



ELSEVIER

Contents lists available at [ScienceDirect](https://www.sciencedirect.com)

International Journal of Intercultural Relations

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijintrel

The impact of globalized conflicts: Examining attitudes toward Jews among Britons in the political context of the war in Gaza

Simon Ozer^{a,*}, Milan Obaidi^{b,2}, Robin Bergh^{c,3}

^a Department of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences, Aarhus University, Denmark

^b Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

^c Department of Psychology, Uppsala University, Sweden

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:

Global event
Conflict
Antisemitism
Identity
Intergroup attitudes
Anti-Jewish

ABSTRACT

Reports have indicated an increase in anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitic incidents following the Hamas terrorist attack in Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza. In two studies ($N_{\text{Study1}} = 354$ and $N_{\text{Study2}} = 490$), we experimentally investigated the impact of priming with material referring to the war in Gaza on hostility toward Jews, and on antisemitism as well as other various ethnic groups (to determine whether this exposure specifically affected attitudes toward Jews or had a broader impact on ethnic attitudes in general). We also examined the indirect relationship between political orientation and anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism, through sociopolitical factors such as global identification, out-group identity fusion, social dominance orientation, and misanthropy. Our results showed an experimental effect of increased negative attitudes toward Jews, as well as toward Britons and Scandinavians, but did not reveal an increase in antisemitism. This effect was not replicated in Study 2, possibly due to reduced media attention. The indirect effects suggested that political orientation (left vs. right-wing) was positively associated with anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism through social dominance orientation. In contrast, conservative political orientation was negatively associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people. Our findings imply two distinct political pathways to antisemitism: one linked with classical political right-wing orientation and the other to a complex identity-based conflation of attitudes toward Israel with prejudice toward the Jewish ethnic group.

The impact of globalized conflicts: Examining the impact of the war in Gaza on attitudes toward Jews among Britons

Globalized interdependence and interconnectivity have transferred local conflicts to the global arena, affecting people across the globe in various ways. While local war and conflict are geographically bounded, global awareness and individual positioning are closely linked with local events through interconnectivity. For example, people across the globe are informed about the war in Ukraine through news outlets and social media. They position themselves on either side of the conflict, often based on political orientation and local and global discourses (Khaldarova & Panti, 2019). Other conflicts, such as the war in Sudan, do not receive the same media

* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: ozers@psy.au.dk (S. Ozer).

¹ ORCID: 0000-0002-4881-4201

² ORCID: 0000-0001-6416-1805

³ ORCID: 0000-0002-5041-7723

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184>

Received 23 October 2024; Received in revised form 13 March 2025; Accepted 5 April 2025

Available online 18 April 2025

0147-1767/© 2025 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

attention and global awareness, although these conflicts similarly result in devastating human consequences. Accordingly, globalized conflicts appear to prompt a sense of relevance, importance, and perhaps identity-based positioning among individuals across many countries (Castells, 2012).

With accelerating globalization people are affected by their affiliations with diverse social groups (e.g., ethnic, religious, cultural, and political), complex intergroup processes, and solidarity with groups they may not even belong to (Kunst et al., 2018). The Israel-Palestinian conflict is an asymmetric intergroup conflict, with Israel holding superior power over Palestine, which fosters group-based emotions in response to perceived threats (Fink et al., 2025). The Israel-Palestinian conflict has persisted for many years. The unprecedented terrorist attack by Hamas on Israel on October 7th, 2023 involved more than 3000 terrorists infiltrating Israel, killing approximately 1200 people and kidnapping 240. In response, Israel launched a bombing campaign and invaded Gaza with the declared objectives of freeing the hostages and eliminating Hamas. During this Israeli offensive, more than 48,000 Palestinians have been killed and numerous residential areas have been destroyed. Research has found that a central factor driving the justification of intergroup violence in Israel is perceived threat (Rozmann, 2025).

In relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict, large scale protests have been witnessed across the globe mostly to support the Palestinian cause or to denounce Israeli war efforts. During the first 20 days after the terror attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7th, 2023, and the subsequent war in the Gaza Strip, 4200 demonstrations were registered worldwide with 90 % being categorized as pro-Palestinian, 13 % as pro-Israel, and 2 % as neutral (Lay & Murillo, 2023). Although the protesters primarily focus on Israeli politics, there have been warnings about a rise in antisemitism in both Western and non-Western countries. Particularly in the United Kingdom, reported incidents of antisemitism increased by 589 % (i.e., 4103 incidents for 2023) after October 7th, 2023, compared to the same period the previous year (Sherwood, 2023).

In the present studies, we aimed to investigate the impact of the war in Gaza on attitudes toward Jews and antisemitism among Britons through experimental research. Additionally, besides this situational impact, we correlationally examined relevant individual differences that might explain prejudice toward Jews as an ethnic and religious group not directly involved in the conflict (although many Jews outside of Israel share an emotional bond to Israel as a Jewish majority country). Accordingly, we focus on how globalized conflicts can have an impact on ethnic groups far from the location of that conflict. Specifically, we examine the dynamic associations among individual factors such as political orientation, social dominance orientation, out-group identity fusion, misanthropy, and global identification regarding attitudes toward Jews and antisemitism among majority Britons.

Globalized identities and outgroup evaluations

Globalization, as increased connectivity across geographical distances, has shaped our sense of belonging and in turn which groups we identify with (e.g., global identification has become more prevalent; McFarland et al., 2019). Social identity describes the part of one's self-concept that derives from group membership, as well as the value and significance related to such membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This identity can lead to intergroup bias prompting in-group favoritism and out-group negativity. Social categories and group membership (e.g., Muslim, American, student) are employed to simplify and navigate the social environment. Through categorization and comparison, individuals can enhance their group's image while potentially stereotyping or even discriminating against others. Accordingly, group membership is a central aspect of humans' everyday lives and is fundamental to individuals' self-concept and social behavior. Global identification reflects affinity with humans as a superordinate ingroup (Reese et al., 2014) and it has been positively associated with dispositional empathy, values of care and justice, and support for reducing global suffering and inequality as well as negatively associated with right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (McFarland et al., 2019).

Globalization, out-group empathy, and collective action

Globalization refers to the intensification of global interactions and relationships across political, economic, technological, environmental, social, and cultural dimensions. This process causes distant events to impact the local context and vice versa. Essentially, it marks a transition from distinct yet interconnected local contexts to the creation of a shared global social and cultural space (Held & McGrew, 2007; Tomlinson, 1999). Numerous global events (e.g., climate crises and wars) can promote a sense of collectivity or group identity. Moreover, such events can be perceived as direct or indirect threats to one's sense of meaning and values, leading to feelings of uncertainty and anguish. These experiences of anguish and external threats have been found to strengthen social and cultural identities, supported by the threat-identity hypothesis stating that perceived threats to one's social group strengthen group identification and in-group cohesion as a psychological defense mechanism (Hogg, 2021).

The global spread of pro-Palestinian demonstrations and support indicated that people beyond the immediate and extended in-groups (e.g., Palestinians, Muslims, Arabs) were affected by the conflict. Emotional responses to the war in Gaza (e.g., anger, fear, and sadness) can spread through social networks and media resulting in moral outrage and empathy with the Palestinian people who are suffering. Centering on the importance of identity and morality, the Dual Chamber Model of Collective Action describes how people are motivated for collective action against perceived injustice and group-based anger (Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021). In this model, identification and morality (e.g., politicized identification) are mutually motivating collective action through secondary factors of emotional experience of group-based injustice and belief in efficacy to deal with the situation. Although this model for collective action was developed around local, offline circumstances, it can be applied to global issues as well (Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021; Reese et al., 2019).

