

ANTISEMITISM
REPORT
2019-2020





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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The pattern of antisemitism that can be identified in Hungary is different from that in Western European countries both in number and composition. The number of cases is considerably lower than in Western Europe, and within this, it should be emphasised that the number of physical atrocities is extremely low. At the same time, antisemitism is present in everyday life, which is discussed in this report under the categories of conspiracy theories, hate speech, and antisemitism in public life.
- In 2019, a total of 53 cases were registered by the Security Service of Mazsahisz, and in 2020, a total of 70 incidents. The figures, if the previous years are also considered, show a steady increase since 2015.
- In the already-low case numbers of physical atrocities and vandalism, the number of cases declined further between 2019 and 2020, which is presumably also due to the fact that as a result of restrictions due to the corona virus, the possibility of incidents of this type has also decreased compared to the previous year.
- At the same time, hate speech, conspiracy theories, and the category referred to as antisemitism in public life, increased between 2019 and 2020. The increase in cases requiring verbal and non-physical space (articles, comments, online hate speech, etc.) is presumably also partly due to the “confinement” caused by the virus. On the other hand, the increase in the number of cases in these categories may also be related to the crisis caused by the coronavirus, the resulting tensions of which often trigger aggression against various communities.

- In both years, the highest number of cases was recorded within the hate speech category; there were 20 cases in 2019 and 31 cases in 2020. In both years, the use of the swastika and the Star of David stand out in relation to symbols connected to hate speech; the latter in pejorative sense, when “marking” persons perceived to be Jews or buildings associated with Jewry. The increase of over 50% in hate speech cases in 2020 is presumably due to the increased tensions caused by the epidemic.
- In the two years under review, one of the most common perpetrators of antisemitic incidents was the Our Homeland party, which employed hate speech several times through both its thematic events and its speeches at these events.
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- The second category, with only slightly fewer cases than in case of hate speech, is antisemitism in public life, with 20 incidents recorded by the Security Service of Mazsahisz in 2019, and 29 in 2020. During these two years, some subcategories within this category were over-represented; cases related to the one-sided presentation of certain historical events of concern to Jewry and the cases of symbolic or literal recognition of openly antisemitic, far-right historical figures or “contemporary” individuals. In these cases, the current government and the pro-government media appear as actors in an overproportionate manner. The relatively high number of cases belonging to the category of antisemitism in public life indicates that antisemitism is being normalised in public life, becoming part of the mainstream discourse.
- With regard to conspiracy theories, two of the four theories appeared in 2019 and two of the three topics in 2020 are “localised” versions of an international theory, which is a good illustration of the global nature of antisemitic conspiracy

theories. It is evident from the data that in 2020, the coronavirus provided further “fuel” for conspiracy theories.

- Registered cases were inevitably affected by both Hungarian and foreign political events. An example of the former is the 2019 municipal elections and some by-elections, which were surrounded by antisemitic incidents; for the latter, the US presidential election and the related QAnon conspiracy theory in 2020, which has enthusiastic followers in Hungary as well.
- There are recurring events and themes that define public discourse from time to time and fall within the scope of antisemitism. One such event in 2019 and 2020 was the far-right event honouring the troops who broke out from besieged Buda Castle, referred to as Breakout day, which became an internationally prominent event for the far right. A recurring theme is George Soros, against whom, a campaign which has been going on for years to a greater or lesser extent, also contains certain elements of antisemitic stereotypes and conspiracy theories¹.
- It can be stated that in Hungary, anti-Israel sentiment is still primarily typical of the far right. Cases of this category are closely related to ‘classical’ conspiracy theories, namely that Israel intends to buy or to colonise Hungary.

1) The mention of the name of George Soros in connection with the issue of migration to Europe is also given as an example in the Handbook for the practical use of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism, in the part where it discusses cases that qualify as antisemitism according to the working definition. Handbook for the practical use of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism, <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d3006107-519b-11eb-b59f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>

- Many of the cases in the physical space took place in rural locations, where the Jewish community barely survived, with only some public buildings and monuments as reminders of former Jewish communities. Most cases are verbal abuses that mostly take place online.
- Of course, social media is a prominent location for antisemitic incidents, most notably incidents in the category of conspiracy theories and hate speech.
- Like the cases themselves, their perpetrators are difficult to categorise on the basis of a variety of socio-demographic variables, i.e. antisemitic acts tend not to be connected to certain well-definable social groups.

INTRODUCTION

The starting point for combating antisemitism is to define it appropriately. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism², which was also adopted by Hungary in 2019 as a legally non-binding document, provides an excellent basis for this. A Handbook published by the European Commission in 2021 provides additional guidance to the practical application of the working definition³.

2) International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, Working Definition of Antisemitism, <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism>

3) Handbook for the practical use of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism, <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d3006107-519b-11eb-b59f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>

Mazsihisz uses the IHRA definition in its data collection, which allows the data to be compared with antisemitic phenomena observed in other countries. This was also highlighted in the OSCE Conference on Antisemitism held in February 2021, where the importance of publishing country-specific aggregates was emphasised, inter alia, by speakers⁴. **At the same time, it is important to emphasise that there are country- and region-specific characteristics⁵, that are also to be considered in order to properly interpret the phenomena experienced in the given context.** These specifics will be discussed separately during the analysis.

As several analyses have pointed out, the year 2020 brought a difference from our usual lives in several respects, which was largely related to the worldwide spread of Covid19. **The virus and the closely-related global economic downturn also provided new “fuel” for antisemitic conspiracy theories⁶, which also appeared in Hungary.** In the analysis below, these local and global factors will also be briefly addressed, comparing them to the previous year, 2019.

Following the report on antisemitism, a survey commissioned by Mazsihisz of the Medián Opinion and Market Research Ltd. is included in this document, which was conducted in November-December 2019 on the relationship of the Hungarian society to Jewry. We believe that the joint presentation of the general attitudes of the entire Hungarian population towards Jews and the registered antisemitic incidents provides a sufficiently comprehensive picture of the period under review, therefore, they are published together.

4) OSCE conference explores combating antisemitism, <https://fra.europa.eu/en/event/2021/osce-conference-explores-combating-antisemitism>

5) Barna, Ildikó and Félix, Anikó. *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries*. Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute, 2017.

6) <https://wjc-org-website.s3.amazonaws.com/horizon/assets/3yqx8bza/myths-r6-final.pdf>

METHODOLOGY AND TERMINOLOGY

The data in the report were collected by the Security Service of Mazsihisz in course of its monitoring activities:

- open, online data from news sites and social media;
- by collecting information from gentiles and Jewish community members submitted to Mazsihisz;
- with a summary of the cases collected and recorded by the staff of the Security Service of Mazsihisz.

Mazsihisz distinguishes 6 types of antisemitic incidents during data collection:

- Physical attack
- Threat
- Vandalism
- Hate speech
- Antisemitic conspiracy theories
- Antisemitism in public life

Most of the categories are based on the IHRA work definition. While the first three categories may not need to be defined separately, for the second three categories, it is important to explain their exact meaning more precisely. The category of **hate speech** includes cases that can be interpreted as hate speech, i.e. “incitement against a community” (to violence) according to the current Criminal Code. It is important that often there is an overlap between the categories of vandalism and hate speech (for example, when a swastika is painted on a public monument), therefore, the distinction between the two categories is based on whether there was a proven bias antisemitic motive to vandalism. If so, this is reported in the hate

speech category, even though vandalism also materialises. Of course, there are incidents beyond these that can be classified into several categories; these cases will be indicated in the analysis.

Within the category of hate speech, three subcategories, or subtypes are distinguished: 1) Placing a swastika or other intimidating symbol, incitement text, drawing, caricature in public spaces, institutions and buildings; 2) The use of inciting symbols or texts against the Jews or persons perceived to be Jewish; 3) The perpetrator is known, i.e. what person or organisation the incident that falls into the category of hate speech can be linked to. These categories are not mutually exclusive and there are crossovers between the subcategories of course, as there are cases where both the perpetrator and the target person / group of hate speech are known.

Mazsihisz uses the IHRA’s working definition as the basis for defining **antisemitic conspiracy theories**, which is defined as follows: *“making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.”* However, this definition is complemented by the inclusion of cases, which are based on antisemitic stereotypes of this type, without, however, explicitly stating the word “Jew”, that is, implement a kind of coded antisemitism⁷. In this category, two subtypes are distinguished: 1) Global conspiracy theory or its “Hungarianised” version; 2) Conspiracy theories specifically responding to a Hungarian (historical or contemporary) event.

7) Ruth, Wodak. “Suppression of the Nazi Past, Coded Languages, and Discourses of Silence: Applying the Discourse-Historical Approach to Post-War Anti-Semitism in Austria” *In Political Languages in the Age of Extremes*, Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), 351–379. Oxford: OUP, 2011.

The **category of antisemitism in public life** includes antisemitic content formulated by or shared by public actors. This may include antisemitic content published by politicians, actors of the legal and public administration system, and academia⁸. **The latter category includes cases which, while not fulfilling the concept of hate speech, are offensive to the Jewish community. Thus, it is intended to illustrate the extent to which antisemitism appears and is normalised in everyday public discourse.** Within the category, the following subtypes are distinguished: 1) Symbolic acts and statements of concern in terms of historical authenticity; 2) Emergence and publication of far-right ideas, persons and organisations in public life, in mainstream discourse; 3) Manifestation of conspiracy theories in public life; 4) Anti-Israel manifestations; 5) Other types of antisemitism in public life.

Incident categorization:

Physical attack

Threat

Vandalism

Hate speech

- Swastika or other intimidating symbol, incitement text, drawing, caricature
- Use of inciting symbols or texts against Jews or persons perceived to be Jewish
- Perpetrator is known

8) Public servant “is any person, who exercises public power or was designated for a position entailing the exercise of public power and who forms or formed the political public opinion pursuant to his task.” <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a0300003.tv>

Conspiracy theories

- Global theory or its Hungarian version
- Conspiracy theories specifically responding to a Hungarian (historical or contemporary) event

Antisemitism in public life

- Symbolic acts and statements of concern in terms of historical authenticity
- Emergence and publication of far-right ideas, persons and organisations in public life, in mainstream discourse
- Manifestation of conspiracy theories in public life
- Anti-Israel manifestations
- Other types of antisemitism in public life

ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS BY TYPE

PHYSICAL ATTACK

Regarding physical atrocities, as stated in the executive summary, the situation is considerably better in Hungary than in many other European countries. According to the data, there was one physical attack in 2019 and not even directly against the Jewish community. On February 9th, 2019, as in previous years, a series of extreme-right events **honouring the troops who broke out from besieged Buda Castle**, dubbed Breakout Day or the Day of Honour, was held under the leadership of the far-right organisation Légio Hungária, which is one of the largest far-right parades in Europe every year. The event itself will also be discussed under the category of hate speech due to the totalitarian symbols displayed there, however, physical atrocity could also be documented that year, as men dressed in black suits attacked protesters. Several people were hit, and one was pushed against the wall by unknown extremists.

In 2020, no physical atrocities were recorded, which is not an exceptionally low value due to the generally low number of cases. However, it is conceivable that the epidemic and associated curfew restrictions contributed to this, given that the absolute number of contacts also decreased significantly.

THREATS

In 2019, the Mazsihisz system recorded four cases belonging to the category of threat. In June, one of zsidó.com's shared links on Facebook received a bomb threat from a Facebook page. The site of the attack was named as the Chabad Centre, opposite the Dohány Street Synagogue. Cooperation with the authorities began in connection with the threat, and the Action and Protection Foundation filed a report.

There were several far-right attacks against the Auróra club during the year. For the first time in September, a group led by the far-right Budaházy syblings, "paid a visit" to the club at an LGBT event to protest against "gay propaganda". On October 23, Légió Hungária broke away from a pre-announced march and carried out a spectacular action in front of the closed Auróra club. Participants in the action burned a gay pride flag and painted logos and placed signs on the wall. The group marched dressed in T-shirts with the Légió Hungária logo and black uniform. There were around 400 people, including children. The attack on Auróra was condemned by the district mayor, and the club filed a complaint after the action. In the following weeks, the club was under reinforced police protection. Nevertheless, in November, a far-right paramilitary organisation called the Outlaws' Army also visited Auróra and placed stickers containing threatening messages on the wall.

The club is well known to have a Jewish manager and is operated by the Marom Budapest Jewish Foundation. Auróra is also home to several other NGOs, including Budapest Pride and the Roma Press Centre, making it a "perfect" target for far-right organisations. Although the specific attacks (excluding the Outlaws' Army action) were against the LGBT community, the series of assaults against Auróra can be considered an antisemitic incident according to the IHRA working definition, as the Marom, which operates it, is a Jewish youth organisation, so, the target of the attack is "linked to Jews".⁹ If the attacks are compared with similar, but more serious, life-threatening international cases,¹⁰ it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that they also have an ideological pattern. These incidents are related to a typical antisemitic conspiracy theory, in which Jews (or a "background power") is held responsible for various trends, most notably supporting or even triggering migration or putting different ethnic or sexual minorities, disadvantaged groups "at an advantage" against the majority society. In this sense, a kind of parallelism can be identified in the attacks against Jewish communities that are involved in human rights activism.

9) International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, Working Definition of Antisemitism, <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/hu/resources/working-definitions-charters/az-antisemitizmus-ihra-altal-elfogadott-munkadefinicioja>

10) For example, a person who shot and killed several people at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh posted on his social media page that he could not allow "intruders" to enter his country, referring to the joint refugee protection group of HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society) and the Tree of Life Synagogue. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/pittsburgh-shooting-suspect-posted-online-about-hias-agency-known-work-n925391>

In 2020, three cases were recorded in this category by the Security Service. In connection with Breakout Day events already discussed in the physical attack category, the webpage called vadhajtások.hu also published a picture, on which people with obscured faces dressed in black hold flags that were taken from physically assaulted young protesters. The title of the post: *“This is our first warning: We will not be threatened by foreign anti-fascists.”*



Source: <https://hirhugo.hu/2019/02/09/bunyo-volt-budan-a-fidesz-kozeli-szelsoseges-vadhajtások-csoport-megtamadta-az-antifasiszta-tuntetoket/>



Also in February, a security guard at Liszt Ferenc Airport threatened and Jew-baited a taxi driver, which the taxi driver videotaped. The security guard was fired with immediate effect. On June 3rd, 2020, a man pictured below attempted to enter the Israeli Cultural Institute – this failed due to the security protocol used by the MAZSIHISZ Security Service – then he called the reception on the street intercom and said: “Jews, Jews, you will die!”, before leaving the scene prior to further opportunities for action.

