THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Published by Maurice Freedman Research Trust Ltd

VOLUME XXXIII : NUMBER 2 : DECEMBER 1991

CONTENTS

Editor: Judith Freedman

ISSN 0021-6534

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PUBLISHED TWICE YEARLY, IN JUNE AND DECEMBER
by Maurice Freedman Research Trust Ltd
(Published by the World Jewish Congress 1959–80)

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION
INSTITUTIONS: £12.00 (U.S. $24.00)
INDIVIDUALS: £10.00 (U.S. $20.00)
SINGLE COPIES: £6.00 (U.S. $12.00)

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY W. S. MANEY & SON LTD, LEEDS

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PROPOSED ELECTORAL REFORM IN ISRAEL

Avraham Brichta

ONE of the most heated political debates in Israel since soon after the establishment of the State has centred on various proposed reforms of the country's electoral system. The reformers argued that the changes which they advocated would remove most of the existing defects of that system, while those opposed to any electoral change have claimed that such a change would destroy the very foundations of Israel's democratic system as well as the pluralistic fabric of Israeli society.

The reformers assert that the proportional representation (PR) list system, with a nation-wide constituency of 120 members for the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), undermines political stability, prevents the safeguarding of local interests, and does not allow for any meaningful contact between the representative and the represented — so that there is no provision for accountability or for responsiveness. Moreover, the present electoral system concentrates the nomination process in the hands of the central party organs and of the party bosses and functionaries. Admittedly, this electoral system is representative to the extent that it makes it possible for any group which has won 1.5 per cent of the total valid votes to obtain a seat in the Knesset. On the other hand, the focus of representation is the party, the party ideology, and group interests — but not the individual voter and his or her concerns.

Moreover, Israel's extreme form of proportional representation has necessitated the formation of coalition governments and such governments have been obliged to allow a major distortion in the allocation of national resources and of the distribution of political offices. Consequently, coalition governments in order to survive have had to resort to various manœuvres which have impaired the decision-making process, and that in turn has led to persistent demands for the reform of the electoral system and to various proposals for the implementation of a new method of electing members of parliament.

The Struggle for Electoral Reform

Israel's PR system has its roots in the institutions of the pre-State period. It had been introduced in 1897 in the elections to the Zionist

Congress and later to the Elected Assemblies of the *Yishuv* (the Jewish settlement in Palestine); in both cases, this was in order to attract and to maintain the support of the widest possible range of Jewish political groups so as to enable these factions to exert some authority without possessing sovereignty. Consequently, the Election Committee of the Provisional State Council recommended in 1948 that the Constituent Assembly, which later became the First Knesset, should be elected on the basis of a PR list system. The Election Committee was guided by three main considerations: (1) the PR system had deep roots in the tradition of pre-State institutions; (2) the decision applied only to the election for the Constituent Assembly; and (3) the state of war (the War of Independence) and general mobilization made it impossible to introduce a more complex electoral system which would require the division of the country into constituencies.[1] Thus, what was originally *ad hoc* legislation became one of the most permanent features of the Israeli political system.

However, it must be noted that the PR list system was severely criticized from the very beginning and that David Ben-Gurion was the most insistent advocate for replacing a nation-wide party-list system with a simple-majority system based on the British model.[2] He recommended that the country be divided into 120 constituencies, each of whose representative would be elected by a simple majority. His proposal was adopted by Mapai (the Labour Party) towards the end of the Second Knesset in 1954;[3] and from the Third Knesset until the establishment of the Labour Alignment in 1965, this plank was included in Mapai's platform in all the election campaigns.

During the term of the Second Knesset (1951–55), there were other proposals for reform. The General Zionists advocated raising the minimum electoral quota from one to ten per cent for the elections to the Third Knesset and in a coalition agreement with Mapai (signed on 26 December 1952) this proposal was accepted. But the Progressive Party (Ha-Miflaga Ha-Progressivit) vigorously opposed this minimum-quota clause and threatened that unless it was either shelved or deleted, it would not join the coalition.[4] The Progressive Party had never won in any election even as little as five per cent of the national vote and the clause would simply put an end to the existence of the Progressives in the Knesset and eventually an end to the party itself.

Mapai was in favour of the ten per cent quota because such a quota would reduce the number of political parties in the Knesset to not more than four major blocs. Together, Mapai and the General Zionists could muster enough votes in the Knesset to ensure the passage of a minimum-quota bill.[5] However, Mapai decided in the end not to sponsor such a bill before the Third Knesset elections because it wished to keep the Progressive Party as a convenient coalition partner — and not to put that party in a position where it would have

to decide either to merge with the General Zionists or to cease to exist.[6]

For their part, the General Zionists were eager to absorb the Progressives and to consolidate administrative control within the party by brandishing the whip of this minimum-quota bill over the heads of the small dissenting factions in their ranks: the bill would nip in the bud any attempt by these factions to defy party discipline or to run on an independent ticket at the next general elections, since in such a case the splinter groups would be unable to obtain the required minimum of votes.

It would be politically naïve to think that the reformers were motivated only by a desire to correct major flaws in the electoral system. Clearly, the reforms advocated were supported because the party which proposed them believed that it would benefit directly from such a change in the electoral system. During the term of the Third Knesset (1955–59), both Mapai and the General Zionists resumed their efforts to change the electoral system, which would be incorporated into the 'Basic Law: the Knesset'. Mapai advocated the simple-majority single-ballot system with 120 constituencies whereas the General Zionists wanted a constituency-proportional system.[7]

In the Second Knesset, Mapai and the General Zionists together could boast of a total of 65 members of the Knesset, but in the Third Knesset, their combined number was only 53 MKs. The main opposition parties and the smaller coalition parties then joined forces to defeat Mapai's proposal by 58 to 42 votes, while the alternative sponsored by the General Zionists was overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of 58 to 11.[8] After the failure of these two attempts at reform, the Knesset passed Section 4 of the 'Basic Law: the Knesset' which required an absolute majority in order to change the nation-wide PR list system.[9] On 16 August 1959, a coalition of the smaller parties succeeded in pushing through an amendment stipulating that Section 4 could be changed only if there were a majority (at least 61) in all the stages of the legislative process — that is, in each of the three readings of the proposed bill.[10] Section 4 thus became one of the very few entrenched clauses in the whole of Israeli legislation.

In 1965, after Ben-Gurion left Mapai, he founded the Workers' Party (RAFI) and again attempted to effect a reform of the electoral system. His efforts gained some momentum only after there was a merger of Mapai, RAFI, and Ahdut Ha-Avodah and the establishment of the Labour Party (Mifleget Ha-Avodah) in 1968. In June 1969, the centre wing of the Labour Party decided in principle to support a change of the system and advocated a constituency-proportional alternative to the PR list system. The Labour Party then adopted that proposal, which became incorporated into its platform in the elections to the Seventh Knesset held in October 1969.[11] Then, in the third session of the

Seventh Knesset, the Labour Party tabled in 1972 a private member's bill which proposed a mixed constituency-proportional system: 90 MKs would be elected from 18 five-member constituencies and the remaining 30 MKs would be elected from a central list. In a preliminary vote, this Labour proposal was supported by the Free Centre (Ha-Merkaz Ha-Hofshi), the State List (Ha-Reshima Ha-Mamlakhtit), and the Liberals (Ha-Miflaga Ha-Liberalit, the former General Zionists) in the Likud.

For the first time in the history of the struggle for electoral reform in Israel, this bill was approved by the Knesset in a preliminary vote (a private member's bill requires such a vote). However, although the bill was approved by the minimum majority of 61 members of the Knesset, it did not proceed to a first reading mainly because the Liberals withdrew their support, claiming that they were under pressure from Herut warnings that if they did support electoral reform, their joint Gahal bloc might not survive.[12]

After the elections for the Eighth Knesset in 1973, electoral reform was again on the agenda. The leader of the State List, Yigal Hurvitz, had been a staunch supporter of Ben-Gurion's policies and he now submitted a private member's bill that would institute a simple-majority single-ballot system in the elections for the Ninth Knesset.[13] The proposal was considered to be too radical, since it would entail changing an extreme proportional-representation system in favour of an extreme majoritarian system.

Another proposal, by Gad Yaacobi, which called for the introduction of a mixed proportional-constituency system, was referred by the Knesset to its Law and Constitution Committee as a preliminary to a first reading. The proposal provided that the majority of Knesset members be elected in a number of multi-member constituencies, while the rest would be returned on the basis of a country-wide list system.[14] But there were fierce objections from the National Religious Party, from Mapam (then, a left-wing Marxist party) and from various other small parties; these objections, in combination with the early dissolution of the Eighth Knesset in April 1977, killed the proposal at birth — even before a first reading.[15]

During the election campaigns for the Ninth Knesset in 1977, the platforms of both the Labour Alignment and the Likud included proposals for a change in the electoral law. Herut, the major partner in the Likud, had consistently opposed such a change because it feared that it would strengthen the Labour bloc. However, it now accepted the recommendation of its partner, the Liberal Party, to support a moderate electoral reform.

Electoral reform was almost the *raison d'être* of the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), established in 1977. It declared that the single most important task of the Ninth Knesset should be the

adoption of a new electoral law and it recommended the dissolution of the Ninth Knesset and stated that the elections for the Tenth Knesset should be held on the basis of the new system. Before it would agree to enter the cabinet, the DMC insisted that the country be divided into 20 four-member constituencies (resulting in 80 MKs) and that the remaining 40 members be elected from a central list. The National Religious Party, for its part, would agree to no more than six constituencies electing a total of 80 members, while the remaining 40 would be elected from a central list. The agreement of October 1977 which brought the DMC into the coalition formed by Begin stipulated that a proportional multi-member district system should be adopted and put into effect for the elections to the Tenth Knesset.

During the term of the Ninth Knesset (1977–81), a committee consisting of representatives of the coalition parties was established in order to make recommendations for electoral reform; it was required to finish its work within nine months.[16] However, despite the fact that more than three-quarters of the members of the Ninth Knesset represented parties committed to electoral reform, no concrete steps were taken from 1977 to 1981.

At the first session of the Tenth Knesset, in 1981, a private member's bill was introduced which would set a 2.5 per cent threshold for all lists. It was sponsored by a leader of the Likud and was supported by some of the coalition partners in the Likud government, but it was opposed by the Labour Alignment probably because if it was passed, it would have eliminated the small Arab lists (formed on a regional and a personal basis) which traditionally supported Labour, as well as two tiny groups on which Labour relied for their votes.[17] That bill was defeated in a comparatively close vote of 44 to 37.

In July 1984, the Eleventh Knesset had 15 political parties. Neither of the two major blocs, the Labour Alignment and the Likud, could form a viable coalition and this was seen as the result of the extremely divisive nature of Israel's electoral system. Moreover, the desire for reform was reflected later in the opinion polls: in 1965, only 29 per cent of the public wanted to change the system but in 1987, the proportion had risen to 69 per cent.[18] In view of this impressive public support, 44 MKs from both the coalition and opposition parties decided to collaborate in order to present a private member's bill to amend the existing electoral system and their proposed legislation was referred to the Law and Constitution Committee of the Knesset for a first reading; but it never reached the stage of a second reading.[19]

In September 1987, a group of professors from the Faculty of Law of Tel-Aviv University recommended a mixed electoral system as part of their proposed Constitution for the State of Israel. Their proposal was based on the principles of the West German electoral system (they were examining these principles and adapting them to the Israeli situation

before the reunification of Germany). They recommended that Israel be divided into 60 single-member constituencies and that the representatives be elected by a simple majority vote. The remaining 60 Knesset members would be elected from a nation-wide list. There would be a 2.5 per cent threshold, and successful parties would receive the number of seats proportional to their electoral strength, minus the number of seats they gained in the constituencies.[20] For instance, if a party obtained 50 per cent of the total vote and won 40 seats in the constituencies, it would be entitled to 20 additional seats from the central list.

Admittedly, the West Germans have had good reasons to be satisfied with their electoral system — but it does have shortcomings.[21] There has been serious criticism in Israel of the Tel-Aviv group of law professors who have advocated that the Israeli State adopt the West German model. It was pointed out at the time that West Germany was a federation as well as a large country with a large population, and with a deeply-rooted local and regional culture and tradition. The division of Israel into 60 single-member constituencies does not take into account its distinctive centralistic tradition. It would create artificial entities without any cultural or traditional roots and would encourage undue fragmentation on the basis of local interests. Moreover, the MKs who would be elected from single-member constituencies by a simple majority would represent only a minority of their constituents. It is most unlikely that in a country like Israel with a highly politicized and ideologically fragmented political culture, the voters would agree to be represented by an MK who belonged either to the right-wing or to the left-wing camp. While contests at the level of the single-member constituencies are conducive to two-party competition, they do not suit multi-party systems. Finally, the proposal of the Tel-Aviv professors does not provide a remedy for what the Israeli voter especially needs: the opportunity of choosing not only a party close to his political views, but also to vote for a candidate of his liking. Single-member constituencies do not enable the voters to choose among candidates. In fact, single-member constituencies are no less list systems on a district basis, than is the 120-member list-system prevailing in Israel on a nation-wide basis. In the event, although the proposal of the professors passed the first reading by 69 MKs voting for it and was then referred to the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee shortly before the dissolution of the Eleventh Knesset, it never reached the stage of a second reading.

Soon after the elections for the Twelfth Knesset in November 1988, the attempts to reform the present electoral system were resumed. The Tel-Aviv professors now altered their proposal: 60 MKs would be elected in 20 three-member constituencies and the other 60 on a nation-wide list system. This revised proposal served as a basis for the

deliberations of the Coalition Committee on Electoral and Government Reform convened by the two main parties — the Labour Alignment and the Likud — after the elections for the Twelfth Knesset. That bi-partisan committee came to the conclusion after several months of deliberation that there must be a change in Israel's electoral system according to the following principles:

I

(1) The electoral system should be proportional on a national basis but personal on a constituency basis: 60 MKs would be elected in 20 electoral districts, three from each district, and the other 60 MKs would be elected from a national list.

(2) Full proportionality would be maintained in the representation of parties in the Knesset. The distribution of seats would be determined by the results of the elections for the national lists.

(3) There should ideally be 120 Members of Knesset — or as near as possible to that figure. Expert opinion and advice should be sought for a technical method of preserving full proportionality while maintaining the size of the Knesset at 120 and the proposals of the experts should be studied and discussed in the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee of the Knesset in the course of its deliberations about reforms in the electoral system.

(4) The threshold would be fixed at a minimum of four MKs: a party which returned fewer than four members at a general election would not obtain any representation in the Knesset.

(5) The method of voting should be as follows:

(a) Each eligible voter will have two ballots; the first will be in respect of his choice of a party in the national list.

(b) In the second ballot, when there will be a list of all the candidates for election in the voter's district, the voter will indicate in his ballot card two preferred candidates, whether they are of the same party or of two different parties.

(6) Each list on the constituency ballot will include the names of three candidates. (The general list of candidates up for election will incorporate all the party lists.)

(7) The three candidates who receive the most votes in each district will be elected, on condition that they belong to parties or lists which have passed the national threshold. If an elected candidate is disqualified, he or she will be replaced by that candidate in the same party who has obtained the next greatest number of votes. If there are no candidates from the same party remaining in the constituency, then the next candidate in line on the national list of the same party will assume office.

(8) The boundaries of the electoral districts will be drawn by a committee of three who will be appointed by the president of the Supreme Court.

(9) A candidate will be permitted both to be included in a national list and to run in an electoral district. Those elected in the constituencies will be the first to become Members of the Knesset; their number will be supplemented by those elected from the national lists on the basis of national proportionality.

II

The members of the committee will refer the resolutions made in this proposal for approval to the authorized bodies of their respective parties.

III

The above principles will be included in a proposed Basic Law of the Knesset, which is currently under deliberation and which is on the agenda of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee. If amendments and modifications of the above principles are proposed during the course of the deliberations, they will be brought before the Coalition Committee for Electoral and Government Reform.

IV

The committee will continue its deliberations on reform by taking up the issue of the structure of government and the method of electing the Prime Minister.

The Political Consequences of the Proposed Reform

The reform proposed by the bi-partisan committee is, not surprisingly, in favour of the two largest parties — the Likud and the Labour Alignment — but it also has serious shortcomings which perhaps were inevitable if an agreement was to be reached which was acceptable to both parties. One of the shortcomings is that the fact that the proposed threshold will be fixed at a minimum of four members of the Knesset means that a party which will win two or three Knesset seats in the districts but none in the national list, will be denied any representation in the Knesset. This violates the very principle of district representation which the division of the country into constituencies aimed to achieve and moreover amounts to unseating a representative who had been duly elected by his constituency.

