

ANTISEMITISM WORLDWIDE REPORT FOR 2023



**The Center for the Study of
Contemporary European Jewry**
The Lester and Sally Entin
Faculty of Humanities
Tel Aviv University

With the support of The Adam and
Gila Milstein Family Foundation

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The Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University supports research on Jewish history, culture, politics, and interfaith relations. It publishes the flagship annual Antisemitism Worldwide Report and the annual For a Righteous Cause Report. Every year, the Center organizes three seminars on Jewish affairs that are open to the public and publishes eight issues of Perspectives – analytic essays on contemporary Jewish life and thought.

You are welcome to visit: <https://cst.tau.ac.il>



The Irwin Cotler Institute
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Tel Aviv University

The Irwin Cotler Institute at Tel Aviv University is devoted to instruction, training, and policy-oriented research on human rights, democracy, justice, and the fight against antisemitism and racism at large.

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ADL is the leading anti-hate organization in the world. Founded in 1913, its timeless mission is “to stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure justice and fair treatment to all.” Today, ADL continues to fight all forms of antisemitism and bias, using innovation and partnerships to drive impact. A global leader in combating antisemitism, countering extremism and battling bigotry wherever and whenever it happens, ADL works to protect democracy and ensure a just and inclusive society for all. As a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, ADL takes no position in support of or in opposition to any candidate for political office.

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The views and opinions expressed by the authors in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Center for Contemporary European Jewry, or the Cotler Institute.



A WORD OF THANKS

The Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University expresses its deepest gratitude to **The Adam and Gila Milstein Family Foundation** for their support of our work.

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ADL recognizes the support of individuals and foundations who are part of our global fight against antisemitism and hate. At this time of rising antisemitism, we would like to thank our supporters for all that they make possible.

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FOREWORD

In the aftermath of the October 7 war crimes committed by Hamas, the world has seen the worst wave of antisemitic incidents since the end of the Second World War. This Report is a messenger of bad news. The data collected from law enforcement authorities, governmental agencies, Jewish organizations, and media platforms tell a story of Jewish existence under growing threat.

Particularly alarming is that also in the nine months leading to October 2023, in which no exceptional event happened, most countries with significant Jewish populations saw a rise in the number of antisemitic incidents compared to the same period in 2022, including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, Brazil, and Mexico. This means that the war in Gaza helped spread a fire that was already out of control. And it was already out of control despite the significant efforts invested in recent years by governments on educational and legal initiatives aimed at reversing the trend.

Two years ago, this Report stated that the fight against antisemitism was failing. The data from 2023 show that bad has come to worse. It is time for soul searching. More slogans and more speeches will certainly not do the job. It is equally naïve to think that more budgets will solve everything. There is a need for careful, independent, and transparent studies of the methods applied so far to inform which are effective and which are not, which need to be expanded, and which should be neglected. The obvious must be mentioned: As in the case of any social evil, the test for programs applied against antisemitism is whether they lead to a decline in the phenomenon.

The distress and danger Jews currently experience should not be overstated. This is not 1939, let alone 1942, not anywhere. Yet while being attacked or harassed has not been the experience of most Jews outside Israel, the data indicate that if current trends persist and continue to deteriorate, the curtain will descend on the ability of Jewish identities to be manifested with security and freedom in the West.

The severe nature of the crisis should be duly recognized by governments and law enforcement agencies. There is no good racism and bad racism, racism that can be ignored and racism that cannot. Racism directed against groups considered socially strong is as destructive as any other form of racism. No society can be truly free and peaceful if its Jews are subjected to intimidation and harassment based on their ethnicity and beliefs.

October 7 highlighted how poisonous antisemitism is. While antisemitism does not define the ideology of Hamas, it has been, from its inception, an inseparable part of Hamas' dehumanization of Jews and its depiction of the war against Israel in ahistorical, essentialist binary religious terms. The reactions to Hamas' crimes reveal how deep-seated antisemitic narratives have become across the Muslim world. Analyses in this Report demonstrate their spread across Arab societies (p. 47) as well as in Turkey (p. 59) and Iran (p. 73).

As a conspiracy theory, the oldest in history, antisemitism is a sickness that blinds those who consume it from seeing the truth for what it is and from respecting the humanity of others. An important lesson to draw from the Gaza war is that peace in the Middle East will not be achieved unless antisemitism is firmly uprooted from Arab societies. Demanding actions to that effect should become fundamental in all future diplomatic processes.

Social media is a primary tool in the present-day proliferation of antisemitism. It allows extremist evil-wishers to spread falsehoods, defamations, and conspiracy theories without being held accountable. No significant improvement in the fight against antisemitism will be accomplished unless those who provide platforms for hate speech will be made to apply responsible editorial discretion, including such that hinders the abuse of social media by global agents of chaos. A comprehensive study conducted for the Report on the profiles of the conveyers of antisemitic propaganda on X (formerly Twitter) in English, Arabic, and German, as well as the contents of their messages (p. 99), highlights the need for more profound and meaningful treatment of the problem.

One of the biggest challenges presented by contemporary antisemitism is that it is expressed by the extreme right and the extreme left and that both expressions increasingly encroach on the mainstream. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the United States (p. 35). It makes the choice of allies and priorities more difficult. Being between a rock and a hard place should not lead to despair, though; Jewish communities and organizations need to tirelessly reach out for broader alliances and cooperation with those committed to righteous causes.

While antisemitic activists often emphasize their problem is with Israel and not with Jews, some target Jewish individuals, institutions and symbols. There is only one name for such actions. It is tempting to treat the post-October 7 antisemitic wave as an emotional response to the war and the catastrophe it brought on a civilian population which Hamas has been using as human shields. That, however, is simply not the case. Some of the most outrageous antisemitic expressions in the context of the conflict were articulated in the first days following October 7, before Israel had begun its military campaign.

Criticizing Israel, including in harsh terms, is not antisemitism. Seeking its elimination as the national home of the Jewish people, including through the false argument that it is an unlawful colonial enterprise, is antisemitic. The historical facts are that the Land of Israel is the ancestral homeland of Jews, where they maintained a continued presence, and where, with the rise of Zionism, they purchased the lands on which they settled and were given the right to a state by an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly. Those who believe that all the above does not make Israel in its recognized borders a legitimate state, should realize that unless they come up with a good explanation why their historical-moral criteria apply to Israel only, they will not avoid the label they try to disavow.

The rise of populism across the Western world presents the fight against antisemitism with uneasy dilemmas. How should populist leaders, who are philosemites and pro-Israel, be treated if their movements host antisemites, have neo-Nazi pasts, or distort the history of their nations? To what extent can the fight against Jew-hatred be blind to hate directed against other minority groups and remain morally credible? A special section of the Report (p. 77)

FOREWORD

analyzes the reasons for the ascendance of populism and its potential implications for Jews, with special attention to Germany and the Netherlands.

At the beginning of 2023, the Chief Rabbi of Moscow in exile, Pinchas Goldschmidt, warned that Jews should leave Russia before they are scapegoated. These were words of wisdom from a courageous spiritual leader who knows the Russian regime and Russian history well, and who refused to support the failed military aggression and the crimes against humanity committed against Ukraine.

Sadly, Rabbi Goldschmidt has not been disproven. During 2023, the Russian dictator Putin and senior members of his regime made blatant antisemitic attacks and continued to engage in Holocaust distortion as part of their broader campaign against the liberal West, liberal values, and human decency. Russia has also supported Hamas in its war against Israel (p. 55). Fascists and Jew-hatred are twains that often meet, especially in times of crisis, and the future risk for Russian Jews should be recognized.

Following October 7, antisemitic propaganda also spread in places from which it had been largely absent in the past, including China. In a country like China, the spread of antisemitic content online can hardly occur if the regime objects. China prides itself, and rightly so, for taking part in the rescuing of thousands of Jews in the Holocaust when few others did. That legacy should not be stained. The regime should make a clear stand against antisemitism, as well as call Islamist terrorism by its name.


Since October 7, across the Western world, some Jewish parents have been afraid to send their children to school. The sense of security in some Jewish communities has been undermined, including in socially peaceful countries with a passion for human rights, such as Scandinavia (p. 65). In France, home to the largest Jewish population in Europe and the largest in the world outside Israel and the United States, Jewish intellectuals and Rabbis express uncertainty that their children and grandchildren will enjoy the same security, freedom, and sense of belonging they had (p. 27).

The troubling developments discussed in this Report call for contemplation – and for action. Four of the global leaders in the fight against antisemitism offer their reflections and their advice in a special section (p. 119).

The fight against antisemitism is existential and essential. In a highly polarized Jewish world, it is a source of unity. Despite that, and in fact, precisely because of that, an important reminder is in order. In relative terms, Jews have contributed to science, technology, philosophy, and culture more than any other people in history. Jewish heritage is a source of great pride and inspiration for Jews and non-Jews alike. Let us fight antisemitism with rigor and determination. At the same time, let us not allow that fight to define who we are.

SECTION 1

GLOBAL OVERVIEW



DATA: ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS WORLDWIDE 2023

In recent years, escalations on the Gaza front, in which sovereign Israeli territory and Israeli citizens were targeted by an Islamist group that openly seeks Israel's total annihilation, have proven repeatedly to lead to dramatic increases in the number of antisemitic incidents reported across the world. It is thus not surprising that the October 7 war crimes committed by Hamas and the defensive war declared by Israel have led to the worst wave of antisemitism seen in the West since the end of the Second World War, as demonstrated by the Report's annual overview of antisemitic incidents worldwide.

However, the alarming data presented here should not be seen merely as a reaction to the war in Gaza. Across the world, and with few noticeable exceptions, the first nine months of 2023 also saw an increase in the number of documented antisemitic incidents in comparison to 2022.

Antisemitic attacks were committed from both the extreme right and the extreme left; with the number of incidents being so high, neither can be considered negligible or fringe expressions.

The people and communities behind the numbers should be recognized. In the United States, for example, on average, approximately three bomb threats a day were received in synagogues and Jewish institutions. Ten times more than in 2022. Every such threat tells of a community whose everyday activities are disturbed and whose sense of security is shattered. It tells of broken routines and of horrified children.

Freedom of religion does not exist where members of one religion live under fear. Multiculturalism means little when members of minority cultures are targeted.

The fight against antisemitism requires accurate, nuanced, transparent and timely publication of the state of antisemitic incidents. Whether the data is favorable or damaging, it is essential to recognize it for what it is in order to allow for an informed discussion.

It is commendable that in most countries with large Jewish populations, data on antisemitic incidents are available and accessible by a variety of sources, including law enforcement agencies, even when not flattering. It is regrettable that in some they are not. For example, we were unable to receive formal or reliable information on the state of antisemitism in Hungary and Romania in 2023. Unlike last year, the Polish Police declined to provide data for this Report, referring us to the data Poland officially provides to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, which will only be published at the end of 2024.

United States (Jewish population 6,000,000)


Reports by law enforcement and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) show antisemitic incidents and attitudes continued to increase across the United States.

ADL’s annual audit of antisemitic incidents in the United States catalogued 7,523 incidents in 2023 (when applying the same methodology applied in 2022), compared to 3,697 incidents in 2022 and 2,717 in 2021.¹ They are the highest numbers the ADL has ever recorded and the third straight year of registering a record high.

In the aftermath of October 7, cases of anti-Zionist rhetoric or activism and some formulations of calls for “resistance” were recorded for the first time as antisemitic incidents. Applying this methodology, a total of 8,873 incidents occurred in 2023. Of the 8,873 incidents recorded in 2023 based on the new methodology, 5,204 occurred between October 7 and December 31, 2023.

Of the 7,523 incidents recorded in 2023 based on the old methodology, 3,976 occurred between October and December compared to 1,000 in the same period in 2022. The 3,547 incidents recorded between January and September 2023 based on the old methodology was greater than the 2,697 incidents recorded during the same period in 2022.

The number of incidents increased in each category compared to 2022 and 2021 – harassment, vandalism, and assault. Based on the old methodology, incidents of harassment increased from 2,298 in 2022 to 5,256 in 2023, while incidents of vandalism increased from 1,288 in 2022 to 2,106 in 2023. In 2023, the ADL recorded 161 incidents of assault across the United States, compared to 111 in 2022, 88 in 2021, 33 in 2020, and 61 in 2019. The ADL also recorded 962 bomb threats toward synagogues and Jewish institutions, up from the 94 recorded in 2022.



The New York Police Department (NYPD), the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), and the Chicago Police Department (CPD) also registered an increasing number of incidents compared to 2022. The three cities have the largest Jewish populations in the United States – approximately 1.5 million, 519,000, and 292,000, respectively.

¹ In the aftermath of October 7, ADL changed its methodology to include certain cases of anti-Zionist rhetoric and activism, as well as some formulations of calls for “resistance,” as antisemitic incidents. This had not been done previously.

GLOBAL OVERVIEW

In 2023, the NYPD recorded 325 anti-Jewish hate crime reports compared to 261 in 2022, 214 in 2021, 126 in 2020, and 252 in 2019. This included 39 reported incidents of assault in 2023 compared to 32 in 2022. Of the 325 reported incidents, 159 occurred between October and December 2023 compared to 64 during the same period in 2022. Prior to October 7, reported incidents were trending down compared to the previous year with 166 incidents recorded between January and September 2023 compared to 197 during the same period in 2022.²

In 2023, the LAPD recorded 165 anti-Jewish hate crime reports compared to 86 in 2022, 79 in 2021, 40 in 2020, and 42 in 2019. This included 18 reported incidents of assault in 2023, compared to 11 in 2022. Of the 165 anti-Jewish hate crime reports recorded in 2023, 75 occurred between October and December compared to 26 incidents during the same period in 2022. Prior to October 7, reported incidents were increasing compared to the same period in 2022 – 90 compared to 60, respectively.³

In Chicago, the CPD recorded 50 anti-Jewish hate crime reports in 2023 compared to 39 in 2022, eight in 2021, six in 2020, and 21 in 2019. The number of reported anti-Jewish assaults was the same in 2023 as in 2022 with nine such incidents recorded each year. Of the 50 anti-Jewish hate crime reports in 2023, 33 occurred between October and December 2023 compared to ten during the same period in 2022. Prior to October 7, anti-Jewish hate crime reports were down compared to the previous year – 17 between January and September 2023 compared to 29 during the same period in 2022.⁴

According to the ADL’s survey on antisemitic attitudes in the United States, 24% of Americans believe six or more anti-Jewish tropes, compared to 20% in 2022 and to 11% in 2019. These are the highest percentages since the early 1990s. In addition, contrary to previous trends, “younger Americans are more likely to endorse anti-Jewish tropes, with millennials agreeing with the greatest number of anti-Jewish tropes on average, at 5.4. They’re followed by Gen Z at 5, Gen X at 4.2, and Baby Boomers at 3.1.”⁵

The ADL documented a record high of 1,112 incidents of white supremacist antisemitic propaganda in 2023, compared to 852 incidents in 2022, 352 incidents in 2021, 277 incidents in 2020, and 165 incidents in 2019.⁶

The top distributors of antisemitic propaganda in the United States in 2023 were the neo-Nazi Goyim Defense League (GDL) (512 incidents) and the white supremacist Patriot Front (431 incidents). In 2022, the GDL, the Folkish Resistance Movement (FRM, formerly Folks Front), and White Lives Matter (WLM) were the leading distributors of antisemitic propaganda.⁷

² For NYPD hate crime data, see: <https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-analysis/hate-crimes.page>.

³ For LAPD hate crime data, see: <https://data.lacity.org/Public-Safety/Crime-Data-from-2020-to-Present/2nrs-mtv8/data>.

⁴ For CPD hate crime data, see: <https://home.chicagopolice.org/statistics-data/data-dashboards/hate-crime-dashboard/>.

⁵ Center for Antisemitism Research, “Antisemitic Attitudes in America 2024,” ADL, February 29, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/antisemitic-attitudes-america-2024>.

⁶ Center on Extremism, “White Supremacist Propaganda Incidents Soar to Record High in 2023,” ADL, March 26, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/white-supremacist-propaganda-incidents-soar-record-high-2023>.

⁷ Center on Extremism, “White Supremacist Propaganda Soars to All-Time High in 2022,” ADL, March 8, 2023, <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/white-supremacist-propaganda-soars-alltime-high-2022>.


France (Jewish population 442,000)

In cooperation with the French Ministry of Interior, the Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive (SPJC) recorded 1,676 antisemitic incidents in 2023, compared to 436 in 2022, 589 in 2021, 339 in 2020, and 687 in 2019. Of the incidents recorded in 2023, 1,242 occurred between October and December 2023, compared to 107 in the same period in 2022. The number of incidents between January and September 2023 (434) was also higher than in the same period in 2022 (329), but less than in the same period in 2021 (472).⁸

Eighty-five antisemitic incidents involving physical violence were recorded in 2023, compared to 43 in 2022, 60 in 2021, 44 in 2020, and 45 in 2019. Among the acts of violence were a December 2023 incident in which an assailant broke into a Paris daycare and threatened its Jewish director with a knife and the November 2023 attempted murder of a Jewish woman in her home in Lyon.⁹

The 102 incidents of vandalism constituted an increase from 48 in 2022, 68 in 2021, and 54 in 2020. They just exceeded the 101 incidents recorded in 2019. Almost 60% of the incidents recorded by the SPJC in 2023 targeted people, either through physical violence, threatening behavior, and targeted letters or leaflets, rather than property. Among the threatening behavior was an anonymous threat to blow up 20 Jewish schools in the Paris area at the end of October 2023. These were threats that caused a number of schools to evacuate.¹⁰

Antisemitic incidents in France 2022-2023



⁸ For the SPJC’s annual reports, see: <https://www.spcj.org/>.

⁹ Jerusalem Post Staff, “‘You’re Jewish, We Will Rape You’: Nursery Director Targeted in Paris Attack,” *Jerusalem Post*, December 14, 2023, <https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-778093>, and TOI Staff and AFP, “French Jewish Woman Stabbed, Seriously Wounded at Lyon Home; Swastika Daubed on Door,” *Times of Israel*, November 5, 2023, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/french-jewish-woman-stabbed-seriously-wounded-at-lyon-home-swastika-daubed-on-door/>.


¹⁰ Zvika Klein, “Jewish Schools Across Paris Evacuated due to Bomb Threat,” *Jerusalem Post*, October 30, 2023, <https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-770820>.

Canada (Jewish population 394,000)

The Toronto Police Department and the Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM) recorded increases in the number of antisemitic hate crimes in 2023 compared to 2022. In Toronto, police recorded 132 incidents in 2023 compared to 65 incidents in 2022. Of the 132 incidents in 2023, 56 occurred between October 7 and December 17, 2023.¹¹ In Montreal, the SPVM reported 73 acts of hate against the Jewish community, more than the 72 hate-related incidents it recorded in all of 2022. Among the 73 incidents were two shooting attacks targeting a Montreal Yeshiva and the throwing of a Molotov cocktail at a synagogue.¹² For more data from Canada please see page 125.

United Kingdom (Jewish population 292,000)

The Community Service Trust (CST) in the United Kingdom recorded 4,103 antisemitic incidents in 2023, compared to 1,662 in 2022, 2,261 in 2021, 1,684 in 2020 and 1,813 in 2019.¹³ Of the 4,103 incidents in 2023, 2,699 occurred on or after October 7, compared to 392 incidents in the same period in 2022. The 1,404 incidents recorded in 2023 prior to October 7 constituted an increase compared to the 1,270 incidents recorded in the same period in 2022.



The CST did not record an incident of extreme violence (an attack with the potential or intention of causing death or grievous bodily harm) in 2023 compared to one in 2022, three in 2021, three in 2020, and one in 2019. The 266 incidents of assault in 2023 exceeded the 136 assaults in 2022, the 174 in 2021, the 97 in 2020, and the 158 in 2019. Fifty-eight assaults involved throwing stones, bricks, bottles, eggs or other objects at victims. Fifty-three assaults involved punching

¹¹ See: Spiro Papuckoski, “Hate Crime Reports, Incidents Up in 2023, Toronto Cops Say,” Toronto Sun, January 11, 2024, <https://torontosun.com/news/local-news/hate-crime-reports-incidents-up-in-2023-toronto-cops-say>, and Tyson Lautenschlager, “Antisemitic Incidents Make Up 53% of Reported Hate Crimes since Israel-Hamas War Began: Toronto Police,” CBC, December 19, 2023, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/hate-crimes-data-toronto-police-1.7064086>.

¹² Paula Newton and Artemis Moshtagian, “Montreal Jewish School Hit by Gunfire for Second Time in less than a week as City Experiences Uptick in Hate Crimes,” CNN, November 14, 2023, <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/13/us/montreal-jewish-school-shooting/index.html>.

¹³ For the CST’s annual antisemitic incidents reports, see: <https://cst.org.uk/>.

or kicking victims, while 36 involved the use of weapons, fake firearms, vehicles, or knives to strike, threaten, or attempt to assault victims.

For example, in the predominately ultra-Orthodox area of Stamford Hill, a victim was assaulted with a bottle while being verbally abused with antisemitic insults.¹⁴ The 182 incidents of damage and desecration of Jewish property marked an increase compared to 74 in 2022 and 82 in 2021. Most incidents recorded fell into the category of abusive behavior, with 3,328 incidents recorded in 2023 compared to 1,339 in 2022.

Reflecting on the situation in the United Kingdom following October 7 compared to earlier in 2023, Rabbi Herschel Gluck, the founder of the Shomrim Organization, distinguished in a conversation with the Report between his personal experience and that in his role with the Shomrim. While he personally has not encountered an increase in anti-Jewish hate, Shomrim received more reports between October and December 2023 than in the same period in 2022, though he did not provide exact numbers. “The vast majority of these incidents,” he stated, “are very minor... committed by disaffected white and black youths and are yobbish in nature.”¹⁵

Argentina (Jewish population 173,000)

The Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas (DAIA) registered 598 antisemitic incidents in 2023, compared to 427 in 2022, 488 in 2021 and 504 in 2020. Since DAIA recorded an all-time high in total incidents in 2019 (918), the number of incidents declined each subsequent year until 2023. Between October and December 2023, DAIA recorded 325 incidents, compared to 286 during the same period in 2022. The rise in 2022 was attributed to a large increase in online antisemitic incidents connected to the World Cup in Qatar.¹⁶

Russia (Jewish population 145,000)

In 2023, the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis recorded no acts of antisemitic violence and only a single act of antisemitic vandalism, compared to no acts of antisemitic violence and five acts of antisemitic vandalism in 2022, with one antisemitic act of violence and three acts of vandalism in 2021. It is the second straight year that SOVA did not record an antisemitic act of violence.¹⁷

The reliability of these data is questionable, given the current state of oppression and misinformation in fascist Russia.

¹⁴ Shomrim (Stamford Hill) (@Shomrim), “Orthodox #Jewish Victim Assaulted...,” X, October 31, 2023, <https://twitter.com/Shomrim/status/1719132103906922942>.

¹⁵ Email Correspondence, March 2024.

¹⁶ For DAIA’s annual antisemitic incidents reports, see: <https://www.daia.org.ar/>.

¹⁷ For the SOVA public database on acts of violence and vandalism since 2007, see: <https://www.sova-center.ru/en/database/>.


Australia (Jewish population 118,200)

The Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) recorded 662 antisemitic incidents in the country between October and November 2023, compared to 79 during the same period in 2022 and 91 in 2021. The number of incidents between January and September 2023 (371) was also higher than in the same period in 2022 (363). This includes the category of assaults, with seven incidents compared to four.

Among the incidents were three assaults (compared to two during the same period in 2022), including Jewish school girls having food thrown on them in Sydney, a Jewish cyclist with an Israeli flag pushed off his bicycle and kicked and punched in Melbourne, and a Jewish man assaulted in a public park by several individuals in Sydney. Graffiti, verbal abuse and antisemitic chants at demonstrations were also common and undermined the community's sense of security.¹⁸

Germany (Jewish population 118,000)

The Federal Criminal Police Office's (*Bundeskriminalamt*, BKA) Criminal Police Notification Service – Politically Motivated Crimes (KPM-D-PMK) collects data on antisemitic crimes and the number of antisemitic acts of violence. Between October and December 2023, the BKA recorded 2,249 politically motivated antisemitic crimes compared to 506 in the same period in 2022. Between January and September 2023, a decline in the number of politically motivated antisemitic crimes was recorded compared to the same period in 2022 – 1,365 in 2023 compared to 2,133 in 2022.¹⁹



In addition to the BKA, the Federal Association of Departments for Research and Information on Antisemitism (RIAS), also released data on antisemitic incidents that occurred between October 7 and November 9, 2023. In that period, RIAS recorded 994 incidents, including three acts of extreme violence, 29 physical assaults, 32 threats and 72 acts of vandalism. Among the incidents was the firebombing of the Kahal Adass Jisroel community synagogue in Berlin, a little

¹⁸ For ECAJ's annual antisemitic incidents reports, see: <https://www.ecaj.org.au/>.

¹⁹ For the KPM-D-PMK's reports, see: <https://dip.bundestag.de/>.

over a week after the Hamas attack.²⁰ During this period, there was an average of 29 incidents per day in Germany compared to an average of seven incidents per day in the same period in 2022.²¹

Brazil (Jewish population 91,000)

The Brazilian Israelite Confederation (Confederação Israelita do Brasil, CONIB) began publishing data on antisemitism in Brazil in 2022. In 2023, CONIB recorded 1,774 incidents compared to 432 in 2022. Between October and December 2023, CONIB recorded 1,363 incidents compared to 101 incidents over the same period in 2022. The number of incidents between January and September 2023 (411) was higher than during the same period in 2022 (331).²²

South Africa (Jewish population 51,000)

According to its annual report, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD) and its Community Security Organization (CSO) recorded 207 incidents in South Africa in 2023, compared to 68 in 2022 and 76 in 2021. This is the highest level of antisemitic incidents recorded in the country since SAJB began compiling reports in the 1990s. Between October and December 2023, SAJBD recorded 139 incidents compared to 19 over the same period in 2022. The 68 incidents recorded between January and September 2023 exceeded the 49 recorded in the same period in 2022 and equaled the total for 2022.

In addition to the sharp increase in incidents following October 7, the organization recorded an increase in the number of assaults and vandalism. In 2023, six assaults were recorded, compared to zero in 2022, two in 2021 and two in 2020. Among the most egregious assaults was an October attack on a Johannesburg rabbi, in which the assailant attempted to ram and run his car off the road while shouting antisemitic abuse and threats at him. The six incidents of vandalism recorded involved the desecration of Jewish cemeteries in Pretoria and Durban. The greatest number of antisemitic incidents in South Africa fall in the category of verbal abuse (targeted and general), with 46 incidents recorded in 2023, compared to 28 in 2022, 26 in 2021 and 27 in 2020.²³

While stressing the situation for Jews in South Africa is not “solely one of doom and gloom,” SABJD’s David Saks stated to the Report that “October 7 and its aftermath have undoubtedly placed much additional stress on the Jewish community, particularly at a time when South Africa’s grave social, economic and political challenges are causing many to question the community’s long-term future in the country.”²⁴

²⁰ TOI Staff, “Berlin Synagogue Firebombed, With Antisemitism Spiking as Gaza War Rages,” *Times of Israel*, October 18, 2023, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/berlin-synagogue-firebombed-with-antisemitism-spiking-as-gaza-war-rages/>.

²¹ RIAS, “Antisemitic Reactions to October 7,” November 30, 2023, https://report-antisemitism.de/documents/RIAS_Monitoring_Bericht_30-11-2023_Englisch.pdf.

²² For CONIB’s antisemitism monitor, see: <https://combateaoantisemitismo.org.br/monitoramento/>.

²³ SABJD reports for 2019-2023 were generously provided to the Center.

²⁴ Email Correspondence, March 2024.

Mexico (Jewish population 40,000)

The Tribuna Israelita, one of Mexico’s Jewish community organizations, tracks antisemitic incidents in the country, including those in mass media and on social media platforms. In 2023, the organization recorded 78 antisemitic incidents compared to 21 incidents in 2022, 19 in 2021, nine in 2020, and 12 in 2019. Of the 78 incidents, 52 were recorded between October and December 2023, compared to three in the same period in 2022. The 26 incidents recorded between January and September 2023 was greater than the 18 recorded during the same period in 2022 and the total for 2022.

The majority of incidents fell into the categories of graffiti (2023: 47; 2022: seven; 2021: seven) and verbal and physical threats (2023: 15; 2022: six; 2021: four). Prior to October 7, antisemitism had seeped into Mexico’s public political discourse around the 2024 presidential elections. In July 2023, former president Vicente Fox derogatorily referred to Mexico City’s former Mayor, Claudia Sheinbaum, as a “Bulgarian Jew.”²⁵

The Netherlands (Jewish population 29,800)

The Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israel (CIDI) recorded 107 incidents in October 2023 compared to 14 in October 2022.²⁶ Dutch governmental anti-discrimination agencies received 154 reports of antisemitism in 2023 compared to 69 reports in 2022.²⁷

Belgium (Jewish population 28,000)

Reports available from Antisemitisme.be, a civil society organization that records antisemitic incidents in Belgium, recorded 70 antisemitic incidents in Belgium in 2023 compared to 34 in 2022. According to the incidents published on its website, 62 of the 70 incidents occurred between October and December 2023 compared to three such incidents during the same period in 2022. Six assaults were recorded in 2023, down from the 17 antisemitic assaults in 2022, but higher than the three in 2021.²⁸ In one case, a Jewish man wearing a “Chai” necklace was assaulted by three men of North African origin at a Brussels train station. The assailants ripped off his necklace and shouted insults at him in Arabic.

Another independent body in Belgium that tracks antisemitic incidents is UNIA. In 2023, between October 7 and December 7, UNIA recorded 66 antisemitic incidents, which exceeded the 57 incidents recorded by the organization in total in 2022. Typically, UNIA only records four to five antisemitic incidents per month.²⁹

²⁵ Patrick J. McDonnell, “A Ranting Former Mexican President Manages to Offend Retirees, Jews and French,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 26, 2023, <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-07-26/a-ranting-former-mexican-president-manages-to-offend-retirees-jews-and-the-french>.

²⁶ For CIDI’s annual reports, see: <https://www.cidi.nl/>.

²⁷ CIDI, “Anti-Discrimination Agencies: Antisemitic Reports in 2023,” *cidi.nl*, February 7, 2024, <https://www.cidi.nl/antidiscriminatiebureaus-verdubbeling-van-antisemitische-meldingen-in-2023/>.

²⁸ For incidents and previous reports, see: <https://antisemitisme.be/fr/>.

²⁹ UNIA, “Antisémitisme en Belgique – Rapport 2024: Annexe au départ des signalements du 7/10 au 7/12/2023,” January 25, 2024, <https://www.unia.be/fr/articles/mieux-lutter-contre-antisemitisme>.

Italy (Jewish population 27,000)

The Observatory of Antisemitism of the Contemporary Jewish Documentation Center (CDEC) recorded 454 incidents in 2023 (259 incidents online, 195 in the “real-world”) compared to 241 incidents in 2022 (164 online, 77 in the “real-world”).³⁰ Of the 454 incidents in 2023, 216 were recorded between October and December 2023, compared to 67 during the same period in 2022. In the first nine months of 2023, there was already an increase in the number of incidents compared to the previous year – 238 in 2023 compared to 174 in 2022.

The 195 “real-world” incidents included one physical assault, compared to two incidents in 2022, five in 2021, one in 2020 and two in 2019. In that case, in December 2023, a Jewish school student was singled out by a classmate chanting “Free Palestine” and “Long Live Palestine.” The classmate urged others to attack the Jewish child, which they did as he left the school, beating and threatening him.

As in 2022, CDEC did not record a single case of extreme violence. These instances are extremely rare in Italy (in 2021, a Jewish man was attacked and wounded with a knife; no such incidents were recorded in 2020 and 2019). In 2023, CDEC recorded ten acts of vandalism and 67 acts of graffiti compared to six and 28 in 2022.

Switzerland (Jewish population 18,800)

The Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities (SIG), in collaboration with the GRA Foundation Against Racism and Antisemitism, recorded 155 “real-world” antisemitic incidents in Switzerland’s German, Italian and Romansh language areas compared to 57 in 2022, 53 in 2021 and 47 in 2020.³¹ This included ten physical assaults compared to a single incident in 2022, 47 incidents of verbal abuse compared to 16 in 2022 and 42 incidents of graffiti compared to nine in 2022. Of the 155 incidents recorded in 2023, 113 occurred between October and December compared to eight during the same period in 2022. The 42 incidents that occurred between January and September 2023 were slightly less than the 47 recorded in the same period in 2022.

In 2022, CICAD recorded 100 “real-world” antisemitic incidents in the French language area of Switzerland, compared to 26 in 2022, 22 in 2021 and 15 in 2020. There were 78 “serious acts” (graffiti, insults, and letters) in 2023 compared to 23 incidents in 2022, seven in 2021, and three in 2020, while in 2023 there were 22 “grave acts” (assault, harassment, desecration, arson, targeted threats) compared to three in 2022, five in 2021, and three in 2020.

³⁰ For the CDEC’s annual antisemitic incidents reports, see: <https://www.cdec.it/>.

³¹ For the SIG’s and CICAD’s annual antisemitic incidents reports, see: <https://swissjews.ch/en/> and <http://cicad.ch/fr>.

Spain (Jewish population 12,900)

According to the chronology available on its website, the Observatorio de Antisemitismo en España recorded 49 antisemitic incidents in Spain in 2023 compared to 23 in 2022, eight in 2021 and 16 in 2020.³² There were 17 acts of vandalism in 2023 compared to ten in 2022, including the defacing of a medieval cemetery where Jewish converts are buried and graffiti outside synagogues and other Jewish institutions. Other incidents involved promoting antisemitic tropes, largely connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, online in the media and on social media platforms.

Austria (Jewish population 10,300)

The antisemitism reporting office of the Vienna Jewish Community (Israelitischen Kultusgemeinde Wien (IKG)) recorded 1,147 incidents in 2023 compared to 719 incidents in 2022 and 965 incidents in 2021. Of the 1,147 incidents in 2023, 720 occurred between October and December 2023 compared to 169 during the same period in 2022. Prior to October 7, the average number of incidents recorded per day in 2023 was 1.55 compared to 1.97 in 2022, showing a declining trend in the number of incidents. Following October 7, the daily average rose from 1.55 to 8.31 incidents per day, increasing the daily average for the entire year to three point one four incidents per day.

In 2023, there were 18 physical assaults compared to 14 in 2022 and 18 threats in 2023 compared to 21 in 2022. There were 149 incidents of damage and desecration in 2023 compared to 122 in 2022, including an arson attack on the Jewish section of Vienna's central cemetery at the beginning of November 2023. The largest increase in incidents were mass mailings, with 536 incidents in 2023 compared to 140 in 2022.³³

New Zealand (Jewish Population 7,500)

While data on antisemitic incidents is not formally collected and tabulated, the New Zealand Jewish Council informed the Report on an increase in incidents after October 7, including physical threats and intimidation, vandalism of private and public property, online abuse and bullying of school students. In November 2023, a synagogue in Christchurch was vandalized twice, while over half of the respondents to a survey conducted by the Holocaust Education Center in Wellington reported their children had experienced antisemitism in school since October 7.³⁴

³² A chronology of antisemitic incidents recorded by the Observatorio de Antisemitismo en España is available on its website: <https://observatorioantisemitismo.fcje.org/>.

³³ For the IKG's annual reports, see: <https://www.antisemitismus-meldestelle.at/berichte>.

³⁴ "Christchurch Synagogue Vandalized," Star News, November 23, 2023, <https://www.odt.co.nz/star-news/star-christchurch/christchurch-synagogue-vandalised>, and JC Reporter, "Antisemitic Incidents on the Rise in New Zealand," *The Jewish Chronicle*, December 28, 2023, <https://www.thejc.com/news/world/antisemitic-incidents-on-rise-in-new-zealand-hj3rorir>.

Czech Republic (Jewish population 3,900)

According to data from the Police Presidium of the Czech Republic, in 2023, there were 18 criminal offenses against Jews in the country, compared to 25 in 2022 and 37 in 2021. The number of offenses against Jews also fell below those recorded in 2020 (27) and 2019 (23). Of the 18 criminal offenses recorded in 2023, seven occurred between October and December, compared to five offenses recorded in the same period in 2022.

Bulgaria (Jewish population 2,000)

According to correspondence with the head of the Organization of Jews in Bulgaria (Shalom), the number of real-world antisemitic incidents recorded in the country increased in 2023 compared to 2022, rising to 107 incidents in 2023 compared to nine in 2022.³⁵ Of the 107 incidents in 2023, 70 occurred between October and December 2023 and 37 occurred between January and September 2023. Shalom recorded five incidents in 2021, six incidents in 2020 and seven incidents in 2019.

³⁵ Email Correspondence, March 2024.

NEITHER HERE. NOR THERE

IS THERE ANY PLACE WHERE FRENCH JEWS CAN STILL FEEL SAFE?

Last December, France's President Emmanuel Macron invited the country's Chief Rabbi, Haim Korsia, to light the first candle at the start of Hanukkah. The occasion was an award Macron received for his efforts in fighting antisemitism.

