THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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VOLUME TWO 1960

Published on behalf of the World Jewish Congress
by William Heinemann Ltd, 15–16 Queen Street, London W1

CONTENTS

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VOLUME II NO. 1 JUNE 1960

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PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY

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Annual Subscription £1.1.0 (post free)—Single Copies 12s 6d net

Applications for subscription should be addressed to the Managing Editor, The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 55 New Cavendish Street, London W1

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BUTLER AND TANNER LTD
FROME AND LONDON

EDITORIAL

THE GENERAL publishing policy of the *Journal* remains as it was set out in the first issue, and we should like again to invite authors to submit papers to be considered for publication.

One change in the composition of the *Journal* has been necessary. The summaries in Hebrew and French will no longer appear. We know that they were of interest to some people, and we apologize to them for withdrawing what they may hitherto have enjoyed. It has become clear, however, that the summaries are of little use to the great majority of our readership, and we have been obliged to dispense with them, at least for the time being.

TUNISIAN JEWRY DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS

Robert Attal

BEFORE the Second World War, Tunisian Jewry, quite distinct from the Jewries of Algeria and Morocco, was hardly known to the wider Jewish world. Up to the eve of the War, the Jews of Tunisia lived peacefully among their Muslim, French, Italian, and Maltese neighbours. They had emancipated themselves with astonishing speed. They were able to take the highest places in the secondary schools and colleges. They were capable of fighting for their rights with great determination.[1] It took the War to make the outside world realize that Tunisian Jewry existed—a war which, of course, brought new problems for these Jews to face. From this point on world Jewish organizations were to make a great impact on them and their elite was to break the last chains of its spiritual ghetto. Other events, such as the creation of the State of Israel and the granting of independence to Tunisia, were also to have their repercussions. In this paper I shall try to review the different stages of development through which this 'historyless Jewry' has passed. The story is one of upheaval and abrupt change.

May 1943 saw the end of the Nazi grip on Tunisia and the opening of a new era for its Jews. Reacting to the Anglo-American landings in Algeria in November 1942, the Germans at once occupied Tunisia, only to be driven out by the Allied forces in May of the following year. The Nazi occupation of Tunisia thus lasted six months. However, because the country was at that time a French Protectorate, even before 1942 the Jews had had to suffer the consequences of the anti-Jewish policy pursued by the Pétain Government.

The Treaty dated 30 November 1940 applied the *Statut des Juifs* to Tunisia. It was aimed principally at introducing a *numerus clausus* in

the public services, and on 26 June 1941 a census was ordered. This, the first step in the extension of the *Statut des Juifs*, was followed by a long series of anti-Jewish laws and regulations which bore heavily upon the Jews of Tunisia. Before the German Occupation, the *numerus clausus* had been applied mainly to civil servants, but in addition lawyers had been removed from the Bar, doctors had been specially licensed to practise only among their fellow-Jews, Jewish organizations had been dissolved, and in October 1942 had begun the sequestration of Jewish property and the removal of cinemas and publications from their Jewish owners. The elected Community Council was dissolved in September 1941. In its place was put a Communal Administrative Committee, headed by a President who bore the ungrateful task of trying to check the disastrous consequences of each new antisemitic decree and of looking after the unemployed civil servants and the jobless among the young men. The last decree issued in Tunisia by the Vichy Government came on 22 October 1942. After that, with the advent of the Axis forces, decrees affecting the Jews were signed by Generals von Arnheim and von Nehring. Then began the period of 'harassment by the police, arbitrary arrests, large-scale raids, and internment camps'.[2]

The sudden and unexpected arrival of German troops delivered nearly 100,000 Jews into their hands. (These Jews were divided by nationality as follows: 68,268 were Tunisian subjects, 6,496 of French nationality, 3,208 Italian subjects, and 668 British subjects.) The Germans, on the model of the *Judenrat* set up in Eastern Europe, created a Jewish Council which was forced to carry out the anti-Jewish measures imposed on it. On 23 November 1942 the Germans arrested leading Jews, and the next day began to requisition Jewish housing, the owners being obliged to abandon all their furniture and effects. The Committee had to furnish a list of 1,000 residences liable to requisition, as well as a roll of 2,000 young Jews for forced labour, the Committee being obliged to provide the latter with food, clothing, and equipment.

With increasing speed the Occupation authorities demanded other lists, to such a point that 500 were to be recruited every week. Hostages taken from among middle-class Jews had to furnish guarantees, while the young 'recruits' were put to forced labour. Work camps were opened up throughout the country, and generally in places (harbours, air-fields, etc.) exposed to bombing. The young Jews were supposed to repair the damage caused by Allied bombs, to clear up bombed towns, and even to dig trenches at the front.

When they wanted to increase the number of workers, or simply to terrorize the Jews, the Germans organized massive raids in which they rounded up indiscriminately young and old, the fit and the unfit, forcing them into service. Many young men succumbed to Allied bombs and the harsh treatment meted out by the German soldiery.

Food and hygiene were very poor; sickness spread; epidemic disease threatened. A great many people have remained invalids as a result of the horrible conditions of work to which they were subjected. The tragedy of six months of Nazi Occupation is illustrated by the fact that during 1943 there were 2,575 deaths among the Jews as against 1,985 births.

The Germans took other stern measures. They imposed a mounting number of cash fines on the Jewish Committee, the first of these totalling 20 million francs. They forced the creation (by a French collaborator sent by the Vichy Government) of a 'Committee' to come to the aid of the French, Muslim, and Italian victims of Allied bombing. The resources of this 'Committee' were fed by fines levied on the Jews (who were held responsible for the bombing). More Jewish hostages were imprisoned to ensure that these fines were regularly paid. Among the property in kind handed over by the Jews were their wireless sets.

The Germans turned the Great Synagogue in Tunis into a warehouse. The poor Jews in the *Hara* (the Jewish quarter) of Tunis suffered the requisitions made by the Germans, the raping of their daughters, and the house-breaking of the soldiery. Prominent Jews and young men guilty of trying to escape from the work camps were sent by air to the extermination camps in Europe.

Jewish communities in the interior of the country (Sousse, Sfax, and so on) were fined (a first fine of 15 million francs and a second of 10 million were levied in Sousse), their burden being proportionately greater than that on the larger Tunis community. In Djerba, for example, the Germans exacted fifty kilos of gold from a community which did not exceed 3,700, under the threat of shooting its leaders and shelling three small Jewish areas on the island.

The end of the nightmare came with the Liberation of Tunisia by Allied troops in May 1943. France was then still occupied, and the decree of 8 August 1943 by the French Committee of National Liberation abrogated the *Statut des Juifs*. Slowly the Jews resumed their place in social life.

The Jewish Community reverted to its former position, while many organizations (among which one should especially mention the 'Joint') came to the aid of the Jewish population. Other bodies set up a little later, such as 'Nos Petits', OSE, and ORT, played an extremely effective part in helping the children and adolescents. They had much to do among people who had generally suffered from the War and among refugees from the bombed towns who had sought a livelihood in the capital.

Among many Jews the German Occupation marked a renewal in their attachment to organized Judaism, even when it was not a renewal of faith. (The fasts and prayers recommended by the Chief Rabbi during the Occupation had been scrupulously observed.) It should be stressed

that in general Tunisian Jewry remains very traditionalist, especially in the South and in the Tunis ghetto.[3] The eighty-four synagogues and prayer-houses of Tunis are heavily frequented on Saturdays and Holy Days.

Intellectual, economic, and social activity underwent a general upsurge after the War. The Jewish French-language newspapers reappeared, creating contact between local communities and forming a bridge with world Jewry. The weeklies, *La Voix Juive*, *Gazette d'Israël* (revisionist in tendency), *L'Echo Juif* (of a commercial character), devoted their columns to the preoccupations of the day: the reorganization of local Jewries, concern with a Europe embroiled in the Nazi massacres; the progress of Jewish life in Palestine. The Jews of the Ghetto and of the South got their news from the only weekly in Judeo-Arabic, *En Nejma* (the Star), which reappeared immediately after the War, unlike *Le Juif* which stopped in 1939 for good.

In the field of education it is important to note that there was a marked increase in school numbers, especially among the girls who, becoming more and more numerous in the primary schools, began to make their mark in secondary and higher schools.

An unprecedented surge forward in economic life brought a new middle-class into being. A developing civil service called increasingly on the Jews, who were excellent intermediaries between the native population and the protecting power. Jews began to travel in large numbers, and a holiday in France became an ordinary affair. Even more numerous were the students who went to France to pursue their higher studies. In this way new horizons were opened up to the Jews, but their rapid emancipation brought its inevitable consequence: mixed marriages. There had been a few cases before the War, but now they increased to the point where a Rabbinate poorly adapted to new circumstances could not stem the flow. Local Jewish bodies multiplied (it would take too long to name them all here), although their activity was tainted by an element of snobbery. The Judaism of the middle-class would certainly have gone through a profound crisis if the growing Zionist organization had not attracted a section of the young people.

Let us now examine the demographic structure of the Jewish population after the War.[4]

A general census of the population was carried out in 1946. Only the Jews of Tunisian nationality were separately enumerated because Jews of French or other foreign nationality were counted as Frenchmen or of some other nationality along with their fellow-nationals belonging to other religions. In this way an administrative tradition was continued whereby Tunisian Jews had been separated from Tunisian Muslims in official statistics. This statistically fortunate distinction allows us to establish the exact number of Tunisian Jews immediately after the

Liberation: 70,971. To this figure one must add about 25,000 Jews of French and other foreign nationalities. This figure of 70,971 Tunisian Jews is the highest reached by Tunisian Jewry since the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1881.

In 1946 the gainfully-employed section of Tunisian Jewry consisted of 19,928 persons divided among nearly all occupational categories. 12,764 of these gainfully-employed Jews, or 65 per cent, were enumerated in Tunis. The remainder were found mainly in the centres of Sousse, Sfax, Gabes, and Djerba.

Industrial occupation stood first in the list, employing 9,265 people. Commercial activities came second with 6,594 people, of whom 300 were employed in banks and insurance offices. 1,166 Jewish workers were employed in porterage and transport. 115 workers were engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fishing.

Next came the liberal professions with 160 people in law and 175 in medicine, 144 consultants, technicians, artists, and writers. There were 1,048 office-workers, and 254 judges in rabbinical tribunals and teachers of Hebrew. There were only 322 civil servants. Finally, there were 687 Jews employed in personal service (barbers, domestic servants, etc.).

Many French and foreign Jews occupied high places in the administration and in intellectual activities. Unfortunately, for the reasons set out above, their number is not known.

A great demographic change was brought about by the creation of the State of Israel. The Jewish population of Tunisia was gradually reduced by people leaving the country. Since 1948 the number of births among Tunisian Jews has constantly decreased owing to the departure of many people from the Tunisian South, which is the area where people have large families and are unacquainted with birth control. In this way the number of births, which was 2,809 in 1947 (the maximum since 1914), fell in 1957 to 1,412.

I have spoken of the attachment of Tunisian Jewry to its traditions; partly as a result of their sentimental attachment to Zion some of them decided to leave their native land for Israel. Even before 1948 some hundreds of young people organized in groups had settled in *kibbutzim*.

These large-scale departures (in which Jews left without any preparation for the new conditions of life in Israel) slowed down to reach a minimum figure of 650 departures in 1953. At this date 15,000 Jews had already left Tunisia without being forced to go, but a new factor now came into play: political troubles and economic stagnation.

Political troubles marked the years 1952–6, the negotiations between France and Tunisia finally leading to independence. This period saw an economic stagnation which generally affected every section of the population. The stagnation and the uncertainty of the future were essential factors in determining Jews to leave Tunisia. The number of emigrants leaving for Israel increased: 2,600 left in 1954 (that is, four

times as many as in the preceding year), 6,000 in 1955, and 6,500 (an unprecedented figure) in 1956.

But not all the emigrants have gone to Israel. Discouraged by living conditions in Israel (the sternness of the realities of Israeli life imposing a complete change in the way of life), a certain number of Jews settled in France and even, although in very small numbers, in Canada.

All these departures have brought about a decline in numbers which has not been compensated for by the excess of births over deaths. Thus when in 1956 a second census was carried out by the Government, it was found that from 70,971 in 1946, the number of Tunisian Jews had fallen to 57,792.[5] The decrease in the number of Tunisian Jews from 1946–56 has therefore been 13,000. In reality the figure should be 26,000 because during this period the excess of births over deaths among the Jews has come to more than 13,000. The following table summarizes these facts.

TABLE I

Year	*Tunisian Jews*			
	Births	*Deaths*	*Excess of Births over Deaths*	*Emigration to Israel*
1947	2,809	1,065	1,744	—
1948	2,718	858	1,860	2,000
1949	2,444	807	1,637	2,000
1950	2,477	765	1,712	4,564
1951	2,357	713	1,644	3,471
1952	2,332	708	1,624	2,671
1953	2,040	679	1,361	606
1954	2,025	640	1,385	2,651
1955	1,807	556	1,251	6,104
1956	1,516	574	942	6,545
1957	1,413	367	1,046	2,618

In the following paragraphs I shall attempt to summarize the position as it now is. It is important to note that the flow of *aliyah* which reached its maximum during the years 1955 and 1956 has abated; the year 1957 already marked a reduction of two-thirds in the number of departures as compared with the previous year.

The independence of Tunisia and the end of terrorism and political disturbances were followed by official declarations by nationalist leaders concerning the equality of all Tunisians, both Jewish and Muslim, and these declarations have inspired a certain feeling of security. But we must remember that there is another factor which has slowed down *aliyah*: the Tunisians already established in Israel have themselves, by their letters, discouraged their friends and relatives who

were preparing to join them. The difficulties of settling in a new home, the complete change in the way of life, the difficulties experienced by the North Africans, are among the most common arguments used by those already established in Israel. One should add that a considerable percentage of the Jews who still remain in Tunisia are members of the middle class; that is to say, they are those for whom the adaptation to life in Israel presents the most problems.

Since 1956 there have been many departures for France. However, while a recent work[6] shows that these departures are bound up with family ties and that their proportion has not exceeded during the years 1954–6 a third of the departures for Israel, we can say that an inverse movement is today in process of taking place: the departures for France are becoming more and more numerous even among the mass of the people who have always remained sentimentally attached to Israel.

For the sake of completeness, we should note that nearly 120 families of Tunisian Jews have emigrated to Canada in the course of the last three years.

All these facts entail their social consequences. An investigation which I carried out has shown that more than 50 per cent of those who left Tunisia for Israel in 1956 are under 18 years of age. Among those leaving, the proportion with large families was also very high. These facts explain why the decrease in the numbers of Tunisian Jews is making itself felt in the schools, especially in the primary schools where the number of Jewish pupils continually diminishes. The number of Tunisian Jews in the school population has declined from 16,710 in November 1954, to 11,761 in November 1956. The *Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* provided us with information concerning the decrease in the number of schoolchildren: while in January 1954, 4,218 pupils attended schools run by the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Tunisia, this figure fell to 4,055 in November 1956, then to 3,856 in December 1956, and finally to 3,607 in 1957.[7]

It is characteristic that since 1946 the Jews have not stopped crowding into and around Tunis, the capital. While in 1946, 59 per cent of Tunisian Jewry was concentrated in Tunis, this percentage had increased to 67 in 1956. The capital is not only a staging point for emigrants, but in opening up more opportunities it welcomes the dispossessed and the rootless Jews from other parts of the country.

Those wishing to emigrate had been most numerous in the South (the Gafsa-Kasserine region), the reduction in the population of this area having reached more than 44 per cent. Their position near the frontiers had entailed a growing insecurity. Their attachment to their traditional practices has also been an essential factor causing them to emigrate to Israel.

Because the departure of French technicians brought with it a slowing down in the administration of the country, the census of February

1956 has not yet been completely analysed. Thus we have no information concerning the gainfully-occupied population among Tunisian Jews. A comparison with the figures for 1946 would have been very interesting, for it would certainly have shown us which of the occupational categories have been most affected by emigration to Israel and France. However, a recent enquiry in the *Hara* (Ghetto) of Tunis based on a manual sorting of the 1956 census, provides us with information on this part of the capital and gives us an idea of the occupational structure of ghetto Jewry in Tunis in 1956. It will be useful to cite these data here.[8]

In 1956 the Jewish population of the ghetto numbered 7,638 and was divided into the following nationalities: 6,611 Tunisian subjects, 871 people of French nationality, and finally 156 of foreign (Italian, British, Spanish, etc.) nationality. 27·8 per cent of this total, or 2,127 persons, constituted the gainfully-employed part of the Jewish population of the Tunis ghetto. Their occupational distribution by sex is shown in the following table:

TABLE 2

Occupational Categories	*Males*	*Females*
Unskilled workers	956	75
Skilled workers	318	18
Small traders	175	5
Business employees	254	43
Office workers	64	34
Civil Servants, Liberal Professions	66	8
Home Duties	1	99
Others	10	1
Total	1,844	283

The growing number of unemployed at this period reached 398, and 120 families, consisting of 309 people, returned themselves as living exclusively on the help given them by the Jewish Community and charitable bodies. We must remember, of course, that these figures apply only to the Jews of the Tunis ghetto and not to the gainfully-occupied population of the European quarters of the capital, which includes a good number of intellectuals (doctors, lawyers, chemists), businessmen, employees in private agencies, and civil servants.

On attaining first self-government and then independence, the Tunisian Government, while never ceasing to proclaim the principle of equality between Muslims and Jews, adopted policies of Tunisification and Arabization. We must examine what has followed from these policies.

The personnel of the civil service has to be completely Tunisian. One after another French civil servants have been relieved of their duties and have returned with their families to jobs which the French Government has given them as compensation. A good number of Jewish civil servants of French nationality (which they have acquired by individual naturalization) have also been forced to leave Tunisia with their immediate families and sometimes with their aged relatives. Integrated into the French administration, they find themselves very often isolated in some small French town where they are the only Jews in the area.

Independent Tunisia has acquired a Constitution. The text of this Constitution dated 1 June 1959 affirms that Tunisia is a Muslim State (the President of the Republic, but not necessarily the députies, must be Muslim), and constitutes 'a part of the Magreb for the unity of which it works within the framework of common interests'.[9] It proclaims the will of the Tunisian people to 'remain faithful to its membership of the Arab family'. The Constitution proclaims, among other things, liberty of conscience and freedom in the exercise of religion.

Thus Tunisian Jews are secure in the practice of their religion, and leading Muslim political figures participate as guests in Jewish religious ceremonies. But these same figures often refer in their speeches to the idea that the Jew is considered the equal of his Muslim compatriot only on condition that he does not look towards Zion. And it is not easy to silence a millennarian aspiration.

Within the framework of Arabization the Arabic language is gradually taking the place which French occupied in the schools and the civil service for more than seventy years. Thus it is natural that those whose mother tongue is French and whose studies were carried out completely in French should fear lest they be left behind by their Arab colleagues.

In view of the principle of equality among Tunisians the Zionist Organizations, in that they were thought to distract the Jews from their 'Tunisian preoccupations', were no longer considered to have a *raison d'être*. Thus, the *Shlichim*, the Israeli organizers of young Zionist movements, have not been able to obtain a renewal of their visas and have been forced to return to Israel. The Jewish organizations concerned with help to children have had to Tunisify themselves, and in consequence have had to stop limiting their aid to Jews. It is for this reason that, for example, a growing number of Muslim pupils attend the schools run by the Alliance Israélite Universelle, where Arabic is taught by Muslim teachers. We may well expect that the faithful application of this principle will lead the Tunisian Government to fail to distinguish between Jews and Muslims in its future statistical publications; we shall then be forced to approximations which less and less will correspond to reality.

It is very difficult to summarize in a few words the role played by the Community. As a legal entity enjoying an independent budget, the Jewish Community had many resources which allowed it to maintain buildings devoted to religious purposes, to pay rabbis, to keep up places of religious instruction at all grades, to distribute help to the poor and the sick, and to subsidize different kinds of Jewish works concerned with teaching and philanthropy. Between the years 1938 and 1940 it even played, indirectly, a political role in that it nominated a representative of the Jewish people to the Tunisian section of the Grand Council of Tunisia, which was a sort of representative body during the time of the Protectorate. One should add that in the years after the War it has played a very great cultural role, organizing meetings, courses of instruction in Hebrew for adults, the setting up of Jewish libraries, and so on. Tunisians reproached the Community for isolating the Jews and for keeping them separate from the rest of the national community in the field of public assistance. Thus, within the framework of the efforts made by the independent Tunisian Government completely to integrate the Tunisian Jews into the nation, a law of 11 July 1958 has reformed the legal status of religion in Tunisia: in place of the Jewish Community there has been set up a Jewish Religious Association. Jews of both sexes (the franchise is extended to women) will elect members, who must be of Tunisian nationality, to an administrative council. Since the promulgation of the law of 11 July 1958, however, no election has taken place, and Jewish religious questions have remained in the hands of the provisional committee nominated by decree. This reform, in the words of the Secretary of State for Justice, 'aims to limit the field of action of religious associations and to eliminate everything in their fields of activities which could, in one fashion or another, accentuate the particularisms existing in the nation'.

All matters touching the personal status of Tunisian Jews were formerly within the competence of the Rabbinic Tribunal. From 1898 it was this Tribunal which judged affairs in the field of marriage, divorce, inheritance, succession, and guardianship. Rabbinical judges, who were civil servants paid by the Ministry of Justice, had competence in these fields and dispensed justice on the basis of the Talmud and the Shulchan Aruch.

The Rabbinical Tribunal was several times reorganized, its last formal installation, in new offices and with a completely different personnel, taking place in 1952. A decree of 27 September 1957, which was part of the programme of Tunisification, dissolved the Tribunal (along with other religious courts) and henceforth Tunisian Jews no longer enjoyed a special jurisdiction in the field of their personal law, but had to have recourse to the ordinary Tunisian civil courts.

Up to the end of the nineteenth century the Jews of Tunis were

buried in a cemetery situated outside the city. As the city grew the number of buildings in the area of the cemetery increased to the point where it became a vast unbuilt-up area in the middle of a town. The question of the State buying back the cemetery was raised many times by the Protectorate authorities, but they always came up against a complete refusal on the part of the leaders of the Community. Famous rabbis were buried in the cemetery and the Jews of Tunis did not look favourably upon the removal of their remains. One senior official of the Protectorate even had the idea of having the remains shipped to the Holy Land in a French Navy Cruiser with all the honours due to them,[10] but the plan was endlessly put off. The present Government decided to expropriate the cemetery 'for the public good' and to do this without involving the Jewish Community in any financial expense. When in August 1958 bulldozers invaded the old Jewish cemetery, there was talk of the remains being taken to Israel, but this idea came to nothing, and the Jews of Tunis, accustomed to making pilgrimages to the old graves, today walk across a new public park where only a few months ago they used to foregather in their cemetery. (A similar clearance of Muslim cemeteries has also been carried out.)

During the period which preceded internal self-government the Jews were a constant theme in the speeches of nationalist leaders. Never before had the Jews been spoken of so much as elements who had to be taken into account. The first Tunisian Government appointed as Minister a prominent Jew greatly respected by both Muslims and Jews. This appointment was approved by the whole Jewish community. For the first time the many approaches made by the Jewish community to have Yom Kippur made a legal holiday were given effect; schools, banks, and public offices were closed on that day. But two years later the Jewish Minister was no longer to be found in the Tunisian Government, and in the decree giving the official list of legal holidays of the new Republic Yom Kippur did not appear.

As we have seen, during the course of twenty years Tunisian Jewry experienced a period of disturbance, the repercussions of which have by no means yet ended. The Nazi Occupation with its disastrous consequences, the beginnings of assimilation suddenly brought to a halt by the creation of the State of Israel, and then the integration of Jews in their native country as citizens equal to Muslims, all these have been too much for the Tunisian Jew with his peaceful temperament and his hopes for a quiet life.

The community was reduced by emigration and by the decrease in the number of births. The proportion of old people was already greater in 1956 than it had been in 1946. We may estimate, without fearing too great an error, that the total number of Jews in Tunisia today lies somewhere between 50,000 and 55,000.

There is no Jew in the country without a brother, a parent, or other

close relative in France or Israel. The Tunisian family, still marked by many of the characteristic features of a patriarchal system, has been greatly affected.

Great hopes are reposed in the foresight of President Bourguiba and in the maturity of his policies. Despite the return to a normal atmosphere, the Jews of Tunisia are nevertheless uncertain. In a country which is taking its first steps as an independent nation, they hesitate and ask themselves the question: What will it be like tomorrow?[11]

NOTES

[1] Note the stormy debates about the eventual extension of the Décret Crémieux to Tunisian Jewry.

[2] J. Sabille, *Les Juifs de Tunisie sous Vichy et l'occupation*, Paris, 1954.

[3] R. Attal, 'Note sur une enquête de sociologie religieuse en milieu Israélite à Tunis'; *Cahiers de Tunisie*, no. 10, 1955.

[4] R. Attal, 'Note succincte sur la démographie des Juifs en Tunisie', *Information Juive*, Algiers, December 1954.

[5] R. Attal, 'Répartition géographique et coefficient de diminution des Juifs tunisiens 1946–1956', *Information Juive*, Algiers, July 1956.

[6] R. Attal and R. Setbon, *Aspects of Jewish Emigration from Tunis* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, no date (pp. 8).

[7] *Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle*, tables appearing in nos. 88, 103, 104, and 113.

[8] P. Sebag with the collaboration of R. Attal, *Evolution d'un ghetto Nord Africain, la Hara de Tunis*, Paris, 1959.

[9] *Le Monde*, Paris, 2 June 1959.

[10] R. Darmon, *La situation des cultes en Tunisie*, Paris, 1930.

[11] Jerusalem, July 1959.

THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF ANGLO-JEWRY 1883-1960

Norman Bentwich

I LOOK BACK seventy-seven years to the date of my birth, 1883, and I realize that my childhood decade was a turning point in the development of the Anglo-Jewish community. The immigration from Eastern Europe, Russia and Rumania, was beginning, and in the next thirty years it transformed the economic and social structure. To the relatively small community of wealthy merchants, big and petty traders, and skilled artisans, with an uppercrust of 300 men in the liberal professions, and rapidly advancing in them, it brought a mass of poor manual workers from the Eastern ghetto seeking security and freedom. The newcomers formed little ghettos in East London and in the bigger industrial centres, e.g. Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow; they multiplied small synagogues, friendly societies, and Jewish night-schools (Heder and Talmud Torah), and they fostered a Yiddish literature and theatre. Before the outbreak of the First World War the East European immigrants had increased the size of the community fourfold, from 50,000 to 200,000. The eager and ambitious men and women among them were taking their place in the leadership of the community. The World War was a great instrument of integration of the Jewish community because most of the young men and many of the young women of all sections of the community were enrolled in the Forces, and mixed with the non-Jewish citizens.

Between the two world wars the Jewish population was increased again by a hundred thousand, about a third, mainly as the result of the admission of a mass of refugees from Nazi persecution in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia. They were a very different element from the earlier immigrants, consisting in large part of intellectual middle-class families. They included many men and women distinguished in the medical and legal professions, in academic life and literature, and in all the arts. They included also a number of Jewish scholars devoted to

Judaism and what was called the *Juedische Wissenschaft*. Undoubtedly they raised the cultural level both in its general and in its Jewish aspects, and were a vitamin of the community.

Comparing the Anglo-Jewish community of today with that of the eighties of the last century, perhaps the most striking characteristic is its Conservatism. It is seven times the size, its demographic structure is radically different: it has no longer that primacy in the Jewish world which it enjoyed in the days of the Pax Britannica. Yet its fundamental institutions are substantially the same. In the ecclesiastical sphere the Chief Rabbi exercises authority over the congregations not only of the United Kingdom but of the British Commonwealth. In the lay and political sphere, the United Synagogue, the representative Board of Deputies of British Jews, and the non-democratic Anglo-Jewish Association, the three of them much enlarged, carry on the functions which they exercised seventy years ago. The United Synagogue, being originally a union of three congregations in the City of London and Whitechapel, has grown to an association of over one hundred in Greater London. The Board of Deputies, formed in 1760 of representatives of the Sephardim, from the Iberian Peninsula and Holland—then the premier and aristocratic community—and of the Ashkenazim, derived from Central Europe, for the purpose of presenting a loyal address of Anglo-Jewry to the new King George III, is today formed by a more or less democratic election by all sections of the community, and is recognized as the official channel of communication with the Government, both in domestic matters and in foreign affairs which concern the Jewish people. The Anglo-Jewish Association, created in 1871 during the Franco-Prussian war, is a nominated, self-coopting body of men and women, concerned particularly with the defence of Jewish rights and interests against attacks on grounds of religion, race, or politics. A major change in the two latter bodies, which reflects the social climate, is the inclusion of women delegates. The Board of Guardians and Trustees for the relief of the Jewish poor in London, over a hundred years old, is still the major charity of the community. *The Jewish Chronicle*, which is still older, remains the principal Press organ of communal affairs, and as a newspaper covers the whole Jewish world.

It is a symbol of the religious continuity that the Authorized Prayer-Book of the Conservative congregations of the British Empire has not been changed during the seventy years. With its English translation, made sixty years ago by the Reverend Simeon Singer, it is still the standard book of worship. It is another symbol of the Conservative continuity that the principal communal charities concerned with the Jews of the country are largely directed by members of the old-established aristocracy. The hereditary principle is strong in Anglo-Jewish as in English public life, and evokes a sense of responsibility in 'the hundred families'.

In the political institutions of the community, however, the new element had and has its full part. The young generation from Eastern Europe knocking at the door was symbolized in Professor Selig Brodetsky, who came to London in the nineties as a child from Russia, the son of poor parents, made his way from the Jews Free school to Cambridge, distinguished himself there, and was appointed to a professorial chair at Leeds University. He quickly assumed the leadership of that third largest Jewish community in the Kingdom, and went on to be the President of the Board of Deputies and of the English Zionist Federation, following in the latter office Dr. Chaim Weizmann. The lead in the major financial instruments of the Jewish National Home, and later of the cause of Israel, was taken by dynamic men and women of the new generation, whose parents had been poor immigrants. Because of the need for larger contributions for the settlement of Jews migrating to Israel, on a scale never contemplated in the old communal charities, the direction soon passed to persons of great wealth; big giving and generosity, rather than birth and intellectual eminence, had to be the main qualifications.

At the beginning of the period the cultural level of the community in all Jewish aspects was low. Jewish learning was not held in great respect, and the few scholars who pursued it were almost all immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe. Unlike the communities in Germany, Austria and France, which maintained institutions devoted to the study of Judaism, Anglo-Jewry had no learned society and no learned review to encourage such studies. The Jews' College in London was purely for training rabbis and ministers, and most of its teachers and students also came from abroad. The situation, however, gradually changed with the stimulus of the growing foreign element. One naturalized scholar, Solomon Schechter, originally from Rumania and brought to England in 1882 by Dr. Claude Goldsmid Montefiore, a scion of two of the old families, to be his tutor in Rabbinics, was the moving mind and the spiritual force. He inspired a group, partly of English-born Jews, and partly of immigrants like himself, to a serious interest in Judaism, Jewish history and Jewish literature. Two of his disciples, Claude Montefiore and Israel Abrahams,—a native Anglo-Jewish scholar—founded and edited the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, which could compare with the best Continental periodicals of Jewish learning. Two other members of the group, Lucien Wolf and Joseph Jacobs, the latter being a native of Australia, formed the Jewish Historical Society of England, which was concentrated on the history of the Jews in this island in the Middle Ages and after the Resettlement in the seventeenth century. The Jubilee year of Queen Victoria, 1887, was marked by an Anglo-Jewish Exhibition, which recorded the achievements of 200 years, from the tiny beginnings. One of its permanent publications was an Anglo-Jewish Bibliography, which was supplemented 70 years later by Dr.

Cecil Roth, the premier English writer of this century on Jewish history, on the occasion of the three hundredth anniversary of the Resettlement of Jews in Britain.

In recent years there is certainly no lack of production of books by Jews about Jews and Judaism, or of Jewish periodicals. The learned *Jewish Quarterly Review*, indeed, passed to American hands at the beginning of this century. But another organ, the *Jewish Quarterly*, is concentrated on religious, philosophical and cultural aspects of the Renaissance, and a learned *Journal of Jewish Studies* and a Hebrew learned periodical are published. Two other monthly journals are issued: by the Association of Jewish Refugees (who crossed the North Sea from 1933 till the end of the World War) and by Dr. Wiener's Library, which is a remarkable collection of books and documents dealing with the Nazi Regime, and has become a permanent part of the historical archives of the Jewish people. The two journals are concerned particularly with the history and interests of the Continental accretion to the community which arrived after 1933. Most of the larger provincial communities maintain a weekly journal, and some of them more than one. The literary consciousness of Anglo-Jewry today has then become strong; and the Anglo-Jewish community in our time has taken the place which was held for two centuries by the community of Germany as the principal Jewish cultural centre of Europe.

The community of Great Britain now numbers about 450,000, a little less than one per cent of the total population. Of them a quarter of a million live in the area of Greater London. While the Jewish population in the metropolis has multiplied, there is no longer a Ghetto, a quarter of the poor, in East London, as there was 70 years ago. The Jewish population there, which in 1900 was reckoned at 125,000, had fallen in 1945 to 30,000; children of school-age are 3,000, while 60 years ago there were 30,000. The overwhelming proportion of the Jews live in the principal towns, and in particular quarters of them. In several boroughs of Greater London they form nearly one-third of the population. They flock also to certain holiday and seaside resorts, Brighton, Bournemouth, Margate, Blackpool. Many are happier in a Jewish society, and a growing tendency is manifest among the adults to establish their own athletic and social clubs. At the universities the ever-increasing number of Jewish students has brought a more intense Jewish cultural activity, particularly among those who are children or grandchildren of immigrant families. On the other hand, the wider distribution into smaller towns, which was started by the evacuation of families from London and the big industrial cities in the Second World War, has to an extent remained.

Another striking feature of the community in our day is the growth of the spirit of equality which, while characteristic of the general British society, has still more deeply affected the Jewish community. Broadly

the British Jews today are a middle class. The trend to intellectual occupations is steadily fostered. Jewish boys and girls seize in full measure the opportunity, given by the welfare state, for secondary and higher education. The proportion of Jewish students at the older and the younger universities is high, and one of the remarkable vocational changes has been the high proportion of Jews in academic appointments. They have risen, also, to the head of some liberal professions, particularly the medical and the legal. A few individuals, such as the first Lord Reading, Lord Samuel, Edwin Montagu, Emanuel Shinwell, have attained high political office.

No serious anti-Semitic movement has obtained a foothold in political life. Between the World Wars, in the period of the big economic depression of the thirties, Sir Oswald Mosley, an ambitious and restless politician, started a party of British Fascists which was openly modelled on Mussolini's Fascism and on Hitler's anti-Jewish Nationalist Socialism. Its followers wore black shirts, used violent methods against any questioners or hecklers at their meetings, and denounced the Jews as exploiters and the enemies of the people. For a few years it was a serious mischief locally in East London; but at the outbreak of the Second World War it was utterly discredited because of its pro-Nazi attitude. Its principal members, including Mosley himself, were interned during the war under a regulation for the security of the realm. The attempt to revive it under another name after the end of the war miscarried. For a little time Jewish and 'Left' opinion in East London was agitated again by meetings of the 'Unity Movement', but soon the excitement petered out. The failure does not mean that no anti-Semitism exists; but public opinion in its broad stream is tolerant. When early in 1960 there was a sudden outbreak or 'rash' of neo-Nazi attacks on the Jews and Judaism, the infection spread for a few weeks to a lunatic fringe in England. But at once responsible public opinion was marshalled to check it.

The national service, which has required young men to spend two years in the Forces, has been a powerful instrument for mingling the Jews with the rest of the population. At the same time, Jewish consciousness has been emphasized on both sides as a result of the Hitler persecution. While there is little or no feeling in Britain against the Jews as a minority, since differences of religion, race and nationality, and cultural attachment of minorities are accepted as normal in the multinational society, Jews like other national elements, the Welsh, the Scots, and the Irish, tend to hold to 'the sacred differences'. The danger of excessive assimilation, which was felt before the growth of the Zionist Movement, has been checked. Today, in fact, there appears to be sometimes the opposite danger of over-emphasizing separateness.

The communal organization is more comprehensive and more far-reaching than it was seventy-seven years ago. Each section is looked after by Jewish agencies in a way which was not conceived in the Victorian

era. The provision for the young men and women is an example. In the early part of the century, when the idea of residential settlements of university men and women in the midst of the working-class quarters was pursued in the Jewish and the general community, three such Jewish centres were established in the East End of London. The first bore the name of Lewis House, after the Jewish social worker, Harry Lewis, who was for many years a resident in Toynbee Hall, the prototype of such settlements. Half a dozen young men from the British universities, including Sir Leon Simon, Harry Sacher, Dr. Mortimer Epstein, Jack Myers (son of a famous editor of *The Jewish Chronicle*), and the writer, lived there, and gave their evenings and weekends to cultural activities among the Jewish youth. A more permanent foundation was the Bernard Baron settlement and club, directed by (Sir) Basil Henriques and his wife, who have won a national and international reputation by their devoted half-century of youth work on a religious basis. The third centre in the same neighbourhood is the Brady Street settlement, associated with boys' and girls' clubs, and providing also for adults and old people. Today, when a large number of Jewish youth from East London and other workers' districts win their way to the Universities, the need of the service of such settlements is reduced. But other agencies are multiplied. Besides boys' and girls' clubs and the remaining residential settlements in the Jewish quarters of London and other big towns, the Association of Jewish Youth supervises scores of adult clubs and cultural societies. The clubs, the Jewish Lads' Brigade and the Athletic Societies today are in great measure managed by the young people themselves, who have become independent of the philanthropies and direction of other circles. The University students again, who today are counted in thousands, have organized for themselves an Inter-University Students Federation, which is engaged in cultural activities. And the International Order of B'nai B'rith has introduced into England an established institution of Jewish students in American universities, a Hillel House, that is designed to be a centre for religious and social activities, and a meeting place for Jewish students from many countries. British Jews in recent years have had an honourable place in national and international games. The largest of the Zionist youth bodies, the Maccabee, with 5,000 members, is part of a world organization devoted to sport. The British element has a full part in the athletic meetings of the Maccabead, held every few years in Israel, which are designed to be Jewish Olympic Games.

