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HASSIDISM IN FRANCE TODAY: A PECULIAR CASE?

Jacques Gutwirth

THIS paper attempts to describe Hassidism in France today within its historical and sociological context. That country's hassidic movement is in fact limited to only one group: the Lubavitch, who have displayed a remarkable and astonishing dynamism in the heart of a population which has not in the past been drawn to any form of Hassidism.[1] France has certainly not been a country of choice for the hassidim — neither before nor immediately after the Second World War. Surprisingly, it was only after 1960 (with the mass emigration of North African Jews) that only one hassidic movement, that of the Lubavitch, took hold in France among the newcomers and soon spread throughout the country. That was a doubly peculiar development with the domination of only one hassidic movement among a section of Jewry which had rarely been attracted to that type of Judaism.

Nowadays in France there are believed to be some 10,000 to 15,000 Lubavitch followers (men, women, and children). A proportion of these are loyal adherents while the rest are 'sympathisers' who attend more or less regularly the movement's synagogues or prayer houses. Although 10,000 to 15,000 represent only two to three per cent of the half-million French Jews,[2] we must bear in mind that before 1950 the country had barely a few dozen Hassidic families of mainly Russian or Ukrainian origin. Nowadays, however, at least three-quarters of the Lubavitch members or sympathisers are of North African origin (from Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) and are mostly the children and grandchildren — the so-called second and third generations — of those who immigrated in the 1960s.

Before the Second World War, Hassidism, like strict Jewish Orthodoxy, had few adherents in France. Admittedly, there were very observant Jews among immigrants from Eastern Europe who had settled in Paris; many of them attended what were known as 'oratoires' (prayer-houses) in the rue des Rosiers (in the fourth arrondissement) which was the historical heart of Parisian Jewry.[3] At the time, between the 1920s and the 1940s, a

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small number of Lubavitch members lived in Paris, but they had neither a prayer-house nor any other institution attached to them.

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, after 1945, some Lubavitch hassidim who had been living in the Soviet Union came to Paris but that city was for most of them only a staging post on the way to other destinations — mainly Brooklyn, Montreal, or London. Joseph Isaac Schneerson was then the sixth rebbe (the charismatic leader of the Lubavitch) and at his request some 30 households continued to remain in Paris;[4] they resided then mainly near the two small synagogues in the rue des Rosiers, spoke little or no French, and the prospect of their winning over *baalei tshuva* (returners to the faith) which was to become the chief aim of the Lubavitch from the 1960s onwards, was not yet one of their main concerns. The Paris Lubavitch, like hassidim elsewhere, have specific religious requirements and the Paris group had to be content with the absolute minimum at first. Admittedly, there was in the district known as le Marais a *mikveh* (ritual bath) but it was apparently the only one in Paris;[5] and there was only one butcher shop which could boast of being *glat kosher* (very strictly kasher), as well as only one wholly reliable patisserie for cakes and sweetmeats. Gradually, the Lubavitch established other ritual baths and food shops while some members of the movement became *shohetim* (ritual slaughterers of food animals and of poultry) accredited to the Consistoire de France, the official established communal institution of French Jewry.[6] In fact, the Consistoire and the Jewish communities were short of religious specialist personnel and the Lubavitch were also welcome as religious teachers, as *kashrut* supervisors, etc.

In the years immediately following the Second World War, the synagogue at 17 rue des Rosiers was attended by faithful persons of various Orthodox and hassidic leanings, mainly those who had survived the Shoah (the Holocaust); but gradually most of them left Paris and the synagogue became the place of prayer for religious people who did remain in the locality — in fact the Lubavitcher, who until today are its faithful users. That prayer-house, believed to date from 1879, is not recognisable from the street: it is situated in an apartment on the first floor of an eighteenth-century building and it overlooks an inner courtyard. The main room is reserved for men's prayer while, next to it and near the entrance, there is the space for women's prayer, separated by a screen and curtains. Furniture is very basic: the main room houses an altar and the Torah scrolls, and also a few wooden benches, tables, and book-shelves. It is a place for both prayer and study — quite characteristic of a hassidic *shtibel.*

Very soon after the end of the Second World War, in 1946, the Paris Lubavitcher had set about establishing their own educational establishment, beginning with a yeshiva called *Tomchei Tmimim Lubavitch* (supporters of the purest Lubavitch), about 25 kilometres from Paris, in Brunoy,

surrounded by greenery. The aim of that yeshiva was, and still is, to provide training for rabbis, ritual slaughterers, and religious teachers for the Lubavitcher in France and elsewhere. The principal subjects taught are mainly Talmudical studies and 'hassidism' (*hassidut*) — in fact the study of *Tanya*, the main opus of the founder of the Lubavitch movement, Shneur Zalman of Liady (1745–1813), as well as the sermons and letters (generally published in book form) of the various Lubavitch rebbes. In recent decades, the Lubavitch have studied in particular the writings of their last famous leader, Menachem Mendel Schneerson (1902–1994).

In the early years of the yeshiva, most of the students were boarders and some of them came from outside France. The younger ones were taught the French language but the studies of the Torah, the Talmud, and of *Tanya* were held (and still are held) in Yiddish, a language which students who are of North African origin have to learn. In fact, since 1950 the yeshiva received not only Ashkenazi students but also some young Moroccans who had already attended in Morocco the Lubavitch institutions established immediately after the end of the Second World War.[7] Also in the early years, the Brunoy yeshiva used to send its senior students to teach in *talmudei Torah*; these were just schools which provided the equivalent of Sunday-school tuition. They held classes to provide some Jewish education for pupils aged 7 to 14 years on Sundays and on the weekly half-day of secular schools. Lubavitch had not then established full-time primary or secondary schools. Later on, in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s some 20 *talmudei Torah* staffed by the Lubavitch were opened in the rue des Rosiers, in the 18th and 19th arrondissements, in Montreuil, in Aubervilliers, and in the Lilas.

In 1947, the Lubavitch founded a school for girls, Beth Rivka, in Montmorency, outside Paris; it was later transferred to Yerres, near Brunoy. By 1975 there were 150 pupils while nowadays there are some 600. It has both a primary and a secondary tuition cycle, which follow the state's educational requirements and therefore receives financial support from the state. However, the school also has had since 1958 a nursery and a boarding seminary where religious tuition predominates and these therefore do not receive any state subsidy. It must also be noted that nowadays before being admitted to the seminary (which has provision for 60 students), the young girls must have first obtained either a *'Brevet d'enseignement commercial, professionnel'* (BEPC) or a baccalaureat and there is also a provision for preparing a *'premier cycle universitaire de langues'* (Deug).[8] Thus, among the Lubavitch, as among other hassidic groups, the girls (including those who will later teach religious studies) are given a secular education which is broader than that provided for boys. That seminary has educated a number of female teachers who are active in Lubavitch or other religious schools in France and elsewhere. I shall return later in this paper to the remarkable development of the Lubavitch educational system, which in France probably more than in

other countries is a major factor in the flourishing of the hassidic movement.

Events of major importance in North Africa provided a great stimulus for the Lubavitch to effect a transformation. In 1956, Tunisia and Morocco achieved their independence and after six years of bitter war Algeria finally became independent in 1962. The majority of the Jewish population of these three countries left their native lands and a large proportion of them came to settle in France. Algerian Jews, after the Crémieux decree of 1870, were French citizens. Some Tunisian and Moroccan Jews were already familiar with Lubavitch. In 1951, Menachem Mendel Schneerson had sent Habad[9] emissaries to open various schools in these two countries and these religious institutions attracted children of underprivileged families and created a significant link between the Lubavitch and North African Jews.[10] Thus young girls who had been to Habad schools in Tunisia were able to continue their studies in Lubavitch seminaries in Crown Heights in New York and then became religious teachers in Paris.

However, the first generation of Algerian and Tunisian Jews who settled in France were not much influenced by Lubavitch; they identified mainly with the secular values of the French republic and modernism and wished to give their children a secular education which would fit them for good social positions. They also certainly wanted to provide their children with a traditional Jewish religious knowledge and therefore sought to enroll them into Sunday Schools — which happened to be provided mainly by the Lubavitcher. On the other hand, many Jews from Morocco were generally devoted to their own religious practices and were not attracted by the Ashkenazi hassidism of the Lubavitch. But the transplantation of the North African newcomers to France was very painful. The old extended families with their fierce kinship loyalties were now dispersed not only in various parts of France but also in the United States, in Canada, and in Israel. They did not always look back nostalgically to their North African past, but they resented their inability to lead 'a proper Jewish existence'. Meanwhile, the Lubavitcher rebbe had since the early 1960s embarked on a missionary campaign — directed only to Jews — entitled *Ahavat Israel* (Love of Israel) and his emissaries in France took the opportunity for outreach to the uprooted immigrants.

The Lubavitch emissaries were Yiddish speakers; they spoke French only haltingly and with a Russian accent. However, unlike the French native Jews who were perceived by the North Africans to be distant 'and almost goy-like', the Lubavitcher were warm, friendly, and listened attentively to the problems brought by the immigrants. They gave advice and entered into proper dialogue. In particular, their rabbis and *shlihim* (emissaries) dealt with the practical problems of the North African Jews, who wished to conform to religious requirements. Thus, one woman states that she had telephoned the Consistoire several times to enquire how she

should proceed to make her crockery and cutlery *kasher*, but the instructions she was given seemed to her to be very sketchy. An acquaintance gave her the telephone number of the Lubavitch organization and that very evening two hassidic members came to her door and took the crockery and cutlery to immerse them in the appropriate prescribed water.[11] As for the affixing of *mezuzot*, the Lubavitcher were very willing not only to provide them (during their systematic campaigns for that observance) but they also obligingly affixed them to the doors.

Nevertheless, for North African Jews of the first generation to settle in France, the Lubavitcher were too extreme.[12] It was only after 1965, in the main, that some of them abandoned their native religious practices and followed those of the Lubavitch; this happened when a large proportion of Lubavitcher and of North Africans Jews had already been born (or had grown up) in France. Rabbi Shmuel Azimov, a former student at the Brunoy yeshiva, therefore educated in France, became in 1965 the leader of missionary activities among the Jews in France. Young emissaries — who had been brought up in France and spoke French fluently — were now active among young Jews of North African origin who were also French-speaking. Then there was the Six-Day War of 1967 which stimulated a quest for identity, often a religious quest, among many French Jews. Later, as in the case of the counter-cultural movement in the United States, the 'revolutionary' events of May and June 1968 in France affected many Jewish young men and women and the Lubavitcher tried to reach them: they provided Habad houses where friendly and sympathetic rabbis welcomed these young persons, who were disoriented and who were seeking a meaning for their lives. That encounter (between Lubavitch efforts and these circumstances) achieved results beyond all expectations: Lubavitch hassidism progressed and grew in France and in particular it acquired a Sephardi facet — while young Ashkenazi Jews still more influenced by the ambient French secularism, were (apart from some exceptions) much less drawn to Habad. In the course of time, the Lubavitch faithful of Russian origin have increasingly become a minority.

French Lubavitch and Sephardi Culture.

Nowadays, young Jews of North African origin who constitute the second or third generation of settlement in France, and who adhere to Lubavitch hassidism, no longer speak the Arabic or the Judeo-Arabic languages of their grandparents (or in some cases, of their parents). They were born, brought up, and educated in France and they express themselves in the French language. Moreover, some of them can now speak some Yiddish, since Yiddish is the language of instruction in the Brunoy yeshiva and of course in Crown Heights in Brooklyn, where some of them go on short or extended visits. By adhering to Habad, they discard many of the traditional practices of North African origin. Thus, these new

recruits would not even consider celebrating the *Mimouna*, when in North Africa at the end of the Passover festival, couscous and sweetmeats like baklava were offered by the Arab neighbours and were eaten together with them; such a commensalism is not accepted by the hassidim.[13] Indeed, new converts to hassidism tend to minimise or to actively reject the Judeo-Arab past of their ancestors and they adopt the customs of another Jewish culture — appropriating a legendary and mythical past, that of the hassidic world of Eastern Europe.[14] One of the major vehicles of this transformation is their assimilation of Lubavitch *hassidut*, as noted above.

Among the Lubavitcher, married women must cover their head (while they theoretically have their head shaved or their hair cut short) but they rarely wear a head scarf or a veil, as most Muslim women do in France. More often, they wear wigs (which frequently are indistinguishable from their own natural hair), under elegant caps or small hats. They also increasingly tend to wear modern Western-style clothes: many Lubavitch women or those who are sympathisers of that hassidism (and especially the younger ones who have enrolled their children in Habad schools), instead of wearing dark dresses of below-knee length (which are cut amply loose) and dark stockings, now wear long close-fitting dresses which give the look of present-day fashion. Indeed, in many cases it is quite difficult to identify these hassidic women by their appearance.

During my fieldwork in Paris in 2003, I noted that Lubavitch hassidism has altered in several respects. To start with, some prayer-houses which I visited bear little resemblance to the hassidic *shtiblech*: they have rows of seats, as is the usage in classic synagogues — not tables surrounded by benches for studying the large volumes of the Talmud. Moreover, during the festival of Sukkot, it is accepted for women to have their meals next to men in the booths or cabins erected for the days of the festival. At the prayer-house of the rue des Rosiers, the *gabbay*, who during the morning prayer is in charge of selecting (on two weekdays) those who are given the honour of saying the blessings before and after the reading of Torah excerpts, the *alyah*, will readily ask some apparently non-hassidic and unknown visitor (indeed, he did call me), to recite the first important blessing, that of the Cohanim — the Priestly Blessing. Moreover, during daily prayers on weekdays, no one seems to be shocked when the ring of mobile telephones is heard, or by the conversations which follow that ring. Admittedly, the Lubavitcher are generally more tolerant than other hassidim, but for the Lubavitch of North African origin that tolerance[15] was part of their Mediterranean cultural heritage rather than a result of their adherence to Lubavitch missionary teachings. Indeed there is a 'sephardisation' of Habad hassidism in France.

Furthermore, the French Lubavitch are very proud of the fact that they practise one particular *minek*, local custom. In 1973 a group of about 30 followers, mostly *baalei-tshuva*, visited Crown Heights during the high

holy days. In the main Lubavitch synagogue, on *Simhat Torah*, during the Hassidic dancing procession of the Rejoicing of the Law, the rebbe (Menachem Mendel Schneerson) called upon all the visitors from France to participate in dancing and he began to sing the usual sequence of liturgical verses, *Ha-aderet ve ha emuna*, to the tune of *la Marseillaise*, the French national anthem, which has a marked revolutionary lyric. The next day he explained to the visitors that this anthem would help to effect a revolution in France, against *yetzer-ha-ra*, the evil tendency or impulse.[16] The rebbe wanted the Lubavitcher to chant in this fashion during Simhat Torah — but only in France. Since then, the Lubavitcher in France proudly observe that practice which, at least symbolically, contributes to merge their Ashkenazi and North African origins into a common French Lubavitch identity.[17]

The Lubavitch Institutions and the Educational System

Nowadays the Lubavitcher have no less than 70 *shlihim* (emissaries) actively engaged in the various institutions of the movement, in Paris and its environs. In the capital, their synagogues and Habad houses are mainly situated in eastern Paris, especially in the 19th and 20th arrondissements — where, during the last decades, many Lubavitch members have their homes, as do many other pious Jews, especially those of North African origin. The rue des Rosiers synagogue certainly continues to function while the administrative building (situated rue Lamartine in the 9th arrondissement) serves also as a prayer-house and has facilities for adult classes. In the suburbs of Paris there are about 20 Habad houses and oratories. However, the Lubavitcher do not neglect other areas which have no nucleus of observant Jews and although they do not have prayer-houses in every district, they do have emissaries who live in various other parts of the city and suburbs where Jews are dispersed — for instance, Pontault-Combault, Maisons-Laffitte, Poissy. These emissaries can be easily reached by telephone and from such an initial contact, they can expect to establish closer links with dispersed Jewish inhabitants.

As noted above, in the years immediately following the Second World War, the Lubavitcher provided Sunday schools as well as classes held on the weekly half-day of secular schools and established the Brunoy yeshiva and a school for girls in Yerres. In the 1960s, Lubavitcher rabbis joined forces with a community of Algerian Jews (who had emigrated from their native town of Ghardaïa) and they founded a full-time religious school in Aubervilliers which they named *Chne-Or*, a light of two, since two communities had united to build that school, which today has classes from nursery to the final year of secondary education and is under state control. Since the 1960s, the Lubavitcher have progressed to boast nowadays of some 7,000 pupils in the various Habad institutions to be found in the

Paris conurbation, apart from a further 1,500 in eight provincial cities: Cannes, Dijon, Grenoble, Lyon, Marseille, Nice, Strasbourg and Toulouse.[18] That remarkable expansion is partly the result of the usual demographic growth among hassidim and partly owing to two other factors. First, Lubavitch schools (unlike other orthodox schools in France) will admit pupils from families who are not totally observant as long as at least their children observe rules in force in the school, such as the wearing of skullcaps for boys and modest clothing for girls; such an attitude is in keeping with the welcoming spirit and the missionary vocation of the movement.[19] Second, among many more or less traditionalist Jewish households nowadays, there is a real concern about secular schools, especially because of recurring problems of violence, drugs, extortion rackets, and particularly since the intensification of the Middle East conflict, the antisemitism (sometimes expressed violently) of a number of Muslim pupils.

The Lubavitcher have now various school groups in the Paris conurbation: there are, of course, the *yeshiva* and the *heder* (primary religious school) in Brunoy, with 400 pupils in the yeshiva and 100 in the *heder*; for girls, the Beth Rivkah school and seminary with 600 pupils in Yerres; the Aubervilliers Chne-Or school mentioned above which has 500 pupils; and other schools in Sarcelles, Fontenay-sous-Bois, Massy, Villeneuve-la-Garenne, as well as recently a *kolel* in Yerres — an advanced yeshiva whose students usually are young married men, with an intake of 30 to 50 students every year.

In the city of Paris there are major institutions: the Cité de l'Education Sinaï for girls in the 18th arrondissement (inaugurated in 1990) which has 1,200 pupils ranging from nursery to the final year of the lycée, with technical and vocational options, while for the boys there is la Cité de l'Education Heikhal Menachem in the 20th arrondissement (inaugurated in 1995). The latter group has one building with five floors and another with seven floors; they house a *heder* and a lycée with the two options as available for girls, and also a library, a gymnasium, and a synagogue. The lycées for girls and for boys are under state supervision and are subsidized by the state. Finally, there is an establishment for girls with two schools (Beth Mouchka and Beth Hana), also subsidized by the State and under government supervision; they are housed in a large modern building with a usable space of 18,000 square metres, in the rue Petit in the 19th arrondissement. There are some 2,000 pupils, from kindergarten to the final year of secondary school, with 75 classrooms benefiting from modern architecture, with large windows providing good daylight. There is also a crèche with 80 cribs, a library, a kitchen, a refectory, and a gymnasium. It is claimed to be the largest school in Europe which conforms to Orthodox Jewish practice; but only a small proportion of the pupils come from Lubavitch households, while there are also some pupils from non-observant homes. Again, that is in keeping with the missionary zeal of the

Lubavitcher, and also with the welcoming stance so characteristic of Habad in France. The present building replaces several dispersed establishments; it was started in 1995, was ready for occupation in the school year starting in 1999, and was officially inaugurated in November 2000. The pupils appear to be given remarkably good tuition since the examination results for the baccalaureate (whether the option is science, economics, or sociology — no option for philosophy or literature is available), are excellent: year after year it shows an almost 100 per cent success rate.

A plaque affixed to the entrance of the Haya Mouchka complex states that its solemn inauguration was graced with the presence of the chief rabbis of France and of Paris, by the presidents of the Paris Consistoire and of the Consistoire central de France, of the Conseil représentatif des Institutions juives de France (CRIF), and the director of the Fonds social juif unifié. That school complex is therefore recognized by the Jewish establishment of France — which clearly thus gives it respectability as far as non-hassidic parents are concerned, when they have to decide on the type of schooling for their children. As is customary among hassidim, there is a total separation between the boys' and the girls' schools. Thus, Haya Mouchka has an 'annexe' for boys, with 700 pupils, in the 20th arrondissement: it has a primary school and a junior high school, but the cycle of secular studies for boys is more limited than the one available for girls — as is usually the case among other hassidic movements.

In the various school complexes, kindergartens provide the foundation for a Jewish education; there are about 10 of them in the Paris conurbation, with several hundred children and since they are not subject to French government educational rules, the Lubavitcher can socialize the children according to their own ideas. Thus, they teach the pupils at an early age to read the prayer-book in Hebrew. In fact, the children have to become familiar with several languages. When those kindergartens were established from 1975 on, those in authority did not wish to teach the French language since they wanted to persevere with the traditional *heder* practice of the use of Yiddish. But the parents disagreed and eventually Hebrew was taught in the morning and French in the afternoon. Indeed, for the Lubavitcher as for other hassidim, the Hebrew language is reserved for praying and for the reading of the Torah. But modern Hebrew, such as is used in Israel, has come into the kindergartens with the use of Israeli children's textbooks and also because some of the pupils and some of the teachers have lived in Israel. As for Yiddish, although it is generally not spoken by children of North African origin, some phrases such as *gut shabbes, gut yontov* (happy festival), *yourtsayt* (anniversary of death) and others, have infiltrated the vocabulary of the young children. Among themselves — whether in the classroom, or outside, or at home — the children speak French. For children of North African origin, who are the majority, Yiddish is a foreign tongue while Hebrew is essentially the language of the sacred. Nevertheless, while the children's formal education proceeds

year by year, those two languages are increasingly used; in the Brunoy yeshiva teaching is given in Hebrew and in Yiddish.

All hassidic movements attach great importance to education and they would prefer, if they can afford it, to provide it in their own schools; but in any case their children receive a hassidic education in their own home — which is far from the case for children of North African origin who go to Lubavitch schools in France. Because of the large influx in Habad communities of so many new members of that origin, Lubavitch schools attach particular importance to teach and socialize these pupils according to the movement's precepts.[20] But that course of action does not always find favour with those parents of traditional North African background. A native of Djerba commented about their own children:

> We do all we can at home to transmit to them our traditions, our customs, our education, although our children go to the Sinai school [one of the Lubavitch schools]. It is not always easy. We try our utmost to make them understand the extent of our old culture, how rich and alive it is, so that they may not forget where they come from, so that they may not be led to believe that they come from Eastern Europe.

That is only one among many such observations, expressing resentment against what appears to some to be a belittlement of Sephardi religion and culture.[21] These criticisms notwithstanding, the Lubavitch schools have indubitably achieved great deployment. In 1990 Lubavitch educational establishments in the Paris conurbation had 3317 pupils[22] but the number since then has more than doubled, with 7,000.

Financial Problems. The Professions

As noted above, Lubavitch schools are in great part subsidized by the French government; they must bind themselves by contract to abide by health and safety regulations and to teach various required subjects (French language, mathematics, geography, chemistry, physics, etc.). In the case of crèches, they are subsidized by the municipalities. However, other substantial costs have to be met — such as the construction of school buildings and their maintenance, and the salaries of the teachers, especially those who teach religion. Parents are supposed to pay school fees, but their contribution is most inadequate. Nowadays, Jewish national institutions, such as the *Fond social juif unifié* (FSJU), promote initiatives which aim to maintain Jewish life by social, educational, and cultural activities; and the FSJU does contribute to the maintenance of Lubavitch schools, but only to a small extent. It is therefore very necessary to collect funds and to appeal vigorously to donors not only for the schools but also for the prayer-houses and other Lubavitch services. It must be stressed that Habad in France (like Habad in other countries) receives no funds from the Lubavitch head office in Crown Heights. Some Lubavitch

members are therefore kept very busy in their efforts to gather funds and the movement does appear to be successful in one way or another in gathering funds from its members and sympathisers. Among other resources, there is an annual fund-raising gala and the one held in December 2003 required each couple to pay 500 Euros for their entrance ticket; in 2001 the cost of such a ticket had been the equivalent of 400 Euros (2,600 francs).

The Lubavitch movement does have sponsors who are well-to-do: medical doctors, dentists, and others in the liberal professions as well as engineers, business people, and experts in information technology among others. Some of these donors are members, others are only 'sympathizers'.[23] In France a comparatively great number of Lubavitcher provide religious services for the country's Jews. They are ritual slaughterers of food animals, *kashrut* supervisors, butchers, bakers, restaurant owners, etc. who provide kasher ingredients; there are also booksellers and stationers who sell religious books, especially Habad texts. Finally, there are very many teachers of every degree of competence (from pupil teachers to headmasters and headmistresses), employed in the various Lubavitch schools. Thus the Lubavitch movement conforms to the situation of other hassidic groups in the world by having a great proportion of their gainfully-employed personnel in various forms of religious occupations.[24]

Politics

The Lubavitch movement became particularly involved in political matters when it was building the Haya Mouchka complex in the rue Petit. The erection proved to be extremely costly, totalling more than one hundred million francs (15 million Euros). Lubavitch asked the regional council of the Île-de-France for a subsidy and a financial guarantee but in spite of the support of the council's moderate right-wing parties, their request was rejected on four occasions in 1994; a majority of the council — with the left-wing Greens, communists, socialists as well as the extreme right-wing Front National — refused, on the grounds of secularism. Nevertheless, the mayor of Paris himself (Jean Tibéri, a member of the Rassemblement pour la République, President Jacques Chirac's moderate right-wing party), took the responsibility for the municipality of Paris to give a grant and to provide also a public guarantee for a loan of 10 million francs (1,525,000 Euros). The Lubavitch seem to have shown their appreciation of the assistance they had been given: Hillel Pevsner, Chief Rabbi of the Lubavitch, called for votes for Jacques Chirac at the presidential election of 1995.[25] Admittedly, the Lubavitch spokesman (rabbi Haïm Nissenbaum) stated that each member must vote according to his conscience; but he added that Jacques Chirac had obtained much sympathy from the Lubavitcher by providing support for communal matters.[26]

Thus Lubavitch is involved, in the pursuit of its own interests, in French politics at both the municipal and the national levels. Recently, the intensification of the conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians and a series of major and minor manifestations of antisemitism in France have affected the Lubavitch as they have affected other Jews — especially in districts where Jews and Muslims had for long lived side by side without any major incidents. The hassidim with their striking visibility (their beards, the men's black hats, the skullcaps for small boys, etc.) are easy targets and therefore are frequently the victims of trouble-makers. Often, individuals are attacked; households are threatened and insulted; and graffiti are painted on the front doors of Jewish apartments. The Lubavitcher have taken some precautions — for instance, women and children do not go into the streets after 9 p.m. in some districts — but they generally trust the authorities to give them protection while they themselves provide discreet surveillance.

The Lubavitch have also managed, in the course of years, to become a rather significant partner of the Consistoire, which is the officially-recognized religious institution of French Jewry, although there have been persistent conflicts between the Consistoire and the Lubavitcher about kasher meat. In 1991 two Lubavitch rabbis decided to establish their own ritual slaughter, in order to use the fees they received for that procedure for the benefit of Lubavitch institutions, especially the Sinai school.[27] The movement embarked upon a campaign for the institutional acknowledgment of the validity of their own slaughter, so that they might have access to the abattoirs: since a decree of 1981, the licence for Jewish ritual slaughter can be given only by the Chief Rabbi of France, on the recommendation of the rabbinical tribunal of the Consistoire, which controls the validity of *kashrut* claims. Pressure was exerted on that tribunal, kasher butchers were approached, and there was even a meeting with the Minister of the Interior who is also in charge of religious matters. Neither the Lubavitch nor the Consistoire wished the dispute to proceed to a court case whose decision was not easily predictable. It took four years to reach an agreement: the Consistoire granted the Lubavitcher official licences and a share of the fees received by the slaughterers was given to the *Association consistoriale israélite de Paris*. The Lubavitcher were authorized to affix their own stamp certifying the *kashrut* of the butcher shops which they sponsor (six in the Paris conurbation) as well as the *kashrut* of some two dozen restaurants but they gave also an undertaking that they would not question the validity of the *kashrut* certificates granted by the Consistoire. On the other hand, the Lubavitcher proceeded to create their own rabbinical council which awards various restaurants, butcher shops, caterers, etc. its own *kashrut* certification and since the year 2000 has provided a list of all institutions which it monitors so that in effect the Lubavitcher now have in some ways a parallel Consistoire.

