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ETHNIC INEQUALITY IN UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN ISRAEL

Yossi Shavit, Yinon Cohen, Haya Stier, and Svetlana Bolotin

Ethnic Stratification in Israel

THIS is a study of the changes in the patterns and the scope of ethnic inequality of university graduates in Israel which have occurred since the 1960s. Ethnic stratification is the single most common research subject in Israeli sociology. Several studies have examined the trends and changes in educational inequality among different ethnic groups[1]; they have all assumed a linear trend of change in ethnic differentiation in education. The most common hypothesis is that, in time, the educational attainment of Mizrahim (Israelis of Afro-Asian origin) will rise, as they overcome the cultural and economic barriers which, it was assumed, had impeded their progress. The undisputed conclusion of these studies was that whereas ethnic inequality in the rates of primary and secondary education had declined, the ethnic gap at the post-secondary level remained quite stable throughout the 1970s.

The present paper contributes to this literature in several important respects. First, we employed the most recent data available and extended the study of changes in ethnic inequality in university education to the cohorts who attended university during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, we found that these changes were not linear and that the size of the ethnic gap oscillated during the period under consideration. Third, we show that much of the change, especially among men, was due to the rates of Ashkenazi (Jews of European or American origin) students who obtained university degrees. Fourth, we demonstrate that among Mizrahim, there are interesting differences between those of Asian and those of North African origin. The proportion of university graduates among the former has recently increased twofold, while it has remained rather stable among the latter. Thus, we can see the emergence of an ethnic gap in university

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education within the Mizrahi groups, a gap which has been overlooked by previous published research. Finally, we tried to explain some of these changes by relating them to changes in the economic returns of higher education, the financial crisis of Israeli universities, and the waves of emigration from Israel during the period under study.

Israel is an ethnically-stratified society consisting of several Jewish ethnic groups and of three major non-Jewish religious groups (Muslims, Christians, and Druse). Jews constitute about 80 per cent of the population and virtually all the rest are Arabs. The Jewish population is divided about equally between the Mizrahim, who came mainly from Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East, and Ashkenazim, who are mainly of European origin.[2] The Israeli Arabs suffer from severe discrimination in employment, and in the allocation of social services and they occupy the lower social strata.[3] Among the Jews, Ashkenazim are more privileged than the Mizrahim. They have fewer children (except for those who are religiously orthodox), a higher socio-economic status, and their mean levels of attainment are also higher.[4] We excluded the non-Jewish minorities from the analysis in this study because the Labour Force Survey data, which we used, includes too few of them.[5]

Scholars agree that the social disadvantages of Mizrahim have their roots in the way they were received by the Ashkenazi establishment during the early years of the State, when they arrived in waves of mass migration; it is now commonly believed that the veteran Ashkenazim treated them with less consideration than they treated Ashkenazi immigrants. Discrimination was especially noticeable in housing and education, which were both centrally administered in the new State. Immigrants were often assigned to towns, villages, and neighbourhoods with little regard for their own preferences. Typically, Mizrahim were more often than not dispatched to the new development towns and to villages in the periphery. Some of these localities had very poor infrastructures and soon became pockets of poverty and despair. Ashkenazim were more likely to live in the older established towns such as Tel Aviv and Haifa and to enjoy the superior social services and employment opportunities which they offered.[6] Several students of the inequality between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim attribute it to the legacy of this original sin, the failure to absorb the former group properly.[7]

The Mizrahi groups, however, are far from homogeneous. There exist among them several important differences which must be noted. First, the Iraqi immigrants came to Israel in the very early 1950s — early enough for many of them to find housing in the urban centres of the country — while the North Africans arrived in the mid 1950s and in the 1960s when it was difficult to obtain housing in the more desirable areas, and they were forced to go to the periphery.[8] Second,

many of the affluent and well-educated members of the Jewish communities in North Africa migrated to France, while those who came to Israel tended to have had limited schooling.[9] Consequently, Israelis of North African extraction are among the least successful ethnic groups in the country.

Nevertheless, during the past five decades there have also been forces which drove the ethnic groups towards integration and merger. The most important behavioural indicators of this are the patterns of intermarriage. About a quarter of all marriages between Jews in Israel are 'mixed' marriages between a Mizrahi and an Ashkenazi, and the proportion who intermarry has been rising.[10] There has also been a growing acceptance by Ashkenazim of Mizrahi culture — including music, food, and ritual practices. Since the mid-1970s, when the Likud party came to power, the proportion of Mizrahim in the political elite has increased. In 1999, more than half the ministers in the government are of Mizrahi extraction, more than their share in the population. However, despite these developments, the ethnic gap in academic and higher education persists.

Ethnic Educational Inequality Until the 1970s

Before the establishment of the State of Israel, the immigrants from Eastern and Central Europe began laying the foundations of the social institutions which were to constitute the Jewish State. Primary education was predominantly academic and nearly universally attended, while secondary schools generally followed the model of the German *gymnasium* — elitist, academic schools which prepared pupils for solid culture, national service, and for the *bagrut* (matriculation) diploma which is a precondition for university admission. Many of the Jewish children from the Middle East and North Africa, who arrived soon after the foundation of the State, did not do well in these European-style schools. Their average scores on nationally-standardized achievement and scholastic aptitude test scores were lower than the Ashkenazi mean by a full standard deviation,[11] and their drop-out rates were very high. Academic secondary schools (the successors of the *gymnasium*) were not eager to admit Mizrahim fearing that they might lower the school's success record. The solution was the very rapid expansion of vocational schools, which had low academic requirements and which did not lead to a *bagrut*.[12] Mizrahi children were encouraged, by various administrative means, to enroll in vocational — rather than in academic — schools, so that in the late 1960s, only a quarter of these pupils in the first year of secondary education attended academic schools, compared with 50 per cent of Ashkenazi children.[13]

The expansion of vocational education resulted in two important changes in ethnic educational inequality. First, it increased the rate of secondary school attendance and completion in all ethnic groups, dramatically reducing the ethnic gaps at this stage of the educational system.[14] Second, it maintained ethnic inequality in the proportion of Mizrahim obtaining *bagrut* and in the proportion in which they attended post-secondary education and graduated from university. Nahon[15] analyzed data drawn from the 1983 census; he found that, among native Israeli Jews and those who immigrated by the age of nine, ethnic inequality in the rates of university graduation was very stable across age groups, especially among those who had been educated in Israel since the establishment of the State. Using the same data, Shavit[16] studied change in ethnic educational gaps among men born between 1942 and 1958; he found that during that period there was no change in the rate of Mizrahim attending post-secondary education (defined as 13 years of schooling or more) and a small decline in the Ashkenazi rate.

Recent Changes In Ethnic Educational Stratification

Since the 1970s, there have been several changes in the school system, which may have contributed to a reduction in the ethnic gap in university enrolment. First, it seems that the gap between mean scores of Ashkenazim and Mizrahim on standardized tests declined by about half during the 1970s.[17] Second, post-primary schooling is slowly rolling back its vocational component and is expanding the relative share of academic tracks. In 1980, 43 per cent of upper-secondary pupils were in academic tracks, but by 1992 this proportion had risen to 48 per cent.[18] During the same period, vocational schools showed an increase in the numbers of their pupils who attend matriculation-bound tracks from 50.6 per cent in 1980, to 54.8 per cent in 1992.[19]

Cohen and Haberfeld[20] recently examined changes in the ethnic educational gap. They employed Income Survey data for three distinct time points: 1975, 1982, and 1992. Their conclusions varied according to the age at which education was measured. For example, when measured at ages 35–39, they noted that the gap between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim is smaller than when measured at younger ages. They attributed this result to differences between the ethnic groups in the age-distribution of graduation. Mizrahi men, they argued, tend to complete university studies later than Ashkenazim do. The methodological implication of this situation is that educational attainment, especially university graduation, should be measured at later ages.

Our present study goes beyond earlier ones in several important respects. First, we define ethnicity in more detail than was described in most previous research, and we distinguish between Mizrahim of Asian (mostly Iraqis and Iranians) and of North African origins. Second, we measure education at a comparatively mature age — 30–34 — because by then the vast majority of all groups have completed their university education. Third, rather than focus on specific and distinct cohorts or time points, we study the changes continuously by measuring university graduation rates for all birth cohorts born between 1946 and 1964.

Methods, Data, and Variables

In the first part of the analysis we employed data from 15 Labour Force Surveys (LFS) for the years 1980–94. These surveys are the only repeated cross-sectional data sets available in Israel. We pooled them to estimate the proportions of university graduates in cohorts born between 1946 and 1964 who were 30–34 years old. Data published by the Israeli Council on Higher Education for the 1980s show that about 25 per cent of university students are 30 years or older at the time of graduation, but that 90 per cent graduate by the age of 34.[21] Our cohorts would have made the transition into higher education starting in the mid- to late 1960s and ending in the early 1990s.

All estimates are computed for Israeli-born respondents. Immigrants were not included because many of them did not study in Israel. Some Israeli studies of education include immigrants who came to Israel when they were young: for example, Matras, Noam, and Bar-Haim[22] include those who had arrived by the age of 14 — assuming that they had spent the most important part of their education in Israel. We prefer to exclude all immigrants on the grounds that even those who arrived as children often suffer (or benefit) from various idiosyncratic factors which affect their level of attainment compared to native Israelis.

Variables

The LFS include two measures of education: number of school years completed and the type of last school attended. The categories of the later variable are: primary, lower-secondary, vocational secondary, academic secondary, yeshiva (an institute of religious education at the secondary or higher level), post-secondary technical school, other non-academic post-secondary school, and university. There are no available data on whether or not respondents graduated from the last school they attended and whether they obtained a diploma. We assumed that all respondents whose last educational



FIGURE 1. Cohort proportions of university graduates: Israeli-born Jews, aged 30–34 at time of survey. *Data: Labour Force Surveys 1980–96*

establishment was a university and who had completed 15 or more years of schooling are university graduates.[23]

In addition to education, we measured gender, year of birth, and ethnic origins. As stated earlier, Ashkenazim are defined as Jews whose parents were born in Europe or America. We distinguished between two major groups of Mizrahim: those whose parents immigrated from Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon and other countries in the Middle East, and those whose parents came from North Africa. We refer to the former group as Asians and to the latter as North Africans. Native respondents whose parents were also born in Israel are merged with the Ashkenazim on the assumption that most are descendants of parents who had migrated to Israel in the pre-State era, when the vast majority of immigrants were Ashkenazim.

Changing Ethnic Inequality In University Education

We began the analysis by looking at the proportions of successive cohorts who graduated from university. These proportions are shown, separately, for men and women, in Figure 1. We noted a decline in the proportions between the cohorts born in the mid-1940s and those born in the mid-1950s. The decline is larger for men than for women. Among men, the proportion declines from about 25 to about 14 per cent. For women, it declines from about 22 to about 17 per cent. For the cohorts born between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s the proportion increases again but does not regain its original level. The



FIGURE 1A. Cohort proportions completing university by age 30–34: Israeli-born Jewish men. *Data: Labour Force Surveys 1980–96*



FIGURE 1B. Cohort proportions completing university by age 30–34: Israeli-born Jewish women. *Data: Labour Force Surveys 1980–96*

observed variation in these rates is due, in part, to cohort differences in ethnic composition. The earlier cohorts consisted primarily of Ashkenazim whereas in later cohorts, Mizrahim constitute the majority. The declining proportion of Ashkenazim, the more educated

ethnic group, in successive birth cohorts may explain the overall decline in university graduation. In the remaining figures we present cohort differences in the proportion of graduates by ethnicity, separately.

Figure 1A presents cohort differences in the proportions of graduates for Ashkenazi men and for the two Mizrahi groups, those of Middle Eastern and those of North African origins. The Ashkenazi curve shows a peculiar pattern. It is quite flat at first, then drops by about a third to 22 per cent, and then rises to a new and higher level at about 35 per cent. To the best of our knowledge and despite its large size, this dramatic decline has not been noted in previous published research. The decline is robust and appears for these cohorts irrespectively of whether we employ the pooled data set for the 17 Labour Force Surveys (1980–96) or any single one of the surveys of the 1990s. Nahon[24] analyzed data, which were collected in 1983, when the birth cohorts of the mid-1950s were in their late twenties. He noticed the decline but assumed that it represented censoring, and that it would disappear once these cohorts would have completed their educational attainment process. As noted above, Shavit,[25] who saw a gradual decline in the Ashkenazi rates of post-secondary education, suggested that it might have been due to the increased proportion of Ashkenazim who turned to vocational, rather than to academic secondary education. The present analysis refutes both these possibilities. It is clearly not a matter of the censoring since all cohorts are observed at the same ages and are about equally censored. Nor could it have resulted from changing track placement of Ashkenazim. Whereas the drop in university graduation rates is large and abrupt, the decrease in the proportion of Ashkenazim attending *bagrut*-bound tracks was very gradual, decreasing by only about 15 per cent between 1972–73 and 1981–82.[26]

The patterns of change in the rates of university graduation for the two Mizrahi groups show differences between them. Among men of North African origin, the rates rose until the cohort born in 1957 and have been stable since then at under 10 per cent. Men of Middle Eastern origin began with rates higher than those of the North Africans, but their rate declined later, and they converged with the North Africans for several cohorts. However, in the youngest three cohorts the Asian rates increased rapidly — leaving the North Africans far behind. Interestingly, the Asian decline is contemporaneous with the decline seen for *Ashkenazi* men and may be due to similar causes.

Turning to the figures for women (Figure 1B), we see that except for some fluctuations for the cohorts born in 1946, 1948, and 1950, the rate of university graduation among Ashkenazi women has been quite stable, at about 30 per cent, throughout the period under study. The proportion of university graduates among the two groups of Mizrahi

women is much smaller. Except for some fluctuations involving the four oldest cohorts, both curves show slight inclines over time. However, in the youngest cohorts, the Asian curve seems to rise at an accelerated rate whereas the North African rate flattens, remaining at below 10 per cent.

To sum up, ethnic inequality in the rates of university graduation changed in an irregular fashion over time, and there were differences along gender lines. Ashkenazim were by far more likely than the Mizrahim to graduate but within the Mizrahi segment there are interesting differences: in recent cohorts Asians are about twice more likely than North Africans to graduate. Thus, the ethnic gap between Ashkenazim and Asians seems to have narrowed, but the gap between North Africans on the one hand, and Ashkenazim and Asians, on the other, is widening. Among men, there was a sharp decline in the graduation rates for both Ashkenazim and Asians who were born in the mid-1950s. In the next section several possible explanations are considered to account for this unexpected and previously unnoticed decline.

A Digression on the Cohorts of the 1950s

Some members of the cohorts born in the mid-1950s would have started their university studies in the mid-1970s after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when the Israeli economy was undergoing a severe slowdown, aggravated by the oil crisis which that war had precipitated. The authorities of the country had to take large loans for the acquisition of materiel and supplies and had then to repay the loans from the country's annual budget funds — at the expense of provision for social services, including education.[27]

That severe economic crisis could have affected the educational attainment processes in several ways. First, those who might have intended to embark on university studies before the Yom Kippur War intervened, perhaps calculated that a university degree would not necessarily lead to well-paid employment in the current economic climate and they had less incentive to invest in higher education. This hypothesis is tested in Figure 2 in which we plot the changes in the effects of secondary and tertiary years of education on men's logged income from employment at the ages of 30 to 40 for various survey years. The cohorts born in the mid-1950s would have made the decisions regarding their university education in the middle or late 1970s. We assumed that when these individuals had to decide whether or not to go to university, they were aware of the current returns of university degrees for cohorts who had recently obtained such qualifications, for those who were somewhat older than themselves — say, from 30 to 40 years old at the time.



FIGURE 2. Effects of secondary and tertiary years of education on log income from work: Jewish men aged 30–40 by year. *Data: Family Income Surveys 1970–82*

The higher the perceived returns, the more likely they would be to attend university. We do not have measures of perceptions but can estimate the actual returns of education for those who were 30–40 years old in various years. We used data drawn from Income Survey information for the years 1970, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982.[28]

The pattern of returns of schooling appear to explain at least part of the puzzle of the declining rates of university graduates among Ashkenazi and Asian men born in the 1950s. Between 1970 and 1976, rates of returns of secondary and tertiary education changed in opposite directions: during 1970–73, returns of higher education increased while returns of secondary education declined slightly. In the following three years, 1973–76, the trend reversed itself: returns of university education declined by more than 28 per cent while the returns of secondary education increased by 12 per cent. In other words, the economic incentives for university education declined following the 1973 war. The sharpest decline in university graduation occurred among Ashkenazi men who were expected to enroll in universities after the 1973 war. It is plausible that some of them decided not to attend university because, for a time, the economic returns of that investment were declining, and the returns of secondary education were on the rise. Under these conditions, it might have seemed rational not to go to university.

TABLE 1.
Number of Matriculates by Year

Year	Number of Matriculates
1963–64	*7,255*
1964–65	*8,539*
1965–66	*8,182*
1966–67	*10,732*
1967–68	*10,514*
1968–69	*10,511*
1969–70	*11,043*
1970–71	*11,843*
1971–72	*11,955*
1972–73	*12,600*
1973–74	*12,500*[a]
1974–75	*12,810*
1975–76	*13,320*
1976–77	*13,130*
1977–78	*13,500*
1978–79	*13,500*
1979–80	*14,000*

NOTES
[a]Estimate from Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, 1974.
Exact number not known.
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, 1965–81

A second way in which the crisis of the mid-1970s might have reduced university attendance was through the cuts in financial allocations to universities. Until recently university education in Israel was financed primarily by the State. In the early 1970s the national budget for higher education grew at an annual rate of about 13 per cent in real terms. However, in the three years following the Yom Kippur War, there was a striking decline in that budget's growth rate to three per cent in 1974, four per cent in 1975, and only one per cent in 1976. The average annual increase throughout the 1970s and 1980s was one per cent.[29] This happened at a time when the number of *bagrut* holders was increasing at a rate faster than that in the late 1960s. In 1969–70 there were about 11,000 male and female matriculants, who would have entered university beginning in 1973–74. In 1974–75 there were about 13,000 *bagrut* holders — an increase of 16 per cent in five years (Table 1). In the years 1966–69 the number of *bagrut* holders did not increase but even declined slightly. The 1970s also witnessed an increase in the demand by women, especially Ashkenazi women, for higher education. It seems plausible that a combination of these factors created a bottleneck in university admissions, which may have resulted in the decline and stagnation of the university graduation rates we noted.

A third possible explanation for the observed decline in the proportion of male university graduates for the cohorts born in the 1950s is the disproportionate emigration of would-be university

graduates. In the following few paragraphs we explore the hypothesis that there was a sizable emigration of these and that the emigrants tended to be more educated, on average, than those who remained in Israel. The analysis was confined to Ashkenazim who left Israel because, as we shall show, they constituted the bulk of emigrants in these cohorts and because we were unable to obtain sufficient data on other groups of emigrants.

After the 1973 War, emigration from Israel was at its peak.[30] It is likely that many of the birth cohorts of the early 1950s, who were demobilized during 1974–79, left the country during those years. Indeed, that was the impression in Israel in the years following the Yom Kippur War, a period when Jewish emigration was viewed as a salient social problem both in Israel and in the American Jewish community.[31] In those years, issues of emigration were often discussed by popular and scholarly writers as well as by political leaders. In June 1976, Menahem Begin (then the leader of the opposition) told the Knesset: 'Since the State was founded, we have lost [through emigration] four divisions of 12 brigades'.[32] A few months earlier, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had referred to emigrants as 'deserters' and 'a fallout of weaklings'[33] — implying not only that Jewish emigration was a major social problem, but also that emigrants were not drawn from the cream of Israeli Jewry, at least with respect to their Zionist values.

Rabin's assertion has been contradicted by empirical studies which found that those emigrants were characterized by superior education and socio-economic status.[34] In addition, it was noted that emigrants were disproportionately of Ashkenazi origin, tended to leave Israel in their twenties and early thirties, and that more men than women tended to emigrate.[35] An evaluation of the selective emigration hypothesis requires data on a) the number of Israeli-born Ashkenazi men who resided outside Israel at a given date, and b) their level of education. Such data are available for the United States, the main country of destination for Israeli emigrants, but not for other countries. The Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 1990 U.S. Census enabled us to estimate the number of Israeli-born Jews in the U.S. by age[36] as well as their schooling and self-reported ancestry.

In the absence of data on other countries of destination, we used the U.S. data to characterize the Israeli-born emigrant population living in all countries of destination in 1990. Clearly, this involves some strong assumptions. The first is that the composition of all Israeli emigrants was identical to that of the Israelis residing in the United States. The proportion of Ashkenazim among Israeli-born emigrant men in the United States was estimated at 75 per cent.[37] Second, we assumed that the United States attracted half of all Israeli-born male emigrants. This assumption is consistent with the Israeli CBS estimates

TABLE 2.
Percentage with a Bachelor or Higher Degree, by Birth Cohort: Israeli-born Men of Ashkenazi Origin in Israel and Abroad

	Israeli Residents		*Emigrants*			*Isr. + Emig.*
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*
Cohort	*# born*	*% B.A.*	*# abroad*	*% abroad*	*% B.A.*	*% B.A.*
1945	5,000	30.0	1,085	27.7	54.5	35.3
1946	5,135	30.1	1,394	37.3	61.8	39.1
1947	5,063	28.8	969	23.7	68.9	36.5
1948	6,900	28.0	1,175	20.5	39.5	30.0
1949	8,750	30.8	1,440	19.7	60.5	35.7
1950	12,464	33.2	1,892	15.2	42.8	34.7
1951	12,374	31.8	2,631	21.3	51.3	36.0
1952	11,987	31.0	1,949	16.3	41.3	32.7
1953	11,152	25.6	1,985	17.8	43.7	28.8
1954	9,949	30.0	2,048	20.1	44.0	32.9
1955	9,814	27.2	1,715	17.5	61.3	33.2
1956	9,493	21.3	1,998	21.0	46.9	26.7
1957	9,482	24.6	1,728	18.2	40.5	27.4
1958	9,046	35.3	1,233	13.6	42.5	36.3
1959	8,865	32.8	1,107	12.5	49.9	34.9
1960	8,992	33.2	1,886	21.0	46.9	36.1
1961	8,882	36.3	1,739	19.6	34.3	35.9
1962	8,729	31.9	1,134	13.0	24.3	30.9
1963	9,062	35.0	1,311	14.5	43.7	36.3
1964	9,739	33.6	1,340	13.8	25.1	32.4

NOTES

Sources and computations (c refers to column number):
column 1: Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years.
column 2: Labour Force Surveys 1980–94 (when respondents were 30–34 years old).
column 3: (number of Israeli-born Jewish men in 1990 PUMS) × (.75) × (2).
column 4: (c3/c1).
column 5: 1990 US PUMS, Israeli-born Jewish men.
column 6: {[(c1 − c3) × c2/100] + [c3 × c5/100]}/c1.

for Israeli emigrants by country of destination.[38] Third, we assumed that the educational attainments of Israeli emigrants living in the U.S. were similar to those of Israeli emigrants living in other countries.

While admittedly crude, these assumptions along with the 1990 PUMS data, and data on the size and ethnic composition of the cohorts born in Israel between 1946 and 1964, enabled us to estimate the volume of brain-drain in cohorts of Israeli-born Ashkenazi men. In other words, we can estimate how many of the 'missing' university graduates lived abroad in 1990. The calculations are presented in Table 2.[39]

We noted, first, that there was quite a high rate of emigration in the cohorts under study. About 13–21 per cent of Israeli-born Ashkenazi men from the birth cohorts under study lived abroad in 1990 (Table 2, column 4). Their educational levels were high: between 41 and 61 per cent were university graduates aged 30–40 years (column 5).[40]

In column 6 we computed the total proportion of Ashkenazi university graduates for each birth cohort — whether living in Israel

FIGURE 3. Cohort proportions of university graduates among Ashkenazim with and without emigrants

or abroad. Clearly, these proportions are higher than the proportions of university graduates among Ashkenazim living in Israel (column 2). The difference between column 2 and column 6 is a crude estimate of the brain drain. The two columns are plotted in Figure 3. For the birth cohorts of 1950–60, the rate of university graduates is two to five per cent higher when emigrants are included. We were particularly interested in the cohorts born in 1950–56, as we observed a sharp decline in university graduation among those who remained in Israel of 36 per cent (from 33.2 for the cohort of 1950 to 21.3 per cent for the cohort of 1956). When emigrants are included, the decline is more modest: 23 per cent (from 34.7 per cent for the cohort born in 1950 to 26.7 per cent for the cohort of 1956). This implies that nearly one-third of the observed decline in the proportion of university graduates experienced by Ashkenazi residents of these cohorts is due to selective out-migration during the late 1970s and the 1980s.[41]

Discussion

Scholars working on ethnic stratification in Israel are divided. Some argue that inequality between the ethnic groups is declining, as the groups assimilate both culturally and economically.[42] Others argue that inequality persists because the dominant ethnic group, the Ashkenazim, manages to perpetuate its privileges by excluding others

from the higher and more selective educational tracks.[43] Both positions assume a linear trend of either stability or change in the ethnic gaps.

Our results show that ethnic inequality in university graduation did not change consistently during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but rather showed ups and downs. This may explain why there are such heated disagreements among scholars and lay people alike over the plain facts — let alone over their causes. The 'facts' vary according to the time of observation. Shavit[44] — who employed the 1983 Census data and analyzed cohorts born until the late 1950s — saw the beginnings of a gradual decline in inequality in the rates of post-secondary education. Nahon[45] — who observed cohorts born until 1953 reached different conclusions, which varied by gender. We now know why; during the period under study there were shifts in the direction of change in the ethnic gap and these varied by gender.

Among women, the gap has declined for several cohorts, at least for those born since the early 1950s. The decline in the gap among women is due to increases in university graduation rates among Mizrahim coupled with stability in the rate among Ashkenazim. Among men, on the other hand, ethnic inequality in university education was affected primarily by fluctuations in the graduation rates among Ashkenazim. Inequality was at its minimum not as a result of the advancement of Mizrahim but a result of losses among Ashkenazim.

Furthermore, we found important differences between the two Mizrahi groups — the Asians and the North Africans. Nahon[46] studied ethnic inequalities in education both in the immigrant generation and among the Israeli-born. In the former, he found that Asians (as well as Egyptians) were more educated on the average than immigrants from the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia). However, these differences disappeared among the native-born. He saw this as evidence of the similar predicaments suffered by both the Asians and the North Africans during the immigration process and in the years which followed. Ashkenazim perceived both groups as equally 'under-developed' and children from both groups were usually assigned to non-academic tracks in secondary schools, which blocked the road to university education. Our results suggest that equality between the two Mizrahi groups in the rates of university education was temporary, and, at least for men, may have been due to the depressing effect of the post-immigration years on the educational attainments of Asians. If the trends which we found continue into the future, the gap between the two groups may increase.

Conclusion

Future research on educational inequalities between ethnic groups in Israel should attempt to proceed in several directions. First, more

detailed classifications of ethnic groups should be employed. It is quite clear that broad ethnic categories based on continents of origin are too heterogeneous. For example, Yemenites and Iraqis exhibit very different educational distributions, as do Jews from Egypt and from the countries of the Maghreb. Ideally, country-specific groups should be compared. Second, non-Jews should be integrated in the analysis. The Palestinian population in Israel is also very heterogeneous with respect to education and there are large gaps between Christians on the one hand, and Muslims and Druse on the other. Third, and most importantly, we should attempt to understand why some groups seem to be increasingly successful in educational attainment (for instance, Iraqi and Egyptian Jews) while those of Moroccan origin lag far behind, after four decades of settlement in Israel.

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NOTES

[1] Yaacov Nahon, *Patterns of Educational Expansion and the Structure of Occupational Opportunities — the Ethnic Dimension* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1987. Yossi Shavit, 'Tracking and the Educational Spiral: A Comparison of Arab and Jewish Educational Expansion in Israel', *Comparative Education Review*, vol. 33, no. 2, 1989, pp. 216–31; and Yinon Cohen and Y. Haberfeld, 'Second generation Jewish Immigrants in Israel: Have the Ethnic Gaps in Schooling and Earnings Declined?' in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 21, no. 3, 1998, pp. 507–28.

[2] Israelis generally refer to Jews originating from Europe (especially Eastern Europe) as Ashkenazim. For Jews from Asia and North Africa, most Israelis use (incorrectly) the term Sephardim which properly refers only to Jews of Spanish and Portuguese origin who until recently spoke Judeo-Spanish at home — as Jews in Turkey still do to this day. However, some Israelis use, as we do in this paper, the term Mizrahim (plural of Mizrahi, which means Eastern) to refer to non-Ashkenazi Jews.

[3] See, for instance, Noah Lewin-Epstein and Moshe Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy*, Boulder, 1993.

[4] See, for instance, in note 1 above; Shavit, op. cit., and Cohen and Haberfeld, op. cit.

[5] See Shavit, op. cit. in note 1 above and Yossi Shavit and Vered Kraus, 'Educational Transitions in Israel: A Cohort Analysis of Change in the Educational Attainment process', *Sociology of Education*, vol. 63, no. 1, 1990;

also Nahon, op. cit. in Note 1 above, for analyzes which do include both Jews and non-Jews.

[6] Calvin Goldscheider, *Israel's Changing Society: Population, Ethnicity, and Development*, Boulder, 1996; and Seymour Spilerman and Jack Habib, 'Development Towns in Israel: The Role of Community in Creating Ethnic Disparities in Labor Force Characteristics' in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 81, no. 4, 1976, pp. 781–812.

[7] Shlomo Swirski, *Education in Israel: Schooling for Inequality* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1990.

[8] Elmelech Yuval, Noah Lewin-Epstein, and Moshe Semyonov, 'Ethnic Inequality in Home Ownership and the Value of Housing: The Case of Immigration in Israel' in *Social Forces*, vol. 75, no. 4, 1998, pp. 1439–62.

[9] Michael Inbar and Chaim Adler, *Ethnic Integration in Israel: A Comparative Case Study of Moroccan Brothers Who Settled in France and in Israel*, New Brunswick, N.J., 1977.

[10] Yossi Shavit and Haya Stier, 'Ethnic and Educational Assortative Mating. Changing Marriage Patterns in Israel' (Hebrew), *Megamot*, vol. 38, no. 2, 1997, pp. 207–26.

[11] Gina Ortar, 'Educational Achievements of Primary School Graduates in Israel as Related to their Socio-Cultural Background', *Comparative Education*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1967, pp. 23–42.

[12] Reuven Kahane and Laura Starr, 'The Impact of Rapid Social Change on Technological Education: An Israeli Example', *Comparative Education Review*, vol. 20, no. 2, 1976, pp. 165–78.

[13] Nahon, op. cit. in Note 1 above.

[14] Shavit and Kraus, op. cit. in Note 5 above.

[15] Nahon, op. cit. in Note 1 above.

[16] Shavit, op. cit. in Note 1 above.

[17] Yechezkel Dar and Nura Resh, 'Social and Ethnic Gaps in Academic Achievement in the Israeli Junior High School' (Hebrew), *Megamot*, 33, no. 2, 1991, pp. 164–87 and Micha Razel, 'The Closing of the Israeli Shephardic-Ashkenazic Educational Achievement Gap: A Meta-Analysis' (Hebrew), *Megamot*, vol. 38, no. 3, 1997, pp. 349–66.

[18] Ministry of Education of Israel, *Ma'arechet ha-Khinuch Be're'i ha-Misparim* (*The Educational System in Numbers*), 1993, p. 9.

[19] Ibid. p. 19.

[20] Cohen and Haberfeld, op. cit. in Note 1 above.

[21] Council for Higher Education of Israel, *Ma'arekhet ha-Haskala ha-Gevoha be-Israel: Megamot ve-Hitpatchuyot* (*The System of Higher Education in Israel: Trends and Developments*), Jerusalem, 1994, p. 129.

[22] Judah Matras, Gila Noam, and Itshak Bar-Haim, *Young Israelis on the Threshold: A Study of the 1954 Cohort of Israeli Men*, Jerusalem, 1984.

[23] Israeli primary and secondary education lasts 12 years in total. A B.A. typically requires three additional years. The vast majority of drop-outs from university do so between their first and second year, that is, between their thirteenth and fourteenth year of education. We therefore assume that those who completed 15 years graduated from university.

[24] Nahon, op. cit. in Note 1 above.

[25] Shavit, op. cit. in Note 1 above.

[26] Nahon, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 129.

