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Editor: Judith Freedman

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'This Journal has been brought into being in order to provide an international vehicle for serious writing on Jewish social affairs . . . Academically we address ourselves not only to sociologists, but to social scientists in general, to historians, to philosophers, and to students of comparative religion. . . . We should like to stress both that the Journal is editorially independent and that the opinions expressed by authors are their own responsibility.'

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THE
JEWISH JOURNAL
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JEWS IN THE ECONOMIC ELITES OF WESTERN NATIONS AND ANTISEMITISM

W. D. Rubinstein

THE relationship of the place of the Jews in the economic elites of the countries in which they were living to modern antisemitism has been comparatively neglected in the recent literature on this topic. It is the purpose of this essay to shed some light on the subject in a clear way. The conclusions of this paper may be summarised as follows. First, there is a clear and striking pattern of Jewish participation in the economic elites of the Western countries from about 1840 to 1939 — such that the more backward the country in terms of its economic development the *higher* the proportion of Jews in its economic elite, and the more advanced the country, the *lower* the proportion of Jews in its economic elite.[1] The statistics of this phenomenon appear to be extraordinarily clear-cut; Jews as a rule clustered very disproportionately in the commercial/financial sector of the economy. Second, the demonstrable over-representation of Jews in the economic elites of many continental European countries was itself a potent force for creating and engendering antisemitism, arguably the most important single force which persisted over the generations. Jewish intellectuals, especially the theorists of Zionism, were well aware of these facts, which permeated their conclusions about the amelioration of the Jewish situation in Europe. Next, in the 'advanced' countries, especially in the English-speaking world, the place of the Jews in the economic elite of each country was categorically different since they were, demonstrably, a small or insignificant minority. This fact also had profound implications for the levels of antisemitism in these societies, plainly working to diminish hostility to Jews. Finally, while the situation of the Jews closely resembled that of other 'entrepreneurial minorities' in Europe and its adjacent areas in many ways, the situation of the Jews as an 'entrepreneurial minority' was in other ways unique, although the fate of other 'entrepreneurial minorities' was, often, similar to that of the Jews in continental Europe.

TABLE 1.

Approximate Jewish Percentage in the Economic Elites of Western Countries, *c.* 1860–1945

Country	Year(s)	Jewish Position
Hungary	1887	62.3% of top business taxpayers
Czarist Russia	*c.* 1914	estimated 35% of the Russian mercantile class
Poland	1929	45% of the highest income-earners outside agriculture
Germany	1908–11	a) 31% of richest families
		b) 22% (or 25%) of Prussian millionaires
Britain	a) 1809–1939	8.5% of estates of £500,000 or more
	b) 1809–1939	2.4% of estimates of £100,000 or more
	c) 1870–1919	4 of 24 estates of £2.5 million or more
U.S.A.	a) 1865–*c.* 1970	6.5% (20 out of 310 persons) in super-rich class ($20/$30 million plus)
	b) 1901–1910	3% of chairmen of largest companies
	c) 1929	*c.* 19% of richest New York City residents
Australia	a) 1817–1939	3.3–3.6% of largest estates left in N.S.W. (*c.* 39/1090)
	b) 1853–1939	2.3–2.4% of largest estates left in Victoria (*c.* 19/785)

The main conclusions about the extent of Jewish participation in the economic elites of various Western societies in the later nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries are set out in Table 1. Wherever possible (the estimates for Czarist Russia and the United States being the main exceptions) the statistics of Jewish participation derive from named taxation records — for income tax, wealth tax, or probate data — from which Jewish wealth-holders can be identified. The two other cases, Czarist Russia and the United States, are derived, respectively, from the estimates of a well-known economist of that day and from recent historians of this subject who have carried out considerable research.

The results demonstrated in Table 1 are very striking indeed. There is a virtual straight-line progression in the Jewish percentage of the wealth elite downward from the most 'backward' to the most 'advanced' nations. Significant, too, is the markedly-higher Jewish percentage in Germany compared with Britain or the United States. The Jewish over-representation was most marked in Eastern Europe, where Jews (along with other non-indigenous peoples like Germans, Armenians, Greeks, and even overseas Scotsmen) traditionally *were* the entrepreneurial middle class. When a native middle class did emerge in Eastern Europe, it was as a rule disproportionately engaged in heavy industry — with finance and commerce largely remaining in the hands of Jews.

Assessing the Jewish percentage of the economic elite in Eastern and Central Europe is plainly fraught with difficulty, given the paucity and inaccuracy of the available statistics. Nevertheless, fairly good estimates can be made for at least three such societies: late nineteenth-century Hungary, Czarist Russia in its final decades, and inter-war Poland. In Hungary, there are reliable statistics about the highest class

of taxpayers (known as 'virilists') in 1887. At that time, no fewer than 62.3 per cent of businessmen in this category (362 out of 588) were Jewish, according to the research of Andrew C. Janos.[2] Moreover, 12.5 per cent of the 'virilist' landowners in Hungary in 1857 were Jewish — 305 out of 2,450.[3] By the 1920s it was apparently the case that 54.0 per cent of the owners of commercial establishments in Hungary (66.2 per cent in Budapest) were Jews, as well as 85.0 per cent of the directors and owners of financial institutions (90.3 per cent of those in Budapest), and 62.1 per cent of all employees in commerce. But only 12.5 per cent of all industrialists (31.6 per cent in Budapest) were Jews, by the familiar Jewish/Gentile divide between commerce and industry.[4] It was also claimed by Janos that 'the members of twenty or so "grand" [Jewish] families — the interlocking clans of Kohner, Ullman, Herzog, Deutsch, Mauthner, Goldberger, [and] Wodianer . . . controlled among themselves some 90 per cent of Hungary's modern banking system and industrial plants'.[5]

For Czarist Russia, nothing comparable to the precise statistics available for Hungary apparently exists. On the other hand, a good many industry-by-industry estimates of Jewish entrepreneurial participation are available. These have largely been compiled, it should be noted, by recent Western scholars rather than by antisemites. Moreover, and most centrally, Jewish entrepreneurial achievement in Czarist Russia took place despite the enormous, overwhelming antisemitic barriers to upward Jewish social mobility and despite the legal confinement of most Jews to the provinces of the Pale of Settlement. Nevertheless, a number of important Russian industries were very disproportionately owned and organised by Jews; they included textiles, sugar refining, flour milling, saw mills, brewing and alcohol, tobacco, and the leather manufacturing industry; in commerce, the grain and timber trade; banking; shipping and transport; and mining — industries from which Jews were not barred by law.[6] Such statistics as exist show that the Jews often far exceeded their percentage of the population in these fields. For instance, in 1910 Jews owned 182 of 518 joint-stock sugar companies (35 per cent) in Belorussia and the southwestern provinces; in 1897, 287 out of 530 tanneries (54 per cent); 69 out of 106 sawmills in the northwestern areas (68 per cent); and so forth, based on very scattered statistics.[7] By 1878, 60 per cent of the grain export from Odessa was in Jewish hands; according to the 1897 Census, 886 out of every 1,000 persons engaged in commerce in Russia's northwestern provinces were Jews.[8] By 1916, according to the Russian economist Professor M. Bernatsky, Jews constituted 'more than one third (35 per cent) of the Russian mercantile class'.[9] Liberals like Bernatsky saw Czarist restrictions as plainly counterproductive and urged reforms. Until the end of the Czarist regime, however, such reforms were bitterly resisted. Indeed,

much of Czarist antisemitism might be seen as an attempt to prevent Russian Jewry from dominating the Russian economy, since many Russian conservatives feared that this would follow if Jews were given unrestricted residential and economic freedoms within the Empire.

Statistics of the Jewish percentage among high income earners in inter-war Poland also exist, compiled by Joseph Marcus in his outstanding book *The Social and Political History of the Jews in Poland, 1919–1939*. In 1929, according to Marcus's research, among the approximately 2,000 persons in Poland's non-farm sector with incomes of 20,000 zlotys (approximately £656 or U.S. $3,279) or more, 900 were Jews: in other words, Jews constituted 45 per cent of the highest income-earners outside the agricultural sector.

TABLE 2.
Poland, 1929 (Non-Farm Sector)

Income Earners	Number ('000 Zl) Jews	Number ('000 Zl) Non-Jews	Total Annual Income* Jews	Total Annual Income* Non-Jews
Group I (20,000 + Zl = £656 + or US $3279)	9,000	11,000	61.3	92.6
Group II (3000–20,000 Zl = £98–£656 or US$ 492–$3279)	89,900	538,100	171.8	257.7
Group III (under 3000 Zl)	925,500	3,203,700	12.3	17.8
Total Annual Income:			245.5 40.0%	368.2 60.0%

*Includes farm sector (in zlotys)
Source: Joseph Marcus, *Social and Political History of the Jews in Poland, 1919–1939* (Berlin and New York, 1983), Table 7, p. 44; Appendix, Table 4A, p. 450.

This figure is certainly extraordinary, given the already rampant antisemitism of the inter-war Polish republic, the dire and chronic poverty of many (perhaps most) of Poland's Jews, and the virtual exclusion of Jews from senior positions in the state sector and in the civil service. Jews accounted for about 10 per cent of Poland's inter-war population, and were clearly greatly over-represented among top income-earners, even allowing that they were much more heavily concentrated in the non-farm sector than were Polish Gentiles. Jews were also slightly over-represented among the intermediary segment of taxpayers, constituting about 14.3 per cent of so-called Group II income-earners, those with incomes of between 3,000 and 10,000 zlotys. Moreover, according to Marcus's statistics, Jews received about 40 per cent of all income earned by Poland's Group I earners, *including* incomes earned in the agricultural sector.[10] This work contains a long description of the central importance of Jewish entrepreneurs to the Polish economy, both before the First World War and after

independence. During the period until the achievement of Poland's independence in 1918, Gentile Poles played almost no role in the development of large-scale business life. One three-volume history of industry in Poland until 1939 states that only one Gentile Pole, Karol Jarosynski, can be described as an authentic tycoon or captain of industry.[11] According to Marcus,

> not one large (and probably no medium) textile manufacturing enterprise was founded or owned by a Pole . . . This circumstance, of the majority of the population taking no part at all in the pioneering of industrialization has no parallel in any other country in Europe.[12]

Polish entrepreneurship was almost entirely dominated by Jews and Gentile Germans, with Germans highly significant in heavy industry, especially in areas like Silesia which had been under German or Austrian rule before 1918.[13]

The position of the Jews in the economic elite of Germany has been explored by W. E. Mosse and Dolores Augustine.[14] Fairly precise conclusions about the identities of Germany's richest men and families in the first decades of the twentieth century are available from the so-called 'wealth census' of German millionaires based upon the triennial tax returns for 1908 and 1911. From these, a retired German economist, Rudolf Martin, abstracted the names of every person (about 8,300 in all) worth one million marks (about £20,000) or more, and provided biographies of everyone worth five million marks (about £100,000) or more. Martin's *Yearbook of Millionaires*, published in Berlin in 1912, has recently been rediscovered by social and economic historians and has formed the basis of much new research of a statistically-accurate kind. Not every principality in the German Empire was covered in Martin's work, but Prussia, Frankfurt, and other major economic centres were included. In Prussia in 1908 there were 747 millionaires worth five million marks or more, of whom at least 162 were Jewish, or 21.7 per cent.[15] Mosse also estimates that Germany's corporate elite just before the First World War — consisting of the chairmen, multiple board members, and managing directors of the 100 largest public companies — comprised about 125 men, of whom 40–50 (32–40 per cent) were Jewish.[16] Among the 29 *families* in Wilhelmine Germany with aggregate fortunes of 50 million marks or more (at least £2 million or $10 million), nine (31 per cent) were Jewish or of Jewish origin.[17] Mosse's list of these most wealthy families is shown in Table 3; those families who were Jewish or of Jewish descent are asterisked.

Some clear patterns emerge from this table. The richest single family was neither the Rothschilds nor the Krupps but the little-known Gentile colliery barons the Haniels (who were also engaged in rolling-mills and machine-building), collectively worth 394 million

TABLE 3.
Wealthiest German Families in 1908–1911

	Million Marks	No. of Individuals in Families
Haniel	394	(13)
*Rothschild, incl. Goldschmidt-R.	310	(7)
Henckell	252	(7)
Krupp	250	(3)
Hohenlohe	151	(1)
*Speyer	121	(2)
Waldthausen	103	(9)
*Mendelssohn, incl. Mendelssohn-B.	101	(5)
Schaffgotsch	100	(2)
Pless	93	(2)
Thyssen	79	(3)
Stumm	78	(4)
Tiele-Winckler	74	(1)
Arenberg	74	(2)
*Gans/Weinberg	71	(6)
*Bleichröder/Schwabach	70	(3)
Guilleaume	69	(5)
*Oppenheim	68	(4)
von Rath	67	(10)
Mumm von Schwarzenstein	63	(7)
*Schottländer	61	(5)
Ballestrem	56	(1)
Dippe	55	(4)
Henschel	54	(2)
*Simon	52	(2)
Schichau/Ziese	53	(2)
*Mosse	51	(2)
Borsig	51	(3)
Metzler	50	(4)

*Jewish families.

marks (£16 million or $78.8 million). The German Rothschilds were second, followed by the Gentile Henckells, colliery and engineering magnates in Silesia, the armaments and steel-making Krupps, and another great Gentile Silesian colliery and landowning family, the Hohenlohes. From this table it will be seen that although the Jews were very rich, they were seldom *the* richest men or families, a pattern found repeatedly. Another familiar pattern is the concentration of Jewish wealth almost exclusively in finance and commerce, with Gentile wealth found mainly in heavy industry and mining, as well as in banking and other commercial trades. Mosse also notes the clear impression among contemporaries that Jewish participation in the Weimar Republic's economic elite had markedly declined compared with their position under the Empire, except in the joint-stock banking sector.[18] On the whole, Jews were apparently less important, and thus possibly weaker, when Hitler came to power than a generation earlier. Yet there can be no doubt whatever of the striking over-representation of Jews among Germany's economic elite, with Jews constituting only

one per cent of Germany's population but accounting for a vastly higher percentage of the wealth elite.[19]

In contrast to this, the situation in the economies of the English-speaking world was very markedly different. Britain was the home of both the industrial and the commercial revolutions. Between 1815 and 1870 it had the dominant economy of the world, while the City of London remained the world's leading financial centre until 1914. Britain's comparatively small Jewish community was heavily centred in London and its elite component, often known as the 'Cousinhood', was dominated by a small number of very wealthy, interrelated families of Sephardi or German Ashkenazi descent. Led by such renowned families as the Rothschilds, Montefiores, Goldsmids, Mocattas, Cohens, Samuels, and perhaps a dozen others, it was heavily centred in financial and commercial pursuits in the City of London, especially in merchant banking, stockbroking, and bullion dealing. Yet in Britain that 'Cousinhood' operated in a society which was very different from anything on the continent, even Germany. By the mid-nineteenth century, Britain had produced thousands of successful and wealthy businessmen, in a society which had not known feudalism for many centuries but in which the 'cash-nexus' was ubiquitous even among the landed aristocracy. Britain had also produced a large, prosperous, and stable middle class, based especially in London, with tens of thousands successfully engaged in business and professional life. In such a milieu, Jewish businessmen, even the wealthiest and most successful, were in no way particularly note-worthy, let alone unique, and still less were they dominant, as might be accurately alleged about much of continental Europe.

The place of Jews in the wealth elite of Britain can be measured with considerable precision from the probate records, which show wealth left at death. From 1809 onwards (when the records begin in a usable form), the name and value of the estate left at death can be ascertained for anyone leaving property in Britain. The valuation figure has included all personalty but excluded all unsettled land until 1898 and settled land until 1925. Between 1809 and 1939 a total of 199 persons left estates of £1 million or more; 28 of these, or 14.1 per cent, were Jews. A total of 579 persons left between £500,000 and £1 million in that period, of whom 38 (6.6 per cent) were Jews. Thus about 8.5 per cent of Britain's top wealth-holders between 1809 and 1939 were Jews. However, even this figure significantly *over*states the Jewish percentage of Britain's actual wealth elite, since, as noted, land was excluded from the valuation figures, and thus many great landowners (those not leaving £500,000 or more in personalty) are not included in these statistics. If they were to be included, it is likely that the Jewish percentage would be roughly one-half of the figures just noted.[20] Comprehensive data also exist about everyone leaving

£100,000 or more in Britain between 1809 and 1899, from more recent research on which I have been engaged. Among 7,574 persons leaving estates of £100,000 or more in Britain during that period, only 179 (2.4 per cent) were Jews.[21]

TABLE 4.
Jews in the British Wealth Structure — £100,000 + estates, 1809–1899

	Non-Jews	Jews	Jewish %
1809–1819	237	3	1.3
1820–1829	307	3	1.0
1830–1839	363	5	1.4
1840–1849	378	2	0.5
1850–1859	444	13	2.9
1860–1869	775	13	1.7
1870–1879	1,074	33	3.1
1880–1889	1,582	48	3.0
1890–1899	2,672	59	2.2
	7,574	179	= 2.4%

Put another way, more than 97 per cent of persons leaving £100,000 or more in Britain during the nineteenth century were not Jewish. Even this figure overstates the Jewish component by excluding many large landowners with insufficient personalty to leave £100,000 or more.

Anglo-Jewry's economic elite was overwhelmingly concentrated in the City of London and in the financial/commercial sector of the economy. Only three among the 66 Jews who left fortunes of £500,000 or more were industrialists (Ludwig Mond and his son Sir Alfred Melchett, first Baron Melchett, chemical manufacturers and founders of what is now ICI; and Sir Bernhard Samuelson, a steel manufacturer). Virtually all the others (like the Rothschilds or Sir Moses Montefiore) were engaged in finance or commerce, especially in the City. But here, the nature of these businesses probably diminished hostility to Anglo-Jewish business magnates. Classically, Anglo-Jewry's financial elite had virtually no interface or nexus with the 'ordinary' British person. British merchant banks were engaged chiefly in foreign and government loans; they were not High Street clearing bankers. No British clearing bank was owned or dominated by Jews. Thus, no Anglo-Jewish banker ever foreclosed on a British farm or house property in arrears, or charged usurious rates of interest for loans to an ordinary consumer. There were, of course, Jewish money-lenders such as the multi-millionaire Samuel Lewis (1837–1901), who specialised in loans to aristocrats in expectation of their inheritances, and there certainly existed an underworld of Jewish pawnbrokers, rackrent landlords, and catchpenny traders, but the Anglo-Jewish financial and commercial aristocracy had virtually no dealings of this kind.[22]

It will also be noted that Anglo-Jewry's economic elite closely resembled an 'inverted pyramid' with, comparatively, many more large fortunes than smaller ones. This is quite an accurate perception: Anglo-Jewish wealth-holders tended to cluster disproportionately among the very wealthiest of the wealthy, where they did indeed attract a good deal of attention, sometimes adverse, especially during the Edwardian period. Nevertheless, Jews constituted a surprisingly small component of the very wealthiest part of Britain's economic elite and plainly did not 'dominate' the British economy.

Taking only the very large British fortunes, those of a minimum of £2.5 million (about £125 million, or $200 million) left at death between 1870 and 1919, one finds that there was a total of 29 such estates. Among 24 British persons leaving wealth at this level (five such fortunes were left by foreigners), only four were left by Jews. Given the renown of the Anglo-Jewish 'Cousinhood' families and the central importance of the City of London to Britain's economy, this is indeed rather surprising: it seems that in Britain, very wealthy Jews were simply a small part of a very large picture. As with the German case, the very largest estates were left by non-Jews. Five foreigners — three South Africans, a Canadian, and a Greek — also left fortunes of £2.5 million or more in Britain; three of them were non-Jews. The picture presented here, moreover, again exaggerates the Jewish percentage by omitting most landowners. During the late nineteenth century, the richest man in England was certainly the Duke of Westminster, who owned Mayfair, Belgravia, and Pimlico. The first duke, who died in 1899, left about £900,000 in personalty but was generally estimated to be worth about £14 million in all, including his real estate. Other very great landowners — such as the Dukes of Bedford, Buccleuch, Northumberland, and Portland, the Earl of Derby, and Viscount Portman — were each almost certainly worth more than a total of £2.5 million.

The pattern found in Britain was reflected in an even clearer way in the most advanced economy, that of the United States. The Jewish presence in the American wealth structure during the classical period (c. 1865–1929) of 'Gilded Age' capitalism was, indeed, lower than in Britain. The most comprehensive academic study of America's richest men during 1865–c. 1970 was carried out by Frederic Cople Jaher, who studied the 310 richest Americans of that period, only one of whom was born after 1930.[23] His criteria for inclusion was wealth reliably estimated at $20 million or more between 1865 and 1919, $30 million or more between 1920 and 1945, and £75 million or more in the post-1945 period (to c. 1970). Fortunes had to have been held for some length of time — not to have been ephemeral.[24] According to these criteria, only 20 of 310 persons, or 6.5 per cent, were Jews.[25] By birth-cohort, only one of 27 top American wealth-holders born before

TABLE 5.
Jewish and Non-Jewish Top Wealth-holders in Britain, Deceased 1870–1919
(Minimum £2.5 Million)

Jewish	('ooo)
1. Herman, Baron de Stern (1815–1887) financier	£3,545
2. Lionel N. de Rothschild (1808–1879) merchant banker	£2,700
3. Samuel Lewis (1837–1901) money-lender	£2,671
4. Nathan, 1st Baron Rothschild (1840–1915) merchant banker	£2,500
Non-Jewish	**('ooo)**
1. Charles Morrison (1817–1909) financier; warehouseman	£10,939
2. Henry O. Wills (1828–1911) tobacco manufacturer	£5,315
3. George Coats, 1st Baron Glentanar (1849–1918) sewing thread manufacturer	£4,324
4. Enriquetta Rylands (d. 1908) widow, cotton manufacturer	£3,602
5. Thomas Brassey (1805–1870) railway contractor	£3,200
6. Wentworth Beaumont, 1st Baron Allendale (1829–1907) mineral and landowner	£3,189
7. Sir Charles Tennant (1823–1906) chemical manufacturer	£3,146
8. Hugh McCalmont (1809–1887) stockbroker	£3,122
9. Sir Frederick Wills (1835–1909) tobacco manufacturer	£3,051
10. Giles Loder (1786–1871) Russian merchant	£2,900
11. John Gretton (1833–1899) brewer	£2,884
12. William, 6th Earl Fitzwilliam (1815–1902) landowner	£2,882
13. Sir Andrew Walker (1824–1893) brewer	£2,877
14. Sir Edward Wills (1834–1910) tobacco manufacturer	£2,635
15. William O. Foster (1814–99) ironmaster	£2,588
16. John Rylands (1801–1888) cotton manufacturer	£2,575
17. Peter Coats (1842–1913) sewing thread manufacturer	£2,562
18. W.H. Wills, 1st Baron Winterstoke (1836–1911) tobacco manufacturer	£2,548
19. Sir James Coats (1834–1913) sewing thread manufacturer	£2,548
20. Hubert, 2nd Marquess of Clanricarde (1832–1916) landowner	£2,500

1830 (4 per cent) was Jewish, six of 105 born in 1830–65 (6 per cent), eight of 113 born in 1866–99 (7 per cent), and five of 55 born since 1900.

Concomitantly, it was certainly the case that the overwhelming majority of America's celebrated multi-millionaires during its golden age of *laissez-faire* capitalism and extraordinary economic development

TABLE 6.
Foreigners Leaving £2.5 Million or More in Britain, 1870–1919

Jewish	('000)
1. Alfred Beit (1853–1906) South African 'Randlord'	£8.049
2. Barney I. Barnato (1853–97) South African 'Randlord'	£2,807
Non-Jewish	**('000)**
1. Sir Julius Wernher (1850–1912) South African 'Randlord'	£10,044
2. Donald Smith, 1st Baron Strathcona (1820–1914) Canadian railway magnate	£4,700
3. Panaghi A. Vagliano (1817–1902) Greek merchant (in the City of London)	£2,888

were Protestants of British or northern European descent — Vanderbilt, Astor, Carnegie, Morgan, Frick, Gould, Rockefeller, Harriman, Whitney, Mellon, Duke, Ford, Stanford, Armour, and so many other renowned American tycoons. In contrast, only a handful of American Jewish businessmen of that period are well-known, with probably the most famous being the financier August Belmont (representative of the Rothschilds in the United States), the Seligman and Guggenheim families, the Strauss family of Macy's department store, and other retailing dynasties. Compared with a Rockefeller, Morgan, or Ford, however, they were minor exemplars of the heroic age of American capitalism. Recently, *American Heritage* magazine compiled a list of the 40 richest Americans of all time, with estimates of wealth given in 1998 dollars. Not one of these 40 was Jewish — the five richest-ever Americans being John D. Rockefeller (1839–1937), £118.5 billion in 1998 dollars; Andrew Carnegie (1835–1919), £62.8 billion; Cornelius Vanderbilt (1794–1877), £59.9 billion; John Jacob Astor (1763–1848), £48.7 billion; and Bill Gates (born 1955), £38.5 billion.[26]

Other surveys of business leaders in 'Gilded Age' America also provide evidence of the very small number of Jews in America's economic elite. Perhaps the best known is William Miller's survey of 190 presidents and chairmen of America's largest companies in manufacturing, mining, railways, public utilities, and finance (commercial and investment banking and life insurance), assessed by size of firm, in the decade 1901–10. Miller found that six of the 190 men in his study were Jews, or 3 per cent;[27] 90 per cent were Protestants — 25 per cent Episcopalians (that is, Anglicans) and 21 per cent Presbyterians — while seven per cent were Catholics. Only one of the six Jews (Daniel Guggenheim of American Smelting and Refining) was an industrialist; the other five (among them August Belmont, Jacob H. Schiff, and Paul M. Warburg) were primarily financiers. Another well-known study of America's 247 leading industrialists of

the 1870s in textiles, railways, and steel did not identify a single Jew:
every man in the sample was a Protestant.[28]

Other data from America point to the comparatively small
proportion of Jews in that country's economic elite until the post-1945
(or even the post-1970) period, even in milieus where one might have
expected significant numbers of Jews to be present. For instance, lists
of the wealthiest residents of New York City — those whose personal
assessments for local taxes based upon estimated personalty were the
highest of any New York City residents — were published in the
earlier part of this century. The official tentative estimate for 1929,
the last year before the Great Depression, contained the names of 101
persons assessed for $100,000 or more.[29] Of these, either 18 or 20
were Jews, a lower percentage than the estimated proportion (28.7
per cent) of Jews in New York's population at that time. The wealthiest
resident of New York City then, assessed as worth $1.1 million, was
John D. Rockefeller Sr. The wealthiest Jewish New Yorker, Nettie G.
Naumberg, was assessed at $300,000, that is, in joint 16th–20th place
on the scale of wealth, trailing such citizens as the Huntingdons,
Vanderbilts, Whitneys, and Harknesses.

Something might also be usefully said here about the situation in
Australia during the same period, drawn from Australia's probate
records. Unlike the case in Britain, Australia's records included the
value of land as well as personalty. I compiled lists of the largest estates
left per five-year period (for example 1880–1884, 1885–1889, etc.) in
New South Wales and Victoria — generally the 50 largest estates in
each period.[30] New South Wales (whose capital is Sydney) and
Victoria (capital, Melbourne) were the two largest and most advanced
Australian colonies, which federated with the other Australian
colonies in 1901 to form the Commonwealth of Australia. Among the
1,090 largest estates left in New South Wales (as grouped by five-year
cohorts) between 1817 (when the Australian probate records begin)
and 1939, only 36 to 39 per cent were left by Jews (the origins of
several wealth-holders is unclear), or 3.3 to 3.6 per cent. In Victoria,
among the 785 largest estates left between 1853 (Victoria became a
separate colony in 1851) and 1939 no more than 18 or 19 had been
held by Jews, or 2.3–2.4 per cent. Most wealthy Jews were retailers or
merchants, although a wide variety of trades was represented. The
wealthiest estate left by an Australian Jew was that of the retailer
Sidney Myer (1878–1934), the founder of the Myer Emporium
department store in Melbourne, who left £1,532,000. The largest
Jewish Australian fortunes could not compare with the largest non-
Jewish estates, which in general were left by pastoralists like 'Big'
Clarke, Sir Samuel Wilson, and Sir Samuel McCaughey, or by urban
businessmen like the Millers and the Symes.

It might well be pointed out that the countries with the greatest Jewish component in their wealth structure also had the largest Jewish populations, so that the high Jewish percentage in the wealth structure is not remarkable. There is a certain element of truth in this observation: the Jewish population was obviously greater, in both absolute and comparative terms, in Poland than it was in Britain. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to draw general conclusions from that fact. The following table (from the *American Jewish Year Book* for 1918–1919 and 1927–1928) presents the Jewish and overall populations in the countries considered in this paper at various times between 1919 and 1921.

TABLE 7.
Jewish Populations in Selected Countries ('000)

	Year	Total Population	Jewish Population	%
Russian Empire	1913	170,903	6,946	4.1
Poland	1921	27,193	2,854	10.5
Austria-Hungary	1910	51,109	2,258 (Hungary: 938)	4.4 (Hungary: 5.1)
Germany	1910	64,926	615	0.95
United Kingdom	1915	46,407	264	0.56
United States	1918	103,000	3,300	3.2
Australia	1911	4,455	17	0.4
France	1911	39,602	100	0.25

A number of conclusions seem clear. First, everywhere the Jewish component of the economic elite was markedly higher than the Jewish share of the population: this is simply a fact about the Jewish condition at that time. Second, in no country was the Jewish percentage of the population greater than a tiny minority, inter-war Poland alone excepted, even in Czarist Russia. Third, as a proportion of the overall population the number of Jews in Germany, Britain, France, and even Australia was not wildly different, despite the great differences in the Jewish percentage of the economic elite of each country. Moreover, although there is a rough correlation between the percentage of Jews in any country and the quantum of antisemitism found there, it is only a very rough one. In particular, Jewish numbers in the United States were vastly in excess of any reasonable or accurate assessment of the extent of American antisemitism, even during the inter-war years, when nativist and elite exclusionist pressures on Jews (and other immigrant minorities) were probably at their peak. It may not be fully appreciated that by the late 1880s New York had already become the city with the largest Jewish population in the world, while by the late 1930s New York had the largest Jewish population of any city in the world by a factor of many times. By 1939 New York's population of about 2.2 million Jews was more than six times larger than Warsaw's

and, remarkably, thirteen times the Jewish population of pre-*Anschluss* Vienna (165,000).[31]

It thus seems clear that Jewish participation in the economic elite of each country was autonomous, in the sense that it cannot readily be linked with Jewish population figures. On the other hand, it can clearly be linked with the degree of economic development of each country, especially with the transformation of that society from predominantly rural to predominantly urban. More importantly still, Jewish over-representation in the economic elite of each society can plainly be linked to the extent of serious and sustained antisemitism in these societies, however loosely and however much the extent of antisemitism was obviously dependent upon, and mediated by, innumerable other cultural, religious, political, and social factors. To put the matter bluntly, throughout Eastern and Central Europe the Jewish component of the economic elite was, demonstrably, so high as inevitably to engender antisemitism, in particular in the context of an era hallmarked by near-universal nationalism and nationally-based rivalries.

