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HANUKKAH AND THE MYTH OF THE MACCABEES IN ZIONIST IDEOLOGY AND IN ISRAELI SOCIETY

Eliezer Don-Yehiya

MODERN national movements tend to make use of traditional festivals in order to nourish their political myths.[1] A myth may be defined as a tale possessing symbolic significance so that relevant lessons can be drawn from it. The present article examines the manner in which the Zionist movement made use of the Festival of Hanukkah to create and disseminate a national myth, the myth of the Maccabees (who fought against Greek rule of Judea, in 167–158 B.C.E. and who were also known as the Hasmoneans). The focus is mainly on the decades 1880–1948, before the establishment of the State of Israel, but the changes in the pattern of Hanukkah celebrations since independence will also be considered and set in the broader context of recent developments in Israel's political culture.

Hanukkah was one of various Jewish traditional festivals which the Zionist movement employed to assert the continuity of Jewish identity and the national right of the Jews to the Land of Israel. However, although the secular Zionist groups continued to celebrate the traditional religious festivals, they changed the manner of the celebration and also reinterpreted some of those festivals, with the aim of replacing their original religious content with new national or social myths.[2] The leaders of the Zionist Labour movement in particular grasped the importance of the political potential of Jewish festivals. One of them, Berl Katznelson, commented: 'The Jewish year is filled with days which for sheer depth have no parallel in other peoples. Is it in the interest of the Jewish workers' movement to squander these latent forces?'.[3]

The approach to the traditional festivals was selective, and the principle of selection applied both to the festival itself and to its attendant ceremonies and customs. A guiding principle was the degree to which the traditional festival could be imbued with a national or social aura, and serve to reinforce a political myth. As a result, some holy days underwent a change of status: those which occupied a central

place in traditional Judaism, such as Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year) and Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement) were set aside because of their purely religious character while those with a less pronounced religious context, such as Hanukkah, were brought into prominence.

The renewed importance given to Hanukkah was apparent from the early beginning of the organized Zionist movement in 1882. Zionist clubs and associations were named after the Hasmoneans or the Maccabees, while Hanukkah was chosen as the preferred time to hold conferences and parties; it was also a popular theme of nationalist sermons and speeches.[4] It must be remembered that Theodor Herzl concluded his book, *The Jewish State*, with the words: 'The Maccabees shall rise again'.

Before the establishment of the State of Israel, Hanukkah was celebrated by the Jewish community of Palestine (Eretz–Israel) as an important national holy day and Zionists of all persuasions participated in the regenerated ceremonies associated with the festival. In the Labour movement, attempts were also made to imbue Hanukkah with a 'social' element by proclaiming it as a celebration of class, as well as of national, liberation. Thus, in 1910, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (who later became the second president of Israel) depicted the Hasmoneans as 'simple peasants' who liberated their people from foreign rule, as well as from exploitation by Jewish priests and 'capitalists', who enriched themselves 'at the expense of the people'.[5] A peculiar attempt to use Hanukkah for class-struggle propaganda was made by the Palestinian Jewish Communists, who supported the anti-Zionism of the Arabs and who went so far as to portray the anti-Jewish riots of 1929 as a popular uprising of Arab peasants against Zionist efforts to dispossess them. In 1929, the Communist Youth League of Palestine published a pamphlet in which the leader of the Palestinian Arabs and self-confessed foe of Zionism — the Jerusalem Mufti, Hadj Amin al-Husseini — was portrayed as the equivalent of Mattathias the Hasmonean, since both were spiritual leaders who encouraged the emergence of a national class-liberation movement:[6]

> It may well be that the symbol in whose name the Hasmonean muftis fought was of a fanatic–religious character, but the real cause for which the peasant masses rose up was that of a movement of liberation from foreign domination and cruel exploitation.

However, the vast majority of the Jewish community of Palestine continued to regard Hanukkah as chiefly expressing the values associated with the struggle for national liberation. This perception was shared by the two rival movements which competed for hegemony in the Zionist movement and in the Jewish community of Palestine (the *Yishuv*): the Labour movement which was established in 1905 and the Revisionist movement which was founded in 1925. However, the two

movements differed in their approach and in their interpretations of Jewish historical myths.

Both Labour and the Revisionists used myths which revolved around heroic deeds and struggles for national independence; but the Revisionists emphasized the theme of combating foreign rule without hesitation and without compromise, however dangerous the fight, and even if their own nation was not willing to encourage such a rebellion. The Revisionists glorified the Zealots who revolted against the Romans in 66–70 C.E. as well as Bar-Kokhba's fighters who also rebelled against the Romans in 132–35 C.E. Bar-Kokhba's last stronghold was Betar and this was also the name of the youth movement of the Revisionists, while their most radical group was called Brit Habiryonim, after the most militant of the Zealots.

Although other Zionist groups also admired the fighters against the Romans, they gave pride of place to the Hasmoneans who had waged war only after grave acts of provocation and of suppression by the Greek rulers. Such a reaction was more in tune with the 'defensive ethos' (to use Anita Shapira's term)[7] of the Labour movement and of other moderate groups in the *Yishuv*, while the revolts against Roman rule were more in line with the militant ethos of the Revisionists.

We can even detect a certain ambivalence in the attitude of some Revisionists towards the Hasmoneans. This is related to the fact that many Zionist leaders, writers, and poets, who inspired the Revisionist movement, were admirers of the Hellenistic culture which was anathema to the Hasmoneans. The Revisionists saw themselves as disciples of the renowned Zionist leader, Max Nordau. In an article published in 1900, Nordau urged the cultivation of a 'muscular Jewry', which he associated especially with Bar-Kokhba, whom he described as 'a hero who never knew defeat' and who embodied 'the Jewry that is steeled in war and is enamoured of weapons'.[8] Nordau also lauded, as representatives of 'muscular Jewry', the young Hellenizing Jews who took part in wrestling competitions and who were among the bitter enemies of the Hasmoneans.

One of the poets who was held in high esteem by the Revisionists and who exercised a powerful influence on them was Shaul Tchernichovsky (1875–1943), a great admirer of Hellenistic culture, who bluntly blamed the Maccabees because they had sought to eradicate Hellenism. In his 1926 poem 'My Melody' the poet rhetorically asks: 'Who are you, my blood that seethes within me? The blood of the Maccabees?' and replies: 'No! ... the blood of the conquerors of Canaan is my blood'.[9] One of the Zionist leaders who admired Hellenistic culture was the founder of the Revisionist movement, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who in 1905 declared:[10]

> Mankind will be eternally grateful to Hellenism, which was first to point to sports as the best educational means for creating, by prolonged training and

will-power, a type imbued with spiritual beauty and courage. The Hellenes were the first to establish special gymnasia for this purpose.

Abba Achimeir, the prominent radical Revisionist, was even more forthright in his 1932 article in which he expressed more admiration for the Hellenistic culture which the Hasmoneans fought against than for the traditional Jewish culture which they were defending. He argued that in contrast to traditional Judaism, which was mainly a spiritual phenomenon, Hellenism gave expression to the 'earthly-political' approach which he favoured.[11] Achimeir's attitude towards Judaism later changed, as did the approach of some other Revisionist leaders, including Jabotinsky.[12] In an article published in 1941, Achimeir described Hellenism as an expression of 'civilization', which was an internationalistic, materialistic, and technological cultural phenomenon, but devoid of national distinctiveness.[13] Judaism, in contrast, could be perceived as a typical example of an authentic national culture expressing 'an intensive inner independent spiritual life'. From this point of view, the Hasmoneans' revolt against the Greeks symbolized the clash between cosmopolitan 'civilization' and national 'culture' — and Achimeir clearly preferred the latter.

The ideological differences between the Revisionists and Labour also became apparent in their differing concepts of the Hanukkah festival and of the Hasmonean revolt. The Revisionists saw the revolt as exhibiting heroism in battle and self-sacrifice for the cause of national independence, while their political rivals interpreted that revolt as a popular uprising of peace-loving peasants who had to defend themselves against their cruel oppressors.

However, despite their differences, the various secular movements in the *Yishuv* certainly were united in looking upon Hanukkah as a celebration of political activism and of a national awakening. The only exception were the 'Canaanites'. Their leader, the poet Yonathan Ratosh, rejected the myth of the Maccabees since this myth was an affirmation of the continuing connection between Zionism and Judaism which the Canaanites vehemently opposed.[14] Ratosh's attitude towards the Hasmoneans is linked with his reservations about the Second Temple period as a whole. He explained that in that era, the original Hebraic culture of Eretz–Israel was driven out by non-territorial Judaism which had been imposed on the people by the returning Babylonian exiles.[15]

The Canaanites depicted the Hasmoneans not as Hebrew fighters in a campaign for national liberation against foreign rule, but as Jewish religious fanatics who were primarily fighting their internal adversaries, the Hellenizers. Although that struggle occurred in Eretz–Israel, the Hasmoneans did not fight for the cause of a political–territorial nation, but for that of a dispersed and self-enclosed religious

sect. Adaya Horon, the Canaanite historian, has claimed that the only original purpose of the war of the Hasmoneans was to secure 'independence of worship in Jerusalem and its environs with freedom to take revenge on "the wicked" — the Hellenizers among them ... No national liberation was involved'.[16] Horon added that although Judaism and Hellenism were mutually incompatible, there was no conflict whatever between the Greek and the Hebrew cultures. Indeed, the Greeks were heavily influenced by the early Hebrews.[17]

Some principles held by the Canaanites, notably their radical 'negation of the Diaspora', corresponded to ideas which were widespread among young native-born Palestinian Jews.[18] However, their rejection of the myth of the Maccabees, as well as the sharp distinction they drew between the 'Hebrew history' of the Biblical period and the 'Jewish history' which followed, never gained acceptance beyond marginal circles in Jewish society in Eretz–Israel.

Ironically, the Canaanite conception of Hanukkah resembles that of the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox Jews). For both groups, who rejected Zionism out of diametrically-opposed reasons, Hanukkah is a religious holy day, and the struggle of the Hasmoneans cannot serve as the source of a national–political myth. However, the difference between the Haredim and the Canaanites is that the former exalt the religious character of Hanukkah, whereas the latter excoriate it. As for the Zionists, secular and religious alike, they were of the opinion that the fact that Hanukkah was rooted in the Jewish religious tradition should not hinder its use for the promotion of national goals.

It is worth noting here that the festival of Hanukkah has potentialities which cannot easily be found in other traditional celebrations, which are loaded with religious meaning and require strict observance. That was why the secularized version of the Passover *seder* was confined mainly to the kibbutz movement. Many Jews who were not Orthodox, but who still respected the religious tradition, balked at the introduction of changes in the consecrated order of the *seder*, just as they objected to the transformation of *Shavuot* (the Feast of Weeks or Pentecost) in the kibbutz into a harvest festival in which the traditional meanings, notably the giving of the Torah, were discarded.[19] On the other hand, since Hanukkah was less ritualized than Passover or *Shavuot*, it could more easily be re-interpreted as a modern–national festival.

Nevertheless, even Hanukkah can illustrate the problems entailed in the use of a traditional religious festival for the dissemination of a political myth. The first difficulty is that, historically, the revolt of the Maccabees against the Greeks began as an uprising of traditional Jews against religious decrees enacted by the Greek ruler with the encouragement and active support of the Hellenizers, who wished to impose on the Jewish people an alien secular culture. This was an obstacle for

those Zionists who aimed to make the events and heroes of Hanukkah the source of a national political myth, devoid of a religious content.

Virtually every national or social movement must at some point decide how to resolve the problem of the gap between myth and fact. One solution is simply to disregard the inconvenient facts, or to present them in a new light by reinterpreting them. Secular Zionism resorted to the former option in its reinvention of the Hanukkah festival: 'problematic' aspects of the Hasmonean revolt were ignored or played down, and the accent was placed on elements which seemed to lend themselves especially to the aims of the Zionists. Thus, the causes of the revolt were not stressed and the spotlight was directed at the heroism and courage of the fighters and at the continued struggle for political independence even after the religious decrees were abolished. Israel Eldad aptly summed up the stratagem when he noted that Zionism 'appropriated the form but not the content of the war of the Hasmoneans'.[20]

Hasmonean goals were also reinterpreted in a manner which placed the emphasis on 'loyalty to the people' and on 'preserving national distinctiveness', without specifying the actual components of that distinctiveness. Thus, even the Zionists who admired Hellenistic culture denounced the Hellenizers for deserting their people in favour of foreign rulers. Nordau observed that the new 'muscular Jews' of the Bar-Kokhba Zionists' sports club 'had still not attained the degree of heroism of our forefathers who would burst into the arena in their masses ... in order to take part in the competitions'. However, he added: 'Morally speaking, we are already at ... a level higher than theirs'. This was because the Jewish athletes in Hasmonean times were ashamed of their Jewishness and strove to conceal their origin, whereas the modern Jewish sportsmen openly displayed their national pride.[21]

The second problem about the Zionist conception of Hanukkah is that that conception cannot be reconciled with the traditional interpretation of the festival. The Talmud has very little to say about the wars of the Hasmoneans, and almost nothing about their connection to Hanukkah. Instead, the central theme is the 'miracle of the cruse of oil' which was found in the Temple and which continued to provide fuel to burn in the candelabrum for eight days, although the amount of oil was sufficient for only one single day. This miracle is represented as the source of the major celebration of the festival — lighting the candelabrum for eight days. The war against the Greeks is certainly given an important place in the prayer 'For the Miracles' which is recited on Hanukkah, but the prayer does not praise the courage or strength of the Jews as the factors which ensured their victory, but refers to God's deliverance of his people because of their piety:

> And You in Your great mercy stood by them in their hour of distress ... You delivered the strong into the hands of the weak, the many to the few, the

> defiled to the pure, and the evil-doers into the hands of those who devote themselves to the study of Your Torah.

Thus, God was the only true redeemer and the principal task of the Jews was to consecrate the Temple for His worship and to offer Him prayers of thanksgiving:

> Afterward Your sons came to the sanctuary of Your house, and cleaned Your Palace and purified Your Temple and lit lights in the chambers of Your holy place. And they set aside these eight days of Hanukkah to praise and exalt Your great and holy name for Your miracles and Your wonders and Your deliverance.

Clearly, then, the traditional conception of Hanukkah does not accord with the modern Zionist view of the festival as the victorious struggle of the people for self-redemption, which was achieved through their own efforts alone, without divine help. But the Zionists claimed that their own version of Hanukkah was the more accurate one and that it was the political passivity of traditional religious Jews which caused them deliberately to ignore the heroic exploits of the Hasmoneans and their struggle for national liberation.[22] The words of the prayer 'For the Miracles' were condemned for the same reason. A Jerusalem writer, Shlomo Jonas, stated in an article published in 1893 that this prayer praised the Lord for the deliverance of His people but omitted to refer to the brave fighters who had achieved that victory:[23]

> We recite [in that prayer] . . . You fought . . . You judged . . . You avenged . . . You delivered . . . [but] Who wrought all these things? Who did all this? Who was the emissary of the Lord? Who was the man of battle? Where is Judah the Maccabee who defended his brothers with his sword and his bow . . .? Judah the Maccabee might as well never have existed for all his mention in this prayer!

In another article published in 1911 the Socialist Zionist writer, Zerubavel (Yaakov Vitkin) commented on the striking contrast between martyred Jews in the Diaspora, the helpless victims of pogroms, and the new Jews, who bore arms and fell in the defence of their homeland.[24] These Jews, members of *Hashomer*, the first Jewish defence organization, were renewing the heroic tradition of the Hasmoneans and of the insurgents against the Romans. In Zerubavel's view, that tradition had been abandoned in the Diaspora, which had sanctified 'passive martyrs' and had consigned to oblivion activist heroes. Those responsible were 'the passive Torah bearers . . . who carried the name of God on their lips but whose hearts were far from every feeling of freedom and liberty'. The author observed: 'Martyrs are evoked at a time of weakness, heroes are emulated at a time of courage and action'. That was why the pioneers of the national renaissance tended to identify with the Hasmoneans and with the other heroes of the Second

Temple: 'The Hasmoneans did not make do with prayers ... The Biryonim did not expect miracles ... They shed their blood for the people's freedom'.

The village of the Hasmoneans, Modi'in, became a shrine for the Zionist youth movements and a place of pilgrimage. Zerubavel pointed to the contrast between Modi'in and Miron, the pilgrimage site in the Galilee, which has been a centre of prayer and ritual for traditional Jews. While Modi'in is a symbol of activism and courage, Miron symbolizes the passive waiting of traditional Jews for a miraculous salvation from the heavens. The author asked: 'Miron and Modi'in ... which is stronger? Which will triumph? Which will determine the course of our current history?'

Zerubavel's approach was not favoured by all the spokesmen of secular Zionism. Even in his own Labour movement, there were those who maintained that the central theme of the Hanukkah celebration should not be military activism but spiritual heroism. That was the stand taken by Berl Katznelson, who stressed the virtue of selfless devotion to the Jewish faith associated with Hanukkah, as exemplified in the story of Hannah and her seven sons who were willing to sacrifice their lives rather than surrender to apostasy. In an article published on Hanukkah in 1944, Katznelson entered the debate about the fiercely condemnatory proclamation issued by the rabbinical establishment against Jewish pig farmers in the Holy Land. He quoted the legend dating back to Hasmonean times about a pig which dug its hoofs into the wall around Jerusalem 'and the whole land did shake from one end to the other'. Katznelson declared his support for the rabbis, reasoning: 'How shall we tell our children about the selfless devotion of ... Hannah and her seven sons — if the very cause for which they were killed has no meaning in our own way of life?'.[25]

However, Katznelson also did not concur with the traditional concept of Hanukkah, since it stressed the miraculous salvation from above, in contrast to the Zionist emphasis on the theme of self-liberation. This clash between the two approaches to the festival was apparent from the very beginning of modern Zionism. In 1903, a rabbi deplored the actions of the Zionists who, he claimed[26]

> magnified the festival of the Maccabees and augmented their strength and power, and this is truly a great mistake ... For under natural conditions they were incapable of winning the war, and [they were victorious] only because they were completely just men and sought with selfless devotion to save our sacred religion.

The fiercest opponents of the Zionist version of Hanukkah were the Haredim, who also dismissed Zionism as a movement which ran counter to the spirit of religious tradition. They claimed that the manner of the Zionist celebrations of Hanukkah was closer to the

outlook of the Hellenizers than it was to that of the Hasmoneans, although the Zionists were pretending to be praising the latter. They added that the Zionists expressed admiration for the values fostered by the Hellenizers under the influence of a foreign culture, such as the worship of physical strength. Yitzhak Breuer, a major Haredi leader, commented:[27]

> The Hellenizers loved their people and their land in their own fashion ... They loved the land but loathed the Land of Torah, loved the people but despised the People of the Torah, loved Greek licentiousness but hated the burden of Torah ... It is not for the Jewish State that the Hasmoneans fought but for the People of the Torah. They did battle against the kingdom of evil when it threatened the People of the Torah with destruction ... They also fought against the wicked among their own people ... This was a kulturkampf ... Greek culture triumphed over the whole world, and only the Torah culture was able to withstand it.

As for the religious Zionists, they sought to reconcile the national myth of the Maccabees with the traditional elements of Hanukkah. They held that the struggle of the Hasmoneans was fuelled by both religio–spiritual and national–political goals. Rabbi Yeshayahu Shapira, the Hapoel–Hamizrachi leader, considered the exploits of the Hasmoneans to be a shining example of the special obligation on the Orthodox community to rally to the cause of national redemption:[28]

> In the days of the Hasmoneans, the banner of the revolt was raised expressly by Torah followers, and they risked their lives for the liberation of the land and of the Jewish spirit. Today, we face a similar war, a war for the redemption of our land and a war for the liberation of the Jewish spirit from the alien cultures that we have absorbed.

A unique approach to Hanukkah was presented by a group which called itself 'Covenant of the Hasmoneans' and advocated a fusion of religiosity with radical Messianic nationalism. The Hasmoneans were their models because they exemplified the ideal fusion of the religious believer and the hero–warrior. In *Hahashmonai* (The Hasmonean), they published an article at the time of the 1944 Hanukkah festival which asserted that the lesson of the revolt against the Greeks was that the national struggle should be conducted in a revolutionary and uncompromising style: 'It is not by building and ploughing and sowing well, or even by defending ourselves with arms that we will attain ... liberty, but by establishing the irrevocable fact by irrevocable means: "Who shall be sole ruler here?" '[29]

As Orthodox Jews, the members of the 'Covenant' had to confront the problem of the apparent contrast between their militant nationalistic attitude and the political passivity of traditional religious Jewry. They resolved that problem by blaming the conditions of Jewish exile for the abandonment of the heritage of heroism associated with the

Hasmoneans. Another article in their publication stated that 'heroism and pride were deeply-rooted qualities in the Jewish people from its very beginnings ... The Torah does not teach submission and weakness. It is a source of strength and pride'. However, the 'distortion and disruption' caused by the exile had brought about a 'warped attitude towards heroism'.[30] Moreover, it was argued that as a result of the 'shortcomings of the Diaspora', the Torah sages 'cannot be considered as exemplars in other matters such as heroism in battle'.[31]

Other religious Zionists also claimed that it was not religious tradition but rather conditions of exile which were the source of Jewish historical passivity. However, in contrast to the members of the 'Covenant', they sought to link Hanukkah to the values of labour and land settlement rather than to militant–nationalistic values — an approach more in keeping with the ethos of the Labour movement than with that of the Revisionists. Thus, Rabbi Shapira concluded his article on Hanukkah with the statement that the battle for the nation's political and spiritual deliverance 'is no longer waged by the sword, but through the redemption and settling of the land'.