Another large group of Zionist youth is the Habonim (meaning the Builders) with 3,000 members, of whom a trickle passes each year to the Land of Israel. Other Socialist Zionist groups, one of them religious, prepare their members intensively in England for life in Israel. The Zionists conduct their own educational programme, stressing the knowledge of the living Hebrew and the geography and history of the

Land of Israel, and above all, a pioneering spirit, with the aim of persuading boys and girls in the Commonwealth to be pioneers in Israel. They have in recent years founded a few day-schools, which give a Jewish and a general education, and also stress Hebrew and knowledge of Israel.

Paradoxically the Jewish community has established in this century institutions for the sick, to render services now borne by the State. The general Jewish hospitals in London, Manchester and Leeds, and convalescent homes for tubercular patients are a legacy from the last period of maximum effort of the community for the immigrants from Eastern Europe. The County Councils, which are the educational authority and provide the funds for primary and secondary education, make large grants to the Hebrew day-schools, and to the remaining Jewish denominational schools, and give facilities for religious instruction in the general secular schools. A Jewish higher education committee has been established in London to encourage boys and girls of secondary schools to pursue advanced Jewish studies and become Jewish teachers.

The refugees from the Continent who arrived during the last decades, though integrated into the British community and for the most part British citizens, still maintain their organizations for mutual help. They have brought a signal contribution of brains to the country which gave them refuge and to the community which helped them so generously. They take their full part in economic and social life and more than their share in artistic life. Their young generation, educated in British schools and universities, is likely to continue and enhance that contribution. One consequence of the influx has been to strengthen the element which holds to the full observance of the law and the study of Talmud and Rabbinical literature. This element established in 1927 a Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations which numbers a hundred synagogues distributed in all parts of the country. Their schools provide for 3,000 children, and they have established a Yeshiva, a higher Talmudic college, in Northern England at Gateshead. While the observance of the dietary laws in Jewish homes is not as strong as it was seventy years ago, it is enforced in Jewish public entertainment, partly through the influence of this element.

Another significant feature of communal life is the relation of British with American Jewry. By their numbers, their wealth and generosity, their political and economic influence, American Jews hold today a primacy among the communities outside Israel. With the Jews of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth they are the largest part of the dispersion, and they share a common language and to a great extent a common origin. Yet their relations with the British community is sometimes queered by misunderstanding; comparable with the occasional rift between the British and American governments on questions of world policy. In major issues, however, whether in relation

to Israel, the United Nations, or diplomatic representation on behalf of oppressed Jews and Jewries, the two 'Anglo-Saxon', or rather English-speaking communities, regularly cooperate with each other. The American Jewish Committee has a permanent representative and an office in London, and in all principal endeavours the two communities have developed a habit of cooperation. It has important consequences that English has in our day taken the place of Yiddish as the mother-tongue of the greatest part of the Jewish people.

The most fundamental change, however, in the attitude of the Jewish community during the seventy-seven years has been in its outlook towards the Land of Israel. For centuries the Jews had to be satisfied with a 'portable Fatherland', the way of life, the tradition of the Bible and the Rabbis, the culture and the history through the ages. Now it has a permanent geographical Fatherland, which commands, not the political allegiance, but the sentimental attachment and the practical help of the great mass of Jewry. It provides, too, new cultural ties between all the scattered congregations. Zionism has become in the last seventy years the major ideal and the rallying point of the Jews dispersed throughout the world. And while the political congresses of the Zionist organization, now regularly held in Jerusalem, and the ceaseless collecting of funds for the building of the National Home, loom large in the workaday life of the Jewish communities, what matters more in the evolution of Judaism is the spiritual influence of the Home.

Herzl wrote, at the outset of his effort to make 'Israel a Nation': 'The return to Judaism must precede the return to the Jewish land.' In this conception he approached the standpoint of his contemporary, the spiritual Zionist Ahad-Haam, who strongly opposed his political activity. It was the lesson of Ahad-Haam that the essential task of the National Home was to revive Judaism rather than to save homeless Jews. In the land of Israel the prophetic ideal of justice must be fulfilled by the returning people.

In Israel Judaism is again a living civilization. And the Hebrew renaissance has made the Hebrew Bible a living book for the near two million Jews living there. In the words of the English Coronation Service, the books of the Law and the Prophets are 'the living oracles of God'. The influence of Israel on the Jewish communities, including Anglo-Jewry, is to strengthen this sense of Judaism as a civilization, and to awaken fresh interest in the Hebrew Bible. It tends also to make each community more conscious of its links with the whole congregation of Israel.

The liberal trend of the nineteenth century in the politically emancipated communities was to reduce the intense Judaism of the ghetto, and convert it into a matter of religious belief and practices, which was treated as a private affair. Equality of citizenship of Jew and Gentile was regarded as conditional on cultural conformity in all things except

these beliefs and practices. That tendency to de-nationalization has been reversed in the last decades. The influence of the Hebrew renaissance and the creation of the State of Israel make for the reconstruction of Jewish life in the free countries on religious-national lines. Jews are recognized to be not just a religious denomination, like the Methodists or Roman Catholics. They remain something unique; a religious nationality, the heirs of a civilization which it is for the good of humanity to preserve.

The love of the Bible, which has been a profound characteristic of Protestant Britain, and the desire to encourage commercial enterprise, which was vital to the island people, were the keys opening the doors to Jewish admission into Britain in the seventeenth century. They remained strong motives of the British partnership with the Jews of the world in the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. For the last seventy years the destinies of the Jews and the British people have been more and more interwoven. The prophecy that the Messianic era would come when the Jews were dispersed to the ends of the earth was believed by Cromwell's Puritan advisers to have its fulfilment in the readmission of Jews to Anglia, the angle or the end of the world. The close connexion or rather, the innate community of interest which was established between British Jews and Palestine, since the very beginning of the national movement, is reflected in the present relations of the Anglo-Jewish community to the State and people of Israel. By the working of Providence, England became, for thirty years, the governing Power in Palestine and the centre of the Zionist organization: and the Anglo-Jewish community was called upon to give the lead in the realization of the age-long hope of the Jewish people. Though British Jewry are less than one twentieth of the whole congregation of Israel, they counted in this period for much more than their numbers warrant. It may be said that leadership was thrust upon them; and the seventy years may be regarded as the British era of modern Jewish history.

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ANGLO-JEWISH LITERATURE

Harold Pollins

ONE OF THE persistent themes in the discussion of Jewish arts is the definition of the subject. What exactly Jewish creative works are, is, for example, a practical question. When a Jewish novelist writes a non-Jewish story, should it be included in bibliographies or anthologies devoted to Jewish literature? The compilers of such anthologies sometimes acknowledge the problem; they seldom solve it. In a book of short stories and extracts from novels called '. . . *In England and in English*' (London, 1947) [with the sub-title 'A Collection of Modern Stories by Jewish Writers'] the editor, William Goldman, writes:

> As can be seen by a perusal of its contents, the material selected has no shared racial, religious or national basis. While it is true that its authors are the representatives of more than one nation and of more than one religious faith and, possibly, in some cases, of no religious faith at all, the three qualities shared by all the stories are: that their authors are Jewish; they are domiciled in England or are of English birth; and all write in the English language (p. 11).

In fact he begs the question of what a Jewish writer is. Of the sixteen pieces in the book only seven are on Jewish themes, plus one or two others whose Jewishness is implicit. The connexion between some of them, such as an East End story, *Solomon the Scoundrel*, by Max Clapper, and an extract from Marghanita Laski's war-time satire, *Love on the Super-Tax*, is so remote that an anthology of stories by people six feet tall would seem to be just as sensible as this one.

In this essay I shall follow the line of thought of Salo Baron who argues that there is little reason to expect to find 'Jewish' traces in the artistic works of those who are culturally assimilated into the environment of the Diaspora, unless their productions are explicitly Jewish.

'Only here and there', says Baron, 'a connoisseur will detect, or thinks he detects, a certain undefinable ingredient which stamps this or that art as Jewish.' [1] Jewish novelists seldom pose their problems in a theological framework, although religious practices and rituals often feature in their writings. It is true that there may be an element of religious (or social) attitude which is sometimes called 'Jewish': charitableness; humanitarianism; the strength of family life; sentimentality; for example. But it is easy to argue that these attributes are in no way peculiar to Jews.

Thus a Jewish novel is not necessarily a religious novel, or one in which religious attitudes are important themes. More positively, it is Jewish because the characters and situations are Jewish. This is a definition of convenience, in the same way as, in this essay, I mean by Anglo-Jewish literature those novels and plays by Jews which deal with Jewish life in Britain.[2]

There are, however, two aspects of this definition which need to be mentioned. First, while a Jewish novel or play may often be identified as such by the names of the characters and their speech, and by the situations through which the plot develops, there are some works, ostensibly non-Jewish, which may in fact be basically 'Jewish'. Peter Shaffer's well-received play, *Five Finger Exercise* (London, 1958), deals with an English middle-class family, but to many Jews the situations are typically those of modern Jewish life.

Second, there are those works which, while having identifiable Jewish characters, are only marginally relevant to this essay. In Harold Pinter's play, *The Birthday Party* (London, 1959), there is a main character called Goldberg whose Jewishness is explicit—in name, language, and attitude. But the theme of the play—whatever it is; it is one of those complex symbolic works in which the author provides hardly any clues to the meaning of the symbols—is quite clearly not essentially a Jewish one.[3] The character of Goldberg is well-drawn and accurate; but the play does not tell us much about the situation of Anglo-Jewry in the 1950's—or at any other period. And the major purpose of this essay is to discuss the relation between the literature and the social history of Anglo-Jewry.

This is only one of the many topics which could be discussed within the general category of the sociology of literature. Another, which I also want to examine, is the attitude of the various writers to the problems and situations they describe. With the latter is involved a matter which needs to be looked at first—a matter which the creative writers of all minority groups have to face; its direct relevance to this essay will become evident at a later stage.

I

Like the figure of the Negro in American literature, the characterization of the Jew in English literature has attracted a great deal of attention. During the past eighty years there have been numerous articles and essays on the subject, and at least a half-dozen books, the latest being Professor Harold Fisch's *The Dual Image: A Study of the Figure of the Jew in English Literature*, which appeared in 1959. These various works, of different quality, all tell the same dismal story.[4]

George Orwell, in a brief aside, came to this conclusion:

> There has been a perceptible anti-Semitic strain in English literature from Chaucer onwards, and without even getting up from this table to consult a book I can think of passages which *if written now* would be stigmatized as anti-Semitism, in the works of Shakespeare, Smollett, Thackeray, Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, T. S. Eliot, Aldous Huxley, and various others.[5]

He was echoing, perhaps unwittingly, the views of many others. M. J. Landa, in his *The Jew in Drama* (London, 1926), a comprehensive, but unsatisfactory work, was even more insistent:

> In no department of human activity has Jew-baiting been more persistent and popular than in the realm of the drama. From time immemorial the Jew has either been grossly libelled or ruthlessly travestied on the stage. The practice has become an almost adamantine law. Like an unending serial story, the harrying of the Jew runs through the history of the theatre, from out of the chaos of its beginning unto this very day (p. 9).

Nevertheless the writers on this subject admit that changes have taken place. The stock character of the Jew, as it developed in works before about 1700, contained, as Professor Fisch shows, a strong element of myth, a myth based partly on the religious conflict between Judaism and Christianity in the middle ages, and partly on the historical reality of the medieval Jew as usurer. Further, before the eighteenth century few Englishmen had ever come across Jews except in legend and fiction. But however strong remained the antagonism towards the Jews, and however fixed was the mythological image in the public's mind, from the eighteenth century onwards more favourable characterizations began to appear. It was the Age of Enlightenment, of the transition to industrialism, of the beginnings of democracy, and of the growth of tolerance. The effect was seen in Lessing's *Nathan der Weise*, and in Richard Cumberland's *The Jew*. In the latter play, Sheva the Jew 'is a saint ready to deprive himself of all bodily comforts for the sake of others'.[6]

Tolerance—the removal of civil disabilities, and the movement of notable Jews into the upper reaches of British society after the middle of the nineteenth century—was one factor in the improvement of Jewish characterization in literature. Another was the sympathy extended to

Jews because of their sufferings and persecution in Europe. After 1933 that sympathy grew, and, with the political line-up of the period, 'to put an unsympathetic Jewish character into a novel or a short story came to be regarded as anti-Semitism'.[7] The result is seen, nowadays, in the recent novels by non-Jews about Jews, such as Hugh Massingham's *The Harp and the Oak* (London, 1945); Samuel Youd's *A Palace of Strangers* (London, 1954); and C. P. Snow's *The Conscience of the Rich* (London, 1958). In Massingham's novel a kindly Jewish doctor meets anti-Semitism in an English village in war-time. Youd's story of a Liverpool-Jewish family (with German connexions) is mainly concerned with inter-marriage. Snow's novel is about a wealthy banking family in the 1930's. In all of these the Jewish characters no longer display any remnants of the earlier mythology.[8]

One important novelty is that opposition to anti-Semitism came to be used to illustrate a character's liberalism. In *The Struggles of Albert Woods* by William Cooper (London, 1952) the hero's ambitions are about to be crowned by the conferment of a knighthood; a minister of state has said: 'Something must be done for Woods.' At a party Woods hears a woman saying that Hitler was right about the Jews: 'I'd load them all in Channel steamers and take the bung out of the bottom.' Woods insults her: 'You stupid ——!' She is the wife of the minister; he does not get the knighthood. (It is important to state that in the late fifties liberalism is more often equated with attitudes towards coloured people than towards Jews.)

But while the emphasis on public attitudes towards them is the predictable preoccupation of the members of a minority group, it cannot be said that the approach of the various studies on the Jew in literature, or the conclusions they reach, are always very helpful. Each study could be criticized in detail; Professor Fisch's is the latest and is worthy of special mention. His essay is distinctive for two reasons. First, he sets his theme in a psychological framework; second, he brings the story up to date. (The previous major work on the subject, Modder's *The Jew in the Literature of England*, peters out at about 1900.)

Fisch's study is, however, unsatisfactory. His psychological approach suffers from the defects of all such interpretations of anti-Semitism —defects which have been lucidly explained by Professor Ginsberg.[9] Further, his analysis of some novels seems to go far beyond anything the authors intended. Thus he argues that Graham Greene's *Brighton Rock* (London, 1938) 'is a novel conducted at the level of theological symbolism or allegory', and is a story based on 'the old medieval conjunction of Jew and Devil'. (One of the race-gangs in the novel is a Jewish gang.) In fact the Jewish element in the story is hardly relevant to the major themes; and the killing of Spicer, which Fisch likens to the crucifixion and betrayal of Jesus, is a minor incident (Fisch, pp. 74–5).

But, more generally, what exactly is meant by 'anti-Semitism' in

many of these contexts? What is a favourable or an unfavourable character? One of the difficulties is seen quite clearly in the conflicting lists of so-called anti-Semitic and favourable writers. Orwell included Dickens among those who 'made a definite effort to stick up for the Jews'. Dr. van der Veen, on the other hand, speaks of Dickens's Fagin as 'the malicious and cowardly Jew'.[10] Dickens himself denied he was possessed of any anti-Jewish sentiments when he created Fagin. 'Fagin in *Oliver Twist*', he wrote, 'is a Jew, because it unfortunately was true of the time to which the story refers, that that class of criminal almost invariably *was* a Jew.'[11] Whether or not this was in fact the case need not detain us; the point is that even if Fagin was a historical character, Jews would still object to him, for he displays some of the stereotype characteristics that Jews prefer not to see portrayed.

Even when writers have produced demythologized Jewish characters, or protests against intolerance, the characters are often stereotype images or offend Jewish susceptibilities in some way. *The Merchant of Venice* is usually interpreted as a plea for tolerance and charity towards the Jews. But there are many people who regard the play as anti-Semitic; the character of Shylock may be played with humanity and understanding, but few Jews can listen to much of it without irritation. 'Shylock' in common speech is a term of abuse. The Jew in Cumberland's play is used as a protest against the hardship and injustice of the Gentile world, but he is a usurer, as is Moses in Sheridan's *School for Scandal*. Anthony Trollope's recent biographer says that Trollope is not anti-Semitic (a description of Bertrand Russell's). 'For apart from Roger Carbury, Brehgert [the Jew] is the only genuinely honest man in the book, and behaves throughout with intelligence and forbearance. Instead of being a symbol of anti-Semitism, Brehgert's disagreeable appearance helps to rehabilitate not only a Jew, but—a much more difficult matter—the popular idea of one.'[12] Galsworthy's play *Loyalties* (1922), about a Jew, De Levis, whose money is stolen at a country-house, is a plea for justice for the Jew. It was hailed by M. J. Landa as being 'in a class by itself as a serious and conscious effort to grapple with a Jewish—and an English—problem' (p. 236). But De Levis is better described as 'a caricature of Jewish characteristics rather than a representation of a Jewish character. He has all the faults with which anti-Semitism credits the Jew.'[13] The characters are often intentionally unpleasant; the author is saying that despite the unpleasantness it is wrong to be anti-Jewish. It is a noble concept, but the stereotype image remains, and the reader does not come away with any affection for Jews.

Probably most writers, Jewish or not, who have used Jewish characters, have been accused by somebody of anti-Semitism. The writer's difficulty arises precisely from the adjustments associated with the move from the ghetto, for with it is involved the desire to avoid the stigma of the stereotype image. Jews, the feeling seems to be, should not be portrayed

as financiers, as rich people, as misers, as having foreign accents, and as humble, fawning monstrosities. Their physical features should not be described in terms of ugliness.[14] An American writer has complained of what he insists is the gratuitous anti-Semitism in Graham Greene's writing. He instances sentiments like: 'They tell you Jews are awfully generous, don't you believe it.' And: 'The sharp acquisitive Jewish faces peered out.' [15]

The Jewish writer is clearly in a dilemma in such a situation. 'On the one hand, he is committed to the ideal of imaginatively delineating people and situations with as much honesty as he can command, holding nothing back. On the other hand, as a Jew he is expected to take into consideration the probable effect a book or a situation will have in spreading and intensifying anti-Semitic prejudice.' [16] Nevertheless, there has been no shortage of Jewish writers who have not hesitated to criticize what they saw in Jewish society. In addressing the general public the Jewish writer may well be inhibited; how he reacts may depend on his judgement, experience, and feelings, and on the intimacy of his connexion with the Jewish community.

II

The first works which may properly be described as Anglo-Jewish novels appeared in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; they accompanied, that is to say, the beginnings of the large-scale immigration from Eastern Europe which completely transformed the Anglo-Jewish community. In general it is the history of that new group which is the basic subject matter of the subsequent novels and plays. That history is familiar, and parts of it have been well described in several recent studies.[17] The new foreign immigrants live in the 'East Ends' of towns; they suffer poverty and hardship; but they work hard, become anglicized, and they, or their children or grandchildren, become prosperous and move out to the suburbs.

The works of fiction reflect that history, but there tends to be a time-lag. The first Anglo-Jewish novels were not, in fact, by or about the new immigrants. Such novelists as Julia Frankau ('Mrs. Frank Danby'), and Amy Levy wrote about the anglicized, middle-class, West End Jews, the descendants of earlier immigrations. By 1880 that community was largely English-born and some had taken advantage of the economic and social advances of the preceding generation. The Jewish characters are on the threshold of acceptance into English upper middle-class society; both of these writers protested at the narrow, enclosed, materialist world they saw.[18]

That middle-class world was overwhelmed by the post-1881 immigration of poor, Yiddish-speaking Jews, but the middle-class Jewish writers tended to retain their primacy. Thus as late as 1933, when Joseph

Leftwich's collection of stories, *Yisröel, The First Jewish Omnibus,* was published, most of the pieces in the English section were by descendants of the pre-1881 immigration. Nevertheless, the focus of attention must inevitably be the new immigrants of the last part of the nineteenth century, and of their children.

How many 'East End' novels, written in English, there were is not easy to say. There must have been many which have been forgotten, having made no impact when they were published or since. Even those lists of Anglo-Jewish writers which seem to detail everybody who has ever written seldom mention the names of Noah Elstein, R. Hildebrand, or John Sorsky. The only Jewish writers in Britain who have been accorded serious critical treatment are Disraeli and the poet Isaac Rosenberg. Disraeli is properly regarded as significant for his political rather than his Jewish writings (and it is a matter of opinion whether or not he should be included as a Jewish writer).[19]

Obviously much of this literature is not worth treating with the detailed critical apparatus that a study such as this ought to require. Some of the books now make embarrassing reading and it is a matter for wonder that they are still acknowledged with respect.

One general factor in the literature by and about the post-1881 immigration is that there is a time-lag. The first generation were seldom able to acquire fluency in English, and those who described them in fiction were not themselves part of that immigration. The most famous novel of Jewish life in England in the late nineteenth century is undoubtedly Israel Zangwill's *Children of the Ghetto* (1892); but Zangwill was born in England in 1864. Another contemporary description of London's East End appeared in Samuel Gordon's *Sons of the Covenant* (London, 1900); Gordon was born in Germany in 1871 and his English education was at a public school (the City of London School) and at Cambridge University. (His novel is primarily a work of social conscience, typical of the attitudes of the period. It deals with West End as well as East End Jews.)

The East End was also described by later writers; it appeared in Izak Goller's *The Five Books of Mr. Moses* (London, 1929), and in Simon Blumenfeld's *Phineas Kahn, Portrait of an Immigrant* (London, 1937).

These novels, whether written contemporaneously or later, share many features in common. The hero and his family live the same life of poverty, in overcrowded, unhealthy slums. They speak Yiddish or broken English, and are often intensely religious. The community is self-contained, and there is hardly any contact with the outside world; except for Christian missions, an important feature of Goller's strange novel. (He deals with a recurrent theme; the non-Jewish person is found to have had a Jewish mother.)[20] But the non-Jewish world, in general, remains something strange and fearful, to be avoided.

The immigrant novels are often regarded with distaste nowadays because of the foreignness of the characters and the sentimentality of the

situations and of the writing. But several of the novels of the 1930's, dealing with the second generation, have a different, tougher tone. They include Noah Elstein's *Plight of Peretz* (London, 1930), Simon Blumenfeld's *Jew Boy* (London, 1935), and his *Phineas Kahn*, and Willy Goldman's *East End My Cradle* (London, 1940). The period covered by these novels—say 1910 to 1940—saw what David Daiches has suggested was 'one of the most short-lived languages in the world'—Scots-Yiddish: 'Aye man, ich hob' getrebbelt mit de five o'clock train'; and 'Vot time's yer barmitzvie, laddie?' [21] Such 'languages' probably existed in most places, producing cockney-Yiddish, Welsh-Yiddish, Lancashire-Yiddish, and so on. One or other was spoken by the parents of the main characters in the novels produced in the 1930's. In the more Jewish areas the children adopted a more English, but still recognizably Jewish accent. The girl in Elstein's novel has the typical 'adenoidal' overtones of the period.

The majority of the second-generation people in these novels are still working-class, but there is a change of emphasis. The East End was always a declining community; the aim of most Jews was to leave it as soon as possible, and to move out of the working-class by becoming a small master or manufacturer, the children going to grammar schools and entering the professions.[22] The novels of the thirties do not reflect this theme. The talk is of strikes, unemployment, trade union and political action. The heroes do not speak of becoming manufacturers or doctors, but poets, artists, and writers. Blumenfeld's *Jew Boy* is Jewish only because the main character is a Jew. He leaves the family early in the novel, and the remainder of the story is a typical, if well-written, example of the Proletarian Novel. It has, for Jewish novels, an unusually unsentimental atmosphere, and it includes sex, a subject which Jewish writers until then seem to have forgotten.

In some of the novels, the father is a failure, hopeless at trying to make a living. This accords with the proletarian theme, as well as showing a typical character in Jewish folklore. But it also agrees with the rejection of the middle class which comes into these novels and helps to account for the fact that the family is still poor and in the East End.

In Goldman's *East End My Cradle* the hero describes his father:

> My father had every Jewish trait except the one the Gentile world has made into a legend: acquisitiveness. He didn't have the acquisitiveness even of the ordinary breadwinner. . . . To this day he goes round giving bits of his wages to beggars. He has an inconvenient disposition to see the other man's view-point. In a dispute over the rent his heart bleeds for the landlord's difficulties (p. 190).

The father in *Plight of Peretz* is also a failure:

> After a life full of odd vicissitudes, trumpery trades and petty businesses, Mr. Israel had recently turned trousers-presser, taking work 'out' from a

number of master-tailors. (As his wife was wont to comment bitterly, he had flown, flown, flown—and alighted on the back of a pig.) . . . He earned very little, even when working full time, for he was a slow worker, or, as his wife would call him, a scratcher (p. 44).

Whereas the non-Jewish world hardly enters the immigrant novel, it has an important place in the novels of the second generation. There is the question of anti-Semitism; there is the problem of inter-marriage. Inter-marriage may act as an escape-route from a narrow, bigoted world, or be, more positively—as in Louis Golding's over-rated *Magnolia Street* (London, 1932)—the answer to the Jewish problem. Opposed to it are family pressure and the folk-myth of Jewish ritual and practices; religious practices are performed by the older generation but seldom by the younger.

Willy Goldman's novel, which appeared in 1940, marked the end of an era, although not of the East End's appearance in fiction. His hero grows up in the Cable Street district of Stepney, a tough area of Jews and non-Jews, and goes to work in the tailoring trade.[23] In 1940 the blitz began the final break-up of the Jewish East End, already weakened by earlier movements out to Hackney, Stamford Hill, and the suburbs.[24] Later, the general decline in the population of the East End combined with post-war prosperity to accelerate the suburbanization of London Jewry, a process paralleled in the provincial towns.

Those who, before the war, were brought up in the working and lower middle-class areas outside the East End have made their appearance in novels published since the war. They were written by people whose schooldays and youth were spent in the shadow of Hitlerism, Spain, the Popular Front, Zionism, and the war. The characters may still live largely in a Jewish atmosphere, as in Roland Camberton's *Rain on the Pavements* (London, 1951), a novel of Hackney, but the non-Jewish world is very much in evidence. The heroes usually go to a grammar school, where most of the boys are non-Jews. In Dannie Abse's novel of Cardiff, *Ash on a Young Man's Sleeve* (London, 1954), the boys in the family have non-Jewish girl-friends with the parents' knowledge—a new departure. The third important novel is Alexander Baron's *With Hope, Farewell* (London, 1952), based, like Camberton's, on Hackney, although the group dealt with belong to the working-class Dutch Jews who came to Britain in the pre-1881 period. All three novels are in the form of chronicles, beginning with the heroes as children in the 1920's and following their life as children at school and, in Baron's case the hero's career in the R.A.F. during the war, and his experiences after the war in 1948.

Abse's novel reflects the leftish politics of the period, as does Camberton's; the latter also introduces the reader to Zionism, but only in a brief episode. There is hardly any anti-Semitism referred to in Abse, and it is played down in Camberton—incidents at the grammar school are

described ironically. In Baron's book it takes first place. Like so many other Jewish novels the hero rejects the Jewish community for its narrowness and squalor; later, after the war, he returns to it under the impact of anti-Semitism. The final episode describes the post-war Fascist activity in Hackney, and the attacks on synagogues in Britain which accompanied the terrorist activity during the close of the Palestinian mandate. There is an anti-Jewish riot during which the hero's wife is injured and has a miscarriage.

Baron's novel describes, in sensitive detail, how it feels to be a Jew in a hostile or possibly hostile world. The tone is set in the first chapter when the family is on holiday at a non-Jewish hotel. They are anxious to avoid slighting remarks and to seek out other Jews. The mother at lunch says to her husband:

'That couple over there.' She spoke softly and urgently. 'I bet you they're ours.' The boys listened; they knew what she meant. 'Him, the husband; look at him.' She was excited at her discovery.

He looked. 'Nah. You're imagining. Anyway, you can't tell. Can't ask them either. They'd take a fit if you was wrong.'

'You can hint,' she said. There was a special technique for hinting; a host of private, innocent words and phrases to trail here and there in the midst of conversation, in the hope of a response (p. 15).

The Jews in the East End novels of the 1930's had no time to be touchy in this way; they were aggressive. Abse's hero is neither sensitive nor aggressive. The hero as a young boy asks:

'Uncle, what's it like to be Jewish all your life?'

"S all right,' he said (p. 27).

This is the tone of relationships with the immediate Gentile world, but the author introduces echoes of anti-Semitism from the wider world.

The post-war period has been written about in other novels. In some of Wolf Mankowitz's stories, such as *Make me an Offer* (London, 1952), a story of antique dealers, the setting is the present day; the Jewish businessman is well described. Some of his other stories are firmly based on the East End and the East End, too, was the setting for two plays produced in 1958, which aroused a great deal of interest: Arnold Wesker's *Chicken Soup with Barley* and Bernard Kops's *The Hamlet of Stepney Green.*[25] Kops's play is set in a lower middle-class home at the present day, and describes the attempt of the son to become a crooner. The theme of Wesker's play is disillusionment with the Communist Party, ending with the Hungarian Rising of 1956. It begins with a Jewish family living in Stepney in 1936. They take part in the demonstration to prevent the Fascists marching through the East End; it is a continuation, in other words, of the theme of Blumenfeld's *Jew Boy.*

After the war the family is living in a council flat in Hackney and is still working-class. As in so many East End stories, the mother is dominant, the father is a failure, and the son wants to be a writer. The fact that they are Jewish is hardly relevant to the story. There is little awareness of contemporary Jewish events; the mother becomes a Communist because of the state of the economic system, not—as was probably more typical—as a reaction to Hitlerism and anti-Semitism. There is nothing about Zionism.[28]

In only one novel has Zionism played a major role, in David Marcus's *To Next Year in Jerusalem* (London, 1954). It is set in Ireland during 1947 and 1948 in a remote town where there is only the remnant of a Jewish community. The events in Palestine provide the background to the story. Part of the material is familiar—the religious, foreign, older generation, for example—but the novel's strangeness lies in the hero's being one of the only ten males in the town. He is attracted to Palestine, but he hesitates to go because he is essential for the *minyan* (a poor excuse) and he is in love with an Irish girl. The hero is Jewish both in terms of his adherence to religious practices—another new departure—and to Zionism; he is also integrated in the Irish community. Unlike novels written by English Jews, this one was not afraid to speak up for the terrorists—indeed the Irish background is a suitable setting for such an attitude.

III

All the Jewish writers, from Zangwill to Wesker, focus their attention on the East End and its extension, and on working and lower middle-class life. The East End, however, as the major centre of the Jewish population and the source of the community's strength is vanishing. It is a commonplace to observe that Anglo-Jewry is becoming middle-class and professional. This is known from the few available statistics and from ordinary experience. The decline of the East End, and the growth of Jewish communities in north-west London and the outer suburbs (there is a similar spread in the provinces), also imply the same process. It is a commonplace too to be critical of the new Jewish middle-class. *The Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* used the opportunity of the tercentenary of the resettlement of the Jews in England to make a stock-taking of the present Anglo-Jewish situation (13 January 1956). Zionism is now conventional and no longer dynamic; there is a vast mass of religious indifference; inter-marriage and assimilation are increasing. At the same time an orthodox minority is becoming increasingly intolerant in religious matters. There is no source of persons or ideas in the now vanished intensely-Jewish Eastern European countries, and what so many people have been saying for generations about decay in Anglo-Jewish life now has a greater chance than ever of success. Jews nowadays

adhere to religion as a social necessity, but the highest offices go to those with money. 'Our community is overwhelmingly middle class and one of its characteristics is that it thinks of success in terms of money; its heroes are those who attain success on the financial plane.'

An attack on materialism in modern Jewish life was the major theme of a novel by Brian Glanville, *The Bankrupts*, published in 1958. The author has no direct knowledge of the East End, and went to a public school; for those reasons alone the novel would merit some attention. It was written by a competent writer, and it aroused a great deal of controversy within the Jewish community. There was a long correspondence in *The Jewish Chronicle*, the main Anglo-Jewish periodical; ministers of religion spoke about it; Glanville received the accolade of 'Angry Young Man'. A series of interviews with other young Jewish writers, published in *The Jewish Chronicle* in December 1958 and January 1959, showed quite clearly that they had little faith in the Anglo-Jewish community or its future. The external forces making for cohesiveness—anti-Semitism and Zionism—were no longer of pressing importance; but there was nothing in Judaism or Jewish life positive enough to attract and hold people. All that remained were lockshen pudding and charity dances.

This is the mood of Glanville's novel. There were aspects of the book that caught on and it is worthy of detailed examination. In *The Bankrupts* the grandparents came from Eastern Europe and the family business was built up in the East End. The parents moved out of the East End and now live somewhere 'between Hampstead and Hendon'. The family retain links with the Jewish religion, but their attachment to ritual is minimal—they eat bacon, for example. The story hinges on the daughter, who has had a typical English upper middle-class education; she has no job, but dabbles in art. The parents want her to marry a rich young Jew—any rich young Jew—and much of the novel concerns her rejection of a string of suitors. She meets a Jewish postgraduate student, and, after parental opposition, she goes off to live with him. He obtains a post at the Hebrew University, and gets killed by Arabs. She finds she is pregnant and decides to go to Israel to have her baby in a kibbutz. The point is that this wealthy society is hopelessly and corruptly materialist. Bernard Carter, the student, is not suitable for her because he can only become a teacher or a lecturer and will not earn much. The society is interested only in money, fashion, charity dances, and business.

The novel describes and attacks the closely-knit family whose Jewishness is vestigial, but which exists largely within its own Jewish world. Its members attend Jewish functions, belong to Jewish organizations (e.g. a golf club), and spend their holidays at Jewish hotels.

There is much that is worthwhile in the novel. It is an excellent illustration of the fact that even anglicized Jews can and do live almost

entirely Jewish lives, in which their contacts, business as well as social and familial, are Jewish. What can be the stiflingly oppressive atmosphere of a Jewish family, with meticulous control of the children by the parents, is dissected with repetitive precision. The detailed investigation of materialism is salutary; it is a useful corrective to the widely-held impression—among non-Jews as well as Jews—that Jews are necessarily sensitive, artistic, musical, and intellectual.

And yet the novel does not come off. Even apart from the melodrama of the ending, there are faults of style and characterization. The writing is strident, and the discussion is carried on at the top of everyone's voice, involving an over-use of exclamation marks and adjectives. Almost everybody and everything is painted in lurid colours. Sometimes this leads to peculiar images; a fresco on the wall of a Jewish restaurant contains 'policemen *frozen* into strange, stiff attitudes and grimaces, as though by the *lava* of some invisible volcano' (p. 20; my italics). There is little development of character and little attempt to probe beneath superficialities. It is as though the author has made a rapid tour and amplified the snatches of conversation he heard. Furthermore, the author overstates his case. It is a commonplace in Jewish fiction to attack the Jewish religion; he gives the usual reasons of a meaningless and irrelevant ritual, but he also blames it for the heroine's refusal to sleep with the hero.

To describe the novel as anti-Semitic, as many people did (I heard it spoken of as 'disloyal'), is not very helpful. The author has written that those who protested at the book were objecting to any criticism of the Jewish community; the society he attacks 'denies the justice or validity of any hostile statement'. It is true that most people object to criticism —the author not least among them—but he is wrong to impute defence mechanisms to the motives of those who have objected to the book.[27]

For it is clear that he has written an indictment of the whole of London Jewry, and possibly of all Anglo-Jewry. This is plain from his authorial comments: for example, the story of the family from the grandparents' immigration in the late nineteenth century 'was straightforward and familiar, in all but detail, the story of a thousand other Jewish immigrants' (p. 16). It is this wholesale generalization which has caused much of the irritation to his readers. The characters and situations he describes are based on Hampstead Garden Suburb; it would be very easy to produce evidence from elsewhere to dispute much of what he says.[28] For example, the situation he describes—a student of English literature being turned down as a prospective son-in-law—can, and no doubt does, arise. It is the contrary of the myth of the Jewish attachment to disinterested learning. But it would have made more sense, and been more typical, if the arguments had been about a poor workingman, or a non-Jew. A more usual solution would have been for the student to have been offered a post in the family business.

One particular objection needs to be stated; his descriptions of Jewish physical features. Sentences such as 'The voice was glutinous, its owner swarthy, huge-nosed, Asiatic' (p. 135) give the right impression of repugnance. But the author must make allowances for those to whom such writing is reminiscent of Fascist journalism. Compared with this, the objections to Graham Greene's descriptions seem trivial and absurd.

Finally, while an attack on materialism is an important and necessary theme, this book does not arouse sympathy. The humourless method of using the petulant grumblings of some spoilt children induces boredom rather than understanding.

IV

The Anglo-Jewish novelists and playwrights have undoubtedly produced works which reflect the recent social history of the Jews of Britain. Their fiction is a useful commentary on, and provides interesting supplementary material for, any discussion of the main trends of that history. But it would be hopelessly wrong to assume that what has interested these writers are necessarily the main problems that have agitated Anglo-Jewry.

The time-lag operates in the later works of fiction. It is obvious that most Anglo-Jewish works have a strong autobiographical flavour—not many of the writers have produced more than one or two Jewish stories, and they are invariably about young people or the stories are told from the viewpoint of young people. Moreover, Jewish writers in England seem to have few contacts with general Jewish life; their knowledge of Jewish matters is, apparently, based on a remembrance of their childhood, and they protest at that childhood.