In any other Western country, this gesture would have gained praise as a sign of respect for the Jewish community and for the existence of good, healthy interfaith relations. In France, a country of subtle nuances where symbols matter a great deal, it ignited a storm of public condemnations.

Macron was accused of breaching the French constitutional principle of *laïcité* that requires the complete separation of religion and state. Across the French political spectrum, this principle, put into effect in 1905 to end years of struggles between the Catholic Church and the State, is seen as essential to fulfill the promises the French Revolution gave the French and the world at large: freedom, equality, fraternity.

"As far as I know, this is the first time this has ever happened. It is a breach of secularism," David Lisnard, a right-wing politician who serves as the Mayor of Cannes, told the BBC. Carole Delga, Socialist President of the Occitanie region, exclaimed, "The Élysée is not a place of religion. You cannot compromise with secularism." Alexis Corbière, a far-left politician, asked if "Macron will now do the same for other religions? Some yes, some no? It's a dangerous spiral."

The bluntest of responses came from French Jewish leaders. They felt that Macron's actions endangered a foundation of their sense of belonging and security in French society at the worst possible time. "This is something that shouldn't be allowed to happen again," said the Head of the Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions (CRIF), Yonathan Arfi. The CRIF boss added that "anything that weakens secularism weakens Jews."

For French Jews, secularism has served for over a century as a guarantee that their religious and ethnic identity would not injure their integration and mobility in society. It blends well with the motto of the Jewish Enlightenment that called on Jews to confine expressions of religiosity to the private sphere.

The largest Jewish community in Europe and the third largest globally after Israel and the United States, French Jewry has proved to be a remarkable success story. It is a very Zionist community, with strong family and emotional ties to Israel. At the same time, it is a very French community – proud of the French language, proud of French culture, and proud of what Jews have achieved in France in the fields of culture, business and politics.

But for some years now, there has been a fear that this will not last.

“He [Macron] surprised us,” said Jonas Jacquelin, the rabbi since 2013 of the Copernic Street Synagogue, the first Reform synagogue in France, inaugurated in December 1907 by the Union Libérale Israélite (ULI). On Yom Kippur, as many as 3,500 local Jews attended the synagogue, and a nearby compound was rented for the event.

We sat in his small office on the second floor of the Synagogue. The walls were covered with religious literature in French, Hebrew and English.

Born in 1984, Rabbi Jacquelin is not fond of the notion that Jews should restrict their religiosity to their homes. He noted the result has been that some Jews have lost their identity altogether. However, he believes the constitutional fundamental of secularism has worked well for Jews and should be maintained. “It allowed us to be Jews, but not to be too much,” he said.

Tunisian-born (in 1940) Mireille Hadas-Lebel is a professor emerita of Jewish history at the Paris-Sorbonne University who served as the president of a Jewish-Christian association. She is the mother of five children. Her husband, Raphael, has served on the Council of the State (the French equivalent of a Supreme Court) and in several high-ranking public positions.

“We are against it. We thought it was a mistake,” she said of the candle lighting. “France is not America. It is not Israel. We like our Republican values. I know that we could never explain this to an American or a Brit, but this is what we are.”

One prospect particularly concerned her. “The next thing, we will have the Muslim ‘id celebrated at the Presidential Palace. This is a nightmare for us. In France, the public sphere should be religiously neutral. I don’t like religious Jews wearing tzitzit on the street. We should not be distinct from the other people. Being distinct can attract antisemitism.”

We met French-Jewish journalist Jean-Luc Allouche in a Parisian café. Born in 1949 in Constantin, Algeria, his family migrated to France when he was 12. A former senior journalist with *Libération*, a voice of the French left, Allouche is also an acclaimed translator of Hebrew literature.

He could not be clearer as to the Hanukkah debate. “I am 150% against it,” he said. Muslims have been arguing for years that there was a bias favoring the Jews. Macron’s breach would give them an excuse to claim that “Jews are allowed to do everything, and we are forbidden to do anything,” Allouche explained.

Allouche noted that while Macron participated in a candle lighting, he did not attend the massive pro-Israel rally in Paris following October 7, in which tens of thousands of French Jews demanded that their country stand against Hamas and against rising antisemitism in the country.

We heard the same criticism from a Jewish shop owner in his late 40s in the Marais (the unofficial Jewish neighborhood of Paris). He told us Macron is like a father who tries to please all his children. If Macron wanted to make a point, he should have attended the rally in support of Israel and against antisemitism.

GLOBAL OVERVIEW

The shop is visibly Jewish from the outside. During the afternoon in late December, it was full of customers. There was no security. In neighboring synagogues, entry required clearance but nothing more.

Across Paris, dozens of posters calling to free Hamas-held hostages were visible on shop windows and walls. Men wearing kippahs were seen everywhere. We visited one pro-Palestinian demonstration, which only several dozen people attended. There were fewer demonstrators than the number of police officers tasked with protecting the event. If there was fear on the capital's streets, we did not observe it.

The data, however, were alarming. As elsewhere, the immediate consequence of Islamist atrocities committed against Israelis was a steep rise in attacks against local Jews by people who most likely insist that they have no problem with Jews and claim their only issue is with Israel.

From October 7 to December 12, 2023, there were 484 antisemitic incidents recorded in Paris alone, compared to the 436 incidents recorded across the whole of France in all of 2022.

The rise should not be seen as a secluded outburst. Antisemitic attacks and expressions have shown a tendency to climb in France following Israel-Hamas escalations. Even in relatively quiet years, attacks have existed in significant numbers.

Since 2010, approximately 40,000 French Jews left for Israel, a wave of Aliyah third only to Russia and Ukraine.

Antisemitism was noted as the main catalyst for mass migration. The reality is more complicated, though. Cheaper and faster flights and economic opportunities, as well as the creation of small French enclaves across Israel, have made it possible for French Jews to move to their Jewish homeland without forsaking entirely their French homeland. Transnationalism has been accepted as a political norm in France.

In 2010, the Republic allocated parliamentary seats for representatives of French citizens living abroad. Israeli-French Jews now have a directly elected voice in the National Assembly.

The first deadly attack against Jews since the end of the Second World War occurred on October 3, 1980, in Jacquelin's synagogue. A member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Hassan Diab, planted a bomb outside the venue. It killed four people and wounded 46. There were 320 worshippers inside when the bomb went off during a Shabbat service.

Jacquelin has not been a victim of antisemitism himself. Still, outside the synagogue, he does not wear his kippah. This is in part because he was raised so and in part because he does not want to provoke antisemitic attacks.

He cautions that the number of antisemitic incidents does not tell the whole story. When Dreyfus was falsely accused, Jews were not massively attacked in France. But they recognized the hostile environment – that Jews were becoming a scapegoat and people wished them harm. Today, he feels France is returning to those dreadful days, with “death to the Jews” chants heard during demonstrations.

More than the antisemitic incidents that occur, some French Jews fear what they believe is the creeping, gradual Islamizing of their country. France is the Western country with the largest Muslim minority. There are approximately six million Muslims in the country, although the precise number is not known.

Some French Jews who left North Africa do not appreciate the public manifestations of Islam in their neighborhoods. They fear that they will be the first victims of the so-called “Muslim takeover” of the country.

Some who identified with the French left or with the center (many still do so regarding Israeli politics) have adopted the views of the French radical right when discussing migration policies and the future of Islam in the country. Generalizations prevail. The potential for dialogue is denied.

Every antisemitic incident adds to the stress. What may seem trivial and negligible for the majority is not so for members of a minority group that has learned the lessons of history. The Jewish shop owner told us that his friends’ children who attend public schools were physically attacked by their classmates on several occasions. Some of his friends hid their mezuzahs inside the house.

Allouche has a 15-year-old granddaughter who attends a public school. Not next year. Two months after the October 7 attacks, a classmate stood in front of her and the whole class and shouted: “I hate you because of your country.” The classmate meant Israel. In September, the granddaughter will transfer to a Catholic private school.

In the early 2000s, following 9/11 and 7/7, scholars advanced the thesis that secularism created a more cohesive society in France than in other European societies with large ethnic minorities. A French national team composed of ethnic French and sons of migrants won the FIFA World Cup. Hundreds of thousands celebrated in Champs-Élysées. Social tensions based on cultural and religious differences seemed like something from the past.

This was too naïve. France has been, and remains, a majority Christian and majority white country, where Christianity defines, to a great extent, history and culture, with ethnic French at the helm in almost every sphere of influence and prestige.

Trends and norms that made the integration of some Muslims difficult also made it to France. No country is an island. The awakening to that reality was harsh. Serious politicians will not argue that they have a magic formula to create one big, happy, unified nation.

What does all of that mean for the future of Jews in the country? The urgency of the question is highlighted by the political prospect that in 2027 the French will elect a candidate rooted in an antisemitic movement as their next President.

For a generation of Israelis, Yoav Toker was synonymous with Paris. The France-based correspondent of Israel’s public channel for several decades, he is currently a professor at the American University in Paris and at the University of California in Paris.

said that while she could not live in any other country but France, she also “could not live without Israel.”

The Jewish shop owner said French Jews always saw Israel as a shelter. Following October 7, they realized how fragile it was. He is not considering making Aliyah, but not because of security concerns. Rather, France is what he is used to and where he has a prosperous business.

Allouche has a cousin fighting in Gaza. The attachment of his family members to Israel grew following October 7. Some said they wanted to join the IDF.

Still, he will not leave France, and neither will his offspring. That does not mean he feels entirely safe in the country. “I always felt I was a guest in this country. I think it is preferable to think this way. That’s because I have studied history. I know that this country is better than ever before. I love this land, its culture, its people. But, I also know this can change in an instant. I know we are at a crossroads because of the lessons I learned from history that the younger generation is unfamiliar with.”

Rabbi Jacquelin said that since October 7, more people have attended the synagogue. They want to find solidarity. Their emotional attachment to Israel grew. He is not optimistic about the future of Jews in France: “In 10 years, I fear we will not be better off. That is because of changing demographics, because of the economy. Non-French Jews are also concerned about the future.”

Does he consider Israel a potential safe haven for his family? “Well, there we will be a target as well. Perhaps it is the Jewish destiny, to be a target.”

- Prof. Uriya Shavit and Dr. Carl Yonker

SECTION 2
THE AFTERMATH OF
OCTOBER 7



THE UNITED STATES FAR RIGHT AND WRONG

While much attention has been given in the media to the tsunami of heinous antisemitic expressions by elements within the American far-left following October 7, alarming voices were also heard among the American extreme right. Neo-Nazis, white supremacists, white nationalists and elements within Christian nationalism (the idea that the American nation is defined by Christianity) welcomed and celebrated Hamas' attack. They glorified the Palestinian terrorist organization and spread its propaganda while positioning themselves as defenders of the Palestinian national cause.

Neo-Nazis, white supremacists and white nationalists have never been lovers of Zion or Jews in general. Antisemitic views among some Christian nationalists are a more recent development. Antisemitism is considered the lowest common denominator that often, but not always, binds an otherwise splintered American far-right together.

According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, as of 2022, there were over two hundred neo-Nazi, white supremacist and white nationalist hate groups spread across the United States. Several of these groups, particularly the Patriot Front, Goyim Defense League (GDL), and White Lives Matter (WLM), have been the top distributors of antisemitic propaganda in recent years, according to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Researchers at Lehigh University studying the far-right found in surveys they conducted that “four percent [of Americans] identify with neo-Nazis and about one in ten identify as white nationalists.”¹ The last figure represents over 30 million Americans.

For those whose views serve an anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist ideological and instrumentalist purpose, October 7 was a golden opportunity to advance further their hateful and racist fringe perspectives into mainstream conservative discourse, using it to attack rivals, mobilize supporters and attract new followers.

In his first livestream after October 7, Jon Minadeo, the founder and leader of the GDL, referred to Jews and Israel as the “synagogue of Satan” and urged his more than 900 viewers that “now is the time to get these [antisemitic] fliers out there. This is in the media. A lot of people are getting sick and tired of these Jews. These Satan worshipers... I’m stoked, I’m happy to see Israel being attacked.”² On his Telegram channel, Minadeo praised the chants of “gas the

¹ See Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), “Hate Map,” splc.org, June 2023, <https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map>; Center on Extremism, “White Supremacist Propaganda Incidents Soar to Record High in 2023,” ADL, March 26, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/white-supremacist-propaganda-incidents-soar-record-high-2023>; and David Masciotra, “Right-Wing Extremism is More Common Than You Think,” *Washington Monthly*, April 10, 2023, <https://washingtonmonthly.com/2023/04/10/right-wing-extremism-is-even-more-common-than-you-think/>.

² HandsomeTruth, “482nd GTV,” GoyimTV, October 9, 2023, <https://goyimtv.com/v/1623206796/482nd-GTV>.

Jews” at a pro-Palestinian rally on the steps of the Sydney Opera House. He declared that we “need white people doing this.”³

Mike Peinovich, leader of the National Justice Party (NJP), characterized October 7 as “a great day.” “Free Palestine. Hail Hamas,” he exclaimed.⁴ Peinovich also called out “fake right-wing nationalists” who were not praising the attack as being “exposed.”⁵

Online, at demonstrations and through distributing propaganda in the form of banners, fliers and stickers, far-right groups also advanced antisemitic isolationist and anti-war narratives implying that Jews or Israel are in control and the primary beneficiaries of American foreign policy. At a rally outside the White House at the end of October, the NJP demanded the US end its support of Israel, praised Hamas, denied the Holocaust, and chanted, “No more Jewish wars!”⁶

The group White Lives Matter demonstrated in California with signs and hung banners that read, “no more wars for Israel,”⁷ while the New Jersey European Heritage Association (NJEHA) advanced the same message on its banners at demonstrations throughout the country and condemned “the 75-year illegal occupation of Palestine.” The NJEHA labeled Israel’s self-defense as an “inhuman assault” against Gaza and declared that the US would not be “dragged into another conflict at the behest of the Zionist Supremacist state of Israel.”⁸

The NJEHA also distributed new propaganda fliers with similar antisemitic isolationist messages. The hand-outs implied Jewish control over American foreign policy in the Middle East. They revived the 1967 USS Liberty incident in which the Israeli Air Force and Navy mistakenly attacked a US Navy ship.⁹ In Montana, members of local “Active Clubs” (a network of white supremacists from various groups who train for the war against the white race) praised Hamas and the Lebanese terror organization Hizballah at a pro-Palestine rally where they clashed with pro-Palestinian protestors who yelled at them to go home. In response, the white supremacists suggested they shared a common Jewish enemy and that for Palestine to be free, “the Jews have to be stopped.”¹⁰

One of the antisemitic narratives advanced by those on the far-right suggested that the Israel-Hamas conflict would accelerate and advance the replacement of “whites” in Europe and the

³ Handsome Truth (@HandsomeTruth), “We Need White People Doing This,” Gab, October 10, 2023, <https://gab.com/HandsomeTruth/posts/111211083166289200>.

⁴ Mike Peinovich (@mpeinovich), Telegram, October 7, 2023, <https://t.me/mpeinovich/2974> and <https://t.me/mpeinovich/2976>.

⁵ Mike Peinovich (@mpeinovich), Telegram, October 7, 2023, <https://t.me/mpeinovich/2980>.

⁶ Mike Peinovich (@mpeinovich), Telegram, October 29, 2023, <https://t.me/mpeinovich/3242>.

⁷ White Lives Matter California (@WLM_USA_California), Telegram, October 9, 2023, https://t.me/WLM_USA_CALIFORNIA/491, and White Lives Matter California (@WLM_USA_California), “We returned to Walnut Creek...,” Telegram, October 16, 2023, https://t.me/WLM_USA_CALIFORNIA/497.

⁸ NJEHA Official Feed (@NJEHA1), Telegram, October 14, 2023, <https://t.me/NJEHA1/1909>.

⁹ NJEHA Official Feed (@NJEHA1), Telegram, November 9, 2023, <https://t.me/NJEHA1/1933>, and NJEHA Official Feed (@NJEHA1), Telegram, November 14, 2023, <https://t.me/NJEHA1/1937>.

¹⁰ Benjamin Rubin, “Pro-Palestinian Protestors Clash with White Supremacists in Missoula during the Weekend,” *Daily Montanan*, October 24, 2023, <https://dailymontanan.com/2023/10/24/pro-palestinian-protesters-clash-with-white-supremacists-in-missoula-during-the-weekend/>.

United States. The white genocide, or replacement conspiracy, suggests there is an organized plot (typically by Jews) to eliminate the white race through mass immigration, assimilation or violence. Different versions of this conspiracy theory, often cloaked in more moderate and not overtly antisemitic language, have succeeded in reaching new audiences among mainstream conservatives in recent years. For example, Tucker Carlson, the conservative political commentator formerly on Fox News and now on X (formerly Twitter), gave voice to the conspiracy theory on his show. He suggested that “left-wing elites” are encouraging immigration to America.

Neo-Nazis, white supremacists and white nationalists are typically not concerned about hiding who they believe is behind the replacement conspiracy. They readily embrace those who espouse any version as being “based,” meaning seeing “the truth” or “reality” as it is. Immediately after the attack, white supremacists, white nationalists and neo-Nazis began pushing the narratives that whites in the US and Europe had never benefited from supporting Israel and that Israel had created, supported and funded, with the help of Jewish groups, the migration of Muslims to Europe and the United States. The NJP’s Peinovich stated that “Israel and Jews are creating and facilitating the problem.”¹¹

Addressing his followers, Thomas Rousseau, the leader of the group Patriot Front, linked the conflict in the Middle East to the issue of uncontrolled migration and worried that America was stumbling into World War III. Rousseau criticized Americans who advocated for Israel and accused them of hypocrisy for defending Israel’s fight for territorial integrity and its rights as a state but not America’s. Rousseau also implicitly suggested that “Zionists” were foreign elements “who are not loyal to the heritage of America or the political institutions outlined by [its] founders.”¹²

Reporting on their activity at the Montana demonstration noted above, White Lives Matter Montana argued that “a free Palestine means a Middle East that can take back its people from the West. The atrocities the unmasked Jew is inflicting on his fellow Semites are instrumental in the refugee crises they inflict on the West. Both problems have a common, twisted root.”¹³

Those on the far-right who advanced explicitly antisemitic versions of replacement theory were encouraged when influential figures like Elon Musk and Tucker Carlson advanced the claim. Commenting on an X user’s post accusing Jews of promoting hatred of whites, Musk wrote, “You have said the actual truth.” The billionaire ignited a firestorm for promoting the antisemitic conspiracy.¹⁴

¹¹ Mike Peinovich (@mpeinovich), Telegram, October 8, 2023, <https://t.me/mpeinovich/2998> and <https://t.me/mpeinovich/2999>.

¹² Patriot Front (@PatriotFrontUpdates), Telegram, October 13, 2023, <https://t.me/PatriotFrontUpdates/17192>.

¹³ White Lives Matter Montana, “Demonstration Report: Northwest States Coalition,” Substack, November 12, 2023, <https://whitelivesmattermontana.substack.com/p/demonstration-report-northwest-states>, and White Lives Matter Montana (@WLM_MT), “November 12th, 2023, Demonstration Report,” X, November 12, 2023, https://x.com/WLM_MT/status/1723787893045694535?s=20.

¹⁴ Elon Musk (@elonmusk), “You Have Said the Actual Truth,” X, November 15, 2023, <https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1724908287471272299?s=20>, and Blake Montgomery, “Elon Musk Agrees with Tweet Accusing Jewish People of ‘Hatred Against Whites,’” *The Guardian*, November 16, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/nov/16/elon-musk-antisemitic-tweet-adl>.

Carlson, who condemned the Hamas attack and stated that Israel had a right to defend itself in the immediate aftermath of October 7, criticized donors who stopped making contributions to universities in response to increased and unaddressed campus antisemitism but had (allegedly) funded “anti-white” racism and “genocidal” rhetoric against whites on campuses for years. While not explicitly stating that the donors were Jewish, his comments were understood this way by white supremacists who considered it an anti-Jewish “dog whistle.”¹⁵

Charlie Kirk, the head of the conservative youth group Turning Point USA (TPUSA), explicitly linked American Jews to supporting and financing anti-white causes in the context of his defense of Elon Musk.¹⁶ Still, particularly post-October 7, Kirk and TPUSA have long been outspoken in their support of Israel.

Before October 7, Nick Fuentes, who since 2017 has encouraged his supporters (known as Groyper) to infiltrate mainstream conservative institutions and influence the conservative movement’s rightward shift, has been a virulent critic of Kirk and TPUSA in the struggle for young conservative minds. In early 2023, Fuentes railed against TPUSA’s “Experience Israel” organized trips for young conservative leaders and argued that the visits were used to justify “Con Inc’s [...] enslavement to Israel” and were not about visiting the “Christian Holy Land.” While visiting the “Christian Holy Land” was acceptable, Fuentes, blending antisemitic themes of Jewish control with deicide, claimed that the trips were an Israeli influence operation on the American right. He stated that he was “sure these Zio Jews are paying for your trip so you can go sightsee where they killed our messiah.”¹⁷

After October 7, Fuentes used accusations that TPUSA and Charlie Kirk were antisemitic to question the taboo of unconditionally supporting Israel in conservative circles. How could America First policies, Fuentes asked, be achieved if conservatism is under such pressure from “the Zionists.” In its place, a “patriotic conservative political movement that is totally independent of these Zionists” must be created.¹⁸ Fuentes’ use of antisemitic and anti-Zionist rhetoric has not only come to form an integral part of his Christian nationalist and white supremacist worldviews. It is also a calculated populist political decision that seeks to exploit the generational gap regarding opinions toward Israel among both conservative and liberal Americans.

Fuentes, who has become increasingly outspoken in his antisemitism in recent years, shed any and all pretense after October 7 in his appeals to the anti-Jewish demographic. On Telegram,

¹⁵ On Carlson’s response to October 7, see: Tucker Carlson (@TuckerCarlson), “Ep. 29 After the Hamas Attacks, What’s the Wise Path Forward?,” X, October 10, 2023, <https://x.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1711496189323952185?s=20>. On Carlson’s comments on replacement theory, see: Eyes on the Right, “Tucker Carlson: University Donors are Funding ‘Genocidal’ Rhetoric Against White People,” angrywhitemen.org, November 16, 2023, <https://angrywhitemen.org/2023/11/16/tucker-carlson-university-donors-are-funding-genocidal-rhetoric-against-white-people/>, and Tucker Carlson (@TuckerCarlson), “Ep. 39 Candace Owens Responds to Ben Shapiro,” X, November 16, 2023, <https://x.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1724924211150389280?s=20>.

¹⁶ The Charlie Kirk Show, “If You Call Everyone Antisemitic, Then No One Is,” The Charlie Kirk Show, October 16, 2023, <https://thecharliekirkshow.com/podcasts/the-charlie-kirk-show/if-you-call-everyone-anti-semitic-then-no-one-is>.

¹⁷ Nicholas J. Fuentes (@nickjfuentes), Telegram, June 27, 2023, <https://t.me/nickjfuentes/11231>.

¹⁸ Nicholas J. Fuentes (@nickjfuentes), Telegram, October 16, 2023, <https://t.me/nickjfuentes/12033> and <https://t.me/nickjfuentes/12034>.

but mostly through his nightly livestream broadcasts, Fuentes has pushed his hatred of Jews and Israel while commenting on the Hamas-Israel conflict. Expressing little to no sympathy with Palestinians (beyond their usefulness in undermining Israel's international standing and credibility), Fuentes has railed against conservative support for Israel and has singled out Jewish conservatives in particular. During one program, he called conservative Jews such as Dennis Prager, Mark Levin, and Ben Shapiro a "parasitic force" and "double agents" who are seeking to weaken the United States and traitors who should be imprisoned or deported.¹⁹

In December 2023, during an appearance on white nationalist Stew Peters' show, Fuentes and his host talked at length about alleged Jewish control of the United States, particularly media and government. Fuentes referred to Jews as "a nation of sorcerers" and "devil-worshippers" who "run our media and our country." He and Peters listed how "Zionists" control American foreign policy and angrily pontificated on how "a country 6,000 miles away" could control us.²⁰

Like Fuentes, another antisemitic Christian nationalist, Andrew Torba, the founder of the alternative social media platform Gab, has shed all pretense regarding his anti-Jewish views. When the House passed a solidarity resolution with Israel in October after the Hamas attack, Torba referred to it as the "ZOG: Zionist Occupied Government" and praised Republican Rep. Thomas Massie of Kentucky for voting no.²¹ Torba also shared a video of antisemitic Christian nationalist pastor Rick Wiles, who could be seen attacking conservatives supporting Israel. Wiles argues that if one is a Zionist, then one is not a Christian. He suggests that Israel was preparing to slaughter every Palestinian in Gaza.²² While Torba has not gone as far as Wiles to promote antisemitic blood libels against Israel, now deleted posts and memes on Gab and Gab's Telegram channel suggested that Israel was the enemy of Christianity and deliberately targeted the faith and the faithful for destruction in Gaza and elsewhere.²³

Torba, like Wiles and more so than Fuentes, has used the events of October 7 to further advance Christian anti-Jewish narratives designed to undermine the concept of "Judeo-Christian" civilization and the theology of dispensationalism that tells us of God's parallel and enduring roles for Israel and the Church, while advancing Replacement theology – the notion that the Church replaces Israel, the Jewish people, as God's chosen. When Charlie Kirk posted a picture of himself at the Western Wall with a caption from Genesis 12:3 ("I will bless those who bless you"), Torba suggested Kirk get a Bible so he could learn the cores of Christianity, rather than be "under the antichrist Zionist spell of confusion."²⁴

¹⁹ Nicholas J. Fuentes, "Gaza War Day 12: Biden Meets with Netanyahu, Genocide Imminent???" | America First Ep. 1238," Rumble, October 19, 2023, <https://rumble.com/v3q9jul-america-first-ep-1238.html>.

²⁰ Stew Peters Network, "Live: Nick Fuentes on the Stew Peters Show! Why do Pro-Israel Zionists Control U.S. Foreign Policy?," Rumble, December 19, 2023, <https://rumble.com/v426z9q-live-nick-fuentes-on-the-stew-peters-show-why-do-pro-israel-zionists-contro.html>.

²¹ Andrew Torba (@a), "ZOG: Zionist Occupied Government..." Gab, October 26, 2023, <https://gab.com/a/posts/111301792553154215>.

²² Andrew Torba (@a), Gab, October 24, 2023, <https://gab.com/a/posts/111288445191689825>.

²³ On Wiles, for example, see his frequent tweets and Telegram posts, as well as broadcasts of his TruNews web and radio program.

²⁴ Andrew Torba (@a), "The New Testament Presents Jesus..." Gab, November 8, 2023, <https://gab.com/a/posts/111372011524415545>,

Some of the far-right activists who advocate hateful rhetoric against Jews do so because they are antisemites and hating Jews constitutes a core aspect of their worldview. Others are possibly not devout antisemites but recognize the appeal antisemitic notions have in certain publics.

A little over a decade ago, some scholars suggested antisemitism was a “dead prejudice” in the political repertoire of far-right movements, largely replaced by anti-Muslim prejudice.²⁵ This suggestion has proved misguided at best. Among neo-Nazis, white supremacists and white nationalists on the far-right, antisemitism never ceased to be part of the core ideology, while for some antisemitic Christian nationalists, hating Jews has developed into an ideological pillar of their populist nationalism.

American history has never been free of antisemitism, but recent surveys and studies on antisemitic attitudes in the country and across the ideological spectrum reveal a disturbing rise. A 2022 ADL survey on antisemitic attitudes in America informed that 85% of Americans believe at least one anti-Jewish trope, as opposed to 61% in 2019, while a 2024 follow-up survey by the ADL found 24% believe six or more antisemitic tropes, as opposed to 11% in 2019 and the previous high of 20% in 2022.²⁶

When the relationship between antisemitism and political ideology is considered, Hersh and Royden confirmed that in the United States, antisemitic prejudice “is more common among young adults [18-30-year-olds] than older adults” and found “that antisemitic attitudes are far more prevalent on the right, particularly the young far-right.”²⁷ A 2023 PRRI/Brookings Christian Nationalism Survey found that 19% of Christian nationalist sympathizers and 23% of Christian nationalist adherents believe that Jews hold too much power in the United States. The data show that 37% of sympathizers and 44% of adherents believe Jews are more loyal to Israel than the United States.²⁸

This implies that the far-right in America has an audience among which antisemitic conspiracies and narratives resonate and have standing appeal. Indeed, among American neo-Nazis, white supremacists, white nationalists and antisemitic Christian nationalists, advancing antisemitic political narratives that blame Jews for the concerns, grievances and unfulfilled aspirations of

²⁵ Ruth Wodak, “The Radical Right and Antisemitism,” in Jens Rydgren, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 103.

²⁶ Center for Antisemitism Research, “Antisemitic Attitudes in America: Topline Findings,” ADL, January 12, 2023, <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/antisemitic-attitudes-america-topline-findings>, and Center for Antisemitism Research, “Antisemitic Attitudes in America 2024,” ADL, February 29, 2024, <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/antisemitic-attitudes-america-2024>.

²⁷ Eitan Hersh and Laura Royden, “Antisemitic Attitudes Across the Ideological Spectrum,” *Political Research Quarterly* vol. 76, no. 2 (2023), 698.

²⁸ PRRI and The Brookings Institution, “A Christian Nation? Understanding the Threat of Christian Nationalism to American Democracy and Culture,” February 2023, <https://www.prrri.org/research/a-christian-nation-understanding-the-threat-of-christian-nationalism-to-american-democracy-and-culture/>. According to the survey, Christian nationalist adherents and sympathizers are those who completely or mostly agree with the following: (a) America should be declared a Christian nation; (b) US laws should be based on Christian values; (c) the country will be lost if it moves away from its Christian values; (d) being Christian is an important part of being truly American; and (e) Christians should exercise dominion over all aspects of American society.

ordinary people has become more prevalent, “serving as a powerful interpretive framework.”²⁹ These antisemitic narratives offer a comprehensive, often conspiratorial and simplistic analysis explaining what went wrong, why Jews are to blame and what can be done to resolve the situation.³⁰

The increasing populist mobilization of antisemitic narratives in divisive internal arguments and debates over policy and the direction of the Republican Party, even if taking place mostly online today, is a highly concerning development. The conservative establishment, from elected politicians to party officials and popular conservative commentators, remains firm in considering antisemitism anathema, condemning its manifestations and viewing with serious concern its mainstreaming within the party.³¹ The disagreement over Israel and the growing prevalence of antisemitic rhetoric reflects the raw, chaotic nature of the messy internal debates raging among the Republican base. The implications of the outcomes of these debates, especially as the presidential election nears, will have profound consequences not only for the future of American Jewry but also for the future of the Republican Party and American democracy.

– **Dr. Carl Yonker**

ACADEMIC FAILURES

On October 7, professors, students, and university staff across the United States witnessed the wanton slaughter, rape, and hostage-taking of Israeli Jewish and Arab civilians, as well as international students and workers, including young people of university age who, in an alternate universe, could have been their roommates, pupils, and friends.

While one might think that the best and brightest of America might be the beacons of morality in an international crisis, hundreds of students have gathered week after week, glorifying Hamas violence at raucous, and at times, violent, demonstrations on dozens of campuses across the country. Featured speakers have expressed support for terror to the frenzied delight of their audiences, who waved placards and flags and enthusiastically chanted slogans dedicated to the destruction of Israel and the broader elimination of the Jewish people, such as “From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be Free,” “There is only one solution: Intifada Revolution!” and “Glory to the Martyrs!”

²⁹ Jelena Subotic, “Antisemitism in the Global Populist International,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* vol. 24, no. 3 (2022), 458.

³⁰ On populist political narrative see: David Ost, “Politics as the Mobilization of Anger: Emotions in Movement and in Power,” *European Journal of Social Theory* vol. 7, no. 2 (2004), 229-244.

³¹ Mychael Schnell, “GOP Antisemitism Resolution Passes House, Fractures Democrats,” *The Hill*, December 5, 2023, <https://thehill.com/homenews/house/4343220-gop-antisemitism-resolution-passes-house-fractures-democrats/>, and Ben Kamisar, “RNC Passes Resolution Condemning Antisemitism after Trump Dinner with Ye,” *NBC News*, January 27, 2023, <https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meetthepressblog/rnc-passes-resolution-condemning-anti-semitism-trump-dinner-ye-rcna67922>.

Among the most egregious examples, a professor at Cornell University declared he was “exhilarated” by Hamas’ atrocities, while a professor at Columbia University wrote of the “innovative Palestinian resistance,” which he deemed “awesome” and “incredible.”³² The crowds were no better. At New York University (NYU), a crowd of more than 100 went even further, with some allegedly yelling, “Gas the Jews!” and “Hitler was Right.”³³

Professors around the country have also demanded solidarity with Palestine in the classroom and on campus. Among the most egregious examples, at Stanford, several Jewish students were told to stand in the corner while their lecturer minimized the Holocaust and harangued them on the evils of colonialism, saying an Israeli student was “definitely a colonizer.”³⁴

Jewish and pro-Israel students have been physically assaulted, verbally harassed, bullied online, and generally made to feel unsafe on campus, while Jewish fraternities, Hillel and Chabad houses, and even dorm rooms have been vandalized. Guards have now been deployed at some universities to protect Jewish students while attending Shabbat dinners.³⁵ According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), nearly three-fourths of American university students have said they experienced or witnessed some form of antisemitism since the academic year began.³⁶

Harvard became a test case for campus antisemitism when a suit was filed against it for events that transpired on its campus after October 7. Following the Hamas attack, more than 40 university student clubs and faculty signed petitions critical of Israel, crowds verbally abused Jewish students with chants of “killers and rapists of children,” Jewish students were bullied online with posts like “Harvard Hillel is Burning in Hell” and “Let ‘Em Cook,” Israeli students were accosted in lecture halls, antisemitic slogans appeared outside the law school, posters of Israeli hostages were ripped down numerous times, and both Faculty for Justice in Palestine and Students for Justice in Palestine posted a flagrantly antisemitic cartoon to advertise their latest events.

All this occurred as the leadership of academia fell silent, particularly at America’s most elite universities. Harvard issued a tepid statement only after its now-former president was publicly shamed and donors closed their checkbooks. This was replicated on other campuses where

³² WENY TV News, “Cornell Professor Seen Calling the Hamas Attacks ‘Exhilarating’ in Viral Video,” YouTube, October 18, 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ro1Op2lw3tk>, and “Columbia Professor Praises Hamas Attacks on Civilians,” *Jerusalem Post*, October 13, 2023, <https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-768109>.

³³ Jonathan Stempel, “NYU is Sued by Jewish Students Who Allege Antisemitism on Campus,” *Reuters*, November 15, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/legal/nyu-is-sued-by-jewish-students-who-allege-antisemitism-campus-2023-11-14/>, and “Bella Ingber, Sabrina Maslavi, and Saul Tawil v New York University,” US District Court – Southern District of New York, November 14, 2023, <https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/nyu-jewish-students-antisemitism-complaint.pdf>.

³⁴ Kelly Rissman, “Stanford Lecturer Accused of Singling Out Israeli Students as ‘Colonizers,’” *The Independent*, October 13, 2023, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/stanford-lecturer-jewish-students-colonisers-b2429542.html>.

³⁵ Haley Cohen, “Post-Oct. 7, Jewish Life on Campus Requires Extra Security,” *Jewish Insider*, October 24, 2023, <https://jewishinsider.com/2023/10/hamas-terror-attack-jews-campus-security-hillel-chabad/>.

³⁶ Anti-Defamation League, “Not on My Campus,” adl.org, February 2024, <https://notoleranceforantisemitism.adl.org/>.

weak, qualified statements appeared days or weeks after October 7 and discussed the atrocities in a passive voice. Others remained silent.

As Israeli, Jewish, and pro-Israel students were subject to physical and verbal assaults on campus, some campuses failed to respond appropriately. The moral timidity of these responses was laid bare at the US House of Representatives Committee hearing where the presidents of Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, and MIT could only answer “it depends on the context” to whether calls for Jewish genocide violated university policy. Due to the lack of administrative responses to antisemitism, perhaps unsurprisingly, dozens of campuses are now under scrutiny for Title VI violations (Title VI prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin in federally funded programs).

What can possibly explain the proliferation of physical violence and verbal assaults against both Jews and pro-Israeli students and the proliferation of anti-Zionist and antisemitic discourses on American campuses today?

The following interconnected intellectual roots played a role: (a) critical/liberated ethnic studies and discourses, (b) prevailing diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) frameworks that fail to account for antisemitism, and (c) Qatari and other funding from the Middle East.

Since their emergence in the late 1960s and 1970s, ethnic studies and associated disciplines became increasingly oriented toward discourses of post-colonialism, state violence, settler colonialism, and genocide, particularly inspired by the theoretical work of those like Edward Said, Frantz Fanon, and Michel Foucault. This worldview also embraced ideas of intersectionality – where class, race, gender, and other categories coincide in lived experiences of bigotry and oppression. Increasingly, ethnic studies have overlapped with a new field of “whiteness studies” and “critical race theory,” which seeks to understand legal and social constructions of race. In addition, transnational solidarities among perceived oppressed minorities have been part of the field’s scholarly and identity-formation agenda, and its aggressively activist political positions constitute a core part of its academic mission.

