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# **Israelis abroad:** The transformation of the Jewish Diaspora?

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This study is part of the work of the European Jewish Demography Unit at JPR, the only independent body in Europe generating fundamental demographic data about Jews across the continent to support community planning. Demographic data cover a variety of issues including fertility, mortality and migration, and they are critical to understanding population trends, including key questions such as whether Jewish populations are projected to grow or decline over time and what forces need to be monitored to measure and understand that. We use these types of data to help Jewish community leaders understand how their communities are evolving, and to undertake research work that feeds directly into planning work on issues such as projected demand for school places, elderly care provision, social cohesion and security.

## / Introduction

The Land of Israel is the birthplace of the Jewish nation. It is also a place which, over the long course of Jewish history, Jews have left and returned to. Indeed, the big picture of Jewish history can be seen as a cyclical migratory movement with the Land of Israel as a focal point. Already around the first year of the Common Era, about 50% of all Jews lived in Israel with the remaining 50% living in the Diaspora, albeit close to Israel in geographical terms, mostly in the adjacent areas of the Middle East and North Africa. By 1000 CE, most Jews lived outside of Israel; a thousand years later, on the cusp of 2025, the numerical relationship between Israel and the Diaspora resembled the first year of the Common Era again. This happened as a result of the large-scale return of Jews to the Land of Israel, mostly in the second half of the twentieth century: 3.4 million Jews and their family members came to Israel between the establishment of the modern State of Israel in 1948 and the end of 2022.[1] This latest, modern return of Jews to the Land of Israel was not the first such occasion this has happened; Jewish history has seen others (e.g. the return from the Babylonian Exile in the 6$^{th}$ Century BCE), albeit on a less spectacular scale. Nor was state building in the first part of the twentieth century unique to Jews: many European and Middle Eastern nations established their modern states at a similar time. The political programme underlying the establishment of modern Israel, Zionism, drew on the same political philosophy – nationalism – that created nation states everywhere. The uniqueness of the Jewish case comes from the successful interaction between an ancient and prevailing dream of return and modern political ideas and instruments.

[1] Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel. *Statistical Abstract of Israel* 2023 (74), Table 2.53.

The history of Jewish immigration to Israel, known in Hebrew as '*aliya*', meaning 'ascent', is often regarded as a profoundly optimistic and celebratory act, when seen by Jews themselves or their political allies. When it is seen by detractors of Israel or political adversaries of Jews, the tone is very different: lamentable and threatening. The history of departure from Israel – in Hebrew, '*yerida*' or 'descent' – is the exact opposite. Israel's enemies have always celebrated or wished for the potential mass departure of Jews. And throughout much of the history of modern Israel, Israeli political leaders and the wider population have also expressed anything from sharp negativity towards emigrants,[2] through disappointment, to neutrality. This was perhaps understandable given that the Zionist project was still working to establish itself throughout most of the twentieth century. Emigration, particularly during the first few decades of Israel's existence, was often interpreted as an act of betrayal. Yet this sentiment in the Israeli public has decreased with time: the maturation of Israel as a stable democracy, a strong economy and a cohesive society has affected this perception. Perhaps the broader realities of globalisation have had an effect too: international business travel and relocation have become normative. Indeed, today, the departure of Israelis from Israel is more frequently seen by the public in neutral or even positive terms, as a sign of strength and a proof of Israel's capacity to spread its culture and export its scientific and commercial know-how.[3] Negativity still exists but it is mostly restricted to times of crisis.[4] After all, a developed economy like Israel is expected to give rise to people wishing, for example, to export their knowledge outside of Israel or acquire education there. Their departure may not be permanent and may be dictated by market forces, circumstances and aspirations, rather than any type of act of betrayal.

Statistical, demographic and historical research on *aliya* is well-developed.[5] At the same time, research on *yerida* is in a very different shape. The reasons for this situation have nothing to do with the political meanings of these different migration streams. Rather, aliya is simply well-documented administratively: when new immigrants apply for the right to immigrate to Israel, they are added to the Population Registry (a database of residents) upon immigration, and they receive assistance from the State. The Israeli statistical authority (Central Bureau of Statistics, or CBS-Israel) only needs to access these administrative sources periodically to build a full picture of immigration. This makes the production of statistics on aliya rather straightforward. In other words, from an Israeli statistical authority perspective, aliya is highly visible.

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[2] Itzhak Rabin's expression characterising people who make 'yerida' as the 'fallout of weaklings' is perhaps the most famous. מקור ראשון – "נפולת של נמושות"מותר לנו להתגעגע ליצחק רבין שאמר

[3] Shain, Y. 2022. *How the Zionist revolution changed history and reinvented Judaism*. Post Hill Press: New York.

[4] See, for example, a position voiced by Yoaz Hendel, an Israeli politician, in the mid-2024. " נפולת של נמושות": ירידה איננה אופציה | ישראל היום

[5] The Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel, has produced a large body of publications over the years documenting migration to Israel. Interested readers are encouraged to consult these materials, especially the '*Immigration to Israel*' series and statistical tables published annually as part of the *Statistical Abstract of Israel*. Other central analytical works on immigration to Israel that should be highlighted are: (1) Schmelz, U.O. and DellaPergola, S. 2006. 'Migrations.' *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd edition. (2) DellaPergola, S. 2009. 'International migration of Jews,' in: Eliezer Ben Rafael and Itzchak Sternberg (eds.) *Transnationalism*, Leiden/London, Brill, 213-236. (3) DellaPergola, S. 1998. 'The global context of migration to Israel,' in: Elazar Leshem and Judit Shuval (eds.) *Immigration to Israel – Sociological Perspectives*, New Brunswick, Transactions, 51-92. (4) Staetsky, L. Daniel. 2017. *Are Jews leaving Europe?* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research. (5) DellaPergola, S. 2020. 'Diaspora vs. Homeland: development, unemployment and ethnic migration to Israel, 1991-2009,' in: *Jewish Population Studies*, Volume 31. Jerusalem: Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. (6) Staetsky, L. Daniel. 2023. *Jewish migration today: what it may mean for Europe*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

In contrast, yerida is a not as well-documented because it does not rely on a similarly smooth administrative process, and leaving Israel inevitably results in a loss of visibility. So there is no similarly clear administrative status of an emigrant: in Israel, an act of emigration is neither declared to the State, nor is it applied for.[6] Israelis travel freely in and out of the country. A status of an emigrant is established by CBS-Israel based on a factual continuous absence of a resident from Israel for a period of 12 months, as recorded in the Population Registry. However, it is important to stress that the *intention* of the emigrant – i.e. whether they are planning to remain abroad or return in time – remains unknown and is not measured or captured in any way. Instead, the data measure the actual behaviour, and the underlying intentions are implied, perhaps imperfectly. Yet this is done in accordance with the accepted definition of a 'migrant' across both national and international statistical systems.[7] The total number of Israelis remaining abroad continuously for a period of 12 months at any point in time ('emigration stock' in demographic jargon) is periodically published by CBS-Israel. The same applies to the annual movements of Israelis from and back to Israel for a period of 12 months ('emigration flows'). These fundamental elements of statistics on yerida will be used in this report.

Thus, the systems used by CBS-Israel cannot produce a full picture of Israelis abroad of the same quality as their picture of immigrants to Israel. Upon departure for a long period, or for good, emigrants become invisible to the Israeli system of population registration that underlies the statistical work of the CBS-Israel; their deaths, for example, may not be registered, and children born to them abroad may or may not be registered in the system. Further, their locations remain entirely unknown. All this means that whoever aspires to have a picture of the population of Israelis abroad needs to bring together information both from CBS-Israel and from additional sources, such as the statistical authorities of countries receiving Israeli emigrants, surveys of Israelis abroad, and such like. In this report we do precisely that. The moment Israelis settle abroad and their visibility for Israeli population administration diminishes, they become visible for administrative and statistical systems of their destination countries. Collecting such statistics is possible but labour-intensive as there are close to 200 countries in the world today where Israelis could exist.

[6] In the 1950s, emigration was declared to the Israeli authorities in charge of border control and/or the population registry, although it was neither a hard requirement nor a pre-condition to exit, and not all emigrants did so.

[7] See: United Nations. 1998. 'Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration.' *Statistical Papers Series M*, No. 58, rev. 1.

Despite these difficulties, several significant statistical works have been published over years on the topic of Israeli populations abroad. Their importance is immense, and readers with an interest in tracing the thinking and the scientific methodology on this topic are advised to consult them.[8] Yet all of them have been limited in one way or another either to selected countries and regions or to certain aspects of Israeli migration. As a result, there is considerable uncertainty both about the numbers of Israelis living abroad and the valid ways of establishing the numbers, among scholars, policymakers and community leaders alike, whether living within Diaspora Jewish communities or outside of them. Very different numbers are quoted by different bodies, and the state of knowledge on this matter can be characterised as disarray. To our knowledge, this is the first report with an ambition to map the global population of Israelis, including their geographical dispersion, the subgroups within them, the trajectories of their numerical development and their numerical impact on the Diaspora Jewish populations. We also develop a methodology of establishing the number of Israelis.

The report has six sections in total. Sections 1-4 create a definition of what constitutes the population of Israelis abroad, quantify different segments of this population and, where possible, trace its development over time. Section 5 assesses the numerical impact of the Israeli population living abroad on local Diaspora Jewish populations. The concluding section (Section 6) features a summary of findings and proposes a potential new way of thinking about the population of Israelis abroad, the nature and the future of the Jewish Diaspora and its relations with Israel. We do not adopt a position on whether yerida should be seen in a pessimistic or optimistic light – our analysis is simply statistical. However, we do point out that new and better data may invite a revision of previously held notions in this respect, and outline future directions for research.

