Jews in the European Community: Sociodemographic Trends and Challenges

by SERGIO DELLAPERGOLA

AT MIDNIGHT OF DECEMBER 31, 1992, the European Community moved one important step ahead in bringing about the economic integration of 12 Western European countries (EC-12): Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.[1] Implementation of the Single Market, following the 1987 Single European Act, opened the borders of EC member states to free, mutual circulation of people, goods, and services and advanced the EC one step forward toward what could become, in due course, fuller political integration. At the same stroke of midnight on December 31, Czechoslovakia, a country having common borders with the European Community, was in the process of splitting into two new sovereign states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, putting an end to a union that had lasted since the end of World War I. Even more dramatically, a devastating civil war accompanied by episodes of atrocity and "ethnic cleansing" was ravaging what was once Yugoslavia, another of the EC's close neighbors.

Thus, at the start of 1993, the European continent was emitting ambivalent and troubling political signals. Even as some areas were advancing toward the dream of peace and harmony envisioned by the fathers of European federalism after World War II, their neighbors were burying the thousands killed in the merciless destruction of Sarajevo and many more places in Bosnia. At the same time, the ramifications of major geopolitical changes, such as the crisis and dismemberment of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin wall, and the unification of Germany, were not yet fully

Note: Research on Jewish demographic trends in Western Europe reported in this article was supported by a grant from the Vigevani Fund of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Research on Jewish educational statistics was supported by the L.A. Pincus Jewish Education Fund for the Diaspora.

[1]For an introduction to the concept, legal framework, and main socioeconomic aspects of the European Community, see L. Gladwyn, *The European Idea* (London, 1967); Jacques Delors, *Le nouveau concert européen* (Paris, 1992); Dennis Swann, *The Economics of the Common Market* (Harmondsworth, 7th ed., 1992); G.N. Minshull, *The New Europe into the 1990s* (London, 1990); The Economist, *Pocket Europe* (London, 1992).

absorbed or understood. These political transformations, among other factors, unleashed an impressive wave of international migrations, adding a serious economic burden to nations already experiencing economic woes. These developments account for growing social turmoil and outbursts of xenophobia, primarily in Germany but in nearly every other EC member state as well. With European society as a whole still lacking a definitive and stable political order, and perhaps more significantly, a clear vision of what might be expected in the future, hopes for a more prosperous, stable, and powerful Europe in the aftermath of the cold war go hand in hand with fears of large-scale sociopolitical destabilization, increasing outbursts of ethnic violence, and the menace of resurgent Nazi and fascist ideologies.

When one tries to assess the current status of Jewish communities within the framework of the EC, these developments obviously arouse some anxiety. The primary concern is for the political and economic stability of Europe in general, and in the EC in particular. Amidst a growing mood of disillusionment with national political leadership and institutions, the centrifugal forces aiming to break up countries such as Belgium or Italy seem at times more powerful than the centripetal strivings toward European unity. The ambivalence shown by the Europeans over the Maastricht agreement, which by establishing monetary union provides a basis for constitutional harmonization among the EC member states, demonstrates that the process of European union cannot yet be considered unquestionably irreversible. Clearly, the Jews will experience the effects of the more general trends that may emerge, for better or worse—along with other sectors of European society.

The question of cultural identification is increasingly complex, too. Basically there is little tolerance for pluralism and diversity in the individual historical backgrounds of EC member states. Rather, each European nation has tended to emphasize both the superiority of its own culture over others and the sacred territorial base of its own political sovereignty. Can a new, more pluralistic and tolerant order be created within a unified EC framework, in which the various component national cultures are recognized as equals, and which grants minority cultures not defined by a specific territory the same recognition and legitimacy? And can such nonterritorial cultures and communities hold their own against the stronger EC national cultures and maintain their own viable existence in a united Europe? How will the Jews fare, caught as they seem to be between these two opposing forces: latent—and sometimes very real—hostility on the part of the surrounding society, and the benign acceptance by that society that encourages assimilation?[2]

---

[2]For a historical overview of anti-Semitism in Europe, see Robert S. Wistrich, "Anti-Semitism in Europe Since the Holocaust," elsewhere in this volume.

Clearly, these are difficult questions of a general nature and with broad implications. A survey of much larger scope than the present one would be needed to do justice to the complexity of the issues at stake for the Jewish presence in the EC. This article reviews the major sociodemographic processes that currently characterize the Jewish population within the EC. Some basic historical background to the current trends is provided, and brief attention is paid to a few issues of broader significance for the present and future of Western European Jewry, such as the organizational structure of Jewish communities and the process of socialization of the new generation through formal Jewish education. In our concluding remarks, we will try to draw some broader conclusions about the issues that now confront the Jews in the European Community.[3]

Conceptual Problems and Sources

The study of Western European Jewish communities can draw from mature historical and, to a lesser extent, sociological traditions, at the country and local levels;[4] however there has been little attempt to study

[3]With regard to some of the topics not dealt with in the present article, the reader may be interested in the following. On the current status of the teaching of Jewish civilization in European universities: Doris Bensimon, *L'enseignement des disciplines juives dans les universités européennes* (Jerusalem, 1988); Sharman Kadish, *The Teaching of Jewish Civilization at British and Irish Universities and Other Institutions of Higher Learning* (Jerusalem, 1990). On recent anti-Semitism and other forms of prejudice: Tony Lerman, ed., *Antisemitism World Report 1992* (London, 1992); David A. Jodice, *United Germany and Jewish Concerns: Attitudes Toward Jews, Israel and the Holocaust* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1991); *L'immagine dell'ebreo nell'Italia degli anni '80, La Rassegna Mensile di Israel* 56, no. 3, 1990. On the representation of Israel in the European press: Hanna Pout, *European Perspectives on Israel with Special Reference to Eight British and French Weeklies* (Ramat Gan, 1991). On European Community-Israel relations: Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph H. Weiler, eds., *Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours* (Berlin, 1988). Data on Jewish emigration from EC countries to Israel are analyzed in Sergio DellaPergola, "Mass *Aliyah*—A Thing of the Past?" *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 51, 1989, pp. 96–114.

[4]Since the literature on Jews in individual European countries is too extensive to be even tentatively summarized here, a selection of relevant works is offered, most of which stress a social perspective. On Belgium: Jacques Gutwirth, *Vie juive traditionnelle: ethnologie d'une communauté hassidique* (Paris, 1970); Willy Bok, "Vie juive et communauté; une esquisse de leur histoire au vingtième siècle," in *La grande Synagogue de Bruxelles; contributions à l'histoire des juifs de Bruxelles* (Brussels, 1978), pp. 151–68; Willy Bok, "L'entrelacs du religieux et du laïc dans les milieux juifs en Belgique," in *Eglises, mouvements religieux et laïques*, ed. L. Voye, K. Dobbelaere, J. Remy, and J. Billiet (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1985), pp. 333–46; on Denmark: Jacques Blum, *Danske og/eller Jode?* (Copenhagen, 1972); Adina Weiss Liberles, "The Jewish Community of Denmark," in D.J. Elazar et al., *The Jewish Communities of Scandinavia* (Lanham, Md.-Jerusalem, 1984), pp. 57–102; on France: Otto Klineberg, Georges Levitte, and Georges Benguigui, *Aspects of French Jewry* (London, 1969); Dominique Schnapper, *Jewish Identities in France: An Analysis of Contemporary French Jewry* (Chicago, 1983); Doris Bensimon, *Les juifs de France et leur relations avec Israel (1945–1988)* (Paris,

the Jewish scene in a coherent and integrated regional context.[5] This lag reflects several general problems hindering contemporary Jewish demographic, socioeconomic, and sociocultural research. For one thing, there barely exists a meaningful sociological-historical framework for the study of general society within the European Community, let alone for the

---

1989); on Germany: Leo Katcher, *Post Mortem: The Jews in Germany Today* (New York, 1968); Monika Richarz, "Jews in Today's Germanies," *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 30, 1985, pp. 265–74; Frank Stern, "From Overt Filosemitism to Discreet Antisemitism and Beyond: Anti-Jewish Developments in the Political Culture of the Federal Republic of Germany," in *Antisemitism Through the Ages*, ed. S. Almog (Oxford, 1988), pp. 385–404; on Greece, Adina Weiss Liberles, "The Jews of Greece," in D.J. Elazar et al., *The Balkan Jewish Communities* (Lanham, Md.-Jerusalem, 1984), pp. 102–26; on Italy: Sergio DellaPergola, *Anatomia dell'ebraismo italiano: caratteristiche demografiche, economiche, sociali, religiose e politiche di una minoranza* (Roma-Assisi, 1976); Sergio DellaPergola and Eitan F. Sabatello, "The Italian Jewish Population Study," in *Studies in Jewish Demography: Survey for 1969–1971*, ed. U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S.J. Gould (Jerusalem-London, 1975), pp. 53–152; H. Stuart Hughes, *Prisoners of Hope: The Silver Age of the Italian Jews, 1924–1974* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983); on the Netherlands: S.J. Wijnberg, *De Joden in Amsterdam* (Assen, 1967); Ph. van Praag, *Demography of the Jews in the Netherlands* (Jerusalem, 1976); on Spain: Haim Avni, *Spain, the Jews and Franco* (Philadelphia, 1982); Samuel Toledano, "La situation actuelle de la communauté juive d'Espagne," in *European Jewry: A Handbook*, ed. E. Stock (Ramat Gan, 1983), pp. 84–90; on the United Kingdom: Maurice Freedman, ed., *A Minority in Britain* (London, 1955); Shaul Esh and S.J. Gould, eds., *Jewish Life in Modern Britain* (London, 1964); S.L. Lipman and V.D. Lipman, eds., *Jewish Life in Britain 1962–1977* (New York, 1981). The AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK regularly publishes surveys of Jewish affairs in a number of EC countries. See also the respective country entries in the *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Jerusalem, 1971) and subsequent *Encyclopedia Judaica Yearbooks*.

[5]Two seminal symposia held in Brussels in the 1960s introduced the need for an integrated research perspective on European Jewry. The proceedings were published in Centre National des Hautes Etudes Juives, Brussels, and Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, *Jewish Life in Contemporary Europe* (Brussels, 1965); Willy Bok and U.O. Schmelz, eds., *Démographie et identité juives dans l'Europe contemporaine* (Brussels, 1972). Two more recent conferences were held, respectively, at the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies, on "Jewish Identities in the New Europe" (July 1992); and, organized by the Fonds Social Juif Unifié, on the premises of the French Senate-Palais du Luxembourg in Paris, on "1992—Les juifs dans l'Europe d'aujourd'hui et de demain" (Nov. 1992). The proceedings are due to appear in the near future. Selected portions of the present article were presented on these occasions. Among other writings introducing a comprehensive Western European Jewish perspective, see Cecil Roth, "The Jews of Western Europe," in *The Jews: Their History, Culture and Religion*, ed. L. Finkelstein (New York, 1960, 3rd ed.), pp. 250–86; Morris Ginsberg, "A Review of the European Jewish Communities Today and Some Questions for Tomorrow," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 6, no. 1, 1964, pp. 118–31; Arnold Mandel, "The Jews in Western Europe Today," AJYB 1967, vol. 68, pp. 3–28; Zachariah Shuster, "Western Europe," in *World Politics and the Jewish Condition*, ed. Louis Henkin (New York, 1972), pp. 181–206; Doris Bensimon, Sergio DellaPergola, Joel S. Fishman, and Fritz Hollander, "Western Europe," in *Zionism in Transition*, ed. M. Davis (New York, 1980), pp. 141–77. Two very useful and comprehensive works are Ernest Stock, ed., *European Jewry: A Handbook* (Ramat Gan, 1983); and Daniel J. Elazar, *People and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of World Jewry* (Detroit, 1989).

Jewish segment.[6] For another, the very nature of European Jewry—geographically dispersed and with extremely varied forms of communal organization—makes it difficult to collect, organize, and meaningfully analyze information.

Viewed broadly, the size, corporate profile, and cultural content of Jewish communities in Europe are the products of the deepening integration and assimilation of Jews in the surrounding social and cultural environment that has proceeded since emancipation. These processes have affected individuals' perceptions of themselves as Jews and the ways in which they express their Jewishness. As the boundaries of the Jewish collective have tended to become increasingly complex, sometimes blurred, or even inconsistent, new concepts have become part of the research vocabulary, such as the "core" versus the "enlarged" Jewish population. The former definition applies to the aggregate of those who consider themselves, or are willing to be considered, Jewish by any identificational criterion, and do not possess an incompatible alternative identification; the latter includes the larger aggregate of all current Jews, former Jews, other persons of recent Jewish descent, and any other related non-Jewish persons who share household ties with Jews.[7] Different definitions of the Jewish collective obviously result in different population counts, assessments of ongoing social trends, and evaluations of the future prospects of Jewish communities.

Another complicating factor is immigration. Since the end of 1989, the volume of Jewish international migration, especially from the former Soviet Union, has again reached historic peak levels—an unmistakable sign of the ongoing European continental crisis. This additional factor overlaps with the question of how significant the EC-12's geographical boundaries actually are. Is it really relevant, from the point of view of assessing contemporary and future trends, to address a Jewish collective that is limited to the EC member countries? Or is a broader geographical definition preferable, one that includes other Central and Eastern European countries? The broader framework is surely relevant, since the bonds and commonalities in the Jewish experience transcend the narrower institutional definition of a European Community which is itself bound to change in the course of time. Yet, if the goal is a pragmatic assessment of society, the existing institutional context cannot be ignored, since in the end it is the one that determines the actual constraints and opportunities of Jewish life.

---

[6]Federico Chabod, *Storia dell'idea d'Europa* (Bari, 1964); Robert T. Anderson, *Modern Europe: An Anthropological Perspective* (Pacific Palisades, 1973); Luigi Barzini, *The Europeans* (New York and London, 1982); H. Seton-Watson, "What Is Europe, Where Is Europe?" *Encounter*, July-Aug. 1985, pp. 9–17; William Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe* (London, 1990).

[7]These concepts are discussed in greater detail in U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 1990," AJYB 1992, vol. 92, pp. 484–512.

One further major difficulty in organizing a coherent analysis derives from a chronic lack of data sources on many important aspects of Jewish life in Western Europe, and the fragmentary and inconsistent nature of the sources that are available. Before World War II, official censuses and reports of vital statistics in some EC countries provided information on the respective Jewish populations. In the postwar period, such information has become extremely rare.