These embedded discourses and activism have also become fixtures of the broader literature and rhetoric of the humanities and social sciences, becoming core features of interdisciplinary research, teaching, and public engagement. They have also become incorporated into the professional bodies in the field. Professional organizations, search committees, editorial boards, and other administrative units act as gatekeepers, perpetuating these frameworks in academic hiring, publication, and advancement.

While the scholarly contributions of ethnic studies advanced the recognition of identity groups that have long been discriminated against in the academy and society, they have also helped enshrine rigid binaries that encouraged the viewing of Jews and Israel within broader constructions of power relations, race, and society. Within these hierarchies, (Ashkenazi) Jews have been coded as “privileged,” including within the power structure of white supremacy in the United States. This was done regardless of the complexity of Jewish identity and nuances of American Jewish history, including the long *durée* of antisemitism and Jewish victimhood.

Within this framework, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become a paradigmatic case of state violence, settler colonialism, and genocide, with Israel being considered an unfashionable entity in a post-colonial moment. There is little acknowledgment of Zionism as a movement of Jewish self-determination, safe refuge, or national liberation. At the same time, Palestinians came to be seen as the (symbolic) epitome of oppression and victimhood, with historical agency largely absent and terrorism often coded as “freedom fighting.” These binaries have come to dominate the field’s discourses and activist agenda and these framings have spilled over more largely into the campus environment, as reflected in much of the activities since October 7.

A corollary factor alongside ethnic studies has been in the institutionalization of DEI frameworks that do not adequately integrate antisemitism, particularly on campuses that intend to offer support for groups and individuals who have often been discriminated against or excluded from university spaces. University DEI frameworks arose mainly after the US Supreme Court decision on affirmative action (*Regents of the University of California v. Bakke*) in 1978, which allowed race to be considered in college admissions. It has since expanded beyond campuses and emerged as a significant industry and management tool in the private sector in recent years, particularly since the murder of George Floyd in 2020.

DEI has spurred training sessions and meetings, the hiring of specialized staff, the creation of diversity statements and bylaws, and the introduction of new programs and policies. According to one study of 85 campuses, DEI spending has increased 27% in the past five years and, at four-year public universities, constituting close to 8.5% of their annual budgets.³⁷ Some public and private universities even exceed this – the University of Michigan reportedly has over 500 DEI-related positions with a yearly cost of over \$30 million, while Harvard University is estimated to have 98 DEI-related positions at almost \$15 million a year.³⁸

Admirably, DEI initiatives do seem to produce results: a substantial increase in the enrollment of minorities and more supportive environments for students with marginalized identities.

However, DEI has been attacked for excluding some groups from its activities. Some conservative politicians and figures have railed against DEI for enshrining admissions policies that have systematically reduced the number of white, Jewish, and Asian students on elite university campuses. Enrollment at selective universities with traditionally sizeable Jewish student populations has been cut dramatically: from 40% in 1967 to 33% in the early 2000s to 16% at the University of Pennsylvania today, while most other Ivy League universities hover around 10%, falling from 20-25% decades ago.³⁹

³⁷ Insight Staff, “An Insight Investigation: Accounting for Just .5% of Higher Education’s Budgets, Even Minimal Diversity Funding Supports Their Bottom Line,” Insight into Diversity, October 16, 2019, <https://www.insightintodiversity.com/an-insight-investigation-accounting-for-just-0-5-of-higher-educations-budgets-even-minimal-diversity-funding-supports-their-bottom-line/>.

³⁸ Jennifer Kabany, “UMICH Now Has More Than 500 Jobs Dedicated to DEI, Payroll Costs Exceed \$30 Million,” *The College Fix*, January 9, 2024, <https://www.thecollegefix.com/umich-now-has-more-than-500-jobs-dedicated-to-dei-payroll-costs-exceed-30-million/>, and Heather MacDonald, “Conservative Donors, Wake Up!” *City Journal*, Summer 2023, <https://www.city-journal.org/article/conservative-donors-wake-up>.

³⁹ Sara Weissman, “Jewish Enrollment is Down at Many Ivies,” *Inside Higher Ed*, May 8, 2023, <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/admissions/2023/05/08/jewish-student-enrollment-down-many-ivies>.

Some conservatives also charge that DEI promotes divisiveness and preferential hierarchies between groups, and generally empowers activist and political agendas of Critical Race Theory (CRT) to dismantle the existing system, among other things.

DEI programs and frameworks also have been indicted for both ignoring and fomenting antisemitism on campuses. Since (Ashkenazi) Jews in the United States in generations have predominantly been coded as a white and privileged minority, they were an ethnic group generally excluded from the traditional purview of DEI.

For example, Harvard University announced it would expand its DEI programming to include combatting antisemitism in November 2023 after coming under intense criticism.⁴⁰

Moreover, a recent report found only two of 24 programs surveyed in 2022 had antisemitism training or programs as part of the broader mission of promoting minorities.⁴¹ DEI frequently does not see Jews as a marginalized group, given its understanding of power relations, even though Jews are only 2% of the American population.

While DEI might have begun to identify traditional right-wing antisemitism as a threat to Jewish communities in the wake of the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting in 2018, it has largely proved incapable, both before and after October 7, of distinguishing and deterring antisemitism on the far-left, downplaying or diminishing its manifestations.

A third factor that has been thrust into the spotlight again is the issue of donations to American public and private universities by Qatar and other Middle Eastern governments that are hostile to Israel and known sponsors of Hamas. At the forefront of funding is Qatar and its Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development, which was established in 1995. Through the Qatar Foundation, the Gulf country became the primary donor to Middle Eastern Studies programs across the United States. Also, it established satellite campuses in Qatar for several leading American universities, such as Northwestern University and Georgetown University.

Conservative estimates suggest that in the two decades since 9/11, Qatar has contributed over \$4.7 billion to various American higher education institutes.⁴² A 2023 report that examined higher education funding from other Arab states found the largest donors to be Saudi Arabia (\$2.9 billion), the UAE (\$1.3 billion), and Kuwait (\$858 million), which, together with Qatar, constitute 23% of all American university donations per annum.⁴³

These countries' support for Middle East studies is perhaps apparent, but their broader intellectual and social agendas on university campuses are less so. These countries have worked to position themselves as benevolent, even enlightened, patrons of the arts and sciences at American universities, establishing critical alliances with pipelines to significant centers of

⁴⁰ Janet Lorin, "Harvard to Add Antisemitism to DEI after Ackman Criticism," Bloomberg, November 9, 2023, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-09/harvard-to-add-antisemitism-to-dei-policy-after-ackman-criticism>.

⁴¹ StopAntisemitism, "Antisemitism on US College and University Campuses – 2022 Report Card," StopAntisemitism, n.d., <https://stopantisemitism.org/reports/>.

⁴² Sophie Shulman, "Tuition of Terror," Ctech-Calcalist, October 30, 2023, <https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/jwhsqhrat>.

⁴³ Ibid.

power and influence in the United States. Yet, by dint of their affiliations, campuses sponsored by despotic and anti-Zionist regimes are sometimes silent partners to rampant human rights abuses and illiberal agendas.

Antisemitism today seems to have taken firm root in the academy. One wonders whether university administrations will have the courage to demand changes in curricula and narratives, amend DEI programs, and condition or refuse foreign funding. Ultimately, antisemitism in the academy reflects a profound failure of education. If this is what informed student-citizens in a democratic society think and do, then the great American universities have utterly failed them. They have been taught polemics rather than principles, apologetics rather than analysis, and convenient truths rather than critical thinking.

– Dr. Sara Yael Hirschhorn

THE ARAB WORLD

A TALE OF HATE AND DARKNESS

Following the October 7 attack, there has been a significant surge in antisemitic expressions in Arab discourse. It involved the demonization of Jews in religious terms, the propagation of conspiracy theories alleging, among other things, the existence of Jewish control over global media, and narratives that deny or distort the scope and nature of the war crimes committed by Hamas.

Between October 7 and October 31, CyberWell, a non-profit organization monitoring antisemitism on social media, reported that in comparison to previous months, the levels of content identified as highly antisemitic had doubled.¹ A late December 2023 report from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) highlighted a similar rise in antisemitic political cartoons in the Arabic press, further evidence of the surge in such sentiments.²

Arab antisemitic expressions following the October 7 attack extended well beyond the borders of Gaza. They involved officials in various states, including those that have signed peace or normalization treaties with Israel, as well as religious leaders and institutions, political groups and parties, media corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and social media users.

The Egyptian al-Azhar, one of the most prestigious religious institutions in Egypt and the wider Sunni Muslim world, is affiliated and financially supported by the Egyptian State. Following October 7, scholars at the university launched an antisemitic campaign, referring to Israel as the “Zionist enemy.” Al-Azhar’s official social media pages characterized Israel as a “bloodthirsty wolf” that delights in “eating the flesh and drinking the blood” of children, women and the innocent.³ One scholar, Sheikh ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Atrash, called for boycotting international companies owned by Jews and those collaborating with Jews, whom he referred to as “treacherous people.”⁴

Another Al-Azhar scholar, Muhammad ‘Umar al-Qadi, the institution’s Dean of the Faculty for Islamic and Arabic Studies, wrote on his Facebook page that “[In speaking of] resistance, I refer to the jihad fighters in Palestine, who defend their honor and land, those who fight their

¹ CyberWell, “Israel-Hamas War: Trending Antisemitic Narratives & Calls to Violence,” November 2023, <https://cyberwell.org/reports/>.

² Anti-Defamation League, “Antisemitism in Arab Cartoons during the Israel-Hamas War: A Chronology of Dehumanization of Jews and Demonization of Zionism and Israel,” ADL, December 21, 2023, <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/antisemitism-arab-cartoons-during-israel-hamas-war-chronology-dehumanization-jews>.

³ Al Azhar (@AlAzhar), “Laqad tahawwala al-‘adu al-sahyuni...,” X, November 1, 2023, <https://twitter.com/AlAzhar/status/1719723797735985469>; For further a review of these views see Ofir Winter and Michael Barak, “Al-Azhar’s stance: A Blow to the Global Fight Against Terror – Opinion,” *The Jerusalem Post*, November 8, 2023, <https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-772171>.

⁴ “Ma Hukm al-‘Aml fi Sharikat Yamtalikuha al-Yahud?.. Azhari Yajib,” *Cairo 24*, n.d., <https://www.cairo24.com/1888808>.

enemies and ours, specifically the Jews [...] I pray for Allah’s support for His soldiers and His camp, and for victory to be bestowed upon our brethren in Gaza, Palestine, and other Muslim nations against their enemy and ours, the foe of both Allah and humanity, those cursed descendants of apes and pigs.”⁵

The Moroccan Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party (PJD) also engaged in spreading hate. Abdelilah Benkirane, the PJD’s Secretary-General and former Prime Minister of Morocco, derogatorily referred to Jews as “idiots” and “enemies of the believers,” claiming that they had been “cursed by God and subjected to humiliation for 2,000 years.”⁶ Besides expressing support for Hamas, such statements are part of an effort to regain public support in Morocco after the PJD’s electoral defeat two years earlier.

These remarks reflect religiously motivated antisemitism, drawing on Islamic texts and traditions to portray Jews and Israelis as foes of both Islam and humanity. This narrative often recalls historical grievances, notably through the slogan “Khaybar, Khaybar, Jews, Muhammad’s army will return,” which incites violence by referencing the seventh-century Battle of Khaybar, where Muhammad’s forces defeated Jewish tribes. Demonstrations following Friday prayers on October 13 and October 27 at the al-Azhar campus featured chants of “with spirit and blood we will redeem you, al-Aqsa,” alongside the Khaybar slogan, underscoring the entrenched hostility and call for violence against Jews.⁷

Another aspect of antisemitic discourse in the Arabic press and social media following October 7 was the widespread use of antisemitic imagery through caricatures and AI-generated images. Portrayals dehumanized or demonized Israelis and Jews by depicting them as animals, monsters, or Nazis. For instance, Hespress, a popular Moroccan news website, featured a caricature in early November showing Israel or the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as a rat adorned with an American flag earring and with its tail chopped off by a cleaver labeled “Gaza.”⁸ Similarly, the Egyptian news portal Roz Al-Yousuf published a caricature portraying Israel as a monstrous snake devouring a bleeding Gaza as part of a campaign inviting artists worldwide to submit caricatures about the Gaza war.⁹

Similar caricatures have also appeared in publications across Gulf countries. For example, a caricature published in Bahrain portrayed a demonic figure with the Star of David on its

⁵ MEMRI, “Virulent Incitement by Al-Azhar: Praise for Palestinian Jihad Fighters; Israel is Destined to Perish; U.S. is the Greatest Satan; Jews are Descendants of Apes and Pigs,” MEMRI Special Dispatch no. 10952, November 10, 2023, <https://www.memri.org/reports/virulent-incitement-al-azhar-praise-palestinian-jihad-fighters-israel-destined-perish-us>.

⁶ Rym Bousmid, “Au Maroc, Benkirane et le PJD dérapent (encore) au sujet de la guerre Israël-Hamas,” *Jeune Afrique*, November 22, 2023, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1507000/politique/au-maroc-benkirane-et-le-pjd-derapent-encore-au-sujet-de-la-guerre-israel-hamas/>.

⁷ “Bil-Ruh Bil-Damm Nafdiki Ya Filastin,” *al-‘Arabiyya Misr*, October 13, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBhV_JIPp1Y.

⁸ Hespress, “Khasa’ir Isra’il,” November 4, 2023, <https://www.hespress.com/%d8%ae%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%b1-%d8%a5%d8%b3%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%8a%d9%84-1259744.html>.

⁹ MEMRI, “Cartoons in Egyptian Media Portray Israel, U.S. as Wading in Gazan Blood, Netanyahu as Hitler,” MEMRI Special Dispatch no. 10961, November 16, 2023, https://www.memri.org/reports/cartoons-egyptian-media-portray-israel-us-wading-gazan-blood-netanyahu-hitler#_edn8.

forehead, removing a mask labeled “humanity,” suggesting a duplicitous nature that hides malevolent intentions behind a veneer of civility. In Qatar, another caricature depicted Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu as Adolf Hitler, drawing a direct parallel between Israeli leadership and Nazi atrocities.



A caricature titled “The Ugliness of Artificial Beauty” featured on Al-Bilad (Bahrain), November 26, 2023¹⁰

Conspiracy theories were also common in the post-October 7 discourse, casting Jews as global manipulators of politics and economics. Jews were depicted as self-serving, cunning and the enemies of civilization, allegedly dominating the West, especially the United States, or colluding with colonial powers. Muhammad ‘Ali al-Houthi, a member of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, echoed this sentiment on his Telegram channel, stating, “Throughout history, Jews are known to only love themselves, constantly striving to uproot all of humanity so that they alone may remain.”¹¹

During a parliamentary session on November 21, Egyptian MP Diya’ al-Din Dawud called for Egypt to sever ties with Israel, describing it as “a Nazi country” and “the successor of past colonialism, and the ally of present-day colonialism. It is the ally of all the colonialist regimes in an attempt to destroy the region, with Egypt being the top prize.”¹² In Morocco, MP Nabila Mounib accused Jews of trying to infiltrate the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs¹³ and charged Israel with exacerbating tensions between Morocco and Algeria.¹⁴

¹⁰ The caricature is featured in the ADL’s report. See ADL, “Antisemitism in Arab Cartoons during the Israel-Hamas War.”

¹¹ MEMRI, “Yemen’s Ansar Allah Movement (Houthis) Promotes Antisemitism Between Attacks on Israel,” Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, December 6, 2023, https://www.memri.org/jttm/yemens-ansar-allah-movement-houthis-promotes-antisemitism-between-attacks-israel#_ednref1.

¹² DMC, “Al-na’ib Diya’ al-Din Dawud: al-quwat al-musallahah al-Misriyyah tahuzzu bi-da’am sha’bi didd ayi tahdid,” YouTube (14:26), November 22, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WeG8mKcoG0E&ab_channel=dmc.

¹³ Muhammad Adel Al-Tato, “Munib tahadhar min ‘ikhtiraq Isra’ili’ li-wizarat al-awqaf wa ‘sahyinat’ al-makun al-yahudi bi-al-Maghrib,” Al3omk, November 8, 2023, <https://al3omk.com/886054.html>.

¹⁴ Hafeez Al-Sadiq, “Nabila Munib tataham ‘al-dhubbab al-iliktruni al-sahyuni’ bi-ta’jij al-tawtur bayna al-Maghrib wa-al-Jaza’ir,” Le360, February 7, 2024, <https://ar.le360.ma/politique/NJ6CMF4WFJEQHDZGCNRVTBCCRA/>.

The discourse following the October 7 attack and the subsequent war has also involved glorifications and justifications of the Holocaust. Often, such hate is accompanied by implicit or explicit calls for violence against Jews or Israelis. Social media has seen a flood of messages in Arabic proclaiming that “Hitler was right”¹⁵ and expressing sympathetic views towards the Holocaust, suggesting that the extermination of Jews was justified.

Parallels were drawn between Israel and Nazi Germany, asserting that the conflict in Gaza constitutes genocide, comparable to or even worse than the Holocaust. The comparison of Israel and the IDF to Nazis, while not new, has gained more traction in the aftermath of October 7, with media outlets and social media users throughout the region referring to the war as a new “Holocaust” allegedly perpetrated by Israel. Such comparisons serve to trivialize the historical reality of the Holocaust and promote a narrative that aligns Israel’s actions in Gaza, aimed at a terrorist organization using civilians as human shields, with the systemic extermination of Jews perpetrated by the Nazis.

For example, the PJD party has urged the Moroccan government to sever ties with Israel, noting the “tremendous suffering of the Palestinian people in its struggle against the Nazi and racist policies of the [Zionist] enemy.” Similarly, on October 19, the Egyptian newspaper *al-Yawm al-Sabi’*, which is affiliated with the government, described the war in Gaza as “the Gaza Holocaust.”¹⁶ An op-ed in *Akhbar al-Khaleej*, a Bahraini newspaper recognized for its pan-Arab stance, contended that “what the Palestinian people have endured for the past 75 years is their own Holocaust [...] eclipsing Zionist narratives and legends about the Jewish Holocaust. The Zionist entity is accused of committing crimes unparalleled globally, making the Palestinian Holocaust a thousand times more horrendous.”¹⁷

The events of October 7 were denied in the spirit of Holocaust denial. One notable example is Queen Rania of Jordan’s interview with CNN on October 25, 2023, in which she repeatedly questioned the evidence Israel provided regarding the massacre.¹⁸ Her apologetic views attempted to maintain the portrayal of Palestinians as victims in global media and discourse, seeking to reconcile the dissonance between sympathy for the Palestinian cause and the crimes committed by Hamas on October 7.

Narratives that deny, distort or justify the October 7 massacre frequently merged with allegations that Israel propagates a false narrative that dominates Western media and aims to justify an all-out military assault on Gaza. These narratives sometimes falsely accused the IDF of being responsible for the majority of Israeli civilian casualties, disregarding the fact that much of the evidence for the massacre was recorded by Hamas itself and that its militants use civilians as human shields.

¹⁵ CyberWell, “Israel-Hamas War.”

¹⁶ Al-Yawm al-Sabi’, “Holokost Gaza.. Dabh al-Insaniya fi Mustashfa al-Ma’mdani.. Ghadan bi-‘al-Yawm al-Sabi’,” *al-Yawm al-Sabi’*, October 18, 2023, <https://rb.gy/j4azmd>.

¹⁷ Fawzia Rasheed, “Al-Holokost aw ‘al-mahraqa al-filastiniyya’ wasqot al-gharb!,” *Akhbar al-Khaleej*, October 22, 2023, <https://akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1345747>.

¹⁸ Sana Noor Haq and Claire Calzonetti, “Queen Rania of Jordan Accuses West of ‘Glaring Double Standard’ as the Death Toll Rises in Besieged Gaza,” CNN, October 25, 2023,” <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/24/middleeast/queen-rania-jordan-amanpour-interview-intl/index.html>.

Justifying or excusing the Hamas attack frequently aligned with its glorification and with calls for additional violence against Israelis or Jews globally. This was particularly evident on social media, where the Arabic hashtag Tufan al-Aqsa (Al-Aqsa Storm) was used to share graphic content celebrating the killing, torture, maiming, and kidnapping of Israeli victims.

While condemnations of the rampant antisemitic discourse were not common, they existed. Several Arab intellectuals, including Egyptian author and civil rights activist Dalia Ziada, strongly condemned Hamas' actions, criticizing the unjustified violence and atrocities committed against innocent Israeli civilians. In her media interviews, Ziada raised questions about how any person with a conscience could overlook or justify acts of murder, rape and kidnapping simply because the victims are Jews. She denounced such indifference as "insane." She underscored her commitment to speaking out against these injustices and to standing up for the Jewish people, rejecting calls from her critics to remain silent.¹⁹ She contested Hamas' portrayal of the attack as religiously justified by Islam and spoke out against the recent increase in Arab antisemitism, particularly evident on social media.²⁰

Antisemitism in the Arab world reached a new high – or, actually, low – following October 7. Yet the phenomenon is not new. The vicious flood of hatred has deep roots.

Antisemitism has been an integral part of Arab political discourse for over a century, tracing its origins to the work of Muhammad Rashid Rida, the editor of the modernist-apologetic Islamic journal *al-Manar* from 1898 until his death in 1935. Responding to the rise of political Zionism, Rida embraced antisemitic rhetoric already at the turn of the 20th century.²¹

The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a notorious antisemitic forgery first published in Russia in 1903, were translated into Arabic in the mid-1920s. Between 1956 and 1967, nine additional translations were published in Egypt alone, along with 50 books based on their interpretation. In 1958, Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al Nasser gave a copy to an Indian reporter, claiming it as evidence of Europe being controlled by a network of 300 Zionists.²² By the beginning of the 21st century, dozens of printed editions of the Protocols were documented, along with electronic versions of the book available online.

Mahmud 'Abbas, a founding member of Fatah and current Chairperson of the Palestinian Authority, submitted a PhD dissertation in Moscow in 1982 that questioned the existence of gas

¹⁹ Ruth Marks Eglash, "For One Acclaimed Egyptian Author and Activist, Speaking Out Against Hamas has Come with a Price," *Jewish Insider*, December 18, 2023, <https://jewishinsider.com/2023/12/dalia-ziada-egypt-hamas-activist-israel-terrorism/>.

²⁰ The Sun, "Egyptian author Dalia Ziada forced into hiding for siding with Israel," YouTube (21:30), January 7, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GstN0G51TwE&t=4s&ab_channel=TheSun.

²¹ Uriya Shavit, "Zionism as Told by Rashid Rida," *Journal of Israeli History* vol. 34, no. 1 (2015), 23-44.

²² Esther Webman, "Adoption of the Protocols in the Arab Discourse on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Zionism and the Jews," in Esther Webman (ed.), *The Global Impact of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion: A Century Old Myth* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 175-195. On the distribution of the "Protocols" in the Palestinian society in the 1920s see also: Joseph Nevo, "The Palestine Arabs' Attitude towards the Yishuv and the Zionist Movement," in Shmuel Almog (ed.), *Zionism and the Arabs* (Jerusalem: The Historical Society of Israel and the Zalman Shazar Center, 1983), 153.

chambers and the murder of six million Jews. Published as a book in 1984, ‘Abbas attributed the Nazi Final Solution to the Zionists.’²³

Antisemitic notions served as a means to dehumanize “the Zionist enemy” and frame the Arab-Israeli conflict in meta-historic and religious terms. Conspiracy theories regarding world Jewish domination provided Arabs with comforting explanations for their defeats by Israel. This despite numerical superiority, thereby absolving the Arab side of responsibility for unfavorable military outcomes. These theories suggested that Arabs and Muslims were not simply defeated by a small Zionist state but were overcome by a global malevolent power purportedly controlling the world through clandestine means.²⁴

Islamist movements, who seek to reconstitute Islam as a comprehensive and binding framework of life and identity, have integrated antisemitic notions into their discourses since their inception in the 1920s. This stems partly from their unwavering opposition to Israel’s existence, which stands in the way of the vision for Islamic political and geographic unity, their interpretation of the conflict in religious terms, and possibly the ignorance of their leaders. As a result, antisemitism became a fundamental of their historiographies and policies.

Drawing on Islamic traditions recounting conflicts between Muhammad and the Jewish tribes of his time, Islamist texts published since the 1940s have depicted Jews as enemies of the Prophet. They have even accused them of plotting his assassination. Jews were portrayed as possessing evil and treacherous qualities, deemed violators of contracts, and therefore considered unreliable partners for peace, let alone normalization, which entails cooperation, mutual trust and rapprochement.²⁵

Hamas’ antisemitism was thus not an Islamist novelty but a continuation of a longstanding legacy of hate. Article seven of its Charter envisions a world free of Jews at the end of times. “The Islamic Resistance Movement,” it states, “aspires to bring the promise of Allah to pass, no matter how long it takes. As the prophet [Muhammad], may the prayer of Allah and his blessing of peace be upon him, said: The time [Judgment Day] will not come until Muslims fight the Jews and kill them and until the Jew hides behind the rocks and trees, and [then] the rocks and trees will say: ‘Oh Muslim, oh servant of Allah, there is a Jew hiding [behind me], come and kill him.’”²⁶

Following the events of October 7, this anti-Jewish *hadith* (Prophetic tradition) is read differently, evoking images of Israeli Jewish citizens²⁷ fleeing for their lives, hiding in their homes, shelters, and orchards as Hamas jihadi fighters hunt them. These atrocities perpetuate animosity between Israelis and Palestinians in the foreseeable future, hindering efforts towards peace and reconciliation.

²³ Uriya Shavit and Ofir Winter, *Zionism in Arab Discourses* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 48.

²⁴ Shavit and Winter, *Zionism in Arab Discourses*, 47-51.

²⁵ Ofir Winter, *Peace in the Name of Allah: Islamic Discourses on Treaties with Israel* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022), 41-51, 114-124, 176-188.

²⁶ *The Hamas Charter (1988)*, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, March 21, 2006, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/pdf/PDF_06_032_2.pdf, 15.

²⁷ While the vast majority of victims of the October 7 attack are Jewish, Muslims, migrant workers and students from Thailand, the Philippines, Nepal, Cambodia and Tanzania were also among the casualties.

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The Charter, adopted by the movement in 1988 and unchanged since, frames the conflict with Zionism in Palestine as a struggle against “the Jews” (Article 32). Jews are portrayed as bloodthirsty demons plotting against humanity in general and Muslims in Palestine in particular, with Zionism compared to Nazism (Article 20). Inspired by the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, article 22 in the Charter asserts that “[the Jews] were behind the First World War, through which they achieved the abolishment of the Islamic Caliphate, made a profit and took over many of the sources of wealth [...] They were also behind the Second World War, in which they made immense profits by buying and selling military equipment, and also prepared the ground for the founding of their [own] state [...] No war takes place anywhere in the world without [the Jews] behind the scenes having a hand in it.”²⁸

In the belongings of a Hamas military commander who participated in the October 7 massacre and was subsequently killed, a note was found with words of encouragement to his troops before battle. It urged them to remember that the Jewish enemy is “a disease which has no cure except beheading and removing their hearts and livers.” The note also mentioned the names of some of Muhammad’s Companions, heroes of early Islam, who fought against Jews in the Arabian Peninsula. Such references imply a view that the contemporary conflict with Israel is yet another chapter in a long, unending struggle against the Jews throughout time and generations.²⁹

Hamas did not attack Israel only because it is antisemitic. However, antisemitism is an inseparable aspect of the rationale behind its war crimes on October 7, underpinning its relentless and indiscriminate enmity towards Israel and Jews. The proliferation of antisemitic expressions in Arab discourse following October 7, extending well beyond the rhetoric of Hamas and other Islamist groups, suggests that for the Middle East to achieve lasting peace, the international community must understand the origins and deep-seated nature of this hatred. It must identify and punish those who spread it and work determinedly to eradicate it.

– **Dr. Ofir Winter** and **Morr Link**

²⁸ *The Hamas Charter (1988)*, 27.

²⁹ “Documents Brought Back from the Gaza Strip Indicate that Hamas Premeditated Its Atrocities against Israelis and Kidnap and Maltreat Them,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, January 20, 2024, <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/documents-brought-back-from-the-gaza-strip-indicate-that-hamas-premeditated-its-atrocities-against-israelis-and-to-kidnap-and-maltreat-them/>.

RUSSIA

FASCISTS GOING FROM BAD TO WORSE

In 2023, the level of antisemitism in Russia intensified in comparison to the previous year. Senior Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin himself, have systematically used antisemitic tropes and Holocaust distortion to promote their political interests. Statements by government representatives encouraged and legitimized antisemitic discourse in traditional media and on social networks. Following the massacre in southern Israel on October 7, the antisemitic discourse escalated even more and translated into antisemitic events in the North Caucasus republics of Russia.

During a press conference on January 18, 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov compared Nazi Germany's policy for the "Final Solution" of the Jewish question to the efforts of Western countries to bring about the "Final Solution of the Russian question." He also compared the US-led coalition to help Ukraine in its war against Russia to Adolf Hitler's army that invaded the Soviet Union. The White House, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs, the Anti-Defamation League, and the European Jewish Congress condemned Lavrov. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement of condemnation in which it emphasized that any comparison of the Nazi plan to exterminate Jewish people to contemporary events is unacceptable. However, Lavrov refused to apologize, and the Kremlin did not respond either.¹

Against the background of Russia's failures in the war against Ukraine, Russian leaders continued to delegitimize the Ukrainian government through antisemitic statements against Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. These statements were based on the misguided hope that employing them would help legitimize the war. At the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, a well-attended international conference held in June 2023, Putin stated, "My Jewish friends tell me that Zelensky is not Jewish; he is a shame of the Jewish people." He also said that during the Second World War, 1.5 million Jews perished in Ukraine, most of whom were murdered by "[Stepan] Bandera's people."²

Putin spoke again on these issues at the meeting of the Presidential Committee for Patriotic Education "Pobeda" (Victory) on September 5 and claimed that 1.5 million Jews were killed in Ukraine by "Ukrainian nationalists and antisemites, supporters of Bandera, while the SS units did not even see fit to participate in these killings."

In an interview with a state television channel that aired after the committee meeting, Putin said that "the Western masters put a person at the head of modern Ukraine, an ethnic Jew, with

¹ "“Окончательное решение русского вопроса”: Лавров сравнил США с Гитлером, а россиян с евреями,” Newsru.co.il, January 18, 2023, https://www.newsru.co.il/world/18jan2023/lvrov_0015.html.

² "Путин назвал Зеленского позором еврейского народа," RIA, June 16, 2023, <https://ria.ru/20230616/zelenkiy-1878708342.html>. Stepan Bandera was a Ukrainian nationalist, head of the military wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, known for his antisemitism and collaboration with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union.

Jewish roots, with Jewish origins, to cover up the anti-human essence that is the foundation of the modern Ukrainian state and the glorification of Nazism.”³

The movie “Witness,” financed by the Russian Ministry of Defense and released in August, constituted another propagandistic attempt to misrepresent the realities of war in contemporary Ukraine through distorted references to Jews. It depicts a Belgian Jewish violinist who visits Ukraine days before the Russian invasion and witnesses the inhumane acts of its government and nationalists. Although the film failed at the box office, it testifies to the mindset of the decision-makers in Russia.

Putin’s statements, which combined severe distortion of the Holocaust and antisemitic tropes, received broad exposure in Russian and international media. The Ukrainian government expressed astonishment at Israel’s silence in the face of Putin’s outrageous words about Zelensky.⁴ However, the Israeli Foreign Ministry does tend to respond to statements by Russian diplomats that distort the Holocaust. In June 2023, after Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova criticized Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine for supporting the glorification of Nazi collaborators, the Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman replied that “no country will preach to the State of Israel and its diplomats about the importance of preserving the memory of the Holocaust.”

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs also came out against an article Zakharova published in the official newspaper of the Russian government, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, in which she claimed that the Holocaust does not refer only to Jews but also to other peoples.⁵ Israel emphasized its opposition to “any attempt to distort and trivialize the Holocaust, especially those that make political use of the greatest disaster of the Jewish people.”

An escalation in the antisemitic rhetoric was evident not only in Russia’s management of the war in Ukraine but also in its internal discourse. The entanglement of the Russian army and the huge losses it has suffered in Ukraine translates into taking a heavy hand against the “fifth column” and the “traitors,” those liberal and pro-Western circles who oppose the war and who, in Russian discourse, are traditionally identified with the Jews.⁶

In May, the theater director Zhenya Berkovich was arrested and accused of justifying terrorism. However, the real reason for her arrest was her public opposition to the war in Ukraine.⁷ A commentary in Russian media in the context of her arrest noted that “the Jews actively support

³ “Путин заявил, что «бандеровцы и иже с ними» убили полтора миллиона евреев,” *Meduza*, September 5, 2023, <https://meduza.io/feature/2023/09/05/putin-zayavil-cto-banderovtsy-i-izhe-s-nimi-ubili-poltora-milliona-evree>.

⁴ Guy Alster, “Senior Aide to Zelensky: It is not clear to us why Israel did not Condemn Putin’s Words [Hebrew],” *Walla!*, June 20, 2023, <https://news.walla.co.il/item/3587963>.

⁵ “Памяти всех жертв Холокоста,” *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, July 19, 2023, <https://rg.ru/2023/07/19/pamiati-vseh-zhertv-holokosta.html>.

⁶ According to the latest assessment, Russia lost about 300,000 of its troops since the beginning of the invasion. See here: “U.S. Intelligence Assesses Ukraine War has Cost Russia 315,000 Casualties – Source,” *Reuters*, December 12, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-intelligence-assesses-ukraine-war-has-cost-russia-315000-casualties-source-2023-12-12/>.

⁷ “Российский антисемитизм: давно не виделись,” *Riddle*, January 12, 2024, <https://ridl.io/ru/rossijskij-antisemitizm-davno-ne-videlis/>.

Wahhabism, and there is a feeling that they are doing this precisely against the Russians. We have a whole group of Jews who joined this organization and died in it successfully.”⁸

The toxic antisemitic discourse continued to reverberate through media and social networks without interruption. In August, Svetlana Talyzina, a movie actress, was interviewed on one of the most-watched programs in Russia. In her interview, Talyzina accused a group of artists of betraying Russia while highlighting their Jewish origins and the fact that some of them fled from Russia to Israel.⁹ The interview went viral on YouTube and on other social media platforms. While it drew criticism from Russian opposition circles, it was not condemned by a single government official in Russia.

Putin himself contributed to this witch hunt against “Jewish traitors.” Speaking at the Economic Forum in September, he used antisemitic tropes as he railed against the former Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Anatoly Chubais. Putin also referred to Arkady Volozh, the founder of the Russian giant technology company Yandex. He claimed that after moving to Israel, Volozh had been compelled to criticize the Russian invasion in order to please Israeli authorities.¹⁰ These comments marked the first time since the beginning of the war that Putin publicly voiced dissatisfaction with Israel and identified it with a pro-Ukrainian Western camp (despite Israel’s efforts to maintain a neutral position on this issue).

The intensifying antisemitic sentiment before October 7 explains in part the outbreak of hate toward Israel and antisemitism in Russia after the massacre. In his first response to the massacre, Putin did not condemn Hamas but made sure to point out the legitimate rights of the Palestinians (which, he argued, have not been recognized or obtained). In keeping with the anti-Western rhetoric since the start of the war in Ukraine, Putin blamed the United States for what was happening and for the failure to establish the Palestinian state. No official Russian representative phoned the Israeli prime minister to express solidarity.

Six days after the massacre, Putin mentioned in passing Israel’s right to self-defense, but at the same time, he compared the Israeli military operation in Gaza to the Nazi siege of Leningrad during the Second World War. For context, Leningrad is considered in Russian historical memory to be one of the most terrible crimes committed by Nazi Germany in Russia. Putin’s comparison of the Israeli military to the *Wehrmacht* was echoed in official media. Telegram channels that support Putin and his war in Ukraine did not hide their *schadenfreude* about the tragedy in Israel. They published messages such as “It’s a shame that too few people were killed,” “It’s a shame that you can’t join in,” and “There is no empathy and mercy for the Israelis who are fleeing the enclave cities.”¹¹

⁸ “Еврейский конгресс заявил в СК на антисемитизм эксперта из дела Беркович,” *RBC*, May 17, 2023, <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/17/05/2023/64648f459a79471bc32ca2c8?from=copy>

⁹ “Валентина Талызина: Ахеджакова, Брыльска, Зеленский и Гордон,” *Empathy of Manuchi*, August 15, 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SrlJVIDYmAQ&t=393s>.

¹⁰ “Путин высказался о Кудрине, Воложе и ‘удравшем’ Чубайсе,” *Vesti.ru*, September 12, 2023, <https://www.vesti.ru/article/3546737>.

¹¹ “Z-каналы радуются нападению на Израиль, завидуют ХАМАС и отправляют Макаревича на фронт,” *Channel Masha Borzunova*, October 13, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8SIC71C_BQ&t=393s.

