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THE NORMATIVE AND THE FACTUAL: AN ANALYSIS OF EMIGRATION FACTORS AMONG THE JEWS OF INDIA

Margaret Abraham

JEWS have been settled in India for many centuries. Some of them even claim to be descended from the ten lost tribes of Israel and to have reached India about two thousand years ago. Their communities were inevitably influenced to some degree by the caste system, but they attempted with varying degrees of success to preserve their Jewish faith. They are remarkable, among other things, for not having experienced antisemitism in their host country, in contrast to most other Diaspora Jewries.[1]

India's independence from British rule in 1947 and the establishment of the State of Israel the following year had a major impact on the Jews of India. In many years, for nearly three decades from 1949 onwards, hundreds of them (and in some years thousands) emigrated to Israel. According to the Jewish Agency, 25,214 Jews from India had come to settle in Israel by the end of 1987. S. B. Isenberg's compilations from the official censuses of population of India reflects this exodus: the 1941 census enumerated 22,480 Jews and a decade later the total had risen to 26,512. By 1961, there was a marked decline: 18,553 were returned; in 1971, 5,825; and at the last published census for 1981, 5,618.[2] The present paper is chiefly concerned with the causal factors in the emigration of Indian Jews to Israel, their *aliyah*. Clearly, they did not leave their native land in order to escape from the antisemitism of their compatriots or from discriminatory legislation.

The Jewish Settlement in India

There have been three principal Jewish communities in India, apart from the small number of Jews from Western countries: the Cochin Jews, the Bene Israel, and the Baghdadi Jews. Joan Roland states that 'at their maximum strength in 1951' the Bene Israel numbered about 20,000 and the Baghdadis about 5,000, while the Cochin Jews had always been a small group, and had never numbered more than 2,500.[3]

The Cochin Jews, settled on the Malabar coast of South India, claimed that they were descended from the ten lost tribes of Israel; but there is no reliable evidence about their distant origins or the precise period of their arrival in India. However, there is definite evidence that they were settled in the country in the ninth century and that they were granted many valuable privileges by the Rajas of Cochin.[4] There were three groups of Cochin Jews: the Malabar or Black Jews, the Pardesi or White Jews, and the Manumitted or Brown Jews. The Malabar group are the earliest settlers; their dark complexion and the similarity of their physical features to those of the indigenous local people is presumed to be the result of past intermarriage with the non-Jewish native inhabitants. The Pardesi or White Jews are later arrivals; their community is smaller than that of the Malabar group, and they have maintained a separate Jewish identity and played an important part in the economic history of Cochin. The Manumitted or Brown Jews are the offspring of slaves of the Pardesi Jews (who had been given their freedom by the Pardesis and had voluntarily converted to Judaism) or of unions between Pardesi men and native women. During their settlement in India, these three groups of Cochin Jews adopted some of the customs and traditions of the local Hindu population but they were always strict in the observance of their Jewish faith and thus clearly differentiated themselves from the non-Jewish local inhabitants.

The Bene Israel, who were divided into two groups (the Gora or White Jews and the Kala or Black Jews), constituted the largest group in India and like the Cochin Jews they also claimed descent from the ten lost tribes of Israel. However, in contrast to the Cochin Jews, who were always aware of their Jewish identity and who maintained regular contact with other Diaspora communities over the centuries, the Bene Israel were isolated from other Jewish settlements for hundreds of years (when they had lived in the Konkan region of Maharashtra, on the west coast of India) and they had prolonged lapses in some religious observances. They were also partly assimilated into the Hindu caste structure. But they did retain some Jewish practices, such as circumcision, the observance of some dietary laws (*kashrut*) and of the Sabbath, as well as the recitation of the *Shema* (the Jewish confession of faith) on important occasions — at a circumcision, a wedding, and a death. They were traditionally known as 'Saturday oil-pressers' because they specialized in that trade but refrained from work on the Sabbath. These religious observances served to distinguish them from the local population and led the Cochin Jews to discover their existence in the eighteenth century and to acquaint them with a deeper knowledge of the principles and the practice of Judaism.[5]

It was also in the eighteenth century that a large group of Bene Israel moved to Bombay; many of them joined the East India Company's regiments. Strizower quotes Kehimkar's statement that 'the Bene

Israel soldiers were the pick of the Native Army of the Bombay Presidency, and constituted almost half of the number of native officers of each regiment of the Bombay Presidency for nearly a century and a half'. Other Bene Israel were skilled craftsmen, especially carpenters, and office clerks.[6]

Unlike the Cochin Jews and the Bene Israel, the Baghdadi Jews were comparatively late settlers in India; the term 'Baghdadi' referred also to Jews who had come from Basra, from Aleppo in Syria, from Iran, and from Aden. They came in some numbers to Bombay and to Calcutta in the early nineteenth century and several of them were wealthy traders who established very successful business enterprises, achieved immense economic success, attained prestigious positions, and became leaders of Indian Jewry. They established several charities and educational institutions for the benefit of both their correligionists and non-Jews, but they held themselves aloof from the native population and did not adopt any Indian practices. They looked upon the British as their social reference group and adopted British customs and a British life-style. Several of them were given honours, including knighthoods.[7]

The first decades of the twentieth century saw increased Indian nationalism and Zionism. These two movements were to give the Jews of India a heightened awareness of their ethnic and religious identity and to emphasize their minority status. Before India attained independence in 1947, the Jews of India had acquired privileged positions under the patronage of the British. Gussin has commented that the Bene Israel 'were favoured by the politics of insignificant numbers. Precisely because the community was so small and, therefore, presented no threat to the British overlords, it was disproportionately rewarded'.[8]

Although the Jewish communities in India did not have close relationships with the other religious groups in the country, they co-existed harmoniously. The Cochinis and the Bene Israel also adopted some of the Hindu practices and caste-like hierarchies. For example, the Bene Israel, in deference to their Hindu neighbours, usually abstained from beef, and sometimes from all meat; they also frowned upon widow remarriage. The three categories of Cochin Jews did not intermarry, and neither did the White and Black Bene Israel groups. Joan Roland also states that both the Cochinis and the Bene Israel objected to Black Jews coming near their cooking vessels and adds:[9]

> The Baghdadi Jews also adopted castelike attitudes towards the Bene Israel because of their lack of ritual orthodoxy and supposed 'ancestral impurity'. In some, but not all, of these instances of 'caste' distinction, color played an important secondary role.

Under British rule in India, the small minorities, including the Jewish groups, were given special educational and job opportunities.

The Indian Jews, in return for this patronage, showed loyalty to the British and increasingly distanced themselves from the Hindu and Muslim native population. They were reluctant to antagonize the British by participating actively in the Indian nationalist movement. Moreover, Zionist emissaries were striving to arouse in them a Jewish nationalism. The Bene Israel had received an invitation to attend the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897; in 1903, the Cochin Jews founded their first Zionist organization; and in 1920 three Baghdadis founded the Bombay Zionist Association.[10] India's Independence in 1947 was perceived by the majority of the local Jews as the end of a golden era. When the State of Israel was established in 1948, they began to plan their *aliyah* and, as stated above, by the end of 1987, a total of 25,214 had settled in the Jewish State, leaving only about 5,000–6,000 Jews in India.[11]

Emigration Factors

In 1987 and 1988, I conducted a total of 157 interviews with Indian Jews: 117 in India and 40 in Israel. My informants in India were Cochin, Bene Israel, and Baghdadi Jews. In each community I started with a few key individuals, and by the process known as 'snowballing' I was introduced to other informants. I endeavoured to make my selection from a broad range of socio-economic strata. I conducted the interviews mainly in English and sometimes in Malayalam; in two cases I required the services of an interpreter for two Bene Israel respondents who spoke only Marathi.

I asked all 157 informants, 'In your view, what are the factors which influenced or influence the Indian Jews to emigrate to Israel?'. I made it clear that I was referring to all Indian Jews — the Bene Israel, the Cochinis, and the Baghdadis. The informants in India were further asked whether they wished to settle in Israel. The 63 who said that they wanted to emigrate were asked to list the factors which influenced their desire to make *aliyah*, while the 54 who said that they wanted to remain in India were asked to list the factors which led to that decision. The 40 who were settled in Israel were asked to state the factors which had influenced them to make *aliyah*. The responses given by all 157 informants can be categorized into six broad sets of factors.

1) *Economic factors.* The main push factors were a lack of suitable job opportunities, low income, housing problems, inflation, and a low standard of living. The principal pull factors to emigrate to Israel were better employment opportunities, greater amenities, low-cost housing, loans to immigrants, and a comparatively high standard of living in terms of material possessions — such as a television set, a refrigerator, a cooking stove, or a video cassette recorder.

2) *Social factors.* There was a decline of Jewish social and cultural activities in India and it was likely that such activities would be widely available in Israel, as well as a better social status.

3) *Political factors* included the indirect consequences of communal tensions between the Hindus and the Muslims; and a lack of political viability in India as a minority community.

4) *Religious factors.* A profound desire to realize the dream of a return to the Holy Land, where Judaism is a way of life, where on the Sabbath and on the Jewish festivals one does not go to work, and where *Kasher* food can be easily obtained.

5) *Family factors.* To be reunited with other members of the family who had made *aliyah* and, among the younger generation, the greater likelihood of finding a suitable marriage partner in Israel.

6) *The age factor.* The right time to emigrate is when one is young and fit, while for the old it is very difficult to uproot oneself.

An analysis of the responses showed that informants differentiated between the factors which had influenced their own emigration to Israel and those which would influence the *aliyah* of their compatriots. Four-fifths of those who had settled in Israel (32 out of the total of 40, or 80 per cent) claimed that they had been primarily influenced by religious factors; slightly more than half cited economic factors (22 out of 40) and family factors (21 informants); while 12 mentioned political factors, only two cited social factors, and none referred to age as a consideration.

A majority of the 63 who stated that they wished to go on *aliyah* (45 informants out of the 63 or 72 per cent) cited economic factors while a smaller number (38 or 61 per cent) claimed that religious factors were important; 24 mentioned social factors, 17 cited family considerations, ten referred to their age, and only five out of the 63 referred to political factors.

However, when all 157 informants (both the 117 in India and the 40 who had settled in Israel) were asked to list the factors which in their opinion generally influenced the emigration of all Indian Jews, only 12 out of the 40 (30 per cent) who had made *aliyah* cited religious factors — whereas (as stated above) 80 per cent of that same group had claimed that the religious factors had been important in their own decision to settle in Israel. More than two-thirds of them (70 and 67.5 per cent) gave greater emphasis to political and economic factors respectively — factors which they had declared to be of much lesser importance in their own *aliyah*: 30 per cent of the immigrants interviewed in Israel cited political factors and 55 per cent referred to economic factors.

A similar pattern is revealed by the answers of the 117 respondents questioned in India: about three-quarters of them (77 per cent) stated

that Indian Jews generally would be influenced by economic factors when considering *aliyah* and 72 per cent cited political factors, while only 28 per cent of those interviewed in India and 30 per cent of those who had settled in Israel stated that religious factors would generally influence the members of all the main Jewish communities in India (the Bene Israel, the Cochinis, and the Baghdadis) to decide to go on *aliyah*.

How can this striking difference in the perceptions of one's own motivations and the motivations of fellow-Indian Jews to go on *aliyah* be explained? I believe that the answer lies in terms of the normative and the factual.[12]

The Normative

Jews throughout the Diaspora have prayed for centuries for the return to the Holy Land — 'Next year in Jerusalem'. Devout Jews generally consider it to be a religious imperative to live in *Eretz Israel*, the land of their ancestors which the Almighty had given them, according to the Bible. Consequently, it is not surprising that Indian Jews — whose own religious identity had been reinforced by the division of the Indian sub-continent into the Muslim state of Pakistan and the largely Hindu state of India, as well as by the Zionist movement — should stress religious factors as the main motivation for going on *aliyah*. To give more prominence to economic or political considerations would be to admit that, in their own case, materialistic values were more important than religious ideals, the mundane more important than the sacred. That may well be why they claimed that it was mainly religious fervour and love of Zion which would, and did, decide them to emigrate to Israel. A Bene Israel who had made *aliyah* said:

> I came to Israel because I am religious and because our Jewish law teaches us that it is the religious duty of all Jews to return to the Promised Land. We have always prayed for the day when we will all be together in the Holy Land.

A Cochini immigrant stated:

> While there are many members of the community, especially the poorer ones, who came to Israel to improve their economic situation, I and my family came because of religious sentiment. Even when we lived in India we never forgot our love of Zion. As soon as we got a chance to come to Israel, we came.

A Baghdadi who was interviewed in India stated:

> I always wanted to go to Israel. Earlier I could not go because I had to look after my ailing mother, but now my mother is no more. I am an Orthodox Jew and want to fulfil the promise to return to Jerusalem. Also it is becoming harder and harder for us to maintain our religion in India. We cannot get a

minyan [the quorum of ten Jewish male adults for communal prayers] without paying the people to come and it is not easy to observe *kashrut* here.

A Bene Israel who had remained in India told me:

My family and I want to leave India and go to Israel because of religious sentiment. Most of the [Indian] Jews have already left. We are economically comfortable here but for us Jews there is a calling, that is, to return to the Promised Land.

A Cochini who had also remained in India explained:

I stayed here in India till now because I like it here, but now I would like to go to Israel. It is becoming difficult for those of us who have remained here to continue practising our faith. Jewish religious life in India is slowly coming to a standstill in our community and I am an observant Jew. Besides, Israel has always been our spiritual homeland. All Jews at some point of their life want to return there and I want to fulfil that dream.

Clearly, respondents were aware that they would enhance their image by asserting that economic or political considerations were of lesser importance than the fulfilment of a religious imperative to settle in the Holy Land. Indeed, as is evident from the above statements, some of them were at pains to point out that it was neither poverty nor discrimination which would lead them to make *aliyah*. The motives which they cite are remarkably similar to some of those expressed by Canadian Jews who had settled in Israel; in the last issue of this *Journal* (vol. 32, no. 2 December 1990), Cyril Levitt and William Shaffir commented, when discussing the factors which had led their informants to decide to emigrate to Israel:[13]

Various reasons were given for the decision to go on *aliyah* but one which all the respondents mentioned was a desire to live in the Jewish State. They wanted to realise the long-standing dream of leading a Jewish life in a Jewish homeland.

The authors add that their informants did not say that they felt driven out of Canada because of rising levels of antisemitism or discrimination, but on the contrary spoke appreciatively about their native land. Moreover, they certainly did not wish to settle in Israel in order to raise their standard of living; they were aware that the opposite was likely to be true. One of them said:[14]

We knew that we wouldn't be able to live in Israel at the same standard we were living here . . . In fact, if we were really interested in making money, we knew that Israel wasn't the place to go. So, as far as economics were concerned, we were prepared to make sacrifices.

My Indian Jewish informants, while claiming that their own *aliyah* had been, or would be, undertaken mainly out of religious fervour and Zionist idealism, were not blinded to the fact that many of their

compatriots were likely to be influenced mainly by economic and political factors when considering emigration to Israel. Of course, it is possible that most of the 40 informants whom I interviewed in Israel had indeed been mainly motivated by religious fervour, that they neither deliberately over-emphasized the religious factors nor were deluding themselves about their actual motives for going on *aliyah*. Even if that were the case, however, it is not surprising that many of them believed that they differed from most Indian Jews, since the latter (like most emigrants from other countries and of other religions) could reasonably be presumed to wish to improve their standard of living in a country where they would not be a vulnerable minority group, without political power, and at the mercy of possible or threatened discriminatory practices.

The Factual

Economic Factors

When India was granted Independence in 1947, it was plunged into turmoil with the influx of a massive immigration of Hindus from newly-established Muslim Pakistan. The economic situation was precarious, with serious inflation; there was an acute shortage of housing as well as intense competition for job vacancies. The Indian Jews, many of whom had enjoyed privileged positions under British rule or in the service of Indian rajas, now had to compete with the local non-Jewish population on no more than equal terms.

Although India was in theory a secular state, religious affiliation acquired great importance in practice. After the communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims which had led to the partition of the sub-continent, the Hindus understandably tended to favour fellow-Hindus. None of my informants complained about antisemitism, but they did say that it became increasingly difficult for Jews to obtain satisfactory employment because preference was given to Hindus. They explained that although Indian law stipulated that all Indian citizens, whatever their race or creed, were to enjoy the same rights and privileges, employers in practice preferred to hire Hindus, if the latter's qualifications were of approximately the same level as those of non-Hindu applicants.

As stated above, in the eighteenth century the Bene Israel had begun to leave their villages in the Konkan area of Maharashtra to settle in the Bombay region. That exodus continued until the 1940s, but some Bene Israel remained in the rural areas of Maharashtra or retained the titles to their lands in that State. For a large number of them, land ownership was their main source of income. When new land laws were enacted, they were severely affected.

Shalva Weil has commented:[15]

> In 1949, the Government of Maharashtra passed the Bombay Tallugdari Tenure Abolition Act by which tenants were to be given full occupancy rights in the land held by landlords if they paid a limited fee. In 1955, the Bombay Act No. 1 abolished the rights of landlords altogether. Bene Israel landowners sold their land where they could and joined the ranks of the urban migrants. Unable to make a good living in Bombay, emigration to Israel seemed the better alternative. There, so reports went, immigrants were provided with housing, jobs, free blankets, a cash loan and other benefits.

Some of my informants referred to the financial difficulties which the new legislation engendered for members of their families or other Bene Israel landowners. They said that the position of the Bene Israel in the urban areas had also deteriorated; housing was a major problem in Bombay and most of my informants had to live in the suburbs and commute to work daily. Moreover, the cost of living was rising, while it was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain suitable employment. One informant living in India told me:

> During the British rule, the Bene Israel had jobs. We were in the Civil Service, army, postal, and railways services. This changed with Independence — now there were more people looking for jobs. Obviously, there was a shortage of jobs. The standard of living changed. So many of our people left for Israel with the help of the Jewish Agency. They thought they would get good job opportunities and better housing there — so they left.

In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, economic conditions in India worsened. There was rising inflation but a minimal rise in earnings, while affordable housing was deplorable and scarce. The Bene Israel generally found it increasingly difficult to manage on their wages. Only those few among them who were exceptionally well qualified or who had sizeable capital assets could maintain a satisfactory standard of living. Most members of the community therefore had to decide whether to remain in India in a state of deprivation or to emigrate to Israel, where they hoped that their situation would improve. During those decades, many thousands went on *aliyah*.

