parents. The Talmud Torah, however, is endeavouring to attract greater numbers, especially to their after-school classes, and in particular to increase the number of girl pupils. One proposal aimed at increasing the number of pupils has been to establish a 'Scholarship Centre' where the children would be helped in their secular homework by qualified tutors and then follow on in advanced Hebrew classes.

The quality of education imparted depends on whether properly qualified teachers are available, a problem that hinges on the type of salaries paid and therefore on the general financial situation. In this respect the Talmud Torah has to rely on the goodwill of synagogues, most of which have accepted the Communal Levy for Education, the periodical sums contributed by various organizations such as the Board of Shechita, and endowments, donations, etc., coming from individuals. Again, there is the problem of the time children can spend in the Talmud Torah. It is certainly a burden for young children regularly to attend evening classes lasting two to three hours after a whole day at school, whilst on the other hand it is generally agreed that withdrawal classes lasting some forty minutes, about three times a week, are inadequate. The obvious answer to the problem is the Jewish day-school, and the Leeds community made a start in this direction some three years ago. The Jewish primary and nursery schools have now a total of 145 children and progress is being made at a rapid rate.

The champions of the Jewish day-school movement, namely the

Hebrew Education Board and the Zionist Council, the two organizations which are in fact jointly responsible for the schools, met with stiff opposition from those with assimilationist tendencies. The latter pointed out that it was undesirable to segregate Jewish from non-Jewish children. Another contention was that Jewish schools may not have a high enough standard and that they may prove a stigma, factors which could hinder or even spoil completely the later career of the child. This fear of a possible effect on the future career of the child has been noticeable especially as regards boys. Thus, in the Selig Brodetsky Jewish Day School, while in the 5–6 age group 59 per cent of the pupils are boys, in the 7–8 age group only 33 per cent are boys. It remains to be seen what percentages of boys will be found in the higher classes, as these will be formed in the near future. The picture would be even more complete should a secondary Jewish school be established.

The arguments in respect of segregation and the effects of a Jewish school on the child's future career, although overcome in the committee meetings and discussions among communal leaders, are still likely to keep many children away from Jewish day-schools, and it is the general attitude towards the day-school movement that will ultimately decide in what direction Jewish education will move, and what powers it will be able to acquire.

Another matter connected with Jewish children in schools is the Kosher Meals Service which provides some 250 meals per day, of which 90 are taken up by the Jewish day-schools. A survey of children who attend Talmud Torah withdrawal classes from five schools has shown that 46·6 per cent take advantage of the provision of kosher meals. Two factors must be mentioned however. On the one hand, the number of Jewish children in the schools is often greater than the number attending withdrawal classes. On the other hand, children in some of the schools are at too great a distance from the canteen providing the kosher meals. But considering that the percentage for children from Cowper Street Schools, where the canteen is situated next door to the schools, is only 49·9 of those withdrawn, it can be safely concluded that with the best of conditions only about 50 per cent of Jewish children could be attracted to the Kosher Meals Service, unless a definite change were to take place in the attitude of parents towards it.

Here we can conveniently mention the existence of two Parents' Associations. One is the Leeds Jewish Schools Parents' Association with some 150 members. They run 'socials', handing over the proceeds to the schools, and have lectures on educational and religious problems. The other is the Moortown Talmud Torah Parent-Teacher Association, with some 300 members. Their activities are similar to the first one.

Higher religious education is traditionally provided by the Talmudical Colleges or as they are usually called the Yeshivahs. The Leeds Yeshivah provides such education to only a small number of part-time

students. It often attracts some university students and graduates who arrange their own *shiurim* (lessons) with the teachers of the Yeshivah. It also attracts a small number of young *Baalei Teshuvah*, i.e. those returning to a religious way of life.

Jewish religious education for adults is provided mainly by the Rabbis of the town. At least three independent courses of *shiurim* are held on the Sabbath, the Bible and the Talmud being studied. Attendances vary from five to twenty and mainly those of the older generation take part. In addition, the Institute for Adult Jewish Education, whose tutors are again the few Rabbis, provides some courses held during the week, e.g. in Talmud, Midrashic Literature, Modern Hebrew and prayer book, the total number enrolled being fifty-four.

There is little else in the way of regular adult educational activity, even of a secular Jewish content, except for some activity on the part of the adult Zionist cultural groups. There are on the other hand the occasional lectures, symposia or debates, organized by various groups, cultural, charitable, etc.

The Leeds University Jewish Students' Association has a membership of 110. It is estimated that including some twenty Israeli students, there are between 160 and 180 Jewish students at Leeds University. Since some of the 110 J.S.A. members are not now attending courses but are graduates who maintain their association with the group over many years, it could not be asserted that more than 60 per cent of Jewish students identify themselves with the Jewish Students' Association. The latter has the following main objects: 'to disseminate Jewish learning; to bring together Jewish people in the University; and to uphold Jewish traditions'. Its work consists mainly of meetings of an educational nature and of 'socials', as well as organizing and attending week-end schools. The Jewish hall of residence, the recently established Hillel House, where twenty students live, acts as a centre for the members of the Jewish Students' Association.

Although sport and other social activities take up most of their time, some educational work is undertaken by the few well-organized clubs, such as the Leeds Jewish Institute, which caters for those of over 18, and the Judean Club for those between 14 and 18. Both clubs have experienced a declining membership whilst situated in the Chapeltown area, because of the dwindling Jewish population there. Thus the Institute's membership dropped from 2,600 in 1948 to 1,500 in 1958, and that of the Judean Club from 375 in 1948 to 160 in 1956. Since the latter has moved to the Moortown area its membership has increased again to 300. The new grounds of the Judean Club have also facilitated the strengthening and expansion of the 27th North Leeds Boy Scouts' Group, one of the well-known Jewish scout groups. Similarly the Moor Allerton Golf Club situated in Moortown has been expanding, and has experienced a considerable increase in membership during the last

three years, its total membership being now in the region of 700. This increase took place in spite of membership being very costly, i.e. over £114 in the case of a full adult member.

There are a number of cultural organizations which consider themselves to be Jewish bodies because their membership is predominantly Jewish, but which are not interested in Jewish culture as such. For example, the Jewish Music Club with a membership of 200 out of which half a dozen are non-Jews, has as its aim the furtherance of classical music. It is only occasionally that a programme is of Jewish content, the ratio being about one to fifty. Similarly, the Proscenium Players, an amateur theatrical group with sixty-five members of whom a few are non-Jews, out of forty-five plays put on only six of Jewish content. The Jewish Orchestral Society is in the same category as the above two organizations, although of late nearly 50 per cent of its members are Gentiles. The Orchestral Society and the Proscenium Players in fact get much support from non-Jewish audiences, and they in their turn help both Jewish and non-Jewish charities.

In the field of literary societies, the community shows an obvious weakness. Except for the Zionist inspired groups, e.g. the Tarbuth Association, which exists to promote the use of Hebrew and propagate Hebrew literature, no literary societies exist. Similarly, no regular Jewish literary publication of any sort is produced in Leeds, and the community has no newspaper of its own.

The Leeds Jewish Lecture Committee has as its object the provision of lectures and informal addresses on subjects of general Jewish interest, mainly to non-Jewish audiences. These are intended to promote understanding and goodwill between Jews and non-Jews.

ZIONIST ORGANIZATIONS

The Leeds Zionist Council is the 'roof-organization' to which forty-three groups are affiliated, with a total membership of over 1,200. The Council co-ordinates the work of the various groups and provides help wherever required. In addition its main activities include Hebrew classes, special lectures, Hebrew Seminars, exhibitions and displays, library facilities, public relations work, information service, Israel Independence Day celebrations, receptions, etc. It also arranges the Yorkshire Keymen's Conference, which is an annual meeting of Zionist Councils from the surrounding region. The Council further plays its role in the larger Zionist network through its affiliation to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain, and to the Jewish Agency, which is a global Zionist body.

Within the Zionist framework we find general societies, e.g. the Leeds Zionist Society, whose membership has in the last few years declined from 400 to 120, or the Tarbuth Association with some 50 members;

political groups and their respective youth groups, e.g. Poalei Zion with Habonim, representing socialist Zionism, and Mizrachi with Bnei-Akivah, representing religious Zionism (the membership of some of the political and youth groups has declined and such organizations as the Mapam or the Revisionists are now defunct); and Women's groups, e.g. the Pioneer Women or the Women's Mizrachi, concerned mainly with fund raising for Israel (the Leeds Women's Zionist Council co-ordinates the activities of fifteen groups affiliated to the Federation of Women Zionists, which is itself a branch of the Women's International Zionist Organization).

The Jewish National Fund is the oldest organization in the field of fund raising. In Leeds the number of subscribers, mainly in the form of boxes kept on premises, is 3,680 and the amount that accrued from these during the year ending June 30th 1958 was £4,679. If we allow for some duplication in view of the fact that boxes are sometimes held by one person both in his house and his shop, we find that approximately 3,500 families subscribe to the J.N.F., which represents 63·5 per cent of the total number of Jewish families in Leeds. Other fund-raising methods are the sale of trees planted in Israel, donations for names inscribed in golden books, various functions, moneys raised by the J.N.F. Fellowship groups, and house-to-house drives undertaken by youth groups.

The Joint Palestine Appeal is the premier fund-raising scheme in support of Israel. The following Tables will give us some comparative figures suggesting certain trends in this field:

TABLE I

J.P.A. Campaigns, 1947–58[1]

Year	*Gross Income* £	*Donors*
1947	25,063	1,029
1948	102,544	4,006
1949	48,549	1,121
1950	51,200	1,653
1951	60,183	2,033
1952	54,375	3,189
1953	51,430	2,599
1954	61,726	2,459
1955	62,279	3,078
1956	60,784	2,758
1957	76,076	2,610
1958	57,924	2,224
1959	64,148	2,169

Table I illustrates clearly that in times of crisis there has been an appropriate response. Thus, the extremely high figure for 1948 was due to the establishment of the State of Israel and her war of independence. Again, the next highest figure in the Table is the one for 1957 owing to

TABLE II

Kol Nidrei Appeals, 1950–59

Year	*Amounts Promised* £	*Donors*
1950	1,625	697
1951	2,936	1,606
1952	3,229	1,759
1953	3,775	2,207
1954	3,665	2,245
1955	3,909	2,458
1956	3,378	2,280
1957	3,209	2,196
1958	3,055	1,931
1959	3,121	1,861

the Suez campaign at the end of 1956. Much depends, therefore, on such important events, although other factors also affect the figures.

Looking at the gross income of J.P.A. Campaigns in Table I, we must remember that the devaluation of the pound took place in 1949 (18th September), and subsequently its real value further went down as a result of inflation. Therefore the higher figures of the middle 1950's do not represent a much greater income in terms of real value, even when compared with the much lower figure for 1947. However, the number of donors did show a definite increase, the two peak years, with the exception of 1948, being 1952 and 1955. But after 1955 an annual decline in the number of donors had set in and this maintained itself till 1959, the last figure in Table I.

In Table II we find a steady increase in the number of donors from 1950 to 1955, the latter being the peak year. After this, right up to 1959, there is a steady decline. As regards the amounts promised there was also a steady decline after 1955, although in 1959 this decline was reversed. The reason for the increase in 1959, in spite of the still fewer donors, has been the change in the minimum contribution allowed, i.e. from 5*s.* in previous years, to 10*s.* 6*d.* in 1959.

For our estimate of changes in the degree of enthusiasm for Israel and the Zionist cause in the community, incomes or amounts promised are a rather poor guide. A more reliable guide for suggesting certain trends is given by the number of donors. In this respect both tables point to a definite decline after 1955. Table II is especially reliable since it is based on all the places of worship and so represents the community as a whole. The donors come from the largest possible number, as it is on Kol Nidrei night that the largest number of people attend synagogues or temporary places of worship. Here a more spontaneous response is measured than the donor figures in Table I would enable us to gauge, for although the latter include the Kol Nidrei Appeal donors, they also contain donors specially approached by canvassers or influenced by the leaders of the campaign.

The conclusion we have to reach is that since 1955 there appears to

have been a general decline in enthusiasm, although it can be reasonably expected that important events would again be able to elicit a greater response.

Another important fund-raising scheme is the Blue and White Bazaar, which is held every two years. This is a joint effort of numerous Zionist groups, although non-Zionist groups such as the Bnai Brith or Synagogue Ladies' Guilds also take part. In the 1957 Blue and White Bazaar, which was held at the Leeds Town Hall, some thirty-six groups co-operated, in addition to which numerous individuals gave their assistance. The total income was £28,000, net profit being £26,000. These were the highest figures yet attained, and the Blue and White Bazaar can be expected to continue in a very successful manner. The main reason is that it has become a sort of general communal event, enjoying great popularity in view of the pleasant social atmosphere it creates. Thus, in 1957, during the three days for which it was open, more than 3,000 people visited it.

Whilst an account of Zionist organizations and their work can give us an idea of the extensive Zionist network that covers the community, it must be emphasized that the Zionist field of influence is even wider than such an account would make us believe. Thus, most of the synagogues have a Zionist inclination, evidenced for example by the use of the most important religious occasion of the year for the Zionist cause, i.e. the appeal on Kol Nidrei night. Non-Zionist organizations such as the Bnai Brith, the Committee of Jewish Market Traders, or the Friendship Club, help to raise money for the J.N.F. Again, the Jewish Students' Association has a strong Zionist bias, and it encourages lunch-time Hebrew classes, interfunctions with Zionist groups, tours to Israel, etc. In addition, many of the leaders of other organizations are leaders of Zionist groups or at least active supporters, effecting further influence in this way. In the case of education, for example, the Zionist Council together with the Talmud Torah Hebrew Education Board is responsible for the Jewish day-school movement in Leeds. This was made possible by many of the Zionist leaders being at the same time in the active leadership of the Talmud Torah Hebrew Education Board. Finally it must be mentioned that the Zionist movement can, at times of emergency for example, call upon the support of a great number of people who do not belong to any of its organizations. In fact the Representative Council itself, speaking in the name of the community as a whole, supports the Zionist cause in what seems to be a taken-for-granted manner. This is for example the pronouncement made by its President at the Annual General Meeting of March 1958: 'We in Leeds, who give so much of our time and effort to the affairs of our own community, as well as to the affairs of the non-Jewish community, are nevertheless foremost in the moral and practical assistance which we render to the State of Israel.'

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

In this category we include those organizations whose main purpose is to maintain the rights of the Jewish community and to defend it against any injustice. First to be mentioned is the Leeds Jewish Representative Council which, as its 'list of purposes' shows, speaks on behalf of the community, and seeks to maintain the rights of Jews on a basis equal to all other citizens. If there are any attempts by some organization or individual to impair these rights, the Representative Council uses some of its organs in order to prevent any developments detrimental to the Jewish community. Thus, the Leeds Area Defence Committee, which is the local branch of the Jewish Defence Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, but in fact operates under the auspices of the Representative Council, has as its purpose the combating of antisemitism, and its members undertake to observe the local press, indoor and outdoor meetings, films, the stage, radio, etc. The Defence Committee stresses two points: (*a*) that while its alertness is necessary, it must work with the minimum of publicity; (*b*) that its work must be carried out in a disciplined manner. It is generally believed that publicity of whatever nature, and the lack of restraint on the part of Jews however justified, can only be detrimental to the aim of defence work, which is to maintain good relationships between Jews and non-Jews. To achieve the latter, the stress is put on educational work, e.g. by providing, through the Jewish Lecture Committee and the Council of Christians and Jews, speakers to address non-Jewish audiences, in this way to reduce antisemitic prejudices.

Another organization which is concerned with defence is the local branch of the Association of Jewish Ex-Service Men and Women. The peak membership figure of 1,000 was reached in 1950, and since then membership has declined to fewer than 400. The leaders of the Association have pointed out that the drop is in direct consequence of the decrease in antisemitism. They have also said that membership and interest would increase should the need arise, but that they would rather not see the organization flourish in this way, and would not decry its disappearance should its work become unnecessary. The Association closely co-operates with the Defence Committee.

So far we have dealt with the local aspect of political activity. The community, however, takes interest further afield both in a national and global sense. As regards the former it has fourteen local representatives on the Board of Deputies of British Jews, which deals with 'the political and civil rights of Anglo-Jewry'. Regarding the latter, there is a Leeds branch of the British Section of the World Jewish Congress. The branch, which has some seventy members, has not been very active lately. As in the case of the Ex-Service Men's Association, the falling off of interest and activity is probably due to a decline in the need for such activity.

Although the Poalei Zion, the Zionist counterpart of the Labour Party, declares its support for and solidarity with the Labour Party, and is also officially connected with the Workers' Circle, which takes an active interest in the political struggles of the Jewish working classes, the foregoing account of political organizations shows clearly that the community is mainly concerned with its own problems, especially those arising from the relationship of its own members with the general population, as well as with similar problems facing other Jewish communities in England or other parts of the world. This is obviously not to say that members of the community are not active, as individuals, in local and national general politics.

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

The largest organization in this sphere is the Leeds Jewish Workers' Co-operative Society Ltd., which has a membership of 2,114. Men may become members at the age of 25 and one contribution covers a man, his wife, his unmarried daughters, and his sons up to the age of 25, so that the above figure of over two thousand represents mainly families. The main aims of the Society are: (*a*) to insure members with burial rights without any additional costs; (*b*) to enable members to buy kosher meat at the lowest possible cost, through its butcher shop. Membership fees and trading profits are all ploughed back and no dividends are paid out.

Although the aims and activities of the society are not purely economic, since it acts in the main as a social insurance scheme for the burial of the poorer section of the community, the Society has made constant use of the economic instrument of price competition. Whether in its membership fees for burial rights, the retailing of kosher meat, or Synagogue membership fees, it has always striven to offer the lowest terms and prices, and its success has been no doubt due mainly to this factor.