Moreover, a peculiar situation has arisen. Some Lubavitch slaughterers, among them Rabbi Belinov, had been working for many years for the Consistoire. Yet Rabbi Belinov was one of the initiators of the request to grant his movement slaughter licences, and after the end of hostilities he has been appointed as *dayan* (a member of the rabbinic court) in the *tribunal rabbinique consistorial* of Paris, where he presides precisely over all matters concerned with ritual slaughter![28] The 1995 agreement and the high status attained by Rabbi Belinov mark the influence of Lubavitch in matters where religion and economics are so strongly intermingled as a result of the substantial financial contributions from the fees for ritual slaughter. Moreover, a Lubavitch rabbi is today one of the eight vice-presidents of the Paris Consistoire, while there has also been an insertion into secular Judaism: as stated above, the Lubavitcher since 2001 have been active in the CRIF. The CRIF's major objective is to pursue political action in dealings with government authorities, with the media, etc. Apart from its fight against antisemitism, another major objective of the CRIF has been to support the State of Israel, come hell or high water.

The Lubavitcher movement has thus managed to find accommodation with both the religious and the political establishments in the country. Interestingly, these do not seem to have been much troubled by the over-enthusiastic personality cult of the last rebbe, Menachem Mendel Schneerson. In the 1990s, many of his devotees believed that he was the Messiah; later, after his death and burial in 1994, many still awaited his resurrection and consequent confirmation that he was indeed the Messiah.[29] In France the Lubavitch rabbis and emissaries, if they may believe in private that Schneerson is the Messiah and will arise from the dead, do not publicise that belief; recent brochures, pamphlets, and other Lubavitch publications do not mention this matter.[30] Indeed, most of the local leaders are probably well aware that French Jews would not easily welcome a messianic climate. Furthermore, the movement puts strong emphasis on its orthodox but non-sectarian programme in its huge schools; this stress on spreading Judaism in accordance with the *Ahavat Israel*, (Love of Israel) now a long-established Lubavitch commitment, certainly serves to popularise Lubavitch hassidism in France, whereas advertising messianism would probably have an opposite result.[31]

Moreover, although Lubavitch in France is certainly devoted to the State of Israel and concerned about the future of its Jewish population, the movement refrains from making declarations about events in the Middle East. Such a cautious position may have been taken in consideration of the Muslim population in France but it also gives an aura of moderation and respectability to the Lubavitcher among French Jews (whether or not they are familiar with their institutions and their missionary activities), who mostly view them as a responsible and efficient ultra-orthodox movement which has — among its other achievements — helped to strengthen Jewish identity.

Conclusion

In France, a country strongly dedicated to secular values, only the Lubavitcher, among the various hassidic movements, have succeeded in creating and maintaining a firmly visible and respected presence, owing in part to their comparatively modernistic and non-sectarian attitudes.[32] Admittedly, the extraordinary expansion of its members has been helped in their case as in that of other hassidim by the observance of the commandment to be 'fruitful and multiply';[33] but another major factor in that expansion has been the adherence of Jewish immigrants from North Africa and in particular of the children and grandchildren of the original immigrants who settled in France in the 1950s and 1960s. Those second and third generations, on adhering to hassidism, also have been fruitful and multiplied. However, it must be noted that in France, unlike the case of many other countries, the recruits have not been 'repenting Jews' (*ba'alei tshuva*), with no or very little religious upbringing, but Jews who were traditionally imbued with at least traditional Jewish values and observances. Moreover, by adhering to Lubavitch, these recruits were, deliberately or not, expressing their rejection of their Judeo-Arab past and probably at the same time their resentment against a French consistorial Establishment which had not truly extended to them a warm welcome.[34]

There have been other general factors which may somewhat explain the affinities between North African Jews settled in France and Lubavitch Hassidism. The hassidim have always adopted Isaac Luria's Sephardi liturgy and prayer book (*Nussach ha-Ari*) and possibly of still greater importance is the fact that both hassidim and many North African Jews have an intense veneration for holy persons or saints. Hassidim venerate the rebbe or *tsaddik* (saint) and believe in his miracles and divine gifts (as in the case of the Lubavitcher extraordinary veneration for rabbi Schneerson) while the North Africans have also their revered saints who are believed to perform miracles. They are devoted for instance to the *hillula*, festivity, a pilgrimage to the shrines of saints, especially in Israel,[35] and also to a famous shrine in Djerba, Tunisia.

Whatever its exact causes, the massive 'sephardization' of the Lubavitch movement in France is an original and unexpected development in the movement. Admittedly, the main Lubavitcher leaders are still of Russian origin, even if some of them were born in France; but the majority of the officials in the various Habad institutions are now of North African origin and come from a Sephardi religious tradition. The large presence of North Africans leaders, members, and supporters has influenced French hassidism, which is more tolerant and liberal than elsewhere, particularly in its schools which extend a warm welcome to a wide public. Moreover, when we consider that the Lubavitch movement in France with its 10,000 to 15,000 members and sympathizers, accounts for more than a small fraction of the movement's total across the world,

perhaps the Sephardi laissez-faire style will gain acceptance among the Lubavitcher in other countries — especially since there is now no longer a single charismatic and all-powerful rebbe to lay down specific aims and prescriptions which must be unquestionably and devotedly obeyed.

Acknowledgment

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NOTES

[1] Laurence Podselver has published several pioneering articles on the subject. See especially her 1) 'Le mouvement Lubavitch: déracinement et insertion des séfarades', *Pardès*, vol. 3, 1986, pp. 54–68 and 2) 'La tradition réinventée: les hassidim de Loubavitch en France', *Revue des Etudes juives*, 1992, vol. 151, pp. 441–50.

[2] Recent research, by questionnaire, was carried out under the supervision of Erik H. Cohen (see 'Les résultats de la grande enquête sur les juifs de France' *L'Arche*, vol. 538, December 2002, pp. 54–73). It estimates the number of Jews in France to be from 500,000 to 575,000 persons, according to the criteria used; the smaller total, 500,000, is based on a restricted definition: the households of those interviewed who declared themselves and also their whole family to be Jewish, while the figure of 575,000 is based on the number of individuals in households whose head has asserted he or she was Jewish but that the household includes other residents who are not. In the case of the hassidim, of course, only the former criterion would apply, since they obviously would include only Jewish persons in their family unit.

[3] It has been the historical heart of Paris Jewry since emancipation in 1791.

[4] That is according to the Lubavitch rabbi Haïm Nissenbaum, spokesman of the movement in France.

[5] See (Anonymous) 'Les débuts des institutions 'Habad' en France, chapitre II: les premiers pas', *Kountrass*, vol. 96, July 2003, p. 11.

[6] The Consistoire is a communal institution created in 1808 during Napoleon's empire, under state control. After the separation of Church and State in 1905, the Consistoire became a voluntary religious organization.

[7] It is said that in Morocco, more than 75 pedagogical institutions provided tuition for about 10,000 young Jewish Moroccans; see 'Les débuts...' op. cit. in Note 5 above, p. 9.

[8] Ibid., p. 16.

[9] Habad, another name for Lubavitch, is an acrostic formed from the initials of the Hebrew words *hohkma*, *bina* and *da'at*. The words mean wisdom, discernment, and knowledge.

[10] See Note 7 above.

[11] An observant Jew, who follows the prescriptions of the *Shulhan Arukh*, must immerse newly bought cooking utensils into flowing water — water from a spring, a river, or rain.

[12] See Podselver, 1986, op. cit. in Note 1 above, pp. 61–63.

[13] The Mimouna celebrated the return to a 'normal' diet after the end of the Passover in North Africa, when couscous and sweetmeats were eaten and non-Jewish neighbours were welcome.

[14] See Podselver, 1986, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 64.

[15] See Victor Malka, *Les juifs sépharades*, Presses universitaires de France (Que sais-je? series), Paris, 1997, pp. 70–71 and 80. The Ashkenazi Jews have tended for centuries to be far more rigorous than the Sephardim in matters relating to *kashrut* and to be extreme in their interpretation of religious observances. Sephardim generally have a more liberal interpretation and their behaviour is characterised by spontaneity, hospitality, and tolerance; the Lubavitcher most often practice the latter two.

[16] Norman Solomon in his *Historical Dictionary of Judaism*, published in 1998 (p. 415) states that the tendency to do evil can be overcome through God's grace and Torah, and notes that the words *yetzer* and *ha-ra'* occur in Genesis, Chapter 6, verse 5.

[17] Several Lubavitch adherents related this story to me. See also the French Lubavitch web site 'loubavitch.fr/pages/lerabbiet la france.asp'.

[18] See (Anonymous) 'Ecoles juives de France', *Kountrass*, vol. 70, 2000 (Internet version).

[19] Another orthodox school establishment, *Ozer ha-Torah*, founded after the Second World War by North African Jewish immigrants, is far more strict.

[20] See Podselver, 1992, op. cit. in Note 1 above, pp. 442, 443.

[21] See Michèle Baron, 'De Djerba à Paris XIX°', *L'Arche*, vol. 508, 2000, p. 69; Patrick Simon and Claude Tapia, *Le Belleville des juifs tunisiens*, Paris, Autrement, 1998, pp. 157–8; and Laurence Podselver and Denise Weill, 'La nouvelle orthodoxie et la transmission familiale', *Pardès*, vol. 22, 1996, p. 153.

[22] See Podselver, 1992, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 441.

[23] No precise data are available to provide a socio-professional profile of the movement.

[24] Unemployment does not appear to be a serious problem among the faithful.

[25] See Nicolas Weill, 'Essor et désarroi des Loubavitch', *Le Monde*, 21 September 1996, p. 11. By a decree of 14 July 1997, Hillel Pevsner was given the title of chevalier de la Légion d'honneur. President Chirac himself invested him with that decoration at the Elysée Palace and made a speech referring to him as an 'ami de longue date'.

[26] Ibid.

[27] On the suject of kasher meat, see Sophie Nizard, 'La cacherout en France. Organisation matérielle d'une consommation symbolique', *Les Cahiers du judaïsme*, vol. 3, 1998, pp. 64–73 and Julien Bauer, *La nourriture cacher*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, (Que sais-je ? series) 1996, pp. 58–59.

[28] See Sophie Nizard, *L'Economie du croire. Une anthropologie des pratiques alimentaires juives en modernité*, thèse de Doctorat, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences sociales, Paris, 1995, vol. II, p. 252.

[29] See William Shaffir, 'When Prophecy is not Validated: Explaining the Unexpected in a Messianic Campaign', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXVII, n°2, December 1995, pp. 119–36; Aviezer Ravitzky, *Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press (transl. from the Hebrew), 1996, pp. 193 ff. and David Berger, *The Rebbe,*

the Messiah, and the Scandal of Orthodox Indifference, London and Portland (Oregon), Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2001.

[30] However, one Lubavitch rabbi in Paris founded a small group which has published for some time a periodical, *Le courrier de la Gueoula*, spreading the messianic resurrectionist belief.

[31] The almost monolithical nature of Lubavitch in France is in sharp contrast with the movement's position in other countries. In the United States, in Crown Heights, Lubavitch yeshivot have been marked by rifts and even in Lubavitcher headquarters there are conflicting groups: 'resurrectionists', who add after the rebbe's name 'Long live King Messiah' and the non-resurrectionists who say classically, 'of blessed Memory'. The first have even recently taken control of the building; see Jan Feldman, *Lubavitchers as citizens: A paradox of liberal democracy*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 35–36; Jonathan Mahler, 'Waiting for the Messiah of Eastern Parkway', *The New York Times*, Magazine desk, section 6, 21 September 2003; Stephanie Wellen Levine, *Mystics, Mavericks, and Merrymakers. An Intimate Journey Among Hasidic Girls*, New York and London, New York University Press, 2003, pp. 2–3, 146, 171–2. In Antwerp (Belgium) there are two Lubavitcher groups, one resurrectionist, the other not. In Israel, at the hassidic village of Kfar Chabad the 'messianists' dominate; see Henri Guirchoun, 'Le messie s'est arrêté à Kfar Habad', *Nouvel Observateur*, n° 1685, 20 février 1997.

[32] Recently a group of Bratslaver Hassidim, the so-called *toïte hasidim* (Yiddish for dead hassidim) who are adepts of a rebbe departed since 1811, has opened a place of worship, but there are only a few dozen adepts.

[33] See Jacques Gutwirth, *La renaissance du hassidisme, de 1945 à nos jours*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2004.

[34] See Podselver, 1986, op. cit. in Note 1 above, 1986, p. 57.

[35] See Yoram Bilu, 'Dreams and the wishes of the Saint' in Harvey E. Goldberg (ed.), *Judaism viewed from within and from without. Anthropological studies*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1987, pp. 285–313 and Stéphanie Le Bars, 'Rabbins magiques', *Le Monde*, 20 November 2004, p. 21.

THE JEWISH ECONOMY OF SALONICA (1881–1912)

Orly C. Meron

Introduction

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Jewish community of the Ottoman Salonica Province experienced an economic golden age. The liberal reforms initiated by the Ottoman Empire, directed at legal equality for religious minorities, created new opportunities for non-Muslim groups. These reforms also encouraged foreign investment in Ottoman territories. The abolition of trade monopolies and the establishment of free trade zones (1838) effectively transferred control of imports from Ottoman authorities and guilds to European hands.[1] Creation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (1881) laid the foundations for European semi-colonialism based on reallocation of authority between economic (European) and political-legislative (Ottoman) spheres.[2] A contemporary described the 'infiltration of foreign influence' that sapped the energies of the empire and undermined its sovereignty. He added: 'The public utilities, water, and gas works, transportation, tobacco monopoly, and financial institutions were owned and administrated by Western capital... Even the postal service had been invaded by the Powers ...'.[3]

Foreign investments in Macedonia's infrastructure, including construction of the new modern port (1891),[4] and penetration of new agricultural technologies in addition to remittances from Macedonian emigrants, promoted agricultural surpluses and accelerated capitalist links with rural areas.[5] The impact of the huge new consumer market on Salonica, the Macedonian metropolis, in its function as an administrative capital and a casern for Ottoman troops, was described by a contemporary in these words:[6]

> La Vieille Serbie, L'Albanie, l'Epire, la Macédoine et une partie de la Thrace sont tributaires du marché salonicien. De toutes ces riches contrées, les produits agricoles, destinés à être exportés dans le monde entier, affluent à Salonique, où, d'autre part une armée toujours renouvelée de commerçants vient se fournir d'articles manufacturés et de denrées coloniales pour les besoins d'une clientèle constituée par plus de quatre millions d'habitants ... Salonique en était tout à la fois le cerveau et le coeur.

European semi-colonialism represented the external historical framework for the economic activities of minorities such as the Chinese in Southeast Asia (at the turn of twentieth century),[7] Pakistanis and Indians in East Africa,[8] and the Lebanese in West Africa (up to the 1960s).[9] This situation created new economically-profitable opportunities for 'demotic ethnic communities'.[10] Simultaneously, it stimulated regeneration of the group's communal ethnic resources, thereby promoting demographic growth and reinforcing social solidarity as well as its members' status resources: real capital, human capital, social capital, and mobility. These resources allowed the group to adapt its economic activities to the new circumstances. Under these conditions, by virtue of its competitive advantages over the majority as well as over other minorities, these ethnic groups were able to fulfil functions that the indigenous majority was unable or unwilling to do. In our case, the Jewish demotic ethnic community, politically loyal to the dominant elites in a heterogeneous, rigidly-stratified colonial society, became a *middleman minority*.[11]

The classic concept of middleman minority emphasizes that such minorities significantly benefit from out-group elite sponsorship. In turn, the sponsoring elites profit from the middleman minority's vulnerability. As long as the indigenous alternatives are few and the exterritorial dimension of the middleman's Diaspora does not pose a political threat, this minority retains its value for the dominant elite. Analytically, this concept fits traditional, state-building, and colonial situations not only in the context of the third world but that of Europe as well.[12]

However, unlike the external colonialist framework observed in Africa and Asia, which enabled differentiation between three prominent elements — colonialists, a middleman minority, and the local subordinated masses — European semi-colonialism was more complex. The latter challenged minorities with conflicting loyalties: on the one hand, Germany and her Austro-Hungarian ally posed imperialist aspirations which included Macedonia as a semi-periphery; on the other, France and Britain begged to develop economic interests in the region.[13] The Salonican case, with its multi-national, competitive ethnic society, presents an especially elaborate model of a middleman minority operating in the European backyard.

The classic middleman-minority approach is useful for comparative analysis of dynamics derived from such economic structures and cultural attributes.[14] But since the model treats the minority as a monolithic population segment by stressing the minority's mercantile legacy and business activities, it lacks the tools necessary for analysis of the entire group's total economic activity.[15]

Because this paper is based on empirical research, I have chosen to use the *ethnic economy* concept to examine the interplay between the ethnic and general economy at a static point of time, and therefore broaden the original concept's applicability. Every middleman minority has an

ethnic economy which includes the ethnic group's self-employed, employers, and co-ethnic employees. Thus, the *Jewish ethnic economy* is distinguished by the employment that the Jewish minority created on its own account from among the employment opportunities found in the general labour market.[16]

The aim of this paper, which presents and interprets findings from an empirical study of official Austro-Hungarian data complemented by contemporary testimony, is to demonstrate how the Jewish minority of Salonica functioned as a classic middleman minority during Ottoman Macedonia's semi-colonial era. Its historical parallel would be the non-Jewish middleman minorities found in patrimonial and colonial societies. In particular, this article illustrates the relationship between both the Jewish Salonican economy and the ethnic economy components that it complemented within the general economy.

I. The Socio-Demographic Profile of the Jewish Minority in Salonica

According to a published report written in 1884 by an *Alliance* 'informer' in Salonica, the province's Jewish labour force consisted of 4,000 tradesmen, 4,000 shopkeepers, 2,000 porters, 600 boatmen, 250 brokers, 250 butchers, 250 tinkers, 150 fishermen, 150 donkey drivers, 100 domestic servants, 60 coal dealers, 60 turners, 50 chair manufacturers, and 500 people plying various other trades.[17] Although the available data are imprecise, they do confirm the well-known image of Salonica's Jewish minority. Since the first half of the nineteenth century, Salonica had been home to an entrenched demotic ethnic-religious community of Ottoman Jews, impoverished and lacking modern education and skills.[18]

The new opportunities attracted new immigrants, including Jews, from former Ottoman territories who preferred the Sultan's sovereignty to the new national states,[19] or who, like Italian Jews, were attracted by the favourable economic conditions offered by the Ottoman Capitulation regime.[20] According to official Ottoman sources (1893, 1906), there was a 40 per cent increase in the Salonica Province's Jewish population at the turn of the twentieth century.[21] The mass of the Jewish population was concentrated in the central sub-district of Salonica; it was therefore the dominant ethnic component in the city, estimated by a contemporary as numbering about 70,000. According to official data (1905–06), the Jewish community constituted the majority in the city (55 per cent), greater in number than either the ruling Muslim segment (about 31 per cent) or the indigenous Greek minority (about 13 per cent).[22]

'Recently arrived' Italian Jews joined the old, tiny, Jewish elite composed of both foreign and Ottoman Jews holding *berats*, that is, they were a group enjoying the favourable commercial conditions embodied in the Capitulations. This privileged elite had acquired real capital, linguistic and commercial skills as a legacy from their mercantile activity as

economic intermediaries in Mediterranean international trade since the sixteenth century.[23] European semi-colonialism enabled the Jewish minority to renew the group's 'ethnic resources' and the 'class resources' associated with its individual members' skills, both as a prelude to mobilization for profit maximization in the new commercial environment. Antisemitic incidents, in both Europe and the Ottoman Empire, functioned as 'reactive ethnic resources' by regenerating solidarity between local Jewish elites and the larger local Jewish population as well as with their counterparts in other European states.[24] Jewish philanthropic associations, the most prominent being the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, contributed to this growing sense of group identification by bolstering weak community institutions with investments in education and welfare. At the same time, the Jewish elite's entrepreneurial activities allowed them to utilize their accumulated financial and human capital to stimulate the entire Jewish community's adaptation to modern Western culture.[25] Added to those transformations was the community's political behaviour, which remained faithful and pro-Turkish even in the brief period of the Young Turks' regime. Ottoman Jewish citizens, in contrast to Balkan national minorities, lacked political and territorial aspirations; they thus became favourites of Ottoman elites.[26] To conclude, as the nineteenth century waned, the features of the Jewish minority resembled a demotic ethnic community less than they did a middleman minority.

II. The Boundaries of the Jewish Economy: absence from agriculture and minor participation in the public administration

The Jewish minority's concentration in the Macedonian metropolis explains the density of Jews in urban professions (commerce and industry) and accords with their 'urban economic tradition', the result of an historical preference necessitated by Jewish communal life.[27] According to a contemporary account (1900): 'except for peasantry, you could find them [Salonican Jews] in all professions and works ...'.[28] This pattern remained unchanged even after the purchase of large agricultural estates (*ciftliks*) in Macedonia by Jewish capitalists in the wake of legislation permitting foreign ownership of land.[29] These investments were speculative, aimed to facilitate access to agricultural raw materials (for example, wine and wood) for industry. Although Salonican Jews were not winegrowers, they were involved in Macedonia's wine industry.[30] Most unusual was the participation of Jews in maritime agriculture. About 100 Jewish families earned their livelihood from fishing in the Bay of Salonica or in the open seas. As a result, their activities are incorporated within the framework of urban 'maritime occupations'.[31]

The Jewish presence in the public administration was negligible since Ottomans dominated this sector even after the *Tanzimat* (1839) reforms which theoretically opened the sector to non-Muslims.[32]

In consequence, cases of Jews participating in the senior Ottoman military command or as officials in the Salonica Province administration were considered quite atypical.[33] The municipal bureaucracy in the Macedonian capital also remained monopolized by the Muslim majority although it rested on Sabbetaians (*Donme*), a group considered as belonging to the majority population, and familiar with the workings of modern administration. Hence, Sabbetaians narrowed participation of Jews and other minorities in the Salonica City Council to representation of one council member from each community (for example, Bulgars, Greeks, and Jews).[34]

A report written by delegates of the Union des Associations Israélites, which visited Salonica in January 1912, portrays the Jewish professional structure on the eve of the Greek annexation of Salonica in broad strokes. According to the report, the Jewish labour force included 24,385 employed individuals distributed in five main branches: Industry and Crafts (41 per cent), Transportation (six per cent), Finance and Brokerage (five per cent), Commerce (46 per cent), and Professional Services (two per cent).[35]

Several questions arise as a result of that portrait. What was the estimated size of the Jewish economy? Was there a balance between self-created employment opportunities and those offered by the general labour market? Did that balance affect the Jews' ability to accelerate their economic mobility as individuals and as a group? Because the report was interested solely in the Jews, it does not refer to any of the city's other ethnic components. We cannot therefore distinguish between employment in the Jewish economy and Jewish employment in the general economy. However, by relying on an official Austrian source, I will try to systematically reconstruct the Jewish economy from the perspective of the general economy. As the city population was multi-ethnic, the so-called 'general economy' contained three main ethnic components: the Turks (representing the politically-dominant segment), the Greeks (representing the second most prominent minority after the Jews), and 'Others' (including Europeans, Slavs, and Macedonians). The research therefore focused on the main sectors located within the boundaries of the Jewish economy — Professional Services and the Business Sector — considered to be Jewish domains with predominantly Jewish workers.

III. Professions and Professional Services

In 1912, Jewish employment in this sector was distributed between the Jewish community's public sector and its private sector, which included about two per cent of all the Jews employed in Salonica (430 out of 24,385). Its composition included primarily teachers (70 per cent, 300 out of 430) and a small number of journalists (10 out of 430). There was also a minority of professionals (120): physicians (20); dentists (25); pharmacists (40); lawyers (30); engineers and architects (5).[36]

These data mirror the impact of the educational, cultural, and social revolution experienced by Salonica's Jewish community primarily after 1880. This revolution, initiated by the elite, was facilitated by the recruitment of social capital from diverse communities in the Jewish world. The opening of schools and professional training workshops by the *Alliance*, intended to respond to rising demand for educational and cultural services, created numerous teaching jobs. The establishment of multilingual newspapers was likewise indicative of the cultural renaissance which helped to revive contacts with Ladino-speaking Jewish communities scattered throughout the Balkans. With the Empire's institutionalisation of medical practice in the middle of the second half of the nineteenth century, demand for licensed physicians and pharmacists, graduates of European Universities or of Istanbul's School of Medicine, consistently grew.[37] New positions in the health service which served the Jewish community in recently-established clinics and hospitals founded by Baron Hirsch or, alternatively, in hospitals built by foreign powers, were aimed at filling the gap created by the absence of an Ottoman health service system.

What, then, was the relative size of the professional segment in the Jewish economy in comparison to the same segment in the other ethnic economies active in Salonica? The entries on the list of professionals adapted from the Austrian report can be assigned to two basic categories. The first (21 professionals) included journalists (9), midwives (4) and opticians (8). Most salient is the presence of Jewish journalists (7 out of 9) and the absence of Greeks (Table 1). This list confirms the clear presence of journalists that contributed to the integration of the Jewish community by participating in activities which did not contradict their expressed loyalty to the Ottoman regime.

The second category includes 143 professionals in fields requiring significant investments in human capital: medicine, pharmacy, law, engineering, and architecture. An inter-ethnic comparison focusing on the participation rate in the liberal professions indicates that the presence of Jews (40 per cent, 57 out of 143) was far greater than that of Turks (15 per cent, 21 out of 143), 'Others' (15 per cent, 22 out of 143) and Greeks (30 per cent, 43 out of 143). However, calculation of the correlation between participation in the liberal professions and the ethnic component's proportion in the population[38] indicates that the proportion of professionals in the Jewish economy was large (1.02) in comparison with professionals in the majority economy (0.50), but small in relation to this segment in the Greek economy (1.19) and even smaller in comparison than in 'Others' (2.30). The last group was especially dominant in medicine (13 out of 22 professionals) and consisted primarily of European physicians, including Jewish physicians who were imported from Central Europe to ease the comparative scarcity of physicians precisely when the Empire had institutionalised the profession.[39]

Table 1.
Professionals in Salonica (1912) by Ethnic Origin (4)

Profession	Jewish (%)	Greek (%)	Turkish (%)	Others (%)	Total (%)	Professionals (No.)
Doctors	37	35	7	21	100	68
Pharmacists	54	31	4	12	100	26
Lawyers	42	19	39	0	100	36
Engineers and architects	23	31	8	38	100	13
Opticians	63	13	0	25	100	8
Midwives	50	0	0	50	100	4
Journalists	78	0	0	22	100	9

Source: Adapted from *Austrian Report*, 1915, pp. 138, 186–9.
Notes: *a*) The database was derived from a secret, official 200-page report (1915) in German, compiled and issued by the Museum of Commerce at the order of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. I wish to thank Bibliothek des Österreichisches Staatarchivs for lending Bar Ilan University this document (II.41.821): K. und K. Österreichisches Handelsmuseum, (Dezember, 1915) *Salonik, Topographisch — Statistische Übersichten*, Wien (hereinafter, *Austrian Report*, 1915).

b) Because it was not issued or used for propaganda purposes, I assume that the report is unbiased.

c) 'Ethnic origin' was defined by onomastic methods. The method has been used by scholars such as B. Lewis and C. Issawi. For example, see Issawi (ed.), op. cit. in Note 1, pp. 13–14 and Lewis, op. cit. in Note 18, p. 64, in the Notes at the end of this article.

d) The category 'engineers and architects' excluded 'mechanical engineers' (all of whom were Jewish), who were included in the firm list, below, as 'machine production' in the metals branch.