After Indian Independence and the economic and political instability which followed the departure of the British, the wealthier Baghdadi Jews decided to leave — not to emigrate to Israel but to settle mainly in the United Kingdom, where they had an economic basis and where the British way of life appealed to them. However, the many Baghdadis whom these men employed in their various commercial concerns did not have the resources to settle in Britain; one of them, who had remained in India commented:

> We Baghdadis always mixed with our own people. Some of us worked in Baghdadi companies and we were happy. However, once the British left,

> things changed; the wealthy Baghdadis wanted to leave India. The company ownership gradually shifted to other people. There were new rules and regulations for promotions, benefits, etc. Jewish holy days were not observed. We are Orthodox Jews and this made it difficult. While we were not fired, many wanted to leave. Those who felt that they had better economic chances in Israel migrated there.

As for the Cochin Jews, economic conditions also led some of the less affluent among them to emigrate to Israel. These were mainly the households of small shopkeepers and petty traders; some of them had not been prosperous under British rule. In 1922, eight elders of two Cochin synagogues wrote to the President of the English Zionist Federation in London to seek help about resolving communal disputes. In their letter, they confessed that they had become 'a very backward' community, adding: 'Most of our people are illiterate and ignorant'.[16] After India had achieved Independence, matters did not improve for the poorer Cochinis. Moreover, the landowners among them were, like their Bene Israel correligionists, adversely affected by new legislation: the Kerala state government enacted land ownership laws in the 1960s which diminished their income. One Cochin informant living in India told me:

> For the poorer Cochinis, it made economic sense to go to Israel. Here, many of them are making very little money. Some had a small area in their own homes where they would sell eggs, bananas, etc. Not only this, they were Orthodox. For them, going to Israel meant better economic opportunities as well as a chance to live in the Holy Land. And as you know, they have improved their standard of living. They worked hard and now they have better houses, a fridge, TV — things which they could never have got here. They are economically better off than most of us who have remained here.

Another Cochini, whom I interviewed in Israel, said:

> There is no doubt that a lot of the Indian Jews came to Israel to make a better life for themselves, especially among the Bene Israel and the poorer Cochinis. It was not that they did not like India or were discriminated against but because they heard that Israel gave immigrants jobs, loans, and houses. Religion also played a role, but it was not the most important reason. Here, in Israel, there are many who are less Orthodox than those in India.

Although economic factors were very important motives for going on *aliyah*, it must be stressed here that the Cochinis were renowned throughout the centuries for their piety, for their meticulous adherence to Jewish religious principles and practices. In the quotations above, the Cochini informants spontaneously referred to the religious motivation as an additional factor in the decision to settle in Israel. Moreover, I noted when analysing the responses of all my informants in India and in Israel that the Cochinis were the only group to give great

importance to religious factors as well as to economic considerations when discussing the *aliyah* of all Indian Jews.

Political factors

After Independence, the Indian Jewish minority could not expect the privileges and rewards which it had received from the British authorities or from the local maharajas. The introduction of an electoral system based on adult suffrage meant that numerically insignificant minorities would be rendered ineffective as political entities; the process of democratization necessarily had that result. Before Independence, there had been acute tension between India's Hindus and Muslims and the nationalist movement had acquired increasingly Hindu overtones. Shivaji, the seventeenth-century Hindu conqueror, was adopted as a heroic model for the victorious struggle for freedom. This affronted the Muslim nationalists, since Shivaji's struggle had been primarily against the Moguls.

The hostility between the Hindus and Muslims of India and the violence which ensued was viewed with great concern by the religious and the ethnic minorities of the country. After Independence, in the 1960s and the 1970s, there was an increasing trend for communal and caste affiliations to dominate the political process. Gussin has commented:[17]

> ... increasingly there has been a swing back to vernacular-speaking politicians, very much influenced by the traditional, communalist political ethic. These communal/traditional politicians have accepted the parliamentary system but are utilizing it primarily as a vehicle to raise their own and their caste status.

The Shiv Sena, a fundamentalist Hindu political party in Maharashtra (a region where some Bene Israel still lived) adopted a strongly militant dimension; it advocated the supremacy of the Hindus and directed most of its antagonism towards the local Muslim minority. In the late 1960s, the Shiv Sena's slogan was 'Maharashtra for Maharashtrians' — which meant 'for Hindus'.[18]

The Bene Israel, who clearly had a non-Hindu identity and who lived in a primarily Muslim-dominated area in Maharashtra, felt doubly excluded. Moreover, they had held in British India secure positions in the lower ranks of the administrative and political structure but now they were relegated to what appeared to be a precarious marginal position in Independent India. A Bene Israel who had emigrated to Israel commented:

> The Shiva Sena is very powerful in Bombay. They have control over everything and want only their people to have good positions. This was most obvious during the late sixties. By then the problem of our status in Israel had improved and so many felt that we would be better off here.

His reference to the problem of the Bene Israel status in Israel is to the controversy regarding a marriage between a Bene Israel and a Jewish person who was not a member of the Bene Israel. Jean Roland has observed:[19]

> Although the question of the Bene Israel's status as full Jews in regard to marriage with other Jews was raised in Israel in the 1950s by some Orthodox Jews, who feared that the Bene Israel's past ignorance of Jewish law relating to divorce and levirate marriage made them unacceptable, it was not until May 1961 that the controversy came to the fore. At that time—when the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbinate happened to be vacant—the Sephardic chief rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Itzhak Nissm (from Iraq) refused to declare that the Bene Israel were acceptable as proper Jews for purposes of marriage. Individual rabbis could now refuse to perform marriages between Bene Israel and other Jews unless the Bene Israel party underwent ritual conversion.

The Bene Israel protested vigorously and organized mass demonstrations and hunger strikes in Israel. A Bene Israel scholar, Benjamin J. Israel, has commented that 'the slur of presumptive bastardy was cast on the whole community, rendering its members barred in perpetuity from marrying outside their own tainted group. This slur naturally reflected itself in all social dealings'.[20] Militant Bene Israel groups formed an Action Committee in Israel and a Bene Israel Purity Justification Committee in Bombay. Various compromises offered by the religious authorities of Israel were rejected by the Bene Israel. Finally, in August 1964 the Knesset passed Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's resolution 'that affirmed that the Knesset viewed the Bene Israel as Jews in all respects and with the same rights as all other Jews, including matters of personal status' and that 'called on the Chief Rabbinate to remove the causes of any feeling of discrimination among the Bene Israel'. The Chief Rabbinate did so a few days later.[21] As a result, the Bene Israel emigrated to Israel in increasing numbers during the subsequent years, with the active encouragement of the Jewish Agency.

As noted above, the Baghdadi Jews throughout their stay in India kept apart from the native non-Jewish population and were demonstrably pro-British. When India attained Independence, the Hindu majority understandably viewed the Baghdadis as a foreign pro-colonial element. That Jewish group had lost its British protectors and had no close links with the new political masters. The Baghdadis in large numbers decided to leave India and settle elsewhere; the wealthiest segment went to Britain while others emigrated mainly to North America, Australia, and Israel. A small segment remained in India. Joan Roland states:[22]

> By the early 1980s, hardly eight hundred Baghdadi Jews remained in India. Some were engaged in domestic commerce. Many were elderly or retired

professionals or businessmen who could not take their money out of India and/or who enjoyed a standard of living there that they could not maintain abroad. Others were indigent dependents of the Sassoon trust funds.

As for the Cochin Jews, they became uneasy after Independence because they suspected that political changes would have an adverse effect on their situation. A Cochini whom I interviewed in India said:

> From the time that the Cochin Legislative Council was started in 1925, the Cochin Maharaja had a seat allotted for a Jewish representative. However, when the administration changed hands into the hands of the Congress ministry, this nomination of a Jew was cancelled . . . against the advice of the Cochin Maharaja. The protests of our community members had no impact on the decision of the ministry. This kind of situation had never happened before.

Other Cochini informants also referred with concern to the loss of a Jewish official representation. This was a warning signal that they could no longer rely on their traditional protection and privileges and many of them emigrated to Israel.

Social, Family, and Age Factors

The role of social factors in influencing *aliyah* was given the same weight by those informants who wished to emigrate to Israel as by those who were asked to evaluate their importance for all the Jews of India: 38.7 and 38.5 per cent respectively. The Cochinis and Baghdadis who had remained in India lamented in particular the present lack of cultural and social activities, which they attributed largely to the fact that their groups had been greatly depleted by emigration; there were fewer circumcisions, bar-mitzvahs, and weddings to celebrate. However, only two out of the 40 informants whom I interviewed in Israel cited the social factors; but just over half of them (21) claimed that family factors had led them to make *aliyah*. Frequent comments were that they had wished to join their relatives who had settled in the Holy Land because they wanted to live in close proximity to other members of their family. One person said that the decision to emigrate was taken because the children would have a better future in Israel. Such a focus on family life is not surprising in view of the fact that both Indian society and the Jewish people have greatly valued the unity and solidarity of the family.

Age was the factor least frequently cited as having an influence on *aliyah*. Not one of the 40 informants I interviewed in Israel referred to it in the context of their own emigration. On the other hand, a quarter of these same informants (10) said that age might be relevant when they were asked to give their opinion about the factors which would influence the *aliya* of all Indian Jews. These informants as well as those who had remained in India tended to comment that it was difficult for

older people to adjust to living in a different country, but that the young should go to Israel to start a new life. On the other hand, some of the Baghdadis I interviewed in India said that the lack of adequate social welfare provisions for the old in India was a cause for concern and conditions in Israel would be more favourable.

Conclusion

The Jews of India lived harmoniously for centuries with the non-Jewish inhabitants of the country and some of them were granted special privileges by the local rulers and later by the British authorities. They retained their separate religious identity and supported the Zionist movement, but few of them emigrated to what was Palestine. The Independence of India in 1947 brought about political and economic changes which caused concern to the small minorities, including the Jewish groups.

Hindu nationalism and the acute tensions between Hindus and Muslims intensified the marginality of the Jews. However, the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 gave them the possibility of realizing the Zionist dream, of settling in the Jewish State, where they elected to be part of the dominant Jewish majority and where they would have all the necessary facilities for practising their religion — observing the dietary laws and abstaining from work on the Sabbath and on religious holy days.

Most of my informants who had made *aliyah* stressed the importance of the religious factors in their own decision to emigrate. However, both they and those who still lived in India put more emphasis on economic and political considerations when they gave their opinions about the factors which would influence the *aliyah* of all the Jewish groups in India.

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NOTES

[1] See Margaret Abraham, *Ethnic Identity and Marginality: A Study of the Jews of India*, unpubished Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse University, 1989; See also Joan G.

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[2] See Shirley Berry Isenberg, *India's Bene Israel. A Comprehensive Inquiry and Sourcebook*, published by Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1988, pp. 293–95.

[3] See Roland, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 5.

[4] See David G. Mandelbaum, 'Social Stratification among the Jews of Cochin in India and in Israel' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 17, no. 2, December 1975, pp. 166–69.

[5] See Strizower, op. cit. in Note 1 above (*Exotic Jewish Communities*), pp. 53–54.

[6] Ibid., pp. 66–67.

[7] See Roland, op. cit. in Note 1 above, pp. 18–19, 157.

[8] Carl Mark Gussin, *The Bene Israel: Politics, Religion and Systematic Change*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse University, 1972, p. 74.

[9] Roland, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 4.

[10] Ibid., pp. 80–82, 151.

[11] See Antony Lerman *et al.*, eds., *The Jewish Communities of the World. A Contemporary Guide*, fourth edn, London, 1989, p. 78. See also *The Jewish Year Book 1987*, London, 1987, p. 150.

[12] See Ephraim H. Mizruchi and Robert Perucci, 'Norm Qualities and Deviant Behaviour' in Ephraim H. Mizruchi, ed., *The Substance of Sociology*, New York, 1973.

[13] See Cyril Levitt and William Shaffir, 'Aliyah and Return Migration of Canadian Jews: Personal Accounts of Incentives and of Disappointed Hopes' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, no. 2, December 1990 (pp. 95–106), p. 97.

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[15] Shalva Weil, *Bene Israel Indian Jews in Lod, Israel: A Study of the Persistence of Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Sussex, 1977, p. 62.

[16] Fischel, 'Early Zionism in India', op. cit. in Note 1 above, pp. 327–28.

[17] Gussin, op. cit. in Note 8 above, p. 77.

[18] Ibid., p. 79.

[19] Roland, op. cit. in Note 1 above, pp. 249–50.

[20] Israel, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 89.

[21] Roland, op. cit. in Note 1 above, pp. 250, 251.

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RELIGIOUS OR ETHNIC SELF-IDENTIFICATION OVER THE TELEPHONE: A PILOT STUDY OF MANCHESTER JEWRY

Marlena Schmool

Introduction

THE research reported here developed while planning a survey of the Jewish population of Greater Manchester. The aim of that survey is to examine the social, demographic, economic, and Jewish identity of Jews (whether or not they are affiliated to the Jewish community) who live in the area which was under the jurisdiction of the Greater Manchester local authority between April 1974 and March 1986. It is to be a large-scale direct sample survey undertaken by the Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews in co-operation with the Greater Manchester Jewish Representative Council.

Manchester Jewry is dispersed throughout the conurbation. Its members live in a variety of locations (suburban, inner city) and of types of housing. These factors combined to suggest the use of telephone interviews for a preliminary stage of the survey. Furthermore, experience abroad shows that telephone interviews can provide valid data and that the method should not be rejected out of hand in Britain.

Although this pilot exercise grew out of projected research concerned with the Jewish population of the Greater Manchester area, the findings of the study were expected to have wider application. At the same time as the Manchester Jewish Population Survey was being planned, a co-ordinated round of social surveys of Jewish communities throughout the world was proposed by the World Zionist Organization and the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. If telephone interviewing were to prove practicable in Greater Manchester, it could be considered for Jewish community research throughout Great Britain.

The conventional wisdom in the Jewish community of Great Britain has been that, for historical and psychological reasons, British Jews would be unwilling to identify themselves as Jews over the telephone.

Experience from American studies carried out in such different communities as Rhode Island, St Louis, and Denver indicates that Jews in America do not show this reluctance.[1] In this respect, American Jews are most likely following general American cultural patterns. Thus, in a culture where telephone coverage is more widespread[2] and its usage is more strongly related to social rather than to business matters,[3] Jewish historical memory may become less important and psychological barriers against answering questions about Jewishness from unsolicited callers less pronounced.

Telephone Ownership in the Jewish Community

A telephone study could not be contemplated if the group to be examined was expected to have low levels of telephone ownership. However, Anglo-Jewry is largely a middle-class community[4] and prima facie Manchester Jewry might be expected to show high levels of telephone ownership, certainly higher than the national average. Indirect evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from a study of *Jewish Chronicle* readers in 1984.[5] Analysis of their ownership of durable goods (among which telephones were included) shows that in 1984, 42 per cent of *Jewish Chronicle* households had dishwashers and 45 per cent had video-cassette players. The comparable 1986 General Household Survey figures of the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys for all households in Great Britain were seven per cent and 38 per cent respectively. It would therefore seem reasonable to expect telephone ownership among Jews to be at least at the 83 per cent national average reported in the 1986 General Household Survey.[6]

One exception to this general high level of ownership could be the elderly. Initial enquiries to the Manchester Jewish Social Services (MJSS) suggested that adult children of the elderly usually ensure that their parents have telephones, but other disadvantaged or low socio-economic-status groups might not own, or have access to, telephones. A subsequent analysis carried out in October 1988 by MJSS on behalf of the Community Research Unit found that of the 140 cases then being dealt with by the MJSS, 64.3 per cent of all clients had a telephone. Nationally, 63 per cent of all households with a gross weekly income of £60 or less in 1986 had telephones.[7] However, the Director of MJSS considered that the 64.3 per cent underestimated ownership levels, since not all telephone numbers were on file; but unfortunately the remaining names were not checked against the telephone directory to see if this was so. The MJSS records further showed that 76.9 per cent of the 78 elderly and 48.3 per cent of the other 62 clients had telephones. It is therefore in the other category (such as single-parent households) that the greatest non-coverage occurs.[8]

A further factor to be taken into account in a large-scale study would be the proportions of ex-directory numbers and other numbers not

listed by an individual's surname. In Britain in 1985, at least 12 per cent of numbers were not listed;[9] therefore, the problem must be faced. This pilot study, which was concerned with testing responses to an ethnic/religious question, did not directly deal with that issue. However, some problems about the telephone-number coverage of synagogue lists emerged in the course of the research. These are examined below, as are levels of non-household and business numbers.

Aims and Methods

The aims of the study were, first, to test whether British Jews (as exemplified by Manchester Jewry) will admit to their Jewishness over the telephone and, second to see if the response is affected by whether or not the interviewer's bona fides is vouched for by a recognized Jewish institution. Simultaneously, the attitude of non-Jews to the question has to be considered. If directory-lists, random-digit dialling, or Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) are eventually to be used in Jewish community surveys, it is important to know that non-Jews will answer a screening question directed at pinpointing households with Jewish members.

With these objectives, two random samples of 150 households were selected. The first was from ten Manchester synagogue membership lists in hand at the time of the study and the second from the North Manchester area British Telecom directory, where numbers sampled were those with addresses in the M7 or M25 postal districts (areas where Manchester Jews were known to reside) and the entry was not immediately identifiable as a business telephone number.

The interview period was from the end of October 1988 to the middle of January 1989 (excluding the Christmas vacation from mid-December to immediately after the New Year 1989). By mid-December 1988, 143 interviews were carried out by 20 students from the Applied Social Work Department at Manchester Polytechnic, as part of their Research Methods course. They had no previous interviewing experience and were trained by the Research Director of the Community Research Unit. The remaining 157 interviews were carried out by Unit staff in London and Manchester in the first half of January 1989. Interview quotas and questionnaire rotation for the students were controlled by Mr David Boulton of Manchester Polytechnic.[10] Since the questions were of a simple nature and could be answered by any adult, interviewers were not instructed to interview any specified member of the household but were told to make sure that the interviewee was 17 years of age or over. Interviews by the Unit research staff were supervised by the Research Director. While experienced interviewers would have completed the interviewing more quickly, the concomitant cost would have precluded the test being carried out. Moreover, the questionnaires were very simple to administer, taking at

most only two or three minutes, well within the capability of the students. (Copies of the two questionnaire forms used by the interviewers are given in the Appendix, at the end of this paper.)

The two questionnaires were distributed between the two samples at random, and if repeat calls were necessary, they were made at times which differed from the time of the original call. Most initial calls were made between 4.30 p.m. and 7.30 p.m. There was no interviewing on Friday afternoon after 3.00 p.m. or throughout Saturdays, so as not to offend Jews on the Sabbath. Some telephoning was conducted on Sunday to households expected to be Jewish.

The two samples were subdivided. Half of each set of respondents were told that the interviewer was a student carrying out research as part of his/her course at the Manchester Polytechnic while the other half were told that the student interviewer was conducting a small study under the auspices, and with the backing, of the Greater Manchester Jewish Representative Council. The study was designed in this way to examine two separate issues: first, whether the method of introduction affected response; and second, whether the response rate differed between the Jewish and the general samples.