VANDALISM

Five vandalism cases were recorded by the Mazsihisz security service in 2019 and two in 2020. Here again, it is important to mention that there are several cases “complemented” by explicit hate speech, which is discussed in the analysis of that category. The decrease in the number of cases in 2020 is presumably partly due to epidemiological restrictions in this category as well.

It can be stated that all these cases, in both years, are crimes committed against institutions, public monuments and statues specifically related to Jews. In 2019, the first recorded case in this category was the theft of a cast iron Menorah in front of the Synagogue in Szombathely. Police initiated proceedings on suspicion of theft, but it is unclear whether it was an incident with antisemitic motives. However, the suspicion may be reinforced by the fact

that the glass panel of the building of the Szombathely Community was broken a month and a half before this case.¹¹ The next incident of vandalism occurred in July 2019, when “love padlocks” were placed on the Holocaust memorial titled *Shoes on the Danube Bank* created by film director Can Togay and Kossuth Prize-winning sculptor Gyula Pauer¹². This world-famous monument has fallen victim to this modern form of self-expression, which was thus damaged presumably not by antisemitic motive but by ignorance.

In August, the *Living Memorial (Eleven Emlékmű)* in Szabadság Square was damaged twice in one week; it was erected by citizens commemorating the victims of the Holocaust, in protest against the monument to the victims of the German occupation created by Péter Raab Párkányi, considered by many to be a forgery of history. Furthermore, an event that took place in September also fits into this pattern, when the freshly laid Stolpersteine stones (stumbling blocks) in Hajdúszoboszló were smashed. This is an artwork of the German sculptor Gunter Demnig, commemorating the victims murdered in the Holocaust in several countries. The stumbling blocks honouring four members of the Aufferber family killed either in forced labour camps or in Auschwitz were damaged at dawn the morning after its inauguration.

In September 2020, two cases were recorded by the Security Service of Mazsihisz, in which Jewish-related facilities were damaged. First, the Holocaust memorial in Zalaegerszeg was damaged, where an unknown perpetrator cut off the Menorah and threw it away. A police report was made. Then, three tombs were knocked down and smashed in the Jewish cemetery in Kecel, and another

¹¹) In that case, the perpetrators were identified based on surveillance camera footages and were caught in a matter of days.

¹²) Such padlocks are usually placed by couples at tourist attractions, thus proving their love to each other.

nearby tomb was contaminated with human faeces. The municipality maintaining the cemetery and the caretaker of the graves filed a report with the police.

HATE SPEECH

Within the cases of the hate speech, several subcategories are distinguished. One of the subcategories is placing a swastika or other intimidating symbols, incitement text, drawing, caricature in public spaces, institutions and buildings. Five of these subtypes were recorded by the Security Service in 2019. Two were in locations outside Budapest: in July, a swastika was painted on the wall of the Synagogue in Tapolca, which currently serves as a cultural centre, and on the nearby Fidesz office; in December, the Jewish memorial in Makó was vandalized with the inscription “Jews are murderers”. Another three incidents took place in Budapest: In July, someone wrote on the Roma Holocaust Memorial on Nehru Bank “*Fags, Paedophiles and George Soros belong in gas chambers*”, In September, the Star of David was painted on the corner of Andrásy road and Kertész street, and in October, unidentified persons tried to set fire to a poster of the ARC exhibition and wrote “*the Holocaust was funny, too*”.

The other subcategory is the use of inciting symbols or texts against the Jew or persons perceived to be Jewish. This happened in January 2019 with a poster depicting two public figures, singer Zsuzsa Koncz and writer Miklós Vámos, on which a Star of David was drawn. Later, in the second half of the year, two similar cases occurred during the municipal elections; In September, first the poster of the joint opposition candidate in the 3rd district of Budapest, Dr. László Kiss, was marked with the Star of David by unknown perpetrators, then in the 7th district a hanging Star of David

was drawn on several campaign posters of the joint opposition candidate Tamás Borka-Szász. In November, there was hate speech against two journalists working for the Index independent news portal at the time. Posters depicting Gábor Miklósi and András Dezső in front of the Israeli flag were placed in several locations of Budapest with the caption “We have also come from beyond the border”, and underneath “Index - Constant whining, latent anti-Hungarian propaganda, treason”. Furthermore, in the same month, several members of the Jewish community received threatening messages on their social media profiles. In August of the same year, there was also an incident where hate speech took place “face to face”: Ádám Vay, the cantor of Nyíregyháza was walking with a companion when they became victims of an atrocity, in which five young people on bicycles first incited each other, then, made statements suitable for inciting hatred in their direction and addressed to the Jews generally; they chanted, spat, and even expressed their disapproval with Nazi salute. Shortly afterwards, the dozen police officers who arrived at the synagogue issued an arrest warrant against the perpetrators based on the available information and camera footage.

The third subcategory type is, when it is known to what person or organisation the incident that falls into the category of hate speech can be connected. This category includes incidents such as the picture taken in January, at the wedding of Tamás Sneider, ex-Jobbik party politician now independent MP, where his wife greeted the gathering with a Nazi salute; or the incident calling Péter Jakab, President of the Jobbik Party, “Jacob” multiple times on Echo TV, and in February, the statement of Tibor Nagy, the mayor of Tiszaeszlár and president of the MIÉP party, that the Maccabi games should be boycotted. Also in February, at the Day of Honour event commemorating the breakout discussed above; **based on photo evidence, several people participated with armbands, iron crosses, and Nazi tattoos containing banned totalitarian symbols. On the**

memorial hike following the commemoration, a German group raised a Nazi flag in the forests of Buda.




Source: https://index.hu/kultur/eletmod/2019/02/11/nemet_neonacikkal_meneteltem_a_kitores_turan/

In August, at the Dorog - MTK football game, Dorog fans showed the Sieg Heil rarely experienced since the 1990s. In September, first a well-known activist, Márton Gulyás, was called a Jew when handing out food to the poor, then the president of the Magyar Solymász Egyesület (Hungarian Falconers Association), István Prágay, named German Chancellor Andrea Merkel Jewish in social media. In October, an EMIH (Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation) event was filmed in Madách Square, which was later used on the Internet to produce videos suitable for incitement to hatred. In November, as part of the antisemitic incitement against the journalists mentioned above, András Dezső was portrayed on the 888.hu news portal with a hook-nosed, antisemitic caricature.

In May 2020, the subcategory damage to public monuments and buildings with hate speech inscriptions included repeated damage to the Roma Holocaust Memorial on the Nehru Quay. In addition to the inscription “Gypsy extermination - crime extermination”,

Ildikó Bangóné Borbély Member of Parliament for MSZP (Socialist Party) was insulted. Also in May, unidentified persons drew swastikas on the sidewalk of one of the streets in Csepel's. In June, in the 13th District of Budapest, at the corner of Gyula Hegedűs and Miklós Radnóti Streets, a swastika was drawn on a poster advertising the Maimonidész English-Hungarian Bilingual Jewish Secondary School. In the same month, a swastika was painted on the fence of the property at Rákóczi street 41 in Debrecen; the perpetrator is unknown. In May, unidentified persons drew swastikas on the wall of the Synagogue in Gyöngyös. Furthermore, the painting of the following inscription on the windscreen of one of the ambulance vehicles at the entrance of the National Traumatology Hospital (on Fiumei Road): "Juden wagon Jews on the right I", which was immediately removed according to the information of the OMSZ (National Ambulance Service). In the same month, the Synagogue monument at the corner of Várkörút-Rákóczi út in Székesfehérvár was urinated on by two unknown people. A police report has been made. In October, a swastika was drawn on the wall of the then unopened Jewish Performing Arts Centre. In November, a sign proclaiming white supremacy was painted on a wall on Nagykőrösi út in Abony, nearby shops were daubed with paint, and a swastika was spray-painted on a board.



Signs in Abony

The second subtype, hate speech against specific persons or organisations, includes a poster from March 2020 with obscene and antisemitic inscriptions popping up at several points in Budapest with a portrait of Harvey Weinstein. In May, antisemitic incitement was published twice against Tímea Szabó, independent Member of Parliament and co-chair of the Párbeszéd Magyarországért party. This subtype also includes the following incitement sign that was placed on a public billboard in May: "Into the gas chamber with George Soros, the Rat". **In November 2020, a letter was sent by post to the "Dohány Street Synagogue" from an unknown sender. The Security Service of MAZSIHISZ opened the envelope after inspecting it. The envelope contained pages full of banned totalitarian symbols, inciting, obscene sentiments verbally abusive to Jews. Mazsihisz took the necessary measures with the Authorities.**

A similar case to the "Jacob joke" of 2019 occurred in August; in a trailer on Pesti TV, a right-wing, near-government TV station, Péter Márki-Zay, the mayor of the opposition in Hódmezővásárhely, was called Jewish, and his name was altered with saying that "this is how it would be used in Hebrew"



Inciting inscription against Tímea Szabó, Member of Parliament, in Fővám Square

The third subtype of hate speech includes cases where the perpetrator is known. In January 2020, the KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party) in Baranya county promoted Article 50 of the Basic Law with a Nazi propaganda poster, which enshrines the protection of the institution of marriage and its definition as a male-female relationship.



In 2020, the far-right Breakout Day (Day of Honour) commemoration events were held again. Although the police had announced in advance that they would ban the far-right event from the Castle district, it was held on Saturday, eventually in Városmajor. The organisers did warn the participants not to wear totalitarian symbols, but based on the photos, this was not complied with by all participants this year either.

Furthermore, racist, antisemitic rhymes were chanted at the Kazincbarcika versus MTK Budapest football game in the Merkantil Bank League in March, in connection with which the Hungarian Football Federation initiated disciplinary proceedings. During the year, several events belonging to this category can be linked to the Our Homeland party. In March, on the anniversary of the inauguration of Miklós Horthy as governor, the party held a torchlight procession, where the party's president,

László Toroczkai, said that “*history is being falsified by those who attack Horthy.*” Furthermore, he thinks, that “*The Jews don't face their past, because no one talks about why the leaders of the Hungarian Soviet Republic were almost without exception, all of Jewish descent.*” Then he continued, “*one can see now that there are those who are preparing another Trianon, thinking about population exchange*”. The Action and Protection Foundation filed a complaint against László Toroczkai for committing the crime of incitement against a community. Later, on October 23, at the party's 1956 commemoration held in Corvin Street, Budapest, the party leader again dwelt on the Jewish origins of some historical figures deemed negative by later generations: “*Slomó Köves will surely report me again for saying this, but I want to ask the rhetorical question, why is it that both Rákosi and Gerő were of Jewish origin?*” In his opinion, “*This is the result of the organised settlement of the 18th and 19th centuries, when the number of Jews and Gypsies often doubled*”.

Another event of the party was the “*March against Gypsy Crime on Deák Square*”, organised in May in cooperation with other organisations (Légió Hungária, Self-Defence League, Hungarian Fanatics, Carpathian Brigade, Újpest Ultras), where several people demonstrated with the Nazi salute. A fourth Our Homeland event during the same year was held in the Bikás Park in Budapest. **Historian Ernő Raffay participated and gave a lecture as a guest speaker in front of hundreds of people, according to whom “the Jews pushed the Hungarians out of their possessions” and who was awarded the Officer's Cross of the Hungarian Order of Merit on the occasion of August 20 (see chapter on antisemitism in public life). During the “national rock concerts,” several people exhibited the Nazi salute.**




Another similar event was the disruption of a demonstration in Budapest in front of the American Embassy in Szabadság Square “Demonstration Against Racism” by the far-right organisations Légió Hungária and Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement. They arrived at the scene at the beginning of the demonstration and interrupted and heckled the first speaker, but due to the rapid intervention of police on the scene, no major incident occurred. The sign of one of the far-right protesters read, “Down with Jewish Racism, Free Palestine”.

The far-right events above demonstrate how antisemitism and racism are linked, and that in Hungary, the anti-Israel sentiment remains primarily characteristic of the far right.

A fifth extreme right event of the year was organised in Győr, by CI8, the paramilitary wing of the Blood and Honour, where neo-Nazi bands gave a concert.

In May, Gyula Zsegrács, a MP for Fidesz in Pápa agreed with a Facebook comment abusing the Jews in the “Together for Pápa” Facebook group. In August, László Bíró, a right-wing politician, and a joint opposition candidate (MSZP, Momentum, LMP, Jobbik, DK, Párbeszéd) for the 6th constituency of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county in the by-elections on October 11th stirred emotions

with antisemitic manifestations on social media: “My dog goes mad when the flea-bags walk by my house. My friends work in the hotel industry, they tell me what’s going on” – with Laszlo Bíró referring to Hasidic Jews from abroad, on pilgrimage, often staying hotels in Szerencs and the surrounding area. In another post, Bíró writes: “Jewish usury bank capital was detached from the economy, and the cosmopolitan robbery euphemized as war reparations was abolished”, and also, “They don’t care about the oath taken on the Holy Crown. Two new basic organisations have been formed around here recently; that’s what I am interested in, and not Judapest.”



In July, a flag with the SS symbol was placed on the facade of a weekend house in Leányfalu. A man walking by photographed the house, and, according to an eyewitness, one of the persons coming out of the house, a woman said that they were celebrating her husband’s 44th birthday, and the sign stands for the number 44. The man who took the photo said he was Jewish, and it was an SS badge, which is a banned totalitarian symbol, and therefore, it disturbed him. Then a man coming out of the house replied, “but we’re Nazis, and your train is leaving now anyway.” The man who took the picture then left the scene, explained the incident to

a friend living in the village, who later filed a report to the police attaching the photograph. After visiting the scene, the police, at the request of 444.hu news portal, stated the following: *“Individuals interested in electricity through their work made a flag with lightning symbols for a person celebrating his 44th birthday. When police drew their attention to the resemblance to a banned totalitarian symbol, they immediately removed the flag. There was no suspicion of a crime, and no criminal proceedings were instituted.”* However, later on, proceedings were initiated in connection with the case.