Under these circumstances, the bulk of documentation on EC Jews in recent years has been provided by sources internal to the Jewish communities.[8] One tool is the routine compilation of vital statistics (marriages and divorces, male births, and burials) and the analysis of membership registers in synagogues and other Jewish institutions. Such efforts have been successfully implemented in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and to a limited extent in Belgium, Greece, and a few more places. More significantly, special surveys of representative samples of the Jewish population were undertaken in certain countries or localities—in France, Italy, Denmark, and in selected locales of the United Kingdom. Over the years, the latter efforts have provided integrated views of the demographic, socioeconomic, and Jewish behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of the surveyed Jews. Moreover, repeated international surveys of Jewish education conducted in the 1980s have provided quite a detailed and accurate picture of this significant aspect of Jewish life.[9]

Unfortunately, limited coordination between these efforts makes it difficult to provide systematic comparisons and syntheses. Nor has there been any serious attempt to update the information collected in the past on a European scale. Yet the need for a systematic approach is greater now than ever, in the context of the EC integration process under way and in light of emerging social developments. Ideally, a European Jewish Population and Community Survey would be an instrument for assessing the different communities within the EC-12, based on a common set of definitions and research agenda. But this would require a far more coordinated Jewish organizational structure than that which exists at present within the European Community.

---

[8]For inventories of sociodemographic sources, see Sergio DellaPergola, "Recent Demographic Trends Among Jews in Western Europe," in Stock, *European Jewry: A Handbook*, pp. 19–62; Sergio DellaPergola and Leah Cohen, eds., *World Jewish Population: Trends and Policies* (Jerusalem, 1992), pp. 154–56.

[9]See below in the section on Jewish education.

Jewish Community Organization in the EC

Just as the main frame of reference of collective life in Europe has long been the nation-state, the form taken by Jewish life in each country has been shaped along lines that reflect the different character of the various nations. In the modern period, the standing of the Jews vis-à-vis the majority society and institutions has typically been that of a religious group. The alternative possibility of definition as an ethnic-national group was not conceivable, given the ethnocentric and culturally homogeneous character of most nation-states. In the French tradition, which exerted strong influence throughout the continent, Jews were indeed granted equal civil rights as individuals, not as a corporate group. Consequently, the development of organizations to represent Jews before the general polity reflected a balance between the basic needs of Jewish communities and the somewhat limited ways in which the majority was able to conceive of the Jewish presence.[10]

The three major types of concern reflected by Jewish community organization can be defined as political representation, religious functioning, and the provision of social and educational services. In a more distant past, individual Jews or small groups sought to carry out these functions on the basis of their own special standing and influence with public authorities. In the course of modernization, the character of Jewish community organization tended to become less personal and elitist, with a more democratically selected leadership to some extent replacing charisma and color. Based on the circumstances in each country and community, slightly different forms of community organization evolved for dealing with the three major areas of communal concern (see table 1).

In France, the main religious organization, the Consistoire, long served as the central Jewish representative body. However, needs emerging in the social sphere, notably in connection with the absorption of Jewish refugees and other immigrants, led to the emergence of a powerful central lay community organization, the Fonds Social Juif Unifié (FSJU). At a later stage, the need to provide unified representation to all of the major Jewish organizations—often representing quite different constituencies and interests within the same Jewish community—led to the creation of a central roof political organization, the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France (CRIF). With different degrees of complexity, these major functional divisions exist in Belgium, the Netherlands (which lacks a central Jewish political representative organization), and Germany (where there is no central Jewish religious body).

The major alternative model is that of the central, all-inclusive represent-

[10]For more detailed discussion of the topics in this section, see Stock, *European Jewry: A Handbook,* and Elazar, *People and Polity*.

ative body, such as the Board of Deputies of British Jews. In this case, even if the major functions are technically split among different organizations, the main entity plays a pivotal role in all or most areas of Jewish life. The central representative organization is usually elected by, or composed of delegates from, local Jewish communities and institutions. Variations of the centralized Jewish community model exist in Italy and Spain (where the emphasis of the central body is on political representation), Greece, Ireland, and Denmark (actually the Jewish community of Copenhagen where most Jews live). Small communities that lack the scale to develop more than one function, such as Luxembourg or Portugal, have only a religious body.

With regard to both major models, the "centralist" and the "pluralist," an important distinction exists between activities of national and local scope. Where the main purpose of the unified central representative body is political, religious and service activities are usually the province of local Jewish communities. Where several central organizations coexist nationally, they may maintain branches at the local level.

Another important area of Jewish community activity is all that concerns the State of Israel, the Zionist movement, and the many related fund-raising bodies. Other organized activities within the Jewish community address culture, recreation, and the representation of specific sectorial interests. All or several of these options operate in one form or another in the various EC communities. The result is a rich and complex patchwork of national and local institutions, of either broad or limited purpose.

The core of leadership and the main activists involved in these different groups often overlap significantly, while a large share of the Jewish public may not be involved at all. Indeed, the proportion of fee-paying members of a community varies substantially.[11] In Italy, where until 1984 paid membership in a Jewish community was compulsory under state law, the proportion formally affiliated may be above 90 percent. In the United Kingdom, in 1990, probably as many as 70 percent of the Jewish households were synagogue members. In France, the overall rate of belonging to any Jewish organization probably approaches 40 percent; in a 1988 survey, 22 percent of the respondents were frequent participants in Jewish community activities, 29 percent participated rarely, and 48 percent never or nearly never attended.[12]

The major problem of Jewish community organization in the 12 EC countries is the remarkable lack of coordination, the fact that there is no

[11]See DellaPergola, *Anatomia*; Doris Bensimon and Sergio DellaPergola, *La population juive de France: socio-démographie et identité* (Jerusalem-Paris, 1984); Marlena Schmool and Frances Cohen, *British Synagogue Membership in 1990* (London, 1991).

[12]Erik H. Cohen, *L'Etude et l'éducation juive en France ou l'avenir d'une communauté* (Paris, 1991).

central representative organization of the Jews of the 12 EC countries. There are several significant Jewish organizations operating at the continental level, such as the European Jewish Congress, the European Council of Jewish Community Services, and the Conference of European Rabbis. But in each of these instances, "Europe" is understood in the broader and, we would argue, somewhat anachronistic perspective extending from Lisbon to Vladivostock, rather than in the restricted and operative EC-12 definition. It is one thing to foster a sense of solidarity and interchange among Jewish communities continentally, or for that matter, globally; it is another to be able to conduct focused activity, such as lobbying, at the level of the central EC institutions in Brussels, Luxembourg, or Strasbourg, and to be regarded by those official European institutions as their functional Jewish counterpart. Failure to provide coordinated planning and representation of the different Jewish communities in a clearly delimited EC framework could seriously hinder the ability to defend or promote Jewish interests in a rapidly changing environment.

Demographic Trends, 1939–1991

Both the size of the Jewish population throughout the territory of the current European Community and its geographic distribution have been shaped by a complex of factors, some imposed from the outside by the majority society, others reflecting internal conditions and needs of the Jewish community.[13] Political, economic, and cultural forces determined quite different and changing rates of demographic growth among Jewish populations across the various regions and provinces of Europe, within the EC and outside of it. Over time, most communities, countrywide and locally, experienced alternating periods of sustained growth and sudden collapse, due to large-scale in- or out-migration or actual physical destruction. A high degree of geographic mobility also influenced the changing size and distribution of Jewries in Europe, as did differing intensities of demographic patterns such as marriage, fertility, mortality, and natural increase. Secessions from, or accessions to, Jewish communities on religious or ideological

[13]The demographic data in this section are adapted from Jacob Lestschinsky, "Die Umsiedlung und Umschichtung des judischen Volkes im laufe des letzten Jahrhunderts" *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* 30 (1929), pp. 123–56, and 32 (1930), pp. 563–99; Moses Moskowitz, "Distribution of the Jewish Population on the European Continent," AJYB 1941–42, vol. 43, pp. 662–73; U.O. Schmelz, *World Jewish Population: Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem, 1981); Sergio DellaPergola, "Changing Patterns of Jewish Demography in the Modern World," *Studia Rosenthaliana* (special issue) 23, no. 2, 1989, pp. 154–74; and U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population," appearing each year in AJYB since vol. 82, 1982. The latest update is "World Jewish Population 1991," AJYB 1993, vol. 93.

grounds were yet another component of Jewish population change, generally resulting in net losses to the Jewish side.

HISTORICAL TRENDS

In comparison with the total European population, European Jewry experienced a much earlier pace of rapid growth. From an estimated 719,000 Jews in 1700, the total of Jews in Europe (Western and Eastern together) rose dramatically to 2,020,000 in 1800, 8,766,000 in 1900, and 9,500,000 in 1939. Between 1700 and 1939 the Jewish population multiplied by a factor of above 13, while the total population of the continent passed from 125 million in 1700 to 575 million in 1939—a growth factor of 4.6. As a consequence of its early and powerful demographic "takeoff," European Jewry increased its numerical and cultural dominance over other sections of the Diaspora. By 1860, European Jewry's share of the world's total Jewish population approached 90 percent. Continuing intense Jewish population growth in Eastern Europe and the buildup of strong social pressures there ultimately led to mass emigration, which played a crucial role in the formation of major new Jewish centers in America and other extra-European countries, and also produced some growth in Western European Jewries.

Quite a different picture emerges when one tries to reconstruct the historical demography of the Jewries in what today are the 12 EC countries. It can be roughly estimated that the total Jewish population in EC countries increased from some 180,000 in 1700 to 1.3 million in 1939, a factor of 7.2. In addition to the immigration from Eastern Europe mentioned above, a continuous though small trickle of Jewish immigrants arrived from various parts of the Mediterranean area. However, the share of total world Jewry held by Jewish communities in the EC area declined steadily over the same period, from more than 16 percent to less than 8 percent. At this stage, when the Jewish population of Western Europe had already reached slower demographic growth and was headed toward stagnation, the Holocaust resulted in irreversible losses. Beyond the direct consequences of physical destruction, other demographic effects of the Holocaust included emigration, conversion from Judaism, and the scanty numbers of the generation born during the war. Because of the consequent rapid aging and the additional effects of assimilation, current Jewish population estimates are, and are bound to remain, substantially lower than on the eve of World War II. In 1945, an estimated 843,000 Jews lived in the present EC countries, representing about 7.8 percent of world Jewry (see table 2). The overall trend has since been one of moderate increase, the total estimate for EC Jewry in 1991 being 987,000 persons, still only 7.6 percent of the world's Jewish population.

Over time, significant changes occurred in the geographic distribution of Jews in Europe, and more specifically within the present EC. Looking at the changing size of Jewish communities over the last two or three centuries according to present-day political boundaries, three basic profiles emerge: (a) substantial growth and then dramatic decline, as happened in most Eastern European and Balkan countries as well as in Western European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Austria; (b) growth in more recent generations and then stabilization, as in the United Kingdom and France; and (c) relative stability in the long run, as in the case of Italy and smaller communities such as Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, and Spain.

PRESENT-DAY JEWISH COMMUNITIES

In the perspective provided by contemporary events, four major groups of European Jewish communities may be singled out: the 12 EC member countries, other non-EC-member countries in Western Europe, the new independent republics which until 1991 formed part of the Soviet Union, and other countries in Eastern Europe. For most of the historical span considered here, Eastern European Jewish communities were clearly preponderant. After World War II the demographic center of gravity of European Jewry moved westward.

At the end of 1991, the total Jewish population of Europe was estimated at 2,010,000, or 2.6 per 1,000 total inhabitants of the continent. Roughly one million Jews lived in the 12 EC countries, less than 900,000 remained in the seven European countries of the former USSR, and smaller numbers were found elsewhere—44,000 in Western Europe outside the EC, and 111,000 in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The recent emigration from the former USSR is leading to a rapid decline of the Jewish population in that region. Most of the emigrants are headed to Israel or to the United States and other overseas countries, but Germany is drawing its share, providing some demographic reinforcement to the Jewish population in that country and in the EC more generally. Significantly, since the exodus from the former USSR that began in the early 1990s, and for the first time in modern history, more Jews can be found in Western than in Eastern Europe.

As to the internal distribution of Jewish population within the EC itself, before World War II it was much more equally spread across different countries than it is today. After the initial decline of German Jewry through large-scale emigration, already by the late 1930s the United Kingdom had the largest Jewish population of any EC country. This held true until the early 1960s when, following the decolonization of North Africa, the mass immigration of close to 250,000 Jews gave to France its new standing as flag

bearer of the Jewish presence in Western Europe. Since the late 1960s, the size of French Jewry (referring to the "core" Jewish population) can be realistically estimated at about 530,000, a figure that has remained quite stable until now.[14] Higher figures that have been circulated periodically may refer to the enlarged Jewish population of Jews, ex-Jews, and non-Jewish household members, but certainly appear to be inconsistent with the known historical development of the Jewish population.

By contrast, the United Kingdom has traditionally been a country with substantial emigration, and that has included several thousands of Jews. Based on a recent reconsideration of the vital statistics regularly collected by the Jewish community, the estimate of the Jewish population of the United Kingdom was reassessed downward to about 300,000, and in all likelihood will continue to decline in the near future.[15]

The third largest Jewish population in the EC has now become Germany, which after World War II was reduced to a scant and heterogeneous community of elderly German Jews, displaced persons from other European countries, and former Israelis. According to the detailed records kept by the Zentralwohlfartsstelle der Juden in Deutschland—the central Jewish social service agency in the country—the Jewish population grew from 27,711 at the end of 1989 to 28,468 in 1990, 33,692 in 1991, and 37,498 at the end of 1992. While there is a lack of certainty about the number of recent immigrants from the former USSR, according to some reports, as many as 20,000 have settled in Germany since the end of 1989.[16] Allowing for some time lag between immigration and registering with the organized Jewish community, the Jewish population in Germany probably passed the 40,000 mark in 1990, and most likely reached a total of 50,000 by the end of 1992. Since many of these migrants appear to have ambivalent feelings about their Jewishness, German Jewry has yet to reach the standing of a consolidated community, such as the one that emerged in France soon after mass immigration, or the more established one in the United Kingdom or smaller communities such as those in Italy, the Netherlands, or Greece. Moreover, if we consider the nature of the interaction between majority society and

---

[14]Bensimon and DellaPergola, *La population juive de France*.