Although the interviewing was cold-calling (that is, without previous arrangement), this did not mean that, at least insofar as the Jewish sample was concerned, prospective interviewees need be totally ignorant about the survey. In an effort to develop communal awareness and to increase support for the proposed project, there had been widespread discussion and publicity in the local Jewish press over a period of some two years. In addition, immediately before telephone interviewing began and at regular intervals while it was in progress, the Manchester Jewish press carried reports about this particular small survey. Interviewees could thus have known that they might be telephoned. The publicity stressed that interviewers would not know the identity of those whom they were contacting since they had been given only a telephone number — not a name or address. It was also made clear that the findings would be used solely for statistical purposes and would be treated in the strictest confidence.

A press release covering the same points was also sent to the *Bury Times*, the *Salford Times* and the *Manchester Evening News* — local newspapers read in the North Manchester area where the Jewish community is centred. During the first interviewing period, student interviewers told the Research Director that they themselves had read about the survey. It also became clear that some non-Jewish respondents knew about the study following unsolicited coverage in local free newspapers.

In studies of the type proposed, when interviewees cannot be individually warned of a forthcoming telephone call, this essential information must be provided through the press and, where

appropriate, augmented by other local advertising methods, such as notices in local shops, so that a basic level of awareness about the project can be developed.[11] The efficacy and penetration of this media coverage were assessed by asking self-identifying Jews whether they had read about the study in the two local Jewish newspapers (which together have an average weekly circulation of about 8,500) or whether they knew of it from any other source.

Synagogue Membership Lists

One of the major problems faced in planning the Manchester survey is the development of a population register of Jews from which to draw the sample. It is inappropriate here to discuss definitional problems of Jewishness but previous research indicates that the synagogue-affiliated section of British Jewry should be the initial core of the sample frame.[12]

Early in the planning of the survey, in mid-1986, 33 synagogues listed in the Greater Manchester Jewish Representative Council Year Book were asked to provide a copy of their membership lists to the Community Research Unit. The process of collecting these lists was very protracted, with many follow-up contacts being made. At the time of sampling for the telephone pilot study in October 1988, only 12 lists had been obtained. The main reasons given for not providing them may be summed up by such comments as 'Our members are worried about who could see or have access to the lists', and historically-induced caution — although there were also a few reservations about receiving junk-mail and other misuse of data-sets. Ten of these 12 lists were already entered in the Unit's computer when the pilot study was initiated. The original 150 synagogue-list random sample was drawn by computer from these ten lists which covered about 60 per cent of the known synagogue membership in the Greater Manchester area. The time-lag between receiving them and sampling from them could account for much of the change to non-Jewish households referred to below.

Some of the synagogue lists of addresses also gave telephone numbers; the remaining numbers were traced either in the telephone directory or from directory enquiries. Of the original 150 sample addresses, 34 were rejected: 25 were ex-directory numbers, five were for addresses outside the Greater Manchester area, and three were households either without a telephone or with a number listed under a name different from that available to us. The 34th address was for a synagogue member known, from reports in the local Jewish press, to have left Manchester. The 34 names were replaced by a random sample from those available synagogue lists from which names and addresses had not yet been entered on the computer.

In the course of telephoning, we found that 11 of the 150 numbers (seven per cent) in the final synagogue list were no longer for Jewish

households. It is not possible to say how many numbers changed from one Jewish owner to another: in the interests of anonymity, no attempt was made to find the name of the present householder. A further seven numbers (five per cent) taken from the synagogue lists were non-households — for instance, a doctor's surgery or business premises.

Findings

Table 1 sets out the response to the telephone calls according to the source of the number contacted and to which questionnaire was used. Of the total 300 numbers selected, 23 (ten directory and 13 synagogue-lists) had to be discarded as 'out-of-scope'. Within this group, eight of the telephone directory sample and six of the synagogue-lists sample were discontinued lines, while two of the telephone directory sample and seven of the synagogue-lists numbers were non-household. At a further 21 numbers (ten directory and 11 synagogue-lists) no contact was made after three telephone calls. The 'no contact' category of the synagogue-lists numbers included three numbers which were answered by telephone-answering machines on each of three contact attempts. Interviews were then completed with 77 per cent of the remaining 130 telephone directory numbers, and 70 per cent of the 126 synagogue-lists numbers.

TABLE 1. *Response according to source of telephone number and questionnaire used*

	Source				*Questionnaire*			
	Directory		*Syn. lists*		*Student*		*Jewish*	
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
Attempted Calls	150	100	150	100	150	100	150	100
Contact	130	86.6	126	84.0	135	90.0	121	80.7
Interviews								
Jewish Household	10	6.7	77	51.3	45	30.0	42	28.0
Non-Jewish Household	90	60.0	11	7.3	52	34.7	49	32.7
Refusal	30	20.0	38	25.3	38	25.3	30	20.0

If we then turn to the response to the different questionnaires, we find that, of the 135 contacted with the 'student' introduction, 72 per cent gave interviews compared with 75 per cent of the 121 contacted with the 'Jewish' introduction.

As regards the character of refusal, only four of the 68 refusal cases were immediate 'hung up' response. The remaining 64 refusals were 34 cases characterized as 'household refusal', where the adult answering the telephone refused to be interviewed (giving answers such as 'I'm

not interested', 'I'm in the middle of cooking', 'Don't ring, please' and 'I'm too busy now but don't call back'), and 30 classified as 'respondent refusal' where the telephone was answered by someone under the age of 17 who passed the call to an adult, who then refused to come to the telephone.

In total, 25 per cent of the original sample from synagogue lists refused to participate in the study, as opposed to 20 per cent of the telephone directory sample. When the refusal according to type of questionnaire is examined, the 'student' introduction is seen to have produced 13 (nine per cent) household refusals whereas the 'Jewish' introduction prompted this immediate refusal in 21 cases (14 per cent). However, the *combined* household and respondent refusal rate reverses this pattern, being 24 per cent for the 'student' questionnaire while the combined figure for these two responses to the 'Jewish' questionnaire was 18.7 per cent.

The anticipated loss of Jewish households from the synagogue-lists sample has already been discussed. It was expected that a compensatory number of Jewish households would occur in randomly-sampling the M7 and M25 postcode telephone numbers, since previous research has shown that more than five per cent of the population of these areas of Manchester is Jewish.[13] This expectation was realized, with the telephone-directory sample yielding 11 interviews with Jewish households.

When the outcome of contacts is collapsed into simply refusal and interview completed, four groups in all can be defined according to the source of telephone number and questionnaire used. Each group had 75 targeted contacts. Of these, in the student questionnaire/directory group, 52 interviews were completed while in the student questionnaire/synagogue lists 45 were completed; 48 in the Jewish questionnaire/directory group and 43 in the Jewish questionnaire/synagogue-lists group were completed. It is thus clear that response rates were not significantly affected by either sample source or type of questionnaire used. (Chi-square for the effect on response of questionnaire used is 0.039 and of source of number is 1.671. Neither of these is significant with one degree of freedom at the five per cent level.) Furthermore, the pattern of responses according to type of questionnaire and to source of telephone number does not differ greatly from the original allocation pattern.

As stated above, in order to allay suspicion among Jewish respondents, there was regular publicity about the Telephone Study in the local Jewish and general Manchester press. The publicity was of a general nature, explaining that a number of households chosen at random would be telephoned. It was further specified that this was a technical exercise in preparation for the planned survey of Greater Manchester Jewry. This reassurance was repeated in the course of the

fieldwork period. These press reports were only the latest stage in a regular flow of information about the survey over a two-year period. It was therefore assumed that, if the local Jewish press reports were effective, respondents would know of the survey. However, the results from the 87 Jewish households interviewed suggest that the information had not penetrated the communal psyche to any great extent. Only 17 per cent remembered learning about the survey from reading the Jewish press, while a further three per cent had heard about it from another source. Strikingly, 77 per cent of Jewish respondents said that they had no knowledge about the project.

Since the aim of the study was simply to assess whether Jews would self-identify and, simultaneously, whether non-Jews would answer the screening question rather than just put the telephone down, the questionnaire used was deliberately very short and in no way tested whether Jews would answer a more detailed one. To counterbalance this and to indicate *stated* willingness of Jews to answer a fuller questionnaire over the phone, Jewish respondents were asked 'If asked, would you be ready to answer questions about yourself and your family over the phone?'. Thirty-five of the 87 Jewish respondents (40 per cent) said that they would be prepared to answer, while 31 (35 per cent) said that they would refuse; 16 (18 per cent) were undecided and the remaining five (6 per cent) gave no reply. However, there were few totally unqualified answers. Thus, a respondent might be willing to answer further questions 'with identification', 'but not on Saturdays' or 'by appointment'. On the other hand, someone initially unwilling might be prepared to answer fuller questions in 'maybe some other way' or 'depending on the personalness', suggesting that in (undefined) given circumstances they would answer. The occasional 'definitely yes' reported back by interviewers was obviously very encouraging.

Discussion

The main reason for conducting this pilot study was to test whether the bald question 'Is anyone in the household Jewish?' would be answered by Jews and non-Jews over the telephone. Our results show that a question framed to elicit this information will probably be answered. Irrespectively of the source of the telephone-number or of the introductory preamble to the questionnaire, some 60 per cent of the samples replied to this question. The completion rates of 59 per cent and 67 per cent which we obtained compare favourably with the results reported by Collins *et al.* The studies they analysed had response rates in telephone studies of between 46 and 65 per cent, with 60 per cent being considered an encouraging level.[14] The higher completion rate for contacted numbers in the telephone-book sample may reflect the ease with which an interviewer could maintain contact long enough to ask the religious or ethnic screening-question. Once it became clear to

non-Jews that this was near the end of the interview, it was readily answered. The difference in completion rates, however, is not statistically significant.

It is important that respondents in households without Jews are equally prepared to answer this question because these households would have to be eliminated from any study using this technique for screening for Jewish identity. It became evident in the course of interviewing that the question was indeed acceptable to non-Jewish households, often being greeted with amusement.[15] In this light, the 27 and 33 per cent combined 'non-contact/refusal' rates for the telephone-directory and the synagogue-lists samples respectively became worrying. If this type of question is used in later studies with similar results, the self-selection bias would be two-fold: (un)willingness to self-identify as a Jew would be added to a general (un)willingness to participate in a survey.[16] The nature and scale of this pilot work did not allow the reasons for non-response to be categorized or quantified. The 17 per cent household refusal to the Jewish questionnaire where contact was made, as opposed to the ten per cent refusal to the student questionnaire, might indicate self-(de)selection bias. However, as owing to possible change of ownership we did not know exactly which homes (even on the synagogue list) were Jewish, we can do no more than offer this as a possibility. But since response rates are not significantly affected by the type of questionnaire, it could equally be that refusal *overall* was related more to the fact of being called to the telephone than to the subject-matter of the research.

The conventional wisdom about the reluctance of members of the British Jewish community to self-identify over the telephone must therefore be called into question. A high proportion of synagogue-affiliated Jews in Manchester were willing to admit their Jewishness over the telephone, at least to the extent that they generally were prepared to be involved in a short telephone interview. Some questions, however, remain unresolved — a major one being whether respondents would agree to longer interviews.[17] Furthermore, this pilot highlighted problems already anticipated about obtaining lists from synagogues and from other community organizations which would be the core of the sample frame in planning a community survey.

As regards communal lists, the bias in telephone ownership away from the elderly and low-economic-status households (as suggested by the MJSS data) was expected in the light of data from general sources. However, the erosion over time owing to the change-over to non-Jewish households (at least seven per cent) and loss from the sample because members gave a business number to the synagogue (five per cent) were not so predictable — nor was the extent of ex-directory numbers or of numbers listed under other names and not given to synagogues.

The possible use of electoral registers, telephone directories, and similar general lists to supplement and expand the core of affiliated members of the community is affected by the proportion of Jews in the wider society and their dispersion within it. Overall, with an estimated Jewish population of 326,000 in Great Britain (according to Community Research Unit data), about six persons in every thousand are Jewish, with the major concentrations in Greater London and Greater Manchester. As noted above, the M7 and M25 postal districts were chosen for this telephone exercise because they are known to be areas of concentrated Jewish population. It was expected that more than five per cent of the households would be Jewish, and in fact this was the case for seven per cent of that sample. Were the Manchester study to be based solely on unstratified random sampling of the total population, and assuming unrealistically that all Jewish households had telephones and that there were no refusals, approximately 87 calls would be needed to pinpoint one Jewish household.[18]

Stratification would reduce this ratio but clearly cost would become an overriding factor. However, costs must be balanced against the anticipated real gains in representativeness. Preparatory work for the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey in the USA indicated that, whereas 2.5 per cent of the American population are Jewish, more than three per cent of households screened have a Jewish member.[19] It would seem from the Manchester pilot study that, with a properly-worded screening question, telephone interviewing in Britain might similarly widen the coverage of communal studies. To the best of my knowledge, there is no published social research on British Jewry based on data acquired from a telephone survey.

Acknowledgement

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NOTES

[1] See Calvin Goldscheider and Sidney Goldstein, *The Jewish Community of Rhode Island: A Social and Demographic Study, 1987*, Jewish Federation of Rhode Island, Providence, R. I., 1988; Bruce A. Phillips and Eleanor P. Judd, *Denver Jewish Population Study 1981*, Allied Jewish Federation, Denver, 1982; Bruce A. Phillips and Eve Weinberg, *The Milwaukee Jewish Population* (unpublished report), 1984; and Gary A. Tobin, *A Demographic and Attitudinal Study of the Jewish Community of St. Louis*, Jewish Federation of St Louis, 1982.

[2] See Dennis Trewin and Geoff Lee, 'International Comparisons of Telephone Coverage' in Robert M. Groves *et al.*, eds., *Telephone Survey Methodology*, New York, 1988, p. 17.

[3] Martin Collins, Wendy Sykes, Paul Wilson, and Norah Blackshaw, 'Nonresponse: the UK Experience', in op. cit. in Note 2 above, p. 214.

[4] Stanley Waterman and Barry Kosmin, *British Jewry in the Eighties: A Statistical and Geographical Study*, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1986, p. 47; Stanley Waterman, *Jews in an Outer London Borough, Barnet*, Queen Mary College, London, 1989, pp. 34–38.

[5] I am grateful to the *Jewish Chronicle* for providing these unpublished data and for authorizing publication.

[6] See T. Griffin, ed., *Social Trends 19*, HMSO (Her Majesty's Stationery Office), London 1989, p. 104.

[7] Ibid.

[8] I am grateful to Mr Michael Anderson, Director of Manchester Jewish Social Services, for compiling this information from his agency records.

[9] See Martin Collins and Wendy Sykes, 'The Problems of Non-coverage and Unlisted Numbers in Telephone Surveys in Britain', in *The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A (General), vol. 150, Part 3, 1987, p. 244.

[10] I am grateful to Mr David Boulton and to the students and staff of the Applied Social Work Department of Manchester Polytechnic for their participation in, and help with, the fieldwork.

[11] See Deborah J. De Lange and Barry A. Kosmin, *Community Resources for a Community Survey*, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1979, pp. 16–19; and Goldscheider and Goldstein, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. 8.

[12] See S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population 1960–1965', in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968, p. 19; and Barry A. Kosmin and Caren Levy, *Synagogue Membership in the United Kingdom, 1983*, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1983.

[13] Waterman and Kosmin, op. cit. in Note 4 above, p. 27.

[14] Collins *et al.*, op. cit. in Note 3 above, pp. 215–16.

[15] It also provided an interesting anomaly. One synagogue-list number was that of a lady who had been born Jewish, had converted to Christianity, and when contacted was just going to church.

[16] Although the same biases may occur in door-to-door interviewing, it is possible to identify most Jewish houses by the mezuzah affixed to the doorpost. See Barry A. Kosmin and Caren Levy, *Jewish Identity in an Anglo-Jewish Community*, Board of Deputies of British Jews, London, 1983, p. 12; and Wendy Sykes and Martin Collins, 'Effects of Mode of Interview: Experiments in the UK' in *Telephone Survey Methodology*, op. cit. in Note 2 above, p. 305.

[17] See Collins *et al.*, op. cit. in Note 3 above, p. 229.

[18] Using Random Digit Dialling, 17,722 households were contacted in Milwaukee to find 475 with a Jewish member: see Phillips and Weinberg, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. A–2; in Denver 41,000 calls were made for 802 completed interviews: see Phillips and Judd, op. cit. in Note 1 above, p. vii. That is, there was one Jewish household per 37 calls in Milwaukee and one per 51 calls in Denver.

[19] This information was provided by Dr Barry A. Kosmin, Director of the North American Jewish Data Bank.

MARLENA SCHMOOL

APPENDIX

Code Number: ☐☐☐ Phone Number: ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Respondent: M F

Hello, is that number .....? (VERIFY TELEPHONE NO.)
My name is ..... I am a social science student at Manchester Polytechnic and I would be grateful if you would answer one or two questions for a small project which people on my course are carrying out. This will only take one or two minutes.

Could I please speak to someone aged 17 or over?

IF ANOTHER PERSON COMES TO ANSWER, INTRODUCE YOURSELF AGAIN

The first few questions are just about habits and pastimes.

1. Could you tell me whether anybody in the household drives a car?
YES NO
IF YES How many drive? .....

2. Now what about smoking, does anyone in the household smoke?
YES NO
IF YES: Could you tell me how many people smoke? .....

3. Does any one support a football team?
YES NO
IF YES: Which? .....

4. Could you tell me if more than one household uses this phone number?
YES NO
IF YES: How many households use it? .....

We are also interested in minority groups. And we are doing part of our study for the Manchester Jewish Community.

5. Could I ask if anyone in the household is Jewish?
YES NO
IF NO, CLOSE INTERVIEW. That's all I need to know, thank you. Thank you very much for your help.

6. How many people are Jewish? .....

7. What is the precise occupation of the head of your household?
.....

8. Have you read about this project in the *Jewish Telegraph* or *Gazette*?
YES NO
IF NO: Did you hear about it in any other way, e.g. from a friend?
YES NO

9. If asked, would you be ready to answer questions about yourself and your family over the phone?

YES NO DON'T KNOW

Thank you very much for sparing the time to anwer these questions. I hope you enjoyed the interview.

Code Number: ☐☐☐ Phone Number: ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Respondent: M F

Hello, is that number .....? (VERIFY TELEPHONE NO.)

My name is ..... I am a social science student at Manchester Polytechnic and I would be grateful if you would answer one or two questions. My class is helping Manchester Jewish Representative Council on some background technical-work for a proposed survey of the Manchester Jewish Community. You may have read about this in the local press.

Could I please speak to someone aged 17 or over?