Further, it is normal for any writer of quality to assume the primacy of the arts and to reject and despise many aspects of contemporary life. The writer's concentration on the significance of becoming a writer or artist is not, therefore, completely unexpected. Again, there are gaps in this literature. The post-1933 German immigration is hardly represented[29] nor is there much mention of Zionism, a movement which, in the 1930's and 1940's, tended to become the major force in Jewish life, for many people superseding the synagogue as its focal point. The establishment of the State of Israel has removed much of the *raison d'être* of Zionism, leaving a void which many anxious minds are seeking to fill.

This is clearly one of the major problems in modern Jewish life, associated with the desire to establish a Jewish identity, the desire of those who wish to become as English as possible, to remove all traces of stereotype images, and yet who want to remain attached to the Jewish community, or to identify themselves in some way as Jews.[30] There is material, for example, in the experiences of Robert Henriques, a mem-

ber of a Jewish family settled in England since at least the eighteenth century, a Regular Army officer, and a farmer. He was an Englishman who happened to practise the Jewish religion, and an anti-Zionist. 'Israel was not much more than an item of news to me until the late autumn of 1955. It was then that something clicked through some cause which, even to-day, I cannot locate. Perhaps it was the Centurion tank which Britain was giving to Egypt but withholding from Israel. Or perhaps it was some remote stirring in a Jew's blood. Whatever it was, I had a sudden, inexplicable, undefined and still indefinable feeling of identity with Israel, a place that I had never visited and for which I had even felt, hitherto, a kind of apprehensive repugnance.' [31]

Dr. Talmon also has some pertinent comments:

> It seems impossible to lay a finger on anything tangible and measurable in the Jew's Jewishness; yet an ailing, all-devouring self-consciousness comes like a film between him and the world. Not bothered with when things are normal and prosper, he is seen as ubiquitous, all-powerful, sinister when blame is to be laid upon someone. I believe the links holding Jews together are—to use words of Edmund Burke—as invisible as the air and as strong as the heaviest chains, and the Jewish ingredient to be as imperceptible to the senses, yet as effective in results, as vital energy itself.
>
> But these things are too subtle for the historian's techniques and such crude instruments as quantitative measurements of Jewish participation in trades and professions, or data on attendance at synagogue and contributions to charities. Jewish impulses and reactions, attitudes and sensitiveness, Jewish patterns of thought and feeling, and Jewish modes of behaviour call for the intuition of the artist, and can indeed be only intimated by symbols, conjured up by poetic incantation, and conveyed by the art of the novelist.[32]

Not everyone will agree with those sentiments. There is a crying need for factual information of the most basic kind; for example, the only research on inter-marriage in Britain is based on fifty cases. It would do no harm, either, to have systematic information about Jewish participation in the arts, as consumers as well as producers. There is, however, a great deal in what he says. Whether the present generation of Anglo-Jewish novelists can tackle it is debatable. There are several who have the equipment to do so, but to judge by the recent utterances of some of them, while they may be aware of the ambiguities in Jewish life, they maintain a self-imposed social distance between themselves and the Jewish community. Their attack on materialism is not a criticism of industrial society in the grand manner, but rather a long-winded grumble at the Jewish community for not buying their books. At that level of discussion we cannot hope for much.[33]

NOTES

[1] Salo W. Baron, 'The Modern Age', in *Great Ideas and Ages of the Jewish People* (ed. Leo W. Schwarz) (New York, 1956), p. 390.

[2] In 'Anglo-Jewish Literature' I include also works relating to the Jews of Ireland and Wales (produced by Lily Tobias, Dannie Abse, and David Marcus). There is no other suitable phrase; 'British-Jewish' would be wrong because Commonwealth writers would have to be included, and the Irish would have to be excluded.

[3] For some comments on Pinter see: *The Times*, 16 November 1959; *New Statesman*, 12 December 1959; *The Observer*, 13 December 1959.

[4] For a bibliography of publications between 1877 and 1935 see C. Roth, *Magna Bibliotheca Anglo-Judaica* (London, 1937), pp. 172–6. Since 1935 the major works have been: M. F. Modder, *The Jew in the Literature of England* (Philadelphia, 1939); E. D. Coleman, *The Jew in English Drama. An Annotated Bibliography* (New York, 1943) (this includes American works).

[5] George Orwell, 'Anti-Semitism in Britain', in *England Your England, and other essays* (1953), p. 76. The article first appeared in the *Contemporary Jewish Record* in 1945.

[6] Fisch, op. cit., p. 46. For a general discussion of the period see: H. R. S. van der Veen, *Jewish Characters in Eighteenth Century English Fiction and Drama* (Groningen, 1935).

[7] Orwell, op. cit., p. 73.

[8] Perhaps the most important Jewish character in modern English literature is Leopold Bloom in James Joyce's *Ulysses*. For a recent discussion see: David Daiches, 'James Joyce's Jew' in *The Jewish Chronicle Quarterly Supplement: A Review of Literature and the Arts*, 25 December 1959.

[9] Morris Ginsberg, 'Anti-Semitism', in his *Reason and Unreason in Society* (London, 1947), pp. 208–11.

[10] Orwell, op. cit., p. 76; van der Veen, op. cit., p. 31.

[11] This was in a letter of 1863 to Eliza Davis. Printed in Modder, op. cit., p. 220.

[12] A. O. J. Cockshut, *Anthony Trollope. A Critical Study* (1955), p. 211. The reference is to *The Way We Live Now* published in 1875.

[13] Helen Bentwich, in a notice of the play. *The Jewish Review*, no. 2 (1932), p. 110. One writer even goes so far as to include *Loyalties* with the other anti-Semitic novels and plays: Ludwig Feuchtwanger, 'Reflections on Anglo-Jewish History', *Historia Judaica*, Vol. 9, no. 2 (1947), p. 126.

[14] In Goller's *The Five Books of Mr. Moses* the author addresses the reader: 'The writer apologizes. His tale is villainless. He tried to find a villain to entertain his readers and to wipe off old scores. To hit back at the Gentile novelists. Ninety-nine per cent of the Ikeys and Moseses in Gentile novels have hooked noses, sensual lips, wicked, scheming brains, and lisps. And they are ever lying in wait to overreach the simple, honest, manly innocent Gentiles' (p. 159).

[15] H. U. Ribalow, 'Of Jews and Graham Greene', *The Jewish Quarterly*, Vol. 3, no. 2 (1955), p. 13.

[16] C. I. Glicksberg, 'Anti-Semitism and the Jewish Novelist', *Mid-Century* (ed. H. U. Ribalow) (New York, 1955), p. 341. He is speaking of American-Jewish writers, but the sentiment is appropriate to other countries besides America.

[17] V. D. Lipman, *Social History of the Jews in England, 1850–1950* (London, 1954); *A Minority in Britain, Social Studies of the Anglo-Jewish Community* (ed. M. Freedman) (London, 1955); Israel Finestein, *A Short History of Anglo-Jewry* (London, 1957), especially chapters 12 and 13; Lloyd P. Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870–1914* (London, in press 1960).

[18] Victor Gollancz, in *My dear Timothy* (London, 1952), describes the same world in non-fictional terms. For Amy Levy, see: Beth Zion Lask, 'Amy Levy', *Transactions Jewish Historical Society of England*, Vol. XI (1924–7), pp. 168–89.

[19] For Rosenberg see: *Poems*, by Isaac Rosenberg, selected and edited by Gordon Bottomley (London, 1922); D. W. Harding, 'Aspects of the Poetry of Isaac Rosenberg', *Scrutiny*, Vol. 3, no. 4, (1934–5); *The Collected Works of Isaac Rosenberg* (eds. Gordon Bottomley and Denys Harding) (London, 1937); *Isaac Rosenberg. A Catalogue of an Exhibition held at Leeds University*, May–June 1959 (Leeds, 1959).

[20] Goller's book deals with the East End, but the characters are of the Dutch-Jewish community.

[21] David Daiches, *Two Worlds. An Edinburgh Jewish Childhood* (London, 1957), p. 119.

[22] 'The more striving and ambitious Jewish parents (and many of them fell into this category) were quick to perceive the advantages to be gained by sending their children, either as scholarship winners or fee-payers, to the expanding grammar schools. Professor David Glass points out that high prestige was given among the Jewish community to "leaving the ghetto", and this leaving process was facilitated by winning a place in a grammar school.' Flann Campbell, 'East London Grammar Schools', *East London Papers*, Vol. 1, no. 2 (1958), p. 3n.

[23] See K. G. T. McDonnell's discussion of the book in *East London Papers*, Vol. 2, no. 2 (1959), pp. 109–114.

[24] The move to the suburbs appears in novels such as Goller's, and Blumenfeld's *Phineas Kahn*.

[25] These two plays were printed in *New English Dramatists* (ed. E. Martin Browne) (Harmondsworth, 1959).

[26] For some views on Wesker's writings see: *Manchester Guardian*, 6 August 1959; *The Times*, 21 September 1959.

[27] Brian Glanville, '*The Bankrupts*: Some Defence Reactions', *The Jewish Quarterly*, Vol. 6, no. 1 (1958), pp. 34–5.

[28] I heard someone who lives in Stamford Hill comment, after reading the novel: 'So that's how they live in north-west London.'

[29] Victor Ross, *Basic British* (London, 1956) is one example, although not explicitly Jewish. This is similar to those 'aren't the English peculiar' books, but is saved from banality by the occasional bitter tone, as in the description of the internment of refugees at the beginning of the Second World War.

[30] American-Jewish writers seem to have had some success in tackling this theme. See: Leslie A. Fiedler, *The Jew in the American Novel* (New York, 1959); 'A Vocal Group. The Jewish Part in American Letters', *Times Literary Supplement*, 6 November 1959 (special edition on 'The American Imagination'), pp. xxxv–xxxvi.

[31] Robert Henriques, *One Hundred Hours to Suez* (London, 1957), p. 13.

[32] J. L. Talmon, *The Nature of Jewish History—Its Universal Significance* (London, 1957), p. 13.

[33] I should like to acknowledge the assistance and advice of Mr. John Trim, Lecturer in Phonetics, the University of Cambridge, with whom I have discussed many of the points in this article.

THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENT IN ISRAEL[1]

David Patterson

THE TERM *Kibbutz* has become so universally familiar that it is sometimes difficult to recall that the oldest collective settlement in Israel, Dagania, has just completed its first jubilee. An idea which in 1909 was represented by a single settlement with barely a dozen members, today encompasses some two hundred and fifty settlements comprising over eighty thousand souls. Such growth is undeniably impressive if not phenomenal. But it is something of a shock to realize that these figures were not so very different ten years ago! Indeed, by far the greater part of the rapid growth of the *Kibbutz* movement is confined to little more than the quarter of a century preceding the War of Independence in 1948.

It is arresting, too, to reflect upon the area of meaning embraced by the term collective settlement in its wider sense, including on the one hand the dozen members of Dagania in 1909 and on the other, the seventeen hundred souls in Givat Brenner at the present time. The largest collective settlement in Israel is more than a hundred times the size of its first parent. It is not surprising that such a quantititive change has drawn qualitative changes in its wake. But the very nature of such a growth gives rise to a string of fascinating questions. Is such development the inevitable logic of the *Kibbutz* idea? How much of the original ideal can be preserved within a framework so dramatically enlarged? Is this what the settlers wanted, and still want? How flexible is the *Kibbutz* in the face of the changing demands of the State? But more importantly—and this, perhaps, is the most irritating and perplexing question confronting the *Kibbutz* movement—why has the attraction of the *Kibbutz* declined so drastically in the last decade?

Until the creation of the State, and in some measure during the following years, the *Kibbutz* represented a pioneering instrument *par excellence* as well as a distinctive mode of life. Both these aspects are clearly recognizable right from its earliest days. The physical conditions governing colonization in Palestine, namely the utter neglect of the land, the prevalence of disease, the lack of organized resources and the constant danger of attack—to mention but a few hazards of many—combined to make collective settlement the logical and most efficient means of winning a foothold on the soil. Indeed, the achievements of the *Kibbutz* in this direction are remarkable and compel wholehearted admiration. Only a comparison of some of the older and most lovely settlements with photographs of the wastelands which the original members first encountered can give the slightest inkling of the devotion, effort and self-sacrifice required. Nor should the element of spiritual satisfaction be overlooked. It is no coincidence that Goethe's Faust reached ultimate salvation by reclaiming land from the sea!

But the distinctive mode of life was no less fundamental to the *Kibbutz* idea, endowing it with an attractive force that was, perhaps, the main cause of its remarkable growth from the early 1920's to the foundation of the State. From its very beginning the ideals of the *Kibbutz* were humanitarian, and indeed utopian, in the extreme. The aim was to create a society in which neither man nor woman would be subject to exploitation by his fellow, a society which was based on equality of opportunity, on the dignity and equality of labour, on the equality of the sexes, on absolute social security—in short, a symbol of the brotherhood of man.[2] Such principles demanded a high level of individual behaviour, and depended upon each member's personal sense of responsibility. What was required amounted to a revolution of character and exerted a strong appeal over large numbers of young men and women by temperament responsive to the challenge of high ideals. The society which emerged was self-selective and self-disciplined. It played a decisive part in the emergence of the State, and contributed very able men and women of great integrity, whenever and wherever necessary, out of all proportion to its percentage of the overall population. Until the War of Independence and for some years afterwards the members of the collective settlements constituted the *élite* of the Jewish population, universally recognized as such, and conscious of the fact. They were rightly regarded with admiration, and shouldered their many burdens with a quiet but sustaining dignity. This important theme will recur.

The combination of two different elements—the pioneering instrument and the distinctive mode of life—in the original framework of the *Kibbutz* gave rise, also, to some additional features which, although primarily utilitarian, were accepted as part and parcel of *Kibbutz* ideology. Mainly for reasons of economy, but partly in order to foster the equality of the sexes, the communal dining hall and the communal

crèche were instituted. In the first small collectives both measures served the practical purposes of freeing women from domestic tasks, thus enabling them to undertake other work, as well as allowing them to enter fully into the cultural and administrative life of the *Kibbutz*. An original necessity, however, was soon found to be a virtue, so that communal eating was further justified as conducive to the sense of community so important to the *Kibbutz*, while the communal care of children from the very moment of birth came to be regarded as an essential preparation towards developing the social instincts of the growing child. Both these features rapidly crystallized into rigid principles of *Kibbutz* ideology, so much so that perhaps the great majority of members would still consider the *Kibbutz* unthinkable without them. The relevance of this question will be dealt with later. For the moment, it is sufficient to recall that both these elements play a dominant role in shaping the pattern of *Kibbutz* living.[3]

Since the War of Independence eleven years have passed, and during that period a number of radical changes both in the physical composition and in the prevailing mental climate of Israel's population have combined to modify the position of the *Kibbutz* to a considerable degree. Perhaps the most obvious, and certainly one of the most important changes governing the place of the *Kibbutz* in the country as a whole, stems from the very much reduced percentage of the overall population living within a *Kibbutz* framework, when compared to the figure at the time of the foundation of the State. This is not due to any absolute reduction in *Kibbutz* population, but to the great waves of immigration during the last decade.

In 1948 when the overall Jewish population comprised no more than 650,000 souls, the *Kibbutz* movement accounted for not less than 10 per cent of that total number—and wielded an influence out of all proportion to its size. In the first ten years following the establishment of the State more than 900,000 immigrants entered the country, thereby swelling the Jewish population to almost two and a half times its former size. But during these ten years, the numerical growth of *Kibbutz* dwellers has been comparatively small, so that the *Kibbutz* now accounts for no more than 5 per cent of the total Jewish population. Even in absolute terms, without reference to the emergence of other factors, this represents a serious decline. But the situation is aggravated by a further and very significant change. In 1948 the *Kibbutz* comprised by far the largest and most important element of the Jewish population of the country engaged in agriculture.[4] At that time it overshadowed all other types of farming settlements, whether semi-collective, cooperative or based on private ownership. Since that time, however, the latter forms have increased at a very rapid rate, so that the number of workers who are also members of a *Kibbutz* now accounts for less than a third of the total agricultural labour force. As the *Kibbutz* was previously considered

the most efficient, and indeed the most logical method of colonization, and in consequence the primary agricultural instrument of the country, the rapid growth of other forms of settlement has necessarily undermined its ascendancy.

Reasons for the failure of the *Kibbutz* movement (the term is used in a broad sense to include the various federations of collective settlements) to attract and retain new members in any substantial numbers during the last decade are readily forthcoming. Before 1948 by far the greater part of the Jewish population was composed of immigrants from European, and up till 1933 particularly east-European countries. A substantial proportion of these immigrants had been fervent supporters of Zionism for many years prior to their coming to Palestine. In many cases they had devoted long periods of time to acquiring a type of physical and mental preparation suitable for the pioneering life of a collective settlement before ever leaving their countries of origin. Frequently they arrived in groups, whose members had grown used to living and working as a unit. Moreover, even once inside the country the group would often have to work within the framework of an established *Kibbutz* for a number of years before being granted an area of land on which to found a settlement of its own. The fact that such an area was frequently surrounded by hostile Arabs made the collective type of settlement, to which they had in any case conditioned themselves by a lengthy process of education, seem all the more natural. Inclination, training and self-preservation all pointed in the same direction. Moreover, after Hitler's rise to power an ever growing sense of urgency inclined a large number of individuals to lend their shoulder to what seemed to many to be the most promising wheel for the reconstruction and revitalization of Jewish life. Nor should it be ignored that the great majority of immigrants to Palestine before 1939 were under thirty years of age, and in consequence more adaptable to the physical and mental adjustment demanded by the pattern of *Kibbutz* life.

Since 1948 the vast majority of the immigrants have been conditioned by very different circumstances and fall into entirely different categories. In recent years more than 75 per cent of immigrants have come from Asian and African countries, where such education as they acquired was largely rudimentary, and certainly bore no resemblance to that received in the Jewish youth movements in Europe prior to the Second World War. As a result the ideals of the *Kibbutz* are foreign and frequently repugnant to them. By and large they neither understand the motivations nor appreciate the advantages of collective settlement, particularly in its intangible and spiritual aspects. The absence of money, or for that matter of any system resembling a formal wage, within the *Kibbutz* is incomprehensible to the uninitiated immigrant, who is forced to the conclusion that the members work for nothing. Such a realization may excite surprise, or even pity—but scarcely a

desire for emulation! Alternatively he may value the standard of living, the social security, the educational and recreational facilities offered by the *Kibbutz*, but still consider the sacrifice of his economic independence too high a price to pay for such advantages.

Of the remaining immigrants since the War of Independence the greater part have arrived either from countries occupied by the Germans during the Second World War or from countries governed by the Communist Party since. In neither case has their experience of collectivization been a happy one; and for the most part, having once regained their independence after many bitter years they are not inclined to surrender it again, no matter how radically different the circumstances may be. Their attitude is generally appreciated, even by members of the *Kibbutz* movement to whom the slightest imputation of any such comparison must necessarily appear utterly ludicrous. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all the efforts and inducements on the part of the *Kibbutz* movement as well as on the part of the government to attract new immigrants to the *Kibbutz* have achieved scant success. Even the immediate offer of attractive housing conditions, in many cases better than those enjoyed by the members themselves after ten or fifteen years of hard work, has yielded small results. Even when immigrants are induced to avail themselves of this generous offer, they rarely stay longer than it takes to find a job and some sort of housing—no matter how inferior—elsewhere. Not infrequently the area of a *Kibbutz* devoted to the absorption of new immigrants takes on the air of a transit camp—much to the irritation of the members of the settlement. It is only fair to add, however, that since 1948 the proportion of young and healthy immigrants is very much less than prior to 1939. As stated above, it is in any case only the latter who are normally capable of making the considerable reorientation required for collective living.

More surprising, however, is the failure of the *Kibbutz* movement in recent years to win any substantial permanent reinforcement from the ranks of the young men and women who were either born or who have grown up in the country, but outside the *Kibbutz* framework. At one time the collective settlements recruited a respectable proportion of their members from the native-born youth, and to this day the great majority of young Israelis have stayed and worked at a *Kibbutz* at some period in their lives, if only for a few weeks. But even though considerable numbers have joined existing collectives or helped to found new ones during the last decade, very many of them have ultimately left the *Kibbutz*, sometimes after investing in it many years of hard work and after having endured the first, and inevitably the most difficult pioneering period. For young people with homes and parents in the country it is, of course, much easier to leave the *Kibbutz* and embark upon a different mode of life than is the case for people without any such outside resources to cushion their departure. But the reasons for these losses

to the *Kibbutz* movement—as well as its failure to attract any substantial number of new members from recent immigrants—including immigrants from Western countries—must also be sought in the different patterns of thought and in the changing attitudes which have gradually emerged in Israel since the establishment of the State.

Prior to the War of Independence, as stated above, the *Kibbutznik*—as the member of a *Kibbutz* is commonly dubbed—was the acknowledged aristocrat of Jewish Palestine. The open admiration of almost the entire Jewish community for the achievements of the *Kibbutz* movement was both sincere and well merited. By sheer hard work, integrity, devotion and self-sacrifice the members of the ever increasing number of collective settlements had welded themselves into the backbone of the Jewish community in Palestine, setting the tone and standards of the country, and providing the morale and much of the leadership which was destined to achieve statehood. The *Kibbutznik* was always in the vanguard, ready to undertake the hardest and most unpleasant tasks, self-disciplined enough and sufficiently idealistic to put the interest of the nation before his own whenever the need arose. Valuing the life of the spirit more than physical comforts, the *Kibbutznik* was simply clad, modestly fed and spartanly housed; but his cultural and intellectual pursuits were manifold and real. Just as his *Kibbutz* maintained the highest standards of hospitality towards the entire community, so he, too, was always a welcome visitor in any private dwelling. Townsfolk were proud to have friends among the members of a collective settlement; and parents felt gratified when their sons and daughters left home to join a *Kibbutz*. To become a member of a *Kibbutz* was considered not merely respectable but admirable. So much so that the attitude of the town dweller was frequently one of mild apology for his own remissness in remaining a private individual. In such an atmosphere it is scarcely surprising that the *Kibbutz* movement felt confident about its future. Aware of the almost universal high regard in which he was held, the *Kibbutznik* considered himself the spearhead of a new type of society, which might eventually attract the great majority of the country's population, and usher in a new era of social justice. Certainly the sense of belonging to a real *élite* provided a genuine compensation for the minor discomforts and petty irritations of *Kibbutz* living. Not merely to be conscious of doing the right thing, but to recognize the heartening sign of universal approval inevitably results in a strengthening of *morale*.

It is on this front that the changes in the last decade have proved most worrying for the *Kibbutz* movement. Here, again, the factors involved in the emergence of different attitudes are not difficult to find. The enormous immigration following the War of Independence gave rise to problems of cultural acclimatization perhaps even more formidable than that of physical absorption. The population increased with

such rapidity that the existing community was able to foster its own attitudes among the newcomers only to a limited degree. The immediate and over-riding needs were the physical integration of the immigrants into the economy by providing work, shelter, food and basic social services, and the maintenance of an adequate defence force. The dissemination of *values* had necessarily to be relegated to a subsidiary place. As a result, the newcomers, so soon to constitute a majority of the population, developed a variety of attitudes towards the phenomenon of the *Kibbutz*, ranging from admiration through indifference to contempt. The universal high esteem which had hitherto been lavished on the *Kibbutz* movement was now confined to a minority of the population, and even within that minority other influences were already at work:

Among the social tendencies which have appeared in Israel during the last decade, one of the most clearly recognizable and most readily comprehensible is the steadily growing desire for material improvement. Long years of disturbances, struggle, hardships, sacrifice and austerity have not unnaturally given rise to a yearning for security and an increasing share of the good things of life. As elsewhere, the majority of Israelis are seriously preoccupied with the problems of raising their material standards and achieving a more comfortable and more graceful mode of life. But as the emphasis on materialism increases, the significance of intangible and idealistic values tends to decline. Attitudes which were once regarded as being highly admirable and worthy of emulation may soon appear somewhat unreal and immature in the pursuit of material acquisition. In consequence the idealistic concepts of the *Kibbutz* tend to be paid lip-service rather than sincere respect even on the part of that section of the population which formerly comprised its staunch admirers.

It must be admitted that similar tendencies are also recognizable within the *Kibbutz* movement itself. Not that the *Kibbutz* was ever monastic, in the sense of deliberately adhering to poverty for its own sake—although there does exist a by no means negligible school of thought which maintains on principle that the standard of living in the *Kibbutz* should remain comparatively simple. Nevertheless material conditions in the older and well established settlements frequently compare favourably with those obtaining in the cities, and certainly represent a vast improvement over the material standards prevailing in the *Kibbutz* before the War of Independence.[6] A number of the older settlements laid the foundations of their present prosperity during the Second World War by establishing industries to supply a variety of products to the Allied Forces in Palestine. By dint of continuous hard work, and in many cases with the help of Reparations from Germany which the individual recipients surrender to the common purse—sometimes with the exception of an agreed percentage—most collective

settlements founded twenty years ago or more, and a respectable number of younger ones, can now provide their members with the tangible rewards of labour, such as were previously reserved only for the children. That these are the well-deserved rewards of unrelenting toil and continuous self-denial stretching over many years, no one would venture to deny. But once begun the process of material acquisition seems to exercise a fascination in the *Kibbutz* no less than in the outside world—with a concomitant shift of emphasis away from an ascetic idealism. Moreover the effect is noticeable in another sphere.

One of the most powerful attractions exercised by the *Kibbutz* before the establishment of the State stemmed from its unrivalled performance of the two most necessary and dangerous functions confronting Jewish settlement, namely, the colonization and defence of the land. The appeal of genuine pioneering activity was reinforced by an element of romanticism particularly attractive to the young. Although these roles are still performed by the younger settlements situated on the borders, both functions have largely been usurped in the last decade, by the Israeli army on the one hand and by the rapid growth of alternative forms of colonization on the other. In the case of the established settlements, moreover, the normal processes of agriculture, however rigorous, can no longer claim to be pioneering in any real sense. The development of the State has focused attention upon other needs, and undermined the position of the *Kibbutz* as the foremost instrument for the demonstration of patriotic loyalties. Mining in the Negeb or working in the new port of Elath, for example, offer a greater attraction to youthful zeal than the somewhat pedestrian pattern of *Kibbutz* life, and tend to divert forces which previously would almost certainly have been drawn inside the framework of the *Kibbutz*.

One further problem consequent upon the establishment of the State has caused much soul-searching within the *Kibbutz* movement. The vast immigration created an urgent and compelling demand for an immediate expansion of employment. In order to help solve this problem the government of Israel turned to the collective settlements, where the constant urge to develop the manifold branches of the economy normally produces a chronic shortage of manpower. But here the *Kibbutz* movement was faced with a baffling dilemma. How could the obvious necessity of finding employment for the immigrants be reconciled with the basic principle of the *Kibbutz* which forbids the exploitation of labour? The obvious solution of absorbing the immigrants as members of the settlements was frustrated from the outset by the blank refusal of the great majority to join. The inescapable clash of nationalist and socialist loyalties aroused a storm of controversy both in the *Kibbutz* movement and throughout the country at large. The compromise solution adopted by many of the settlements of employing hired labour only for certain rigidly defined activities such as

stone-clearance and building represents a brave attempt to overcome an apparently insuperable obstacle. Nevertheless, a breach in so basic a principle cannot be ignored, and seriously weakens the whole foundation of social justice upon which the concept of the *Kibbutz* primarily depends.

All these factors have wrought considerable changes during the last decade not only on the position of the *Kibbutz* movement as a whole, but also on the attitude of the individual member. Far from occupying the comforting role of acknowledged aristocrat, which only a dozen years ago seemed permanent and unshakable, the *Kibbutznik* is now regarded in a number of different lights. In certain quarters where the old ideals still exercise considerable sway, his prestige remains high and he is viewed with a discerning esteem. In wider circles, however, the attitude towards him is equivocal. For many people the comparatively favourable conditions obtaining in the well established settlements is a source of envy. Others regard the *Kibbutzniks* generally as eccentrics, or naïve idealists obstinately sacrificing themselves on the altar of an outworn creed. A considerable section of the population is frankly indifferent to or ignorant of the concepts of the collective life, while others again consider that the principal factor underlying a member's adherence to a *Kibbutz* is the inability to support himself and his family in the competitive world outside.

Inevitably these various attitudes influence the *Kibbutznik's* own outlook in some measure, and have serious repercussions on his self-esteem. To belong to an acknowledged *élite* is one thing; to be regarded as an eccentric, or still worse a good-for-nothing, is another. Certainly, the element of doubt in the minds of many *Kibbutzniks* with respect to the present pattern of collective life and its prospect for any long term survival is very real. The uncertainty is aggravated by the only too apparent lack of any substantial numerical increase in recent years, which has undermined the dynamism of the movement as a whole, and given rise to an urgent but as yet unfruitful search for fresh sources of stimulus.

Within the *Kibbutz* movement an awareness of changed conditions has manifested itself over the last decade in a number of important reactions, some of which have led to negative and some to positive results. As early as 1952 grave signs of social disturbance were evident in the political explosion which rent a large number of collective settlements in two, and seriously undermined the prestige of the entire movement throughout the country. Although ostensibly due to the clash of political ideas particularly in the delicate field of education, the extraordinary passions which these issues then aroused appear grossly exaggerated from the perspective of a mere seven years, and seem rather symptomatic of a deep-rooted social unrest. At all events the harsh sundering of ties, in many cases slowly and painfully forged by

laborious toil and extending over twenty years and more, appears in retrospect an unnecessarily distressing method of resolving internal disagreements. Support for this belief may be deduced from the fact that even in 1952 the number of members leaving collective settlements for a variety of reasons—before the War of Independence a comparatively rare occurrence—had grown so large as to assume almost an air of commonplace, no longer calculated to arouse incredulous surprise or outraged indignation. Indeed, the process was even then sufficiently widespread to furnish the theme of Aaron Meged's best selling novel *Hedva and I* (Tel-Aviv, 1953) which portrays in satirical but nonetheless serious vein the difficulties encountered by a young Israeli couple grappling with the problem of reorientation to city life after leaving the *Kibbutz*, in which they had invested many years of hard work, and whose ideals at least one of the pair still cherishes. During the last six years a small but constant stream of leavers has continued to flow out of the collective settlements.[6]

This regrettable loss of valuable manpower has naturally given rise to a serious examination of the causes by the *Kibbutz* movement itself. Although the number of motivations which culminate in a decision to leave a collective may be large and complex, four principal factors seem most compelling. The most obvious and widespread reason for leaving a *Kibbutz*, which in its broadest sense embraces all other reasons, is the feeling of dissatisfaction with or positive distaste for the limitations and demands of collective life, which may gradually develop in an individual or member of a family even after many years of apparently successful adaptation. It must be admitted that the *Kibbutz* framework, in which people must necessarily rub shoulders with one another day in and day out—including, of course, members with whom they may have no temperamental affinity but whose activities are inevitably intertwined in some way with their own—and which subjects its members to the constant and at times uncomfortable censorship of public opinion, gives rise to a good deal of pettiness, self-righteousness and minor irritation. If the wider ideals are lost sight of completely—and the normal stress of hard physical toil is not always conducive to an awareness of lofty principles—these minor irritations may well assume insufferable proportions. Such dissatisfaction, too, is frequently accompanied by a longing for the attractions of the outside world, with all its apparent range of opportunity and its only too tangible evidence of material reward. The example of the substantial number of former members of collective settlements who have succeeded in establishing a comfortable position for themselves in town naturally affects in some degree the members who remain, particularly those—and almost every *Kibbutz* has its quota—who dislike collective living but for various reasons doubt their ability to start life afresh in the competitive world outside.

The sheer size of the larger settlements in comparison with the small closely-knit groups which constituted the early collectives is responsible, perhaps, for a second reason which induces many people to leave. The very nature of the *Kibbutz* with its basic principle of group responsibility naturally presupposes that each member will abide by a majority decision. Such acceptance often demands a high level of self-discipline on the individual member's part, particularly—as is frequently the case—when the decision radically affects his personal life, by determining for example what work he shall perform or by requiring him to spend some years away from home. Acquiescence is especially difficult in cases where a decision has been reached in direct contradiction to the clearly expressed wishes of the member concerned. The willingness of an individual to accept a majority decision vitally affecting his own life necessarily assumes a large measure of confidence on the part of the member concerned in the collective wisdom and considered judgement of the group as a whole. No less importantly the system must also presuppose an intimate knowledge of the temperament, abilities and personal circumstances of every individual in the *Kibbutz*. In the small collective as originally conceived both conditions were not merely possible, but normally obtaining. In a *Kibbutz* comprising up to a thousand members, however, the individual may only too often be aware that a vital decision affecting his life has been taken at a general assembly, the majority of whose participants have scarcely more than a casual acquaintance with his own particular problems, but feel impelled to reach a conclusion because of general fatigue, the lateness of the hour, and the knowledge that they have to get up at five in the morning. It happens not infrequently that a decision taken at one general assembly has to be reversed at the next. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that occasions arise when individuals find themselves unable to accept a majority decision, and prefer to leave the settlement.

The germ of the third and fourth causes of defection may be traced to the expedients of the first settlements mentioned above, namely the communal dining hall and the communal crèche, which early became crystallized as an integral part of *Kibbutz* ideology. Many settlements have suffered for decades from the drab misery of inadequate dining facilities, where hurried and graceless meals are the norm, and where such members as are unable to develop a protective shell of sheer indifference, are subject to the unpleasant strain of a constantly recurring distaste. Even the bigger and better dining room with ultra-modern kitchen facilities, which has become the aim of the vast majority of settlements, serves at most to alleviate the position. For all its festive and very impressive air on joyous occasions, the communal dining hall provides little joy in its everyday capacity. At its best it may be efficient and reasonably comfortable; at its worst it can be horrifying. As the *Kibbutz* grows, moreover, the dining hall plays a correspondingly less

important role as the social and cultural centre of gravity. In consequence its justification as an indispensable instrument for fostering the sense of community is proportionately undermined.

No less perturbing for many parents, and particularly mothers, is the institution of the communal crèche.[7] It happens not infrequently that even the most stalwart proponents of the crèche experience severe qualms on this issue on first becoming parents. The problem is largely one of emotion and temperament in the case of both the parent and the child; but here, too, an important element lies in the measure of confidence which the mother feels she can place in the nurse. Many a woman can overcome the instinctive conviction that she is the best qualified person to care for her baby in the first years of its life only after a severe struggle with her conscience. For this reason a by no means negligible number of young married couples, hitherto well adjusted to the pattern of collective living, have left the *Kibbutz* shortly after the birth of a first child. The communal crèche, moreover, and the communal dining hall are no longer easily defensible from the standpoint of economics, for in the majority of settlements as much as 50 per cent of the total labour force is employed in the social services.

In order to counteract these forces of disintegration a number of new forms have gradually found their way into the *Kibbutz* movement during the last decade, and further experiments—often accompanied by fierce discussion—are still in progress. One attempt to alleviate minor dissatisfaction has produced a system of personal allowances, which enable the individual members of certain collective settlements to indulge their tastes for small luxuries and afford, for example, the opportunity of a wider personal preference for clothes, holidays or presents for their children. Many people have welcomed these innovations as a healthy sign of flexibility. Others, however, still regard them with some suspicion as the thin edge of the wedge. Again, the lack of general understanding of an individual's problems, which may so easily arise particularly in a large *Kibbutz*, has been partially remedied for many years by the creation of small committees composed of highly respected and generally trusted men and women, with whom the members may discuss their difficulties and grievances with the utmost frankness, and whose considered opinions carry great weight in the general assembly.

A further interesting development is the official blessing which many collective settlements have finally bestowed upon old established custom. For many years such individuals as have been unable to face the trials of the communal dining hall with equanimity have developed the habit of taking their rations back to their own rooms in order to eat in comparative seclusion. A healthy recognition of this fact has led to the inclusion of a small kitchenette in the design of each new room, or set of rooms, erected. Although usually tiny, this kitchenette makes it

possible for those who so desire to prepare at least some of their meals in private, quite apart from the obvious advantages of making entertaining easier and less primitive. Similarly, the dislike of many parents for the communal crèche has induced a number of settlements to provide sleeping accommodation for babies and young infants in their parents' quarters. This experiment, however, gives rise to serious difficulties. On the one hand it involves considerable changes in the domestic architecture of the *Kibbutz*; on the other, it limits the role which such parents can play in the social and cultural life of the settlement, as well as exposing them to the risk of disturbed nights—a factor which can seriously undermine their working efficiency. Nevertheless, all these and similar attempts by the *Kibbutz* to counteract the causes of dissatisfaction indicate a healthy awareness of changing conditions, and the necessity of evolving fresh social patterns.

No section of the community has devoted so much thought and energy and so high a proportion of its total resources to education as the *Kibbutz* movement.[8] Among the many interesting aspects of that educational system two features command the warmest admiration. Every child at all capable of benefiting by it is educated until the age of eighteen, while the average size of class is scarcely half that obtaining in a comparable school in town. During the last few years of schooling, moreover, the child spends a graded proportion of his time working in turn in the manifold branches which comprise the economy of the settlement. The aim is an intelligent and balanced approach to education, providing a stimulating and integrated combination of theory and practical application.

Not unnaturally, the system of education is directed towards the continuity of the collective pattern of life, and the ideals transmitted are those inherent in the *Kibbutz* ideology. Whereas the original members of a settlement were self-selecting and deliberately chose to live within a collective framework—in itself a revolutionary act—their children are conditioned to the life of the settlement by environment and education. Their adherence to the forms evolved by their parents, however, requires no revolutionary decision. On the contrary, it depends upon a willingness to conform. Hence a certain dichotomy arises when, as recently, one of the *Kibbutz* federations proposed to help young, struggling settlements, or found new ones, by sending away a proportion of the young men who had grown up in established settlements, thereby requiring them to leave the places which they had been taught from childhood to regard as their natural and permanent home.[9] It is of interest that in the ensuing discussion the proposal was advocated with far greater enthusiasm by the older generation than by the young people concerned. No less than in the outside world, the younger generation of the *Kibbutz* seems more interested in security than embarking on fresh pioneering tasks.