[15]Steven Haberman, Barry A. Kosmin, and Caren Levy, "Mortality Patterns of British Jews 1975–79: Insights and Applications for the Size and Structure of British Jewry," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, ser. A, 146, pt. 3, 1983, pp. 294–310; Steven Haberman and Marlena Schmool, *Estimates of British Jewish Population 1984–88* (London, forthcoming). The earlier revision suggested a central estimate of 336,000 for 1977; the latter brings the estimate down to 308,000 in 1986; hence 300,000 or less at present.

[16]E.g., Judith Winkler in the Israeli daily *Ha'aretz*, Feb. 23, 1993, reports first data from a survey of Jewish immigrants to Germany from the former USSR. The survey was done by the Mendelsohn Center for Judaic Studies of the University of Potsdam and Germany's central Jewish community organization.

Jewish minority—one of the more sensitive factors in the growth or decline of a Jewish community—any judgments about the long-term prospects of a Jewish community in Germany are better left suspended.

Reflecting the interplay of different demographic variables, Jewish population growth rates in EC countries have tended to be generally negative or only marginally positive (table 3). The main exception, apart from postwar France and current Germany, is Spain, which has attracted immigration from various sources, including Latin America. With the exception of France and Spain, the number of Jews per 1,000 inhabitants of each country—and hence their visibility in the broader society—is now much less than it was in 1939. Of all the geographic, political, and socioeconomic factors that help to explain the differences between individual countries, the variable effect of the Holocaust is by far the strongest. Between 1939 and 1945, seven EC countries lost significant portions of their Jewish populations: Greece, 89 percent; Germany, 78 percent; the Netherlands, 77 percent; Belgium (with Luxembourg), 66 percent; France, 44 percent; Italy, 38 percent. (The remaining five EC countries—Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom—had postwar Jewish populations that were the same or larger than before the war.) Here indeed is a melancholy reminder of a tragic chapter in the rich, creative, and often happy history of the Jews in modern Europe.

Recent Geographic Distribution: Patterns and Significance

To gain deeper insight into the present as well as possible future changes, we need to understand the determinants and consequences of Jewish population distribution in individual countries as well as in smaller geographic divisions. We have already mentioned the differential effects of the Holocaust in determining the size of current Jewish populations. It is also important to assess the forces of attraction and repulsion that generate voluntary population movements to and from given regions and cities. A further critical element is the ability of a population to reproduce itself demographically, which, in the case of Jewish communities, may be affected by changing patterns of group identification no less than by the biological facts of birth and death.

In the more distant past, the Jewish presence in a given country, both nationally and locally, was related only in part to a set of rational socioeconomic factors; more often it reflected the willingness or unwillingness of the ruling powers to provide the Jews with the legal and economic conditions required for survival. For the more recent period, European countries and their respective Jewish populations have to be seen as components in a broader, global socioeconomic and political system. The balance of forces

operating in such a system tends to attract people toward the "center" of the more developed and stable countries, and away from the "periphery" of the less developed and more unstable nations. Jews, unless political barriers prevented them from doing so, have tended to respond rationally to these forces of push and pull. Indeed, at the world level, the size of Jewish populations in the various countries and their proportion in the total population in those countries tend to be highly and positively correlated with major indicators of socioeconomic development, industrialization, and political freedom.[17]

In the contemporary world, socioeconomic modernization and affluence in a given country have been, more often than not, positively associated with liberal public attitudes that permit Jews to conduct a relatively autonomous communal life. In the post-World War II period, EC countries generally offered both political freedom and affluence, conditions that attracted substantial immigration from other parts of the world. The fact that there are today more Jews in France than in the United Kingdom indicates that the former offered relatively better economic opportunities and therefore was able not only to attract more Jews but to hold on to more of those already there. The major exception to this schematic view of the relationship between Jewish population size and a country's socioeconomic attractiveness is represented by the relatively scarce numbers in Germany, the strongest economic partner in the EC. While the obvious explanation rests with the historical factors already outlined, it is also the case that the Jewish population in Germany is indeed currently growing, fed by immigration from the former Soviet Union.

FACTORS RELATED TO JEWISH PRESENCE

A country-by-country examination of European Jewry illustrates even more clearly the relationship between the Jewish presence and general socioeconomic and sociocultural conditions at the local level. Table 4 presents the detailed distribution of total and Jewish populations (as of 1990) in the 69 main regions into which the 12 EC countries are customarily subdivided.[18] The same table also shows the proportion of Jews per 1,000

[17]Sergio DellaPergola, "Israel and World Jewish Population: A Core-Periphery Perspective," in *Population and Social Change in Israel*, ed. C. Goldscheider (Boulder, 1992), pp. 39–63.

[18]Estimates were prepared on the basis of continuous data collection by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Questionnaires sent periodically to the central Jewish representative organizations in each country yield, among other things, data and estimates on regional Jewish population distribution. The estimates reported here are our adaptation of the original estimates received. Besides sources already quoted in notes 4, 11, 12, and 13, see Dov

inhabitants in each region, and the region's economic status as expressed by Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) per inhabitant, a measure of standard of living. (The PPS consists of the Gross Domestic Product adjusted for market prices.) Table 5 presents a synthetic analysis of the same data, making it possible to compare the distribution of Jewish and general population in five regional strata, based on the economic status of the regions.

The fact that each stratum includes a substantial share of the EC's total population, varying between 13.5 percent and 27.2 percent, indicates that general population size is not clearly correlated with socioeconomic indicators. By contrast, the Jewish population appears to be overwhelmingly concentrated in the upper regional stratum. Around 1990, over 59 percent of the EC-12's total Jewish population resided in the 14 regions of the top stratum; the next two strata of regions each had 19 percent of the Jewish population; and the two bottom strata of regions together accounted for only 2 percent. Accordingly, the proportion of Jews per 1,000 of total population declines from nearly 8 in the upper stratum, to 2–3 in the next two strata, and to 0.2 in the lower two strata.

Further examination of the data in table 4 reveals that even in the 14 European regions included in the top stratum, based on standard of living, there are quite different proportions of Jews per 1,000 inhabitants. The intensity of the Jewish presence is definitely above average in three regions: Greater Paris (310,000 Jews, or 30 per 1,000 population); the United Kingdom's South-East, which includes Greater London (232,000 Jews, or 13 per 1,000); and Greater Brussels (15,000 Jews, or 15 per 1,000). Each of these metropolitan areas is a major world or continental capital whose area of influence transcends the boundaries of a single country. A moderate Jewish presence (1–3 per 1,000 inhabitants) exists in six more regions in the top stratum: Berlin, Hamburg, Hessen (main city: Frankfurt), Denmark (Copenhagen), Lombardy (Milan), and Luxembourg. Again, each of these is a national or regional capital with wide international connections. The five remaining regions in the top stratum have low proportions of Jews (less than 1 per 1,000): Noord (Groningen) in the Netherlands, Bremen and Baden-Württenberg (Stuttgart) in Germany, and Nord-Ovest (Turin) and Emilia-Romagna (Bologna) in Italy. The slight Jewish presence in these latter regions, despite their being among the higher-ranked in living standards, is probably explained by the comparatively less complex and sophisticated socioeconomic and cultural facilities they offer. However, the rela-

---

Liebermann, "Report on the Jewish Community in Belgium," a paper presented at the Conference on Jewish Demography (Jerusalem, 1987); Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland, *Vierteljahresmeldung uber den Mitgliederstand* (Frankfurt, quarterly); Stanley Waterman and Barry Kosmin, *British Jewry in the Eighties: A Statistical and Geographical Guide* (London, 1986).

tively high standard of living available in these areas may well attract larger numbers of Jews in the future.

While the pull of socioeconomic factors is clearly strong, historical inertia, or the continued presence of a Jewish community in a certain locale, also plays an important role in determining current Jewish population distribution. Relatively large Jewish communities exist in regions whose current socioeconomic situation is just moderately attractive but which had a thriving Jewish life in the past. In the second highest stratum of European regions, six have Jewish populations of 10,000 each and represent at least 2 per 1,000 of the total population: the West (main city: Amsterdam) in the Netherlands, Lazio (Rome) in Italy, Vlaams Gewest (Antwerp) in Belgium, and the Centre-Est (Lyons), Est (Strasbourg), and Sud-Ouest (Toulouse) in France.

In the third stratum of regions, the same conditions of Jewish population size-density are met by four regions: the Mediterranée (Marseilles) in France and the United Kingdom's Scotland (Glasgow), North-West (Manchester), and Yorkshire (Leeds). The same size-density conditions are not met by any region in the two lowest regional strata. Indeed, the scant Jewish presence in some of the more economically depressed regions in the EC, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Southern and Insular Italy, Ireland, and the states of former East Germany, supports the general interpretation suggested here.

A further significant feature of Jewish population distribution, shown in table 6, is its overwhelmingly urban concentration. More than half a million Jews (525,000 people, or 53 percent of the total EC Jewry) were estimated in 1990 to live in the two metropolitan areas of Greater Paris and Greater London. In the Paris area, out of a total estimate of 310,000 Jews, about 145,000 lived in the City of Paris, 113,000 in the closer suburban belt (*Petite couronne*), and 52,000 in the more distant suburban belt (*Grande couronne*). In the London area, where overall the Jewish population presented a denser ecological concentration, out of a total estimate of 215,000 Jews, 72,000 lived in the Inner Boroughs and 125,000 in the Outer Boroughs of Greater London, and 18,000 in the more peripheral adjacent Home Counties. Another 258,800 Jews (26 percent of the EC total) lived in 13 cities with 10,000 to 50,000 Jews each; and 131,900 Jews (13 percent) lived in 47 cities with 1,000 to 10,000 Jews. Overall, about 92 percent of all EC Jews lived in cities with an estimated presence of 1,000 Jews or more.

A more sophisticated analysis of the same data, employing multivariate statistical techniques (not presented here in detail), shows that two variables are most prominently associated with the regional distribution of Jews in the EC: the status of a place as a country's capital city and the standard of living. These two variables alone explain about one-third of the statistical

variance in Jewish population distribution. This pattern can be better understood by considering the correlation that exists between the general social profile of more developed European regions and the social structure of Jewish populations. On the general side, there is a strong association between a higher standard of living and high population density (as appropriate to large urban areas), the variety of economic activities with an emphasis on services (as contrasted to agriculture and industry), and the quality of available educational, research, and cultural facilities.[19] This major cluster of socioeconomic elements at the regional level fits well with typical socioeconomic characteristics of Jews: high educational attainment and growing specialization in professional and managerial activities (see below).

Even if the correlation between the Jewish presence and the existence of attractive socioeconomic conditions in European regions should be considered with a grain of caution, there can be no doubt that these findings display high internal consistency. The same findings also hint at future trends and adjustments, especially if the process of economic and political integration within the EC continues. The greatly enhanced freedom of travel and employment for EC citizens across country borders, as well as internal migration within countries, will quite probably lead to an increasing correspondence between what a certain place or region can offer, economically and culturally, and the willingness of people to live in such a place. This is the general trend likely to affect the total EC population in the longer run, and there is no reason to believe that EC Jews will not be among those taking advantage of the new opportunities.

Socioeconomic Structure and Mobility

The pattern of Jewish population distribution within the EC that we have just examined reflects the considerable similarities in socioeconomic stratification found in most Jewish populations. Available data on the socioeconomic characteristics of Jews are quite fragmentary, but those that exist show a high degree of consistency. One common trait of nearly all Jewish communities on record is the higher level of education attained by Jews in comparison with the general population. Historically, the trend leads from a relative lack of illiteracy in earlier periods to a significant overrepresentation of university graduates and postgraduates in the present. Today it can be safely assumed that substantially more than one-half of the younger Jewish adult generation is exposed to university education. In other words, while levels of educational attainment have risen among both Jews and

[19]Roger Brunet, ed., *Les villes "européennes"* (Paris, 1989).

non-Jews, the relative gap between the two groups has not tended to disappear.[20]

OCCUPATIONAL PROFILES

Equally significant transformations occurred in the occupational structure and socioeconomic status of the Jewish labor force. Generally speaking, the constraints and—less often—opportunities typical of minority status produced quite similar occupational profiles among Jews in the different EC countries. However, occupational stratification of Jews also reflected particular national economic circumstances. International migration played an important role as well. The occupational structures and mobility paths of the foreign-born and local-born differed, with the foreign-born paying a social price in the process of becoming absorbed in the new country and experiencing, at least initially, a loss of social status. Depending on the general societal circumstances and on the characteristics of the migrants themselves, the latter often eventually recovered some or most of their former status or even improved on it. The local-born had the advantage of beginning their occupational lives in the environment in which they had been socialized, and under normal conditions could expect to improve their socioeconomic standing over that of their immigrant parents.

Between the two world wars, Central and Eastern Europe were the main suppliers of immigrants to Jewish communities in today's EC. After World War II, the immigration of Jews from former colonies in North Africa and elsewhere had the greatest impact and significance. On the largest scale this involved the Jews of the three former French colonies in the Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria) during the 1950s and 1960s. Further examples are the transfers of thousands of Jews from Iraq and India to the United Kingdom in the late 1940s and early 1950s, from Egypt to Italy, France, and to a lesser extent to other countries in the 1950s, from Libya to Italy in the 1960s, and from Iran to Italy in the late 1970s. Still, even with this substantial immigration, the majority of the Jewish population in EC countries is now local-born.

FRANCE

Before looking at the social-mobility trends among Jews in France, it is important to recall that the mass exodus from North Africa involved a split between those choosing France as the preferred country of destination and those choosing Israel. The choice was generally determined by the citizen-

[20]Sergio DellaPergola, *La trasformazione demografica della diaspora ebraica* (Torino, 1983).

ship held by North African Jews at the time of decolonization. The overwhelming majority of Algerian Jews, who were French citizens, went to France, while most Moroccan Jews and a majority of Tunisian Jews, who were not, went to Israel. In the process, most of the Jewish upper socioeconomic strata from the three Maghreb communities settled in France, while immigrants to Israel were mostly members of the lower-middle and lower classes.[21]

French Jewry has undergone over the last three generations a thorough socioeconomic metamorphosis,[22] in which the selective character of immigration has figured significantly. The general occupational trend of Jews in France and—as far as the data allow us to ascertain—elsewhere in the EC as well, has been movement away from production and commerce, concentration in the professions and management, and low participation in agriculture, heavy industry, personal services, and public administration. The French case study shows conformity with these trends, though the presence of Jews in public administration is or at least was, until the late 1970s, far higher in France than elsewhere, since many Jews were employed in civil service in the French colonial regime. An interesting consequence for the socioeconomic structure of French Jews after the massive "repatriation" of the early 1960s was that those who were entitled to French government help with tenured jobs and public housing were initially dispersed more widely throughout France and throughout the Greater Paris metropolitan area than those who resettled on their own or with the help of the Jewish community.

