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THE PARTITION PLAN OF PALESTINE AND ZIONIST PROPOSALS FOR THE BEISAN VALLEY

Yossi Katz

THE continuing violent clashes between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine in the mid-1930s led the British Mandatory power to send a Royal Commission to the country — the Peel Commission — which arrived in 1936 and in 1937 reported to the British Government. The Commission recommended partition: an Arab state, which would include Transjordan, and a Jewish state, which would extend over the whole of the Galilee, some valleys, and the coastal plain. There would be a permanent British enclave, which would include Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with a corridor to the sea. An exchange of population would complete the political separation between Jews and Arabs.[1] With the exception of the concept of a forced transfer of population, the partition plan was accepted by both the British Government and the League of Nations.[2] Although that plan caused bitter debate among the Jews, the Zionist leadership ultimately accepted the basic principles as the only realistic option for establishing a Jewish State in Palestine in the foreseeable future.[3] Therefore, during 1937–38, the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund worked on two levels — political strategy and settlement activity — to ensure that the terms of partition and its final boundaries would be optimal for the Jewish State in Palestine. Those boundaries were to be set by the Woodhead Commission (formally known as the Palestine Partition Commission), due to arrive in Palestine in 1938.[4]

This article will examine the various efforts and the complex planning of the Zionist bodies to improve the projected boundaries of the Jewish State. I have chosen to look at the Beisan Valley, which links the Jordan and the Jezreel Valleys, because it exemplifies most of the principles which guided the Jewish Agency in its demand for alterations to the boundaries proposed by the Royal Commission. This is also a clear example of strategic Jewish settlement designed in

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response to the Royal Commission recommendations and the impending partition. The article is based primarily on material from the archives of the Jewish Agency's Political and Settlement Department and of the Jewish National Fund (JNF).

The Partition Plan of the Royal Commission

The partition plan of the Royal Commission was based on three fundamental principles. First, that implementation of the plan must be a practical possibility; second, that the plan must be compatible with previous British commitments; and third, that the partition must be fair to both Jews and Arabs.[5] In setting boundaries, three more principles were added: (1) that the areas where Jews acquired lands and settled be separated from the areas settled entirely or primarily by Arabs;[6] (2) that the Jewish State have an area sufficiently large for demographic growth and settlement;[7] and (3) that the sanctity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem be preserved, not desecrated, and that free and safe access to them be guaranteed, as '... a sacred trust of civilization — a trust on behalf not merely of the people of Palestine, but of multitudes in other lands to whom those places, one or both, are Holy Places'.[8]

The transfer of Arabs out of the Jewish State, even by force, was intended to enable expansion of the Jewish settlement and thus to compensate for the comparatively small area of the Jewish State.[9] In implementing the principle of 'separation', the Royal Commission included within the borders of that State the coastal plain, the valleys, and the entire Galilee.[10] Incorporating all the Galilee, especially the hilly regions, contravened the principle of separation since that region was inhabited by a significant Arab population. But the Royal Commission viewed the Galilee as a land reserve for the development of the Jewish State and it advocated therefore that its Arab inhabitants be moved out of the Galilee. On the other hand, it was recommended that the mixed cities — Safed, Tiberias, Haifa, and Acre — remain under temporary British Mandate, and that Nazareth become part of a permanent mandate.[11]

The Royal Commission had debated whether to include the entire Galilee within the Jewish borders or to limit the size of the Jewish State in that region, while expanding it in the south. Ultimately, the 'north view' won out, partly because the Zionist leadership successfully lobbied the Commission and British officials.[12] Chaim Weizmann, for example, raised the matter with Commission member R. Coupland, who presented him with the alternatives — the Negev or the Galilee; and Ben-Gurion noted: 'Chaim naturally chose the Galilee'.[13] Another factor in favour of the Galilee was that there were good relations between the Jews and the Maronites in Lebanon. Strategic



Map 1. The Royal Commission's Partition Plan, 1937

considerations also seemed to influence this decision, since the natural defence of Haifa from the north (a city in which the British had a special interest, to the extent of proposing that it be under temporary British Mandate) would be the slopes descending to the Litani Valley. According to that view, the Jews might be able to entice the French in Lebanon to move their border northward to the same line — a territorial arrangement which would serve the British well, because they thought that the Jews would be better able than the Arabs to defend that border.[14]

The Commission decided that alongside the Jewish and the Arab States, a new British Mandate would be declared on an enclave which would include Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with a corridor to the sea;[15] that would preserve these holy places and guarantee free access to them. The Commission seems to have been aware that placing Jerusalem inside the Mandate meant excluding from the Jewish State the

section of the city outside the old city walls where 75,000 Jews resided, with all that implied for the future of the Jewish State; but it saw no practicable way of dividing the city.[16]

The boundary between the Jewish and Arab States drawn by the Royal Commission is delineated on a map they prepared (Map 1). Note the location of the boundary in relation to adjacent settlements. It extends from Rosh Haniqra along the northern and eastern borders of Palestine to the Sea of Galilee, crosses it, and continues to the source of the Jordan River (leaving the Degania settlements and the area east of them within the Arab State). From there, the boundary follows the Jordan River to north of Beisan (the electric power plant in Naharayim and the town of Beisan remaining within the Arab State) to the Jezreel Valley until north of Megiddo. From this point, it turns south-west to the coastal plain (leaving Tūlkarm in the Arab State, according to the principle of separation), and meets the northern boundary of the Mandate enclave east of Lydda. Near Qazaza it meets the southern border of the Mandate enclave and from there proceeds south in a direct line until east of Jaladiya, from where it turns west to the sea. Thus the Mandate enclave bisected the Jewish State, with no territorial contiguity between the two parts.

In addition to Jerusalem and Bethlehem, the British enclave incorporated Ramleh, Lydda and Bet Dagon. Jaffa was included in the Arab State, and its link to it was ensured by the Mandate enclave, which would be open to all. Bordering Jaffa were Tel-Aviv and Bat Yam, which were assigned to the Jewish State;[17] that State, approximately five million dunam, comprised about 20 per cent of the area of western Palestine. The area within the Arab State in Palestine was about 20.5 million dunam while the British enclave was about 800,000 dunam.[18]

The key component in the Royal Commission partition plan was the establishment of the principle of a border between the Jewish and the Arab States. Another important component of the plan, as noted above, was the exchange of population, which was meant to complement the setting of boundaries. Some other proposals of the Royal Commission were: declaration of a permanent British Mandate on the Sea of Galilee and the north-western shores of the Gulf of Aqaba; construction of a port in Tel-Aviv on condition that it co-operate with the port of Jaffa; financial support of the Arab State by the Jewish State; and the temporary levy of customs duties on the country's ports by the Mandate government.[19]

Political Activity: The Principles Underlying Zionist Demands for Alterations in the Royal Commission Proposal

The partition plan of the Royal Commission was very carefully considered by the top echelons of the World Zionist Organisation and the

Jewish Agency. The 20th Zionist Congress, meeting in Zurich in early August 1937 — a month after the publication of the Royal Commission report — resolved to empower the Zionist Executive to negotiate with the British to improve the terms of the proposed Jewish State in Palestine.[20] The demands submitted by that Executive to the British were the result of extensive deliberations,[21] thrashed out and formulated in the Jewish Agency by both the Political Department and the Boundaries Committee; each of these bodies had a panel of experts to advise on various aspects of the partition plan, in readiness for the imminent arrival of the Woodhead Commission.[22] The Zionist Executive submitted its requests in final form to the Woodhead Commission at the end of 1938. The amendments proposed by the Zionist leadership regarding the boundaries of partition were based on a number of principles and goals:

1. *Presentation of reasonable proposals.* Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, maintained: 'We must consider what is possible and what is impossible to achieve[23] . . . We should raise only those issues which are vital to us and which have a reasonable chance of success, and we must fight for all of these together'.[24] In keeping with this principle, Dov Joseph, Chairman of the Boundaries Committee, rejected out of hand a proposal raised in that forum to limit to the minimum the Arab State in Samaria (along the Jenin-Ramallah line), since '. . . the Arabs would thus receive only the mountainous regions, and the British would not agree to a proposal that is unfair from the Arab point of view . . .'.[25] Similarly, Ben-Gurion concluded that they could not demand that the Negev be part of the Jewish State if the Galilee were included,[26] and no Zionist demand was made to eliminate the British enclave, even though it bisected the Jewish State; but proposals were made to modify the boundaries of that enclave.[27] Within the framework of 'reasonable demands', the Zionist leadership sought to demonstrate that the alterations would not harm the Arabs or the interests of their State[28] — for example, consignment of the Negev to the Mandatory enclave would do no harm because it was unlikely that the Arabs would make the Negev desert bloom,[29] and shifting the eastern boundary further to the east so that the water sources would be included within the Jewish State would not harm the Arabs in Samaria.[30]

2. *Secure and defensible boundaries for the Jewish State.* Defensible boundaries were needed because of the bitter hostility between Jews and Arabs, the ongoing provocations by Arabs, and the likelihood that vulnerable boundaries would invite aggression and border disputes.[31] Another consideration was that in the event of war, the belligerents would not confine themselves to rifles and machine guns, but '. . . would also use advanced weapons such as heavy artillery, planes,

etc. . . .'.[32] Since the Jewish State would be an island in an Arab sea, it was imperative that the area of that State be sufficiently large to provide strategic depth and to permit the settlement of an adequately large Jewish population to defend the borders.[33] In this context, Ben-Gurion emphasised:[34]

> A Jewish State in a limited area could not withstand attack from the neighbouring Arab State. The new Arab State is 17 times the size of the Jewish State, and its population is nearly double (850,000 against 591,356). One must also not forget that nearly 300,000 Arabs reside in the Jewish State and that, in any case, inhabitants of neighbouring countries — Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia — can come to the assistance of the Arab State.

3. *Economic security and a self-supporting economy.* These aims could be achieved first and foremost, if the area of the Jewish State were sufficiently large to allow for future population growth as well as the absorption of mass immigration; many of the immigrants would be directed to agricultural settlements. Similarly, one could establish new agricultural settlements to serve the residents of the State and provide housing for many — a pre-condition for a viable local market. Zionist representatives emphasised that the Jewish State proposed by the Royal Commission was too small to satisfy these needs. This argument was reinforced when the British government rejected the Commission's plan to transfer forcibly Arab inhabitants from the proposed Jewish State in order to enable Jewish settlement on the vacated lands; and the likelihood of their voluntary transfer was remote. The Jewish Agency Boundaries Committee believed that the area of the Jewish State must be enlarged by at least one million dunam; economic considerations dictated keeping within its borders those areas endowed with natural resources and economic enterprises, in addition to places of special importance such as Haifa, which had been assigned to the temporary Mandate, and the new western part of Jerusalem.[35]

4. *Maximum control over water resources.* Control over water resources was deemed essential to support dense settlement based on intensive, irrigation farming (this point had already been noted by the Royal Commission), which was vital for the survival of the Jewish State. First, it was feared that water sources not controlled by that State would be poisoned. Second, the special panel of experts of the Boundaries Committee noted the importance of the water spill-off from the Samarian mountains westward to the dense population in the coastal lowlands and stated: '. . . It is possible that waters accrued from subterranean sources, either by drilling or natural springs, could be exhausted by persistent or even wanton use . . .'. It would therefore be necessary to collect the spill-off from Samaria, either through mountain dams or by allowing it to penetrate the soil. Also regarded as vital was control of the entire Sea of Galilee, the two banks of the Jordan River,

PARTITION PLAN OF PALESTINE



Map 2. The Jewish proposal for partition in Palestine, 1938

and the Galilee, which held about half the water resources of the proposed Jewish State.[36]

5. *Control over major transportation arteries.* That was discussed in July 1937.[37]

6. *The addition of areas not inhabited by Arabs.*[38] That was considered important primarily for security reasons and political strategy. It was the only way that a Jewish majority could be created in the future Jewish State, especially since the Royal Commission plan would leave many Arabs within its boundaries and since, as noted above, the forced transfer of Arabs had now been rejected by the British government.[39]

Those principles guided the setting of boundaries proposed by the Jewish Agency to the Woodhead Commission; the borders were marked on an Agency map, enclosed with the Zionist requests for amendments (map 2). It was hoped that such a revised partition plan would be implemented and would give the Jewish people an

independent State in some areas of Palestine. In deciding these boundary lines, the Zionist leaders had to choose between conflicting principles: for security reasons, for example, they sought to append areas which contained a sizable Arab population, although that was not a desirable demographic prospect.[40]

The centrality of security considerations in the deliberations of the Zionist Executive is striking, especially when compared with the planning of the Royal Commission in drawing the borders; that Commission believed that the very process of political partition and separation of the two populations, with the addition of population transfer, would lead to peace between Jews and Arabs. The Zionist Executive, however, begged to differ and did not think that there would be peace and amicable relations between two peoples on opposite sides of the border, even after partition. The Executive's sense of foreboding seems to have been reinforced by the violent events which had begun in 1936, and the British Government's rejection of the principle of forced transfer of the Arab population. This apprehensiveness fostered a desire to ensure defensible borders, strategic depth, and secure transportation arteries.[41]

In addition to formulating demands for alterations in the Royal Commission Plan, the Zionist leadership also mounted an information campaign designed to encourage the British to expand the final boundaries. For example, Zionist contentions were that the Royal Commission proposal contravened its own principles because it did not honour the obligations of the Mandate to the Jews and because it was not practical and discriminated against the Jewish side. As part of this campaign, a protest was registered, claiming that the Royal Commission plan was tantamount to a third proposed partition of Palestine, each of which was unjust to the Jews.[42] The first, in 1919, divided up that Middle East region between England and France, severing areas of land owned by Jews. In the second, in 1922, the eastern part of Palestine was detached from the national home, although the intention of the Balfour Declaration had been to allow Jewish immigrants to settle there and to establish a Jewish State throughout its entire historic territory. Now in the context of a third partition, the Royal Commission proposed 'to award the Jews a mere one-eighteenth of the area included in the Balfour Declaration',[43] comprising only one-fifth of western Palestine. Zionist representatives stressed that the Commission had allotted a limited area to the Jewish people who sought to rebuild their home in Palestine, while the area at the disposal of the Arabs was vast, including states which had already won political independence. That was a blatant injustice, particularly in view of the persecution of Jews in Central Europe, their deteriorating situation in Eastern Europe, and the fact that the world was increasingly closing its doors to Jewish refugees.[44] In general, only a Jewish State could provide a definitive



Map 3. The Jewish proposal for partition in Beisan Region

solution to the Jewish problem; it was needed for all the Jewish people, not only for the Jews of Palestine. But the area of the Jewish State proposed by the Royal Commission did not allow sufficient room, according to Ben-Gurion, to absorb the masses in need of sanctuary.[45]

Zionist Demands to Alter the Partition Plan in the Beisan Area

The proposal of the Royal Commission did not include most of the Beisan Valley, the Mount Gilboa range, and the southern portion of the Jezreel Valley within the boundaries of the Jewish State (see map 1). The proposed boundary would extend from the Jordan River north of the town of Beisan and bisect the Beisan Valley, south of the old Hijaz railway until Megiddo.[46] But the Jewish Agency proposal included not only the Gilboa range and the entire Beisan Valley, but also the town of Beisan[47] (see maps 2 and 3).

The Beisan Valley comprised 150,000 dunam which had undergone substantial changes of ownership since the latter part of the nineteenth century. In 1882 the Turkish Sultan, Abd al-Hamid, had purchased the area from the Turkish government; that was made possible by implementation of a law which stated that land not cultivated for three consecutive years could be expropriated from its owners. The Arabs who lived on the property were not driven away, but continued to cultivate the land by primitive methods and to graze sheep on it, and were considered to be tenants. After the Young Turk revolution, the government seized the Sultan's land and nationalised it. After the conquest of Palestine by the British, the area was transferred to the Mandatory government, but the Arabs who inhabited seventeen villages in the Beisan Valley demanded ownership of the property. The first High Commissioner for Palestine granted the claim and in the

Ghor-Mudawara Agreement of 1921, the Beisan Valley was divided into plots and sold to the Arabs for a paltry sum. However, they were not able to develop the valley, and the sparse yield did not allow them to pay the government even the small sums they owed for the land. During the 1920s and 1930s, they began selling off the plots to the highest bidder.[48]

The Zionist claims about the boundaries of the Beisan Valley were rooted in economic (settlement) as well as in security considerations. The land which the Jewish Agency wanted in the Beisan Valley comprised about 100,000 dunam of irrigated soil, rich in springs and subterranean water that could meet the needs of a dense Jewish population there. The Boundaries Committee of the Agency believed that the water resources of this valley could also serve other regions[49] and it contended that the Arabs had not developed the region at all: 'This area is now sparsely settled and the Arab inhabitants have an excess of land which they cannot cultivate, nor is it worth their while to do so, and they have put it up for sale . . .'.[50] In the summary memorandum it dispatched to the Woodhead Commission, the Zionist Executive emphasised that much of the area belonged to absentee landowners and it quoted the words of the Royal Commission which had also noted that the Arabs had not managed to develop the region and it had on record the statement of Sir John Hope-Simpson, a government envoy in 1930, who criticised the Ghor-Mudawara Agreement because it had '. . . taken from the government the control of a large area of fertile land eminently suitable to development and for which there is ample water available for irrigation. The whole of the Beisan lands have been distributed and large areas have already been sold. Further large areas are in the market. The grant of the lands has led to land speculation on a considerable scale . . .'.[51]

The Royal Commission had endorsed this criticism and added that the Ghor-Mudawara Agreement of 1921 had been drawn up hastily and with insufficient preliminary study. It had failed to note development possibilities and was excessively generous to the Arabs — who were incapable of taking advantage of that generosity; and there were no safeguards to prevent their abuse of the privileges granted by the agreement.[52] The Zionist Executive claimed that this criticism should have compelled the Royal Commission to include the Beisan area within the Jewish State, especially since the Mandatory government was committed to allowing Jewish settlement on government land; and it expressed surprise that the Royal Commission had not adhered to one of its own principles — namely, honouring previous British commitments.[53]

Security considerations also dictated important modifications in the boundary lines. First and foremost, it was necessary to incorporate

within the Jewish State the southern descent of the Gilboa and its summit:[54]

> The Jewish state would have . . . no way of protecting its southern borders if it does not have strategic positions on the mountains overlooking the south from where an attack from the mountains of Samaria could be repelled . . . Only from the high peaks which extend toward the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu'a can one observe the mountainous areas to the south, noting movement and advances from that direction. These peaks command the entire area and have served from time immemorial as watch towers and fortified positions for the valley. Therefore the lie of the land dictates that they be included within the area to which the Jezreel and the Jordan Valleys belong, and that they serve as fortified frontier posts in times of need.