Another shortcoming of the proposed reform is that the voter is entitled to two ballots — one for his preferred party and one for the candidate of his choice. Although this grants the voter a significant influence in electing his preferred two candidates, it tends to increase

party fragmentation in the parliament — as has been the case in both France and West Germany with their system of two-ballots voting.[22] This is exactly the opposite of one of the major aims of the proposed reform: to have a more limited number of parties in the Knesset.

These shortcomings of the proposal by the bi-partisan committee could be rectified in one of the following ways. First, by eliminating the two-ballots system; each voter would be entitled to vote only for a party list, but he would be entitled to indicate his preference among the candidates of his list. This method is used in Finland and its adoption in Israel would enable the voter to indicate his within-party preference while preventing the negative impact of the panachage (cross-party voting) on party fragmentation in parliament. Second, it is possible to determine the threshold in percentages and not in absolute numbers. The bi-partisan committee's proposal to set a four-MKs threshold would then be the equivalent of a 3.3 per cent threshold. A party would be entitled to participate in the allocation of seats if it attained either 3.3 per cent of the total votes or elected at least one candidate in a constituency. This would prevent the unseating of a duly-elected district candidate — but, on the other hand, it would tend to increase party fragmentation and would therefore be less desirable than the first alternative. A third possibility would be to entitle a party to get representation in the Knesset even if it does not attain the required 3.3 per cent threshold, but elects at least one representative in the district, by increasing the total number of MKs. This means that, as was the case in West Germany, the total number of MKs would not be fixed. (In West Germany, when a party won more directly-elected seats than it had been allocated, in a particular region, that party would none the less retain all the regional seats it had won and the size of the *Bundestag* would simply increase, as had occasionally happened.) The disadvantages of this method in the Israeli circumstances stem from the fact that the apparently minor change of even one extra seat could have a major impact on the fortunes of one of the main parties. For example, after the 1988 elections, the leader of the Likud was asked to form a government because the Likud had won just one seat more than the Labour Alignment: 40 against 39. Finally, it must be pointed out that although the bi-partisan committee recommended that full proportionality must be maintained in the representation of parties in the Knesset, the details of its proposals for electoral reform show that the principle of proportionality might be distorted at both the district and the national levels.

The d'Hondt formula currently in use in Israel favours the large parties; Victor d'Hondt wished to encourage small parties to merge in order to reduce the number of such parties and to help to provide more stability for the party entrusted with the government of the country. The d'Hondt formula allocates seats according to the highest average

of votes each party obtains in an election. The Hare formula, which was in use in Israel from 1951 to 1969, favours the small parties; but if the 60 seats at the district level are allocated according to the d'Hondt formula, then almost all of them would be given to the two largest parties.

A projected distribution of seats in 14 constituencies electing 60 members and a 60-member national list by the d'Hondt and by the Hare formulae, based on the Twelfth Knesset election returns and a three per cent threshold, would have given the following results at the district level: the d'Hondt formula would have allocated the 60 seats by giving 29 to the Labour Alignment and 29 to the Likud and the remaining two to Shas; but the Hare formula would have given only 20 to the Alignment, 22 to the Likud, while the small parties would have also gained seats: two to Ratz, two to Mafdal, five to Agudat Israel, five to Shas, and the remaining four to Rakach. In this projected distribution, the 120 seats would be distributed among seven parties, because eight parties which won 16 seats in the Twelfth Knesset elections would not be granted any representation.

Moreover, the principle of full proportionality would be even more significantly distorted at the national level. The committee's proposal states: 'The distribution of the seats will be determined by the results of the elections for the national lists'. This means that the total number of additional seats allocated to each party would be determined by a quota arrived at by dividing the total number of votes by the total number of the 60 national list seats — not by dividing them by the total number of the district and national seats, namely 120. Only the second quota guarantees full proportionality to all parties attaining the required threshold. The first quota would cut the representation of the small parties virtually by half, since almost none of them would gain any seats at the district level. At the district level, the projected distribution of seats shows that the Labour Alignment and the Likud would each have 29 seats and Rakach would have the remaining two — while Ratz, Mafdal, Agudat Israel, and Shas would have no representation.

Conclusion

If the bi-partisan committee's proposed reform had been adopted in the elections to the Twelfth Knesset in 1988, several political consequences would have followed:

(1) threshold: by increasing the threshold from one to three per cent, there would have been only seven parties — not 15;

(2) formula: by using the d'Hondt formula, the calculation of the total number of additional seats on the basis of the 60 national list seats (instead of on the basis of the total number of 120 seats) would

significantly decrease the representation of the small parties and thus greatly benefit the two largest parties at both the district and the national levels;

(3) district magnitude: the district magnitude would be small and there would probably be disproportionate results at the district level.

However, if the additional 60 seats at the national level are used to compensate parties in order to achieve full proportionality, then a projected distribution of seats in 14 constituencies electing 60 members and a 60-member national list by the d'Hondt formula, based on the Twelfth Knesset election returns and a 2.5 per cent threshold, would allow nine parties instead of seven to obtain representation.[23]

The reform advocated by the bi-partisan committee would achieve some of the targets of the various proponents of electoral reform in Israel. The division of the country into 20 constituencies could enable local interests to be given special attention. The election of representatives on a constituency basis would enhance the accountability and responsiveness of the MKs and would decentralize the nomination process. The introduction of preferential voting at the district level could increase the influence of the voters' choice of candidates. However, the critics of that proposed reform stress that it would weaken the parties, reduce party cohesion in the Knesset, and put undue emphasis on local issues in a country which still faces the challenge of a number of major national problems. They add that there might still be the necessity of forming coalition governments in which the religious parties still would, in all probability, play a pivotal role.

Finally, one should bear in mind what Stein Rokkan noted about electoral systems: they function 'within culturally given contexts of legitimacy, and they are changed under the strains of critical "growing pains" in the development of the over-all constellations of national institutions'.[24] In Israel, it is in the interest of the small parties and of the religious parties, as well as of the party machines and bureaucracies of the large parties, to preserve the existing PR system with all its defects and therefore to resist any change. However, in my considered opinion, the fact that none of the proposed electoral reforms is likely to remedy all the deficiencies of a political system should not deter the Members of the Knesset from using electoral engineering to achieve at least some of the desired targets.[25] They would be well advised to follow the exhortation of the Salvation Army: 'Save the world, one soul at a time'.[26]

Acknowledgements

The research for this paper was supported by the Bar-Rav-Hai Workshop for the Study of the Israeli Parliamentary System, at the Department of Political Science of the University of Haifa.

I am grateful to Vernon Bogdanor and to Alan Dowty for their helpful comments.

NOTES

[1] See Moetzet Hamedina Hazmanit (Provisional State Council), Protocol dated 28 October 1948, pp. 26–32.

[2] For an account of Ben-Gurion's efforts to amend the electoral system and for a summary of his position about the change which he advocated, see his *Medinat Yisrael Ha-Mehudeshet* (The Revived State of Israel), Am Oved, Tel Aviv, 1969, pp. 575–79.

[3] Mapai had three main party organs: the convention, the centre, and the secretariat. According to Ben-Gurion, the proposal was adopted by the party centre at a meeting on 16 September 1954; a simple majority system was adopted by a vote of 52 to six. Ibid., p. 578.

[4] For an account of the efforts to prevent the imposition of a ten per cent electoral quota, see the Hebrew daily *Zmanim* of 13 and 22 December 1953 (front pages).

[5] Mapai had 45 MKs while the General Zionists had 20; together, they could therefore have obtained an absolute majority with their combined 65 votes.

[6] On Mapai's motives for withdrawing support from the proposal, see the front page of *Zmanim* of 16 August 1954. See also the article (in Hebrew) entitled 'How are we to change the electoral system?' in *Ovnaiim*, vol. 5, 1965, p. 45.

[7] 'A bill for a referendum on the electoral system of the Fourth Knesset, 1958', was tabled by the MK Y. Almogi: see the Knesset Record (the Israeli equivalent of Hansard), vol. 25, pp. 531–33. See also the bill tabled by MK Y. Serlin in the same issue of the Knesset Record, pp. 533–35.

[8] Ibid., p. 517.

[9] Ibid.; this motion was approved by 58 votes to 53.

[10] See Amendment no. 3 of the Basic Law of the Knesset in the official records of the Knesset (*Divrei Ha-Knesset*), 1959, vol. 27, p. 2962.

[11] See Gad Yaacobi and Ehud Gera, *Ha-hofesh livkhor* (The Freedom to Choose), Am Oved, Tel-Aviv, 1975, p. 59.

[12] Ibid., pp. 58–106.

[13] See, in the official records of the Knesset, the entry for session 36 of the Eighth Knesset, 1974, pp. 737–51.

[14] See the 1977 Proposed Amendment to the Basic Law of the Knesset: the draft proposal by the Labour Alignment and the Likud in the Eighth Knesset (Knesset house committee resolution of 16 March 1977).

[15] The debate on the proposal in the Law and Constitution Committee began in March 1977.

[16] The principles of the coalition agreement were published in the Hebrew daily *Ma'ariv* of 25 October 1977.

[17] See Samuel Sager, *The Parliamentary System of Israel*, Syracuse, N.Y., 1985, p. 50.

[18] For the 1965 figures, see Yaacobi and Gera, op. cit. in Note 11 above, p. 55. For the 1987 figures, see Baruch Susser, ed., in the provisional edition of the book in Hebrew entitled *The Political System of Israel*, Tel-Aviv, 1987, p. 490.

[19] It was referred by the Law and Constitution Committee for the first reading on 17 March 1987.

[20] See the brochure entitled (in Hebrew) *A Proposed Constitution for the State of Israel*, unpaginated and undated, p. 16.

[21] See Arend Lijphart, 'The Demise of the Last Westminster System? Comments on the Report of New Zealand's Royal Commission on the Electoral System', *Electoral Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1987, pp. 97–103; Eckhard Jesse, 'Split Voting in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Analysis of the Federal Elections from 1953–1987', *Electoral Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1987, pp. 109–24; Eckhard Jesse, 'The West German Electoral System: The Case for Reform, 1949–1987', *West European Politics*, vol. 10, no. 4, 1988, pp. 434–48; and Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*, New Haven and London, 1989, pp. 230–32.

[22] See Arend Lijphart, 'The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–1985' in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 84, no. 2, 1990, p. 481.

[23] Three detailed tables of the projected distribution of seats in 14 constituencies are available from the author, Dr Avraham Brichta, at the Department of Political Science of the University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31999, Israel.

[24] See the article by Stein Rokkan on 'Electoral Systems' in *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1968, vol. 5, p. 19.

[25] See Giovanni Sartori, 'Political Development and Political Engineering' in J. D. Montgomery and A. O. Hirschman, eds., *Public Policy*, vol. 17, Cambridge, Ma., 1968.

[26] See Samuel P. Huntington, 'One Soul at a Time: Political Science and Political Reform' in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 1, March 1988, pp. 3–10.



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A BRIEF SURVEY OF PRESENT-DAY KARAITE COMMUNITIES IN EUROPE

Emanuela Trevisan Semi

SINCE the turn of the present century, demographers and anthropologists have shown great interest about the Karaite communities of Europe.[1] These groups were limited in number and they obeyed strictly the rules of exogamy and homogamy,[2] while living for centuries in host societies which had other dominant religions. Protestant writers had considered since the seventeenth century the Karaites to be 'rational' Jews — in contrast to the Rabbinic Jews whom they labelled as 'superstitious' and whom they therefore viewed as 'Pharisees'.[3] Even nowadays, there remains among some social scientists and other scholars a serious curiosity about the structure and beliefs of Karaite communities after their desperate fight for survival during the Second World War, when they argued forcefully that they were not Jews 'racially' and therefore not to be dealt with as 'genetic' Jews by the Nazi and fascist or Vichy French authorities.[4]

In the course of several centuries, the Karaites developed defence mechanisms which showed some similarities with those adopted by the Marranos (the Jews who officially converted to Christianity since the time of the Spanish Inquisition, while secretly continuing to observe some Jewish rituals and other practices); those mechanisms, as well as their ability to exhibit some of the characteristics of the host society, enabled them to survive in several countries of varying cultural and national structures.

This paper is based on the data I collected when engaged in fieldwork among the Karaites of Poland and Lithuania in 1989 and among those living in France in 1991. The word 'Karaite' is derived from the Hebrew term *ba'alei mikra* ('those who read' — that is, those who read the written Old Testament text). Indeed, the Karaites strictly adhere to the principles and practices set out in the Scriptural text and they refuse to recognize the validity of the oral law as recorded in the Talmud. They therefore also do not observe the principles and practices set out in the Talmud, since the text of the latter is based on the oral law. In Eastern Europe, these *ba'alei mikra* insist on referring to themselves as *Karaim* and they object to the term 'Karaite'. This is

because in the past, Rabbinic Jews in Eastern Europe made sarcastic play of the fact that in the group's language *kara-it* means 'black dog'.[5]

The Karaites nowadays continue generally to define themselves mainly in contradistinction to Rabbinical Jews whom they often considered to be their 'enemies' through the centuries. They have evolved an image, or rather a stereotype, of Rabbinic Jews as inferior beings. For example, they are at great pains to stress the peculiar (alleged) practices of those Jews; the Karaites of Lithuania claim that Rabbinic Jews bury their dead in a sitting position and that their pronunciation of the Hebrew language is weird. They clearly refer to the Ashkenazi style of pronouncing Hebrew and apparently ignore the fact that Sephardi and Oriental Jews utter Hebrew words in the same way as the Karaites do.

The Eastern European Karaites also claim that they have no Jewish characteristics whatsoever and instead stress the similarities between their own practices and those of the Muslims — such as removing footwear before entering their places of worship — as well as the similarities with Christian traditions, since also like the Christians they tend to celebrate many feast days within the intimacy of their families rather than in a house of prayer. This is particularly true of the Karaites of Eastern Europe who, since the end of the eighteenth century, and under the influence of Abraham Firkovich (the famous Karaite bibliophile and archaeologist), have maintained that the 'racial' origins of the Karaites are distinctly not Jewish and that the Karaites are descendants of the Khazars. However, it should be noted here that such firm denials of any affinity between Karaites and Rabbinic Jews have been expressed mainly by Karaite leaders and that several decades ago it was already noticed that rank-and-file Karaites were much more moderate in their attitude to Rabbinic Jews.[6]

Most of the Karaites who live in Europe nowadays are descended from the branch of Karaism which has flourished since the sixteenth century in Lithuania, Galicia, and the Crimea. According to a 1985 survey, there were then in Poland 100 Karaites and 24 half-Karaites (children of mixed marriages where one of the parents was Christian); they lived mostly in Warsaw, Gdansk, and Kracow.[7] According to the 1970 Census report to the USSR, there were then in the Soviet Union a total of 4,571 Karaites; they lived mainly in Lithuania (Vilnius, Troki, and Kaunas), in the Crimea, and in the old Karaite centre of Panevezys. Only a few individuals were left in the town of Halicz (in the Ukraine), which had been for centuries an important place of Karaite settlement. It may be that there are still in Vienna or elsewhere in Austria some Karaites who have remained there after seeking refuge with the Tartars in the flight from the Crimea when the Nazis were defeated in 1944.[8]

France has had Karaite citizens since the second decade of the present century, when some 300 fled Russia and sought refuge after the Revolution of 1917. After the Suez war of 1956 (also known as 'the Sinai campaign'), hundreds of Egyptian Karaites emigrated to France and their numbers were augmented by a few Karaite households from Istanbul. There are also several isolated individual Karaites and some Karaite families in Switzerland and in Italy. In this context it is worth noting that the Karaites of Egypt, in very sharp contrast with those of Eastern Europe, claim to be the true and original (unmixed) descendants of the Jews from the era of Jeroboam the First.

The leaders of the Karaites in Europe nowadays are a very old *hazzan* (cantor) who in 1989 lived in Breslaw, some turcologues in Poland, and a few historians of Karaism in Poland and in France. In the Soviet Union the various communities have their own local dignitaries. The last *hakham* (equivalent to a rabbi) in Eastern Europe lived in Troki and died in 1961; he was Seraja Szapszal. In France there is no Karaite *hakham*. Two old Karaite Egyptian leaders live in Switzerland; the majority emigrated to Israel and to the United States.