The antisemitic events in the North Caucasus in late October were a natural result of the anti-Israeli and antisemitic hysteria in Russian media since October 7. Residents gathered in city centers to demand the expulsion of Jews and, in one place, set a Jewish community center on fire. The events culminated in the city of Makhachkala, where rioters managed to take control of the local airport and tried to attack Jewish passengers on a flight arriving from Tel Aviv. Putin accused the United States of attempting to destabilize Russia and sympathized with the residents of the Caucasus protesting in the face of what they described as Israel's war crimes in Gaza. He called on them to join the Russian army fighting in Ukraine "for the sake of Russia and the future of the Palestinian people."¹²

After the war in Ukraine began, the former Chief Rabbi of Moscow, Pinchas Goldschmidt, warned that in the face of military failures, the Russian government's hunt for "scapegoats" would not spare the Jews. Sadly, 2023 proved that he was right.

– Dr. Yaron Gamburg

¹² "Что сказал Путин на совещании по ситуации в Дагестане," *Vedomosti*, October 30, 2023, <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/10/30/1003393-cto-skazal-putin-na-soveschani>.

TURKEY

ANTISEMITISM, LIKE NEVER BEFORE

In the Fall of 2023, relations between Israel and Turkey were the warmest they had been in many years. Turkey's deteriorating economy, the lira's devaluation vis-à-vis the US Dollar and the grave need to attract immediate foreign investment pushed it to change its foreign policy radically. Both Israel's and Turkey's uncoordinated support of Azerbaijan against Armenia during the 2020 Second Karabakh War created a crucial common denominator. The generous Israeli humanitarian aid mission to Southeast Turkey after the February 6, 2023, earthquake also helped sooth past tensions.

Improved relations between the two countries withstood the tests of two tense Ramadans on Jerusalem's Temple Mount as well as Israel's limited August 2022 Operation Breaking Dawn against the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the Gaza Strip, and the countries' intelligence agencies worked together to thwart Iranian terrorist attacks against Israeli tourists in Istanbul.

Thanks to these developments, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came together on the sidelines of the annual UN General Assembly summit in September 2023. The meeting between the two leaders was characterized as the beginning of a new era. The two emphasized their willingness to cooperate on energy development in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Then came October 7.

Backed by the Iran-led axis of opposition to Israel, Hamas managed to sabotage not only the expansion of the Abraham Accords, i.e. the realization of the Israeli-Saudi normalization process, but also ruined the fragile Israeli-Turkish normalization.

On the first day of the war, while not condemning Hamas for the atrocities it committed, Erdoğan adopted a seemingly "balanced" approach, calling on both sides to show restraint and to renounce violence. Indeed, this policy maintained the Turkish stance adopted during the normalization process. However, amid the Turkish opposition's open support for Hamas from the outset of the war and rising Palestinian casualties, Erdoğan decided to change course.

Erdoğan adopted a pro-Palestinian position and a pro-Hamas stance. On October 25, 2023, Erdoğan rejected calling Hamas a terrorist organization, describing it instead as an organization of freedom fighters that seeks to liberate its occupied land. He ignored the fact that the October 7 attack targeted Israeli towns and kibbutzim within its internationally recognized borders.¹

On October 28, at the "Great Palestine Rally" in Istanbul that drew hundreds of thousands of pro-Palestinian Turks to the streets, Erdoğan formally put an end to the normalization process with Jerusalem. He used anti-Israel rhetoric to increase his domestic approval with a mind to

¹ "Erdoğan: Hamas terör örgütü değil, mücahitler grubudur," Euronews, October 25, 2023, <https://tr.euronews.com/2023/10/25/erdogan-hamas-teror-orgutu-degil-mucahitler-grubudur>.

the March 2024 municipal elections, thus turning Turkish foreign policy into a public relations instrument in domestic politics.

In his speech, he once again repeated his previous statement whitewashing Hamas and did not hesitate to label Israel as “a disposable pawn of the West in the Middle East,” suggesting that Israel is no longer viewed as a strong state in Ankara. Erdoğan went on and hinted that Israel would one day cease to exist and that when that day comes, his country would be willing to absorb the stateless Israeli Jews as the Ottoman Empire once absorbed Sephardic Jews who fled the Spanish Inquisition in 1492.² His words, typical of his Islamist background, indicated he desires Jews to recognize Islam’s superiority and rejects the Jewish right of self-determination in their ancestral homeland.

Following the October 28 rally, Erdoğan’s public criticism against Israel turned into a daily routine. While repeating the same kind of delegitimizing statements against Israel and its war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Turkish president went even further and tagged Israel as a national security threat to Turkey. In his November 11 statement, Erdoğan openly highlighted the Jewish “Promised Land” concept as a security threat against Turkey’s territorial integrity. He claimed that the so-called promised land concept envisions a Jewish state from the Nile to the Euphrates River, including 20 Turkish provinces in the southeast of the country.³

In this framework, Erdoğan portrayed Gaza as the forward outpost for Turkey’s defense against Israel. He even equated Gaza with Azerbaijan’s Karabakh cause, which was liberated from ethnic Armenian separatist-control in 2023. In doing so, Erdoğan elevated Gaza’s importance for Turks from a pan-Islamic cause to the cause of the Turkish state, in which Karabakh was once a part.⁴

Following Erdoğan’s statements, his government’s mouthpieces began to launch “historic inquiries” into the concept of the “Promised Land” and provided a fictional map showing all of southeast Anatolia and Cyprus under Jewish domination.⁵

Sabah and *Türkiye* newspapers launched an antisemitic campaign claiming that Jews around the world, particularly Israeli Jews, are buying land and private property in Northern Cyprus “to turn North Cyprus into a second Palestine.”

According to the newspapers, within ten years, Jews will finalize their “silent invasion of the north” by using “the land purchase method that was used in Palestine.”⁶ Despite the absurdity of the claims about Jewish land purchases in the northern part of the island, the president of

² “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: İsrail’i savaş suçlusunu olarak dünyaya ilan edeceğiz,” TRT Haber, October 28, 2023, <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-israili-savas-suclusu-olarak-dunyaya-ilan-edecegiz-807738.html>.

³ “İsrail’e vadedilmiş topraklar ve nükleer uyarısı: Sabrımızı zorluyorlar,” Yeni Şafak, November 11, 2023, <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/israile-vadedilmis-topraklar-ve-nukleer-uyarisi-sabrimizi-zorluyorlar-4573918>.

⁴ “İşgalci İsrail, Türkiye için de tehdit,” *Sabah*, November 21, 2023, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2023/11/21/isgalci-israil-turkiye-icin-de-tehdit>.

⁵ “İsrail’in ‘Vadedilmiş Topraklar’ hayali neyi hedefliyor?,” *Sabah*, November 18, 2023, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/tatlican/2023/11/18/israilin-vadedilmis-topraklar-hayali-neyi-hedefliyor>.

⁶ “SABAH’ın haberi büyük ses getirdi! KKTG’de sessiz siyonist işgale tepkiler artıyor,” *Sabah*, December 8, 2023, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/galeri/gundem/sabahin-haberi-buyuk-ses-getirdi-kktcde-sessiz-siyonist-iskale-tepkiler-artiyor>.

the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Ersin Tatar, said that he could not ignore them and would take necessary measures by enacting a new law to eliminate the “threat” against the Turkish sovereignty on the island.⁷

Yeni Şafak, another governmental mouthpiece, led the most vicious antisemitic rhetoric in the institutionalized Turkish press. It called not only for the destruction of the Jewish state⁸ but also portrayed the Jews and their religion as a “falsified, perverted 3000-year-old faith” that needs to be wiped out from the surface of the earth.⁹

Ali Erbaş, the head of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (“Diyanet”), made a similar slander. While characterizing Israel as the “Zionist terrorist organization that seeks to acquire the whole Promised Land,” Erbaş emphasized that “perverted Judaism, false theological obsessions and filthy politics” are the core forces driving Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.¹⁰

In the aftermath of October 7, distortions of the Holocaust became widespread in Turkish political discourse. Ömer Celik, the spokesperson of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), compared the Israeli government with Nazi Germany for not agreeing to a permanent ceasefire with Hamas. Celik missed the historical fact that the Jewish victims of the Holocaust were all unarmed civilians and did not constitute any military threat to Germany or commit atrocities against the German people. Further, Celik sought to portray Hamas as the victim of the war.¹¹

The AKP-led banalization of the Holocaust was adopted by the country’s so-called “mainstream” media organs. On December 10, the formerly well-respected newspaper *Milliyet* renamed Gaza “Gazzeschwitz” (“Gazze” is Turkish for Gaza).¹² Moreover, the newspaper made another outrageous accusation, comparing the territorial dimensions of Auschwitz (5 sq km) with al-Mawasi (3.3 sq km), the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) designated safe zone in Gaza.

The banalization of the antisemitic rhetoric in public discourse then became visible on Turkish social media. By using pro-Hamas hashtags like #AksaTufanı (“#Al-AqsaFlood”), a considerable amount of Turkish social media users declared their support for Hamas, insulted Jews and openly expressed their desire to see “Jewish towns” razed to the ground.¹³

⁷ “KKTC’de Yahudi istilasına karşı harekete geçildi! Yasal düzenlemeler yolda,” *Takvim*, December 8, 2023, <https://www.takvim.com.tr/video/haber-videolari/kktcde-yahudi-istilasina-karsi-harekete-gecildi-yasal-duzenlemeler-yolda>.

⁸ “Bu terör devleti yok edilmeli,” *Yeni Şafak*, October 18, 2023, <https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/bu-teror-devleti-yok-edilmeli-4568401>.

⁹ “Dünya bu virüsü yok etmeli: Gazze’deki katliamların sapkın arka planı,” *Yeni Şafak*, December 8, 2023, <https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/dunya-bu-virusu-yok-etmeli-gazzedeki-katliamlarin-sapkin-arka-planı-4580082>.

¹⁰ “Küresel güçlerin Gazze’de sergiledikleri tavır çöküşlerini göstermektedir,” *Diyanet*, December 11, 2023, <https://diyanet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Kurumsal/Detay/36062>.

¹¹ “Ömer Celik: Netanyahu hükümeti Nazilerle aynı şeyi yapıyor,” *TRT Haber*, November 7, 2023, <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/omer-celik-netanyahu-hukumeti-nazilerle-ayni-seyi-yapiyor-810724.html>.

¹² “Metrekareye 1,65 kişi! Auschwitz bile 5 kilometreydi,” *Milliyet*, December 10, 2023, <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/metrekareye-1-65-kisi-auschwitz-bile-5-kilometreydi-7047110>.

¹³ “#Aksa Tufanı Üzerinden Antisemit Mesajlar – Serdar Korucu,” *Avlaremoz*, October 7, 2023, <https://www.avlaremoz.com/2023/10/07/aksa-tufani-uzerinden-antisemit-mesajlar-serdar-korucu/>.

Despite the existence of civilian Israeli hostages kidnapped by Hamas, the same social media users sought to justify Hamas' inhumane acts by stating that all the Jews except children are considered soldiers.¹⁴ Even the death notice of the Israeli-Turkish dual citizen Avi Zakuto did not change this attitude. A large number of antisemitic social media users expressed their deep satisfaction with Zakuto's death, stating that they wished him "suffering within flames."¹⁵

The Israeli tourists who happened to visit Turkey during the first week of the war were also not immune from the antisemitic discourse. Turkish social media users portrayed the arrival of Israeli tourists as potential refugees who allegedly fled from Israel due to the war. A new hashtag, #WeDoNotWantJewishRefugee (#YahudiMülteciİstemiyoruz), began to appear on social media platforms, primarily X (formerly Twitter).¹⁶

Antisemitic social media rhetoric reached its peak on October 18 when a Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket fell short and hit Gaza's al-Ahly Baptist Hospital. Hamas accused Israel of killing more than 500 innocent people in the hospital. As Turkish media solely rely on Hamas sources, Israel was described as the perpetrator. Subsequently, Turkish social media users expressed their affinity for Adolf Hitler by sharing his photos and short videos. They attached captions like "Hitler was right" and "I wish Hitler could finish the job."¹⁷

Inevitably, the hatred on social media was also felt on Turkish streets. Some Turks expressed their open support for Hamas and its spokesperson, Abu 'Ubayda. Historical buildings and city squares were adorned with Abu 'Ubayda's posters, including in Ankara (the capital), Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Şırnak and others.¹⁸

Antisemitic calls also became visible on Turkish streets. According to some social media users, a flier posted throughout Istanbul called for "death to the Jews" and a "manhunt against the Jews living in Turkey." The picture of the flyer was posted on Reddit and X.¹⁹

Another disturbing public notice appeared at the entrance of an Istanbul second-hand book shop called "Rağmen Sahaf." Reminding of the dark days of Nazi Germany, the store owner put a "Jews are not allowed" sign on the entrance of his shop. Due to public outcry, local authorities later took down the sign. While the act was largely condemned as racist, similar

¹⁴ "İsrailli Sivil Rehineler Üzerinden Antisemit Mesajlar – Serdar Korucu," Avlaremoz, October 8, 2023, <https://www.avlaremoz.com/2023/10/08/israilli-sivil-rehinler-uzerinden-antisemit-mesajlar-serdar-korucu/>.

¹⁵ "İsrail'de Hayatını Kaybeden Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Vatandaşı Üzerinden Antisemit Mesajlar – Serdar Korucu," Avlaremoz, October 12, 2023, <https://www.avlaremoz.com/2023/10/12/israilde-hayatini-kaybeden-turkiye-cumhuriyeti-vatandasi-uzerinden-antisemit-mesajlar-serdar-korucu/>.

¹⁶ "#YahudiMülteciİstemiyoruz Üzerinden Antisemit Mesajlar – Serdar Korucu," October 9, 2023, <https://www.avlaremoz.com/2023/10/09/yahudimulteciistemiyoruz-uzerinden-antisemit-mesajlar-serdar-korucu/>.

¹⁷ "Hastane Saldırısı Üzerinden Antisemit Mesajlar – Serdar Korucu," Avlaremoz, October 18, 2023, <https://www.avlaremoz.com/2023/10/18/hastane-saldirisi-uzerinden-antisemit-mesajlar-serdar-korucu/>.

¹⁸ "Diyarbakır'da surlara Ebu Ubeyde posterleri asıldı," Artı Gerçek, November 17, 2023, <https://artigercek.com/guncel/diyarbakirda-surlara-ebu-ubeyde-posteri-asildi-273381h>.

¹⁹ "Filistin yürüyüşünde antisemit afiş iddiası: Türkiyeli Yahudiler hedefte," Avlaremoz, November 15, 2023, <https://www.avlaremoz.com/2023/11/15/filistin-yuruyusunde-antisemit-afis-iddiasi-turkiyeli-yahudiler-hedefte/>.

acts unfortunately occurred elsewhere. An Istanbul taxi bearing a sign “Israeli passengers are not allowed” was documented.²⁰

On October 28, the main entrance to Izmir’s Etz HaHayim Synagogue was vandalized with graffiti reading “Israel the murderer.” Luckily, the attacker was caught red-handed by the police.²¹ In Istanbul, the city’s only Jewish hospital, “Or Ahayim” (Light of Life), which has served the public since 1898, became the target of a demonstration by pro-Palestinian Turkish doctors who wore blood-stained surgical gowns to protest against Israel.²² As the protest echoed on social media, some condemned it and deemed it an antisemitic act. In light of this, the Istanbul Medical Chamber did not remain silent and issued an official condemnation against the protest. They stated that “peace cannot be provided with antisemitism.”²³

A day after the protest at Or Ahayim Hospital, due to the deteriorating sense of security in the Jewish community, the Ulus Jewish High School in Istanbul, with its 515 Jewish students, was formally granted special permission from the Turkish Ministry of National Education to conduct school online. The school also asked for further funding to enhance security around their grounds.²⁴

Some Turkish media began to consider Jewish Turkish citizens as legitimate targets. The antisemitic daily *Yeni Akit* attacked Jews living in Turkey who hold dual citizenship (Israeli-Turkish). The newspaper urged the Turkish government to enforce the 5901 law to terminate the citizenship of the “Zionist citizens of Turkey” who allegedly joined the ranks of the IDF to fight Hamas. The language of the newspaper sought to portray all Turkish Jews as collaborators with Israel.²⁵

In the same spirit as *Yeni Akit*, during a live TV show on Ülke TV, Murat Özer, a journalist with the newspaper *Akşam*, delivered a fiery antisemitic speech by calling on Turkish Jews to condemn the Israeli military campaign in Gaza. In his speech, Özer declared his hostility to Jews and downgraded their status to “guests” in the country instead of equal citizens. Özer asked Turkish Jews to condemn Israel as some American Jews had done. He openly threatened them, asking and demanding: “What do Jews of Turkey want? Our mosques and churches are bombed. There is no single minaret left in the Gaza mosques. Look! Here you can pray freely in your synagogues. What do you want? Do you want to drive the Muslims crazy? Renounce now!”²⁶

20 “İstanbul’da bir sahaf Nazi Almanyası’nı aratmıyor: ‘Yahudiler giremez,’” Avlaremoz, October 26, 2023, <https://www.avlaremoz.com/2023/10/26/istanbulda-bir-sahaf-nazi-almanyasini-aratmiyor-yahudiler-giremez/>.

21 “İzmir Etz Hayim Sinagogu’na Antisemit Saldırı,” Avlaremoz, October 28, 2023, <https://www.avlaremoz.com/2023/10/28/izmir-etz-hayim-sinagoguna-antisemit-saldiri/>.

22 “Balat Or-Ahayim Musevi Hastanesi yakınında antisemit eylem,” Avlaremoz, November 22, 2023, <https://www.avlaremoz.com/2023/11/22/balat-or-ahayim-musevi-hastanesi-yakininda-antisemit-eylem/>.

23 “Antisemitizmle Barış Sağlanamaz!,” Türk Tabipler Birliği İstanbul Tabip Odası, November 23, 2023, <https://www.istabip.org.tr/7719-antisemitizmle-baris-saglanamaz.html>.

24 “Azınlık okulları temsilcileri Milli Eğitim Bakanı ile buluştu,” Agos, November 23, 2023, <https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/29482/azinlik-okullari-temsilcileri-milli-egitim-bakani-ile-bulustu>.

25 “Siyonist uşaklarını vatandaşlıktan atın,” Yeni Akit, October 17, 2023, <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/siyonist-usaklarini-vatandasliktan-atin-1796488.html>.

26 “Canlı yayında anlamlı tepki! Siz Müslümanları çıldırtmak mı istiyorsunuz?,” Video 7, November 16, 2023, <https://video.haber7.com/video-galeri/255311-canli-yayinda-anlamli-tepki-siz-muslumanlari-cildirtmak-mi-istiyorsunuz>.



The antisemitic propaganda tabloid *Millî İnkılap*, an offshoot of the Nazi *Der Stürmer*

One of the reasons antisemitic views are appealing to some in the Turkish public is that they are deep-seated.

Anti-Jewish sentiments date to the 17th century and to the Muslim resentment against the *Dönmes*, the disciples of the false messiah Sabbatai Zevi. The *Dönmes* seemingly converted to Islam, practicing Muslim rites in public while observing Judaism secretly at home. Even today, the *Dönmes* are openly held responsible by various intellectuals and politicians for the 1909 Young Turks revolution that led to the deposition of Abdülhamit II. Several important political figures, from the founding father of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,²⁷ to the former Turkish president Abdullah Gül, were accused of being *Dönmes*. In 2005, Gül felt compelled to deny the allegations.²⁸

The Jews' refusal to assimilate into the dominant Turkish-Muslim identity and pledge their loyalty to the Ladino language instead of speaking Turkish triggered occasional persecutions during the early days of the republic in the 1920s. During this period, the antisemitic propaganda tabloid *Millî İnkılap*, an offshoot of the Nazi *Der Stürmer*, portrayed the Jews in derogatory stereotype depictions such as “black marketeer, materialistic, merchant, opportunist, hook-nosed, dirty...”²⁹ The Thrace Pogroms (summer of 1934), in which thousands of Jews were forced to flee from the Thrace region, and the anti-minority Wealth Tax policy (1942) were the immediate products of this vicious propaganda. Almost 100 years later, the excuses for hating Jews changed. But the hate did not go away.

– Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanaracak

²⁷ “Atatürk’ün Yahudi olduğunu açıkladığı bilgisinin yer aldığı iddia edilen kitap,” Teyit, July 26, 2022, <https://teyit.org/analiz/ataturkun-yahudi-oldugunu-acikladigi-bilgisinin-yer-aldigi-iddia-edilen-kitap>.

²⁸ “Abdullah Gül: Sabetayist değiliz,” Haber 7, June 7, 2005, <https://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/95891-abdullah-gul-sabetayist-degiliz>.

²⁹ Tanıl Bora, *Cereyanlar Türkiye’de Siyasi İdeolojiler* (Istanbul, İletişim, 2017), 383-387.

SCANDINAVIA

SOME COLD REALITIES

The Scandinavian societies regularly rank among the most free and most democratic in the world. Norway, Sweden and Denmark are known for egalitarian values and high levels of social trust and cohesion. Moreover, these nations have stood out with their high per-capita reception of asylum seekers and refugees. Scandinavia appears to be one of the world's more hospitable places for ethnic, religious, and other minorities. But how hospitable are they for Jews when antisemitism raises its head?

The true extent of Scandinavian commitment to diversity and inclusion was put to a strong test in the final months of 2023, when the October 7 massacre and the ensuing Israel-Hamas war triggered a wave of antisemitism that rattled Jewish communities. Antisemitic manifestations and their impact on Jewish communities appear to have been relatively similar in the three Scandinavian countries. The political response, however, varied significantly. While Swedish and Danish government leaders have demonstrated forceful and visible verbal support for their Jewish minorities, as well as taken concrete policy actions, the Norwegian political leadership has been markedly less vocal in its statements and reactions.

Reported cases of harassment, threats, and vandalism directly targeting Jews multiplied after October 7 in all Scandinavian countries.

In Norway, a country with a Jewish population of 1,500, the police noted a twofold increase in reported antisemitic hate crimes in 2023, with a spike following October 7. Some 40 incidents were recorded in 2023. That is 2.7 incidents for every 100 Jews living in Norway. By comparison, around 80 hate crimes targeting Muslims were recorded in 2023, or 0.03 incidents per 100 Muslims.¹ In other words, the Norwegian police recorded 90 times more anti-Jewish than anti-Muslim hate crimes when adjusting for population size. While we do not have descriptions of every incident, we know some have been serious and frightening. In a survey of 326 Jews in Norway, published in November 2023, some respondents described their experiences. The following examples serve as an illustration:²

“I have received multiple anonymous phone calls with threats.”

“Grave threats. We have moved to a secret address.”

“My son was threatened with a knife because he is identified as the only Jewish kid.”

“One of my closest has received death threats.”

“My son was threatened by someone who said they would beat him and use their knife on him.”

¹ “Dobling av anmeldelser om antisemittisme: Skaper redsel og uro,” *NRK.no*, December 20, 2023, <https://perma.cc/8RVE-86KS>. The Jewish population of Norway is estimated at 1,500, while the Muslim population is about 250,000.

² “Jødehatet,” *NRK.no*, November 30, 2023, <https://perma.cc/H4JL-V3Y7>.

“Both of my children have been harassed [...] they beat my son with a stick while shouting, ‘I hate Israel.’”

At 20,000, the Jewish population in Sweden is the largest in Scandinavia. Swedish police also recorded an increase in reports of antisemitic hate crimes, with 57 incidents in the month following October 7 (the previous month saw 39 incidents). As a police spokesman explained, “there has been a shift from verbal threats to more actions [...] Most remarkably, people are now starting to target individuals and seek them out where they live.”³

The Jewish Community of Denmark, where 6,400 Jews live, received 30 reports about antisemitic incidents in the first nine months of 2023. In the month following October 7, there were 80 such reports, including multiple death threats.⁴ Notably, a terrorist plot appeared to have been thwarted in December as Danish police arrested several suspected Hamas operatives believed to be planning attacks on Israeli or Jewish targets.⁵

The October 7 massacre elicited numerous public statements and acts of support and celebration across the world.⁶ Endorsements of the bloodiest attack on Jews since the Holocaust were observed in Scandinavia as well.

In Norway, Peder M. Lysestøl, a veteran communist who co-founded the Norwegian Palestine Committee in 1970, posted a public statement on Facebook the day after the massacre in which he lauded the terrorists. The first sentence of his post read, “We are impressed with the skill and bravery of Hamas soldiers and others who now successfully inflict a defeat on the Zionist occupiers.”⁷ The post was removed after being “liked” by some 50 persons, including university professors and a former leader of the far-left Red Party. While Lysestøl is not widely known to the general public, he has been influential in far-left and pro-Palestinian circles and a vocal participant in campaigns to boycott Israel.⁸

On national TV news on the evening of October 7, the current head of Norway’s Palestine Committee enthusiastically referred to Hamas as “resistance fighters” who had “liberated themselves.”⁹ In a more explicit show of support, a nurse posted a photo of himself on social media displaying a Hamas tattoo on his arm with the accompanying text, “A fantastic day!! May my brothers in Hamas cleanse the entire old Palestine of these Zionist bastards and their hypocritical supporters.”¹⁰ Similar statements, lauding the attack and referring to Israeli civilians as “Zionist settlers” and hence legitimate targets, were observed in online discussions

³ “Hatbrotten mot judar i Sverige ökar kraftigt,” *TT Nyhetsbyrå*, November 7, 2023. See also “Den antisemitiska vågens avtryck i Sverige. En lägesbild,” *SKMA Nyhetsbrev*, December 17, 2023, <https://perma.cc/JZ3Q-AHPP>.

⁴ “Det Jødiske Samfund har fået 80 henvendelser om antisemitisme på en måned,” *Ritzau General News Service*, November 8, 2023.

⁵ “Danish Police Nab Suspects over Alleged Hamas Plot against Jewish, Israeli Targets,” *Times of Israel*, December 14, 2023, <https://perma.cc/FTK6-TJPD>.

⁶ Derek Spitz, “The Professors and the Pogrom: How the Theory of ‘Zionist Settler Colonialism’ Reframed the October 7 Massacre as ‘Liberation,’” *Fathom Journal*, November 2023, <https://perma.cc/9BXE-LMTS>.

⁷ “- Kaller jødejakt frihetskamp,” *Dagbladet*, October 9, 2023, <https://perma.cc/5NWZ-HKR6>.

⁸ See Wikipedia, “Peder Martin Lysestøl,” https://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peder_Martin_Lysestøl.

⁹ “Reagerer på NRK-intervju: – Kvalmendem,” *Nettavisen*, October 9, 2023, <https://perma.cc/RNA3-2PUW>.

¹⁰ “Nurse in Norway Proudly Flexes Hamas Tattoo in Hospital,” *Toronto Sun*, November 2, 2023, <https://perma.cc/ZR4W-96NC>.

among supporters of the far-left Red Party,¹¹ reflecting a larger international trend of online celebration of the Hamas massacre.¹²

Demonstrations in support for the Hamas-led attack were most conspicuous in Sweden, where spontaneous gatherings took place on the day of the massacre in various locations, including Helsingborg, Kristianstad, Växjö, and Malmö, where participants waved Palestinian flags, sang, danced, and chanted. The celebrations were shared on social media, and commented on by individuals, including imams, teachers, healthcare workers, and aid workers. Some comments were positive, expressing joyful, even ecstatic emotions (e.g., “We have never been so happy,” “My tears of joy never end”).¹³ On October 9, up to 300 cars drove through Malmö in a pro-Palestinian demonstration.¹⁴

In Norway, antisemitic manifestations included the displaying of an Israeli flag with a swastika replacing the Star of David,¹⁵ antisemitic graffiti sprayed on the wall of an Oslo metro station (“Hitler started it, we finished it”),¹⁶ and chants of “Khaybar khaybar, ya yahud” during pro-Palestinian demonstrations.¹⁷ Antisemitic graffiti also appeared in Sweden and Denmark.¹⁸ In Sweden, the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement, a group known for its open Jew-hatred, joined the anti-Israel demonstrations with calls to “crush Zionism.”¹⁹ In Denmark, swastikas appeared in schools and universities.²⁰

The wave of antisemitism triggered by the October 7 attacks and the Israel-Hamas war became a major source of concern, worry, and fear in the Scandinavian Jewish communities. Multiple reports of Jews concealing their identity, fearing for the safety of their children and having doubts about the future of Jewish life in their country have appeared in all three Scandinavian nations.

On October 30, the Jewish Community of Oslo published an unusual letter entitled “Report of Concern – A Warning for Norwegian Democracy.”²¹ The report focuses on the consequences of a rise in antisemitic and extreme expressions in the discourse around Israel in both mainstream and social media, as well as in other public spaces:

11 Facebook post by Dag Gladmann Sørheim, October 11, 2023, <https://perma.cc/44TU-C7JK>.

12 Matthias J. Becker et al., “Celebrating Terror: Antisemitism Online after the Hamas Attacks on Israel” (Berlin: Technische Universität Berlin, Centre for Research on Antisemitism), <https://doi.org/10.14279/depositonce19143>.

13 “Palestinskt firande i Sverige efter attackerna mot Israel,” *Doku.nu*, October 24, 2023, <https://perma.cc/NK32-N3SM>.

14 “Firande av attackerna i Israel fördöms: ‘Är groteskt,’” *SVT.se*, October 9, 2023, <https://perma.cc/L4KS-KBRQ>.

15 “Politiet fjernet israelsk flagg med hakekors i Oslo,” *NRK.no*, November 5, 2023, <https://perma.cc/EQ3D-JLRP>.

16 “Etterforsker Hitler-tagging: – Mulig hatkriminalitet,” *TV2.no*, December 19, 2023, <https://perma.cc/3XRC-3ST2>.

17 “Ropte antijødiske islamske slagord under pro-Israel markering,” *iNyheter.no*, October 15, 2023, <https://perma.cc/J5XN-77KB>.

18 “Antisemitisk graffiti på central plads i København – nu griber kommunen ind,” *Ritzau General News Service*, October 10, 2023.

19 “Nordiska motståndsrörelsen agerade mot judar och riksdagspolitiker,” *Nordfront.se*, October 12, 2023, <https://perma.cc/A9SP-LTBR>.

20 “Minister beder skoleledere gribe ind: ‘På mine egne børns skole er der malet hagekors ud over det hele,’” *Berlingske*, November 24, 2023, <https://perma.cc/2FDB-WYPR>.

21 “Bekymringsmelding – varsko for det norske demokratiet,” *VG*, October 30, 2023, <https://perma.cc/4WW4-4CS7>.

“Words lead to actions, and the effect of this shift in discourse is now being felt in everyday life in a way we cannot remember in our generation. Several of our members have, in recent days, experienced threatening incidents against their homes because they are Jewish.”

The letter continues to mention disturbing episodes, including the tearing off of a mezuzah, the deliberate cutting of a family’s child stroller wheels and a harrowing incident where a Jewish family was awakened at night by someone ringing their doorbell, attempting to force entry and shouting threats outside their home.

The extent to which such acts of harassment, vandalism, and intimidation impacted the small Jewish community was documented by an investigation carried out in November by the Norwegian public service broadcaster NRK.²² Of the 326 Jews who responded to the NRK survey, the majority said they had experienced antisemitism directed at them personally or through their loved ones. A full 82% said their experiences following October 7 had made them consider whether Norway is a safe country for Jews.

Respondents who indicated having experienced one or more unsettling incidents related to their Jewish identity after October 7 were asked who was behind the most serious incident. The most common response was “someone with a Muslim background” (63%), followed by “someone with a left-wing view” (48%). Only 5% indicated that the perpetrator was “someone with a right-wing view.” This general distribution of the ideological and religious colors of current antisemitism was also found in the major EU FRA surveys of Jews in Europe carried out in 2012 and 2018. They are likely to be valid for Sweden and Denmark as well.

Swedish Jews were also surveyed in November. The vast majority of the 690 respondents felt that living with an openly Jewish identity had become “much more unsafe” (71%) or “somewhat more unsafe” (20%) following October 7. A clear majority (82%) said it felt unsafe to wear Jewish symbols openly. About half of the respondents said they had discussed emigration.²³

No similar survey has been carried out in Denmark, but media reporting suggests that the Jews of Denmark have lived through similarly difficult times following October 7. Some reports detail parents telling their children not to let others know that they are Jews.²⁴

How have Scandinavian political leaders responded to this situation?

Sweden’s center-right government, headed by Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson of the liberal-conservative Moderates, has been very clear in condemning antisemitism in Sweden and voicing support for the Jewish community.

²² “Jødehatet,” *NRK.no*, November 30, 2023, <https://perma.cc/H4JL-V3Y7>.

²³ Judiska Centralrådet i Sverige/Infostat, “Antisemitism i Sverige i svallvågorna av sjunde oktober” (Stockholm: Infostat, November 21, 2023), <https://www.judiskacentralradet.se/single-post/svenska-judars-upplevelse-av-antisemitism-efter-7-oktober>.

²⁴ See, for example, “Denmark Calls in Army to Defend Jewish Sites,” *The Local*, December 3, 2023, <https://perma.cc/3JYK-3E7L>; “Utrygheden stiger blandt danske jøder efter terrorangreb – mor har bedt sin søn skjule davidsstjernen,” *TV2.dk*, October 11, 2023, <https://perma.cc/99X7-PFMN>; “Danske jøder fortæller deres børn, de ikke må sige, de er jøder,” *TV2 ØJ*, October 18, 2023, <https://perma.cc/S9SM-AWZT>; “Jødiske forholdsregler,” *Weekendavisen*, December 6, 2023, <https://perma.cc/BBS6-T8WY>.

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On October 10, Kristersson strongly condemned the celebrations of the October 7 attacks that took place on the streets of Swedish cities. “They should be ashamed and it is a disgrace for Sweden that such a thing can occur at all,” the PM said. He also expressed strong concern over rising antisemitism and called on the state, municipalities and schools to be decisive in marking Jew-hatred as unacceptable.²⁵ A few days later, the government’s concern was reaffirmed as three ministers met with representatives of Jewish communities to discuss challenges relating to antisemitism and how to tackle them in the future.²⁶ Words were backed up by deeds as the government later announced increased financial support to aid the Jewish community and help combat antisemitism.²⁷

Kristersson followed up throughout November and December with multiple public statements, op-eds, and symbolic visits to Jewish sites showing the government’s support for Swedish Jews. On November 8, he published an op-ed calling antisemitism “a disgrace to our country,” vowing never to accept a development in which Jews feel increasingly unsafe in Sweden, and listing a number of government policies in place to counter and prevent antisemitism.²⁸

On December 6, not only Kristersson, but also leading representatives of all parties in the Swedish Parliament (except the far-right Sweden Democrats), participated in a “kippah march” in solidarity with the Jewish community. Both Kristersson and Magdalena Andersson, head of the Social Democratic Party and the parliamentary opposition, spoke during the event. Andersson spoke of Jewish life in Sweden as “an inalienable part of our society,” calling for a “principled and vigorous” fight against “antisemitism in all its forms.”²⁹

Denmark’s bipartisan government, headed by Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen of the Social Democrats and also consisting of the Liberal Party and the Moderates, responded to the wave of antisemitism in much the same way as the Swedish government.

On October 13, Frederiksen spoke during a commemoration of the victims of the October 7 massacre in Copenhagen’s Great Synagogue, where the Queen of Denmark was also present.³⁰ The prime minister stated:

“I assure you that you are not alone in these difficult times. Danish Jews will never be left alone. [...] You should know that Denmark is with you. We grieve with you, and we share your pain. I am deeply moved by this tragedy that has befallen Israel and Jews the world over.”

In November, the Danish Justice Minister responded to reports about an increasing antisemitic threat by asserting that “the safety of Danish Jews and the fight against antisemitism is the

²⁵ “Kristersson: Risk för vågor av antisemitism”, *TT Nyhetsbyrå*, October 11, 2023.

²⁶ “Regeringen möter judiska organisationer”, *TT Nyhetsbyrå*, October 16, 2023.

²⁷ “Regeringen: Ökat stöd till judiska församlingar”, *TT Nyhetsbyrå*, October 25, 2023.

²⁸ “Antisemitism är en skamfläck för vårt land”, *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 8, 2023, <https://perma.cc/7M47-8SM7>.

²⁹ “‘Spreading Light in the Darkness’: Swedish Leaders Wear Kippot in Solidarity March with Jewish Community”, *Haaretz*, December 7, 2023, <https://archive.is/Xkpzu>.

³⁰ “Mette Frederiksen: Danske jøder kommer aldrig til at stå alene”, *DR.dk*, October 14, 2023, <https://perma.cc/K5ED-2NH9>.

government’s highest priority,” and announced an increase in financial support for security measures to protect Jewish institutions.³¹ Danish police were also instructed by the Justice Ministry to intensify their focus on possible cases of support for and incitement of terrorism in the context of anti-Israel demonstrations.

On November 9, Frederiksen and other leading politicians spoke during a Kristallnacht commemoration outside the Parliament organized under a banner that read “We stand together against antisemitism.” Frederiksen mentioned the fear among Jews who now hide symbols of their Jewish identity, recalled the proud history of how most Danish Jews were rescued during the Nazi occupation and called for renewed efforts to make posterity proud of the country by again protecting Danish Jews from antisemitic threats.³² In her New Year’s speech, the Prime Minister again reiterated Jews’ “right to live in peace, safety, and freedom” in Denmark as well as in Israel and elsewhere.³³

The center-left government of Norway, headed by Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre of the Labor Party, also signaled support for the troubled Norwegian Jewish community in the wake of October 7. However, the message was without the same emphasis and empathy that characterized Swedish and Danish responses.