Over-representation in the economic elite of a visible ethnic minority of the degree found in Poland or Hungary was certain to cause trouble regardless of the identity of the group: if Belgians, Bulgarians, or Bolivians had constituted 62 per cent of the highest income-earners of Hungary, rather than Jews, that would certainly have engendered resentment against them. Such an assertion would not have been shocking to the early theorists of the Zionist movement, who were well aware that the 'abnormal' socio-economic structure of European Jewry was a potent source of antisemitism. When Ber Borochov, the socialist Zionist, described the occupational structure of European Jewry as 'an inverted pyramid' and Vladimir Jabotinsky spoke of 'the antisemitism of things rather than of men', both surely had these facts in mind, both wishing to create a 'normal' Jewish society in Palestine.

These facts might also better help us to understand the nature of European antisemitism as it emerged in the late nineteenth century. To us, European antisemitism appears to be a weapon of the strong against the weak, a kind of ideological sadism. To European right-wing nationalists of the post-1870 period, however, antisemitism appeared to be a weapon of the weak against the strong, an attempt (as they saw it) by a downtrodden nation to regain control over its resources from a separate, distinctive minority which appeared to dominate its economy — an aim not unlike that of anti-colonial movements in the Third World *vis-à-vis* the Europeans and foreign entrepreneurial minorities (like the Chinese throughout South-East Asia). The Zionist movement understood this perfectly well, however

disturbing such a perspective may seem to us viewed with post-Holocaust eyes.

Moreover, research is most likely to demonstrate a very considerable actual Jewish over-representation in many other social and political areas which figured largely in the litany of continental antisemitism of the post-1870 period, especially Jewish participation in the radical left, the liberal professions, in journalism, and in the media. The over-representation of Jews in the Marxist revolutions of Europe in 1917–1919, though never as high as extreme antisemites claimed, was indeed substantial. In probably the most extreme case, the Bela Kun Revolution of 1919 in Hungary, of 48 People's Commissars in the short-lived government, 30 were Jewish, as were 161 of its 202 highest officials.[32]

It might also be very tentatively maintained that there was less antisemitism in continental Europe in those countries where Jews failed to demonstrate such a marked degree of over-representation in the economic elite. Some very suggestive evidence is available here from the experience of the Jews in Bulgaria and Belgium. According to a recent study of Bulgarian Jewry in the Holocaust, Jewish spokesmen in that country in the 1930s, threatened by the rising tide of antisemitism, took pains to note that their social structure differed markedly from that in other European countries.

> Jews had almost no part in the nation's wealth . . . There wasn't one Jew among the owners of mines, forests, and quarries ... There were only 84 industrialists, and not even one banker ... Out of 25,000 Jews in Sofia, only 1422 owned shops, and 723 were merchants whose entire capital consisted of a small crate of cheap goods.[33]

Almost uniquely in Europe, antisemitic legislation introduced by the Bulgarian government at that time was genuinely unpopular with both elite and mass opinion in the country, while Bulgaria's Jewish population survived the war intact. The survival of the whole of Bulgarian Jewry was unique among any country allied with Nazi Germany, and was due in part (though not wholly) to the relative unpopularity of antisemitism, especially among Bulgaria's elites. In Belgium, where the Nazi military authorities had drawn up plans in 1941 to eliminate Jews from the economy, Maxime Steinberg recently noted that 'the Belgian Jews did not measure up to the expectations of antisemitic mythology . . . The Jewish businesses were mostly . . . enterprises of middle, small, or minuscule importance' of interest 'neither to the Belgian economy nor to the German war economy'.[34] It is a fact that a significantly higher portion of Belgian Jewry survived the Holocaust than in virtually every other area directly occupied by Nazi Germany, especially in a country on Germany's doorstep. The precise number of Belgian Jews who perished in the Holocaust is

uncertain, but was apparently about 24,600 out of some 70,000 Belgian Jews, about 35 per cent.[35] This figure should be compared with the statistics for the Netherlands (which had a greater tradition of tolerance than virtually anywhere else in Europe): 104,000 out of 140,000 perished, or 74 per cent. Plainly, there were many salient factors in determining the likelihood of a Jewish community to survive the Nazi occupation, but these facts certainly appear noteworthy.

The situation in most of continental Europe, especially Eastern and Central Europe, differed categorically from that in the 'New Diaspora', especially the English-speaking world. In the economic sphere, Jews plainly failed to dominate the economy, although they were over-represented in the elite. There is no reason to suppose that the quality of Jewish entrepreneurship in London or New York was markedly lower than in Budapest or Vienna, and the reason for the lower Jewish percentage of the economic elite was, without question, that non-Jewish entrepreneurship was vastly superior to that in Eastern Europe. Britain's commercial and industrial magnates of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who generated self-sustained economic growth for the first time in any society in history and, above all, America's business tycoons during the period when the United States rose from frontier obscurity to becoming the world's greatest economic power, vastly outnumbered the Jewish entrepreneurial minorities found there.

The difference between a continental Europe and the English-speaking world was also reflected in the different approaches to capitalism in the writings of Werner Sombart and Max Weber. To Sombart (1863–1941), the antisemitic, proto-Nazi German sociologist and economic historian, capitalism was 'Jewish'; to Max Weber (1864–1920), famously, capitalism was 'Protestant'.[36] In my view, one of Weber's underlying concerns in linking capitalism to Protestantism was specifically to respond, as a German liberal, to German conservatives who had long since viewed capitalism as 'Jewish' (and, as well, to respond to Marxism, which sees modern capitalists as comprising a new elite adversarial to Europe's pro-modern elites, which largely remained in power in the Edwardian period). In contrast to either, Weber saw *both* German capitalism and Prussia's political and military elites as emerging from the Reformation. He also implicitly or explicitly viewed Germany as both 'modern' and sharing all-important commonalties with the other leading 'modern' and Protestant nations, America and Britain.[37] In a curious but revealing passage in *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, Sombart noted that when he stated in public that capitalism was 'an expression of the Jewish spirit', he was told that 'the history of the United States proves the contrary', and noted that 'Mark Twain . . . once considered at some length why the Jews played no great part in the [United] States, giving

as his reason that the Americans were as "smart" as the Jews, if not smarter'.[38] Sombart then notes: 'there is an almost unique identity of view between Judaism and Puritanism' and that 'Puritanism *is* Judaism'.[39]

There is almost certainly a strong element of truth in Sombart's contentions, which may well account for the unique success enjoyed by the Jews in the English-speaking world in modern times, and the rarity of strong antisemitic tendencies. In the English-speaking world, antisemitism was strongly visible only at some especially disturbed times — as, in Britain, during the five years or so after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 — or was social and elitist in nature (especially in the United States), particularly manifested as the attempt by the threatened Anglo-Saxon elite to restrict overly-rapid upward mobility by immigrant Jews (and other white minority groups), chiefly during the inter-war period.[40] Political antisemitism was either non-existent or always confined to the outermost fringes of political life, while a significant tradition of philosemitism, founded in particular in the predominant liberal ideology of the English-speaking world, was just as significant as was antisemitism, and arguably more significant.[41]

These observations beg the question of how and why the Jews became such a dominant force in the economic elite of the Eastern and Central European states. Were they a uniquely talented and successful minority group, or did they share numerous commonalties with other minority groups? The best answer to these questions, in my opinion, lies in viewing the Jews as an entrepreneurial minority with many features in common with other groups but also with several strikingly unique features.

It is not easy to offer a clear and cogent definition of the term 'entrepreneurial minority', and I propose to cut the Gordian knot by defining it as a group, virtually religious or ethnic in nature, which has a well-deserved reputation for success at business life. Clear-cut examples of such groups include Quakers and Unitarians in Britain after about 1700, Island Greeks (such as those from Chios or the Ionians), overseas Chinese, Armenians, Parsees, and Jews throughout all of modern history. Other groups which might well be included under the heading of 'entrepreneurial minorities' include overseas Scots, East India Company 'nabobs', and 'old China hands' — that is Western (chiefly British and American) merchants resident in Chinese trading posts for many years. The most cursory glance reveals the extremely diverse nature of these groups. What, if anything, distinguished the Jews from the other groups? Indeed, what did the Jews and other entrepreneurial minorities have in common?

In my view, no theory of entrepreneurship has successfully situated the Jews (or, indeed, other groups) into a convincing theoretical

matrix. I think that the most fruitful way of classifying the best-known entrepreneurial minorities is embodied in Figure 1:

It will be seen that this schema divides entrepreneurial minorities into two essentially different types: 'chosen' endogamous sects and diasporas. Jews as a group contain elements of both and uniquely straddle the two. These two types of entrepreneurial minorities are often conflated and confused, but have essentially different characteristics. 'Chosen' endogamous sects (the term 'chosen' derives from the Biblical Hebrew notion of 'chosenness') are typically small Protestant sects, of which the Quakers and Unitarians are probably the best-known. Historically, such sects are commonly endogamous, intermarrying exclusively among themselves and, in the case of the Quakers, long expelling those who 'married out'. They maintained separate educational systems and had an agreed version of their history based centrally on memories of persecution, engendering a notion of Divine 'chosenness'. Although English Protestant groups are the best-known 'chosen' groups, other non-Protestant sects may perhaps also be classified here, such as the Parsees and, especially, the Jews themselves, the original 'chosen people' who exhibit most of the qualities of the later smaller Protestant sects.

'Chosen' groups are seemingly always religious in nature, although some 'intellectual aristocracies', such as the famous Cambridge University 'intellectual aristocracy' from the time of Charles Darwin to John Maynard Keynes also seemingly exhibit similar qualities (but in this case not manifested in business life). The 'Weber Thesis' is normally construed as interpreting the success of Protestant sects, and especially of smaller sects of this type, in terms of their religious beliefs, particularly their 'this-worldly asceticism', the ploughing back of profits,

wealth as a sign of God's grace, and the notion of an occupational 'calling' from God. The 'Weber Thesis' cannot readily come to terms with non-Protestant groups which may exhibit similar characteristics. Max Weber maintained that modern capitalism demonstrated, especially in its ploughing back of profits and 'deferred gratification', qualities more closely associated with Protestantism than with the mercantile and financial pursuits long associated with Jews.

While, since Weber, the success of Protestants at entrepreneurship has traditionally been explained by religious factors (those outlined above), *non*-religious explanations of the success of such groups are also possible and are in many ways more plausible and convincing. In particular, 'chosen' endogamous groups are often hallmarked by constituting national (or international) networks which, especially before the late nineteenth century, provided information on business conditions in widespread places, gave credit and loans, diminished risks, formed a pool of trustworthy partners and marriageable offspring, ostracised dishonest members, and taught basic entrepreneurial and business skills and methods through apprenticeships among the extended network. Together, these gave 'chosen' groups a tremendous advantage in pre-corporate, pre-modern times. Some diaspora groups functioned in the same way, and here it is often difficult to distinguish between the two, although 'chosen' groups often operated within their own homeland rather than outside it (to name one difference), while diasporas often lacked a self-conscious religious identity. *Non*-religious explanations of the success enjoyed by entrepreneurial *religious* minorities paradoxically probably better explains the success of non-Protestant groups than does the 'Weber Thesis' about Protestantism alone.

In my opinion, one other central characteristic among 'chosen' endogamous groups, including most emphatically the Jews, is that they almost invariably combined high marginality with high self-esteem. High self-esteem is a component of their 'chosenness', while high marginality stems from their status as religious minorities which were frequently persecuted. The *combination* of these two qualities may be one of the key determinants of high achievement in a variety of fields and may fruitfully distinguish high-achieving minorities from other minorities which have no reputation for business (or intellectual) achievement, such as Roman Catholics in Britain or blacks in the so-called 'black diasporas'. Such groups typically combine high marginality with low self-esteem (although it is obviously very difficult to demonstrate this satisfactorily). It is also possible to imagine non-religious groups which combine high self-esteem with at least a sense of high marginality, for instance the 'Cambridge intellectual aristocracy' noted above.

It would be worth asking here whether high achievement is transmissible among a range of fields apart from entrepreneurial ability. For instance, Jews since c. 1850 have produced a grossly disproportionate number of important scientists and seminal thinkers, especially in the social sciences (although they are not so strongly represented in other fields). The 'Cambridge intellectual aristocracy', if it is in any way comparable to the Jewish case, was entirely non-entrepreneurial, both in the social origins of most of its members (although Darwin and Ralph Vaughan Williams were descended from the Wedgwoods) and in its field of achievement. The sense of 'chosenness' common to such groups is, however, primarily religious in nature and is clearly best engendered by core religious beliefs and values. One wonders whether the notion so central to America's national consciousness of the United States being 'God's own country', the 'last, best hope of mankind' — a kind of national self-esteem really found nowhere else — has itself stimulated America's amazing entrepreneurial success during the past 150 years.

This schema distinguishes 'chosen' endogamous groups from diasporas. Recent sociologists have divided diasporas into a number of types; for example, Robin Cohen distinguishes 'victim diasporas' (Africans and Armenians); 'labour and imperial diasporas' (Indians and British); 'trade diasporas' (Chinese and Lebanese); etc.[42] Although Cohen's divisions are useful on a general level, a different set of emphases is given here, where entrepreneurial diasporas are further divided into two distinct types: those whose members experience (and intend to experience) emigration and return to their homeland, and true diasporas, those whose members either have no real homeland or none to which they can return, or wish to return. The overseas Scots who made a fortune in the Empire, then returned to buy a Highland estate and hopefully found a high-status dynasty, are examples of the first type of diaspora, as were British 'nabobs' and 'old China hands', while Armenians are a well-known example of the second type. Armenians made their homes wherever they found themselves, and had no independent homeland to return to, although there were heavily Armenian areas of settlement, especially in what is today the Armenian Republic in the Caucasian mountains, in eastern Turkey, and throughout the Ottoman Empire, particularly western Turkey, before the 1915 persecutions and pogroms. Armenians also formerly lived throughout Eastern Europe, constituting a major part of the mercantile class, and indeed throughout the whole of the Levant.[43]

Very similar to the Armenians were the Island Greeks, who since the early nineteenth century have controlled a grossly disproportionate share of the world's cargo·shipping trade (and still do). They are also merchants and bankers, and until the early part of the twentieth

century were dominant in the export trade from southern Russia to all parts of the world.[44] Island Greeks came from a number of different places in the Greek Mediterranean islands and the coast of Turkey, with an interesting pattern wherein men from one such geographical area succeeded another group *at the same trades* at roughly generational intervals. The earliest and best-known shipowning Island Greeks in the modern period came from the island of Chios, and included the well-known Ralli, Schilizzi, Papayanni, and Petrocochino families. By the 1860s the Rallis and others had established their international headquarters in London, where nine members of the Ralli family and five Schilizzis left estates of £500,000 or more between 1868 and 1939. After the 1860s, a second set of Island Greek merchants, originating in the Ionian Islands, gradually replaced them in similar endeavours. A world-wide Greek mercantile diaspora had been formed by the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, even in 1990 Greek shipowners apparently owned more than one-third of the world's merchant cargo fleet, vessels flying either the Greek flag or flags of convenience.[45] Aristotle Onassis was, of course, probably the most famous post-war shipowner. It is also interesting to note that while Island Greeks were renowned for their business prowess, Greece itself remained a semi-developed country until recently. This pattern is probably a common one among entrepreneurial diasporas. Most assuredly, the 'Pale of Settlement', where Jews were confined to live in Czarist Russia until the First World War, was known for its chronic poverty *despite* the parallel strong Jewish entry into the economic elites of many countries.

As indicated in the diagram, Jews were clearly a diaspora entrepreneurial minority — indeed, once again, the archetypal one, since they literally had no homeland until 1948, apart from shared memories of the Biblical land of Palestine. Only with the rise of the English-speaking democracies and basic changes in definitions of national citizenship to include religious and ethnic minorities could Jews securely feel themselves a part of the country they lived in, or were so regarded by the majority. Unlike 'chosen' endogamous groups, which are usually religious sects, diasporas are based in ethnicity/nationality commonalities. The success enjoyed by entrepreneurial diasporas is thus presumably due to the non-religious advantages of internationally-based but interrelated minority communities noted above. Clearly, the 'Weber Thesis' has no relevance to explaining the success of these groups. Indeed, while smaller Protestant sects occasionally acted as internationally-based entrepreneurial diaspora groups — the transatlantic Quaker 'Cousinhood' of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries comes to mind, as do the Protestant German communities of Eastern Europe before the Second World War — Protestants did

not as a rule form entrepreneurial diasporas in the same way as did Jews, Greeks, Lebanese, Armenians, and other such groups.

The success enjoyed by both types of entrepreneurial minorities distinguished in this schema is more typical of the early modern period and of the earlier stages of modern commercial and industrial capitalism (up to about 1870) than of the corporate capitalism of the past 130 years. Corporate capitalism has largely rendered unnecessary the advantages (trustworthy partners, risk-minimisation, etc.) enjoyed by both groups. It puts in place a professional managerial structure with profit-making goals and criteria, has access to international information networks, establishes rationally-based hiring and promotion criteria, and funds research/development and advertising. Corporations can engage in take-overs and mergers of a kind which kinship-based partnerships find difficult. Theoretically, corporate capitalism should be entirely or very largely free of religious/ethnic modes of organization. In contemporary America, Britain, and Europe, it is just possible that ethnicity indeed plays almost no role in the hiring and promotion practices of most very large corporations, although in America before about 1960, large corporations were white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (and male) bastions. Professional business school education, and the current popularity of business careers among talented students, suggest that hiring and promotion into the larger corporations will be based largely on talent. Since the mid-1960s, also, virtually every democracy has adopted anti-discrimination legislation which makes overt ethnic discrimination illegal. Democracy, pluralism, secularisation, and the ubiquity of the mass media have done much to remove the shared memories of oppression which bound together groups like Protestant Dissenters until as late as 1914.

Nevertheless, it is clearly the case that some ethnic/nationality groups have remained as strikingly successful entrepreneurial minorities until the present, for instance Jews and Island Greeks. Indeed, new ethnic-based entrepreneurial minorities have become prominent in the contemporary period, for example Overseas Chinese (with a long history of entrepreneurship behind them), the Hindu and Sikh diasporas, and perhaps a Nigerian/West African group. Many shops in impoverished black ghettos in the United States are run by Korean and Indian immigrants. One also wonders whether in the past 25 years there has been the emergence of a women's business class, centred in some types of 'tender-minded' shops and services. How conceptually to relate the growing female presence in business life to the impact of previous 'minorities' is an interesting question, but it probably should be linked to the emergence of an affluent, well-educated middle class of consumers, as well as to the removal of

discriminatory barriers in entry into business life, the provision of credit, etc., and to non-traditional family and life-style patterns.

Paradoxically, it also seems clear that the heyday of the capitalist 'rugged individual' tycoon was typically found at a period later than the zenith of the religious or ethnic-based entrepreneurial minorities, which were associated with an earlier phase of capitalism. Very roughly, the 'ideal type' of the (often Methodist) northern factory owner reached his zenith after about 1850 — long after, for instance, the Quaker 'Cousinhoods' became prominent. One reason for this is that the advantages enjoyed by the older kinship networks had largely dissipated by that time. For example, by the later nineteenth century there was an independent mercantile and sales network for the products of Britain's manufacturing enterprises (or at least the beginnings of one), local banks which supplied credit, etc. Thus, both 'rugged individual' tycoon capitalism *and* corporate capitalism may be more typical of the later (post-1850/1870) phases of capitalism than are modes of capitalism exemplified by either type of entrepreneurial minority.

By and large, both types of entrepreneurial minority were more likely to be found in commercial than in manufacturing capitalism. Indeed, 'middleman' capitalism was often heavily associated with extended kinship and international networks of the types discussed here. In the Middle Ages and the early modern period, also, Jews predominated in the role of bankers, money-lenders, and tax-collectors, largely because of the ban on usury among Christians. In the modern era, although the ban on usury no longer exists, Jewish economic activity has certainly been found disproportionately in finance and commerce. However, in contrast, Protestant sects appear to have had a much greater affinity (for reasons which are not obvious) with industrial and manufacturing capitalism as well as with commerce. This may in fact be an important distinction between 'chosen' groups and diasporas.

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the Levant until the Second World War, entrepreneurial minorities and diasporas virtually constituted the business middle classes of many countries which had failed to produce a native business class (such as Poland, Rumania, and much of the Ottoman Empire). As demonstrated, Jews in these countries were a disproportionate component of the economic elite, but such groups as Armenians, Greeks, Lebanese Christians, and Eastern European German Protestants were also very prominent. In general, relations between entrepreneurial minorities were always good, although there were some notable exceptions when rivalries emerged. For instance, some historians have noted the disproportionate involvement of Greeks in the antisemitic pogroms in southern Russia between 1881 and 1905. This may have been caused by the

growing displacement of Greek merchants by Jews in the import-export trade of southern Russia at that period. Previously, Greek merchants had dominated this trade by exporting via the Black Sea and the Levant. In the late nineteenth century, however, Jewish merchants, using the railway routes to Europe, were rivalling the Greeks.[46]

Conclusion

The Jews, uniquely, bridge both 'chosen' minorities and diasporas. Sociologists and historians have pointed to a wide range of factors to account for the ability of Jews in business life. In Christian Europe until the Reformation, Jews were the only people who could lend money at interest and were commonly used by kings and royal courts as tax-collectors and money-lenders (for example, by the Norman kings of England between 1066 and 1290). As late as the eighteenth century, 'Court Jews' remained as official money-lenders to many Central European princes, for instance the Rothschilds to the rulers of Hesse-Cassel. Some Marxist historians have argued that the unique 'wealthy pariah' economic role of Jews was precisely what allowed them to survive for so many centuries as the only non-Christian group permitted to exist in most of Europe.

In religious terms, Judaism has no tradition of poverty as a virtue in itself nor of asceticism (although it equally has no tradition of wealth being seen as a sign of God's favour). Jewish tradition demanded that all Jewish males (and, indeed, females) be literate in order to read prayer books, while Jewish religious life is obsessively time-conscious (of festivals, sabbaths, etc.) in, perhaps, a modern sense. From a non-religious perspective, Jews were, as a people, a kind of very large extended kinship network all over the Western world and the Levant, with fewer internal class barriers than among most other settled peoples, and a long tradition of wealthy Jews assisting poor and oppressed Jewish communities. Perhaps more importantly than any other factor, practising Jews could not, until the early mid-nineteenth century, enter the nobility or higher-status groups of any European country; even if rich, they could not readily buy land, become landed aristocrats, or join the military elite (or, by definition, the Christian church elite). Thus Jews could become wealthy only as owners of personalty, not realty; there was no Jewish 'haemorrhage of talent' towards the idle rich among the children and grand-children of successful Jewish businessmen, or at any rate much less of one than among other groups. Furthermore, as successive generations of impoverished Orthodox Jews left the ghettos, especially by heavy emigration to America and other parts of the 'new Diaspora' after 1880, they entered societies which were regularly well-disposed to

capitalism and to upward social mobility, with much less rampant antisemitism than prevailed in Eastern and Central Europe. Nevertheless, while all these factors greatly benefited the Jews in 'backward' countries, the Jewish proportion of the economic elite in the more developed countries was much smaller and, in many places, minimal. By weight of numbers, and by exhibiting characteristics very similar to those which traditionally brought economic success to the Jews, the Gentiles in the developed countries provided the over-whelming majority of the economic elite of those countries.

As the Jewish example immediately suggests, entrepreneurial minorities have often been subject to fierce hostility by local national-ists. As noted, one of the major underlying factors in modern European antisemitism has been the often grossly disproportionate over-representation of Jews in the local economic elites of Central and Eastern Europe. (Significantly, antisemitism was always strikingly lower in the English-speaking world, where the Jewish percentage of the economic elite was always comparatively low.) In Southeast Asia, Overseas Chinese have been subject to similar hostility, as have been Hindus and Sikhs throughout East Africa. Armenians were massacred by the Turks during the First World War, while more than a million Greeks were expelled by Turkey in the early 1920s. Indeed, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that much of twentieth-century nationalism, in Europe and beyond, has consisted of eliminating 'alien' entrepreneurial minorities from national economies. To go even further, it might well be useful for historians to view European antisemitism of the 1879–1945 era (including the Holocaust, although that obviously has unique features) as an attempt to eliminate an overly-successful and visibly different minority. Thus antisemitism had many features in common with other attempts around the world aimed by other peoples at other overly-successful minorities. In contrast, the English-speaking world has been largely sympathetic to such minorities, particularly in the largest cosmopolitan *entrepôts* like London and New York. In the English-speaking worlds, by and large, success has rarely been penalised. One late nineteenth-century description of the Baltic Exchange in London (which deals primarily in freight chartering on merchant ships) noted that its prominent members included 'the wily Greek and the almost wilier Hebrew, the cute Yank and the German with spectacles on both outer and inner eye . . . together with some of the shrewdest Britons, metropolitan and provincial'.[47] These ethnic descriptions were ambiguous: half hostile but half admiring. The City of London, in particular, has welcomed entrepreneurial minorities for centuries, while New York was the 'melting pot' itself. The comparatively sympathetic attitude of the English-speaking countries presumably stems from the fact that capitalism and democracy were deeply rooted in their local cultures,

but also from the fact that a powerful and successful elite existed which did not perceive these outsider groups as a threat.

Entrepreneurial minorities were 'elite' groups which should therefore be distinguished from other types of ethnic minorities. Such groups as the Irish in Britain and America and the Blacks and West Indians in both countries and elsewhere were groups without a reputation for entrepreneurial talent. They were perceived as threats and unwelcome arrivals in very different ways from attitudes to Jews and Armenians and they were feared for such alleged characteristics as propensity to drunkenness and crime, as well as the dangers they allegedly presented of 'swamping' the demographic balance of a country. It will be interesting to see whether trends towards globalization and increasingly greater rates of higher education throughout the world will produce, in the twenty-first century, a world-wide capitalism which is freer from the influence of entrepreneurial minorities, or whether such minorities will persist, either in the same forms as have been known in modern times or in new, perhaps disguised, ways.

NOTES

[1] There is a well-known school of Jewish economic historians which links Jewish economic participation with disproportionate economic backwardness, although the evidence and conclusions of this paper are, so far as I am aware, original. See especially the essays (particularly by Yehuda Don, Victor Carady, and Michael K. Silber) in Yehuda Don and Victor Karady, eds., *A Social and Economic History of Central European Jewry* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1990), and Michael K. Silber, ed., *Jews in the Hungarian Economy 1760–1945: Studies Dedicated to Moshe Carmilly-Weinberger on His Eightieth Birthday* (Jerusalem, 1992). See also Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid, eds., *Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe* (Seattle and London, 1997), reviewed in this Journal by Harold Pollins vol. XL, numbers 1 and 2, 1998). On the economic theme in modern antisemitism, see also Kevin Macdonald, *Separation and its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism* (Westport, Conn., 1998), pp. 38–50. To give a consistent and cogent definition of an 'economic elite' is a difficult task. This difficulty is greatly compounded by the fact that available international statistics are not consistent, being used in one country to denote prominent businessmen and elsewhere for top wealth-holders or high income-earners. The historian is at the mercy of these definitional difficulties,

although the categories of course overlap very considerably. Nor does membership in the economic elite (however defined) always imply political power (however defined) and, indeed, one of the major difficulties faced by European Jewry before the Second World War was that their disproportionate presence in the economic elite did not result in equivalent political power. Almost certainly the end of the aristocratic regimes in 1918 weakened this linkage considerably.

[2] Andrew C. Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825–1945* (Princeton, 1982), Table 12, p. 114. A 'virilist' was one who paid more than 1,000 florins in direct taxes. It should be noted that Janos's statistics are based on a random sample of 18 of 64 Hungarian counties. The names and incomes of all 'virilists' were derived by Janos from a book self-published in 1887 by A. Censor, *Our Society and Its Calling* (in Hungarian).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid. These data, it should be clearly noted, were taken by Janos from an avowedly antisemitic source: Alajos Kovacs, *The Ascendancy of Jewry in Hungary* (in Hungarian, Budapest, 1933, ibid., Notes 66 and 67).

[5] Ibid. Again, Janos's claim apparently derives from Kovacs's work.

[6] I. M. Dijur, 'Jews in the Russian Economy', in Jacob Frumkin *et al.*, eds., *Russian Jewry (1860–1917)*, New York, 1966, *passim*.

[7] Ibid., pp. 129–133. See also Arcadius Kahan, 'Notes on Jewish Entrepreneurship in Tsarist Russia', in Geoffrey Guroff and Fred V. Carstenzen, eds., *Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union* (Princeton, 1983).

[8] Dijur, op. cit. in Note 6 above, pp. 133–34.

[9] Cited in Ibid., p. 142. Jews at the time constituted only five per cent of the Russian population. It should be noted that, according to Bernatsky's statistics, 65 per cent of the Russian mercantile class were not Jews. The period *c.* 1890–1917 also saw the emergence of a significant non-Jewish Russian commercial and industrial bourgeoisie which is only now being studied by historians.

[10] Joseph Marcus, *The Social and Political History of the Jews in Poland, 1919–1939* (Berlin and New York, 1983). Appendix: Table 4A, p. 450. Marcus's statistics do not, however, distinguish as clearly between the agricultural and non-farm sectors as one would wish.

[11] Ibid., p. 95. The three-volume work, by Aleksander Bochenski, was published in Warsaw in 1966–1969.

[12] Marcus, op. cit. in Note 10 above.

[13] Ibid., pp. 112–21.

[14] W. E. Mosse has written two books on this subject, *Jews in the German Economic Elite, 1820–1935* (Oxford, 1987) and *The German-Jewish Economic Elite, 1820–1935: A Socio-Cultural Profile* (Oxford, 1989). The study by Dolores Augustine, *Patricians and Parvenus: Wealth and High Society in Wilhelmine Germany* (Oxford, 1994) is also based on Martin's 'wealth census' material, but examines only Prussia and only businessmen (thus ignoring the non-business component of German wealth-holders). It reaches conclusions·broadly similar to those in the works by Mosse: about 25 per cent of Prussian millionaires were Jewish. Of the non-Jews, at least 64 per cent were Protestants (chiefly Lutherans) and only 9 per cent Catholics (Augustine,

p. 32). By a familiar pattern, the wealthiest single person in this sample was not Jewish, namely Bertha Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach ('Big Bertha', the wife of the head of Krupps), who was worth 283 million marks (about £14.2 million or £57 million).

[15] Mosse, *Jews in the German Economic Elite*, op. cit. in Note 14 above, p. 6.

[16] Ibid., p. 8.

[17] Ibid., p. 202.

[18] Ibid., pp. 323–33.

[19] France is the most important country for which we lack genuinely comprehensive statistics which are comparable with those elsewhere. In France, taxation records were generally collected by *département*, making national studies difficult. Some conclusions relevant to this paper, however, can be made. First, the Rothschilds were almost certainly the richest family in France during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and account for much of the image of rich and powerful French Jews so common on the French far right from the Orléans period until Vichy (and beyond). By far the richest of the Regents and Governors of the Bank of France under the Second Empire (1851–1870) was James de Rothschild, worth on one estimate 115 million francs (about £4.7 million): Alain Plesis, *Régents et Gouverneurs de la Banque de France sous le Second Empire* (Paris, 1988), p. 362, note 911. James de Rothschild (1792–1868), head of the French branch of the bank, was assuredly the richest man in France, and probably the richest man in Europe, at his death. A more recent estimate of his wealth at death, by Niall Ferguson, places it at 193 million francs (£7.7 million), probably about twice as great a fortune held by anyone in Britain at the time: Niall Ferguson, *The World's Banker: The History of the House of Rothschild* (London, 1998), p. 1036. On the image of the Rothschilds as singularly wealthy and powerful and the impact of this image on French antisemitism, see Stephen Wilson, *Ideology and Experience: Antisemitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair* (East Brunswick, NJ, 1982), p. 247–301; and Michael Graetz, *The Jews in Nineteenth-Century France* (Stanford, Cal., 1996), especially the chapter on 'Rothschild, the King of the Jews' (pp. 80–119).