The Karaites of Eastern Europe speak a language which is akin to a sub-group of Turkish and which they call Karaim; that language has an admixture of borrowed Hebrew, Arabic, and Persian terms; its written form used to be in Hebrew characters until the turn of the present century but it later followed the roman alphabet. Karaim is claimed to be a fundamental part of modern Karaite identity and it is a source of pride for the Eastern European Karaites, since the language is seen as tangible proof that they are part of the Turkic ethnic group, and especially that they are indeed the descendants of the Khazars. They find no difficulty in equating the use of a language with the ethnic or 'racial' identity of other speakers of that language. It is such an attitude which must have led the intellectual Karaites of Eastern Europe to concentrate their interest since the beginning of the present century on linguistic studies.[9]

The Karaites of Egypt, however, had no knowledge of Karaim, as spoken and written by their correligionists, but always used the Hebrew and/or Arabic languages. The Karaites who went to French or Italian schools in Egypt acquired these additional languages.

There are nowadays in Europe about 6,000 members of the two main branches of Karaism — those of Eastern European settlement and those of Egyptian origin who came to France after 1956. Although they may appear to be radically different from one another in several respects, they have in fact many important elements in common — not only in the realm of religious beliefs and practices but also in their life-style. They use the same calendar to mark their festivals (the calendar of the Karaites in Israel, who are of Egyptian origin) and they also freely intermarry — for example, a member of an Eastern

European community may take as a spouse a Karaite of Egyptian origin.

Moreover, the various dispersed Karaite groups in Europe have something else in common: a general aptitude to merge unobtrusively in some segment of the wider society, to be as inconspicuous as possible. For example, the Karaites of Egyptian origin now settled in France pretend to belong originally to the Rabbinic Egyptian Jewish community in that country while in reality, in the privacy of their homes, they continue to observe their traditional Karaite practices and rituals; but *vis-à-vis* the French authorities, the French Gentile citizens and French Jews, they pass as members of the much larger Jewish community of Egyptian origin.

If a theoretical ladder is drawn to represent the degrees of observance of Karaite principles, one should put at the top of the ladder the community of Egyptian Karaites in France; in the middle, those now living in Poland; and at the very bottom, those in Lithuania and in the Crimea. No data are readily available about the Karaites of Panevezys in Lithuania; according to the Italian enquiry of 1934,[10] it seems that they had become less acculturated before the Second World War to the process of Polonization which affected other Karaite group (especially as far as the Karaim language was concerned). Instead, the community apparently retained more than any other Karaite groups in the Soviet Union its traditional rites and observances. As for the Karaites of the Crimea, I have no available fieldwork data and only contradictory reports from Polish and Lithuanian Karaites whom I interviewed.

The Karaites of the Soviet Union have been deprived for several decades of their religious texts and of the Old Testament; they have not been able to observe freely and openly their rituals, even in the privacy of their own homes; and they have had to live and survive in an atheistic culture — to survive by appearing to conform to that dominant culture. As a consequence, they have perhaps inevitably lost nearly all the elements of their religion and of their culture. It is to be hoped that fieldworkers will now be given the opportunity to report in the near future on the situation of the Karaite citizens of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that one of the religious practices which has survived among some Soviet Karaites is that of the celebration of the Passover; they refer to the festival as the *haggadah*, retaining the name of the text of the Passover celebrations and using it to refer to the actual period of the festival. They also bake *matzot* (the prescribed unleavened bread) in their own homes: they call that bread *tinbil*; and they also eat bitter herbs — but apparently do not know the religious bases of such practices.[11] Not only do they not have ready access to the text of the Old Testament, but they also have no copies of their own particular version of the *haggadah* (which is very different from the *haggadah* of Rabbinic Jews). Since they have also not had the benefit of

religious instruction, they have no reference points to guide them about the origins of their old religious traditions and beliefs. On the other hand, they have retained a fairly lively interest in Karaism generally. Meanwhile, since the Soviet Union recognizes the existence of various nationalities in the country, the Karaites can claim to constitute a national group.

When I was in Vilnius in 1989, I discovered that the Karaites who wish to preserve a 'pure' Karaite lineage or pedigree take as their first spouse a fellow Karaite from their own community and wait until offspring of the union are born. Once such an unsullied line of descent has been formally established, they feel free to divorce and to choose another spouse who is not a Karaite but who is more to their liking as a marriage partner.

Following the establishment of various 'national' centres in Vinius, such as the Jewish centre and the Tartar centre, the city's Karaites founded recently their own establishment, which aims to preserve Karaim (their own language) and their own culture. For example, it has recorded various aspects of Karaite folklore, including tales, proverbs, and lullabies. The folkloric items which have been particularly preserved are those which are akin to the customs and traditions of Turks and Khazars. Even the Karaite museum in Troki, which was established some years before the Second World War, has preserved exhibits and artefacts which are mainly of Oriental manufacture or of a Turkish character; they could be described as being of only general interest, since there are no religious objects apart from the single case of an oil lamp which used to be in the Karaite synagogue in Damascus. It is worth noting that the museum has no objects with a Hebrew inscription — neither in Hebrew characters nor in roman transliteration. That fact surprised me since in 1989 in Warsaw I saw in a Karaite private house a great many objects which used to be in various Karaite synagogues in the Crimea and which bore Hebrew inscriptions. There are also Hebrew inscriptions on gravestones in Karaite cemeteries. I saw one such inscription on a tombstone in the old cemetery of Vilnius (which dates from the middle of the nineteenth century and which is separated from the Tartar graveyard only by a small ditch), and many others in the old Troki cemetery.

That old Troki cemetery was consecrated many centuries ago; in it, there lie buried victims of the plague which ravaged the Karaite communities of Lithuania in 1710; most of the inscriptions in that cemetery are in Hebrew until the third decade of the present century. However, those gravestones dating from the second half of the nineteenth century until the turn of the twentieth have under the Hebrew words a Russian or Polish inscription.[12] Next to that old cemetery, a new one was consecrated in 1935; most of the inscriptions there are in Russian, Lithuanian, and Karaim. The ground is strewn

with small glass pebbles in order to smother weeds: no other more direct methods of weed eradication are employed because according to Karaite tradition, a cemetery must not be maintained: it must be left to revert to nature.

The Karaites who are now in Poland (and whom I described above as being half-way up the ladder of traditional observance) came to that country in the present century. They are the descendants of Karaites who emigrated from the Crimea after the First World War, of Eastern European Karaites who had come before the Second World War to study (especially medicine, engineering, and law) at Warsaw University, and of other Karaites who had served in the Polish army in exile during the Second World War and had married Lithuanian Karaite women. Many of the present-day Karaites in Poland have now married non-Karaite spouses in a civil ceremony.[13]

There has been a continuing tradition, still in force, for a special scholarly interest in the Turkish language and in the Karaites' own language, Karaim. This is well in evidence in the Institute of Oriental and Hebraic Studies of Warsaw University.

Karaites in Poland are also well represented in the liberal professions.[14] Members of the older generation (those who are past their fifties) have not forgotten the old religious customs and traditions and they speak nostalgically about those which used to be observed — such as the ceremonies relating to a circumcision or to a religious wedding.

The Karaite cemetery in Warsaw, which is near an Orthodox Christian graveyard, was consecrated only about a century ago. The oldest inscription is dated in the 1890s.[15] The person buried under that tombstone was from the Crimea and the inscription is in Russian characters. The other gravestones have inscriptions in Polish and in Karaim (in roman characters). On some graves, there are sculptured designs of twigs or of cups from which a small flame issues. I have not seen such devices in any other Karaite cemetery, either in Europe or elsewhere. (I have visited the Karaite cemeteries in Jerusalem, Cairo, and Istanbul.)

In Poland, the Karaites are recognized by the authorities as a religious association and they are governed by the Statute of the Karaite Religious Union, which regulates civil as well as religious matters. The members of the Karaite clergy, consisting of the *hakham*, the *hazzan*, and the *ochuwczu* (a sort of sexton) are officially recognized by the Statute and are expected to deal with the organization of religious instruction as well as the upkeep of the synagogue and of the cemeteries. The *hazzan* must also deal with the solemnization of marriages, and the burial services.[16]

Among young Karaites, there is evidence of a renewal of interest in aspects of Karaism: in the late 1970s, a young man published a booklet in Polish about Karaism entitled *Coś* ('something').[17] Karaite meetings

are also organized in Warsaw and the proceedings are held in the Karaim language; the most popular meetings are those which are concerned with Karaite folklore — as is the case in Lithuania.

As for France, the case of the Egyptian Karaites who have settled in that country is of particular interest to those who have studied the process of 'Marranisation' and its manifestations. In Egypt, the community referred to its members as 'Karaite Jews' — Israélites Caraïtes — and were also described by the Rabbinic Jews of that country as 'Juifs Caraïtes'. However, when these Egyptian Karaites emigrated to France and settled there, most of them claimed to be Egyptian Rabbinic Jews and attended services in Sephardi synagogues. When I carried out fieldwork in France this year (1991), I noted that the Karaites of Egyptian origin strive to merge into the background as far as possible and in so doing lead a sort of double life. Karaism has no *bar-mitzvah*, no laying of phylacteries, no *mezuzoth*, and no ritual bath for 'family purity'. However, young boys of the community now prepare for a *bar-mitzvah* and carry out the rite while *mezuzoth* are affixed on the door jambs of their homes. Here it must be stated that young Karaites resent having to study for their *bar-mitzvah* and complain about it in the privacy of their homes.

Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement) does not always occur on the same day in both the Rabbinic and the Karaite calendars. When it does not, those Karaites who work for Rabbinic employers fast on both days. On the occasion of their own holy day, in such a case, they assemble quietly in their own homes to carry out the traditional Karaite rituals. The Karaites of Egyptian origin resident in France tend to take fellow-Karaites as spouses. In some cases, the latter are residents of the United States, Turkey, or Israel and they have been introduced by close or distant relatives of Egyptian Karaite families who had emigrated to those countries. Sometimes, a Karaite will marry a Rabbinic Jewish partner in a ceremony conducted according to Rabbinic rites. In such cases, it may well be that the officiating Rabbi is not aware (or prefers not to be aware) that one of the partners is a Karaite. In Rabbinic Judaism, a Karaite is not acceptable as a spouse for a Jewish bride or groom and Karaite divorces are not considered to be valid procedures according to Rabbinic *halakhah* (religious law).[18]

The Karaites of Egyptian origin in France prefer to mix with French Jews who are not very observant and who are not familiar with all the traditions of Judaism in various countries; this enables them to get away with the fiction that their practices are those which were current among Egyptian Rabbinic Jews. For example, they go so far as to invite non-Orthodox French Jews to their own Karaite Passover celebrations, asserting that their rituals are those of Rabbinic Jews — although they do not have on their *seder* table the platter with the prescribed items of food. Moreover, the Karaite Passover *haggadah* consists only of Psalms

and the three blessings (on unleavened bread, bitter herbs, and wine); some households have a *haggadah* text, with a French translation, which was printed in Cairo in 1940. Thus, the Karaites of Egyptian origin who have settled in France have managed to merge openly into the Sephardi strand of the pluralistic society of French Jewry while secretly preserving their own identity as non-Rabbinic Jews and quietly observing as much as possible their own traditional religious practices. The *hakhamim* of the Egyptian Karaites chose to emigrate to Israel or to the United States, so that the members of the community who settled in France have no qualified religious leaders; they felt closer to Rabbinic Jews than to French Christians and therefore decided simply to say that they were Jews of Egyptian origin.

The Karaites of Eastern European origin resident in France all seem to have merged into French society. Those still in Eastern Europe, who had denied since the eighteenth century the existence of any link between themselves and Rabbinic Judaism, eventually merged into the religiously devout Polish wider society as well as into the militantly atheistic culture of the Soviet Union. This truly remarkable ingenuity and successful strategy has resulted in the fact that the various Karaite communities are seen, whatever country they live in, as being conservative and conformist groups. That may well be why the stereotype of a Karaite in Europe since the seventeenth century[19] has been that of a loyal, trustworthy, and hard-working citizen.*

* This article has been translated by Judith Freedman.

NOTES

[1] See Samuel Weissenberg, 'Die Karäer der Krim' in *Globus*, vol. 84, no. 1, 1903, pp. 139–55. See also Alexandre Baschmakoff, *Cinquante siècles d'évolution ethnique autour de la mer noire*, Paris, 1937, pp. 152–64 and Corrado Gini, 'I caraimi di Polonia e Lituania' in *Genus*, vol. 2, no. 1–2, 1936–37, pp. 20–22. On the Karaites of Egypt, see Elda Luzzatto, 'I caraiti egiziani' in *Archivio per l'Antropologia e la Etnologia*, vol. 83, 1954, pp. 81–131.

[2] The rules of marriage among the Karaites are based on a literal interpretation of Genesis 2:24 which specifies that man and wife will become one flesh. Accordingly, Karaite religion considers that husband and wife become blood relatives, and by extension so do the kinsmen and kinswomen of one's spouse become blood relatives and hence forbidden marriage partners at some future date. See Leon Nemoy, 'Karaites' in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 10, Jerusalem, 1971, column 780.

[3] See the references to John Dury (1596–1680) and to Johann Rittangel (1606–52) in the article by Richard Popkin, 'The Lost Tribes, the Karaites and the English Millenarians' in *Journal of Jewish Studies*, vol. 37, no. 2, 1986, pp. 213–27; a reference to Gustav Peringer (1651–1710) can be found in an article by Simon Szyszman, 'Gustav Peringer's Mission bei den Karäern' in *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, n.s., vol. 27, no. 2, 1952,

pp. 215–28. See also Jacques Basnages, *L'Histoire et la religion chez les Juifs*, vol. 2, Rotterdam, 1707, pp. 433–78.

[4] See the article by Philip Friedman, 'The Karaites under Nazi Rule' in Max Beloff, ed., *On the Track of Tyranny*, London, 1960, pp. 97–123; Warren P. Green, 'The Nazi Racial Policy Toward the Karaites' in *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1978, pp. 36–44; Shmuel Spector, 'The Karaites in Nazi-occupied Europe Seen Through German Documents' (in Hebrew) in *Peamim*, no. 29, 1986, pp. 90–108; and by Emanuela Trevisan Semi the following two articles: 'L'oscillation ethnique: le cas des caraïtes pendant la seconde guerre mondiale' in *Revue de l'histoire des Religions*, vol. 206, no. 4, 1989, pp. 377–98; and 'The Image of the Karaites in Nazi and Vichy France Documents' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, no. 2, December 1990, pp. 81–94.

[5] See Tadeusz Kowalski, *Karaimische Texte im Dialect von Troki*, Krakow, 1929, p. viii.

[6] That moderate attitude is revealed in the findings of the research carried out by Corrado Gini and his team in 1934 (sponsored by the Comitato italiano per lo studio dei problemi della popolazione) among the Karaite communities of Poland and of Lithuania — communities which I myself reported on, in my *Gli ebrei caraiti tra etnia e religione* (Rome, 1984, pp. 72–75). See also Libmann Hersch (who was a member of Gini's team), author of 'Les langues des inscriptions funéraires au cimetière caraïme de Troki' in *Genus*, vol. 2, no. 3–4, 1937, pp. 266–68.

[7] See Roman Freund, *Karaites and Dejudaization*, Stockholm Studies in Comparative Religion, no. 30, Stockholm, 1991, p. 100.

[8] See Spector, op. cit. in Note 4 above, p. 102.

[9] This was particularly so in the case of Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, Alexander Dubinski, and Simon Szyszman.

[10] See Corrado Gini, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 16; see also Elisabetta Gottardo, *Le Comunità caraite contemporanee in Lituania e Polonia*, unpublished MA thesis, University of Venice, 1984–85, pp. 35–37 and 218–24.

[11] For a more detailed analysis of the celebration of the *Seder*, see my recent article, 'Le *seder* non *mesuddar* dans la Pâque des Caraïtes contemporains. Une analyse du processus de transformation' in *Cahiers d'études juives*, vol. 3, 1991.

[12] They were studied by Hersch (op. cit. in Note 6 above) who saw them as evidence of the process of rejection of the Hebrew language which was taking place among the Karaites of Eastern Europe.

[13] See Freund, op. cit. in Note 7 above, pp. 99–100 and Gottardo, op. cit. in Note 10 above, pp. 76–78.

[14] See Gottardo, op. cit. in Note 10 above, p. 76. She found, in 1981, that of the 120 Polish Karaites whom she identified, 46 had a University degree and a further nine were university students. I have no precise comparative data for other Karaite communities in Europe, but I noted a similar tendency in Lithuania while the Karaites of France were more inclined towards commerce.

[15] Only the figures 189– are legible: the last number is effaced, worn away.

[16] Gottardo, op. cit. in Note 10 above, has reproduced the statute in full and provided an Italian translation (pp. 154–66).

[17] Ibid., p. 109.

[18] See Micael Corinaldi, 'The Problem of Divorce by Judicial Decree in Karaite Halakhah' in *Dine Israel*, vol. 9, 1978–79, pp. 101–44.