In August, two more cases of this type occurred. The 444.hu news portal reported that in Budapest, at the terrace of the Briós café on Pozsonyi road, a woman aged 40-50, with a cultured appearance, began cursing and verbally abusing Jews while walking among the guests. The waiters, in vain, asked her to stop insulting the guests and leave, in response to which, they too were called Jewish. Another case in the same month was when a man shopped at Tesco in Jászberény while wearing a swastika T-shirt. Unfortunately, this does not constitute the use of the totalitarian symbol in violation of Article 335 of the Criminal Code, because, as stated in a police decision in a similar case, *“The used symbol differs in several aspects, from the totalitarian symbol known as the swastika. The most significant difference is that the direction of the swastika is*

clockwise, but the symbol which is the subject of the case is counter clockwise.” In October, György Szalma, the journalist at Origo news portal at the time, wore a swastika bracelet on a TV show. Later, the then journalist defended himself by saying that he received it on a holiday in India as a souvenir.

In November, the far-right news portal kuruc.info compared Moshe Kantor, president of the European Jewish Congress, to George Soros in a long article. According to the article, *“There is hardly a substantial difference between Soros’ and Kantor’s motivations, as it will become clear below: they both shape the world as Jews, serving Jewish interests — even in areas of the world that are mainly inhabited by white men. In the same way, the activity of both of them is fundamentally detrimental to the self-determination, demographics, culture, and ultimately the survival of these white nations. (...) with Kantor, whose basic aims are quite similar to those of Soros: support for non-white migration and sexual deviance, racial mixing and multiculturalism, and, of course, on top of that, the security of Jews (or the safe exercising of their power).”* He mentioned that *“It is also relevant for Hungary that Mazsihisz is a member of the EJC, whose chairman, András Heisler, became a member of the EJC Executive Committee at the election of officials”.* Finally, he states that *“it is important to sweep away censors like Kantor and anti-Hungarian propagandists, along with all their organisations, institutions, and the traitors who help them”.*

Presenting all hate speech articles on kuruc.info would stretch the scope of this report, however, it is important to note that the portal demonstrated the most extreme form of antisemitism and hate speech against other communities practically every day in both years under review; and has been doing so ever since, referring to “Jewish Crime”, “Gypsy Crime”, “Holohoax Dossier”, “Jews and Fleas, Politically Incorrect Facts and Opinions” and “European Civilization in Jewish Pliers”.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES

One of the most important features of antisemitic conspiracy theories is that they always “adapt” to the most important challenges of the given time and they make Jews the cause of the problems. These theories are characterised by explaining certain, often technological, political, social or natural phenomena with the same theory: the phenomenon is the work of a certain invisible group. The assumption of background power is the basis of several conspiracy theories; the world is ruled by an invisible elite over the power of “official” country leaders. These theories are, in most cases, inseparable from antisemitism, insofar as one of their most important elements is often that people in the background power are Jews or work for Jews. Unfortunately, antisemitic conspiracy theories are constantly present in Hungarian public discourse, of which the period under review was no exception. **In 2019, these theories appeared in 4 topics, in 2020, around 3 themes. In both years, two topics are “localised” versions of an international theory, which illustrates the global nature of antisemitic conspiracy theories.**

In 2019, one such topic was the Maccabiah Games held in Budapest, about which conspiracy theories were most prevalent during the event. The grandiose international Jewish amateur sports event once again brought to light the “traditional” fears of Israelis settling in Hungary, which theories, combined with the increasing number of housing estate construction projects, culminated in the presumption of organised settlement of Jewish players arriving for the Maccabiah Games, which were compared to Israeli settlements. Related to that, the unfortunate phrasing of former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, which mentions “the acquisition of Hungary”, once again took off in the social media. Also in connection with the Maccabbi Games, the vision of the death of the nation and

the fear of the complete destruction of the Hungarians received new impetus; pictures of masses of people waiting to be treated in an oncology ward was linked to the death of the nation in certain online forums, which would be caused by the money allocated to the Maccabiah Games. **There was also gossip about Viktor Orbán’s Jewish origin in connection with the grant of 5 billion given to the Maccabiah and his Honourary Maccabiah membership, and the old idea has also gained new strength, that Hungary is a satellite state of Israel.** An interesting branch of the theory of Viktor Orbán’s Jewish origin was that even changes to the traffic rules were explained by it several times, for example, the fact that church traffic signs now feature no cross, or, that the organisers of the Maccabiah Games could use the bus lane.

Another “triggering” topic was the introduction of a technological innovation, 5G, in August 2019. **Naturally, antisemitic conspiracy theories also played a crucial role among all the confusing theories circulating on the Internet, most notably, the theory came to the fore that the “Zionist World Conspiracy” will use mobile internet technology for genocide.**

In addition to theories that react to current events, there are also more “traditional” antisemitic conspiracy theories, the more-prevalent ones include concepts related to the “prehistory” of Hungarians. One of the branches of this line of thought is that during the conquest of Canaan by the Jews, Scythian tribes with Hungarian roots were exterminated, and Jesus was also their descendant, who is a relative of the kings of Árpád dynasty. This theory took off again in 2019 in the form of an online lecture. And another “classic” is referring to a global elite as discussed earlier, for which Tamás Fricz, a right-wing political scientist and one of the leaders of the CÖF (Civil Unity Forum), set an example in his article on Greta Thunberg in the columns of Magyar Nemzet in December

2019, in which he talked about the “*Rothschilds, Goldsmiths, Soros, etc. - that is, the global elite*”.

The first case in this category from 2020 is news related to the fear of “Israeli acquisitions,” and within that, news related to Imre Posta’s MAG (Model Movement) sect. A young couple refused to register their new-born child in January in response to Posta’s rather chaotic conspiracy theory, according to which Hungary is an Israeli company registered in America. Imre Posta has been included in similar reports several times because he often organises various gatherings, where he warns the participants with confusing theories related to military actions. He often makes references to a forthcoming second Holocaust.

From February 2020, there has been a significant rise in antisemitic conspiracy theories, which can be partly attributed to the worldwide spread of the coronavirus.

In the context of Covid19, “background power” theories have gained new impetus worldwide; the “background power” or often more explicitly, Jews or Israel have been associated with the development, and spreading of the virus, or anti-virus measures. Behind all these processes, these theories assume manoeuvres driven by various coordinated interests, with a deliberately negative impact on people. Conspiracy theories related to the coronavirus have also spread to Hungary, the first examples of which appeared in March 2020. Attila Pataki (the lead singer of the band called Edda) answered a reporter’s question as follows: “*I am convinced that the coronavirus hysteria is being spread by background power and world leaders to test how much they can scare people, and maybe it’s also useful for them to hide something important that they don’t want us to know about*”.

Also in March 2020, in the radio talk show of Zsolt Bayer and István Stefka entitled “Paláver” broadcast in Karc FM on Mondays and Tuesdays, the callers repeatedly referred to the coronavirus-

related activities of the background power, during which Jews were explicitly mentioned several times. The presenters did not distance themselves from these opinions: “*Background power commanded that white Christians should be exterminated or mixed ... the background power, they are so rich that we must not even talk about them as Jews ... the Jews are the source of all trouble ...*”; “*... the virus... was organised on purpose ... I will say it, the billionaire Jews said ... 800,000 slaves are enough for them ...*” “*I think with this virus, the aim of the background power is to introduce a martial law for the entire world ... then a global government...*”.

In April 2020, the President of the far-right Our Homeland also “dissertated” on the activities of the background power in relation to the coronavirus on his YouTube channel with over a million views, whenever he outlined that he considered the phenomenon to be a global conspiracy, “*It was released into the world from somewhere from the circles of Bill Gates, and of course it is no coincidence that the virus could break into the territory of the European Union.*” He claimed that “*It is not far-fetched to assume that this epidemic was artificially blown up, and there are even secret services, countries, states behind it... who knew in advance that this coronavirus would come.*” He illustrated his response to “why” by quoting the infamous Rothschild saying: “*The time to buy is when there’s blood in the streets.*” His conclusion was: “*So, the point of the coronavirus is speculation, that from the goods now bought cheaply... the small circle that dominates the world, the circle of billionaires, will become even more powerful, their wealth and power even greater at the end of the epidemic, and the vulnerability of ordinary people will increase.*”

Another conspiracy theory, QAnon¹³, which originated in the United States and spread globally, also appeared in Hungary in 2020. On Facebook, until it banned QAnon-related content, Hungarians joined several pages, and Hungarian users also created Hungarian QAnon groups. Among their chaotic “background power” theories, these groups also believed that *“the Rothschild family killed Princess Diana back then”*. Furthermore, they distributed a series of revealing videos entitled *“Fall of the Cabal”*, which aim to prove that *“the members of Cabal, the elite of the global mafia, who belong to an ancient religion, are within that / instead of that Kabbalists, but are mainly Zionists, and are related to Freemasonry, but, at the same time, they are also members of a particular Luciferian sect”*.

ANTISEMITISM IN PUBLIC LIFE

The last category analysed is antisemitism in public life, where, based on the methodology described in an earlier chapter, the cases that we believe contribute to the normalisation of antisemitism in public life are discussed, even if they do not necessarily fulfil the concept of antisemitism according to the IHRA definition.

The first subtype of this category is statements and symbolic acts related to historical events, often insulting the victims of the Holocaust, or with questionable historical authenticity. In 2019, the interview with Sándor Szakály, the head of the Veritas Institute, published in the January in Magyar Hírlap, falls into this category. Among other things, he claimed that the *numerus clausus* was not a law against the Jews and called the idea that the law may have been

13) JWorld Jewish Congress. *QANON: A CONSPIRACY MYTH. Report*. 2020. <https://wjv-orgwebsite.s3.amazonaws.com/horizon/assets/ZIVbhalv/quanon-r4-final.pdf>

the forerunner of the Holocaust downright unacceptable.¹⁴ From February, this subcategory includes the incident when Zoltán Babucs, the editor of Magyar Hírlap, praised the SS soldiers serving in Budapest during the World War in a TV program by Kristóf Trombitás broadcast on channel M5 of the state television, saying that the majority of them did not take part in war crimes and since they were soldiers, *“indeed, they deserve to be called heroes, as they took part in the defence of the Hungarian capital by order.”* In September, a statue of Gyula Kornis, an antisemitic politician and Piarist monk, was unveiled in Vác with the participation of several prominent politicians from the government party. The Hungarian Liberal Party launched a petition, and Mazsihisz protested the inauguration of the statue in a statement. The Our Homeland party held a horse parade in November to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Miklós Horthy’s entry to Budapest.

The next subcategory, based on the cases, is the emergence and publication of far-right ideas, persons and organisations in public life and in mainstream discourse.

From February, this includes the state-sponsored Breakout Memorial Hike organised by the Börzsöny Action Group and the Hazajáró Honismereti és Turista Egylet (Returning Homeland Knowledge and Tourist Association) in both 2019 and 2020, which takes place on the same day as commemorations called Day of Honour. The hike reinforces the narrative that heroizes the participants of the Breakout

14) The Latin term *numerus clausus* means “closed number”. Act XXV of 1920 tied the number of students admitted to higher education institutions to the ratio of the various “nationalities and ethnic species” to the total population. Although the law on paper did not refer to Jewry, it was clearly directed against Judaism. More details: Kovács, Mária M. *Törvénytől sújtva – a numerus clausus Magyarországon, 1920-1945*. Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2012.

and presents the meaningless and tragic event as a heroic act.¹⁵

The next case is related to the National Song Festival held in March in Transylvania with the support of the National Cultural Fund (NKA), where, among others, the far-right band Romantikus Erőszak as well as Gábor Göbl, the president of the Our Homeland in Sopron performed with his band. With the sponsorship of the NKA, these extreme right bands received public money in exchange for their performance. A similar case occurred in June, when the Hungarian government initially awarded half a million forints to the Felvidéki (Upper Hungary) Hungarian Sziget Fesztivál organised by the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement through the Bethlen Fund. The subsidy was later withdrawn by the Prime Minister's Office after several international newspapers wrote about it. The case when from 2019 that Gergely Kulcsár was registered in the second place of the election list of Jobbik Hajdú-Bihar county fits into this category. He had previously spat at one of the shoes of the Holocaust Memorial *Shoes on the banks of the Danube*, and called the Holocaust a “bogus” and doubted its victims. The politician later publicly apologised for all this. The category also includes the award given to writer Kornél Döbrentei by Miklós Kásler in March. In an earlier statement, the member of the Hungarian Academy of Arts argued that “*Jewish laws were enacted in order to save Jews, with the Jewish leaders nodding in agreement at the time.*” In another statement, he said that “*Hungarian Jewry does not appear in the role of gentle, Homeland loving people.*” Following the antisemitic manifestations of Döbrentei, Péter Eszterházy, Magda Szabó and György Konrád, among others,

¹⁵) Information from authentic archival sources related to the Breakout as a historical event, as well as interviews with the descendants of the survivors, is available on the website of historian Krisztián Ungváry, kitoresnapja.hu, where visitors can even take part in a virtual eruption tour

withdrew their membership from the Hungarian Writers' Association, as the Association failed to condemn it. The news first appeared in July, in which it was later also confirmed that Mihály Takaró would be entrusted with the revision of the National Core Curriculum, who, among other things, had previously called the Literature magazine Nyugat, a “small Jewish newspaper”. Under the pressure of the literary historian, the works of openly antisemitic authors such as Dezső Szabó or József Nyírő were included in the curriculum.

The third subcategory is the manifestation of conspiracy theories in public life. This includes an interview in nepszava.hu with Manuel Hassassain the new Ambassador of the State of Palestine to Hungary in January 2019, in which, in addition to sharply criticising Israel throughout, he also states that “*There is a very strong Jewish lobby in Hungary with a long history, which has a serious influence on decision-makers. We don't even expect our side to be taken.*” Another event in this category this year was the re-launch of posters across the country entitled “You also have the right to learn what Brussels is up to” featuring Jean-Claude Juncker and George Soros. With this, the poster tried to suggest that the billionaire of Jewish descent is actually directing the leaders of the EU. This type also includes the journalism of Zsolt Bayer, a right-wing opinion-maker, from October, according to which millions of Israelis want to settle in Hungary. **All three cases evoke the traditional antisemitic topics, which speak of the excessive influence and power of Jews, either locally or globally.**

The fourth subtype covers anti-Israel manifestations, which include two demonstrations held in February 2019 against the Israeli Eurovision Song Contest in front of the Hungarian Television (MTVA) Headquarters, organised by the Budapest Solidarity for Palestine Group and the General Union of Palestinian Students. The aim of the demonstration was to prevent Hungary from sending

a contestant to the song festival, thus boycotting the event held in Israel. Both events were attended by 10-15 people.