Another organization which can be listed here is the recently established Leeds Jewish Housing Association Ltd. It was initiated by the Leeds Jewish Board of Guardians in 1953, but is now an independent non-profit making organization. Its main aim is to provide at reasonable rents 'housing and associated amenities for persons of limited means'. With the aid of the Board of Guardians and the Leeds City Council a suburban site in the Moortown area has been acquired for the purpose of providing 200 dwellings, a communal hall, a place of worship, and other amenities. The scheme has been approved by the City Council and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, who have agreed to make loans to the Association of up to 90 per cent of the capital cost of the project.

The second type of economic organization that we find in the

community is in the form of an association of traders dealing with a specifically Jewish product, i.e. kosher meat or poultry. Thus we have the Retail Kosher Butchers' Association, and the Kosher Poultry Dealers' Association. These organizations promote the interests of their members and the trade as a whole, but at the same time give their support to various institutions in the community; e.g. they give financial aid to Jewish education.

Thirdly, we come to the Jewish professional associations, which are naturally small and exclusive groups. Although their primary aim is to bring together Jewish people of a particular profession, their objects do vary to some extent. Thus, whilst the Jewish Medical Society stresses the furtherance of scientific knowledge amongst Jewish practitioners, and engages in no charitable work, the Jewish Dental Society has a close concern for the Dental Hospital in Israel. Similarly the Jewish Pharmacists' Association raises money for the School of Pharmacy of the Hebrew University. This is not to say that the latter two neglect the promotion of scientific knowledge or the cultural aspect of the groups, and it goes without saying that all of them serve as a meeting ground of a social character. These professional bodies are also interested in maintaining a high standard of professional conduct amongst the Jewish members of the professions. The various groups have occasional interfunctions.

In industry there are no specific Jewish organizations either on the employers' or employees' side. The latter have long since ceased to have their own Jewish trade unions, but in view of the large numbers of Jewish workers in certain trades, Jews are active in some of the unions, e.g. the National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers, which in fact has delegates on the Leeds Jewish Representative Council and other organizations, e.g. the Leeds Jewish Board of Guardians.

CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

Excluding Zionist groups but including friendly societies, there are some forty charitable organizations in the community. It is not necessary to describe the work of, or even mention, all these institutions, but to give some insight into charitable work the most important and typical organizations will be selected for more detailed analysis.

The Leeds Jewish Board of Guardians has recently celebrated the 80th anniversary of its foundation. Since the early days its work and purpose underwent great changes. It is no longer called upon to relieve dire poverty or distress. Its task now is *to supplement benefits* accruing from the welfare state, and *to enhance opportunities* for attaining more reasonable standards of living. The Board is especially concerned with helping the infirm and the aged. It has for this purpose a Mobile Meals Service and a Rest Centre. It also carries out family case work and often

preventive work is done especially as regards juvenile delinquency and marriage difficulties. Voluntary workers regularly visit hospitals, old and lonely people, and the latter are also taken on country outings. Help and advice is also given for example on problems of a legal nature, child adoption, convalescence, and so on. Special assistance is given at the Holy Days which enables poorer families to celebrate these festivals in the traditional manner. Sedarim are arranged and Passover food is distributed. Elderly people are helped to obtain part-time jobs and the Loan Fund of the Board is used to prevent the complete breakdown of a family's financial structure, particularly in the case of small traders and artisans.

The total number of cases dealt with in 1957 was 408 families totalling 792 persons; 152 families were in receipt of weekly allowances and 34 loans were granted totalling £1,836. In 1957 the Board had an expenditure of £16,058 and an income of £15,129. On the income side it must be noted that the 2,600 subscribers have provided only £2,054, another £2,922 accruing from donations. On the other hand £7,303, i.e. nearly half the income, was derived from the annual concert.

The work of the Board is done through the close co-operation of the staff and the various committees, e.g. the Welfare Committee, the Loan Fund Committee, the Annual Charity Concert Committee, etc.

The Jewish Board of Guardians, which is affiliated to the Leeds Council of Social Services, co-ordinates its work with both Jewish and non-Jewish organizations, e.g. the hospitals, the Local Health Authorities, Probation Officers, the National Assistance Board, the N.S.P.C.C., the Jewish Citizen's Advice Bureau, and other Jewish Boards of Guardians in the country.

We shall deal next with the Leeds Home for Aged Jews and Home of Rest. The Home looks after forty-four old and infirm, and with the transfer to the commodious premises at Donisthorpe Hall and the new building programme costing some £55,000, an additional fifty-eight residents will be accepted. There is a heavy waiting list, especially in view of the fact that the Homes cater for not only Leeds but also other communities such as Bradford, Hull, Harrogate, Sheffield and Nottingham. Demands on the Homes are likely to increase further, as lately more middle- and upper-class people have been applying. This is no doubt a result of the better district and general surroundings to which the Homes moved some two years ago. In fact the widening of the group for which the Homes cater has brought up the question of possibly altering the constitution, so as to enable the taking in of paying residents.

At present, the main sources of income are weekly and annual subscriptions, covenants, the annual dance, ward and bed endowments, old age pensions, supplements received from Leeds Corporation Welfare Services Department, Memorial Tablets, and general donations.

The residents have, among many facilities, regular medical attention, synagogue services, occupational therapy, talks and concerts, etc.

In view of the fact that the Leeds Jewish hospital has been taken over by the Ministry of Health, the Herzl-Moser Hospital Amenities Association has been formed. The purpose of the Association is to provide those comforts and amenities to the patients in the Herzl-Moser hospital, which will produce a Jewish atmosphere and to supply those patients who need it with convalescent after-care treatment. With regard to Jewish patients in other hospitals, two organizations are active. First, the Kosher Kitchen for Hospitals supplies some seventy to eighty patients per week with kosher meals at six different hospitals. Secondly, the Jewish Ministers' Visitation Committee on which some sixteen chaplains serve, carries out not only the regular visiting of patients in hospitals and of inmates in prisons, but also sees that Jewish boys born in various maternity hospitals are circumcised, and that patients are not sent, as far as this is possible, to hospitals where no kosher food is available. The Hospital Management Committees will accept only chaplains appointed by the Visitation Committee, which is also represented on the Hospitals Voluntary Aid Committee.

In spite of the general decline in membership as a result of the National Insurance scheme, the 'friendly society' movement is still quite strong and active. There are a dozen Jewish friendly societies affiliated to the Representative Council. Their general aims can be classified as: (*a*) those designed to help members mainly in the form of benefits given in sickness, death, and confined mourning; and (*b*) those concerned with helping various worthy causes.

Finally, we must mention the Citizens' Advice Bureau, which was established by the Bnai Brith to give expert advice and guidance on legal, domestic, and current problems, and to provide information on any other matter of a practical nature. The Bureau deals with 350–400 cases a year, and it is interesting to note that whereas a number of years ago the percentage of Jews who came for advice was 80 as against 20 per cent non-Jews, now that the area where the Bureau is situated has been abandoned by many Jews, roughly half of those coming for advice are Jews and half are non-Jews.

To give some idea of the great number and variety of Jewish welfare and charitable organizations in existence, we shall just mention a few, without describing the work they do. Thus, there is the Service Committee of the Major Clive Behrens Branch of the British Legion, the Jewish Children's Convalescent Home, the Junior Organization for Leeds Jewish Charities, The Ladies' Aid Society, the Jewish Girls' Marriage Fund, the Benevolent Lending Society, the Orphan Aid Society, the Sick Aid Society, the Jewish Blind Society, the Jewish Ladies' Dorcas Society, the Keren Hatorah Relief Fund, and the Ladies' Charity Guild.

There is quite definitely a duplication of work in many respects, but especially in that of fund raising. The argument, however, is that the advantages of having numerous charitable organizations outweigh the disadvantages. The main advantages seem to be that with the existence of a great number of organizations, more money can be raised and that a greater number of voluntary workers come forward. It could be argued, however, that well-organized appeals on a grand scale for all charities might achieve better results than the numerous schemes do, whilst a sufficient number of voluntary workers could be attracted by a co-ordinating body, or an overall welfare organization, establishing many different committees. The fact remains that no co-ordinating body exists for charity work, although it is true to say that a great deal of co-operation does take place among the various charitable organizations in the community.

CONCLUSIONS

Specific Jewish organizations, of which we have seen there is such a wide variety in the community, are effective as forces of social control in various ways. To begin with, they offer an opportunity for identification. By belonging to a synagogue, a Jewish club or a Zionist society, and by contributing to Jewish charities or parading with other Jewish ex-servicemen, the individual is able to maintain his Jewish consciousness. In this way, Jewish organizations arrest the processes of assimilation. In fact, the more assimilated a Jew is, the more eagerly he tries to sever all his contacts with Jewish organizations. We have to distinguish here, however, individual from group assimilation. Thus, while Jewish organizations may prevent individual assimilation, they often become assimilated in toto, i.e. as a group. Thus, synagogue services tend to become more akin to Church services, and there is little, for example, to distinguish the Judean Club in Leeds from a similar type of non-Jewish club in the city. Nevertheless, the mere fact that only Jewish youngsters belong to the Judean Club, tends to prevent a physical assimilation, if not a cultural one. In effect this means that Jewish organizations tend to perpetuate the segregation of the Jewish minority from the non-Jewish population.

It is important to point out that all the organizations, without any exception, are voluntary.[5] It is true that once an individual does become a member he will be expected to adhere to certain codes and norms. But he is free to leave the organization, and no physical[6] sanctions are used either to keep him in the group or to coerce him to accept group norms. Economic sanctions are used somewhat rarely. The best example is where some business men will contribute to an important charity, such as the J.P.A., rather than risk being boycotted by the more powerful economic magnates on whom they may depend for their sales and

who happen to be the leading organizers of the charity. Such a state of affairs obtains in the community we are dealing with, especially in the clothing trade, where the smaller business men would seldom risk economic penalization coming from the more substantial business men. It is, however, psychological sanctions that are most widely used. It is the opinion of others that often makes an individual contribute to the Board of Guardians, to buy kosher meat, and to belong to a synagogue. How effective the psychological sanctions are likely to be depends on a number of factors, such as attitudes and interests, family life, and so on.[7]

Considering the voluntary nature of membership, we find that fair numbers associate themselves with the important organizations. Thus if we take the total number of Jewish families to be 5,500[8] and synagogue membership representing families to be 4,200[9] we find that 76·3 per cent associate themselves with synagogues. If we take the number of families subscribing to the Board of Guardians to be 2,400[10] we find that this represents 43·6 per cent of the total number of families. Again, 63·5 per cent of the total number of families subscribe to the J.N.F.[11] On the other hand, with very few exceptions, almost all belong at least to a burial society if not to a synagogue, and almost all at the very least contribute occasionally to some Jewish organization.

This account shows that the organizational structure covers the vast majority of Jews living in Leeds, and that with the aid of sanctions, especially psychological, it tends to arrest assimilation, tends to segregate members of the minority from the general population, and above all gives an opportunity of identification with the minority community.

NOTES

[1] This article and figures quoted in it, which unless otherwise stated relate to 1958, are based on material in an unpublished M.Sc.(Econ.) thesis 'Aspects of Social Control in a Minority Community —The Leeds Jewish Community' (E. Krausz, University of London, 1960).

[2] The Leeds Jewish population is estimated to be in the region of 18,000 to 20,000. Ibid., Ch. I, pp. 3–6.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Sources for Tables I & II: Financial Reports, Auditors' Reports and Kol Nidrei Appeal Statements, J.P.A. Leeds.

[5] In most East and Central European countries, in contrast to Britain, membership of the community, i.e. the *Kultusgemeinde*, was obligatory, and the Governments concerned (e.g. in Hungary or Rumania) regarded it as a legal entity. In fact the *Kultussteuer*, i.e. the communal tax, was payable in the same way as income tax.

[6] Expulsion is at times practised, but hardly ever is physical action needed to effect it.

[7] For a full discussion of various types of sanctions employed as techniques of social control, see Richard T. LaPiere, *A Theory of Social Control*, 1954, Chapters 9 and 10.

[8] See section on Synagogues.

[9] In the section on Synagogues, total synagogue membership is given as 4,640, but this must be reduced to a maximum of 4,200 in view of duplications and non-family memberships.

[10] The higher figure of 2,600 is given in the section on Charitable Organizations, the source being the Board of Guardians 80th Annual Report, but again in view of duplications (the full list shows that often two people of the same family contribute) the figure must be reduced to a maximum of 2,400.

[11] See section on Zionist Organizations.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

BEIGEL, Greta, Ph.D., University of Vienna. Editor *Congress Digest*. Formerly Head, German Publications Desk, Office of War Information. Author of many articles in German and Austrian periodicals. Associated with the Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York.

DAUBE, David D. Jur. (with distinction), Göttingen, Ph.D., Cambridge, D.C.L., Oxford, Hon. LL.D., Edinburgh, Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of Oxford, Fellow of All Souls' College, Fellow of Caius College, Lecturer in Law, Cambridge, Professor of Jurisprudence, Aberdeen, Fellow of British Academy, Appointed Gifford Lecturer at Edinburgh, 1961 and 1962. Author of: *Studies in Biblical Law*, 1947; *The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism*, 1956; *Forms of Roman Legislation*, 1956, etc.

GOULD, Samuel Julius, M.A. (Oxon.), Reader in Social Institutions, London School of Economics and Political Science. Formerly Assistant Lecturer in Politics, University College of Swansea, 1949–50, and Visiting Professor of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1958–9. Founding Member, Jewish Statistical Society of Great Britain. Rockefeller Research Fellow at Harvard University, 1961.

KRAUSZ, Ernest, M.Sc. (Econ.). At present engaged in Jewish sociological research work at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

LISSAK, Moshe, M.A., Senior Assistant, Department of Sociology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Author of *Agricultural Settlements of New Immigrants* (in Hebrew), 1956; (in collaboration with Dov Weintraub) *Some Social Aspects of Agricultural Settlement in Israel*, 1958. At present in charge of research project on absorption of immigrants in agricultural settlements.

MATZ, Milton, B.A., B.H.L., M.H.L., Associate Rabbi, The Temple, Cleveland, Ohio. Author of *Theological Developments in Contemporary Reform Judaism; Religious Institutions and the Prevention of Delinquent Behaviour*. At present preparing a study on the relations between religious attitudes and parental expectations. Candidate Ph.D., Committee of Human Development, University of Chicago.

MITCHELL, William Edward, M.A., Philosophy, M.A., Anthropology. Associate in the Research Institute in Family Relations of the Jewish Family Service, New York City. At present preparing a manuscript, 'Kinship and Casework', a report on the findings of a project studying relationships between the nuclear family and its network of kin and the implications of such relationships for social casework practice.

NOVE, Alexander, B.Sc. (Econ.), Reader in Russian Social and Economic Studies, University of London. Author of *The Soviet Economy—an Introduction*, 1961; *Communist Economic Strategy—Soviet Growth and Capabilities*, 1959; (with D. Donnelly) *Trade With Communist Countries*, 1959; many articles in various periodicals.

PEARL, Chaim, B.A. (Lond.), M.A. (Birmingham), Ph.D. (London). Minister, New West End Synagogue, London. Formerly Chief Minister, Birmingham Hebrew Congregation. Author of *Guide to Jewish Knowledge* (joint author); *Guide to Shavuoth; Jewish History Pamphlets* (joint author). Editor, Popular Jewish Library series.

WEINTRAUB, Dov, M.A., Senior Assistant Department of Sociology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Author of 'Some Problems of Absorption in Agricultural Settlements' (in Hebrew), *Megamoth*, Vol. V, 1954; 'Public Awareness and the Educational Problems of Agriculture in Israel', *Major Project on Scientific Research on Arid Lands*, Unesco, May 1960; 'The Demographic Factor in New Immigrants' Agricultural Settlements in Israel' (in Hebrew), *Megamoth*, Vol. X, 1960. In charge of research project on absorption of immigrants in agricultural settlements.

JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Alec Nove

THE question of the situation of Soviet Jews has been the subject of controversy, with one side charging the regime with active antisemitic policies, while in a number of statements the Soviet leadership emphatically deny the charge and assert that Jews have religious and civic freedoms on a par with all other nationalities of the U.S.S.R. It is therefore worthwhile inquiring as carefully as possible into the real situation, bearing in mind the inevitable imperfections of the evidence.

Before describing the situation as it is, it is necessary to make a brief historic excursion. In doing so, the reader should bear in mind an essential distinction, which is often overlooked, between *governmental policies* on the one hand and *folk attitudes* on the other. These may, of course, interact. Thus the government may embark on antisemitic policies because it wishes to play up to popular prejudices, or because the government itself reflects these prejudices, through the fact that its members are people who share folk attitudes to Jews. None the less, a distinction must be made between these two kinds of antisemitism. For example, any serious student of Poland between the wars would have to note that the Polish governments of the period tended to be markedly *less* antisemitic than their citizens.

Antisemitism runs deep in Eastern Europe, and, alas, it has not been cured by the massacre of most of the Jews resident there. Its basic causes lie outside the purview of this article. However, in the U.S.S.R. they have been contributed to by several special features of Soviet history. Thus Jews played an important role in all the revolutionary parties and were prominent among the Bolshevik leadership and in local officialdom. The majority of the Jewish population were not in sympathy with Bolshevism, and indeed suffered economically from the measures against private trade and handicrafts. But in the public mind opposition to Communists or just 'the authorities' became linked with opposition to Jews. Partly for this reason, and partly because the Communists in the early days were genuinely internationalist, vigorous measures were taken against manifestations of folk antisemitism, especially in the twenties and early thirties.