In spite of the objections of the ultra-Orthodox, Hanukkah became a festival which provided the *Yishuv* with symbols of solidarity, national cohesiveness, and political mobilization, and was intended to imbue the Jewish population (and the younger generation in particular) with the virtues of heroism and a readiness for self-sacrifice in the pursuit of national goals. So it was that the pioneers and the defenders of the *Yishuv* were depicted as 'new Maccabees' — a title which was especially claimed for the underground organizations (the Haganah, Irgun, and LEHI) which repeatedly adopted symbols associated with Hanukkah and the Maccabees.

Hilda Schatzberger has shown that each of these organizations used the exploits of the Maccabees to legitimize its goals and its methods of operation.[32] For example, the Haganah (which was controlled by the official *Yishuv* leadership) stressed that the army of the Hasmoneans was an army of defenders and of popular liberators which had the unwavering support of the people. On the other hand, the Irgun depicted the Maccabees as freedom fighters who of their own initiative rose in revolt against foreign rule, without reference to the official leaders of their Jewish community and indeed against the will of these leaders. LEHI claimed that the Hasmonean revolt provided a precedent for the use of terrorism as a legitimate method of combat. Its spokesmen reminded their critics of Mattathias (the priest and father of the Hasmonean brothers) who killed the Hellenizing Jew who offered a sacrifice to a statue erected in Modi'in, and sparked off the revolt. All three underground organizations, in common with most Zionist groups in the *Yishuv*, drew a parallel between the Maccabees (whose war was that of 'the few against the many') and the struggles waged by the

underground fighters and the defenders of the *Yishuv* against forces vastly superior in both numbers and material.

The myth of the Maccabees was also associated with the whole gamut of activities connected with self-defence and with the land-settlement operations carried out in the *Yishuv*. The festival of Hanukkah was celebrated in public ceremonies and at mass events to foster in the people the Hasmonean spirit of heroism and devotion to the national cause. According to the historian Ben-Zion Dinur,[33] the ceremonies included:

> lighting the candles with great ostentation, lectures and speeches in synagogues and community halls, in schools and kindergartens, on the Hasmoneans' war of freedom ... so that the whole people might know ... what the heroes did, what a people is capable of accomplishing if moved by faith, by trust, by the ability to lay down its life ...

The period of Hanukkah was also perceived as a time of 'national reflection' in which individuals as well as the whole Jewish community must engage in self-examination, asking themselves: 'What brick did I bring to the great edifice we are building — a home for the Jewish people in its land?'[34] Hanukkah was also used for various Zionist activities. The days of the festival were described as 'days of convocation for the whole movement, days of assemblies and conferences'.[35] The Jewish National Fund, which was engaged in buying land for Jewish settlement, chose the days of Hanukkah for its mass fund-raising operations. These included a special campaign which appealed particularly to the religious sector of the *Yishuv*. In 1939, for example, the Sabbath preceding Hanukkah was set aside as 'a Sabbath dedicated to the land and its redemption'. The official announcement stated that 'on this Sabbath speeches will be delivered in all houses of worship, ... in which the need to expedite the redemption of our Holy Land ... will be explained'. The religious–Zionist daily *Hatzofe* published proclamations of the chief rabbis urging the religious public to contribute to the land-redemption project.[36]

On the other hand, the Hanukkah celebrations aimed at the general public almost entirely ignored the festival's religious–traditional significance. The decrees of the Greek ruler against Jewish religious observance were depicted as merely an incidental effect of the subjugation to foreign rule, not as the root cause of the Hasmonean revolt. The 'miracle of the cruse of oil' was openly belittled since it was believed that it was a salient example of the passive approach which characterized traditional Diaspora Jewry. Indeed, a popular song, widely heard during Hanukkah, stated: 'No miracle befell us, no cruse of oil did we find'. The divine intervention of the Lord was replaced by reference to the heroic people who delivered the Jewish community by their own courage and strength. A children's song chanted at

Hanukkah altered the Biblical verse: 'Who can utter the mighty acts of the Lord?' (Psalms, 106: 2) to 'Who can recount the exploits of Israel?'. The very name 'Maccabees', traditionally considered to be an acronym for the verse, 'Who is like unto thee, O Lord, among the gods?' (Exodus, 15: 11) was given a new rendition by a Zionist functionary: 'Who is like unto thee among the nations, Israel?'[37] Although religious circles condemned the festival's growing secularization, religious Zionist schools were actually following this trend, and songs such as 'Who can recount the exploits of Israel?' were also sung in their Hanukkah celebrations. (But after the establishment of the State of Israel, the original Biblical words were restored in those schools.)

Traditional practices in the celebration of the festival, such as the lighting of the candles in the *Menorah* (candelabrum), were observed but they were reinterpreted: the candles were said not to be in memory of the miracle of the cruse of oil, but to betoken the light of national deliverance. Furthermore, the ceremony of lighting the candles which traditionally took place in the home was now observed in the town square or other place of public assembly; and instead of the traditional blessings, there were speeches, declarations, and songs of a national–political character, and torches were lit and were carried through the streets in festive parades.

The lighting of the candles or torches was sometimes accompanied by special ceremonies designed to reflect the festival's regenerated meaning. One elaborate event was a pilgrimage to Modi'in where members of the youth movement, Maccabi, lit a torch and relayed it in a marathon to light Hanukkah candles along the way. On the first occasion of such a ceremony in Modi'in, the audience was told that the torch which was being kindled there would be carried by runners who were the descendants of the Maccabees 'not only to light the Hanukkah candles but to light up the hearts of Hebrew youth and to herald unity and national action'.[38] The Modi'in marathon became part of a series of sports events which were held during the Hanukkah period.

In many other cultures it is customary to celebrate national holidays with parades, torch marathons, and other ceremonies involving fire and light as symbols of awakening, heroism, and fortitude.[39] But in the Hanukkah celebrations there was also the interplay between the lighting of the candles and of the torches. While the first custom symbolized continuity with the Jewish tradition, the lighting of the torches symbolized the motif of renewal and of a change from that tradition. In contrast to the small, modest candles used in the private homes, the torches were carried with great flourish while their light shone over great distances. Thus, they could also be said to represent the renewal of the flame which had been largely extinguished or hidden in the Jewish people during the Diaspora, but which was now rekindled, to illuminate the movement of national revival.

The various new ways of interpreting and celebrating Hanukkah prompted some observers to claim that the traditional holy day had been in fact replaced by a new festival which differed from the older one in content and even in name. Thus, while the Hebrew word Hanukkah (which means 'dedication') refers to the religious dedication of the Temple in the wake of its liberation from the control of the Hellenizers, the preferred name now was the 'Festival of the Hasmoneans'. The historian, Joseph Klausner, who was one of the mentors of the Revisionist movement, stated:[40]

> Hanukkah is an ancient festival, but a modest one. The Festival of the Hasmoneans is a new holy day, but full of high spirits and popular gaiety. What was Hanukkah? ... 'For the Miracles' ... the lighting of the little candles ... at home, potato pancakes and playing cards for the adults, spinning tops for the toddlers. And what is Hanukkah now? — The Festival of the Hasmoneans, a holiday filled with cheering, a big national holiday which is celebrated by the Jewish people in all its dispersions with parties and speeches, songs and ballads, hikes and parades ... This is our Festival of the Hasmoneans as it is today, and does any nation have a national holiday as great and as consecrated as this?

The establishment of the State of Israel apparently led to a decline in the importance of Hanukkah in Israeli political culture. It is no longer a major national event, with public assemblies, declarations, and speeches, or with mass parades. One reason for this decline was that there was now a new annual national celebration — Independence Day. Another reason is related to the attitude of David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, who wished to glorify the Biblical period and its heroes, not the Hasmoneans or other heroes of the post-Biblical period. For, although Judah the Maccabee or Bar-Kokhba were undoubtedly brave heroes, they were eventually defeated and were unable to preserve and consolidate the political independence for which they had fought; hence they could not serve as role models for Ben-Gurion's *Mamlachti* (Statist) approach, which put the emphasis on enduring military and political achievements. Moreover, Ben-Gurion did not wish to engage in a confrontation with the religious sector of Israel, which opposed the secularization of traditional festivals. He explained that since the Bible was accepted or revered by all sections of Jewish society, secular as well as religious, it was the most fitting source for national myths and symbols.[41]

In a Knesset debate in 1955 about military decorations, Ben-Gurion rejected the proposal to name medals after leading figures of the Second Temple period such as Judah the Maccabee or Bar-Kokhba. He insisted that only Biblical heroes were worthy of having medals named after them, because they surpassed in stature all those who came after them, including the Hasmoneans and the leaders of the revolts against the Romans. He argued that 'the Israeli child, the Israeli youngster ...

needs to feel that our history did not begin in 1948, nor in 1897, and not even in the days of the Maccabees', but that it had its origins in the Biblical era, 'the period of Jewish glory and independence ... the period of independent spiritual creativity which forged the Jewish people and brought us to this day'.[42]

Ben-Gurion was of course aware that his approach differed from that of 'classical' Zionism in whose mythology 'the theme of the Maccabees and Bar-Kochba ... was placed on a pedestal, not historical events which had occurred earlier and were more crucial'. According to him, the cult of the Hasmoneans had its roots in 'the protest of the Zionist generation against the Talmud which tried to obscure and conceal the Maccabees' enterprise'. But unlike their forebears, the Jews of modern Israel did not need 'heroes of protest' against the Talmudic approach. What they needed were 'educational heroes' such as the Biblical figures 'who were set apart both by their primacy and by being anchored in an authentic historical–literary source which was accepted and revered by the whole Jewish people'.[43]

Ben-Gurion's attitude also marked the crucial difference between conditions in the Holy Land before and after the establishment of the State of Israel. Before independence, Zionism needed to make use of the myths glorifying the overthrow of foreign domination of the Jewish nation, and this was also true of the underground organizations during the *Yishuv*. But the myths and symbols employed before 1948 were no longer relevant after Independence. New myths and symbols were now necessary, such as would help to consolidate and intensify the loyalty of Israelis to their State, stress the necessity of civil obedience to the State's laws and institutions, and ensure that Israeli citizens would be ready to act in defence of their country and for the realization of its goals. That was why Ben-Gurion favoured the Biblical heroes who had established themselves as legitimate leaders in the kingdoms of the First Temple.

Ben-Gurion was not solely responsible for the decline in the public importance of the Hanukkah festival as a national celebration. That decline was part of a process of cultural change which has been manifested in the growing tendency in Israeli society to discard the secularized and politicized new versions of the Jewish festivals and to return to the more traditional private and domestic forms of celebration. Thus, Hanukkah celebrations in Israel either regained traditional religious features or became a sort of popular entertainment. In neither case do they carry ideological or political messages.

Many Israeli Jews do not perceive Hanukkah as a saliently national festival. In a public opinion survey which Charles Liebman and I conducted with the help of the Pori Institute in 1975, only a little over a third (35.1 per cent) of the respondents said that they regarded Hanukkah primarily as a national festival; 21.9 per cent considered it to

be a primarily religious festival and 14.6 per cent regarded it primarily as a family celebration. The other respondents defined Hanukkah as a 'religious–family' occasion (5.4 per cent), 'religious–national' (9.2 per cent), 'national–family' (6.3 per cent), and a 'religious–national–family' celebration (4.9 per cent).[44] As this was the first such survey, no statistical data were available for comparison. However, we can conclude on the basis of everything that we know about the way that the festival used to be celebrated in the *Yishuv* period and in the early years of the State, that the percentage of those who regarded Hanukkah as a distinctly national holiday had probably been far higher in those years.

The changes in the public perceptions of the festival are also reflected in the patterns of its celebration. Today, Hanukkah is celebrated mainly in the circle of family and friends, in the home or in parties. The 'little candles' and the spinning tops, the potato pancakes and the doughnuts have once again become the festival's primary symbols. Such changes should be seen within the context of a far more comprehensive transformation in Israeli political culture, as discernible in the way that Israelis celebrate their other festivals.

The present discussion of this development is confined to the most general terms. Two distinctive but interconnected processes are at work: on the one hand, there is a departure from the earlier tendency towards the deliberate and explicit secularization of religious festivals and ceremonies, and a return to their original traditional formulas; on the other hand, there is also a retreat from the 'nationalization' or 'politicization' attempts which marked the ceremonies of Jewish festivals during the *Yishuv* period and the early years of the State. Both trends reflect a weakening of commitment and fidelity to collective values, as well as the abandonment of myths and symbols which were used to express those values.

This whole process is linked in turn to the great decline in the status of secular ideologies, such as Socialist Zionism, or Ben-Gurion's version of *Mamlachtiyut* (Statism). These ideologies were intended to replace traditional Jewish religion as a symbol-system which would underpin the cohesiveness of Jewish society and be a source of inspiration for the achievement of national goals.[45] With the decline of these ideologies, institutionalized and politicized structures of festivals and ceremonies were abandoned in favour of more traditional or more individual and spontaneous styles which do not reflect clear and well-defined ideological commitments. A related development is the attenuation of political authority in Israeli society, as evidenced in the refusal of large sections of the Israeli public to accept the dictates of the establishment concerning the management of social and cultural affairs, including symbolic and ceremonial behaviour. A salient example is the change in the patterns of Independence Day celebrations,

which is manifested in the trend away from symbols and ceremonies of clearly collective significance towards practices of a more 'private' and pluralistic nature, and the declining role of political leaders in the regulation of the celebrations.[46]

The only exception to the current trends of divesting Hanukkah of its political and heroic overtones is to be found in the symbol-system of Gush Emunim. In that movement, which advocates a mixture of devoutly religious and national values,[47] Hanukkah symbolizes the uncompromising struggle for both religious and national goals. Danny Rubinstein describes the occasion of a lecture given in 1980 by one of the spiritual leaders of Gush Emunim, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, on the subject of 'The Miracle of Hanukkah'. The rabbi declared that the chief feature of the festival was a commemoration of the victory of the heroic Hasmoneans over their people's oppressors. But that victory, the rabbi added, was achieved because the Jewish fighters were divinely inspired with spiritual power, which proved miraculous just like the miracle of the cruse of oil.[48] Here we have a conception which stresses the centrality of the heroism of the Hasmoneans in the struggle to liberate their people, but which asserts that the source of that heroism was divine inspiration.

The members of Gush Emunim consider themselves to be the successors of the Maccabees. Gush Emunim played a dominant role in 'The Movement to Stop the Withdrawal from Sinai', which was engaged in 1982 in a struggle against the implementation of the Camp David agreements with Egypt. Members of that group described themselves as 'the Hasmoneans of their generation, the few against the many, fired with the spirit of truth and faith'.[49] The case of the Hasmoneans was used by the political radicals of Gush Emunim in their polemic against their rivals of the Israeli left. In an article published on Hanukkah 1987, Dan Be'eri commented caustically that Hanukkah celebrations hailing the heroism of the Maccabees were increasingly becoming 'something both creaking and grating', and the reason for this was that:[50]

> Just between ourselves, the Maccabees were at bottom pretty fascistic. They were also terrorists and religious fanatics who thrust the nation into mortal danger. They operated out of irrational, Messianic motives, and fomented a civil war. They also spurned the nation's legitimate legal institutions, which enjoyed the solid support of a broad consensus, whereas they were a radical, violent minority. They ... despised progress and universal cultural values. So, is it the deeds of these people that we are instilling in Jewish youth, not to mention the miracle of the cruse of oil? This must be stopped at once! It's all very well and fitting for Orthodox Jews. But it cannot be a Zionist holiday, glorious and positive, a source of inspiration for a progressive and humanistic society.

Dan Be'eri was a member of the 'Jewish Underground' which was active in the occupied territories in the years 1980–84, and he had

received a prison sentence in 1985 for his part in the plot to blow up the Dome of the Rock — the Muslim shrine on the Temple Mount. At the trial of Be'eri and his comrades, one of the defence's arguments was that 'this court would also have convicted Judah the Maccabee for removing the idols from the Temple'. The same reaction was implicit in a comment by the father of one of the accused: 'This court is situated on Salah al-Din Street and not on Judah the Maccabee Street: that's the whole problem in a nutshell'.[51]

Gush Emunim made efforts to link Hanukkah to its settlement activities. On Hanukkah 1976 it established its first settlement in the occupied territories at Sebastia, and on Hanukkah 1981 it launched a countrywide campaign to stop the Sinai withdrawal, using the slogan, 'Do not uproot what is planted'. However, despite the importance which Gush Emunim has attached to Hanukkah, it has not been able to restore its standing as a central national event. One reason for this is that Hanukkah could not compete with new national festivals, such as Independence Day — and since the Six-Day War of 1967, also Jerusalem Day, which has acquired special importance and is indeed particularly celebrated by Gush Emunim. But the important factor is that while Gush Emunim can boast of its achievements in establishing Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, it can hardly boast of having made a deep impression on Israeli culture.

There has clearly been a great weakening in the link between Hanukkah celebrations in Israeli Jewish society and the national myth of the Maccabees. The prevailing tendency now is to observe the festival in a manner which reflects a mild fusion of national and traditional elements and which to a large extent is characteristic of Israeli political culture in general.

NOTES

[1] See Henry Tudor, *Political Myth*, London, 1972.

[2] Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel*, Los Angeles, 1983.

[3] Berl Katznelson, 'Well-springs' (Hebrew) in B. Katznelson, *Ketavim* (Writings), Tel Aviv, 1947, vol. 6, p. 391.

[4] Azriel Shohat, 'Names, Symbols and Ambience in Hibat Zion' in *Shivat Ziyon* (Hebrew Annual), vols 2–3, 1951, p. 248.

[5] A. R. (Yitzhak Ben-Zvi), 'The Miracle of Hanukkah' in *Ha-achdut* (Hebrew weekly), no. 10, December 1910.

[6] Quoted by G. S. Yisraeli (Walter Laqueur), *MPS–PKP–Maki* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1953, p. 69.

[7] Anita Shapira, *Visions in Conflict* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1988, pp. 23–71.

[8] Max Nordau, 'Muscular Jewry' (Hebrew) in M. Nordau, *Ketavim* (Writings), vol. 1, Jerusalem, 1955, pp. 187–88.

[9] Shaul Tchernichovsky, 'My Melody' in *Poems* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1959, p. 278.

[10] Quoted on the basis of hearsay evidence in Moshe Bela, *The World of Jabotinsky* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1975, p. 133.

[11] Abba Achimeir, 'Hellenism in Judea and Judaism in Hellas', in A. Achimeir, *Revolutionary Zionism* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1966, p. 237.

[12] See Eliezer Don-Yehiya and Charles Liebman, 'Zionist Ultranationalism and its Attitude towards Religion', *Journal of Church and State*, vol. 23, no. 2, 1981, pp. 259–74.

[13] Abba Achimeir, 'The Hanukkah Miracle in the Past and the Present' in *Revolutionary Zionism*, op. cit. in Note 11 above, pp. 255–56.

[14] Yehoshua Porat, *The Life of Uriel Shelah* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1989, p. 139.

[15] See Yonathan Ratosh's foreword in Y. Ratosh, ed., *From Victory to Defeat* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1976, pp. 21–26.

[16] Adaya Horon, 'The Primeval Hebrew', in Ratosh, op. cit. in Note 15 above, p. 254.

[17] Ibid., pp. 209–15.

[18] Baruch Kurzweil, 'The Essence and Sources of the "Young Hebrews" Movement ("Canaanites")', in B. Kurzweil, *Our New Literature: Continuation or Revolution?* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1965, pp. 270–300.

[19] See M. Glickson, 'Beautiful Is the Harvest Festival with the Festival of the Giving of Our Torah' (Hebrew) in Yom Tov Levinsky, ed., *Sefer Hamoadim* (The Book of Festivals), Tel Aviv, 1950, vol. 3, p. 284.

[20] Israel Eldad, 'The Logic of Hanukkah 1981', *Nekuda* (Hebrew weekly), no. 22, December 1981, p. 5.

[21] Nordau, op. cit. in Note 8 above, p. 188.

[22] Many historians reject this view. See Yehoshua Efron, 'The Revolt of the Hasmoneans in Modern Historiography' in *Historians and Historical Schools* (a collection of essays in Hebrew; the name of the editor is not given), Jerusalem, 1963, pp. 117–43.

[23] The article, 'Commandments Require Devotion', was first published in the Hebrew weekly, *Hatzvi* in December 1893. It was reprinted in Yehoshua Kaniel, ed., *Ben-Yehuda in Prison* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1983, pp. 3–4.