[27] Gur Ofer, 'Public Spending on Civilian Services' in Yoram Ben-Porat, ed., *The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crises*, London, 1986, pp. 192–209, and Yacob Metzer, 'The Slowdown of Economic Growth: A Passing Phase or the End of the Big Spurt' in Yoram Ben-Porat, ed., ibid., London, 1986, pp. 75–101.

[28] Income is measured as the natural logarithm of income from work for gainfully employed men. The equations for income include eight variables: five dummies for being of either Asian or African ethnic origin, for being married, for being Israeli-born, and for having migrated to Israel at least five years before the survey. Educational attainment is measured with three variables representing the number of years at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels respectively.

[29] Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, *National Expenditure on Education 1992 and Preliminary Estimates for 1993 and 1994. No 1*, Jerusalem, 1996, p. 34.

[30] Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, *Statistical Abstracts of Israel*, Jerusalem, 1984. R. Lamdany, *Emigration From Israel*, Discussion Paper No. 82.08, The Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, Jerusalem, 1982.

[31] Dore Kass and S. M. Lipset, 'Jewish Immigration to the United States from 1967 to the Present: Israelis and Others', in M. Sklare, ed., *Understanding American Jewry*, New Brunswick, 1982, pp. 272–94 and Moshe Shokeid, *Children of Circumstances: Israeli Immigrants in New York*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1988.

[32] Cited in Yinon Cohen, 'War and Social Integration: The Effects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict on Jewish Emigration from Israel', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 53, no. 6, 1988, pp. 908–18.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Yinon Cohen, 'Socioeconomic Dualism: The Case of Israeli-Born Immigrants in the U.S.', *International Migration Review*, vol. 23, no. 2, 1989, pp. 267–88, and Yinon Cohen, 'Family Background and Economic Success Through Work and Marriage', *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, vol. 5, 1986, pp. 173–99.

[35] Lamdany, op. cit. in Note 30 above.

[36] Y. Cohen and Y. Haberfeld, 'The Number of Israelis in the US in 1990', *Demography*, vol. 34, 1997, pp. 199–212.

[37] The proportion of Ashkenazim among Israeli-born in the 1990 New York Jewish Population Survey (NYJPS) is 63 per cent (we thank Bethemai Horowitz for providing us with this estimate). The respective figure based on the ancestry questions in the 1990 PUMS is 82 per cent. The 'true' figure for all Israeli-born emigrants born between 1950–60 is probably somewhere in between these estimates. Thus our assumption that 75 per cent of Israeli-born emigrants are Ashkenazim is a crude approximation based on the best available data.

[38] Ariel Paltiel, 'Migration of Israelis Abroad: A Survey of the Official Data From Selected countries', *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, vol. 6, 1986, pp. 51–78 (Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel).

[39] We cannot conduct similar calculations for Mizrahim because they constitute a minority among Israeli emigrants to the USA — and therefore there are very few of them in PUMS.

[40] Clearly, this percentage is lower for the very youngest cohorts because they had not completed their education by the time of the 1990 census.

[41] The contribution of selective out-migration may be slightly lower than we estimate because for emigrants the graduation proportions are estimated in the 34–40 age group whereas for Israeli residents they refer to those aged 30–40 years.

[42] See, for instance, Sammy Smooha and Yohanan Peres, 'The Dynamics of Ethnic Inequality: The Israeli Case', *Social Dynamics*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1975, pp. 63–80 and Yohanan Peres, 'Horizontal Integration and Vertical Differentiation Among Jewish Ethnicities in Israel', in Alex Winegrod, ed., *Studies in Israeli Ethnicity*, New York, 1985, pp. 39–56.

[43] See, for instance, Nahon, op. cit. in Note 1 above; Shavit, op. cit. in Note 1 above; and Swirski, op. cit. in Note 7 above.

[44] Shavit, op. cit. in Note 1 above.

[45] Nahon, op. cit. in Note 1 above.

[46] Ibid.

INTER-GENERATIONAL RELATIONS AMONG UPPER MIDDLE-CLASS JEWISH FAMILIES IN ISRAEL

Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli

STUDIES in the middle of the twentieth century which predicted the disintegration of the Western extended family,[1] were later replaced by analyses which glorified the nuclear family as the ideal.[2] However, although the small nuclear family — consisting of a couple and their young children — was academically placed at the centre while other relatives were marginalized, the extended family has persisted and thrived. This unexpected survival resulted in a growing academic interest in inter-generational relations and, more particularly, in the relationships between adult children and their parents.[3]

In the literature on inter-generational relations, that which pertains to the role of the parents of adult children is most interesting, since it deals with a unique modern phenomenon, which emerged with mass longevity in industrial societies.[4] Israel, although it is an industrial country, exhibits familistic patterns usually prevalent in traditional settings and therefore provides a unique field for the study of inter-generational relations. More particularly, the study of upper middle-class families can reveal how relations between young married adults and their parents evolve within socio-cultural perceptions in a situation which is comparatively free of economic constraints.

Published studies of adult children and their parents have tended to emphasize the aspects of support and solidarity[5] or conflicts and stresses within the relationship.[6] In a recent publication, ambivalence was suggested as the leitmotif of inter-generational relationships.[7] Other studies explored factors such as affinity, opportunity structure, and functional exchange between adult children and their parents,[8] or the impact of family size, previous child-rearing experiences, current competing loyalties, and familistic ideology,[9] all of which were found to have decisive influences on the relationship.

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The relations between adult children and their parents — usually studied among middle-class North Americans — are generally said to be close and supportive,[10] when measured by residential propinquity and frequency of meetings.[11] However, these studies do not show functional/instrumental parental assistance as a regular component of the relationship.[12] It is argued that usually parents provide financial assistance only during the children's launching period — contributions towards college education and home purchase. In the latter case, the median parental assistance was $5,000 in the 1980s.[13]

Outside the United States, the Mexican family exemplifies an alternative structure of 'Grand-families', which prevails in urban Mexico. These are composed of 'a couple, their children, and their grandchildren, so that the person's "meaningful others" include parents and siblings as well as spouse and children'.[14] Among the basic family obligations, economic support is listed as a central one. This family structure implies that children do not figuratively 'leave home' during the parents' lifetime, even when they set up separate households.

Among American Jews the situation is somewhat similar. In her comparative study Goldscheider[15] found that Jewish parents financially support their student children much more than do non-Jewish parents (50 per cent among Jews, versus 4–12 per cent in other groups).[16] Among families with children who left home before completing their education, the proportion of such support was as high as 80 per cent.[17] Jewish children are also the smallest contributors to the parental household, with only eight per cent providing some economic aid, compared to 31–49 per cent among non-Jewish youth.[18]

The pattern of prolonged child support among American Jews accords with the climate of familism which prevails in Israel. Despite some erosion in the past two decades — as measured, for instance, by divorce rates[19] — Israeli families are comparatively stable:[20] a higher percentage of Israelis marry; they do so at a younger age; they have more children; divorce relatively rarely; and when they do, those concerned tend to remarry.[21] Israelis approve of obligations between siblings and parents and they feel more connected to their kin.[22] This familism is enhanced by — and reflected in — the ongoing subordination of marital status to religious law, subjecting marriages and divorces to the control of the conservative religious courts. The small size of the country contributes to the persistence of familism, since most adult children live near their parents and meetings can usually take place fairly easily.

Familism is also manifested in extensive financial transfers from parents to their adult children; this has become prevalent in Israel. Within middle-class families, such transfers are expected by children

and perceived as almost obligatory by their parents. Wealthier parents may give financial assistance in the tens and hundreds of thousand dollars, as routine payments over extended periods (university education, monthly rent, household expenditure) or concentrated on special occasions, such as home purchase. In a recent study, Lewin-Epstein and his colleagues[23] found that 63 per cent of their respondents agreed with the statement that 'it is impossible/very difficult to manage without parents' assistance'. Interestingly, respondents over 55 years of age, who belong — or are about to belong — to the 'helpers category', agreed with that statement even more strongly (70 per cent), than did the generation of younger recipients. Only a small minority (9.8 per cent) of all respondents stated that it was 'not really difficult/fairly easy to manage without parents' assistance'. Moreover, the majority of the respondents thought that such assistance should be extended for as long as it was needed, irrespectively of age or life-cycle stage.[24] Among the wealthier Israelis of Euro-American origin (that is, Ashkenazim) the figure was as high as two-thirds. A third (33.9 per cent) of the respondents in the Lewin-Epstein survey said that they had been helped by their parents in the purchase of their first home and 18.6 per cent inherited it or received it as a gift. Among Euro-American descendants and among academics, the figure rose to 38.9 and 43 per cent respectively.[25]

Given the wide age-span of the respondents (30–65 years old), and the fact that the parents of older Israelis were usually financially unable to extend such help, these figures imply extensive support provided by present-day parents to their adult children. This argument is supported by the findings of a survey of young Israeli home buyers,[26] showing that the vast majority were helped by their parents and that parental aid often constituted as much as 65 per cent of the property's cost. More generally, among all the couples who married in Israel between 1982 and 1989, three per cent lived with their parents while an additional two per cent lived in an apartment which belonged to their parents.[27] Among the couples who owned their flats, 10 per cent had received it as a gift from their parents[28] and 30 per cent received an average subsidy of 15 per cent towards the purchase.[29]

In this paper I show how among upper middle-class families in Israel, parents and adult children chose to extend the role of parent-provider to later stages in the life-cycle — to when the children are in their thirties and forties. These 'children' rely on parental help for routine assistance as well as for major acquisitions. The protracted contribution of parents, over years and decades, as well as their intensive prolonged involvement in the adult child's household became a factor which the younger family took for granted and relied upon when planning for the immediate or distant future. This general situation constitutes the background against which I explore how the

prolonged contribution reflects and constitutes patterns of intergenerational relations in established Israeli families. More generally, the concept of launching is challenged in this Israeli context.

The data presented in this article were collected during fieldwork undertaken between 1987 and 1991 in an established neighbourhood of Tel Aviv, hereafter called Givat Narkis.[30] In 1987 I started interviewing residents, focusing mainly on the reasons for their choice of the specific neighbourhood and apartment in which they lived. I reached the first interviewees by personal acquaintance and told them that I was engaged in a study of the neighbourhood. Later on, each one referred me to other local residents who were later interviewed. The interviews lasted from one to three hours and encompassed 36 households. In a few cases, the encounter was expanded when I was invited by the interviewees for social meetings outside the scope of the research. These few relations were maintained throughout the fieldwork period.

Nevertheless, it was clear in 1987 that the interviews provided only limited information: I usually met the woman only; I had no direct access to local life; and I could not experience in person the neighbourhood's dynamics. I therefore rented an apartment in Givat Narkis and lived there for three years (from 1988 to 1991). I told the neighbours that I was working at the University and studying the neighbourhood. They never asked for further details.

As a resident I became highly involved in the local life: I spent every summer afternoon with the neighbours in the common yards; I volunteered for the neighbourhood's committee; I organized all neighbourhood-related material (letters, articles, manifests composed by the residents) in a systematic manner, as part of my membership in the 'archive committee' which compiled 'a neighbourhood archive'; I participated in the Community Centre Resident Committee and attended all the public events organized in the neighbourhood for its residents; I used local shops and services and took advantage of the shopping interaction as a fieldwork opportunity; I spent long hours in the neighbourhood's streets and parks, community centre, and shopping centre. In addition, I interviewed local service providers (such as teachers, business owners, and vendors) as well as municipality officials and professionals who served the local population — such as architects and interior decorators. As a resident I received in my mailbox various advertisements and three free local newspapers. This material was collected and systematized for the purpose of my research. Moreover, I could follow spontaneous occurrences — particularly quarrels and arguments — which took place in the neighbourhood.

Towards the end of my fieldwork, in November 1990, I conducted a neighbourhood survey. The survey complemented the ethnographic

material by providing a general socio-demographic picture of the local population. It also served to examine the prevalence of various phenomena observed during the fieldwork. The survey gathered data about 325 households, which constituted about 10 per cent of the local households at the time. The main topics explored in the questionnaire were those of neighbour relations; organized local activity; problems with the authorities; consumption patterns; use of local services; standard of living; inter-generational relations (relations between the residents and their own parents and children); attitudes towards the neighbourhood; and views regarding various social roles. In addition, respondents were asked about their socio-demographic traits.

While the survey constituted an important component of the research design, the fieldwork was primarily qualitative and ethnographic. I found the ethnographic method to be most suitable for the study of prolonged parental assistance to adult children. In the case of limited parental assistance, quantitative methods are usually sufficient for portraying a general picture. However, at the other extreme, where parents are very supportive and are deeply involved in the lives of their adult children, a study of the details of this involvement requires a more subtle methodology, in order to reveal the multiple facets of such inter-generational relations. In this paper, I focus on the perspective of the adult children, who were my principal informants.

The research field, Givat Narkis, was located on the established northern edge of Tel Aviv. In accordance with the town planning of the municipality, the area contains small and large apartments, interwoven in a way which deliberately precludes class segregation. The small apartments were in fact the Israeli version of subsidized housing — but offered for sale (not for rental) at subsidized prices to individuals who fitted the Ministry of Welfare's criteria of comparative deprivation; they constituted about 30 per cent of the neighbourhood's apartments. On the other hand, neighbouring buildings were very luxurious and the prices of these apartments were among the highest in the country. During the 1980s most subsidized housing units were expanded — collectively, following the residents' initiative — to provide three to three and a half bedrooms rather than the original two bedrooms. This residential integration reflects Israel's general policy, presumably aimed at promoting social integration — as reflected in school bussing, educational programmes, university quotas, and other affirmative action.

As a result of this, the population of Givat Narkis was, indeed, a mosaic of middle-class sub-categories, from people who barely could make ends meet to others who were unencumbered by financial constraints. The population was also ethnically heterogeneous: while most of the residents were of Euro-American descent, nearly 30 per

cent were of Asian-African origin. This demographic profile is considerably more mixed than that found in other prestigious urban areas, where the Ashkenazi-Oriental ratio is roughly one to six, rather than about one to three. Quite often, this heterogeneity was manifested at the family level, when the couple itself was ethnically mixed.

The residents were mainly secular, with 22 per cent defining themselves as 'traditional' and a mere 1.5 per cent as 'observant' or 'religious'. There was no synagogue in Givat Narkis nor any other religious institution. The educational level of the residents was higher than the national average, with two-thirds having completed at least some college studies. The adults were concentrated in the 25–54 age-group and most of them (80 per cent) were married. The remaining 20 per cent consisted primarily of rent-paying students who chose Givat Narkis because of its nearness to Tel Aviv University. At the time of my fieldwork, there were many amenities in Givat Narkis: four commercial centres offered a wide range of services and merchandise; a luxurious (private) sports club included varied, elegant facilities; an active municipal community centre was extensively used by both children and adult residents. On the other hand, the local state school was the object of much criticism.[31]

In contrast to findings in other settings outside Israel,[32] Givat Narkis residents were not disturbed by the socio-economic heterogeneity and were highly satisfied with their homes and the environs, which some described as 'the best place in the world' and 'paradise'. In the neighbourhood survey, three-quarters of the respondents agreed with the statement: 'I wish all the residential neighbourhoods in Israel were like Givat Narkis' and 90 per cent agreed that 'many Israelis would like to live in Givat Narkis if they could afford it'. At the time of the fieldwork, 3,500 residential units (out of the planned 5,000) were already built, accommodating about 17,000 people.

Family was a centrepiece in the lives of the residents. The nuclear family was, in many respects, their primary focus, with children forming the hub of both daily routine and parental concern. Many of the local facilities and services were aimed at households with young children; education was a major local issue; and children's welfare was a principal subject of the frequent negotiations with the authorities. The whole neighbourhood has indeed been planned for young nuclear families, as was evident in the architecture of the apartments (three to four and a half bedrooms and in the public amenities (day-care centres and amusement parks).

The extended family was not as conspicuous. Quite the opposite: Givat Narkis residents tended to exclude issues concerning distant kin from local conversations, and they had little information about parents and siblings of their neighbours, their place of residence, occupation, or life-style. This tendency was explained by the potential

conflicts which such topics could provoke in a place as heterogeneous as Givat Narkis.[33]

The priority of the nuclear over the extended family was also reflected in the neighbourhood survey, in which respondents were requested to select and grade five out of 13 social roles. Here, the roles of 'spouse' and 'parent' ranked above all others, with double the popularity of the role of 'son/daughter of my parents' (73 per cent and 77 per cent against 39 per cent respectively, included these roles in their five-role lists). The latter ('son/daughter') was the seventh in popularity, after parent, spouse, Israeli, Jewish, male/female and secular/religious. (Here it must be noted that not all respondents had children and some did not have living parents.)

The local marginalization of kin-related issues in conversations in Givat Narkis was not because they were considered unimportant. Indeed, in their private lives, Givat Narkis residents maintained extensive ties with their relatives, as shown in the case of three Givat Narkis families which I will describe. I selected them because they provide clear illustrations of the three relationship patterns between adult children and their parents which I observed during my fieldwork. While I do not present these families as 'statistically representative' — obviously, every family in Givat Narkis was unique in many ways — the three families did exhibit relations which were typical of, and prevalent within, the upper middle-class. Indeed, the popularity of these patterns went beyond the upper middle-class, since less affluent local families also considered these exchange patterns to be desirable, and approved of them, though on a more moderate scale (as illustrated by the vignette that follows the three case studies). These generalizations, which can only be suggested with respect to the wider Israeli context, can be more confidently argued in regard to Givat Narkis, where my observations elicited abundant support for them: in occasional local conversations, in residents' own biographical accounts, as well as in life events which unfolded during the fieldwork period, similar views and narratives were described and supported.

Before turning to the ethnography, one point needs to be re-emphasized: while the described families belonged to the more affluent segment of the population of Givat Narkis, such families were numerous in the neighbourhood. On a national scale also, they were not exceptional; they were by no means very rich but rather typical of the Israeli upper middle-class, consisting largely of professionals or small-to-medium business owners. In terms of earned income, these people were placed in the top 20 per cent of gainfully-employed Israelis.

The accounts focus on women's perspectives as a result both of my stronger ties with local women and of women's role as pivotal kin (kinkeepers).

Case I: Parents as providers

Iris and Jacob were accountants; she was in her late twenties while he was in his early thirties, and they had six-month-old twin boys. When I started my fieldwork, Iris was on a leave of absence from her job (an extension of her maternity leave) and Jacob was just starting out as an independent accountant. The household lived in a spacious four-bedroom apartment in Givat Narkis. Iris's father was a successful accountant and her mother an administrator at Tel Aviv University; they lived in a prestigious district of Tel Aviv, a 10-minute drive from Givat Narkis. Iris was their elder daughter; the younger daughter, also an accountant, was not married at the time.

Although Iris described her relations with her parents as not being particularly close, the older couple were highly supportive. They had bought Iris and Jacob's luxurious flat several years earlier, when Iris was still in high school, and had rented it out for a few years. It was legally transferred to the young couple shortly after they married, and was then valued at about U.S. $250,000.

Iris's pregnancy was a major event for the extended family: the babies were to be the first grandchildren, after a period of fertility treatments. Thus, when they learned that she was carrying twins, Iris's parents replaced her small car with a new large family car (in addition to her husband's), so that two baby car seats could fit comfortably inside. Iris said that when the twins were born, her parents gave 'some $3,000 for the night nurse, and occasionally [they] deposit another $1,000 into our bank account. Apart from that, they always ask if we need more'. Her parents also routinely bought toys and clothes for the babies, sometimes in accordance with Iris's requests. Iris explained their generosity: 'First, my father always says he'd rather pay for baby-sitting than baby-sit himself; and second, why should they wait until they die? My father was radiating with happiness when he gave us the home. They are so happy to help us'.

A few months after the birth, Iris considered that their apartment was not spacious enough for the expanded household. After some preliminary 'market research', she decided that a semi-detached house in a nearby prestigious suburb would be within their means if her parents bought her present apartment for a comparatively high price. She therefore decided to devote her leave to searching for such a house. When the new house was bought, Iris's parents gave the couple an additional gift, the cost of renovating the master bedroom's bathroom: 'My mother said we were absolutely free to spend as much as we wanted, as long as it went to our bathroom. She didn't want me to be mean and "stretch" a fixed sum to cover other renovations, but rather she wanted me to feel unrestricted in at least one place, so that I could feel really spoiled'. Iris added that her mother was pleased

about the new house also because it was now possible to have room for live-in domestic help. She warned Iris: 'Forget about help from Jacob' and added, 'You'll have to pay for every bit of help. Fortunately, you'll be able to afford it'.

In the shadow of Iris's wealthy parents was Jacob's less affluent mother. She was the widow of a career army officer,[34] and although she lived in an affluent Tel Aviv suburb, her financial situation was not as comfortable as that of Iris's parents. Apart from Jacob, she had a married daughter with three children, as well as a younger married son. However, when Iris and Jacob started looking for a house, she sold a piece of land she owned and divided the money equally among her three children. Jacob's mother was less involved than Iris's parents in the couple's life. Some information, such as Iris's fertility treatments — which Iris had shared with her parents — was concealed from Jacob's mother, who was told that they did not yet want to start a family. After the twins were born, Jacob's mother offered her house for the elaborate circumcision ceremony and reception.

Meetings with Jacob's mother took place mostly at weekends, when the family gathered at her house for Friday dinner. This tradition, established years before Iris had come into the family, was of great significance for Jacob, but less so for his wife. She expected the twins' crying to release her own household from the obligation 'to take them out for these lousy dinners ... 'Who on earth needs it all . . . I don't ask for their help, but I expect them not to impose further burdens on us'. This reaction was anchored in Iris's resentment because her mother-in-law did not give a great deal of help with the twins. She knew that she could not expect much financial assistance from her, but she expected her to help with the care of the twins to a significant extent. Her mother-in-law had a paid job and was deeply involved in helping her own daughter to raise her three toddlers since that daughter could not afford much paid help. But Iris was not pacified and complained that she hardly ever came to help with the twins.

From time to time, Iris reproached the two mothers for not helping her enough; but one day she said with satisfaction: 'My mother and Jacob's mother are now helping a little bit more, because I really screamed'. The help was primarily occasional baby-sitting and sometimes supervising the nanny when Iris and Jacob went on holiday. The view that such personal help was normative can be illustrated by the following. Shortly after the twins were born, Iris's mother became depressed. Iris, who was very conscious of her social image, hid the problem from all her acquaintances and friends (and she claimed to have many close friends) as well as from Jacob's relatives. Sharing the general expectation of getting closer to her mother once she herself had children,[35] Iris was concerned lest her friends wonder why her mother was not more helpful. After exhausting

short-term excuses (flu, a trip abroad), Iris preferred to accuse her mother of being 'too busy' or 'too selfish' rather than to disclose her emotional disorder. Interestingly, the generous financial help given by the parents, which was not hidden, was no substitute for the actual personal care and assistance expected from a grandmother.

Iris's case illustrates an extended launching, not uncommon in Israel: it lasted over nearly two decades, during which time her parents helped her to accomplish various consumer goals. Starting with the purchase of the luxurious apartment in the mid-1970s, it went on to include arranging the kind of post she wanted in the army, and funding her university tuition plus living expenses during her student years. These gifts, which added up to hundreds of thousands of dollars, were seen by Iris — as they are by most Israelis of this social class — as a normal parental obligation.

According to Iris, her parents' generosity stemmed from their own interests: their preference to give money rather than provide physical assistance as well as their own satisfaction from helping their daughter. In its Jewish-Israeli context, this interpretation has a particular meaning. After the trauma of the Holocaust and the wars fought in Israel, inter-generational continuity is a new experience for many old and middle-aged Israelis. For immigrants, whether Holocaust survivors or their offspring, the option that their children may lead comfortable lives presents an optimistic narrative, the fulfilment of which elicits a sense of normalcy and security. Iris's parents — whose own parents had lost most of their families in the Holocaust — belonged to that category. For them, the prolonged luxurious launching of their daughter cushioned her life prospects and gave them comfort. This interpretation may also explain Iris's self-perceived right to criticize her mother for her alleged insufficient help, which reveals Iris's maximalist perception of parental obligation.

While not all Givat Narkis residents were funded as extensively by their parents, this pattern was not unusual among wealthy families. At least three other residents I know of were given new cars upon the birth of their children;[36] another couple received an interest-free $80,000 loan from the wife's parents, which they were asked to return only when they could afford to do so. Many were given apartments outright — as presents, not loans. The gift of an apartment is of particular significance given Iris and Jacob's financial circumstances. In their late twenties they were already earning considerable sums, and their income was expected to rise in the near future. Nevertheless, their most expensive material needs were provided by Iris's parents, not at 'a springboard level', but at a luxurious level, beyond the reach of most Israelis, which satisfied their residential ambitions for the family-raising stage. At the same time, the ongoing involvement in the couple's life turned successful professionals into dependent children,

'settled down' by their established elders. Thus, their house, considered by most Israelis as their most important property, was a gift they had received rather than a symbol of their own accomplishments. In this case, it crystallized a parental superiority in a manner which was unlikely to be challenged.

In this context, several aspects of the significance of home ownership in Israel need to be noted. In 1990, the average price of an apartment was U.S. $90,000, and in the case of Tel Aviv, it was $135,000.[37] These figures should be considered against an average monthly (gross) income, per Israeli household, of 4,315 NIS (New Israeli Shekel) — roughly $2,000 in 1992/93, — and an average monthly expenditure of 4,115 NIS.[38] Given these figures, and considering the usual limit of bank mortgages to a sum equal to only half the value of a property, the difficulty for an average young Israeli couple to buy an apartment without parental help becomes apparent. For most young Israelis who have no capital for a deposit, parental assistance provides a springboard from which taking a large mortgage becomes feasible.

Israelis who cannot afford to buy, rent from private owners. This alternative is considered less desirable: since there are few homes purpose-built for renting, those available are let for short terms. The tenants — who are subject to the owners' whims — do not therefore invest in renovations to make their residence more comfortable. In addition, a monthly rent (ranging from $500 to $1,500) is considered a squandered opportunity cost, when the money would be better invested with a mortgage towards the purchase of one's own home. Another perceived advantage of owning one's apartment is psychoeconomic: in the fragile Israeli reality, saturated with insecurities including economic ones, home ownership is perceived as a solid investment, preferred by most Israelis. This preference is also rationalized in terms of rising real estate prices which turn home ownership into a profitable financial asset. This perception was twice as popular after the 1983–85 hyper-inflation which was as high as 400 per cent annually.[39] In subsequent years, which saw the wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, property prices soared, reaching unknown heights, thus rendering home owners better off than ever before, while leaving the others further away from ownership.

Case II: Parents as providers and companions

Anat and her household lived in a spacious four-bedroom apartment in Givat Narkis, one floor above Anat's sister, Orit, who lived with her own household in a similar unit. Anat, a computer scientist, was in her late twenties when I first met her, the wife of an accountant and mother of two daughters aged one and three. Orit was then

completing her MBA degree, had a 6-months-old baby son, and was married to a computer programmer; during my period of fieldwork, her second son was born.

As is the case elsewhere,[40] residential proximity in Givat Narkis, promoted close relations. The two sisters, who had no other siblings, shared many household tasks. Anat routinely handed down to her nephew her daughters' clothes, many of which had been bought by her parents; the sisters shared a record collection and a 'pool' of earrings; they shared their mother's old car which she had given to them; the parents' cleaning woman worked for the sisters, who decided ad hoc which house would be cleaned on a specific day; they shared their cooking tasks — when Anat prepared meat balls, Orit prepared the salad; when Anat bought a computer she did not buy a printer, because Orit had one. Each sister had a key to the other's home. The sisters cherished their closeness, as illustrated by Anat's statement that if she decided to move (to a flat with a sun deck), she would have to find two neighbouring flats since she must live close to her sister; in the autumn of 1990, several months after Orit and her household moved to Brussels for a three-year appointment, Anat's household followed suit.

The parents of the sisters were in their mid-fifties and wealthy. The mother was a housewife and the father a senior banker; they lived in Tel Aviv, a 15-minute drive from their daughters, in a luxurious apartment which included a room furnished and equipped for the grandchildren. The parents visited their daughters at least once a week and invited them during the weekend for a meal. All parties took for granted that Jewish festival meals were to be hosted by the parents. Anat commented that 'the age of 50 is the time for hosting festive gatherings'. Anat also used to meet her mother in a Tel-Aviv cafe at least once a week — and often two or three times. The birthdays of every family member were celebrated together.

Anat's grandparents were also significant in the family relations. When Anat was in the army, her parents were living abroad, and she lived with her grandparents for two years. Her grandfather had arranged for her to be positioned in the post she wanted during her military service. Later on, when she met her future husband, 'he had to be approved by my grandparents', she said. During my fieldwork period, the sisters saw their grandmother (the grandfather had died meanwhile) about once a week and received various gifts from her. When Anat went with her husband and children on a two-week vacation in Europe, they spent half of it with the grandmother, then in her mid-seventies, who was on holiday in Europe at that time. Anat's parents-in-law were not as intimately involved in her household. They were invited to birthday parties and for occasional visits, and sometimes they would go together for a week on holiday abroad.

Anat's parents went abroad frequently, mostly for her father's business. On their return, they brought back clothes and household items for their two daughters, always buying equivalent items for both. Sometimes, the young women requested specific items. Orit said: 'My mother returns loaded even from a two-day trip and my father has also learned to shop'. The father gave them regular financial advice. In addition to the flow of gifts and advice, the parents had bought the apartments of their two daughters. Anat was given hers some time after she married, while Orit's apartment was registered as the parents' property. This was probably because of Orit's more recent marriage, which was therefore considered more fragile. It should be noted here that in case of divorce in Israel, all common property is divided between the parties. By registering the property under their name and transferring it to the younger generation only a few years later, the parents — who had paid for the apartment — thus avoided the risk of having to buy back half of it from their child's divorced spouse.

Unlike Iris's family, Anat's relations with her parents included a strong element of companionship. She did not appear to wish to limit their involvement in her own household and spent several afternoons or mornings every week with her mother, and sometimes also with her sister. Indeed, she spent as much time with them as she did with her husband — if not more. All Anat's other ties were marginal and friends were considerably less significant than family members. To her acquaintances in the neighbourhood, Anat always praised her family. She repeatedly described her parents as superior, attributing virtues to her mother ('I learned from my mother what the important things in life are'; 'Now I see that my mother was right'; 'She always senses what people are like and helps me to avoid troubles'; 'My parents bought a lamp like ours, which is the greatest compliment I could possibly get'). Anat was also very protective of her mother and never asked her for physical help ('My mother would sleep on the floor for us, so great is her love. But I will not ruin my mother for my children. So I never leave [my daughter] with her after mid-day because it would disturb her rest').

This positive attitude was part of an idealized image of the family. Throughout my three-year ties with Anat, I heard only praise for her relatives. She loved to quote her mother's surprise at her friends' complaints about their children: 'My daughters are just wonderful and I have not a single word of criticism about them'. The same image remained when Anat's father was involved in a financial scandal resulting in his picture appearing on the front pages of the national newspapers. Anat ignored the entire affair and maintained an appearance of normalcy. According to her, the harmonious relations

were based on the mutual respect each generation felt for the other; she did not seem to wish to distance herself from her parents.

Later on, when Orit's departure for Brussels coincided with the 1990 tension which preceded the Gulf War, Anat and her household hastily left for Brussels for an unlimited period with no prospect of employment there. The neighbours said that the move was entirely funded by the parents. Such closeness among relatives — particularly between sisters, as in the case of Anat and Orit — was fairly common in Givat Narkis. Two women I knew said that they had moved to Givat Narkis in order to be close to their sisters; three others said that they would never leave the city or the country because that would mean being separated from their families; another resident was in the habit of meeting her sister almost every day, although she lived a 30-minute drive from Givat Narkis. When one resident wanted to illustrate how ill-natured her neighbour was, she said that the woman had not met her sister for months. According to a local real estate agent, quite often two sisters came together to inquire about apartments in the same or neighbouring buildings; and in one case three sisters bought flats in the same building which was under construction.