Similarly, the Zionist proposal noted the importance of keeping the Beisan and Jezreel Valleys out of the range of Arab artillery.[55] It also emphasised that the summit of the Gilboa had no agricultural value, so that consigning it to the Jewish State did not prejudice the Arab State.[56] From the security standpoint, the boundary should be pushed south from the town of Beisan and the Hijaz rail line in order to secure the railway and to prevent transformation of Beisan '. . . into a powerful military base with convenient communications to Transjordan through the Sheikh Hussein bridge, and to the south via the Jericho–Beisan road. Thus swift and easy communications with the Jordan Valley via the Jezreel Valley could be curtailed. Also, a fortified base there would compel us to secure the southern portion of the Jordan Valley, which would remain in our hands, and we would have to make a prodigious effort to safeguard the south-east portion of the Jezreel Valley, which would be exposed to Beisan.'[57]

That was apparently one of the arguments used to justify inclusion of the town of Beisan within the boundaries of the Jewish State, even though it meant the addition of 3,000 Arabs to that State. As noted, one principle of the Zionist Executive in drawing boundaries was to minimise the number of Arab inhabitants of the Jewish State and one suggestion had been to leave the town of Beisan outside the Jewish boundaries — but because of security considerations the suggestion was rejected.[58]

Settlement Activity

From the moment the partition plan of the Royal Commission was revealed in 1937, Zionist settlement activity — the purchase of lands and the establishment of new settlements (in most cases, kibbutzim) complemented the political-information campaign which attempted to persuade the British to alter the plan in favour of the Jewish State. Land purchases and settlement were concentrated in areas which had not been allocated to that State in the Royal Commission proposal, but

which the Zionist Executive hoped to secure eventually as an extension of the boundaries. On the other hand, the Zionists had another scenario to deal with: the Galilee had been included in the Jewish State, but Jewish settlement there was sparse and that jeopardised the ultimate disposition of the region. The Zionists assumed that Jewish settlement would play a decisive role in determining the final boundaries of the Jewish State to be carved out by the Woodhead Commission, which was to come to Palestine in 1938.[59] That assumption was based on the Royal Commission Report, which generally incorporated within the Jewish State all the Jewish settlements and their lands. A leader of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) stated in November 1937: '. . . just as the lands we settled affected the boundaries set by the Royal Commission, so too the expansion of our territorial property can determine the permanent disposition of the boundaries. Thus we must expedite the purchase of land in the Arab region . . . This is the last opportunity for these efforts. Who knows if it will not be too late one year from today?'.[60]

Concentrated efforts were therefore made to expand Jewish settlement in frontier areas as well as in the Galilee. Although the Royal Commission had awarded the entire Galilee to the Jewish State, the fear persisted that given the sparsity of Jewish settlement, the Woodhead Commission and the British government would reverse that decision and allocate the region to the Arabs.[61]

In the Beisan Valley, a number of fortuitous land purchases had been made by the JNF from 1929 onwards. Their purpose was to create territorial contiguity between the Jewish settlements in the Jezreel and Jordan Valleys; but the lands were divided among many owners, the plots were small and dispersed over a wide area, and that lack of contiguity would not allow the creation of new settlements. By 1935, the JNF had acquired 23,000 dunam while other Jewish bodies bought an additional 2,000. All had Arab tenants and the JNF began to take steps to ensure that ownership would remain in the hands of Jewish bodies; but actual Jewish settlement on the purchased land could not take place because of the eruption of Arab riots in the spring of 1936. Only in the closing days of that year was the first kibbutz founded — Tel Amal (Nir David); it was followed in the first week of 1937 by a second kibbutz, Sdeh Nahum.[62]

Since there were only very few Jewish settlers in the Beisan Valley, the Zionists considered it essential to make efforts to establish more settlements in order to improve the prospect of including Beisan within the boundaries of the Jewish State when final partition lines were drawn. (This was in addition to the need to establish settlements on tracts which had been purchased by the JNF, lest they be seized by Arabs during the widespread violence.)

The Zionist leadership had become familiar with the general outline of the Royal Commission's partition plan before it was officially

published in July 1937[63] and it was galvanized into proceeding with concentrated land purchase and ensuring the rapid establishment of new settlements in the Beisan Valley in the hope of altering the proposed boundaries. That was of paramount political importance before the publication of the Royal Commission Report.[64] With reference to the activity which would be required in the Beisan Valley, Yosef Weitz, head of the Land Department of the JNF, wrote in April 1937:

> The political events threaten to sever parts of our land and remove them from our possession. If indeed the die is cast to partition the land, it is clear that the Beisan Valley will slip from our grasp, because no Jewish settlement exists there . . . We would be forfeiting one of the most important areas for agricultural settlement. Creation of a network of Jewish settlements from one end of the valley to the other would thwart schemes to detach the area from us . . . The terms for land purchase in this valley have given rise to a situation in which plots have been purchased helter-skelter throughout the valley. This fact, which ordinarily would have been a drawback in terms of planned settlement, has now turned into an advantage. Now we can establish settlements in a belt around the valley and they can, to some extent, control the entire valley which is sparsely populated, rich in soil, and dominates the Jordan River.

Weitz called upon the Zionist leadership to immediately embark upon the establishment of settlements and road construction in the valley, whatever the economic cost.[65] That call to action formed the basis for a clearly-formulated geographic policy about Jewish settlement in the Beisan Valley: settlements would be established at the extreme ends of the valley, with the aim of ensuring inclusion of the entire valley within the proposed Jewish State. Only at the second stage would settlements be placed in the heart of the valley. Indeed, as can be seen in map 4, Moshav Bet-Yosef and the kibbutzim Tirat Zvi and Maoz Chaim — which were established in the Beisan Valley in the course of 1937, with the partition plan in mind — were situated at the northern, southern, and eastern ends of the valley. It was only later that other kibbutzim were established within the valley itself (see map 4).

The Jewish Agency decided in June 1937 to settle the area of Zarra at the south end of the Beisan Valley. Moshe Shertok, director of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, was in charge of composing the detailed statement to the Woodhead Commission with its demands to modify the boundary proposals of the Royal Commission. He strenuously argued that the Zionist Executive must establish a kibbutz on the southern edge of the Beisan Valley, even though it would be isolated, precariously placed in terms of security, and constitute a serious budget problem in that location. In deliberations of the Zionist Executive in June 1937, Shertok dwelt on the utmost political importance and the urgency of settlement in the south of the valley:[66]



Map 4. The Jewish Settlements in Beisan Valley 1936–1938

> ... He believes that the southernmost area would be the first to be conquered. He does not know what the fate of Beisan will be if the land is divided into regions, if partition takes place. Our status in the Beisan Valley is not clear. Although we own some land there, it is scattered and cultivated to some extent by the Arabs. But if we can make Zarra our southernmost point, there is hope that we can rescue additional locations for the Jewish area. He cannot guarantee that if we give our all to settle the region, it will be included in the Jewish area. But we must do our utmost to prevent the government from stealing this land from us. The [Zionist] bodies must decide to expedite maximum settlement of this location. If this proves financially impossible, it would be most tragic. There are two alternatives: either we give up the site or we hold onto it by people who are willing to settle there over time, with all the danger implicit in this settlement.

Shertok's words were effective and led to the decision to place a kibbutz at the southern end of the Beisan Valley, in late June 1937, Kibbutz Tirat Zvi was established there.[67] A few days later, in early July, Kibbutz Maoz Chaim was founded at the eastern end of the Beisan Valley.[68] Together with Bet-Yosef at the northern end of the valley, a moshav which had already been established in April of that year, the settlement strategy which sought to ensure inclusion of the Beisan Valley within the future Jewish State was completely implemented. The settlement in 1938 of Kibbutz Kfar Ruppin at the eastern

edge of the Beisan Valley was intended to reinforce that strategy (see map 4).

In subsequent years — from 1939 until the outbreak of the 1948 War of Independence — Jewish settlement efforts focused on the centre of the Beisan Valley; indeed, the reinforcement of settlements in that area was continued for strategic-political reasons — enhancing the prospects of including the valley in the future Jewish State. This policy, however, was no longer directly related to the recommendations of the Royal Commission;[69] since, by then, the British government had decided not to proceed with the plans for partition.[70]

Recommendations of the Woodhead Commission: British Withdrawal of the Partition Plan

The Woodhead Commission arrived in Palestine in April 1938; it was charged with examining the practicability of implementing the partition plan, and it unanimously concluded that reasonable boundaries for a Jewish State and an Arab State could not be drawn. Although members of the Commission differed about an alternative partition proposal, they unanimously opposed the partition plan of the Royal Commission. The Woodhead Commission also examined the boundary proposals of the Jewish Agency and generally rejected these as well.

The Woodhead Commission was charged with including the minimal number of Arabs in the Jewish State, and vice versa and it therefore asserted that the proposed Zionist amendments to the boundaries were unacceptable, as they would retain a large Arab population within the area of the Jewish State. As for the Zionist proposal to extend the Jewish State over the Beisan Valley and the adjoining region east of the Jordan River, the Commission noted that it was not desirable to include within that State the town of Beisan, which had a wholly Arab population of more than 3,000 and which was a centre of Arab nationalism. The valley itself, in the opinion of the Commission, should be set aside to be used as farms for Arabs who wished to relocate from the Jewish to the Arab State. As for the area east of the Jordan River (see map 3), there was no guarantee that the Transjordan government would agree to transfer some of its lands to the area of the Jewish State. Moreover, the Commission commented:

> The military authorities have advised us that, in order to obtain a viable defensive boundary for this area, it would be necessary to draw that boundary a very considerable distance inside the Trans-Jordan hills. This would mean the inclusion in the Jewish State, in addition to the sparsely populated land in the hill country of Trans-Jordan, a country inhabited entirely by Arabs.

The Woodhead Commission was not persuaded by the arguments of the Jewish Agency concerning security considerations in setting the

boundaries. It rejected the Zionist proposal to place the lands south of Jerusalem, including the town of Hebron, inside the Mandate enclave, on the grounds that this would exclude an important Arab town and large rural settlements from the area of the Arab State. Similarly, inclusion of the western part of Jerusalem within the boundaries of the Jewish State, as proposed by the Jewish Agency, was considered impractical by the Commission, not only for administrative reasons but primarily because of the staunch opposition of the Arabs.[71]

The Woodhead Commission recommendations, in contrast with the partition proposal, were viewed favourably by the British government which — by late 1937, upon pressure from its Foreign Ministry — had already begun to retreat from the partition concept. The context for this was the vehement opposition to partition among Arabs in Palestine and the Arab world at large and there was concern that in the imminent European conflict, the Arab world would side with the enemies of England if partition was implemented. In effect, the British government hoped that the Woodhead Commission would make the decision it did make. Even before the departure of the Commission for Palestine, the Foreign Ministry believed that the partition plan would soon be rescinded, relying on the Commission to conclude that the plan was not practicable. Indeed, clarifications to that effect were transmitted to the Arab capitals. In November 1938, the Report of the Woodhead Commission was published together with a formal announcement by the British government that it considered the partition plan to be impractical, and therefore would not now support it.[72]

Conclusion

The recommendations of the Royal Commission regarding partition which began to emerge in mid-1937 compelled the Zionist leadership to undertake a concerted information campaign and lobbying efforts among the British, while simultaneously pursuing practical measures, to ensure that the final partition plan would be an optimal one. The leadership, while accepting in principle the concept of partition because it ensured the establishment of a Jewish State in the foreseeable future, balked at the boundary lines recommended by the Royal Commission. These boundaries could not guarantee the political, economic, and physical survival of an independent Jewish State in Palestine and could not enable it to absorb masses of Jewish immigrants. The information campaign and the lobbying were based on the principle that alterations should appear reasonable and logical to British eyes and absolutely essential from the Jewish point of view. The Zionist leadership hoped to demonstrate that the desired changes would not harm an Arab State and indeed coincided with British interests;[73] but it became clear that the information campaign and the

lobbying would not ensure the desired amendments. The experience of Zionism ever since its establishment as a movement, as well as the boundary proposals of the Royal Commission, indicated to the Zionist leadership that it was necessary to supplement the political campaign with practical measures of settlement. Now for the first time, settlement functioned directly as a tool to achieve political goals. Against this background in the years 1937–38, a new and unique settlement reality emerged in the Beisan Valley as well as in the Galilee and other frontier regions. The very nature of the settlement activity and the priorities in determining the locations were part of the singularity of settlement strategy during these years.

In contrast with the Royal Commission's recommendations of 1937, the Woodhead Commission in 1938 concluded that it could not recommend reasonable boundaries for a Jewish State and an Arab State. It rejected not only the partition plan of the Royal Commission and the Zionist demands that this plan be modified, but also the alternative partition scheme proposed by the Jewish Agency — even though the Agency had made a major effort to propose a plan which would be acceptable to the British.[74] The conclusions of the Woodhead Commission reinforced the position of the British government, which by the end of 1937 had begun to have serious doubts about the merits of partition.

From 1937 to 1948, it became increasingly clear to the Zionist leaders that their political leverage was not strong enough to enable them to secure a Jewish State and that practical settlement efforts were therefore essential. The long-term Zionist perspective that settlement determined boundaries took root during that period.[75]

NOTES

[1] Palestine Royal Commission, *Report Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty*, London, July 1937, pp. 370–97.

[2] Palestine Partition Commission, *Report Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty*, London, October 1938, pp. 11–14, 52, 282–84.

[3] See S. Dothan, *Partition of Eretz-Israel in the Mandatory Period: The Jewish Controversy* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1979.

[4] S. Dothan, *The Struggle for Eretz-Israel* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1983, pp. 138–43; also E. Oren, *Settlement Amid Struggle* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1978, pp. 38–62.

[5] Palestine Royal Commission, op. cit. in Note 1, pp. 382–86.

[6] Ibid., p. 382.

[7] Ibid., pp. 382–83.

[8] Ibid., p. 381.

[9] Ibid., pp. 389–93.

[10] Ibid., pp. 382–85.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Central Zionist Archive (hereinafter C.Z.A.), *File S25/10066*, Letter from Ben-Gurion to Shertok (Sharett), 3 July 1937; D. Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1974, vol. 4, p. 228; M. Sharett, *Making of Policy* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1971, vol. 2, p. 209.
[13] Ben-Gurion's *Memoirs* op. cit. in Note 12, p. 198.
[14] Sharett, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 344.
[15] Palestine Royal Commission, op. cit. in Note 1, pp. 381–82.
[16] Sharett, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 344.
[17] Palestine Royal Commission, op. cit. in Note 1, pp. 382–85.
[18] C.Z.A., *File S25/10054*, Ben-Gurion's Proposal for Tri-partite Partition, 3 December 1937.
[19] Palestine Royal Commission, op. cit. in Note 1, pp. 381–92.
[20] Dothan, 1983, op. cit. in Note 3, p. 138.
[21] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, Memorandum Submitted to the Palestine Partition Commission by the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jerusalem, May 1938.
[22] Sharett, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 435; M. Sharett, *Making of Policy* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1972, vol. 3, p. 106; Ben-Gurion, op. cit. in Note 12, vol. 4, p. 437; C.Z.A., *File S25/5120*, List of the Various Committees and their Members; C.Z.A., *File S25/10109*, List of the Members of the Boundaries Committee and a Summary of its Activity.
[23] See Sharett, *Making of Policy*, op. cit. in Note 22, p. 230.
[24] Ibid., p. 259.
[25] C.Z.A., *File S25/5143*, 1 December 1938, Protocol of the Boundaries Committee.
[26] Ben-Gurion, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 322.
[27] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, Z. Lifschitz, Boundaries Committee: Proposals for Partitioning Palestine, 14 April 1938.
[28] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 21).
[29] Ben-Gurion, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 455.
[30] C.Z.A., *File S25/5138*, Protocol of the Water Committee, 19 May 1938.
[31] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 21).
[32] C.Z.A., *File S25/5154*, Report on Estimated Boundary Line from a Security Standpoint, 26 July 1937. See also C.Z.A., *File S25/10066*, op. cit. (Note 12).
[33] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 21).
[34] C.Z.A., *File S25/10054*, op. cit. (Note 18). See also C.Z.A., *File S25/5145*, Letter from Berl Katznelson on 27 April 1937, dealing with the subversive potential if a large Arab minority would remain in the Jewish State.
[35] See C.Z.A., *File S25/8121*, Letter from Avnimelech to the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, 11 July 1937; C.Z.A., *File S25/5143*, Protocol of the Boundaries Committee, 10 November 1937; C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 27); C.Z.A., *File S25/8122*, Letter from Picard to the Political Department, July 1938; C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 21); Ben-Gurion, op. cit. in Note 12, pp. 61, 67, 131, 207, 243, 266, 455. In commenting on the Royal Commission report, the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations asserted that the areas to be allocated to Jews must be extensive and sufficiently fertile to allow for intensive economic development and rapid and dense settlement: see C.Z.A., *File S25/3786*. The charge of the British government to the Woodhead Commission was to arrive at the boundaries of two

states affording '... a reasonable prospect ... of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states ...': See Palestine Partition Commission, op. cit. in Note 2, p. 7.

[36] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 27). See also C.Z.A., *File S25/5143*, Protocol of the Boundaries Committee, 22 November 1937; C.Z.A., *File S25/5138*, Protocol of the Water Committee, 19 and 27 May 1938; C.Z.A., *File S25/5143*, op. cit. (Note 35); C.Z.A., *File S25/5138*, The Partition Problem from a Hydrological Point of View, undated.

[37] C.Z.A., *File S25/10054*, Z. Lifschitz, Possible Boundaries of the Jewish State as a Result of the Partition of Western Palestine into Two Separate Entities, 15 July 1937; C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 27); C.Z.A., *File S25/10109*, Summary of the Activities of the Boundaries Committee.

[38] C.Z.A., *File S25/10054*, Comments on the Partition Proposal by J. Weitz, 19 July 1937; C.Z.A., *File S25/5143*, op. cit. (Note 35); C.Z.A., *File S25/5120*, Letter from Simon to Shertok, January 27, 1938; C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, ibid.

[39] C.Z.A., *File S25/5145*, Letter from Berl Katznelson to Chaim Weizmann, 27 April 1937; C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, ibid.

[40] C.Z.A., *File S25/5120*, op. cit. (Note 38); C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, ibid.; C.Z.A., *File S25/5143*, op. cit. (Note 35).

[41] Y. Katz, 'Formulation of the Jewish Agency's Proposal for the Boundaries of the Partition' (Hebrew), *Zion*, vol. 56, no. 4, 1991, pp. 404–39.

[42] Ben-Gurion, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 362; also D. Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs*, Tel-Aviv, 1982, vol. 5, p. 196.

[43] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 21); Ben-Gurion, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 362; and Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs*, op. cit. in Note 42, p. 196.

[44] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 21).

[45] See previous Note. The quotation is from Ben-Gurion, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 124; see also pp. 226, 323, 398, 455.

[46] Palestine Royal Commission, op. cit. in Note 1, pp. 382–84.

[47] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 21).

[48] Palestine Royal Commission, op. cit. in Note 1, pp. 259–62. See also J. Weitz, *Our Settlement Activities in a Period of Storm and Stress 1936–1947* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1947, pp. 73–76; and D. Gavish, *Land and Settlement* (Hebrew), Jerusalem 1991, pp. 124–31.

[49] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 27); C.Z.A., *File S25/5138*, op. cit. (Note 30); Ben-Gurion, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 455.

[50] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 27).

[51] Palestine Royal Commission, op. cit. in Note 1, pp. 261–62.

[52] Ibid., pp. 259–62.

[53] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 21); Ben-Gurion, op. cit. in Note 12, pp. 363–64.

[54] C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 27); C.Z.A., *File S25/10054*, op. cit. (Note 37); C.Z.A., *File S25/5143*, op. cit. (Note 35) and op. cit. (Note 36); C.Z.A., *File S25/10054*, Reports by Lifschitz and Zelikovitz, 12 December 1937.

[55] C.Z.A., *File S25/10054*, Letter from Zelikovitz to Simon, 23 April 1938.

[56] C.Z.A., *File S25/10054*, op. cit. (Note 37); C.Z.A., *File S25/6654*, op. cit. (Note 21).

[57] C.Z.A., *File S25/10054*, op. cit. (Note 54).

[58] Sharett, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 229.

[59] Oren, op. cit. in Note 4, pp. 22–37; A. L. Avneri, *The Jewish Land Settlement and Arab Claims of Dispossession (1878–1948)* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1980, p. 168; Dothan, op. cit. in Note 4, p. 145; C.Z.A., *File KKL 10*, Protocol of the Meeting of the Executive of the JNF, 6 December 1937 and 25 April 1938; C.Z.A., *File S25/2956*, Letter from Ben-Gurion to the JNF, 27 December 1937; and Y. Weitz, *My Diary and My Letters to My Sons* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1965, vol. 1, p. 191.

[60] See *Davar* (Hebrew), 19 November 1937.

[61] See Note 59.

[62] Weitz, op. cit. in Note 48, pp. 76–77; C. Givati, *A Century of Settlement* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1982, pp. 298–99.

[63] Sharett, op. cit. in Note 12, pp. 100–4.

[64] Ibid., p. 144.

[65] C.Z.A., *File KKL 5/8318*, Letter from Weitz to Ussishkin, 19 April 1937. The quotation is from this source.

[66] C.Z.A., *Protocol File of the Zionist Executive*, Statement by Shertok at the meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive, 6 June 1937.

[67] C.Z.A., *Report of the Executive Committee of the Hapoel HaMizrahi Movement to the Eighth Conference*, Tel-Aviv, 1942, p. 125.