[19] One of the first accounts which so described the Karaites was by John Dury, who had related the descriptions given to him by Johann Rittangel; the latter had lived for long among the Karaites of Turkey and apparently also among those of Lithuania: see Popkin, op. cit. in Note 3 above, pp. 218–20.

SYNAGOGUE MARRIAGES IN BRITAIN IN THE 1980s

Marlena Schmool

Sources and Trends

THE findings presented in this paper are the latest instalment in a series initiated by Prais and Schmool in 1967:[1] they are based on the annual compilations of synagogue marriages throughout the United Kingdom, as returned to the Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews in London, and on special tabulations of returns to the Registrar General of marriages solemnized in England and Wales according to the usages of the Jews for the years 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1987; a summary of the annual figures for 1971 to 1990 is given in the Appendix. Although there are individual years between 1971 and 1990 which show an increase, the general pattern is one of a decline, more marked in the case of synagogue than of national marriages. In 1989, all marriages in England and Wales were 85.7 per cent, and all religious marriages were 75.8 per cent, of their 1971 level; but synagogue marriages in 1986–90 were 62 per cent of their 1971–75 level.

The pattern of decline of synagogue marriages is not consistent throughout the community. The Appendix shows that weddings in Liberal synagogues have fallen by some 57 per cent whereas the parallel decline in Reform synagogue weddings is 23 per cent over the same period; on the other hand the Right-wing Orthodox show an increase of 15 per cent between 1976–80 and 1986–90. The major part of the overall decline is accounted for by the fall in weddings in Central Orthodox synagogues, which are for the most part under the auspices of the Marriage Authorisation Office of the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations.[2] For the years 1986–90, 64 per cent of all synagogue marriages were solemnized in Central Orthodox synagogues; but in 1970, the proportion had been 73.9 per cent of (the then larger total of) all synagogue marriages that year.

Marital Status of Brides and Grooms

Jewish law not only allows divorce but indeed prescribes it in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, the incidence of divorce has traditionally

been low in Jewish communities.[3] Until very recently, the records of synagogue marriages showed that the proportion of brides or grooms who were divorcees was consistently lower than half the percentage of divorcees entering into another marriage in the general population of England and Wales.[4] However, these data underestimate the incidence of remarriage after divorce among British Jews: some divorcees remarry in a Register Office either by choice or because they have been unable to obtain a *get* (bill of divorcement) and therefore cannot marry in an Orthodox synagogue.

These civil marriages in a Register Office do not provide data on the religion of the spouses, so that there is no direct means of discovering from public records the numbers of civil marriages where one or both spouses, of whatever previous marital status, was or were Jewish. Consequently, it is to be expected that synagogue marriage registers will show a high proportion of unions between bachelors and spinsters and a correspondingly low proportion of weddings where one or both partners had been previously divorced. Table 1 confirms that throughout the 1980s, although there was an increase in the proportion of divorcees remarrying, more than 80 per cent of both brides and grooms marrying in a synagogue were marrying for the first time. The comparative proportions for the general population of England and Wales during the same period were 73 per cent of grooms and 74 per cent of brides. However, it must be remembered that there has been an overall decline in the *number* of all synagogue marriages while the incidence of remarriage has risen and that the proportion of synagogue marriages where both partners were marrying for the first time fell from 82 per cent in 1981 to 77 per cent in 1987.[5]

TABLE 1. Marital status of persons marrying in synagogue, selected years

		Grooms			*Brides*		
Year	*Total 100%*	*Bachelor*	*Widowed*	*Divorced*	*Spinster*	*Widowed*	*Divorced*
1981	1041	86.3	5.2	8.5	86.1	5.2	8.7
1983	1064	83.4	5.2	11.5	84.1	5.0	10.9
1985	1005	83.5	4.9	11.6	85.5	3.9	10.7
1987	916	82.3	4.8	12.9	83.1	4.8	12.1

Source: OPCS Tabulations

Kosmin and Waterman have reported that between 1974 and 1978, the proportion of synagogue marriages where both partners were marrying for the first time fell from 83.6 to 82.4 per cent.[6] The latest available data show a further seven per cent decline in first marriages since 1978. As is usual with overall trends, this pattern is not

homogeneous throughout the community, nor is it restricted to any one section of it. The Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies has been able to provide some rudimentary data on variations in marital status of brides and grooms between synagogal groups. In 1981, 11.8 per cent of those solemnizations authorized by the Chief Rabbi's Office involved at least one divorcee, but by 1988 that proportion had risen to 18.9 per cent. According to information provided for 1988 by 60 synagogues (mainly Progressive, but including one major Orthodox grouping), 27.9 of all weddings in those 60 synagogues had at least one partner remarrying after a divorce. Unfortunately, the Community Research Unit could not obtain data about marital status for weddings solemnized under the auspices of Right-wing Orthodox groups, which are popularly believed not to have incurred an increasing rate of divorce. (Although some informed observers have commented that even these sectors are being affected by the general rising divorce rate, these observers have not produced hard evidence.)

Age at Marriage

Two major factors influencing the incidence of, and subsequently the average age at, marriage are the age structure of the population and the attitudes of young persons concerning matrimony. The agedness of British Jewry[7] may lead to a later average age at marriage, despite the influence of the host society where there is a younger age at marriage. Moreover, one must bear in mind the international Jewish pattern of a comparatively late age at marriage in modern times. The data in Table II show that British Jews do marry in synagogue at a later age than do all brides and grooms in the general population.

TABLE II. Median age at marriage of bachelors and spinsters and of all marriages, selected years: synagogue marriages and England and Wales

	Synagogue Marriages		*England and Wales*	
MEN				
	Bachelors	*All grooms*	*Bachelors*	*All grooms*
1981	25.77	26.37	24.14	25.91
1983	25.12	27.08	24.48	26.30
1985	25.55	27.57	24.88	26.67
1987	26.61	27.80	25.29	27.00
WOMEN				
	Spinsters	*All brides*	*Spinsters*	*All brides*
1981	23.29	23.34	21.95	23.40
1983	23.70	24.70	22.33	23.81
1985	24.01	24.71	22.80	24.28
1987	24.33	25.37	23.30	24.75

Source: OPCS Tabulations

Admittedly, there has been a recent tendency in British society for marriage at an older age; but Jewish brides and grooms have still regularly been older than those in England and Wales generally. The median age of Jewish bachelors at marriage was on average in the 1980s just over a year (1.04) older than that for all bachelors in England and Wales, while the median age of Jewish spinsters marrying in a synagogue was on average 1.24 years above the general England and Wales level. However, the difference in median age is smaller when we consider all brides and grooms — not just spinsters and bachelors. Although, with the exception of brides in 1981, all Jewish brides and grooms were overall older than those in the general population, the difference was not as marked as for those marrying for the first time: the median age of all Jewish bridegrooms in synagogues was, on average, 0.74 years above that of all bridegrooms in England and Wales, while all Jewish brides were 0.45 years older than brides in the general population.

The change in median age at marriage for Jewish bachelors and spinsters has not been as marked as that of bachelors and spinsters in the general population of England and Wales in the 1980s. From 1981 to 1987, the median age at first marriage for Jewish men rose by 0.84 years while that of men in the general population rose by 1.15 years. For Jewish spinsters, the rise was 1.04 years as compared with 1.35 years for all spinsters. This difference in increase may be related to the fact that the average age of Jewish brides and grooms has for some time been higher than the average age of brides and grooms in the general population[8] and that the host society is only now showing a comparable change.

The comparative patterns of change are reversed when figures for *all* brides and grooms — not just those marrying for the first time — are considered. The median age at marriage rose by 1.43 years for all Jewish bridegrooms as against a rise of 1.09 years for all bridegrooms in the general population, and by 2.03 years for all Jewish brides as against a rise of 1.35 years for all brides in England and Wales; but these figures must be treated with caution, since they do not take account of civil remarriage after divorce. The remarriage of those who were widowed must also be kept in mind: in the case of Jewish widows and widowers, the age at remarriage has been about three years more than the age of those widowed and remarrying in the general population.

Community Replacement

Trends in synagogue weddings and knowledge of age and marital status at marriage may be utilized to throw light on communal containment. By using data on age at first marriage, we can estimate

the shortfall between potential and actual numbers of persons marrying for the first time in any one year. In 1970, Prais and Schmool showed that the then current fluctuations in annual totals of synagogue weddings mirrored to some extent the serious fluctuations in the numbers of synagogue weddings of the parental generation during the years of the Second World War.[9] Recent changes in social attitudes towards marriage and new styles of family formation no longer allow such assumptions, but it is still possible to calculate the numbers of bachelors and spinsters expected to marry; this in turn may help to estimate potential recruitment to the Jewish community.

The crude synagogue marriage rate is half the overall marriage rate of the general population and has been so since the 1960s, but it would be unsophisticated to base any predictions on this type of data, without taking into account differences in age structures. This difficulty is overcome by examining the Jewish and the general society's records of expected and of actual first marriages and by noting the differences between British Jewry and the general population of England and Wales in this respect. If we use the method adopted by Prais and Schmool and assume that the fertility ratios in the late 1950s and the early 1960s were the same for Jews as for the general population, the number of brides and grooms expected to reach the average age at first marriage in any year can be estimated by applying the ratio of births to marriages of the appropriate year to the number of synagogue weddings in that year.[10] For example, in 1981 the median age at first marriage for Jewish males was 26 years, giving 1955 as the year of birth. In 1955 in England and Wales, the ratio of legitimate male births to all marriages in the general population was 0.96 and the number of synagogue marriages was 2,158. By multiplying 2,158 by 0.96, we obtain an estimate of 2,072 Jewish men expected to reach the median age of first marriage in 1981. The parallel calculation for brides is based on the year 1957 and shows that 2,084 Jewish women would be expected to reach the median age at first marriage in 1981. The exercise was carried through for the Jewish and for the general populations and the results are presented in Table III. That Table shows a regular overall decline in the proportion of the expected numbers of brides and grooms who actually married, and the decline holds good for both men and women and for both the Jewish and the general population.

Some discrepancy between the expected and the actual numbers of marriages is not surprising, since not all persons survive to a marriageable age (approximately 2.6 per cent of men and 1.8 per cent of women die before the age of 25 years). Moreover, there has been for more than 20 years an increase in pre-marital cohabitation: in 1967 in England and Wales, about two per cent of all bachelors and spinsters had cohabited with the partners whom they eventually married while in 1987, the proportion had risen to 58 per cent of the men and 53 per

TABLE III. Expected and actual first marriages, males and females, selected years

	Jews			*General Population*		
	Expected marriages	*Actual marriages**	*Actual % of Expected*	*Expected ('000s)*	*Actual ('000s)*	*Actual % of Expected*
MALES						
1981	2072	984	47.5	371.2	259.1	69.8
1983	2287	964	42.2	384.3	251.8	65.5
1985	2142	931	43.5	405.5	253.3	62.5
1987	2214	837	37.8	431.2	258.7	60.0
FEMALES						
1981	2084	983	47.2	363.9	263.4	72.4
1983	2165	972	44.9	395.2	256.2	64.8
1985	2082	953	44.5	406.8	258.1	63.4
1987	2120	845	39.9	420.4	263.0	62.6

Sources: OPCS *Population Trends* 59, Spring 1990
Registrar General's *Statistical Review of England and Wales 1964* Part 11
OPCS Special Tabulations

* Estimated by applying the proportion of first marriages in the OPCS Special Tabulations to total numbers of synagogue marriages recorded by the Community Research Unit.

cent of the women who married in that year.[11] Clearly, cohabitation has delayed marriage; it has also in some cases replaced marriage, as is evident from the 25 per cent of births outside marriage in 1988. Furthermore, such births are being registered increasingly by both parents, from 49 per cent doing so in 1975 to 68 per cent in 1987.[12]

Table III shows that there is a difference of more than 20 per cent between the Jewish and the general rates of attained marriages, to the disadvantage of the Jewish community. However, this difference between the two groups has diminished since the early 1960s, when Jews attained about 72 per cent of expected first marriages at a time when the first marriages of the general population (with brides and grooms being younger than in previous years) were exceeding the expected numbers.

One explanation of this difference between the two groups is that the birth-to-marriage ratio, used to calculate expected numbers of individuals marrying for the first time, overestimates Jewish fertility in the 1950s and the early 1960s. The little available evidence indicates that the fertility of Jewish women at that time was 13 per cent below the national average.[13] If we take this lower fertility level into account, the ratio of actual to expected first marriages would be raised by between six and eight per cent, making the resulting achieved numbers of bachelors and spinsters marrying lower by some 13 per cent than the parallel case for the general population. Part of this additional

difference may be accounted for by emigration — not only to Israel (*aliyah*) but also to other countries — which, in turn, is offset by immigration of young Jews from abroad. With more native-born Jewish females than males marrying in British synagogues, we must presume that first-time brides marry some immigrant men, after allowing for an average six per cent of all the spinster brides marrying Jewish divorcees or widowers. Moreover, the national figures for the general population may have been augmented by the marriages of immigrants and their children, particularly from the British Commonwealth. Any allowances for these actual marriages would reduce the difference between the Jewish community and the general population even more.

Since post-war marriage trends in British Jewry were first charted in 1965, the gap between the general and the Jewish marriage rates has been regularly analysed. The model by Prais and Schmool for the 1960s indicated that for the period 1960–65, the shortfall between actual and expected synagogue weddings was 28 per cent; and for 1966–68, 31 per cent.[14] This present paper has shown that between 1981 and 1987, the shortfall for bachelors rose from 52 to 62 per cent while for spinsters the increase was smaller — from 53 to 60 per cent.

Conclusion

The internal communal shift from Progressive to Right-wing Orthodox marriage in recent years has led some observers to suggest that overall loss from all groups would be more than offset by the increasing numbers of weddings of strictly observant Jews. However, the Appendix shows that this has not been the case. Moreover, there has been a weakening of conventional Jewish marriage patterns,[15] as is revealed by the decline in first marriages in Table 1.

On the other hand, divorced men and divorced women have entered into second religious unions in increasing numbers: between 1981 and 1987, there was an increase from 88 to 118 men, and from 91 to 111 women, who had been divorced and who had their remarriage solemnized in a synagogue. We must also bear in mind that anecdotal evidence suggests that some British Jews may be following the national trend of cohabitation instead of (or before) marriage. These individuals may not be estranged from Judaism, especially if they are cohabiting with a Jewish partner, even if they do not eventually decide to enter into either a civil marriage or a religious union.

Appendix

Synagogue Marriages in Great Britain: annual averages 1971–1990; annual totals, 1986–1990

Year	*Central Orth.*	*Right-wing Orth.*	*Sephardi*	*Reform*	*Liberal*	*Total*
1971–75	1388.4*			224.8	128.6	1741.8
1976–80	899.4	97.8	43.2	189.8	88	1318.2
1981–85	763.8	102.4	40.4	179.2	67.6	1153.4
1986–90	692.2	112	48	172.6	55.8	1080.6
1986	699	122	46	160	70	1097
1987	659	96	43	184	62	1044
1988	702	121	56	182	46	1107
1989	679	118	47	170	43	1057
1990	722	103	48	167	58	1098

* Includes Sephardi and Right-wing Orthodox.

NOTES

[1] S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages in Great Britain: 1901–1965', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 2, June 1967 (pp. 149–74); S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'Synagogue Marriages in Great Britain 1966–8', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 12, no. 1, June 1970 (pp. 21–28); and Barry A. Kosmin and Stanley Waterman, 'Recent Trends in Anglo-Jewish Marriages', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 28, no. 1, June 1986 (pp. 49–58).

[2] Most London, and all except four provincial, Ashkenazi Orthodox synagogues require marriage authorization (the equivalent of a civil marriage licence) from this office before performing the marriage ceremony. Other Central Orthodox marriages are from the small Masorti group of synagogues, which is ideologically akin to the Conservative synagogue grouping in America; the number of marriages in this group each year is small and has been included with the mainstream figures, since the annual compilation of British Jewish marriage figures began in 1965.

[3] Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1986, p. 58.

[4] Kosmin and Waterman, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 54.

[5] The comparable figure for England and Wales in 1987 was 64 per cent. For a full discussion of the situation in England and Wales, see Maire Ni Bhrolchain, *Age Difference Asymmetry and a Two-Sex Perspective* (OPCS Longtitudinal Study Working Paper 70), London, 1990.

[6] Kosmin and Waterman, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 54, Table 11.

[7] Stanley Waterman and Barry Kosmin, *British Jewry in the Eighties: A Statistical and Geographical Study*, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1986, p. 11.