The quest for familial closeness can be illustrated by the finding that 30 per cent of Givat Narkis residents had at least one relative in the neighbourhood.[41] It must be noted that Givat Narkis was first established in the mid 1970s and more populated in the 1980s — which meant that none of its residents grew up in the neighbourhood. Residential proximity was therefore actively pursued by those who joined their relatives in the area. With few exceptions, relatives in Givat Narkis generally maintained good relations with each other. In the course of my fieldwork it became apparent that the closest links were usually between a woman and her kin. In a young household, the wife usually sought support from her own mother rather than from her mother-in-law. The importance of the bond between mother and daughter may be a consequence of women's kinkeeping role,[42] which, prevailed in Givat Narkis, as it does in many societies.[43]

In the case of Orit and Anat, the residential proximity — set by their parents who bought neighbouring flats for their daughters — was part of a wider family intermeshing. In their weekly visits, the parents (or mother) used to settle in one apartment and call the other daughter to join them with her children. Familial rituals, such as gift-giving upon returning from trips abroad, also took place in one apartment in the presence of both daughters and the grandchildren. Festive meals and birthday parties included both sisters' households as a matter of course, unless one or the other was engaged with the husband's relatives — which rarely occurred. Thus, although in terms of their age and life cycle the sisters had passed the launching period,

as usually defined, they remained closely linked to their parents. The birth of grandchildren operated here, as elsewhere,[44] to draw the generations closer together. New veins of giving and 'spoiling' were added and new events and activities were constituted as familial gatherings. Indeed, since the two sisters had a protective attitude towards their parents, they made few physical demands on them and companionship became the primary mode of interaction. As for their husbands, my observations did not reveal any resentment on their part.

This 'ideal' companionship may be related to both the prolonged dependency and the sharing of everyday life by the two adult generations. That is in accordance with findings showing greater inter-generational harmony in launching families than in empty-nest families.[45] However, the very use of the term 'launching' seems inappropriate in the present context. As in the case of Iris's family, here, too, the process was a prolonged one. Moreover, in Anat's family it was supplemented by daily interactions and involvement in the third generation's life. That was probably the kind of parental involvement which Iris missed so much and continually asked for.

Case III: The intermeshed households: Parents as partners

Dina was a woman in her late thirties, married to David, four years her junior; both were high school graduates. The couple and their two sons, aged four and 10 at the beginning of my fieldwork, lived in an expanded subsidized housing apartment in Givat Narkis during the 12 years of their marriage. Dina's parents had migrated from Yemen in the late 1940s and had six children and a limited income. They could not provide financial support for Dina when she married and were not otherwise involved in her household's daily life. Dina, on her part, did not seem eager to have them visit too often and during my three years of fieldwork — when I lived next door to her — I never met them. However, Dina did mention once that her mother telephoned her every morning to wake her up and wish her a good day. The only member of Dina's family of origin whom I met was her brother who rented an apartment for his household in the same building. The siblings exchanged mundane services, primarily baby-sitting, and the brother participated in Dina's group of card players.

David's parents were born in Europe and had come to Israel in the late 1930s. They were wealthy owners of a meat factory which employed 70 workers. In addition to David, they had a daughter who was single and had been living in New York for many years. David and his wife and sons were therefore their closest relatives in Israel and the focus of their emotional lives. They probably moved to Givat

Narkis in the mid 1980s in order to live near their son and his household; they bought an apartment very close to his.

Dina was very attached to her mother-in-law. She described her as 'one in a million, in ten million', and repeatedly stated how happy she was to be living so close to her. The two women met at least once a day and shared a wide range of routine activities. The mother-in-law helped in preparing the food and looking after the boys and invited the younger household for a meal every Saturday. During the Jewish festivals, she invited many relatives and Dina and her husband and children stayed over for a night or two. Although the two households lived within one minute's walk of one another, Dina looked forward to these extended visits, to 'the days when someone will pamper *me*, for a change'. In addition, the two women spent long hours together as companions and met at least once a week for a card game. It is worth mentioning here that contrary to prevailing stereotypes, the ethnic dissimilarity did not seem to hinder the extreme closeness between them — perhaps because Dina had been born in Israel, gone to Israeli schools, and had no personal experience of the Yemen.

David's mother was very supportive also in other ways. When the younger household went on a four-day vacation, she surprised them by arranging to have a pest control service, which involved taking out all the kitchenware and rearranging it; when Dina broke a toe, her mother-in-law performed all the household chores; and when Dina started a day-care service at home for several (two–five) toddlers, David's mother came every day to lend a hand. Indeed, this expected assistance was an important factor in Dina's initial decision to open a day-care service, since the older woman was not paid for her assistance.

Volunteering for the day-care project was, in a way, the mother-in-law's way to 'apologize': as stated above, her son's household had lived in an expanded subsidized housing apartment since his marriage. The flat was very small (90 square metres) for the couple and their growing children and Dina was eager to acquire more spacious accommodation. This wish was a usual aspiration of the residents of that type of subsidized housing and people moved out when they could afford to do so. Dina's household had been among the first residents of the building and it would be among the last to leave. The fact that her nearest neighbour was also moving out at that time added to her wish to leave.

Dina and her mother-in-law considered larger apartments only within Givat Narkis as an option: leaving the district was out of the question. Among the neighbours, it was known that Dina was waiting for her in-laws to provide 'a proper apartment'; but that had to be postponed as the in-laws, who had recently bought their own Givat Narkis apartment, had also renovated their factory, and were

therefore financially constrained at that time. Dina talked about this plan very openly with her neighbours and even belittled the assistance, saying that the difference was not that great, 'only 70,000–80,000 U.S. dollars'.

During the interim period, the in-laws contributed regularly to their son's household. In addition to the services described above, they paid David a monthly salary. The routine had started several years earlier, when David worked for his father. When he became allergic to chemicals used in the industrial process — so Dina claimed — he stopped working there, but was not removed from the payroll. (During the fieldwork period, David worked only occasionally, as a doctor's receptionist and as a salesman at a record store.) David and Dina were thus entirely dependent on the older couple — who consequently had some authority in matters affecting the younger household.

Generally speaking, this aspect of inter-generational relations was not discussed with the neighbours; while demands from, and criticism of, parents by adult children were occasionally discussed, the opposite was not mentioned in local gatherings. I heard Dina say only once: 'My father-in-law shouts at me that I neglect the children', but no other complaint was ever uttered publicly, to my knowledge. More significant, perhaps, was Dina's reaction, which seemed free of any resentment, but rather acknowledged the right of her father-in-law to criticize her.

While Iris's case exemplified a prolonged launching and Anat's case added the parents' role as companions, Dina's case was an example of an intermeshed household where launching, in its usual sense, did not seem to occur. Working together, performing household tasks together, celebrating festivals together, spending leisure time together, the older couple and their son's household practically shared their whole lives. Judging by their conduct in the neighbourhood, the two units were not undergoing any process of separation but rather the opposite: they were reinforcing their mutual ties. Since the son was in his 40s when I left the field, had been married for 15 years, and was the father of two children, and his parents were in their 60s, there is evidence to suggest that achieving autonomy was not intended at all, as indicated by the older couple's move to Givat Narkis. The prevailing notion mentioned above, that parents should help their children for as long as their help is needed, applies literally in this case.

The parental involvement was accepted as natural by the younger couple in their forties: in many respects, they still behaved like 'dependent children'. They took it for granted that festival meals would be provided and served by the parents; that the parents' assistance when provided, would be freely given even when routinized, and that the parents would extend financial assistance whenever

necessary. Moreover, it was accepted by both parties that parental resources were available for the younger family, thus blurring the economic boundaries between the generations. This familial merging was enhanced by residential proximity. The grandchildren's freedom to go by themselves to the near-by home of their grandparents; the convenience of walking back and forth even on rainy days; the ability to get together several times a day — all symbolically rendered the two apartments as parts of a single whole.

Proximity between adult children and their parents was generally considered in Givat Narkis as great good fortune resulting in a good quality of life. This view might have stemmed from the routine participation of parents which was the norm in many families: one resident had her mother look after her children every Monday; another, a lawyer in his mid-thirties, lunched at his mother's every day; yet another had her son chauffeured by his grandfather to school for six months, until the family's apartment in Givat Narkis was ready. Many residents met their parents regularly every weekend, and others — whose parents lived farther away — mentioned the distance as a burden which they (the younger couple) had to bear for moving to another area.

Working for one's parents, as in David's case, was another popular pattern in Givat Narkis, where many residents had parents who were business owners. One man worked in his father's upholstery business, which had already been legally transferred to him; a woman worked with her father and expected eventually to inherit the firm; yet another resident worked with his two brothers in the law firm which their late father had established. (I did not encounter an adult child who employed a parent, probably owing to the age distribution of the residents.) Parents who worked in senior positions took advantage of their connections to help their child obtain a specific job: Iris's army post as well as Anat's, which had been arranged by their relatives, are but two examples.[46]

However, Dina's case was unusual in its being anchored in her husband's family. Elsewhere,[47] and particularly among Jews,[48] it is the maternal relatives who are usually more involved. Lewin-Epstein and his colleagues found that in Israel cases of exclusive help from the wife's parents were nearly twice as common as those benefiting from the husband's parents.[49] In Givat Narkis also, mother-daughter dyads were stronger and more common than intimate pairs of mother and daughter-in-law. The neighbours tried therefore to explain the unusual closeness between Dina and her mother-in-law and one of them attributed the relationship to the older couple's gratitude to Dina, who 'took their crazy [*'mechigene'*] son as a husband'. It was said that David's head injury during the 1973 Yom Kippur War probably caused his uncertain temper and fits of anger. If this were the case —

and I can neither support nor refute the explanation — it may well account for the parental supportive attitude towards the younger household. Given the deep involvement and the opinionated nature of all the adults involved, the rarity of disputes seems significant.

By the same token, the absence of Dina's mother from the neighbourhood scene may be explained by the more difficult adjustment of Asian-African families in Israel — who are often underprivileged. Inter-generational conflicts occur more frequently among Oriental Jews.[50] Dina's parents, who had come from Yemen, lived in a run-down part of the city, and were unfamiliar with her life-style and social circle. In this respect, Dina's case exemplifies the repercussions of immigration and mobility as stereotypically perceived for both categories of Israeli Jews: on the one hand, an Ashkenazi couple who accumulated economic capital and maintained close ties with its offspring, who in turn depended on parental wealth. On the other hand, an oriental family, who did not rise in the social scale, eventually became less attractive to its own members. In Givat Narkis, and probably elsewhere in Israel, the strong financial support given by parents over many years helps to smooth relations between the generations and generally promotes affection and closeness.

On parents' obligations to children

The views of residents about parental financial assistance to adult children were explicitly aired in a casual afternoon gathering in the common yard of the public housing project in which Dina lived. The participants, nine women, came from families of modest means and therefore had been eligible for the Ministry of Welfare's provision of subsidized housing for sale. Meanwhile, however, real estate prices in Givat Narkis had risen steeply and by the time of that discussion every one of those households lived in a property of substantial value (about $140,000). Nevertheless, according to various socio-economic criteria, these women belonged to the upper-working and lower-middle classes.

Their conversation centred on the financial obligation of parents when launching their children. Two women argued that parents did not have to buy apartments for their children: 'I've been married for 13 years, and throughout these years, all I had were debts, debts, debts. Now, at long last, I start coming out of it, so now, I am supposed to start working for *them*? Let them work for themselves. Why, has anyone given me what I possess? So they, too, will have to work'. Another neighbour supported this view, claiming that she was giving her children the best education possible, 'in order to enable them to manage, by themselves, in later years'.

That attitude was severely attacked. All the other women claimed that parents should help their children as much as they could, including the purchase of apartments. One participant said that she and her husband had decided not to move to a larger apartment in order to save money for the future, when their children — then aged four and 11 — would need apartments for themselves. Several participants reproached the first speakers by recalling their own economic struggles as young couples and expressed their wish to spare their children the unpleasant experience. As mentioned above, all the participants were original tenants of the buildings, that is, people who came from families of modest economic means and who had not managed to improve their accommodation during the 12 years which had elapsed since they had first moved in. Their nurturing attitude thus showed a readiness to make active sacrifices for a significant period in order to be able to benefit their children in the future.

Probably, the Givat Narkis context — where middle-class households of very different incomes were neighbours — intensified the residents' awareness of their financial situation. While the speakers all knew of Dina's wealthy in-laws and their plan eventually to buy a spacious flat for their son's household, there were others with no relatives who could offer this kind of assistance. At the end of the conversation, the first speakers, who found themselves defending a minority position, greatly moderated their initial stance. The main opponent now commented: 'Obviously, if you have money, you will give, but it is not always possible to give a whole apartment to every child'.

The prominence of this view of parental obligation had been illustrated a few months earlier by Anat, who said to me that she would have another child if that did not imply the later obligation to acquire one more apartment: 'If I am fortunate, I'll be able to buy two apartments for the girls, or at least two halves, but buying apartments for three children is absolutely out of the question, so I guess I'll have to give up this dream'. Once again, then, the notion that parents should help their children for 'as long as they need it' was reaffirmed.

Discussion

The launching processes described above differ greatly from North American depictions. In the United States, comparable secular, affluent populations maintain dispersed social and familial networks, contacted primarily by space-transcending technologies.[51] While in North America, kinship ties were labelled 'a latent matrix',[52] in Israel, these ties are active regularly. Rather than a potential mobilized in emergencies, generations of Israelis interact routinely, even when secular and wealthy. Moreover, the richer and better-educated

parents have closer relations with their children than do those who are less advantaged.[53] In this respect, the Israeli upper middle-class family resembles Afro-American and Mexican-American families, who exhibit tighter relations with, and greater residential proximity to their extended kin.[54]

The great involvement and economic support given by Israeli parents to their adult children may be interpreted on several levels. Starting with socio-demographic variables, most of the parents described in this article had two to three children. Like small families elsewhere, who maintain tighter relations than do larger ones,[55] small Israeli families are closely knit. This family structure, which correlates with wealth and education, is also associated with a higher likelihood to own a home.[56] Another factor which facilitates inter-generational relations in Israel is the low divorce rate in the older generation: in 1987, only 3.4 per cent of the Jewish men and 5.9 per cent of the women, in the age-group 40–54 were divorced.[57] Since adult children maintain closer ties with married rather than divorced parents,[58] the comparative stability of Israeli families in the 1970s supported the closeness illustrated in this paper. Third, in a country as small as Israel, wide dispersion is rare and getting together is therefore less difficult than is often the case in North America.

The particularities of the launching of upper middle-class children in Israel suggest several generalizations. First, any asymmetry between the families of the younger husband and wife was accepted. This asymmetry was usually manifested in several aspects — financial assistance, physical assistance, emotional support, and affinity. Generally speaking, according to my observations, the relations with the more generous parents were closer. Various explanations may be offered for this preference: the child of the wealthier parents had the upper hand in the marriage; the higher prestige of the more affluent parents vis-à-vis their child's in-laws; and the giving parents might be more active in initiating inter-generational activities and paying for them.

In such situations, resourceful parents established a prolonged superiority, even over successful adult children. They expected their adult children living in Givat Narkis to repay their generosity primarily by keeping in close touch with them. The parents, who were all healthy, working, and socially active, were not in any way dependent on their children. (Wealthy and educated elderly Israelis are less likely to rely on their children as primary caregivers and less likely to cohabit with them.[59]) All they looked for was the emotional reassurance and gratification of having an extended family, of being the 'patriarchs' of a newly-established lineage. In this psycho-economic exchange, the parents regularly provided their adult

children with gifts of substantive value, while the latter were merely expected to acknowledge the contribution.

The development of such inter-generational exchange may be associated with the emergence and aging of a wealthy generation for the first time in the country's history. None of the other parents described in this study had had wealthy parents themselves who could have helped them substantially when they were launched. Their own parents were mostly poor immigrants, who arrived in Israel either after surviving the horrors of the Holocaust or following a harsh migration from Muslim countries. Indeed, the percentage of people in Israel who were financially helped by their parents when acquiring their own home increased from 22 per cent among those older than 55 to more than 50 per cent among those aged 34 or less.[60] Thus, the parents of some Givat Narkis residents were 'psychological gentrifiers', who enjoyed increased leisure, travel, and a general rise in their standard of living.[61] Apparently, among the newly-established pleasures of life was the ability to provide their children with 'a soft landing', to ease their lives with material comforts. This new power seems to constitute a life-goal in its own right.

In the 1990s such people were no longer representatives only of exceptionally rich families, but of a wider stratum of persons in their fifties and sixties who had grown up to adulthood and found rewarding employment. Unlike their own parents, these people — although they were witnesses and survivors of national crises and wars — did not suffer major catastrophes or uprooting. They received a formal education and some of them prospered in their careers, which translated into social prestige and financial independence. In addition, they might have inherited property from their own parents, who had not been rich but perhaps had owned an apartment or had saved some money. In this socio-historical economic context, many parents said that they preferred 'to give the money when it was needed rather than let their children wait until they died'.[62]

From the adult children's perspective, this pattern satisfied their needs in a world of increasing longevity; they did not expect to inherit in the near future the property of their parents, whom they considered young and lively. However, since they themselves were establishing their own households, they did expect financial contributions as a part of parental obligation towards them. The neighbours' discussion described above indicates that they in turn were already behaving in accordance with this norm. In this respect, the residents of Givat Narkis exemplify a more general trend[63] of reducing children's obligations while enhancing parental obligations.

My general argument is thus that there seems to be a version of 'grand-family' in Givat Narkis and probably generally in Israel. Although young Israelis may acquire their own apartment, which is

physically separate from that of their parental home, some adult married children choose to live in geographic proximity to them. Moreover, quite often the intensive co-operation between the generations is also maintained even if they live in different areas of the country. As for financial aid, in Israel — as in Mexico — parental help to adult children is considered normal, even 'natural' by both generations.

Essential differences exist, however, between the two settings. While Mexican grand-families number 50 to 100 individuals,[64] Israeli three-generation families are considerably smaller. In the cases analysed above, such families numbered about 10 people and more distant relatives were hardly known. The quantitative difference narrows the scope of kin exchange and unlike the Mexican grand-family, the three-generation family in Israel is not the basis for one's occupational or social network. In addition, the Israeli family structure is not as formalised and solid as it is in Mexico. Frictions may therefore lead to an erosion of the inter-generational closeness, which is considered an option rather than an obligatory norm. Bearing in mind the more industrialized nature of the Israeli context and the presence of strong American influences, which are generally viewed positively, three-generation families in Israel are more threatened and fragile than they are in Mexico. That is probably why older parents and in-laws strive to provide continued financial assistance and gifts to their children and grandchildren — who receive them often as a matter of course.

The launching of upper middle-class Israelis, as observed in Givat Narkis, challenges the notion of generational separation as a cultural personal goal. The individualized nuclear appearance of upper middle-class households allows parents and siblings to remain closely linked: they depend upon one another for friendship and emotional support while expected parental financial assistance is gladly given and happily received.

NOTES

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THE MOTIVATIONS AND ASSIMILATION OF BRITISH WOMEN WHO MIGRATED TO ISRAEL, 1965–1975

Sharon Ann Musher

ALTHOUGH migration from high-income to middle-income countries differs from the norms of Western, consumer society, there was a rapid increase in the number of young Jews from English-speaking countries who voluntarily migrated to Israel in the 1960s in a movement known as the fourth wave of post-independence aliya. The newcomers to Israel expected to obtain not material gain but personal satisfaction and social approval through their migration, which in Hebrew is called aliya, meaning ascension, progression, and success. This paper investigates the gender dimension of such migration by exploring the motivations and assimilation processes of 30 British women who chose to settle in Israel between 1965 and 1975.[1]

Dina's description of why she decided to migrate shows the types of forces which might have led a British Jew after the Six-Day War of 1967 to leave a comfortable native land for a less affluent promised one:[2]

> I had not been aware really of Israel, of its importance, of Zionism at all, before 1967. And it was only during the 1967 war, when I was seventeen years old, and we saw on television all these healthy, good-looking, young, Israeli boys digging trenches. [Laugh] I was always under the impression, like a lot of people, that Israel was a country of rabbis and desert. ... My father said he wanted very much to go and see Israel, and we asked if we could go with . . . And I can't explain it to you. . . . My eyes were open to a country I couldn't believe I hadn't known existed. Nearly everyone was Jewish! The people cleaning the floors, the postman, and street cleaners. There was a tremendous feeling of comradeship here. . . . It was youthful. It was exciting, vibrant . . . and I really felt it every moment. It was electrifying for me. . . . And I felt something very spiritual which I'd never experienced before. . . . I became very proud to be Jewish. . . . And I said

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this, before I even left Israel — remember this is a holiday — I said . . . to my parents I have to come back here. And I knew, I knew I meant to live.

The majority of research on voluntary migration to Israel and on the assimilation process of such immigrants has focused on the decision-making process of individuals like Dina. According to sociological literature, such migration is the result of a combination of 'push' factors — which are caused by dissatisfaction with one's native country or because of hardships experienced there — and 'pull' factors, which attract immigrants because of special opportunities available in another country.[3] Research about migration to Israel suggests that, before the Six-Day War of 1967, pioneering and classical Zionist ideals 'pulled' voluntary immigrants to the 'promised land'.[4] After 1967, Zionist motivations declined and were replaced by what researchers refer to as 'Jewish' and 'religious' motivations.[5] Dashefsky, Amicis, Lazerwitz, and Tabory — in their social-psychological model of motivations for immigration — argue that before 1967, motivations for voluntary migration to Israel were 'other expressive': immigrants asked not what Israel could do for them, but what they could do for that country. After 1967, on the other hand, motivations for migrating to Israel were 'self expressive' in that individuals moved in order to fulfil personal quests for happiness. Studies cite four main motivations which led Jews to migrate to Israel: (1) satisfying personal aspirations; (2) moving with ideological peers; (3) maximizing an investment in Jewishness; and (4) joining a traditional society. The third and fourth explanations, developed by anthropologist Kevin Avruch, contend that American Jews migrated to Israel after 1967 in order to invest in their ideal conception of their (ethnic) selves and to join a community where that self is part of a 'traditional society'. In other words, Jews migrated to Israel to make their 'traditionalised social identity . . . find consonance in a community of like-minded others'.[6]

Although there are numerous studies on voluntary migration to Israel, few of them have explored the gender dimension of this movement. Most previous work has either not included women in the sample, designed studies which over-represent men, or treated motivations for voluntary migration as gender-neutral.[7] The few studies which specifically include women focus on the effect of migration on marital relations and on the rate, costs, and opportunities of women's paid employment.[8] These projects are part of a growing body of comparative literature on the impact of migration on gender-role expectations, labour-market participation, and gender-linked socio-economic inequality, but they do not explore the effect of gender on assimilation. In other words, they investigate how immigration might change a woman's status, but not how women's experiences

might challenge currently accepted theories about motivations for immigration and the assimilation process.

The present article intends to use gender as a category of analysis in studying the motivations and assimilation process of immigrants. Using in-depth interviews with 30 British female migrants to Israel, this paper will do the following: (1) explore the timing of migration to Israel in the context of other major life-choices and of historical time; (2) examine the effect of different socio-demographic characteristics on assimilation; and (3) finally look at how macro-processes — such as rapid social change in Israel — affected immigrants' assimilation, in addition to the micro-considerations of the woman's socio-economic and marital status. It is my contention that in order to understand migration, we have to study both gender differences and the relationship between individual motivations and social restrictions and opportunities.

The present study focuses on British women who migrated to Israel because, although they have been under-researched as a group, quantitative analysis suggests their significance. Specific data on the migration to Israel of British women is not accessible; however, available information about aliya suggests that it is selective by age, sex, and marital status.[9] For example, most studies of American migrants to Israel find that a disproportionate number of them since 1948 have been single, young women.[10] The following chart illustrates the predominance of young women who emigrated from all countries to Israel between 1969 and 1972, when the ratio of women to men was at its height. Among 15 to 29 year olds — the age range which contained the largest numbers of immigrants — the gender balance was particularly weighted towards females.

In addition, there are some indications that women from all countries were considerably more likely than men were to remain in Israel after migration. A longitudinal study of 560 immigrants conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics and by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research found that five years after migrating to Israel between 1969 and 1970, men were leaving the country at almost twice the rate of women.[11]

This study concentrates specifically on Anglo-Jewish women because only minimal research has centred on the migration to Israel of British Jews as compared to the significant body of work on American aliya — although the United Kingdom has been only second to the United States, since the establishment of the State of Israel, with regard to the numbers of those who migrated to Israel from various English-speaking countries.

Given the disparity between the respective Jewish populations in the two countries, a much larger percentage of the Anglo-Jewish community migrated to Israel. Between 1969 and 1976, the rate of

Chart 1. Immigrants from all countries to Israel by age range and by gender, 1969–1972. Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Immigration to Israel, 1948–1972, Part I. Annual Data*, special series no. 416 (Jerusalem, 1973)



TABLE 1.
Jewish Immigrants to Israel from English-speaking Countries, 1949–1972

Years	*USA*	*UK*	*S. Africa*	*Canada*	*Australia*	*% English-speaking to Total Immigrants*
1948–52	1873	2080	707	278	126	0.71
1953–56	522	515	350	110	50	1.25
1957–60	870	760	383	124	63	1.5
1961–64	2102	1260	1003	241	133	2.08
1965–68	2066	1140	829	231	150	5.42
1969–72	18366	4968	2478	2086	735	16.61
Total	25,799	10,723	5,750	3,070	1,257	4.60

NOTES

Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Immigration to Israel, 1948–1972. Part II. Composition by Period of Immigration*. special series no. 489 (Jerusalem, 1975).

migrants to Israel per 10,000 British Jews was 27, as opposed to a rate of eight migrants to Israel per 10,000 North American Jews.[12] In addition, there are also some suggestions that British migrants were more likely than Americans were to remain in Israel. Sergio DellaPergola's interpretation of a 1972 census, one of the few pieces of evidence which documents reverse migration, implies that the median stay for British migrants to Israel was twice as long as that of migrants from the United States.[13] His findings — combined with

what we know about women's rates of reverse migration — suggest that British immigrants, particularly women, may have been more satisfied with life in Israel than were North Americans.

Method

In researching this study, I conducted and tape-recorded 30 face-to-face, in-depth interviews — in English — with British women who took the decision to migrate to Israel between 1965 and 1975, when they were between the ages of 15 and 29. I used a snowball method to garner participants: I sent letters of introduction to British women, suggested by the British Olim Society, by members of my family, friends, and by women already contacted. I also placed an advertisement in *Link Magazine*, a publication of the British Olim Society. These two approaches yielded 85 potential participants. From this list, I chose to interview 30 British women based on their availability, on their current location, and on what I could ascertain about their religious backgrounds, political positions, and economic levels. Five of the women interviewed went to Israel between 1965 and 1975, but returned to Britain after a period ranging from two and a half to 13 years. I conversed with them in England in the spring of 1995, and I interviewed the remaining 25 women in Israel, in the summer of 1995. The latter group had migrated in 1965–1975 and had remained in the country. I selected women who lived in various locations in Israel, including cities, kibbutzim, West Bank settlements, and the small northern town of Safed, in order to gather a geographically and politically diverse population. I further sought a variety of viewpoints by telephoning potential respondents, before selecting my sample, and questioning them about their marital statuses and their religious backgrounds before they migrated to Israel. Almost two-thirds of the women interviewed (19) were single when they migrated to Israel. A similar proportion of the sample was religiously observant.

Each selected woman participated in a semi-structured interview which lasted between 50 minutes and three hours, depending on her availability. Questions focused on the participant's background, on her motivations for aliya, and on her subjective and objective assimilation. All interviews were tape-recorded.

The approach used in this study was qualitative rather than quantitative; thus, the sample size and the findings reported in this paper are not meant to be statistically significant, but rather to explore why some people might be satisfied with one situation while others might be dissatisfied with a similar one. An attempt was made to understand patterns of behaviour through the women's own subjective perceptions and through the meanings they attributed to critical events and situations.

In my analysis, I have considered the experiences of the entire sample, including the five women who returned to Britain, when examining motivations for migration to Israel; however, I have not weighed the returnees' experiences into my investigation of assimilation because of the small sample size.

The Sample

As mentioned above, statistics on the socio-demographic trends of women who emigrated to Israel from Britain are not currently available; thus, it is difficult to determine how representative the sample is. The five-year return rate of British migrants to Israel, in the late 1960s, was probably somewhere in between that of all female immigrants (17 per cent) and that of all Western European and American immigrants (38 per cent).[14] Since only five women (17 per cent of the total sample) were returnees, the sample may somewhat under-represent those who returned to Britain.

The selected sample also both under-represents the number of British migrants living in Israeli cities and over-emphasizes those women living on the geographical periphery. For example, of the 25 women interviewed in Israel, 11 were living in Jerusalem and Greater Tel-Aviv, eight on kibbutzim, four in West Bank settlements, and two in Safed. Contemporary censuses show that American immigrants settled mainly in cities: in Jerusalem, and in the Greater Tel-Aviv area.[15] It is likely that the geographical distribution of British people in Israel reflected that of American migrants, who tended to live in areas of predominantly English-speaking communities.

The over-emphasis on kibbutzim, West Bank settlements, and the northern town of Safed can be justified by the use of a quota-sampling technique, whereby some individuals are over-represented in order to include a wide variety of people in the study. Eight per cent of British immigrants do not live in Safed; however, I interviewed two women who lived in that town in order to have an adequately-sized sample of individuals from small, rural areas other than co-operatives or West Bank settlements.

For background information about each woman interviewed, please see the Appendix where they are listed alphabetically by name with details about each woman's level of assimilation, location, year of birth, year of migration, academic, religious, Zionist, and Hebrew background, and marital status at the time of migration. The Appendix also indicates the interviewee's work, education, marital status, and location when the interview was conducted.

Aliya and Life-Course Events

Jews who were raised in Zionist circles — as were slightly more than two-thirds (21) of the women interviewed in this study — frequently saw aliya as an obvious move which enabled them to fulfil the aspirations and dreams of their Zionist youth groups, their family, and themselves. Indeed, 11 of the women interviewed described their decision to migrate to Israel as having been natural. One of them said: 'Basically we grew up in B'nei Akiva [an Orthodox, Zionist youth group], and I mean I personally never thought about doing anything other than live in Israel'.[16]

But retrospective perceptions are often overshadowed by a woman's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with her current lot. Despite the memory of migration to Israel as having been natural, only four of the 21 youth-group members chose to follow the programme set by such groups in terms of a summer holiday in Israel, a one-year course there, joining a *garin* (migration group), and then migrating to Israel. Although many of the women in this study may have been taught that Israel was 'the place Jews had to go, the homeland, the aim', for most of them the decision to migrate to Israel and the timing of that move overlapped with other decisions — such as when or whether to leave their parental homes, to acquire higher education, to work, to marry, and to have children.[17] By reconstructing the decision-making processes of Anglo-Jewish women who wished both to fulfil themselves and to satisfy their parents, we can begin to see the forces which might have pushed women away from Britain and pulled them towards Israel.

The first choice which those who were considering migrating to Israel faced was whether to remain in Britain after they completed O-level examinations — either to study further for A-levels (which would qualify them for university entrance) or to seek employment — or to emigrate to Israel at that point. Most of the women interviewed (24) chose to study for A-levels before emigrating; 17 of them either began or obtained university or professional qualifications before migration, and two went to university soon after migrating to Israel. In contrast, most women in the general population of Britain did not proceed to higher education in the 1960s and 1970s: only approximately five per cent of all British women and about eight per cent of Anglo-Jewish women studied beyond A-levels.[18]

Given the existence of merit-based scholarships in the United Kingdom and of those based solely on immigrant status in Israel, few women had to overcome serious financial obstacles in order to leave their parental homes, to go to university, and to work. Social norms and parental wishes, however, frequently influenced these young women's decisions. For example, Elise was one of three B'nei Akiva

members interviewed who wanted to spend a year on *Hachshara*, the youth group's programme in Israel, but whose parents discouraged her and her siblings from doing so. 'My parents said absolutely no way' she recounted. They said: 'We don't care what you do with your lives, but get qualified, get qualified, get qualified, get self-supporting and do what you want'.[19] Suzie decided without parental persuasion that she wanted to study in England before migrating to Israel. Remembering a holiday which she had taken in Israel, she explained, 'I thought of staying [in Israel], but I couldn't bear the idea of university there, so I came back to do a law degree in Manchester. ... I wasn't brave enough to do it all alone'.[20] The 17 other women who chose to attend college or university in Britain before migrating to Israel had faced similar pressures and fears.

Approximately two-thirds (18) of the women interviewed were in paid employment before they migrated to Israel. Five of them had been secretaries for Jewish organizations in between visiting Israel and migrating. Leora described herself as 'preparing for aliya' during that period:[21]

> Mentally and physically I didn't have what I needed to go back with. I wanted to obviously buy lots of things that I thought I would need to go back with. I had to save money up. I didn't want to take any money from my parents. I had to make all the arrangements through the Aliya Department. And I had to mentally gear myself up.