[68] A. Bein, *Immigration and Settlement in the State of Israel* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1982, p. 269.

[69] For details, see Oren, op. cit. in Note 4.

[70] For details, see M. J. Cohen, *Palestine, Retreat from the Mandate: The Making of British Policy 1936–1945*, London, 1978; and N. Katzburg, *From Partition to White Paper — British Policy in Palestine 1936–1940* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1974.

[71] Palestine Partition Commission, op. cit. in Note 2, pp. 73–80 and 111–15 (the quotation is from p. 113). See also Katzburg, op. cit. in Note 70, pp. 55–56.

[72] Katzburg, op. cit. in Note 70, pp. 35–44 and 55–56.

[73] On the down-scaling of Zionist demands for alterations as a result of taking British interests into account, see for example Ben-Gurion, op. cit. in Note 12, p. 456.

[74] Palestine Royal Commission, op. cit. in Note 1, pp. 73–80, 111–15, 232–81.

[75] This conception was undermined as a result of the peace agreement with Egypt, but broad circles in Israel continue to embrace it. Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip until recent years attests to the longevity of this strategy.

THE IMPACT OF THE GULF CRISIS IN ISRAEL

Mario Sznajder

THE impact of the Gulf crisis was many-sided in Israel. Perhaps its most important effect was to shake some of the basic beliefs of Israeli society and to raise questions concerning political and military strategies which were not only favoured by most of the country's leaders but also enjoyed a high measure of public support. That Gulf War reawakened the deepest and most basic traumas of Israeli society: the Holocaust and the 1947–49 War of Independence.

This paper attempts to analyse the changing pattern of attitudes in different aspects: the discussions on the problems of civilian protection arising from the crisis; the emergency routine measures; and the German connection which reawakened the fears and horrors of the Holocaust. Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, its citizens had to fight several international wars: the War of Independence in 1947–49; the Suez campaign (known in Israel as the Sinai war) in 1956; the Six-Day war in 1967; the Yom Kippur War of 1973; and the Lebanon War in 1982.[1] In each case, there was a latent threat of Arab attacks on the home front. In 1948 and to a lesser degree in 1967, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities were attacked.[2] Israel's small size meant that the State could not rely on defensive tactics, especially after the harsh experiences of the War of Independence. Military planning since the early 1950s was based on an offensive approach.[3] In the case of an attack from neighbours, the Israeli military forces would have to carry the fight beyond the State's borders, into enemy territory. The civilian population had to be protected and the task was made especially difficult because of the proximity of the main population centres to the borders.[4] There was also a long tradition of military reprisals swiftly following enemy action against the Jewish State, especially when such attacks were directed against Israeli civilian targets.[5]

Both the people of Israel and the militant Arab countries were aware of the repercussions of such threats to the security of Jewish civilians: Israeli society depended on the 'offensive ethos' whenever there was a serious danger from Arab nations. Consequently, in such a situation,

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the Defence Forces of Israel could rely without reservations on the solidarity of the country's Jewish citizens, whatever the dissensions between the various segments of the population — whether there was a cleavage between the religious and secular groups, between various ethnic groups, or between low-income households and the affluent ones. On the other hand, at times of open hostility and armed conflict, the internal Arab-Jewish cleavage widened appreciably, since there has been a latent distrust between Arabs and Jews in the country, a distrust which can easily become dangerously paranoiac.[6] However, the War of Lebanon altered the staunch loyalty of the Jewish population to its military leaders at times of war: there was no enduring commitment in 1982 on the part of all Jewish citizens to the offensive ethos. The massacre of Palestinian civilians by the Lebanese Falanges, Israel's allies, at Sabra and Shatila caused a clear rift to emerge and there was much soul-searching and some outright condemnations of that war, *milhemet brerah* — a war of option, not of immediate necessity. During the Gulf crisis, on the other hand, there was no possible option to adopting a defensive stance.[7]

The present article deals mainly with the period of the Gulf crisis, between August 1990 and the beginning of the Gulf War in mid-January 1991. The length of that crisis combined with the restrictions imposed by the international situation and the attitude of the United States led to a reawakening of the traumas of the Holocaust and of the War of Independence so sharp that the social cleavages could not be marginalised.

Defensive measures

From the outset of the Gulf crisis, there was the perceived danger that Iraq might use its chemical arsenal against Israel, and a heated debate ensued about the need to distribute defence kits to all the inhabitants of the country. The command of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the Ministry of Defence argued that premature distribution of such kits would have negative effects: it would cause general panic and it would signal to the Iraqis that Israel was preparing for war. The Minister of Foreign Affairs (David Levy) and senior officials of that Ministry argued that the distribution of the kits would calm the population's anxiety. To which the IDF command countered by assuring the citizens that there were enough kits to supply every single person, but that distribution should not be made before it was urgently necessary, because many kits might easily deteriorate.[8] There were proposals to arrive at a compromise: to have a pilot project to check on the smoothness of the distribution system, for example, or to distribute the gas masks immediately to the areas considered to be most dangerous or susceptible to chemical attack.

The committee of ministers concerned with security affairs met on 22 August 1990 and decided to follow the advice of the IDF and of the Ministry of Defence: that is, not to distribute the anti-gas equipment.[9] But on the same day, probably in order to show that the Israeli government remained in a state of high alert, Prime Minister Shamir asserted in a television interview: 'If the Iraqis dare to attack us, they will pay dearly for it'.[10]

The Jews of Israel remained in a high state of tension and anxiety. The *intifada* (the uprising of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) had lasted two and a half years and its impetus had begun to wane; but now those rebels were given great encouragement by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saddam Hussein's vociferous anti-American and anti-Israeli condemnations and threats. The leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and most of the Arabs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip enthusiastically acclaimed Saddam Hussein as a liberator and indeed as a saviour. They argued that their *intifada* had helped to precipitate the Gulf Crisis and that it must be intensified; these pro-Iraqi demonstrations and declarations increased to such an extent that security measures in those areas were tightened. Meanwhile, the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza found that regular remittances from Palestinians living in Kuwait had abruptly ceased. Moreover, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia were clearly angered by Palestinian ecstatic support for Saddam Hussein — which caused left-wing Palestinians to claim that Saddam Hussein was right to condemn the oligarchies of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States as reactionary exploiters of skilled and unskilled Palestinian workers.[11] The Israeli Jews then contemplated with fearful alarm the possibility of an Iraqi attack coupled with an armed Palestinian rebellion in the West Bank and Gaza. The latter were seen as an Iraqi fifth column within Israeli urban and rural areas and the harsh security measures taken by the government led to the Arab interpretation that great masses of Palestinians would be expelled from the West Bank and Gaza.[12] All this added to the feeling of insecurity and fear which prevailed in August 1990. Israel's political leaders found themselves in an unusual situation: at a time of impending danger, they had to exercise restraint while faced with a determined and powerful enemy; the traditional policy of 'say little, do much' could not be implemented. The argument that the entire world, so to speak, was ready to take on, and fight to the end one of Israel's most implacable enemies, was uneasily accepted so long as the missiles did not actually land in Israel and cause some destruction.

The restraint shown by Israel's leaders during the crisis (and later during the missile attacks) was interpreted by both Arabs and some ultra-nationalistic Jews as exposing the reality of Israel's total dependence on the United States. In October and November 1990,

anti-gas equipment began to be distributed in an orderly manner and the population was instructed about the necessary steps to be taken to be ready for immediate action if a chemical attack was signalled.[13] Some new difficulties arose, but there was no panic once the protective measures had been taken.

The Emergency Routine

On 29 November 1990, the United Nations Security Council authorised the use of all necessary force against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. The United States and its Western and Arab allies were meanwhile massing their military arsenal and their manpower in north-eastern Saudi Arabia.[14]

Within Israel, emergency measures had been set in motion, as noted above. The serious error which had been committed three months earlier, in August, had provided a salutary lesson: a civil defence commander in the course of a television interview had advised that each household should be provided with a fire extinguisher, a first-aid kit, insulating materials, a supply of food for two weeks, and a transistor radio with fresh batteries. A transistor radio was necessary in case of power failure, so that government instructions could be transmitted at all times. This advice was sound, but prematurely given and resulted only in creating panic, because the public had not been sufficiently briefed about the political and military situation. The command of the IDF was greatly angered by the tenor of that civil defence advice and there was immediate press comment on the matter.[15] Expert opinion was cited to the effect that authoritative information should be promptly supplied to calm the fears of the public;[16] but the government did not follow that strategy, perhaps because it was feared that such a step would be interpreted by the population of the State and by other countries as an obvious prelude to an Israeli military attack on Iraq. A press war broke out instead, with conflicting views of various political and military analysts aired in the mass media. Finally, as the end of the period specified by the United Nations ultimatum approached, tourism declined and civilian preparations against a potential Iraqi attack increased.

By the end of December 1990 the distribution of the kits to civilian households was almost completed. The daily newspaper *Ha-aretz* had warned during the panic of the previous August that although there were enough kits for all the citizens of Israel (Jews, Muslims, and Christians) and for foreign residents, there was not enough provision for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza.[17] The Supreme Court ruled that under international law those Palestinians must be provided with the necessary protection; and distribution of kits was accordingly started in the occupied territories. Then there was the problem faced by

orthodox Jews who were bearded and refused to shave; they were provided eventually with a special type of gas mask to be fitted well over their bearded faces. Such masks had been specially designed for small children and people suffering from asthma.[18] There were hundreds of thousands of strictly orthodox men but not yet a sufficient number of special masks to accommodate them all, and a public discussion ensued about priority lists. The matter was also raised in the Knesset and both parliamentary and press debates on the issue clearly reflected the religious-secular cleavage in the country.

During the Gulf crisis, Israeli citizens had to learn to adjust to the novel situation that during a time of grave danger to the security of the State and of all citizens, the burden could not be carried entirely by the defence forces: there was now a home front. In 1956, Ben-Gurion had been particularly concerned about a weak home front and had succeeded in obtaining French naval and air force protection for the civilian sector during the Suez War.[19] More than three decades later, Israel was placed in a situation which did not allow for its military forces to take the initiative and attack the potential enemy before the civilian population could suffer the dire effects of an Iraqi onslaught. The home front had to learn to defend itself in its own territory and it was expected that the offensive ethos would predominate and that there would be a show of solidarity, especially on the part of politicians and parliamentarians.

But when the problem of gas masks for bearded strictly orthodox men arose, there was open resentment expressed by the secular majority of the public about the decision to give such men masks which had been intended only for children and for asthmatics. On the other hand, the ultra-orthodox groups argued that they constituted a large minority because of their non-Zionist and anti-secular positions — and as such, their special status and rights must be recognized within the framework of the Israeli democracy.

On 16 January 1991, a few hours before the onset of the Gulf War, the gas-masks issue was raised in the Knesset. Moshe Zeev Feldman, a member of the orthodox non-Zionist political party Agudat Israel, asked that the question of masks for bearded men be placed formally on the agenda. He went on to remind his parliamentary colleagues that the fate of Israel was in the hands of the Almighty, who would surely listen to the prayers of his believing people. Prayer was the road to salvation. He claimed that two days earlier, on 14 January, about 100,000 persons had assembled to pray at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem; the claim was rebutted by Emanuel Sizman, a member of the Labour Party, who commented that according to police sources, there had been only 60,000, not 100,000. But Mr Feldman had persisted and proudly stated that while secular educational establishments had been closed because of the danger of Iraqi attacks, the students of the Torah had continued

their religious education and had prayed with renewed vigour and as a consequence, the kingdom of evil would vanish into smoke and the wicked government of Saddam Hussein would be wiped out of the earth.[20] Feldman then passionately rebutted what he called the slander and false accusations made by the mass media, to the effect that thousands of rabbinical students had left the country before the expiry of the United Nations ultimatum. Rabbinical leaders had instructed their adherents not to leave Israel and the small number of yeshiva students who had deserted was smaller than those who had come to live in the kibbutzim and who had in fact left the country even earlier. Since kibbutzim are largely associated with the Labour movement, a member of the Labour party, Shevach Weiss, replied that those who had left the kibbutzim were foreign volunteers and were neither Israeli nor Jewish; Mr Sizman added for good measure that no kibbutz member had been known to have left the country.

Mr Feldman claimed that he had made representations about the issue of gas masks on seventeen occasions to the military authorities and to the Ministry of Defence, but had received no answer from them and he was now obliged to raise the matter as a question of urgency. The problem had been known since the previous August but now in January the issue had still been kept in abeyance. A truly believing and devout Jew would not shave his beard under any circumstances and it was well known that some had perished in the Holocaust because they would not shave the beards which readily identified them as Jews. Mr Feldman had been outraged, he added, when he learnt that an old man had approached a Civil Defence officer only two days earlier to ask what precautions he should take and that the officer had replied callously, 'Shave your beard'. That was a stupid and wicked answer and Mr Feldman himself had not received proper advice when he had approached the Ministry of Defence.[21] For the government, the Minister of Police, Mr Roni Milo, replied to these charges, explaining in some detail the problems involved in supplying hundreds of thousands of masks not only for othodox Jews but for other bearded men who were Christians or Muslims. The cost of such masks was enormous, and not sufficient provision had been made because the extent of the demand had not been known at the outset of the crisis.[22]

The German Connection

When it became known that Germany had supplied Iraq with the materials needed to manufacture chemical weapons, there was a high degree of political and social consensus in Israel, with the reawakening of the traumas of the Holocaust. Michael Bar Zohar (Labour) pointed out in the Knesset that a report published by the United States government cited about 550 firms in some 59 countries which were

breaking the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, forbidding trade with Iraq. The largest group was Jordanian, which was not surprising; but about 100 firms, which constituted the second largest group, were German and some of them were still supplying spare parts and material to Iraqi chemical warfare factories. The most prominent was the Karl Kolb Company of Essen.[23] The members of the Knesset were naturally aware that Iraq had continued to receive through various intermediaries substantial amounts of military hardware, but the fact that Germans were contributing on a large scale to the production of Iraqi non-conventional weapons touched a raw nerve, both in parliament and throughout the country. Moreover, it was asserted that Germans were not only providing Iraq with the capacity to produce various types of highly lethal gases — poison and nerve agents such as Sarin and Tabun — but also the means to deliver them efficiently with the help of German technology. Furthermore, the Scud missiles which had been obtained from the Soviet Union were not as effective as the new models developed in Iraq with German assistance. The Jews who had survived the Second Word War and their children were now in peril as a result of the combined efforts of two old enemies: Germans and Arabs.

The firm of I. G. Farben had also supplied Iraq; it was this firm which several decades earlier had invented and produced the Zyklon B gas which had been used to kill millions of Jews in the gas chambers; that same firm had also produced Tabun, a nerve gas, and had provided Iraq with the technology to manufacture it.[24] Israeli Jews were aghast and outraged that the democratic government of Germany, as well as many other countries, could allow (and indeed help in) the production of deadly poisons of the kind which had murdered millions of Jews within living memory. Mr Bar-Zohar commented bitterly that there was something monstrous and grotesque in the fact that several decades after Auschwitz, Germany was again an element in the same satanic formula: Jews — Germans — gases.[25] It was impossible for him to comprehend that although there were so many pro-peace movements in Germany — whether green, red, or yellow — none had led demonstrations against the merchants of death in their own country. West Germany had been engaged in attempting to teach the former East Germans the values of democracy and freedom — while turning a blind eye to the stream of bacteria, poisons, and deadly agents flowing from its land into the Middle East.[26]

Israel had been established as an independent state after millions of Jews had been deliberately killed by a powerful enemy venting its destructive hatred against a scattered and defenceless people. But now there was a Zionist State which was ready to fight for its survival and the offensive ethos reappeared, emerging from the depth of bitter anti-German feeling and the legacy of the Holocaust. A journalist in

October 1990 stated in an article in a daily newspaper that he had not survived the extermination camp of Auschwitz and the gas chambers of Birkenau in order that, about 45 years later, he should carry in an independent Jewish State an anti-gas kit, to protect himself against a gas which the Germans again had developed and produced.[27]

Some Israeli Jews disagreed with this stance. They argued that when one faced mortal danger, as in the Holocaust, one should try to run away from it: that would be a logical reaction. The implication was that the Zionist leaders had not taken the proper steps to prevent the destruction of European Jewry during the Holocaust and now the Israeli government would not have the means to prevent the destruction of its citizens. According to them, German technology, Iraqi hatred of Israel, and the present policy of Israel to keep a low profile during the Gulf crisis combined to presage the obliteration of the Jewish population of the country. There were memories of the days immediately preceding the Six-Day War of 1967, when many feared that Egypt would use the poison gas it had employed in Yemen, as well as the missiles it had developed; both the gas and the missiles had been produced with the aid of German scientists and technicians.[28]

Israelis demonstrated in front of the embassy of the recently united Germany in Tel Aviv. Large groups of young Israelis and Diaspora Jews went on the 'March for Life' to the site of the extermination camps in Europe and paid for a large advertisement in *Yediot Aharonot*, which read:[29]

1941: Zyklon B — Gas for the extermination of Jews
1991: Nerve Gas — Gas for the extermination of Jews
To the Government of the United Germany
ENOUGH!
No to the German marks you have brought us!
Enough of the Gas you have produced and sold!
Immediately put on trial the new war criminals
you have created!
LET US LIVE IN THIS COUNTRY

There were debates about the extent and depth of the German historical memory and of the moral obligations towards Israel; Germans were accused of condoning criminal behaviour. Newspaper articles commented that Germany's present legal system, designed to prevent a recurrence of Nazism, had ensured liberties not available under totalitarian regimes; but in effect that legal system allowed the arms traffic to Iraq to prosper: the legal loophole was exploited by all those who were concerned more with Germany's trade balance than with moral rectitude.[30]

The German Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Israel during the Gulf war and was met by protesters in Ramat Gan and Jerusalem. One anti-German banner (in English) read:[31] 'The real linkage: Hitler

1945, Saddam 1991'. The German minister had come to show solidarity with Israel and he immediately offered 250 million German marks as 'humanitarian aid', then batteries for Patriot missiles, and political support. Later, Germany's financial contribution was increased in order to help Israel to rebuild the sites destroyed by the missiles. That led to renewed discussions in Israel about the legal and moral implications of accepting German money as reparation for what was perceived to have been damage partially caused by German co-operation with Iraq in the production of equipment used to attack Israel.[32]

Conclusion

The Gulf crisis caused Israelis to confront a novel situation: the home front would now be the arena of war if the threatened Iraqi attacks on the country's cities took place. The system of civil defence was questioned and the protective measures proposed did not find universal approbation. Instead of Israeli civilians relying on the Defence Forces to defend them, as in the past wars and crises, it was now individual citizens and families who had to ensure their own survival.[33] International pressures precluded the usual offensive option and the usual closing of ranks of the civilian population in support of the Defence Forces did not take place under these new conditions of crisis: social cleavages emerged clearly.

Acknowledgement

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NOTES

[1] There was also a war of attrition between Israel and Egypt from 1968 to 1970.

[2] Tel Aviv was repeatedly bombarded during the War of Independence by the Egyptian Air Force: 42 people died in the attack of 18 May 1948. See Netaniel Lorch, *The War of Independence* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1966, pp. 262 f. and Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, London, 1975, pp. 32–33, 67, and 260–62.

[3] Nevertheless, an extensive network of shelters was designed to protect the civilian population: see Zvi Lanir and Zur Shapira, 'Analysis of Decisions Concerning the Defense of Rear Areas in Israel: A Case Study', in Zvi Lanir, ed., *Israeli Security Planning in the 1980s*, New York, 1984. The authors of this article argue that it was considered politically desirable to provide shelters; moreover, those who built homes in residential areas were required by law to provide shelters for each household: ibid, pp. 191–95 and 197.

[4] See Luttwak and Horowitz, op. cit. in Note 2 above, p. 91. See also Dan Horowitz, 'Israel's Concept of Defensible Borders', *Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems*, no. 16, 1975, pp. 6–8. Horowitz discusses skilled manpower in the context of the offensive ethos.

[5] Luttwak and Horowitz, op. cit. in Note 2 above, pp. 106–10.