Examining cases of collective mobilization among Arab Palestinians in Israel, Harboun et al. (2020) argue that, beyond immediate political opportunities, the perception of symbolic resources such as group solidarity and collective identity plays a crucial role in

determining whether a group engages in protest or remains inactive. Their findings suggest that when group leaders perceive the cost of inaction as high (e.g., due to threats to identity, political marginalization, or lack of recognition) mobilization efforts are more likely to persist, even in the face of structural barriers. Aligned with this, other research shows that perceived or actual similarities (e.g., religious or political belief, values, identity, cause) between individuals and victims of unjust treatment heighten feelings of injustice, evoke anger, and increase the likelihood of taking action against the perceived perpetrators (Belmi et al., 2015; Gordijn et al., 2001; Kunst et al., 2018), or even endorsing acts of violent extremism to defend those perceived to be suffering (Obaidi et al., 2018). Accordingly, although protestors across the world might not have a direct connection to the Palestinian people, they might identify with the Palestinian cause and by extension with a broader in-group or a global identification responding to perceived injustice.

Based on the experience of relative deprivation, perceiving an out-group experiencing injustice can activate people's ideological beliefs initiating collective action in support of this group (Kunst & Obaidi, 2020). Particularly, research has found that political left-wing are more likely to engage in violent protests in support of out-groups who are seen as oppressed as compared to similar out-groups who are not perceived as equally oppressed (Kunst et al., 2018). This concept pertains to both political and ideological values concerning intergroup relations and social hierarchies, as reflected in social dominance orientation. This orientation supports social hierarchy, emphasizing in-group superiority (Pratto et al., 2010). Such anti-egalitarianism can influence the extent to which individuals support oppressed low-status (i.e., Palestine) or high-status groups (i.e., Israel), as well as out-groups like ethnic Jews.

While the support of out-groups regarded as oppressed is often driven by similar factors as social identity, as well as perceptions of injustice, it can also be understood through Ideological Conflict Theory (ICT; Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017). ICT provides a framework for examining how deeply held ideological beliefs, including political orientation rather than just group identity, can motivate individuals to support distant conflicts like that of the Palestinians, especially when these beliefs align with broader narratives of oppression and resistance. However, it is essential to note that ICT also emphasises the role of identity in ideological conflicts. For example, those who identify with ideological groups that emphasise egalitarianism, equality, anti-imperialism, and anti-colonialism—values often associated with certain political orientations—may see those suffering under occupation as part of their ingroup in an ideological sense, even if they are ethnically, racially, culturally, or geographically distant (Skitka & Morgan, 2014). Aligning with this, individuals' support for Palestinians could be rooted in moral values such as care/harm and fairness/cheating. People who prioritize these moral foundations, which often correlate with specific political orientations, might be particularly supportive of Palestinians due to the perception of them being harmed and mistreated (Haidt, 2012).

The comprehensive impact of globalization can restructure individuals' sense of self and social identity, leading to salient global identification, which in research has been linked with greater propensity to cooperate at the global level (Grimalda et al., 2018) as well as engaging in the reduction of global suffering and inequality (McFarland et al., 2019). This global identification, coupled with moral and ideological values and political orientation, can amplify awareness of injustice or oppression of a disadvantaged group, thereby initiating support for the Palestinian cause, particularly among the left-wing political orientation. Moreover, identification with the Palestinian cause and people may be further strengthened through out-group identity fusion (Kunst et al., 2018), a visceral feeling of oneness that can extend to large groups of individuals with whom one has no personal relationships (Swann et al., 2012).

Globalized conflicts, social identities, and anti-Jewish hostility

Framing effects, global media and the consumption of news depicting events in geographically distant contexts, are assumed to affect social identities as well as individuals' evaluation of ethnic out-groups by activating stereotypes and prejudices (Kersten & Greitmeyer, 2023; Domke et al., 1999). Activation and deactivation of various social identities may affect out-group attitudes. For example, global identification may create sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, which in turn can lead to hostility toward Israel. Hence, for some, supporting Palestinians may be as much about rejecting what they regard as opposing ideologies (e.g., Zionism, militarism, or perceived oppression) as it is about supporting Palestinian rights. This hostility may then be stereotyped as anti-Jewish hostility, building on the assumption that Jewish people generally are supportive of Israeli politics.

Anti-Jewish hostility can reflect a form of out-group negativity or prejudice, which collectively and negatively shape one's understanding and perception of all Jews as a uniform group. These generalized out-group attitudes align with similar biases directed at other groups than Jews (e.g., Muslims or Americans). This anti-Jewish hostility can be understood as part of the broader concept of antisemitism that also includes conspiracy beliefs as well as negative perceptions of Judaism as a religion. Accordingly, antisemitism can include (1) Jewish conspiracy beliefs, portraying Jews as a secretive and powerful threat, (2) religious myths such as Jews being responsible for the killing of Jesus Christ or of murdering Christian children as well as (3) denial of Jewish victimhood, including the rejection of Holocaust remembrance (Bilewicz et al., 2013). A working definition of antisemitism suggests that "[a]ntisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews" (IHRA, 2016). Such perceptions can be exemplified by the belief that Jews regard themselves above other people or that they hold too much power in the business world. It can also be illustrated by the perception that Jews are more loyal to Israel than they are to the country they live in (ADL, 2019a, 2019b). Anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism have prevailed throughout history as a global phenomenon, accusing Jews of being a string-pulling global elite and trans-national community. People often adopt positions based on social identities and intergroup attitudes during social conflicts. Accordingly, ethnic, political, or national identity may become pronounced during conflicts and predict ingroup favoritism and out-group hostility (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

In terms of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, a broader identification encompassing the Palestinian people, and their suffering could activate hostility toward Israel as the oppressor in the conflict. Accordingly, Israel may be perceived as the advantaged and high-status party, while Palestine can be seen as both disadvantaged and oppressed, exemplified by issues such as Israeli settlements. For example, previous research shows that people often punish those who they perceive as harming and oppressing others, and this behaviour is

driven by a desire to uphold social norms of fairness and justice (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). A central question of this manuscript was to what extent beliefs and attitudes about Israel extrapolates to more (or less) anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism.

Although antisemitism has appeared in various forms throughout the history of Great Britain, it has also been considered a relative safe haven for Jews, particularly for those migrating from Eastern Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Britain played a significant role in the establishment of the State of Israel, having issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917, which expressed support for a Jewish national home. From 1920–1948, it administered Mandatory Palestine, during which it faced tensions with both Jewish and Arab populations (Cardaun, 2015). Currently in the United Kingdom, antisemitism is estimated to be prevalent among 10 % of the general population. It is more widespread among 18–34-year-olds (13 %) compared to those over 50 years old (8 %), among males more than females (16 % vs. 5 %), and more so among Christians than those reporting no religion or Atheists (8 % vs. 4 %). Within this evaluation, the perception of Jews being more loyal to Israel as compared to the United Kingdom is the most prevalent prejudice (ADL, 2019a, 2019b). Moreover, 65.8 % of Jewish college students in the United States of America reported feeling “very” or “extremely” emotionally safe before the terror attack on Israel on the 7th of October, 2023, as compared to 32.5 % after. Likewise, 73 % of the Jewish students had experienced some form of antisemitism since the beginning of the 2023–2024 school year as compared to 43.9 % the year before (ADL, 2023). While anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism have historically been more common on the political far right, the recent rise in antisemitism may be a prejudiced reaction to the war in Gaza among the political left.