Nevertheless, it is upon the young men and women born in the collective settlements that the future of the *Kibbutz* movement depends. They and their children constitute the ultimate test of the normality and permanence of the collective framework. The collective settlements have evolved a society in which the highest ideals are combined with great practical ability. Their achievements are impressive in the extreme, their tenacity proven, their collective wealth, numerical power and influence formidable. What remains to be seen is the measure of their flexibility to meet the rapidly changing conditions of a new State.

NOTES

[1] The author of this paper spent three months at Kfar Hanasi in 1951 and six weeks at Givat Brenner in 1959. At the time Kfar Hanasi was a young and struggling settlement some three years old. Givat Brenner, founded in 1928, is the largest collective settlement in Israel.

[2] For a description of the mental climate prevailing in the *Kibbutz* before the Second World War see M. Pearlman, *Collective Adventure*, London, 1938.

[3] Concise factual information about the *Kibbutz* during the period prior to the Second World War may be found in E. Samuel, *A Handbook of the Jewish Communal Villages in Palestine*, 2nd ed., Jerusalem, 1945 and H. F. Infeld, *Cooperative Living in Palestine*, New York, 1944. For a later description see M. Weingarten, *Life in a Kibbutz*, New York, 1955.

[4] For a survey of economic conditions of the pre-war period see G. Muenzner, *Jewish Labour Economy in Palestine*, London, 1945.

[5] Cf. Gerda Cohen, 'The "Affluent" Kibbutzim' in *Commentary*, Vol. 28, No. 24, October, 1959.

[6] For an analysis of some of the crucial stresses within the *Kibbutz* see M. E. Spiro, *Kibbutz, Venture in Utopia*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956. The criticisms advanced by S. N. Eisenstadt in his review of the book in the *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 58, No. 5, 1956, and by D. Miller in his review in *Man*, Vol. 57, Article No. 139, July 1957, should, however, be taken into consideration.

[7] See the following studies on the family in the *Kibbutz* by Y. Talmon-Garber: 'The Family in Cooperative and Collective Settlements' in *Transactions of the World Population Conference*, Rome, 1954; 'The Family in Collective Settlements' in *Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. IV, 1956; and 'Social Structure and Family Size' in *Human Relations*, Vol. XII, No. 2, 1959.

[8] For a study of the educational system see M. E. Spiro, *Children of the Kibbutz*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1958. Again, however, attention should be paid to the reservations expressed by Margaret Mead in a review of the book in the *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 61, No. 4, August 1959, and by J. E. Elleners in the *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 25, No. 1, February 1960.

[9] This topic constituted a major theme at the conference of the *Kibbutz* federation called *Kibbutz Ha-Me'uhad*, which took place at Givat Brenner in the spring of 1959.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE JEWISH POPULATION OF JERUSALEM DURING THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS[1]

O. Schmelz

THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

FOR the purposes of this study we have been able to make use of two censuses, of 1839 and 1866 respectively, which were undertaken on the initiative of Sir Moses Montefiore. The demographic conclusions that can be drawn from these censuses are fully borne out by detailed contemporary descriptions. In particular, we have relied on the accounts of physicians, among them Jews who had themselves spent many years in Jerusalem.

In the middle of the nineteenth century Jerusalem held the largest Jewish community in Palestine, which comprised about half the total Jewish population of the country. The number of Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem grew roughly as follows (according to the sources that seem most trustworthy): 1839—roughly 3,000; 1856—5,700; 1866—5,600; *c.* 1870—8,000. Among them the Sephardim and Orientals formed a decreasing majority: 1839—83 per cent; 1856—70 per cent; 1866—59 per cent; whereas the proportion of Ashkenazim increased accordingly.

The combined effect of the increasing immigration from Europe and of various assistance projects for the local population undertaken by Europeans (both Jewish and non-Jewish), was to heighten the European influence on the Jews of Jerusalem. However, living conditions in the city were very poor—on account of bad and crowded dwellings, inadequate water supply, poverty, want and hunger, insanitary habits, and high morbidity, and the frequent occurrence of epidemics. As a result of these conditions a very high mortality prevailed. A vivid illustration of the appalling health conditions in Jerusalem is revealed by the

consternation expressed by immigrants from Yemen, as late as the beginning of the present century, at the increase in their infant mortality on settling here. Even in backward Yemen infant mortality had apparently been far lower.

The Jews of Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century formed a very unusual population. Demographically, they were unable to maintain their numbers because of the high mortality; in consequence, not only the increase but even the preservation of the existing size of the population depended on large reinforcements of immigrants from abroad. Economically also, they could not sustain themselves; they needed continual financial help from abroad, which was effected in particular by means of the *Halukah*.

The two dominant factors in the demographic process among the Jews of Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century were: the immigration from abroad, which was very large compared to the population existing in the city; and the mortality, which was so high as nearly, or at times completely, to offset the combined effects of immigration and births. It can be assumed that the birth rate was high, but this was of little avail in building up the population, because of the child mortality. Departures from Jerusalem were apparently only of minor importance demographically.

The arrival of many immigrants on the one hand and the numerous deaths among all inhabitants on the other hand, produced high percentages of new immigrants among the existing inhabitants and the rapid turnover of a large part of the population. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the great majority of the adult Jews in Jerusalem were foreign-born and a large part of these were recent immigrants. If, in spite of the comparatively large immigration, the population grew but slowly, this was due to the mortality. This finding assumes additional poignancy, since it can be shown that, at least as regards the mid-nineteenth century, the widely held view that a large part of all immigrants were old people is incorrect.

Despite the facts that virtually all adult males in the censuses were married, that age at marriage was very low, and that children were desired, the average number of surviving young children was very low even in families in which the head was a middle-aged man. This again was primarily caused by the mortality. Enlightened visitors from abroad took an unfavourable view of the very early marriages that were customary in Jerusalem; both their accounts and the censuses themselves forcefully bring out the lack of demographic usefulness of the very early marriages (at any rate under the prevailing conditions of high mortality): in both censuses the majority of couples in which the husband was below 25 years of age had no living children.

Similarly, the acuteness of the mortality created high percentages of widows and orphans. We have been able to demonstrate that a large

proportion of the widows were the survivors of immigrant couples. The great number of widows was the main cause of a marked preponderance of women in the population.

Divorces were apparently not rare. If, furthermore, we consider that, in spite of the high mortality, nearly all the men in either census were then actually married, it seems likely that remarriage was comparatively frequent.

The age structure of the Jews of Jerusalem can be studied in detail only with respect to the males. Amongst these it was strongly influenced (especially in the adult age groups) by the age composition of the new immigrants, who formed a large part of the existing adult population. According to the censuses, only among the Ashkenazim in 1866 was there a relatively high percentage of aged people (about 20 per cent of the males were 55 years and over). The proportion of the 0–14 years old in the population was reduced below what one might have expected in conditions of high birth rate, principally because of the heavy child mortality.

By an analysis of the census data we have been able to point out differences in the demographic characteristics of the well-established *edoth*[2] (i.e. the Sephardim in both censuses and the Ashkenazim in 1866) and of *edoth* that were new in the city (i.e. the Ashkenazim in 1839, the Moroccans in 1866). The new *edoth* were small and had a particularly high percentage of recent immigrants; the age composition of their adults was a relatively young one, whereas the percentage of children was not high; there were comparatively fewer widows and orphans.

Compared to other populations, the percentage of middle-aged persons among the males in the large established *edoth* in Jerusalem was rather low; yet relatively few even of these men had, economically speaking, any occupation (excluding religious pursuits). There is full agreement between the censuses sponsored by Montefiore, which we have analysed, and accounts published at the time, on this point as well as on the range of occupations that were followed by the Jews of Jerusalem and on the tendencies towards specific callings in the various *edoth*.

However, even the relatively small number of adult men who followed some occupation often did not succeed in making a living from it and stood in need of assistance. The mainstay of the material existence of the Jewish community in Jerusalem was the *Halukah*. The lack of purchasing power and the difficulty of saving and of capital accumulation—resulting from the constrained hand to mouth existence—combined with the absence of vocational experience, formed practical obstacles to any rapid transformation of the economic régime. However, the main obstacle was the system of social values, which effectively dominated the aspirations and lives of the Jews of Jerusalem and in the

centre of which stood 'learning', i.e. the preoccupation with matters of religion.

We have seen that the Jewish community in Jerusalem departed from usual demographic and economic patterns by depending on continual help, in men and money, from abroad. This community was no less extraordinary in the social objectives it set itself. Among the Jews of the Diaspora, at any rate in important circles, there was a striving for material prosperity. However, the Jerusalem community, quite consciously, and not merely because opportunities were lacking, renounced economic prospects and contented itself mainly with subventions from outside in order to dedicate itself to a religio-national ideal.

Devotion to ideals and self-sacrifice on the one hand, and on the other hand the wastage of human lives and health, abject poverty, idleness, alms-seeking, unreadiness for self-help, fanaticism, and apparently even the absence of high standards of religious scholarship—all these formed part of the life of the Jews in Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century.

CLOSE OF THE OTTOMAN PERIOD

During this time, the Jews of Jerusalem began to depart from their former constrained condition just as quite literally many of them transferred from the walled-in area of the crowded Old City to new quarters, which they erected for themselves in nearby open spaces. The number of Jews in the city grew from 8,000 in about 1870 to 14,000 in 1877, 28,000 in approximately 1895, and probably 45,000 before the First World War. Especially at the time of the First *Aliyah*, Jerusalem absorbed a large part of the immigrants who entered Palestine, and the peak of its relative population size was reached near the end of the nineteenth century, when about 60 per cent of the total Jewish population of the country dwelt in this city. However, in the years preceding the First World War, the rate of growth slackened, for by then more attention was paid in Palestine to agricultural objectives and to an economic approach in general, which led to a marked development of the rural colonies and the coastal towns. During the period which is under consideration here, the Jews became the majority of the population of Jerusalem; among the Jews the Ashkenazim now had a slight majority (according to estimates by Luncz for 1895 and 1907: 54 per cent).

The close of the Ottoman period was also a time of social awakening and social progress in Jerusalem. The effects of this new more dynamic atmosphere are most evident in the establishment of the new residential quarters. There can be no doubt but that this had also important results in improving health standards and lowering mortality. However,

statistical data for this period are lacking. Thus we can but conjecture the city's development, the positive trend of which is attested by the situations at the beginning and the end of this period: the distressing conditions that prevailed in Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century as contrasted with the immensely improved state of affairs in the early years of the Mandate.

The First World War dealt heavy blows to the Jewish community in Jerusalem. The number of Jews in the city fell to about half its former size, and the proportion of Ashkenazim in the remaining population dropped slightly below half. The results of a census taken in the city in 1916 show signs of a temporary wave of high mortality, which was due to war-time conditions.

THE MANDATORY PERIOD

Whereas in general the Jewish population of Palestine recovered rapidly from the losses of the First World War and its numbers continued to show a great increase owing to the strong immigration from abroad, the pace of advance was slower in Jerusalem. The Jewish population grew and economic progress was made, dwelling areas were enlarged, and a number of the inhabitants achieved a rather high standard of living; but the development of Jerusalem in Mandatory times was definitely less rapid than that of the total Jewish population of the country and especially of the two new great centres: Tel-Aviv (and Jaffa) and Haifa. Jerusalem was one of the country's principal towns, but in spite of the growth of the population and not inconsiderable development in all spheres of activity, its relative importance decreased continually. This trend was evident also in the decline of the attraction which Jerusalem held for new immigrants, in a considerable number of departures of existing inhabitants from the city, and similarly in the limited impetus which economic and building activities received in the city. The causes for this relative backwardness of Jerusalem were geographical, demographic, and economic:

(*a*) The remoteness of the city from the sea-coast and from those regions of the country where, during Mandatory times, the main part of the Jewish construction effort took place. The resulting isolation of the Jewish community of Jerusalem was of importance politically and with respect to security, but also economically, owing to the absence of developed rural surroundings which might have provided a market for the products and goods of urban industry and commerce.

(*b*) The large proportion within the Jewish population of Jerusalem of people of Oriental extraction and of the 'Old Yishuv',[3] to whom energetic, modern economic activity was alien.

(*c*) The small size of the economic enterprises in Jerusalem and their modest level in every respect: invested capital, power consumed, tech-

niques of work, number of employees, and value of product or of turn-over.

These factors influenced one another and together, and to an increasing extent, effectively handicapped Jerusalem's prospects of development.

It is true that Jerusalem was the capital of the country—the seat both of the Mandatory Government and of the head offices of the Jewish National Institutions. Yet the facts of the city's development make it clear that this status, which was dictated by historic and sentimental considerations, was given but scanty implementation in the living reality of the Zionist activities of the time.

Resemblances may be found in several demographic respects between Jerusalem and, on the other hand, Safed and Tiberias. Despite the disparity in size and degree of development between them and Jerusalem, they were also ancient communities which had in common with it not only a similar background in previous generations but also large percentages of ultra-religious elements and of Orientals in the population.

As is well known, the Jewish population of Palestine in the present century has comprised a complex mixture of people of widely different origin, who brought with them their distinctive social traditions. In Mandatory times this situation was less obvious than either before or now, since the vast majority of immigrants, who with their children formed the bulk of the Jewish population of the country, then came from Europe. As a result, the mode of life of the Jews of Palestine on the whole assumed a European and progressive character. However, this did not happen to the same extent in Jerusalem, where a large proportion of the Jewish population throughout the Mandatory period were ultra-religious, conservative Ashkenazim, or tradition-adhering Sephardim and Orientals. Both these sections remained very conspicuous in Jerusalem, even though they were faced by increasing numbers of the third important population group in the city: the more progressive people, who were mainly Europeans.

In the everyday life of this heterogeneous Jewish population in Jerusalem, there was comparatively little integration. Rather there was a sort of co-existence of different modes of life, within a city which was characterized by the presence of members of different religions and sects. This state of affairs found outward expression in the separate residential quarters of the various Jewish population groups. In view of the different demographic traditions of these groups, the key to the understanding of many of the demographic peculiarities of Jewish Jerusalem, as a whole, in Mandatory times is provided by the particularly mixed nature of its population.

Since the 1930's a considerable percentage of the progressive elements in Jerusalem were natives of Central Europe. The many educated

people among them engaged in particular in office work or the liberal professions; such people were attracted to the city, among other reasons, by the establishment and expansion of public offices and of institutions of learning and culture. From a socio-economic point of view, this type of inhabitant qualified Jerusalem to be not only a religious centre but also a centre of learning and administration.

The number of Jews in Jerusalem rose from about 21,500 at the end of the First World War to 34,000 in 1922, 53,800 in 1931, 80,800 in 1939, and approximately 95,000 in 1947. (Detailed reasons can be given for not accepting any higher population estimates for the close of the Mandatory period.) From 1922 to 1946, the Jewish population grew threefold in Jerusalem, whereas it grew 7 times in the whole country, 11 times in Tel-Aviv and Jaffa, and 13 times in Haifa. Consequently, the proportion of Jerusalem's population in the total Jewish population of Palestine dropped from 41 per cent to 17 per cent. As early as 1931, the Jewish population of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa slightly outpaced that of Jerusalem, and it was more than twice as large as the latter towards the end of the Mandatory period; by then the number of Jews in Haifa approached that in Jerusalem, of which it had formed less than a third in 1931.

The ability of Jerusalem to attract new immigrants steadily decreased. This was true not only in general but also for immigrants from each of the principal regions of the world. At any given time, the percentage of all new immigrants that was absorbed in Jerusalem fell short of the percentage of Jerusalemites in the Jewish population of the country; this again held good not only for all immigrants but also if persons born in either Asia, Africa, or Europe are considered. Those immigrants who settled in Jerusalem differed consistently from the totality of Jewish immigrants to Palestine. Among them were a larger proportion of natives of Asia and Africa as well as of Central Europe; of children and especially of old people (but relatively fewer middle-aged persons); of women in all age groups. The persistence of these differences can be traced throughout all the immigration periods into which it is customary to divide the time of the Mandate.

By the comparison of censuses of different date it is possible to show a considerable number of departures from Jerusalem by existing inhabitants, both natives of Jerusalem and others. The city provided the unusual spectacle of a capital with respect to which the migratory balance of persons born in the country was definitely negative. The tendency to leave the city was particularly strong among the European-born Jews, and in the early adult ages in all groups according to region of birth.

The crude birth and death rates were higher in Jerusalem than in the whole country. However, in this connexion the influence of the age composition must be borne in mind, since there was a smaller repre-

sentation of middle-aged persons in Jerusalem than in the whole country. Both birth and death rates became greatly reduced in the course of time, in comparison with the high figures which were still prevalent in the early years of the Mandate. The general death rate—and similarly the infant death rate—steadily decreased right down to the end of the Mandatory period; the birth rate reached the lowest point about 1940, but recovered to a certain extent afterwards. In Jerusalem, these demographic rates underwent changes parallel to those in the whole country. The entire development is to be interpreted as a rapid change-over to lower mortality and lower fertility, in accordance with the pattern that is usual when a society adopts a more modern mode of life.

Marriage was nearly universal in Jerusalem; i.e. only small percentages of those inhabitants who had reached the end of their fertile period remained unmarried. Most couples in the population (many of whom had married before their immigration) were composed of individuals of the same or similar origin. This tended to the continuation of the existing differences by origin group in marriage and fertility patterns. In Jerusalem, as in the whole country, the Sephardim and Orientals married earlier than the Ashkenazim; among the Sephardim and Orientals there was a larger average difference between the ages of husband and wife (and in connexion with this a higher percentage of widows in the population); in particular, their fertility was greater than that of the Ashkenazim. The differences between the origin groups were most marked as between the foreign-born persons of either group. The situation among the total Ashkenazim in Jerusalem with respect to marriage age and fertility was influenced by the presence in the city of circles of religious people among whom marriage is early and children are numerous.

As regards the influence of the marriage pattern on fertility, Jerusalem enjoyed no advantage over the total Jewish population of Palestine in the second half of the Mandatory period. Yet the fertility of the Jews was higher in Jerusalem than in the whole country. This was so not only in all the principal population groups, by region of birth, but particularly in the total population, which in Jerusalem included a larger percentage of the fertile women born in Asia and Africa than in the whole of Palestine. The difference in fertility between Jerusalem and the whole country was apparently most marked in the middle of the Mandatory period, but decreased towards the end of this time owing to the decline in the fertility of the native-born women in Jerusalem, who formed a large part of the women at fertile ages in the city.

We have been able to study the marriage and fertility of native-born women in Jerusalem in 1938–9 and in the first years of statehood; a big change towards higher marriage age and reduced fertility can be

observed. We can attribute this change to the replacement of the 'generation' of women at fertile ages who were born before the Mandatory period by a new 'generation' who grew up amidst the influences of the Mandatory time. (This latter generation was to a considerable extent born to parents who immigrated only at that time from culturally advanced countries.) In 1938–9 the fertility of native-born women in Jerusalem was much higher than that of native-born women in the whole country, and approached that of the women born in Asia and Africa. However, in 1952–4[4] the fertility of the native-born women in Jerusalem was only slightly higher than that of all native-born women in the country, much lower than that of the women born in Asia and Africa, and close to that of the European-born women. In connexion with this clear change in the fertility pattern of the native-born women in Jerusalem, the following facts deserve to be emphasized:

(*a*) Throughout the period under review the composition, by origin group, of the native-born women in Jerusalem at fertile ages did not alter appreciably. Sephardi and Oriental women always formed about one half of them, so that no change of this sort can account for the drop in fertility.

(*b*) The composition, by origin group, of the native-born women was very different in Jerusalem from that in all Palestine; in the whole country Sephardi and Oriental women constituted but a limited minority.

(*c*) Nevertheless the fertility of the native-born women in Jerusalem dropped nearly to the level of all native-born women in the country.

(*d*) Moreover, it may be assumed that the fertility of the native-born Ashkenazi women in Jerusalem was similar to that of the native-born Ashkenazi women in the whole country. (It was not by any means much lower, because of the concentration of religious people in Jerusalem.) If so, no other explanation can be given of the specific development of the fertility of all native-born women which occurred in the city, but that the fertility of the native-born Sephardi and Oriental women became similar to that of the native-born Ashkenazi women. This conclusion may be thought to be of interest for the study of the integration of the various sections of the Jewish population of Israel.

In Mandatory times, the age-specific mortality rates were higher in Jerusalem than in the whole country. However, in view of the greater fertility in the city, the intrinsic rate of the natural increase may be considered to have been, at least in general, higher in Jerusalem than in the whole country.

In Jerusalem, a higher proportion of the population growth was attributable to natural increase than was the case in the whole country. This was due to the comparatively limited extent of the absorption of immigrants and the considerable natural increase in the city.

The decline in the absorptive capacity of Jerusalem produced among the foreign-born in the city a higher percentage of persons who had immigrated during the early immigration waves than was to be found among the foreign-born in the whole country.

The Sephardim and Orientals had risen to more than 50 per cent of the Jews of Jerusalem during the First World War; their share among the new immigrants who settled in the city was still about 40 per cent in the nineteen-twenties; moreover, their fertility was high. As a consequence of all these facts, they continued to form a large part of the Jews of Jerusalem throughout Mandatory times. Their percentage was lowered in the thirties and forties, for at that time a great majority of the new immigrants who settled in Jerusalem came from Europe; but even then the Sephardi and Oriental elements constituted more than 40 per cent of the Jewish population of the city. As against this, Sephardim and Orientals were estimated as only about 20 per cent of all Jews in the country at the beginning of the nineteen-forties.

People born in Palestine—in their great majority actually natives of Jerusalem—formed about half of the Jewish population of the city in the thirties and forties. (There are no earlier figures on inhabitants by birth place.) The percentage of native-born individuals was considerably higher among the Jews of Jerusalem than among all Jews in the country. The high percentage of native-born persons in Jerusalem was due to the existence of a fairly large Jewish community in the city as early as the end of the nineteenth century; the rather considerable fertility in Jerusalem; and the comparatively limited extent to which new immigrants were absorbed in the city.

During the Mandatory period, the Jews of Jerusalem differed from the whole Jewish population of the country by their greater heterogeneity—both with respect to origin group (for at that time the various sections of Orientals were especially concentrated in Jerusalem) and also with respect to the country of birth of the foreign-born.

As was the case also in the whole country, there was a striking difference in the age structure between the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim and Orientals in Jerusalem, in keeping with the differential fertility of the two groups. Sephardim and Orientals being but a small minority in the whole of Palestine, the age distribution of the total Jewish population was similar to that of countries where wide use is made of birth-control. In Jerusalem, nearly half the Jewish inhabitants were Sephardim and Orientals; therefore the total percentage of children in the city was considerable and the age structure can be diagrammatically represented as a pyramid with a rather large base. Besides the considerable percentage of children, Jerusalem's age composition was characterized by the existence also of a relatively considerable percentage of old people (owing to the long existence of a large Jewish population in the city and a tendency among aged religious immigrants

to settle there). With respect to both percentages—of children and of old people—the Jews of Jerusalem were surpassed only by those of few localities in Mandatory Palestine.

The comparatively reduced proportion of middle-aged people in Jerusalem and, on the other hand, the existence of considerable percentage of children and old people, had definite economic implications, since the bulk of the working population is drawn from the middle age groups. In the second half of the Mandatory period, there was for every 100 individuals aged 15–59 years a ratio of 78 to 81 children and old persons (together) in Jerusalem, as against only 53 or 54 in the whole country. Thus a considerable burden of providing for dependants rested on earners in the city.

In the Mandatory period there were relatively fewer men in Jerusalem than in the whole country, both in general and in the various adult age groups; this was consistently so both in the existing population and among the new immigrants who settled in the city. This fact should be viewed in relation to the unfavourable economic situation in Jerusalem, which deterred unmarried men, who are especially mobile, from settling in Jerusalem or staying there.

The average size of families was rather large in Jerusalem as compared with the whole country, in keeping with the large proportion of Oriental elements and the higher fertility in the city.

For the closing years of the Mandate and a short while afterwards, we have also examined the distribution of the Jews in Jerusalem by family status (single, family head, other member of family) and the distribution of the families by structure (e.g. couple only, couple with children, etc.). As regards these matters, we have been unable to compare the situation in Jerusalem with that in the whole country, for no statistical data are available on the latter.

Towards the close of the Mandate, as the political struggle grew more intense and the security situation deteriorated quite especially in Jerusalem, symptoms of crisis also became apparent in the city in the strictly demographic field: in 1947, the migratory balance of Jewish Jerusalem was negative, and her population participated only to a limited extent in the boom of marriages and births that took place among the rest of the country's Jewish population.

THE PERIOD OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

We possess relatively detailed statistical information on Jerusalem's Jewish population during the dramatic times which were marked by the crisis and the siege of 1947–8 and the ensuing recovery of the city; for in the short time from 1947 to 1950 no fewer than four general population censuses were carried out in Jerusalem, one of them in the middle of the fighting in Spring 1948.

THE JEWISH POPULATION OF JERUSALEM

Owing to the War of Independence, the number of Jerusalem's Jews decreased from about 95,000 in the middle of 1947 to 87,000 in Spring 1948. In the latter figure are included both those who were actually in the city and those on active service with the army. After that there occurred a further decrease, so that in the country-wide census of November 1948 no more than 83,000 persons indicated Jerusalem as their permanent place of residence, of whom only 78,000 were either actually in the city or in the army. The fighting and the siege caused casualties, protracted suffering for the whole population, damage to many buildings, economic inactivity; and, as long-term results, the loss of the Old City and of the free access to Mount Scopus, the bisection of Jerusalem and the localization of the Israeli part of the city on the very border, connected with the main territory of the State only by the narrow strip of the 'Corridor'. On the other hand, the war bestowed on the Israeli part of Jerusalem a sudden increase in its housing potential by virtue of the thousands of dwellings abandoned in previously non-Jewish quarters.

Since the end of the fighting, a number of factors and processes conducive to the recovery of Jerusalem and her future development have been in operation:

(*a*) Since the close of the year 1948 tens of thousands of new immigrants have been directed to the city or have come on their own initiative. (Most of the new immigrants arrived in Jerusalem before 1952.)

(*b*) In the 'Jerusalem Corridor' many new Jewish settlements have been established, which guarantee the effective linking of the city with the rest of the State.

(*c*) Israel's Jerusalem has become a Jewish city: 99 per cent of her inhabitants are Jews; the fetters on her development, which under the Mandate were due to governmental attitudes and to the existence of the mixed municipality, are a thing of the past.

(*d*) The effective establishment of the capital of the State of Israel in Jerusalem, through the transfer of the central organs of government and the big government offices to the city, has been of very great importance. This has had a favourable influence on: (1) the material existence of the population; (2) the status of Jerusalem (both within the country and in the eyes of the outside world) and the self-esteem of her inhabitants; (3) the effective inter-relation between Jerusalem and the other parts of the State.

(*e*) Serious progress has also been made in the establishment of industrial enterprises in the city.

(*f*) In the period of the State, Jerusalem has benefited from large-scale building activities, among which the following have been the most conspicuous: for residential purposes—the erection of a strong belt of housing estates in the south and south-west of the city; for public

purposes—the gradual construction of the Government and University cities, which are to constitute a National Centre in the heart of an expanded Jerusalem.

(*g*) As has been the case in the whole country, large sections of Jerusalem's population, both 'veterans' and new immigrants, have benefited from a rise in the standard of living. The new housing estates have improved dwelling conditions in the city. (This holds good also for new immigrants' housing, if we compare it with the sheet-metal huts of the transit camps.)

(*h*) The social barriers which, in Mandatory times, divided the various parts of Jerusalem's Jewish population according to origin and mode of life, have been reduced. The weakening of these barriers has been due to the already mentioned improvement in the living standard of formerly under-privileged groups and also to the following: the new realities of public life; the close proximity of people from different population groups in the new residential areas; and the impact of mass immigration, which emphasized those features that were common to all the veteran residents on the one hand and to all the new immigrants on the other hand, irrespective of origin. As time goes on, ever-increasing numbers of young people arrive at maturity in the city who are less sensitive to the distinctions by origin group. The distinction between 'veterans' and participants in the mass immigration after the establishment of the State, has already by now lost much of its practical significance.

(*i*) Since the establishment of the State a great change has occurred in the demographic position of the Jews of Jerusalem in relation to the total Jewish population of the country. Under the Mandate the total Jewish population of Palestine had a predominantly European character, and Jerusalem was in a position far removed from the general average, both with respect to the basic fact of the exceptionally mixed character of her population and to other demographic characteristics influenced by this fact (such as fertility, age distribution, and family size). However, owing to the mass immigration from Islamic countries, conditions in the whole country have altered, and the general average has shifted markedly towards the position existing in Jerusalem. In Jerusalem itself a number of changes have taken place which have tended to bring the situation in the city closer to that in the whole of the State. These trends and the establishment of many new immigrants' settlements, including urban ones (the demographic character of which is much farther removed from the European pattern than that of Jerusalem) have put an end to the city's former exceptional position and led to its 'normalization' within the new realities of the State of Israel.

The number of Jews in Jerusalem rose from 83,000 permanent residents in November 1948 to 138,700 at the end of 1951, and to

148,000 at the end of 1956. The relative growth of Jerusalem's population from the low level directly after the siege was greater than in the municipal areas of Tel-Aviv and Haifa and similar to the growth in the whole of the sub-districts of Tel-Aviv and Haifa (i.e. these towns with their surroundings). However, the rate of growth in Jerusalem fell short of that of the whole population of the State, since the majority of new immigrants were directed elsewhere than to the existing large Jewish towns. The falling-off in Jerusalem's growth after 1951 corresponds to the paucity of immigration during several years and the greater insistence on directing new immigrants to development areas.

In the period of the State, the main part of the population growth has been due to immigrants; this is true for Jerusalem as well as for the whole country. In September 1953 there were in Jerusalem 44,500 persons who had immigrated since 1948 (31 per cent of the city's population); at the beginning of 1957 new immigrants formed 28 per cent and their young children born in Israel formed another 8 per cent of the population of Jerusalem. Veteran residents of the country have continued to move only in limited numbers from another locality to Jerusalem; in the first years of the State, a large proportion of those who came consisted of government employees who were transferred to Jerusalem together with their offices, among them not a few who had been residents of Jerusalem previously. In the years 1952–4, when immigration was small and the consolidation of the preceding mass influx was going on, a slightly negative migratory balance existed in the three big towns. In Jerusalem the same situation still continued in 1955; the rate of departures from this city was most considerable among European residents.

Detailed information on marital status in the population is available only for the first few years of the State. At that time the Jews of Jerusalem possessed no advantage over the total Jews of the country as regards the influence of the marriage pattern on fertility. The Jews of Jerusalem participated in the boom of marriages and births that took place in the entire population in the early years of the State and affected the veteran residents as well as the new immigrants. According to the detailed analysis undertaken for each of the years 1952–4, fertility was higher in Jerusalem than in the whole of the State—not only among all women, but also among the women born, respectively, in Palestine, in Asia and Africa, and in Europe. However, unlike the situation in the middle of the Mandatory period, the difference in total fertility between the women in Jerusalem and in the whole country was but small; this again was true not only with respect to all women, but also if women born in the same main region of the world are considered. (With respect to all women, the diminishing dissimilarity in the composition by origin group between the populations in Jerusalem and the rest of the country, played its part.) Nevertheless, a detailed scrutiny of

the demographic characteristics of birth performance reveals that the women of Jerusalem may actually be considered as still having been more fertile. (They had relatively more high order births and births in the second part of the fertile period.)

The age-specific mortality rates in Jerusalem, including the infant mortality rates, were in 1952–4 on the same rather low level as in the whole of the State. Because of this and the greater fertility in Jerusalem, her population may be credited with a higher intrinsic rate of natural increase than the total population of the State.

In spite of the increased similarity of the demographic situations in Jerusalem and the whole State, the city's peculiarities from Mandatory times in the composition of the inhabitants, and in that of the new immigrants by region of birth (and origin group), do persist:

(*a*) In 1953 the proportion of the native-born in the population was 45 per cent in Jerusalem but only 28 per cent in the whole State. The percentage of native-born persons in Jerusalem was reduced from 57 per cent in 1948 to 45 per cent in 1953 owing to the large-scale absorption of immigrants, but there can be hardly any doubt that since that time it has risen again.

(*b*) In the first five years of the State (the latest period for which we have information) there were, as in Mandatory times, relatively more natives of Asia and Africa and of Central Europe among the new immigrants who settled in Jerusalem than among the total new immigrants. However, the difference between Jerusalem and the whole country in the percentage of natives of Asia and Africa among the new immigrants was greatly reduced; in both Jerusalem and the whole country this percentage was now much higher than in the Mandatory period (in Jerusalem in September 1953: 61 per cent of the immigrants from 1948 onwards; among all immigrants to Israel: 50 per cent of those who arrived from the establishment of the State until the end of 1952). The percentage of natives of Asia and Africa among the foreign-born in the population of the whole State grew relatively more than the corresponding percentage in Jerusalem and thus somewhat approached the latter: the proportion of the Asian- and African-born among all foreign-born increased in Jerusalem from 34 per cent in 1948 to 48 per cent in 1953, but in the whole country it increased from 15 per cent in 1948 to 38 per cent in 1953. At the beginning of 1957 there were about 58 per cent Sephardim and Orientals in the entire population of Jerusalem (i.e. including the native-born).

Unlike what happened under the Mandate, the composition by age and sex of the new immigrants who settled in Jerusalem at the time of the mass immigration into the State of Israel resembled closely that of the total new immigrants at that time. Under the influence of the many new immigrants who arrived, the age distribution in the whole of the State became more regular than before and more similar to that in

Jerusalem. According to a comparison of the age structure in the whole country and in Jerusalem in 1953, the increasing similarity was most marked in the percentages of children, which had come very close to each other. In the whole State the percentage of persons in the middle age groups decreased from 65 per cent in 1948 to 61 per cent in 1953; the corresponding percentage in Jerusalem, on the other hand, rose somewhat (from 56 per cent in 1948 to 58 per cent in 1953), so that the former difference was greatly reduced. The proportion of old people continued to be higher in Jerusalem.

Among all new immigrants who came to Jerusalem there was a limited majority of males. This caused a change in the general sex ratio in Jerusalem, which throughout the Mandatory period had shown a surplus of females in the population; by 1953 males and females lived in about equal number in the city and the age specific sex ratios in Jerusalem had moved nearer than before to those existing in the whole country.

In the second part of the Mandatory period there were in Jerusalem relatively low percentages of adults in the population and of working persons among the adults. Since then the percentages of adults in Jerusalem and in the whole State have become more similar, as we have seen. Moreover, four country-wide sample surveys of the labour force, carried out in the years 1955–7, have shown nearly identical percentages of working population (in both sexes together) in Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa, and the whole country. However, all these percentages were lower than those ascertained outside Jerusalem before the establishment of the State. One of the causes of the lowered percentage of the working population and for the levelling-out of this percentage in Jerusalem and elsewhere was the new immigrants, who made the composition by origin group of the whole population of the State more similar to that in Jerusalem, and among whom there was a tendency for women in general and men above a certain age not to engage in any gainful occupation. Another cause of the lowered percentage of the working population was the introduction of military service. However, one of the principal causes of the equality achieved by Jerusalem was the considerable percentage of working women (among all adult women) that developed in the city. In all the four surveys of 1955–7 the percentage of working men was lower in Jerusalem, but the percentage of working women definitely higher, than in the other two large towns and in the whole country. (The mutual cancelling-out of the two divergencies produced the equality in the general percentage of the working population, i.e. both sexes being considered together.) Moreover, the percentage of working women in Jerusalem has been definitely higher in recent years than under the Mandate. The relatively large participation of women in the labour force in Jerusalem must be viewed in relation to the fact that lately the percentage of the

working women active in the economic branch of 'public services' [5] has been much higher in this city than in Tel-Aviv, in Haifa, or in the whole State, or than was the case in Jerusalem itself at an earlier time (61–62 per cent of the working women in Jerusalem in 1957 as against 33–42 per cent in Tel-Aviv, Haifa, and the whole country in 1957, and 46 per cent in Jerusalem in 1948). If, in addition, we mention that among the working men the percentage of those engaged in 'public services' has also been much higher in Jerusalem than in Tel-Aviv, in Haifa and in the whole State, a first idea may be gained of how important it is economically for the people of Jerusalem that their city is the capital of the State of Israel—a town of offices and public institutions.

Since Mandatory times, the built-up area of Jerusalem inhabited by Jews has greatly expanded southward and westward. According to detailed investigation of the residential expansion of the Jews of Jerusalem, from 1939–47 until 1953–6 the topographical centre of their distribution had moved about three-quarters of a kilometre southward. Whereas in 1947 92 per cent of the Jews of Jerusalem lived in the 'central section' [6] of the city, only 64–65 per cent lived there in 1953–6, the rest residing in the southern and western sections of the expanded town. The 'standard distance' of the Jewish population of Jerusalem, which is a measure of the dispersion of the population round its centre,[7] grew from about 1 km. in 1939 and 1947 to 1·8 km. in 1953 and 1956. Whereas origin group and not period of immigration was the principal determinant for the choice of a residential area in Jerusalem in the Mandatory period, the reverse has been true since the establishment of the State. Although a certain movement southward and westward has been noticeable among the population that already lived in the city prior to the creation of the State, the newcomers who immigrated from 1948 onwards live to a much larger extent in the outer regions and especially in the south and west. Therefore the centre of the topographical distribution of the new immigrants is farther south, and their 'standard distance' is much greater, than in the case of the 'veteran' population. These differences in residential distribution between 'veterans' and new inhabitants of Jerusalem are clearly observable even within detailed origin groups and the groups consisting of the natives of individual countries.