The fifth group included cases that could not be clearly categorized into one of the subgroups, but also fell into the wider category of antisemitism in public life. In March 2019, several pro-government platforms attacked the Auróra club. The Pesti Srácok called the club the “Soros headquarters in Budapest”, and Magyar Hírlap published an article titled “Celebrating the Soviet Republic in Auróra”, and indicated right in the subtitle that “Jewish parties” were also held there. “Instead of admission fees, the club takes ‘suggested donations’ from guests and the nightclub welcomes support; this week there was a ‘Jewish purim party with dressing up and traditional drinking games’”. In the hostile article, the names of Soros, the Open Society Foundation, and the Marom Association appear several times in connection with various negative contents. In May, in relation to the film *Son of Saul*, László Toroczkai, the president of Our Homeland party said at the party’s May Day event, that the film “strengthens everything, mostly collective national guilt, but not collective national self-consciousness”. In September, Zsolt Semjén’s remarks in connection with MP Tamás Sneider and DK MP Tamás Bauer, referring to them as the “Sneider-Bauer coalition” were labelled as antisemitic by several press outlets. The accusation was rejected by Semjén. The last case of the year in this sub-category, was the statement of deputy executive director of the governing party Lajos Kósa in connection with the results of the elections in Hajdú-Bihar county: “*The Jews were forced, or perhaps even enjoyed, to vote for the Arrow Cross Knight in the Hajdú-Bihar County Assembly*”. After the incident, which received significant press attention, he apologised on several forums for the ambiguity of his words, but did not withdraw his statement.

In 2020, a significant part of the scandals surrounding the new National Core Curriculum fall into the first subtype,

within the sub-category of heroization of questionable historical events and persons. Examples in this category include the incident that the novel titled *Give me back my mountains* written by Albert Wass, an openly antisemitic and politically active writer and member of the Arrow Cross Party, was included in the National Core Curriculum, along with Ferenc Herczeg, a celebrated writer of the Horthy era, despite the protests of several Jewish and non-Jewish organisations. Also, the fact that the curriculum itself was prepared under the supervision of the antisemitic, horthyist Mihály Takaró. Also related to Wass Albert is the case from January that a statue of Wass Albert was erected next to the Miklós Radnóti Cultural House in Csepel, at the suggestion of the pro-government municipality. Miklós Radnóti is known to have lost his life as a victim of the Holocaust, so the Albert Wass statue erected in front of the Cultural House named after him hurts legitimate feelings. Also in January, it was announced that a radio programme entitled “I Believe in a Homeland” would be launched on Kossuth Radio, in which, among other things, a group called the Ragged Guard, an executioner group led by sadistic and antisemitic killers, would be presented as a “self-organizing armed group”. News from September was that a conference in Kecskemét entitled “The brave and heroic”, that would portray Iván Héjjas, leader of the anti-Jewish atrocities within the Ragged Guard, as a hero, received state support. The opening speech of the conference was given by László Salacz, Member of Parliament of Fidesz. After the event held in Kecskemét, the program series continued in Budapest during the month.

It hit the world press and sparked an international scandal when, in December, Demeter Szilárd, Ministerial Commissioner and Director of the Petőfi Literary Museum, called Europe the “*Gas Chamber of George Soros*” and George Soros the “*Liberal Führer*” in an article. Subsequently, András Bencsik explained in the program *Sajtó Klub* in Hír TV that Demeter’s article “*was criticized because*

of the hypersensitivity by Jewish organisations and individuals in Hungary, due to so-called relativization. I don't think they're right." Also, that "I read it carefully several times, it's impeccable, there was no unfortunate wording in it, it was perfect as it was." The last incident in this subcategory this year was that Miklós Kásler, Minister of Human Capacities, gave extraordinary support for the repatriation of the dining car of governor Miklós Horthy's former train, the "Turán".

In 2020, the first news belonging to the subcategory of normalising extreme-right ideas comes from January, when Beatrix Siklósi was appointed director of Kossuth Radio. In 2014, Siklós still had to be removed from the position as head of religious programs of the state television under pressure from historic churches, after regularly sharing antisemitic posts, racist jokes, and writings from far-right portals on her social media profile. 21 organisations of the Jewish Community Forum joined the open letter requesting the dismissal of Beatrix Siklósi from MTVA CEO Dániel Papp, who, nevertheless, stood up for Beatrix Siklósi, and called the accusations unfounded, citing Slomó Köves, the senior rabbi of the EMIH (Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation). He strongly rejected the reference made to him in connection with this case. Another incident in January was that Tamás B. Varga, the former editor of the far-right, extremely antisemitic news portal kuruc.info, published an article in the pro-government newspaper Demokrat.

From 2020, the Breakout Day Memorial Hike was held again, and as an additional case, it is worth mentioning that the news report broadcast in the near-governmental Hír TV about the events, according to which the "peaceful commemorators" of the far-right Legió Hungária were disturbed by "anti-fascist protesters". Hír Tv even interviewed Béla Incze, the leader of Légio Hungária, portraying him as a peaceful commemorator.

Another emblematic case from 2020 that falls into this subcategory, is that on the occasion of the National Day on August 20, the above-mentioned historian Ernő Raffay, an employee of the Institute of Hungarian Research and one of the founders of the Trianon Research Institute Public Benefit Foundation, received the Officer's Cross of the Hungarian Order of Merit. In his own words, Raffay sums up a longer line of thought about the immigration of Jews as follows: "a group of migrants came in, they multiplied, and pushed us out of positions in science, schools, academia, universities, banking, land ownership, professions; here's a lesson, people".

In September, Minister of Défense Tibor Benkó replied to the question of for how much did the otherwise openly nationalist, often revisionist, homophobic band Kárpátia wrote the marching song for the arrival of the four Leopard 2A4 tanks at the request of the army, he replied "the song was written by Kárpátia without any compensation, in honour of the arrival of the tanks, out of patriotic thought, as an offering to the soldiers". The band also wrote the anthem of the far-right Hungarian Guard, which has been banned since. The band received HUF 400,000 in state funding in 2015, for writing a song for "border hunters", and then in 2018, the National Cultural Fund Program provided HUF 5 million to produce a documentary about the band. In 2020, on the video blog Partizán, former students of the University of Kecskemét said that their lecturer, Mihály Takaró, who was officially responsible for the revision of the National Core Curriculum at the time, called the magazine Nyugat a Jewish newspaper and stated that "of course, Imre Kertész is not Hungarian either".

From 2020, one conspiracy theory case within the category of antisemitism in public life was when the government-aligned newspaper Magyar Nemzet published an article in April stating that George Soros wanted to use the coronavirus to his advantage and bought himself into the Mayor's office in Budapest.

Ronald Lauder, president of the World Jewish Congress, cited the article to illustrate that “antisemites around the world blame the Jews for the coronavirus”.

From 2020, the first anti-Israel, antisemitic manifestation in public life can be attributed to Előd Novák, vice-president of the Our Homeland party, who, in connection with his views that it is necessary to restrict legal immigration on the grounds of harming the public interest, quoted former Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres saying that the Israelis had bought Hungary. Still in January, Ahed Tamimi, a Palestinian teenager inciting the killing of Jews was praised by the women’s magazine Marie Claire in an article. The Palestinian teenager, who had previously been reported to have kicked and slapped Israeli soldiers and was therefore sentenced to eight months in prison was portrayed as a freedom fighter by the magazine.

In 2020, Our Homeland was the first one to have a case in this subcategory. The party publicly promised sanctions against some of its party members because of their Nazi salute, however, at least in public, these sanctions were never implemented. Furthermore, at one of the events of Our Homeland, Árpád Szakács, the former head of the central editorial office of government-aligned Mediaworks, started his presentation on the enemies of Hungarian culture by telling an antisemitic Jewish joke. In April, a photo montage was posted on Fidesz Budapest’s Facebook page, in which Budapest’s mayor Gergely Karácsony’s head was photoshopped on the body of the Arrow Cross “national leader” Ferenc Szálasi; in the picture the Arrow Cross leader is looking at Budapest on the banks of the Danube after the devastation of the World War. In July, Imre László, mayor of Újbuda representing the DK party, praised some of Adolf Hitler’s activities at a meeting of the local government. The mayor of Jewish descent apologised in a statement. It also happened this month that while Tamás Deutsch spoke

in the Parliament about the fact that Jobbik had previously requested the listing of members of Parliament of Jewish origin, Tibor Nunkovics, a MP of Jobbik, had practically called the Fidesz MEP a Jew. Miklós Soltész, Secretary of State responsible for Church and Ethnic Relations in the Prime Minister’s Office, who sat closest to the MP, later said: “*Nunkovics pointed first to his nose and then to Deutsch, saying that you are one of them, too.*” Nunkovics defends himself by saying that “*he did not call Tamás Deutsch a Jew but a drug addict.*” In July, János Fiala in the TV program *Civil a pályán*, which was broadcast live on ATV made inappropriate, out-of-context remarks about László Bodolai, President of Index.hu Zrt. Lawyer Péter Zamecsnik was just talking about knowing Bodola personally, when Fiala said, “*I have Jewish acquaintances, too.*”

In September, Attila Vidnyánszky, Director General of the National Theatre, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation Maintaining the University of Theatre and Film Arts (SZFE) said in a TV talk show titled *Egyenes Beszéd* broadcast on ATV in connection with Professor György Karsai, Hungarian classical philologist, theatre historian, literary historian: “*I will never be able to explain to György Karsai what concepts like nation, the homeland, and Christianity mean, because he is incapable of accommodating what I think.*” György Dörner, the Theatre director of Új Színház, used a similar sentiment in connection with the scandal caused by the change of model of the University of Theatre and Film Arts: “*Whoever is not Hungarian should not teach in Hungary and should not educate the youth to become anti-Hungarians.*” In November, the government-near newspaper *Magyar Nemzet* quoted the unfortunate statement of György Landesmann, a former chief rabbi, saying that if the Jewish values were subtracted from Hungarian culture, there would be nothing left but “*baggy herdsman pants and peach palinka.*” This was brought up by the newspaper in connection with an article published by Zoltán Kovács, the editor-in-chief of the magazine *Élet és Irodalom*. According to the article,

the editor-in-chief also considers the Hungarians to be primitive when he claims that the national consultations launched by the government wrongly assume that Hungarians can decide independently on the issues raised. The last case in this subtype in 2020 was a speech of Krisztina Baranyi, the mayor of the 9th district of Budapest, when, in defence of an investment, and making fun of its opponents, she said, “but those damned-awful, Jewish investors cannot build on 1,200 square meters”. The mayor denied antisemitic motives for her statement, and on the contrary, she tried to substantiate her suspicion with this sentence as to whether the investor was opposed by the assembly because of their Jewish origins.

CLOSING THOUGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER STEPS

- The relatively small number of cases underlying the above analysis allowed us to mention each case and analyse them briefly. The aim of this more qualitative approach is to interpret the topic in its own complexity and thus to better present the context itself.
- Most of the conclusions cannot be empirically proven and do not fully reflect Mazsihisz’s official position.
- The newly-introduced category of antisemitism in public life requires further specification, which we intend to do in the near future with the participation of both Hungarian and international experts on the subject.

Antisemitism report table 2019-2020

1. Physical attack 2019:1 2020:0

2. Threat 2019: 4 2020:3

3. Vandalism 2019: 5 2020:2

4. Hate speech

2019:

- Placing a swastika or other intimidating symbol, incitement text, drawing, caricature in public spaces, institutions and buildings: 5
- The use of inciting symbols or texts against the Jews or persons perceived to be Jewish: 6
- The perpetrator is known: 9

Total: 20

2020:

- Placing a swastika or other intimidating symbol, incitement text, drawing, caricature in public spaces, institutions and buildings: 9
- The use of inciting symbols or texts against the Jews or persons perceived to be Jewish: 6
- The perpetrator is known: 16

Total: 31

5. Antisemitic conspiracy theories 2019: 4 2020: 5

6. Antisemitism in public life

2019:

- Symbolic acts and statements of concern in terms of historical authenticity: 4
- Emergence and publication of far-right ideas, persons and organisations in public life, in mainstream discourse: 6
- Manifestation of conspiracy theories in public life: 3
- Anti-Israel manifestations: 2
- Other types of antisemitism in public life: 5

Total: 20

2020:

- Symbolic acts and statements of concern in terms of historical authenticity: 8
- Emergence and publication of far-right ideas, persons and organisations in public life, in mainstream discourse:8
- Manifestation of conspiracy theories in public life: 1
- Anti-Israel manifestations: 2
- Other types of antisemitism in public life:10

Total: 29

Total 2019: 53

Total 2020: 70

MEDIÁN: SURVEY ON ANTISEMITISM IN HUNGARY¹⁶

¹⁶ Due to arithmetic rounding, the total value of the charts occasionally may differ from hundred percent.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the survey conducted in early December 2019, Median examined the prejudice and susceptibility to antisemitism of Hungarian society towards Jews. Most of the set of questions has been unchanged for several years, providing an opportunity for comparison over time.

Regarding cognitive antisemitism, which indicates a susceptibility to negative misconceptions about Jews, a gradual, slight increase could be observed in recent years. In 2019, however, there was a decline: the proportion of strongly cognitive antisemites fell from 21 per cent to 16 per cent, there was no change in the case of 'moderate antisemites', but the proportion of those resistant to this type of antisemitism increased from 38 to 44 per cent. The change is only significant compared to last year; around 2015-2016, the public opinions showed a similar distribution.

There is no significant change in emotional (affective) antisemitism compared to last year; the proportion of emotionally moderately antisemitic people has risen somewhat (from 9 to 11 per cent) and that of non-antisemites from this respect has stagnated at 71 per cent. These data also fit into the multi-year time series, with roughly one-third of society exhibiting some degree of emotional aversion to Jews.

According to a comprehensive, aggregate indicator that is the combination of affective and cognitive antisemitism, 20 per cent of society is strongly antisemitic, with an additional 16 per cent moderately antisemites — while nearly two-thirds (64 per cent) show no antisemitic attitudes at all. This value is also not a significant

shift from the average of previous years.

The results confirmed past research conclusions, that social background has only a limited effect on susceptibility to antisemitism. No significant differences were observed in terms of gender composition, employment and income groups - only those living in small settlements and those in the 40-60 age group proved to be slightly more anti-Jewish than average, with 25-28 percent of them being strongly antisemites. However, these “fluctuations” should be treated with caution, with no significant age- or place of residence-related differences in long time series. Perhaps the only thing that can be cautiously stated is that graduates are somewhat more immune to antisemitism: in 2019, 13 percent were strongly and 8 percent moderately antisemitic.