Table 7 provides a unique survey of the occupational transformations of French Jewry from the interwar period until 1988. Retrospective data from the 1970s allow a reconstruction of the characteristics of the fathers of contemporary Jewish heads of households, of the foreign-born Jewish labor force on the eve of emigration, and of the current labor force during the 1960s and 1970s. A survey conducted in 1988 provides updated information about the current social characteristics of French Jewry. Fathers of those who were heads of households in the 1970s presumably were economically active during the 1930s. The proportion of "upper cadres"—the French term for higher-status professionals and managers—increased from 9 percent of the fathers of Jewish heads of households living in the Greater Paris area, to 19 percent of the Jewish labor force in the 1960s, and 26 percent

[21]Sergio DellaPergola, "Aliya and Other Jewish Migrations: Toward an Integrated Perspective," in *Studies in the Population of Israel in Honor of Roberto Bachi*, ed. U.O. Schmelz and Gad Nathan (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 172–209; see also Nancy L. Green, "Jewish Migrations to France in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Community or Communities?" *Studia Rosenthaliana* (special issue) 23, no. 2, 1989, pp. 135–53.

[22]The following analysis is based on Bensimon and DellaPergola, *La population juive*, and Cohen, *L'Etude et l'éducation juive*.

in the 1970s. It was somewhat lower (15 percent) in French provincial cities in the 1970s where, because of the just mentioned repatriation patterns, one finds a much higher share of "middle cadre" and clerical positions among Jews. In 1988, the proportion of Jewish "upper cadres" was estimated at about 42 percent nationally. Over the period considered here, the proportion of "middle cadres" was fairly stable, around 15–20 percent of the Jewish labor force, while the share of traders and craftsmen declined sharply from 65 percent of the fathers of Jewish heads of households surveyed in the 1970s down to 28 percent of Jews employed in 1988. The blue-collar segment of the Jewish labor force was already small during the interwar period, and remained fairly stable at around or less than 10 percent until the end of the 1970s. From the 1988 data it appears to have declined to less than 2 percent. These data contrast markedly with the general distribution of the total urban French population, which includes lower percentages of "upper cadres" and traders and a substantially higher share of workers in industry and services.

OTHER COUNTRIES

A similar picture emerges from the admittedly scattered data available on the occupational and social-class status of British Jews.[23] Comparisons of different urban and suburban communities, and of different generations within the contemporary Jewish population, indicate an overwhelming predominance of middle-class, professional, technical, and skilled occupations. The upward social mobility of the younger, suburban Jewish population is largely a function of the national expansion of education and training and the increasing diversity of work opportunities in the liberal professions in the United Kingdom. Few Jews can now be found in the traditional working-class occupations, such as the sweated labor in the clothing industry with which immigrant Jews of the London's East End were associated at the beginning of the century.

In countries of the EC with smaller Jewish populations, Jews are less visible in the national socioeconomic context and also have fewer opportunities for occupational differentiation. One of the consequences is a slower pace of social mobility and relatively greater participation in traditional Jewish trades. Even one or two centuries after moving out of the ghetto, there is a strong relationship between occupation, place of residence, and individual behavior. Jewish social interaction tends to be stronger among people who are employed in traditional Jewish economic activities.

One example is Amsterdam, where, during the late 1960s, 47 percent of

[23]See Waterman and Kosmin, *British Jewry in the Eighties*.

employed Jews were in occupations that could be termed traditionally Jewish—29 percent in textiles, 9 percent in diamonds, and 9 percent in intellectual professions. These persons displayed more distinctively Jewish behaviors than those found in other types of occupations.[24] There are also examples of significant social-structural differences between Jewish communities within the same country. In Belgium, there is a striking contrast between Antwerp, where the diamond industry has long constituted a prominent enclave of traditional Jewish craftsmanship, and Brussels, the capital city, a more modern environment, where Jews are employed in managerial and professional positions in the bureaucratic economy.[25]

A similar situation exists in Italy, though with reversed roles between cities.[26] In Rome, the capital city, a background of late emancipation from the ghetto has left visible signs of a poorer Jewish economy, long based on peddling and small-scale trade. Although the recent tendency is to move into more ambitious commercial activity, the pace of entry into the professions still lags behind that of other communities. In Milan, a leading international commercial center, a Jewish community with a large immigrant component is heavily engaged in wholesale international trade. At the same time, there has been steady movement into the professions on the part of established Italian Jews and the second generation of immigrant families.

Overall, one can see throughout the EC the meeting of traditional Jewish occupational specialization and know-how in industry, finance, and the professions, based on long experience in the economic life of the Diaspora, with the unique options and opportunities offered by the economy in each specific locale. In the course of time, some trade-off may have occurred between increased occupational prestige and the somewhat diminished prominence of Jewish entrepreneurs. If true, this may have quite mixed consequences for Jewish philanthropy in the long run. In any event, avenues for mobility are greater in the larger and more powerful centers of the world economy than in smaller, more provincial or peripheral localities, and it is in the former that the vast majority of EC Jews reside.

Family Processes and Their Demographic Consequences

To explain the changes that have occurred in the demography of the Jewish family over time, some background on the social characteristics of European Jews will be helpful. One of the main features of European Jewish

[24]See Wijnberg, *De Joden in Amsterdam*.

[25]See Liebermann, "Report."

[26]See DellaPergola and Sabatello, "The Italian Jewish Population Study"; Renato Mannheimer, "A Study of the Jewish Community of Milano," in *Papers in Jewish Demography 1989*, ed. U.O. Schmelz and S. DellaPergola (Jerusalem, forthcoming).

demographic trends in the past was the cleavage between east and west. Even though earlier modernization and declining mortality combined with immigration to promote the growth of Western European Jewries, Jewish population grew much faster in Eastern Europe. A common denominator in East and West Europe alike was the distinctively earlier Jewish transition from high to low mortality and fertility levels.[27] Explaining such uniqueness in the context of general demographic trends in Europe requires careful consideration of the Jewish cultural framework, namely, the particular interplay of community, family, and individual in sociodemographic behaviors. Such interaction at different times contributed to reducing morbidity and mortality risks, increased the chances for family formation and reduced the risks of family dissolution, and helped to spread the burdens of family growth. Residential segregation—by region, city, and neighborhood—enhanced the perpetuation of distinctive age-old Jewish demographic and cultural patterns. On the whole, these factors operated less intensively in Western than in Eastern Europe, resulting in less dramatic Jewish population increases.

MARRIAGE AND INTERMARRIAGE

Far removed from these patterns of the past, the Jewish population in the contemporary European Community faces a serious problem of demographic continuity. One leading trend, also present in other Diaspora settings, is the decline of the conventional Jewish family—being currently married, *and* to a Jewish spouse.[28] If the Jewish family of endogamous couple and children was once a cornerstone of corporate Jewish continuity, several relevant indicators point to a process of erosion. These are: a diminished propensity to marry, later marriage, more frequent divorce, less frequent remarriage, low marital fertility, high rate of mixed marriage, and the socialization as Jews of only a minority of the children born to mixed-married couples. Data from a variety of contemporary EC Jewish popula-

---

[27]See, on the Jewish side: Roberto Bachi, *Population Trends of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1976); U.O. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors," AJYB 1981, vol. 81, pp. 61–117; Sergio DellaPergola, "Major Demographic Trends of World Jewry: The Last Hundred Years," in *Genetic Diversity Among Jews: Diseases and Markers at the DNA Level*, ed. B. Bonne-Tamir and A. Adam (New York-Oxford, 1992), pp. 3–30; Barry A. Kosmin, "Nuptiality and Fertility of British Jewry 1850–1980: An Immigrant Transition?" in *Demography of Immigrants and Minority Groups in the United Kingdom*, ed. D.A. Coleman (London, 1982), pp. 245–61. On the general side: Michael W. Flinn, *The European Demographic System 1500–1820* (Brighton, 1981); Ansley J. Coale and Susan C. Watkins, eds., *The Decline of Fertility in Europe* (Princeton, 1986).

[28]These aspects are discussed in detail in Sergio DellaPergola, "Recent Trends in Jewish Marriage," in *World Jewish Population: Trends and Policies*, ed. S. DellaPergola and L. Cohen (Jerusalem, 1992), pp. 65–92.

tions indicate general marriage propensities ranging between 80 and 85 percent of a generation, of whom 10 to 15 percent may be currently divorced at prime reproductive ages, and a rate of outmarriage around or above 50 percent. This implies that considerably less than half the Jewish adults who are at the usual life-cycle stage of child-rearing (roughly ages 30 to 45) find themselves married to another Jew, a status that was once virtually universal.

Contemporary data on mixed marriage, by country, indicate a substantial variation in levels but a consistent pattern of increase. In Germany, the levels reported during the 1970s and 1980s were above 75 percent of the marriages; in Italy and the Netherlands above 50 percent; in France around 50 percent, but still with a significant differential between Jews of longtime European origin and recent immigrants from North Africa—the latter with lower levels but following the general trend toward heterogamy. Conversion in the context of marriage has been much less frequent in Europe than in America, probably because intermarriage generally occurs in a secular environment.

Data from France, Italy, and the Netherlands for the 1960s and 1970s consistently show that a majority of the children of mixed couples are not raised as Jews. Interestingly, in Italy and France, again unlike the trend prevailing in America, the more influential parent in the religious upbringing of a child of mixed marriage is the father. This may produce conflict between the traditional Jewish rules of matrilineal identity transmission and the subjective decisions and feelings in many households. Overall, however, intermarriage is a definite factor in the lowering of the "effectively" Jewish birthrate, which refers to only that part of the newborn generation raised as Jews.

FERTILITY; AGING

Jews in EC countries were among the first to experience an early drop in the birthrate. The data in table 8 illustrate the cases of three countries for which relatively accurate data are available: Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The patterns are similar, although the timing and intensity of the decline in each were quite different, especially as each national experience was differently affected by the Holocaust. In each instance, however, the Jewish birthrate eventually dropped considerably below that of the total population. In the more recent period, the latter too has declined to unprecedentedly low levels.[29]

The same trends are described for France through a reconstruction of the

[29]Commission des Communautés Européennes, Cellule de Prospective, *L'Europe dans le movement démographique* (Brussels, 1990).

Total Fertility Rates (TFR) of Jewish and total women over the last 60 years (table 9). The TFR measures the number of children that would be born under the age-specific fertility levels of the observed year. It is a better measure than the crude birthrate, since it is less affected by a population's age structure. Especially since the late 1960s, a marked drop occurred in the TFR among French Jews, and even more significantly, in the "effectively Jewish" fertility level. Among Jewish women in France and presumably most other EC countries, as early as the early 1970s, typical TFRs tended to range around an average of 1.5 children—or 40 percent less than among the French total population. The trend among the total population has since been one of continuing decline, which allows for the presumption that even if the Jewish TFR stabilized and did not continue to decline, it remained extremely low. Similar declining fertility patterns—albeit starting significantly later and somewhat attenuated—have also appeared among Jews who migrated to France in the course of the last few decades from the more traditional Jewish environments in North Africa.

Under contemporary conditions of low mortality, the level required for the replacement of a generation would be 2.1 children per woman. In other words, if—as seems likely—the fertility data for France represent the experience of other countries as well, the estimated average fertility of 1.5 children means that Jewish populations are now experiencing an intrinsic "demographic overdraft" of roughly 25–30 percent of the size of the present generation. This points inevitably to an older age distribution and a smaller population size in the next generation.

Low fertility is indeed a powerful determinant in the process of population aging now visible throughout the EC population in general, and more markedly among the Jews (table 10). Among the Jewish minority, as noted, the general effects of low fertility, combined with attrition in Jewish identification and intensifying intermarriage, are wearing away the younger segment of the age distribution. Table 10 demonstrates the trends and range of variation in age distribution among the Jewish populations in 10 of the 12 EC countries. Nearly without exception, the median age has been increasing, reflecting the declining proportion of Jewish children. Often, the percentage of the latter is lower than that of the elderly aged 65 and over.

Within this general picture, a few differentials are worth noting. The Jewish population in France is significantly younger than that in any other EC country, thanks to the relatively high birthrate that still prevailed in North Africa before the great wave of migration. But a projection of data from the 1970s up to 1990 indicates that aging is a universal trend among European Jews. The degree of aging in larger communities that have attracted immigration tends be somewhat lower than in smaller ones, which may have lost some of their younger adults to the larger centers. Jewish populations tend to be older in central cities than in suburban areas (in table

10, compare the urban Hackney and suburban Redbridge data within the Greater London area, or the central city and suburbs in Greater Paris). Finally, differences in age structure may reflect the different character of local Jewish communities. Such is the case in Belgium, where the more religious community in Antwerp is younger than the more secular one in Brussels.

The end product of the chain of sociocultural and demographic processes that produced an overaged Jewish population structure is an increasing crude death rate and a negative balance between the number of births and deaths (see table 8). One poignant example of this is contained in the vital statistics collected by the Community Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews.[30] The average annual excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births in the United Kingdom was 1,674 in 1975–79, 1,840 in 1980–84, 1,108 in 1985–89, and 1,519 in 1990. This corresponds to a Jewish population loss of nearly 25,000 over a period of 16 years, out of a Jewish population estimated at 330,000–350,000 in the mid-1970s and downwardly revised to 300,000 in 1991. While the situation in the UK is quite typical of most other Jewish communities across Europe, it is by no means the most extreme on record. Smaller communities in the EC, as shown by the German and Italian data in table 8, have been experiencing much sharper variations of the same trend.

Low fertility, assimilation, aging, and a negative balance of births and deaths have resulted in what appears to be an irreversible erosion of Jewish population across the EC. Jewish immigration from the crisis-stricken communities in Eastern Europe toward the more affluent and stable communities of the EC can be a palliative, but only as long as no significant reversals take place in the complex of social and demographic factors that determine Jewish population continuity. Jewish family processes within the EC have converged, anticipating to a large extent the current demographic profile of most European societies. Any interpretation of the present pattern and its implications for the future must take into account the transformation of norms, goals, and aspirations of contemporary young adults in the individualistic and secular context of postindustrial European society.[31] As things stand now, the weight of European Community Jewry in the global Jewish picture is clearly diminishing.