Current studies

Based on the literature review, we test the following hypotheses through two studies: Hypothesis: The conflict in Gaza enhances antisemitism and hostile attitudes toward Jews among the majority population in the United Kingdom. We also explored how political orientation could be associated with anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism through global identification (Studies 1 and 2) as well as out-group identity fusion, social dominance orientation, and misanthropy (Study 2).

In the preregistered Study 1 (https://aspredicted.org/L8Q_4PV), we set out to investigate the effects of the War in Gaza on attitudes toward various ethnic groups (particularly Jews, although we include other ethnic groups to assess whether the priming effects are specific to Jews or generalizable across other groups or specific targeting Jews), antisemitism, and global identification. We compared the experimental effect of priming half of the participants with information concerning the war in Gaza with a control group. Accordingly, we conducted *t*-tests in SPSS to examine experimental differences concerning attitudes toward ethnic groups, antisemitism, and global identification. Moreover, as described in the preregistration, we estimated a model associating political orientation with attitudes toward Jews and antisemitism through global identification across the two experimental conditions. This model was tested with Mplus 8 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2011) using Maximum Likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. The following criteria were employed for evaluating model fit (Kline, 2015): Comparative Fit Index (CFI) $\geq .90$, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) $\leq .08$, and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) $\leq .08$ for acceptable fit. Criteria for invariance: $\Delta\chi^2$ should not be significant, $\Delta CFI \leq .010$; $\Delta RMSEA \leq .010$, and $\Delta SRMR \leq .010$.

In pre-registered Study 2, We replicate our study with a larger sample and include additional measures as potential indicators of individual differences relevant for understanding anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism. Specifically, we examine whether misanthropy (to assess whether the conflict is causing general pessimism about humanity or specific negativity toward Jews), social dominance orientation (to assess how group-based hierarchies and power dynamics influence anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism), and out-group fusion could be an explanation for the results in Study 1.

Study 1

Methods

Prolific was used for data collection utilizing an online self-report questionnaire. Data was collected on January 11th, 2024, which was the date that South Africa presented their accusations of genocide in Gaza at the International Court of Justice in Hague, Netherlands. We sampled only white Christians or atheists to reflect the majority population in the UK. Half of the participants were randomly primed by a text from newspapers describing allegations toward Israel concerning a potential genocide in Gaza. The text described how the UN warns of a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, with mass casualties and displacement, as the ICJ reviews genocide allegations against Israel. This group also viewed two press photos depicting the destruction of buildings and suffering caused by the war. The other half (the control group) was primed by a text and an image describing house cleaning (e.g., dusting and vacuuming; see [Supplementary Material](#)).

Using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009), we conducted a power analysis for a *t*-test to detect a difference between two independent means with a small sized effects ($d = .03$) and 80 % power. Our power analysis produced a minimum required sample size of $N = 352$ to detect significant effects (alpha level of .05).

Participants

The participants were 365 British adults. Three participants were excluded from this sample as they failed both attention checks. Additionally, eight participants were removed because they did not provide correct responses to the manipulation check (“A previous text in this questionnaire concerned”), indicating that they had not read the priming text. The final sample comprised 354 British adults. Participants’ ages ranged from 21 to 79 with a mean of 43.39 ($SD = 12.60$). Regarding gender, 50.6 % were male, 49.2 % were

female, and 0.3 % indicated other. Participants also reported their perceived socioeconomic background: 18.6 % below average, 19.5 % just below average, 35.6 % average, 18.9 % just above average, and 7.3 % above average.

Measurement

Besides providing background information, participants completed the following scales in the specified order (see [Supplementary Material](#) for all included items).

Political orientation was assessed by three items: general political views and social and political issues. Sample item reads: “When it comes to social issues, how liberal or conservative are you?” Answers were given on an 11-item Likert-Scale ranging from 0 (*Extremely liberal*) to 10 (*Extremely conservative*). Cronbach’s alpha was excellent, $\alpha = .92$.

Feeling thermometer scales assessed participants’ attitudes toward various ethnic groups: Native Americans, Jews, Sikhs, Britons, Arabs, and Scandinavians. The instructions read: “Please use the sliders to indicate how warm or cold you feel towards the following groups.” The feeling thermometer scale ranged from 1 (*very cold*) to 100 (*very warm*).

Global identification was assessed by the Global Social Identification Scale (Reese et al., 2014), which consists of five items based on the social identity approach. Sample items include “I feel strongly connected to the world community as a whole.” Responses were given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*Strongly disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly agree*). Cronbach’s alpha was excellent, $\alpha = .96$.

Antisemitism was measured through the Antisemitism Index (ADL, 2019a, 2019b) which consists of 11 items that tap into anti-semitic stereotypes. The sample item reads: “Jews have too much control over global affairs.” Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*Probably false*) to 7 (*Probably true*). Cronbach’s alpha was excellent, $\alpha = .95$.

Results

Political orientation was indicated before the priming. There was no significant difference between participants in the war in Gaza priming and the control priming regarding political orientation ($t(352) = -1.35, p = .179, d = .14$). In [Table 1](#), correlations and means are presented across the experimental priming. Comparing attitudes toward ethnic groups, antisemitism, and global identification indicated that participants primed with the war in Gaza held more negative attitudes toward Jews ($t(352) = -2.22, p = .027, d = .24$), Britons ($t(352) = -2.04, p = .042, d = .22$), and Scandinavians ($t(352) = -2.26, p = .024, d = .24$) but not vis-à-vis the other ethnic groups (native Americans, Sikhs, and Arabs). Moreover, there were no significant differences regarding antisemitism ($t(352) = 1.26, p = .21, d = .13$) and global identification ($t(352) = 0.36, p = .717, d = .04$).

As described in the preregistration an indirect effects model was tested to examine the association between political orientation and attitudes toward Jews and antisemitism through global identification. The model yielded acceptable fit to the data, $\chi^2(166) = 492.32, p < .001$; CFI = .936; RMSEA = .074, 95 % CI (.067;.082); SRMR = .047. with factor loadings ranging between .59 and 1.00. The results of this model (see [Fig. 1](#)) yielded significant associations between political orientation and attitudes toward Jews ($\beta = -.17, p = .001, 95\%CI = [-0.28; -0.07]$), antisemitism ($\beta = .25, p < .001, 95\%CI = [0.14; 0.35]$), and global identification ($\beta = -.26, p < .001, 95\%CI = [-0.36; -0.16]$). Moreover, global identification was significantly and positively related to attitudes toward Jews ($\beta = .15, p = .011, 95\%CI = [0.04; 0.26]$) but not antisemitism ($\beta = -.02, p = .680, 95\%CI = [-0.13; 0.08]$).

Evaluating the indirect effects within the model yielded one significant indirect path. Political orientation was associated with attitudes toward Jews ($\beta = -.04, p = .024, 95\%CI = [-0.07; -0.01]$), but not antisemitism ($\beta = .01, p = .682, 95\%CI = [-0.02; 0.03]$), through global identification.