[8] Sergio DellaPergola, *Recent Trends in Jewish Marriage*, Occasional Paper: 1989–07, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem; 1989, p. 2.

[9] Prais and Schmool, 'Statistics of Jewish Marriages . . .', op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 159.

[10] Prais and Schmool, 'Synagogue Marriages . . .', op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 23.

[11] John Haskey and Kathleen Kiernan, 'Cohabitation in Great Britain — characteristics and estimated numbers of cohabiting partners', in *Population Trends* 58, London, OPCS, 1989, p. 25. See also Bruce Penhale, *Living Arrangements of Young Adults in France and England and Wales*, London: OPCS Longtitudinal Study Working Paper 68, 1990, p. 12.

[12] Kathleen Kiernan and Malcolm Wicks, *Family change and future policy*, Family Policy Studies Centre, London, 1990, p. 8.

[13] Prais and Schmool, 'Synagogue Marriages . . .', op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 24. In view of the increase in remarriage, the present calculations have been restricted to numbers of people marrying, and have not been taken further to give numbers of first marriages.

[14] Prais and Schmool, 'Synagogue Marriages . . .', op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 25.

[15] DellaPergola, op. cit. in Note 8 above, p. 29.

ANTI-JUDAISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Geoffrey Alderman

(Review Article)

GAVIN I. LANGMUIR, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism*, x + 417 pp., University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, 1990, $45.00

ROBERT S. WISTRICH, *Antisemitism. The Longest Hatred*, xxvi + 341 pp., Thames Methuen, London, 1991, £16.99.

TOWARD a Definition of Antisemitism is the second in what is planned as a triology of volumes exploring the relationship between hostility to the Jewish religion (anti-Judaism) and hostility to Jews (antisemitism).[1] When publication is complete, Professor Langmuir will have consolidated his reputation as one of the world's leading authorities on the origins of anti-Jewish prejudice, and more especially on the part played by Christendom in the development and refinement of ideas which led, from the massacres triggered by the proclamation of the First Crusade (1096), through the spread of a miscellany of fantastic notions crudely bracketed as 'The Blood Libel' (but which Professor Langmuir rightly subdivides into accusations of ritual crucifixion, ritual murder, and ritual cannibalism), to the preaching of Martin Luther against Jews ('We are all at fault in not killing them', said Luther.)

Professor Langmuir reminds us that Luther's pamphlet *The Jews and Their Lies* was reissued during the Third Reich, and that *Der Stürmer* felt it necessary to warn parents of the dangers their children might face if allowed into the company of Jews during Passover (p. 309). A compilation of Jewish laws and customs published in New York in 1927 noted that in 'the barbarous idiotic lands where they make false slanderous accusations (that the Jews use human blood on the night of Passover), people abstain from using red wine'.[2] If this is believed, nowadays, to be nothing more than a historical curiosity, it is worth recalling (as Professor Wistrich does in his volume under review here, at pp. 234–35) that in the contemporary Muslim world the Libel enjoys credibility 'even in seemingly scholarly tomes'. The last trial involving the 'Blood Libel' in Europe took place as recently as 1911 (the Beilis

case, in Kiev). So great have been the fears entertained within the Jewish world of the possible repercussions of the Libel that it is only within the past few years that the Board of Deputies of British Jews has permitted a small number of bona fide scholars to examine the notorious 'Burton Book' — in fact, a chapter (entitled 'Human Sacrifice amongst the Sephardim or Eastern Jews'), excised, after an epic legal struggle, from Sir Richard Burton's posthumously published volume, *The Jew, The Gypsy and El Islam*, which appeared in 1898.[3]

The accusation of ritual murder against Jews predates Christianity. It was recorded by the historian Posidonius in the second century BCE, was repeated in the first century BCE, and was mentioned disparagingly by Josephus, in his book *Against Apion*, in the first century CE. At the beginning of the fifth century CE, the accusation surfaced in relation to the Jews of Inmestar (Syria). Professor Langmuir cannot be certain that these records were unknown amongst clerics in England in the middle of the twelfth century, but the weight of his bibliographical and historiographical researches indicates that they were not and that, therefore, 'there was a complete discontinuity between the first accusation against Jews in antiquity and the first medieval accusation' (p. 214).

It was at Norwich, England, in about 1150, that the myth was reinvented by Thomas of Monmouth, who, 'on the basis of biased testimony and his own imagination' (p. 283), turned the murder in 1144 of the boy William into a grim story of martyrdom at the hands of the Jews: Norwich thus acquired its own patron saint — and the income to be derived thereby — while Thomas rescued himself from the obscurity that might otherwise have been his fate as a monk in the priory of Norwich Cathedral. During the twelfth century there were a number of incidents in which Jews — in England, France, and Germany — were accused of murdering Christians. Thomas of Monmouth was the first to accuse Jews of ritual crucifixion; the accusation gripped the medieval Christian imagination. At Blois, in 1171, many Jews were burned to death on its account; at Fulda (in Germany) in 1235, 34 Jews were murdered in similar circumstances, and although the then Emperor Frederick II subsequently absolved the Jews of Germany of the charge of ritual murder, and condemned the accusation as false, it had already succeeded in putting down deep roots throughout northern Europe. We encounter it again at Valréas (in eastern France) in 1247, and of course at Lincoln (1255), where the death of the boy Hugh, and the subsequent judicial execution of no less than 19 Jews on charges arising from his alleged murder for ritual purposes, were subsequently used by Chaucer as the basis for his 'Prioress's Tale', written 150 years later.

Why were these accusations made, and why were they believed? Noting that those who created the accusations, and those who

employed them as a means of inciting others to kill Jews, 'never said that they themselves had actually observed Jews doing any of those things' (ritual crucifixion, ritual cannibalism, the use of Christian blood in the Passover ceremony, etc.), Professor Langmuir offers as 'the primary explanation' for this new form of irrational hatred of Jews the fact that western Christianity itself was being undermined by self-doubt (p. 13). In particular, concepts and 'facts' then deemed essential to the Christian creed — such as the physical reality of the Resurrection, and the belief that Christ was physically present in the Eucharist — were being questioned by members of the Christian faith. If it could be proved – or at least if it could be said — that Jews indulged in activities based upon the empirical truth of these facts and upon the dogmatic credibility of these concepts, then the doubts could and would be swept away. Thus (in Professor Langmuir's view), the fact that the accusation that Jews tortured Christ by assaulting the consecrated host (the wafer used in the Catholic Mass) arose at the end of the thirteenth century was not accidental: for this particular charge surfaced at the end of a period during which the Papacy had had to go to extraordinary lengths — culminating in the institution of the Feast of Corpus Christi in 1264 — to reassure the faithful that the body and blood of Christ really were present in the bread and wine of the Eucharist (p. 307).

So it was that otherwise rational and highly educated men, such as Peter the Venerable, who in 1122 became abbot of Cluny, 'the greatest monastery in Latin Christendom' (p. 197), could none the less allow themselves to be driven by doubt — and by material considerations — into entertaining the most irrational beliefs about Jews. 'If the Saracens are to be detested', Peter wrote to the French King Louis VII in 1146, 'how much more are the Jews to be execrated and hated?'; 'God wishes them, not to be killed, but to be preserved in a life worse than death' (p. 201). It is in and through writings such as these that we can discern the beginnings of that shift in emphasis, from an anti-Judaic to an anti-Jewish discourse, that was to have such tragic consequences centuries later.

The bulk of Professor Langmuir's volume is concerned with the world of medieval western Europe, and brings together material which has, as he tells us, appeared elsewhere. But among the fourteen essays (three of which, including one on Peter the Venerable and another on Ritual Cannibalism, are new) is a superb critique of the historiography of the Jews that first appeared in *Jewish Social Studies* in 1968. This essay, 'Tradition, History, and Prejudice', should be compulsory reading for all Jewish historians who busy themselves with Jewish matters. Before I turn to Professor Wistrich's book I think it is worth quoting from this essay (p. 53) the following sentences:

> The main point that emerges from an examination of the way that Jews and the majority are treated in majority and Jewish historiography is that the

> more historical scholarship appeals to a particular group and fulfills the function of tradition or is dominated by a particular religious vision, the more it tends to ethnocentrism and prejudice . . . [This bias] rarely appears in works written by historians for historians . . . In historical writing and education for some general public, the viewpoint and needs of the audience all too often influence the presentation . . . What is needed is a clearer distinction between history as a branch of knowledge and the selective use of historical knowledge to further the interests, identity, or religion of a particular group.

Antisemitism. The Longest Hatred was written to accompany a series of three programmes broadcast in April 1991 on the Independent Television Network in Britain. The pitfalls to which Professor Langmuir draws attention in the passage just quoted are admirably illustrated in Professor Wistrich's tome. To begin with, although the author is fully aware that there are important and fundamental differences between anti-Judaism, antisemitism, and anti-Zionism, these sensitivities seem to me very imperfectly reflected in his discussion. Instead, the reader is offered literary snapshots of these very dissimilar forms of prejudice, as if they are simply variants of one 'hatred'.

They are not. The extent to which the Koran is antisemitic, and not just anti-Judaic, is a matter of some dispute, and remarks made by one Israeli speaker, on the third of the television programmes, were subsequently challenged by Islamic scholars as 'biased propaganda against Islam'.[4] Professor Wistrich devotes a chapter to 'The Question of Palestine', but I am far from convinced that Arab (and especially Palestinian–Arab) opposition to Zionism ought to be classified as in any meaningful sense antisemitic; indeed, the author himself admits (p. 250) that for Palestinian intellectuals 'their struggle for Palestinian national identity . . . is not governed by hatred of Jews . . . Their anti-Zionism is the other side of their affirmation of Palestinian national identity, a rejection of Israelis not as Jews but as conquerors and settlers'. If this is so, on what grounds has this particular chapter been included in the book? Would Professor Wistrich label the Ulster Protestants as racist simply because they are opposed to the aims of Irish Nationalists — or vice versa?

On the subject of anti-Jewish and anti-Judaic manifestations in Eastern Europe, Professor Wistrich is remarkably diffident. The grave political misjudgments made by Jewish leaders in various parts of the Habsburg Empire in the period 1867–1914, in allowing Jewish minorities (more especially in Galicia and the Bukovina) to be used by Vienna as counterweights to various emergent and predominantly Slav nationalisms, are hinted at — just about — but neither explored nor explained. Anti-Jewish prejudice in the USSR cannot be fully understood without grasping the part played by Jews in the implementation

of Stalinism. Turning to Rumania, Professor Wistrich admits that Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen's 'own role under the Ceaucescu regime is itself a problem', and he goes so far as to refer to the fact that Rabbi Rosen 'is alleged to have acquiesced' in human-rights abuses perpetrated by the late unlamented Rumanian dictator (p. 148). A little more light on this matter would not have been out of place.

Antisemitism. The Longest Hatred is a substantial volume, but I came away from it feeling that I had learned very little. I must also confess to an intense irritation at its literary style: words such as 'Caesaropapist' (p. 171), 'visceral antisemitism' (p. 140 and elsewhere), and 'Third Worldism' (p. 122) left me bewildered. As to the claim on the dust-jacket, that the book 'will be indispensable to the general reader', I prefer to exercise the right of silence.

NOTES

[1] The first volume, *History, Religion, and Antisemitism* was reviewed in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 33, no. 1, June 1991.

[2] Rabbi S. Ganzfried, *Code of Jewish Law*, Trans. H. E. Goldin, New York, 1927, chapter cxviii, para. 1.

[3] The late Dr Vivian Lipman examined this manuscript in 1988, and subsequently discussed its contents with me. It was his opinion that Burton had plagiarized the chapter from a book published in Paris in 1846, entitled *Relation Historique des Affaires de Syrie . . .*, written by 'Achille Laurent', possibly a pen-name adopted by the French Consul in Damascus at the time of the Damascus Affair (1840), of which the Blood Libel was the central feature. The legal efforts of the Board of Deputies to purchase the copyright and so suppress publication of the chapter are described in Colin Holmes, *Anti-Semitism in British Society, 1876–1939*, London, 1979, pp. 49–54.

[4] *Jewish Chronicle*, 31 May 1991, p. 6.

BOOK REVIEWS

JEREMY COHEN, ed., *Essential Papers on Judaism and Christianity in Conflict, From Late Antiquity to the Reformation*, xiv + 578 pp., New York University Press, New York and London, 1990, $31.50 (hardback $75.00).

NAOMI A. COHEN, ed., *Essential Papers on Jewish-Christian Relations in the United States: Imagery and Reality*, x + 378 pp., New York University Press, New York and London, 1990, $31.00 (hardback $75.00).

ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, ed., *Israel and Diaspora Jewry: Ideological and Political Perspectives*, 258 pp., Bar-Ilan University Press, Ramat Gan, 1991, n.p.

Through its *Essential Papers* series, New York University Press is making available a range of texts (primarily articles and essays) on various aspects of Jewish studies. The volumes reviewed here, edited by Jeremy and Naomi Cohen, cover Jewish–Christian relations in, respectively, medieval Europe and the USA. To the expert they will offer nothing new, therefore; but for the general reader, and the ever-burgeoning number of students on Jewish-studies programmes, they bring together a wealth of core secondary material, while the commentaries offered by the editors aim to place this material in critical comparative contexts.

How well are these tasks carried out? The intelligent lay-person's vision of medieval Jewry is often heavily skewed by images of penalties and persecutions, of book-burning and blood-libels, of individual martyrdoms and collective massacres. I periodically re-read the Calendar of the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews, dating from thirteenth-century England (and published by the Jewish Historical Society of England) just to remind myself, and my children, that the exercise of the most basic of freedoms (such as fetching a midwife to assist a woman in labour) involved European Jews in financial penalties and physical risks, punctuated (both in England and in mainland Western Europe) by periodic assaults upon property and persons.

Nevertheless, until the end of the thirteenth century, Jews certainly survived in Western Europe, and even flourished. Attempts to entice them into conversion were generally unsuccessful. Jewish polemicists propagandized against the Christian assaults upon their faith; indeed, some Christians were sufficiently impressed to consider embracing Judaism, and a few actually did so. Partly as a consequence, and

certainly in the early medieval era, the Roman Catholic Church was forced into extreme measures to counter the attractions of Judaism. Rabbinical dicta designed to restrict contact between Jews and non-Jews were mirrored by Christian decrees having the same end in view. As early as the year 456, at the Council of Vannes, Christians were forbidden to eat at a Jewish table, while the Council of Orleans (533) ruled against mixed marriages.

These instances feature in Bernard Blumenkranz's essay, 'The Roman Church and the Jews', which first appeared in *The Dark Ages*, edited by Cecil Roth in 1966, and which forms one of the most lucid of the contributions included in Jeremy Cohen's volume. In all, that editor offers nineteen essays, reflecting a wide range of scholarship on themes as diverse as 'The Dead Sea Sect and Pre-Pauline Christianity' (David Flusser), Solomon Grayzel's classic study of 'The Papal Bull *Sicut Judeis*' (an essay dating from 1962, and dealing with the early twelfth-century decree protecting Jewish privileges), Salo Baron's 'John Calvin and the Jews' (which was first published in 1965), and Kenneth Stow's examination of the background to 'The Burning of the Talmud [by decree of the Roman Inquisition] in 1553' (first published in 1972).

In an Introduction of some 34 pages, Jeremy Cohen attempts to put all these contributions in context. 'At virtually every stage', he argues, 'Jews responded to Christian attacks upon Judaism in kind' (p. 33). For example, 'when Christians attacked Jews during the Crusades to avenge the martyrdom of Jesus, Hebrew chroniclers proclaimed the superiority of Jewish martyrdom. In the century of the first Christian condemnations of the Talmud, Jewish polemicists began to read, to cite, and to criticize the New Testament' (pp. 33–34). Cohen's Introduction is crisp, even pithy, but it lacks two qualities essential to the success of a volume such as the one under review here. It offers the novice, the intelligent non-specialist, no overview of the subject-matter. The absolute beginner must begin somewhere else: having done so, he or she will find Jeremy Cohen's selection indispensable. Moreover, it is not sufficiently critical. The inclusion of Cecil Roth's essay entitled 'The Medieval Conception of the Jew', which was first published in 1938, is totally justified. But medieval scholarship has moved on since then. Where are the contributions from Gavin Langmuir, or from Jonathan Riley-Smith — to name but two contemporary medievalists (neither of whom is Jewish, incidentally), whose efforts have done so much to revise our thinking about Jewish–Christian relations in medieval Europe?