---

[30]The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community Research Unit, *Annual Report on Vital Statistics* (London, yearly); Marlena Schmool, "Synagogue Marriages in Britain in the 1980s," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 33, no. 2, 1991.

[31]Ron Lesthaeghe and Johan Surkyn, "Cultural Dynamics and Economic Theories of Fertility Change," *Population and Development Review* 14, no. 1, 1988, pp. 1–45; David A. Coleman, "European Demographic Systems of the Future: Convergence or Diversity?" *Conference Proceedings: Human Resources in Europe at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Luxembourg, 1992), pp. 137–79.

Aspects of Jewish Identification

As noted earlier, because Jewish identity in Western Europe was predominantly patterned along religious rather than ethnic lines,[32] Jews who were swept up in the extensive secularization of general European society found themselves without alternative avenues for the expression of their Jewishness. One exception was Israel, whose emergence as a state after 1948, and especially with the Six Day War of 1967, provided a powerful new magnet of attraction and a focus for mobilization within the Jewish communities—although, given the complex circumstances of the Middle East, Israel also came to represent a focus of internal dissent.

Based on the actual evidence about the patterns and intensity of Jewish practice and identification, one can describe EC Jewry as being largely secular, having only a minority of intensively practicing Jews, yet with a broad consensus about a necessary minimum of Jewish symbolic interaction. In the European context, this minimum seems to include three elements: interest in Israel—though not necessarily support; performing a Jewish ritual once a year—most likely attending some form of a seder on Passover; and having one's male children circumcised. Not conforming with this bare minimum means intentional self-exclusion from even the loosest definition of a Jewish community, though a residual sense of Jewish identity may take the form of a general interest in Jewish culture, something that is shared today by a significant public of non-Jews.

The whole range of intensity of behaviors and attitudes, from least to most intensive, obviously exists within the Jewish population. Along the intensity continuum one can distinguish three main divisions: a relatively small coherently Jewish subcommunity that remains to a large extent segregated from the majority of general society; a much larger community of those who conform or participate in Jewish communal life in selective ways; and a growing minority of assimilated or absentee Jews. The particular modes of operating and the relative sizes of these major types clearly vary across the different EC countries, but in general terms, this tentative typology seems to apply well to each of them.

SELECTED INDICATORS OF JEWISHNESS

Table 11 reports a selection of data on the frequency of some indicators of Jewishness in three EC countries. The data were compiled from different Jewish population surveys: in France, in the Greater Paris area during the 1970s and in the five major French provincial communities in 1978; in Italy,

[32]For a general assessment of the topic, see David Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization* (New York, 1978); Anthony D. Smith, "The Question of Jewish Identity," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* 8 (New York, 1992), pp. 219–33.

nationally in 1965 and in Milan in 1986; in the United Kingdom, in the Outer London suburb of Redbridge in 1978 and through a survey of the members of the mainstream Orthodox United Synagogue in 1991.[33] Although the data are not as systematic as one might wish, they reveal some significant patterns of similarity as well as variations between the different Jewish communities.

One main element of Jewish identification is the meaning given by the respondents to their attachment to Judaism. In France during the 1970s, this meaning was principally religious, consistent with the already noted European view of Judaism as a religion. Other more secular-ethnic modes of attachment, such as history, community, or the family, played a much smaller role in the Jewish identification of French Jews. A much higher frequency of religious identification in the French provinces than in the Greater Paris area reflects the relatively greater presence in the former of Jewish immigrants from North Africa, who espouse a more traditional view of Judaism. The second most frequently cited meaning of Judaism is a sense of "Jewishness"—something clearly experienced by respondents but neither clearly defined nor necessarily positive in terms of its content.

The Italian data for the 1980s point to a much more secular outlook; the family, Jewish history, and Israel emerge as the principal channels of individual Jewish identification. It is hard to say whether the difference between Jews in Milan in the 1980s and French Jews in the 1970s is due only to the different composition of the respective communities or whether a time effect is at work as well—in other words, that data on French Jews today would be closer to the Italian data reported here.

There is greater consistency between the several sets of data regarding the frequency of Jewish practices such as synagogue attendance, eating matzah on Passover, fasting on Yom Kippur, observing the Sabbath, and keeping kosher. Despite some geographic variation, the distribution of synagogue attendance is quite symmetric in each place, with a plurality attending only on the High Holy Days, festivals, and special family events (such as weddings or bar mitzvahs), and two relatively balanced minorities of people who attend either more often or virtually never. The proportion never attending synagogue appears to be higher in France than elsewhere.

Generally, Passover offers the occasion for the most participation in Jewish observance. Very high proportions of Jewish households (ranging between 79 and 91 percent in the various surveys) say they eat matzah;

---

[33]See, respectively, Bensimon and DellaPergola, *La population juive*; Cohen, *L'Etude et l'éducation juive*; Renato Mannheimer and Adriana Goldstaub, *Indagine demografico sociologico attitudinale sulla comunità di Milano* (unpublished manuscript; abstracts appeared in *Bollettino della Comunità Israelitica di Milano*, 1988); Barry A. Kosmin and Caren Levy, *Jewish Identity in an Anglo-Jewish Community* (London, 1983); Stanley Kalms, *A Time for Change: United Synagogue Review* (London, 1992).

however, the percentages of those who abstain from consuming leavened bread are significantly lower. Fasting on Yom Kippur tends to be observed by slightly fewer persons than those observing some Passover rituals (with the exception of the Redbridge sample). The levels of observance of the Sabbath and dietary laws are much lower, especially when the distinction is made between casual or occasional observance and strict compliance with Jewish laws and customs. Some Sabbath observance was more frequent in Redbridge (and by reasonable assumption elsewhere in the United Kingdom as well) than in France or Italy. With regard to Belgium, there are no direct data on religious observance; however, counts of the total seating capacity in synagogues and *shtiebels* (prayer rooms) in the 1980s provide one indirect indicator of the demand for Jewish religious facilities. In Antwerp and Brussels, which have Jewish populations of roughly the same size (see table 6), the situation was quite different, with about 9,500 places counted in the former community and about 4,000 in the latter.[34]

While the evidence indicates a significant decline in Jewish religious practice over the past, it also points to some revival among the younger age groups, albeit with some extreme forms of estrangement present as well. Religious practice appears to be strongly affected by the life-cycle stage of a person or household. The changing Jewish character of these stages might be informally described as "youthful enthusiasm," "young-adulthood decline" (in the context of other—mainly economic—cares), "child-rearing revival," and "old-age decline," as physical problems and isolation objectively limit the ability to take part in Jewish observance.

Jewish religious observance tends to decline with rising levels of educational attainment. One of the intervening factors here is the higher rate of mixed marriage that, at least in the past, occurred among better-educated Jews. There is some evidence that the frequency of outmarriage has now increased substantially among the lower social strata of the Jewish population, which in EC countries generally constitute a relatively small minority of the Jewish population. The poorer sections of the Jewish community may feel excluded from organized Jewish life, among other reasons because of the rather high costs entailed in Jewish community membership and participation. Another obstacle to wider Jewish participation is the somewhat elitist character of many programs aimed at deepening familiarity with Jewish culture. At the same time, it should be noted that mass mobilization of Jews did occur in Western Europe whenever Israel was in difficulty and a show of solidarity on the part of Diaspora Jewry was needed.[35]

---

[34]See Liebermann, "Report."

[35]Izhak Sergio Minerbi, Adolphe Steg, and Chaim Perelman, "Western Europe," in *The Yom Kippur War, Israel and the Jewish People*, ed. M. Davis (New York, 1974), pp. 183–218.

RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION

Another significant aspect of Jewish identification is that of religious denomination, which represents an interesting juncture between the individual's needs and preferences and what the Jewish communal structure offers. In this regard, EC communities differ strikingly from North American Jewry, with the Orthodox denomination having a relatively dominant share of the European Jewish public.[36] The counterparts of Conservative and Reform movements exist in some EC countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, but their share of the total Jewish population is comparatively small. No such congregations exist in Italy, Spain, or Greece.

A likely interpretation of this major difference between EC and American Jewries is that in American society, although it is formally secular, organized religion serves an important function as a primary, albeit nominal, channel both for individual identification and community organization.[37] Thus, changes in personal philosophy and attitudes, or even growing secularization, have not necessarily led to the decline of religious institutions; rather, the institutions have reformulated their content and style, or new churches and similar frameworks have been created. In Europe, on the other hand, civic and religious institutions often found themselves in a situation of conflict, with the success of one working to the detriment of the other. Secularization often led people to drop out from religion altogether. Although the original movement seeking to create Jewish religious institutions that would merge Jewish content with modern ideas and approaches, Reform Judaism, developed in Germany in the 19th century, no comparable movements emerged in postwar Western Europe as serious alternatives to Orthodoxy, on the one hand, and to complete secularism, on the other. As a result, the predominant religious identification of European Jewry is Orthodox, nominal though it is for many individual Jews.

In the United Kingdom, where mainstream Orthodoxy has long been the leading force, there has been a consistent move away from it over recent decades.[38] Between 1970 and 1990, the share of Greater London male synagogue membership held by the United Synagogue declined from 72 to 58 percent; the similarly mainstream small Sephardi Orthodox sector re-

---

[36]Compare our European data with the situation in the United States in Sidney Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," AJYB 1992, vol. 92, pp. 77–173.

[37]See Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology* (Chicago, 1955); Jack Wertheimer, "Recent Trends in American Judaism," AJYB 1989, vol. 89, pp. 63–162.

[38]See Barry A. Kosmin and Caren Levy, *Synagogue Membership in the United Kingdom 1983* (London, 1983); Schmool and Cohen, *British Synagogue Membership in 1990*.

mained stable at around 4 percent; the right-wing Orthodox sector increased from 3 to 9 percent; the Reform sector (similar to the American Conservative movement) increased from 12 to 18 percent; and the Liberal sector (close to American Reform) increased from 9 to 11 percent. It appears from this that British Jewry is becoming polarized, with the so-called right and left wings gaining at the expense of the center. In France, one indicator of the weakness of the progressive community relative to the mainstream Orthodox Consistorial or right-wing Orthodox is the fact that, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, only about 7 percent of synagogue marriages in the Greater Paris area were celebrated by the Union Libérale.

A 1991 survey of the United Synagogue, the mainstream Orthodox organization in the United Kingdom, confirms the nominal character of a substantial proportion of the membership, with 23 percent labeling themselves weak observers (of these, 4 percent self-described nonreligious Jews, 16 percent just Jewish, 3 percent progressive), 67 percent traditional, and 10 percent strictly Orthodox Jews. Of those who describe themselves as traditional, 88 percent travel on the Sabbath, and 95 percent turn on electric lights on the Sabbath. Overall, the frequency of synagogue attendance among United Synagogue members does not seem to differ substantially from that of a general sample of Jews.

Apart from the religious sphere, other significant paths for expressing Jewish identification do exist and are manifested in EC Jewish communities, as elsewhere in the Diaspora. The level of interest in the Middle East and, by implication, the State of Israel, is extremely high—in fact, the highest of any other indicator of Jewishness (see table 11). The available data show considerable variation in the percentage of visitors to Israel from the different Jewish communities, which can be explained in part by a time effect. An increase in tourism during the last 10–15 years has most probably contributed to raising the percentages of visitors above those reported in the 1970s for France and the UK (where in this respect Redbridge may not be entirely typical), making them somewhat closer to the 80 percent reported for Milan in 1986. High percentages of the Jewish public say they are interested in Judaism, showing their interest through, among other ways, reading books on Jewish topics and Jewish periodicals, following the Jewish press, and keeping up with current developments in Jewish literature, history, and Judaic studies.

GENERAL EUROPEAN TRENDS

To properly understand the data on Jewish identification, we need to view them in the comparative context of general social and intellectual trends in

the EC and in European society at large.[39] The historical process of secularization has been accompanied by a decline in religious practice and a lessened willingness of young Europeans to commit themselves to religious vocations. Large-scale surveys, such as the 1981 European Values Study, provide interesting insights into the religious attitudes and practices of the general public. Wherever the data can be analyzed by age groups or compared with similar earlier observations, a conclusion of ongoing erosion in religious and national values is inescapable. At the same time, younger cohorts put more emphasis on a more subjective elaboration of norms and on achieving personal goals. If, as some maintain,[40] a form of secular religion has taken hold, it can be argued that it lacks the binding content and corporate sanction that characterize traditional religion. Facing a general crisis of religious values in contemporary Western societies, efforts are in fact being made by the established religions, chiefly the Catholic Church, to reconquer the lost ground through concerted evangelical activity in Europe.[41]

In 1981, a majority in each of the EC countries investigated said they believed in God, but the frequencies ranged from 58–65 percent in Denmark, the Netherlands, and France; to 72–77 percent in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Belgium; 84–87 percent in Italy and Spain; and 95 percent in Ireland.[42] The proportions attending religious services once a month or more often varied roughly in the same way across the different countries, but the range of variation was much greater, with a minimum of 12 percent in Denmark and a maximum of 88 percent in Ireland. In France, the United Kingdom, and Italy (countries whose Jewish populations are covered in table 11), attendance among the general population at religious services once a month or more was 18 percent, 23 percent, and 52 percent, respectively. Comparing these data with the proportions of Jews attending a synagogue on High Holy Days, festivals, and some Sabbaths, or more often, we can estimate that Jews attend religious services more frequently than the general population in France and the United Kingdom, and less frequently than in Italy. The general population's attendance figure for Italy

[39]R. Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton, 1977).

[40]T. Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion* (London, 1967); John Simons, "Culture, Economy and Reproduction in Contemporary Europe," in *The State of Population Theory: Forward from Malthus*, ed. D. Coleman and R. Schofield (Oxford, 1986), pp. 256–78.

[41]A significant initiative in this sense was the publication in November 1992 of a new, modernized version of basic Catholic doctrine: *Catéchisme de l'Eglise catholique* (Paris, 1992).

[42]Jean Stoetzel, *Les valeurs du temps présent: une enquête européenne* (Paris, 1983); S. Harding, D. Philips, and M. Fogarty, *Contrasting Values in Western Europe* (Basingstoke, 1986).

actually looks quite high, in light of the observed social patterns there during the last decade.

