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# PARADIGMS OF JEWISH ETHNICITY: METHODOLOGICAL AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Michael L. Gross

## *Introduction*

UNDERSTANDING Jewish ethnicity in the United States is largely a product of the way in which we understand ethnicity in general. Over the last ten years or so, two perspectives have emerged: the organic or primordial approach and the organizational approach. The former, perhaps the more intuitive, views ethnicity in terms of a relatively closed organic group of individuals closely bound by strong primordial ties such as race, religion, or culture. The latter, on the other hand, views ethnicity — or more precisely, ethnic affiliation — as the product of rational choice and strategic judgement based on an individual's evaluation of the most effective means available to achieve political goals within a competitive environment.<sup>1</sup> Re-emergent ethnic consciousness in the 1960s, for example, was explained not only in terms of a primordial or affective desire to discover one's roots and recover some sense of belonging, but primarily in terms of ethnic affiliations which were perceived to be politically effective and necessary for individuals to receive a fair share of goods and services.<sup>2</sup> Ethnic groups wedded affective and rational elements in an efficient political vehicle which best allowed individuals to press claims in a political system characterized by interest-group competition. This reconceptualization of ethnicity in strategic terms marked a shift away from a 'primordial' or organic conception of ethnicity towards what has been termed a 'mobilization' or 'organizational' conception. Within the structure of American pluralism, primordial ethnicity stresses ethnic persistence and particularism, while strategic or organizational ethnicity emphasizes political integration through the development of voluntary associations.

This debate also reflects the controversy which has erupted within the Jewish community over the relative merits of 'survivalism' and the effect that it should have on community norms and institutional

policies.<sup>3</sup> Among ethnic groups Jews have stood out as an anomaly because of their stubborn persistence in their host society which places them between declining white ethnic groups, on the one hand, and more persistent non-white groups on the other. This is beginning to change, however, as intermarriage rises and birth rates decline and as Jews themselves grapple with the questions of their own continuity. American Jews are beginning to realize that integration may ultimately come to mean assimilation and that the alternative, ethnic entrenchment or 'survivalism', may place them at odds with the values of American pluralism.<sup>4</sup>

Within the Jewish community, as among other groups, two broad questions about ethnicity have emerged. The first is descriptive and evaluative: what is the state of American Jewry today and what criteria should be used to evaluate the health of the community? The second question is normative: what should Jewish ethnicity look like and which norms should it conform to? This normative question is characteristic of the renewed debate over cultural pluralism: is the goal of American pluralism assimilation or integration, are democratic society and individual well-being better served by acknowledging the persistence of fundamental ethnic and cultural differences, or is the strength of American society to be found in a tempered view of ethnicity, one which restrains the corporate particularity of any ethnic, cultural, or religious group?

#### *Ethnic Persistence and Ethnic Paradigms*

Addressing these concerns depends in part on how we view the ethnic phenomenon and which paradigm we choose to evaluate the competing claims of ethnicity and multi-culturalism. Each paradigm offers a fundamentally different approach to the understanding of ethnicity and therefore tends to give disparate answers to the two questions raised above as well as leading to different methodological, normative, and policy-making ramifications. Each paradigm can be analysed along five salient dimensions: normative tradition, definition of ethnicity, dynamics of ethnic affiliation, policy-making, and the social benefits and dangers implicit in each approach. These are summarized in Table 1. The first point to be noted is that each paradigm is loosely rooted in a different philosophical tradition, roughly characterized as classical pluralism and cultural pluralism. In general, classical pluralism is essentially an outgrowth of what has been termed 'protective' democracy.<sup>5</sup> The overriding concern was unrestrained self-interest and the principal strategy regulative: if democracy could not subdue sectarian interests, it must devise a way to live with them. For Madison and other classical pluralists, such as David Truman or Robert Dahl, the answer was to be found in a broad system



## PARADIGMS OF JEWISH ETHNICITY

TABLE I. *Paradigms of Ethnicity*

	Organic Paradigm	Organizational Paradigm
<i>Normative Tradition</i>	cultural pluralism	classical pluralism
<i>Definition</i>		
Unit of Analysis	personal attributes:	ethnic political organizations:
Defining Characteristics	race descent religion shared historical background	voluntary associations bureaucratic service organizations social movements
Exclusivity/Permeability	yes/no	no/yes
Operational Definitions of Ethnicity and Measures of Community Health	intermarriage and fertility rate identity measures: friendship ties organizational affiliation linguistic/historical proficiency ritual observance	organizational effectiveness outputs: goal attainment inputs: resource mobilization membership budget size
<i>Dynamics</i>		
Group Type	expressive	instrumental
Motivation to Affiliate	affective	rational: incentive based
Ethnic Decline: Defining Characteristic	assimilation	disaffiliation
Causes of Decline	intermarriage weakening of identity/ primordial ties reduction in total numbers	inadequate incentives lack of critical mass
<i>Policy</i>		
Targeted Population	unaffiliated	critical mass
Prescriptions to Arrest Decline	parochial education ethnic programming expressive experiences	domain shift incentive shift constituency shift
<i>Ramifications</i>		
Benefits	satisfaction of primordial needs: self-identity belonging	political and strategic efficacy
Dangers	corporatism ethnic stratification	conservatism stagnation organizational persistence
Normative Implications	ethnic persistence	ethnic transition

of representative government based largely on the regulation of voluntary organizations through free association and the equal opportunity of access. Groups are offered unrestricted access to the political system commensurate with their ability to organize. Great pains were taken to emphasize the voluntary, permeable, and transitory nature of these associations so as to break rather than reinforce social cleavage. Classical conceptions of pluralism have not attached any particular significance to ethnic groups. Madison was, of course, particularly concerned with religious sectarianism but most theorists have ignored

the phenomenon and, by omission, largely view ethnic groups as simply another kind of voluntary organization.

Ethnicity and cultural distinctiveness emerged as a distinct issue at the turn of the century. Echoing John Dewey's concern for individual development through communal affiliation, Horace Kallen turned to the ethnic or cultural community as the logical vehicle for self-realization. Dewey's claim, however, was essentially non-sectarian, arguing that the kind of individualism professed by John Stuart Mill could not provide the means by which individuals could pursue moral and intellectual development. 'Valid inquiry', as Dewey termed it, could be provided only within the context of active participation in a viable community so that 'equality and freedom [were] expressed not only merely externally and politically but through personal participation in the development of a shared culture'.<sup>6</sup>

However, there is no reason to assume that the ethnic group offers any privileged vehicle for answering Dewey's concerns. To do this, Horace Kallen linked individuality to difference, and linked individual difference to corporate exclusivity. Individuals develop their individuality, to paraphrase Dewey, through participation in the development of a shared *but distinct* culture. Like Harold Isaacs and other 'primordialists', Kallen can make this move only by stipulating powerful primordial ties which bind individuals and render their participation in any shared *common* culture of dubious value.<sup>7</sup> Although Dewey emphasized the need for communal affiliation, it was left to Kallen to turn to the ethnic or cultural group as the primary political community. From these two philosophical traditions, two paradigms of ethnicity emerge — each carrying vastly different assumptions, normative prescriptions, and policy recommendations.

### *The Organic Paradigm*

In the organic paradigm, a clearly-defined set of individuals can be linked by one or more of the following criteria: race, descent, common physical attributes, shared linguistic and historical heritage, and religion. It includes members formally affiliated with the political organizations of the community, unaffiliated members, often spouses and sometimes their immediate family members, and future generations. Criteria such as these, based primarily on lineage, blood lines, and other primordial ties, come to define ethnic groups as exclusive and impermeable. Understood in this way, ethnic groups are primarily a pre-political phenomenon, the product of primordial ties antecedent to the existence of any political structure. They can also be characterized primarily as 'expressive' associations whose members are linked by affective ties and a desire to share common experiences.<sup>8</sup> They are committed to self-maintenance and continuity. Present ethnic activity

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is in a constant state of flux, largely devoted to the ongoing struggle to preserve the past for the benefit of the future. When the future becomes the present, it then undertakes the same task. There is therefore a particular concern for the integrity of the ethnic group measured by the absolute number of members at any given time and the preservation of the very primordial ties which define the group: language, shared history, other cultural artefacts, and lineage.

Methodologically, it is the strength of these primordial ties which becomes the measure of ethnic health and persistence. There are two primary indicators: a demographic measure for the number of those who qualify for ethnic membership and an identity measure which gauges the strength of ethnic identity among those who qualify. Since ethnicity is measured by these two indicators, it often fades over time and across generations and ethnicity thus defined tends to weaken. There is then an attempt to strengthen the position of the community, usually by arresting intermarriage and by developing programmes which will intensify the levels of ethnic identification.

In the case of American Jewry, the response of its leaders has usually been to retrench and to devise a policy of self-maintenance or 'survivalism'. Such a strategy has been viewed with some concern since it is far afield from many traditional Jewish goals such as the provision of social welfare and the defence of civil rights. Instead, the focus has shifted to segregative and parochial practices as well as intensified ethnic programming and day education. In broader terms, this marks a move from a goal of 'integration' as described above to one of 'particularism' — a move which has attending benefits and costs. While a primordial conception of ethnic identity might contribute to self-esteem or a sense of personal identity and security, it also carries the risk of corporatism and ethnic stratification — that is, the tendency to engender and endorse a hierarchically-arranged and ethnically-segmented social order. From nearly all perspectives, there are substantial differences between the organic and the organizational paradigms: a different unit of analysis, different methodology and policy prescriptions, and different views of the place of ethnicity within the context of American pluralism.

### *The Organizational Paradigm*

The organizational paradigm conceives the ethnic community primarily as a web of interconnected voluntary organizations and therefore the unit of analysis shifts from personal attributes and the behaviour of individuals to the structure of ethnic political organizations. These include mutual-aid societies, fraternal associations, social welfare and philanthropic agencies, and ideological or political groups. That redirects the methodology of ethnic studies from

measures of individual behaviour, such as intermarriage and friendship networks, to measures of organizational health and of effectiveness. The latter are determined not by demographic and identity factors but by empirical measures of resource mobilization (budget and membership) and historical measures of goal achievement. They focus on the efficient attainment of goods and services through collective action. Because of the unique logic of collective action, they direct their attention not to maintaining as large a homogeneous population base as possible but towards overcoming free-rider problems and achieving critical mass — that is, the *fewest* number of individuals necessary for an organization to function.<sup>9</sup> From this perspective, the organizational paradigm recognizes that individual motivations to affiliate are primarily rational rather than affective. One's participation hinges upon calculations of expected utility, affected by the chances of organizational success and the perception that one's individual contribution will make a difference. Under these circumstances, ethnic groups decline not when members lack a sufficiently strong ethnic identity but when they lack sufficient incentive and choose to disaffiliate.

Organizations use incentives to attract a member's time and money. Some members join in order to reap material advantages such as insurance or travel discounts while others join for the 'solidarity' benefits or for the fellow-feeling that comes with joining a fraternal association, a brotherhood or sisterhood. In addition, many individuals join voluntary organizations out of normative or ideological motivations — that is, a sense of duty to help in some wider struggle or political cause. Voluntary associations can therefore be characterized according to the type of incentive which attracts membership — economic, solidarity, or normative, and they decline when they can no longer offer attractive incentives and members leave and go elsewhere.<sup>10</sup> Ultimately, the associations of an ethnic community may run out of incentives — ironically, not only when they are failing to achieve their goals but when they are most successful and have achieved their major policy objectives. At this point, the ethnic group has reached the limit of its political legitimacy and slowly disintegrates. Arresting decline is a matter of introducing salient incentives through innovative organizational strategies. These may consist of shifting domains of activities, shifting incentive structures, or downscaling. Examples of successful strategies will be illustrated below in the examination of the American Jewish community.

From a normative perspective, an organizational conception of ethnicity avoids the dangers of corporatism and particularism which attend the organic paradigm. Ethnic associations are transitory and permeable, and tend to be judged according to their efficacy and ability to provide a wide variety of public and private goods. Once they have achieved their major policy goals, their legitimacy fades. There is then

## PARADIGMS OF JEWISH ETHNICITY

a danger that they may strive for self-maintenance rather than accept dissolution, with the result that they develop patterns of conservatism and stagnation. The problem of organizational persistence or survival is one which almost all voluntary associations (not only ethnic societies) eventually must face.

There are some scattered data to allow us to question the exclusive use of the organic paradigm. First, instead of exclusivity and impermeability, what we find is increasing evidence that affiliations are shed and acquired with comparative ease even among non-white ethnic groups.<sup>11</sup> Second, successful collective action does not depend upon a pool of members drawn from a large, homogeneous population; rather, the individuals needed to sustain critical mass may be drawn from small, 'privileged' groups or from a large, heterogeneous and partially-assimilated population.<sup>12</sup> Third, the incentives which are necessary to attract members may be even more appreciated by those who are more assimilated, those who have left the formal protective ethnic fold and have come to value the benefits which political organization may bring both to the individual and to other members of his group.<sup>13</sup> If this is in fact the case, one would expect ethnic leaders to be drawn from the ranks of more assimilated individuals — as is indeed the case of leadership patterns in American Jewry.<sup>14</sup> Finally, the effects of expressive programming can be partially measured: some data suggest that expressive experiences only engender ties which are weaker than those engendered by instrumental experiences.<sup>15</sup>

Although more data need to be collected, there are enough to question the validity of the organic paradigm and the hold which it has over the way in which ethnic communities are conceptualized. I will offer in the sections which follow a preliminary analysis of American Jewry from the perspective of the organizational paradigm. This requires a comparison with the methodologies and policies of the organic paradigm, and it should yield a far richer picture of an ethnic community by drawing attention to salient elements of organizational growth and decline and the directions which might be suggested so as to generate an atmosphere in which ethnic communities can thrive within a climate of pluralist democracy.

### *Paradigms of Jewish Ethnicity*

American Jewry, like many other white ethnic groups in the United States, has traditionally been analysed along the lines of the organic paradigm. Little research was carried out about its organizational dynamics, but now that has begun to change.<sup>16</sup> The assessment of the health of American Jewry has become a matter of measuring intermarriage and fertility rates as well as indicators of identity. The 1990

Jewish Population Study has been the source of a great deal of concern because those measures have pointed to a clear decline within the 'core' population — although the implications for the future of American Jewry have been the subject of much debate. Intermarriage is rising, fertility rates decreasing, and the percentage of American Jews has declined as a proportion of the general population of the United States.<sup>17</sup> Consistent with the organic paradigm, comprehensive attempts were made to measure ethnic identity qualitatively within the core population according to a number of related behavioural variables including intermarriage, friendship ties, ritual observance, and community affiliation. Two general trends have been noted. On the one hand, all measures of identity strength have weakened when the Jewish population is considered as a whole, while on the other hand, some ritual observances (especially segregative practices) are on the rise within an increasingly religious minority of the population.<sup>18</sup>

There has been considerable controversy in the interpretation of these data. Those of the 'assimilationist' school have viewed them with a good deal of foreboding and have predicted that intermarriage, declining fertility rates, and the substantial weakening of the traditional indicators of Jewish identity will inexorably lead to the dissolution of American Jewry. On the other hand, a 'transformationist' interpretation of the data attempts to refute such a picture of decline; it uses the same set of figures to stress the stabilization of the intermarriage rate (pointing out that there are also positive effects of intermarriage because many non-Jewish spouses convert to Judaism or raise their children as Jews) and the positive effects of part-time Jewish education which leads to some ritual observance including the celebration of holy days. As a result, American Jews have not become an assimilated ethnic community but a transformed one, fully aware of the civil and symbolic aspects of Jewish ethnicity.<sup>19</sup>

From the perspective of the organic paradigm, the decline in quantitative and qualitative measures of ethnicity will cause concern to both assimilationists and transformationists since a decline in the absolute numbers of adherents must adversely affect the vitality of the community, regardless of the way in which the data are interpreted. Ultimately, such vitality is evaluated from the standpoint of the attitudes and behaviour of individual members. These measures are cumulative. One can count the numbers of the core community (as the 1990 study did), build a rough measure of identity by adding various indices (such as number of Jewish friends, charitable contributions, organizational affiliation, and frequency of ritual observance) and evaluate ethnic persistence from a time study of this general index. The more individuals meeting the various criteria, the healthier the community according to that view. The controversy between assimilationists and transformationists is rooted in the method by which the population is

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counted, who goes to constitute the core population, and the comparative weights given to identity measures.

This view of ethnicity is unnecessarily short-sighted. By arguing that more is better, the organic paradigm ignores recent data which suggest, for example, that a large homogeneous population is not necessarily the ideal base for efficient organizational development and successful collective action.<sup>20</sup> But if we shift to the organizational paradigm, we see that the actor of prime importance within the ethnic community is not just the individual but that the voluntary association has a major role. The health and effectiveness of these associations might be judged by the number of their members, but this bears no relationship to the number of members in the population at large. By focusing solely on organic measures of ethnicity, one may lose sight of the organizational health of the community, a state of affairs not directly related to the performance of organic indicators and one which may be a better measure of ethnic persistence. This kind of analysis leads to the adoption of methodological approaches and normative conclusions which are different from those provided by the organic paradigm.

### *An Organizational Analysis of Jewish Ethnicity*

In contrast to the organic paradigm, the organizational paradigm of ethnicity focuses upon the structure of the voluntary associations which characterize a particular ethnic group. The first part of this analysis is concerned with the kinds of associations which typify a particular group and asks: 'what are their goals and how have they evolved over time?' An association may be classified by the types of incentives which it offers its members and by the goals which it strives for. In turn, the organizational evolution of a community reflects the relative maturity of the group — a factor which comes to bear directly upon its health and its ability to persist within the host society. The second part of this analysis gauges the effectiveness of these voluntary associations. There has been much theoretical debate about organizational effectiveness and the health of commercial organizations has often been measured by indicators such as profit and loss, market share, employee satisfaction, and flexibility and adaptability. However, since many of these indicators cannot be used in the case of voluntary associations, effectiveness may be measured by two other sets of variables: first, input factors or the ability to mobilize scarce resources (such as members and money); and second, output-factors — that is, goal achievement.<sup>21</sup> That leads to the following methodological questions: how is the community organized, what are its aims, and how successful is it in securing these aims? It must be noted that in such a case, a voluntary association may greatly differ from commercial organizations in that it can fail not only because it has become ineffective but precisely because it has been most effective and secured its major policy goals. In such a case it can be said

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that 'success breeds failure', as associations fall victim to their own success.

*A Typology of Ethnic Organizations: The American Jewish Case*

As stated above, there are various types of voluntary associations which could be classified broadly according to the incentives they offer: a) economic associations which offer material benefits; b) fraternal associations which offer solidarity benefits; and c) purposive organizations, so named because they are directed toward achieving some 'cause' or 'purpose', most often in the form of a public rather than a private good.<sup>22</sup> Within these kinds of organizations, members are motivated not by material or affective incentive but by normative incentives of duty and ideology. American Jewry's purposive organizations pursue a wide range of goals: community relations, Zionism, social welfare, religious education, and culture. There has been little research published on the evolution of associations within specific ethnic groups, but it has been noted that when individuals move up the socio-economic ladder, they tend to abandon associations which offer material and solidarity benefits in favour of joining those which offer purposive benefits and pursue public goods.<sup>23</sup> Because the provision of public goods is often stymied by the free-rider problem (that is, the rational inclination of most individuals *not* to contribute to collective undertakings), the mark of a mature community is to be found precisely in its ability to sustain purposive organizations.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, a shift back to material or solidarity associations and an inability to sustain purposive voluntary associations would be an indication of community decline. The development of these organizations provides a

TABLE 2. *Jewish Organizational Evolution since 1900*  
(number of national organizations classified by organizational type and purpose)

	Economic	Solidarity				Purposive				
	Mutual Aid	Frater- nal <sup>1</sup>	Profes- sional	Women's Youth	Youth	Comm'ty Relations	Zionist	Religious, Education, Welfare Cultural	Social	Refugee
1907	20	4	4	2	-	2	6 <sup>3</sup>	17	9	3
1917	21	8	7	4	6 <sup>2</sup>	4	11 <sup>3</sup>	23	17	3
1926	16	16	10	9	20 <sup>2</sup>	5	17	48	15	4
1933	15	15	12	12	21 <sup>2</sup>	5	23	50	18	5
1945	16	22	16	19	29 <sup>2</sup>	13	38	84	19	17
1960	16	5	26	20	21	13	53	76	17	12
1975	11	6	33	20	29	18	55	94	20	10
1989	10	6	29	16	22	19	60	99	19	10

<sup>1</sup> Figures include veterans' associations, B'nai B'rith and social clubs

<sup>2</sup> Youth figures exclude 37 college fraternities and sororities in 1945, 43 in 1933, 25 in 1917 and 6 in 1907. By 1960 most fraternities were no longer being listed.

<sup>3</sup> Figures include 1 socialist organization in 1907 and 2 in 1917.

Source: *American Jewish Year Book — 1907-1991*



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measure of ethnic persistence which functions independently of the organic measures of ethnicity cited above.

The importance of a salient incentive structure can first be seen by simply looking at the numbers and types of organizations as they have evolved over time. Table 2 illustrates the shift in types of organization since 1907<sup>25</sup> and although this reflects only the number of associations (membership and budgets are considered below), it does point to changes in the type of dominant association since the turn of the century. Reading across the table shows the organizational structure at a given historical period, while reading down the table shows the evolution of various types of association over time. Although many offer mixed incentives, they have been classified by the most dominant incentive offered. In general there has been a clear move away from material and solidarity associations toward purposive organizations, a shift indicative of a steadily maturing community and consistent with the hypothesis that material and solidarity incentives lose their appeal as socio-economic status improves.

Until the First World War, it was still possible to differentiate between Eastern European Jewish and German Jewish associations. By and large, the former were dominated by mutual-aid societies while the latter were beginning to develop national purposive organizations, particularly in the areas of community relations and of refugee relief. By the 1920s membership of Eastern European Jewish societies began to decline<sup>26</sup> but not in a uniform manner. The first to lose members were those dependent primarily on material incentives, usually in the form of insurance benefits. Those providing innovative solidarity incentives such as 'family circles' (family rather than male-based societies) were active until the Second World War, and those able to integrate purposive or normative incentives, such as the socialist Workmen's Circle, still survive.<sup>27</sup> Associations offering mainly solidarity benefits have exhibited a mixed trend since the turn of the century. Those such as college fraternities and clubs and the B'nai B'rith, a mass-based men's fraternal organization, grew steadily until the late 1950s. College fraternity affiliation waned with the general decline of these associations in the 1960s while the B'nai B'rith has failed to attract younger, particularly third-generation, American Jewish men.<sup>28</sup> In the late 1960s and the first part of the 1970s, youth groups and women's associations grew appreciably in membership — probably in response to the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The youth associations then declined, in spite of substantial increased funding by their parent organizations in the past two decades (see Table 3). On the other hand, women's groups have generally continued to grow in membership and in income throughout the 1980s and they appear to be the dominant Jewish fraternal organization today. (They will be considered below.)