NOTES

[1] This paper contains a summary of part of the results of an extensive historical and statistical study, which we hope to publish in book form (in Hebrew). Two volumes are contemplated: one dealing with demographic development, the second with economic and social data and with the territorial growth and composition of Jewish Jerusalem. The information contained in this paper is drawn mainly from the first of the two volumes. A version of this paper was read at the Second World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1957, in the Section 'Demography of the Jews'.

[2] Two shades of meaning of the Hebrew term *edoth* are distinguished here. *Edoth* itself is used for the large organized sections which existed among the Jews of Jerusalem in the nineteenth century. The word is translated as 'origin group' when we are concerned, in the present century, with the origins of the inhabitants.

[3] Ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi elements, amongst them descendants of immigrants from pre-Zionist times.

[4] For these years detailed information was available. The date, it is true, falls outside the Mandatory period, which is being considered here; but it can also be shown that near the end of the Mandate, in 1947, the fertility of native-born women in Jerusalem was particularly low. (After the establishment of the State, their fertility suddenly rose; that is, even by the end of the Mandatory time it displayed the elasticity characteristic of a group where births are, to a large extent, controlled and planned; this was a far cry from the fertility pattern which still prevailed among the native-born women in Jerusalem in 1938–9.)

[5] Administration and educational, medical, and legal services, etc. (including self-employed persons in these fields).

[6] The central area of the city as far as the western limits of Mekor Baruh, the 'Nahlaot' and Rehavia, and the southern limits of Rehavia, Talbya, and Yemin Moshe.

[7] The quadratic average of distances from the centre.

NUPTIALITY AND FERTILITY OF ORIGIN GROUPS IN ISRAEL[1]

K. R. Gabriel

THIS PAPER sets out to describe patterns of nuptiality and fertility in Israel. It starts with a description of these phenomena in the Jewish population as a whole, though evidently this is merely an average of the patterns in the very varied components of the population. It then goes on to deal in detail with individual origin groups, and finally reviews some data on trends in nuptiality and fertility which are connected with length of stay in the country.

We have attempted to describe separately the underlying patterns of demographic phenomena, and the observed rates in different periods. Rates are given to considerable fluctuations from year to year, but we assume that some underlying 'true' pattern exists, and we have tried to disentangle it from the fluctuations.

Data on Nuptiality

The present analysis of nuptiality is based mainly on the data of 1953, and also on the 1948 Census (Registration of the Population). A great boom of marriages occurred between these two dates—see Table 8—apparently caused by the influx of a surplus of unmarried immigrants, as well as by unusually high marriage rates. These effects had been largely reduced by 1953, when rates were apparently little above normal. No analyses have yet been undertaken for later years.

Marriage statistics were analysed in the form of nuptiality tables, estimated either (1) from age specific marriage rates for persons single, or (2) from rates specific for age only, or (3) from proportions single in the population at each age.

TABLE 1. *Percentage remaining Single—1953 data*

	Age 50–59		*Age 70–74*	
	Male	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
From proportions single in population	3·8	3·3	1·4	1·5
From age specific marriage rates for single persons	1·6	0·6	1·0	0·4

TABLE 2. *Proportions Marrying at each age (per 10,000 in Population at that age) by Sex, 1953*

Age	*Males*		*Females*	
	From age specific rates for bachelors	*From general age specific rates*	*From age specific rates for spinsters*	*From general age specific rates*
—16	16	16	98	97
17	102	102	1,372	1,342
18	190	188	1,506	1,420
19	348	343	1,383	1,205
20	586	569	1,241	1,070
21	804	771	1,043	944
22	925	871	811	749
23	904	850	571	568
24	840	797	477	465
25	787	749	351	360
26	720	685	286	313
27	600	580	163	200
28	502	496	107	151
29	448	454	93	145
30	366	370	88	138
31	321	313	64	112
32	266	267	43	91
33	216	231	29	84
34	184	213	21	68
35–39	440	653	59	213
40–44	164	285	22	110
45–49	61	110	11	60
50–54	33	60	5	30
55–59	28	45	6	35
60–64	16	25	2	10
65–69	11	20	2	10
70–74	9	20	3	10

TABLE 3. *Mean Ages at first Marriage, by Sex—1953**

	Males	*Females*
From age specific rates for persons single	27·0	21·6
From general age specific rates	27·4	22·5
From proportions single in population	26·8	21·9

* Calculations do not take mortality into account—the effect of mortality is a reduction of less than six months in mean age at marriage.

Proportion ever Marrying

Marriage is almost universal in Israel. Among both sexes there are only 3–4 per cent remaining unmarried by ages 50–59, and even fewer at higher ages. Estimates based on 1953 marriage rates for persons single are lower still, presumably because of a slight excess in the rates of that year. Net probabilities of ever marrying, when we take into account also the chances of dying single, are about 0·91 for males, 0·94 for females. It seems that chances of remaining single are slightly greater for males than for females.

Proportions remaining single in Israel are among the lowest in the world, similar to what is found generally in underdeveloped regions. Much larger proportions unmarried obtain in almost all populations of European origin.

In many countries there are more women than men remaining single. There seem to be two types of countries where the opposite situation prevails: first, countries with almost universal marriage like the Arab countries, India, and some Balkan countries; second, English-speaking countries outside Europe, apparently because these are countries of immigration with a relative scarcity of women. Both these conditions obtain in Israel, and this may explain the slightly higher proportions remaining single among males than among females.

Ages at Marriage

The distribution of first marriages by age of brides and by age of bridegrooms are obtained from age specific marriage rates: (1) for persons single, or (2) for all persons. The two estimates differ slightly because of unusual proportions single in the population.

The age distribution of bridegrooms is positively skew. Little more than 1 per cent marry before age 18. The percentage marrying at each age then rises rapidly to about 9 per cent at ages 22–23. After those ages the percentages fall off again slowly; by 35–40 there are fewer than 1 per cent marrying at each age, and at high ages the frequency of first marriages is very low.

Brides have an even more skew age distribution, with a maximum frequency of 15 per cent marrying at age 18. After that age the frequency per age declines steeply to below 1 per cent around age 30. At high ages there are very few brides indeed.

The following partition values describe these distributions well. 10 per cent of males who marry, do so by age 20·6, 25 per cent by age 22·5, and 50 per cent by age 25·5. The corresponding ages for females are 17·6, 18·6, and about 20·5. The estimates for higher ages are less reliable but it would seem 75 per cent of marrying males are married by age 29–30 and 90 per cent by age 35 or thereabouts; 75 per cent of marrying females by 23–24 and 90 per cent by little over 26. The concentration of ages at marriage is shown by the fact that 50 per cent of bridegrooms

marry in a range of about 7 years of age, 50 per cent of brides in a range of about 5 years only.

Mean Age at Marriage[2]

Mean age at first marriage is estimated at 27–27·5 years for males and about 22 for females. Individual estimates vary slightly because the effects of the marriage boom had not quite passed by 1953.

In Israel, males marry on the average later than in most Eastern and Arab countries; later than in the United States and in other English-speaking countries, though only little later than in England and Wales; earlier than in countries of Northern, Western, and Southern Europe. Among East European and Latin American countries there are some where males marry earlier than in Israel and some where they marry later, so that no general comparison can be made.

Females in Israel marry on the average later than in Eastern and Arab countries; earlier than in all English-speaking countries except the United States—again the difference between Israel and England and Wales is small, though in the opposite direction to that found for males; earlier than in all European and most Latin American countries.

In comparison with Arab populations Israeli mean ages at marriage are late among females and not quite so late among males. In comparison with English-speaking and European countries generally, Israeli females marry early and males not so early. It would seem that for both sexes mean ages at marriage in Israel are between those in Arab countries and those in Europe. Also, the differences in ages at marriage between Europe and the Arab countries are smaller for males than for females; hence Israeli males are not found to marry much earlier than European males.

Percentages Single at Various Ages

Differences between countries in proportions single generally correspond to differences in mean ages at marriage, but the place of Israel among other countries is slightly different. At young ages (20–24, 25–29) proportions single are rather lower in Israel than in other countries with similar mean marriage ages. Among males, for instance, in Israel proportions single at those ages are similar or lower than in England and Wales, Australia and Canada—though mean age at marriage is higher. Israeli females show lower proportions single at those ages than females in the United States, though the latter marry earlier. These differences are much more pronounced at higher ages, at which proportions single are seen to be much lower in Israel than in other countries with similar mean ages at marriage.

These comparisons of proportions single bring out an important difference between nuptiality in Israel and in European countries with similar mean ages at marriage. In Israel there are more people marrying

already at early ages, but the high frequency of marriage is especially noticeable at higher ages. Relatively to other countries there is a special propensity to marry among those who are a little older; this tendency balances the high proportions marrying early and results in a not so low mean age at marriage.

TABLE 4. *Probabilities of Marrying within five years, for Single Persons of each Sex, by Age (computed from age specific marriage rates for persons single)*

Age	*Israel, 1953*		*England and Wales, 1942–7*	
	Males	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*
15	·066	·401	·046	·177
20	·425	·806	·375	·574
25	·601	·780	·555	·514
30	·638	·645	·423	·236
35	·525	·380	·302	·143
40	·398	·230	·208	·076
45	·242	·150	·123	·063
50	·168	·088	·039	·054
55	·176	·100	·034	·026
60	·121	·042	·033	·018

Probabilities, for single persons, of marrying within one year—for either sex—are relatively low at the earliest ages, then rise rapidly to a maximum—especially among females—and thereafter decline slowly to very low probabilities at high ages.

Probabilities that a bachelor marry within one year are highest—0·17—at ages 30–34; the maximum age cannot be located precisely. For bachelors at all ages between 20 and 40 the probability is not below 0·10. By age 50 the probability falls to 0·05, as it also does before age 20.

Probabilities of marrying within a year are higher yet for spinsters. For them the probability is highest at about age 24, reaching almost 0·25! For spinsters at all ages between 20 and 30 the probabilities are above 0·20, between 17 and 36 above 0·10, and after age 45 below 0·05. Again we see that females marry earlier and in a smaller age range than males. It is not correct, however, to consider an unmarried female at age 25 or 30 to be necessarily doomed to become an 'old maid', as there is still a very appreciable probability of marrying after these ages, and after higher ages as well.

It is interesting to compare the probabilities of marrying for single persons at each age, in Israel and in England and Wales, as the mean ages at marriage are similar in both cases. Probabilities are higher in Israel at all ages, but the excess is relatively greater at the higher ages. This confirms the impression gained from the study of proportions single. The great frequency of marriage is not concentrated in the lower age groups, as in most non-industrial societies (for females, at any rate),

but is remarkable especially at advanced ages. Thus the Israeli population differs not only from European populations where fewer people marry, but also from those of Asia and Africa where frequencies of marriage are as high as those in Israel.

TABLE 5. *Probabilities of remarrying after having been Divorced (calculated for all persons born—estimates from 1953 age specific rates of remarriage as divorcees)*

	Males	*Females*
Gross Probabilities (not taking mortality into account)	·143	·135
Net Probabilities (taking mortality into account)	·124	·125

No reliable estimates of the probabilities of divorce have yet been computed for Israel. Our rough computations show that according to 1953 rates about one person out of every eight persons born is likely to remarry after having been divorced. The proportion getting divorced must be greater yet. Though these estimates cannot be considered very reliable there is no evidence that divorces are less frequent than suggested here.

TABLE 6. *'Total Fertility', by Birth Order, 1938–1954**

Year	*All Births*	*Births of Order*					
		1	2	3	4	5	6+
1938	2·48	1·11	0·55	0·29	0·16	0·10	0·26
1939	2·23	1·01	0·52	0·24	0·15	0·09	0·23
1940	2·35	1·09	0·57	0·23	0·14	0·09	0·24
1941	2·12	1·04	0·47	0·20	0·12	0·09	0·21
1942	2·38	1·19	0·58	0·24	0·12	0·08	0·18
1943	3·11	1·46	0·88	0·30	0·15	0·11	0·21
1944	3·27	1·24	1·15	0·40	0·17	0·10	0·21
1945	3·38	1·20	1·20	0·46	0·18	0·11	0·22
1946	3·39	1·21	1·10	0·46	0·19	0·12	0·21
1947	3·54	1·44	1·04	0·50	0·21	0·12	0·23
1948	3·08	1·33	0·89	0·42	0·16	0·09	0·18
1949	3·43	1·40	1·06	0·51	0·18	0·10	0·18
1950	3·90	1·28	1·24	0·63	0·27	0·16	0·32
1951	4·01	1·32	1·18	0·60	0·31	0·19	0·41
1952	3·98	1·21	1·19	0·60	0·32	0·20	0·47
1953	3·88	1·15	1·15	0·59	0·32	0·21	0·47
1954	3·59	0·99	1·05	0·58	0·31	0·21	0·45

* Total Fertility is estimated by adding the age specific birth rates for mothers of all ages. In years of high birth rates this may overestimate true fertility, and conversely in years of low birth rates. In Israel the estimates for first and second births are above the maximum possible—one per woman—for most of the years observed. This is presumably due to two causes: (1) births delayed before immigration and born later in Israel, (2) a 'baby-boom' during the years considered. A discussion of this phenomenon which is paralleled by an extraordinarily high marriage rate, is contained in a forthcoming paper, 'The Effect of Immigration on Marriage and Birth Rates in Israel'.

As the proportion of women bearing a first birth is so obviously over-estimated it is of course quite impossible to estimate the extent of childlessness from these data.

Fertility

Our analysis of the fertility of women in Israel is based principally on birth rates specific by age of mother and also classified by order of birth. The study of fertility by such rates involves the assumption that the rates of a particular period are mean rates of a typical cohort of women. We find great fluctuations in these rates, and apparently a tendency of immigrants to postpone births abroad and make up their numbers after immigration. Both these factors make the inference of fertility levels from birth rates exceedingly difficult. Calculations of 'total fertility' from birth rates have therefore to be used with caution, and we have tried to obtain corrected estimates of the mean number of children per woman, by taking averages over several years and eliminating obvious excesses of births of any particular order.

TABLE 7. *Fertility by Order of Birth—Adjusted Estimates*

	Mean no. of Births per Woman	*Probabilities of having a Birth of Order*					
		1	2	3	4	5	6+
Pre-mass-immigration (1938–47 mean)	2·57	max.	·81	·33	·16	·10	·22
Post-mass-immigration (1954)	3·40	max.	max.	·58	·31	·21	·45

It has been necessary to make separate estimates of fertility in Israel for the late Mandatory period and for recent years, since mass immigration, especially from Oriental countries, greatly changed average fertility. The above estimates for both periods (Table 7) are considered to be upper bounds for the true values which may be a little lower.

In both periods almost all women had first and second births, as also almost all women married within the reproductive period. Before mass-immigration there was a widespread tendency to have two children only, and only about a third of the women had more than two births. In the present-day population of Israel there is a greater propensity to have third births (almost 60 per cent of women) and even fourth births (about one third of the women). The effect of the immigration of Oriental women was almost entirely in increased numbers of higher orders of births, though immigration has not been the only cause of this increase. Evidently fertility differentials in Israel consist in some groups having two children only, while other groups have more—none have fewer.

Most births are born to mothers aged 20–35, with a maximum frequency at ages 20–24—on the average there is slightly more than one birth per woman within those five years of age. The mean age of mothers at birth is 27·5 years. Most first births are born to mothers aged 15–29, with a mean age of 23·6. Second to fifth births are born to mothers aged on the average 26·9, 28·3, 29·3, and 30·2 years, respectively.

TABLE 8. *Gross Nuptiality Rates, First Marriages, 1935–1954**

Year	*Rate*	*Year*	*Rate*
1935	1·18	1945	0·96
36	1·02	46	1·37
37	1·09	47	1·35
38	1·02	48	1·09
39	1·12	49	1·31
40	1·25	50	1·45
41	1·36	51	1·20
42	1·32	52	1·18
43	1·08	53	1·02
44	0·96	54	0·95

* These rates are calculated on the assumption that first marriage to all marriage ratios were constant at the 1952–3 level during the whole period.

Fluctuations in Marriage and Birth Rates

There was a long and considerable decline in fertility up to the thirties; no data on marriage are available for this period. The decline in fertility corresponds to similar trends in other European populations in that period. In Israel the decline was accentuated by changes in the origin composition of the population, as the percentage of European born women, who are less fertile, increased. There may also have been a considerable reduction in the fertility of Oriental women in that period, as their fertility in the late thirties was much below the level of almost natural fertility which presumably prevailed amongst them when they immigrated.

The lowest levels of marriage and birth rates were reached in the late thirties, and there were even fears that fertility was below replacement level. These were years of economic crisis in Israel and great internal insecurity.

The Second World War brought great changes in marriage and birth rates, as in many other countries. At the beginning of the war there were a great number of marriages, partly postponed from the late thirties and partly anticipated before the men joined up. In the later part of the war there was a great reduction in the number of marriages as many young men were serving abroad. Discharge of the soldiers increased marriage rates again after the war, as did also the large percentages single among illegal immigrants coming into the country after the war.

These changes in marriage rates were reflected a few years later by similar changes in birth rates. First came peaks of first birth rates in 1943–4 and 1947, and somewhat later also of second and third and higher order births. These fluctuations were especially marked among second and third births and less so among first and fourth births. It is interesting to note also that these fluctuations were most marked among

women of western origin who tend to limit their families drastically, and much less among the more fertile Oriental women.

The War of Independence temporarily reduced marriage rates and birth rates of all orders. Presumably these reductions were made up soon after.

Mass immigration during the first years of independence produced a great change in the demographic pattern of Israel by increasing the percentage of Orientals in the population. We have not been able to establish changes in nuptiality, though there may have been a reduction in ages at marriage. There was, however, a great increase in fertility.

In addition to those fundamental changes there was also an unusual frequency of marriages and births in the early years of independence. The peak year of marriage rates was 1950, and for first births 1951. Since then rates have been falling off again.

There were special reasons for the high rates among new immigrants. There had been high percentages single and widowed among immigrants, and their marriages increased rates in Israel, first nuptiality rates and later also birth rates. There may also have been many births which had been postponed from before immigration. But changes in ages of mothers at birth suggest that births were not so much postponed as anticipated. And also among long-settled women those were years of high rates of apparently anticipated births. The conditions of living in reception camps might partly explain the high birth rates of new immigrants, as it has been found that immigrants have especially high rates in their first year in Israel. This, however, offers no explanation for the rise of the birth rates of long-settled women at the same time. It would seem that the continuation of an austerity régime with the limitation of the outlets for expenditure of personal income brought about an anticipation of births in the early fifties—and perhaps already in 1947—which would otherwise have been postponed until later years.

After this abnormal frequency of births there had to be a decline. Changes in the economic outlook, the gradual relaxation of controls and wider opportunities for spending one's income, resulted in a renewed wish to postpone births or reduce their number. The excess numbers single among immigrants have also disappeared since, and marriage rates are returning to a more normal level. We consider the falling off of marriage and fertility rates in recent years to be a return to a normal long run level, and not a reduction below the true level of nuptiality and fertility of the Israeli population.

The final and long run level of marriages and birth rates cannot be established precisely yet. Possibly rates may be temporarily reduced even below their true long-run level when the births anticipated in the early fifties would have been born. It seems that nuptiality rates reached their true level about 1954, and birth rates might therefore be expected to reach it somewhat later. We believe there will be no further important

fall in marriage and birth rates after 1956, but that rates are now not much different from their true level in the Israeli population with the present origin composition.

Origin Differences in Nuptiality

The only data allowing comparisons of nuptiality patterns of different groups are the 1948 Census[3] tabulations by sex, age, and marital status, within groups by country of origin and period of immigration; and similar data for immigrants 1948–52. The probability of not marrying is estimated from the proportions single at ages 50–59, as few marry later, and the mean age at marriage was computed by known methods of using census data.[4] These calculations supplement estimates of median ages at marriage presented in an earlier paper,[5] in which intergroup differences were discussed in detail.

TABLE 9. *Proportions Single at Age 50–59—with 99 per cent Confidence Bounds —by Sex and Country of Birth (1948 Census)**

Country of Birth	*Males*			*Females*		
Israel	*·006*	*·018*	*·042*	*·009*	*·025*	*·053*
Asia and Africa	*·008*	*·018*	*·037*	*·002*	*·009*	*·026*
Turkey	·004	·032	·116	·000	·000	·062
Iraq	·001	·018	·085	·000	·000	·083
Yemen and Aden	·002	·016	·059	·001	·012	·056
Syria and Lebanon	·000	·000	·108	·004	·038	·137
Other Asia	·002	·018	·067	·000	·000	·045
North West Africa	·000	·037	·275	·000	·000	·122
Other Africa	·000	·000	·221	·000	·000	·379
Europe and America	*·032*	*·040*	*·049*	*·027*	*·035*	*·044*
Russia and Baltic	·019	·031	·049	·020	·034	·056
Poland	·026	·036	·050	·016	·026	·040
Rumania	·012	·027	·052	·009	·025	·054
Bulgaria	·001	·024	·110	·000	·014	·100
Other Balkans	·005	·032	·100	·000	·000	·046
Germany and Austria	·047	·074	·112	·050	·077	·114
Czechoslovakia	·030	·079	·170	·015	·059	·154
Hungary	·016	·061	·158	·000	·000	·072
Other Europe, etc.	·003	·061	·281	·000	·028	·206

* Central figure is point estimate, outer figures are confidence bounds.

Probabilities of ever Marrying

Proportions remaining single are slightly higher for Europeans than for Orientals, yet do not seem to exceed 4 per cent by age 50–59. Small numbers of persons in these high age groups preclude our establishing any differences between individual Oriental countries of origin. Among European immigrants, however, those from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia have significantly higher proportions not marrying—about 7 per cent.

The generally low proportions remaining single which obtain even among Israel born confirm the accuracy of the population data as against that of 1953 rates which suggested still lower proportions (see Table 1).

No systematic or significant difference in proportions not marrying was found between immigrants of different periods of immigration, either among Orientals or among Europeans. The data are therefore not presented here.

Mean Ages at Marriage

The means in Tables 10 and 11 should be read in conjunction with the medians published earlier,[6] but in this case the pre-1929 data cannot be relied on, as this group included very few people in the earlier ages.

TABLE 10. *Mean Age at Marriage, by Continent of Birth and Period of Immigration (Estimates based on 1948 Census Data)**

Period of Immigration	*Continent of Birth*		
	All Continents	*Asia and Africa*	*Europe and America*
		MALES	
Total	27·65 ± ·08	27·24 ± ·24	27·62 ± ·10
Israel-born	28·02 ± ·27	—	—
pre-1929	(26·69 ± ·26)	(26·24 ± ·52)	(26·77 ± ·31)
1930–39	27·01 ± ·14	26·33 ± ·41	27·18 ± ·15
1940–47	28·16 ± ·22	28·25 ± ·53	28·17 ± ·24
1948	29·24 ± ·24	29·94 ± 1·25	29·17 ± ·25
		FEMALES	
Total	22·34 ± ·09	21·29 ± ·27	22·14 ± ·11
Israel-born	23·03 ± ·26	—	—
pre-1929	(22·30 ± ·26)	(21·61 ± ·47)	(22·69 ± ·31)
1930–39	21·81 ± ·16	21·45 ± ·46	22·08 ± ·17
1940–47	21·92 ± ·25	20·97 ± ·64	22·17 ± ·28
1948	23·09 ± ·29	22·68 ± 1·73	23·14 ± ·30

* (*a*) Bracketed figures cannot be considered reliable.
(*b*) Standard errors were computed by considering each estimate as a function of proportions single which were assumed distributed binomially.

1948 immigrants of both sexes are outstanding in their high mean ages at marriage. This is presumably due to large proportions single among these people who had immigrated only recently—and at a time of war. For the same reasons we should expect a reduction in excess proportions single as more years pass from the date of immigration. This may well account also for the apparent decrease in male age at marriage with length of stay in Israel. Had this been a real trend in marriage age we

should have expected it to continue with Israel-born marrying youngest —but it does not. Apart from 1948 immigrants, there is a trend of female ages at marriage increasing with length of stay in Israel, and this is continued by the higher ages among Israel-born. This trend is slight, but interesting in its running counter to what would have been expected from the differences in proportions single at immigration.

The length of stay differences among both sexes were much the same for Orientals and Europeans; hence differences between these two groups do not seem to have changed with length of stay in Israel.

The most important differences in ages at marriage are between origin groups. European bridegrooms are on the average about a year older than Oriental bridegrooms, and brides about one and a half years older. Earlier estimates[7] had suggested considerably greater origin differences, but were based on most unreliable data and methods.

Israel-born bridegrooms are a little younger than European, but brides are older than those of either immigrant group—this is due to the trend of increasing female age at marriage with length of stay, as mentioned above.

Thus differences between the ages of the couple are slightly higher among Orientals (over 6 years) than among Europeans (below 5½ years) and least among Israel-born (below 5 years).

TABLE 11. *Mean Age at Marriage—Foreign-born by Country of Birth (Estimates based on 1948 Census Data)*

Country of Birth	*Males*	*Females*
Asia and Africa		
Turkey	27·27 ± ·64	22·20 ± ·66
Iraq	28·57 ± ·66	22·30 ± ·75
Yemen and Aden	24·44 ± ·51	20·30 ± ·52
Syria and Lebanon	27·55 ± ·81	20·01 ± ·77
Other Asia	27·20 ± ·58	22·20 ± ·65
North West Africa	28·29 ± 1·11	19·25 ± 1·30
Other Africa	29·30 ± ·91	22·50 ± 1·37
Europe and America		
Russia and Baltic	27·79 ± ·28	22·35 ± ·32
Poland	28·13 ± ·15	22·21 ± ·18
Rumania	26·50 ± ·27	22·47 ± ·30
Bulgaria	27·66 ± ·60	22·73 ± ·66
Other Balkans	27·32 ± ·55	21·70 ± ·58
Germany and Austria	27·22 ± ·28	21·64 ± ·31
Czechoslovakia	27·24 ± ·51	21·18 ± ·61
Hungary	26·45 ± ·60	22·55 ± ·65
Other Europe and America	28·25 ± ·87	24·28 ± ·86

Even more considerable differences exist within these wide groups. Among Orientals we find Yemenites marrying earliest, and Iraqi and Turkish immigrants latest. Generally the earlier marrying come from

more backward countries, and the later marrying from countries where Jews were in some contact with modern industrial society. Among European immigrants age at marriage differences between individual countries are smaller, but generally mean ages rise as countries further North and West are considered; this roughly corresponds to the degree of industrialization of the countries.

TABLE 12. *Mean Age at Marriage—Immigrants by Country of Birth (Estimates from 1948–52 immigration statistics by sex, age and marital status, and from Unesco sample of New Immigrants, 1950–51)**

Country of Birth	*Immigrants 1948–52*		*New Immigrants' Sample*	
	Males	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*
Turkey	26·5	24·2	26·9	23·0
Iraq	28·9	23·4	—	—
Yemen and Aden	22·8	20·0	23·2	15·7
North West Africa	26·9	21·3	24·5	18·1
Libya	25·0	22·0	—	—
Other Asia, Africa	—	—	26·7	19·7
Russia and Baltic	—	—	29·0	23·2
Poland	27·6	21·2	27·6	23·5
Rumania	27·6	24·4	28·2	23·8
Bulgaria	26·5	22·2	29·0	22·8
Other Balkans	—	—	30·1	24·0
Germany and Austria	—	—	31·3	24·6
Czechoslovakia	—	—	30·9	23·7
Hungary	—	—	30·4	23·3
Other Europe, etc.	—	—	28·8	23·1

* (*a*) For the New Immigrants' sample an ordinary mean of the ages at which the immigrants had married was computed.
(*b*) For the immigration statistics, mean age at marriage was obtained from proportions single at each age from 15 to 49. Since in some countries a number of girls marry before age 15, the method must have produced overestimates for them.
(*c*) The computations from immigration statistics are from Sicron (1957), Chapter 7.

The data from immigration statistics shed no further light on the small European differences. For Oriental immigrants, however, we find the inter-country differences to have been even greater at immigration. This suggests that inter-country differences have been reduced to some extent with length of stay in Israel, and confirms earlier findings about smaller inter-country differences among older than among newer immigrants.[8]

TABLE 13. *Total Fertility by Birth Order—Women born in Asia and Africa*

Year	Total	Order of Birth					
		1	2	3	4	5	6+
1938/40	4·55	0·87	0·77	0·68	0·56	0·44	1·24
1944/45	4·79	1·04	0·87	0·71	0·55	0·49	1·13
1949	4·45	1·11	0·87	0·73	0·46	0·38	0·90
1950	5·66						
1951	6·30	1·39	1·09	0·89	0·75	0·60	1·59
1952	6·23	1·23	1·14	0·86	0·73	0·59	1·68
1953	6·15	1·20	1·14	0·90	0·72	0·59	1·61
1954	5·67	1·02	1·04	0·91	0·66	0·55	1·48
Pre-1948 Immigrants							
1951	5·71	1·10	1·04	0·83	0·72	0·47	1·54
1952	5·35	0·92	1·06	0·79	0·60	0·44	1·54
1953	4·98	0·97	0·96	0·80	0·55	0·44	1·27
1954	4·22	0·90	0·76	0·69	0·47	0·34	1·07
New Immigrants							
1951	6·50	1·45	1·10	0·91	0·77	0·64	1·63
1952	6·45	1·28	1·15	0·88	0·76	0·64	1·74
1953	6·41	1·24	1·16	0·92	0·75	0·64	1·70
1954	5·96	1·04	1·08	0·94	0·71	0·60	1·60

TABLE 14. *Total Fertility by Birth Order—Women born in Europe and America*

Year	Total	Order of Birth					
		1	2	3	4	5	6+
1938/40	1·82	1·04	0·48	0·16	0·06	0·03	0·05
1944/45	2·91	1·26	1·17	0·33	0·08	0·03	0·04
1949	3·21	1·52	1·08	0·43	0·11	0·04	0·03
1950	3·29						
1951	3·17	1·36	1·18	0·43	0·13	0·04	0·03
1952	3·04	1·28	1·16	0·42	0·12	0·04	0·03
1953	2·87	1·20	1·10	0·38	0·12	0·04	0·03
1954	2·63	1·06	1·03	0·35	0·11	0·04	0·03
Pre-1948 Immigrants							
1951	3·50	1·36	1·32	0·56	0·17	0·05	0·04
1952	3·35	1·23	1·32	0·56	0·15	0·05	0·04
1953	3·09	1·12	1·22	0·51	0·16	0·05	0·04
1954	2·90	1·08	1·15	0·46	0·15	0·04	0·03
New Immigrants							
1951	2·85	1·34	1·06	0·30	0·09	0·03	0·03
1952	2·80	1·28	1·07	0·31	0·09	0·03	0·02
1953	2·70	1·22	1·03	0·29	0·09	0·04	0·03
1954	2·48	1·07	0·97	0·28	0·09	0·04	0·03

TABLE 15. *Total Fertility by Birth Order—Israel born Women*

Year	*Total*	*Order of Birth*					
		1	2	3	4	5	6+
1938/40	3·49	0·89	0·70	0·50	0·41	0·28	0·70
1944/45	3·68	0·95	0·97	0·54	0·35	0·26	0·60
1949	3·56	1·12	0·92	0·56	0·27	0·22	0·48
1950	3·93						
1951	3·56	1·03	0·91	0·60	0·31	0·21	0·50
1952	3·36	0·96	0·95	0·57	0·27	0·19	0·42
1953	3·22	0·95	0·92	0·51	0·30	0·16	0·39
1954	2·89	0·84	0·85	0·50	0·26	0·12	0·33

Origin Differences in Fertility

Fertility differences between origin groups are relatively much greater than nuptiality differences. Oriental women bear about twice as many children as European women. Our estimates are based on the total fertility figures of Tables 13, 14, and 15, but as there were obvious surpluses of first and second births in recent years, we have subtracted these and reduced the total fertility of first and second births to 0·95 and 0·90 respectively—in view of sterility. We consider these adjusted estimates as upper bounds for true fertility.

TABLE 16. *Age Specific Fertility Rates, 1954, by Continent of Origin and Length of Stay*

Age of Mothers	*Israel-born*	*Born in Asia and Africa*		*Born in Europe and America*	
		Pre-1948 Immigrants	*New Immigrants*	*Pre-1948 Immigrants*	*New Immigrants*
15–19	22·1	105·7	120·8	53·9	50·2
20–24	159·6	209·9	336·7	187·5	156·0
25–29	177·1	213·2	282·8	166·3	137·1
30–34	132·9	169·7	238·8	113·3	95·0
35–39	64·7	103·6	136·2	47·7	45·7
40–44	19·1	32·7	60·5	9·9	9·8
45–49	2·8	9·6	16·8	0·8	1·3

European women are estimated to bear 2·5 children on the average to old immigrants, 2·3 to new immigrants. The corresponding means for Oriental women are 4–4·5 and about 5·5. Almost all women of both groups bear first and second births, and origin differences are mainly in higher order births. Less than half the European women have a third birth and as few as 4 per cent have a fifth birth; more than two-thirds of Oriental women have third births, and more than a third even have a fifth birth. Corresponding differences are found in age specific fertility rates: European women concentrate their births mainly in a short

period of ages and their rates are reduced particularly at the higher ages and the youngest ages as well.

Israel-born are a composite group by parental origin and thus tend to have demographic patterns intermediate between those of the two main origin groups. During late Mandatory times their fertility was about 3·5 births per woman on the average, now only about three. This reduction is presumably due to the increasing part of those of European parentage among them in recent years.

TABLE 17. *Indices of Fertility—by Country of Origin**

Country of Birth of Mother	*1949 Birth Statistics*		*1952 Birth Statistics*	
	Sf	Sa	Sf	Sa
Israel	*3·96*	*2·96*	*3·28*	*2·94*
Asia and Africa				
Turkey	3·16	2·75	3·47	3·27
Iraq	5·79	4·74	6·68	4·56
Yemen and Aden	8·73	6·37	9·45	7·34
Syria and Lebanon	7·36	4·96	—	—
Persia	—	—	7·11	5·01
North West Africa	5·92	4·57	8·23	5·77
Libya	6·04	4·33	6·64	5·21
Egypt	3·27	3·29	3·89	3·55
Europe and America				
Russia	3·12	3·20	3·31	3·10
Baltic countries	1·88	1·84	2·51	2·43
Poland	2·03	2·07	2·68	2·62
Rumania	1·72	1·84	1·86	2·05
Bulgaria	2·30	2·32	2·39	2·45
Yugoslavia and Albania	2·35	2·21	2·26	2·37
Greece	3·15	3·13	3·13	2·92
Germany	2·02	2·05	2·30	2·30
Austria	2·01	2·05		
Czechoslovakia	1·86	1·98	2·18	2·32
Hungary	1·99	2·08	2·48	2·54
Other Europe and America	2·04	2·07	1·98	2·14

* The indices were computed from age specific ratios of all births to first births by methods suggested by Hajnal (1948). These indices can be shown to be much affected by short-term fluctuations and this greatly reduces their reliability. A detailed discussion of these indices will be found in Gabriel and Falk (1958).

Further differences exist between immigrants of individual countries of origin within each broad group (Orientals, Europeans). No figures on the population by age and individual country of origin are available, so only very rough estimates of fertility could be computed (Tables 17 and 18). Considerable fertility differences are observed between women of different Oriental countries. Yemenite women seem most fertile—with at least six or seven children—followed by North-West African women. Other immigrants with high fertility are from Persia, Syria and Lebanon, and Libya. Women from Iraq have fewer children. Two

Oriental groups with appreciably lower fertility are women from Turkey and Egypt—only 3–3·5 children on the average.

TABLE 18. *Mean Birth Order, by Country of Birth of Parents (Sample of Confinements 1955–56, in town hospitals)**

Country of Birth	*Duration of Marriage (years)*	
	3–5	6–10
Turkey	2·05 ± ·10	3·05 ± ·17
Iraq	2·34 ± ·08	3·76 ± ·14
Yemen	2·60 ± ·17	3·76 ± ·11
Syria	2·33 ± ·14	3·95 ± ·24
Persia	2·52 ± ·17	4·00 ± ·30
Morocco	2·31 ± ·13	4·11 ± ·13
Tunisia	2·63 ± ·24	4·70 ± ·42
Libya	2·58 ± ·20	3·73 ± ·37
Egypt	2·26 ± ·13	3·35 ± ·30
Poland	1·86 ± ·06	2·20 ± ·06
Rumania	1·56 ± ·08	2·23 ± ·12
Bulgaria	1·61 ± ·10	2·04 ± ·15
Greece	1·87 ± ·02	2·36 ± ·21
Germany	1·67 ± ·18	2·23 ± ·22
Czechoslovakia	1·50 ± ·20	2·20 ± ·25
Hungary	1·67 ± ·22	2·82 ± ·37

* I am indebted to Dr. Goldschmidt of the Hebrew University Department of Zoology for providing the data, and to Mrs. Ronen for analysing them.

All groups of European women have fewer children than any Oriental group, and the differences between themselves are not so great. Women from Russia bear the most children, then women from Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic countries. Women from Central, North, and South Europe have relatively few children. In the Balkans, Rumanian women had as low fertility as any other European group, whereas women from other Balkan countries were almost the most fertile from Europe. This order is generally in agreement with that found in earlier studies,[9] and apparently also among the Jews in their country of origin. It is important to note that the order by fertility is much the same as the order by age at marriage noted above.

The demographic order of countries of origin generally corresponds to what is known about the demographic patterns among Jews in each of these countries. In Oriental countries demographic patterns depend mainly on the backwardness of the countries or their contact with industrialized society; thus Yemen is at one end of the scale and Turkey at the other. Another factor is introduced wherever the Jews are radically different from the main body of the population, as for instance in Iraq where they were concentrated mainly in the large towns and in contact with the semi-English administration, or in Egypt, where the Jews were

an economic elite and their origin was often European rather than Egyptian. It is not clear why the contact of North African Jews with the French administration does not seem to have influenced their demographic patterns at all.