Apart from purely folk attitudes, there also gradually developed a

species of antisemitic prejudice among many Communist party members. This can be traced to three causes. One is simply that they imbibed folk attitudes with their mothers' milk. The second arose from the high proportion of Jews among oppositionist party intellectuals, who were victims in the Great Purge. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, and a host of lesser lights were among them, and this led to some feeling about the unreliability of Jews, which could be used in the inner-party struggles, especially as the new Stalinist party cadres were increasingly tough men-of-the-people, with no patience for intellectuals (and, incidentally, *because* they were genuinely 'of the people', they were more likely to be influenced unconsciously by folk attitudes): Thirdly, Jews were prominent as traders, legal and illegal, which helped to fan traditional attitudes towards 'Jewish speculators' (or Jews as 'incurable petty-bourgeois') among those whose ideology was against trading as such.[1]

The line taken by Jewish Communists on Jewish questions was mixed. They were strongly anti-Zionist and anti-religious, but the attitudes of 'party Jews' were complicated by a difference of opinion between those who favoured the preservation of Jewish consciousness and specifically Jewish cultural organizations, and the assimilationists whose aim and desire was to merge the Jewish masses as quickly as possible into the peoples among whom they lived. However, Yiddish schools, theatres, and newspapers were allowed as much freedom (however much that was) as were those of other nationalities, and synagogues were no more repressed than were churches, though at some periods repression was applied to both. Yiddish was deliberately supported against Hebrew, as an anti-Zionist measure. In this respect no major changes occurred in the thirties. The Purges removed many Jews from official posts and thereby greatly diminished their weight in the party hierarchy, but large numbers attained eminence in science, the arts, and other fields less directly political. It is generally conceded that folk antisemitism was in decline at this period.

During the war, in an effort to rally public opinion to the Soviet cause, a Jewish anti-fascist committee was formed, and its representatives toured England and America. Jews played their part in the Soviet Army, while millions of their parents, relatives, and children ended their lives in mass graves on the outskirts of Kiev, Minsk, Vilna, and hundreds of smaller places. Unfortunately the war also greatly stimulated antisemitism, especially in the Ukraine. This was apparently due partly to German propaganda, and partly to the general consequences of hardships on popular temper in traditionally antisemitic areas.

Two other aspects of wartime history should be mentioned. One is the question of the failure to evacuate Jews from areas overrun by the Germans. Here, in my view, the Soviet authorities have an effective

reply to make. The speed of the German advance was such as to cause utter confusion, in the course of which the army lost several million prisoners in 1941 alone. Means of transport were desperately lacking and in the circumstances it was surely altogether too much to expect an adequate organization of an evacuation of Jews in that year. The other point concerns the sinister episode of the shooting, on ridiculous charges, of the Polish-Jewish leaders Erlich and Alter in 1941, shortly after they had begun to undertake, apparently with Soviet official help, work analogous to that of the Soviet Jewish anti-fascist committee. This was evidence of an attitude to Jewish organizations which was to show itself with disastrous effect in the years 1948–53.

After the war there was a brief period of respite, and then came the 'antisemitism from above' of 1948–53, the remarkable period of persecution. The Jewish anti-fascist committee was broken up and almost all its members shot. Prominent Yiddish poets, novelists and actors vanished and the most eminent of them were shot. Many jobs were barred to Jews. Attacks on so-called 'homeless cosmopolitans' assumed strong antisemitic overtones. It became harder and harder for Jews to get into universities. The theatres were closed, the schools were closed, the Jewish press was liquidated.[2] This whole process culminated in the 'doctors' plot' with its open anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist features, and eye-witnesses tell of the antisemitic responses to the 'doctors' plot' on the part of many citizens.[3] Worse seemed likely to follow.

Why did all this happen? There seem to have been several reasons. One was the creation of the state of Israel, with its consequence of suspicion of possible disloyalty. It may be no coincidence that the anti-Jewish measures followed the open demonstration by Jews in greeting Israel's first ambassador in Moscow. The suggestion reportedly made to Stalin to allow Jews to settle in the Crimea,[4] instead of the remote and unpopular Birobidzhan, was seized upon as evidence of some obscure treason, and the authors of this suggestion are thought to have been shot. Then the security-mad officials of Stalin's police regarded the possession of relatives abroad as evidence of doubtful loyalty, and whatever qualities the Jews do or do not possess, they do certainly tend to have relatives abroad. However, the repression was above all directed at those who desired to behave *as Jews*. Thus while many writers in Yiddish were shot, Jews who wrote in Russian suffered little or no penalty, except in so far as many Jewish literary critics were under attack as 'cosmopolitans'.

Then, fortunately for many other people apart from Jews, Stalin died. Those doctors who survived their 'interrogation' were released with apologies. The persecutions of the 1948–53 era were dropped, and successive amnesties emptied the concentration camps of Jewish and other survivors of past repressions. In 1955 Jewish musical evenings were again permitted. Gradually it became known that many of those

shot in the 1948–53 repression were individually rehabilitated, and in some instances (e.g. Bergelson, Markish, Kvitko) their works were published again, in Russian translation. This was, of course, part of the general 'thaw' which affected virtually all aspects of Soviet life, and from which the Jews certainly benefited and still benefit. In 1958, the hundredth anniversary of Sholom Aleichem's birth was celebrated with a big edition of his works in Russian translation, and a small edition in Yiddish, the latter being the first Yiddish printing (outside Birobidzhan) for ten years (it is a bibliographical rarity in Moscow, but can be bought readily in Paris and London). In 1959 limited editions of two more (long-dead) Yiddish writers appeared in their native language (Peretz and Mendele Mocher Seforim). In the last few months there have been reports that some poems by living poets will be published in the Yiddish language, and, as these lines are being written, news has come of a Yiddish literary magazine which should shortly appear.

However, the situation, though certainly better, remains deeply unsatisfactory.

First of all, there is no non-religious Jewish organization of any kind in the entire U.S.S.R. Jews cannot meet to discuss their problems or their interests. If they happen not to be religious, or have no synagogue in their place of residence, they have nowhere to gather and no means of expressing their collective views on any topic whatsoever. The Yiddish cultural institutions which were banned in 1948 have not been restored, and the 'evenings of Jewish song' (of which more in a moment) are a poor substitute.

Secondly, religious freedom is severely restricted. True, synagogues exist, and anybody is free to worship in them. But there is no link between synagogues, no chief rabbinate (despite the title of Chief Rabbi of Moscow), no possibility of coming together to discuss religious issues, no contact with religious Jews abroad. Bibles and religious requisites (e.g. prayer-shawls) are apt to be returned to their senders if posted from abroad to a Soviet destination. There are difficulties in obtaining *kosher* food, matzos and prayer-books. All this represents discrimination. Thus the Orthodox church is fully organized with its own hierarchy and its own monthly journal, and, like the Baptist church, it maintains regular contacts with churches outside the U.S.S.R., has supplies of newly-printed prayer-books and so on. The position has been made worse by the tendency to close certain small provincial synagogues and not to permit the opening of new ones, even where, as in the city of Kharkov, there are many Jews and no house of prayer. When religious Jews gather to pray together 'unofficially', forming a *minyan* as required by religious teaching, local authorities are apt to take measures against them. Denunciations of *minyanim* have appeared in the provincial press from time to time.

Thirdly, there are continuing allegations of discrimination in

university entrance, the barring of certain types of jobs to Jews, and so on. These allegations are by no means of equal reliability. Thus the absence of Jews from the diplomatic service is very noticeable, but, as will be shown, there seems still to be a substantial number of Jewish students. It may well be that there is now no *ruling* concerning university admission, and that discrimination reflects the prejudices of the local authorities; this could explain the fact that the complaints on this score often originate from the Ukraine and Belorussia, areas of traditionally strong antisemitism. On the other hand, statements made to foreign visitors by both Khrushchev and Furtseva suggest that they consciously wish to avoid having too many Jews in the professions, and that they may well have imposed or encouraged a species of *numerus clausus*, which could masquerade beneath an insistence that children of 'workers' should be given preferential treatment.

Fourthly, there are disturbing reports of overt antisemitic behaviour by ordinary people. There is strong evidence of a synagogue being set on fire in a small town near Moscow, though this is an extreme case, and some desecration of graves in western areas. No one, of course, could seriously suggest that official policy was directly responsible; the Soviet government or Party as such does not organize pogroms or acts of hooliganism against Jews. However, one form of indirect stimulation of antisemitic attitudes is the newspaper article (the so-called *felyeton*) or radio talk, which attacks individuals by name. Such articles are common enough, but when, as often happens, a disproportionate number of the 'victims' have Jewish names, it must be expected to have deplorable results. This is particularly evident in areas traditionally antisemitic, and so the local press and radio in these areas may well indirectly contribute to the behaviour of the hooligan element.[5] It is also possible that local police officials are less than diligent in tracking down the perpetrators. The Soviet press has been silent about these episodes.

Soviet officials deny some of the above assertions and explain away others. If compelled to do so, they would admit that repression was wrongly applied to Jewish artists and writers in 1948–53—though there had been no *public* admission of antisemitic policies at this period, as distinct from rehabilitation of individual victims—but they claim that there is now no demand for publication in Yiddish, that Yiddish writers reach a much larger public (both Jewish and non-Jewish) by being translated into Russian, that there is no need for Jewish schools or a Yiddish theatre, and that if Jews wish to live a national-cultural life they could move to Birobidzhan. (The Jewish population of this remote corner of East Siberia is not published, but is thought to be a few thousand.) In this connexion, it is interesting that the results of the 1959 census show that just over 20 per cent of the 2,268,000 persons who claim Jewish nationality say that Yiddish is their native language.[6] Discrimination against Jews in public life and in education is always

emphatically denied, and Jewish prominence in science and the arts is cited as proof of this. No limitation on Jewish religious observances is admitted. The elimination of antisemitism has often been claimed by propagandists, but can hardly be seriously maintained in serious conversation; however, antisemitic hooliganism or propaganda are said to be illegal and stamped on if they occur.

How can we judge the truth? What is in fact the present situation of Russian Jews, and what is their attitude to the regime?

In evaluating sometimes contradictory evidence, we must consider the reliability and nature of the sources from which information can be derived. Obviously, not every rumour or complaint about discrimination, even if made sincerely by a Russian Jew, is necessarily true. On the other hand, Soviet statements have so often been misleading that official denials cannot be taken at face value—though, naturally, official statements about Jews are not necessarily false. Evidence must be sought where it can be found. Thus circumstantial and well-based accounts of the synagogue-burning episode, the closure of synagogues, or actions against *minyanim* in some small towns come from travellers who see or hear these things, or from references in the provincial press. Antisemitic folk-attitudes are all too easy to notice, even by a casual traveller.

My own belief is that the evidence of centrally-ordered discrimination in education and employment is somewhat ambiguous, though, as already suggested, it may find expression through the prejudices of those charged with the selection of students. Certainly there are some impressive statistics about Jews in learned professions. This shows that Jews were the second biggest nationality among scientific workers (*nauchnye rabotniki*—the term includes learning other than science in the English sense of the word).

TABLE I

Scientists ('learned persons') by nationality

		1955	*1958*	*1959*
Total	U.S.S.R.	223,893	284,038	310,022
of which:	Russians	144,285	182,567	199,997
	Jews	24,620	28,966	30,633
	Ukrainians	21,762	27,803	30,252

Sources: *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo SSSR* (Moscow, 1957), p. 254, and *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu* (Moscow, 1960), p. 757.

The Jews clearly provide a disproportionately large number of scientific personnel, as may be seen from the fact that they are ahead of the Ukrainians, though there are over fifteen times as many Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R. as there are Jews. Not very surprisingly, the proportion of Jews in the total is in decline; though in absolute terms their numbers show a considerable increase, the total increases faster still.

Similarly, at the second congress of writers of the U.S.S.R., held in 1954, the breakdown of delegates by nationality showed the Jews to be second only to the Russians, and ahead of the Ukrainians. No report of a conference of economists, to take another example, can fail to mention many Jewish names, though leading *official* posts in the academic and scientific world are seldom held by Jews. Thus, while diplomacy and high party and government posts are now almost wholly *Judenfrei*, intellectual and scientific life is another matter. Doctors' name-plates in Moscow show a large number of Jewish names, and Jewish engineers may be encountered all over the place, from Leningrad to the Urals and beyond. This does not disprove the existence of discrimination in university recruitment as of today, of course. It may well exist, and some Russian Jews certainly believe it to exist; but there is some doubt about the facts.[7] Only one figure relating to numbers of students has become available from Soviet sources. This appeared in the statistical compendium, *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo v RSFSR* (Moscow, 1958). The figures which it contains are confined to the Russian Federal Republic only, in which, according to the census, there live 875,000 Jews. On page 381 of this compendium there is a table giving students by nationality for the academic year 1956/7. The figures are as follows:

Jewish students, Russian republic (RSFSR)

	Numbers	*Percentage of total students*
Higher educational institutions	51,563	4·1
Secondary specialized institutions	21,490	1·7

The percentages look very low to those who are used to educational statistics in Eastern Europe. However, a closer examination of the figures puts a different complexion on things. It seems improbable that there are even as many as 85,000 Jews in the Russian Republic who are in the age-groups from which university students are drawn. If this is so, it follows that the maximum percentage conceivable, if every Jew without exception went to the university, would only be about 7 per cent, since the total number of students in the Russian Republic in that year was 1,266,000. The high percentages achieved by Jews in earlier decades were a by-product of the comparatively low numbers of other nationalities. Even now, the percentage of Jews proceeding to higher education in the total Jewish population of this republic (nearly 6 per cent) is over five times as high as the average for all nationalities in the Russian Republic (1·1 per cent). Adding together higher and 'secondary specialist' education, one accounts for the very large majority of 'educatable' Jewish youth. It is perfectly true that this in no way disproves the existence of a *numerus clausus* in particular universities or other places of learning, nor does it in any way affect allegations of discrimination in republics other than the Russian (notably, the

Ukraine and Belorussia). Perhaps a high proportion of the Jews take examinations as external students.[8] It is also important to note that the large majority of Jews of the Russian Republic live in the two cities of Moscow and Leningrad, where the general cultural level is far above the all-union average, and it is also possible that some Jewish students come to Russian universities from other republics. But when all is said and done, it would be absurd to base on the statistics just quoted any allegation of discrimination.

This relates, of course, to discrimination against Jews only by reason of nationality. It does not extend to their rights to act, or write, or organize themselves as Jews. Here there is no doubt whatever that restrictions are severe, and official explanations are lame and unconvincing. Even if only a fifth of the Jews claim Yiddish as a native language, this is nearly half a million people, and many a smaller nationality has the right to publish in its language. Besides, many Russian-speaking Jews also understand Yiddish and may wish to read (for instance) Yiddish poetry in the original. They must, for that matter, wish to discuss or write about Jewish questions in Russian, but that too is hardly possible. For instance, some Jewish writer or historian may have something to say about the terrible war years. But these events as they concern Jews are seldom referred to, save very briefly in formal state documents about Nazi atrocities. In recent years, one recalls the Sholokhov film, 'The Destiny of Man', and also a first-rate piece of concentration-camp reportage entitled 'This must not happen again' (published in 1957); both refer to massacres of Jews, both were written by non-Jews. Both are exceptions to the general policy line of 'the less said, the better'. One cannot find more than a few isolated lines devoted to these events in a literary work by a Jew (since 1948). I do not include journalistic references in connexion with attacks on Adenauer's Germany, which occur from time to time. It is known that at least one major work on the subject exists. The writer, Markish, who was shot in 1952 and is now 'rehabilitated', wrote a novel, *Footsteps of Generations*, dealing with the fate of Polish-Jewish refugees in the U.S.S.R. and 'the heroic struggle of the Warsaw ghetto rising'; it appears on the list of his works in the article on him in Volume 51 of *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, accompanied by the word 'unpublished'. Unavoidably, Jews must feel bitter about this comparative silence on their national tragedy.[9] To take another example, in such places as Babi Yar, the ravine outside Kiev which was the scene of one of the biggest massacres, there is no monument or any mark of commemoration of the victims. Then, despite widespread disparaging 'folk' remarks about the Jewish war record, Jews as such cannot publicly 'answer back' with a list of the many Russian-Jewish war heroes. Again, the official line seems to be 'the less said, the better', although it is agreeable to be able to welcome positive references to the war record of Russian Jews in the newspaper *Trud*.

One may surmise that the extent to which individual Jews feel this policy depends on the store they set on being Jews. But the many who wish to merge with their fellow-citizens are also affected by the selective and indeed illogical nature of official policy. When Jews perform good acts, they are generally described as 'Russians' (for instance, see the *Encyclopaedia* entry for the painter Levitan, and many others). Yet the description 'Jew' still appears on the passport of Soviet citizens of Jewish 'nationality', the cultural facilities given to other 'nationalities' in the U.S.S.R. are not available, and the press silence on 'good' Jews does not extend to press stories about the socially undesirable acts of some local Isaak Israelevich. This is neither one thing nor the other, it is a semi-assimilation when it suits the authorities, but not when it suits even the assimilationist Jew.

A story heard in Russia goes like this. 'Suppose the Jews were allowed to leave Russia, what proportion would wish to leave?' Answer: '120 per cent, the other 20 per cent being non-Jews who would say they were Jews in order to leave Russia.' The implication behind this story is certainly false. A great many more or less assimilated Jews, especially those with good jobs, would not wish to leave. But among those who wish to be Jews, there must be many who would emigrate, especially to Israel. This may be judged indirectly by the publicity given in the Soviet press to anti-Israeli stories by a few Jews who have returned from there, and also by the reception enjoyed by Israelis who attended the Moscow Youth Festival of 1957. At present the Soviet authorities can argue, with some reason, that they cannot allow Jewish citizens to leave Russia merely because they wish to do so, when that right is denied to other citizens. Soviet Jews' attitudes to Israel are hard to assess, because open expression of Zionist sympathies is still dangerous. I shall never forget one of these 'evenings of Jewish song', which are at present the only form of non-religious Jewish public gathering which can exist in Russia. There was one harmless-sounding song about 'Home' which stopped the show; it had to be sung again, and many members of the audience were in tears. Of course some of the tears may have been for their homes destroyed in the war, but the demand for an encore had more to it than that. They would never have dared give such expression to their views a few years earlier, but the 'thaw' has progressed. The audience was predominantly Russian-speaking, but their very presence at the concert involved an active interest in things Jewish.