[6] Baruch Kimmerling, *Social Interruption and Besieged Societies (The Case of Israel)*, Buffalo, New York, 1975, pp. 25–26. Kimmerling depicts Israel as a besieged society in which periods of military crisis constitute social interruptions, and states that many of the characteristics of these interruptions provide principal aspects of the offensive ethos. Kimmerling enlarged on this theme in his book: *The Interrupted System. Israeli Civilians in War and Routine Times*, New Brunswick and Oxford, 1985; pp. 174–76 deal with the uneasy relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minorities in the Israeli sphere of control.

[7] See Baruch Kimmerling, 'Militarism in Israel', *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. 4, 1993, p. 218.

[8] See Zeev Schiff, 'When are the anti-gas masks to be distributed?' (Hebrew) in the front page of the daily *Ha-aretz* of 20 August 1990, and an item in the same newspaper, p. 2 of 16 August 1990, 'If the defence kits against chemical warfare are immediately distributed, they may become damaged'.

[9] See the item on the front page of *Ha-aretz* of 22 August 1990 about ministerial decisions concerning the distribution of gas masks.

[10] See page 2 of *Ha-aretz* of 23 August 1990.

[11] See the paper by Menachem Klein on the PLO and the *Intifada* subtitled 'Between Euphoria and Despair' (Hebrew), a publication of the Moshe Dayan Studies Center for the Middle East and Africa, Tel Aviv University, 1991, p. 36. Klein argues that the PLO had believed that, with the help of Iraq, Israel's military superiority could be neutralized. For the economic problems of the Palestinian Arabs, see the report by Zeev Schiff on the front page of *Ha-aretz* of 28 August 1990; he noted that many Palestinians were paid in Kuwaiti dinars and held their savings in that currency — which was reduced in value by 75 per cent after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent economic sanctions.

[12] *Ha-aretz* of 14 August 1990 stated on its front page that the Defence Forces were instructed to disperse the demonstrations in support of Saddam Hussein.

[13] See 'Israel and the Gulf Crisis', *The Jerusalem Report*, 3 January 1991, p. 10.

[14] Ibid.

[15] See the front page of *Ha-aretz* of 24 August 1990.

[16] See 'Today's talk with Professor Michael Inbar', *Ha-aretz*, 24 August 1990, p. 2.

[17] See the front page of *Ha-aretz* 12 August 1990. Gad Barzilai has commented that most Israeli Arabs lived in rural areas and both the Arab and the Jewish rural populations were not in as great a danger as the inhabitants of large cities and towns, according to the authorities: *A Democracy at War: Conflict and Consensus in Israel* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1992, p. 281.

[18] That kind of mask used a battery-operated mechanism which brought fresh filtered air into a sealed plastic bag around the head of the user.

[19] Luttwak and Horowitz, op. cit. in Note 2 above, pp. 125, 143, 199, and 297.

[20] See 'Preparation of Gas Masks for Bearded Persons and Others' (Hebrew) in the parliamentary record, *Divrei Ha-Knesset*, Yud Dalet (14), of 14–16 of January 1991, p. 1790.

[21] Ibid., p. 1791.
[22] Ibid., p. 1792.
[23] 'Supply of Materials for the Production of Chemical Weapons from Germany to Iraq', *Divrei Ha-Knesset*, pp. 1793–94.
[24] Ibid. The Reagan Administration had a harsh exchange with the then Chancellor of West Germany in 1981, which resulted in I. G. Farben ceasing to supply a large amount of material to the Iraqi who later was to become the general in charge of Iraq's military industries.
[25] See Note 20 above, p. 1794.
[26] Ibid., p. 1795.
[27] See Noach Klinger's article entitled 'Lama Lo?' (Why not?) in the daily *Yediot Aharonot* of 7 October 1990, p. 20.
[28] Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million. The Israelis and the Holocaust* (Hebrew), 2nd edition, Jerusalem, 1991, p. 475. By a very odd coincidence, the decision to distribute the anti-gas equipment to the population of Israel was published on 2 October 1990, the very same day on which the reunification of Germany took place: see the headlines on the front page of *Yediot Aharonot* of that day.
[29] See *Yediot Aharonot* of 29 January 1991, p. 11.
[30] Herbert Krosney, 'How German justice helped Saddam' in *The Jerusalem Report* of 7 February 1991, p. 3.
[31] Leslie Susser, 'German Shame, Again' in ibid. p. 11.
[32] See the report by Gideon Alon, 'Talk of the Day with Dr Joseph Burg' in *Ha-aretz* of 15 March 1991, p. 2.
[33] See Baruch Kimmerling, 'A Rearguard War over External and Internal Hegemony' (Hebrew) in *Politica*, no. 37, March 1991, p. 17. Kimmerling stresses the need to define the distinction between a crisis leading to war and a war situation.

ANGLO-JEWS: THEIR CHRONICLERS AND HISTORIANS

Max Beloff

(Review Article)

DAVID S. KATZ, *The Jews in the History of England 1485–1850*, xv + 447 pp., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, £40.00.

DAVID CESARANI, *The* Jewish Chronicle *and Anglo-Jewry 1841–1991*, xiv + 329 pp., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, £40.00 or $59.50.

'THE history of Anglo-Jewry has always been more teleological than most' (p. 323). By this, David Katz, professor of English history at the University of Tel Aviv, means that its story from the 'readmission' under Cromwell to the middle of the last century has always been told in terms that look forward to the ultimate goal of full 'emancipation'. That goal was signalised in the traditional view by the admission of Lionel de Rothschild to the House of Commons in 1858 — two centuries of progress, marked by occasional setbacks such as the uproar over the 'Jew Bill' of 1753 but basically a testimony to the perseverance of the community itself.

Since the first historians of Anglo-Jewry were to be found among the descendants of those who were 'readmitted' in the seventeenth century, and since the community was so small (a few hundred during the Restoration of the monarchy; some ten thousand in the middle of the eighteenth century with, for the first time, organized communities outside the metropolis; and a mere thirty-five thousand in the year that Lionel de Rothschild took his seat); and since its dominant Sephardi element was highly literate as well as highly disputatious, producing an almost endless store of archives, it is not surprising that the works of these historians were inwardly focused and often strayed into mere antiquarianism or genealogy: their subjects were all cousins, after all.

Professor Katz now argues, as the title of his book makes clear, that it is easier to fulfil the historian's proper role of discovering both what actually happened and what people at the time felt they were doing and

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hoped to achieve, if the Jewish record is placed in the context of the history of the wider English society into which the Jews wished somehow to be fitted, without sacrificing what we now refer to as their 'identity'. We can see without much difficulty why Jews wished to reverse their medieval expulsion, but why was the English state prepared to let them do so? What were the attitudes towards the Jews both of the political class, itself subject to enlargement, and of the general population? How does literature help to answer this question — Shylock, yes and Fagin, yes; but what of other writers and other theatrical presentations?

How did foreign visitors to England see the Jews and their situation? To answer these and similar questions, Professor Katz brings a wealth of learning — Jewish, Christian, and secular — and an enviable ability both to analyse a problem and to tell a story when this is relevant to his argument. It is a work of rare quality.

It takes the author two chapters and more than a hundred pages to get to Menasseh ben Israel and 'readmission'. The first chapter deals with Henry VIII's efforts to find Jewish scholars on the continent prepared to rule about the discrepancies in Jewish biblical and post-biblical teaching on marriage to a brother's widow, in a way which would permit the King to put aside Catherine of Aragon and marry Ann Boleyn. At a time when only a tiny number of Marranos (outward converts to Christianity who practised secretly some of the main Jewish religious observances) can be traced in England, and when both the Christian and the Jewish worlds were deeply divided, Henry's reception of a Jewish convert in the interests of his 'divorce' remains an oddity — Defender of the Faith indeed! Jewish scholarship could be held to be more important than Jewish 'infidelity'.

Next to scholarship, what gave Jews prominence was their real or assumed expertise in the field of medicine; and so it was that a number of Marranos were caught up in the conspiracy against Queen Elizabeth in the 1590s, with its complicated international repercussions in Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Turkey — Constantinople being in the sixteenth century the only capital city where Jews as such played an important role.

What this prelude does is to emphasize Professor Katz's two main departure points for his basic concern: the importance of the existing Marrano community in London at the time of Menasseh ben Israel's petition and the degree to which religious issues were uppermost in the minds of those Englishmen who either disapproved of or favoured a Jewish presence. Since millenarian longings were present both in the seventeenth century and in the decades after the French Revolution, the conversion of the Jews was thought to be of major significance, and one of the hopes (sometimes expressed, sometimes tacit) of those who upheld their right to settle in England was that contact with the native

population would turn them into good Protestants. It was not commercial pressures which spoke in favour of 'readmission' — indeed, at most times, English businessmen worried more about Jewish competition than they hoped to gain from their dealings with Jews — but arguments derived from religion.

So far from Menasseh ben Israel's mission having been a success, his basic plea was rejected. There was no full-scale acceptance of an equality of rights for Jews, as was later on to be found in the legislation of some of the 'enlightened despots' and of the French Revolution and Napoleon. What happened was quite different: an acceptance of the casting off by the existing Marrano community of its Christian disguise and of the right of its members to practise, without impediment by the authorities, its true religion. The process of legitimisation continued in the Restoration period, not without some crises, and was enhanced by the Glorious Revolution, when Jewish entrepreneurs acted as providers for the armies of William III in the Irish campaign, and subsequently, on the continent.

What we have for the next 150 years is not the expectation of total emancipation but a working for the alleviation of the considerable degree of discrimination which still existed. Jews could not own land: how then could they provide burial grounds? Jews could not serve in parish offices because of the oaths demanded: how were they to avoid penal fines if chosen? Bit by bit, a relationship was worked out which enabled Jews to pursue their personal and financial goals and even to profit by the curiosities of the English legal system. The first use made by a Jewish litigant of that system was the submission of a matrimonial dispute to the Archbishop of Canterbury's Court of Arches. Henry VIII's tactics in reverse. Yet as late as 1818, it was possible in respect of another Jewish plea — this time on a charity issue — for the Lord Chancellor, Eldon, to urge the judges to recollect that 'Christianity is part of the law of England' (p. 365).

Charity was an important topic, since part of the story of the Jewish community in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is its economic differentiation. Many of the leaders of the Sephardim became rich men and in that capacity could find a way into genteel and even, up to a point, royal society. Money speaks. It was possible for that section of Anglo-Jewry to act benevolently towards its less fortunate members and even to assist its co-religionists abroad, as far afield as Jerusalem. Contact with government could also secure British intercession with foreign governments to limit the latter's anti-Jewish measures.

On the other hand, the Ashkenazi community which came into being later was for the most part poor and confined to less lucrative pursuits. One consequence of this, to which Professor Katz attributes much importance because of its impact upon the public perception, was the association of Jews with crime, particularly as receivers of stolen goods,

where the border-line with peddling was notoriously difficult to draw. In an age when crimes against property were treated with great harshness and when crime of all kinds received much attention, such Jews as were incriminated clearly did their community more harm than the often rather conspicuous style of life of their more fortunate brethren. It is not surprising that the leaders of Victorian Jewry should attach so much importance to respectability and use its resources for educational and charitable institutions to give their co-religionists the wherewithal to attain it. But as Professor Katz points out, that is another story, since the 1850s not only witnessed the accomplishment of 'emancipation', but also the beginning of new waves of Jewish immigration, large enough to multiply by ten the numbers of Jews in the country who were nevertheless largely dependent for their internal affairs and relations with the authorities on the legacy of the previous period.

The changes in the composition of the Jewish community were marked also by changes in its outlook and in the distribution of its energies; the input from Germany was in this respect particularly important. The community became more self-conscious and inquiring.

In a leading article on 13 November 1846, the *Jewish Chronicle* observed that 'the cultivation of literature and science has not, to the present day, been the favourite pursuit of English Jews' (p. 23). It is hardly an observation that would ring true a century and a half later; and one branch of literature which now flourishes is the history of the 'English Jews' themselves. To that history, Dr Cesarani's book, like the volume by Professor Katz, makes a notable contribution. The *Jewish Chronicle* — sometimes in a monopoly position and sometimes leading all competitors both in the English language and for a brief period in Yiddish — has performed a unique role as a mirror of the Jewish community in the United Kingdom and as its mentor on controversial issues, both within the community itself and in its relationship with the Christian majority in the wider British society as well as with respect to the Jewish people in other parts of the world, and since 1948, the State of Israel. No reader of this absorbing and carefully-crafted book could fail to agree with Dr Cesarani's contention that it is 'almost impossible to understand the emergence of a modern Jewish identity in Britain without appreciating the paper's contribution' (p. 248).

The author's achievement is all the more remarkable in that the paper's own archives were wholly destroyed during the German blitz in the Second World War, so while its views can be ascertained from its own columns, what lay behind them in terms of the influence of successive proprietors and interventions from Jewish authorities (religious and secular) is not so easy to determine. To some extent, the gaps are made up for by recourse to other archives both in Britain and in Israel, and for the more recent period by oral evidence. Nevertheless,

this is the history of a newspaper, not of a community; Dr Cesarani is well aware that newspapers, even if an occasional subsidy is forthcoming, have to pay their way and he shows himself well acquainted with the impact of new developments in the technique of printing, the development of communications, and above all of the impact of advertising upon the fortunes of the paper. Indeed, he notes that advertising itself can provide a clue to the wider theme, observing for instance that 'from 1900 onwards the amount of advertising for kosher foodstuffs grew enormously' (p. 108) — showing the impact of the greater orthodoxy of the immigrants who came during the early decades of this century, just as later advertising reflects Anglo-Jewry's growing embourgeoisement, with all its social and political consequences.

It has also been possible to demonstrate, despite the gaps in the records, that although the first impetus to creating a journal of this kind came from observing similar ventures on the continent, notably in Germany, its later handling was typical of what has been a feature of the history of Anglo-Jewry: the importance of close family relationships (not unknown, of course, in the general newspaper world) so that a comparatively small number of families were involved in the control and production of the paper. Its history is in part dynastic: between 1907 and 1931, the paper was dominated by Leopold Greenberg; from 1937 to 1946, it was edited by his son Ivan. The importance in later years of Leopold Kessler and his son David was hardly less remarkable.

The Greenbergs are particularly significant, since it fell to the *Jewish Chronicle* to inform and instruct Anglo-Jewry on the fortunes of the Zionist movement, the situation of the *Yishuv* (the Jewish settlement in Palestine), and after their time, the State of Israel.

The account of how this was done has of necessity two sides to it. On the one hand, there was the question of how far the Jewish community and its leadership should criticise British policy when it ran counter to what the paper saw as the Jewish interest, and this in turn dovetails with the problem of dealing with British immigration policy, policy towards Nazi Germany, the handling of the Holocaust, and anti-semitism in Britain itself. While Jewish leaders as represented by the Board of Deputies were in favour of the traditionally low profile, Leopold Greenberg was for a more outspoken attitude. On the other hand, there were the internal problems of the Zionist movement where both Greenbergs were of the Herzlian 'political' school — in the younger Greenberg's case, to the extent of espousing Zionist revisionism. The result was that under both editors, the *Jewish Chronicle* was unrelentingly hostile 'towards Chaim Weizmann, and his stewardship of the Zionist Organisation. While the paper was the strongest advocate of Zionism in Britain and throughout the world, it was also one of the most painful thorns in the side of the Zionist leadership' (p. 251).

One result of the attitudes taken up by the *Jewish Chronicle* after the allocation of the Mandate to Britain was that Anglo-Jewry did not have 'any notion that the Palestinian Arabs had a case, even if it was an inferior one' (p. 129). On the other hand, from the Six-Day War of 1967 onwards, the *Jewish Chronicle* has tended to take a doveish rather than a hawkish position where Israel's policies are concerned. But this position also has had its complicating factors, arising from the impact during those years of renewed antisemitism in England itself. Many of the younger generation of Jewish intellectuals whom the paper wished to bring into its orbit were sympathetic to the Left in British politics because they saw it as the major bastion against such anti-Jewish prejudice. On the other hand, in part because of the influence on the campus of Palestinian and other Arab students, the Left was strongly anti-Israel and thus at odds with the paper's commitment to the defence of the Jewish State.

The book does not omit non-political aspects of Jewish affairs as illuminated in the *Jewish Chronicle*: notably, in the nineteenth century, its concentration on religious matters, even to the extent of long investigations of Christian theology as well as Jewish apologetics. Conversion remained a perpetual source of worry. Within Jewry itself, there was the fight of the Orthodox to counter Reform, and later Liberal, Judaism and their representation in the official organs of the community. Controversies over the role of the Chief Rabbinate and candidates for that office, as well as the long-running Rabbi Louis Jacobs affair of the 1960s, and the question of the status of the new Jewish fundamentalism of the Lubavitcher variety also occupied the paper and its correspondence columns. To all these issues, Dr Cesarani is a fully-qualified guide.

Even the best scholars can fall into errors; I have found only one. In dealing with the antisemitism fuelled by the Marconi scandals of 1912–13, the author refers to Hilaire 'Belloc's journal, *New Witness*' and to 'G. K. Chesterton, the editor' (p. 110). But Belloc's journal was called the *Eye-Witness* and when he gave it up after a year and it took on the title of *New Witness* in 1912, the editor was not G. K. Chesterton but his disreputable younger brother, Cecil Chesterton, a very different figure. Leopold Greenberg could not have made that mistake.

JUDAISM AND MODERNITY: THE WHOLE AGENDA

Norman Solomon

THIS ESSAY was stimulated by a reading of Gillian Rose's *Judaism and Modernity*,[1] It embeds a review of that book within a sketch of what I conceive as the agenda to be addressed by any Jewish thinker who wishes to assess or merely to reinterpret Judaism at the present time. I begin with a survey of two major issues in philosophical ethics, the second of which is Rose's primary focus. Towards the end, I briefly outline the broader agenda.

Morals, Law and Reason

We live in a new Age of Unreason. Not entirely, of course. Large swathes of our lives are governed by rationalities of one sort or another. Our dependence on technology, from transport and communication to medicine and to household appliances, restrains us from outright abandonment of the rationality of empirical science. Even the social sciences presuppose some underlying rationality in our interpretation of history and human behaviour.

But as against this, many people have in recent years questioned the ability of reason to provide certainties, particularly in moral and ethical questions. If philosophers abandon reason, rather than trouble to refine it, they may accept by default notions which run counter to reason; such notions commonly arise from religious claims to revelation, or through a self-defeating liberalism which lapses into 'dogmas of correctness' unrestrained by conventional rationality. Ordinary people discover that scientists, historians, and other professionals candidly admit to the inability to offer them a coherent and comprehensive account of the 'meaning of life', so they turn elsewhere, often to fundamentalist forms of religion, oblivious to the critiques levelled against such religion in times gone by. By preferring a spurious claim of certainty over a frank admission of doubt, they become vulnerable to cultism and superstition, to astrology and New Ageism, to alternative 'life-styles' and forms of healing. Most people spend much of their lives evading decisions as to what to do. The handiest places of refuge for

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those who cannot make up their own minds are the ready-made religions and political programmes, the more demanding the better; the more the leader or the system demands, the less is left to the agonizing decision-making of the individual. That is why fundamentalism attracts more adherents than does 'moderate' religion.

The perceived lack of moral consensus leads many to believe that we are in the midst of a collective moral crisis and that there is no rational way out. This alleged moral crisis has twin roots in the intellectual history of Europe:

1. Since Hume exposed the lack of a logical connection between what *is* and what *ought* to be, philosophers have been unable to provide an agreed rationale for moral behaviour. This inability has been exacerbated by the erosion of belief in divinely-revealed codes of behaviour.

2. Events including the Holocaust have focused attention on the failure of society to sustain high ethical standards in public institutions. As people have lost faith in government and authority, which they wrongly identify as the sources of order and rationality, they have lost faith in reason itself.

These themes will now be explored.