[8] The most recent publications produced by analysts at the Central Bureau of Statistics Israel that ought to be mentioned in this respect are: (1) Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel. 2014. *Demographic characteristics of the outgoing and incoming flows of Israeli who spent abroad at least one year, 1996-2009*. Publication 1558. (Hebrew). (2) Cohen-Kastro, E. 2022/23. 'A new methodology for estimation of international migration of Israelis at the ICBS.' *Hagira* 13. (Hebrew). (3) Press Release of CBS-Israel, 293/2023, 'Departures and Returns in 2021 of Israelis Staying Abroad Continuously for a Year or More.' References therein will lead to earlier publications on the subject. Note also that statistical tables on inflows and outflows of Israeli emigrants from and to Israel are regularly published in the *Statistical Abstract of Israel*. Among the important historical statistical publications, all produced by analysts associated with CBS-Israel, we choose to mention: (1) Paltiel, A. 1986. 'Migration of Israelis abroad: survey of official data from selected countries.' *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* 6 (reprint); (2) Paltiel, A. 1990. 'Indicators of the number of Israeli residents abroad.' *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* 2 (reprint); (3) Lamdany, R. 1983. 'Emigration from Israel.' *The Economic Quarterly/Ha-Riv'on Le-Kalkala* 116: 462-278. (Hebrew); (4) Rabi, Z. 1978. 'Emigration from Israel 1948-1977.' *The Economic Quarterly/Ha-Riv'on Le-Kalkala* 99: 348-358. (Hebrew). Recent publications, offering statistical, demographic and sociological perspectives, authored by scholars outside of the statistical establishment, that are particularly noteworthy, include: (1) Cohen, Y. 2011. 'Size and selectivity of Israeli-born immigrants in OECD countries.' *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 52 (1-2): 45-62; (2) Cohen, Yinon. 2007. 'The demographic success of Zionism.' *Israeli Sociology* 8: 151-158 (Hebrew); (3) Cohen, Y., and Y. Haberfeld. 1997. 'The number of Israeli immigrants in the U.S. in 1990.' *Demography* 34: 199-212; (4) Rebhun, U. and L. Ben-Ari. 2010. *American Israelis: Migration, Transnationalism, and Diasporic identity*. (5) Kosmin, B. 1998. 'Israelis in the United States: Reconciling Estimates with NJPS'; (6) Kooyman, C. and Almagor, J. 1996. *Israelis in Holland*. Amsterdam: JMW; (7) Rebhun, U., Kranz, D., and Sunker, H. 2022. *A double burden: Israelis in Germany*. New York: CUNY Press.

## 1/ Israelis outside of Israel: a global picture

Who is an Israeli emigrant? How are they to be defined? Arguably the most straightforward way to define one is to adopt the definition implemented by the Israeli national statistical system. From this perspective, an emigrant is a permanent resident of Israel who has left Israel for an extended period of time. Their departure from Israel can be temporary or permanent; their intentions and future scenarios are not considered by the system, not least because these can be rather fluid. Instead, the definition is strictly factual, and the minimal period of absence from Israel is conventionally set at twelve months.[9] This is a very simple, internationally comparable, definition.

It should be noted that the population of Israeli emigrants consists of two subpopulations: those born in Israel, and those born outside of Israel. The latter are people who immigrated to Israel at some point in their lives, either as adults or children, and lived in Israel for some time before leaving and settling outside of Israel. In this report, we refer to the former group – those born in Israel – as 'Group A', and the latter group – those born outside of Israel – as 'Group B', for brevity.[10] The significance of this nuance for understanding Israeli emigration is that while *both* Israel-born (Group A) and non-Israel-born emigrants (Group B) are accounted for by the Israeli statistical system, only Group A is typically fully visible to the statistical systems of destination countries, especially in censuses. As a result, we have a comparatively better understanding of Group A's demographics and dispersion across the globe. We will return to this point later.

Theoretically, those in Groups A and B constitute the entire 'Israeli emigrant' population. However, the reality is more complex than that. Both Group A and Group B build their lives outside Israel: in particular, they marry, cohabit and bring children into the world. Their spouses may belong to Group A or B, or they may be non-Israeli Jews living among the Jewish populations of the Diaspora or indeed non-Jews. The same goes for their children: they may be included in Groups A and B – if they were born or spent any time living in Israel – or they may not, if they were born after their parents' departure from Israel. Whilst children and spouses of Groups A and B may not be Israeli emigrants under the strict definitions imposed by statistical systems, they are still sociologically and demographically relevant. They constitute the world in which Israeli emigrants live and, in the case of children, they are biologically connected to them. Therefore, we use the broad term of the 'Israel-connected population' here, which is inclusive of Groups A and B and any of their children born outside Israel. To help clarify this, we denote the children of Group A as Group C1 in this report, and the children of Group B as Group C2. Whilst these children (Groups C1 and C2) are invisible or only partly visible to the statistical systems in Israel and abroad, we make an attempt here to reconstruct their sizes on the basis of the available information about them.[11] In this section, we relate to Israelis as a term covering Groups A and B. We will provide a clear indication when, in subsequent sections, the discussion turns towards Groups C1 and C2.

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[9] This is to distinguish emigrants from those Israelis who are temporarily absent from Israel. At any point in time, a large number of Israelis may be abroad temporarily for tourism, business etc. This definition follows the definitional recommendations developed by the Statistical Division of the United Nations: United Nations. 1998. 'Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration.' *Statistical Papers Series M*, No. 58, rev. 1.

[10] Today, about 15% of Israel's population and 20% of its Jewish population is foreign-born. This is not a dramatically high number. In fact, many Western countries today possess foreign-born components at a similar level to Israel. For example, the proportion of foreign born in England & Wales was 16% in the 2021 Census. Source for Israel: Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel. 2023. *Statistical Abstract of Israel* 74, Tables 2.1 and 2.9.

[11] We do not possess a method of estimating the number of spouses of Israel-born – those who were born outside Israel and never lived in Israel.

Defined in this way, the total number of Israelis (Groups A and B) permanently living abroad has been estimated within a range of 571,000-613,000 at the end of 2021.[12] This is an official estimate produced by CBS-Israel. CBS-Israel has monitored the number of Israelis crossing Israel's borders since the establishment of the modern State of Israel in 1948. Israel is one of a small number of countries worldwide that operates an efficient border control system that is linked to the Population Registry. Due to its security situation, the borders of Israel are not 'open' in the sense that European borders are; instead, all movement through its borders is very closely monitored. This means that all, or nearly all, border crossings of the bearers of Israeli passports are registered. As a result, the number of Israelis staying abroad continuously in a way that suggests that the centre of their life is outside Israel (for example, if they live abroad for one year or longer) can be estimated with relative ease. Without getting too technical, CBS-Israel accumulates information on the departures of Israelis abroad for a period of one year or longer, and the returns of Israelis staying abroad for one year or longer, and then calculates the balance of these movements for each year since 1948. The balance, adjusted for mortality of Israelis abroad, is effectively the number of Israelis permanently living abroad, as featured above.

[12] See: Press Release of CBS-Israel, 293/2023, 'Departures and Returns in 2021 of Israelis Staying Abroad Continuously for a Year or More.' A new accounting methodology for Israelis abroad is under development at present at CBS-Israel. To date, this methodology is not mature enough to render a re-estimation of this number. When and if implemented, the new methodology is unlikely, in our view, to produce a vastly different number of the stock of Israelis abroad. See: Cohen-Kastro, E. 2022/23. 'A new methodology for estimation of international migration of Israelis at the ICBS.' *Hagira* 13.

This, however, is not the end of the story. Some uncertainty exists, which is why the number is estimated within a range rather than as a single number. One major factor behind the uncertainty is that the mortality of Israelis living outside Israel can only be estimated indirectly. Still, using the laws of demography, analysts from CBS-Israel can build a picture of mortality, and then 'discount' the population of Israelis abroad accordingly. Other uncertainties exist too, around: (1) the possibility that some Israelis may have crossed the Israeli border on a foreign (i.e. non-Israeli) passport and, as a result, were not captured by the Israeli border control system; and (2) the number of those who left Israel on a foreign passport before the 1980s, when the current border control system came into operation. However, in our view, neither of these categories are suspected to be very significant in size. First, many of those who left Israel before the 1980s may have passed away since. Second, for those possessing an Israeli passport, leaving Israel on a foreign passport has been very difficult technically, due to the way in which the border control system operates.[13] Third, our investigations based on the statistical systems of key destination countries for Israeli emigrants (the USA and Canada) actually revealed the presence of a group of Israeli emigrants, specifically Israel-born, who may not have been captured by the Israeli border control system. These are people born in Israel, for example, to American citizens who resided in Israel for a while, had children while there, but who may or may not have obtained Israeli citizenship and a passport for themselves or their children. The status of these people is ambiguous in both the Israeli and the American statistical systems. The American system (the Census) classifies them as born outside the USA but, at the same time, does not classify them as immigrants to the USA. We estimate that, in total, about 34,000 individuals like this reside today in the USA and Canada combined.[14] To err on the side of caution, we assume that about half of these people may have had an Israel passport, and so may be included in the estimates of emigrants produced by CBS-Israel, while the other half never had one, so are excluded.[15]

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[13] These and other uncertainties, such as the difficulty in establishing the permanent place of residence for those Israelis who maintain homes in different countries and frequently move to and from Israel, are covered in detail in: Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel. 2014. *Demographic characteristics of Israelis exiting and entering the country after a continuous stay abroad for a year or more 1996-2009*. Publication 1558. (Hebrew). See also a methodological article by Cohen-Kastro in *Hagira*, in a previous footnote. These publications also contain a lot of details on the history of the registration of the border movements of Israelis and changes that happened over time both in administration of the movement by the Israeli Ministry of Interior and in the CBS statistical work based on them.

[14] The official online engine of the American Community Survey (the ACS) shows about 139,089 Israel-born in the USA in 2022 in its tables relating to foreign-born population (ACS 5 years estimates, a pretabulated data product). These are clearly defined as foreign-born – i.e. anyone who is not a citizen of the USA at birth (About the Foreign-Born Population). At the same time, the engine of the 5% Public Use Micro Data samples (PUMS) shows 166,209 Israel-born in the same year, via the variable 'Place of birth'. Detailed analysis of PUMS reveals that the total of 166,209 includes Israel-born classified explicitly as 'foreign-born' (134,787) and Israel-born classified as 'native', i.e. in possession of USA citizenship at birth (32,422). The ambiguous status of the latter group (32,422) is in full view. These individuals may or may not be present in the Israeli emigration data: they will be present if they possess Israeli citizenship and an Israeli passport, and they will not be if they do not. In reality, some of these individuals (and their parents) may be American citizens without Israeli citizenship, spending extended periods in Israel at times as 'tourist visa overstayers'. (A side note: pre-tabulated data and microdata samples are derived from the same ACS data, they are just different 'casts' of the same source, hence the differences between theoretically identical products extracted from them. See: U.S. Census Bureau, 'Understanding and Using the American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample Files: What Data Users Need to Know,' U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2021.) A similar situation is observed in Canada: the last Canadian Census (2021) found 33,845 Israel-born of whom 29,395 are defined as immigrants to Canada, while others are not (Canadian citizens at birth). See Appendix 1 for data sources for Canada and the USA.