Second, in contrast, regional studies of leading local businessmen in nineteenth-century France do not show any great Jewish presence. One study of Alsace under the Second Empire found that about 10 per cent of leading local entrepreneurs were Jews. Most were Protestants, often Germans — see Nicholas Stoskopf, *Les Patrons du Second Empire: Alsace* (Paris, 1994). Third, Jews, especially the Rothschilds, but other financial families as well, were a visible component of the so-called '200 families' who allegedly dominated the French economy between 1900 and 1939. The largest French estates left between 1902 (when nation-wide probate statistics are first available) and 1914 were those of Alphonse (1827–1905) and Gustave de Rothschild (1829–1911), two of James's sons, each of whom left about 250 million francs (about £10 million), far more than any British Rothschild of that time was worth. On this topic see also Theodore Zeldin, *France 1848–1945: Volume One, Ambition, Love and Politics* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 53–86 and Adeline Daumard, 'Wealth and Affluence in France Since the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century', in W. D. Rubinstein, ed., *Wealth and the Wealthy in*

the Modern World (London, 1980). I am most grateful to my colleague Professor Roger Price for some of these references.

It is also apparently impossible to give precise figures for Austria. The fullest attempt to do so is by William O. McCagg, 'Jewish Wealth in Vienna, 1670–1918', in Michael K. Silber, ed., *Jews in the Hungarian Economy, 1760–1945* (Jerusalem, 1992). According to his samples, however, 'about 70 per cent' of members of the Vienna Stock Exchange in 1886, 1900, and 1910 were Jewish (p. 74). Among the 408 directors of industrial stock companies (i.e. public companies in industry and manufacturing) in 1917, 31.9 per cent were Jewish (130 out of 408), with Jews constituting 37.8 per cent of such directors in Vienna (96 out of 254: ibid., p. 78.) Among persons holding seven or more such directorships, 45.5 per cent (51 of 112) were Jewish, including 46.8 per cent in Vienna (ibid.). McCagg gives many statistics pointing to the extraordinary over-representation of Jews in the economy of late Imperial Austria, especially in finance.

[20] On British wealth-holding, see my *Men of Property: The Very Wealthy in Britain Since the Industrial Revolution* (London, 1981), esp. pp. 150–56, and 'Modern Britain' in W. D. Rubinstein, ed., *Wealth and the Wealthy in the Modern World*, op. cit. in Note 19 above, esp. pp. 68–71.

Another 37 estates of £2.5 million each were left in Britain in the period 1920–49. Of these, five were left by Jews and 32 by non-Jews, with another two estates at this level left in Britain by Jewish South Africans. The largest Jewish estate in this period was that of Sir Ernest Cassel, who left £7.2 million in 1921. The largest non-Jewish estate was left by Sir John Ellerman, the mysterious financier and shipping magnate (of German Lutheran and English descent), who left £36.7 million in 1933. In real terms, Ellerman was probably the richest Englishman in modern history.

[21] A further group of perhaps 30–40 persons, whose origins are unclear, might have been Jewish, but were probably of 'Aryan' German or some other non-Jewish ethnic origin. A surprising number of the Jews in the £100,000 to £300,000 range in the nineteenth century did not emerge from the well-known 'Cousinhood' families, and virtually nothing could be traced of their backgrounds or careers.

[22] On Samuel Lewis, see Gerry Black's biography, *Lender to the Lords, Giver to the Poor* (London, 1992).

[23] Frederick Cople Jaher, 'The Gilded Elite: American Multimillionaires, 1865 to the Present', in Rubinstein, ed., *Wealth and the Wealthy*, op. cit. in Note 19 above, esp. pp. 220–242. Among the 310 persons in Jaher's study, the birth dates of 300 are known. Of these, 17 (9 per cent) were born before 1830, 105 (35 per cent) between 1830 and 1864, 113 (38 per cent) between 1865 and 1899, and 55 (18 per cent) since 1900 (ibid., p. 243).

[24] Ibid., pp. 222–23.

[25] Ibid., Table 5–17, p. 246. It should be noted that Professor Jaher (of the University of Illinois) is also an expert on American antisemitism — he is the author of *A Scapegoat in the New Wilderness: The Origins and Rise of Anti-Semitism in America* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994) — and would be very sensitive about identifying Jewish entrepreneurs accurately.

[26] 'The 40 Richest Americans of All Time', reprinted from *American Heritage*, October 1998, in *The Sunday Times Rich List 1999*, 11 April 1999.

[27] William Miller, 'The Recruitment of the American Business Elite', in William Miller, ed., *Men in Business: Essays on the Historical Role of the Entrepreneur* (New York, 1962), p. 331.

[28] Frances W. Gregory and Irene D. Neu, 'The American Industrial Elite in the 1870s: Their Social Origins', in ibid., p. 200.

[29] It was published in *The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1929* (New York, 1928), p. 500.

[30] Complete information can be found in Hilary L. Rubinstein, *The Jews in Australia: A Thematic History, Volume I, 1788–1945* (Melbourne, 1991), pp. 409–423.

[31] An interesting and typical recent example of this misunderstanding may be found in an essay by Tomasz Gasowski, 'The Second [Polish] Republic and Its Jewish Citizens', in Slawomir Kaparalski, ed., *The Jews in Poland, Volume II* (Cracow, 1999), pp. 129–30. The author states that Warsaw 'had 352,000 Jews . . . in 1931. It was the largest Jewish community in the world'. In fact, Brooklyn, one of New York's five boroughs, had at that time in its 90 square miles nearly three times as many Jews as Warsaw, about 950,000. Brooklyn at that time was home to more Jews than all of Western Europe.

[32] Denis Praeger and Joseph Telushkin, *Why the Jews?: The Reasons for Antisemitism* (New York, 1982), p. 63. See also Rudolf L. Tokes, *Bela Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic: The Origins and Role of the Communist Party of Hungary in the Revolutions of 1918–1919* (New York, 1967), Appendix J, 'Biographical Directory of Leading Figures of the Hungarian Republic of 1919', pp. 249–260.

[33] Michael Bar-Zohar, *Beyond Hitler's Grasp: The Heroic Rescue of Bulgaria's Jews* (Holbrook, Mass., 1998), p. 29, citing a 1940 Memorandum by Joseph Geron, president of the Bulgarian Jewish community.

[34] Maxime Steinberg, 'The *Judenpolitik* in Belgium Within the West European Context: Comparative Observations', in Don Michman, ed., *Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews-Belgians-Germans* (Jerusalem, 1998), p. 201, citing reports of the German military administration.

[35] Ibid., p. 203, n.10. About 25,000 Belgian Jews 'found shelter in Belgian homes' during the Nazi occupation: Dan Michman, 'Research on the Holocaust: Belgium and General' in Michman, ibid., p. 30.

[36] Sombart's well-known work on this subject, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, was published in 1911. An English translation appeared in 1913. Weber's *Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist der Kapitalismus* first appeared in *Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, vols. XX and XXI (1904–1905) and was translated into English in 1930 by Talcott Parsons as *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. The literature on the 'Weber Thesis', as his linkage of Protestantism and capitalism is known, is too large to cite here. Recent discussions include Hartmut Lehmann and Guenther Roth, *Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts* (Cambridge, 1993), and Norman Stone, 'The Religious Background to Max Weber', in W. J. Shiels, ed., *Persecution and Toleration* (Oxford, 1984). The literature on Sombart is, in contrast, almost non-existent. See, however, Paul R. Mendes-Flohr, 'Werner Sombart's *The Jews and Modern Capitalism* — An Analysis of its Ideological Premises', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book XXI* (London, 1976), pp. 87–108.

[37] Weber, it might be noted, came of liberal German Protestant background and also had Huguenot ancestors. Several of his close Huguenot relatives, the Souchays, were wealthy merchants in London and Manchester, and Weber, like many German liberals of his day, was a pronounced Anglophile. (See Guenther Roth, 'Weber the Would-be Englishman: Anglophilia and Family History', in Lehmann and Roth, eds., op. cit. in Note 36 above.)

[38] Sombart, op. cit. in Note 36 above, p. 38.

[39] Ibid., pp. 248–49.

[40] On British antisemitism see W. D. Rubinstein, *A History of the Jews in the English-Speaking World: Great Britain* (London, 1996), esp. pp. 125–62, 196–223, and 313–20.

[41] W. D. Rubinstein and Hilary L. Rubinstein, 'Philosemitism in Britain and the English-speaking World, 1840–1939: Patterns and Typology', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XL, numbers 1 and 2 (1998).

[42] Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas* (London, 1997).

[43] See Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II: Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth to the Twentieth Centuries* (London, 1997).

[44] There is an outstanding recent history of this group by Gelina Halaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day* (London, 1996). See also I. P. Minoglou and H. Louri, 'Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks in the Black Sea and Greece, 1870–1917', *The Journal of European Economic History*, vol. 26, no. 1 (Spring 1997), and Ionna Pepelasis Minoglou, 'The Greek Merchant House of the Russian Black Sea: A Nineteenth-Century Example of a Traders' Coalition', *International Journal of Maritime History*, vol. X, no. 1 (June 1998).

[45] Halaftis, op. cit. in Note 44 above, pp. 264–67.

[46] John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History* (Cambridge, 1992) and Halaftis, op. cit. in Note 44 above, pp. 70–104.

[47] Quoted in Halaftis, op. cit. in Note 44 above, p. 59.

A MOST UNCIVIL CIVIL WAR: THE JEWISH FELLOWSHIP AND THE BATTLE OVER ZIONISM IN ANGLO-JEWRY, 1944–1948

Rory Miller

S PEAKING before a prestigious audience at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on 27 November 1945, Moshe Shertok — then head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency and a member of its executive, and later the first Foreign Minister of Israel — addressed the issue of the anti-Zionist constituency within Jewry. He was uncompromising in his view and stated:[1]

> There are small groups . . . [they] live in complete isolation, they are like fossils . . . which still manage to survive . . . they are neither here nor there as far as the course of Jewish history is concerned. They cannot and they do not even attempt to leave their mark upon the Jewish people. They are not urging people to action, they are not mobilising them at all, they are not setting out any other idea before them which can inspire action.

Though of note for its eloquence and the fact that the speaker was one of the leaders of world Zionism, Shertok's words were but a restatement of what by 1945 had become the standard Zionist presentation of the state of the opposition it faced within Jewry, a presentation which can be found in any of the Zionist polemical writings of the time and in editorials in such papers as the *Zionist Review* (organ of the English Zionist Federation) or *New Judea* (organ of the World Zionist Organization in London). Nor was this dismissive presentation of Jewish anti-Zionists simply wishful thinking or propaganda. Later scholars such as Walter Laqueur, Gideon Shimoni, Robert Wistrich, and Stuart Cohen have all agreed with this assessment of the condition of assimilationist Jewish anti-Zionism in the final Mandate era,[2] with Cohen, for example, noting the 'obvious and self-confessed isolation of anti-Zionists'.[3]

As Ben Halpern has shown in his masterly work — *The Idea of the Jewish State*[4] — assimilationist anti-Zionism had lost much of its influence in the decades after the Balfour Declaration, as Zionists looked to co-operate with opponents for the practical benefit of the Yishuv, which in turn converted many Jews who were ideological anti-Zionists into non-Zionists (opposed to Jewish nationalism but prepared to help in the development of the Jewish National Home).

Of greater short-term importance was the British Government's publication of the Palestine White Paper of 1939. This document angered the vast majority of Jewry with its anti-Jewish discrimination in limiting immigration levels into Palestine and the accompanying Land Transfer regulations which restricted the sale of land to Jews in Palestine on the basis of their religion.[5] This was followed by the Zionist victory in the 1943 communal elections to the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the representative body of British Jewry. It was also followed by the horror of the Holocaust which, more than any other factor or event, increased the sympathy of the average member of Jewry towards Zionism as a pro-active answer to the problems facing the Jewish people.

But the isolation and marginalization of Jewish anti-Zionists was also a result of an intense propaganda barrage by the Zionist movement and the misguided, uncompromising, extremely insensitive (and at times, almost irrational) campaign against Zionism by the anti-Zionist constituency. Nowhere can this little-documented aspect of the battle over Zionism within Anglo-Jewry be more clearly seen than in an examination, a case-study so to speak, of the Jewish Fellowship, a body which has been referred to as both 'the last gasp' and the 'last stand' of anti-Zionism in Anglo-Jewry.[6]

The Jewish Fellowship: Antecedents and Outlook

The Jewish Fellowship (hereafter, the Fellowship) had been founded in 1942, but was only officially organized and presented as a functioning body in September 1944. Its founder and chairman, Basil Henriques, was a member of one of the leading Anglo-Jewish families; as warden of the Bernard Baron St. George's Jewish Settlement and a magistrate in juvenile cases he had devoted his life to working with under-privileged Jewish youth in the East End of London.[7] Former MP Sir Jack Brunel Cohen — Conservative MP for Fairfield, Liverpool, 1918–1931 — was the Fellowship's president and the body included some of the most eminent names in Anglo-Jewry and many of those members of the community held in the highest regard in the non-Jewish world: Sir Robert Waley Cohen, president of the United Synagogue, the leading Orthodox Jewish body in the community, and heralded in some quarters as the 'uncrowned king of Anglo-Jewry';[8]

Sir Leonard Lionel Cohen, who in 1946 became the first Jewish Lord Justice; Daniel Lipson (Independent Conservative MP for the constituency of Cheltenham, 1937–1950); Colonel Louis Gluckstein (Conservative MP for Nottingham East, 1931–1945); Rabbi Dr Israel Mattuck, Rabbi of the Liberal Synagogue; Viscount Bearstead; and Lord Swaythling, to name but a few.

The fundamental goal of the 'influentially sponsored'[9] Fellowship was to provide a Jewish forum where political Zionism, with its goal of a Jewish State in Palestine, could be publicly and vigorously opposed on the grounds that Jewry was a religion, not a nation — and as such had no right to acquire a state. As Sir Jack Brunel Cohen informed the Fellowship council, the body had the duty 'to remove the impression . . . that although Jews [are] British by birth . . . [they are] Jewish by nationality'.[10] Thus the Fellowship was the ultimate expression within the assimilated sector of British Jewry of the long-time opposition to the Zionist movement and particularly its doctrine that the Jews were an ethnic minority and that the Jewish problem was a national problem. The most notable earlier exponents of this position were the highly influential journalist and Jewish diplomat Lucien Wolf and the patrician theologian and father of Liberal Judaism in Britain, Claude G. Montefiore, as well as the League of British Jews founded in November 1917 as a forum for those Jews who believed that emancipation was a 'universally valid panacea for the contemporary Jewish condition'.[11]

It is important to note that the Fellowship was not alone within Jewry in opposing the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine at that time. Other groups, such as the Anglo-Jewish Association (hereafter, the AJA) and Agudath Yisra'el also then opposed such an eventuality. However, the AJA was perceived by the Zionists as a non-Zionist, rather than an avowedly anti-Zionist body. Unlike the Fellowship, it had not been founded in the turmoil surrounding the Biltmore Declaration of 1942 (which saw the first official call for a Jewish State by the mainstream Zionist movement), but had existed since 1871 as a charitable and cultural association. Likewise, though the AJA was in the years under examination officially opposed to a Jewish State, it differed from the Fellowship, whose total membership was anti-Zionist: many of the AJA's members supported Zionism and opposed the official position of their leadership.[12]

Thus the difference between the AJA and the Fellowship was profound. For while the latter was against a Jewish State on principle, even if Jewry made up the vast majority of Palestine's population and the Arab minority supported the creation of a Jewish State, the AJA — under the presidency of Leonard Stein, a highly respected member of Anglo-Jewry who had served as political secretary of the World Zionist Organisation from 1929 to 1939 and as legal adviser to the Jewish

Agency from 1930 — was opposed to a State on the basis that at the present time such an entity provided neither an answer to the Jewish problem nor safety for those Jews already in Palestine.

The religious anti-Zionists of Agudath Yisra'el — founded in 1912 in Kattowitz, primarily by orthodox German, Polish, and Hungarian Jews — shared with the Fellowship members a philosophical and immutable opposition to the creation of a Jewish State. Religious anti-Zionists viewed Zionism as a catastrophic, pseudo-messianic ideology that would forestall redemption by human action.[13] Yet Agudists viewed Liberal Judaism, with which the Fellowship came to be intimately associated, as almost as much anathema as a secular Jewish State in Palestine.

Added to this was the fact that orthodox religious anti-Zionism motivated, as it was, by the tenets of traditional Judaism and Jewish insularity, could in no way be perceived, or presented (as the Fellowship was within Jewry), as a betrayal of Judaism in the non-Jewish world. Thus neither Agudath Yisra'el nor the AJA saw the Fellowship as an ally or a friend in their opposition to a Jewish State and neither of them was perceived by Zionists in the way that the Fellowship was — as a purely extra communal assimilationist body attempting to destroy Jewish hopes for Palestine in the non-Jewish world at a time of both great emotional and political sensitivity (given the recent Holocaust in Europe and the sense that a final decision over Palestine was imminent).

The Fellowship Enters the Fray

On 7 November 1944, Lord Moyne, British Minister resident in the Middle East, was assassinated by Zionist extremists in Cairo.[14] On the same day the Jewish Fellowship officially entered the battle over Palestine by holding a press conference to announce its public platform. It is ironic that these two events occurred on the same day because, despite the fact that the mainstream Zionist movement in Britain was shocked by the Moyne assassination and condemned it vigorously,[15] the Fellowship saw the assassination of Lord Moyne, by Jews in the name of Zionism, as symbolizing both the perversion of Judaism inherent in Zionist statist aspirations and the spiritual decay within Jewry.

For the Fellowship the campaign of Zionist Jews for a Jewish State in Palestine raised issues which struck at the heart of Jewish existence in the Diaspora — whether Jews were loyal to their country of birth or to the Zionist nationalist movement and ultimately, if it ever came into being, to the Jewish State. A Jewish State would severely strain, if not destroy beyond repair, the great strides that the Jews as members of a religious community had made since being granted citizenship.

And only when a strong and vibrant Jewish community based on religious rather than political principles existed and was inhabited by 'people of the Book' and 'Shema Jews' — as opposed to the 'Hatikva Jews' who supported political Zionism — could the claims of the political Zionist movement be shown to be false.[16]

The writer Joseph Leftwich, who to many was the literary heir of Israel Zangwill within Anglo-Jewry, was a founding member of the Fellowship. Leftwich's instinctive response to the Holocaust was to look critically at the state of Judaism in those communities which had survived Hitler's onslaught. As a member of the first council and executive of the Fellowship, he sincerely hoped that the body would provide an answer to the spiritual poverty of Judaism which threatened to engulf post-Holocaust Jewish life.[17] But Leftwich was also very aware of the antipathy to Zionism fundamental to the Fellowship position and he feared that this aspect would come to dominate the association, which in turn would nullify any moral force it had. In a private letter in August 1944, Leftwich summed up this fear and concluded: 'the Jewish Fellowship is useless unless it can be lifted out of an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility'.[18]

However, the Fellowship was never able to lift itself out of 'an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility' within the community of Jewry. First, Zionist propaganda was successful in presenting the Fellowship's opposition to Zionism not as an inherent part of the body's attempt to rejuvenate Jewish life but as a potential threat to its existence. Second, by openly opposing Zionism with the use of such extreme and alarming arguments — most notably that Zionism was a Nazi creed — and by doing so in the non-Jewish world, the Fellowship alienated much of the Jewish community and provided both momentum and credibility to the Zionist propaganda claims aimed at the Fellowship.

Moshe Rosette (who as a member of the Jewish Agency Information Department at that time was at the forefront of the Zionist propaganda offensive) recalled in a 1961 interview that it would have been 'an exaggeration' to say that the Jewish anti-Zionists had any effect on the Jewish community and added that the 'small lunatic fringe — the Jewish Fellowship — were never very effective . . . never an effective counter blast to good Zionist propaganda'.[19] However, the Zionist attitude to the Fellowship as anathema to the rest of Jewry must be viewed, not in terms of its actual threat, but rather in the context of the time. It was distasteful enough that a body like the Fellowship should choose to make its public appearance in the wake of the White Paper, the Zionist capture of the Board of Deputies in 1943, and especially the Holocaust. But to do so at a time when the crucial decisions over Palestine's future would be made, and to oppose Zionism in the non-Jewish world, where the appearance of Jewish unity on Palestine was particularly important, presented Zionism with

a direct challenge to its claim that the whole of Jewry was united behind the goal of a Jewish State in Palestine.

Added to this was the fact that there existed during the war a belief that Jewish anti-Zionists would mount a counter-offensive after the war. An anonymous report, written during the war and circulated amongst the Zionist leadership, claimed that after the war a 'group of leading and influential British Jews' would work against Zionism and would attack the Zionists as 'unpatriotic foreign born Jews' and 'label all such Jews as Jewish Nazis'. This memorandum ended with a warning that these Jews would attempt to replace the Zionist leadership of Anglo-Jewry with a 'pure British-Jewish community'.[20]

The post-war Zionist presentation of Jewish anti-Zionists in the Fellowship as a distinct, separate, and isolated group within Jewry must be viewed in these terms. *New Judea* stated at the beginning of 1945:[21]

> The concept of *kol yisrael chaverim* has an historical significance. It means comradeship of all Israel; it means true solidarity, sharing Jewish suffering, ideals, aspirations and hopes for the future. The Fellowship reject this concept and real meaning of *kol yisrael*, yet presume to take the name of the Jewish Fellowship.

There was also an attempt to analyze why this alienation from the rest of Jewry had occurred. At the most superficial level the existence of the Fellowship was put down to social position and wealth, according to *New Judea* which commented on 'those Jews who do not support Zionism . . . from the wealthy class'.[22] But this was too much of a generalisation to be accepted as the definitive reason for what was perceived to be such anti-Jewish behaviour.

Thus Zionist commentators delved deeper into what motivated the members of the Fellowship. For example, Zionist publicist Harry Sacher asked in a 1947 article why some Jews attempted to fight their heritage by taking sides with the Christian majority.[23] Though undoubtedly a piece of Zionist propaganda, it should also be seen as an example of Jewish bewilderment at the actions of some co-religionists. Another Zionist commentator, Barnet Litvinoff, looked to 'Self-Hatred Among Jews', the pioneering work by the American social psychologist Kurt Lewin, to explain the attacks on Zionism by Rabbi Dr Israel Mattuck, spiritual leader of the Fellowship. Litvinoff saw in Mattuck an 'interesting example of self-hatred'. But more generally he also saw in the Fellowship's role within Jewry a perfect example of Lewin's analysis of leaders from the periphery, those influential Jews who, ashamed of their religion, attempted to limit the action of their co-religionists by taking a position of leadership within the community as a way of silencing the vast majority of Jews with whom they disagreed.[24]

In the Zionist use of arguments such as this, one begins to see that there existed a tendency to view the members of the Fellowship as separate from the majority of Jews, not only in their position over Zionism, but in fundamental and irreconcilable respects. Maurice Cohen, honorary secretary of the Zionist Federation, speaking in the summer of 1946, stated that there was no possibility of compromise with Jews who opposed Zionism because 'their aims are essentially different to ours'.[25] This view was reiterated constantly throughout these years, most notably in a *Zionist Review* editorial on the Fellowship in November 1948, at the time of the body's winding up, which concluded with the observation: 'the difference between them [the Fellowship and the Zionists] is in quality and kind'.[26]

For the Fellowship came to be viewed as the concrete expression of a lack of Jewish self-respect that was seen to be at the heart of the division between Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews. It was in these terms that the anti-Zionist statements of Julian Franklyn, the secretary of the Fellowship, were dismissed because 'for every self-respecting Jew his views are beyond contempt'.[27] Similarly, the 1947 Fellowship memorandum on *The Jewish Problem*, sent to the British Foreign Secretary and to Ambassadors at the Court of St. James, stressed the loyalty of Jews to the nations in which they lived and vigorously attacked political Zionism. This prompted the *Zionist Review* to comment '. . . could spiritual servility and lack of dignity go further?'[28], while as a Zionist columnist asked rhetorically, 'Take our Jewish Fellowship . . . can any other people boast of such strange growths? Of course not, because among other peoples self-respect would not allow a man to deprecate his own spiritual inheritance'.[29]

The Jewish Fellowship and Liberal Judaism

The Zionist portrayal of the Fellowship as a body motivated by a lack of self-respect was primarily a continuation of the age-old Jewish (adopted by the Zionist movement) accusation that Jews who looked away from Jewry and into the non-Jewish world did so out of Jewish self-hate. What made the case of the Fellowship an interesting variation on this theme was the use of its intimate connection with the Progressive Jewish movement in Britain to emphasize its betrayal of Jewry and to nullify it as a valid alternative to Zionism within Jewry.

Religious leaders of British Progressive Judaism[30] such as Rabbi Curtis Cassell, Dr Harold Reinhart (senior minister of West London Synagogue), and Rabbi Gerhard Graf (minister at Bradford and Sinai Synagogue, Leeds) were all militant anti-Zionists in these years and lent support to the Fellowship. Reinhart was a member of the Fellowship council and Rabbis Graf and Cassell contributed anti-Zionist articles to the Fellowship paper, *The Jewish Outlook*. Indeed

Rabbi Dr Israel Mattuck — Rabbi of the Liberal Synagogue and the religious head of the Liberal movement in Britain — came to symbolise the domination of the Fellowship by Reform or Liberal Jews, with Paul Goodman, a leading Zionist commentator of the era, describing the Fellowship as 'a number of English men of Jewish faith inspired by the leader of a Synagogue [Mattuck]'.[31]

The most vocal lay leaders of the Fellowship were also closely involved in the Progressive Jewish movement in Britain. In 1945 Colonel Louis Gluckstein became president of the Liberal Synagogue, while in the following year Colonel Robert Henriques became chairman of the Association of Progressive Synagogues of Great Britain, the umbrella body for all Reform synagogues in the country, and held the position until 1952. Lord Justice Cohen, Fellowship president Sir Jack Brunel Cohen, and Fellowship secretary Julian Franklyn all served on the council of the West London Liberal Synagogue. Leon Rees, treasurer of the Fellowship, was a leading member of the St. George's Settlement Synagogue; Fellowship chairman Basil Henriques was both founder and warden of that synagogue and it was he who more than any other of the lay leaders of the Fellowship symbolized the close relationship between Liberal Judaism and anti-Zionism. Indeed, one of the few things that Zionists and anti-Zionists seemed to agree on was the central position held by Henriques within the Fellowship. Both Selig Brodetsky — the ranking British Zionist and head of the Board of Deputies of British Jews in the immediate post-war era — in his memoirs and the Fellowship stalwart, Colonel Louis Gluckstein, in a private letter in March 1945, described Henriques's role in exactly the same words: 'the moving spirit behind the Fellowship'.[32]

This close connection to Progressive Judaism of the leading and most publicly-known Fellowship members was significant because there was then a great schism between Orthodox and Progressive Judaism within Jewry, a schism which has persisted to this day. The vast majority of British Jews (regardless of their actual level of religious observance) identified with the traditional form of orthodoxy and in turn this engendered a deep suspicion of the Progressive section of the community. The divide within Jewry was acknowledged by the Progressive movement; in October 1945 the *Synagogue Review*, the organ of the Association of Progressive Synagogues, admitted in an editorial that the 'orthodox party has been overwhelmingly superior in both numbers and organization'.[33] At the annual meeting of the Liberal Synagogue in June 1945, at which Gluckstein was appointed president, an official complaint was made about the bad relations between Liberal Jewry and the rest of the community,[34] while Colonel Robert Henriques said in 1946 that 'so called orthodox Jewry has

denounced the so called progressive movement in Judaism as a festering sore to be excised, or an evil tumour to be rooted out'.[35]

Zionist polemics concentrated on this seemingly intimate relationship between the Fellowship and the Progressive leadership as a way of isolating the Fellowship from the mainstream of Jewry. The *Zionist Review* in an article on the founding of the Fellowship stated: 'it is gratifying that Zionists and representatives of religious Jewry, except members of the Liberal Synagogue, have not found it possible to join Mr Henriques's organisation'.[36]

Throughout these years a central part of the propaganda battle against the Fellowship became an attack on Progressive Judaism, the 'deformed congregation [reform congregation]',[37] rather than on anti-Zionist Jews who happened to be Reform or Liberal Jews. The *Zionist Review* was consistently derogatory about the Liberal Jewish movement, which it described as 'the cold theology so foreign to living Judaism'.[38] Particular animosity was directed towards the Bernard Baron Settlement — since it was the section of the Liberal movement personally associated with Basil Henriques. In 1943 the paper had claimed that Henriques was 'only Jewish in name' and that the Jewish children under his care were under threat.[39] It continued in this vein throughout the post-war era, condemning Henriques's attempts to make 'gentlemen out of little Yiddish boys' by means of indoctrinating them with the belief that 'in Liberal Judaism and anti-Zionism lay the future happiness of the Jews'.[40] Harry Sacher was even more specific — accusing Henriques of being a Liberal Jewish anti-Zionist with the aim of Christianising and hence destroying Judaism,[41] while in November 1945 the *Jewish Chronicle* referred to Henriques as an 'extreme anti-Orthodox ... whose anti-Orthodox activities are abhorrent to the vast majority of Jews in this country'.[42]

But perhaps the most potent example of Zionist propaganda devoted to attacking the Fellowship as a Liberal entity and the Liberal movement as an anti-Zionist entity, was the *Gates of Zion*, the quarterly review of the Central Synagogue Council of the Zionist Federation. That publication continually attacked the Fellowship's links with the Liberal movement as proof of its lack of Jewishness and of its isolation from the rest of Jewry. The first editorial of the first issue attacked the 'British Israelites' — a common and derogatory term denoting anti-Zionist Liberal Jews — and highlighted the failure of the Fellowship to gain support within the orthodox community, a fact that was reiterated and deemed 'highly significant' in its subsequent attacks.[43]

Raphael Loewe, a Fellowship leader who was Reader in Rabbinics at the University of Cambridge, was constantly preoccupied with the need to show that the Fellowship represented orthodox Judaism and advocated this view at various Fellowship meetings during these years.[44] The Fellowship also attempted to counter this aspect of

Zionist propaganda on two fronts. First, by presenting its principles and objectives from an orthodox perspective in both its literature and public appearances. For example, in the first educational pamphlet published by the Fellowship, *What is Judaism?*, Basil Henriques presented the Fellowship argument from the Liberal perspective, while the Orthodox outlook was set out by Dr Alfred Marmorstein, Professor of Talmud, Midrash and Liturgy at Jews' College.[45] Second, the Fellowship attempted to counter the Zionist accusation that it was only a body of Progressive Jews, by stressing that some of its leading members were also leading members of Orthodox Jewry. The most obvious example was that both the president (Sir Robert Waley Cohen) and the vice-president (the Hon. Ewen Montagu) of the United Synagogue, the governing body of the majority of orthodox synagogues, were founding members of the Fellowship.