The 'thaw', of course, has the effect not only of making some Jews more willing to give vent to their feelings, but also emboldens anti-semites, just as the increased powers being given to local officials provides them with more opportunities, in areas of traditional antisemitism, to express their prejudices. It should not be lightly assumed that greater freedom of expression in Eastern Europe is an unmixed advantage for Jews. If anyone has this delusion, a short discussion with typical

Ukrainian or Hungarian refugees may quickly disabuse him. Naturally, this is no argument against freedom. Only we must see realistically that, where there is widespread 'folk antisemitism', more opportunities for expressions of opinion will be used, *inter alia*, to make antisemitic remarks and, in extreme cases, even to set fire to a synagogue. Sad, but true.

The real attitude of the Soviet leadership appears to be compounded of several elements. They are genuinely wedded to a 'territorial' theory of nationality into which the Jews do not fit. They claim to favour the solution of assimilation, and react negatively to anything which helps the survival of Jewish consciousness, the more so because of the links which Jews often have with Israel and with relatives in the 'capitalist' world. They are probably quite honestly indignant if accused of antisemitism, and certainly do not behave in anything like the manner of 1948–53. If Jewish theatres and newspapers existed now, it is most unlikely that Khrushchev would order them to be closed. However, seeing that they are closed, and that (under Soviet conditions) it requires a positive political decision to allow them to open again, they refrain from taking that decision. Their reluctance to publicize anything Jewish can have two explanations, one of them by no means to their discredit. Their reasons may be of an antisemitic kind, or they may wish to avoid stirring up feeling against Jews. The lack of press publicity about the synagogue-burning episode need have no sinister reason behind it; the publicity given to swastika-scrawling in this country had the unintended effect of *encourager les autres*. However, one cannot ignore the wide range of Khrushchev's *obiter dicta* on the subject. Apart from a number of off-guard utterances, one can cite the comparatively mild example of his statement to the French socialist party delegation in 1956, to the effect that, while in the early years of the regime there were many Jews in the party and government, 'we developed our own cadres'. To some extent this is a statistical statement of the obvious: no reasonable person would expect the percentage of Jews in high places of these early years to continue indefinitely. But his formulations suggest a mental attitude which, though nominally internationalist and assimilationist, is in fact nationalist and sharply distinguishes between Jews and 'us Russians'. It is very noticeable that Jewish party officials are almost wholly non-existent, which can hardly be due to accident. Private statements by Russian officials are not seldom rather sharply antisemitic, and it is hardly possible to imagine that this does not influence their everyday behaviour as far as Jews are concerned, whatever may be the content of the ideology to which they nominally subscribe. This is but one of many examples of the long-term effect of the folk background of Russia on the beliefs and actions of her rulers,[10] and it does seem that the top leaders do to some extent share the popular prejudice about Jews, but to represent them as 'racially' antisemitic in the positive sense,

of spreading the poison themselves or of leading public opinion in this direction, would be neither fair nor accurate. The true situation is unsatisfactory enough; there is no call for exaggerated epithets.

How many Soviet Jews feel themselves to be Jews? To some extent, the recent census provides the answer, because, as the census rules clearly stated, the recording of nationality was based solely on the declarations of the persons concerned. Thus it is quite probable that the number of people registered as Jews on their passports exceeds by a considerable margin those who admitted to this nationality on the census questionnaire. This could well be the reason for the surprisingly small number of Jews reported by the census (2,268,000, instead of the widely expected 3 million). The motives for Jews reporting themselves to be Russians can be many and varied. For instance, some genuinely feel themselves to be Russian and wish to be assimilated if possible. Others react as did a number of British Jews when asked to give their religion in the Army; some wrote 'Church of England' in order not to be 'different'. Then there are the many children of mixed marriages. Thus, a sizeable disparity in figures based on administrative and on 'subjective' definitions of a Jew would be hardly very surprising, though perhaps the expectation of 3 million was exaggerated; wartime losses were so immense.

The territorial distribution of Jews in the 1959 census is as follows:

		(*Thousands*)
Total		2,268
of which:	Russia proper	875
	Ukraine	840
	Latvia	37
	Lithuania	25
	Estonia	5
	Belorussia	150
	Georgia	52
	Uzbekistan	94
	Moldavia	95

The total in 1939 was 3·02 million in the 'old' territory of the U.S.S.R., but roughly 5 million within its present territory.

The small numbers resident in the Baltic states, Moldavia (i.e. Bessarabia) and Belorussia, which were overrun in the very first days of the war, testifies to the efficiency of the Nazi extermination squads.[11] There were perhaps as many as 300,000 Jews in Lithuania alone (in its present boundaries, i.e. including Vilna) in 1939. Many in at least the eastern Ukraine were able to get away. Some of the refugees settled in Central Asia, which accounts for the considerable numbers in Uzbekistan. No further geographical particulars are available at present.

The national spirit among the young was greatly reinforced by the persecutions of the late-Stalin period, and is inevitably strengthened by every new manifestation of discrimination. Thus the official restrictions

may well defeat their own object. The realization that this is so, the pressure of world opinion, and the support of a portion of the Russian intelligentsia, may well lead in the near future to some small extension of the permitted area of Jewish cultural self-expression. But unfortunately it is also possible that Jewish national self-assertion would be regarded as proof of disloyalty and therefore serve to justify further restrictions and discrimination.

All in all, the picture is far from encouraging. Jewish secular activities are virtually confined to evenings of Jewish song and recitations of Sholom Aleichem. Religious activities are tolerated within limits, but appear to be regarded as inherently connected with bourgeois nationalism and with Israel ('next year in Jerusalem') and so are obstructed in a variety of ways. It appears to be the government's hope that Yiddish will completely die out, and they are reluctant to do anything to encourage or preserve it. All this would be consistent with a straightforward denial of Jewish nationality, and with a policy of assimilation such as was in fact advocated by many Jewish revolutionaries, repugnant as this may be to those for whom Jewish religious and secular survival has a high value (and indeed to those who value the rights of people to retain their identity if they wish). However, under the influence of folk traditions and of strong feelings of Russian nationalism, this simple assimilationist policy is not carried out. Nor, in a sense, in a consciously multi-national state, would it be an easy matter to do so. Yakov Greenberg is not a 'Russian' (or Ukrainian, or Georgian), any more than an imaginary Hyman Cohen of Glasgow would be a Scotsman. So when it comes to the point, the Soviet authorities do treat Jews as a separate nationality, and thereby stand in the way of assimilation; they insist that the nationality always appears on documents, application forms for all jobs, and so on, and thereby facilitate discrimination which arises out of 'grass-roots' antisemitic tradition and the pursuit of advancement by other nationalities. To repeat the point made earlier, this is neither one thing nor the other. It is not very hard to see why and how this anomalous situation arose, but this does not make it any more defensible.

NOTES

[1] For a good example of these attitudes, see the interesting short story by A. Tertz, 'The Trial Begins', published in *Encounter*, January 1960, and by Collins and Harvill Press.

[2] Except for an insignificant newssheet in remote Birobidzhan, where an insignificant 'Jewish autonomous region' survived.

[3] This is referred to, cautiously, in Ehrenburg's novel *The Thaw*.

[4] The deportation, in 1945, of the Crimean Tartars left vacant spaces for settlement.

[5] An extraordinary and fortunately unique example was the publication in Daghestan (a Moslem area) of blood-libel accusations. It is believed that those responsible were dismissed, but it is significant that such a thing could have happened at all.

[6] Of course, many more understand it.

The figure of 20 per cent is thought by some analysts to represent an understatement, but this seems unlikely. The traditional Yiddish-speaking areas suffered most from the holocaust of wartime years.

[7] It may not be irrelevant to add that parents endeavouring to get boys into certain well-known London schools have encountered discrimination somewhat nearer home.

[8] All the figures cited include external students.

[9] Since these lines were written, several forthright references to this subject have appeared in Ehrenburg's serialized autobiography.

[10] One sees it also in their views on such diverse subjects as painting, architecture and sex, which contrast greatly with the attitudes on these matters of the Communists in the 'twenties.

[11] Though some were deported by the Soviet authorities as 'socially undesirable elements' in 1940–41, with the result that their lives were saved, though this was hardly the object of the deportation.

DESCENT GROUPS AMONG NEW YORK CITY JEWS*

William E. Mitchell

LAST JULY the following advertisement appeared in the *New York Sunday Times* (1960):

Cousins' Clubs, Family Circles, club benefits, anniversaries. We have modern facilities and pleasant surroundings to make your affair a success within a modest budget . . . Write Deerpark Farms, Cuddebackville, N.Y.

And this one was in the *New York Post* (1959):

Family Circles, Societies, and Cousins' Clubs are invited to affiliate. Ask us how to become a Workmen's Circle branch. Phone or write for details.

The Cousins' Clubs and Family Circles to which the managers of Deerpark Farms and the Workmen's Circle were appealing for business are two types of corporate descent groups which apparently are unique to American Jewry.[1] Anthropologists and friends to whom I have written abroad inform me that there are no similar kinds of kinship organizations existing among the Jews of England, France, Israel, South Africa, or Australia. I do not as yet have a similar distributional check for other nations with a big Jewish population. In the United States these descent groups exist in all of those cities where there is a large Jewish Community, e.g. Los Angeles, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and New York.

The comparatively recent emergence in the United States of these descent groups among one of the most urbanized cultural groups in the world poses some intriguing problems for theorists in the areas of urban kinship, acculturation, social mobility, formation of descent groups, and comparative structure of non-unilineal descent groups, of which the Family Circle and Cousins' Club are heretofore unreported examples. Since they are unreported in the anthropological literature—indeed, even *Commentary* has by-passed them—and since I frequently have met with such marked scepticism among colleagues as to the possible existence of these descent groups, my comments will be primarily of an ethnographic nature.

* A paper presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 17 November 1960.

The study of these kin groups is being carried out in the New York City area in connexion with a social science project sponsored by the Jewish Family Service of New York and the Russell Sage Foundation.[2] We have collected data on over a score of Family Circles and Cousins' Clubs, including tape-recorded interviews with officers and members, genealogies, and copies of records such as constitutions, minutes of meetings, correspondence, family histories, and financial records. My wife and I also have attended numerous gatherings of these kin groups as participant observers. Unfortunately, as is so often the case in field work, it has not been possible to study each group in comparable terms of depth and range of coverage.

Non-unilineal descent groups have only recently developed into a specialized area of inquiry in the field of kinship studies as such workers as Goodenough (1955), Firth (1957), Davenport (1959), Sahlins (1959), Ember (1959), and Solien (1959) have focused attention on this problem area by their theoretical and ethnographic contributions. Firth (1957:6) has suggested that we call these descent groups 'ramages' and Davenport (1959:562) has proposed 'sept'. However, since the definitions of these terms are not appropriate for describing the structural properties of Cousins' Clubs and Family Circles, for the purposes of this paper at least, I am using the term 'ambilineage' as the rubric under which to classify both types of descent groups, although there are marked structural differences between them.[3]

An ambilineage may be defined as a corporate descent group with lineal transmission of affiliation rights through both males and females from an apical ancestor or ancestors to whom each cognate can genealogically trace his relationship.

In any discussion of Family Circles and Cousins' Clubs one point should be made at the very start. These are not Landsmanschaft Vereins, i.e. a type of Jewish voluntary association which includes as members those individuals and their descendants who emigrated from a common territory in Europe, usually defined according to a town, city, or county. Whereas these Vereins are organized around the unifying tie of a former common residential territoriality, the Family Circles and Cousins' Clubs are organized exclusively on the basis of kinship.

The majority of the five and a quarter million Jews in the United States today are the immigrants, or the descendants of immigrants, who came to this country from Eastern Europe in the decades around 1900. The Landsmanschaft Verein was their social invention for providing a system of mutual co-operation among individuals whose kinship ties had been broken by immigration.[4] I as yet have not established when the Family Circle as a structural type first appeared within the New York Jewish community but its formal structure seems to be modelled in part on that of the Vereins. I do have information on a

few Family Circles that originated in the 1920's but there are others which are undoubtedly older. The only published statistics on Family Circles in New York are in a book written by a W.P.A. Writer's Project (Yiddish Writers' Group of the Federal Writer's Project: 1939) which lists the names of over a hundred such organizations. Nor do I know exactly when the Cousins' Club first appeared except that it is antedated by the Family Circle. It also has been very difficult to get any accurate estimate on the number of these kin groups in the New York City area today. In an informal telephone check with the United Jewish Appeal and the Jewish National Fund, I found the former has 'several hundred' and the latter 'about 300' such groups listed on their rolls as contributors. However, since only two of the groups I have studied to date give to Jewish philanthropies, the existing number must greatly exceed the 300 mark.

With this introduction in mind, I should like to describe these ambilineages in general terms. If the descent group is our reference unit—whether Family Circle or Cousin Club—there are four possible modes of affiliation, viz. matrilateral, patrilateral, virilateral, and uxorilateral.[5] In other words an ego may affiliate with the descent group if his mother, father, husband, or wife is a member or eligible for membership. Thus while some individuals have no descent group with which they may affiliate, there are many instances where an individual belongs to two or three such groups. One of the most interesting facts about these kinship organizations is that regardless of the mode of ego's affiliation or his sex, the rights and duties of all members are the same. Affines as well as cognates, women as well as men, are not only eligible to hold offices within the group, but frequently hold the highest offices. For example, one of my informants is the Secretary of her husband's Cousins' Club on his mother's side and the President of the Family Circle on her husband's father's side. Incidentally, among her own cognates there are no ambilineages.

The members of most Family Circles and Cousins' Clubs are residentially scattered throughout the metropolitan area including the suburbs in New Jersey, Connecticut, Westchester, and Long Island. Some even live as far away as Hartford, Atlanta, Miami and Detroit. The socioeconomic status of members also varies and a group might include among its members a lawyer and university professor as well as a cab driver and bar-tender.

Elected officers usually include a President, Vice-President, Treasurer, Recording Secretary, and Social Secretary. Some groups also have a Corresponding Secretary, a Trustee responsible for the care of the organization's documents, or a Sergeant at Arms who is sometimes empowered with the right to levy fines from those members who become too vocally dominant during a meeting. The election of officers is usually held every one or two years.

The amount of the yearly dues varies from group to group as do the other details of organization, but all that I have studied impose some financial obligations on their members. Persistent failure to pay dues results in excluding the delinquent member from the organization. Aside from dues, many groups also have a 'Good and Welfare Fund' or 'Sunshine Club' which raises money at each meeting by donations or a raffle, the funds being used as cash presentations or to buy gifts for members celebrating some important family event, e.g. a wedding anniversary, birth of a baby, Bar Mitzvah, or a graduation from high school or college.

All of these descent groups keep some records with a Constitution, minutes of meetings, and financial records as the minimum. Others may have a recorded family history complete with information on all known ancestors including a genealogy and maps showing from where they emigrated. Some also regularly issue a newsletter to members which is also sent to relatives who are geographically dispersed.

The attention and emphasis given to these different documents varies again with the group. For example, a constitution might be written in ungrammatical English on note-book paper or typed on legal bond and phrased in the elegant jargon of the lawyer who as a member of the Family Circle was drafted to write its Constitution.

One of the Family Circles I have studied—we can call it the Goldman Family Circle—has an eight-page constitution of the formal-legal type. This Family Circle is 32 years old and has 83 members of whom 58 are cognates and 25 are affines. There are also at least 33 lineal descendants of the ancestral pair who, although aware of the group's existence, have not affiliated for reasons of geographical distance, disinterest, or personal enmity to the Family Circle or some of its members. The following are a few excerpts from the Goldman Family Circle's Constitution:

The object of the organization is to create a close relationship between the members and to carry into effect programmes that will mutually benefit the entire family.

Any person is eligible for membership who is a descendant of Itzik and Malcha Goldman according to the Family Tree on file with this Constitution, their offspring and their spouses.

Dues shall be as follows: $8.50 per year for a single member; $12.00 per year for a married couple.

The financial records of the Family Circle are to be audited every two years by a committee of 3 members appointed by the president; within 30 days from the expiration of the term of the treasurer.

The Cemetery Committee shall have charge of the Family Circle burial grounds; shall attend funerals and unveilings of monuments, and shall visit the families of the bereaved during the period of mourning.

The Family Circle shall at all times contract for, lease or own a cemetery

for the burial of its deceased members or those of their families entitled thereto, as herein provided.

Most Family Circles and Cousins' Clubs meet regularly once a month from September to May or June, either in the different homes of members or in a private room at a centrally located hotel. The preferred meeting times are Saturday night or Sunday afternoon. The first part of the afternoon or evening is occupied with the business meeting, often a raucous, anarchistic affair in spite of the President's earnest attempts to follow *Robert's Rules of Order*. I have seen the chair reduced to absolute impotence as his relatives in great high humour or heated indignation debated and argued the current family issues, quite oblivious to his gavel pounding and pleas for quiet. Here is a statement from the minutes of a Cousins' Club:

> Due to all the hollering and noise, our newly elected president wanted to throw in the sponge and call it quits, but we moved her down.

This poses an interesting paradox. Although many of these groups have adopted the structural trappings of a formalized government including a Constitution, parliamentary procedure, and the election of a Chief Executive, the actual business of the group is conducted in an egalitarian and intensely personal manner with little regard for the elaborate formal structures they have created.

Occasionally an argument in the business meeting will become so serious that a member and his family will resign, and it may be years, if ever, before they will return to the group. In one Family Circle a conflict had developed between an affinal member and his wife's siblings. He was angry because they would not donate money to buy their aged mother—his mother-in-law—a television set. Hoping to shame his wife's non-contributing brothers and sisters in front of their own relatives, he asked the Family Circle at its business meeting to help buy the set. A great debate ensued. It was finally decided that the Family Circle had no funds to provide luxuries for its members although they would grant the protagonist a loan if he wished to buy the set for his mother-in-law. His proposal having backfired, he resigned from the organization, taking his wife and children with him.