The demographic order of countries of origin of European immigrants generally corresponds to the level of industrialization of the different countries, which roughly varies from South-East to North-West Europe. This development affected Jews also through their emancipation from orthodoxy, which had imposed traditional ways of life on them, including also habits of early marriage and high fertility. As against orthodox Jewry from parts of Poland and Russia we may contrast the liberal Jews of Central and Western Europe whose fertility was exceedingly low and amongst whom there was an appreciable percentage who never married. Here, too, the demographic order of origin groups in Israel corresponds to that among the Jews in the Dispersion and at immigration.

TABLE 19. *Indices of Fertility by Origin of Mother and Occupation of Father (1949)**

Birthplace of Mother	*Total*		*Israel*		*Asia and Africa*		*Europe and America*	
Occupation of Father	Sf	Sa	Sf	Sa	Sf	Sa	Sf	Sa
Total	2·44	2·44	3·22	2·83	5·97	4·37	2·06	2·10
Professional	1·97	2·05	2·45	2·36	—	—	1·81	1·89
Administration and clerical	2·04	2·11	2·52	2·46	2·83	2·85	1·85	1·92
Trade and Sales	2·96	2·88	—	—	—	—	2·25	2·22
Manual Labour	2·57	2·56	4·20	3·24	6·45	4·67	2·12	2·15
Farming	3·23	2·50	2·72	2·57	5·75	4·40	2·84	2·23
Services, etc.	2·30	2·37	2·54	2·51	4·83	3·94	1·92	2·02

* See note to Table 17.

Again, very few and unreliable data are available on occupational differences in fertility. The only estimates are based on birth statistics, but have been broken down into broad origin groups first, so that occupational differences can be studied separately from origin differences. Wives of clerical and professional men have the lowest fertility, whilst manual workers and tradesmen (all sales and commerce) have relatively many children. The position of agriculture has varied in different periods. Occupational differences are larger among Orientals than among Europeans, perhaps because the reduction of Oriental fertility has begun at first in the 'upper strata' which are in closer contact with Europeans and tend to emulate them. Occupational differences may affect origin differences when changes in the occupational

structure of immigrants occur. Increasing numbers of Orientals in 'upper strata' occupations may effect a reduction in their fertility. We do not believe this to be the main process of demographic change in Israel; it seems to us that most changes occur within origin and occupational groups, but we have no data to test this assumption on.

The Effect of Length of Stay in Israel on Nuptiality and Fertility

The effect of length of stay in Israel on nuptiality and fertility is of the utmost importance for the demography of Israel. An evaluation of the future development of Israel's population must take into account not only the differences between origin groups, but also the expected trends of the development of these differences.

We have unfortunately been able to make only very few direct comparisons of the same immigrant group at different periods of their life in Israel. Most comparisons are of data of a particular period, comparing newer and old-established immigrants. These comparisons may reflect other factors as well as differences in length of stay. The most important disturbing factor would be origin differences, and therefore all comparisons have been made only within the two broad origin groups. But within each of these groups there might have been differences in the representation of individual countries which could have affected nuptiality and fertility. Comparison of new immigrants and old settlers separately for each country of origin could be made only for some of the data on marriage. Strictly speaking, for all other comparisons we have to assume the country composition of new and old immigrants from either broad origin group to have been the same, and also that there were no other demographically relevant differences between the immigrants in the two periods. Neither of these assumptions is strictly true for our comparisons of old immigrants (immigrated before 1948) and new immigrants (immigrated since 1948).

Firstly, it is clear that some origin differences did exist between old and new immigrants. We know that European immigration in the thirties came mainly from Germany, Poland, and Central Europe, whereas in the first years of independence the main countries of origin were Rumania and Bulgaria. Among Orientals before 1948 there were few of North African origin, whereas in later years immigration from those countries was very considerable. Fertility differences may of course have been affected by these origin differences. Unfortunately we have no sufficiently detailed data to enable us to take account of the expected influence on fertility of these changes in origin composition.

Secondly, persons who immigrated during Mandatory times and those who immigrated during the period of independence may have differed in each country of origin, and these differences may have affected demographic patterns as well. One would not expect such differences to have been important among different waves of Oriental immigrants as their

fertility has not been limited to any important extent. But European immigrants before the Second World War were a select group in their national outlook and readiness for the drastic change of mode of life involved in immigration. It may well be that this group would have been especially affected by the extreme limitation of natality in Europe in those years. On the other hand new immigrants from Europe spent the war years under Nazi rule, and this is bound to have affected their fertility. Many births must have been postponed during the war and possibly made up later or after arrival in Israel. In some cases people may have been affected so as not to be able to raise a family any more, in others they may have had extra births to make up for children lost in the persecutions and the war. We have very little precise information about the extent of these influences on Jewish demography and we are therefore not able to evaluate the effects of selection of immigrants and of the war and persecution on the differences between earlier and later immigrants.

We are forced back on the assumption that demographic differences between old and new immigrants are differences in length of stay only. The factors that we have considered may have influenced these comparisons but we are unable to say by how much. We shall have to be cautious in using our comparisons, and try to supplement them as far as possible by comparisons of old immigrants with the entire population before independence. These last would be the only comparisons where factors of selective migration and changes in origin composition cannot operate.

No trend in probabilities of marriage can be related to duration of stay in Israel. Nor is there any evident change in male ages at marriage. It seems, however, that female ages at marriage rise with length of stay: women of the older immigration marry later than new immigrants, and native born even later. No lessening of age at marriage differences between Orientals and Europeans can be discerned, but within each group there seems to be a reduction in differences between individual countries of origin. This phenomenon has been observed for both sexes and different sources of data seem to confirm it. It appears then that there is a trend to unify the ages at marriage of immigrants from both main origin groups. Among Orientals as among Europeans, groups with relatively high ages at marriage tend to reduce them with duration of stay, and early marrying groups tend to raise their ages at marriage.

Data bearing on the effect of length of stay on fertility include primarily the total fertility estimates for new and old immigrants and Israel-born—Tables 13, 14, and 15—and the comparison of total fertility of old immigrants 1951–4 with the whole population of the same origin before mass immigration, i.e. 1938–40 and 1944–5, in the same tables. Other data are analyses of 1951 and 1952 birth statistics which also show the differences between Israel-born women of various parental

TABLE 20. *Indices of Fertility, by Origin of Mother and Period of Immigration*

	1951 Birth Statistics		*1952 Birth Statistics*	
	Sf	Sa	Sf	Sa
Born in Europe and America				
Immigrated before 1948	2·67 ± ·06	2·51 ± ·04	2·69 ± ·05	2·62 ± ·03
Immigrated since 1948	1·98 ± ·02	2·16 ± ·02	1·98 ± ·08	2·16 ± ·02
Born in Asia and Africa				
Immigrated before 1948	6·21 ± ·41	4·85 ± ·17	7·23 ± ·17	5·45 ± ·10
Immigrated since 1948	5·38 ± ·21	4·21 ± ·05	5·74 ± ·14	4·78 ± ·06
Born in Israel of Fathers				
Born in Europe and America	2·43 ± ·12	2·35 ± ·06	2·61 ± ·12	2·50 ± ·06
Born in Asia and Africa	5·02 ± ·59	3·95 ± ·18	4·05 ± ·21	3·79 ± ·14
Born in Israel and not known	3·26 ± ·16	2·95 ± ·07	3·48 ± ·19	3·04 ± ·07

* See note to Table 17. Standard errors were calculated by considering the indices as functions of the percentages of first births among all births, and assuming these percentages to be binomially distributed.

TABLE 21. *Mean Birth Order, by Community and Birthplace of Mother (Confinements in Hadassah Hospital, Jerusalem, 1932–33)**

Community	*Immigrants*	*Israel-born*
Ashkenazi (mostly of European origin)	2·1	2·75
Oriental (mostly of Oriental origin)	4·3	3·5

* I am indebted to Mr. H. S. Halevi for allowing me to reproduce these data.

TABLE 22. *Mean Birth Order, by Continent of Birth and Birthplaces of the Parents (Sample of Confinements, 1955–56, in town Hospitals)**

Origin of Both Parents		*Europe and America*		*Asia and Africa*	
Father born:	*Mother born:*	*Duration of Marriage (years)*		*Duration of Marriage (years)*	
		3–5	6–10	3–5	6–10
abroad	abroad	1·71 ± ·04	2·23 ± ·04	2·38 ± ·08	3·87 ± ·05
abroad	in Israel	1·83 ± ·09	2·38 ± ·11	2·24 ± ·18	3·60 ± ·07
in Israel	abroad	1·50 ± ·10	2·52 ± ·18	2·15 ± ·15	3·71 ± ·28
in Israel	in Israel	1·86 ± ·11	2·76 ± ·13	2·10 ± ·10	2·85 ± ·20

* *Source:* See Table 18.

origins, and relate these to the figures for old and new immigrants—Table 20. Further fragmentary data are analyses of hospital statistics in 1932–3 and 1955–6 in which the Israel-born mothers are classified by community or parental origin—Tables 21 and 22. Estimates in these last three tables cannot be considered reliable because of shortcomings in data and methods, but they are valuable in providing confirmation of the trends apparent in the scant data available.

Women of the older immigration from Oriental countries have much lower fertility than new immigrant women from those countries. Native-born women of Oriental origin have even lower fertility, so that there is a clear trend of reducing Oriental fertility with duration of stay. It is not quite clear to what extent the whole reduction of fertility has occurred in Israel, as it seems that even new immigrant women from the East have fewer children than one would expect if they did not limit their fertility at all. It may be that Oriental women used to restrict their families to some extent even in their countries of origin.

Among women of European origin length of stay is correlated with a slight rise in fertility, mainly in a larger number of three and four child families. This trend is also evident in the further rise of the fertility level of native-born women of European parentage.

The reduction of Oriental fertility is not unexpected. When a group of people from a backward and traditional society comes into contact with an industrial and generally agnostic environment, it is to be expected that the group will to some extent assimilate the mores of the more modern population. So that Oriental immigrants who had very high fertility, adopted European methods of family limitation to some extent. The final development of this trend cannot be foreseen yet, nor can it be said whether future generations of Oriental origin will reduce their fertility by as much as Europeans.

The increase of the fertility of Europeans is more surprising. One cannot suppose this group to have partly assimilated the more fertile habits of their Oriental neighbours. Orientals were a small minority before independence, and anyway one would not expect a modern free-thinking population to adapt itself to a more backward community, least of all in such vital matters as the size of family. There is not generally known to be an important degree of adoption of Oriental mores by European immigrants.

Another possible factor is the change in the occupational structure of European immigrants in Israel. It might be thought that the adoption of 'lower' occupations would result in a corresponding rise in fertility. This explanation may be relevant to the comparison of fertility in European Jews in Israel and in the Dispersion. It does not seem to be relevant to the comparisons of old and new immigrants, as it is highly unlikely that differences of occupational structure between new and old immigrants and native born of European origin really are in the

direction of lower social strata among the latter. Perhaps the explanation is that changes in occupations are only felt gradually.

We tend to believe that the increase of the fertility of Europeans can be understood only in terms of the change of outlook of Jews in Israel and the Dispersion. The important factors are not so much occupational or status changes, as changes in the attitude towards the community, personal security, and the outlook for the future. It may also be that possibilities of economic and social advancement are more limited in Israel, so that large families are not so important a handicap.

The reduction of origin differences in fertility from new to old immigrants, and even more to the first Israel-born generation, is not, then, merely a trend of assimilation. There are a number of different factors at work. True, the decline of Oriental fertility is largely a movement of assimilation of European patterns, but it is not at all clear how far this trend will continue, and what the ultimate level of fertility of the descendants of Orientals will be. The slight increase of European fertility with duration of stay is less well explained. It would seem to signify the abandonment of Jewish attitudes of extreme family limitation in the European Dispersion, and the adoption of an outlook more suited to a people in their own country. It would be very important to consider this last problem from a sociological point of view, and thereby also to see to what extent this trend may continue or has perhaps already been completed.

It is too early to estimate the future development of patterns of nuptiality and fertility in Israel. We know too little about changes in nuptiality even to guess at future trends. We may assume the fertility of Orientals and their descendants to continue declining and that of Europeans perhaps to rise slightly. We cannot foresee whether these trends will result in a common level of fertility for both groups or whether this will come about only in the long run through inter-marriage between the origin groups. Origin differences in fertility continue in the first native-born generation also in other countries of immigration. Changes of fertility of origin groups are affected mainly by two factors: the occupational groups to which the immigrants and their descendants tend, and the extent of intermarriage with the natives. Both these factors are likely to slow down the trend of reduction of origin differences in Israel. There seems to be considerable economic origin differentiation even among the native-born generations, and the extent of intermarriage between Orientals and Europeans is not great.

The development of fertility in Israel in the near future depends on two conflicting trends: the reduction of Oriental fertility which is greater than the rise of that of Europeans, and the increasing share of the more fertile Orientals in the population. We cannot foresee which of these factors will predominate, and whether an upward or downward trend of fertility will ensue.

NOTES

[1] This paper is a summary of some of the results of a Ph.D. thesis on 'Nuptiality and Fertility in Israel—with special reference to differences between origin groups and their assimilation', at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem under the supervision of Professor R. Bachi. This research was supported, in part, by the Ford Foundation grant for demographic research. For details on methods and sources the reader is referred to the above study. Unless otherwise stated, data are based on government statistics and special supplementary estimates. A version of this paper was read at the Second World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1957, in the Section 'Demography of the Jews'.

[2] Comparisons with other countries are based on similar data collated by the United Nations. U.N. (1949–50, 1955).

[3] These tabulations were carried out on a special 20 per cent sample of the registration cards, with the support of the Ford Foundation grant.

[4] See Gabriel (1953), p. 277, or Hajnal (1953).

[5] Gabriel (1956).

[6] Gabriel (1956), Table 1.

[7] Bachi (1952), p. 434; Gabriel (1953), pp. 279–82.

[8] Gabriel (1956), pp. 255–7.

[9] Gabriel (1953), p. 291, quoting data published by Bachi (1944), Table 89.

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NOTES ON THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN JEWRY*

Abraham G. Duker

WHILE considerable research has been carried out by sociologists in certain areas of Jewish life in the United States, particularly on the subjects of identification and opinion, little research has been done on the various aspects of daily life. This paper attempts to summarize some developments in this field.

Of the estimated five million Jews in the U.S., about 75 to 80 per cent were born there. Probably about 80 to 90 per cent are of East European descent. The primary culture of the overwhelming majority is American culture, an amalgam mainly of Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and democratic secular ingredients, under the growing impact of Catholic influences. The majority of the American Jews understand but do not speak Yiddish. American Jewry is on the way to becoming one of the most educated groups in the U.S. At present at least 80 per cent of the secondary high school graduates who are Jews enter college. In contrast, the Jewish education of American children, except those who study in All-Day schools, is very meagre and is practically non-existent at the secondary school level.

The culture of the American Jew is shaped by the following influences: (1) American culture with its strong Christian component; (2) the Jewish religion; (3) East European Jewish culture; (4) vestiges of German-Jewish culture, and (5) the impact of Zionism and Israel.

The process of acculturation shows many parallels with other societies. A good example is the choice of names. Just as Moshe changed to Moritz and Mieczysław in Europe, in America he becomes first Morris or Max, later Marvin, and now Murray or Merwyn. Names like Christopher or Christine also appear. Preference is always given to Anglo-Saxon and Celtic names (Barry, Dennis) and only a few biblical names are acceptable (David, Daniel, Judith), more among women than men. It is presumed that changes of family names occur more fre-

* Summary of a paper read at the Second World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1957, in the Section 'Demography of the Jews'.

quently among Jews than among other ethnic groups. A study during the Second World War revealed that 50 to 60 per cent of names of Jews in the armed forces were of Anglo-Saxon or Celtic origin.

While Jewish identification and affiliation are on the rise, Jewish cultural expression tends to weaken. Nevertheless, some grandchildren of immigrants appear to have received a better Jewish education than their parents. The rise in identification and affiliation can be traced to the impact of the Hitler Catastrophe, the establishment of Israel, and to the feeling of being 'at home' in America, without the fear of being identified as an immigrant or the child of one. The rise in identification has brought many new members of the second and third generations to the synagogue, and religious expression is becoming the most important visible way of Jewish identification. However, this does not imply that there has been a corresponding rise in personal piety or in synagogue attendance. The latter is usually reserved for 'crisis' situations. The impact of the religious attitudes of the majority is seen in many areas. Generally, American Jews have adopted the custom of worship once a week, usually at late Friday evening services. Many customs have been added: the invocation at public gatherings, the rabbinical robe, the type of hymns, the sermon, and the posture in prayer. The process of acculturation can best be observed in a study of disappearing customs and American innovations.

Among customs that are practically unknown among the third and many of the second generation are the *mikveh*, *tenaim* (but not *ketubah*), *ben zakhar*, *shaatnez*, *arba kanfot*, *tsom bekhorim*, the posting of *shir hamaalot* after births, the sale of *hametz*, *tashlikh*. In this respect, Jews living in New York probably have had better opportunities to become acquainted with some of these customs, while children brought up in the suburbs are apt to know a bearded Jew only from illustrations.

Shifts in the importance of holidays are caused by their proximity to Christian holidays. Thus Hanukkah looms as a chief holiday, while Purim has lost its gift-giving appeal. Similarly, Passover has gained by its proximity to Easter, retaining mainly its family festival character, and developing into a communal holiday because of the custom of congregational second *sedarim* and secularist third *sedarim*. On Yom Kippur and Rosh ha-Shanah synagogues are most crowded. Despite increasing home ownership, the *sukkah* has become a congregational rather than family or neighbourhood affair. Hoshanna Rabba is generally unknown. Yizkor has retained a greater hold.

New aspects of holidays tend to give them greater significance. Thus the ceremonial of confirmation has encouraged attendance in Reform and Conservative synagogues on Shabuot, while the consecration ceremonial of first entrants to the synagogue schools has been attracting more children and parents to the synagogue services on Simhat Torah.

In the Reform and Conservative synagogues women outnumber the

men at services. Generally women are the greater participants in intellectual-cultural activities in North American civilization. The women therefore play a much larger role in synagogue activities and services. They are called up to the Torah in Conservative and Reform synagogues and stand up to recite the *kaddish* even in many Neo-Orthodox ones. A new custom is Bath Mitzvah which usually takes place on Friday evenings, even in some Orthodox congregations. Attendance is encouraged by synagogue services and other activities organized along age and special-interest lines, rather than on an overall communal approach. An example is the Junior congregation or the special Sabbaths (Friday evenings) for different organizations. As daily attendance has become generally restricted to mourners, attempts to retain the custom of praying with *tephilim* are seen in the 'minyonaires' or 'Father and Son' services on Sunday, where breakfasts are served and social and athletic activities follow the prayer and the meal. Of course, Bar Mitzvah is the chief family occasion celebrated in the synagogue. In the larger cities, weddings and sometimes even Bar Mitzvah ceremonies usually take place in special wedding halls and hotels.

The new customs mentioned have been consciously introduced mainly by the rabbis. However, there are many new *minhagim*, introduced under the impact of Christianity or the general culture, or through the ingenuity of competitive wedding hall proprietors, individual *hazzanim*, choir directors, masters of ceremonies in the wedding halls or funeral parlours. Burials are losing their austerity, and in the large cities they tend to take on the character of a social occasion. The custom of *tachrichim* is on the way out; simple boards are being replaced by more and more ornate caskets. It would take much time to describe the new funeral ceremonials, including the secular ones. A visit to the mourner's home calls for a gift of food, candy, wine or liquor. Cemeteries are visited on Father's and Mother's Days (commercially invented annual holidays), probably as often as during the month of Ellul. Commercial ingenuity has produced gift wrappers for Hanukkah and special holiday candles. To the old New Year greeting cards have been added Hanukkah and Passover greeting cards, humorous get-well and other cards, spiced with Yiddish phrases in English transliteration, and even combination Christmas-Hanukkah cards. Characters like 'Uncle Max the Hanukkah Man' or 'Elijah' distribute gifts to the children on Hanukkah and at the communal *Sedarim*, here and there.

Much of Jewish cultural expression has always revolved about food. American technical ingenuity has made Jewish food accessible to Jews and Gentiles. Kosher gefilte fish and Jewish delicatessen, blintzes and borsht can be bought in many larger stores in medium and smaller cities. This does not mean an increase in the observance of *kashruth*. In this respect there are two standards. Many observe *kashruth* at home but not outside; on the other hand, there is the growing practice of

observing *kashruth* at public Jewish functions by all. Of the more bizarre commercial preparations there are kosher 'bacon' and kosher Chinese noodles, while of late I have noted at kosher banquets salmon-tuna fish imitations of shrimp salad. In the line of food, *hallah* has been retained and can be bought on Fridays at railway stations catering for commuters; it is generally called Jewish bread. *Matzah* too has retained its popularity and is served on Passover even in non-kosher restaurants. As in the case of foods of other groups, there is a good deal of transculturation; one extreme example, the pizza-beigel, is widely advertised by a popular store in New York City. The enrichment of the American cuisine with Jewish dishes may well be more popular among Negroes in the large cities because of their closer contact with Jews as domestic servants and other employees.

More limited is the addition of Hebrew and Yiddish phrases to the American vocabulary, usually words of low prestige, mainly through popular media, such as the comics and television. Among the latest additions to have achieved respectability in the important *Time* magazine is the verb to *kitzel*. There is also much borrowing in Jewish religious terminology. A good example is the Catholic term 'retreat'. In the vocabulary of the American Jew the *shamas* has become a sexton, while the policeman has become a *shamas*.

It would be an error to judge all the innovations negatively. While many indicate a low cultural-intellectual status in relation to Jewishness, some point to folk-creativity and the desire to maintain as much of Jewish living culture as possible. Israel, too, exercises an increasingly important influence in this direction. Not only is the establishment of the Jewish state a most powerful factor in Jewish status and self-identification, as well as in the retention of the concept of *klal Yisrael* in a community that is increasingly divided by religious groupings with a low degree of Jewish education; it also has its effect on the mores of American Jewry. The Israeli-Sephardi pronounciation is replacing the German-modified Ashkenazi Lithuanian in synagogue, school, and the relatively few homes where Hebrew is spoken. Zionist and Israeli dances are vying with the East European ones at *simhot* among those Jews who are not afraid to relax and be *heimish*. Ceremonial objects and certain types of art products, not always of the highest type, adorn the homes of those who identify themselves with Jewishness.

This is a brief review of an important area in the study of contemporary Jewry. Many parallels will be found in other countries, including Israel, since many of these developments are part of the adjustment of Jews to secular western culture. Indeed, there is need for a co-operative study of the daily culture of Jews in different countries and societies.

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THE DEMOGRAPHY OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE[1]

H. S. Halevi

BY EASTERN EUROPE I mean Russia and the states established along her western boundaries after the First World War in territories which had belonged to the Russian Empire: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia. These communities comprised 75 per cent of the Jewish people in 1880; even in 1925 they constituted over half of all the Jews of the world. Developments between the two wars and the extermination during the last war very heavily affected this part of Jewry, which was considered its backbone from the demographic, religious, and cultural points of view.

Great changes have occurred during the last fifty years in the numbers of Russian Jews. Before the First World War they numbered approximately 5,600,000. In 1920, after the loss of the Western areas, the number decreased to 2,744,757; 1,772,479 lived in the Ukraine and 407,000 in White Russia.[2] 2,672,000 Jews were enumerated in the 1926 census and 3,020,000 in the 1939 census. The decrease in 1926 is to be explained by the changed definition of 'Jew'. The census of old Russia was based on religious differentiation, while divisions after the Revolution have been made on a national basis. In the 1926 census nationality was defined in terms of ethnic group, while in 1939 it was defined in terms of the national group with which the individual preferred to be identified. The number of people in Russia who were Jews by origin was greater than the number of those identifying themselves with the Jewish people. It is estimated that about 3,300,000 Jews lived in Soviet Russia at the beginning of the Second World War.

After the Russian territorial expansion during the first years of the war, the number of Jews under Soviet rule increased by approximately two millions.[3] A great part of the Jews failed to evacuate the areas later occupied by the Germans. The occupied territory included about two-thirds of the Jewish population within the old boundaries of Russia, or almost 80 per cent of Jews living in the expanded Soviet State. The

evacuation of the Jewish population before the advancing enemy was on a small scale, and a considerable proportion of Russian Jewry therefore fell victim to 'extermination'.

There is no reliable information on the number of Jews in Soviet Russia after the War. The usual figure of two millions probably comes close to the actual state of affairs.

Even before the last War the birth-rate and natural increase of Russian Jewry were decreasing, and it constituted an ageing population. The Jewish birth-rate was also lower than that of other urban groups.

From 1926 to 1939 the population of Russia as a whole grew by 15·9 per cent, and the number of Jews by less than 13 per cent.[4] We have relatively many statistical data on the Jews of Odessa.[5] During the years 1892–1904 the vital index (the ratio of births to deaths) never fell below 127·7 (in 1896), and during most of these years it was between 140 and 160. However, in 1905 the vital index fell to 100·6, and in the following ten years it was always lower than 125. The rate of natural increase among the Jews of Odessa fell from 12·6 in 1897 to 4·0 in 1910, and in 1920 (a year of famine and epidemics) it sank to −24·5.

The percentage of children up to the age of 10 fell from 28·3 in 1897 to 18·5 in 1920, while the percentage of those aged 50 or above rose during the same period from 10·5 to 15·5. Lorimer,[6] analysing the ratio between the numbers of children under the age of 5 and of women in reproductive ages, came to the following conclusion: 'It is apparent that the Jewish population was barely replacing itself at this time, whereas some groups were tending to double their number in each successive generation.' The results can be seen in the ageing of the Jewish population.

TABLE 1. *Age Frequency among the Jews of the Ukraine 1897 and 1920*

	0–10	10–20	20–40	40–50	50–60	60+	*Total*
1897	28·3	24·3	28·6	8·3	5·8	4·7	100·0
1920	18·5	25·9	29·7	10·4	8·6	6·9	100·0

In the year 1926 the rate of natural increase among the Jews of the Ukraine was lower than that of any other national group (Germans —32, Ukrainians—24, Poles—21, Russians—18, Jews—15) and lower than the general rate of the urban population.[7]

One of the reasons for this process was the entrance of many Jews into the free professions after the Revolution. These professions are known for their low birth-rate. In 1913, 7 per cent of the economically active Jews in Russia were employed in white-collar professions, and in 1939 this percentage had risen to 37·2. During the same period the number of Jews in the free professions rose from 3 to 12·8 per cent. In 1929 more than three-quarters of all Jews in Moscow were employed in the civil

service. In 1931 Jews constituted almost 30 per cent of all those employed in the medical profession.[8] Engagement in these professions had also led to assimilation, which in the social circumstances of the Soviet Union has promoted mixed marriages. Marriages of this kind generally produce few children, and the majority of the children born in mixed marriages are not brought up as Jews even in countries where such a possibility exists.[9] The breaking down of the traditional 'pale of settlement' brought about a dispersion of the Jewish population into all parts of Greater Russia, and its 'density' in the general population declined. The average percentage of Jews in all cities of Russia declined from 8·2 to 4·2 during the years 1926–39; in the cities of the Ukraine it declined from 22·7 to 11·7; and in the cities of White Russia from 40·2 to 23·9.[10] The consequence of this change was twofold: the standard of living among the Jews of Russia rose, and the assimilative power of the majority population group increased.

TABLE 2. *Percentages of Jews among Inhabitants of Various Regions of Russia*

	1900	*1939*	*1946*
Ukraine	9·4	4·8	1·7
White Russia	12·7	7·2	1·2
Central Russia	0·4	1·0	0·6

The concentration of Jews in big towns, their dispersion from the 'pale of settlement' into all parts of the State, the decrease in the proportion of Jews in the total population, the disturbance of equilibrium in the numbers of men and women owing to internal migration, and, in addition, the social environment which facilitates heterogamous marriages—all these are factors which determine the demographic development of Russian Jewry. Although mortality decreased to a great extent (and the Jewish infant mortality is much lower than that of the people among whom they live) it was not enough fully to counterbalance the decrease in natality.

There is no reason to believe that the situation changed after the last War. An 'external cause' exterminated part of the Jewish Diaspora in Russia, and the demographic position of the remnants does not promise very much. Russia has in general compensated itself for the heavy losses in population suffered during the war and occupation, but the Jews of Russia will find it difficult to stabilize their present numbers.

The first census in liberated Poland was taken in 1921 and showed 2,845,364 Jews by religion, as against 2,110,448 by nationality. In 1931 the corresponding figure was 3,113,933 Jews by religion, of whom only 381,000 did not declare Hebrew or Yiddish as their mother-tongue. The Jewish population in Poland on the eve of the last war was estimated at 3,350,000. The Central Committee of Polish Jews stated in a

personal communication to Professor Bachi in November 1948 that there had been more than 3·5 million Jews.[11] In 1945–6 there were 80,000–100,000 Jews in Poland and their number decreased by emigration to 40,000–50,000. At present we are witnessing a new wave of immigration from Poland to Israel, the result of which may possibly be the complete liquidation of the Jewish community in Poland.

The official registration of vital statistics among Polish Jews was to a considerable degree defective. Jews did not register many of their marriages and births. Therefore their official marriage-rate was low, the proportion of 'illegitimate' births was high, there were great deviations from the normal in masculinity of births, etc.

Polish Jewry had an urban character, although a smaller proportion was concentrated in the metropolitan city than in other countries. Three-quarters of Polish Jews lived in towns, as against one-quarter of the total population. But only 10 per cent of all Polish Jews lived in Warsaw, as against about 65 per cent of British Jews living in London, 70 per cent of French Jews in Paris, 45 per cent of American Jews in New York.

Only two Jewish communities in Poland numbered more than 100,000 persons (Warsaw and Lodz), and three communities numbered 50–100,000 (Lwow, Cracow, and Wilna). Most of the Jews lived in small urban settlements, in communities of less than 10,000 each. The importance of this fact for the demography of the Jews of Poland can be seen in the distribution by age of the Jewish population according to the Census of 1931.

TABLE 3. *Age Distribution (per cent) of Jewish Population in Poland, 1931*

Age	*General Population Poland*	*Jews*					
		Poland	*Large Cities*	*Small Cities*	*Villages*	*Lodz*	*Cracow*
0–14	33·6	29·6	27·1	31·0	32·8	27·7	23·4
15–19	9·5	9·6	9·6	9·8	9·3	9·6	9·9
20–39	32·6	33·8	36·1	32·1	31·5	36·7	39·5
40–59	16·4	18·2	19·2	17·7	16·8	15·6	20·0
60 and +	7·8	8·7	7·9	9·3	9·5	10·3	7·2
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0	100·0

The percentage of children is greater in the villages than in the cities. In all instances it is lower for the Jews than for the general population. In Cracow, the capital of Western Galicia, the low percentage of children is nearest to the Western pattern. The attraction of people of working age to the cities caused a high urban concentration of men between the ages of 20 and 40, while the contact with urban culture influenced the decline in the birth-rate.

Because of the urban character of Jews their division by occupation was different from that of the general population. 34·6 per cent of all employed Jews engaged in commerce and insurance, as against 1·5 per cent of the general population; 31·7 per cent were in industry and mining, as against 7·5 per cent; and in Government service and the free professions there were 4·3 per cent of Jews as against 2·2 per cent in the general population.[12]

Economic difficulties and lack of numerical balance between men and women caused postponement of marriages: 30 per cent of the total male urban population, and 53 per cent of the female, married before the age of 25; for Jews the corresponding proportions were 21·3 per cent and 34·5 per cent. It is clear therefore that births among Jews occurred at higher parental ages.

The large surplus of women in the Jewish population should be mentioned in connexion with Jewish marriage habits in Poland. According to the Census of 1931, there were 109 women to every 100 men in the Jewish population; and at the marriage-age the ratio went up to 119 : 100. This was apparently a result of emigration, in which men participated more than women.

A downward trend was evident in the Jewish birth-rate and differences existed between districts. On the average for all Poland the Jewish birth-rate decreased from 22·1 at the beginning of the twenties to 19·2 in 1937. In Warsaw the rate was 35 per 1,000 Jewish inhabitants at the end of the nineteenth century; it decreased to 15·2 during 1921–2 and to 9·0 in 1932. Galicia, and in particular its eastern part, had a higher birth-rate. This was the centre of Polish Chassidism, of deeply religious and nationalistic Jews living in small towns and villages. But even in this district the birth-rate dropped from 46·2 per 1,000 in 1882 to 21·4 during 1931–5. This is still a considerable birth-rate when compared with those of Western countries.

The Jewish birth-rate was low even if we take into consideration the urban character of the Jewish population. In the years 1931–2, the birth-rate among the total urban population in Poland was 21·0; among urban Catholics, 22·4; and among urban Jews, 18·6. During the same period the birth-rates among the rural populations were: general population, 33·0; Catholics, 37·6; Jews, 21·6.[13]

The infant mortality rate among Jews was very low; in 1937 this rate was 136 per 1,000 live births for the total population of Poland, but only 46 for Jews. The general mortality was also low. In 1937 it was 10·5 per 1,000 Jews for the state as a whole, and in Galicia it was 10·0 during 1931–5. Before the last war, the rate of natural increase of Jews in Poland was about 10 per 1,000. It was higher in Galicia (1931–5: 11·4) than in Warsaw (1932: 0·5; 1933: 1·7), and in small villages than in towns. The crude reproduction rate of Jews in Poland, 1927–30, was 1·41, and the net rate 1·02. In the western districts it was below 1; the

fertile groups of the Jewish population were in the central and southern districts of Poland. The rate of reproduction of Jews in the five main cities was much lower than 1·0, and the late Professor Hersch quotes only 0·47 in Warsaw during the years 1930–6.[14]

We have no data on the demographic status of the remnants of the Jewish community in Poland after the war. Immediately after the war there were signs of a high birth-rate, accompanied by a strong urge to establish new families and to rebuild family units. This seems to have been only a passing and temporary manifestation. According to estimates of the American Joint Distribution Committee, 2,000 Jewish births occurred in Poland in 1947. Since there were some 100,000 Jews in Poland in that year, the figure was equal to a birth-rate of 20 to 22 per thousand, hardly a very high rate. Considering the great 'fluctuation' in the number of Jews in Poland, and their strong desire to emigrate, we can assume that their rate of natural increase is not high.

The Jewish population in the other countries included in this review were small when compared with those of Russia or Poland. Lithuania had about 250,000 Jews, Latvia fewer than 100,000, and approximately only 4,500 Jews lived in Esthonia. These states lacked a 'fertile' district like Galicia, and their demographic situation was therefore worse. In Lithuania the proportion of children up to the age of ten decreased from 27·1 per cent in 1897 to 17·0 per cent in 1923.[15] According to Professor Hersch, Lithuanian Jewry had no natural increase at the beginning of the thirties; Professor Bachi calculated the average final number of children per family in 1936 to be 2·57, which does not differ much from Hersch's supposition.[16]

According to Lestschinsky,[17] the rate of natural increase among the Jews of Lithuania declined from 9·6 per thousand in the years 1922–6 to 1·3 in the years 1937–9. The mortality rate has become higher and higher throughout the period of Lithuania's independence, which proves that the ageing of the population has reached great dimensions. Even though the marriage rate was relatively high, it was connected with the stream of emigration (mainly to Israel), and Lithuanian Jewry did not benefit, in any demographic sense, from these marriages. The decline in the proportion of Jewish residents in Lithuanian cities shows an increasing economic competition with non-Jewish neighbours and a worsening of the general economic situation. It is no wonder, therefore, that the number of Jewish emigrants from Lithuania in the years 1923–39 was higher by some five thousand than the natural increase during the same period.

The situation in Latvia was worse. In spite of the small Jewish emigration, the number of Jews in this country decreased from 1925 to 1935. In 1934 rates of births and deaths were equal (12·4). Esthonian Jewry was similar in character, origin, and way of life to Latvian Jewry.[18]

All these communities were annihilated in a very short time. The

Nazi Commanders of occupied areas considered it their first duty to 'cleanse' them of Jews. In a report submitted to Heidrich on 31 January 1942 all *Judenrein* places were marked on a map by a coffin.

In summary we may state:

(1) The birth-rate and natural increase of the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe were decreasing before the Second World War. In spite of this, there was still a considerable rate of natural increase among Polish Jewry, which was considered therefore as the 'granary' of the natural increase of Ashkenazi Jews.

(2) The greater part of the Jews in these countries, and especially in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia, vanished in the process of the Nazi 'final solution'. Some fled to Russia and are today an integral part of Russian Jewry.

(3) It is improbable that the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe will grow by natural increase, and it is doubtful whether they will be able to keep their numbers up.

(4) As a consequence of the above-mentioned developments, a profound change occurred in the place occupied by Eastern Europe on the demographic map of the Jewish people. The weight of the remnants of Eastern European Jewry in the total of the Jewish people is slight.

NOTES

[1] Paper read at Second World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1957, Section 'Demography of the Jews'. See 'Chronicle', p. 133 below, for recent figures on the Jews in the U.S.S.R.

[2] J. Lestschinsky, *Contemporary Jewish Record*, Vol. III, p. 522.

[3] *Jewish Affairs*, Vol. I, no. 1, p. 2.
Jews in Nazi Europe, Baltimore 1941, p. RU-8.

[4] J. Lestschinsky, *Jews in Soviet Russia* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1943, pp. 56–67.

[5] J. Lestschinsky, in *Papers in Jewish Demography, Statistics, and Economics* (Yiddish), Berlin, 1923, pp. 71–5.

[6] F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union*, Geneva, 1946, pp. 94–7.