Indeed, the Zionist attacks on Waley Cohen at that time were so strong precisely because his ranking position in the United Synagogue gave credence to the Fellowship claim that it represented the Orthodox tradition within Jewry.[46] Zionists also used the letters page of the *Jewish Chronicle* to attack the Fellowship's claims on this issue. For example, Mr H. Grunis called on Waley Cohen to resign from the Fellowship because of his position in the United Synagogue, while a similar letter in the same paper by Mr J. Mendel, a member of the United Synagogue council, called on Waley Cohen, Montagu, Henry Gledhill, and Frank Samuel — all honorary officers of the United Synagogue — to resign from the Fellowship council.[47]

The size of the Fellowship's delegation (15 members) to the Anglo-American Committee — the most important international forum on the Palestine problem in the post-war era, established to examine that problem in relation to the position of Jewish refugees in Europe made homeless during the war[48] — must be primarily seen as an effort to stress (as Brunel-Cohen informed the committee) that the Fellowship 'represents every shade of Orthodoxy, members of the United Synagogue, the Liberal Synagogue, Reform and Sephardic'.[49] It included Ewen Montagu, vice-president of the United Synagogue; A. Alan Mocatta, warden of the Spanish and Portuguese Congregation; and the Rev. Bueno de Mesquita, retired senior minister of the Sephardi community. Indeed, Basil Henriques wrote to the *Jewish Chronicle* in February 1946 after the Fellowship appearance to stress that the delegation had been represented by many leading orthodox members.[50] This claim by Henriques was rejected the following week by both Joseph Nabarro, who denied that the Sephardi community en masse supported the Fellowship, and J. Mendel who condemned Henriques for trying to pretend that the Fellowship delegation represented the United Synagogue.[51]

In May 1947 *The Jewish Outlook* in turn condemned the attacks on the Fellowship in the Zionist press as 'malicious', precisely because 'its intention is to traduce the Jewish Fellowship and convey the impression that the Jewish Fellowship is simply an accretion to Liberal Judaism', adding that up to 75 per cent of the Fellowship membership was orthodox.[52] In the same month Harold Soref — chairman of the AJA's publications committee and editor of the AJA journal, the *Jewish Monthly* — also took up this issue. Soref, a staunch anti-Zionist, represented the Liberal Synagogue at the Board of Deputies, and although he was not a member of the Fellowship he supported and advised the body and attended its executive meetings.[53] He especially attacked the *Gates of Zion* for its 'heresy hunt' and 'sordid and unseemly tactics' against Liberal Judaism.[54]

Moreover, the Fellowship attacked the Zionist claims on the Liberal issue as hypocritical, coming as they did from a movement which counted among its public spokesmen such individuals as Lewis Namier. Namier — Professor of Modern History at the University of Manchester, 1931–1957, and political secretary of the Jewish Agency in London, 1929–1931 — was a fierce critic of Jewish anti-Zionists, whom he referred to as 'the judeocentric assimilationists'.[55] However, he was also a man who had married outside the Jewish faith not once but twice, and on the second occasion had been baptised into the Russian Orthodox Church. Thus *The Jewish Outlook* wondered how atheistic and apostate Zionists like Namier could have the gall to attack them for their close connection with Liberal Judaism and asked, 'if this of their leaders, what of the rank and file?'[56]

Regardless of the validity of these claims — and it should be noted that Namier defended his seemingly contradictory position with the argument that although the 'charge of irreligion is sometimes levelled against Zionists . . . the Jew who works for the Return, and still more the one who effects it, bears the truest testimony to his faith'[57] — and the fact that many of the leaders of Zionism, including M. C. Weiler in South Africa, and especially Rabbis Silver and Wise in the United States, were leaders of Progressive Jewry, the overriding impression within Jewry throughout these years was that the Fellowship was an anti-Zionist body motivated in part by its relationship with Liberal Judaism. The barrister and scholar George Webber, for example, stated in a 1946 review of Anglo-Jewry: '. . . lay and religious leaders of Progressive Judaism are hostile to the Jewish National Home and play a decisive part in the Jewish Fellowship'.[58]

In 1946, prominent Fellowship leaders Harold Reinhart, Basil Henriques, Ben Moss, Lilly H. Montagu, and Rabbi Mattuck all attended the World Congress of Progressive Judaism. However, there was no unanimity on the issue of Zionism within the Progressive movement, even within the Liberal section. Indeed Basil Henriques,

writing a decade later, did admit that although in his view there were very few ardent Zionists who were Liberal Jews, the Liberal movement never took an official position, either for or against Zionism.[59]

Yet first and foremost the Zionist attack on the Fellowship as a Liberal body was a propaganda tactic that played on the prejudices which existed within the community to make real the Zionist claim that 'the Jewish Fellowship ... excludes the overwhelming part of Anglo-Jewry'.[60] The Zionist success in promoting the view of the Fellowship as an alien body within Jewry cannot be over-emphasized; for example, in a report in the *Jewish Chronicle* on a Fellowship meeting in Yorkshire in 1946 the correspondent reported that throughout the evening 'we were told we should spread the gospel of the Jewish Fellowship, "gospel" being the right word' and continued: 'I cannot remember whether the meeting concluded with the sign of the cross or the double cross'.[61]

A letter by Harold Morris in the same paper, condemning Rabbi Mattuck's position on Palestine, is only one of many written to the 'Organ of Anglo-Jewry' in these years that highlight the Zionist success in presenting anti-Zionism, Liberal Judaism, and the Fellowship as one and the same, sharing a common isolation from Jewry: for Morris, 'one thing is quite certain ... in their rejection of Palestine as a Jewish state. . . Liberal Jews have forfeited all rights to be part of Jewry at all'.[62] This argument against the Fellowship was complemented by the fact that even members of Agudath Yisra'el — a body also opposed to the creation of a Jewish State — could not support the Fellowship or even condone it, because of the overriding perception that it was a Liberal assimilationist group, lacking halakhic validity and outside the community of Jewry. A letter, sent to the Fellowship newspaper and signed simply 'Agudist', stated:[63]

> As an Agudist of many years standing ... it seems to me interesting that the only two Jewish bodies ... really pleased with the report of the Anglo-American Committee [on Palestine and the Jewish Question] ... Agudah and the Fellowship ... [and yet] ... we find it difficult to co-operate with you because we do not consider most of your members Jews.

Zionism is Nazism: The Jewish Fellowship Argument

Many of the Fellowship's anti-Zionist arguments — that Zionism caused dual loyalty amongst Jews, was a cause of antisemitism, and that Jews were not a national group but a religious community — were very much a continuation of the traditional assimilationist arguments against Zionism. But another argument, that Zionism was a Nazi creed, was both a product of the time and a central reason for the antipathy felt within Jewry towards the Fellowship.

During his evidence before the 1946 Anglo-American Committee, Fellowship leader Colonel Louis Gluckstein stated:[64]

> I think it is pertinent to ask the question: does anybody really believe that if Hitlerism had not appeared, if six million Jews had not been slaughtered you would today be sitting here faced with the question of a Jewish state and all that goes with it?

This argument was partly an attempt to oppose Zionism by reiterating the commonly-held view that the Nazi treatment of Jews, and that alone, had created the momentum for a Jewish State as a way of dealing with the Jewish refugee problem. And it must be stated that although the Zionist movement was anxious not to be perceived as a refugee movement and was adamant that even if the Nazi persecution of the Jews had never occurred there would eventually have been a Jewish State, it did attempt to capitalise on whatever humanitarian sympathy the movement gained as a result of the Holocaust. However, on another level Gluckstein's statement to the Anglo-American Committee can be seen as part of the Jewish Fellowship's belief that those Jews, who had suffered at the hands of the Nazis and were subsequently involved in the efforts to establish a Jewish State, acted as they did as a response to the whole Nazi experience.

Gluckstein spelt this out later on in his evidence when he told the Committee that the views of Displaced Persons and camp survivors in favour of Zionism should be discounted as they were not 'mentally or physically fit to form a judgement'.[65] In part this was the view that the Nazi terror had caused some mental imbalance in Jewry best symbolized by those who resorted to terrorism to obtain a Jewish State. Basil Henriques, writing in the *Star* on Jewish terrorism in Palestine, stated:[66]

> Many of those who perpetrated them [terrorist acts] suffered in concentration camps . . . nearly all have relatives in Europe . . . they feel that they have nothing to lose by what they do. They are too unhinged in their mental outlook to be able to see the appalling consequences.

If the Fellowship had used its analysis of the relationship between Zionism and Nazism only as an explanation of the motivations of those who carried out terrorist acts (regardless of whether it was the correct diagnosis of the mental state of Jewish terrorists), it would have been harder for Zionists to criticize the Fellowship. Many within mainstream Zionism, and Anglo-Jewry as a whole, would not have disagreed with *The Jewish Outlook*'s claim that 'the fanaticism of some Jews in Palestine . . . can only be understood by those who realise how their hearts bleed for their loved ones . . . they have completely lost their sense of reasoning'.[67]

But the Fellowship went further and portrayed Zionism itself, Jewish nationalism, the Jewish State policy, and all those Zionist Jews,

whether they had been directly involved in the suffering in Europe or not, as being under a delusion brought about by Nazism. Julian Franklyn — a veteran communal worker who before becoming secretary of the Fellowship had been the Board of Deputies organizer for outdoor-speaking campaigns against antisemitism — was of the opinion that the real ailment affecting the Jewish community was not Zionism per se, but the 'traumatic effect of the Nazi attack', which had made Zionism appear as an appealing option.[68]

Another Fellowship leader, Harold Reinhart, wrote to *The Times* that Zionism which had gathered momentum in the Nazi era was 'bred on despair and disillusion — naked nationalism — contrary to the whole Jewish tradition'.[69] After the publication of that letter, Reinhart received much supportive correspondence from other Fellowship members, including Basil Henriques, while the Jewish historian Albert Hyamson told him that his letter to *The Times* encapsulated 'the true Jewish view'.[70] Henriques, in a letter to Fellowship members, agreed with Reinhart and stated: 'it is only the deterioration in the status of the Jews arising from Nazi doctrines of race, and the consequent appalling persecution . . . which is responsible for the spread of the fallacious doctrine of Jewish nationhood and a Jewish state'.[71]

Moreover, it was the view of Jewish anti-Zionists that those Jews who supported the creation of a Jewish State were not only victims of Nazism who, blinded by the trauma of Nazism, had forgotten the true meaning of Judaism but were also enemies of Jewry. For by subscribing to the theories of a Jewish race and a Jewish State they had become the torchbearers of Nazi-inspired doctrines, and hence had to be viewed as the propounders of the Nazi philosophy in the post-war world. Gluckstein, for example, stated to the Anglo-American Committee that 'to believe that this [Jewish suffering] is a justification for Jewish separatism and Jewish nationalism seems to me the adoption of the Hitler doctrine'.[72] *The Jewish Outlook* echoed this in an editorial which claimed: 'the conception of a Jewish race can only stand if we are prepared to accept the Nazi conception of a Nordic race'.[73]

Julian Franklyn was even more blunt when he stated: 'many of us are supporting Hitler's racial theory with which he has scourged us, and are repeating his blood and soil slogan . . . in the idea that we are asserting destiny'.[74] In another article published in the *Contemporary Review* in July 1947,[75] Franklyn again explained clearly why the Jewish anti-Zionists believed that there was a direct link between the Nazi creed and the Jewish support for a Jewish State:

[the] degeneration of Jewish affairs has been brought about mainly by the rise of Hitlerism . . . Hitlerism . . . making its "anti-Semitic international"

not a religious, but a racial and political issue . . . the Zionists with short-sighted opportunities succumbed to the challenge, since the ultimate development of the philosophy of blood and iron was Nazism, it is not surprising that modern Zionism's definition of Israel is racial and national.

Thus Nazism had artificially created, through propaganda, the belief that Jewry was a race and a national entity rather than a religion. By promoting the Jews as a race, rather than a religion, other nations had a reason to refuse to help Jewry when it faced the Nazi persecutions. For once Jewry was perceived as a national entity, it became a legitimate casualty of the war. Franklyn stated in his *Contemporary Review* article:[76]

> when the Jewish outlook was that of a religious community devoid of egocentric political consciousness, the Christian countries of the world in the name of religion [were] . . . ready to receive victims of the Pogroms . . . Hitlerism reversed all that making [Jewry] . . . not a religious but a racial and political issue.

According to the Fellowship, the Zionists continued to propagate this myth in order to achieve a Jewish State. In doing so political Zionists had become the imitators of the Nazis and heirs to the Nazi mantle. For Albert Hyamson, Zionism was 'a movement to divest Jewry of its peculiar attributes' and to make it 'as other nations'; in doing so it was laying the foundations for the destruction of Judaism as a religion and thus the successes 'of Hitler and Goebbels and Streicher are being perpetuated by their victims'.[77]

Moshe Shertok, speaking at the United Nations in 1947, represented the general Zionist attitude to the comparison of Zionism to Nazism when he said 'I will not attempt to refute this charge because it refutes itself'.[78] But English Zionists were aware that the comparison was a dangerous, insulting, and widespread anti-Zionist tactic at that time. It is worth noting that the anonymous wartime memorandum (referred to earlier in this paper) on the post-war strategy of Jewish anti-Zionists predicted that the latter would present Zionists as 'Jewish Nazis' after the war. Julian Franklyn, the Fellowship's most vocal proponent of the belief that Zionism was a Nazi creed, was seen as a pariah within the wider Jewish community. He believed it was his duty to present publicly the Jewish view on such issues, telling Harold Reinhart that he undertook the task as 'I do not know anybody better qualified', but that if there was someone else who would do the job 'I shall only be to happy to take a backseat and remain mute'.[79]

The Zionists, unmoved by this selfless sacrifice to duty, responded to his comparisons of Zionism to Nazism with the view that he had gone 'completely mad'.[80] Leonard Stein, in his capacity as head of the AJA, the most important non-Zionist body within Jewry, was less willing to view Franklyn's statements as evidence of insanity. In April

1945 he discussed with the editor of the *Jewish Chronicle*, Ivan Greenberg, the Fellowship's, and especially Franklyn's, attempt to discredit Zionism in public by labelling it a Nazi creed. Stein was in no doubt as to 'the damage that may be done by this kind of talk' and urged Greenberg to 'take up this issue' in his paper.[81] Less than a week later Stein once more told Greenberg just how 'objectionable' he found this Fellowship 'scandal' to be.[82] Greenberg heeded Stein's advice and in an editorial condemned Franklyn as 'a lamentable propagandist . . . lacking a sense of decency'.[83]

This abhorrence of the Fellowship's argument against Zionism on the basis that it was a Nazi creed can be seen as a Jewish rather than a purely Zionist attitude. It can be best summed up by reference to a letter by one F. Polishuk to the *Zionist Review*[84] written in the aftermath of a claim by Franklyn in the *Streatham News* that Zionism was a fascist creed. Polishuk stated that

> the attempt by one or other of their worthy brotherhood [the Fellowship] to compare the ideals of Zionism with the revolting theories of Nazism (nay even to pronounce the two names in the same breath) is a scandal . . . the so called Fellowship, what a misnomer, for there can be no kind of Fellowship between that body and the rest of Jewry.

The Fellowship in the Non-Jewish World

The Fellowship made no attempt to conceal the fact that it was greatly concerned with setting out its position, which to Zionists meant its anti-Zionist position, in the non-Jewish world. A list of Jewish Fellowship aims drawn up at a meeting of the executive in March 1944 stated[85] that the body looked to

> co-operate with fellow citizens of other creeds in strengthening the influence of religion in the life of the nation, in bearing the responsibility of citizenship and national loyalty and in promoting the highest standards of honour and service in public and private life.

Joseph Leftwich (who opposed the politicisation of the Fellowship) called for this 'loyalty and honour' clause to be removed as it 'savoured of apologetics'. But rather than taking his advice, the executive agreed with Brunel Cohen that this section was very important and decided to re-emphasize this goal once more at the end of the document.[86]

The Fellowship also made a conscious decision to oppose political Zionism in public. Brunel Cohen in an early speech admitted that the Fellowship's opposition to the Jewish State policy 'entails the necessity to combat propaganda'[87] and in September 1944 he and Colonel Robert Henriques sent letters to *The Times* stating their opposition to the creation of a Jewish Brigade (a military formation of Jewish volunteers within the British army).[88] Brunel Cohen's letter, which he

signed in his capacity as president of the Fellowship, can be viewed as the first official effort of this organization to use the media to fight Zionism, something which Brunel Cohen admitted in his address to the Fellowship council after the publication of the letters.[89]

Within the Zionist movement there had always been a sensitivity to what was perceived to be anti-Zionist Jews using the general press to oppose Zionist aspirations. As early as 1917 Leon Simon had argued against an essay in the *Edinburgh Review*,[90] by the influential Jewish anti-Zionist, Lucien Wolf, primarily in terms of the danger that this article could do by misleading uninformed non-Jewish readers who were unaware of the 'ignorance and half-truths' of the Jewish opponents of Zionism.[91] It is therefore not surprising that the Zionist response to the Henriques and Brunel Cohen letters was both immediate and fierce. Barnett Janner, MP, urged Jews 'not to rush into print' with views which they knew to be contrary to the wishes of Anglo-Jewry,[92] while there was a rally at the Glasgow Jewish Institute condemning the letters within a week of their publication.[93] An editorial in the *Jewish Chronicle* gave expression to the prevalent Jewish attitude to the letters when it condemned the introduction of the Fellowship to 'public cognisance . . . in a non-Jewish paper' and added that it was 'tragic that even before its existence [was] announced in the Jewish press or world it used *The Times*'.[94]

The Fellowship's decision to hold a press conference to announce its existence at Oddino's Hotel in London in November 1944, just a few months after the publication of these letters, fostered the belief that it was appealing primarily to a non-Jewish constituency through the use of the press. This had a basic truth to it; but the fact that the press conference occurred on the same day as the Moyne assassination meant that it gained (as the Fellowship admitted) 'only meagre publicity' and was 'crowded out of the papers'.[95] Likewise, a *Jewish Chronicle* report on a meeting, held by the Fellowship in May 1946 in the Synagogue Hall of the wealthy Jewish community of Harrogate, Yorkshire, noted that Basil Henriques had invited non-Jewish reporters, despite being asked by the Synagogue not to do so, and the Synagogue therefore had refused to allow these journalists to attend the meeting when they arrived.[96]

Apart from appealing to the non-Jewish world as a way of fighting Zionism, the Fellowship's use of the non-Jewish media was inevitable, given its leadership's conviction that it was unable to receive an objective hearing in the Jewish press. The *Synagogue Review*, which under editorial guidance was fiercely anti-Zionist during these years, argued in 1945 that 'the whole orientation of these papers [the Jewish press] is Zionist' and criticized the fact that 'Palestine propaganda tends to monopolise the Jewish reader's eyes'.[97] This was reiterated by Brunel Cohen who informed the Anglo-American Committee that

anybody who studied the Jewish press 'might come to the conclusion that there was simply no other point of view [than Zionist]'.[98]

The Jewish Fellowship: Memories of '1917'

The Fellowship's use of the general media evoked memories of the notorious letter to *The Times* sent in 1917 by leading anti-Zionist Jews opposed to the British government's support for what would ultimately be the Balfour Declaration.[99] That letter was issued by the heads of the Conjoint committee[100] of the Board of Deputies without permission from the leadership of either the Board or the AJA, and both bodies subsequently censured the signatories. Nevertheless, the Zionist movement was united in its belief that the letter had been harmful to Zionist aspirations and that its really damaging effects had not been within Jewry, for if anything that letter marked the beginning of the process of Zionists gaining a foothold in the communal institutions, especially in the Board of Deputies, the governing body of Anglo-Jewry.

Rather, the letter's real harm had been in its effect on Gentile opinion. As David Vital argues, the decision of the leaders of the Conjoint committee to go public in *The Times* was 'an effort to meet the publicists and polemicists of Zionism on the ground where they had been evidently making the most progress: among members of the non-Jewish social and political elite'.[101] As such this decision was a watershed not so much because of the contents of the letter but because it was sent at all. For it was believed that this intervention in *The Times* had raised in the Gentile mind the possibility that a prestigious and significant section within Jewry opposed Zionist aspirations, and therefore was the prime reason that the Cabinet decided to water down the original wording of the Balfour Declaration. For example, in 1942 Lavy Bakstansky (secretary of the Zionist Federation and a leading Zionist at the Board of Deputies) appealed to Louis Gluckstein not to oppose Zionism in public and reminded him: '25 years ago people like you attempted to kill the Balfour Declaration . . . failed but managed to change its formulation ... which cost many lives'.[102] An article in the *Zionist Review* entitled 'Remember 1917', written shortly after the publication of the Brunel Cohen and Henriques letters in *The Times*, concluded with the statement that 'the result of the intervention by notables of British Jewry was disastrous'.[103]

If the First World War had provided the backdrop for the Balfour Declaration, then all agreed that the end of the Second World War was a prelude to a permanent decision on the future status of Palestine. It is in this context that the emergence of the Fellowship and its propaganda efforts in the non-Jewish world must be seen. For the shadows of 1917

still clouded Zionist aspirations and the momentous events of 1917, the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and the efforts of a group of important Jews to oppose it, became the benchmark for the actions of the Fellowship in the post-war world. Moshe Rosette in a private letter in January 1944 summed up the Zionist fear when he stated: 'I believe a conflict in Jewish life is coming which will make 1917 look like a dress rehearsal'.[104] Thus it is hardly surprising that the same man, speaking in his capacity as a member of the Board of Deputies — representing the Montague Road Beth Hamidrash — during a debate in April 1945, attacked the Fellowship for going outside the community and using the non-Jewish press to fight Zionism, arguing that this would result in great harm to Zionism and to the Jewish people.[105]

Rosette's view was echoed by the *Zionist Review* which condemned the Fellowship for 'using methods of propaganda which are nothing but a menace to the community',[106] arguing that 'the worst possible thing' Jews could do was to oppose each other in the national British press, because this was a direct threat to Jewish defence.[107] Indeed the Board's Defence Committee — responsible for ensuring the security of British Jewry — did examine the Fellowship's threat to communal safety on being contacted by Isaac Dartle, an indignant member of Anglo-Jewry, who made an official complaint after attending a meeting of the Paddington branch of the Fellowship. That Committee sent a report on the Fellowship to Ivan Greenberg (editor of the *Jewish Chronicle*, 1937–1946) to make him aware of the Fellowship's public statements.[108] Dartle also had a letter published in the *Jewish Chronicle* attacking what he termed the Fellowship's 'campaign of abuse' in the Gentile world against the majority of Jewry and concluding that this effort was 'earning them, and rightly, the contempt not only of the community but of the non-Jews whose favours Mr. Henriques and his fellow members so obsequiously pursue'.[109]

The Jewish Chronicle and the Jewish Fellowship

The extent of the Fellowship's isolation within Jewry can be seen in the attitude to it of the *Jewish Chronicle*, the flagship paper of Anglo-Jewry. Throughout the years 1944–1948 the Zionist leadership in Britain viewed the *Jewish Chronicle* as an obstacle to Zionist aspirations and leading Zionists were continually corresponding with Ivan Greenberg[110] about the perceived anti-Zionist position of the newspaper. Councillor Abraham Moss (representative of the Council of Manchester and Salford Jews on the Zionist Federation) wrote to Greenberg in 1944 pleading that the *Jewish Chronicle*, because of 'its prestige', had to support the Zionist goals,[111] while Maurice Rosette told Greenberg that he was 'astonished to think' that the *Jewish Chronicle* could be opposed to Zionist aspirations.[112]

Greenberg took offence at what was termed the 'smear campaign' against the paper in the Zionist press.[113] He also insisted that he shared the same objectives and the same enemies as the Zionists but that he believed that the Zionist obsession with total dominance of the community was not helping, but harming the Zionist movement; and he stood by his editorial position on the basis that it was the duty of a non-party paper to provide a forum for all elements within Jewry to set out their positions.[114] Yet even after Greenberg had resigned in the summer of 1946 (ironically, he was replaced by his assistant editor John Shaftesley on the grounds that he was too sympathetic to Zionist extremists in Palestine), the paper continued to be attacked as 'the mouthpiece of the Order of Trembling Israelites'.[115]

The Zionist attack on the *Jewish Chronicle* was presented primarily in terms of the impact which the paper's opposition to Zionism would have on the non-Jewish world, where it would be a 'Godsend to the enemies of the Jewish national revival'.[116] Yet despite the Zionist claims that the *Jewish Chronicle* was anti-Zionist, and that this was having a devastating effect in the non-Jewish world, the reality was that on the truly defining benchmark of Jewish anti-Zionism — attitudes to the Fellowship — that paper held a position very close to that of the Zionists. The *Jewish Chronicle* was extremely harsh on the Fellowship both in its editorial comments and in its reports on the body's activities. Its first editorial on the Jewish Fellowship, following the letters by Robert Henriques and Brunel Cohen in *The Times* on the Jewish Brigade, attacked both men personally, stating that the Henriques letter 'would make every self-respecting Jew blush' (like the Zionist polemics, equating Jewish anti-Zionism with a lack of self-respect), and continued by accusing him of 'indulging in a disloyal impertinence to Jewry'.[117] This same editorial concluded with a statement that was to encapsulate the isolated position of the Fellowship within Jewry throughout its existence, when it stressed that the Fellowship did not appeal to the orthodox Jew, the AJA, or the Board of Deputies[118] and that

> whether intended or not [this] . . . avowedly anti-Zionist movement . . . seems to have started off on a somewhat strange course of anti-everything, for a body which has chosen the nice chummy sounding title of Fellowship.

In the first half of 1946, a time when tension was rising in anticipation of the publication of the Anglo-American report (which was followed by the arrest by the British army of Jewish leaders in Palestine), the *Jewish Chronicle* continued to present the Fellowship in the harshest terms. A correspondent who attended and reported in detail on two Fellowship meetings at that time was severely critical of the Fellowship and its position. Reporting on a February meeting, he stated that some of the claims by the Fellowship speakers were 'so

wickedly libellous of Jews as to be unfit to print' and described the Fellowship as a non-humanitarian, anti-Zionist, assimilationist body and as if to emphasize the damaging nature of those three character-istics he concluded his report with these lines from Shakespeare: 'Mine eyes were full of tears, I could not see, and yet salt water blinds them not so much but they could see a sort of traitor here'.[119] In his next report in May 1946 he was equally appalled and could only muster the strength to say: 'I cannot sufficiently emphasize how distressing the whole thing was'.[120]

One must put these denunciations into their proper context. They were made despite the Zionist claims that the paper was anti-Zionist. They were also made despite the private efforts of Fellowship leaders to influence Greenberg into taking a positive view of the Fellowship. Joseph Leftwich, whom Greenberg admired, lobbied the editor in the early days of the Fellowship and sent him copies of the confidential minutes of Fellowship executive meetings, in an attempt to prove that if given the opportunity and encouragement, he could lead the Fellowship away from its negative (anti-Zionist) inclinations and towards its positive (religious) principles.[121]

In the wake of the publication of the Brunel Cohen and Henriques letters in *The Times*, and undoubtedly sensing that their publication was a miscalculation in view of the reaction of the community, Fellowship chairman Basil Henriques wrote a personal letter to Greenberg (who himself was a strong supporter of the Jewish Brigade proposal), stating that he was 'desperately keen that the Jewish Fellowship should not be wrecked over the letters to *The Times*'. He added that the religious goals of the Fellowship would be hurt if the body was condemned in the *Jewish Chronicle* and concluded with the plea: 'Don't let your momentary anger overcome your vision of what the Jewish Fellowship can achieve'.[122]

However, as we know the *Jewish Chronicle's* anger with the Fellowship was not 'momentary', and its editor ignored the general appeals by Leftwich as well as Henriques's specific plea regarding the letters in *The Times*. Indeed, so aggressive was the editorial attack on Henriques in response to his letter that the paper had to retract its remarks and apologise in the following issue.[123] In short, under the editorship of both Greenberg and then Shaftesley, the 'organ of Anglo-Jewry' was no supporter of the Fellowship, something which once more highlights the isolation of that association within Jewry.

The Jewish Fellowship and the Board of Deputies of British Jews

After achieving a majority in the communal elections of 1943, and despite disagreements within Zionist ranks as to how best to tactically use their new influence at the Board, all Zionists agreed that it was

now impossible for anyone to claim that the community of Anglo-Jewry, as represented by the Board of Deputies, was opposed to the Zionist programme. In November 1944 the Board voted in favour of a statement on Palestine supporting the main goals of political Zionism and taking the unprecedented step of endorsing the Zionist call for a Jewish State or commonwealth in Palestine.[124] In Zionist eyes this symbolized the fact that Anglo-Jewry wholeheartedly supported Zionist aspirations for a Jewish State. *New Judea* welcomed the Board's statement as 'an unequivocal endorsement of the Zionist claim by so important a representative body' and the *Zionist Review* noted that the Board statement indicated 'clearly where British Jewry stands on the question of Palestine'.[125]

The Fellowship refused to accept the Zionist assertion that its control of the Board of Deputies meant that it was representative of Jewry's stance on the Palestine issue and Zionism. Rather, it blamed the existence of a 'Zionist caucus' which controlled the Board but had no right to pretend it represented the totality of British Jewry.[126] The Fellowship argued that the Board had forfeited its right to claim that it represented the community, because it had stopped acting in the interests of Anglo-Jewry when it had been taken over by an international Zionist movement which had no interest in representing British Jews, but rather saw the Board as a vehicle for its Jewish State policy.[127]

The Fellowship presented the Board as nothing but a tool of the Zionist movement, or as *The Jewish Outlook* called it, 'a branch of transatlantic and Middle Eastern political organisations' and 'a letter box of Great Russell Street [headquarters of the Zionist movement and the Jewish Agency in London]'.[128] For the Fellowship, the Board's support for the Jewish Agency's Palestine policy was the most obvious proof that it was nothing but a rubber stamp for international Zionism. Especially galling was the Board's tendency to stress in all its communications with the government that on the issue of Palestine it acted in co-operation with the Jewish Agency. For example, in a letter to George Hall, the Colonial Secretary in 1945, Sidney Salomon — the Board's executive and press officer — after condemning the deportation of Jewish terrorist suspects without trial from Palestine, stated: 'I am directed to add that this request [that suspected terrorists be given a hearing before deportation] is made with the knowledge of the Jewish Agency for Palestine'.[129] In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Board's decision to refuse an invitation to the Palestine conference of 1947, unless the Jewish Agency first agreed to attend, was presented in *The Jewish Outlook* as proof that the Board's policy was being 'dictated by extremist leaders from abroad'.[130]

Others within Anglo-Jewry — most notably leading members of the AJA, such as Percy Cohen and Neville Laski — were also very

critical of the Board's domination by political Zionists. The AJA had been the biggest loser when the Zionists gained control of the Board in 1943, since the Zionist victory resulted in the disbanding of the Joint Foreign committee (Conjoint) which was made up of AJA and Board representatives. The Conjoint had been regarded as the Board's pre-eminent committee and its abolition removed much of the AJA's ability to influence the policy of the Board.[131]

This marked the beginning of a fraught and at times openly hostile relationship between the Zionist-dominated Board, the English Zionist movement, and the AJA leadership. That in turn resulted in the direct appeal to the British government by the AJA on issues relating to Palestine and the organization of a 'New Group' of AJA-orientated deputies at the Board to oppose Zionist dominance — which quickly developed into a co-ordinated attempt to challenge the Zionist majority, particularly the dual position of Professor Selig Brodetsky who was both president of the Board and the leading Zionist in Britain. The 'New Group', as it was called, was chaired by its founder Neville Laski, who had been president of the Board of Deputies from 1933 to 1940. In its inaugural resolution it claimed that its objective was to restore the independence of the Board as a representative institution of Anglo-Jewry, but the orchestrated attempt by Laski to have Selig Brodetsky removed from the presidency resulted in a motion which was defeated resoundingly by 227 to 35 votes in March 1948. Members of the Fellowship played a prominent role in the 'New Group'. For example, Colonel Gluckstein was on its 'ad hoc' committee, while the chairman and secretary of the permanent committee of the 'New Group' were, respectively, Fellowship members Robert Henriques and Robert Carvahlo.[132] Nevertheless the Fellowship's relationship with the AJA was complex; one of the reasons it had come into being in the first place was the belief that the AJA was not representing the views of anti-Zionist Jews clearly or forcefully enough, and throughout its existence it looked to the AJA for moral and practical support and attempted to achieve with it what was described as 'an understanding'.[133]

However, as noted above, the AJA under Stein never did come to 'an understanding' with the Fellowship, and Stein in particular was hostile to it and made every effort to publicly distance himself from the Fellowship. For example, in a 1946 letter to the *Jewish Chronicle*, Stein stated that although the paper had printed a statement by Basil Henriques in which the Fellowship leader had quoted a statement by Stein to support his own opposition to Zionism, he wanted to make it clear that he was not in agreement with Henriques and that any opposition to Zionism he had was — unlike Henriques's — not based on 'abstract conceptions' but on actual facts.[134]

The refusal of the AJA to lend support officially to the Fellowship position (the AJA refused the Fellowship's request that the AJA represent it before the Anglo-American Committee), added to the latter's isolation within the community because the AJA was the most important unelected Jewish association with a long history of service to the community and eminent leaders. Undoubtedly there was an overlap between members of the AJA and the Fellowship (in 1948 Alan Mocatta, Basil Henriques, Albert Hyamson, Lord Swaythling, and Samuel Isidore Salmon sat on both the Fellowship and AJA councils), and Zionist polemics often tended to blur the distinction between the two groups and the 'challenge thrown out by the AJA and the Jewish Fellowship'.[135] However, while there was never official support from the AJA for the Fellowship's anti-Zionist position, there was a divide within the AJA as to whether or not the Association should support the Jewish Agency in its Palestine policy.[136]

The Fellowship's relationship with the Board was different from that of the AJA. Ultimately the AJA withdrew from its position as a constituent member of the Board in an effort to offer itself as a viable alternative to the Board, albeit a minority one, for those Jews who agreed with its Palestine policy.[137] The Fellowship, in contrast, was not in a position to take a similar course and offer itself as a functioning alternative to the Board. It was only a new body, and was limited in its actions by the fact that it presented itself as an organization primarily concerned with the religious revival of Anglo-Jewry. Indeed, the Fellowship was not even a constituent member of the Board (which meant that it had no right to send members as delegates to the Board). This, however, did not mean that it had no role within the Board or could not oppose Zionism from within the Board.

