

# **JEWS AND JEWISH EDUCATION IN GERMANY TODAY**

## **Volume 1: The Research**

*Principal Investigator*

**Eliezer Ben-Rafael**

*Tel-Aviv University*

*Investigators*

**Olaf Glöckner (Potsdam University)**

**and Yitzhak Sternberg (Open University; Beit Berl College)**

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## Preface

This is a research report about a large-scale investigation of the Jewish population of Germany, the major current challenges facing it, and its educational institutions. The project was carried out at the initiative of the L.A. Pincus Fund for Jewish Education in the Diaspora and in cooperation with the following foundations: Chais Family Foundation, The Pears Foundation, Schusterman Foundation – Israel, Edmond J. Safra Philanthropies, Severyn Ashkenazy, and The Rosalind & Arthur Gilbert Foundation.

**Volume 1**, as summarized in the opening Executive Summary, first presents the survey that was undertaken among close to 1,200 respondents throughout Germany; the various sections focus on the following: a general characterization of this population, a systematic analysis of the attitudes of its new members, a comparison between veterans and newcomers, and data that particularly concern the issue of Jewish education.

During this research, we also investigated and analyzed the general landscape of Germany's Jewish educational institutions, before conducting a content analysis of individual interviews of leading figures of Germany's Jewish population that focused on how they perceive the present-day challenges of this Jewry.

These different facets of the research yielded general conclusions presented in the concluding chapter.

**Volume 2** presents in full the texts of the 23 interviews of leading figures interviewed for our research.

**Volume 3** consists of the survey questionnaire in the three languages used, the sampling procedures, the series of tables obtained from the survey, and a comprehensive picture of Jewish educational institutions operating today in Germany.

## Executive Summary

1. This is a research report about a large-scale investigation of the Jewish population of Germany, its major current challenges, and its educational institutions. The project was carried out at the initiative of the L.A. Pincus Fund for Jewish Education in the Diaspora and in cooperation with the following foundations: Chais Family Foundation, The Pears Foundation, Schusterman Foundation – Israel, Edmond J. Safra Philanthropies, Severyn Ashkenazy, and The Rosalind & Arthur Gilbert Foundation.

The research team that was formed included, as well as the principal investigator, a researcher from Israel, and another from Potsdam University.

The research tools included:

- (a) questionnaires that were drafted in English, then translated into German and Russian;
- (b) a sample large enough to include the major milieus of the Jewish population of Germany;
- (c) the defining of a group of leading figures in Germany's Jewry, representing most movements and organizations at work in the country, who served as privileged informants about "burning issues" on the agenda of Jewry in Germany;
- (d) a comprehensive mapping of the institutions of Jewish education throughout Germany.

These tasks were undertaken during 2008-2009. At all stages, we deeply appreciated the willingness and readiness of the L.A. Pincus Fund to support the work.

2. In this report, we present all the material collected, our interpretation of the major aspects investigated, and the conclusions that we reached which might be useful for all entities interested in the practical significance of the data.

This report is composed of three volumes, each of which addresses a distinct part of our work:

*Volume 1* presents first the survey that was undertaken among 1200 respondents throughout Germany; its results yielded:

- a general characterization of this population
- a systematic consideration of its new members
- a comparison between veterans and newcomers
- survey data that concern the issue of Jewish education
- an overview and general analysis of Germany's Jewish educational institutions
- a presentation of how leading figures perceive the present-day challenges of this Jewry
- general conclusions.

*Volume 2* presents the texts of 23 interviews with leading figures interviewed for our research who indicate what they, as privileged informants, see as “burning issues” of present-day Jewry in Germany.

*Volume 3* presents the tools of research: the different linguistic versions of our survey questionnaire, the sampling procedures, and the sample’s composition itself, as well as a comprehensive presentation of the survey data. Last but not least, this volume presents our comprehensive mapping of Jewish educational institutions in Germany at the present time.

### **3. The New Jewry of Germany**

(a) **Characterization.** The Jewish population in Germany has undergone an enormous increase in the past 30 years. A large body of knowledge has recently been created by researchers interested in this new Jewry but, as a rule, they have not yielded a comprehensive perspective on the developments and internal Jewish dynamics. These are the goals that this research tackled, with special attention to future perspectives, and therefore, to the state of Jewish education today.

Russian-Speaking Jews (RSJs) now form the overwhelming majority of Germany’s Jewry. Many of that majority have resided there for less than a decade, are not German citizens, and do not know the language fluently. Hence some language barrier exists between many RSJs and Veteran Jewish Residents in Germany (Vets) even though it does not appear to be too rigid. The general age-distribution attests to a relatively large number of elderly people. From a socioeconomic point of view, and quite unusually for a Jewish population, a relatively large percentage consists of retired or unemployed people, and the majority even evaluate their income as below the average in the German society.

For the most part, Jews in Germany do not favor orthodox Judaism but neither are they overwhelmingly secular. They are best characterized by the notion of Jewish pluralism, and can be divided into Orthodox, Ultra-Orthodox, Liberals (Conservative and Reform congregations), more or less traditional Jews, and secular individuals. The large majority are Halachic Jews. However, people of mixed origin, who are married to, or living with non-Jewish spouses or companions, constitute a substantial part of this population.

(b) **Identity Orientations.** The prevailing allegiances of Jews in this country are definitely directed at Jewishness and solidarity with Israel, though they do not exclude some feelings for their country of origin, and for the country where they settled. Jewishness, moreover, is defined here in reference to both religious principles and sociocultural particularism. Moreover, both halachic influences and non-halachic cultural criteria appear in issues relating to “who is a Jew.” Related to these allegiances, most respondents have become members of Jewish communities, but are less eager to join other Jewish organizations.

Socially, most respondents describe relations between RSJs and Vets in terms of both tensions and cooperation, while a minority speak of irreconcilable alienation. Moreover, many respondents (RSJs) mention that they still have ongoing contacts with relatives and friends who either remained in their former country, or emigrated to Israel. In this latter respect, there is no difference between RSJs and Vets. In this context, it is noteworthy that despite the difficult socioeconomic conditions of many of them, the prevailing tendency

among respondents in terms of appreciating Germany society is positive – despite an awareness of genuine and unsolved problematic aspects.

#### 4. Inner Divisions of RSJs

(a) **The Criteria of Divisions** - RSJs, who currently comprise 90% of Jews in Germany, can be divided according to religiosity, length of time in the country, areas of settlement, size of communities, origins, income and age. Some of these features correlate in some ways with respondents' attitudes. We cite here only the most notable.

(1) *Jewish Pluralism* - As could be expected, Orthodox respondents show stronger allegiance to Judaism, the Jewish people, and Israel than the other religiosity categories. They are also more involved in Jewish institutions, and committed to the Jewish education of their children. More than secular Jews, they seek a milieu that is Jewish, and also tend to have RSJs as friends. On the other hand, secular respondents appreciate Germany and the German culture more than the Orthodox, and also feel more attached to their country of origin.

(2) *Exogamy versus Endogamy* - Offspring of homogeneous families, in general, feel more Jewish, express stronger belongingness to the Jewish people, and show more solidarity with Israel than the offspring of exogamous families. They number relatively more Orthodox people, and also tend to be more sensitive to unpleasant aspects of life in Germany. On the other hand, the offspring of mixed families are somehow more bound to the former country, and the same applies to RSJs who live with a non-Jewish partner, in comparison with those living with a Jewish one.

(3) *The Age Factor* - In comparison to the younger strata, the older ones show a stronger sense of belonging to the Jewish people, and solidarity with Israel. Like the younger ones, though, they appreciate what they find in Germany, especially in the domain of culture, the political regime, and welfare. Moreover, they continue to use Russian in most areas of activity and maintain more contacts than the younger with their former country. The younger attach more importance to Jewish education, try to provide their children with it, and themselves attend synagogue services more often. On the other hand, German is gaining ground among them, and they feel a stronger sense of belonging to German society.

(4) *Length of Stay* - Length of stay influences attitudes in the same direction as age but in the contrary sense: the longer the length of stay, the more individuals tend to adopt attitudes typical of the younger. Hence, the more veteran RSJs use German more than the less veteran – even though Russian is still dominant in several spheres. They also feel a stronger sense of belonging to German society. Length of stay also diminishes the relation to the old country.

(5) *Region of Residence and Size of Community* - Residents in smaller communities of the East tend to be less veteran than RSJs in the other regions. They are less committed to Judaism, the Jewish People and Israel, and use Russian more. Unemployment is also more acute here than in Berlin or Western cities. At the same time, members of large communities show greater attachment to the German society while in Berlin, RSJs are also more in contact with non-Jewish Russian-speakers.

## **(5) One Jewry?**

A crucial question is of course whether the two constituents of Jewry in the country – RSJs and Vets – tend to remain alienated from each other or, on the contrary, tend to create one unified Jewry. We considered this issue by comparing RSJs and young Vet adults, on whom the future of this Jewry devolves.

It appears here that attachment to Judaism is stronger among Vets than among RSJs, and that this is also the case with belonging to the German society. Because each of them depends on different circumstances, attachment to Jewry does not contradict adherence to the non-Jewish society – for Vets – and somewhat weaker attachment to Jewry may also be concomitant with weaker belonging to the German society – for RSJs. On the other hand, the two younger strata tend also to converge toward each other – notwithstanding the divergences which still stand out, especially in the area of language. Vet and RSJ young adults tend effectively to get closer to each other, in their attitudes vis-à-vis themselves, their feelings toward the community, and their perspectives on their environment.

One cannot ignore, however, that willingness to become affiliated with Jewish organizations is much weaker among RSJs than among Vets, which predicts that there may well be in the future a reproduction of the problematic situation of today regarding the recruitment of community leadership: a Jewry headed by elements stemming from the small Vet minority over a community where the vast majority is RSJ. In such a situation, alienation may easily grow among the latter in the context of linguistic and cultural gaps, as well as socioeconomic differences, though in this situation one cannot rule out the reality of the tendency to social intermingling.

In brief, and despite the divergences underlined above, lines of convergence do appear that refer mainly to the importance of Jewishness and solidarity with Israel, openness to one another, reticence about merging into German society and, together with all these, esteem for major aspects of that society. Hence, at this point in time, one may indeed speak of a process of formation of one Jewry in Germany out of the segments that divide it today.

Intervening at this point are the importance of education and the hopes of today's adults with respect to the next generation.

## **(6) Jewish Education: Expectations and Reality**

(a) **Expectations** - A wide majority of respondents are willing to provide their children with a Jewish education. Not all, however, translate their wishes into facts. The Orthodox are the ones who concretize this ambition in practical efforts – though even among them, more than a few confess their powerlessness in this respect. Among the other categories – Liberal, traditional and secular - efforts and realizations illustrate a declining gradient. To this should be added that Jews who originate from mixed families, or live with a non-Jewish partner, are the least preoccupied by the necessity of providing a Jewish education. Even among them, the majority have some aspirations to give children elements of a Jewish education. Furthermore, the younger strata are probably more committed to Jewish education than the older strata. Jewish education is expensive, even when some public support is provided, and hence, it is more within reach of larger and more affluent communities, than of smaller and poorer ones – such as the small communities of Eastern Germany.

In the context of this diversity of factors, one must also consider the extent to which respondents attach importance to children's acquisition of the German culture. Their

position on this issue is quite divided: a minority – especially among individuals who have not received an academic education and/or belong to the Orthodox – does not endorse the importance of this acquisition and the majority who favor it are divided into different degrees of willingness. Moreover, members of the younger strata are less sensitive to the question of their children’s acquiring German culture than are the older ones. This may be accounted for by the fact that their own German culture leads them to take this acquisition for granted, while they feel more keenly the need to take care of their children’s Jewish education.

On the other hand, when it comes to practicalities, more than a few respondents complain about the shortage of institutions of Jewish education in their communities. These complaints often refer to the lack of adequate programs in Israel Studies, while others speak of an unsatisfactory number of courses in Bible, Judaism and Jewish history as well as Hebrew classes which are far from meeting the demand. It must be noted here that Jewish pluralism makes a difference on this question. While only a minority of the Orthodox feel that no program is missing – they apparently take care of Jewish education on their own - nearly half of the secular do voice complaints – with Liberals and traditional Jews in an-in-between position. Moreover, many respondents – in all types of communities - are aware of their own need for Jewish learning, and say they would appreciate Jewish programs. Hence, the answer to the question of “do Jews in Germany show interest in Jewish learning?” is clearly affirmative.

(b) **The Offerings** - When it comes to what is offered in Jewish education, it is notable that a multiplicity of Jewish educational institutions exists in Germany, a large number of which have been recently created. Up to now, however, one can hardly speak of a dense and comprehensive network of institutions. In almost all communities in Germany - especially the medium-size or small ones - there is a deplorable lack of financial resources and qualified personnel that would enable a full-fledged system for children, not to speak of interested adults. In many places there are Jewish kindergartens of diverse religious or secular orientations, but not everywhere, and many face the problem of an insufficient number of pupils. Several cities have elementary schools, some of them Orthodox, but they too are insufficient - even in large communities. High-schools do not exist at all, except one in Berlin. Youth centers are more numerous; they offer a large range of activities but individual participation is reduced to a limited number of hours per week.

Jewish student organizations constitute another relevant factor. They are not always successful in attracting a large public for the debates and leisure activities which they organize. They are in competition with an organization like Chabad which also runs activities – in its own style – aimed at Jewish students. In addition, there are clubs or centers for adults, which offer lectures and courses in Judaism or Israel studies. Some of these centers are sustained by communities and religious congregations.

At the level of academic higher education, there is also a diversity of frameworks, from the Heidelberg Jewish university for professional training, to university departments of Judaism and associated matters, and research centers dedicated to this area. Noteworthy here is the independent Touro College of Berlin which combines academic studies and involvement in the Jewish world. Finally, Germany has several institutions for rabbinical studies. Up to now, however, the number of their students is modest even when one includes recently founded Chabad yeshivot. Besides all these, there are also non-academic projects initiated by private initiatives or world Jewish organizations, such as *Limmud* -

the popular Learning Festival project, the Salomon Birnbaum Society for Yiddish, and the so-called Other Music - Yiddish Summer Festival.

In brief, Jewish education in Germany is on the rise – both with respect to the number of institutions and the diversity of offerings. In many communities, though, many of which formed recently, the number of Jews is still too small to provide the ground for developing a ramified educational setting. For the time being, the community of Berlin is the only one that has been able to build a network of Jewish educational institutions, and only a few other large communities (Munich, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt) are close to this goal.

It is worth emphasizing at this point that a major challenge faced by Jewish education at all levels in Germany is the secularism of the largest part of the present-day Jewish population, which often shows little interest in religious education. Organizations like the Jewish Cultural Association of Berlin aspire to respond to this challenge by investing in educational-cultural events. This kind of association, however, still has only limited influence throughout Germany's Jewry where, in most places, the synagogue is the heart of the community.

### **(7) The Burning Issues**

With few exceptions, the leading figures who were interviewed during this research agree that many communities fail to attract large-scale involvement in community work. While some interviewees blame competing stimuli in the surroundings, that overshadow the appeal of the community, others deplore the poor equipment found in the community center - especially in small communities. In other words, the rapid growth of the Jewish population in the 1990's was not accompanied by an adequate influx of resources.

Some interviewees rather blame the RSJs' attitudes and their lack of experience in community life. Only a few RSJs, they contend, were successfully co-opted by the Vet leadership because of the lack of experience of most active RSJs with the circumstances prevailing in Germany. Some interviewees did not hesitate to state that a change in leadership recruitment can only be expected in the second generation. Others insist on the fact that meanwhile the number of mixed marriages is increasing, which could destabilize the community. Still others are less pessimistic and cite the many veterans and newcomers who are highly committed to Germany's Jewry.

Moreover, the secularism of Germany's Jews – Vets and RSJs alike – does not necessarily imply increased assimilation. Even mixed families may be welcome in the community and join Jewish networks. Some figures among the interviewees call for the acceptance of the principle that within the continuum of Jewish identity, non-religious Judaism can no longer be ignored. This attitude means however that work must be done on a definition of Jewish identity that will remain relevant for future generations. Furthermore, several interviewees also hope that contact with Israel, especially in the field of education and youth exchange, might serve as important lever in community work in Germany.

Some interviewees, however, ask themselves whether the Jewish State, will remain the definitive religious, spiritual and cultural center for global Jewry. On the other hand, all agree that the times when Jews were ashamed to live in Germany are over. The future development of organized Jewish life is far less predictable, none the less. The synagogue will most probably remain the focus of Jewish life, and Jewish clubs, interest groups, and initiatives will emerge from them. At the same time, the attitudes of Jews are becoming more and more varied, and new answers are needed to respond to their queries.

## **(8) A Transnational Diaspora**

The diverse facets of our research substantiate the conceptualization of a “transnational diaspora.” This condition has always been typical of Jewish communities – even long before a Jewish State existed and when the notion of “territorialized origin” was little more than a myth. In today’s Germany, this notion of transnational diaspora may have particular relevance, even different kinds of relevance. The small veteran Jewish community that itself represents an amalgamation of Holocaust survivors, refugees from Eastern Europe, migrants from Israel and others, has always been known for its strong allegiance to Israel, as soon as the State was created, adopting it as its “territorialized origin.” This, however, did not preclude it from anchoring itself in the German post-war reality.

The Russian-speaking Jews who arrived in the 1990s also illustrate a case of transnational diaspora. They constitute a distinctive case, essentially different from the veteran community. Russian-speaking Jews, indeed, tend to refer themselves, not to one but to two “territorialized origins:” the FSU and Israel. As recent immigrants from the FSU, they continue to use Russian, to refer to its culture, to keep contacts with relatives and friends left behind, as well as to pay visits to the “old country.” On the other hand, they also identify with Israel as Jews; they know people – relatives and friends – who have settled in Israel since the collapse of the USSR; they follow events in the Middle East, and show solidarity with the Jewish state, as the State of the Jews. These two simultaneous allegiances underline the peculiarity of this diaspora.

Yet, as shown by the data throughout this report, their main line of allegiance is toward Israel – even though, as mentioned, their origin in the FSU is marked by the language they want to keep and the cultural values they draw pride from. This condition only amplifies the dilemmas that diasporans face when entering a new setting that is neither of their two “territorialized origins.” Hence, more than many other cases of transnational diaspora, they face problems of defining their collective identity, the nature of their social boundaries, and the tenets that singularize them vis-à-vis “others.” More than any other case of transnational diaspora, they may be marked by a pluralism of formulations of their collective, degrees of identification, and attitudes toward their new environment. As our data hint, these differences relate, in varying manners and degrees, to contingencies like exogamy versus endogamy, religiosity, age, region, length of stay, origin, income, and size of the community.

It is in this context that the issue of Jewish education assumes crucial significance. Education must indeed provide the answers to very weighty and crucial questions.

## **Chapter I. Jews in Contemporary Germany, Previous Research and the Present Project**

### **A New Jewry in Formation**

In December 1945, German Reform Rabbi Leo Baeck (1873-1956), a survivor of the Holocaust, declared: "The era of Jews in Germany is over once and for all."<sup>1</sup> Three years later, in 1948, the World Jewish Congress declared that in the future no Jew should enter German territory. In the eyes of many Jews in the world, it was unimaginable that the country whose leaders carried out the murder of six million Jews throughout Europe could gain any kind of legitimization as a home for Jews in the near future. In Germany itself, the Jews who were still living in transit camps run by the Allied forces were the only remnants of the Jewish population that had lived in Germany for centuries and which, but one decade before, consisted of a flourishing Jewry numbering world-renowned intellectuals, scientists, artists, businessmen, politicians. and rabbis.

Still, a small group which did not include only old and destitute survivors of the Holocaust, remained on German soil. It also numbered young and middle-aged people who stayed in the country or immigrated to it, and started to re-form a new Jewry. While some of them refrained from stating their Jewishness in public, nuclei of Jewish communities were reestablished. From 1945, synagogues that were not totally destroyed were renovated, and hosted regular services by invited foreign rabbis. In 1950, a Central Council of Jews in Germany (Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland) was founded as the umbrella organization of the Jewish communities and institutions active in the country. The large majority of this small segment of population resided in West Germany.

These developments were encouraged by officials of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) that had become part of the Western bloc. This regime firmly supported the renewal of a German Jewry and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, more particularly, extended this approach toward the new State of Israel. The reparation agreements between Germany and Israel were to crown these efforts as indicators of a new democratic German state and its unquestionable break with the Nazi past. As a result, from 1955 to 1959, about 6,000 Jewish émigrés returned to West Germany<sup>2</sup>. In parallel, several hundred Jewish socialists and communists had also settled in East Germany since the late 1940s. Many of the latter, however, were later persecuted by the regime and forced to abandon the community frameworks that they had helped create. More than a few then fled to West Germany.<sup>3</sup> Ever since, only small groups of Jews continued to live in East Germany - mostly in regional capitals like Leipzig or Dresden. At the end of the 1980's there were no

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<sup>1</sup>Wolfgang Benz, Sitzen auf gepackten Koffern. Juden im Nachkriegsdeutschland. In: Juden und Deutsche. Spiegel spezial 2 / 1992, p. 47.

<sup>2</sup>Monika Richarz, Juden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in der DDR seit 1945. In: Micha Brumlik (ed.) u.a., Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland seit 1945, Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 21f.

<sup>3</sup>I. Deutschkron, Israel und die Deutschen (1983), p.187.

more than about 500 registered members of Jewish communities in East Germany, including East Berlin.<sup>4</sup>

In West Germany, the ranks of the Jewish communities tended to increase over the years. A few thousand refugees from the Eastern Bloc - Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland - were rejoined by a few hundred from Iran. According to official statistics, about 40,000 Jews immigrated to West Germany between 1958 and 1988<sup>5</sup>, though, thousands of Jews also left Germany for other destinations. Ultimately, the number of registered members in Jewish communities in West Germany hovered between 26,000 and 28,000 during 1960-1989.<sup>6</sup>

That reality would be completely transformed with the crumbling and dislocation of the USSR in the late 1980s and the massive emigration of Jews from the region. The reasons for this emigration were many. The two major ones were probably the rise of nationalism and the economic crisis that shook the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Jews had been the target of virulent popular anti-Semitism throughout the years and feared the new nationalist regimes that took power in the new countries formed when the Soviet Union was dismantled. On the other hand, the fall of the Soviet bloc occurred in circumstances of acute economic difficulties that destabilized the situation of many Jews who were concentrated in vulnerable middle-class strata. Hence, within one decade, from the late 1980s Hence, within one decade, from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, between 60 to 70 percent of the Jews living in the region emigrated and resettled in new places. The majority of these émigrés now live in Israel, the United States, and Germany. It is estimated that about 800,000 Jews still live in the countries which formed the USSR; their numbers are around 1,100,000 in Israel, 400,000 in the US and 200,000 in Germany.

In each setting where they settled, Russian-speaking Jews (below - RSJs ) found a very different environment. In Israel, RSJs find a predominantly Jewish society in which Jewishness is a national identity, and where they constituted an ethnocultural entity on the basis of their Russian culture and language. Those RSJs who settled in the US or in Germany found themselves in societies where they constitute an ethnocultural group on the basis of both their Jewish identity and Russian culture. As such, they enjoy in these countries rights and possibilities of expression they never knew in the USSR. Despite this similarity, their respective experiences in the United States and Germany are also very different. In the United States, Jews make up a strong, successful and influential community and RSJs constitute but one segment of about 10 percent among them. In Germany where the Jewish community was much smaller and had little impact on public life, RSJs found themselves in the position of constituting the main bulk of the country's Jewish population.

One major pull-factor that brought these RSJs to Germany was the *Contingency Refugee Act* initiated by the Conference of the Federal Ministers of Interior in unified Germany on January 9, 1991. This Act opened the gates of the country to RSJs in an unrestrictive

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<sup>4</sup> It can be assumed that many Jews in the GDR avoided contact with the Jewish Communities for two reasons. First, the general anti-religious policy of the East German regime which implied certain kinds of discrimination for adherents of religious organizations; and second, the rigid anti-Israeli stance of the regime was sometimes combined with attempts to "enlist" Jews in East Germany for public condemnations of Israeli policies, or Zionism in general.

<sup>5</sup> Richarz in: Brumlik (1988), p.22.

<sup>6</sup> Neues Lexikon des Judentums, ed. Julius H. Schoeps, Gütersloh / München 1998, p.199.

manner throughout the 1990's. It is in this context that at the turn of the millennium, about 200,000 RSJs came to Germany. Half of these immigrants joined the Jewish communities and increased their membership threefold: today, indeed, the number of registered members of Jewish communities in Germany add up to more than 100,000. These favorable circumstances started to deteriorate, however, ever since 2005 when the Contingency Refugee Act, which was re-formulated several times, gradually imposed substantial restrictions to the right of immigration to Germany of RSJs. Under its current version, it grants rights to settle only to young, qualified Jewish immigrants.

Throughout the 1990s, the attractiveness for many RSJs of the Act and the privileges it granted them were bound to the fact that Germany was viewed by them as a part of the European culture which they identified with, enjoyed a democratic and stable regime that they longed for, possessed welfare services that warranted a high degree of social security, and was geographically close to the FSU which made it not too difficult to reach. In this context, Germany absorbed more RSJs in the early years of the twenty-first century than either Israel or the United States.<sup>7</sup>

For many observers, this influx of RSJs embodies the opportunity to start a cultural Jewish revival in Germany. Today, the largest Jewish community in Germany (about 12,000 members) is found in Berlin, and other relatively strong communities exist in Frankfurt, Munich and Düsseldorf, each with more than 5,000 members. In former East Germany (GDR), where Jewish life hardly existed at the end of the 1980s, new Jewish communities have emerged in Dresden, Leipzig and Potsdam. In each of these cities, RSJs make up nearly the whole Jewish community.

All in all, RSJs in Germany make up about 90 per cent of the registered members of Jewish communities, which is eloquent of the drastic demographic shift that took place in the Jewish population of Germany (Kessler, 1998). Veteran Jewish residents in Germany (below - Vets) still compose the majority in leading Jewish community bodies, and representatives of the RSJ majority are gradually increasing their weight in these institutions. This may be explained by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the RSJs lacked any previous experience in leading Jewish organizations. Another possibly better explanation is that, during their first period of immigration, newcomers are primarily concerned with problems of survival in their new environment, which leaves the field available to Vets to continue managing community affairs. Furthermore, veteran community activists showed talent in holding on to their positions of command over the newcomers. It is in this context that one may observe many instances of emergence of tension between newcomers and old-timers. Last but not least, there is also the dividedness of RSJs among themselves. It is reported that geographical groups, like "Muscovites," "Leningraders" or "Odessans" have re-emerged here and there.

In any event, RSJs-Vet relations do not always proceed smoothly. Political interests are added to the language barrier, and to each party's feeling that it conveys a culture – German versus Russian – of world-importance, and while most Vets see themselves as Orthodox Jews, the majority of RSJs stand at a distance from any form of religion. In Bremen and Leipzig, for instance, it was reported that the Jewish councils vigorously

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<sup>7</sup> In 2002, Germany absorbed 19,262 RSJs, Israel absorbed 18,878 and the United States absorbed 2,486. In 2003: Germany: 15,442; Israel: 12,400; USA: 1,581. Sources: Federal Office of Migration and Refugees in Germany (Nuremberg), Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in Israel, HIAS Arrival Statistics in the U.S.

insisted on the community's religious character, and while some RSJs' leaders accepted it, others felt obliged to work against it on behalf of their secularism.

None of these facilitate the interactions between the two segments of Germany's Jewish population.

### ***Institutional Innovations***

And indeed, the flood of RSJ immigration firstly challenged the leading bodies of the Jewish community, i.e., the Central Council of Jews in Germany (Zentralrat) and the Central Welfare Board of Jews in Germany (ZWST / Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland), to adjust to the new circumstances. The Central Welfare Board was urged to develop new programs for children and the elderly, while social work now became a most important task. In parallel, this body also set up mechanisms to help RSJs in the job market (such as seminars for professionals and language courses). The Central Council entered negotiations with politicians and officials for improving the legal conditions for the integration of the newcomers.

At the institutional level, the Union of Progressive Jews in Germany (UPJ) (2002)<sup>8</sup> was set up as a branch of the World Union for Progressive Judaism (WUPJ) and it was successful enough to create 21 communities with a total of 4,500 members. These Liberal communities are mainly located in Western Germany (Munich, Cologne and Hanover). The political weight of the UPJ is limited due to its restricted membership. Nevertheless, since 2005 it has been recognized officially and it is entitled to financial support from the German government. Within a few years, the organization established a Rabbinical College (Abraham Geiger College in Potsdam - in 2000) and a School for Cantors (2008 in Potsdam). The Zionist "Arzenu" association and the "Young and Jewish" ("Jung und Jüdisch") youth movement are also affiliated to the UPJ. Some regional branches of the UPJ are members of the Central Council but others remain autonomous. Here and there, moreover, friction can be observed between UPJ communities and communities directly dependent on the Central Council, over their shares in State funding channeled through the Central Council.

In tandem, RSJs created the World Congress of Russian Speaking Jews (WRY), which maintains direct relations with other RSJs in Jerusalem, Moscow and New York. The Berlin office coordinates European projects and activities, but its main calling is the preservation of the Russian language and culture. It also organizes political actions in support of Israel and against anti-Semitism and terror, hosts international cultural events (mainly with Russian-speaking Jewish artists) and also tries to improve the situation of non-Halachic Jews in Germany. The WCRJ is actually a political lobby acting particularly on behalf of RSJs.

Communities linked directly to the Central Council and those of the UPJ add up to about 120 communities throughout Germany. However, only 23 of them number more than 1,000 members, and only six more than 4,000 members (Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, Hanover, Cologne and Düsseldorf). With the exception of Berlin, all communities with over 1,000 members are situated in the Western part of Germany which has always

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<sup>8</sup> As a general international working group, the Union of Progressive Jews in Germany, Austria and Switzerland was already established in 1997.

displayed stronger structures of Jewish life **S**mall communities of several hundred are also found in Eastern Germany.

**Table 1.1.: The large Jewish communities by membership (over 18 years old)**

<b>Communities</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>2007</b>
Berlin	6,411	10,742	10,915
Frankfurt (A.M.)	4, 842	6,503	6,953
Munich	4,050	6,194	9,587
Düsseldorf	1,510	4,952	7,226
Hanover	379	2,610	4,617
Cologne	1.358	3.127	4.576

Large communities have, of course, more opportunities to attract qualified rabbis, cantors, educators, and social workers, and to discuss matters of the public agenda at a more sophisticated and authoritative level. In this respect, smaller communities encounter more difficulties as they are far more dependent on particular individuals volunteering for community work. The large community of Berlin constantly increases its membership thanks to a continuing influx of RSJs. This demography factor allows for a multiplicity of educational, cultural and religious frameworks. Seven synagogues operate in the city, including ultra-Orthodox and orthodox ones (of which one, created in 2006, is Sephardic), as well as a Conservative and a Reform synagogue. This versatility is bound, however, to quite harsh internal political conflicts over leadership and financial matters.