[24] Zerubavel, 'Yizkor (Fragments of Ideas)' in *Ha-achdut* (Hebrew weekly), nos 11–12, 1 February 1911. See also Jonathan Frankel, 'The Yizkor Book of 1911: A Note on National Myths in the Second Aliyah', in H. Ben-Israel *et al.*, eds., *Religion, Ideology and Nationalism*, Jerusalem, 1986, pp. 335–84.

[25] Berl Katznelson, 'How Far the Love of Israel (In the Wake of the Debate over Hanukkah)' in B. Katznelson, *Ketavim*, vol. 12, Tel Aviv, 1950, p. 57.

[26] Quoted in Ehud Luz, *Parallels Meet*, New York, 1988, pp. 123–24.

[27] Yitzhak Breuer, *Moriah* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1982, p. 89.

[28] Rabbi Yeshayahu Shapira, 'The Lesson of the Partition Vote', *Hatzofe* (Hebrew daily), 16 December 1939.

[29] B. Duvdevani, 'Is This the Beginning of the Revolt?', *Hahashmonai*, December 1944 (Hebrew).

[30] 'Chapters of the Covenant of the Hasmoneans', ibid., Spring 1944 (Hebrew).

[31] Ibid., Spring 1946.

[32] Hilda Schatzberger, *Resistance and Tradition in Mandatory Palestine* (Hebrew), Ramat-Gan, 1985, p. 58.
[33] Ben-Zion Dinur, 'Festival of the Hasmoneans', *Sefer Hamoadim*, op. cit. in Note 19 above, p. 197.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] *Hatzofe*, 16 December 1939.
[37] Ernest Simon, 'Are We Still Jews?', *Luah Ha'aretz* (Hebrew Annual), 1952, p. 99.
[38] 'The Torch Race from Modi'in', *Sefer Hamoadim*, op. cit. in Note 19 above, p. 212.
[39] George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, New York, 1975, pp. 40–44.
[40] Yosef Klausner, 'Hanukkah — Symbol and Warning', *Sefer Hamoadim*, op. cit. in Note 19 above, pp. 189–90.
[41] Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 'Judaism and Statism in Ben-Gurion's Thought and Policy', *Haziyonut* (Hebrew Annual), vol. 14, 1989, pp. 51–88.
[42] *Knesset Proceedings*, 1955, p. 1792 (Hebrew).
[43] Ibid., pp. 1791–92.
[44] These are unpublished results of the survey, which was conducted for our study on civil religion in Israel.
[45] This subject is discussed extensively in Liebman and Don-Yehiya, op. cit. in Note 2 above.
[46] Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 'Festivals and Political Culture: Independence Day Celebrations', *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 45, Winter 1988, pp. 61–84 (see especially pp. 82–83).
[47] Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 'Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Origins and Impact of Gush Emunim', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2, April 1987, pp. 215–34.
[48] Danny Rubinstein, *On the Lord's Side: Gush Emunim* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1982, pp. 141–43.
[49] Quoted by Gideon Aran in *Eretz Israel Between Politics and Religion: The Movement to Stop the Withdrawal from Sinai* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1985, p. 12.
[50] Dan Be'eri, 'Hanukkah of the Zionists', *Nekuda* (Hebrew), no. 116, December 1987, p. 8.
[51] See Haggai Segal, *Dear Brothers* (Hebrew), Jerusalem 1986, p. 258.

REBUILDING JEWISH EDUCATION IN EUROPE AFTER THE WAR

Bernard Steinberg

THE destruction of the Jewish communities of Continental Europe during the Second World War brought to an end the structure of a well-established tradition of religious, welfare, and educational institutions.[1] It was therefore necessary from 1945 onwards to begin a process of reconstruction on the part of the survivors, with the assistance and participation of Jewish communities, communal agencies, and religious movements (such as Lubavitch) from the rest of the world. Of special significance, at the onset of a new era of Jewish history, was the participation of established Jewish welfare organizations, notably the American Joint Distribution Committee (often referred to as 'the Joint'). In addition, the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization and, after 1948, the State of Israel were sources of educational ideas and materials, and also teaching personnel.

The first twenty post-war years can be depicted as an era of reconstruction in two distinct stages. The first decade, from 1945 to about 1955, was one of upheaval, with shifting populations in Europe and with difficult economic conditions. It was thus a painful and uphill task to re-establish organized community life.[2] The ensuing decade was one of reconstruction and consolidation in Western Europe, while the tragically depleted Eastern European communities were effectively isolated from the rest of world Jewry. In Poland and Hungary, for example, after a limited post-war revival, the situation changed drastically as the new Communist regimes consolidated their power and exercised stifling ideological controls on organized Jewish activities.

At the end of the war, some 150,000 Jewish children of schoolgoing age remained in liberated Europe, excluding Soviet Russia, in contrast to a total of about 1,200,000 children in the 1930s.[3] From the very moment of liberation, Jewish welfare units which arrived at the concentration camps organized the rehabilitation of the survivors, and one of their special concerns was the education of the children.[4] Thousands of survivors were now housed under harsh conditions in the camps for displaced persons in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Even

without the help of the relief agencies, within months of liberation the survivors had organized a working communal framework under their Central Committee of Liberated Jews of Germany. Within that framework, schools, vocational training centres, yeshivot, and cultural institutions constituted a most important component.[5] In the early years, the Joint allocated much of its relief programmes exclusively for child and youth care.[6] Scores of children's houses were set up by the Joint as well as by Youth Aliyah and a number of other organizations. These houses, together with the schools which were attached to them, were established on the basis of broad ideological affiliation — Orthodox, Yiddishist, or Zionist. Of necessity, however, education formed only one facet of the amenities provided. There was also in the immediate post-war years the need for general relief work, such as the provision of food and clothing, medical treatment, and psychological guidance and counselling, as well as vocational training.

By 1948, the Joint was helping to provide education for over 110,000 persons in Europe. In that year, it also maintained in the American zone of Germany alone, 67 schools, 47 kindergartens, and 75 Talmud Torah establishments. It also paid for the printing and distribution of more than half a million textbooks and religious books.[7] Another organization involved in the sphere of Jewish education and training was ORT (which provides vocational training and technical training throughout the world). By 1948, ORT was responsible for 597 courses and 78 centres in the countries of liberated Europe, with 934 instructors for 12,068 students in the British and American zones of occupied Germany, in Austria, and in Italy.[8]

Also in 1948, the Central Committee of Liberated Jews in the American zone of Germany reported that 6,054 Jewish children were being educated by 750 teachers and 225 lecturers in 46 kindergartens, 67 primary schools, three grammar schools, 78 *hedarim*, and 12 yeshivot. It added that there were 20 seminaries for teachers and six for lecturers.[9] It was estimated that there were corresponding enrolments and institutions for Jewish pupils in the British and French occupation zones.

The first concerted post-war effort to deal with the problems of Jewish education on a global scale was in the establishment of a body called the United Jewish Educational and Cultural Organisation (UJECO) at a conference in Paris in October 1946, which was attended by representatives from 12 countries. UJECO's primary concern was with European Jewry, and this was given official priority.[10] During the first two post-war decades, a number of conferences were held with the intention of establishing a permanent co-ordinating body with representation from most, if not all, European Jewish educational agencies. In the event, such a body never materialized.[11]

There was the problem of financial resources. After the original agreement in Luxembourg in September 1952 between the German

Federal government and representatives of Jewish organizations from several countries, provision was made for a global payment of 450 million Deutschmarks over a period of 12 years. This amount was in respect of non-returnable and heirless assets of Holocaust victims, and was to be apportioned in a series of annual claims conferences. In the course of these conferences, held between 1952 and 1965, grants were made to communal and welfare institutions in Israel as well as in the Diaspora. The reconstituted communities in Europe benefited from the total of 19.5 million dollars allocated to Jewish educational reconstruction on a worldwide basis.[12]

The newly-established State of Israel provided a further impetus to Jewish education, especially to the launching of the Hebrew language as a living tongue. The Education Departments of the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization took an active part by providing emissary teachers from Israel to the European communities, while emissaries from the various Zionist youth movements helped to develop an important non-formal sector of Jewish education. During the 1950s in Jerusalem, the Greenberg Institute under the administration of the Jewish Agency, and the Gold Institute, its Orthodox equivalent within the Jewish Agency Torah Department, fulfilled an important function as training establishments for Hebrew teachers in the Diaspora, including Europe. By 1965, for example, some 50 Hebrew teachers from Western Europe had attended courses at these institutions.[13] In various other fields, including the provision of publications and of teaching aids and materials, and also regular vacation courses in Israel, the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization helped to consolidate the newly-emergent education systems.

Eastern Europe

From the 1950s onwards, the Jewish communities under the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe were subject to stringent state policies. Before the Second World War in such countries as Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania, great centres of Jewish learning had existed. Those facilities for Jewish education which had been re-established after 1945 now quickly declined in scope and influence.[14] Direct official contacts with Jewish organizations in the rest of the world were restricted, and those with the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization were completely severed.

There were, however, notable exceptions. In Hungary and Romania, Jewish communal structures and institutions — including synagogues and part-time Jewish schooling — were allowed to function to a certain extent unhindered. Thus, the rabbinical seminary in Budapest was re-opened while ORT vocational schools had been allowed to function in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,

and Hungary until 1949. Elsewhere in the Communist bloc such amenities were minimal, and where they did exist they were strictly regulated by the Communist authorities.[15] Whereas in 1939 there had been in all these countries flourishing Jewish communities, all that remained after the war and the Holocaust were only small and isolated remnants of Jewish settlement. The Yiddish language and the old traditions were discouraged, while organized religious activities were severely curtailed in most cases. The series of purges in a number of Eastern bloc countries in the late 1940s and early 1950s involved Jewish citizens, and resulted in a resurgence of antisemitism. There were consequent feelings of bitter disillusionment and insecurity amongst Jewish survivors. Furthermore, the new communities were now dominated by Jewish doctrinaire Communists.[16] As a result of these developments, there was large-scale Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe.

Before the Second World War, Poland had a Jewish population well in excess of three million, as well as a flourishing network of yeshivot, full-time *hedarim*, and day-schools. At the beginning of 1948 only some 5,000 pupils (less than half of the Jewish child population) were receiving some form of Jewish education in about 50 establishments. By 1963, it was reported that the total number of Jewish pupils was between 1,200 and 1,500 in seven Jewish schools. There were also some 400 students attending ORT vocational centres, but it may well be that many of these students were not Jewish.[17]

There was, moreover, a virtual de-Judaisation of the learning content in Jewish schools, accompanied by a pre-eminent status given to Communist doctrine. Hebrew-language teaching and religious instruction were both effectively eliminated, although the teaching of Yiddish as a language was encouraged. A Yiddish text-book published in 1949 stressed the importance of 'socialist education' and listed the following four aims for Jewish education:[18]

> 1. Love and loyalty to the Jewish people, its national–historical memory and national–cultural voluntarism.
> 2. Citizen's loyalty to Democratic Poland and active patriotism.
> 3. Loyalty towards the People's Democracy under the leadership of the united workers' class, socialist humanism, hatred of Fascism.
> 4. Cult of active revolution and understanding of its world meaning.

The text-books used in the Jewish schools in Poland illustrate the implementation of this policy. For example, a typical series of readers in the Yiddish language included an anthology of extracts from Jewish and Soviet writers, all of which exhibited a strong socialist bias. By contrast, nothing in the content of the text-books or readers was devoted to traditional Jewish values and concepts.[19] In 1963, a visitor from England reported on his return that he had been particularly

struck by the complete ignorance of matters Jewish among children attending Jewish schools in Poland. One instance which he cited was that when he asked a number of pupils who 'Moshe Rabbeinu' was, none could tell him, or even associate Moses with the Bible.[20]

In Hungary, Jewish community life benefited from the re-opening soon after liberation of the Rabbinical Seminary of Budapest. The Principal and several members of the staff had survived, so that it was possible for the seminary to function effectively by 1946, with financial help from Jewish organizations in other lands. In that year, seven rabbis were ordained.[21] In Czechoslovakia, after the Communist assumption of power in 1948, the small post-war Jewish community was officially allowed to continue its religious activities under state supervision. However, in practice these activities were greatly restricted by the continuing shortage of rabbis and teachers. Despite these difficulties, Hebrew text-books and magazines of Jewish interest were published and regular celebrations on religious festivals were arranged for the children.[22]

In Romania, a network of more than 200 Jewish schools was re-established in the immediate post-war years as part of an active cultural framework.[23] However, the enactment of the Communist Law on Religious Cults in August 1948 deprived Jewish authorities of the right to levy taxes on members of their community for the purpose of financing their educational and welfare institutions. With individual congregations thus limited in scope and influence, their educational institutions inevitably deteriorated.[24] This process in Romania was accelerated by the Educational Reform Act of 3 August 1948, which ordered a radical overhaul of the country's schools in conformity with Marxist–Leninist doctrines. The assets of all religious organizations were expropriated, and every religious school in Romania became part of a unified state system, but the Act permitted the establishment of schools with one of several minority languages of instruction. However, the Yiddish units of general education were attended by a total of only 302 pupils. In the national census of February 1956, of the 144,236 members of the 'Jewish nationality' 34,263 gave Yiddish as their mother tongue.[25] The few Yiddish units of general education had to use text-books strongly based on Communist dogma. In the Yiddish reading-books there were hardly any words of Hebrew derivation, while the spelling of Hebrew Biblical names was altered and differed from the original, accepted version.[26] Paradoxically, under the oppressive Ceausescu regime from the 1960s onwards, there was a partial relaxation of government controls on Jewish religious activities, with a marked revival of traditional observances. Meanwhile, there had been a mass emigration of Romanian Jews, a large proportion of whom went to settle in Israel.

As for what was until quite recently the Soviet Union, whatever cultural and educational facilities had existed for Jews before and

during the war had been effectively destroyed by 1958.[27] Observers and visitors from the West told of clandestine Bible and Talmud classes for children, but apart from these reports and the subsequent testimony of 'refuseniks', there have been few official or other documented details. Even the small number of pre-war Yiddish-medium schools with a Communist orientation did not survive the Second World War. Thus, by the end of the first two post-war decades, the Jewish population numbering about two and a quarter million had no Jewish schools which functioned with the knowledge of the authorities.[28] However, the latter did allow a small yeshiva to be opened in 1958 in the premises of Moscow's main synagogue for students to receive rabbinical instruction, so that they could later minister to the various Jewish communities in the USSR. In 1962, that yeshiva had virtually ceased to function, since students from the provinces were unable to obtain travel permits to Moscow.[29]

Western Europe

In non-Communist Europe, the reconstruction of Jewish education was able to proceed with the aid of a policy of co-ordination inaugurated by the establishment of the United Jewish Educational and Cultural Organisation. Its policy was implemented at a conference in Paris in 1947 on the basis of six main aims, and guided by a 'positive attitude towards the Jewish religious tradition and Jewish achievements in Palestine'. Its objectives were set out as follows:[30]

(a) To plan and execute a proper and adequate programme to restore and assist in maintaining through the local Jewish communities an educational programme for Jewish adults and children in Europe.
(b) To provide in particular for the training of personnel.
(c) To provide suitable educational books and materials.
(d) To encourage and assist Jewish learning and scholarship and promote the Hebrew language and culture.
(e) To undertake such other educational measures as may be thought advisable.
(f) To co-operate with other organizations which are engaged in like purposes.

The formulation of this policy was overshadowed by such factors as a declining birth rate, a mortality rate in most European Jewish communities higher than the national average, and a large proportion of mixed marriages, with the Jewish partner in most cases moving out of the faith.[31] In the immediate post-war years, the main tasks concerned reconstruction, help to displaced persons, aid to the newly-established State of Israel, and the restoring of links between the decimated communities. After 1950, the emphasis was on consolidation and development, links between Western European Jewry and the rest of

world Jewry, and on the problem of Jews in countries behind the Iron Curtain.

In the free and open societies of Western Europe, social conditions were now highly conducive to assimilation. It was pointed out at the time that there was an inherent problem of definition in considering those factors and criteria which determine Jewish identity. Many Jews in these countries were not affiliated to a synagogue or to a Jewish organization, did not participate in Jewish cultural activities, and did not have a distinctive Jewish name. It was further acknowledged that there were many marginal, nominal, or crypto-Jews.[32]

Since the socio-political background varied from country to country, there was no overall pattern of development for Jewish education in Western Continental Europe. For example, day-school development was at least partly dependent on state financial aid, and generally upon state policy towards denominational schools. By 1956, when a Conference on Jewish Education in Europe was held in Paris under the aegis of the American Joint Distribution Committee, the lack of liaison and co-ordination between the various communal agencies was singled out as the most urgent problem.[33] The Conference devoted special attention to the development of Jewish day-schools, and reported on data collected from questionnaires to all such schools as were known to exist in non-Communist Europe.[34] The position was summarized as follows. There were 2,548 pupils in the elementary schools (1,441 boys and 1,107 girls) and 963 children in the secondary schools (545 boys and 418 girls) while the total number in the kindergartens was 670. The teachers were not all Jewish: out of a total staff of 292, only slightly more than half (161) were Jewish and 88 of them taught Jewish subjects. Only seven schools received a state subsidy while the approximate cost of teaching the schoolchildren was 135 dollars per capita per annum. Some of the schools owned their premises or occupied, rent-free, Jewish community buildings. The number of hours devoted to Jewish subjects each week ranged from a minimum of two to a maximum of 20, yielding an average of nine hours.

In the various countries of Western Europe, each Jewish educational system of course had its own characteristics, influenced by local custom and conditions.[35] Jewish day-schools in Belgium benefited from government grants provided in accordance with the *Pacte Scolaire* of 1959. The long-established Jewish community of Antwerp founded two flourishing schools, while in Brussels a day-school provided for a high proportion of the Jewish children in the community. The École Centrale Israélite in Brussels, when it was founded in 1947, drew more than half its pupils from the Jewish orphanage. By 1961 the school had developed infant, primary, and *Athénée* (academic secondary) departments, in which Jewish subjects were taught daily from 9 to 11.15 a.m.[36] Apart from the help to denominational day-schools, the

Pacte Scolaire allowed previous existing arrangements to be continued for visiting teachers who provided religious instruction in state schools. In the school year 1949–50, 408 Jewish pupils in 26 schools received such instruction from 17 visiting teachers, while corresponding figures for 1961–62 were 703 pupils and 22 visiting teachers in 66 state schools, mainly in Brussels, Antwerp, Liège, Ghent, and Charleroi.[37]

In the Netherlands, there were two small day-schools in Amsterdam and a number of supplementary schools in that city and in the Hague. Jewish children whose homes were geographically remote from organized communities received lessons through correspondence courses. In addition, regular seminars for adults were organized, with courses in subjects and activities ranging from Bible to indoor 'educational games'.[38]

In Italy, most Jews lived in Rome or Milan; many in the former city belonged to the poorer classes. Both cities had a comprehensive system of Jewish day-schools since 1945. The syllabus in the three Jewish schools in Rome was in accordance with that of the Italian state school system, but provided in addition one and a half hours of Hebrew daily. In Milan, with a Jewish community of about 9,000, it was reported in 1962 that there were about 860 pupils in Jewish day-schools.[39] The Jewish schools in Italy were described in the 1950s as being 'to a large extent instruments for keeping the children out of the strictly Catholic elementary schools of the land'.[40]

The Jewish community of Greece tragically had been largely destroyed as a result of the deportation to concentration camps during the Nazi occupation. By 1953 there were only about 6,200 Jews in the country, out of a pre-war total of some 77,000. In that year, an elementary day-school was opened in Athens by the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* and functioned with the aid of government grants. Other *Alliance* schools were established two years later in Salonika and Larissa. While the secular curriculum in those schools presented no problems, the Jewish Studies programmes depended upon educational material and visiting emissary teachers from Israel. By the end of the 1950s, the Athens day-school had 105 pupils, while there were supplementary schools in six other cities with a total of some 320 pupils. It was also estimated that a little over a third of all children of schoolgoing age were receiving some form of Jewish education.[41]

Thus, in the years following the first post-war decade, although there was a phase of consolidation in Jewish education, serious problems persisted. A number of surveys and reports cited the lack of adequately-qualified teachers of Jewish subjects, of suitable text-books, and of educational material for young persons and for adults. A series of surveys carried out by the Joint, as well as other observers, confirmed that the day-school was the most effective agency of Jewish education in Europe, while also noting that the part-time institutions were far from

satisfactory.[42] In one report, the day-school was described as 'a Jewish instrument that strengthens group belonging ... to offer the child a rationale of Jewishness'.[43]

In 1962, the American Joint Distribution Committee published the results of a survey conducted in ten countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, The Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland. It was estimated that of about 118,000 children between the ages of six and 17 in all these countries, no more than 25 per cent were receiving some Jewish education, in either day or supplementary schools, ORT vocational schools, or yeshivot.[44] Of these children, 80 per cent were at supplementary schools. Corresponding figures based on a similar survey completed in 1966 gave very similar results.