[7] L. Isserlis, *Vital Statistics of Jews*, Ose-Rundschau, Vol. V, no. 8, p. 8.

[8] See 4, p. 133.

[9] There are many references to prove it. Some are: A. Ruppin, *Sociology of the Jews*, I (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1934, pp. 195–201. R. Baker, in *Papers in Jewish Demography, Statistics, and Economics* (Yiddish), Berlin, 1923, p. 154. J. Segal, ibid., pp. 170–3. B. Blau, *Jewish Social Studies*, 1950, Vol. XII, pp. 163, 166. J. M. Meulenhoff, *De Bevolking van Amsterdam*, Amsterdam, 1936, p. 58.

[10] See 4, p. 60. S. M. Schwarz, *Anti-semitism in the Soviet Union* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1953, pp. 36–8.

[11] L. Hersch, *General Encyclopaedia—Jews*, Vol. I (Yiddish), p. 333. J. Lestschinsky, in *Jewish Economics* (Yiddish), 1937, p. 91, and in *Yivo Bletter* (Yiddish), Vol. XXIII, p. 324. A. Tartakower, *Żydzi w Polsce Odrodzonej*, Vol. II (Polish), pp. 186–7.

[12] Tartakower, op. cit., p. 381.

[13] *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland*, 1938, p. 50.

[14] Hersch, as in 11, p. 386. C. Tietze, in *Population*, Vol. IV (French), pp. 364–5.

[15] Lestschinsky, *Probleme der Bevölkerungsbewegung bei den Juden*, Padua, 1926, p. 15.

[16] Hersch, as in 11, p. 379. R. Bachi, *Marriage and Fertility in the Various Sections of Jewish Population* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1944, pp. 174–5.

[17] J. Lestschinsky, in *Lithuania*, Vol. I (Yiddish), New York 1951, pp. 829, 839–44.

[18] Hersch, as in 11, p. 353.

BOOK REVIEWS

POLISH JEWRY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Arieh Tartakower

(*Review Article*)

DR. MAHLER'S BOOK* is published by the 'Cultural and Social Union of the Jews in Poland', which is a semi-government institution. This fact deserves notice, but despite its official character, the 'Yiddish-Buch' is far from being a publishing house for communist literature only. It may have been so earlier, but in the last few years it has changed its character and published many important scholarly works—for example, Professor Mark's standard history of the Jews in Poland. What characterizes it at the present is the wide scope of its activities. Several books are put out every year, most of them in several thousand copies, and they all sell. The house has over five thousand regular subscribers to its publications, a remarkable achievement for a community of hardly more than forty thousand souls, a considerable number of whom use Polish as their daily language. This is an important proof of the vitality and Jewish consciousness of the small community.

Dr. Mahler's book fits well into this framework of activity. Written by an Israeli historian of repute, himself of Polish origin, it is without doubt an important scholarly achievement. The very idea of preparing a statistical book devoted to Polish Jewry in the eighteenth century is of great significance. Dr. Mahler undertook to scrutinize the results of the census of Jewish population ordered by the Polish government in the year 1764, a few years before Poland's dismemberment. Only scholars, especially historians and statisticians, can appreciate fully what an effort of this kind means. The work was started in the twenties and required many years of painstaking study of the census volumes in the archives of the Polish government; it could be brought to a conclusion only in the last few years.

This tremendous investment of work is not the only thing to be stressed. No less significant is the fact that it was undertaken despite the rather small chance of arriving at a correct picture of Jewish life in the period in question.

* Raphael Mahler, *Jews in Old Poland in the Light of Figures*, 2 volumes, in Yiddish, Warsaw, 1958, 30zl.

The census of 1764, like most others in previous centuries, was not undertaken for the sake of science. Censuses of population up to the nineteenth century were mostly directed to military or fiscal ends. The main thing was to find out how many soldiers could be mobilized and how much money could be squeezed out of the population for meeting military costs and for other expenses of the monarchs. The immediate consequence of this kind of approach was that the results of the censuses could never be considered reliable, since considerable parts of the population managed to 'disappear' so as not to be forced into military service or to pay excessive taxes. If to this reluctant attitude on the part of the population the lack of any competent methods and machinery is added (since statistics is a rather young science, hardly known before the eighteenth century), then the unsatisfactory results of the various censuses, to put it mildly, may well be realized.

The census of 1764 was no exception. It was undertaken by the Polish government in order to increase the income from the head tax imposed on the Jewish population. Up to that time an overall sum in respect of this tax had been paid to the Polish government by the official organs of the Jewish community, but this sum, although increased again and again, had appeared to the Polish authorities as much too small, and the decision was therefore reached to abolish the system and instead to levy a direct tax. The census was to provide the exact figures needed for this particular purpose. All Jews over the age of one year were to be counted, since the head tax was due from every one of them. The results were, of course, inaccurate. The Jewish communal bodies were themselves interested in showing smaller figures so as not to be forced to pay the head tax for the poor classes of the population and in order to be able to squeeze additional amounts needed for their own purposes, especially for payment of the tremendous communal debts of the time. There was an additional factor making for inaccuracies: the commissions in charge of the census consisted mostly of Jews who hardly knew Polish and who prepared their data in Hebrew to be translated afterwards into Polish, whereas the few Polish members of the commissions were frequently no more than half-literate and unable to control the conducting of the census. Despite all the efforts of the government, despite the terrible oath imposed on the Jewish members of the commissions, and despite the threat of heavy penalties, the results can hardly be considered as reliable; in too many cases the falsification of the figures is obvious.

Dr. Mahler nevertheless undertook to make use of this material for scholarly purposes. He assumed that it might be possible to correct the figures so as to come nearer to the truth. To the figure for the Jewish population shown by the census (587,658) he first added the number of children less than one year old, who were not counted since no head tax was due from them (computing this number as 37,315), and then came to the conclusion that about 20 per cent were to be added on account of those who succeeded in evading conscription (124,995). The overall figure thus arrived at was 749,968, and the author is inclined to consider it as more or less correct. The proportional figures concerning structure of the population can in his opinion be considered as valid, since there was no reason for falsifying them, and their examination is without doubt of considerable interest.

This then was the way in which the book was prepared. It can in general

be divided into two main parts, the demographic and the economic. (No data concerning the cultural and political structure of the Jewish population could be expected from a census such as this.) Of these two parts only the first one can be considered as based on more or less complete figures and then with the reservations made above. As for the second part, the census commissions in general were not very interested in securing data concerning the occupational structure of the Jewish population, and in only too many cases they simply omitted them or recorded them in a careless way, just as they did with regard to other data which might have thrown some light on the economic situation of the Jewish population (the number of workers and clerical staff in the service of Jews, the number and size of Jewish households, etc.). The data obtained in this way are, therefore, far from satisfactory, and it was again the author's task to correct or supplement them so as to arrive at certain conclusions. This part of the book, although equalling the first part in size is, therefore, based on less statistical material and is more hypothetical.

This is not the place to go into the details of the various chapters and tables. A few examples may suffice. The most interesting section of the demographic part of the book is the one dealing with the division of the Jewish population between towns and villages. Despite the great differences between the various districts of Poland (especially between the economically and socially more developed Western districts and the backward Eastern provinces) the overall figure of 26·9 per cent of the Jews living in villages as against three-quarters of them concentrated in the towns (including a great number of small towns) may be considered as characteristic of the time and of the period which ended early in the present century. High as this percentage was (surpassing greatly the corresponding figures for Western Europe), it nevertheless is insignificant when compared with the overwhelming majority of the Polish population concentrated in villages. This on the one hand accounts for the very small representation of the Jews in the villages (an average of two Jewish families per village) and on the other hand for their very great representation in the towns, where they made up half of the population (and in small towns even much more).

The author has devoted several chapters of his book to the sex structure of the Jewish population as reflected in the census, to its civil status (there were relatively more marriages than among the Gentile population), to the age structure of married people, and to the number and structure of the widowed and divorced population. Unfortunately no figures are given as to the age structure of the entire Jewish population and as to its movement; apparently not very much was to be learned about such things from the census.

The very characteristic rural-urban division of the Jewish population of Poland almost automatically leads to the problem of Jewish occupations. Actually the part of Dr. Mahler's book devoted to Jewish occupations in the villages may be regarded as one of the most interesting, since it reconstructs before our eyes the picture of a life which to a considerable degree had already disappeared many years before the last war. The difficulties to be overcome in describing this particular segment of Jewish life in Poland were less serious, since unlike the town population, the data concerning the occupations of the Jews in the villages were registered rather fully. They reveal an extremely characteristic picture. 80 per cent of the Jews in the villages were

concentrated in three occupations: those who rented the properties of rural landlords (the so-called *arendators*), tavern-keepers in villages and on the roads (the *kretshmers*), and *shenkers* (mostly employees of the first two categories). The part played by other occupations, including the artisans, was insignificant.

Of these three occupational categories the *arendators* were without doubt the most important. They rented not only the landed property of the Polish notables, but also their various rights to taxes, dues, etc. Apart from that they established their own taverns, distilleries, and breweries. They may have been among the few groups of wealthy Jews in Poland, although among them there were many exceptions. An interesting description of the various categories of these *arendators* and of other rural occupations is given in the present book. Here we find the type of *Dorfjuden*, once so common in Eastern Europe, whose study, despite a few efforts made in the last generation, still remains incomplete.

Much more difficult is the question of the occupational structure of the urban population, which, as we have seen, was registered very imperfectly. For the most part, the census commissions recorded occupations only if they were obvious or widely known, neglecting others, especially among the merchants, so that the overall picture is far from correct. Dr. Mahler quotes the figures derived from twenty-two towns in ten districts, according to which the occupational structure of the Jewish population there was (in percentages) as follows: *arendators* and *shenkers* 3·5, merchants 4, transportation industry 1·5, artisans 27, free professions 12, occupations not registered 52. It is clear that not very much can be done with such figures. The author tries to correct them and arrives at the following structure, which he considers as more or less correct: *arendators* and *shenkers* 13–15, merchants 35–38, transportation industry 2–3, artisans 30–33, free professions and other occupations 16–18. He nevertheless devotes most of his following remarks to the artisans, about whom much information is to be found, although even this is far from complete, many branches of craft not being mentioned at all or not in the right proportions. The same applies to the free professions. Such specifically Jewish occupations as those of rabbis, cantors, *melamdim*, *belphers*, musicians (*klesmorim*) and others were registered only very incompletely. The author has nevertheless managed to prepare a rather interesting résumé despite those deficiencies. The picture of Jewish artisans as it appears here confirms the assumptions valid also for the generations to follow: the overwhelming role of a few branches (tailors, furriers, capmakers, etc.), rather important position of those based on the specific needs of the Jewish population (bakers, butchers) and a rather weak representation of all others.

A special part of the book is devoted to the housing conditions of Polish Jews as shown by the census. It appears that the houses in which the Jews lived were mostly Jewish property. The type of small one- or two-family houses prevailed. More than half of the Polish Jews lived in rented houses or apartments. The economic situation of the various classes is well reflected in their housing conditions. The *arendators*, *kretshmers*, and merchants almost all lived in their own houses, whereas among the *shenkers* and free professions (mostly *melamdim*, *shamoshim*, musicians, etc.) those living in rented apartments were frequently the majority. (Among the free professions rabbis were an exception, living mostly in their own houses.)

All these facts and many others are presented in Dr. Mahler's book in a scholarly and interesting way. The only—fortunately very short—exception is the apologetic part of the book where the author tries to prove that the Polish Jews in their great majority were hard-working and productive elements. His arguments are not convincing enough and in my opinion superfluous. There can hardly be doubt as to the great number of *luftmenschen* in the Polish Jewish population at the end of the eighteenth century. The figure of 52 per cent without specified occupation shown by the census may really be exaggerated and in many cases the result of lack of interest and understanding on the part of the census commissions; but neither can we accept Dr. Mahler's corrected statement which brings it down to a small percentage (16–18 per cent, including the free professions). The description by many competent and unbiased writers at the time hardly leaves room for doubt. But is this to be considered as an argument against the Jews? Was it their fault that they were not admitted into many towns at all (towns with privileges *de non tolerandis Judaeis*); that many occupations were closed to them either by law or by the intolerance of their Gentile neighbours; that they were surrounded by an atmosphere of hatred on the part of the authorities and the Gentile population; and that in many cases they were exploited even by their own organs, the *kahal*? How could a normal economic life develop in such conditions? Mass poverty and mass unproductivity was a quite natural result, just as it was later in Czarist Russia and in Poland between the two world wars with conditions similar to those of Poland in the eighteenth century. Dr. Mahler himself stresses the fact that there was no hope of solving the Jewish economic problem under conditions existing at the time, not noticing apparently the contradiction between this statement and the previous one about the 'productivity' of Jewish economic life in Poland.

But apart from this flaw the book can be considered as a good example of scholarship carried out with great effort and great ability. One has only to glance through the second volume, consisting entirely of tables prepared by the author, to appreciate the amount of work invested in it. The structure of the book is extremely clear. The two indexes of geographical locations and names at the end of the first volume are very useful. It is a pity that no subject index was included, but the very elaborate table of contents may to a considerable degree be considered a substitute.

The book without doubt deserves to be known to wider circles than those reading Yiddish today. A translation into English and Hebrew might well be considered.

CRIME AND SOCIETY

Hermann Mannheim

(*Review Article*)

THROUGH the generosity of the Nuffield Foundation two assessments have been made in recent years of the present situation and problems of criminological research in Britain, one by Lord Pakenham and another by Lady Wootton.* Each of these assessments is of considerable interest. A few words might not be altogether out of place on the merits or otherwise of general surveys carried out by persons who, however brilliant and distinguished in other fields, are outsiders to the particular branch of knowledge whose achievements they are commissioned critically to evaluate. Evaluations of the methods and findings of specific research projects by scholars unconnected with the research itself have, of course, become an accepted and almost indispensable feature in criminology, especially in the United States. The crucial difference between their task and that allotted to Lord Pakenham and Lady Wootton has been that the American assessors were experts in the subject involved and that their work was limited to one specific research project. They were not expected to roam unfettered over a vast area of scientific endeavour already possessing an immense literature of its own and full of landmines of every conceivable construction. In the circumstances, one might respectfully venture to doubt whether either of these eminent investigators had much of a chance of success, and the final result has only confirmed one's initial doubts.

In addition to her well-known interests in the British political field, Lady Wootton is a distinguished social scientist, a writer and controversialist of unusual shrewdness and skill, for a number of years a J.P. and a Chairman of one of the Metropolitan Juvenile Courts, in short, an author with every claim to be treated with respect and consideration. She is not a criminologist, and, as far as can be ascertained, this is her first venture in the field of criminological studies. Apparently, she embarked on her present task with only a rudimentary knowledge of the criminological literature she was going to survey, and it has to be said at once that, in spite of spending many years on it, she has not been able to acquire that complete mastery of her subject which alone would have entitled her to speak, and to criticize the work of others, with the confidence exhibited in this book. To make her task even more

* Barbara Wootton, *Social Science and Social Pathology*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1959, pp. 400, 35*s*.

This review is in part based on a lecture delivered before the Scottish Branch of the British Sociological Association in Glasgow on 21 June 1959.

difficult, although the bulk of her investigation has been concerned with criminological topics, it is not limited to them: as the title shows, Lady Wootton is dealing with other forms of social pathology as well, and there are substantial sections in the book on mental health and illness, on criminal responsibility, on marriage, divorce, illegitimacy, and on social work in general. I am not here concerned with all these various problems except as they have some direct bearing on criminology.

Primarily, the book is intended as an exercise in debunking, but not infrequently the author has been so much carried away by her own enthusiasm for this fine art that she seems to be suffering from a mild dose of an illness which might perhaps be called 'debunkitis'. The main criticisms of the book can perhaps be summarized by saying that it contains, first, much that is good but not new; second, that it makes a few new points which are not so very good; and third, that it has some points which are neither good nor new. Lastly, in spite of the wide scope and length of the book the investigation leaves certain major gaps and, as a consequence, fails to convey an idea of some of the real and most intricate problems discussed in the modern international literature of criminology.

The book is divided into three major Parts: I. A review of the contemporary situation and of research findings; II. The contemporary attitude to social pathology: the social implications of psychiatry; and III. Conclusions. In the first Part a useful survey is given of the statistical situation of the various forms of social pathology, but as far as crime is concerned it cannot be said that the statistical analysis and interpretation add anything very new. This is followed by a critical analysis of 'twelve criminological hypotheses', of theories of the effects on delinquency of maternal separation or deprivation, of criminological theories based on the age of the offender, and of prediction studies. With the exception of the last-mentioned, all these theories and hypotheses are discarded as nearly useless. Altogether, Lady Wootton is highly critical not only of them but also of recent attempts to establish criminology as an independent branch of scientific knowledge (p. 307) which, she thinks, are based upon the entirely unjustified 'faith in the overwhelming importance of criminality as a thing-in-itself' and of the mere fact of conviction. 'To the Establishment-minded the mere fact of conviction for law-breaking (always with the tacit exception of the laws which they themselves are most disposed to break) is of such magnitude as to dwarf into significance any consideration of what is broken or when or how . . . .' Those of us who are familiar with modern criminological thought and literature may be forgiven if we rub our eyes and wonder what sort of bogus criminology it is that the author may have in mind; and our bewilderment subsides only when we discover that such standard works as Sellin's *Culture Conflict and Crime* and Sutherland's *White Collar Crime* do not even appear in the Bibliography. Actually, it has become a commonplace in post-war criminology that research should not be limited to court and conviction cases which, inevitably, give a one-sided impression. Non-court material has in fact been used to an increasing extent, notably by Cyril Burt, John Mays, and by psychiatrists discussing mainly homosexual and prostitution cases. Unfortunately, there are obvious limits to this on account of the difficulty in getting hold of the case material outside the courts and the penal system. This, however, is not the

fault of criminologists, but is due to the inherent nature of research in a field exposed to social stigma and the threat of penal sanctions.

It is, however, not only the neglect of non-court delinquency and criminality that arouses Lady Wootton's contempt for present-day criminology, but also its concentration on certain types of offences and offenders at the expense of other, even more important, ones, a concentration which, she alleges, has produced a completely wrong picture of the crime situation and of criminological problems in this country. Take, for example, motor traffic offences, a subject on which the author, quite rightly, is very emphatic. 'Motorists', she writes (pp. 26 ff.), 'constitute over 48% of all those convicted of any criminal charge in any court. Yet this revolution is generally ignored alike by the public and by the professional sociologist—to a degree that really queers all criminological discussion . . . .' Now, it is of course perfectly true that the tremendous rise in motoring offences presents one of the most important and intractable problems in modern criminal law and criminology, but can we really say that these problems have been altogether ignored? As a reader of newspapers and as a magistrate Lady Wootton knows that the inadequacy of the penalties imposed on motorists has been a constant topic for many years. On a more theoretical level attention has been paid to the subject by a number of writers in several countries, and although the present reviewer greatly dislikes having to refer to his own writings, he cannot well prove his point without reproducing at least the following few sentences from a lengthy discussion of the whole subject of criminal negligence in his *Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction*, first published fourteen years ago:

> Criminal law has not yet become sufficiently aware of the fact that we are living not in an individualistic but in a mass age, where everything has to be adapted to the use of mass methods. Likewise, it has not yet grasped the profundity of the revolution which Freudian psychology has brought about in our interpretation of the idea of 'negligence'. Formerly a Cinderella of the criminal law, negligence has become one of its pivotal conceptions, which modern legislative technique can no longer afford to neglect . . . The reckless motorist is only the most frequent and most familiar representative of that new type of offender . . . Only in part are the difficulties which have arisen for the administration of criminal justice in this field inherent in the technical side of the matter, for the rest they are due to class prejudices . . .[1]

While this brief quotation may at least show that criminologists in this country have not been entirely unaware of the problem, it is of course true that it has not been possible so far to undertake any large scale research into this group of offences, or for that matter into many others for which it would be equally needed. Such research would have to be carried out by a whole team of workers from the various disciplines concerned; it would be expensive and have to face many obstacles on the part of powerful vested interests.

Closely connected with her criticisms of the class prejudices of criminologists as expressed in their attempts to minimize the significance of motoring offences is the author's emphasis on the hidden value-judgements in criminological research.

> Such theories as that delinquents come from broken homes or have mothers who go out to work, or that they are not members of clubs or do not go to church, have certainly *originated* in the value-judgements of those who put them forward, whether

> or not they subsequently prove to be well founded . . . This practice of importing hypotheses from general philosophical principles into the study of social phenomena involves peculiar risks. Every investigator is inclined to fall in love with his hypothesis, but association with high moral principle is a powerful added charm . . .[2]

Here I could not agree more with Lady Wootton, but her discussion of this truly formidable problem would have been much more helpful if she had made an attempt, in the light of the international literature on the subject, to provide some guidance to the research worker on how to overcome this danger. This, however, she has not done, and indispensable names such as Max Weber or, more recently, Arnold Rose[3] do not even appear in the index, while that of Gunnar Myrdal is quoted once but in an entirely different connexion. It is a pity that Lady Wootton has deprived us of the intellectual pleasure of a discourse on the views of these great sociologists and has rather been content to criticize the smaller fry. Moreover, as already stressed by Sir John Wolfenden, 'she urges other writers to exclude value judgements from their scientific assessments; but she does not always succeed in following her own prescription'.[4]

Another important, and to a large extent justified, criticism made in this book is that criminologists, and psychiatrists too, have often used very imprecise definitions of their basic terms. The author rightly complains of the 'devastating lack of precision in the terms employed' (p. 170). While the reviewer has every sympathy for Lady Wootton's feelings of disappointment, his sympathy would have been stronger still if she had not—no doubt unwittingly—given the impression that she was the first to discover this weakness.[5] In the past ten years the position has considerably improved, and in fairness it has to be stressed—a point ignored by Lady Wootton—that much of the previous inadequacy of criminological research has to be understood historically as due to the fact that it had, more often than not, to be done by persons of no scientific training or trained in entirely different fields. In part it has also been the inevitable consequence of the unsatisfactory quality of most of the documentary material used for those earlier researches. Usually, lack of financial resources made it impossible for research workers to collect their own case material, and they had to be grateful for permission to use whatever case material they could lay their hands on; moreover, they had to do their research mostly in their spare time and for no material reward. It is only a very recent development that money has been made available for criminological research. A writer so deeply interested as Lady Wootton in questions of poverty and economic conditions in general as sources of crime might well have given some thought to bad material conditions as causes of poor criminology. This might have led her to some reflections on the sociology of knowledge with reference to criminology more profound than the scanty remarks at the end of her book (pp. 337–8).

One final illustration of what I regard as 'good but not new' in Lady Wootton's book is her reference to the danger that modern methods of penal treatment, whether based upon psychiatric diagnosis or on statistical prediction or other scientific information, may lead to very dissimilar consequences for similar offences: 'to a public conditioned to the belief that the punishment should fit the crime such inequalities of treatment can only appear as monstrous injustice' (pp. 335–6). How very true and unoriginal![6]

On this general matter our author has nothing to say of any importance except for a few remarks on the 'age-old conflict between deterrence and reform' and an entirely unfounded criticism of 'psychiatric methods and predictive researches of the Mannheim and Wilkins type' which 'concentrate attention solely upon the future of the convicted person himself, as though no one else in the world existed' (p. 336). This latter criticism entirely ignores the obvious fact that prediction studies have so far been given the task only of answering the question whether certain offenders are likely to offend again; in future they might also be asked to find out what the reaction of other persons and of the community at large is likely to be to individual offenders or to the way in which they are treated, and so on. In other words, the emphasis on the individual is nothing inherent in predictive techniques as such. In connexion with her remarks on deterrence and reformation the author also deplores what she regards as the 'surprisingly little interest' shown by criminologists in the important question of whether the post-war increase in crime has been due 'to increased activity on the part of recidivists or to the addition of fresh recruits to the army of the convicted'. Considering what I had already written in 1942[7] I regret that I am unable to accept Lady Wootton's criticism.

The same applies to the charge made by the author concerning the subject of female delinquency:

> The relative rarity of women offenders . . . has for the most part been tacitly ignored by students of criminology, any clues suggested by this sex difference being generally neglected. Apart from the work of a few students who have interested themselves particularly in the offences committed by women [here the only reference given is to a not particularly good American monograph] the habitual reaction of sociologists and criminologists to the sex difference has been to eliminate the female subjects from their studies on the ground that the numbers of available cases is too small to allow of any valid inferences being made (pp. 31–2, 318).

Many of the better class of American textbooks on criminology and even the short English text by Howard Jones contain either lengthy chapters on female delinquency (see e.g. Mabel Elliott's *Crime in Modern Society* or Walter C. Reckless's *The Crime Problem*) or, as in the case of Jones, at least a few pages on it; there is *Five Hundred Delinquent Women* by the Gluecks and a chapter of more than twenty pages on the subject in my *Social Aspects of Crime in England between the Wars* (1940); and Cyril Burt's *Young Delinquent* is based on a sample of 123 boys and 74 girls. It is of course true that, on account of the much smaller number of female offenders, statistical inquiries often exclude the latter, but this does not mean that the problems of female delinquency have remained *terra incognita* where the relevant questions have not even been asked, let alone answered. It can in fact safely be said that all the points raised by Lady Wootton have been discussed in the literature.

I agree most strongly with the author that the interests of Society as against those of the individual offender should not be neglected and that the role of group values should be studied by criminologists. The second item is in fact the main theme of my book *Group Problems in Crime and Punishment*, to which she once or twice refers. I do not think, however, that she has added much to our existing knowledge of it. From a writer with her strong political views one might have expected some worthwhile new ideas on this topic, but

they are not there. Even on such an obvious subject as white collar crime she has hardly anything to say. As already mentioned, Sutherland's famous book on it is not even included in the Bibliography, where only one of his earliest articles on the subject is referred to. On the other hand, she shows herself greatly attracted by Sutherland's theory of differential association, for which, she thinks, only 'little support has been forthcoming from other criminologists' (p. 67). In fact, Sutherland has succeeded in building up a very influential school of American criminologists around this theory. There is a not very friendly reference in the book to 'what it is now fashionable to call "culture patterns"', but Albert Cohen's stimulating and widely discussed book on the sub-culture of the delinquent boy in U.S.A. is not even mentioned. Practically all the author has to say on the subject of a criminal 'sub-culture' is that 'the sceptic may well ask what is gained by labelling familiar differences in social habits "sub-cultures", or whether "anomie" is more than a high-sounding name for the attempts of the poor to get rich quick in the only ways open to them' (p. 69), which is a misinterpretation of Durkheim's concept of anomie. Clearly, neither Durkheim nor Merton (neither of whom is mentioned in the index) need have existed for the author. To ignore the first-rate contributions to our problems made by such contemporary thinkers as Merton seems unjustifiable.

In her chapter on mental disorders Lady Wootton discusses, among other topics, the concept of moral and criminal responsibility. Here she shows herself deeply concerned about recent developments, in particular in the treatment of psychopaths, and about certain movements in favour of abolishing or at least modifying the M'Naghten Rules. In the preceding chapter she presents a skilful and devastating analysis of the various current definitions of the concept of 'mental health', an analysis which, in her view, justifies the following conclusion:

> If mental health and ill-health cannot be defined in objective scientific terms that are free of subjective moral judgements, it follows that we have no reliable criterion by which to distinguish the sick from the healthy mind. The road is then wide open for those who wish to classify all forms of anti-social, or at least of criminal, behaviour as symptoms of mental disorder (p. 227).

She rightly criticizes the 'circular argument which explains anti-social behaviour by ill-health while inferring the ill-health from the behaviour' and insists that there should be 'a criterion which distinguishes between the sick and the responsible among anti-social persons in accordance with the presence or absence of recognized symptoms of abnormality which are independent of their misbehaviour' (pp. 237–8). All this is very good and true but not really new. What is not so good is the tendency to exaggerate the dangers threatening our whole society from the ill-conceived efforts of some misguided psychiatrists and lawyers. Let me take as an illustration the case of that eternal headache of both professions, the criminal psychopath. Lady Wootton's conclusion, derived from a survey of what is in fact only a small section of the literature, is that no independent criterion has so far been found to distinguish him from the persistent offender. In fact, if Lady Wootton had consulted, say, the special number on Psychopathy published by the *British Journal of Delinquency* in October 1951, she would have found, among many other points of interest, that in a group of prisoners examined in London

prisons there was a statistically significant positive correlation with abnormality of the Electro-Encephalogram on the part of the psychopaths as compared with the controls. Similar findings by Denis Hill in a group of murderers are also well known. And besides such differences in the E.E.G. other significant differences were also discovered, e.g. concerning certain neurological anomalies and in certain features of capillary microscopy. It is not entirely true, therefore, to say that no independent criterion can be discovered. In modern legislative work in this country and abroad, such as the Mental Health Act, 1959, the Danish Penal Code of 1930, and the Western German Draft Penal Code of 1956–8, the possibility of establishing such criteria has been recognized and led to the inclusion of special provisions for psychopaths.

This leads us to Lady Wootton's views on the M'Naghten Rules. Here one hesitates to be too critical, since the author is not a lawyer, but as she has come out so strongly in favour of these antiquated and largely discredited Rules it has to be said that her faith in them as the only formula capable of providing a stable legal system is mistaken. 'Once we allow any movement away from a rigid intellectual test of responsibility on McNaghten lines, our feet are set upon a slippery slope which offers no real resting place short of the total abandonment of the whole concept of responsibility' (p. 249). As one who had many years of experience as a criminal court judge with legal provisions different from the M'Naghten Rules, I can assure her that the path is *always* slippery, with or without the Rules, but it is hardly more slippery and definitely more in conformity with modern scientific ideas without than with them. Why should all Continental countries and many of the States of U.S.A. and other parts of the world as well be able to do without the Rules if they are indispensable?

My final point has, unfortunately, to be made in a very condensed form. There is no real discussion in this book of those fundamental differences between the great international schools of criminology which have for so long coloured and largely determined the historical development of our discipline: the classical and positivist schools and now the movement of 'social defence'. In Britain, on the whole, less attention has been paid than elsewhere to these struggles between the various schools, and this omission has in some cases paid good dividends in practice because too much attention to theoretical quibbles can easily bring the work of the penal reformer to a complete standstill. There are, however, also certain very real problems, such as for instance that of preventive detention and the treatment of the habitual offender in general, which can hardly be solved regardless of their theoretical foundations. It is a matter for regret that these matters have been largely ignored in a book written to review, among other topics, the present position and problems of criminology.

NOTES

[1] *Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction*, 1st impression, London, 1946, p. 57.

[2] Wootton, pp. 317 ff.; also pp. 55, 217, 283, and *passim*.

[3] See my critical notice of Arnold M. Rose, 'Theory and Method in the Social Sciences', *British Journal of Delinquency*, October 1956, pp. 254 ff.

[4] *The Sunday Times* (London), 7 June 1959.

[5] Cf. my *Group Problems in Crime and Punishment*, 1955, chap. 6, originally written in 1949.

[6] Cf. *Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction*, pp. 228 ff.

[7] See *Group Problems*, pp. 99 ff.

AVENUES IN JEWISH FOLKLORE

J. Maitlis

(*Review Article*)

THE STUDY OF Jewish folklore is comparatively new. At first the subject attracted the attention of writers such as I. L. Peretz, M. J. Berdyczewski (M. J. Bin Gurion) and S. Anski, and was soon followed up by scholars such as M. Gaster, N. Sloustsch, Max Grunwald, L. Ginzberg, and a host of young men and women. Mention should also be made of forerunners like Max Gruenbaum and Joseph Jacobs, who devoted a great deal of research to Jewish folk literature and in particular to the Jewish folk tale. In a fast-changing world it became paramount that a start should be made with a systematic collection of the vast treasures of oral traditions, customs, and folk beliefs still current among a large section of Eastern European and to a certain degree Oriental Jewry. The Jews living in small towns and townships were in a much stronger position to preserve some of the older forms of culture than those living in large cities where they were exposed to a more sophisticated, cosmopolitan civilization and subject to faster changes of fashion. In the townships of the 'Pale of Settlement' life was more organic and customs and lore were shared more homogeneously throughout the group. Here the old forms of a folk community were still fully intact.

To gather before it became too late and classify folklore materials and traditions in order to interpret the life and culture of the Jewish masses through the ages was a challenge which was first taken up by a group of enlightened Jews in Russia at the beginning of the present century, headed by the historian S. Dubnow and by the indefatigable Yiddish writer and folklorist S. Anski (S. Rapaport). Connected with the name of Baron Horace Ginzburg, the great Maecenas of Jewish culture in Russia, the 'Jewish Historico-Ethnographical Society' was established in St. Petersburg and the Russian periodical *Perezhitoye* published. This society was, as far as I know, the first of its kind to organize a systematic collection of Jewish folklore and ethnographic materials. S. Anski, famous as the author of the dramatic legend *The Dybbuk*, in the years 1912–14 led an expedition of folklorists into the townlets and settlements of the Ukraine, Podolia, and Volhynia, where an abundance of materials, documents, and oral traditions were collected, classified, and arranged for publication. Some of the material concerning the life of the Jew, his outlook and tradition, his beliefs and his upbringing, the events of family life etc., were recorded in the first volume, *Der Mentsh*, published in St. Petersburg in 1914. The fate of the remaining material is not known.

One of the surviving members of this memorable expedition, Mr. Abraham Rechtman, presents us now with a most valuable account* of what was ,ound and committed to writing by the enthusiastic group of investigators. He recalls the visits to a number of historical places such as Radziwill, Mikulayev, Ostrog, Nemirov, Ludmir, Berdyczev, Dubno, and the famous Miedzyborz, the seat of the founder of Hassidism, Rabbi Israel Bal-Shemtov. Here the investigators found a mine or oral traditions, countless folk tales and interesting variants of legends which the author attempts to recount partly from notes and partly from memory. The expedition also found a vast body of materials pertaining to folk traditions, customs and beliefs, which Mr. Rechtman vividly describes and documents.

Having devoted his introduction to the work and life of S. Anski, Mr. Rechtman recalls in his first chapter some vivid impressions of the historical places visited by the expedition. He relates various versions of miraculous stories about the old local synagogues. These are mostly *etiological* legends which explain existing traditions, such as the miraculous origin or survival of some of the holy places. There is, for instance, a legend about the old town of Ostrog (Ostroh, which according to the folk etymology meant *Os Torah*, the sign of the Torah), for generations a seat of Jewish learning. Here the 'Synagogue of the Meharsha' (Rabbi Samuel Aidels) was, according to legend, saved with its Jews by miracle during a heavy Russian bombardment in 1792. To commemorate this miraculous event, the community celebrated a local Purim (Purim Ostroh) each year on the seventh day of Tammuz. Anski himself published some variants of folk tales and texts of incantations which he collected and later published in the volume *Folklore and Ethnography*, to which reference should be made.

Mr. Rechtman reports some beautiful examples of folk art and decoration in the synagogues they visited, a testimony to great creativity. The old synagogue buildings were architecturally delightful and had elaborate fine carvings and very good biblical paintings on the ceilings. Of special artistic quality were the works in silver and gold, items of jewellery and religious objects which were later exhibited in the ethnographic museum in St. Petersburg, of which S. Anski was the curator for many years.

For the student of comparative folklore the following two variants of legends are of special interest. First, there is the story of the death of Rabbi Yaakov Joseph of Ostrog. There lived a wicked clergyman who, in order to show his malice towards the Jews, started to toll the church bells whenever a Jewish funeral passed the church. When the body of Rabbi Yaakov Joseph was carried by, and the priest began tolling the bells, a miracle happened and the church sank. A variant of this story is to be found in the old Yiddish *Ma'aseh Book* (first published in Basel, 1602) of the death of Rabbi Judah Hasid. Here, when the body of the pious man was carried through the gate and the wicked gatekeeper began tolling the bell, the gate fell and buried him underneath it.

Another story is told of a man who married a woman of the Korahites, and who after a short sojourn in their underworld returned to this world and later

*Abraham Rechtman, *Jewish Ethnography and Folklore. Reminiscences of the ethnographical expedition led by S. Anski, with illustrations of old synagogues and tombstones in the Ukraine* (in Yiddish), Yiddish-Scientific Institute—Yivo, Buenos Aires, 1958, pp. 352.

died in Ostrog as a well-known scholar. According to the biblical story, Korah and his followers were swallowed up alive by the earth. The legend impresses on the Korahites that they continue to live in the underworld, and that in the days of the Messiah they will rise from out of the earth. Journeys to the other world are well known motifs of numerous stories, Jewish and non-Jewish, ancient and contemporary. A variant is also to be found in the aforementioned *Ma'aseh Book* in the story of the marriage of the daughter of a prince to a demon, and in the famous *Ma'aseh Yerushalmi* (cf. ed. J. L. Zlotnik). The story belongs to the group which Stith Thompson classified as 'marriage or liaison with fairies' and is widespread.

Whilst the Jews were responsible for the diffusion in Europe of many Oriental tales and legends and thus enriched the folklore of Western nations, they themselves were influenced to a great extent by their Christian neighbours. In addition to the old tales and legends from the Talmud and Midrash in the course of centuries they created new ones with the medieval or hassidic wonder-rabbis and saints as their heroes. Their folklore was now connected with the inner life of the Jewish community, a life often of great sorrow and suffering, but also full of beliefs and hopes that a miracle might soon deliver them from the hands of their oppressors.

Most instructive in this connexion are several stories and legends retold by Mr. Rechtman about the wonder-working graves of holy men of the past. These are a real mine of the hassidic lore of Eastern Europe. Of particular significance were the graves of some famous wonder-rabbis, with 'huts' or 'tents' (*Ohel*) built over them and which, owing to the miraculous powers ascribed to them, became places of pilgrimage. In the 'hut' and all over the grave there were scattered heaps of scraps of paper containing 'petitions' for intervention and imploring the blessing of Heaven for the petitioners. Of special interest are certain survivals to which Mr. Rechtman refers in connexion with two types of bricks found on the holy graves. We have here undoubtedly a custom of a typical *apotropaic* character. The one brick called *Shmad Tsigel* (Apostasy brick) contained an incantation to prevent evil and imploring that the heart of the renegade might be turned back to his faith. The other type of brick was the 'Love brick', which called for a change of heart in the unhappy lovers, so that they might live again in peace and harmony.