In terms of party choices, the differences are more significant: even this year, right-wing parties have the most voters with strongly antisemitic views (37 percent), but this is a substantial decrease from last year’s 44 percent. The next party in the “ranking” is Fidesz (21 percent of its voters strongly dislike Jews), and this attitude is the least characteristic of voters for Momentum (5 percent).

One of the most alarming results of the 2018 survey was another increase in the proportion of Holocaust deniers and relativisers. This year, the trend has stopped and has even fallen by an average of 4 percentage points, but 11 per cent still believe that “there were no gas chambers in the concentration camps” and a further 16 and 21 per cent believe that “Most of the atrocities were invented by the Jews only in retrospect,” and “the number of Jewish victims was far less than is generally claimed”.

The survey also addressed issues related to the Sorsok Háza (House of Fates) this year again. While last year we discovered that 21 percent had heard of the project but very few were able to recall it on their own (2 percent), this year the research sought to

answer whether respondents knew who is involved in the project. Both Maria Schmidt and the Jewish community received 19 percent respectively; 16 percent of respondents said that the project is implemented by Mazsihisz (the organisation actually opted out of the project), 16 percent indicated the government, 8 percent Slomo Köves, and 5 percent EMIH. The questionnaire listed options, the respondents would have been able to recall even fewer organisations and names on their own. Even so, the data reveal ignorance and indifference.

The 2019 survey also asked questions concerning George Soros, which was first included in the set of questions in April 2017. This time again, respondents had to choose between two possible answers:

- “some believe that George Soros is primarily a power-hungry, selfish businessman who seeks to advance his own interests on a global scale ”
- “others say they that he is a generous, good-natured billionaire who spend huge sums on important social problems”

In 2017, the former was chosen by 51 percent, the latter by 32 percent, and 16 percent was unable to decide. By 2018, as many as 61 percent said Soros was aspiring to power, and 29 percent said he was embracing good causes, and only 10 percent failed to answer. In 2019, the results were roughly similar, with 57 percent having a negative and 30 a positive opinion of the billionaire, and a further 13 percent unable or unwilling to make a decision. From 2017 to 2018, therefore, the perception of Soros clearly deteriorated, which has changed only slightly since then - one could even say that recent research has confirmed the 2018 result. The significant shift is undoubtedly the result of the extremely intense government campaign. The campaign, based on the concept of the “Soros Plan”, was launched in 2016, but became even

more intense in 2017: Orbán addressed this idea in his speech at the Free University of Bálványos in the summer, followed by the first major poster campaign and the “national consultation” in part specifically dedicated to Soros. Therefore, probably already in 2017, people’s opinion of the billionaire may have been more unfavourable than before, but even after that we experienced a substantial negative shift.

INTRODUCTION¹⁷

In November-December 2019, the Median Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research conducted a comprehensive survey on the relationship of Hungarian society to Jewry, commissioned by Mazsihisz:

- opinions, notions related to Jews
- on the occurrence and strength of antisemitic prejudices
- on the opinions on the Holocaust and remembrance
- associations related to Jews

The research was conducted based on a questionnaire, with a personal interview of 1,200 people aged 18 and above. The minor distortions of the sample were corrected by applying a mathematical method (weighting) based on data of the Central Statistical Office, thus, the sample accurately reflects the composition of the voting age population by type of settlement, gender, age and education. The margin of error of the reported data does not exceed ± 3 per cent of the total sample, depending on the distribution of responses. The survey was based on the concept developed

¹⁷) The structure and line of thought of the study largely follow the methodology of previous years, the methodological explanations also come from previous reports.

by András Kovács¹⁸, the questionnaire that he has used several times since 1995 was used, makes it possible to present the changes in the data over time.

Median interviewers took a relatively long period of time, about half an hour for each respondent to ask them questions about Jewry. However, before presenting the enormous data set, it is necessary to clarify the question of what the questionnaire data show and what they do not show. At the beginning of the present study, first, it will be presented with indirect evidence to what extent views and opinions about Jews and recent events interest the average Hungarian citizen, what importance voters attach to the issue. In light of this, we consider it expedient to discuss the challenges of measuring antisemitism and prejudice. After clarifying methodological aspects, first the occurrence of anti-Jewish views and feelings are presented, then it is examined which groups of society these are primarily characteristic of. Next, data on the Holocaust, remembering the past, and then the associations with Jews, Israel, and George Soros are presented. At the end of our paper, we will determine which of the factors analysed increases the likelihood of antisemitism the most.

PERCEPTION AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF JEWRY

As in previous surveys, the data for 2019 show that issues related to Jewry are on the periphery of the interest of Hungarian voters. This is not surprising, of course, as people’s attention tend to be

¹⁸) Kovács András: *A kéznél lévő Idegen. Antiszemita előítéletek a rendszerváltozás utáni Magyarországon. POLGART Kiadó, Budapest 2005. ; The Stranger at Hand. Antisemitic Prejudices in post-Communist Hungary. Brill, Leiden – Boston 2011.*

directed to matters that directly affect them; economic processes, political debates, sentences of politicians, general news on public life.

According to the content analysis of NMHH¹⁹, in 2019²⁰, not a single topic related to Jews was among the 20 most-discussed topics of the main news channels in any given the month. In 2014, the debate over the monument in Szabadság Square received demonstrable publicity - but even then only in a single month, and only with a medium value. Since then, there has been no Jewry-related affair among the most important topics.

Our questionnaire-based research also reveals that voters are not reached by news about the Jews, or they are not considered to be especially important and memorable. We examined how many people mention events related to Jewish organisations or Jewish public life in recent months in responding to an open-ended question (i.e., by heart, without pre-given choices for answer): 72 percent of the total population did not answer the question at all, and a further 21 percent claimed that they had not heard of any such event. The remaining 7 percent does not necessarily mention specific events either — they generally talk about some commemorative event, so respondents did not seem to be up to date on the topic. 1 percent could recall a very specific event: they referred to Lajos Kósa's statement calling for Jews to be held accountable²¹. In 2019, only 0.5 percent of respondents could recall the Sorsok háza (House of Fates), compared to 2 percent in the 2018 sample. Respondents, when answering an open-ended question, were unable to recall who is behind the House of Fates project; one person mentioned Mazsihisz, that was not even involved

19) <http://nmhh.hu/szakmai-erdekeltok/mediafelugyelet/politikai-szereplok-mediahasznalata>

20) data were published until July.

21) https://nepszava.hu/3059024_kosa-lajos-zsidozott-egy-vaskosat-a-mazsihisz-es-az-emih-is-elitelte-a-kijelentest

in the project, and only two (!) Maria Schmidt (the total sample was 1,200 people). The questionnaire then gave options for answers; we were curious to see how many respondents could recall who was behind the project. Mária Schmidt and the Jewish community both received 19 percent, Mazsihisz (that opted out of the project) 16 percent, the government also 16 percent, Slomo Köves 8 percent, and EMIH (Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation) 5 percent.

Based on the above, we can reasonably assume that the issues subject to this study are low in importance within the average citizen's priorities. In the following, all data should be interpreted in this context: presumably only a small but not negligible part of the respondents consider the topic relevant.

MEASURING ANTISEMITISM AND PREJUDICE

From the above it also follows, that, for example, answers to the question is, "How much do you like or dislike the Jews?" can only show the direction of the attitude, but not the weight given to the issue: be it sympathy or antipathy, even extreme values do not necessarily show the respondent's extremely strong emotions or motivations. It is also important to emphasise that questionnaire-based research can reveal opinion, prejudice, and attitude, but hardly any real behaviour.

According to our interpretation, the questions measuring antisemitism primarily reveal attitudes: it is a manifestation with variability as its main characteristic. Based on temporal comparison, it is worth examining whether the climate of opinion has shifted in a more empathic or rather hostile direction towards Jews. Applying the method used by András Kovács for a long time, two dimensions were distinguished: in the case of agreeing with notions,

misconceptions, conspiracy theories about Jews, we can speak of cognitive antisemitism, and in the case of general emotional rejection and social distancing, of affective antisemitism. Combining the two dimensions, the proportion of respondents characterised by both attitudes can be demonstrated, and even its intensity. Those who agree with very few antisemitic statements are categorized as “non-antisemitic”, those who approve of a small but not insignificant number of statements are “moderately antisemitic” and those who agreed with most of the statements are referred to as “strongly antisemitic”. Again, these categories do not express the importance attached to the issue and do not reveal anything about the respondent’s actions.

THE DEGREE OF ANTISEMITISM

Cognitive antisemitism

The content of antisemitic prejudice was measured by means of a set of questions about notions and “knowledge” about Jewry, which have been employed on several occasions the past two decades. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of five the extent to which they agreed with eight statements. The statements include traditional antisemitism of religious origin - anti-Judaism - as well as antisemitic stereotypes rooted in the excessive influence attributed to Jews, *and statements that would see the solution in the marginalisation of Jews*. Table I shows the proportion of respondents who agreed with the statements ‘completely’ and ‘mostly’ (values 5 and 4 on the scale).

Table I. Content of antisemitism (percentage of those who agree)

	ÉV	TELJESEN EGYETÉRT	EGYETÉRT
Intellectuals of Jewish descent keep the media and culture under their control. ²²	2006	12	19
	2011	14	21
	2013	11	18
	2015	14	19
	2017	16	20
	2018	16	17
	2019	11	18
There is a secret Jewish network determining political and economic processes.	2006	10	17
	2011	14	20
	2013	15	19
	2015	15	20
	2017	17	20
	2018	20	20
	2019	16	20
There is an excessive influence of the Jews in Hungary today.	2013	12	15
	2015	15	17
	2017	15	21
	2018	15	22
	2019	13	19
It would be best if the Jews left the country.	2006	5	7
	2011	8	12
	2013	6	9
	2015	9	11
	2017	11	13
	2018	10	11
	2019	5	10

22) Since 2015, for the sake of clarity, we formulated the statement in the set of questions that “it is a dangerous that intellectuals of Jewish origin keep the press and culture under their influence”.

The number of Jews in certain occupations should be limited.	2006	5	10
	2011	7	12
	2013	5	11
	2015	8	13
	2017	13	17
	2018	12	15
	2019	9	14
The crucifixion of Jesus is an unforgivable sin of the Jews.	2006	8	12
	2011	9	12
	2013	7	8
	2015	10	15
	2017	15	16
	2018	19	18
	2019	13	15
The suffering of the Jews was God's punishment.	2006	7	7
	2011	5	9
	2013	4	7
	2015	7	11
	2017	8	12
	2018	11	13
	2019	9	10
Jews are more likely to use dishonest means to achieve their goals than others.	2006	8	13
	2011	9	17
	2013	7	15
	2015	11	15
	2017	15	20
	2018	14	19
	2019	13	17


Overall, the above statements meet with the agreement of approximately one-third to one-fifth of the population, which, however, represents a decline from the 2018 peak.

However, the most popular statements remain those related to the “excessive influence” of the Jews, their secret conspiracy, and the use of even dishonest means to achieve their goals, thus, roughly one-third of the population can somewhat agree with traditional conspiracy theories about Jews. Despite the welcome decline, it remains alarming that 23 percent agree with the statement reminiscent of the numerus clausus, and one and a half out of 10 people said that “it would be best if Jews emigrated from the country”. Analysing at the data, it does not seem excessive to state that disinformation is a common breeding ground for antisemitism (and xenophobia), individuals are less and less able to choose from the information surrounding them what is real and authentic. Moreover, most of the conspiracy theories reassure frustrated individuals: it is not they who are responsible for their own (un)happiness, but a secretly operating organisation.

In the long run, therefore, the peak of the steady rise since 2006 was indeed 2018: In 2019, there was no increase in any of the issues. This is also shown in Figure 1, where the three categories were created by adding up the scale values of each respondent concerning the eight statements. Thus, the lowest scale score is 8 and the highest 8 times 5, that is 40. The first group (non-antisemites) included those who might accept some prejudiced stereotypes but scored low on a scale based on the sum of their responses (8-20 points), in the second (moderate antisemites) those who were moderately prejudiced (21-30 points) and in the third those who were characterised by strong antisemitism based on their scores (31-40 points). Finally, those who did not respond or gave a “don't know” answer were put in the “unclassifiable” category, but for

the sake of clarity, only the proportions without a lack of response are shown.

Figure 1. Proportion of cognitive antisemites in Hungarian society, 2013-2019 (per cent)




The breaking of the negative trend observed until 2018 can be clearly seen here, too: the proportion of those resistant to antisemitic claims increased by six percentage points by 2019, while the ratio of those highly susceptible to antisemitism dropped by five.

Affective antisemitism

In this dimension, the emotional relationship to Jewry is mapped based on three questions. First, the respondents were asked to state whether they felt antipathy towards Jews or not.

Figure 2. Emotional rejection to Jews (percentages)



It is clear from the Figure above that there was a significant change in public attitude in 2010. While before 2010, 9 to 14 percent of the population disliked Jews, since 2010, roughly one in four people do so. While based on the tables above we might tend to consider a 3 percent change between 2018 and 2019 a positive change, it is clear from the data that there has been no clear trend since 2010.

The experience of previous years has shown that the emergence and expansion of the Jobbik party can be reason for the greater growth after 2010: the rejection of Jews and other minorities in public discourse became legitimate, and this may have resulted in many respondents revealing their feelings more openly. Although in recent years Jobbik has shifted towards the centre with a more moderate approach, antisemitism and the rejection of other minorities has remained part of the political discourse (not only in the case of Jobbik).

In the next question, respondents expressed their feelings about Jews and other ethnicities on a scale of 9. In Table 2, mean scores are shown, with 9 representing maximum sympathy and 1 representing total antipathy.

Table 2. Sympathy index of Jews and other ethnic groups on a 9-grade scale (2006-2019)

	2006	2007	2009	2010	2011	2013	2014	2015	2017	2018	2019	correlation coefficient with sympathy for Jews
Arabs	3,87	3,66	4,37	4,04	3,93	4,06	4,09	3,32	3,44	3,51	3,37	,409**
Roma	3,33	3,03	3,39	3,64	3,63	3,69	3,64	3,29	3,45	3,53	3,33	,315**
Blacks	4,55	4,24	4,72	4,26	4,48	4,2	4,28	3,96	3,93	4,11	3,91	,377**
Romanians	4,7	4	4,11	4,23	4,44	4,26	4,45	4,41	4,58	4,64	4,56	,423**
Chinese	3,77	3,8	4,09	4,01	4,11	4,12	4,33	4,44	4,54	4,76	4,64	,452**
Swabians	5,38	5,48	5,75	4,86	5,14	4,96	5,3	5,79	5,72	5,78	5,89	,540**
Jews	5,02	5	5,24	4,47	4,61	4,53	4,73	5,09	4,91	5,26	5,38	-
Migrants	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,84	2,72	3	2,76	,368**


* A correlation coefficient is a statistical indicator that expresses the strength of a relationship between two variables. It takes a value of one if a variable is fully defined by another variable, a zero value means that they are completely independent of each other. So, for example, a correlation coefficient of 0.543 between the attitude towards Jews and Swabians means that the relationship between the two sympathy scales is very strong: the same respondents tend to like (or dislike) the two ethnic groups. The other relationships are slightly weaker but still significant (at 95 percent, indicated by the two stars).