Seven out of the 14 women who obtained diplomas or university degrees before migrating to Israel chose to gain work experience in their field before aliya. With one exception, all those who migrated to Israel directly after university joined their fiancé, their husband, or members of their nuclear family already living in Israel.

Despite their high educational level, the women interviewed described themselves as having been limited to fairly traditional lifestyles both as young adults in their parental homes and as young married women. Rina, who sought to have both a career and a family, explained the restricted options open to Anglo-Jewish women in the following manner:[22]

> [In Manchester] either you belonged to a Jewish community and you became your middle-class, Jewish housewife buying bagels on a Sunday morning and cream cheese and lox, or whatever they call it, and dropping your kid off at the King David School, organising WIZO coffee mornings for some baby place in Ashkelon ... or you got very religious ... or you were out. You're sort of an outsider.

The perception of culturally-limited opportunities for Jewish women is supported by available statistics regarding the paid employment of Anglo-Jewish women. In a survey conducted in the London suburb of Edgware in 1963, for example, only 22 per cent of Jewish

women were in paid employment as compared to 40 per cent of the general female British population.[23]

Although Rina was one of the few women who said that she was motivated to migrate to Israel in order to be gainfully employed, 11 of those interviewed admitted that they saw aliya as a means of achieving freedom and independence. For young Jewish women, particularly for religious ones, Israel appeared to offer freedom for adventure while remaining within acceptable limits. Rachel reminisced that her first trip to Israel was 'the most fantastic social experience' she had ever had. She remembered that 'the freedom [of] being able to wander about' by herself and being 'able to go into everyone's houses and all this sort of thing was a tremendous experience'.[24] However, eating 'anywhere' and going into 'everyone's house' could not have been always permissible for Orthodox Jews since a large number of Israelis did not observe kashrut in their homes. Her understanding of people's commonality and of her similarity to them created a feeling of belonging, acceptance, and pride. Daniella had also been exhilarated: 'There was a certain freedom that I felt. ... It was a true feeling that this is where I belong. This is my place. I don't have to answer to anybody'.[25]

Many of the women interviewed saw Israel as a means not only of achieving freedom as Jewish individuals, but also of enhancing their personal autonomy as women. Judy explained:[26]

> I mean this is being truthful, but where I grew up and the way, you know, nice Jewish girls didn't just leave home. So it wouldn't have been right just to, you know if you're in London you've got a perfectly good university in London with lots of perfectly good colleges. There's no reason to leave London and go to some other university in the middle of nowhere or not in the middle of nowhere which will be less good. You know people who live outside London might use going to London as an excuse to leave home but being in London, there was really nothing to do. I had a friend who went and took a flat at the other end of London. Oh what had she done! It was like she had done this very strange, terrible thing. But coming to Israel somehow or other was . . . an acceptable thing to do.

Examining when the interviewees actually left their parental homes reveals the astuteness of Judy's comment: 15 of the 18 respondents who grew up in London lived at home or with a close relative while they studied or worked. The three Londoners who left home before either marrying or migrating to Israel included one who received a grant to study dentistry at Birmingham; a second whose parents drove her to Leeds to keep her away from her non-Jewish London boyfriend; and a third, Suzie, who studied law at Manchester. Suzie was allowed to study away from home without any difficulty; however, she understood that if she returned to London after completing her degree, she would have to live at home. This motivated her decision

to make aliya immediately after graduating. She stated: 'I knew that I didn't want to live in my parents' house. I could have moved to Manchester, but I couldn't have got my own flat in London. I would have had to have lived at home'.[27]

In contrast, almost all the women who grew up outside London (11 out of 12) had left their parental homes to work or to study before they married or migrated to Israel. The exception was Michelle, who had left school when she was 17 in order to help to support her family, because her father was ill and unable to work. She lived with her parents in Darlington until the age of 21 and married an Israeli who was living in England at the time.[28]

Two of the women interviewed, who grew up in provincial areas where they knew little about Judaism and thought of Israel as a 'foreign country', considered leaving home by moving elsewhere in Britain.[29] Deborah said: 'I wasn't really aware of the existence of Israel or anywhere to go other than a bigger town when I got older. . . . At that age [16] it would have been enough to go to London or to Manchester'.[30] In contrast, single women who grew up in Jewish and Zionist circles outside London, particularly those living in Manchester (5), often viewed Israel as offering even greater possibilities for autonomy than did London, since they experienced the Anglo-Jewish community itself as being stifling. Chava noted: 'I couldn't see myself as one of those [Manchester] women. They were very small-minded. They spent all day on the telephone to each other and at the grocers and going shopping for clothes. I couldn't see myself doing that my whole life — the suburbia values. I thought there must be more to life than this'.[31] In addition to objecting to the materialistic values of the Manchester Jewish community, Naomi disliked its political conservatism. She said:[32]

> A lot of my friends got married at 18 or 19. None of the girls went to university, only the boys did. The girls married young and thought of nothing but what to buy for the house, clothes, and their husbands making money. I at that point was, I won't say incredibly rebellious, but for my group I was rebellious. I believed in equality for all, and this was during the Che Guevara period. I won't say I was a Communist, but I believed in equal rights for everybody. . . . And I felt that I had, at some point, to move to Israel. I didn't know when. I didn't know what was going to make me do it, but some time.

Although these two women might have been searching for a life style which was more fulfilling than that of a typical Jewish wife in Britain in the 1960s, most of those in the sample sought spouses in Israel: 19 of those interviewed were single and unengaged when they migrated to Israel, and according to the social norms of the period, they were at an age when they ought to have been looking for husbands.[33] Whereas the average age of marriage for Jewish women

in Britain then was 21.5,[34] the single women who migrated to Israel did not marry until they were an average age of 25, and two of them were still single when they were interviewed.

The ratio of Anglo-Jewish women to men may partially explain the gender ratio of migration to Israel in the 1960s. In their study of synagogue marriages in Britain, Prais and Schmool argued that the sharp fluctuation in marriages during the Second World War, combined with the comparatively large difference in age at first marriage between Jewish grooms and brides, led to a significant deficiency of grooms from 1967 to 1972.[35] Such a male deficit might have encouraged young women to look elsewhere for husbands.

Six of the women remembered that looking for a partner contributed to their motivations to migrate to Israel. For the three who went to Israel with the intention of marrying Israelis, aliya and marriage were intimately connected. Evie said: 'My aim was to marry an Israeli. . . . There was something very attractive about the fact that a fellow had been in the army, sort of a — a man'.[36] The other three women who remembered searching for a spouse as having motivated their emigration had believed that they could maximize their chances of meeting a nice Jewish boy, whether or not he was an Israeli, if they were living in Israel. Miri explained:[37]

> It was important to all of us to marry Jewish spouses. . . . So I think it was something that I made aliya when I was twenty one. I wasn't expecting to get married when I was twenty one in a few months, but obviously it was something. . . . The idea is that I would meet somebody here and I wouldn't have to look too closely and inquire.

Most parents encouraged their daughters to marry before they migrated; however, they still allowed their single young daughters to go to Israel unescorted by husbands. '[My parents] said I should get married first', Judy reflected, 'but it wasn't like I had a boyfriend. I said this is it — I'm going'.[38] Her ability to migrate to Israel, but not to leave home otherwise before marriage further illustrates the extent to which aliya was a socially-acceptable alternative for young women.

Migration to Israel, however, was not always a personally liberating experience. For example, seven of the women interviewed — most of whom were not raised in Zionist circles — migrated to Israel because that was where their Zionist or Israeli husbands wanted to live. Elizabeth recalled: 'I knew that if I married Daniel, I would come and live in Israel. He'd always said that that's where we will live. . . . It's just always been very clear to me that you go where your husband goes. It was a natural chain of events. It was just a natural pull'.[39] Retrospective accounts of motivations for migrating to Israel range from Elisabeth's perspective to resentment depending, in part, on the current marital status of the woman interviewed. Michelle, for

example, went to Israel neither to maximize her investment in Judaism nor to enhance her personal autonomy: 'To cut a long story short ... [my Israeli husband] told me, you know, the marriage is not so good, he likes to play around, and I was very unhappy, and I wanted to leave him. He said if we came to Israel, it would be easier. ... So I decided, O.K., I was very young, and I really cared about him, and I loved him, he was my husband, and I had this beautiful child. So, that basically is the reason why I made aliya. ... I came to try and make my marriage work'.[40] Unfortunately, neither Michelle nor her husband succeeded in making their marriage work, and they were divorced within two years of their migration.

The women in this study chose to migrate to Israel during 1965–1975, when many British women were shifting their primary orientation from domesticity to employment outside the home. Migrating to Israel allowed Jewish single women to delay marriage and to explore alternative roles; it also allowed Jewish married women to combine domesticity with self-fulfilment. For some, however, the decision to move to Israel and the timing of that migration had more to do with family commitments than it did with more abstract ideals.

Aliya and Historical Events

Migrating to Israel in the 1960s and 1970s was a salient option for young Jewish women from Britain not only because they felt 'pushed' out of Britain by restrictions on personal opportunities to leave home, to marry, and to work, but also because the opportunity to participate in a movement 'pulled' them towards Israel. Aliya provided them with what Ronald Inglehart describes as 'post-materialist' satisfaction. According to him, since the affluent and university-educated members of the generation born after the Second World War came of age in the 1960s, the values of Western societies have shifted from materialist to post-materialist: they have changed from individuals pursuing 'physical sustenance and safety' to people striving for 'belonging, self-expression, and ... quality of life'.[41] Rachel explained how her contemporaries saw migration to Israel as a chance for women to pursue post-materialist aims as opposed to material advancement. She reflected:[42]

> There was always such a difference between us and the non-Jewish girls in school, and they used to envy us for it. They said you're lucky, you've always got Israel to work towards. What are we working towards? They didn't know. What job we're going to do or whatever. They didn't see any aim in future life the same way as we did.

The historical events — which had occurred when the women interviewed had migrated to Israel — also made them feel as if living in Israel would allow them to satisfy more than simply their personal

and familial needs. The Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 stimulated individuals who wanted to participate in a critical moment of Israel's development to volunteer on kibbutzim, to visit Israel, and to attempt to live there. Novels, newspaper and radio reports, and in particular eye-witness accounts of the Six-Day War combined to paint a romantic impression of Israel. Corrine recalled:[43]

> It was a very, very exciting time. I remember watching the news and the papers every day. And I remember, I taught in heder in the evening, and I stopped at the underground station, and all of a sudden I saw the headlines. Israel had recaptured Jerusalem. And I still remember to this day where I was standing when I saw that. It's one of those things. I think most Jews remember where they were when they heard that news. It's like most Americans remember where they were when Kennedy was assassinated. . . . It was a very romantic time. It was a very beautiful time in Israeli history.

Popular perceptions of these two momentous wars affected 17 of the women enough to make them visit Israel within a year of either war, and 11 of them migrated to Israel within two years of each war. Single women were more likely than married ones were to respond to the events of the times. All but two of those who visited Israel and migrated there shortly after the war were single; one of the two was married to an Israeli. For the six women who married before migrating to Israel, the wars were less significant in influencing the timing of migration than were more practical issues such as the household's financial position and the ages of their children. One woman explained that if you have children, 'you've got to have a job to go to. You can't just appear like you do when you're straight from university and you've got nothing and it doesn't matter. If you've got a family to support, you've got to have something'.[44]

A Typology of Assimilation

Women's roles as mothers, workers, and citizens affected not only their motivations for migration and the timing of that move, but also their assimilation process. Seven women in this study migrated to Israel with young children and nine of the immigrants subsequently had between three and five children each. Family responsibilities coupled with the concentration of women in routine, semi-skilled, low-paid work meant that many were not integrated into Israeli society through paid employment as readily as were their male counterparts.[45] This was particularly true for English-speaking non-professional women, who were channelled into secretarial work. In addition, female migrants rarely entered Israeli society by serving in the army, since they were exempt from military service if they were

older than 20 years of age or were married. How then did these women become integrated into Israeli society?

To answer this question, we need to investigate both how female immigrants perceived the experiences of mothering and of paid employment to have affected their process of assimilation, and the relation between socio-demographic characteristics and assimilation. In order to measure levels of assimilation, a typology was created by dividing the women in this study into groups based on variables which related to S. N. Eisenstadt's explanation of the process of assimilation. Eisenstadt describes socialization as occurring when the immigrant learns and, eventually, internalizes new roles.[46] The women interviewed were evaluated both on the basis of their adaptation to life in Israel (based on their level of knowledge of Hebrew, as measured by their ability to speak, to read, and to write the language) and on their level of social integration – which was determined by the composition of their friends in terms of the proportion who came from English-speaking countries as compared to those who were either sabras (Israeli born) or immigrants from non-English-speaking countries. Since self-evaluations both of Hebrew ability and of friendships with non-native English speakers were used, these markers are subjective and vary according to the individual's conception of fluency in Hebrew and of relationships.

The women interviewed fell into three categories of assimilation. Nine were unassimilated, since they were not proficient in Hebrew; in other words, they could communicate in Hebrew, but five of them did not speak grammatically, had a limited vocabulary, and could not read or write the language beyond an elementary level. The unassimilated women, in general, had few friends who were not immigrants from English-speaking countries. On the other hand, 16 women were assimilated in so far as they were proficient to fluent in speaking, reading, and writing Hebrew. There were two subsets within the assimilated group. Those who 'maintained difference' had a high Hebrew ability, but had chosen to have more friends from English-speaking countries than from Israel or from non English-speaking countries. In contrast, those assimilated women who 'became Israeli' not only were proficient to fluent in Hebrew, but also had more Israeli friends than ones from English-speaking countries. Note that those women who 'became Israeli' did not necessarily join mainstream Israeli society, since the term measures only the geographical origins of the majority of an immigrant's friends and not the subjective definition of what it means to actually be Israeli.[47]

One woman in the sample did not fit easily into the categories constructed in this typology. Jane is an Oxford graduate who married an Israeli, moved to Israel with him, and converted to Judaism. She claimed that nowadays people rarely spotted that she was not a

sabra.[48] At the time of the interview, Jane spoke Hebrew fluently, with no trace of a foreign accent, and her friends were almost exclusively native-born Israelis. Although she read and wrote Hebrew only at a rudimentary level, I have placed her in the category of immigrants who 'became Israeli' since her personality and her socio-demographic characteristics have more in common with that group than they do with the unassimilated group — which is where she belongs on the criterion of her Hebrew literacy.

Assimilated versus Unassimilated

Orthodox background, Hebrew skills, and membership of a Zionist organization are three factors which facilitated — but did not guarantee — assimilation. All the women who assimilated were either religiously-affiliated Zionists, or knew Hebrew, French, or German before migrating to Israel. But some of those who did not assimilate also fitted into these categories. For example, roughly half of both the assimilated and the unassimilated women knew some Hebrew before migrating to Israel; thus, the level of Hebrew knowledge before migration did not necessarily indicate one's level of assimilation. The socio-demographic differences between women who assimilated and those who did not suggest that further — and perhaps more accurate — characteristics of successful assimilation include high educational and occupational status, as well as the ability to find and keep a spouse.

A comparison of two of the five women who migrated to Israel as young mothers highlights the differences between those who assimilated and those who did not. Leona, a Zionist and traditionally Jewish woman,[49] recounted her experiences as a young mother with a sick child and a husband fighting in the Yom Kippur War:[50]

> The only time that I thought about leaving was . . . in '73, during the war. Sam was away for six months. It was very, very hard. I mean I was working and that was good. I had the child and he had asthma and I just thought it was the end of the world. I was stuck here with a sick kid. I had mother. Everyone was very helpful. But I didn't know it was asthma and he was getting pneumonia and there was this war. And I went to the army and said, 'Look, can you release my husband because he has to come and help me look after my child'. And their reply was very sympathetic but the reply that came out was that it was negative. I can't cope with this. This is too big for me.
>
> Sharon: Were you in communication with Sam?
>
> Leona: Yeah, but very occasionally. He wasn't on the telephone.
>
> Sharon: How did he respond to your desire to leave?
>
> Leona: He didn't consider it. He was doing his thing. He really liked the macho thing. He was fighting. This was what he was waiting for. He knew that he had to be there and that's what he had to do. But for me, I didn't

have to be in this flat in Bat Yam, with a sick kid, and a job, and a war not knowing. I mean it was just too big a job for me.

Leona and her husband were able to reconcile their differences, but the concentration of divorces in the unassimilated group, where Leona is situated, probably reveals the impact which difficulty in assimilating to life in Israel could have on marriages. Four of the nine unassimilated women divorced their first husbands as compared to one of the 16 assimilated women.

Ruth was another woman who was both a new immigrant and a young mother at the same time. At the end of her second year at university she had left England to migrate to Israel with her Zionist, British husband and their six-month old child. She spoke little Hebrew, felt socially isolated, and was overwhelmed by daily tasks which she would not have had to do as a mother in England — such as preparing baby food since there were no baby-food jars and laundering clothes without a washing machine. However, for Ruth — unlike Leona — the Yom Kippur War represented a watershed moment, the turning point when she began to learn Hebrew and to become assimilated. She recounted:[51]

It was a great national trauma, and I felt very much part of that trauma. . . . It was a tremendous shock, and this was invincible Israel who was suddenly attacked, and everybody felt personally threatened, and I felt personally threatened too. And the sense of community — we all went to the local air-raid shelter together. We were all sharing whatever we'd prepared for our babies with each other. It was a sudden sense of being much more part of what was going on in Israel. . . . The post-Seventy-Three period wasn't a lonely struggle. My Hebrew still wasn't good and, as I said, I wasn't working in anything that I could find satisfying, but it was different. I was a different person. I felt more settled. And when I say that life began when I started my present profession, it was only in terms of my own self-image. My own feeling of pride in what I do everyday.

One factor which differentiates Ruth from Leona and, more generally, assimilated women from unassimilated ones is educational status. Ruth left England in the middle of her university course, but she completed her BA in Israel. The degree allowed her to train in Israel to become a therapist for the visually impaired and that career encouraged her process of assimilation, both by forcing her to improve her Hebrew and by giving her access to a wider Israeli community.

Just as education was Ruth's entrée into a satisfying job which facilitated her assimilation, it also helped other women to assimilate. In general, the women who assimilated were much better educated before migrating to Israel than were those who did not assimilate. Whereas nine of the 16 assimilated women obtained college or university degrees before migration and all but one of the remaining seven completed their higher education in Israel, only one of the

unassimilated women, Bonnie, had trained professionally before aliya. She was also the only unassimilated woman who continued her education in Israel. The differences between the educational backgrounds of assimilated and unassimilated women moreover translated into differences between the occupational statuses of the women in both groups. When interviewed, nine of the assimilated women worked in professional jobs, which had required specialized training, as compared to only one unassimilated woman, Bonnie.

University training allowed immigrants to obtain non-secretarial paid employment. The more professional the position an immigrant held, the more likely she was to be in a Hebrew-speaking and, more generally, in an Israeli environment. Thus, we see a correlation between education, professional status, and assimilation, although the order of causation, including whether education facilitates the ability to assimilate or vice versa, is not clear.

'Maintaining difference' versus 'becoming Israeli'

Leah fell into the category of women who 'became Israeli'. Her story encapsulates the differences between the approach of someone who 'maintains difference' and another who 'becomes Israeli'. She said:[52]

> Something very strange happened when we came here because I was suddenly my own person, and [my husband] didn't like it very much. I worked in the school with the kids and also, like I said, we used to go back to give the children their supper in the evenings, and sometimes there were birthday parties which were always in the evening around the camp fire. And I used to come back very happy and bubbly, and he would sometimes sulk and not talk to me. And it was like I wasn't his little wife that gave him his dinner. And gradually, over the years, he found it very, very hard. And he couldn't communicate. And he just didn't like the idea of me, you know, what I did on the kibbutz and enjoying my own things.... We went on a trip together to the Sinai with half of the kibbutz, and he didn't want me to sing and sit by the campfire with all the rest of them. He wanted me to sit by him and not even help get the food ready and muck in.... That trip was the end of our marriage. I knew that I couldn't carry on.

They divorced soon afterwards, and he left the kibbutz. A year and a half later, Leah remarried an Israeli, the new couple remained in the same kibbutz, and she became fluent in Hebrew and acquired friends who were mainly not English-speakers. Leah was one of the five women who 'became Israeli,' who chose to marry an Israeli-born man. In contrast, none of the women who 'maintained difference' married an Israeli, and all but two of them married native English-speakers.

Since most of the women interviewed who 'maintained difference' had British husbands, the language spoken in their homes was English. Israelis need to know English in order to attend university; thus, there are incentives for English-speaking immigrants to teach the language to their children, and the ability to speak English confers status on individuals. An English language and literature high-school teacher explained why English is the primary language spoken in her house as follows:[53]

> Our environment is purely English. One thing we did always insist on, is that we speak only English in the house because we wanted our children to be able to speak with their family. And we were very particular, maybe too particular . . . insisting they speak English in the house, to each other as well.... They're not allowed to speak Hebrew. I felt that it's very important. Not only is it important for the family abroad, but here in Israel, English is such an important part of university.

While knowledge of English maintained connections with family in Britain and facilitated social advancement in Israel, exposure to Hebrew and to Israelis encouraged assimilation. A story told by one of the nurses who 'became Israeli' about her experiences during the Yom Kippur War illustrates the type of impact that immersion in an Israeli environment could have on assimilation:[54]

> We worked in Shaare Tzedek [a hospital] first of all. It was Yom Kippur and I was in Kiryat Moshe.... Suddenly a kid ran into the shul [synagogue] and said the war had broken out. And I just left and went straight to the hospital and I can't explain it. It was a togetherness I'd never known before.... And I remember we went home at two or three in the morning. I think we had to walk home. I took another nurse with me who couldn't get to her apartment. Everywhere was pitch black. The next day we had to try to get back to work. There was no public transport running. And the police car in the end picked us up. And then we began working twelve-hour shifts. And I worked in the medical ward. So, for twelve hours a day I was with Israelis and hearing about their fathers and their brothers and their sons and their boy friends and what they were going through. And I lived with two Israeli girls. And in point of fact, my friend's brother was killed right at the end of the war.... That was when I suddenly began to feel a part of the country.... I began to get to know more people. I never thought again about giving up. It was a turning point.

But even in less dramatic instances, working with Israelis in Hebrew-speaking environments made women such as Ruth, the visual therapist, and Chava, a real estate agent, feel more Israeli themselves. Chava explained:[55]

> My work has very much given me an identity of being an Israeli. Because out of 40 officers that I work with, I would say only three or four of them are actually Anglo-Saxons and the rest are Israeli. And I meet them on a daily basis, and I work with them, and I speak to them. And it's opened

> my eyes. Also I'm meeting Israelis who are selling their homes or buying homes.... So I'm much more involved in Israeli society now because of work.

While those women who 'became Israeli' may have been more exposed to the Hebrew language and to Israeli culture than were those who 'maintained difference', the former were also more likely to join fringe communities than were the latter. The majority of those who 'maintained difference' — five women — lived in English-speaking communities in Jerusalem or Greater Tel-Aviv; one of them explained the predominantly English-speaking composition of her friends by saying: 'The neighbourhood is that way. It's not because we go out of our way to find more English-speaking immigrants. It just happens that way'.[56] In contrast, most women who 'became Israeli' did so by joining the fringes of Israeli society: four lived in West Bank settlements; two in kibbutzim; one in Safed; and two in Jerusalem.

One of the women who 'became Israeli' and lived in Jerusalem considered herself to be on the political, if not the geographical, periphery of Israeli society. Jane — the Oxford graduate who had converted to Judaism — was the only non-religious, assimilated woman in the sample; she described herself as having become a 'left-wing, secular, fiercely anti-religious Israeli of British origin'. She claimed:[57]

> [My views] are shared by most of the people that we know. I mean our friends tend to be very homogenous in political viewpoint. And we are all of us on the extreme left of the spectrum as it's defined in Israel.... I mean I certainly feel I belong amongst those people. Whether I belong in Israel altogether is another story.'

Jane, like most women who 'became Israeli', thus distinguished herself more as a member of a particular social group than as part of mainstream Israeli identity.

Ultimately, whether and who a woman chose to marry, the career she pursued, and the communities she decided to join depended on her personal needs. Natalie's story illustrates the role that personal preference played in encouraging a woman who was capable of 'becoming Israeli' to maintain her difference. When Natalie — a British student who had attended an Israeli university and returned to England — decided to marry and to make aliya with her Anglo-Jewish boy-friend (an accountant who knew no Hebrew) her level of assimilation changed: 'I reverted totally back. I went away from being totally integrated, and I mean totally integrated to being only partially integrated'.[58] Four years before she was interviewed, Natalie and her husband had moved to an affluent, predominantly English-speaking suburb of Tel-Aviv where they have very few non Anglo-Saxon

friends. She described moving to Ra'anana as the turning point when she felt settled in Israel:[59]

> I think, funnily enough, that we've definitely been more settled since [the move]. I don't know why. I just don't know why. I think that it's because we're part of a smaller community. Petah Tikvah is quite big. We did have a lot of very good friends there. But Ra'anana is smaller and everybody needs everybody else. And I think that was very, very important. Especially in the last three or four years, things have just clicked.

Natalie's experience shows how personal satisfaction can influence assimilation: although she had the ability and the flexibility to 'become Israeli', she found more personal fulfilment in joining a predominantly English-speaking, affluent community.

When Expectations Meet Reality

The aliya of the women interviewed was inspired by post-materialist ideals, but Israel in the late 1960s was changing socially and economically from scarcity to abundance. The transition to consumerism was evident even in the government's policy of substantial tax concessions on the consumer durables of immigrants. Ironically, Israel used materialist incentives in order to encourage a post-materialist migration. The gap between Britain and Israel in regard to material wealth and to consumption has now more or less closed since the time when these women migrated. Indeed, six women recalled technological change as affecting their assimilation. One of them said: 'Let's put it this way, I can safely say that up until the time I had a phone, I would have gone back at the drop of a hat'.[60]

Israel's move towards affluence paralleled a shift from secular Zionism to religious Zionism. Secular Zionists' retrospective evaluations of their initial motivations for aliya and expectations of life in Israel most aptly demonstrate the change in the times. Six of the nine secular Zionists, half of whom remained unassimilated, admitted that they felt somewhat to completely disillusioned with life in Israel. Michelle, who described herself as 'an English flower that's stuck in the middle of the desert' was the most pessimistic about the changes in Israel. She explained:[61]

> I'm talking about the people here that they're so busy leaving the country, looking for material things, trying to live life like Americans in Israel. I guess it's just natural. I couldn't expect it to stay the same forever. I think what's the difference whether I'm here or in America or in England? The people that do care about Israel are not the sort of people that I could identify with. Is anyone feeling that strong here anymore, apart from the fanatics that I can't identify with at all? I'm sorry if I'm sounding muddled. I try not to give it too much thought because it's all I can do sometimes just to stay here really. I wouldn't stay if my children weren't here. That's

> the long and the short of it.... This is a country that's very, very difficult to live in. I had a son in a fighting unit for three years. And then we had the Gulf War and we were all innocent victims. I feel, you know, let's get out of here. What are we doing here? And I'm not alone here. I look, people are running away. My son left. My son was born here.

Perceptions of Israel's ability to fulfil inner-expressive needs have changed since the cohort studied migrated to Israel. Their children, particularly the children of secular women like Michelle, have joined the waves of other Israeli youth who are, currently, travelling the world in search of the 'self-expressive' aims which Dashefsky *et al.* described as having motivated their parents to make aliya.[62] The change in the socio-demographics of immigrants, from secular to religious, and their increased movement to the settlements suggest a shift in the location of post-materialist ideals from the secular Zionist kibbutzim in earlier decades to the religious Zionist settlements in the present political periphery of Israeli society.[63]

Chava's explanation of the satisfaction which she finds in living in the West Bank settlement of Efrat illustrates one result of what happens when individuals seek a more 'meaningful' existence, while still desiring personal creature comforts:[64]

> Here you can be bourgeois, but you're still contributing to Israeli society. You're still living an idealistic life. You know what's going on now with the political side of that. I can still go to Dagan and spend the night there and make my political statement and come back to my beautiful home. You've got everything here. And I've got people around me who are from all different economic statuses of life, different on the ladder. And I never had that in Old Katamon [a district of Jerusalem]. It was very difficult to break out of the social sphere that you were in. And most of the people around there were extremely wealthy. That's not the case here and I prefer it. I prefer to be with ordinary people rather than with the hoity-toity who you feel if you invite them to tea you have to take out your china. Here everybody uses paper plates, and nobody thinks about it.

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to explore the gender component of voluntary migration by examining the motivations for migration and the assimilation process of a cohort of British women who emigrated to Israel between 1965 and 1975. Interviews revealed that these women settled in Israel in order to be a part of a movement, to increase their personal autonomy, and to explore alternative roles in terms of marriage and employment. Whether they made aliya in order to leave home, to balance family and a career, or to participate in a historical moment, the types of 'self-expressive' motivations for migration to Israel which Dashefsky *et al.* identified pushed emigrants

away from Great Britain and pulled them towards Israel. But gender expectations, including assumptions during that period that a woman should remain in her parental home until she married, that she should not work outside the house once married, and that she must follow her husband and help his career, did shape the decisions which the female migrants in this sample made in attempting to fulfil the expectations both of themselves and of their families. For some of them, particularly those who migrated for their spouses, the difference between 'self-expressive' and 'other-expressive' motivations was less clearly demarcated than it was for men. In addition, women's efforts to achieve greater personal autonomy through aliya as indicated by this study, directly contradict Avruch's interpretation of the desire to migrate to Israel as representing an urge to traditionalize. Indeed, for British women in the 1960s and 1970s, migration to Israel was attractive, in large measure, because it offered somewhat sheltered women a chance to be more independent.

In terms of the assimilation process, this study investigated the correlation between some socio-demographic characteristics and levels of assimilation and found that well-educated, professional women in stable, married relationships were more likely than others to assimilate. Out of these three factors, educational status appears to have played the most pivotal role, in that it determined women's access to the types of professional jobs which facilitated assimilation. Future research is needed to determine whether educational levels and professional status are simply a manifestation of the type of skills needed to assimilate, or if such opportunities and abilities themselves encourage assimilation. Another research project might investigate the effect on women's assimilation of the 'double burden' — namely, the combination of paid labour, which was frequently semi-skilled and poorly paid, with unpaid work, such as caring for children and, as they age, parents.

Something which is probably not gender-specific — but is rarely discussed in the literature on migration to Israel — is the notion that the country to which these women migrated was not stagnant, but rather in a process of rapid change. For many voluntary immigrants, the self-expressive ideals which led them to make aliya have clashed with the increasingly materialistic orientation of Israel. Thus, we see that the majority of those who 'became Israeli' have joined groups which are on the political and geographical fringes of Israeli society.

Overall, we can conclude that although migrating to Israel may appear to be a highly idiosyncratic choice in the context of western consumer society, the women interviewed in this study fall into a pattern which is largely explicable in terms of the diverse needs and aspirations of their generation, time, and place.

Acknowledgements

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Appendix

The following is an alphabetized listing of the interviewees (using fictitious names to preserve anonyminity) with their level of assimilation; location; year of birth; year of migration; academic, religious, Zionist, and Hebrew background; and marital status at the time of migration. In addition, I give brief details about employment, education, marital status, and location of interview. I have labelled families as 'traditionally Jewish' if they did not identify themselves as having a specific religious affiliation, but celebrated the Sabbath and the Jewish main festivals in some special way. I considered the families Masorti (part of the Conservative movement) or Liberal (Reformed) only if they identified themselves as such. In addition, the Zionist youth groups to which some of the interviewees belonged included Orthodox ones (B'nei Akiva and Ezra), Liberal to Secular ones (Hanoar Hatzioni and Federation of Zionist Youth), and Socialist ones (Habonim and Hashomer Hatzair).

Anna (unassimilated) was born in London in 1948 to Orthodox parents. She migrated to Israel in 1972 with a two-year-old child and with her British husband, who was in the furniture business. Before migration, Anna completed A-levels, visited Israel once, had no Zionist affiliation, and learned some Hebrew. When interviewed, she lived in a secular kibbutz, taught sculpture and silk-screening, and had three children.