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TABLE 3. *Membership and Budget Trends in Selected Major Jewish Organizations*

Budget Trends (adjusted gross income)						
<i>Membership Trends (reported number of members)</i>						
Organization (Purpose)	% change 1949-59	% change 1959-72	% change 1972-80	% change 1980-89	% change 1989-91	Income, 1991 (millions) <i>Total Membership</i>
<i>Purposive Organizations</i>						
United Jewish Appeal (domestic and Israel)	-37	+91	-12	+7	+22	1,100 (pledges including Exodus)
Anti Defamation League (antisemitism)	-33	+100	-1	+73	-16	32.4
Am. Jew. Committee (community relations)	-22 +52	+133 +45	-15 +2	+3 +9	-13 -11	18.6 40,000
Am. Jew. Congress (community relations, Zionism)	-22 <i>nc</i>	+69 -20	-14 <i>nc</i>	+6 +25	-16 <i>nc</i>	6.1 50,000 (1989)
Jewish Labour Committee (community relations)	-64	-36	-19	-40	-9	.6
NACRAC (community relations)	+25	+81	-4	-1	+10	1.6
Zionist Org. America (Zionism)	-25 <i>na</i>	+70 +8	<i>na</i> +31	<i>na</i> 0	<i>na</i> -66	<i>na</i> 50,000
Joint Distribution Comm. (refugee relief)	+6	-50	0	+108* +45**	-31** -53**	88.7** 42.7**
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Soc. (refugee relief)	-3	-38	+416* +67**	-20* -61**	-63* -15**	11.7* 4.4**
Union of Amer. Hebrew Cong. (religious)	+27	+41 (1959-74)	+28 (1974-86)	+12 (1986-91)		11.5
Jewish Education Service of North America	+10	+107	-16	+2	-11	1.3
Jewish Publication Society (cultural)	+23	+70	-31	+18		2.3
Jewish Welfare Board (social welfare)	+4	+26	-13	-5	-15	5.3
<i>Solidarity Organizations</i>						
Pioneer Women	+7 +25	-10 <i>nc</i>	-29 <i>nc</i>	-41	+5	3.0 50,000 (1989)
Hadassah (women)	+12 +20	+48 <i>nc</i>	-17 +15	+17 -4	-4 <i>nc</i>	74.4 385,000
National Council Jewish Women	+10 +29	+25 -9	-8 <i>nc</i>	+9 <i>nc</i>	+17 <i>nc</i>	5.5 100,000
ORT (women)	<i>na</i> +50				<i>nc</i>	145,000
B'nai B'rith Women	<i>nc</i>	-1	+11	-20		120,000
Hillel (college youth)	+49	+77	-6	+27	-4	17.2
B'nai B'rith Youth Org.	+116 +51	+66 -29 (to 1974)	+4 +6	0 -26	-12	8.0 25,000 (1989)
National Federation Temple Youth	+165 <i>nc</i>	+42 +66	+53 <i>nc</i>	-42 -50	+7	.8 20,000 (1989)
Young Judea (youth)	-20 <i>nc</i>	+118 <i>nc</i>	+61 -33	+60 -35	-6	2.4 6,500 (1989)
United Synagogue Youth	<i>na</i>		-27	-13		14,100 (1989)
B'nai B'rith (men)	+179 (1945-57)	-50 (1957-69)		-32 (1957-87)		136,000 (1987)

\* includes U.S. federal funding; \*\*excludes U.S. federal funding; nc = no change; na = not available

## PARADIGMS OF JEWISH ETHNICITY

Apart from women's associations, it is purposive organizations which dominate American Jewry; they were established on a national scale in the early part of the twentieth century and were firmly in place by 1920. The major organizations include the American Jewish Committee (civil rights and overseas relief), the American Jewish Congress (civil rights, Zionism, and overseas relief), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (overseas relief), the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith (civil rights), the Women's Zionist Organization of America or Hadassah (women's issues and Zionism), and the Zionist Organization of America (Zionism). By this time, Jewish trade unions and the rudiments of major Jewish charitable federations were also firmly in place. Purposive organizations have continued to grow in number in all fields, although not at equal rates. In the early part of the century, concerns were dominated by social welfare and were largely the purview of the German Jewish community. The number of social welfare associations has held fairly constant but social welfare is no longer the dominant aim of purposive associations: it has yielded to Zionist, communal, religious, and educational organizations. Growth appears to have slowed in the last decade, however. Among Zionist organizations, the small increase since 1975 was the result of the establishment of 'progressive' Zionist groups (particularly after the Lebanese War) while among the others, growth has occurred among associations which are Holocaust-related, such as museums.

Since the turn of the century, the entire organizational structure of the Jewish community has witnessed a move towards purposive voluntary associations. Organizations emphasizing solely material or solidarity benefits have declined dramatically; the dominant organizations today are women's groups and a wide variety of purposive associations. On the face of it, this might denote a fairly convincing picture of community strength. However, one must then consider the effectiveness and health of the associations themselves. Organizational effectiveness, as noted earlier, can be analysed according to input factors — the ability of the association to mobilize resources in the form of members and money — and to output factors — the ability of the association to meet its goals.

### *Organizational Effectiveness: Input and Output Factors*

Table 3 reflects the membership and budget trends of selected major national Jewish organizations over the last 40 years.<sup>29</sup> The data point to an emerging pattern of stagnation, although there are variations. In general this pattern is cyclical as organizations respond to historical traumas such as the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War, and the emigration of Soviet Jewry. That is not unexpected and in and of itself is certainly indicative of a resourceful if not vibrant community structure. The greatest expansion of resources was at the time of the Six-Day

War while the period encompassing the 1973 war showed no such sustained growth.<sup>30</sup> Although there was a remarkable response to the 1973 war, in adjusted figures the pledges made to the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) in 1974 have not been surpassed: the energy could not be sustained.

An examination of the solidarity and of the purposive associations reveals that without exception the strongest periods of growth for the former were in 1949–1959 and 1959–1972 and that soon after, effective resource mobilization waned — first in societies such as B'nai B'rith and then in the youth associations. This trend was not reversed by the historical trauma of the Six-Day war of 1967 or by Operation Exodus (the mass emigration of Soviet Jews which began in 1991). The membership and budgets of women's associations, on the other hand, have continued to grow steadily in spite of erratic income in the 1970s. It was an unexpected development, for in spite of their stated ideological (Zionist) and philanthropic goals, these associations still draw members by providing fraternal benefits. One would have expected that the attractiveness of these incentives would decline as more women work outside the home and have less leisure time to join local chapters. In fact, some of these associations have adapted successfully to changing circumstances by repackaging fraternal benefits — the Women's Zionist Organization, Hadassah, has established professional chapters (for example, affiliates for nurses or lawyers), singles groups, and evening meetings. Moreover, while continuing to emphasize their traditional normative concerns with Zionism and philanthropy, the associations have been reinvigorated by women's issues, particularly reproductive rights. Further research is needed to determine whether the success of Hadassah and of other women's societies is a peculiar Jewish phenomenon or part of a resurgence of women's fraternal organizations in the wider society.<sup>31</sup>

In the case of most of the purposive associations surveyed, organizational resources declined in the 1950s, rose in the 1960s, declined again in the 1970s, and began to rise slowly in the 1980s. Since 1989, however, there has been some indication that resources are beginning to diminish; but the changes have not been uniform. In the case of refugee associations, the trends reflect the cycles of Soviet emigration and the availability of United States federal support. Although the resources of many community-relations organizations have declined since 1980, those of the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith have remained unusually strong. That was due to the adoption of unique strategies and will be considered below. Among other associations, particularly the United Jewish Appeal, growth figures can be misleading since some local charitable federations reported for the first time that they needed to borrow money commercially or to invade endowment funds in order to meet their commitments.<sup>32</sup>

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It has often been claimed that Jewish communal associations in America have a prodigious ability to mobilize resources, but as we saw above, the picture which emerges is not monolithic but cyclical, subject to a number of socio-economic and historical factors. There has been some stagnation in recent years but it is difficult to account for it solely in terms of waning identity measures. First, there is no clear connection between identity indicators and communal participation. In earlier years, Jewish associations drew their leaders from the ranks of the more assimilated; in 1965, for example, when associations were committed primarily to instrumental causes, identity strength was not an indicator of philanthropic activity — a finding consistent with other studies which have discovered little correlation between strong identity measures and successful ethnic mobilization.<sup>33</sup> Second, the decline in organizational affiliation has not been accompanied by a concomitant decline in many indicators of ethnic identity. Steven Cohen, in fact, has argued that indicators of ethnic identity have stabilized while attachment to the purposive associations surveyed here has declined.<sup>34</sup> This, in turn, is reflected in changing organizational preferences. Older members have maintained what can be described as cosmopolitan concerns: social welfare, civil liberties, and the preservation of democratic society while younger members are decidedly more parochial since their concerns are dominated by ethnic persistence if not particularism: culture, education, and identity.<sup>35</sup> Both groups exhibit different, albeit strong, measures of identity but younger members have disaffiliated from community associations. Thus, what is thought to be attenuated identity cannot account for recent organizational stagnation.

Apart from this, one is compelled to look at stagnation in relation to the ability of an association to achieve its aims. On the one hand, stagnation can result when associations fail, when they are no longer capable of reaching their goals and of providing the necessary purposive incentives. However, in a phenomenon unique to voluntary associations, organizations can stagnate precisely when they have been most effective, when they have attained their major policy goals. In such circumstances, it is success which breeds failure — not organizational collapse or attenuated identity.

### *Goal Achievement*

Goal achievement offers another avenue by which organizational effectiveness can be measured. All associations strive to attain specific goals and the first reaction is to judge effectiveness by measuring the extent to which these goals are achieved. However, such an approach must take into account various methodological problems. First, the goals are not always clear-cut and stated aims may differ from actual aims, while the goals of members may differ from those of the

association's leadership. Second, there are no definite measures by which to gauge goal attainment; consensus is a common method but as will be seen in the case of antisemitism, objective and subjective measures often conflict. Finally, there are cases when there can be no certainty that an association's goal has been achieved solely or mainly as a result of that association's efforts. With these caveats in mind, four major policy goals can be delineated and we may tentatively conclude that they have largely been achieved and are no longer sufficiently compelling to motivate many individuals to take up the cause.

Traditionally, there have been four clearly-defined goals: political liberty and the reduction of antisemitism; adequate social welfare services for members; the rescue of Jewish refugees; and Zionism. These goals have changed little since the 1920s and concern for the Land of Israel still dominates the communal agenda. While the problem of antisemitism and the rescue of Jewish refugees tend to vary according to circumstances, the provision of social welfare no longer has the importance which it used to have: it has given way to concerns for survival, intermarriage, ethnic identity, and education.

Although no one could convincingly argue that the major policy goals cited above have been entirely achieved, the question remains whether they are sufficiently salient in order to motivate individuals to affiliate with the community. Two broad measures of goal achievement are available: one subjective and the other objective. Subjective measures are derived from attitudinal surveys while objective measures reflect historical indicators. Obviously, this is problematic since a lack of concern about antisemitism (among leaders, for example) does not necessarily mean that the threat of antisemitism has, in fact, abated. Objective, historical, and empirical indicators, though, are even more problematic: we might readily gauge the present state of antisemitism, for example, but we cannot easily assess all future threats to the State of Israel.

The subjective indicators of the threat of antisemitism tend to diverge. While Jewish leaders have gradually considered antisemitism to be of secondary importance, community members have claimed that it is quickly becoming a source of overriding concern.<sup>36</sup> Objectively, it is difficult to show that antisemitism in the United States has ever been seriously life-threatening; but it has given cause to complain justifiably about social, legal, and economic discrimination.<sup>37</sup> Although White Americans have manifested decreasing antisemitism since the 1960s — partly because of an increasing awareness of civil rights and liberties — Jews have experience of an especially virulent form of Black antisemitism as well as the acrimony of left-wing movements. They have also suffered as a result of the general perception among many Americans that Judaism and Zionism are inextricably linked. Strong anti-Administration stands by the pro-Israel lobby (the American Israel

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Public Affairs Committee — AIPAC) and protracted legislative battling have also raised the question of dual loyalty, an accusation particularly worrying for American Jews. On the whole, however, empirical surveys have indicated a significant decline in antisemitic attitudes, particularly among young Americans, since the 1950s.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, most Jews are reporting little discrimination and state that social, educational, and occupational positions are open to them.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, as we saw above, appreciable numbers have expressed concern about the threat of antisemitism in the United States. There have been explanations for this state of affairs by referring to specific recent events: instances of Black antisemitism; the riots in Crown Heights, New York, in 1991; the Pollard affair (in which an American Jewish naval technician was convicted of spying for Israel); and recent clashes between Jewish leaders and the Bush administration about government policies towards Israel. Although such events have not been shown to have much effect on the majority of non-Jewish Americans and on their attitudes to American Jews, the latter have continued to manifest anxiety.<sup>40</sup> One might also note here the efforts of the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith (ADL) to create an awareness of antisemitism among members of the community. The ADL is the only Jewish organization devoted almost exclusively to the fight against antisemitism and prejudice and it is the only Jewish association among major organizations to have registered a steep rise in its revenues in the 1980s — precisely during the years in which antisemitism was thought to have diminished.

With the decline of antisemitism by the end of the 1970s, revenues began to fall off as the ADL was faced with the prospect of achieving its policy goals. With success, there would be little incentive for members to continue to contribute resources. The ADL chose two strategies: the first was to emphasize within the Jewish community the continued threat of antisemitism and the second was to shift domains and publicize its expertise in the field of 'prejudice reduction'. The ADL was successful on both fronts and at the beginning of 1978 it undertook a campaign to monitor antisemitic incidents; the episodes were confined to property crimes (particularly vandalism and later, arson) and to crimes against persons — that is, assault, threats, and harassment. Such occurrences showed a slight rise in the early 1980s, a decline in the mid-1980s, then an increase from 1986 onwards.<sup>41</sup> However, it is not clear whether these numbers have any significance in the wider context of crimes generally committed throughout the United States. For example, how should we evaluate the 929 acts of vandalism, 60 cases of physical assault (including one murder), and 890 cases of harassment reported by the ADL in 1991? Must they lead one to conclude that antisemitism constitutes a renewed threat to American Jews? Most Jewish leaders maintain that there is not such a danger and that this is

confirmed by most empirical studies. But according to the ADL and to many American Jews, there still is a major threat; the ADL's audit for 1991 described the murder in Crown Heights, New York as the 'first lynching of a Jew in the United States since Leo Frank in 1915'.<sup>42</sup>

The reduction of antisemitism is a policy goal which has been substantially achieved. This has been recognized by the ADL and it has shifted domains in an effort to raise funds from non-Jewish sources. As awareness of racial and sexual prejudice increased in the United States the ADL, with a long-standing record of protecting civil liberties, now approached corporate bodies and submitted plans for programmes of 'prejudice reduction' — which proved to be so popular that according to some accounts, corporate non-Jewish contributions matched those from Jews.<sup>43</sup> The ADL also opted for decentralization and created more branch offices as well as increasing the personnel in existing offices. Other community-relations associations have adopted a different strategy. When the American Jewish Committee (which is also dedicated to preserving and enhancing civil liberties) suffered a declining membership in the 1960s, it responded not only by deciding to decentralize and to increase the number of local chapters, but it also offered grassroots incentives: aid to local businesses, newsletters, and community archives.<sup>44</sup> Its membership then climbed through the 1970s but again has been in decline since the early 1980s, perhaps attesting to the comparative weakness of material incentives as a factor for sustained organizational growth.

Policy aims, other than those concerned with civil liberties, do not lend themselves to such a clear-cut analysis. Subjective indicators of the comparative importance of social welfare goals are virtually non-existent; such goals are simply not cited as an important issue on the community agenda<sup>45</sup> — as shown by the fact that social welfare budgets have failed to grow at a rate comparable with other agency budgets.<sup>46</sup> That, in turn, reflects objective indicators of organizational success: the Jewish community has become wealthier, non-Jews have replaced Jews as the primary recipients of many Jewish social-agency services, and the federal government has assumed the major burden of funding social services.<sup>47</sup> As a result, local charitable federations spend smaller amounts on social welfare programmes, although there are still significant numbers of impoverished Jewish households.<sup>48</sup> As social welfare needs decline, they have been replaced by an increasing concern for ethnic identity, education, and assimilation and alienation. This marks a shift away from an organizational paradigm of ethnicity towards one which focuses upon organic concerns and ethnic persistence.

Like social welfare, refugee needs were goals of considerable importance during the first part of the present century; by 1950 they were considered less pressing and all but died<sup>49</sup> only to be reinvigorated in



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recent years by the plight of Soviet and other Disapora Jews (particularly the Ethiopians). However, since the issue of Soviet Jewry was subject to changing historical events, it does not appear as a consistent item of concern for Jewish leaders. In the 1990 leadership survey it does not figure at all, while in 1978 it ranked in importance only second to that of the survival of Israel. In between, in the 1981–82 population survey, it ranked last — behind assimilation, antisemitism, the security of Israel, and Jewish education.<sup>50</sup> It is also difficult to predict the extent of the importance of rescuing distressed brethren in the future. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been no obvious indication that the country's Jews still wish to emigrate in very great numbers, while a major proportion of the only other large distressed community, that of the Jews of Ethiopia, was transported to Israel in 1991. There are present indications that the issue will become mainly the responsibility of the State of Israel, assisted primarily by the United States. Indeed, there has been a significant drop in the budgets of HIAS and the Joint and local federations are no longer earmarking funds for the emigration and absorption of Jews from the former Soviet Union.<sup>51</sup>

The remaining policy goal to be considered now is that of the security of Israel. A strong case can be made that the other major policy aims — civil liberties, refugee relief, and social welfare — have largely been met; but it is considerably more difficult to claim that Israel is undeniably secure. However, all one need argue is not that this goal has been entirely achieved, but only that it has receded in importance. Although communal leaders tend to voice more concern than do communal members, the trend among both groups in recent years has been to give Israel's security a lower priority on the communal agenda<sup>52</sup> and local concerns have taken precedence, with more funds being consistently and increasingly reallocated to local agencies.<sup>53</sup> These subjective indicators give weight to the conclusion that Zionist aims are effectively being achieved and that communal concern ought gradually to be directed elsewhere.

However, objective indicators of organizational success cannot be so easily measured: there is no agreed reliable method of assessing a present or future risk to a nation. In the case of Israel, 1948 (the War of Independence), 1967 (the Six-Day War), and 1973 (the Yom Kippur War) were watersheds which marked mortal threats to the Jewish State. Although the last few years have witnessed some comparative measure of security, further serious fears cannot be ruled out given the potential menace, for example, of regional nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, as the impression of security is increasingly accepted subjectively and increasingly compelling objectively, it will become more difficult for Zionist organizations to recruit or retain members. But it would certainly be misleading to interpret this evidence as indicative of a weakening ethnic identity and a failure of ethnic

education, since it is only the *urgency* of the goal of Israel's security, like that of the other major policy goals surveyed above, which has become attenuated.

*Summary of Agenda Setting and Goal Achievement*

The data and historical analysis in this paper suggest that communal organizations have exhibited remarkable flexibility in their ability to mobilize resources, achieve policy goals, and adapt to changing situations. Contributions from community members have kept pace with both inflation and the relative wealth of the community, most traditional policy goals have been met, and some associations have shown an ability to adapt by shifting domains or by manipulating incentives. But their very success has meant that many fraternal and purposive societies are faced with a declining membership and a declining income, with pressure exerted on them to trim their budgets in favour of local needs.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, the general level of affiliation to communal associations continues to decline so that one is led to conclude that individuals are not transferring their allegiance from one society to another but are continuing to disaffiliate. The organizational responses have varied, as we saw; the Anti-Defamation League has regained contributions by changing its strategy, and others like the local federations retrench, reintroduce material incentives and expressive experiences, relegate national organizations to secondary importance, and see more cosmopolitan leaders and members being replaced by those whose concerns are parochial. This shift towards conservatism and bureaucratic self-maintenance can be said to define a new cycle in communal evolution, one which marks what might be termed a 'post-mature' community. Such a community will witness increasing disaffiliation on the part of most members and increased segregation on the part of a minority as it attempts to come to grips with the failure

*Communal Life-cycles*

	<i>Pre-mature</i>	<i>Mature</i>	<i>Post-mature</i>
Organizational Goal	consolidation	integration	survival
Primary Goods Sought	private	public	mixed
Dominant Type of Organization	instrumental: economic	instrumental: purposive	expressive
Primary Incentive Structure	material	normative	solidarity
Organizational Strategy	decentralization, multiple start-ups	centralization, strong national organization, federations, consolidation of domains	decentralization, retrenchment, downsizing, conservatism
Leadership	mixed	assimilated	parochial

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caused by its very success. These changes in communal life-cycles are summarized below.

If one is to try to depict these periods historically, account must be taken of the fact that there are really at least two Jewish communities: the German and the Eastern European — and perhaps a third in the form of Jewish women's groups. Each might be seen to have passed through these phases at different times. The German Jews started this process in the mid-nineteenth century, with an extensive network of mutual-aid societies and social clubs. These began to wane by the turn of the century and were augmented primarily by philanthropic groups and social service agencies. Several factors accounted for that: rising socio-economic status, the growth of personalized philanthropy and of ideals of noblesse oblige, and the general growth of voluntary associations at the turn of the century. Among the Eastern Europeans that process began with massive immigration at the end of the nineteenth century. As noted earlier, mutual-aid societies dominated in the very beginning but were then slowly replaced by mass-based fraternal associations, national community-relations organizations, and federated charities. In both communities, the first phase was one of consolidation and of attempts to maintain essential social services for the members. Early associations provided private goods, were primarily services for fees, and proliferated as numerous, disconnected organizations. Once basic social services were secured, the community began to mature, particularly as socio-economic status improved.

In its mature phase, integration replaced consolidation as the primary organizational goal. From the perspective of the organizational paradigm, members of ethnic groups develop increasingly sophisticated methods to compete for scarce goods and resources. Because of the wide array of objectives sought and the multi-faceted arena in which they are pursued — legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic at the local, state, and federal level — successful ethnic groups are those which have developed a multi-dimensional and variegated network of associations, each secure in its own domain and often united in centralized political organizations. Members may have a complex set of motivations which lead them to join and it is therefore necessary to offer mixed incentives in order to overcome the free-rider problems inherent in the provision of public goods. Integration occurs when there is a successful establishment of political organizations which are capable of mobilizing the resources necessary to press the claims of their members. In the mature stage, these associations tend to offer both affective and normative incentives under the direction of strong but assimilated leaders, individuals who have progressed beyond parochial ethnicity.

Post-maturity describes a decline in ethnic political associations brought about by their very success. After integration, the purposive

goals lose salience and organizations have to fight for their very survival. Their leadership becomes increasingly parochial and the associations once again look to the satisfaction of local needs at the expense of national needs and are then characterized by conservatism: little or no budget growth, declining membership, and an inability to adapt to changing concerns. However, there are exceptions: Jewish women's organizations are still flourishing because of the appeal which social (solidarity) benefits continue to have and because they are reinvigorated by salient women's issues.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, it might even be argued that they have not yet entered a post-mature phase.

In this paper, post-maturity has been depicted as a distinct life-cycle in the evolution of American Jewry and it will be interesting to see whether further research among other groups will reveal a similar pattern. In the United States, some groups are still consolidating (Blacks and Hispanics) and others are maturing and intergating (Korean-Americans). Then there are those which declined at an accelerated rate following maturity (Italians and German Americans, for example) apart from the Jews who now appear to be entering a period of post-maturity.