IF ANOTHER PERSON COMES TO ANSWER, INTRODUCE YOURSELF AGAIN

1. First, could you tell me if you are all one household at this phone number?

YES NO

IF NO: How many households use this number? .....

2. How many people are there altogether in *your* household including yourself? .....

3. How many of these people are Jewish? .....

IF NONE, CLOSE INTERVIEW. That's all I need to know, thank you. Thank you very much for your help.

4. How long have you personally lived at this address ..... years

5. What is the precise occupation of the head of your household?

.....

6. Are there other Jewish families living in your street?

YES NO DON'T KNOW

7. Have you read about this project in the *Jewish Telegraph* or *Gazette*?

YES NO

IF NO: Did you hear about it in any other way, e.g. from a friend?

YES NO

8. If asked, would you be ready to answer questions about yourself and your family over the phone?

YES NO DON'T KNOW

Thank you very much for sparing the time to answer these questions. I hope you enjoyed the interview.

ANGLO-JEWRY REVISITED

Max Beloff

(Review Article)

V. D. LIPMAN, *A History of the Jews in Britain since 1858*, xvi + 274 pp., Leicester University Press, Leicester and London, 1990, £9.95 (hardback, £35.00).

DAVID CESARANI, ed., *The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry* (Jewish Society and Culture series), xii + 222 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, £35.00.

LIONEL KOCHAN, *Jews, Idols and Messiahs. The Challenge from History*, vii + 231 pp., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, £35.00.

WE are fortunate in that the late Vivian Lipman completed this summary of his life's work, thus enabling posthumous publication to go ahead. It is consciously designed as a sequel to Cecil Roth's classic *A History of the Jews in England* and begins where Roth left off, with the achievement of representation in Parliament as the culmination of Jewish Emancipation, some two centuries after the 'readmission' of the Jews in Oliver Cromwell's time.

Dr Lipman mainly confines himself to the years between 1858 and 1939, with only a brief chapter covering the no less crowded years from 1939 to 1989. Into the period with which he principally deals, much devoted research by himself and others has been undertaken and he has fully acknowledged his sources. As might be expected, his initial questions are statistical and topographical. How many Jews were there in Britain? Where did they originate? Where did they live? (The maps help.) What were their religious allegiances and their communal institutions? How did they earn their living and support those who failed to do so? Given a community which was being so powerfully influenced by successive waves of immigration and where, as in the wider British world, upward mobility usually involved a change of address, these apparently straightforward enquiries call for all the historian's skills. In addition, and inevitably, Vivian Lipman retells the story of the growing challenge to the leadership exercised by the descendants of the old Anglo-Jewish élite, from both Orthodox and Zionist quarters and from important provincial Jewries discontented with London's hegemony. Nor does he omit to bring into focus the comparatively short-lived commitment of the new immigrant

proletariat to independent Jewish trade unions and to socialist and anarchist movements, pending that proletariat's later absorption into the general organizational framework of the British Left.

What makes the history of Anglo-Jewry so difficult to analyse is of course its involvement in the wider world of European (and to a more limited extent, North American) Jewry. Immigration itself, particularly from Eastern Europe, was both the prime source of changes within the community and of changes in its relationship with the host society — whether in terms of immigration control or of support for initiatives to rectify the persecutions and injustices that stimulated the flow. But the conflicting ideologies of acculturation, self-awareness, and Zionism itself were understandable only in their wider settings; so too was the perennial argument over how to fight antisemitism, whether by lowering or raising the Jewish profile. For the last period covered in this book (1939–89), the most important factor which differentiated British Jewry from other Jewries in the West was that Britain was the mandatory power for Palestine and that British Jewry therefore stood in relation to its own government in a different and more complicated context.

No doubt others will find this or that omission in Vivian Lipman's coverage of a large theme in a comparatively short book. I have found only one. He does not mention that one result of the Russian Revolution of 1917 was the arrival in London (as well as in greater numbers in Berlin and in Paris) of educated Russian-speaking (not Yiddish-speaking) Jews who for a time also imported their own communal activities and charities. The most important of the latter, which antedated the Revolution, was ORT (the Organization for Rehabilitation and Training) which, in addition to its impact on world Jewry, was to influence British educational policy itself when 'training' became a living issue in the 1980s.

The Cesarani volume is less ambitious than its title might suggest. It does not give a general picture of the history of Anglo-Jewry but consists of a number of essays on different (and in some cases, neglected) aspects of that community. The link between them is not chronological but ideological. It purports to be a repudiation of the Roth-Lipman version of Anglo-Jewish history in favour of an approach which takes account not so much of new perspectives from within the subject as of current fashionable concerns with class, gender, ethnicity, and so forth. It repudiates the optimism of both the assimilationist and the Zionist approach to the subject. The authors seem to have in common an ineradicable belief in the all-pervasiveness of British antisemitism whether in the 'Conservative' form of treating the Jews as an unassimilable element, or in its 'Liberal' form of expecting them to secure their status by accepting the values of the wider society. Tony Kushner, in the concluding essay of the volume ('The Impact of British

Anti-semitism, 1918–1945'), has no difficulty in documenting the extent to which governmental attitudes to further immigration after the First World War were dominated by a fear of stimulating antisemitism in the United Kingdom. Indeed he can go no further than other writers, notably Bernard Wasserstein, have done. But like those who find Jews behind the arras in all situations, Dr Kushner finds antisemitism. For instance, he attributes the internment of enemy aliens in the summer of 1940 to the fact that a very high proportion of them were Jewish. I suspect that Dr Kushner is too young to remember that fateful summer and too unimaginative to make allowances for the decision of the British government not to take any risks, after witnessing the crumbling of so many European countries and after the pervasiveness of rumours (some no doubt well-founded) that 'fifth columns' had played a part in the débâcle. The fact that people were Jews made it improbable that their sympathies were with the enemy, but could blackmail be discounted?

The suggestion that Jewish allegiance to left-wing organizations has been underplayed is borne out by David Cesarani's chapter on the transformation of communal authority between 1914 and 1940. He shows that the old guard still held sway in the 1920s despite the advent of the Zionists and that it was the dissatisfaction created by the communal leaders' reaction to fascism at home and abroad in the 1930s which caused the leadership to pass into other hands. The Zionists who profited by this change had had to compete with left-wing parties for the allegiance of those hitherto largely unrepresented; nor was their triumph among the 'masses' total — Britain never became an important source of *aliyah*.

While Cesarani's revised analysis is acceptable, Elaine Smith's narrower focus on the politics of East End Jewry in the interwar period is useful on individuals and episodes but occasionally shies away from the fundamental question of who was exploiting whom. This is particularly important in the light of Cesarani's pointing to the 'myth' that the Communist Party 'had, virtually alone, defended the Jews of East London' (p. 131). Other essays all include some matters of interest, without much altering the received and familiar picture. Anne J. Kershen gives a useful account of the industrial and psychological reasons which led to specifically Jewish trade unionism in London and in Leeds. Bill Williams shows the extent to which even provincial Jewries are better understood if analysed in class terms, by chronicling the rise of a new entrepreneurial class among the *Ostjuden* immigrants in Manchester between 1850 and 1914; but I see no reason for his adopting the American vulgarism 'alrightniks' to describe them — to be hostile to assimilationism does not necessarily involve hostility to the English language. The same, alas, must be said with even greater force of the chapter by Bryan Cheyette entitled 'The Other Self:

Anglo-Jewish Fiction and the Representation of Jews in England, 1875–1905'; he tackles the interesting task of investigating Jewish self-perceptions through the writings of three Anglo-Jewish novelists (Benjamin Farjeon, Julia Frankau, and Israel Zangwill) at the turn of the century, but he appears to be so overwhelmed by his own learning and so unable to give a clear account of his own views that the reader is likely to be baffled

As someone whose grandmother kept shop in the Pale of Settlement while his grandfather studied the Talmud, I do not find Rickie Burman's investigation of the economic contributions of Jewish women in Manchester in the first two generations of immigrants particularly surprising; and as with most research based upon 'oral' sources, one feels that some questions have remained unasked. Rosalyn Livshin's account of the acculturation of the children of immigrant Jews in Manchester over roughly the same period (1890–1930) brings out quite effectively the impact of the contribution of the Jews' own communal leadership. It is clear from the tone that she is not happy about the process of that acculturation, since she adheres to the view that it is naïve to believe that 'if you became English, if you assimilated then anti-semitism would cease' (p. 94). In 'Jewish Refugees, Anglo-Jewry and British Government Policy, 1930–1940', Louise London makes some telling points without calling for a radical reappraisal of a very mixed record. Sensitivity about employment, particularly in the medical profession, was even more important than the latent antisemitism which creeps out of the documents.

To what extent, beyond achieving a certain conformity to the book's ideological thrust, the editor has tried to secure agreement among the authors is not clear. On one important point, they differ. Elaine Smith fully documents the drift away from religious observance among East End Jews after the First World War and concludes that it was class and ethnicity, rather than religion, which were 'the key factors in uniting second-generation East End Jews' (p. 162). However, Tony Kushner asserts with equal force that the evacuation of Jewish children to avoid the blitz often resulted in cutting them off from their religious roots. He comments that this evacuation during the Second World War, although it acted as an integrative force, 'illustrated that toleration had its price, the cost being a breakdown in religious observance from which in many ways the Jewish community in Britain has never recovered' (p. 204). It cannot have happened twice. I would guess that, unlike some of his fellow-contributors, Tony Kushner attaches importance to the religious aspect of Jewish identity. But he is not altogether prepared to face the intellectual consequences. The only justification for *shechita* is in religion. Those who do not adhere to the Jewish religion are surely entitled to advocate the banning of this form of animal slaughter if they believe, rightly or wrongly, that it results in

unnecessary pain to animals. It makes no more sense to accuse them of antisemitism than to accuse them of anti-Islamism if they object on the same grounds to the Muslim rules for animal slaughter.

In general, however, the idea that Jews are to be defined by their adherence to a particular religion seems as remote from the general approach of this volume as the idea that the Jews are a nation like other nations — though if one is to regard antisemitism as ineradicable, the Zionist argument would seem to gain much force. The position as seen by Dr Cesarani and his friends is that the Jews are characterized by their 'ethnicity'. The editor tells us in his Introduction that 'Jewish ethnicity is a central concern of these essays' (p. 5); it can explain Jewish middle-class attraction to Zionism and Jewish working-class attraction to left-wing politics (p. 6). Yet apart from the suggestion that such definitions are rooted in external and hostile perceptions of Jewry, what are we to understand by 'ethnicity'? Dr Cesarani and his associates declare themselves to have been influenced by 'Britain's problematic record as a host for immigrants from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan' and by 'the dynamism of racism along with neo-Fascism in this country during the 1970s' (p. 10).

But this is to embark upon a highly dangerous trajectory. If the reason for a new attention to Anglo-Jewry is the 'possibility that Britain might be moving towards a multi-ethnic society' (p. 10), might it not be best to begin with the impact of such a change on the position of the Jews themselves? Have the authors failed to observe that the manifestations of antisemitism in recent years have been on university and polytechnic campuses and that this is the product of accessibility to Arab and Islamic propaganda of precisely those ethnic minorities with whom Jews seem to be invited to align themselves, and of elements in the Labour Party to whom the Palestinian cause makes the greatest appeal? Of course, upper-class antisemitism still exists — the recent fuss over the War Crimes Bill was proof enough — but the major danger is on the Left, which is where Dr Cesarani would seemingly wish Jews to take their stand.

These immediate and pragmatic issues are, however, less important than the conceptual confusion over ethnicity. When we talk about 'ethnic groups', we mean groups distinguished from the rest of the host society by race and colour, by language, or by creed — or by a mixture of all three — and that such groups demand the means for perpetuating these distinctions. If only one of the distinctions is present, as in Northern Ireland, the word 'ethnic' would not normally be used. It begins to look as though 'ethnicity' is little more than a euphemism for 'race'. And this must be particularly so where the Jews of Britain are concerned. Language is not, as it is in many such situations, an important factor: Yiddish, for all the welcome revived interest in it, is not the vernacular of Britain's Jews today, while Hebrew as a secular

language is closely associated with Zionism, for perfectly good reasons. Nor is one assisted by talk of 'culture'; Jews since Emancipation have made important contributions to the general culture, but this is in terms of developments in Europe or North America as a whole. Whether a secular culture of an independent and original nature will develop in Israel, it is far too early to tell. All we have as specifically Jewish is derived at whatever distance from Judaism itself. It would seem more in keeping with our age to prefer to be defined by one's religion rather than by one's race. Perhaps Dr Cesarani thinks otherwise. If so, he is in strange company. The middle way can sometimes be the most dangerous of all.

How much more fruitful an approach based upon the religious definition of the Diaspora Jew can be, is clearly demonstrated in Lionel Kochan's latest work; it is based on a deep knowledge of Jewish as well as of secular learning. It can to some extent be seen as a commentary upon the directive given by Moses Mendelssohn early in the period of the Enlightenment, when he wrote in *Jerusalem or on Religious Power and Judaism* (1783): 'No wiser advice than this can be given to the House of Jacob. Adapt yourselves to the morals and the constitution of the land to which you have been removed; but hold fast to the religion of your fathers too' (quoted by Kochan, p. 71).

Kochan begins with an exploration of what he calls 'The Politics of the Torah', with the balance it holds between the roles of secular and ecclesiastical authority, and shows the impact upon the dual organization of Jewish communities in the Europe of the movement for Emancipation by examining the history of two major centres of Jewish life, Berlin from 1670 to 1800 and London from 1650 to 1880. In the first case, which is typical of much of Europe in the age of enlightened despotism, the Jews gradually acquired group rights as a community in return for the assumption by the leaders of the community of responsibilities for the good behaviour of its members, including above all the liability for special taxation. Some developments can be explained by the declining force of religious intolerance; but for most of the rulers, including the kings of Prussia, the Jews were mainly seen as useful to their economic and financial interests.

The case of London is very different. Anglo-Jewry acquired the shape and institutions it had — both Sephardi and Ashkenazi — by the time when the new immigration from Eastern Europe began, as the result of a process by which Jews gradually achieved a measure of toleration and ultimately of Emancipation on an individual basis. What they demanded and achieved was the right to participate in all aspects of British life without abandoning their ancestral faith. The institutions they came to establish, based upon the synagogue as a unit, were voluntary like those of the Christian Dissenters; they were not imposed by the State. On the other hand, there was an inevitable

overlap between Jewish religious institutions and the demands of the secular State, for instance in questions of marriage and divorce. So the separation was not total. As the State also began to involve itself more closely with welfare services in the broadest sense, the community largely responded by creating its own, so as to avoid pauperdom becoming a reflection on Anglo-Jewry, and where necessary by intervening to secure for Jewish recipients of public assistance proper scope for the exercise of their religious beliefs — for instance, in dietary matters. The development of a lay leadership — the 'cousinhood' of which so much has been made — is thus explicable by the need to maintain a dialogue with the State, a function more difficult for the rabbinate, most of whose members during the period in question were recruited from abroad.

The second part of Lionel Kochan's book deals with a different topic, and one more peripheral to the Anglo-Jewish community as such, the persistence within Jewry of messianic thinking and its successive incarnations. Most of these, from Sabbatai Zvi (1626–76) onwards, attracted attention mainly in Central and Eastern Europe or among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire; but a form of messianism did also affect Anglo-Jewry, when a secular Zionist impulse based upon national aspirations came to offer a short cut on the road to Zion. Each successive pretender to the mantle of the Messiah had come to grief, but the belief that only a true Messiah could remedy the dispersion remained alive. Much of the early religious opposition to Herzl and his campaign for Zionism is here illuminated.

Finally, Lionel Kochan looks at the contrast between the writings of a utopian kind and the utopian experiments based upon some of them in the Gentile world of nineteenth-century Europe and America, and their absence with two exceptions among Jews. The two exceptions — A. L. Levinsky's *A Journey to the Land of Israel in the Year 5800* and Herzl's *Altneuland* — are utopian above all in their unwillingness to face the facts of history: the particular problems which Jews had to confront and which their Utopias failed to tackle through ignoring them. As Dr Kochan points out, this is especially striking in the case of Herzl, whose own diplomatic approach to winning back the Holy Land had been based upon a very realistic appreciation of the political and strategic considerations involved. He concludes that Jews cannot simply equate the real with the desirable, since the reality falls short of their aspirations. On the other hand, they cannot safely ignore it but must do the best they can within a particular historical context, as was by and large the case in Berlin and in London during the years with which he deals. One does not need 'ethnicity' to explain the Jewish story. Here there is genuine food for thought.

THE ROOTS OF ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

Geoffrey Alderman

(Review Article)

ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ed., *Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the Contemporary World*, x + 213 pp., Macmillan Press in association with the Institute of Jewish Affairs, Basingstoke, 1990, £35.00.

GAVIN I. LANGMUIR, *History, Religion, and Antisemitism*, ix + 380 pp., University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, 1990, $37.50.

IN the post-Holocaust world, most Jews regard antisemitism and anti-Zionism as virtually indistinguishable. If we agree (for the moment) that Zionism is a political movement having as its objective the self-determination of the Jewish people, and their reconstitution as a nation-state, we must agree also that it is possible to oppose Zionism without harbouring the least resentment or prejudice against Jews as individuals or as members of religious communities — in exactly the same way as it is possible to oppose Cornish or Breton nationalism while at the same time evincing a fervent concern for and devotion to the welfare of Cornishmen and Bretons. Indeed, before 1939 — and for some years thereafter — some of the world's leading Jews spent a great deal of time plotting against the Zionist movement, and trying to bring about its downfall; but even to contemplate designating such persons as self-hating Jews would be a gross travesty.

Times change. The Zionist movement, whatever else it stood for, was established and has flourished in the context of a view of Jews in the world which is not merely political but which is fundamentally anti-assimilationist. More than that, as Professor Bauer notes in his contribution to Professor Wistrich's collection of essays ('Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism — New and Old'), Zionism 'defines the Jews as being one people dispersed over the globe, with a common heritage, and with a political centre in Israel with which those Jews who so wish may identify'; you cannot support Zionism and at the same time deny that Jews constitute a people, one 'worldwide community'. This, as Professor Bauer makes clear, 'goes beyond the denial of the right to self-determination as understood in international politics' (p. 199).