Bonnie (unassimilated) was born in London in 1949 to culturally Jewish, but secular parents. Before migration to Israel in 1971, she obtained a degree in drama. She had not visited Israel, had no Zionist affiliation, and knew no Hebrew. Bonnie then married and divorced a sabra, became Orthodox, and married an English immigrant who worked as a psychiatric social worker. When interviewed, she lived in Safed, worked as a drama therapist, and had four children by her second husband.

Chava (assimilated, 'became Israeli') was born in Manchester in 1953 and was brought up in an Orthodox household. In 1973, she migrated to Israel to join her English fiancé, who worked for Bank Leumi. Before aliya, she had nearly completed a BA, visited Israel three times, belonged to B'nei Akiva, and learned Hebrew. When interviewed, she had obtained her BA, had lived in a West Bank settlement, worked as a real-estate agent, and had four children.

Corrine (assimilated, 'became Israeli') was born in Clapton in 1950 to Orthodox parents. Before migrating to Israel in 1972, she spent a year at university, visited Israel four times, belonged to B'nei Akiva, and learned Hebrew. In 1974, she married a sabra, who marketed agricultural goods for a religious kibbutz, and they had seven children. When interviewed, Corrine was a buyer for the kibbutz's clothes boutique and managed the baby house.

Daniella (assimilated, 'maintained difference') was born in London in 1949 to Orthodox parents. She migrated to Israel in 1968, returned to England to marry an English Jew who worked as an accountant, and then in 1972 returned to Israel with her husband and an infant. Before the initial migration, Daniella completed A-levels, visited Israel three times, belonged to B'nei Akiva, and learned Hebrew. When interviewed, she lived in Jerusalem, had acquired two BAs from Israeli universities, was studying for a Masters in psychology, and had four children.

Deborah (unassimilated) was born in Stoke-on-Trent in 1938 to traditionally-Jewish parents. In 1968, she migrated to Israel with her British Zionist husband and their two children, aged six and 10. Before migration, he ran his father's clothing business, and she was a housewife who had completed O-levels, visited Israel once, had no Zionist affiliation, and knew no Hebrew. When interviewed, Deborah lived on a secular kibbutz where she worked in the biological laboratory.

Dina (unassimilated) was born in London in 1950 to Liberal Jewish parents. Before migrating to Israel in 1968, she completed O-levels, visited Israel once, had no Zionist affiliation, and knew no Hebrew. When interviewed, she lived in Tel-Aviv, worked as an English-speaking secretary in the British Embassy, and was single.

Elisabeth (assimilated, 'maintained difference') was born in London in 1948 to traditionally Jewish parents. She migrated to Israel in 1970 with her Zionist, Peruvian fiancé, who was in the textile industry. They moved to Peru in 1978 and returned in 1984 to Israel where they have since remained. Before migration, Elisabeth had obtained a BA in French and Russian, visited Israel once, had no Zionist affiliation, and knew very little Hebrew. When interviewed, she lived in Hertzlia, where she was a homemaker, a community volunteer, and had four children.

Elise (assimilated, 'became Israeli') was born in Liverpool in 1949 to Orthodox parents. Before migrating to Israel in 1966, she obtained nursing qualifications, visited Israel twice, was a member of B'nei Akiva, and learned Hebrew. When she was 25, she married an American geologist and they had four children. When interviewed, Elise lived in a West Bank settlement and worked as a nurse.

Evie (assimilated, 'became Israeli'), was born in London in 1951 to Orthodox parents. She migrated to Israel in 1973, married a sabra, and the following year moved to Ireland with her husband, so that he could study medicine. They returned to Israel in 1979. Before the initial migration, Evie completed A-levels, visited Israel six times, belonged to B'nei Akiva, and learned Hebrew. When interviewed, she had obtained a degree in translation and was working as a translator and an English teacher. She lived in Safed and had five children. Her husband was a practising medical doctor.

Ilana (assimilated, 'maintained difference') was born in Belfast, Northern Ireland, in 1953 to Orthodox parents. Before migrating to Israel in 1974, she had acquired a BA in psychology, visited Israel twice, was a member of B'nei Akiva, and learned Hebrew. In 1975, she married another British immigrant who worked as a fruit technologist, and they had one child. When interviewed, Ilana lived in Reḥovot and was a social worker.

Jane (assimilated, 'became Israeli') was born in 1948 in Hitchin to Anglican parents. She moved to Israel in 1974 with her sabra husband, who was a professor of Russian history. Before migration, she had obtained a BA in history from Oxford University, visited Israel once, had no Zionist affiliation, and knew no Hebrew. When interviewed, Jane had converted to Judaism before having her two children. She lived in Jerusalem, where she edited a series of English, archaeological books, after completing a second BA and beginning a Masters in Archaeology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Judy (assimilated, 'maintained difference') was born in London in 1949 to Orthodox parents. Before migrating to Israel in 1969, she had completed A-levels, visited Israel twice, was a member of B'nei Akiva, and learned Hebrew. When she was 27, Judy married in Israel a Romanian immigrant, who worked as an engineer, and they had four children. When interviewed, she lived in Jerusalem and worked in advertising for an English newspaper.

Katie (returnee) was born in London in 1946 to traditionally-Jewish parents. She migrated to Israel in 1969 and returned to England in 1971. Before aliya, she had obtained a degree in dentistry, visited Israel, became Orthodox, was active in Habonim, and learned Hebrew. Katie married a South-African astrophysicist in Israel, and the couple later went to England, where they had two children. When interviewed, she lived in London and worked as a dentist.

Leah (assimilated, 'became Israeli') was born in London in 1942 to traditionally-Jewish parents. She migrated to Israel in 1963 with a British Zionist fiancé, returned to England the following year, and then in 1969 moved again to Israel with three children, all under the age of four. Before aliya, she completed her O-levels, joined Hashomer Hatzair, and learned some Hebrew. When interviewed, she lived in a

secular kibbutz with her second husband, an Israeli. They had two children together. Leah studied the Alexander Technique in Israel and, when interviewed, was teaching the method in the kibbutz.

Leona (unassimilated) was born in Poland in 1946, lived in Israel from 1950 to 1952, and then moved to London with her traditionally-Jewish family. In 1969 she migrated to Israel with her British, Zionist fiancé, who was working as a salesman. Before migration, Leona completed A-levels, visited Israel twice, belonged to Ezra, and knew some Hebrew. The couple had three children in Israel. When interviewed, Leona lived in Tel-Aviv and worked as an office manager for a news agency.

Leora (returnee) was born in London in 1950 to Orthodox parents. She migrated to Israel in 1970 and returned to England two and a half years later. Before migration, Leora completed O-levels, visited Israel twice, joined the Federation of Zionist Youth, and learned Hebrew. When she was 25 and living in England, Leora married an English Jew, who worked as an engineer. They had one child and tried in 1980 to settle in Israel, but returned to England after a few months because he was unable to find work in Israel. When interviewed, Leora lived in London and worked as a secretary.

Melissa (returnee) was born in 1947 in Hertfordshire to traditionally- Jewish parents. She moved to Israel in 1969 but returned to London in 1972. Before migration, Melissa obtained a BA in Mathematics, visited Israel three times, was a member of Habonim, and knew some Hebrew. After returning to England, 34-year-old Melissa married an English non-Jewish atheist, and they had two children. When interviewed, she lived in London and worked as a computer instructor.

Michelle (unassimilated) was born in 1942 in Darlington to traditionally-Jewish parents. In 1968, she migrated to Israel with an infant and her sabra husband, who worked as an engineer. Before migration, she completed A-levels, visited Israel twice, had no Zionist affiliations, and knew little Hebrew. When interviewed, Michelle had divorced her first husband, married an American who worked in the aircraft industry, and they had a child. Michelle lived in Tel-Aviv, worked as an English secretary, and was a grandmother.

Miri (assimilated, 'became Israeli') was born in 1947 in London to Masorti parents. Before migrating to Israel in 1968, she acquired nursing qualifications, visited Israel, became Orthodox, was affiliated with Ezra, and knew some Hebrew. When she was 32, Miri married a sabra professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University, and they had five children. When interviewed, Miri lived in a West Bank settlement and worked as a nurse.

Naomi (unassimilated), was born in Manchester in 1946 to Orthodox parents. Before migrating to Israel in 1970, she completed

A-levels and had some teacher training, visited Israel three times, was a member of B'nei Akiva, and learned some Hebrew. She married an American Jewish journalist in Israel when she was 24 and they had three children. When interviewed, she lived in Jerusalem, worked as an office manager for *Time Magazine*, and was divorced.

Natalie (assimilated, 'maintained difference') was born in Edgware, Middlesex in 1952 to traditionally-Jewish parents. She migrated to Israel in 1974, returned to England in 1977, when she married an English Jew who worked as an accountant, and re-emigrated to Israel in 1978. Before her first migration, Natalie had obtained a BA in Hebrew and Jewish History, visited Israel three times, became Orthodox, belonged to B'nei Akiva, and learned Hebrew. When interviewed, she had completed a course in teaching English language and literature and another one in translation, taught English, lived in Ra'anana, and had four children.

Noga (assimilated, 'maintained difference') was born in London in 1941 to traditionally-Jewish parents. Before migrating to Israel in 1963, she obtained a degree in pharmacy, visited Israel once, belonged to Habonim, and learned Hebrew. When she was 26, Noga married an Anglo-Jewish immigrant, and they had three children. When interviewed, she was living on a secular kibbutz and working as a purchaser for the kibbutz's biology laboratory.

Norma (returnee) was born in Wales in 1943 to Orthodox parents. She migrated to Israel in 1969, returned to England in 1976, moved back to Israel in 1979, and returned again to England in 1984. Before her first migration, Norma finished A-levels, visited Israel twice, belonged to Hanoar Hatzioni, and learned Hebrew. When interviewed, she lived in London, managed public relations for a Jewish company, and was single.

Rachel (assimilated, 'became Israeli') was born in 1952 in London to Orthodox parents. Before migrating to Israel in 1974, she completed a BA in geography, visited Israel three times, belonged to B'nei Akiva, and learned Hebrew. When she was 25, Rachel married an Iraqi immigrant who worked for a security company, and they had six children. When interviewed, Rachel, who had studied in Israel for a teaching degree and one in town planning, lived in a West Bank settlement and worked as a teacher.

Rebecca (unassimilated) was born in London in 1942 to traditionally-Jewish parents. She migrated to Israel in 1970 with two children, aged five and one, and with her husband, a British Zionist who owned and managed a men's wear shop. Before migration, Rebecca completed O-levels, belonged to Habonim, and knew almost no Hebrew. After the birth of a third child, the couple divorced. When interviewed, Rebecca had remarried, and her second husband was an

Anglo-Jewish immigrant. They lived in a moshav, where she managed the supermarket and clothes boutique.

Rina (unassimilated) was born in Birmingham in 1946 to secular parents. Before migrating to Israel in 1969, she completed O-levels, visited Israel twice, had no formal Zionist affiliation, and knew little Hebrew. In 1970, Rina married a Russian immigrant who was a farmer in a secular kibbutz, and they had five children. When interviewed, Rina still lived in the kibbutz, where she milked cows and worked as a journalist.

Ruth (assimilated, 'became Israeli') was born in London in 1950 to Orthodox parents. In 1970 she and her British, Zionist husband, who was a journalist, migrated to Israel with their infant. Before migration, she had begun a BA, had no Zionist affiliation, and knew little Hebrew. When interviewed, Ruth had completed a BA and trained as a therapist for the visually impaired; she taught rehabilitation, lived in Jerusalem, and had three children.

Sheila (assimilated, 'maintained difference') was born in 1951 in Barnet, a suburb of London, to traditionally Jewish parents. She migrated to Israel in 1973 with her British fiancé, who worked as an agricultural mechanic. Before migration, Sheila acquired a BA in mathematics, visited Israel, became Orthodox, joined B'nei Akiva, and learned some Hebrew. When interviewed, she lived in a religious kibbutz, worked as an accountant, and had five children.

Suzie (returnee) was born in 1954 in London to Orthodox parents. She migrated to Israel in 1977 and returned to England in 1988. Before migration, Suzie acquired a BA in Law, visited Israel three times, belonged to B'nei Akiva, and learned some Hebrew. When she was 24, Suzie married a Dutch Jew who worked for a metal company and they had three children in Israel. When interviewed, Suzie lived in London and was a full-time homemaker.

NOTES

[1] I use the term 'Anglo' in this article to refer to people throughout the United Kingdom: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

[2] Dina interviewed on 30 July 1995 in Tel-Aviv.

[3] C. I. Waxman, *American Aliya: Portrait of an Innovative Migration Movement* (Detroit, 1989), p. 15.

[4] Ibid., ch. 5.

[5] H. L. Jubas, 'The Adjustment Process of Americans and Canadians in Israel and their Integration' (Michigan State University, Ph.D. thesis, 1974), p. 120; K. Avruch, *American Immigrants in Israel: Social Identities and Change* (London, 1981), p. 4; and G. Engel, 'Comparison between Americans Living in Israel and Those who Returned to America: Part II, Israeli Background', *The Journal of Psychology*, vol. 75, second half, 1970, p. 249.

[6] A. Dashefsky, J. de Amicis, B. Lazerwitz and E. Tabory, *Americans Abroad: A Comparative Study of Emigrants from the United States* (London, 1992), pp. 65, 67; G. S. Berman, 'Why North Americans Migrate to Israel'. *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 21, no. 2, December 1979, pp. 135–44; G. Engel, 'Comparison between American Permanent Residents of Israel: Part II, Israeli Background,' *The Journal of Psychology*, vol. 72, first half, 1969, p. 139; and Avruch, op. cit. in Note 5 above, pp. 4–5.

[7] For examples, see: Z. Gitelman, *Becoming Israelis: Political Resocialisation of Soviet and American Immigrants* (New York, 1982), p. 185; M. I. Blejer and I. Goldberg, 'Return Migration — Expectations vs. Reality: A Case Study of Western Immigrants to Israel', *Research in Population Economics*, vol. 2, 1980, p. 448; J. T. Shuval, *Immigrants on the Threshold* (London, 1963), p. 62; G. S. Berman, *The Work Adjustment of North American Immigrants in Israel* (Jerusalem, 1978). p. 11; and Jubas, op. cit. in Note 5 above, p. 93.

[8] See M. Hartman and H. Hartman, 'International Migration and Household Conflict', *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, vol. 17, no. 1, 1986 and R. Raijman and M. Semyonov, 'Gender, Ethnicity, and Immigration: Double Disadvantage and Triple Disadvantage among Recent Immigrant Women in the Israel Labour Market', *Gender and Society*, vol. 11, no. 1, 1997, pp. 108–25.

[9] Gitelman, op. cit. in Note 7 above, p. 64.

[10] Ibid.; Avruch, op. cit. in Note 5 above, p. 41; Waxman, op. cit. in Note 3 above, p. 91; Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Immigration to Israel, 1948–1972. Part I. Annual Data*, special series no. 416 (Jerusalem, 1973); Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Immigration to Israel, 1974*, special series no. 503 (Jerusalem, 1976); and Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Immigration to Israel, 1975*, special series no. 528 (Jerusalem, 1976).

[11] Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Immigrants of 1969/70: The First Five Years in Israel*, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics: Supplement, vol. XXVII, no. 4 (Jerusalem, 1976).

[12] Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Immigration to Israel, 1948–1972. Part II. Composition by Period of Immigration*, special series no. 489 (Jerusalem, 1975).

[13] S. DellaPergola, 'Some Occupational Characteristics of Western Jews in Israel', in *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1977*, edited by O. U. Schmelz, P. Glickson, and S. DellaPergola (Jerusalem, 1980), p. 260.

[14] Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Immigrants of 1969/70*, op. cit. in Note 11 above.

[15] Jubas, op. cit. in Note 5 above, p. 92.

[16] Elise interviewed on 11 September 1995 in her West Bank settlement.

[17] Naomi interviewed on 13 August 1995, in Jerusalem.

[18] Central Statistical Office, *Social Trends*, vol. 1, 1970, p. 133; D. A. Coleman, 'Population', in A. H. Halsey, ed., *British Social Trends Since 1900: A Guide to the Changing Social Structure of Britain* (London, 1988), p. 105; and B. A. Kosmin and C. Levy, 'The Work and Employment of Suburban Jews: the Socio-Economic Findings of the 1978 Redbridge Jewish Survey' (London, 1981), p. 11. The proportion of British female students mentioned above was derived by calculating the number of full-time undergraduate female students for the academic year 1965 to 1966 as compared to the British female population in the 1981 Census. The 1981 Census was used for these

calculations rather than the 1969 one because, in 1969, the nearest appropriate age-range was from 15 to 29. In 1981 the range was from 20 to 24 and therefore was more representative of the university-age population. The data on Anglo-Jewish female students was based on the percentage of Jewish females in the London suburb of Redbridge who, according to a 1978 study, were students when they were between the ages of 20 and 22. In 1978, Redbridge was the home of the third or fourth largest borough concentration of Jews in Greater London. The estimated Jewish population of Redbridge consisted of 19,350 people, 8.24 per cent of the total population. Although these calculations are only rough ones, they illustrate the marked contrast between the sample and its contemporaries.

[19] Elise, see Note 16 above.

[20] Suzie, interviewed on 20 June 1995 in London.

[21] Leora, interviewed on 2 May 1995 in London.

[22] Rina, interviewed on 28 August 1995 in her kibbutz.

[23] E. Krausz, 'The Edgware Survey: Occupation and Social Class,' *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 11, no. 1, June 1969, p. 76.

[24] Rachel, interviewed on 3 September 1995 in her West Bank settlement.

[25] Daniella, interviewed on 8 August 1995 in Jerusalem.

[26] Judy, interviewed on 1 August 1995 in Jerusalem.

[27] Suzie, see Note 20 above.

[28] Michelle, interviewed on 27 July 1995 in Tel Aviv.

[29] Rina, see Note 22 above.

[30] Deborah, interviewed on 23 August 1995 in her kibbutz.

[31] Chava, interviewed on 3 September 1995 in her West Bank settlement.

[32] Naomi, see Note 17 above.

[33] Since all the women who were engaged when they made aliya married shortly after their arrival in Israel, I have not counted them as single women.

[34] E. Krausz, 'The Edgware Survey: Demographic Results,' *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968, p. 93.

[35] S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'Synagogue Marriages in Great Britain, 1966–1968', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 12, no. 1, June 1970, p. 26.

[36] Evie, interviewed on 7 September 1995 in Safed.

[37] Miri, interviewed on 7 August 1995 in her West Bank settlement.

[38] Judy, see Note 26 above.

[39] Elisabeth, interviewed on 29 August 1995 in Hertzlia.

[40] Michelle, see Note 28 above.

[41] R. Inglehart, 'Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 75, no. 4, 1981, p. 880.

[42] Rachel, see Note 24 above.

[43] Corrine, interviewed on 30 August 1995, in her kibbutz.

[44] Katie, interviewed on 21 June 1995 in London.

[45] D. Bernstein, 'Economic Growth and Female Labour: The Case of Israel' in *Women in Israel*, edited by Yael Azmon and Dafna N. Izraeli (London, 1993), p. 67.

[46] S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants: A Comparative Study Based on the Jewish Community in Palestine and the State of Israel* (London, 1954), p. 6.

[47] I have not included those women who returned to Britain in this section.

[48] Jane, interviewed on 16 August 1995 in Jerusalem.

[49] I have used the term 'traditionally-Jewish' to indicate that the interviewee did not affiliate herself with a movement, but celebrated the Sabbath and the Jewish main festivals in some special way.
[50] Leona, interviewed on 31 July 1995 in Tel Aviv.
[51] Ruth, interviewed on 25 July 1995 in Jerusalem.
[52] Leah, interviewed on 22 August 1995 in her kibbutz.
[53] Natalie, interviewed on 5 September 1995 in Ra'anana.
[54] Elise, see Note 16 above.
[55] Chava, see Note 31 above.
[56] Judy, see Note 26 above.
[57] Jane, see Note 48 above.
[58] Natalie, see Note 53 above.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Michelle, see Note 28 above.
[62] Dashefsky *et al.*, op. cit. in Note 6 above.
[63] Waxman, op. cit. in Note 3 above, pp. 98–100.
[64] Chava see Note 31 above.

THE NAMES WHICH 'MODERN-DAY ZIONIST IDEALISTS' GIVE TO THEIR CHILDREN

Lisa R. Kaul-Seidman

NAMES are the simplest, most literal and obvious of all symbols of identity.[1] They may be signs or labels which classify and individualize, but they may in some societies also embody, encode, reflect and communicate a wealth of information not only about individuals and their relations to others, but also about the social system, and social practices.[2] For instance, individual names could reveal membership in a kin group, religious community, or a peer group; naming after an ancestor may reveal patterns of inheritance or residence; and name-sharing may demonstrate the importance of god-parenthood.[3]

The use of names as a means to express or enforce an ideology, or as a strategy of resistance, reveals their power to encode. The French government, for example, required in 1905 that its citizens choose names for their children from a list of officially-approved saints' names.[4] This requirement subtly indicated the state's role in the 'private' lives of its citizens, and the limits in practice of the theoretical separation of Church and State in France. On the island of Truk, on the other hand, the Truk used personal names to resist their social system which suppressed individuality: each person was given a distinct and individual name and no names were duplicated on the island.[5]

Jewish personal names have functioned, through the ages, both to reveal and to encode. Kaganoff suggests that Jewish first names[6] are 'more than convenient labels for classification that facilitate communication'. Rather, he argues[7] that because of their 'highly charged symbolic value' they

> serve as clues for deciphering the cultural patterns of Jewish history: from them we can determine whether people's sentiments inclined towards separateness or assimilation or Jewish nationalism. We can tell when the

> Jews were loyal to the Hebrew language, and when indifferent. And names also reveal something about the changing political and economic orientations of the Jews through the centuries.

Kaganoff's statement throws into relief the *malleability* of Jewish names. Unlike other facets of their identity, Jews have clearly seen names as *workable* or *changeable*: not only can names be changed to reflect a change in circumstance,[8] but a change in name can bring about a change in circumstance.[9]

This malleability, however, does not detract from the intrinsic[10] or expressive power ascribed to names. Thus, although Jewish law does not stipulate a naming *system*, it does enjoin that a child be given a 'good name', which will aid its development along the right path in life.[11] Similarly, even though scholars tend to catalogue 'names' and 'naming' under the somewhat apolitical category of 'Jewish folklore and customs',[12] they have been used as political instruments. Early Zionist settlers in Palestine, for example, exploited the malleability of names by adopting new names to express their collective politico-national renaissance. In changing their names from 'Grien' to 'Ben Gurion', from 'Rachmilewitz' to 'Onn', or from 'Perlman' to 'Ben Yehuda', and in adopting names like Ben Amichai, Amiad, Ben Artzi, Ben Ami, these men were consciously expressing an ideology which severed their ties with the Diaspora, and heralded their individual and collective rebirth in the land of their forefathers.[13] The practice of expressing national rebirth through names has continued in the State of Israel, where, among other measures, the Foreign Ministry used to require that its officials, especially those stationed outside the country, have a Hebrew name.[14]

In this article I describe how one community of 'modern-day Zionist idealists' name their children. 'Modern-day Zionist idealist' is a term of self-identification used by members of the West Bank settlement of Tekoa. I shall highlight how Tekoans use their children's names, rather than their own names, as a discursive tool to articulate this identity. In only two instances have the parents changed their own family and/or personal names to express their ideology.[15] Most parents are conscious of the significance of the names of their own children as well as of names of the children of others in the settlement. In fact, Tekoans often pointed out to me the 'specialness' of children's names when I undertook wider anthropological research on the religious nationalist ideology and identity of the Tekoans in 1993. Some Tekoans even suggested that I make names the subject of my research.

I suggest that children's names in Tekoa are significant not only because they identify the child concerned, classify his/her social status, or convey information about social relationships, but because

they are 'semantically full': they recount the story that Tekoan parents 'tell themselves about themselves'.[16] This story is revealed both through the literal meaning of the names and through the events, people, places, and times which they commemorate. Thus most of the names have a descriptive and a moral element, and so function like memorabilia: they encapsulate or narrate family histories, and mark other events which are significant. It is the choice of these 'events'[17] that is particularly revealing of the parents' ideology; for it is within these events that meaning is given to the child's name.

Two clarifications are necessary here. First, although naming is clearly not an arbitrary activity in Tekoa,[18] there is no clear-cut naming *system* which is followed by every Tekoan. A small minority of parents stated that they chose a name simply because they liked the sound of it. Hence, I do not make the claim that one can 'tell'[19] children whose parents are 'modern-day Zionist idealists' from those whose parents claim other identifications merely through their names, in the manner that Cecil suggests that one can 'tell' Catholic and Protestant children by their names in Northern Ireland.[20] Second, by 'children in Tekoa' I mean those who were present there at the time of fieldwork. I do not mark the distinction between those born within Tekoa and those born outside Tekoa; the majority of children were born in Tekoa. However, given the relative youth of the settlement, some of the children were named before their parents moved to Tekoa. In all these cases, save one, the parents already subscribed to 'modern-day Zionist' ideology.

I. Tekoa: a Community of 'Modern-Day Zionist' Idealists'

Tekoa, 're-settled' on the directives of a biblical promise — 'And I will plant them upon their land, and they shall no more be plucked out of the land that I have given them' (Amos 9: 15)[21] — is a 'fact on the ground' of the *Gush Emunim*. The *Gush Emunim*, or the Bloc of the Faithful, was officially founded in 1974 and is distinguished by its irredentist stance towards the Occupied Territories of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. The *Gush Emunim* call the territories of the West Bank by their biblical names of *Yehudah* and *Shomron*, and claim them as the historic heartland of the land of Israel (*Erets Yisrael*). Along with the Gaza strip, they identify these areas by the acronym YESHA (salvation) and regard Jewish settlement of these territories as a religious obligation (*mitzvah*) which will facilitate the messianic coming.[22]

Tekoa is situated about 20 kilometres south of Jerusalem, and is one among an archipelago of settlements in the West Bank. It was officially affiliated with the settlement wing of the *Gush Emunim*, *Amanah*, in 1977, and its constitution was accepted by the Labour Ministry in

1980.[23] Tekoa is a 'rural-urban community' (*yishuv kefar kehillati*), where members can commute to work. It is organized by a nucleus (*gar'in*) which screens potential members with the aim of promoting social conviviality, and is administered by a co-operative union to which all members must belong. Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of Tekoa is the heterogeneity of its 150 households:[24] it has members from some 20 countries of origin — with varying levels of religiosity,[25] varying styles of displaying this religiosity, and varying life styles — ranging from agricultural workers to professionals.

Despite the Tekoan claim that 'there is no average Tekoan',[26] the community collectively identifies itself as 'modern-day Zionist idealist'.[27] This term reflects a two-pronged strategy of Tekoan ideology: on the one hand, the appropriation of 'Zionist idealist' identity allows them to legitimize their settlement (i.e. 'Zionist') activity in the Occupied Territories. This 'phase' of settlement, they argue, is merely a 'continuation' of activity initiated in biblical times and continued on a large scale in the last century by Zionist settlers. Tekoans see themselves as the isolated and marginalized followers of the Zionist tradition of pioneering settlement activity (*halutziyyut* and *hityashevut*) which, in their view, has died out in an increasingly 'Hellenized' Israeli society.

On the other hand, Tekoans use the easily recognizable category, 'Zionist', to articulate their own ideology of 'religious Zionism', which they see as 'authentic' Zionism. They claim that religious Zionism, unlike secular Zionism, recognizes the irrevocable links of the Zionist movement to Judaism. Zionism without Judaism, they argue, is empty — 'like a chicken without a head'; in fact the very *raison d'être* of Zionism, for the Tekoans, comes from Judaism. Tekoan 'religious Zionism' is both a product of secular Zionism and a critique of its interpretation of the religious system of Judaism. Thus to be a 'modern-day Zionist' is to be both fully 'Jewish' and fully 'Zionist'. Not surprisingly, Tekoans question the Jewishness of ritually-observant Jews who live in New York. Similarly, they castigate as the 'enemy within' those Zionists who do not see a connection between the *whole* land of Israel, the people of Israel, and the Torah of Israel, and who are willing to trade land for peace.

II. Children's Names in Tekoa

Children in Tekoa have a melange (in order of their popularity) of biblical, Hebraised, modern 'Israeli',[28] and anglicized names. Of the 159 children whose names I collected, 59 have a single personal name. The majority, although commonly addressed by only one name, have two personal names. Contrary to the suggestion of Bilu and Abramovitch,[29] the giving of single names is not a practice exclusive

to native-born Israelis. Among the families who chose to give their children single names was a 'mixed' family, in which the wife was of Yemeni origin and the husband was an immigrant[30] from Russia. They used their children's names to proclaim the wife's distinctive Yemeni ethnicity. Most other single names commemorated relatives, or narrated parental ideology and aspirations for the child.

Similarly, the practice of giving children two names is not distinctive of immigrants, whom one might expect to continue the Diaspora custom of giving a child a 'holy' name (*shem kodesh*) and a secular name (*shem kinnui*).[31] Only one immigrant couple consciously followed this practice; at the time of the birth of their children, the parents were moving between America and Israel and they decided to give each of their children an 'English' as well as a 'Hebrew' name. In giving their children two names, most Tekoans combine a cultural aspect of name-giving with a more personal one: one name usually follows the Jewish custom of naming after an ancestor, while the other is a self-conscious expression of the parents' identity. The question of who names the child is something of a non-issue in Tekoa.[32] Generally it is the parents who do. In one family, the maternal grandfather, who immigrated to Israel from Yemen, chose the name. In another, recently 'returned to the faith' family, the teenage daughter chose her own, 'new' Hebrew name.

The significance of children's names in Tekoa is thrown into relief in two interconnected ways: first, by the content or meaning of the names and, second, by the reasons underlying the choice of name. The range of reasons reveals Tekoan commemoration of time (events), place, and people, and also reflects a narrative of the parents' biographies — their aspirations for their children, their affiliation to Judaism, their attachment to the land of Israel, and their politics. While I have categorized the names which follow according to the themes the names commemorate, my demarcation is clearly artificial and far from water-tight: in consonance with modern-day Zionist ideology, many names resonate symbolically across the categories. Not surprisingly, Tekoans often cite more than one reason for a choice of name and may accordingly either give their child more than one name or a name which is multi-referential.

A short note on methodology: although I knew the names of most of the children in Tekoa because I worked as a volunteer in the kindergarten and elementary school there, and also because people often pointed out names which they thought were 'special', I formally asked parents about the names of their children in the course of wider-ranging 'interviews'. With the exception of one parent who read out descriptions of the characters after whom she had named her children from a dictionary of Jewish names, most parents rendered their own explanations. Most of my English-speaking informants translated the

meaning of names from the Hebrew into English. Hebrew speakers either saw the meanings of names as self-explanatory or attempted in some instances to explain the meanings. In what follows, I give the parents' explanation or translation in inverted commas, as well as including in parentheses, wherever applicable, a more 'accurate' explanation or translation from the Hebrew. I have transliterated the names from the Hebrew following the general rules of transliteration of the Encyclopedia Judaica.[33]

A. Names which commemorate people

i. Names which commemorate relatives

The practice of naming children to commemorate an ancestor, although not dictated by Jewish law, is popular among Jewish communities.[34] There are differences in the implementation of this custom based on whether the ancestor is alive or dead and on the perceived dangers both to the newborn infant and to the ancestor arising from the principle that a person's soul is housed in his name. Thus Ashkenazim prefer naming children after deceased ancestors, while Sephardim and those from the *Edot ha-Mizraḥ* do not hesitate to name their children after living ancestors or relatives. Of the 159 children in Tekoa, 78 were given at least one name to commemorate a relative, or a friend of the family. All Tekoans of an Ashkenazi background who followed this custom named their children after a relative or friend who had died. The practice of naming children after living relatives was limited to families where at least one spouse was of *Mizraḥi* or of Sephardi descent.

Children were either given the same name as the commemorated person, a suitably gendered or Hebraised version of it, or merely a name which bespoke a connection. For example, an immigrant couple, with the husband from Russia and the wife from France, called their daughter, *Simaḥ*, a Hebraised version of the name of her maternal grandmother, Simone. Similarly, another immigrant couple, of which the husband is from the United States and the wife is a convert from Canada, named their daughter *Ḥannah* after her Catholic grandfather John (Yoḥanan). Other examples of Hebraised names, again given by immigrant couples, were *Hilah* (named after her grandmother, Helen) and *Gilat* (named after a young cousin of the mother's, Gail). Interestingly, it was only immigrants, many of whom had non-Hebraised names themselves, who chose to Hebraise the names of relatives. All the *sabras* who named their children after a relative retained, wherever applicable, the non-Hebraised version of the person's name.