The surveys revealed wide divergences from country to country. For example, in the early 1960s France had an estimated 100,000 Jewish children aged between six and 17 years, of whom approximately only 13.5 per cent were receiving a Jewish education. Corresponding figures for Belgium were 8,100 and 36.7 per cent, for Sweden 2,800 and 50.2 per cent, and for Austria 900 and 72.2 per cent.[45] Jewish schooling provision was mainly at the pre-primary or primary levels, and between 1959 and 1962 the proportion of pupils staying on to receive secondary education rose from 45 to 65 per cent. In terms of total enrolment in all schools, there was a rise of 15 per cent in the decade between 1956 and 1966, and in secondary schools alone this increase amounted to 31 per cent. Nevertheless, by 1965, for the ten countries surveyed, some 8,000 children were at day-schools, compared with about 20,000 at supplementary schools. Of the day-school children, some 1,000 were in kindergartens, 4,000 in elementary schools, and 3,000 in secondary schools. For the whole of Western Europe — which in addition to the above ten countries included Germany, Gibraltar, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, and Spain — an estimated 20 per cent of Jewish children aged between six and 17 were receiving some form of Jewish education.[46]

In the day-schools themselves, the methods used, the standards attained, and the relative importance attached to Jewish studies varied greatly. In 1962 the majority of such schools devoted between five and seven hours weekly to these studies, while about a quarter of these establishments had fewer than five hours weekly. Of the supplementary schools, only ten per cent provided seven hours or more per week, 30 per cent devoted four to six hours, and 60 per cent between one and three hours.[47] By 1966 the situation had improved, with one day-school pupil in five receiving instruction in Jewish studies for more than ten hours per week, while the majority received such instruction between seven and eight hours a week. As for the supplementary schools, about half of them organized club and recreational youth activities, with

children doing their secular school homework under supervision, being given a snack, and taking part in organized sports — apart from receiving formal and informal Hebrew tuition. This was particularly so in France, and also in the Netherlands and Italy, while Switzerland provided youth counsellors.[48]

A major difficulty in the reconstruction of post-Holocaust communities was that there were no longer large Jewish populations concentrated in some districts of Europe's larger cities. One of the results was that school transport systems were essential for the survival of Jewish schools in Rome, Brussels, Milan, and Athens. In Munich, by the 1960s, almost half of the educational budget was being spent on transport costs. In countries where there were scattered provincial communities, the schools had to provide boarding facilities. The schools in Antwerp, for example, accommodated pupils from Jewish homes in various countries of Europe.[49]

The administrative and legislative relationship between the state and denominational schools has always varied from country to country, particularly with regard to the provision of government subsidies. For example, in Holland and Denmark such schools (including the Jewish day-schools) still receive grants to cover virtually all maintenance costs, while in Austria, Finland, and Switzerland the schools remain responsible for almost all their running costs. In the latter case, an important source of income must inevitably be the school fees. Thus in 1962 in France, Belgium, and Switzerland these fees amounted to between 40 and 50 per cent of the entire income of Jewish day-schools.[50]

Clearly, an essential factor in the development and maintenance of educational systems was the degree of active interest and willing participation within the Jewish communities themselves. In many cases such involvement was not forthcoming, and one observer commented on a 'lay leadership that is criminally indifferent and negligent'.[51] By 1966, 17 day-schools in Belgium, France, Italy, and Switzerland reported that they had vacancies in their classes, but could not attract enough Jewish children because of lack of interest and support within their communities.[52]

The Case of French Jewry

Before the Second World War, there were some 300,000 Jews in France. After the liberation in 1945, only some 150,000 remained but by the mid-1960s this number had grown to about half a million. That spectacular increase was largely the result of the great influx during the late 1950s of Jews from North Africa and partly that of the resettlement of Jewish displaced persons of Eastern European origin. One of the important influences upon the modern historical development of

French Jewry was the existence of a well-established secular state educational system dating from the founding of the Third Republic in 1871. Jews could send their children to government schools without fear that they would be exposed to Christian indoctrination. However, the tradition of Jewish participation in secular society and culture also meant that Jewish pupils could assimilate more easily.[53] At the same time, Roman Catholic missionaries were active in seeking the conversion of French Jews. The explanation of one convert can be quoted as a typical description of the process as '*un acte de soumission à une force dont je n'ai pas cherché à saisir la portée ni à lui résister par la critique*'.[54]

Following upon the immediate tasks of post-war reconstruction, the communal institutions of French Jewry had to face the challenge of the absorption of the immigrants from North Africa. It has been observed in some quarters that they did not respond adequately to that challenge. In the field of education in particular, it was noted that of all Diaspora communities the proportion of Jewish children in France not receiving any form of Jewish education was one of the highest. Even before the full impact of the North African influx, the director of the *Fonds Social Juif Unifié* was quoted as stating that while only 20 per cent of Jewish children under 14 years of age were given some form of Jewish education, hardly five per cent over that age knew anything about Judaism.[55] In 1955, the Franco-Jewish writer Isaac Pougatch set out in stark terms the background of rapid assimilation among French Jewry, and maintained that the only solution to this process of communal disintegration was the establishment of an effective educational system to halt the total estrangement of young Jews from any facet of Judaism.[56]

By the early 1960s, provision had to be made for the children of the North African Jews. An estimated 150,000 immigrants had augmented the existing Jewish population of about 340,000. Of these, about 85,000 had entered France between the years of 1955 and 1961 alone. In Marseilles, the local community had grown from 4,000 in 1945 to 35,000 in 1961. There were also several French towns — such as Angers, Annecy, and Carpentras — which for many years had had few if any Jewish inhabitants until the arrival of the North Africans.[57] Many of them found that they had little in common with the Jews of metropolitan France and in the process there was the ever-present danger of loss of Jewish identity. The 110,000 Algerian Jews were considered to be most at risk, since they had already absorbed a strong French cultural tradition. Many of them were destitute when they arrived in France, and they settled into the most appalling housing conditions. It is claimed that Christian missionaries took advantage of the situation, which resulted in an alarming number of conversions. Consequently, a number of unofficial Jewish groups were set up to counteract these missionary activities, by caring for the social welfare of

immigrants, and in particular by arranging facilities for Jewish education.[58]

The estrangement of the younger generation from their parents was attributed to the contrasts in the methods and content of the respective North African and French traditions of Jewish education. In the North African Jewish communities, religious education had consisted largely of learning by rote a mass of unexplained material from the Bible and the Prayer Book, while there was undeviating religious observance. This contrasted sharply with the comparative lack of piety in France.[59] The resultant situation was summed up by one observer in the following terms:[60]

> ... the divergence between the naïve, unsophisticated, patriarchal, father-centred, disciplined, religious, even superstitious-ridden society of North Africa and the free child-centred, permissive society of France is shocking and traumatic.

The 'slippery path' which led many North African immigrants to abandon their Jewish identity was described as a sequence in the following stages: 1) abandonment in turn of Sabbath observance, of eating only kasher food, of synagogue attendance, of festivals observance, of Bar-Mitzvah, of Jewish names in favour of Gentile names, of marriages in a synagogue, and of circumcision; 2) conversion to another religion; and 3) total repudiation of Judaism, coupled with acceptance of antisemitic beliefs.[61]

The problem was intensified by the fact that the older-established Jewish population was generally far from being religiously observant; it was estimated that in 1959 in Paris — with a Jewish population of about 250,000 — only 3,000 children were receiving any form of Jewish education.[62] Several years later, one survey concluded that in the whole of France about 90 per cent of Jewish children were still not receiving any kind of Jewish education.[63] One of the reasons for this state of affairs may have been the acute shortage of qualified teachers to cope with the influx of some 20,000 more children, especially in the areas where new communities had come into being.[64] Furthermore, educational policy-makers had to acknowledge the fact that there was a very wide gap between the traditional Judaism and religious practices of the newcomers and the Jewish life which they found in France. The situation was also exacerbated by the socio-economic difficulties of the immigrants. Under the circumstances, it was believed that a radical adjustment of the Franco-Jewish attitudes was essential in order to find the solution to the problem.[65]

By the mid-1960s, a number of sociological studies had confirmed the ongoing crises within French Jewry emanating from the high rate of assimilation. Indifference and apathy among Jewish university students, many of whom by now were of North African origin, posed

particularly serious problems.[66] Of special concern, however, was the rapid decline in religious observance and consciousness among the younger generation of many immigrant families.

Postscript: World Perspectives

In August 1962, the Conference of Jewish Organizations (comprising ten leading Jewish organizations) convened a world conference in Jerusalem. It was attended by about 200 delegates from 30 countries. Eight workshops were set up to report back on the following aspects of Jewish education: 1) communal responsibility for Jewish education; 2) teacher training and welfare; 3) day-schools; 4) the place of Israel in Diaspora education; 5) elementary education; 6) secondary and youth education; 7) Jewish Studies in institutions of higher learning; and 8) adult education.[67] The reports and resolutions on these eight issues thus dealt with the perceived major problems of Jewish education in the Diaspora. The responsibility was placed on individual communities to deal with Jewish education 'as of the highest priority', while it was stressed that current appropriations were 'woefully inadequate'.[68] The lack of adequate teacher-training facilities as well as the low prestige and status accorded to teachers were greatly deplored; it was also acknowledged that there was a preponderance of untrained, unqualified, part-time teachers of Jewish subjects. The provision of sufficient numbers of suitably-qualified teachers was therefore regarded as the most urgent prerequisite. Towards that end, measures had to be taken for the development of a full-time Jewish teaching profession.[69]

In 1964, two years after the Jerusalem conference, a World Council of Jewish Education was established, with headquarters in New York and by 1966, it was in contact with a number of Jewish organizations in several countries. It sponsored an 'Opinion Study Concerning Recruitment and Training of Jewish Teachers in the Diaspora', and initiated the following projects: preparation of programmes of study for some Jewish communities which had requested them; plans to increase and intensify the Jewish component in summer camps; the gathering of statistics of the Jewish child population of the world; determining a list of participating organizations in the World Council; and setting up a 'Pedagogic Reference Centre' in New York to accommodate a collection of text-books, teaching aids, administrative guides, visual and aural materials and other relevant materials.[70]

The reconstruction and maintenance of provision for Jewish education, especially in post-war Continental Europe, was largely dependent upon the annual Claims Conferences from 1952 to 1965. With the help of Claims Conference grants, new schools were built or acquired in Athens, Rome, Milan, Strasbourg, Paris, Amsterdam, and Stockholm.[71] The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 provided

a valuable impetus to Jewish studies, especially to the study of Hebrew as a living language. This gave Jewish education all over the world a badly-needed aura of reality. One educator commented: 'Pedagogically the introduction of Israel into the classroom offers a heaven-sent opportunity to bring a new approach to basic subjects and to enliven ideas whose presentation may have been dulled through frequent repetition'.[72]

The Educational Departments of the World Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem also played an increasing part in stimulating Jewish education in a number of Diaspora communities — ranging from issuing publications to promoting educational visits to Israel.[73]

One of the main criteria for assessing the effectiveness of Jewish education is through the collection and analysis of statistical data on actual enrolments. In post-war Europe the three settings of formal Jewish education — supplementary part-time classes meeting after school hours or on Sundays; Jewish day-schools; and the various forms of 'release time' or 'withdrawal' classes in state-maintained schools — never encompassed the overwhelming majority of Jewish children. One survey of Jewish education in Western Europe reported that in 1965, 90 per cent of Jewish children in France were not receiving any form of Jewish education, compared with 43 per cent in Britain, and 38 per cent in a group of 13 other countries.[74]

The Six-Day War of 1967 together with the emergence of multi-ethnicity as a permanent reality in Western European societies with viable Jewish communities inaugurated a new approach to Jewish education. The first two post-war decades had represented a crucial transition towards the establishment of a stable and thriving communal life, of which Jewish education has remained a vital component. As Daniel J. Elazar commented in this Journal in 1969:[75]

> A study of the educational function in each community will not only lead to an understanding of its content and its place in the community's scheme of things, but will also serve as an important means of gaining insight into the community's values and self-image.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

AJDC:	American Joint Distribution Committee
J.C.	*Jewish Chronicle*
J.E.	*Jewish Education*

[1] For an overview of the situation before 1939, see 'Tentative List of Jewish Educational Institutions in Axis-Occupied Countries by the Research Staff of the Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction', Commission

on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, New York, 1946, published as a supplement to *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 8, no. 3, 1946, pp. 3–95.

[2] 'In the process the entire basis of the Jewish polity was radically changed, the locus of Jewish life shifted, and virtually every organized Jewish community was reconstituted in some way', commented Daniel J. Elazar in 'The Reconstitution of Jewish Communities in the Post-War Period', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 187–226, December 1969, p. 191.

[3] See Leon Shapiro, *Jewish Children in Liberated Europe*, New York, 1946, p. 1.

[4] Azriel Eisenberg, ed., *The Lost Generation: Children of the Holocaust*, New York, 1982, pp. 334–43.

[5] Koppel S. Pinson, 'Jewish Life in Liberated Germany', *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2, April 1947, pp. 101–26, provides a vivid eye-witness account of this episode, based on his experiences as a relief worker in the camps between October 1945 and September 1946. See especially pp. 118–23 for details of educational and cultural reconstruction.

[6] See Charles Jordan, 'L'apport du "Joint" à la reconstruction de la vie communautaire juive en Europe', pp. 193–99 in *La vie juive dans l'Europe contemporaine — Jewish Life in Contemporary Europe* (Proceedings of a September 1962 Conference held in Brussels), published by the Institut de Sociologie de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, 1965.

[7] Ibid., p. 193. See also Yehuda Bauer, *Out of the Ashes: The Impact of American Jews on Post-Holocaust European Jewry*, Boulder, 1989, pp. 209–15.

[8] Leon Shapiro, *The History of ORT*, New York, 1980, pp. 240–43.

[9] Elizabeth E. Eppler, 'Jewish Education in Europe, 1933–1960', pp. 208–36 in Nehemiah Robinson, ed., *The Institute Anniversary Volume (1941–1961)*, New York, 1962.

[10] Report of the Conference on Jewish Educational Reconstruction, Paris, 12–18 September 1946.

[11] Following upon the 1946 and 1947 conferences, the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* declined to accept full representation on the United Jewish Educational and Cultural Organization, preferring instead to preserve its own independence in the form of full autonomy, see *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle*, nos 48–49, December 1950–January 1951, passim.

[12] For a comprehensive historical account, including allocations for educational reconstruction, see Nana Sagi, *German Reparations: A History of the Negotiations*, Jerusalem, 1980, and Ronald W. Zweig, *German Reparations and the Jewish World*, Boulder, 1987.

[13] This figure is calculated from the text and tables in Alexander M. Dushkin *et al.*, *Jewish Education in the Diaspora*, Jerusalem, 1971, pp. 3–10, 45–46, and 65. See also *Quarterly Bulletin*, Department of Education in the Diaspora, Jerusalem, Summer 1965, p. 4.

[14] The ruthless Stalinist obliteration of Jewish culture in the USSR during the immediate post-war years has also been adequately recorded and documented. See, for example, Elias Schulman, *A History of Jewish Education in the Soviet Union*, New York, 1971, especially pp. 162–66, and H. B. Bass *et al.*, *A Decade of Destruction: Jewish Culture in the USSR 1948–1958*, New York, 1958.

[15] Eppler, op.cit. in Note 9 above. For an overview of the early post-war years in Eastern Europe, see Peter Meyer, Bernard D. Weinryb, Eugene

Duschinsky, and Nicolas Sylvain, *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, Syracuse, N.Y., 1953.

[16] Nehemiah Robinson, *The Position of the Jewish Communities of Eastern Europe on the Eve of 1958*, New York, 1959 (mimeographed).

[17] Jacob Lestschinsky, 'Poland', pp. 32–33 in Nehemiah Robinson, ed., *European Jewry Ten Years after the War*, New York, 1956.

[18] L. Lozowski, *Dertsiungs Program foon die ZK foon die Yiden in Polen* (Educational Programme of the Central Committee of the Jews in Poland), Warsaw, 1949, pp. 14–15.

[19] S. Szneiderman and A. Warkowicka, *Dos Yidishe Wort* (The Yiddish Word), 2 vols, Warsaw, 1959.

[20] *Jewish Review* (London), 15 May 1963, p. 206.

[21] Moshe Carmilly-Weinberger, ed., *The Rabbinical Seminary of Budapest, 1877–1977*, New York, 1986, pp. 35 and 340.

[22] Rabbi Dr Gustav Sicher *et al.*, *Jewish Studies*, Prague, n.d., *c.* 1955; see especially the article by Rabbi Emil Davidovič, 'The Life of our Religious Communities', pp. 43–47.

[23] Julius Fischer, 'Rumania', pp. 45–54, in Robinson, ed., op. cit. in Note 17 above.

[24] Ibid., p. 54.

[25] Randolph L. Braham, 'The Rumanian Schools of General Education', *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. 21, no. 3, 1961, pp. 310–48.

[26] For example, Eliezer Frankel, *Yiddishe Shprach* (Yiddish Language), a reader for grades 3 and 4, Bucharest, 1957/8.

[27] See H. B. Bass *et al.*, op. cit. in Note 14 above, passim.

[28] Schulman, op. cit. in Note 14 above, p. 170. The 1959 Soviet census enumerated 2,267,814 Jews in the USSR: Mordechai Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure*, Westport, Ct., 1987, p. 21. Since the recent dramatic changes in the former Soviet Union and the large-scale Jewish emigration, there is now available a large collection of *samizdat* Jewish text-books, handwritten, typed and duplicated, dating from earlier decades.

[29] Benjamin Pinkus, *The Jews of the Soviet Union*, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 285, 290, and 295. See also Nora Lévin, *The Jews in the Soviet Union since 1917: Paradox of Survival*, vol. 2, London, 1990, pp. 591–92.

[30] United Jewish Educational and Cultural Organization, *Report of 2nd Conference*, Paris, 23–25 October 1947, p. 36.

[31] See, for example, Sergio DellaPergola, 'Recent Demographic Trends among Jews in Western Europe', pp. 19–58 in Ernest Stock, ed., *European Jewry: A Handbook*, Jerusalem, 1982.

[32] See Abraham Moles, 'Sur l'aspect théorique du décompte de populations mal définies', in *La vie juive* . . ., op. cit. in Note 6 above, pp. 81–87.

[33] AJDC Conference on Jewish Education, Paris, 8–10 October 1956. List of Draft Resolutions.

[34] AJDC report dated 26 August 1956, containing an analysis of replies to a questionnaire sent to 17 organizations, of which 16 replied.

[35] Sylvain Salomon Brachfeld, *Het Joods Onderwijs in Belgie* (Jewish Education in Belgium), Antwerp, 1966, sets out a descriptive profile of the system.

[36] Léon Leibman, 'L'enseignement Juif en Belgique', *Menorah* (Quarterly published in Brussels), no. 4, 1961, p. 2.
[37] anon. in *Menorah*, no. 1, 1962, p. 3.
[38] *AJDC Survey of Jewish Day and Supplementary Schools in Western Continental Europe*, Geneva, October 1962, p. 13. See also Moshe Mandel, 'Once a Week in Amsterdam', pp. 18–21, *Community* (Paris), no. 18, June 1965.
[39] Fausto Pitigliani, 'Problèmes Sociaux des Communautés Juives de Rome et de Milan', pp. 209–22 of *La vie juive* ..., op. cit. in Note 6 above. See especially pp. 215 and 222.
[40] Elijah Bortniker, 'Jewish Education in Europe', *J.E.*, vol. 30, no. 1, Fall 1959, pp. 49–59, p. 53.
[41] Joseph Pessah, 'Jewish Education in Greece after World War II', *J.E.*, vol. 39, no. 3, 1969, pp. 23–26.
[42] The series of American Joint Distribution Committee Reports, compiled by Stanley Abramovitch, *Survey of Jewish Day and Supplementary Schools in Western Continental Europe*, Geneva, 1959, 1962 and 1966, provide an informative review and profile, with detailed statistics, of Jewish educational provision in Western Europe.
[43] Bortniker, op. cit. in Note 40 above, p. 54.
[44] AJDC *Survey*, 1962, p. 8.
[45] AJDC *Survey*, 1966, pp. 9–10 and Tables 1, 2a, 2b, 3, 4 and 5.
[46] AJDC *Survey*, 1962, p. 12, and 1966 *Survey*, p. 8.
[47] AJDC *Survey*, 1962, pp. 12–13.
[48] AJDC *Survey*, 1966, p. 12, and 1962 *Survey*, p. 14.
[49] AJDC *Survey*, 1962, p. 16, and 1966 *Survey*, pp. 11 and 13.
[50] AJDC *Survey*, 1962, p. 20, and 1966 *Survey*, pp. 19 and 23.
[51] Azriel Eisenberg, 'Jewish Education in Europe', *J.E.*, vol. 34, no. 1, Summer 1964, pp. 244–47; see p. 247.
[52] AJDC *Survey*, 1966, p. 10.
[53] For an informative, concise profile of French Jewry during the first two post-war decades, see Georges Levitte, 'A Changing Community', pp. 10–23 in Otto Klineberg *et al.*, *Aspects of French Jewry*, London, 1969.
[54] Quoted by Pierre Aubery in *Milieux juifs de la France contemporaine*, 2nd edn., Paris, 1962, p. 281. See also Michel Roblin, *Les juifs de Paris*, Paris, 1952, pp. 124 and 135–36.
[55] Arnold Mandel, 'France', pp. 195–219 in Nehemiah Robinson, ed., op. cit. in Note 17 above, p. 209.
[56] Isaac Pougatch, *Se Ressaisir ou Disparaître*, Paris, 1955, passim.
[57] D.D.G. 'Nouvelle Géographie Juive de France', pp. 6–10, in *Hamoré* (Paris), no. 27, 1964. See also Arnold Mandel, 'France's Algerian Jews', in *Commentary*, vol. 35, no. 6, June 1963, pp. 475–82. For a study of North African Jews in France, carried out in 1962 by Josiane Bijaoui-Rosenfeld, see 'Some Aspects of the Integration of North African Jews', in Klineberg *et al.*, op. cit. in Note 53 above, pp. 97–142.
[58] News item, 'Conversion Dangers in France', *J.C.*, 19 January 1962, p. 16.
[59] Emile Touati, 'Quoi de Neuf?', *Hamoré*, No. 27, June 1964, p. 11.
[60] Eisenberg, op. cit. in Note 51 above, p. 247.
[61] Abraham Moles, *North African Immigration into France* (mimeographed), Community Service, Paris, 1961, p. 21.