Naomi Cohen's companion volume deals with Jewish–Christian relations in the United States of America. The book is slimmer than Jeremy's, and more tightly controlled. It features fifteen essays in five thematic sections, each section preceded by an introduction which

does, at an admittedly elementary level, offer a chronological and comparative historiographical overview. Thus, the four essays on the theme of 'The Christian Component of American Antisemitism' follow an introduction which, though short, none the less manages to refer to the seminal work of Oscar Handlin, John Highman, and Lloyd P. Gartner.

It is a pity (and somewhat puzzling) that Gartner's thesis, that an important strand in American–Christian thinking about Jews actually prevented the spread of anti-Jewish prejudice, is not represented in its own right in Naomi Cohen's collection. In the summer of 1991, I accepted an invitation to attend, in Jerusalem, a Workshop on University Teaching of Contemporary Jewish Civilization and specifically on antisemitism. Participants from the USA (I recall with special affection Leonard Dinnerstein, from Texas, and David Singer, Director of Research at the American Jewish Committee) were adamant that anti-Jewish prejudice was no longer a feature of significance in the American–Jewish experience, and that the continued existence of the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League could be explained simply as an instance of the successful regeneration of a self-perpetuating and self-justifying bureaucracy.

If this is indeed the case, historians need to explain an apparent slump in the barometer of American antisemitism after 1945. Before the Second World War, antisemitism appeared to have been as sturdy and deep-rooted a plant in the New World as it was in the Old, drawing strength from Christian stereotypes which underpinned social and economic prejudices. The infamous exclusion of President Ulysses S. Grant's friend, the banker Joseph Seligman, from the Grand Union Hotel at Saratoga in 1877 because he was Jewish, is often taken as marking a new departure in the development of anti-Jewish prejudice in the USA. In fact, as Naomi Cohen herself points out in her own contribution to the volume she has edited (an article on 'Antisemitism in the Gilded Age', first published in 1979), the arrival in America of German Jews, in the 1840s and 1850s, had already excited economic envy, which grew during the maelstrom of the Civil War.

Christian revivalism, which was both a cause and consequence of that tragic conflict, added its own pernicious ingredient to the brew, and the arrival of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe set the mixture firmly on the boil. Add to that the numerous attempts, by both Protestants and Catholics, to inject Christianity into the fabric of the American Constitution; the prominence of Jews in American socialist movements; the part played by Jews (and especially by Rabbi Dr Judah Magnes) in American pacifism during the First World War; and the isolationism that was such a central feature of popular culture and politics in America in the 1920s and 1930s; remember that American medical schools operated blatant anti-Jewish quotas during those two

decades (sending bright American-Jewish medical students scurrying across to Scotland to obtain their qualifications, as shown by Kenneth Collins in Chapter 6 of his *Go and Learn: The International Story of Jews and Medicine in Scotland*, Aberdeen, 1988); put all these factors into the equation, and then marvel that anti-Jewish prejudice in the USA was not more virulent.

Part of the answer is certainly to be found in the philosemitism that has been such a marked feature of particular strands of American Protestantism. Egal Feldman's essay 'American Protestant Theologians on the Frontiers of Jewish–Christian Relations, 1922–1982', offers pen-portraits of the three most outstanding exponents of this trait: George F. Moore (1851–1931), the charismatic Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971), and Niebuhr's pupil A. Roy Eckardt. American Protestant theologians have been among the most vocal in describing the Holocaust as a negation of Christian values and — in a real sense — more inimical to Christianity than to Judaism. This line of argument is well represented, in Naomi Cohen's collection, by a short article published in 1974 by Eckardt's wife, Alice, and by an extract from Professor Robert Ross's monograph, *So It Was True: The American Protestant Press and the Nazi Persecution of the Jews*, which appeared in 1980.

But philosemitism, it seems to me, will not do as a complete explanation of the relative security of Jews in America since the Holocaust. The social situation of American Jews, the comparative affluence of American society, not least the predominance of Judaism in various non-Orthodox and assimilationist varieties, have all played a part. It is not fortuitous that the most dramatic manifestations of anti-Jewish sentiment in the USA in recent years have involved Orthodox Jews, and that the anit-Jewish riots which took place in Brooklyn in the summer of 1991 involved highly visible Orthodox Jews and under-privileged Blacks. These issues are, of course, quite beyond the scope of Naomi Cohen's volume. None the less, the superficial references to them (occurring mainly in 'American Christians and Israel, 1948–1988', by C. H. Voss and D. A. Rausch, first published in *American Jewish Archives* in 1988) leave a great deal unsaid.

The accusation of dual loyalty has featured in the corporate armoury of American antisemitism, but its edge has been considerably blunted by the very nature of American society, in which all are immigrants except the Red Indians. If American Jews acknowledge obligations to two sovereign states, what is one to say of the Irish Americans or even — to stretch a point but not to stretch it too far — of the Slovene-American diaspora? In Western Europe, and in the Muslim Middle East, however, the accusation of Jewish 'cosmopolitanism' has managed to strike very deep, and often with tragic results.

The re-establishment of a Jewish State, in 1948, marked a turning-point also in the development of the charge of 'dual loyalty' against the

Jews. To profess allegiance both to a state and to a religious creed is and always has been commonplace, not to say meritorious. But to profess allegiance to two states is something very different. The relationship between Western Jewries and the State of Israel was the major theme of a conference organized at Bar-Ilan University by the Shlomo Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People. Seventeen original papers presented at that gathering have been edited by Professor Eliezer Don-Yehiya. The theme of 'dual loyalty' is to a greater or lesser extent evident in all of them.

It is of course true, as Professor Emanuel Rackman explains in his contribution to the volume, that the Western democracies have come to recognize, and indeed to facilitate, the right of their citizens to embrace a variety of loyalties, even extending to the concept of dual nationality. I do not know the number of British citizens simultaneously holding French nationality, and vice versa; but the number is bound to be very small and, in any case, does not involve (as far as I am aware) any other common bond. The unique combination of qualities that make up 'Jewishness', and the historical burdens imported into that concept over the centuries, do mean that 'dual nationality' is never going to be a very safe answer to the charge of 'dual loyalty', where the objects of the charge are Jews.

In any case, most Jews in the Western diasporas are not going to accept 'dual nationality', in its legal sense, even though many of them behave as if it were a political reality (for example in their approach to party politics, and to the media). Is it unfair, therefore, for the Gentile world to hold them accountable, at least in some degree, for the policies and actions of the State of Israel? At one level the answer must be a resounding 'yes', because diaspora Jewries enjoy none of the voting rights and political obligations of Israeli citizens. But in relation to economic and financial relationships the responsibility of diaspora Jews for what is done in and by Israel must be acknowledged, at least to some extent, and especially by the Jewish communities of the USA.

By the middle of the next century it is likely that there will be only three centres of significant Jewish existence in the world: in Israel, in the territories of the Soviet Union, and in the USA. As to the Soviet Jews, the future is uncertain and possibly bleak. In the USA the Jews are overwhelmingly non-Orthodox. In Israel the Haredim (the ultra-Orthodox) have tasted power, and have developed a liking for it. They and their counterparts in the USA may regard the State of Israel as an affront to the Judaism they profess; but they retain a keen and growing interest in its governance, as Daniel Gutenmacher demonstrates in his paper on 'Agudath Israel of America and the State of Israel'.

The reason is not difficult to discern. The centre of gravity in the world of the Jewish non-Orthodox is firmly located in the USA.

Professor Chaim Waxman, of Rutgers University, reminds us in his essay 'Religion and State in Israel: The Perspective of American Jewry', that the religious parties in Israel would be ill-advised to ignore American-Jewish public opinion, more especially on the question of possible amendment of the Israeli Law of Return in a manner detrimental to the interests of Reform and Conservative Judaisms.

There is a tremendous irony here. In the early years of Israel's existence much was heard, and made, of the ideology of *mamlakhtiut* ('statism') more particularly as formulated and purveyed by David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister. According to this ideology (explored from different perspectives in articles by Giora Goldberg and Yosef Gorni), Israel was the guardian of the Jewish world, and therefore had the right and the duty to speak and act on behalf of Diaspora Jews, and even to decide what the interests of these Jewries really were. The Haredim of Jerusalem and B'nai B'rak are Ben-Gurion's true disciples, arrogating to themselves the right to determine the religious parameters of the Jewish State which they have only gradually come to accept. In time they will attempt to impose those parameters upon world Jewry in general and upon American Jewry in particular. The relationship between Israel and Diaspora Jewry will then undergo its greatest test.

GEOFFREY ALDERMAN

BARBARA BALLIS LAL, *The Romance of Culture in an Urban Civilization — Robert E. Park on race and ethnic relations in cities*, 208 pp., Routledge, London and New York, 1990, £35.00.

This biographic account of Robert E. Park makes pleasant reading despite it being somewhat repetitious. The reasons are many. It encompasses a wider field, including the contributions of the Chicago School to the sociology of race and ethnic relations. The author, as it would be expected, provides interesting details and pungent quotations from Park's writings. And most laudable, Ballis Lal writes in a non-aggressive yet persuasive manner, giving the reader her own positive view concerning the value of Park's ideas and theories — balanced, however, with some critique and reservations.

Park, together with W. I. Thomas and the entire Chicago School, including later modifiers such as Herbert Blumer, provide a sociological paradigm based on ethnographic research principles and the theoretical perspective of symbolic interactionism. The idea is to 'reveal the subjective world of the actor's experience' (p. 29), bringing the sociologist to full awareness of the centrality of culture and communication in human life — which requires of him to know the history and culture of the group he investigates.

The attractiveness and legitimacy of such an approach cannot be denied. Yet Ballis Lal highlights a number of weaknesses in Park's approach and that of the Chicago School as well. Thus, Park overestimated the role of communication and empathy in mitigating racial injustice. He had a romantic vision of a 'moral brotherhood', and his interpretation of social control, as essentially self-control emphasizing the volitional aspects of action, deflected him from 'the limitations arising from the differential distribution of resources, and in particular economic and political power' (p. 63).

Again, Park's lack of interest in social class and the role of power in influencing race and ethnic relations was 'an inevitable consequence of the omission of a concept of social structure from his general perspective' (p. 64). Others, like Blumer, still wedded to the Chicago School have reformulated the paradigm by claiming that 'the intersubjective orientations of individuals and groups . . . must themselves always be considered in the context of objective social conditions, including the activities of government and political interest groups' (p. 65). But in their opposition to sociological determinism and the reification of social relationships, they perpetuate the gap between themselves — seeing the social world as an open and constantly changing social process — and others, like E. C. Hughes and Morris Janowits, who emphasize the importance of the macroscopic character of group life and the institutionalized aspects of society. It was Erving Goffman, also trained at Chicago, who tried to bridge the gap by 'defining the situation' of the idiosyncratic individual, thus setting the parameters for interaction.

Reading this book reminds us in particular of two things. One is that the 'ethnicity paradox' is still applicable to today's scene: namely, that ethnic identification and the continuity of ethnic traditions in the immigrants' new homeland — that is, a pluralistic approach — is more conducive to acculturation to the American way of life than are immediate submission and conformity. The other is that the debate between the enthnographers giving us the rich material from the large urban industrial areas of early twentieth-century modernizing America, as well as their insights predicting the developing race and ethnic consciousness, and the tidier-than-real structuralists attempting to produce social scientific generalizations, is still continuing at the end of the century, and is likely to continue for a long time to come.

For all those involved in studying ethnic relations, and for whom ploughing through the classics is a daunting task, this book is certainly 'essential reading'.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

NAFTALI LOEWENTHAL, *Communicating the Infinite. The Emergence of the Habad School*, xi + 336 pp., University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, $45.95 or £31.95.

Renan once said that the person best qualified to study a religion is a former adherent of that religion — a dubious proposition to which Naftali Loewenthal gives the lie in this splendid study. Loewenthal frankly acknowledges his own deep personal commitment to the *Habad*/Lubavitch school and yet manages successfully to treat the emergence of this version of Hassidism without bias and with complete scholarly objectivity, combining socio-political with philosophical analysis to produce a work, replete with copious footnotes, that promises to be the last word on this difficult but fascinating topic.

Contrary to the conventional view, the Hassidic movement was not, at first, 'mysticism for the masses', as it has been called, but an élitist way for the few pneumatics and charismatics yearning for an ascent of soul into the realms of the *Merkavah* (the Divine Chariot seen by the prophet Ezekiel) — in the Kabbalah, the mystical realm of the *Sefirot*, the powers or potencies of the Godhead in manifestation emanating from the *En Sof*, the Limitless, impersonal Ground of Being. But the Baal Shem Tov (1698–1720), the founder of the movement, had the ambition to bring some of the joy and raptures he and his associates had experienced to wider circles, with the inevitable tensions that resulted between the mystical flight and the realities of Jewish life in Eastern Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. One of the main complaints of the *Mitnaggedim* (the opponents of Hassidism), was that to attempt to convey the mysteries to ordinary people was to court disaster: mystic fervour would bring about an attitude of indifference to the practical observances upon which traditional Judaism is based. Aware of this danger, the majority of the later Hassidic Rebbes discouraged reflection on the Kabbalistic map of the *Sefirot*, substituting for it the ideal of *devekut* (attachment to God in mind and heart). *Habad*, on the other hand, coped with the problem by seeking to cater for different types of devotees, each according to his intellectual and spiritual capacity.

Habad was founded by R. Shneur Zalman of Liady (d. 1812) and developed by his son and successor, R. Dov Baer (d. 1827). The latter settled in the Russian town of Lubavitch, hence the name Lubavitchers by which the Hassidim belonging to this group are known today. *Habad* stands for *Hokhmah* (Wisdom), *Binah* (Understanding) and *Daat* (Knowledge), the names of three of the highest *Sefirot*, representing the divine thought processes, so to speak, mirrored in man's psychic life. The aim of the true mystical adept is to link his soul with the divine realm by a process of severe contemplation on the *Merkavah*, in which he attains to the stage of *bittul ha-yesh* (annihilation of selfhood). I recall witnessing a prominent Lubavitcher Hassid, R. Yitzhak Horowitz

(known as R. Yitzhak Masmid) spending a whole hour lost in silent contemplation of the first verse of the *Shema*. The same teacher, in obedience to the doctrine of *bittul ha-yesh*, would never use the personal pronoun 'I' in his conversation.

Obviously such elevated states were for the few only, for the Rebbe and a very small number of his more dedicated followers. And yet the aim of *Habad* was to 'communicate the Infinite' to all the Hassidim — to the scholars, the artisans, the business men and even, to some extent, to the women. The solution was to encourage contemplation at different levels, as has been noted above, and to seek to provide the *bittul ha-yesh* aim in less demanding form — for example, by the intense study of the Torah for the Talmudic scholars who, as they discussed complicated legal topics of little relevance to daily, practical life, were, none the less, linked to the divine mind and will, the Source of these laws, and thus were also, in a sense, lost in the divine. For ordinary persons, *bittul ha-yesh* could be attained by *mesirat nefesh* (self-sacrifice) that is, by living up to the onerous demands of a life of Torah amid all the troubles with which Jews were beset in a hostile environment. Loewenthal describes all this with great erudition, utilizing archival and other source material in a keenly critical approach in which the strivings of his heroes are seen as conditioned, to some extent, at least, by the social, economic, and political circumstances of their day and age.

The following observations are not intended to detract from the value of this model study. Like many other students of Hassidism (including the master, Gershom Scholem) I used to accept, as Loewenthal still does, the authenticity of the famous letter of the Baal Shem Tov, published at the end of R. Jacob Joseph of Pulannoye's *Ben Porat Yosef* in 1771. But now I have my doubts. Is it not odd that a letter, in which the Baal Shem Tov remarks that, in an ascent of soul, he saw the Messiah who told him that he would come when the Baal Shem Tov's teachings would have spread abroad, should appear out of the blue just at a time when the Hassidic movement was being heavily attacked? And if R. Jacob Joseph had this letter in his possession all the time, as it is claimed, why did he make no reference to its contents in any of the sayings he quoted in his work in the name of his master, the Baal Shem Tov?

Loewenthal (pp. 205–08) has an excursus on 'Hasidic teachings for a Non-Jew' — the 'non-Jew' in question being either the Russian Tsar or the Governor of Vitebsk, to whom a truly remarkable letter is addressed in which are conveyed Hassidic and Kabbalistic teachings on what can only be described as a Hassidic understanding of the divine right of Gentile kings. This missive cannot bear the weight Loewenthal gives it — that the early *Habad* leaders, in their efforts at wider communication of Hassidic ideas, extended their concern to the non-Jewish world. He should have mentioned that, in the *Tanya* (the

classic work of R. Shneur Zalman), Gentiles are said to have no 'divine soul' and that even their 'natural soul' comes from a tainted spiritual source.