[15] Under conditions of total uncertainty, this is an accepted practice resulting in the best possible approximation to the true value.

All considered, we allow for the possibility that the official estimate of Israelis abroad may be affected by undercounting. In view of this, the top limit of the range produced by CBS-Israel (613,000) may be closer to the truth than the bottom or the middle of the range. To this high CBS-Israel estimate we add half of the 'ambiguous' emigrants who may not have been captured by the system, to give us 630,000. This, in our view, is the most defensible estimate of Israelis living outside of Israel.

At the end of 2021, the total population of Israel stood at 9,453,000. It follows that Israelis living outside of Israel constituted about 6% of the global Israeli population of 10,083,000.[16] This can be thought of as the minimal accumulative loss to the Israeli population due to emigration. It is minimal because the number 630,000 does not include most children of Israelis born outside of Israel. Arguably, this finding does not revolutionise our understanding of Israel's population dynamics, but it does add a novel nuance. At the time of writing this report (late 2024), Israel's population had just crossed the 10 million threshold. If all Israelis living abroad had remained in Israel, Israel's population would have reached this mark at least three years earlier. Further, the minimal loss of 630,000 for Israel is the minimal gain for the Diaspora. The majority of Israelis abroad are Jewish (we will return to this point later in the report) and given that the total Diaspora Jewish population came to 8,280,500 at the end of 2021, Israelis constituted about 6% of it at that time.[17]

Figure 1. Global population of Israelis, by location, 2021-2023




Source: Author's calculations based on: (1) Press Release of CBS-Israel, 293/2023, Departures and Returns in 2021 of Israelis Staying Abroad Continuously for a Year or More. (2) CBS-Israel, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* 74 (2023), Table 2.2 (population by religion).

[16] The size of the Israeli population is sourced from: Table 2.2 (Population by religion), *Statistical Abstract of Israel 74* (2023). The Israeli population at the time of publication stood at 10 million. The end of 2021 figure is used here since most estimates of Israeli emigrants abroad correspond to years 2021-2023.

[17] The size of the Diaspora Jewish population is sourced from: DellaPergola, S. 2023. 'World Jewish population, 2022.' *American Jewish Year Book 2023*. It is assumed that Jews constitute 80% of all Israelis abroad (about 504,000; see supporting information later in this report).

There are certain aspects of Israeli migration that CBS-Israel cannot capture. First, the destinations of Israeli migrants are not captured by the border control system on which CBS-Israel relies in its work. Second, information on subgroups of Israelis, such as the shares of Jews and non-Jews, or the shares of Israel-born migrants versus non-Israel-born migrants (i.e. former immigrants to Israel) in the total number of Israeli abroad, cannot be estimated. To cover these aspects, we turned to complimentary sources. Just like CBS-Israel, the statistical authorities of different countries generate data about the size and composition of their populations. For this purpose, periodic censuses of populations, undertaken all over the world, typically collect information on individuals' country of birth. Some censuses, though not all, also collect information on religion.

As an aside, censuses today are conducted using a variety of methodologies. Some censuses are traditional in the sense that they reach all households and individuals across their country and collect information about them in a single large-scale exercise (e.g. UK and Canada). Others rely on pre-existing systems of population registration that are accessed and analysed periodically in order to create an up-to-date picture of the population (e.g. Austria and the Netherlands). Still others conduct rolling large-scale population surveys that have replaced the traditional census (e.g. France). Irrespective of the exact method, most censuses collect data on people's country of birth, so the number of Israel-born individuals can be sourced from them. Some of this information is stored on the websites of national statistical authorities in publicly accessible datasets. We investigated these datasets in detail. When the information was not publicly accessible, we submitted a formal request for the relevant data to the statistical authority. With rare exceptions, the requested information was sent to us in response. In the next section, we capitalise on this information to explore previously under-researched aspects of the Israeli emigrant population.

## 2 / Israelis outside of Israel: Israel-born versus others

In this section, we begin with assessments of the two principal subgroups of Israelis living abroad: those who were born in Israel and those who were born elsewhere and immigrated to Israel at some point in their life. There may be differences between the two in the nature of their links to Israel. The first group are 'sabras', of whom many (although not all) are well-embedded in Israel's social realities and Hebrew-speaking culture. The second group is less so, on average. Compared to the first group, their cultural and linguistic situations may be more distant from Israel. Their move out of Israel, as adults or children accompanying their parents, may constitute either a return to their original country of origin or a move to a third country following a stay in Israel. This group includes people who spent only a few years of life in Israel.

Consolidating all information available from the national censuses taken across the world leads to the conclusion that, on the global scale, in the period corresponding approximately to the years 2021-2023, the number of Israel-born people living outside of Israel can be estimated at around 328,000 (rounded number), which constitutes 52% of all Israelis abroad. Assuming the total number of Israeli emigrants in 2021-2023 is about 630,000, it follows that about 302,000 of Israelis living abroad at that time were born outside Israel (48%, rounded number).

Figure 2. Israelis abroad, by origin, 2021-2023




Source: author's calculations based on: (1) Press Release of the CBS-Israel, 293/2023, Departures and Returns in 2021 of Israelis Staying Abroad Continuously for a Year or More. (2) sources and methods detailed in Appendix 1.

Table 1 shows detailed information on the Israel-born group living outside Israel (about 328,000), by location. Three countries lead in the number of Israel-born people living in them (numbers are rounded for readability): the USA (51%, about 169,000), Canada (10%, about 34,000), and Germany (24,000, 7%). The number of Israel-born people in the UK (23,000, 7%) is very close to that in Germany. Note that all countries belonging to the Anglosphere (USA, Canada and the UK, but also Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Ireland) account for about three-quarters of all Israel-born people living outside Israel.

In an earlier estimation exercise, conducted by the Columbia University sociologist Yinon Cohen in relation to the year 2000, the total number of Israel-born people living outside Israel was estimated at 217,000, with the USA accounting for 57% of this figure, Canada about 8% and the UK about 5.5%.[18] While the number of Israel-born people has grown both globally and in each of these three major destination countries, the proportionate shares of the key destination countries has changed slightly. Given the broad comparability of Cohen's estimates with ours, it follows that over the first quarter of the twenty-first century the USA became a slightly less central (and perhaps less attractive or accessible) destination for Israel-born emigrants, whereas places like Canada and the UK became somewhat more central. The proportionate share of the USA was even higher in the early 1980s: probably about 60%, according to some earlier estimates.[19]

The national statistical authorities across the world do not offer a consistent way of identifying the estimated 302,000 Israelis living abroad who were not born in Israel. However, that is not necessarily a problem. Given how well the distribution of Israel-born people is mapped, it is reasonable to assume that the distribution of the non-Israel-born group follows *broadly* the same pattern. If the total number of Israelis (Israel-born and non-Israel born) in a given country is of interest for specific policy purposes, then a 1.92 multiplier can be used for this purpose.[20] For example, if the number of Israel-born people living in the USA is currently

[18] Author's calculations based on: Cohen, Y. 2011. 'Size and selectivity of Israeli-born immigrants in OECD countries.' *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 52 (1-2): 45-62.
[19] See: Paltiel, A. 1986. 'Migration of Israelis abroad: survey of official data from selected countries.' *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* 6 (reprint).
[20] A multiplier is obtained by dividing the total number of Israelis abroad (630,000) by the number of Israel-born abroad (328,000).

estimated at 169,000, then the total number of Israelis can be obtained by multiplying this number by 1.92 (around 324,500). The number of non-Israel-born would be around 155,500, i.e. the difference between 324,500 and 169,000.

We avoid adjusting the numbers for each country for the following reason. Some degree of care and discernment should be exercised with such adjustment. Applying the multiplier may be appropriate for countries with large communities of Israel-born people located in the well-established centres of Israeli Diaspora, such as the countries of the Anglosphere. The non-Israel-born population in the USA consists both of former American Jewish immigrants to Israel who returned to the USA and other immigrants to Israel who decided to relocate to the USA. However, the use of the multiplier may not be appropriate, for example, for the less established centres in the Far East, such as Hong Kong and Japan. The latter cannot have significant numbers of former immigrants to Israel. Israeli populations there are more likely to be temporary communities involved in commercial and technological activities of these very developed economies.

Table 1. Israel-born global population outside Israel, by location, 2021-2023

| Europe | | | | North America | | Latin America | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | | 100,098 | | Total | 202,576 | Total | 5,718 |
| Germany | 23,616 | Norway | 981 | USA | 168,731 (137,072*) | Argentina | 1,394 |
| UK | 23,152 | Ireland | 903 | | | Mexico | 1,244 |
| France | 8,479 | Finland | 804 | Canada | 33,845 (29,395*) | Panama | 714 |
| Netherlands | 7,008 | Greece | 798 | | | Costa Rica | 215 |
| Italy | 4,736 | Czechia | 761 | | | Guatemala | 105 |
| Switzerland | 4,215 | Bulgaria | 736 | **Asia and Africa** | | Rest | 2,046 |
| Spain | 3,983 | Portugal | 618 | Total | 6,587 | | |
| Belgium | 3,580 | Poland | 391 | South Africa | 1,151 | **Australia and NZ** | |
| Sweden | 2,847 | Luxembourg | 256 | China | 549 | Total | 13,172 |
| Austria | 2,591 | Slovakia | 256 | Japan | 460 | Australia | 12,077 |
| Hungary | 1,904 | Serbia | 197 | Hong Kong | 422 | New Zealand | 1,095 |
| Denmark | 1,794 | Russia | 155 | Georgia | 181 | | |
| Turkey | 1,662 | Latvia | 131 | Philippines | 67 | **Total outside Israel: 328,151** | |
| Romania | 1,561 | Lithuania | 126 | Azerbaijan | 52 | | |
| Cyprus | 1,136 | Rest | 721 | Rest | 3,705 | | |

Source: Appendix 1.

Note: (1) * Numbers excluding an 'ambiguous' population described in a previous section and footnote 13, i.e. Israel-born who are citizens of the USA by birth. (2) Some imputations were made for those countries where the author's efforts to get the actual data failed. In several countries data on Israel as country or birth or nationality was not available because it was fundamentally non-existent in the population statistics of these countries (e.g. Brazil). In other cases, statistical offices simply could not be reached (e.g. India). Imputations were made taking the unknown countries' resemblance in economic and political terms to countries with known figures. Imputed figures are included in the regional totals and in the subcategory 'Rest' for each region. Appendix 1 should be consulted for the exact information on imputations. These imputations have little impact on the grand total or the regional totals. (3) In the particular case of France, the number only includes Israel-born without French nationality (citizenship) at the time of birth, i.e. those born in Israel with French nationality and those born in Israel who acquired French nationality after migrating to France are excluded. The actual number of Israel-born could be close to 17,000. See Appendix 1 for further details.