The table primarily provides information to which ethnic groups are most (un)popular in society. Traditionally, the Roma have always been the least accepted minority in Hungary, but in 2015, since the outbreak of the refugee crisis, an even less popular group has emerged: migrants. The anti-migrant climate is also indicated by the fact that the average score of both Arabs and blacks has declined in these years - they are the groups that the general population tends to associate with migrants - while the perceptions of other minorities have remained largely unchanged. The perception of Jews improved somewhat after 2017.

The last column of Table 3 highlights that the attitude towards Jews is likely to be accompanied by like or dislike of any other group: the correlation is particularly strong for Jews on the one hand and for Swabians, Chinese, Romanians, and Arabs on the other, but the correlation is also significant in the case of other ethnic groups. In everyday term, it means that the same people reject the Jews, who have resentment against other ethnic groups. *Thus, antisemitism usually goes hand in hand with general xenophobia.*

In the third question, we also measured aversion and distancing from Jews - and other ethnic and lifestyle minorities.

Figure 3. Social distancing from various groups. “Would not consent to a moving to the neighbourhood” (2013-2019, per cent)



The question “would you consent to a moving into your neighbourhood” demonstrates the social distances between various groups, because, going beyond general resentment, we can get an idea of how willing individuals would be to meet people of different ethnicities in their daily lives, and how willing they would be to share their wider living space with them.

It is obvious that the “tolerating differences” is far from Hungarian society; one or two out of 10 people resent even the “most popular” ethnic groups. Most of society distance themselves from homosexuals, and the vast majority of society rejects migrants.

However, the relative position of the Jews in this comparison is also fairly favourable compared to the other groups; similarly to

Table 2, a favourable trend can be observed over time in this case as well, with fewer people distancing themselves from the Jews in 2018 and 2019 than in previous years.

The last two data sets (Table 2 and Figure 3) indicate that the inclusion of migrants in the questionnaire probably had a strong effect on the scores of the other groups as well. In questionnaire-based research, the context always influences responses: simply due to the fact that a strongly rejected group was included in the questionnaire (and two other groups, the Arabs and the blacks, are also associated with them by many), other ethnicities are viewed more favourably: the Chinese and Jews were able to improve their position for this reason as well - probably because respondents also rated them *relative* to migrants.

Table 3. Proportion of those who would consent to having a Jewish neighbour ... (2019, per cent)


	Among those who would agree it have a...	Among those who would NOT agree it have a...
Arab	92	71
Skin head	91	72
Romanian	90	57
Roma	89	72
Chinese	89	58
Homosexual	89	66
Black	88	69
Hungarian immigrant from Transylvania	85	40
American	83	34

Interestingly, general xenophobia extends to anyone who is “different”: intuitively, we might think, for example, that the rejection of Jews and Skinheads is characteristic of completely different groups of people, but on the contrary: those who reject Skinheads are also more likely to be averse to Jews. For a significant part of the Hungarian population, therefore, the “Jew” is merely one of the manifestations of *otherness*, and in this *capacity*, they dislike them - just as they do everyone else who represents “otherness”.

Based on the three data sets presented so far - following the traditions of this research - by summarizing the data of Figure 2 and Table 2, a comprehensive picture can be formed of the proportion of those with antisemitic sentiment within the Hungarian population²³. Figure 4 also shows that affective antisemitism strengthened in 2010 and has eased somewhat since then. Overall, it appears that, similar to the 2018 survey, 29 percent of the total population has some sort of antisemitic attitude.

23) Respondents who stated that they dislike Jews and also scored between 1 to 5 on the dislike/like scale in relation to Jews were classified as extremely antisemitic; the rest of the “dislike” group as well as those who do not dislike the Jews, but gave the values 1-3 on the sympathy thermometer in the category of moderate antisemites, and all other respondents to the non-antisemitic category.

Figure 4. Proportion of affective antisemites, 2003-2019 (per cent)




The size of antisemites based on the sum of the two dimensions

Evidently, although the groups of cognitive and affective antisemites largely overlap, they are not identical; we do not automatically find the same individuals in the two groups. In the next part of the analysis, the two dimensions are merged: those are considered strongly antisemites, who were classified as such in both dimensions, or at least in one dimension they exhibit extreme antisemitism and moderate in the other. And those respondents classed as moderate antisemites in both dimensions or as extreme antisemites in one dimension and as non-antisemites in the other dimension, were placed in the group of moderate antisemites.

The Figure presenting consolidated antisemitism shows that roughly one-third of society is characterised by some degree of antisemitism, and one-fifth by strong antisemitism. The comparison over time reveals that antisemitism strengthened significantly between 2006 and 2011, and since then, small fluctuations have been observed. For the rest of the study, this aggregate indicator will be used.

Figure 5. The proportion of antisemites in Hungarian society, 2006-2019 (per cent)



WHO ARE THE ANTISEMITES?



Prejudice and demographic, economic and social status

When examining the connection between antisemitism and social background, it must be concluded that there is a very weak link between the two: antisemitism is thus at similar level in all social groups, there are no major differences. It is common for a group to exhibit slightly above-average antisemitism in a given year, but it no longer stands out when observing long-term trends.

A slight difference could be observed by age this time, but there are usually minimal differences. All social genders are equally susceptible to antisemitism.

The differences are somewhat more consistent in terms of level of education and the type of work: graduates and intellectuals are less prone to antisemitic views (in 2019 the difference was even more significant than in previous years). However, in the classification according to income categories, the values are almost identical, perhaps the lowest category is slightly less susceptible to antisemitic sentiments. Fundamentally, social status can also only be slightly linked to antisemitism.

Figure 6. Antisemitism by social background (2019, per cent)




■ Not antisemitic ■ Moderately antisemitic ■ Strongly antisemitic

Antisemitism and religiousness

There were several questions concerning religion and religiosity: we examined whether religiousness, frequency of church attendance, and affiliation with any denomination were related to antisemitic prejudice. In this dimension even less differences were observed than in the case of demographic characteristics: the intensity of antisemitism does not depend on what religion one belongs to and how religious one is. Even antisemitism rooted in religion — anti-Judaism — has no significant relation to religiousness. No significant differences are found when examining the denomination; the different distribution of “don’t know” responses can also be primarily attributed to the low number of cases (52).

Figure 7. Antisemitism according to religiousness (2019, per cent)




Antisemitism and social attitudes

In addition to social background, the role of political views and attitudes was also analysed: based on the responses in the questionnaire, first it was examined whether agreement on various social policy issues increases the likelihood of antisemitism. The results confirmed past research conclusions that antisemitic prejudice is closely related to attitudes not directly related to Jews, such as the rejection of otherness (xenophobia), conservatism, law and order attitudes, trust in certain moral and social norms and rules.

As in previous years, those who proved to be antisemitic to some extent, would restrict abortion, limit the number of people of colour or blacks living in the country, or consider homosexuality immoral. It is important to emphasise, however, that agreeing with any of the statements below increases the chances for the individual to embrace antisemitic views.

Figure 8. Antisemitism and social policy attitudes (2019, per cent)



ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES

In the next section, it will be examined whether political affiliation, willingness to participate in elections, and party preferences are linked to antisemitism. Respondents first had to place themselves on a seven-grade scale based on three questions: dimensions of left-right, conservative-liberal, and moderate-radical. As also data from previous years have shown, in general, individuals with antisemitic attitudes tend to be more right-wing or radical, but there is no significant difference in terms of the conservative-liberal dimension. Interestingly, both extreme antisemites and non-antisemites tend to be more conservative relative to the total population, while moderate antisemites are more liberal than the general population.


There is a larger difference between non-antisemites and extreme antisemites in terms of political affiliation from the aspect of self-classification as left-right wing: those who have no antisemitic attitudes at all tend to be more left-wing than the general population; moderate antisemites are about at the Hungarian average, while extreme antisemites are clearly more right-wing than the society as a whole. Similar trends are observed on the moderate-radical scale. Those who are not antisemitic tend to see themselves as moderate compared to entire population, while the moderate antisemites prove to be slightly more radical than the general population. Extreme antisemites are clearly more radical than society as a whole.

Table 4. Political self-classification and antisemitism, 2018
(averages on a scale of 1 to 7)

	Not antisemitic	Moderately antiemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Total population 2019	Total population 2018
Left bloc (1)- Right bloc (7)	4,36	4,46	4,94	4,5	4,62
Conservative (1)- Liberal (7)	3,67	3,37	3,75	3,63	3,63
Moderate (1)- Radical (7)	3,31	3,77	4,41	3,61	3,50


Traditionally, there is a very weak correlation between political interest and willingness to vote and antisemitism. In 2019, however, the proportion of extreme antisemites among those with no willingness to vote increased: a significant portion of this group may feel that they are not adequately represented (perhaps also thanks to Jobbik's moderation to a people's party).

Figure 9. Antisemitism and willingness to vote (2019, per cent)



Party choice correlates with antisemitism more than most of the factors presented above (Figure 10). 37 percent of Jobbik voters are strongly antisemitic and another 22 percent are moderately antisemitic, so most of its voters still have some level of antisemitic attitudes. Furthermore, antisemitites are found in almost the same proportion as the total population among Fidesz and DK voters, - however, in previous years, there were fewer anti-Jewish respondents among DK voters. The proportion of antisemitites among MSZP voters increased slightly in 2016 and 2017, but in 2018 and 2019, it returned to the low level observed in previous years. Momentum has the smallest proportion of strongly antisemitic voters.

Figure 10. Antisemitism by party choice (2019, per cent)



It is worth examining party choices from another perspective: who do antisemitites vote for? Fidesz leads in all groups, especially among those with most extreme anti-Jewish attitude. Jobbik and, in the opposite direction, MSZP and Momentum voters differ significantly in the groups formed based on antisemitic attitude. However, overall, the figure can be interpreted that antisemitites are as divided regarding party choice as others.

Figure 11. Party choices of Antisemitites (2019, per cent)





Figure 12 shows the proportion of strongly antisemitites among voters of Jobbik, Fidesz, and left-liberal opposition parties over time. Although the most strongly anti-Jewish voters remain in Jobbik, their proportion is noticeably declining, by 2019, the gap with the other parties has narrowed significantly. There is no significant pattern among the voters of Fidesz and the opposition parties apart

from Jobbik. The one-off jump in 2017 demonstrates that it is wiser to draw conclusions from long time series rather than momentary fluctuations: antisemitism is undoubtedly the least characteristic of voters of left-wing and liberal parties.

Figure 12. Proportion of extreme antisemites among voters in various parties (2019, per cent)



The following table illustrates the extent to which each party is considered antisemitic by its own voters and by the entire population.

Jobbik's aspiration to become a moderate people's party has not yet brought a breakthrough in this regard: 81 percent of the population (and in 2018, 84 percent) believes that the party is antisemitic

at some degree, and nearly half think it is very characteristic. Regarding the other parties, there were fewer people alleging that they were antisemitic, and respondents considered LMP and the Momentum as least anti-Jewish. It is not surprising that parties' own voters perceive their party much more innocent than the entire population – however, it may seem surprising that many vote for their favourite party in spite of the fact that they consider it at least partly antisemitic: for example, 28 percent of Fidesz voters do so.

Table 5. Who are antisemites? Is antisemitism characteristic of the following parties? (2019, per cent, as a percentage of valid responses)

		Very characteristic	Somewhat characteristic	Not at all characteristic
Jobbik	Total population	48	33	19
	Own voters	36	35	28
Fidesz	Total population	14	35	51
	Own voters	4	28	67
MSZP	Total population	13	35	53
	Own voters	3	38	58
DK	Total population	12	28	60
	Own voters	6	16	78
LMP	Total population	8	29	63
	Own voters	5	20	75
Momentum	Total population	8	28	64
	Own voters	0	13	87

REMEMBERING THE PAST AND THE HOLOCAUST


Remembering World War II plays a crucial role in both Hungarian antisemitism and the grievances of Hungarian Jewry: many conflicts arise from differing interpretations. Therefore, allowing for a comparison over time, the questionnaire included a set of questions, with which we examined the views of the Hungarian population on the Holocaust, the responsibility for the persecution of Jews in World War II, and the need to confront the historical past.

Table 6. Opinions about the Holocaust and confronting the past, 2009-2019 (per cent, positive statements about Jews in italics)

	2006	2009	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
1. During the war, non-Jewish Hungarians suffered as much as Jews	56	66	65	65	60	64	70	-	70	66
2. There were no gas chambers in the concentration camps	7	6	7	8	12	11	11	8	15	11
3. The number of Jewish victims was much less than is generally claimed	14	12	18	19	23	23	24	22	26	21
4. <i>More should be taught in schools about persecution of Jews so that this does not happen again</i>	45	54	46	50	42	46	52	42	50	46
5. Most of the horrors were only invented by the Jews in retrospect.	9	11	13	14	15	19	18	17	21	16
6. So many decades after the persecution of the Jews, this topic should be off the agenda.	48	40	58	53	54	50	52	55	55	51

As in 2018, opinions in 2019 are divided on how much the persecution of Jews should be talked about and taught about (questions 4 and 6, respectively), and roughly half of society agrees with both statements. Although the vast majority of voters distance themselves from the idea of denying or relativizing the Holocaust, a non-negligible proportion of respondents are receptive to it: 11 percent (statement 2) stated total denial, 21-16 percent (statements 3 and 5, respectively) partial denial and relativization. However, compared to the peak values observed in 2018, the proportion of those who agree with all partially or fully relativizing statements dropped significantly, by 4 - 5 percent. While the main finding of the research published in 2019 was that already a quarter of the population is characterised by relativization and a sixth by - unlawful - denial, in 2019, only one-fifth of the population was characterised by relativization and only one in 10 people by unlawful denial. The 2019 data are more similar to the 2017 ones (Figure 13). In terms of changes over time, 2011 is also the year of reversing the negative trend, and in the case of Holocaust denial and relativizing statements, the year 2014. The previous trend-like growth has fallen by 2019, but it is impossible to predict whether it is a permanent decline or a one-off occurrence.