[62] Elijah Bortniker, 'Report on Jewish Education in Europe', *J.E.*, vol. 29, no. 3, Spring 1959, p. 36.
[63] Jacob Braude, 'Jewish Education in Western Europe (1965). A Survey', *J.C.*, 4 March 1966, p. 26.
[64] Touati, op. cit. in Note 59 above.
[65] André and Renée Neher, 'Le Judaïsme nord africain en France: nécéssité d'une culture juive en masse', *Hamoré*, no. 27, June 1964, pp. 12–20.
[66] Georges Benguigui, 'First-year Jewish Students at the University of Paris', pp. 24–96 in Klineberg *et al.*, op. cit. in Note 53 above. See also Doris Bensimon-Donath, *L'Intégration des Juifs nord-africains en France*, Paris, 1971, pp. 197, 238, and 257–58.
[67] *Interim Report* of the World Conference on Jewish Education, Jerusalem, 12-16 August 1962, p. 4.
[68] Ibid., p. 13.
[69] Ibid., p. 17.
[70] *Memorandum of Activities*, World Council on Jewish Education, New York, 26 February 1967.
[71] AJDC *Survey*, 1962, pp. 8 and 17, and 1966 *Survey*, pp. 14 and 21.
[72] Beatrice J. Barwell, 'Israel and the Jewish Child', *Zionist Year Book, 1955–1956*, London, 1957, p. 402.
[73] Dushkin, op. cit. in Note 13 above, passim.
[74] Braude, op. cit. in Note 63 above.
[75] Elazar, op. cit. in Note 2 above, p. 213.

DEATH'S SHADOW. REFLECTIONS ON THE HOLOCAUST

Colin Holmes

(Review Article)

FRANK CHALK and KURT JONASSOHN, *The History and Sociology of Genocide. Analyses and Case Studies*, xviii + 461 pp., Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1990, £30.00 or $55.00 (paperback, £12.95 or $22.50).

ABRAHAM TORY, *Surviving the Holocaust. The Kovno Ghetto Diary*, xxiv + 553 pp., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Ma. and London, 1990, £24.95 or $34.95.

DAVID KAHANE, *Lvov Ghetto Diary*, x + 162 pp., University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1990, n.p.

LAWRENCE L. LANGER, *Holocaust Testimonies. The Ruins of Memory*, xix + 216 pp., Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1991, £16.50 or $25.00.

MARTIN S. BERGMANN and MILTON E. JUCOVY, eds., *Generations of the Holocaust* (new enlarged edition, first published in 1982 by Basic Books), xix + 356 pp., Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, $52.00 (paperback, $21.50).

AARON HASS, *In the Shadow of the Holocaust. The Second Generation*, xi + 180 pp., I.B. Tauris, 110 Gloucester Avenue, London NW1 8JA, 1991, £14.95.

A FEW months ago, in the middle of rural England, I was told that the organized attempt to exterminate Jews during the Second World War was a myth. Any suggestion that it did occur was dismissed as mere Jewish propaganda. At the same time as this interview took place it became known that Fred Leuchter, the Revisionist writer who had attempted to demolish existing opinions on Auschwitz, was interested in coming to Britain in the company of Robert Faurisson, one of the leading pioneer exponents of the Revisionist interpretation of the Holocaust. To the likes of Leuchter and Faurisson, the mountain of literature on the Holocaust amounts to no more than a calculated, accumulated hoax. The terror, the pain, the

anguish, which can be traced through the lives of generations of Jews, survivors and their children, is dismissed as a collective fantasy, albeit with a rational political purpose — to secure a Jewish State. In the event, the British Government refused Leuchter permission to enter Britain. But, as I write, I have before me a leaflet headed The Clarendon Club, which announces that on 15 November 1991 Robert Faurisson, who possesses dual French–British nationality, would be addressing a meeting in Central London on 'The Myth of the Gas Chambers'.[1]

In the light of such Revisionism, it is salutary to remind ourselves of the considerable corpus of historical and sociological opinion which attempts to understand the politics pursued in a wide range of states to root out and destroy those who are regarded as subversive and dangerous opponents. In their book *The History and Sociology of Genocide*, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn trace the emergence of such policies in Europe and elsewhere. Their study divides neatly into three parts. It possesses a conceptual framework in which attention is duly given to Yehuda Bauer's distinction between genocide and holocaust. The former is viewed as the planned destruction of a racial, ethnic, or national group but, unlike the latter, it does not embrace a programme of total physical extermination. The crime of holocaust, we are reminded, relates to 'the planned physical annihilation for ideological or pseudo-religious reasons, of all the members of a national, ethnic or racial group'.[2] It is into this latter category that Chalk and Jonassohn would place the fate of European Jewry during the Hitlerite epoch. They claim that the closest parallel to this organized killing of the Jews can be found in the Turkish treatment of the Armenian minority. In this regard they draw heavily upon the super-charged writings of Vahakn Dadrian. Elsewhere, but not consistently, they suggest that the history of the Gypsies in the Hitlerite epoch follows a pattern similar to that of the Jews. Any recognition of the destruction wreaked by the Germans upon Europe's Gypsies is to be welcomed: for too long the lives of Gypsies during this period have remained invisible. The second part of the book is composed of case studies and will be of particular assistance in undergraduate teaching. Finally, Chalk and Jonassohn provide a helpful bibliography.

The scope of their work is worldwide. The fate of Europe's witches, of Indians in the Americas, of Christians in Japan, and of the Zulus under Shaka, are among their case studies. Their text is limited in the depth of its analysis but the bibliography allows readers to build on firm foundations. It is regrettable, however, that the book comes without an index. Nevertheless, supplemented by additional material (and here film, video and literary sources come to mind)[3] *The History and Sociology of Genocide* provides a solid base for comparative studies of mass-killing processes.

Chalk and Jonassohn write as professional sociologists. Their work is an academic statement. But anyone interested specifically in the fate of European Jewry can supplement such information with an important range of primary material. Some written testimonies survived the Nazi epoch: one of the best known of these is Emanuel Ringelblum's record of life in the Warsaw Ghetto.[4] Moreover, survivors and their children have talked, sometimes agonizingly, of the impact of the Holocaust on their lives. Such oral testimony, though often neglected in favour of printed material, is a valuable source with which to understand the recent history of European Jewry.

Abraham Tory's *Surviving the Holocaust. The Kovno Ghetto Diary* was compiled largely during the Second World War by Abraham Golub (he changed his name to Tory in 1949). Written in Yiddish and covering the years between 1941 and 1944, it is an account of daily life in the Kovno ghetto in Lithuania into which at one point the Germans herded and confined approximately 30,000 Jews. Tory was one of these. He served as secretary to the *Ältestenrat*, a body which mirrored the Jewish Councils established by the Germans elsewhere in occupied territory. He survived the Holocaust. But his diary is overwhelmingly depressing and harrowing, although occasional shafts of light break through the shadows. There are loving accounts of the celebration of Jewish festivals. Hope from the outside world could also lift spirits in the ghetto, even though the mood was temporary. We read the entry for 11 July 1943: 'Yesterday afternoon the mood in the ghetto was excellent. The British radio had just broadcast the news about the invasion of Sicily by the Allied armies. This news had been brought by workers returning from the city: in no time it spread throughout the ghetto'.[5] Moreover, we read on 30 July 1943 of Tory's visit to the priest Vaickus, 'one of the honourable people who in the most difficult times for the Ghetto used to show us a smiling and friendly face, and to speak encouraging words to us'.[6] Tory tell us: 'I took out of my pocket a photograph of the place where the material [his diary] was hidden ... "Please put it in a safe place. This is the key to material of great importance. When the times comes [*sic*] please pass it on to the right people". We shook hands. A stone was lifted from my heart. Now, whatever may happen, nothing will be lost. The priest is a responsible person'.[7] However, such flashes of hope are rare. On other occasions we are reminded of vivid contrasts. On 4 May 1943: 'The radiant golden rays of the spring sunshine illuminated the morning hours of the day. The air in the ghetto was suffused with warmth, light and joy. The trees and plants basked in the sun', but then Tory catches sight of the barbed wire fence which circumscribed the ghetto and reflects: 'This is why there is no joy in life here, no spring sunshine in our spirits, and no joy in sowing'.[8]

Conditions in the ghetto are graphically described, in particular the range of hostile pressures and situations which the Jews encountered.

The Germans exercised control in the occupied territory but the Jews faced hostility also from the surrounding Lithuanian population. Tory's observations, including his graphic account of the killing of 52 Jews at the garage of the Agricultural Co-operative Society on 4 August 1941, is one of the reminders of this generalized hostility. Such evidence is a clear indication of a widespread phenomenon in Nazi-occupied territory, that of a culture of native antisemitism into which the Germans could plug their own brand of hostility.

Tory's observations serve as a particular reminder of the various degrading roles to which Jews in their powerlessness were assigned. Jewish police were employed by the Germans to remove Lithuanians from flats in order to make room for German personnel. Middlemen, of whatever form, are universally hated. Other examples of degradation linger in the memory. On 17 November 1942, Gestapo officers searched an apartment in the ghetto and found a quantity of valuables belonging to a young Jew, Meck, who had been apprehended trying to escape from the ghetto. The valuables had belonged initially to Meck's parents. The Germans, after taking a decision to execute Meck, insisted that the gallows for the public hanging should be constructed by the Jewish police and that Jews were to carry out the execution. The police found two young Polish Jews, already in detention, who agreed to carry out the death sentence in return for their release.[9] Perhaps these unknown Polish Jews survived the war. If so, at what psychological cost? Survival is often associated with heroism or the sturdy spirit. But we need to recognize that, moving as they did in a hellish situation, survival for Jews in the ghetto, short-term and longer-term, might occur for different reasons. Sometimes, those who thought that they had a lifeline to survival were cruelly deceived. In one tragic case, the Blumenthal family were promised a safe journey to Switzerland via Berlin — only to be machine-gunned by the Gestapo in the vicinity of Kovno. This is one of the most depressing features in a generally bleak terrain.[10]

Surviving the Holocaust is a valuable source not only because of its first-hand account of life in the Kovno ghetto from 1941 until 1944, at which point the Germans destroyed the ghetto, but also because the diary entries are interleaved with official documents relating to its history. Furthermore, the diary and the documents have been provided with an impressive set of textual and historical notes by Dina Porat, which are an indispensable guide to the original sources.

Kovno was liberated by the Red Army in 1944. So too was the city of Lvov. During the previous three years, the Jews in that Ukrainian city had been subjected to the terror unleashed by the Germans. David Kahane's *Lvov Ghetto Diary* is an account of that period. In it there are parallels with Tory's impressions of the situation in Kovno. In Lvov, the surrounding Ukrainian population was as hostile towards the Jews

as were the Lithuanians in Kovno. Indeed, 'the chief virtue of the [*Lvov Ghetto Diary*] lies in its contribution to the historiography of one of the most bitterly disputed aspects of the Holocaust, namely the attitude of Ukrainians to Jews during that period'.[11] In the midst of general hostility, however, some evidence did emerge of succour and support. Among the good Samaritans, the 'most eminent figure ... was Metropolitan Sheptytsk'yi, the head of the Ukrainian Church'.[12] Kahane can be counted among the Jews whom this priest saved from death. Apart from shedding light on antisemitism among the Ukrainian population, the *Lvov Ghetto Diary* is therefore 'an important addition to the theme of the "Righteous Gentiles" in the literature on the Holocaust'.[13]

In the Ghetto, however, uncertainty usually prevailed and salvation came rarely: in Belzec, the camp to which Jews from Lvov were usually transported, there was the virtual certainty of death. In such circumstances how did Jews respond? Does a strategy for survival emerge from the diarist's observations? There was no simple pattern. Some tried to 'pass' as Aryans. But, as in every instance of 'passing', the danger of betrayal lurked ever-present. Kahane himself converted into a phoney Jewish policeman in order to survive. Some Jews went 'meekly' to their deaths. Why? Was it essentially meekness? Or did it reflect a positive decision taken in order to preserve the lives of those Jews who remained? Or is this image of sacrifice for the greater good a later commentator's gloss rather than a positive decision by those who experienced the events? In Lvov as in Kovno, complex decisions had to be taken for which even Jews, with a long history of persecution, were largely unprepared. Survival did not automatically result from strength: to the Germans such a quality in a Jew could be an incitement to murder. Death did not automatically follow from meekness. In this respect alone, memoirs from the wartime ghettos modify some commonly-held assumptions and stereotypes.

The accounts of Kovno and Lvov concentrate on the experiences of those Jews who felt the full immediate impact of German rule in occupied Europe. But what of the later years? Marc Bloch, a French historian who fell victim to the Nazis, wrote of history as a seamless garment and it would be dangerous to assume that the impact of the Holocaust ended with the collapse of Hitler's Germany in 1945. Lawrence Langer's *Holocaust Testimonies* is based upon the Fortunoff Video Archives for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University. These personal accounts, collected after 1945 from survivors, reveal the continuing trauma resulting from Nazi policy. However, Langer's major objective is not to expose the continuity of raw suffering but to insist upon the importance of oral testimony in helping to comprehend the complexities of the Holocaust. Oral evidence is presented as a source which is as valuable as narrative texts: such spoken material is described as particularly 'rich in spontaneous rather than calculated

effects'.[14] The process of writing about the Holocaust, the search for a word, the phrasing of a sentence, the historian's injunction to create coherence out of chaos, can affect the essence of what is under consideration. In short, Langer argues, not always in the most limpid of prose styles, that oral history is a vital ingredient in deromanticizing the survival experience. Rather than dwelling upon survival as a consequence of the strength of the human spirit, Langer suggests that it often depended upon a more complex process. The validity of this observation has already been underlined in considering the Kovno and Lvov diaries.

Langer's work reveals that the study of the Holocaust can benefit from the attention and analytical techniques of a literary scholar. Two works, Aaron Hass's *In the Shadow of the Holocaust. The Second Generation* and the re-issued book, *Generations of the Holocaust*, edited by Martin S. Bergmann and Milton E. Jucovy, serve as reminders that psychiatrists have also taken a keen interest in the Holocaust.

Survivors did not begin to receive legal and medical attention on any significant scale until the West German Government passed its Restitution Law in 1953, following which serious investigations began into 'the survivor syndrome'. Furthermore, an awareness that the Holocaust could exercise an impact on the children of the Holocaust survivors came only later. The Group for the Psychoanalytic Study of the Effect of the Holocaust on the Second Generation was established in 1974. The longer-term reactions to the Holocaust have been as complex as those which can be traced in centres such as Kovno and Lvov when the extermination programme was under way. Some survivors have continued to live as if another Holocaust hovered just over the horizon. Such lives have been seriously disturbed by this response. Others have survived through a process of repression, stamping out memories. Some survivors have adopted a strategy of sublimination, reading about the Holocaust, writing on it, working through the trauma. Such strategies have not necessarily been followed as conscious choices. Moreover, they are ideal-types: they can and do overlap. It is on such themes that *Generations of the Holocaust* concentrates. But, approaching the Holocaust from a different perspective, there is an additional valuable section on 'The Persecutor's Children' which studies the impact of the Holocaust on the children of the Nazis.[15]

Aaron Hass's book covers some of the same ground. It is a personal as well as a professional odyssey: 'I am forty-one years old . . . But I am foremost a child of an earlier era . . . Events that occurred fifty years ago, before my birth, follow me. Stories of these times, images before my eyes, evoke my most intense feelings of anger, fear and sadness. My parents, survivors of the Holocaust, raised me and shaped me'.[16] However, it is a survey based not on personal testimony but on interviews with 48 children of survivors, concentrating on the influence

of the Holocaust on their behaviour and the particular strategies they have pursued in their lives as a result of, and in response to, this legacy. As such, it is a useful complement to *Generations of the Holocaust* and is more accessible in its approach and style.

But Hass's book contains another theme. In noticing the differences between those Jews in America who did not have any direct contact with the Holocaust and those Jews who did, Hass emphasizes the need for a knowledge of the past to explain the present. In other words, the psychiatrist enters a plea for history: 'Only by learning about the past can we have some appreciation of what was lost, destroyed. And perhaps, only through knowledge of the Holocaust and our parents can those in the second generation fully understand themselves'.[17]

This observation carries us back to the beginning. Hass realizes the importance of the past. But so do the Revisionists. To the revisers of history, the past is an albatross which hampers their political activity; rather than remembering the past they are intent on demolishing it. There are, of course, commentators who refuse to take such Revisionism seriously. Indeed, there are those who avoid any attempt to deny the Revisionists' claims, arguing that by engaging with them one demeans oneself. But an accurate, historical record is important. So too is the defence and dissemination of such history. Any doubts on this score should be removed by one of the most chilling observations in this collection of works on genocide and the Holocaust. It comes from Hass. The conversation between two American undergraduates appears as follows: 'My parents went through the Holocaust in Europe'. 'Yeah, my parents probably had it just as tough. They went through the depression in the United States'.[18]

NOTES

[1] Faurisson was present at the meeting at Chelsea Town Hall. Leuchter was smuggled into Britain and gave a brief address before the police intervened in the proceedings. Both men were in the company of David Irving.

[2] See the discussion in Chalk and Jonassohn, pp. 19–21.

[3] A video, called 'Where shall we go?', has been made recently by Swing Bridge Video in Newcastle. It concentrates on survivors of the Holocaust and is intended for students aged 13 years and upwards. See below for a discussion of oral testimony on video which is analysed by Lawrence Langer. On film evidence generally, see Annette Insdorf, *Indelible Shadows. Film and the Holocaust*, second edition, Cambridge, 1990. *Sophie's Choice* and *Schindler's Ark* are among the better-known literary texts which relate to the Holocaust. A major new novel, whose importance has received almost instant recognition, is Louis Begley, *Wartime Lies*, London, 1991.

[4] See also the material in Alan Adelson and Robert Lapide, eds., *Lodz Ghetto. Inside a community under siege*, London, 1990.

[5] Abraham Tory, *Surviving the Holocaust. The Kovno Ghetto Diary*, Cambridge, Ma. and London, 1990, p. 417.

[6] Ibid., p. 445.
[7] Ibid., p. 446.
[8] Ibid., p. 318.
[9] Meck's last recorded words were: 'Brothers I forgive you. I know you were forced to do it. Give my love to my mother and sister' (ibid., p. 155). His mother and sister were executed by the Germans on the following day. It must be presumed that the valuables stayed in the pockets of the Germans. These incidents involving the Meck family are covered in entries for the period 15–19 November 1942 (ibid., pp. 154–57).
[10] See ibid., pp. 394–98. The entry is for 25 June 1943.
[11] See David Kahane, *Lvov Ghetto Diary*, Amherst, 1990, p. vii.
[12] Ibid. See also Shimon Redlich, 'Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsk'yi, Ukrainians and Jews during and after the Holocaust', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, vol. 5, no. 1, 1990, pp. 39–52.
[13] Kahane, op. cit. in Note 11 above, p. vii.
[14] Lawrence L. Langer, *Holocaust Testimonies. The Ruins of Memory*, New Haven and London, 1991, p. 129.
[15] One traumatic case involves the 'history of a daughter of a Nazi who, out of protest, married a Jew; but the husband's rigidity and sadism came close to being that of a Nazi. Therefore, she rebelled against him and refound her Nazi father': Martin S. Bergmann and Milton E. Jucovy, eds., *Generations of the Holocaust*, New York, 1990, p. 313.
[16] Aaron Hass, *In the Shadow of the Holocaust. The Second Generation*, London, 1991, p. 1.
[17] Ibid., p. 164.
[18] Ibid., p. 165.