The ethnic hierarchy of liberal professions was constructed as a result of access to educational opportunities in addition to occupational preferences. In contrast with the majority population, which did not enjoy access to modern mass education — thus did not know French, the main language of instruction even in the Imperial School of Medicine, located in Constantinople — members of the non-Muslim community, including the Jews and Greeks, benefited from the modern elementary and high-school education. Their acquisition of European languages, especially French, paved their way to institutions of higher learning, especially to Medical Studies (including Pharmacy). In order to encourage non-Muslims who knew French to attend the Imperial School of Medicine, the sultan ordered a kasher kitchen to be installed for the Jews and allowed leave on religious days for students of all persuasions, including the Sabbath for the Jews.[40]

However, given the absence of universities in Macedonia and the ethnic communities' inability to invest in the establishment of a higher education system in Salonica, acquisition of liberal professions outside Salonica remained an option open solely to families with means. After considering these constraints, we can explain the professional dominance of the Greeks by two factors: early exposure to modern education and western universities[41] and the comparatively small size of the Greek minority residing in the province's capital.

Despite the fact that the absolute number of Jewish physicians (25) was larger than the number of Jewish lawyers (15), the inter-ethnic comparison between these professionals reveals that in the Jewish economy, the gap between advocacy and medicine was smaller than that in the Greek economy (24 physicians and 7 lawyers). The data collected from Ottoman records lend further support to the pattern's salience: of 66 physicians, the rate of Jewish physicians was just over half (26 per cent, 17 out of 66) the rate of Greek physicians (47 per cent, 31 out of 66) in Salonica, although three times as great as the proportion of Turkish physicians (nine per cent, 6 out of 66).[42] This trend resulted from the unavailability of educational opportunities in Salonica, located in what was considered the periphery, as well as the political and socio-economic status of the students' ethnic identity group.

Acquisition of the Turkish language in Jewish educational institutions,[43] the accessibility of law schools in the Empire as well as in Salonica and, especially, the presence of Jews among the senior faculty of Salonica's Faculty of Jurisprudence served to expand Jewish membership in this profession.[44] In contrast to the Turks, who used law degrees as springboards to higher positions in the public administration (the sphere preferred by urban Turkish elites but closed to the Greeks) Jewish lawyers, bereft of political aspirations and banned from joining the dominant elites, saw their future practice as linked to the business sector. This decision, it may be argued, was also influenced by obligations to improve the family business. In any case, the Jewish tendency to invest in human capital of the type that yields revenues in the business sector is likely to explain the high rate of Jewish dentists (32 per cent, 8 out of 25) among all Jewish physicians on the list and the high rate of Jewish pharmacists (53.8 per cent) among all pharmacists.

The most common pattern to be found among all medical professionals listed irrespective of ethnic membership was the absence of differentiation between specializations. For example, physician-pharmacists[45] were physicians (or dentists) who were entered on lists of physicians as well as of dentists; ophthalmologists were likewise listed as opticians as well as spectacles sellers.[46] This pattern is typical of societies in transition from a pre-industrial to a modern society and supports affiliation with a middleman segment. The trend may have been based on co-ordination of activities. Reception of patients in a room attached to a pharmacy was considered by most physicians to be the most efficient and convenient arrangement for all concerned: the physician, the pharmacist, and the patient.

The low representation of Jewish architects and engineers (3 out of 13), like the representation of Greeks (4 out of 13), in contrast with the comparatively high representation of Europeans can be explained not only by the absence of civil-engineering studies in the Ottoman empire (it was available in Western Europe, *inter alia*, in the Zurich Polytechnic), but also to their connection to the state infrastructure — that is, public

utilities — associated with European semi-colonialism. Under these circumstances, this was an 'unloved profession' among the Greek elites, who entered it only later within the framework of the Greek nation-state, and of wealthy entrepreneurial Jewish families, who joined the profession when it served the family business.[47]

IV. Commercial and Industrial Enterprises: the core of the ethnic economy

The scope of the ethnic economy in Salonica during this period was influenced by demand conditions, state policy, as well as the entrepreneurial capacity of its members.[48] European semi-colonialism was accompanied by Ottoman legal reforms regarding ownership that created new consumer markets for: (1) primary exports from Salonica's hinterland to western industrialists; (2) imported industrial products, semi-raw materials for local growing industry and luxury products geared to domestic demand; and (3) local craft ware and manufactured products, including furniture, clothing, and construction materials (see Table 2).

The research has shown that the Jewish economy indeed played a significant role in the urban economy (see Table 2). Although European entrepreneurship was intensive, especially in the construction of infrastructure,[49] a sector where state involvement was glaringly absent, the majority of urban firms were in Jewish hands (538 out of 931). The high share of Jewish enterprises (58 per cent) when compared with the share of Turkish enterprises (eight per cent) is explained by: (1) the dispersion of the Turkish population throughout rural Macedonia; (2) the Turkish elite's traditional inclination for government and military service, which prevented the creation of a business tradition; and (3) delayed development of a modern public education system, which led to a shortage in Western business and linguistic skills, essential for access to newly-emerging opportunities. As a contemporary Jewish traveller to Salonica commented: 'The Turks are officials, large landowners and small shopkeepers, but not of any commercial importance'.[50]

Into this vacuum, Jewish entrepreneurs arrive well equipped to penetrate the new niches by virtue of their commercial skills, available labour, and political loyalty. While Greeks and Armenians, who served as consul dragomans and minor administrators, were rejected by the Ottomans owing to their collective Russian patronage and nationalist aspirations,[51] 'foreign' Jews, although no more than a minor segment of the total Jewish population,[52] enjoyed the confidence of European interests, which they sometimes represented as consuls,[53] together with that of the Ottoman elites, owing to their affiliation with the loyal Jewish community. Local Jewish allegiance to the Ottoman Empire and the absence of any local territorial aspirations were exemplified by the lack of any official connection to the Central Zionist Organization before the Greek Occupation (1912).[54] Ottoman Jews, as favoured co-citizens and trustees of the old

Table 2
Firms (N = 931) in Salonica (1912) by Ethnic Origin (4) and Branch (15)

Branch	Ethnic Origin of Firms in a Given Branch (%)				Total	
	Jewish	Greek	Turkish	Other	%	N
Food and beverages	61.0	27.0	6.0	6.0	100	100
Chemicals	60.7	17.9	3.6	17.9	100	28
Construction materials	63.3	22.4	2.0	12.2	100	49
Energy and public utilities	50.0	6.3	6.3	37.5	100	16
Metal	35.7	11.9	11.9	40.5	100	42
Wood	69.0	17.2	10.3	3.4	100	29
Hides, leather and footwear	49.1	31.6	5.3	14.0	100	57
Textiles	68.0	16.0	10.0	6.0	100	50
Clothing	49.0	10.2	23.5	17.3	100	98
Printing, paper and office equipment	50.0	15.4	7.7	26.9	100	52
Tobacco	55.6	11.1	22.2	11.1	100	18
Domestic wares and furniture	73.2	7.3	4.9	14.6	100	41
Trade in agricultural products (incl. grain)	57.0	25.2	3.0	14.8	100	135
General wholesale and retail	61.5	5.1	15.4	17.9	100	39
Finance and commission trade	61.6	14.1	4.5	19.8	100	177
% Ethnic firms out of the total firms	58	18	8	16	100	931
Number of firms per ethnic group	538	164	76	153		

Source: Adapted from *Austrian Report*, 1915, pp. 138–84.
Notes: *a*) For a definition of 'ethnic origin', see Table 1, above. Because the critical mass (96 per cent) of firms was privately owned, they are ethnically identifiable by their names.

b) 'Branch' of economic activity is based on sub-branch division of the following sectors in the Greek census (1928): industry; commerce; finance and brokerage.

c) Every firm is classified in just one branch, according to its main activity. The list thus effectively provides an independent 'natural sample'.

d) The total number of firms in the sample (931) conforms with the total number of commercial enterprises in Salonica, which was estimated by contemporaries to number approximately 900. See: G.N. Cofinas, *Salonique: son avenir* (Athens, 1913, p. 5) cited by E.A. Hekimoglou, 'The Jewish Bourgeoisie in Thessaloniki, 1906–11', in I.K. Hassiotis (ed.), *The Jewish Communities of Southeastern Europe*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1997, p. 183.

Ottoman elites, and 'foreign' Jews, as representatives of European economic semi-colonialism, thus co-operated in assuming a key role in the local economy by virtue of their competitive advantages over the Ottoman majority and other minorities.

The distribution of Jewish firms throughout all branches demonstrates the horizontal involvement of Jews in the city's economy. This involvement, as demonstrated by the data, supports Maurice Freedman's findings about the Chinese in British Malaya.[55] Freedman states that the interaction between a minority's demographic size, its geographical concentration, and its 'economic heritage'[56] influences its distribution among all economic branches.

The prevalence of family firms (96 per cent) among all Jewish firms contrasts with the rarity of limited-shares companies, a fact which facilitated construction of the sample (see Table 2, note 1). This feature is explained both by the tardy commercial legislation and the absence of trust between Macedonia's ethnic segments, one result of centuries of Ottoman occupation.[57] Thus, very few modern partnerships requiring capital investments and based on trust between 'blood strangers' were to be found.[58] The prevalence of family firms and cartels, resting on 'self-exploitation' of close and distant relatives, reinforced vertical integration. Jewish intra-dependence nonetheless deepened owing to increasing competition between Jewish traders and artisans with their Greek rivals.[59] What Jewish entrepreneurial niches were, then, found in the general economy?

Entrepreneurs

Table 3
Jewish Niches (Salonica, 1912)

Sub-branch	Total Firms	Jewish Firms	
	N	N	% out of the total
Banking	39	33	84.6
Grain & flour	34	29	85.3
Silkworms & cocoons	13	11	84.6
Opium	10	7	70
Pharmaceuticals	13	9	69.2
Watches & valuable articles	19	17	89.5
Colonial commodities	47	38	80.9
Bones & rags	5	5	100
Cotton yarn (comm'l)	7	7	100
Wood coal	8	8	100
Glass, plates & metals	17	16	94.5
Leather	8	7	87.5
Ropes & jute sacks	15	12	80
Wool, yarn & fabrics	14	10	71.4

Source: Adapted from *Austrian Report*, 1915, pp. 138–84.
Note: I define a Jewish niche as the over-representation of Jewish firms (i.e., Jewish owners) in a particular sub-branch, when the percentage of firms belonging to the Jewish minority in a sub-branch is at least one and a half times larger than the percentage of that group in the firm sample.[60]

a. Banking

The absence of an Ottoman banking system for financing Macedonian economic development left this niche open to local and foreign non-Muslim elites, most of which (85 per cent) were Jewish. Capital accumulated from previous foreign trade activity,[61] in addition to the ability to

mobilize new capital through networks of co-religionists or co-citizens in core states and the new Balkan states,[62] supported the community's economic heritage in banking and money-lending.[63] These factors enabled Jewish banks to serve as substitute local credit suppliers for the non-existent Ottoman institutions. This domination of financial facilities in addition to the political support from Ottoman elites granted Jewish businessmen a clear advantage over their Greek competitors,[64] while it facilitated the financing of large-scale trade.

b. International Commerce: organization of primary exports and wholesale distribution of imports

Jewish participation in agriculture was limited to financing and distribution. The pervasive financial activity engaged in by Salonica's Jewish middlemen included organization of primary agricultural exports to core states and import of semi-raw materials and manufacturing products from Western states on their way to the Macedonian periphery. For example, the export of silkworm cocoons was a new commercial branch stimulated by international market forces and development of the local textile industry.[65] The ability of the Jews to finance the costs of storage, transportation, shipping and insurance buttressed their capacity to vertically integrate in all evolving commercial chains. In addition, access to the nationalist terror-fraught Macedonian hinterland enabled Ottoman Jewish traders to serve as loyal, skilled middlemen between the rural cultivators and officials of the provincial Public Debt Administration.[66] Business networks between co-religionists, which included officials at Salonica's port as well as intermediaries at destination ports, ensured efficient handling of vulnerable and expensive raw materials. Appropriate international connections likewise ensured Salonican Jewish merchants an immediate profit. Owing to these favourable conditions, they thus preferred exporting silkworm cocoons instead of taking risks in the non-competitive silk-weaving industry.[67]

Simultaneously, Jewish traders specialized in the import and wholesale distribution of colonial commodities (such as sugar, coffee, and rice) although the main imports to Salonica at the time were luxuries,[68] included in the 'furniture and domestic appliances' branch (see Table 3). All these were final consumer goods, sold directly in competitive retail markets to individual consumers.[69]

c. Import of Semi-raw Materials and Jewish Production

Jewish control of trade in semi-raw materials clarifies the nature of Jewish manufacturing *vis-à-vis* Greek competition in Salonica Province, where local industry concentrated on lighter sub-branches of the metals industry, primarily mechanical repair, blacksmithing, and ironsmithing. At the end

of the Ottoman era, Jewish manufacturers in Salonica displayed a pronounced preference for importing semi-raw manufacturing inputs, limiting integration of production to the final stage of the process, close to both the traders and the end consumers.

For example, the absence of Jewish enterprises from the tanning industry, an industry belonging to the economic heritage of Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire,[70] demonstrated the Jewish preference for exporting hides and importing processed hides and leather soles. Jewish merchants tended to enter the industry only in its final phase — for instance, the sale of footwear. The Jewish entrepreneurs focused on trade (including export) of hides (8 out of 13 firms) and controlled trade in leather (see Table 3), considered a cost-benefit strategy essential for survival in the face of Greek competition. Furthermore, in contrast with Greek entrepreneurs, the Jewish strategy was to utilize favourable international networks (efficient exchange of information and financial co-operation). They could thus rapidly realize profits from hide exports to core-state markets while relying on fine available imported semi-raw materials.[71] The Jewish domination of the 'footwear and leather trade' sub-branch (88 per cent) ensured supply of semi-raw materials for Jewish producers faced with increasing competition from Greek rivals.[72] This behaviour also indicated a division of labour between country dwellers as producers of industrial inputs and city dwellers as producers of final products.

Similarly, Jewish supremacy (94 per cent) in the import and introduction of new construction materials ('glass plates and metals') ensured industrial inputs for glaziers and blacksmiths occupied in the completion phase of construction. Likewise, Jewish control (100 per cent of the organisation of production, wholesale and retail distribution for industrial and domestic use[73]) in the low-risk 'wood coal' sub-branch was assured by both increasing internal demand in Salonica and favourable relationships with Ottoman forestry officials.[74] Jewish predominance (10 firms out of a total of 14) was also exhibited in the 'wool' sub-branch, that is, the import of wool yarn and fabrics from England, Germany, and Austro-Hungary[75] and production of knitwear. Jewish merchants financed production and distributed finished products. The putting-out system they employed in workshops and cottage industry saved production costs while it increased efficiency.[76] This expertise in the wool trade again matched the internal market division between countryside producers and their urban counterparts. The comparatively late mechanization of the technologically simple wool industry meant that only modest investments were required. In addition, cheap female labour, utilized in spinning yarn from fine imported wool, intensified Jewish competition with the European producer interested in selling in the local Salonica market.[77]

In-depth analysis of the activity in what we may consider Jewish niches reveals intra-dependency in addition to interdependence between those

niches. For example, the 'ropes and jute sacks' niche (12 enterprises out of a total of 15) became a rapidly growing industry as a result of the dynamic tobacco industry and developing local consumerism. Increasing demand for packing material (ropes and sacks), especially among Jewish merchants in colonial commodities as well as grain, flour, and tobacco, extended their commercial activity vertically toward production of inputs. Sub-branch integration involved import of raw jute from India and Great Britain via Hamburg or Vienna to Salonica, jute weaving, production of sacks, and subsequent distribution to wholesalers.[78]

Finally, the 'Jewish'[79] 'rags and bones' trade (100 per cent), which included waste collection from the city and its hinterland, also demonstrated deepening vertical integration. The export of byproducts of the hide and textile industries to industrialists in Germany, Austro-Hungary, England, Italy, and France[80] created a subsidiary source of income with minimum costs.

Employees

The database used for the empirical research does not provide the number of Jewish minor intermediaries or Jewish employees and craftsmen. Thus I could not accurately estimate the size of the Jewish economy. However, from the *Austrian Report* and previous research based on similar sources, I was able to distinguish between manufacturing and commercial activities.

The Jewish workers' preference within the manufacturing branches was rationally motivated by economic considerations. Jewish workers were able to reject manual labour in 'Jewish' industrial enterprises — for example, the brick-manufacturing factory and the brewery owned by the Allatinis; these jobs were taken by Slavic workers from the hinterland. Jewish entrepreneurs, on their part, preferred to employ non-Jewish workers because their wage costs were lower and because their employment allowed operation of the plant throughout the week, including the Jewish Sabbath and Jewish festivals.[81] On the other hand, Jewish entrepreneurs preferred to employ Jewish workers, in whom they had confidence, at the upper levels of the commercial chain. This trend suited Jewish leanings towards commercial and intermediary occupations.[82] Hence, Jewish employment in Jewish industrial firms was generally limited to administrative and marketing jobs.

The Jewish workers' preference for the tobacco industry was also motivated by rational economic considerations. Jewish domination of unskilled and semi-skilled labour in the tobacco industry indicated the strong attraction towards a new, rapidly-growing branch characterized by intensive labour. The labour shortage instigated by local emigration (owing to the Macedonian strife) explains the comparatively high remuneration in this flourishing branch. Jewish labour thus preferred

working for the comparatively high wages paid not only in Jewish but also in foreign ('other') tobacco plants to manual labour in Jewish industrial enterprises belonging to less profitable branches. According to the *Union des Associations Israélites* report (1912), a Jewish labour force of about 8,000 workers dominated the tobacco industry, whose income was held in lien by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. Even if the figure provided by the Jewish Committee was exaggerated,[83] it was known that about 63 per cent of the workers registered with the Tobacco Workers Syndicate (1908) in Salonica were Jewish, and that 90 per cent of the workers in the cigarette-manufacturing factories owned by the tobacco monopoly were also Jewish.[84] At the same time, Turkish tobacco firms (about 22 per cent of all firms), located proximate to agricultural regions, employed village labour.[85] Jewish concentration in the profitable tobacco sector therefore reinforces findings from previous studies which show that the middleman minority labour force was more expensive than indigenous labour.[86]

V. Overland and Marine Transport Services: Jewish workers and the Jewish economy

Jewish workers, whether self-employed or salaried, were prominent in the overland and maritime transport industries, involving carriages and carts (500), porters (600), seamen and stevedores (400).[87] Although no data are available for the calculation of the proportion of Jews in this sector within the general economy, the organised labour force provides some indications of the distribution of ethnic participants. For instance, a co-operative association of Jewish carters was formed despite the absence of such an association among Greek carters, a fact that indicates Jewish control of private transport in metropolitan Salonica.[88] Moreover, only after the Young Turks revolution (1908) Jewish carters, who did not work on the Sabbath, allowed a small number of Greek carters to work on the Sabbath in order to meet public demand.[89]

Jewish workers also provided unloading, unpacking, and transport services for raw goods and manufactured products within this Jewish niche (see Table 3). According to contemporary accounts, 'the porter's trade in Salonica was almost entirely Jewish ... '.[90] Guilds of Jewish porters, which survived even after other guilds operating in the Ottoman Empire were disbanded during the nineteenth century, monitored competition within the Jewish economy by means of internal allocation of the raw goods market by storage area. Furthermore, the empirical research revealed that the monopoly enjoyed by the porter guilds was adapted to the raw goods traded in Jewish niches, such as wood coal, hides, wheat and barley, silkworms, opium, and flour.[91] After considering these conditions, we can conclude that Jewish labour dominated private overland transport services, as part of the Jewish economy, despite a clientele distributed throughout the general economy.

However, the reticence regarding manual labour exhibited in some manufacturing industries was absent from maritime transport. Side-by-side with Jewish entrepreneurs (who owned boats) and Jewish semi-skilled workers (stevedores, sailors), Jews were also employed as menial labourers (for example, porters) and customs clerks (150), whose wages were paid by the port's management.[92] The Jewish preference for menial jobs in the port, which was an important sector in the general economy, was again rationally motivated. Their reason: the comparatively high wages offered to Macedonian port workers as a result of manpower shortages in the face of growing demand for labour.[93]

Like their compatriots in the commercial and industrial sectors, the presence of Jewish workers in the overland and marine transport sector demonstrates the community's tendency to act as a middleman minority. However, in addition to the stated economic considerations, we should note the fact that such activities reduced the discrimination associated with work in the general economy: (1) the control which Jewish traders exercised over trade passing through the port influenced their preference for services provided by Jewish workers; and (2) the Ottoman regime's preference for employment of loyal Jewish port workers did not, however, correspond with the traditional allocation of jobs in Ottoman ports, where work was distributed to members of ethnic minorities, like the Greeks, who had a maritime tradition.[94] Nonetheless, the absence of the Turkish public's trust in local Greeks, suspected as they were of co-operating with the Greek nationalists intent on annexing the port, in effect blocked penetration of Greek workers into the port's employment rosters.[95]

Jewish labour was thus characterised by the following attributes: political loyalty; a sufficient supply to meet demand; and a diversified commercial tradition which included maritime labour and trade in addition to Western languages and managerial skills. These qualities allowed the Jewish minority to dominate the full range of occupations available at the port, from menial labour to international trade.

Despite the fact that Jewish port labourers and customs clerks were not included in the Jewish economy, they served that economy by their participation in the general economy. Reciprocities between the general economy and the Jewish economy in effect came to a peak in the port. Not only was there no separation between the two, they were mutually dependent on one another. While ignoring here the structural boundaries separating other areas of the two economies, we can state that Jews exercised dual control over the port: horizontal control over activities associated with international trade, and vertical control over entrepreneurial investment. This was accomplished through supply of commercial services (customs, insurance, etc.), including unloading and delivery prior to transport. One indication of the scope of the Jewish presence in the port and the preference of Jewish workers for jobs there as opposed to the public administration can be found in the decision rendered by Salonica's

Chamber of Commerce (1 December 1911) declaring that Jewish porters need not work on the Sabbath. This policy was adopted in response to wishes of the Jewish community,[96] and resulted in the closing of Salonica's customs offices on Saturday rather than Sunday.

If we take contemporaries to be reliable judges, I would consider the respite from labour on the Jewish Sabbath in terms of a 'Sabbath Index'. Accumulated testimonies of Jewish and non-Jewish visitors about the cessation of port activity on Saturdays, but not on Christian or Muslim days of rest, corroborate our conclusions that Salonica's Jewish economy during the last decade of Ottoman rule was well integrated in both the regional and international economy, what we have called the general economy. Additional evidence to this effect is provided by Vidal Nahum, an entrepreneur born in Salonica and father of the sociologist Edgar Morin, in the following statement:

> Le Samedi, d'abord, c'était la fête générale à Salonique, les musulmans, les orthodoxes, les Bulgares, tout le monde fermait les magasins, Samedi c'était sacré, ... la douane, la poste, tout était fermé.[97]

Summary and Conclusion

A comparison of the Jewish employment distribution between 1884 (in the *Alliance* report, see p. 24 above) and 1912 (in the *Austrian Report*) has led to the conclusion that the Jewish economy accelerated the group's economic mobility. The strong entrepreneurial capacity of the Jewish elite was thought to be reflected in the ability to mobilize class resources and renewed ethnic resources in order to exploit the new demand conditions. As a result, the Jewish economy became large and lucrative.

In this article, I have attempted to show that it was the economic consolidation of the Macedonian hinterland and its port Salonica which contributed to the economic development and vitality of the Jewish economy.[98] Its heavy dependence on the port economy, expressed in the Jewish community's capacity for economic intermediation, was due to a unique European semi-colonial framework combined with the Ottoman policy of supporting entrepreneurship among minorities historically faithful to the regime. The latter provided yet another advantage for the Jews in a period when disloyalty and ethnic political aspirations were rampant. These factors allowed Jews to take advantage of economic opportunities arising from exogenous factors. As David Cesarani concluded in the debate on 'Port Jews':[99] 'The study of Jews in a city port cannot really be divorced from the relationship of Jews in these locations to Jews and non-Jews in their hinterlands and other significant urban centres, such as imperial capitals'.[100] Thus, geopolitical changes — the annexation of Salonica Province (1912) by the Greek nation-state and the contraction of hinterland markets — were to adversely affect Salonica's Jewish minority, which henceforth ceased to function as a middleman minority.

The discussion focused on the framework most appropriate for examination of the economic activities of the Jews before the establishment of the State of Israel. It appears that an analysis of the ethnic economy within the framework of the middleman minority model can help us not only in the conduct of systematic empirical research on the subject but also support us in the search for a response to the question: did the Jewish economy in Salonica function as an ethnic enclave?

Application of the ethnic economy concept and the middleman minority model in combination, has indicated that at the turn of the twentieth century, the Jewish minority of Salonica presented a classic example of a middleman minority but *not* an ethnic enclave. Not only did Jewish entrepreneurs sell their wares to non-Jewish clients and employ a Gentile labour force taken from the local population, it also enjoyed the unique situation of Ottoman state sponsorship. This case therefore bears no resemblance to the classic ethnic enclave represented by Jewish immigrant communities in Manhattan's Lower East Side, with its extraordinary concentration of retail and manufacturing firms operating in many business sub-sectors.[101] The model applied in the present research therefore offers an effective empirical approach for comparative analysis of different Jewish communities that were dependent on the existence of similar external conditions. Examples include the Jewish Sephardi communities in the Balkans and Baghdad as well as other capitals and states within the Ottoman Empire's domains at the eve of its downfall.

NOTES

[1] See Charles Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800–1914,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, p. 82; Şevket Pamuk, 'The Ottoman Empire in the "Great Depression" of 1873–1896', *The Journal of Economic History,* 1984, vol. XLIV, no. 1, pp. 107–18; Ezel Kural Shaw, 'Integrity and Integration: Assumptions and Expectations Behind Nineteenth-Century Decision Making', in C.E. Farah (ed.), *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire,* Thomas Jefferson University Press, Northeast Missouri State University, 1993, pp. 39–52.

[2] The 'semi-colonial situation' characterised by the absence of direct European political control, as in Thailand, from the middle of the nineteenth century until 1932 (establishment of the modern state), is a typical example of a semi-colonial situation. See Gary G. Hamilton and Tony Waters, 'Ethnicity and Capitalist Development: The Changing Role of the Chinese in Thailand', in Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid (eds.), *Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe,* Washington University Press, Seattle and London, 1997, pp. 258–84.

[3] Leon Sciaky, *Farewell to Salonica: Portrait of an Era,* Current Books, New York, 1946, p. 118.

[4] See Alexandra Yerolympos and Vassilis Colonas, 'Un urbanisme cosmopolite', in G. Veinstein (ed.) *Salonique, 1850–1918: La "ville des juifs" et le réveil des*

Balkans, Editions Autrement, Paris, 1993. pp. 158–76; Meropi Anastassiadou, *Salonique*, 1830–1912, Brill, Leiden, New York and Koln, 1997, Ch. 8 and pp. 421–6.

[5] See B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, London, New York, and Toronto, 1961, pp. 89–90; John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History 1550–1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, pp. 280–4; and Basil C. Gounaris, 'Emigration from Macedonia in the Early Twentieth Century', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 1989, vol. 7, pp. 133–53.

[6] Central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem (Z3/2, D. Florentin, Salonica 15/12/1912).

[7] See, for example, Karl A. Yambert, 'Alien Traders and Ruling Elites: The Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Indians in East Africa', *Ethnic Groups*, 1981 vol. 3, pp. 173–98.

[8] See, for example, Vincent Cable, 'The Asians of Kenya', in A.M. Rose and C.B. Rose (eds.), *Minority Problems*, Harper and Row, New York, 1972, pp. 103–11; Parakash C. Jain, 'Towards Class Analysis of Race Relations: Overseas Indians in Colonial/Post-Colonial Societies', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1988, vol. 23, pp. 95–103.