#### *Conclusion*

The question which arises from the above analysis is whether the trend towards disaffiliation and post-maturity represents a desirable state of affairs within the context of American democracy. Again, the answer depends upon the paradigm chosen to address questions of ethnicity. Within the context of the organic paradigm, that trend is not desirable and has spawned a doctrine of ethnic particularism and survivalism. However, when viewed from the perspective of the organizational paradigm and its commitment to classical pluralism, this steady disaffiliation is not all that undesirable. If the failure to endure results from the very success of the group's endeavours, as has happened in the Jewish community, then classical pluralism offers no solace. The organizational paradigm defines an ethnic group primarily in terms of the integrity of its voluntary associations. If these fade then the community, primordial ties notwithstanding, will begin to disintegrate. Pluralist democracy, like many other forms of democracy, enjoins citizens to become responsible political actors. When ethnic ties are expeditious — that is, at the pre-mature and mature phases of development — pluralism facilitates, if not encourages ethnic political associations whose purpose is to secure the political goals of their members. However, it stops short of recognizing corporate legitimacy, cognizant of the fact that it ultimately skews the individualistic foundation which lies at the core of American democracy. Classical pluralism walks a thin line, for while it encourages ethnic *integration* through the

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formation of segregated political associations, it does not alter the fact that normative theory and political practice remain adverse to ethnic *persistence*. Ethnic groups need to recognize this upper limit; if they do not and strive to push for ethnic persistence regardless of the instrumental value of their association, then systemic forces may assert themselves in a manner contrary to that envisioned by advocates of multi-culturalism. In entering a stage of post-maturity the theoretical limits of normative pluralist democracy and the evolution of ethnic communities — characterized in this paper by the American Jewish community — appear to dovetail. Apart perhaps from women's groups, members of most associations have, in spite of the many efforts of their organizing elites, either voluntarily disaffiliated or reinterpreted their associations in terms of expressive goals. It appears that the majority of American Jews may now increasingly exhibit a tendency to disaffiliate, while a significant minority has embraced expressive goals and segregative religious practices.

The organizational paradigm presented here suggests a model of ethnicity which not only reflects the normative principles of democratic pluralism but offers an added dimension for better understanding the state of American Jewry today. From the perspective of this paradigm there is little that one can or *should* do to prevent individuals from disaffiliating from the community as policy goals are achieved and members turn their interests elsewhere. Successful organizations are those which have been sufficiently flexible to be able to shift domains and redefine incentives. That may require an association to embrace non-Jewish issues (as some women's groups have done) or even to acquire a non-Jewish constituency (as the Anti-Defamation League has done). The policy goals would thus be redefined in instrumental or purposive terms, or associations would join forces with constituencies which have legitimate political aims — and in such cases there would be no normative objections to organizational persistence. Under these circumstances, post-maturity would constitute a period of continued activity for some organizations.

To make predictions about the future of a post-mature community as described here would go beyond the scope of this paper. Like the debate which takes place within the organic paradigm, here too one might conceive of 'assimilationist' and 'transformationist' perspectives. However, any such debate must take place within the normative framework of the organizational paradigm. This recognizes that democratic pluralism encourages groups to make claims which are fundamentally of a political nature — claims about equality, civil liberties, social welfare — and not about the preservation of cultural distinction. It also recognizes that distinct cultural claims are transitory and although often essential for the realization of political efficacy, they are subordinate to political claims. When the latter are achieved, as in the

case of American Jewry, the former logically and, it appears, empirically, tend to expire as well.

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NOTES

<sup>1</sup> For primordial approaches to ethnicity see Harold Isaacs, *The Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change*, New York, 1978. For a discussion of organizational or mobilization approaches see Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity, Theory and Experience*, Cambridge, 1975, pp. 1–26 and James McKay, 'An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationist Approaches to Ethnic Phenomena', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 54, 1982, pp. 395–420.

<sup>2</sup> Daniel Bell, 'Ethnicity and Social Change', in Glazer and Moynihan, eds., op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 171. Talcott Parsons has also noted the voluntary aspect of ethnic groups and the fact that they are no longer as mutually exclusive as they once were: see Talcot Parsons, 'Some Theoretical Considerations on the Nature and Trend of Change of Ethnicity', in Glazer and Moynihan, eds., op. cit. in Note 1 above, pp. 53–83.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Steven M. Cohen and Leonard Fein, 'From Integration to Survival: American Jewish Anxieties in Transition', *Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, number 480, July 1985, pp. 75–88 and Michael Gross, 'Looking beyond Survivalism: The Challenge of Pluralist Democracy', *Midstream*, forthcoming.

<sup>4</sup> In a very candid description of this dilemma, Steven Bayme stated: '... we must recognize that formation of a distinctive Jewish identity may well be offensive to many. A distinctive Jewish identity may in some ways run counter to the universalistic norms of American society': Steven Bayme, 'Foreword', in Steven M. Cohen, *Content or Continuity? Alternative Bases for Commitment, The 1989 National Survey of American Jews*, New York, 1991.

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of protective and developmental democracy, see C. B. MacPherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, Oxford, 1977 and David Held, *Models of Democracy*, Stanford, 1987.

<sup>6</sup> John Dewey, *Individualism Old and New*, New York, 1929, p. 17. For a good review of the history of cultural pluralism see John Higham, 'Ethnic Pluralism in Modern American Thought', in Higham, *Send These to Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America*, New York, 1975. Unlike Higham, I do not see cultural pluralism as simply a manifestation of classical pluralism but as an

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outgrowth of a different sort of democracy, that which has been described as 'developmental' democracy.

<sup>7</sup> See Horace Kallen, *Democracy and Culture in the United States*, New York, 1970, pp. 61 and 94 and Harold Isaacs, *op. cit.* in note 1 above, pp. 29–52.

<sup>8</sup> See C. Wayne Gordon and Nicholas Babchuck, 'A Typology of Voluntary Organizations', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, 1959, pp. 22–29.

<sup>9</sup> See Russell Hardin, *Collective Action*, Baltimore, 1982.

<sup>10</sup> The best introduction to the subject of incentive structures and voluntary organizations is still James Q. Wilson, *Political Organization*, New York, 1974.

<sup>11</sup> Orlando Patterson, 'Content and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance: A Theoretical Framework and Caribbean Case Study', in Glazer and Moynihan, eds., *op. cit.* in Note 1 above. Even among Jews, the latest population study now includes as part of the Jewish community two million Gentiles or Jews who converted to another religion. This represents almost 25% of the present total Jewish population: see Barry Kosmin, *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey*, New York, 1991, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> Privileged groups are those in which each has sufficient motivation to provide a public good. They are generally unworried by free-riders, and can afford to pay for all or most of the good themselves: Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Cambridge, 1971. Within ethnic communities this often leads to elitism as it translates into the 'big-giver' whose co-operation is often the target of intense efforts by the organizational leadership. On the other hand, building a larger association may be facilitated by access to a large, heterogeneous pool of individuals, increasing the probability that a sufficient number of them will find an adequate incentive to join: see P. Oliver, G. Marwell, and R. Teixeira, 'A Theory of Critical Mass I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Public Goods', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 91, no. 3, 1985, pp. 522–56. Both these circumstances differ from those stipulated by the organic paradigm.

<sup>13</sup> This has been noted in recent studies of ethnic mobilization in which more assimilated communities have exhibited greater degrees of mobilization. See Susan Olzak, 'Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization', *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 9, 1983, pp. 355–74; 'Ethnic Mobilization in Quebec', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3, 1982, pp. 253–73; and Joanne Nagel and Susan Olzak, 'Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Extension of the Competition Model', *Social Problems*, vol. 30, no. 2, 1982, pp. 126–43.

<sup>14</sup> Charles Liebman, 'New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies', in *American Jewish Year Book*, New York, 1979 and Jacob Ukeles, *American Jewish Leadership: A Study*, New York, 1991.

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, M. Hanks, 'Youth, Voluntary Organizations, and Political Socialization', *Social Forces*, vol. 60, no. 1, September 1981, pp. 211–23, and M. Hanks and Bruce Ecklund, 'Adult Voluntary Associations and Adolescent Socialization', *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 19, Summer 1978, pp. 481–90.

<sup>16</sup> See Daniel J. Elazar, *The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry*, New York, 1976 and Liebman, *op. cit.* in Note 14 above.

<sup>17</sup> Inter-marriage rates have risen from 8% in 1957 to 28% in 1990, while the rate for those married since 1985 has climbed to 52%. Birth rates, in turn, have fallen from 2.43 children born to women who in 1990 were aged 55–64 to 1.57 for those aged 35–44. As a proportion of the American population, the Jewish

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community has declined from 3.7% in 1945 to 2.2% in 1990: see U. O. Schmelz, 'Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors', in *American Jewish Year Book*, New York, 1981, p. 85; Kosmin, op. cit. in Note 11 above; and Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *On Equal Terms*, New York, 1982, p. 67.

<sup>18</sup> Jack Wertheimer, 'Recent Trends in American Judaism', in *American Jewish Year Book*, New York, 1989.

<sup>19</sup> See Steven M. Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival*, Bloomington, 1988.

<sup>20</sup> See Note 12 above.

<sup>21</sup> See Arthur Bedeian, 'Contemporary Challenges in the Study of Organizations', *Journal of Management*, vol. 12, 1986, pp. 185–210; Peter Georgiou, 'The Goal Paradigm and Notes towards a Counter Paradigm', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 3, September, 1973, pp. 291–310; Joseph Molinar and David Rogers, 'Original Effectiveness: An Empirical Comparison of the Goal and Systems Resource Approaches', *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 17, Summer 1976, pp. 401–41; Richard Steers, 'Problems in the Measurement of Organizational Effectiveness', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 4, December 1975, pp. 547–57; David A. Whetten, 'Organizational Growth and Decline Processes', *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 13, 1987, pp. 335–58; Ephraim Yuchtman and Stanley Seashore 'A System Resource Approach to Organizational Effectiveness', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 32, no. 6, 1967, pp. 891–901.

<sup>22</sup> Public goods, as distinct from private goods (goods or services for fees), are those which are available to anyone regardless of whether they contributed to the organization which obtained them. As such, they are characterized by 'non-excludability'; typical examples include clean air or national defence. Most Jewish organizations today seek to obtain public goods such as the security of Israel, civil rights and political liberties, and the rescue of Jewish refugees. All Jews benefit from these goods regardless of their contribution — thereby setting the stage for free-riding and collective-action problems. See James Q. Wilson, op. cit. in Note 10 above; Terry Moe, *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups*, Chicago, 1980; David Knoke and James R. Wood, *Organized for Action: Commitment in Voluntary Associations*, New Brunswick, 1981; and David Knoke and Richard Adams, 'The Incentive Systems of Associations', *Research in the Sociology of Organizations*, vol. 5, 1987, pp. 285–309.

<sup>23</sup> Wilson, op. cit. in Note 10 above.

<sup>24</sup> For classical treatments, see Mancur Olson, op. cit. in Note 12 above and Russel Hardin, op. cit. in Note 11 above.

<sup>25</sup> Although the *American Jewish Year Book* began publication several years before 1907, the directory of national Jewish organizations started to fill out only in 1907. Thereafter and until 1945, the directory included detailed membership information and an effort was made, subject to available sources, to monitor changes every ten years. After 1945, information about membership was discontinued and trends were clearly indicated by 15-year cycles.

<sup>26</sup> This is reflected not only in the decline in the number of associations but also in the decline in the size of the membership. In Brith Abraham, one of the largest mutual-aid societies, membership peaked between the years 1909 and 1920 at 200,000 members, declining to 142,000 in 1925, 94,000 in 1933, and



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58,000 in 1945 — a trend also evident in the other large mutual-aid societies. The Workmen's Circle peaked in the mid-1920s with approximately 85,000 members but for reasons which reflect a unique organizational strategy (and will be discussed below) the association's decline was not nearly so precipitous: from 78,000 members in 1930, to 72,000 in 1940 and 67,000 in 1967: see *American Jewish Year Book*, for the respective years, and Melech Epstein, *Jewish Labor in the United States 1914-1952*, New York, 1953.

<sup>27</sup> See, for example, Richard Benkin, 'Ethnicity and Community: Jewish Communities in Eastern Europe and the United States', *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 4, 1978, pp. 614-25; Isaac Levitas, 'The Jewish Association in America', in Joseph Blau, ed., *Essays in Jewish Life and Thought Presented in Honor of Salo Wittmayer Baron*, New York, 1959; Hannah Kliger, 'Landsmanshaften in New York and Tel Aviv', in U. O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography. Proceedings of the Demographic Sessions Held at the 9th Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, August 1985*, Jerusalem, 1989; M. Bassin, 'Family Circles' and I. E. Rontch, 'The Present Status of the Landsmanschaften' (in Yiddish) in *The Jewish Landsmanschaften of New York (Yiddish)*, pp. 109-110 and 9-23: it was a volume prepared by the Yiddish Writers' Group of the Federal Writers' Project and was published in New York in 1938. See also Maximillian Hurwitz, *The Workmen's Circle*, New York, 1936. Unlike the other mutual-aid societies, the Workmen's Circle sought not only mutual-aid and insurance benefits for its members but was also dedicated to supporting the Socialist movement in the United States and around the world. Later, the association was active in Jewish (particularly Yiddish) education, a cause which it continues to support to this day.

<sup>28</sup> See David Makovsky, 'B'nai B'rith on the Brink', *Moment*, vol. 14, January 1989, pp. 28-35. Although the B'nai B'rith, particularly in its early years, offered members the benefits of a mutual-aid society and, during its long history, attached itself to purposive causes such as community welfare or Zionism, it has been classified as a fraternal organization because its primary incentives are still social and solidarity benefits.

<sup>29</sup> The sources of all budget figures (except for the United Jewish Appeal) are Large City Budget Conference (LCBC) reports, 1949-1992 (New York: Council of Jewish Federations). For UJA figures, see Mark Lee Raphael, *A History of the United Jewish Appeal 1939-1982*, New York, 1983, and *United Jewish Appeal Annual Report 1990-1991*. All membership figures are from LCBC reports, 1949-1952, with the following exceptions: *The Encyclopedia of Associations* — Zionist Organization of America (1979, 1989), ORT (1949-89), B'nai B'rith Women (1949-89), B'nai B'rith Youth (1989), and Young Judea (1949-89); self-reported to author in July 1992: Zionist Organization of America (1991) and United Synagogue Youth 1972-1991. Figures for B'nai B'rith are drawn from *The American Jewish Year Book*, 1945-46, *The Encyclopedia of Associations*, 1958 and Makovsky, op. cit. in Note 28 above. Budget figures for Young Judea and the National Federation of Temple Youth reflect funds earmarked for 'youth activities' by their parent organizations, Hadassah and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations respectively. In the case of Hadassah, this represents a subvention and not net income. The financial data are detailed, reliable, and conform to general accounting practices — with the exception of the data presented for the United Jewish Appeal which make

references to pledges in a given year and not to income received from the previous years pledges. Membership data are less clear. Many of the associations surveyed do not have a dues-paying membership; among those which do, membership figures are self-reported, approximate, and not subject to independent verification.

<sup>30</sup> The year 1972 was chosen as the starting year for that period specifically to avoid an inflated initial figure.

<sup>31</sup> A recent article in *Newsweek*, for example, describes the success of women-only travel clubs in much the same way that the success of Hadassah was described to me: a woman's escape from the pressures of the workplace, a chance to network with like-minded women, and a place where a wide array of women's issues can be seriously discussed. Hadassah, of course, adds the ideological dimension of Zionism and philanthropy but by all accounts the attraction of the solidarity benefits which it offers should not be underestimated. Further research is needed among the members themselves to determine the relative salience of fraternal and normative incentives.

<sup>32</sup> For example, see the *Five Year Resource Development Plan, Jewish Federation and Jewish United Fund of Metropolitan Chicago*, 1990, pp. 88-90, 104.

<sup>33</sup> See Steven M. Cohen, 'Trends in Jewish Philanthropy' in *American Jewish Year Book*, New York, 1980, and Olzak, op. cit. in Note 13 above.

<sup>34</sup> See Cohen, op. cit. in note 4 above, p. 45.

<sup>35</sup> R. Cohen and S. Rosen, *Organizational Affiliation of American Jews: A Research Report*, New York, 1992, pp. 18-19, 40-41.

<sup>36</sup> In the last survey of Jewish leadership, antisemitism was ranked as one of the top three Jewish concerns by less than half of those surveyed and stood behind the threat to Israel, loss of Jewish identity, and Jewish education. These priorities among community leaders mirrored the data in a study carried out 12 years earlier; agenda concerns have changed little during that period: see Ukeles, op. cit. in Note 14 above and Jonathan Woocher, *Sacred Survival: The Civil Religion of American Jews*, Bloomington, 1986. For community members, however, the fear of antisemitism has mushroomed. Surveys in 1983, 1984, and 1990 all enquired about antisemitism; the percentage which stated that it was a serious problem for American Jews rose from 37% in 1983 to 83% in 1990: Steven M. Cohen, *1984 National Survey of American Jews: Political and Social Outlooks*, New York, 1985, p. 276 and Kosmin, op. cit. in Note 11 above, p. 29.

<sup>37</sup> John Higham, 'American Anti-Semitism Historically Reconsidered', in Charles H. Stember, ed., *Jews in the Mind of America*, New York, 1966, pp. 237-58.

<sup>38</sup> Harold E. Quinley and Charles Y. Glock, *Anti-Semitism in America*, New York, 1979; Gregory Martie and Ruth Clark, *Anti-Semitism in the United States: A Study in Prejudice*, New York, 1982; and Jerome A. Chanes, 'Anti-Semitism in the United States: On the Rise or on the Decline?' *Midstream*, vol. 36, no. 1, January 1990, pp. 26-31. For a differing view, see Stewart J. D'Alessio and Lisa Stolzenberg, 'Anti-Semitism in America: The Dynamics of Prejudice', *Sociological Inquiry*, vol. 61, no. 3, 1991, pp. 359-66.

<sup>39</sup> See Martie and Clark, op. cit. in Note 38 above, pp. 106-07.

<sup>40</sup> Jerome A. Chanes, op. cit. in Note 37 above.

<sup>41</sup> See *ADL Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents*, New York, 1978-91.

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<sup>42</sup> *ADL Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents*, New York, 1991, p. 2.

<sup>43</sup> Personal communication from Jerry Rosen, ADL New York regional director 1980–89.

<sup>44</sup> See Elazar, *op. cit.* in Note 16 above, p. 197.

<sup>45</sup> In the 1990 leadership study (Ukeles, *op. cit.* in Note 14 above) social welfare needs do not even appear as an item on the Jewish agenda. Nor do they figure in a general population study of 1981–82: Steven M. Cohen, *National Survey of American Jews*, New York, 1983, p. 100. In the 1978 Young Leadership Study (Woocher, *op. cit.* in Note 36 above, p. 124) these needs ranked 13 out of 18 and then only when addressed to the concerns of the elderly.

<sup>46</sup> In Chicago, for example, the budget for educational and cultural needs increased by 52.4% between 1985 and 1990 while the budget for social welfare needs rose by about 39%. Federation contributions during the same period grew by 35% as against a 25% increase in funds contributed to social welfare agencies (inflation during that period was 18%).

<sup>47</sup> In Chicago, for example, public funding accounts for approximately 20% of the local federation's budget (*5 year Resource Development Plan, Jewish Federation and Jewish United Fund of Metropolitan Chicago*, Chicago, 1990, p. 35), but a much larger portion of social welfare programmes: 75% of the Jewish Vocational Service, 30% of the Council for the Jewish Elderly and 25% of the Jewish Children's Bureau. When all social services are considered, the decline in federation participation in social welfare projects over the past 50 years has been dramatic — in New York, it fell from 40% in 1947 to 5% in 1971 (Liebman, *op. cit.* in Note 14 above, p. 28).

<sup>48</sup> According to the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, 130,000 households or 14% of all Jewish households had an annual income of under \$20,000, while annual income of about 7% was below the poverty level of \$12,500 for a family of four: Kosmin, *op. cit.* in Note 11 above, p. 19.

<sup>49</sup> The budgets of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee peaked in the years immediately following the Second World War and have only recently risen (see Table 3).

<sup>50</sup> See Cohen, *op. cit.* in Note 45 above, p. 100; Woocher, *op. cit.* in Note 6 above, p. 123; and Ukeles, *ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>51</sup> In Chicago, for example, \$18,300,000 was budgeted in 1990–91, \$7,300,000 in 1991–92 and \$3,000,000 in 1992–93, thereby fulfilling federation commitments of \$28,600,000 ('Jewish Federation Allocations 1988–89 through 1992–93' — memo of the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago, dated August 1992).

<sup>52</sup> According to the 1981–82 study, 69% of respondents thought that the security of Israel was a very important concern (Cohen, *op. cit.* in Note 45 above), but in 1990 the proportion of respondents who thought that helping Israel was the most important concern was under 50%, coming after 'helping humanity', 'helping other Jews', and 'transmitting Jewish values'. Jewish leaders, on the other hand, have continued to attach a high value to the security of Israel although there has also been a decline: in a 1978 young leadership survey (Woocher, *op. cit.* in Note 36 above), 97% of the respondents rated the security of Israel as a 'very serious' communal problem, but by 1990 (Ukeles, *op. cit.* in Note 14 above) only 81% cited the security of Israel as one of the top three communal concerns. The statements are not parallel but

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they do reveal a drop in the unanimity which Israel's security is sometimes thought to enjoy among American Jews. A similar decline in concern about Israel can be seen when age cohorts are compared: Cohen, *op. cit.* in Note 4 above, p. 76.

<sup>53</sup> This allocation has declined steadily in the last decade from 48% in 1982 to 42% in 1990. Furthermore, as funds raised by Federations grew by 42% from 1982 to 1990, allocations to the UJA rose by only 22% while allocations for local needs rose by more than 70%: February 1992 memo of the Council of Jewish Federations.

<sup>54</sup> See Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago, *5 Year Plan and Council of Jewish Federations, Executive Summary: Funding Plan for National Agencies*, New York, August 1992. Allocations to national agencies have dropped in recent years from 2% of local federation grants to 1.5%.

<sup>55</sup> The ADL's budget has flattened out recently, as has that of Hadassah — although Hadassah membership continues to grow.

# ETHIOPIAN IMMIGRANTS IN ISRAEL: BETWEEN PRESERVATION OF CULTURE AND INVENTION OF TRADITION

Steven Kaplan and Chaim Rosen

**I**N the 1980s, more than 16,000 Beta Israel (Falasha)<sup>1</sup> travelled along various routes to leave their native land and to settle in Israel. By the middle of 1990, a further 20,000 — encouraged by promises from representatives of the American Association for Ethiopian Jewry (AAEJ) that they also would be helped to emigrate — had abandoned their villages in the countryside and moved to the capital, Addis Ababa.

At first, these prospective immigrants were enabled to leave Ethiopia in small groups, a few hundred at a time. Then, during a 36-hour period on 24–25 May 1991, some 14,000 were dramatically airlifted to Israel in a daring initiative code-named 'Operation Solomon'. Another few thousand were later transported to Israel, so that by the summer of 1992 there were more than 45,000 Ethiopian immigrants in Israel and only a few hundred of their compatriots remained in north-west Ethiopia.<sup>2</sup> While plans are finalized to bring out that remnant, there can be little doubt that the Beta Israel way of life and culture, which had persisted in Ethiopia for several hundred years, has now ceased to exist.<sup>3</sup>

Since the Beta Israel first came in large numbers to Israel in the early 1980s, their culture has been the focus of considerable attention and discussion, with virtually every agency concerned with Ethiopian immigrants advocating a policy of 'preserving Ethiopian Jewish culture'.<sup>4</sup> The terminology may have varied, but it is obvious that cultural pluralism is high on the agenda of political correctness in Israel today. There is the implication — indeed, the point is sometimes openly made — that Israel must not repeat the 'mistakes of the 1950s', when large waves of Afro-Asian Jewish immigrants were treated as a cultural *tabula rasa*, capable of being turned into modern-day Israelis.<sup>5</sup>

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The aim of the present article is to reconsider the culture of Ethiopian immigrants in Israel. In the first section, we shall argue that most programmes of 'cultural preservation' are based on a myth, and that serious internal contradictions characterize virtually all the many phenomena classified and justified under that rubric. We shall then suggest that changes in the culture of Ethiopians in Israel can be best understood not as unauthentic or diluted forms of traditional *Beta Israel* life, but as the latest developments in the evolution of an *Ethiopian Jewish* culture, which has since its inception in the early twentieth century drawn from both Beta Israel and normative Jewish models. The cultural transformation of Ethiopian immigrants in Israel should be considered in terms of this comparatively modern, inherently syncretic Ethiopian Jewish culture, rather than on the basis of some idealized, static model of a pure Beta Israel past. In the final section of this article, we reconsider some specific examples of the culture of Ethiopian immigrants in the light of the model we have suggested.