Although there are serious limitations to these comparisons, the impression is that the sweeping secularization process in Western Europe has radically reduced the extent of religious observance among Jews and non-Jews alike, but that a comparatively larger section of the Jewish community seems to have resisted these trends. This is true in terms of both the resilience of the relatively small "hard core" of regularly practicing Jews and the preservation of a minimum of normative or traditional behaviors among a much larger section of the community—no matter how secularized on the whole. This being the case, it may be necessary to reexamine the widespread perception that the fabric of European Jewish communal life is seriously weakened. Such a process is indeed taking place, but it is part of a general European trend of decline in traditional forms of identification that is comparatively even greater.

The recent evidence on changing religiosity patterns in the EC offers strong support for the interpretation offered earlier of marriage and fertility declines. The marriage-and-baby boom of the 1950s and early 1960s and the subsequent decline that started in the mid-1960s and continued into the mid-1970s closely correspond to changes in general religious orientation, as measured by such phenomena as the percentage of Easter communicants in England and Wales and the number of novices entering the clergy in France.[43] As with religion, elementary family processes that once represented the nearly universal norm seem now to have become expressions of highly ideological and optional choices. On the Jewish side, the evidence is accumulating that inmarriage has become the voluntary, conscious expression of a preference for Jewish continuity instead of the automatic, normatively determined behavior it once was.

In summarizing their analysis of French Jewry in the 1970s, Bensimon and DellaPergola estimated that about one-quarter could be considered religious or strongly traditional, one-half otherwise communally involved, and one-quarter quite marginal. In the late 1980s, based on a more recent survey, Cohen evaluated the proportion of observing Jews at 15 percent, with 49 percent considered traditionalists and 36 percent nonobservant.[44] Even if the concepts compared are not identical, the change does not seem to be drastic.

---

[43]See John Simons, "Reproductive Behavior as Religious Practice," in *Determinants of Fertility Trends: Theories Re-examined*, ed. C. Hohn and R. Mackensen (Liege, 1982), pp. 133–145; Guy Michelat, Julien Potel, Jacques Sutter, and Jacques Maitre, *Les Français sont-ils encore catholiques?* (Paris, 1991); Silvano Burgalassi, *Il comportamento religioso degli italiani* (Florence, 1968).

[44]See, respectively, Bensimon and DellaPergola, *La population juive*; Cohen, *L'Etude et l'éducation juive*.

In Italy, similar conclusions can be reached by comparing the data on Jewishness of the 1960s and the 1980s, and comparable observations would probably apply to the Jews in Belgium, Spain, and possibly Germany. It would appear, then, that the Jewish identification of EC Jews has been relatively stable. One important qualification relates to the effects of immigration. In Italy, in the intervening period, substantial Jewish immigration from relatively more traditional backgrounds added fresh blood to the existing community. In France, many immigrants who in the 1960s were too busy coping with the initial stages of integration to be involved in Jewish community activities, by the 1980s were in the forefront of the community.[45]

From World War II to the present, a continuous influx of new forces was instrumental in replenishing EC Jewries and strengthening the Jewish identification of their members. Now, however, apart from the uncertain Jewish impact of possible newcomers from the former USSR, the traditional reservoirs of Jewish immigration are empty. It is essentially with their own existing forces that Western European Jews will have to face the challenges of Jewish continuity in the future.

Ways of Response: The Jewish Educational System

Among the different possible corporate responses of a Jewish community facing the challenge of transmitting a viable Jewish identification, Jewish education is one of the most significant.[46] In Europe, as in other parts of the Diaspora, the role of the Jewish school has been elevated to that of a sort of proxy for the Jewish family, which in many cases and unlike earlier generations lacks the ability to socialize its own children as Jews. As a result, education is now a major item in the overall financial picture of a community. For these reasons, the structural characteristics of the Jewish educational system in the EC merit brief examination.[47]

---

[45]See, e.g., Claude Tapia, *Les juifs sépharades en France (1965–1985); études psychosociologiques et historiques* (Paris, 1986); Martine Cohen, "Les Juifs en France: Renouveau ou assimilation: un faux dilemme," in Michel André et al., *Sortie des religions, retour du religieux* (Lille, 1992), pp. 101–21.

[46]A systematic sociological-historical analysis can be found in Harold S. Himmelfarb and Sergio DellaPergola, eds., *Jewish Education Worldwide: Crosscultural Perspectives* (Lanham, 1989). See there in particular the three articles on Jewish education in Western Europe: Adrian Ziderman, "Jewish Education in Great Britain," pp. 267–300; Yair Auron and Lucien Lazare, "Jewish Education in France," pp. 301–32; Stanley Abramowitz, "Jewish Education in Other Western European Countries," pp. 333–54.

[47]The following analysis is based on a selection of the main sources of data available on the quantitative aspects of Jewish education. Two Censuses of Jewish Schools in the Diaspora have been coordinated by the Project for Jewish Educational Statistics at the A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. See Nitza Genuth, Sergio DellaPergola, and Allie A. Dubb, *First Census of Jewish Schools in the Diaspora*

Within the network of Jewish educational institutions in EC countries, day schools now play the predominant role. This had been the established pattern in some of the smaller Western European Jewish communities, but not so in the two largest, France and the United Kingdom, where as late as the 1970s the predominant mode of Jewish education was part-time. *Talmud torahs* in the French-speaking communities and *heders* in the English-speaking ones were run largely by the central Jewish institutions responsible for religious affairs, such as the Consistoire Israélite or the United Synagogue's London Board of Religious Education. Their approach reflected the view that the Jew, as an emancipated and equal citizen, would receive his or her basic education in the framework of a country's public education system and would acquire Jewish culture and learning through special supplementary activities.

Historical developments, among which the two principal ones were the anti-Jewish discrimination of the early Holocaust period—when Jews were barred from public schools—and the large postwar Jewish immigration to Western Europe—requiring the integration of many, often deprived, newcomers into the Jewish community—led to growing recognition of a need for Jewish private schools. A more recent factor stimulating the demand for Jewish day schools was disillusionment with a public-school system beset by social, disciplinary, and curricular problems. Over the years, growing proportions of the Jewish public came to accept the inherent value of independent Jewish schooling. Indeed, the interest in developing a Jewish day-school network in different EC countries has increased in intensity in recent years. Initiatives in this area have been taken by central Jewish community organizations, such as the FSJU in France, by ad hoc sponsoring or coordinating bodies, such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee on a continental scale or the Jewish Educational Development Trust in the UK, and by smaller educational networks representing different shades of religious orientation or specific institutions, such as Lubavitch, Otzar Hatorah, and ORT.

FRANCE-UK COMPARISON

Table 12 describes some of the main structural characteristics of Jewish education in France and the United Kingdom between 1981 and 1992. The

---

1981/2–1982/3; International Summary (Jerusalem, 1985); Sergio DellaPergola, Uzi Rebhun, and Daliah Sagi, *Second Census of Jewish Schools in the Diaspora 1986/7–1988/9; Preliminary Report* (Jerusalem, 1992, mimeo). See also Sergio DellaPergola and Nitza Genuth, *Jewish Education Attained in Diaspora Communities, Data for 1970s* (Jerusalem, 1983). The more recent data are derived from Jewish Educational Development Trust, *Securing Our Future: An Inquiry into Jewish Education in the United Kingdom* (London, 1992); Prosper Elkoubi, *Données sur les écoles juives à plein temps en France* (Paris, 1992, mimeo).

changing enrollment patterns should be understood in the light of the recent Jewish demographic trends noted above. For example, the decline in the overall number of Jewish pupils in the UK reflects the diminishing demographic base of that community; however, it is accompanied by stability or even moderate growth in the enrollment rate per 100 Jewish children of school age (3 to 17). The current Jewish school enrollment is moderately high in the UK, around 55 percent of the potential target population. Taking into account pupils who are exposed to Jewish education for short periods, the rate of those ever enrolled in a Jewish day or part-time school is close to 80 percent. Jewish school enrollment rates in France tend to be lower, in fact the lowest within EC Jewish communities. In France, since the post-World War II period, the effort to develop the Jewish school system has lagged behind the pace of population growth. However, the data for the late 1980s and early 1990s point to substantial increases. Overall, probably more than 35 percent of eligible children were currently enrolled in a Jewish day or part-time school in 1991–92, up from 24 percent ten years earlier. With regard to Jewish schools in other EC countries, data from the early 1980s indicate an intermediate current enrollment rate of around 36–40 percent, on the average.

One significant factor in the impact of Jewish schooling is the duration of exposure. The general tendency in Jewish day schools is a relatively high enrollment at the early elementary level and substantial dropping out with the passage to higher grades, especially at the transition from elementary to high school. The 1980s saw a significant increase in enrollment at the pre-primary level, possibly tied to the expanded participation of women in the labor force. Moreover, there are differences between countries in the emphasis placed on the educational effort at different age levels. In France the major effort has been devoted to post-primary education. In 1986–87, 46 percent of the enrollment in Jewish day schools in France was at ages 12–17, versus 34 percent in the United Kingdom in 1990–91 (see table 12). Part-time Jewish education is concentrated around the ages of bar-bat mitzvah, although enrollment covers the age spectrum between 3 and 17.

The role of different ideological streams is another important facet of the Jewish school system. Since most Jewish day schools, whether sponsored by a central Jewish community body at the national or local level or by a more distinctly ideological organization, service a general Jewish constituency, they tend to have student bodies from heterogeneous Jewish backgrounds. However, in larger communities where several Jewish day schools exist, recent trends point to the growth of schools that hold to more stringent religious standards. In 1986–87, 30 percent of the pupils in Jewish day schools in France attended mainstream Orthodox schools, while 26 percent were in right-wing Orthodox schools—which, among other curricular fea-

tures, do not allow notice to be taken of Israel Independence Day. In the UK, the student body was split equally between mainstream and right-wing Orthodox day schools, each with 38 percent of the enrollment. The share held by general, nondenominational Jewish community schools has been increasing, too, while the Liberal and Progressive movements are barely represented in the day-school system. Part-time Jewish schools are dominated by the respective mainstream Orthodox movements in the various countries.

Most Jewish day schools are subject to some form of public control. In France, a growing number have obtained some financial support from the government, which regards private schooling as being in the public interest. Similar arrangements exist in several other EC countries. The curriculum of Jewish schools must satisfy the general educational requirements of each country, to which varying amounts of Hebrew and Judaic studies are added. As a result, the variation in the Jewish school curricula between EC countries can be substantial. For example, in 1981–82, a Jewish day-school pupil in the 12–14 age group received an average of 11.1 hours per week of instruction in Hebrew and Judaic studies in France, versus 9.9 hours in the United Kingdom, and 6.2 hours in the rest of the EC countries. These differences reflect, among other things, the different length of the school day in the various locales. Where the general curriculum is based on longer schooling hours, there are more hours for Judaic instruction. On the other hand, the part-time programs are far less intensive, as they are based on one or two weekly sessions, and it can also be assumed that the attendance of pupils is somewhat less regular than in the case of day schools.

Finally, the number and quality of teaching personnel in EC Jewish schools compare favorably overall with those of Jewish schools elsewhere in the Diaspora. The number of teachers in Jewish schools appears to have increased over the 1980s, though some of the increase may simply reflect improvement in the quality of data. Regarding the educational attainment of teachers in Jewish day schools, a fair proportion are college graduates and holders of professional certificates. The level of general and especially Jewish education is lower among teachers in part-time Jewish schools.

The critical question in relation to Jewish education is how it affects the Jewish identification of those who are exposed to it. The evidence available from research in different countries, such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, is somewhat mixed. Jewish schooling definitely provides information and intellectual concepts, as well as a solid Jewish environment for the socialization of Jewish youth. All in all, though, the influence of family

background appears to be stronger and more lasting than that of formal Jewish education.[48] Also, informal and less expensive Jewish frameworks such as youth movements may prove to be equivalent to formal schooling in their effect on Jewish identification.[49] Still, the plain fact is that Jewish schools now reach the majority—and in some countries the overwhelming majority—of the younger Jewish generation at some time in their lives. At least potentially, therefore, they constitute a powerful instrument in the effort to create a Jewishly aware and educated base for the Jewish community of the future, or at least to counteract the de-Judaizing influences emanating from the general environment. To make the Jewish school system more effective in reaching its objectives is one of the most pressing challenges to the organized Jewish community in the EC, as it is elsewhere.

Some Conclusions and Implications

Our attempt to present a cohesive picture of Jewish population and community in the European Community may be premature, if not naive. What we have been dealing with in this article are two entities which to a large extent do not yet exist: an integrated, functional European Community, and within it an EC-conscious Jewish community. We stressed that the Jewish community in each of the EC member countries essentially functions separately, so that most observers would probably consider the only relevant frame of reference for the analysis of Jewish affairs still to be a national one. Yet, several significant common patterns do exist across EC countries that allow for the formulation of a few synthetic conclusions. On the basis of the trends that have been discussed here, we suggest that European Jewry can be viewed in terms of two alternative models: a "community of presence" vs. a "community of continuity."

Given the devastation and trauma of the Holocaust, it is surely remarkable that the Jews residing in the boundaries of the EC rebounded from their losses and achieved socioeconomic and cultural success, public visibility, and recognition. International migration contributed to the viability of these communities, but that only partially explains their staying power. One may cautiously hypothesize that the size and viability of Jewish populations are significantly associated with, if not entirely explained by, the nature of the societies within which Jews found themselves and with which they interacted. The general socioeconomic forces operating in the European

[48]Stephen Miller, "The Impact of Jewish Education on the Religious Behaviour and Attitudes of British Secondary School Pupils," in *Studies in Jewish Education* 3, ed. J. Aviad (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 150–65.

[49]Erik H. Cohen, *The World of Informal Jewish Education* (Jerusalem, 1992).

market functioned as powerful poles of attraction or repulsion in the process of settlement of Jewish individuals, and accordingly did or did not generate conditions favorable to a viable Jewish community life. Three apparently essential prerequisites for a successful Jewish presence are a democratic political system, a culture permitting pluralism of expression, and freedom of movement. Based on these criteria, the recent EC experience has been quite favorable for Jews, allowing for the emergence of a lively "community of presence." However, socioeconomic and sociopolitical market forces are mutable by nature; a Jewish presence that relies exclusively or mostly on such premises, should its supporting base topple, may vanish quite rapidly.