Fact and value: 'is' and 'ought'

David Hume formulated clearly the separation between moral and other types of discourse, the essential distinction between fact and value. Hume was concerned with what G. E. Moore[2] was later to call the 'naturalistic fallacy', the idea that ethics can be derived from some fact or group of facts in the material world, some aspects of nature:[3]

> In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulation of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought*, or *ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

Philosophers have tried numerous ways to 'reduce' ethics to something else, latterly even to feelings and emotions; but even this leaves a distinction between those feelings or emotions which are 'moral' and those which are not. Theonomous ethics is another form of the

'naturalistic fallacy', for it leaves open the old problem; even if it could be known that God had commanded something, is it right only contingently, *because* God commanded it, or was it intrinsically right all along irrespective of God's command? Any attempt to evade this dilemma by defining God as the source or basis of morality simply shifts the dilemma to the nature of God: if God is merely the source of morality how are we to identify him with God the Creator of the physical universe?

Amongst philosophers who have recently tried to 'rescue' ethics from its divorce from the 'real' world is Alisdair MacIntyre.[4] MacIntyre is particularly bothered by the inability of 'modern' moral philosophers to reach consensus on moral issues,[5] and attributes this in large part to the detachment of ethics from its social and historical roots in the pre-modern era, when the virtues found meaning within a comprehensive, teleological understanding of man, from which flowed a 'rational' system of virtues. As MacIntyre rightly observes, Hume's separation between 'is' and 'ought' (or rather, the intellectual movement of which it is a sharp expression) spawned the Enlightenment project of 'justifying', or at least accounting for, morals, as seen in a range of philosophers from Kant to the utilitarians to various brands of intuitionism and relativism.

MacIntyre somewhat alarmingly rejects the post-Enlightenment assumption that morality can be built on some doctrine of human rights — or rather, he admits that morality can be built on human rights, but rejects the assumption that there are such rights. In his radical rejection of the liberalism so ardently championed by von Hayek[6] as well as by John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, and Isaiah Berlin, MacIntyre abandons authentic moral insights of the Enlightenment, such as the appreciation of the individual as a morally autonomous being who is not merely a cog within the wheel of society.

In a striking sentence (p. 111), MacIntyre informs us:

> If the deontological character of moral judgements is the ghost of conceptions of the divine law which are quite alien to the metaphysics of modernity and if the teleological character is similarly the ghost of conceptions of human nature and activity which are equally not at home in the modern world, we should expect the problems of understanding and of assigning an intelligible status to moral judgements both continually to arise and as continually to prove inhospitable to philosophical solutions.

From the protasis of this sentence we see that MacIntyre has freed himself from the 'post-enlightenment project of justifying morals' at the price of a total rejection of self-contained moral discourse. It is not that he thinks that moral principles (such as the value of the individual, or the goodness of benevolence) can be 'explained' in natural terms. He

denies that there are such independent principles, and holds that people who assert them are simply echoing concepts of virtue which were meaningful within the ontology of some earlier society.

'Ontology' undoubtedly influences ethical judgements, today as well as in the past.[7] Today's 'ontology' — the scientific account of human nature and origins and of the development of societies and religions — inclines us to the abolition of slavery, the condemnation of racism, and the equality of the sexes. It remains meaningful to pose the question, 'Granted that people were enslaved by the unjust use of force, and not because of personal deficiency or inferiority, is there a moral duty to abolish slavery?'. The retort to that question could be that there are no moral duties, or that it is right to oppress the weak; the mere *description* of the world, as Hume stressed, cannot *logically entail* moral principles. Nevertheless, our moral principles are *in fact* formed in the light of the way we perceive the world about us.

MacIntyre proceeds through three stages in his account of virtues.[8] They are (i) qualities necessary to achieve the goods internal to practices, (ii) they contribute to the good of a whole life, and (iii) they relate to the pursuit of a general human good elaborated and possessed within an ongoing social tradition. All these stages are dependent on the last, the idea of the 'general human good' which flows from the nature, purpose, or 'final cause' of man. But precisely this teleological notion fails within the Darwinian account of human origins. That is why we are tossed between the Scylla of relativism and the Charybdis of moral absolutism. When MacIntyre, in his final peroration, calls for 'a new St. Benedict', he appears to seek the recovery of a medieval, or even older, ontology, simply because this would provide a *telos* for human beings which could be the foundation of a rational system of virtues. But what sort of Platonic 'noble lie' would this be, seeing that we have definitively abandoned the medieval Aristotelian cosmology, with its four types of 'cause'?[9] There really is no refuge in a now discredited teleological anthropology. We cannot escape the need to develop some sort of value system based on contemporary, *non*-teleological ontology; the 'dentological' nature of such a system would be a simple consequence of the nature of moral thought.

The most insidious of MacIntrye's demands is his call for 'the construction of local forces of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us' (p. 263). What he so conspicuously fails to provide is the agreed ontology which alone could support such communities. We cannot argue backwards and say, because a particular type of virtue ('family values', for instance) appeals, that we must adopt an account of the universe which supports that virtue. If the universe doesn't happen to be like that, then we must develop a programme of virtues that *does* correspond with what the world is like.

Morality, Ethics, and Law

The second issue to have undermined confidence in reason is the failure of society to sustain high ethical standards in public institutions. How can government or professional bodies escape corruption? Hegel distinguished between private morality (*Moralität*) and public ethics (*Sittlichkeit*); the state, as manifestation of the general will, affords through its laws the highest expression of the ethical spirit and the fullest rationality. (Though I reject Hegel's analysis of the relationship between morals, ethics and law, I must assume it for the purposes of the argument.) Yet we have seen repeatedly that the state has itself become the instrument of repression and evil has been institutionalized. Law and morals have been 'dirempted' — sundered apart. Some philosophers think this is necessarily so; that, as Gillian Rose put it, it is '. . . the very opposition between morality and legality — between inner, autonomous 'experience' and outer, heteronomous institutions — that depraves us'.[10]

Jürgen Habermas expresses the impulse which led him to the Frankfurt School:[11]

> At the age of 15 or 16, I sat before the radio and experienced what was being discussed before the Nuremberg Tribunal; when others, instead of being struck silent by the ghastliness, began to dispute the justice of the trial, procedural questions, and questions of jurisdiction, there was that first rupture, which still gapes . . .

Theodor W. Adorno, reacting to fascist totalitarianism, and wrongly interpreting Hegel as sanctioning totalitarianism (Hegel argued that the abridgement of freedom by any actual state is morally unacceptable), developed a 'negative dialectic', according to which all systems of thought, being 'reified' in society, express and help perpetuate forms of domination.[12] This appears to lead nowhere other than into a sort of nihilism generating a critique of any possible social theory, an inability to reconcile ethics and law or to opt for either. Gillian Rose's philosophy of the 'broken middle' attempts to break through this impasse. Post-modern antinomianism, she admits, 'completes itself as political theology, as new ecclesiology, mending the diremption of law and ethics'.[13] But precisely this diremption — this 'broken middle' — must be *addressed*, not overcome; 'comprehension of diremption in all its anxiety and equivocation'[14] is the way forward.

Gillian Rose: 'Judaism and Modernity'

Professor Rose's *Judaism and Modernity* is an important and perceptive work, which squarely addresses the second of the problems outlined above, and complements her work on the 'broken middle'. It is a collection of essays, some of them (for example, 'Is there a Jewish

Philosophy?') lecture texts with a clarity and orderliness of presentation not always evident in the more speculative pieces such as 'Of Derrida's Spirit' — but this perhaps reflects Derrida's failings rather than Rose's. Some overlapping and repetition occur (pages 16 and 44 are an example), as many of the essays were composed for special occasions. Nevertheless, some guiding ideas are set out in the introductory chapter and emerge at the focus of the whole enterprise. Fine essays on Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, and Walter Benjamin are amongst several which combine to bring alive the intense dialectic of Judaism and post-Kantian (in the broadest sense) philosophy; explorations of the thought of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Simone Weil augment the theme. Rose is perhaps at her most authoritative in discussing Buber, Adorno (and the Frankfurt school generally), and Lévinas, and at her most imaginative in dealing with architecture, the Tower of Babel included, as the paradigm of post-modernism (the term 'post-modernism' is, of course, borrowed from aesthetics, not least those of architecture).

Rose states: 'It is by working through my difficulty in the *ratio* and the crises of modern philosophy that I discover myself in the middle of the *ratio* and crises of modern Judaism' (pp. ix–x). That is, she has discovered Judaism not as the 'sublime Other' (opposite, or complement) of modernity, but as exhibiting in its ethical presentations the same worries about law and the state which have provoked anxiety amongst modern philosophers. The first reaction might be to wonder at the surprise this discovery has evoked; would it not be true at virtually any period in Jewish history — say, Maimonides in twelfth-century Islam — that Jewish philosophers have worried about the same basic issues which troubled their non-Jewish contemporaries? But Rose speaks (p. x) of the 'feigned innocence of the "and" in *Judaism and Modernity*'; I suppose she means to imply that the organic connection of Jewish and general philosophy, the significant Jewish identity of so many 'general' philosophers — Cohen, Adorno, Lévinas, Benjamin, Weil, Derrida (why not Bergson or Husserl, one wonders?) — marks off the modern phenomenon from anything before.

Is There A Jewish Philosophy?

And so to work! 'Is there a Jewish philosophy?', enquires the first essay. No, says Rose, in her opening gambit. But, she continues, what about Maimonides and S. R. Hirsch? Perhaps their philosophies are merely 'defences', adjuncts to translation. Then, 'is there?' may mean: *is* there? *can* there be? or *should* there be? Posing the question imposes an agenda. But since we are now 'at the end of philosophy', and if this means 'at the end of free enquiry into beginnings', we get back to law as 'commandment' (*not* ethics as inner imperative; law as outer). Leo

Strauss and Emmanuel Lévinas misrepresent the rationality against which they define themselves, and they misrepresent Judaism as 'unchanging and without history'. On the contrary, both philosophy and Judaism must be explored in terms of their uncertainties, their strivings towards realization; Judaism is itself uncertain between ethics and *halakha*, and so converges with philosophy, which struggles with the diremption between moral discourse of rights, and the actualities of power.

The preceding is, I hope, a fair summary of pages 11–18 in Rose's text. I expect it to leave the reader breathless. And I beg the author, with all respect, to be patient with me and permit me to ask her what she means by her question, Is there a Jewish philosophy? What exactly is it about which we ask whether it *is*, or *can*, or *should be*? How would we recognize the animal if we caught it? Would a 'Jewish philosophy' be (i) a philosophical account of some aspects of Judaism, and if so which? or (ii) a wholesale reduction of Judaism to a philosophical system, or (iii) an apologetic presentation of Judaism in contemporary philosophical garb?

Then, what is Judaism? There are after all many Judaisms, and each of them comprises many parts — religious doctrines, social norms, folk tales, symbols, laws, history. The answer need not be the same for each 'Judaism'. The absence of any coherent statement as to the content of Judaism, coupled with an apparent reluctance to engage in specific issues, give the impression that the author is writing not about a living religion so much as about broad characterizations of Judaism made by philosophers. This is unfortunate, as there are occasions where she utilizes her detailed knowledge of Judaism to great effect, as in her critique of Nietzsche; nor can one doubt that her encounter with 'live' Judaism has directed her personal development.

Even more anxiously, as if daring to doubt the Empress's clothes, I must enquire, What is Philosophy? Were Hegel and Kirkegaard its fathers, was Frankfurt its mother, and its progeny Adorno and Horkheimer and Benjamin and Habermas? Or were Bacon and Hume and the empirical tradition its fathers, Vienna and Cambridge and Oxford its mother, Carnap and Popper and Russell and early Wittgenstein and Austin and Quine its progeny? We have nowadays the phenomenon of self-sealing communities of thinkers whose members look on members of other such communities as non-philosophers or as simply incompetent. Even where an attempt is made to cross the divide, as with Jacques Derrida's pseudo-debate with John Searle,[15] one is not convinced that either party understands the other, or even shares an agenda. This 'diremption' within contemporary philosophy is at least as important as that between law and ethics, and by no means without its counterpart in Jewish thought. Paradoxically, moreover, it may be precisely Rose's suppressed youthful immersion in analytic and

linguistic philosophy which enables her now to resist the post-modernist rejection of 'philosophy' in favour of social theory.

We proceed. To demonstrate the convergence of Jewish and philosophical thought, Rose cites Fackenheim[16] and Bauman,[17] both of whom view the Holocaust as implicating the tradition, whether philosophical (Fackenheim) or sociological (Bauman), in total domination, and both of whom respond by calling for a 'pre-social' morality; a prophetic call confronting institutionalized legality. She observes that both have failed to explore the 'inversion of meaning into contrary institutions', the simple fact (as I would put it) that if their call — say, Fackenheim's '614th commandment', not to grant Hitler a posthumous victory — became embodied in social institutions, it could only result in a new domination.[18] That is, Jewish and philosophical thought converge precisely within the 'broken middle' between law and ethics which neither will face. But if this is so, there *can be no answer* to the question, Is there a Jewish philosophy? We are left merely (concludes Rose) with *ein neues Unbehagen*, a new discomfort.

If we accepted Rose's philosophical position, and if we accepted her concept of Judaism as centred on the relationship of law and ethics (leaving aside what 'law' or 'ethics' might mean) the conclusion might follow, though it is difficult to see why addressing the discomfort of the broken middle should not be referred to as a 'philosophy of Judaism'. But there are innumerable alternative, even preferable, understandings of 'Judaism', of 'philosophy', and of the question itself; at least some intepretations of the question would allow unequivocal affirmative answers.

Ethics and Halakha

The essay on Ethics and *Halacha*[19] is obviously central to the book, and was Rose's contribution to a conference convened by Emil Fackenheim in Jerusalem in 1988 to discuss the relationship between political modernity and the Holocaust. Aharon Lichtenstein[20] and Eugene Borowitz[21] had published papers on the relationship between ethics and *halakha* some years earlier, and it is instructive to see how Rose summarizes their positions (p. 29).

Lichtenstein, she says, asks whether Judaism recognizes an ethic *independent of halakha*. His question concerns the ethical legitimation of *halakha qua* traditional authority — is it *equitable*? Borowitz, on the other hand, asks what is the authority of the ethical impulse *within halakha*. His question concerns the ethical legitimation of *halakha qua* legal-rational authority — is it *egalitarian*? This reading of the dispute neatly turns Lichtenstein into Hegel and Borowitz into Kirkegaard (my observation, not Rose's), and generates a convergence of the philosophical and Jewish problem of the diremption of ethics and law.

Rose fails to notice that the pretence of Lichtenstein and Borowitz to be arguing about the relationship of ethics and *halakha* is a sham, or at most a secondary outcome of a deep disagreement about God and the world. The underlying controversy concerns the ontology of *Torah miSinai*. Borowitz is above-board on this:[22]

> The issue of the internal ethical adequacy of Jewish tradition is not a minor one . . . If Rabbinic Judaism were to recognize an ethics independent of it, that would be to recognize a second source of authority to the Torah. Or, to say the same thing differently, Jews would have to admit that God had given them only a partial, not a complete, revelation.

Halakha, for Lichtenstein, is in a rather literal sense the 'voice of God' — a transcendent God — commanding, and commanding moreover in specific, revealed laws. It is of course compatible with this to maintain that *halakha* contains within itself broad ethical principles which modify its specific provisions, or even that there is an autonomous ethical realm of which the laws of the Torah are as perfect as possible an expression. Both these positions were taken by medieval Jewish philosophers. The former position was taken by Nahmanides, who adopted 'You shall do that which is upright and good' (Deuteronomy 6:18) as a criterion for judgement in matters which could not be determined by standard halakhic procedure, or where one could 'go beyond', without contradicting, standard *halakha*. The second position was taken by Maimonides (*Guide* 3:35). Maimonides in effect concedes that *halakha* falls short of ethical perfection; since it is expressed in terms of generally applicable laws, there will inevitably be isolated cases of injustice, for it is impossible to frame laws in such a way that all instances are covered. Less dramatically, Saadia, Maimonides, and all who like them maintain that the provisions of Torah coincide with those of rational ethics, *ipso facto* maintain that there is an ethical realm independent of Torah; though being pre-modern it would not occur to them that this allows the individual the right to act according to his private perception of the ethical.

Borowitz, on the other hand, is a liberal rabbi fully committed to the historical critical approach to holy texts. *Torah min Ha-Shamayim* is for him a distant metaphor for a social reality, the people Israel in covenantal relationship with its God; *halakha* is formed, rather than dictated, in this setting. Hence the desire for a firm ethical legitimation of the legal-rational authority of *halakha* — perforce an egalitarian legitimation, for that is the flavour of current ethical thought.

Justly criticizing Strauss and Lévinas for their representation of Judaism as unchanging, without history, placeless and eternal, Rose writes (p. 17): 'Talmudic argument rehearses a rationalism which constantly explores its own limits without fixing them'. That is, the Talmudic argument lies precisely at the broken middle, not where either Lichtenstein (*halakha*) or Borowitz (ethics) would locate it.

But this at once romanticizes and distorts the 'Talmudic argument'. Romanticizes, because a large part of Talmudic argumentation is taken up with the reconciliation of texts and with mundane aspects of law; and distorts, for it appears to limit the Talmudic argument to an exploration of ethical, or potentially ethical, issues. Talmudic citations could indeed be rallied to support Rose's thesis, but how representative a cross-section would they be? Is Rose perhaps confusing the Talmudic argument with the subsequent reflections of philosophers on it?

Moreover, is there anything distinctive about the Talmudic argument in this respect? Could not the same be said of the Islamic Shari'a, of Hindu or Chinese legal systems, or for that matter about the Canon Law of the Church or the secular legal systems of the West? Every system of law, positive or 'natural', 'explores its own limits' as it is applied and interpreted in changing circumstances; and though systems vary in rigidity, it is not possible for any system to fix its own limits absolutely. The meeting-point Rose finds between Judaism and Modernity cannot be an exclusive one. All societies which have legislation — that is, all societies — meet there. It is surely not only Judaism that 'shares with modernity the same crisis of self-comprehension ...' (p. 12).

Judaism Confronting Modernity: a Ten-Point Agenda

Rose explores her thesis by interpreting a wide range of authors, noting with sensitivity their situations within or concerning Judaism. Her analysis is often novel and illuminating, not mere examples or variations on a theme. Every reader will have his or her own preference. One of the essays I enjoyed most was that on Kirkegaard and Buber, in which she reveals the 'broken middle' manifested in Buber's political thought, most clearly in his rejection of the boundaries, limits, inherent violence of law on the one hand, and his advocacy of a Jewish State on the other; this interpretation is beautifully encapsulated in an analysis of two of his dreams.

Rose does not take it upon herself to review as a whole the problems confronting Jews who wish to rethink their Jewish heritage within the context of modernity. I shall do that briefly now, setting a context in which Rose's work may be placed (though not the context out of which she actually writes). By 'Jewish heritage' I mean the broad spectrum of Jewish writing and experience from the second-century Yavneh scholars to the present century. By 'modernity' I mean not one particular philosophical school, but the whole complex scientific, critical, and cultural revolution first clearly seen to emerge in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

1. ORIENTATION (ontology — what sort of world is it?). Our beliefs about the world have changed radically since our tradition

was formulated. The unbounded yet finite, expanding universe, in which our whole planet is an infinitesimal part of one of billions of galaxies, does not tally with the Genesis picture of a flat earth served by sun, moon, and stars; nor does a planetary history of five billion years, with an expectation of further billions, square with the total six thousand years from Creation to Messiah which tradition typically assumes. Our understanding of the constitution of matter, and of reproductive and mental processes, is far removed from the animistic theories assumed by our classical sources. What effect does or should this have on the way we read and relate to those sources?

2. CRISIS OF MEANING. We ensure continuity and social cohesion by persisting in the use of words, sentences and symbols handed down to us. Words, sentences and symbols shift in meaning as the context in which they are uttered changes. What meaning, if any, can be attached to such fundamental traditional concepts as the soul, or life after death? The background assumptions about the universe in the light of which those concepts were formed are no longer acceptable. If, for instance, we consider the traditional teaching on life after death, it is not a reasonable option to think of 'heaven' as somewhere in the sky, or 'hell' (*Gehinnom*) as beneath our feet. Nor, in the light of modern neurophysiology, can we assign to the soul, as a distinct and separable entity from the body, functions which were commonly assigned to it rather than to the 'body'. The problem is not the old one of to believe or not to believe, but rather, are 'heaven' and 'hell' and 'soul' intelligible concepts at all?