Leading Fellowship members such as Ben Moss, Louis Gluckstein, and Basil Henriques sat on the Board as representatives of Synagogues and communal institutions which were constituent members of the Board. They also participated in the Board's various committees. In 1946, for example, Gluckstein represented the Liberal Synagogue, while Ben Moss and Basil Henriques represented the St. George's Settlement Synagogue and Robert Henriques represented the West London Synagogue. In the same year Leon Rees, the Fellowship's treasurer, was on the Board's Charities registration committee. Robert Henriques was on both the Defence committee and the Palestine committee, while both Ben Moss and Basil Henriques were appointed in May 1946 to the special committee investigating the baptism of Jewish children.[138]

Yet the efforts of these leading Fellowship members to oppose Zionism from inside the Board emphasized just how marginalized it was as a body within Jewry. Colonel Louis Gluckstein was the most vociferous of the Fellowship leaders in attacking Zionism from his

position as a member of the Board of Deputies, and his long-time efforts in this respect had come under repeated attack from Zionists. In 1942 Lavy Bakstansky began a heated correspondence with Gluckstein after the latter, who was then a member of the Board's Foreign Affairs committee, had publicly attacked Zionism in a speech. Bakstansky asked him to refrain from such public statements in future. Gluckstein in reply took 'strong exception' to the 'dictatorial pretensions' of Bakstansky's letter.[139]

This was hardly surprising since Palestinian-born Bakstansky was the embodiment of what the Fellowship saw as the Board's domination by international Zionists. Indeed in the view of the Fellowship organ, Bakstansky was the *'Palestinian* official of the Zionist Organisation on the *so called* Board of Deputies of British Jews'.[140] But Bakstansky persisted and in further correspondence told Gluckstein that he deserved 'severe criticism if not censure' for his actions.[141] Gluckstein shrugged off these rebukes and continued to openly attack the Board. So much so that in October of the same year Brodetsky in a letter to D. I. Sandelson — a leader of the Leeds Jewish community and one of Brodetsky's closest advisers — stated that he was getting very tired of the anti-Zionist efforts of Gluckstein, who had not been elected as MP for Nottingham in order 'to intervene with the government on Jewish questions or to represent Jewish interests in public'.[142]

Gluckstein was not alone in his opposition to the Board's Zionist stance. As has been mentioned, this opposition resulted in the creation of the 'New Group' in 1947, but it was his stubborn refusal to bow to the Zionist majority at any point in the debate over Palestine which marks him apart from the general group opposed to the Zionist domination of the Board. This singular opposition resulted in Gluckstein experiencing the wrath of Zionist members of the Board, with deputy Dr John Mack on one occasion attacking his anti-Zionist stance as an attempt to purchase immunity from antisemitism.[143] The perception of Gluckstein as the leader of the anti-Zionist group within the Board, which had infuriated Bakstansky and Brodetsky so greatly during the war, increased in the post-war era, so that Barnett Janner, MP, during the Board's debate on Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's Palestine statement of November 1945, called on 'Gluckstein and those few who were with him' to halt their opposition to the Board's Palestine policy.[144]

However, it was Gluckstein's evidence before the Anglo-American Committee on behalf of the Fellowship in January 1946 that most outraged the Board. In his evidence Gluckstein stated that both he and Basil Henriques — the other main Fellowship spokesman to give evidence — had long been members of the Board of Deputies, but that the Board had 'ceased to be a representative body of all types of Jews and denominations of British Jews'. He added that it was because

many 'felt that the Board no longer represents the voice of Anglo-Jewry that the Fellowship was formed', finishing off his tirade against the Board with the claim that the Fellowship represented 'much more properly the great unheard and unspeaking masses of British Jewry'.[145]

In response to these claims A. E. Easterman, the chairman of the Board's Palestine committee, told deputies that the Anglo-American Committee would be furnished with a statement showing the composition of the Board, the method of election, and the general procedure in order to re-emphasize the representative and democratic nature of the Board. The Board also passed a motion, proposed by the Palestine committee, condemning Gluckstein on the grounds that, as one of its members, he had told the Anglo-American Committee that the Board was 'not representative of Jewry'.[146] This condemnation of Gluckstein was of particular and unusual ferocity, even by the standards of the battle between the Zionists and anti-Zionists; Reinhart, who had been a member of the Fellowship's delegation to the Anglo-American Committee, described the Board's attack on Gluckstein as 'beastly'.[147] The correspondent of the *Jewish Chronicle*, who was present on that occasion, commented that Gluckstein was totally isolated at one of the most highly-attended and 'boisterous' meetings of the Board that he had known.[148] This was confirmed in the same paper by David Brotmacher (deputy for Vine Court Synagogue), who noted the 'astonishing unanimity' of the condemnation of Gluckstein at the Board and justified it on the basis that Gluckstein's attacks on the Board's representative nature 'cast before a non-Jewish body, caused grave harm to Jewry and Zionism'.[149]

In part, the ferocity of the Zionist attack was an attempt to gain revenge on Gluckstein for his long-time public opposition to Zionism, which Brodetsky told a correspondent in 1942 had been 'agitating us now for years'.[150] Gluckstein had always disregarded such Zionist attacks on his position. In the heated exchange of letters with Bakstansky in 1942, he had ended the correspondence with the statement that he was 'entirely indifferent' to the abuse heaped upon him by Zionists.[151] Nor did he bow to the Zionist censure of his Anglo-American Committee evidence; his response to the condemnation was that the Board could do whatever it wished, it would not injure him in the slightest — an attitude which other Fellowship leaders wholeheartedly supported, with Rose Henriques (the wife of the Fellowship chairman), in later years recalling the episode, and admiring Gluckstein: 'right forcefully and persistently did he stick to his Fellowship guns'.[152] Yet despite his stoicism in the face of recurrent attacks and condemnations from the Zionists at the Board, his efforts only highlight the fact that Gluckstein and the Fellowship were little more than a nuisance to the Zionist-dominated Board. And the Zionists were quick to use the fact of the Fellowship's ineffectiveness

at the Board to dispel any claims that it made about representing Jewry.

The *Zionist Review* dismissed what it saw to be the Fellowship's efforts to speak for Jewry on the issue of Zionism by reminding readers that 'when Henriques and friends put their view against a Jewish state before the Board on November 5th 1944 . . . they got 18 out of 159 votes and only a few of the 18 shared the extreme anti-Zionist views of the Fellowship'.[153] Indeed, the Fellowship activists never gained credible support for their efforts at the Board. Gluckstein's proposed amendment to the Board resolution on Foreign Secretary Bevin's 1945 Palestine statement (with its conciliatory call for an equitable solution to the Jewish problem and support for the creation of the Anglo-American Committee), received only 15 favourable votes. Moreover, the motion to refer back the Board's resolution on not attending the Palestine conference in London, unless the Jewish Agency attended, was defeated by 123 votes to 14. Similarly, the motion to refer back the Board's official statement on the majority report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine — proposed by Ben Moss and seconded by Gluckstein — was defeated by 126 votes to 17.[154] It was with such votes in mind that Selig Brodetsky, in his capacity as president of the Board, was able to state in a letter to the *Yorkshire Post* attacking the Fellowship's claims to speak for the community: 'I think not even five per cent of the members of the Board would have anything to do with the Fellowship'.[155]

The Ultimate Test: Support Within Anglo-Jewry

After the Zionist success in gaining a majority at the Board elections in 1943, the argument that the Board opposed Zionism and therefore Zionism did not represent Jewry lost much of its credibility. One has just to look at the manifold resolutions passed at various annual meetings of diverse Jewish bodies to see how much support the Board had amongst the Synagogues and communal institutions of Anglo-Jewry in 1945–1948.[156] The Fellowship, aware of its standing at the Board, took the second most effective course: the Board did support Zionism, but in doing so it did not represent the masses of Anglo-Jewry. This had been Gluckstein's argument before the Anglo-American Committee, and it had been how Basil Henriques had argued in 1945 before a parliamentary committee when challenged over the fact that the Fellowship's position had been overwhelmingly defeated at the Board of Deputies.[157]

There is no doubt that the Fellowship did indeed attempt to present itself as speaking on behalf of Anglo-Jewry. *The Times* reported that Colonel Robert Henriques, in his speech to the first annual meeting of the Fellowship, was confident that 'the overwhelming majority of

British Jews could unite within the Fellowship'.[158] Throughout its entire existence the Fellowship did not hide its belief in the importance of having a large membership; it was the 'main task',[159] and Basil Henriques continually urged other Fellowship leaders to concentrate on attracting new members.[160] Further, he made success in attracting members the benchmark to be used in considering whether or not the Fellowship was speaking for the Jews of England.[161] Throughout 1945 and 1946 the Fellowship claimed that membership was increasing to a 'marked degree', and a meeting of its executive in September 1946 was informed that membership was rising steadily and satisfactorily.[162] Much of the basis for this optimism was due to the establishment of local Fellowship groups in areas of large Jewish populations in London and the provinces. By 1947 within Greater London there were groups in Bayswater, Paddington, Hampstead, South London, and the Thames area.

But although the creation of these local groups was an achievement of sorts, and the determined efforts of leaders such as Julian Franklyn and Basil Henriques to speak to these groups and motivate them shows the commitment of Fellowship leaders, the reality was that there were never more than ten local groups in England, just as there were never more than two thousand members of the Fellowship. Now and then, Fellowship leaders admitted that their association had failed to achieve much support within Jewry; Julian Franklyn in a 1947 article noted that support for the Fellowship was 'at present but a trickle',[163] while a 1948 *Private and Confidential Memorandum* even admitted that the Fellowship position was 'not held by the majority of Jews in England'.[164]

More often, however, the Fellowship persisted in claiming that it represented the majority of British Jewry. Even after the birth of the State of Israel, *The Jewish Outlook* stated in June 1948: 'while the Zionists are rejoicing, the bulk of the community is stunned and bewildered by the speed of events'.[165] Such claims showed that the Fellowship's opposition to Zionism, though sincere, was not always logical or rational. Robert Abrahams in a letter to *The Jewish Outlook* typified this attitude: he insisted that anti-Zionist Jews 'must stress that decisions reached by various Jewish organisations outside the Fellowship are not necessarily representative of the true opinion of Jewry'.[166] In other words, he asserted that while the position of the Fellowship was the legitimate position of Jewry, the stance of other, much larger communal bodies was not.

Inherent to this attitude was the belief that Fellowship Jews were the only ones who had not been manipulated, deceived, or brainwashed by Zionist propaganda. And it was in these terms that Fellowship leaders such as Julian Franklyn had claimed in 1945 that it was the duty of those Jews who found themselves 'blessed with the

ability to distinguish between their religion and their nationality' to take a stand against Zionism.[167] This view was echoed in *The Jewish Outlook* which argued editorially in 1947 that it was only those Jews who had 'not been blinded by blatant propaganda', and who could 'still distinguish' between charity and politics, religion and nationality, who understood the true value of the Fellowship.[168] In these terms, and contrary to Zionist propaganda, the Fellowship's position was not motivated primarily by the 'politics of fear',[169] a lack of Jewish self-respect, or an aversion to its Jewish heritage, but by a definite immoveable faith in its own distinctive conception of Judaism. Yet however sincere the Fellowship position was, its perception of Jewish duty was at variance with that of the majority of Jews who, at least by 1945, equated support, or at least tolerance, of Zionism with Jewish self-respect and duty and who could not fathom what denouncing Zionism as Nazism had to do with promoting the true Jewish view.

Thus, despite its convictions and its membership's ability to delude itself, the Fellowship failed to gain credible support either at the Board of Deputies or in the wider community of Jewry by way of a large membership. It failed to counter Zionist propaganda and to convince Anglo-Jewry that it was not a Liberal anti-Zionist conspiracy against the Jewish community. It failed to appeal to other Jewish bodies, even those like the AJA or Agudath Yisra'el which were not politically Zionist in orientation. A victim of communal trends, contemporary events, Zionist propaganda, and its own extremism, the Fellowship was wound up in November 1948. With this, the contentious, but undoubtedly strong, tradition of Jewish assimilationist opposition to Zionism within Anglo-Jewry came to an end. It would never return.

Abbreviations
ABD Archives of the Board of Deputies of British Jews
MEC Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford University
PLUS Parkes Library, University of Southampton

NOTES

[1] Moshe Shertok, *The Twin Problems of Palestine and the Jewish People*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 27 November 1945, 8/1155, p. 9.

[2] Walter Laqueur, 'Zionism and its Liberal Critics, 1896–1948', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 6, 1971, pp. 161–82; Stuart Cohen, 'Selig Brodetsky and the Ascendancy of Zionism in Anglo-Jewry: Another View of his Role and Achievements', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXIV, no. 1, June 1982, pp. 25–38; Robert S. Wistrich, 'Zionism and Its "Assimilationist" Critics (1897–1948)', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 4, no. 2, Winter 1998, pp. 59–112; Gideon Shimoni, 'The Non Zionists in Anglo-Jewry, 1937–1948', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXVIII, no. 2, December 1986, pp. 89–115.

[3] Cohen, op. cit. in note 2 above, p. 34.

[4] Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State*, Cambridge, Mass., 1961.

[5] Cmd. 6019, *Palestine, A Statement of Policy*, H.M.S.O., May 1939.

[6] Wistrich, op. cit. in note 2 above, p. 86 and Shimoni, op. cit in note 2 above, p. 102.

[7] On Henriques, see Leonard Montefiore's homage, 'B.L.Q.H', *Jewish Monthly*, vol. 1, no. 8, November 1947, pp. 9–11. See also Henriques's own memoirs, *The Indiscretions of a Warden*, London, 1937 and L. L. Loewe's *Basil Henriques, A Portrait*, London, 1976.

[8] See Elazar, pseud., writing on the occasion of Waley Cohen's seventieth birthday, 'Sir Robert at Seventy', *Jewish Monthly*, vol. 1, no. 7, October 1947, p. 38.

[9] Paul Goodman, *Zionism in England: 1899–1949: A Jubilee Record*, London, 1949, p. 76.

[10] Brunel Cohen, *Address to Fellowship Council*, 20 June 1945, p. 4.

[11] Gideon Shimoni, 'From Anti-Zionism To Non-Zionism in Anglo-Jewry, 1917–1937', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXVIII, no. 1, June 1986, pp. 19–47, p. 23. On the League of British Jews, see Laurie Magnus, *Old Lamps for New: An Apologia for the League of British Jews*, London, 1918 and *The Need for the League*, London, 1917.

[12] Leading AJA members who opposed the group's official position on Palestine and supported the Zionist stance included Rabbi I. J. Unterman, William Goldstein (member of the AJA council), Dr L. Kirsch, Herbert Michaelis, Louis Nathan, Shabtai Rowson, Lionel Jacobson (chairman of the Newcastle Jewish Representative Council), Mark Labovitch (president of the Leeds Jewish Representative Council), and Dr P. I. Wigoder, a leading member of the Manchester Jewish community.

[13] See *The Purpose and Programme of the World Agudist Organisation*, London, 1937.

[14] On Moyne's assassination see Gerold Frank's *The Deed: The Assassination of Lord Moyne*, London, 1964 and Bernard Wasserstein's 'The Assassination of Lord Moyne', *Jewish Historical Society of England, Transactions*, vol. XXVII, 1978–1980, pp. 72–83.

[15] See for example, the statement by Selig Brodetsky, the Zionist president of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 8 November 1944, ACC3121/C14/21/1, ABD.

[16] See Fellowship secretary Julian Franklyn argue in these terms, 'Israel: State or Religion?', *Contemporary Review*, vol. CLXXII, no. 979, July

1947, pp. 35–39, p. 36. Franklyn points out in this article that it was the former Chief Rabbi Hertz who, speaking in a different context, had originally made this distinction in 1936.

[17] Joseph Leftwich, 'Are We a Philistine Community?', *Jewish Monthly*, vol. 1, no. 9, December 1947, pp. 11–23.

[18] Leftwich to Greenberg, 21 August 1944, MS150 AJ 110/5, Ivan Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[19] Moshe Rosette interview, 8 February 1961, pp. 13, 16, project 2 'Management of the Jewish Agency London, 1939–1948', Oral History Project, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

[20] See the memorandum *Report on Post-War Plans of Jewish Anti-Zionists*, n.d., MS119 AJ3 278–283, Selig Brodetsky papers, PLUS.

[21] *New Judea*, February–March 1945, p. 72.

[22] Ibid., November 1945, p. 19.

[23] Harry Sacher's article 'The Study of Jewish History', first published in *New Judea* in 1947, can be found in his book of essays, *Zionist Portraits and Other Essays*, London, 1959, pp. 291–96.

[24] Barnet Litvinoff, 'Fanaticism and Fantasy', *Zionist Review*, 19 July 1946, p. 9. Lewin's 1941 essay 'Self-Hatred Among Jews' can be found in Gertrud W. Lewin, ed., *Resolving Social Conflicts*, New York, 1948, pp. 186–200. See also Miriam Lewin Papanek's 'Psychological Aspects of Minority Group Membership: The Concepts of Kurt Lewin', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. XXXVI, no. 1, January 1974, pp. 72–79.

[25] Maurice Cohen speaking at a meeting of the East London branch of Poalei Zion, 4 April 1946, reprinted in *Zionist Review*, 19 April 1946, p. 11.

[26] 'Life and Language', *Zionist Review*, 26 November 1948, p. 8.

[27] 'Beyond Contempt', *Zionist Review*, 20 April 1945, p. 2.

[28] 'Scandalous Document', *Zionist Review*, 6 February 1948, p. 1.

[29] Zakan, pseud., 'The Order of Trembling Israelites', *Zionist Review*, 28 June 1946, p. 10.

[30] Progressive Judaism, most commonly divided into Reform and Liberal Judaism, had its roots in Germany in the early years of the nineteenth century and emerged in response to changes in the political, social, and cultural conditions brought about by the emancipation of the Jews. It manifested itself in different forms in various countries. But in general terms the Progressive movement differed from Orthodox Judaism in its belief that it was legitimate to make changes in the formulations of Jewish belief or in the codification of Jewish law. This resulted most noticeably in an attempt to adapt the synagogue service to the modern world, which saw a shortening of the liturgy and the presentation of sermons, and even some prayers, in the vernacular rather than in Hebrew.

Reform Judaism was first introduced into England in 1840, with the formation of the West London Synagogue. Liberal Judaism, which espoused a more radical reinterpretation than Reform Judaism regarding both orthodox theology and practice, grew out of Reform and was first established in England with the formation of the Religious Union in 1901 and the formation of the Liberal Synagogue in 1911.

[31] Paul Goodman, 'Our Own Effort', *Zionist Review*, 26 January 1945, p. 6.

[32] See Brodetsky, *From Ghetto to Israel*, London, 1960, p. 243 and Gluckstein to Sir Edward Spears, 6 March 1945, Box 4/6, Edward Spears papers, MEC.

[33] *Synagogue Review*, vol. XX, no. 2, October 1945, p. 9.

[34] See Shabtai Rowson's report on the meeting, *American Jewish Year Book 5705*, vol. 46, 18 September 1944–7 September 1945, p. 192.

[35] Robert Henriques, 'Unity and Expedience', *Jewish Monthly*, vol. 1, no. 2, May 1947, pp. 9–15, p. 11.

[36] 'Capturing Youth', *Zionist Review*, 22 December 1944, p. 1.

[37] 'The Unmentionable', *New Judea*, June 1948, p. 148.

[38] 'High Festivals', *Zionist Review*, 19 September 1947, p. 11.

[39] *Zionist Review*, 17 December 1943, p. 6.

[40] 'Guiding the Young', *Zionist Review*, 20 August 1948, p. 8.

[41] Sacher, *New Judea*, April 1945, p. 98.

[42] *Jewish Chronicle*, 9 November 1945, p. 6.

[43] See Paul Goodman, 'Mount Zion or Mount Gerizim?', *Gates of Zion*, vol. 1, no. 1, September 1946, p. 3 and 'Zion and the United Synagogue', vol. 1, no. 2, January 1947, p. 1.

[44] On Loewe's concerns on this issue, see Leftwich to Greenberg, 21 August 1944, MS150 AJ 110/5, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[45] Basil Henriques and Alfred Marmorstein, *What is Judaism?*, London, 1945.

[46] See, for example, *Gates of Zion*, vol. 2, no. 3, April 1948, p. 2.

[47] See H. Grunis, 27 April 1945, p. 15 and J. Mendel, 18 May 1945, p. 15. Both in the *Jewish Chronicle*.

[48] On the Anglo-American Committee, see Amikam Nachmani's *Great Power Discord in Palestine: The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Problem of European Jewry and Palestine, 1945–1946*, London, 1986 and Alan H. Podet's *The Success and Failure of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945–46: The Last Chance in Palestine*, Lewiston & Queenston, 1986. See also Michael J. Cohen, 'The Genesis of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, November 1945: A Case Study on the Assertion of American Hegemony', *Historical Journal*, vol. 22, no. 1, January 1979, pp. 186–207.

[49] See evidence of the Jewish Fellowship before the Anglo-American Committee, London, 30 January 1946, ACC3121/C14/30/5, p. 39, ABD.

[50] Henriques, *Jewish Chronicle*, 15 February 1946, p. 14.

[51] Both Nabarro and Mendel's letters were published in the *Jewish Chronicle*, 22 February 1946, p. 16.

[52] *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 12, May 1947, p. 2. See also Rabbi Curtis Cassell's article 'The Gates of Zion: A Criticism', in the same paper, vol. 1, no. 9, January 1947, p. 8.

[53] See, for example, his comments in the minutes of the Jewish Fellowship executive meeting, 9 March 1944, MS150 AJ 110/5, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[54] See Harold Soref's review of the *Gates of Zion* in the *Jewish Monthly*, vol. 1, no. 2, May 1947, pp. 65–66, p. 65.

[55] See Namier's attack on Mattuck in these terms, *Manchester Guardian*, 16 December 1943. See also a longer argument on similar lines in his essay 'The Jewish Question', *Facing East*, London, 1947, pp. 142–50.

[56] *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 2, no. 1, June 1947, p. 14.

[57] Namier, op. cit. in note 55 above, p. 148. For a highly interesting account of Namier's complicated relationship with Zionism, see Norman Rose's *Lewis Namier and Zionism*, Oxford, 1980.

[58] Webber, 'The Present Position of Anglo-Jewry', *Jewish Forum*, vol. 1, no. 1, October 1946, pp. 75–85, p. 80.

[59] See Henriques, 'The Attitude to the State of Israel and Jewish Nationalism' in Israel Mattuck, ed., *Aspects of Progressive Jewish Thought*, London, 1954, pp. 115–20, p. 115.

[60] *Zionist Review*, 5 September 1947, p. 3.

[61] 'A Performance in Yorkshire', *Jewish Chronicle*, 22 February 1946, p. 8.

[62] Harold Morris, *Jewish Chronicle*, 19 July 1946, p. 15. For other examples of attacks on the Fellowship in the letters pages of this newspaper, see J. H. Sieff, 16 February 1945, p. 15; Cecil Nash, 1 March 1946, p. 18; Barnett Hyman, 8 March 1946, p. 14; Corporal A. Berkovitch, 29 March 1946, p. 15; and H. Grunis, 26 April 1946, p. 15.

[63] 'Agudist', *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 2, May 1946, p. 13.

[64] Evidence of the Jewish Fellowship before the Anglo-American Committee, ACC3121/C14/30/5, p. 42, ABD.

[65] Ibid., p. 43.

[66] Henriques, 'British Jewry and the Terrorists', *Star*, 13 January 1947.

[67] *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 3, June–July 1946, p. 3.

[68] Franklyn, 'Jewish Defence and the Jewish Fellowship', *Synagogue Review*, vol. XIX, no. 9, May 1945, pp. 66–67, p. 66.

[69] Reinhart, *The Times*, 23 September 1947.

[70] Hyamson to Reinhart, 23 September 1947, MS171 AJ 246/122, Harold Reinhart papers, PLUS.

[71] Henriques, *Statement to Fellowship Members*, 1 February 1946, p. 2.

[72] Evidence of the Jewish Fellowship before the Anglo-American Committee, ACC3121/C14/30/5, p. 60, ABD.

[73] 'Cannibal Scientists', *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 2, no. 9, January 1948, p. 6.

[74] Franklyn, op. cit. in note 68 above, p. 66.

[75] Franklyn, op. cit. in note 16 above, p. 38.

[76] Ibid. p. 37. See also 'Fascism Fertilises Fascism', *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 12, no. 1, June 1947, p. 14.

[77] Hyamson, *Palestine: A Policy*, London, 1942, p. 7.

[78] Shertok's speech to the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, 17 October 1947, reprinted in full in *New Judea*, October–November, 1947, pp. 15–17.

[79] Franklyn to Reinhart, 23 March 1948, MS171 AJ 246/24, Reinhart papers, PLUS.

[80] 'Beyond Contempt', *Zionist Review*, 20 April 1945, p. 2.

[81] Stein to Greenberg, 19 April 1945, MS150 AJ 110/5, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[82] Stein to Greenberg, 23 April 1945, MS150 AJ 110/5, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[83] *Jewish Chronicle*, 27 April 1945, p. 10.

[84] F. Polishuk, *Zionist Review*, 27 April 1945, p. 5.

[85] See *Aims of the Jewish Fellowship*, 9 March 1944.

[86] See minutes of the Fellowship executive meeting, 9 March 1944, MS150 AJ110/5, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[87] See Brunel Cohen's *Address to the Fellowship Council*, 20 June 1945, p. 4 and Basil Henriques's speech to a meeting of the executive and council on 15 February 1946, 3/34, 1945–1947, MS132 AJ 195, Basil Henriques papers, PLUS. See also 'Spreading the Message', *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 2, no. 9, April 1948, p. 5.

[88] See Henriques's letter in *The Times*, 21 September 1944 and Brunel Cohen's in *The Times*, 23 September 1944.

[89] Brunel Cohen, op. cit. in note 87 above, p. 3.

[90] Lucien Wolf, 'The Jewish National Movement', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 225, no. 460, April 1917, pp. 1–17.

[91] Leon Simon, *The Case Against the Anti-Zionists*, London, 1917, p. 17.

[92] Janner, *Zionist Review*, 29 September 1944, p. 2.

[93] See report in *Jewish Chronicle*, 6 October 1944, p. 13.

[94] *Jewish Chronicle*, 29 September 1944, p. 8.

[95] See Brunel Cohen, op. cit. in note 87 above, p. 3 and *Some Information for You: Confidential Memorandum*, London, 1945, p. 4.

[96] *Jewish Chronicle*, 24 May 1946, p. 15.

[97] *Synagogue Review*, vol. XIX, no. 5, January 1945, p. 35.

[98] See evidence of the Fellowship before the Anglo-American Committee, ACC3121/C14/30/5, p. 41, ABD.

[99] The letter was published in *The Times*, 24 May 1917.

[100] The Joint Foreign Committee (Conjoint) of the Board of Deputies was founded in 1878 by the Board of Deputies and the AJA with the aim of merging the overseas work (charity, protection of Jewish rights, etc.) of the two bodies. It developed into the pre-eminent committee at the Board of Deputies concerned with international affairs.

[101] See Vol. 3 of David Vital's history of Zionism, *Zionism: The Crucial Phase*, Oxford, 1987, p. 276.

[102] Bakstansky to Gluckstein, 11 June 1942, MS150 AJ 110/8, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[103] 'Remember 1917', *Zionist Review*, 27 October 1944, pp. 1–2. See also Chaim Weizmann's similar recollection in *Trial and Error*, London, 1949, pp. 254–57.

[104] Rosette to Greenberg, 18 January 1944, MS150 AJ110/5, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[105] Rosette's statement, Board of Deputies debate, 15 April 1945, reported in *Jewish Chronicle*, 20 April 1945, p. 5.

[106] 'An Outrage', *Zionist Review*, 23 March 1945, p. 2.

[107] 'Vicious Propaganda', *Zionist Review*, 13 April 1945, p. 1.

[108] Chairman of the Defence committee to Greenberg, 3 April 1946, MS150 AJ 110/4, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[109] Isaac Dartle, *Jewish Chronicle*, 12 April 1946, p. 15.

[110] See David Cesarani's *The Jewish Chronicle and Anglo-Jewry*, Cambridge, 1994, especially chapter 6, 'Ivan Greenberg and the Crisis Years, 1937–1946'.

[111] Moss to Greenberg, 2 February 1944, MS150 AJ 110/5, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[112] Rosette to Greenberg, 18 January 1944, MS150 AJ 110/5, Greenberg papers. See also Brodetsky to Greenberg, n.d., MS119 AJ3 208, Brodetsky papers and Bakstansky to Greenberg, 1 July 1942, MS150 AJ 110/5, Greenberg papers. All PLUS.

[113] 'Zionist Isolationists', *Jewish Chronicle*, 11 May 1945, p. 8.