Figure 3 presents the proportionate distribution of the Israel-born living abroad contrasted with the distribution of Jews in the Jewish Diaspora. The findings are remarkable. Just like Diaspora Jewry, the Israel-born population is concentrated mostly in North America (the USA and Canada) and Europe: over 90% of Israel-born people abroad live in these places. Yet, Europe is much more central in importance for Israelis: it hosts close to a third of all Israel-born people abroad (31% to be precise), in contrast to just 16% of all Diaspora Jews. This centrality of Europe for the population of Israelis abroad is an entirely novel finding.

### Figure 3. Israel-born abroad versus the population of the Jewish Diaspora, by continent, 2021-2023




Source: Author's calculations based on: (1) Appendix 1; (2) Panel B. DellaPergola, S. 2023. 'World Jewish population, 2022'. *American Jewish Year Book*, 2023.

## Focus on the Anglosphere

73% of all Israel-born people living outside of Israel (about 241,000) live in the 'Anglosphere,' defined here as incorporating the USA, Canada, the UK, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Ireland. Figure 4 shows the trajectories of the numerical development of Israel-born people in six of these countries. Growth of the Israel-born population is evident everywhere, although the pace of that growth varies from place to place. The largest Israel-born community, situated in the USA, has experienced relatively modest growth over the past decade or so, growing by 7% between 2011 and 2021. In contrast, the Israel-born populations in Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand grew by about 30% over approximately the same period, and in Ireland the Israel-born population more than doubled. The Israel-born population in Australia grew by 11% in a decade, less substantively than the Canadian, British or Irish Israel-born, but more than the American.

## Figure 4. Israel-born populations in the Anglosphere: trend in numbers in the early 21st century




Source: see Appendix 1.

Note: (1) * In the USA and Canada: two series are presented; one excludes an 'ambiguous' population described in a previous section and footnote 10, i.e. Israel-born who are citizens of the USA by birth, another includes this group. (2) In the USA, the comparison of the number of Israel-born in 2000 to the next data point in 2011 is not straightforward and should be done with care. Somewhat different methodologies were used for generating numbers in 2000 and from 2011 onwards. We estimated the 2000 number based on the methodology developed by Yinon Cohen in: Cohen, Y. 2011. Size and selectivity of Israeli-born immigrants in OECD countries. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 52 (1-2): 45-62. Cohen's estimates rely on the 5% Public Use Micro Data samples (PUMS) from the 2000 American Census and Database on Immigrants in OECD countries. Greater frequency of estimates in the last decade or so became possible due to a roll out of the American Community survey (ACS). In that period, data collection methodology remained the same and the 2011-2021 figures are fully comparable.

In three locations – USA, UK and Canada – we have a longer perspective of the numerical development, going back almost quarter of a century to 2000/2001. Looking at the trajectory in the first decade of the 21st Century reveals an interesting finding. In all three locations, the pace of growth in the number of Israel-born in 2011-2021 is *lower* than in the previous decade (2001-2011). In the UK and Canada, for example, the numbers rose by nearly 30% in 2011-2021 (rounded), which on the surface indicates a very significant increase. Yet, in 2001-2011 the increase was at a level of above 40% (for both countries). Thus, some deceleration of increase is observed in these countries. This is also probably happening in the USA: the exact assessment there is precluded by changes in the methodology of data collection, but the data available indicate that the Israel-born population in the USA may have grown by at least 11% between 2000 and 2011, while remaining largely stable between 2011 and 2021.

## Focus on Europe

Today, 31% of all Israel-born people living outside of Israel live in Europe (100,000), of whom about a quarter are in Germany and a similar proportion in the UK. Today, we can document in detail (Figures 5 and 6) the trajectory of change in the number of Israel-born in twenty European countries over the past decade or so. These twenty countries, including the UK and Ireland featured earlier, account for 92% of all Israel-born people in Europe. This is an unprecedented insight in quality and scope.

### Figure 5. Israel-born populations in Europe (excluding the UK): trend in numbers in the 21st century






Source: See Appendix 1.

Note: (1) In the particular case of France, the number only includes Israel-born without French nationality (citizenship) at the time of birth, i.e. those born in Israel with French nationality and those born in Israel who acquired French nationality after migrating to France are excluded. The actual number of Israel-born could be twice the number shown. (2) For Germany: estimates for 2018 and 2022 originate from the German microcensus, these are actually averages of years 2017-2019 and 2021-2023, respectively. Points in-between are estimated averages. See Appendix 1 for further details.

An increase in the number of Israel-born people can be seen in eighteen out of twenty countries. Belgium and France were the only countries where the number of Israel-born declined over the past decade, by 1%-4%. The largest increases (above 70%) were observed in certain places in Eastern Europe (Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Czechia) and in Ireland, albeit from a relatively low base. Still very significant increases on a scale of 20%-40% took place in Austria, Germany, UK, Netherlands and Spain. The Israel-born population increased by 10%-20% in Scandinavian countries and Hungary, and by 5% in Italy. Italy had the lowest scope of growth of all European countries with a positive increase.

Figure 6. Percentage growth in number of Israel-born around 2013-2023, selected countries of Europe




Source: see Appendix 1. Note: for Germany the exact period is 2018-2022.

## 3 / Israelis outside Israel: Jews versus non-Jews

Most Israelis living abroad are Jewish. National censuses that include questions on religion, such as the British, Canadian and Australian ones, provide this insight. Notably, the American and the French censuses do not ask about religion. When asked, a religion question is typically formulated as 'What is your religion?' and does not presume a degree of religiosity or adherence to ritual. Rather, it is a religious identity question. A religion question normally presents a list of religious groups and asks the respondents to tick a group they mostly identify with. The respondents can declare not having a religion, or, in some instances, having some secular beliefs, and they can also choose not to reply to the religion question at all. By cross-classifying country of birth data of respondents with their religion, a detailed religious profile of an Israel-born population can be built.

A question on religious identity, as practiced in censuses, is not ideal for the identification of Jews. Jewishness can be captured both in terms of religion and ethnicity. Previous research has shown that although many Jews, irrespective of their degree of religiosity, are comfortable describing themselves as Jews in religious and ethnic terms seeing no contradiction between them, a minority may reject a purely religious identification.[21] In practical terms, when it comes to self-identification in surveys and censuses, some secular or agnostic Jews may, and can even be expected to, indicate that they have no religion or skip the religion question altogether. Thus, it can be assumed, with a great degree of certainty, that some Israel-born Jews would understand their Jewishness in ethnic and cultural terms but not religious ones, and would therefore be found in census datasets in the categories 'No religion', 'Religion not stated' and such like.

[21] Readers interested in this question can familiarise themselves with the following empirical materials and perspectives pertaining to this issue: (1) DellaPergola, S. and Staetsky, Daniel. 2022. *What is Judaism: are Europe's Jews a religious or an ancestry group?*, London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research. (2) Staestsky, D. Jews in the 2021 Census of England and Wales: The actual number, the actual developments; (3) Staetsky, D. 'Jewishness: Written in the Body, *Times of Israel*, 26 December 2019.

On this assumption, Table 2 presents two versions of proportions of Jews among the Israel-born living in selected countries (v1 and v2), with the largest and most reliable datasets. The first version (v1) is based only on those cases where Israel-born individuals identified as Jews by religion, whereas the second version (v2) adds those who indicated that they have no religion, have secular perspectives or such like. The truth is most likely to be found between these versions: to quantify this we also offer an average of the two. Analytically, it is impossible to be more precise than that. For different policy purposes, all presented versions can be used. The preference for one over another should be dictated by the precise uses of that figure.

Table 2. Proportions of Jews among Israel-born, selected locations

| Category | England and Wales | | Canada | Australia | Mexico |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Census 2011 | Census 2021 | Census 2021 | Census 2021 | Census 2020 |
| Total Israel-born | 17,778 | 22,546 | 29,395 | 11,035 | 1,203 |
| Jewish by religion | 11,487 | 15,239 | 20,565 | 6,902 | 964 |
| No religion + no response to religion question | 4,122 | 5,393 | 7,505 | 2,687 | 122 |
| v1. % Jewish | 65 | 68 | 70 | 63 | 80 |
| v2. % Jewish + No Religion + no response | 88 | 92 | 95 | 87 | 90 |
| **Average of v1 and v2** | **77** | **80** | **83** | **75** | **85** |

Source: Author's calculations based on (1) England and Wales in 2011: ONS 2011 Census Table CT0289, (2) England and Wales in 2021: ONS 2021 Census Table Country of birth (extended, 190 categories) and Religion (10 categories), (3) Canada: 2021 Census Tables Religion by immigrant status and period of immigration and place of birth: Canada, provinces and territories, (4) Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2021 census data, country of birth by religion cross-classification, (5) Mexico: 2020 Census. INEGI. Censo de Población y Vivienda 2020. Cuestionario Básico.

Averaging across all available datasets, the proportion of Jews among the Israel-born is around 69%, according to the narrow definition (v1) and 90%, according to the broad definition (v2). The average of these definitions is 80%. Note that an indirect estimation of the proportion of Jews out of the Israel-born population in the USA conducted in 1990, found 84%.[22] We have no reasons to believe thar this number has changed significantly since then. Therefore, we propose to use these proportions in application to other communities, where such data on religion are not available. After all, the documented variation in the proportion of Jews is relatively low and Jews constitute a majority among Israel-born people everywhere where data on the religious composition of this group can be sourced.

It would also be reasonable to think of 80% as the best approximation of the proportion of Jews among the total number of Israelis abroad, both those born in Israel and elsewhere. CBS-Israel does not trace the religious composition of all Israelis remaining abroad, but it does document the composition of outflows and inflows of Israelis leaving Israel for more than a year. The aggregation of all information on the religious composition of the balance of outflows and inflows for 1990-2022 is shown in Figure 4.

[22] Cohen, Y. and Y. Haberfeld. 1997. 'The number of Israeli immigrants in the United States in 1990.' *Demography* 34 (2): 199-212.

Figure 7. Religious composition of the balance of outflows and inflows of Israelis leaving Israel for a period of 365 days or more, 1990-2022




Source: author's calculations based on the data on outflows and inflows of Israelis exiting Israel for a minimal period of 365 days, communicated by CBS-Israel in response to a special request.