Figure 13. Proportion of those who agree with statements denying or relativizing the Holocaust, 2006-2019 (per cent)



ISRAEL AND ANTISEMITISM

It goes without saying that emotions and opinions about Israel also play a significant role in attitudes towards Jews. While criticism of Israel's politics does not necessarily imply dislike of Hungarian Jewry (and vice versa), it is nevertheless a familiar phenomenon when antisemitic prejudices appear in the guise of criticism of the Jewish state.


Table 7. Opinions about Israel and antisemitism, 2019
(Proportion of those agreeing, percentage; 5 – fully agrees, 1 – does not agree; agrees = 5 and 4 together)

	Not antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Total population 2019	Total population 2018
1. The Jews living here are more loyal to Israel than to this country	24	54	63	35	40
2. Israel is fighting a legitimate self-defence against attacks	33	36	26	32	33
3. Jews are at greater risk in some countries in Western Europe than in Hungary	42	54	53	46	50
4. Seeing the increasingly- harsh Islamic terrorist attacks, I am much more understanding towards Israel than before	32	32	24	30	35
5. Israel is an aggressor, carrying out genocide against the Palestinians	17	36	44	26	31

Although only the proportion of those agreeing is presented in the table, it is important to note that an unusually high ratio of respondents, one-fifth to one-sixth, answered “I don’t know”. Another roughly 30 percent indicated an average value, which often indicates inexperience and uncertainty in the matter. Thus, only about half of the respondents were able to express an opinion on the above issues, i.e. we can reasonably assume that Israel is a rather distant and unknown topic for Hungarian society. This is also indicated by the fact that the agreement with statements number two, three and four was almost completely independent of the attitude towards Jews. Statements one and five proved to be simpler, it was clearer whom and what the respondent need to relate to, therefore the correlation was more significant in these two cases: the more antisemitic one was, the more the statement that put Hungarian Jewry and Israel in a bad light could be agreed with.

The following question was partly about Israel, which examined the legitimacy of the penalty for booing at the Israeli anthem at a football match.

Figure 14. “A couple of years ago, the Hungarian football team was severely penalized, having to play its next three matches behind closed doors because the Hungarian fans booed at the opponent’s anthem. In your opinion, this punishment ...” (2019, per cent)



Respondents understood the question much better than the previous ones; the rate of “don’t know” answers was very low. Evidently, the vast majority considered the punishment to be justified, with only a strong third of society considering it excessive – and this view may not be motivated by anti-Israel sentiment. Again, to a limited extent, but still significantly, opinions were formed based on antisemitic stance. At the same time, the fact that as much as half of the respondents who proved to be strongly antisemitic consider punishment to be justified also shows that they are not all rabid and combative voters.

ASSOCIATIONS ABOUT JEWS

So far, we have analysed closed-ended questions only, in which respondents had to choose from pre-defined options. At the same time, we were also curious to know what comes to people's mind in connection with the word "Jew". The answers to the open-ended questions help us to find out what is important to the respondents, for in this case, they do not respond to pre-defined answers, but spontaneously mention what comes to mind. There were as many types of responses as respondents; these are presented in categories in Table 8. Similar responses were arranged in a group. Slightly less than half of the respondents did not mention anything at all, the table only contains data without missing answers.

Table 8. "What comes to mind first when you hear the word Jew?" (2019, open-ended question, spontaneous responses in the groups formed based on the level of antisemitism, as a percentage of respondents)

	Not antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Total population 2019	Total population 2018
Neutral comment: Persecution, Holocaust, Auschwitz, suffering in World War II	33	35	11	29	24
Neutral comment: religion, ethnic group, customs, culture, bible, language	25	29	18	24	30
Money, power, wealth, trade, USA, influence	16	14	39	20	18
Positive: smart, tolerant, hardworking, humane	18	5	6	13	7
Negative attributes: desire for power, hunger for money, exploitation, stinginess, laziness, hatred	2	10	23	8	12
They are the same as others. I don't care who is a Jew and who is not	5	1	0	4	5
Appearance	1	6	2	2	1
Palestinian-Jewish conflict	0	0	1	0	1

The table starts with an overview of the attributes most frequently mentioned in 2019, so the neutral, descriptive associations came first: based on these, it is impossible to say what emotions the mention of the word “Jew” evoked in the respondent. The category of persecution can also be considered neutral, with the two categories together accounting for more than half of the responses (53 percent). The thoughts of “money,” “power,” and “influence” are already a borderline case: these can be neutral or even appreciative remarks, but it is more viable to assume a more negative attitude in the case of most of the respondents representing 24 percent: jealousy and envy are one of the primary motivations for antisemitism. All this is also supported by the fact that most of the extremely antisemitic respondents mentioned a statement of similar nature, of which almost 4 out of 10 respondents have related associations.

However, the next category is clearly positive, with slightly more than a tenth of respondents describing Jews as smart, tolerant, hardworking, and humane, and only slightly fewer people associate it with negative qualities, (8 percent) thinking of hunger for money, exploitation, stinginess when they hear the word Jew. Interestingly, however, that only a fraction of respondents (4 percent) stated that they are the same as me, no different from me. In 2018, 1-1 percent associated Jews with one of their own acquaintances or with George Soros, respectively, however by 2019, these two categories became obsolete, as no one mentioned them. A substantial change compared to 2018 is a 5 percentage point increase in the positive category and a 4 percentage point decrease in the negative one.

Respondents were also asked what they believed Jewish characteristics are. The results are presented in the table below.

Table 9. "In your opinion what are the distinctive features of Jews?" (2019, open-ended question, spontaneous responses in the groups formed based on the level of antisemitism, as a percentage of respondents)

	Not antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Total population 2019	Total population 2018
Neutral: rich, money, business sense. (It can be praise and envy as much as something negative.)	25	27	24	25	22
Hair, facial hair, clothing, physical features, large nose, etc.	0	36	13	22	13
Neutral: traditions, behaviour, way of thinking, worldview, solidarity	0	17	18	16	17
Positive: smart, tolerant, hardworking, humane	19	3	4	13	12
Negative: arrogant, haughty, pushy, mean, exploit everyone, stingy, lazy	0	9	35	13	11
There is none, the same as any other person, nothing special	15	8	5	12	19

Table 9. illustrates that the majority have a neutral association, which includes the first three categories, mentioned by a total of 63 per cent. Another 12 percent also did not want to make statements about Jews collectively (last category in the table). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that both praise and negativity and envy can be in the background of neutral answers: the ingrained prejudices of society remain, respondents are likely to judge Jews not based on their own knowledge but on hearsay. This may be indicated by the group of answers such as “rich, influential” and those focusing on appearances.

Positive and negative qualities in relation to Jews were highlighted by the same proportion of respondents (both at 13), however, unsurprisingly, positive traits were mostly mentioned by non-antisemites, while negative traits were typically emphasised by respondents with extremely antisemitic attitudes. *It is worth mentioning that “only” one-third of the respondents who proved to be strongly antisemitic on the basis of other questions mentioned negative traits: this correlation also demonstrates that susceptibility to antisemitism (“tendency to join”) does not mean that these respondents themselves think negatively about Jews.*

PERCEPTION OF GEORGE SOROS

Based on open-ended questions, associations of the respondents about George Soros were explored. In recent years, there has been a lively debate over whether the anti-Soros campaign is antisemitic. On the one hand, we were interested in what the respondents think about Soros on their own, and the extent to which these remarks are related to Jewry. On the other hand, it was also investigated whether there was a correlation between the direction of opinions and the respondent’s antisemitic predisposition.

Table 10. “What comes to your mind first when you hear the name George Soros?” (2019, open-ended question, spontaneous responses in the groups formed based on the level of antisemitism, as a percentage of respondents)


	Not antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Total population 2019	Total population 2018
1. Rich, influential, businessman (neutral)	29	25	20	26	21
2. Migrants	18	20	24	20	26
3. Wicked, traitorous, general negative remarks	13	21	21	16	13
4. Anything positive about Soros	8	8	8	8	8
5.(Hunger for) power	5	7	6	6	4
6. I'm bored of Soros (Neutral about Soros)	8	3	2	6	5
7. Jewish (anything that includes this word)	3	0	3	3	2
8. Unexplained wealth, unjust enrichment, speculator, fraud	1	3	6	2	8
9. Orbán also received money from Soros	2	0	1	1	1
Other	13	13	9	12	12

Overall, the majority of respondents associated something negative with George Soros (statements 2, 3, 5, 8), however, 44 percent in 2019 show a significant decline from 51 percent in 2018, and especially compared to 62 percent in 2017. While in 2018 a quarter of the total population and in 2017 30 per cent associated the billionaire with migrants, in 2019, “only” a fifth of the total population did so. The downward trend is overshadowed by the fact that the occurrence of the first statement has increased significantly, and the question is whether neutral answers such as “rich”, “powerful”, “businessman” and similar remarks are intended to be compliments or pejorative. It is also clear that the three most popular categories are in line with the government’s propaganda, with 62 per cent of respondents repeating them in some way. “Only” 3 percent of the total population associated George Soros with him being Jewish; as many extremely antisemitic as non-antisemitic. There is a moderately strong correlation between anti-Jewish predisposition and opinions about Soros: 37 per cent of respondents who were not antisemitic based on other questions mentioned something negative, and 57 per cent of those who are strongly antisemitic. Consequently, some people view Jews in general differently from what they think of the American billionaire in particular.

If we compare the associations related to Jewry and the associations related to George Soros, it is apparent that those who associate money, power and influence, as well as negative attributes with the Jews are the ones who most often refer to the origins of the billionaire, however, the number of answers in these cases is very small, therefore, we refrain from drawing any far-reaching conclusions.

Furthermore, in the form of closed-ended questions we explored what the whole population thinks about George Soros. In this case, respondents could choose from two predefined response categories, one containing a clearly positive statement and the other a clearly negative statement. This question has been included in the questionnaire since 2017, the data are provided below (Figure 15).


Figure 15. In your opinion, George Soros (per cent)



After the open questions, it is also worth analysing the proportion of the population with positive or negative opinion about the American-Hungarian businessman, when they can choose from pre-defined options. Most of them are negative also in this case, but the shift between 2017 and 2018 is noteworthy: In 2018, the number of people who think negatively about the activities of the billionaire increased significantly (while by 2019, there was only a slight change). The anti-Soros campaign was most intense in the summer and autumn of 2017 (national consultation, billboards), so it is reasonable to claim that this could have strongly contributed to the increase in 2018. We believe it is likely that the data recorded in November 2017 were already more negative than what voters had thought earlier - however, we cannot prove this theory as this question was first asked in 2017. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the campaign has made an impact.

The impact can be observed in broad sections of society, not just in radical, antisemitic groups.

Figure 16. Opinion on George Soros in the groups formed according to media consumption, party choice and level of antisemitism (2019, percentage distribution)



- He is mainly a power-hungry, selfish businessman who strives to promote his own interests on a global scale
- He is a generous billionaire supporting good causes who spends huge sums on important social problems
- Does not know

Similar to Table 10, Figure 16 shows a significant correlation between antisemitic attitudes and perceptions of Soros, but the majority of even those voters who are not susceptible to antisemitism condemn the American-Hungarian businessman. The same applies for regular viewers of RTL, but even ATV consumers are almost equally divided on this issue. It is not surprising in light of the fact that, according to previous research by Median and Mérték, cross-consumption is quite significant in Hungary: many watch and read media platforms contrary to their political beliefs²⁴. Those uncertain about their party choice also have a more negative view of Soros, as do right-wing and socialist voters. The majority of DK and Momentum voters viewed the billionaire as benevolent and generous.



Interestingly even though right-wing voters are more inclined to agree with anti-Jewish claims than Fidesz voters, Soros's activities are condemned to an even greater extent by voters of the government parties than by those of Jobbik. This implies on the one hand that the campaign likely had a strong impact on society as a whole, and, on the other hand, that there were perceptible differences in terms of party choice: government supporters identified themselves even more with the messages of the billboards.

AWARENESS OF THE JEWISH ORIGINS OF HISTORICAL FIGURES

In the last block of the questions, the respondents' level of awareness and knowledge was explored: we were curious about whether they were aware of the Jewish origins of various historical figures.

²⁴) <https://mertek.eu/2018/11/26/a-politikai-tajekozodas-forrasai-magyarorszagon-trendek-2015-18/>

Figure 17. Knowledge of the origins of historical figures (2019, percentage distribution)



For the sake of clarity: the first five persons were of Jewish descent (George Soros, Imre Kertész, Alfréd Hajós, Béla Kun, Mátyás Rákosi), the others not. At the same time, perhaps it is not incidental how the persons in question related to their own origins: Jewish origin played the most important role in Kertész's identity, it was not typical for the others to speak in public as Jews. None of them practiced religion actively.


The distribution of “don't know” answers shows that the majority of Hungarian society does not know, or at least not correctly, what the origins of these persons were. Even in the case of Prime Ministers Antall, Gyurcsány and Orbán, only roughly one third of the respondents were well informed (Antall was a Catholic, Orbán Protestant, and Gyurcsány is from a Catholic family, but is not religious). It also reveals a lot about the knowledge level that in the case of several historical figures of evidently non-Jewish descent, 5-10 percent of the respondents indicated Jewish in their answer. In our view, this was not so much a conscious misconception as a wrong “guessing” on the part of the respondents. Furthermore, it is apparent that the Jewish origins of Kun and Rákosi are known only to a very narrow layer of the society, therefore, their negative perception can hardly be the reason behind *today's* antisemitism. Also, the case of Hajós (and to some extent Kertész) proves that positive perception does not mean that the person's origin is widely known.

Finally, we are again compelled to conclude that it is difficult to explain the much higher-than-average awareness of George Soros's origins by anything other than the government's campaign and the discourse surrounding it. Although the billboards and the national consultation did not explicitly mention Soros's origins, a large part of the Hungarian population probably only learnt from the public discourse that the Hungarian-American billionaire is Jewish. Otherwise, it would be illogical why more people think of Soros as a Jew than of Kertész: his Jewish descent was a much more prominent element of Kertész's public communication.

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

International comparative studies provide a useful adjunct to contextualizing data, even if few are available. First, the frequency of Holocaust relativization was compared with Western and Eastern European countries, supplemented by the perceived frequency of physical atrocities and the fear of these assaults.