The first official government response to rising antisemitism in Norway came on October 20, when Prime Minister Støre visited the Oslo synagogue, as well as a mosque, with the purpose of “hearing how Norwegian Jews and Muslims experience the situation in the Middle East.” The PM stressed the importance of not importing the Israel-Palestine conflict to Norway. “We must take care of each other, it should be safe to belong to different religious communities in our country [...] We must fight antisemitism and anti-Muslim attitudes and not let them grow,” he said.³⁴

On November 4, the government announced that it would renew its *Action Plan Against Antisemitism* in 2024 and that it had proposed increasing financial support for Jewish communities in the new state budget. In a press release, the Minister for Local Government and Regional Development stated the need for persistent and increased efforts to combat antisemitism. The Minister stressed that doing so “is not the Jews’ responsibility, it is our common responsibility [...] The government does not want [...] the tense situation to reduce the safety of Palestinians in Norway or Jewish Norwegians.”³⁵ A few days later, the Foreign Minister visited the synagogue in Oslo to express solidarity in light of rising antisemitism. “We all have a responsibility to fight prejudice and racism. We can never tolerate that Jews in Norway should feel unsafe,” the Foreign Minister stated during the visit.³⁶

³¹ “Justitsminister vil sende akut millionhjælp til Det jødiske samfund,” *Radio4*, November 13, 2023, <https://perma.cc/JMG9-D4NY>.

³² “Statsminister Mette Frederiksens tale ved Krystalnatten den 9. november 2023,” *Statsministeriet*, November 10, 2023, <https://perma.cc/5W6Y-FX9L>.

³³ “Statsminister Mette Frederiksens nytårstale den 1. januar 2024,” *Statsministeriet*, January 1, 2024, <https://perma.cc/YG6J-6PZH>.

³⁴ “Statsministeren på besøk i synagoge og moské i Oslo,” *Regjeringen.no*, October 21, 2023, <https://perma.cc/SBF3-D6YH>.

³⁵ “Styrker innsatsen mot antisemittisme,” *Regjeringen.no*, November 4, 2023, <https://perma.cc/V7YT-HYF7>.

³⁶ “Jøder i Norge – Føler oss utrygge og alene,” *VG*, November 7, 2023, <https://perma.cc/22VR-A65E>.

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While Prime Minister Støre used his Facebook page to share multiple statements regarding the Hamas attacks and the ensuing war, not a single post addressed the situation for Jews in Norway. The PM did publish a statement on November 9 mentioning the 1938 Kristallnacht pogrom.³⁷ This post, however, mentioned neither the October 7 massacre nor the wave of antisemitism threatening Jews in Norway and elsewhere. Instead, the text focused on “the brutal war in the Middle East” and the civilian suffering in Gaza. It deserves mention that the Ministry for Local Government and Regional Development did issue a press release on November 9, mentioning the fight against antisemitism. Published only on the government’s website, the statement was brief and not widely publicized.

When the Norwegian public service broadcaster published a thorough report on the experiences of Norwegian Jews, including interviews with individual Jews who recounted harrowing experiences of antisemitic harassment and intimidation, there was no significant response from the political leadership in Norway and not a word from the prime minister.

All in all, Norwegian political leaders did offer some support for Norwegian Jews in the face of rising antisemitism. Still, compared to Sweden and Denmark, their public statements and actions were lower in quantity, quality, and visibility. While a sense of heartfelt solidarity and compassion shines through in the words and deeds of leading Swedish and Danish politicians, the Norwegian government’s expressions have been brief, aloof, and often couched in general terms instead of focusing on Jews and the specific challenge of antisemitism. Perhaps most notably, the Kristallnacht commemoration passed without any public appearance or strong statement from the government addressing the challenge of antisemitism.

The striking difference between these cases is not in the manifestations of antisemitism or its impact on Jews but in the political response. Swedish political leaders were the most vigorously outspoken in taking a clear stance against antisemitism in all its forms. The Danish leadership also responded forcefully with high-level public speeches and appearances to show solidarity. By contrast, Norway’s political leadership appeared muted and half-hearted in its stance on antisemitism and Jewish life in Norway.

Norway’s lackluster response to antisemitism at home appears linked to its foreign policy stance towards Israel and the conflict with Hamas. On October 9, the King of Norway was instructed by the Foreign Ministry not to issue condolences to Israel “due to the political nature of the conflict [between Israel and Hamas].”³⁸ Moreover, on October 27, Norway, as the only Scandinavian country, voted for an Arab-drafted UN General Assembly resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza that failed to condemn or even mention Hamas, the October 7 massacre, or the hostages.³⁹

It is possible that the government eyed an opportunity to renew Norway’s role as a peace mediator and feared alienating Palestinians and Arabs by signaling a pro-Israel position. Given that much current antisemitism is linked to hostility towards Israel and Zionism, foreign

³⁷ Facebook post by Jonas Gahr Støre, November 9, 2023, <https://perma.cc/PF5Z-7VU6>.

³⁸ “UD frarådet konge-kondolanse,” *Dagbladet*, November 9, 2023, <https://perma.cc/7BLJ-UF58>.

³⁹ “UN General Assembly rejects motion to condemn Hamas, calls for ceasefire,” *UN Watch*, October 27, 2023, <https://perma.cc/W4HB-PA25>.

policy ambitions may have come in the way of a forceful stance against antisemitism. It is also possible that an underlying sympathy for the Palestinian cause, which has long been strong in the Norwegian labor movement and is reinforced by a multiplicity of NGOs and civil society actors, helped shape the government's response to antisemitism.

Perhaps more importantly, there is relatively widespread aversion against the Jewish State in Norway, as evidenced by a 2022 survey finding that one in three Norwegians believe Israel's treatment of the Palestinians is "just as bad" as the Nazis' treatment of Jews.⁴⁰ Dealing with such delusions – without stigmatizing standard criticism of Israeli governments or policies – remains an essential and complicated task for policymakers and educators seeking to contain the virus of antisemitism in Norway and elsewhere.

– Dr. Johannes D. Enstad

⁴⁰ "Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims in Norway, 2022," *The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies*, April 2023, <https://perma.cc/5KFP-L3K8>, 70.

IRAN

THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATES

Contrary to a common misconception, antisemitism is not a new phenomenon in Iran. It predates the Islamic Revolution and even the establishment of the State of Israel. Alongside good relations between some Persians and Jews and the economic flourishing of some in the Jewish community, and partly as an antagonistic response to those realities, anti-Jewish hatred has existed for hundreds of years in the country that has become, in today's world, the fiercest enemy of the Jewish people.

Shiite clerics prohibited equality between Muslims and Jews. Until the end of the 19th century, Jews were forced to live in "open ghettos," were referred to as "impure," and paid a special tax for religious minorities. Some were compelled to convert to Islam. During the 20th century, clerics accused Jews of being secularists and Western agents who cooperated with the Shah's regime and Israel to change the Islamic character of Iranian society.

During the Holocaust, anti-Jewish sentiments intensified. Some Iranians considered the Jews and the British as usurpers of their property. The Nazis were thought to be a movement that could free Iran from Western-assisted political oppression. The Nazi Iranian party, "Sumka," advocated the superiority of the Aryan-Iranian race and campaigned against the communists, who were growing in influence at the time, as well as the Jewish community. Its propaganda sowed the seeds for the state-run antisemitism that followed.

While in exile, the leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, called upon Muslims to boycott Jews and avoid working in Jewish-owned factories or businesses. After establishing the Islamic regime in 1979, the Iranian leadership adopted an uncompromising anti-Israel line and bolstered it with blunt antisemitic rhetoric. Dozens of new organizations were established with the support of the regime inside and outside of Iran, and they were massively funded to promote antisemitic propaganda in traditional and new media.

This tendency reached its lowest during the years of Mahmud Ahmadinejad's presidency. Ahmadinejad was obsessed with the denial of the Holocaust and, upon the conclusion of his failed term in 2013, stated that shattering what he called the myth of the Holocaust was one of the most significant achievements of his presidency. He suggested that the Jews of Israel should be transferred to Europe or to Alaska.

Ahmadinejad's antisemitism and Holocaust denial harmed the Islamic regime internationally. Over the past decade, Iran distanced itself from such rhetoric while not shunning antisemitic expressions altogether.

The October 7 massacre marked a change. The worst of demons went loose in the Iranian official media, which gave voice to particularly heinous antisemitic rhetoric.

The official websites of the Iranian regime, particularly those close to Revolutionary Guards and official propaganda bodies, published articles that involved classic blood libels and other antisemitic tropes. For example, the website Javan, run by the Revolutionary Guards, wrote about “the ancient and hidden roots of the murder of children by Jews, stemming from their beliefs and history. The Jews of today are not those who were loyal to the Prophets Abraham or Moses but have usurped this title and are using it for their own purposes [...] Even today, these Jews worship the calf and the idol in secret ceremonies, a monster with bull’s horns to which they used to sacrifice babies. Jewish secret societies made sure to unite around rituals in honor of Molech, and their priests performed gruesome rituals for the idol [...] They even brought this ritual to the USA, where they perform it in a group known as the ‘Bohemian Club’ in the woods.”¹

Jews were described as leading sophisticated conspiracies. The conservative website Irdiplomacy condemned Turkey for not severing its ties with Israel. It warned that “the foreign policy of the Jews was based on foreign trade, and they transferred this policy to the Zionists. That is why Germans in the period before the Second World War said that for the Jews, the economy is more important than their feelings [...] It is not clear how Erdogan’s Turkey chose such a policy [of maintaining commercial ties with Israel], which dictates the Turkish policy towards Gaza [...] It can be seen clearly today that his policy regarding the Palestinians and Gaza throughout his 20 years in office was fraudulent. Erdogan is motivated by promoting propaganda for the benefit of his image, and therefore, today, during the war in Gaza, we meet Erdogan who is, so to speak, Islamist and pro-Palestinian, but in practice, it is only propaganda, and Erdogan promotes his relations with Israel.”²

Some described the war in Gaza as heralding the Day of Judgment, with special conferences organized on the subject. An article on the website 313 (the number symbolizes the “Mahdi” – the Muslim Messiah) stated that the present war between Israel and Hamas is the great war that was prophesied already in the Bible to take place in the land of Palestine. According to this prediction, the war will be the war of Armageddon and Judgment Day for the Jews.³

In a conference entitled “Jewish Zionism and the New World Order,” organized by the Messianic organization “Mahdi is Coming” and attended by the “Association for the Defense of Palestine” and the “Supporters of the Liberation of Al-Quds Institution,” one of the speakers stated that there are indeed material reasons for the war between the Jews and the Palestinians. Those reasons include a famine imposed by the Jews against the Muslims, as well as the internal disputes within parts of the Zionist regime. The Jews’ belief in being the “chosen people” is what really causes them to try to destroy other nations because, so the speaker continued, it is written in their holy books that they must destroy the Amalekites. Thus, the Jews try to

1 “Khodaye vaqeiye regime koodak kosh Esraail,” Javan, October 15, 2023, <https://www.javanonline.ir/fa/news/1191668>.

2 “Siasat Yahoodi Erdogan dar Ghazeh,” IRDIPLOMACY, December 10, 2023, <http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/fa/news/2023503>.

3 “Pishbini Naboodi Esraail dar Torat,” U313, October 28, 2023, <https://www.u313.ir/item/1211>.

revive their 3000-year-old monarchy by creating the doomsday war known as Armageddon in order to destroy the Muslims.⁴

Following the war in Gaza, Holocaust denial and distortion made a comeback in Iranian official media. *Farhikhtegan*, a newspaper associated with conservative elements in the regime, claimed that the history of the Holocaust was distorted by the Jews in order to justify Zionist crimes in Palestine. These, they say, exceed the severity of those committed by the Nazis. The newspaper doubted that six million Jews were murdered during the Holocaust.⁵

Antisemitic tropes prevalent on Iranian social media following October 7 include phrases such as “Mice Jews,” “They will soon make you Soaps,” “You worship the devil and take the money of the Muslims,” and “The Jews are at the bottom of humanity but exploit everyone.” Some accounts use the Nazi flag or the swastika in their responses.

The Jewish community living in various cities throughout the country was compelled to demonstrate against Israel and its actions in the war and to justify the narrative of Hamas and the Iranian regime. According to international observers, these were the largest demonstrations of the Jewish community in Iran since the revolution. Members of the community felt their safety would be endangered unless they showed their total opposition to Israel. The spokesperson of the US State Department condemned the Iranian regime for forcing the Jews in Iran to demonstrate against Israel.⁶

After years of moderating its deep hatred of Jews, the Iranian regime and elements within Iranian society have taken the masques off. The combination of deep-seated antisemitism and the attempts to develop nuclear arms make Iran an existential threat to the Jewish people and to human civilization at large.

– Beni Sabti

⁴ “Yahood dar tadarok jang jahani Armageddon,” *Mizan*, November 9, 2023, <https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/4743609>.

⁵ “Nazi tar az Hitler,” *IRDIPLOMACY*, December 13, 2023, <http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/fa/news/2023595>.

⁶ “Esraail: Yahoodian Iran chareii joz sherkat dar rahpeymaii zed Esraaili nadashtand,” *VoaFarsi*, December 1, 2023, <https://ir.voanews.com/a/7380669>.

SECTION 3

THE RISE OF POPULISM IN THE WEST



THE WESTERN WORLD

POPULISM AND THE JEWS

Populism is a political orientation, a state of mind, that creates binaries between the people and imagined or real elites, establishments, and the systems of power that the populists accuse of being out-of-touch, deceptive, hypocritical, self-centered, and self-duplicating. While often rooted in right-wing extremism and even fascism, the priorities populists present echo in part those on the far-left. Populists tend to present themselves as outcasts, meaning that in criticizing them, the political mainstreams reinforce their credibility. They use harsh, demagogic, and offensive rhetoric, point to made-up enemies from within, and promise swift, total solutions for problems that do not have swift, total solutions.

And in recent years, they are on the rise across the Western world.

In 2022, Brothers of Italy won a plurality of the votes in the parliamentary elections, and Giorgia Meloni became Prime Minister. That same year, Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Rally, won a record 41.5% of the vote in the second round of France's presidential elections. That was an increase of almost 10% from five years before. Three years before the next elections, the once impossible scenario of a Le Pen in the Élysée is now in the cards.

In the United States, former President Trump, who lost the 2020 elections by seven million votes and then encouraged a failed violent coup to remain in power, surprised some pundits in 2023 by reasserting his grip over the Republican Party. His many legal woes boosted his standing. Few in the Netherlands imagined that Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party would ever win a plurality of the votes. They did in November 2023. A month later, in Argentina, the eccentric and energetic Javier Milei emerged from the political sidelines to win the presidency by a landslide.

In Germany, Alternative for Germany (AfD) established itself as the second largest party in dozens of opinion polls with approximately 20% support. That means it would win a quarter of the seats in the Bundestag if the elections scheduled in 2025 were held today. In Austria, where elections are scheduled later this year, the Freedom Party is expected to win the plurality of the votes by a considerable margin.

The list is still long.

Why have populists been doing so well in the West? One reason is that mainstream parties and politicians have not done a good job addressing some of our time's big issues. The loneliness and sense of purposelessness resulting from the breakdown of traditional social and family structures, job insecurity, the ascendance of cultural relativism, including grotesque and despotic manifestations, and loose migration policies have all contributed.

The latter became a flagship populist agenda for a reason. Large waves of migration (including illegal) to Western countries raised serious questions regarding the meaning of national identity

and culture, including the social status and role of Christianity. Ignoring those questions did not make them go away. The constant flow of cheap labor benefited business owners (to a point) and the compassionate class (social workers, educators) but was not always advantageous for the working class. The dissonance became fertile ground for politicians who call to close all the gates hermetically, expel illegal migrants regardless of their circumstances and deny expressions of identity that are not in line with what populists believe is the true national character.

Historically, times of transformation in mass communication endanger liberal societies. The rise of populism has benefited from the rise of social media. Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and their likes help populists in three ways. First, by creating platforms that bypass mainstream media organizations, the mainstream priorities that guide them, and the shared perceptions of reality they communicate. Second, by providing space for publishing falsehoods without the checks and moderations enforced by media where editors have the final say. Third, by creating echo chambers in which those who are inclined towards the populist voice hear nothing but that voice.

Another media development that benefited populism was the rise of reality shows. When transforming prime-time television twenty years ago, these shows projected a scent of democratization: the emergence of popular culture in which every person has a chance to become a super-star and have his or her unique talents discovered, whether in singing, dancing or cooking. In reality, those shows did nothing but transfer power from a small group of celebrities to an even smaller group of behind-the-scenes media moguls. The illusion they created by promising that every person has the potential to become rich and famous fed anti-elites sentiments.

Populism has also benefited from the centrist bent of contemporary politics in the West. Bill Clinton proved in 1992 that a conservative Democrat is more electable than a liberal one. Tony Blair demonstrated five years later that New Labour is more electable than the old one and relieved his party from the ghosts of that other Tony. On the other side of the aisle, George W. Bush and Angela Merkel showed the electoral appeal of compassionate conservatism.

In the post-Cold War world, few who sought the helm of power championed absolutist notions of socialism, capitalism, libertarianism, or any other “ism.” The conventional wisdom was that ideology should be set aside for pragmatic policies and broad coalitions.

Advanced polling techniques encouraged that tendency. Because it became possible to know almost with precision what the electorate thinks on each and every issue, politicians were tempted to parrot unchallenging and uninspiring scripts that distance from presumed fringes. As a result, people who were unhappy with mainstream discourse remained unrepresented and yearn for a different voice.

Trump has projected authenticity and originality by defying some (although not all) conventional wisdom dictated by campaign experts. As in the case of other populists, that was what convinced and still convinces disaffected voters that he is really not “one of them,” whoever “them” are.

THE RISE OF POPULISM IN THE WEST

The night the polls closed and the projections were broadcast in Germany's last elections in 2021, I watched a debate between prominent party personalities on a German television channel. It was interesting to see how they listened patiently to one another, with the moderators actually allowing them to speak. They all looked as if they were made of the same establishment mold. In the 1980s, the Green Party stood for youth, rebellion, and new ideas. Yet, watching the debate, I could not tell by appearances who represented those values in the studio. The speaker for the AfD stood out because all the other lookalike men and women in suits criticized and shunned him. I put myself in the shoes of a marginalized German. Who would I identify with? The one who is not one of them, no doubt.

The word populism is usually used in the pejorative. While being unapologetic about anything is a populist creed, populists do not identify themselves as such. But, that a party or a leader is populist does not mean that their agenda is, in essence, ill-intended, morally illegitimate or unworthy of consideration.

This is what makes populism so difficult to deal with from a liberal-democratic standpoint. The words are more often than not within the pale of legitimacy. It's the music that calls for alarm.

For Western Jewry, the ascendance of populism is not good news. There are, first, the lessons of history to consider. Where politicians find large audiences for ethnocentric notions and intolerance to cultural and religious differences, Jews have reason for concern. Where real and imagined elites are attacked, Jews have reason for concern. Where constitutional guarantees for individual freedoms are challenged, Jews have reason for concern. It makes no difference if Jews are the initial target or not. The spirit of populism, once present, will never allow them to breathe peacefully.

Populist Western leaders are, almost without exception, pro-Israel and admirers of the Jewish people. They recognize the threat of radical Islam and are impatient with Islamist expressions at home. On the other hand, some populist parties have roots in neo-Nazi or right-wing extremist movements, where Jew-hatred and Holocaust denial were prevalent. Some host, even if on their fringes, activists who openly sympathize with antisemitic notions. Some, where this is relevant, deny or sideline the crimes committed by leaders in their countries against Jews during the Second World War. Others openly call to reduce the engagement of their societies and their schools with the history of the Holocaust.

While it is tempting for some Jews to identify with politicians who seek to curb the religious freedoms of Muslims at large, those freedoms are also pertinent to Jews. It is a great irony that the ability to practice Judaism in freedom in Europe has become dependent on the endurance of those freedoms for Muslims. Marine Le Pen answered in the affirmative in 2017 when asked whether, in line with her plan to prohibit Islamic headscarves in the public sphere, kippahs would also be banned. She said the Jews would need to make that sacrifice for the benefit of public safety.

How profound the challenges presented by populists will be in the coming years depends on the level of their success and the depth of their commitment to their agendas. These are far from assured. Razor-thin margins can make historical differences. American populism will

not go away any time soon, but another Trump defeat may force traditional conservatives to break from this trend and realign their bones.

In Germany, the AfD may well end up in the range of just 15% of the vote after the next elections. This means that it would remain no more than a political irritation that forces older parties to do what populists despise most – establish broad coalitions between them. If Le Pen loses the next elections, that may signal a return of French conservatives to a Gaullist orientation. The example of Meloni in Italy proves that when in power, facing realities for what they actually are, populists are sometimes forced to lean more toward conservatism than promote their original views. The example of Wilders in the Netherlands, who, seeing that he could not establish a majority, ultimately gave up in March 2024 – at least for now – on his dream of becoming Prime Minister, shows that populists can exercise constraint and political maturity.

Whether populists continue their march forward or decline, remain loyal to the outrage that brought them to power or shift to the center-right, they are certain to present tough dilemmas for Jewish communities as well as for the state of Israel. To note a few examples: Should political leaders with a distant fascist past who have reformed be considered partners for dialogue and cooperation, and if so, based on what criteria of repentance and probation? Should pro-Israel and philosemite movements and parties be excused if they tolerate neo-Nazis and anti-Jewish hate speech on their fringes? Should Jews ignore calls by populists to limit the civil rights of minorities who are not Jewish?

It is not constructive to present absolutist universal guidelines for these and other dilemmas because, to be frank, Jewish communities are far too vulnerable and Israel, in which populism had also risen in 2022, is far too short of reliable allies to advance purist moral stances in every circumstance that begs to do so. That said, the long-term caveat of nuanced policies on moral issues is that when values are compromised based on pragmatic calculations they risk becoming nothing more than political tools.

– Prof. Uriya Shavit

GERMANY

HOW DANGEROUS IS ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY?

Alternative for Germany (AfD), established as a Eurosceptic, anti-migration party, first made it to the Bundestag in 2017, winning 12.6% of the votes. Four years later, it declined to 10.4%. According to multiple polls, if elections were held today, it would be destined to win approximately 20% of the votes and become the second-largest party after the Christian Democrats. The party is particularly strong in the former East German states. The polls predict it would emerge as the largest in state elections in two of them, Thuringia and Saxony, which will be held on September 1, 2024.

None of the other major parties in Germany consider the AfD a legitimate coalition partner. The party is suspected of disloyalty to the German constitution and of hosting neo-Nazi sympathizers. Its commitment to the moral lessons Germany has vowed to ingrain and implement in its policies and education system is not firm. The support of elements within it to the Russian dictator and war criminal Putin is alarming.

In January 2023, news broke about a secret meeting held in Potsdam in November 2023 by far-right extremists and neo-Nazis who discussed plans for the mass deportations of foreigners and so-called non-assimilated Germans. The AfD denied any involvement by its activists in the meeting, a claim put into question in media reports. Revelations about the Potsdam meeting sparked massive demonstrations across Germany. Still shunned by the mainstream, populism entertaining right extremism and neo-Nazism has nevertheless become a significant aspect of German politics and society.

Dr. Marcus Funck, an associate professor at the Center for Research on Antisemitism at the Technical University of Berlin, and **Dr. Maik Herold**, a political scientist from the Technical University of Dresden and the International Research Network on Migration and Democracy (MIDEM), specialize among other issues in the study of present-day populism in Germany. They shared with the Report their insights on the AfD and the risks it poses.

Is the AfD an antisemitic party?

Dr. Maik Herold: This question is not easy to answer. In the official positions, programs, and statements of the party, overt antisemitism can hardly be identified. Instead, the party has emphasized a pro-Israel stance in recent years, claiming to be the sole political party in Germany committed to rigorously combating “imported antisemitism” resulting from immigration.

At the end of 2023, the AfD faction even brought a motion to the Bundestag on this matter. In it, it called on the federal government to legislate to ensure that “individuals with antisemitic or anti-Israeli sentiments, denying the fundamental right to exist of Israel, cannot acquire German citizenship.” Additionally, in 2018, the party-affiliated association “Jews in the AfD”

was established to develop its own substantive positions and to counter accusations of antisemitism within the AfD.

Nevertheless, over the past years, observers have regularly noted representatives of the AfD employing typical antisemitic language codes, metaphors, and symbols in speeches and debate contributions. Within a context of globalization-criticism, anti-Americanism, and other polemics enriched with conspiracy narratives, a strong antisemitic dimension has surfaced, with messages conveyed through the Dog-Whistle principle. Through references to figures like George Soros, Mark Zuckerberg, or the Rothschilds, a connection was drawn between international financial capitalism, the allegedly fraudulently acquired wealth of its beneficiaries, and Judaism.

As for the AfD's voter base, studies have indicated a disproportionately high prevalence of antisemitic positions. Approximately one in ten AfD supporters endorse anti-Jewish statements, roughly double the proportions found among CDU and SPD supporters.

Dr. Marcus Funck: When the AfD appeared on the political stage in 2013, it represented a distinctively West German elitist, anti-establishment movement that had lost its political home within then-Chancellor Merkel's CDU as well as within the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP). Driven by Euroscepticism and the idea of strict austerity in fiscal policy, it particularly agitated against the monetary regime of the Euro and represented a conservative, élite anti-establishment.

Unlike its European siblings on the extreme right, the AfD started as a center-right party that shifted towards the extreme right, including a relative openness to antisemitism. Early electoral successes, quick radicalization, and a relative openness for new members from all political strands made the party an attractive option for the far-right fringe, and thus antisemitic positions.

On the level of ordinary membership, classical antisemitic stereotypical images, tropes, and symbols can be identified in social media comments, internal communications, but rather seldomly in public statements. Party programs and electoral platforms include or included calls for outright bans of kosher slaughter as well as male circumcision – two demands that would make Jewish life in Germany factually impossible.

Moreover, the AfD centers its *volkish* identity politics around outright criticism of German memory politics related to National Socialism, the Second World War, and the Holocaust. While there is an effort to avoid open Holocaust denial because of possible legal consequences, statements relativizing and distorting the Holocaust as well as German historical responsibility are commonplace among the rank and file of the party.

While I would hesitate to categorize the AfD as a “classical” antisemitic party that centers its ideology around anti-Jewish resentments, one can easily identify all forms of antisemitic positions in the party's communications, programs, and also concrete political demands.

Why is the AfD particularly successful in the former East Germany?

Dr. Maik Herold: There are several reasons, some of which are relevant for explaining ongoing tensions between East and West Germany in general.

On the one hand, studies have shown that particularly nationalistic and ethnocentric-nativist orientations are significantly more prevalent in the eastern parts of Germany. The deeper causes of this finding are likely rooted in the distinct histories of the two German states. However, when it comes to antisemitic attitudes, the findings are less conclusive; some studies even suggest that people in Western Germany are more inclined to endorse anti-Jewish statements. On the other hand, over the past decade, politically contentious issues such as migration, climate, and COVID-19 have repeatedly demonstrated that the typically populist narrative of a sharp antagonism between detached, corrupt, and morally bankrupt elites and the “common people” resonates strongly in Eastern Germany.

This resonance is not solely due to cultural differences between East and West but is also associated with persistently divergent socio-economic conditions. The eastern parts of Germany have higher unemployment rates and the average wage level is about 20% lower than that of West Germany. Furthermore, significant disparities in the distribution of private wealth contribute to differences in everyday life of East and West Germans in terms of available capital, land ownership, and inheritances.

These structural inequalities are also passed on to the next generations. For instance, while young West Germans often receive financial support from their parents well into adulthood, young people from East Germany on average are more likely to experience quite the opposite. They rather need to support their parents, who are at risk of poverty in old age due to fractured career paths, prolonged unemployment or precarious employment after 1989, and lower pensions.

In this context, the extremely unequal representation in top positions has a particularly lasting impact. In all sectors of German society, East Germans are glaringly underrepresented. Even within East Germany itself, 70% of leadership positions in politics, judiciary, administration, business, press, broadcasting, and academia are occupied on average by Western Germans.

Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that criticisms of elites and populist sentiments find stronger resonance in Eastern Germany. Regular surveys indicate that a majority of East Germans even feel like “second-class citizens” in their own country. The feelings of devaluation, deprivation and lacking recognition expressed in such perceptions are among the strongest predictors of voting for the AfD in empirical research.

Does the party's success represent fatigue in Germany from the burden of historical memory?

Dr. Marcus Funck: German memory culture as it has developed since the 1980s was never unchallenged but was advanced first by civil society and then by progressive political actors. Only since the 2000s, German memory culture in general and a political culture that is centered around an understanding of Germany's responsibility for the past has been firmly established. After Merkel's ascent to power in 2005, positions critical of this "progressive" understanding of Germany's memory culture had no prominent place in the CDU and FDP (Free Democratic Party) and migrated to political movements and parties of the far-right.

Criticism of Germany's official, state-centered memory culture forms an essential part of the AfD's political program. The relativization of the German Nazi past in juxtaposition to the glorification of German history are commonplace among party representatives and voters. Several polls indicate that strong skepticism or outright rejection of the German memory culture are predominant among AfD voters.

Dr. Maik Herold: In a broad sense, I would argue that there is no widespread fatigue in Germany regarding the established approaches to dealing with the country's past, and there is no extensive dispute about its memory becoming a "burden." Nevertheless, the past, including the era of National Socialism, remains a constant subject of societal negotiation and interpretation. The narratives produced in this process are subject to perpetual transformations. Each generation must, in a sense, learn to grapple with Germany's past in its own way.

In this learning process, certain ruptures and changes are evident. The disappearance of the last eyewitnesses from the era of National Socialism, Germany's transformation into an immigration country, especially the increased immigration of people from Muslim countries, has the potential to shape future debates about Germany's past. The division between East and West Germany also plays a role, as the era of National Socialism was remembered somewhat differently in the two German states.

Several years ago, the AfD attempted to capitalize on this theme. Radical representatives of the party lamented the "systematic reeducation" that began after 1945, called for a "180-degree turn in memory politics," referred to the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin as a "monument of shame," and demanded breaking the "current narrowing of German memory culture to the era of National Socialism [...] in favor of an expanded view of history that also encompasses the positive, identity-forming aspects of German history."¹ In typical fashion for today's populist radical right parties, such formulations are deliberately ambiguous in articulating revisionist sentiments without explicitly stating them.

Beyond extremist circles, however, the response to these attempts was rather subdued. My impression is that questions of collective identity and the proper handling of Germany's past are less present in public debates today and ignite less controversy than in the 1990s and

¹ AfD manifesto from 2016: Programm der Alternative für Deutschland, Kurzfassung, 10.

2000s. Nevertheless, especially in the current struggle to address the electoral success of the AfD, historical comparisons to the 1920s and 1930s are frequently drawn.

Does the AfD have a real chance of becoming a ruling party or at least a “regierungsfähig” party (a legitimate part of a governing coalition) in the coming decade?

Dr. Maik Herold: This depends on both the AfD itself and the other parties. On one hand, the AfD would need to shift its positions towards the center and disassociate from extremist views and activists to be considered a possible coalition partner for other political parties. However, such a move is not foreseeable at the moment.

On the other hand, it is not entirely implausible that in a few years, especially conservative and center-right parties, such as CDU/CSU and Freie Wähler (state-based “Independent voters”), might open up to stronger cooperation with the AfD. Yet, with respect to formal coalition alliances, this is currently still unlikely. Particularly, CDU/CSU has ruled out any direct cooperation with the AfD at the federal and state levels.

However, the consistent distancing of all other parties from the AfD also involves some problematic side-effects. Although a majority of the electorate has been rather supportive of right-leaning parties, positions, and policy programs for years, the sharp demarcation from the AfD prevents that majority from manifesting itself politically. This particularly applies to Eastern Germany, where in most areas the CDU and AfD together can account for up to 60% of the vote according to recent polls, yet center-left governments comprising CDU, SPD, Greens, and Left parties have been formed for years and still remain the only plausible option. To counter the growing AfD, the CDU in some regions is now even discussing cooperation with the post-socialist party “Die Linke” and its most recent spin-off, the “Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht.”

This development is deeply frustrating for parts of the CDU base, especially considering that some current AfD representatives were active CDU members just a few years ago, with contacts between CDU and AfD members still remaining at the local level. The AfD tries to benefit from this situation by successfully establishing the impression that only voting for them can guarantee to bring an end to a leftist-liberal government policy agenda.

Against this backdrop, the extent to which a consistent distancing from the AfD will persist in the future remains unclear. If the AfD continues to grow, it could also potentially govern alone in some regions of Eastern Germany in a few years. Forms of minority government are also imaginable. In Thuringia, this scenario could already occur this year, as the electoral law stipulates that if no absolute majority is achieved in two parliamentary votes, the prime minister (Ministerpräsident) can be elected with a simple majority in the third round. If other parties fail to agree on a common counter-candidate, this could (almost accidentally) lead to the first election of an AfD head of a German state.

How do Jews in Germany feel about the AfD and the fact that there are Jews who are members of the party?

Dr. Maik Herold: This is very hard for me to answer because I am not Jewish and I cannot really feel the way that a German Jew might feel about the AfD, so I can just give my outside opinion.

Opinions vary widely. For example, some Jews who came from the former Soviet Union are now very much pro-AfD because the party is aligned with their conservative or right-leaning values.

Some years ago, the Central Council of Jews in Germany issued a joint declaration against the AfD after then-AfD leader Frauke Petry said that the AfD is the guarantor of Jewish life in Germany because it is opposed to Muslim mass immigration. The Central Council strongly disagreed with this, emphasizing that the AfD is not a party for Jews, it's not a party for Jewish life, and it's even not a democratic party. So, the feelings among German Jews about the AfD are mixed.

You have to keep in mind that the AfD is predominantly non-Jewish and its messages are directed to a non-Jewish audience. It hardly attempts to address the concerns of the Jewish community. The main message of its Jewish members is “look at us – we represent part of the Jewish community and we’re in the AfD, so it is not a bad party but a very liberal and democratic one.”

Dr. Marcus Funck: The Central Council of Jews in Germany, the official representational body of the Jewish community in Germany has repeatedly and convincingly distanced itself from the AfD. It published, together with more than 40 other Jewish organizations a position paper against the party “No Alternative for Jews,” and has rejected the efforts of the AfD to win the hearts of Jews in Germany through a firm pro-Israel position driven by anti-Muslim resentments.

There is, however, a small, unknown number of Jews, primarily with post-Soviet backgrounds, that support the AfD. In 2018, a group, “Jews in the AfD” (JAfD), was founded and received wide media recognition. Most observers considered the JAfD to be nothing more than a media gimmick with Jews playing the role of “useful idiots” whitewashing the AfD of antisemitism. Indeed, the JAfD has less than 20 members, some with rather questionable Jewish backgrounds, and plays little to no role within the party.

Is there a gender, educational or age profile for supporting the party?

Dr. Marcus Funck: Besides Alice Weidel, one of the two party leaders, and several other individuals, the party’s public face is masculine. Rather unsurprisingly, voters of the AfD are also predominantly male.

During the last state elections in Bavaria and Hesse, the AfD gained significantly more support from men (20%) than from women (13%). Among party members women are grossly underrepresented (18.7%) among MdBs (Member of the Bundestag), the percentage is less than 12%, by far the lowest percentage of all political parties in the German Bundestag.

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Programmatically, the AfD can be seen as a partly misogynistic party, favoring traditional gender roles and rejecting any modernization in gender relations. In summary, although there exist, of course, a substantial number of female voters for the AfD, its general outlook is rather male dominated.

While the AfD's core voters come from the age cohort of between 25 and 60, its support is surprisingly high among young, especially first-time, voters. The lowest support comes from the age cohort older than 70 years, most likely because of traditional party bonds and more conservative voting patterns. One needs to be cautious, however, to draw general conclusions from post-elections polls as the AfD has made inroads into almost all age cohorts, and, thus, is on the way into transforming into a *Volkspartei*, representing people of all strands.

The party leadership represents a higher-educated élite but members and voters mostly come from other strands of society. In recent elections and polls, the AfD was particularly strong among workers (gaining from the Social Democrats and the Left Party) and low-income groups.

Education is an important factor: among voters with a high school degree, support for the AfD is less than 10%; and among voters without a high school degree it is between 20 and 25%. The biggest divide, however, is marked by regions. In rural areas and small-towns, the AfD regularly wins more votes than in the cities, no matter if in the East or the West.

In conclusion, in educational, social, and regional categories, groups that are in relative decline seem to be more inclined than others to support AfD positions.

Is there any chance that the body responsible for safeguarding the constitution (Verfassungsschutz) will prevent the party from running in the upcoming national elections? Do you think such a move will cause more harm or benefit?

Dr. Maik Herold: From my point of view, this is absolutely out of the question. There is no constitutional basis for such a step. In the history of the Federal Republic, the Constitutional Court has banned parties in two cases: the Nazi oriented Socialist Reich Party in 1952 and the Stalinist Communist Party in 1956. In the last 20 years, there were two attempts to ban the NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany), which is a very extremist right-wing, neo-Nazi fringe party, and they failed because the bar for such a move is very high.