Once the group has completed its business meeting—and this may take an hour or longer—the rest of the evening is a party. Refreshments, often elaborate, are served and there is modest drinking. Some groups, however, limit the amount of money that the hostess or social committee may spend on food as well as define the kind of food to be served. This is especially true of the Cousins' Clubs which consciously want to reduce competition between their members.

During the party there is always much visiting between members and some joke-telling. If children are allowed to attend, they might be

asked to perform for the group. In some groups the older folks play poker and the younger people might dance. Here is one informant's description of her Family Circle meeting:

> We sit and talk mostly—sit and talk, play the piano, sing, dance; that's what we always do when we get together after we have the meeting, which is a formal meeting with everyone shouting at each other. But it's lots of fun. We like it.

Besides these regular meetings, the group usually sponsors several other activities during the year, and at some of these the cognates of affinal members are invited to attend. Many groups have a spring or summer outing at a park or at a small country resort like Deerpark Farms. In December there probably is a 'Chanukkah Party' for the children, or, depending on the degree of religious orthodoxy of the members, it is called a 'Christmas-Chanukkah Party' and features a gift-laden Santa Claus who gives presents to the children.

Although I have been making ethnographic generalizations regarding both Family Circles and Cousins' Clubs, there are some very definite structural differences between them. In a Family Circle all of the lineal descendants and their spouses of the acknowledged ancestral pair are eligible to affiliate regardless of age or generation, whereas the Cousins' Club restricts its membership horizontally to a set of first cousins and their spouses. Their children, however, may also become members at the age of 21 or when they marry, if this is earlier. The original group of first cousins who founded the descent group are usually the children of some 6 or 7 siblings who immigrated from Europe. The cousins, for the most part, are born in the United States. One of the principal reasons for this rare type of horizontal kin organization is undoubtedly the intergenerational value conflicts which sometimes separate the immigrant generation from their more Americanized offspring. The Cousins' Club is apparently one way to maintain and proclaim the traditional Jewish value of family solidarity by organizing generationally while at the same time excluding an older and sometimes troublesome generation whose viewpoints and life-styles are so different.

Another important structural difference between the Family Circle and Cousins' Club is their degree of corporateness. Some Family Circles are actually incorporated by the State of New York, maintain a large and active loan fund for members, and own their own burial ground. Whereas the functions of the Family Circle are economic as well as social, the Cousins' Club is more exclusively a social group which attempts to maintain its integration by theatre parties, 'cook-outs', or an inaugural dinner-dance.

In summary, I have tried to present a general image of two unique types of nonunilineal descent groups which I have called ambilineages. Although the picture is incomplete, it should serve as a further reminder

that kinship relations in a western urban industrialized setting can be considerably more structured than we have assumed.

NOTES

[1] My use of the term 'corporate' is that of Fried's (1957:23), i.e. 'A group is corporate if it maintains continuity of possession to an estate which consists of things, persons, or both.'

[2] The project is entitled 'Studies in Social Interaction' and the research staff includes Hope Leichter, Director, Judith Lieb, Alice Lin, Candace Rogers and, formerly, Fred Davis and Diane Pendler. I am indebted to each of them as well as to my wife, Joyce S. Mitchell, for relevant research material.

[3] Firth (1957:6) describes his use of 'ramage' as follows: 'In former publications I have used ramage to include the Tikopia descent group. This, I think, is better described functionally as a lineage, keeping the term ramage for those descent groups which are not unilineal. Ramage would then be defined as a corporate descent group of a non-unilinear (ambilineal) character, membership being obtained ambilaterally, i.e. through either parent according to circumstances. Such a group ethnographically is normally found to be non-exogamous.' However, in a Family Circle or Cousins' Club membership is obtained not only through parents but through spouses as well.

Ember (1959:573), following Davenport's (1959:562) use of 'sept', gives us the clearer definition: 'Corresponding to the unilinear term "sib", the term "sept" is proposed for the nonunilinear descent group whose members acknowledge a bond of common descent but are unable to trace the actual genealogical connections between individuals (see Murdock 1949:47 for the definition of a sib).' Since Family Circles and Cousins' Clubs trace the connecting links to a common ancestor or ancestral conjugal pair, they are not 'septs' according to the above definition. Instead, they are a type of lineage, i.e. a descent group whose members actually can trace genealogically links to a common ancestor or ancestors. Unlike 'unilineages' where membership rights are transmitted exclusively through either men (a patrilineage) or women (a matrilineage), the Family Circle and Cousins' Club type of lineage structure could be distinguished by the term 'ambilineage', since membership rights are transmitted through both men and women, while actual affiliation is through either parents or spouse.

[4] For more detailed discussions o voluntary associations see, for example, Komarovsky (1946), Dotson (1953), and Little (1957).

[5] Since anthropologists only recently have begun to recognize the structural implications of the inclusion of cognates' spouses as members in some descent groups, e.g. Southall (1959), we have no terms for stating an affine's mode of affiliation to a descent group. I am suggesting 'virilateral' to describe the mode of affiliation for a woman to her husband's descent group and 'uxorilateral' to describe the mode of affiliation for a husband to his wife's descent group.

I also wish to propose a distinction between descent groups which restrict membership to cognates only and those which incorporate affines. The first type could be called 'cognatic descent groups' as distinguished from 'composite descent groups' where the spouses of cognates are incorporated as members. The most precise designation of a Family Circle or Cousins' Club would then be a 'composite ambilineage' as distinct from a 'cognatic ambilineage' where affines of cognates would be excluded from membership. A similar distinction could be made for other forms of lineage and sib structures. This differentiation between 'cognatic descent groups' and 'composite descent groups' should not be confused with Murdock's (1949:65–66) 'consanguineal kin groups' and 'compromise kin groups' since the structural criteria involved are different.

REFERENCES CITED

DAVENPORT, WILLIAM (1959) 'Nonunilinear descent and descent groups', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 61:557–72.

DOTSON, FLOYD (1953) 'Voluntary associations in a Mexican city', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 18:380–386.

EMBER, MELVIN (1959) 'The nonunilinear descent groups of Samoa', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 61:573–77.

FIRTH, RAYMOND (1957) 'A note on descent groups in Polynesia', *Man*, Vol. 57:4–8.

FRIED, MORTON H. (1957) 'The classification of corporate unilineal descent groups', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 87:1–29.

GOODENOUGH, WARD H. (1955) 'A problem in Malayo-Polynesian social organization', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 57:71–83.

KOMAROVSKY, MIRRA (1946) 'The voluntary associations of urban dwellers', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 11:686–698.

LITTLE, KENNETH (1957) 'The role of voluntary associations in West African urbanization', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 59:579–596.

MURDOCK, GEORGE P. (1949) *Social structure*, New York.

NEW YORK POST (1959) March 15, Vol. 158, no. 85, p. M13.

NEW YORK SUNDAY TIMES (1960) July 10, Vol. 109, no. 37423, p. XX7.

SAHLINS, MARSHALL D. (1958) *Social stratification in Polynesia*, Seattle.

SOLIEN, NANCIE L. (1959) 'The nonunilineal descent group in the Caribbean and Central America', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 61:578–583.

SOUTHALL, AIDAN W. (1959) 'A note on local descent groups', *Man*, Vol. 59:65–66.

YIDDISH WRITERS GROUP OF THE FEDERAL WRITERS' PROJECT (1939) *Jewish families and family circles of New York*. New York, Yiddish Writers' Union.

THE MEANING OF THE CHRISTMAS TREE TO THE AMERICAN JEW

Milton Matz

EVERY human grouping has its set of symbols. They may be in the form of totems or pennants, chants or anthems, rites or customs, formulas or words. They mean something beyond their actual nature. Symbols represent thoughts and feelings, which, while not a part of their objective existence, are no less real. The music of 'The Star Spangled Banner' has no objective relation to the values and the destiny of America, yet when Americans hear its melody, it immediately brings to mind the glory that is America.

The symbol system of any group reflects its values, beliefs, and aspirations. They reaffirm the group's basic commitment to its way of life. As its life situation changes and it redirects its energies, its symbolism will be refashioned in keeping with its new context of life.

When the East European Jew came to the shores of America, he brought with him the symbols of his former way of life in the *shtetls* and towns of the old country. They reflected the themes of Torah (the religious literature of the Jew) and revelation, *zkhus* (the protecting influence of good deeds) and *yikhus* (high status based chiefly on scholarship or wealth of ancestors or relatives). With him came also the symbols which differentiated his society into *sheyneh yidn* (upper class Jews) and *prosteh yidn* (simple people). He pictured himself as living in *golus* (exile), surrounded by the *goyim* (non-Jews).

In America the old ways had to be refashioned. The immigrant had to find a new world of meaning in his new home. A process of symbolic experimentation, both conscious and unconscious, was begun by the new immigrants, and this process is still continued by their children and their children's children as they seek to define for themselves the full meaning which life in America offers to them and the identity which it places upon them.

The American who is also a Jew has had to react to the symbol systems of America. He accepted those which dealt with the implicit values of the American way of life. He rejected, by and large, the symbols of the non-Jewish religious world of America, and he is still

perplexed by those symbols which he defines as occupying the marginal territory between secular American values and non-Jewish religious values. This confusion is most evident when we investigate the meaning which the Christmas tree has for the American Jew.

In the early part of December 1958, at the time when the Christmas mood was reaching its crescendo, I studied the attitudes of 53 middle class South Side Chicago parents. The sample was composed of second and third generation Jews who are affiliated with local Reform Temples. The study was based on a questionnaire and on selected interviews. Though this sample is exceedingly limited, it points out certain avenues for theoretical speculation.

The results indicate that 79·2 per cent of them never have Christmas trees but that 37·5 per cent think that having a tree would 'make it easier for their children'. 34 per cent of them, regardless of whether they have a tree or not, are concerned with whether they should or should not have a tree. 58·3 per cent feel that their children want a tree. 21·4 per cent indicate that they do not know what they would tell their children were they to ask for a tree. 31·6 per cent would wish that the Christmas tree were acceptable to the Jewish religion.

These results indicate that the Christmas tree must be considered as a symbol with some pertinent meaning to the American Jew. The anguish of the mother who cannot tell her child, 'No, you cannot have a tree', clearly indicates that she has as strong feelings about the tree as does her child, and probably they are stronger. But what are these feelings? What attitudes does the Christmas tree evoke? What needs does having or not having a tree meet?

An illuminating insight into these problems is gained when our statistics are seen from the respective points of view of the second and third generation Jews. When the responses of these categories are studied, we find that distinct processes of attitude formation are at work.

Let us first view the life situation of the second generation Jew. The developmental life situation of the second generation child (I am referring to second generation individuals whose parents came to America after the age of 18) is effectively described by Warner and Srole in the third volume of the Yankee City Series. They find that the second generation child in its first few years of life is wholly absorbed by the family, and its personality is slowly organized to correspond with the typical ethnic personality pattern. For example, the ethnic language, which is the mode of communication between parents, also becomes the language of the child. The regulation of the child's behaviour and attitudes is according to ethnic modes.

As the child grows older he begins to tear himself away from the patterns of his family. The moment he leaves his home to play with his non-Jewish friends, the moment he enters the English speaking public school, the moment he is entranced by the alternative values and

customs which surround him, at that point he broadens the breach between the generations.

The second generation individual finds himself straddling two cultures: the American non-ethnic culture, with its beckoning economic vistas on the one hand; and his Jewish ethnic sub-culture, with its compelling familial ties on the other. He is quickly made aware of the fact that in America economic mobility cannot easily be achieved by the person who remains immobile ethnically. He feels that in order to resolve this basic contradiction, he must find some *modus vivendi* which would hyphenate the contradiction between his Americanism and his Jewish ethnicism.

Warner and Srole outline three ways in which this conflict in personality can be resolved. The individual may engage in 'profane behaviors', i.e. those which violate the standards of both the ethnic and American societies. On other levels, depending upon age, education, and intellectual background, his behaviour may take an 'intellectual' form and lead to escape into esoteric, religious or political movements. He may attempt to 'free himself from the ethnic home and background, leave it, renounce its traditions, and embrace "100 per cent Americanism" '. Finally, and most frequently, 'Rather than react against both cultural sets of elements or against only the ethnic elements in his personality, the individual may attempt to reconcile both.'

The bulk of the second generation Jewish group falls into this third category. They are the people who are earnestly striving to bridge the gap between their past and their present. They maintain within themselves strong feelings of ambivalence both towards their ethnic background, which will not let them go and which stamps their ethnicity upon them for all of America to see; and towards the outside world, which acts as if it did not want to take them in. They strive to create meanings for themselves which would help hyphenate 'Jew' to 'America'.

Two important word symbols of the second generation are *yiddishkeit* and 'kosher-style'. *Yiddishkeit*, the collective second generation word symbolism for the totality of Jewishness, is in sharp contrast with the first generation's views of the totality of Jewish life. *Yiddishkeit* has all the innuendoes of a burlesque of the old ways. It brings to mind kitchen smells, Yiddish phrases and oaths, good-natured recollections of the old days, and snatches of half-forgotten songs. *Yiddishkeit* treats the old ethnic ways in a cavalier and high-handed fashion. It brings it under the judgement of American values and finds it lacking.

But we must not underestimate the attractiveness of *yiddishkeit*. Many a second generation Jew will leave a Temple and go to another in search of it. He will move from one neighbourhood to another because it lacks that indescribable *pot pourri* of sentiment which he calls *yiddishkeit*. He is convinced that it is something which Gentile America lacks and that this lack is irreparable. *Yiddishkeit* ridicules the ethnic ways,

criticizes the 'unfeelingness' of the American way, and at the same time unites the two within the personality of the American second generation Jew.

The institution of 'kosher-style' food, which is also largely a second generation development, represents the same syndrome of meanings. The food is not ritually kosher, thus violating the Orthodox religious code and parental practice. Yet it is not wholly American and is regarded as being in some undefinable way superior to American cooking. Kosher-style represents a double hostility—to both the Jewish ethnic background and the American pattern—yet it has merged an aspect of ethnic practice with American ways.

Now let us turn to the reaction of the second generation to the Christmas tree. The responses given by them fall into the pattern we should expect on the basis of our preceding discussion. They indicate a strong need for ethnic solidarity. In reply to the question, 'I think Jews are upset by a Jew who has a tree,' 78·4 per cent answered in the affirmative, in contrast to 57 per cent for the third generation group. In practice, 14·2 per cent second generation Jews always or occasionally have a Christmas tree in contrast to 39·9 per cent for the third generation. Regardless of their covert indecision, the second generation apparently maintain strong ethnic defences against the tree.

Their desire for ethnic preservation goes hand in hand with a strong concern for relating to the Gentile world. 75·6 per cent felt that non-Jews are interested in whether or not Jews have Christmas trees, as compared with only 53·3 per cent of the third generation. Their involvement with the conflict arising from their need to reconcile two cultures within their own personalities is brought out in their replies to questions which concern their children. Though only 14·2 per cent have trees, 54·5 per cent responded that they think having a tree makes it easier for their children; and 31·5 per cent seriously consider the possibility of having a tree. The contrast between the low percentage of those who have trees and the considerable percentage of those who feel their children need trees mirrors the conflict within them between their desires for assimilation into the American fabric and their loyalties to their ethnic ties.

What definition do they give to the tree? There is a large consensus that the tree is a religious symbol and not a secular, social one. 71·4 per cent agree that it is a religious custom, as compared to only 23·1 per cent of the third generation. In word associations, 50 per cent of the first words that came to their minds in connexion with the term 'Christmas tree' were of a purely christological nature. This is in contrast with 20 per cent for the third generation. The second generation would stamp the tree as a religious symbol and therefore as alien to their needs. There would seem to be little doubt that they regard its usage as an affront to their own group.

But despite this consensus, there is a strong undercurrent of ambivalent feeling which prevents the second generation from setting all thought of the tree aside. 26 per cent responded that they would not know what to tell their children if they were to ask to have a tree. (Only 8 per cent of the third generation expressed this doubt.) Only 78 per cent of the second generation felt that the tree is not approved of by their faith. 17·3 per cent responded that they were in doubt on this point. This is in striking contrast to the third generation group which was in unanimous agreement that the tree is alien to Judaism. One wonders whether the confusion on the point by the second generation serves the purpose of minimizing the religious objection to the tree, thereby partially assuaging their feelings of guilt for finding meaning in a symbol which they define as being christological.

The second generation Jew would then define the tree as a non-Jewish religious symbol which is alien to his group and an affront to his fellows. But he also values its use as minimizing the conflicts of marginality. He feels that the obstacles that face his children in adjusting to a non-Jewish culture would be easier if they were to have a tree. Their reaction to the tree mirrors the perennial inner contradiction of their generation—the conflict between the demands of the ethnic group and the yearnings for American acceptance. The dilemma is symptomatized by the confusion and ambivalence that accompany an unresolvable conflict.

What meaning, then, would the use, or the contemplated use, of the tree have for the second generation Jew? It would indicate an expression of hostility towards his Jewish ethnic group. It would indicate his resentment of the Gentile world, in as much as he would be employing a Gentile symbol, which he defines religiously, for secular purposes. And finally, and most significant, the Christmas tree would serve as a hyphen between the two components of his identity. The Christmas tree is thus defined as sharing the characteristics of the other symbolic words of the second generation Jew. Being similar to *yiddishkeit* and 'kosher-style' it shares in their ambivalence and in their attempts to bridge the gap between cultures.