[9] See Neil O. Leighton, 'The political Economy of a Stranger Population', in William A. Shack and Elliot P. Skinner (eds.), *Strangers in African Societies*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979, pp. 85–103.

[10] An ethnic community encompasses established institutions that provide an internal framework for the ethnic minority's economic activities. On definitions of 'ethnic minority' see, for example, Ernest Krausz, *Ethnic Minorities in Britain*, MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1971, p. 10. On 'ethnic community' see Anthony David Smith, 'The Problem of National Identity: Ancient, Medieval and Modern?' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1994, vol. 17, no. 3, p. 383. In A.D. Smith's typology, a 'Demotic/vertical ethnic-community', in contrast with a 'lateral ethnic community', refers to the diffusion of solidarity throughout the social strata of an ethnic community and emphasizes intra-group endogamy. See Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pp. 79–89.

[11] On the classic middleman-minorities model as found in patrimonial societies, see Tamostu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, *Ethnic Stratification — A Comparative Approach*, Macmillan, New York, 1965–72, pp. 168–98; Hubert M. Blalock, *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*, Capricorn Books, New York, 1967, pp. 79–84; John A. Armstrong, 'Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas', *American Political Science Review*, 1976, vol. 70, pp. 393–408; and Pierre L. Van den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, Elseivier, New York, 1981, pp. 137–56.

[12] See Howard Aldrich and Roger Waldinger, 'Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship', *Annual Review of Sociology* 1990, vol. 16, pp. 120–1, 125–6.

[13] On the 'Macedonian Problem', see Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897–1913*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1966, Ch. 1. For a summary of the role of the Jews in the Macedonian strife, see Orly C. Meron, *The Jewish Community of Salonica (1881–1935): Middleman Minority in a process of Peripheral Incorporation into the Capitalist World-Economy*, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Bar Ilan University, 1999, pp. 100–11 (in Hebrew).

[14] See Robin Ward, 'Middleman Minority', in Ellis Cashmore, *Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 4th edition, New York, 1996, pp. 237–8.

[15] See Jain, op. cit. in Note 8 above, pp. 95–103.

[16] I. Light and S. Karageorgis, 'The ethnic economy', in N.J. Smelser and R. Swedberg (eds.), *The handbook of Economic Sociology*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, pp. 647–70.

[17] See Paul Dumont, 'The Social Structure of the Jewish Community of Salonica at the End of the Nineteenth Century', *Southeastern Europe*, 1979, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 33–72, 37.

[18] For Dr. Moise Allatini's report on the state of the Jewish community in mid-nineteenth century Salonica, see Y. Barnai, 'Sources', in *History of the Jews in the Islamic Countries*, vol. III, The Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, Jerusalem, 1986, p. 108. See also B. Lewis, *The Jews of Islam*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, p. 171.

[19] See Stanford J. Shaw, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic*, New York University Press, New York, 1991, pp. 193, 204; Yitzchak Kerem, 'The Influence of Anti-Semitism on Jewish Immigration Patterns from Greece to the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth Century' in C.E. Farah (ed.), *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, Thomas Jefferson University Press, Northeast Missouri State University, 1993, pp. 305–14; and Justin McCarthy, 'Jewish Population in the Late Ottoman Period', in Avigdor Levi (ed.), *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, Darwin Press, Princeton, NJ, 1994, pp. 375–97, 379.

[20] Attilio Milano, *Storia degli Ebrei Italiani nel Levante*, Casa Editrice Israel, Firenze, 1949, pp. 185–9; and Edgar Morin, *Vidal et les siens*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1989, pp. 24–26.

[21] These figures are based on data published by Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*, University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1985. For 1893: Tab. I.8.A, pp. 134–7; for 1896: Tab. I.12, pp. 158–9; for 1897: Tab. I.13, pp. 160–1; for 1906: Tab. I.16.A, pp. 166–7.

[22] On the under-registration in the Ottoman census and the consequent difficulties in determining the size of the Jewish population, see for example McCarthy, op. cit. in Note 19 above, pp. 375–97. For D. Florentin's estimate, see op. cit. in Note 6 above; for the composition of the Jewish population, see Anastassiadou, op. cit. in Note 4 above, p. 95.

[23] See Minna Rozen, 'Contest and Rivalry in Mediterranean Maritime Commerce in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century: The Jews of Salonica and the European Presence', in M. Rozen, *In the Mediterranean Routes*, Chair for the History and Culture of the Jews of Salonica and Greece, Tel Aviv University, 1993, pp. 65–113 (in Hebrew).

[24] On the distinction between 'orthodox' and 'reactive' components in 'ethnic resources', see Ivan Light, 'Immigrant and Ethnic Enterprise in North America', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1984, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 195–216.

[25] For the initiative activity of the Jewish elites to regenerate solidarity and westernize the community, see Dumont, op. cit. in Note 17 above, pp. 33–72; Georges Weill, 'The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Emancipation of the Jewish Communities in the Mediterranean' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 1982, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 117–34; Esther Benbassa, 'Associational Strategies in Ottoman Jewish Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', in Avigdor Levi (ed.), op. cit. in Note 19 above, pp. 457–84; and Rena Molho, 'Education in the Jewish Community of Salonica at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century', in *Proceedings of the Eleventh World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, June 22–29, 1993,*

The World Union of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1994, Division B, vol. III, pp. 179–86.

[26] See Feroz Ahmad, 'Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914', in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire,* Holmes & Meier, New York, 1982, vol. I, pp. 401–34; and Rena Molho, 'The Jewish Community of Salonika and its Incorporation into the Greek State (1912–1919)', *Middle Eastern Studies,* 1988, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 391–403.

[27] See Nicholas Svoronos, 'Administrative, Social and Economic Developments, 1430–1821', in M.B. Sakellariou (ed.), *Macedonia: 4000 Years of Greek History and Civilization* (English edition, supervised by H.L. Turner), Ekdotike Athenon, Athens, 1991, pp. 354–86.

[28] The quotation is translated from the Hebrew; see Y. Uziel, *The white Tower* (2nd edition), Tel Aviv, 1978, p. 31 (in Hebrew).

[29] We can learn about Jewish Salonican bankers who owned *chiftliks* from USSR archives. For example, Jacob Modiano owned 15 estates: see Christo Christov, *The Land Problem in Macedonia in the XIXth Century,* Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Press, Sofia, 1964 (in Bulgarian).

[30] See *Salonica, Mother City of Israel,* the Institute for Salonica Research, Tel Aviv, 1967, pp. 237–8 (in Hebrew).

[31] Greek fisheries, in contrast, operated in lakes of the Macedonian hinterland. On the Jewish Salonican fisheries, see Baruch Uziel, 'The Jewish Fisheries in Salonica' in *Salonica, Mother City of Israel,* op. cit. in Note 30 above, pp. 244–8; and Isaac R. Molho, *Jewish Seamen in Israel,* Jerusalem, 1951, pp. 36–37 (in Hebrew).

[32] See also Carter V. Findley, 'The Acid Test of Ottomanism: The Acceptance of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy', in Braude and Lewis, op. cit. in Note 26 above, pp. 339–68; and Aron Rodriguez, 'From Millet to Minority: Turkish Jewry', in Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, pp. 238–61.

[33] Eugene Abraham Cooperman, *Turco-Jewish Relations in the Ottoman City of Salonica: Two Communities in Support of the Ottoman Empire,* U.M.I, New York University, 1991, pp. 74–75.

[34] See François Georgeon, 'Selanik musulmane et deunmé', in G. Veinstein (ed.), op. cit. in Note 4 above, pp. 105–18; and Anastassiadou, op. cit. in Note 4 above, pp. 116–7; 425–6.

[35] *American Jewish Year Book* (hereinafter A.J.Y.B), *1913–1914,* The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1915, p. 203.

[36] See A.J.Y.B, ibid.

[37] See Michèle Nicolas, 'La pharmacie d' officine à Istanbul', in D. Panzac (ed.), *Histoire Economique et Sociale de l'Empire Ottoman et de la Turquie (1326–1960),* Paris 1995, pp. 235–42; and Méropi Anastassiadou-Dumont, 'Science et engagement: la modernité Ottomane à l' âge des nationalismes', in M. Anastassiadou-Dumont (ed.), *Médecins et Ingénieurs Ottomans à l' Age des Nationalismes,* Maissonneuve & Larose, Paris, 2003, pp. 5–28.

[38] This calculation is based on the Greek census (1913) conducted in Salonica by the Greek governor immediately following the invasion. Of all the available data, this source indicates the smallest proportion (39 per cent) of Jews in the total population, — 61,439 out of a total population of 157,889. The census data were

first published by Vassilis Dimitriadis, 'The Population of Salonica and its Greek Community in 1913', *Makedonika,* 1983, vol. 23, pp. 88–116 (in Greek). According to the census, the ethnic distribution was as follows: Jews (39 per cent); Greeks (25 per cent); Turks (29 per cent); Bulgars (4 per cent) and foreigners (3 per cent). In the present study, Bulgars and foreigners are classified within one category: 'Others' (7 per cent).

[39] This trend reached its peak in the early 1930s with the arrival in the Turkish Republic's capital of Jewish physicians from Germany. See F. Tachau, 'German Jewish Émigrés in Turkey', in A. Levi (ed.), *Jews, Turks, Ottomans: A Shared History, the Fifteenth through the Twentieth Century,* Syracuse University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 233–45. The Greek Minister of Finance would eventually (25 September 1933) express his hopes that Greece would be able to follow Turkey and invite Jewish-German physicians and scientists to come and live in Greece in order to establish a medical institution_similar to that found in Constantinople. See *A.J.Y.B.,* 1934, p. 19.

[40] See Maria Georgiadou, 'Expert knowledge between tradition and reform: The Caratheodorys: a Neo-Phanariot Family in 19th Century Constantinople' in Anastassiadou-Dumont, op. cit. in Note 37 above, pp. 243–94, 248. On the educational institutions found among the ethnic communities in Salonica, see Mark Mazower, 'Salonica between East and West, 1860–1912', *Dialogos,* 1994, vol. 1, pp. 104–27. For a survey of Jewish Physicians, see M. Molho. 'Medicos Sefardies en Salonica', 2001, *Sefardica,* vol. 12, pp. 167–97.

[41] See Paul Dumont, 'Jewish Communities in Turkey during the Last Decades of the Nineteenth Century in Light of the Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle', in Braude and Lewis (eds.), op. cit. in Note 26 above, pp. 220–1.

[42] According to the Ottoman Almanac of Salonica province (1902/3). See Anastassiadou, op. cit. in Note 4 above, p. 354.

[43] On the study of the Turkish language in Jewish educational institutions, see Dumont, op. cit. in Note 17 above; and Benbassa, op. cit. in Note 25 above, p. 462.

[44] Israel Chazan was appointed by the Turkish Government to the post of Rector, the Faculty of Jurisprudence, University of Salonica: *A.J.Y.B.,* 1912, p. 179.

[45] For example, Raphael Benusiglio and Albert Sciaky; see *Austrian Report,* 1915, p. 187. Given this trend, only pharmacists, who were classified as members of a single profession, were included in the sample.

[46] For example, the Greek ophthalmologist and optician G. Svouronos: see *Austrian Report,* 1915, p. 188.

[47] For Greek engineers, see Georgiadou, op. cit. in Note 40 above, pp. 250–1. For Jewish engineers, see Orly C. Meron, 'Sub-ethnicity and Elites: Jewish Italian Professionals and Entrepreneurs in Salonica (1881–1912)', *Zakhor, Rivista di Storia degli Ebrei D'Italia,* vol. X (forthcoming 2005).

[48] See Aldrich and Waldinger, op. cit. in Note 12 above; and Light and Karageorgis, op. cit. in Note 16 above.

[49] 'Electricity, Gas and Water', a sub-branch of 'Energy and Public Utilities' (branch no. 4, Table 2), was exclusively European.

[50] Nathan Mayer, *The Jews of Turkey,* London, (n.d. [1913]), p. 38.

[51] See Feroz Ahmad, op. cit. in note 26 above; Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, 'Introduction', in Braude and Lewis (eds.) op. cit. in note 26 above, pp. 1–34; Roderic H. Davison, 'The *Millets* as Agents of Change in the

Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', in Braude and Lewis (eds.), op. cit. in Note 26 above, pp. 319–37; Charles Issawi, 'The Transformation of the Economic Position of the *Millets* in the Nineteenth Century', in Braude and Lewis (eds.), op. cit. in Note 26 above, pp. 262–85; Bernard Lewis, op. cit. in Note 18 above, p. 61; and Ezel Kural Shaw, op. cit. in Note 1 above.

[52] 2.8 per cent of the entire Salonican Jewish population (1914). See P. Risal (pseudonym of Joseph Nehama), *La ville convoitée, Salonique,* Perrin et Cie, Paris, 1917, p. 255.

[53] Jews, Greeks, and Armenians served as Dragoman and High Secretaries in the consular representations of the following states: Austro-Hungary, Germany, Persia, Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and the United States of America. See *Austrian Report,* 1915, pp. 194–8.

[54] See Rena Molho, op. cit. in Note 26 above.

[55] Maurice Freedman has shown that although the Chinese in British Malaya represented about 30 per cent of the total population, they were found in all economic sectors. This contradicts Furnival's previous research dealing with the ethnic division of labour in plural societies in Southeast Asia. See J.S. Furnival, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1948; and Maurice Freedman, 'The Growth of the Plural Society in Malaya' in I. Wallerstein (ed.), *Social Change: The Colonial Situation,* John Wiley, New York, 1966, pp. 278–89.

[56] The construct *economic heritage* refers to a form of accumulated human capital (for example, proficiencies) that immigrants endeavour to utilize in their adopted country. See Yehuda Don, 'Economic Behaviour of Jews In Central Europe before World War II' in E. Aerts and F.M.L. Thompson (eds.), *Ethnic Minority Groups in Town and Countryside and Their Effects on Economic Development (1850–1940),* Leuven University Press, Leuven, 1990, pp. 114–24, 116.

[57] See *Austrian Report,* 1915, pp. 49–50.

[58] See Traian Stoianovich, *Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe,* M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1994, pp. 196, 292–3.

[59] See Meron, op. cit. in Note 47 above.

[60] For a sociological definition of ethnic niche, see Suzanne Model, 'The Ethnic Niche and the Structure of Opportunity: Immigrants and Minorities in New York City', in Michael Katz (ed.), *The "Underclass" Debate: Views from History,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, pp. 161–93; R. Waldinger, *Still the Promised City? African-Americans and New Immigrants in Post-Industrial New York,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, and London, 1996, p. 21; and R.C. Kloosterman and J. Rath (eds.), *Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Venturing Abroad in the Age of Globalization,* Berg, Oxford, 2003. For additional analysis of a similar table about Jewish niches, see also O.C. Meron, 'Jewish Entrepreneurship in Salonica during the Last Decades of the Ottoman Regime in Macedonia (1881–1912)', in C. Imber (ed.), *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West,* Tauris Academic Studies, London and New York, 2005, vol. 1, pp. 265–86.

[61] See, for example, Jean Pierre Filippini, 'Le role des négociants et des banquiers juifs de Livourne dans le grand commerce international en Méditerranée au XVIII Siècle', in A. Toaff and S. Schwarzfuchs (eds.), *The Mediterranean and the Jews,* Bar Ilan University Press, Ramat Gan, 1989, pp. 123–50.

[62] For examples of the Jewish network built on co-religionists from Salonica, London, and Sarajevo, see Edgar Morin, op. cit. in Note 20 above.

Correspondence between Salonican Jewish firms and their representatives scattered abroad are found in archives such as the 'Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People' in Jerusalem.

[63] Salonica's main Jewish financial institution, the *Banque de Salonique,* was established (1888) by the Allatini brothers in co-operation with the *Austrian Länderbank* and the *French Comptoir d'Escompte.* See *Austrian Report,* 1915, p. 127.

[64] The Ottoman authorities prevented operation of the Greek National Bank, which represented Greek national elites active in Ottoman territories; see Stavros Theophanides, 'The Economic Development of Greek Macedonia after 1912', in M.B. Sakellariou (ed.), *Macedonia: 4000 Years of Greek History and Civilization,* Ekdotike Athenon, Athens, 1991, pp. 509–27. At the same time, Jewish financiers refused to extend credit to Greek entrepreneurs: see Aron Rodrigue, *Images of Sephardi and Eastern Jewries in Transition: The Teachers of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, 1860–1939,* University of Washington Press, Seattle and London 1993, p. 235.

[65] The total value of silkworm cocoon exports from Salonica reached 3,400,000 francs, a quarter of the value of tobacco exports: see *Austrian Report,* 1915, p. 79.

[66] On the silkworm monopoly controlled by the PDA, see Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,* vol. II, Cambridge University Press, London, New York and Melbourne, 1979, p. 233.

[67] On the difficulties and deterioration of silk-weaving from the end of the nineteenth century, see Donald Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 116; Idem, 'Ottoman Manufacturing in the Nineteenth Century', in D. Quataert, *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500–1950,* State University of New York Press, Albany, 1994, pp. 87–122, 104–7; and Idem, 'The workers of Salonica, 1850–1912', in D. Quataert, and E.J. Zürcher (eds.), *Workers and the Working class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, 1839–1950,* Tauris Academic Studies, London and New York, 1995, pp. 59–74, 64–65, 171–3.

[68] For a contemporary's testimony, see for example, Hayim Toledano, 'The Jews in the Commercial and Industrial Life of Salonica', in David Recanati (ed.), *Zikhron Saloniki,* vol. II, Tel Aviv, 1986, p. 203 (in Hebrew). On the exclusivity of the Jews in the jewellery trade, see *Salonica, Mother City of Israel,* op. cit. in Note 30 above, p. 237.

[69] See Don, op. cit. in Note 56 above, pp. 121–3.

[70] Participation in tanning was not approved for the Islamic faithful: see Lewis, op. cit. in Note 18 above, p. 28. Hence, the fur trade became a monopoly of the Greek guilds. This industry's presence in the Greek economic heritage is confirmed by the over-representation of Greek enterprises in the hides, leather, and footwear branch.

[71] The value (1913) of imported leather and soles from Hungary equalled 318,399 francs: See *Austrian Report,* 1915, p. 85.

[72] The duplication found frequently between trade in leather and shoemaking products in the preliminary sample confirms the interdependence between trade in industrial inputs and production. In contrast, no duplication was found between shoemaking products and tanning, which supports the assumption that there is no certain dependence between skin processing and production of footwear and other leather products. See also Svoronos, op. cit. in Note 27 above.

[73] See *Salonica, Mother City of Israel,* op. cit. in Note 30 above p. 237.

[74] On the supervision of forests in the late Ottoman era, see Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, London, New York, and Melbourne, 1977, pp. 235–6.

[75] Imported wool yarn and fabrics, valued (1913) at 616,818 francs, ranked as the second textile import after cotton (*Austrian Report, 1915*, p. 85).

[76] Duplication between Jewish and non-Jewish firms, labelled 'agencies of manufactured goods' and 'wool products', demonstrates that the entrepreneur was a wholesaler who also financed the costs of production and distributed the finished products. The putting-out system used in production, especially in cottage industry, saved costs. On the putting-out system, see Arcadius Kahan, 'The Impact of Industrialization in Tsarist Russia on the Socioeconomic Conditions of the Jewish Population' in R.W. Weiss (ed.), *Essays in Jewish Social and Economic History*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1986, pp. 1–69.

[77] The combination of availability of raw material — sheep wool — and cheap labour helped the wool industry in Macedonia to survive throughout the nineteenth century. The few technological innovations appearing during that period delayed introduction of mechanized looms: see Quataert, 1993, op. cit. in Note 67 above, pp. 51–52; Idem, 1995, op. cit. in Note 67 above, pp. 62–64.

[78] See *Austrian Report*, 1915, p. 66; Yannis Megas, *Souvenir — Images of the Jewish community of Salonika 1897–1917*, Kapon Editions, Athens, 1993, p. 85.

[79] On the trade in trash of textile or skin industry or second-hand goods, considered 'Jewish' see Nachum Gross (ed.), *Economic History of the Jews*, Keter, Jerusalem, 1975, pp. 266–9; and Bina Garncarska-Kadary, *The Role of Jews in the Development of Industry in Warsaw 1816/20–1914*, Tel Aviv, 1985, p. 168 (in Hebrew).

[80] In 1912, export of bones to England and Austro-Hungary was valued at 34,000 francs; the rags export to Germany, Austro-Hungary, England, Italy, and France was valued at 30,000 francs: see *Austrian Report, 1915*, p. 80.

[81] For a contemporary's testimony, see Uziel, op. cit. in Note 28 above, p. 82. On the ethnic division of labour in Salonican enterprises, see *Austrian Report*, 1915, pp. 73–56; see also Quataert, 1995, op. cit. in Note 67 above, p. 66.

[82] See Simon Kuznets, 'Economic Structure and Life of the Jews', in L. Finkelstein (ed.), *The Jews, Their History, Culture and Religion*, vol. II, Harper & Row, 3rd edition, New York, pp. 1597–666.

[83] According to Nathan Mayer, a Jewish owner of tobacco enterprises in the Kavala district (a regional centre for the tobacco industry in Salonica Province) about 3,000–4,000 Jewish workers were engaged in the tobacco industry: see N. Mayer, op. cit. in Note 50 above, p. 38; see also Donald Quataert, 'The Industrial Working Class of Salonica, 1850–1912', in A. Levi (ed.), op. cit. in Note 39 above, pp. 194–211.

[84] Quataert, 1995, op. cit. in Note 67 above, pp. 71–73.

[85] His Majesty's Stationery Office, *Report on the Industrial & Economic Situation in Greece for the Years 1923–1924*, London, p. 21.

[86] See Edna Bonacich, 'A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism — The Split Labor Market', *American Sociological Review*, 1972, vol. 37, pp. 547–59; and Idem, 'A Theory of Middleman Minorities', *American Sociological Review*, 1973, vol. 38, pp. 583–94.

[87] *A.J.Y.B*, 1913–1914, p. 203.

[88] Quataert, 1995, op. cit. in Note 67 above, pp. 60–61.

[89] Dumont, op. cit. in Note 17 above, p. 64.

[90] Yitzchak Broudo, 'Salonica's Porters, their Specializations and Organizations', in *Salonica, City Mother of Israel,* op. cit. in Note 30 above, p. 243.

[91] See Idem, ibid, pp. 242–3.

[92] See 'Economic Life' in *Salonica, City Mother of Israel,* op. cit. in Note 30 above, p. 237.

[93] The daily wages of port labourers (7s-8s) in Salonica's port (1911) were considered to be the highest ever paid in Macedonia; See Gournaris, op. cit. in Note 5 above, p. 145.

[94] See A.J. Sussnitzki, 'Ethnic Division of Labor', in C. Issawi, *The Economic History of the Middle East. 1800–1914,* Chicago University Press, Chicago and London, 1966, pp. 114–25.

[95] See Quataert, 1995, op. cit. in Note 67 above, p. 59.

[96] *A.J.Y.B.,* 1911, p. 186.

[97] See Morin, op. cit. in Note 20 above, p. 16.

[98] See also: Mark Levene, 'Port Jewry of Salonika; Between Neo-Colonialism and Nation-state', *Jewish Culture and History,* 2001, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 125–54; and Maria Vassilikou, 'Greeks and Jews in Salonika and Odessa: inter-ethnic relations in cosmopolitan port cities', *Jewish Culture and History,* 2001, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 155–72.

[99] See David Sorkin, 'The Port Jew: Notes toward a Social Type', *Journal of Jewish Studies,* 1999, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 87–97.

[100] David Cesarani, 'Conclusion: Future Research on Port Jews', *Jewish Culture and History,* 2001, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 197–8.

[101] See Aldrich Waldinger, op. cit. in Note 12 above, p. 124; for another Jewish enclave, see Harold Pollins, 'Immigrants and Minorities — The Outsiders in Business', *Immigrants & Minorities,* 1989, vol. 8, no. 3 (November), pp. 252–70.

INTERMARRIAGE HANDBOOKS

Gerald Cromer

Ensuring Jewish Survival

As American Jews moved to the suburbs after the Second World War, they underwent a process of acculturation without assimilation.[1] Those living in the newly-created gilded ghettoes became increasingly indistinguishable from their Gentile neighbours. At the same time, however, the new suburbanites largely remained a group apart. American Jews saw themselves, and were viewed by others, as 'the classic illustration of voluntary group endogamy'.[2]

This is not to suggest, of course, that there were no jeremiads or prophecies of doom regarding the future of American Jewry and the dire consequences of the desire to integrate into the wider society. However, they were few and far between. It was not until the beginning of the 1960s that the unease became more widespread. After the publication of a series of communal and national surveys about the rate of intermarriage, the focus of concern shifted from integration to survival. Leaders of all the denominations expressed their anxiety about the steady increase in the number of Jews marrying out, and the extent to which it endangered 'Jewish survival' or 'the Jewish future'.

As, or even because the situation grew more threatening, a number of academics and communal leaders were at pains to point out that the rise in intermarriage was unavoidable. It is, they argued, part of the price that modern Jews must pay for freedom and equality in an open society. With the passage of time, this reluctant acceptance turned into a warm embrace of intermarriage. It began to be related to as an opportunity rather than a threat. The argument was very simple. A concerted attempt to reach out to intermarried couples rather than to stigmatize them may lead to a net gain rather than a loss for American Jewry.

Advocates of the move 'from outrage to outreach' now point to the large number of Gentile partners who have come to identify themselves as Jews and to take an active part in the life of the community. In addition, they claim that their approach has had a positive effect on many Jewish partners by providing them with an incentive and opportunity to learn about Judaism and to explore their relationship to it. This kind of search

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stimulated a new or renewed interest in, and attachment to, things Jewish. Meeting the other, it is argued, has led to a clarification of their own beliefs and a fresh understanding of the self.

Other academics and communal leaders have questioned the effectiveness of outreach programmes in the battle against assimilation. They are of the opinion that those involved in mixed marriages — both the Jewish and the Gentile partner — do not represent the best target population, and that the community's resources should be channelled towards the moderately affiliated. Thus, Jack Wertheimer *et al.* suggested shifting the emphasis to enlarging the core by shrinking the middle rather than working with those on the periphery of the community or beyond its confines. Inreach, they argue, is preferable to outreach for one simple reason: it is more likely to save American Jews.[3] Taking this argument a step further, there are those who claim that outreach not only does less good than its proponents would have us believe, but also causes a great deal of harm. They contend that if the community accepts those who marry out with open arms, others will conclude that there is nothing wrong in it and will, therefore, follow in their footsteps. According to this view of things, outreach is counterproductive. Rather than inducing people to join the community, it encourages them to leave its ranks.

Despite this difference of opinion about the efficacy of outreach programmes, the advocates of an inclusive and of an exclusive approach to non-Jews share a common concern. Both schools of thought are motivated by a deep anxiety about the future of American Jewry and a firm belief that their policy provides the best and even the only way of ensuring it. There are others, however, who are more concerned about the personal rather than the communal ramifications of intermarriage. Since the late 1980s a number of handbooks for intermarried couples have been published.[4] They are concerned, above all, with the quality of the marital relationship. As far as the authors of these manuals are concerned, the most important thing is to help make the marriage work. The aim is to ensure a joyous union rather than to guarantee or even encourage a Jewish one.

Making Intermarriage Work

Almost 40 years ago, Sklare and Greenblum drew attention to the fact that comparatively few parents on the suburban frontier expressed their opposition to intermarriage in terms of Jewish law or Jewish identity. Doing so, they suggested, would have placed them in conflict with the American creed of equality of all people and the ideal of romantic love. Parents argued instead that intermarriage is an inherently unstable union and that it should therefore be avoided at all costs. According to Sklare and Greenblum, this discord approach provided them with a safe way of expressing their desire to continue the chain of tradition while at the same time avoiding the appearance of ethnocentrism.[5]

Some of the handbooks play down the difficulties involved in intermarriage. They argue that the similarities between Judaism and Christianity and/or the lack of interest of many partners in their faith reduce the chances of serious conflict occurring on religious issues. Most of the authors, however, accept the basic premise of the discord approach. They accept that marrying out is a particularly precarious undertaking. Religious issues together with cultural differences between the spouses make intermarriage an even more risky affair than marital unions in general.