We then tested whether the priming would affect this indirect-effects model. Model invariance across the two priming (i.e., Gaza war versus control) was examined by comparing constrained (regression paths constrained to be equal across priming groups) versus unconstrained models (regression paths freely estimated for both priming groups). The results yielded no significant decrease in model fit; consequently, invariance across the two models was established, $\Delta\chi^2(4) = 3.57, p > .468$; $\Delta CFI < .001$; $\Delta RMSEA = .001$; $\Delta SRMR = .001$.

Table 1
Correlations and means across experimental priming.

Variable	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	Gaza priming M (SD)	Control priming M (SD)
1. Political orientation		-.14	-.23**	-.28**	.23	-.40**	-.08	.26**	-.19*	4.97 (1.92)	5.24 (1.82)
2. Native Americans	-.12		.65**	.70**	.34**	.50**	.77**	-.16*	.26**	74.23 (21.53)	78.37 (19.79)
3. Jews	-.22 **	.70**		.78**	.39**	.67**	.70**	-.46**	.22**	71.49 (22.75)	76.63 (20.92)
4. Sikhs	-.29**	.71**	.83**		.27**	.67**	.75**	-.35**	.27**	74.34 (21.77)	78.29 (21.09)
5. Britons	.11	.46**	.46**	.36**		.26**	.49**	.05	.15	75.25 (19.36)	79.42 (19.14)
6. Arabs	-.40**	.56**	.66**	.71**	.31**		.51**	-.36**	.34**	61.65 (25.05)	64.59 (26.72)
7. Scandinavians	-.13	.68**	.65**	.71**	.49**	.47**		-.19*	.30**	79.39 (17.54)	83.59 (17.51)
8. Antisemitism	.26**	-.19*	-.51**	-.39**	-.03	-.39**	-.11		-.05	2.74 (1.37)	2.55 (1.33)
9. Global identification	-.34**	.15*	.15	.21*	.02	.29**	.09	-.13		3.90 (1.47)	3.84 (1.46)

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. Results above the diagonal reflects war in Gaza priming and below the control priming.




Fig. 1. The results of the indirect effects model. Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Preliminary discussion

Partly supporting our hypothesis, the results of Study 1 indicate that the war in Gaza can lead to negative attitudes toward Jews but not to antisemitism. This finding suggests that people might express negative feelings towards Jews in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without endorsing the broader stereotypes and conspiratorial beliefs that define antisemitism (Fiske, 2002). Moreover, negative attitudes toward a group do not always translate into overtly hostile stereotypes or beliefs, such as antisemitism (Fiske, 2002). Moreover, the priming affected attitudes toward Britons and Scandinavians. These effects could reflect a disappointment toward one's in-group (i.e., British historical ties with the conflict) and other high-status populations for not intervening in the conflict. This could relate to politically left-wing participants' low scores on social dominance orientation and rejection of social hierarchy (i.e., suppression of Palestine). Moreover, people can perceive themselves as fused with out-groups represented in distant locations through solidarity and sympathy (Kunst et al., 2018). Finally, the priming was associated with a more negative attitude toward all the assessed ethnic groups, although they were not all significant. This could suggest that the priming of the war in Gaza was causing misanthropy, reflecting aversion toward people in general, or perhaps, pessimism about humanity overall. As such, we included a measure of misanthropy as well as additional target groups in Study 2.

Study 2

In Study 2, we aimed for replicating and extending Study 1. Accordingly, the same priming was used and additional ethnic out-groups were added (i.e., Germans as high-status primarily pro-Israel, Irish as high-status primarily pro-Palestinian, and Japanese as high-status neutral). Moreover, additional measures were employed to investigate the association between the priming and anti-Jewish hostility, including social dominance orientation regarding group status, as well as misanthropy and out-group identity fusion (with either Palestinian or Israeli people).

Methods

Similar to Study 1, Prolific was used for data collection utilizing an online self-report questionnaire. The data for this study was collected on June 20, 2024, approximately six months after the data collection for Study 1. At this time, the conflict in Gaza had entered a less intense phase, yet it remained characterized by ongoing occupation and suppression and with Israeli hostages still in captivity. Concurrently, international attention was gradually shifting toward the potential escalation of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. We reached a representative sample from the United Kingdom. Half of the participants were randomly primed with a newspaper text and images describing allegations against Israel concerning a potential genocide in Gaza, similar to Study 1 but with updated casualty figures. The other half (the control group) was primed by a text and image describing house cleaning (see [Supplementary Material](#)).

Using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009), we conducted a power analysis for a F -test to detect a difference between two groups regarding nine response variables and including six predictors with a small sized effects ($f^2 = .012$) and 80 % power (Cohen, 1992). Our power

analysis produced a minimum required sample size of $N = 440$ to detect significant effects (alpha level of .05). We will aim for a total of at least 500 participants.

Participants

Participants were 517 citizens from the United Kingdom. The participants reflected a representative sample regarding gender, age, and political affiliation. Nine responses were removed for the analyses because they did not complete most of the questionnaire. Additionally, two responses were deleted because they failed both attention checks. We then removed participants who reflecting the out-groups we were assessing attitudes toward: six Muslim participants, three Buddhist, three Jewish, three Hindu, and one Sikh. The final sample comprised 490 participants, of which 52.0 % were female, 47.2 % were male, 0.6 % were other, and 0.2 % did not wish to answer the question. Regarding age, the sample ranged from 18 to 83 ($M = 46.47$, $SD = 15.95$). Regarding religion, 44.9 % identified as Christian, 38.1 % replied atheism, and 13.8 % identified as other. Participants reported the following perceptions of socio-economic standing: 17.0 % below average, 20.4 % just below average, 41.7 % average, 15.4 % just above average, and 5.5 % above average.

Measurement

We utilized the same measurements as in Study 1, with political orientation ($\alpha = .94$) and global identity ($\alpha = .95$) assessed before the priming. The last measure included before the priming was Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Ho et al., 2015). This measure was included to tap into how group-based hierarchies and power dynamics influence anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitic attitudes. Accordingly, preferences for maintaining or challenging group hierarchies may shape their views on Jews as a perceived powerful or subordinate group, potentially contributing to antisemitic beliefs, such as conspiracy theories about Jewish control or manipulation in global affairs. The scale consists of two domains of dominance and anti-egalitarianism. Dominance refers to a preference for group-based hierarchy and dominance, whereas anti-egalitarianism signifies a rejection of equality and support for hierarchy-maintaining social policies. The sample item reads: "An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom". The scale was answered through a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*Strongly disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly agree*). Cronbach's alpha was good, $\alpha = .89$.

After the priming, feeling thermometer scales assessed participants' attitudes toward the following ethnic groups: Native Americans, Jews, Sikhs, Britons, Arabs, Scandinavians, Germans, Irish, and Japanese ranging from 1 (*very cold*) to 100 (*very warm*). Antisemitism was again measured through the Antisemitism Index ($\alpha = .95$)

Misanthropy was measured using five items from Wuensch et al., (2002) work that tap into a general hatred, dislike, or distrust of the human species, human behavior, or human nature. A sample item includes: "Both history and current events show that human beings are basically wicked." The scale was answered using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Cronbach's alpha was acceptable, $\alpha = .77$.