BOOK REVIEWS

GARY A. ANDERSON, *A Time to Mourn, A Time to Dance: The Expression of Grief and Joy in Israelite Religion*, xvii + 139 pp., Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1991, £25.00.

The basic thesis of this comparatively small but erudite work is that (to quote the jacket blurb) 'in ancient Israelite culture (and later Jewish culture) mourning and joy as emotional experiences have visible behavioral components for both the individual and the community at large'. Stripped of the jargon, this presumably means that there are joyful and sorrowful periods during which the emotions of joy and grief are given expression in ritualistic patterns and these, unlike the emotions, can be commanded. For instance, a person who mourns over the death of a near relative is obliged to set aside seven days (the *shiva*) in which he or she is expected to *behave* in a mournful fashion. One would have thought this to be obvious and to apply to every culture, but the author traces these behavioural patterns in the Bible, drawing on both very early Akkadian literature (in which he is an expert and of which I must declare my ignorance) and on the very late Talmudic literature. He justifies his resort to this wide range of material by postulating that such patterns can be detected consistently in all three periods, stretching over two millennia. Indeed they can, but this might well be because they are universal.

The treatment of the Talmudic material, it must be said, leaves much to be desired. Let me give an illustration of how Anderson has misunderstood or misinterpreted his Rabbinic sources. Right at the beginning of the book (p. 2), Anderson quotes the Mishnah *Moed Qatan* 1:7 (*sic*, actually it is 1:5) where Rabbi Meir says: 'A man may gather together the bones of his father or his mother since this is for him an occasion for rejoicing'. But Rabbi Jose says: 'It is for him an occasion for mourning'. Anderson comments on this as follows:

> What is at issue is the ritual status of the mourner on the day of secondary burial, the day on which the dessicated bones of the deceased were gathered together for reburial. Is the individual to mourn or to rejoice on this day? The question strikes modern-day readers as unusual, for it presumes that an element of choice is involved. If one understands the terms for grief and joy in this rabbinic text as the inner feelings of the participants, then the text makes no sense. How can these two rabbis legislate how a person is to feel, especially with regard to the death of a parent? On the other hand, if the issue is seen as a question of how one is to behave, the legal debate is quite understandable.

Not the slightest indication is given that this Mishnah is concerned with whether the man who gathers the bones of his father or his mother may do this on the intermediate days of a festival (*ḥol ha-moed*) when mourning is forbidden. Rabbi Meir holds that he may gather the bones on this festive day since, after all, it is a source of rejoicing to him that his parent's bones are taken to be reburied in the family sepulchre, whereas Rabbi Jose holds that, at the time, the man's feelings of sorrow over the death of his parent are reawakened and the gathering of the bones is incompatible with the mood that ought to prevail on the festive day. There are thus two conflicting emotions in the breast of the man who gathers the bones; one, that of joy, compatible with the festive day of *ḥol ha-moed*, and the other, that of sorrow, incompatible with it. Rabbi Meir sees the emotion of joy as the dominant one, Rabbi Jose the emotion of sorrow. Or, possibly, Rabbi Meir holds that since there is an element of joy in the gathering of the bones the act is compatible with the day of joy while Rabbi Jose holds that since there is an element of sorrow, the gathering of the bones cannot be tolerated. This is the plain and only possible meaning of the passage in its context (in tractate *Moed Qatan* which is devoted to the laws of *ḥol ha-moed*). It is a behavioural passage but is about correct and incorrect conduct on *ḥol ha-moed* and is emphatically not, as Anderson seems to maintain, about whether the gathering of the bones as such is an occasion for joyous or sorrowful conduct.

Considerations of space do not allow further illustrations of misunderstanding. However, it is too much to expect a Biblical and Akkadian scholar also to be expert in the Talmud.

LOUIS JACOBS

ELIEZER BEN-RAFAEL and STEPHEN SHAROT, *Ethnicity, religion and class in Israeli society*, x + 287 pp., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, £32.50 or $39.50.

For a student of British society, the divisions engendered by geography, religion, and culture have always been seen as of secondary importance in comparison to the effect of class. Increasingly, however, the academic world, as well as practising politicians and journalists, have had to come to terms with the exigencies of a multi-cultural society. Geographic origin, skin colour, even language have made the concept of ethnicity significant and indispensable. In an open and democratic society, competition for scarce resources, material or symbolic, has provided the underlying dynamic of ethnic behaviour. Furthermore, it is not enough that society deems individuals to constitute a recognizable social group. Social organization with all that it implies for the group in terms of self-awareness and its ability to manipulate and

enforce social boundaries, is the *sine qua non* of ethnicity. I make no apologies for this instrumental view of social behaviour, nor, I hasten to add, do I impute any honour or dishonour to my working definition of ethnicity. It is a rational answer and an efficient means of surviving in a complex, differentiated society.

Israel also is an open and democratic society, and one where the electoral system as well as the composition of the population invite and exaggerate social divisions. Students of Israeli society, however, face an additional problem; the very existence of the state is predicated upon the ingathering of the Jewish Diaspora, and the fusion once more of a dispersed people into a united community. Conflict and disunity challenge not only the stability of the state but call into question the cohesion of the Jewish people.

The point of departure for this book is that divisions do indeed exist in Israeli society; they are public and manifold but not mutually reinforcing. Thus the coherency of an ethnic grouping is compromised by socio-economic differences; the latter variable is modified by the openness of class boundaries and the historical lack of an industrial working class. Religion becomes attenuated by levels of education and political choice swayed by the influence of neighbourhood, friendship, and occupation.

The authors argue that the sociological and cultural complexities of everyday life do not challenge the basic integrity of Israeli society. Despite the correlation between ethnic origin and socio-economic status (that is, Israelis of 'Afro–Asian' origin tend to occupy lower-status jobs), or the acrimonious debates between orthodox and secular Jews, the core identity of being an Israeli is accepted. The religious emphasis and the cultural nuances may be in dispute, but the essential component of Jewishness is not. This conclusion inevitably raises the problem of the position of citizens of Arab origin in Israel. Israeli Arabs account for about 18 per cent of the population. In all important spheres but the economy, they live separate lives; religion, language, and the concentration of Arab settlement geographically makes this large minority group parallel to — but unabsorbed in — modern Israeli society.

The growing aspirations of Jewish Israelis throughout the 40-odd years of the state are matched by those of their Arab fellow-citizens. Although given legal equality, and special judicial and community rights as well as basic municipal services, the problem of conflicting loyalties, of sympathy and even co-operation with external enemies, has kept Israeli Arabs from any meaningful cultural and ideological integration into Israeli society. The most obvious example is the absence of any obligation on their part to serve in the country's armed forces. The inclusion of a chapter on Israeli Arabs in this book appears almost as an afterthought and the research in depth that has obviously

gone into the study of the Jewish population is not evident here. The authors have tried to bring all the divisions in Israeli society within one coherent and unified theoretical framework, but Arab claims are different in quality and kind from those of the Jewish citizens. Arguably, the critical nature of Arab claims, from within Israel proper as well as the administered territories, cannot be adequately defined as constituting another category of ethnicity — 'ethnonationalism', as the authors call it (p. 5). Conflating ethnicity and nationalism confuses rather than simplifies in the best possible way two complex sets of socio-political behaviour.

The much-publicized malaise in Israeli political life, the inability of the government to take decisive measures in relation to the economy, the difficulties of absorbing Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and the lack of movement in the peace process (either towards territorial compromise or outright rejection of it) have not produced a *coup d'état* situation familiar in other new states undergoing change. This book demonstrates competently why this is so.

DAVID CAPITANCHIK

MOSHE DAVIS and YEHOSHUA BEN-ARIEH, eds., *With Eyes Towards Zion–III: Western Societies and the Holy Land*, xiv + 275 pp., Praeger Publishers, New York, 1991, $41.95.

In September 1975 a group of scholars met in Washington, D.C., to discuss aspects of the relationship between America and the Holy Land. The results of their labours appeared two years later under the title *With Eyes Towards Zion*, edited by Professor Moshe Davis, who at the end of the 1950s had moved from the Jewish Theological Seminary of America to teach American Jewish History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The volume which appeared in 1977 was followed by the America–Holy Land reprint collection of 72 volumes. A second colloquium, held in Jerusalem in 1983, resulted in a further collection of essays, *With Eyes Towards Zion–II* (1986). The third volume is the subject of the present review, and we are promised a fourth. The entire project is a testimony to the efforts of Professor Davis, who can claim with some justice to have initiated an entirely new area of historical research.

The fact that the study of the interface between Western societies and the Holy Land began in the United States is no coincidence. Professor Gershon Greenberg reminds us that the Puritans who settled in America regarded it as a new or perhaps even as an alternative 'Zion' — a promised land, sacred and Messianic. Spanish conquistadores had already supposed that American Indians might constitute the Ten Lost Tribes. Early Jewish migrants (particularly Reform Jews), whilst

avoiding such speculations, none the less agreed that America might indeed constitute a new Zion; the view taken by immigrants from Eastern Europe, that America was the *Goldene Medina* (the Golden Land) is well known.

Here, therefore, were the makings of a special relationship, which drew travellers from both North and South America to Palestine in the nineteenth century, and which was to form a basis of pro-Zionist sentiment in American Catholic as well as in American Protestant circles. In a wide-ranging examination of 'The Concept of the Holy Land in Iberoamerica', Leonardo Senkman (of the Hebrew University) draws attention to the pivotal role which Biblical tradition has played in Latin-American literature in the twentieth century, as reflected pre-eminently in the writings of Jorge Luis Borges. Senkman reminds us that a majority of Latin-American countries (13 out of 20) voted for the re-establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine in 1947 — the culmination of a long process of involvement by the more progressive elements in Latin-American society in cultural as well as in political activities that might be termed 'Zionist' in the broadest sense.

In Europe, interest in the Holy Land was re-awakened by the decline in Ottoman power in the early nineteenth century; international power politics, harnessed to religion, proved a powerful motor driving both governments and individuals to involve themselves in Palestine. Essays by Professor Erich Geldbach of Marburg and the late Dr Vivian Lipman complement each other in offering short expositions of British and German Protestant penetration of Palestine, more particularly through the establishment of the joint Anglo-Prussian Bishopric in Jerusalem in 1841. As Dr Lipman points out (p. 198), 'the Bishopric was aimed primarily at the conversion of the Jews'. Much British activity in nineteenth-century Palestine was indeed frankly conversionist in origin and character.

As well as offering accounts of Western involvement in the Holy Land, the volume contains essays surveying archival sources, and a stimulating account by Rupert Chapman (Executive Secretary of the Palestine Exploration Fund) of the archaeological dimension to the British relationship. In a purely bibliographical sense, the work is a model of how a collection of essays should be ordered and presented. The next volume is eagerly awaited.

GEOFFREY ALDERMAN

SAM N. LEHMAN-WILZIG, *Stiff-Necked People, Bottle-Necked System. The Evolution and Roots of Israeli Public Protest, 1949–1986* (Jewish Political and Social Studies series), ix + 213 pp., Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1990, $25.00.

Israeli social scientists increasingly voice apprehension in their books and articles at what they see as an attenuation of popular support for the rule of law. Politics is becoming largely a street activity, albeit one with its own rules governing the behaviour of protesters and police alike. Extra-parliamentary activity, it is alleged, is to be found among established social groups protesting against the long-time indifference of the government, as well as among the newly-arrived immigrants.

This book is concerned with political life within Israel proper and does not touch upon the years of turmoil in the occupied territories since the *intifada* (the Arab uprising). The brevity of the existence of Israel as a State and the comparative maturity of its political system make it possible to take an historical view of the political behaviour of its citizens. From such a perspective, one may discern the rise and fall in the frequency and vigour of public protest as well as note and try to explain the periodic nature of intense activity or passivity in political life. What marks Israel out from other Western-style democracies is the *ad hoc*, as opposed to institutionalized, form of much of the public protest. This and the transient nature of the groups involved distinguish the politics of protest from the politics of conventional interest-group behaviour.

Common to the findings in this book and other recent research into political protest is the non-violent character of Israeli protest and its failure, deliberate or otherwise, to challenge the prevailing status quo and the distribution of power in the Israeli State. *Ad hoc*, transient, and essentially non-violent, does protest serve any purpose other than providing a necessary outlet for the build-up of tensions to be found in all social relationships and societies? The author raises questions of a cultural heritage of protest, a Jewish 'political man' who carries and transmits culturally-acquired ideas and behaviour; a 'protest' gene perhaps which underlies a combative and disputatious national character. Indeed, a list of protest activities from Biblical times is given in Appendix A to support the theory of cultural transmission.

Far more persuasive, not least of all because it reinforces and echoes other research — most notably by Gadi Wolfsfeld in *The Politics of Provocation: Participation and Protest in Israel*, 1988 (reviewed in this Journal in vol. 31, no. 2, December 1989) — is the explanation which deals with the concrete structures of Israeli political life. Dr Lehman-Wilzig sums it up succinctly: '... systemic petrification constitutes an overriding long-term factor underlying Israeli extra-parliamentarism' (p. 125). In the face of a sclerotic bureaucracy and a secretive impenetrable political party organization, demonstrations and street

protests provide the only available options to express demands to government.

However, this reviewer is not persuaded that there is a culture of protest as described in the present book, although Dr Lehman-Wilzig correctly raises the methodological problems to be found in much of the comparative national surveys on conflict and protest. He draws attention to the difficulty of even defining what protest is, so that the term has a general applicability across frontiers and political systems. There is the problem of the reporting and of awareness that protests have indeed taken place. Thus, it is possible that protest activity has been significantly under-reported in the research literature and that protest in Israel is no more frequent than in other democratic Western-type societies.

In 1971, the function of the Ombudsman was added to the State Comptroller's Office. We are told that the Israeli Ombudsman 'receives a larger number of complaints than his counterparts overseas, not only proportional to the size of the population but even in absolute numbers' (p. 182). Surely this might indicate that when formal channels of complaint exist, Israelis will use them rather than, as the author suggests, that protest and complaint '... in part stem from the same culturally-based mentality'. Explanations of group behaviour which depend upon psychology or on cultural factors necessarily entail qualitative judgements. Dr Lehman-Wilzig's scrupulously researched book and his obvious intellectual integrity still fail, for this reader at any rate, to make a significant case for a cultural mind-set. Indeed, his conclusions reinforce the significance of the political system, its closure or openness to public demand, and the questionable validity of much of the quantitative data currently used in research on public protest.

DAVID CAPITANCHIK

YONATHAN SHAPIRO, *The Road to Power. Herut Party in Israel* (SUNY Series in Israeli Studies), translated by Ralph Mandel, vi + 208 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1991, n.p.

The party politics of the State of Israel have become a focal point of international relations. Any work which contributes to their elucidation has therefore much claim on one's attention. Professor Shapiro, who has already written much on this matter, has now produced a valuable account of the birth of Herut, the core of the contemporary Likud, and of its development until it became the governing party of Israel in 1977. It is not an easy book to read since Professor Shapiro is not much concerned with narrative — he omits any account of the role of the Irgun in the final period of the British Mandate; what he uses are

rather categories of explanation derived from the literature of sociology and political science concerning phenomena in countries far removed from Israel. The book is also in large part the study of a single personality, that of Menachem Begin; so psychology is also called into service.

Professor Shapiro holds the view that Herut must be seen in the first place as the product of the Zionist youth movement in Poland, the Betar, which based its ideology and style on that of other right-wing movements of protest in Europe between the wars, and notably upon those of the Polish nationalists headed by Jozef Pilsudski. Such parties despised mere pragmatism in the pursuit of economic and social objectives of a rational kind; they were instead devoted to the promulgation of myths and symbols which could overcome their followers' feelings of exclusion from the dominant élites of their time.

Politics of this order were brought to Israel by the immigrants from Poland and were given an even more martial aspect by their role in the Irgun. After the establishment of the State in 1948, Herut emerged from the Irgun and from the beginning it remained faithful to its roots in the Betar. One characteristic of parties of this kind has always been the leadership principle; Begin's capacity to impose himself and his close associates as the sole sources of authority in the party through all its vicissitudes until 1977 is given an important share in Professor Shapiro's analysis. What Begin did was to identify himself with the legacy of Zeev Jabotinsky by blurring their not inconsiderable differences over policy in the 1930s. He insisted — in a manner now familiar among Third World nationalist movements — that Israel had been created as a result of the armed struggle waged by the Irgun against the British and not as the product of a much more complex process rooted in the international configuration of the post-war world, successfully manipulated to Israel's advantage by Ben-Gurion and his colleagues in Mapai. Above all, Begin took on economic and social matters an anti-socialist and pro-capitalist stance likely to appeal to the groups in which his movement found the highest echo — those excluded from the positions of power and influence of upper middle-class professional people and intellectuals, from the aristocracy of the kibbutz movement deeply entrenched within the Haganah and its offspring the Israel Defence Forces, and finally from the bureaucracy of the Histadrut with its powerful instruments of patronage. However, Begin was sometimes prepared to compromise on economic matters, as when Herut eventually entered the Histadrut organization.

What was beyond question was Begin's belief in the validity of the claim that Israel must embody 'all Eretz Israel' — that is, the whole of the territory of the former British Mandate. Since, until the Six-Day War of 1967, there was no obvious means by which this dream could be realized, Herut's appeal was that of a party standing for a myth.

Meanwhile, between 1948 and 1967, Israel was in fact governed by a party of a very different kind — Mapai. It was different not only in its ideology but also in its structure, and unlike Herut it had its own organization at different levels operating both as the source of policies and as the link between the leadership and the electorate. In these circumstances, Israel, while not a one-party State, was undoubtedly a State with a dominant party, permanently in government and with no obvious prospect of losing that role. Immigrants — whether from Europe or from Asia and Africa — were on the whole absorbed into its following if not into its cadres, since most roads to settlement and advancement were in its hands. What changed the situation was the two wars; the Six-Day War made expansion towards 'the whole of Eretz Israel' possible (and indeed the first moves in that direction were made by a Mapai-led government) while the Yom Kippur War of 1973, because of the weaknesses it revealed in the political and military preparedness of the country, forced the dominant party to accept a further period of disarray and the substitution, however partial, of a new élite for the founding fathers. This loss of prestige and control by what became the Labour Party offered the opportunity to what became the Likud. Israel became a State mainly divided between two almost equal parties — of the Right and of the Left — which but for proportional representation might have swallowed up the remainder.

Professor Shapiro points out that it was only then that the allegiance of the bulk of the Sephardi population switched from Labour to Likud; the emphasis of the latter on the politics of status rather than on mere economic and social betterment produced a ready echo among groups who had found a less than cordial welcome from the previous ruling élite. Others may wish to follow up this exploration of the past and bring further elements into the picture, but at least we may now question the stereotypes of 'hawkish' Sephardim against 'doveish' Ashkenazim.

One's admiration for Professor Shapiro's learning is qualified by a curious error which he makes. He writes (p. 43) that in the 1920s 'it was already clear that the British government was in no rush to set up a Jewish state, notwithstanding its commitment to the League of Nations when it was awarded the Mandate for Palestine'. He had earlier also said (p. 14) that 'the British government was given a mandate by the League of Nations to help the Jews establish their own State in Palestine'. But this is quite incorrect. The Mandate made no mention of a 'Jewish State'; what it did was to enshrine in international law the original commitment of the British government in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Whatever the Zionists and some of their Gentile friends may have intended or hoped, there is no record that any of the Allied Powers — including Great Britain — who became members of the League of Nations were

committed to a Jewish State. Unless this is grasped, the history of the Mandatory period becomes unintelligible.

MAX BELOFF

GIDEON SHIMONI, ed., *The Holocaust in University Teaching*, xvi + 279 pp., Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York, 1991, £25.00 or $47.50.

This volume results from a gathering of scholars in Jerusalem in July 1988; they were brought together, under the auspices of the International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization, in order to discuss the teaching at university level of the Holocaust. The book reproduces the syllabi of 26 such courses, over half of them taught at various campuses in the USA, four at Israeli universities, three in Canada, and one each in Brazil, South Africa, and England. Additionally, the reader is offered short essays on the use of film and the visual arts in Holocaust teaching, and on the relationship which a course on the Holocaust might have to interdisciplinary studies and to theological analysis.

One is struck not simply by the variety of courses (which range from first-year undergraduate to doctoral level) but more especially by the differences of approach. At a non-sectarian Jewish-sponsored university in the United States, such as Brandeis, students come with some background in both Jewish and general history: the emphasis is clearly focused upon the Holocaust as a European phenomenon, the ultimate outcome of a sick culture in which (Professor Jick explains) Jews 'became the scapegoats *par excellence* for every ache and ill of European societies'. In the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, where most students are not Jewish and where a majority 'are of the first generation in their family to attend college', an attempt is frankly made — in the context of a carefully structured and stimulating survey of the Holocaust, its antecedents, and consequences — to confront students with the Christian view of the Jew, but also with the Holocaust as the ultimate expression of a racist discourse with which they may be assumed to be very familiar in the American South.