Were the AfD to be banned, it would not be beneficial for German democracy. A new and similar organization will spring up right away in its place. The whole discussion about banning this party is very unfortunate. Yes – it corresponds with the sentiment of broad parts of the population that wants to get rid of the AfD. But such a move is not legally plausible and will be counter-productive because it plays into the hands of the AfD's narratives that there is no fair democratic competition in Germany.

THE NETHERLANDS

WILDERS, ISLAM, THE JEWS AND ISRAEL

On November 22, 2023, the Dutch politician Geert Wilders secured a major victory in the country's parliamentary elections with his Party for Freedom ("PVV"). Wilders' party won 37 of the 150 parliamentary seats, equaling 23.5% of the votes and gaining 20 seats compared to his 2021 election result.¹ The PVV became the largest party in 251 of the 342 Dutch municipalities. Three months later, following his failure to build a parliamentary majority, Wilders announced he had given up on becoming prime minister, yet he remained the most influential figure in Dutch politics.

The PVV ran an electoral campaign that used the slogan "Dutch people first." Wilders warned that the people of the Netherlands too often come in second place, blaming this on what he calls the continuing "asylum tsunami" and the European Union's interference in Dutch affairs regarding economy, law, climate and border control.²

His landslide victory raises the question of what made his party so immensely popular after decades on the political fringe. At the same time, his party's focus on nativism puts the Dutch Jewish community in an uneasy position – even though the PVV is outspokenly pro-Israel.

A firm stance against immigration and the "Islamization" of the Netherlands has characterized Geert Wilders and his party since its founding in 2006. For 17 years, during which the party took a prominent and vocal seat in the opposition of the Dutch parliament, it has proclaimed a political agenda that proscribes an asylum stop, a mandatory return policy for Syrian refugees, and a limit on the number of foreign students.

According to the party's electoral program, Islamic schools, Qurans and mosques do not belong in the Netherlands. Wilders acquired a controversial reputation because of statements in this regard. In 2008, he produced the film "Fitna," which associated the Quran with terrorism and sparked international protest. On March 19, 2014, during his election speech in The Hague, he caused a commotion by asking the audience, "Do you want more or less Moroccans in this city and in the Netherlands?" As the audience chanted, "Less! Less!" Wilders responded, "ok, so we'll take care of it."

Because of the first statement, Wilders was found guilty of group insult by the Dutch Court of Appeal, a judgment enforced by the Dutch Supreme Court. However, he was not punished, and he was acquitted of the charge of incitement to hatred and discrimination.³

¹ Official Elections Results [Dutch], November 2023, <https://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen/detail/TK20231122>.

² PVV electoral program 2023 [Dutch], <https://www.pvv.nl/images/2023/PVV-Verkiezingsprogramma-2023.pdf>.

³ Dutch Judiciary, "Criminal Case against Wilders: Documents [Dutch]," <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Bekende-rechtszaken/Strafzaak-Wilders>.

Although Geert Wilders has been anti-elitist, anti-immigrant, and Eurosceptic from the beginning, his discourse has become much more populist over time. Populism can be generally characterized by a political discourse in which a distinction is made between “two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite.’”⁴

When talking about the ordinary people, Wilders has used the term “Henk and Ingrid” – two common Dutch names that represent the archetype of the average, hard-working Dutchman. Wilders promises to return the power to the people, to uproot the elite and to save democracy. He consistently demonizes the elite in The Hague and in Brussels. He claims that power is in the hands of a small, highly educated clique that is overwhelmingly oriented towards the liberal left, while “the rest are allowed to pay taxes, but does not have a say.”⁵

In his style of discourse, Wilders is unique and iconic. He has a distinct provincial accent, rarely uses English, speaks unapologetically, and is famous for coining his own invented pejorative phrases. For example, he called mosques where Islamic incitement takes place a “hate hut” (Dutch: haathut). He referred to Islam as a “desert ideology” (Dutch: woestijnideologie) and addressed organizations that are overly subsidized, in his opinion, as “subsidy guzzlers” (Dutch: subsidieslurpers). He also suggested what he called a “head rag tax” (Dutch: kopvoddentaks) as a tax on wearing headscarves.⁶ His electoral program is written in a colloquial language typical for populists, including statements, “Now it comes down to it. Are we going left or right?” and “Discrimination against Dutch people must end. After all, it is our country.” Quotes using bolder language include, “We must reconquer the Netherlands” and “Our country is overcrowded.”

There are several reasons why a plurality of Dutch voters chose the outspoken and controversial leader of this right-wing party. In the Netherlands, it is relatively new that people translate their views into a vote for a less conventional and more radical party like the PVV. In the past, Dutch society was organized according to the principle of “verzuiling” or pillarization, meaning that everyone is situated within one’s own religious or ideological circle and that pillar institutions, including political parties, newspapers and sports clubs, organize life. In that system, people voted loyally for the same party.

De-pillarization has been a gradual process that started in the 1960s and continued well into the 2000s. It means that individuals no longer act only based on which religious or ideological group they belong to but based on strictly personal considerations. Over time, this process has resulted in a new distribution of votes in the Dutch elections.

Aside from this, views on immigration in the Netherlands have become more negative over the years, among other things, due to the large number of Syrian refugees that came in 2015 and a perception that the integration of Muslim immigrants is falling short. The previous cabinet fell due to a failed asylum agreement, and so migration became the most important topic of the electoral campaigns and debates of 2023.

⁴ Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 4 (2004), 541-563.

⁵ “PVV electoral program 2023 [Dutch],” <https://www.pvv.nl/images/2023/PVV-Verkiezingsprogramma-2023.pdf>.

⁶ Jan Kuitenbrouwer, “The Style and Tone of Wilders’ Language [Dutch],” *Onze Taal*, Vol. 79, 2010, https://www.dbnl.org/tekst/_taa014201001_01/_taa014201001_01_0091.php.

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The PVV was firmly and unequivocally committed to the issue of migration, about which there is actual growing dissatisfaction in the Netherlands. Discontent prevailed as center and left parties failed to address the issue successfully in the eyes of the public. In this regard, the PVV seems to have found a golden formula that resonates well with voters, combining a populist message (the bad elite betrays the good people) with a nativist message (immigrants threaten the nation). At the same time, Wilders excelled in highlighting differences between him and other parties, and voters sometimes prefer to choose a party that stands out more clearly.⁷

The PVV's attitude toward Muslims is more than that of picking a scapegoat, which is common for populist parties. Wilders is passionate about questions that have been on the political agenda in the Netherlands for years and that were left insufficiently addressed by other parties. Yet, it should also be pointed out that targeting a certain group of people as the cause of society's problems is typical for populist discourse.

The party's preference for the "ordinary native," the highlighting of a scapegoat, and the demonization of the elites and the privileged raise the concern that the party and its discourse provide fertile ground for antisemitism that puts "the Jews" at the center of all that is bad.

Wilders himself has not manifested any affinity with antisemitism, and he has never made any antisemitic statements. He is outspoken about his respect for Jews and the importance of harboring the safety of the Jewish community in the Netherlands. Number four on the PVV's list is the Israeli-born Gidi Markuszower, who is a driving force in the PVV's policy regarding the Dutch-Jewish community and Israel.

Wilders also continues to repeat that Dutch culture is based on "traditional Judeo-Christian and humanistic values," which has made the Netherlands a prosperous country.

Furthermore, Wilders is vocal about his love and unconditional support for Israel. In this regard, the PVV's party program unequivocally states:

The PVV is a great friend of the only real democracy in the Middle East, Israel. The Netherlands is also culturally linked to Israel. Ties with Israel will be strengthened, among other things, by moving our embassy to Jerusalem. The Dutch representation in Ramallah at the corrupt Palestinian Authority will be closed immediately. After all, the Netherlands already has an embassy in Amman, the capital of the one and only Palestinian state: Jordan.⁸

The PVV's previous electoral program of 2010-2015 also sheds light on this issue. It states:

"Israel is an unparalleled success. Born in the darkest moment of the twentieth century and grown into a center of technological progress. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, home to the Jewish people after two thousand

⁷ "People Versus Elite: PVV the Most Recent Example of the Success of Right-Wing Populism in Europe [Dutch]," *RTL Nieuws*, November 24 2023, <https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/buitenland/artikel/5420462/euroscopsis-radicaalrechts-nationalistisch-partijen-eu-trend>.

⁸ "PVV Electoral Program 2023 [Dutch]," <https://www.pvv.nl/images/2023/PVV-Verkiezingsprogramma-2023.pdf>.

years of exile and the country that has suffered from the blows of *jihād* like no other. Israel fights for us. If Jerusalem falls, then Athens and Rome will be next. That is why Israel is the main front in the defense of the West. That is why we must do everything we can to stop the offensive of the leftists and the Mohammedans to destroy Israel. The Netherlands and the EU must immediately stop demanding that Israel condemn itself to indefensible borders by making territorial concessions. Land for peace makes no sense. It is not a territorial but an ideological conflict, a conflict between the reason of the free West and the barbarism of Islamic ideology.

Wilders went to Israel at the age of 17, where he worked and lived on a kibbutz. He then later visited the country many times. According to the late historian and antisemitism scholar Evelien Gans, Wilders might idealize Israel, but he is not philosemitic either. She concluded that Wilders' PVV "is able to draw a line between his party and the traditional antisemitic extreme right and neo-Nazi organizations."⁹

However, she argues, Wilders is one of those who employ Jews "to add strength to their own position." For example, in the way that he portrays Israel as the beacon of light in dark Muslim surroundings and resisting the threat of *jihād*. Also, Wilders' citation of the Dutch "Judeo-Christian values" is a convenient slogan to communicate what he is for and against. In addition, the PVV argues that rising antisemitism in the Netherlands is only caused by Muslim immigration.

In Europe, the PVV has associated itself with political parties such as the National Front and *Vlaams Belang*. Unlike the PVV, these parties have an antisemitic ideological past. Wilders expressly distanced himself from antisemitic statements by the former leader of the National Front, its founder Jean-Marie Le Pen. When Le Pen proclaimed criticism of the French-Jewish singer Patrick Bruel by saying, "we will build another oven next time," in reference to the extermination camps in the Holocaust, Wilders called Le Pen's statement "disgusting."¹⁰ Wilders has repeatedly emphasized that the National Front under its new leader, Marine Le Pen, was not an antisemitic party. Nevertheless, Marine's father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, represented the National Front in the European Parliament at the time of the statement.

While Wilders is not an antisemite, among the PVV's supporters there are at least a few antisemites. This is evident, among other things, from a review of the conversations on the neo-Nazi internet platform "Stormfront" and on the PVV's online forum.¹¹

A party representative in the city of Emmen, Tom Kuilder, once retweeted an image from "Stormfront" about the alleged danger of "white genocide." In response, the PVV withdrew

⁹ Evelien Gans, "Anti-Antisemitic Enthusiasm and Selective Philosemitism: Geert Wilders, the PVV and the Jews," November 2013/February 2014, https://www.jmberlin.de/sites/default/files/antisemitism-in-europe-today_6-gans.pdf.

¹⁰ "Wilders about Le Pen: "Disgusting [Dutch]," NOS, June 8, 2014, <https://nos.nl/artikel/658504-wilders-over-le-pen-walgelijk>.

¹¹ Jaco Alberts, "Wilders' New Far-Right Friends [Dutch]," *Vrij Nederland*, November 9, 2013, <https://www.vn.nl/de-nieuwe-extreem-rechtse-vrienden-van-wilders-2/>; Arthur Eaton, Petter Törnberg and Coen van de Ven, "The Online Echo-Chamber of the Extreme Right [Dutch]," *De Groene Amsterdammer*, no. 21, May 26, 2021, <https://www.groene.nl/artikel/de-online-echoput-van-extreem-rechts>.

Kuilder's party chairmanship. However, he was allowed to continue to represent the party in the municipal council.¹² On the PVV "Forum voor realisten," statements could be found saying that Jews are as "backward" as Muslims, with both coming "from the same sandbox." Another statement said, "Jews first kept bleating about having a country of their own, why don't they simply go there?"¹³ These are individual statements and no research is available to measure how many PVV voters hold antisemitic views.

Several PVV party members have made remarks in public that caused alarm for Jews.

PVV member of parliament Martin Bosma has made antisemitic insinuations about the political influence of George Soros, a billionaire of Hungarian Jewish descent. Bosma blamed Soros for financing a movement to uproot the Dutch cultural holiday of "Sinterklaas" and for removing certain exhibits from Dutch museums because of their "so-called" racist content. He said that Soros holds "a lot of sway in Dutch democracy" and tries to influence Dutch culture using "foreign money." When another MP accused Bosma of resorting to an old antisemitic stereotype, Bosma defended himself by making the baseless statement that Soros had become rich by collaborating with the Nazis.¹⁴

In another instance, Henk Bres, a PVV party representative in the municipal council of the city of The Hague, shared on Twitter a meme depicting Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte as a criminal who is being taken away, wearing a t-shirt with a star of David and a picture of George Soros.¹⁵

Another controversy developed around the phenomenon in which PVV members have promoted a flag that has Nazi connotations. The so-called "Prince's flag," an orange, white and blue flag, goes far back in Dutch history and was carried by the supporters of William of Orange in the battle against the Spaniards during the Netherlands' War of Independence.¹⁶

At the end of the 1930s, the Dutch Nazi party, "NSB," claimed this flag as its nationalist symbol. Since then, the Prince's flag has been popular among far-right groups. Several PVV members, however, have tried to restore the flag to its former glory, claiming it is a flag the Netherlands should be proud of.¹⁷ One PVV member had this flag hanging in his office window, while others

¹² "Monitor of Antisemitic Incidents 2018," CIDI, July 12, 2011, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Submissions/CIDI2.pdf>.

¹³ Forum voor realisten. The forum was removed after some time. See <http://kafka.antenna.nl/?p=4548> and <http://www.alertmagazine.nl/?p=1328> cited in Evelien Gans, "Anti-Antisemitic Enthusiasm and Selective Philosemitism: Geert Wilders, the PVV and the Jews," November 2013/February 2014, www.jmberlin.de/antisemitism-today/Gans.pdf.

¹⁴ "Dutch Parliament Proceedings," October 14, 2020, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20202021-14-3.html>; "George Soros as Bogeyman for Antisemites [Dutch]," CIDI, <https://www.cidi.nl/george-soros-als-boeman-voor-antisemieten/>.

¹⁵ "Monitor of Antisemitic Incidents 2018," CIDI, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Submissions/CIDI2.pdf>.

¹⁶ The Eighty Years' War (1568–1648), which led to the separation of the northern and southern Netherlands and to the formation of the United Provinces of the Netherlands (the Dutch Republic).

¹⁷ "PVV MP: Prince's Flag is a Flag to be Proud of," *Algemeen Dagblad*, May 11, 2011, <https://www.ad.nl/binnenland/pvv-kamerlid-prinsenvlag-is-vlag-om-trots-op-te-zijn~a391f04b/>

have worn the flag in parliament as a statement.¹⁸ PVV supporters have occasionally used the flag during demonstrations. In at least one instance, several of them also gave the Nazi salute at such a demonstration in September 2014.¹⁹

Another reason for concern for Dutch Jewry is that several of the PVV's policy priorities regarding Muslims could have a negative effect on Jewish life and observance in the Netherlands as well. The main example is that Wilders supports a ban on ritual slaughter. More specifically, he condones a ban on animal slaughter without stunning beforehand (a requisite for *halal* and *kosher* meat).

During a debate in parliament about a proposed ban on animal slaughter without stunning beforehand, MP Dion Graus of the PVV repeatedly referred to the practice as “religious torture” and “ritual torture.”²⁰ In 2012, Graus accused Jews of “torturing animals under the guise of freedom of belief” in a television interview.²¹

Graus was not impressed by the statement of six European rabbis who made a plea against the bill and in favor of freedom of religion. Graus' reaction was that “the PVV has never yielded to lobbies from anyone.”²²

Manfred Gerstenfeld, the late historian of antisemitism studies and former Vice-Chairman of the Foundation for Research of Dutch Jewry, claimed that the result of such a ban would certainly be antisemitic, pointing out that banning ritual slaughter has a long tradition in European antisemitism. Indeed, three months after the beginning of the occupation by Nazi Germany, ritual slaughter was banned in the Netherlands in July 1940.

Historian Amanda Kluveld wrote that she sees in “the eagerness to reject kosher slaughter [...] the echo of a dark past.” Even though the intent of the PVV's proposed reforms is not to limit Jewish religious freedom, the results could very well be. Bans on headscarves and circumcision are also being discussed.

– Dr. Joyce van de Bildt

¹⁸ “Wilders' MPs Wear Badges Featuring Nazi-linked Flag in Parliament,” *Dutch News*, September 27, 2013, https://www.dutchnews.nl/2013/09/wilders_mps_wear_badges_featur/.

¹⁹ CIDI, “Monitor of Antisemitic Incidents 2013,” March 2014, <https://www.cidi.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MonitorAntisemitischeIncidenten-2013.pdf>; “PVV Demo Draws Neo-Nazi Flags, while ‘Politically Incorrect Debate’ Attracts 2,000,” *Dutch News*, January 22, 2018, <https://www.dutchnews.nl/2018/01/pvv-demo-draws-neo-nazi-flags-while-politically-incorrect-debate-attracts-2000/>.

²⁰ “Transcript of Parliamentary Debate of April 13, 2011 [Dutch],” https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20110413/voortzetting_behandeling_2/document3/f=/vip1mtgmbazl.pdf.

²¹ “Graus Made Antisemitic Statements [Dutch],” *Limburg1*, October 30, 2012, <https://l1.nl/graus-deed-antisemitische-uitspraken-44746?pagina=4>.

²² “House Wants Ban on Ritual Slaughter [Dutch],” *Nederlands Dagblad*, April 14, 2011.

SECTION 4

X AS A CASE STUDY



WHO IS SPREADING LIES ON X?

In August 2017, the Israeli-German comedian and activist Shahak Shapira spray-painted tweets containing hate speech on the pavement in front of Twitter's European headquarters in Hamburg. Shapira had previously reported those tweets to Twitter because of their harmful content. The social media network, however, refused to delete them, citing its free speech policy.

The tweets Shapira painted on the street and sidewalk contained messages such as “Let's unite and gas some Jews again. Those were good times,” “Another bunch of *Kanaken* [a German slur for people from the MENA region] arrived. Did they miss the exit to Auschwitz???” or “Niggers are a plague.”¹

Since social media networks emerged two decades ago, the spread of antisemitic, racist, misogynistic, homophobic, or otherwise hateful content on them has been a cause for concern.² Social media platforms opened new paths for spreading hate as users benefit from the (perceived) anonymity and, thus, the (perceived) immunity from legal repercussions.

One of the core problems in limiting hate speech on the internet is that there is no uniform international framework for doing so. Countries apply different social, political, and legal approaches to combat hate speech. For example, in essence, the United States (US) prioritizes free speech based on protections afforded in the First Amendment. The result is that hate speech is, to a large extent, permitted and a form of protected speech in the US. An example is the so-called “Auschwitz lie,” according to which the Holocaust either did not happen or did not reach its mass-genocidal extent. On the other hand, based on the historical experience of the Holocaust, post-Second World War Germany enshrined as the first and most important clause in its constitution the protection of human dignity in Article 1. The goal was to stop future incitement against minorities. While free speech is also a constitutional right, enshrined in Article 5, para. 1, the constitution allows limiting speech under certain conditions, such as protecting human dignity. In Germany, denying the Holocaust is a crime punishable by prison.³

¹ Sebastian Eder, “Ey Twitter, löscht den Scheiß,” faz.net, August 7, 2017, <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/menschen/twitter-hassbeitraege-vor-firmenzentrale-in-hamburg-gesprueht-15140487.html>, and Julia Wadhawan and Noemi Mihalovici, “Twitter ignoriert Hasskommentare – Shahak Shapira sprüht sie ihnen vor die Haustür,” spiegel.de, August 7, 2017, <https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/hasstweets-shahak-shapira-bekannt-sich-zu-graffities-vor-twitter-buero-in-hamburg-a-00000000-0003-0001-0000-000001576779>.

² European Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Online Content Moderation – Current Challenges in Detecting Hate Speech* (Vienna/Luxemburg: Publications Office of the European Union: 2023); Zachary Laub, “Hate Speech on Social Media: Global Comparisons,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hate-speech-social-media-global-comparisons>; The Economist, “In Germany, Online Hate Speech has Real-World Consequences,” economist.com, January 12, 2018, <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/01/12/in-germany-online-hate-speech-has-real-world-consequences>; Philipp Bovermann and Tim Frehler, “Tanzt für uns,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 6, 2024, <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afd-tiktok-rechtsextremismus-martin-sellner-erfolg>.

³ Jamie Rauch, “The Good, the Bad, and the Historically Antisemitic: An Analytical Comparison of Anti-Hate Laws in Germany and the United States,” *Brooklyn Journal of International Law* 47:1 (2021), 260-298.

In parallel to the development of online hate speech, scientific, political, and societal interest in the problem of online hate speech grew, and initiatives to address it proliferated, for example, in the form of legal frameworks and civil society organizations. Recently, the European Union (EU) established the Digital Services Act, which requires the largest social media platforms with millions of users to actively counter hate speech, and which, since early 2024, requires EU-member states to control those platforms.⁴ Civil society initiatives such as HateAid, Klicksafe, and Stop Hate UK have led public awareness campaigns.

The largest social networks, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, have publicly announced that they would take measures to reduce the spread of hate speech.⁵ The case of Twitter, renamed X in 2023 by its new owner, Elon Musk, stands out: it has become a favored platform for antisemites, racists, conspiracy theorists, and others who intend to spread hate online.⁶

This article seeks to contribute to the research on online hate speech in general and on the spread of antisemitic content on X in particular. Despite the existence of dozens of works on online hate speech, there is a shortage of information on the users spreading antisemitic content in various languages and the wider networks those users operate in. Recent reports suggest X has decided to take action against the proliferation of antisemitism on the platform. The article shows the essentiality of doing so.

Methodology

When spending time on X, hate speech can be easily encountered randomly. To find and systematically analyze antisemitic content, one must first identify keywords commonly used to spread such content. For this study, keywords in English, German, and Arabic were chosen from lists of keywords identified in previous searches, studies, or trial runs as antisemitic.⁷

Each selected keyword clearly fell within the categories outlined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Working Definition of Antisemitism: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical

⁴ European Commission, “The Commission Sends Request for Information to X under the Digital Services Act,” [ec.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4953), October 12, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4953.

⁵ See, for example, Billy Perrigo, “Facebook Says It’s Removing More Hate Speech Than Ever Before. But There’s a Catch,” *Time*, November 27, 2019, <https://time.com/5739688/facebook-hate-speech-languages>.

⁶ Sheera Frenkel and Kate Conge, “Quantifying A Large Rise In Hate Speech Under Musk,” *New York Times*, December 3, 2022, Section B, 1.

⁷ See, for example, Joe Mulhall, ed., *Antisemitism in the Digital Age* (London: HOPE not hate Charitable Trust, 2021); Martin J. Riedl, Katie Joseff, Stu Soorholtz, and Samuel Woolley, “Platformed Antisemitism on Twitter: Anti-Jewish Rhetoric in Political Discourse Surrounding the 2018 US Midterm Election,” *new media & society* (2022), 1-21; ADL Center for Technology and Society, “Sliding Through: Spreading Antisemitism on TikTok by Exploiting Moderation Gaps,” [adl.org](https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/sliding-through-spreading-antisemitism-tiktok-exploiting-moderation-gaps), November 20, 2023, <https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/sliding-through-spreading-antisemitism-tiktok-exploiting-moderation-gaps>; Carl Miller, David Weir, Shaun Ring, Oliver Marsh, Chris Inskip, and Nestor Prieto Chavana, “Antisemitism on Twitter Before and After Elon Musk’s Acquisition,” *CASM Technology and ISD*, March 20, 2023, <https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Antisemitism-on-Twitter-Before-and-After-Elon-Musks-Acquisition.pdf>.

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manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”⁸

The keywords chosen were “holohoax” and “Zionazis” in English, “Globalisten” in German, and “*Brutukalat Hukama’ Sahayun*” (Protocols of the Elders of Zion) in Arabic.

Software identified that worldwide, 24,400 tweets used the keyword “holohoax” in the period August 13, 2022, to September 12, 2023. The software randomly selected 643 of those tweets and pulled all publicly open-source available data from the accounts that tweeted them. The selection included usernames, locations, gender, age, short bios, as well as the most common keywords and themes engaged with.⁹

All of the 643 collected tweets were read to check whether their content was antisemitic. The reading revealed that approximately 5% of tweets did not actually contain antisemitic messages but typically condemned the use of the antisemitic keyword. Sixty-four (64) tweets were randomly selected and qualitatively read and analyzed.

The same method was applied to the remaining keywords. The software identified that worldwide, 21,100 tweets contained the keyword “Zionazis,” of which 1,308 were randomly selected and quantitatively analyzed for biographies, with 130 randomly selected and textually analyzed. Fifty-eight thousand four hundred (58,400) tweets contained the keyword “Globalisten,” of which 2,151 were randomly selected and quantitatively analyzed for biographies; 215 were randomly selected and textually analyzed. Two-thousand nine hundred (2,900) tweets contained the keyword “Brutukalat,” of which 1,433 were randomly selected and quantitatively analyzed for biographies; 140 were randomly selected and their content analyzed. For each sample, the qualitative reading revealed that 5% to 10% of tweets did not contain antisemitic messages.

A second round of data collection was conducted in early 2024 for tweets posted between October 7, 2023, and February 19, 2024, to compare and analyze the use of the selected keywords before and after the October 7 attack.

For this period, the software identified 25,800 tweets that contained the keyword holohoax, of which 2,730 were randomly selected and quantitatively analyzed for biographies. The software also identified 110,700 tweets containing the keyword Zionazis, of which 13,400 were randomly selected and quantitatively analyzed for biographies. The keyword Globalisten was found in 49,900 tweets, of which 7,380 were quantitatively analyzed. A further 3,100 tweets contained the keyword Brutukalat, of which 450 were quantitatively analyzed.

⁸ International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance: “Working Definition of Antisemitism,” International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, n.d., <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>.

⁹ Users are free to choose their username and provide personal details about themselves. The content in no way has to match reality. For example, users can claim to live in London, while actually living in Paris; they can claim to be men, while actually being women; they can claim to be politicians, while actually being university professors; and they can claim to be called Max Mustermann, while actually being called Jane Doe.

Analysis and Results

HoloHoax

Locations

Users spreading the keyword holoHoax mainly claimed to be in English-speaking countries. Before October 7, 2023, almost 85% claimed to be in the United States, 3% claimed to be in Canada, and just under 3% claimed to be in the United Kingdom (UK). The remaining users came from other locations.

This means that US users were strongly overrepresented: the keyword holoHoax was more than 30 times more popular in the US than in the UK, despite the US having only around four times as many Twitter/X users as the UK (95.4 million to 23.2 million, respectively).¹⁰

Following the October 7 attacks, the share of users from the United States and the UK that tweeted about an alleged holoHoax slightly increased (84.8% to 86.5% and 2.7% to 3.4%, respectively), while the share of users from Canada decreased (3.0% to 2.8%).

Gender

A majority of approximately 56% of users before October 7 and 60% of users following October 7 that shared the holoHoax keyword on Twitter/X were male. The findings befit the general statistics about gender distribution and X use, according to which, for example, around 63% of users in the US are male and 37% are female.¹¹

Age

Around 70% of users spreading the holoHoax keyword on X, before and after October 7, were up to 34 years old. This means that users spreading the keyword holoHoax were far younger than the average X user. Worldwide, only 56% of users fall into the 18-24 years and 25-34 years age ranges.¹² The findings further show that the October 7 attacks had a minor impact on the age distribution.

¹⁰ Statista, “Leading Countries Based on Number of X (formerly Twitter) Users as of January 2023,” Statista, January 2023, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/242606/number-of-active-twitter-users-in-selected-countries/>, and Jack Shepherd, “23 Essential Twitter (X) Statistics You Need to Know in 2024,” Social Shepherd, January 5, 2024, <https://thesocialshepherd.com/blog/twitter-statistics>.

¹¹ Stacy Jo Dixon, “Distribution of Twitter Users in the United States as of January 2023, by Gender,” Statista, March 1, 2023, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/678794/united-states-twitter-gender-distribution/>.

¹² Stacy Jo Dixon, “Distribution of Twitter users worldwide as of April 2021, by age group,” Statista, March 29, 2022, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/283119/age-distribution-of-global-twitter-users/>; Brooke Auxier and Monica Anderson, “Social Media Use in 2021,” Pew Research Center, April 7, 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-media-use-in-2021/>; Frederik Harms, “Anteil der Nutzer von Social-Media-Plattformen nach Altersgruppen in Deutschland im Jahr 2023,” Statista, January 29, 2024, <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/543605/umfrage/verteilung-der-nutzer-von-social-media-plattformen-nach-altersgruppen-in-deutschland/>.

Content of Tweets and Bios

Users referring to a holohoax showcase strong sympathy for contemporary right-wing US politics: They echo calls for white supremacy, voice support for Donald Trump, and object to gun control and abortion. Among users analyzed for this study, the ones sharing the holohoax keyword were the most outspoken and unambiguous about their hatred for Jews and other minorities.

The analyzed tweets and bios contained a narrow spectrum of themes and topics, most prominently spreading nationalist and white supremacist ideology, denying the Holocaust, and promoting hatred for and violence against Jews. There was evidence for the belief in broader antisemitic conspiracy theories, such as about secret Jewish world domination.

The keywords most repeated in tweets by some users who referred to a holohoax included PaulGosar, killthejews, TheNoticing, BanTheADL, and BIRTHCERTIFICATEFRAUD.¹³ Some of those keywords speak for themselves, such as “killthejews” or “BanTheADL.”

Others require readers to be familiar with right-wing discourses. Paul Gosar, for example, is a US Congressman from Arizona. Gosar supported the false claim that the 2020 elections were rigged. Gosar echoes political discourses, including sharing links to websites praising Hitler and denying the Holocaust.¹⁴ TheNoticing refers to people who believe they can see the truth, unlike most others, and notice or become aware of Jewish conspiracies for world domination. TheNoticing is also the name of an antisemitic Telegram channel.

The users’ bios revealed a similar pattern. Among the most repeated keywords were “white,” “right,” “truth,” “noticer,” “proud,” and “Jew.” The most prominent theme in the bios was (white) nationalism, including support for white supremacy. Users were outspoken about their hatred for Jews as well as for other minorities. For example, users called themselves “supporters of white people, their culture and their history,” “pro-white,” or “PROUD WHITE MALE!”¹⁵

One user described himself as a “Red Blooded American. Patriot. Veteran. Gun Owner. Far Right Extremist. Deplorable. Ethnocentric & Proud of my European Heritage.” Another was a “DEFENDER OF WESTERN CIVILISATION!” who added that “WHITE WELLBEING IS NON-NEGOTIABLE!!!!” Other users promoted slogans such as “America First” or proclaimed support for the (former) Confederacy.

¹³ The keywords DemVoice1 and VoteBlueEveryElection are prominent. A detailed reading of the tweets containing the keywords revealed that the users criticized Antisemitic hate speech, such as “holohoax.” See, for example, the tweet, “The GOP are showing us who they are, and we should believe them. Hey Arizona!!! You choose to send Gosar to Congress. Does his behavior reflect your values? I hope not! #VoteBlueEveryElection #DemVoice1 #FreshResists QT @ProjectLincoln: .@RepGosar yesterday used his <https://t.co/dzchA8jp8l> newsletter to promote a site that has posted content calling the Holocaust “the Holohoax” and telling readers to “stand up for Hitler.” The GOP isn’t hiding who they truly are anymore” (http://twitter.com/Mad_as_hell/status/1684334723613724673).

¹⁴ Jerod Macdonald-Evoy, “Paul Gosar Promoted an Antisemitic Website that Praised him for Condemning ‘Jewish Warmongers,’” *Arizona Mirror*, April 17, 2023, <https://azmirror.com/2023/04/17/paul-gosar-promoted-an-antisemitic-website-that-praised-him-for-condemning-jewish-warmongers/>.

¹⁵ Here, as in the following, quotes are not adjusted for caps lock, nor are typographical or grammatical errors corrected.

The second prominent theme after promoting nationalism was openly displayed antisemitism (when it was not already included in claims for white Christian exclusivity). For example, one user referred to himself as “PURE BLOOD ANTI JEW.” Another stated that “as my dear friend Ezra Pound once said, ‘There is a reason they have been banished from 109 nations.’” Another wrote that “goyimlivesmatter” and yet another referred to himself as a “(((noticer)))”

Another wrote that the “jew world order is white genocide.” Yet another wrote that he was “Unapologetically white. Counter-semite. Segregationist.” Other users who professed allegiance to American extremist Nick Fuentes used the abbreviation NatSoc (National Socialist) in their bios or stated that “Weimar problems demand Weimar solutions.”

Antisemitism was also expressed through belief in conspiracy theories. The belief in secret Jewish control of the world’s financial and economic systems plays a central role in the far-right worldview. Users employing the keyword holohoax confirm this. They stated in their bios that they opposed the “New World Order,” the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Rothschilds, the Rockefellers, the Wallenbergs, Blackrock, and Vanguard. One wrote that he was against “all the satanic elite globalists with their sick pedophile cult and Agenda 2030.”

The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development is a United Nations plan of 17 development goals, including reducing poverty and hunger and improving education for all. In the eyes of some conspiracy theorists, it is a plan to shift control of the “world order” to a secretive elite made up mainly of Jews. As will be discussed more in-depth below under the keyword Globalisten, some users prided themselves on their alleged ability to think independently and, unlike most people, see the truth behind the global power game.

Other conspiracy theories promoted by users included the myth that the COVID-19 pandemic either did not exist, that it existed but was planned by the government to subdue the population, or that the vaccinations developed against COVID-19 were actually injections used to control humans by secretly implanting a microchip in them. One user, for example, spoke of the “Plandemic.” Other users supported the idea that the Earth is flat.

Some users showed overwhelming support for former President Trump. This prompted users to proudly claim that they participated in the January 6, 2021, Capitol attack or at least supported it. They promoted the lie that the 2020 US elections were rigged or called for an uprising against the government by declaring, “This is the time we have been preparing for our entire lives. The time to expose and eradicate evil.”

In line with the political views promoted by Trump and the vast majority of Republicans, users employing the keyword holohoax rejected gun control (some even compared it to slavery), proclaimed their Christian faith (including posting Bible verses in their bios), and voiced opposition to sexual and gender diversity.

Some examples of tweets and user bios from the holohoax realm follow:

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Tweets

1. holohoax included. oy vey not the 6 gorillion!!
2. Nah, the holohoax has been going for about 50 years and shows little sign of slowing any time soon.
3. It's not just the ADL [Anti-Defamation League]. It's all jews pretty much, they don't hide it at all. Just look up all the anti-white articles and see who wrote them. Then, watch videos of rabbis speaking of the white race. Stuff is so obvious, and people are blinded by chosen and holohoax
4. She's not white, she's a jew her family were survivors of the holohoax apparently, surprise surprise. Why have they been the eternal victims since the middle ages? Or have they? What is Semitism?
5. 6 gorillion were gassed at lampshade soap factories just so gubment [government] employees could ride dune buggies on the moon. forget that there were only 3 to 4 million jays in German occupied Europe and 3 to 4 million holohoax survivors it's still mankind's greatness achievement in Eurolib
6. According to jews (deserved lower case j!), everything others do/say is anti-Semitic. Does it surprise me that the biggest liars/thieves, most evil ppl, turn out to b the biggest whiners/bitches? Nah, not at all. Due to a false holohoax death toll, y'all were given a great....
7. Oh yeah a 6 million def got gassed in the #holohoax if I didn't say that already. That's why jews were so grateful that the goyish Americans saved them from the gas chambers.. that's why they took over the media to blame whitey for every little thing that ever happened
8. Now do yiz believe us? #nazi #holohoax #thirreichadvocate
9. Anti_Semitism. Your lot took out the hyphen, but we put it back. Semitism= gays, porn, media lies, 911 lies, holohoax nonsense and other Jew evil. We know, we are sick of your kvetching [complaining]. We talk about Semitism now, recognise it for what it is.
10. Blacks use slavery for an excuse to riot and attack people Jews use the holohoax for money and deflection from their own evil agenda

Bio

1. A HERO FOR ALL OF US -- Supporter of White People, their Culture, & History. The USA is part Confederacy – we have states. Understand that & be tolerant.
2. Volk | heathen | lover of fine arts and reading dusty books | Pro-White, Nationalist and traditionalist | Fren | Antiwhites will be mocked then blocked
3. (((noticer))) posting memes & debating things that usually get me suspended // GoyimLivesMatter // Opinions change as I learn // Gab: TalmudDisrespecter o/

Following the October 7 attacks, keywords and themes referring to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict entered tweets that contained the keyword holohoax. The conflict became such a prominent

issue that it dominated the X debate surrounding a holohoax. Apart from the conflict, tweets referred to contemporary political debates, such as the MiLeg (Michigan Legislature) or the 2024 presidential elections.

Zionazis

Locations

Users spreading the keyword Zionazis mainly claimed to be in English-speaking countries, even though the term itself is not necessarily English. The wordplay would work, for example, in German or French. Before October 7, almost 55% of users spreading the term Zionazis came from the United States, trailed by the United Kingdom, where some 6% of users joined the debate.