Out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian or Israeli people was assessed through six items. Following the work of Kunst and colleagues (2018) regarding fusion with the out-group, the measure was adapted such that all items were framed towards the Palestinian or Israeli out-group (i.e., "I am one with the Palestinian people"; $\alpha = .93$ and "I have a deep emotional bond with the Israeli people"; $\alpha = .94$). The scale was answered through a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*Strongly disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly agree*).

Results

Similar to Study 1, political orientation was indicated before the priming. There was no significant difference between participants in the war in Gaza priming and the control priming regarding political orientation ($t(488) = -1.56$, $p = .119$, $d = .14$). In Table 2, correlations and means are presented across the experimental priming. Through a fully saturated path model, we examined the effects of the priming (war in Gaza vs. control) on attitudes toward various ethnic groups, antisemitism and misanthropy. The results yielded no significant effects of the priming regarding attitudes toward any group (all $ps > .15$, see supplemental materials for test details).


We then further examined the interaction among the individual difference variables (i.e., political orientation, global identification, social dominance orientation, out-group identity fusion, and misanthropy) and the situational priming effects on attitudes toward Jews and antisemitism through invariance testing. Specifically, we tested a model in which these individual difference variables predicted anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism. Invariance across the two priming conditions (i.e., Gaza war vs. control) was assessed by comparing a constrained model (with regression paths constrained to be equal across the priming groups) to a model in which one regression path was freely estimated at a time. None of the changes in model fit were significant (i.e., $\Delta CFI \geq .010$; $\Delta RMSEA \geq .010$, and $\Delta SRMR \geq .010$). Accordingly, no significant interaction effects were found.

As described in the preregistration, an indirect effects model was tested to examine the association between political orientation and attitudes toward Jews and antisemitism through global identification, social dominance orientation, out-group identity fusion (Palestinian and Israeli people), and misanthropy (see Fig. 2). The model yielded an acceptable fit to the data, $\chi^2(240) = 939.46$, $p < .001$; CFI = .915; RMSEA = .077, 95 % CI (.072;.083); SRMR = .072. with factor loadings ranging between .55 and .97. The results of this model (see Fig. 2 and Table 3) yielded significant associations between political orientation and antisemitism ($\beta = .32$, $p < .001$, 95 %CI = [0.21; 0.43]), global identification ($\beta = -.33$, $p < .001$, 95 %CI = [-0.42; -0.23]), social dominance orientation ($\beta = .32$, $p < .001$, 95 %CI = [0.48; 0.63]), and out-group fusion with Palestinian people ($\beta = -.47$, $p < .001$, 95 %CI = [0.55; 0.40]). Moreover, social dominance orientation ($\beta = -.17$, $p = .003$, 95 %CI = [-0.28; -0.06]) and misanthropy ($\beta = -.11$, $p = .011$, 95 %CI = [-0.19; -0.03]) were negatively and out-group identity fusion with the Israeli people positively ($\beta = .32$, $p < .001$, 95 %CI = [0.23; 0.40])

Table 2
Correlations and means across experimental priming.

Variable	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	Gaza priming M (SD)	Control priming M (SD)
1. Political orientation		-.32*	-.26**	-.16*	-.22**	.14*	-.37**	-.06	-.15*	-.22**	-.25**	.31**	.52**	-.07	-.45**	.01	4.95 (2.20)	5.27 (2.31)
2. Global identification	-.27**		.15*	.11	.27**	-.01	.37**	.08	.23**	.20**	.22**	-.05	-.28**	-.25**	.50**	.14*	3.80 (1.36)	3.43 (1.39)
3. Native Americans	-.17**	.30**		.62**	.68**	.43**	.53**	.69**	.59**	.64**	.64**	-.20**	-.34**	-.02	.23**	.02	73.27 (22.03)	74.71 (21.97)
4. Jews	-.13	.25**	.67**		.72**	.39**	.58**	.63**	.55**	.65**	.52**	-.52**	-.26**	-.13*	.10	.25**	69.02 (23.64)	70.31 (26.84)
5. Sikhs	-.26**	.25**	.68**	.75**		.42**	.69**	.72**	.66**	.61**	.59**	-.37**	-.35**	-.13*	.22**	.05	71.06 (22.97)	71.95 (24.71)
6. Britons	.05	.11	.42**	.48**	.49**		.29**	.56**	.40**	.49**	.36**	-.04	.04	-.28**	-.07	.08	78.77 (19.42)	79.33 (20.62)
7. Arabs	-.45**	.39**	.57**	.62**	.72**	.32**		.47*	.60**	.46**	.59**	-.42**	-.48**	-.19**	.44**	.15*	57.44 (27.53)	60.25 (29.68)
8. Scandinavians	-.09	.18**	.67**	.65**	.70**	.62**	.50**		.68**	.66**	.64**	-.19**	-.21**	-.08	.13*	-.02	77.51 (19.68)	79.06 (19.66)
9. Germans	-.23**	.32**	.67**	.62**	.72**	.43**	.65**	.71**		.54**	.74**	-.22**	-.32**	-.21**	.22**	.02	69.62 (22.38)	71.48 (23.11)
10. Irish	-.27**	.30**	.70**	.60**	.67**	.58**	.62**	.67**	.69**		.59**	-.26**	-.26**	-.14*	.18**	.05	76.79 (21.52)	78.09 (21.00)
11. Japanese	-.24**	.32*	.70**	.61**	.69	.44**	.62**	.72**	.73**	.69**		-.23**	-.39**	-.12	.21**	.03	72.15 (22.79)	74.23 (22.27)
12. Antisemitism	.25**	-.05	-.19**	-.55**	-.37**	-.15*	-.37**	-.22**	-.26**	-.23**	-.22**		.32**	.15*	-.16*	-.19**	2.89 (1.39)	2.85 (1.53)
13. SDO	.57**	-.26**	-.21**	-.20**	-.30**	-.10	-.43**	-.16*	-.28**	-.26**	-.29**	.27**		.02	-.39**	-.05	3.47 (0.82)	3.52 (0.81)
14. Misanthropy	.06	-.26**	-.07	-.17**	-.16**	-.25	-.20**	-.10	-.17**	-.19**	-.13*	.15*	.18**		-.06	-.06	3.53 (1.14)	3.38 (1.23)
15. Fusion Palestinian	-.48**	.44**	.26**	.16*	.29**	-.00	.51**	.12	.29**	.31**	.29**	.02	-.33**	-.04		.27**	3.41 (1.60)	3.31 (1.71)
16. Fusion Israel	.05	.23**	.20*	.38*	.21**	.13*	.20**	.20**	.17*	.11	.14**	-.24**	-.05	-.03	.27**		2.79 (1.45)	2.82 (1.47)

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. Results above the diagonal reflect war in Gaza priming and below the control priming. SDO = Social Dominance Orientation.



Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Fig. 2. The results of the indirect effects model from Study 2. Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Table 3

Path estimates and confidence intervals for the indirect effects model in Study 2.