[114] Greenberg to Brodetsky, 13 July 1943, MS119 AJ3 205, Brodestsky papers, PLUS.

[115] *Zionist Review*, 13 September 1946, p. 1.

[116] 'A New Campaign', *Zionist Review*, 18 May 1945, p. 1.

[117] 'Fellowship or Free for All?', *Jewish Chronicle*, 29 September 1944, p. 8.

[118] Ibid.

[119] 'A Performance in Yorkshire', *Jewish Chronicle*, 22 February 1946, p. 8.

[120] *Jewish Chronicle*, 24 May 1946, p. 15.

[121] Leftwich to Greenberg, 20 March 1944, MS150 AJ 110/7, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[122] Henriques to Greenberg, 25 September 1944, MS150 AJ 110/5, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[123] See the retraction and apology, *Jewish Chronicle*, 20 October 1944, p. 10.

[124] See Board of Deputies of British Jews, *Statement on Palestine*, London, 1944.

[125] *New Judea*, October–November 1944, p. 3, and 'The Voice of Anglo-Jewry', *Zionist Review*, 10 November 1944, p. 1.

[126] *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 2, May 1946, pp. 4–5.

[127] Ibid., vol. 1, no. 7, November 1946, pp. 1–2.

[128] Ibid., vol. 1, no. 3, June–July 1946, p. 13.

[129] See Salomon to Hall, 6 September 1945, ACC3121/C14/28, ABD.

[130] *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 6, October 1946, p. 13.

[131] The Zionist resolution proposing the disbanding of the Conjoint committee was passed by 154 against 148 Board deputies and thus did not have clear-cut support. For correspondence and material on the disbanding of the Joint Foreign Committee, see ACC3121/C11/10, ABD.

[132] For the Fellowship's public support for the AJA, see *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 12, May 1947, p. 2.

[133] See minutes of Fellowship executive meeting, 9 March 1944, MS150 AJ 110/5, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[134] Stein, *Jewish Chronicle*, 19 July 1946, p. 15.

[135] 'Anglo-Jewry Backs the Agency', *Zionist Review*, 19 July 1946, p. 1.

[136] For example, Zionist members of the AJA organised to submit a memorandum to the Colonial Secretary in March 1945 stating their support for the Jewish Agency's Palestine policy, ACC3121/C14/28, ABD.

[137] On the AJA decision to leave the Board, see minutes of the meeting between representatives of the AJA and the Board of Deputies, 18 July 1947, ACC3121/C11/10, ABD.

[138] On Fellowship members who were also on the Board of Deputies, see *The Board of Deputies of British Jews Annual Reports* (1944–1949).

[139] See Bakstansky to Gluckstein, 11 June 1942, MS150 AJ 110/8 and Gluckstein to Bakstansky, 19 June 1942, MS150 AJ 110/8, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[140] *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 4, August 1946, p. 3 (emphasis added).

[141] Bakstansky to Gluckstein, 26 June 1942, MS150 AJ 110/8, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[142] Brodetsky to Sandelson, 13 October 1942, MS119 AJ3 151, Brodetsky papers, PLUS.

[143] Mack was speaking at the debate on the Board's Palestine statement, 5 November 1944 and his claim was reprinted in the *Zionist Review*, 10 November 1944, pp. 4–5.

[144] See Janner's statement during the Board's debate on Bevin's Palestine statement, 18 November 1945, reported in the *Jewish Chronicle*, 23 November 1945, pp. 6, 15.

[145] See evidence of the Fellowship before the Anglo-American Committee, ACC3121/C14/30/5, p. 41, ABD.

[146] The condemnation of Gluckstein took place at the Board meeting of 24 February 1946.

[147] Reinhart to Henriques, 25 February 1946, MS171 AJ 240/92, Reinhart papers, PLUS.

[148] *Jewish Chronicle*, 1 March 1946, p. 7.

[149] David Brotmacher, *Jewish Chronicle*, 15 March 1946, p. 15.

[150] Brodetsky to Sandelson, 13 October 1942, MS119 AJ3 151, Brodetsky papers, PLUS.

[151] Gluckstein to Bakstansky, 30 June 1942, MS150 AJ 110/8, Greenberg papers, PLUS.

[152] Rose Henriques, 1 March 1946, 3/34, 1945–1947, MS132 AJ 195, Henriques papers, PLUS.

[153] *Zionist Review*, 9 March 1945, p. 1. *New Judea* presented the vote in exactly the same way, October–November 1944, p. 3.

[154] For details of these debates, see reports in *Jewish Chronicle*, 23 November 1945, pp. 6, 15 and *Zionist Review*, 20 September 1946, p. 9 and 25 July 1947, p. 8.

[155] Brodetsky, *Yorkshire Post*, 15 January 1946.

[156] For example, the annual conference of the Synagogues, Societies and Institutions of East London passed a resolution at its annual meeting on 25 February 1945 expressing its accord with the policy of the Board of Deputies in regard to Palestine'. For this and other examples of this form of communal support, see ACC3121/C14/28, ABD.

[157] See report on Henriques's speech before the Middle East Parliamentary Committee, Jewish Telegraphic Agency's *Daily News Bulletin*, vol. 12, no. 56, 8 March 1945, p. 2.

[158] *The Times*, 15 October 1945.

[159] Brunel Cohen, op. cit. in note 87 above, p. 5.

[160] Henriques to Reinhart, 27 October 1945, MS171 AJ 240/92, Reinhart papers, PLUS.

[161] Henriques, *Statement to Fellowship Members*, 1 February 1946, p. 4.

[162] See *Some Information for You*, London, 1945, p. 6 and the report on the Fellowship executive meeting in *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 6, October 1946, p. 13.

[163] Julian Franklyn, op. cit. in note 16 above, p. 39.

[164] *Private and Confidential Memorandum*, London, 1948, p. 3.

[165] See *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 2, no. 11, June 1948, p. 8.

[166] Abrahams, *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 6, October 1946, p. 15.

[167] Franklyn, op. cit. in note 68 above, p. 67.

[168] *The Jewish Outlook*, vol. 1, no. 12, May 1947, p. 2. See also *Calling All Jews*, London, 1948, which asserted that it was the 'clear-sighted' members of Jewry who supported the Jewish Fellowship.

[169] This is the term used by Richard Bolchover to describe the assimilationist opposition to Zionism within Jewry in *British Jewry and the Holocaust*, Cambridge, 1993, p. 103.

HASSIDIM AND THEIR REBBE: SOME INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

William Shaffir

IN a recent review article, Jacques Gutwirth laments the absence of attention accorded the role of the hassidic leader, or rebbe, and claims that the '... function of a charismatic *rebbe* is very much still alive nowadays among hassidic communities'.[1] Indeed, as any ethnographer of hassidim knows only too well, analysis of a hassidic community necessarily involves an examination of the rebbe's role because hassidim situate him not only at the centre of the community but also of their lives. The rebbe, the term used by the hassidim to designate their charismatic religious leader, occupies front-and-backstage in any portrait of hassidic life, and the ethnographer does well to understand the dynamics of the rebbe's commanding role.

My opportunity to appreciate the significance of the hassidic rebbe occurred at various stages during my field research among them. A few instances follow. During my first contact with the Lubavitcher hassidim, in 1968, one could not help but notice a large banner outside the yeshiva inviting Jews to join millions of others who had fulfilled the *mitzvah* (commandment) of donning *tefillin* (phylacteries). A Lubavitcher, noticing that I was new to the scene, approached me and explained: 'The Lubavitcher rebbe started a *Tefillin* campaign to help Israeli soldiers in the Six-Day War'. (I was to hear about the Lubavitcher rebbe — about his background, his views on the widest variety of topics, and the enormous powers vested in him by his followers — throughout my years of research in their community.) About a year later, I found myself employed by the Tasher hassidim as a secretary in their administrative office. My chief responsibility involved typing letters to individuals, companies, and government officials requesting financial assistance for the newly-established community. These letters were typed on an IBM electric typewriter. One day, my supervisor returned one of them and said: 'The rebbe says that some of the lines on the letter are crooked. You'll have to do it over'. I glanced at the lines. To me, the letter looked just fine. However, I immediately realized that there was no arguing the point.

Whenever I saw the Tasher rebbe entering or leaving the yeshiva, an entourage surrounded him and people rushed to catch a glimpse of him and to be in his presence. To his hassidim, I realized, he was no ordinary person. Familiar with the Yiddish song, 'Az Der Rebbe Elimelech' ('When the Rebbe Elimelech'), which extols the influence and power of the hassidic rebbe over his followers, I understood that the lines could not be said to be straight if the rebbe claimed that they were crooked. One other noteworthy incident, a few years later, reinforced my appreciation of the rebbe's standing among his hassidim. When my book on the Montreal Lubavitch community was published, a Lubavitch acquaintance discussed its merits and short-comings. Though generally favourable to what I had written, he expressed both surprise and disappointment that I had missed an essential point which he thought I had surely grasped. He objected to the following passage:[2]

> Because the Rebbe is perceived by his followers as unable to do wrong, they are willing to claim to have misinterpreted and not "really understood" his advice if it should prove objectively false. Consequently, it is impossible to have a disconfirmation of the Rebbe's teaching.

Surely, claimed the Lubavitcher, I had it wrong: the rebbe's teaching could not be disconfirmed because the rebbe did not err. Interestingly, when I recently asked a Tasher hassid if he had ever heard of a situation where the rebbe's advice was judged to be wrong, he looked at me quizzically, paused, and replied: 'Like now when it's the middle of the day, it should be night. It can't be because the rebbe is *emes* (truth)'.

My aim in this article is modest — to highlight some features characterizing the relationship between the rebbe, the hassidic community, and his hassidim. The community in question is Tash, and this Journal recently published one of my articles about the group.[3] I wish to show that the hassidim's discourse about the rebbe is organized around a set of assertions or claims testifying to his supernatural and superhuman attributes and powers. The generating of such claims, I suggest, results in a commonly-adopted script whose essential features concentrate on the rebbe's miraculous abilities and deeds. In particular, I focus on claims about his powers in cases of illness. I maintain that hassidim invest their rebbe with charismatic traits which they believe to be rooted in his very being.[4] My conceptualization of charisma relies upon Max Weber's definition of the term: '... a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are... regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a

leader'.[5] In other words, followers become convinced that their charismatic leader is a direct agent of God, or perhaps even God incarnate, and feel a sense of mystery and awe in his presence.

A brief review of research about hassidim and their communities[6] identifies the rebbe's centrality. Before analyzing the organization of everyday life in Satmar, Rubin stresses the importance of 'the individual who is the heart and soul of the community; the man whose presence makes all the difference to the existence of Satmar in its present form'[7] — the Satmar rebbe, Yoel Teitelbaum. Rubin maintains that not only is it essential to recognize the rebbe's personal attributes and his multi-faceted role in the community's social fabric, but also how these attributes are perceived by his followers. His role is that of a decision maker, ultimate Torah authority, and a source of comfort and security. He is perceived as a saintly individual leading hassidim to maintain that '... their master has divine assistance which prevents him from erring in any matters...'.[8] Rubin emphasizes that '... what is important is the way he is perceived by the members of the community, rather than the way he might score on some objective value scale'[9] and finally that all facets of the rebbe's leadership are affected by his charismatic appeal which sets him apart from his followers. I return to the matter of charisma below.

Jerome Mintz contends that the rebbe '... serves as a mediator between his followers and God' and that his power and authority are rooted '... in his intense piety, in his special relationship to God, and in his yihus (lineage)'.[10] His relationship to his followers extends '... in the uncertain areas of life rather than in the clearly defined domain of the law'.[11] Thus, for example, rebbes are usually asked for assistance in matters relating to illness, financial difficulties, and personal problems. According to his followers, the rebbe enjoys the ability to analyze the roots of any problem and to pray for its resolution. Mintz observes: 'The Rebbes are thought to move in spheres not understood by ordinary men. It is believed that the Rebbes can, in dire circumstances, intercede on behalf of their followers with the Heavenly Court'.[12] For instance, even when medical practitioners are sought out, faith in the rebbe's power remains foremost: 'Believers inevitably discover that mystical aid was necessary to locate the right doctor and to select the appropriate medicine'.[13] Moreover, 'Whenever a successful resolution is achieved by supernatural means, one may say that it is the Almighty working through the Rebbe'.[14]

Solomon Poll's analysis of the rebbe stresses his charismatic appeal:[15] followers attribute supernatural, and possibly divine powers to their religious leader and believe that he not only has connections with the 'upper worlds', but also uses his special gifts for the benefit of his followers. 'Hasidic Jews view their rebbe as a visionary, as a man to whom God appears, as a man who is attached to God'.[16] They

believe that '... he "travels in the upper worlds" and that he has connections with the "ultimate", the "fundamental", and the "vital-order-determining" forces'.[17] Indeed, the rebbe's charismatic qualities derive from the intensity of such beliefs. 'The more highly the community thinks of the rebbe, the more he is capable of doing for them,' asserts Poll, and in the process, '... the dominance of the charisma is strengthened'.[18] He concludes: 'Because Hasidim perceive the rebbe to be endowed with charisma, the Hasid-rebbe relationship is one that works'.[19]

Some Background about the Rebbe and the Community

The hassidic enclave, established by the Tasher rebbe in 1963, is situated on the border of Boisbriand, Quebec, some 25 kilometres north of Montreal. Its presence in this setting is strikingly incongrous: the hassidim are surrounded by French Canadian neighbours in an area where much of the land remains zoned for agriculture. Since they have a fundamental belief that cultural survival depends on remaining resolutely separate, their rebbe deliberately chose that locality to ensure that the community would be quite insulated from the distractions and temptations of urban life. A 1994 article about this sect, in a popular magazine,[20] described them accurately as 'cloistered in their self-imposed ghetto ..., lead a life of strict devotion totally dedicated to carrying out the will of Ha-Shem on Earth and to raising children to do the same'. These hassidim have co-ordinated a methodical plan of isolation to help buttress their boundaries against untoward influences. To any visiting outsider, the community appears as a picturesque reminder of yesteryear caught in a time warp. It seems to have come as close to recreating a shtetl as one is likely to find in the Diaspora, along with New Square and Kiryat Yoel, north of New York City (communities of the Skverer and Satmar hassidic sects).

In an earlier article in this Journal,[21] I documented the group's growth since its inception. The 18 Tash families who left Montreal with their rebbe to establish a refuge from the temptations of city life have burgeoned into a self-sufficient community of close to 250 families, or some 3,000 persons benefiting from a series of institutions — including yeshivas, schools, mikvehs, a colonnaded shopping area, an ambulance service, a butcher, a bakery, etc. — which have enabled it to remain successfully insulated from the mainstream. A resident recently boasted to a newspaper reporter: 'We have everything here, except drugs, crime, and AIDS'.

In recent years, two main features have impacted upon the community: size and attention by the media. The two are not entirely unrelated. The rate of growth has been quite staggering. The Tasher

applied to the authorities for zoning changes to enable them to build houses on formerly-designated agricultural land, and when a Tasher official was asked by a Quebec tribunal about the number of children in the community, he replied: 'About one child for every year and a half of marriage . . . . We have an average of eight now'. When asked how many couples could be expected to marry over the next ten years, he estimated at least 300 but probably more. And when information was sought about the number of children expected to be born into the community over the next ten years, he replied: 'Two years ago, we had one birth per week. This year we have, on average, two children per week. Two years from now, probably four or more. Over ten years, about 1500 children'.

A series of incidents have spotlighted the community both within Quebec and internationally.[22] A rash of publicity occurred in 1995 when the Tasher gave every indication of supporting Quebec's separatist movement in a national referendum, much to the consternation of the organized Montreal Jewish community which had uniformly lined up behind Canadian federalism. In 1999, the community was the target of a federal revenue department raid by 25 agents and a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer. Revenue Canada alleged that the College Rabbinique de Montreal, Yeshiva Oir Hachaim D'Tash, was involved in fiscal fraud, maintaining that the community's charitable organization produced greatly inflated tax receipts in exchange for donations.[23] And most recently, the community became the centre of national and international attention during the wedding festivities of the Tasher rebbe's granddaughter. Joerg Haider came on a visit to Montreal shortly after his extreme right-wing Freedom Party joined the Austrian governing coalition and made the startling announcement that he had received an invitation to the wedding. Tasher officials denied that any such invitation had been issued and also vehemently denied that Haider would be a welcome guest. Despite the denial, the damage was done: many Canadians were perplexed about the community and the Haider scandal led these hassidim to be described by one Montreal rabbi as loose cannons.

At the helm of the Tasher hassidic sect is its septuagenarian rebbe, Meshulim Feish (Forencz) Lowy, who established the community. He was born in Hungary in 1923, the son of a rabbi in the Hungarian town of Demetch who was known as the Demetcher *rov* (rabbi). His grandfather, Elimelech, served as a rabbi near the Czech border, in the town of Nirtash, from which the sect derives its name. A hassid, familiar with the rebbe's history, claims that when the present rebbe was three years old, he was praying as if he were a 50-year-old rabbi. So impressed was his grandfather, that he said: 'This little boy will be something, a very great tsaddik [righteous person] in his time. The

present rebbe had been very close to his grandfather, who initiated the Tash dynasty by attracting followers seeking assistance and advice. I was told: 'And this little grandson was always with his grandfather. And he saw always how his grandfather was the rebbe, how he's taking care of people, and helping people...'. Another follower said: 'Even as a child, they said he's going to be a rebbe. The way he grew, the way he made a *brookheh* [blessing], the way he handled with people'.

When his grandfather died, it was announced at the funeral that his son, Eliezer, would succeed his father as rebbe and that in due course after Eliezer's death, rabbi Lowy (Eliezer's nephew) would assume the dynastic leadership. During the Second World War, the rebbe is said to have been saved by several miracles: for instance, he was to have been deported to Auschwitz, but instead was sent to a labour camp. He returned to Budapest after the war. Meanwhile, his uncle, Eliezer, had died and Rabbi Lowy then became the Tash rebbe, in 1945.

He decided to emigrate to the United States but, according to him, heavenly guidance directed him to Canada. (However, it is more than likely that immigration restrictions in America played some role in the rebbe's decision to choose Canada.) He married a distant kinswoman in Austria and came to Montreal in 1951, where he remained until 1963 when, along with the families of 18 followers, he moved to the newly-established Tash community in Boisbriand.

From Rebbelleh[24] to Rebbe

A Tasher hassid told me:

> Today, in the hassidish world, you ask, 'Where can you go if you have a problem?' And, in general, the answer they'll say is: 'Tash. There's another one [rebbe] in Israel, and maybe there's another one somewhere else, but that's it'. Basically you know that when you get here, you're going to the right place.

Another hassid said:

> God forbid you have an accident. Your wife, she's unconscious and they have to make an emergency operation. And you have a question, 'Should I do it, or should I not do it?' And you have one phone call. Who would you call? Who do you really trust? You have a choice of doctors, but you need the very best. You're not going to worry about whether the doctor's a Republican or Democrat. Who is the best there is to help you at this time? So even if you're a Democrat, you'll go to a Republican because it doesn't matter. And it's the same here . . . . People look around the world today and realize what kind of tsaddik the rebbe is. This is where you come.

As in other areas of life, the world of hassidic rebbeim (plural of rebbe) is stratified and a status hierarchy distinguishes its incumbents. The absence of any standard ranking order does not detract from the

varying prestige accorded to respective rebbeim. My particular interest lies in analyzing the dynamics by which the Tasher rebbe's prestige has been enhanced over the course of his lifetime. A hassid commented: 'At first he was a rebbelle, today he is a rebbe'.

A long-time resident of Hamilton, Ontario, claims to remember when in 1955 the Tasher rebbe visited the Jewish community in order to raise money. I mention this to a Tasher hassid who says: 'I could believe it. The rebbe was a very young man then. He had a few followers, but not many. He did what he had to do to raise money. It wouldn't happen today. Then he was a rebbe also, but not a major one, like today'. In discussing the change in the rebbe's status with Tasher hassidim, two points are consistently made. The first, very simply, is the passage of time; the Tasher rebbe has outlived many of his contemporaries: '... a lot of the older rabbis [rebbes] passed away already. So people who were connected to older rabbis, from before, had more places to go. But look around and you'll see that there aren't many of the older rabbis left. He's one of the older ones'. This is echoed by a yeshiva student: 'A lot of the older rebbes passed away. The rebbe is one of the Grand rabbis of the world now. He's one of the biggest in the world'. Another hassid's observations confirm this: 'When the rebbe was still younger, not everyone wants to respect him. And some people are connected to different rebbes, or their fathers are from different dynasties, so they keep to them. But then people start to follow a different rebbe'. It would seem therefore that longevity has been a critical component in the transformation. However, longevity alone is insufficient.

'When people know that something is real, it's hot' said a Tasher, referring to the rebbe. 'They come running. They know this is a place of holiness'. Over the course of time there was a dissemination of the rebbe's holiness and of his mystical and miraculous powers. There have been accounts, from both followers and outsiders, confirming his superhuman powers. 'You have to believe that a tsaddik knows everything, but we see it. The biggest bank in the world, whenever it's making a decision, they come to the rebbe and ask what to do'. The Tasher observe the continuous presence of outsiders from various corners of the world who come to secure an audience with the rebbe and they, themselves, repeatedly claim that they have witnessed his miraculous powers. While time cements the connection between rebbe and hassid, the established reciprocal relationship is both circular and cumulative, resulting in increased admiration for the rebbe's accomplishments and a feeling of awe. In fact, there is a third element, the belief that God is the source of the rebbe's power: 'Our *kesher* [relationship] with the rebbe is because he is giving the *ruchneeyess* [spirituality] for the *yishuv* [community]. As the rebbe becomes older, he also becomes holier and the more he is holy, the more he is close to

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Ha-Shem (God, literally 'The Name') and then this gives more people an opportunity to be closer to Ha-Shem. And this is how the rebbe's power grows and that's how so many people hear about him'. Another said: 'When somebody has *ruchneeyess* to such a level like the rebbe that he's so close to Ha-Shem, Ha-Shem gives him the opportunity to do these things'.

Not only must the rebbe enjoy longevity and engage in practical accomplishments that are attributed to his supernatural powers, but these accomplishments must be broadly recognized. His deeds must enjoy wide circulation. A hassid claimed: 'This has become a tourist place of holiness. Hundreds of people from the United States, from all over come here every Shabbess to be with the rebbe'. Another says: 'Thousands of cars are crossing the border [between Canada and America]. They want to see him, that's enough. To be under one roof, to *mispalel* [pray] with the rebbe'. So how do people hear about the Tasher rebbe, I inquire? First, because the network of Tasher hassidim has expanded: there are graduates of the Tasher yeshiva throughout New York — in Williamsburg, Boro Park, Money, Monroe. A follower claimed: 'We are counting now some 10,000 hassidim of the rebbe in New York'. Second, followers of the rebbe — people deferring to his wisdom and judgement — also come to the Tash from such places as Brazil, Paris, Antwerp, London, Argentina, and Israel to seek an audience for his blessing and intervention. Third, the size of the community in Boisbriand has grown substantially over the years, thereby greatly expanding the network of people who hear about the rebbe's activities. 'So this boy has a father and a father-in-law, so more people become connected, and so more people start to come', is one explanation. And, finally, in the words of a Tasher: '... when something good happens, you tell people. And people tell other people. And the word gets out: The rebbe is the real thing'. Ironically, a consequence of the rebbe's fame and growing popularity is that Tasher in Boisbriand find it increasingly difficult to consult him directly, and as frequently as they wish, on matters of importance and concern.

The Rebbe's Charisma

As noted above, the individual endowed with charisma is believed to possess exceptional powers regarded as originating from the divine and as unavailable to ordinary mortals. The popular Yiddish folk song, *Kum Aher Du Philosof* (Come Here, You Philosopher) rebukes the mitnagdim (opponents of hassidism) for their skepticism about the belief that a rebbe can ascend to the heavens at will as well as perform miraculous feats. I once asked a hassid whether the rebbe improves at being rebbe? 'Yes, he gets to be holier. It's not like you have it and

that's it', he replied and added: 'Why do we go to a rebbe? Because the rebbe has *b'seeyato d'ishmeiyo* [God's grace]. And the more the rebbe does *mitzvess* (*mitzvot*, good deeds), the more he acquires this power from Ha-Shem. It's a spiritual thing. It's something higher than we [ordinary persons] understand'. Higher than they understand or not, Tasher are eager to talk about the rebbe and to maintain forcefully that he is endowed with accomplishments.[25] For example, two hassidim draw attention to the rebbe's quality of mind: 'Things which come up on his table, don't come up on Bill Gates' table. I've heard about people who come with complicated businesses, with tax department business about what to do. Did I ever tell you the story about a guy who comes to the rebbe because he has a tax audit?'. References to the rebbe's mental perspicacity are common, and comparing his mind to a computer is not unusual, as the following observation shows:

> The rebbe, his head is faster than a computer. Hundreds and hundreds of people visit here. People who were students here years ago come with a *kvitl* [a petition presented to the rebbe]. People come and give their hand and the rebbe asks about their children, their business. The minute he leaves the hand, he's with somebody else, and the computer doesn't even search so fast. And the rebbe remembers and the next person comes. The computer doesn't search so fast.

The overwhelming majority of claims relate to matters of health and illness. In the most typical scenario, as confirmed by numerous accounts pointing to the healing powers of *rebbeim*,[26] an individual turns to the rebbe for medical advice. While this advice may be at odds with, or even contrary to, the path advocated by a medical authority, the rebbe's counsel proves superior, and even the physician is at a loss to explain the incredible turn of events. For example, three accounts:

> Like a doctor will ask, 'What are you talking about? Why do you say you want to ask the rebbe about a decision to make an operation? I am the doctor'. So the person will say, 'You're the doctor, but I wouldn't do anything without permission of my rebbe'. A little example. There's a man here, he's a friend of mine, so he told me. They found on one of the *kishkess* [intestines] something not good. And he went to a doctor and the doctor said immediately to make an operation. It's an emergency . . . . Anyway, after three months, everything was ready for the operation. Before he went to the operation room, the doctor said, 'You know, it's a very hard operation. I have to tell you. And tell your family they should pray very hard for you because it's not an easy case'. So he said: 'I'm sorry, doctor. I have all respect for you. My rebbe said it will go very easy and everything will be fine'.... So the doctor said: 'I don't understand you. Your rebbe is in Boisbriand and I'm here by you and I see everything, so why do you tell me that?' So my friend said: 'You know what? After the operation, we'll talk'. After he finished the operation, the doctor came in

with a big smile: 'You know rabbi, your rebbe was right. I never had such an operation and I want to come to the rebbe. I want to have a blessing from the rebbe'.

I'll tell you a story that I know. A woman from Toronto came to the rebbe. Her X-ray showed that she had a very bad disease. It was not good. So she came to the rebbe and the rebbe told her to go to a second doctor. So she came to the second doctor with her file, and this doctor didn't see anything. And here the first doctor told her it was terrible news. So what happened was that the first doctor made a mistake because he took out the file with a woman's similar name. It's only the *koyakh* [strength] of the rebbe who could see through this.

A person went to the doctor and the doctor said he has cancer. So he didn't know what to do so he decided to call the Tasher rebbe. So he told the rebbe what the doctor said, and asked: 'What should I do?' So the rebbe had a boy over here, who had to get married, from a poor home. So the rebbe said he'd take care of it. The rebbe needed $10,000 for the *chasseneh* [wedding], but there was no money. So the rebbe said to the person who called: 'Give me $10,000 and everything will be OK'. $10,000 at that time was a lot of money. So he agreed. He came to the rebbe. He gave the $10,000 and the rebbe said: 'Go back to the doctor and see what he says'. So he came back to the doctor and the doctor said: 'Listen I don't understand this, but I don't see anything'.

Such accounts, though generic in form, may assume an unusual twist. One variation that surfaced on several occasions was of an individual who appeared to be healthy but who, upon visiting the rebbe, is advised to engage in seemingly senseless behaviour and seek medical counsel. To be sure, the rebbe's advice is heeded and turns out to be life-saving. For example: '... so when he was at the rebbe, the rebbe told him to drink at least twelve glasses of water every day. He didn't understand why because he wasn't sick. It turned out that he didn't know that he had a kidney disease. The doctor said if he didn't drink all the water, he would not have lived'.

Unlike physicians, however, who base their decisions on medical evidence, the rebbe does not require a medical chart to proffer advice. 'The rebbe makes decisions about people he doesn't know in seconds. How so? It is a gift that the rebbe has acquired from God'. One follower told me: 'To answer a question, the rebbe opens a *chumash* [Pentateuch], looks in, *davens* [prays], and then he gives the answer. It's an answer *min hashomayim* [from heaven].' Another said:

If there's a hard question, the rebbe will open up a book. He'll go to a *tehillim* [Book of Psalms] or a *siddur* [prayer book], open it up, and he'll find similarities on the page he opened... He's knowledgeable enough to make the connection. I don't know how he works but the rebbe has a *khokhmeh* [wisdom, genius] something, where on the person's name he sees a lot of things.

Indeed, not only do hassidim not comprehend how the rebbe manages his prognostications but they also do not have either a wish or a need to know. The mantle of holiness enveloping the rebbe, and separating him from his followers, is akin to the 'cloak of competence'[27] which enables medical practitioners to separate and distinguish themselves from lay persons. This cloak is maintained by the profession and serves to isolate patients who thus are unable to see that 'the emperor has no clothes'. Along similar lines, hassidim are well-served by the symbols, rituals, legends, and myths which are identified with the privileged role of their leader. The rebbe's position enjoys such high currency precisely because it remains mystified. Demystification, therefore, could only lead to a diminution of the rebbe's aura.[28]

Conclusion

This brief article has only scratched the surface in examining the relationship between the Tasher rebbe and his followers. Indeed, any examination of that community will necessarily require a focus on the rebbe's role in overseeing its development. However, in addition to documenting hassidim's claims about his miracle-related activities — a topic which they are keen to discuss — it is also necessary to analyze seemingly more mundane elements of his everyday life; for example, his daily schedule, the degree to which he is informed of day-to-day affairs in the community, the administrative structure in place to facilitate access to him, his role in community fund-raising, and his varied relationships to his followers as well as how young children are socialized to revere him.

Any consideration of a hassidic rebbe is necessarily an examination about leadership: its consistency and evolution. More specifically, we need to try to discover whether leadership is a character trait of a leader or a need of those who are led, whether it is an inborn or inherited quality, or an ability which can be acquired. It is clear that a hassidic rebbe is believed to possess an array of intellectual virtues, organizational skills, and supernatural abilities. It is equally clear, however, that these qualities do not necessarily inhere in the person *ab initio*, but are credited to him by his followers. The rebbe is set apart and becomes elevated to a higher status as a result of tributes paid to him and of claims made about him. Recognized as holy and endowed with spiritual powers, he becomes shaped into the image which his followers have created. Finally, the rebbe becomes invested with charisma, a point nicely captured in this hassid's observations about a rebbe:

> People have to believe in you and people have to follow you. You have to be worthy of being followed. You know the story. This guy wakes up in

the middle of the night. He's happy. His wife says: 'Why are you happy?' He says: 'I dreamed that I became a rebbe'. The wife says: 'You idiot. You don't have to dream you became a rebbe. The hassidim have to dream you're a rebbe. *Your* dream doesn't help'.

NOTES

[1] See Jacques Gutwirth, 'Hassidism Reappraised', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 40, nos. 1 and 2, 1998, pp. 79–86.