Few Tekoans give a reason for naming after a relative: the customary significance of the act is seen to speak for itself. There was

only one instance in which a woman elaborated on this 'custom': an immigrant from Morocco who moved to Tekoa in 1988, she named her son, *Aviad* ('eternal father'), to commemorate her father-in-law who had died when she was seven months pregnant. She commented that she named her child in consonance with a custom that 'if a child is born during the year of mourning' he is named to commemorate the dead. She hoped that in doing so her newborn son would bring 'peace' to the grieving family.[35]

Only very rarely did Tekoans explain why a certain relative was chosen to be remembered; these included cases in which the relative had died in the Holocaust. Other occasions meriting explanation by the parent were those in which the relative had helped them during a particularly difficult period; when the relative had met with an untimely death; and when the relative had died during one of the wars fought by Israel. Conspicuous by their absence as reasons for a choice of name were admirable qualities of the commemorated relative, or a wish expressed by the relative (if deceased)[36] to have a child named after him/her.

ii. Names which commemorate non-relatives

Instances in which parents thought that their choice of names was self-explanatory and so required no elaboration were not limited to the commemoration of relatives. In two cases, for example, a non-related person was chosen: Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook.[37] One parent had immigrated from the U.S.A. as a child, had been brought up on a secular kibbutz, and had 'returned to the faith', studying thereafter at the *Merkaz ha-Rav* yeshivah. In naming his child *Yehudah* he found it sufficient to state that he chose the name 'after Rav. Z.Y. Kook'. The other parent, a modern-orthodox immigrant from the U.S.A., found it sufficient to state that she had named her son *Zvi* because he was born in the year that Rav Kook died. In both these instances the child was also given a second name, the choice of which was related in greater detail.

In all the other instances, the parents clearly stated why they had chosen a person to be commemorated through their child's name. Thus, when Susan,[38] an immigrant from England, chose to name her son (who was the first male child to be born in Tekoa), *Nehemia* or 'the comfort of God', she did so to commemorate two members of Tekoa — one who had been killed in the Lebanon war, and another who had been murdered at the Herodium. She hoped that her son's name would symbolize peace and comfort to the fledgling community. Similarly *David Judah* was named in memory of David Rosenfeld, the man murdered at the Herodium. The child's parents, immigrants from the United States, chose this name both because it commemorated one of

Tekoa's former members (who had been their friend) and because it echoed 'the might of the biblical David'.

In naming children after persons who had died tragically, Tekoans seem directly to contravene traditional practice.[39] It could be argued, however, that for these Tekoans, it is the cause of death which is significant: they remember these dead members as 'heroes', 'martyrs to the cause', rather than as people who had met with an 'unfortunate' death. Thus, the Rabbi of Tekoa's wife chose to name one of her children to commemorate a settler who had been killed in Hebron. She called him *Shivi* (a truncated form of *Elyashiv* — God will return) both because the name symbolized the concept of 'return' and because it resonated with the biblical portion of the week in which the child was born: a plea to God asking him to return his people to Bashan (Micah 7: 14).

The significance of the person commemorated is particularly conspicuous when children are named to commemorate historical and biblical figures. Unlike many kibbutz parents who choose scriptural names because they like the sound of them,[40] Tekoans focus on the biblical connotations of the name. Thus while secular *kibbutzniks* avoid traditional biblical names like David, Rachel, and Miriam,[41] these are popular choices in Tekoa. Other names which Tekoans chose, and the explanations they gave of their significance, are:

- *Noah*, 'one of the first five girls in the time of the *Bnei Israel*, who was allowed by Moses to inherit her father's estate'. (One of the five daughters of Zelophehad; Num 26: 33; 27: 1–11.)
- *Merav*, 'the daughter of King Saul' (1 Sam 14: 49).
- *Havvah*, 'the first woman in the world' (Gen 3: 20).
- *Beruryah*, 'a wise woman in the Talmud' (wife of R. Meir; second century; only woman in Talmudic literature whose views on Halakhic matters are seriously reckoned with by scholars of her time).
- *Eliyah*, 'after the prophet Eliyahu' (1 Kings 17; 2 Kings 2).
- *Rivka* and *Sarah*, 'the mothers' (Rivka, wife of Isaac, Gen 24: 67, 25: 22–24; Sarah, wife of Abraham, mother of Isaac, Gen 17: 15–16, 21: 2–3).
- *Akiva*, 'after Rav Akiva' (leading rabbinic teacher of the first third of the second century).
- *Asa*, 'king of Judea' (son and successor of Abijam and third king of Judah after the division of the united monarchy; 1 Kings 15: 9–10; II Chron 13: 23).
- *Evyatar*, 'a high priest who helped David against Saul' (1 Sam 22: 20–23; I Sam 23: 9).
- *Yehudah, Binyamin* 'the two tribes'. (Binyamin: youngest son of Jacob and Rachel; Gen 35: 18; Yehudah: son of Jacob and Leah; Gen 29: 35).

- *Iddo*, 'a prophet from Tekoa' (Iddo was a prophet in the days of Solomon and of Jerobam I, King of Israel; responsible for keeping record of genealogies; II Chron 9: 29; 12: 15; 13: 22).
- *Amos*, 'shepherd from Tekoa' (eighth-century Hebrew prophet).
- *Eliezer Ben Jaer*, 'around at the time of Massada' (first century C.E.; Chief of the Sicarii who captured the fortress of Massada at the beginning of the Roman War and commander of the besieged fortress from C.E. 66 until its fall in 73).

The descriptions which parents gave of these commemorated people are somewhat compressed and presuppose more detailed knowledge. Two themes, however, seem to run through their choices: all the girls are named after outstanding women who played an important role in Jewish history, while the boys are given names which bespeak a connection with the area of Judea. Zohar, who came to Israel from Morocco when she was three months old and named her daughters Havvah, Beruryah and Eliyah, sums up her reasons for choosing these names: 'It is important to give children the names of people who are important to us and are good people'.

Naming to commemorate people, or 'naming after' as it is colloquially put, maintains familial continuity. In extending this customary practice to include non-relatives, Tekoans express their affiliation to people who are metaphorically claimed as forebears of their child. This allows them to place the newborn child into a group which extends beyond his/her blood relatives to that of the Jewish community. Thus, Tekoans are able both to circumscribe the boundaries of the group that the newborn child is entrusted to continue and to articulate their own notions of blood and belonging.

B. Names which commemorate 'Time'

Many Tekoans name their children to commemorate events which took place at the time of their child's birth. These events occur both in what I call 'Jewish' time, and in 'secular' time.

i. Events in 'Jewish time'

Popular events commemorated in Jewish time include Jewish festivals at the time of birth. Hence Zena (English by birth, brought up as 'modern orthodox' and part of the *B'nei Akiva* youth movement), who moved to Tekoa in 1981, gave her children 'modern' names which commemorate festivals that occurred at the time of their births.[42] She named her daughter *Orah* (light) *Rachel* because she was born just before *Hanukkah* and had very bright eyes and because the *parasha* of the week recounted the death of the biblical Rachel (Gen 35: 16–21). When her other daughter was born on the day of the fifth candle of

Ḥanukkah, Zena named her *Tal Ḥagit* (*Tal* — dew; *ḥag* — festival) because she did not want another name connected with light (which would connote her birth during the festival of *Ḥanukkah*) but nevertheless wanted to commemorate the fact that she was born during *Ḥanukkah*.

Similarly Elana, a native Israeli, named her son *Ya'ir* because she went to hospital on *Ḥanukkah* and wanted 'some memory of the *nir*' (candle, light, splendour). Arik and Tamar, sabras raised in secular kibbutzim, wanted to give their son a name which evoked a 'connection to nature' because he was born near the festival of *Tu bi-Shevat*, commonly celebrated as Arbour day in Israel.[43] Hence they named him *Ya'ar* (forest). Another sabra whose daughter was also born on *Tu bi-Shevat* chose to emphasize both the agricultural connotations of the day and the time of year in the name he chose for his daughter: he called her *Nirit*, where *Nir* stood for a plough, while *Nirit* is the name of 'a flower that grows at the onset of spring' (ridolfia).

Ze'ev and Shahar, religious sabras, named their son, born on the eve of *Tishah be-Av*, *Ḥanina* (pardon, amnesty) because it is also 'a name for the Messiah' who they believe will be born on *Tishah be-Av*. Similarly Ehud, a stalwart of Tekoa, who emigrated from Russia and maintains a religious household despite a secular upbringing, chose to name his daughter *Hadas* (myrtle branch used during *Sukkot*) because she was born during *Sukkot*. And Martha, another 'returnee to the faith' immigrant from the United States, named her daughter *Tal* (dew) because she was born during the festival of *Pesaḥ*; she saw the birth of her daughter as a *Pesaḥ* gift and named her after a prayer, *tefillat Tal*, traditionally recited during that period.

Apart from festivals, some members of Tekoa named their children after other significant events in the Jewish calendar. Here are some examples:

Yisgav or 'special, extraordinary' was circumcised on the first day of the month of *Nisan* (*rosh ḥodesh Nisan*). According to his father, Ehud, *Nisan* is remembered as the month when the *B'nai Israel* came out of Egypt. Yisgav's name was meant both to evoke the 'special spiritual meaning' of this event and to emphasize the extra-ordinariness of the start of the Jewish exodus. *Shav Zion* or 'return to Zion', Ehud's other son, was circumcised on the first day of the month of *Sivan*. Ehud said that he chose that name because of the various events at the time of the boy's circumcision and in the week which followed. *Sivan*, he explained, is traditionally seen as the month when the spiritual exile of the Jews ended and it was also the time of the Russian Coup in 1991. Furthermore, present at the Sabbath after which the child was circumcised were a mixture of young people, members of *B'nei Akiva gar'inim* from various countries: Russia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Australia. This gathering, Ehud told me, was 'very emotional',

since every one seemed to be 'joined together as part of the people of Israel (*am Yisrael*)'. Hence he chose the name, Shav Zion.

Shir (song) — whose mother was a sabra of Sephardi origin who moved to Tekoa in 1991 — was born at the time when the weekly Torah portion of the Bible dealt with the crossing of the Red Sea. That was when Moses's sister is reputed to have sung a song to God on the Sabbath (Exodus 15: 20–22), which led that particular Sabbath to be called *shir Shabbat. Noam* ('easy'), Zena's son, was born on the first day of the month of *Elul* and she chose that name because the prayer during the month of *Elul*, which is traditionally seen as a month of introspection, is called Noam. *Ateret Tamar*, her other daughter, was named after the biblical Tamar, who was mentioned in that week's portion of the Bible; Zena named her *Ateret* or 'crown' because she was in labour as the Sabbath came into Jerusalem and the Sabbath is traditionally likened to a queen with a crown.

Adar was named so, according to his mother, because he was born during that month in the Jewish calendar.

ii. Names which commemorate events in 'secular time'

Netayah (sapling of God) was born immediately after the dismantling of the settlement of Yamit in the Sinai desert; his mother, Esther, recounted that it was a traumatic event for the entire settler population. A popular song among the settlers at that time prophesied the return of the people to the land, the 'planting' of the people on the land, such that the people would cause the land to flourish and grow. Seeing their aspirations bulldozed at Yamit, the boy's parents decided to give him a name which was representative of the hopes and desires of the settler community at large. Furthermore, they saw their son as symbolic of the future generation that was to be planted in the land of Israel. *Mattityahu Sinai* was also born at the time of the withdrawal from Yamit. His parents, immigrants from the United States, saw his birth as a 'gift from God' (*Mattityahu*) and decided to call him Sinai so that 'when people hear his name they will be forced to remember what happened'.[44]

Shuvayah (return to God), Netayah's sister, was born close to Jerusalem Day. Her mother said that Shuvayah was a popular song at the time of her birth and was about the return of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. She therefore linked up the significance of Jerusalem Day and the lyrics of the song and named her daughter Shuvayah. *Shalom* (peace) was born at the start of the *Intifada* (the Palestinian uprising in the late 1980s); his parents saw his name as symbolizing what they hoped would be in store for them in the future.

Tekoans are clearly not the first Jews to name their children after Jewish festivals or significant events around the time of their birth.

Kaganoff describes the prevalence of this practice in ancient times and in the middle ages: children born during a festival were called Yom Tov, those born on Hanukkah were rather uninspiredly called Hanukkah and those born on Pesah were called Pesah.[45] This practice is similar to that described by Cecil among Catholics in Northern Ireland, who name their children after holy days, as in the names Concepta or Assumpta.[46] However, only a small minority of names given to children in Tekoa (such as Hadas, Ḥagit, and Adar) clearly denote the event they in fact commemorate; most names merely connote an event, and have a meaning independent of the event they commemorate.

The choice of these 'connotative' names is revealing. In some instances the names work as clear mnemonics for events at the time of birth — for example, Ya'ir, Shir, Noam, Ateret Tamar, Shuvayah. In other instances, they connote an aspect of the time remembered — as in Ya'ar, Nirit, Tal. In the majority of instances the names express the interpretation by the parents of the time commemorated; it is significant that in nearly all these cases, they choose to remember 'difficult' events through hopeful names. For example, a time of mourning is commemorated as a time of hope (Ḥanina); a time of displacement is retold as one of emplacement (Mattityahu Sinai, Netayah, Elyashiv); a time of flight is remembered as one of settlement (Shav Zion, Yisgav); and a time of war is marked by peace (Shalom).

Giving children names which commemorate events and reactions to events at the time of their birth allows Tekoans to mark history. They are able to personalize otherwise impersonal events in Jewish history and current Israeli history, so that these events are remembered as part of their individual family histories.

C. Names which commemorate place

Tekoans argue that they, like the early Zionists, are merely engaged in reclaiming their rightful inheritance (*naḥalah*).[47] They do so not merely by settling the land, but also by giving children names which commemorate the specific area of Judea.[48] The most straightforward way is to name children 'Yehudah'. Thus although *Gur Aryeh Yehudah* or 'the lion cub of Yehudah' was named after his paternal grandfather, his mother hastened to add that this was also 'the name given by the biblical Jacob to Yehuda at the time of his death'[49] and was a fitting name for her son as they lived in Judea. Another *Yehudah*, although named after his deceased grandfather, was also so named because he was born in 1993, in the aftermath of the Oslo Peace Accords, and his mother saw this name as 'fitting the times', since 'Judea was in danger'.

Apart from this straightforward correlation, some chose names which bespoke the special status of Judea in Jewish topography —

hence the name *Shemaiah Yehudah* or 'God listened to Yehudah' which an American immigrant chose; she explained that *Shemaiah* was the name of one of the first *Tana'im* (the general name for scholars whose opinions were recorded in the Mishnah text). Further, in the past tense, the verb means God listened, and in the future, it is a prayer requesting God to listen. She said that while the name Yehudah was given after a maternal grandfather, she had a 'backward explanation' for this name. She stated that it is written in the *Torah* that although Moses blessed all the tribes, God only listened to the voice of Yehudah and furthermore, she added, the name was appropriate because she lived in 'the land of Yehudah' (*Erets Yehudah*), and the name 'Yehudah' was also linked up with leadership.

The mystical qualities associated with this particular land were also expressed by the name given by John and Gina to their daughter, *Ruth-El Tehiyah*. While Ruth-El was commemorative of an ancestor, the choice of *Tehiyah* (renaissance) reflected the daughter's birth in the house which her parents had built into a home in Tekoa. Gina saw Tehiyah, also the 'first sound of the *shofar* on Yom Kippur' (*teki'ah*), as a fitting choice.

Susan commemorated place by giving her sons names of biblical figures from the area of Judea.[50] She called her son *Achijah*, after a prophet from Shiloh because at the time of his birth she and her husband had been debating whether to settle in Shiloh[51] or in Tekoa. She called her other son *Ira*, after the tenth-century commander from Tekoa who was the son of Ikkesh and a commander in David's army. *Hanamel* ('given of God'), her next born, was to follow in the footsteps of the seventh-century cousin of Jeremiah who had asked Jeremiah to redeem a plot of land for 17 shekels of silver to demonstrate his faith that the people of Judea would eventually return in peace to their land. Similarly, Dov commemorated the birth of his daughters near Hebron by giving one 'another name for the biblical Sarah': *Yiscah*. (Sarah is buried in Hebron. In Aggadah, Sarah is identified with Yiscah, the daughter of Abraham's brother, Haran; Gen 11: 29.) He named the other *Aner*, 'after the *Ben Aner* — the descendants of those who live in Hebron' (Aner: one of three Amorite brothers who resided around the citadel of Hebron). Similarly, Ze'ev and Shahar named their daughter *Rachel*, because they live close to the burial site of the biblical Rachel.

In these instances, it is not territory itself which is being commemorated, but rather the characters who have inhabited that territory and made it historical. In that way, Tekoans are able to turn this contested and occupied territory into a specifically 'Jewish place',[52] a repository of collective Jewish history. In other instances, Tekoans commemorate place by recounting their own actions in that place, particularly their role in 'returning' the Jewish people to that land, thereby ensuring the

reproduction of Jewish 'place'. Hence, some names reflect various facets of this bid to 'return'. Thus, *Geulah Shomrona* (the redemption of Samaria): Geulah's mother, Linda, an immigrant from the United States and one of the first to settle in Tekoa, recounts that by moving to Tekoa she turned each day of her life into a 'demonstration'. She and her husband wanted to give their daughter a name which was 'important' for them. That choice was also dictated to a certain extent by the fact that Linda had liked the name Geulah ever since she had met Geulah Cohen, one of the leaders of the *Gush Emunim*, and was meant to have a greater significance. Linda hoped that on hearing her daughter's name people would recognize the political significance of the 'redemption of Samaria', that is, the territory occupied by Israel in the aftermath of the Six-Day War.

Neta ('something that is planted') was chosen by Daphne, an American by birth, who said that she and her husband (who is Dutch) chose this name associated with planting and regeneration because they wanted a name which would symbolize a 'return to the land'. As for *Nili Arielah*, Nili is an acronym for 'the eternity of Israel cannot be falsified', while Arielah is a synonym for Jerusalem.[53] Daphne was inspired to name her other daughter Nili Ariela after she heard that Palestinians were naming their children after Palestine. She argued that if the Arabs could give their children such political names, the Jews were also entitled to name their children after 'Jerusalem Day' and 'Independence Day'. In the case of *Elyashiv Yehudah* (God will return to Judea), his mother, a modern orthodox immigrant from the United States, chose these names 'to express her politics'.

Naming to commemorate place is an important constituent of the armoury of devices with which Tekoans seek to legitimize their settlement activities. By using the Hebrew name for the area of Judea, they advance the proposition: 'Where else should *Yehudim* (Jews) live, but in *Yehudah* (Judea)?' Another popular slogan is '*Yehudah* (Judea) is for the *Yehudim*' (Jews)'. They contrast their names with names of Palestinian Arabs who live in the area. These names, Tekoans assert, reflect the origin of these Arabs in Egypt. Similarly, by arguing that 'even the Arabs have not changed the names of places here', Tekoans establish this territory as land promised to the Jews, and as so recognized by the Arabs. In commemorating this place through the names they give their children, Tekoans portray themselves as belonging to 'this land'. They close the hiatus between actually belonging to this land and being of this land, on the one hand, and their newly-immigrant status to these territories (and in the case of some, to the state of Israel) on the other, by naming their children to commemorate this land as their ancestral inheritance. In doing so Tekoans seem to be following in the footsteps of the early Zionist settlers. However, unlike the case of the early Zionist settlers — whose

adoption of names of local places reflected 'a frantic desire of the settlers to become one, in body and name, with the landscape of their regained patrimony, its rivers and mountains, its trees and its thorns'[54] — Tekoan commemoration of place reflects a desire to narrate the history of the place. Rather than merely draw up a map of the regained patrimony, Tekoan children's names retell the ongoing relationship between a people and its patrimony.

D. Names which express ideas and hopes

Children are viewed as the repository of the future. Children's names function to express parents' hopes and ideas for that future and to acknowledge God's power to determine this future. Since the future is modelled largely on a heroic biblical past, many children are named after important biblical figures. Some are also given names evocative of specific qualities with which the parents hope the child will be endowed. For example, *Hadar Binah*: her mother hoped that the child would — in keeping with a Talmudic passage which argues that women are granted more understanding than men — be blessed with understanding (*binah*). She also hoped that her daughter would reflect an inner beauty or glory (*hadar*), because *hadar* was the chief concept espoused by her husband's youth movement, with whom he had first visited Tekoa. Similarly, *Ortal* (Or, light; Tal, dew), was named so in the hope that she would be a light to the family.

Conspicuous by their absence are names which directly denote firmness, strength, courage, or vigour. This is not because Tekoans do not foresee the need for these qualities in their enterprise, as did the early Zionists who adopted such names. Instead, Tekoans express hopes for these qualities either through names which acknowledge the child as, or hope that the child will be, a source and instrument of divine aid, and hence as automatically 'filled' with strength, courage, etc. Thus some of the popular names clearly acknowledge the child as a gift from God: *Matanyah, Netan-El* — 'gift from God'. Other names articulate proof of divine intervention and express gratitude: *Elianah*: 'my God answered'; *Yoḥai*: 'God lives'; *Rinatyah*: 'singing God's praises'. Still others define the child and his/her relationship to God — *Yedidyah*: 'friend of God'; *Batyah* (daughter of God); *Ẓuriel*: 'Boulder of God'; *Oved*: 'one who works for God'; *Ẓuri Shalom* (Rock of Peace); *Oriyah* (light from God); *Ori* — (light) 'taken from the Psalms: Hashem is my light and salvation'.

Conclusion

In an ethnographic essay entitled 'Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight', Clifford Geertz reveals how the sport of cockfighting is in

fact a story which the Balinese 'tell themselves about themselves'.[55] I suggest that the naming of children in Tekoa performs a similar function. On the one hand, it initiates a child into society while on the other hand, it locates the child on a genealogical and geographical map of the Jewish community through the millennia of its existence. Thus the routine and instrumental activity of naming becomes a way of narrating the collective story of the Tekoans, which is spun around the theme of commemoration and celebrates 'rebirth'. It is by virtue of living in Tekoa that Tekoans see themselves as renewing a Jewish presence in the 'land of Israel'. Their children, many of whom were born in Tekoa, serve as the conduit or vessel through which this process of rebirth and renewal is actualized. And names, especially those given to the children, are one medium through which Tekoans articulate their rebirth. The reasons cited for name choices also serve to legitimise the Tekoan presence in this disputed territory. Although all Tekoans refer to Jewish history to name their children, some are clearly better acquainted than others with that history. That is one reflection of the mixed composition of the settlement.

In using names as their chosen medium of expression, Tekoans follow a strategy commonly adopted by groups as a means of contestation and appropriation. New nation-states, for example, often exercise their ability to reinterpret the nation's past by changing names of places back to their 'original' form.[56] Similarly, the action of naming a child 'Yehudah', after the territory of the West Bank, allows Tekoans to 'reclaim' this contested territory as theirs.

This naming practice does not break with the established Jewish custom of using names to maintain 'continuity' but exploits this very tradition. Thus, almost uniformly, Tekoans enlarge the 'ancestral pool' to incorporate a whole list of metaphorical ancestors. Similarly, remote geographical spaces become 'ancestral' homes, and moments in mythic and historical time become ever-present. Constantly repeated, called out, shouted, these names re-create locality, time, and nationhood and thus articulate the collective story of 'restoration'.

Acknowledgments

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NOTES

[1] H. Isaacs, 'Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe', in N. Glazer and D. Moyniham, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Cambridge, MA, 1975, p. 46.

[2] See, for example, D. Maybury-Lewis, 'Names, Person and Ideology in Central Brazil', in E. Tooker, ed., *Naming Systems*, Washington D.C., 1984.

[3] See, for example, M. Herzfeld, 'When Exceptions define the rules: Greek Baptismal Names and the Negotiation of Identity', in *Journal of Anthropological Research*, vol. 38, no. 3, 1982, pp. 288–302.

[4] M. Leon, 'Of Names and First Names in a Small Rural Community: Linguistic and Sociological Approaches', in *Semiotica*, vol. 17, no. 3, 1976, pp. 211–31.

[5] W. Goodenough, 'Personal Names and Modes of Address in Two Oceanic Societies', in M. Spiro, ed., *Context and Meaning in Cultural Anthropology*, New York, 1965.

[6] B. Kaganoff, 'Jewish First Names Through the Ages. Juanita to Yente', in *Commentary*, vol. 20, no. 5, 1955, pp. 447–52. Kolatch states that the adoption of surnames by Jews is very recent; he traces it to 1785–87 in Austria: see A. J. Kolatch, *The Name Dictionary: Modern English and Hebrew Names*, New York, 1973, p. 336.

[7] See Kaganoff, op. cit. in Note 6 above.

[8] The Bible provides some classic examples of this: Avram becomes Avraham (Gen 17: 5) while Ya'acov becomes Yisrael (Gen 32: 29). See *The Jerusalem Bible*, Jerusalem, 1989. For a concise history of changes in naming practices among the Jews see Kaganoff, op. cit. in Note 6 above.

[9] *Tractate Rosh ha-Shana*, 16b states that four things can cancel the doom of man: charity, supplication, change of name, change of action. Thus it is a popular practice among Jews to change the name of one who is mortally ill in the hope of cheating the 'angel of death'.

[10] A myth surrounding the creation of the legendary monster, the *golem*, also reveals the potency of names. Trachtenberg cites the example of one Elijah of Chelm who lived in the middle of the sixteenth century and is reputed to have created a *golem* from clay, and given it life by inscribing the name of God upon its forehead. He destroyed this creature by tearing the life-giving name from its forehead: J. Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic and Superstition. A Study in Folk Religion*, Cleveland and New York, 1961, p. 85.

[11] M. Samra, 'Naming Patterns Among Jews of Iraqi Origin in Sydney', in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXI, no. 1, June 1989, pp. 25–37. He quotes this from Isaac Palachi's *Yafeh Laleb*, vol. 3, Izmir, 1880, column three.

[12] A quick perusal of titles and bibliographies of scholarship on Jewish names reveals that most scholars categorize 'names' under the category of 'folklore and custom' — for example, B. J. Bamberger, ed., *Studies in Jewish Law, Custom and Folklore*, New York, 1970. Also see *Index of Articles on Jewish Studies. Bibliographical Quarterly of the Jewish National and University Library*, Jerusalem, 1969.

[13] A. Elon, *The Israelis*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983 (1971), pp. 125–26. Also see H. Sacher, *Zionist Portraits and other Essays*, London, 1959, p. 315; he states: 'In Palestine the changing of names is common practice. When a Jew lands, he enters upon a new life and assumes a new name, but it is an appropriate one. He means to become a complete Jew and he proclaims that resolution by casting away his Galuth name and adopting a Hebrew name'.

[14] See B. Kaganoff, *A Dictionary Of Jewish Names And Their History*, London, 1978, p. 88. Also see C. Adler, 'Name Changes in Israel', in *Names*, vol. II, 1954, pp. 38–39.

[15] One individual changed both his first name and surname when he immigrated to Israel; he replaced his anglicized first name with a different Hebraic name and changed his surname to *Shir-El* (song of God). Another man retained his 'diaspora' first name but changed his surname when he came to settle in Israel. He and his newly-converted wife chose *Amiel* (people of God), because it expressed their 'nationalist and religious sentiments'.

[16] The notion that societies construct their own interpretations is taken from C. Geertz, *The Interpretation Of Culture*, London, 1973.

[17] K. Hastrup cites Edwin Ardener who explains that 'in social space, not everything that happens is an event . . . Events are defined within the space by a certain quality: significance'. See, K. Hastrup, 'The Prophetic Condition', in M. Chapman, ed., *The Voice Of Prophecy And Other Essays*, Oxford, 1989, p. 221.

[18] Not surprisingly, even the pets in Tekoa have telling names. Of special significance are the names of two donkeys who were alive at the time of the Camp David Accords. One had been called *Begin* and the other *Sadat*. At the time of my fieldwork, the single donkey in Tekoa was called *Autonomia* (autonomy). Two young boys, who were both very politically aware, rode *Autonomia* around the settlement and shunned the fancier bicycles. Another resident named his dog *Teddy* after the erstwhile Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kolleck, who was regarded as anti-settler.

[19] See R. Cecil, 'The Marching Season in Northern Ireland: An Expression of Politico-Religious Identity' in S. Macdonald, ed., *Inside European Identities*, Oxford, 1993, pp. 146–66. Cecil quotes Burton's explanation of the concept of 'telling' as 'based on the social significance attached to name, face and dress, area of residence, school attended, linguistic and possibly phonetic use, colour and symbolism. . . . It is not based on undisputed fact, but, as an ideological representation, is a mixture of myth and reality.'

[20] Cecil, ibid., demonstrates that in Glengow, as throughout Northern Ireland, there are broad differences between 'Catholic' names and 'Protestant' names. Catholics tend to have Irish names spelt either in the Gaelic way or in an anglicized version: for example, Patrick (Padraig) or Rory (Ruari or Ruadhraigh); they are also commonly named after a member of the Holy family (Mary, Joseph) or a saint (Theresa, Brendan). In practice many people tend to be named after a relative. Protestant names tend to indicate an English or Scottish ancestry, and are not infrequently drawn from the Old Testament. Thus names such as Ruth, Leah, Nathaniel, and Samuel are found among the more common English and Scottish names of Protestants.

[21] Tekoa is the biblical home of the prophet Amos. Tekoans use this verse and the verse preceding it from the Book of Amos as their cosmogonic charter in their pamphlet for newcomers (*Tekoa: Kefar Kehilatti b'Yehudah*, 1993, no publishing details). It is interesting to note that the Israeli novelist, Amos Oz, also refers to the Book of Amos in his introduction to Tekoa, in *In The Land of Israel*. However, the verses he chooses (Amos 1: 1, 5, 7; 2: 4, 5, 11, 14; 5: 11) all predict disaster and desolation, not dwelling in the land of Israel. (Amos Oz, *In the Land of Israel*, London, 1983, p. 51.)

[22] There is a vast corpus of literature on the *Gush Emunim*. See, for example, G. Aran, 'Jewish Zionist Fundamentalism: The Bloc of the Faithful', in M. Marty ed., *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago, 1991; E. Don-Yehiya,

'Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins of the Gush Emunim', in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2, 1987, pp. 215–34; I. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, New York, 1988; D. Newman, ed., *The Impact of the Gush Emunim: Politics and Settlement on the West Bank*, London, 1985; E. Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of the Israeli Radical Right*, Oxford, 1991. However, while I was doing fieldwork (1992–93) I was often faced by the assertion that the *Gush Emunim* no longer exists. I argue elsewhere (Kaul, L. R. *Re-claiming the Nation Through Land: Jewish Religious Nationalism in Israel*, D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1995) that the *Gush Emunim* no longer exists in its *original* form; it can, however, be researched today by studying the settlements affiliated with *Amanah*, the settlement wing of the *Gush Emunim*. For the purposes of this study, I shall follow this approach and side-step the complex problem of identifying the *Gush Emunim* today.

[23] Its existence from 1975 to 1977 was as a humble outpost of NAHAL (a branch of the Israeli Defence Forces which combines military service with agricultural service) intended to check smuggling activity from Jordan into Israel along the Dead Sea.

[24] Approximate number in 1993. There has been considerable change in population through the 1990s with the influx of Russian immigrants, many of whom were given a '*beit rishon b'moledet*' (first home in the homeland) in Tekoa. Tekoa has grown considerably in response to the uncertain political situation in the wake of the Oslo Accords (1993).

[25] Tekoa is one of the few 'mixed' (*meurav*) settlements affiliated to *Amanah*. Other mixed settlements in the same region are Har Gilo, Kfar Eldad, El-David. Tekoans fly the '*meurav*' banner with pride and cite themselves as a perfect example of harmonious Jewish co-existence, where commitment to settling the land of Israel overcomes petty barriers of religious insularity. However, when a group of ultra-orthodox (*Ḥaredi*) Jews sought membership in Tekoa in 1993, the Tekoan community was riven with disagreement. Many saw the *Ḥaredi* invasion as hazardous to the tenuous social balance which had been created, but given the demands of the political situation in 1993, the Tekoans voted to allow the *Ḥaredi* contingent to apply for membership of Tekoa.

[26] All unattributed quotes from this point on are from members of Tekoa, as recorded in my field journal.