	Attitude toward Jews			Antisemitism		
	β	p	95 % CI	β	p	95 % CI
<i>Direct effects:</i>						
Political orientation	-.09	= .150	-0.20; 0.03	.32	< .001	0.21; 0.43
Global identification	.08	= .158	-0.03; 0.18	.11	= .039	0.01; 0.21
Social dominance orientation	-.17	= .003	-0.28; -0.06	.15	= .005	0.05; 0.25
Out-group identity fusion (Palestine)	-.10	= .077	-0.21; 0.01	.17	= .002	0.06; 0.29
Out-group identity fusion (Israel)	.32	< .001	0.23; 0.40	-.23	< .001	-0.37; -0.19
Misanthropy	-.11	= .011	-0.19; -0.03	.13	= .004	0.04; 0.22
<i>Total and specific indirect effects:</i>						
Political orientation	-.07	= .135	-0.15; 0.02	-.04	= .359	-0.12; 0.05
Global identification	-.03	= .164	-0.06; 0.01	-.03	= .051	-0.07; 0.00
Social dominance orientation	-.10	= .003	-0.16; -0.03	.08	= .004	0.03; 0.14
Out-group identity fusion (Palestine)	.05	= .078	-0.01; 0.10	-.08	= .003	-0.14; -0.03
Out-group identity fusion (Israel)	.01	= .659	-0.03; 0.04	-.01	= .661	-0.04; 0.02
Misanthropy	.00	= .982	-0.01; 0.01	.00	= .982	-0.01; 0.01

Note. Significant effects are highlighted in bold.

linked with attitudes toward Jews. Global identification ($\beta = .11, p = .039, 95 \%CI = [0.01; 0.21]$), social dominance orientation ($\beta = .15, p = .005, 95 \%CI = [0.05; 0.25]$), out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people ($\beta = .17, p = .002, 95 \%CI = [0.06; 0.29]$), and misanthropy ($\beta = .13, p = .004, 95 \%CI = [0.04; 0.22]$) were positively and out-group identity fusion with the Israeli people negatively ($\beta = -.28, p < .001, 95 \%CI = [-0.37; -0.19]$) associated with antisemitism.

Evaluating the indirect effects within the model yielded three significant indirect paths. Political orientation was associated with attitudes toward Jews through social dominance orientation, political orientation was indirectly linked with antisemitism through both out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people and social dominance orientation (see Table 3 for statistical details).

Finally, we tested whether the priming would affect this indirect-effects model. Model invariance across the two priming conditions (i.e., Gaza war versus control) was then examined by comparing constrained (regression paths constrained to be equal across priming groups) versus unconstrained models (regression paths freely estimated for both priming groups). The results yielded no significant decrease in model fit; consequently, invariance across the two models was established, $\Delta\chi^2(9) = 18.18, p > .011; \Delta CFI < .001; \Delta RMSEA = .001; \Delta SRMR = .001$.

Preliminary discussion

The results of Study 2 did not replicate the experimental findings of Study 1, as the priming did not have any effect on attitudes toward Jews or antisemitism. Moreover, the priming did not appear to induce misanthropy. Our indirect effects model yielded important individual differences behind anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism, highlighting political orientation with right-wing orientation reporting more antisemitism and hostility toward Jews. This association was mediated positively by social dominance orientation. Additionally, left-wing political orientation was indirectly associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with Palestinians.

Discussion

Despite the reported increase in antisemitic incidents following the terror attack in Israel on the 7th of October 2023, and the subsequent Gaza war (Sherwood, 2023), our studies did not exclusively support an assumption of a general rise in anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism. In Study 1, we observed increased hostility toward Jews and other high-status groups, but these were not replicated in Study 2. This discrepancy may be due to a decrease in global attention as well as the focus moved to the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, which might have evoked changed sympathies. Another explanation could be that the first experiment was conducted during a time when the conflict was highly salient due to the international attention surrounding South Africa's accusations of genocide at the International Court of Justice. This could have heightened emotional responses and made participants more susceptible to priming effects, leading to increased anti-Jewish hostility. However, by June 20th, 2024, when the second experiment was conducted, the salience of the war might have been diminished, reducing the emotional response, which may explain the lack of the experimental effect (Gross & Brewer, 2007). Likewise, Britons might have become desensitized over time due to repeated news about the war, leading to a reduced emotional reaction (Slovic, 2007). Consequently, our studies point toward more classical predictors of antisemitism and hostility toward Jews, namely individual differences in political orientation together with social dominance orientation and out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people. Accordingly, these studies can be discussed regarding the impact of globalized conflicts as well as the nature of anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism.

Globalized conflicts and identity dynamics

According to extended models of social identity approaches to collective action (Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021), an identity centered on the Palestinian cause may emerge through global connectivity, driven by anger and perceived injustice, and sustained by a sense of collective efficacy. Accordingly, this suggests that collective activism could potentially lead to a change in the Western countries' approach to the Gaza conflict. However, the effects of this globalized mobilization may be temporary. The findings in the present studies suggest that the effects of globalized mobilization for collective action may be temporary and subject to fluctuation over time. This temporal variability was observed through inconsistencies in the experimental effects across the two timepoints in Studies 1 and 2. Several factors may contribute to these temporal changes in collective action mobilization. 1) As global events unfold, media attention can rapidly shift to other prominent issues. For instance, the emergence of significant political events (e.g., the presidential election in the United States). 2) The nature and focus of conflicts themselves can change over time. What begins as a localized issue may evolve into a broader regional conflict (e.g., the war between Israel and Hitzbollah including the role of Iran), necessitating a reevaluation of collective action strategies and goals.

The identifications with the Palestinian cause can become so strong that they lead to a visceral feeling of oneness with the group in which the boundaries between the personal and social self become permeable, termed identity fusion (Swann et al., 2012). In contemporary interconnectivity, more identities become available and relevant and, in some situations, individuals can identify with a group that they do not originally belong to or with a social movement for collective action, which can result in out-group fusion as a sense of becoming one with that group (Kunst et al., 2018). Such out-group fusion can initiate extreme attitudes and engagement with conflicts that do not immediately appear relevant in one's local context. Historical examples include volunteers defending the Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War and foreign fighters joining ISIS to fight for an Islamic caliphate. In the present study, global identity as well as out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people emerged as significant regarding antisemitism. By contrast, global identification in Study 1 was negatively associated with anti-Jewish hostility, reflecting the dual nature of this concept: identification with all of humanity (including Jews) and awareness of perceived injustice and suffering worldwide and, consequently, a reaction to this. Additionally, concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict, political left-wing identities among Americans have been associated with a willingness to engage in protest on behalf of Palestinians through fusion out-group fusion (Kunst et al., 2018). This could be related to our finding of an indirect effect associating political left-wing with antisemitism through identity fusion with the Palestinian people.

As people in globalized societies may hold multiple group identities, not all of these identities may become salient due to global events such as the war in Gaza. For example, research found that global identification, but not national identity, appeared to become salient with the priming of the war in Ukraine among the Danish population (Ozer et al., 2024). However, this perception of a foreign war reflected a direct threat (i.e., the possibility of war or conflict in other parts of Europe). In contrast, the war in Gaza is not perceived as a direct threat to the white majority population in the United Kingdom. This difference in perceived threat highlights how distinct identities can trigger different emotional responses and ways of thinking in various situations. For instance, while the war in Ukraine might invoke feelings of solidarity and concern through a global identity, the war in Gaza may activate other identities (i.e., global, out-group fusion, or political), leading to diverse reactions. The salience of identity is crucial for reactions to perceived social injustice,

as it can shape how individuals and groups respond to such events. Moreover, group permeability (i.e., where individuals from disadvantaged groups perceive the possibility of moving to an advantaged group) can lead to more individualistic responses rather than collective action (Lalonde, Silverman, 1994). Accordingly, when mobility is perceived as limited, collective identity may become more salient, driving collective action. Understanding these identity dynamics is crucial for comprehending how different populations respond to global conflicts and social injustices. However, social dominance orientation was positively associated with anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism in Study 2, reflecting how such attitudes might be relevant among other groups (e.g., the political right wing) beyond those emerging around the Palestinian cause.