In the light of Loewenthal's objective approach, it is more than a little odd that, without any Halakhic warrant, he prefers throughout the spelling 'G-d' for God; this is particularly inexcusable when that form is substituted for the full spelling given in the works of other scholars whom he quotes. These are, however, comparatively minor matters. Loewenthal's heroes tried mightly to communicate the Infinite. He is to be congratulated in carrying out so well the possibly less glamorous but no less worthy task of communicating the finite.

LOUIS JACOBS

WERNER E. MOSSE, Co-ordinating editor, *Second Chance: Two Centuries of German-speaking Jews in the United Kingdom*, xiii + 654 pp., J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), for the Leo Baeck Institute, Tübingen, 1991, DM 128.

Many symposia which grow out of conferences or seminars (as this volume did out of a seminar held in Cambridge in 1988) are disappointing owing to the diversity of subjects and approaches. Moreover, the papers are often uneven in quality. The present offering from the Leo Baeck Institute, consisting of thirty-five essays with a preface by Sir Claus Moser, is a welcome exception. There is scarcely a contribution which is not illuminating on the aspect of the subject alloted to it. The volume deserves the most careful study not merely by those who for one reason or another are attracted to the particular themes of the authors, but by anyone who regards the problem of migration and acculturation as central to our understanding of society, and likely to become even more central to our concerns as we appear to be entering another period of *völkerwanderung*.

The achievement is the more remarkable in that even if one stretches the term 'Jew' to include Jews who had abandoned their ancestral faith and who had even accepted conversion either before their arrival in Britain or thereafter, the numbers involved are not very large whether measured against the total body of Jewry or indeed against Britain's Jewish population. The first such migration was in the eighteenth century, when a limited number of Ashkenazim (from Central and Eastern Europe) who were mainly of low social status came to Britain to join their more numerous and better-placed Sephardi brethren; but the total number of Jews in Britain remained comparatively small during the period of the Napoleonic wars and of the emancipation of Western and Central European Jewry.

The second migratory wave occurred when Britain's early industrialization attracted, mainly for economic and occasionally for political

reasons, a comparatively small but important section of the German-Jewish economic élite. Out of these immigrants and their descendants came the important though limited concentration of Jewish enterprise in a number of provincial industrial towns and the role, heralded by the Rothschilds, that Jews were to come to play in financial circles in the city of London. The interest of this phase of the immigration lies more in its contributions to the British economy and to some aspects of cultural life (notably music) than in relation to the Jewish community of Britain itself — which failed to build up those centres of specifically Jewish learning that existed or were coming to exist in continental Europe. The third and final group were Jews from Germany and Austria who in the 1930s found their way into the United Kingdom against many obstacles; they made an important contribution to Jewish religious and cultural activity and a major input into the culture of the host country.

The dilemma posed by the smallness of the numbers of people involved, which makes it hard to apply the statistical methods that are the bread and butter of modern sociology, has been overcome in two ways. In the first place, the papers in this volume deal not only with the effect of migration upon the immigrants and their children, but also with the nature of their welcome or of their rejection by the host society. It thus illuminates both Jewish and British attitudes towards new immigrant Jews and the consequent policies adopted by native Jewry and by the British government. In the second place, individual experiences can be briefly alluded to and simple lists of names may sometimes be sufficient to make either a negative or a positive point — for instance, many natural scientists but few social scientists. However, both sets of inquiries have pitfalls of their own.

In view of the often harsh criticism of British policy in the 1930s and in the war years, the lack of a comparative dimension is regrettable. Since the tragedy of Hitler's Europe encompassed the Jews of almost all Germany's continental neighbours, it would not be easy to envisage what a similar study might have made of the Netherlands, or Belgium, or France where Jews had also sought refuge. The country that does figure over and over again is the United States; but as the authors all admit, one is there dealing with a country built out of immigrants rather than with a long-established, comparatively homogeneous national community. Nevertheless, the duty of rescuing the persecuted was given so little weight in face of the 'quota' system established after the First World War, that the record of the United States in this regard is hardly a proud one. Humanitarian instincts were more alive in Whitehall and Westminster than in the White House or on Capitol Hill.

At first sight, this is less obvious for those German Jews whose names became famous in science or the arts or as scholars and who, after a

preliminary stay in Britain, found a permanent refuge in the United States. That they could do this was very largely owing to the expanding system of higher education and research which America enjoyed at the time and could afford to fund. Britain was as ready as the United States to permit the settlement of individuals with a 'contribution' to make; but it lacked the institutional means (both academic and industrial) fully to implement such a policy. The receptivity to newcomers in any society is not merely a function of prejudice or of the lack of it; it also depends upon the health of the economy and its impact upon particular forms of employment. Sometimes, as is often the case in the British medical profession, there is an innate conservatism which refuses to recognize that there may be things which are better done elsewhere, and such resistance is too like hypocrisy for comfort.

When one is dealing with the interaction between immigrant individuals or groups and a host society, one needs to know a good deal about both and to have some sensitivity to nuances. On the whole, the authors here assembled come well out of this test, but there is bound to be the occasional lapse — particularly when some of the contributors to this volume are themselves German. Rudolf Muhs has some interesting things to say about Jews of German background in German politics — more than one might have thought. But his remarks about the Privy Council and about the House of Lords suggest that he is not properly aware of the role of either. Alfons Söllner is right to call attention to the failure to absorb many social scientists into British universities and to point out that this arose from the comparatively limited development of the disciplines of the social sciences in the Britain of the 1930s. (The same point is made by Mitchell G. Ash with particular reference to psychology.) But occasionally, Söllner's touch is uncertain: it is true that Moritz Bonn's appointment to a chair at the London School of Economics was unusual, and a tribute to his international reputation for his works on 'British colonial history and modern imperialism', as well as on 'Western capitalism and democracy in general' but when Dr Söllner goes on to write: 'Apparently he taught these subjects in complete accordance with the old Commonwealth orientation and could therefore be considered an Englishman by adoption' (p. 135), he is in fact obviously unfamiliar with the subject.

Peter Lasko's chapter on the fine arts is one of the volume's highlights. It is curious that while fine arts, and above all the study of fine arts within an historical framework, received a major impetus from the arrival of German refugees in the 1930s (as well as fine-art publishing, which figures in a separate chapter on publishing by Uwe Westphal), musical life — with the glittering exception of the Amadeus Quartet — did not, though Germany might be thought to be more central to the latter than to the former. And even Professor Lasko, with all his experience in British academe, can go astray on the detail: he

talks of the distinguished art historian Otto Pächt establishing himself in the 'relatively minor position of a fellow of Oriel College'; but a fellow of an Oxford college in the 1930s would not be considered as holding a minor position and Pächt himself had not come to England with a German professorship — according to Professor Lasko, he had been only a 'lecturer' (*privatdozent*?) at Heidelberg.

Dr Hoffmann's study of the contribution of the refugees to British historiography is both wide-ranging and well-informed; he is no doubt right in pointing out that once again it was the United States which ultimately profited most from the German-Jewish exodus, particularly in relation to the study of more modern periods. As for Britain, the immigrants provided an important infusion of skills and new approaches to both classical and medieval studies. When considering the youngest generation, those who came as children and who received the bulk of their education in Britain, it is odd to find the name of Professor Karl Leyser omitted; the medieval German Empire, which had been neglected in the Anglo-Norman context of much British medieval historical study and teaching, has certainly been put back in the centre of the stage by Leyser's work.

In scholarly and scientific studies, the impact of a migration is always complicated. It is not just a question of importing other people's knowledge and ideas into the host country, it is a matter of establishing the kind of dialogue between the newcomers and their hosts which creates a new synthesis to which both have contributed. In this respect, Dr Paul Hoch's brief chapter on the contributions of German-Jewish refugees to physics is a model of what can be done. Dr Weindling's essay on the problems which arose in respect of medical science, while interesting in itself, does not dig so deep. He naturally mentions the role of Sir Ernst Chain in the development of the curative properties of penicillin. (Chain incidentally illustrates one of the problems of definition, since though born and educated in Berlin, his father had come from Russia — was Chain a German Jew or an Eastern European Jew, *ostjüde*?) What Dr Weindling does not point out is that Chain's approach, both at the time of the research on penicillin and subsequently in the development of antibiotics, was based upon an appreciation of the necessary connection between pure science and industry, familiar to Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany but looked at askance by part of British academe and neglected to its cost by much of British industry to this day.

The occasional omissions and minor gaps do not detract from the merits of this volume, seen as a whole. No doubt other readers will find other aspects of a particular contribution not as well treated as they would have wished. In condemning the hardships imposed by the mass internment of the 1940s, a number of contributors (and in particular John Fox) fail to distinguish the difference between refugees from a

country with whom the host nation is at peace and one with whom it is engaged in a life and death struggle for survival — Britain's case in 1940. If one looks at the treatment by the United States of its citizens of Japanese descent, with no substantial threat of invasion, the British decision about internment becomes easier to understand. The immigrants were interned not because they were Jews (that is, not as a result of antisemitism) but because they were Germans. And the reaction of the refugees themselves proved considerably more understanding than that of the historians who were not even born at that time, or who were infants then.

There is something a little artificial in the limitation imposed by the book's title to the German-speaking Jews of the United Kingdom. In fact, it has not been possible to adhere to the limits of that title literally, since the subsequent fortunes in the United States of so many of the refugees of the 1930s have had to be considered. Ideally, the volume should have included all the territories for which the government of the United Kingdom was responsible — including, above all, Palestine under the British Mandate. The development of British policy can only be understood (not, I would add, justified) by emphasizing that it was under a dual pressure both to allow refugees to come to Britain itself, and at the same time to step up the pace of admissions into Palestine. In the case of the training given to the young among the refugees, alluded to but not fully investigated, this aspect is of particular importance. And in such a remarkable volume of Jewish history, it is extraordinary that no Israeli scholar has been asked to (or has been willing to?) contribute.

We are considering here, as most of the authors accept, a story that is drawing to its close. Whether in the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel, or more rarely back in Germany, the German-speaking Jews have been incorporated (or are being incorporated) into the general Jewish community or even into the wider society of the host country. By the time of the influx in the 1930s, such a process had already occurred in respect of the earlier Jewish immigrants. But unlike those Russians who left their country after the Bolshevik Revolution, the exiles from Germany did not try to build up the kind of inward-looking communities that for generations tried to keep alive a vanished culture. In part, this was no doubt because the Nazi era lasted for only about twelve years, while it has taken more than seventy years to witness the downfall of Bolshevism. This does not mean that German Jews were incapable of developing institutions of their own, when the need arose; the Leo Baeck Institute is the most remarkable of them.

We are also considering in relation to the 1930s and the 1940s a great human tragedy; the tale even of those individuals who were rescued is bound to be a sombre one. There is understandably not much humour in this book, despite the attention given to the cabaret and to cartoons.

But perhaps the dignity of history should permit one such comment to appear. One wonders if the writers of this volume, particularly the younger ones, are aware that in native Anglo-Jewry the newcomers were referred to as the *Beiunsers*. '*Bei uns* ['at home' — that is, in Germany], things were done differently and better'. The affection for Germany which was thus demonstrated may help to explain the post-war reconciliation of Jews and Germans — to which this volume and its contributors from Germany give an abiding testimony.

MAX BELOFF

BERNARD WASSERSTEIN, *The British in Palestine. The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict 1917–1929*, xiv + 273 pp., 2nd edition, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, £35.00.

Professor Wasserstein's important book was originally published by the Royal Historical Society in 1978. Since the series in which it appeared has a fairly restricted circulation, it is useful to have the book more widely available from a commercial publisher. However, what we now have is more in the nature of a reprint than a second edition in the full sense. Although Professor Wasserstein admits that a certain amount of new material has come to hand and makes some use of it, particularly in the early chapters dealing with the military administration before the esblishment of the Mandate in 1922, he claims not without reason that nothing has emerged in the course of the last few years which invalidates his original principal conclusions.

The first is that British officials for the most part were hostile to the British government's view of its duty under the Balfour Declaration. In some cases, this was clearly owing to antisemitic prejudice; but in other cases, these officials were convinced that the Palestinian Arabs could never be won over to accept the Jewish National Home and that the British government's commitment to that Home placed the administrators in an impossible position. (Indeed, on a careful reading of the evidence, it is perhaps surprising that the Mandate was not abandoned much earlier.) Professor Wasserstein's second conclusion is that the sceptics on the ground were right, that the Arabs were indeed irreconcilable, and that no political structure — whether unitary or binary — could be set up with any hope of success. As the personal tragedy of Herbert Samuel (who was High Commissioner in Palestine from 1920 to 1925) and of other Jewish servants of the Mandatory government showed, British Liberalism and full-blown Zionism were hard to keep together in harness.

The author is no doubt right in thinking that the reason for Britain's persistence with the Mandate was to be found in the impact in London (not in Jerusalem) of wider imperial and strategic considerations. In

this respect, his self-imposed limitation to a study of the administration in Palestine itself is perhaps to be regretted, since it means that he gave too little attention to what was going on in London, between Whitehall departments, between the armed services, and in cabinet. One can see from the revised bibliography that Professor Wasserstein has taken a very limited view as to what recent work is germane to his particular theme. The problems of military manpower after the European armistice would have been better understood by taking account of Keith Jeffrey's *The British Army and the Crisis of Empire* (Manchester, 1984) while the so-called Sherifian solution has been much illuminated by David Fromkin in his study of the Middle East post-war settlement as a whole in his remarkable book, *A Peace to End All Peace* (London, 1989). And if I may with all due modesty refer to my own work, I think Professor Wasserstein might have found the Middle Eastern chapters of both volumes of my *Imperial Sunset* (London, 1969, and 1989) useful in showing how Palestine fitted into the general imperial scheme and in particular its role in the Anglo-French rivalry that was so important in the years with which he is dealing.

The British in Palestine had its origins in a doctoral thesis and it is quite right that someone writing a thesis should concentrate upon the new material — especially unpublished material which he has discovered. To some extent, the material will always determine the content. But when, like Professor Wasserstein, one has risen to the academic uplands and has the chance of going over one's early work for a new edition, one should attempt a wider approach. This is particularly true in this case. For vastly different as is the situation on the ground today and its international context compared with conditions in 1929, nevertheless the current problems of Arab-Israeli peacemaking can certainly not be solved without a full understanding of the nature and development of the national and personal tragedies of which this book gives an account which has the merit of being both balanced and perceptive. If Jewish officials had a difficult time, what about Arab officials in the Mandatory regime? Their risks were even more grave and immediate, as have been those incurred by subsequent Arabs accused of 'collaborating' with the Jewish State.

MAX BELOFF

CHRONICLE

The International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization was established in 1980, under the auspices of the Israeli Presidency. It has two main goals: 'to provide collegial support to teachers in a variety of academic areas which can be included in the term "Jewish Civilization"; and to emphasize the pivotal role of Israeli universities and their cultural resources in the development of this field'. The Center has compiled a World Register of University Studies in Jewish Civilization; that Register lists about 1,300 universities and institutions of higher learning throughout the world which offer courses in some aspect of Jewish Civilization.

A Regional Development Conference of European Universities which have important units of studies in Jewish Civilization was convened last July under the auspices of the Center. The Conference was held in Jerusalem and in a Foreword to the programme of the Conference, Professor Moshe Davis — the Center's Academic Chairman — stated that the programme of the Conference would consist of three parts:

(a) Survey of fields of interest — interrelations between the humanities and Judaica; Bible, Hebrew language and literature;
(b) Jewish Civilization studies in European universities and Israeli universities as a resource;
(c) Introduction to major repositories of Judaica.

Scholars who accepted invitations to participate in the Conference came from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Spain, and the USSR.

The Center also organized last July continuing workshops on various subjects:

'Hebrew Language and Literature: Teaching Genres of Contemporary Hebrew Literature in the Original; Contemporary Jewish Civilization: University Teaching of Antisemitism in the Contemporary Context; Jewish History and Culture: Se-hardic and Oriental Studies: Spain and North African Jewry from the Middle Ages until the Modern Period; Jewish Philosophy: Paradigms in Teaching Jewish Philosophy: The Medieval Era: Maimonides, the Contemporary Era: Levinas; Jewish Political Studies: Liberal Democracy and Communitarian Democracy in the Jewish Political Tradition; Modern Hebrew Literature in Translation: the Position of Women Writers in Modern Hebrew Literature and their Reception; and Jewish Civilization in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union'.

Another workshop, held last May in Jerusalem, was concerned with the development of the teaching of Jewish art at University level.