A "community of continuity," by contrast, is one that has the strength and capacity to survive in the long run, based on solid demographic processes and the ability to nurture and transmit an original cultural identity from generation to generation. While not necessarily immune to the general market forces operating in society at large, such a community finds major support in an internal value system and the community's own institutional network. The ability to do this—which existed throughout most of the Jewish historical experience—appears uncertain in the light of recent demographic trends in EC Jewish communities, although it surely can be found in particular segments within them. Erosion of the family, assimilation, and the dilution and blurring of Jewish identity at the periphery of the community make the task of demographic and cultural continuity increasingly complicated and uncertain. Still, ways of responding, as shown by the Jewish educational system, exist and can achieve significant results.

How will the Jews fit into the new Europe? At this juncture, it is impossible to suggest a prognosis for the future based on either the past Jewish experience in Europe or the present. The international scene is extremely fluid, and the nature of the emerging European order is shrouded in uncertainty. What is clear is that whatever the thrust of social, economic, cultural, and political change in Europe, it is bound to affect the profile and in fact the very existence of Jewish communities on the continent.

A Europe that is open, pluralistic, and tolerant will offer fertile ground in which Jewish communities can thrive and in turn bestow benefits on society at large. Under such circumstances, the relatively small yet highly selective and geographically concentrated Jewish community might even become significant politically.[50] An interesting case in point is the French

[50]On the general significance and trends of Jewish political behavior in some Western European countries, see Dominique Schnapper and Sylvie Strudel, "Le vote juif en France," *Revue française de science politique*, Feb. 1984; Jacky Akoka, "Vote juif ou vote des juifs? Structure et comportement electoral des juifs de France," *Pardes* 1, 1985, pp. 114–37; Geoffrey Alderman, *The Jewish Community in British Politics* (Oxford, 1983); Sergio DellaPergola, *Anatomia*, ch. 15.

vote on the Maastricht treaty on September 20, 1992, in which a scant majority of the total French electorate (less than 51 percent) voted in favor, but Jews (roughly 1 percent of the total population) may have delivered the decisive one percentage point needed to save European economic integration. If this assumption is true, then Jews clearly and resolutely expressed their preference for a manifesto of stability and prosperity in Europe.

If, on the other hand, Europe experiences a revival of ethnic tribalism and national conflicts, or even religious fundamentalism, with the inevitable intolerance for diversity, Jews and other minorities will be in an untenable position. In this regard, the Jews share the fate of many others, such as the large numbers of foreign workers who have entered the EC in recent years, Gypsies, several Protestant and Evangelical minorities in Catholic countries, and most significantly, a rapidly growing Muslim population. At the same time, the uniqueness of their experience has produced heightened sensitivity among Jews. Jews do not need physical violence to put them on the alert; symbolic violence may be enough. Under conditions of crisis, self-defense mechanisms would have to be activated, including complete disentanglement as a last resort. This would of course be a most disruptive and tragic outcome, not only for European Jews but for the European Community itself.

In the light of both historical and contemporary experience, it would seem advisable for European Jews to cultivate an integrated view of themselves. To the extent that a united Europe becomes a permanent reality, the Jews and their institutions will be better off fitting into it rather than ignoring or escaping it. If European Jewry is to take full advantage of the intellectual, socioeconomic, and political weight of its one-million strong constituency, it must find ways to bridge the provincial or particularistic divisions that prevail. Even in the face of a general erosion of traditional norms and beliefs, there seems to be a still unmet demand for Jewish culture and identity, which should be thoughtfully evaluated and satisfied. To slow the pace of demographic erosion, greater resources must be invested in education, and there must be integration between communities continentally. If pragmatic choices have to be made, priority should be given to the larger, stronger centers of greater vitality in an integrated Europe rather than to the smaller, weaker, and dispersed periphery. Moreover, ties should be strengthened between European Jewry and the two major Jewish cultural and demographic centers, in Israel and the United States.

In this respect, it is necessary to mention the need for research that goes beyond the quantitative aspects that constitute the main focus of this essay and that may contribute to an understanding of Jewish sociodemographic and identificational trends and their interplay with general political, socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional variables in the EC. Looking at the

unfolding reality of European Jewry with a critical eye and within a coherent analytical frame of reference may help not only to predict the future course of the Jewish experience in the European Community but also to devise Jewish corporate interventions that render that experience more fruitful and rewarding.

TABLE 1. MAIN CENTRAL JEWISH REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 12 COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Country	Organization	Main Concern
Belgium	Comité de Coordination des Organizations Juives de Belgique (CCOJB)	Political
	Consistoire Central Israélite de Belgique	Religious
	Centrale des Oeuvres Sociales Juives	Service
Denmark	Det Mosaiske Troossamfund i Kobenhaven	All inclusive[a]
France	Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France (CRIF)	Political
	Consistoire Central des Israélites de France	Religious
	Fonds Social Juif Unifié (FSJU)	Service
Germany	Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland	Political
	Zentralwohlfartsstelle der Juden in Deutschland	Service
Greece	Kentriko Israelitiko Simvoulio Ellados (KIS)	All inclusive
Ireland	Jewish Representative Council of Ireland	All inclusive
Italy	Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane (UCEI)	Political
Luxembourg	Consistoire Israélite de Luxembourg	Religious
Netherlands	Nederlands-Israelitisch Kerkgenootschap	Religious
	Stichting Joods Maatschappelijk Werk	Service
Portugal	Comunidade Israelita de Lisboa	Religious[a]
Spain	Federacion de Comunidades Israelitas de España	Political
United Kingdom	Board of Deputies of British Jews	All inclusive

[a]The total country's Jewish population is virtually concentrated in one local community.

TABLE 2. JEWISH POPULATIONS IN EUROPE, 1939–1991 (ROUGH ESTIMATES)

Country[a]	1939	1945	1960	1991
	Absolute Numbers (Thousands)			
World total	16,600	11,000	12,160	12,850
Europe total	9,500	3,800	3,241	2,010
European Community	1,295[h]	843[h]	890	987
Belgium[b]	93	32	36	32
Denmark	6	6	6	6
France	320	180	350	530
Germany	195	45	24	42
Greece	75	8	6	5
Italy	47	29	32	31
Netherlands	141	33	30	26
Spain[c]	6	10	6	13
United Kingdom[d]	345	350	400	302
Other West Europe[e]	130	109[h]	47	44
Former USSR (Europ. part)[f]	3,394	1,989	1,970	868
Other East Europe[g]	4,681	859	334	111
	Percentages			
Jews in Europe as % of world Jewry	57.2	34.5	26.7	15.6
Europe total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
European Community	13.6	22.2[h]	27.5	49.1
Other West Europe	1.4	2.9[h]	1.4	2.2
Former USSR (Europ. part)	35.7	52.3	60.8	43.2
Other East Europe	49.3	22.6	10.3	5.5

[a]Boundaries as in 1990.
[b]Including Luxembourg.
[c]Including Portugal, Gibraltar.
[d]Including Ireland.
[e]Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Austria, Switzerland.
[f]Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia (incl. parts in Asia), Ukraine.
[g]Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey (European part).
[h]Including refugees in transit.
Source: Based on files available at Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, the A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

TABLE 3. JEWISH POPULATIONS IN EUROPE, 1939–1991[a]: YEARLY PERCENT OF CHANGE AND PROPORTION PER 1,000 INHABITANTS

Country	Yearly Percent Change			Jews per 1,000 Population	
	1939–1945	1945–1960	1960–1991	1939	1991
World total	−6.6	0.7	0.2	7.5	2.3
Europe total	−14.2	−1.1	−1.5	15.6	2.6
European Community	−6.9	0.4	0.3	4.8	2.8
Belgium	−16.3	0.8	−0.4	11.0	3.1
Denmark	—	—	—	1.5	1.2
France	−9.1	4.5	1.3	7.7	9.3
Germany	−21.7	−4.1	1.9	2.8	0.5
Greece	−31.1	−1.9	−0.6	10.1	0.5
Italy	−7.7	0.7	−0.1	1.1	0.5
Netherlands	−21.5	−0.6	−0.5	15.8	1.7
Spain	7.0	−3.8	2.5	0.2	0.3
United Kingdom	0.2	0.9	−0.9	6.9	4.9
Other West Europe	−2.9	−5.5	−0.2	5.4	1.3
Former USSR (Europ. part)	−8.5	−0.1	−2.6	16.7[b]	3.6
Other East Europe	−24.6	−6.1	−3.5	40.4	0.6

[a]See notes to table 2.
[b]Based on total USSR.
Source: as in table 2.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ca. 1990: COUNTRIES AND STATISTICAL REGIONS

Country and Region[a]	Total Population[b]	Jewish Population[c]	Jews per 1,000 Population	Purchasing Power Standard[d]
Total European Community	341,560,000	999,600	2.9	100
Belgium	9,845,000	31,800	3.2	102
1. Bruxelles	975,000	15,000	15.4	155
2. Vlaams Gewest	5,681,000	15,000	2.6	102
3. Région Wallonne	3,206,000	1,800	0.6	84
Denmark	5,143,000	6,400	1.2	117
France	56,138,000	530,000	9.4	111
1. Ile-de-France	10,231,000	310,000	30.3	165
2. Bassin Parisien	10,145,000	13,000	1.3	103
3. Nord-Pas-de-Calais	3,929,000	4,000	1.0	91
4. Est	5,019,000	30,000	6.0	100
5. Ouest	7,379,000	10,000	1.4	92
6. Sud-Ouest	5,821,000	35,000	6.0	98
7. Centre-Est	6,849,000	38,000	5.5	105
8. Mediterranée	6,382,000	90,000	14.1	96
Germany	77,573,000	40,000	0.5	114
1. Baden-Württemberg	9,618,000	2,200	0.2	120
2. Bayern	11,221,000	7,600	0.7	113
3. Berlin	3,410,000	9,300	2.7	128
4. Bremen	674,000	100	0.1	146
5. Hamburg	1,626,000	2,500	1.5	187
6. Hessen	5,661,000	9,000	1.6	129
7. Niedersachsen	7,284,000	800	0.1	97
8. Nordrhein-Westfalen	17,104,000	6,500	0.4	111
9. Rheinland-Pfalz	3,702,000	500	0.1	101
10. Saarland	1,065,000	300	0.3	107
11. Schleswig-Holstein	2,595,000	100	0.0	95
12. Brandenburg	2,641,000	450	0.2	67
13. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	1,964,000	100	0.1	67
14. Sachsen	4,901,000	350	0.1	67

TABLE 4.—*(Continued)*

Country and Region[a]	Total Population[b]	Jewish Population[c]	Jews per 1,000 Population	Purchasing Power Standard[d]
15. Sachsen-Anhalt	2,965,000	50	0.0	67
16. Thuringen	2,684,000	150	0.1	67
Greece	10,047,000	4,800	0.5	57
1. Voreia Ellada	3,196,000	1,300	0.4	54
2. Kentriki Ellada	5,853,000	3,200	0.5	59
3. Anatolika-Nisia	847,000	300	0.4	52
Ireland	3,720,000	1,800	0.5	65
Italy	57,061,000	31,200	0.5	104
1. Nord-ovest	6,271,000	1,700	0.3	128
2. Lombardia	8,879,000	9,000	1.0	133
3. Nord-est	6,468,000	1,600	0.2	109
4. Emilia-Romagna	3,935,000	400	0.1	131
5. Centro	5,818,000	2,200	0.4	110
6. Lazio	5,109,000	16,000	3.1	110
7. Campania	5,671,000	200	0.0	73
8. Abruzzi-Molise	1,586,000	0	0.0	84
9. Sud	6,770,000	50	0.0	71
10. Sicilia	5,098,000	50	0.0	71
11. Sardegna	1,641,000	0	0.0	77
Luxembourg	373,000	600	1.7	124
Netherlands	14,951,000	25,700	1.7	107
1. Noord	1,591,000	500	0.3	151
2. Oost	2,949,000	2,200	0.7	87
3. West	6,809,000	22,000	3.2	112
4. Zuid	3,222,000	1,000	0.3	94
Portugal	10,285,000	300	0.0	52
1. Norte	5,354,000	0	0.0	43
2. Sul	4,333,000	300	0.1	63
3. Ilhas	521,000	0	0.0	52

TABLE 4.—*(Continued)*

Country and Region[a]	Total Population[b]	Jewish Population[c]	Jews per 1,000 Population	Purchasing Power Standard[d]
Spain	39,187,000	12,000	0.3	72
1. Noroeste	4,502,000	0	0.0	68
2. Noreste	4,168,000	0	0.0	86
3. Madrid	4,863,000	4,000	0.8	83
4. Centro	5,388,000	0	0.0	63
5. Este	10,468,000	5,000	0.5	80
6. Sur	7,847,000	2,900	0.4	57
7. Canarias	1,433,000	100	0.1	65
United Kingdom	57,237,000	315,000	5.5	104
1. North	3,080,000	2,000	0.6	92
2. Yorkshire-Humberside	4,899,000	16,500	3.4	95
3. East Midlands	3,920,000	2,000	0.5	98
4. East Anglia	1,992,000	3,000	1.5	102
5. South-East	17,265,000	232,000	13.4	123
6. South-West	4,543,000	2,000	0.4	97
7. West Midlands	5,181,000	6,000	1.1	94
8. North-West	6,374,000	37,000	5.8	97
9. Wales	2,821,000	2,000	0.7	88
10. Scotland	5,121,000	11,500	2.2	98
11. Northern Ireland	1,567,000	1,000	0.6	80

[a]Regional divisions are NUTS 1, the higher geographical level used by the Statistical Office of the European Communities to break down countries into statistical regions. *Source:* Eurostat, *Regions; Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics—NUTS* (Luxembourg, 1991).
[b]Total EC population based on country figures. Total populations of European regions are 1986 averages. Data for Germany refer to 1989; for Greece, to 1984. *Source:* Eurostat, *Regions; Statistical Yearbook 1989* (Luxembourg, 1990).
[c]*Source:* as in table 2.
[d]The Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) is an index of standard of living. It is based on gross domestic product per inhabitant, adjusted for market prices.