### *The Paradoxes of Preservation*

Among the many Israeli institutions involved in the absorption of the Beta Israel, none has played a greater role than *Aliyat Hano'ar* (Youth Aliyah). Its youth villages and boarding schools have carried the burden of educating and training thousands of Ethiopian teenagers, including many orphans. Moreover, respect for Ethiopian Jewish culture has been one of the keynotes of its policy pronouncements. Rather surprisingly, little attention has been paid to a paradox which lies at the core of its efforts in this area: the family, both nuclear and extended, was central to traditional Beta Israel society. Education, financial support, marital arrangements, and political ties were only a few of the spheres in which the family's role was crucial. How Youth Aliyah, whose very essence is the removal of children from the family home and consequently of many responsibilities from the family's jurisdiction, could nevertheless preserve tradition is something of a mystery. Culture is not, after all, simply a matter of proverbs, songs, games, handicrafts, and other elements of 'folklore'.

Even greater and more immediate contradictions exist when the preservation of Ethiopian Jewish culture is undertaken by Rabbinic-sponsored religious groups. The Ethiopian Jews, they argue, came from a traditionally religious society and should therefore be placed within religious institutions. Indeed, virtually all Ethiopian children have been placed in religious schools. In reality, no group has as long and consistent a record of attempting to 'correct' (that is, undermine) Beta Israel religious life as do those associated with the Israeli Chief Rabbinate. Even today, some officials will reveal these efforts with

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remarkable candour. Thus, in summarizing the activities of the Jewish Agency's first representative in Ethiopia, two authors comment in a section of a chapter entitled 'Corrections in Religious Life according to Halakha' that 'crucial progress was made towards returning them [the Ethiopians] to Judaism'.<sup>6</sup> In fact, most of these programmes had little to do with the preservation of what was unique and specific to Beta Israel *culture*, rather they sought to homogenize their beliefs and practices into a single universal *tradition*. The internal contradiction inherent in such policies is neatly summed up by Rabbi Menachem Waldman's recent proposal that 'Torah Ulpanim' be set up in order to 'preserve the heritage of the community while bringing it into line with the general tradition of Israel'.<sup>7</sup>

Other more romantically-inclined authorities have suggested that various aspects of Ethiopian women's traditional role be preserved in Israel. For instance, at a recent symposium, the head of a major kindergarten project for Ethiopian immigrants criticized the policy of placing children in all-day care centres. 'We're depriving the mother from Ethiopia of her traditional role of being with her young child most of the day', she complained. Others have voiced similar concerns about Ethiopian women not being provided with facilities to observe their traditional customs of living in separate residences when menstruating.

Unaddressed in such proposals is the social and economic price which such traditions carry with them, when divorced from their original milieu. In Ethiopia, where the household functioned as a unit of production, women could both fulfil their role in the economy and care for young children. In Israel, those who choose to stay at home with young children will almost certainly not hold jobs and therefore will not contribute to their household income. In Ethiopia, the household economy and the extended family minimized the disruptive effects of women regularly leaving the home when they menstruated or for childbirth and for several weeks after giving birth; but in Israel such women would find it all but impossible to obtain paid employment which would allow them to leave their homes every month for a few days, while secure in the knowledge that their close female relatives would look after their young children during their absence.

Moreover, is it not more than a little paternalistic to expect Ethiopian women to preserve in Israel their traditional practices, while their sisters in that country and in much of the Western world claim and often achieve new freedoms and opportunities? Further, to be consistent in such paternalism, should the Ethiopian Jews be also encouraged to preserve a comparatively high rate of divorce, submit to males making most decisions affecting their daughters and wives, and be enabled to follow the customary African practice of uvulectomies — all in the interest of tradition?

*From Beta Israel to Ethiopian Jews*

At the heart of much of the confusion concerning the preservation of Ethiopian traditions in Israel lies the failure to distinguish between two related, but different, cultural identities: that of the Beta Israel and that of Ethiopian Jews. The Beta Israel — or, as they were most commonly called, Falasha — were a people of Ethiopia whose recorded history in that country dates back to the Middle Ages.<sup>8</sup> Despite some important differences, most notably their identification as a despised semi-caste group of craftsmen, they were on the whole remarkably similar to their Christian neighbours in language, dress, diet, family structure, and even religion. Thus, both groups prayed in Ge'ez, were led by a hierarchy of monks, priests, deacons, and *dabtarotch* (non-ordained clergy), used many of the same sacred texts, and viewed themselves as heirs to the children of Israel. At no point in their recorded history before the mid-nineteenth century, did the Beta Israel have any contact with outside Jewish groups.

From the mid-nineteenth century onward and particularly following the arrival in Ethiopia of Jacques (Ya'acov) Faitlovitch, the Beta Israel were increasingly exposed to the influence of foreign Jews. Gradually, their self-identity, religious structure, and social mores began to change. Throughout the twentieth century the Beta Israel underwent a recasting of their culture, which gradually but inexorably transformed them into Ethiopian Jews. Long before the majority of them reached Israel, their religious hierarchy and practices, beliefs concerning their origins, and many other aspects of their society and culture had been altered to bring them closer in line with that of Jewish communities outside Ethiopia. While elements of earlier Beta Israel traditions remained (and remain to this day) an important part of Ethiopian Jewish culture, Beta Israel and Ethiopian Jewish cultures became increasingly distinct as the quantity of 'normative' Jewish elements in the latter grew. At the same time, general social changes and patterns of modernization, including modern education and in a few cases urbanization, also altered many aspects of traditional Beta Israel life.<sup>9</sup>

The story of the transformation of the Beta Israel into Ethiopian Jews has, in general, received little attention. Popular writers, and proponents of cultural preservation, have usually preferred to view their subject as timeless, and to deny all evidence of change. They often begin their orations and articles with assertions such as 'For 2,500 years the Jews of Ethiopia . . .'. Thus, the headline of an article published in the respected Hebrew daily *Ha-aretz* at the time of 'Operation Solomon' read, 'THEY DON'T KNOW PURIM OR HANUKKAH — THEY ARE NOT AWARE OF THE RULINGS OF THE SAGES'.<sup>10</sup>

One cannot help but wonder who 'THEY' are. Purim was first celebrated in Ethiopia in 1953, when Hebrew prayer-books (*Nusach Ashkenaz*) were also distributed. In 1959 Rosh Hashanah (two days),



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Yom Kippur, and Sukkot were observed in their standard Jewish form for the first time in the village of Ambober. In 1961, 1,500 copies of an Amharic booklet on holy days and Sabbath observance were distributed by the Jewish Agency. Elements of 'normative' Jewish practice even began to be introduced into the Beta Israel's unique pilgrimage festival, *Seged*.<sup>11</sup>

Wolf Leslau, who had visited the Beta Israel village of Ambwora for the first time in 1946, noted on his return visit 16 years later:<sup>12</sup>

The situation was not the same when I visited the same village in 1962. Several young Falashas now spoke Hebrew and some elders knew how to read Hebrew. Unlike the practice of former days, the Feast of Hanukkah was celebrated, and candles were lit in the synagogue. During the Feast of the Tabernacles a booth was built in the compound of the synagogue, a practice not known previously. As for the two young teachers of the village, they wore the prayer shawl during worship.

These changes, introduced more than a generation ago, were alien elements which were inserted into Beta Israel traditional culture. Efforts to encourage Ethiopian Jews in Israel to turn back the clock in order to return to an alleged purer, more authentic, faith, would probably have little chance of success. Moreover, advocates of such an approach would have to confront other problems as a result of such attempts; they would have first to establish the period during which Beta Israel culture ceased to be traditional. Was it when Protestant missionaries arrived in Ethiopia in the 1860s, or when Faitlovitch came in 1904, or again when the Jewish Agency's first emissary arrived in 1953? Precisely which culture of which period should we try to preserve?

It is our considered opinion that we must begin by recognizing the distinction suggested above between Beta Israel culture and Ethiopian Jewish culture. Whatever our intentions or desires, Beta Israel culture as it developed and flourished in Ethiopia has come to an end. Its demise, which began in Ethiopia, has continued in Israel as one of the inevitable side-effects of the community's wholesale immigration. Its passing should be respectfully mourned; and its history recorded and studied, while some informants still retain accurate memories. It should not, however, be represented and remembered as a frozen decontextualized parody of itself. Attention is better directed to the evolution of Ethiopian Jewish culture, a neo-traditional phenomenon whose roots go back no later than the beginning of the present century. This culture is still being defined in Israel today. During the coming years, its main outlines will become increasingly clear. It should be welcomed and appreciated for what it is: a testimony to a living people's adjustment to their new surroundings — not represented as what it is not and cannot be. In the final section of this paper, we

explore some of the main characteristics of the development of this culture through a series of case studies.

*Ethiopian Jewish Culture in Israel: Glimpses of a Process*

The limits of this article do not permit us to explore fully the many contexts in which Ethiopian Jewish culture is being created and articulated in Israel today. Indeed, given the fact that in 1992 at least half of the total number of Ethiopians had been in Israel for less than two years, such an attempt would be both presumptuous and premature. We shall therefore confine ourselves to the elucidation of a number of examples from the realms of religious leadership, material culture, and ritual. From the diversity of the examples, one can both appreciate the breadth of the changes which have taken place and identify the clear links between these Israeli-based phenomena and the emergence of Ethiopian Jewish culture in twentieth-century Ethiopia.

*From Monks to Qessim*

The emergence of Beta Israel culture in medieval Ethiopia is intimately linked to the rise of monastic clergy as the supreme religious leaders of the group. Beta Israel accounts of their history trace virtually all major elements of their religion to the influence of two monks: Abba Sabra and Sagga Amlak. According to most of these accounts, Abba Sabra was originally a Christian but later joined the Beta Israel. Sagga Amlak, his disciple, is generally believed to have been a son of the Christian Ethiopian Emperor Zar'a Ya'eqob (who reigned from 1434 to 1468). These two historical figures are credited with many features of Beta Israel culture, including monasticism, laws of purity, holy days, literary works, and prayer liturgy. Although these traditions are a somewhat idealized and condensed view of their role, other sources (including prayer texts) support such Beta Israel beliefs and are generally accepted as reliable by scholars today.<sup>13</sup> (The prayer texts mention these figures and Ge'ez historical texts cite other examples of Christian monks who joined the Beta Israel.) Thus, for most of their known history, the Beta Israel religious hierarchy closely resembled that of the Ethiopian Church with celibate monks, married priests (*qes*; plural: *qessotch*), deacons, and non-ordained singers (*dabtarotch*; singular: *dabtara*).<sup>14</sup>

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the monastic clergy of the Beta Israel came under attack from a variety of sources. Initially, Protestant missionaries ridiculed their claim to a biblical mandate for their office and exposed their comparatively low level of scriptural knowledge.<sup>15</sup> The great famine of 1888–92 (*Kifu-gen*) devastated the Beta Israel, and made it demographically difficult if not impossible to continue to support a celibate clerical class.<sup>16</sup> Finally, the Jewish

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anti-missionary Faitlovitch condemned the institution of celibate monks as foreign to Judaism.<sup>17</sup>

As Ethiopian Jewish culture developed throughout the twentieth century, the importance and number of monks receded. While they continued to be celebrated in traditions as great holy men, on an operative level they were increasingly replaced by the *qessotch*. Although also unique among modern Jewish communities, the *qessotch* could, at least, be more easily assimilated to Jewish views of the Ethiopians, and particularly to their image as a lost tribe practising an archaic form of ancient Judaism. The *qessotch* were, for example, frequently compared to the biblical priests, while their similarity to Christian clerics (also called *qessotch*) was virtually ignored.

Almost from the outset, however, the *qessotch*'s religious authority was challenged by both foreign and Ethiopian proponents of a more normative form of Judaism.<sup>18</sup> The *qessotch*, therefore, occupied a curiously ambiguous position in Ethiopian culture. On the one hand, they were its foremost religious representatives, heirs to the monks of the Beta Israel. On the other, as young people became increasingly aware of normative Judaism, their role and skills were pushed more and more towards the periphery.<sup>19</sup>

In Israel, the *qessotch* (or, as they are known in the Hebraized plural form, *qessim*) have been treated with the sort of paradoxical behaviour which is, as we have seen, characteristic of the attempt at 'preservation of culture'. On a practical and juridical level, they have been stripped of all formal aspects of their role in Ethiopia: they no longer serve clearly-defined communities or groups of believers and cannot officiate at weddings, sacrifices, or funerals. At the same time, some groups, especially those associated with the rabbinical authorities, have sought to promote them as *the* traditional leaders of the Ethiopian Jewish community, whose advice should be closely followed in formulating absorption policy.<sup>20</sup>

Unwittingly perhaps, the Israelis' treatment of the *qessim* contains two of the crucial elements of the British policy of 'indirect rule'. On the one hand, 'tradition' is celebrated and used to legitimize the position of selected native leaders; but on the other, all real power and authority are invested in outsiders while traditional leaders are reduced to the role of mediators and cultural brokers.<sup>21</sup>

### *From Despised Craftsmen to Traditional Artisans*

At the same time as monastic clergy articulated and defined the Beta Israel's religious system, their economic identity was also clarified. From the early fourteenth century onward, a gradual process of disenfranchisement took place which eventually deprived many of the Beta Israel of their rights to own inheritable land. Denied this crucial economic asset, they pursued a number of strategies to retain their

economic viability. Some migrated to peripheral areas where access to inheritable land was still possible; others accepted the reduced status of tenant farmers. Almost always they sought to supplement their income by pursuing 'despised' crafts such as smithing, pottery, and weaving.<sup>22</sup>

During the succeeding centuries, the Beta Israel became increasingly identified with crafts — men as smiths and women as potters. Although valued for the essential role they filled as suppliers of agricultural implements, tools, weapons, and clay vessels, they were also feared and avoided as semi-magical masters of fire, *buda*, capable of changing the form not only of earth and metal, but of people and animals.<sup>23</sup>

Not all aspects of a culture change at the same pace, and therefore long after they had begun to identify with world Jewry, the economic lives of the majority of Beta Israel continued largely unchanged. In the early 1970s, three-quarters of households in the Gondar region supplemented their income from agriculture with smithing and pottery.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, in at least one village, Walaqa, situated a few kilometres from the regional capital, an interesting change had taken place. Encouraged by outsiders — including the wife of an American doctor — and by Peace Corps volunteers, Ethiopian Jewish women, who already had well-developed potting skills, began to produce small clay dolls for sale to tourists. Initially, these were modelled on pictures of prehistoric figurines which they had been shown by outsiders, or on elements from everyday life — such as women carrying water or preparing food. Later, in order to appeal to Jewish tourists and to highlight their own religious orientation, statuettes of 'rabbis', of Solomon and Sheba, of lions crowned with Jewish stars, and other Jewish themes became prominent.<sup>25</sup>

Within a few years of the production of the first statuettes, scholarly articles concerning 'Falasha Fertility Idols' had appeared.<sup>26</sup> Although not all authorities were taken in so easily, the figurines rapidly became the most recognizable element of Ethiopian Jewish material culture and were sold by several pro-Falasha organizations as part of their fund-raising effort.

Following both 'Operation Moses' in 1984 and the more recent 'Operation Solomon', attempts have been made to encourage Ethiopian immigrants in Israel to engage in cottage industries such as pottery, weaving, and embroidery. In some cases, proposals have been put forward to create a traditional Ethiopian village as a tourist attraction, where various products (including traditional figurines and clothes) would be on sale. Typically, such programmes of cultural preservation are replete with paradoxes and inconsistencies. In one of the most developed pottery workshops, for example, Ethiopian Jewish *men* were trained for the first time as potter-sculptors. The sculptures which they produced were modelled on non-Ethiopian sub-Saharan

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figurines, including such uncharacteristic elements as bare-breasted women. Thus in the name of 'traditional art', members of the 'wrong' sex are encouraged to engage in a 'despised profession' in order to produce foreign versions of statuettes whose origins can be traced to external influences on a single village only one generation ago.<sup>27</sup>

The excitement with which Ethiopian figurines has been greeted raises, moreover, yet another question concerning the manner in which cultural forms are labelled as traditional. If Beta Israel statuettes first produced for sale to tourists can now be marketed as 'traditional handicraft', why shouldn't Sabbath candles and prayer shawls, which were adopted at the same time or earlier, be accepted as elements of 'traditional religion'? At the least, there appears to be a strange sort of cultural double standard at work here, whereby non-normative phenomena are classified as traditional far more quickly than are normative ones.

### *Ritual Immersion: From Purity to Politics*

As the two examples cited so far indicate, the evolution of Ethiopian Jewish culture in Israel has not proceeded along a single path. While the redefinition of the role of the *qessim* followed quite naturally on the transition from monks to *qessotch* earlier in this century, the development of the statuettes followed a far more complex route. Not only were the initial figurines produced comparatively late and in a single village, but the cultural messages they conveyed have shown numerous zig-zags. In Ethiopia, their Jewish content constantly increased while in Israel the 'primitive' African elements appear to have reasserted themselves. Doubtless, outside evaluations of market forces are a major factor in these developments,<sup>28</sup> but this explanation should not lead us to neglect some important lessons. The development of Ethiopian Jewish culture in Israel will not be a unilinear phenomenon in which the Ethiopian elements inevitably give way to more and more normative features. Moreover, one must avoid the simplistic assumption that the abandonment of a traditional custom or symbol is automatically connected with a lessening of ethnic distinctiveness. In our final example, we examine the manner in which the discontinuation of the traditional practice of ritual immersion became an expression of the refusal of Ethiopian immigrants to acculturate and conform.

In Ethiopia, the Beta Israel's commitment to a separate identity within a multi-ethnic society was most clearly symbolized by their devotion to high standards of communal purity.<sup>29</sup> Traditional rules known as *attenkuqn* (don't touch me) sought to limit contact with outsiders by requiring isolation, and ritual immersion after each such contact. Although probably only observed fully by Beta Israel monks, such rules were a vivid expression of a communal ideal. Some of the others who were considered unclean and required to undergo ritual

purification, including immersion, were women at the time of menstruation and childbirth, midwives, and anyone who performed a circumcision, or touched a corpse, or an animal which had died (but not as a result of ritual slaughter). So ubiquitous were such ceremonies, that Beta Israel villages were usually situated near streams or rivers to facilitate immersion, and their neighbours claimed that as a result of their frequent purifications they smelled of water.<sup>30</sup> By the middle of the twentieth century, Ethiopian Jews had abandoned most purification rituals, with the notable exception of those pertaining to childbirth and to menstruation.<sup>31</sup>

The whole issue of ritual immersion acquired a special relevance in the wake of the Ethiopians' dispute with the Israeli Chief Rabbinate following Operation Moses.<sup>32</sup> The Rabbinate, in an attempt to clarify several anomalies in the personal religious status of Ethiopian Jews, required them to undergo a symbolic conversion ceremony and demanded that they perform immersion (Hebrew: *tevila*) in a ritual bath (Hebrew: *mikve*). For reasons which have never been adequately explained, the Rabbinate expressed its demand as a requirement for *temqat* (in Ge'ez and Amharic this word means baptism!). By using the term *temqat* rather than such alternatives as *matallam* or *tabala*, the Rabbinate paved the way for opponents of immersion to claim that it represented nothing less than a minor variant on the long-standing Christian demand for baptism. Ethiopian activists argued that having fought to resist *temqat* in Ethiopia, how could they so readily acquiesce to it in Israel?<sup>33</sup>

The extent to which this argument represented a genuine confusion and not merely a clever debating trick is uncertain. On the one hand, the Beta Israel's disdain for Christian baptism is genuine and clearly documented. As early as the mid-nineteenth century the Beta Israel monks spoke with contempt about the 'absurd practice of baptism'.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, Ethiopian Jews in Israel do, on occasion, use the term *temqat* when referring to their own practices of ritual purification.

Yet another barrier to the acceptance of the Rabbinate's demands was the Ethiopians' belief that immersion must take place in running water. In contrast to *tevila* in a *mikve*, in Ethiopia *matallam* was performed only in a stream or river: a pool of water was not considered acceptable. Thus, no continuity of practice was perceived by Ethiopian Jews between their own form of immersion and that demanded by the Rabbinate.<sup>35</sup>

The refusal to perform immersion — which in Ethiopia was a symbol of the Beta Israel's identity, in contrast to the dominant Christians — became in Israel a means of asserting their independence from the Rabbinate. The stereotyped image of the missionary as a crafty trickster waiting in the bush for an opportunity to magically transform Jews into Christians via water was replaced by a similar image of the

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Orthodox rabbi. Parents refused to let their children go to swimming pools or even wade in the sea, lest their entry into water be construed as equivalent to ritual immersion. One militant Ethiopian *qes* refused to perform a religious ceremony at a local community centre because of a swimming pool on the premises! Even ritual immersion in association with purification after menstruation, which had proved to be the most tenacious of habits in Ethiopia, was abandoned by many women, when they were misled into believing that a visit to the *mikve* under such circumstances was also a form of *temqat*.

Paradoxically, the Ethiopians' abandonment of their traditional role as a people 'who smell of water' was not a denial of their uniqueness, but an assertion of it. In Ethiopia their practice of immersion marked them as a people with a special concern for purity and group boundaries. In Israel, the same act was catapulted from the realm of purity to that of politics. Thus, its discontinuation signified their refusal to accept challenges to their Jewish identity or to obey outside dictates.

### *Conclusion*

The few examples considered above offer only the briefest of glimpses into the many forms of Ethiopian Jewish culture in Israel. At a later date, we hope to present a fuller discussion and to suggest one possible typology for the analysis of that culture.<sup>36</sup> For the moment, however, several points need to be stressed. Although each of the cases discussed above has been depicted by the popular press and by Ethiopian activists as intimately related to the preservation of 'traditional culture', this term sheds little light on the nature of such phenomena. None of them presents any direct link to Beta Israel culture as it existed before the twentieth century. In fact, each of them can be properly understood only in the context of the emergence of what we have called Ethiopian Jewish culture in Ethiopia. What they represent is not the fossilization of an ancient form, but the most recent developments in a fascinating example of ethnic redefinition. During the coming years the contours of Ethiopian Jewish culture in Israel will become increasingly clear. It should be welcomed and appreciated for what it is, a testimony to a living people's adjustment to their new surroundings, not criticized for what it is not and cannot be.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> In Ethiopia, the members of the group usually referred to themselves as Beta Israel (The House of Israel) or simply Israel. They were more widely known as 'Falasha'. Today, they prefer to be called Ethiopian Jews. In this paper we shall suggest that an analytical distinction be made between these terms.

<sup>2</sup> When children born in Israel are counted, the total population of Ethiopian Jews living in Israel in 1992 exceeded 52,000. Although there are few practising Beta Israel in Ethiopia today, tens of thousands of *Faras Moura* (Christians of Beta Israel origin) still reside in that country. The Israeli government is currently attempting to formulate its policy towards this group. See Steven Kaplan, 'Falasha Christians: A Brief History', *Midstream*, vol. 39, no. 1, January 1993, pp. 20-21.