When we turn to the third generation, we find a totally different picture. Marcus Hansen has formulated what he calls the 'principle of third-generation interest', which he describes in these terms: 'What the son wishes to forget, the grandson wishes to remember.' The third generation 'have no reason to feel any inferiority when they look around them. They are American-born. Their speech is the same as that of those with whom they associate. Their material wealth is the average possession of the typical citizen.' The third generation have rid themselves of the sense of alienation which had plagued their fathers. They have become American in a way that was impossible for their parents. They belong to the American homeland and they know it with every fibre of their being.

But the resolution of this problem rendered more acute the problem of self-identification. The third generation Jew now considered himself American. But being American he found is not enough. He had to answer the query, 'What kind of American are you?' Paradoxically he found his answer in the very identity that his father attempted to run away from. He found his name, his social place, through his Jewish identity, his sense of belonging to the Jewish group. But this group was no longer based on the old ethnic culture with its foreign language and ways; it was based on its only salvageable part, its religious core. Herberg writes, 'the old family religion, the old ethnic religion, could serve where language and culture couldn't; the religion of the immigrants—with certain necessary modifications, such as the replacement of the ethnic language by English—was accorded a place in the American scheme of things that made it at once both genuinely American and a familiar principle of group identification'.

The third generation Jew had no need to deny his Jewishness in order to hasten his Americanization; on the contrary it was necessary for him to affirm his Jewish identity. He found in the American pattern the hyphen for his two cultural heritages; he found that they were the two necessary faces of the same coin.

The third generation does not share the confusion of the second generation to the Christmas tree. They are unanimous in maintaining the obvious fact that the Jewish religion does not sanction the use of the Christmas tree. Only 8 per cent of them are in doubt as to what to tell their children if they ask for a tree, in comparison with 26 per cent for the second generation. They feel that there is a rightness in the fact that a Jew should stay with his religious practices. 93·5 per cent responded that they felt that Gentiles admire the Jew who stays with his religion by not having a tree.

Yet despite their apparent resolution of the factors of confusion and ambivalence, their responses indicate that the symbolism of the tree is extremely attractive to them—much more so than to the preceding generation. 39·9 per cent admit to always or occasionally having trees. 61·6 per cent would wish that the Christmas tree were acceptable to Judaism. Are these responses to be understood as a continuation in a different form of the dilemma of their parents, or is there another solution?

The third generation completely redefine the meaning of the Christmas tree. We have seen that their parents define it as a religious, and therefore totally unacceptable symbol. 76·9 per cent of the third generation responses maintain that the Christmas tree is a social rather than a religious symbol. This is in striking contrast to 28·6 per cent for the second generation. When asked to associate words with the term 'Christmas tree', 20 per cent of their first words were christological, as compared with 50 per cent for the other group. The third generation

secularized the tree. It removed its religious definition and thus mitigated the greatest obstacle to its utilization. It minimized the hostile implication which the tree formerly had.

But what meaning does the tree hold for the third generation? This group has a vital interest in refashioning the meanings which life in America holds for them. Their search for meaning and identity takes place primarily within the framework of their reaffirmed faith. This is exemplified by the return of the third generation to the synagogue, and by the strong concern which they are manifesting in the development and reinstitution of religious symbolism in their homes and temples. This revival of interest in religious symbolism is amply testified to by the volume of materials in this field which has been issued by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and by the other synagogue organizations. This symbolic activity of the third generation is easily observed in any Liberal Temple in the land.

But there is another aspect to this activity. The third generation Jew needs also those symbols which express the basic unity between all Americans above and beyond the divisive categories of religion, race, class, occupation, age, and geographical locale. He knows that his identity is specific and individualized, but it serves the purpose of placing him within the broader context of his total society. He regards himself as inextricably a part of the broader pattern and as irrevocably involved in its fate. He judges himself by its values. He guides himself by its potentials. He fashions his most personal aspirations out of its fabric. He craves for the symbolism which would reaffirm to him his unity with the totality of America.

William Lloyd Warner maintains 'that Christmas and Thanksgiving, Memorial Day and the Fourth of July, are days in our ceremonial calendar which allow Americans to express common sentiments about themselves and share their feelings with others on set days pre-established by the society for this very purpose. This calendar functions to draw all people together to emphasize their similarities and common heritage; to minimize their differences; and to contribute to their thinking, feeling and acting alike.'

What meaning does the tree have? 26·6 per cent (as contrasted with 2·9 per cent for the second generation) responded affirmatively to the blunt statement 'By having a Christmas tree a Jew does his bit to bring all religions together'. 40 per cent of the third generation (we should remember, too, that 40 per cent admit to having trees) responded affirmatively to the statement that 'In a sense the Christmas tree symbolizes the unity of all Americans, through its emphasis on brotherhood and friendship'. Only 17 per cent of the second generation agreed with this view.

What meaning does the third generation evoke when he utilizes the symbolism of the tree? He is affirming his at-homeness in America.

But what of the inner contradiction in this gesture? In order to express his belief in the essential unity of America and Americans, which exists above and beyond the irreconcilable religious divisions, the third generation Jew would use the Christmas tree, a religious symbol, which in America is a divisive symbol. He would mitigate the flagrancy of the contradiction by calling it a social rather than a religious symbol. But deep within he knows that the symbolism of the tree is an unnatural one for that purpose. Why else would 93·5 per cent of them say that the non-Jew 'admires the Jew who stays with his religion by not having a tree?' Barely 7 per cent of them would grudgingly admit that they suspect that Gentiles 'admire the Jew who has the courage to have a tree'. The third generation Jew is aware that religious lines are becoming increasingly important in America and that his American symbols cannot be taken from partisan grounds. They feel uncomfortably inappropriate when used, but apparently not uncomfortable enough to cause him to give up the tree.

What future will the Christmas tree have among Jews? The interpretation of the second generation disappears in the third. It is the product of a painful process of cultural transition. It would seem to pass away with its context. The definition of the third generation is undoubtedly a more permanently viable one; buttressed as it is by the prevalent tone of a society which is largely Christian, it is exceedingly attractive. Its symbolism will undoubtedly continue to enchant the hearts of the young and the memories of the old. But will the definition of the third generation maintain itself and grow?

I believe not. The third generation Jew comprehends the process of three-fold religious differentiation within America. He realizes that being an American today means to be either a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew. As Herberg says, 'Not to be a Catholic, a Protestant or a Jew today is, for increasing numbers of American people, not to be anything, not to have a name'.

As religious lines of differentiation sharpen, the third generation Jew and his offspring will become more aware of the inner contradiction involved in using the divisive symbols of religious identity of another group as their symbol of American unity. He will turn to more appropriate symbols for expressing his at-homeness in America.

Tabulation of Affirmative Responses in 'Christmas Tree' Study

	Total (*per cent*)	*3rd Gen.* (*per cent*)	*2nd Gen.* (*per cent*)
1. I think non-Jews are interested in whether or not Jews have Christmas trees	69·2	53·3	75·6
2. I suspect they admire the Jew who has the courage to have a tree	6·4	7·1	6·0
3. I suspect Gentiles admire the Jew who stays with his religion by not having a tree	89·0	93·5	86·2

		Total (*per cent*)	*3rd Gen.* (*per cent*)	*2nd Gen.* (*per cent*)
4. I think having a tree makes it easier for the children		37·5	33·3	54·5
5. I think the tree can be regarded as a social rather than a religious custom		45·7	76·9	28·6
6. I think Jews really admire the Jew who has the courage to have a tree		2·4	0·0	3·0
7. I think they are upset by a Jew who has a tree		72·5	57·0	78·4
8. By having a Christmas tree a Jew does his bit to bring all religions together		9·8	26·6	2·9
9. It is my practice to follow the custom of my parents with regard to a Christmas tree		76·9	80·0	75·7
10. I believe the Christmas tree is not approved of by my religion		83·9	100·0	78·0
11. In a sense the Christmas tree symbolizes the unity of all Americans through its emphasis on brotherhood and friendship		24·0	40·0	17·0
12. I am concerned with whether I should have a tree or not		34·0	50·0	31·5
13. I know what to tell my children if and when they ask about having a Christmas tree		79·6	92·0	74·0
14. I think my children want a tree		58·3	89·0	53·3
15. I like the Christmas spirit		89·1	100·0	85·0
16. I had a Christmas tree as a child		17·6	40·0	8·3
17. I would desire that the Christmas tree were acceptable to the Jewish religion		31·6	61·6	16·0
18. I desired a tree as a child		56·5	77·0	48·5
19. It is our family custom to have a tree	always	7·5	13·3	5·3
	never	79·2	60·1	85·8
	occasionally	13·3	26·6	8·9
20. Association of christological words to Christmas	1st word	43·9	20·0	50·0
	2nd word	38·5	27·0	43·0
	3rd word	38·8	29·0	45·0

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND PAGE REFERENCES

HAUSEN, MARCUS LEE, *The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant*, Augustanian Historical Society, Rock Island, Illinois, 1938, pp. 9–10.

HERBERG, WILL, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, New York, 1955, pp. 44, 53.

WARNER, W. L., *American Life*, Chicago, 1953, p. 2.

WARNER, W. L., and SROLE, LEO, *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups*, New Haven, 1945.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE AMERICAN JEWISH CULTURAL SCENE: AN EVALUATION AND A NEW BEGINNING

Greta Beigel

(*Review Article*)

IF one were to guess which Jewish community, outside of Israel, knows most about itself, the first guess probably would be American Jewry—in which case the mark would be 'F' for failing. We do not even know how many of us there are, not even approximately, although the same figure has been bandied about for decades. In any survey of the Jewish communities of the world, there are always two stumbling blocks—of which Soviet Jewry is one, of course, and the other American Jewry. If there is an antithesis to the closely knit organized Jewry of the East European *shtetl*, it is the sprawling disorganized and over-organized multitude of American Jews, comprising in itself the whole range from orthodoxy to atheism, a multiplicity of organizations for every aspect of Jewish life, the most developed system for raising funds, and the least developed system for recognizing itself and its aims.

Thus, any serious attempt to evaluate any aspect of American Jewish life as a whole is indeed welcome. A survey of national Jewish cultural services in America* is especially welcome, first because cultural services have, for many understandable reasons, been a stepchild of Jewish self-appraisal for a long time, and second, because it is an excellent and truly informative piece of work, despite the limitations imposed upon it both from within and from without.

The study was made in 1959, at the request of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, by a committee of scholars headed by Dr. Judah J. Shapiro. In sponsoring it, the Council rightly noted that American Jewry had created and maintained a vast network of organizations to meet humanitarian needs, while cultural efforts were conducted by a number of small organizations limited in scope and in their finances. An assessment of the total contribution of all these institutions was considered long overdue in order to help American Jews build an American Jewish life which, ideally,

* *National Jewish Cultural Services in America.* Appraisals and Recommendations. A Study Conducted by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, 56 pages.

would blend the best of Jewish tradition with the best of the democratic American environment.

The booklet* which was the result of this study is an excellent example of an analytical survey combined with a blueprint for future work in a form more concise than might have been considered possible. Even a person completely unfamiliar with the American Jewish scene will receive an introduction into the many and diversified cultural endeavours in one way or another supported by American Jewry. He would at the same time undoubtedly be baffled, as every rapporteur on American Jewish life has been, by the multiplicity and complications of American Jewish organizational life. It is indeed high praise to say that the study reflects all these complexities in detail and yet never loses sight of the basic problems and goals with which it is expected to deal.

There are large segments of cultural life which are on purpose omitted from the framework of the study: the whole complex of Jewish education on the elementary, high school, and university level (on which, it will be recalled, a complete report was issued in the same year by Alexander M. Dushkin and Uriah Z. Engelman under the sponsorship of the American Association for Jewish Education), as well as the whole field of rabbinics. The present survey report deals mainly with archives, scholarship, research and publications, four closely interrelated fields.

Despite the recent tercentenary observances, it is rightly stressed that the history of the Jews in America, as a cultural collectivity with a life of its own, is scarcely one century old. The earlier immigrants, attempting to make a living for themselves and their families, had as little time to devote to the cultural field as the pioneers of the frontier period in American life generally. It was enough, and more than enough, to build the institutions to meet religious and economic needs, and later to add educational and social tasks. It is only now, the report holds, that religious, communal, and welfare institutions are developed well enough to permit American Jewry to enter the cultural field in a manner commensurate with its numbers and its riches.

While earlier generations had pessimistically predicted increasing assimilation, the present generation witnesses increasing Jewish identification. At the same time, however, a seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of Jewish culture and learning, the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe, has ceased to exist. Everyone active in American Jewish organizational life knows that it becomes increasingly difficult to fill key positions in cultural agencies even if the funds are available. Unless American Jews accept the task of providing the funds and the energy necessary to assure a continuity of Jewish cultural life, the shortage of Jewish leaders will very soon become total, along with the attrition by old age and death of the ranks of Jewish scholars and leaders of the last immigrant generation. As regards the possibility of support from Israel, the report notes that 'an American Jewry that has rejected so firmly the role of second-class political citizenship on the American scene will not docilely accept a role of second-class cultural citizenship on the world Jewish

* It is accompanied by much larger mimeographed supplements reviewing the contributions of the individual organizations on the one hand, and of the Judaica Departments of American colleges and universities, on the other.

scene'. Cultural exchange has been accepted—but the word 'exchange' implies a two-way relationship.

Among encouraging signs of progress in the cultural field are cited an awakened interest in archives; the publication of more books of Jewish interest; heightened respect for Jewish scholarship as a whole. On the other hand, there are very serious gaps. Historians of the future, working with material now to be found in the U.S.A., would be better prepared to write an authoritative history of Lodz or Warsaw than of Chicago or Cleveland; there is as yet no organized profession of Jewish scholarship, such as has been created in the fields of the rabbinate and of social work; a good deal of Jewish funds have gone to general American cultural foundations, but very little money has been provided so far for American Jewry's own cultural needs. Less than one per cent of the total allocations raised by Jews in America goes to the domestic cultural field.

While it is true that funds and support generally are coming forward more easily for needs that can be presented dramatically, such as persecution overseas, the need for Jewish research can and should be presented in a way to persuade practical-minded American Jews. The study makes a case not only for applied research but also for 'pure' research, the importance of which has recently been recognized, even though belatedly, in the field of physical science. 'We have seen an awesome example in our day', the author warns, 'of the effects of cultural sterility imposed from without in Soviet Russia. Cultural sterility from within may be less dramatic, but in the long run just as deadly.'

Cultural endeavours, it is hoped, will be made easier by the fact that some old conflicts in American life are fading. Yiddishism *v.* Hebraism, Zionism *v.* anti-Zionism, socialist ideas *v.* capitalist ideas—the lines of demarcation between all these old opposites are becoming blurred, as do the differences between different 'Landsmanschaften'.

Describing the archives now existing in various institutions such as the American Jewish Historical Society (the oldest collection founded in 1892), the American Jewish Archives of the Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion, and of the Jewish Theological Seminary, as well as those of Y.I.V.O., the report stresses the importance of archives for Jewish continuity. There is, in addition, the library of the American Jewish Committee, the Zionist Archives of the Herzl Foundation, many records dealing with specific aspects, such as the data on Jewish migrations that can be found at H.I.A.S., etc. etc. There are also the records of the various Judaica Departments at universities and public libraries.

When all this is added up, the picture nevertheless remains inadequate for various reasons: no overall planning was put into archival activities so that the records preserved are too voluminous in some respects, too scarce in others; many vital documents were saved only by lucky accidents, which is the same as saying that others of equal importance were *not* saved from destruction; many of the existing archives are for all practical purposes inaccessible; very little indexing and cataloguing has been done; there is a great shortage of archivists and librarians; facilities for the physical preservation are so lacking in many cases that the fragments from the Cairo Geniza, e.g. 'have undoubtedly deteriorated more in a single generation in New York

than during many centuries in Egypt'; there is practically no co-ordination between agencies to avoid duplication and to facilitate research.

The section of the report that reviews scholarship and research emphasizes again that, as scholars can no longer be imported from abroad, they will have to be trained in America lest Jewish knowledge and with it Jewish life deteriorate. There are now three Jewish institutions which have begun to train scholars at the graduate level: Hebrew Union College, the Jewish Theological Seminary, and Yeshiva University. But the output of advanced scholars is still infinitesimal. In addition, there is Dropsie College, one or two Teachers' Colleges, and last but by no means least, the Jewish Departments of the great American universities. Even if all those facilities were substantially expanded, grave problems of recruitment would remain. To attract young men into these fields and to compete with the general field on the one hand and the Rabbinate on the other hand, a greatly expanded programme of fellowships and grants is necessary. The report further makes the important point that the research departments maintained by various agencies are often and understandably called upon to meet day by day practical problems and thus have less time and means at their disposal for their purely scholarly or research functions—a point that everyone working in such an agency will corroborate from his own experience.

The report also outlines some of the tasks ahead, such as a broad demographic study, research into Jewish attitudes, including relationship between the United States Jewry and Israel Jewry, in addition to the research projects in the more traditional field of Jewish scholarship as well as investigations of the Jewish aspects of general social questions. However, even when such tasks have been set, and even when ways to finance them have been found, there arises the equally difficult problem of establishing priorities among such tasks, another problem that is intensified by the organizational anarchy on the American Jewish scene.

The last two sections of the report review publications and Departments of Jewish Studies in American secular institutions. Starting from the fact that the distribution of some 140,000 volumes by the Jewish Publication Society can be seen as proof of 'a respectable interest in Jewish books in America, or as a commentary on our lack of appetite for Jewish learning', the book publishing field is briefly reviewed, including the Yiddish and Hebrew publication ventures of the Congress for Jewish Culture and the Hebrew Publishing House sponsored by the Histadruth. The main point made in this section of the report is that 'work of high quality either in periodicals or in books, is with each passing year less likely to be produced unless it is commissioned', an observation that is unfortunately as true in the Jewish field as it is generally. Again, somebody has to decide what kind of material deserves subsidy, even if and when the necessary communal funds will have been mobilized.