A different constellation characterizes the community of Hanover where the Liberals (LJG) are particularly strong. This community was founded in 1995 with only 79 members, but it numbers today about 600 members - not exclusively due to RSJs' immigration. Over the years the LJG raised funds from political institutions, and became affiliated with the Central Council of Jews in Germany. It is sustained by activists involved in a variety of frameworks. LJG's success in Hanover is based, among others, on the cooperation of both Vets and RSJs – and on solid contacts with local politicians. In January 2009 the LJG was able to open a new community center (Etz Chaim) and employ its first full-time rabbi.

The differences between Berlin and Hanover are only examples of the large variety of Jewish communities in Germany accounted for by attitudes, denominations, cultural singularities, age, size, and other criteria. Hence, the United Jewish Community in Frankfurt am Main (with nearly 7,000 members) has so far managed to keep all current denominations under one roof – including Orthodox groups. In contrast, in Munich (nearly 10,000 members) and Cologne (nearly 5,000 members), Liberals have founded communities distinctively apart from the orthodox - in Munich “Beth Shalom” and in Cologne “Gesher la Massoret”)

***Trends and Movements***

**Generations ago, the vast majority of** RSJs lost most of their links to the rich Jewish heritage of Eastern European Judaism. This reality was revealed wherever they immigrated – Israel, the USA and Germany. In the latter case – but not only – that reality impelled several international Jewish bodies – like the American Jewish Committee and some world Jewish religious movements – to enroll themselves to bring RSJs back to world Jewry and

Judaism. In Germany, the work of Chabad and the Ronald S. Lauder Foundation are particularly notable.

Chabad currently operates 13 centers of varying size across Germany.<sup>9</sup> Its emissaries (shlichim) do not solicit contributions from the public, nor are they funded by governments. Chabad is mainly sustained by private donations, and it aspires to cooperate with the communities and the Central Council. Chabad Rabbis are even willing to officiate in UJC communities (in Berlin, Cologne and Munich). Past President of the Central Council, Paul Spiegel, stated in an interview in 2005: “Chabad Rabbis do very good Jewish work. They bring people to Judaism who otherwise would probably be lost. We support Chabad insofar as the sovereignty of the Jewish Communities is not harmed.”<sup>10</sup>

In Berlin, Chabad established programs for almost all ages; among other institutions, it created a mother & child center, a kindergarten, an elementary school, a center for leisure activities, a circle of students and a computer center. Chabad activists also work on the streets, and visit sick people. In September 2007, Chabad opened in Berlin a Center for Family and Education which is the largest of its kind in Europe. It consists of a synagogue, a mikveh (a ritual purification bath), rooms for study and leisure time, a library, a computer lab, an event hall, a restaurant and a tourist shop. A yeshiva (rabbinical college, plural - yeshivot) and a college for male teenagers are also attached to this center. The director, Rabbi Yehuda Teichtal, is from Brooklyn, New York, and he accepted the position of Rabbi in the United Jewish Community in Berlin.

It is common practice in Chabad to get in touch with municipality leaders at Chanukah and to light menorahs in the main squares (in Berlin at the Brandenburg Gate). The various programs are offered without any fees, and with permanent availability to the public and intense public relations have increased Chabad's reputation among the Jewish population. Liberal or secular intellectuals criticize Chabad's theology<sup>11</sup> and its attitudes concerning the Middle East conflict. However, these debates do not endanger the movement's popularity in Jewish circles.

Private donations and sponsorship also fuel the Ronald S. Lauder Foundation (LF). This foundation has invested in yeshivot, schools, kindergartens and community centers in Eastern and Central Europe since the end of the Cold War. In Germany, LF employs about 50 people in Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Frankfurt and Würzburg. LF has a foothold in Berlin since 1996 when it founded a Midrasha (college for teachers). Later, it created a yeshiva (Beis Zion) (2000) and a Rabbinical Seminary (Hildesheimer Rabbinical Seminary).<sup>12</sup> In Frankfurt/Main, LF established a Chovev Educational Center for Adults of Zionist-religious allegiance. In cooperation with the local UJC, the foundation also established a Morijah Elementary School in Cologne (the first Jewish elementary school after World War II), and, again in cooperation with the local Jewish Council, a Jewish kindergarten in Hamburg. It supported the creation of a learning center for the young in Würzburg and of a Torah Center in Leipzig – the first endeavor of this kind in the Eastern part of Germany.

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<sup>9</sup> Berlin, Cologne, Dresden, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover, Karlsruhe, Munich, Nuremberg, Offenbach, Potsdam, and Ulm

<sup>10</sup> Jüdische Zeitung, October 2005, p.13.

<sup>11</sup> Some very critical Jewish intellectuals categorize Chabad as a religious or even messianic sect.

<sup>12</sup> One of the ordained Rabbis went to Cologne, the other to the Jewish Community of Leipzig.

The LF Yeshurun center is a pilot project for community building in Berlin. It numbers about 30 young observant families interested in studying Judaism as a group. Most of the families live in the same quarter, close to the “Beis Zion” yeshiva. Yeshurun center has also close contacts and projects with sister communities in Zurich, Antwerp, London and Budapest.

In brief, Chabad and LF have brought fresh impetus to Orthodox Judaism in Germany. Both institutions are backed by efficient and successful structures. They are particularly active among RSJs and many of their activists (Americans and Israelis) know Russian. A major advantage of their action is their total independence from German federal or state support, and therefore from the Central Council of Jews in Germany. Which does not gainsay that both movements seek close relations with the Council and present themselves as allies rather than as competitors.

Another trend of religious Judaism is the Masorti movement - that in Germany represents the American Conservative trend. The movement started its endeavors in Germany with Rabbi Gesa Ederberg in 2002, in Berlin. It is principally active in this city where it opened a Beit Midrash (in 2003) and a kindergarten (in 2004). Rabbi Gesa Ederberg<sup>13</sup> serves as the rabbi of the Egalitarian Berlin Community in the Synagogue of Oranienburger Straße that before 1933 was the largest synagogue in Berlin.

Furthermore, one also finds in Germany a few independent initiatives mostly concentrated in large cities. Beit Debora, for instance, is a project that was initiated in 1998 by a group of feminists. In May 1999, it hosted a conference of European female rabbis which was the first of its kind in Europe. Other conferences later took place in Berlin and in the meantime, other branches have opened in Budapest and Sofia. Several Beit Debora activists are strong supporters of Liberal Judaism and oppose the Central Council of Jews in Germany which is closer to orthodox Judaism.<sup>14</sup>

In addition to all these, there is a visible increase in the number of cultural associations throughout Germany that discuss and debate Jewish cultural and historical topics without reference to religious credos. They attract secular Jews interested in their Jewish heritage. A prominent example is the Jüdischer Kulturverein Berlin (JCA Berlin), that was founded by some Jewish intellectuals in East Berlin. In the early 1990's, the JCA Berlin opened its gates to RSJs and its main activities consisted of cultural and artistic events, language courses and seminars on social and political topics. Associations of this kind tend to oppose Orthodoxy and are especially critical of excluding non-Halachic Jews from community frameworks.

In this context it is interesting to learn about the creation in 2006 of a Limmud (“studies”) framework that consists of one or several days of learning dedicated to Jewish matters – Limmud festivals – held annually or more frequently. Limmud, which originated in England, consists of a set of workshops inspired by various movements, and that presents opportunities for learning about Jewish history, religion, culture, philosophy and Israel.

On the other hand, the Jewish population of Germany is still relatively poor in terms of media. The major outlets are a weekly published by the Central Council (the “Jüdische

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<sup>13</sup> Rabbi Gesa Ederberg, aside from her functions in the Masorti movement in Germany and Europe, is also a founding member of the General Rabbinical Conference (ARK) at the Central Council of Jews in Germany (Allgemeine Rabbinerkonferenz).

<sup>14</sup> L. Dämmig and E. Klapheck in: Lustig/Leveson (2006), p. 152.

Allgemeine”) and a Russian language monthly, the “Yevreyskaya Gazeta”<sup>15</sup>. Besides these, several community bulletins are published (often bilingual German-Russian). These media provide information about community matters, the Jewish world and Israel, and also serve as fora for debates. Intellectuals are very much present in these media.

Last but not least, in recent years there has been a considerable increase in Jewish internet websites. Highly frequented Jewish portals have been created by both Vets (“Ha Galil” or “Milk and Honey”) and RSJs (“Zametki po yevreyskoy istorii”). These portals reveal the wide diversity of Jewry in Germany and present information on Jewish history and traditions as well as about cultural events, tourism or marketing.

### ***Area of Investigation***

Over the past 30 years, the Jewish population in Germany has undergone enormous increase and changes. The Jewish infrastructure has grown remarkably with new synagogues, community centers and educational frameworks. Alongside the Central Council of Jews in Germany and affiliated communities, new movements and institutions have appeared – from the Union of Progressive Jews (UPJ) to Chabad and the Lauder Foundation. It is also noteworthy that Germany has two roof organizations of rabbis – the Orthodox Rabbinical Conference (ORK) and the General Rabbinical Conference (ARK) of Germany.<sup>16</sup>

At the same time, non-religious organizations are active too. Some are partly or completely independent from the Council - cultural associations, artistic and study centers.

However, these developments do not yet say much about internal Jewish dynamics and the chances and perspectives for enlarging and consolidating organized Jewish life in this country in the long run. These are issues that several researchers have tackled in recent years.

The recent dramatic increase in the Jewish population of Germany has attracted researchers. Julius Schoeps et al. (1996, 1999) pioneered this undertaking. Their two Germany-wide empirical studies among Russian-speaking Jews (RSJs) focused mainly on the impacts of their arrival on the development of the country’s Jewish community. Paul Harris (1997) analyzed the juridical framework and the political conditions in which RSJs settled in Germany. Early pieces of research on RSJs in Germany also focused on the problems of racism that new immigrants encountered (Schoeps, Jasper, & Vogt, 1995; Spülbeck 1997) against the backdrop of a wave of right-wing extremism during 1992 and 1993. These works showed that RSJs reported relatively few personal experiences of anti-Semitism. In the late 1990s, a number of case-studies in certain cities (Doomernik 1997; Kessler 1998; Silbermann 1999; Petschauer 1999; Oswald 1997; Tchernina and Tchernin 2003) explored RSJs’ problems of inclusion in the Jewish communities and the relationships they developed with Vets. It was generally observed that this contributed positively to the stabilization of the communities, demographically and structurally. Jewish community leaders devised new social and cultural programs in order to draw the new

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<sup>15</sup> The same Russian publishing house that publishes the monthly “Evreyskaya Gazeta” (Werner Media) also launched a project to build up a German-language monthly - “Jüdische Zeitung”. It was published existed from summer 2005 until spring 2009 and then closed. Since October 2009, there has been a second attempt to establish the “Jüdische Zeitung” on the German market. Several expert interviewees (see Volume 2) refer to the project.

<sup>16</sup> Both Rabbinical Conferences cooperate under the Roof of the Central Council of Jews in Germany.

immigrants closer,<sup>17</sup> although in some cases, this development was hindered by conflicts within community boards (Hess and Kranz, 2000).

Another dimension of research has revolved around inclusion into German society as a whole. Several works evinced socio-economic hardships. Tress (1998) indicated the positive influence of Germany's wide range of social services for immigrants while, however, Gruber and Rübler (2002) and Cohen and Kogan (2005, 2007), who investigated the socio-economic situation of RSJs on the labor market, showed that unemployment was extremely high (between 35% and 40%) among them, although 70% of RSJs hold academic degrees. While Gruber and Rübler primarily focus on the waste of intellectual resources due to unemployment, Cohen and Kogan (2007) highlight the hardships for RSJs in obtaining jobs matching their qualifications. This brings a majority of RSJs to consider their "basic problems of integration as unsolved" (Schoeps, Jasper, and Vogt, 1999).

Researchers also found that many RSJs encounter difficulties in learning the codes of daily life in Germany and in some places the attitude of non-Jewish Germans toward them does not make not making this task easier. Spülbeck (1997) who conducted a study in East Germany, elaborates on the German hosts' problematic attitudes towards these foreigners. This, as noted by Kessler (1998) influences RSJ's weak interaction and communications with the receiving non-Jewish population, that are not improving over time. On the other hand, as shown by Alfons Silbermann (1996) and Judit Kessler (1997), Vets also find difficulties in their interactions with RSJs since the latter do not always show enthusiasm to join the local communities. This was shown also by Karen Körber (2006) who led a qualitative case-study in an East German Jewish community. Schoeps et al. (1996, 1999) and Ben-Rafael et al. (2006) refer in this respect to persistent language and cultural barriers, while Jeff Peck (2006) explores the relations between RSJ sub-groups.

Issues of identity clearly emerge here, as described by ethnologist Franziska Becker (2001) who focused on RSJs' biographical re-constructions and identity search. Rainer Hess and Jarden Kranz, (2000) confirm the reality of these difficulties with an empirical study on identity among RSJs' youth in holiday camps. Two studies, Silbermann (1997) in Cologne and Kessler (2002) in Berlin, explore self-images and expectations. The Berlin survey reveals that a considerable proportion of RSJs are not interested (or only slightly so) in Jewish religion. Only 14% of the respondents stated religiosity as an explicit reason for being members of Jewish communities.<sup>18</sup> The Cologne Study (Silbermann 1997) elaborated on the mutual perceptions of Vets and RSJs.<sup>19</sup>

These questions are at the center of comparative studies of RSJs in different countries – Germany versus Israel (Bade and Troen 1993); Germany and the US (Hegner 2008); (Germany, Israel and the US (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006); Germany, Israel, the US and Canada (Remennick 2007) – or of RSJs and other groups (Dietz 2000). Yvonne Schütze and Tamar Rapoport (2000) analyzed trends of integration of young RSJs in Jerusalem and Berlin

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<sup>17</sup> As described in other chapters of this book, there is a significant trend among RSJs to increase cultural and social activities within the Jewish communities, while the Veteran (German-speaking) members want to keep the preferences of community as they were before the great RSJ influx. An important study that shows the dynamics between the new arrivals and the veteran members was carried out by Alfons Silbermann (1997) and his team in the Synagogue Community of Cologne.

<sup>18</sup> Analysis of the Jewish Community survey 2002, in: "jüdisches berlin", Oct. 2002, p. 20.

<sup>19</sup> Silbermann (1997:74): "Almost a third of all Community members do not take part in community life, in terms of synagogue attendance. Among the new members from Russia, the number of those who attend services less than once a year or never, is even higher."

while another trend of research that developed in recent years focuses on images of RSJs in Israeli and German media (Nelly Elias/Julia Bernstein 2007; Nelly Elias 2008). As a rule, these works indicate a general desire to assert both Jewishness and belongingness to the Jewish world, and a preservation of the allegiance to the Russian culture. This syndrome takes on a variety of forms in different places and milieus, and sparks off friction in different environments (Kessler 1998, Hegner 2008). Bodemann and Bagno (2008:164) delve into these tensions and elaborate on their ultimately destructive character.<sup>20</sup> These tensions, however, are often overemphasized in the German media which easily propagate clichés and stereotypes about RSJs, overshadowing the frequent good relations that exist in many communities between them and Vets (Becker 2001; Elias/Bernstein (2007).

Joining Jewry and retaining Russianness, however, does not always satisfy the young RSJ. Hess and Kranz (2000) point out the search for identity among youngsters who are often disappointed by the absence of authoritative spiritual guidance. In turn, and as emphasized by Gotzmann, Kiesel and Körber (2005-2008), uneasiness often reigns in Jewish communities because of their lack of success to enroll the young.<sup>21</sup> Wolffsohn (2008) does not attach too much importance to these impressions and maintains that Jews gain gradually more self-confidence - that does not contradict, as described by Schneider (2000) - the development of increasing diversity on the Jewish cultural scene.

It is in the context of this body of knowledge that the present research-project attempts to provide an comprehensive analysis of Jewry in Germany today and discusses, on this basis, the issue of what Jewish education consists of at this time.

## **The Research Project**

The research presented in the following investigated the Jewish population now living in Germany – the recent RSJs population as well as the country's veteran Jewry - Vets. The research took place in 2008-2009 and focused on collective identities, involvement in community life and Jewish educational practices and frameworks. The research also delved into questions such as: how far is this population bound by rituals and collective memory, and what kind of allegiance and interaction does it illustrate *vis-à-vis* its environment: the non-Jewish population. Regarding RSJs, in particular, this research also asked about their relations with the non-Jewish Germans and Russian-German ethnics as well as about their eventual aspirations to remain a distinct entity. **In addition**, the research studied respondents' aspirations in the realm of Jewish education, and their reactions to the possibilities they find in their new country in this respect.

In accordance with these goals, this research consisted of three facets, each of which necessitated a methodology of its own:

### ***The survey***

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<sup>20</sup> Bodemann/Bagno (2008:164): "The recent putsch-like transfer of power in the Berlin community is only a case in point, and Jewish intellectuals will be ever more remote from the Gemeinden [communities]. The cultural gap is too great to overcome."

<sup>21</sup> "Until now, the communities rarely succeed to recruit young adults and the 'middle age' generation of the [RSJ] immigrants. However, they must open their doors for topics and activities which fit the needs and interests of young people." (A. Gotzmann, D. Kiesel and K. Körber in: Jüdische Allgemeine Nr. 13, March 26th 2009).

In the first stage, the researchers conducted a survey of about 1,200 subjects forming a random sample of Germany's Jewish population as a whole. The survey was conducted in Germany's largest Jewish communities as well as in a number of small communities. We thus divided the Jewish communities into several categories, by size:

**Berlin** with 11,000 members

*Large communities* of more than 1,500 registered members

*Middle-sized communities* numbering 500-1,500 members

*Small communities* of less than 500 members

The subjects were primarily members or participants in a variety of Jewish frameworks – parents of school children, university students, cultural circles, local Jewish communities or members of specific associations. In fact, in the absence of a central list of Jews in Germany, we used any clue that would help us to contact Jews. This procedure might be seen as harming the randomness of the sample, but since we took care to have a number as large as possible of respondents – about 1200 - and seeing the diversity of our sources, we believe that we obtained a sample that was close to a faithful representation of the population investigated. The only sampling problem that we were unable to avoid concerns the Vets. Seeing that they compose only about 10% of the target population and since we did not have any general list, we had to rely on channels of access to potential respondents that led us to an overrepresentation, in this group, of the younger adult stratum. At the stage of systematic comparison between RSJs and Vets, it constrained us to make do with this stratum in both groups. The interviews themselves were conducted by people who were enrolled on the various sites of the research; they included students, social workers, and activists in Jewish organizations. In the absence of any central institutional support, we had to work directly with people active in local organizations – after receiving the agreement of local Jewish councils. In some cases, we operated with freelancers outside any Jewish formal framework.

Respondents were requested to answer a 100-item questionnaire. Originally written in English, it was then translated into German and Russian (see Volume 3, A). Each subject chose the language of the interview. As for the questionnaire itself, our context variables included, among others, age, gender, education, occupation, religiosity, family status, place of residence, qualification for the Halachic versus non-Halachic Jewish status, length of stay in Germany and origins.

Beyond these background aspects, respondents were asked about the major issues implied by integration in society that are commonly investigated by research works in the field of immigration and integration. Among other issues, we inquired about personal experiences of migration and social life; collective identity and identification; perspectives on the environment, allegiances; and expectations in the realm of education. The interviews generally lasted around 20-25 minutes. Some were conducted on a face-to-face basis; others by asking respondents to fill up the questionnaire by themselves. The data were codified and analyzed according to appropriate statistical methods.

### ***Interviews of Public Figures***

In the second phase, the research aspired to gather testimonies from prominent Jewish community personalities (23 people), throughout the Jewish population of Germany,

concerning the issues they see as particularly vital for the Jewish agenda, and how they view the development of Jewry in the country, especially in the area of education. This part of the research was essential in our eyes, since in addition to the attitudes of the population in general as expressed in the survey, we also wanted to consider the perspectives of people most involved in working with and shaping that Jewry. A major question here related to the extent to which the two dimensions converge or diverge.

These personalities included both veterans and newcomers - nearly half of the interviewees were RSJs; men and women - one third were women; people from Berlin and other cities; members of the older generation; and others from the younger one. They include leading public figures who are well-known in the Jewish communities and media, rabbis, and renowned intellectuals and academics. Among the interviewees were professionals and lay leaders belonging to the main congregations (Orthodox, Masorti/Conservative, and Liberal) as well as the heads of two newly established Orthodox movements – Chabad, and the Ronald S. Lauder Foundation).

Among others, we interviewed presidents of communities in Berlin, Munich and Leipzig, as well as the Rector of the University of Jewish Studies (Hochschule für Jüdische Studien) in Heidelberg, the leading academic school of German Jewry for 30 years. Furthermore we interviewed the leader of an outstandingly successful educational project in North-Rhine Westphalia (Gesher – Integration by Education and Culture), the coordinator of the Limmud Learning Festival, and the Director of the Berlin Office of the World Congress of Russian Speaking Jews (WCRJ).

### ***Mapping Educational Frameworks***

The third phase of the research consisted of a comprehensive overview of Jewish educational frameworks active on German soil at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century – as far as our means of communication and links could reach. This dimension of our investigation took place while we already knew that this country's Jewry was evolving toward a pluralism of its own which, among other consequences, favored the encouragement of the development of Jewish educational institutions and projects under the initiative of a variety of organizations – some stemming from communities, others from international networks, and still others from local independent projects.

Moreover, we also know that Jewry in this country is dispersed throughout a large range of types of communities and that problems and challenges are not necessarily identical everywhere. This research was aimed at updating our general picture of the dynamism of Jewish educational life in Germany by mapping out the setting of educational institutions. We gathered information from dozens of sources across the country and, wherever possible, did not make do with official information, and interviewed school principals and sponsors. We studied frameworks depending on the Haredi Chabad and the Lauder Foundation, as well as institutions run by Jewish councils or secular circles. This overview allowed a general look at endeavors in the field of education, by whom, and for what target-public.

In brief, Phase 1 aspired to present where and how Jews in Germany stand vis-à-vis Jewishness; Phase 2 explicated the perspectives of leading figures on the development of Jewry; Phase 3 explored the praxis of Jewishness in the area of education.

Together, these different phases of the research represent the most comprehensive research project carried out within this population until now. This project yields a thorough

description and analysis of the Jewish population of Germany, its attitudes, activities, expectations, identity formulations and existential dilemmas. By its comprehensive character and focused concerns, it may be instrumental in outlining strategies for community development according to the intentions of the Jews of Germany today. Above all, this research indicates major lines of dynamism and makes clear the patterns of change and transformation experienced by this population and which leads it toward new challenges.

### **A Theoretical Edge**

At the theoretical level, this research project cannot avoid today addressing the question of the extent and manner the case of Germany's Jewry responds to the notion of transnational diaspora which is, at the heart of the preoccupations of social researchers in this era of global trends of population movements. This notion (Ben-Rafael 2010), that is well known to researchers of the Jewish world, has now been adopted by researchers in many other fields. It designates the dispersal throughout the world of people with the same territorial origin who, in one way or another, maintain allegiances to the whole that they form together. Understandings attached to the diasporic condition vary both within and between diasporas but this 'transnationality' implies a continuation – through transformation – of the principle of "one diaspora."

As a general case the founding narrative of diasporas justifies aspirations to retain distinctiveness from locals and allegiance to legacies originating from "elsewhere." "Elsewhere" indicates a commitment that cuts across boundaries and concretizes 'here and now' a principle of 'dual homeness.' Dual homeness implies the anchoring of a collective in its local environment, intensified by an external reference of belongingness. When diasporans effectively become part of society, they also learn a new language and grow accustomed to new symbols. Ultimately, they acquire a new national identity that becomes their primary one and diminishes the original one to secondary status. The outcome is a tendency towards fluidity of social boundaries that invites actors to question and redefine their identities in the endless debates typifying contemporary intellectual endeavors. This fluidity of boundaries together with the dual-homeness condition of diasporans signify that commitment to the national society and the state is coupled with transnational allegiances. Hence, none of these lines of loyalty are now one-sided and total.

This condition has always been typical of the dispersed Jewish communities – even long before a Jewish State existed and when the notion of "territorialized origin" was little more than a myth. In Germany today, this notion of transnational diaspora may be of particular relevance, even of major relevance in some cases. The veteran Jewish community (that represents the Holocaust survivors) has always been known for its strong allegiance to Israel, as soon as the State was created, and adopted it as its "territorialized origin." This, however, did not preclude it from anchoring itself in the German post-war reality. As for the new Russian-speaking immigrants, who now form the vast majority of Jewry in Germany, they now find themselves with two diametrically different "territorialized origins."

On the one hand, this population which can now openly express its Jewishness, cannot but assess some allegiance to Israel where the largest part of their fellow-members have chosen to settle and form there the largest concentration of RSJs in the world. On the other hand, this population is also deeply marked by Russian culture that, unavoidably, turns it toward their country of origin. Hence, RSJs in Germany share, so to speak, a double

transnational-diaspora condition while their settling in Germany cannot but arise for them the question of their anchorage in their new environment that would, sooner or later, also become a homeland – and, eventually, the very first of all.

In this context, an investigation of Germany's Jewry is also a question of general theoretical interest, as it should illustrate how contradictory principles of "homeness" can coexist, or, on the contrary, confront each other.

## Chapter 2: A General Statistical Description

### Background Aspects

The exact number of respondents in the survey was 1,185 people. Among them, 88.7% were born in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) or in Eastern Europe – we call them RSJs – and the rest – 11.3% – were born in Germany (9.4%) or other countries. We divided these respondents into four categories according to the length of their stay in Germany:

- (1) Respondents who immigrated to Germany after the age of 8 and who reside in the country for less than 10 years - 49.9%;
- (2) Respondents who immigrated to Germany after the age of 8 and who reside in the country for 11-15 years - 25.6%;
- (3) Respondents who immigrated to Germany after the age of 8 and who reside in the country for more than 15 years - 9.3%;
- (4) Respondents who were born in Germany or arrived in Germany when they were less than 8 - 15.2%.

These data show the recent character of the transformation of German Jewry. Furthermore, 31.5% of the respondents are under 40 years of age, 26.4% are aged 41-60 and 42.1% are older than 60.

Moreover, and as it is usually the case with a survey (men are more often at work, than women at home where the survey is carried out), 45.5% of our respondents are males. In addition, 60% live with a spouse (which we term “partner” in the following, for brevity’s sake); two-thirds (66.3%) have children and around that proportion (63%) hold an academic degree. In other words, our respondents are people drawn from middle-class milieus.

In the realm of Jewish pluralism (or religiosity), we distinguished four categories. “Orthodox,” which includes here the ultra-Orthodox, designates people attached to the halachic commandments in a religious spirit. “Liberals” is intended for religious people who identify with a Judaism free from some halachic constraints. “Traditional” designates those who adhere to some religious norms out of respect for traditions, but who do not consider themselves religious. Lastly, “Secular” refers to people who present themselves as non-believers and non-traditional (even if they do respect some markers of Judaism).

Only a minority of 13.2% of the respondents feel close to orthodox Jewishness. One-fifth (22.3%) feel closer to non-halachic liberal (Conservative or Reform) Judaism while one-third (32.2%) define themselves as traditional, and another third (32.3%) as secular. Hence, one cannot speak of polarization between religious and non-religious Jews but rather of pluralism, with a diversity of orientations toward the Jewish religion. Clearly, the large majority refuses to consider itself religious. In the background of these data, it should also be taken into account that three-quarters (73.8%) of all respondents told us that they originate from families where both parents are or were Jews, leaving a quarter (26.2%) who originate from families where one parent is not Jewish. This substantial rate is still larger when it comes to the question of the spouses our respondents live with (if relevant): among all those who live with a spouse, less than two-thirds (62%) live with a Jewish

spouse . Hence, independent of their feelings and how they identify vis-à-vis Jewishness, this is a population where belongingness to mixed families is by no means exceptional – though it is not yet the prevailing norm.

The greatest number of respondents (71.2%), like Jews everywhere, reside in big cities while the rest live in medium and small towns. More specifically, one-fifth (19.3%) live in Berlin while another fifth (20.7%) reside in places in former East Germany, and the majority (60%) in cities that were previously in West Germany. In a word, Jews in Germany are city-dwellers but do not necessarily concentrate in the country's capital.

Regarding occupation, one-fifth (18.6%) are students while a smaller contingent (12.6%) consists of workers or employees and another contingent (9.7%) consists of professionals or businesspeople. The salient trait here is that over one-third (34.1%) are unemployed and living on social welfare, and another quarter (24.9%) are retired. This rate of nearly 60% of people outside the labor market is rather an unusual situation – especially for a Jewish population. It reflects the population's age and difficulties in converting its assets of human capital (see the high rate of academics) into relevant qualifications for the jobs available. As a corollary, a majority (59.1%) of all respondents also evaluate their income as being below the German national average, which again strongly contradicts the condition of Jews in most other countries.

Another salient – and related - feature of this population is the fact that only one-fourth (25.5%) of respondents hold German citizenship, with the overwhelming majority holding Russian (22.7%) or Ukrainian (35.3%) citizenship. The weight of immigrants in the sample (as in Germany's Jewry altogether) receives here its truest expression.

From this general characterization of our sample, we now turn to the attitudes of respondents toward the diverse issues that the questionnaire addresses, and that refer in a variety of ways to issues of inclusion in society.

### **Identity and Attitudes**

In the context of the background features presented above, we now turn to respondents' views of their identities and attitudes toward the various facets of their experience as Jewish residents in Germany.

#### *Identities and Allegiances*

One of the major issues that was considered in our questionnaire concerns the contours of collective identities. We defined this issue as involving primarily the feeling of being a part of a wider collective, and considered in this light the allegiance to the Jewish people, solidarity with Israel, and attitudes toward the German nation, and the country of origin (if different from the former).

Table 2.1 shows that of all four circles of belonging, it is solidarity with Israel and the feeling of belonging to the Jewish People that are by far the strongest allegiances of our respondents –only small minorities – respectively 3.1% and 3.9% do not identify at all with those two circles of reference. The comparable figures for the sense of belonging to the former country's nation (28.2%) or the German nation (46.2%) are much more important. Interestingly enough, however, the former country's nation nor even the notion of German nation cannot be neglected altogether: not less than 44% still identify with the former at least moderately, and nearly a quarter (23.3%) with the latter.

The importance of Jewishness and Israel naturally raises the question of what Judaism signifies for our respondents. The questionnaire asked this question and allowed respondents to offer several answers – which explains that the answers exceed 100%. The results were as follows:

	The German Nation (n=1169)	The Jewish People (n=1143)	Solidarity with Israel (n=1157)	Former Country* (n=946)
Not at all	46.2	3.9	3.1	28.2
A little	30.5	13.4	8.6	27.7
Moderately	20.0	32.8	24.6	32.3
Much so	3.3	49.9	63.6	11.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* RSJs who arrived in Germany after the age of 8

“religion” was the most popular, with a slight majority (51.3%);

“culture” came in second with a large minority (42.7%);

“ethnicity” was third and obtained a small third (30.0%);

“group solidarity” obtained a quarter (27.4%).

“group solidarity” obtained a quarter (27.4%).