People tend to marry at a stage in both their family and individual life-cycle when they are the least interested in religion. The handbooks therefore warn prospective couples that the situation is likely to change when they have children and need to decide what kind of religious identity to pass on to them. The authors also draw attention to the fact that many people, as they grow older and become more aware of their mortality, tend to become more involved in religion. These changes do not cause a problem if both partners respond to them in the same way. If, as is often the case however, they react differently, differences of opinion on religious questions can become a serious bone of contention and even threaten a hitherto harmonious marriage.

Religious issues are thought to be compounded by ethnic-based differences between Jews and Christians. Even if the partners are non-observant or non-believers, the guides argue, their 'cradle culture' has an enormous influence on all aspects of their lives. *The intermarriage Handbook* (published in 1988), for instance, draws attention to a large number of dissimilarities in values, emotional style, daily routine, and child-rearing patterns, and suggests that they are particularly likely to lead to conflicts because of the 'irreducible core of Jewishness' that characterizes so many of those who marry out. Despite (or perhaps because) they find this aspect of their identity so difficult to understand, and even more so to explain to their partner, it constitutes an ongoing threat to every intermarriage. The guides suggest that disagreements about religion are also complicated by the fact that they are often a symbolic representation of other problems in the marital relationship. In such instances, religion acts as a scapegoat for the kinds of conflict that can, and often do occur, between spouses in a single-faith marriage. This is also the case with regard to parent-child relationships. Conflicts about intermarriage are often just another round in the ongoing power struggle between the generations. They are part of the process of individuation and separation rather than a reflection of a serious difference of opinion about the rightness of marrying out of the faith.

The handbooks often refer to all these potential tensions and disputes as time bombs or land mines that can blow up at any time. Intermarried couples are constantly treading dangerous ground. However, all the guides insist that the situation can be defused if they act wisely. Avoidance of the Romeo and Juliet syndrome according to which love conquers all

and a concerted attempt on the part of both partners to deal with each problem as it arises will enable them not only to preserve their marriage, but also to transform it into a highly-enriching experience.

All the guides advise those who have intermarried or are contemplating doing so to clarify their position regarding religion in general and their own faith in particular. The authors also urge the Jewish partners to examine how they feel about their ethnic status. Those who come to the conclusion that they are afflicted by Jewish self-hatred, or by what is now more frequently referred to as internalized oppression, are recommended to join an ethnotherapy group in order to rid themselves of these negative feelings. Self-respect and self-awareness, the guides insist, are an essential prerequisite for a healthy personality and, in turn, for a happy marital relationship.

This belief provides the basis for the stance that the handbooks adopt towards conversion to Judaism. While fully aware of the potential advantages of such a move to the marriage, they are at pains to point out that it is not always beneficial, and that if undertaken in order to placate the Jewish partner it may prove to be highly detrimental to the marital relationship. Conversion, the authors argue, should be considered only if the Gentile spouse feels unhappy about his or her current religious identity or, more positively, if it constitutes the logical conclusion of a personal spiritual journey. The decision has to 'come from the heart'.

Self-awareness must be accompanied by self-disclosure. Conspiracies of silence, the handbooks insist, are detrimental to any marriage, and particularly to those involving partners from different religious backgrounds. They stress the need for completely open communication between the spouses. Failure to discuss all the potential tensions and to make joint decisions about religious issues is a recipe for disaster. This argument is often taken a step further. Many of the authors contend that the actual decisions that the couple make are less important than the way in which they reach them. The process is more important than the end result. This is particularly the case with regard to child rearing. The authors hold very different opinions about the effect of bringing up a child in two faiths on his or her identity. Some believe that it causes deep confusion; others think that it gives them the opportunity to get the best of both heritages. Significantly, however, even those who feel that this kind of upbringing can and often does lead to serious problems regard it as less damaging than growing up in a conflict-ridden situation. They regard tug-of-war families in which each partner tries to raise the children in their own faith, or take-over families in which one parent succeeds in doing so are much more harmful. Consensus, whatever form it takes, is considered preferable to conflict.

The handbooks are replete with 'living examples' of both successful and unsuccessful intermarriages. Both kinds of story, however, are designed to show that marrying out is not inherently problematic. Rather,

the outcome depends on the extent to which the partners strive at the personal and interpersonal level to make their marriage work. Everything hinges on whether both the Jewish and Gentile spouse develop their self-awareness and keep the communication channels between them open. Potential problems abound, but they can be solved and even avoided entirely.

All the authors take this argument a stage further. They contend that the partners can go beyond simply coping with the situation and actually turn it to their advantage. Reuben states:[6]

> Differences are not necessarily barriers in a relationship. Differences can be, in fact, opportunities for mutual support and decision-making. The challenge of an interfaith marriage is to create harmony out of differences, mutual respect and love in the midst of ambiguity and paradox. See every difference as a gift from your partner's past, a window into a world that you have never known. Each difference that you uncover is yet another example of something that you can learn about and from each other, to add a unique and special dimension to your relationship and your love.

Intermarriage, in short, is, or at least can be, a blessing in disguise.

The Right-Wrong Trap

The handbooks are meant to serve as non-judgmental guides for those who are considering marrying out or who have already done so. They therefore describe the various options available for the celebration of Jewish and Christian festivals and life-cycle events, child rearing, communal membership, etc. The authors often resort to a market analogy. Jews who marry out and their Gentile spouses are exhorted to avoid 'the right-wrong trap' and to engage in 'spiritual shopping' in order to find the solutions which best meet their needs. The aim is to ensure that each couple makes an 'informed decision' or 'a wise choice' rather than to guarantee, or even encourage, a Jewish one.

While the self-appointed mentors encourage intermarried couples to search for and choose their own particular spiritual path, they themselves fall into 'the right-wrong trap' and are completely intolerant of those who reject their approach in its entirety. All the authors are highly critical (and even sometimes contemptuous) of anyone who is less enthusiastic about intermarriage than they are. Thus, communal leaders who favour a more exclusive policy towards Jews who marry out and their Gentile partners are portrayed as parochial and prejudiced. The guides have little patience for this kind of 'religious chauvinism'.

The handbooks are particularly disparaging of those parents who express outright opposition to intermarriage and are unwilling to come to terms with their child's decision to marry out. According to this view of things, the adoption of a hard-line approach is a sign of bigotry and a

clear indication of the fact that the parents in question have failed to live up to values that they tried to inculcate in their children such as tolerance, equality, and respect for the other. They are, in short, not practising what they preached. Significantly, none of the handbooks attribute parental opposition to their children marrying out to the older generation's commitment to Jewish law or Jewish continuity. They explain it instead in psychological terms. Conflicts about intermarriage, the guides insist, are merely a reflection of family dynamics in general, and the power struggle between the generations in particular. Many of the authors therefore urge parents to read their book and even to undergo therapy in the hope that this will lead them to adopt a more tolerant and healthier approach to the situation.

This kind of argument is highly reminiscent of those used in an earlier age to explain why Jews married out. Thus, before the steep rise in the rate of intermarriage their decision to do so was attributed to factors such as counterphobia and dysfunctional family backgrounds. This parallelism is, perhaps, the clearest sign of the enormous change that has occurred in American Jewry over the last 40 years. The stigma that was once attached to those who marry out has not simply ceased to exist in large sectors of the community; it has been transferred to their parents and other co-religionists who oppose them doing so. The outrage is now directed against those who take a firm stand against exogamy. It is they who are beyond the pale.

NOTES

[1] Erich Rosenthal, 'Acculturation without Assimilation? The Jewish Community of Chicago, Illinois', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, no. 2, 1960, pp. 275–88.

[2] Calvin Goldscheider, 'Demography of Jewish Americans: Research Findings, Issues and Challenges' in Marshall Sklare (ed.), *Understanding American Jewry*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982, p. 36.

[3] Jack Wertheimer, Charles S. Leibman, and Steven M. Cohen, 'How to Save American Jews', *Commentary*, vol. 101, no. 1, 1996, pp. 47–51.

[4] Judy Petsonik and Jim Rensen, *The Intermarriage Handbook: A Guide for Jews and Christians*, New York: William Morrow 1988; Steven Carr Reuben, *Making Interfaith Marriage Work: A Nonjudgmental Guide to Coping with the Spiritual, Emotional and Psychological Issues*. Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing 1994; Roy A. Rosenberg, Peter Meehan, and John Wade Payne, *Happily Intermarried: Authoritative Advice for a Joyous Jewish-Christian Marriage*, New York: Macmillan 1988; and Joan Hawxhurst, *The Interfaith Family Guidebook: Practical Advice for Jewish and Christian Partners*, Kalamazoo: Dovetail 1998, are typical of this genre.

[5] Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier: A Study of Group Survival in the Open Society*, New York: Basic Books, 1964, pp. 311–13.

[6] Reuben, op. cit. in Note 4 above, pp. 70–71.

THE JEWISH LEGION AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Harold Pollins

(Review Article)

MARTIN WATTS, *The Jewish Legion and the First World War*, xviii +287 pp., Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2004, £55.00.

THERE is, undoubtedly, the need for an explanation of the fact that in 1917, towards the end of the First World War, the British government authorised the formation of specifically Jewish infantry units. They were officially three battalions of the City of London Regiment, the Royal Fusiliers — 38th, 39th and 40th, with a fourth, the 42nd, being the unit's depot — but came to be known as the Jewish Legion. Their existence, although short-lived, has been known for many years and there is a Jewish Legion museum at Avichail, Israel. A number of autobiographies of participants have appeared as well as other studies in the last 20 years on relevant aspects of contemporary Anglo-Jewish history.[1] But there has not been hitherto a full-scale history of the Legion and this book is therefore to be welcomed for that reason. It uses a number of classic studies by participants but more importantly Martin Watts has made full use of public records of relevant government departments (including those previously used for this purpose); other records in various depositories; and the testimonies of a number of former members of the Jewish Legion. These appear to have been collected after the Second World War and may suffer through distance from the events. Some were written by members of the soldiers' families.

There is more to the book than that. The author aims to place the history of the Legion in the context of contemporary trends in Anglo-Jewry and this takes him also, briefly, into recent Anglo-Jewish historiographical controversies, mainly over the extent of antisemitism in Britain.

However, the Jewish battalions of the Royal Fusiliers were not the first Jewish units in the British army. There was the short-lived 11th Tower Hamlets Volunteers, created soon after the establishment in 1859 of the

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Volunteer Movement, a body of citizen soldiers. It was formed in the East End of London, a main centre of Jewish life.[2] But this is only a minor footnote and absence of any mention of it in the book is of no great moment. On the other hand, the author does omit reference to some other preliminaries which are worthy of presentation. He briefly mentions that the idea of a Jewish army on the side of the Allies was first discussed in England very soon after the war began in August 1914 'amongst a small group of intellectual Russian Jews who were active in the Zionist movement' (p. 3). Chaim Weizmann describes how Pinhas Rutenberg came to his house in September 1914 and told him 'of his dream of a Jewish army to fight on the Allied side' (p. 4). Since the author solidly places the later discussions in the period before 1917, surrounding the possibility of establishing a Jewish armed force, within the controversies in Anglo-Jewry between Zionists and anti-Zionists, he naturally notes this abortive effort. But this vague idea is his only reference to it and in any case the Zionist movement was then officially neutral in the war.

However, there was coincidentally a much greater contemporary attempt in Britain for the same end. The first suggestion in favour of a Jewish unit was made in a letter to the *Jewish World* very soon after the war began[3] on the grounds that 'the formation of an essentially Jewish corps [would be] ... a Jewish expression of loyalty and appreciation of England'. Many letters and reports followed both for and against the idea. It might have been killed off when Rev. Michael Adler, the Jewish chaplain to the armed forces, wrote to the War Office on 28 October 1914 opposing the proposal — to which the War Office replied that it had no intention of sanctioning such a formation.[4] Nevertheless the agitation in favour continued in which two men, Joseph Cowen and M.D. Eder, were intimately concerned. They were both Zionists and were involved in the subsequent history of the Legion but their arguments in 1914 were not couched in Zionist terms as was the later controversy which did lead to the creation of the Jewish Legion. Coincidentally, the two men had letters published in the same issue of the *Jewish World*[5] both written in terms of countering antisemitism and of encouraging recruitment, which was voluntary. In the same month a 'Jewish Recruiting Committee' was set up and full-page notices were printed in the Jewish papers, one stating: 'Join the Special Jewish Unit'.[6]

There was indeed a partial victory for the proponents when the War Office conceded that Jewish recruits could, if they wished, serve together in one regiment, the King's Royal Rifle Corps.[7] Not much more is heard of this but it is noteworthy that the *British Jewry Book of Honour* (henceforth *BJBH*) lists more than 600 men who served in that regiment throughout the war. The true figure was undoubtedly greater as the book is notoriously incomplete and there were often transfers between regiments. Moreover, the idea of Jews serving together was given force through Army Council Instruction 206 'Enlistment of Jews' (18 December 1915).

This stated, inter alia, that where there were considerable numbers of eligible Jews, recruitment officers should arrange that the men, as far as possible, serve with their friends.[8] And a further ACI, 1156 issued on 8 June 1916 (which the author quotes on p. 68), said that Russian Jews, 'if they so desire may be posted in batches to serve together in the same unit'.

In practice, the only Jewish unit formed in the early part of the war was nothing to do with this discussion in Britain. The Zion Mule Corps (ZMC) was formed in Egypt in 1915, initially consisting of Jews who had been expelled from Palestine by the Turks. Others were recruited from Jews resident in Egypt. The unit served in the ill-fated Gallipoli expedition of 1915 (the men acquitting themselves well) and was wound down early in 1916 when the Gallipoli campaign ended. The author devotes his second chapter to its history in a well-written account.

The Zion Mule Corps is relevant to the story of the Legion for two reasons. When the Gallipoli campaign ended and the ZMC was disbanded, 120 of its 700 or so members transferred to Britain and joined the 20th London Regiment and some, perhaps most, later went to the Jewish Legion. The other relevance of the ZMC to the story of the Legion was that three of the leading characters were instrumental in agitating for it between 1915 and 1917. They were the non-Jewish commanding officer of the ZMC, Lt-Col. J.H. Patterson, who later commanded one of the Jewish battalions of Fusiliers; Vladimir Jabotinsky; and Joseph Trumpeldor. In March 1915 Jabotinsky and others had aimed to set up a Jewish army to fight the Turks in Palestine. But the British army authorities stated that there were no plans to invade Palestine; that aliens could not join the British army except as transport and supply men; and that they could be used on another front against the Turks. Thus was born the Zion Mule Corps.

The author's account is very good but contains at least one error. He quotes the 1987 reminiscences of one ZMC member and states that the survivor was 'one of many Zion Mule Corps veterans to be later awarded the Gallipoli Star' (p. 37). No campaign medal was awarded specifically for those who took part in the Gallipoli campaign. They would have been awarded the 1914–15 Star, the appropriate one for all those who served in theatres of operation between 5 August 1914 and 31 December 1915.

The Jewish Legion came into existence formally on 12 September 1917 under an Army Council Instruction, number 1415, entitled 'Formation of Battalions for the Reception of Friendly Alien Jews'. In fact the Army Council had agreed in April 1917 to the formation of 'a Russian Jewish Battalion' (p. 90) and the intervening months were taken up with various details. While the opposition to the proposed Jewish unit continued, there were discussions about its name (should 'Jewish' be included; 'Maccabean' was suggested at one stage), and about its badge (a Magen David, or a Menorah). To avoid some of the difficulties involved in such matters, the units were part of the Royal Fusiliers and they at first used that regiment's cap badge.

It had taken two years to reach the stage of the Legion's authorisation and Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to the agitation and to the various controversies leading up to the decision. In fact the history of the Legion, as well as the events leading up to it, and the way in which it was wound down, consisted largely of protest and argument against the authorities about its desirability, the way in which it was deployed, and its subsequent history. To start with the pre-history: there is no doubt that Vladimir Jabotinsky was a significant character in the agitation for the Legion. As a Zionist he was keen to advance that cause through Jewish involvement with the Allies by means of a Jewish unit taking part in the liberation of Palestine. That was clear enough and he had some important Jewish and non-Jewish support. In Britain he and his colleagues had to convince the politicians and the War Office, who had plenty of objections, as well as face the opposition of many older-established Anglo-Jews who were anti-Zionist, opposed to the idea of Jewish nationality. They were people who saw no commonality between British Jews and Jews in other countries. But in addition, these controversies were played against changes in the external environment. There was the urgent need for recruits to the British army, given the high level of casualties in France and Flanders and other theatres of operations. While Jews of British birth had joined up in large numbers, those of Russian birth were extremely reluctant to do so, and an important part of the discussion was how to get them as recruits.

Other factors included the appointment at the end of 1916 of the new Prime Minister, Lloyd George, who was more favourable to Zionism and also of opening an Eastern front. In December 1916 and January 1917 Allied forces removed the Turks from Egyptian territory. Moreover, a pro-Zionist, Leo Amery, became part of the Prime Minister's 'kitchen cabinet' while another man favourable to Zionism, Sir Mark Sykes, was the principal advisor to the government on the Middle East. The arguments continued, with one reason at the back of the opposition to a Jewish unit fighting in Palestine being that since the French were involved in possible post-war arrangements for Palestine, it was desirable not to offend them.

The author gives these reasons for the eventual agreement of the government to the formation of the Legion. First, was the growing domestic pressure to deal with the question of Russian Jews who were reluctant to volunteer for the army. Of particular importance was the Military Service Convention between Britain and Russia of 16 July 1917 which permitted the conscription into the British army or the repatriation of Russian subjects of military age in Britain (and reciprocal arrangement for British subjects in Russia). The second were two international events early in February and March: the prospect of the United States of America entering the war, and the Petrograd revolution. There was much behind-the-scenes activity until in April the Army Council formally

decided to accede to the Jewish Legion idea. There still remained the insistent opposition of such anti-Zionists and established Anglo-Jews as cabinet minister Edwin Montagu but the policy remained and, as noted above, the Jewish units were formally announced in September 1917.

Chapters 5 and 6 respectively deal with 'Raising the Battalions' in Britain and in the United States. Since the author is telling his story chronologically, these chapters are in the right order. The first battalion to be formed was the 38th which was the British unit and came to be composed of British-born soldiers who transferred from British army units and Russian-born Jews resident in Britain, as well as former Zion Mule Corps men. In fact, in both chapters the author includes other matters which occurred in the same periods. Thus neither chapter deals exclusively with the subject of their titles and includes other topics — such as changes in the position of aliens in Britain — but it is convenient to concentrate on those subjects. In Chapter 5 the author makes much of the preliminary difficulties in obtaining recruits: 'the anticipated rush of recruits and transferees was not forthcoming' (p. 177). He mentions the accusation made by Jabotinsky that the Senior (he says 'chief') Jewish Chaplain in France, Rev. Michael Adler, had instructed all Jewish chaplains to 'preach that it was a shameful act to (*sic*) Jews to serve in our regiment' (p. 117). Yet the contemporary complaints he quotes about the slowness of recruitment are hard to reconcile with the actual figures he gives. By December 1917 (the unit having existed only since September) the number of Other Ranks (officers and non-commissioned officers excluded) amounted to 1,352 (p. 122), well up to establishment. In the meantime the Bolshevik Revolution had occurred with certain effects on Britain but the main one, as far as the Legion was concerned, was the urgency it impelled in Jabotinsky and Weizmann to press for the deployment of the 38th battalion in Palestine. In January 1918 they were successful: it was placed on immediate notice for overseas services and they embarked in February.

Chapter 5 includes a few examples of oral testimonies held at Avichail of men who had served in the Legion. One conclusion from them is that very few in the 38th Royal Fusiliers had any attachment to Zionism. In this they were very different from the American recruits, the subject of Chapter 6. The author describes their recruitment against the background of severe divisions within American Jewry, although soon there was agreement between some groups of them. A Jewish Legion Committee was formed in New York, the initiative coming from members of Poale Zion who obtained the endorsement of the American government and recruitment could go ahead. In practice Jews who were resident in the USA could sign up if they were not American citizens and this restriction was thought to have reduced recruitment, although it was said that some American Jews gave up their citizenship in order to join. As with the chapter on the British battalion, there are extracts from oral

testimonies of former members or on their behalf, if deceased, by members of their families. Martin Watts concludes that there was a stronger commitment to Zionism among those recruited in America, but he judiciously notes: 'Without corroborative evidence it is difficult to distinguish between the well-meaning myth, apocryphal story, and reality' (p. 159). He considers how important were the American recruits for the Legion. He quotes a figure of the total number who served as 10,000 and one suggestion is that 65 per cent were American. Another figure is that of the 5,000 who served in the Middle East, 34 per cent were from the USA. Whatever the true figures, Watts concludes that the American volunteers constituted the largest part of the Legion (pp. 154–5).

The 39th battalion, commanded by an Australian-Jewish officer, Lt. Col. Eliezer Margolin, DSO, joined the 38th on 28 April 1918 at a training camp near Cairo. It was under strength but the numbers were made up by the arrival of the first American recruits in July. In Chapter 7, 'Preparation and Prejudice', the author describes the contemporary background in the Middle East, where the military authorities were reluctant to welcome the Jewish battalions. He attributes this hostility to the nature of the British army officer class, who were generally anti-alien and antisemitic. Thus the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 was barred from publication in Palestine. However, while one can accept his general point about antisemitism, one piece of evidence is suspect. He quotes Chaim Weizmann's memoirs about a conversation with Major Wyndham Deedes, an Intelligence Officer in the Middle East, who was very strongly pro-Zionist. Deedes showed Weizmann a copy of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and said, 'You will find it in the haversack of a great many British officers here'. The author refers to the 'circulation' of the *Protocols* among army officers later in the book, but notes that it was not published in English until 1920 and adds that 'we must presume that these officers read them in the original Russian' (p. 163). One wonders how many British officers could read Russian.

On 5 March 1918, Lt. Col. Patterson, the commanding officer of the 38th battalion, wrote to General Allenby, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), asking permission to recruit among Palestinian Jewry. He also asked permission for Jewish officers and men, serving in other regiments, to transfer to the Jewish unit. His requests were refused and the author aims to explain the attitude of the staff. Apart from antisemitism, he argues that it made sense 'for the British Army to favour better relations with the Arabs rather than the Jewish population, both indigenous and immigrant, of Palestine' (p. 164). But the position changed after 21 March 1918 with the German offensive on the Western Front which led to the transfer of British army units from the Middle East to France. At first the attitude of the high command in Egypt towards the Jewish Legion did not alter. With the withdrawal of Russia from the war, the Military Convention had come to an end and the War

Office had decided that in future Russian Jews in Britain should be sent to units of the Labour Corps, thus stopping recruitment in Britain for the Legion. The EEF command decided also to offer the Jewish troops the choice of transferring to labour units. In fact only ten men of the 38th opted to do this. But in May General Allenby at last agreed to the recruitment of Palestine Jews and up to perhaps 2,000 did so volunteer (the precise number is unclear.)

The purpose of the whole exercise was achieved later in 1918 when the two battalions, 38th and 39th, took part in the battle of Megiddo against the Turks in Palestine. However, the Palestinian recruits were not engaged, having been kept in their training camp in Egypt. The author stresses the problems facing the Legion before the battle. They included arguments over whether the Jewish battalions were to form a brigade on their own or to be joined in formation by the West Indian Regiment. Then there was their location in a malaria-infested part of the Jordan Valley which resulted in many casualties through sickness — the battalion's strength of 800 when it first entered the valley was reduced to 550 by the start of the campaign a month later.

Colonel Patterson complained of discrimination against his men on the ground that his battalion served in that place for a longer period than other infantry units. However, the author sensibly compares the sickness rates of the Jewish soldiers with those of the West Indian men and finds that the West Indian sickness rate was higher. He gives a spirited account of the actions of the Legion in which they were part of a multinational force, including Australians and New Zealanders. It is a pity that the map illustrating the battle on page 249 is so small and hard to read. The Megiddo battle did not last long and the Turks were soon broken. Total casualties were tiny compared with the tremendous losses on the Western Front. For the Legion he says that six were killed in action, four were wounded, and 26 died as a result of wounds or of disease. However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission records that 45 died in that area before the end of 1918. Several gallantry awards were awarded.

In keeping with much of the tone of the book, the author looks at the negative aspects of the battalions' part in the battle. True, he does quote a letter from General Chaytor (the New Zealand commander of the force of which they were a part) to Patterson afterwards praising them for their good work. 'The way you smashed up the Turk rearguard when it tried to counter-attack across the Jordan made our advance up the hills of Moab an easy matter' (p. 199). But the author refers also to the lack of public recognition of the part played by the Legion which, coupled with the circulation of the *Protocols,* 'support the existence of antisemitism' (p. 200).

The last substantive chapter, number 9, is entitled 'Disturbance and Decline', and deals with the final history of the Legion until it was disbanded in May 1921. It is a sad postscript telling of great uncertainty about the post-war role of the Legion, of mutinies, courts martial, riots,

deaths, and antisemitism. He explores the differences between the Middle East army authorities and those of the British government and shows that with the end of the war there was the pressure to return British army units to Britain and the Legion was retained to take their place. The army in Palestine dragging its feet (together with evidence of antisemitism among some senior officers as well as rank-and-file British soldiers) led to disillusionment and mutiny among some Legionnaires. In the 39th battalion Major Smolley, a non-Jewish officer in temporary charge while the Jewish commanding officer was on leave, and who was regarded by some of the men as an antisemite, was faced with insubordination. In any case, 98 men from the 38th and 39th battalions were arraigned in August 1919; 54 were found guilty at the ensuing courts martial and 44 were found not guilty.[9] Colonel Patterson made the point that the severe sentences, up to seven years imprisonment, were in sharp contrast with British soldiers who had committed worse crimes but had not even been charged. As it happened, all the 54 convicted mutineers were American citizens, Canadian volunteers, and Russians who had enlisted in the USA. As a result of efforts made by the American State Department, the men were amnestied, released, and repatriated.

Although Chaim Weizmann pressed the War Office that the garrison of Palestine should be staffed by Jews, General Allenby refused to entertain it. In fact the Legion began to be run down through demobilisation. In November 1919 the 39th and 40th battalions were disbanded. One bright spot in this history was the re-designation of the 38th battalion as the 38th battalion Royal Fusiliers (1st Judeans) with the Menorah as the cap badge replacing the Fusiliers' grenade. But after the attack by Arabs on Tel Hai on 1 March 1920, when Joseph Trumpeldor was killed, there were Arab riots and units of the British army, but not the 1st Judeans, were used to deal with the situation. Shortly afterwards Jabotinsky was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and there were further riots in May 1921, by which time the Legion was reduced to a handful of soldiers. It was officially disbanded on 31 May 1921.

There is a small number of errors and ambiguities. On p. 15 the author gives a total figure of 10,000 recruits for the Jewish Legion but the monthly statistics from March 1918 to May 1921 in Appendix 1 (pp. 244–7) show a maximum of 6,995.[10] I think that the spelling of the soldier given as Katzelenjohn should be Katznelson (p. 37). I cannot really understand his statement (p. 52) that most of the Russian-born Jews living in Britain 'retained their Russian nationality despite being second- or even third-generation immigrants by 1914'. Those born in Britain would automatically have been subjects of the Crown. On p. 63 he speaks of 50,000 British Jews who had 'already volunteered' for the armed forces, apparently by 1916. The figure of 50,000 who served comes from the *BJBH* and this includes personnel from the Commonwealth. But that book (p. 4) states unequivocally that the total of 'some 50,000 Jews' who served in His

Majesty's Forces did so during the whole of the war. In any case it conflicts with the other usually quoted figures of 10,000 who had volunteered before conscription was introduced in 1916[11] and also with the author's figures on p. 104, quoting from *The Times,* 8 August 1917, that there were 40,000 Jews in the British Army, 32,000 being 'English Jews' and the others from the Commonwealth. In a reference to former members of the Zion Mule Corps who had transferred to the 20th London Regiment, he states that Vladimir Jabotinsky and Joseph Trumpeldor 'had control of the 20th London cadre'. I find that hard to understand.