The collection of essays presented by Professor Wistrich brings together papers offered originally at a conference held under the auspices of the Insitute of Jewish Affairs, London. The offerings are wide-ranging in their coverage, encompassing communist and left-wing anti-Zionism, the anti-Zionism of the Muslim, Arab, and Third Worlds, and anti-Zionist prejudice in the West. I take these descriptions from the titles of the editor's own sub-divisions. In his Introduction, Professor Wistrich fairly confronts the issue of whether antisemitism and anti-Zionism have an organic relationship. He argues that in totalitarian societies anti-Zionism 'fuses much more readily with age-old antagonisms to Jews and Judaism', while in democracies it amounts to 'a systematised defamation of the Jewish nation' (p. 3). That anti-Zionism is used by all manner of authoritarian regimes to explain away their shortcomings is readily apparent. But the use of 'Zionism' as a general term of abuse goes much further than that. In parts of the Third World, as Antony Lerman demonstrates in his contribution entitled 'Fictive Anti-Zionism: Third World, Arab and Muslim Variations', it has become virtually de-Judaised: in Outer Mongolia the Chinese are labelled 'Zionists', and the same epithet is used both by Communist shop-stewards in Paris about Arab immigrant workers, and by exiles of the Haitian opposition in relation to Papa Doc Duvalier.

It is a safe bet that most of the inhabitants of Outer Mongolia have never seen a Jew and know little if anything about Israel, its history, and pre-history. To them, however, the word 'Zionist' denotes a series of imperialist, colonialist, oppressive, and generally undesirable traits, in much the same way that 'Jew' and its derivatives have been used for centuries to describe various forms of antisocial behaviour. And it is precisely at this point, at the level of rhetoric and discourse, that one begins to understand why there is, unfortunately, merit in the argument that although antisemitism and anti-Zionism can and must be viewed as distinct phenomena, their universes overlap to an alarming extent. The rampant anti-Zionism of the 1980s and the rampant antisemitism of the 1880s occupy much common ground. In particular, the charge often heard in the last century, and in the first half of the present, that the Jew was the purveyor of modernity, of capitalism, and especially of international capitalism, of democracy and (perhaps paradoxically) of imperialism, are mirrored in the more recent accusations that Zionism is nothing less than neo-colonialism, or is a facet of international capitalism, and that its presence in the Middle East is nothing less than an attempt to overthrow the traditional values of that region, replacing them with democracy, or socialism, or liberalism, or capitalism, or all of these 'Western' values.

Professor Nettler's essay ('Islamic Archetypes of the Jews: Then and Now') and Professor Sivan's contribution ('Islamic Fundamentalism,

Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism') make uncomfortable but necessary reading because they demonstrate the depth and breadth of the divide that separates the Islamic world from an acceptance of the legitimacy of Jewish nationhood and hence of the re-establishment of a Jewish State. In drawing our attention to the Qur'anic view of Jews, Professor Nettler is not trawling the oceans of a bygone era; rather he is explaining the very roots of contemporary Islamic hostility to Jewish self-determination and also to Jews themselves, who are portrayed in Islamic literature as the evil geniuses behind the perceived weakening and undermining of Islamic power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He states (p. 72): 'Zionism, the Jews, Westernisation, imperialism and Christianity coalesce, with the Jews as the main unifying agent'.

The part played by Christianity in the spread of anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist prejudice does not figure prominently in Professor Wistrich's volume. Substantively, it is the subject of only one essay ('The Christian Churches on Israel and the Jews' by Rabbi Dr Norman Solomon) which in the space of 14 pages can do no more than describe in the most impressionistic way an unedifying legacy that has managed to transform itself from anti-Judaism through antisemitism to the Holocaust on the one hand and to an insidious but purposeful anti-Zionism on the other. Those who seek an exhaustive — not to say exhausting — treatment of this subject can do no better than consult Professor Langmuir's monograph. But I warn them now that should they do so, they will not have set themselves an easy task.

Gavin Langmuir (who is not Jewish) teaches history at Stanford University. In presenting us with the results of what he modestly terms 'a little mental housekeeping' (p. 14) he ranges very wide, and with consummate and comprehensive scholarship, over the field of religion as a personal and as a social phenomenon. Much of the book is not concerned with antisemitism at all, but with the springs of religious belief, the meanings of religious practices, the nature of religious doubt, and the difference between religion and religiosity. In treating of these subjects, Professor Langmuir employs the tools of the historian and (with equal facility) of the sociologist, the anthropologist, the philologist, the philosopher, and the psychologist. Religion, he posits, is nothing more than the set of beliefs and practices 'prescribed by religious authorities' (p. 138); it is, in other words, a social phenomenon. Religiosity, by contrast, pertains to the individual; it exhibits 'relatively stable patterns of nonrational symbolizing' (p. 172), but through its operation can come religious doubts and ultimately irrational thought. Christian anti-Judaism is grounded in demonstrable and rational differences. But Christian antisemitism — irrational beliefs held by Christians about Jews — only arose during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the reason for its appearance lay,

according to Professor Langmuir, in the doubts that arose within Christendom at that time about the validity of some Christian beliefs — such as the reality of the physical Resurrection. Through the persecution of Jews and the spread of the Blood Libel, Christian authorities affected to reassert and reinforce the truth of what many Christians had come to doubt, and some to deny.

This is an intriguing argument. Can it be applied to the antisemitism of more recent times? Professor Langmuir thinks so. From the beginning of the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, he sees a causal relationship between the resurgence of antisemitism and the destruction of older value-systems through industrialisation, urbanization, capitalism, socialism, and the rationalist assault upon religious beliefs. Ultimately (and I am here paraphrasing a complex set of arguments), the consequent crises of identity resulted in the persecution and mass destruction of Jews by way of insurance and reassurance. Jews constituted a threat to the Aryan myth: by urging and implementing antisemitic policies, the myth could be endowed with a spurious veneer of reality. 'The Nazis . . . thought of Jews as a race. But the reality of Jews contradicted Nazi beliefs . . . The contradiction was so blatant that the only way Hitler could protect his Aryan religion was to suppress knowledge of the human reality of those labeled "Jews" by exterminating them' (p. 346).

This explanation of the Holocaust is intriguing too: the Nazis had encouraged an irrational and false picture of the Jew and of Jewishness; to have permitted the Jews to live would have entailed the risk that this picture could have been shattered, as people would have been bound, eventually, to have compared the myth with the reality. Jews were killed because it was too dangerous to the well-being of Nazism to permit them to remain alive.

I hear what Professor Langmuir is telling me, but I remain sceptical. That Nazism may be validly described as a religion in its own right does not concern me very much, though there is clearly merit in this view, as Professor Langmuir recognizes. He is correct in his assertion that 'belief in the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth does not *necessarily* produce antisemitism' (p. 367; my emphasis). The fact is — as he also recognizes — that some Christians created antisemitism out of anti-Judaism, and that both the Catholic and the Protestant churches encouraged its growth and refinement in order to bolster and expand their own authority. Nazism was built upon Christian foundations. But to talk about 'Nazism' as if it were a monolith set of beliefs is to fall into a trap as dangerous as that presented by the failure to distinguish between anti-Judaism, anti-Zionism, and irrational antisemitism.

Not all Nazis wished to exterminate the Jews. True, all wished to rid Germany of its Jewish inhabitants, but some, certainly in the 1930s, and on the basis of there being a mystical but real relationship between

a people and the land upon which it dwelt, argued that the proper place for Jews was in Palestine. The rise of political Zionism gave credence to this view. Zionism did not collaborate with Nazism, but it is foolish to deny that there was a certain mutuality of views between the two sets of philosophies, not least because — by very different routes, of course — both had come to a broadly similar set of conclusions about the Jewish condition in the Diaspora.[1] Professor Langmuir is a distinguished medievalist; he has nothing to say about differences of emphasis and of intent between different strands of Nazism in approaching the Jewish 'problem'. I make reference to these differences now merely to indicate a major weakness in his own thesis, which may explain medieval Christian antisemitism but which cannot, by itself, explain that species of antisemitism which afflicted Germany earlier this century.

When I had finished reading both these books, I could not help reflecting that in spite of the considerable scholarship they display, their explanations of anti-Judaism, antisemitism, and anti-Zionism reflect a similar bias — namely, a refusal to examine (except, perhaps, in relation to Christological anti-Judaism) the objective validity of such prejudices. Let me illustrate what I mean by referring briefly to the charge of 'dual loyalty', formerly expressed as cosmopolitanism (the international Jew) but nowadays more generally subsumed within the wider charge of Zionism.

To what is the Jew ultimately loyal? This is a perfectly fair question, to which there may be as many answers as there are Jews on this earth. By Jews themselves, however, the charge of dual loyalty is often, deliberately, fudged. But it has to be taken seriously, no matter by whom it is laid. Lenin poured scorn on the idea of Jewish 'nationality', not merely as purveyed by the Zionists but also as peddled by the anti-Zionist socialist Bundists, whose view that the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party be run on federal lines (so as to give it — the Bund — a free hand in dealing with matters pertaining to the Jewish proletariat) was, as Lenin rightly suspected, a thinly-veiled attempt to bolster and exploit Jewish separatism. Professor Zvi Gitelman in his contribution to the Wistrich volume quotes (p. 16) Lenin's statement in an essay on the Bund: 'The idea of a Jewish nationality runs counter to the interests of the Jewish proletariat, for it fosters among them . . . a spirit of hostility to assimilationism, the spirit of the "ghetto"'. By this argument, even those most implacable Orthodox-Jewish opponents of political Zionism, the Satmarer Hasidim of New York and the Neturei Karta of Jerusalem, have in some degree accepted the Zionist diagnosis of the Jewish condition. Most Diaspora Jews harbour dual loyalties. But then so do most Roman Catholics and most Muslims; the widespread acceptance, at least by liberal democracies, of the concept of dual nationality has added a further, institutionalized, dimension to the universality of this phenomenon. Why, then, is the dual loyalty of

the Jew exploited much more viciously than that of other religious and ethnic groups?

The Jewish contribution to anti-Jewish prejudice has also escaped systematic scholarly treatment. The accusation levelled at Zionism by Claude Montefiore, the 'prophet' of Liberal Judaism, that Zionist policies contributed to the rise of Hitler, can perhaps be explained away as the exasperation of an arch-assimilationist. Less easy to dismiss is the fact that during the 1930s the Board of Deputies of British Jews was drawn ever closer to the view that some Jews, by their conduct — more especially in relation to industrial and commercial practices — reinforced (I use this word deliberately) antisemitic stereotypes; by 1940 the Board had become preoccupied with what it referred to as 'the internal causes of antisemitism' in Britain.[2]

There is a book here waiting to be written. Who will have the courage to embark upon the task?

NOTES

[1] This argument is explored briefly by Professor M. Scult, of Vassar College, in Jacob Katz, ed., *The Role of Religion in Modern Jewish History*, Association for Jewish Studies, Cambridge, Ma., 1975, pp. 140–45.

[2] See Geoffrey Alderman, *London Jewry and London Politics 1889–1986*, London and New York, 1989, pp. 90–94 and especially p. 101 where the words 'the internal causes of antisemitism' are quoted from a 1940 memorandum by the Defence Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews.

BOOK REVIEWS

JOSEPH DAN, ed., *BINAH: Studies in Jewish History, Thought, and Culture*, Volume II (publication of the International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization, Jerusalem, and of the Open University of Israel, Tel-Aviv), xiii + 249 pp., Praeger Publishers and Greenwood Press, New York, Westport, and London, 1989, $55.00 or £43.95.

The aim of the *BINAH* series, as stated in the (same) Introduction to Volume I (reviewed in the last issue of this Journal) and to this volume, is to provide English-speaking university students of Jewish civilization with Engish translations of notable articles originally written and published in Hebrew. The articles presented in this volume are: Victor Aptowitzer, 'The Celestial Temple as Viewed in the Aggadah'; Jonah Fraenkel, 'Time and Its Role in the Aggadic Story'; Yitzhak F. Baer, 'The Socioreligious Orientation of "Sefer Hasidim"'; Rachel Elior, 'The Concept of God in Hekhalot Literature'; Isaiah Tishby, 'Mythological versus Systematic Trends in Kabbalah'; Warren Zev Harvey, 'Maimonides and Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil'; Emanuel Etkes, 'The Gaon of Vilna and the Haskalah Movement: Image and Reality'; Ehud Luz, 'Jewish Nationalism in the Thought of Yehezkel Kaufmann'; Eliezer Schweid, 'Martin Buber as a Philosophical Interpreter of the Bible'; and Joseph Dan, 'Gershom Scholem: Between History and Historiosophy'.

It can be seen at a glance that the editor has chosen articles covering diverse areas of Jewish thought, not only, or primarily, for the high value of the articles in themselves, but for the way in which the authors approach their subject. The stress is on scholarly methodology in which concepts are seen against their historical background and studied objectively and systematically. The student may take issue with some of the conclusions; indeed, presumably he or she is encouraged to do so but, whether agreeing or disagreeing, will learn much from the manner of arriving at the conclusions. Aptowitzer's study, for example, shows how material taken from various periods can be laid under tribute in order to trace the development of the idea that there is a Temple in heaven corresponding to the Temple on earth. It is doubtful, however, whether Aptowitzer is correct in finding the idea as early as Isaiah 6:1–6. Although the Midrash does understand it that Isaiah saw his vision in the heavenly Temple, the plain meaning of the text seems to be that he saw it in the Temple on earth. The translator has used, without

saying so, the Jewish Publication Society of America's version in his translation of the Isaiah text, which renders the statement in Isaiah 6:1 as 'I beheld *my* Lord' instead of 'I beheld *the* Lord' (evidently reading the Hebrew as *adoni* instead of, as in the current texts and the ancient versions, *adonai*). This emendation is suggestive, explaining why the Tetragrammaton is not used if the reference is to *the* Lord, but it is misleading to introduce this type of unexplained Biblical exegesis into an article the author of which makes no reference to it at all. This seemed worth noting since, so far as I am able to judge, this and all the other translations are otherwise competently done.

The two articles of especial interest to the readers of this Journal are those by Baer and by Etkes. Baer's classic demonstrated fifty years ago that the 'Saints of Ashkenaz', in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, adapted for their purposes some of the ideas as well as the superstitions of the general Christian population in Germany. Etkes takes issue with the hitherto widely-held notion that the famous Talmudist and rabbinic genius, the Gaon of Vilna (1720–97), was a forerunner of the *Haskalah* in Russia. (*Haskalah* = Enlightenment; it refers to the movement for spreading modern European culture among Jews.)

In my review of the first volume of *BINAH*, I stated that we could look forward to further volumes in this series. The appearance of Volume II has whetted our appetite for more of the same, to the benefit of the professional scholar and the general reader as well as the university student.

LOUIS JACOBS

MARCIA DREZON-TEPLER , *Interest Groups and Political Change in Israel* (SUNY Series in Israel Studies), vii + 308 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990, $49.50 (paperback, $16.95).

AMIA LIEBLICH, *Transition to Adulthood during Military Service: The Israeli Case* (SUNY Series in Israeli Studies), vii + 221 pp., State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989, $44.50 (paperback, $14.95).

Many years ago, Daniel Bell predicted (in *The End of Ideology*, 1960) the end of ideological politics in Western industrialized societies and the consequent shift of ideology as an instrument of political change to the developing countries of the Third World. The current orthodoxy is that Western societies are complex, and political life is thought to match the prevailing economic and cultural life in its diversity. In such political cultures there is no one group which dominates all others; governments co-operate with various interest groups in the process of decision-making. Indeed, the number of interest groups and the causes they espouse are large enough to constitute a distinct field of study in

political science. This view of vibrant political life outside formal parliaments or assemblies is reinforced by the increasing technological nature of society requiring the participation of experts in decision-making. Even groups which promote moral or ethical causes have their experts. The member of parliament, assembly, or senate representing the general views of the electorate is increasingly dependent upon, if not superseded by, the expert personnel provided by the interest group.

Bell's view suggests the existence of societies based on abundant resources, in which politics as popularly defined has ceased to exist; instead, in what amounts to a Marxian utopia, decision-making is about the allocation of these abundant resources, a process to be pursued rationally and pragmatically by individuals or groups through negotiation and compromise.

Israel therefore presents us with a curious anomaly: Western in its social and economic organization, it is nevertheless a new society with many of the problems characteristic of developing states in the Third World. Socio-economic resources are scarce; there is pressure of population on limited land; as a country of immigration it has all the problems of social integration; and, most importantly, it is in dispute over borders with the majority of its neighbours.

The lack of resources and the hostility of the Arab world are overshadowed by, and some might argue pale into insignificance against, the political culture of the Jewish State. Israeli life, as Dr Drezon-Tepler describes it, is permeated by the rhetoric of ideology. Where once a millennial cast to political argument might have served to mobilize the resources of a new and very vulnerable state, the maturity of the electorate and its socio-economic aspirations are ill-served by recourse to an outdated socialism or a nationalism of the most revanchist kind. Furthermore, ideology exacerbates the problems of the electoral system where a pure form of proportional representation ensures that no one party can secure a clear majority to form a government. Political life is dominated by two ideological blocs around which a multitude of small parties circle like satellites. The result is a recipe for immobilism and alliance-building of the most bizarre kind, as unlikely bedfellows are thrown together to form coalitions.

Nevertheless, Dr Drezon-Tepler's book demonstrates that rational policy formulation and day-to-day decision-making take place in a form that is recognizable in Western societies as pluralistic and democratic. Indeed, the very existence of ideological politics has nurtured the growth of interest groups whose demands are formulated in pragmatic, self-interested terms which avoid straying into the domain of principle and values at odds with the government of the day.

A multi-party system of essentially weak individual parties makes party loyalty an ineffective means of articulating and realizing group interests. Rather, it is the ministers of important departments and their

civil servants who are the targets of pressure. Dr Drezon-Tepler presents an in-depth analysis of three different types of interest groups in the Israeli system and describes in some detail the growth and history of each, the modifications they have undergone over time, and last but not least, the changes they have induced in the disposition of power in Israeli political institutions.

The Manufacturers Association was the first independent pressure group to be formed and to flourish from the early years of Labour Party domination of the *Yishuv* (the Jewish settlement in Palestine) in a political environment unfriendly to particularistic interest groups, especially if they championed capitalist practices. The kibbutz organization, the Ihud (*Ihud hakvutzot Vehakibbutzim*), while formerly and in fact supporting the ideals of Labour-based governments, also had its own particular agenda — the promotion of the kibbutz-sector agricultural economy. Both these very different organizations learnt to plead their different causes in ways least likely to create confrontation. Successive Israeli governments learnt the benefits of using interest groups to facilitate legislation and to promote social change.

Gush Emunim, the third interest group to be chosen for this study, appears to differ from the other two in its apparent deliberate choice of confrontation with Israeli governments — whatever their political colour. This group of religious activists came to prominence in 1973 when the cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel gave rise to fears that any rapprochement between the two countries might put the Jewish tenure of the West Bank at risk. Dr Drezon-Tepler meticulously examines the shifts in policy and actions of the group who, depicted in the international press as hot-headed religious zealots, in reality conducted their affairs with political acumen and rationality. Most importantly, the author also examines the changes in Israeli politics and within the settlement movement which subsequently saw the creation of a new political party, the Tehiya (Renaissance) Party. This party attracted ultra-nationalist members of the Likud and intellectuals as well as Gush Emunim members, the latter being convinced that no amount of group activity outside the political arena proper could halt what they saw as the appeasement of the Arabs with land for peace in the Camp David accords.