The first place of religion testifies that this dimension of Judaism is still viewed here as an important factor of Jewish identity despite the fact that, as mentioned, only 13.2% of the respondents feel close to orthodox Judaism, and an additional 35.5% are also non-secular who feel close to non-halachic denominations. Hence, more than a few respondents feel that religion defines their Judaism even if they themselves are not believers and do not see themselves as religious. Moreover, additional data we obtained show that about three-quarters of the respondents attend synagogue at least once a year, with 28.2% reporting that they attend synagogue services several times a year, and 24.1% that they attend “frequently.”

<b>Table 2.2 Considering Non-Jews who are Married to Jews (%) ( n=1141)</b>		
Consider as:	A Non-Jewish Man (Married to a Jewish Woman)	A Non-Jewish Woman (Married to/Living with a Jewish Man)
A regular Jew	4.1	5.3
Like a Jew	21.6	3.2
A regular non-Jew	74.2	91.5
Total	100.0	100.0

Still, as seen, many respondents do not neglect the religious factor. This is particularly the case when it comes to the question of “Who is a Jew?” and of assimilation. Respondents tend even to adopt then a halachic attitude. Hence, Table 2.2 shows that non-Jews married to or living with Jews are considered as “regular” non-Jews by most respondents. This is almost nearly unanimous when it comes to women of non-Jewish origin who married or live with a Jewish man. The difference between the answers to the two questions reveals the influence of the halacha, since it endows women with the determinant role in defining the Jewishness of offspring.

However, in Table 2.3 which considers the offspring of mixed unions, we see a mixture of halachic and non-halachic attitudes. The halachic attitude is manifest, for example, in attaching differing importance to women and men in determining the Jewishness of children in mixed unions. A child of a non-Jewish man and a Jewish woman is seen by a large minority as a regular Jew, but of a non-Jewish woman and a Jewish man, only by a small number. However, Table 2.3 also indicates the importance that large minorities of respondents attach to education. These attitudes illustrate non-halachic attitudes – even though the relative difference between the two categories of cases again shows some influence of the halachic tradition.

<b>Table 2.3 Considering a Child of a Non-Jew who is Married to a Jew (%)</b>		
Consider as:	A Child of a Jewish Woman and a Non-Jewish Man (n=1164)	A Child of a Non-Jewish Woman and a Jewish Man (n=1161)
A regular Jew	43.6	7.1
Like a Jew	14.9	17.6
A regular non-Jew	3.2	26.3
Depends on education at home	38.3	49.0
Total	100.0	100.0

	Respondent's Child (n=1090)	Respondent (n=637)
Opposed	18.7	25.9
Not enthusiastic but supports	39.5	33.9
No opposition at all	41.7	40.2
Total	100.0	100.0

A certain non-halachic orientation is also manifest in Table 2.4: relatively high percentages of respondents – though still minorities – show no opposition at all to the possibility that either the respondent's child or the respondent him/herself, if not married, will marry a non-Jew.

*Involvement in the Jewish Community*

It is in accordance with their awareness of their Jewishness that Germany's Jews are also involved in Jewish frameworks. As seen in Table 2.5, two-thirds of our respondents are members of Jewish communities. Interestingly enough, this kind of involvement seems limited to the local community framework – as shown by the contrasting low figures of participation in Zionist or pro-Israel organizations - in spite of the respondents' manifestations of solidarity with Israel noted above. It also contrasts, with the minimal interest shown in involvement in organizations active among RSJs. These findings indicate an interest in becoming members of Jewish organizations, but little interest in wider or more focused forms of involvement.

	Zionist or Pro-Israel Org. (n=1121)	Local Jewish Community and Related (n=1141)	Org. Active Among RSJs (n=939)
No	90.3	33.2	92.7
Yes	9.7	66.8	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

While most respondents are in contact with Jewish institutions, as shown in Table 2.6, a good quarter describe these contacts as frequent. Moreover, it clearly appears here that both RSJs and non-Jewish Russian-speaking institutions or organization are hardly attractive to RSJ respondents.

	Jewish Inst. in Germany (n=1140)	Russian-Speaking Inst. in Germany (n=938) *	Russian-Speaking Jewish Inst. in Germany (n=881) *
Not at all	18.1	61.4	44.0
A few	53.5	35.1	44.6
A lot	28.4	3.5	11.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* RSJs who arrived in Germany after age 8

A close look at Table 2.6 also reveals that while either kind of institutions has little appeal to our RSJ respondents, still, between Russian-speaking frameworks and RSJ frameworks, the latter attract these respondents more.

#### *Language Use and Knowledge*

When it comes to the use of languages among our respondents, the numerical importance of RSJs in the sample and in Germany's Jewish population is obvious, as well as the recent character of their arrival in the country. Table 2.7 shows that Russian is the most widely used language by a majority of respondents. It holds the first place for reading, communication with the spouse, talking with the children, and children's speech among themselves. The only area where Russian has parity with the German language concerns watching television. This may be explained by the attractiveness of German television programs that are as popular as Russian channels.

	For Reading (n=1180)	Watching Television (n=1158)	With Partner (n=890)	With Children (n=771)	By Children (n=696)
German	18.1	33.0	10.6	3.9 <sup>1</sup>	16.8 <sup>1</sup>
Russian	47.2	32.7	80.1	85.2	59.1
German and Russian	33.2	32.7	7.6	9.1	22.4
Other language	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

<sup>1</sup> The results regarding the language used for communication with children and between children themselves, may be influenced by the fact that the more veteran population, who uses German principally in all areas, is over-represented in the youngest age group (below 40) and among people who don't have children.

Besides the importance of Russian, Table 2.7 also shows that the use of German is increasing: when adding the categories “German” and “German and Russian,” one obtains large minorities not only for TV watching but also for reading and speech among children. Hence, despite the dominance of Russian, one can see the progress of additive bilingualism. This is also shown by Table 2.8: Russian is, of course, the language that is best known by RSJs, but a good third of RSJs assess their German as at least quite fluent. At the same time, and according to their own evaluation, respondents' knowledge of Jewish languages is minimal – regarding both Yiddish and Hebrew.

	Hebrew (n=1049)	Yiddish (n=1058)	German (n=964)*	Russian (n=958)*
Poor	81.4	80.4	31.6	0.4
Some	11.3	14.4	34.3	1.4
Quite good	4.5	3.8	19.8	13.2
Good	2.8	1.4	14.2	85.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* RSJs who arrived in Germany after the age of 8

### *Social Relations*

Jews in Germany are thus not an isolated entity: even the newest immigrants learn German and use it in given areas of activity. However, does this mean that they tend to become part of the social webs of society, or of the Jewish community as a whole? Table 2.9 does not consider Jews' social life in general, and focuses only on the respondents' closest friends in Germany as an index of their mode of social inclusion.

	Closest Friends (n=1174)	Russian-Speaking Friends (n=1167)
Jewish	35.9	43.8
Non-Jewish	3.1	1.4
Both	61.1	54.8
Total	100.0	100.0

Table 2.9 shows that most respondents' closest friends are both Jewish and non-Jewish and that for one third, they are only Jewish. For more than half of our respondents, closest friends from Russian-speakers, are both Jewish and non-Jewish while for nearly a half, they are Jewish only. In other words, it appears that Jews in Germany do not tend to form

an enclave or a ghetto: though for quite a few, social life involves only Jews, for many of them, it consists of Jews as well as non-Jews, whether Russian-speaking or not.

On additional questions, we also found that a large third (35.4%) of the respondents describe the relations between Vets and RSJs as characterized by indifference; another third (34.2%) see these relations as marked both by tension and cooperation. Another contingent that is not negligible (16.8%) depicts these relations in terms of cooperation and goodwill as opposed to the last group (13.6%) that portrays them as primarily characterized by tensions and conflict. In other words, the question of the relations between RSJs and Vets are marked by difficulties and are far from evoking unanimity. It seems that the overwhelming majority (85.9%) of respondents are convinced that the contribution of RSJ to Jewry in Germany is essentially positive.

It should also be added here that many RSJ respondents mention that they still have ongoing contacts with relatives and friends who remained in their former country - 34% mention frequent contacts of this kind, and 27.6% very frequent ones. In addition, we also learned that most respondents also have contacts with relatives or friends in Israel: 31% portray the level of these contacts as moderate and 30.4% as intense.

Finally, what is most striking in Table 2.9 is the very small number of respondents who depict their closest friends as being only non-Jews – and this holds true for both Vets and RSJs.

#### *Attitudes Toward Germany and German Society*

These last data turn our attention at this point to respondents' attitudes toward Germany and German society. A majority of all respondents (52%) describes their inclusion in German society as satisfactory, and in very satisfactory terms. An even larger majority (54.8%) say that living as a Jew in Germany is not problematic for them. Moreover, again a majority mention that they attach importance to their children's adoption of German culture: for 44.2% it is moderately important and for 29.3% very important. In comparison, for 23.8% of the respondents the acquisition of a Jewish education by their children is moderately important and for 28.1%, very important. Hence, at first glance, respondents tend to see the acquisition of German culture as somehow of greater importance than acquiring Jewish culture. Concomitantly, half (49.4%) of RSJ respondents who settled in Germany after age eight emphasized that they feel more at home in Germany than in their country of origin while a small minority (11.3%) said the contrary, and a quarter (26.5%) that they feel the same both in Germany and their former country.

This tendency receives support from a variety of directions. As indicated in Table 2.10.1, German reality is assessed in positive terms and there is great appreciation of Germany's political regime, economic situation, perspectives for children's future, its social security system, and the quality of life. The dominant image of Germany and German society is thus one that underlines its stable democracy, prosperity, opportunities and social benefits.

**Table 2.10. Positive and Unpleasant Aspects of Life in Germany (%)**

<b>1. Positive Aspects</b>					
	Political Regime (n=1140)	Economic Situation (n=1108)	Prospects for Children (n=815)	Social Security (n=1129)	Quality of Life (n=1136)
Not at all	7.1	3.7	3.9	2.1	2.4
A little	13.9	11.5	4.2	4.9	4.3
Moderately	29.9	30.7	16.0	20.6	23.1
Very much so	49.1	54.2	76.0	72.4	70.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>2. Unpleasant Aspects (%)</b>					
	Difficulties in finding a Suitable Job (n=1045)	Barriers by Non-Jews (n=1096)	Memory of the Shoah (n=1129)	Anti-Semitism in Germany (n=1123)	Experience of Anti-Semitism (n=1064)
Not at all	28.8	30.6	12.0	14.2	38.0
A little	12.9	20.8	21.1	24.2	23.8
Moderately	17.3	25.0	26.6	25.4	19.1
Very much so	41.0	23.6	40.3	36.2	19.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

On the other hand, Table 2.10.2 shows that respondents also perceive difficulties and hardships. They complain about difficulties in finding suitable jobs, discrimination by non-Jews, and forms of anti-Semitism. They readily admit that the memory of the Shoah is disturbing. All in all, however, one notices that the highest rates (the category “very much so”) given by respondents to unpleasant aspects of Germany are substantially lower than those given to positive aspects. Hence, it is quite clear that the prevailing tendency regarding esteem for Germany and German society is positive – even though it does not preclude the awareness of respondents to problematic aspects.

## **Conclusion**

In brief, RSJs are now the overwhelming majority of Germany’s Jewish population and many in that majority were not only born there but have resided there for less than a decade. This explains why most respondents are not German citizens. This population is unbalanced from the viewpoint of the age distribution, with a relatively high proportion of

people aged 60+. It is also highly educated and concentrated in large cities (especially in the West and Berlin).

Most Jews in Germany do not favor orthodox Judaism but neither are they overwhelmingly secular. They constitute, in this respect, a population best characterized by the notion of Jewish pluralism. Moreover, while a large majority are Halachic Jews, mixed ascendancy and actual mixed couples are not infrequent among them, and represent a significant part of this population.

From a socioeconomic point of view, it appears that a relatively large percentage consists of retired or unemployed people, and a majority even assess their income as below the average in the German society - which is quite exceptional for a Jewish population anywhere today.

When it comes to the perceptions and self-images of this population, it should first be emphasized that prevailing allegiances definitely are directed at Jewishness and solidarity with Israel, though they do not entirely exclude other allegiances: some feelings still exist for the country of origin, and other feelings for the host country.

For these respondents, Jewishness is the major token of identity and they tend to define it by referring to the religious principle, as well as to some forms of sociocultural particularism. Moreover, in most cases one detects both halachic influences and non-halachic cultural criteria when it comes to issues relating to "Who is a Jew?" and attitudes to the offspring of mixed unions. Concerning these attitudes, we also find that respondents join the ranks of Jewish communities but are less eager to attach themselves to other kinds of organizational links.

When considering this population, however, we must bear in mind the linguistic issue: many respondents who are RSJ appear not to possess fluent German, while it may be assumed that many Vets do not know Russian. Hence, a barrier still exists between many RSJs and Vets. On the basis of our data, however, we may also assess that this barrier is becoming less and less rigid and that the knowledge and use of German among RSJs is increasing. Already at this point, the research shows that most respondents' closest friends are both Jewish and non-Jewish and, for RSJs, are not only Russian-speaking. In other words, Jews in Germany do not form an enclave.

Actually, a majority of respondents also describe relations between RSJs and Vets in terms of both tension and cooperation, and only a minority cite irreconcilable alienation. Moreover, we also learn from our data that many RSJ respondents mention that they still have ongoing contacts with relatives and friends who either remained in their former country, or emigrated to Israel.

These last data turn our attention at this point to respondents' attitudes toward Germany and German society. Despite the uneasy socioeconomic conditions in which many live, the prevailing tendency among respondents regarding esteem of Germany and German society is positive – even though this does not preclude their awareness of genuine and unsolved problematic aspects.

All in all, this general description of present-day Jewry of Germany shows that it effectively represents a case of transnational diaspora and, moreover, a quite complex one. One sees the importance of Jewishness and solidarity with Israel as two identity principles that appear together and which widely prevail in the set of collective identities. This allegiance to Israel in conjunction with Jewishness does not however preclude links and

identification also appearing – among RSJs, to be sure - with respect to the “former country.” Hence, one finds here, at least among the largest part of the respondents, two “territorialized origins,” while, on the other hand, attitudes toward the German language, culture and society also demonstrate acceptance of the present-day environment as the place where they feel at home. However, a very large minority (46.2%) of the respondents do not feel at all part of the German nation, and so feeling at home in Germany does not necessarily mean that they consider Germany a genuine homeland. From these perspectives – that are not necessarily coherent and simplistic - one may understand how respondents tackle the various questions that we asked them and how ultimately they view their own condition in contemporary Germany – for better or for worse.

### Chapter 3: Germany's Russian-Speaking Jews

#### *General description*

We saw in the previous chapters the extent to which Germany's Jewry is divided by several significant parameters – Jewish pluralism, age, income, length of stay, regions of residences etc. One major parameter is the differentiation between RSJs and Vets. This division is especially salient as it conveys differences of languages, cultures, life experience and value perspectives.

In this chapter, we turn to this divide. Aware of the overwhelming numerical superiority of RSJs among Jews in Germany, we focus on them before pursuing the data's analysis. We wanted to know to what extent one may speak of RSJs in terms of one homogeneous population, or whether we should speak of a diversity of tendencies. At this stage, 984 respondents were relevant. On all counts, the description of this part of the sample is very close to what was said with respect to the whole sample, since RSJs represent about 90% of it. It should still be noted that:

- \*The vast majority were born in the FSU: 42.3% in Russia; 42.2% in Ukraine; 9.7% in other European parts of the FSU or non-FSU Eastern European countries; and 5.9% in the Eastern parts of the FSU.
- \*All of them immigrated to Germany after age 8; furthermore: 60% reside in this country less than 10 years and only 10% are here more than 15 years.
- \* 21% of the participants are under 40; 29.6% belong to the age group 41-60; 49.4% are older than 60.
- \* The random sample yielded a majority of women of 54.6%, and 65.7% of the sample live with a spouse.
- \*70.1% have an academic degree.
- \*12.4% of them (“immigrants”) feel closest to Orthodox or another kind of Jewishness; 21.4% to liberal Judaism; 30.1% feel somewhat traditional and only 36% are secular.
- \*67.7% live in big cities in Germany whereas the rest (32.3%) live in towns of medium and small size in German terms.
- \*49.6% reside in cities that have a large Jewish community (over 1,500 people); 37% where the Jewish community is of medium size (500-1,500) and 13.4% where it is small (less than 500 people).
- \*13.8% reside in Berlin, 23.9% live in places that were formerly in East Germany, and 62.3% live in places that were West Germany.
- \*9.3% are students; 12.8% are workers or employees; 9.5% are professionals or business persons; 39.8% are unemployed who live on social welfare, and 28.6% are retired.
- \*24.8% are citizens of Germany. Among the others, the majority are citizens of Russia (23.1% ) and Ukraine (35.5%).
- \*64.6% evaluate their income as below the average income in German society, whereas the other 35.4% evaluate their income as average or above average.

\*72.3% are sons or daughters of homogeneous Jewish families, whereas the remaining 27.7% originate from mixed families.

\*65.7% live with a spouse, and for 62.7% the spouse is Jewish.

Let us also recall here the following points which are of special interest:

In terms of collective identities, solidarity with Israel and the feeling of being a part of the Jewish people are much stronger among these respondents than the sense of being part of the German nation, or that of their country of origin.

The Russian language is the most widely used language by these respondents, in daily speech, reading, with children, and among children. The only exception where Russian is less dominant in this respect concerns watching television.

As to the knowledge of languages, by their own self-evaluation, respondents' knowledge of Hebrew and Yiddish is minimal, while the majority of respondents have not yet mastered German (Table 3.1).

**Table 3.1: Knowledge of Languages (%)**

	Hebrew (n=853)	Yiddish (n=869)	German (n=955)	Russian (n=950)
Poor	90.5	82.4	31.5	0.4
Somewhat	6.7	12.2	34.5	1.4
Quite good	1.6	3.7	19.7	13.1
Good	1.2	1.7	14.3	85.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Most respondents are members of local Jewish communities. Membership in other organizations is quite low. While practical and material reasons (like access to welfare services) may account for this, only 23% describe their contacts with the community as continuous.

7.3% of the RSJ respondents are members of organizations active among RSJs. The membership rate is even lower with regard to organizations active among non-Jewish FSU immigrants (4.4%). Furthermore, as shown in Table 3.2, a majority does not have any contacts with Russian-speaking institutions in Germany whereas 56% maintain some contacts with Russian-speaking Jewish institutions.

**Table 3.2: Contacts with Institutions (%)**

	Jewish Inst. in Germany (941) (n=941)	Russian-Speaking Inst. in Ger (n=929)	Russian-Speaking Jewish Institutions (n=874)
Not at	20.1	61.1	43.9
A few	57.0	35.4	44.6
A lot	23.0	3.4	11.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Furthermore, the vast majority of the respondents attend synagogue services, although 39.5% do so only rarely. For almost half of the respondents, synagogue attendance rates are quite impressive: 25.7% attend synagogue several times a year, and 22.5% do so more frequently.

Nearly half of the respondents (45.3%) describe their inclusion in German society as satisfactory or very satisfactory; a slight majority (54.5%) feel that living as a Jew in Germany is not problematic for them. Hence, half of our RSJ respondents (49.4%) say they feel at home in Germany, and a quarter (26.5%) that they feel the same in both Germany and their former country.

In comparison with the findings of the general sample, as expected, RSJs, when alone, show a somehow lower percentage of citizenship of Germany (24.8%); less fluency in the German language; more usage of Russian; a higher percentage of unemployment and people living on social welfare (39.8%); a higher self-rating (64.6%) as belonging to income strata below the national average; a higher percentage who do not work in their professional field (46.1%), or who do not work at all (41.6%).

Numerous RSJs have intense contacts with relatives and friends in their former country - 34% describe these contacts as frequent and 27.5% as very frequent.

On the other hand, while a little over half the respondents (51.4%) describe the veterans' attitudes to the newcomers in positive terms, an important cohort (39.1%) speak of these relations as marked by mutual indifference and others (11.4%) portray them as conflictual - another 31.1% argue that these relations are both tense and cooperative and 18.4% as mainly cooperative.

Despite their propensity to endorse secular attitudes, RSJs tend to think that Judaism is primarily a religion (48%). Other results for this question include culture (40.2%); ethnicity (32%); and solidarity (29%). This result is especially impressive in view of the fact that, as mentioned above, only 12.4% of RSJ respondents feel close to orthodox Judaism. In a similar vein, RSJs tend to adopt Halachic attitudes to the crucial issue of who is a Jew, and sometimes mix Halachic and non-Halachic criteria regarding other issues.

Last but not least, RSJs tend to view tolerantly the option that their child (46.1%) or the respondent him/herself (46.9%) might marry a non-Jew.

In brief, since RSJs comprise almost 90% of the respondents, the data that apply to them exclusively are only slightly different from the general sample, and the variables presented here confirm that assessment. This means that the analyses which concluded the previous chapter are also valid when it comes to RSJs only. Beyond this general picture, however, and thanks to the size of our sample, we could delve into statistical interactions appearing between variables, and especially when considering background aspects in regard to attitudes. We will later consider in this perspective:

- (a) Jewish pluralism
- (b) Age
- (c) Length of stay in Germany
- (d) Jewish versus mixed parenthood
- (e) Jewishness of partner
- (f) Region of residence
- (g) Size of Jewish communities
- (h) Origin

(i) Self-assessed income.

Do these attributes or criteria of differentiation make a difference among RSJs with respect to the attitudes that our questionnaire investigated - collective identities, the Jewish community, the general environment and, last but not least, Jewish education?

## **Attitudes and Background**

### **(a) Jewish Pluralism**

Intervention of background features The diverse degrees and kinds of Jewish pluralism are a major factor of heterogeneity among RSJs. The most notable differences with respect to a whole series of issues concern the two extreme categories: the Orthodox, at one end and the secular at the other. The two other categories – liberals and (to some extent) traditional – tend to express intermediary attitudes. Before considering the differences in attitudes, we emphasize that these two groups are also distinct with respect to other background features – as shown in relevant tables/Vol3/C (vol. 3):

**Age** - Secular respondents tend to be older than the Orthodox; 36.1% of the Orthodox respondents are 40 or less, whereas the same figure for the secular respondents is 19.1%. Moreover, 52.1% of the secular are over 60 and the corresponding figure among the Orthodox is 29.9% (Table 387/Vol3/C).

**Region** - 35.5% of the Orthodox live in East Germany, whereas this figure is only 21.3% for the secular. In addition, 68% of secular respondents in the West, but only 46.4% of the Orthodox (Table 386/Vol3/C).

**Identity of spouse** - Out of all Orthodox respondents who live with a spouse, 78.6% have a Jewish spouse, whereas the corresponding figure for secular respondents is 54% (Table 391/Vol3/C)

In brief, the Orthodox tend to be younger than the secular, relatively more of them live in East Germany, and tend to contract homogeneous unions. In the latter respect, we underline that only a small majority of the secular respondents who live with a partner have a Jewish partner.

Jewish pluralism and attitudes Turning now to differences in attitudes, identity and identification, we find several relevant differences relating to Jewish pluralism. Table 3.3 presents the major findings.

Jewish pluralism and attitudes Turning now to differences in attitudes, identity and identification, we find several relevant differences relating to Jewish pluralism. Table 3.3 presents the major findings.

**Table 3.3: Jewish Pluralism and Attitudes**

	Orth/Ultra Orth	Liberal Judaism	Traditional	Secular
<b>1. Visiting Israel (n=872; %) (<math>\chi^2=0</math>)</b>				
Never	27.3	43.5	39.3	50.6
Once	32.7	31.0	30.5	29.1
Several times	40.0	25.5	30.2	20.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>2. Membership in Zionist or Pro-Israel Organizations (n=840; %); <math>\chi^2=0.001</math></b>				
No	83.0	93.8	92.9	94.4
Yes	17.0	6.2	7.1	5.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>3. Feeling Part of The Jewish People (n=867; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
Not at all	1.9	4.8	2.3	6.1
A little	17.9	17.6	8.8	15.4
Moderately	16.0	35.1	35.2	42.3
Very much so	64.2	42.6	53.6	36.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>4. Contacts with Jewish Institutions in Germany (n=853; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
Not at all	6.7	17.2	13.9	30.4
A few	50.5	60.6	58.3	57.6
A lot	42.9	22.2	27.8	12.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>5. Feeling About Child Marrying a Non-Jew (n=814; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
Opposed	43.3	14.3	18.5	8.0
Supports	32.0	43.4	45.2	33.4
No opposition	24.7	42.3	36.3	58.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>6. Synagogue Attendance (n=881; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
Never	1.8	7.5	4.9	23.3
Rarely	26.4	38.5	31.6	49.4
Sometimes	24.5	25.1	34.2	19.5
Frequently	47.3	28.9	29.3	7.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>7. Non-Jewish Man Who Marries a Jewish Woman (considered) (n=848; %); <math>\chi^2=0.022</math></b>				
A regular Jew	2.8	4.3	3.9	3.7
Like a Jew	9.3	21.2	23.4	26.6
A regular non-Jew	87.9	74.5	72.7	69.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>8.; Child of Non-Jewish Man and Jewish Woman (considered) (n=873; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
A regular Jew	67.9	42.6	39.5	27.5
Like a Jew	10.1	11.2	17.1	19.2
A regular non-Jew	2.8	4.3	4.2	3.5
Depends on	19.3	42.0	39.2	49.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

<b>9. Closest Jewish Friends in Germany (mostly) (n=876; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
Russian-Speaking	55.6	72.7	77.7	77.6
Non-Russian	2.8	0.5	0.4	0.3
Both	41.7	26.7	22.0	22.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>10. Knowledge of German (n=861; %); <math>\chi^2=0.001</math></b>				
Poor	18.3	30.1	29.6	36.9
Somewhat	29.8	37.7	36.5	32.2
Quite good	32.7	21.3	19.6	14.3
Good	19.2	10.9	14.2	16.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>11. Living as a Jew in Germany (n=878; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
Very problematic	9.1	5.9	3.4	10.5
Somewhat	50.0	39.4	44.5	31.4
Not problematic	40.9	54.8	52.1	58.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>12. Positive Aspects of Germany: Social Security (n=849; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
Not at all	1.9	2.2	1.1	3.0
A little	8.7	2.2	0.8	2.7
Moderately	22.3	15.2	19.2	10.0
Very much so	67.0	80.4	78.9	84.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>13. Feeling Part of Former Country's Nation (n=850; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
Not at all	50.5	30.9	25.1	22.8
A little	27.2	22.7	30.2	26.4
Moderately	15.5	33.1	36.5	36.0
Very much so	6.8	13.3	8.2	14.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>14. Feeling Part of the Russian-Speaking Community in Germany (n=779; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
Not at all	36.7	17.9	16.7	21.1
A little	29.6	27.4	23.6	19.6
Moderately	27.6	41.1	41.2	37.9
Very much so	6.1	13.7	18.5	21.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Attachment to Judaism, the Jewish People and Israel** Orthodox respondents manifest stronger attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people than the secular do. This is expressed, for instance, in questions such as feeling part of the Jewish People; contacts with Jewish institutions in Germany; giving children a Jewish education (Table 7/Vol3/C); the importance of receiving a Jewish education (Table 8 /Vol3 B); using Jewish media (Table 9/Vol3/C); negative feelings about one's child marrying a non-Jew (Table 14/Vol3/C); preferring marriage with a Jew (Table 15/Vol3/C); Jewishness of closest friends in Germany (Table 22/Vol3/C); Jewishness of Russian-speaking friends (Table 23/Vol3/C); membership in Jewish organizations in Germany (Table 25/Vol3/C);

frequency of synagogue attendance (Table 26/Vol3/C); knowledge of Yiddish (Table 28/Vol3/C); feeling part of the RSJs' community in Germany (Table 32/Vol3/C).

Items in Table 3.3 confirm this tendency.

\*64.2% of the Orthodox, for instance, feel very strongly that they are part of the Jewish people, whereas the respective figure for the secular is 36.2%.

\*42.9% of the Orthodox maintain many contacts with Jewish institutions in Germany, while the corresponding share for the secular is only 12%.

\*43.3% of Orthodox oppose their child's marrying a non-Jew while the rate for the secular is only 8%. Actually, 58.5% of the secular respondents have no objections at all to their child's marrying a non-Jew, whereas among the Orthodox this figure is only 24.7%.

\*47.3% of the Orthodox respondents attend synagogue frequently, while the respective share of the secular respondents is only 7.9%.

\*Moreover, the Orthodox respondents visit Israel more often than the others, especially when compared with secular respondents. Membership rate of the Orthodox in Zionist or pro-Israel organizations (17%), is substantially higher than in the other categories - and again especially when compared to the secular (5.6%).

Related to the above, Orthodox respondents are also far more likely to conceive Judaism and the Jewish people in halachic terms rather than the secular. This is evinced with regard to issues like: how to consider a non-Jewish man who is married to a Jewish woman (Table 11/Vol3/C); how to consider the child of a non-Jewish man and a Jewish woman (Table 12/Vol3/C) and a child of a Jewish man and a non-Jewish woman (Table 13/Vol3/C).

Table 3.3 confirms these distinctions:

\* 87.9% of the Orthodox consider a non-Jewish man who marries a Jewish woman as a regular non-Jew, while the corresponding figure for the secular is 69.8%.

\* 49.8% of the secular think that a child of a non-Jewish man and a Jewish woman should be considered according to the education given at home, whereas among the Orthodox only 19.3% share this view.

*To sum up, Jewish pluralism appears in our findings as a continuum of four categories - Orthodox, Liberal, Traditional, and Secular. This means that one cannot speak of a polarization among respondents but rather of a graduation, according to the degree of reference to halachic religiosity, to non-religious non-traditional, ethno-cultural attitudes between the two ends of the continuum. When it comes to Judaism, however, we do find substantial differences in orientation.*

*As could have been expected, Orthodox respondents are clearly far more aware of their allegiance to Judaism and to the Jewish people, more involved in the activity of Jewish institutions, and more committed to the Jewish education of their children. Clearly more than the secular, they seek a Jewish milieu and are also inclined to have RSJs as friends. In other words, they are more "Jewish" and more of them socialize with RSJs: the two seem to go together, in their eyes.*

*In addition, the Orthodox respondents are also more attached than the secular to Israel as a Jewish State. They visit it more frequently and are also more often belong to Zionist or pro-Israel organizations. They are also more rigid in their concept of who is a Jew. On the*

*other hand, secular respondents are more eager to emphasize here the education received at home as the major condition of a Jewish identity.*

**Language Use and Knowledge** When it comes to the linguistic dimension, paradoxically enough, one can see that Orthodox respondents' self-rated use of German is higher than that of the secular respondents, and that the latter rate themselves higher regarding the use of Russian. This may be explained mainly by the fact that secular respondents tend to be older than the Orthodox. These tendencies are also illustrated by reports on the languages spoken by children among themselves (Table 5/Vol3/C), respondents' contention that they experience less difficulties in acquiring German (Table 35/Vol3/C) and their self-reported knowledge of German (Table 36/Vol3/C).

Table 3.3 is also explicit here:

\*77.6% of the secular respondents' Jewish friends in Germany are Russian-speaking and the corresponding figure for the Orthodox respondents is 55.6%.

\*51.9% of the Orthodox evaluate their knowledge of German as quite good or good, whereas the corresponding figure for the secular is 30.9%.