Jewish responses to the Holocaust feature in all the courses, but the strengths and weaknesses of these responses figure much more centrally in courses taught in Israel. The very title chosen by Dan Michman at Bar-Ilan University — 'Jewish Leadership under Nazi Domination' — serves to underline his course's critical, psychological approach. At the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Dalia Ofer devotes no less than seven of the 18 units of her course on 'Major Issues in the History of the Holocaust' to aspects of Jewish leadership. Dr Ofer's course is also remarkable in that it includes some consideration of the

uniqueness of the Holocaust, comparing the fate of the Jews with that of 'the Armenians prior to the Holocaust, the Gypsies during the Holocaust, the mass massacres in Biafra or Bangladesh, or the events connected with the Vietnam war'. The fate of the Armenians also forms a major part of the course entitled 'The Politics of Genocide', taught by Colin Tatz at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, in which the Holocaust is discussed alongside a depressingly long list of twentieth-century genocidal events,

Any academic contemplating a course on the Holocaust will be well advised to turn to this book, not only for the differences of treatment which it embraces, but also for its very comprehensive bibliographies and for the sample question-papers and course assignments which some of the course descriptions contain. Dr Shimoni has made a first-class job of editing and arranging the material. The clarity of the resulting volume is not the least of its virtues.

GEOFFREY ALDERMAN

NORMAN SOLOMON, *Judaism and World Religion* (Library of Philosophy and Religion series), xv + 295 pp., Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1991, £40.00.

At one level, this is yet another (expensive) guidebook on the attitudes of Judaism towards contemporary social, political, and philosophical issues, though rarely done with such aplomb. On a deeper level, however, the book is unique in considering how one can go about discovering such attitudes. This kind of search has to be engaged in by all religions, hence 'World Religion' in the title. As Rabbi Dr Solomon puts it (p. 1):

> The sources of our religions (Bible, Talmud, Church fathers, Quran, and the like) were all set down in writing in a world very different from ours. How can we extrapolate from them to our present circumstances? Even if we were people of perfect faith within our respective communities, ready and eager and obedient and wanting nothing better than to decide about conservation, or the welfare state, or the politics of the Near East or the Third World debt problem, on the basis of our traditions, how is it possible to do so?

In other words, solutions for Jews, taken directly from the Talmud on, say, economic questions (this is often undertaken, nowadays) are bound to be bogus solutions since, apart from the difficulty of determining what the Talmud has to say, the ancient Rabbis lived in a society far less complex and less global than ours. If, for instance, the Talmud speaks of strikes (and this is a little hard to discover) there is not much guidance here for society today since, in Talmudic times, there was little organized labour and nothing resembling the capitalist

systems after the Industrial Revolution. With this caveat in mind all the time, Dr Solomon explores attitudes towards conservation; the ethics of commerce; liberation theology; the problem of wealth distribution; religion and state; the doctrine of the Messiah; the Holocaust and the problem of suffering; the use of religious language; and the diversity of faiths.

On these and other themes arising out of them, the author is constantly aware that he is treading a tightrope between reverence for the past and the need for progress; between Jewish particularism and Jewish universalism; between loyalty to one's own religion and not only tolerance but a measure of acceptance of other religions as in some way legitimate. Naturally in such an enterprise, especially with regard to Judaism and other religions and religious language in general, there are the twin dangers of relativism and synchronism, dangers which, on the whole, Solomon manages to avoid. But occasionally, he seems to go too far, as when he remarks (p. 208) that the denial of a personal deity by Theravada Buddhists is no stronger than that of Maimonides. For all Maimonides' doctrine of negative attributes, his God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as well as the God of the philosophers. Solomon is very courageous in his reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Messiah as a model for the hope of, and working for, world betterment rather than as an event soon to take place. But when he observes (p. 159) that 'in all probability earth, and people with it, will continue to exist for hundreds or even *thousands more millions of years*' (italics mine), one is entitled to ask how he can be confident about the probability. Some of us have an open mind on the whole question of whether or not God will intervene directly to bring human history to its culmination, perhaps in the very near future. It certainly does not follow logically that because we now know about the great age of the universe and the creatures who inhabit it, theological postulates about the time scale of the future have to be abandoned entirely. And while his calling attention (p. 215) to the fact, based on linguistic analysis (in which field he is obviously competent), that creeds have many functions other than truth claims, very few believers of every faith would agree that 'it is unclear that they carry truth claims at all'.

A book of this scope has remarkably few errors but the following should be corrected in a subsequent edition. The criterion of length is applied not to the 'orders' of the Mishnah (p. 2) but to the tractates within the orders. 'Gaonim' (p. 26) should be 'Geonim'. The Talmudic expression *bnei aliyah* is better translated as 'those who belong on high' rather than (p. 137) 'those who go upwards'. Most scholars hold that the Rav Hillel who declared 'There is no Messiah for Israel' is not the same person as 'Hillel II' (p. 140) responsible for fixing the calendar. The debate in the Tosefta on whether Gentiles have a share in the World to Come is between Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer, not

(p. 231) Rabban Gamaiel II. It is not accurate to state that the Noahide law against eating a limb torn from a living animal 'covers cruelty to animals' (p. 255) since this law is held by the Rabbis to be 'Biblical' — whereas it is debated in the Talmud whether cruelty to animals is 'Biblical' or only 'Rabbinic'. The transliteration on p. 271 should be *hearot* not *he-Arot*. But these are very minor matters and in no way affect the close argument of this valuable book of great interest and importance not only for modern Jews but for religious people of all faiths.

LOUIS JACOBS

BERNARD WASSERSTEIN, *Herbert Samuel. A Political Life*, xvi + 427 pp., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, £45.00.

Bernard Wasserstein has put us all in his debt by producing the first full-length biography of the Liberal statesman, Herbert Samuel, and by doing so on the basis of prolonged search among the archives which this most meticulous of politicians left behind him, as well as other sources, for a career that touched at many different junctures the high politics of the United Kingdom and its Empire and the concerns of Anglo-Jewry. By subtitling the book 'A Political Life', Professor Wasserstein would appear to suggest that his subject-matter is in some respect limited and that it would be possible to extend it to include Samuel's personal life; but he gives no reason to believe that from the time that Samuel went up to Oxford, to Balliol College, in 1889 to the date when he gave the first-ever party political television broadcast in 1951, the well-being of the *res publica* was not the central concern of his daily being. What is true is that few people if any could claim to get behind the public man and envisage the personality that lay behind it. Certainly the contemporary penchant for exploring the sexual dimension gets little purchase on someone so close to his own family and so rigid and unbending on moral issues.

It is not the case that Samuel was lacking in passion or immune from internal conflict. His decision to give up his family's Orthodox Jewish observance — after all Balliol's efforts to make sure that he was supplied with kasher food! — and his eventual gradual acceptance of at least formal adhesion to the Jewish faith and its embodiment in the synagogue (partly in deference first to his mother and then to his wife) was obviously a difficult one. As Professor Wasserstein rightly reminds us, such a religious crisis was not infrequent among late Victorians of an orthodox Christian background. It is certainly the case that his adoption of the Zionist cause took his political colleagues by surprise; it was the fruit of much study and reflection and was a passionate affair — one that, when he embarked upon it, could hardly redound to his own self-advancement which unfriendly critics believed to be the basis of all his actions.

Professor Wasserstein is disinclined to see Samuel's Zionism as a reaction to the antisemitism of the pre-1914 years in English politics; it certainly antedated the Marconi crisis and the endeavour by the odious Hilaire Belloc to connect him with the improprieties of some of his political associates. He points out that Belloc's latest biographer, Mr A. N. Wilson, revives the accusation — which is a little like still believing in the guilt of Captain Dreyfus. Professor Wasserstein is particularly good in showing how two members of the Anglo-Jewish cousinhood with the same involvement in the 'New Liberalism' — Samuel himself and Edwin Montagu — could take up such radically different positions about the Zionist phenomenon. The problem of Jewish identity in an environment which makes assimilation possible has rarely been so well set out. Whatever Samuel's opponents might say, it was not a case of putting Jewish feelings first: he showed scant sympathy for Russian Jews in England who were not prepared to fight for Tsarist Russia and who would refuse to be enrolled in a British army fighting on Russia's side.

On the other hand, Samuel was of course regarded as a Jew — the first member of the Jewish faith to sit in a British cabinet — and that could always be used by his opponents. This was notably the case with Lloyd George, whose own sympathies with Zionism did not prevent him from making wounding remarks of an antisemitic character about Samuel during the long and sordid dying throes in the 1930s of the old Liberal Party. Yet Samuel's faults were not those of excessive and flamboyant conduct or appearance so often associated with Jews in Western Gentile societies. On the contrary, his coldness and remoteness were what made him a figure who might be admired but was rarely loved or even very much liked.

Professor Wasserstein has dealt elsewhere and at greater length with Samuel's period as High Commissioner in Palestine (1920–25). He asks, as others have done, whether in the end it was a benefit to the aspirations of the Zionists to send a Jew to that vital post. I am inclined to agree with him that whatever may be said about Samuel's handling of problems which he faced, it was his prestige in England which prevented the whole British involvement in Palestine being terminated in 1924, when the reaction against Britain's commitments in the Middle East reached its peak. On one issue which is still of political significance, the author is again correct in dismissing the notion that Transjordan was ever part of what the British had had in mind as constituting Mandatory Palestine with its commitment to a Jewish National Home or that the setting up of the Emirate of Transjordan was somehow to subtract from that commitment. But it is a pity that he makes this point only in a footnote (p. 263) and does not refer his readers to Avi Shlaim's *Collusion Across the Jordan*, which enables one to grasp the other side of the equation.

It is important to realize that Samuel's involvement with matters of specifically Jewish interest — immigration, Palestine, and the rescue of German Jews in the 1930s — were only episodes in a career of which the core was his contribution to the 'New Liberalism' of the era of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith and the part he played in its eventual replacement by a Labour Party of socialist rather than meliorist convictions and policies. It was the Liberal temperament and the Liberal belief that all men are rational and that therefore they should always be able to agree on matters of dispute or at least come to a compromise which explains Samuel's successive setbacks — his over-optimism about getting Jews and Arabs to agree in Palestine; his failure to bring about a just solution to the problems of the mining industry in the 1920s; his willingness to go along with 'appeasement' in the 1930s: all are of a piece. And this admirable work gives us the material for following Samuel's career in these terms. Samuel's later writings on 'philosophy' must be regarded primarily as a way of putting across the ideas which had guided him during a life mainly and most satisfactorily filled with action.

Professor Wasserstein presents this long story effectively and sometimes eloquently. The illustrations, both photographs and political cartoons, are well chosen. A map would have been helpful, so too would have been the inclusion in the bibliography (confined to manuscript sources) of a list of the books and articles referred to in the footnotes. Much care has been taken over detail, but a few slips have crept in: King Albert of the Belgians was nephew, not brother, of Leopold II of Congo ill-fame (p. 237); Edward Grey's title was Viscount Grey of Fallodon (not Falloden, p. 247 fn.); and the French High Commissioner in Syria was Henri de Jouvenel (not Bertrand de Jouvenel, p. 353 fn.). But such trifles do not detract from one's pleasure in a remarkable achievement — a most absorbing book.

MAX BELOFF

CORRESPONDENCE

Letter to the Editor from Professor Robert Wistrich

Though in normal circumstances I would not respond to a book reviewer's opinion, Professor Geoffrey Alderman makes a number of statements in his review of my *Antisemitism. The Longest Hatred* (*JJS*, December 1991) that necessitate a reply. Quoting the medieval historian Gavin Langmuir's generalizations (to my mind greatly exaggerated) about some Jewish historians making selective use of history 'to further the interests, identity, or religion of a particular group', he suggests that in the book under review I have fallen into this pitfall. But Professor Alderman provides no evidence whatsoever to support this claim which is as mistaken as it is impertinent. The fact is, as Professor Alderman should know, that a book published by Thames Television and aiming to inform the broadest public has no brief for any sectarian interests, nor do I personally have any hidden agendas beyond that of a professional historian seeking to unravel the complex history of antisemitism. Indeed, none of the various non-Jewish critics who dealt with the book suggested any such thing and some, like the reviewer in the *Catholic Herald*, specifically praised its objectivity. To confuse the issue, Professor Alderman refers to a complaint in a British Muslim paper about one misquote from the Koran made by an Israeli expert in Part 3 of the Thames Documentary Television series of the same name. He relies here on a brief *Jewish Chronicle* report. The facts are these: Ehud Ya'ari, the highly respected Israeli TV commentator on Arab affairs, quoted from memory a sentence from the Koran about the Jews as 'the sons of snakes'. The offending passage — less than ten seconds of TV time — was subsequently removed and an apology was made by Thames. However, the actual Koranic passage which he was thinking of (Sura 5:60/65) refers to the penalty of God's wrath for the unbelievers of the Children of Israel — that they will become apes and swine — scarcely less offensive to Jews! More importantly, though, the error is not to be found in my book and therefore Alderman's reference to it strikes me as both misleading and irrelevant.

Professor Alderman goes on to question whether Arab or Palestinian opposition to Zionism should be regarded as antisemitic in any degree. To this effect he even quotes me as pointing out that some Palestinian intellectuals reject Zionism for reasons unconnected with anti-Jewish sentiments and then, using this, he reproaches me for including a chapter about 'The Question of Palestine' in my book. But this is

disingenuous. Most of that chapter is about the inability of the Arab masses to distinguish between Jews and Zionists; about the infiltration of European-style antisemitic myths into Palestinian anti-Zionism (the Mufti of Jerusalem, etc.) and only at the end do I point out (as objectivity demands) that some Palestinians have successfully liberated themselves from this incubus.

At this point it is instructive to look back to Professor Alderman's earlier review (*JJS*, June 1991) of a volume edited by me, entitled *Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the Contemporary World* (Macmillan, 1990) which was considerably fairer, more accurate and indeed competent. There he writes (p. 45) of 'the depth and breadth of the divide that separates the Islamic world from an acceptance of the legitimacy of Jewish nationhood and hence of the re-establishment of a Jewish State'. He agrees that Jews are portrayed in Islamic literature as 'the evil geniuses behind the perceived weakening and undermining of Islamic power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' (p. 45). Nor does he have any difficulties in accepting that we are dealing with 'an unedifying legacy that has managed to transform itself from anti-Judaism through antisemitism to the Holocaust on the one hand or to an insidious but purposeful anti-Zionism on the other' (p. 45). I could not put it better myself! But the Alderman of December 1991, reviewing the same author on a similar subject in the same journal at an interval of about six months, is beside himself at the thought that we might be dealing with variants of one hatred. This, I submit, is a case of Alderman versus Alderman!

But there are more oddities to come. For Professor Alderman asserts that I am 'remarkably diffident' about Eastern Europe, whatever that might mean. He ignores the fact that two of the longest and most outspoken chapters in the book deal with contemporary Russia and Poland. He further complains that I barely refer to the 'grave political misjudgements' made by Jewish leaders in Austria–Hungary between 1867 and 1914 (*JJS*, December 1991, p. 120). According to Professor Alderman, the fault of these unnamed Jewish leaders is that they allowed Jewish minorities in Galicia and Bukovina 'to be used by Vienna as counterweights to various emergent and predominantly Slav nationalisms . . .'.

Now there are so many confusions and simplifications here that it is difficult to know where to begin. The only grain of truth in it is that liberal Jews in Vienna preferred Jews all over the Monarchy to align with mainstream German culture. This found a strong echo in Bukovina among the Jews themselves (where it was not incompatible with a strong sense of Jewish ethnicity and an independent Jewish politics). In eastern Galicia, too, a German cultural orientation survived until the First World War and again, this was a region where Jewish nationalism was relatively well developed. But Polish pressures

for assimilation had to be accommodated in Galicia and Jewish leaders, especially in the western part of the province, did try to meet this demand as best they could. In my view they cannot be blamed for the growing intransigence of Polish nationalism which after 1918 released its full fury against the Jewish minority, no longer protected by the shield of the relatively liberal Habsburg State.

This brings me to the most disturbing feature of Professor Alderman's general stance and the one point of consistency in his two reviews. Already in June 1991 he bemoaned the fact that Jewish historians refuse to accept the 'objective validity' of antisemitic prejudice (p. 47). Apparently, he feels that there is a book to be written about the Jewish 'contribution' to antisemitism, about how some Jews by their practices and behaviour reinforce it. I confess openly, at the risk of being accused by Professor Alderman of pandering to ethno-centrism, that I seriously doubt the value of this whole approach. Indeed, I feel a distinct chill down my spine when I read Alderman's assertion in the second review that antisemitism in Russia 'cannot fully be understood without grasping the part played by Jews in the implementation of Stalinism'. This is exactly what the antisemites in Russia and Eastern Europe today (indeed all over the world), just like the Nazis before them, have always claimed. It was even one of the more vicious rationalizations of the Holocaust. To blame the Jews for Communism is as pernicious a myth as the familiar canard that most Jews are wealthy, or represent an economic threat, or undermine Christian beliefs, or for that matter always favour Jewish interests at the expense of the Gentiles. The point of my book was to show that antisemitism is a pure ideology, a set of beliefs which exists independently of what Jews believe, of their practices and their behaviour. It has been built up over centuries by an accumulation of superstitions, myths, and irrational fears into a paranoid world-view that no longer requires real Jews in order to pursue its fantasies. It is regrettable that Professor Alderman failed to address this central thread in my book and chose instead to follow his own private obsessions into what I believe is a blind alley.

Professor Geoffrey Alderman replies:

I welcome the decision to publish the letter from Professor Wistrich arising from my review of his book *Antisemitism. The Longest Hatred*, and I am grateful for the opportunity to reply to the criticism he has made.

Any book about antisemitism which claims serious attention must maintain, throughout, a clear distinction between anti-Judaism (opposition to Judaism as a theological creed), antisemitism (non-rational prejudice against Jews), and anti-Zionism (opposition to the concept of national self-determination for the Jewish people). Not the least virtue of Professor Gavin Langmuir's work is that these distinctions are not

merely recognized but applied. Professor Wistrich's *Antisemitism* seems to me deficient in this respect.

It is true that, in his Introduction (p. xvi), Professor Wistrich admits 'there is clearly a danger in using antisemitism in this overly generalised way', by which he means a term 'in general usage as denoting *all* forms of hostility towards Jews and Judaism throughout history' (emphasis as in the original). I have to say that I can find very little recognition of this evident pitfall in the body of the work. But my reservations about the book go further than this. That Professor Wistrich wrote a book 'aiming to inform the broadest public' is entirely laudable. However, it it precisely because he wrote a book aimed at the broadest public that there was a duty upon him to explore and explain all forms of anti-Jewish prejudice, and to do this in a balanced way. My concern is not so much with his objectivity as with his selectivity.

I turn first to his chapter, 'The Question of Palestine'. I admit at once (as I did in my June 1991 review of the book of essays edited by Professor Wistrich, *Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the Contemporary World*) that the movement for the re-establishment of a Jewish State has resulted in an ugly, Islamic antisemitic discourse.[1] That does not mean that Islamic or Arab opposition to Zionism should be defined in simplistic terms as anti-Jewish. In Palestine, tragically, two nationalisms compete for control of the same area of land — as they do, tragically, in Northern Ireland. We might characterize these conflicts as tribal; we would be ill-advised if we portrayed them as racial, or even as fundamentally religious (the great Irish nationalist patriot C. S. Parnell was a Protestant). I must remind Professor Wistrich that before 1945 many prominent Jews were vehemently anti-Zionist; he must know their names as well as I do. If Professor Wistrich regards anti-Zionism as a form of anti-Jewish prejudice, 'The Question of Palestine' ought to have included some discussion of Jewish anti-Zionism. Why didn't it?

I never accused Professor Wistrich of misquoting the Koran; I merely referred to its alleged (and apparently admitted) misquotation in one of the television programmes with which publication of the book was associated. But I must warn Professor Wistrich that there are dangers in relying exclusively upon passages from the Koran as evidence for any allegation that Islam is, has always been, and must be intrinsically antisemitic. The passages which he quotes (at pp. 199–200 of his book) can only be understood in the context of the time at which they were written, and the historical circumstances from which they arose. What would Professor Wistrich say to an Islamic scholar who condemned Judaism as racist and quoted, in support of this view, the well-known passage from the Passover service, 'Pour out Your wrath upon the nations that know You not, and upon the kingdoms that call

not upon Your name . . .'? This game we can all play, but it can lead only to misunderstanding and bitterness.