The picture of the religious composition of Israelis abroad generated on the basis of the data held by CBS-Israel matches rather well onto the data from the national censuses that register Israel-born Israelis. CBS-Israel data indicate that Jews (defined by this source as halachic Jews) constitute 68% of Israelis abroad, whereas 23% are Israelis whose religion in not classified in the Population Registry of the State of Israel. The latter group includes halachic Jews who: (1) could not prove their Jewish status to the religious authorities in Israel (e.g. due to the lack of appropriate documentation); and (2) did not sufficiently care to prove their Jewishness, alongside non-Jews (mostly people of Jewish heritage) who did not subscribe to any religious identity. Taken together, Jews and those whose religion was unclassified constituted 91% of Israelis abroad. The average of the proportion of Jews (68%) and the proportion of Jews and those unclassified (91%) comes to 80%.

## 4 / The Israel-connected population: an attempt at reconstruction

In the first section of this report, we coined the term 'Israel-connected population' that is inclusive of Israelis abroad who: (1) were born in Israel (Group A); (2) immigrated to Israel and spent a certain amount of time there before leaving Israel and settling in their current location abroad (Group B); and (3) children of both of these categories (Group C, subdivided into Group C1: children of Group A, and Group C2: children of Group B). Thus far in this report, we have documented the sizes of Groups A and B, their geographical dispersion across the globe and their religious composition. We now move on to consider their children (Groups C1 and C2).

It is important to understand that there is not a ready method of direct estimation of the number of children born to Israelis outside of Israel based on national censuses from the destination countries. Equally, the Israeli statistical system cannot capture most of them. The children's population is a proverbial black hole. While their parents' status of being 'Israel-born' is clearly visible in national censuses asking about the country of birth, children themselves remain invisible simply because Israel is not their country of birth, so most of them appear as native in the national censuses conducted outside Israel. The Israeli statistical system only captures those who were permanently resident in Israel prior to departure from

Israel: again, Israeli parents of children born outside Israel qualify for that, but most of the children do not.

The number of such children can be estimated indirectly for those censuses and surveys that register the parent-child connection and the detailed family composition of Israeli families, including the number of children in them and the place of births of these children. We analysed six different datasets containing this information in the context of USA, England & Wales, and the Netherlands.[23] These analyses suggest, rather consistently, that the number of Israel-born and their children born outside of Israel can be approximated by a 66:34 ratio. Applying this ratio to the sizes of Groups A and B, as per above, the sizes of Groups C1 and C2 can be estimated. Table 3 shows the estimated sizes of all groups.

Table 3. Israel-connected populations: a summary, 2021-2023

| | Israel-born migrants | Israeli migrants born outside Israel* | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of Israelis | 328,000 (Group A) | 302,000 (Group B) | 630,000 |
| Number of children born abroad | 169,000 (Group C1) | 156,000 (Group C2) | 325,000 |
| **Total** | **497,000 (A+ C1)** | **458,000 (B + C2)** | **955,000** |

Note: (1) rounded numbers. (2) * Former immigrants to Israel now settled abroad. Source: see notes to earlier exhibits and Appendix 2.

In addition to the estimated 630,000 Israelis living outside of Israel, there are estimated to be 325,000 children of these Israelis who were born abroad. Defined in this broad way, the global population of Israelis living outside Israel can be estimated at 955,000.

The number of Israelis living outside of Israel is often contested. Jewish communal leaders and journalists operating across the Jewish Diaspora sometimes come up with a much higher number of Israelis that seems entirely unsupported to demographers working with population data. Looking at the sizes of Groups A, B, C1 and C2 and adding them together may help to comprehend the discrepancy between the popular and the scientific assessments. The answer to a question 'How many Israelis?' depends on how 'Israelis' are defined. If the term 'Israelis' is understood narrowly as just those born in Israel, then the appropriate assessment at this point in time is just over 300,000 (rounded to the nearest hundred thousand). If the term is understood broader as including foreign-born children of Israelis, then the assessment is about 500,000. If the term 'Israelis' is understood in the broadest possible way, including additionally those not born in Israel and their children, the appropriate assessment is between 900,000 and 1 million. None of these answers is wrong, provided the definitions, inclusion criteria and projected policy uses of any number are made explicit.

The last point is especially important. It is appropriate for scholars and policy users of these figures to question and probe any definition. They can, and may even be expected to point out, for example, that groups A, B, C1 and C2 differ in the intensity of their connection to Israel, be it cultural, political, emotional or linguistic. The linguistic connection to Israel of the Israel-born population, for example, is the most immediate, and it may be weaker in their children. It may be weaker still among non-Israel-born Israelis and especially in their children. The chief issue to consider is the concrete uses to which any of these numbers are being put. Penetration of the native Hebrew speaking culture in the European space can be assessed at a level of about 500,000 people (Groups A and C1), so that is the relevant number for

[23] Detailed exposition of sources and methods can be found in Appendix 2.

commercial and educational initiatives targeting confident users of the Hebrew language. In contrast, educational initiatives targeting the enhancement of knowledge of Hebrew would need to take into account groups B and C2 – an additional number close to 500,000. Other uses may not be impacted at all by the degree of linguistic distancing, but by other dimensions. It is worth remembering that this larger population includes Christians, Muslims, immigrants to Israel who only briefly 'passed through' the country on their way to another destination and, indeed, a modest number of children of refugees (e.g. from Somalia and Eritrea) who were born in Israel.

An additional issue is important to bear in mind when interpreting and using the figures above. Our estimation of the size of the population of children of Israel-born and non-Israel-born Israelis living abroad is done using a multiplier (Appendix 2). The multiplier was developed based on the realities of very established Israeli Diaspora populations (USA, UK, the Netherlands). It may not be universally applicable and could provide a poor fit to the emerging Israeli communities in Eastern Europe or the Far East. These communities may have different numerical relationships between first and second generation Israelis, just as they may have different numerical relationships between Israel-born migrants and non-Israel born migrants, as mentioned earlier. Further research should be done to bring additional clarity on this issue. In the meantime, country-specific estimations of the group sizes (A, B, C1 and C2) should be conducted with care, involving professional demographers.

## 5 / Impact of Israelis on Jewish Diaspora communities

Many Jewish communities today contain very significant proportions of Israelis. Israel-born Israelis (i.e. not including their children born outside Israel) are minimally estimated as constituting 20%-50% in certain Scandinavian countries, Spain, Ireland and Bulgaria (six countries), and 10%-20% across eight additional countries in Central and Southern Europe and New Zealand (Figure 8). It must be stressed that, especially when it comes to the impact of Israeli culture rather than a purely demographic impact, these are minimal estimates. Israelis not born in Israel and their children are not taken into account by any of these estimates. If the children of the Israel-born populations are taken into account, the proportion of Israelis in the total Jewish populations grows further.

Whereas it is difficult to be definitive as to what constitutes a small versus a large proportion in a social sense, putting these proportions in the context of the population dynamics and debates of the developed world helps. With rare exceptions, the non-Jewish populations of Western and European countries today are diverse and diversifying. The countries that are amongst the most diverse, as measured by the proportion of foreign-born in their populations, include Germany, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Iceland, and Switzerland. In most of these countries, foreign-born residents comprise close to 20% of the population; in Switzerland, it is higher still at about 30%. In France and many other countries of Southern and Northern Europe the proportion is lower but still in double digits: mostly within the range of 10% to 15%. Beyond Europe, the USA has a foreign-born population of 14%, Canada has 24% and Australia has 29%.[24]

[24] Sources: (1) European countries, except the United Kingdom: Eurostat. 2022. Eurostat Statistics Explained: Migration and migrant population statistics. Data refer to 1 January 2022. (2) United Kingdom: Office for National Statistics. 2022. International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021. (3) United States of America: US Census Bureau. American Community Survey 2021, Table SO501. Selected characteristics of the native and foreign-born populations. (4) Canada: Statistics Canada. 2017. Number and proportion of foreign-born population in Canada, 1871 to 2036. The data are projections from 2016 (most recent year with known data) to 2021. (5) Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2022. Australia's population by country of birth: statistics on Australia's estimated resident population by country of birth. Data refer to 2021.

Figure 8. Israel-born Jews as a proportion of the Jewish population: minimal estimates, 2021-2023




Source: Author's calculations based on figures shown in Table 1 and Jewish population sizes given by (1) UK: Staetsky, L. Daniel. 2024. 'A 'demographic hybrid': haredi demography in the early 21st century', volume edited by David Myers and Nechumi Malovicki-Yaffe, *New Trends in the Study of Haredi Culture and Society* (purdue.edu). (2) Netherlands: Staetsky, L. Daniel. 2025. *Jews in the Netherlands: fifty years of stability and Israelisation*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research. (3) all other countries: DellaPergola, S. 2023. 'World Jewish population, 2022'. *American Jewish Year Book 2023*.
Note. (1) Percentage is calculated on the basis of the Jewish population figures for 01/01/2022 appearing in the American Jewish Year Book, a source of official statistics on Jewish global population size and distribution. There is some uncertainty as to whether or not the whole Israel-born population is accounted for in Jewish population figures. This is due to the inherent difficulty in estimating the migration component. Should some Israel-born be excluded from Jewish population figures, calculating their proportion out of the total number of Jews will result in overestimation. We have calculated the proportion of Israel-born (and their children) as an average of two figures: the proportion obtained on the assumption that all Israel-born are accounted for in Jewish population figures, and the proportion obtained on the basis of the adjusted population figures (assuming that no Israel-born were accounted for in the original figures). We consider the resultant average proportion to be a minimal estimate. (2) It is assumed that Jews constitute 80% of the number of Israel-born and their children.

What is the relevance of this information for judging the social importance of the Israeli element for Jewish populations of the Diaspora? It is simply that this level of immigrant presence is considered to be high and transformative in a cultural and political sense by much

of the European public. Some judge the presence of migrants as enriching and/or economically necessary, or at least unproblematic; others see it as a cultural and political threat, or at least something to carefully monitor. In the past couple of decades, several important works of fiction and political pamphlets expressing such concerns, have been published in Europe alone. Their titles are very telling: *Submission* by Michael Houllebecq, *Germany abolishes itself* by Thilo Sarazzin, and *The strange death of Europe: immigration, identity and Islam*, by Douglas Murray, published in the United Kingdom in 2017.[25] These publications capture the mood of some of the Western public. However, they do not remain uncontested – there are positive and celebratory voices regarding migrants' contribution to the West, and *Bloody foreigners* by Robert Winder and *How migration really works* by Hein de Haas are especially noteworthy. Yet it is a matter of broad consensus across the political spectrum that a cultural shift within Europe and the West is under way, and the presence of foreign-born at a level of 10%-30% of the population translates into this kind of debate.