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Jews' College London has published a prospectus on 'Learning for Teaching'. It states that the course will be held on Mondays from 11 a.m. to

3 p.m. during the spring and summer terms of 1992 and that the sessions 'will consist of seminars, workshops, tutorials, visits and guest speakers from schools and other educational institutions, etc.'. A major feature of the course will be to give students the opportunity 'to observe and teach in a number of Jewish day schools during the academic year'. The course will cost £75.00 for the two terms and must be paid in advance; application forms are obtainable from Jews' College, Albert Road, London NW4 2SJ, and by telephone (081–203 6427) quoting form LFT). A Jews' College certificate will be awarded on successful completion of the course.

Another prospectus of Jews' College gives details of courses offered at the College's Institute of Advanced Jewish Learning: a part-time evening M.A. from London University and 'Advanced Diploma courses'. Admission to the College's M.A. course 'is subject to the candidate possessing a satisfactory level of relevant knowledge in Hebrew and Jewish Studies'.

*

The Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews published in 1991 *British Synagogue Membership in 1990* by Marlena Schmool and Frances Cohen. The authors state: 'This booklet provides details of synagogue membership in the United Kingdom in 1990. The data were collected directly from the records of major London synagogal organizations and by postal questionnaire from individual synagogues throughout the Provinces. . . . Our report covers the whole religious spectrum of British Jewry. . .'. They recorded 356 congregations in 1990 in the United Kingdom, with a total membership of 101,239; this 356 total shows a net increase of 28 synagogues since 1983, the result mainly of small Right-wing Orthodox congregations established in North London and in Manchester and some new Reform and Liberal synagogues in various areas. Greater London had 183 congregations in 1990, against 162 in 1983; between 1983 and 1990, 11 synagogues closed and 32 were newly established.

Outside Greater London, there are 173 congregations; 87 are in major Jewish centres such as Manchester, Leeds, and Brighton 'while 86 are in 68 communities throughout the United Kingdom from Scotland to the South-Coast and including Northern Ireland, Jersey, and the Isle of Man, which have a Jewish population of under 1,500'.

The 183 congregations in Greater London consist of 94 Central Orthodox, 51 Right-wing Orthodox, 15 Reform, 13 Liberal, and 10 Sephardi; in the provinces, there are 113 Central Orthodox synagogues, 18 Right-wing Orthodox, 26 Reform, 13 Liberal, and three Sephardi — a total of 173.

*

The Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews published last October its 'Report of Vital Statistics for 1990'. There were 1,098 marriages solemnized in synagogues in 1990 — showing some increase over the previous year's total of 1,057. The Central Orthodox group reported 722 weddings in 1990 (679 in 1989); the Right-wing Orthodox, 103 (118 in 1989); and the Sephardim, 48 (47 in 1989); the total of the Orthodox segment was therefore 873 in 1990, against 844 in 1989. Reform synagogues reported

167 marriages in 1990, against 170 in 1989 while the Liberal synagogues registered 58 in 1990 against 43 the previous year; the total number of marriages in the Progressive sector was therefore 225 in 1990, against the 1989 total of 213.

More than two-thirds (71.3 per cent) of the total number of synagogue marriages in 1990 took place in London and the remaining 28.7 per cent in the provinces; the numbers were 783 in London and 315 in the provinces — against 784 in London and 273 in the provinces in 1989.

Religious divorces (*gittin*), registered by all *Batei Din* in 1990, totalled 261; 217 in London and 44 in the provinces. The annual averages of *gittin* were 283 for the period 1983–86 and 254 for the 1987–90 period. However, it must be noted that these figures underestimate the extent of divorce in Anglo-Jewry, since many couples obtain only a secular divorce.

The total of burials and cremations under Jewish auspices in 1990 was 4,615 against 4,535 in 1989; two-thirds of the burials and cremations took place in the London area.

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The September 1991 issue of *L'Eylah* (a semi-annual which is published by the Office of the Chief Rabbi and Jews' College, London) is largely concerned with the roles and aspirations of Jewish women. There is a symposium on Judaism and feminism, a review article on 'The Jewish Woman of Antiquity' by Tessa Rajak, and reviews of several studies of Jewish women and the Jewish family.

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The Summer 1991 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that Tel Aviv University has devised a course for training former Soviet medical students in the health professions at the Faculty of Medicine. 'The 65 immigrants taking the course were all medical students in the Soviet Union, most of them having completed two to four years of study. But the prospect of their ever practicing medicine in Israel is dim' because in addition to the country's 12,000 physicians, some 5,000 settled in Israel in 1990 alone, and a further 5,000 may make *aliyah* in 1991. A four-semester course will prepare the students to obtain professional qualifications which will enable them to enter the fields of nursing, physiotherapy, and occupational therapy, where there are vacant positions.

The University is also offering another course specially designed for Soviet immigrants to train them as social workers, in order to serve the Russian-speaking community in Israel.

*

The Refugee Studies Programme for the study of forced migration (established at Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford) was founded in 1982. Its published *Annual Report 1990–1991* states (page 1): 'The total refugee population (i.e. those who have crossed an international boundary), was estimated as being close to 18 million in 1990, while another 20 million were displaced within their own countries. Such figures exclude the many who have found permanent refuge but have known as refugees themselves what it is to

take flight and search out asylum, and what it means to be unwelcome and rejected or grudgingly offered a minimal existence as a dependant on the goodwill of foreigners. . . . The importance of the Refugee Studies Programme lies in its ability to provide a venue for research; an independent forum where scholars, policy makers and administrators, refugees and practitioners of many kinds can exchange experiences and pool understandings; and publications and other media through which governments and the public can be informed'.

The Refugee Studies Programme (RSP) has a Documentation Centre which it claims (p. 17) '. . . is becoming the repository of private and institutional papers relating to refugees and other involuntary migration. . . . The Documentation Centre would appreciate authors sending copies of their papers to be included in the collection.' . . . The RSP also publishes a *Directory of Current Research on Refugees and Forced Migrants*; that Directory 'includes a bibliography, gives information about those researching in this field, and promotes communication among scholars. The third edition, which will contain at least 350 new entries, is due to be published in early 1992'.

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Volume One of *Guides to the Archives in Israel* was published in 1991 in Jerusalem by 'Israel Archives Association in cooperation with the Israel State Archives'. The Editor is P. A. Alsberg and he states in the Preface: 'The Guide to the Israel State Archives is the first volume of a series of guides to comprise all historical archives, documentation centres and manuscript collections in Israel. . . . In general the description of the holdings of the Israel State Archives is based on record groups comprising all records of a ministry or a department or an administrative unit in charge of well-defined functions.'

This first Guide starts with a brief list of the surviving records of the government under Turkish rule; this is followed by a section on the records of the Palestine government under British rule, from 1920 to 1948; another section on the 'State of Israel and Its Institutions'; and a final chapter entitled 'Non-governmental Records, Private Papers and Collections'.

There are 16 illustrations; they include 'a Diary Note of Herbert Samuel on his talk with the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey on the future of Palestine, 14 November 1914'; a proclamation on 1 September 1929 by the High Commissioner, Sir J. R. Chancellor, on atrocities against Jews in Hebron; the first page of the transcript of Adolf Eichmann's interrogation, with corrections by Eichmann, dated 29 May 1960; and a telegram from Count Folke Bernadotte on the repatriation to Palestine of Jewish detainees in Kenya, dated 4 July 1948.

The Introduction to the Guide states (p. 14): 'Catalogues and detailed lists of the contents of record groups open to research are available at the reading room of the State Archives'.

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The January–August 1990 issue of *La Rassegna Mensile di Israel* (received in London in September 1991), a publication of the Union of Italian Jewish Communities, includes a section on some of the the speeches delivered to the Congress of that Union held in December 1990. That issue of *La Rassegna*

Mensile also includes an article by Maria Castlelnuovo (pp. 131–59) entitled 'La deputazione ebraica di assistenza e servizio sociale: cent'anni di zedaquà'; the author first lists the various charitable bodies: in 1559, there was the official foundation of a benevolent association which provided medicines for the Jewish poor and for their burial; another association, established in 1695, distributed milk and food for the needy; an old people's home was established in 1725; *Baalè berit* was founded in 1843 to pay for the circumcisions of the poor; while in the year 1617 there were established a charity to provide dowries for poor Jewish girls and another for the washing of the dead. In 1885, *la deputazione centrale di carità* was established and became an umbrella organization for several Jewish charities; the author records its activities until 1990.

Another article (pp. 259–75) deals with antisemitism in Italy. It is by Adriana Goldstaub, of the Centro di documentazione ebraica contemporana in Milan, and deals with the situation in Italy from November 1986 to August 1990; it records the results of several surveys concerned with antisemitism or anti-Israel prejudices. Surveys in 1988 and 1990 found that 11 per cent of the respondents were hostile to the Jews; about 18 per cent had favourable attitudes towards Jews, while the remainder were indifferent.

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The Department of Tourism of Vaucluse has published an English-language brochure (with the co-operation of the Montpellier Centre for Jewish and Hebraic Studies and of various other bodies) entitled 'The Road of Jewish Heritage in the South of France'. There are brief sections on the history of the settlement of Jews in Languedoc, in Provence, and in Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin and the guide includes several detailed maps as well as illustrations of historic Jewish sites and synagogue interiors. There is also a reproduction of the January 1790 'Lettres Patentes du Roi' relating to a decree of the Assemblée Nationale 'portant que les Juifs, connus en France sous le nom de Juifs Portuguais, Espagnols & Avignonois, y jouiront des droits de Citoyen actif'.

Montpellier had a Jewish district in the thirteenth century, in the centre of the town; it included a synagogue, an alms house, and a *mikveh* (ritual bath). The town's Jews were later moved to another area and were finally expelled in 1394. A few years ago, the Montpellier municipality restored the medieval *mikveh* and in the underground vaults 'the ritual bath is to be found with the stairway to it, the disrobing room, and the surprising expanse of natural water'. In October 1985, the restored *mikveh* was formally open to the public.

In Provence, the village of Les Milles had housed a camp 'for the assembling and sorting out of German and Austrian nationals, most of them Jews, antinazis and refugees, two of them Nobel prizewinners, scientists, famed painters (Max Ernst, Hans Bellmer, Max Lingnier, Gus). After the armistice in June 1940, the camp became an "internment camp" then a "transit camp" for eventual emigration, and in August/September 1942, before the occupation of the Free Zone by the Germans, the Vichy government had about two thousand Jews deported to Drancy, then Auschwitz.' The camp was closed in March 1943 but 'the magnificent wall-paintings done by the prisoners' have survived. A Memorial Museum was inaugurated on the site in April 1989.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Anderson, Gary A., *A Time to Mourn, A Time to Dance. The Expression of Grief and Joy in Israelite Religion*, xvii + 139 pp., Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1991, £25.00.

Charny, Israel W., ed., *Genocide. A Critical Bibliographic Review. Volume Two*, xxviii + 432 pp., Mansell, London, 1991, £50.00.

Davis, Moshe and Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, eds., *With Eyes Towards Zion — III. Western Societies and the Holy Land*, xiv + 275 pp., Praeger, New York, Westport, and London, 1991, $55.00.

Gordis, David M. and Yoav Ben-Horin, eds., *Jewish Identity in America*, xv + 296 pp., University of Judaism, Los Angeles, 1991, $19.95 (hardback, $39.95).

Horwitz, Gordon J., *In the Shadow of Death. Living Outside the Gates of Mauthausen*, xii + 236 pp., I. B. Tauris, London and New York, 1991, £14.95.

Jacobs, Louis, *Structure and Form in the Babylonian Talmud*, xi + 138 pp., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1991, £25.00 or $44.50.

Kamen, Charles S., *Little Common Ground: Arab Agriculture and Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1920–1948*, xi + 327 pp., University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1991, $39.95.

Khalaf, Issa, *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939–1948*, xix + 318 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, 1991, $18.95 (hardback, $57.50).

Leibler, Isi, *Jewish Religious Extremism. A Threat to the Future of the Jewish People*, iii + 48 pp., published by (and available from) the World Jewish Congress, 501 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 and the Australian Institute of Jewish Affairs, G.P.O. Box 5402CC, Melbourne, Victoria 3001, Australia, 1991, n.p.

Levine, Hillel, *Economic Origins of Antisemitism. Poland and its Jews in the Early Modern Period*, xv + 271 pp., Yale University Press, New Haven and London, n.p.

Lustiger, Arno, *'Shalom Libertad!' Les Juifs dans la guerre civile espagnole*, translated from the German by Chantal Kesteloot and with a Preface by Daniel Mayer, 524 pp., Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1991, 189 francs.

Mendelsohn, Richard, *Sammy Marks: The Uncrowned King of the Transvaal*, xvi + 304 pp., published by David Philip (Cape Town) and Ohio University Press (Athens, Ohio), in association with Jewish Publications — South Africa, 1991, n.p.

Müller, Ingo, *Hitler's Justice. The Courts of the Third Reich*, translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider, xviii + 349 pp., I. B. Tauris, London, 1991, n.p.

Ritzer, George, *Metatheorizing in Sociology*, xiii + 363 pp., Lexington Books, Lexington, Ma. and New York, 1991, $49.95.

Schmelz, Uziel O., Sergio DellaPergola, and Uri Avner, *Ethnic Differences Among Israeli Jews: A New Look*, vi + 204 pp., published by the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the American Jewish Year Book and the American Jewish Committee, Jerusalem, 1991, n.p.

Shimoni, Gideon, ed., *The Holocaust in University Teaching*, volume prepared in association with The International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization, Jerusalem, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York, 1991, £25.00 or $47.50.

Sobel, Zvi and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, eds., *Tradition, Innovation, Conflict: Jewishness and Judaism in Contemporary Israel*, SUNY Series in Israeli Studies, viii + 316 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, 1991, n.p.

Spolsky, Bernard and Robert L. Cooper, *The Languages of Jerusalem*, xiv + 166 pp., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, £30.00.

Szulmajster-Celnikier, Anne, *Le Yidich à travers la chanson populaire. Les éléments non germaniques du yidich*, xxiv + 276 pp. + 20 pages of illustrations, Peeters Press, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1991, 1490 Belgian francs.

Talmon, Shemaryahu, ed., *Jewish Civilization in the Hellenistic-Roman Period*, 269 pp., published in co-operation with The International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization, Jerusalem, by the Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha, Supplement Series 10, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield, 1991, £30.00 or $50.00.

Zenner, Walter P., *Minorities in the Middle: A Cross-Cultural Analysis*, SUNY Series in Ethnicity and Race in American Life, xv + 224 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, 1991, $16.95.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ALDERMAN, Geoffrey; D.Phil. Professor of Politics and Contemporary History at Royal Holloway and Bedford New College, University of London. Chief Publications: *British Elections*, 1978; *The Jewish Community in British Politics*, 1983; *Pressure Groups and Government in Great Britain*, 1984; *The Federation of Synagogues*, 1987; and *London Jewry and London Politics*, 1989.

BRICHTA, Avraham; Ph.D. Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science of the University of Haifa. Chief Publications: *Democracy and Elections* (in Hebrew), 1977; 'Amateurs and Professionals in Israeli Politics' in *International Political Science Review*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1983; 'Selection of Candidates to the Tenth Knesset: The Impact of Centralization' in Howard R. Penniman and Daniel J. Elazar, eds., *Israel at the Polls, 1981*, 1986; and 'The Proposals for Presidential Government in Israel: A Case Study of Institutional Transference' in *Comparative Politics*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1986.

SCHMOOL, Marlena; B.Soc.Sc. Executive Director, Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews. Chief Publications: co-author, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population, 1960–65' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968; co-author, 'Synagogue Marriages in Great Britain 1966–68' in *JJS*, vol. 12, no. 1, June 1970; co-author, 'Statistics of Milah and the Jewish Birth-Rate in Britain' in *JJS*, vol. 12, no. 2, December 1970; four Registers of Social Research on the Anglo-Jewish community published in the *JJS*, between 1968 and 1988; and 'Researching British Jewry' in *Occasional Papers on Jewish Social Services*, No. 2, August 1988.

TREVISAN SEMI, Emanuela; Ph.D. Research Fellow, Dipartimento di scienze storico-archeologiche e orientalistiche of the University of Venice. Chief Publications: 'A Note on the Lubavitch Hassidim in Milan' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 20, no. 1, June 1978; *Gli ebrei caraiti tra etnia e religione*, 1984; 'The Beta Israel (Falashas): From Purity to Impurity' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 27, no. 2, December 1985; 'L'oscillation ethnique: le cas des caraïtes pendant la seconde guerre mondiale' in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, vol. 206, no. 4, 1989; and *Morte del senso e senso della morte nel primo racconto di A. B. Yehoshua*, 1989.

THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

EDITOR: Judith Freedman

VOLUME THIRTY-THREE 1991

Published by Maurice Freedman Research Trust Ltd

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