<sup>3</sup> The process of Beta Israel *aliyah* (immigration to Israel) has been the subject of vast popular attention and comparatively little scholarly discussion. On the period until 1985 see, for example, Louis Rapoport, *Redemption Song: The Story of Operation Moses*, New York, 1985 and Tudor Parfitt, *Operation Moses*, London, 1985. From a more critical perspective, but one with significant flaws, see Ahmed Karadawi, 'The Smuggling of the Ethiopian Falasha to Israel through the Sudan', *African Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 358, 1991, pp. 23-49; and Teshome Wagaw, 'The International Political Ramifications of Falasha Emigration', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 29, no. 4, 1991, pp. 557-82.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Ora Donia, *Visiting with the Ethiopian Jews in Ethiopia*, Department of Immigration and Absorption of the Jewish Agency, 1983; and Ministry of Immigrant Absorption of Israel, *Master Plan for the Absorption of Ethiopian Immigrants* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1985.

<sup>5</sup> For a highly polemical critique of current policies, see Jeff Halper, 'The Absorption of Ethiopian Immigrants: A Return to the Fifties', in Michael Ashkenazi and Alex Weingrod, eds., *Ethiopian Jews and Israel*, New Brunswick, 1987, pp. 112-39.

<sup>6</sup> See Yehudah Azrieli and Shaul Meizlish, *Mission Ethiopia* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1989, p. 38.

<sup>7</sup> See 'The religious-spiritual absorption of Ethiopian Jews in Israel', in Varda Netzer and Hannah Polani, eds., *Saga of Aliyah*, Jerusalem, 1990, p. 110. Rabbi Waldman has recently suggested that the problem of the *Faras Moura* (see Note 2 above) be dealt with by 'returning them to their Judaism'. The policy he advocates is, in fact, not a return to *their* (that is, Beta Israel) practice, but the introduction of Rabbinic Judaism.

<sup>8</sup> On the Beta Israel in Ethiopia see Steven Kaplan, *The Beta Israel (Falasha) in Ethiopia: From Earliest Times to the Twentieth Century*, New York, 1992; and James Quirin, *The Evolution of the Ethiopian Jews*, Philadelphia, 1992.

<sup>9</sup> For a discussion of this process, see Ruth Westheimer and Steven Kaplan, *Surviving Salvation: The Ethiopian Jewish Family in Transition*, New York, 1992, pp. 13-33.



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<sup>10</sup> 26 May 1991.

<sup>11</sup> See Edna Leviatan, 'The Encounter of the Falasha with Modern Judaism', unpublished MS. (Hebrew); Azrieli and Mcizlish, *op. cit.* in Note 6 above, *passim*; and Shoshana Ben-Dor, 'The Sigd of Beta Israel: Testimony to a Community in Transition', in Michael Ashkenazi and Alex Weingrod, eds., *op. cit.* in Note 5 above, p. 146.

<sup>12</sup> Wolf Leslau, 'A Falasha Book of Festivals', in *For Max Weinreich on his Seventieth Birthday*, The Hague, 1964, p. 187.

<sup>13</sup> See Quirin, *op. cit.* in Note 8 above, pp. 65–68; Kay Kaufman Shelemay, *Music, Ritual and Falasha History*, East Lansing, 1986, pp. 79–86; Wolf Leslau, 'Taamrat Emmanuel's Notes on Falasha Monks and Holy Places' in *Salo Wittmayer Baron Jubilee Volume*, II, Jerusalem, 1974, pp. 624–34; and Shoshana Ben-Dor, 'The Holy Places of Ethiopian Jewry', in *Pe'amim* (Hebrew), vol. 22, 1985, pp. 32–52.

<sup>14</sup> Kay Kaufman Shelemay, 'The Musician and Transmission of Religious Tradition: The Multiple Roles of the Ethiopian *Dabtara*', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, vol. 22, no. 3, 1992, pp. 242–60, especially pp. 253–54.

<sup>15</sup> See Kaplan, *op. cit.* in Note 8, pp. 116–42, especially pp. 123–25.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 150–53.

<sup>17</sup> Unfortunately, we still lack both a comprehensive biography of Faitlovitch and a detailed analysis of his impact on the Beta Israel. See, however, Itzhak Grinfeld, 'Jacques Faitlovitch—"Father" of the Falashas', in Yossi Avner *et al.*, eds., *The Jews of Ethiopia: A People in Transition*, Tel Aviv, 1986, pp. 30–35; Simon Messing, *The Story of the Falashas*, Brooklyn, 1982, pp. 54–79; and especially, G. Jan Abbink, 'The Falashas in Ethiopia and Israel: The Problem of Ethnic Assimilation', *Nijmegen Social Anthropologische Cahiers*, vol. 15, 1984, pp. 84–92.

<sup>18</sup> See Steven Kaplan, 'Leadership and Communal Organization among the Beta Israel (Falasha)', in *Encyclopaedia Judaica Yearbook 1986–87*, Jerusalem, 1988, pp. 160–62.

<sup>19</sup> More than 20 years ago, the chief priest of the Gondar region complained that 'because the young teachers have access to the government, Falasha follow them, and only adults and the elderly continue to obey the priests of old': quoted by Yael Kahane in *Black Brothers*, Tel Aviv, 1977, p. 78 (Hebrew: our translation). On ritual changes, see Shelemay, *op. cit.* in Note 13 above, pp. 56–57, 86–90.

<sup>20</sup> In the autumn of 1992, a group of *qessim* held protests demanding that the Chief Rabbinate and the State recognize their 'traditional' right to perform weddings and divorces. The Rabbinate responded by stating its willingness to allow those *qessim* who successfully completed a course to serve on local religious councils. An Inter-ministerial committee was set up to formulate a solution to this problem and has not yet presented its recommendations.

<sup>21</sup> See Terence Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 211–62.

<sup>22</sup> See Quirin, *op. cit.* in Note 8 above, pp. 63–65, 134–38; and Kaplan, *op. cit.* in Note 8 above, pp. 65–69.

<sup>23</sup> Kaplan, *ibid.*, p. 110–15, and G. Jan Abbink, 'A Socio-Structural Analysis of the Beta Esra'el as an "Infamous Group" in Traditional Ethiopia', *Sociologus*, vol. 37, no. 2, 1987, pp. 140–54.

<sup>24</sup> Shelemay, *op. cit.* in Note 13 above, p. 6.

<sup>25</sup> Messing, *op. cit.* in note 18 above, p. 30.

<sup>26</sup> See O.F.A. Meindardus, 'Fruchtbarkeitsidole der Abessinischen Juden', *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, vol. 91, 1966, pp. 127-30; R. Rauschebauch and E. Hammerschmidt, 'Tonfiguren der Falascha', in J. Lukas, ed., *Neue Afrikanistische Studien*, Hamburg, 1966, pp. 109-16; and F. C. Gamst and M. C. Baldia, 'Über die sogenannten "Fruchtbarkeitsidole" der Falascha von Abessinien', *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, vol. 105, 1980, pp. 134-45.

<sup>27</sup> For an interesting example of some of the issues raised in this section, see Benneta Jules-Rosette, *The Messages of Tourist Art*, New York, 1984.

<sup>28</sup> This shift towards 'African' elements also hints at a shift in the manner in which Ethiopian Jews present themselves to the outside world. While in Ethiopia they identified themselves as Jews, in Israel they emphasize their distinctive Ethiopian identity. In this way they are following a well-trodden path. Those who before coming to Israel were German *Jews*, Moroccan *Jews*, etc. in Israel became Germans, Moroccans, etc. (We are grateful to Professor Erik Cohen for bringing this comparative aspect to our attention.)

<sup>29</sup> Steven Kaplan, *Les Falashas*, Turnhout, 1990, p. 142; Wolf Leslau, *Falasha Anthology*, New Haven, 1951 (2nd edn., 1963), pp. xiv-xix; and Emanuela Trevisan-Semi, 'The Beta Israel (Falashas): From Purity to Impurity', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 25, no. 2, December 1985, pp. 103-14.

<sup>30</sup> Leslau, *op. cit.* in Note 29 above, p. xiii.

<sup>31</sup> Messing, *op. cit.* in Note 17 above, pp. 51-52.

<sup>32</sup> Steven Kaplan, 'The Beta Israel and the Rabbinate: Law, Politics, and Ritual', *Social Science Information*, vol. 28, no. 3, 1988, pp. 357-70.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 364-65; see also Chaim Rosen and Rachamim Yitzhak, 'Ethiopian Jews in Israel: Review and Prospect', in Itzhak Bezael and Steven Kaplan, eds., *Studies on Ethiopian Jewry*, East Lansing, forthcoming.

<sup>34</sup> See Antoine d'Abbadie, 'Rapport sur les Falachas', *Journal des Débats*, 6 July 1845, p. 94.

<sup>35</sup> Neither the Rabbinate nor its opponents appear to have made any serious attempt to bridge these differences by explaining either the natural connections between *matallam* or *tabala* and *tevila* or the halakhic acceptability of an indoor or an outdoor *mikve*.

<sup>36</sup> For an excellent example of such a typology in another area, see Amnon Shiloah and Erik Cohen, 'The Dynamics of Change in Jewish Oriental Ethnic Music in Israel', *Ethnomusicology*, vol. 27, no. 2, 1983, pp. 227-51 and Erik Cohen and Amnon Shiloah, 'Major Trends of Change in Jewish Oriental Ethnic Music in Israel', *Popular Music*, vol. 5, 1985, pp. 199-223.

# NON-RITUAL ALCOHOL USE AMONG ISRAELI JEWS

Shoshana Weiss

**J**EWS generally are reputed to consume freely alcoholic drinks but to have a minimum of alcohol-related pathologies. It is believed that this is because they have a tradition of drinking, but not of drinking heavily. A review of nine articles published in English between 1970 and 1983 about the rates of Jewish alcoholism showed that it was still a comparatively rare phenomenon among Jews.<sup>1</sup> Another article, published in 1988,<sup>2</sup> noted that a study published in 1984<sup>3</sup> had cast doubt on the continued success of Jews in maintaining a low level of alcoholism, but argued that there was not enough methodologically sound research which would dispute the traditional finding favourable to Jews.

In fact, various studies conducted from the 1960s to the early 1980s in the Diaspora had concluded that there was only moderate drinking among the majority of Diaspora Jews and low rates of alcohol-related problems.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, studies conducted during the same period in Israel found that there were low rates of per capita consumption of alcohol as well as of cirrhosis of the liver and that the proportion of adolescent and adult Jews who imbibed alcohol was much lower than that among comparable groups in England and North America.<sup>5</sup>

## *Recent Trends in the Diaspora*

The results of studies carried out in the late 1980s were consistent with the earlier research which had revealed that there was a low prevalence of heavy drinking and related problems among Jews.<sup>6</sup> These articles had continued to use the traditional sociological and psychological theories, which had been advanced to explain why Diaspora Jews indulged only in moderate drinking, while they lived as a minority among a Gentile population. It was suggested that there was fear of uncontrollable behaviour resulting from over-indulgence in alcohol in a Gentile hostile environment, since such behaviour would

have intensified the prevalent hostility to Jews and that Jews had been exposed from an early age to rituals involving only a moderate amount of wine.<sup>7</sup>

There was also a biological theory, following the results of a study which examined 15 men who had reported having parents who were both Jewish. The study suggested that these men had an increased sensitivity to lower levels of alcohol and that this was a factor which led such individuals to drink only very moderately in order to avoid the adverse physical, psychological, and social consequences of heavier drinking in their case. The conclusion was:<sup>8</sup>

The reasons underlying the relatively low level of alcoholism among men and women who consider themselves to be Jews are still unknown. It is probable that complex factors involving social, cultural and also biological factors interact to produce a decreased level of severe alcohol-related problems.

#### *Recent Trends in Israel*

In Israel today, both the drinking of alcohol and the attitudes towards its use still differ to some extent from those prevalent in Europe and in North America. On the other hand, there has recently emerged a significant change in this context: according to nationwide surveys carried out in Israel in 1982, 1983, and 1987 by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, there was during those years an increase in beer drinking and in drinking in public houses among young people and in drunkenness among Israeli-born second-generation Jews.<sup>9</sup> This is a cause for concern. Young adults now tend to serve alcoholic drinks at the type of social gathering at which their parents would have served tea or coffee. Bars and public houses have also become fashionable — there are at present more than 2,500 such establishments in the country, according to the Israeli beer industry.

An article published in 1988<sup>10</sup> stated that in 1986, the Department for the Prevention and Treatment of Alcoholism of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs estimated that there were 15,000 chronic alcoholics. An article published in 1992 stated that in the late 1980s the estimated number of alcoholics was 25,000<sup>11</sup> while another paper estimates that there were at least 50,000 alcoholics during that period.<sup>12</sup> The discrepancy between the two figures is the result of different methods of calculation. The lower figure of 25,000 was based on the 1987 nationwide research which relied on the percentages of individuals who personally admitted that they themselves were alcoholics. The higher estimate of 50,000 is based on the same survey of 1987, which reported on the percentage of respondents who said that they knew at least one alcoholic individual among the members of their own close family group. In both cases, new immigrants from the Soviet

## NON-RITUAL ALCOHOL USE AMONG ISRAELI JEWS

Union were not included. According to EFSHAR (an acronym for an association concerned with treatment programmes for abusers of alcohol), there are at present about 10,000 alcoholic new immigrants from the former Soviet Union.

The theory that decreasing levels of religious observance tend to be associated with increasing levels of drunkenness and alcoholism is not clearly validated by recent Israeli findings. Indeed, the data show that there is a possible link between religiosity and acquaintance with individuals who are alcoholics: the greater the religiosity, the greater the percentage of acquaintances who are alcoholics.<sup>13</sup> For example, the 1987 national survey revealed that 16 per cent of the 285 religious respondents, 12 per cent of the 532 traditional respondents, and 7 per cent of the 365 secular respondents knew at least two alcoholics (defined as persons who cannot function without alcohol).<sup>14</sup> Indeed, one can argue that it is possible for religious Jews to have acquaintances who are alcoholics but who are not themselves religious. This issue therefore requires further research. In addition, the 1987 nationwide survey revealed that religious respondents tended to drink more often for motives more likely to lead to alcohol addiction than did their secular counterparts. These motives included: to attenuate a bad mood or depression, to ease tension, to forget troubles, and to sleep better at night. That 1987 survey also revealed that about a quarter (26 per cent) of the 1,189 respondents knew at least one alcoholic, 35 per cent knew at least one daily drinker, 12 per cent knew at least one daily drinker among the members of their own family group, and 7 per cent knew of at least one alcoholic in their immediate close family.<sup>15</sup>

Such findings lead one to believe that daily drinking and alcoholism are more prevalent than had been previously assumed from the answer given in reply to direct questioning of respondents — for example, 'In the course of the last year, how many times did you take alcoholic drinks, not for ritual purposes?' In 1983, 40 per cent of the 1,149 respondents stated that they believed that alcohol drinking was a serious problem in Israel and the proportion had risen to 49 per cent of 1,189 respondents in 1987.<sup>16</sup> In 1987 also, 10 per cent of the respondents were concerned about the fact that they themselves or members of their family consumed too much alcohol.<sup>17</sup> Such frank admissions of personal worry are a significant finding.

The recent immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union brought to Israel very large numbers of alcoholics who are afraid to seek treatment. This great fear of being labelled alcoholics exists among them because in their native land alcoholics could not obtain a driving licence or were not allowed to engage in some specified occupations until they could show a clean record over a number of years. Moreover, they are suspicious of the forms of treatment offered in Israel according to Western psycho-social methods because these differ so greatly from

the methods which had been employed in the Soviet Union — such as hypnosis or the injection of drugs.

In Israel, the treatment centres for alcoholics are non-coercive: you come to the centre because you want to come, not because you have been ordered by the authorities to do so. The staff are mainly social workers and such persons are not generally believed to be fully competent by the alcohol-dependent immigrants who were treated by medical personnel in their native land. Furthermore, therapy in Israel is conducted in family or group sessions — again, a form of treatment with which the immigrants were not familiar because alcoholics in what used to be the Soviet Union were apparently forcibly incarcerated in hospitals.<sup>18</sup>

During the period April to September 1991, Soviet newcomers constituted 11.65 per cent of new cases of Jewish alcoholics admitted to the seven Jewish centres for the treatment of alcohol dependency; but a few months later, in the first quarter of 1992 (from January to the end of March 1992), they accounted for 17.6 per cent of new cases and in the following quarter (April to June 1992), the proportion was almost exactly the same: 17.7 per cent. However, in the third quarter of 1992 (from July to the end of September 1992), they constituted 32.3 per cent of new cases.<sup>19</sup>

The American data gathered by the 1988 and 1990 national household surveys of drug abuse revealed that a quarter (25.2 and 24.5 per cent, respectively) of young persons aged between 12 and 17 years had taken at least one alcoholic drink in the month preceding the survey.<sup>20</sup> A survey conducted in North Israel in 1990 showed an almost identical proportion of alcohol consumption among the young: 25.4 per cent of a total of 1,044 young urban persons aged from 13 to 18 years reported that they had drunk beer during the month preceding the survey. Moreover, 35.5 per cent reported that they had drunk wine and 15.3 per cent stated that they had drunk distilled spirits.<sup>21</sup> In the 1989 national survey, 32.2 per cent of 8,151 respondents aged 12 to 18 years reported drinking beer in the previous month, 26.6 per cent reported drinking wine, and 13.1 per cent stated that they had drunk distilled spirits.<sup>22</sup> Another study, carried out in 1990 among 435 kibbutz-born pupils aged 14 to 18 years, revealed that 58 per cent of the male respondents and 37 per cent of the females reported beer-drinking during the month preceding the survey. As for wine, the proportions were 46 per cent of males and 40 per cent of females; and for distilled spirits, 40 per cent of males and almost the same (39 per cent) in the case of females.<sup>23</sup>

It must be borne in mind that the road to alcoholism usually takes some years to reach visible deterioration and that the authorities do not have to be concerned only with immigrants who have brought with them the 'non-ritual drinking cultural trend' from the Diaspora. Home-grown Israelis are developing the practice now.

## NON-RITUAL ALCOHOL USE AMONG ISRAELI JEWS

### *Conclusion*

Like all Jews, including those in the Diaspora, Israelis will drink some wine on ritual occasions; but they also now have a tendency to adopt the usage of Gentiles in Western countries.<sup>24</sup> They are no longer in exile, no longer a minority within the wider society, and they have become familiar with the patterns of frequent drinking of alcohol which obtains among large sections of populations of Europe and North America. They observe the tourists in Israel, as well as the immigrants from Western countries; they travel abroad for pleasure or for work; and they see foreign films and television programmes which lead them to believe that one aspect of 'the good life' is the pleasure derived from consuming alcoholic drinks. Many of them have also come to believe that beer or distilled spirits, or wine, will provide some relaxation or relieve stress. After the decades of economic difficulties and of austerity which followed the establishment of the State, and especially since the Six-Day War of 1967, many Israeli Jews have decided to adopt the style of living characteristic of large numbers of Western citizens, including drinking alcohol fairly often.

There is a law in Israel which prohibits the supply of alcohol to those under the age of 18 years; but that law does not appear to be strictly enforced. It is also important to note that the majority of young Israelis do not now join youth movements, as they used to do in large numbers in the past; these movements discouraged the drinking of alcohol for pleasure.

It is not only the immigrants from the former Soviet Union who include an appreciable proportion of alcoholics. Some of the newcomers from Ethiopia have taken to imbibing large amounts of beer and there are already Ethiopian Jews in treatment centres for alcoholism in Israel. Ethiopian Jews embarked on the habit after they had come to Israel. Beer reminds them of the taste of a traditional drink — *Tale* — which in Ethiopia contains under 5 per cent of alcohol.

Israel at present is an ideal field for research into the factors which lead members of a society, renowned for observing moderation in alcohol consumption, to alter their attitude to intoxicating beverages and to develop fairly rapidly patterns of non-ritual drinking which are commonly found in Western countries.

### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Suzanne Bainwol and Charles F. Gressard, 'The Incidence of Jewish Alcoholism: A Review of the Literature', *Journal of Drug Education*, vol. 15, no. 3, 1985, pp. 217-24.

<sup>2</sup> Charles F. Gressard and Suzanne Bainwol, 'Jewish Drinking Practices: Implications for Prevention', *Journal of Alcohol and Drug Education*, vol. 33, no. 2, 1988, pp. 67-75.

<sup>3</sup> L. V. Flasher and A. A. Maisto, 'A Review of Theory and Research on Drinking Patterns among Jews', *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, vol. 172, 1984, pp. 596-603.

<sup>4</sup> Genevieve Knupfer and Robin Room, 'Drinking Patterns and Attitudes of Irish, Jewish and White Protestant American Men', *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, vol. 28, 1967, pp. 676-99; M. M. Glatt, 'Jewish Alcoholics and Addicts in the London Area', *Mental Health and Society*, vol. 2, 1975, pp. 168-74; Wolfgang Schmidt and Robert E. Popham, 'Impressions of Jewish Alcoholics', *Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, vol. 37, no. 7, 1976, pp. 931-39; Barry Glassner and Bruce Berg, 'How Jews Avoid Alcohol Problems', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 46, 1980, pp. 647-64; and Wesley H. Perkins, 'Parental Religion and Alcohol Use Problems as Intergenerational Predictors of Problem Drinking among College Youth', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 26, no. 3, 1987, pp. 340-57.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Shoshana Weiss and Pnina Eldar, 'Alcohol and Alcohol Problems Research 14 — Israel', *British Journal of Addiction*, vol. 82, no. 3, 1987, pp. 227-35; and Israel Adler and Denise B. Kandel, 'A Cross-cultural Comparison of Socio-psychological Factors in Alcohol Use among Adolescents in Israel, France and the United States', *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, vol. 11, no. 2, 1982, pp. 89-113.

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<sup>8</sup> Maristela G. Monterio, Jeffery L. Klein, and Mark A. Schuckit, 'High Levels of Sensitivity to Alcohol in Young Adult Jewish Men: A Pilot Study' *Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, vol. 52, no. 5, 1991, pp. 464-69.

<sup>9</sup> Haviva Bar, Pnina Eldar, and Shoshana Weiss, 'Three National Surveys on Non-ritual Alcohol Drinking Patterns of the Israeli-Jewish Adult Population in the 80's — What Are the trends?', *Israel Journal of Psychiatry and Related Sciences*, vol. 27, no. 2, 1990, pp. 57-63.

<sup>10</sup> Shoshana Weiss and Pnina Eldar, 'Alcohol Control Policy in Israel 1986-1987: Recognizing the Need for Diverse Primary Prevention Initiatives', *Alcohol and Alcoholism*, vol. 23, no. 6, 1988, pp. 515-20.

<sup>11</sup> Nahum Michaely, 'The Profile of the Israeli Alcoholic' (Hebrew), *Mifgash*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1992, pp. 117-27.

<sup>12</sup> Shoshana Weiss, 'Israeli Children in Families with Alcohol Problems. Review of Studies and Programs', *Alkoholizm i Narkomania* — a quarterly of the Polish Psychiatric Association (in press).

<sup>13</sup> See Bar, Eldar, and Weiss, op. cit. in Note 9 above.

<sup>14</sup> Haviva Bar, Pnina Eldar, and Shoshana Weiss, 'Alcohol Drinking Habits and Attitudes of the Adult Jewish Population in Israel 1987', *Drug and Alcohol Dependence*, vol. 23, 1989, pp. 237-45.

<sup>15</sup> See Bar, Eldar, and Weiss, op. cit. in Note 9 above.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.



## NON-RITUAL ALCOHOL USE AMONG ISRAELI JEWS

<sup>17</sup> See Bar, Eldar, and Weiss, op. cit. in Note 14 above.