When it comes to matters internal to Jewish communities today, Jews tend not to have debates that would be similar in tone, particularly those that would put an emphasis on potential or real conflictual or incompatibility. Unlike in the past, the arrival of new migrants into Jewish communities today is commonly seen either positively or neutrally. Concerns and debates exist when it comes to groups marked by different level of religiosity (e.g. regarding what is understood as a need for greater 'integration' of strictly Orthodox Jews, or their attitudes on social issues that are not aligned with the more liberally minded majorities) but not by their different origins *per se*. Israeli emigrants tend to be perceived as very secular by Jewish communities of the Diaspora. Communal debates regarding their integration, when held, stress this aspect and ponder at the nature of the policies of integration. At the same time, Diaspora Jewish culture becomes 'Israelified' with greater visibility, for example, of Israeli products, food culture, and children's names. This, in itself, is often seen as a positive development – something to welcome and of which to be proud. This non-conflictual reality is very infrequently, if ever, commented on but it is not trivial given the intensity of debates around immigration in society at large. The absence of internal Jewish debates at present is, in itself, a signal that Jews commonly perceive themselves as a coherent ethno-religious group or people, notwithstanding the differences of lifestyle, politics, culture and language among them. Still, the cultural transformation of the Jewish Diaspora is underway. With the presence of Israel-connected populations estimated minimally at a level of 10%-20%, for example, and often higher than that, it is possible to consider the cultural evolution of the Jewish Diaspora, and to start asking question about the demographic impact of Israelis on the prospects of Diaspora Jewish populations.

## 6 / Conclusions

This report has offered a picture of the Israeli population living outside Israel in a way that has never previously been done in the history of this subject. A variety of sources, including data collected by the Israeli national statistical authority and statistical authorities across the world, have been brought together to paint a picture of the Israeli population abroad. The insights arising from this are unprecedented in breadth and detail. The following summary points are especially noteworthy.

**Around the year 2022, the population of Israelis living outside of Israel – i.e. people who were either born in Israel or arrived there as immigrants and then left Israel and settled outside of its borders – is estimated at about 630,000.** About 328,000 (52%) of these were born in Israel, and 302,000 (48%) were born elsewhere but moved to Israel at some point in

[25] These were published in France, Germany and the United Kingdom in 2015, 2010 and 2017, respectively.

their lives, before moving on to somewhere else. At the same time, the total population of Israel stood at 9.5 million. It follows that the proportion of Israelis abroad comprises about 6% of the total global population of Israelis. Further, Jewish Israelis, estimated at 80% of all Israelis, comprise about 6% of the Jewish population of the Diaspora. The approximate size of the Israeli population abroad has been known for some time from periodic press releases by the Israeli national statistical authority, CBS-Israel. However, there has been nowhere near as much clarity as to the segmentation of this population into the Israel-born and others, and Jews and non-Jews. Further, this population has never been examined in the broader context of the overall population sizes of Israel and the Jewish Diaspora. The 6% loss to Israel and parallel gain to the Diaspora is a totally novel finding.

The distribution of the Israeli population, as defined above, across the Diaspora, is also not something that was known with certainty. The concentration of Israelis in the USA was suspected, but several new insights have been observed in this study. Today, we can confidently say that **about three-quarters of all Israelis outside of Israel live in the Anglosphere** (USA, Canada, UK, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Ireland), and close to 50% live in the USA.

The four largest Israeli populations abroad are based in the USA, Canada, Germany and the UK. This is not entirely surprising in and of itself: these countries all have strong economies presenting solid opportunities for professional development. Further, they are culturally familiar to Israelis: three of them are English-speaking, a key language of international communication. The more unexpected finding is the number of **Israelis living in Europe and especially in Germany. Today, Germany has the largest population of Israel-born people in Europe. Europe as a whole hosts close to 30% of Israelis abroad. The proportion of Israel-born people living in Europe, including the UK, is much higher than the proportion of the Diaspora Jews living there (16%).**

**The Israeli population abroad is growing** and, unlike in the past, it is now possible to document the pace of its growth in countries where the majority of Israelis live. The American Israeli population has been growing rather modestly in the past decade, but the Canadian, British and German populations of Israel-born Jews have grown at a much faster rate of about 30% at the same time. The Israel-born populations in the Netherlands and Spain have grown even more, by 35%-40%. Moreover, there are smaller Israeli communities in Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Czechia and Ireland that have grown by as much as 75%-135% (all numbers rounded), albeit from very small bases. So, **not only is the European Israeli population quite central numerically, it is also growing rapidly.**

It is not entirely clear when Europe became attractive for Israelis (longer data series are required for that) but the strength of European economies, especially communication and computing technologies and various branches of engineering and medicine, as well as the relative proximity of Europe to Israel, may all play an explanatory role in this development. The recent growth of international Israeli companies that sometimes relocate their staff abroad for extended periods of time, as well as foreign multinationals with offices in Israel who also relocate staff, are undoubtedly factors contributing to the growth of the Israeli population abroad. It should also be noted that several European countries today grant citizenship to Israelis on different ancestry clauses; the impact of these policies on the number of Israelis in Europe has not been investigated so far, but it is reasonable to hypothesise that they may have had an impact.

**There is more than one way of answering the question 'who is an Israeli emigrant?'** This statement does not arise from the context of contemporary identity politics but out of a complex demographic reality. The Israeli statistical authority, CBS-Israel, counts as Israeli emigrants all Israel-born and non-Israel-born citizens who left Israel and settled abroad. This is administratively straightforward and indeed, the demographically correct approach. Such a

definition is needed to maintain the population accounts of the State of Israel in accordance with the rules of official statistics. Yet the reality is that Israelis abroad bring children into the world, and these children cannot be accounted for in official Israeli statistics of emigration. Furthermore, these children tend to remain invisible (as Israelis) in the official statistics of their countries of residence. Censuses and surveys of foreigners typically collect information on people's country of birth, but for children born outside of Israel, this method is inadequate. Detailed analysis of the household composition of Israelis allows the size of this population to be reconstructed. When children of Israel-born and non-Israel born migrants are accounted for, the total number of Israelis across the Diaspora rises to about 955,000. Defined in this way, Israelis abroad constitute about 9% of all people who could reasonably be called Israelis globally (i.e. the combined total of the population living in Israel and Israelis abroad). **Jewish Israelis abroad currently constitute 9% of the population of the Jewish Diaspora**. This too is a novel quantification.

On the other hand, the complication around the question of 'who is an Israeli?' in the context of emigration from Israel, is not novel. Historically and contemporaneously, high estimates are not infrequently circulated by Jewish community leaders, for example. Professional demographers usually come up with lower estimates. Writing on the cusp of the twenty-first century, the eminent demographer of the Jewish Diaspora, Professor Barry Kosmin, **noted that widely varying estimates of the number of Israelis existed at that time across the USA and elsewhere, and attributed them to the lack of definitional clarity.** He argued: "There are several possible explanations for the discrepancy between higher, more popular estimates on one hand, and lower, more scholarly estimates…. on the other hand. Public perceptions do not take into account, for example, the return of many Israelis to Israel… On the other hand, popular estimates may include spouses or children of Israeli-born Jews, even if they themselves have never been to Israel or are not Israeli-born. These and other factors may contribute to 'gross' overestimations of the Israeli-born Jewish population…"[26] Today, almost quarter of a century later, this explanation still resonates. In this report, several definitions of Israelis are presented and quantified. None are wrong and all are usable. What should determine the choice between the several options offered is the specific projected uses of these figures. **Both scholars and policy makers at all levels are encouraged to ask themselves first 'what do we need this number for?' before they ask 'how many Israelis exist?' Different numbers will be more or less correct, depending upon how they are used. All numbers can be wrong, if put to wrong or undefined uses. A naïve question 'how many Israelis are there?' will not do; it has no simple answer.**

The final summary point relates to the demographic and social impact of Israeli populations on Jewish Diaspora populations. Israeli Jews, defined as Israel-born and non-Israel-born without accounting for their foreign-born children, account for about 6% of the Jewish Diaspora. Maximally defined, inclusive of all children born abroad, Israelis constitute today about 9% of the Diaspora. **In several locations in Europe, most notably in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and certain Eastern European and Scandinavian countries, the percentage of those born in Israel among the wider national Jewish population is already in double digits. In many of these locations, the combined share of the Israel-born and their children rises to 20% and above of the Jewish population.** It should be noted that the proportion of Israelis is especially large, and thus particularly transformative in the context of small and medium-size Jewish Diaspora communities. These are very significant percentages suggesting that the Jewish Diaspora is undergoing a significant transformation. When similar percentages of foreign-born people across the West and Europe are observed, they often translate into intense, at times bitter, political conversations about the 'direction of travel' of whole cultures and nations. The presence of Israel-born, or foreign-born Jews, in Jewish communities is not perceived by Jews themselves as sensitive politically today. Still, the

[26] NJPS Methodology Series: Israelis in the United States.

cultural transformation of the Jewish Diaspora is likely to follow on the back of the demographic change.