Rev. S. Lipson (pp. 104–5) was not the 'Chief Rabbi of the Armed Services', there being no such title. Rev. Michael Adler was the Senior Chaplain until July 1918 when he handed over to Rev Arthur Barnett, whom Adler said, 'I had trained to be my successor'.[12] On p. 172 he refers to Major James Rothschild (actually de Rothschild) having transferred to the 39th battalion from the Grenadier Guards. Various mentions of him in the *London Gazette* have no reference to that regiment but give it as Canadian Cavalry and in particular as the Royal Canadian Dragoons (1 May 1917, p. 4,785; 27 June 1919, p. 8,178). He refers (p. 184) to two 'coloured' Jewish soldiers in the Legion, but one was a Sephardi Jew from the West Indies named Melhado and he was probably European. At least two other men from the West Indies were of that name and they were officers. He speaks of a non-Jewish officer in the Legion, Major Daniel Hopkin (pp. 169, 190) as having transferred from the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. The officer's entry in the Medal Roll at The National Archives (WO 372/10) says that his other regiment was East Yorkshire. He also says of Hopkin that 'like the majority of the 39th's officers, he was a Gentile'. But the *BJBH,* p. 261, lists 22 officers in that battalion (but not Hopkin; no doubt an error on *BJBH's* part) of whom most were clearly Jewish and even some of the doubtful ones had possibly Jewish names, such as Green, Harris, Jacobs, and Phillips. On p. 192 he notes a Jewish soldier from northern England who transferred to the 38th battalion from the 'Yorkshire Imperial Infantry'. There were several regiments with Yorkshire in their title but none was so called. I think he may mean the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. On p. 204 he refers to 'Figure 9.1 and 9.2 depicting American volunteers' but 9.1 gives total figures for all the battalions including the depot, with no mention specifically of Americans. Figure 9.2 is headed 'Courts martial summary August 1919' and again has no reference to Americans.

Despite these sundry deficiencies this is an interesting and useful book. It is a full account of the origins and history of the Jewish battalions and indicates the various pressures and interests facing those who were advocating it and those opposing it. He places the discussion within the context of the structure of Anglo-Jewry as well as of the contemporary military situation. He also briefly examines some current controversies within recent Anglo-Jewish historiography, carefully taking a position

between those who emphasise antisemitism in British history and those who stress philosemitism. In all, a worthwhile contribution to the subject.

NOTES

[1] For example, J.H. Patterson, *With the Judeans in the Palestine Campaign*, London, 1922; Vladimir Jabotinsky, *The Story of the Jewish Legion*, New York, 1945; Sharman Kadish, *Bolsheviks and British Jews*, London, 1992; Mark Levene, *War, Jews and the New Europe: the Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf 1914–1919*, Oxford, 1992; Elias Gilner, *War and Hope: a History of the Jewish Legion*, New York, 1969.

[2] Harold Pollins, '11th Tower Hamlets Volunteers: the first Jewish unit in the British Army', *The Bulletin of the Military Historical Society*, vol. 48, no. 191, pp. 130–5.

[3] *Jewish World* (henceforth *JW*), 26 August 1914, p. 8.

[4] The letters are printed in *JW*, 11 November 1914, p. 16.

[5] *JW*, 2 December 1914, p. 21.

[6] *JW*, 30 December 1914, p. 1.

[7] This was stated at an 'Enthusiastic Public Meeting' reported in *JW*, 6 January 1915, p. 13. It was held 'for the purpose of stimulating recruiting among Jews, and in particular to promote recruiting for the proposed Jewish unit'. This early authorised unit for Jews is referred to in *BJBH*, p. 9.

[8] I am grateful to Ivor Lee for information on ACI 206. Martin Watts refers to other aspects of the ACI although not naming it.

[9] However, in the column headed 'Outcome' in Table 9.2, giving details of the courts martial, the figures of those found guilty do not add up to 54.

[10] *BJBH*, p. 10, says: 'In all there were 6,500 men belonging to the three battalions of the Royal Fusiliers'.

[11] *BJBH*, p. 3.

[12] Rev. Michael Adler, DSO, 'Experiences of a Jewish Chaplain on the Western Front (1915–1918)', *BJBH*, p. 58.

BOOK REVIEWS

HASIA R. DINER, *The Jews of the United States, 1654 to 2000*, x + 437 pp., University of California Press, Berkeley, 2004, $29.95 or £18.95.

Surprisingly under-researched until very recently indeed, American Jewish history has now been examined in an ever-growing array of works, among them the five-volume history edited by Henry L. Feingold, *The Jewish People in America* (Baltimore, 1992), as well as in studies by, among others, Arthur Herzberg (*The Jews in America: Four Centuries of an Uneasy Encounter*, New York, 1989), Howard M. Sachar (*A History of the Jews in America*, New York, 1992), and Gerald Sorin (*Tradition Transformed: The Jews' Experience in America*, Baltimore, 1997). *The Jews of the United States* by Hasia R. Diner, Steinberg Professor of American Jewish history at NYU, is the latest addition to these growing ranks. It is part of a series edited by David Sorkin on Jewish Communities in the Modern World which included Todd M. Endelman's *The Jews of Britain, 1656–2000* (Berkeley, Cal., 2002), reviewed by me in this *Journal* (vol. 44, nos. 1 and 2, 2002, pp. 84–89). Diner's work is, generally speaking, an excellent one and is a model of intelligent compression. Anyone wanting a well-informed, concise, and clear introduction to American Jewish history can do no better than read Diner's book. I was continuously impressed by her ability to offer cogent and useful definitional accounts of a variety of events and major organisations, their origin and purpose, which are models of their kind.

Only occasionally does she appear to falter: perhaps in an exaggeration of the amount of American antisemitism, certainly in her discussion of 'rescue' by American Jews during the Holocaust (she does not seem to realise that, before 1941, no one could foresee genocide while, after 1940–41, Europe's Jews were prisoners of Hitler, not refugees, and unreachable), and in an over-emphasis on the left and its attitudes. Is it really the case, as she asserts (p. 329) that 'Israel divided rather than united American Jews', a claim apparently based in an exaggerated emphasis on the importance of left-wing fringe groups like Breira? I would also have personally preferred more demographic and socio-economic data and more on the incredible range of Jewish achievement in the United States, but that is very much a personal preference.

Taken on its own terms, this is an excellent book and a valuable addition to university reading lists on modern Jewish history. One would,

however, have welcomed an effort to place the Jewish experience in the United States, with its very considerable degree of anomalousness, in a wider context. While American Jewry is often seen as the natural and normal model of the evolution of Diaspora communities, in many respects it is actually highly anomalous, like the United States itself. Three aspects of this American Jewish 'exceptionalism' might briefly be highlighted. Until very recently, American Jews failed to establish their own day-school or university system, with the overwhelming majority of American Jews educated at state schools and existing (non-Jewish) state and private universities. While this may seem pre-ordained, there is a glaring contrast in the behaviour of another religious minority of migrants, namely American Roman Catholics. American Catholics established a remarkably vast system of full-time Catholic parochial schools and universities. In other words, American Catholic immigrants, often barely literate and poverty-stricken, established a costly educational system of their own, while American Jews, 'the people of the Book', did not. To ask the reason why would require a lengthy essay, but one might speculate as to what American Jewry would have been like if it had: probably more conservative and Orthodox, and possibly encountering less 'snob' antisemitism between 1900 and 1950, often the product of a perception of excessive numbers of would-be Jewish applicants at Protestant universities. Following from this, one might also point out the anomalousness of Jewish political left-liberalism in the United States, so inconsistent with their post-1960 economic status and the movement of the mainstream American centre-right to a strong pro-Zionist position. This continuing stance (an estimated 75 per cent of American Jews voted for John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election) is *not* somehow pre-ordained among contemporary Jewry: in Britain and Australia, Jews certainly vote strongly for the right-wing party, while Israeli politics have seen the relentless erosion of the strong Labour majority among its founding fathers.

There is also the anomalousness of American society itself: a place where Jews, as one minority among many others, were often hardly noticed and were arguably the victims of group hostility to a much lesser extent than were most other groups. America's economic elites were also overwhelmingly Protestant, its 'malefactors of great wealth' (in Theodore Roosevelt's phrase) during the golden age of American capitalism emerging from the ranks of W.A.S.P. families such as the Rockefellers, Carnegies, and Morgans. While Jews in central and eastern Europe certainly constituted a vastly over-represented share of the economic (and professional) elite, in America, the land whose 'one universal item of veneration' was 'the Almighty dollar', the achievement of the Jews was nothing out of the ordinary, and efforts by antisemites to depict American Jewry as a mysterious, all-powerful financial elite nearly always fell on deaf ears, lacking any real popular resonance. Hasia Diner's book ably

and lucidly explains the dimensions of the growth of American Jewry, but future studies should now aim at a broader picture.

WILLIAM D. RUBINSTEIN

SYLVIA BARACK FISHMAN, *Double or Nothing? Jewish Families and Mixed Marriage*, xvi + 196 pp., Brandeis University Press, Waltham, Mass., 2004, $24.95.

In the United States, as is well-known, mixed marriages have reached incredible levels. According to the National Jewish Population Survey, 40 per cent of American Jews aged 25 to 49 are married to non-Jews. Only 50 per cent of these households are raising their children as Jewish, compared with 97 per cent of Jewish inmarried households (p. 71). Sylvia Barack Fishman's *Double or Nothing* is an illuminating and very useful study of intermarried households in the United States, based chiefly on extensive interviews; the author is director of the Contemporary Jewish Life Program at Brandeis University, where she is a professor.

Professor Fishman engages both with those Jewish voices who find the current situation disastrous and unacceptable, and also with those who believe that in the American melting pot it is probably inevitable, a sign of the decline of antisemitism, and often of the good reputation of Jews as marriage partners and of the Jewish people generally. Many of her insights are memorable: Jewish women (p. 128) frequently regard themselves as paying the price for the acceptance by Reform Judaism of patrilineal descent as evidence of Jewishness, with Jewish men often viewing Jewish women as unattractive and preferring to marry non-Jewish women if no penalty is involved. Conversely (p. 29), Jewish women sometimes perceive Jewish men, again in conformity with stereotype, as 'weak' and also physically unattractive.

These patterns would not necessarily be disastrous, except for the proven fact that, as noted, a very high percentage of the children of such marriages are not raised as Jews and know little of their Jewish heritage. There is ample room here for longitudinal studies of these children and how they respond to their Jewish heritage in later life. It is quite possible, even likely, that many will eventually identify with it and 'rejoin' a synagogue or other Jewish institution. One would also like to learn more of the attitude of intermarried couples and their children to the State of Israel, a subject not examined here.

Intermarriage is a major phenomenon throughout the Diaspora, for reasons similar to those outlined by Professor Fishman, although the predominant American attitude, namely that Judaism is just another religion and that one's ancestry is an irrelevant accident, is probably highly specific to the United States. It is interesting to compare the American situation with

that of another immigrant-receiving Diaspora democracy, Australia, where intermarriage rates probably do not exceed 15 per cent and may be lower. There, predominant Orthodoxy (in contrast to America's Reform) and nearly ubiquitous Jewish day schools work against intermarriage, as does the stable, compact nature of the principal Jewish communities, those of Melbourne, Sydney, and Perth. Professor Fishman discusses (p. 34) the theory that young American Jews attend university away from home, seen as a potent source of high intermarriage rates, and dismisses it. Nevertheless, virtually all university students in Australia live at home and attend local universities. It is hard to believe that this does not act to further diminish intermarriage rates. Diaspora Jewry thus appears to have several evolutionary pathways, of which America's might or might not be either the best or necessarily the norm.

WILLIAM D. RUBINSTEIN

CALVIN GOLDSCHEIDER, *Studying The Jewish Future*, xvii + 152 pp., University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2004, $18.95 (hardback, $35.00).

Publications which look into the future of the Jewish people tend to be pessimistic. In the countries of the diaspora they point to growing intermarriage, to assimilation, and to a decline in religious observance. The view is summarised in the title of Bernard Wasserstein's *Vanishing Diaspora: The Jews of Europe since 1945* (1996) and Calvin Goldscheider quotes the same opinion in a number of other works. This short book takes the opposite view; it is much more cheerful and optimistic.

It is in the series The Samuel and Althea Stroum Lectures in Jewish Studies which are given annually at the University of Washington but in fact the text is by no means a verbatim version of the spoken word. The author explains that he took account of comments and discussions after the lectures and that he altered the style from that appropriate to speech to one more suitable for print. Calvin Goldscheider is at Brown University where he is a professor of Judaic Studies and of Sociology and he has a particular interest in demography.

Essentially he has two themes. He examines projections of future Jewish populations in the diaspora and shows that they are wrong; in any case their measurement is not useful for discussions of the future for the Jews. He concludes, instead, that it is qualitative indications of Jewish life which need to be examined in discussions of the future. He uses the comparative method of analysis, making comparisons over time and between communities. He notes the three orientations which inform most analyses of the history, the present, and the future of Jewish communities. They are the Zionist approach which regards all communities outside Israel as declining;

Jewish nationalism is the only future. The second is based on religion. Judaism was the source of cohesion and the future must depend on a renewing of religious values. The third perspective is based on the proposition that there is no future for Jews in the absence of antisemitism and discrimination. He rejects all three as the sole guidelines for analysis although he uses certain parts of each for his own approach.

The first part of the book is demographic. In it he aims to show that despite the high intermarriage rate in the USA, in fact the Jewish population there has grown — not fallen. He illustrates this by the use of available statistics which inform a model (p. 25). This consists of 10 hypothetical families of whom at least one partner is Jewish and five spouses marry Jews. Five marry non-Jews so that in the first generation there are 15 Jews. In the second generation there are also 15 Jews calculated as follows. There are 10 Jews from the five marriages where both are Jews. Another four are made up of the two Jews who marry converts to Judaism. Of the three Jews who marry non-converted Jews, one remains Jewish while the partner remains a non-Jew. The other two couples distance themselves from the Jewish community. However, the general result is that in the first generation there has been a gain of two Jews by conversion and he concludes that 'high individual or couple intermarriage rates do not necessarily result in demographic decline in the generation that is intermarrying' (p. 26).

The author also examines the demographic position in Europe and Israel. He disagrees with those who say that there is no long-term future for Jews in Europe. Of course the population is lower than before 1939; the Holocaust took its toll and there was much emigration in the latter twentieth century (however, that invigorated other countries). He notes that the Sephardim were reinforced through immigration to France from North Africa. He also argues that talk of the decline of European Jewry depends on the base-year taken. He makes the point that the European Jewish population in the 1990s amounted to some two million, about the same as in 1800. 'Should we view the Holocaust', he asks, 'as an exceptional period of demographic decline within an overall stability of European Jewish population size? Should we view the stability of Europe's population as extraordinary, given the losses resulting from the Holocaust and emigration to the United States and Israel?' (p. 37).

On the face of it, the future of the Jewish population of Israel is much more secure. He refers to the great hope the state engenders. The population has increased dramatically because of immigration, the higher birth rate and larger family size. The losses due to assimilation are minimal and there is a great deal of Jewish content in family and communal life. But there is a darker side — a discussion which takes him away from demography. In addition to the existence of an Israeli-Arab minority, there are problems and conflicts. There are socio-economic inequalities, and discrimination against women, there are cultural wars between religious

Jews and secular Israelis, and there is political corruption. He also adds the fact of the numerous foreign, non-Jewish workers in Israel, and that very many Russian immigrants have been non-Jews, although members of extended Jewish families.

He concludes from his demographic discussions that the future of Jewry does not depend on numbers and repeats (he does this several times) that 'the fundamental issue for the Jewish future is the quality of Jewish life' (p. 43). Yet it is strange, having established that issue, that he spends a chapter (Chapter 3, 'Forecasting Jewish Populations') of some 25 pages which are a fairly straightforward account of, and comment on, the problems of trying to look into the numerical future of the Jews. He points to the fact that the value of such projections depends on three features: the baseline estimates (where you start from); the quality of the factors that will influence future populations; and the assumptions which are made about future changes. In the case of Jewish studies, all three are weak. Thus the rest of the book is devoted to a discussion about the meaning of 'the quality of Jewish life'.

He prefaces this part by briefly pointing out the obstacles to identifying the sources and content of the quality of Jewish life, notably the lack of agreement about them. There are for example differences between such groups as the Orthodox (emphasizing ritual), while secularists might stress philanthropy; Reform rabbis might focus on ethical and moral values while Zionists would look to commitment to the State of Israel. The author turns for enlightenment to biography and to biblical texts.

He is a reluctant ethnographer ('I have never before used ethnographic research, except to demonstrate its methodological weaknesses' [p. 73]) and his chapter on the subject of biography, while considering generally the role and usefulness of oral history, is essentially about one man. He was a Polish-Jewish survivor of the Holocaust who lost large numbers of his family, who first went to Australia and finally settled in and died in Israel. The author aims to discover what the survivor considered were core Jewish values which the latter insisted he had experienced only in pre-war Poland. He was obviously uncomfortable with his existence in Australia and in Israel. Indeed, after much questioning he appears to come up with the conclusion that 'In the end, Shmuel [the survivor] saw his role in shaping the future as one of helping to transmit a core of Jewish values to his children and grandchildren'. But 'That core was a familiar prayer recited by rote' (p. 84) — he is referring to the fact that Shmuel's three-year-old grandson could recite the morning prayer: *Modeh Ani* ('I thank You, O living and eternal King, for returning my soul to me in mercy. Great is Your faithfulness' [p. 82]).

That weak conclusion does not really say much about 'core values' although it does say something about methods of their transmission, and also one wonders about the appropriateness of utilising one man's biography as the basis for attempting generalisations. Rather more illuminating

is the next part of the analysis, the use of biblical texts 'as sources for some of the fundamental ideas [that the author has] about Jewish values' (p. 86). This is because values are learned from the interpretation of texts. He examines two particular aspects in the *Tanach*, the Pentateuch, viz, prophecy and futures, and animal sacrifices and values. First, he looks at the role of the prophet as discussed in Deuteronomy, Chapters 16–18, and he observes that prophets are primarily messengers, conveying the law, rather than innovators. 'The rabbis encouraged Jews to remember Moses as Moshe *rabbenu*, "Moses our teacher", not as Moses the *navi*, the prophet. It is "Abraham our forefather" (*Avenu*), not Abraham the prophet, who sets the course for future generations'. Thus, he concludes, 'Prophecy as an examination of the future is of limited value in Judaism' (p. 92). Instead he moves on to the second part of this study, where he examines, rather more convincingly, the subject of animal sacrifices and offerings.

The first, animal sacrifices, of course would appear to be quite irrelevant to modern-day Jews. Other matters are more urgent, he imagines Jews saying, and in any case some Jewish denominations have dropped these parts of the bible. Or some refer to these passages as reflecting history. And he suggests that in those Orthodox services where animal sacrifices are retained, few of the participants recognise their meaning and few Orthodox believers are prepared to reinstate the sacrifice system. But, he argues, hermeneutics will assist and relevance to the contemporary world can be inferred. He singles out three messages that Leviticus teaches about animal sacrifices and offerings. First, some of the animal sacrifices were spontaneously motivated and were voluntary, the donor taking an active part in the ritual. Moreover, animals were worth a great deal then, so his general point is that the first set of lessons 'emphasizes voluntarism, community, and public involvement' and the message is 'Volunteer generously to be part of the community' (pp. 95–96).

Second, the offerings which are proferred need not be expensive — sheep, doves, even cereal and flour are acceptable, whatever one can afford. Everyone is therefore of equal value and it follows that diversity within the community is to be welcomed. The third element, I find, stretches the interpretation somewhat. He argues that animal sacrifice has no meaning unless there is intent and intention transforms the mundane into something sacred. Thus the Torah teaches Jews to sanctify everyday life which means to be able to absorb surrounding cultures whose integration preserves Judaism and Jewish culture. '[T]he message is that Jews should build on the new and incorporate it into the established community' (p. 98).

He concludes the book by repeating and augmenting some of the points made earlier. He emphasizes the positive aspects of the transformation of Jewish life in the twentieth century, paying particular attention to the United States of America. While accepting that there have been some

declines in some aspects of Jewish communal life there, he argues that 'new and creative forms of Jewish culture' (p. 128) have developed. He looks at the predominant secularisation in Israel — a 1999–2000 poll reported that only a small minority reported themselves as religious, that is, as *dati* and/or *haredi* — but states that 'The State of Israel is a strong Jewish community because of the interaction among its Jews socially, culturally, and politically and because of the significant role of families there' (p. 129).

As for Europe, he notes that Jewish life may be conditioned by the arrival of new immigrants as well as by the continuation of antisemitism. The immigration of Muslims may contribute to reinforce Jewish distinctiveness. In the absence of any signs of religious revival, it may be that a secular Jewish cultural renaissance is more likely.

There is no necessary contradiction between the author's persistent caveats about the perils of trying to predict the future and his tentative efforts to do that. He is careful to surround his tentative predictions with qualifications and warnings. But his optimistic tone is quite heart-warming.

HAROLD POLLINS

YOSEF GORNY, *Between Auschwitz and Jerusalem*, xii + 250 pp., Vallentine Mitchell, London and Portland, Or., 2003, £24 or $39.50 (paperback £13.50 or $19.50).

As the author himself points out, this is a historical study of the Holocaust which does not deal with the history of the Holocaust (p. 5). Rather, this fascinating and ambitious work, which was written between 1994 and 1997, examines the moral, theological, philosophical, and political questions relating to what Gorny terms the 'public thinking' (p. 5) on the Holocaust's influence on the changing relationship between Israel and the Diaspora and of Holocaust consciousness on Jewish identity.

Although the introductory chapter establishes the informal and personal approach the author takes, by placing the subject in the context of his own attitude to the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, he chooses the capture and execution of Adolph Eichmann by Israel in the first half of the 1960s as the starting point for his examination of the public discourse on the relationship between the Jewish State and the Holocaust. This is well-worn territory and Gorny is less successful in evoking the highly-charged atmosphere in Jewish intellectual circles at the time of the Eichmann trial, than some of the personal accounts of those directly involved (such as Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg's memoir *The Politics of Memory*).

Israel's decision to apprehend and punish Eichmann predictably angered those anti-Zionists who had opposed the establishment of Israel

on the grounds that Judaism was a religion rather than a national entity. But it also troubled many thinkers who were unsure as to whether Israel had the right to take responsibility for the 'status, security, and rights of Jews outside borders' (p. 21–22). Gorny is right to focus the majority of his critique on the 'public discourse' on the Eichmann affair on the attitude of Israel's then prime minister David Ben-Gurion and the complex, contradictory, and highly contentious views of Hannah Arendt, whose book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the Banality of Evil* caused an outcry among Jewish intellectuals.

This examination of the public discourse on the Eichmann affair is followed by three fascinating self-contained, but interrelated chapters on the theological, academic and ideological discourses on the relationship between the Holocaust and the State of Israel in Jewish life and identity. In each of these chapters the author clearly shows how one's Zionist, non-Zionist, or anti-Zionist outlook influenced his or her attitude to the issue. But he goes further than this. For example, the chapter on the theological discourse examines the wider issue of how theologians searched for the religious significance of both the Holocaust and the State of Israel. In doing so Gorny provides a highly informative and illuminating introduction to the general reader of the main strands of contemporary Jewish theology. Moreover, he also succeeds in distilling the fundamental views of many leading Jewish thinkers — such as Elie Wiesel, Emil Fackenheim, Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits and Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks — into accessible and comprehensible prose. He also succeeds in explaining the positions of more radical thinkers such as liberation theologian Marc Ellis, whom the non-specialist reader may not have encountered previously.

Likewise in the chapter on the academic discourse, the views of numerous historians, sociologists, philosophers and literary critics (including, but by no means limited to Lucy Dawidowicz, Saul Friedlander, Yehuda Bauer, Irving Horowitz, George Steiner, and Nathan Rotenstreich) are explained in plain and effective language. In particular, the author clearly shows how the academic discourse has focused primarily on whether the 'Holocaust [was] a particularist Jewish phenomenon or a universalistic one' (p. 84–85).

The chapter on the ideological discourse is divided into two sections which focus on Israel and the United States respectively. This chapter, perhaps unavoidably, draws on the views of many of those discussed earlier. But the sub-section on Israel not only focuses on how the views of public intellectuals was presented in the national media but also on how the Holocaust has been co-opted and politicized by both the Left and the Right as a political weapon. This is especially true regarding the Arab-Jewish conflict. The author notes, for example, how some on the political Left came to present Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories as 'Judeo-Nazis' and how some on the Right have used the Holocaust to justify all Israeli political actions.

The section on the United States highlights the similarities, as well as differences, between the ideological discourse in the US and Israel. By focusing on the arguments put forward by liberal, conservative, and radical Jewish intellectuals in the most prominent Jewish periodicals published in the US, the author succeeds in showing how the attitude on the Jewish Left and Right evolved over the last 40 years. Appropriately, this section on the US ends where the author began his book, by focusing on the successes and failures of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington since it was opened in 1993. Here the author also includes some fascinating statistics on the religious, socio-economic, and educational background of visitors to that museum.

The concluding chapter is not only a summary of what came before but also an opportunity for Gorny to present his own views, which are obviously the fruits of deep and wide learning. All in all, this is a hugely worthwhile book that should be viewed as a significant contribution to the literature on the relationship between the Holocaust and Israel. But it should also be welcomed as a valuable contribution to the research on the evolution of Jewish thinking in the post-Holocaust era.

RORY MILLER

YAAKOV MALKIN, *Secular Judaism: Faith, Values, and spirituality*, x + 150 pp., Vallentine Mitchell, London and Portland, Or., 2004, £42.50 or $62.50 (paperback £17.50 or $26.50).

This short book is both a manifesto promoting the tenets of Secular Judaism and a tribute to this form of Jewish belief. Following a highly informative Foreword by Rabbi Sherwin T. Wine, the author, a Professor at Tel Aviv University, presents a systematic, and for the most part effective, study. Secular Judaism, we are informed 'stress[es] freedom over commandments' (p. 2) and describes the beliefs of those Jews 'who do not adhere to the *Halakhic* religious commandments' as well as the 'culture and creations of the Jewish population free of adherence to *mitzvot*' (p. 16).

Noting early on that the majority of Jews in Israel and the Diaspora already live their lives along secular Jewish lines, this book focuses on setting out the qualities and characteristics of the secular Jewish philosophy, which range from a commitment to humanism and pluralism, to a 'capacity to embrace divergent and contradictory beliefs' (p. 8). At the heart of this philosophy is not only a belief that Judaism is a culture rather than a religion, but that humanity is the creator of God.

It is hardly surprising that a work which includes sub-sections entitled 'Man as the Creator of God and Morality' and statements such as 'God was born in men's minds and has no existence beyond man made literature and art' (p. 67) is as much a harsh critique of religious Judaism as it is

an explanation of the secular Jewish philosophy. Professor Malkin argues that religion has no justifiable 'monopoly' (p. 1) on Jewish life or practice. He attempts to reclaim the Bible, Jewry's 'collective memory' and 'collective truth' (p. 9) for secular Jews by challenging the Orthodox success in presenting the Bible as a vindication of religious ritual.

But it is not this esoteric theological debate that most concerns the author. Rather, it is actual developments in Israel, where he believes a battle is raging between proponents of a secular Jewish philosophy and the anti-humanist, anti-secular, and anti-pluralist religious orthodox. He argues that the establishment of the Jewish State in the 1940s was secular Jewry's 'greatest historical achievement' (p. 11). As such, he is determined that the secular Jewish State of Israel, with its roots in the Haskalah movement in the eighteenth century and the secular Zionist movement, must be protected from 'arbitrary rule' (p. 91) and 'extremist Orthodoxy' (p. 102).