Drivers of anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism

In the present studies, we only found a significant impact of priming in Study 1 regarding anti-Jewish hostility. However, our indirect effect models reveal the different orientations and identities associated with antisemitism. Specifically, the political left-wing orientation appears less associated with antisemitism than the classical predictors of the political right and social dominance orientation.

Anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism are ancient phenomena with various manifestations; a new form of antisemitism has emerged concerning the question of Israel (Cardaun, 2015; Enstad, 2024). The intertwined attitudes toward the state of Israel and Jews, in general, appear to be connected with the ongoing conflict. However, contemporary attitudes toward Israel and Jews are convoluted, as they can be driven by political orientation. Classical hostility toward Jews is often found among the far-right. Still, far-right evangelical groups in the United States of America have provided strong support for Israel and Jews as the chosen people of God, cumulating criticism of Israel among liberals (Inbari et al., 2021). Accordingly, both right- and left-wing political orientations can be associated with hostility toward Jews, which may transfer into generalized antisemitism. This includes conspiracy beliefs about Jews secretly controlling or manipulating world events. In our Study 2, we found connections between right-wing political orientation, social dominance orientation, identity fusion with the Palestinian people, and global identification with antisemitism. Both ends of the political spectrum may harbor beliefs about Jewish dominance in global affairs, though such beliefs on the left may particularly relate to opposition to the widespread support for the state of Israel. A study on antisemitism in the United States found that while it exists on both the extreme political left and right, it was far more prevalent on the right (Hersh & Royden, 2022). In support of this, across European countries, xenophobia emerged as a strong predictor of antisemitism (Kovács & Fischer, 2021).

The convoluted and intertwined attitudes toward the state of Israel and Jews as an ethnic group reflect how left-wing criticism of Israel may sometimes translate into a hostile stances toward Jews in general. Moreover, Christian right-wing groups hold positive attitudes toward the state of Israel (e.g., partly because of the importance Israel and Jerusalem plays in Christian eschatology). Research has found that Christian nationalists score higher on antisemitism because they are invested in the social dominance of Christians. Indeed, Dennen and Djupe (2023) found social dominance orientation to be strongly associated with antisemitism among a Christian majority sample in the United States of America. Additionally, they found that social dominance orientation and Christian nationalism can act as substitutes, meaning that even individuals with low social dominance orientation levels are likely to exhibit similar levels of antisemitism as those with high social dominance orientation, given they are strong Christian nationalists. This is reflected in our indirect effects model results highlighting political right-wing orientation and in Study 2, social dominance orientation is strongly associated with hostility toward Jews and antisemitism. Nevertheless, social dominance orientation was not associated with antisemitism in a German study, highlighting authoritarianism's importance (Frindte et al., 2005). This might suggest a significant sociohistorical effect, where the patterns in the United Kingdom resemble those of the United States of America.

Limitations

The present research should be considered in the light of several limitations. First, participants were recruited through Prolific, and these sampling methods have obvious limitations. Although, a strength of our Study 2 was that it comprised a representative sample regarding gender, age, and political affiliation, the people participating thought such panels might not reflect the general population. Thus, our conclusions of the paper are restricted to the samples we report here. Second, we did not examine the degree to which participants were exposed to media coverage (and which media) concerning the war in Gaza. Media exposure could be an important predictor of how participants respond to priming (i.e., such exposure could be assumed to be less at the time of Study 2 than Study 1). Third, beyond priming effects, our study may also capture confirmation bias if participants unconsciously seek information that aligns with their preexisting attitudes, potentially causing an inflation of the results (e.g., effect sizes; Kassin et al., 2013). Fourth, our indirect effect models are estimated using cross-sectional data, which prevents us from reaching causal conclusions. Fifth, our measure of anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism were manifest, whereas the reports of an increase in antisemitic incidents may refer to latent expressions of antisemitism (e.g., subtle and diffuse antipathy against Jews; Frindte et al., 2005).

Conclusion

Overall, our studies suggest that the war in Gaza may have increased anti-Jewish hostility in the United Kingdom, but not antisemitism. Additionally, the conflict does not appear to have promoted long-lasting increases in hostility toward Jews, given the different results in Study 1 and 2. Our findings indicate that classical individual difference predictors, such as right-wing political orientation, social dominance orientation, and identity fusion with the Palestinian cause, as well as global identification, are associated with both anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism in the United Kingdom. Specifically, our study suggests two distinct pathways to

antisemitism: one associated with support for the Palestinian people and cause and hostility toward Israel, and the other, more prominent in our results, linked to right-wing political orientations and social hierarchies that favor the ingroup (majority) and lead to out-group (minorities) hostility. Overall, while we find some situational effects of the ongoing conflict and the importance of individual differences in relation to anti-Jewish hostility and antisemitism, further research is needed to understand the broader impact of global conflicts on out-group hostility.

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Ozer Simon: Writing – original draft, Project administration, Methodology, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization. **Bergh Robin:** Writing – review & editing, Methodology, Conceptualization. **Obaidi Milan:** Writing – review & editing, Methodology, Conceptualization.

Appendix A. Supporting information

Supplementary Material associated with this article can be found in the online version at [doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2025.102184).