3. GOD. The problem of assigning meaning to the term 'God' has been recognized since the Middle Ages, and there were many, such as Maimonides, who held that no attributes (qualities) could be assigned positively to God. The Holocaust has raised yet again the ancient problem of the compatibility of the existence of evil with the existence of an all-powerful, benevolent God. Rose cites Hermann Cohen's concept of God as origin (p. 118), or knowable as *Gerechtigkeit* (p. 121); Rosenzweig on love of God (pp. 141 f.); Derrida's argument that God is defeated and becomes finite . . . that history is 'always in relation to a finite divinity' (p. 237). But there is still a tendency to evade the substantive issue, *is* there God? Does it make sense to attach the name 'God' to the merely finite (Kaplan, Rubenstein) or to the passible (A. J. Heschel)? What does God-talk accomplish that cannot be accomplished by any other mode of discourse?

4. REVELATION. This will ultimately depend on one's view of God. But even on the most traditional view, it is necessary to define

precisely what is meant by 'Torah'. What texts, words, ideas were revealed, what sort of process was revelation, does it continue, how is it recognized?

5. HISTORICAL CRITIQUE OF SOURCES. How 'authentic' are our Biblical texts? Indeed, can any meaning be attached to 'authenticity' if we take on board the findings of recent Biblical scholarship on the historical background of the Bible and the development of literary forms in ancient Israel?
6. AUTHORITY. Once the authenticity of texts as the unmediated record of God's actual words is challenged, how can we make sense of the authority of texts, or of the authority of those religious leaders whose claim to authority derives from their claim to being the authentic exponents of those texts?
7. ISRAEL AND IDENTITY. Traditionally, Jews have thought of themselves, and been seen by others, as a distinctive people with a distinctive role in history and a land of their own (even if their sinfulness excluded them from it). It is out of this conception that the modern state of Israel arose. Modern anthropology readily acknowledges group cultural differences, and has encouraged the fashion of 'searching for roots'. All this leaves us with the identity problems which characterize so much contemporary Jewish thought; how do we understand ourselves as citizens of plural societies, and how do we relate to Israel? Is Judaism meaningful outside the context of Israel? Are 'covenant' and 'chosen people' exclusive terms, or non-exclusive archetypes? How should we relate to other religions and other religious communities?
8. CONTEMPORARY VERSUS TRADITIONAL ETHICS. 'Modern' values include equality of races and sexes, individual rights, respect for other faiths, all of which values are denied, or at least considerably compromised, within tradition including *halakha*. The problem is not so much a *lack* of contemporary moral consensus, as the existence of a consensus *against* traditional ethics. Can one any longer accept as divine or authoritative a Torah which discriminates against women?
9. IMPLEMENTATION. Problems arise when the 'divine moral imperative' is translated into effective legislation, whether in the Jewish community or in the state of Israel. Precisely here the diremption of law and ethics so central to Rose's thought is at its most acute; the law which at the level of private conscience could be morally elevating becomes dominating and oppressive when it is adopted into public policy.
10. Finally, there are the practical problems to be considered of maintaining Jewish culture within a secular society and under a secular government.

None of these problems is new. Many of them were intensely debated throughout the nineteenth century. It is depressing that the debate on 2 and 3 has rarely emerged into the open, that 4, 5, and 6 are persistently avoided by the Orthodox, and that 'public relations' makes it difficult to face up to 8. The agenda also demonstrates why no serious progress will be made without consideration of 'ontology' in its broadest sense, that is, the full picture of the universe as revealed by the natural, historical and social sciences. Only on the basis of such an ontology can a sound rationality emerge. Within this rationality space can be found for morality, ethics, and religious values. That is why this essay began with a refutation of MacIntyre; it is vital to reject his call and that of others like him to abandon Enlightenment rationality. Not the least of Rose's achievements is to have resisted the irrationalizing proclivities of post-modernism.

NOTES

[1] Gillian Rose, *Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays*, Blackwell, Oxford (and Cambridge U.S.A.), 1993.

[2] G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903; revised edition, with an introduction by Thomas Baldwin, Cambridge, 1993.

[3] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, London and New York, 1911, book 3, part 1, section 1, p. 177. The italics are Hume's.

[4] Alisdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (first published in 1981), 2nd edition, London, 1985; (the quotations are from the 2nd edition). For a refutation of MacIntyre's pessimistic diagnosis of the contemporary moral situation, see Jeffrey Stout, *Ethics after Babel*, Boston, 1988. For an application of MacIntyre's ideas to Judaism, see Jonathan Sacks, *The Persistence of Faith: Religion, Morality and Society in a Secular Age* (the 1990 BBC Reith lectures), London, 1991.

[5] MacIntyre does not tell us just when moral philosophers reached the sort of consensus after which he hankers. It may that moral consensus, or at least apparent moral consensus, is available only under conditions of political or religious repression.

[6] F. von Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty*, London, 1960, and *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 3 vols., London, 1973–79.

[7] MacIntyre uses the word loosely: strictly speaking, ontology deals with the question of how many fundamentally distinct sorts of entities compose the universe. But MacIntyre's usage is convenient and I shall retain it.

[8] The stages are conveniently summarized on p. 273 of the 2nd edition. The theory is more fully worked out in chapters 14 and 15.

[9] Stephen Clark asks whether MacIntyre's St Benedict 'will be one more cult leader, and people faced by that prospect may decide that a decaying individualism, with all its faults, is preferable': Stephen R. L. Clark, 'Abstract Morality, Concrete Cases' in J. D. G. Evans, ed., *Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Problems*, Cambridge, 1987, p. 49.

[10] Rose, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 35.

[11] In an article on 'The German Idealism of Jewish Philosophers' cited by R. J. Bernstein in Richard J. Bernstein, ed., *Habermas and Modernity*, Oxford, 1985, p. 2.

[12] T. W. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, Frankfurt, 1966 and English translation by E. B. Ashton, *Negative Dialectics: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno*, London, 1978.

[13] Gillian Rose, *The Broken Middle: Out of our Ancient Society*, Oxford (and Cambridge, U.S.A.), 1992, p. xv.

[14] Ibid., Preface, p. 310 (the Preface is at the end of the book).

[15] See Derrida's original paper, 'Signature, Event, Context', responding to Austin, in Peggy Kamuf, ed., *A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds*, New York and London, 1991, pp. 82–111.

[16] Emil Fackenheim, *To Mend the World: Foundations of Future Jewish Thought*, New York, 1982.

[17] Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Oxford, 1989. See also Bauman's more recent *Postmodern Ethics*, Oxford (and Cambridge, U.S.A.), 1993.

[18] Fackenheim continues to be embarrassed by the inordinate attention given to his '614th Commandment', first mooted in an article in *Judaism* (vol. 16, Summer 1967). Compare Adorno's remark, 'A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen' (*Negative Dialectics*, op. cit. in Note 12 above, p. 365; the German original appeared in 1966). In my view, the domination by Holocaust concerns of much subsequent Jewish thought and social action has indeed seriously stifled development.

[19] This is Gillian Rose's spelling; I have used elsewhere the transliteration form *Halakha*: *kh* instead of *ch*.

[20] See A. Lichtenstein, 'Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of *Halakha*?' in Marvin Fox, ed., *Modern Jewish Ethics: Theory and Practice*, Columbus, Ohio, 1975, pp. 102–23.

[21] See Eugene B. Borowitz, 'The Authority of the Ethical Impulse in *Halakha*' in Jonathan Plout, ed., *Through the Sound of Many Voices*, Toronto, 1982. It has been reprinted several times, most recently in Eugene B. Borowitz, *Exploring Jewish Ethics: Papers on Covenantal Responsibility*, Detroit, 1990, pp. 193–203. There is a considerable literature on the relationship between ethics and law in Judaism, and the debate between Lichtenstein and Borowitz forms only a small part of that literature. For another approach, see Walter Wurzburger, 'Law as the Basis of a Moral Society' in *Christian Jewish Relations*, vol. 14, no. 1 (74), March 1981, pp. 6–18.

[22] Borowitz, *Exploring Jewish Ethics*, op. cit. in Note 21 above, p. 194.

BOOK REVIEWS

BARUCH KIMMERLING and JOEL S. MIGDAL, *Palestinians: The Making of a People*, xix + 396 pp., The Free Press, New York, 1993, $29.95.

In his book entitled The *Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (New York, 1987), Benny Morris describes the chaos into which Palestinian society gradually slipped as Britain made preparations to relinquish its mandate over Palestine. He says that as the British administration physically withdrew, 'Arab society fell apart' (p. 19). The Morris book is not the work of an Israeli government propagandist. On the contrary, the author's objective and meticulous research into the documentary sources of the period critically examines the popular heroic myths and legends which characterize accounts of the early days of the establishment of the Jewish State. Morris is a leading Israeli academic of the so-called revisionist school of history, adopting a critical interpretation of the recent Israeli past. Yet he suggests that the Arabs of Palestine had a weak sense of national identity; family, clan, village or region vied for the loyalty of the Arab population which scarcely differentiated itself from the Arabs of Syria, Lebanon, or Egypt. 'Commitment and readiness to pay the price for national self-fulfilment presumed a clear concept of the nation and of national belonging which Palestine's Arabs, still caught up in a village-centred (or at best a regional) political outlook, by and large completely lacked' (pp. 17–18).

Few objective observers today would deny the reality of Palestinian commitment to self-determination. How then did this community, broken and scattered by the events of 1947–48, cohere into a nation? The answer in all its complexity is attempted by Kimmerling and Migdal in the book under review here. Like Morris, they look again at the documentary evidence as well as at the all too partial historiographical work of Palestinian and Israeli authors. They supplement the secondary sources with field research undertaken over two decades amongst Palestinians living in the villages on the West Bank and among those on the campus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

The book is a reinterpretation of the evidence of the recent past; its thesis is that the Arab inhabitants of Palestine were not the passive, fatalistic victims of a variety of dreadful events but rather a community, initially marked by the loose relationships of traditional society which evolved into a nation, in the fullest modern meaning of the word. The process recalls the experience of the European proletariat of Marxist writing. The change, painful and slow, was not merely the reaction to extraneous social situations, but came about as a consequence,

sometimes of elite groups, sometimes of the mass, actively fashioning a destiny for themselves. Like the nineteenth-century proletariant of Marx, the people of Palestine, indeed of much of the Middle East, were prey to the insatiable demands of European capitalists, constantly seeking new markets for their products and new sources of raw materials for their production lines. An essentially agrarian people became gradually urbanized and educated in order to service, mostly at the lower levels, an alien civil administration whose purpose was to organize the uninterrupted access to world markets. The consequences of colonization by the European powers are still being played out today. The ultimate resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict perhaps represents the end of what Harold Macmillan called 'the winds of change' — the putting right of the frontiers arbitrarily drawn across Africa and the Middle East by the English and the French. European colonization not only altered the socio-economic structure of Palestinian society, but brought with it political ideas of national self-determination and the democratic exercise of power. The authors argue that these ideologies underlay two uprisings which were the most momentous acts in recent Palestinian history.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, the Palestinian Arabs saw Jewish immigration and the acquisition of Arab land as the overwhelming dangers to be overcome. In the 1930s new political activists — urban, youthful, and highly nationalistic — now saw the British as the enemy; the Jews were merely a secondary client group who would be swept away with the demise of British imperialism. In 1936 the Arab population erupted into violence against the British authorities, perceived to be in favour of the rising number of Jewish immigrants. The violence was quickly translated into the call for a general strike. The traditional leadership was swept along by the young, urban nationalists; merchants and shopkeepers, Arab farm labourers, and intellectuals participated in stoppages and acts of non-co-operation. Street violence, arson, and sabotage of important railroad links caused the British to deploy more troops and to set up a Royal Commission. The latter, the Peel Commission, recommended the partitioning of Palestine between the Jews and Arabs. But the idea of partition was anathema to the Palestinian Arabs and the rebellion increased in its ferocity and geographical spread. However, what marked this particular attempt at national liberation was the failure of the Palestinian leaders to organize the rebels into a unified fighting force and since both the British and the Jews were the targets of the violence, British troops had clear instructions to suppress the rebels.

Kimmerling and Migdal describe the shifting pattern of the rebellion, the movement in the battles from the towns to the rural hinterlands. The lack of essential co-ordination between the Palestinian groups brought local leaders to the fore — and also allowed for

internecine quarrels to be pursued — and sometimes violently settled — under the guise of the revolt. There was also obfuscation on the part of the British who used a mixture of brutal military force and shifting policy decisions to quash the violence. The authors pursue the paradox of the revolt: it brought shared feelings of national identity to the fore, but showed only too clearly the divisions within Palestinian society; and they argue that the years of civil strife, the eventual decimation of the Palestinian leadership, and the destruction by the British of Arab civil institutions left Palestinian society exhausted and vulnerable by 1948, when the war against the creation of a Jewish State was started.

If the Arab revolt of 1936–39 was the beginning of a nascent Palestinian identity, the *intifada* was surely the culmination of that process. The enemy was as before an alien occupying power, once the British and now the Israelis; but Palestinian society had changed. Initially described as the spontaneous, transient action of angry individuals in response to the death of four Gazan workers in a road accident, the violence soon spread from the refugee camps to the towns and villages of the West Bank. It became all too apparent that the Israeli army was unable to cope with a civil insurrection which was characterized by the deliberate decision of a well-organized Palestinian population not to use lethal weapons. The penultimate chapter of the book dealing with the *intifada* is particularly interesting; it details the evolution of the economic relationship with both Jordan and Israel and the irreversible change it brought about in social conditions. The unionisation of workers, the setting up of universities, and the increasingly important social role for women challenged and attenuated first the traditional loyalties to family and clan and then ultimately co-operation with, and obedience to, the Israeli government. During the British Mandate, the Jewish settlers of Palestine were able to build a substantial social infrastructure which was transformed with relative ease into national institutions once the new State was established. The Palestinians in the occupied territories have tried to do the same. Better educated, with the possibility of participation in numerous social and economic organizations, they have aspirations unknown to their grandparents in the Palestine of the Mandate. Furthermore, the Israelis had to confront a disciplined population with a unity of purpose and one whose leaders used brilliantly the opportunities given to them by the mass media to present their national cause to the world.

The book ends optimistically with the anticipation of a Labour-led government in Israel with a popular mandate to make peace. The authors of course could not have known of the secret negotiations in Norway and their consequences for the political landscape of the Middle East. The reader is therefore left to speculate on the future of the Palestinians, not only those in the former occupied territories but the Palestinian Diaspora spread throughout the world. Will those

Palestinians living in the refugee camps of the Lebanon be content to maintain merely a loyal and supportive relationship with the small Palestinian State in the making as perhaps their compatriots in New York may? Of immediate consequence is the problem of power-sharing between, on the one hand, the Palestinians who stayed in the rump of Palestine after the defeats of 1948 and the Six-Day War of 1967 and, on the other hand, the more famous personalities who travelled the world for more than three decades and by various means helped to create a sense of national identity.

The peace process in the Middle East is, and must continue to be, comprehensive; the negotiations take place between the governments of sovereign states, each with individual national interests that must be satisfied. The Palestinians are obliged to negotiate in a political limbo; they constitute something more than the word 'entity' implies, but something less than a truly independent state. What powers do the leaders possess in order not merely to articulate but to impose the Palestinian national interest in a region where military power or its threat is the common currency of regional relations?

If this reviewer has a criticism of the book, it is that it is not long enough to do justice to the fascinating and eventful history it sets out to narrate. The Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate in Palestine, and the wars of 1948 and 1967 jostle for space with the analysis of modernisation and social change and the importance to Palestinian political culture of poetry and song. It is nevertheless a good introduction to the subject, with substantial references and notes for any reader who wishes to pursue the subject in greater depth.

DAVID CAPITANCHIK

ANTONY LERMAN, JULIET J. POPE, JULIA SCHÖPFLIN, and HOWARD SPIER, general editors, *Antisemitism World Report 1994*, xxvi + 252 pp., Institute of Jewish Affairs, 79 Wimpole Street, London WIM 7DD, 1994, £10.00 or U.S. $18.00 plus postage.

This is a most informative book, written clearly, with no jargon or circumlocutions. The facts as known are set out unemotionally and concisely and their impact is all the more striking for that. The nine-line Preface states that the 'Report documents antisemitism throughout the world in the year 1993. The absence of an entry on a country does not imply that antisemtisism does not exist in that country. . . . The length of entries reflects to some extent the amount of data that were available. It is emphasized that the *Antisemitism World Report 1994* is a report on *current* antisemitism: it is not intended as a survey of the general situation of the Jewish communities of the world'. The long Introduction tells readers that a wide variety of sources supplied the

information: 'specialist authors; Jewish communal organizations; monitoring organizations; research institutes; academic researchers; and the expertise and archives of the Institute of Jewish Affairs. Whenever a statement raised doubts and independent corroboration was impossible to obtain, the statement was not included.'

There are several sections: Western Europe; Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; Middle East and North Africa; Southern Africa; Asia; Australia; North America; and Latin America. The first page of the Introduction summarizes the main points of the Report and states that the Jewish communities facing the greatest threat are those in Romania, Turkey, and the Ukraine, while Fascism has become respectable in Italy. It notes what it calls 'electronic fascism: the spread of antisemitic and racist propaganda through computer networks and by other electronic means — the growth area of "antisemitica" in the 1990s' (p. ix). However, Latin America has shown continued improvement in most countries of the region (by comparison with the data in the Institute's *Report* for 1993) while in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli peace process has mellowed the official positions towards Jews and Israel.

Two broad types of antisemitic groups are distinguished: the neo-fascist and Nazi parties whose members often wear uniforms of a paramilitary nature while the other group consists of far-right organizations which are populist and do not openly show antisemitic attitudes but are anti foreigner with a platform which often includes 'coded antisemitism or antisemitic innuendo'. The section on Western Europe lists, under the heading of 'Manifestations', incidents of desecration of graves in Jewish cemeteries in the following countries in Western Europe: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Graves were also desecrated in Argentina, Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

Denials of the Holocaust are current in many countries and cause outrage to the Jewish population, but the *Report* points out that the allegations have little general effect on mainstream opinion. Some centuries-old accusations persist, such as Jews being guilty of deicide and murdering Christian children ritually. One of the most chilling examples cited is a report in a Turkish publication in February 1993 'alleging that Israel was extracting the organs of the eighty-nine Bosnian Muslim children whom it had given refuge on humanitarian considerations'; and a later pro-Islamic weekly with a circulation of 20,000 'interviewed a number of Turkish writers and academics, some of whom made comments against the Jews and Israel on the grounds that Israel really had been using the organs of Bosnian children' (p. 87). It may surprise some readers that Islamic publications in Belgium claimed 'that the Israelis had decapitated the children while

still alive, removed their organs for transplant operations and drunk their blood in Jewish religious ceremonies' (p. xv). (One wonders whether the Israelis issued invitations to foreign journalists to see the Bosnian Muslim children and whether the Israeli diplomats in Turkey and in Belgium took any action to counteract that monstrous libel.)

This reviewer remembers that in Cairo there was a persistent rumour every Passover that the unleavened bread, *matzot*, was baked with the blood of Muslim children; some servants in Jewish households refused to touch the *matzot*, assuring their employers that this accusation was based on fact, but that of course the perpetrators did not commit their crimes openly and other Jews were blameless. Accusations of ritual murder of Christian children were common since the Middle Ages in many European countries but the Report cites the case in Austria in July 1993 when devotees gathered to celebrate the cult in memory of a child who was alleged to have been the victim of a Jewish ritual murder in 1462. The bishop of the Tyrolean diocese issued a ban against the cult, and an inscription on a plaque near the chapel, affixed in 1990, states that the murder allegation was totally unproven and that the belief in the child's martyrdom is 'erroneous' — but a plaque in the chapel itself still refers to 'a dark, bloody deed' (p. 9).