This is a good study and a necessary addition to the bookshelves of anyone researching, or specializing in, the teaching of interest-group politics. As a welcome by-product, it also relates in a highly-readable form the political history of modern Israel from its earliest days.

The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and their role and function in Israeli society are permeated by ideology no less than the overt political institutions described by Dr Drezon-Tepler. However, they have always upheld an ideology which has united an otherwise disputatious and divided population. Service in the IDF is mandatory; it has not

become, unlike the case in some Western armies, a job to be pursued for the pay, security, and the vocational training it might offer the recruit. The values propagated by the IDF demand patriotism and social responsibility; the recruit is expected to forgo his own individual self-interest for a higher communal good. It is essentially group-orientated, fraternalistic, and overwhelmingly masculine in its ethos. Although girls serve a mandatory period in the forces, they follow a modified training and one where they are not exposed to combat duties.

Army values and norms of behaviour are therefore experienced by the great majority of young Israelis, usually at what is now recognized as a critical time in their personal development — the transition from late adolescence to adulthood. Dr Lieblich's book questions whether that transition is culturally relative or whether there is an evolutionary line along which all must proceed, any differences being a deviation from a universal norm. However, the methodology, in what is otherwise an interesting study, is not really able to bear the weight of the book's general conclusions. The sample consisted of 30 young men who had answered a notice-board advertisement; 160 hours of interview were recorded and reproduced verbatim. Half the sample were freshmen at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, while the other half were involved in pre-academic studies or attended art school and music academies. The self-selected group were predominantly urban, middle-class, and of Ashkenazi descent, and the book reflects essentially the subjective views of an exceedingly limited sample, since many thousands of young men are inducted into the IDF annually. Furthermore, only eight of the 30 interviews are published in the book.

These narratives certainly give a fascinating insight into the ambiguities and pressures experienced by individuals during military service, but it does not seem possible to conclude, as the author does, '... that most men describe positive change as a dominant trend. In their final evaluations they tended to agree that their military service, above and beyond the specific negative effects, was worthwhile' (p. 185). 'Or, on the other hand, several of the men who served in elite units or who completed officers' training, attributed their standard of absolute responsibility to their military education' (pp. 168–69). The groups referred to are at best a handful of men, whereas the conclusions suggest that they represent a large population.

Dr Lieblich concludes that maturation is culturally-specific and that the Israeli Defence Forces represent and propagate what is the cultural norm for Israeli men. Had the interview sample been very much larger and more comprehensive in its structure, had it contained participants of Sephardi descent, as well as the poor and the uneducated, and had it included more new immigrants, perhaps then the conclusions might have been different. The process of maturation might be more

class-specific than the author suggests and the influence of the IDF less pervasive than the limited research data seem to indicate.

DAVID CAPITANCHIK

HARVEY E. GOLDBERG, *Jewish Life in Muslim Libya. Rivals and Relatives*, x + 181 pp., University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1990, $18.25 or £12.75 (hardback, $45.95 or £31.95).

Readers who expected to find a detailed ethnographic account of the history of the Jewish settlement in Libya until the 1940s will probably be disappointed by Professor Goldberg's volume. The author states in his Preface: 'Parts of this work have appeared before, but in every instance have been revised' (p. x). He then proceeds to list these earlier publications and a look at the Contents page of the present book shows that Chapter 4 is entitled 'Jewish Weddings in Tripolitania: A Study in Cultural Sources' while the title of one of his earlier articles (published in 1978) is 'The Jewish Wedding in Tripolitania'. Chapter 6, 'Jewish-Muslim Religious Rivalry in Tripolitania', must be assumed to be a revised version of Goldberg's 1980 article entitled 'Religious Rivalry in Tripolitania', and *mutatis mutandis* the same applies to Chapter 7, 'The Anti-Jewish Riots of 1945: A Cultural Analysis' and the 1977 article entitled 'Rites and Riots: The Tripolitanian Pogrom of 1945'. The title of Chapter 2, 'Jewish Life in Muslim Tripoli in the late Qaramanli Period' is longer than the title of his 1984 article, 'Jewish Life in Muslim Tripoli'.

The present volume has clearly been an attempt to integrate previous contributions into one monograph, but the attempt has not been very successful. It would have been preferable to publish this book as a collection of essays on the Jews of Libya; the present text reads like a first or second draft of a monograph. Throughout the book, when Professor Goldberg mentions an author, he rarely cites the title of the work concerned but simply gives the surname of the author with the year of publication in brackets. One then has to turn to the end of the book and look up the author in the section entitled 'References'. It is distracting to read (p. 19): 'One student of the period (Folayan 1979:43, quoted by Pennell 1982:113) in attempting to describe the essence of the system, states . . .'. Since there are Notes at the end of the main text, surely it would have been preferable in this case to have started with the actual name of the 'student of the period', to have quoted what he or she stated, and to have put a note marker at the end of the sentence. The Note would then have given all the relevant bibliographical details. As it is, we have to look up both Folayan and Pennell in the 'References' — only to discover that Pennel was the author of a review of a 1979 book by Folayan and that Pennell's review

was published in 1982 in '*Libyan Studies* 13: 113–14' (p. 167). And at the end of all that, we still do not know who the 'student of the period' was.

Professor Goldberg seems to assume that his readers are familiar with the history and geography of Libya. There is no map to show the areas of past urban and rural settlement of the Jews; the nearest to such a map is a photograph with the caption: 'Aerial view of the Old City of Tripoli. The Jewish quarter runs against the sea in the center of the background'.

The author tells us in his Introduction (p. 2) that the present study

> is based on a methodology that has arisen in response to the materials at hand. The method combines oral history, namely, the interviewing of Libyan Jews now found in Israel concerning life in their original communities, with written historical sources viewed in anthropological perspective. While keenly aware of the limitations of this method, I hope to show that it is capable of illuminating systems of meaning that animated the interchanges between Muslim and Jew in everyday life in Tripoli and Tripolitania.

The chapters that follow the Introduction reveal that the 'written historical sources' consist largely of Mordechai Ha-Cohen's record (written in Hebrew) of the history and customs of the Jews of Tripolitania, a fact which Professor Goldberg readily acknowledges. He tells us that Ha-Cohen was born in Tripoli in 1856 'and passed away in Benghazi in 1929' (p. 10). (One does not usually expect to see such a euphemism in the scholarly text of a university professor. The term is also used in connection with Rabbi Mimun who had 'passed away' by 1847 (p. 41). On the other hand, when Christians and Muslims cease to live, they simply die or are killed.)

The present Jewish reviewer (who was for several years a student at Cairo University and who later carried out anthropological fieldwork among Muslim Malays and Muslim Indonesians) is not convinced of the merits of Professor Goldberg's method of combining mainly non-Muslim sources and wholly non-Muslim oral history. Surely some written as well as some oral Muslim sources (likely to be available mainly in the Arabic language) would be essential to provide a balanced picture? The author's 'materials at hand' are inadequate for this purpose, since they can safely be assumed to reveal for the most part only the retrospective Jewish view of 'the interchanges between Muslim and Jew in everyday life' in Tripolitania. A valid 'anthropological perspective' must be based on objective anthropological data — not on the recollections of Libyan Jewish immigrants interviewed in Israel or on the writings of Mordechai Ha-Cohen and of travellers and historians.

Moreover, some of the arguments are phrased in obscure language — for example, the assertion on p. 116 that 'a theory of symbolic action can provide a positive characterization of a phase of collective behaviour previously explained by concepts such as "uninstitutionalized"'. A few pages earlier (p. 105), the term 'political

upstartsmanship' is used; it was a relief to find that the second word does not figure in the latest edition of *Chambers English Dictionary*.

On the other hand, Professor Goldberg does show that he is familiar not only with the theories of leading social scientists, but also with much of the literature on North Africa. His extensive 'References' are listed from p. 159 to p. 171 and are in four languages — English, French, Hebrew, and Italian. They will be of very great use to those engaged in the field of North African and Middle Eastern studies and in research on Arab-Jewish relations.

Some of the sections in the present volume are instructive, especially those dealing with Ottoman rule, with Italian colonization, with itinerant Jewish peddlers, and with the position of Libyan Jews during the Second World War. It was shortly before the First World War that Italy conquered Libya; some sections of the local Jewish population prospered for a few years until the advent of Fascism. Italo Balbo, the Governor of Libya, commanded the Jews to open their shops on the Sabbath and to send their children to school on that day. When two Jewish shopkeepers refused to desecrate the Sabbath, he ordered them to be publicly flogged in December 1936 — to the delight of some Muslim spectators. Goldberg himself comments (p. 108): 'In popular lore Balbo appears as an oppressor, and it is claimed that the plane crash which took his life occurred on a Saturday as retribution for his attempt to force Jews to desecrate the Sabbath'.

It was tragic that just as Libyan Jews could believe that, as a result of the Allied victory, a new era was dawning for them, anti-Jewish riots broke out in November 1945 in Tripoli and spread to other areas. More than a hundred Jews perished: 38 in Tripoli and 97 in rural districts. However, there were apparently 'numerous stories of Jews who were helped to safety, spontaneously, by individual Muslims' (p. 112). In 1949, Libyan Jews were finally allowed by the British authorities to emigrate to the newly-established State of Israel. Some years later, an American student called Harvey E. Goldberg was to 'embark on a field trip to an Israeli village of Libyan Jews to write a dissertation on the subject' (p. ix).

Professor Goldberg has since then acquired a great deal of knowledge about North Africa and about Islam. However, he seems to forget that all his readers may not be as familiar as he is with the number of Arabic words he uses. He usually translates the Arabic word on the first occasion he uses it, but thereafter seems to assume that his readers will not forget the meaning, even if that word occurs again only many pages later. It would not have been unreasonable to expect a glossary, under the circumstances. But there is no glossary, only a list (on p. 73) in transliterated Arabic and in English of 14 items which, according to Mordechai Ha-Cohen, were sold by Jewish peddlers. The author's transliteration is sometimes peculiar; for example, 'needle and thread'

are given as the English translation of the Arabic *yibrausilk*. Even making allowances for differences in pronunciation between Cairo Arabic and its Libyan counterpart, it is difficult to see why 'needle and thread' become one word in Libyan Arabic. *Ebrah* = needle; *wa* = and; *silk* = thread or wire (the common word for sewing thread is *khet*) so that it is much more likely that Libyan Arabic even in Ha-Cohen's day would be transliterated as *ebrah wa silk*, not *yibrausilk*. We are also given the English 'tumeric' instead of turmeric, while the preceding term is given as *zhar* and translated as 'flower water from orange peels'. I suspect that *zhar* is the same as the ordinary Arabic word *mazahr* which is distilled orange blossom water and which can still be bought in some French pharmacies as 'eau de fleurs d'oranger'; it is also on sale in London and has been used as a common remedy for generations in North Africa and in the Middle East. It is not to be confused with *maward*, which is distilled rose water that is often used in Greece, Iran, and Turkey as well as in North Africa and the Middle East to flavour some drinks and some sweetmeats.

JUDITH FREEDMAN

RADU IOANID , *The Sword and the Archangel. Fascist Ideology in Romania* (translated by Peter Heinegg), iv + 327 pp. and 33 illustrations, East European Monograph series, Boulder, 1990 (distributed by Columbia University Press, New York), $44.00.

This well-researched book casts a sombre light on the strength of fascist ideology in Romania before and during the Second World War. The main sufferers were the Jews, who were both victims and scapegoats. It is a striking paradox in the tragic modern history of European Jewry that a fascist government which was animated by deep-seated prejudice against the Jews and which was responsible for the deaths of many thousands of them, was later instrumental in saving more than 200,000 of its Jewish citizens. A large number of the survivors later emigrated to Israel and played their part in creating a vigorous Jewish State.

General (later Marshal) Ion Antonescu, who was appointed Prime Minister in 1940, was a committed fascist and antisemite but he refused to obey all the orders emanating from Nazi Germany during the war. He wished to rid his country of its Jewish inhabitants and one of the means of achieving that end was to allow them to emigrate to Palestine. He was not determined to kill them, although he did not condemn the Jassy pogrom of June 1941 or stop the brutal deportation of the Jews of Dorohoi.

In July 1942, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mihai Antonescu (no relation of Ion) concluded an agreement with Gustav Richter, the

German adviser on Jewish Affairs attached to Eichmann's department who had been posted to Bucharest; by that agreement, the Jews were to be deported to Poland to their certain death. According to notes in the Nuremberg Archives, Radu Lecca, the Romanian High Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, had gone to Berlin to confer with Eichmann about the deportation of Romanian Jews to Lublin, in Poland. However, at his trial after the war Lecca claimed that he had agreed to the deportation of only the Jews of northern Transylvania. But the commandant of Auschwitz testified that at that time a massive arrival of Romanian Jews was expected at the camp. Eichmann himself referred to the 'difficult negotiations with the Romanian authorities who intend the extermination of the Jews to be carried out in the country itself' (p. 207). The Romanian government, in spite of the accords that it had signed, stubbornly resisted the German pressures and refused to deport to Nazi camps the Romanian Jews living in territories under its direct jurisdiction.

Radu Ioanid rightly rejects Hannah Arendt's contention that the savagery of the Romanian pogroms shocked and horrified the German SS. He points out convincingly that the SS were organized to kill the Jews and that what shocked them was the 'dilettantism' of members of the Antonescu administration, who showed that they were crude and undisciplined amateurs when it came to exterminating the Jews. The author of this valuable study also comments that those Romanian historians who attempt to exonerate or to excuse Antonescu are using unconvincing arguments. Antonescu was the dictator of his country and although it is true that it was the Germans who perpetrated several massacres in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria, it is also true that these regions were under Romanian fascist authority and that when Antonescu's government was determined to have deportees returned to Romania, it sometimes succeeded in that aim. Antonescu's regime was neither a servile fascist puppet at the orders of Berlin nor was it fundamentally opposed to Nazism. Antonescu did distance himself from Hitler, but he continued to keep to his military commitments to Nazi Germany.

Moreover, there is the record of Antonescu's statement to his Council of Ministers about his policy regarding Jews: 'I let the crowd loose to massacre them then I retire into my fortress and once the massacre is over I restore order' (p. 214). On 6 October 1941, he informed his ministers: 'As far as the Jews are concerned I have taken measures to rid these regions of them indefinitely. There are still in Bessarabia around 10,000 Jews who in a few days will be taken across the Dniester and, if circumstances permit, even beyond the Ural' (p. 215).

Some months later, Ribbentrop, Germany's Foreign Minister, received confirmation of the Antonescu-Richter accords which had

been negotiated in July 1942. All the details of the deportations were meticulously planned: the type of freight carriers, the number and destination of the daily convoys, and the number of guards. In the event, and for a variety of reasons (including the possibility that Germany might lose the war), these deportations did not take place. At first there were delays because of the appeals by Romanian Jewish leaders and in particular the plea by the Jewish communities of Banat and Transylvania who were the first in line to be deported and who had contributed 100 million lei for the construction of the Palais des Invalides. The director of that institution, Dr Stoenescu, was at the time Ion Antonescu's personal physician and his intercession was favourably received. The Chief Rabbi of Romania, Alexander Safran, and other Jewish leaders appealed to the Queen Mother, to the Apostolic Nuncio, and to the Swiss ambassador in Bucharest as well as to the Metropolitan of Transylvania — who all made urgent representations to Antonescu.

Professor Raul Hilberg has put forward an interesting explanation for the cancellation of the Jewish deportations; he believes that when the members of the Romanian delegation came to Berlin in August 1942 to discuss the details of the deportation, they were received without the courtesy which they expected. Apparently, the Nazis thought that since agreement in principle had already been reached, there were only formalities to go through with the minumum of fuss. The Romanian officials were offended by what they considered to be German arrogance and their pride was deeply wounded. It is possible that such an apparently trifling occurrence did in fact tip the balance in favour of rejecting the Nazi request to despatch Romanian Jews to their doom.

There were, of course, other factors. Romania was not occupied by German troops and its economy had always been heavily dependent on the skills and entrepreneurship of its Jews. And since the Germans seemed increasingly likely to lose the war, Antonescu began to look upon the Jews as a form of exchangeable currency. Meanwhile, Romanian and Hungarian Jews, especially young children, continued to emigrate to Palestine, despite the protests of the Germans and of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.

Radu Ioanid agrees with Paul Lendwai, whom he quotes as stating: 'Romania offers the unique example of a country where the pro-German government of Marshal Antonescu was the first to undertake a large-scale massacre of Jews and . . . in the final analysis saved the lives of more Jews than any other satellite of the Germans' (p. 206).

All those concerned with the intricacies of Romanian fascism and with the fate of Romanian Jewry will greatly benefit from the results of Radu Ioanid's scholarly research.

JOSEPH FINKLESTONE

W. E. MOSSE, *The German-Jewish Economic Elite 1820–1935. A Socio-cultural Profile*, xiv + 369 pp., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, £35.00.

The history of German Jewry between the Emancipation and the advent of the Nazi Reich is both of deep interest in itself and of relevance to the perpetual problem of how a civilized modern state can cope with a distinctive minority. Professor Mosse's most recent contributions to this subject have dealt with only one element in the story, that of a comparatively small handful of Jewish families who played important roles in the creation of the modern German economy by their prowess as entrepreneurs in banking, commerce, the retail trade, and some branches of the manufacturing industry and who also, by accumulating considerable fortunes, could play a part in determining their own life-styles and in contributing to the public good, whether within the Jewish community or on a larger national scale.

The first instalment of his study was published some years ago under the title of *Jews in the German Economy. The German-Jewish Economic Elite 1820–1935* (Oxford, 1987). The new work explores the social and cultural aspirations and achievements of this élite and its responses to the twin poles of 'identity' and 'integration'. While this aspect of the subject is an important and in Professor Mosse's hands an absorbing one, the book does not of course give a complete portrait of German Jewry for the period covered. It omits the vast bulk of members of ordinary middle-class families, whether engaged in commerce or in the professions. These families appear only when they contribute a late incomer into the élite world which had not altogether succeeded in perpetuating its original stock. The author deals only with the élite's relations with its circumambient Gentile society and looks neither at the implications of the growth of a trans-ethnic intelligentsia nor at the Jewish presence among left-wing opposition groupings.