It seems that the differences between these two categories with respect to the use of German and Russian is influenced by their age-group. The percentages of the two younger age groups (-40 and 41-60) among Orthodox are higher than those of the secular (36.1% and 34% as against 19.1% and 28.8%, respectively). Moreover, the percentage of the older age-group (61+) among the secular is higher than among the Orthodox (52.1% as against 29.9%,) (Table 387/Vol3/C). Interestingly enough, however, Orthodox respondents evaluate their knowledge of Hebrew and of Yiddish as better than the secular do.

*To sum up, the Orthodox respondents appear to know German better and use it more than the secular - who use Russian more. The younger average age of the former, and their wider connections with non-RSJs, may account for these data.*

**Inclusion in and Attitudes Toward Germany and German Society** In contrast with the findings regarding the use of German, it appears that the attachment of secular respondents to Germany and German society is stronger than among the Orthodox. This difference between these two ends of the Jewish-pluralism continuum is indicated by data that refer to several relevant issues: how problematic it is for a Jew to live in Germany (Table 16/Vol3/C); how important it is that children adopt German culture (Table 17/Vol3/C); the social perspectives open to children in this country (Table 18/Vol3/C); how beneficial Germany's social security system is (Table 19/Vol3/C); to what extent they appreciate the quality of life in this society (Table 20/Vol3/C); where they feel more at home, in comparison to their country of origin (Table 30/Vol3/C).

Table 3.3 is explicit in all these respects:

\* for 58.1% of the secular, living as Jews in Germany is by no means problematic, whereas the equivalent figure for the Orthodox is 40.9%.

\* 84.4% of the secular see social security in Germany in a very positive light, while the figure for the Orthodox is 67%.

On the other hand, quite paradoxically, secular respondents also show stronger attachment to their former country and to the Russian-speaking community in Germany than the Orthodox (Tables 31 and 33/Vol3/C). This is confirmed by Table 3.3 which shows that:

\* 50.5% of the Orthodox respondents do not feel at all part of their former country's nation, while the corresponding figure for the secular is 22.8%.

\* 21.4% of the secular feel very much as being a part of the Russian-speaking community in Germany, whereas the respective figure for the Orthodox is 6.1%.

*In summary, secular respondents appreciate the present-day environment more than the Orthodox - who feel less attached to Germany and the German culture. On the other hand, the secular feel less detached from their country of origin than the Orthodox.*

**(b) The Age Factor**

Intervention of Background Features When it comes to age differences, the main distinction concerns the youngest age stratum (-40) versus the two older ones (41-60) and (61+). Before considering the relations of age to attitudes, it should be noted that this factor is also bound to other background features. Hence, while 79.3% of the oldest stratum (61+) have an academic degree, the figure for the (-40) is only 40% (Table 396/Vol3/C); 48.1% of the (-40) evaluate their income as average or above average in German society, but the corresponding figure for the (61+) is 30.4% (Table 398/Vol3/C); 80.9% of the (61+) are from families where both father and mother are Jews, and the figure for the (-40) is only 48.2% (Table 399/Vol3/C).

*In other words, the younger are less educated than the older but enjoy a better economic position. This paradox is accounted for, most probably, by the very fact that this is a population of immigrants whose human capital accumulated in the country of origin, and lost much of its market value upon immigration. Moreover, the parents of the younger ones were less inclined to endogamy than the older generation.*

Age and Attitudes No less substantial differences appear when it comes to respondents' attitudes in the various areas investigated.

**Table 3.4: Age and Attitudes**

	-40	41-60	61+
<b>Knowledge of Hebrew (n=815 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Poor	74.4	93.9	97.0
Somewhat	18.3	4.3	2.0
Quite good	3.3	0.9	1.0
Good	3.9	0.9	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Following Israeli Events and Developments (n=917 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	4.1	0.7	1.5
A little	23.3	13.8	5.3
Moderately	33.2	36.1	31.0
Very much so	39.4	49.4	62.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

<b>Giving (have given) Children a Jewish Education (n=689 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
No Jewish education	38.8	64.9	73.8
Sunday school	20.0	14.2	6.2
Day school	23.8	10.0	11.6
Other	17.5	10.9	8.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Membership in Jewish Organizations in Germany (n=904 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
No	43.5	32.1	27.0
Yes	56.5	67.9	73.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Synagogue Attendance (n=932 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Never	21.9	15.5	6.3
Rarely	36.7	45.1	37.9
Several times a year	19.9	24.9	28.3
Frequently	21.4	14.4	27.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Child of Non-Jewish Man and Jewish Woman (considered) (n=922 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
A regular Jew	57.5	38.0	28.3
Like a Jew	10.4	14.9	18.3
A regular non-Jew	2.1	2.9	5.1
Depends on education at home	30.1	44.2	48.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Language Used for Reading (n=935 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
German	14.7	2.5	1.5
Russian	28.4	56.7	70.1
German & Russian	54.8	40.8	28.0
Other language	2.0	0.0	0.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Language Spoken with Spouse (n=748 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
German	14.1	3.8	0.5
Russian	69.6	92.4	95.7
German & Russian	13.3	3.8	3.2
Other language	3.0	0.0	0.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Knowledge of German (n=912 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Poor	7.4	19.2	51.2
Somewhat	16.8	37.6	39.9
Quite good	33.7	27.7	7.5
Good	42.1	15.5	1.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

<b>Inclusion in German Society (n=930 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not satisfactory	8.6	15.2	21.7
Somewhat satisfactory	28.4	39.9	42.2
Satisfactory	31.0	33.7	33.5
Very satisfactory	32.0	11.2	2.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Unpleasant Aspects of Germany: Memory of the Shoah (n=892 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	16.1	9.7	9.7
A little	33.9	14.1	6.7
Moderately	30.2	32.0	23.7
Very much so	19.8	44.2	59.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Unpleasant Aspects of Germany: Anti-Semitism in Germany (n=884 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	15.1	15.4	12.4
A little	35.4	19.2	11.5
Moderately	29.2	30.1	19.7
Very much so	20.3	35.3	56.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Important that Children Adopt German Culture (n=757 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	20.3	10.2	9.7
A little	21.8	8.6	7.9
Moderately	38.3	51.2	46.6
Very much so	19.5	29.9	35.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Positive Aspects of Germany: Political Regime (n=905 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	5.2	6.9	7.5
A little	19.2	7.7	5.7
Moderately	36.8	24.8	25.6
Very much so	38.9	60.6	61.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Visiting Former Country (n=908 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0.037</math></b>			
At least once a year	16.0	26.9	29.4
Once in 2 years	16.0	15.1	15.4
Less than once in 2 years	22.3	20.3	18.5
Rarely, if at all	45.7	37.6	36.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Attachment to Judaism, the Jewish People and Israel As shown by Tables 42, 43, 71 and 72/Vol3/C, the relation of identities to age strata is not one-dimensional. Hence, the (-40) illustrate greater attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people than the older strata, at least as far as the importance of giving Jewish education to children is described (Tables 49 and 50/Vol3/C). Yet, at the same time, it is those aged 61+ who report stronger feelings of belonging to the Jewish people (Table 41/Vol3/C); higher rates of membership in Jewish organizations in Germany (Table 69/Vol3/C) as well as RSJ frameworks (Table 76/Vol3/C). On the other hand, according to respondents, knowledge of Hebrew is better

among the younger while, at the same time, the older testify to stronger solidarity with Israel.

Table 3.4 corroborates the complexity of this picture.

\* 97% of the (61+) respondents rate their knowledge of Hebrew as poor, while this figure for the (40-) is 74.4%.

\*62.2% of the (61+) intensively follow Israeli events and developments whereas the respective figure for the (40-) is 39.4%.

\*73.8% of the (61+) respondents are not giving or have not given their children any Jewish education, while the similar rate for the (40-) is 38.8%.

\* 73% of the (61+) respondents are members in Jewish organizations in Germany, and the respective figure for the (40-) is 56.5%.

\* 21.9% of the respondents of the (40-) never attend synagogue services, whereas the corresponding rate for the (61+) is 6.3%.

Interestingly enough, (40-) respondents conceive Judaism and the Jewish people in more halachic terms than the (61+) – this is shown by how they view a child of a non-Jewish man and a Jewish woman (Table 52/Vol3/C) and a child of a Jewish man and a non-Jewish woman (Table 53/Vol3/C). This is confirmed by Table 3.4:

\* 57.5% of the (40-) respondents consider the child of a non-Jewish man and a Jewish woman as a regular Jew, while the figure for the (61+) is 28.3%; 48.3% of the (61+) maintain that such a child should be considered according to the education given at home, whereas the corresponding figure for the (40-) is 30.1%.

*To sum up, the different age strata illustrate different kinds of ties with Judaism, the Jewish people and Israel. The younger attach greater importance to Jewish education, and effectively try to offer it to their children. They themselves know little Hebrew, but more than the older ones, and also tend to attend synagogue services more, which is coherent with their more halachic understanding of who is a Jew. On the other hand, the older stratum is marked by stronger feelings of belonging to the Jewish people, and solidarity with Israel, and also illustrate greater readiness to join Jewish and RSJ organizations. This incoherence may be due to the fact that RSJs, old and young, are relatively new to Judaism and to relations with the Jewish world. Each age stratum encounters different realities – the older were not exposed to Jewish institutions during their early socialization; the younger are closer to Germany's Jewish institutions, though they themselves received little Jewish education at home.*

Language Usage and Knowledge More in accordance with expectations, the use of German appears to be more extensive among (40-) respondents whereas the use of Russian is more widespread among (61+) respondents. Among the latter, this is confirmed by the data concerning the language used for reading (Table 44/Vol3/C) and watching television (Table 45/Vol3/C), the language spoken with spouses (Table 46/Vol3/C), with children (Table 47/Vol3/C) and the reports about the language used among children (Table 48/Vol3/C). Russian is also the language used with their closest Jewish friends (Table 66/Vol3/C). Moreover, (61+) respondents also contend that they experience greater difficulties in acquiring German (Table 78/Vol3/C) and that they feel much more at ease with Russian (Tables 79 and 80/Vol3/C).

Table 3.4 corroborates these findings:

\*14.7% of the (40-) respondents read only in German, while the corresponding figure for the (61+) is only 1.5%. Moreover, 70.1% of the (61+) use Russian exclusively for reading – with 28.4% among the (40-).

\*14.1% of the (40-) respondents use only German with their spouse, while the corresponding figure for the (61+) is 0.5%. On the other hand, 95.7% of the (61+) use exclusively Russian with their spouse, whereas the respective figure for the (40-) is 69.6%. In spite of the difference revealed here one can however see that in all age strata, Russian is the dominant language when communicating with spouses.

\*75.8% of the (40-) evaluate their knowledge of German as quite good or good, while the respective figure for the (61+) respondents is 8.8%.

*Altogether, on all counts we see that German is gaining ground among the younger stratum, with Russian used almost exclusively in many areas of social activity. Even among the younger, Russian is still often the predominant language.*

Perspectives on Germany and German Society - The findings also reveal mixed tendencies with respect to relations with German society. In addition to the linguistic tendencies viewed in the above, we observe greater attachment to Germany and to the German society of the (40-). This is indicated in the more positive description of respondents' inclusion in German society (Table 39/Vol3/C) or feeling part of the German nation (Table 40/Vol3/C). Moreover, (40-) also underrate unpleasant aspects of life in Germany – regarding job opportunities (Tables 62 and 83/Vol3/C), the memory of the Shoah (Table 63/Vol3/C), evaluation of anti-Semitism in Germany (Table 64/Vol3/C) and personal experiences of anti-Semitism (Table 65/Vol3/C). On the other hand, one also observes an attachment to Germany and German society on the side of the (61+) when it comes to praising Germany's European and national culture (Table 59/Vol3/C), the importance attached to children's adoption of the German culture (Table 56/Vol3/C) and the appreciation of the social perspectives available to children (Table 58/Vol3/C). Moreover (61+) also appreciate the political regime more than the younger respondents do (Table 57/Vol3/C), and its system of social security (see Table 61/Vol3/C).

These contradictory tendencies are also visible in Table 3.4:

\*32% of the (40-) respondents describe their inclusion in German society as very satisfactory, whereas the figure is 2.6% for the (61+).

\* 59.9% of the (61+) respondents see the memory of the Shoah as very disturbing, while the corresponding figure for the (40-) is 19.8%.

\*At the same time, 35.8% of the (61+) respondents see it as very important that their children adopt German culture, while the corresponding figure for the (40-) is 19.5%.

\*61.2% of the (61+) respondents see Germany's political regime most favorably, while the respective figure for the (40-) is 38.9%.

*In summary, the (40-) feel a stronger sense of belonging to Germany and German society. They find here more advantages than disadvantages. The (61+), however, do have a polarized position vis-à-vis them: they too find Germany to be a place with something to offer them. While the (40-) tend mainly to underrate practical hardship, the (61+) tend more to appreciate cultural and political aspects as well as social security.*

Contacts with the “Old Country” - (61+) respondents maintain stronger contacts with their former country - family/friends (Table 73/Vol3/C) and visit there from time to time (table 74/Vol3/C). In Table 3.4, one finds that 29.4% of the (61+) respondents visit their former country at least once a year, while the corresponding figure for the younger is 16%.

*In other words, the older maintain stronger contacts with their former country than the younger, though these contacts have not completely died away among the latter.*

### **(c) Length of Stay in Germany**

Intervention of Background Features In all immigration studies, length of stay is viewed as a crucial variable accounting for immigrants’ inclusion in their new society. In our survey, as mentioned, we differentiated three groups: RSJs residing in Germany less than 10 years (10-); those of [10] 11 to 15 years of residence, and those of 16 years and more (16+). Again, the most significant differences appear between the two ends as the median group stands in-between.

Considering first the relation of length of stay and other background features, we note that 87.8% of the (16+) live in large cities, whereas the corresponding figure for (10-) is 61.3% (Table 376/Vol3/C). This relates to the fact that 78.6% of the (16+) belong to larger Jewish communities, 18.4% to medium-size communities and only 3.1% to small-size communities; the respective figures for the (10-) are: 45.1%, 38.7% and 16.2% (Table 377/Vol3/C). Moreover, 46.9% of the (16+) live in Berlin, 9.2% in East Germany and 43.9% in the West; the corresponding figures for the (10-) are: 7.2%, 27.3% and 65.5% (Table 378/Vol3/C).

It is also notable that 52.1% of the (16+) evaluate their income as average or above average with respect to German society, and this figure is 29.9% for the (10-) (Table 381/Vol3/C). Moreover, 23.5% of the (16+) are workers or employees, 24.5% are professionals or businesspeople and 16.3% are unemployed and live on social welfare; the respective figures for the (10-) are 7.9%, 5.5% and 45.1% (Table 380/Vol3/C).

Finally, 57.1% of the (16+) were born in Russia and 29.6% in Ukraine, whereas the respective figures for the (10-) are: 40.4% and 42.4% (Table 379/Vol3/C). Furthermore, 81.6% of the (16+) originate from a homogeneous family with Jewish parents while this figure for the (10-) is 67.9% (Table 382/Vol3/C). For 78.1% of the (16+) respondents who live with a spouse, this spouse is Jewish, whereas this figure is 57.7% for the (10-) (Table 383/Vol3/C).

*To sum up, the (16+) are relatively more numerous in Berlin and big cities in the Western part of Germany; they are also better off, originate more often from Russia or Ukraine; they are also more often offspring of homogeneous families and themselves live with Jewish partners. These data point to the differences in sources of recruitment of RSJs of the different waves of immigration in Germany. Other important differences appear when it comes to attitudes.*

Length of Stay and Attitudes When it comes to the length of stay and attitudes, Table 3.5 shows several relevant distinctions.

**Table 3.5: Length of Stay and Attitudes**

	10-	11-15	16+
<b>Visiting Israel (n=969 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Never	51.2	38.4	17.7
Once	29.2	32.7	26.0
Several times	19.6	29.0	56.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Feeling Part of the Jewish People (n=948 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0.002</math></b>			
Not at all	4.8	4.2	2.1
A little	15.9	14.2	7.4
Moderately	39.5	31.9	28.4
Very much so	39.8	49.7	62.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Having Contacts with Jewish Institutions in Germany (n=941 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	17.2	27.4	15.8
A few	60.4	53.4	47.4
A lot	22.5	19.2	36.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Language Used for Reading (n=980 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
German	2.9	7.0	13.3
Russian	65.6	46.0	28.6
German & Russian	30.7	46.6	57.1
Other language	0.9	0.3	1.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Language Spoken by Children among Themselves (n=668 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
German	8.5	20.2	38.5
Russian	69.0	52.2	36.9
German & Russian	21.3	26.6	24.6
Other language	1.3	1.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Knowledge of German (n=955 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Poor	40.2	21.7	9.7
Somewhat	35.4	33.6	31.2
Quite good	16.2	24.7	24.7
Good	8.1	20.0	34.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Inclusion in German Society (n=974 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not satisfactory	20.6	13.8	4.1
Somewhat satisfactory	42.0	34.9	22.7
Satisfactory	30.7	34.2	47.4
Very satisfactory	6.7	17.1	25.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Feeling More at Home (n=945 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Germany	40.2	61.0	269.2
Former country	14.9	6.5	4.4
The same in both	31.3	20.2	17.6

In neither	13.5	12.3	8.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Positive Aspects of Germany: Social Security (n=937 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	1.3	1.4	7.4
A little	2.7	2.1	5.3
Moderately	13.0	16.3	24.5
Very much so	83.0	80.2	62.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Having Contacts with Family/Friends in Former Country (n=961 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	5.4	10.1	20.2
Somewhat	24.2	38.9	39.4
Often	36.4	31.8	26.6
Very often	34.0	19.3	13.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Visits to Former Country (n=951 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
At least once a year	32.2	15.3	18.5
Once in 2 years	17.2	14.6	5.4
Less than once in 2 years	17.7	24.1	17.4
Rarely, if at all	32.9	45.9	58.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

***Attachment to Judaism, the Jewish People and Israel*** Attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people is clearly stronger among the (16+) than among the (10-): their feeling of belonging to the Jewish people is stronger (Table 87/Vol3/C); they have more contacts with Jewish institutions in Germany (Table 93/Vol3/C); they are more eager to give their children a Jewish education (Tables 94 and 95 in Vol3/C); they are more negative regarding the possibility of their child marrying a non-Jew (Table 97/Vol3/C); they are more negative about themselves marrying a non-Jew (Table 98/Vol3/C); their closest friends in Germany tend more often to be Jewish (Table 102/Vol3/C); their closest Russian-speaking friends are more often Jewish (Table 103/Vol3/C); they are more familiar with Yiddish (Table 106/Vol3/C). The (16+) also show a stronger attachment to Israel than (10-) – which is shown in the frequency of visits to Israel (Table 84/Vol3/C) and the knowledge of Hebrew (Table 105/Vol3/C).

Table 4.5 confirms these assessments:

\*62.1% of the (16+) feel very much that they are part of the Jewish people whereas the respective figure for the (10-) is 39.8%.

\*36.8% of the (16+) have many contacts with Jewish institutions in Germany, while the corresponding figure for the (10-) is 22.5%.

\*56.3% of the (16+) have visited Israel several times, while this figure for the (10-) is 19.6%.

*To sum up, and again quite paradoxically, it seems that respondents who have been longer in Germany than others show a stronger attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people, and are more ready to join Jewish institutions. A Jewish education is more important for them, than it is for recent arrivals. They also tend to live in a RSJ milieu and to exhibit solidarity with Israel. This may have two different explanations. On the one hand, it may*

*be possible that (16+) came from more Jewish milieus than the newcomers; this seems to be confirmed by the data seen in the above. On the other hand, we may also suggest that for RSJs, living in Germany encourages them to become more aware of their Jewishness and their ties with Israel. This may be supported by the fact that before immigration, RSJs were most often very remote from Judaism, and in Germany they gradually discovered it as their heritage.*

Language Usage and Knowledge - The (16+), as we mentioned, evaluate their knowledge of Hebrew and Yiddish as better than the (10-). Besides this, one can see that the use of German is more extensive among the (16+) whereas the use of Russian is wider among the (10-). This difference between the two categories is exemplified in the language used for reading (Table 88/Vol3/C) or watching television (Table 89/Vol3/C). It is also shown in the language spoken with one's spouse (Table 90/Vol3/C), with children (Table 91/Vol3/C) and among children (Table 92/Vol3/C). It is also the language used with the closest Jewish friends in Germany (Table 101/Vol3/C) and it is also indicated by the differences in self-ratings of one's knowledge of German (Table 113/Vol3/C).

Table 3.5 corroborates these findings -

\*13.3% of the (16+) use exclusively German for reading, while the respective figure for the (10-) is 2.9%. Moreover, 65.6% of the (10-) use exclusively Russian for reading, whereas the corresponding figure for the (16+) is 28.6%.

\* 38.5% of the children of the (16+) use exclusively German among themselves, whereas the corresponding figure for the (10-) is only 8.5%. Furthermore, 69% of the children of the (10-) use only Russian when speaking among themselves, while the respective figure for the (16+) is 36.9%.

\*59.1% of (16+) evaluate their knowledge of German as quite good or good, while the similar figure for the (10-) is 24.3%.

*To sum up, the (16+), as could be expected, show a wider use of German than the (10-) in different areas of activity – though Russian is still prevalent even among them, especially when socializing. In other words, German progresses with length of stay, but Russian does not lose its status. RSJs remain a speech community of their own even with the passing of years, but neither do they not tend to enclose themselves in a linguistic enclave.*

**Attitudes Toward Germany and German Society** - In the following data, the findings also reveal the stronger attachment to Germany and to German society of the (16+) (Table 85/Vol3/C). This is reflected in stronger feelings of being a part of the German nation (Table 86/Vol3/C); being at home in this country (Table 110/Vol3/C); experiencing less difficulties in acquiring German (Table 112/Vol3/C) and working in one's profession (Table 115/Vol3/C). However, on certain counts, it is the (10-) who show more positive appreciation of their lot in Germany: they are more appreciative of the promising perspectives for children (Table 99/Vol3/C), the efficiency of social security (Table 100/Vol3/C); inter-group relations within the Jewish community (Table 107/Vol3/C) and Vets' attitudes to RSJs (Table 116/Vol3/C).

Table 3.5 again confirms all these:

\*25.8% of the (16+) describe their inclusion in German society as very satisfactory, while the corresponding figure for the (10-) is 6.7%. Moreover, 69.2% of the (16+) feel more at

home in Germany when compared with their former country, whereas the corresponding figure for the (10-) is 40.2%.

\*On the other hand, 83% of the (10-) see the German social security system in a very positive light, and the respective share for the most veteran immigrants is 62.8%.

*To sum up, the (16+) who are the most veteran among RSJs feel also the strongest attachment to Germany and to German society. This, however, by no means precludes the newcomers (10-) from also showing positive appreciation of their lot in Germany – even more than the (16+) on certain counts.*

Contacts with the “Old Country” As could also be expected, the (10-) maintain wider contacts with their former country than the (16+). This tendency relates to family and friends (Table 108/Vol3/C) and also to the former country (Table 109/Vol3/C). It is a most interesting fact that (16+) also maintain non-negligible contacts with the old country.

Table 3.5 confirms this perspective:

\*70.4% of the (10-) have frequent or very frequent contacts with relatives or friends in their former country, whereas the respective figure for the (16+) is 40.4%.

\*49.4% of the (10-) travel at least once every two years to their former country, while the corresponding rate for the (16+) is 23.9%.

*Thus, while length of stay tends to diminish relations with the old country, RSJs as a whole still qualify for the notion of “transnational diaspora” since the countries of origin are still present in their current endeavors.*

#### ***(d) Jewish Versus Mixed Parenthood***

Intervention of Background Features A general characteristic of today’s Jewish diasporas is that more than a few individuals are the offspring of families where one of the parents is or was not Jewish – that is, exogamous families from a Jewish point of view. Moreover, many individuals who are Jewish are also married to or live with a non-Jew. This applies to RSJs as well, and especially so seeing the weakness of organized Jewry in the FSU, possibly more than among other Jewish populations. We found that a quarter of our respondents are offspring of exogamous families, and that slightly more than a half of the respondents originating in mixed families and who live with a spouse, have a non-Jewish spouse – as opposed to one-third of the respondents who are from homogeneous Jewish families.

The question that we wanted to investigate in this context was the extent to which this aspect makes a difference regarding the issues examined in this research. Below we analyze separately those two kinds of endogamy-versus-exogamy problématiques: we first analyze the data that concern our respondents according to their families of origin and second, according to their own families.

As far as families of origin are considered, it is worth recalling that the respondents who arrived earlier in Germany (16+) tend more to originate from homogeneous Jewish families - 81.6% of the (16+) but only 67.9% among the (10-). One must add here that 67.8% of the respondents who are from a Jewish homogeneous family and live with a

spouse, live with a Jewish spouse; the corresponding figure for respondents from a mixed family is 48.1% (Table 440/Vol3/C).

*Exogamous families of origin are by no means infrequent among RSJs in Germany, and the offspring of heterogeneous families tend more to have non-Jewish spouses.*

**(e) Parenthood Type and Attitudes**

Table 3.6 presents the impact that we found for this aspect regarding attitudes.

**Table 3. 6: Mixed Versus Homogeneous Families of Origin**

	Mixed Parenthood (26.2%)	Homogeneous family (73.8%)
<b>Feeling Solidarity with Israel (n=957 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>		
Not at all	4.5	2.3
A little	14.8	6.8
Moderately	33.3	24.4
Very much so	47.3	66.5
Total	100.0	100.0
<b>Following Israeli Events and Developments (n=954 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>		
Not at all	4.2	1.0
A little	19.8	8.5
Moderately	36.6	31.6
Very much so	39.3	58.8
Total	100.0	100.0
<b>Feeling a Part of the Jewish People (n=943 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>		
Not at all	12.0	1.5
A little	24.4	10.9
Moderately	38.0	35.3
Very much so	25.6	52.3
Total	100.0	100.0
<b>Membership in Jewish Organizations in Germany (n=942 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>		
No	48.3	25.5
Yes	51.7	74.5
Total	100.0	100.0
<b>Feeling a Part of Former Country's Nation (n=932 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>		
Not at all	20.9	31.3
A little	25.6	28.3
Moderately	36.2	30.8
Very much so	17.3	9.6
Total	100.0	100.0

**Attachment to Judaism, the Jewish People and Israel** In a general manner, respondents originating from homogeneous families show stronger attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people. It is expressed in the feeling of being part of the Jewish people (Table 118/Vol3/C); the importance of giving children a Jewish education (Table 123/Vol3/C); reservations regarding the possibility that one’s child marries a non-Jew (Table 125/Vol3/C); reservations regarding their own readiness to marry a non-Jew (Table

126/Vol3/C). On the other hand, these respondents also emphasize the more unpleasant aspects for a Jew living in Germany in the context of memories of the Shoah (Table 127/Vol3/C), anti-Semitism (Table 128/Vol3/C), and personal experience of anti-Semitism (Table 129/Vol3/C). Moreover, respondents of this category are more affiliated to Jewish organizations in Germany (Table 131/Vol3/C), attend synagogue more (Table 132/Vol3/C), and have a grasp of Yiddish (Table 134/Vol3/C).

These respondents also manifest a stronger attachment to Israel: they visit Israel more frequently (Table 117/Vol3/C), feel stronger solidarity with the State (Table 119/Vol3/C), more of them have relatives or friends there (Table 120/Vol3/C) and are in contact with them (Table 121/Vol3/C), they follow Israeli events (Table 122/Vol3/C) and are affiliated with Zionist or pro-Israel organizations (Table 130/Vol3/C).

Table 3.6 confirms these assessments:

\*52.3% originating from homogeneous families feel very strongly that they are part of the Jewish people, while the respective figure for the respondents of mixed parentage is 25.6%.

\*74.5% of the respondents from homogeneous families are members of Jewish organizations in Germany, whereas the corresponding figure for respondents from mixed parentage is 51.7%.

\* 66.5% of the respondents from homogeneous families feel a strong solidarity with Israel, while the corresponding figure for the respondents from mixed families is 47.3%.

\*58.8% of the respondents from homogeneous families follow intensely Israeli events whereas the respective figure for the respondents of mixed parentage is 39.3%.

*To sum up, the offspring of homogeneous families feel more Jewish and a stronger belonging to the Jewish people, and they are also more firmly attached to Israel. They are also more sensitive to unpleasant aspects of the life in Germany, feel greater solidarity with Israel and are interested in its development – they are also more in contact with friends and relatives living there.*

**Attachment to One's Former Country** On the other hand, individuals originating from a mixed family are more attached to their former country. They visit it more often (Table 135/Vol3/C), feel more at home there (Table 136/Vol3/C), and feel more part of the nation of their former country (Table 137/Vol3/C).

Table 3.6 also reveals the following:

\*53.5% of the respondents from mixed families feel part of their former country's nation, while the corresponding figure for the respondents from a homogeneous family is 40.4%.

*In other words, having mixed parentage is somehow related to a stronger attachment with the former country, and retaining more ties with it.*

### ***e) Jewishness of Spouse***

Intervention of Background Features We have also seen that 65.7% of RSJ respondents live with a spouse and that for 62.7% of them, that spouse is Jewish while for 37.3% this is not the case. We wanted to assess the impact of this aspect.

We found little correlation between this criterion and other background features besides the fact that 74% of the respondents who live with a spouse who is Jewish live in large cities; while the figure for those living with a non-Jewish spouse is 58.9% (Table 442/Vol3/C). As a corollary, most of the former (55.2%) reside in cities where one finds a large Jewish community whereas the respective figure for those living with a non-Jewish spouse is 39.2% (Table 443/Vol3/C).

*In summary, mixed couples are more numerous in smaller cities where the Jewish community is smaller. One line of relating these finding to some explanation may be that opportunities for finding a Jewish spouse are more limited in a small community.*

### Spouse Type and Attitudes

**Attachment to Judaism, the Jewish People and Israel** - RSJs respondents who live with a Jewish spouse show stronger attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people than those living with a non-Jewish one.

This difference is indicated in their contacts with Jewish institutions in Germany (Table 139/Vol3/C); the importance they attach to giving their children a Jewish education (Table 140/Vol3/C); their reservations regarding the eventuality that their child will marry a non-Jew (Table 142/Vol3/C); their feeling about marrying a non-Jew themselves (Table 143/Vol3/C); their relative emphasis on the issue of anti-Semitism in Germany (Table 144/Vol3/C) and personal experience of anti-Semitism (see Table 145/Vol3/C); the Jewishness of their closest friends in Germany (Table 146/Vol3/C) and of their Russian-speaking friends (Table 147/Vol3/C); and finally, the frequency of their attendance at synagogue services (Table 149/Vol3/C).

Regarding attitudes toward Israel, these respondents also visit the country more frequently (Table 138/Vol3/C) and more of them are members of Zionist and pro-Israel organizations (Table 148/Vol3/C).

Table 3.7 shows that correlations exist between respondents' spouse type and their attitudes toward the issues at hand.