Another myth which continues to have wide currency is *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, the notorious antisemitic publication alleged to be a secret document revealing a sinister Jewish plot to dominate the world and overcome Christian society with the help of freemasons, amongst others. The *Protocols* were first published in Russia at the turn of the century and widely circulated in Europe by Russian émigrés. There are translations in many European languages as well as in Japanese and Arabic, and new editions are regularly published. An Estonian translation appeared in the capital's bookshops in 1993, but following condemnation from several sources, the copies were withdrawn from sale. In Russia, however, the *Protocols* are on sale in Moscow and in St Petersburg and according to a London newspaper (the *Independent* in a July 1993 issue) in an item about the murder of the Russian Imperial family during the Russian Revolution, the words 'Here the Jews killed the Tsar's family' were splashed in thick paint on the concrete slabs around the site of the murder.

The *World Report* also gives details of accusations that Jews infect their enemies with the Aids virus and that they cause cancer. In some cases, as in Azerbaydzhan, the antisemitic accusations are believed to stem from Iranian influence in financing newspapers and periodicals which print anti-Israel and anti-Jewish material. Under the circumstances, it is interesting to note that in Iran itself, in December 1993,

the leaders of the country's Jewish community 'rejected the findings of the Amnesty International report which claimed that the rights of religious minorities were restricted in Iran and used the opportunity to reaffirm their allegiance to the Islamic Republic' (p. 173).

It is difficult to read the Report for long without at first being incredulous that in countries such as Sweden and Denmark, Finland and New Zealand, antisemitism in some quarters is alive and well; and after the first hundred pages or so, the catalogue of anti-Jewish manifestations and printed accusations in so many countries ceases to outrage or to cause mirth in reaction to the preposterous denunciations, and leads to depression. On the other hand, some entries give cause for lifting discouraged spirits: in the Czech Republic, for instance, no cases of anti-Jewish violence or cemetery desecration were reported in 1993 and the final comment in the section on the country states: 'Countering racism and xenophobia was considered an important task not only by Jews and Jewish organizations but also by the entire democratic spectrum' (p. 101). That is all the more interesting since in neighbouring Slovakia in 1993 there were cemetery desecrations in two areas and antisemitic slogans had been sprayed on a synagogue, as well as swastikas, in October 1992 — the court proceedings against the perpetrators were continued in 1993. At least, however, the brief section on 'Legal Matters' in the entry on Slovakia tells us that there were also court proceedings after *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* was published in Bratislava in 1991; and that when the honorary president of the Union of Jewish Communities of Slovakia was sued because he was alleged to have slandered a weekly by describing it as an antisemitic publication, the court rejected the suit and confirmed that the weekly was indeed antisemitic. The Jewish population of Slovakia is estimated to be between 3,000 and 6,000. Of course, the small size of the Jewish segment in a population of millions need not diminish virulent antisemitism.

The phenomenon of antisemitism without Jews is well known. In some countries, attacks on the State of Israel, and on Zionism in the Diaspora, often disguise antisemitism under the cloak of political commentaries — as do accusations of dual loyalty (loyalty to the Diaspora country of residence and to Israel). Japan has only about one thousand Jews in a population of 124 million; but it has an (admittedly very small) antisemitic party which participated in the July 1992 parliamentary elections (p. 198) and Jews were accused in a publication of disguising America's troubles by attacking Japan and in another newspaper of stock price manipulation which resulted in seriously damaging Japan's economy. This journal published in its June 1987 issue (vol. 29, no. 1) an article by a Japanese university teacher, Tetsu Kohno, on 'The Jewish Question in Japan'. He showed that there had been four phases of 'collective antisemitism' in Japan,

beginning with the defeat by the Red Guards of a Japanese expeditionary force of 75,000 men sent to Siberia to support the tsarist army. The Japanese readily believed what the tsarist officers claimed — that the Jews were the instigators of the Bolshevik revolution. A tsarist general had ordered that every one of his soldiers should be given a copy of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and a Japanese army captain who was attached to that general's staff later translated the entire text of *The Protocols* into Japanese.

The *Antisemitism World Report 1994*, referring to the phenomenon of 'antisemitism without Jews', states that this 'reinforces a fundamental fact about antisemitism and all forms of racism: it has nothing to do with the actual realities of Jewish life' (p. xxiii). A frequent justification of antisemitic accusations is that there is no smoke without fire, that there must be valid grounds for such an enduring and widespread condemnation of Jews and of Judaism. Yves Chevalier, a French sociologist, published in 1988 a scholarly study entitled *L'antisémitisme: Le Juif comme bouc émissaire*. In his Preface, he analyses the concept of a scapegoat and states that such a concept is not strictly applicable to Jews since a scapegoat willingly takes upon itself the guilt of its butchers while in the case of those Jews suffering from antisemitism, it is a case of 'victimisation' since the condemned Jew does not consider himself guilty and does not willingly go to his sacrifice. In his Conclusion, he states that it is true that there is no smoke without fire but that the fire is not where it is believed to be and that antisemitism is a wall of hatred and imbecility, a wall which we must strive to knock down (p. 388).

JUDITH FREEDMAN

SAMUEL C. MELNICK, *A Giant Among Giants. A History of Rabbi Shmuel Melnick and the Princelet Street Synagogue*, xiii + 137 pp., Pentland Press, Edinburgh, Cambridge, and Durham, 1994, £10.75 (paperback).

This book is an act of piety, in which the author records the activities of his grandfather, an immigrant rabbi from Poland who came to England in 1894 and who ministered to the congregation of Princelet Street Synagogue in Spitalfields (London) from 1896 to 1920. There is a shortage of data on the rabbi, who left few extant writings, but this brief book includes a chronology of the synagogue and five appendices.

The author presents us with a series of events, speeches, and activities in the rabbi's career, culled from press reports and minute books. There is an overwhelming amount of factual detail in some cases — such as the lengthy description of the arrival of Chief Rabbi Hertz at Euston Station in London, where he is welcomed (among others) by the members of the Board of Shechita, who include Rabbi Shmuel

Melnick. On the other hand, the rabbi's grandson is sometimes remarkably vague, as when he tells us: 'In September the same year he spoke at a memorial service to Mrs (or was it Mr?) Harris Tibber, a supporter of the South Hackney Talmud Torah at the Talmud Torah (or was it the Beth Hamedrash, St Thomas' Road?)' (p. 24).

The history of the synagogue is a catalogue of the comings and goings of rabbis and honorary officers, of the consecration of numerous *sifrei Torah*, of roof repairs, and of the painting and various furnishings of the synagogue building. The author also has some speculative comments on speeches: 'Perhaps adding to the joy of Simchat Torah an address was given by Rabbi Melnick presumably in some humorous vein' (p. 95).

In short, this book does not appear to be well researched but the parochial chronology which it contains might appeal to those who are connected with the synagogue.

LEONARD MARS

NORMAN SOLOMON, *The Analytic Movement: Hayyim Soloveitchik and his Circle* (University of South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism series), xv + 268 pp., Scholars Press, Atlanta, Georgia, 1993, $64.95 ($44.95, paperback).

There emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century, chiefly under the influence of Rabbi Hayyim Soloveitchik (1853–1918), a school of Talmudists whose members created and developed a new, if not revolutionary, methodology for Talmudic studies, in which legal concepts are subjected to keen analysis with a view to placing each in its proper perspective. The basic aim was not to provide new answers to old problems, as in the writings of traditional commentators, but rather to show that, once the analysis has been made, all the difficulties vanish of their own accord. In the book under review, Rabbi Dr Norman Solomon examines in rich detail the application of this methodology as it appears in the works of twelve scholars whom he considers to be its leading practitioners. (I would have included Jacob Reines and Meir Simhah of Dvinsk and perhaps also have made reference to the Galician scholar, Joseph Engel, who employs a similar methodology, albeit in a less limiting way.)

An illustration of the way the methodology is applied can be found in Rabbi Yehezkel Abramsky's commentary to the Tosefta. He was a member of the Analytic School and he explains that according to Leviticus (11:9–10), only those fish may be eaten which have fins and scales; these are called in the Talmud the *simanim* ('signs' or 'indicators') of the fish. The question is whether these are only 'indications' that the fish is fit to be eaten or whether they are the 'cause' of its fitness. In other words, is a fish kasher *because* it has fins and scales or is it kasher

for some other reason, which we can call X, and the fins and scales are only an indication that X is present? Now the Talmud (*Hullin* 66b) states that while all fish which have scales have fins, some fish have fins but no scales. Since this is so, the determining factor is the existence of scales — but then why does the Torah refer to fins at all? The Talmud replies that fins are referred to in order 'to make the teaching glorious' (Isaiah 42:21) — that is, simply to provide extra information concerning the laws of the Torah. This makes sense if the reason why the fish is kasher is that it has fins and scales: it is necessary for the Torah to state that fins are a contributory factor. But if fins and scales are only indications that the fish is kasher and since scales are an indication in themselves, no additional information is provided when the Torah gives fins as one of the indicators.

From that illustration and the many others considered by Norman Solomon, it is clear that in the Analytic Movement, the Talmudic concepts are subjected to a specially rigorous analysis for which a new terminology was invented, including the use of terms taken from medieval Jewish philosophy such as cause and effect, actual and potential, positive and negative, and existence and non-existence — all unknown in the previous history of Talmudic and general Jewish legal studies. Solomon has no difficulty in providing interesting parallels with the methods of reasoning in Western jurisprudence, even hinting that the members of the Analytic School might have been introduced to Western methods through conversation with their students (they were all teachers in the famous Lithuanian yeshivot).

The Analysts were strongly opposed to the introduction of secular studies into the yeshiva curriculum, even though one or two of them had some knowledge of general literature; Reb Itzeler Ponievezer (1854–1918), one of Solomon's heroes, was not only familiar with the works of Karl Marx but even entertained the notion that Marxism would be compatible with Judaism, were it not for the Marxist opposition to the ownership of private property. The very methodology of the Analytic School appears to have been influenced to a large extent by modern, secular patterns of thought. While firmly declaring that all the concerns of the students should be limited to 'the four ells of the *Halakha*' (in the Talmudic expression), their reasoning itself seems to have come to them, indirectly at least, from extra-Halakhic sources. Solomon seeks, successfully, to explain the paradox on the grounds that the last decades of the nineteenth century were a period of great upheaval in the intellectual life of Russian Jews. Faced with the challenge of the *Haskala* (the Enlightenment), they simultaneously retreated into the 'four ells' and unconsciously adopted quasi-*Haskala* norms for the understanding of the traditional sources. The traditionalist Rabbis were aware of that and they accuse the Analysts of planting foreign shoots in the wholesome Jewish vineyard. That is why the

Analysts constantly stress that they are not innovators at all but are simply trying to make explicit that which had been implicit in the system all along.

Solomon states in his Preface that in 1966 the University of Manchester accepted his Ph.D. thesis *magna cum laude* and the text is now published in its original form, with the addition of editorial notes to correct some errors. He comments on p. viii: 'I cannot offer an update. The field covered is too vast, my own views and interests have evolved, and there is no area of scholarship of the many upon which the thesis touches — rabbinics, history, law, logic, hermeneutics, language (Hebrew and Yiddish) — which has not changed dramatically in the intervening twenty-seven years. This 1966 work does not adequately reflect all the resources of modern scholarship or even those available in the 1960s, but I am confident that it offers a coherent and basically sound overview of a very influential yet not fully appreciated school of Jewish thought'. The book does, indeed, fulfil its promise even though the author did not try to bring it up-to-date. No one else could do it so well.

Norman Solomon should reconsider his decision not to bring this admirable study up-to-date and then insist on securing the services of a competent proof-reader: misprints abound in the present volume.

LOUIS JACOBS

SIMON TAYLOR, *A Land of Dreams. A Study of Jewish and Caribbean Migrant Communities in England*, xiii + 217 pp., Routledge, London, 1993, £40.00.

The all-encompassing sub-title promises more than is actually provided. The Preface more precisely states its contents: a study of the East European Jews in the East End of London from the 1880s to 1914; and another on Caribbean migrants in Birmingham from 1939 to the early 1960s. Just over two pages in Appendix 1 summarise later developments.

It is, no doubt, interesting and possibly enlightening to make comparisons between different groups of immigrants but it must depend on the objects of the study. The author is very much aware of the differences. An ethnographic study like this, he tells us, 'exposes not only the diverse historical and cultural roots of the two migrant communities; it also exposes the quite different social and economic conditions which confronted the two groups of migrants upon arrival in England' (p. xi). Which prompts one to question the purpose of the exercise, beyond its portrayal of various difficulties and problems of adjustment, the common currency of migrant studies. He explains that his use of the survey material, collected for the important pioneering

study by Leslie Stephens, *Employment of Coloured Workers in the Birmingham area*, 1956, *inter alia*, adds to the knowledge of the early stages of Caribbean settlement in that city. He also makes use of his own interviews there, but for the Jewish material he relies on contemporary sources as well as on oral history recordings at the London Museum of Jewish Life (its former title of Museum of the Jewish East End is given here).

In such a short (but very expensive) book, the background details are necessarily in summary form. There are some errors of fact: the first practising Jew was admitted to the bar in 1833, not 1883 (p. 18) and it is odd to read on p. 17 about an 'affluent Jewish middle class' in England in the 1880s, while on the next page dealing with the same period, it is stated that 'the archetypal English Jew still scraped a living from hawking and peddling'.

HAROLD POLLINS

CHRONICLE

The Summer 1994 Report of the International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization states that the Center, with the support of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, convened a two-day Conference in Moscow in February 1994. The meeting was attended by about 120 professors and instructors of Jewish Studies from 21 cities in five republics: Azerbaizhan, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia, and the Ukraine. The Moscow scholars represented the following institutions: 'Jewish University of Moscow, Institute of Philosophy, World Union for Progressive Judaism, Academy of Sciences, Gnessin Academy of Music, Moscow State University, the Open University of Russia, Institute of Oriental Sciences, State Institute of Culture, Moscow joint Society for Jewish Books, The Catholic College, Protestant Publishing House, Museum of Jewish Life, and Touro College'. The participants from St Petersburg represented St Petersburg University, St Petersburg Jewish University, and the Institute of History while those who came from Kiev represented universities and institutes from the Ukraine. Other republics sent participants from various universities: the universities of Donetzk State, of Volgograd State, of Ural State, of Kharkov, Vilnius, Tomsk, Irkusk State, Rostov State, Samara State, Tbilisi State, Zaporoshe State, and Baku State, as well as Perm University and Rostov Pedagogical University. Institutes and learned societies also sent representatives.

An Editorial in the Report comments that the Conference 'laid the foundtion for a much needed network to facilitate the flow of information and ideas. In order to provide a permanent structure for this network, the International Center and the American Jewish Joint decided to establish the Moscow Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization. The Center will aim to co-ordinate activities in all the republics of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), 'organize seminars and workshops to render the teaching of Jewish studies courses more effective, encourage the publication of textbooks and monographs, and serve as a liaison with the International Center and universities in Israel'.

The American Jewish Joint has played an important part in supporting the new Jewish universities in Moscow, St Petersburg, and Kiev. Now there is a growing number of state universities in the Former Soviet Union which have Jewish Studies courses or which have expressed a desire to develop such courses, and in order to provide them with facilities for tuition and other study requirements, the International Center in Jerusalem is proposing a twinning between these universities and Jewish Studies Centers in Europe, America, and Australia. Some institutions in Western countries have already taken such an initiative: the Jewish Theological Seminary, Touro College, and YIVO teach Jewish Civilization in Moscow while the Paris Sorbonne and the Oxford Centre also have programmes to develop Jewish Studies in Russia. The Editorial ends with the following appeal: 'There may be other American and

European institutions that are doing similar work, about which we are unaware. We now call upon all Jewish Studies Centers and Programs, large or small, to join us in this effort'.

Meanwhile, the Report notes that 903 students in 69 cities of the Fomer Soviet Union have registered for courses offered by the Open University of Israel; more than half the total (553) are in Russia, followed by 169 in the Ukraine, and 90 in Belarus while the remainder are in Moldova, Estonia, Azerbaizhan, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Kirgyzia, Uzbekistan, and Armenia.

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The Report of the International Center informs its readers that the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and the University Press of America are the joint publishers of *Major Knesset Debates 1949–1981*, edited by Netanel Lorch. This is the first English publication of the debates and six volumes 'cover between one and one-and-a-half per cent of the total material. . . . The introductions are extremely useful for the research student. They comprise a general introduction to the Knesset, its history, procedure, composition upon its election; and a brief introduction to each debate, most of which covered issues of foreign policy, defense and relations with Arab states. A glossary of political parties and personalities is also included.'

*

The Ninth British Conference on Judeo-Spanish Studies will take place on 2–4 July 1995 at Queen Mary and Westfield College, Mile End Road, London. It will start on Sunday afternoon, 2 July, and continue on Monday and Tuesday, 3 and 4 July. The announcement of the Conference states: 'Papers are invited on all aspects of Judeo-Spanish culture, particularly language and literature. The maximum length for a paper is 30 minutes and there will be ample time for discussion. Residential accommodation has been reserved on the main campus . . . Mile End is a particularly appropriate setting for a Judeo-Spanish conference as the original Sephardic immigrants to England settled in this area'. The final date for submission of paper titles is 1 April 1995 and they should be sent either to the Department of Hispanic Studies of Queen Mary and Westfield College at Mile End Road, London E1 4NS or to Hilary Pomeroy, 7 Ferncroft Avenue, London NW3 7PG.

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The Hong Kong Jewish Club (4/F Melbourne Plaza, 33 Queen's Road Central, Hong Kong) is the publisher of *Jewish Times in Hong Kong*. The first issue of the magazine (vol. 1, no. 1) is dated '5754 Av/Elul', July–August 1994, and claims that 'it is the essential guide to Jewish events in Hong Kong for people of all ages, affiliations and nationalities'.

The September 1994 issue of the magazine states: 'The Jewish Historical Society of Hong Kong (JHS) is organized as a division of our Jewish Club' and it has aimed to establish a centre for the collection, study, and preservation of materials concerning Jews and Judaism in China and Hong Kong. '. . . the JHS has established Hong Kong's first (and only) fully catalogued Judaica

library, published three volumes in its Sino-Judaic monograph series, produced a Jewish community introductory booklet which is updated and reprinted at various intervals, and established an archive for research materials relevant to the history of the Jews of Hong Kong and China. At present, volume IV in our monograph series is in an advanced stage of preparation. It will be a history of the Jews of Harbin, and will contain many historical photographs which have been gathered from many different sources around the world. . . . Our latest project was to assist with the financing of the world's first Chinese language Encyclopedia Judaica, working closely with the China Judaic Studies Association'.

According to the Jewish Club, there are about 3,000 Jews in Hong Kong and 'an impressive range of organizations and facilities including several synagogues (Orthodox, Sephardic, Chabad Lubavitch, Reform), a Day School and Hebrew School . . . two Kosher restaurants and kosher products grocery store, Mikvah, part-time Yeshiva, Jewish Women's Association and, of course, United Israel Appeal'.

*

The Summer 1994 issue of the Newsletter of The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism (SICSA) of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem states that the Center conducts several types of research simultaneously. 'One type is concerned with past antisemitism, ranging from the pre-Christian Hellenistic world to this century. Studies in this area are done in collaboration with the Zalman Shazar Center, and the Historical Society of Israel. Books that will be of interest to non-Hebrew readers are translated and published in English as well. A second type of research concentrates on antisemitism worldwide in this century. In addition, research on topical problems and their analysis is conducted by the ACTA (Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism) project of the Center, published in the form of occasional papers'.

SICSA is engaged in a multi-volume bibliography on antisemitism and four volumes have already been published; there is a computerized data base through the ALEPH system of the Hebrew University. The Center has decided that 'the investigation of antisemitism in the twentieth century should concentrate on a number of crucial problems: psychological interpretations of antisemitism, antisemitism in the media, Muslim fundamentalism, antisemitism in Eastern Europe, attitudes to Jews in the Christian churches, and anti-Jewish intellectual trends in the Western World. Research proposals that would fit these new priorities are welcomed. Proposals are reviewed by experts in the field and approved annually by the Academic Committee in May or June'. Fellowships are awarded each year to several doctoral students who carry out research on antisemitism.