Of singular historical interest were the community and guild records (*Pinkes*), bearing on the activities of various communal bodies, guilds, and other local societies. These communal registers contain also a number of important statutes (*Takanot*) and regulations dealing with a variety of social and personal problems in the daily life of the Jew. Here we also find recorded stories of ghosts and of saints, and of informers and evil-doers whom the community has cast away for ever.

Section VI of the book deals with widespread superstitions, customs, and folk beliefs, which have been the subject of serious study by a number of folklore students, but the author makes no comparative references. He presents us, however, with several texts of incantations (in Hebrew, Yiddish, and even Ukrainian) which served to combat 'evil eye' or exorcize an evil spirit, beliefs in which have a long history and seem to be of foreign origin. Mr. Rechtman relates a story of how a Dybbuk was exorcized in Chmelnik (Podolia) in the

year 1755, giving the texts of the incantations and prayers used; this story may have served Anski as a source for his dramatic legend *The Dybbuk*.

It seems that a great deal of this striking material was unfortunately lost during the turbulent times of the war and the Russian revolution. Only fragments of a rich collection of folk narratives have been preserved and assembled by our author. In some of the stories he attempts to preserve much of the local colour and the popular style, but in most cases, he admits, he has had to resort to reconstruction partly from memory and partly from notes, a procedure which is not always satisfactory. Certain inconsistencies in style and genre of the recorded narrative are thus unavoidable. The loss of some traditional patterns and the original forms of some tales will be greatly regretted. But Mr. Rechtman's book is a happy combination of personal account and reminiscences, as well as of a selection of folk materials, survivals, and narratives, often with characteristic colloquialisms, and idiomatic and figurative phrases and popular sayings, which will undoubtedly be used with much benefit by students of Jewish folklore.

SHORTER NOTICES

H. J. ZIMMELS, *Ashkenazim and Sephardim, Their Relations, Differences and Problems as Reflected in the Rabbinical Responsa*, pp. xv, 347. Jews' College Publications, New Series No. 2, Oxford University Press, London, 1958, 42*s*.

The information contained in this work is of absorbing interest. The author has conscientiously examined and illuminated the mass of rabbinic responsa relating to the religious lives of the Jewries of the Franco-German cultural sphere and the Iberian peninsula and to their contact with one another. The picture that emerges is one of an essential unity of theory and practice, with minor differences of ritual and organization which attempts have been made to ascribe more or less plausibly to different social, political, and economic circumstances. The effect of these differences was from time to time diminished by large-scale mutual imitation—a process which Dr. Zimmels has succeeded in tracing with the utmost clarity. The absurdity of the view that persecution led to an increase of rabbinic restrictions becomes apparent from his study. Calamities, in general, militated in favour of leniency—particularly as far as earning a livelihood was concerned—and the predominant motive underlying rabbinic teaching throughout the generations was the desire to intensify the spiritual activity of the individual. As the main preoccupation of the Jew used to be his concern for the salvation of his soul in the World of Truth as a consequence of his fulfilment of his obligations in the World of Falsehood, it is not surprising that exercises framed towards that end were meticulously performed. The personal inspiration of outstanding spiritual leaders and the acceptance of their direction by the learned and devout elite through whom their teachings percolated downwards to the faithful masses, have certainly had a far greater effect on the development of Jewish religious life than external circumstances. In both Jewries, the attachment to the spiritually eminent was so overwhelming that their fame and influence were rapidly and effectively distributed from one region to another. Where members of both Jewries lived side by side, there was a perfectly natural inter-group rivalry which amounted to little more than preference for the traditions of one's own group. Moreover, each of the two large groups was divided into many smaller groups, each with its own rite and heritage. Yet these rivalries which often split small towns into

a number of separate communities, must be seen in proportion. Even the smallest of them harked back to the inspiration of one or more of those saintly figures through whose lips the Divine Voice could be plainly heard. Even when they appeared to disagree with one another, their words were acknowledged as those of the Living God.

It is when we approach modern times that the sources of responsa material appear to dry up. As the demand for it has dwindled, this is hardly surprising. Rabbinic responsa cater for traditional societies which expect their spiritual masters to show them the paths along which they have to conduct their private and collective lives. We frequently read, of course, of individual sinners who ask for remedies for their sins and, occasionally, waves of laxity invite and arouse storms of rebuke; but nowhere in the responsa quoted by Dr. Zimmels can one observe even the slightest hint as to a situation in which believing and practising Jews constitute at the most a substantial minority of almost every Jewish community. Yet such is the contemporary state of affairs, which Dr. Zimmels ignores, preferring to seek comfort in prophecy of an eventual union of Ashkenazim and Sephardim in the Zionist state which would regard itself as the heir to both sets of traditions. This seems a little unrealistic. Nor can it be deduced from the material which he has so competently handled. From the point of view of the religious survivors of both groups, the main struggle within that state is between believers and secularists with the mass of the population constituting the mission-field in which there is an abundance of souls to be saved. The fundamental question, therefore, remains whether the traditionalist remnants of both groups and of others originating in Asia and Africa can combine for the defence and promotion of the faith. There are many signs that the more zealous descendants of the Franco-German school are seeking to lead some of their counterparts in other groups in the direction of practical collaboration but none of the literature on the subject indicates attempts to compile synthetic liturgies and codes. On the contrary, the revival or the maintenance of Jewish spirituality is presumed to require not only personal fervour but also a sense of continuity; and, perhaps, that is the reason for the remarkable number of new editions of works by spiritual leaders of Oriental Jewish communities of the past that are now being printed in Jerusalem. From Dr. Zimmels's study, it is clear that even mere customs have always been regarded throughout Jewry as sanctified by their observance by generations of the devout. They have been abandoned by the devout only when their numbers were so small as to make the continuation of separate communal life impossible and enforce assimilation within a more flourishing community. Throughout his fascinating book, he quotes not a single example of union through synthesis and it seems most unlikely to happen in the future. What could happen in the event of complete secularist control of Jewish religious life is an enforced amalgamation on the lines of the union of the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches in Prussia during the last century. For that, however, a far more substantial decline in religious fervour would be required. Judaism, as Dr. Zimmels will surely agree, is not yet entirely a sociological religion. It is even becoming less inclined that way.

EMILE MARMORSTEIN

FRANCESCA M. WILSON, *They Came as Strangers*, pp. xix, 266. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1959, 25*s*.

Miss Wilson has written a very readable account of the refugees who have sought asylum in the British Isles; they are those who fled from political, religious or racial persecution or the threat of it. She has made good use of memoirs and other material which throw light on the experiences of refugees and on the attitude to them of their hosts; there are many revealing and instructive anecdotes which add much to the interest of the book. The book falls into three main sections, dealing in turn with the Huguenots, the political refugees of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the Jews. The most colourful personalities, such as Rousseau, Paoli, Mazzini, and Victor Hugo, appear in the second section, but the best and most extensive account of refugees' experiences, used in the work, is that of the Huguenot Jacques Fontaine.

Great Britain has a good record as affording an asylum for refugees, though its people can hardly be said to have gone out of their way personally to welcome refugees or to attempt to understand their problems. Absorption was in fact not made

easy. This record was somewhat marred after the First World War by the official attitude to refugees when the Aliens Act was operated to their disadvantage; it seems to be the case that this attitude was only modified in the thirties as the result of the pressure brought to bear by those who were deeply concerned at the plight of the sufferers from Nazi persecution. An extraordinary example of official stupidity and panic was the internment overnight in May 1940 of some 500 academic refugees, many of whom were deported overseas. An inquiry conducted in 1958 showed that among those who had been academic refugees there were then four Nobel Prize winners, 35 Fellows of the Royal Society and 23 Fellows of the British Academy. These were the kind of people whom the Government shut up at a time when the country needed all the trained intelligence it could command, and whom the dictators in their criminal folly caused to flee from their homes. So our recent record has not been spotless. But since this deplorable episode official action has not stood in the way of the desire of the British people to continue their traditional practice and to afford homes and decent treatment to refugees. There is no doubt that recent arrivals, Poles and Hungarians, as in the earlier cases of the Huguenots and the Jews, have made valuable additions to the population of the country.

A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS

ZOSA SZAJKOWSKI, *Autonomy and Communal Jewish Debts during the French Revolution of 1789*, pp. 182, 350 copies printed, 1959. Published with the help of the Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, New York, n.p.

RICHARD W. EMERY, *The Jews of Perpignan in the Thirteenth Century*, pp. 202, 1959. Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press, 36*s*.

In his present study Mr. Szajkowski examines the fate of communal Jewish debts to Christian creditors after 1789. He gives the legal history behind the eventual refusal of the government to take over these debts, although this had been done in the case of other religious groups. The uncertain national status of the Jews appears to have been responsible for their not being regarded as a *corporation*, an indispensable factor in the nationalization of a debt. The consequence of this was, as the author very pertinently points out, that although the revolution ideologically demanded the abolition of state-within-the-state allegiances, the judicial decision about Jewish communal debts meant the maintenance of the old community ties for the purpose of debt collection. In his analysis of these debts, the author makes the altogether reasonable point that since most of them were contracted so that exorbitant discriminatory taxes could be paid, and not in the furtherance of private business, the judicial decision did not err on the side of humanitarianism.

Both this and Mr. Emery's book are scholarly, well-documented works. If the latter writes with more grace it must also be said that several misprints and a hearty, autobiographical opening to the Preface mar his text. Mr. Emery has examined seventeen notarial registers of Perpignan for 1261 to 1289, for the light they might shed on local Jewish economic history during that period. He finds that he is dealing with a new Jewish community, with many parental links throughout the area of Aragon and Northern Spain, which had moved in at a moment when the town was beginning to expand rapidly. Given these facts, one is not very surprised to find moneylending the chief occupation of these Jews, and this to all sections of the population. The royal protection they enjoyed, and which often saved them from prosecution in the religious courts on the charge of usury, was of course interested and temporary, scarcely outlasting the century.

H. TINT

BENJAMIN AZKIN, ed. *Studies in Law, Scripta Hierosolymitana*, Vol. V, Publications of the Hebrew University, 259 pp., 1958. Magnes Press, Jerusalem.

This symposium published by the Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University bears eloquent testimony to the high scholarly achievements of its members, and also to the very special importance which, from the point of view of comparative law, attaches to the development of legal thought and legal practice in Israel.

The State of Israel is placed at a cross-roads of legal influences from England, from the Continent, from Jewish tradition, and—to some extent—from the religious laws of Islam and of Christianity. The pattern of legislation and of judge-made law which is emerging from this confluence of legal currents is in itself of great interest to the comparative lawyer and to the sociologist. History offers however many examples of a new legal system being created under the impact of diverse legal traditions which meet at a point of special geographical and political importance. What is unique in Israeli law today is that these legal traditions are merged at a point at which they themselves have reached a very high stage of intellectual development, a point at which the process of law making and of legal analysis has become conscious. The process of merger is therefore not only deliberate but, if the word be permitted, scientific. We are witnessing a mutual cross-fertilization of Anglo-American, Continental (French, Italian, German, Austrian), and Jewish legal thought at a high level of scholarship, a reciprocal attraction and repulsion of systematic Continental and casuistic English reflection and practice, and the volume under review is, one hopes, only the first of a series of publications intended to mirror this evolution of legal thinking, the general importance of which to sociologists and to jurists needs no emphasis.

What is most striking to any outside observer of this evolution is the continued power of what Sir Frederick Pollock called 'the expansion of the common law'. It is indeed remarkable to see from a book such as this how scholars of Continental origin and training adopt English ways of thinking, a phenomenon which appears to the reviewer to be also reflected in the practice and attitude of the Israeli courts. English law was introduced in Palestine in certain limits by the Mandatory Power. The substance of the common law and of doctrines of equity were made applicable in Palestine so far as the circumstances of the country and of its inhabitants permitted and subject to qualifications rendered necessary by local circumstances. Much British legislation was introduced in substance through ordinances, and, as in India, branches of the common law (e.g. the law of tort) were codified for the purpose of being applied in the territory. But all this was side by side with the continued existence, in some respects, of the Turkish law (which itself was influenced not only by the Sharia but also by various Continental legal systems), and, of course, most importantly, the Jewish law which applied to matters of personal status, as well as the other religious laws which were applicable. The new State inherited all this in 1948, and, since that year, has added a great deal through the legislation of the Knesset and the judge-made law of its courts, especially its Supreme Court. Many of its judges and legal scholars are of Continental origin, and, although during the years of the Mandate they had become cnured to English methods of procedure, interpretation, and thought, there was nothing after 1948 to prevent either the legislature, or the courts, or legal scholars from abandoning, gradually or abruptly, the specifically English approach which, under the Mandate, they had had to adopt by force of circumstances. But nothing of the kind has happened. On the contrary: it seems to this reviewer—and the volume under review confirms it—that Israel is, for the time being at least, determined to remain within the 'Anglo-Saxon' legal family, which will be surprising only to those who have failed to observe the 'attractive' power of English legal methods in countries of 'civil law' origin such as Quebec and Louisiana. This applies in Israel especially to matters such as the highly important supervisory function which the High Court exercises in relation to the civil service, to the law of evidence, in short to those branches of English law which serve the purpose of protecting the individual against possible encroachments on liberty and property. In these, but not only in these respects the tradition of the common law has clearly proved to be a valuable legacy which the Mandatory Power left to the new State, and many of the lawyers of

Israel are very conscious of it. Many of them are trying to preserve this legacy but to develop it with the help of the so frequently intellectually superior Continental methods of deduction and of presentation.

A highly technical analysis like that on 'Renewal of Actions' offered in this volume by Professor S. Ginossar demonstrates this clearly: we see how English methods of interpretation are combined with an attempt to present a procedural problem in a systematic fashion which reflects a Continental approach. An article by Dr. Y. Dror on 'Some Recent Developments of the Doctrine of Precedent in Israel' shows how the law of a new State seeks to grapple with the principle of *stare decisis*, especially in the face of the problem 'how to balance the need for legal security against the need for adjusting the law to social change'. The question whether the Knesset was justified in permitting the Supreme Court to overrule its own decisions does not cease to agitate the minds of the lawyers. Dr. Dror's admirable analysis of this and other controversies should be of special interest to sociologists: they raise fundamental problems of the ideology of the legal profession, and should provide food for the thoughts of English and American jurists. Two articles by Dr. Z. Warhaftig on 'Specific Performance in Hebrew Law' and by Dr. R. Yaron on 'Dispositions in Contemplation of Death' demonstrate the great value for comparative legal studies of confronting the solutions found by Jewish law for problems arising from contractual relationships and from dispositions *mortis causa* with those of other systems, ancient and modern. Judge H. E. Baker's contribution on the 'Use of Marginal Notes in the Interpretation of Statutes' and Dr. M. Zohar's study of 'Modern Trends in Military Law and their Influence on Israel's Military Justice Law' show in two very different areas of great importance how English law is being adapted to a new environment: both the greater freedom which (in comparison with the English courts) the Israeli judges enjoy in using marginal notes for statutory interpretation, and the role played by legally trained military judges as members of courts martial in Israel show that the needs of a new society may and do have to prevail against the traditions inherited from England. Even if the volume had not included a masterly contribution by Professor N. Feinberg on 'The Legal Validity of the Undertaking concerning Minorities and the Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus', it would have been clear that the highest standards of scholarship in International Law would be maintained at the Hebrew University. It is further proved by an article by Dr. Ruth Lapidoth on 'Les Rapports entre le Droit International Commun et le Droit Interne en Israel', from which it appears that the Israeli Courts have adopted the principle of the Common Law that customary international law is part of the law of the land unless it is contradicted by positive rules of municipal law and that the latter are presumed to be in accordance with international law.

In a way the most thought provoking contribution to the volume is the first. This is an essay by Professor G. Tedeschi on 'Private Law and Legislation' today. Here we are faced with the vigorous protest (almost a *cri de cœur*) of an Israeli jurist of Italian origin and training against the anti-democratic tendency of the common law to minimize the role of legislation and to proclaim the rule of the judges, a tendency which today is supported by some neo-Savignians on the Continent against whom Professor Tedeschi has marshalled a formidable array of arguments. One could wish that voices like these were more frequently heard in England, and one must agree with much of Professor Tedeschi's polemic. One might however have welcomed a closer attention on his part to modern American thought in this field, perhaps also a little more scepticism towards the will o' the wisp of 'certainty' in the law, and one cannot help wondering what would happen to Professor Tedeschi's arguments if one day Israel gave itself a written constitution with a catalogue of fundamental rights and a power of judicial review on the American pattern. Even so, and especially when confronted with Dr. Dror's study of the principle of precedent, this article shows that the intellectual battles which are being fought in the making of a new law for a new nation give rise to problems of the greatest general importance, and one cannot withhold one's gratitude from the Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University for having presented them to a wider public in this attractive and convenient form.

O. KAHN-FREUND

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Adler-Rudel, S.: *Ostjuden in Deutschland 1880–1940*, Schriftenreihe Wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Institute of Jews from Germany, I, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1950, DM.21.

Applebaum, Morton M.: *What Everyone Should Know About Judaism*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, $3.

Bentwich, Norman: *The Religious Foundations of Internationalism—a study in international relations through the ages*, second enlarged edition, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1959, 21*s*.

Berlin, Isaiah: *The Life and Opinions of Moses Hess*, The Lucien Wolf Memorial Lecture, London, December 1957, W. Heffer & Sons Ltd. for the Jewish Historical Society of England, Cambridge, 1959.

Borrie, W. D., *et al.*, ed.: *The Cultural Integration of Immigrants*, a survey based upon the papers and proceedings of the UNESCO Conference held in Havana, April 1956, UNESCO, 1959, 15*s*.

Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany: *Five Years Later—Activities 1954–1958*, New York, 1959.

Durkheim, Emile: *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, edited with an introduction by Alvia W. Gouldner, translated by Charlotte Saffler from the edition originally prepared with an introduction by Marcel Mauss, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1959, 28*s*.

Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, The: Fourth Report 1957 and 1958, Jerusalem, 1959.

Gordon, Albert I.: *Jews in Suburbia*, with a foreword by Oscar Handlin, Beaver Press, Beaver Hill, Boston, 1959, $3·50.

Grew, Frederick J.: *Wealth and the Common Man*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, $3·75.

Holde, Arthur: *Jews in Music*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, $5·00.

Hughes, Stuart H.: *Consciousness and Society, the re-orientation of European Social thought 1890–1930*, MacGibbon & Kee, London, 1959, 30*s*.

International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation: *International Bibliography of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. III (Works published in 1957), in co-operation with the International Congress of Anthropological & Ethnological Sciences, UNESCO, 1960, 35*s*.

International Repertory of Institutions conducting Population Studies, UNESCO, 12*s*. 6*d*.

Jacobovits, Immanuel: *Jewish Medical Ethics*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, $6·00.

Lipset, S. M., & Bendix, R.: *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, William Heinemann, London, 1959, 30*s*.

Marshall, T. H.: *International Comprehension in and through Social Science*, L. T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture No. 29, Oxford University Press, 1960, 3*s*. 6*d*.

Molitor, André: *The University Teaching of Social Sciences—Public Administration*, UNESCO, 1959, 14*s*.

Moscati, Sabatino: *The Semites in Ancient History*, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1959, 15*s*.

Penrose, C. S.: *Outline of Human Genetics*, Contemporary Science Series, William Heinemann, London, 1959, 12*s*. 6*d*.

Pollack, Emmanuel: *The Kronstadt Rebellion (the first armed revolt against the Soviets)*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, $3·00.

Rubner, Alex: *The Economy of Israel, A Critical Account of the First Ten Years*, Frank Cass & Co, London, 1960, 25*s*.

Runes, Dagobert D.: *Dictionary of Thought—From my writings and from my learnings*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, $5·00.

Runes, Dagobert D.: *Pictorial History of Philosophy*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, $15·00.

Russell of Liverpool, Lord: *If I Forget Thee*, Cassell & Co., London, 1960, 30*s*.
Schwarz, Walter: *The Arabs in Israel*, Faber & Faber, London, 1959, 21*s*.
Simon, Ernst: *Aufbau im Untergang*, Schriftenreihe Wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Institute of Jews from Germany, 2, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1959, DM.21.
Stoutenburgh Jr., John L.: *Dictionary of the American Indian*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1960, $10·00.
Sulzbach, Walter: *Die Zwei Wurzeln und Formen des Juden Hasses*, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1959.
Taylor, Alan R.: *Prelude to Israel—an analysis of Zionist Diplomacy 1897–1947*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, $4·75.
Thennissen, Gert H.: *Zwischen Golgatha und Auschwitz*, Joseph Melzer Verlag, Köln, 1959.
Yivo Institute for Jewish Research: *Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science*, Volume XII, New York, 1958/1959.
Zweig, Ferdynand: *The Israel Worker, Achievements, Attitudes and Aspirations*, Herzl Press & Sharon Books, New York, 1959.

CHRONICLE

Prepared by

P. Glikson

Israel's population at the end of 1959 reached 2,089,000, of whom 200,000 were non-Jews. During that year there were 23,045 immigrants and some 84,000 tourists. In the same year about 45,000 residents travelled abroad for varying periods of time, and about 10,000 persons left the country for permanent residence abroad. According to an official estimate, about 114,000 persons have emigrated from Israel since the establishment of the State. The last figure includes some 5,000 non-Jews.

*

Yad Vashem (Jerusalem) is to conduct a world-wide inquiry into the causes of the recent anti-semitic outbreaks, according to the Chairman of the organization, Dr. A. L. Kubovy. It is planned to convene in Israel a congress of historians from all over the world to work out a comprehensive programme of instruction for schools and universities about the Nazi period. Dr. Kubovy said that he believed that the outbreak of the swastika plague was due partly to the failure of Jewry—and the world at large—to depict the Nazi menace in its true perspective. The *Yad Vashem* inquiry is aimed at determining whether the recent swastika outbreaks were organized by a single neo-Nazi group, or whether it was a chain reaction among independent groups, triggered by the initial Cologne incident.

*

In 1959, 12,273 Jews emigrated from Communist Eastern European countries via Austria. The majority of them, estimated at about two-thirds, emigrated to Israel. At present only a few hundred Jewish emigrants pass through Austrian boundaries each month.

*

There are about 7,000 Jews in Bulgaria, of whom 4,000 are concentrated in Sofia. The majority are employed in industry and the co-operatives and the Jewish population is said to enjoy complete equality. There are Jewish clubs in which lectures are given by Jewish and non-Jewish writers. There is a Jewish choir of 80 which arranges concerts throughout the country. The central representative body of Bulgarian Jewry is named the Central Consistory of Jews in Bulgaria, which has no connection with the religious body existing in Bulgaria called the Central Israelite Religious Council.

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The Chairman of the Conference of the Ministry of Education of the *Länder* in Bonn declared that the teaching of the history of the Nazi regime should be furthered in the elementary schools, even if it would be necessary to enforce it by decrees and regulations.

*

A detailed report on religious discrimination has been published under the auspices of the United Nations. The document, comprising nearly 30,000 words, was prepared by Mr. Arcot Krishnaswami, of India, and was submitted to Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld by the author in his capacity as special rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, a subsidiary of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The report is based on a survey in all the 82 Member States of the United Nations. It saw a more tolerant attitude in many countries, including predominantly Roman Catholic countries. It cited recent decisions by Pope John XXIII to delete from Catholic liturgy passages that might hurt the feelings of Jews, Moslems, and members of other faiths.

'Nearly all religions and beliefs display a similar trend towards a greater measure of tolerance,' the report said.

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The first volume of the *Encyclopaedia Hinuchit* (Educational Encyclopaedia) has appeared in Jerusalem. It is published by the Ministry of Education in co-operation with the Bialik Institute of the Jewish Agency, and is edited by Professor Martin Buber and a number of other distinguished scholars. The Encyclopaedia is intended for Jewish educationists all over the world.

*

There are no precise estimates of the number of Jews in the Federal German Republic. According to the latest figures given by the Central Council of Jews in Germany, there are just over 21,580 registered members of Jewish organizations and perhaps another 9,000 or so unregistered. The Council believes that about 2,000 have returned to Germany in the past four years. The Government claims, however, that there are about 30,000 who are members of congregations, and 15,000 to 18,000 others; it is suggested that there is such a high proportion of the latter because it is not yet respectable for a Jew to admit that he has voluntarily returned to Germany.

*

On 4 February 1960, the Soviet Press published the result of the census held in the U.S.S.R. in January 1959. According to this, the number of Jews in the Soviet Union is 2,268,000, of whom 28·8 per cent or 473,000, gave Yiddish as their mother-tongue. The breakdown, according to Republics, was given as follows:

Area	*Number of Jews*	*Percentage considering Yiddish as their native language*
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic	875,000	0·7
Ukraine	840,000	2·0
Belorussia	150,000	1·9
Uzbekistan	94,000	1·2
Georgia	52,000	1·3
Lithuania	25,000	0·9
Moldavia	95,000	3·3
Latvia	37,000	1·7
Estonia	5,000	0·5

In Kazakhstan, Azerbaidjan, Kirghizia, Tadjikistan, Armenia, and Turkestan, the number of Jews in the various populations is not given because they do not reach the minimum proportion in these republics which enables them to be recognized as a

national minority. This minimum differs in each republic. Nor have the numbers of Jews in the so-called 'autonomous' Jewish region of Birobidzhan been published as yet.

The question arises as to how accurately these figures reflect the Jewish population of the Soviet Union. They diverge from the total of 3,000,000 Jews, published in the Soviet report in New York at the same time as the census results were appearing in the Soviet Press. The difference of three-quarters of a million is perhaps explained by the fact that a proportion of the Soviet Jewish population chose to declare themselves as Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, etc., and were able to do so because no documentary verification of nationality was required during the census. But Jews remain Jews in the Soviet Union whatever nationality they declare in the census. National status is governed by parentage and is permanently recorded in identity cards.

It seems to follow that three-quarters of a million Soviet Jews are ready to forgo their Jewish national identity. On the other hand, 2,268,000 have publicly avowed their attachment to the Jewish people. It is even more remarkable that, in a social and political climate in which Yiddish and Jewish culture are repressed, 472,000 Jews were not discouraged from declaring Yiddish as their mother-tongue.

The number of those who practise Judaism—given as 500,000 by Mr. Voshikov, the Soviet spokesman on religious affairs—together with the Yiddish-speaking Jews who are not religious, would perhaps suggest that for as much as one-third of the total Jewish population Jewish religion or culture is still a matter of living importance. It should be noted that religious Jews are not necessarily Yiddish-speaking. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, where orthodox Judaism is very strong, most Jews have never spoken Yiddish.

*

Hope that Jewish day schools in Victoria (Australia) will soon be attended by forty per cent of all Jewish children is expressed in the last Annual Report of the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies, one of the seven constituents of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, a member organization of the World Jewish Congress.

At present, 7,500 children of the Melbourne community of 32,000 Jews, about one half of the total Jewish population of Australia, are receiving Jewish education in one form or another. 1,340 are attending four day schools, 1,836 seven Sunday school centres, and 870 part-time weekly schools. Religious instruction classes are attended by 3,160 young people while 325 children are attending kindergartens. The Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies employs a total staff of 196 teachers.

*

Some 25,000 Jewish victims of Nazi persecution inhabiting 36 countries all over the world are annual beneficiaries of the allocation granted by the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, a special report issued by the Conference has declared. The report summarizes the activities of the Claims Conference over the last five years.

In those years the Conference allocations for the benefit of Nazi victims reached nearly $50,000,000 all told. The funds stem from the agreement signed in 1952 by the German Government, the Government of Israel, and the Claims Conference. Payments to the Conference were scheduled to reach $107,000,000 over a period of 12–14 years.

*

The American Jewish Committee is initiating a long-range series of studies financed by a $25,000 foundation grant to explore the effects of prejudice and discrimination upon the national economy and its manpower resources and other aspects of human relations. The grant was given by the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation and the research project will be known as the Maurice Falk Studies.

Wasted manpower, morale, and productivity resulting from discrimination cost American industry some $3,000,000 a year, according to a recent report of the President's Committee on Contract Compliance.

The research programme is the first major study project of the American Jewish Committee's new Institute of Human Relations.

*

The creation of a Centre for Higher Jewish Studies was approved at a recent meeting held at the Solvay Institute of Sociology, Brussels University.

The President of the Centre is to be M. Max Gottschalk, Scientific Adviser to the Institute and President of the Central Jewish Consistory of Belgium, and members of the Board will include a number of distinguished Belgian professors. A grant is to be provided by the Belgian Ministry of Public Instruction.

The Centre is to concentrate mainly on the scientific study of Judaism in the historical, religious, cultural, economic, and other fields. Jewish and non-Jewish scholars from Belgium and abroad, particularly Israel, will be invited to associate themselves with its endeavour.

*

The Bareli Prize, established in Israel in memory of the late Itzhak Bareli (Director of the Workers' Bank and one of the leading economists of the country), awarded annually for outstanding achievements in the field of sociological and economic research, was given for the year 1959–60 to Dr. Arieh Tartakower in recognition of his outstanding scholarly work, and especially for his book, *Jewish Colonization in the Diaspora*, published in 1959. It is the first publication of its kind in Hebrew, describing the attempts of many Jewish communities all over the world for the last 150 years to establish agricultural colonies and settlements outside Palestine. In 1958 Dr. Tartakower published *The Story of Colonization* of which *Jewish Colonization in the Diaspora* is a continuation.

*

On 18 December 1959, Professor Alfred Bonné, Head of the Economics Department of the Hebrew University, died in Jerusalem.

Professor Bonné was born on 16 November 1899, and after graduating in economics and sociology in Germany, where he was strongly influenced by Max Weber's work, he arrived in Palestine in 1925. On his arrival he immediately emphasized the need for continuous research for the understanding of the economic problems of the country and of the Middle East. He became an active member of the Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency, founded by Professor Ruppin, and was its head from 1943. In his works Professor Bonné always stressed the need to obtain basic economic data on the Middle Eastern countries, and especially on Israel, as well as the necessity for combining the economic and sociological approaches for a better understanding of the special economic structure of the region. While the first point was brought out in his books which describe the economy of these countries, e.g. *Palästina, Land und Wirtschaft* (1932), *Der Neue Orient* (1936), the combined economic and sociological approach was at the base of his two comprehensive studies of the Middle East, *The Economic Development of the Middle East* (1945) and *State and Economics in the Middle East* (1948). This approach is also evident in his last book, *Studies in Economic Development* (1957), in which the fruits of his studies of the general problems of economic development were collected together.

In his last book Professor Bonné specially stressed the importance of political thought and action in economic development. He also contributed greatly to the development of the economic profession in Israel, especially on the academic level. He was appointed lecturer in economics at the Hebrew University even before the founding of an economics department. When, in 1943, the first steps were taken towards establishing a Social Science Faculty, in which economics would be taught, Professor Bonné played a decisive part. He acted as Head of the Department of Economics. Throughout the various phases of his work Professor Bonné always showed a friendly concern for young colleagues and students. He also acted as Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Hebrew University. During the period of his appointment the Faculty greatly expanded and many fields of study were added to the curriculum.

Professor Bonné was specially active in dealing with the problems raised by the introduction of business administration as a university subject. It was always his belief that a vital connexion should exist between academic studies and the real world.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ATTAL, Robert. Librarian of the Ben-Zvi Institute, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Author of several papers on the demography and sociology of Tunisian Jewry. Now engaged on an investigation into the history and culture of the Jews of Tunisia.

BENTWICH, Norman, O.B.E., M.C., M.A. (Cantab.), Hon. LL.D., Hon. Ph.D. Formerly Professor of International Relations in The Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Attorney-General, Palestine (1918–31); Director of The High Commission for German Refugees (1933–36); Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors of The Hebrew University; etc. Author of *Philo-Judaeus, Josephus, England in Palestine, The Religious Foundations of Internationalism*, etc.

DUKER, Abraham G., B.A., Ph.D. President and Professor of Social Studies, The College of Jewish Studies, Chicago; Editor, *Jewish Social Studies*. Formerly Instructor in History, Hebrew Union School of Education; Lecturer in History, Columbia University, New School for Social Research. Author of works on the Situation of the Jews in Poland, Jewish Survival in the World Today, Emerging Culture Patterns in American-Jewish Life, etc. Professor Duker has published many studies on Polish-Jewish Relations and American-Jewish history and sociology; he has completed books on, among other subjects, the American-Jewish Community, Brandeis's Letters on Zionism, and the history of American Zionism.

GABRIEL, Kuno Ruben, B.Sc.(Econ.), Ph.D. Instructor in Statistics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Formerly Research Associate, Department of Statistics, University of North Carolina. Author of *Patterns of Nuptiality and Fertility in Israel* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1960, and various papers in the fields of demography and statistics. Dr. Gabriel's current research includes the analysis of patterns of dependence in multi-variate data and multi-variate analysis of variants.

HALEVI, Haim Shalom, M.A. Assistant Director-General (Planning), Ministry of Health, Jerusalem. Formerly Assistant Director, Hadassah Medical Organization, Jerusalem, and Assistant Director-General (Admin.), Ministry of Health, Jerusalem. Author of 'Anthropometry of Jewish Infants in Palestine', *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, new series, Vol. 9, No. 3; 'Divorce in Israel', *Population Studies*, 1957; 'The Incidence of Abortion Among Jewish Women in Israel', *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 48, No. 5, 1958; 'Health Problems in the Absorption of Mass Immigration', *Israel Medical Journal*, Vol. 18, Nos. 1 and 2, 1959; etc. At present Mr. Gabriel is working on problems of mental disease in Israel, infant mortality, and the demography of the Jewish people.

MAITLIS, Yaakov J., Ph.D. Lecturer and writer. Chairman of the Research Section of YIVO, London. Author of *Das Ma'asse-Buch, The Bodleian Manuscript 'Libes-Briv', a pre-Haskalah reform treatise* (Yiddish), *London Yiddish letters of the early 18th century, The Ma'aseh in Yiddish Ethical Literature*, etc. At present Dr. Maitlis is working on folklore, Yiddish history, and old Yiddish literature.

MANNHEIM, Hermann, O.B.E., Dr. Jur., Hon. LL.D. Hon. Director of Criminological Research Unit, London School of Economics; co-founder and co-editor, *British Journal of Delinquency*; President, Scientific Commission, International Society of Criminology; etc. Formerly Reader in Criminology, University of London; Judge of the Court of Appeal, Berlin, and Professor of Criminal Law, Berlin University (until 1933). Author of *The Dilemma of Penal Reform* (1939); *Social Aspects of Crime in England Between the Wars* (1940); *War and Crime* (1941); *Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction* (1946); *Juvenile Delinquency in an English Middletown* (1948); *Group Problems in Crime and Punishment* (1955); *Prediction Methods in Relation to Borstal Training* (Joint Author, 1955); *Pioneers in Criminology* (Editor, to be published in 1960); and many articles in various journals. Dr. Mannheim is now working on various projects for the Home Office, London, and the London School of Economics. He is preparing a new 'Library of Criminology', the first volume of which will appear in the course of 1960.

PATTERSON, David, M.A. Cowley Lecturer in Post-Biblical Literature, University of Oxford. Formerly Lecturer in Modern Hebrew, University of Manchester,

Lecturer at the Institute of Jewish Studies, Manchester, Principal of Habonim Institute, Manchester; Kennicott and Hebrew Fellow, Oxford. Author of numerous articles in learned journals between 1955 and the present; translator of M. Shamir, *The King of Flesh and Blood*, London, 1958. At present Mr. Patterson is Joint Editor of *Sifrut*, a journal devoted to contemporary Hebrew literature, and is engaged on research in the Hebrew literature of the 19th century.

POLLINS, Harold, B.Sc.(Econ.). Research Officer, Industrial Relations, National Coal Board, Britain. Formerly Senior Research Assistant, Department of Social Studies, University College of Swansea, University of Wales (1950–53) and Senior Research Assistant, Centre for Urban Studies, University College, London (1958–60). Author, with T. Brennan and E. W. Cooney, of *Social Change in S.W. Wales*, (1954) and articles in many periodicals and journals. Mr. Pollins has been concerned recently with the study of West Indians in London and with research on local government in the Greater London area.

SCHMELZ, Oskar, M.A., Ph.D. Chief, Department of Demography and Social Statistics, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, Israel. Author of many publications in the field of social statistics. At the moment Dr. Schmelz is working on a book, *The Development of the Jewish Population of Jerusalem during the Last Hundred Years*, the first volume of which is soon going to press.

TARTAKOWER, Arieh, Dr. Jur., Dr. Pol. Sci. Chairman, Israel Executive of the World Jewish Congress, Jerusalem. Formerly Ruppin Lecturer in Jewish Sociology, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Lecturer in the Sociology of the Jews, Institute of Jewish Studies, Warsaw, 1932–39. Deputy Director, Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York, 1940–46. Author of *Toldoth Tnuat ha-Avoda ha-Yehudit*, 3 vols, 1928–30; *Zarys Socjologji Zydostwa*, 1938; *Yidishe Emigrazie un Yidishe Emigrazie Politik*, 1939; *Nedudei ha-Yehudim ba-Olam*, 1947. Co-author (with Itzhak Schiper): *Zydzi w Polsce Odrodzonej*, 2 vols., 1939; (with Kurt R. Grossman) *The Jewish Refugee*, 1944; *In Search of Home and Freedom*, 1959; *Ha-Hevra ha-Yehudit*, 1958; *Ha-Hevra ha-Israelit*, 1959; etc. etc. See also 'Chronicle', page 134 above.