I turn now to Eastern Europe. Nothing that Professor Wistrich says in his letter of protest negates the validity of what I wrote in my review. I admit at once that the relevant chapters in the book are outspoken. But I put it to Professor Wistrich that they are also unbalanced. What Professor Wistrich has done is to extract, from an exceedingly complex web of political, social, and economic history, those episodes which lend greatest colour to the sense of controlled outrage he wished to convey. I maintain that an important element in the formation of anti-Jewish prejudice in post-Habsburg Eastern Europe was the remembered history of Jewish complicity in maintaining Habsburg control of these lands before the Great War. Let me cite the case of Dr Benno Straucher, a leader of Bukovinan Jewry (elected in 1897 as deputy at the Vienna *Reichsrat* for Czernowitz) whose alliance with the Germans and the Ruthenes (*c.* 1907) had as one of its aims the thwarting of Polish electoral ambitions in the Bukovina. In Bohemia and Moravia the Jews proudly identified themselves as Monarchists (by which was also meant the maintenance of control from Vienna), even as Habsburg rule was visibly crumbling during the First World War. Their preference for German culture — and German nationality — was to have a predictable effect on elements of the Czech nationalist movement in the inter-war period. Todd Huebner, of Columbia University, New York, in a study of nationality conflict in the Czech lands, cites one leader of German Jewry in Prague, in 1921, as declaring that he would rather his followers abandoned Judaism than their German nationality.[2] What effect does Professor Wistrich believe such sentiments might have had upon the newly-established Czech state?

And so I come to what I take it is the fundamental purpose of Professor Wistrich's protest, namely to launch an attack upon my view that some — I stress 'some' — Jews, by their conduct, have fostered anti-Jewish prejudice. The evidence for this is overwhelming. As an historian, it is not my business to 'blame' Jews for Communism. But I am entitled to assert that antisemitism in Russia cannot be fully understood without grasping the part played by Jews in the implementation of Stalinism. As an historian, it is not my business to blame Russians for blaming Jews for the evils of Stalinism. But I am entitled to argue that, because Jews were prominent in the promulgation of Stalinism, anti-Jewish prejudice was intensified. It is no business of the historian to make moral evaluations: but it is his business to explain. No explanation of antisemitism in the USSR is complete that does not make reference to the part played by Jews in the operationalization of Leninist–Stalinist ideology.

I did not, in my review, make any reference to chapter 9 of Professor Wistrich's book, entitled 'Britain: The Limits of Tolerance'. Here, in

just 13 pages of text, Professor Wistrich attempts an overview of anti-Jewish prejudice in Britain without once mentioning the fact that Jews, in a variety of ways, have aided and abetted the development and persistence of such prejudice. He alludes to the agitation that resulted in the passage of the Aliens Act in 1905, but makes no reference to Jewish support for the agitation and for the Act: why not?[3] He alludes to the post-1918 campaign by the *Morning Post*, which claimed that foreign Jews were purveyors of Bolshevism, but makes no reference to Jewish support for this campaign: why not?[4] He alludes, in the context of a cursory examination of inter-war anti-Zionism, to the allegation that Jews harboured dual loyalties, but omits to mention that this allegation was supported by some very prominent British Jews, such as C. G. Montefiore when President of the Anglo–Jewish Association and Neville Laski when President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews: why not?[5] He alludes to the antisemitism of the British Union of Fascists, but makes no reference to the fact that some of the complaints made by Gentiles against Jews in East London, and which the BUF exploited to the full (for example, that the Jewish Board of Guardians in London supplied blackleg labour to break strikes, and that Jewish retailers systematically abused the privilege of Sunday trading by trading on Saturday as well as Sunday) were undoubtedly true: why not?[6]

I must add that I am deeply concerned about Professor Wistrich's selective use of evidence to support his contentions. Dealing with anti-Jewish prejudice in post-1945 Vienna, Professor Wistrich notes critically (p. 92 of his book) that the argument was frequently heard that 'special treatment' of Jews must be ruled out as a form of 'racism in reverse'. But I can point to an article, written in 1944 and published in the *Review* of the Anglo–Jewish Association, in which a very similar argument was put forward as the right policy for *Jews* to follow once Nazism had been defeated.[7] Elsewhere, Professor Wistrich seems to me to descend from history into speculation. We are told that at the time of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Arabs congratulated Eichmann for having liquidated six million Jews, and that Ahmad Shukeiry, the first leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, 'might well have identified with this kind of thinking' (book, p. 247). Well, Professor Wistrich, either Mr Shukeiry did so identify, or he didn't; speculation of this sort should have no place in a scholarly work.

In conclusion, I want to ask Professor Wistrich this question: why, in writing his book, did it apparently not occur to him that the question of a Jewish contribution to anti-Jewish prejudice needed to be addressed — even if, at the end of the day, he were to have decided that the allegation was without foundation? Professor Wistrich, in his letter, talks of 'irrational fears' as a concomitant of antisemitism; it does not seem to have occured to him that rational fears might also have been

and be a concomitant. In writing his book, and particularly in writing his book for 'the broadest public', I submit that Professor Wistrich had a duty, as an historian, to address this highly sensitive aspect of what he and I can probably agree is a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon. This duty he avoided.

Antisemitism (in short) is not just 'a pure ideology, a set of beliefs which exists independently of what Jews believe, of their practices and their behaviour'. Rather, neither antisemitism, nor anti-Judaism, nor anti-Zionism can be fully and comprehensively understood without reference to and consideration of Jewish beliefs, behaviour, and practices. It is not sufficient for Professor Wistrich to dismiss this approach as 'a blind alley', and I must in my own defence protest at his characterization of my views, which can be fully supported by reference to empirical data, as 'private obsessions'. Methinks Professor Wistrich doth protest too much.

NOTES

[1] Geoffrey Alderman, 'The Roots of Anti-Jewish Prejudice', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 33, no. 1, June 1991, pp. 43–48. In his letter of complaint, Professor Wistrich refers to and quotes from this article. I must point out that none of his quotations refer to remarks made by me about his own contribution to the volume he edited, and that my reference to 'an unedifying legacy that has managed to transform itself from anti-Judaism through antisemitism to the Holocaust on the one hand or to an insidious but purposeful anti-Zionism on the other' was made specifically in the context of Rabbi Dr Norman Solomon's essay on 'The Christian Churches on Israel and the Jews'.

[2] T. Huebner, 'Nationality Conflict in the Czech Lands, 1918–1921: Jews between Czechs and Germans', p. 14. (Paper presented to the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies held at Harrogate, 22 July 1990.)

[3] The evidence is in G. Alderman, *The Jewish Community in British Politics*, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 69–73.

[4] G. Alderman, *London Jewry and London Politics, 1889–1986*, Routledge, 1989, pp. 64–65.

[5] 'An Englishman of the Jewish Faith' (C. G. Montefiore), 'Zionism', *Fortnightly Review*, November 1916, p. 823; Archives of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, C11/10/2: Memorandum by Laski on the World Jewish Congress, 6 January 1937.

[6] Alderman, *London Jewry*, pp. 91–94.

[7] E. F. Q. Henriques, 'Aryanisation', *Anglo-Jewish Review*, no. 1, September 1944, p. 19.

Rejoinder from Professor Wistrich:

Professor Alderman's reply to my letter mistakenly suggests that I consider Arab or Islamic opposition to Zionism as racial or as

fundamentally religious. Of course I am aware of those elements in Arab anti-Zionism which are independent of antisemitism and explain them in some detail in the book. On the other hand, there is very definitely such a thing as anti-Jewish prejudice in the Arab world and I am glad to see that Alderman now concedes this to be the case. Jewish anti-Zionism is an interesting subject and Professor Alderman should be pleased to know that I am currently writing a book about this topic. But it would have been wholly irrelevant to have included it in the present book.

Professor Alderman's warning about presenting the Koran as antisemitic is equally pointless since nowhere do I say anything so simplistic. My point is that fundamentalists selectively and one-sidedly use the Koran to inflame anti-Jewish feelings today, so Alderman's strictures should be addressed to them and not to myself.

Professor Alderman is no authority on Austro–Hungarian Jewry or East Central European Jews between the wars as his remarks once again illustrate. Does he seriously believe that Poles after 1918 cared about Straucher's 1907 alliance in Bukovina with Germans or Ruthenians — there were far more important and pressing factors that explain their antisemitism and I make them clear in my book. Again, Professor Alderman seems unaware that antisemitism had substantially declined in the post-1918 Czech Republic and the older charges that Jews were a 'Germanizing' element had ceased to have much political importance. Nor do I know any historian who would take seriously Professor Alderman's claim, as originally stated, about the role of Jews in Stalinism being a major cause of Soviet antisemitism. If he is now merely arguing that it may have intensified anti-Jewish prejudice, then that is another matter but it means he has changed his ground.

Within the narrow limits of space alloted to me here I can hardly be expected to answer Professor Alderman's new litany of assertions about Britain in any detail. But once again, what strikes me is their extraordinary irrelevance. They illuminate precisely nothing about British antisemitism! What relation, moreover, is there between a 1944 article in the *Anglo–Jewish Review* and antisemitism in post-war Austria? Precisely none. Professor Alderman should read Robert Knight's research on this topic, which I mention, before he exonerates Austrian attitudes to Jews in this convoluted fashion.

Professor Alderman's suggestion that I engage in 'speculation' about Ahmad Shukeiry is itself purely speculative and out of place in his review. Shukeiry called for what amounted to the genocide of Israeli Jews and has long since been disowned even by the P.L.O. Does Alderman want to rehabilitate him, too? Obviously Professor Alderman and I totally disagree on the Jewish 'contribution' to antisemitism. To me it is no different from talking about the black 'contribution' to

white racism or the female 'contribution' to male chauvinism. However, Professor Alderman is free to pursue this line of research which he deems so vital, though I note in passing that he has not one word of criticism for Professor Langmuir's neglect of this topic. It would appear that only Jews are expected by Professor Alderman to accuse themselves for having been persecuted by others.

Finally, I must object to Professor Alderman's pontification about my 'duty, as an historian'. This kind of posturing surely does no service to serious intellectual debate.

Editor of The Jewish Journal of Sociology:

This correspondence is now closed.

CHRONICLE

The Fall 1991 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that 20,000 Norwegians contributed more than one million dollars to help Israel absorb Soviet immigrants. 'The funds were raised through an organization ... which incorporates four Christian and two Jewish organizations. Some of that money was forwarded to Tel Aviv University to retrain immigrants and prepare them to teach physics in Israeli secondary schools'. There are now 32 trainees (who obtained M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in physics in the former Soviet Union) learning Hebrew, Jewish History, and Israeli teaching methods in order to qualify for teachers' certificates. 'Israel has been short of qualified physics teachers, and schools have assigned biologists and mathematicians to teach physics. The Norwegian-aided program will make it possible to fill positions with qualified physicists to teach the subject ....'

That same issue of *Tel Aviv University News* includes two pages (pp. 40–41) dealing with the problem of Jewish divorce in Israel. The Dean of the University's Faculty of Law, Professor Ariel Rosen-Zvi, the author of a book entitled *Familial Law in Israel: Between Sacred and Secular*, is said to be religiously observant but to have 'few kind words to say about the conduct of the rabbinical courts', which now increasingly disqualify non-Sabbath-observant witnesses to marriages. 'Women in particular come out the losers in the process of rabbinical entrenchment .... husbands seeking to remarry are often granted permission on grounds that would not have satisfied the rabbinate had the applicant been a woman'.

Professor Rosen-Zvi advocates the establishment of a family court to avoid 'the continuous battle of sacred-secular authority'. 'Alimony, for example, is the province of both courts, and a woman may choose where to sue. From 1960 to 1986, alimony claims in civil courts have increased twentyfold, as opposed to a threefold increase in the rabbinical courts, which are notorious for setting lower allowances'.

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The September-December 1990 issue of *La Rassegna Mensile di Israel* (received in London in January 1992) is a publication of the Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiana; it consists mainly of articles about the perception of the Jew in the Italy of the 1980s and includes reports on research among students in Milan and in Venice. This issue of *La Rassegna* also has an announcement (on page 568) about the Ninth Congress of the Associazione Italiana per lo Studio del Giudaismo (AISG) which will be held from 20 to 24 September 1992; detailed information about the programme of the congress can be obtained from the secretary of the Ninth Congress AISG, Dipartimento di Medievistica, Via Derna 1, I-56126, Pisa, Italy.

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CHRONICLE

The Spring 1992 issue of Jews' College newsletter, *College News*, announces that 'from October 1992 students will be able to study part-time for their University of London Bachelor of Arts degree. By spreading the course over five years of study, the College hopes to widen access to many new groups of potential students who are unable to study full time'. Details can be obtained from Jews' College, Albert Road, London NW4 2SJ (telephone: 081-203 6427). The College also will provide part-time study programmes for an M.A. in Jewish Studies as well as for an Advanced and Post-graduate diploma in Jewish Studies (three years, part-time, day or evening) and for a Certificate in Higher Jewish Studies (one or two years part-time day).

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The Autumn 1991 issue of *Les nouveaux cahiers* (no. 106), a publication of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, includes an article by Martine Berthelot Puig-Moreno on the Jewish community of Barcelona. She states that there are 2,000 Jews at present in the city, originating from Romania, Egypt, Lebanon, Italy, Chile, France, Germany, and what was the Soviet Union. However, three main groups can be distinguished: Jews from Balkan countries (Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary) who came to Barcelona at the turn of the twentieth century until the Second World War; Moroccan Jews who had been citizens of the old Spanish protectorate in Morocco and who came to Spain between 1955 and 1975; and since 1975, Argentinian Jews who are least observant of Jewish religious traditions.

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Report no. 12, Winter 1992, of the International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization, states that more than 200 scholars from 23 countries came to Israel and dealt with a wide variety of subjects at the 11th Annual Workshops. 'Among the participants were a scholar from Beijing University, and three junior Muslim scholars from Morocco, all completing post-graduate studies in Paris. Preceding the Workshops, a European Regional Development conference attracted rectors, heads of Jewish Civilization Studies departments, and junior scholars from 13 European Universities, including Karlova University, Prague, and Eotvos University, Budapest'.

The Report also states that in June 1991, an International Colloquium was held in London for promoting the teaching of Jewish Law at university level in Britain.

Cambridge University now offers a course on the impact of the Holocaust on Judaism and Christianity, as an option within the undergraduate divinity degree. 'A lecturer in Rabbinics at Cambridge stated: "The divinity faculty has undergone a complete transformation from a traditional Christian faculty to one which is open to religious studies in the widest sense ... It is not necessary to study any Christian subjects. In fact, it would be possible to devise a course entirely on Biblical and Jewish subjects, if one so wished"'.

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A 1991 issue of *Pardès* (a journal published twice a year by Cerf of Paris) is entitled 'Histoire contemporaine et sociologie des juifs de France'; it is number 14 and appeared at the end of 1991. However, the issue also contains two articles on Moroccan Jewry: 'L'arrivée des Megorashim au Maroc et leur installation à Fès. Le témoignage d'Abraham de Torrutiel' by the late Sarah Leibovici and 'La fin des judaïsmes en terre d'islam: le cas du Maroc' by Michel-Meyer Albo.

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Soviet Jewish Affairs, a journal of the Institute of Jewish Affairs in London, has published a special issue (vol. 21, no. 1, Summer 1991) entitled 'Government, Nationalities and the Jews of Russia, 1772–1990'. It consists of the proceedings of a Conference convened by the Institute of Jewish Studies, University College London, held in March 1990. The Institute of Jewish Affairs also sponsors another journal, *Christian Jewish Relations*; vol. 24, nos 1 and 2, Winter 1991, has a section entitled 'Documentation' which includes the following items: 'Declaration of Orthodox Theologians Concerning Antisemitism in Russia June 1988'; 'Statement of the Synod of the Reformed Church in Hungary on Relations with the Jews'; and a communiqué from the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America on Lutheran-Jewish relations.

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The July–September 1991 issue of *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* includes a section entitled 'Terre promise'; it has three articles, two of which are in French and the third in English: 'La Terre comme projet utopique dans les représentations religieuses et politiques juives' by Régine Azria; 'Terre rêvée, terre convoitée: Israel' by Alain Dieckhoff; and 'The History of a Metaphor: Christian Zionism and the Politics of Apocalypse' by Jan Nederveen Pieterse.

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It was announced at the end of last January that the 11th International Congress on Criminology will take place in Budapest from 22 to 27 August 1993. The general theme of the Congress will be 'Socio-political Change and Crime — a Challenge of the 21st Century' and the official languages will be English, French, German, Hungarian, and Spanish. The Congress is being organized by the International Society for Criminology, Paris.

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It was announced last January that a Society for the Study of Ethiopian Jewry (known popularly as the Falashas) has been established, with its main seat in Venice University, at the Dipartimento di Scienze storiche archeologiche e orientalistiche. The President of the Society is Professor Emanuela Trevisan Semi of that department of the University of Venice. Secondary seats of the Society are at the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies (Yarnton Manor, Oxford OX5 1PY, England) and at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 105 Boulevard Raspail, Paris 75006, France.

The objectives of the society are listed as follows: to encourage the study of Ethiopian Jewry; to facilitate scholarly work in this field; to make the documentary sources available for study; to help to preserve both primary and secondary material; to encourage international co-operation in this field; and to convene international colloquia and conferences. A congress will be held in Venice on 1–3 February 1993.

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The *SICSA Report* is the Newsletter of The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Its Fall 1991 issue (no. 6) states that the Center, in conjunction with the Institute of Jewish Affairs of London, plans to sponsor 'a scholars' conference on European Unification and Antisemitism' to be held in Berlin, tentatively in September 1992. Those who would like to attend the conference can obtain detailed information from Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung, Technische Universität Berlin, Ernst-Reuter-Platz 7, 9 OG, D-1000 Berlin, Germany.

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The Refugee Studies Programme at Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford states that it will be offering a one-week course from 7 to 11 December 1992 on 'Human Rights and Refugees'. The course 'is intended to provide an opportunity for those who work with refugees, especially those who are involved in protection work, to extend their knowledge of international law pertaining to today's victims of forced migration'. Those wishing to enrol should write to The Course Training Officer, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, 21 St Giles, Oxford OX1 3LA.

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On 10 November 1975, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 3379 which determined 'that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination' by a vote of 72 in favour, 35 against, and 32 abstentions. That resolution was repealed by the United Nations on 16 December 1991 by 111 votes for and 25 against.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Barkaï, Ron, *Les infortunes de Dinah ou la gynécologie juive au Moyen-Age*, trans. Michel Garel, 301 pp., Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1991, 245 francs.

Benbassa, Esther with the collaboration of Aron Rodrigue: *Une vie judéo-espagnole à l'Est: Gabriel Arié (1863–1939)*, 498 pp., Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1992, 249 francs.

Berg, Roger, *Histoire du rabbinat français (XVI^e–XX^e siècle)*, 280 pp., Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1992, 199 francs.

Brenner, Joseph Chaim: *Out of the Depths* (trans. David Patterson), x + 101 pp., Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford, 1992, paperback, £8.95.

Dashefsky, Arnold, Jan DeAmicis, Bernard Lazerwitz, and Ephraim Tabory: *Americans Abroad. A Comparative Study of Emigrants from the United States*, xv + 166 pp., Plenum Press, New York and London, 1992, $27.50 ($33.00 outside the USA and Canada).

Frankel, William, ed., *Survey of Jewish Affairs 1991*, xi + 294 pp., Basil Blackwell for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, Oxford, 1991, £55.00.

Gold, Steven J., *Refugee Communities. A Comparative Field Study*, xiv + 257 pp., Newbury Park, London, and New Delhi, 1992, paperback, £15.50.

Kadish, Sharman, *Bolsheviks and British Jews. The Anglo-Jewish Community, Britain and the Russian Revolution*, xiv + 298 pp., Frank Cass, London, 1992, £35.00.

Kalib, Goldie Szachter with Sylvan Kalib and Ken Wachsberger, *The Last Selection. A Child's Journey through the Holocaust*, xx + 267 pp., Univ. of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1991, n.p.

Marty, Martin E. and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Volume 1 of the Fundamentalism Project, xvi + 872 pp., Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, $45.95 or £31.95.

Rose, Gillian, *The Broken Middle*, xv + 336 pp., Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, £14.95 (hardback, £45.00).

Shalev, Michael, *Labour and the Political Economy in Israel*, xiii + 400 pp., Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1992, £40.00.

Wolin, Richard, ed., *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ix + 315 pp., Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1991, $40.50.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

DON-YEHIYA, Eliezer; Ph.D. Associate Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University. Chief publications: *Religious Institutions in the Political System* (Hebrew); co-author, *Civil Religion in Israel*, 1983; and *Israel and Diaspora Jewry: Ideological and Political Perspectives*, 1991.

HOLMES, Colin; Ph.D. Professor of History at Sheffield University. Chief publications: *Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876–1939*, 1979; *John Bull's Island*, 1988; and *A Tolerant Country?*, 1991.

STEINBERG, Bernard; Ph.D. Associate Professor, Dept. of Hebrew Studies (formerly, Associate Professor in the Faculty of Education), University of Cape Town. Chief recent publications: 'The Present Era in Jewish Education: A Global Comparative Perspective' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 26, no. 2, 1984; 'The New Education: Fifty Years After' in *Journal of Education*, vol. 16, 1984; 'Origins, Attitudes and Aspirations of Student Teachers' in *The South African Journal of Education*, vol. 5, no. 4, 1985; 'Social Change and Jewish Education in Great Britain' in *Jewish Education*, vol. 54, no. 3, 1986; and 'Comparative Education in South Africa: An Irrelevant Exercise?' in Douglas Young and Robert Burns, eds., *Education at the Crossroads*, 1987.