The Newsletter lists under 'Research in Progress' the titles of studies being conducted in universities and institutes in Israel and in other countries. These include research on antisemitism in Romania in 1942; in contemporary Poland; in France in the 1930s; in Japan; in present-day Slovakia; in Italy in the first half of the twentieth century; in Australia in 1933–45; in Brazil and Argentina in 1890–1980; in East Germany in 1945–53; in England in 1882–1919 with special regard to economic and political factors; in Hungary in

1988–91; in contemporary Russian socio-political thought since glasnost; and, at the Gutman Institute in Jerusalem, a study of the perceptions and responses of Israeli Jews to antisemitism.

The Summer 1994 SICSA Newsletter also includes an article by Frank Stern on 'Jewish Images in German Films since 1945'. The author states: 'Throughout postwar German history the cultural twins of remembrance and amnesia were strongly interwoven with changing images of the Jews'. He comments that the 1979 American television mini-serial *Holocaust* was seen by many millions of Germans and apart from the emotional shock, there was the oft-repeated words: 'We did not know'; but the impact of that film quickly eroded and when 15 years later *Schindler's List* was shown in cinemas, many Germans misinterpreted the film as a story about the 'good German'. Frank Stern warns: 'There exists a wide gap between the representation of images of the Jews and their fate on the screen and the historical consciousness of wide strata of the German population. The cinematic truth, even of documentaries, is not always taken for historical truth nor is there reflection on its relevance for the understanding of German national history'.

The SICSA Newsletter has a brief item about antisemitism in Austria. A pilot study by an Austrian, Dr Herta Herzog, asked respondents not what they themselves thought about Jews but what they had heard about Jews; it seems that 'Jews are widely perceived as "others" . . . in contrast to the perception of non-Austrians, such as foreign workers, as "outsiders"'. The conclusion is that antisemitic attitudes have been passed on to a younger generation in Austria.

*

The September 1994 issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* includes a report on the school year 1992–93 in the various educational establishments of the *Alliance*. The network consisted of 48 institutions in several countries, with a total of 21,467 pupils, a slight increase on the previous year's total of 21,100. There are schools in France, Iran, Israel, Morocco, Spain, and Syria and in addition there are affiliated schools in Belgium, Canada, France, Israel, and Spain. Iran has four *Alliance* schools (in Teheran, Ispahan, Kermanshah, and Yezd) with 402 pupils while Damascus in Syria has one school with 130 pupils, and Morocco has five schools with more than a thousand students: 1,019. The affiliated establishments have far greater numbers, in Canada and in Israel; there are 15 such schools in Montreal and nine in Israel.

This issue of *Les Cahiers* has an informative article dealing briefly with the history of the Jewish communities in what was Persia and is now Iran and describing the foundation of *Alliance* schools in various towns in the country; the first was established in Teheran in 1898 and was followed in 1900 by schools in Hamadan and in Ispahan, and a year later by a school in Kachan. Shortly after, more schools were opened in other towns. Until 1926, the main language of instruction was in French, but Persian and Hebrew were also used in classes. When the *Alliance* first established a school in 1898, the local rabbis objected that such a school would destroy religious beliefs in the pupils and in order to counter these accusations, the *Alliance* stressed the importance in its teachings of the Hebrew language and of religious observances. Then,

gradually, secular subjects were introduced in *Alliance* schools, but Hebrew continued to be taught — not as a spoken language, only for a better understanding of the Bible. More than two-thirds of the teaching day (70 per cent) was devoted to the study, in the French language, of arithmetic, science, history, and geography, apart from the French language and French literature. The pupils sat for French examinations: the primary school certificate and three years later, the 'brevet'. Some of the pupils were then selected to go to France to acquire modern teaching methods at the Jewish teachers' training college. In 1910, the *Alliance* school in Teheran introduced an 'oeuvre d'apprentissage'; there were 18 apprentices who learned to become printers, tailors, shoemakers, and carpenters, while one of the young men became a blacksmith.

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The Spring 1994 issue of *Les nouveaux cahiers*, a quarterly publication of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, has a special section entitled 'Les Juifs et l'Etat'. Various articles deal with several aspects of the relations between French Jewry and the state authorities. Although a September 1394 edict expelled all Jews from the French kingdom, and a March 1615 royal edict stated that all Jews, even disguised (as non Jews) should leave the country within a month, on pain of death, these decrees were not implemented: in 1550, in Bordeaux, François de Castro, Louis de Berga, and 23 other household heads obtained letters patent authorising them to live in the town. Portuguese merchants also lived in Bordeaux, in the guise of New Christians, but it was known that they adhered to some Jewish religious practices. In February 1656, the authorities are ordered to arrest and imprison Jews who have no passport or residence permit; but the order, after it was printed, was not implemented and in December of that same year, the 'Portuguese' are allowed by edict to live 'wherever they would like'. Then in Lorraine and in Alsace in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Jews are allowed to reside in various areas, to practise the religion of their fathers, and to bury their dead in special cemeteries. Meanwhile, in Bordeaux, some 300 families of Portuguese New Christians who used to baptise their children, go to mass, and marry in church in order to conform to their status of Christians and to preserve appearances, are said in 1655 by an indignant bishop to 'practise openly the Jewish religion'.

Other articles deal with the status of Jews in later periods of French history; the attitudes of monarchs such as Louis XIV and Napoleon; Zionism between the two World Wars; the French rabbinate; the French intellectuals, philosophers, and politicians; and Algerian Jews. In an introduction to the section on Jews and the French State, there is a reference to a witty comment said to have been made by David Ben-Gurion about the declaration by Léon Blum, 'Je suis français, je suis socialiste, je suis juif'; Ben-Gurion observed that in Hebrew, one reads from right to left.

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The October 1994 newsletter of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, in London, entitled *IJA News*, announces that the IJA's Council decided last July to sever its formal association with the World Jewish Congress. It adds: 'We hope to

continue to provide research materials to the WJC, and we pay tribute to the WJC's foresight in founding the IJA and supporting it over so many years'. The IJA also announced a second change: 'the establishment of an international partnership between the IJA and the American Jewish Committee (AJC), the premier US national Jewish organization dealing with the entire range of issues affecting Jews in the US and internationally. The two organizations will retain complete independence'.

*

The August 1994 issue of *Moment* magazine (published in Washington, D.C.) includes an article on 'Jews Who Choose Jesus' by Alan Edelstein. He states that a 'recent issue of the *Messianic Times*, the leading periodical of the movement, lists 144 Messianic congregations across the United States. In some cases, it is the church denominations themselves that set up Messianic synagogues as part of their commitment to Jewish evangelism; . . .'. He adds that a growing number of these synagogues, 'including Beth Yeshua in Philadelphia and Beth Messiah in Washington, D.C., are well-established, highly visible and aggressive in their outreach to the Jewish community' (p. 33).

The article reproduces (p. 36) a 'Communications Card' carried by missionaries of the Messianic Jewish Alliance of America (MJAA); it gives instructions about the 'right terminology' to use when approaching potential converts to Jewish Messianism. For example, the missionaries are told to say 'Messiah Jesus' 'Messiah Yeshua' but not 'Jesus Christ' and under the heading of 'Explanation' the first words are: 'The term "CHRIST" does not have a Jewish connotation to the average Jewish person'. Similarly, the word 'convert' should not be used and the missionaries are enjoined: 'DO SAY "Messianic / completed / fulfilled" Jew' because '"convert means to TAKE AWAY Judaism and to become a "goy", a Gentile. "Completed Jews" means to BUILD UPON OR ADD TO his Jewish heritage by gaining the atonement, gaining the Messiah and gaining a more personal relationship to God'. The term 'bible believer' must be used, not 'a Christian'; potential converts should not be invited to 'come to church' but to 'come to a meeting of Bible believers' because the term 'church' is 'too Gentile'. As for the 'New Testament', that must be referred to as '2nd part of Bible or New Covenant' because the New Testament is considered to be a non-Jewish book; and the last instruction on the Communications Card is to use the word 'tree', not 'cross' because the 'cross' has been a symbol of Jewish persecution.

In the same issue of *Moment*, there is a report by another contributor entitled 'Russian Jews Find Religion — Only it's Christianity' (p. 37). Elizabeth Soloway Snider states: 'The outreach strategy is simple: Messianic Jews generally ingratiate themselves with the Russian community by offering English lessons, free summer camps for their children and help finding housing and jobs. Only then do they offer the Russians their Cyrillic copies of the New Testament and begin "witnessing" to immigrants whose "circumstances have made them open and receptive to the Gospel", according to the North Carolina-based Chosen People Ministries'. There are more than 200,000 Jews in New York and more are arriving but a 'source at the Russian

division of the New York federation maintains that most immigrants don't buy the Jesus thing. "If Martians come tomorrow and give something for free, they [the immigrants] will take it"'. The head of the Council of Jewish Organizations apparently agrees, for she is quoted as commenting: 'Most Russian Jews at least know it isn't right to get mixed up with Jesus. . . . They have fierce pride in their Jewish identities'. One of the leaders of the New York Association for New Americans (NYANA) is of the same opinion: he states that the Russian immigrants 'are not literate in Jewish traditions, but their sense of belonging to the Jewish people, the importance to them of being Jewish, is very, very high'.

On the other hand, a rabbi in Florida who is concerned about the Messianic activities in his community says that the question, ultimately, is not how to combat Messianic evangelism but rather: 'Why aren't mainstream synagogues meeting these people's spiritual needs? The Jewish community must be prepared to educate them from scratch, to transform ethnic pride into comprehensible religious observance at a serious, intellectual level'. And the director of the Dallas Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council has pointed out: 'They may not practice what you teach, but the onus is on the community to teach them'.

These Messianic missionaries have been criticized by some Catholic and mainline liberal Protestant movements, which have now largely abandoned their efforts at converting Jews. At the Interfaith Conference of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., the proselytising activities which 'deligitimize the faith tradition' of potential converts were condemned and a 1987 statement censured in particular 'Hebrew Christians' and 'Jews for Jesus' for seeking 'to win over, often by deception, many Jews who are sincerely looking for a path back to their ancestral heritage' (p. 38). Also in 1987, three Messianic Jewish families formally tried to obtain Israeli citizenship, claiming that they were entitled to do so under the terms of the Law of Return in Israel. But the Supreme Court of Israel unanimously rejected the petition and Chief Justice Menachem Elon is quoted as stating, in his opinion: 'The Jewish people, over 2,000 years of Jewish and world history, determined that [followers of Jesus] shall no longer be considered members of the Jewish people, that they removed themselves from the people and shall not come within it' (p. 39).

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The Sociological Institute for Community Studies of Bar-Ilan University publishes *Sociological Papers*. Volume 3, no. 1, May 1994, is entitled *A Hotbed of Hatred: Conflicts in Eastern Europe*; the author is Feiwel Kupferberg, of Aalborg University in Denmark, and his 33-page text starts by setting out four main questions which 'a sociological analysis of ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe should seek to illuminate'. They are '(1) Why have ethnic conflicts become such a predominant fact of contemporary East European history? . . . (2) How do we account for the very strong degree of violence and aggression in some cases of ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe, while other conflicts have been solved in a fairly civilized and rational manner? . . . (3) . . . Why was communism, which in itself created ethnic hostility, able to contain ethnic conflicts and hatred more effectively than the post-communist regimes? . . .

(4) A sociology of ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe also raises the more general problem of the character and historical origins of the Eastern European nation-building processes'. The author concludes his analysis with the statement: 'The reason ethnic hatred is such a problem in Eastern Europe today is . . . not only because the communist concept of nation-building was artificial and thus fundamentally unstable. Another reason is the loss of the "reconcilating" dimensions of communist peace-making . . .. The Eastern Europeans expected or hoped that social security and international cooperation would be provided by their new economic and political ties with the West. As it turned out, this was far from a realistic belief'.

Volume 3, no. 2, July 1994 of *Sociological Papers* is a 10-page essay entitled *The Transition in Romania: A Theoretical Approach*, by Oscar Hoffman who is deputy director of the Institute of Sociology of the Romanian Academy.

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The Joint Authority for Jewish-Zionist Education in Jerusalem has published the first issue of *Avar ve'Atid*, or 'Past and Future'. The issue is dated September 1994 and its 'Statement of Purpose' tells readers that the journal is 'dedicated primarily to the promotion of Jewish education — in the broadest sense of the term — as the principal medium for the meaningful preservation of the historic Jewish people. The publication will reflect a *klal yisrael* orientation, an ideology of ethnical Jewish nationalism (Zionism), and analytical, dialectical discourse on crucial issues affecting the world Jewish agenda'.

The last contribution in *Avar ve'Atid* (pp. 122–26) is entitled 'What is the Joint Authority?' and the author is David Harman, who is Director-General of the Joint Authority. He states: 'The Joint Authority for Jewish-Zionist Education was organized in 1991, as a result of the pressure exerted by pro-Israel Diaspora fundraising bodies on the World Zionist Organization to establish an overall policy and coordinate the programs of its educational units, to reduce duplication and waste, and to provide more qualitative and imaginative programs to their Diaspora constituencies. . . . The Joint Authority is governed by a commission of 36 men and women from different parts of the Jewish world who were appointed by the Zionist political parties and the Diaspora's pro-Israel fundraising organizations. . . . The commission convenes thrice annually in Israel, and an executive committee of 12 members, all residents of Israel, meets bi-monthly in Jerusalem. The Authority seeks to regulate the activities of both the World Zionist Organization's former educational departments as well as those of the Jewish Agency for Israel . . .' The address of *Avar ve'Atid* and of the Joint Authority is P.O. Box 92, Jerusalem 91000, Israel.

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The first issue of *Israel Affairs*, vol. 1, no. 1, is dated 'Autumn 1994' and it is published in London by Frank Cass & Co. The publisher claims that this new quarterly journal is 'the only English-language journal dedicated to the study of the Israeli experience in all its aspects'. The first number is a special issue entitled: 'Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel'. The contributions include an article by Max Beloff on 'The Diaspora and the Peace Process'

(pp. 27–40), which ends on an optimistic note: 'Israel is bound to find more and more reasons to eradicate the isolation in which it has lived since its creation. There are already signs that the economic boycott is being diluted . . . Among the students at the "Desert Research Centre" of the Ben-Gurion University can be found Kuwaitis and Saudis. Can such a process be reversed?' (pp. 38 f.).

Another article, by Elisha Efrat, is concerned with 'Jewish Settlements in the West Bank: Past, Present and Future' (pp. 135–148). The author begins by noting: 'The future of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is amongst the thorniest and most intractable problems confronting Israeli and Palestinian peace-makers . . .' and he concludes: 'Undoubtedly the settlers will have to fight for their survival in a region increasingly governed by Palestinian autonomy. Some of them . . . will leave very soon. Others will leave when provided with alternative dwelling inside Israel itself, while a small group of extremists, the most ideological kernel among the settlers will remain under Palestinian rule and continue to claim the right of Jews to settle in all parts of Greater Israel. For how long these die-hard settlers will be able to last as a small island in a hostile ocean, and under what circumstances, remains to be seen' (p. 148).

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The 25th Annual Conference of the Oral History Society will take place at the University of the West of England, Bristol, from 21 to 23 April 1995. The conference will bring together 'historians, social scientists, theologians and students to share the fruits of their recent work into how people, whatever their creed, see religious faith and spiritual belief in their daily lives'. The joint hosts of the conference are the University of the West of England and the Department of Theology and Religious Studies of the University of Bristol.

*

This Journal published in its December 1992 issue (vol. 34, no. 2) an obituary of Elie Kedourie (1926–1992) who had been a professor of Politics at the London School of Economics and who was a member of the Advisory Board of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*. Elie Kedourie was the founding editor of *Middle Eastern Studies*, a periodical which was first published in 1964; the 30-volume index (1964–1994) of that Journal has an announcement stating that the Elie Kedourie Fund, which has been established now and which will be administered by the British Academy, will sponsor an annual lecture in Modern History. Elie Kedourie had been a Fellow of the British Academy. The announcement adds: 'A further aim of the fund will be to make grants to young scholars, of any nationality, in support of all aspects of research in Middle Eastern and Modern European History'.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Brink, T. L., ed., *Holocaust Survivors' Mental Health*, viii + 147 pp., Haworth Press, New York and London, 1944, $29.95.

Chernick, Michael, ed., *Essential Papers on the Talmud*, ix + 485 pp., N.Y. University Press, New York and London, 1994, $25.00 (hardback, $65.00).

Cotts Watkins, Susan, ed., *After Ellis Island: Newcomers and Natives in the 1910 Census*, xviii + 451 pp., Russaell Sage Foundation, New York, 1994, $49.95.

Goodkin, Judy and Judith Citron, *Women in the Jewish Community: Review and Recommendations*, foreword by Rosalind Preston, xii + 122 pp., published by Women in the Community, Alder House, Tavistock Square, London WC1 9HN, 1994, n.p.

Kushner, Tony, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination. A Social and Cultural History*, xiii + 366 pp., Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge, U.S.A., 1994, £14.00 or $22.95 (hardback, £45.00 or $54.95).

Patai, Raphael, *The Jewish Alchemists. A History and Source Book*, xv + 617 pp., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, $35.00 or £29.25.

Pincus, Fred L. and Howard J. Ehrlich, eds., *Race and Ethnic Conflict: Contending Views on Prejudice, Discrimination, and Ethnoviolence*, xv + 408 pp., Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford, 1994, £15.95 (hardback, £48.50).

Rist, Ray C., ed., *The Democratic Imagination: Dialogues on the Work of Irving Louis Horowitz*, vii + 607 pp., Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, 1994, $49.95.

Schmool, Marlena and Stephen Miller, *Women in the Jewish Community. Survey Report*, xxiii + 144 pp. plus Appendices, Women in the Community, Alder House, Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9HN, 1994, n.p.

Stone, Russell A. and Walter P. Zenner, eds., *Critical Essays on Israeli Social Issues and Scholarship* (Books on Israel, vol. III), vi + 268 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany N.Y., 1994, $16.95.

Tobach, Ethel and Betty Rosoff, eds., *Challenging Racism and Sexism: Alternatives to Genetic Explanations*, ix + 337 pp., The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, New York, 1944, $14.95 (hardback, $35.00).

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

BELOFF, Professor Lord, F.B.A. Emeritus Professor of Government and Public Administration in the University of Oxford and Emeritus Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. Chief publications: *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia* (two volumes, 1947 and 1949); *Imperial Sunset, 1897–1942* (two volumes 1969 and 1989); *Wars and Welfare: Britain 1914–1945*, 1984; and was the British editor of seven volumes of *L'Europe du XIX^e et XX^e siècles*, published between 1959 and 1967.

KATZ, Yossi; Associate Professor at Bar-Ilan University in the Department of Geography and Vice-President of the Israeli Geographical Association. Chief publications: 'Jewish Pioneer Agricultural Settlements in Western Canada' in *Journal of Cultural Geography*, vol. 14, no. 1, 1993 (joint author); 'The Palestinian Mountain Region and Zionist Settlement Policy, 1882–1948' in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2, April 1994; *Jewish Settlement in the Hebron Mountains and the Etzion Block 1940–1947* (in Hebrew), 2nd edition, 1993; *The Business of Settlement: Private Entrepreneurship in the Jewish Settlement of Palestine 1900–1914*, 1994.

SOLOMON, Norman, Ph.D. Visiting Fellow in Holocaust Studies at the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Postgraduate Studies. From 1983 to 1994, was Director of the Centre for the Study of Judaism and Jewish/Christian Religions in Birmingham. Chief publications: *Judaism and World Religion*, 1991; *The Analytic Movement: Hayyim Soloveitchick and his Circle*, 1993; and 'Jewish Divorce Law and Contemporary Society' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 25, no. 2, December 1983. Is working on *A Historical Dictionary of Judaism* scheduled for publication by Scarecrow Press in 1996.

SZNAJDER, Mario S.; Ph.D. Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Research Fellow in the Harry S. Truman Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Author of articles on the origins of Fascism and on authoritarianism and democracy published in various journals and co-author of *Birth of the Fascist Ideology* published in English in 1994 (originally published in Paris in 1989 as *Naissance de l'idéologie fasciste*).

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