[27] See, for example, the Tekoan pamphlet, op. cit. in Note 21 above.

[28] What I call modern 'Israeli' names are distinguished by being Hebraic, by their brevity, and often by their idiosyncratic nature. One of my informants, a religious native Israeli, characterized 'Israeli' names as those which were in Hebrew, which were not necessarily biblical, and which reminded one of 'young people'.

[29] Y. Bilu and H. Abramovitch, 'Visitational Dreams and Naming Practices Among Moroccan Jews in Israel', in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXVII, no. 1, 1985, pp. 13–22.

[30] While the application of the term 'native-born Israeli' (sabra) is clear-cut, I think the term 'immigrant' is more complex. In the context of this essay, I shall use 'immigrant' to signify anyone who has moved to Israel as an adult. Those who were very young when their families moved to Israel need, in my

view, to be distinguished both from 'immigrants' and from the 'native born'. Hence I shall point out cases of such individuals.

[31] See B. Kaganoff, op. cit. in Note 6 above; he argues that from the twelfth century onwards the widespread use of non-Jewish names by the Jews led Rabbis to decree that every Jewish boy be given a purely Jewish name at his circumcision. This led to the custom of giving a child two names: 'religious' names were used in documents of a religious nature (such as *ketuboth* and *gittin* — marriage contracts and bills of divorcement), and when the boy was called to read Torah. Non-Jewish names were used for civil and business purposes. Bilu and Abramovitch, op. cit. in Note 29 above, p. 14, see this practice as helping to 'preserve an intact if secondary Jewish identity'.

[32] This is in contrast to Bilu and Abramovitch, ibid., who show how naming of children becomes a locus for conflict between generations, where the young want modern names, and the older generations attempt to ensure continuance of custom with 'traditional' names.

[33] I am thankful to Ariela Levy of Tekoa for helping me with the Hebrew spelling of the names and to Adina Feldstern at the Hebrew Union College for going over the transliteration.

[34] For historical details see Kaganoff, op. cit. in Note 6 above. The practice of naming children to commemorate an ancestor clearly dates to the later biblical period. Kaganoff states that before, names reflected an absolute identity of the person with the name. See also Zborowski and Herzog, *Life is with People: The Culture of the Shtetl*, New York, 1952, p. 321.

[35] She was quoting from the *Shulḥan Arukh*. According to her, 'when a father is mourning a father, a newborn son brings peace, while a newborn daughter brings health'.

[36] For a discussion on the politics surrounding this transaction between the generations, see Samra, op. cit. in Note 11 above.

[37] Son of Rav A. I. Kook (1865–1935), first Ashkenazi Chief rabbi of Palestine and founder of the *Merkaz ha Rav* yeshiva. Rav Z. Y. Kook is seen, along with his father, as the ideologue and spiritual mentor of the *Gush Emunim*.

[38] I have used pseudonyms for the parents. In choosing the pseudonym, I have tried to remain faithful to the original style of name. Thus if the parent has an Anglo-Saxon name, I have chosen an Anglo-Saxon pseudonym.

[39] See Trachtenberg, op. cit. in Note 10 above, p. 78. He states that traditional practice proscribes as irresponsible naming a child after someone who was unfortunate, has died young, or was murdered.

[40] See Bilu and Abramovitch, op. cit. in Note 29 above, p. 15.

[41] Ibid., pp. 14–15.

[42] Zena stated that her choice of names was dictated by a desire to give her children modern first names and biblical middle names. All the 'modern' names, however, commemorate events at the time of her children's births.

[43] The *Gush Emunim* was officially founded on *Tu bi-Shevat*, in 1974 at Kfar Etzion. See K. Avruch, 'Traditionalising Israeli Nationalism: The Development of the Gush Emunim' in *Political Psychology*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1979, pp. 47–57.

[44] It is interesting to note that she did not allude to the historical Mattityahu, father of the famous Maccabee brothers, who is considered to be among the earliest Jewish 'patriots'. He died in 167 BCE.

[45] See Kaganoff, op. cit. in Note 6 above, p. 450.

[46] See Cecil, op. cit., in Note 19 above.

[47] Thus Tekoans call themselves '*mitnahalim*' (those who reclaim their inheritance). Mainstream Israeli society, on the other hand, brands them '*mitnahablim*' — a corruption of this term which puns on the word *mehablim* (saboteurs).

[48] Naming after place is a practice noted in anthropological literature. However, that practice usually seems to denote 'place of origin' and is commonly used for migrant populations who are named after their original place of habitation. See, for example, G. Collier and V. Bricker, 'Nicknames and Social Structure in Zinacantan', in *American Anthropologist*, no. 72, 1970, pp. 289–302. Tekoans reverse this scenario: they name themselves after place in/while 'returning' to it, rather than in emigrating from it.

[49] See Gen 49: 9–10. I am thankful to an expert reader of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* for pointing out that Jacob did not rename Judah. Rather 'Gur Aryeh Yehudah' is a description, even a prophecy that Judah would be [like] a 'lion's whelp'.

[50] Unlike the other Tekoans, Susan read out descriptions of the characters after whom she had named her children from a dictionary of Jewish names.

[51] Another settlement on the West Bank.

[52] Tekoans seem to make the space-place distinction made by Y. Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*, London, 1977 and W. Brueggemann, *The Land: Place as Gift, Promise and Challenge in Biblical Faith*, Philadelphia, 1977, p. 5. According to Brueggemann, space is 'an area of freedom, without coercion or accountability, free of pressures and void of authority . . . It is characterized by a kind of neutrality or emptiness waiting to be filled by our choosing. . . . Place is a space that has historical meanings, where some things have happened, which are remembered and which provide continuity and identity across generations'.

[53] NILI is an acronym of the verse 1 Samuel 15: 29. It was also the name of the pro-British, anti-Turkish Jewish underground in Palestine during the First World War. Daphne, however, did not allude to this fact.

[54] See Elon, op. cit. in Note 13 above, p. 127.

[55] See Geertz, op. cit. in Note 16 above, p. 448.

[56] One example of this is the change of name of Bombay to its 'original' name 'Mumbai' by Hindu nationalists in India.

THE RISE OF THE JEWISH ENGLISHMEN

Harold Pollins

(Review Article)

ISRAEL FINESTEIN , *Anglo-Jewry in Changing Times: Studies in Diversity 1840–1914*, xvi + 265 pp., Vallentine, Mitchell, London and Portland, Oregon, 1999, £37.50 or $55 (hardback); £19.50 or $25 (paperback).

PERHAPS our reaction was a form of inverted snobbery when, as youngsters in East London, we heard of people who, we were told, called themselves 'Englishmen of the Hebrew persuasion'. We responded, ungrammatically, 'Who persuaded who?' — Maybe we misheard or possibly my memory is at fault for in the first pages of this book we read that in the early Victorian years there were significant changes in vocabulary, when 'Jewish religion' was substituted for 'Jewish nation' and, notably, 'Hebrew' for 'Jew'. Whatever the detail this book deals in large part with those who aimed to achieve a Jewish and English synthesis.[1] As such it can be regarded as a particular case-study of the adaptation of members of an immigrant group (and their later anglicized descendants) to a majority society. Naturally, much Anglo-Jewish historiography deals with such matters. One has to explain how the United Synagogue, the main (London-based) synagogal organization, came to be set up by Act of Parliament and became, so some think, the Jewish equivalent of the Church of England. Or how the religious leaders of congregations came to be called, collectively, 'clergy' and individually 'reverend' and 'minister' and to sport a dress modelled on those of Christian ministers.

Answers to these and other questions can be found in this new collection by Israel Finestein. This volume of essays might be regarded as a sequel or as complementary to the author's *Jewish Society in Victorian England: Collected Essays* (1993). Both Prefaces are remarkably similar in referring to the themes he is pursuing. He notes a background of the general developments which presaged the Victorian age, such as the great economic transformation in Britain, changing class structures, and major political events both in this

country and abroad. His prime concern is their effects on Anglo-Jewry. This second volume of lectures and essays, some not previously published, extends the coverage and explores new ground. The author, whose name will be known to readers of this Journal, is primarily a lawyer (a Q.C. — Queen's Counsel) who ended his career as a Crown Court Senior Judge. He has been an active public figure mainly in the Jewish community, notably as a President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and, relevant to this discussion, a President of the Jewish Historical Society of England. In the best and exact sense of the term he is an amateur historian, following on from his Double First in History at Cambridge. He has been engaged in Anglo-Jewish history for a long time, a half-century or so. I am sure I heard him deliver an early version of his lecture on Matthew Arnold, the basis for chapter seven of this new book ('Matthew Arnold, the Jews and Society') some time in the 1950s. His essays are to be found in a variety of publications, and it is good that this book contains some previously unpublished pieces.

Some might wonder if his considerable knowledge of the subject could have been put together in the form of a connected narrative, as a chronological and thematic history of Anglo-Jewry. It is worth recalling his early effort in that direction. Maurice Freedman, the first managing editor of this Journal, once told me how highly he thought of Israel Finestein's paperback, *A Short History of Anglo-Jewry*, published in 1957 by the British Section of the World Jewish Congress as number seven in its series, Popular Jewish Library. In detail, no doubt, it has been supplanted by more recent studies, but is still, I find, a very useful introduction to the subject. It covers the whole period of Anglo-Jewry and not just the nineteenth century which is his main speciality.

This book, though, like his 1993 volume, is a collection of discrete pieces. There are eight chapters of varying length, prepared at different times for oral delivery or publication and they inevitably contain some overlap and duplication. This does not necessarily matter for, in general, most of the essays relate to a number of themes. Three of the chapters centre on the life of individuals, two of them Jewish religious functionaries and one a non-Jew (Matthew Arnold) whose writings reflected his great interest in Jewish history and religion. Four essays are on specific aspects of nineteenth-century Anglo-Jewish history which relate to features mentioned in the first chapter, the longest in the book. That chapter is entitled 'Early Victorian Anglo-Jewry: Aspirations and Reality' — a heading which is not very precise about its contents (although it is somewhat more transparent than the less than eye-catching title of the book). It deals mainly with the 1840s and 1850s but is not restricted to those decades. Among the diverse matters affecting Anglo-Jewry were — these are examples — the emancipation agitation (the demand for civic

equality); the advent of Reform Judaism; and the attempts to deal with poverty within the Jewish community. Naturally, given the period under description, much of it is taken up with the history of the demand for 'emancipation' — which in Britain meant the eventual granting of certain civil rights in a pragmatic, piecemeal fashion, culminating in the admission of professing Jews to the House of Commons in 1858.

The 'Aspirations and Reality' of the chapter's sub-title refer to the hopes of some of the main opinion-formers of Anglo-Jewry in the early nineteenth century, those who in a sense helped to create and develop the notion of 'Jewish Englishmen'. They were demanding various rights of equality so that they would be regarded as Englishmen who happened to practise a different religion. The opening sentence of his first page puts it succinctly: 'Civic and political emancipation was seen by those in the Jewish community who strove for it, as a recognition that the community had become or should be regarded as being a religious communion and nothing more'. Even Roman Catholics — let alone Protestant Nonconformists — were obtaining relief from old legal disabilities, and sometimes the needs of these groups coincided. Thus the gradual opening of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge to other than members of the Church of England was clearly relevant to these other outsiders. Chapter 4, 'Religious Disabilities at Oxford and Cambridge and the Movements for Abolition, 1771–1871', tells this story.

The 'Reality' of the first chapter refers, inter alia, to the barriers in the way of achieving the ideal of being 'one of the elements in the great and multi-faceted Nonconformist grouping in society, one of the religious bodies out of conformity with the Established Church' (p. 1). On the one hand were those Christians who continued to see Jews as a separate nation who, however loyal to the Crown, could not ever be regarded as Englishmen. Certainly they should not be allowed to become members of either local councils or Parliament. Some Jews countered this by their reference to a 'Jewish mission'. By this was meant the advancement of good citizenship, a notion elaborated by some (including Christian supporters of Jewish emancipation) to include the Jewish contribution to Western civilization and its civilizing role.

'Reality' also meant that the new ideas, in tune with nineteenth-century ideas, which essayed an optimistic belief in progress conditioned by education and economic development, suffered setbacks from time to time. Thus one of the paradoxes of the advocated role of the Jews in English society was the fact that despite all the anglicized adoptions and the desire to be merely another religious denomination, the Jews did have bonds with Jews in other countries. Near the start of the account, at the beginning of the Victorian period, there was the

Damascus Affair, which engaged Jewish sympathy and action. The 'old state of mind' (p. 2) was thus not entirely eradicated and although the 'Jewish Englishman' persisted, the idea took some hard knocks following the large-scale immigration of the different Jews from Eastern Europe later in the century.

That first chapter deals with these matters and enters into a number of other related themes, in the process providing a useful history of the middle years of the nineteenth century. The author includes the rise of a Jewish middle class which came to challenge the older, aristocratic families which had run Anglo-Jewry (and continued to have a major influence well into the twentieth century). He looks at the unsuccessful efforts to instil some intellectual content into Anglo-Jewry — the short-lived literary journals, for example, and the difficulties in establishing Jews' College. One clichéd interpretation would be that Anglo-Jewry mirrored British society's pragmatic (and less theoretical) approach — thus the establishment of the Reform Synagogue in 1840 did not occur because of the influence of the Reformers on the Continent but for purely practical reasons. It was not a consequence of some profound theological disagreement. The chapter also deals with the growth of importance of provincial communities, before their expansion which coincided with the Eastern European immigration. Finestein locates the provincial communities within the crisis of 1853, centring on the argument over the admission of Reform Deputies to the Board of Deputies of British Jews. He also writes about the poor and the working class, but it has to be said that almost all the book refers to those in positions of authority and influence or who aspired to that status; he is good on the rising middle class and the growth of the provincial communities. The poor were seen as the recipients of charity and there was little demand for political emancipation among the Jewish working-class.

These and other themes come into the other chapters and are often elaborated there. Chapter three, 'Jewish Emancipation in Victorian England: Self-imposed Limits to Assimilation', explains some of the 'Reality' of the first chapter. In particular he describes how, in their desire to maintain a Jewish community of faith, emancipationists supported separate institutions — Jewish schools being an obvious example — as well as separate welfare bodies. Such activities did not readily sit with other objectives of acceptance by British society. For example, over the question of education there were two opposite attitudes, exemplified by those of Henry Keeling and Sir Samuel Montagu (pp. 98–9). Keeling, a jeweller in the City of London, one of the new middle-class men of influence, argued: 'I have always considered the prime purpose in the struggle to attain civil and religious liberty was to secure the Jewish community in its exclusive right of upholding our institutions distinct from those of other creeds'.

He was opposed to 'excessive fraternization between Jewish and Christian children in the schools' yet — it is one of the oddities of minority status — because of his popularity among both Jews and Christians he was elected in 1853 a Churchwarden of St George's in the City, 'stipulating only that he should be excused from taking part in the religious services' (p. 98).[2] Sir Samuel Montagu, 'the most resolute layman in metropolitan Jewry in defence of firm Orthodoxy' (and founder of the Orthodox Federation of Synagogues) on the other hand was opposed to separate Jewish day schools for middle class Jews. However, he did not oppose them for the children of poor immigrants, considering such schools 'a valuable Anglicising factor' (p. 99).

Two chapters seem, at first sight, to be peripheral to Anglo-Jewry, since they are about non-Jews: chapter five, 'British Opinion in the Mid-nineteenth century on the Idea of Jewish National Restoration' and chapter seven, 'Matthew Arnold, Jews and Society'. The themes of the former were the subject of a recent article in this Journal[3] and, like the Matthew Arnold essay, there are connections with the history of emancipation. Three chapters deal more with religious matters — although not so much about theological content as about organisational developments. Chapter two, 'The Anglo-Jewish Pastorate (1840–90)', explains the development of sermons delivered in the English language in both Sephardi and Ashkenazi congregations and how that change was associated with the emergence of the preacher who became the 'minister' and 'reverend'. This is not dry-as-dust stuff for the author enlivens his description and analysis with interesting real-life events and personalities. Two chapters towards the end of the book indeed concentrate on two such men: chapter six is entitled 'Morris Jacob Raphall (1798–1868): The English Career of Popular Preacher and Lonely Publicist' and chapter eight is about the last Chief Rabbi of the nineteenth century: 'Hermann Adler (1839–1911): Portrait of Jewish Victorian Extraordinary'.

The former is not a familiar name in Anglo-Jewish historiography, but of the various Minister-Preachers of his day Finestein rates him 'the most remarkable' among the five 'pre-eminent figures in this vocation'. He was the most learned, he preached and lectured extensively, and he was ever ready to repudiate publicly 'calumnies on Jews and Judaism' (p. 168). For example, during the Damascus Affair of 1840 *The Times* published a letter from a former Fellow of an Oxford college reviving the blood libel and attacking Jews generally. Raphall responded vigorously. He was a Swedish-born child prodigy and had studied philosophy at university; while remaining Orthodox in religion, he aimed to combine traditional Judaism with modern philosophy. He was associated with attempts to raise the standards of Jewish discussion — such as the weekly *Hebrew Review and Magazine of*

Rabbinical Literature which was produced for a year and a half in 1834–35. It, like other comparable efforts, failed in the face of lack of public support. In 1841 the Birmingham Hebrew congregation appointed him Minister and headmaster. He felt himself obliged to supplement the salary he received, not least by public lecturing, and when the congregation reduced his salary in 1848 (to use more of its funds to meet the needs of the Jewish poor) he left for a lecture tour in the United States. He took up residence in that country for the rest of his life. His career is a case-study of the theme of the development of the pastorate but Raphall was anything but typical of the Jewish 'clergy'. He was an intellectual and a man of independent mind and thought. However, some aspects of his experiences at that time were not unusual, especially the evidence of the low esteem in which the ministers were held and the philistinism of Anglo-Jewry.

Hermann Adler has had much written about him. The son of the previous Chief Rabbi, Nathan Marcus Adler, he had necessarily absorbed those experiences of Anglo-Jewry which are the main themes of this book. Finestein describes him succinctly: 'He became an English public figure, prominently associated with innumerable national public bodies, academic, philanthropic and social'. He was appointed a Commander of the Royal Victorian Order ('a title in the personal gift of the monarch') and it was the Bishop of London who nominated him, successfully, for membership of the elite club, the Athenaeum. The notion of a 'Jewish mission . . . defined as nothing less than to raise the moral standards of mankind' was associated with anglicization which also had a moral purpose. '(T)he inculcation of Judaism among Jews was a postulate of good citizenship . . . public adherence to the faith of Judaism was a public duty' (pp. 220–22). It followed that he was not in favour of political Zionism. These ideas of his, and of those of the more anglicised families, were not universally acceptable among the Jews of Britain, least of all among the Eastern Europeans who arrived in great numbers during his period of office. The chapter on Hermann Adler, which summarises both the main themes of Victorian Anglo-Jewry and the different threads within it and the pressures experienced towards the end of the period, is appropriately the last chapter.

The book is primarily a discussion of the views and actions of the 'chattering classes' of Anglo-Jewry, as revealed mainly in their publications, books, and articles as well as their letters to the Jewish press, notably the *Jewish Chronicle*. It is a work of synthesis and interpretation but at the same time there is new information here. The first chapter in particular is a majestic sweep and deserves to become a classic. But it is a pity that the proof-reading could not have been better and that there are a few factual errors. For example, Raphael Loewe is spelled Lowe on p. 164; in the bibliography Parsond should

be Parsons while the reference to the book edited by Ursula Henriques is incomplete and mixed with a reference to another (incomplete) publication (p. 254); David Meyer Isaacs is sometimes given as David Myer Isaacs; and St Edmund Hall, Oxford is given as St Edmund's Hall (p. 133). On p. 226 the date of the formation of the West Ham congregation is given as 1907 but a book was published in 1997 on the centenary of its creation.[4]

NOTES

[1] There is a terminological analogy with Polish-Jewish experience. 'Some assimilationists began to call themselves "Poles of Mosaic denomination" or even "Jewish Poles" ': Eva Hoffman, *Shtetl. The History of a Small Town and an Extinguished World*, London, Vintage, 1999, p. 128.

[2] This was not a unique election. The *Jewish Chronicle*, 18 November 1994, p. 28, printed a photograph of the grave at Willesden Jewish Cemetery of Vivian Nathan Neville; the inscription on it includes, inter alia, 'Formerly Senior Churchwarden of All Hallows, Lombard Street'. Earlier, Louis Kyezor, a German-born resident and benefactor of the village of Whitton, was invited to be a candidate for churchwarden. The *Jewish Chronicle* (23 September 1864, p. 5), reporting the matter, posed the question whether Jews could be churchwardens and gave its opinion that they could because they paid rates (local taxes). Usually two churchwardens were elected annually as lay representatives of the incumbent.

[3] W. D. Rubinstein and Hilary L. Rubinstein, 'Philosemitism in Britain and in the English-speaking World, 1840–1939: Patterns and Typology', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XL, nos, 1 and 2, 1998. This covers a longer period and a wider geographical area.

[4] Howard Bloch, *Earlham Grove Shul: One Hundred Years: West Ham Synagogue and Community*, London, 1997.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ISRAEL

Israel Finestein

(Review Article)

ROBERT R. FRIEDMANN ed., *Crime and Criminal Justice in Israel: Assessing the Knowledge Base Toward the 21st Century*, xiii + 437 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1998, $24.95.

THE Preface states that this volume is a 'source book' for 'students and scholars'. However, it is also likely to be useful for legislators and administrators — as is intimated in the subtitle. Professor Robert Friedmann heads the Criminal Justice Department of Georgia State University in Atlanta. He has assembled here 15 studies by academic authorities in Israel and America on a large array of facets of Israel's criminal justice system. He adds a concluding chapter of his own, summarizing the contributions and pointing to the need for some changes and to areas in the system which would benefit from further research.

Various authors deal with the incidence and trends in patterns of crime in Israel, including organized crime; politically motivated violence; and juvenile delinquency. There is also a critical analysis of the structure of the hard-pressed criminal court system, with growing crime statistics outpacing judicial manpower and the availability of courtrooms. The largest section of the volume relates to law enforcement, including an examination of the judicial options for punishment, trends in sentencing, and the overcrowded prisons, where an exceptionally large number of suspects are held in detention while awaiting trial. Throughout the book, there are relevant bibliographies of English-language works by legal academics — in which category of scholarship Israel is especially rich.

In 1948, the newly-independent State of Israel adopted the Criminal Law Ordinance which had been put into effect by the British Mandatory authorities in 1938. Piecemeal over the succeeding decades, there were enacted many amendments and new laws; the principal changes are set out succintly in Professor Kremnitzer's paper, entitled 'Criminal Law in Israel'. While stressing the value of case law in the interpretation and application of the many-sourced (and at times, seemingly inconsistent) body of criminal law, he takes

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note of the fact that case law, despite the valiant efforts of the judiciary, 'cannot serve as a substitute for a proper criminal code. . . . The conclusion is therefore that the method of gradual amendments has been exhausted. The "garment" can no longer be patched — it has to be replaced' (pp. 193–94).

In 1992 the Knesset enacted that 'the liberty of the person shall not be . . . restricted . . . except by a statute that benefits the values of the State of Israel and is directed toward a worthy purpose, and then only to the extent that it does not exceed what is necessary'. Kremnitzer observes that not only will this provision have an impact on the interpretation of existing laws, but that it also introduces a 'new constitutional era of judicial review' over statute law (p. 204).

Parliament at Westminster has incorporated into English law the European Convention on Human Rights. When that Act is finally implemented, it may (or may not) in practice endow the High Court with power to exercise judicial review of English legislation as to its constitutionality. The practice of judicial review has expanded in recent years in both England and Israel. The superior courts assume jurisdiction to review quasi-judicial, administrative, and other executive agencies with a view to remedying any breaches of natural justice. There have been periodic consultations between the senior judges of Britain and Israel on the principles and practice of judicial review.

To practitioners in the English courts, there is bound to be much that is familiar in Israel's legal system generally. The Mandate's legacy of the central principles of English law has been strengthened by the presence, at all levels in the system, of members of the English Bar or former students of law at British Universities. Not for nothing is Israel perceived as a member of the common law family, of which England is historically the centre. However, there are significant differences between the laws of the two countries — notably in the absence in Israel of the jury system as well as of a lay magistracy; the latter deals with by far the largest proportion of criminal proceedings heard in England. But in spite of these and other divergences, there are elements of a common ethos in the two legal systems.

As a newly-independent country with a growing population of strikingly different political, cultural, religious, and social backgrounds, Israel soon became a 'social science laboratory', not least with regard to the formulation and operation of the criminal law. The succession of wars with its neighbouring countries and the continuing problems of internal security have served to accentuate the importance of achieving a proper balance between freedom and control — as some of the contributions to this volume show.

The exploration of the changing nature of the responsibilities of the police force is of special relevance. Erella Shadmi's chapter ('Police and Police Reform in Israel: The Formative Role of the State') offers

a careful assessment of how 'state interests' crucially affected the shaping of policing and the construction of the police force, 'often at the expense of the goals of communities and the needs of ordinary citizens' (p. 207). Resources were devoted to national security issues at the expense of crime-fighting. The need 'to establish state authority and respect for the law, especially among groups that had not been accustomed to it or were not so inclined, became urgent. . . . Crime issues were considered less important and patrol duties secondary to other political duties. . . . Demonstrations, crowd control and assistance to the military attracted many police resources' (pp. 208–17).

Erella Shadmi, a former colonel in the Israel police force and now a lecturer in criminal justice at Beit Berl College in Israel, sets out the main reforms in the police service since 1958. They have been largely in the direction of decentralizing authority and functions, and the development of police patrol and 'preventive efforts'. Improved standards for recruitment and advancement were introduced and police-community relations were redefined. However, she recognizes that despite the ongoing reforms, elements of statism persist. Her study is more than an academic analysis: it is a call for the further examination of the 'tension' between state-oriented policing and community policing. Indeed, the volume as a whole is a call for still further new thinking in the reform of the criminal law system.

Although the book does not profess to deal with substantive law, it inescapably examines the standards of proof required for a criminal conviction and the nature of the new offences laid down in Israel's criminal legislation. Some may consider it surprising that there is not more attention paid to rules governing the admissibility of police evidence in a criminal trial. In England, the tightening up of the rules in the 'police and criminal evidence' legislation in the course of the last 15 years (and in the many judicial decisions thereon) have played an increasing part in court proceedings in the interests of fairness to the Defendant. The judge has a residual discretion to allow evidence which may be challenged under the new provisions if he is satisfied that in the circumstances this will not militate against fairness. Rules of evidence and procedure are often of the essence in the fair conduct of a trial. Much has been written about these and related matters by legal academics in Israel — notably, Professor Eliahu Harnon of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

In 1992, President Herzog — himself a member of the English Bar and a former law student at an English University — called for a commission to consider the advisability and practicality of restructuring the legal system. He was particularly concerned about delays in bringing detained suspects to trial and the protracted pre-trial procedure. However, it is clear that the increased rate of incarceration was connected with the increase in crimes of violence and in drug

offences, even though overall crime figures were falling. Longer sentences for drug offences and for crimes of violence do not appear to have affected the rate of offending. Israel is not a country of especially heavy drug usage; the offences of supplying drugs and of illicit handling (sometimes across borders) are rifer than the admittedly disturbing level of usage would suggest.

There has been the tendency in beleaguered Israel to impose severer sentences on politically-motivated offences, especially those which involve violence to persons or property. There is also a tendency to treat Jews guilty of such crimes less severely than Arabs. In his article on 'Punishment, Prisoners' Rights and Pardons', Leon Sheleff (lecturer in Law and Sociology at Tel-Aviv University) cites instances of presidential pardons for Jews imprisoned for politically-motivated murder at a stage which, had the defendants been Arabs, might not have been likely to attract such early release. There have been politically-directed releases of Arabs — often as part of an Israel-Arab agreement or treaty — many of whom were originally detained under military or other emergency regulation without trial.

The Supreme Court of Israel has assumed jurisdiction over the Administered Territories and hears appeals by Arabs and by other inhabitants of these Territories. A long-standing question concerned the use of physical pressure during interrogation. In 1999, the Court departed from its former limited approval of such procedure in special circumstances and ruled against such practices. Among the judges who have been foremost in adopting the humanitarian principles behind such decisions have been Haim Cohn and Menachem Elon, basing themselves on specific features of traditional Jewish law. Human rights, like natural justice, represent values which may be imperilled everywhere when ignored anywhere. How far and when these considerations will affect the well-known case of Mordechai Vanunu, who has been in almost constant solitary confinement since 1990, remains to be seen (pp. 262–63).

PERCY SAUL COHEN: 1928–1999

PERCY Saul Cohen was born in Durban, South Africa, on 6 August 1928 and died in London on 15 September 1999. He attended the University of the Witwatersrand, in the Department of Economics, but in 1948 decided to move to London. He registered for the degree of B.Sc. (Econ) in Social Anthropology, at the London School of Economics. He graduated in 1951 and was later a Ph.D. student at the LSE. He went in 1953 to Israel to gather research material for a thesis on Yemeni immigrant communities and while doing so worked as a temporary research officer for the Henrietta Szold Foundation from 1954 to 1957. On his return to London, he was employed as a tutorial assistant at Birkbeck College (1959–1960) while writing his doctorate thesis entitled *Leadership and Politics Amongst Israeli Yemenis*.

His first full-time appointment was in the Department of Sociology at the University of Leicester, where he was Lecturer from 1960 to 1965. He returned to the LSE in 1965 also as a Lecturer in the Department of Sociology; but in 1967 he was promoted to Reader; and in 1971 he was appointed to a Chair in Sociology, which he occupied until his retirement in 1991. His appointment as the first Dean of Undergraduate Studies at the LSE coincided with the years of his tenure as a Reader: 1967–1971. That was the period of serious student rebellions and he was greatly admired for the skill with which he handled explosive situations.

In 1968, Percy Cohen published *Modern Social Theory*, which attracted critical praise for its clarity and according to his colleague, Christopher Husbands — writing in *The Independent* newspaper of 22 September 1999 — that book 'had a significant impact upon the way that sociological theory came to be taught'. In 1980, he published *Jewish Radicals and Radical Jews* and in the Preface to the book he stated that he had been approached some years earlier by the director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs in London to write a book on Jews and the New Left and to supervise some research on young Jewish radicals in several countries (Argentina, Britain, France, Germany, and the United States). The last paragraph of the Preface expresses his stand as a scholar and as a concerned observer:

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> I have tried, in the first instance, to produce a work of social science. . . . since I am no mere bystander in these matters — I feel strongly when Jews are wronged and strongly when they wrong others; though I do not, on the whole, expect Jews to be morally better than others, only no worse . . . Some of my comments will anger Jewish Radicals, other comments will also anger Radical Jews; while yet others will anger their critics and members of the Jewish establishments . . . Those thoughts do not trouble me: I would rather arouse sympathy for my views than anger; but I would rather provoke anger than induce boredom.

Percy Cohen had felt anger as a young student: he found the apartheid system unacceptable, as did some of his fellow students in South Africa. One of these, Stanley Glasser, addressed the mourners during the funeral service on 21 September 1999 and recalled that a group of students had left South Africa to come to London in the late 1940s, fired with enthusiasm and determined to keep in touch. They established a charity, the Rand Education Fund, to provide support for rural primary schools in South Africa. The Fund held formal annual meetings, and the proceedings would close with one of the members reading a paper. Stanley Glasser said that Percy Cohen's last presentation at an annual meeting was about the economic and social conditions in Argentina in the 1920s and that it was 'brilliant — concise, imaginative, stimulating'. He also spoke of little-known talents of the young Percy in South Africa: he was a gifted scrum-half who made 'a major contribution when the Economics students won a match against the boasting Engineering students, causing a startling sensation on the campus . . .'.

The various newspaper obituaries in the British press (in *The Independent*, *The Times*, *The Guardian*, and the *Jewish Chronicle*) in the weeks following his death stressed his contributions to sociology and his talents as a lecturer and teacher. His involvement with *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* and its editors was of very long standing. Maurice Freedman had influenced him when he was a student in the Department of Social Anthropology at the LSE and he paid a glowing tribute to him when he delivered the address at his funeral on 16 July 1975. His article based on his doctoral research was published in this Journal (vol. 4, no. 1, 1962): 'Alignments and Allegiances in the Community of Shaarayim in Israel'. He contributed book reviews and became a member of the Journal's Advisory Board. In 1980, when the World Jewish Congress decided that it could no longer support financially the Journal, Percy provided encouragement when it was decided to use the funds which Maurice Freedman had bequeathed to his wife in order to establish the Maurice Freedman Research Trust as an educational charity, which would be the publisher of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*. He became a trustee and

continued to advise on the merits of the numerous articles submitted for publication.