<sup>18</sup> Aviva Bar-Am, 'Learning to Be Unafraid', *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, 22 November 1991, pp. 12-13.

<sup>19</sup> *Reports of Sociodemographic Variables of Alcoholics Admitted to the Centers for Alcohol Dependency Treatment during April-September 1991, January-March 1992, April-June 1992, July-September 1992* (Hebrew), EFSHAR — Association for the Development of Social Services, Alcohol Treatment Programs, Ramat-Gan, November 1992.

<sup>20</sup> 'Overview of the 1988 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse', *National Institute on Drug Abuse Capsules*, Rockville, Maryland, August 1989; and 'Overview of the 1990 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse', *National Institute on Drug Abuse Capsules*, Rockville, Maryland, December 1990.

<sup>21</sup> Michael Moore and Shoshana Weiss, 'Alcohol Drinking among Urban Jewish Youth in Israel in 1990: Alcohol as the Main Prevention Target', *Psychology of Addictive Behaviors*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1992, pp. 196-99.

<sup>22</sup> Giora Rahav, Zipora Barnea and Meir Teichman, 'Alcohol Consumption among Israeli Youth: Epidemiological and Demographics', paper presented at the 16th Annual Alcohol Epidemiology Symposium, Budapest, 1990.

<sup>23</sup> Shoshana Weiss and Michael Moore, 'Non-ritual Alcohol Drinking Practices among High School Students from the Kibbutz Movement in Israel: Implications for Prevention', *Journal of Drug Education*, vol. 21, no. 3, 1991, pp. 247-54.

<sup>24</sup> Shoshana Weiss, 'Primary Prevention of Excessive Drinking and the Jewish Culture — Preventive Efforts in Israel 1984-1985', *Journal of Primary Prevention*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1988, pp. 218-25.

# REGISTER OF SOCIAL RESEARCH ON BRITISH JEWRY 1992

Frances Cohen and Ann Franses

## *Introduction*

**T**HIS is the fifth Register of Social Research to be published in this Journal; previous editions appeared between 1968 and 1988. The last Register — published in the June 1988 issue (vol. 30 no. 1) — listed 45 entries; this current Register lists 44. The very wide range of subjects under research reflects a continuing interest in local Jewish history, particularly in the provinces, with some communities attempting local social surveys. Scotland in particular is both researching its past and planning for its future by seeking to establish community priorities.

A new trend has developed in recording social history other than in written form; this is apparent from details which have been submitted about projects using photographic, audio- and video-recording techniques. Not all of these projects have been included, since some fall outside the ambit of this Register — such as personal family histories. Growing awareness of the urgency and need to record the history of Holocaust survivors has resulted in videotape projects. The listings also indicate interest in the relationship between British Jewry and Israel, in the necessity to identify the needs of Jewish youth, and in the transmission of values and cultural identity to the next generation. Work has been undertaken about the role of women within the community, including studies within the Ultra-Orthodox groupings.

As in previous editions of the Register, the following information has been recorded as far as relevant and available:

- a. title of the project;
- b. short description;
- c. the name of the person or committee responsible for the research;
- d. the name(s) of the principal research worker(s);
- e. the actual or proposed starting date;
- f. the actual or proposed completion date;

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- g. date and details of publication of interim results; and
- h. the actual or probable date and place of publication of final results.

This present Register is divided into three parts. Part A lists research undertaken or sponsored by Jewish communal organizations; Part B lists research undertaken under university or other academic auspices; and Part C lists those individuals who have undertaken research privately. Enquiries regarding a particular entry should be addressed to the person or organization undertaking the research, except in the case of private persons. In this latter case, enquiries should be directed to the authors c/o Community Research Unit, Board of Deputies, Woburn House, Tavistock Square, London WC1H OEP.

*PART A: Research Undertaken by Jewish Communal Organizations*

ASSOCIATION FOR JEWISH YOUTH

AJY House, 128 East Lane, Wembley, Middx., HA0 3NL

- 1.a. *Jewish Young People Today*
- b. Research into the life-styles and leisure interests of Jewish young people and their activity in relation to the Jewish Youth Service.
- c. Mr M. Shaw.
- e. Summer 1991.
- f. Spring 1992.
- h. Summer 1992.

ASSOCIATION OF JEWISH COMMUNAL PROFESSIONALS

17 Arden Road, London, N3

- 2.a. *A Blueprint of the Jewish Communal Service*
- b. Assessment of the current needs of the British-Jewish communal professional in relation to training, motivation, and strategic planning.
- c. d. AJCP Working Party.
- e. December 1990.
- f. Ongoing.

BIRMINGHAM JEWISH HISTORY RESEARCH GROUP

10 Lenwade Road, Oldbury, Warley, Birmingham, B68 9JU

- 3. a. *Survivors in Birmingham Jewry*
- b. Tapes made by refugees from Germany who came to Britain in 1933-45 and who settled in Birmingham.

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- c. d. Dr Z. Josephs and other members of the Birmingham Jewish History Research Group.
- e. f. Ongoing.
- h. These tapes are to be deposited in the Birmingham Archive at the Birmingham Museum.

### BOARD OF DEPUTIES OF BRITISH JEWS, COMMUNITY RESEARCH UNIT

Woburn House, Tavistock Square, London, WC1H 0EZ

Established as 'The Statistical and Demographic Research Unit' in 1965; changed to 'Community Research Unit' in 1987. Compiles statistical data on various aspects of British Jewry; prepares interpretative studies of trends; sets up and advises on local surveys; and collaborates with other research bodies and with social service agencies to provide data for community planning. Functions under a special committee of the Board of Deputies (Chairman: Professor Eric Moonman; Research Director: Mrs Marlena Schmool; Researchers: Mrs Frances Cohen and Mrs Ann Franes).

- 4. a. *Annual Compilation of Community Births, Marriages, Religious Divorces (Gittin), and Deaths*
  - c. d. As above.
  - e. Ongoing.
  - h. 1991 statistics available July 1992 and 1992 statistics should be available in July 1993.
- 5. a. *Interfaith Couples*
  - b. Analysis of the social characteristics of participants in the Outreach Seminars at the Sternberg Centre for Judaism for persons in interfaith relationships.
  - c. Community Research Unit and Outreach initiative at the Sternberg Centre for Judaism, 80 East End Road, London N3 2SY.
  - d. Mrs M. Schmool.
  - e. Annual seminars since 1989.
- 6. a. *The Jewish Population of Britain, 1984-88*
  - b. Estimate of the size of British Jewry in 1984-1988, using the death-rates method. Updates earlier studies of 1960-65 and 1975-79 published respectively in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10 no. 1, June 1968, pp. 5-34 and *The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, vol. 146, Part 3, 1983, pp. 294-310.
  - c. d. Professor S. Haberman, Mrs M. Schmool, and Mrs F. Cohen.

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- e. 1989.
- f. 1992.
- 7. a. *British Synagogue Membership 1990*
  - b. Analysis of membership patterns of synagogues in the United Kingdom.
  - c. d. Unit Staff.
  - e. 1991
  - h. Published by the Board of Deputies, London, 1991.
- 8. a. *Women's Participation in Organized Communal Activities*
  - b. Development of benchmark statistics of women's membership in formal organizations.
  - c. d. Unit Staff.
  - e. March 1991.
  - f. November 1992.
- 9. a. *Patterns of Identity and Religious Practice*
  - b. Sociological sample survey of ritual practices, attitudes, and beliefs comparing members of the Progressive and of the Orthodox communities.
  - c. In conjunction with City University, Department of Social Sciences.
  - d. Mrs M. Schmool and Dr S. Miller.
  - e. December 1992.
- 10. a. *Inter-generational Transmission of Jewish Identity*  
See entry 27 in Part B, under City University.

GLASGOW JEWISH REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL

49 Coplaw Street, Glasgow, G4 2

- 11. a. *Towards 2000 and Beyond*
  - b. Analysis of social and demographic characteristics of Glasgow Jewry to assist in planning for future needs.
  - c. d. Dr H. Tankel and 2000 Working Party.
  - e. 1991.

HULME HEBREW CONGREGATION

c/o 5 Carmel Court, 14 Holland Road, Crumpsall, Manchester M8 6NP

- 12. a. *History of Hulme Hebrew Congregation*
  - b. Examination of how local authority planning has helped shape Manchester Jewry, using Hulme Congregation as a case study.

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- c. d. Mr N. Freeling.
- e. 1992.

### JEWISH EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRUST

44a Albert Road, Hendon, London, NW4 4HU

- 13. a. *Think-Tank on Jewish Education*
- b. In-depth survey of trends in full- and part-time education using survey, documentary, and qualitative research techniques.
- c. Mr F. Worms, Mrs S. Weinberg and Mr M. Mail.
- d. Dr S. Miller.
- e. March 1991.
- g. First phase, 1992.

### JEWISH HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF ENGLAND — LEEDS BRANCH

c/o Mrs H. Sterne, Honorary Secretary, 43 Roper Avenue, Leeds, LS8 7LG

- 14. a. *Leeds Jewry 1929-1939*
- b. Sociological study of Leeds Jewry.
- c. Leeds Branch, Jewish Historical Society of England.
- e. 1986.
- f. 1991.
- g. 1993.

### LEAGUE OF JEWISH WOMEN

Woburn House, Tavistock Square, London WC1H 0EZ

- 15. a. *Youth Survey*
- b. Sample survey to ascertain the needs and requirements of young people.
- c. Mrs S. Kempner in conjunction with the Association for Jewish Youth.
- e. 1991.
- f. 1992.

### THE LONDON MUSEUM OF JEWISH LIFE

The Sternberg Centre, 80 East End Road, London N3 2SY

- 16. a. *Jewish West End Project*
- b. Study of the social history of the Jews of the West End (Marylebone, Soho, Fitzrovia, and Bloomsbury) using

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documentary archives and oral histories from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1945.

c. d. Jewish West End Project Research Committee.

e. 1990.

f. 1993.

h. Exhibition of Jews in the West End at the Sternberg Centre in 1993.

MANCHESTER JEWISH MUSEUM

190, Cheetham Hill Road, Manchester M8 8LW

17. a. *Life of Michael Fidler, M.P.*

b. Biography set against the background of Manchester and British Jewry between 1920 and 1980. Explores notions of leadership in British Jewry and the political relationship between the Jewish community and the wider society.

c. d. Mr B. Williams.

e. 1990.

f. 1992.

18. a. *Being Jewish in Manchester 1890-1990*

b. A study of Jewish identity in twentieth-century Manchester, based on oral and documentary sources. The analysis is set against the background of community development.

c. d. Mr B. Williams.

e. 1990.

f. 1993.

REFORM SYNAGOGUES OF GREAT BRITAIN

c/o 10, Camley Park Drive, Maidenhead, Berks. SL6 6QF

19. a. *The History of the Reform Synagogues of Great Britain*

c. d. Rabbi Dr J. Romain and Dr A. Kershen.

e. 1989.

f. 1993.

h. To be published by the Reform Synagogues of Great Britain, Manor House, 80 East End Road, N3 2SY.

REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL OF NORTH EASTERN JEWRY

Culzean Park, Graham Park Road, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE3 4BH

20. a. *Community Census 1989-1993*

b. Update of demographic review of the Newcastle community, continuing work begun in 1983.

## RESEARCH ON BRITISH JEWRY

- c. Census sub-committee.
- d. Mr W. Sharman.
- f. 1993.
- g. Autumn 1992.
- h. Autumn 1993.

### TESTIMONY: BRITISH VIDEO HOLOCAUST ARCHIVE

67 Addison Road, London W8

- 21. a. *Testimony*
- b. Aims to provide professional video records of all Holocaust survivors in Britain.
- c. d. Mr E. Perry and Mr D. Herman.
- e. August 1989.
- g. To be housed in National Sound Archive of the British Library and at Yale University.

### UNITED SYNAGOGUE REVIEW

3 First Avenue, Hendon, London, NW4 2RL

- 22. a. *The Role of the United Synagogue in the Years Ahead*
- b. Examination of all aspects of structure, organization, and management, including relationships between the lay and the professional leadership within the United Synagogue. Involves direct attitudinal research among synagogue members.
- c. Mr S. Caplan.
- d. Mr S. Caplan, Ms S. Begner.
- e. October 1991.
- f. June 1992.
- h. September 1992.

### WIENER LIBRARY

4 Devonshire Street, London, W1N 2BH

- 23. a. *Britain Reacts to the Holocaust 1945-1990*
- b. Analysis of the responses of British society and of the Jewish community to the Holocaust; and the impact of these responses on culture, politics, education, etc.
- c. Dr D. Cesarani.
- e. 1992.
- f. 1992.
- h. 1993.



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WIENER LIBRARY/PARKES LIBRARY, SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY

24. a. *Refugee Archives in Britain*  
b. Publication of proceedings of a symposium held in February 1992 on the records of refugees and survivors from Nazism.  
c. d. Dr D. Cesarani and Dr T. Kushner.  
e. 1992.  
g. 1992: in *Wiener Library Newsletter* and *Immigrants and Minorities* published by Frank Cass, London.

*PART B: Research Undertaken under Academic Auspices*

POLYTECHNIC OF EAST LONDON, SCHOOL OF INDEPENDENT STUDY  
c/o Jewish Care, 221, Golders Green Road, London, NW11 9DW

25. a. *Cross-Cultural Issues in Social Work*  
b. Development of a training programme designed to give non-Jewish care staff an understanding of the issues of Jewish identity, particularly in so far as the elderly residents of Jewish Care are concerned.  
c. d. Mrs J. Usiskin.  
e. 1990.  
f. March 1992.  
h. M.A. thesis.

CITY UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB

26. a. *Trends in Anglo-Jewish Education*  
b. Analysis of statistical trends in part-time and full-time educational provision. Evaluation of educational developments and strategic goals of Jewish educational agencies.  
c. d. Dr S. Miller and Mrs M. Schmool.  
e. October 1991.  
f. April 1992.  
g. Report of the Jewish Educational Development Trust, September 1992.
27. a. *Inter-generational Transmission of Jewish Identity*  
b. Innovative research project pairing parents and children and examining the sociological and psychological factors influencing children's ethnic and religious identity.  
c. d. Mr R. Barron, Dr S. Miller and Mrs M. Schmool, in conjunction with the Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies.

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- f. Submission to Economic and Social Research Council, 1993.
- 28. a. See entry 9 in Part A, under Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies: *Patterns of Identity and Religious Practice*.

GLASGOW UNIVERSITY

Glasgow, G12 8QQ

- 29. a. *Integration of Jewish Immigrants in Glasgow, 1880-1939*
- b. Historical study of integration of Jewish Immigrants into the wider local society.
- c. d. Mr B. Braber.
- e. 1987.
- f. 1992.
- g. Doctoral thesis, Glasgow University. Copy deposited at Scottish Jewish Archives Centre, Garnethill Synagogue, 127 Hill Street, Glasgow G3 6UB.

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS CENTRE  
FOR VOLUNTARY ORGANISATION

Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE

- 30. a. *The Work and Organisation of Churches and Synagogues*
- b. Literature review and case studies on organizational features and problems associated with local churches and synagogues.
- c. d. Mrs M. Harris.
- e. 1989.
- f. 1994.
- g. Margaret Harris, *Organising Modern Synagogues: A Case of Multiple Models*, Leo Baeck College, 1990.

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

20, Bedford Way, London WC1 0AL

- 31. a. *Sacred and Secular*
- b. A study of the different pedagogies in a Jewish primary school, examining parallel cultural matrices in the General and Jewish Studies Departments.
- c. d. Ms C. Scharfer.
- f. August 1990.
- h. M.A. thesis, University of London.

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UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, ROYAL HOLLOWAY AND BEDFORD NEW  
COLLEGE, DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

Egham Hill, Egham, Surrey, TW20 OEX

32. a. *Depression among Orthodox Jews*  
b. A study of life-events, difficulties, and vulnerability factors in relation to depression and anxiety in two groups of Orthodox Jews.  
c. Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.  
d. Dr C. M. Loewenthal and Mrs V. Goldblatt.  
e. April 1991.  
f. July 1993.
33. a. *Immunization Uptake among Orthodox Jews*  
b. A study of factors which stop Orthodox Jews allowing their children to be immunized.  
c. Stamford Hill Group Practice.  
d. Dr C. M. Loewenthal, Dr C. Bradley and Mrs R. Lewis.  
e. August 1991.  
f. December 1991.

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN  
STUDIES

Russell Square, London, WC1H 0X9

34. a. *The Language of British Judaism*  
b. A study, from the perspective of the Sociology of Language, of the use of Hebrew, Yiddish, and English in Jewish religious life in Britain.  
c. d. Dr L. Glinert.  
e. January 1991.  
f. December 1992.  
g. L. Glinert, 'Language as Quasilect: The Language of British Judaism', in L. Glinert, ed., *Hebrew in Ashkenaz*, Oxford University Press, 1992.

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT

35. a. *History of Habonim in England, 1948-1955*  
b. Thesis submitted for the M.A. in Jewish History. An historical analysis of the development of this Socialist-Zionist youth movement in England, describing the tensions of working

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shortly after the Second World War between the Anglo-Jewish community and the new State of Israel.

- c. d. J. Leigh.
- e. September 1988.
- f. August 1990.
- h. M.A. thesis, 1990, University of London.

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER, DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC SOCIAL WORK

6 Pine Road, Didsbury, Manchester, M20 0UX

- 36. a. *Attitudes towards, and Provision for, the Mentally Ill in the Jewish Community*
- b. To document the experience of the Jewish mentally ill, in the past (that is, when hospitalized) and in the present climate of 'community care'. It is hoped to work confidentially with a client group.
- c. d. Ms D. Freeman.
- e. October 1992.
- f. June 1994.

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER, DEPARTMENTS OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES AND OF SOCIOLOGY

Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL

- 37. a. *Consideration of the Life-style and Attitudes (to Judaism, and Roles as Wife/Mother/Self) of Ultra-Orthodox Jewish Women*
- b. Interviews with Ultra-Orthodox Jewish women, focusing on their attitudes to religion and their sense of self.
- c. d. Ms S. Stern.
- e. January 1992.
- f. December 1993.
- h. M.A. dissertation.

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, ST JOHN'S COLLEGE

Oxford, OX1 3JP

- 38. a. *Anglo-Jewish Responses to the Establishment of the State of Israel*
- b. Political attitudes of the Anglo-Jewish Community to the State of Israel from the election of Selig Brodetsky as President of the Board of Deputies in 1939 until the Suez crisis of 1956.
- c. d. Mr S. Wendehurst.

FRANCES COHEN AND ANN FRANCES

- e. October 1991.
- f. December 1993.
- h. Doctoral thesis, University of Oxford.

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, ST ANTHONY'S COLLEGE  
Oxford, OX2 6JF

- 39. a. *Jewish Charitable and Self-help Organisations in Manchester and Hamburg in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*
- b. Enquiry into the extent and nature of Jewish welfare in the two cities. Analysis of welfare institutions of the native Jewish elite and the impact on them of Eastern European Jewish immigration.
- c. d. Mr R. Liedtke.
- e. October 1991.
- f. 1994/95.
- h. Doctoral thesis, University of Oxford.

UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK, DEPARTMENT OF ARTS EDUCATION  
Coventry, CV4 7AL

- 40. a. *Religious Education and Community Project (RECP)*
- b. Explores the nature of nurture and the transmission of culture from one generation to another in four religious traditions — Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism. Research methods include interviewing children in their schools and homes, and participant observation in educational institutions and places of worship.
- c. Mr R. Jackson.
- d. Mr P. Woodward and Ms E. Nesbitt.
- e. October 1990.
- f. September 1993.
- g. November 1991 to the Economic and Social Research Council.
- h. September 1993 to ESRC. Also articles to be published in relevant academic and educational journals.

*PART C: Research by Private Individuals*

MR N. GRIZZARD

- 41. a. *Bradford Jewish Heritage Trail*
- b. The history of Jewish Bradford from 1820 to 1991.
- c. d. Mr N. Grizzard and Ms L. Oldfield.
- e. Continuing from 1983.

## RESEARCH ON BRITISH JEWRY

- g. *Following Bradford's Jewish Heritage Trail*, third revised edition published in November 1991 by Bradford Interfaith Centre, Listerhills Road, Bradford 7.

### MR E. CONWAY

- 42. a. *'Wej Patter': The Language and Lifestyle of Patter Merchants*
  - b. An oral history project recording Wej Patter, the language of spivs, gamblers, and market traders, used in the Manchester Jewish Community between 1945 and 1975.
  - c. d. Mr E. Conway.
  - e. June 1990.
  - f. April 1992.
  - g. A paper was delivered at the 1991 Yakar Conference on 'Preserving the Jewish Heritage'.
  - h. 1993.

### MR M. FREEDMAN

- 43. a. *Social Demography of the Leeds Jewish Community*
  - b. Regular compilations of Leeds community vital statistics and indirect local population estimates.
  - h. Reported annually.

### MR P. GOURGEY

- 44. a. *Indian Jews in Britain*
  - b. Immigration of Jews from Bombay and Calcutta since the Second World War with special attention to the synagogues which they established.
  - c. Mr P. Gourgey.
  - e. May 1992.
  - f. May 1993.

### MR B. WILLIAMS

- 45. a. *Holocaust as Memory*
  - b. Selections from interviews with Holocaust survivors and their children.
  - c. d. Mr B. Williams, National Sound Archive.
  - e. 1991.
  - f. 1993.
  - h. To be published by Methuen in 1993.

## BOOK REVIEWS

MAX BELOFF, *An Historian in the Twentieth Century: Chapters in Intellectual Autobiography*, iv + 138 pp., Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1992, \$25.00 or £18.95.

I was one of those who was fortunate to have gone to a course of lectures by Max Beloff nearly 40 years ago in Oxford, when he set out for a confused undergraduate world the hard facts and even sterner conclusions about the reality of Soviet foreign policy. Last year I saw him at the University of Buckingham, that pantheon to educational free enterprise, an elder statesman of the world of intellectual self-expression and self-help. Across the divide of so many years lay a wealth of academic achievement, in books and articles, now encapsulated in this short volume, and providing a stimulating panorama of Beloff's views.

The son of Russian-Jewish immigrants, Beloff spent the time between school at St Paul's and university at Oxford travelling through Germany. It was the autumn of 1931, and in what he describes as 'the best thing I ever wrote', an article in his school magazine, he drew a contrast between the clouds of war and civil strife on the continent 'and what appeared to be the unconquerable complacency of England' (p. 3). Later, in his own academic work, he was to show how, as France was collapsing in 1940, Britain — all complacency shattered — proposed an Anglo-French union in an attempt to save western civilization.

Beloff published his first book in 1938. It was a study of public order and popular disturbances at the end of the seventeenth century and the early eighteenth. His training in the archives of this distant past made his work on the twentieth century all the more rigorous. It also gave him a sense of perspective when dealing with the political controversies into which he plunged after he became a member of the House of Lords. His outspoken support for the War Crimes Bill was made against the hostility of a majority of his fellow-peers, not only on legalistic but also on less happy grounds. He states: 'I said at the time and still hold that a barely suppressed anti-Semitism on the part of some of the bill's opponents was obvious from listening to the debate' (p. 6).

The experience of public life has confirmed Beloff in the view that the phrase 'open government' is a contradiction in terms. Only by access to the original documents of decision-making can one see how these decisions were made. There is no blueprint, and no amount of guesswork, inside or outside an ideological framework, can expose historical

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truth. Even the recollections of participants in the events of the past, the stock-in-trade of many historians, will not suffice. The sentence in this book that most warmed the cockles of my own historian's heart is this: 'One of the greatest pleasures that research ever gave me was the discovery, when working on the project for an Anglo-French Union during the crisis of 1940, that the accounts in print of all the principal participants could be shown to be factually inaccurate' (p. 24).