**Table 3.7: Jewish Versus Non-Jewish Spouses and Attitudes**

	Non-Jewish Spouse	Jewish Spouse
<b>Visiting Israel (n=693; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>		
Never	53.1	36.1
Once	27.1	31.7
Several times	19.8	32.2
Total	100.0	100.0
<b>Feeling About Child Marrying a Non-Jew (n=667; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>		
Opposed	6.1	21.1
Not enthusiastic but supports	31.7	43.5
No opposition at all	62.2	35.4
Total	100.0	100.0

<b>Closest Friends in Germany (mostly) (n=699; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>		
Jewish	24.8	40.5
Non-Jewish	1.1	1.1
Both	74.0	58.4
Total	100.0	100.0
<b>Visiting Former Country (n=684 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>		
At least once a year	31.4	21.6
Once in 2 years	19.0	14.3
Less than once in 2 years	20.9	20.4
Rarely, if at all	28.7	43.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Table 3.7 concurs with these conclusions:

\* 21.1% of the respondents who live with a Jewish spouse are opposed to their child’s eventually marrying a non-Jew; while the respective figure for those who live with a non-Jewish spouse is 6.1%.

\*40.5% of the former have exclusively Jewish close friends and this figure is 24.8% for those who live with a non-Jewish spouse.

\*36.1% of the former never visited Israel, whereas the respective share for respondents who live with a non-Jewish spouse is 53.1%.

*In other words, endogamous RSJs show stronger attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people than exogamous RSJs. This is indicated in all respects investigated and it concurs with a less positive perspective on Jewish life in Germany and stronger propensity to belong to a homogeneous RSJ milieu – including more frequent attendance at synagogue services. This is also compounded by stronger feelings of solidarity with Israel.*

Contacts with the Country of Origin Respondents who live with a non-Jewish spouse maintain stronger contacts with their former country; they have more contacts with relatives or friends who remained in the former country (Table 150/Vol3/C) and visit there more frequently (Table 151/Vol3/C).

Table 3.7 confirms this tendency:

\*50.4% of the respondents who live with a non-Jewish spouse travel at least once every two years to their former country, whereas the corresponding figure for respondents living with a Jewish spouse is 35.9%.

*To sum up, respondents living with a non-Jewish spouse maintain stronger contacts with their former country.*

**(f) Region of Residence**

Interventions of Background Features An additional criterion of differentiation among RSJs concerns their region of residence at the time of the research. We differentiated here between Berlin (13.8%), East Germany (23.9%) and West Germany(62.3%). We have seen that the more veteran RSJs (16+) are relatively more numerous in Berlin and in the

Western part of Germany. On the other hand, Orthodox respondents are relatively more numerous in the East when compared to secular ones. It should be added that one does not find any large Jewish community in the East (Table 422/Vol3/C); that RSJs who were born in Russia are relatively more numerous in Berlin, and that in the East there are more people in the younger age-category. Moreover, one finds in Berlin relatively more respondents who were born in Russia (Table 423/Vol3/C) and belong to the elder category of age (Table 425/Vol3/C). Possibly more crucial, 48.9% of the respondents in the East are unemployed, while their share for Berlin is 30.1% (Table 426/Vol3/C). 45.9% of the respondents in Berlin evaluate their income as average or above average with respect to German society while the corresponding rates are 32.9% for the West and only 20% for the East (Table 427/Vol3/C). Last but not least, while 75.3% of the respondents in Berlin who live with a spouse, live with a Jewish one, this figure is 57.4% for respondents in the East (Table 428/Vol3/C).

*In other words, the diverse regional categories of RSJs do not differ greatly from each other. Principally, one may discern that the non-Orthodox, the more veteran, and the more affluent are relatively more numerous in Berlin and in West Germany, in comparison with the poorer, the more recent arrivals, and the Orthodox, who are relatively more numerous in the East. Moreover, the unemployed are also relatively more numerous in the East.*

### **Region of Residence and Attitudes**

In certain respects, there are some significant differences between RSJs, according to their region of residence.

**Attachment to Judaism, the Jewish People and Israel** It indeed appears that some correlations can be found between region of residence and attitudes toward the issues at stake. Hence, respondents from the East manifest a weaker attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people than the respondents from the West and especially from Berlin. This difference is indicated in feeling part of the Jewish people (Table 186/Vol3/C); contacts with Jewish institutions in Germany (Table 192/Vol3/C); importance attached to the Jewish education of children (Tables 193 and 194/Vol3/C); reservations regarding the possibility of one's child – or oneself - marrying a non-Jew (Tables 200 and 201 in Vol3/C); Jewishness of one's closest friends in Germany (Table 208/Vol3/C) and of Russian-speaking friends (Table 209/Vol3/C). The respondents from the East also show a weaker attachment to Israel than in Berlin and the West as expressed in the lower frequency of visits to Israel (Table 185/Vol3/C); weaker sense of solidarity with the Jewish State (Table 187/Vol3/C); less interest in following Israeli events (Table 188/Vol3/C); a lower rate of membership in Zionist or pro-Israel organizations (Table 210/Vol3/C); and less knowledge of Hebrew (Table 212/Vol3/C).

Table 3.8 illustrates these tendencies:

**Table 3.8: Region of Residence and Attitudes**

	Berlin	East	West
<b>Feeling Solidarity with Israel (n=962 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	3.1	0.9	3.7
A little	2.3	20.1	6.0
Moderately	32.6	30.3	24.0

Very much so	62.0	48.7	66.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Membership of Zionist or Pro-Israel Organizations (n=923 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
No	95.4	98.2	89.9
Yes	4.6	1.8	10.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Membership of Zionist or Pro-Israel Organizations (n=923 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Opposed	34.1	9.2	13.8
Not enthusiastic but supports	36.6	26.6	43.1
No opposition at all	29.3	64.3	43.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Closest Friends in Germany (mostly) (n=973; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Jewish	44.0	20.1	38.0
Non-Jewish	2.2	1.3	1.2
Both	53.7	78.6	60.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Language Spoken by Children Among Themselves (n=668 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0.04</math></b>			
German	20.7	11.3	15.0
Russian	58.7	71.3	57.5
German & Russian	19.6	17.3	26.1
Other language	1.1	0.0	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Positive Aspects of Germany: Economic Situation (n=918; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	2.5	3.9	2.6
A little	8.3	3.0	7.4
Moderately	42.5	21.6	29.8
Very much so	46.7	71.4	60.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Working in Profession (n=943; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
No	57.5	32.2	49.2
Yes	15.0	10.3	12.5
Unemployed	27.6	57.5	38.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Feeling Part of the Russian-Speaking Community in Germany (n=854; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	15.4	14.8	23.5
A little	16.2	35.0	20.4
Moderately	40.2	35.9	40.9
Very much so	28.2	14.3	15.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* 48.7% of respondents in the East feel strong solidarity with Israel, whereas the corresponding figures for respondents in Berlin and the West are 62% and 66.3%.

\* only 1.8% in the East are members of Zionist or pro-Israel organizations, while the figures for the other two categories are 4.6% in Berlin and 10.1% in the West.

\* 64.3% in the East have no opposition at all to their child marrying a non-Jew, while the figures in Berlin and the West 43.1% and 29.3%, respectively[in the West].

\*for 20.1% in the East, the closest friends in Germany are exclusively Jewish, while the figures are 38% in Berlin and 44% in the West.

*To sum up, respondents residing in the East appear systematically less committed to Judaism, the Jewish people and Israel. This appears in several respects and may be explained by the fact that this region has mostly small communities, often quite distant from bigger Jewish centers. More isolated, these Jews are very much dependent on their environment, and thus more exposed to its culture and orientations.*

**Language Use and Knowledge** We already know that RSJs in the East tend to speak Russian more, and that respondents elsewhere tend to speak German more. These differences are exemplified in watching television (Table 189/Vol3/C) and the languages children speak among themselves (Table 191/Vol3/C).

Table 3.8 confirms this wider use of Russian among respondents in the East when compared with the West and Berlin.

*To sum up, in contrast with the above, it appears that RSJs living in the East use Russian more than in the West or in Berlin. One may reconcile the two disparate tendencies by the fact that the respondents are often more recent arrivals than those in other parts of Germany.*

**Inclusion in and Attitudes Toward Germany and German Society** - On the other hand, attachment to Germany and German society is weaker in Berlin than in both the West and the East. This is elicited in the importance given to the possibility that children adopt German culture (Table 202/Vol3/C) and in the emphasis on some positive aspects of life in Germany – in the realms of economy (Table 203/Vol3/C) social security (Table 205/Vol3/C), culture (Table 204/Vol3/C), quality of life (Table 206/Vol3/C) or veteran-newcomer relations (Tables 213 and 224/Vol3/C).

Table 3.8 confirms that:

\* 46.7% of the respondents in Berlin see the economic situation in Germany as attractive, while the respective figures in the West and the East are 60.1% and 71.4%, correspondingly.

\* on the other hand, 27.6% of the respondents in Berlin are unemployed, whereas the corresponding rates for the respondents from the West and the East are 38.3% and 57.5%, respectively.

*To sum up, quite unexpectedly, attachment to Germany and German society is weaker in Berlin than elsewhere in Germany, and Jews there consider the country as less attractive. This, in spite of the fact that Berliners suffer less from unemployment than other RSJs in Germany – especially in the East. This is possibly due to the more critical mind that reigns in Berlin in general vis-à-vis society as a whole.*

**Attachment to the Russian-Speaking Community in Germany** - The attachment of the respondents in Berlin to the Russian-speaking community (Jewish and non-Jewish) in Germany is stronger than the one manifested by respondents in the West and the East. This difference is exemplified by stronger feelings of being a part of the Russian-speaking Jewish community in Germany (Table 216/Vol3/C); feelings of being a part of the Russian-speaking community in Germany (Table 217/Vol3/C); membership in an organization active among RSJs (Table 218/Vol3/C).

This tendency is also illustrated in Table 3.8:

\* 28.2% of the respondents in Berlin feel strongly that they are part of the Russian-speaking community in Germany, while the corresponding figures for respondents in the West and the East are 15.2% and 14.3%, respectively.

*To sum up, the attachment of the respondents in Berlin to the Russian-speaking community (Jewish and non-Jewish) in Germany is stronger than the one manifested by respondents in the West and the East. This may well be due to the larger numbers of both RSJs and Russian-speaking non-Jews and the number of clubs, centers of entertainment available to Berlin Jews – among RSJs as well as among Russian-speaking non-Jews.*

### **(g) Size of Jewish Communities**

Intervention of Background Features We also considered differences among RSJs that relate to the size of Jewish communities. We have already seen that large communities are not found in the East and that the earlier RSJ immigrants to Germany tend to concentrate more than others in the country's larger cities. We may add now the following:

\*46.1% of the respondents in the large communities were born in Russia, while the corresponding figure for respondents in the small Jewish communities is 31.8% (Table 413/Vol3/C).

\* 58.3% of the respondents in the large Jewish communities belong to the older age group (61+), whereas the respective figure for small Jewish communities is 39.7% (Table 415/Vol3/C).

\*48.6% of the respondents in the medium-size Jewish communities are unemployed living on social welfare, and the similar figure in large Jewish communities is 33.2% (Table 416/Vol3/C).

\*43.6% of the respondents in the large Jewish communities evaluate their income as average or above average with respect to German society whereas the respective figures are 29.9% for medium-size Jewish communities and 20.6% for small Jewish communities (Table 418/Vol3/C).

\* 70.3% of the respondents in large Jewish communities who live with a spouse, live with a Jewish spouse; the figure for the respondents in small Jewish communities is 45.9% (Table 419/Vol3/C).

\* 28% of the respondents in the large Jewish communities have German citizenship while the corresponding figure for the small Jewish communities is 17.5% (Table 417/Vol3/C).

*To sum up, in the large Jewish communities (Berlin and the West) and somehow in contrast with small and medium-size communities, RSJ immigrants are more veteran, more of them originate from Russia, and are older. Economically speaking, they are less unemployed, more affluent, less subject to assimilation, and more of them have obtained German citizenship.*

### **Size of Jewish Community and Attitudes.**

We also found correlations between this dimension and attitudes.

**Attachment to Judaism, the Jewish People and Israel** - Attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people is greater among respondents in large Jewish communities than in medium

and small ones. This difference is expressed in the importance attached to the Jewish education of children (Tables 157 and 158/Vol3/C); reservations about one's child or oneself marrying a non-Jew (Tables 162 and 163/Vol3/C); the Jewishness of one's closest friends in Germany (Table 170/Vol3/C) and of Russian-speaking friends (Table 171/Vol3/C). Attachment to Israel is also slightly stronger among respondents in large Jewish communities as indicated in interest shown in Israeli events (Table 154/Vol3/C) and membership of Zionist or pro-Israel organizations (Table 172/Vol3/C).

This tendency is exemplified in Table 3.9:

\*36.5% of the respondents in large communities have no opposition at all to their child marrying a non-Jew, whereas the corresponding figures for respondents from medium and small Jewish communities are 54.1% and 60.5%, respectively.

\*12% of the respondents in large communities are members of Zionist or pro-Israel organizations, while the respective figures for respondents in medium and small communities are 3% and 1.5% respectively.

*To sum up, members of large communities are more committed to Judaism, the Jewish people and Israel. These differences, to be sure, are not drastic and may be related to the fact that large communities have also many more Jewish institutions and a stronger presence in the public scene.*

**Table 3.9: Size of Jewish Community and Attitudes**

	Large Jewish Community	Medium Jewish community	Small Jewish Community
<b>Membership in Zionist or Pro-Israel Organizations (n=923 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
No	88.0	97.0	98.5
Yes	12.0	3.0	1.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Feeling about Child Marrying a Non-Jew (n=901 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Opposed	22.4	8.0	10.1
Not enthusiastic but supports	41.1	37.9	29.4
No opposition at all	36.5	54.1	60.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Working in Profession (n=943 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0.003</math></b>			
No	52.3	41.7	36.9
Yes	12.1	12.5	12.3
Unemployed	35.5	45.8	50.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Positive Aspects of Germany: Economic Situation (n=918 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	2.1	2.8	6.3
A little	8.5	5.1	3.1
Moderately	35.7	24.1	22.7
Very much so	53.8	68.0	68.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

<b>Feeling Part of the Russian-Speaking Community in Germany (n=854 ;%); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>			
Not at all	18.6	25.8	9.8
A little	19.6	23.1	38.2
Moderately	41.0	36.6	42.3
Very much so	20.9	14.4	9.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Inclusion in and Attitudes Toward Germany and German Society** In this respect as well, one finds mixed tendencies. Respondents in large communities show greater attachment to Germany and German society regarding the emphasis given to unpleasant aspects of Jewish life in Germany - anti-Semitism in Germany (Table 167/Vol3/C) or finding a job in one's profession (Table 183/Vol3/C). Respondents in medium and small Jewish communities manifest a stronger attachment to Germany and German society, through emphasis on positive aspects of Jewish life in Germany such as in the area of the economic situation (Table 164/Vol3/C), social security (Table 165/Vol3/C) or veterans' attitude to newcomers (Table 184/Vol3/C).

These tendencies are shown in Table 3.9:

\*35.5% of the respondents in large communities are unemployed, while the respective figures for respondents in medium and small Jewish communities are 45.8% and 50.8%.

\*53.8% of the respondents in large communities see the economic situation in Germany as very attractive and the corresponding figure for respondents in medium and small communities is 68%.

*To sum up, in many respects, respondents in large communities show greater attachment than in other communities to Germany and German society, but the contrary is true in other respects.*

**Attachment to the Russian-Speaking Community in Germany** The attachment of respondents from large communities to the RSJ community in Germany and to the Russian-speaking community are both stronger than that shown by respondents in the medium and small Jewish communities. This difference is shown in their sense of belonging to the Russian-speaking Jewish community (Table 176/Vol3/C) and the Russian-speaking community in Germany (Table 177/Vol3/C); membership in organizations active among RSJs (Table 178/Vol3/C) and membership in organizations active among Russian-speaking people (Table 179/Vol3/C). This tendency is also illustrated in Table 3.9.

*To sum up, the attachment of respondents in large communities to the RSJ community in Germany and to the Russian-speaking community is somehow stronger than that shown by respondents in other communities.*

**(h) Origin**

Background Features We also considered the criterion of RSJs' origins. The main differences, in this respect emerge between respondents that were born in Russia (R) or Ukraine(U) and those born in other parts of the Former Soviet Union (O). We have already

seen that R and U tend to be more veteran than O, and to concentrate in Berlin and other large cities and communities. Let us add now additional applications of this criterion to other background features:

\* 53.4% of R and 50.5% of U belong to the oldest age group (61+), while the respective figure for O is 29.3%; moreover, 28.2% of R and 27.3% of U are from the 41-60 age-group, whereas the corresponding rate for O is 43.1% (Table 369/Vol3/C).

\*76% of R and U have an academic degree, while the similar figure for O is 62.1% (Table 371/Vol3/C).

\*32.6% of R are retired from work and the respective rate for U is 17.9% (Table 372 Vol3/C).

\*26.8% of R and 28.6% of U hold German citizenship whereas the corresponding figures vary between 9.2% and 6% for O (Table 373/Vol3/C).

\* 35.8% of R and 38.9% of U evaluate their income as average or above average with respect to German society; the respective figure for O is 22.2% (Table 374/Vol3/C).

\*55.2% of O originate from Jewish homogeneous families; the figure for the other categories is 70% (Table 375/Vol3/C).

*To sum up, RSJs from Russia or Ukraine tend to be more veteran and to concentrate in large cities and communities. They also are more numerous in the older age-group and among the unemployed. At the same time, they tend to be more educated, more affluent, and more of them have obtained German citizenship. Their family background, moreover, is also more homogeneously Jewish.*

### Origins and Attitudes.

In Table 3.10, a further examination is made of attitudes, using a more detailed differentiation between origins: Russia, Ukraine, other European parts of the former Soviet Union (to which we add non-FSU Eastern European countries), and the rest of the FSU.

**Table 3.10: RSJs' Specific Origins and Attitudes**

	Russia	Ukraine	FSU Eur+East Eur	FSU (rest)
<b>Membership in Jewish Organizations in Germany (n=946; %); <math>\chi^2=0.02</math></b>				
No	34.5	32.1	18.1	35.7
Yes	65.5	67.9	81.9	64.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Visiting Former Country (n=951; %); <math>\chi^2=0.008</math></b>				
At least once a year	28.0	25.6	23.9	12.5
Once in 2 years	15.8	16.0	17.4	1.8
Less than once in 2	19.3	20.6	15.2	23.2
Rarely, if at all	36.9	37.8	43.5	62.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

<b>Feeling Part of Former Country's Nation (n=937; %); <math>\chi^2=0</math></b>				
Not at all	26.7	27.2	33.0	40.0
A little	19.9	34.3	33.0	27.3
Moderately	35.0	31.5	28.4	27.3
Very much so	18.4	7.1	5.7	5.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Regarding the relation of origin to attitudes, we are unable to point to any consistent pattern. Nevertheless, we can indicate some interesting differences.

\*Respondents who were born in the European parts of the FSU (without Russia and Ukraine) and Eastern Europe, tend more to belong to Jewish organizations in Germany.

\*Respondents of the same category tend to visit their former country less frequently than the respondents from the other categories.

\*The feeling of being part of the former country's nation is stronger among R than among the other groups.

These findings, as well as all other differences by origin, appear in Table 231—Table 248/Vol3/C.

### **(1) Self-Rated Income and Level of Education**

*We also investigated self-rated income – whether average or above average versus below average – as well as [higher] education level – differentiating individuals who have an academic degree and those who do not – but we did not obtain consistent correlations with attitudes among our RSJ subjects in any of these respects.*

### **Summary: Type of Transnational Diaspora**

In this chapter, we analyzed the tendencies characterizing the RSJs who nowadays compose about 90% of the Jews living in Germany. We saw in the previous chapter the general statistical description of the sample which is very close to, if not identical with, the description of RSJs as a whole. In the present chapter we concentrated solely on RSJs considering the interactions of background features and their relations to respondents' attitudes toward themselves as Jews, the Jewish community, and their environment.

As far as *interactions between background features* are concerned, our principal findings can be summarized as follows:

(1) We have seen that *Jewish pluralism* appears as a continuum of four categories - Orthodox, Liberal, traditional and secular. This means that one cannot speak of a polarization among respondents but rather of a graduation from acceptance of halachic religiosity, non-halachic religiosity, non-religious – traditionalism and secular identity. Moreover, the Orthodox tend to be younger than the secular, to be relatively more numerous in Eastern Germany – although only a minority of them lives there - and to contract homogeneous unions in greater numbers.

This latter feature creates a clear contrast with the secular of whom only a slight majority have a Jewish spouse. Actually, exogamous families of origin are not infrequent among RSJs and offspring of heterogeneous families tend more to have non-Jewish spouses. Moreover, mixed couples are more numerous in smaller cities where the Jewish community is smaller – possibly because opportunities to find a Jewish spouse are more limited there than in a large community.

(2) Regarding the *length of stay* in Germany the influence of which combines with the *regional dimension*, it appears that the (16+) are relatively more numerous in Berlin, and Western-German large cities than more recent newcomers. They are also better off – and number relatively less unemployed - they originate more often from Russia or Ukraine; are more often offspring of homogeneous families and tend more than others to have Jewish spouses.

(3) The *origins* of RSJs also tend partially to combine with length of stay and the regional dimension: RSJs originating from Russia or Ukraine tend to be more veteran and to concentrate in Western-German larger cities and to come from homogeneously Jewish families. As a factor of its own, respondents originating from Russia or Ukraine also tend to be more numerous in the older age stratum and, therefore, among the unemployed. This, notwithstanding the fact that they tend to be more educated and more of them possess German citizenship.

As far as **background features relate to attitudes**, and when we take each of our background features and consider its correlations with the issues at hand, our principal findings are as follows:

(1) *Jewish Pluralism* Orthodox respondents certainly show stronger allegiance to Judaism and to the Jewish people. We saw that they are more involved in Jewish institutions, and more committed to the Jewish education of their children. Clearly more than the secular, they look for a milieu that is Jewish and are also inclined to have RSJs as friends. They are more “Jewish” – in religious-halachic terms - and also more RSJs. The two go together, in their eyes. They are also more attached than the secular to Israel as a Jewish State. On the other hand, the Orthodox also seem to know German better and use it more than the secular - who use Russian more. On the other hand, secular respondents appreciate the environment more than the Orthodox, who feel less attached to Germany and the German culture. In addition, the secular feel less detached from their country of origin.

(2) *Exogamy versus Endogamy* We have also seen that Orthodox Jews are more often the offspring of homogeneous families who, in general – whether or not Orthodox - feel more Jewish and stronger belongingness to the Jewish People. They are more firmly reluctant – for their children and themselves – concerning the principle of the non-homogeneous Jewish family. Offspring of endogamous families are also more sensitive to unpleasant aspects of the life in Germany and demonstrate more solidarity with Israel– have stronger contacts with friends and relatives living there. On the other hand, offspring of mixed families are more bound to the former country. On all counts, the same tendencies appear when it concerns RSJs who live with a Jewish spouse, in comparison with those who live with a non-Jewish spouse.

(3) *The Age Factor* The age factor also relates to relevant differences in attitudes. Considering first the older, in comparison to the younger strata, they show a stronger sense of belonging to the Jewish People and solidarity with Israel. Like the younger, they also

appreciate what they find in Germany, especially in the domain of culture, the political regime, and welfare. Moreover, they continue to use Russian almost exclusively in most areas of activity and maintain stronger contacts than the younger with their former country. The younger ascribe more importance to Jewish education, and effectively try to obtain it for their children. They also attend synagogue services more often. On the other hand, German is gaining ground among them and they also feel a stronger sense of belonging to German society, where they find more advantages than disadvantages.

(4) *Length of Stay* - Length of stay appears to influence attitudes in the same direction as age but in the contrary sense: the longer the length of stay, the more individuals tend to adopt attitudes typical of the younger. Hence, the more veteran RSJs use German more than the less veteran – even though Russian is still dominant in several spheres. They also feel more attached to Germany and to German society. Length of stay also tends to diminish the relation to the old country.

(5) *Region of Residence* - Regarding geographical regions, residents in the East appear less committed to Judaism, the Jewish people and Israel. They also use Russian more than in the West or in Berlin, which we explain by their having arrived more recently than RSJs in those other areas. Yet it is in Berlin where we found weaker attachment to Germany and German society. This, in spite of the fact that Berliners suffer less from unemployment than others – especially in the East. This is possibly due to the more critical opinions that reign in Berlin in general vis-à-vis society. Berliners, moreover, show stronger attachment to the Russian-speaking community (Jewish and non-Jewish). This may be due to the more intense associative and cultural life in the city of both RSJs and Russian-speaking non-Jews.

(6) *Size of Jewish Community* - In several respects, the impact of region overlaps that of the size of communities, as communities in the East are most often small, while in the West communities are mostly medium-size and large – not to speak of Berlin, which is the largest. Hence, in Berlin and the large communities (in the West), RSJ immigrants are more veteran and older. They are less unemployed, more affluent, and more of them have German citizenship. They are also more committed to Judaism, the Jewish people and Israel. These differences are not drastic and may be related to the fact that large communities are capable of building stronger institutions and have a stronger presence on the public scene. At the same time, in certain respects, members of large communities also show a greater attachment to Germany and German society and also to the Russian-speaking community.

These findings substantiate our conceptualization of “transnational diaspora,” but they also elicit a special kind of transnational diaspora. The concept itself refers to communities which have emigrated to new societies but continue to be somewhat committed to their original homeland, its language, and culture at the same time that they are acclimatizing themselves to their new environment. In the light of this definition, RSJs actually constitute a special case of transnational diaspora since its members tend to refer themselves to two – not one – original homelands: the FSU and Israel.

As recent immigrants from the FSU, RSJs, indeed, continue to speak Russian, refer to Russian culture, to maintain contacts with relatives and friends left behind as well as to pay visits to the “old country.” On the other hand, RSJs also identify with Israel as Jews; they know people – relatives and friends – who settled in Israel since the collapse of the USSR; they follow events in the Middle-East, and show solidarity for the Jewish State, as

the State of the Jews. These two simultaneous allegiances to “homelands” that are both distant underlines the peculiarity of this transnational diaspora.

However, as shown by our data throughout this chapter, like any case of transnational diaspora, we see here too the development of a pluralism of formulations of the collective identity, diverse degrees of identification with the collective, and different attitudes toward the new environment as well as toward the original homelands. These differences relate, in varying manners and degrees, to contingencies like age, region, length of stay, origin, and size of community.

Hence, as in many other cases of transnational diaspora, here too we find collective boundaries that are far from rigid: exogamy has become an important aspect in the building of this collective and is, itself one of the circumstances that account for internal variance of attitudes and collective identification.

Still we must recall at this point that, whatever the numerical importance of RSJs in the Jewish community of Germany, another trait of their peculiarity as a transnational diaspora is the fact that they joined another, more veteran Jewish population. The question is then if one may speak today of the formation of two Jewries or one on German soil. The next chapter looks at this issue.

## Chapter 4: Newcomers and Veterans: One Jewry?

### The Question Under Study

To answer the question whether we can speak of one Jewry or two in Germany, this chapter compares our RSJs and Vet respondents. To grasp the lines of development of these populations, we focus here on respondents aged forty and less in both categories. This is the generation that represents the future of the Jewry in this country. In addition, and for more practical reasons, this procedure also concurs with the fact that the means of data collection that we used brought out an over-representation of this age-stratum among the Vets who were reached by our interviewers.

The comparison focuses on selected variables and follows more or less the same lines of analysis used in the previous chapters. Regarding the convergent tendencies of RSJs and Vets, it is grounded on tables referring to respondents aged (40-) already presented in the previous chapters while regarding the divergences, we concentrate our main data in Table 4.1. In total, RSJs aged (40-) numbered 197 and Vets of the same age bracket, 152.

**Table 4.1: Divergences Between RSJs and Vets Aged 40-**

	RSJs	Veterans	p-value
<b>1. Self-rated Income Level (%)</b>			
	(n=189)	(n=111)	
Below average	51.9	27.0	0.00
Average and above	48.1	73.0	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>2. Feeling Part of the Jewish People (%)</b>			
	(n=192)	(n=149)	
Not at all	8.3	1.3	0.00
A little	19.8	8.7	0.01
Moderately	29.2	17.4	0.03
Very much so	42.7	72.5	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>3. Feeling Solidarity with Israel (%)</b>			
	(n=191)	(n=149)	
Not at all	4.7	4.0	0.76
A little	13.6	8.1	0.21
Moderately	28.3	15.4	0.01
Very much so	53.4	72.5	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>4. Contacts with Jewish Institutions in Germany (%)</b>			
	(n=194)	(n=152)	
Not at all	23.7	6.6	0.00
A few	48.5	35.5	0.04
A lot	27.8	57.9	0.00

Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>5. Membership of Zionist or Pro-Israel Organizations (%)</b>			
	(n=186)	(n=151)	
No	91.9	78.1	0.00
Yes	8.1	21.9	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	
Other	3.0	9.2	
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>6. Child of a Non-Jewish Man and a Jewish Woman (considered) (%)</b>			
	(n=193)	(n=152)	
A regular Jew	57.5	74.3	0.00
Like a Jew	10.4	11.2	0.78
A regular non-Jew	2.1	0.0	0.10
Depends on education at home	30.1	14.5	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>7. Child of a Non-Jewish Woman and a Jewish Man (considered) (%)</b>			
	(n=195)	(n=150)	
A regular Jew	6.2	4.7	0.66
Like a Jew	17.9	23.3	0.38
A regular non-Jew	31.8	40.0	0.23
Depends on education at home	44.1	32.0	0.05
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>8. Describing Newcomers' Contribution to Jews in Germany (%)</b>			
	(n=180)	(n=145)	
Negative	12.8	26.2	0.01
Positive	87.2	73.8	0.01
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>9. Closest Jewish Friends in Germany (%)</b>			
	(n=195)	(n=151)	
Russian-Speaking	62.6	35.1	0.00
Non-Russian-Speaking	1.5	23.2	0.00
Both	35.9	41.7	0.44
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>10. Language Spoken with Spouse (%)</b>			
	(n=135)	(n=65)	
German	14.1	60.0	0.00
Russian	69.6	4.6	0.00
German & Russian	13.3	26.2	0.09
Other language	3.0	9.2	0.22
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>11. Language Used for Reading (%)</b>			
	(n=197)	(n=151)	
German	14.7	86.1	0.00
Russian	28.4	0.7	0.00
German & Russian	54.8	9.3	0.00
Other language	2.0	4.0	0.45
Total	100.0	100.0	

<b>12. Watching Television (%)</b>			
	(n=189)	(n=147)	
German	42.3	82.3	0.00
Russian	17.5	0.0	0.00
German & Russian	38.6	10.9	0.00
Other language	1.6	6.8	0.06
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>13. Knowledge of Hebrew (%)</b>			
	(n=180)	(n=150)	
Poor	74.4	39.3	0.00
Somewhat	18.3	35.3	0.00
Quite good	3.3	18.0	0.00
Good	3.9	7.3	0.33
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>14. Feeling Part of the German Nation (%)</b>			
	(n=196)	(n=151)	
Not at all	45.4	16.6	0.00
A little	25.5	33.1	0.24
Moderately	24.0	39.7	0.01
Very much so	5.1	10.6	0.14
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>15. Positive Aspects of Germany: Political Regime (%)</b>			
	(n=193)	(n=150)	
Not at all	5.2	7.3	0.58
A little	19.2	40.7	0.00
Moderately	36.8	39.3	0.71
Very much so	38.9	12.7	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>16. Positive Aspects of Germany: Economic Situation (%)</b>			
	(n=189)	(n=147)	
Not at all	3.7	6.8	0.37
A little	10.6	42.9	0.00
Moderately	31.7	36.1	0.56
Very much so	54.0	14.3	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>17. Positive Aspects of Germany: Promising Perspectives for Children (%)</b>			
	(n=104)	(n=59)	
Not at all	1.9	6.8	0.31
A little	5.8	30.5	0.00
Moderately	21.2	40.7	0.03
Very much so	71.2	22.0	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>18. Positive Aspects of Germany: Social Security (%)</b>			
	(n=192)	(n=147)	
Not at all	1.0	2.0	0.61
A little	5.2	15.6	0.01
Moderately	22.9	50.3	0.00

Very much so	70.8	32.0	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>19. Positive Aspects of Germany: Quality of Life (%)</b>			
	(n=192)	(n=148)	
Not at all	1.6	0.7	0.58
A little	2.1	12.2	0.00
Moderately	20.3	48.0	0.00
Very much so	76.0	39.2	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	
<b>20. Unpleasant Aspects of Germany: Difficulties in Finding a Suitable Job</b>			
	(n=185)	(n=144)	
Not at all	16.2	66.7	0.00
A little	15.7	21.5	0.33
Moderately	27.6	9.7	0.00
Very much so	40.5	2.1	0.00
Total	100.0	100.0	

## Convergences and Divergences

**(1) The Socioeconomic Dimension** Table 4.1 first shows that RSJs and Vets are clearly separated at the level of their self-perceived income: RSJs are divided by half by their perceptions of their incomes along the line “below, versus average or above;” Vets are divided into one quarter of “below” versus three-quarters of “average or above.” This divide is not indicative of polarization but still shows a clear distinction. If all age-groups were included, it is probable that the division would have been sharper since we know that many older RSJs are either unemployed or retired. However, the comparison of (40-) shows that the RSJ-Vet gap tends to diminish, though it is still substantial.