On issues ranging from the equality of rights for men and women, the character and content of Jewish education in the Jewish State, and the highly emotive debates on who is a Jew, Jewish conversion, and the Law of Return the author argues the case for secular Jewish philosophy in Israel in uncompromising and persuasive terms. However, it is certainly possible to take issue with some of the claims in this work. For example, the list of 'defining elements' of what makes someone 'Jewish' (p. 7) includes a number of suspect factors such as the acceptance of the Land of Israel as the ancient homeland of the Jews. This is no indication of Jewish belief. Indeed, many who hold this view of Israel are evangelical Christians committed not to the continuation of Jewish life but to the ultimate conversion of Jews to Christianity.

More importantly, perhaps, is the author's tendency to downplay the hugely important role of religion in providing a focus for, and even sustaining, Jews during the Diaspora period before the establishment of Israel. Although acknowledging early on that the Bible 'may be the one constituent of Judaism on which every Jewish denomination ... has founded its culture' (p. 11), later in Chapter 4 (which is titled 'God and Other Literary Characters'), he appears to downplay the significance and influence of the Jewish Bible — placing its characters on the same level as Don Quixote, Madame Bovary, or those in a Tolstoy or a Dostoyevsky novel. In truth, none of these, or any other, literary inventions of our great writers can compare to major biblical figures in terms of influence on all humanity, not just Jewry.

While the author refuses to see anything good in Jewish orthodoxy or religious belief, he is more open to seeing the weaknesses in a purely secular life. He draws attention to 'the spiritual-intellectual crisis of secularisation' (p. 42) and admits that a life outside the commandments does not mean secular Jews can live without spirituality. Indeed, Chapter 3 attempts to define the kind of spirituality that secular Jews should pursue — firstly

in a humanistic education and a sense of community and culture. More specifically, he argues that the three pillars of spirituality for a secular Jew are love, faith and art.

Throughout this work Professor Malkin often repeats his conviction that education is the key not only to explaining but also to promoting the secular Jewish outlook. As such, it is only fitting that the book's final chapter, the longest, is dedicated to a detailed proposal for an educational programme that would illuminate and bring to life the secular Jewish philosophy.

RORY MILLER

LINDA M. SHIRES, *Coming Home: A Woman's Story of Conversion to Judaism*, viii + 262 pp., Westview Press, Boulder, Col. and Oxford, 2003, hardback, £18.99 or $25.00.

Linda Shires is Professor of English and Textual Studies at Syracuse University, New York, where she also teaches in the Jewish Studies Program. She was born in 1950, the only child of a well-to-do New England couple, and raised as an Episcopalian. Her entirely non-Jewish lineage ranges from one of the *Mayflower* pilgrims to a grandfather who migrated to the United States from Greece. Her book traces her personal odyssey from, as she puts it (p. 81), 'Christianity to Judaism ... WASP to Semite', and includes a compulsive pilgrimage to Germany that she made soon after her conversion, in order to confront the recent Jewish past and to try to situate herself, in some sense, in European Jewish historicity.

Professor Shires married, as his second wife, a Munich-born academic, a Jew who had been brought up in Bolivia before relocating to the United States. She became stepmother to his three Jewish children and in 1990 had a son with him. While she agreed to have her son raised as a Jew, and participated along with her husband, stepchildren, and family friends in Jewish festive rituals, she felt no compunction to embrace Judaism, and it was not suggested that she should. This, after all, was pluralistic America, and she was comfortable straddling two worlds. When she eventually felt the incipient stirrings of an impulse to convert she resisted them for years, needing to be sure that such a commitment was justified and tenable. In her quest she read a variety of Jewish authors voraciously (Rachel Biale, Heschel, Rosenzweig, Soloveitchik, and many more), subjected Judaism and its texts to the rigorous intellectual analysis to which she had been accustomed to subjecting secular literary works, and was inspired by the testimony of Professor Julius Lester, a black American who had made his own spiritual journey from Christianity to Judaism.

One of the principal obstacles to her acceptance of Judaism was the perceived misogynistic attitude of much of the Torah and indeed of many

of the Sages to women — as seen in the rape of King David's daughter Tamar, for instance, and in commentary concerning the scholarly Beruriah and her fate. The result of the author's examination of these and of other issues upon which her decision rested, or which have preoccupied her following her conversion to Conservative Judaism at the age of 48 — Jewish particularism, circumcision, the *mikveh*, the status of body and soul, homosexuality, the Binding of Isaac, the Holocaust — is a cerebral, stimulating, challenging, and immensely readable book. Professor Shires has a palpable enthusiasm for and curiosity about Judaism, has acquired a deep working knowledge of its texts, and brings a fresh perspective to the question of how its precepts and values can and should be applied in the world.

However, her conclusions will irritate and even infuriate Jews whose politics do not coincide with hers and with Jews for whom Halakhah is immutable. For she sees the attainment of 'social justice' in Judaism through a secular left-wing lens. With her life-long commitment to radical causes — feminism, abortion, rights for homosexuals — she is insistent that Judaism must accommodate these things, overriding traditional teaching. Consider, for example, the following bald, bold and impatient assertion (pp. 139–40): 'For the intolerance still displayed toward homosexuals within Judaism today is unacceptable and unjustifiable, as the great film *Trembling Before God* illustrates. The traditional position of Judaism on homosexuality has no place in our lives anymore'. Thus is received wisdom — God-given tradition is, of course, another way of putting it — briskly dismissed. Similarly, she has relied on a one-sided survey of the historiography of the Nazi period to proclaim (p. 204) that 'the betrayal of the Jews by the "Allied" countries and even by American Jews is one of the greatest immoral acts of the Holocaust'. The countervailing argument — that the Allied nations did not have the benefit of foresight regarding Hitler's 'Final Solution', that the Jews of the Reich and of Nazi-occupied lands were effectively prisoners and therefore beyond intervention, and that winning the war was the most practical aid that the Allies could (and did) give — has perhaps passed her by. Nevertheless, these are mere quibbles regarding a book of admirable originality, candour, courage, and integrity.

HILARY L. RUBINSTEIN

STEPHEN W. MASSIL, ed., *The Jewish Year Book 2005: 5765–5766*, xxxvi + 379 pp., published by Vallentine Mitchell in association with the *Jewish Chronicle*, London and Portland, Or., 2005, £29.50 or $45.00.

The *Jewish Year Book* for 2005 continues to provide a great deal of information about British Jewry (pp. 1–139) and about Israel (pp. 162–77).

The sections on Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States of America list the main centres of Jewish population as well as the religious, cultural, and welfare organisations; there are some 30 Zionist organisations and others concerned with Israel in the United States. There are only basic data about most of the 'Other Countries'. It is interesting to note that Singapore Jews are said to number only 240 but have a Jewish Welfare Board and three synagogues; Thailand's 250 Jews have two synagogues, one of which is a Lubavitch-Habad establishment; on the other hand, although Paraguay is listed as having about 900 Jews, only the address of their Representative Council and its telephone number are given.

The Who's Who section of the Year Book covers some 100 pages (pp. 217–317) listing mainly British Jews, but a few others (principally from the United States and Israel) are also included. Among the many useful items of information is a list of the principal Jewish festivals and fasts and a Jewish calendar for 5749–5778 (1988–2018); and a note on 'Marriage Regulations (General)' on pp. 351–2 which includes the list of days when Orthodox Jews may not solemnize marriages — for example, on any Sabbath or during the period of the Passover or of Succot, or surprisingly on Purim.

A concise 'Historical Note on British Jewry' (pp. 202–4) tells us that there are historical records of Jewish settlement in England since shortly after the Norman Conquest of 1066. It is followed by another brief section on 'United Kingdom Legislation Concerning Jews' (pp. 205–8). Of particular interest is the *Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002*, which came into operation in January 2003; it could require in some circumstances a Jewish religious divorce (*get*) to have been obtained before a decree absolute of divorce (a civil divorce) is granted.

There are four essays: 'The Other Balfour: Recalling the 1905 Alien Act' by Brian Klug; 'Black-Jewish Relations in the UK' by Edie Friedman; 'Jewish Lives in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography' by Lawrence Goldman; and 'The Two-Hundredth Anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar' by Geoffrey L. Green. Arthur Balfour is said to have commented (p. xv) that the Jews 'are the most gifted race that mankind has seen since the Greeks of the fifth century'; and four young Jewish sailors took part in the battle of Trafalgar in 1805.

JUDITH FREEDMAN

CHRONICLE

It was reported in March 2005 that Diaspora Jews are increasingly investing in property in Israel. According to the Bank of Israel, Jews overseas invested £220 million in Israeli property in 2003 — more than twice the amount in 2002 — and Israeli estate agents have estimated that sales in 2004 were twice as much again. The head of the international division of the Bank of Jerusalem was quoted as saying that Americans constitute the majority of Diaspora buyers and that a large proportion of these are observant Jews — both modern Orthodox and Haredi. He noted that French Jews, who benefit from a good euro rate, 'are buying because of their problems in France. They are reading the writing on the wall and are hedging their bets by getting one foot in Israel'.

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In April 2004 more than 100 tombstones were desecrated in a Jewish cemetery in eastern France, near Colmar. Insignia and Nazi slogans were painted on 127 tombstones and a plaque at the entrance to the cemetery was covered with a German flag and with the inscription in German, 'Glory to our Fuhrer'. Antisemitic incidents are again increasing in France, having declined in 2003. The French government released figures in May 2005 which showed that there had been 67 attacks on Jewish people or property in France between January and April 2004, a 60 per cent increase on the last quarter of 2003. Both the President and the Prime Minister of France strongly condemned the desecration. In July 2004, 34 Jewish graves were desecrated in a cemetery near Strasbourg.

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It was reported in March 2005 that in 2004 antisemitic incidents in Canada rose by almost 50 per cent over 2003, to more than 850 — a threefold increase since 2000. It is the highest number that B'nai B'rith Canada has recorded in its audit's 22-year history. It estimates that only about 10 per cent of such incidents were ever reported. One of the most serious attacks was the firebombing of a Montreal Jewish elementary school on the eve of Passover. More than half of the 857 incidents listed in 2004 (457) have been categorised as harrassment; another 369 (43 per cent) as vandalism; and 31 (3.6 per cent) as violence. Incidents were reported in all regions of Canada, but most of them — as in previous years — in Ontario and Quebec, where the majority of Canadian Jews live. Some 530 occurred in Ontario — 405 of these in the greater Toronto area while out of the 204 incidents in Quebec, 187 occurred in Montreal.

Synagogues were targeted in 40 cases, Jewish community buildings in 25 incidents, and cemeteries in 10 cases. The attacks on Jewish homes rose by nearly 60 per cent, to 151, while those in workplace settings more than doubled. The audit listed 47 incidents on university campuses and 66 in state schools — a

threefold increase over 2004. The national president of B'nai B'rith Canada was reported to have stated that state schools 'should adopt a zero-tolerance policy for antisemitism and racism. It's not a prank, it's not free speech, it's just not acceptable'. He added that only 13 criminal charges were brought in connection with the incidents reported to B'nai B'rith; investigations were often protracted and inconclusive.

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The Community Security Trust of the Board of Deputies of British Jews reported in February 2005 that there had been 532 antisemitic incidents in Britain in 2004 — an increase of 31 per cent on the 2003 figure of 375. The highest total in previous years had been 405 in 2000, at the start of the second Palestinian intifada. Violent assaults in 2004 had increased from 54 in 2003 to 83 in 2004, a rise of 54 per cent. Half of the 2004 incidents (51 per cent) were abusive behaviour; 17 per cent were threats; 15 per cent were assaults; 10 per cent, damage and desecration; six per cent, literature; and one per cent, extreme violence. There were 28 incidents involving Jewish schools and schoolchildren, while 17 synagogues and five cemeteries were desecrated. The 100 incidents recorded in March 2004 represented the second-highest monthly total compiled by the Community Security Trust. The Crown Prosecution Service issued a statement promising a 'robust response' to racist and religious crime.

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The Austrian Jewish community's Central Committee reported that there had been 232 documented antisemitic attacks in Austria during 2004, a drop of more than 20 per cent from the 292 reported in 2003. However, there had been a rise of a dangerous combination of antisemitism and far-right political beliefs, with 'hidden antisemites' seeking to explain away extremist views on Jews by using Israeli policy as an excuse.

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On 20 April 2005, the 116th anniversary of Adolf Hitler's birth, a synagogue in the Australian city of Newcastle was attacked. The walls were daubed with swastikas and plastered with stickers with antisemitic slogans and the synagogue's six stained-glass windows were destroyed.

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It was reported in March 2005 that the main synagogue in Kiev, in Ukraine, had been vandalised for the second time in three months and a large swastika painted on the synagogue's wall. In December 2004, several windows of the historic building had been smashed. Ukraine's President met the chairman of the Board of Governors of the European Jewish Congress in March 2005 and considered the possibility that Kiev might host an event modelled after the International Forum on the Holocaust held in Stockholm in January 2000.

*

A new Jewish community centre was opened in the Ukrainian town of Zaparozhye in October 2004. It was built by World Jewish Relief, an

international refugee charity, and funded entirely by donations from British Jews. The town's previous Jewish community centre had been housed in the basement of an old block of flats. The local Jewish population is estimated at between 15,000 and 20,000. The new centre will be run by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. It plans to provide medical facilities for all ages; a programme for new mothers; facilities for disabled children; a youth club; arts-and-crafts facilities; and wide-ranging educational programmes. The elderly will be provided with food, including meals-on-wheels.

*

There were three desecrations of Jewish graves in New Zealand in 2004. In two incidents, more than 100 gravestones in two cemeteries in the capital, Wellington, were damaged. The third was in the city of Wanganui, where a Jewish grave was hit with a sledge hammer and smeared with a swastika.

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In October 2004, a Jewish cemetery was vandalised in Alsace, about 10 miles from Strasbourg; some 100 graves were defaced with swastikas and racist slogans. The slogans were spray-painted and some of them stated 'Death to Jews' and 'No Jews, No Arabs, No Negroes', while gravestones were overturned. Some Muslim graves have also been desecrated in the Alsace region.

*

The Anti-Defamation League reported in April 2005 that there had been 1,821 antisemitic incidents in the United States in 2004, the highest number in nine years; most of the incidents occurred in states with large Jewish populations: 350 in New York; 297 in New Jersey; 237 in California; and 173 in Florida. A cemetery was torched in Massachusetts while swastikas and the slogan 'Death to the Jews' were daubed on the walls of a synagogue in Houston, Texas. However, the report also stated that there had been a slight decline in the percentage of Americans who held antisemitic views: 14 per cent, down from 17 per cent in 2002.

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The Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews reported in the summer of 2004 on the vital statistics of Britain's Jews for 2003. Data are given for births; synagogue marriages; religious divorces (*gittin*); and burials and cremations under Jewish auspices. The Introduction to the Report states that the number of births is given only up to 2002 'since those institutions providing data to the unit collect their own data later in the year'.

There were 2665 births in 2002; the data 'are based on totals of *milah* and circumcision which are extrapolated by a biologically determined male : female birth ratio'. There has been a persistent downward trend in births recorded by the community throughout the last decade; at the end of the period 1992–2001, Jewish births were about 15 per cent fewer than they had been in 1992. The Report adds that it is 'worth noting that the initial analyses of ages of Jews from the 2001 censuses very much support the data reported above'.

The total number of synagogue marriages recorded in 2003 was 932, 11 more (one per cent) than in 2002.

The number of completed religious divorces in 2003 was 284, 34 more than in 2002. The Report points out that the data relate to the year in which the *get* is given; in the past, that may have been years after it was first applied for. The Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 stipulates that a *get* is required before a decree absolute can be given for a civil divorce; but enquiries 'to the *batei din* made clear that the steep jump in 2003 in not related' to the 2002 Act.

The number of burials and cremations under Jewish auspices was 3592 in 2003, 78 fewer than the previous year's total of 3670, a decrease of two per cent. The Report notes that approximately 70 burials in Israel in 2003 were included since the data of the Community Research Unit 'relate to permanent residence immediately before death and not to place of burial'.

In the section on 'Regional and Synagogal Distribution', the Report notes that 77 per cent of marriages were solemnized in London synagogues and the remaining 23 per cent in the Regions. As for deaths, 69.5 per cent were for burials and cremations in London and the remaining 30.5 per cent in the Regions. In the case of synagogue marriages, the location of a marriage does not indicate where the couple may eventually live. The majority of marriages (85 per cent) were in Orthodox synagogues and the rest (15 per cent) in Progressive synagogues. The majority of burials (73 per cent) were under Orthodox religious auspices and the remaining 27 per cent of burials and cremations under Progressive auspices.

The Report concludes that while births and deaths have continued to fall since 1992, 'the number of persons marrying in a synagogue, although at a lower level, has remained fairly static'. As for deaths, the number 'has been kept at a lower level because of very marked increases in mean age at death within the community. The mean age has risen between 1994–1998 and 1999–2002 from 77.9 to 79.5 for men and from 81.9 to 83.3 for women'.

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It was reported in March 2005 that Brandeis University in America has opened a centre 'dedicated to producing independent scholarship on the Middle East conflict'. There are endowed chairs in Islamic Studies and Arab Politics and in Israel Studies. One of the visiting scholars in the next year will be the director of a Palestinian polling centre. The President of the University is quoted as stating: 'The clear message to everyone is we're not an advocacy centre'.

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The Autumn 2004 Newsletter of the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies states that its Leopold Muller Memorial Library at Yarnton Manor has acquired the Montefiore Library of Printed Books; the purchase 'was made possible by a £450,000 grant from the Foyle Foundation, and the collection is henceforth to be known as the Foyle-Montefiore Library'. Many of the publications relate to European Jewish history between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries; a large number are concerned with Moses Mendelssohn, the leader (and founder) of the European Jewish Enlightenment, and include material published by him. The collection also includes many dictionaries 'reflecting centuries of accumulated expertise' as well as 'material relating to relations between Jews and Christians by Christian Hebraists as well as Jewish authors'. An extensive collection of prayer books from several

countries is especially valuable since some of them 'contain rites employed in only small areas or even in single communities. Such rarities — especially those which are no longer in use — are precious repositories of Jewish religious literature'.

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The July–September 2004 issue of the *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions*, published by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, contains a range of articles on Max Weber. One of the articles, in English, is by Wolfgang Schluchter and is entitled 'The Approach of Max Weber's Sociology of Religion as Exemplified in his Study of Ancient Judaism'.

Les cahiers du Judaïsme is a publication of the Alliance israélite universelle; its issue no. 17 (2004–2005) is about present-day Germany and contains 18 articles on various subjects. One of the articles deals with Jewish studies in Germany in the twentieth century; another is on the Jews of Leipzig; and there are several photographs of Jewish activities and of Jewish buildings in Germany.

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The Spring 2005 issue of *FHU FOCUS* (a publication of the British Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) states that 2005 'marks the 100th anniversary of Albert Einstein's 'annus mirabilis, 1905'. The publication deals with various aspects of Einstein's life and personality and stresses that he was a founder of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; he is recorded as saying: 'I know of no public event that has given me such pleasure as the proposal to establish a Hebrew University in Jerusalem' and in 1925 he 'saw his dream realized' and gave an inaugural lecture. Einstein died in 1955 and in his last will and testament he bequeathed his personal papers and literary estate to the Hebrew University.

The University has established the Albert Einstein scholarship for students who have shown outstanding promise; candidates will be drawn from the entire student body, 'undergraduates to post-doctoral candidates in every academic discipline'.

The European Union has designated the Hebrew University of Jerusalem's Interdisciplinary Centre for Neural Computation (ICNC) as a Centre of Excellence. The Citation states that 'the combination of facilities, equipment and expertise at one site appears to be genuinely rare in Europe'. Among the research projects underway in the Centre are studies of Parkinson's disease and dyslexia and one of the benefits of the citation is that the European Union will finance the Centre to host more than 100 researchers from Europe 'and train them in applying a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding the functions of the brain'.

*

A new Japanese Cultural Centre was dedicated at the Hebrew University in January 2005; it will promote closer cultural ties between Israel and Japan through symposia, workshops, and other activities. The Centre has helped to organise an Einstein exhibition in Japan as part of the celebrations for Einstein Year.

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Bar-Ilan University stated in November 2004 that its Global Jewish Database (the Responsa Project) is the largest database of its kind. It includes the full text

of the Bible and its principal commentaries; the Babylonian Talmud with Rashi's commentary and *Tosafot*; the Jerusalem Talmud; the *Mishneh Torah* of Maimonides; the Shulchan Aruch with commentaries; *Midrashim*; 369 books of responsa; and the Talmudic Encyclopedia. It noted that the database represented more than 'three thousand years of Jewish literary creativity'.

Bar-Ilan University was established in 1955 in one building; in 2005 it has 73. It had six classrooms in 1955 and today it has 250; it had two laboratories but today it has 166. Its library started with 100 books; by 2002, there were one million and in 2005, 1,100,000. The University offered 25 courses in 1955 while today there are 6,500. The teaching staff in 2005 number 1,700 — against just ten in 1955. Students in all programmes of the University number 36,000 today — against 56 in 1955. By 2002, Bar-Ilan had 59,000 alumni and three years later, in 2005, there are 75,000.

The University opened a new School of Engineering in 2001, 'concentrating on signal processing, micro-electronics, computer and software engineering, and telecommunications and electro-optics'. There are undergraduate degrees in two study tracks: electrical and computer engineering; but the University 'intends to expand the curriculum to offer M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees, and to reach an enrollment of 700 students'.

Bar-Ilan University's *Newsflash* of Fall/Winter 2004 states that a linguist and a psycholinguist in the Faculty of Humanities are collaborating with the University's Multidisciplinary Brain Research Centre in research for dealing with the needs of language-impaired children. They are interested in 'learning if language-impaired children rely on perception and formal knowledge in the same way as normally developing children'.

The School of Education in the University's Faculty of Social Sciences has professional training programmes which 'target the needs of Ethiopian and Russian immigrants, the Ultra-Orthodox community and other diverse sectors of the local population'. It has also created recently a programme for teachers in Israeli state schools aligned with the Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism; the School of Education had been approached by that Movement and it 'decided to equip these educators with the professional tools required to prepare effective curricula' and to enable them 'to become more deeply acquainted with basic Jewish values, traditions and thoughts'.

*

Bar-Ilan University held in June 2004 an international conference on 'War, Terrorism, and Rogue States'. Philosophers, political scientists, and legal theorists participated. One of the organizers of the conference noted that there is 'significant controversy between two philosophical views with respect to terrorism. Should terrorists be treated as "ordinary" criminals, who have the right to due process, or should the rules governing justice of war apply to them?'.

*

The Autumn 2004 issue of Bar-Ilan University's French-language *Bulletin: Edition Spéciale Européenne* states that the University held a ten-day seminar on assimilated Jews in the post-modern era. Participants included young rabbis from Brazil, Canada, Guatemala, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Switzerland, and the

United States. The seminar was held in the wake of an international conference attended by Chief Rabbis from the Diaspora and the leaders of Progressive Judaism who discussed the problem of growing assimilation.

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The Summer 2004 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that Tel Aviv University and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Germany have established a programme for improving Jewish-Arab relations in Israel 'and raising the public profile of the issue'. This new Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Co-operation was inaugurated in the spring of 2004 and there was an accompanying conference on 'The Status of the Arab Minority in the Jewish Nation-State'. The representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Israel is quoted as saying at the inauguration that if Konrad Adenauer and David Ben-Gurion succeeded in laying the foundation of a new relationship between Germany and Israel, 'why shouldn't this be possible today between Arabs and Jews?'.

Since 2000, there has been a growing polarization and enmity between Jews and Arabs as well as 'very little serious strategic thinking on how to re-establish working relations based on mutual respect and tolerance'. The new programme aims to improve the situation by deepening research, presenting policy studies, and workshops. The University is making available 'one of the largest collections of reference material on Arab society in Israel to students, researchers, and government agencies'. It also plans to increase the university's support 'for grassroots organizations and projects in mixed Jewish-Arab cities and in the Arab sector'.

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The same issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that the Minerva Center for Human Rights of the University's Faculty of Law held a conference on 'The International Criminal Court and the Advent of International Criminal Justice', in co-operation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The conference was attended by experts in international criminal law from Canada, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, and the United States. The keynote speaker was Professor Antonio Cassese of the University of Florence, a former president of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

This same issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that the University's Institute for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism published the *2003/4 Anti-Semitism Worldwide Report*, which stated that the five countries with the highest levels of antisemitic incidents were Canada, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom. There was an increase in the number and severity of violent incidents perpetrated against Jews and an escalation in the use of antisemitic expressions as part of campaigns against Israel and Zionism. The Institute recorded a total of 360 incidents; 30 'were major attacks involving bombings, shootings, knifings, and arson'. There was 'a disturbing rise' in antisemitic incidents in Canada and Germany, but in the United States 'the number has remained relatively stable for the past seven years' (between 1,500 and 1,600).

The Report was published in co-operation with the Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish Congress.

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The same issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that the University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) has launched a Europe and Israel Project. Ireland had assumed the presidency of the European Union at the time and the Irish Foreign Minister delivered the inaugural lecture on the 'European Union and the Middle East Peace Process'. He hoped that Ireland's recent peacemaking experience might benefit the search for peace in the Middle East 'although he cautioned against drawing direct parallels'. He added that if Europe says something Israel does not like, 'it does so to a considerable extent out of concern for Israel, not out of hostility'. The Project aims to enhance European-Israeli understanding and co-operation on defence and foreign policy matters through research, publications, conferences, workshops, and other activities. JCSS researchers have already held dialogues with leading European think tanks 'and are providing briefings to European diplomats serving in Israel on an ongoing basis'. The researchers are identifying opportunities for future military and defence-related co-operation between Israel and European countries, 'particularly in the areas of advanced technologies and counter-terrorism'.

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An international dialogue was held at the Institute for Media, Politics and Society of Tel Aviv University, entitled 'Is the Media Biased? The Coverage of Israel and Europe by the European and Israeli Media'. Participants included leading editorial journalists from France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom as well as BBC News. 'No formal consensus came out of the meeting, ... some participants felt that even Israel's right to exist was an issue acceptable for debate'.

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The Fall 2004 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* reports that the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the University read out a letter which he had sent to the Prime Minister of Israel on behalf of the University's governors, warning him that further reductions in support of academic research and training could undermine Israel's economy and society irrevocably. The President of the University pointed out that while the university budgets of Israeli universities were being cut by 20 per cent, Europe, Asia, and the United States are investing more in higher education. The Rector of the University stressed that 'it takes many years and hard work to create an academic community, whereas damaging it can be done very quickly'.

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The same issue states that the Palestinian Studies Program of the University's Center for Peace Research held a two-day seminar on 'The Palestinian Literature and Art Scene' with the participation of Israeli and Palestinian artists, writers, and cultural figures. There were presentations on issues relating to Palestinian art, including its politicization; the status of women and religion; and the influence of Israeli art. The programme 'was established to promote awareness of Palestinian culture and society among Israelis'. It is supported by the Ford Foundation USA.

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The same issue records that Tel Aviv University's Faculty of Medicine has celebrated its fortieth anniversary and that it was established in the face of 'fierce opposition from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem's Hadassah Medical School' which argued that Israel did not need any more medical schools. Today, Tel Aviv University's Faculty of Medicine 'is Israel's largest medical complex'; it has 4,000 graduates and 19 affiliated hospitals serving 60 per cent of Israel's population. It has 'a total student body of 6,549, compared to 54 in its first year'. It has six schools covering medicine, dentistry, continuing medical education, the health professions, graduate studies, and a new School of Public Health. The head of that new School of Public Health pointed out that while contagious diseases 'constituted the number one killer in the early twentieth century, 88 per cent of all illness worldwide is now due to chronic diseases such as heart disease and cancer — and that is what modern public health policy needs to address'.