Professor Mosse is dealing with a quite limited number of families and is consequently heavily dependent for an internal assessment of their problems and motivations upon the minority who left autobiographical material or whose correspondence or diaries have survived. (It would perhaps be well to warn the intending readers that the author clearly assumes that they are likely to know German, since he does not translate either the citations from German material in the text or those much more abundant in his often lengthy footnotes.) The only objective data, which must have taken much work to assemble and present, are those which illustrate the marriage patterns of the Jewish economic elite. They show the network of family alliances which was created by the marriage strategy of the parents; it was partly a matter of choice and partly the result of the almost total inability of the members of that élite, whether baptized or not, to find spouses within the corresponding socio-economic group in Gentile society. It is indeed very striking, and only partly explicable on the grounds of differences in

their respective economic specializations, how totally apart the two groups remained. In cases of marriage to a Gentile, at least on the part of Jewish men, it was necessary to go downwards in the financial and social scale or to find a foreigner as a bride.

In respect of social relations with Gentile society and of career patterns — though there were some posts to which baptism was a passport — it did not make much difference whether the Jewish family was one which remained at least nominally faithful to its ancestral faith or had at some stage adopted with greater or lesser alacrity the religion of the majority. That was the view held by most German Jews as well as by the antisemites. It does at any rate help to explain the futility, given the development of nationalism in an increasingly assertive guise from the 1880s onwards, of the idea that one could be 'a German of the Jewish faith'. There had been a more hopeful period during the Liberal era of the mid-nineteenth century when some kind of willing acceptance of minority status for Germany's Jews appeared possible, but it did not last.

Professor Mosse is indeed extremely convincing in his analysis of how the ebb and flow of German antisemitic sentiment, itself responsive to economic conditions, coloured the commitments of the Jewish economic elite. He is equally good at presenting the differences between the rigidity of the Prussian social structure which gave Berlin Jewry its particular role and the more open attitudes in the south-west of the country. He also shows the extent to which, as the élite's preoccupations became more national in scope, its early functions of leadership within the Jewish communities themselves were abandoned to others. There was no parallel to the Anglo-Jewish 'cousinhood' of the leading families. The German-Jewish élite's virtual impermeability to Zionism that so aroused Chaim Weizmann's ire is also easily explained.

A work of this kind is bound to some extent to be anecdotal and there are some valuable brief biographical sketches which explain a good deal. The account of the *Kaiserjuden*, the twenty or so Jews favoured with the personal attention of Wilhelm II, the last of Germany's 'court Jews', is of particular interest. For the Kaiser, as for others entrusted with power, Jews could be useful as informants on economic matters especially, but in his case also in the cultural sphere. However, they suffered the usual fate of experts — 'always on tap, never on top'.

Professor Mosse acknowledges that one can regard the German-Jewish economic élite as an exceptionally fortunate group commanding many resources, material and intellectual, and happily unaware of the fate that awaited them and their community; or alternatively, as an exceptionally miserable group constantly frustrated in their hopes of full acceptance by the nation of which they felt themselves to be part. What impresses him is that so many were clearly willing to give public

service and to accept the limitations on the possible rewards. Is it not interesting to discover that the founding of the University of Frankfurt was made possible (as Professor Pulzer discovered) through gifts from the Jewish economic élite of 6.6 million marks compared with a mere 1.8 million contributed by Gentile benefactors?

Even within Professor Mosse's self-imposed limitations of subject-matter, two unanswered questions occur to the present reviewer. The author does not make fully clear what was meant by 'baptism'. Did it mean a simple formal acceptance of the Christian religion to be pointed to if occasion arose, or did such converts actually participate in the ordinary routine observances of native Christians? Indeed, on the other side of the coin one would also welcome more details: how many of the non-baptized retained synagogue membership, celebrated the High Holy Days, attended a Passover *seder*, etc.? The other question relates to politics. Professor Mosse refers occasionally to the overseas links of some of the families whose fortunes he chronicles, notably links with Britain and with the United States. Was this politically important, internationally speaking? He does refer to the well-known efforts of the shipping magnate Albert Ballin to avert war in 1914; were his links with Jews of German extraction in England as significant as the British antisemites were prone to believe? Moreover, the Allies believed that American bankers of German-Jewish origin played a major part in delaying the American government's commitment to enter the First World War. In the wider Jewish context, these were questions of some importance.

MAX BELOFF

ARON RODRIGUE , *French Jews, Turkish Jews. The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860–1925* (The Modern Jewish Experience Series), xv + 234 pp., Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1990, $27.50.

It is generally recognized that the Damascus Affair of 1840 marked a turning-point in the relationship between Jews of Western Europe and their Oriental co-religionists. Western Jewry did not 'rediscover' the Jews of the East; but the matter-of-fact way in which sections of the European press reported the resurgence of the Blood Libel appeared as a threat to the safety of even those Jewries which believed they enjoyed the fruits of emancipation. Moses Montefiore, the President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and Adolphe Crémieux, Vice-President of the Central Consistory in Paris, journeyed to the Middle East primarily to obtain justice for the unfortunate Jews who, under torture, had confessed to the murder of Father Thomas. But once there, on the spot, in Damascus and Istanbul, they lost no opportunity of

preaching to their co-religionists the virtues of European-style education, and of condemning the concentration, in the schools run by the Jewish communities in Turkey, upon Hebrew and Judeo-Spanish, to the exclusion of European tongues and especially of Turkish.

Neither Montefiore nor Crémieux had any doubt that a long-term cause of the sorry condition in which the Jews of the Near East found themselves lay in the fact that they were lacking in any meaningful sort of social and cultural integration with their host societies. Following the French occupation of Algeria in 1830, the Central Consistory had turned its attention to what was termed the 'regeneration' of the 'backward' Jews of Algeria, and had sought to apply there the same educational principles which had been applied in metropolitan France earlier in the century: traditional curricula in which the study of Hebrew and of the Talmud predominated were to be replaced by much broader schemes, transmitting the values of the European Enlightenment. But it was not until the conclusion of the Crimean War, and the promulgation, in 1856, of the Reform Edict (granting equal rights to the Sultan's Christian 'and other non-Muslim subjects') that the regeneration of Turkish Jewry was systematically undertaken. The instrument chosen (and in some respects devised) for this purpose was the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, which was founded in 1860.

Although, therefore, the subject of Professor Rodrigue's book might appear narrow at first sight, the study of the educational policy of the *Alliance* in Turkey is bound to throw a fascinating light not merely on the internal history of Turkish Jewry in the last decades of the Sultanate, but also upon the manner in which the *Alliance* interpreted its civilizing mission, and — ultimately — upon the manner in which the appeal of Zionism undermined its work. By the mid-nineteenth century, Turkish Jewry (numbering perhaps 150,000) was in economic decline. As bankers to the Sultan it had been superseded by the Armenians, and as intermediaries in international trade, it was being displaced by the Greeks. Local *maskilim* ('enlightened' Jews) invoked the interest and the resources of the *Alliance* both to reverse this decline and to act as a counterweight to the influence of what were perceived as reactionary local rabbinates.

In 1863, and in Crémieux's presence, a Regional Committee of the *Alliance* was founded in Istanbul. Over the next fifty years, a network of schools was established under its auspices in every Judeo-Spanish community in the Ottoman Empire with a population of more than a thousand. At first the teachers were French Jews; later, graduates of *Alliance* schools were themselves trained as teachers by the Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale which had been established in Paris in 1867. These facts remind us that the *Alliance* was itself an expression of the French imperial mission, and in some respects its instrument. That is to say, although the primary aim of the *Alliance* schools was to

overturn the 'amoral' instincts alleged to pervade Turkish Jewry (p. 73), and to educate their pupils to become 'good citizens' of Turkey (p. 77), the facts that French was the medium of instruction, that French textbooks were much in evidence, and that the superiority of French civilization was more or less taken for granted, had an inevitable permeative effect: 'French became the central referent for culture and prestige for the whole [Judeo-Spanish] community' (p. 119).

Although, therefore, the original aim of those who had supported the building of *Alliance* schools in Turkey had been to promote a greater degree of convergence between Turkish Jewry and Turkish society, the effect was to create a Jewish middle class in Turkey which regarded French society as much superior to Turkish. More than that, the success of the *Alliance* schools resulted, 'in many cases, [in] the total elimination of the traditional education system' of Turkish Jewry (p. 118), and thus in the erosion of a purely religious identity. Worse still, from the standpoint of the *Alliance*, the alienation of Turkish Jewry from Turkish society meant that it was much more amenable to Zionist influence than it would have been if the *Alliance* schools had never been built.

After the revolution of 1908, Zionism made steady progress amongst Turkish Jews, so that by 1914 the *Alliance* 'no longer commanded the allegiance of important sectors among the secular elements' (p. 131). By the early 1920s, 'the Alliance network had been dethroned from its position at the center of communal dynamism among Turkish Jewry by the class that it itself had brought into being' (p. 135). Subsidies which the French government gave to the *Alliance* in and after 1920 were ultimately counter-productive because, in the atmosphere of strident nationalism that pervaded Turkey after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the schools established by the *Alliance* were inevitably — and rightly — seen as foreign intrusions. In 1924, the schools were ordered by the Turkish Ministry of Education to cease all contact with Paris. Turkish replaced French as the medium of instruction and a state curriculum was imposed, with a few hours devoted to Jewish religious education. By 1929, the schools had been 'totally nationalized' (p. 164), though, as the author notes, this was merely part of the wider move to create a unitary national system of education throughout the country.

In telling this story, Professor Rodrigue imports an exhaustive range of primary and secondary sources, and offers a judicious blend of lively description and poignant scholarly analysis. The imposition upon Turkish Jewry of what was essentially a French system of schooling represented, as he notes, an attempt by 'a vanguard of French Jews, new members of a triumphalist French metropolitan culture . . . to reproduce the model of their emancipation . . . in communities which

lived under circumstances far removed from their own' (p. 172). It was (if you think about it) an act of monumental arrogance, from which the only comfort to be derived is that the undermining of the values of religious orthodoxy was followed by the triumph of the very Zionist ideology against which the *Alliance* had battled for so long.

GEOFFREY ALDERMAN

CHRONICLE

The Summer/Fall 1990 issue of *Hebrew University News*, received in London last December, states that the University's Board of Governors heard reports about the retraining of Soviet immigrant scientists to be science teachers in Israeli high schools and about new courses designed to enable Soviet doctors and dentists to practice within the Israeli health care system. The head of the University's committee on immigrant absorption told the Board about the creation of an information centre for Russian and Eastern European immigrants on the Mount Scopus campus. The outgoing Dean of Students stressed that 'it was urgent to reinstitute the University's Career Counseling Center, which had stopped functioning a few years ago for financial reasons, and also urged that incentives in the form of scholarships be granted to Israeli students who were active in absorbing immigrants'.

The Board adopted a resolution which called for the continued independence of the higher education system. It noted that attempts had been made in the past year to reduce the authority of the Council for Higher Education and called on the government and on the Knesset to ensure that the higher education system did not fall victim to partisan politics. The President of the Hebrew University declared: 'The higher educational system of Israel has always been independent. Without independence, we have no higher education, and without higher education, we have no future'.

At the Hebrew University's annual Convocation, the President of Israel's Supreme Court 'spoke of the imperative need to protect individual rights as the backbone of a viable democracy. Citing Israel's Declaration of Independence, he stated that democracy rested on the dispersion of powers. Why did the French Revolution fail and the American Revolution succeed, he asked. Because the Americans guarded individual rights.

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Thirty Jewish historians from the Soviet Union have completed a six-week course of study in Jewish history at the Hebrew University's School for Overseas Students. 'Contacts to bring the historians to Jerusalem were made through the new Jewish Historical Society in the Soviet Union, which held its organizational conference in Moscow. . . . Much material of Jewish historical interest exists in Russian libraries and the hopes are that this material can be revealed, collated and made available to a Jewish public which is hungry for knowledge of its past'.

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The Hebrew University inaugurated in the summer of 1990 a special, intensive course in Biblical Hebrew for 26 students from a number of Catholic Universities in France, Italy, and Spain. 'The course went on for five hours a

day, five days a week, throughout July ... Both elementary and advanced levels were taught, with the emphasis on Biblical grammar, syntax, vocabulary and comprehension of Biblical texts and interpretations.'

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An international conference on Children in War was held at the Hebrew University. It was attended by about 250 scholars (170 from Israel and some 80 participants from 21 other countries); they were practitioners from many fields: psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, developmental psychologists, child welfare workers, children's rights workers, as well as experts on refugee problems. 'The conference focused on various aspects of research and treatment of children caught up in war situations, such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the wars in Lebanon and Cambodia, and conflicts in South America and Africa. Research also was presented on Holocaust survivors who were children during the Second World War. ... Overseas participants came from Argentina, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Finland, Germany, Holland, Italy, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States'.

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The Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University organized in June 1990 a three-day conference, the First International Conference on Equity. Those presenting papers included some 60 judges and scholars from Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States.

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At the end of the academic year 1989–90, the Hebrew University awarded 3,407 degrees; these included '2,300 Bachelor's degrees, 724 Master's degrees, 135 Doctor of Philosophy and Doctor of Laws degrees, and 158 Doctor of Medicine and Doctor of Dental Medicine degrees. ... This year's crop of graduates brings the total number of degrees awarded by the University since its founding 65 years ago to about 76,500.'

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The Ninth International Symposium of the International Committee of Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Studies was held at the Hebrew University; it was attended by 14 scholars from Turkey and about 100 participants from Eastern and Western Europe, North America, Japan, and Israel. 'A special exhibit entitled 'Istanbul-Jerusalem: Islamic Art in the Holy Land' was held at the Jewish National and University Library. ... The exhibit featured maps, documents, books, calligraphic examples and other items from the Ottoman period, taken from the collections of the University library, the Israel Museum and private collections.'

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The Summer/Fall 1990 issue of *Hebrew University News* states that the West German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology has provided funds for the first academic centre in Israel to focus on the literary and cultural relations between Germans and Jews from the Middle Ages to the present. The Franz

Rosenzweig Research Center for German-Jewish Literature and Cultural History is named in honour of the famous early twentieth-century German-Jewish philosopher and theologian. A distinguished delegation of some 50 government officials and academics from West Germany attended the dedication at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the State Secretary of the West German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology commented that the Rosenzweig Center was the largest of some 370 joint research projects and centres which have been established by his Ministry. The purpose of the Franz Rosenzweig Center is to perpetuate the cultural heritage of German Jewry and to research the literature and cultural relations between Germans and Jews. . . . The centre is dedicated to the legacy of those Jewish thinkers and scientists whose contributions to human knowledge had a great impact in Europe and other countries. Among them were those who came to Israel and played a significant role in the formation of Israeli culture and in the development of the Hebrew University, people such as Gershom Scholem, Ernst Simon, Martin Buber and Shmuel Hugo Bergman. . . . The Rosenzweig Center . . . will be interdisciplinary in nature. Its activities will include granting of scholarships to young researchers, promoting cooperation with German and other foreign scholars and institutions, convening of international conferences and workshops, initiating research projects and producing scientific publications. Its initial work will be on German-Jewish *émigrés*.'

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The widow of an Iranian Jew, who settled in Los Angeles after the Islamic Revolution, has established a fund at the Hebrew University to promote research on the history of Iranian Jewry and to provide scholarships for students of Iranian origin.

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The Winter 1991 Report of the International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization states that the Center 'has played an important role in promoting Jewish Civilization Studies in different regions of the world. The Center's *World Register* lists some 1,300 colleges and universities on every continent, in approximately 60 countries where courses in Jewish Civilization are now taught in virtually every discipline of the humanities and social sciences. Through its international faculty exchange, annual workshops, publications and regional activities, the Center promotes contact between scholars in far-flung corners of the academic world.'

There was a 'round table of workshop participants' who reported on various approaches to Judaic Studies in different university settings. The President of the Open University of Israel 'noted that in the past the great majority of scholars who conducted research in Jewish Civilization, and most of their students, were Jews. In recent years, Jewish Civilization Studies are no longer the exclusive domain of Jewish scholars. All but one of the panelists participating in the concluding workshop session represented institutions where non-Jewish scholars study and teach Jewish Civilization to non-Jewish students. Some of them do so in countries where Jews played an important role in the history and culture of the society, as in Poland, Holland, Belgium, the

Soviet Union, and Germany. Others were from countries where Jewish communities do not exist. . . .'.

Belgium was represented by a professor from the Catholic University of Leuven, who stated: 'The Leuven Faculty of Theology offers complete programs in Religious Studies and Theology, both in Dutch and in English. Jewish Civilization is part of the curriculum and research program of both the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Theology. A colloquium, widely attended and well-known in academic circles, Biblicum Lovaniense, is held biennially dedicated to a particular area of Jewish studies.'

A professor at the Department of Political Studies and International Relations of Beijing University stated: 'I have been engaged in teaching and research into Middle East politics, Jewish history and Jewish culture . . . In 1988 I spent a month in Israel where I was able to add new content and learn new methods for my courses. . . . At public lectures I gave, the questions showed how interested the Chinese people are in all that concerns Israel. This year, Israel studies have been included in the approved list of research topics of the State Social Sciences Academic Association.'

A professor from Wroclaw State University in Poland commented: 'Polish Jewry today is largely of academic or historical interest but to many Polish intellectuals, Jewish culture and tradition are very much alive in the Polish national consciousness. It is impossible to understand the evolution of the Polish nation without knowledge of the history of the Jewish people in Poland. An unusual feature of teaching Jewish civilization in Poland is that it is provided almost exclusively by non-Jews, for non-Jews, in a country experiencing a resurgence of anti-Semitism. Thus a danger exists that such courses can be presented with an anti-Jewish nuance. My personal experience of teaching Jewish Civilization at Wroclaw University indicates that such dangers are well within the realm of the possible. Hereditary if not always recognized anti-Semitism, motivated some of my students to take my courses. Painful sensitivity on subjects of nationality characterizes the Polish national personality. Often anti-Semitic moods are so peculiarly interwoven into the Polish mentality that it is difficult to perceive them. This phenomenon often lends an abrasive political coloration to seminars and lectures on Jewish Civilization.'

A pastor from Zaire reported: 'The two Protestant Faculties of Theology and Humanities (in Kinshasa) currently offer three levels of study, toward a B.A., and M.A., and a Doctorate. In all five departments of the Faculty of Theology, courses are offered in the Hebrew Bible, ancient Near Eastern history and culture (Israel and her neighbors), the history of ancient Israel, Israel in the intertestamental period (*bayit sheni*), and Israel in the world of the New Testament and the Church (from Bar Kochba to the Crusades). Courses in rabbinical exegesis and hermeneutics are also offered. Most of our 500–600 students are Christian. The Israel Embassy in Zaire has contributed some books but we will require further sources of gifts as well as funding to organiza conferences, seminars and symposia.'