Significant, albeit smaller, shares of users were from India, Mexico, the Palestinian territories, and Australia. A potential reason for this was that the term aims more at the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as it specifically targets Zionism, which is more acceptable than using a term that denies the Holocaust.

Following the October 7 attacks, the share of users from the United States grew (54.7% to 71.3%), indicating the prominence of the term among users debating the events on and following October 7. Similarly, the share of users from the United Kingdom grew (6.2% to 8.1%), indicating an overall dominance of the term Zionazis in English tweets.

As the keyword is not clearly affiliated with a language, it is difficult to say whether users from some countries are over or underrepresented. However, the dominance of users from the United States – making up more than half of all users for a keyword that can be used in different languages – is striking. It befits the overrepresentation of US users who use the term holohoax.

Gender

As with the term holohoax, the gender distribution of users spreading the term Zionazis was clearly in favor of male users. Notably, the share decreased following the October 7 attacks, indicating that more female Twitter/X users joined in the debate and spread the term Zionazis. This was not the case with the term holohoax and neither, as will be shown below, with Globalisten. However, it was similar to the development of the term Brutukalat.

Age

Similar to the term holohoax, the age distribution for users sharing the keyword Zionazis on X was younger than the age distribution of all X users. The distribution did not change drastically following October 7, the share of users in the age group 25-34 grew by 4%, while the share of those in the age group 18-24 decreased by around the same percentage.

Content of Tweets and Bios

Even before the events of October 7, users spreading the keyword Zionazis had two clearly defined political interests: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which they uniquely sided with

the latter, and contemporary US political issues, particularly those popular among left-leaning civil rights movements.

All keywords mentioned by spreaders of the keyword Zionazis refer to the conflict. There are almost no calls for violence against Jews (though the use of the term Zionazis itself is obscene and violent); there are no pledges of allegiance to right-wing politicians; and there are no references to political issues such as gun control, abortion, or migration. Some users distinguish between Zionists and Jews.

Some users criticize politicians, including Donald Trump, Joe Biden or Sadiq Khan for their support for Israel. Some allege that politicians have been bought by Zionists. Such allegations mirror prominent conspiracy theories about Jewish control of media, government, and finance. Other users refer to the Holocaust, which they do not deny, as a comparison to the current situation in the Palestinian territories.

Keyword	Mentions
FreePalestine	1182
IsraeliCrimes	980
Jenin	832

The analysis of users' profile bios confirms their main interest lies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They either identified as being of Palestinian origin or as supporters of the Palestinian cause. Some users also referenced other contemporary political issues, mainly on the left of the US political spectrum.

Along with freepalestine and Palestine, popular keywords were also BLM [Black Lives Matter], defundthepolice, freecollege, or m4all [medicines for all]. Support for the Black Lives Matter movement and the idea of defunding the police are situated on the left of the American political spectrum. Other users declared dissatisfaction with party politics and shunned Democrats and Republicans. UK users voiced support for Labour politician Jeremy Corbyn, an outspoken supporter of the Palestinian cause.

Several keywords appeared in the bios exactly the same number of times. This makes it likely that the profiles are either automated accounts, so-called bots, or orchestrated accounts run professionally by real users rather than mere expressions of individual political opinions.

Some examples of tweets and bios using the Zionazis keyword follow:

Tweets

1. @Navi_Nistar @muhammadshehad2 Zionazi mentality...always feeling entitled to steal whatever land they want....squatters DNA goes through generations in zionazis
2. @DumisaniTemsgen #Palestinian rockets are #Muslim rockets. They terrorise & kill Jewish women & children. #Zionist #moral bombs & death squads neutralise #Palestinian #terrorist women & children. #ZioNazis are delusional. They're an obstacle to peaceful living & human progress.

3. @Ostrov_A @FoxNews @grossmanhannah Zionazis are scared when they are criticized and exposed for #IsraeliCrimes, the Zionazi cult is not owned by Jews and the Jewish community condemns #israelicrimes and considers them disgraceful to entire humanity.
4. @redbridgelabour Why do Redbridge support Zionazis that Holocaust survivors and Jewish academics have denounced? <https://t.co/hhWTJA4kkv>
5. #UN and #ICC ⚖️ MUST know the #ZioNazis 🇮🇱 continue their #WarCriminal 🇺🇸 #EthnicCleansing 💀 of #Palestine 🇵🇸 WHAT are they going to do about it? #FreePalestineNOW!! 🙌🔥🇵🇸🗡️💣💣💣
<https://t.co/dxpuQAWPWQ>
6. @V_Palestine20 Cute. Hope they enjoy their time in Palestine before they get deported once again. Destroy the ZioNazis. Their clock is ticking. <https://t.co/b7XTeoPO5N>
7. Here is Keir Starmer heaping praise on the British Muslim Heritage Centre, with Maqsood “Zionazis!” Ahmad. “Fantastic”, “wisdom”, “inspiring”, an “interfaith example”. Afzal Khan MP is a keen patron of the Centre. Anything to say, Labour? <https://t.co/lacG4kr0Sk>
8. Fake Jews from Eastern Europe are calling us antisemites, but real Jews don’t agree and are calling them zionazis!
9. @israel_advocacy @hrw @KhuloodBadawi Did Muhammad Khdeir have a weapon, did Ali Dawabshe have a weapon, did the children playing soccer on Gaza’s beach have weapons. Did she have a weapon 🗡️? Did they have weapons 🗡️, NO NO NO. Zionazis murder Pal children. Stop playing the victim. <https://t.co/snIBvqy2yU>
10. @mishtal A day in life of a Nazi Calling him/herself a Zionist Deciding what bs they are going to spread with other Zionazis Crying wolf when challenged Claiming Jews are Zionists 🤡 Foaming at the mouth when their fake narrative is destroyed Begging US for aid

Bios

1. #FreePalestine #EndApartheid #BLM #ErinGoBraugh #M4All #GND #FreeCollege #LivingWage #PaidSickLeave #DefundThePolice #DefundThePentagon
2. Learning, Sharing, 🇵🇸🇵🇸, I block Zionist trolls.
3. Views are my own. Zionism is not Judaism it is anti-Semitic UAE & Saudi doesn’t represent all Muslims and Arabs

Following the October 7 attacks, users who were posting the keyword Zionazis, kept their focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Keywords referring to other contemporary political issues, in the US or other countries, played no role, though the names of leading politicians are referred to in connection to the conflict. Examples include: GenocideJoe, POTUS_too_is_a_War_Criminal, Bundeskanzler, RishiSunak, or VonDerLeyenWarCriminalAccomplice. Except for the reference to President Biden, those terms did not make the list of top-10 keywords, but followed shortly after that.

Globalisten

The German term Globalisten does not directly derive from globalization but from globalism (*Globalismus*). Globalization denotes the advancing of global interconnectivity, for example, of peoples and cultures or markets and supply chains. Globalism is a conspiracy theory, spread mainly by right-wing extremists, claiming that there are agents behind globalization who seek to erect a new, globalist order by purposefully destroying naturally developed national, political, and cultural identities.¹⁶

For example, those who advance this conspiracy theory believe that Globalisten initiate and guide large-scale migration movements to destroy homogenous nation-states and replace ethnically distinct peoples with a uniform being (*Einheitsmensch*).

For people who believe this, the group of Globalisten is made up of Jews who orchestrate the global restructuring as well as their puppets. Synonyms for Globalisten are the “East Coast” (Nazi slur for New York City, which Nazis presented as the center of a Jewish-controlled world capitalism) and the “Zionist Occupied Government” (implying that Western governments, mainly of the United States, cave to Zionist interests. White supremacist extremists believe that the United States is an ethnically heterogeneous state, a society of immigrants, that has never had a pure ethnic identity and that thus easily fell prey to Jewish plans for world domination).¹⁷

The German Domestic Intelligence Service (*Verfassungsschutz*), the agency responsible for, among other tasks, detecting and tracking antisemitic tendencies, explains that in the German-speaking context, antisemitic codes replace overt antisemitic messages. Among the codes for antisemitic conspiracies, the agency cites Globalisten, Ostküste (East Coast), or Neue Weltordnung (New World Order).¹⁸ The reason is that German-speaking users are typically more careful when expressing antisemitism than users who speak other languages.

Locations

Users spreading antisemitic content by referring to the keyword Globalisten, mainly claimed to be in German-speaking countries. Already before October 7, 2023, over 80% of users were from Germany, around 5% from Austria, and around 3% from Switzerland.

¹⁶ Mark Weitzman, “Globalization, Conspiracy Theory, and the Shoah,” in Robert S. Wistrich, ed., *Holocaust Denial – The Politics of Perfidy* (Berlin: De Gruyter 2012), 197-200.

¹⁷ Felix Neumann, “Was verstehen Rechtsextremisten unter Globalismus?,” kas.de, n.d., <https://www.kas.de/de/web/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/was-verstehen-rechtsextremisten-unter-globalismus>; Antonio Amadeu Stiftung, “Gruppen, denen eine Beteiligung an der ‘Weltverschwörung’ vorgeworfen wird,” Antonio Amadeu Stiftung, n.d., <https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/verschwuerungsmythen-und-antisemitismus/begriffe-trends-und-dauerbrenner-der-verschwuerungsideologien>. See also Matthias Meisner, “Juden als Feigenblatt,” *Jüdische Allgemeine*, February 22, 2024, <https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/politik/juden-als-feigenblatt/>.

¹⁸ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, *Lagebild Antisemitismus 2020/21* (Cologne: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2022); see also Sascha Lobo’s ridiculization of those dressing their antisemitism in coded language in order to cover it: “Antisemitismus erkennen für Anfänger,” *Der Spiegel*, February 1, 2024, <https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/antisemitismus-erkennen-fuer-anfaenger-wie-man-hass-gegen-juden-enttarnt-a-7752e35c-52df-4646-9222-bfcd206040ed>.

The distribution, compared to population sizes and prominence of Twitter/X in various countries, shows a slight misrepresentation: X is most popular in Switzerland, where 17% of people aged 18-64 claim to use it, followed by Germany (16%) and Austria (13%).¹⁹ Germany has a population of 83.2 million, Austria 9 million, and Switzerland 8.7 million. Thus, Swiss users are slightly underrepresented while German and especially Austrian users are overrepresented in the use of the term Globalisten compared to average X users.

Following the October 7 attacks, the global share in using the term Globalisten roughly remained the same in Switzerland and Austria, while it grew in Germany from 82.4% to 87.6%.

Gender

The keyword Globalisten was more popular among male users than among female users (66.1% to 33.9%). The October 7 events hardly impacted the gender distribution (66.0% to 34.0%).

Age

The age distribution mirrors findings from above regarding the use of the terms holohoax and Zionazis. Users were on average younger than average Twitter/X users. Unlike the previous keywords, for which the age distribution slightly shifted in favor of younger users following October 7, the events hardly impacted the age distribution among German-speaking users who tweeted about Globalisten. This indicates that the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not significantly affect the political interests of users philosophizing about globalism. It did not motivate users who had not previously engaged with the term Globalisten to join in the debate.

Content of Tweets and Bios

The analysis of tweets containing the term Globalisten showed that users were less straightforward about their hatred for Jews than users who wrote about a holohoax. They were, on the other hand, more straightforward about their hatred for other minorities and particularly for migrants. Apart from that, they were outspoken about their support for right-wing politics, mainly for the far-right alternative für Deutschland (AfD).²⁰ Among users referring to Globalisten, the propensity to believe in and repeat conspiracy theories was evident.

The ambiguity about hatred for Jews, especially compared to the term holohoax, is most likely the result of greater policing and surveillance by security services. For the same reason, German-speaking users tend to label their accounts as satire, pretending that the conspiracy theories and hate speech they spread are just jokes. As indicated in the introduction, legal consequences for hate speech, slander, and Holocaust denial are greater in Germany than in some other countries.

¹⁹ Mathias Brandt, "Twitter im DACH-Raum vergleichsweise unpopulär," Statista, November 14, 2022, <https://de.statista.com/infografik/26062/umfrage-zur-regelmaessigen-twitter-nutzung-in-ausgewaehlten-laendern/>.

²⁰ Deutsche Welle, "Germany: AfD Youth Group can be Classified as 'Extremist,'" *Deutsche Welle*, February 6, 2024, <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-afd-youth-group-can-be-classified-as-extremist/a-68186617>; Ann-Katrin Müller, "The German AfD's Constant Drift Toward Extremism," *Der Spiegel*, August 4, 2023, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/rising-right-the-german-afd-s-constant-drift-toward-extremism-a-4b88b469-e790-47e9-871d-f8f208dd58ba?sara_ref=re-xx-cp-sh.

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Similar to users tweeting about holohoax, users referring to Globalisten showed a strong affinity for extremist ideology. The latter were more outspoken than the former about their belief in a broader range of conspiracy theories. Antisemitism also played a central role, however, in the form of coded language. Holocaust denial is almost nonexistent in German-speaking tweets, unlike in those from the holohoax realm.

The most popular keywords in German-speaking tweets revolved around two themes: the spread of conspiracy theories, sometimes involving global organizations, and the rejection of the current political leadership tied to the claimed support of the far-right AfD.

Among the most popular keywords are some that speak for themselves, such as WEF, Davos, or WHO (World Health Organization), which are tied to alleged conspiracies by a secretive elite and the global institutions they allegedly dominate. In the eyes of basically all believers in those conspiracies, Jews play a central role.

To understand other keywords requires some familiarity with contemporary conspiracy theories. Among those theories, the Great Reset is currently the most popular, as it links to several others. Great Reset is the term used for the belief that a secretive global elite (that is at least partly Jewish) is currently working to rearrange or “reset” the global political, financial, and social order. The theory stretches to migration being used to destroy ethnically homogeneous peoples.

Other keywords require some familiarity with current political debates in Germany. GrueneFilz, for example, refers to an affair in which a high-ranking Secretary of State (in Germany, the rank under the minister) belonging to the Green Party, installed his best man as the head of a federal agency. As a consequence, the state secretary stepped down and his best man did not assume his role as leader of the agency.²¹

The bios of German-speaking users confirm the pattern. They too hint at two major themes. The belief in conspiracy theories and the engagement with contemporary political issues. The most popular keyword in those bios is freedom, appearing in German and English. Users believe that their freedom is undermined by the abovementioned actors who seek to establish a new system.

German-speaking users expanded on their political affiliations in their profile bios. They did so in abstract terms by claiming they were “liberal-conservative” or “conservative-right.” They defined themselves in opposition to “Red-Green ideology and opportunism [the colors of the Social Democrats and the Green Party respectively; both are currently part of the governing coalition],” “Gendernonsens,” “climate fascism,” and migration politics. Others were “anti-woke,” “anti-vegan,” or “genuinely” educated and thus not compatible with the “Green-Left.” One user opposed Germany’s alleged “neo-socialist, eco-fascist transformation,” another claimed that a “pandemic coup” had occurred in Germany, calling the government a “dictatorship,” or a “*Scheindemokratie*” (sham democracy).

²¹ Associated Press, “Top German Ministry Official Resigns after Accusations of Favoritism,” Associated Press, May 17, 2023, <https://apnews.com/article/germany-government-graichen-favoritism-d875e3910c0b7ac43a1c7644e3bb385e>.

Several users positively identified with political parties. Those included primarily the right-wing, or even far-right AfD and a party called Die Basis. The latter was founded during the COVID-19 Pandemic by people who opposed government measures to curb the virus' spread and felt that the government was unjustly limiting legal freedoms. Its political outlook and propensity to spread conspiracy theories match the AfD's. Other users professed allegiance to the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU).

Befitting the claimed political affiliations, users spreading antisemitic messages using the term Globalisten promoted the idea of a world organized according to ethno-nationalist states. The idea has for some time been a pillar of right-wing political thought. Each ethnically rooted nation should live with full autonomy in its (historic or mythical) homeland. As such, states can cooperate economically while political cooperation remains limited.

Migration and the mixing of ethnicities and cultures are rejected. Users promoted a "Europe of Nations," a "national pacifist" Germany, "a World of free people[s]," or "Germany first." They insisted on a German right to identity, culture, *Heimat*, and future, as well as "white survival." Users emphasized their opposition to immigration, *Überfremdung* [exaggerated alienation of the domestic population], and Islamization. Instead, they advocated for remigration [a term used by the far-right to denote the forced migration of people with migration backgrounds, including those with German citizenship].

A common theme among users who tweeted under the keyword Globalisten was skepticism of the media. Journalists were suspected of not telling the truth and instead being "in" on a government conspiracy. One user promoted "independent and unideological journalism." Others promoted alternative media outlets affiliated with the far-right, such as "Achse des Guten [Axis of Good; a reference to the Axis of Evil]."

In the same vein, users expressed distrust in global elites and organizations, calling, for example, for the arrest of Bill Gates (according to COVID-19-related conspiracies, Gates – whom some conspiracy theorists hold to be Jewish and in cahoots with George Soros – planned to implant microchips into human bodies in order to control them). Users presented a list of organizations they rejected. The EU, the WHO, the WEF, and the US Federal Reserve Bank are among them. One user called to "protect the children from high finance" – a code for Jews.

Based on the expressed distrust in media and international organizations, users implored fellow Twitter/X users to return to being self-determined and self-thinking individuals and to no longer be sheep who obey the corrupt system. Users were proud to state that they, unlike others, were the really free people able to withstand government control, that they were able to see truths hidden from others, that they critically questioned information provided to them, that they were able to think for themselves, and that they were truth seekers.

The self-proclaimed free thinkers had a different perspective on contemporary world events than what they considered the mainstream. A core notion for them was "peace." Users claimed they promoted peace, unlike the mainstream, which was intent on war and destruction. For users, this meant that the West should stop supporting Ukraine in its defense against the Russian invasion. Some users claimed that NATO was attacking Putin and Russia.

Instead, they promoted friendship with Russia. Users were united in a belief that there were deeper reasons for the “alleged” war and that it was orchestrated by mysterious powers to serve their interests. One user, for example, claimed that “the established parties [i.e. mainstream German parties] lead Germany into World War 3 against Russia.”

In the same vein, users cited common conspiracy theories according to which airplanes secretly spread chemical agents (known as chemtrails), modern 5G communication technologies spread cancer, and COVID-19 vaccinations were used to implant genes or microchips into human bodies. Several users proudly proclaimed that they were “unvaccinated and untested [against/for COVID-19].” One called the government and health care system “Covid terrorists.”

Users also linked distrust in health care and vaccinations with an interest in alternative lifestyles. They were interested in Demeter foods (a form of biodynamic agriculture) and Waldorf (also known as Steiner) education. Several users objected to digitalization.

Some examples of tweets and bios from the Globalisten realm follow:

Tweets

1. Inclusion [here: integrating handicapped children into regular schools] slows down healthy children and is a farce. Inclusion is a further project by the Globalists to harm Germany. Handicapped people ARE a burden to society. Obviously.
2. The Globalists, Rotschild & Co
3. Yes, the dishonest Oldparties [established German political parties] work for the WEF and for the Globalists...we should stand on the side of the people's party AfD.
4. News from the Globalists: “financial shock” and climate control to initiate their Great Reset [conspiracy theory according to which the Covid19-pandemic was a hoax used to create a so-called new world order and seize political and economic control].
5. The Muslims are not the primary problem. They are just tools of the Globalists. Yes, we will have to come to terms [with them]. The goose is cooked [*die Messe ist wohl gelesen*]. But that does not mean that the way we will live together is already set in stone.
6. Ukraine War, BRICS-currency, Putin – all a lie? We are being lied to & betrayed that's clear, but is everything really planned? Is Putin a cheat on the side of the Rothschild-Globalists? Is Putin cheating?
7. The debate has made the WEF-Globalist-Homo-Resettlers very afraid of an uprising by the German people, so that they had to initiate this false-flag operation.
8. Total realignment and kick out all the corrupt Globalists and bucklers. Then we could talk. Until then #onlyAfD
9. The basis of the calculated mass-immigration to Germany is by the way the destruction of the ethnic identity and the belief in the calculated design of human DNA through breeding and manipulation. The Globalists are fascist-communists and at the same time trans-humans and eugenics. They believe that they can create a worldwide homogenous race

through calculated mass-immigration. Ethnically homogenous islands like the German one will make way for a global, coffee-brown mixed race. That is not my opinion but that of the Globalists...in order to anticipate the accusation of racism.

10. Who is responsible for Germany's downfall? The voters? Russia? No, it is due to the ideology of Eco-Socialists and the interests of Globalists. The discussion here of firewalls is an absolute joke [the term firewall – Brandmauer – is used in German discourse to speak of a protection of the democratic discourse from right-wing extremists]!

Bios

1. Swimming against the current is a sport too. Freedom 🇩🇪 liberal-conservative, post-graduate studies, against state patronizing, critical questioning!
2. Dealing with animals, professionally and privately. Politically conservative / right. Unvaccinated. Against Red-Green ideology and opportunism. I am here for a normal G.
3. 888 author – satire channel – living human being who thinks for himself – maximum oh medium or what? Climate lie = distraction from chemtrails Haarp 5G gene injections.

The content of tweets about Globalisten was almost not affected by the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after October 7. The ten most prominent keywords almost uniquely focused on German political issues. The keywords indicate support for the AfD. Neuwahlen and Ampelbeenden are calls for the government to resign. Only the keywords Hamas and Israel point to the conflict.

Brutukalat

Locations

Users spreading antisemitic content through messages containing the keyword Brutukalat (Protocols) mainly claimed to be in Arabic-speaking countries. Both before and after October 7, around half of all users came from Saudi Arabia (47.4% before and 54.3% after), with significant shares of users stemming from Morocco (14.1% before and 24.6% after) and Egypt (6.1% before and 8.5% after).

X is roughly 2.7 times more in use in Saudi Arabia (15.5 million users) than in Egypt (5.8 million users).²² However, the share of users from Saudi Arabia who tweet about Brutukalat was seven to eight times higher than in Egypt.

Potential explanations for the misrepresentation may be found in the size and structure of diaspora Palestinian populations in Arab countries, representations of Jews in the education system, the existence of peace treaties with Israel and general attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

²² Statista, "Leading countries based on number of X (formerly Twitter) users as of January 2023."

Gender

The share of male users spreading the keyword Brutukalat was far higher than that of female users (76.0% to 24.0%). Following the October 7 attacks, more women began referring to Brutukalat and thus joined the debate (from 24.0% before to 28.0% after).

Age

As with the other keywords investigated for this study, users spreading the term Brutukalat were, on average, younger than overall X users. As with the term Zionazis, the share of younger users further increased following October 7, indicating that the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict motivated more younger users to join the debate.

Content of Tweets and User Bios

Arabic-speaking users who tweeted about the Protocols were mainly interested in how so-called Jewish conspiracies affected the Arab and Muslim worlds. Some users included a reference to religious salvation in their tweets.

Similar to users who tweeted about Globalisten, some users referred to popular contemporary conspiracy theories, for example, about Freemasons, the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccination campaigns, global poverty issues, and chemtrails. These topics were then intertwined with the Protocols in discussions, typically framing them to suggest a grand, cohesive plot influencing various global events.

The most popular keywords among Arabic-speaking users allowed much less insight into their worldview than for English and German-speaking users. Keywords were either generic, such as book – a reference to the Protocols – or were signs of religious affirmations to Allah and the Prophet Muhammad – as are common in Arabic discourses.

Arabic-speaking users who tweeted about the Protocols connected the historical document with various other conspiracy theories, merging historical prejudices with contemporary global and local concerns. This combination of conspiracy theories with the Protocols emphasizes the enduring role of the document as a framework for interpreting global, regional, and domestic events and processes. As with the other investigated keywords, around 10% of tweets went against the majority opinion on Twitter/X. In that case, this meant that users acknowledged the Protocols were a forgery, with some arguing that the document was crafted as antisemitic propaganda.

A predominant narrative in the tweets revolved around the interpretation of the Protocols as a comprehensive blueprint devised by Jews with the objective of global domination. It paints a comprehensive picture of a supposed clandestine effort to reshape the world order in accordance with the Protocols in order to subjugate the entire human population, obliterate all (or most) non-Jewish peoples, and fulfill Jewish prophecies regarding the End of Days.

Users showcased a belief that the unfolding of significant historical events over the last century directly corresponds with the schemes outlined in the Protocols. Notable global occurrences such as the Bolshevik Revolution and the two World Wars were cited as manifestations of

this grand strategy. Furthermore, proponents of this theme asserted that Jewish influence pervaded all major global institutions, actors, and spheres of power.

For instance, some users contended that Jewish interests exerted overwhelming control over the United States via the Zionist Lobby, aligning with the Protocols' objectives. Users evoked a Jewish conspiracy to undermine the Biden Administration, weaken the United States, and trigger a global war with China. One user wrote: "America is led by the Zionist lobby, in harmony with 'The Protocols of the Elders of Zion' that emerged at the first Jewish Congress held in Basel in Switzerland in 1897. [The Congress'] first decisions were that The Jews should rule the world in 100 Years... and in fact they have caused the two world wars."

A second prominent theme suggested a deliberate strategy to subjugate the Arab and Muslim worlds, aligning with the objectives outlined in the Protocols. Proponents of this narrative claimed that the text of the Protocols provided a framework for the systematic weakening of Arab and Muslim societies to pave the way for the territorial expansion of the State of Israel. Historical events such as the dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate and the subsequent establishment of Israel are cited as evidence of this agenda.

A particular focus within this theme was the alleged targeting of strategic Arab nations to dismantle regional resistance against Israel's expansionist ambitions. For example, some users asserted that efforts to destabilize and isolate Egypt were part of a broader strategy, given Egypt's historical and geopolitical significance as a counterbalance to Israeli influence in the region. It was suggested that undermining Egypt could initiate a domino effect, making other Arab nations more vulnerable to manipulation and control.

This narrative also extends to the Gulf region, which is seen by some as a primary target for the strategies outlined in the Protocols. The recent peace agreements between Israel and several Arab states are alluded to by some as an outcome of the alleged Jewish master plan, aiming to integrate Israel into the Middle East while simultaneously undermining pan-Arab solidarity or Islamic unity and taking control over Palestinian territory.

For example, one user, identifying as an Egyptian patriot, emphasized in his bio that "the Egyptian family and the Egyptian army are red lines not to be crossed." He tweeted: "If we review the Protocols of the Elders of Zion we will conclude the following [...] they [the Zionists] understand that if Egypt stabilizes and grows, it will dominate the world as it did before. They do not care about the Arab countries, but they do care about Egypt – because it is the obstacle to Israel's expansion. They began to demolish neighboring countries, which serve [to increase Egypt's] national security, weakening them."

A third, connected, narrative focused on the alleged Jewish strategy to undermine and dismantle global, but especially Arab and Muslim, societies. According to this narrative, the Protocols served as a blueprint for the propagation of corrupting morals and values, which are seen as antithetical to traditional Arab and Muslim cultures. This includes the promotion of concepts such as homosexuality, feminism, prostitution, and controversially, democracy itself. Those were presented as tools used to degrade societal norms, disrupt the concept of the family unit and ultimately dismantle the cultural and religious fabric of society. This narrative encompassed

X AS A CASE STUDY

the promotion of seemingly benign or trivial interests, such as sports, which were framed as tactics to divert attention from more substantive issues and concerns.

For example, one user tweeted: “In America, 40% of children are born out of wedlock. 20% of America’s children live without a father at home, [only] with strong, independent single mothers. This is a product of feminism, which has begun to distort our Muslim societies as well. Anyone who has read ‘the Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ will know that this is something planned, not random.”

A fourth narrative explored the assertion that the Protocols are employed as a strategic tool to discredit and undermine various political forces within the Arab world, including Arab regimes, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Iran. Users suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational structure and methods were purportedly influenced by the Protocols, alongside directives from Iran, with the alleged goal of inciting instability across Arab nations to foster chaos.

Additionally, some users claimed that Shiite countries, and particularly Iran, were orchestrating global dominance in collusion with Israel and the United States, as supposedly foretold in the Protocols and the Torah. This reflects a complex conspiracy involving unlikely alliances aimed at controlling the world stage. Another facet of this theme revolves around the legitimacy of Arab regimes, which are accused of betraying their populations.

For example, one user tweeted: “The corrupt Brotherhood is considered to be in its strongest form today, although it is in the interest of this malicious organization to claim that they are weakened or finished. Their jurisprudence [*fiqh*] is based on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the teachings of the Ayatollahs of Qom and the Imams of Tehran.”

Although not all users disclosed their professions or nationalities, there are mentions of some being based in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Typically, their X bios contained general aphorisms or sayings rather than explicit political or ideological stances. As opposed to users tweeting under the keywords Globalisten or holohoax, those who used Brutukalat were less outspoken about politics. This may be because of lesser political freedom in some Arabic countries, as compared to the German or Anglophone Worlds, or it may have cultural reasons.

Instead, users used the bio section to provide actual biographical data. Some filled their bios with Islamic religious content. According to the bios, the users tweeting under the keyword Brutukalat, are journalists, professors and businessmen. Among them were allegedly the accounts of the Hizbullah-affiliated al-Mayadeen news network, a former Kuwaiti government adviser, and the ex-spokesman of the Egyptian Freedom and Justice party.

Some examples of tweets and bios from the Brutukalat realm follow:

Tweets

1. #destructive. What is happening now in terms of grooming, nudity, and the international legalization of homosexuality and sodomy. The social media race to spread it is what the Zionist Jews and Freemasons sought in the past. To uncover the conspiracy, see the book

The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the book The New World Order in 1990 AD, and others. Former US President Franklin warned of the danger of the Jews.

2. D – From the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (inciting religious and racial differences, their effort to get rid of patriots and intellectuals, their effort to control the media and mislead public opinion, their effort to incite hostility between neighboring countries.
3. When the Jews come to power, wars break out and strife occurs everywhere in the world. Whoever reads the Protocols of the Elders of Zion knows what the Jews are doing in the world.

Bios

1. Al-Mayadeen Media Network is an Arab network, based on the slogan “reality as it is” and is committed to it, to convey the truth, news and opinion.
2. I dream of an Islam that walks on earth, not on Facebook pages and tweets in the skies of my country, not above the Twitter trees. I dream of you offering advice with taste, seeking justice, and belonging to the truth wherever it may be.
3. A Kuwaiti lawyer, graduated from the Military College in 1980 and obtained a Bachelor of Laws and Sharia in 1982. Worked as a defense officer and advisor to the Minister of Defense and a member of Parliament in 2008, an author, and a former prisoner of conscience.

The October 7 Hamas attack and Israel’s subsequent military response had a strong impact on the Twitter/X debate surrounding the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Following the attacks, the most prominent keywords used in the discussion revolved around the escalating conflict. Some keywords were connected to Saudi Arabia, befitting the prominent role of users from that country in the debate.

– Dr. Fabian Spengler, with contribution from Morr Link

SECTION 5
ESSAYS



Reflecting on these troubling times, four international leaders in the fight against antisemitism offer their thoughts and advice: The Honorable **Irwin Cotler**, former Justice Minister and Attorney General of Canada; **Katharina von Schnurbein**, The European Commission Coordinator on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life; **Deborah Lyons**, Canada's Special Envoy on Holocaust Remembrance and Combatting Antisemitism; And **Jonathan Greenblatt**, National Director and CEO of the Anti-Defamation League

EVERYDAY, OCTOBER THE 8TH

Jonathan Greenblatt

Every one of us can remember where we were on October 7. In the United States, it was in the early morning hours when our phones began lighting up with horrible images of Hamas terrorists storming into southern Israel under the cover of hundreds of rockets. As the hours passed, we soon learned the toll of the destruction where over 1,200 people were murdered, thousands more wounded and hundreds were taken hostage back to Gaza.

As I write this, 134 hostages are still in the clutches of Hamas terrorists.

For those of us in the Jewish community, as we awaited Israel's defensive response, we knew all too well what was about to unfold. In the aftermath of that tragic day, a tsunami of hate was preparing to be unleashed against Jewish communities in the United States and around the world. Many of those leading the groups responsible for the antisemitic hate itself were well prepared with talking points and social media toolkits at the ready.

As my friend and writer Bret Stephens so succinctly put it, all of us now live in an October 8th world.

The world of October 8 is one in which the perpetrators of the worst antisemitic massacre since the Holocaust are celebrated as heroes – not just in Ramallah or Beirut, but in the streets of London and New York, and on campuses like Harvard and Columbia.

An October 8 world is one in which prayers for the safety of hostages – men, women, children, the elderly – are met with vile hate speech and moral confusion.

An October 8 world is one in which rape and sexual assault draw universal outrage, unless committed against Israeli women and girls.

An October 8 world is one in which college campuses have no tolerance for even the smallest of microaggressions, except when the insults and threats are directed at Jewish students in the quad, outside their fraternities, or even in the classroom.

ANTISEMITISM WORLDWIDE REPORT FOR 2023

The world of October 8 is one of an unprecedented surge of global antisemitism and, with it, uncertainty for what comes next.

According to ADL's recently released Audit of Antisemitic Incidents, 2023 was the worst year for antisemitism in the US since we began recording them in 1979.

The total number of incidents reported reached 7,523, an increase of over 103% over last year's numbers – which were, at the time, the highest on record.

These acts included harassment, vandalism, and assault, including 468 incidents targeting Jewish-owned businesses, 1,974 acts against Jewish institutions and organizations, and 1,160 incidents against Jewish students in grade school.

What has been most alarming is witnessing how antisemitism is fully displayed on college campuses, where, in 2023, we documented 913 incidents across the country.

As I speak to Jewish leaders and students on these campuses, and when I hear what they are experiencing, I realize very quickly that the Jewish community is facing a crisis unseen in generations.

We have seen instances where Jewish students barricaded themselves in a library because a pro-Palestinian mob was outside. We have heard stories of students being afraid to cross their campuses at night for fear of being attacked, or attending Shabbat dinners at their Hillels with armed guards posted at the doors.

We have tracked protests where those marching are not calling for a two-state solution, but the complete destruction of Israel with chants such as "From the River to the Sea, Palestine Will be Free," "Intifada is the only solution" and "Resistance by Any Means Necessary." It is not very difficult to comprehend what these slogans are advocating for.

Sadly, this lived-in reality has become a norm, but we cannot allow it to be.

Antisemitism isn't just an abstract issue. It's a real-life threat to Jewish life in America and Jews around the world, and our history teaches us that we do not have the luxury to be indifferent when moments like these occur. That means we need to be clear-eyed about the threats we face and have the determination to confront them.

We need to understand and appreciate the nature of these threats, many of which predated October 7 but were amplified following the Hamas attack, starting with anti-Zionism.

Let's make this very clear: anti-Zionism is antisemitism.

Anti-Zionism does not mean taking issue with an action or policy of Israel's government. It doesn't mean support for a Palestinian state. Anti-Zionism is a belief that Jews – alone among the peoples of the world – do not deserve freedom and self-determination in their homeland. It is an ideology of negation and a form of discrimination that treats Jews as a people much the same way that bigots treat individual Jews. For those who believe that Israel's existence doesn't matter, surely Jewish lives don't either.

ESSAYS

Anti-Zionism subverts modern views of justice and oppression by imbuing them with classic anti-Jewish tropes. It harnesses widespread misinformation about Jewish history and deep-seated prejudices against Jews to build a simplistic framework through which antisemites can mask their hate. Anti-Zionists somehow think that it's possible to adamantly oppose the existence of the world's only Jewish state, in which half the world's Jews live, yet have no problem with Jews.

Anti-Zionism is a negation of Jewish history, a denial of Jewish humanity.

If one's idea of expressing dissent against Israeli government policies is to attack Jews in America or Europe (or anywhere, for that matter), that doesn't make you a decolonizer or a freedom fighter or a progressive. It makes you a bigot. Plain and simple.

If you do not wish to take my word for it, and if the data presented in this report do not compel you to understand this, examine the pattern of behavior on display where the biggest cheerleaders for Hamas' violence against Israelis are neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists that ADL has been tracking and battling for years.

Those who march openly against Jews with tiki-torches in Charlottesville, and the SJP (Students for Justice in Palestine) radicals calling for the destruction of Israel are two sides of the same antisemitic coin.

Facing these threats, it seems that the Jewish community in the United States has two choices: flight or fight.

It pains me, as the head of ADL, that some have made the choice to flee, to hide their identity – to wear a baseball cap instead of a kippah, to remove the mezuzah on their doorpost. I know of many parents who have instructed their kids to change the names on their Uber profiles, so they appear less obviously Jewish.

These are tough decisions, deeply personal decisions, and I'm not judging but I get it. I understand the desire to deflect the threat. I understand the urge to protect our kids.

But as I work, travel, and see what is happening in our communities, I am also seeing another response. Not deflection, but defiance. Not flight, but fight.

There are reports of jewelry shops unable to keep gold Stars of David in stock as young people are proud to wear them around their necks. There are accounts of high schoolers suddenly donning kippot, proudly demonstrating to their classmates that they are Jewish.

This isn't just a phenomenon driven by young people. It's driven by all of us who make the decision to engage in the work of making our communities safer and letting it be known that hatred against Jews, against anyone, cannot be tolerated.

What we have seen in this new Jewish grassroots campaign, in community after community and in the work ADL does every day gives me hope.

It shows me and it shows all of us that the time for complacency is over. We can't assume American Jewish life will continue to be a comfortable life – unless we do something now and unless we transform ourselves from observers to activists, from onlookers to advocates.