[2] William Shaffir, *Life in A Religious Community: The Lubavitcher Chassidim In Montreal*, Toronto, 1974, p. 70.

[3] William Shaffir, 'Still Separated from the Mainstream: A Hassidic Community Revisited', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 39, nos. 1 and 2, 1997.

[4] This is the first of two articles I intend to write about the hassidic rebbe. In the conclusion to this article, I will identify some additional areas of interest and likely foci.

[5] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons and edited by Talcott Parsons, New York, 1947, pp. 358–59.

[6] I have selected only a few ethnographic studies for consideration here.

[7] See Israel Rubin, *Satmar: An Island in the City*, Chicago, 1972, p. 56.

[8] Ibid., p. 61.

[9] Ibid., p. 59.

[10] Jerome Mintz, *Legends of the Hasidim*, Chicago, 1968, p. 89.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Jerome Mintz, *Hasidic People*, Cambridge, Ma., 1992, p. 3.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Mintz, op. cit. in note 10 above, p. 114.

[15] Solomon Poll, 'The Charismatic Leader of the Hasidic Community: The Zaddiq, the Rebbe', in Janet Belcove-Shalin, ed., *New World Hasidim: Ethnographic Studies of Hasidic Jews in America*, Albany, New York, 1995, pp. 257–75.

[16] Ibid., p. 260.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 264.

[19] Ibid., p. 273.

[20] Gil Kezwer, 'Shalom, Bonjour', *Canadian Geographic*, July/August 1994.

[21] See 'Separation From the Mainstream: The Hassidic Community of Tash', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 29, no. 1, June 1987, pp. 19–35.

[22] William Shaffir, 'Modernity and Social Change Among Hassidic Jews: Reconfiguring Institutional Structures'. Paper presented at the Meetings of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association, March 2000.

[23] This investigation has yet to be concluded. A lengthy article on the matter appeared in the *Ma'ariv* supplement *HaShavua*, 22 January 2000.

[24] The diminutive for rebbe.

[25] A consideration of the rebbe's daily regimen will be included in another article.

[26] Mintz, op. cit. in note 10 above, p. 100.

[27] For a discussion of the 'cloak of competence', see Jack Haas and William Shaffir, *Becoming Doctors: The Adoption of a Cloak of Competence*, Greenwich, Conn., 1987.

[28] The cloaking behaviour surrounding the professional and the institution of rebbe enjoy some fascinating parallels which are mentioned only briefly in this paper. For an examination of the cloaking dynamics underlying the professionalization process and professions, see Eliot Friedson, *Profession of Medicine*, New York, 1970, and Jack Haas and William Shaffir, op. cit. in note 27 above.

ASSIMILATION IN ISRAEL AND IN AMERICA

Israel Finestein

(Review Article)

ROBERTA ROSENBERG FARBER and CHAIM ISAAC WAXMAN, eds.,
Jews in America: A Contemporary Reader, 425 pp., published under
the auspices of Brandeis University by University Press of New
England, Hanover, 1999, £17.95 (paperback), available from
Plymbridge Distributors, Estover Plymouth, England.

DAN URIAN and EFRAIM KARSH, eds., *In Search of Identity: Jewish Aspects
in Israeli Culture*, 284 pp., Frank Cass, London and Portland,
Oregon, 1999, £18.00 or $25.00 (hardback, £35.00 or $49.50).

THE editors of *Jews in America* are the sociologists Professor
Farber of the Stern College for Women (attached to Yeshiva
University) and Professor Waxman of Rutgers University.
There are 17 studies (some of which have appeared elsewhere)
dealing, inter alia, with the economic adjustment of immigrants;
changes in the character of the American Jewish family; American
Jewish 'feminisms'; the nature and impact of American Jewish
religious movements; and a concluding chapter by the editors. The
second work is edited by Dan Urian, Associate Professor of Theatre
Studies at Tel Aviv University, and Professor Karsh who heads the
Mediterranean Studies Programme at King's College, University of
London. In addition to the Introduction by the editors, there are 14
papers as varied, yet inter-related, in subject matter as the prospects
of 'secular Judaism' in Israel; representations of 'Jewish identity' in
the arts; and Jewish education in Israel.

In their different ways America and Zionism emerged upon history
in a redemptionist spirit. The first English colonists fled the edicts and
pressures of the old world. The early Republic saw itself freed from
the hierarchies and entanglements of an old order, and held aloft the
banner of a new freedom without hereditary powers or any established
church. Likewise, Zionism was a movement to free the Jewish people
from the cares and oppressions of the old world and to endow Jews
with a mastery over their own affairs. In each case the new

dispensation was heralded as being in one way or another a light unto the nations.

The religious pioneer in Israel and his secularist counterpart were often possessed of aspirations of a utopian kind born of ancient idealisms. Such emotions have tended to centre on the idea and reality of Jerusalem. They were implicit in President Weizman's welcome to Pope John Paul II on his arrival in Israel in March this year. He declared: 'Jerusalem has been at the heart of the Jewish people throughout all the generations. It is what gives us our spiritual inspiration'. He described it as the city of the judges, kings, and prophets of Israel, and 'the capital and source of pride of the State of Israel'. Such emotions are shared by secularists and religionists, even if the former do not all feel at ease in living in that city because of the large-scale presence and considerable influence of the latter. Israel was created to be a Jewish State, and there has never been agreement as to what that means.

Despite huge contextual differences, the two books are each concerned with the same two questions — namely, the character and prospects of Jewishness in the open western society of today, and the forms and consequences of assimilation. There comes to mind the often-heard warnings about the Americanisation of Israel. Ironically, many of the measures adopted in America to stem the tide of assimilation have been distinctively American. The otherness of the Jews takes on an American flavour which sharpens differentials between Jews and others, while at the same time merging them into the American system. The melting pot ceases to melt and a live pluralism becomes part of the rights of the American citizen. Among the more vivid examples are the unabashed growth of Jewish political lobbying; the emergence of middle-class and well-groomed cadres of many who are 'ultra-orthodox'; and the 'substantial Jewish day school movement', referred to by the late Professor Daniel Elazar. He described the latter factor as amounting to a 'sharp departure from the thrust of American Jewish interests during the modern epoch when Jews tried desperately to break down all barriers that might keep them out of general schools' (p. 119).

Elazar's use of the term 'modern' indirectly illustrates an underlying theme of the whole book, that is to say the 'postmodernity' of the current Jewish condition in America. The word has many simultaneous meanings in that connection. It means post the third generation after the mass immigration a century ago; post the large-scale industrial employment of most of the twentieth century; post the old-style residential concentration; post Zionism; post the old-style defence consciousness; post old-style European linkages; and post the attainment of general middle-class status. While Israelis may be warned of

their own Americanization, American Jews glory in theirs, even when they use it in Israel's cause.

An Israeli can be such without aspiring to be a distinctively recognizable Jew. He can regard Jewishness as a long historical phase, a kind of pre-history of Israel. He may feel that he has been emancipated, but into what? The answer, he would say, is into the new and developing Israeli culture. Not for nothing did the editors of the second book choose *In Search of Identity* as its title. The philosophic rifts and wide cultural diversity have practical consequences. In a chapter called 'Between Hegemony and Dormant Kulturkampf in Israel', Professor Baruch Kimmerling of the Hebrew University significantly comments (p. 67):

> The constantly increasing standard of living, combined with the de-escalation of external conflict, has triggered an additional process. Israel is evolving from a highly mobilized and collectivist society towards an individualistic consumer-orientated post-industrial society .... In the future this should include demands not only to separate the synagogue from the state, but also a movement to privatise religion, which will include versions of secular and civil religions.

Meanwhile, acute strains grow. Some Supreme Court judges have been readier than others to apply notions of *mishpat ivri* — the rabbinically-developed system of traditional Jewish law derived from Talmud and halakhic codes — in deciding cases which reveal lacunae in substantive Israeli law or legal priciple. In recent years the Court has been politically challenged as secular-motivated and even 'un-Jewish'. There is a rising restiveness over the orthodox religious control of the marriage and divorce laws and their operation. Tens of thousands of Israelis have been exempt routinely from military service on the grounds of being Torah students. In this highly sensitive field, compromises suggested by the present Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Ehud Barak, have proved controversial on all sides of the argument. The manifest politicisation of religion has become an inbred feature of the political system, with resulting deals for funding orthodox religious schools and institutions in return for support in parliament-ary battles. Coalitions can be made or threatened by factions whose foreign policy rests on selected biblical passages.

A key chapter is headed 'Jewish education in the Jewish State' by David Zisenwise of Tel Aviv University. He is in favour of an educational system which helps to enhance the Jewish identity of the State. He notes that such questions as 'How Jewish is the Jewish State', and 'How Jewish is the educational curriculum' are asked 'with frequency and intensity' (p. 146). In his account of successive efforts to increase the Jewish components of school life, he also notes that 'preparation for adult life in a secular western society does not place

emphasis on [Jewish subjects] and reduces their worth to students' (p. 150).

The effects of the cultural diversity have been intensified by the system of direct election of Prime Minister regardless of the state of the parties in the Knesset. If the system of election was intended to curb extreme factionalism in government, it has foreseeably had the reverse result, endangering the substance of democracy (viewed by some as either un-Jewish or a western fad, or both) and discouraging the inculcation of any sense of national identity. Professor Kimmerling observes that a 'major cultural-ideological consequence' of changes in the old cultural hegemony (which certainly had its own internal stresses) 'will be a much greater variation in educational institutions and curricula, and a concentration of the social conflict on resource allocations for education and culture' (p. 67). Such social conflict, without a broad national identity, can paralyse government.

This takes us back to *Jews in America*. Its editors state: 'A large part of the assimilation to American life has been separating the previously intertwining roles of religion and ethnicity in Jewish life and then choosing which elements to keep'. They add: 'Studies find that American Jews who identify their Jewishness by their religion are far more likely to engage in other Jewish behaviours and are far less likely to intermarry, and that religiously observant Jews have the lowest rate of intermarriage' (pp. 402–05).

Demography has become a vital Jewish science. It is well represented in both books. Prophets are busier than ever, with both forecasts and reservations. The pace of Americanisation, the extent of intermarriage, the recourse to disputed conversionary processes, and the growing adoption of the controversial test of 'Who is a Jew?' by way of patrilineal descent, render prognoses even more hazardous than diagnoses.

A significant contrast between the New Babylon and the original, is that the Old Babylon always thought of itself as living in exile. Today's Babylon suffers from no such illusion! For the most part, American Jews are friends of Israel. That circumstance could become the kernel of a surrogate Jewish religion and thereby add an extra dimension to American Jewish ethnicity. Readers who ponder on such prospects and issues, will find in these two volumes much of profound interest to them.

JEWRIES AT THE MARGIN

Harold Pollins

(Review Article)

SANDER L. GILMAN and MILTON SHAIN, eds., *Jewries at the Frontier: Accommodation, Identity, Conflict*, 401 pp., University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 1999, $21.95, paperback (hardback, $49.95).

A major difficulty with this book is the elucidation of its theme. Here is a collection of 16 chapters about Jews in disparate geographical locations plus a general, introductory chapter by one of the editors. Although not an essential pre-requisite, in such books the reader is often told, usually in a Preface, how the work came into existence — for example as papers for a conference. In which case, information is given about the purpose of the conference and other useful details which help to explain the significance of the work, perhaps its place in the discussions of the subject(s) and, especially, what links there are between the different essays in the symposium.

In this case, alas, there is merely — on page 6, in the Introduction — a passing reference to the fact that in 1996 there was a conference in Cape Town at which drafts of the chapters, and other contributions, were presented. There is no Preface and we are told neither the title of the conference nor its theme. We are therefore obliged, in the first instance, to approach the book with the advice merely of the book's title. This does not tell us much, nor does the sparse blurb on the back of the paperback (perhaps the dust cover of the hardback version has a more revealing one?). The book explores, we are told, 'the compelling notion of "frontier" in the Jewish experience as a historical/geographical reality and a conceptual framework'. The blurb goes on to state that the book 'shows how the dynamic confrontation between and among cultures and peoples brings marginalized experiences to the center and provides a new, multivocal account of Jewish history'. A pity that the sentence had begun by stating that the book '[articulates] the tension between the center/periphery model and the frontier model', since the word 'center' is used in two different ways. I take it to mean that 'marginalized experiences' are brought to the fore of the discussion. And I have to

say that I found the notion of tension between theoretical models difficult to envisage. Moreover, 'dynamic confrontation between and among cultures and peoples' seems to be saying that these essays are studies in the field of ethnic or race relations; the novelty here, presumably, is that, judging by the geographical spread of the case studies in this book, we are dealing with Jewish communities many of which are in 'unusual' ('frontier'?) locations.

More help, though, it seems, is at hand. One of the editors, Sander L. Gilman, provides the first chapter (indeed, the book's first words, apart from the Title and Contents pages) that one reads. It is enticingly entitled 'Introduction: The Frontier as a Model for Jewish History'. This proves to be a 25-page essay (including endnotes). It begins with a discussion of the centre-periphery model of Jewish history ('the overarching model for Jewish history has been that of the center or core and the periphery', p. 1) but since, on the same page, he states that that model 'no longer seems adequate for the writing of any aspect of Jewish history', it seems somewhat bizarre to spend almost half the chapter on it. The model, by the way, appears to have no connection, except for the coincidence of terminology, with Wallerstein's concepts.[1]

Admittedly, four of those initial 11 pages are relevantly devoted to questions of language, including the very relevant politics of language usage, notably in such areas as the Austro-Hungarian empire. Gilman ends this part of the chapter by stating: 'It is language which can . . . provide a key to an alternative model for viewing Jewish history, the model of the frontier' (p. 11). These words provide a link to the next dozen pages of text, which include a brief reference to Frederick Jackson Turner's classic formulation and its influence in the analysis of United States history. Gilman's notion of the frontier is not that of Turner's 'real' frontiers. 'One must think of the very concept of "frontier" as a structure of communal fantasy, as a model of imagining oneself in the world' (pp. 13–14). On the other hand, from time to time he speaks not of fantasy or symbolism but of actual spatial matters, especially where people of different cultures or religion or whatever come into contact and react according to the three sub-titles of the book. Indeed, I had assumed from the choice of the geographical locations of the Jewish communities studied in the book that the conference was to do with real frontiers in some sense. The Introduction does not clarify matters.

What do the authors of the substantive chapters make of this conceptual offering? Some of them certainly refer to Gilman's Introduction and some use the word 'frontier', but there are differences of meaning. Thus Bernard Reisman, on page 111 of his essay, 'Alaskan Jews Discover the Last Frontier', starts off with a clear statement of the four criteria which define frontier settlements. They

are that: the area is distant from more settled areas and is undeveloped; it has a small population; limited services; and the distant location reduces kinship connections. Paul R. Bartrop, in chapter 3 — 'Living Within the Frontier: Early Colonial Australia, Jews, and Aborigines' — quotes a definition of frontier from James O. Gump,[2] as 'a zone of interaction between two or more previously distinct peoples, and the process by which relations among peoples begin, develop and crystallize. The frontier "opens" when these peoples initially make contact, and "closes" when one of the peoples gains ascendancy over the other' (p. 92). Such definitions are very real notions, hardly those of fantasy. Interestingly, Bartrop also employs another definition of 'frontier' when he states (p. 91) that 'though rarely roughing it "on the frontier", nonetheless early colonial Jewry found itself in a struggle on the frontiers of legal emancipation'. He concludes his chapter by reiterating the point. While few Jews 'shared the pioneering lifestyle ... for the majority the idea of the frontier represented limited religious rights, a barrier which had to be penetrated and left behind for the betterment of all. In this sense it might be said that Jews in Australia ceased being a frontier people by the middle of the nineteenth century ... From this point onward, Jews progressed into the world of the majority' (p. 107). Clearly the word has many meanings. In any case, it does not appear in all the contributions. How interesting that the chapter by the co-editor, Milton Shain, 'Ethnonationalism, Anti-semitism, and Identity Politics: The North American and South African Experiences', is a straightforward discussion of antisemitism in South Africa, the USA, and Canada by someone whose speciality is that subject.

The 16 chapters are divided into the three sections of the book's sub-title; four come under Accommodation; eight under Identity; and four under Conflict. In practice, as might be expected, there is overlap between them. A chapter on 'Accommodation' is likely to say something on Identity as well as on Conflict. No doubt the geographical coverage of the papers reflects the location of the conference — six are to do with South Africa, two being comparative studies with Lithuanian and North American experience. Others deal with Australia (two essays), Texas, Brazil, the Maghreb (specifically, a study of Albert Memmi's *La Statue de Sel* [The Pillar of Salt]), Quebec, Alaska, New Zealand, China and, a solitary European one, on communities in the east of the Austro-Hungarian empire. There is no concluding or summarising chapter.

Since there are overlaps between the sections, the chapters need not be examined here in strict order although it is useful to begin with the chapter by Albert Lichtblau and Michael John which is the first in the collection. Their lengthy piece is entitled: 'Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina, in Lemberg and Czernowitz: Two Divergent Examples of

Jewish Communities in the East of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy'. Few would object to these places, on the far east of the Hapsburg Empire, being described as frontiers. They both border several countries and have had histories of being absorbed by other countries. The essence of the chapter is the different development of the two areas: Czernowitz, further to the east, manifested a greater tendency towards 'a "modern", "secular" orientation upon German *Kultur*' than did Lemberg which was to the west. In the longest chapter in the book, the authors skilfully deploy a variety of material to explain the reasons for the divergences between the two areas.

Bernard Reisman starts off his chapter on Jews in Alaska by telling us that the state's motto is 'The Last Frontier'; his is a most appropriate subject, therefore, for this book. His interest began in 1993 when, on a holiday there, he found organised Jewish communities in the Alaskan cities he visited. Four-fifths of the 3,000 Alaskan Jews live mainly in three of them: Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau. Another seven places each had fewer than 100 Jews while 172 lived in 'Other Towns'. He thought this residential pattern odd since Jews normally live in major urban areas. However, he makes general demographic points about American Jewry's shift from the country's north-east to the west, a change which is associated with a higher degree of assimilation in the west as well as the fact that Jews in the United States are both more mobile and have a level of education higher than that of the rest of the population. These considerations are relevant since most Jews in Alaska came from the west and had experienced high levels of education. He looks at three questions: who are the Alaskan Jews, where do they come from, and what happens to their Jewish identity? He ends on a surprisingly upbeat note. He refers to statements in Gilman's introductory chapter that, as Reisman puts it, Jews have benefited from encounters and conflicts 'at the margins of countless countries' because they have 'sharpened their capacity to accommodate and to clarify the ways in which they are different (distinctive) from non-Jews'. Thus places like Alaska 'are the latest frontier in the historic saga of "Jews on the move" ' and they may well 'enrich and energize Jews' about to enter the new century (pp. 125–26).

In Latin America, writes Jeffrey Lesser — in '(Re) Creating Jewish Ethnicities on the Brazilian Frontier' — frontiers are 'critical components of national consciousness'. This refers to the countries' border regions 'where the language of the frontier mixes easily with that of the pioneer, yet only in reference to what is commonly denominated as "the interior" '. But he continues that the frontier is not just a location. Heroes dwell in it who have both land and freedom; in Brazil immigrants have settled on the frontier for economic reasons but also to create communities 'which would not be forced to follow strictly

national acculturation and assimilation policies' (p. 209). There were two main groups of Jews in Brazil. The first came from North Africa, especially Morocco, as early as 1823 but mainly later in the century. By 1890 there were about 1,000 in the state of Parà. Their 'marginality' worked in their favour. Potential immigrants to Brazil were divided into two groups: undesirable Africans and Asians, and they were banned; and desirable Europeans and North Americans who could get subsidies. Moroccan Jews who came on their own did not fit into these categories and there were no laws against their immigration. One consequence of their sojourn in Brazil was that after a period they could obtain Brazilian nationality; armed with this they returned to Morocco with both economic success and Brazilian protection.

The second group of Jews in Brazil are better known. They were members of farming colonies founded, from 1904, by the Jewish Colonisation Association of Baron de Hirsch.[3] They were located in southern Brazil at Rio Grande do Sul, one reason being that the Rio Grande do Sul Republican Party was tolerant of religion. For a variety of reasons, despite new recruits there was a constant migration to Porto Alegre, the state's largest city. A series of rebellions and uprisings in the state in the 1920s led to the end of the experiment. In Porto Alegre, Jewish communal life has remained strong. He concludes with the paradox: 'On the Amazonian frontier North African Jews became Brazilian so they could return to Morocco. On the southern frontier Eastern European Jews became Brazilian so they could be Jewish' (p. 220).

Seth L. Wolitz has a marvellous beginning to his chapter, 'Bifocality in Jewish Identity in the Texas-Jewish Experience'. The author, a newcomer to Texas in the 1970s, required a *mohel* to circumcise his son, just born in the state. He obtained the services of a fifth-generation Texas Jew who arrived by plane from Houston. He expected a bearded man, dressed traditionally, but there alighted from the plane a man 'in full Texas dress — the ten-gallon hat, the silver belt buckle, blue jeans and boots'. Under the hat he sported a *yarmulke* and he also wore *tsitsit*. The author points out that there have been Jews in Texas throughout the nineteenth century, some even at the Alamo, and there were organised communities by mid-century. They served in the Confederate Army and by 1900 they totalled some 15,000. They were mainly of German origin and the new Eastern European immigrants were also accommodated eventually. It was a different environment from the 'typical' New York history (tenement-life, for example). In Texas they generally lived in towns and small cities. More recently Northern Jews have moved into the state, resulting in a Jewish population of more than 100,000. The general point the author is making is that Texas-Jewish history is very different from the usual American story and he describes what he calls the

'Texas-Jewish personality' through his interpretation of works by 'three self-consciously Texas-Jewish writers/performers' (p. 187). They include Rabbi Alexander Zuskind's *Memories of Two Generations* (1935), written in Hebrew and Yiddish, recounting migration from Kharkov to San Antonio; *The Immigrant*, a 1985 play by Mark Harelik about his immigrant grandfather, and his 1996 play, *The Legacy*, continuing the story into the next generation. He also examines a song by Kinky Friedman, 'They Ain't Making Jews Like Jesus Anymore'. This reflects the Texas Jew's 'delights in asserting and playacting, like any other Texan, the image of the idealized tough Texas macho' (p. 202). The song 'sets stereotype against its mirror-image: the populist Texas Bubba anti-ethnic against the meanest, toughest Texas Jew in the Texas public space of a beer hall . . . [it] confirms that the Texas Jew is as Texan as the Redneck' (p. 191). The 'bifocality' of the title 'expresses itself . . . in his religious and historical sense of oneness with his fellow Jews and ancestral heritage' (p. 203). However, attitudes of Texan Jews towards African-Americans are hardly mentioned.

The relations in several countries between Jews and 'coloured' minority groups are features of a number of essays, including Maoris in New Zealand, Aborigines in Australia, and Blacks in South Africa. Livia Käthe Wittman's chapter on New Zealand ('Neither Maori nor Pakeha: Jewish Women's Cultural Identity') deals with several dimensions: Jews; non-Jewish whites; Maoris; women. (There are Maori Jews as well.) Since 1984, New Zealand has officially been a bicultural country and the population is divided into two main groups: Maori and Pakeha. The latter word has several meanings, from 'of European descent', to 'New Zealanders of British descent', to a more general 'white skin'. Ambiguity arises because if one is perforce either Maori or Pakeha then all other categories are non-existent. Jews in New Zealand are white and usually of European descent but not necessarily British. The author describes how in the late 1980s, when courses in Feminist Studies were being created, it was proposed that feminists recommended for appointments to such courses should be restricted to Maori women and Pakehas, defined as New Zealand-born white women. The author, born in Germany, and a Lebanese colleague were both made to feel unwanted. The essence of the chapter is a report on interviews with Jewish women in New Zealand, about their identity. They regard their culture as being different from the two 'official' ones and as composed of several strands; they include an affinity with the Maoris on account of a shared history of persecution.

Although difficult to describe as a frontier location, Quebec Province is certainly a meeting-place of different cultures. The major French-speaking area of Canada, it contains well over a quarter of the

country's Jewish population, mostly in Montreal, and this even after an emigration to English-speaking parts of some 20,000 Jews after the Parti Québécois came to power in 1976. When Jews immigrated to the country they could not attend Catholic schools and so went to English (Protestant) ones. Yet there is a French-speaking Jewish element in Quebec, from Egypt, Lebanon and — especially — North Africa, and their dilemmas in a divided society, not least the fact that most are anti-nationalist, are discussed by Régine Robert in 'Francophone Jewish Intellectuals in Present-Day Quebec'. The author expresses the hope that these Francophone Jewish intellectuals can play a role in reaffirming the 'universal principles of human rights and the concept of the just state' (p. 390).

Another country with strong connections with Britain is Australia, the subject of two chapters. Paul R. Bartrop, already referred to, deals with the early history of European settlement in the country. He quotes W. D. Rubinstein to the effect that since there have been Jews there since the first settlement in 1788, when the first convict ship arrived, they have 'never been considered to be aliens to quite the same extent as elsewhere' (p. 91).[4] Not only were they always there but in the nineteenth century they were, until the 1890s, either English-speaking migrants from Britain or their Australian-born descendants. They were British by nationality and so had the same civil and legal rights. Except for religion; and, as mentioned earlier, Australian Jewry's frontier, according to Bartrop, was the search for religious equality. However, he does note that Jews were also in the geographical frontiers of Australia, when they went as shopkeepers, hotel keepers, and pedlars into the bush. There they were accepted on equal terms and often became civic leaders. In that period it was not Jews who were the outsiders. The latter were various Asian groups and, especially, the Aborigines. He discusses at some length the horrific effects on the Aborigines of the coming of the Europeans and whether or not the word 'genocide' is an appropriate description.

Jon Stratton, in 'The Color of Jews: Jews, Race and the White Australia Policy', aims 'to bring Jewish history in Australia out of its isolation and begin an examination of the cultural construction of Jews in the context of the evolution of the White Australia policy and its corollary, the idea of assimilation as the central plank of the formation of the Australian nation-state' (p. 309). There is a different tone, a slightly more acerbic one, in this chapter and also, when bringing the Australian-Jewish story up to more recent years, he examines the complications arising from the immigration of those who, from 1911 to 1966, were designated 'Asiatic' Jews, against a backcloth of the White Australia policy. Stratton also discusses possible theoretical constructs in which to place his discussion, especially that of ambivalence. For this he looks at the ideas of

Zygmunt Bauman and of Homi Bhabha and notions of the 'stranger' and the 'Other'.[5] The difference between Bartrop and Stratton centres on the position of the group in question being (in the present context) both white and non-white. Stratton argues that Jews in general were in this ambivalent position even before the country opened its doors in the late 1960s to Asians who had been kept out before. His last sentence summarises his viewpoint: 'Accepted as "white", in the main, by virtue of Anglo-Australian Jewry's colonial presence and high degree of assimilation, there was always the possibility that Jews in Australia would be "racialized as Asiatics" and excluded from the nation-state' (p. 331). Paul Bartrop comments briefly on Stratton's views (p. 94).

As noted earlier, the country on which several chapters are written is South Africa — another which has had close connections with Britain. Their contents and approaches vary greatly. John Simon, in 'At the Frontier: The Jewish South African Experience', gives a general, overall picture of South African-Jewish history, against the country's history. He can legitimately speak of the country in frontier terms for what was the nineteenth-century colony expanded, especially as the Dutch settlers moved northwards, the Great Trek being only the most familiar example. As in Australia, the first Jews in the country came from Britain and followed the religious traits of British Jewry but Simon continues the story to the present, taking in the greater numbers of Eastern Europeans who immigrated later in the nineteenth century and beyond. He also considers more recent events, including the apartheid period.

Some of these topics are examined by other writers. Gideon Shimoni, in 'Jewish Identity in Lithuania and South Africa', looks back to the territories from which most South African Jews came. Usually called 'Lithuania', they actually extended into what is now Belarus and Russia. He argues that 'Lithuania' being underdeveloped was a frontier society so that the Jews who went thence to South Africa were entering familiar territory. This is important for he argues that 'the essential national identity of the Litvak immigrants ... was preserved in South Africa to a degree that is remarkable when compared to other communities' which experienced immigration from Czarist Russia (p. 149). One notices here an explicit and convincing use of the frontier concept. Three of the other four essays on South Africa are primarily in the field of race relations. Milton Shain, in the essay referred to earlier, examines antisemitism in that country, comparing it with the experience in Canada and the United States, juxtaposed against the varying histories of ethnonationalism in all three countries. Inter alia, he follows Todd Endelman[6] in emphasising the importance of ideology in the discussion, and in so

doing again attacking the interactionist perspective of Colin Holmes and Albert Lindemann which bases antisemitism on material factors.[7]

What might be termed offbeat essays are by two women. Marcia Leveson writes on 'The Enemy Within: Some South African Jewish Writers'. The three writers considered are all women: Sarah Gertrude Millin, Nadine Gordimer, and Jillian Becker. Marcia Leveson discusses the stereotype images of Jews in their novels, starting off with noting their use of words to describe Jews as 'ugly', 'vulgar', or 'gross' — words more commonly used by antisemites. Jewish self-hatred is not unknown in the literature but she also notably refers to the concepts introduced by Sander Gilman. 'The peculiar location of South African Jews, as immigrants in a colonial dispensation, not merely a symbolic but an actual frontier and therefore *doubly* at the periphery of society, may give rise to specific tensions. Some of these tensions are expressed within the framework of literature' (p. 243). She notices some softening of the portrayal of Jews in recent writings.

One of the special features of South Africa has been, and is, relations with the blacks and for Jews, given their often-ambivalent position, the situation became acute, difficult, and embarrassing during the apartheid regime. Some well-known characters, certainly, were publicly opposed to apartheid to the extent of eventually being imprisoned or exiled. Claudia B. Braude, in 'From the Brotherhood of Man to the World to Come: The Denial of the Political in Rabbinic Writing under Apartheid', looks at the attitudes of South African rabbis and also includes those of the main communal organization. Hers is an angry essay, a refreshing, committed change from the tone normally encountered in academic works. While applauding those rabbis who did speak out against the system, she castigates those who did not and who even supported the Nationalist Government. She recognises the dangers faced by the community and she instances the case of Rabbi Andre Ungar, from Hungary, who went to South Africa in 1955. He strongly criticised apartheid, inter alia comparing it to Nazi policies. He was ordered to leave the country.

The sixth South African essay is by Sally Frankental, 'A Frontier Experience: Israeli Jews Encounter Diaspora in Cape Town, South Africa'. Since the 1970s, the Jewish population of the country has fallen despite some Jewish immigration, of which those from Israel account for the majority. She notes that they form a grouping, separate not just from the wider South African population but also from the Jewish community. Moreover, whereas studies of Israelis in other Diaspora countries show them producing 'ethnic enclaves' (for example, Israeli businesses providing services for Israelis) as well as Israeli institutions, these have not appeared in South Africa.[8] She explores the reasons why and produces four explanations: 1, the relatively smaller number of them in Cape Town as compared with

Los Angeles so that the latter has produced viable formal structures; 2, the uncertainty of the future in South Africa generally means that they are best described as 'sojourners' or even 'permanent sojourners' rather than 'settlers'; 3, the relatively high proportion of marriages to South African Jews reduces the need for specifically Israeli, Hebrew-based programmes; and 4, the Cape Town Jewish day school has a high content of Hebrew and Zionist-based instruction which are supportive of Israeli identification.