**(2) Identity and Identification** We now continue to issues relating to identity and identification. We saw in the previous chapters that Jews in Germany undeniably emphasize their attachment to Judaism, the Jewish people and Israel, while at the same time, their feelings about being part of the German nation are generally weak. We found these basic attitudes to be overwhelming among both RSJs and the sample in general.

Table 4.1 that refers to young adults throws additional light on this picture. It appears that attachment to the Jewish people and Israel is relatively stronger among Vets than among RSJs. Moreover, another difference concerns the comparison between attachment to the Jewish People and solidarity with Israel: among Vets, there is no difference between the two items, while among RSJs, allegiance to Israel is somewhat stronger – though still lower than among Vets. This means, in general terms, that younger Vets seem more involved in Jewishness and solidarity with Israel than RSJs – at least in this (40-) age stratum.

Data that concern affiliation to Jewish organizations are coherent with these above findings. We have seen in previous chapters that a majority of both immigrants (68.1%) and veterans (60.4%) are members of some Jewish organization in Germany – especially in local Jewish communities. What we see now is that this rate of membership is lower among the younger, especially among the RSJs. Hence, to the extent that young people’s membership in Jewish organizations forecasts the recruitment of future community leaders,

there seems to be here a continuation of the pattern according to which Vets are more willing to involve themselves in Jewish activities – despite the fact that they are now a small minority in the Jewish population. Most RSJs are only moderately ready to involve themselves, which might forecast future difficulties in the community. When it comes to involvement in Zionist or pro-Israel organizations, however, a large majority of both RSJs and Vets express unwillingness to involve themselves – though, again, this reluctance is weaker among Vets (21.9% of younger Vets are affiliated to such an organization as against 8.1% for RSJs). On the other hand, we have seen previously that RSJs are not too extensively affiliated with organizations active among them, as a group of their own, and that this tendency is weakest in the younger age stratum.

In contrast, we have already seen that a majority of the (40-) stratum among both RSJs and Vets attend synagogue services at least occasionally – with Vets again, being more assiduous in this respect. From this, we can inquire about perceptions of Jewishness in these two groups. Table 4.1 (items 6 and 7) shows more than a few respondents, both among RSJs and Vets, endorse halachic definitions regarding “Who is a Jew?,” though many others, again in both categories, emphasize in this respect the importance of Jewish education at home. Regarding these notions, no substantial differences are found between the two cohorts. This, we may suggest, reveals that younger RSJs tend to absorb the prevailing notions of Jewishness they found in Germany among Vets. It may be classed as a tendency to convergence.

In accordance with these findings, we also find that while Vets have received more Jewish education than RSJs – as indicated by their knowledge of Hebrew - we see that a non-negligible number – a quarter of the RSJs' respondents aged (40-) compared to 60% among Vets – state that they have at least some knowledge of the language.

**(3) Inclusion in the Jewish Community** Do these findings indicate that, from the viewpoint of inclusion in the Jewish community, we are witnessing a kind of symbiosis between these two categories? In one respect at least, we can speak of a strong tendency to answer here positively: the overwhelming majority of both RSJs and Vets see the massive immigration of RSJs in Germany as making a positive contribution to Jewry in the country. That RSJs see their settling here in this light signifies that they see themselves not just as *émigrés* from Eastern Europe, but as a Jewish population. On the other hand, the fact that Vets see RSJs in this way means that they do associate them – or wish to associate them – with veteran local Jewry.

The social barriers, it is true, do not seem to have disappeared and social relations appear to be somehow delimited along the RSJs-Vet line. However, one cannot speak of a non-permeable fence, if only because we find substantial differences between the categories. RSJs' closest friends are generally RSJs themselves but a majority of Vets declare that Russian-speaking individuals are among their closest Jewish friends. Moreover, for quite a few RSJs too, the circle of closest Jewish friends does include non-Russian speakers. Hence, it seems that the social distinction between RSJs and Vets in this age stratum is not rigid, and is more flexible for Vets than for RSJs. This is most probably accounted for by the numerical discrepancy between the two categories in the social reality: Vets encounter RSJs socially far more easily than the other way round.

To this picture we should add that, as seen in the previous chapter, many RSJs – though less in the (40-) category than in the older ones, but still to a substantial degree - maintain contacts with relatives and friends in their former country. While this is not the case for

Vets, obviously, they rejoin RSJs regarding the contacts they have with relatives or friends residing in Israel. On this count, there is again convergence between our two categories.

(4) **The Linguistic Barrier** Possibly the major barrier between Vets and RSJs is the linguistic barrier. Clearly, so far we can say that Vets and RSJs who belong to the younger stratum of age use different languages in many areas of social activity. The language RSJs use most is Russian; the language used by Vets in general is German. In this respect, these are two different speech communities, a fact primarily indicated by the languages that respondents speak with spouses. One can by no means, however, neglect the large number of Vets who speak both German and Russian with spouses. This seems to hint at the number of Vets who live with, or are married to, RSJ spouses.

The same kind of tendency toward different orientations but without rigidity, is exemplified by the issue of the language used for reading. Among (40-), if not in other age strata, one finds, as expected, that each category has a preference for its own language. This contrast is mitigated by the relatively large proportion of RSJs who describe their use of German in this respect, conjunctively with Russian. Differentiation, here too, is short of citing polarization. We may continue from this to television watching. In this respect, there is even a predominance of German over Russian among RSJs with a very obvious convergence toward Vets. To the extent that reading and watching TV say something about culture, one may draw the conclusion that RSJs tend to come closer toward Vets by acquiring German culture – notwithstanding the fact that they also retain Russian in given areas of their social activity. All in all, though they still use Russian widely in many areas of life, it is clear that RSJs (-40) use it less than the older RSJ groups and come to use German more, thus becoming more similar to Vets in their age-stratum.

(5) **Being a Part of the German Nation** Regarding their feelings of being a part of the German nation, we again see differences between the two categories but they do not point to a diametrical opposition. As a general tendency, Vets tend to be more positive than RSJs in this respect; however, both Vets (about 50%) and RSJs (about 70%) are frankly negative in answering this question, or at least very reserved. These data are particularly interesting since they concern (40-) who grew up in Germany (for the Vets) or immigrated at an early age (for most RSJs).

However, when we asked respondents about specific aspects of the German social reality, as a rule we received positive assessments from both Vets and RSJs. We did not find the greatest enthusiasm regarding each particular item, but still there was a consensual level of satisfaction. The differences found between the two categories of respondents are interesting. Thus, German democracy is more esteemed by RSJs than by Vets, seemingly because their comparative reference is the FSU or the present-day nascent democracies of Eastern Europe. The same tendency appears regarding the economic situation in the country: RSJs are definitely more positive, probably in the context of their knowledge of conditions in their countries of origin. We see in Table 4.1 that this propensity is also apparent when it comes to appreciation of welfare services, prospects for children, and the quality of life. On all these counts, RSJs who came from settings very different from Germany or heard about them at home from their parents, are more positive about the circumstances of their present-day life. In this, however, RSJs do not cite a genuine gap between themselves and the Vets who, despite their lesser approval of the reality of their environment, by no means appear alienated from the German society.

**((6) Unpleasant Aspects of German Society** We also wanted to compare Vets and RSJs regarding the unpleasant aspects they find in Germany. Recalling here what we saw in previous chapters, we know that most Vets and RSJs claim that living as Jews in Germany is not problematic for them. This convergence also holds true for respondents in the younger category. Accordingly, a majority on both sides assert the importance of their children adopting German culture. It should be noted that this is much more important for the RSJs than for Vets – possibly because they are not yet at home in that culture. What our data confirm is that the degree of importance ascribed to acquisition of German culture tends to decline among the younger RSJs, who are more at home in the culture. Hence, although this issue is still more important to the (-40) RSJs than to the (-40) Vets, one finds a tendency of convergence here.

Interestingly enough, however, and as seen in the previous chapter, the attractiveness of Germany and German society is less pronounced among the younger age cohort of RSJs than the older age groups. Hence, in that respect too one finds a certain convergence between (-40)s of the two categories. On the other hand, RSJs also tend to find Germany and German society less attractive than the Vets in certain respects - difficulties in finding suitable jobs, barriers set up by non-Jewish Germans, the memory of the Shoah, and anti-Semitism.

In a different respect, we already mentioned that the perception of one's income image among Vets is more favorable than among RSJs. This difference remains intact when comparing the two groups of (-40). However, (-40) RSJs tend to report better economic standing than elder RSJs, and one observes here again a tendency to convergence between the two groups of (40-).

### **Conclusion: One or Two Jewries?**

To underline now some of our major findings, let us remember that in previous chapters we saw that Jews in Germany emphasize their attachment to Judaism, the Jewish people and Israel. At the same time, most do not feel a part of the German nation. These are general traits but when one specifically compares young adults in the Vet and RSJ categories, it appears that the attachment to Jewry is stronger among Vets than among RSJs, and the same is true regarding attachment to the German nation. Hence, paradoxically enough, stronger attachment to Jewry is not contradictory with less reluctance for adherence to the German nation – for Vets – and a somewhat weaker attachment to Jewry may also be concomitant with very weak attachment to the German nation – for RSJs. These data signify that one cannot speak of a zero sum game opposing attachment to the German nation and to Jewry. Each kind of attachment is seemingly conditioned by different factors – historical memories, life experiences, education, family background and/or others.

All in all, we found significant differences between the (40-) Vets and RSJs. However, we also found that when set in the context of RSJs in general, the younger stratum tends to converge toward the younger Vets. We should not underestimate the gap that still exists in many respects, especially in the area of language. As a general rule, and this is our principal and general conclusion, Vet and RSJ young adults tend more to resemble each other in their attitudes vis-à-vis themselves as Jews, their feelings toward the community, and their perspectives on their environment.

Up to now, then, one may speak of linguistic – and thereby a cultural - gap in Germany's Jewish population. One cannot ignore, in this respect, that readiness to join Jewish organizations is weak among RSJs, in contrast to Vets. The crucial aspect implied by this differential readiness to involve oneself in collective causes relates to the fact that involvement of young people in Jewish organizations today forecasts the recruitment of future leaders of Germany's Jewry. If this trend is not reversed, we may witness the future reproduction of today's situation where Jewry is headed by elements stemming from the small Vet minority, a situation that is frequently criticized today by people from the less active segment, i.e. RSJs. It is a situation where alienation may easily develop among the less involved, especially when linguistic and cultural differences underline their distinction from each other.

Another area which invites reflection is the general satisfaction that researchers found among respondents of both categories regarding their inclusion in German society in general – even though, this is more true of some and less of others. This, notwithstanding that both (-40) RSJs and Vets experience genuine difficulties in living a Jewish life in this country and mention in this respect the memory of the Shoah and present-day anti-Semitism. When it comes to the “practicalities” of inclusion, it transpires that in both categories, their closest friends belong most often to their own milieu. Yet we also see tendencies of intermingling, despite the fact that the groups differ from each other regarding their socioeconomic distribution.

If we now try to draw some general conclusions from this comparison of two groups of respondents that represent the future of Jewry in Germany, we can state that we find both clear differences between them and tendencies for convergence - mainly among RSJs. The lines of convergence refer mainly to the importance of Jewishness and solidarity with Israel, openness to each other, reticence from blending into the German nation together with positive appreciation for major aspects of the society – without denying the hardships of the past and other current circumstances.

The lines of divergence refer to the objective fact that each side focuses principally on itself. Due to the linguistic barrier in the context of RSJs' loyalty to their language and culture, together with the desire to acquire German and the German culture, the indifference of many individuals who form the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population about joining community structures, the field is left to the Vets.

This picture, of course, cannot be seen as a definitive description of the reality of Jewry in Germany as things progress, especially for immigrants who may change attitudes as they gradually acclimatize themselves in their new environment. Yet when it concerns the picture we have obtained at this stage, our answer to our opening question is positive: we can indeed speak of a convergent tendency toward one Jewry in Germany. At the same time, it must be added that this Jewry is undoubtedly subject to different options as well as far-reaching tensions. To what extent it will become more or less “one” depends on the people themselves.

In the final analysis, the future of Jewry in Germany depends more than anything else on Jewish education and on present-day individuals' interest in how and what their children will acquire in terms of Jewish values and awareness. This issue is tackled in Chapter 5 where we again observe Germany's Jewry through its several lines of division.

## Chapter 5: Expectations From Jewish Education

One of the major focuses of this investigation concerned the area of Jewish education. This research wanted to consider, in the context of its sociological description and analysis, how far the Jewish population of Germany takes care of the education of offspring in a Jewish perspective, and what it effectively aspires to in this respect. In this chapter, we concentrate on the major findings that we obtained by means of our questionnaire at the level of respondents' cognition and aspirations, and in the next chapter we present an overview of what happens on the ground, in this area.

### **The Cognitive Level: What do Jews Think about the Jewish Education of their Children?**

Our first subject is the question of whether or not the Jewish population of this country – as a whole and its various segments – are concerned about a Jewish education for their children.

The general data show a quite problematic reality. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents have not given or are not currently giving any form of Jewish education to their children outside the home:

62.7% of all respondents are not giving or have not given Jewish education to their children;

11.2% send or have sent their children to a Sunday school;

14.7% have sent or still send their children to a Jewish day school;

11.4% have provided some other kind of Jewish education.

These data refer to both RSJs and Vets, as the differences between these categories are minimal. Among RSJs who arrived after the age of 8, 65.3% are not giving or have not given Jewish education to their children; 11.1% send or have sent their children to a Sunday school; 13.1% have sent or still send their children to a Jewish day school and 10.6% have provided some other kind of Jewish education.

When, however, one considers the various divisions of the Jewish population of Germany, we obtain differences that throw light on the contours of the *problématique* of Jewish education in this country. The most important factor of differentiation here is the dimension of religiosity among RSJs. As indicated in Table 5.1.1, Orthodox respondents give or have given their children more Jewish education than any other category in the space of Jewish pluralism – and especially the secular. Even among the Orthodox, one finds one-third of respondents that have not given or do not give a Jewish education to their children outside the home. This may be explained by the fact that appropriate Jewish education is not available everywhere in Germany or was not available in the FSU. On the other hand, among Liberals, traditional and the secular, more than half of the respondents admit that they have not given or do not give any Jewish education to their children outside home – among the secular, the response is three-quarters. Moreover, among those who have given or give today a Jewish education to their children, day-schools are more popular among the Orthodox and the Liberals, and Sunday schools to some extent among the traditional.

Table 5.1.2 presents this picture in reference to the different age strata among RSJs. The salient fact here is the trend in which the younger stratum tends to provide Jewish education for their children, more than in the (61+) older stratum. Also of interest is the relative importance of day schools and Sunday schools among the younger stratum. This seems to indicate new tendencies in Germany's young Jewish population that contrast with former generations, as well as to the availability of Jewish education in Germany when compared to the situation in the FSU.

When examining RSJs in terms of the length of stay in Germany – Table 5.1.3 - we see that the more veteran immigrants (16+) provided or provide Jewish their children with Jewish education more than the other two categories. Together with the findings pertaining to age strata, it appears that younger people who have lived in Germany for years tend to be more anxious about Jewish education for their children and also enjoyed broader availability of Jewish education than the recent newcomers.

**Table 5.1: Are Giving (Have Given) their Children a Jewish Education\***

	No Jewish Education	Sunday School	Day school	Other	Total
<b>1. Religious Orientation (n=650 ;%) (<math>\chi^2=0</math>)</b>					
Orthodox	32.9	19.7	30.3	17.1	100.0
Liberal	57.1	10.0	19.3	13.6	100.0
Somehow trad	63.9	16.5	11.3	8.2	100.0
Secular	76.7	6.7	7.1	9.6	100.0
<b>2. Age Groups (n=689 ;%) (<math>\chi^2=0</math>)</b>					
-40	38.8	20.0	23.8	17.5	100.0
41-60	64.9	14.2	10.0	10.9	100.0
61+	73.8	6.2	11.6	8.4	100.0
<b>3. Length of Stay (n=720 ;%) (<math>\chi^2=0.002</math>)</b>					
-10	65.5	12.9	10.3	11.3	100.0
11-15	69.5	8.0	13.7	8.8	100.0
16+	50.0	10.3	27.9	11.8	100.0
<b>4. Communities by Size (n=720 ;%) (<math>\chi^2=0</math>)</b>					
Large	57.4	11.9	19.9	10.8	100.0
Medium	74.0	7.9	6.9	11.2	100.0
Small	69.2	17.6	5.5	7.7	100.0
<b>5. Region of Residence( n=720; %) (<math>\chi^2=0</math>)</b>					
Berlin	62.8	4.3	19.1	13.8	100.0
West	61.3	12.1	15.2	11.4	100.0
East	77.2	12.3	4.1	6.4	100.0

\* RSJs who arrived in Germany after age 8

Another criterion that is certainly relevant for RSJs is the size of Jewish communities. For obvious reasons – chiefly the scope of the interested public - Jewish education is more strongly anchored in large communities. It is there that the more comprehensive day schools have a chance to exist and attract interested parents in sufficient numbers. In

contrast, in small communities where Jewish education is weak, Sunday schools are the more popular form of Jewish education.

Concomitantly with these findings, Table 5.1.5 clearly shows that in the East, where Jewish communities are small, there are less options for Jewish education in comparison to Western cities and Berlin – this is particularly visible in the existence of day schools.

### **Aspirations to Provide Children with a Jewish Education**

The second major issue that we wanted to tackle in the present respect concerns the aspirations of our respondents and the extent that differences emerge along the divisions of that Jewish population. In a general manner, our data show that aspirations are higher than practical materialization. While, as assessed in the above, two-thirds say that their children do not, or did not, receive any Jewish education outside the home, only 25.7% of all respondents told us that a Jewish education for their children was of no importance for them. Little importance obtains 22.4% , a moderate importance, 23.8%, and for 28.1% it is very important. Here again, the data referring to RSJs are quite similar to those of the general sample with, respectively, 30.3% of “no importance,” 25.3% of “little importance,” 24.1% of “moderate importance” and 20.3% of “great importance.

**Table 5.2: The Importance of Giving Children a Jewish Education\***

<b>1. Religiosity (n=760) (<math>\chi^2=0</math>)</b>					
	Not at all	A little	Moderately	Great	Total
Orthodox	7.5	20.4	15.1	57.0	100.0
Liberal Judaism	22.3	24.6	34.3	18.9	100.0
Traditional, to some	19.7	23.1	29.7	27.5	100.0
Secular	44.9	30.8	19.0	5.3	100.0
<b>2. RSJs: Age Groups (n=795 ;%) (<math>\chi^2=0</math>)</b>					
40-	19.4	23.9	21.1	35.6	100.0
41-60	33.5	30.6	23.4	12.5	100.0
61+	35.7	22.9	25.1	16.3	100.0
<b>3. Length of Stay (n=831 ;%) (<math>\chi^2=0</math>)</b>					
-10	33.2	22.7	24.1	20.0	100.0
11-15	30.9	32.4	20.7	16.0	100.0
16+	13.3	18.9	33.3	34.4	100.0
<b>4. Respondents, by Family of Origin (n=827 ;%) (<math>\chi^2=0.006</math>)</b>					
Mixed	39.3	22.2	20.9	17.6	100.0
Homogeneous	26.9	26.4	25.2	21.6	100.0
<b>5. Respondents who Live with a Jewish or Non-Jewish Spouse (n=621 ;%) (<math>\chi^2=0</math>)</b>					
Non-Jewish	42.6	24.3	18.7	14.5	100.0
Jewish	24.1	25.4	28.5	22.0	100.0
<b>6. Size of Communities (n=831 ;%) (<math>\chi^2=0</math>)</b>					
Large	24.4	20.9	27.4	27.4	100.0
Medium	39.0	29.2	20.1	11.7	100.0
Small	28.1	29.8	23.1	19.0	100.0

<b>7. Region of Residence</b> (n=831; %) ( $\chi^2=0.003$ )					
Berlin	19.3	23.7	29.8	27.2	100.0
West	31.8	23.1	23.5	21.6	100.0
East	32.8	31.8	22.2	13.1	100.0

\* RSJs who arrived in Germany after age 8

As could be expected and as shown in Table 5.2.1, among RSJs the Orthodox attach much greater importance to their children’s Jewish education than respondents of the other groups - especially for the secular. However, at the level of aspirations, all groups – including the secular - number a majority that proclaim the importance of a Jewish education – at least at the level of “moderate importance.” Most Liberals and traditionals sustain the “moderate” and “great importance” categories of answers, while a majority (slight - but still a majority) among the secular range from “a little” to “great importance.”

Interestingly enough, when it comes to age groups among RSJs – Table 5.2.2 - the data are coherent with those of Table 5.2.1. While a majority in all three strata aspire to a Jewish education for their children, it is respondents in the younger stratum who attach greater importance - with a majority divided between those who answered “moderately” and those who answered more vigorously.

Table 5.2.3 also shows that the longer the immigrants have been on German soil, the greater importance they ascribe to a Jewish education for their children. Conjunctively with former data, this means that length of stay and young age correlate to jointly emphasize this basic aspiration.

Table 5.2.4 indicates that RSJ individuals originating from mixed families – where one parent was not Jewish - tend to be less ambitious regarding their children’s Jewish education. Also significant however is the fact that this differentiation is everything but polar: even among offspring of mixed families, the aspiration to some education for children is shared by more than 60% of the respondents, to the detriment of the “of-no-importance” category.

Following those data, Table 5.2.5 reveals similarly that while RSJ respondents whose spouses are Jewish attach greater importance to the Jewish education of their children: even among respondents who live with non-Jewish spouses, the majority still expresses this aspiration.

When it comes to the impact of Jewish community size among RSJs, Table 5.2.6 shows that respondents in large Jewish communities attach greater importance to their children receiving Jewish education than respondents in medium-size and small Jewish communities. This is probably due to differences in the scope of opportunities offered in the various settings, and it matches the results obtained according to regions of residence for RSJs – Table 5.2.7 – pointing out that Berlin’s Jewish population is the most ambitious with respect to children’s Jewish education, and that it is followed by the Western communities that are generally larger than the Eastern ones.

### **Importance of Children Acquiring German Culture**

In the context of the above, we also considered respondents’ attitudes regarding the importance they attach to their children’s acquiring their environment’s culture, i.e. the

German culture. We found significant results mainly with respect to three criteria among RSJs – the level of education of respondents, their degree of religiosity, and their division into age strata.

Our general distribution of the sample is that:

for 13.2% it is not important at all that their children adopt German culture;

for 13.3% it is only of little importance

for 44.2% it is moderately important

for 29.3% it is very important.

Similar data were obtained for the RSJs: for 11.9%, it is not important at all that their children adopt German culture; for 11.1%, it is only of little importance; for 46.5% it is moderately important and for 30.5% it is very important. Hence, generally speaking, respondents tend to emphasize the importance of their children’s acquiring German culture. This aspiration, however, is anything but potent as most respondents tend to adopt a moderate stand on this issue.

When we now turn to the various divisions of our sample, it emerges that as far as the level of education is concerned – Table 5.3.1 - RSJs' individuals with an academic education are frankly more supportive of the acquisition of the German culture by their children, though the differences between the two categories are by no means polarized.

On the other hand, and as reflected in Table 5.3.2, religiosity is more ambiguously related to the question of children’s acquisition of German culture among RSJs. The Orthodox attach less importance to the possibility that their children acquire this culture than other groups along this criterion. Yet Liberals who emphasized the importance of Jewish education, appear here to also champion the acquisition of the German culture, and thus, contrarily to the Orthodox, do not see a contradiction in the simultaneous acquisition of Jewish and German cultures. The traditional and secular are in an in-between position.

Finally, another aspect that was found significant in these respects concerns the RSJs’ age strata – see Table 5.3.3. In this respect, it appears, again fitting with previous data, that the younger stratum are less sensitive to the matter of their children acquiring German culture than the older strata. This may be accounted for by the fact that their education in Germany has made them consider the German culture as “taken for granted,” but there is also a possibility that these younger people tend to emphasize more strongly the importance of Jewish education as a primary goal.

**Table 5.3: The Importance of Children Adopting German Culture \***

<b>1. Respondents, by Education</b> (n=788; %) ( $\chi^2=0$ )					
	Not at all	A little	Moderately	Great	Total
Non-academic	16.0	16.9	47.9	19.2	100.0
Academic	10.2	9.0	45.9	35.0	100.0
<b>2. Religiosity</b> (n=718 ;%) ( $\chi^2=0$ )					
Orthodox	27.9	20.9	27.9	23.3	100.0
Liberal	11.5	9.1	46.1	33.3	100.0
Somehow trad	10.2	14.4	49.3	26.0	100.0

Secular	11.5	6.7	49.6	32.1	100.0
<b>3. Age groups</b> (n=757 ;%) ( $\chi^2=0$ )					
-40	20.3	21.8	38.3	19.5	100.0
41-60	10.2	8.6	51.2	29.9	100.0
61+	9.7	7.9	46.6	35.8	100.0

\* RSJs who arrived in Germany after age 8

All in all, we see that Jews in Germany do aspire – moderately – to have their children acquire the German culture. We also see though that aspirations for Jewish education are strong and stand in discrepancy with respondents’ cognitive picture of the limits of its opportunities. It is in this context that we continue by turning to “what is missing” both for children and adults, in the eyes of respondents, and what they wished to raise in the structure of this investigation.

### What do Respondents Miss in Their Children’s Jewish Education?

**Table 5.4: Missing Programs for Children’s Jewish Education (%)\***

	Missing Programs						
	Nothing	Israel	Camps	Judaism	Hebrew	Sunday schools	Other
<b>1. General data</b>							
Sample	47.0	19.3	16.8	14.8	14.6	7.8	6.2
RSJs	45.6	21.0	18.9	15.0	13.3	6.9	6.5
<b>2. Religiosity **</b>							
Orth/ultra	20.2	17.7	13.7	11.3	18.5	14.5	4.0
Liberals	25.9	24.3	15.7	17.3	8.1	4.9	3.8
Trad	35	11.3	16.9	14.3	11.3	5.6	5.6
Secular	48.8	16.2	13.1	6.2	8.1	1.9	5.8
<b>3. Region of Residence **</b>							
Berlin	46.0	11.3	11.3	12.9	8.9	4.8	4.8
West	38.9	12.0	15.5	12.2	10.1	5.8	5.6
East	25.0	28.1	15.4	10.4	11.9	5.0	4.3

\*Respondents could give more than one answer to this question

\*\* RSJs who arrived in Germany after the age of 8

Table 5.4 yields selected findings regarding what programs respondents consider are missing in their children’s’ Jewish education. We see that nearly half the answers do not indicate anything special. One-fifth of the respondents complain about a lack of programs in the area of Israel Studies and others note the absence of camps for children, courses in

Bible, Judaism and Jewish History programs and Hebrew classes. Eight percent would like more Sunday schools and 6.2% have still other suggestions. The figures concerning RSJs only follow in the same order.

On the other hand, Jewish pluralism makes a difference among RSJs. Only a fifth of the Orthodox feel that nothing is lacking, as opposed to nearly half of the secular who share the same feeling – Liberals and traditional stand in-between. In a similar vein, the cohort of the Orthodox who complain that Sunday schools are lacking is far more substantial than among the secular – with the Liberals and traditionals again in-between. We learn from these data that the Orthodox are more ambitious here, but that all categories feel that Jewish educational programs should be boosted.

It is also noteworthy that while the feeling of deficiencies in Jewish educational programs seem to reflect an objective reality, for RSJs this feeling is weakest in Berlin which has the largest community with relatively strong Jewish education structures. This sense of deficiency increases, however, when one moves to the communities of the West which are still large but smaller than Berlin's, and are thus poorer in infrastructures. The worst objective situation is, of course, the plight of the small communities of East Germany. Here indeed, one finds the sharpest feeling of shortage in Jewish educational programs. Also of interest is the fact that among programs of Jewish education, respondents tend to include Israel, and to emphasize the shortage that refers to this area of study.

### What is Missing for Adults?

As shown by Table 5.5, not only programs for children are presented as missing.

**Table 5.5: Missing Programs for Adults (%)\***

	Missing Programs					
	Nothing	Israel	Arts	Judaism	Hebrew	Other
<b>1. General Data</b>						
Sample	37.7	27.1	29.5	21.5	15.3	4.5
RSJs	35.1	28.7	33.8	21.6	13.2	4.8
<b>2. Region of Residence **</b>						
Berlin	37.5	15.6	15.0	15.0	13.1	3/8
West	24.6	23.1	24.9	14.9	7.9	4.6
East	21.5	18.4	29.4	18.1	11.9	0.7

\*Respondents could give more than one answer on this question

\*\* RSJs who arrived in Germany after the age of 8

Without broadening the discussion on this topic, we can see how far the respondents themselves are aware of the issue of Jewish learning for themselves. Table 5.5, which presents selected data, shows that in a general manner only a minority of respondents consider what is offered them as satisfactory or that such programs are of no interest to them. We see, on the contrary, that a wide majority would like to be offered programs on Jewish studies – in the realm of Jewish arts, Israel, Judaism or Hebrew courses. This is also

the case of RSJs who belong to a strong community like Berlin and also – and understandably more – in medium-size and small communities.