*

Tel Aviv University held a Conference entitled 'Crisscrossed Glances —Judgment and Prejudice: Mutual Perceptions of French and Israelis' under the auspices of the Foreign Ministers of France and Israel. At the three-day conference, Israeli and French intellectuals discussed the disparity 'between the two countries' image of each other and ways to bridge the gap'. Tel Aviv University's Institute for Diplomacy and Regional Co-operation held an international colloquium entitled 'Track-2 Diplomacy: Benefits and Risks — Is There a Role for Citizens in the Conflict Resolution Process?'. 'Track-2 diplomacy' is the name for peace-making efforts and dialogue by non-governmental groups on both sides of an international conflict. Such initiatives were successful between France and Germany after the Second World War and between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In each case, the goal was to transform informal talks into official, or Track-1, diplomacy. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has given rise to a great number of Track-2 initiatives, but 'the conceptual framework of this type of diplomacy had yet to be discussed in Israel's academic arena'. The colloquium 'focused on theories of Track-2 in civil society, its use in conflicts, and the role of third parties in initiating, managing and funding informal meetings'. The participants came from the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa, and included Israelis and Palestinians.

*

A new Institute for the History of Polish Jewry and Israel-Poland Relations has been established in Tel Aviv University with the support of a group of Israeli businessmen. At the inauguration ceremony, the President of the University said that the Institute would 'promote dialogue that will enable the two parties to discuss their complex relationship, always remembering the past but bearing in mind the present and future that we want to shape together'. The Institute, together with Polish institutions, will organize joint forums, research projects, conferences, student exchange programmes, and Polish and Hebrew language courses. A symposium was held to mark one thousand years of Polish Jewish history and 700 years of Krakow Jewry; the event was

co-sponsored by the Association of Krakowians in Israel and by the Israeli-Polish Friendship League.

The Fall 2004 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* has a report on the findings of a commission appointed by the Israeli government about the state of kibbutzim. The commission found that about 60 per cent of kibbutzim are experiencing financial hardships while 15 per cent 'are on the brink of bankruptcy'. The head of the commission, a professor of sociology at Tel Aviv University, was interviewed by the editor of *Tel Aviv University News* and is reported as stating that kibbutzim have a very great deal of expenditure on welfare, education, and housing as well as feeding their members and caring for their elderly population. Moreover, about 70 to 80 per cent of kibbutzim 'were historically located for security reasons on Israel's strategic borders, entailing high defense costs'. After the establishment of the State of Israel and until 1977, the ruling Labour party (Mapam) supported the kibbutzim, but that support 'became weaker' when the Likud came to power in 1977. Meanwhile, kibbutz members 'were influenced by the larger, more affluent Israeli society, and began to seek a higher standard of living and more individual autonomy'.

In the mid 1980s, there was hyper inflation in Israel, reaching '100 per cent and more — and the kibbutzim got into heavy debt'. Rapidly growing debt and a rapidly aging population led to a profound crisis of confidence in the model which the residents of kibbutzim had created. There was a search for alternative methods and some of the cornerstones of kibbutz ideology were being reconsidered. Members started working outside the kibbutz and nowadays about 30 to 40 per cent of members do so. Many kibbutzim are now selling services to outsiders and are building housing complexes for non-members on kibbutz land. 'In some kibbutzim there is a ratio of 100 members to 100 non-members.' The government commission was set up to simplify a very complex issue and recommend changes in the definition of the kibbutz system.

The government has accepted, and is implementing, the recommendations of the commission: to define two new categories of kibbutzim. A 'conservative kibbutz' would maintain traditional collective values while a 'changing kibbutz' is defined as a kibbutz which is moving away from the original collective ideology by 'privatizing apartments, introducing differential salaries, paid-for services, and ownership of private property, and in some extreme cases, allocating shares and kibbutz assets'. Taxes and other financial and legal matters are being regulated anew.

However, the changing kibbutz still 'remains a kibbutz because it continues to maintain collective responsibility towards its members'. It will provide education, welfare, and essential services as well as 'guaranteed employment and pensions, resources for the handicapped, and health insurance and nursing care for all members'.

*

An Institute for Anti-Aging Therapy Research has been established at Tel Aviv University, funded by Argentinian Honorary Fellows of the University. It aims to combat diseases associated with old age, such as Alzheimer's and Parkinson's. An interdisciplinary framework will co-ordinate research carried out at Tel Aviv University and its affiliated hospitals. The Institute will 'strive to improve the effectiveness of current drugs and develop new ones for visual disorders'.

*

The Winter/Spring 2005 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that the University's Faculty of Social Sciences has established two new Master's programmes. One is a programme in Public and Political Leadership; it is multi-disciplinary and covers a wide range of subjects: civic society; ethics and morality of leadership; leadership and identity among the Jewish people; and reciprocal relations between leaders and their followers in democratic regimes. The second programme is an 'Executive Master's in Diplomacy and Security' and has been launched by the University's Political Science Department for mid-level and senior-level managers in the Foreign and Defence Ministries, the intelligence agencies, the police, and organizations working globally, such as the Jewish Agency. Since Israeli foreign policy and national security are very closely linked, the programme 'aims to produce a new cadre of leaders in the diplomatic and defence sectors to represent and advance Israel's interests' in times of crisis as well as in times of peace. Participants will join the Forums on campus which invite foreign ambassadors to lecture on current affairs or diplomatic relations and attend a weekly workshop on Israel's national security issues.

*

The same issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that the University has launched a new United Nations-Israel Project 'which was established to analyze UN policy toward Israel and further UN-Israel understanding'. The head of the Project said that the Project would monitor the United Nations deliberations and resolutions on the Middle East, explore a potential role for the UN in the peace process, and provide a platform for UN officials to hold discussions with Israelis. A symposium was held, entitled 'The UN and Israel: Can They Co-operate? Reflections From Over Ten Years' Involvement in the Middle East Peace Process'. In the United Nations, the 'bloc of 56 Muslim and 23 Arab member states in the General Assembly has had little difficulty garnering support for passing one-sided condemnations against Israel'. At the symposium, the head of the University's School of Government and Policy pointed out that at the United Nations, Israel is excluded from the Human Rights Commission while Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, and Libya serve on it. The head of the University's Institute for Diplomacy and Regional Co-operation recalled Abba Eban's comment that 'should an Arab delegation propose in the UN that the earth was flat, it would automatically get a vote of "Yes"'.

The outgoing United Nations Special Co-ordinator of the Middle East Process, who was honoured at the symposium, pointed out that it was the General Assembly of the United Nations that 'gave legitimacy to Israel's creation through Resolution 181 in November 1947, even before David Ben-Gurion declared Israel's independence in May 1948'. The head of the University's UN-Israel Project announced that a new course has been devised within the Master's degree in diplomacy entitled 'The United Nations in the Field'; it will host representatives of UN agencies who will help students acquire a wider understanding of the policy and practice of the UN.

*

Under the auspices of the Irish Embassy in Israel and the Irish Foreign Affairs Office, the Irish actor Barry McGovern (who is one of the leading interpreters of Samuel Beckett's works) paid a three-day visit to the Theatre Arts Department of Tel Aviv University. He gave a series of talks and readings as well as a master-class to drama students. During his visit, the first session of the Samuel Beckett Society of Israel was held. It is planned to hold seminars and discussions on Beckett's works, to publish his plays in Hebrew, and to establish a scholarship fund for a Tel Aviv University drama student to study at the Beckett Centre of Trinity College, Dublin.

*

Tel Aviv University held a colloquium entitled 'Israeli-Jordanian Peace: Assessment of a Decade' to mark the tenth anniversary of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. There was a special video address by Prince Hassan, brother of the late King Hussein, and guest speakers included the Director of the Mediterranean Centre for International Affairs in Amman. In his video address, Prince Hassan discussed at some length the history of the Jordanian-Israeli peace talks and his personal involvement in the treaty — each country failing to fulfil the expectations of the other. He spoke of his desire to 'turn the region into one of pluralism, where we do not just tolerate each other, but have genuine respect for each other'.

*

Haifa, Acre, Jaffa, Lod, and Ramle are known as Israel's 'mixed cities' because they have both Arab and Jewish neighbourhoods. Arab residents tend to live in the poorer and run-down districts of these cities; they have higher than average unemployment and lower than average educational standards. Such conditions are a breeding ground for crime and social unrest. The Konrad Adenauer Programme for Jewish-Arab Co-operation held a conference in Tel Aviv University entitled 'Together but Apart: Ethnically Mixed Cities — A Comparative Approach'. The participants included scholars in geography, urban planning, economics, education, and welfare as well as experts from South Africa, Northern Ireland and the United States 'in an attempt to place the problems in a comparative context and to suggest interventionist strategies for effecting change'.

*

It was reported in March 2005 that Britain's Hindu and Jewish leaders met for the first time to discuss co-operation between their communities. The Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth hosted the meeting and praised the contributions of Hindus to British life. The secretary-general of the Hindu Forum of Britain stated that the meeting was 'a historic moment for enriching the dialogue between the two communities'.

*

The BBC conducted a poll following the 2005 Holocaust Memorial Day; 94 per cent of those questioned stated that they had heard of the Auschwitz death camp. In an earlier survey, 55 per cent had said that they had not heard of

Auschwitz. Holocaust educationists believe that this 'astonishing' 2005 response may have occurred as a result of the number of television and radio programmes about the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the camp. The poll involved a postal survey of 4,000 adults.

*

It was reported in May 2005 that vandals in Dublin painted swastikas on the city's synagogue and Jewish museum; they also daubed slogans on the exterior of a Jewish retirement home. A spokesman for the Jewish Representative Council of Ireland is quoted as stating: 'These attacks have been happening since November'.

*

It was reported in May 2004 that Britain's Arts and Humanities Research Board had awarded a grant of 'more than £400,000' to the Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies of University College London for a study of the Kabbalah; it will cover a five-year research project into the Zohar, the most important kabbalistic text of Judaism. The Department was also offered by the same Research Board another grant, of £380,000, for a study of the Jewish press and community of Czernovitz, under Romanian rule during the inter-war years; it is to be conducted jointly with Belfast's Queen's University.

*

It was announced in October 2004 that two Technion medical researchers (Professors A. Hershko and A. Ciechanover) and a professor from the University of California (Irwin Rose) were awarded the 2004 Nobel Prize for Chemistry. The executive director of the British Technion Society said that the Society had funded the research of the two Israeli scientists and that it was 'fitting that Israel's first Nobel Prize for Science should be awarded to leading professors at the Technion'. The two men had obtained both their undergraduate and graduate degrees at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the President of that University was quoted as stating that the Hebrew University 'takes pride in the achievements of these outstanding graduates' whose accomplishments bring honour to a university 'which continues to be a leading force in the attainment of excellence in teaching and research'.

*

The Summer 2004 issue of *JPR News*, a publication of London's Institute for Jewish Policy Research, states that recent large-scale surveys, carried out in various European countries, have shown that Jews have educational qualifications significantly higher than those of the host populations. In England and Wales, whereas 20 per cent of the general population have a 'First degree or above', 36 per cent of the Jewish population do so; in France, 60 per cent of the Jewish population have obtained a baccalauréat while the percentage for the country's general population is 24; in Hungary, 36 per cent of Jews but only 13 per cent of the general population have university degrees; and in the Netherlands 53 per cent of the Jewish population but only 22 per cent of the general population have 'completed university'.

The 2001 Census of England and Wales found that the proportion of Jews in managerial and professional occupations is almost twice that of the general population. Figures from that Census, released in October 2004, show that about one third of Jews have jobs in banking, finance, and insurance — more than twice the national average. Jews have the same profile as Hindus and Buddhists as managers and professionals but the Hindus have the highest proportion of medical practitioners, with five per cent, compared with 3.5 per cent of Jews.

Britain's self-identifying Jews (that is, excluding any Jews who did not state their religion or who stated that they had none) numbered 267,000 and are predominantly native-born; of the 17 per cent who were born abroad, 7,078 were born in Israel; 6,100 in North America; 5,076 in South Africa; and 2,504 elsewhere in Africa.

*

The same issue of *JPR News* states that nearly three quarters of Jews from the Former Soviet Union who settled in Germany since 1990 'had a university or higher-level education': they were 'often trained as engineers, scientists, doctors, and pharmacists'. Jews in Germany 'tend to work in professional occupations'.

*

Rivera is an Argentinian city in southern Buenos Aires province; It was founded as a Jewish colony in 1905 by the German philanthropist Baron Maurice de Hirsch and his Jewish Colonisation Association. The first 25 Russian-Jewish families were settled there in 1905 and in April 2005 there were festivities to mark the city's hundredth anniversary.

*

Marriage in Israel is under the authority of the Orthodox Rabbinate. It was reported in March 2005 that official figures were released, revealing that 250,000 Israelis are disqualified from marrying in the country because they are deemed not to be Jewish under religious law. Most of them are immigrants from the Former Soviet Union who came to Israel under the Law of Return which defines anyone with a single Jewish grandparent as a Jew.

Official figures also show that an increasing number of Israeli couples choose to marry abroad: more than 7,000 did so in 2002 — twice the number who had done so a decade earlier. However, not all of the 7,000 were disqualified from marrying in Israel: 1,332 couples could have married as Jews but opted out of marrying according to Orthodox Jewish rites in Israel.

*

It was announced in April 2005 that to mark 300 years of Jewish life in Gibraltar under British rule, the Gibraltar Heritage Trust and Jewish Heritage UK are to record the historic buildings and sites of the present-day 600 Jewish inhabitants. A team of specialist researchers from the UK-based Jewish Built Heritage have gone to Gibraltar and 'photographed, documented and drawn Gibraltar's four historic synagogues, two burial grounds and other sites of Jewish interest'. The oldest of these buildings is the Great Synagogue which was founded in 1724 by Isaac Nieto of London; it has been rebuilt several times and the present

building dates largely from 1821. It 'shares features with the parent Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue of Amsterdam and London's Bevis Marks'.

*

Les cahiers du judaïsme is a publication of the *Alliance israélite universelle.* Its issue no. 16 (2004) has a section (pp. 69–83) entitled 'Entre assimilation et communautarisme. Sur le port des signes religieux à l'école. Dialogue entre Rémy Schwartz et Pierre Birnbaum'. Rémy Schwartz is a Conseiller d'État and took an active part in the state commission which considered among other matters whether pupils in French state schools should be allowed to wear distinctive items of clothing or large objects linked to their religious beliefs; he also helped in the compilation of the final version of the commision's report. In his discussion with Pierre Birnbaum, he strongly defends the French tradition of secularism since the 1905 French law separating church and state. He argues that there are in France associations of people of diverse origins, such as associations of Portuguese or of Polish persons, whose members have maintained their specific traditions while being good French citizens; pluralism or 'spiritual diversity' can coexist with the French conception of citizenship in the Republic (p. 73).

When told that 'Anglo-Saxon' historians and social scientists have been extremely critical of the ban imposed in state schools in France, he replied 'yes, but they are not shocked that in the United States they must take an oath on the Bible and moreover that Americans have God and patriotism as the cement of their society ... and their God is a Christian God'. He argued that French society has a different history; the state was liberated from the power of the Catholic church and secularism ('la laïcité') fights to ensure that every person has freedom of conscience and freedom of expression without any religion holding sway. French Jews have benefited from the separation of church and state. Admittedly, there have been accusations that the commission's members were mainly Jews — which is pure fantasy. But then, you could never stop antisemites from finding Jewish plots and claiming that the state, finance, and the media are in Jewish hands (p. 83).

*

The no. 17 issue of *Les cahiers du judaïsme* (2004–2005) is about present-day Germany. There are 18 articles; one of them is about the fragmented identity of the Jews of Leipzig; another, on Jewish studies in contemporary Germany, states that there is 'immense interest' in the subject. The author is Michael Brenner, who teaches Jewish history and culture at the University of Munich; he says that research is nowadays carried out in nearly all the German towns, villages, or hamlets where Jews have ever lived (p. 48). These researchers are mainly amateur historians; some of them are moderately competent while others are not. The former head of an Institute concerned with Hamburg Jewry received a communication from an amateur historian who was convinced he had discovered an important local Jewish tradition; he stated: 'In our village, Jews used to start celebrating the *shabbat* since Friday evening'. A teacher of Yiddish in Hamburg University relates that some students who have enrolled to study the subject 'are very surprised when in the first class they attend, they discover that the language is written in Hebrew characters'.

Another short article (pp. 94–96) is entitled 'Allemands et juifs. Une enquête de l'American Jewish Committee'. That Committee had carried out in October 1990 the first survey since the reunification of Germany; the aim was to discover the comparative attitudes of Germans from East Germany and from West Germany towards Jews, towards Israel, and about the Holocaust. A second survey which followed in January 1994 was carried out in several countries, including Germany; it dealt with the perception of Jews and other minorities and with the degree of knowledge about the Holocaust. A third survey was carried out in October 2002; there were 1,250 respondents aged over 14 years. To the question, 'Approximately how many Jews were assassinated by the Nazis during the Second World War?', three per cent said, 100,000; eight per cent, 1 million; 12 per cent, two million; 43 per cent, six million; seven per cent, 20 million; while the remaining 27 per cent 'had no opinion'. Another question asked the opinion of respondents about whether it was important for Germans to be informed about the Holocaust; 27 per cent said that this was essential; 45 per cent that it was very important; four per cent, of no importance; and the remaining eight per cent had no opinion. Another question stated: 'Some people maintain that the massive extermination of the Jews of Europe never did take place. Have you heard such an assertion?'; 61 per cent said 'Yes'; 33 per cent said 'No'; and the remaining six per cent, 'Don't know'. A further question was: 'Do you think that today antisemitism is a problem in Germany?'; 17 per cent said 'a very serious problem'; 43 per cent, 'a real problem'; 30 per cent, 'no problem'; and ten per cent had no opinion.

When respondents were asked to describe their feelings about Jews, three per cent said 'very positive'; 15 per cent, rather positive; six per cent, rather negative; two per cent, very negative; 70 per cent, neutral; and four per cent had no opinion. That 2002 survey was carried out at the request of the American Jewish Committee by a polling institute. One fundamental fact which emerged was that 79 per cent of the respondents have never known a Jew personally and only about a third of the remaining 21 per cent have a Jewish member of their family or a close friend who is Jewish.

*

It was widely reported that in the 2005 campaign for state elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's largest state, the chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) compared foreign short-term investors to swarms of locusts that fall on companies, devouring all they can. In an article in *The Spectator* of 21 May 2005, the associate editor and European columnist of the *Financial Times* states that in present-day Germany (where he grew up in the 1960s and 1970s) there is a poisonous cocktail of anti-Americanism, antisemitism, and anti-capitalism. He describes the chairman of the SPD as 'no Nazi, simply a ruthless political operator' who drew up a 'locus list' of financiers of mostly Jewish-American origin, and adds: 'Publishing lists of Jewish names was a hallmark of Nazism'. After the Chairman first made his 'locusts' remark, 'an opinion poll suggested that two thirds of Germans agree with him in principle' and a cartoon in the house journal of an engineering union 'depicts what appear to be American-Jewish investors as insects with long noses sucking the lifeblood out of the Germany economy'.

On editing The Jewish Journal of Sociology (continued)

On page 116 of the Chronicle of volume 45 (2003), we recorded that we had received in 1996 a letter from one of our subscribers who had been on our list for many years, telling us that his late wife had left us one thousand pounds in her will because 'she wanted to reflect to a small extent the pleasure which she had from reading and browsing through The Jewish Journal of Sociology'. In a telephone conversation, he told us that he was in his nineties and that he had particularly liked two of the articles in our latest issue. Last year, we were told that he had died and that he also had remembered the Journal in his will and made a bequest of one thousand pounds.

It is heart-warming to receive such encouragement in the midst of rising costs and of difficulties with some authors who delay checking references or returning corrected proofs and with some reviewers who need constant reminders. There is also the problem of the classicial 'absent-minded professor'. In one case, an author wrote to us, enquiring about 'the status' of his article. But he had returned corrected proofs, the article had been published, and the Journal had been sent to him some months earlier. He checked and later said airily that he had in fact received it, but he had been very busy with various articles and got confused or his wife or his secretary had failed to inform him that the Journal had been received, and anyway all was well now. On another occasion, the secretary of a distinguished reviewer (who had been knighted for his services to scholarship) telephoned to say that he wished to know when he could expect to see the proof of his review; but he had returned corrected proofs several weeks earlier, which he must have posted himself since his competent secretary, who kept meticulous notes of the progress of his publications, had no record of the book review proof being received or returned corrected. She may have been away when the proof reached him and again, all was well in the end; we assumed that it was unusual for him to open his mail or to post it.

However, absent-mindedness may cause a great deal of anxiety and of work for others. One professor had been connected with the Journal for many years: he was a member of our Advisory Board and had written several articles for us, which he was given permission to reprint, and he came to London regularly. When he was in his late seventies, he wrote to say that there was a book in progress which should include a chapter on his important connection with *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*. Could I please produce the draft of such a chapter, as soon as possible, referring also to our London meetings. I set to work, looking through files, checking facts and dates, and sent a typescript. Several weeks later, he wrote to ask whether I would be sending him the typescript soon. Unfortunately, the carbon copy kept in the office had been typed on coloured paper which could not then be reproduced clearly; the chapter was duly retyped and was safely received. Some months later, he wrote to explain that he had been ill the previous year, had been in hospital, and on his return home he could not find the energy to open the pile of mail awaiting him; he had just put it in a large drawer. He had now opened that drawer and found the large envelope containing the chapter I had originally sent him!

There is sometimes a fine line between absent-mindedness and laziness. Recently, we received a typescript which listed in one passage the names of several authors; I was certain that in at least one case the name had been wrongly spelt and on checking, found that that was so. I asked the author to check every

name in that passage and received a letter from him saying that all but one were correctly spelt; in fact, another name had also been misspelt by him and I simply corrected his typescript and sent it to the printers — but I had not been happy spending some time checking.

Members of our Advisory Board are sometimes approached by colleagues who wish to promote the careers of junior university teachers in their department; they are asked to exert pressure to have submitted articles accepted for publication. The colleagues may become resentful when the intervention is unsuccessful and blame the messenger. Occasionally, an approach is made directly by an author who wishes to see his new book reviewed in our columns — presumably assuming that the review will be favourable. In one case, an author sent us an indignant letter, severely complaining that his book had not been reviewed by us, although it was a most important contribution to knowledge and had been reviewed by two other journals. But it so happened that the volume had been sent to us late, by surface mail, and that when we approached in turn potential reviewers, they each replied that they had already undertaken to review it for other journals.

A few authors appear to have an unrealistic estimate of the influence of our Journal. One established scholar wrote to ask us when we would review his new book because his publishers intended to reprint it and the demand for the book would be greatly increased after our review of it appeared — and that would affect the size of the reprint.

Authors naturally wish to substantiate the findings of their research by providing the results of surveys or questionnaires which they had carried out. Sometimes they seem unaware that an apparently reasonable project of obtaining comparative ethnic data may fail because one of the ethnic groups happens not to conform to the researcher's assumptions. One article was about the mental health of a country's main ethnic groups. In the section on suicide, the author lamented that comparisons were difficult because 'unfortunately the rate of suicide was too low' among one ethnic group.

Most authors, whose knowledge of English is limited, are delighted to have their paper edited and the edited version sent to them for their approval. A few, however, are convinced that they have a thorough knowledge of the English vocabulary, when they obviously do not; in one case an author was surprised when he was told that his 'French-talking' informant should be described as being 'French-speaking'; the word 'parler' of course means both to speak and to talk. We must remain alert when checking translated passages. One of our authors once translated the French word for grandson as 'small son'; the former has a hyphen (petit-fils). (Perhaps the most famous mistranslation from the French is Cinderella's glass slipper, her 'pantoufle de vair'; 'vair' means fur but is pronounced in exactly the same way as 'verre' (glass).)

Some contributors are determined to be politically correct. One of them insisted on the terms 'underground economy' and 'underground market' instead of 'black economy' and 'black market'; she relented only after it was suggested that she could, if she wished, add after 'black market' in brackets 'underground market in the U.S.A.'.

Competent printers may query in the proofs words or figures. Many years ago, we quoted the title of a Jewish Year Book which gave the year 5735–5736; the printer underlined these figures and put in the proof margin: 'Correct?'.

I replied, also in the margin, 'Correct. The Jews are a very, very ancient people'. Later, I met him and he told me that our Journal had stimulated him and his wife to read the Old Testament and later still when they had two children, they gave them Old Testament names.

Our authors often quote from American texts which of course have American spelling and publications from Israeli universities also use American spelling; we put the quotations in inverted commas but often (especially when it is a long quotation) we find that in the proof 'labor' has been printed 'labour' and behaviour, 'behavior', for example. We would then have to ask for the original words to be reinstated in the revised proofs. Nowadays, to save time and expense, I put as a warning in the margin of the typescript: 'U.S. spelling'. Some printers are familiar with the word *kosher* and amend our *kasher* to *kosher* in the proof; so now when the word *kasher* appears in the typescript I put the warning in the margin '*kasher* is Hebrew; *kosher* is Yiddish'.

In our obituary notice of Howard Brotz, in our June 1994 issue (volume 36, no. 1), I mentioned the fact that Howard Brotz had contributed to *A Minority in Britain*, edited by Maurice Freedman. He had stated in a footnote: 'Bacon and ham, as cured meats, seem to be separable from pork in general. For some curious reason, bacon is less objectionable than ham in the U.S.'. The printers of the book were then also the *Jewish Chronicle* printers (but probably not members of Anglo-Jewry) and disliked initials. So instead of 'in the U.S.', they printed 'in the United Synagogue'; in those days it was more usual to refer to the United States with the initials U.S.A. Fortunately, both the editor and the author spotted the printing error; they often wondered later about what would have happened if they had not spotted it.

From time to time, printers write to us to say that they can produce our Journal according to the highest standards but at competitive rates. One printer said that he was in the business of saving us money: '... I'd be pleased to spend just 10 minutes with you discussing how we can *reduce* your current print costs. Your quotation is free and their is no obligation'. Another wrote: 'You're journal could be printed by our machinery specifically designed for high-quality low-cost production'.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Y. Michal Bodemann, *A Jewish Family in Germany Today: An Intimate Portrait*, xii + 280 pp., Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2005, £16.50, paperback.

Nicholas de Lange and Miri Freud-Kandel, eds., *Modern Judaism. An Oxford Guide*, xi + 459 pp., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, £22.95, paperback.

Immanuel Etkes, *The Besht. Magician, Mystic, and Leader*, translated by Saadya Sternberg (first published in Hebrew in Jerusalem, 2000), Brandeis University Press, Waltham, MA, 2005, $39.95 hardback.

Jacques Gutwirth, *La Renaissance du hassidisme. De 1945 à nos jours*, 271 pp., published by Odile Jacob, 15 rue Soufflot, Paris, 2004, 27 euros.

Ladislau Gyémánt, *Evreii din Transilvania. Destin istoric*, 147 pp. in Romanian; followed by English translation, *The Jews of Transylvania* by Simona Farcasan, pp. 152–313, Romanian Cultural Institute, Cluj-Napoca, 2004, n.p.

Ian Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, eds., *Orientalism and the Jews*, 35 + 285 pp., Brandeis University Press, published by University Press of New England, 2005, $26.00 paperback (hardback, $60.00).

Yakov M. Rabkin, *Au nom de la Torah. Une histoire de l'opposition juive au sionisme*, 15 + 274 pp., Les Presses de l'Université Laval, Quebec, 2004, n.p.

Margalit Shilo, *Princess or Prisoner? Jewish Women in Jerusalem, 1840–1914*, translated from the Hebrew by David Louvish, 38 + 330 pp., Brandeis University Press, published by University Press of New England, 2005, $29.95 paperback (hardback, $65.00).

Janet Walker, *Trauma Cinema*, 22 + 251 pp., University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 2005, $24.95 or £15.95, paperback.

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