Beloff — a working historian for more than five decades — remains, as he puts it, a 'sceptic' about historical truth. He is concerned also, and rightly so, with the effect on even vaguely accurate history of the rapidly diminishing role of letter-writing in public life. Even novels might be of greater value in reconstructing the past than so-called contemporary evidence, where that evidence is fragmentary. Even for the era of mass letter-writing and copious documentation, he writes (somewhat disparagingly perhaps, considering his own contribution to historical reality): 'Trollope's political novels are worth innumerable academic theses about nineteenth-century politics' (p. 24).

The range of Beloff's historical work gives this book its fascination. His studies of Russian history, the area in which I first made his academic acquaintance in the lecture hall, influenced my generation considerably. His point of view can be summed up in a single sentence: 'I do not think myself that I ever accepted Russia as not being part of Europe, or ever regarded the revolution of 1917 as other than an interruption of the development that Russia would have followed alongside that of other European powers with whom its fortunes had been linked since the sixteenth century' (p. 76). This was, in my view, the correct perspective, though at the time it flew in the face of the widely-popularized Toynbean orthodoxy that Russia, because of its religious Orthodox inheritance from Byzantium, was irrevocably separated from the Europe that found its inspiration in papal Rome.

My own visits to Russia confirmed Beloff's perspective, that the Communist carapace was a distorted growth under which the main-springs of European culture and civilization were struggling to emerge. His own current perspective, as the Communist regime sinks into oblivion and new forms struggle to emerge, is both wise and instructive: 'The Russians can see what a better society would look like but find it hard to take the steps necessary to get there'. Perhaps they should ask Lord Beloff to revisit them, and to give them his guidance. Though he is rightly shy of vesting any historian with the ability to derive from history a blueprint for the future, he would certainly give them a vast perspective based not only on knowledge, but on lifelong reflection.

Even Beloff makes the occasional slip. He rebukes Churchill for calling Gandhi a 'half-naked fakir' (p. 127); but what Churchill in fact called Gandhi was 'a Middle Temple lawyer posing as a half naked fakir' — quite another matter, to *pose* as a fakir. Nor does Beloff add



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here one of his usually judicious footnotes to point out that, once the India Bill had been put on the statute book in 1935, Churchill held long private talks with two of Gandhi's friends, sent messages back to the Mahatma of the most encouraging kind, and expressed the hope that he could visit the Mahatma in due course in India. The point that Beloff is making here, that nations cannot stand far enough back to see themselves in the round, can be shown to be untrue in Churchill's case. As he told the Mahatma: 'I do not care whether you are more or less loyal to the British Empire. What matters is the well-being of the Indian people' — a far cry from narrow nationalism, and one that Beloff himself might surely have found impressive.

Where Beloff has most to say about Churchill is with regard to Europe; he points out that Churchill's main line of thought towards Europe after 1945 was to find some way in which to bring about the reconciliation of France and Germany. Britain's role would be to encourage this, to coax the French into accepting Germany as a partner in European reconstruction, and in serving as a facilitator of that coming together by reason of its Commonwealth and American links. Whatever course European unity might take, Churchill would not allow it to destroy the Commonwealth bond or to obliterate the special relationship with the United States. My own work on this, published in the *Never Despair* volume of the Churchill biography, bears this out.

This collection of essays, attractively presented, gives pause for thought on every page. Beloff, despite the firmness of his views, is no intellectual autocrat. I found myself often in agreement with him but, where I did not agree, I was conscious that he would not only put up a good case to sustain his argument, but would hear the case for the other side, and enjoy the ensuing debate. Among historians, this is not as common a virtue as it ought to be. It is even rarer when, as in Beloff's case, the decisive factors are always the evidence itself, painstakingly acquired, rather than mere opinion, however lavishly expressed.

MARTIN GILBERT

MICHAEL FISCHER and BRENDA GEIGER, *Reform through Community: Resocializing Offenders in the Kibbutz*, xv + 228 pp., Greenwood Press, Westport, Ct., 1991, £35.95.

Israeli kibbutzim have introduced a number of programmes designed to rehabilitate those who have broken the law, or are considered in danger of doing so. This particular book investigates the most ambitious of these projects — one that deals with prisoners during the last third of their sentences. After earning an early release, they are transferred to a kibbutz. Their new domicile will, it is hoped, prevent their return to prison, turn them into productive citizens and, in certain

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cases at least, even enable them to become fully-fledged members of the kibbutz.

The prisoners who participated in this programme were selected according to two sets of criteria. First, they had to meet a number of objective ones concerning sex (male), age (between 18 and 30) and type of conviction (not rape, pimping, drug dealing, or murder). If they were found to be suitable on these grounds, then more subjective factors such as readiness for work, degree of sociability, and intelligence level were considered. Those eventually chosen to take part in the project were more serious offenders than were the general prison population: they were serving longer sentences and had received more prison terms than had other inmates. In fact, almost half of them had been last imprisoned for violent offences and as many as 75 per cent had been convicted at least once for crimes against the person.

The programme was studied from two vantage points — its various stages and its different components. Thus the resocialization process was first analyzed from the inmate's initial resolution in prison through the first attempts at autonomy to full belonging and rehabilitation. Then the major facets of the programme — work activities and social contacts with adoptive parents and other kibbutz friends, especially of the opposite sex — were considered.

Both lines of investigation led the authors to the conclusion that the resocialization programme had been highly successful: the offender had finally grasped what he had gained and what he had lost, his family and old friends had not been most helpful and he had suffered in various delinquency institutions, but he had been able to overcome adversity and had managed to change. The past no longer bothered him. On the contrary, his experiences had made him stronger and he was now ready to live in the present and to plan for the future.

That euphoric mood is tempered only at the very end of the book. In their epilogue, the authors refer to the case of one prisoner who, together with a young kibbutz member, murdered an Arab petrol-station attendant. However, they mention this incident only in order to argue that one 'dastardly act' should not be allowed to influence our assessment of the project as a whole.

In fact, Fischer and Geiger go one step further. Not only do they argue that the resocialization programme was highly successful; they also claim that it is transplantable. Those who have not lost faith in rehabilitation are therefore urged to establish similar projects elsewhere, since programmes which are based on solidaristic groups engaged in meaningful activities with a supportive milieu can solve the problem of delinquency in variegated settings, especially in the USA.

The low rate of recidivism found amongst participants in the project does, of course, augur well for its future. However, the extent to which the programme is transplantable remains open to question. The

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kibbutz is an existing community which takes upon itself the additional task of delinquency rehabilitation, and that may be the secret of its success. Paradoxically, therapeutic communities established specifically to achieve this goal, may find it much more elusive.

There is a further point. All kibbutz rehabilitation programmes have been introduced since members of the kibbutzim have begun to question the very principles on which their communities were founded. Perhaps these projects constitute one of the ways in which the contemporary kibbutz is trying to restore its sense of purpose. Moreover, it is possible to argue — in spite of the greatly euphoric mood revealed by the book — that the kibbutz needs to undertake such programmes because they will strengthen the community, rather than to conclude that it is the strength of the group which has ensured the success of the rehabilitation of serious offenders.

GERALD CROMER

DANIEL H. FRANK, ed., *Autonomy and Judaism: The Individual and the Community in Jewish Philosophical Thought*, ix + 229 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, 1992, \$49.50 (paperback, \$16.95).

The papers published in this volume had their origin at a conference in Philadelphia in 1989 and are now presented in revised form in order to bring together (as the blurb states) 'leading philosophers of Judaism on the issue of autonomy in the Jewish tradition'. The subtitle is somewhat misleading in that the discussion is not primarily about the relationship of the individual to the Jewish community but rather, as the title itself puts it, autonomy and Judaism — that is, the question of individual dissent from the tradition in obedience to the general moral law. This question is considered from various standpoints. Despite a certain unevenness in the treatment of diverse themes, the volume contains many stimulating ideas. At least, the right questions are asked and, as has been often noted, philosophy is more about asking questions than about providing solutions.

While, naturally, Kant's position on heteronomy versus autonomy is referred to more than once, it is somewhat odd to find no reference to Kierkegaard's 'knight of faith' and his 'teleological suspension of the ethical', both strictly relevant to the thrust of the book. Kierkegaard receives only a single mention (p. 33) and that, only obliquely, as a critic of the Kantian view.

Philosophers not infrequently ignore or try to transcend historical realities. In this book, for instance, an illustration is given of how Rabbinic humanism mitigates the severities and asperities of the Torah and the Prophets by applying a proceduralism which they derive from

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the Torah and the Prophets themselves. 'Thus the laws of evidence and testimony are forged into a powerful obstacle to capital punishment: not only must two witnesses concur independently and in circumstantial detail before the presumption of innocence gives way in capital cases, but there must also have been explicit warning to the criminal immediately prior to his act for an offence to count as capital'. (p. 101). But I. H. Weiss and other historians of the Halakhah have rightly noted that the Talmudic sources in which these rules of evidence occur were compiled at least two centuries after capital punishment had been abrogated. The procedures are given in a purely academic context where a humanistic approach made no demands on credulity. It would have been humanism run riot if, in the time of the Sanhedrin, a murderer could have been executed for his crime only if two witnesses had told him to desist, otherwise they would bring him to court, and he replied that he knew the consequences full well but was going ahead regardless. Which murderer would be so stupid as to commit the crime in such circumstances instead of killing his victim when no one was looking? In other words, what we have in the Rabbinic rules is a humanism in reflection and theory, decidedly not a humanism in practice. To recognize this does not destroy the argument, to be sure, but it does weaken it considerably. Moreover, it is questionable whether a term like 'humanism', or, for that matter, 'autonomy', can be used when dealing with the classical sources of Judaism, produced in an age long before such terms were current. To be fair, the various authors and the editor are aware that a degree of extrapolation from the sources is required if the investigation is to be at all significant.

A few minor points. Heinemann's initial is correctly given as 'I' on pages 113 and 117 but in the Index (p. 228) it is given as 'T'. The Hebrew letter *het* is transliterated as 'ch' in one line (p. 103) but a few lines further on as 'kh'; the latter is the usual rendering for the letter *khaf*. The reference to a 'rapist' (p. 115) is imprecise since the sources quoted refer only to the rape of a married woman. Another imprecise statement is: 'Unlike American law, where a felon continues to suffer disabilities and embarrassment for the rest of his or her life, Jewish law demanded that the community's forgiveness be complete — even to the point of not mentioning the crime any longer' (p. 197). The sources quoted in the note (p. 215) on not mentioning the crime any longer state that it is wrong for an individual, not the 'community' to taunt a former criminal with his misdeeds. Whatever 'American law' might say, one imagines that many American individuals would agree. And the statement quoted in this text (p. 197) is not germane to the issue. In that statement a judge is advised, when two men who have appeared before him have been given the court's decision, that they should henceforth both be regarded as innocent. The reference is to a *civil suit* — at first the judge should treat both as in the wrong but, once the

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decision has been rendered in favour of one, that is the end of the matter — and has nothing to do with whether or not a *felon* should suffer disabilities.

LOUIS JACOBS

TONY KUSHNER, ed., *The Jewish Heritage in British History: Englishness and Jewishness*, xi + 234 pp., Frank Cass, London, 1992, £25.00.

The title and subtitle of this collection of essays represent an attempt to marry two different notions conveyed by the word 'heritage'. The volume is partly directed towards an assessment of the material heritage of the Jews in England (there is not much about the rest of the United Kingdom) — buildings, documents, artefacts. There is also an attempt to relate the existence, or non-existence, of such a material deposit to a particular view of the relations between Jews and the wider community. The former task has been performed with a diligence which will put all students in debt to the various authors. This is especially true of the chapter by Bill Williams on the creation of the Manchester Jewish Museum and the rescue of the much-neglected relics of Manchester Jewry, particularly from its earlier area of concentration. Sharman Kadish gives a more broadly-based account of Jewish buildings in Britain; Susie Barton gives useful information upon what role English Heritage can play in their preservation; and Judy Glasman gives a detailed and illustrated account of the building and organization of London synagogues in the last century — incidentally casting some light on the relations between Samuel Montagu and the Federation of Synagogues. The Appendix, a directory of Jewish historical and heritage sources in the United Kingdom, gives the volume added value.

The theme of Englishness and Jewishness is dealt with in more than one way. It is partly an enquiry into what appears to be a neglect of the Jewish element in English history by English historians, including quite recent ones. Here, Professor Colin Richmond's chapter on 'Englishness and Medieval Anglo-Jewry' provides a truly impressive and disquieting account — though he may have overdone the view that passing over the wickedness of Henry III or Edward the First by British historians amounts to an indifference to the Holocaust. The fact that Professor Richmond is an authority on both does not itself prove a connection. The neglected period is that between the seventeenth century 'readmission' of the Jews and the emancipation campaign. Professor David Katz's chapter on the marginalization of early modern Jewish history is a disappointment. His three instances do not get one very far. While the neglect of Isaac Newton's theological writings by historians of science is an interesting subject, it is not particularly germane to Jewish matters. The neglect of Spinoza's connection with

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English Quakers is a point — but his chief objection is that levied against Spinoza's most recent biographer, Professor Yovel (who, like Professor Katz, is an Israeli); and the affairs of Anglo-Jewry hardly seem to be relevant. The intervention by James the Second on behalf of the Jews of London as a factor in his general policy of relieving the disabilities of non-Anglicans — with consideration of his own Catholic faith to the fore — seems a somewhat minor aspect of the Glorious Revolution to warrant much more attention than it has already been given.

The contributions in the rest of the volume — and indeed, some of the essays already cited — are vehicles for the particular attitude towards history in general and Anglo-Jewish history in particular that is the hallmark of the Kushner-Cesarani school. Where history is concerned, the issue is summed up in a phrase by Bill Williams when he writes about the lack of interest on the part of Manchester Jewry, particularly the older generation, in the recovery of their own history: it was 'a function of the way in which English society in general had defined history. Like all working people they had been led to believe that real history was about influential people and significant events' (p. 140). But what else has history been about since classical times? No doubt 'social' history has its place as showing the ways in which individuals or groups became 'influential' or exercised influence and in exploring the circumstances out of which 'significant' events emerged. But no more than that. Yet for Dr Kushner, as he shows in his discussion of the new national curriculum in state schools, the social background becomes the whole. Thus, in dealing with representations of the history of the East End from 1887 on, he writes that the 1987 celebration 'marked an important coming of age in Jewish historiography: it enabled the representation of Jewish prostitutes and anarchists [a curious juxtaposition] previously ignored or marginalized in historical writings and exhibitions and for them to occupy centre stage' (p. 97). And we get trotted out all the old pleas for gender, ethnicity, and class to be the focus of Jewish history in Britain. And none of it is convincing. Dr Lara Marks produces an interesting and learned essay on various aspects of the lives of Jewish women in Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; but she clearly has difficulty in persuading herself, let alone me, that 'women's history' is anything but a blind alley devised by feminists to keep women from tackling 'real history'.

Tony Kushner and David Cesarani and their friends are very contemptuous of the old Anglo-Jewish leaders and their historians, notably that much more considerable scholar Cecil Roth, for what they see as their 'assimilationism' — that is to say, a desire to enable the successive generations of Jews to find a place in English life according to conventional middle-class standards. But Kushner and Cesarani

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and their followers are themselves assimilationists, only they wish to be assimilated not into traditional British society (what sense does it make to ignore the role of Christianity in the formation of English society and the English State?) but into an imaginary multicultural 'rainbow coalition' politically a part of the Left, even though this means overlooking the fact that there are enormous differences between the history of the Jews in a country where they have (with one break) been settled for a thousand years and newcomers whose sojourn is less than half a century old and whose historical roots in quite recent times lie outside the United Kingdom and indeed the European Continent. Why confuse important issues? A sensitivity to antisemitism in Britain and elsewhere must always, and now more than ever, figure in the Jewish consciousness, but this does not mean that its various manifestations should not be distinguished.

Mr Kushner takes me to task for having written in 1956 that Chesterton, Belloc, and Mosley were foreign-inspired and that this helped to explain their ultimate failure to build successful movements (p. 89). No subsequent research had dispelled the view that Belloc (and Chesterton after him) derived his beliefs from the French reactionaries set in motion by the Dreyfus affair or that Mosley was indebted to both Mussolini and Hitler. British antisemitism, whether in high society or among the working class, has simply not had similar ideological underpinnings. Tony Kushner also complains that I criticized as shameful the membership of Jews in the Communist Party in the 1930s. Is he unaware of what some people knew in the 1930s, more by 1956, and everyone today — that in Stalin's regime there was a constant pressure upon the Jewish communities of the USSR in their material lives, and a lack of freedom to practise their religion, and that Jews figured disproportionately among the victims of the purges and of the gulags? Or has he forgotten the history of the period, that the British Communist Party itself was about to be faced with applauding the Nazi-Soviet pact? But perhaps he subscribes to the familiar French saying, 'pas d'ennemis à gauche' — not even Stalin.

MAX BELOFF

MARK LEVENE, *War, Jews and the New Europe: The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf 1914-1919*, xvii + 346 pp., Oxford University Press for Littman Library, Oxford, 1992, £35.00.

Mark Levene has written a book of the first importance and of great originality — somewhat disguised by a title which could mean almost anything. There have been so many 'New Europes'. The real subject is better indicated by the second part of the title: for it is the diplomacy of Lucien Wolf in guiding the reactions of part of Anglo-Jewry to the

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impact of the Great War on Jewish fortunes in Central and Eastern Europe which is indeed the true subject of this volume and it is an illuminating as well as a strangely topical one. For if the Holocaust largely eliminated part of the Jewish problem in these regions and if emigration from the former Soviet Union to Israel may remove much of the remainder, the problem of minority rights of communities with national sentiments living in states where another national group holds sway is still with us and no nearer a solution.

Lucien Wolf was an historian of Anglo-Jewry, a well-known figure in communal affairs, and a writer on foreign affairs in the general press. In 1917 he was appointed secretary of the Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association — the 'Conjoint', which he represented at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. His career as a leading figure in Anglo-Jewry divides into three parts. The first was his involvement with attempts to have the undertaking given at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 by Rumania to cease its persecution of its Jewish population made effective by international pressure; and he also tried to secure British intervention in respect of anti-Jewish discrimination and anti-Jewish excesses in Russia. At the same time, he was engaged in the campaign of opposition to the Anglo-Russian Entente, a subject on which I myself wrote many years ago. While I received help in relation to Wolf's journalistic contributions to the campaign from his assistant David Mowshowitch (spelled throughout Mark Levene's book as Mowschowitch, which violates all rules of transliteration), I was not given access to Wolf's private papers now at the Yivo Institute for Jewish Research in New York; and it is these which have formed the basis for Mr Levene's study, which deals with the second phase of Wolf's career, his efforts on behalf of the Jews of Europe caught up in the war, and later his activities at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, leading to the 'minority treaties' with Poland and other States. As Mr Levene points out, the third phase of Wolf's career, his efforts to get the League of Nations and its instrumentalities to enforce these treaties, is another subject of considerable importance upon which no one has written. Perhaps Mr Levene himself will one day fill the gap.

Quite apart from the inherent difficulty of the subject, the author has had to face another obstacle to re-creating the reality of these events — the domination for the years 1914–1917 of Zionist historiography. In the end, what the Jews achieved was the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and out of that Declaration, the Palestine Mandate, and out of the Mandate, the State of Israel. It is no wonder that this 'Whiggish' version of modern Jewish history has become accepted and everything incompatible with it thrust to the margins. Wolf's concern and that of similar communal spokesmen in other Western countries about what could be done with the far greater number of Jews who were unlikely to



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find their way to Palestine in the foreseeable future has been treated as a diversion and the break-up of his instrument (the Conjoint Committee) as his eclipse. And yet we find him only a few months after the Balfour Declaration and most conspicuously at the Peace Conference exercising his considerable measure of diplomatic skill to try to get something for his co-religionists to the East. Knowing what we now know, the effort may seem not to have been worth while, but how could anyone have foreseen the Holocaust? Was it not Germany itself which appeared during the war to offer the best hope to the Jews as compared with their actual Tsarist and would-be Polish oppressors? For this also was part of the problem at the time for Wolf and his collaborators in France and Italy. As Mr Levené notes, at the outbreak of the war in 1914, 'in geopolitical terms, Jewish interests *were* best served by alignment with the cause of Germany and the Central Powers: the Conjoint and the whole Anglo-Jewish community, finding itself stranded, so to speak, on the wrong side' (p. 306). If the Central Powers were defeated and their empires broken up as well as Russia's, perhaps the result would be the creation of new nation-states — and there was already ample warning of what that would mean in the case of those States created as a result of the Ottoman Empire's withdrawal from south-eastern Europe. That Empire's partial replacement by 'new state entities dominated by one ethnic group and religious tendency generally marked a deterioration in the position of religious and ethnic minorities' (p. 7).

Lucien Wolf — like his French, German, and Italian counterparts — belonged to a generation who hoped that the emancipation which had made them loyal citizens of their respective countries could be repeated elsewhere in Europe and that they could interest their own governments in pressing for this process to go ahead. However, that depended upon there being peace in Europe, and the possibility of co-operation between the Great Powers; but first the former vanished, then the latter. In a world of competing alliances, statesmen were bound to take a general view of their own country's best interests. In Britain's case, this might mean ruling out Jewish concerns while Wolf's whole *modus operandi* was predicated on there being a consonance between British and Jewish interests. Any divergence between them, actual or imaginary, was fatal to his position and approach. It could of course be added that it was the same apparent coming together of British and Jewish interest in Palestine which was seized by Chaim Weizmann. Only in his case, in 1917, he appeared to have something to offer in return for support. Apart from the tragedies of the war, there was another irony brought to the fore by the Russian Revolution: the ignorance and gullibility of British and other Allied statesmen where Russia was concerned and also about what the Jews there could do for the Allied cause.

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Wolf like Weizmann was operating in a climate of antisemitism — though of a paradoxical variety. It minimized the value of the Jews to the countries in which they lived while over-rating their political significance and potential power. Keeping Russia in the war, after the setbacks of 1916, seemed to depend upon what the Russian Jews might do, so that appealing on their behalf acquired some cogency. Wolf and his friends believed that the thing to do was to promise an alleviation of their conditions on the spot; Lloyd George's advisers came down on the side of those who argued that Palestine should be the bait: 'the government's decision to issue the Balfour Declaration in November 1917 was motivated primarily by a desperate belief that it would avert Russia's withdrawal from the war' (p. 143).

By the time of the Peace Conference, British illusions, including the belief that Bolshevism was simply a Jewish conspiracy, did not matter so much. Britain was in no position to stand up against the Americans. President Wilson had his own illusions and his own commitments — among them, to do nothing that might weaken a sovereign Poland, the West's bulwark. In the circumstances, Wolf's activities and in particular his links with Headlam-Morley of the British government delegation deserve some credit for getting even a minimum degree of formal protection for minority rights. Wolf was not helped by the American Jewish delegation which, under Zionist pressure, wished to argue the case (never likely to be countenanced by the Powers) for 'national autonomy' for the Jews and for recognition that the Jews constituted a separate 'nation' world-wide. (It is odd that although Mr Levene mentions the presence in Paris of Paul Mantoux as the interpreter to the Big Four, he makes no use of Mantoux's record of their meetings — published in Paris in 1955 by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique — although that record contains material which is highly germane to his subject.)

Every book which began as a thesis is likely to have flaws. Examiners know the subject but ordinary readers need more guidance. The author takes several pages to analyse the debates in the Conjoint about publishing a statement of its own proposals in respect of British action concerning Palestine. But when we come to the actual publication of these proposals, we are not told what was in the 'statement'. Not every reader will have ready to hand *The Times* of 14 May 1917.