With respect to this process, there are more questions than answers at the moment. Although the physical presence of Israelis across the Jewish Diaspora has long been acknowledged, its precise scope has not been charted yet, nor has it been examined against the backdrop of the demographic transformation of Western societies. **How does Israeli culture in the broadest sense transform the Jewish Diaspora? Are there signs of cultural unification and 'Israelisation' of the Jewish Diaspora? Have we, perhaps, reached a point in time where the binary status of the terms 'Israel' versus the 'Diaspora' is becoming increasingly irrelevant? What are the Jewish communities that form the vanguard of such a process, and are they located in Europe? Finally, what role does Israeli migration play in maintaining those Diaspora Jewish communities that are currently incapable of demographic growth due to low fertility and advanced ageing? Is physical regeneration of these communities on the cards?**

It must be noted that the term and idea of 'Israelisation' is not new. However, so far, scholarly and journalistic commentary has highlighted the growing centrality of Israel for Diaspora Jews, mostly in a cultural, political and emotional sense. Yet the penetration of Israeli culture into the Diaspora has not gone unnoticed.[27] The economic, political and demographic successes of Israel have often been credited for this. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the Israeli Jewish population has grown and continues to grow, as does its economy. Perhaps, it is time to review the relationship between Israel and the Diaspora, as suggested by Yossi Shain in his book, *Israeli Century*: "The transformation of Israel from the project of the Diaspora to something entirely different is reflected in the dramatic rise of the Jewish State in the last few decades as a major power, both on the world stage and in redefining every facet of Jewish life across the Diaspora." The findings of the project reported here align with this message, and even sharpen it: **has Jewish civilisation reached a point where the Diaspora has become a project of Israel? Has a global Israeli culture begun to emerge?**

Many of these and similar questions fall within the realms of sociology and political science. Specialists in these fields should be encouraged to develop pioneering research projects, but their particulars are beyond consideration in the context of this study which is demographic in nature. In the realm of demography, however, the immediate research agenda can already be outlined now. Given low fertility, ageing and the wide scale of emigration, many European Jewish communities have been declining. The numerical fate of others has been uncertain but is nonetheless expected to decline. Bernard Wasserstein reflected this perception as early as the mid-1990s, in his book *Vanishing Diaspora: the Jews in Europe since 1945.* Noting the very low levels of fertility of European Jews and what Wasserstein saw as a 'withering away' of Judaism and Jewish culture, he concluded that "A realistic demographic projection for European Jewry over the next few decades must… envisage continued steep decline." Interestingly, the presence of haredi Jews was not something that Wasserstein interpreted as demographically promising: "One segment of Jewish society does seem to be demographically healthy and to be able to preserve a distinct identity: the ultra-orthodox. They marry young… and often have families of eight or ten children… But these are a very small percentage of the Jewish people and are mainly concentrated in Israel and the United States. Their family patterns have little bearing on the Jewish future in Europe."[28]

[27] See, for example: (1) Green, T. and Y, Shain. 2016. 'The Israelization of British Jewry: balancing between home and homeland.' *The British Journal of politics and international relations* 18 (4). (2) Khanin, V. Z. 2022. *From Russia to Israel-and back? Contemporary transnational Russian Israeli Diaspora.* Oldenburg: DeGruyter. (3) Shain, Y. 2022. *How the Zionist revolution changed history and reinvented Judaism.* Post Hill Press: New York.

[28] Wasserstein, B. 1996. *Vanishing Diaspora: the Jews in Europe since 1945*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 280-290.

Interestingly, the immigration of Israelis did not register at all on Wasserstein's radar as a potential factor of growth of European Jewish populations. This is an obvious lacuna and needs to be addressed. **It is time for the community of scholars in demography to conduct a reappraisal of European Diaspora realities, with particular attention paid to scenarios of growth and the role that Israeli communities play in it.**

The beginnings of that reappraisal can be found in this report. The need to pay greater attention to forces of population growth in the Jewish Diaspora has similarly been highlighted recently in the context of the Canadian Jewish community.[29] A programme of research run at the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) is dedicated specifically to documenting the sources of growth of European Jewish communities. Two recent reports on the global haredi population, produced as a part of this programme, have shown that the vigorous growth of haredi Jews is helping to reverse the trend of decline in some Diaspora communities and substantially decelerate decline in others.[30] The role of Israeli migration to Europe has not been systematically analysed in a similar manner. A recent report published by JPR on the long-term demographic trajectory of Jews in the Netherlands provided the first evidence of a community that was destined to decline in size since 1945 due to unfavourable demography, but that has managed to escape decline due to immigration and, in particular, Israeli immigration.[31] **Today, the Dutch Jewish community is at the forefront of Israelisation. Detailed demographic inquiries into the state of other Jewish communities, with an eye on the role of Israeli immigration, are both necessary and urgent, not least because an Israeli presence is already well-felt in certain communal institutions, notably Jewish schools.** Unlike the original Diaspora Jewish populations, Israeli populations are relatively young and commonly arrive in the Diaspora at key childbearing ages. As a result, elevated demand for school places in locations favoured by Israelis is only to be expected. Thus, the adequate provision of services by these Jewish schools needs to be predicated on a good grasp of current and future demographic realities. The Dutch inquiry ought to be expanded to cover other Diaspora Jewish communities in Europe. **We maintain that the thesis of a 'vanishing Diaspora', even if it still holds good in its essentials at a European level, needs to be qualified at a country-specific level. Diving deeper into the demography of Israelis abroad, and in Europe in particular, holds a key to that.**

[29] Brym, R. Slavina, A., and Lenton, R. 2020. 'Qualifying the leading theory of Diaspora Jewry: and examination of Jews from former Soviet Union in Canada and the United States.' *Contemporary Jewry* 40: 367-385.
[30] See: (1) Staetsky, L. Daniel. 2024. 'A 'demographic hybrid': haredi demography in the early 21st Century,' volume edited by David Myers and Nechumi Malovicki-Yaffe, *New Trends in the Study of Haredi Culture and Society* (purdue.edu). (2) Staetsky, L. Daniel. 2022. *Haredi Jews around the world: population trends and estimates*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.
[31] Staetsky, L. Daniel. 2025. *Jews in the Netherlands: fifty years of stability and Israelisation*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

## / Appendix 1: Sources

An effort has been made to procure data relating to the same point in time for the maximal number of countries. Many population censuses took place around the world in 2021, so much of the data in this report relate to this point in time. When this was not the case, the data relate approximately to the 2020-2023 period, with several exceptions. Overall, we are confident that the data shown in this report provide a good picture of the number and distribution of Israelis across the globe in the early 2020s. Unless otherwise stated, data relate to the Israel-born population.

For Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, San Marino, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland data originate from: EUROSTAT database, Table: Population on 1 January by age group, sex and country of birth [migr_pop3ctb__custom_11362060].

In the particular case of France, the number only includes Israel-born people without French nationality (citizenship) at the time of birth, i.e. it excludes those born in Israel with French nationality and those born in Israel who acquired French nationality after migrating to France. The definition for France follows a long French tradition of reporting on immigrants' stocks that is different from: (a) the methods of reporting accepted in other countries; and (b) the United Nation's recommended definition that only takes into account the country of birth, and not the nationalities of an individual that can change over the course of their life. Comparisons between the two definitions suggest that the real number of Israel-born people in France could be twice the number produced by the French statistical authority, i.e. around 17,000 (See: Beauchemin, C., Caron, L., Haddad, M. and Temporal, F. 2021. 'International migration: what is measured (and what is not).' *Population & Societies* 594.)

For all other countries, the sources are listed below. Data relate to Israel as country of birth unless otherwise stated.

Armenia: Statistical Committee Republic of Armenia. Data from 2022 Census, obtained by special request.

Argentina: the National Institute of Statistics and Census, 2022 Census. Censo Nacional de Poblacion, Hogares y Viviendas 2022, Resultados definitivos.

Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics, census data. Table: Estimated resident population, Country of birth, Age and sex – as at 30 June 1996 onwards.

Azerbaijan: State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2019 Census. Population Census of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Statistical Yearbook.

Belize: Statistical Institute of Belize. Data from the 2022 Census, obtained by special request.

Canada: Statistics Canada. Census Data: (1) 2001 Census, 2001 Census Topic-based tabulations, (2) 2006 Census, 2006 Census of Canada: Topic-based tabulations (statcan.gc.ca). (3) 2011 Census, 2011 National Household survey: data tables. (4) 2016 Census, Data Table 2016 Census. (5) 2021 Census, Religion by immigrant status and period of immigration and place of birth.

China: Office of the Leading Group of the State Council for the Seventh National Population Census. Data from the 2020 Census. China Population Census Yearbook 2020. Data relate to Israeli nationality.

Costa Rica: National Institute of Statistics and Census of Costa Rica. Data from 2011 Census. Table: Población total nacida en el extranjero por zona y sexo, según país de nacimiento y año de llegada al país.

Croatia: Croatian Bureau of Statistics. Data from 2021 Census, obtained by special request.

Cyprus: Statistical Service of Cyprus. Preliminary data from 2021 Census, obtained by special request.

Georgia: the National Statistics Office of Georgia. Data from 2014 Census, obtained by special request.

Germany: Federal Statistical Office, Germany. Data from the annual microcensus, obtained by special request.

Greece: Hellenic Statistical Authority. Data from 2021 Census, obtained by special request.

Guatemala: The National Institute of Statistics. Data from 2018 Census, obtained by special request.

Hong Kong: The Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong. Data from 2021 Census, obtained by special request. Data relate to Israeli nationality.

Ireland: Central Statistics Office. 2011-2022 Census figures. 2011-2016 Censuses: Table E7053. 2022 Census: Table F5014, obtained by special request.

Japan: Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2020 Census figures. Population Census Basic Complete Tabulations on Portal cite of Official Statistics of Japan. Data relate to Israeli nationality.

Mexico: National Institute of Statistics and Geography-Mexico (INEGI), 2020 Census figures, Table Censo de Población y Vivienda 2020.

Monaco: Monaco Statistics. 2016 Census figures, obtained by special request.

Mongolia: the National Statistics Office of Mongolia, 2020 Census figures, obtained by special request. Data relate to Israeli citizenship.

Montenegro: statistical authority of Montenegro, 2010 Census figures, obtained by special request. Data relate to Israeli citizenship.

New Zealand: Stats NZ. 2006-2018 Census figures. Birthplace (detailed overseas born) and years since arrival in New Zealand by age and sex.

Panama: National Institute of Statistics and Census. 2023 Census. Table 5: Población nacida en el extranjero en la República, por grupos de edad, según sexo y país de nacimiento: Censos 2023.

Philippines: Philippine Statistics Authority. 2020 Census. Foreign Citizens by Country of Citizenship, Region, Province, and Highly Urbanized City: Philippines, 2020. Data relate to Israeli citizenship, only those for whom Isarel citizenship is a single type of citizenship are included.

Poland: Statistics Poland. 2011 Census. Table 10. Population by national-ethnic identification and country of birth, gender and type of place of residence, obtained by special request. 2021 Census did not inquire about country of birth.

Portugal: Statistics Portugal. 2021 Census figures, obtained by special request.

Russia: Federal State Statistics Service (ROSSTAT), 2021 Census, Volume 4, Table 3, population by citizenship and place of birth. Data relate to persons with Israel as a country of birth, provided that they do not possess Russian citizenship.

San Marino: Statistical authority of San Marino (Ufficio Informatica, Tecnologia, Dati e Statistica), obtained by special request.

Serbia: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2022 Census figures, obtained by special request.

South Africa: estimated on the basis of: Graham, D. 2020. *The Jews of South Africa in 2019: identity, community, society, demography.* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

Spain: Instituto Nacional de Estadistika-INEBase. Table 36967.