The section dealing with Jewish departments in American universities focuses on the group of eight institutions whose courses of study are not limited to undergraduate offerings. (Thirteen more colleges offer undergraduate courses such as Hebrew.) The eight institutions are Brandeis, Columbia, Harvard, the State University of Iowa, Johns Hopkins, New York University, University of Pennsylvania, and Yale, whose Jewish Departments and their

immense contributions under renowned scholars such as Dr. Salo W. Baron are briefly described.*

This review of the Jewish cultural scene in the United States is of course not a piece of 'pure research' but was made with a practical purpose in mind, namely, recommendations for improvement. The recommendations are the most controversial part of the report.

The central proposal is the establishment of a National Foundation of Jewish Culture. No fault can be found with this central proposal, of course. It is rather the reservations and hedgings with which this basic proposal had to be surrounded which invite criticism. On the other hand, it is quite clear that without such reservations, the basic proposal would not have had even a chance of acceptance.

Basically, the same difficulties prevail in the cultural field as in other fields in American Jewish life; the vested interests in established agencies obstruct even very strong trends towards unification. The compromise solution has always been some kind of consultative body, established in the hope that its own momentum will enable it in time to override the self-interests of individual organizations.

However, one has only to remember the fate of a few such central bodies in our generation to realize that things unfortunately have worked in the opposite way in the past: there was first the American Jewish Congress, later the American Jewish Conference, and now the National Community Relations Advisory Council (N.C.R.A.C.). In every case, the *élan de vivre* of the participating agencies proved stronger, in practice, than that of the newly-established central body. Following the example of the American Jewish Committee, these individual agencies have either refused to join in the first place, or have walked out after joining, or have at least decreased their support of the central body so as to make it unworkable.

The National Foundation for Jewish Culture, which was recommended in the report under review, was actually incorporated in the State of New York in April 1960. In addition, a council of Jewish cultural agencies was formed which is seen as an advisory body to the Foundation. (However, as before, a number of agencies which should be expected to participate do not, among them the American Jewish Committee.) In order to forestall resistance on the part of the individual agencies, it was immediately conceded that funds should continue to be allocated to these agencies by the communities as before, and not through the National Foundation—which, on the other hand, has been trying to make additional funds available through direct appeals for support to individuals and foundation.

The tentative life-span of the National Foundation has been set at three years. Less than one year has passed since its establishment and there are some positive results. In various ways the Foundation was able to present Jewish cultural needs more effectively, through various channels, and as a result more support has been given by more communities for work in the cultural field by existing cultural agencies. Besides, the Foundation believes that it has tapped a new source of Jewish scholarship in that a number of researchers, students, etc., have contacted the new central body, who other-

* In its brevity, a highly enlightening chapter. More details are to be found in the supplement mentioned earlier, which is based on a questionnaire sent to the 21 institutions.

wise might not have known where to turn and whose ideas might have been lost to the Jewish cultural field. The Foundation has also worked out plans to assist local Jewish communities in creating archives, and a programme of graduate scholarships sponsored by the Foundation will start in the autumn of 1961.

It is obviously much too early to evaluate the accomplishments of the Foundation. The fact that it is directed by Dr. Judah Shapiro, who did such good work in the preliminary review of the field, offers ground for hope that it will work as well as the realities of the American scene permit it to work.

SHORTER NOTICES

Kniga o Ruskom Evreistve (Book on the Russian Jewry) from the 1860s to the Revolution of 1917. A collection of essays. Published by the Union of Russian Jews, 590 pp., New York, 1960.

The history of the Jewish communities in Russia in the period preceding the 1917 revolution is of the greatest possible interest in relation both to the subsequent development of Jewish history and to the Russian revolutionary movement. Out of the Russian Jewish world of that period came not only modern Zionism and much of the material and moral fabric of Israel itself but also many of the movements and institutions that have flourished in the rest of the diaspora to which the emigration from Russia both before and immediately after 1917 gave such substantial increments of strength. It might indeed be objected that in this remarkable collection of essays which makes up a volume of first-rate importance, and which rightly includes chapters on Russian Jews in the development of Israel and in the development of the United States, no room is found for what Russian Jews were doing in western Europe. But this would have meant carrying the story well into the post-1917 period, and that has been rejected. Indeed it is a different story; for however severe the discrimination against the Jews in the last period of Tsardom, and however terrible their sufferings, the period dealt with in this book was on the whole one of hope and creativity. It was a period in which the Jewish intelligentsia (as Mr. Gregor Aronson points out) finding the path of outright assimilation blocked, recovered its contacts with the Jewish masses, and with their aid created new forms, in which Jewish national consciousness, now secular as well as religious, could express itself. The development of such national consciousness, the variety of forms which it took, Zionist, territorialist, cultural-autonomist, socialist and 'bourgeois' presents so wide a conspectus of the 'nationalities' problem generally that one could much wish to see the present work translated so as to make it available both to Jews who do not read Russian, and to non-Jews who are concerned with the general questions that it raises.

The transformation of Russian Jewry from something acted upon by history to an active participant in the historical process which is the theme of Mr. Aronson's article, and of the more autobiographical contribution by Mr. Jacob G. Frumkin, is intelligible only against a knowledge of the sociological background. The foundations for such knowledge is laid in the chapters by Alexis Goldenweiser on the legal position, by Ilya M. Djur on the economic position and by Jacob Lestschinsky on the population statistics and on Jewish labour. A chapter by Ilya M. Trotzky deals with the Jewish institutions of social welfare and mutual assistance, of particular interest in view of the recent celebrations of the eightieth anniversary of ORT. The President of Israel contributes some pages on the history of Labour Zionism in Russia; Mr. Ben-Zion Dinur and Mr. A. Menes write on the national and religious thought of the period and there are separate chapters on the Hebrew, Yiddish and Russian Jewish press. In addition, the contributions of the Jews to Russia's general cultural life in the law, scholarship, literature and the fine arts are separately chronicled.

But fundamentally and inevitably, the Jewish question was a political one and made continually more so by the actions of the government itself. If as Mark Aldanov points out, the Jews played hardly any role in the revolutionary movements of the 1870s and if at that time the Jewish bourgeoisie was strongly loyalist, by 1917 when no fewer than 140 discriminatory laws were on the statute-book awaiting repeal by the Provisional Government, the regime had succeeded in throwing the entire mass of Jewry into the arms of its opponents. Russian antisemitism was made up like anti-semitism elsewhere, and like the legislation it produced, of elements ultimately self-contradictory. Religious, economic, and political and security arguments were successively adduced to support measures which caused new hardships to the Jewish masses, new frustrations for the Jewish intelligentsia, which set up internal tensions within the Jewish community and which over-burdened and corrupted the Tsarist administration itself with the problems of interpretation and of individual application to which they gave rise.

There is nothing which shows Nicholas II's unfitness to rule more plainly than his accepting the artificially stimulated propaganda of the extreme right, and his declaring that his conscience forbade his accepting the advice of his more enlightened ministers to give the Jews some relief. Nor can much be made of the argument that the restrictions on the Jews' rights to settlement, education and employment were seriously intended to help diminish the tensions between them and their gentile fellow-subjects (the usual *apartheid* argument). On the contrary the official measures of discrimination encouraged the manufacturers of pogroms (where these were not, as in many cases they were, the officials themselves). The culmination of the policy was reached after the outbreak of war in 1914 with the large-scale expulsions of Jews from the western provinces on the trumped-up plea of military necessity.

Nevertheless, compared with the Tsars' Bolshevik successors (not to speak of the Nazis) all these measures were relatively mild in that the Jews could still make some active political efforts to remedy their situation, in combination with liberal or radical elements in the population at large. Even after the electoral regulations for the Duma were altered so as to diminish the Jewish membership, the Jewish voice in that body was not absolutely silent. Nor could external pressures be altogether ignored. It is this contrast between the handicaps of Russian Jewry and their astounding creativity that gives drama and tension to this most timely and well-planned book.

MAX BELOFF

IGNAZ MAYBAUM, *Jewish Existence*, 192 pp., Vallentine, Mitchell, London, 1960, 21*s*.

Dr. Maybaum's new book is of particular interest because it takes the Bible seriously. The Bible says that the Jewish people was created by God in order to tell His praise. Dr. Maybaum accepts this statement and derives from it certain well-known facts about the Jews. Ordinary explanations of ethnic characteristics or community qualities or individual virtues are thus *ab initio* invalid. The Jews both as a community and as individuals are what they are because of their divine appointment as a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.

The priest is by nature not a creator. He is a teacher, a go-between. So are the Jews. By divine appointment they are ministers to their fellow-men. The diaspora is for them a necessity. It offers them the field for action required by their destiny. 'Without Gentile history the holy history of the Jewish people could not continue' (p. 183). 'As a nation of priests we are separated from the other nations. But we are the priestly people not by running away from the Gentiles. . . . Priestly separation is not political segregation' (p. 184). 'A priestly separation must connect us with the Gentiles; a political separation makes us Gentiles ourselves' (p. 189). The Jewish genius is fructifying and for that reason needs a non-Jewish environment to fertilize:

'Here is the historic root of the Jewish urge towards the three priestly professions: the legal profession, the medical profession and, in its widest sense, the teaching profession, which includes scientists, writers, journalists, all those who are not exactly creative, as are poets and artists and philosophers, but who create the conditions in which the works of poets, artists and philosophers are handed on to a wide public of young and old' (p. 25).

We have grown too complacent about our so-called Judeo-Christian civilization. Dr. Maybaum reminds us that the 'Gentile' element in the world is not subdued yet. The great task before humanity is to change it, either by the Christian 'conversion' which is a matter of repentance and belief, or by the Jewish transformation of the whole life through moral education. In either case the priestly nation has the duty and function of living in the world. This is where modern Jewish nationalism has gone wrong. Modern Jewish nationalism is a running away from the world. It has adopted the Gentile conception of the pre-eminence of the self-enclosed and self-contained 'sovereign' state. Here Dr. Maybaum sees one great home-task for modern Jewry. It is to make the 'Jewish' State Jewish. This would be, he says, of the greatest service to the State itself, because 'a state not guarded against those to whom a state is the highest ideal always devours its own children' (p. 181).

Yet Dr. Maybaum is far from the so-called 'religious' parties in Zionism. He rejects their topographical conception of religion; and while he is prepared to help the State of Israel, he refuses to accept the idolatry of 'the land' as the sole centre of, or substitute for, Judaism. In this he would seem to be un-representative of the present generation of Jews though probably prophetic of the next; and it is good to see that at least one voice is being raised in Jewish religious circles against the deification of 'state' and 'land' which forms the substance of much Jewish religious rhetoric today.

Dr. Maybaum has included in his volume some essays on general theological topics. Here again he shows originality. Taking the Bible seriously as he does, he tries to uncover the idea behind this that or the other Biblical phrase or story or confrontation. Experts may disagree with some or all of his interpretations (that is their job). The great thing is to have made them. Particular attention should be directed to his illuminating remarks on the three distinctions 'of holy and profane, of ideal and material, and of spiritual and secular' (p. 113); the 'moral idealism of the West against the religious nihilism of Asia' (p. 107); and the difference between Jew and Gentile (p. 105): 'The Jew is concerned with the question, What does God command? The Gentile always asks the question, What is God like?'

The novelty in Dr. Maybaum's approach is always the same. It lies in his deep feeling for the priestly function of Jewry and its priestly task of 'living with the Gentiles without becoming what the Gentiles are' (p. 184). He is not afraid of the conventional condemnation of the Jew as a middle-man ('bourgeois', 'parasite', and so on). On the contrary, he glories in it because he sees the work of mediation as the essential and characteristic task of civilization as such. The point could have been supported by the examples of the Greeks in the Roman world and the Irish in the British, and it is worth insisting upon because it presents a perfectly general objection to the modern cult of exclusive and self-stultifying nationalism.

It follows that the current and over-easy rejection of the phenomenon known as 'assimilation' is superficial. Assimilation of some sort is, as Ahad HaAm recognized long ago, inevitable and nothing to feel guilty about. On the contrary, it is beneficial and at the root of all fresh movements everywhere, and particularly in Jewry. What we must learn to do (and a knowledge of the Jewish past can show us how) is, while joining in with the world, to contribute to it that of our own which is unique. As Dr. Maybaum finely says (p. 178): 'We were a small nation among the nations of antiquity. Political and cultural creations are the work of great and powerful nations. But we added to the civilization of antiquity something not inherent in it. We brought the teaching of the prophets.' And again (p. 179): 'We are the messianic people. We ask: What is the inner capacity of each historic event and movement to bring nearer the Kingdom of God?'

This lively and provocative book shatters most of our idols. It presents a challenge even to the sociologist. For if even *one* society is what it is *not* because of 'natural' causes, the very basis of sociology would seem to be impugned. Dr. Maybaum sets out from the empirical fact of Jewish existence and urges that this in itself strongly suggests that the Pentateuch and the Prophets might be right after all. As indeed they well might be; and we should be grateful to our author for having, so freshly, pointed out so startling, and so alarming, a possibility.

LEON ROTH

E. R. LEACH, ed., *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North-West Pakistan*, 148 pp. (*Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology*, No. 2), Cambridge, 1960, 18*s*. 6*d*.

This book aims at exploring variations on the theme of caste. Only one of the contributions, Dr. Kathleen Gough's 'Caste in a Tanjore Village', describes a typical example of caste organization in India. The subject of Dr. Michael Banks's 'Caste in Jaffna', in the northernmost part of Ceylon, only a few miles south of Tanjore across the Paik Strait, is a Hindu group whose caste system is atypical from an Indian point of view. For example, the high social status of the Brahmans has disappeared. Moreover, non-Brahmans regard Brahman customs not as meritorious but merely as peculiar. Dr. Nur Yalman's 'Caste Principles in a Kandyan Community' deals with Buddhist Sinhalese among whom there exists a caste system which, as Dr. Leach writes in his Introduction, 'is not notably more aberrant' from the ideal type than that which exists among the Hindus of Jaffna. True, there are no Brahmans among the Kandyan community, but there is much stress on endogamy, pollution and rank. Again, it seems to me worth noting that while the lower castes in the Tanjore village view with nonchalance the religious beliefs justifying the inegalities of the caste system, tending to regard these beliefs as providing the higher castes 'with a rationale for their privileges' (p. 54), among the lower castes of the Kandyan community 'the basic tenets of the religious system' support 'resigned acceptance of an inferior status' (p. 104). One wonders why this should be so. Is it that Buddhism is more successful than Hinduism in teaching resignation? On the other hand, while in the Tanjore village high ritual status and economic power tend to correspond, in the Kandyan community a caste may be low yet wealthy or high but poor—circumstances which may tend to make easier resigned acceptance of inferior status in the Kandyan community. In the last essay of this publication Dr. Fredrik Barth discusses 'The System of Social Stratification in Swat, North Pakistan'. The people of Swat are Muslims—who might be expected to repudiate caste on religious grounds. Nevertheless, the rigidly separate groups of Swat, differing greatly in wealth, power, and the respect accorded to them by others, form a hierarchy which, Dr. Barth argues, may meaningfully be compared to that of the Hindu caste system. While sacred activities 'continually assert the basic unity and equality of all Muslims', social stratification is expressed 'in everyday profane situations' in a vast number of different ways—which seems to be the reverse of Indian-Jewish usage.

Like Islam, Judaism is an egalitarian religion. Like the Muslim groups of Swat, the Jewish groups of India differ greatly from one another; there are differences between the Jewish groups in skin colour, wealth, customs, and in many other respects. As in Swat, differences between the Jewish groups of India are accompanied by a difference in social valuation. But in contrast to Swat, inequality among Indian-Jewish groups is expressed at the time of sacred activities. For example, in Cochin there is much ease in everyday relations between the higher and lower Jewish groups. But in the synagogue members of the lower group must sit on special benches; they cannot have their marriages solemnized in the synagogue; until recently they could not bury their dead in the cemetery of the higher group.

I am intrigued by this difference between Jews and Muslims partaking of the Indian world. But in Swat 'A man is "ashamed" to assume any position or perform any action which he feels is incompatible with his caste status' (p. 142). In other words, there is in Swat no presuming upon the equality asserted in sacred activities. Jews, on the other hand, being a minority group, tend to share a common status in the host society. Hence it is not unusual for an established Jewish group to resent the influx of co-religionists whose traits may be evaluated as lower, fearing that the immigrants may adversely affect the status of Jews in the host society. The established group may try to find openings for their co-religionists in other countries; or the established group may nurse the immigrants over the period of transition, helping them to adopt the traits which are symbols of higher status. But in India, in comparison with the lower groups, the members of the higher group were newcomers; the differences between the Jewish groups of India were probably much greater than the differences between Jewish groups elsewhere in the Diaspora; moreover, the main

difference, being physical, was doomed to be permanent. Unwilling to share a common status with the older groups, the newcomers repudiated the unity and equality of Indian-Jewry, considering themselves as existing in a higher degree of religious perfection and giving overt expression to inequality at the time of sacred activities. (Such a claim is of course alien to Judaism; but because it was very much in consonance with the dominant Hindu system and, because moreover, the older Indian-Jewish groups, isolated for centuries from the main stream of Jewish life and assimilated by a social system not usually associated with Judaism, did not at first glance conform to the image of Jews, the claim of the newcomers met with some success.)

In his Introduction Dr. Leach agrees with the authors of this symposium that 'each of the systems described is quite properly to be regarded as a "caste system" . . . because all of them are similar in certain very fundamental ways to the ideal pattern of Hindu caste organization of which a concrete example is provided in Dr. Gough's essay'. Moreover, he agrees with Dr. Barth that this similarity is a matter of structure rather than of culture. But Dr. Leach maintains that caste is indissolubly linked with the Indian world—a view which disagrees with the one put forward by Dr. Barth and also by the late Professor Nadel, who in his 'Caste and Government in Primitive Society', *The Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay*, Bombay, September 1954, 'concerned with extracting the basic principles underlying caste stratification', suggested that 'caste stratified society can occur in widely different cultures and areas of the world, given certain common conditions or processes'.