TABLE 5. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S TOTAL AND JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY LEVEL OF REGIONAL STANDARD OF LIVING, ca. 1990

Stratum of Regions, by Standard of Living[a]	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1000 Population
Total n.	341,321,000	999,600	
Total %	100.0	100.0	2.9
1 (highest)	22.2	59.4	7.9
2	27.2	19.1	2.1
3	19.5	19.0	2.8
4	17.6	1.5	0.2
5 (lowest)	13.5	1.0	0.2

[a]The 69 statistical regions in table 4 were ranked according to Purchasing Power Standard per inhabitant (see last column and note [d] in table 4), and then regrouped into five strata, from highest (stratum 1) to lowest (stratum 5). Strata 1–4 include 14 regions each; stratum 5 includes 13 regions.

TABLE 6. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY CITIES WITH A JEWISH POPULATION OF 1,000 AND OVER, ca. 1990 (ROUGH ESTIMATES)

Country and City	Jewish Population	Country and City	Jewish Population
Belgium		Germany	
Antwerp	15,000	Berlin	9,300
Brussels	15,000	Frankfurt	7,000
		Munich	5,000
Denmark		Hamburg	2,500
Copenhagen	6,000	Cologne	1,500
France		Greece	
Paris region	310,000	Athens	2,900
Paris city	145,000	Saloniki	1,100
Petite couronne[a]	113,000		
Grande couronne[b]	52,000	Ireland	
Marseilles	45,000	Dublin	1,800
Lyon	26,000		
Toulouse	25,000	Italy	
Nice	20,000	Rome	15,800
Strasbourg	15,000	Milan	8,500
Bordeaux	8,000	Turin	1,200
Grenoble	7,000	Florence	1,100
Metz	3,000		
Aix-en-Provence	2,500	Netherlands	
Avignon	2,500	Amsterdam	17,000
Lille	2,500	The Hague	2,000
Nancy	2,500	Rotterdam	1,500
Villeurbanne	2,000		
Cannes	1,500	Spain	
Le Havre	1,500	Barcelona	5,000
Montpelier	1,500	Madrid	4,000
Mulhouse	1,500		
Belfort	1,000		
Colmar	1,000		
Compiègne	1,000		
Dijon	1,000		
Nimes	1,000		

TABLE 6.—*(Continued)*

Country and City	Jewish Population	Country and City	Jewish Population
United Kingdom		Hull	1,500
London region	215,000	Newcastle-upon-Tyne	1,500
Inner London	72,000	Blackpool	1,000
Outer London	125,000	Edinburgh	1,000
Adjacent Home Counties	18,000	Luton	1,000
Greater Manchester	30,000	Nottingham	1,000
Leeds	14,000	Reading	1,000
Glasgow	11,000	Sheffield	1,000
Brighton	10,000		
Birmingham	6,000		
Liverpool	5,000		
Southend	4,500		
Bournemouth	2,000		
Cardiff	2,000		
Southport	2,000		

[a]Départements 92, 93, 94.
[b]Départements 77, 78, 91, 95.
Source: as in table 2.

TABLE 7. JEWISH POPULATION OF FRANCE, BY SOCIAL STATUS, ca. 1930s–1988 (PERCENTAGES)

Socio-economic Status	Jews						Total France
	Greater Paris				Provinces	France	Urban
	Fathers of House-hold Heads[b]	Foreign-born Before Migrat.[b]	1960s[b]	1972–6[b]	1978[b]	1988[c]	1975[d]
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Upper cadre[a]	8.7	13.3	19.3	25.7	15.2	41.7	12.2
Middle cadre[a]	18.8	16.1	14.6	17.8	52.7	18.1	17.5
Clerical		27.2	30.3	25.1		11.1	25.0
Traders	64.7	36.6	26.8	15.4	22.2	19.4	5.8
Craftsmen				5.6		8.3	2.1
Other blue-collar	7.8	6.8	9.0	10.4	9.9	1.4	37.4

[a]The French term "cadre" applies to managers and professionals. The upper cadre group in this table also includes a small number of industrial entrepreneurs.

[b]Retrospective data relate to people who were employed in the 1970s.

Source: D. Bensimon, S. DellaPergola, *La population Juive de France: sociodémographie et identité* (Jerusalem-Paris, 1984).

[c]*Source:* E.H. Cohen, *L'Etude et l'education juive en France ou l'avenir d'une communauté* (Paris, 1991).

[d]INSEE, *Recensement général de la population 1975.*

TABLE 8. BIRTH AND DEATH RATES AMONG JEWISH POPULATIONS IN THREE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES, 1930–1990 (RATES PER 1,000)

Country	Period Around	Birthrate		Death Rate		Balance	
		Jewish	Total	Jewish	Total	Jewish	Total
Germany	1930	7	15	16	11	−9	+4
	1950	3	18	21	11	−18	+7
	1970	5	13	20	12	−15	+1
	1990	5	11	20	11	−15	—
Italy	1930	15	28	15	17	—	+11
	1950	14	22	16	11	−2	+11
	1970	11	17	15	10	−4	+7
	1990	10	10	15	9	−5	+1
United Kingdom	1930	15	19	7	12	+8	+7
	1950	20	16	9	12	+11	+4
	1970	10	16	13	12	−3	+4
	1990	11	14	15	12	−3	+2

Source: as in table 2.

TABLE 9. TOTAL FERTILITY RATES AMONG THE JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATIONS OF FRANCE, 1932–1991

Year	Total Fertility Rates[a]				% Difference Jewish-Total
	Jewish Population[b]				
	European-Born	North African-Born	Total	Total Population	
1932–36	1.54	4.58	1.67	2.07	−19
1937–41	1.97	4.52	2.08	2.07	+0.5
1942–46	1.37	4.47	1.72	2.34	−27
1947–51	2.54	3.97	2.65	2.94	−10
1952–56	2.02	3.66	2.37	2.70	−12
1957–61	2.15	3.52	2.44	2.73	−11
1962–66	1.68	2.58	2.15	2.83	−24
1967–71	1.18	1.65	1.43	2.54	−44
1972–76				2.12	
1977–81				1.90	
1982–86				1.83	
1987–91				1.79	

[a]Average number of children expected at the end of a woman's reproductive span under the age-specific fertility levels of the indicated period.

[b]Retrospective data for Jewish women who lived in Greater Paris, 1972–78, irrespective of where the reported births took place.

Sources: D. Bensimon, S. DellaPergola (1984); *Vingt et unième rapport sur la situation démographique de la France, Population,* 47, 5, 1992, pp. 1113–86.

TABLE 10. JEWISH POPULATIONS IN TEN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES, BY AGE, 1961–1991 (PERCENTAGES)

Country	Year	Age						Median
		Total	0–14	15–29	30–44	45–64	65+	Age
Belgium								
Brussels	1961	100.0	16.0	16.0	16.0	42.0	7.0	44.1
Brussels	1987	100.0	15.0	15.0	16.0	28.0	26.0	50.0
Antwerp	1987	100.0	25.0	25.0	17.3	16.7	16.0	30.0
Total	1987	100.0	20.0	20.0	16.7	22.3	21.0	40.0
Denmark								
Total	1968	100.0	17.0	20.0	17.0	30.0	16.0	41.5
France								
Paris city	1972–4	100.0	18.0	25.2	16.0	27.3	13.5	36.8
Paris suburbs	1976	100.0	23.9	24.9	19.5	23.3	8.5	31.0
Total Gt. Paris	1972–6	100.0	20.5	25.1	17.5	25.5	11.4	34.1
Rest of country	1978	100.0	17.1	28.1	18.0	22.6	14.2	34.0
Total-projected	1990	100.0	17.2	18.6	26.0	23.0	15.2	37.7
Germany (West)								
Total	1970	100.0	11.0	17.0	16.0	35.0	21.0	48.9
Total	1987	100.0	12.8	18.4	24.0	21.1	23.7	41.0
Total	1991	100.0	12.6	14.9	22.2	25.0	25.3	45.2
Greece								
Total	1969	100.0	15.0	20.0	15.0	36.0	14.0	44.9
Saloniki	1981	100.0	11.7	18.6	17.4	25.0	27.3	46.5
Ireland								
Total	1961	100.0	21.6	17.4	18.9	31.5	10.6	39.6
Italy								
Total	1965	100.0	17.6	18.2	19.2	27.4	17.6	41.7
Total	1985–6	100.0	14.0	23.3	18.2	25.8	18.7	40.5
Rome	1985	100.0	19.0	22.7	20.1	23.8	14.4	36.3
Milan	1986	100.0	13.0	24.6	18.7	26.0	17.7	40.4
Turin	1985	100.0	7.0	22.7	13.9	32.1	24.3	48.8

TABLE 10.—*(Continued)*

Country	Year	Age						Median
		Total	0–14	15–29	30–44	45–64	65+	Age
Luxembourg								
Total	1970	100.0	15.5	17.4	16.0	31.4	19.7	45.8
Netherlands								
Total	1966	100.0	16.0	21.0	14.0	33.0	16.0	45.3
United Kingdom								
Edgware	1963	100.0	26.0	22.0	23.0	24.0	5.0	31.4
Hackney	1971	100.0	20.0	18.0	14.0	29.0	19.0	43.2
Sheffield	1975	100.0	17.0	15.0	15.0	29.0	24.0	47.6
Redbridge	1978	100.0	19.0	22.0	18.0	30.0	11.0	37.0
Total	1975–9	100.0	19.9	21.2	17.6	23.2	18.1	36.9
Total	1984–8	100.0	16.9	18.9	18.7	21.6	23.9	41.3

Source: as in table 2.

TABLE 11. SELECTED INDICATORS OF JEWISHNESS IN THREE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES, 1972–1991 (PERCENTAGES)

	France		Italy		United Kingdom	
	Greater Paris	Provinces	Total	Milan	Redbridge	United Synagogue
	1972–6	1978	1965	1986	1978	1991
Meaning of attachment to Judaism				a		
Religion	34	58		33		
Community	10	5		9		
History	7			47		
Family	14	8		51		
Israel	b	b		44		
Jewish reality	31	27		33		
None	4	2		1		
Synagogue attendance						
Weekly or more	9	21	12	17	10	9
Holy days, some Sabbaths	29	40	25	16	17	32
Main holy days, events			38	44	52	53
Yom Kippur only	32	20	13	10	10	
Never	30	19	12	13	11	7
Eat matzah on Passover	82	91	88	90	79	
Thereof: no bread at home	57	73	66	69		
Fast on Yom Kippur	65	84		77	82	
Observe the Sabbath	37	57	35	46	70	
Thereof: regularly			15	14	26	
Observe Kosher rules	36	54	31	46		
Thereof: regularly			10	25		
Interested in Judaism	86	82		87		
Read Jewish books, papers	63	78		86		

TABLE 11.—*(Continued)*

	France		Italy		United Kingdom	
	Greater Paris	Provinces	Total	Milan	Redbridge	United Synagogue
	1972–6	1978	1965	1986	1978	1991
Interested in Middle East	97	95		98		
Visited Israel	49	47		80	26	

Ns as follows: Greater Paris—1,256 households, corresponding to 3,808 individuals; Provinces—172 households, 479 individuals; Italy nationally—2,123 households, 6,516 individuals; Milan—559 households, 1,664 individuals; Redbridge—464 households, 1,418 individuals; United Synagogue—816 households.

[a]Multiple answers allowed; total = 218%.

[b]Not asked.

Sources: D. Bensimon, S. DellaPergola (1984); S. DellaPergola, *Anatomia dell'ebraismo italiano* (Roma/Assisi, 1976); R. Mannheimer, A. Goldstaub, *Indagine demografico sociologico attitudinale sulla comunità di Milano,* unpublished manuscript; abstracts appeared on *Bollettino della Comunità Israelitica di Milano,* 1988; B.A. Kosmin, C. Levy, *Jewish Identity in an Anglo-Jewish Community* (London, 1983); S. Kalms, *A Time for Change: United Synagogue Review* (London, 1992).

TABLE 12. JEWISH EDUCATION IN FRANCE AND IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1981–82 TO 1991–92: SELECTED INDICATORS

	France			United Kingdom		
	1981–82	1986–87	1991–92	1981–82	1986–87	1990–91
			Schools			
Total	216	307		259	271	
Day schools	68	88		82	106	90[a]
Part-time	148	219		177	165	
			Pupils			
Total	20,664	25,483		30,248	27,507	26,962
Day schools	12,638	15,907	21,000	15,346	15,120	16,005
Part-time	8,026	9,576		14,902	12,387	10,957
	Pupils per 100 Jewish school-age population (3–17)					
Total	24	32	(36)	55	55	56
Day schools	15	20	24	28	30	33
Part-time	9	12		27	25	23
	Percent distribution of pupils, by age level					
Day schools, total	100	100		100	100	100
Ages 3–5	20	22		11	31	20
Ages 6–11	43	32		52	44	46
Ages 12–17	37	46		37	25	34
Part-time, total	100	100		100	100	
Ages 3–5	2	4		3	10	
Ages 6–11	82	65		79[b]	67	
Ages 12–17	16	31		18[c]	23	
	Percent distribution of pupils, by school's ideological orientation					
Day schools, total	100	100		100	100	100
Right-wing Orthodox		26			38	43
Mainstream Orthodox	75	30		98	38	56[d]
Conservative and Reform	—	—		0	1	1
Communal and other	25	44		2	23	[d]

TABLE 12.—*(Continued)*

	France			United Kingdom		
	1981–82	1986–87	1991–92	1981–82	1986–87	1990–91
Part-time, total	100	100		100	100	
Right-wing Orthodox		3			—	
Mainstream Orthodox	100	73		61	57	
Conservative and Reform	—	7		39	43	
Communal and other	—	17		0	—	
			Teachers			
Total	1,648	2,660		1,991	2,709	
Day school	1,282	1,897		1,046	1,486	
Part-time	366	763		945	1,223	

[a]Including double counts of schools with multiple educational levels.
[b]Ages 6–12.
[c]Ages 13–17.
[d]Communal and other included in mainstream Orthodox.
Sources: Adapted from N. Genuth, S. DellaPergola and A. Dubb, *First Census of Jewish Schools in the Diaspora 1981/2–1982/3; International Summary* (Jerusalem, 1985); S. DellaPergola, U. Rebhun, D. Sagi, *Second Census of Jewish Schools in the Diaspora 1986/7–1988/9; Preliminary Report* (Jerusalem, 1992, mimeo); Jewish Educational Development Trust, *Securing Our Future: An Inquiry into Jewish Education in the United Kingdom* (London, 1992); P. Elkoubi, *Données sur les écoles juives à plein temps en France* (Paris, 1992, mimeo).