Thailand: National Statistical Office, Thailand.

Trinidad and Tobago: Central Statistical Office of Trinidad and Tobago. 2011 Census. Table: 2011 Population and Housing Census data on Usual Residents Born Abroad, by Country of Birth.

United Kingdom. Census data. (1) 2001 Census: Graham, D. 2015. *Britain's Israeli Diaspora: a demographic portrait.* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research. (2) 2011 Census: Office for National Statistics, Table CT0289; Scotland's Census, Table AT003; NISRA Table QS206NI. (3) 2021 Census: Office for National Statistics Census 2021 Table -Country of birth (extended); (2) Scotland: author's estimate, applying growth rate in the number of Israel-born in England and Wales to 2011 number in Scotland (the real number was not available at the time of publication); NISRA Table MS-A18.

United States of America: U.S. Census Bureau. American Community Survey and Census data. (1) Cohen, Y. 2011. Size and selectivity of Israeli-born immigrants in OECD countries. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 52 (1-2): 45-62. (2) ACS Table B05006: Place of Births for the Foreign-Born population in the United States. (3) ACS 5-Year Estimates Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), Microdata - Census Bureau Data Table.

## Imputations

Some imputations were made for those countries where the efforts to get the actual data failed. In several countries, data on Israel as country or birth or nationality was fundamentally non-existent in the population statistics of these countries (e.g. Brazil). In other cases, statistical offices could not be reached (e.g. India). Imputations were made taking the unknown countries' resemblance in population size as well as economic and political terms to countries with known figures.

Latin America: a figure for Brazil (1,319) is an average of the known figures for Mexico and Argentina. A figure for Guatemala (105) was imputed for each of the following countries:

Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Paraguay. An average (7) of figures for Trinidad and Tobago (8) and Belize (5) was imputed for each of the following: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Barbados, and the Bahamas.

Asia: a figure for India (505) is an average of the known figures for China (549) and Japan (460). A known figure for Hong Kong (422) was imputed for each of the following: South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. A figure of 7 was imputed for each of the following: Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos. A figure for Thailand is known to the national statistical office but could not be isolated due to the existing policies. Results of the 2010 population census of Thailand (National Statistical Office. 2012. The population and housing survey, Table 5), specifies selected countries of origin for people possessing foreign nationality, with the smallest allowed number being 1,206 (people with Hong Kong nationality in Thailand). Israel is included in the remainder total of about 30,000. Special imputation has not been made for Thailand; instead an overall imputation of 1,000 cases was applied to Asia as a whole, to compensate for the lack of information for Thailand as well as possibly some other places where small number of Israelis may exist (Malaysia, Indonesia etc).

Post-Soviet states in Asia: an average (117) of known figures for Georgia (181) and Azerbaijan (52) was imputed for each of the following: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan.

Post-Soviet states in Europe: a known figure for Russia (155) was also imputed for each of the following: Ukraine and Belarus. Special care is recommended with figures in this region due to the ongoing political conflict.

## / Appendix 2: Estimation of Israel-connected populations

The calculations below represent an attempt to reconstruct the population of children born outside of Israel to Israelis abroad. Certain censuses and surveys, featured in this appendix, enable such investigations.

The 'Israel-connected population' is a notion used in a broad sense to describe: (1) the population born in Israel (Group A); (2) the population of people not born in Israel who immigrated to Israel and spent a certain amount of time there before leaving Israel and settling in their current location (Group B); and (3) children born to these populations (collectively Group C, with Group C1 being children of Israel-born and Group C2 being children of former immigrants to Israel who are now settled abroad). The calculations below estimate the proportionate shares of Groups A and C1 in the A+C1 universe. The proportionate shares of Groups B and C2 and the B+C2 universe are impossible to estimate directly with the means available to us at present. It can be tentatively assumed, in our view, that these shares are not very different from each other. We explicitly admit that this last assumption should be tested further – this is an obvious avenue for future work. All calculations below relate to Groups A and C1.

1. Estimation for England and Wales in 2021. In 2021, the Census of England and Wales registered the presence of 22,546 individuals born in Israel. Further investigation of the household composition of these people revealed the presence of 12,051 individuals who were born outside Israel to an Israeli parent. Thus, the Israel-connected population (namely Groups A + C1, as defined above) amounts to 34,597 (22,546+12,051). It follows that the Israel-born population (Group A) constitutes 65% of all Israel-connected individuals in England and Wales in 2021 (22,546/34,597*100) and children born to it outside Israel (Group C1) constitute 35% (12,051/34,597*100). (Sources: (1) ONS Census 2021 Table – Country of birth (extended); and (2) ONS Census 2021 Commissioned table CT21_0327).

2. Estimation for England and Wales in 2011. Detailed investigation of the household composition of the Israel-born population was not conducted in 2011 but some approximations are possible based on the publicly available data. In 2011, the Census of England and Wales documented the presence of 11,498 Israel-born Jews by religion with Israeli citizenship (a version of Group A) and, in addition, the presence of 4,738 Jews by religion with Israeli citizenship who were not born in Israel (a version of Group C1). Both children of the Israel-born segment, themselves born outside Israel (Group C1) and immigrants to Israel who left Israel (Group B), are expected to be found among the latter unless they renounced their Israeli citizenship. The exact share of Group B cannot be estimated. Thus, the Israel-connected population (Groups A and C1) sums to 16,236 Jews by religion. The Israel-born population (Group A) constitutes 71% of all Israel-connected Jews by religion (11,498/16,236*100) in 2011, and children of the Jewish Israel-born population (Group C1) constitute 29% (4,738/16,236*100). (Based on: Graham, D. 2015. *Britain's Israeli diaspora: a demographic profile*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research).

3. Estimation for the Netherlands in 2022. In 2022, the number of Israel-born in the population registration system of the Netherlands came to 7,008 (Group A). In addition, the system registered 4,639 persons who were not born in Israel themselves but for whom at least one parent was born in Israel (Group C1). Both groups in total (A+C1) came to 11,647. It follows that the Israel-born segment (Group A) constitutes 60% of the entire Israel-connected population (7,008/11,647*100), and the children of those born in Israel (Group C1) constitute 40% (4,639/11,647*100). (Based on: (1) Staetsky, L. D. 2024. *Jews in the Netherlands: fifty years of stability and Israelisation*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, (2) CBS-Israel commissioned data on long-term emigration).

4. Estimation for the USA in 1990. An estimation based on the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey in the USA identified 63,000 Israel-born Jewish adults and 7,000 Israel-born children in the American Jewish population. Thus, the total number of Israel-born (Group A) could be estimated at 70,000 persons (63,000+7,000). Additionally, 23,000 USA-born children were present across the households of Israel-born individuals (Group C1). Groups A and C1 together are estimated at 93,000 (70,000+23,000). The Israel-born segment (Group A) constitutes 75% of the total (70,000/93,000*100) and their USA-born children constitute 25% of it (23,000/93,000*100). The estimation was based on a sample of 2,441 Jewish households containing 6,514 individuals. The exact number of Israel-born in this sample could not be reconstructed from the available reports but it would have been less than 100 individuals (Based on: (1) Kosmin, B. 1998. Israelis in the United States: Reconciling Estimates with NJPS; (2) Kosmin, B. et al. 1991. Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey. Council of Jewish Federations; (3) Marketing Systems Group. 1991. 1990 Survey of American Jews. Methodological Report).

5. Estimation for the USA in 2020-2022. In 2020, the American Community Survey (ACS 5-Year Estimates Public Use Microdata Sample, 2020) recorded 166,132 individuals born in Israel (weighted by person-weight). Further, 87,552 individuals declared Israeli ancestry (as a first or a second ancestry) but their place of birth was not in Israel. Thus, the Israel-connected population (namely Groups A + C1) amounts to 253,684 (166,132+87,552). Therefore, the Israel-born population (Group A) constitutes about 65% of all Israel-connected individuals in the USA in 2020, defined here are all Israel-born, and in addition, those claiming Israeli ancestry (166,132/253,684*100). Individuals born outside of Israel but claiming Israeli ancestry (an absolute majority of them are born in the USA) represent the generation of children born to emigrant Israelis. Numerically, their proportion is about 35% of the total Israel-connected population (87,552/253,684*100). (Based on: ACS 5-Year Estimates Public Use Microdata Samples 2019-2022, Microdata - Census Bureau Datasets).

6. Estimation for Germany in 2017-2023. In years 2017-2019, the annual German microcensus recorded 20,000-21,000 individuals born in Israel, and in addition, 7,000-10,000 individuals born in Germany to people born in Israel. Thus, the Israel-born population (Group A) constitutes about 71% of all Israel-connected individuals in Germany (Groups A and C1 combined) in 2017-2019 (average). In years 2022-2023, the microcensus captured 30,000-31,000 individuals born in Israel and 20,000 individuals born in Germany to people born in Israel. The share of Group A is close to 66% in these years. The annual German microcensus covers 1% of the population so there is some volatility in its estimates of small population groups. Therefore, the estimates should be treated with care.

The approximate average ratio of Groups A:Group C1 found across different sources featured above is 66:34.

It should be noted that a reconstruction of the second-generation size of Israelis in the USA (based on the 1990 Census) rendered A:C1 proportions broadly similar to those presented above. See: Cohen, Y., and Y. Haberfeld. 1997. 'The number of Israeli immigrants in the U.S. in 1990.' *Demography* 34: 199-212, especially Table 7.

It should be further noted that a reconstruction of second-generation size of Israelis globally at the end of 1987, based on the application of fertility and mortality rates used for population projections, also generated very similar A:C1 proportions. See: Paltiel, A. 1990. 'Indicators of the number of Israeli residents abroad.' *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* 2 (reprint), page 11.

The author's reconstruction based on the 2013 Pew Research Center survey of American Jews (a sample of 3,475 American Jews by religion or Jews with no religion, containing 50 adult Israel-born Jews as well as 37 US-born children and 6 Israel-born children living in their households) rendered similar A:C1 proportions, based on small numbers. (Based on: analysis of the original 2013 dataset underlying the Pew Research Center publication 'A Portrait of Jewish Americans',. The 2020 Pew Research Center survey of American Jews does not allow such analyses to be conducted.

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- The Humanitarian Trust
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## / About the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)

The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) is a London-based research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in the United Kingdom and across Europe by conducting research and informing policy development in dialogue with those best placed to positively influence Jewish life. Web: www.jpr.org.uk. Its European Jewish Demography Unit exists to generate demographic data and analysis to support Jewish community planning and development throughout the continent.

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