References

- ADL (2019). The antisemitism index. Retrieved from (<https://global100.adl.org/about>).
- ADL (2019). Campus antisemitism: A study of campus climate before and after the Hamas terrorist attacks. Center for Antisemitism Research. Retrieved from: (<https://www.adl.org/resources/report/campus-antisemitism-study-campus-climate-and-after-hamas-terrorist-attacks>).
- ADL (2023). Audit of Antisemitic Incidents 2023. Center on Extremism, New York, USA.
- Agostini, M., & van Zomeren, M. (2021). Toward a comprehensive and potentially cross-cultural model of why people engage in collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of four motivations and structural constraints. *Psychological Bulletin*, *147*(7), 667–700. <https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000256>
- Belmi, P., Barragan, R. C., Neale, M. A., & Cohen, G. L. (2015). Threats to social identity can trigger social deviance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *41*, 467–484. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215569493>
- Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M., Kofta, M., & Wójcik, A. (2013). Harmful ideas, the structure and consequences of anti-semitic beliefs in Poland. *Political Psychology*, *34*(6), 821–839. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12024>
- Brandt, M. J., & Van Tongeren, D. R. (2017). People both high and low on religious fundamentalism are prejudiced toward dissimilar groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *112*(1), 76–97. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000076>
- Cardaun, S.K. (2015). Countering contemporary antisemitism in Britain: Government and Civil Society Responses Between Universalism and Particularism. Brill.
- Castells, M. (2012). *Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the internet age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Cohen, J. (1992). Statistical power analysis. *Current directions in psychological science*, *1*(3), 98–101.
- Dennen, J., & Djupe, P. A. (2023). Are Christian nationalists antisemitic and why? *Social Science Quarterly*, *104*(3), 299–314. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13248>
- Domke, D., McCoy, K., & Torres, M. (1999). News media, racial perceptions, and political cognition. *Communication Research*, *26*(5), 570–607.
- Enstad, J. D. (2024). Facing antisemitism in Europe: Individual and country-level predictors of Jews' victimization and fear across twelve countries. *Social Forces*, *soae091*.
- Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A. G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using G* Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. *Behavior Research Methods*, *41*, 1149–1160. <https://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149>
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. *Nature*, *415*, 137–140. <https://doi.org/10.1038/415137a>
- Fink, O., Hasan Aslih, S., & Halperin, E. (2025). Two paths to violence: Individual versus group emotions during conflict escalation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *28*(2), 355–376. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13684302241277377>
- Fiske, S. T. (2002). What we know about bias and intergroup conflict, the problem of the century. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *11*(4), 123–128. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00183>
- Frindte, W., Wettig, S., & Wammetsberger, D. (2005). Old and new anti-semitic attitudes in the context of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation—two studies in Germany. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *11*(3), 239–266. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327949pac1103_3
- Gordijn, E. H., Wigboldus, D., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2001). Emotional consequences of categorizing victims of negative outgroup behavior as ingroup or outgroup. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *4*, 317–326. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430201004004002>
- Grimalda, G., Buchan, N., & Brewer, M. (2018). Social identity mediates the positive effect of globalization on individual cooperation: Results from international experiments. *PLoS ONE*, *13*(12), Article e0206819. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206819>
- Gross, K., & Brewer, P. R. (2007). Sore losers: News frames, policy debates, and emotions. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, *12*(1), 122–133. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1081180X06297231>
- Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. Pantheon Books.
- Harboun, I., Ben-Porat, G., & Mizrahi, S. (2020). Collective action of ethno-national minority groups and the cost of inaction: Arab Palestinians in Israel. *Identities*, *27*(5), 574–594. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2019.1608033>
- Held, D., & McGrew, A. G. (2007). *Globalization/anti-globalization: Beyond the great divide*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Hersh, E., & Royden, L. (2022). Antisemitic Attitudes Across the Ideological Spectrum. *Political Research Quarterly*, *76*(2), 697–711. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129221111081>
- Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Kteily, N., Sheehy-Skeffington, J., Pratto, F., Henkel, K. E., Foels, R., & Stewart, A. L. (2015). The nature of social dominance orientation: Theorizing and measuring preferences for intergroup inequality using the new SDO7 scale. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *109*(6), 1003–1028.
- Hogg, M. A. (2021). Uncertain self in a changing world: A foundation for radicalisation, populism, and autocratic leadership. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *32*(2), 235–268.
- IHRA. (2016). Working definition of antisemitism. *International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance*. Retrieved from: (<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>).
- Inbari, M., Bumin, K. M., & Byrd, M. G. (2021). Why do evangelicals support Israel? *Politics and Religion*, *14*(1), 1–36.
- Kassin, S. M., Dror, I. E., & Kukucka, J. (2013). The forensic confirmation bias: Problems, perspectives, and proposed solutions. *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition*, *2*(1), 42–52. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.01.001>
- Kersten, R., & Greitemeyer, T. (2023). Global news – global identity? The relationship between media consumption, perception of identity, and ethnocentrism. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *53*, 39–51. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12924>

- Khaldarova, I., & Pantti, M. (2019). Fake news: The narrative battle over the Ukrainian conflict. In S. Allan, C. Carter, S. Cushion, L. Dencik, I. Garcia-Blanco, J. Harris, R. Sambrook, K. Wahl-Jorgensen, & A. Williams (Eds.), *The Future of Journalism: Risks, Threats and Opportunities* (pp. 228–238). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429462030>.
- Kline, R.B. (2015). *Principles and practice of structural equation modeling*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Kovács, A., & Fischer, G. (2021). Antisemitic prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European countries. Action and Protection League. Budapest. (<https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-2408>).
- Kunst, J. R., Boos, B., Kimel, S. Y., Obaidi, M., Shani, M., & Thomsen, L. (2018). Engaging in extreme activism in support of others' political struggles: The role of politically motivated fusion with out-groups. *PLoS ONE*, *13*(1), Article e0190639. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190639>
- Kunst, J. R., & Obaidi, M. (2020). Understanding violent extremism in the 21st century: the (re) emerging role of relative deprivation. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *35*, 55–59.
- Lalonde, R. N., & Silverman, R. A. (1994). Behavioral preferences in response to social injustice: The effects of group permeability and social identity salience. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *66*(1), 78. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.66.1.78>
- Lay, T., & Murillo, C. (2023). Infographic: Global Demonstrations in Response to the Israel-Palestine Conflict. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). Retrieved from: (<https://acleddata.com/2023/11/07/infographic-global-demonstrations-in-response-to-the-israel-palestine-conflict/>).
- McFarland, S. G., Hackett, J. D., Hamer, K., Katarska-Miller, I., Malsch, A. M., Reese, G., & Reysen, S. (2019). Global human identification and citizenship: A review of psychological studies. *Political Psychology*, *40*(1). <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12572>
- Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (2011). *Mplus user's guide* (Sixth Edition., 1998. Los Angeles, US: Muthén & Muthén.
- Obaidi, M., Bergh, R., Sidanius, J., & Thomsen, L. (2018). The mistreatment of my people: Victimization by proxy and behavioural intentions to commit violence among Muslims in Denmark. *Political Psychology*, *39*(3), 577–593. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12435>
- Ozer, S., Gamsakhurdia, V. L., & Schwartz, S. J. (2024). Investigating the Complexity of Cultural Identities in Globalizing Societies. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*.
- Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., & Levin, S. (2010). Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: Taking stock and looking forward. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *17*(1), 271–320. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280601055772>
- Reese, G., Proch, J., & Cohrs, J. C. (2014). Individual differences in responses to global inequality. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, *14*, 217–238. <https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12032>
- Reese, G., Rosenmann, A., & Cameron, J. E. (2019). *The psychology of globalization: Identity, ideology, and action*. Academic Press.
- Rozmann, N. (2025). Understanding intergroup violence justification: the role of ethnicity and perceived threat in Israeli society. *Frontiers in psychology*, *16*, Article 1508324. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1508324>
- Sherwood, H. (2023). *Huge rise in antisemitic abuse in UK since Hamas attack, says charity*. The Guardian. Retrieved from: (<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2024/feb/15/huge-rise-in-antisemitic-abuse-in-uk-since-hamas-attack-says-charity>).
- Skitka, L. J., & Morgan, G. S. (2014). The social and political implications of moral conviction. *Political Psychology*, *35*, 95–110. (<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43783790>).
- Slovic, Paul (2007). If I look at the mass I will never act: Psychic numbing and genocide. *Judgement and Decision Making*, *2*(2). : 1-17. *Judgment and Decision Making*, *2*(2), 1-17.
- Swann, W. B., Jr., Jetten, J., Gómez, Á., Whitehouse, H., & Bastian, B. (2012). When group membership gets personal: A theory of identity fusion. *Psychological Review*, *119*(3), 441–456. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028589>
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Tomlinson, J. (1999). *Globalization and culture*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Wuensch, K. L., Jenkins, K. W., & Poteat, G. M. (2002). Misanthropy, idealism and attitudes towards animals. *AnthrozoöStates*, *15*(2), 139–149.