Hence, to the question of “whether Jews in Germany show interest in Jewish learning” the answer is clearly affirmative. Moreover, as in perceptions of educational programs, here too, Israel Studies appear as a part of that baggage.

### **Conclusion**

The general data point to a basic contradiction: a wide majority of respondents aspire for a Jewish education for their children but fail to provide any. However, the Orthodox seem to concretize their wishes into programs and institutions, though even among them, quite a few describe their inability to fulfil their wishes. Other salient facts are that the younger stratum appears more committed to the Jewish education of their children, and here they join the more veteran RSJs – especially those in the same age stratum. On the other hand, because of their resources, Jewish education is more encouraged by large communities – Berlin and the West – while the Eastern smaller and less affluent communities complain of shortage.

In other words, Orthodoxy, young age, and residence in large cities and communities go together with stronger aspirations for Jewish education. Our findings also show factors that go the other way, such as origin from families with a non-Jewish parent, or living with a non-Jewish spouse. In either case, RSJs tend to be less ambitious regarding the Jewish education of their children – though one also observes that even here aspirations for some kind of Jewish education for children are shared by majorities.

In this context, we also looked at the importance that respondents attach to their children’s acquiring German culture. Roughly speaking, a good quarter do not see this aspect as of major importance. Close to half of the respondents share a moderate position toward this issue. For less than a third, it is a major educational goal. In brief, the acquisition of German culture does not arouse the enthusiasm of most respondents. Among RSJs an academic education has an impact here, however: the more educated respondents are slightly more favorable to the acquisition of the German culture by their children. Non-Orthodox respondents also tend to share a basically favorable attitude toward this option. In addition, and this datum is coherent with previous ones, the younger stratum are less sensitive to the matter. This may be accounted for, as we said, by the fact that their own education in Germany makes them take for granted acquisition of this culture, and they feel that their children’s Jewish education is now more acute.

In this context, and back to the topic of Jewish education, many respondents tended to complain about the shortage of institutions of Jewish education. Some complain about a lack of programs in Israel studies and others speak of the absence of children camps, courses in Bible, Judaism and Jewish history or of Hebrew classes. A minority would like to see more Sunday schools or other forms of transmitting values. Among RSJs, Jewish pluralism makes a difference here. While only a minority of the Orthodox feel that no program is missing – most seem to provide for some Jewish education on their own - nearly half of the secular voice complaints – with Liberals and traditionals in an-in-between position. In brief, while the Orthodox are more ambitious, in all categories many feel that Jewish educational programs should be boosted. As a rule the feeling of no-shortage in Jewish educational programs reflects the reality: among RSJs this feeling is strongest in Berlin which has the largest community and strong structures of Jewish

education. This feeling of no-shortage also applies to the relatively large communities of Western Germany which contrasts with the feelings prevailing in the East, where small communities encounter a thousand hardships for making available Jewish educational institutions.

Interestingly enough, we also see that the respondents themselves are aware of the issue of Jewish learning for themselves: only a minority consider what is offered to them as satisfactory or that such programs are of no interest. A wide majority – in all types of communities - would like programs pertaining to Jewish studies. Hence, to the question of “whether Jews in Germany show interest in Jewish learning” the answer is clearly affirmative. The following chapter considers the extent to which this expectation is met by reality, on the basis of a mapping of the offerings of Jewish education provided in Germany today - which are detailed in Volume 3.

## Chapter 6: Jewish Education in Germany

### Introduction

As we have seen in the previous chapter, while there is a feeling that educational frameworks for Jewish children are lacking, as well the aspiration by adults for more study programs for themselves, the objective reality “in the field” indicates a multiplicity of Jewish educational and study frameworks in Germany. This development is not initiated, controlled and organized by one central body; it is the fruit of efforts from many directions, stemming from several agencies and following a range of models aimed at diverse audiences. In many instances – and this chiefly concerns adults - they also attract many non-Jews interested in Jewish topics. Some of these programs or institutions are funded by public bodies and ministries (in the area of science or culture) and often condition their aid on access to these institutions by non-Jews. Other institutions are more exclusive as they are sponsored by Jewish foundations aspiring to contribute to the development of Jewish community structures.

Yet in almost all communities in Germany - especially the medium-size or small ones - the residents deplore the lack of financial resources and qualified personnel that would make possible a full-fledged educational system for Jewish children and interested adults. Leading Jewish bodies – German or dependent on international bodies - tend to fill the void by amplifying their efforts to build up schools and facilities in many places. Some such frameworks are affiliated with local communities, others are related to academic institutions, while still others are independent projects.

To consider this complex setting succinctly but systematically, Table 6.1 presents the major kinds of Jewish education according to their level and the audience they target.

**Table 6.1: Jewish Educational Institutions in Germany – Current State**

	Total	Central Council	UPJ Ref	Masorti <sup>2</sup>	Chabad	Lauder	Run by State	Indep .
Academic Jewish Studies <sup>22</sup>	9	-	-	-	-	-	9	-
Independent Frameworks	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Rabbinical Colleges / Yeshivot	5	-	1	-	2	2	-	-
Batej Midrash	3	2	-	1	-	-	-	-
Adult Educational Centers	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Student Organizations	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
Youth Centers	23	22	1	-	-	-	-	-
Religious Schools	4	2	-	-	2	-	-	-
High Schools	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Elementary Schools	8	5	-	-	1	2	-	-
Kindergartens	14	9	1	1	1	2	-	-
Total	89							

<sup>22</sup> The departments of “Judaistik” at German universities are not included, because they are linked to general departments of Religious Science or (Christian) Theology. <sup>2</sup>Conservative (non-Orth) Judaism following the American denomination

## **Kindergartens**

The basic educational institution is the kindergarten. In Germany there are fourteen institutions of this kind which depend on various allegiances – among them Orthodox and Liberal affiliations, as well as other, untagged organizations. Strict guidelines can hardly be implemented here in terms of organization, pedagogy or equipment in small or middle-size communities where classrooms are not packed with pupils. The majority of these kindergartens are run by the communities, and most are open to children who are non-halachic Jews, even non-Jewish children. This openness results both from the often small number of Jewish pupils and the fact that some kindergartens are partially financed by local governments. Some kindergartens are also affiliated with Israeli institutions such as the TALI Foundation for Jewish Education, and teach some Hebrew. In some kindergartens, educators pay special attention to teaching German to children of RSJs families.

## **Elementary and Secondary Education**

In several cities there are also elementary schools (eight in total) where Jewish children are enrolled for a full school schedule. This is the case in Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Düsseldorf and Cologne. The Lichtigfeld elementary school in Frankfurt/Main is the largest of these schools and has about 500 pupils and 70 teachers. It opened in 1966, as the first post-war Jewish elementary school in Germany. It runs up to junior high school and plans are underway to extend it to senior high school classes. It will then offer the *Abitur* - the German university entrance qualification exam. The student body of the Lichtigfeld school has 30% RSJ children and 30% non-Jewish students. It is affiliated with the Jewish community of Frankfurt and maintains connections with Israeli educational institutions. Graduating classes travel to Israel, and each year pupils organize events to collect money for Israeli projects.

Other examples are the Heinz Galinski school in Berlin, the Joseph Carlebach school in Hamburg, the school in Stuttgart, and the Yitzhak Rabin school in Düsseldorf which are all elementary institutions functioning under the auspices of local communities. This, however, is not the case in the Lauder Morijah school in Cologne, which is independent and supported by its own foundation. This school is also accredited by the State and as such enrolls up to 25% of children of non-Jewish background; it is known as providing children with a strong program in Judaism.

It should be noted that some large communities have not yet opened a Jewish elementary school while, on the other hand, Berlin now has three. They include the veteran Heinz Galinski school (founded in 1986), an elementary Chabad school, and Beth Zion, a Lauder elementary school founded in 2008. In the Chabad school, classes in German, Hebrew and English start in the first grade.

We must add to that picture one of the most serious deficiencies in Jewish education in Germany today - the almost total lack of high schools. Up to now, in contrast to numerous Jewish communities throughout Europe, Germany has only one Jewish high school. It was founded in Berlin in 1993 and has a student body of close to 420 (in 2009). This missing link in the chain of Jewish education is arguably the most acute problem in German Jewry today, in its efforts to provide children with a Jewish education.

One may add here Sunday schools (not included in Table 6.1) which, on the basis of one half day per week, offer programs in Hebrew and Judaism. Such frameworks, often

religious, have been opened by Chabad in Berlin and Hamburg, and include also the Orthodox Yeshurun school in Frankfurt, and the Jewish religious school of Stuttgart.

### **Youth Centers**

Germany has a quite impressive number of Jewish youth centers, on the other hand. They are sustained by Jewry's central authority and often represent *the* major, if not only, institution attracting Jewish youngsters to social and cultural activities. The importance of these activities follows directly from the fact that despite all efforts, in many places in Germany, Jewish communities are not strong enough to finance more institutionalized frameworks or to support full-fledged schools. The number of youth centers is a kind of compensation that provides activities when they are lacking elsewhere. They often have intensive schedules offering a large diversity of activities. A few of these centers have been in operation for close to 50 years, but most were founded in the 1990's and the 2000's, following the RSJs influx.

Youth centers offer programs for children from age 6 to 18 under the guidance of teachers and counselors. They centers emphasize the transmission of Jewish values but are also responsive to the demand for entertainment and leisure activities. They are open to youngsters of non-halachic background and their general aim is to bring young Jews together, familiarize them with Judaism and provide information about Jews around the world and about Israel. Several centers are supported by the Israeli Lehava project which, among other activities, contributes to the organization of seminars for counselors and educators.

### **Student Organizations**

The Jewish student organizations enjoy only limited success. There are three organizations whose activities are sporadic - the relatively large number of Jews in universities notwithstanding. In fact, the personalities interviewed by the researchers complained that there is little student life among Jewish students. However, the situation may be different at various times, and each organization develops its own centers for Jewish students in different places.

Especially active are the Jewish student centers of Heidelberg, Cologne and Hamburg. The *Union of Jewish Students in Baden* in Heidelberg aims to reach all Jewish students in Southern Germany. It is an independent body although it is supported by the Jewish Council of Baden, and numbers about 100 members. They intend to open a *Hillel House*-type residency for Jewish students on the Heidelberg campus. The Cologne student organization has 60-70 participants. It aims to function as a club for leading discussions about topics of general and Jewish interest, and also organizes parties and leisure activities. The most active regional student initiative at the moment seems to be the Jewish Organization of North German Students (JONS) based in Hamburg (founded in 1995). It has close to 420 members. JONS values Jewish religious traditions but does not consider itself a religious organization. Its slogan for students is: integrate into German society but do not assimilate. JONS organizes parties, get-togethers and debates. It works with international Jewish student organizations.

These student bodies cooperate with local Jewish Communities, the Central Welfare Board of Jews in Germany or with the Central Council. In addition, Chabad also runs programs

and activities for Jewish students. For example, the Chabad Lubavitch Center in Berlin organizes Shabbat celebrations and excursions for students.

### **Adult Education Centers**

It is also worth noting the centers of Jewish learning for adults. Among them are the *Batei Midrash* (houses of learning) dedicated, in a religious spirit, to Jewish Studies for adults. They operate in several cities - in Bamberg and Emmendingen, for example – and are supported by local communities as well as by Jewish or non-Jewish institutions. These centers most often have Orthodox allegiance, although the Beit Midrash in Berlin was founded by the Masorti (Conservative) movement in 2003 and has become a foremost place of Jewish learning.

Besides these Batei Midrash, in the three cities with the largest Jewish communities - Berlin, Munich and Frankfurt/Main – there are Jewish adult education centers (Jüdische Volkshochschulen) that are quite successful in reaching a relatively large Jewish and non-Jewish audience. They were founded before the unification of Germany (in Berlin in 1962, Munich in 1983 and Frankfurt in 1988). Their teaching focuses on Judaism and Hebrew, but they also diffuse information about the Jewish diaspora and Israeli society, as well as serving as forums of inter-religious dialogue and programs. These centers are especially important for RSJs who often lacked any Jewish cultural know-how on arrival in Germany. In order to contribute to RSJs' inclusion into German society and the Jewish community, they offer German language courses as well as practical information. These centers often cooperate with non-Jewish adult education centers of their respective cities. In Berlin – and probably not only there - the center receives funding from the local government which encouraged it to open its gates to non-Jews; it is attended in total by 400 people in a variety of programs.

### **Rabbinical Colleges**

There are currently several institutions in Germany that educate and train candidates for a rabbinical career. The Abraham Geiger College in Potsdam is affiliated with the Reform congregation. The Rabbinical College of Berlin is operated by the Orthodox Lauder Foundation which also has ties with the Yeshiva Beis Zion in Berlin. Besides their particular affiliations, these colleges cooperate with the official bodies of Germany's Jewry. Up to now, however, their number of students remains modest (17 rabbinical students and five cantorial students in Potsdam and nine students at the Beis Zion yeshiva). There are another two institutions - the Chabad yeshivot in Berlin and Frankfurt (12 students in each).

### **Academic Jewish Studies**

Jewish Studies are also a topic that is developing in academia in the form of university programs and the dedication of specialized research centers. Attention should first be given in this respect to the University for Jewish Studies in Heidelberg, supported by the Central Council of Jews in Germany. Students here are expected to become religion teachers, social workers, or administrators. The curriculum comprises both Jewish and professional subjects. Students may obtain first and second academic degrees in Jewish Studies and continue for rabbinical certification at a rabbinical college. However, all in all only 150 students are enrolled in Heidelberg and about half of them are not Jewish.

Another academic institution for Jewish studies is more recent. It was created in 2007 at the University of Applied Science in Erfurt as a department of Jewish Social Work which offers a major in this field in the frame of BA studies. This innovation was sponsored by the ZWST in cooperation with a Swiss foundation (the Dorothea Gould Foundation) and focuses primarily on problems of immigrants. The goal was to train individuals who could work especially with RSJ immigrants.

Besides these frameworks, one finds in Germany several academic frameworks and institutes of research in this field of Jewish Studies in German universities. They include Düsseldorf, as well as the Salomon Ludwig Steinheim Institute at Duisburg University or the Moses Mendelssohn Center at Potsdam University. These frameworks are an integral part of the general academic setting.

Also noteworthy is the Touro College of Berlin, part of the global network of Touro College; it combines academic studies and involvement in the Jewish world. In addition to Jewish Studies, it offers a program in Business Management and Administration, as well as an M.A. in Holocaust Studies. Moreover, there are also several departments of Comparative Jewish Studies (Judaistik) in Germany, which are connected with, or pertain to, centers of Christian theology.

It must be said, however, that the majority of students in Jewish Studies programs in Germany today are not Jewish. This fact underlines that as a topic of higher education, Judaism does not attract substantial interest among Jewish students and that, at the same time, it arouses the interest of quite a few people not part of the Jewish population.

### **Independent Educational Projects**

Educational projects may also grow from private initiatives, independently from establishments. One example among others, *Limmud*, the popular Learning Festival project, that started in England and has achieved great success, arrived in Germany through the voluntary efforts of a handful of individuals who lacked any official financial support. Hence, the Limmud team carries out its own fundraising, to finance a national three-day-festival (in May each year) dedicated to Jewish learning. This has definitely been a success: 24 workshops were offered during the first festival in 2006; 105 workshops were on the program in 2008; and 170 workshops in 2009. The festival offers a panorama of the current Jewish world in a variety of domains.

Another case of an independent project is the creation and activity of the Salomon Birnbaum Society for Yiddish in Hamburg which, since 1995, has supported the teaching of Yiddish and its literature at several universities. The Society targets the public interested in Yiddish literature, language, linguistics, history and arts. As well as professional Yiddish lectures, it offers reading sessions, seminars, theatre performances, movie screenings and colloquia. Funded by government money, registered members' fees and private donations, the Society is open to both Jews and non-Jews, and cooperates with academic and non-academic organizations. It also supports Yiddish classes, publications and translations, as well as promoting academic research thanks to the support of the Salomon Birnbaum Library.

This interest in Yiddish also finds expression in a Klezmer music revival. A so-called Other Music- Yiddish Summer Festival is now held in Weimar through the initiative of American pianist and composer Alan Bern, leader of the Klezmer group Brave Old World.

This festival offers a yearly workshop open to the public, and each winter a small workshop for professional musicians (Yiddish Winter). Interested people from many countries attend these events while the festival itself is now entering its eleventh year. The project brings together about 300 students per year, and has gained an international reputation.

Still another independent project is the Dresden-based project Hatikva – Education and Meeting Center for Jewish History and Culture in Saxony. Hatikva stemmed from a general historical project in Dresden at the beginning of the 1990's, and since then has become an association exclusively dedicated to transmitting Jewish history and culture. Hatikva targets children and young people; it organizes Hebrew classes and develops pedagogical material for teachers and social workers. The association runs an online magazine - *Medaon Magazine for Jewish Life in Research and Education*. Though not financially supported by the community in Dresden, Hatikva cooperates with it in many respects and also works with several non-Jewish organizations, such as the Society for Christian-Jewish Cooperation.

### **Conclusions**

There is a feeling that educational frameworks for Jewish children are lacking, and adults are also interested in more options for Jewish Studies, for themselves. As we have seen, the reality “in the field” indicates a multiplicity of Jewish educational institutions that, however, by no means represent a dense and comprehensive educational network. In almost all communities in Germany - especially the medium-size or small ones - there is a deplorable lack of financial resources and qualified personnel that would make possible a full-fledged system for children and interested adults. There are Jewish kindergartens, but not everywhere, with various religious orientations, and with too few children. In several cities one finds elementary schools, some of them Orthodox, but they too are not numerous enough, and are lacking even in some of the large communities. High schools do not exist, except for the one in Berlin.

On the other hand, Jewish youth-centers are more numerous; they organize Jewish social and cultural activities for children aged 6 to 18. These centers are sponsored mostly by communities unable to finance schools, and bring young Jews together, familiarize them with Judaism and impart information on Jews around the world and about Israel.

At the next stage, are the Jewish student organizations that are not always successful in attracting a large number of Jewish students. These organizations are involved in debates about Jewish or Israeli matters as well as leisure activities which might compete with Chabad's work which also offers activities aimed at Jewish students.

All these, however, do not preclude the activity of adult centers for Jewish learning that are more often than not attached to religious congregations. They operate in several cities and are supported by local communities as well as by Jewish or non-Jewish foundations. They are in competition with adult education centers existing in some of the country's biggest cities - Berlin, Munich and Frankfurt/Main. Their programs focus on Judaism and Hebrew and also diffuse information about the Jewish Diaspora and Israeli society. These centers may cooperate with non-Jewish adult education as they are partially financed by local governments.

In addition, Germany has several institutions which teach candidates for rabbinic positions. Up to now, however, their number of students is still modest even if we include two more recent frameworks, i.e. the Chabad yeshivot in Berlin and Frankfurt (12 students in each).

At the level of academic higher education, one finds first the Jewish university of Heidelberg for professional training. In addition, there is the new department of Jewish Social Work at the University of Applied Science in Erfurt. Besides these frameworks, Germany has several academic frameworks in Jewish Studies in universities, while the Touro College of Berlin combines academic studies and involvement in the Jewish world.

While Touro is an independent institution in the domain of academic studies, there are also non-academic projects that grow out of private initiatives. *Limmud*, the popular Learning Festival project, that started in the UK with success, arrived in Germany through the efforts of a few individuals and its yearly learning festival is a success story. Another case, among others, of independent projects is the Salomon Birnbaum Society for Yiddish in Hamburg which, since 1995, has supported the teaching of Yiddish and its literature at several universities. The Other Music- Yiddish Summer Festival is another example that started in Weimar.

In brief, since the arrival of the RSJs, Jewish education in Germany is on the rise – both with respect to numbers of institutions and the diversity of offerings. In many communities, however, many of which have recently come into being, the number of Jews is still too small for providing an infrastructure for developing a ramified educational setting. For the time being, the community of Berlin is the only one that has been able to build a network of Jewish educational institutions, and while Munich, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt are close to this goal, other communities have a long way to go to keep pace with the capital. A compromise in many cases is the opening of frameworks –kindergartens or schools – to non-Jewish participants. However, such frameworks still depend on the possibility of recruiting educators locally, which is not always easy.

One major challenge of Jewish education at all levels in Germany, it is worth emphasizing at this point, is the secularism of the largest part of the present-day Jewish population who often show little interest in religious education. Facing this challenge are organizations like the Jewish Cultural Association of Berlin (JKV) which invests in educational-cultural events. This kind of association, however, still has only limited influence throughout Germany's Jewry where, in most places, the synagogue is the heart of the community.

Volume 3 provides a tentative list of Jewish educational institutions that we elicited from our investigation of Germany's Jewish communities.

## Chapter 7: The Issue of Agenda

Before drawing conclusions from our investigation, we found it important to question leading figures of the Jewish population of Germany about what they see as the burning issues of this Jewry. They are public figures, through their positions in community bodies, central agencies, educational institutions, and universities. As such they are what can be called “experts” on the Jews of Germany. Because of the importance of their testimonies, we present their interviews in full in Volume 2, but for the same reason, before concluding our work we present here a concise analysis of the main ideas that we heard.

These 23 semi-structured expert interviews were conducted individually, face-to-face. Nearly half of the interviewees were RSJs, and the others were Vets; one-third were women. Among the interviewees were professionals and lay leaders from all major congregations active in Germany (Orthodox, Masorti, and Liberal). We also met the heads of the newly arrived – but very active - Chabad movement and the Ronald S. Lauder Foundation. Community leaders were interviewed in Berlin, Munich and Leipzig, and in addition we interviewed the rector of the University of Jewish Studies (Hochschule für Jüdische Studien) in Heidelberg. We also spoke with the leader of the large-scale educational project of Westphalia, Geshet, as well as with the coordinator of the Limmud Learning Festival, Germany, and the manager of the Berlin Office of the World Congress of Russian Speaking Jews (WCRJ). The diversity of views is illustrative of the breadth of challenges encountered today by Jews in Germany (see the list providing details of the interviewees, in Vol. 2).

The questionnaire was designed to examine the interviewees’ perceptions of the main contemporary challenges of Jewry in Germany after the RSJs’ immigration; present-day relations with the non-Jewish German population and officials; the internal dynamics, debates and conflicts taking place in the Jewish population; the issue of collective identity and relations with Israel; the state of affairs concerning Jewish education in Germany.

***Chronic Shortage*** Jewish life in Germany has undergone radical changes since the country’s political unification. These changes generate new questions and problems while in the immediate aftermath of unification, the influx of RSJs generated crucial challenges from within the Jewish population. Interviewees referred to both kinds of issues.

Germany’s Jewish population is now the third largest in Europe, after France and the UK. However, a second glance shows its demographic structure to be quite problematic and nothing guarantees that young RSJs will be eager to retain their ties with Jewry. According to Rabbi Walter Homolka, pessimistic voices fear that only a small minority of the immigrants will remain in the Jewish community after the first generation passes away. For Homolka “if we don’t do anything substantial within the next 10-20 years (...), we will go back to 1989.”

Such assessments are based on the older majority in the Jewish population (especially among RSJs), widespread passivity of Jews vis-à-vis the Jewish community and the high rates of marriages with non-Jewish spouses. The speaker also reminded us that in recent years there has been a drastic fall in immigration after the Government published (in 2005) new restrictive regulations applying to RSJ immigrants. Evgueni Berkovitch states in this

respect that: “The new Jewish experiment in Germany has been interrupted before a critical mass was reached.” This statement gains even more relevance when we observe the relatively high mortality rate and the low birth rate, bringing about potential regressive demographic trends in the Jewish community.

Not less crucial is the fact that the massive RSJ immigration enlarged the communities but not its infrastructure and staff. Money, energy and time have ever since been devoted to integration work – often at the expense of other synagogue and community activities. Most interviewees confirm that there is now a drastic shortage of professional personnel - educators, social workers and functionaries. Benjamin Bloch, the Head of the Central Welfare Board of Jews in Germany (Frankfurt), adds that there is especially a lack of professionals fluent in both German and Russian. Rabbi Gesa Ederberg (Berlin) speaks of a “huge lack of teachers, educators, rabbis and committed people,” whereas Rabbi Walter Homolka regrets the lack of rabbis able to work with young families.”<sup>23</sup> Sergey Lagodinsky, a member of the Jewish Council in Berlin, points out a “void of effective Jewish political leaders.”

***Lack of Interest among the Young, and Alienation of the Elderly*** Another acute issue concerns the problem of attracting young people who could commit themselves to the community. This is asserted by several interviewees like Singer, Litvan, Kogan, and Böhme. Especially among RSJs, the interest in getting together does not bring them to the synagogue or the youth center. Larissa Syssoeva says here that she noticed that many young RSJs leave the Jewish communities because they see no reason to remain part of it. They continue to maintain networks among themselves but outside the communities. Nearly all interviewees confirm the existence of serious problems for the community concerning young adults (18-40).

Some interviewees tend to paint a less pessimistic picture of the situation. For Micha Brumlik, the main difficulties of integrating RSJs have been overcome and it must now be discussed how this new Jewish population and its younger leadership will take over responsibilities in the community. Lala Süsskind, however, insists that the situation is different from one community to the other. Though, in general, she thinks, that the older generations of RSJs and Vets do not have much in common, principally due to language barriers. This, she contends, is not so important for the middle-aged or younger generations where German is acquired as the first language and permits increased interaction between RSJs and Vets. These voices, we underline, contrast with others which depict the current relations between groups less harmoniously and marked by conflicts.

Toby Axelrod sees in the RSJs-Vet division of Germany’s Jews a problem of communication caused by mistaken expectations on both sides. Another factor, she maintains, is a function of RSJs’ tendency to form distinct communities with associations of their own – such as the World Congress of Russian Speaking Jews (WCRJ)- and to participate in activities conducted in their own language.

An additional and related aspect is that among many RSJs – primarily the elderly - there are feelings of alienation vis-à-vis the environment, a sense of being left aside by the local population. For Benjamin Bloch, it is frequently the case that RSJs feel that not enough is

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<sup>23</sup> The problem is *not* relevant for Chabad and Lauder which delegated especially *young* Rabbis to their German projects, consciously underscoring work with children, youth, and young families.

done by veterans to assist their integration. David Gall stresses here the importance of encouraging a new Jewish vitality that would follow from the diversity of the contemporary Jewish population and of its interests. This diversity should fuel the community's creativity and innovation.

***The Non-Jewish Environment*** On the other hand, almost all interviewees who are leading figures in Germany's Jewry describe their relations with the German authorities as cooperative and marked by goodwill. Ever since 1945, the federal and state governments allocate financial support to Jewish organizations in view of strengthening Jewish community structures. This support has made it possible to open kindergartens, schools, adult centers and libraries. However, this funding channeled via umbrella organizations or local communities creates a situation propitious to the emergence of lobbies and conflicts between Jewish organizations and institutions over their relative share in these resources.

When it comes to tenets of policies, Jewish leaders in Germany face an establishment that is friendly to Israel and a general situation where anti-Semitism is weaker than in many other European countries. Manifestations of anti-Semitism are rare here and whenever they come up, they tend to be seen as a problem of the German society as a whole. This is expressed in large demonstrations and actions against xenophobia, right-wing extremism, or anti-Semitism.

In this context, Jewish leaders encourage the community to place their trust in national and local institutions. Charlotte Knobloch is convinced that Jewish citizens who were born and grew up in the country consider themselves part of the German society. It is on this basis that they want RSJs to also feel that they have found a new home here. Micha Brumlik is confident that the young generations of RSJs already take for granted that they are in Germany for good, and are gradually becoming German Jews, not just residents.

Of course, things are not taken for granted by everyone. Jewgenij Singer reports that while young RSJs aspire to become German citizens, they do not refrain from asking to what extent does German citizenship imply German patriotism. A question that, to some extent, echoes – according to Ederberg, Süsskind and Gall - the debate taking place in German society as a whole, i.e. how far should a German be patriotic these days in the context of this society's recent history.

Two interviewees note two additional problematic aspects of the encounter of Jews with the non-Jewish environment. According to Dmitri Belkin, one cannot speak of this encounter as free from ulterior motives: many non-Jews show a strong interest in Jewish issues that is often tainted with feelings of guilt, if not of traumatism, while others try by all means to avoid discussing Jewish matters. In any case, it is rarely a case of a free discussion. For David Gall, while relations between the Jewish community and the German authorities are smooth, many obstacles still exist behind them. Individual Jews, for instance, are sometimes shocked by the arrogance of officials who would not show their predispositions in the open as anti-Semitism – which is an absolute taboo. One may guess their predispositions, however, from the indirect ways in which they express their dislike of Jews.

In a similar vein, Rabbi Yehuda Teichtal (Berlin) reports his ambivalence toward non-Jewish Germans who are eager to voice praise for Judaism, but do not refrain from assessing harsh attitudes towards Israel, thus revealing underlying deep anti-Jewish feelings. Anti-Israeliness, he contends, is often a cover for anti-Semitism.

More generally, it is the opinion of our interviewees (Knobloch, Kogan, Teichtal, Böhme) that non-Jewish media coverage of Jewish and Israeli events is characterized by disproportion. This may concern the narration of anniversaries or historical events but it may also – which is much more frequent – focus on scandals or stories where Israel or Jews are accused of misdemeanor and which would never awake comparable interest when happening in other communities or countries.

***Jewish Pluralism*** As a result of the transformation of Jewry in Germany in the past two decades, new actors from the outside - Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox as well as Liberal Judaism and others - have started working among German Jews. As a result, a new pluralism of denominations has emerged which, as a whole, is welcomed by interviewees. Christian Böhme thinks that this diversity can only increase the vitality of Jewry in Germany and encourage each actor to increase its attractiveness. Rabbi Gesa Ederberg even thinks that the very principle of pluralism is becoming widely accepted and Toby Axelrod especially praises the new (non-halachic) Egalitarian and Progressive congregations developing alongside the more traditional ones in the larger communities. She also devotes particular attention to the new feminist-Orthodox movement, Bet Debora.

As a consequence of this pluralism, all movements and forces are showing tolerance toward each other. This is what Micha Brumlik identifies as the new reality. On the other hand, Rabbi Michail Kogan emphasizes that this reality also features confrontations, which may be harmful for the development of Jewry in Germany. As a concrete expression of these risks, Benjamin Bloch rejects the idea of institutionalizing the present-day pluralism by structuring accordingly the Jewish all-Germany bodies and the Jewish educational system. A view that is opposed by Evgueni Berkovitch who proposes discussing inter-denominational relations, on the basis of pragmatic considerations.

***Vets and RSJs*** For some leaders who represent the veteran milieu, behind the discussions about pluralism one again finds the question of the encounter between Vets and RSJs, and the latter's reservations about the long-prevailing model of synagogue-centered community. In some communities cooperation between Vets and RSJs, it is noted, has remained minimal, and mutual dissatisfaction easily escalates to open conflict.

A related bone of contention arising periodically within a strong contingent of RSJs concerns the halachic regulations of *giyur* (conversion to Judaism for non-Jews or non-halachic Jews). These rather restrictive regulations are considered unfair by many RSJs who feel Jews by allegiance or by their link to Jewish spouses or relatives, and who, in the FSU, were often the target of anti-Semitism. This contention of unfair conversion regulations fuels animosity between them and Vets.