A Ph.D. student from South Korea who participated in the workshop stated that her future career was to teach Hebrew at the University of Kon-Kuk. 'The university has a student population of 20,000 organized in 15 colleges. A department of Jewish Studies will open in 1991, offering courses in Jewish history and culture, Middle East studies, and the Hebrew Language.'

Another Ph.D. student, from the Department of Theology of the Free University of Amsterdam, also participated in the workshop. He stated: 'In the Netherlands, the academic study of Judaism is primarily focused on Hebrew language and literature, as well as on the classical rabbinic texts (rabbinic theology of the Second Temple period), to which can be added the study of Hellenistic Judaism in relation to early Christianity. There is certainly some academic interest in Jewish Philosophy, as is reflected in the existence of a society called Philosophia Judaica.'

A professor from Humboldt Universität zu Berlin said that 'Judaica and Semitic studies enjoy a long tradition at the (East) Berlin University. First offered in the framework of theological studies, they quickly developed into an independent field of scientific research and teaching. Totally eliminated during the Nazi era, both as to staff and to learning materials, Jewish Studies revived in 1945 within the area of theological research, and beginning in 1960 Professor Heinrich Simon, a well-known philosopher, started rebuilding a scientific framework for Hebraic studies. Major changes taking place in our country [statement presented before unification — ed.] affect our department. . . . Future plans contemplate offering a joint program in Hebrew and Arabic, or Hebrew and Islamic studies.'

Finally, a research associate from Lvov State University commented: 'There is a real treasure trove of Jewish culture in Lvov, but it is not to be found in museums or libraries. Today in the Lvov region, conditions for studying and teaching Jewish problems are far from satisfactory. However, the region's Jewish population is showing increasing interest in a livelier Jewish life.' He added that the Lvov Centre 'encourages this revival through Hebrew courses and lectures in Jewish history' and that the Centre 'initiated the establishment of the museum in the Yanov concentration camp, unique because this former Nazi concentration camp still functions as a hard labor camp for Soviet convicts'.

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The October–December 1990 issue of the *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* includes an article by Dominique Bourel (on pp. 205–11) entitled 'Les Juifs et la Révolution Française: essai d'historiographie'; it is based on 14 recent books and articles on the subject of the Jews at the time of the French Revolution of 1789.

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The Fall 1990 issue of *Tel Aviv University News* states that the International Sephardic Education Foundation (ISEF) focuses its efforts on gifted and highly-motivated young Israelis from development towns and from slum areas in the large cities. 'This year, ISEF celebrated its 13th year of operation — or "Bar Mitzvah" — with a ceremony in the Knesset . . . when it awarded 13 scholarships to exceptional high school pupils, who will be sponsored right through to doctoral level. . . . The Foundation also presented 13 prizes to outstanding Ph.D. and Masters students, and to educational projects run by ISEF scholarship-holders. . . . a prizewinner was . . . Project Kesher ("connection"), which prepares matriculating students in schools in distressed neighborhoods to succeed in the universities' pyschometric exams; ISEF

scholars teach the children mathematics, logic and combatting exam anxiety.' The ISEF National Organizer in Israel commented that the students 'boost the children's self-confidence and also give them a headstart for university, for the army, and for life in general. Through contact with students, the children are also brought closer to the idea of university attendance and receive all kinds of information on what courses of study are available.'

The President of ISEF-Israel, who is a member of TAU's (Tel Aviv University's) Executive Council, commented: 'The Jewish people have always known the value of education — but the State does not give enough support to it. ISEF steped in to help those able students who lack funds to study.' The Foundation has to date provided more than 6,000 scholarships at Israel's seven universities, and it also sends students abroad to pursue their education where necessary. There is a continuity of action, a concept of generations of students helping each other, . . . promising ISEF candidates receive scholarship support on the basis that they will be active in projects in which the Foundation is involved.' For example, there are 'such projects as "Second Chance", which aids adults from distressed areas to complete their matriculation; "Beta Israel", a project in cooperation with TAU's Unit for Community Action, which "adopts" Ethiopian students; law students give legal aid and advice; and tutoring projects with disadvantaged youth. In the "Round Table" project, TAU students tutor in the afternoons at three elementary schools in Tel Aviv's impoverished south. They give personal instruction to small groups and act as role models to the children, encouraging study. . . . Kay Teachers' Training College in Beersheva also serves a club for kids from the city's high-stress "Daled" neighborhood. Five afternoons a week the students offer workshops in their specialities, whether it be ballet, music or ceramics, or math and computers. These are workshops which are normally available to children from more privileged families.'

An ISEF alumni organization has also been established and it is instrumental in helping ISEF scholars to obtain suitable work on graduation.

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It was reported last April that three sets of Jewish archives have been deposited in the Greater London Record Office; the archives of the United Synagogue; the archives of the Chief Rabbinate of the United Hebrew Congregations, 1851–1965 (including records of the Rabbinate of Oldenburg, 1829–30); and the archives of the Federation of Synagogues.

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An exhibition entitled 'Patterns of Jewish Life in the World: Thinking and Religion, Life and Working of Jews in the Cultures of the World' will be held in Berlin from 12 January to 26 April 1992. The English press release states: 'In January 1992 it will be fifty years that the Wannsee Conference agreed upon the extermination of Jewish life in Europe. After a series of historical exhibitions and book publications commemorating the 50th anniversary of Hitler's appointment as German Chancellor and the formation of the cabinet (1983) and the 50th anniversary of the "Reichskristallnacht" (1988) an exhibition relating to the history of civilization is planned and will attempt to create an authentic picture of the different identities of Jewish life in the world.

'. . . The exhibition will be presented in the Martin-Gropius-Building in the neighborhood of "Prinz-Albrecht-Gelande", one of the most terrible addresses in the former "Reichshauptstadt". The "Patterns of Jewish Life in the World" will be presented in 1992 in one of the most beautiful exhibition buildings in Berlin while at the same time and in contrast to it the "Topography of Terror" will be shown in an exhibition hall installed on the ruins of the former SS center of power.

'. . . an immense library . . . is planned and will illustrate the importance of the written word. Rabbinical and religious literature on one side as well as books written by Jewish authors will be significantly juxtaposed according to special subjects, on the other side. . . . The various kinds of Jewish life will be presented within the European museum tradition with original objects and documents in specially constructed display rooms, with all their contrasting diversities and characteristics defined by the different periods and regions.'

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According to an opinon poll commissioned by the American Jewish Committee and by Freedom House (an American human rights group), 40 per cent of Poles, 23 per cent of Czechoslovaks and five per cent of Hungarians stated that they would not like to have a Jew as a neighbour. (The Poles displayed a similar attitude to Russians and to Arabs.) Sixteen per cent of Poles believed that Jews threaten reform, while nine per cent of Czechoslovaks and five per cent of Hungarians are of that opinion.

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The November 1990 issue of *Les Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* states that 2,676 readers came to the modernized and enlarged library in 1989; most of them were university teachers, research workers, and students.

In the school year 1988–89, a total of 20,444 pupils attended *Alliance* schools in 49 establishments in eight countries. In Belgium, there are two schools affiliated to the *Alliance*, both in Brussels, with a total of 516 pupils. In Canada, there are 12 schools, all in Montreal, and most of them are affiliated to the *Alliance*; a total of 4,619 students were enrolled in 1988–89. France has four establishments, with a total of 783 students. In Iran, there are two schools in Teheran, both of them for boys only. In 1988–89, one of these schools had 69 pupils, all of them Jewish, while the other school had 377 pupils of whom 80 were Jewish. There are three *Alliance* schools outside the capital: one in Ispahan, another in Kermanshah, and a third in Yezd; the total enrolment was 433, of whom 84 were Jewish. The *Cahiers* note that in Iran, all schools established by religious minorities are under the authority of the country's academic officials.

In Israel, almost 12,000 students (11,966) were registered in *Alliance* establishments in 1988–89; ten of the schools are affiliated, all of them in Jerusalem, with a total of 6,305 pupils, while six other *Alliance* schools are in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Mikveh-Israel. One of the Jerusalem schools is for deaf and dumb children and it had 97 pupils in 1988–89: 57 girls and 40 boys; three of the forms in the school are for the benefit of Arab deaf and dumb children. The Mikveh-Israel agricultural college was founded in 1870 and in June 1990 it celebrated its 120th anniversary.

In Morocco, the *Alliance* has eight schools with a total of 1,082 pupils; French is the medium of instruction but both Arabic and Hebrew are taught in all primary and secondary forms. The pupils sit for examinations supervised by the *Mission Universitaire et Culturelle française*. There is only one *Alliance* school in Syria, in Damascus; it is a primary school and in 1988–89 it had a total of 305 pupils — 240 girls and 65 boys. There is religious tuition for eight hours every week in every form, while the French language is taught also in every form but for six hours a week.

Spain has one *Alliance* school in Barcelona, the Colegio Sefardi, which had 92 pupils in 1988–89; another school, in Madrid, is affiliated to the *Alliance* and in the academic year it had 202 pupils. The Madrid school is officially recognized by the French government as a 'French school abroad' and its general curriculum is the same as that of the French *lycée* in Madrid; but it also teaches Spanish for two hours daily and religious knowledge for one hour.

The April 1991 issue of the *Cahiers de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle* states that the *Alliance* has done its best to look after the interests of the children of new Soviet immigrants; 13 of its schools (in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Safed) had enrolled 756 Russian children in September 1990; a few months later the total had risen to more than 1,000.

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The Winter 1991 *SICSA Report*, a Newsletter of the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, includes a report by Dr Leon Volovici on antisemitism in the Soviet Union. He states that during a month recently spent in Moscow 'studying the consequences of antisemitism fifty years ago' and finding in Soviet archives 'hundreds of documents on the systematic massacre of hundreds of thousands Soviet Jews in the Nazi-occupied territories', he did not have to search for new forms of anitsemitism in the USSR. He saw 'leaflets warning of the Zionist threat to the world and leaflets denouncing the crimes of the Zionist-Jew Trotsky and of other Bolshevik Zionists against the Russian nation.' He adds: 'I was handed a beautifully printed appeal addressed to "Russians and their brothers all over the world", which began with these jarring words: "Brothers! Our principal enemy — the enemy of Russia — is Zionism. Zionism is the most sophisticated form of international Fascism. . . . I received a manifesto warning not to vote in the next parliamentary election for Jewish or cripto-Jewish candidates, nor even for Russian candidates "judaized" either by Jewish wives or by Zionist and masonic influence. My conversations with Jews from Moscow, Leningrad and Minsk invariably turned to what they considered the burning issue of "popular antisemitism". Feelings of strong apprehension were (and continue to be) aroused by public meetings of the various nationalist organizations, of which "Pamyat" is the most famous, but far from unique in its vicious antisemitism.'

Dr Volovici notes: 'The new bearers of antisemitism . . . are adding a new twist — their chauvinism is *Russian* and not *Soviet*'. However, he concludes that 'the picture is not entirely black. . . . "Pravda" . . . recently published an article signed by the historian S. Rogov warning of the gravity of increasing popular and intellectual antisemitism. Andrei Siniavsky, the well-known writer and dissident, dealt with the question in a recent lecture . . .

Siniavsky explained his concern thus: "because I am a Russian and the 'Jewish question' typifies both the pain and the shame of Russia. For me, antisemitism is a tragedy not just for the Jews but for Russians as well''.

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Routledge and the British Library of Political and Economic Science (BLPES) announced some months ago that ICAS (International Current Awareness Services) will be 'a unique new bibliographical service providing rapid international coverage of the world's most significant social science literature. . . . Journals are drawn from the extensive collections of the BLPES itself and other specialist libraries within the University of London. They are also submitted by a network of overseas correspondents in social science institutions, publishers and libraries throughout the world, thus ensuring the broadest international coverage.'

Volume 1, no. 1, entitled *Sociology and related disciplines*, was published in November 1990. The press release enclosed with the January 1991 issue (vol. 2, no. 1) claims that each year, 'over 120,000 articles are scanned, about one-third of which are in languages other than English. All non-English language titles are listed in their original language and accompanied by an English translation'.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

Alderman, Geoffrey, *Anglo-Jewry: A Suitable Case for Treatment* (Inaugural Lecture delivered at Royal Holloway and Bedford New College, University of London, on 17 October 1989), 31 pp., published by the author in 1990 and available from him at the above College (Egham Hill, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX) at £2.50 inclusive of postage.

Bartoszewski, Wladyslaw Y. and Antony Polonsky, eds., *The Jews in Warsaw. A History*, xi + 392 pp., Basil Blackwell in association with the Institute of Polish-Jewish Studies, Oxford, 1991, £37.50.

Ben-Rafael, Eliezer and Stephen Sharot, *Ethnicity, religion and class in Israeli Society*, x + 287 pp., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, £32.50 or $39.50.

Bergman, Martin S. and Milton E. Jucovy, eds., *Generations of the Holocaust*, xix + 356 pp., Columbia University Press, New York, 1990 (new enlarged edition of the volume first published in 1982 by Basic Books), $21.50 (hardback, $52.00).

Carlebach, Elisheva, *The Pursuit of Heresy. Rabbi Moses Hagiz and the Sabbatian Controversies*, xvii + 364 pp., Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, $63.50.

Cohen, Erik H. avec la participation de Maurice Ifergan, *L'étude et l'éducation juive en France ou l'avenir d'une communauté*, Les éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1991, 250 francs.

Cohen, Jeremy, ed., *Essential Papers on Judaism and Christianity in Conflict. From Late Antiquity to the Reformation*, xv + 578 pp., New York University Press (distributed by Columbia University Press), New York and London, $31.50 (hardback, $75.00).

Cohen, Naomi W., ed., *Essential Papers on Jewish-Christian Relations in the United States. Imagery and Reality*, xi + 378 pp., New York University Press (distributed by Columbia University Press), New York and London, $31.50 (hardback, $75.00).

Don-Yehiya, Eliezer, ed., *Israel and Diaspora Jewry. Ideological and Political Perspectives*, 257 pp., Bar-Ilan University Press, Ramat Gan, 1991, n.p.

Feldman, Emanuel and Joel B. Wolowelsky, *The Conversion Crisis. Essays from the pages of TRADITION* (Treasury of Tradition series), iv + 105 pp., Ktav/The Rabbinical Council of America, Hoboken, N.J., 1990, $8.95 (paperback).

Frankel, William, ed., *Survey of Jewish Affairs 1990*, xii + 303 pp., published for the Institute of Jewish Affairs by Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, £55.00.

Gerevich, Laszlo, ed., *Towns in Medieval Hungary* (East European Monograph series), translated from the Hungarian by T. Szendrei, 152 pp., distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, $40.50.

Halper, Jeff, *Between Redemption and Revival. The Jewish Yishuv of Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century*, xiii + 290 pp., Westview Press, Oxford, 1991, £23.95.

Hass, Aaron, *In the Shadow of the Holocaust. The Second Generation*, xi + 180 pp., I. B. Tauris, London, 1990, £14.95.

Hercenberg, Bernard Dov, *L'exil et la puissance d'Israël et du monde. Essai sur la crise des limites de la représentation et du pouvoir*, 219 pp., Actes Sud, Arles, 1990, 148 francs.

Kahane, David, *Lvov Ghetto Diary* (translated by Jerzy Michalowicz), viii + 162 pp., University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1990, $24.95.

Langer, Lawrence L., *Holocaust Testimonies. The Ruins of Memory*, xix + 216 pp., Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1991, $25.00 or £16.50.

Langmuir, Gavin I., *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism*, x + 417 pp., University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, 1990, $45.00.

Lehman-Wilzig, Sam N., *Stiff-necked People, Bottle-necked System. The Evolution and Roots of Israeli Public Protest, 1949–1986* (Jewish Political and Social Studies series), ix + 214 pp., Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1990, $25.00.

Loewenthal, Naftali, *Communicating the Infinite. The Emergence of the Habad School*, xi + 336 pp., University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1990, $45.95 or £31.95.

Marcus, Jacob Reader, *This I Believe: Documents of American Jewish Life*, xxi + 277 pp., Jason Aronson, 230 Livingston Street, Northvale, N.J. 07647, 1990, $25.00.

Meyer, Michael A., *Jewish Identity in the Modern World*, ix + 110 pp., University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, $17.50.

Miliband, Ralph, *Divided Societies. Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism*, ix + 277 pp., Oxford University Press, 1991 (paperback edition; first published in 1989), £7.99.

Patai, Raphael, *The Hebrew Goddess* (third enlarged edition), Foreword by Merlin Stone, 369 pp., Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1990, $16.00 (hardback, $35.00).

Patterson, David, *A Phoenix in Fetters. Studies in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Hebrew Fiction*, xii + 210 pp., Rowland & Littlefield Publishers (8705 Bollman Place, Savage, Maryland 20763), distributed in the United Kingdom by Eurospan, Kershaw House, 3 Henrietta Street, London WC2E 8LU, copyright in 1988 but first published in 1990, $46.75 or £43.95.

Weiss, Avraham, *Women at Prayer. A Halakhic Analysis of Women's Prayer Groups*, xvi + 147 pp., Ktav Publishing House, Hoboken, N.J., 1990, $15.95.

Wistrich, Robert, *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred*, xxvi + 341 pp., Thames Methuen, London, 1991, £16.99.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ABRAHAM, Margaret, Ph.D. Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology, Hofstra University, N.Y. Author of 'Ethnic Identity and Marginality Among Indian Jews in Contemporary India' in *Ethnic Groups*, vol. 9, no. 1, March 1991.

ALDERMAN, Geoffrey; D.Phil. Professor of Politics and Contemporary History at Royal Holloway and Bedford New College, University of London. Chief Publications: *British Elections*, 1978; *The Jewish Community in British Politics*, 1983; *Pressure Groups and Government in Great Britain*, 1984; *The Federation of Synagogues*, 1987; and *London Jewry and London Politics*, 1989.

BELOFF, Professor Lord, F.B.A. Emeritus Professor of Government and Public Administration in the University of Oxford and Emeritus Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. Chief publications: *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia* (two volumes, 1947 and 1949); *Imperial Sunset, 1897–1942* (two volumes, 1969 and 1989); *Wars and Welfare: Britain 1914–1945*, 1984; and was the British editor of seven volumes of *L'Europe du XIX^e et XX^e siècles*, published between 1959 and 1967.

SCHMOOL, Marlena; B. Soc. Sc. Executive Director, Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews. Chief publications: co-author, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population 1960–65' in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1968; co-author, 'Synagogue Marriages in Great Britain 1966–68' in *JJS*, vol. 12, no. 1, June 1970; co-author, 'Statistics of Milah and the Jewish Birth-Rate in Britain' in *JJS*, vol. 12, no. 2, December 1970; four Registers of Social Research on the Anglo-Jewish community published in the *JJS*, between 1968 and 1988; and 'Researching British Jewry' in *Occasional Papers on Jewish Social Services*, no. 2, August 1988.