Figure 18. The perceived frequency of attacks on Jews and Holocaust relativization in some European countries (2015, percentages, source: ADL²⁵)




25) <http://global100.adl.org/public/ADL-Global-100-Executive-Summary2015.pdf>

There is a huge difference between Western and Eastern countries in all respects. Although Holocaust relativization (and other manifestations of verbal antisemitism) are significantly more prevalent in Eastern Europe, most citizens in the West worry about violent attacks. French Jewry, the largest Jewish community in Europe, is particularly at risk.

Another source of data explores whether respondents would accept different ethnic and lifestyle minorities as colleagues.

Figure 19. “Would you feel uncomfortable if one of your co-workers were a...” (proportion of those agreeing, 2015, percentage, source: Eurobarometer²⁶)




26) <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/yearFrom/1974/yearTo/2016/surveyKy/2077>

The figure above illustrates that Hungarians are less accepting than the European average, however, it should also be noted that the main difference in this respect is between Western and Eastern Europe; other countries in this region produced similar results. According to our own data, the perception of Roma may be even more unfavourable (interestingly, there was no difference compared to the EU average), and opinions on ethnic groups associated with immigrants deteriorated rapidly during 2015-2016. In any case, it is confirmed again that the relative position of the Jews is not weak, but at the same time, Hungary is slightly lagging behind the European average in this respect.

Finally, it is also an interesting question to what extent Hungarians regard antisemitism to be a significant problem compared to other European countries.

Figure 20. “How significant is the problem of antisemitism in your country?” (percentages, Eurobarometer, December 2018 data²⁷)



27) <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2220>

According to these data, this is perceived less of a significant problem in Hungary than the EU average. This is much more important in Western countries and much less in Eastern Europe. There are two possible explanations for this: either antisemitism really is a larger problem in the West, or it is just perceived as more significant. The latter could be related to the fact that voters in Eastern European countries face more pressing problems, such as lower living standards. Interestingly, the values are higher in Hungary and Poland than in the other post-Soviet countries.

DETERMINANTS OF ANTISEMITISM

To conclude our analysis, we address the question to what extent the approaches discussed in the previous chapters constitute a strong explanation for antisemitism individually and collectively. In this section, we examine the hierarchical relationship of the factors presented so far: which are the strongest and which are the ones that are less closely related to antisemitism. This is usually demonstrated in statistical analyses based on the so-called logistic regression model: it is an analysis that contains several variables (questions, statements) simultaneously. There is one outcome variable in the analysis: the question we want to explain. In this case, the outcome variable is the comprehensive antisemitism indicator used throughout this document: the strongly and moderately antisemitic groups were merged, so that everyone agreeing with anti-Jewish statements to a substantial degree was included. The model examines the probability of being able to predict whether someone will be in the antisemitic group based on the explanatory variables (almost all the statements and questions of our research) (Appendix). The correlation coefficient assumes the value 1 in the hypothetical case when the model explains the result variable 100 per cent, that is, if it can be fully deduced from

the explanatory factors, whether someone belongs to the antisemitic group. The minimum of the indicator is 0, in this case the variables of the model are completely independent of antisemitism. It can be concluded that the explanatory factors in the first model - almost all the questions and statements in our questionnaire, the exact list of which can be found in the appendix - together have a 46 percent probability of predicting who will be in the antisemitic group. (this is extremely high in political sociology). We could also say that antisemitism depends on 54 percent on factors that fell outside the scope of our research.

In the next step, this comprehensive model was deconstructed to find out how strongly the questions discussed in each chapter provide an explanation (prediction). In the second model, only socio-demographic background variables are included, the third contains only political self-classification and party choice, the fourth includes variables related to xenophobia, the fifth law-and-order, nationalism, the rejection of 'breaches of the norms' as well as political pessimism the sixth includes the negative associations given to open questions, and the seventh is whether the respondent has a Jewish acquaintance. The Appendix contains all the statements and questions used in the analysis.

Although demographic variables are clearly significant, the explanatory power of the model is very small, 6 percent. This means that *the social background only minimally explains susceptibility to antisemitism*. Equally strong is the effect of a model based on open-ended questions: those who have a negative association with Soros and Jews, and think of degrading traits when listing typical Jewish characteristics, are more likely to be anti-Jewish. However, the fact is that this model also only explains antisemitism by 6 percent. The impact of political views is relatively weak: based on party choice and political self-classification, it can be predicted with an 8 percent probability whether the respondent

will fall in the antisemitic group. Having a Jewish acquaintance has a smaller but still measurable effect: it reduces susceptibility to antisemitism.

Table 11. A comparison of the explanatory power of models presenting different approaches

Model	Strength of the correlation ⁽²⁸⁾
1. Comprehensive	0,455
2. Demographic factors (age, gender, type of settlement, financial background, religiousness)	0,057
3. Party choice and political self-classification (left-right, conservative-liberal, moderate-radical scales)	0,084
4. Xenophobia to other ethnic groups	0,312
5. Political attitude	0,168
6. Open questions, negative associations with Jews	0,060
7. Having a Jewish acquaintance	0,042

28) Nagelkerke R2 indicator. Its maximum value is 1, which shows that the variables in the model fully explain the outcome variable (in this case, anti-Semitism), and a value of zero is assumed if it is not explained in any way, whether they are completely independent. For statistical reasons, all explanatory factors were coded as so-called dichotomous variables: they could take only two types of value (from Budapest or outside Budapest, young or old, graduate or non-graduate, etc.) Each model is significant at 95 percent.

As in previous years, the model taking into account general xenophobia and political attitude have a greater explanatory power, however, in this year's research we were able to examine fewer questions in this regard than in previous years. *A well-known conclusion from the literature has also been substantiated by our research: prejudice rarely goes alone, and xenophobia often takes shape in antisemitism as well. Authoritarianism, the persecution of breaking the norms, believing in law and order and nationalism result in a political character structure that also makes the citizen susceptible to antisemitism. Overall, however, the tendency to reject 'otherness' increases the likelihood of antisemitism the most: whether it manifests itself in the rejection of migrants, homosexuals, drug users or other ethnic groups, minorities.* However, statistical analysis also underlines that it largely depends on factors outside our research whether a person agrees with the anti-Jewish claims. With a questionnaire-based survey, it is impossible to predict this accurately.

SUMMARY

Firstly, the present research sought to answer the extent to which the public is concerned about matters related to Jewry. Based on the frequency of "no answer" and "don't know" type answers and inconsistent (or downright incorrect) responses, it can be concluded that issues affecting the Jewish community escape the attention of a large proportion of respondents, or they are not interested enough to be able to recall them by themselves, not just details, but not even concrete events. Only 7 percent could recall any public event related to Jews, but the vast majority of these were on a very general and vague level.

Second, before presenting the data, it is necessary to think about what agreeing with an antisemitic statement in a questionnaire means and what it does not imply. Clearly, it "only" suggests an opinion, or attitude, but not behaviour, discrimination. There is also no implication regarding the weight of the opinion: even answers with extreme values do not indicate the importance the respondent attaches to the issue. The most important lesson of previous years was that there is a gap between the antisemitism classification based on traditional consensus and antisemitism that can be inferred from spontaneous comments. The majority of respondents regarded as antisemitic by the traditional method do not spontaneously make negative, antisemitic remarks when asked to describe Jews or to list typical Jewish qualities. Yet, if they see a list of traditional anti-Jewish statements, they agree with them. The relationship also exists, of course, vice versa: self-initiated antisemitic thoughts may arise even if antisemitic claims are rejected. On this basis, it seems clear that antisemitism often means receptiveness rather than a solid state of mind. Furthermore, individuals often do not know what they are judging, but easily accept any kind of information about the unknown, and they are able to incorporate it into their own views. In our interpretation, variability is a natural characteristic of antisemitism.

With this interpretation in mind, it is always informative to ask the same questions over a period of several years so that long-term trends can be outlined. These data refer to the attractiveness of notions and misconceptions about Jews (cognitive antisemitism) and the emotional relationship with Jews, social distancing (affective antisemitism). Based on this, antisemitism intensified considerably in 2010 (we assume not independently from the fact that Jobbik appeared in mainstream politics), and since then, only minor shifts could be observed.

Investigating cognitive antisemitism, an important finding in recent years is what we call “*post-truth politics*”: in today’s flood of information, it is becoming increasingly difficult to make informed decisions about the truth. Although the proportion of extreme antisemites fell in favour of non-antisemites in 2019, it can be stated that **cognitive antisemitism is fed by conspiracy theories.**

Respondents, especially those with strong antisemitic attitudes, agreed with statements most, which are the well-known sentiments of conspiracy theories, such as secret Jewish conspiracy, influence, money and power. Susceptibility to this could also be observed among the answers to open-ended questions; the most common characterization of Jews referred to money, power, and influence.

The emotional rejection of the Jews, albeit to a small extent, weakened; while in 2018 and 2017, 25-25 percent rejected Jews, in 2019 only 22. Compared to other minorities, the relative position of Jews also shows an increasingly favourable trend. However, the rejection of the Jews shows a strong correlation with the rejection of other groups, therefore, for a large part of the Hungarian population “Jews” merely embody “otherness”. And in this capacity, they are just as sympathetic or antipathetic as other groups.

Each year, the research seeks to answer the question of what demographic factors contribute to individuals’ antisemitic attitudes. Apart from some random fluctuations, there are usually no serious differences in this dimension - as was the case in 2019, too. Perhaps the only repeatedly confirmed trend is that graduates are a little less susceptible to antisemitism.

Based on party preferences, the differences are more significant; since measurements began in 2013, Jobbik’s camp has always had the highest proportion of voters prone to antisemitism - however, their proportion is also declining. If we turn the question around

and examine who voters with the strongest antisemitic attitudes vote for most likely, we can see that they tend to vote primarily for the governing parties, secondly, they are uncertain, thirdly, they choose Jobbik, and only rarely the opposition parties (most unlikely Momentum).

Remembering the second World War deeply divides Hungarian society: slightly less than half of those surveyed said the issue should be kept on the agenda and a slight majority said remembrance should be put to an end. Even more worrying is the increasing prevalence of Holocaust denial and relativization (the former is common to roughly one in ten respondents, the latter to about one in five respondents) - even though 2019 was the first year in a long time when these data did not get any worse. The Holocaust also plays an important role in identifying Jewry: when asked what comes to mind when they hear the word “Jew,” respondents first mention the Holocaust and persecution, secondarily religion and ethnic groups in general, and others associate it with money, power and influence. The vast majority list neutral statements.

A recurring question in the media is whether the campaign against George Soros can be accused of antisemitism. Even if we cannot answer this question with a clear-cut yes or no, our research has provided a number of important aspects. Soros’s perception is overwhelmingly negative, and the attributes associated with him are typically identical with the government campaign’s main messages. The effectiveness of the campaign is also underscored by the fact that after the 2017 peak, by 2018, the billionaire’s image had deteriorated substantially. There is a correlation between the respondents’ views about Soros and their antisemitic attitudes, party choices, and media consumption, but this is only moderate: respondents not inclined to antisemitism, those supporting the opposition and people watching RTL also have a mostly negative opinion about the American-Hungarian billionaire.

Finally, according to international comparative data, in Hungary, compared to Western Europe, the fear of physical attack is much less common among Jews, but at the same time Holocaust denial and relativization are more common. The difference is not only between Hungary and the West, but rather between the eastern and western parts of Europe.

APPENDIX

The complete logistic regression model

Variable	Model	Beta	Significance level	Exponential Beta (Odds Ratio)
A resident of Budapest	2	0,028	0,923	1,029
University graduate	2	-0,421	0,159	0,656
Lower income group	2	-0,172	0,526	0,842
Higher income group	2	0,256	0,298	1,291
Does not go to church regularly	2	-0,201	0,378	0,818
Under 40 years	2	-0,169	0,434	0,845
Completed up to 8 years of primary school	2	-0,869	0,303	0,419
Man	2	-0,003	0,990	0,997
Interested in politics	3	-0,455	0,040	0,634
Jobbik-voter	3	0,636	0,054	1,889
Right-wing self-classified	3	-0,327	0,176	0,721
Conservative self-classification	3	0,076	0,731	1,079
Radical self-classification	3	0,913	0,000	2,492
Would accept an Arab neighbour	4	-0,211	0,467	0,810
Would accept an American neighbour	4	-0,204	0,545	0,815
Would accept a Roma neighbour	4	-0,767	0,003	0,464

Would accept a Chinese neighbour	4	-0,136	0,584	0,873
Would accept a homosexual neighbour	4	0,375	0,147	1,455
Would accept a Transylvanian Hungarian neighbour	4	0,769	0,022	2,158
Would accept a Skinhead neighbour	4	0,479	0,087	1,615
Would accept a person of colour, or black neighbour	4	-0,276	0,358	0,759
Would accept a Romanian neighbour	4	0,172	0,485	1,188
Would accept a Jewish neighbour	4	-2,352	0,000	0,095
Would restrict abortion	5	0,254	0,264	1,289
Would tighten the reception of refugees	5	-0,648	0,026	0,523
Has religious beliefs	5	0,435	0,049	1,545
Would support the death penalty	5	0,193	0,399	1,213
Considers homosexuality to be immoral	5	0,408	0,079	1,504
Would punish drug users with severe prison sentences	5	0,393	0,114	1,481
Would limit the number of people of colour living in the country	5	0,823	0,000	2,277
Has negative associations with Jews	6	1,304	0,016	3,684
Has negative associations with Soros	6	0,484	0,033	1,622
Has a Jewish acquaintance	7	-0,521	0,030	0,594
Constant		0,826	0,439	2,284

Comment: outcome variable: comprehensive antisemitism indicator (cognitive and affective antisemitism, see Figure 5). Significant variables at the 95 percent level are in bold. In the model column, the sequence number indicates to which sub-model the given variable was included (2 = demographic; 3 = party choice and self-positioning, 4 = xenophobia to other ethnic groups; 5 = law and order, nationalism, authoritarianism, rejection of “breaking the norms”; 6 = open questions). The odds ratio expresses the extent to which the explanatory variable increases the likelihood of antisemitism. For example, those with negative associations about Jews, with all other variables remaining the same, they are, on average, 3.68 times more likely to fall into the antisemitic group based on their responses than those who do not. However, someone who has a Jewish acquaintance is only 0.595 times more likely (i.e., roughly six times as likely) to be among the antisemites: so, it is much more likely not to belong to that group.