Moreover, some RSJ activists also blame Vets for their unwillingness – assumed or real – to share with them power and resources in the framework of the Jewish community. Adriana Stern, a Vet herself, criticizes what she calls dominant attitudes on the side of Vets vis-à-vis RSJs. She deplores that many Vets assume that RSJs have nothing to contribute to the country's Jewry and that Vets have to teach them “everything”. Mikhail Goldberg takes issues with exclusionary attitudes by the Jewish establishment, and accuses Vet leaders of neglecting the interest of the community as a whole, and thereby harming RSJs' readiness to involve themselves in the community.

The RSJs-Vet divide also relates to Jewish pluralism from another point of view. Sergey Lagodinsky and several other interviewees (Brumlik, Litvan) note that, as a rule, RSJs who

tend to get close to religion, express preference for Orthodoxy. It is Lagodinsky's point that many RSJs "have a problem" with non-halachic forms of Judaism. Similarly, Rabbi Michael Kogan estimates that RSJs are mostly atheists but when they leave the FSU, they tend to adopt some norms and look mainly toward the Orthodox in this respect. Rabbi Joshua Spinner disagrees that RSJs are less religious than Vets. According to his experience, most RSJs are now ready to get closer to Judaism. Then, he contends, they tend to divide, like Vets, according to the depth of their interest.

Hence, RSJs, like Vets, are divided regarding issues like conversion. Those RSJs who turned to Orthodox Judaism reject any modification, like Orthodox Jews everywhere. On the other hand, people who aspire to ease the way in to outsiders or non-halachic Jews insist on exploring eventual less restrictive regulations of conversion than those actually in place in Orthodox communities. This kind of position, however, is always opposed by Orthodox Jews, such as Rabbi Gesa Ederberg who claims that retaining halachic dispositions in the matter of conversion is intended to safeguard the unity of the Jewish people. Evgueni Berkovitch suggests instead accepting the position of the American Reform movement, which recognizes the children of Jewish fathers and non Jewish mothers as Jews.

Beyond these different positions, some interviewees (Ederberg, Kaufmann) report that the general climate in the Jewish communities of Germany tends to calm open conflicts among Jews about religious orientations. The pluralism of Jewry offers everyone some way out of the problem of conversion, but at the risk that those converted by Liberals are not recognized as Jews by the Orthodox – which is not the case of Orthodox converts in the eyes of Liberals. It is in the context of these difficulties that some interviewees advocate that to be Jewish just requires one to feel Jewish. This perspective, however, is by no means accepted by the majority. Jewgenij Singer who, as an RSJ is sensitive to the problem of conversion, still contends that there is no other way than Orthodox conversion to withstand the temptation of assimilation. This position is also sustained by Kuef Kaufmann who adheres to the traditional Orthodox opinion that, notwithstanding the suffering, Jews should keep to the halachic ruling on this point.

Prolonging the debate about conversion, Sergey Lagodinsky opposes the present-day ruling defining who is eligible for appointment to the Berlin Jewish Council. According to this ruling, only people whose children are Jewish may be elected. This means that individuals married to non-Jews would not be entitled to be elected. This, he contends, discriminates against individuals according, not to their own Jewishness but their wife's. Ultimately, interviewees do not see a realistic chance at the moment for pushing through modifications of the conversion regulations. We were told that only the World Congress of Russian-Speaking Jews (WCRJ) is fighting directly for the unreserved acceptance of the American Reform kind of conversion.

***The Search for Collective Identity*** Beyond – or behind - these debates, we encounter finally, the question of what comprises Jewishness today for Germany's Jews. To be sure, the fight against anti-Semitism remains on Jewry's agenda here like in all countries of the diaspora. Here in particular, it is associated, probably more than elsewhere, with memories of the Shoah. The question is whether this dimension of Jewishness is enough to give positive tenets to the assertion of Jewishness. Some of the interviewees speak of the discomfort and difficulties Jews experience in the area of identity building. According to

them, tenets of the Jewish community in post-war Germany like the memory of the Holocaust, fighting against anti-Semitism, and solidarity with Israel, are not sufficient to assert what Jewishness is about. Heads of communities, rabbis and educators should now elaborate new tenets. Toby Axelrod believes, with regret, that the young generation in Germany's Jewish population show less interest in these matters than their elder. Its removal from the events of the past attenuates its sensitivity and this development requires a new pedagogy. Rabbi Yehuda Teichtal thinks that such a pedagogy should be oriented toward the active participation of individuals in diverse forms of Jewish life. This aspiration, moreover, should also take into consideration that the very understanding of events, facts or values can acquire different meanings for various segments of the Jewish community. For instance, Teichtal underlines that even the Shoah may be grasped via different perspectives. For many RSJs, indeed, the Shoah is linked to the Soviet war against Nazism to no lesser extent than to considering it in the context of Jewish history. This is not generally the case among non-RSJs.

Relations with Israel constitute another issue that creates differences of interpretations. Several of our interviewees (Böhme, in particular) refer here to the fact that Germany's RSJs had at one time decided against the possibility of settling in Israel after emigrating from the FSU, and opted instead for Germany. This means that they do not link their life path to a Jewish State, and do not see Israel as the ultimate outcome of Jewish history. It does not imply that RSJs and Jews in Germany in general do not identify with Israel and its fight for survival, but it does indicate that a difference is drawn between solidarity with Israel, and accepting Israel as the sole destination of Jews. This kind of approach is especially salient among the younger generation – RSJs and Vets alike. According to interviewees, young Jews show interest in Israel as a country illustrating impetus, opportunities for professionals, or intellectual inspiration. However, this attitude is by no means associated with the belief that the Jewish State is the spiritual, cultural or political center of present day Jewry (Singer, Süsskind). Dmitri Belkin put into words what, in his eyes, many of the young in Germany think: "We're now in a post-Zionist era, where Jewish people across the world say that Zionism is one option among others."

In brief, fighting anti-Semitism, revering the memory of the Holocaust and attachment to Israel will, according to our interviewees, remain the core of the Jewish identity in Germany but in an era when Jews stand at some distance from religion and faith, these tenets require further elaboration and search for additional, and possibly new and pertinent, answers to "what Jewishness is about".

It is on this point that our interviewees who do assert their religiosity – like Micha Brumlik – emphasize that there is no way that Jewishness can be separated from religion and that it constitutes the major link between Jews everywhere. The synagogue and Jewish learning are the core of Jewish life. Rabbi Joshua Spinner goes so far as to remark that any discussion of Jewish identity is meaningless, since the Torah gives the guiding principles to be applied to all fields of life. His colleague Rabbi Gesa Ederberg, in contrast, wants to update the debate about Jewish identity in order to make it more relevant to present-day issues of general interest.

***The Concept of a European Jewish Identity*** The idea of a new European Jewry as a possible "third pillar" of global Jewry (alongside Israel and the American Jewish Community) is another point that the interviewees raised. This question is vital at a time when Europe is in the middle of a process of change and crystallization. Jews from all

countries comprised in the new Europe now belong to a space that tends, in the frame of given limits, to be a political, economic and cultural entity. As a rule, the interviewees are not too disposed to see this issue as of major importance for Jews who are dispersed in different nations, speak different languages, and have different life experiences. Rabbi Joshua Spinner considers the whole idea of a Jewish Renaissance in Europe as unrealistic and hopelessly optimistic – almost laughable. He does not believe that Europeans will grant Jews conditions that will erase the need for Jews to identify with their external reference – Israel. Up to now, Jews in Europe, he contends, feel threatened and there always is a possibility that politicians, churches or labor unions will call for Israel's boycott in an anti-Semitic spirit. Even if Europe eventually moderates its surface attitude toward Jews, it is still worth bearing in mind, in Spinner's view, the anti-Jewish forces at work behind the stage.

Several of our interviewees return to the issue of Jewish education with a diametrically different opinion: only amplifying the Jewish education of the young everywhere in Europe will permit it to face the challenge of securing a future for European Jewry – including Germany's Jewry. In this respect, our interviewees, particularly Tatyana Smolianitski, eagerly emphasize that RSJs are generally very open to learning about Jewish history and culture and would endorse this kind of project in the perspective of contributing to the emergence of a European Jewry.

Actually, all interviewees attach strong importance to the teaching of Judaism. Vibrant Jewish education, they say, is what will nurture a vibrant Jewish community. Aside from cultural and educational associations, learning festivals, and the Jewish media, they underline with much sympathy that the Internet has gained tremendous importance for Jewish learning and exchange in recent years. Most Jewish communities now have their own websites and, each one in its own way, contributes to the diffusion of Judaism. Christian Böhme and David Gall strongly insist on this new means of diffusion and only deplore that this area of activity is still at its beginning in Jewish communities that often lack the resources to reach its potential dissemination.

Other interviewees, like Rabbi Yehuda Teichtal, continue to insist on the irreplaceable character of conventional educational structures. It is in this spirit that interviewees are ready not only to outline the most serious weaknesses of current Jewish education but also make suggestions to improve it. The most significant suggestions can be summarized as follows:

- All communities should hire professionally competent people to take charge of education among young adults (Singer)
- Communities should be encouraged to hire instructors for work among youth, at the local and national levels (Rabbi Homolka). Community endeavors should employ social workers to work in different milieus.
- Educational programs should also be established for community board members as a means of empowering communities (Johannes Heil).
- Models of *inter-generational education* could be operated which would involve the elderly together with children and youth, to bring the first generation and the third generation more closely together (Rabbi Gesa Ederberg).
- The Jewish Scholarship Foundation (*Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich Foundation*) should reach Jewish students and provide them with better study conditions. These students might become, in the future,

opinion leaders and join Jewish networks (Homolka); *Jewish Student Houses* (following the US Beit Hillel System) should be set up in universities (Brumlik, Heil)

- The establishment of a *Jewish Academy* would strive to provide Jewish popular study programs, and build bridges to the non-Jewish public.

***In Conclusion*** In conclusion, with few exceptions (Knobloch, Süsskind), our interviewees agree that many communities are failing to attract commitment to the community by sections of the Jewish population. The most down-to-earth explanation is that there are too many competing stimuli in the surroundings, that overshadow the appeal of Jewish programs in the community. Moreover, Jewish foci of activity are often poorly equipped and framed – especially in small communities, meaning that the rapid growth of Jewish communities in the 1990’s was not followed by an appropriate growth of resources and leadership.

Beyond these explanations, some interviewees do not hesitate to blame RSJs’ attitudes. Benjamin Bloch, for instance, contends that on arrival many of them had no idea of what community life requires. Rabbi Walter Homolka contends that apart from some instances of successful cooptation of RSJ leaders, in many cases, one confronts cultural attitudes that are inappropriate to German circumstances: RSJs are used to having everything organized for them by public authorities while they are expected here to take an active role and shoulder responsibility for themselves. It remains that some of the interviewees disagree with the pessimistic mood: Charlotte Knobloch praises the strong commitment of many veterans and newcomers.

Moreover, for many interviewees, the secularism of Germany’s Jews – Vets and RSJs – does not necessarily imply increased assimilation. Even mixed families are welcome in the community and join Jewish networks. There is now a trend, we were told, that emphasizes openness, if not proselytism. Even a rabbi like Gesa Ederberg is ready to “... accept that within the continuum of Jewish identity there is such a thing as non-religious Judaism.” Micha Brumlik, however, hardly sees the tenets of such forms of Judaism that is not compensated at least by an allegiance to Israel: “As yet it is not clear whether German Jewry has enough self-consciousness of an existence beyond the State of Israel and adherence to it.”

Several interviewees hope that contact with Israel, especially in the field of education and youth exchange, might serve as an important lever in community work in Germany. They (Ederberg, Homolka) reminded us that Lehava – an ongoing project initiated by Benjamin Bloch eight years ago - has gained a strong presence. The idea is to bring young Israelis to Germany to help communities in creating and building up a new Jewish infrastructure. Such an activity, says Bloch, is not necessarily motivated by religious incentives.

Tanya Smolianitski and Rabbi Michael Kogan concur with this idea by elaborating on the importance of educational trips to Israel for young German Jews. Symbols like Jerusalem speak to them; they have relatives living there, and above all, they are moved by the national values represented by the flag, the music, and everything Israeli. All these do not, however, rule out that interviewees question themselves as to whether Israel, the Jewish State, will remain the definitive religious, spiritual and cultural center for global Jewry, including Germany’s Jews. Living in Israel is seen as a possibility, an individual option, but as Lala Süsskind puts it, “the times when Jews in this country were ashamed to live in

Germany are over. There are a lot of indications now which point to a kind of normalization. Many of us feel an integral part of this society.” Yet, the future development of organized Jewish life is far less predictable. Almost all interviewees agree that the synagogues will remain the focus, from where Jewish clubs, interest groups and initiatives will branch out. At the same time it is also clear that not all Jews interested in community life can be satisfied with the programs that are offered. Across the denominations, there is a shared sense that Jewish community life urgently needs support.

In fact, more than an agenda for the Jewish community of Germany, what we obtained here is a set of perspectives and opinions that are scattered and diverse with respect to the several issues we raised in the interviews, to an extent that we are tempted to ask – is there an agenda at all?

## **Chapter 8. Summary and General Conclusions**

### **The New Jewry of Germany**

The Jewish population in Germany has grown immensely over the past 30 years. A large body of knowledge has been created recently by researchers interested in this new Jewry, but, as a rule, they have not yielded a comprehensive perspective on this development and internal Jewish dynamics. These are the goals tackled by this research, with special attention to future perspectives, and therefore, to the state of Jewish education today.

RSJs are now the overwhelming majority of Germany's Jewry; many of them have resided in this country for less than a decade, are not German citizens, and do not speak the language fluently. Hence a language barrier exists between many RSJs and Vets – even though it does not appear too rigid. From a socioeconomic point of view, and quite unusually for a Jewish population, the majority assess their income as being below the average in German society.

Most Jews in Germany do not favor Orthodox Judaism but neither are they overwhelmingly secular. They are best characterized by the notion of Jewish pluralism, and divide into Orthodox ultra-Orthodox, Liberals (Conservative and Reform congregations), somewhat traditional Jews, and totally secular individuals. While a large majority are Halachic Jews, people of mixed parentage, or married or living in companionship with non-Jewish spouses or companions also constitute a substantial part of this Jewish population.

The prevailing allegiances of Jews in this country are definitely to Jewishness and solidarity with Israel, though they do not exclude some feelings for their country of origin, and for their new country. Jewishness, moreover, is defined here in reference to both religious principles and sociocultural particularism. Moreover, both halachic influences and non-halachic cultural criteria appear when it comes to issues relating to “Who is a Jew?” Related to these allegiances, respondents tend to become members of Jewish communities but are less eager to join Jewish organizations.

Socially, most respondents describe relations between RSJs and Vets in terms of both tension and cooperation and but a minority speak of irreconcilable alienation. Moreover, many respondents (RSJs) mentioned that they still have ongoing contacts with relatives and friends who either remained in their former country, or emigrated to Israel. In this latter respect, no difference exists between RSJs and Vets. In this context, it is also notable that despite the difficult socioeconomic condition in which many of them live, the prevailing tendency among respondents regarding esteem for Germany and German society is significant – even though it does not preclude their awareness of the genuine, unsolved problematic aspects.

### **Inner Divisions of RSJs**

We have seen that RSJs, forming a 90% majority of Jews in Germany today, can be divided according to religiosity, length of stay in the country, areas of settling, size of communities, origins, income or age, and that some of these features do correlate in some ways. Interesting correlations were found between these background features and respondents' attitudes. We note here only the most obvious conclusions.

(1) *Jewish pluralism* As could be expected, Orthodox respondents show stronger allegiance to Judaism, the Jewish people and Israel than the other religiosity categories. They are also more involved in Jewish institutions, and committed to the Jewish education of their children. Clearly more than the secular, they seek a Jewish milieu and also tend to have RSJs as friends. On the other hand, secular respondents appreciate Germany and the German culture more than the Orthodox, and also feel more attached to their country of origin.

(2) *Exogamy versus endogamy* Offspring of homogeneous families, in general, feel more Jewish, a stronger sense of belonging to the Jewish People and greater solidarity with Israel than the offspring of exogamous families. They number relatively more Orthodox people and tend also to be more sensitive to unpleasant aspects of life in Germany. On the other hand, offspring of mixed families are somehow more bound to their country of origin, and the same applies to RSJs who live with a non-Jewish spouse, in comparison with those who live with a Jewish one.

(3) *The age factor* In comparison to the younger strata, the older strata have a stronger sense of belonging to the Jewish People and solidarity with Israel. Like the younger, they also appreciate what they find in Germany, especially in the domain of culture, the political regime and welfare. Moreover, they continue to use Russian in most areas of activity and maintain more contacts than the younger do with their former country. The younger ascribe more importance to Jewish education, try to provide their children with it, and themselves attend synagogue services more often. On the other hand, German is gaining ground among them and they feel a stronger sense of belonging to German society.

(4) *Length of stay* Length of stay influences attitudes in the same direction as age but in the contrary sense: the longer the length of stay, the more individuals tend to adopt attitudes typical of the younger. Hence, more veteran RSJs use German more than the less veteran do – even though Russian is still dominant in several spheres. They also have a stronger sense of belonging to German society. Length of stay also diminishes relations with the old country.

(5) *Region of residence and size of community* Residents in smaller communities of the East tend to be less veteran than RSJs in other regions. They are less committed to Judaism, the Jewish people and Israel, and use Russian more. Unemployment is more acute here than in Berlin or Western cities. At the same time, members of large communities also show greater attachment to German society while in Berlin, RSJs are also more in contact with non-Jewish Russian-speakers.

In these data, Germany's RSJs appear to be a quite distinctive Jewish population. One more distinction, and not the least, is that they are joining another, more long-established Jewish population. The question then is whether one may speak of fusion, assimilation, or the formation of two Jewries.

### **One Jewry?**

When one compares RSJs and young adult Vets in terms of the future of Germany's Jewry(ies), it appears that the attachment to Judaism is stronger among Vets than among RSJs, and that this is also the case with the sense of belonging to German society. Because each of them depends on different circumstances, attachment to Jewry does not contradict adherence to non-Jewish society – for Vets– and somehow a weaker attachment to Jewry may also be concomitant with weaker sense of belonging to German society – for RSJs.

On the other hand, the two younger strata also tend to converge toward each other, notwithstanding the divergences that still stand out, especially in the area of language. All in all, Vet and RSJ young adults tend effectively to move closer to each other, in their attitudes vis-à-vis themselves, their feelings about the community, and their perspectives on their environment.

One cannot ignore, however, the fact that willingness to join Jewish organizations is much weaker among RSJs than among Vets, which may predict a future reproduction of today's problematic situation regarding the recruitment of community leadership: a Jewry headed by elements stemming from the small Vet minority over a community where the vast majority is RSJs. It is a situation where alienation may easily grow among the latter in the context of linguistic and cultural gaps, as well as socioeconomic differences. And it is a situation, however, where one cannot dispute the reality of tendencies for social intermingling.

In brief, despite the divergences underlined above, lines of convergence do clearly appear, referring mainly to the importance of Jewishness and solidarity with Israel, openness to one another, reticence over merging with German society and, together with all these, positive appreciation of many aspects of this society – without ignoring the hardships for Jews' inclusion in their environment, represented by the past and other current circumstances. Hence, at this point of time, one may indeed speak of a process in which one Jewry in Germany is forming, from the segments that divide it today. This process, however, is not unavoidable, depending as it does on the actors themselves.

At this point, the importance of education and the aspirations of today's adults intervene. with respect to the next generation.

### **Jewish Education: Expectations and Reality**

A wide majority of respondents are willing to provide their children with a Jewish education. Not all, however, translate these wishes into facts. Among RSJs, it is the Orthodox who concretize this ambition in practical efforts – even though, many of them admit their powerlessness in this respect. Among the other categories – Liberals, traditionals and secular - efforts and realizations illustrate a declining gradient. To this we must add that RSJs from mixed families, or those with a non-Jewish spouse, are not preoccupied by the necessity of providing a Jewish education as much as others are. Even among them, some aspiration for giving children elements of a Jewish education is shared by majorities. Furthermore, among RSJs the younger stratum is probably more committed to Jewish education than the older, and the education offered matches their aspirations. Jewish education is expensive, however, even when some public support is provided, and so it is more in reach of large – and more affluent - communities than of smaller, poorer ones – like the small communities of Eastern Germany.

In the context of this diversity of factors, we must also consider the extent to which RSJ respondents attach importance to their children's acquisition of German culture. Their position on this issue is quite divided: a minority – especially individuals without academic education and/or who belong to the Orthodox – does not endorse the importance of this acquisition and the majority who favor it are divided into different degrees of keenness. Moreover, the younger stratum are less sensitive to this question than the older ones. We believe it may be accounted for by the fact that their own German culture makes them take

this acquisition for granted, while they feel more acutely the need to assure their children's Jewish education.

On the other hand, when it comes to practicalities, more than a few respondents complain about the shortage of institutions of Jewish education in their communities. These complaints refer to a lack of adequate programs in Israel studies and others speak of courses in Bible, Judaism and Jewish history or of Hebrew classes which do not meet the demand. Among RSJs, Jewish pluralism makes a difference here. While only a minority of the Orthodox feel that no program is missing – most seemingly take care of Jewish education on their own - nearly half of the secular do voice complaints – with Liberals and traditionals in an-in-between position. Many respondents – in all types of communities - are also aware of their own need for Jewish learning, and would appreciate – that is what they say – Jewish programs aimed at them. Hence, to the question of “do Jews in Germany show interest in Jewish learning?” the answer is clearly affirmative.

When it comes to offerings in Jewish education, it is notable that there are many Jewish educational institutions Germany, a large part of which are recently created. Up to now, however, one can hardly speak of a dense and comprehensive network of institutions. In almost all communities in Germany - especially the medium-size or small ones - one deplores a lack of financial resources and of qualified personnel that would make possible a full-fledged system for children, not to speak of interested adults. Jewish kindergartens of diverse religious or secular orientations exist in many places but not everywhere, and many of them face a problem of an insufficient number of pupils. In several cities one finds elementary schools- some of them Orthodox - but they too are not numerous enough - even in large communities. There are no high schools at all, except the one in Berlin. Youth centers are more numerous; they offer a large range of activities but individual participation is limited to a few hours a week.

Next, are the Jewish student organizations that are not always too successful in attracting a large public for the debates and leisure activities which they organize. They might be in competition with an organization like Chabad which also proposes activities – in its own style – targeting Jewish students. In addition, there are clubs or centers for adults, which offer lectures and courses in Judaism or Israel studies. Some of these centers are funded by communities and others by religious congregations.

At the level of academic higher education, one also finds a diversity of frameworks, from the Heidelberg Jewish university for professional training, to university departments in Judaism or associated subjects, and research centers dedicated to the sphere. Noteworthy here is the independent Touro College of Berlin which combines academic studies and involvement in the Jewish world. Finally, there are also several institutions for rabbinical studies in Germany. Up to now, however, their number of students remains modest even when factoring in the more recent Chabad yeshivot. Besides all these, there are also the non-academic projects initiated by private initiatives or world Jewish organizations; for example, the popular *Limmud* Learning Festival project, the Salomon Birnbaum Society for Yiddish or the so-called Other Music, Yiddish Summer Festival.

In brief, Jewish education in Germany is on the rise – both with respect to the number of institutions and the diversity of offerings. In many communities – a large part of which are of recent formation - the number of Jews is still too small for to provide the infrastructure for developing a ramified educational setting. For the time being, Berlin is the only community that has managed to build a coherent chain of Jewish educational institutions,

and only a few other large communities (Munich, Düsseldorf or Frankfurt) are close to this goal.

One major challenge of Jewish education at all levels in Germany, it is worth emphasizing at this point, is the secularism of the greater part of today's Jewish population, who demonstrate little interest in religious education. Confronting this challenge are organizations like the Jewish Cultural Association of Berlin which invests in educational-cultural events. This kind of association, however, still has only limited influence throughout Germany's Jewry where, in most places, the synagogue is the heart of the community.

### **The Burning Issues**

With few exceptions, the leading figures who were interviewed during this research agree that many communities fail to attract substantial involvement in community work. While some interviewees blame competing stimuli in the surroundings, that overshadow the community's appeal, others deplore the poor equipment found in the community centers, especially those in small communities. In other words, the rapid growth of the Jewish population in the 1990's was not accompanied by an adequate influx of resources.

Other interviewees pin the blame on the RSJs' attitudes and their inexperience in community life. Few RSJs, it is contended, have been successfully co-opted by the Vet leadership because of the lack of experience of most active RSJs in the circumstances prevailing in Germany. Hence some interviewees did not hesitate to say that perhaps only in the second generation can a change in leadership recruitment be expected. While others insist that in the meantime, mixed marriages that are liable to destabilize the community, are increasing, others hold that the pessimistic mood is not justified and that many veterans and newcomers are strongly committed to Germany's Jewry.

Moreover, the secularism of Germany's Jews – Vets and RSJs alike – does not necessarily imply increased assimilation. Even mixed families are welcome in the community and join Jewish networks. Some interviewees call for adopting the principle that within the continuum of Jewish identity, non-religious Judaism can no longer be ignored. This attitude, which is not opposed by many interviewees, calls for work to be done on defining Jewish identity – or identities – that might be relevant to future Jewish generations – and not necessarily motivated by religious incentives. Furthermore, several interviewees hope that contact with Israel, especially in the field of education and youth exchange, may serve as an important lever in community work in Germany.

In brief, interviewees question themselves as to whether the Jewish State will remain the definitive religious, spiritual and cultural center for global Jewry. In any event they unanimously agree that the times when Jews were ashamed to live in Germany are over, though the future development of organized Jewish life is much less predictable. The synagogues will most probably remain the focus of Jewish life, from where Jewish clubs, interest groups and initiatives will develop. At the same time, Jews' interests are highly varied and questions are asked that need new answers. These questions will probably accompany German Jews for some years to come.

## The Theoretical Edge

At a theoretical level, this research project addresses the question of the extent and manner in which Germany's Jewry responds to the notion of transnational diaspora, which is a core preoccupation of social researchers, in this era of global trends and population movements. This notion (Ben-Rafael 2010) refers to a reality that is well-known to researchers of the Jewish people, and which has become quite commonplace in the contemporary world, characterized as it is by new modes of inclusion in society by migrants from all over the world. It denotes the dispersal of people sharing a same territorial origin and who, in one way or another, maintain allegiances to the whole that they form, as they settle in different societies. Understandings attached to the diasporic condition vary both within and between diasporas but this 'transnationality' implies a continuation – through transformation – of the principle of "one diaspora."

As a general case, the founding narrative of diasporas – a religion, a history, a culture or a language - justifies aspirations to retain distinctiveness from locals and allegiance to legacies that migrants brought with them from "elsewhere." "Elsewhere" – i.e. a "territorialized origin" - indicates a commitment that cuts across boundaries and concretizes "here and now" a principle of "dual homeness." This, in turn, implies the anchoring of a collective in its local environment that does not, in itself, eradicate a reference of belongingness to an external entity. Once settled in their new society, members of such a collective learn a new language and grow accustomed to new symbols. Ultimately, they acquire a new national identity that becomes their primary one, while their original identity is gradually reduced to secondary importance. The outcome is a degree of fluidity of social boundaries that invites actors, in endless debates, to question and redefine their identities. So this fluidity of boundaries, when coupled with the dual-homeness condition, signifies that the commitments of diasporans to the national society and the state, on the one hand, and to the transnational entity on the other, are anything but one-sided and total.

The diverse facets of our research substantiate that conceptualization of "transnational diaspora." This condition has always been typical of dispersed Jewish communities – long before a Jewish State existed and when the notion of "territorialized origin" was little more than a myth. In Germany today, this notion of transnational diaspora may have particular relevance, even of different kinds of relevance. The small veteran Jewish community that, itself, represents an amalgamation of survivors of the Shoah, refugees from Eastern Europe, migrants from Israel and others, has always been known for its strong allegiance to Israel, adopting it - as soon as the State was created - as its "territorialized origin". This allegiance did not preclude it from anchoring itself in the German post-war reality.

The Russian-speaking Jews who arrived in the 1990s also illustrate a case of transnational diaspora, though a quite unusual case, essentially different from the veteran community. In light of the definition of this concept, Russian-speaking Jews indeed tend to refer themselves, not to one but to two "territorialized origins": the FSU and Israel. As recent immigrants from the FSU, they continue to speak Russian, to refer to Russian culture, maintain contacts with relatives and friends left behind, and also pay visits to the "old country." On the other hand, they also identify with Israel as Jews; they know people – relatives and friends – who have settled in Israel since the collapse of the USSR; they follow the events of the Middle-East, and demonstrate solidarity with the Jewish State, as

the State of the Jews. These two simultaneous allegiances to “homelands” underline the unusual nature of this diaspora.

Though, as shown by the data throughout this report, it is toward Israel that their main line of allegiance to a “territorialized origin” is directed – even though, as just mentioned, the language they want to keep and the cultural values they are proud of, mark their origin as the FSU. This condition only amplifies the dilemmas that diasporans face when inserting themselves into a new setting that is not their “territorialized origins.” Hence, possibly more than many other cases of transnational diaspora, they face problems of defining their collective identity, the nature of their social boundaries, and the tenets that singularize them vis-à-vis “others.” Possibly more than many other cases of transnational diaspora, they may be marked by a pluralism of formulations of their collective, degrees of collective identification, attitudes toward their new environment as well as toward each of their “territorialized origins.” As our data hint, these differences relate, in varying manners and degrees, to such contingencies as exogamy versus endogamy, religiosity, age, region, length of stay, origin, income, and size of community.

All in all, this general description of the present-day Jewry of Germany shows that it effectively represents a case of transnational diaspora, and a quite complex one. The importance of Jewishness and solidarity with Israel as two identity principles that appear together are strongly prevalent in the set of collective identities. This does not preclude, however, the case that links and identification also appear – among the Russian-speaking Jews - with respect to the “old country.” On the other hand, it transpires from attitudes toward the German language, culture and society that they accept the present-day environment as the place where they feel at home. A very large minority (46.2%) of the respondents do not feel at all that they are part of the German nation, and therefore although they feel at home in Germany, it does not necessarily mean that they consider Germany as a genuine homeland. Following this it can be asked whether, in the contemporary context, one can speak of Jews in Germany, or German Jews. Regarding the RSJs, since the majority do not feel they are part of the German nation, it is more appropriate to see them as Jews in Germany, rather than German Jews. Their strong attachment to the Russian language and culture only strengthens this argument. Hence, one can say that although they find Germany and German society attractive in many aspects, it is mainly an instrumental attractiveness that does not penetrate deeper into identity and cultural attachments. As for the Vets, although the majority of them see themselves as attached to the German nation, their attachment to the Jewish people is much stronger, as is their solidarity with Israel. Namely, they see themselves much more as Jews than as Germans. So even if it is possible to define them as German Jews, one should pay attention to the fact that the Jewish and the German aspects of this hyphenated identity are far from symmetrical. From these perspectives, that are not necessarily coherent and simplistic, we may understand how respondents tackled the various questions we asked them, and how they ultimately view their own condition in contemporary Germany – for better or worse.

It is in this context that the issue of Jewish education takes on its entire crucial significance. Education must indeed furnish answers to very weighty, crucial questions.

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