Mr Levene is not altogether at home with the structure and nomenclature of the British government at the time. When Rufus Isaacs (later, Lord Reading) became Lord Chief Justice, he could no longer be described as a 'government minister' (p. 43n.); when he was sent to the United States in September 1915, he was already a peer — his elevation did not come 'later' as Mr Levene would have it (p. 59). Francis Acland was not an 'official' (p. 16) nor indeed the Permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, but the *Parliamentary* under-secretary — a very

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different thing (p. 44). Lord Robert Cecil, a minister, is listed among the 'officials' whom Weizmann met in May 1917 (p. 137). Herbert Samuel became Viscount Samuel but never Viscount *Herbert Samuel* (p. 70 fn.). Similarly, Julia Namier can be described as Lady Namier, being the widow of a knight, but not as Lady *Julia Namier* (p. 195 fn.); she had a distinguished ancestry but was not the daughter of an earl or a duke.

There are also some minor indications that Mr Levene is not wholly at home in matters Russian. Kerensky is described as a 'laborist' (pp. 49, 183); but it is not quite accurate to assign him to the *Trudoviks* which one supposes is what is meant. He did enter the Duma under that flag because the Social Revolutionaries were under a ban, but it was to them that he belonged openly in the relevant period. The Menshevik, Chkeidze, appears as 'Tcheidze' (p. 63). And where the author writes of 'White Ruthenia' (p. 194), one must assume that he means what is normally known as White Russia or Byelorussia.

The bibliography is incomplete; it should give all the works cited in the footnotes. And the index is unworthy of a book of this magnitude and complexity, particularly since some characters appear in the narrative with no proper introduction. However, while such faults are mildly irritating to someone who wants to follow up the many trails of thought inspired by Mr Levene's book, they do not detract from a remarkable achievement.

MAX BELOFF

JONATHAN SACKS, *Crisis and Covenant: Jewish Thought after the Holocaust* (Sherman Studies of Judaism in Modern Times series), x + 294 pp., Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, £45.00.

This volume is the outcome of the Sherman Lectures, which Dr Sacks delivered at the Department of Comparative Religion of the University of Manchester in 1989. Though the title suggests a survey of Jewish thought since 1945, much more is attempted; few thinkers of significance since the author's *bête noire*, Spinoza, fail to receive consideration.

The opening chapter defines the 'Themes of Jewish Modernity'. Amongst these are the renewed sense of involvement in general history; secularization, defined by Sacks as 'the displacement of religion to the margins of society' (p. 4); and political emancipation. Emancipation posed a problem of identity, for how could Jews hold on to their particularist religious beliefs and practices whilst becoming part of the larger, 'universal', society? This dilemma was accentuated by the persistence of antisemitism and its secular adaptation, racism. The special nuance that Dr Sacks gives to an otherwise well-rehearsed

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history lies in his account of the rise of various 'orthodox' trends in response to the ambient pressures.

Like other orthodox theologians, not least his predecessor Lord Jakobovits, Sacks rejects the contention of Fackenheim and others that the *Shoah* is a radically new challenge to Jewish faith, preferring to approach it in terms of ancient models of response to suffering. The response of 'what to do', that is, of halakhah, is important. He concludes that 'the strongest metaphor to emerge in the wake of the Holocaust is that of resurrection' (p. 47); this curious lapse into Christian terminology serves to sum up the determination to survive found amongst otherwise disparate groups of Jews, religious and secular, orthodox and reform.

Chapter 3, focusing on Israel, highlights the question of the interpretation of redemption. Again, the novelty of the chapter consists in its account of orthodox involvement with Zionism. Dr Sacks is incorrect in referring to Alkalai and Kalischer as the first to formulate plans for agricultural settlements and the building up of the land; Hillel of Shklov and other disciples of the Gaon of Vilna had attempted to implement such plans decades earlier; they, also, had met with resistance through what Sacks aptly calls the 'internalization of exile', and which was to lead to the rejection of political Zionism by most orthodox leaders in the early twentieth century. In the present day, is the State of Israel the fulfilment, or at least the *atchalta* (commencement) of the fulfilment of prophecy, or can it be viewed in a non-messianic religious perspective? This, argues Sacks, will depend on one's understanding of the nature of Jewish 'destiny'.

Talk of 'destiny' leads to chapters on Jewish identity and peoplehood. The author reviews various attempts to define Jewish identity in the context of enlightenment and emancipation, when not only traditional religious ideas but also community structures were challenged, and again highlights 'orthodox' positions. Chapter 6, on 'Halakhah and Modernity', makes clear the tensions inherent in the attempt to apply halakhah in a secular world; where others would see this as an argument against halakhah, to Sacks it is an argument against modernity. Clearly, his real concern is not with what Jewish identity was or is, but with what it *ought* to be; he demands that individual Jews conform to his concept of 'the Jewish people'. This approach must be rejected because (a) it is authoritarian, and (b) there is no such thing as 'the Jewish people' (or any other people) in the abstract, to which a 'destiny' is attached. People are individuals, nations are abstractions, the future is not determined. Sacks has fallen into the racist/nationalist error exposed by Renan more than a century ago, of fabricating history to justify claims as to what the characteristics of 'the people' are. To define a priori the characteristics of a people is to attempt to exercise power or to manipulate people to conform to the pattern.

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In the latter half of the book Sacks nevertheless expounds his understanding of 'the Jewish people' as a people in a covenant relationship with God based on the Torah. Since, as I contend, 'the people' is not a valid object of discourse, and since Sacks has little to say about God, I shall restrict my remarks to what he has to say about 'Torah'. So strongly does he emphasize his belief in *Torah min ha-shamayim* (Torah from heaven) that one begins to think that he 'doth protest too much', fearful perhaps of the sort of accusations made against Louis Jacobs a generation ago. Now, the doctrine of *Torah min ha-shamayim* as presented in the classical sources of Judaism, from the Mishnah to Maimonides, is that the received scriptural text is the authentic transcription (in the case of the Pentateuch) of words dictated by God to Moses in Sinai about fourteen centuries BCE; to this basic proposition are added others relating to other biblical books and to traditional interpretation. What Sacks actually defends seems not to have the remotest connection with this doctrine: '... what "Torah from Heaven" meant for rabbinic tradition ... Torah is the constitution of the covenant between God and Israel ... it was a hermeneutic stance ... it entailed a *covenantal reading of the Torah*' [italics in text, p. 277]; 'Its words convey not "facts" but instruction and command' (p. 228).

Sacks has ingeniously presented the midrashic process in terms of certain schools of contemporary literary criticism, and combined this with the manifestly incorrect notion that Torah consists only of halakhah. So he can write: 'The doctrine of *Torah min ha-shamayim* was untouched and untouchable by biblical criticism' (p. 229). Now, biblical criticism drove a coach and horses through the conventional doctrine of *Torah min ha-shamayim*, and Sacks evades this conclusion only by changing the meaning of *Torah min ha-shamayim*. He has side-stepped several important issues, not only those of the authenticity, literary history and hence authority of scripture, not only its lack of accord with historical and scientific knowledge, but the moral problems, for instance the call to genocide of the Canaanites, posed by the contents of scripture.

Dr Sacks asserts on p. 233: '*Torah min ha-shamayim* is no abstract, metaphysical doctrine immune to proof or refutation. To the contrary, it makes precisely testable claims. Its most powerful, indeed definitive, claim is that Israel will always exist as a people and always testify to the presence of God'. But neither part of this claim is precise, nor could the claim as a whole be substantiated before the end of time. In any case, an elementary logical error is involved. Even if it followed from *Torah min ha-shamayim* that Israel would always exist, it would not follow from the existence of Israel that the Torah was true; some other part of Torah might be false, or the persistence of Israel might be explicable in other ways.

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Given his interpretation of 'Torah' as an ongoing hermeneutic, what determines the 'authentic' hermeneutic at any given time? Sacks assures us that there is an eternal, permanent Torah, but he fails to set the boundaries of interpretation in an intelligible manner. Why does he accord privilege to Orthodox hermeneutic over Reform or Conservative hermeneutic, while at the same time denying any status whatever to historical interpretation? His indifference to critical historical scholarship leads him to errors in his reading of rabbinic texts. Ignoring recent scholarly work, he refers to the dispute of Rabbis Akiva and Ishmael (p. 226) about whether the Torah was to be understood through the conventions of language as an historical fact, and anyway misinterprets it. He even refers to 'exegetical rules collated by Hillel, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael' (p. 233) as if these were historically correct attributions.

The reconstruction of Jewish theology demands far more serious consideration of its history than Sacks is prepared to give. His 'post-modern' critique of the Enlightenment risks reverting to pre-modern rejection of the scientific method precisely in those areas in which a subjective approach is most hazardous.

NORMAN SOLOMON

ZVI SOBEL and BENJAMIN BEIT-HALLAHMI, eds., *Tradition, Innovation, Conflict; Jewishness and Judaism in Contemporary Israel*, viii + 316 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, 1991, n.p.

This collection of essays is a useful addition to the sociological studies, produced in recent years, of religion in Israel. The contributions are on the whole very readable and though evidently written primarily for specialists, they are sufficiently intelligible to laymen who are normally put off by the sociological jargon often employed in such works.

The volume is in three parts. In the first part, there is a study of religion, ethnicity, and community in a Galilee village; of hagiolatric traditions (there we go with the jargon) among Moroccan Jews in Israel; of the way in which religious and secular Jews react to a Jerusalem funeral ('mismeeting' is a happy sociological term); and of the conflict between tradition and innovation in religious education in Israel. In the second part, Orthodox attitudes towards religious tendencies are discussed, including the 'new religions' — that is, the various cults and missionary bodies. Part three discusses how religious beliefs in Israel affect social life.

The essay by William Shaffir, 'Conversion Experiences: Newcomers to and Defectors from Orthodox Judaism', breaks new ground in studying not only the *baal teshuvah* movement (on this, a number of studies are available) but also the attitudes of people who have left the ultra-Orthodox fold. Shaffir uses for the latter (evidently the current

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Israeli terminology) the expression *hozrim beshe'elah*, (given thus correctly on p. 173 but incorrectly as *horzim* in the table of contents on p. vi). There is a clever pun here. The word *teshuvah* can mean both 'return' and 'reply' so that *hozrim beteshuvah* can be rendered not only as 'those who come back [to Orthodoxy] in repentance' but also as 'those who come back to the answers', from which it follows that the defectors are those who feel impelled to 'return to the questions'. Shaffir notes the remarkable parallels between the two and also the strong differences in the circumstances in which they choose a new life.

The essay on the Jerusalem funeral mentions the strange custom, described by Gershom Scholem and still followed, of issuing a *herem*, a ban, against the children of the deceased from following the bier so that his demon children, produced by his 'waste of seed' during his lifetime, will also be banned from claiming their share of the inheritance. The author of this essay is puzzled (p. 84) as to why the ban is called 'the *kherem* [*sic*, should be *herem*] of Joshua son of Nun' and remarks that none of his informants could give any description for the term or even whether that man is the Joshua described in the Bible. The truth is that Joshua's name is usually attached to every *herem*, not only this one, on the basis of Joshua's ban on the city of Jericho (Joshua 6:26).

LOUIS JACOBS

## CHRONICLE

The 1991-92 Annual Report of the Refugee Studies Programme for the study of forced migration (RSP) states that the RSP's aim 'is to increase understanding of the causes, consequences and experiences of forced migration, through multidisciplinary research, teaching, publications, seminars and conferences'. The RSP is part of Queen Elizabeth House, the University of Oxford's International Development Centre. The Programme was established in 1982, when the total number of refugees was believed to number ten million, with only one million internally displaced. The Annual Report states: 'Today refugees are said to number more than 17 million, with the numbers of internally displaced being much higher: only 30 countries account for an estimated 23 million'.

During the academic year 1991-92, 21 Visiting Research and Study Fellows from 17 countries came to RSP for periods ranging from one term to a full academic year. Visiting Study Fellows take the Foundation Course in Refugee Studies. In 1991-92, that course was 'taught at Masters level, and course-work and examinations are expected from all Visiting Study Fellows. RSP awards certificates of attendance, but no formal qualifications, although many Visitors registered at other universities are able to gain credit for undertaking the course'.

The Annual Report also states that RSP supplies contract research services for international projects; one of those was 'a study of socio-economic aspects

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of agriculture in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank . . . , funded by the Society for Austro-Arab Relations'.

The RSP will convene the fourth meeting of the International Research and Advisory Panel conference on forced migration at Somerville College, Oxford, on 5-9 January 1994. There will be workshops on the following themes: 1) changing political contexts of violence and flight; 2) the meaning of return and home in the decade of repatriation; 3) host responses to forced migration; 4) migration and environmental change; and 5) violence and its psycho-social impact. The RSP's announcement states that papers are sought and adds that abstracts of 100 words 'are invited from academics, policy makers, practitioners and refugees on any of the above themes'. The deadline for receipt of abstracts is 28 February 1993; they should be sent to IRAP 1994 Planning Committee, RSP, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford OX1 3LA. 'The deadline for receipt of submitted papers is October 15 1993, to allow time for pre-circulation to discussants and participants.'

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The Refugee Studies Programme of Oxford, in a joint initiative with the Psychosocial Centre for Refugees of the University of Oslo, will offer on 9-14 August 1993 a course 'which will allow mental health practitioners the opportunity to exchange their experiences and broaden their understanding of psychotherapy with victims of organised violence. . . . Therapeutic interventions will be explored in detail by staff of the Psychosocial Centre for Refugees'.

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The Winter 1993 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that in the 1992-93 academic year, '23,000 degree candidates registered for studies — 10 per cent more than last year. The total includes 1,200 new immigrants. . . . The two largest faculties are Social Sciences, with more than 3,700 students, and humanities, with 3,600. . . . More than 20 per cent of the students in the Meyerhoff Technical College are new immigrants'.

The same issue of *Tel Aviv University News* includes a report of an international seminar for research of antisemitism, held at the University. The seminar was organized by the University's Project for research of antisemitism, in co-operation with Israel's antisemitism monitoring forum, and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith. In her keynote address, the head of the University's Project 'described Holocaust denial as an international phenomenon, with adherents hailing from both the extreme Left and Right. In increasing numbers of symposia and academic journals, in newspapers and on television, people are arguing that Hitler never ordered a Final Solution; that the gas chambers were not technically possible; that the dead Jews are in fact alive; and that all the records, photographs, and memoirs attesting to the genocide are a co-ordinated Jewish lie. The total number of publications promulgating such claims rose from less than 100 in 1981 to 250 in 1992'.

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The Winter 1992-93 Newsletter of the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem,



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includes an article by Dr Jacob Kovalio on the boom of Jewish books in Japan. 'Two images of the Jewish people have attracted the interest of Japanese writers and readers: on the one hand, religious uniqueness and the suffering of the Jewish people throughout history culminating in the Holocaust, and the survival of the Jews as a people against all odds; and on the other hand, there are those attracted to the "matchless" economic, intellectual, and even mystical prowess of the Jews.' Dr Kovalio adds that 'conspiracy books' which stress Jewish omnipotence, have achieved the widest popularity; they are 'obviously antisemitic, are based on negative stereotypes and are written in yellow journalism style'. Their authors claim the forged *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* to be an authentic blueprint for a Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world, deny that the Holocaust occurred, and blame the Jews for developing the atom bombs which were dropped on Japan.

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The August 1992 issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* (AIU), includes a report on the AIU's activities during the school year 1990-91. The *Alliance* had three establishments in France, including the Ecole normale Israélite orientale in Paris, which trains students who have registered in the capital's universities to acquire knowledge of Jewish studies in order to qualify them for a career in teaching Jewish subjects; the course lasts for two years. The AIU had four schools in Iran, with a total of 831 pupils in Teheran, Ispahan, Kermanshah, and Yezd. There were six AIU schools in Israel — in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Mikveh Israel, with a total of 5,931 students. Morocco also had six AIU schools, in Casablanca and in Meknes, with a total of 1,050 pupils; Spain had the Colegio Sefardi in Barcelona, with 107 students; and Syria's AIU school is in Damascus, with 250 pupils in 1990-91: 202 girls and 48 boys.

In addition, there are in several countries Jewish schools which have sought the help of the AIU and which are affiliated to the *Alliance*: two in Brussels, 12 in Canada; one in France; nine in Israel; and one in Spain.

The total number of pupils in both networks is given as 20,590, a decline on the previous year's total of 21,541. The AIU's report on the schools notes that they include 'un nombre non négligeable de jeunes élèves arrivant d'U.R.S.S.'. As for the Jerusalem school for the deaf and dumb, it had 73 boys and 30 girls of different religions and catered in three forms for Arab children.

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It was reported last March that Jewish Agency emissaries were organizing more than 20 *sedarim* for the Passover in 15 cities of the former Soviet Union. The largest communal *seder* was planned for 800 persons in Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine. The Lubavitch movement now has its own kasher abattoir in Moscow and planned to supply Jews with beef not only in Moscow but also in other cities — as well as to Jewish communities in the Baltic republics; and some 45 tonnes of matzot would be distributed. The Jewish Agency and the Lubavitch movement have arranged that help for Passover independently of one another.

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The Sociological Institute for Community Studies of Bar-Ilan University has sponsored a 'new series of papers to be published on a regular basis offering a more rapid channel of scientific communication for social scientists'. The series is entitled 'Sociological Papers' and is edited by Ernest Krausz and Gitta Tulea. Volume 1, no. 1, October 1992 and volume 1, no. 2, also dated October 1992, have been received in London. The first consists mainly of an article entitled 'Contemporary Sociology in Israel' by Eva Etzioni-Halevy and Rina Shapira; it is in Hebrew with a brief abstract in English; the second contains an article in English, 'Religious Adherence and Political Attitudes' by Yochanan Peres.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

- Aberbach, David, *Realism, Caricature, and Bias. The Fiction of Mendele Mocher Sefarim*, x + 131 pp., Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, London and Washington, 1993, £8.99 (hardback, £19.50).
- Alderman, Geoffrey and Colin Homes, eds., *Outsiders and Outcasts: Essays in Honour of William J. Fishman*, v + 214 pp., Duckworth, £35.00.
- Benayoun, Chantal, Alain Medam, and Pierre-Jacques Rojzman, compilers, *Les juifs et l'économie, miroirs et mirages*, 374 pp., Presses Universitaires du Mirail, Toulouse, 1992, 150 francs.
- Berkowitz, Michael, *Zionist Culture and West European Jewry before the First World War*, xviii + 255 pp., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, £29.95.
- Ceccato, Rosella Dorigo, Tudor Parfitt, and Emanuela Trevisan Semi, eds., *L' "altro" visto dall' "altro": Letteratura araba ed ebraica a confronto*, x + 145 pp., Rafaclo Cortina Editore, Milan, 1992, n.p.
- Dundes, Alan, ed., *The Blood Libel Legend: A Casebook in Anti-Semitic Folklore*, ix + 385 pp., University of Wisconsin Press, Madison and London, 1991, £33.95 (paperback, £12.95).
- Elazar, Daniel J. and Shmuel Sandler, *Who's the Boss in Israel: Israel at the Polls, 1988-89*, 313 pp., Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1992, \$39.95.
- Finkelkraut, Alain, *Remembering in Vain: The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes against Humanity* (translated from the French by Roxanne Lapidus and Sima Godfrey), with an Introduction by Alice Y. Kaplan, xxxvi + 102 pp., Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, \$22.50.
- Freedman, Murray, *Leeds Jewry: The First Hundred Years*, v + 39 pp., Leeds Branch of the Jewish Historical Society of England, 1992, n.p.
- Henriques, Ursula R. Q., ed., *The Jews of South Wales: Historical Studies*, xi + 238 pp., University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1993, £25.00.
- Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of a People*, xix + 396 pp., The Free Press, New York, 1993, \$29.95.
- Kliger, Hannah, ed., *Jewish Hometown Associations and Family Circles in New York*, x + 164 pp., Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1992, available in the United Kingdom from Open University Press, Buckingham, £26.00.

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- Laskier, Michael M., *The Jews of Egypt, 1920-1970: In the Midst of Zionism, Anti-Semitism, and the Middle East Conflict*, xiv + 327 pp., New York University Press, New York and London, 1992, available in both hardback and paperback.
- Lee, Eric, *Saigon to Jerusalem: Conversations with U.S. Veterans of the Vietnam War Who Emigrated to Israel*, vii + 200 pp., McFarland & Co, Jefferson, N.C. and London, 1992, distributed in the United Kingdom by Shelwing, Folkestone, £19.15 (paperback).
- Opalski, Magdalena and Israel Bartal, *Poles and Jews: A Failed Brotherhood*, xiii + 191 pp., University Press of New England, Hanover and London, 1992, n.p. (paperback).
- Reich, Bernard, *Historical Dictionary of Israel*, lxv + 351 pp., Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, N.J. and London, 1992, \$47.50 or £40.40.
- Sacks, Jonathan, *One People? Tradition, Modernity, and Jewish Unity*, xviii + 254 pp., Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, London and Washington, 1993, £12.95 (hardback, £30.00).
- Sokol, Moshe, ed., *Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy*, xiv + 205 pp., Jason Aronson Publishers, Northvale, N.J. and London, 1992, n.p.
- Stock, Ernest, *Beyond Partnership: The Jewish Agency and the Diaspora, 1959-1971*, ix + 259 pp., Herzl Press, New York in association with Hassifriya Haziyonit, Jerusalem, 1992, n.p.
- Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, *Assassins of Memory: Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust* (translated from the French and with a Foreword by Jeffrey Mehlman), xxv + 205 pp., Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, \$32.00.
- Wistrich, Robert S., ed., *Austrians and Jews in the Twentieth Century. From Franz Joseph to Waldheim*, xviii + 280 pp., Macmillan Press, Basingstoke and St Martin's Press, New York, 1992, £45.00.

## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

- COHEN, Frances; B.A., PGDRM (Post-Graduate Diploma in Research Methods), Researcher at the Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews.
- FRANSES, Ann; B.A. Researcher at the Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews.
- GROSS, Michael L.; Ph.D. Lecturer in Political Theory at the Department of Political Science of the University of Haifa. His most recent publication is 'Democratic Education and Democratic Character', *Educational Theory*, Summer 1992.
- KAPLAN, Steven; Ph.D. Senior Lecturer in Comparative Religion and African Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Chief publications: *Les Falashas*, 1990; *The Beta Israel (Falasha) in Ethiopia*, 1992; and *Surviving Salvation: The Ethiopian Jewish Family in Transition* (joint author), 1992.
- ROSEN, Chaim; Ph.D. Research Anthropologist for the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption in Israel. Chief publications: 'La dialectique d'interaction entre les Juifs éthiopiens et Israéliens', *Les Temps Modernes*, vol. 41, January 1986; and 'Understanding the Beta Israel Today', *Israel Social Science Research*, vol. 3, nos 1-2, 1985.

## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

WEISS, Shoshana; D.Sc. Director of Research at the Israel Society for the Prevention of Alcoholism. Chief publications: 'Various Characteristics of Alcohol Abuse by Israel High School Students', *Journal of Alcohol and Drug Education*, vol. 33, no. 2, 1988; 'Cultural Differences in the Perception of Magazine Alcohol Advertisements', *Drug and Alcohol Dependence*, vol. 26, no. 2, 1990; 'Adult Women's Drinking in Israel', *Alcohol and Alcoholism*, vol. 26, no. 3, 1991; and 'Perception of Alcoholism among Jewish, Moslem, and Christian Teachers in Israel', *Journal of Drug Education*, vol. 22, no. 3, 1992.