The second chapter which focuses on creative literature — the first being Marcia Leveson's on South African writers — is by Heidi Grunebaum-Ralph, 'Writing Oneself at the Frontier: Jewishness and Otherness in Albert Memmi's *La Statue de Sel*'. This time the context is at the opposite end of the continent, in Tunisia, and deals with antisemitism in a colonial society. It is more than that; the author examines the book's text for its language and imagery and discusses acutely notions of the Self and the Other. The biblical legend of Lot's wife looking back and her punishment 'becomes an allegory for the individual witnessing their past' (p. 301).

The book concludes with a slightly offbeat chapter, less about actual Jews — although they are or were certainly present — but of non-Jews' stereotyping of them. This is 'Jews in Chinese Culture: Representations and Realities', by Zhou Xun. He briefly refers to Jews in China, to the well-known Kaifeng community, to the possibility of Jews in the ninth century in Xinjiang, to the late nineteenth-century Jews of Iraqi origin (the Sassoon dynasty, for example), and more recently the Ashkenazi refugees from Nazism. The last experienced a regime of antisemitism under the Japanese occupation,[9] but the author notes that the bulk of the Chinese population would not have understood Japanese accusations of 'Jewish imperialism', not having met Jews or the term 'imperialism'. Those who had come across Jews in Shanghai merely regarded them as part of the foreign population. Nevertheless, the author describes the existence of anti-Jewish sentiment among some Chinese intellectuals from the early years of the twentieth century. Under the Communist regime Israel was the target but since the 1970s this has changed and there has developed a great interest in Jews and in the State of Israel. However, one offshoot of the emergence of the market economy has been the resuscitation of an old notion of Jews and money. Shanghai aimed 'to welcome "Jewish investments" from all over the world. Kaifeng, the city which once had a small Jewish presence, also declared itself to be a "Jewish economic zone" in order to attract "Jewish" money' (p. 238).

It is not easy to summarize this volume, nor perhaps is it necessary to do so, except for the attention devoted to the explicit notion of a conceptual thread, that of 'frontier'. I am not convinced that this

approach really adds anything to the discussion. This is a book of 16 interesting case-studies, of Jews in a variety of locations and situations. They are about relationships between Jews and non-Jews (the chapter on Israelis in Cape Town referring to intra-Jewish relationships). The title or sub-title of the book could well have used other words or phrases found in the book: 'at the margin'; 'marginal man'; or even 'Jews as the Other'. The essays are all well worth reading and the book is produced to a high standard. One error is the mis-spelling of the surname of William and Hilary Rubinstein in John Stratton's chapter, although correctly spelled in the other Australian chapter by Paul Bartrop.

NOTES

[1] I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, London, 1974. His idea, since somewhat modified, refers to the relationship between the advanced industrial societies and those of the Third World.

[2] James O. Gump, *The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux*, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1994.

[3] There is a useful general history of the JCA by Theodore Norman, *An Outstretched Arm: a History of the Jewish Colonization Association*, London and Boston, 1985.

[4] Quoted from W. D. Rubinstein, *The Left, the Right, and the Jews*, London, 1982, p. 163.

[5] He uses Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Cambridge, 1991 and Homi Bhaba, *The Location of Culture*, London, 1994.

[6] Todd Endelman, 'Comparative Perspectives of Modern Anti-semitism in the West', in David Berger, ed., *History and Hate: The Dimensions of Anti-Semitism*, Philadelphia, 1986.

[7] See Milton Shain, *Antisemitism*, London, 1998. In it he argues that there should not be a hyphen in *antisemitism*. A pity that the book under review did not follow his strong recommendation.

[8] She notes studies of Israelis in Los Angeles and Chicago. To them can be added an article in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*: Rina Cohen and Gerald Gold, 'Israelis in Toronto: The Myth of Return and the Development of a Distinct Ethnic Community', vol 38, no. 1, June 1996, pp. 17–26.

[9] He notes the existence in Japan since the turn of the century of the 'Jewish myth' as demonstrated in David Goodman and Masanori Miyawaza, *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype*, New York, 1995. This book was the subject of a review article, 'The Image of the Jew in Asia', by Walter P. Zenner in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 38, no. 1, June 1996, pp. 42–46.

BOOK REVIEWS

JACK GLAZIER, *Dispersing the Ghetto: The Relocation of Jewish Immigrants across America*, x + 245 pp., Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1998, £29.50.

CAROLE BELL FORD, *The Girls: Jewish Women of Brownsville, Brooklyn, 1940–1995*, xiii + 217 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1999, £16.95.

Eastern European Jewish newcomers to the United States, declared a Jewish communal worker in the opening years of the twentieth century, 'have an idea that what lies beyond the limit of New York is a wilderness; that once they get away from the Ghetto they lose the friends they were accustomed to; that if sickness, trouble, or death comes they have no one to turn to'. It was to encourage immigrants to settle throughout the United States that the Industrial Removal Office (IRO) was established in 1901, and that is the subject of Jack Glazier's book. Triggered by an influx of many thousands of immigrants from institutionally antisemitic Romania, the IRO built on earlier Jewish communal attempts to encourage Yiddish-speaking Jews to leave their ports of disembarkation on the eastern seaboard and the all-too-visible enclaves they had formed there. The German Jews who largely constituted the older established Jewish community, well-integrated and affluent, were sympathetic towards their Eastern European co-religionists yet feared that their mass settlement in New York and other east-coast ports would kindle antisemitism. Their first attempt at shifting the tide of settlement westwards was made in 1874 with the creation of the United Hebrew Charities of New York, while the short-lived Hebrew Emigrants' Aid Society was formed in response to the start of the Great Migration in the 1880s. The IRO was established amid gathering nativist opposition to immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe, which was held to be flooding the country with hordes of culturally-unassimilable and economically-burdensome undesirables, who would have a deleterious and possibly catastrophic impact upon the existing 'Anglo-Saxon' character of the United States.

Based in New York, with subsidiary offices in Philadelphia and Boston and an agency in Indianapolis, the IRO was established by Jews of German background. Paternalistic yet extremely well-meaning, it worked strenuously to enable Jews to find work, especially with Jewish employers sensitive to their needs, and to build their lives

away from New York and other eastern coastal cities, for instance in upstate New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Mid-West. Unlike other societies assisting Jewish immigrants, resettlement was its raison d'être and therefore the central focus of its activities. The IRO was founded at a period when overcrowding in the Jewish neighbourhoods of New York and elsewhere had reached critical levels, and it was hampered by the robust reluctance of Jews to move further afield and leave their comforting communal institutional network behind. By 1917, when it had all but ceased to exist, it had managed to resettle nearly 79,000 people, a target far short of that which it had set itself. Utilising a wide range of sources, Jack Glazier has provided a long-overdue study of this hitherto neglected organization.

The parents of the 41 women who comprise Carole Bell Ford's study were among those Jews who clustered together in New York. Settled since the late nineteenth century by Jewish immigrants as a spillover from Manhattan's Lower East Side, the Brooklyn neighbourhood of Brownsville was in the 1950s and 1960s still the heartland of a poor working-class Jewish community. (Composed largely of Afro-Americans today, it is one of the most disadvantaged areas of New York.) Jewish Brownsville found its historian in Rabbi Alter F. Landesman, whose *Brownsville: The Birth, Development and Passing of a Jewish Community in New York*, was published in 1971 by Block of New York. Nineteen years later *The Nurturing Neighborhood: The Brownsville Boys Club and Jewish Community in Urban America 1940–1990*, by the academic Gerald Sorin, was published by New York University Press. The former virtually ignores women, while the latter obviously disregards them. Carole Bell Ford has gone some way towards addressing the omissions in a book which, while sometimes exhibiting bewildering inconsistencies and grammatical errors inexcusable in an academic publisher, is a thoughtful and engrossing account. She herself was a Brownsville native and contemporary of many of the 41 women in her study; her comments and reminiscences occasionally punctuate the text, but are never intrusive and are always illuminating.

Like her, some of her interviewees came of age in Brownsville during the 1950s; the remainder during the following decade. All, especially the older group, were heavily influenced by familial and societal expectations concerning a woman's role and status. It was a rare woman indeed who managed to maintain hopes of academic and professional achievement and economic independence in the face of traditional Jewish expectations that girls would become dutiful, even deferential, wives and devoted mothers. The ideal of the *baleboste* was reinforced by the emphasis on domesticity which prevailed in the American media of the time and by the surprisingly resilient amount of sexism endemic in American society. Femininity, when all in Ford's

sample were at an impressionable age, meant home and hearth, 'biology as destiny', and trivialisation — encapsulated in the television series of the period, showing contented and often feather-brained women in housewifely roles and subservient to their husbands. The inexorable retreat of American women into domesticity which began with demobilisation immediately after the Second World War was presented as an essential prop of stability during the tense Cold War. It was America, 'land of the free', in which at least until the 1970s employers routinely asked female college graduates 'Can you type?' and where academic institutions operated a 'nepotism rule' which effectively prevented female lecturers getting jobs on the same campus as their husbands, thus relegating them to unemployment or to helping out in the campus library (where, tellingly, the nepotism rule did not apply).

Thus these Jewish girls, mostly born into working-class families, learned early to smother their personal ambitions and repress their egos. Despite the existence in New York of a system of public colleges offering free tuition, few pursued education after high school. Most of those who did took secretarial courses; some others trained as teachers, one of the very few professions deemed suitable for women, not least because school hours were compatible with family life. Girls who yearned to soar in other directions had their wings clipped by disapproving parents or discouraging teachers blinkered by stereotypes of subjects of study and fields of employment appropriate to females: one able student, a scientifically-oriented aspiring astronomer, for instance, still recalls with regret the ruthless stifling of her ambition. Intending scientists were channelled into the liberal arts, and would-be nurses urged to reconsider, since nursing was seen as a menial occupation associated with Irish and black girls. Boys, by contrast, were encouraged to take full advantage of education and the careers and upward mobility it offered. Office work and shop work were popular choices among these girls, for work was regarded as a stop-gap for women before they settled into their true destiny of marriage, motherhood, and volunteering for Jewish causes and organizations. In the meantime their wages were welcome additions to the income of their working-class parental households. Typically, the girls married upwardly-mobile Jewish men, also from Brownsville, who had been given the opportunities denied to them. They have long since left the comparative poverty into which they were born for a comfortable existence.

For all this, even the older women in the study enlarged their horizons during their middle age, taking courses and returning to work. Some, like the author, who turned to academia at a mature age, took advanced degrees. They embraced their 'biological destiny' but they did not allow themselves to be totally defined by it. After all, they

were contemporaries of Betty Friedan, the American Jewish housewife whose book — *The Feminine Mystique* (1963) — is generally credited with initiating the modern women's movement. They welcome the expanded occupational opportunities open to their daughters, but fret about intermarriage and whether their grandchildren will remain Jewish. The most striking aspects of these women's lives is that they have been entwined with one another, and that, although few are religiously strictly observant virtually all are very Jewish in the cultural sense. Friends since primary school, they remain friends to this day. Through the various phases of their lives — young wifehood, motherhood, retirement, and widowhood — they have kept in touch, through all the moves that have taken them out of Brownsville, first to adjoining and 'better' suburbs such as Canarsie, and even to Florida. Many have lived near each other after each move. It is a commonplace that women, unlike men, surround themselves with a supportive social network which helps to cushion them from isolation and the impact of life's vicissitudes. In an age of frequent geographical dispersion and the decline of the extended family, this might not, in fact, hold good any more. But for these Brownsville girls it certainly does; perhaps it has helped to bolster their continuingly strong Jewish self-awareness.

HILARY L. RUBINSTEIN

WALTER JACOB and MOSHE ZEMER, eds., *Crime and Punishment in Jewish Law: Essays and Responsa*, 139 pp., Berghahn Books, New York, 1999, £12.50.

The editors of this book are respectively President and Director of the Freehof Institute of Progressive Halakha (Pittsburgh and Tel Aviv). In the first part of the book there are six engrossing essays on rabbinic criminal law, with special reference to the concept of crime and theories of punishment. A crime, in so far as it caused damage or loss to another individual or to society, was sinful; that was why it was also a punishable crime. It would have been apposite for reference to have been made to the rabbinic notion that atonement for sin should be preceded by best efforts to make good the hurt inflicted on another by the hand or speech of the transgressor. Behind the notion was the conception of a moral universe, allied to which was the principle that the Jewish nation was to be a 'kingdom of priests' — biblical language for the submission of society to a rule of law banishing sin.

In one way or another, the contributors grapple with the unstated question as to what is the moral justification for exacting from the offender a penalty, or an extra penalty, other than to reform or deter him. Why should A suffer punishment or some extra punishment in order to deter B who has no personal link with A? The answer has to do with the nature of society, a point which is most clearly implied in

Richard Block's essay on capital punishment. There is an unwitting parallelism between the rabbinic view and the approach adopted by moral philosophers in nineteenth-century Oxford, notably Bosanquet and T. H. Green. The offender as citizen or denizen has a duty to society not to offend. His offence amounts to a breach in that relationship between members of society on which law and peace within the social framework rest. While the balance between justice to society and compassion towards the offender — both of which are within the rabbinic contemplation — may not always be easy to determine, the examination of the question takes place in a moral spirit, neither vengeful nor arbitrary.

The second part of the book consists of 20 'rabbinic Reform responsa' on a range of criminal law themes. They include the role of professional confidentiality of witnesses in a criminal trial; criminal law and the freeing of hostages; and the responsibilities of Jewish lawyers in representing alleged or convicted terrorists. Many readers today may be particularly interested in the late Rabbi Solomon B. Freehof's *responsum* entitled 'Electronic Eavesdropping and Jewish Law' (pp. 103–07); it was written in 1977. Classic Jewish law is famously strict as regards fairness to the Defendant. Among the rules is the requirement for *oral* testimony. Modern recording devices are not productive in themselves of oral evidence: whose is the heard voice? It can be a crucial question when the tape is sought to be relied on as evidence of a statement said to have been made by the Defendant. The rule requiring pre-offence warnings of the Defendant by the witnesses might be endangered by a tape said to present their voices of warning. Was the Defendant there? There is the further requirement that witnesses must hear the judge's warnings to them of the importance of telling the truth. That cannot be done if they seek to testify by tape instead of attending Court.

Such debate may for the present seem otiose in an electronically-geared world. Yet there is relevance in Rabbi Freehof's re-framing of the question as follows — 'according to the ethical standards underlying Jewish legal procedure, would it be deemed morally right' to use the tape in secular courts? He thought not, and would presumably have said the same, *a fortiori*, in a Jewish court. In English law, after some uncertainty, the Court of Appeal laid down in *R. V. Robson and others* (1972) — in which case this reviewer was one of the Defence counsel — that electronic eavesdropping was admissible in the prosecution's evidence and that it was for the members of the jury to decide whether they are sure that the tape is not a voice fabrication.

One may say of this small book that it is an example of *multum in parvo*. One need not be a member of Reform to appreciate its academic standards. Nor is this reviewer.

ISRAEL FINESTEIN

MALCOLM J. TURNBULL, *Victims or Villains: Jewish Images in Classic English Detective Fiction*, 200 pp., Bowling Green University Popular Press, Bowling Green, Ohio, 1998, hardback $49.95 (paperback $21.95).

Dr. Turnbull is one of the editors of the much-esteemed *Journal of the Australian Jewish Historical Society*. In this book he examines Jewish images in English detective fiction, with particular reference — but far from exclusively — to works published in the 1920s and 1930s. According to him, that was the classic period of this literary genre exemplified notably by Agatha Christie, Dorothy Sayers, and A. B. Cox (Anthony Berkeley). While accepting that the generally hostile stereotyping reflected 'mainstream attitudes to Jews as a group in British society', he observes that such types were introduced 'because people could relate to them', echoing as they did 'real life prejudices or perceptions' (pp. 5–6). Exotic or sinister characters of alien extraction had come to be expected. They helped to sustain or boost sales (or so it might have been thought) and did not of itself necessarily spring from anti-Jewish motivations on the part of the writers.

This attempted degree of mitigation may be supported by the occasional beneficent Jewish character or by the fact that the wily grasping Jew may not be central to the story whose evil core might comprise Gentile figures. But the mitigation is difficult to maintain, bearing in mind that only the purblind or wilful could fail to detect or understand that the regular portrayals in popular literature fed the long-nurtured suspicions and dislike of the Jew. The author notes that as events unfolded in Nazi Germany, some appreciation of the dangers to society, not only to Jews, did cause some writers to show a responsive restraint in the use of stereotyping. However, the stereotyping did not disappear.

The detective story is an exceptionally engaging strand in the much-explored field of English literature relating to the Jewish image. The clever sleuth against the underhand Jew can be excellent fare. The Bolshevik Revolution seemed to offer material for those who wished to demonstrate the 'reality' of the 'international' Jew, subversive or anti-social. Jewish immigration had accustomed people to the presence of foreign Jews seeking — or being assisted by fellow-Jews — to be integrated in society, and often doing remarkably well. They were a clear target for the malign or discontented. G. K. Chesterton thought that anti-Jewish sentiment was engendered not by Jews being Jews but by their efforts at the same time to be something else, Englishmen. If so, it was a good starting-point for the welcome given by readers to the pictures in fiction of the cunning self-seeking Jew, behind whatever facade.

Jews were not the only victims of vivid and sharply pejorative caricatures. The imperial legacy brought in its wake a variety of

adverse stereotyping, born of a highly self-conscious sense of racial or national superiority. The term 'dago' was applied to an assortment of Mediterranean people. Maugham's frequent insinuations about the doubtful character or repute of persons from climes sunnier than those of his native land, somehow enlivened his (in any case flowing and compelling) narrative.

There was talk of the 'yellow peril'. The 'menace' was gruesomely personified in Sax Rohmer's talented Dr. Fu Manchu. Tales of the latter's devilish designs reached perhaps the largest audience of all, through the series of films between the two world wars in which the accomplished actor, Warner Oland, played the carefully-etched imagined villain.

Behind the popular appetite for the Jewish 'villain' was the key factor that the dominant image of the Jew in the popular mind was, states Dr. Turnbull, 'the Jewish financier from banker to pawnbroker' (p. 142). He might have added moneylender and landlord. The occasional counter-stereotype sympathetic Jewish character did not affect the broad picture put into the hands and minds of avid readers. Sympathetic interpretations of Shylock have hardly affected the ingrained image.

A telling indication of the relationship between writer, contemporary scene, and reader, is approvingly conveyed by Dr. Turnbull in his examination of Agatha Christie. She 'uses Jewish stereotypes most effectively as red herrings . . . None of her Jews turns out to be the culprit . . . She manipulates the readers by anticipating and appealing to their prejudices and thus cunningly misleads them' (p. 86). A striking example is the disagreeable financier, Sir Herman Isaacson, to whom the evidence is made to point strongly but wrongly, in *The Secret of Chimneys* (1925). Dr. Turnbull acknowledges that the ploy was discussed by Robert Barnard and Gillian Gill in their respective appreciations of Christie in 1980 and 1990. Christie, Sayers, and Cox, were 'political conservatives and solidly middle class'. This background, combined with 'generally narrow personal visions' is revealed 'in their fictional treatment of foreigners, servants, radicals, gays, women (in the case of Cox), Jews, and other outsiders' (p. 98).

This highly interesting work stems from the author's close study of the original books and from his mastery of the extensive secondary sources. If any moral can be derived from it, it is that one did not need to be a racist or a conscious antisemite to adopt the conventional characterisations. There was in the air what in a different context Jabotinsky called 'the antisemitism of things'. To be antisemitic certainly helped.

ISRAEL FINESTEIN

CHRONICLE

The Fall 1999 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* quotes its rector as stating that 10,000 out of the 26,000 students enrolled at the University, are studying for master's and doctoral degrees and that there is a need to attract the best students for advanced degrees: 'What sets us apart from the colleges are our graduate schools, advanced degree programs, and specialized research facilities'. However, 'the University only has about 1,000 scholarships at its disposal'. In the year under review, doctoral graduates numbered 160, the largest in the history of the University; there were 87 men and 73 women, with ages ranging from 26 to 72. The majority of the doctorates, 105, were in the Sciences while the remaining 55 were in the Humanities and related fields.

Fulbright scholarships were awarded to 16 'outstanding students and faculty' for doctoral and post-doctoral studies in the United States.

Tel Aviv University has established a new Institute for International Scientific Exchanges in Medical Sciences and the head of that Institute stated at the inaugural ceremony that there would be provision for 'a framework for visits and various types of collaboration between TAU academics and their counterparts abroad. These will include holding an international forum for research ..., sponsoring workshops and conferences, inviting leading international experts to TAU, and encouraging new research directions and fresh perspectives in medical knowledge'.

Tel Aviv University has also established a new Latin American Institute whose aim is promoting advanced research of Latin America and increasing academic links between TAU and leading institutions of higher learning there. At the inaugural ceremony — which was attended by 11 ambassadors from Latin American countries and by distinguished academic personalities — it was stated that 'outside Latin America and Spain, no place has such a concentration of Latin American scholars as Israel in general and TAU in particular'.

Tel Aviv University held a symposium on 'Human Rights in Transnational Perspectives' which brought together scholars from Russia, the United States, Canada, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel. The President of the University 'noted that the circumstances in Bosnia, Kosovo, China, Rwanda and other places have created a "new world disorder" which has pushed human rights issues to the forefront of international foreign policy'.

A delegation of several professors of Tel Aviv University visited Japan and co-operation agreements were signed with Kyoto University and the University of Waseda.

Tel Aviv University's Zoology Department and TAU's International Centre for the Study of Bird Migration organized an international seminar on 'Birds and Flight Safety in the Middle East', together with the Israeli Air Force, the Jordanian Air Force, the Turkish Air Force, the Greek Air Force, and the United States Air Force. The aim was to promote co-operation on

flight safety, under the banner 'Migrating Birds Know No Boundaries' and it was agreed to set up a regional warning system for protection against airborne hazards.

*

There has been a sharp decline in the Jewish population of Belarus. The 1989 Census showed 112,000 Jews; but ten years later, the 1999 Census recorded only 28,000 Jews. Emigration was the main factor: 84,000 had left Belarus since 1989.

*

It was reported last December that the first Sephardi synagogue in Moscow was inaugurated in the presence of Russian and foreign dignitaries and of Jews from the Caucasus mountains. The synagogue has been funded by Caucasian Jewish businessmen and is said to be the first place of worship specifically for Moscow's 50,000 Sephardi Jews. Israel's Sephardi Chief Rabbi conducted the opening ceremony. The synagogue occupies one wing of the existing Choral Synagogue complex; it can accommodate about 40 worshippers and has a small assembly hall and a courtyard.

A Torah scroll, in a traditional Sephardi silver and red velvet cask, was carried ceremonially to the courtyard and was opened under a velvet canopy, as the crowd chanted 'mazal tov' and danced by torchlight, in sub-zero temperature. The Sephardi Jews of Moscow come mainly from the Caucasian republics of Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria and from the Uzbek cities of Bukhara and Samarkand.

*

The Summer–Winter 1999 issue of *East European Jewish Affairs*, published by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, includes articles on 'Antisemitism in Petrograd/Leningrad, 1917–1930'; 'New Perspectives on Jewish Emigration from Soviet Ukraine'; 'From *Shtetl* to the City of the Sun Calling at the Schools of Communism: Yiddish in Soviet Ukrainian Trade Unions of the 1920s'; and 'Ilya Ehrenburg and the Holocaust in Byelorussia'.

There are also two review articles: 'The Pale of Settlement: An Inseparable Part of Byelorussian History' and 'Soviet Antisemitism after Stalin'.

East European Jewish Affairs, from 1st January 2000, will appear under the joint aegis of the Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies of University College London and of the Oxford Institute for Yiddish Studies.

*

The Jewish Agency was reported last January to have stated that the number of Jews emigrating from Russia to settle in Israel had more than doubled in 1999: 29,534 left Russia for Israel in that year, compared with 13,019 in 1998. Rising antisemitism and economic conditions were said to be responsible for the decision to leave the country.

*

According to a survey of Israeli Arabs carried out in November 1999 by a lecturer in the political science department of Haifa University, 46 per cent described themselves as Palestinians or Arab-Palestinians in Israel, 21 per cent as Palestinian Arabs, nine per cent as Arabs, and a little over 3 per cent as Palestinians. Only 11 per cent saw themselves as Israeli Arabs and four per cent as Israelis.

*

LATET is an Israeli humanitarian group, established about four years ago, which is registered with the United Nations and with the International Red Cross. It organized a relief mission early this year when Mozambique was devastated by floods. Israelis and South Africans donated funds and transport was provided by El Al and South African Airways. The volunteers were South Africans and Israelis; medical personnel were airlifted, together with 300 tons of food, bottled water, medication, and equipment. Tents, clothing, and blankets were also distributed to stranded villages which the Red Cross had identified.

Some of the LATET volunteers had recently been engaged in similar relief work in Guatemala.

*

The January 2000 issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance israélite universelle* has a long section on the library of the Alliance, from its creation in 1937 of a modern 'salle de lecture' with 16 seats and a building stocking books on eight levels, its recovery after the Second World War, and its increasing acquisition of documents, books, manuscripts, archives, etc. until its total modernization in 1989.

In August 1940, the Nazis took possession of the Alliance building and filled 700 crates with its works and documents and sent them to Frankfurt. After the war, there was a long and laborious process of recovering and identifying the stolen items taken from the Alliance; and a new catalogue had to be prepared.

The library acquired in 1996 a collection of some 800 volumes, among which were a 1675 *mahzor*, a rare Ferrare Bible printed by Samuel Usque in 1553 which is of great importance for the study of Judeo-Spanish; and two other valuable volumes: *La Fe Triumfante*, in Spanish, by Juan Josef Heydeck, published in Madrid in 1815 and *Thesoro dos dinim*, in Portuguese, by Menasseh ben Israel, published in Amsterdam in 1710.

In recent years, the number of readers has averaged about 2,700 annually.

The Autumn 1999 issue of *Les cahiers du judaisme*, also published by l'Alliance israélite universelle, is largely concerned with Jewish music. It includes an article on the music of the Jews of Ethiopia: 'La musique liturgique des Beta Israel' by Olivier Tourny; 'Le *cancionero* séfarade' by Edwin Seroussi; 'Musique juive en terre d'islam' by Jacques Taïeb; and 'Du *shtetl* aux Catskills, le renouveau de la musique *klezmer*' by Henry Sapoznik.

*

The Spring 2000 issue of *JPR News*, a publication of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (79 Wimpole Street, London WIM 7DD), reports on

a seminar for the Jewish voluntary sector held last December. It summarizes some of the main findings of a research project commissioned by JPR from the Centre for Applied Social Research at the University of Manchester. 'There are an estimated 1,910 financially independent Jewish voluntary organizations . . . 76% . . . are based in London and the South East. . . . The total income . . . in 1997 was £503.6 million. . . . The best estimate from this study of the total expenditure of the UK Jewish voluntary sector in 1997 was £386 million. There are many similarities when comparing the patterns of income of the Jewish voluntary sector with the UK voluntary sector as a whole. However, the Jewish voluntary sector obtains more of its income from individuals and less from government. Patterns of expenditure are also similar, although staff costs take a somewhat larger proportion in the Jewish voluntary sector (probably reflecting the high proportion of labour intensive services such as welfare and education).'

*

The B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation in London issued a press release last February about the Hillel Houses it sponsors for Jewish university students. It states that there are 23 Hillel Houses in the United Kingdom, 'from Edinburgh and Glasgow in the North to Brighton, Southampton and Bournemouth in the South'. These are residential houses 'catering for accommodation and social needs' and 'are the centre of Jewish life on campus'. They are closely tied to the Union of Jewish Students. Hillel Houses have more than 400 rooms throughout the country and give accommodation priority to first-year students.

*

The director of the rabbinical courts of Israel is reported to have stated at a news conference that an increasing number of divorces has been registered over the past decade. In 1999, there were 8,604 divorces; about 30 per cent of Jewish marriages end in divorce in Israel. Moreover, he claimed, couples are increasingly choosing to live together without benefit of a wedding ceremony: the number of marriages registered at the rabbinate did not conform with the number of couples recorded in the population registry of the Ministry of the Interior.

On the other hand, the number of conversions to Judaism increased in 1999 to nearly 4,000 individuals.

*

Last February, the Reform Synagogues of Great Britain reported a 66 per cent increase in applications for conversion to Judaism in 1999: from 67 in 1998 to 112 in 1999; 47 applicants were engaged to be married, 38 were already married, and 27 were unattached. The majority were Christians; the others included some who claimed that they did not have any religious affiliation, a Buddhist, and a Sikh. About half the Jewish partners of the applicants had parents who belonged to Orthodox synagogues. The Beth Din convenor of the Reform Synagogues commented: 'Many proselytes become the most committed and devoted members of communities'.

There was also an increase in requests for a *brit milah*, from 149 in 1998 to 208 in 1999.

*

An Exhibition of Contemporary British Ceremonial Art is to be held until 3 September 2000 at the Jewish Museum (129–131 Albert Street, London NW1 7NB, tel. 020-7284 1997). The Press Release states that the works selected for display will be 'suitable for use, either in the home (spice boxes, kiddush cups, seder plates) or the synagogue (Torah mantles, synagogue ark curtains, stained glass)'.

*

We were asked in December 1999 to notify our readers of the following:

The Central Council for Jewish Community Services Ombudsman is now taking any complaints from the community in matters concerning Jewish community services and institutions.

The Ombudsman was formerly part of the Central Council for Jewish Community Services but, since the Council dissolved, it continues as a separate trust . . . *It is an independent service, for which no fee is charged, for the community's benefit.* The Ombudsman will fully investigate a complaint, attempt to arbitrate between the community service concerned and the complainant, make recommendations on the justification of the complaint, on a remedy where possible, and on possible changes in procedure to avoid similar complaints in the future. Those using the service morally bind themselves to accept the recommendations of the Ombudsman . . .

Further details are available from the trustees of the Registered Charity at P.O. Box 20364, London NW11 7FD, England.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Deborah S. Bernstein, *Constructing Boundaries: Jewish and Arab Workers in Mandatory Palestine* (SUNY Series in Israeli Studies), xviii + 277 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 2000, $23.95 (paperback).

Dan Cohn-Sherbock, *Messianic Judaism*, xii + 234 pp., Cassell, London and New York, 2000, £17.99 or $27.95 (hardback, £45.00 or $55.00).

Stephen W. Massil, ed., *The Jewish Year Book 2000: 5760–5761*, 88 + 374 pp., published in association with the *Jewish Chronicle* by Vallentine Mitchell, London and Portland, Or., 2000, £26.00 or $37.50, hardback.

Dan Perry with Alfred Ironside, *Israel and the Quest for Permanence*, vii + 208 pp., McFarland & Co., Jefferson, North Carolina, 1999, distributed in the U.K. by Shelving, 127 Sandgate Road, Folkestone, Kent, £18.75 (paperback).

Robert A. Rockaway, *But He Was Good to His Mother: The Lives and Crimes of Jewish Gangsters*, 288 pp., Gefen Books, New York and Jerusalem, $14.95 (paperback).

Naama Sabar, *Kibbutzniks in the Diaspora* (translated from the Hebrew by Chaya Naor), SUNY Series in Israeli Studies, xii + 189 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 2000, $16.95 (paperback).

Marc B. Shapiro, *Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy: The Life and Works of Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg 1884–1966*, xi + 283 pp., The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, Vallentine Mitchell, London and Portland, Or., 1999, £35.00 or $49.50 (hardback).

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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WILLIAM SHAFFIR is a professor in the Department of Sociology of McMaster University.

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