This book is indispensable reading for anyone interested in problems of caste.

SCHIFRA STRIZOWER

BERNHARD BRILLING, *Geschichte der Juden in Breslau von 1454 bis 1702*, 110 pp., W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1960.

The flourishing medieval Jewish community of Breslau was expelled in 1453; Dr. Brilling examines the seventeenth-century resettlement, when the city was under Austrian rule. Jewish merchants from Poland, Silesia, Bohemia and Moravia intensified their commercial relations with Breslau after Cossack persecutions and the war with Sweden had provoked the westward flight of many Polish communities. Engaging principally in the cloth trade and in commerce with Poland, the merchants made themselves indispensable for the economy of Breslau. Although restricted by law to wholesale trade and allowed to enter the city only at four annual markets or at other times with the special permission of the city council, they nevertheless engaged illicitly in retail trade and settled in Breslau. The city had also to allow *Schammesse*, who were primarily business agents, to remain permanently to conduct the affairs of the other Jews during the latter's enforced absence between markets. Jews employed in the administration of the imperial Mint in Breslau, or in supplying it with bullion, were similarly allowed free entry. As in other German cities, these privileged financiers and the *Schammesse* formed the nucleus and supplied the leaders of the new community. The corporate bodies of the Polish and other foreign Jews successfully used the threat of economic boycott at the end of the century to secure concessions for the conduct of religious services from the city council, in spite of the opposition of the Church and of those rival merchants who had always resisted the admission of Jews. An ordinance of 1702 in effect put an end to Breslau's medieval *ius Judaeos non tolerandi*. Too large a part of Dr. Brilling's booklet, over one third, is devoted to learned apparatus, but it is an original and definitive study of the beginnings of Breslau's renowned community of modern times, the history of which is as yet largely unwritten.

H. J. COHN

H. MANNHEIM, ed., *Pioneers in Criminology*, 402 pp., Library of Criminology, Stevens, London, 1960, 45*s*.
British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 1, No. 1.

Pioneers in Criminology is the first volume in a new venture by Stevens, the Law publishers, and the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency jointly. This initial book in the Library of Criminology is a collection of papers reprinted from the *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, an American journal now celebrating its fiftieth year. They cover, not only many of the better-known pioneers —Beccaria, Bentham, Machonochie, Lombroso, Garafolo, Ferri, Tarde, and Durkheim—but also some lesser known personalities such as Haviland, who built the Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia, a pioneer prison, and Aschaffenburg, a German psychiatrist, who died in 1944 and whose claim to be a pioneer is perhaps not completely established. It also seems rather superfluous that both Isaac Ray, an early American psychiatrist largely responsible for one of the well-known American legal rulings on insanity, and Judge Doe who pronounced the ruling, are included.

The articles are preceded by an introduction in which Dr. Mannheim, in his usual stimulating way, discusses the meaning of positivism and its influence on criminology; and summed up in a general survey of the historical development of criminology contributed by Professor C. R. Jeffery, which is equally if not more stimulating. Professor Jeffery argues that criminologists have confused the study of crime as a sociological phenomenon, with the study of the behaviour of the criminal, and he maintains that 'a theory of criminal behaviour is not a theory of crime. It does not explain why the behaviour is criminal or non-criminal'; and complains that 'there is no theory of criminal behaviour available which explains all criminal behaviour', a complaint which many criminologists would dismiss as attempting to gain a useless objective. He is concerned about the tendency, derived from the positivist school, to think only of individuals, and wants a sociology of law, and a study of crime 'in terms of what it means to society'. This is salutary and interesting, although Professor Jeffery is in some danger of returning to a classical-philosophical approach based on sweeping sociological statements, rather than sweeping humanitarian or legal ones.

As for the contributions themselves, they naturally vary considerably in value. There is an excellent long article on Lombroso by M. E. Wolfgang, and a fascinating discussion of prison architecture, ranging far wider than the contribution of John Haviland, by Norman Johnston. Peter Scott proves with great authority from Maudsley's own writing that he contributed little or nothing to criminology. It would probably have been better to discuss Tarde and Durkheim together rather than in separate articles, and because the contributions are in birth-date order, these two are somewhat separated. Nevertheless, these are minor criticisms and it is clear that the Library of Criminology has got off to a good start with a volume which should be on everyone's bookshelves.

The British Journal of Criminology, although it has gone back to Volume 1, No. 1, is in fact the *British Journal of Delinquency* in a new format and now published by Stevens, although it continues to be edited by the same people for the I.S.T.D. and has the same general layout. The new title is, of course, a better description of what it is about, but this venture is now well established and the *Journal* has in the last ten years become the accepted British trade paper in this field. This particular issue contains an article by P. de Berker on '"State of Mind" Reports' in which he discusses the idea of the inadequate personality; an analysis of 100 receptions into preventive detention by R. S. Taylor, the Senior Psychologist at Wandsworth Prison which brings out the loneliness and lack of social adaptability of this group; a case study of neurotic exhibitionism by C. B. R. Pollock; and a short note on delinquency in industrial areas by D. M. Lowson, an assistant governor in a Borstal, which reminds us of the lack of skill in sociability in many adolescent offenders. There are no outstanding contributions in this issue, but the standard remains as high as ever.

GORDON ROSE

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Abel-Smith, Brian: *A History of the Nursing Profession,* William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1960, 30*s*.

Agaos, Jacob: *The Evolution of Jewish Thought from Biblical Times to the Opening of the Modern Era,* Abelard-Schuman, London, 1960, 35*s*.

Agar, Herbert: *The Saving Remnant, an account of Jewish survival since 1914,* Rupert Hart-Davies, London, 1960, 18*s*.

Bendix, Reinhard: *Max Weber—an intellectual portrait,* William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1960, 30*s*.

Borchsenius, Poul: *The Son of a Star,* translated from the Danish by F. H. Lyon, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1960, 25*s*.

Boussel, Patrice: *L'Affaire Dreyfus et la Presse,* Armand Colin, Paris, 1960, n.p.

Bronowski, J., and Mardish, Bruce: *The Western Intellectual Tradition—from Leonardo to Hegel,* Hutchinson of London, 1960, 30*s*.

Charles, Gerda: *The Crossing Point,* Eyre & Spottiswoode (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1960, 18*s*.

Cooke, Hedley V.: *Israel—A Blessing and a Curse,* Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1960, 25*s*.

Fejtö, Francois: *Les Juifs et l'antisémitisme dans les pays communistes (entre l'intégration et la sécession),* Plon, Paris, 1960, N.F. 10.20.

Field, M. J.: *Search for Security, an ethno-psychiatric study of rural Ghana,* Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1960, 42*s*.

Gartner, Lloyd P.: *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870–1914,* Studies in Society series, Vol. IV, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1960, 30*s*.

Gibson, Quentin: *The Logic of Social Enquiry,* The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960, 24*s*.

Ginsberg, Morris: *Evolution and Progress—essays in sociology and social philosophy,* Vol. III, William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1961, 25*s*.

Glass, Ruth, assisted by Pollins, Harold: *Newcomers—The West Indians in London,* Centre for Urban Studies, Report No. 1, Centre for Urban Studies and George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1960, 21*s*.

Halevi, H. S.: *Mental Illness in Israel,* Ministry of Health, Jerusalem, 1960, n.p.

Hananel, Aser et Eskenazi, Eli (eds.): *Fontes Hebraici ad Res Oeconomicas Socialiesque Terrarum Balcanicarum Saeculo XVI Pertinentes,* Volumen I, Editio Academiae Literarum Bulgaricae (in Bulgarian), Sofia, 1958, 59.40 levas.

Herberg, Will: *Judaism and Modern Man—an interpretation of Jewish religion,* published by Meridian Books Inc., New York, and The Mayflower Publishing Company Ltd., London, 1960, 12*s*.

International Conference on Public Education: *Organisation of Special Education for Mentally Deficient Children,* International Bureau of Education and UNESCO, Geneva, 1960, 15*s*.

Jahoda, Marie: *Race Relations and Mental Health,* UNESCO, Paris, 1960, 2*s*. 6*d*.

Johnson; Harry M.: *Sociology—a Systematic Introduction,* Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1961, 42*s*.

Kaufmann, Yehezkel: *The Religion of Israel—from its beginning to the Babylonian exile,* translated and abridged by Moshe Greenberg, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1961, 42*s*.

Kephart, Calvin I.: *Races of Mankind—Their Origin and Migration,* Philosophical Library Inc., New York, 1960, $6.

Kutzik, Alfred J.: *Social Work and Jewish Values,* Public Affairs Press, Washington D.C., 1959, $3.25.

Levi, Leo: *Vistas from Mount Moria,* Gur Publishing Co., New York, 1959, $3.50.

Lipset, S. M.: *Political Man, the social basis of politics,* William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1960, 30*s*.

MacRae, D.: *Classics in Sociology, a course of selected reading by authorities,* Philosophical Library Inc., New York, 1960, $6.

Medawar, P. B.: *The Future of Man*, The Reith Lectures, 1959, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1960, 10*s*. 6*d*.

Nagórski, Zygmunt et al.: *Dialog Polsko-Żydowski*, Przemówienia wygłoszone w Nowym Jorku 26 września 1956 r., Polski Instytut Naukowy w Ameryce, New York, n.d.

Oplt, Miroslav: *Indonesian Language*, Státní Pedagogické, Nakladatelství, Praha, 1960, Kčs. 24.90.

Patinkin, Don: *The Israel Economy: the first decade*, with a foreword by Simon Kuznetz, Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, Jerusalem, 1960, $2.

Ramati, Alexander: *Rebel Against the Light*, Eyre & Spottiswoode (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1960, 16*s*.

Richardson, H. G.: *The English Jewry Under Angevin Kings*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1960, 35*s*.

Rogers, Barbara N., and Dixon, Julia: *Portrait of Social Work, A study of social service in a northern town*, published for the Nuffield Provincial Hospital Trust by the Oxford University Press, 1960, 25*s*.

Roth, Leon: *Judaism a Portrait*, Faber & Faber, London, 1960, 25*s*.

Rubens, Bernice: *Set on Edge*, Eyre & Spottiswoode (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1960, 16*s*.

Schafer, Stephen: *Restitution to Victims of Crime*, Library of Criminology, No. 2, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1960, 25*s*.

Selltiz, Claire et al: *Research Methods in Social Relations*, revised one-volume edition, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1960, 42*s*.

Seton-Watson, Hugh: *Neither War Nor Peace—The Struggle for Power in the Post-war World*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1960, 36*s*.

Shapiro, Harry L.: *The Jewish People—A biological history*, UNESCO, Paris, 3*s*. 6*d*.

Silbermer, Edmund (ed.): *Moses Hess Briefwechsel*, unter mitwerkung von Werner Blumenberg, Mouton & Co., 'S—Gravenhage, 1959, n.p.

Simon, Leon: *Ahad Ha-am—a Biography*, East & West Library, London, 1961, 30*s*.

Somervil, D. C. (ed.): *Classics in Western Civilization, a course of selected reading by authorities*, Philosophical Library Inc., New York, 1960, $6.

Stein, Leonard: *The Balfour Declaration*, with a foreword by Simon Kuznetz, Vallentine, Mitchell & Co., London, 1961, 63*s*.

Talpalar, Norris: *The Sociology of Colonial Virginia*, Philosophical Library Inc., New York, 1960, $6.

Tartakower, Arieh: *The Sociology of Political Life in Israel*, a reprint from *Jewish Social Studies*, New York, April 1960, n.p.

Watt, Montgomery: *Islam and the Integration of Society*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1961, 32*s*.

Weber, Max: *The City*, translated and edited by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth, William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1960, 21*s*.

Weinreich, Uriel and Beatrice: *Yiddish Language and Folklore, a selective bibliography for research*, Mouton & Co., 'S—Gravenhage, 1959, n.p.

Wheeler, Geoffrey: *Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia*, Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University Press, 1960, 6*s*.

Wiese von Leopold: *Herbert Spencers Einführung in die Soziologie*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln und Opladen 1960, D.M. 3.80.

CHRONICLE

Prepared by

P. Glikson

According to a demographic report completed by the Jewish Social Welfare Institute in Amsterdam, there are about 27,000 Jews living in Holland today. This number includes many Jews who have married non-Jews, and a large number of half-Jewish children.

The pre-war Jewish population of Holland was 154,800 (of whom 14,800 were half-Jewish). The report states that only 5,550 out of the 111,000 Dutch Jews who were deported by the Nazis returned to Holland. Apart from these, the present Dutch Jewish population includes 8,000 people who managed to live in hiding throughout the war, 2,000 who returned from abroad, and at least 8,000 who escaped deportation because they were married to non-Jewish partners. Only 18,000–19,000 belong to Jewish congregations: 16–17,000 to the Synagogue Association and about 1,000 to the Portuguese Jewish and Liberal Jewish Synagogues each. The Jewish school in Amsterdam has about 200 pupils.

*

A socio-statistical survey has been undertaken among the 6,500 Jewish inhabitants of Wrocław, the second largest Jewish centre in Poland. The survey, initiated and conducted by Dr. S. Bronsztejn, is designed as a continuation of similar studies, though of a much more restricted character, which were conducted before the war by various Jewish organizations. It is the first attempt since the war to deal specifically with the material and social conditions of Jewish life in the People's Democracy of Poland.

A detailed questionnaire containing over 60 questions was distributed to all Jewish households in Wrocław. The questionnaire, which is divided into seven parts, asks in the first six sections for general information such as date and place of birth, sex, civil status, date of return to Poland and of settlement in Wrocław; the second and third parts deal with the family of the informant, the nationality of wife and husband, their parents, the number of children, etc.; the fourth inquires into their education and occupation before, during and after the war. There is a special question about the role played by O.R.T. in the occupational qualifications acquired by the informant. Next there is a set of questions about the social and material conditions in which the informant and his family now live, and another relating to cultural matters, with special emphasis on Yiddish cultural interests. The last section tries to ascertain the degree of social and cultural integration into the Polish environment by asking a question about the language used at home, the number of non-Jewish friends, school-mates, etc.

*

The *Alliance Israélite Universelle* maintains at present 135 schools in eight countries with 1,584 teachers and a total enrolment of 47,736:

France	1 teachers seminary	15 teachers	62 students
Iran	34 schools	316 ,,	7,955 pupils
Israel	12 ,,	260 ,,	4,737 ,,
Lebanon	6 ,,	55 ,,	1,510 ,,
Libya	1 school	5 ,,	98 ,,
Morocco	75 schools	814 ,,	29,345 ,,
Syria	1 school	15 ,,	422 ,,
Tunisia	5 schools	104 ,,	3,607 ,,

*

The preliminary results of the population census show a total of 160,032 Jews in Morocco. The foreign Jews are now listed separately.

The Jews were distributed by region and locality as follows:

Agadir	2,867
Al Hoceima	51
Beni Mallal	2,567
Casablanca (Province)	3,418
Casablanca (Prefecture)	71,175
Fes	12,314
Ksar es Souk	4,796
Marrakech	19,368
Meknes	10,080
Nador	72
Ouarzazate	4,743
Oujda	2,482
Rabat (Province)	4,553
Rabat (Prefecture)	9,772
Tarfaya	1
Tangier	6,228
Taza	747
Tetouan	4,798
	160,032

*

There are about 80,000 Jews living in Iran, nearly half of them in Teheran. Most Persian Jews trace their origins back to the Exile in Babylon though there is an admixture of later arrivals from Russia, from Baghdad, and even from Germany. Their economic and social structure reflects that existing in the country as a whole: there are a few enormously rich merchants, bankers, and professional people but the vast majority of Jews in Teheran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Abadan, and other provincial towns, eke out their living as small traders, artisans, and middle men. It is estimated that about 20 per cent of the Jews in Persia live on charity. For the last ten years the Koresh Kabir Cultural Centre, set up by a group of Zionist-minded youth in Teheran, has been the focal point of Jewish activity in Persia and made a major contribution to rejuvenating this ancient community by instilling in the young generation understanding and knowledge of Judaism, of world Jewry, and of Israel. Reports received by the Cultural Department of the W.J.C. describe the centre 'as a beam of (Jewish) culture in Asia, among a Moslem community'. Its establishment and functioning have been made possible by the consistently sympathetic attitude shown by the Persian authorities. There is, however, an urgent need to open many more centres both in Teheran and in the provinces.

*

Dr. Lazar Gurvic, who died on 7th November, 1960, in Geneva, devoted his whole life to O.S.E. (Organisation de la Protection de la Santé des Populations Juives). Born on 21st May, 1890, at Ponievezh, Lithuania, he studied at the University of Dorpat. He graduated in 1913 and was active for a time as a lawyer in St. Petersburg. At the outbreak of the war he was mobilized and served at the Russo-Turkish front. After having been invalided out of the army he joined O.S.E. in 1915. At the first General Conference of that organization in 1916, he was elected member of the Central Committee and, after the death of Dr. S. Frumkin, became its Secretary-General. He remained in this post until 1950 sharing all the vicissitudes of O.S.E. and directing its manifold activities, first in Russia, then in Berlin, Paris, and Geneva. During the last war he was responsible for the clandestine activities of O.S.E. in Occupied France. After his retirement, he remained faithful to O.S.E. as member of its Executive and Vice-President of its Swiss Section. He represented O.S.E. at the W.J.C. Executive, participated in its meetings and plenary assemblies.

Dr. Gurvic wrote articles on current problems of social and socio-medical work among the Jews. His publications include: *Activité de l'O.S.E. de 1912 à 1937, O.S.E., son but et ses activités, Situation de l'O.S.E. dans la vie nationale juive*, etc.

At the time of his death Dr. Gurvic was preparing for this *Journal* a survey of Jewish social work in the Diaspora. The Editors wish to express their deep regret at the passing of a scholar who was instrumental in the founding of the *Journal*.