When Percy was a Professor at the LSE, he learnt that a younger colleague was indignant because the Anglo-Jewish organization which had sponsored her research in Israel had refused to publish the report which she had submitted: it was critical of Israel's educational system at the time. He read the script, concluded that the evidence it contained seemed factual and deserved publication, and he approached the Editor of this Journal, who agreed to publish the article. The author's talents later found reward when she was appointed the head of a college and subsequently she was given a life peerage.

On another occasion, the Managing Editor of this Journal (who had been herself a graduate student at the LSE) was approached by an old friend on behalf of a young girl who had obtained ten As when she sat for her A-level exams. She had confidently applied to the LSE, but her application had been refused; she had not even been called for an interview. The girl was now wondering whether the menial occupation of her grandfather had been a factor in her rejection. The Managing Editor, after checking that the student had indeed obtained such magnificent results at her examination, telephoned Percy Cohen who was then Dean of Undergraduate Studies to ask him to look into the matter because the very honour of the LSE was at stake if the word would spread that grandchildren of a working-class unskilled man were not acceptable as LSE students. He immediately enquired into the matter and discovered that a junior member of his staff — whose duty it was to sort out applications — had read a letter from the girl's headmistress which stated that her former pupil was quite unsuitable to be a university student (or words to that effect, for Percy revealed only the substance of the headmistress's 'reference'). It was later discovered that the woman did not wish her well-behaved pupils to become influenced by the rebellious LSE students.

The young girl was admitted after interview and was later short-listed for a prestigious LSE undergraduate prize. That occasion, and some others, led several LSE professors to regard with some reserve the references provided by headmasters and headmistresses.

Some of the newspaper obituaries stated that Percy Cohen had been very interested in psycho-analysis, having been on the couch himself, and had decided on his retirement in 1991 that he would write a book on the subject. He had apparently completed four chapters, when Alzheimer's disease made it impossible for him to continue. He was looked after at home for several years, with a carer, and retained his dignity and courtesy until the end, when he was placed in a well-run and most comfortable home in London, with his

own kind carer in attendance. He was regularly visited by his wife and daughters and by a few loyal friends.

Until two years before his death, he had many lucid intervals, recognized acquaintances in the street and spoke to them quite rationally — so that some were not aware of his illness. It was tragic to witness the very gradual deterioration of his mental faculties, and even more tragic that he was keenly aware of that deterioration.

There was a very large attendance at his funeral service; retired colleagues and old friends remembered him with great affection while one of his former secretarial assistants recalled the kindness he had shown to junior staff at the LSE. An active fund-raiser for the School said that Percy had made many donations to the institution with which he had been closely connected for more than four decades. He was also a generous friend and on at least one occasion he had offered to contribute to the cost of an expensive operation for a close friend whose financial situation he had at first believed to be precarious.

His friends and former colleagues in many countries will fondly remember his wit, his appreciation of good food and good wine, and the generous hospitality which he and his wife Ruth lavished on their guests, with great grace and good humour.

BOOK REVIEWS

FREDERICK E. COHEN, *The Jews in the Channel Islands During the German Occupation 1940–1945*, 128 pp., The Institute of Contemporary History and Wiener Library Ltd in association with the Jersey Jewish Congregation, London, 1998, n.p.

The first, and longer part, of this booklet deals with the fate of 'Jewish residents of the Channel Islands during the German Occupation' and is an extended version of a paper published in the *Journal of Holocaust Education* in 1997. The present publication — which includes in Part Two, 'Jewish Forced Labourers Transported to the Channel Islands during the German Occupation' — was issued in association with a memorial service held by the Jersey Jewish Congregation on 2 September 1998. That service was to remember the Jews who suffered and also to honour the islanders who helped Jews, in some cases at great risk to themselves.

The author, who is President of the Jersey Jewish Congregation, has based his study on surviving records as well as on a variety of other sources. It is not his fault that the second Part on the forced labourers, who probably amounted to many times the numbers of Jewish residents of the Islands under the Occupation, is so short and thin. The records of forced labour used by the Todt organization did not survive whereas there are plenty of records in the local archives about the Jews who were there when the Germans arrived in 1940.

Between October 1940 and January 1943 the German authorities issued 10 Orders affecting Jews, mild at first, merely requiring registration; gradually becoming more restrictive with businesses being taken compulsorily over by non-Jews (but post-war they were returned); the wearing of the yellow star; until the last ordered deportation of some people. It is not easy in this publication to establish how many Jews there were, partly because most were either married to non-Jews or were the children of such partnerships and were often brought up as Christians or at least had no connection with the Jewish community. Not that that mattered to the occupiers since the first 'Order relating to Measures against the Jews' of October 1940 defined as Jews not only those who belong or have belonged to the Jewish religion but those who have more than two Jewish grandparents. American Jews were exempt from that Order. Seven months later the definition was changed, and a Jew was defined as having at least three grandparents of pure Jewish blood.

After the first Order there were 12 Jews in Jersey, eight with non-Jewish spouses. On Guernsey there were four, and on Sark two who may or may not have been Jews. One, Annie Wranowsky, although she had a large 'J' on her documents, was able successfully to fight the authorities throughout the war, insisting that she was not Jewish. Yet towards the end of Part One we hear of other Jews, not previously mentioned, who were resident in Jersey during the Occupation. The ambiguity of the definition can be seen in the case of two women, French nationals, who were arrested for listening to a radio and inciting German troops to rebellion. They were sentenced to death but that was commuted to life imprisonment after the Bailiff and the Attorney General spoke on their behalf. It is unclear from the information given here whether they were Jews or not, but their graves are each marked with a Magen David.

The book is dedicated to the memory of Marianne Grunfeld, Auguste Spitz, and Therese Steiner who were the first to be deported, indeed were among the first Jews to be deported from Western Europe. Oddly, Grunfeld did not figure on the lists of those who registered in October 1940; she was dead at Auschwitz before the end of 1942. The other two did not survive the war. Others committed suicide.

The book is about the Jews but it does refer to other groups; about 2,000 non-indigenous people were deported from the Islands in September 1942 and February 1943, including some Jews. And most of the information in Part Two, on the forced labourers brought to the Islands, while concentrating on Jews, in fact says more about non-Jews. Many died in the terrible working and living conditions but it is not known how many Jews were among them. The prisoners and those who died are in the main anonymous but the graves of eight French Jews were found in Alderney. The British army erected a board in 1945 stating: 'Here lie the bodies of eight French nationals of the Jewish faith who died during the German Occupation 1941–1945'.

Apart from a record of the Jewish experience, the booklet has a little to say about the non-Jews who assisted Jews. Examples are given of such help but the provision of lists of British subjects to the Germans by the Jersey authorities is not made much of. Lists were supplied, said Clifford Orange — the Chief Aliens and Registration Officer (when questioned by the Allied Liberation Forces) — when the German authorities called for them. But when from September 1942 the purpose of the lists became obvious he refused to supply any more lists.

The book is written in the form of a chronological account and, especially in Part One, relies heavily on the available documents. These are mostly of an administrative type and do not make for

exciting reading. But there is good use of other sources which help to convey the actuality of life during the Occupation. A pity the proof-reading is not better.

HAROLD POLLINS

SETH FORMAN, *Blacks in the Jewish Mind: A Crisis of Liberalism*, x + 273 pp., New York University Press, New York, 1998, $35.00.

In an important sense the theme of this book is centred on one of the major questions of modern Jewish history. To what extent can Diaspora Jewry maintain a vibrant and continuing existence in the absence of pressures, whether negative ones like antisemitism or positive ones based on historical and religious traditions? In the past they have, in their various ways, provided the stimuli. The amount of — and the Jewish reaction to — antisemitism have changed since the Holocaust and the formation of the State of Israel. As the author puts it, after the Second World War American Jewry faced the question: 'what should constitute Jewish identity and distinctiveness when the walls of exclusion and prejudice come tumbling down?' (p. 104). This book, while including a discussion of antisemitism, especially Black antisemitism, in the USA, is really about the other determinant of Jewish survival.

The author refers to Arthur Hertzberg's view that the major cohesive force has been philanthropy. He quotes Hertzberg: 'During the last two centuries Jews who have been able to agree on nothing else have found it possible to construct a community in which all share equally, and as Jews, on the basis of overarching responsibility for less fortunate Jews' (p. 90). Related to that has been, broadly, American Jewry's commitment to liberal social policies, not least in favour of the civil and other rights of Black Americans. The recent inter-play between these two groups is the theme of the book but the author's description and analysis, while specific to time and place, can be usefully applied to other environments in the study of Jewish survival.

It is not necessarily the author's fault that this is a quite depressing book. Its content is the main culprit. The fact is familiar enough that relationships between Blacks and Jews in the USA have deteriorated in the last 30 years. Whereas Jews both individually and through the major Jewish organizations had been active in the civil rights movement, nowadays one is aware of bitter hostility between the two groups. The author, though, goes beyond that story. To him the earlier, close relationship was a mistake; it was to the long-term detriment of the Jewish community.

His argument goes as follows. For various reasons — to repeat — Jews in America have tended to support liberal causes and thus have

broadly aligned themselves with Blacks there, notably in the demand for the latter's civil rights. 'Jews' in this context means the major Jewish organizations but also the ideas of some of the significant Jewish thinkers in that country. Admittedly, that generalization has not applied to the Jews who lived in the southern States and who occupied an extraordinarily ambivalent position, described here in chapter two. They were white, and therefore part of the dominant section in a racist society; but they were Jews. They might therefore experience antisemitism — it was a Jew, Leo Frank, who in 1915 was the only white man in the south to have been lynched. On the other hand, the fundamentalist Christians of the south could also look upon the Jews favourably as People of the Book. The Jews, for their part, broadly adopted the views of the south as regards the status and aspirations of the Blacks, and this brought them into conflict with the liberal views of northern Jews. The author gives a special place to the Frank affair, since it caused American Jews (especially those from Eastern Europe) to empathize with Blacks who also suffered from mob violence.

Among the various themes in this book, one that runs throughout is the ambiguity among Jews about notions of universalism and particularism. Many Jewish ideas and practices are universalistic as they embrace all humanity but while that may be most laudable they can work against Jewish particularism — that is, the desire to maintain the Jewish group. Hertzberg, for example, made the point that the classic Jewish charitable response has been that 'we must take care of the poor who present themselves to us without regard to race, creed, or color' (p. 90). But this extension has resulted in Jewish charity becoming less of a solidifying agent among Jews.

That in essence is the basic message of this book, with special reference to developments among Blacks and their relationships with American Jews. For the latter the growth of Black self-confidence, not just in the civil rights movement but as exemplified by Black Power, posed a dilemma. Minorities, traditionally, could become part of American society through some form of integration, the old melting-pot idea. The ideal was to be an American whatever one's origin. But the demands of Black Power went against that. They wanted separation, not integration, and some leading Jews broadly went along with that view.

The author's approach is broadly chronological. Apart from the Introduction and the Conclusion, three of the five chapters (one of them on the Southern Jews) deal with the period from the end of the Second World War to the mid-1960s. Generalizations are suspect but this was a period of, at most, muted antisemitism and the height of Jewish liberalism and support for Black civil rights. Very usefully he refers to and quotes some of the ideas of leading Jewish publicists.

Take, for example, his chapter two: 'Jews and Racial Integration in the North, 1945–1966'. The movement of Blacks northwards had transformed race relations from being a mainly Southern question. He gives, inter alia, the views of Nathan Glazer and Irving Kristol about the vexed question whether Blacks could be seen as a special case or merely as another example of an American ethnic group. Forman summarizes their view that 'the problem for Blacks was not that they fell outside the ethnic pattern but that they had been so badly off within it that this had a lot to do with the perceived lack of a definable and distinct culture that could unite Blacks in a community based on self-help' (p. 80).

'Self-help' was not necessarily an individualistic attribute. On the contrary, it refers to communal efforts such as those of American Jewry in 'the establishment of settlement houses, Young Men's and Young Women's Hebrew Associations, family desertion bureaus, educational alliances, and job training agencies' (p. 80). There is no doubt that for Blacks such social organizations had been discouraged, apart from the ideas of Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey, and in any case in the post-1945 period their efforts were concentrated on pressing for legal equality rather than on communal self-improvement. Moreover the Black Muslims and Black Power emphasised race as a unifying theme, the very opposite of conventional notions of integration and of the American creed. This was anathema to Jewish writers on the subject.

Some of them welcomed the coincidental appearance in 1964 of Howard Brotz's, *The Black Jews of Harlem: Negro Nationalism and the Dilemma of Negro Leadership*, for it seemed to offer a route to moderate Black nationalism, away from extreme Black racialism. But in practice much of the discussion was overtaken by the events of the 1960s, not just the growth of Black Power and the left-wing reaction to the Vietnam War but also the Six-Day War. For now American Jewry was faced with a recrudescence of antisemitism. This time it came, not from the traditional right, but from the left and from the Blacks.

American-Jewish liberals, supporters of Black rights, were in a dilemma and it is very strange to read how some of them, quoted here — their traditional pro-Black views prevailing — made excuses for Black antisemitism. But there were also very practical problems that needed to be solved and the author identifies as 'the most serious conflict of all' the New York City teachers' strike of 1968 (p. 143). The background was the failure of Black children to benefit from consequences of the 1954 Supreme Court decision of *Brown v. Board of Education*. This had found that racial segregation in America's public (state) schools was unconstitutional. Black parents now began to turn against integration and instead to demand local control. But local

control of the schools faced the fact that the majority of teachers, principals, and administrators in New York City were Jews.

The strike of 1968 came about as an eventual result of one area of Brooklyn, Ocean Hill-Brownsville, being designated an experimental district for greater parental control. The area, once predominantly Jewish, was now almost entirely Black; the few whites included the teachers. The latter's union, the United Federation of Teachers, fearful that decentralisation would reduce the union's bargaining power, opposed the new system. The new Black administrator transferred 19 teachers from the district and 350 teachers walked out followed by strikes later on, which came to affect 900 schools, a million pupils, and 60,000 teachers and supervisors. In all, it was then the longest school strike in American history. A small local dispute became a conflict between a Black spokesman and the mainly Jewish teachers' union. Eventually the teachers won. Those who had been moved to another district got the right to return. But there had been a bitter conflict between Blacks and Jews, both sides being accused of racism. And there were other incidents — not least the practice of affirmative action — which exacerbated the growing differences and hostility between the two groups.

There have been other works on the subject of the deterioration of relationships between Blacks and Jews in America and Forman refers to them at the start of his book. Their titles betray the same dismal story of a once happier relationship: Jonathan Kaufman, *Broken Alliance: The Turbulent Times Between Blacks and Jews in America* (1988) and *What Went Wrong: The Creation and Collapse of the Black-Jewish Alliance* by Murray Friedman (1995). But while they bemoan the loss of the close association, in Forman's view the alliance was wrong and acted to the detriment of the Jews. His conclusion is that 'it is in some ways more difficult to be a Jew in the United States than it is to be Black' (p. 216).

This is an important book. It goes into the history of Black-Jewish relationships at greater depth than is customary and while clearly opposed to the liberal tradition among American Jews the author can be equally critical of the neo-conservatives: his chapter five, 'The Jew as Middleman: Jewish Opposition to Black Power, 1967–72', is about those who, inter alia, did not make excuses for Black antisemitism. The book is well produced and clearly written. While the evidence and the historical account and narrative are valuable and full of insights, there does seem to be rather a lot of it. On occasion one wonders why certain matters are being dealt with in one chapter rather than another. But these are minor quibbles. A more important consideration is that the book is so negative. One can understand the author's wish to attack what he considers to be a misguided historical tradition and he is right to point out where he thinks it went wrong.

But while ground-clearing is acceptable and necessary for new ideas to flourish it would have been helpful if he had imported some positive suggestions for the future of American Jewry, however tentative they might have been. Nevertheless, if the book leads to incisive discussion and action it will have performed a most essential function.

HAROLD POLLINS

VERONIQUE POIRIER, *Ashkénazes et Séfarades. Une étude comparée de leurs relations en France et en Israël (années 1950–1990)*, 312 pp., Les Editions du Cerf, Paris, 1998, 195 francs.

Dr Poirier has written a scholarly study, comparing the adaptation of Jews from Muslim countries (mainly from North Africa) who emigrated to France and to Israel in the four decades following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. In the Introduction, she states that the volume is largely based on her doctorate thesis (which she obtained in 1992). There is a long Preamble, where she at first gives the origins of the terms 'Sepharad' and 'Ashkenaz' and quotes from the *Encyclopedia Judaica* (1972, vol. 14, p. 1163): 'The term Sephardim is often erroneously used for other Jews of non-Ashkenazi origin'. She adds that this is how the term is generally used in Israel and she proceeds throughout the book to follow that usage.

The Preamble is informative about the history of the Jewish populations in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire and their various migrations. In matters of religious laws and practices, she notes the rigidity of Ashkenazim and the more tolerant attitude of the Sephardim; the latter quoted the adage *Minhag metabel Halakhah* — 'l'usage annule la règle', usage annuls the rule. That enabled Sephardim to interpret Jewish law in a more 'supple' manner so that religious principles could find accommodation in the context of daily life. Such divergences between Sephardim and Ashkenazim flowed from the codes published in the mid-sixteenth century by Joseph Caro (a Sepharad), *Shulhan Arukh*, and by Moses Isserles (an Ashkenaz), *Mappa*. There are also marked differences in synagogue liturgy and in the pronunciation of Hebrew and Dr Poirier rightly comments that although such matters may appear of secondary importance, they are in fact usages to which the various Jewish communities are deeply attached because they are for them important identifying characteristics.

Jews of Spanish origin ('authentic' Sephardim) will be disappointed that there are not more details about their old communities in Palestine — in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Safed, and Tiberias, for example — where Judeo-Spanish was spoken, as it was among the Sephardim in the Middle East and in many Mediterranean countries until the middle of the twentieth century and in some cases, to this day.

The author is concerned mainly with the contrast between the manner in which France and Israel received North African Jews during the waves of mass migration from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunis, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. The first wave came to Israel when the country was suffering from the aftermath of the War of Independence, when there were many food shortages and very limited housing. Most of the more educated and 'Europeanized' immigrants who had benefited from schooling at the establishments of the Alliance Française Universelle, in large part Algerians, went to France. The Ashkenazi establishment in Israel did not conceal its appalled reactions when faced with floods of new arrivals who had households containing a very large number of young children and adults who were unable to communicate either in Hebrew or in Yiddish. (In 1971, when there were riots by resentful North Africans — who had seen the recently-built adequate housing, which had been promised for them, given instead to the Romanian and Russian Jews who had only just arrived in Israel — it is alleged (pp. 121–22) that Golda Meir met their leaders but refused to allow them to stage a demonstration, and had deplored the fact that they could not speak Yiddish.)

North Africans were settled largely in 'development towns', with rudimentary housing, schools with indifferent teachers, and few amenities. Their children were encouraged to go to vocational schools rather than to enter the academic stream. There was some truancy and Moroccans acquired a reputation for violent criminal behaviour because some delinquents wielded knives. In an interview published in *Le Monde* of 9 March 1966, Ben-Gurion is quoted as declaring: 'We do not want to see Israelis become Arabs. It is our duty to fight against the Levantine spirit which corrupts individuals and societies', while on 14 September 1966 the writer Shimon Hazaz stated in the Israeli Hebrew daily, *Maariv*: 'We must bring European culture to these communities. We cannot walk backward and adopt the culture of the Yemen, of Morocco, or of Iraq' (p. 75).

In France, however, the North African immigrants found assistance both from the state and from French Jewry. Most of them were familiar with the French language and they did not have to learn to speak and to write modern Hebrew. Within a generation, they showed remarkable upward mobility: from 8.7 to 24.4 per cent were in liberal professions within 20 years, and these were successful in their integration among the French middle class, while remaining faithful to their Judaism. A Moroccan student was elected president of the Union of Jewish Students of France while another man of Moroccan descent took over the management of the Appel Unifié Juif de France. The present Grand Rabbin de France, Joseph Sitruk, is a non-Ashkenazi Jew, as was his immediate predecessor, René-Samuel Sirat

(p. 140) — while the first female rabbi of France, in the Liberal Movement, is from a North African family, as is the head of that Movement.

The epic Six-Day War of 1967 gave the Jews of France a profound pride in their Jewish identity and in the Jewish State; thousands made *aliyah* and they actively sought to be of assistance to the disadvantaged North Africans who had come to Israel in the 1950s and early 1960s. On the other hand, after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and the resultant harsh economic conditions in Israel, many North Africans left the country to go to France where they hoped to find the success which their North African 'cousins' now enjoyed, and where they also hoped to have easier encounters with French Ashkenazim.

In Israel, the North African immigrants and their children did eventually achieve some upward mobility and could benefit from the fact that they came later to constitute more than half the total population of the country. A few obtained senior positions in the cabinet and their adherence to religious parties helped to give them some authority in national politics. One of the principal hopes for more cordial relations between them and the Ashkenazi population is the increasing number of what is called there 'mixed marriages' — that is, unions between Jewish spouses, one of whom is of European/American descent while the other is of 'African/Asian' origin.

On the other hand, the recent immigration of very large numbers of Russian Jews has had the effect of diminishing the percentage of Israelis of North African origin; and whereas in France *all* Jews are united under one rabbinate, Israel has an Ashkenazi and a Sephardi rabbinate. Meanwhile, Dr Poirier notes in her conclusion, a new Diaspora has been emerging, that of Israelis who have settled in Europe and in America. However, the establishment of the State of Israel has meant that all Jewish Diasporas everywhere now have a '*patrie mère*', a motherland ready to welcome them if they should need a refuge.

It is most regrettable that such a scholarly volume does not have an Index.

JUDITH FREEDMAN

CHRONICLE

In September 1999 (at the end of the Jewish year 5759), the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel reported that the country's population was 6,145,000. Nearly four-fifths (79 per cent) were Jews; almost one million (922,000) were Muslims — representing 15 per cent of the total; and the remaining six per cent (376,000) were Druze, Christians, or are listed as following 'no religion' in the Population Registry. The Jewish population has reached almost five million: 4,847,000. There were 63,500 new immigrants with the majority (86 per cent) from the countries of the former Soviet Union.

In the course of the year ending in September 1999, there was a population increase of some 147,000 (2.4 per cent). More than half of that increase (61 per cent) was due to natural increase — the number of births exceeding that of deaths.

In April 1999, when the Central Bureau of Statistics reported on the population of the country, on the fifty-first anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel, the Institute of Contemporary Jewish Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem had noted that Israeli Jews now accounted for 36 per cent of world Jewry and that in 1948, the year of Israeli Independence, the 650,000 Jews in the country constituted only six per cent of the world's Jews. The Institute also stated that half of all Jews under the age of five years now live in Israel, as do 43 per cent of those in the age group five to 15.

*

It was reported last July that the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel published data concerning new immigrants who came to settle in Israel in the 1990s; 376,000 are of working age and some 36,000 (or 9.6 per cent) were unemployed and actively seeking work in the first quarter of 1999. The unemployment rate for non-immigrants during the same period was only slightly lower: 8.2 per cent.

About 22 per cent of new immigrants are scientists, academics, or occupied in the liberal professions; 30 per cent are skilled workers; 19 per cent are in the service sector; 10 per cent are office workers; and the remainder are unskilled.

*

In August 1999 the Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews published a Report of Community Statistics for 1998. The Unit estimated that there were approximately 2,663 Jewish births in Great Britain in 1997. That total represents a decrease of eight per cent over the previous year; the overall downward trend has persisted since 1991. The total number of synagogue marriages recorded in 1998 was 921 — 65 fewer than in 1997, or a decrease of 6.6 per cent. 'As in recent years, the number of

Union of Orthodox marriages has increased whilst there has been a reduction in the number of Central Orthodox marriages. Similarly, a decrease in Reform and Liberal marriages reflects a downward trend.'

There were 233 completed religious divorces (*gittin*) — the same number as in 1997. The Report stresses that the figures 'do *not* indicate *levels of divorce* in the community, nor do annual variations necessarily indicate recent breakdown of marriage, because some applications for a *get* take many years to process'.

The number of burials and cremations under Jewish auspices in 1998 was 3,910, a decrease of 160 (or four per cent) over the 1997 total of 4,070. This decline was evident across all synagogue groupings and was proportionally most marked amongst the Reform (9.7 per cent).

*

The Spring 1999 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that according to the annual report on world-wide antisemitism — published by one of the University's Institutes, in co-operation with the World Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League — antisemitic incidents in 1998 'were more violent and caused more damage than in previous years .... Moreover, 1998 witnessed outbursts of violence in countries hitherto quiet in this respect: Greece, Serbia, Uruguay and South Africa. . . . In South America there was an extreme right and neo-Nazi activity.' A synagogue in Novosibirsk (Siberia) was vandalized: 'Torah scrolls were thrown on the floor and swatikas and Nazi slogans sprayed on the walls. The local police described the incident as "a prank committed by kids on the rampage". Russia's Chief Rabbi said that the attack "highlighted the indifference of the authorities" '.

That issue of *Tel Aviv University News* also states that an agreement was concluded between Tel Aviv University and the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TÜBITAK) to award one-year study fellowships to 10 doctoral and post-doctoral students from Turkish universities to study at Tel Aviv University; it will cover the entire range of academic subjects available. This is in addition to a bilateral cultural and scientific agreement between the two countries; Tel Aviv University teachers have been lecturing in Turkish universities and three Turkish graduate students are following courses in the Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies of Tel Aviv University.

*

A Learning Centre for the Blind has been inaugurated at Tel Aviv University. The Centre is specially equipped with computer software for enlarging visual material and scanning texts, 'and a workstation for totally blind students with a computerized "reader" which scans texts in English and reads them out loud'.

*

The May 1999 issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance israélite universelle* states that the Alliance's kindergarten and primary school in Brussels, Beth Aviv, celebrated its twentieth anniversary in November 1998. Beth Aviv has 160

pupils — aged from two to 12 years — and aims to provide a high standard of academic instruction together with the teaching of the Hebrew language and of Jewish traditions.

A newly-established Eretz Alliance School in Los Angeles has a kindergarten and a Sunday School; it will have primary classes in the next academic year and a Talmud Torah. The school held its first Hannukah party for the children and their parents at the end of 1998.

The *Cahiers* also report that the first Masorti congregation of France, Adath Shalom, was established in Paris in 1991, as the result of a rift in the Liberal Movement of France. Adath Shalom has a membership of about one hundred households and maintains two Talmude-Torah. Its rabbi is quoted as saying that the Masorti Movement is moderate and is open to modernity. It is in favour of the emancipation of Jewish women in the synagogue: they are given a position equal to that of men. The motto of the Masorti congregation of France is 'Tradition and change'.

This issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance* also includes a history of the Jews of Tetouan (pp. 26–37), with numerous illustrations, including one of three members of a family who left the city and emigrated to Venezuela, where they were photographed in 1905, dressed in elegant traditional costumes.

*

The Institute for Jewish Policy Research, in London, published last September — in association with the Kaplan Centre of the University of Cape Town — a report entitled *Jews of the 'new South Africa': highlights of the 1998 national survey of South African Jews*. The 1998 survey was based on a 'nationally representative sample of 1,000 adult respondents'; 536 women and 464 men, with a median age of 45, were interviewed. The majority (87 per cent) were born in South Africa and 94 per cent were South African citizens; 650 lived in Johannesburg, 250 in Cape Town, 50 in Pretoria, and 50 in Durban.

'The general profile shows a population group that is well educated, with 35 per cent having achieved a minimum of a university degree. Half the economically active population are in professional or managerial occupations. . . . The majority of the respondents in the survey feel strongly about their Jewishness, with 49 per cent feeling "extremely conscious of being Jewish" and 41 per cent feeling "quite strongly Jewish" '.

Nearly all adult males (94 per cent) and three-quarters of the adult females (77 per cent) had received some form of Jewish education while a majority of the children 'currently attend Jewish day schools at both the primary and secondary levels'.

The majority of the respondents are Orthodox; 39 per cent stated that they went to synagogue every week and 91 per cent that they fasted on Yom Kippur. Slightly more than half (54 per cent) felt strongly attached and 33 per cent were moderately attached to Israel while '79 per cent have visited Israel at least once (as compared to 37 per cent of American Jews)'.

Only a small proportion of the respondents (12 per cent) said that they were very likely to emigrate within the next five years — half of them giving the reason as fear of crime or personal safety. The authors of the Report conclude their summary of key points by stating that the responses they

received 'point to a cohesive community . . . in the final analysis, South African Jewry remains religiously and communally vibrant, highly skilled and well qualified to assist in the development of a democratic South Africa'.

*

The Jewish Museum, London's Museum of Jewish Life, is holding an exhibition entitled '"The Jewish Dickens": Israel Zangwill and the Wanderers of Kilburn' from 3 November 1999 to 14 March 2000. The press release states:

'Israel Zangwill (1864–1926) was a towering literary figure and an active campaigner of political causes such as pacifism, Zionism and women's suffrage. He was a prolific writer of books, plays, short stories, and journalism. . . . He was a well-known figure in London's literary scene, and friend among others of George Bernard Shaw and Jerome K. Jerome. . . . In his play *The Melting Pot* he coined a phrase that has passed into the English language. He was as well known in America as he was in Britain, and President Roosevelt himself attended the opening night of *The Melting Pot*. . . . A lively programme of talks and events will accompany the exhibition including the premiere of a new play about Eleanor Marx Aveling and her friendship with Zangwill.'

The Jewish Museum is at 129–131 Albert Street, Camden Town, London, NW1 7NB. For bookings and information, please write to that address or telephone 0171-284 1997.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Judith Tydor Baumel, *Double Jeopardy: Gender and the Holocaust*, xix + 292 pp., Vallentine Mitchell, London and Portland, Oregon, 1999, £37.50 or $49.50 (paperback, £18.50 or $25.00).

Roberta Rosenberg Farber and Chaim I. Waxman, eds., *Jews in America. A Contemporary Reader*, xi + 425 pp., Brandeis University Press, published by the University Press of New England, Hanover, N.H. and available from Plymbridge Distributors, Estover Plymouth, 1999, £17.95 (paperback).

Paul Benjamin Gordiejew, *Voices of Yugoslav Jewry*, xvi + 479 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1999, n.p.

Yossi Katz, *The Religious Kibbutz Movement in the Land of Israel, 1930–1948*, 358 pp., The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 1999, n.p.

Hyam Maccoby, *Ritual and Morality. The Ritual Purity System and its Place in Judaism*, xii + 231 pp., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, £37.50 or $59.95.

Jacob Neusner and Tamara Sonn, *Comparing Religions Through Law: Judaism and Islam*, xii + 263 pp., Routledge, London and New York, 1999, £16.99 (paperback).

Jonathan Pearl and Judith Pearl, *The Chosen Image. Television's Portrayal of Jewish Themes and Characters*, ix + 259 pp., McFarland & Co., Jefferson, N.C. and London, 1999, available from Shelwing Ltd, 4 Pleydell Gardens, Folkestone, Kent, £39.15.

Maria Piussi, ed., *Presto apprendere, tardi dimenticare: l'educazione ebraica nell'Italia contemporanea*, 303 pp., Franco Angeli, Milan, 1998, n.p.

Mordechai Sarig, ed., *The Political and Social Philosophy of Ze'ev Jabotinsky. Selected Writings* (translated by Shimshon Feder), xxvii + 162 pp., Vallentine Mitchell, London and Portland, Oregon, 1999, £27.50 or $45.00 (paperback, £15.00 or $22.50).

Dan Urian and Efraim Karsh, eds., *In Search of Identity. Jewish Aspects in Israeli Culture*, iv + 284 pp., Frank Cass, London and Portland, Oregon, 1999, £18.00 or $25.00 (hardback, £35.00 or $49.50).

Stephen J. Zipperstein, *Imagining Russian Jewry. Memory, History, Identity*, xii + 139 pp., University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 1999, $14.95 (hardback, $30.00).

Foklore juif, no. 44 of *Cahiers de littérature Orale*, 266 pp., special issue co-ordinated by Dan Ben Amos, publié sous les auspices de l'Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales, Publications Langues'O, 2, rue de Lille, Paris, 1999, 92 francs.

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