Our community has accomplished so much in the world – and contributed so much.

The Jewish community has been an indispensable part of every culture since our earliest days.

We have overcome discrimination, broken barriers and exceeded expectations. Jews started companies, founded labor unions and cured diseases. Jews built schools, funded universities, and started hospitals. Jews created theatres, launched studios, and started charities. Jews changed norms, passed laws, and secured judgments that made communities better, not only for the Jewish people but all people.

There is not a part of life that the Jewish community has not touched and impacted for good.

And so, the time has come to say the harassment and the attacks must stop. That explaining away one's antisemitism will no longer be tolerated.

Refusing to enforce the laws, or to enforce the policies of your institution when the perpetrators are targeting Jews, must cease.

The twisting of language, the moral cowardice, the indifference toward antisemitism – all of this must end now.

If not, you will hear our voices, because at this moment, in this October 8 world, we will not be silent. We will not flee. We will fight. And we will win. Am Yisrael Chai.

OUR SHARED HUMANITY IS AT STAKE

Deborah Lyons

Canada has the fourth largest Jewish community in the world, with nearly 400,000 people (approximately 1% of the population). Jewish families first arrived in Canada in the 1760s and have been strong contributors to all aspects of Canadian life ever since. In the last few decades, we have seen Jews from several countries immigrate to Canada for the same reason so many came centuries ago: a fear of rising antisemitism in their birth countries and a hope that Canada would be different.

No one could have imagined the brutality of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israelis, nor the sharp rise in antisemitism across the globe that followed these horrific events and their aftermath. Sadly, despite the previous work done to combat antisemitism, Canada was not immune to this disturbing, unprecedented tsunami of antisemitism that swept over the globe and continued throughout the remainder of 2023 to erode democracies and endanger national security.

In March 2024, Statistics Canada released figures that indicate the veracity of this alarming trend, which had been on the rise before October 7.

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The 2022 Police Reported Hate Crimes Report by Statistics Canada indicates that the number of hate crimes reported by police in Canada rose from 3,355 incidents in 2021 to 3,576 in 2022, a 7% increase. This followed two sharp annual increases, resulting in a cumulative rise of 83% from 2019 to 2022.

Hate crimes targeting the Jewish population accounted for 67% of hate crimes targeting a religion in 2022.

The rise of antisemitism in Canada became even more alarming in 2023.

In Toronto, since October 7, hate crimes are up 93% compared to the same period in 2022.

Similarly, in British Columbia, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) stated that 47 antisemitic hate incidents were reported to Vancouver police in 2023, of which 33 occurred after October 7. More police-reported antisemitic incidents occurred in Vancouver in the period of the last three months of 2023 than in all of 2022.

In Quebec, since October 7, over 132 hate crimes and incidents committed against Jewish communities in Montreal have been reported to the Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM).

To address the rising hate in Canada, the Canadian government implemented Canada's federal anti-racism strategy "Building a Foundation for Change: Canada's Anti-Racism Strategy 2019-2022," launched in June 2019.¹ The strategy acknowledges the need for the Government of Canada to combat "racism and discrimination that is anti-Indigenous, Islamophobic, antisemitic, anti-Black, or homophobic." It is important to note that the Anti-racism Strategy identifies key terms, including antisemitism as defined by the working definition provided by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

Recognizing the disturbing growth of antisemitism in the country, the government of Canada appointed the Honorable Irwin Cotler, former Canadian Minister of Justice, as its first Special Envoy in November 2020. This important move was then followed, in July of 2021, by a National Summit on Antisemitism, organized by the Federal Anti-Racism Secretariat and facilitated by Special Envoy Cotler. The Summit brought together Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, key federal ministers, Members of Parliament, officials from provincial and municipal governments, and a wide range of Jewish community leaders and civil society representatives.

At the Summit, the Government of Canada committed to engaging fully with Jewish communities on the next anti-racism action plan and exploring potential adjustments to the Security Infrastructure Program (SIP), Anti-Racism Action Program (ARAP), Community Support, Anti-Racism Initiatives Program (CSMARI) and other relevant programs to ensure greater responsiveness to community needs. On October 16, 2023, nine days after the horrific Hamas attack on Israel, it appointed me, a former Canadian Ambassador to Israel, to the role of Special

¹ Government of Canada, "Building a Foundation for Change: Canada's Anti-Racism Strategy 2019-2022," June 2019, <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/campaigns/anti-racism-engagement/anti-racism-strategy.html>.

Envoy on Preserving Holocaust Remembrance and Combatting Antisemitism, succeeding the Honorable Irwin Cotler.

Given the unprecedented chaos and agony that ensued after October 7, the Special Envoy's office undertook a month-long tour across Canada to meet with the Jewish community to better acknowledge their pain, hear their anxiety, and benefit from their guidance. This tour also included leaders in the federal, provincial and local governments, law enforcement, university administrators, media, etc., to establish increased attention and action to the rising antisemitism. Additionally, a trip to Israel in early December 2023 provided opportunities to speak with Israeli leaders and citizens and visit the sites of the massacre to experience firsthand the pain of the atrocities and share this experience directly with Canadians.

There has never been a more “difficult” time to be a Special Envoy. The challenges are enormous, the environment is heated and fraught, and people are hurt and bewildered. Perhaps most disturbingly, leaders seem paralyzed to respond. Therefore, it is clear that there has also never been a more “important” time to be a Special Envoy for Combatting Antisemitism, both domestically and internationally.

A large focus of the international mandate centers on leading Canada's Delegation to the IHRA and, in concert with the 10-member Canadian delegation, ensuring the follow-up in Canada of the many IHRA initiatives – including holocaust education, monument restoration, and academic research.

Additionally, IHRA has focused on combatting antisemitism, anchored in its broad consultative process to confirm a comprehensive antisemitism definition for use by all 35 member countries. Canada considers this undertaking to be critical to the fight against antisemitism and is presently developing a handbook on how to interpret and apply the IHRA definition. This will represent one of the few national government handbooks on the IHRA definition and will be useful both domestically and for our international partners.

The plague of antisemitism has been exacerbated by the explosive power of social media. This is a battlefield that is best fought collectively.

To that end, in the late fall of 2023 a small group of Special Envoys – including Canada – formed an International Working Group to combine and consolidate global efforts on combatting antisemitism on social media platforms. This effort will align with the Interparliamentary Task Force, formed in 2019 and led by Israel and Canada, recognizing that online antisemitism cannot only be treated as a national or regional matter, but a global one. Related stakeholders include subject matter expert organizations as well as senior representatives of the major social media platforms. The work focuses on enforcement and improvement of community standards and hate speech policies.

The global tsunami of antisemitism has left most countries grappling with a phenomenon that no one had expected in democracies. Canada will join other member countries at the April 2024 Conference on Addressing antisemitism in the OSCE Region. Regular interaction with international counterparts is also underway to share best practices on education, police training, and data collection.

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Adopting a human rights-based approach, the Special Envoy supports the Government of Canada's goal to protect human rights, and to advocate for and advance inclusive public policy and respect for diversity in Canada.

This important work is done by interacting with Canadian institutions and stakeholders to promote Holocaust education, remembrance, research and to encourage the adoption and implementation of the IHRA definition of antisemitism domestically.

The following six priorities are even more critical since October 7.

1. Education, education, education

There is no greater remedy to the antisemitism threat than a full effort on education for all ages. The Office of the Special Envoy is working with key stakeholders across all levels of government to ensure that Holocaust education is taught throughout the country. We are proud of the leadership of our provincial Ministers of Education with more than 80% having recently committed to mandatory Holocaust education.

And with the unprecedented rise in antisemitism, it is critical now that the curriculum go beyond the Holocaust and provide perspective to the students on contemporary forms of antisemitism. Additionally, we must address the issue with the adults in the education system, both the teachers and the school boards. Teachers who will be educating the students on the horrors of the Holocaust must be provided with the tools they need to feel comfortable with the curriculum.

To complement these tools professional development days must be dedicated to modern day antisemitism training to ensure educators can recognize antisemitism in the school system and understand how to address it.

Given the crisis we are all facing, education must extend beyond the school system to engage the larger Canadian public. The Office of the Special Envoy is working with civil society organizations to encourage learning on the Holocaust – both in person and virtual – through museums and educational centres across Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg as well as in our arts community and public library system.

2. Post-secondary institutions

Responsibility over post-secondary institutions in Canada falls under provincial governments, rather than the federal government. Like so many other countries, Canada has felt a growing sense of chaos on our university campuses and a paralysis in leadership response.

This top priority is one that requires a wide range of leadership, from provincial Ministers of Advanced Education to university presidents. Working in close collaboration with provincial Ministers of Advanced Education, efforts will support and mobilize university and college administrators and leaders to act swiftly to respond to antisemitism on their campuses and to ensure the safety and well-being of Jewish students.

Challenges to effectively combat antisemitism on campuses include the misunderstanding of academic freedom and freedom of inquiry, which do not excuse hate speech and human rights or workplace harassment. Many faculty associations and faculty unions are strongly opposed to the IHRA definition of antisemitism. Ahistorical and false analogies about Israel and Jews continue to circulate among faculty and students, and often activism that crosses the boundaries of university codes of conduct is allowed to flourish.

More work will be advanced with various groups in the university ecosystem to ensure that tools, resources, and accurate information about the IHRA definition are better understood and used. Additionally, further legislative measures are needed within provinces to encourage various ministries responsible for post-secondary education to strengthen accountability of universities when it comes to protecting students from hate.

3. Law enforcement

Efforts in law enforcement have preceded October 7 in ensuring that there is trust between Jewish communities and law enforcement, by encouraging a “reassurance protocol” where communities feel safe and secure to report and engage with law enforcement. This includes engaging with police officers, legal practitioners, judges, and legislators on identifying and combatting antisemitism.

This engagement will focus on a cross-Canada review of anti-hate and antisemitism training for police officers, prosecutors, and judges, and working with relevant stakeholders and educators, to ensure substantive training is available to all. Training must also be adapted to apply to the different realities of police officers, prosecutors, and judges.

Since October 7, it is clear that several countries, Canada included, need to review their federal legislation to ensure that the necessary frameworks are in place to regulate hate speech online and in our streets.

4. Data collection

Efforts are underway with relevant domestic government agencies to ensure that comprehensive data are available to accurately portray the dire necessity for combatting antisemitism and presenting a clear and compelling narrative to lawmakers and the Canadian public.

Relevant data collection bodies, such as Statistics Canada, are working to ensure greater consistency in the methodology used to collect and analyze the data provided by various police forces across Canada. This combined with efforts on improving timing coordination with data collection agencies will address the importance of informing important policy analysis and effective decision making.

Furthermore, it is crucial that data collection goes beyond tracking reported incidents of hate crimes motivated by antisemitism, but also includes acts of intimidation and harassment, which are becoming more present in universities, workplaces and in Canadian streets.

5. Online harm

Canada is committed to addressing the pervasive antisemitism that exists online, as witnessed by the sharp rise in antisemitism content since October 7. Antisemitic disinformation and hate propaganda in online spaces further deepens the divides within Canadian society and must be addressed urgently.

The Canadian Government introduced Bill C-63, an Online Harms Act, on February 26, 2024. This legislation aims to protect the safety and wellbeing of children, and all people in Canada, online and offline. The Bill proposes amendments to the Criminal Code of Canada which includes creating a new hate crime and increases maximum sentencing for the current hate crime provisions. The Bill also includes amendments to the Canadian Human Rights Act that will make it easier for individuals to file complaints related to publishing hate speech online.

6. IHRA Handbook

Canada adopted the IHRA working definition in 2019 as part of its Anti-Racism Strategy; the working definition has been adopted by the provinces of New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia, several municipalities, and multiple civil society organizations and educational institutions across the country.

The Special Envoy's Office is hosting broad consultations on a Canadian handbook on the implementation of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism. This educational tool is intended to serve as a guide for Canadian governments, institutions, and organizations to ensure that the IHRA definition is implemented consistently and effectively.

Combatting antisemitism and promoting Holocaust preservation is the responsibility of all leaders across the country and indeed the world: faith leaders, political leaders, educational leaders, community leaders, and business leaders. All leaders need to step up and take responsibility for meaningful engagement and action. This leadership has never been more critical to the sustainability of our inclusive and diverse democracies.

Through our six priorities, Canada is moving from a reactive approach to a proactive one, where we penetrate existing systems to address the underlying causes of antisemitism and help build resilience in Canadian society.

We must emerge from this unprecedented period stronger, not scarred. As we navigate the challenging way forward, both as Canadians and global citizens, we must not fail. Our shared humanity is at stake.

FIGHTING FOR DEMOCRACY

Katharina von Schnurbein

With the heinous attack by Hamas on Israeli civilians on October 7, the world witnessed the deadliest pogrom committed against Jews since the Shoah. There will forever be a “before” and an “after,” not only for Israel and Jewish communities worldwide, but also for Europe.

On the evening of October 7, we projected the Israeli flag on the Berlaymont, the headquarters of the European Commission. On Sunday October 8, the flag of Israel was raised in front of the building next to the European flag. Five days later, President Ursula von der Leyen travelled to Israel together with the President of the Parliament, Roberta Metsola, to show her and our solidarity with Israel. They visited Kibbutz Kfar Azza. They condemned the atrocities in the clearest manner and continued to support all efforts to bring the hostages home.

At this occasion, President von der Leyen stated: “Nothing can justify what Hamas did. This is the time to stand in solidarity with Israel and its people.”²

There is no justification for Hamas’ act of terror nor for the rising of antisemitic incidents in its aftermath. Antisemitism cannot be excused by any war, religion or political standpoint. It represents a threat not only to Jewish communities and to Jewish life, but to an open and diverse society.

While Israel is coming to grips with the tremendous trauma of October 7, Jewish communities in Europe and beyond are faced with a tsunami of antisemitism not seen since 1945. Online and offline prejudices and stereotypes have returned to the surface and have led to an unprecedented wave of antisemitic incidents. They ranged from conspiracy myths, fake news, Holocaust denial and distortion to the glorification of terrorism and hate crimes to online antisemitic hate speech.

The most immediate effect were pro-Palestinian protesters celebrating the Hamas cruelties in the streets of Europe on October 7. These celebrations did not happen in reaction to Israel’s campaign in Gaza, but in support of the heinous cruelty of Jews having been killed, violated and abducted by Hamas.

Data show that antisemitism increased in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France.

Antisemitism is particularly on the rise in the online sphere. Language has become more cruel, violent and overt. According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, in the three days after the attack, the absolute number of antisemitic comments on YouTube videos displaying content related to the conflict increased by 4963%.³ Recent studies found concerning levels of Holocaust

² “Statement by President von der Leyen with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu,” Tel Aviv, October 13, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/statement_23_4986/STATEMENT_23_4986_EN.pdf.

³ Hannah Rose, Jakob Guhl, and Milo Comerford, “Rise in Antisemitism on both Mainstream and Fringe Social Media Platforms following Hamas’ Terrorist Attack,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, October 31, 2023 (updated February 7, 2024), https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/rise-in-antisemitism-on-both-mainstream-and-fringe-social-media-platforms-following-hamas-terrorist-attack/.

denial and distortion on five social media platforms: nearly half (49%) of Holocaust-related public content on Telegram denies or distorts the facts, as well as 19% of Holocaust-related content on X (formerly Twitter), 17% on TikTok, 8% on Facebook and 3% on Instagram. It finds that perpetrators learn to evade content moderation, by using humorous and parodic memes as a strategy intended to normalize antisemitic ideas.

Other antisemitic incidents included arson attacks, physical assault, desecrated monuments and cemeteries, as well as stars of David sprayed on houses. These terrible incidents are reminiscent of some of the darkest times in history causing European Jews to live in fear once again, which is fully unacceptable.

Following the spike in antisemitism, the European Commission issued on November 5 a statement condemning the despicable acts of antisemitism and reinforced its support for Jewish communities: “The spike of antisemitic incidents across Europe has reached extraordinary levels in the last few days, reminiscent of some of the darkest times in history. European Jews today are again living in fear (...) In these difficult times the EU stands by its Jewish communities. We condemn these despicable acts in the strongest possible terms. They go against everything that Europe stands for. Against our core values and our way of life.”⁴

On November 6, 34 Special Envoys and Coordinators on combatting antisemitism globally issued a joint statement calling on governments to meet the security needs of Jewish communities, urging police to address threats against Jews, denouncing antisemitism on campus, urging civil society to stand up against antisemitism and on social platforms to act in line with the law against antisemitic content online.⁵

On January 22-23, 2024, the Commission hosted EU special envoys and representatives of national Jewish communities and European umbrella organizations in its EC Working Group on Antisemitism to discuss the impact of the October 7 attack on Jewish communities and exchange views about government actions.

The attack by Hamas resulted in polarization across European society. Several pro-Palestinian demonstrations turned violent when antisemitic slogans were chanted. Some called for the establishment of a Caliphate, posing a security threat not only for Jewish communities, but for democracy itself. Meanwhile, the silence has been deafening when it comes to civil society actors standing up against antisemitism.

On December 15, 2023, the European Council adopted Conclusions in which it condemned all forms of antisemitism and recalled the EU Antisemitism Strategy.⁶

⁴ European Commission, “European Commission Statement on Antisemitic Incidents in Europe,” europa.eu, November 5, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_5527.

⁵ “Joint Statement of Special Envoys and Coordinators Combating Antisemitism (SECCA),” World Jewish Congress, November 6, 2023, <https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/joint-statement-of-special-envoys-and-coordinators-combating-antisemitism-secca>.

⁶ European Council, “European Council Conclusions, December 14 and 15, 2023,” europa.eu, December 15, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/15/european-council-conclusions-14-and-15-december-2023/>.

In addition, the European Commission accelerated the implementation of the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life and published a new communication on December 6, 2023, entitled “No place for hate: A Europe united against hatred.”⁷ Through it, the European Commission is stepping up EU efforts to fight hatred in all its forms, by reinforcing action across all relevant policies. Safety is a prerequisite for Jewish life in Europe. In cooperation with OSCE/ODIHR and World Jewish Congress (WJC), the European Commission has co-organised over the past two years eight events on the security of Jewish communities, bringing together communities and law enforcement authorities in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Ireland, Italy, North Macedonia and Moldova.

Within the framework of the EUR 30 million Protect Call for public places on December 21, 2023, the Commission made EUR 5 million available exclusively to strengthen the protection of Jewish places of worship, Jewish schools and community gatherings.

As to addressing illegal content online, the EU adopted the Digital Services Act (DSA) in 2023. It is the first comprehensive regulatory framework for online intermediaries offering their services in the EU single market, whether they are established in the EU or outside. Its main goal is to prevent illegal and harmful activities online and the spread of disinformation. It ensures user safety, protects fundamental rights, and creates a fair and open online platform environment.

Given, among other things, the spike of disinformation and hate speech, the European Commission has opened formal legal proceedings against X, TikTok and AliExpress to assess whether they have breached the DSA.⁸ The European Commission works also closely with Europol to address terrorist content online, including the glorification of terrorism.

The Commission further made additional funding available to establish a Europe-wide network of trusted flaggers and fact-checkers to address antisemitism online in all EU-languages and in non-EU languages that transport antisemitic content into the EU.

Trivialisation and distortion of the Holocaust, for example by making false comparisons, has been another immediate and dangerous effect of the October 7 attack. Since January 2024, the Commission is funding training for journalists and teachers on Holocaust distortion.

On the evening of January 23, 2024, the European Commission, together with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU, hosted a Holocaust Remembrance Commemoration in the presence of the President of Yad Vashem and Baroness Regina Sluszný, a Holocaust survivor and hidden child of Belgium. The commemoration brought together European Commission Vice-President Margaritis

⁷ European Commission, “No Place for Hate: A Europe United against Hatred,” europa.eu, December 6, 2023, https://commission.europa.eu/document/c60c451c-ccd2-406a-be3a-ef65123f2bb6_en.

⁸ European Commission, “Commission Opens Formal Proceedings against X under Digital Services Act,” europa.eu, December 18, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6709; European Commission, “Commission Opens Formal Proceedings against TikTok under Digital Services Act,” europa.eu, February 19, 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_926; and European Commission, “Commission Opens Formal Proceedings against AliExpress under Digital Services Act,” europa.eu, March 14, 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_24_1485.

Schinas, European Jewish community representatives, Members of the European Parliament, Ambassadors, youth and religious leaders to discuss the “Future of remembrance.”

On this occasion, the European Commission announced the establishment of a Europe-wide “Network of Places where the Holocaust happened.”⁹

The Commission also increased the budget of the “Citizens Equality Rights and Values” (CERV) Remembrance strand, for projects on promoting Holocaust remembrance.

A key aim of the EU Antisemitism strategy has been and continues to be the building of structures and capacity across the 27 EU Member States. To ensure sustainable commitment by governments and state authorities, the EU Strategy foresees three important commitments: the appointment of a national special envoy or coordinator, the adoption of national strategies or specific actions against antisemitism in other overarching strategies, and the use of the non-legally binding IHRA definition as a basis for the fight against antisemitism.

We have seen a lot of structural progress on national level. As a Jewish representative put it: “In the 2000 years long span of Jewish life in Europe it is for the first time that state authorities, not only do not persecute the Jewish community, but actively create a framework that fosters Jewish life.”

Concretely, twenty EU Member States have adopted national strategies or have included dedicated actions against antisemitism in broader strategies against racism, equality and/or extremism.

Sixteen EU Member States have appointed a national special envoy or national coordinator on combating antisemitism. Twenty-four EU Member States have adopted or endorsed the IHRA definition and may use it as a training tool for law enforcement agencies and educators.

However, government action is not enough. To address and change the tide of rising antisemitism, polarization and hatred, knowledge about contemporary forms of antisemitism needs to permeate the hearts and minds of civil society actors. Every university, school, union, political party, cultural sector or religious community needs to have an action plan in case of an antisemitic incident.

Post-October 7, valuable alliances between Jews and anti-racism activists, Muslims, the LGBTIQ community or climate change activists have broken down. Jews should be able to be part of these organizations without having to “renounce their Zionism” or be asked what their position on the conflict in the Middle East is. The European Commission communication “No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred” calls on all Europeans and organisations to stand up against hatred and speak up for an inclusive and respectful society.¹⁰ This document is the Commission’s commitment to support such initiatives, including financially.

Next to emergency measures taken in the aftermath of October 7, the European Commission continued to implement the EU Strategy on combatting antisemitism and fostering Jewish life.

⁹ European Commission, “Call for Tenders to Develop the ‘EU Network of Places Where the Holocaust Happened,’” [ec.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/items/817568/en), February 7, 2024, <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/items/817568/en>.

¹⁰ European Commission, “No Place for Hate: A Europe United against Hatred.”

The EU Strategy is being implemented in the period 2021-2030 with the first comprehensive implementation report planned to be published in Q2 of 2024. This progress report will include monitoring of progress made in implementing the EU Antisemitism Strategy and progress in EU Member States regarding the fight against antisemitism. The progress report will reflect on the progress made and lessons learned which will lead to a more harmonized and targeted policymaking.

The EU Antisemitism Strategy contains 96 actions of which around 70 have been put in motion since its launch in 2021. The Strategy is made of three pillars: (1) the fight against antisemitism, data collection and victim support, (2) security and Jewish life, (3) Holocaust remembrance and education, education and research about antisemitism and Jewish life. To mention a few examples:

In 2024, the European Commission will publish a Eurobarometer on the perception of antisemitism, and contribute to the third survey on experiences of antisemitism by Jewish people to be released by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency.¹¹

The European Commission is supporting UNESCO through its Erasmus+ program to provide ad hoc trainings to school directors, teachers and education professionals based on OSCE/ODIHR guidance on 'Addressing antisemitism through education' in 11 EU Member States.

The Commission has also started the preparatory work for the first-ever EU-wide Survey on antisemitic attitudes in the EU. The survey will measure to what extent people in all 27 Member States hold antisemitic views and how strong their antisemitic attitudes are. The results are expected in mid-2025.

To improve knowledge about Jewish life and culture in the EU, the European Commission has also started the preparatory works for a pan-European awareness raising campaign on fostering Jewish life.

In support of the research community the European Commission has started preparatory works to build an EU Research Hub on contemporary antisemitism and Jewish life and culture, funded under its Horizon Europe program¹².

At the occasion of Euro-Hannukah on December 12, 2023, European Commission President announced the creation of a European Prize of Jewish cultural heritage, which is currently being developed.

The European Commission also aims to continue to lead the global fight against antisemitism in cooperation with partner countries, international and regional organisations. The challenge we face together is that despite the many initiatives and actions, Jew hatred, Israel-related

¹¹ For the previous Eurobarometer survey, see: European Commission, "Eurobarometer – Perceptions of Antisemitism," europa.eu, January 2019, <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2220>.

¹² European Commission, *Horizon Europe Strategic Plan 2025-2027* (Publications Office of the European Union, 2024), <https://op.europa.eu/en/web/eu-law-and-publications/publication-detail/-/publication/6abcc8e7-e685-11ee-8b2b-01aa75ed71a1>.

antisemitism and conspiracy myths continue to be on the rise. It is therefore necessary to constantly evaluate and adjust our approaches and actions.

In view of the upcoming European elections in June 2024, it is important to remember that fighting antisemitism is not a responsibility for the Jews, but a responsibility for governments and society-at-large. There has been significant progress in building structures and capacity on the European level as well as by national, regional and local administrations to increase government action against antisemitism. However, the unprecedented level of antisemitism and its impediment to Jewish life across Europe necessitates much broader awareness about the phenomenon and a whole-society determination to reject and call out Jew hatred. Fighting *against* antisemitism means fighting *for* democracy.

WHAT WE NEED TO DO NOW

Irwin Cotler

I write in the shadow of October 7, the worst day in Jewish history since the Holocaust. On that day, Hamas terrorists launched a horrific assault on Israel, committing unspeakable horrors – the brutal murder of over 1,200 people, mostly civilians; the systematic rape and gruesome torture of women; the intentional targeting of ambulances and medics; the desecration of corpses; the violent hostage-taking of over 240 Israelis and foreign nationals – crimes too terrible to be believed, but not too terrible to have happened. At the time of writing, more than 130 hostages are still being held in brutal captivity and cages, where each day of captivity is a standing crime against humanity.

These mass atrocities were perpetrated by Hamas, a terrorist organization under American, Canadian, and European law and a terrorist statelet with a terrorist army that has governed Gaza for nearly two decades. It is a genocidal antisemitic terrorist organization; not because I say so, but because they say so, with their genocidal antisemitism enshrined in their founding charter of 1988, and which they have pursued ever since.

One would have thought that these heinous crimes and ongoing incitement to genocide, itself a breach of the Geneva Convention, would have alarmed and reminded the world – less than a century after the Holocaust – of the grave dangers of antisemitism, with a resulting increase in efforts to combat it. On the contrary, since October 7, we have witnessed an unprecedented global explosion in antisemitism, including massive pro-Hamas demonstrations, from Melbourne to Montreal, from Berlin to Berkeley.

We are witnessing the culmination of decades of mainstreaming and legitimization of antisemitism across the campus, popular, media, and political cultures. We see Jews attacked in the streets, in their neighborhoods, at their schools, in their offices, at their community centers, and at their synagogues.

At the same time, and paradoxically, amidst this virulent resurgence of global antisemitism, there are more resources being dedicated to combating antisemitism than ever before. We have Special Envoys across multiple countries, working individually and collectively, we have national action plans to combat antisemitism, and we have strong partnerships between Jewish communal leadership and domestic governments.

To understand this paradox, we need to understand the origins, nature, essence and impacts of antisemitism. Antisemitism is the oldest, longest, most enduring and lethal form of hate. Although antisemitism mutates and metastasizes over time, it is always anchored in one historical, foundational generic, conspiratorial trope: that Jews, the Jewish people, and the Jewish state are the enemy of all that is good, and the embodiment of all that is evil, reflected in whatever is the zeitgeist of the particular moment.

When the zeitgeist was Christianity, the Jews were held to be guilty of deicide. During the Middle Ages, when the zeitgeist was the Black Plague, the Jews were the poisoners of the wells. When the zeitgeist was race, Jews were non-Aryan and sub-human. When the zeitgeist became, beginning in the 1970s, human rights, a development I celebrated, with human rights as the new secular religion of our times, Israel became the meta-human rights violator, the enemy of all that is good, and the embodiment of all that is evil. In other words, Israel became a new geopolitical Antichrist of our time.

In the era of human rights, there have been three tipping points of this new antisemitism. The first tipping point began exactly 50 years ago, in 1974.

In that year, Israel was held out as the enemy of labor, with a resolution of the International Labour Organization condemning alleged Israeli suppression of Palestinian trade unionism. Israel was held out as the enemy of health, with a resolution of the World Health Organization condemning alleged Israeli poisonings of Palestinians in the West Bank. Israel was held out as the enemy of culture, with a UNESCO resolution condemning alleged Israeli desecration of Palestinian holy sites in Jerusalem and the West Bank. Israel was held out as the enemy of women, with a resolution of the UN Commission on the Status of Women condemning Israel for its alleged suppression of Palestinian women's rights. Israel was held out as the enemy of peace, with a resolution of the UN General Assembly condemning Israel as a non-peace-loving nation. Finally, Israel was held out as the enemy of human rights, with a resolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the predecessor of the UN Council on Human Rights, condemning alleged Israeli suppression of human rights.

So it was that Israel, as the enemy of labor, health, culture, women, peace, and human rights, became the enemy of all that is good and the embodiment of all that is evil, culminating in the 1975 UN General Assembly 'Zionism is Racism' resolution, which former U.S. Senator Daniel Moynihan said "gave the abomination of antisemitism the appearance of international legal sanction," and which began the long process of the laundering of antisemitism under the protective cover of the UN, the authority of international law, the culture of human rights, and the very struggle against racism itself. This process proceeded sometimes imperceptively, often indulgently, but inexorably over the next 50 years.

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The second tipping point occurred a few decades later, at the World Conference against Racism held in Durban, South Africa, in September 2001. When it was announced in the late 1990s that this World Conference was to be held in South Africa, I greeted this with excitement and anticipation. This was to be the first international human rights conference of the 21st century; it was to be the first international conference in which anti-racism was to be the organizing theme; and it was going to be held in Durban, South Africa, the birthplace of South African apartheid.

As someone who had been involved in the anti-apartheid movement for years, I was delighted to be part of the Canadian government's delegation to the conference, while participating also in both the NGO and student forums.

What happened at Durban was truly Orwellian. A world conference against racism and hate was turned into a conference of racism and hate against Israel and the Jewish people. A world conference on human rights singled out one state, Israel, and one people, the Jewish people, for selective opprobrium and indictment. A world conference that was to commemorate the dismantling of South Africa as an apartheid state became a conference calling for the dismantling of Israel as an apartheid state.

I can still see the demonstrations, the thousands of students and others marching; I can still hear the chants that kept repeating themselves, "that the struggle against racism in the 20th century required the dismantling of South Africa as an apartheid state, and the struggle against racism in the 21st century requires the dismantling of Israel as an apartheid state." I can still see the placards and posters, not only about Israel and apartheid, but Israel as a Nazi state. I can still see the stereotypical posters and placards of Jews with hooked noses and fangs dripping in blood. I can still see the images of a group of Jewish students being assaulted right outside of the NGO forum, being told "you don't belong to the human race."

Those of us who were at Durban were forever transformed. Durban was indelibly implanted not only on our memory, but on our being. I flew back from Durban to Montreal on September 10th. I awoke the next morning, on September 11, to 9/11. I remember receiving a call later that day from one of my South African colleagues who had been at the Durban conference. She said to me something that I never forgot. She said that if 9/11 was the Kristallnacht of terror, then Durban was the Mein Kampf.

In a word, Durban became the framing for the weaponization and laundering of antisemitism under the cover of human rights. The second tipping point. What happened in the immediate aftermath of Durban was the launching in the 21st century of the assault, assault within the framework of international law and human rights, and the weaponization of human rights of what might be called a new antisemitism, singling out the Jewish state and Jewish people for selective opprobrium and indictment.

Traditional antisemitism was the discrimination against, denial of, assault upon the rights of Jews to live as equal members in whatever society they inhabit. The new antisemitism, which began with the human rights revolution in the 1970s, is the discrimination against, denial of,

assault upon the right of Israel and the Jewish people to live as an equal member of the family of nations.

What is common to both forms of antisemitism, old and new, is discrimination. All that has happened is it has passed from discrimination against the Jews as individuals to the discrimination against the Jews as a people, and then reverberating back against the Jews as individuals, and as a community wherever they reside.

In the immediate aftermath of Durban, Jews and Israel were blamed for 9/11, a conspiratorial trope that continues to this day. The UN General Assembly met, and passed some 20 resolutions condemning Israel, with only five resolutions against the rest of the world combined. The UN Commission on Human Rights met, and in a disproportionate set of resolutions, again singled out Israel for selective opprobrium and indictment.

At the University of Michigan, the first convening of what became the BDS movement took place, where a resolution proposing and supporting a two-state solution, if Israel were to become a democratic state – itself somewhat problematic – was defeated in favor of a resolution condemning Israel as an apartheid state.

Finally, perhaps the most egregious international legal indictments of all, the contracting parties to the Geneva Convention, the repository of international humanitarian law, met in 2001 for the first time. In 52 years, the contracting parties had never convened. They convened for the first time in 2001 to put one state in the docket of the accused. It wasn't Russia. It wasn't China. It wasn't Syria. Only one state was put in the docket of the accused, and that was Israel. Notably, the contracting parties have met twice since then – and again, condemned only one state: Israel.

The aftermath of Durban, the aftermath of this second tipping point, also saw the emergence of three strains of antisemitism that have continued to gain strength ever since: genocidal antisemitism, demonological antisemitism, and political antisemitism.

Genocidal antisemitism, the toxic convergence of the advocacy of the most horrific of crimes, genocide, embedded in the vilest of hatreds, antisemitism, involves calling for the destruction of Israel and the killing of Jews wherever they may be. The 21st century began on January 3rd with the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, saying that there can be no resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict without the annihilation of the Jewish state (he did not even use the typical euphemism “Zionist regime.”)

The Islamic Regime's genocidal antisemitism has continued and metastasized since, ignored by the international community, in contravention of their international legal obligations under the Genocide Convention. This kind of genocidal incitement, emanating from Iran, its proxies, and elsewhere, has been allowed to continue with impunity, which only serves to incentivize its occurrence.

Demonological antisemitism involves the notion and condemnation of Israel as a racist, settler-colonialist, imperialist, ethnic cleansing, child-murdering apartheid Nazi state; the total delegitimization, dehumanization, and demonization of Israel. This type of antisemitism is the

direct continuation of the core conspiratorial trope that Jews, and by extension, the Jewish state as the “Jew among the nations,” are the enemy of all that is good and the embodiment of all that is evil.

Political antisemitism is the denial of Israel’s right to exist, the denial of its legitimacy – in other words, the denial of the Jewish people’s right to self-determination. In addition to denying Jewish indigeneity in their ancestral homeland, political antisemitism often goes so far as denial of the Jews as a people. The whole is, in effect, a denial of Jewish peoplehood in any form or manifestation, often under the crude cover of “anti-Zionism.”

Two decades after Durban, there was a third tipping point: the May 2021 war between Israel and Hamas. I happened to have been in Israel at the time. I was there when over 4,000 rockets were launched indiscriminately at Israeli civilians. Shockingly, the international condemnations were with respect to Israel’s response, not to the rockets, whose indiscriminate firing is, under international law, a double war crime. In other words, justice and law were turned on their heads.

At the same time that rockets fueled by Hamas’ genocidal antisemitism were being launched at Israel, we witnessed the globalization of antisemitism around the world. We witnessed antisemitic incidents, acts, and statements rapidly replicating across the globe. After convoys went through the streets of London, saying, “F... the Jews, we’ll rape your daughters,” similar convoys followed in the streets of other countries, saying the same thing.

In Canada, Jews were targeted and threatened in their neighborhoods and in the streets, on campuses and in their communities. Holocaust memorials were defaced, synagogues were torched, cemeteries were desecrated, and Jewish institutions were vandalized, leading to the highest incidence at that time of hate crimes targeting Jews, and to an explosion of hate on the internet. During May 2021, over the course of just one week, 17,000 tweets were posted saying that “Hitler was right.”

In the wake of that, the Canadian government, and myself as Special Envoy, convened the first ever National Summit to Combat Antisemitism, in the presence of the Prime Minister, some seven government ministers who had respective responsibilities for different ministries involved in the combatting of antisemitism, whether it be justice or public safety or foreign policy, and the like; with parliamentary representation from all parties; and with a diverse representation from members of the Jewish community. The Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, who opened the conference, in closing it shared two testimonies in particular that impacted him and the conference participants themselves.

One was a student at the University of Toronto who described himself as being a progressive student, as a left-wing student, but who found himself, as he said, being marginalized in the campus culture, his speech being silenced, and as he put it, being forced to choose between his Jewish identity and acceptance in the progressive campus culture, where he was stereotyped as being part of the white privileged, if not supremacist, class, and indicted as an apologist for the white supremacist Israel in the Middle East.

The second lived testimony that made an impact was that of a Black Jewish woman who, as she put it, embodied intersectionality, but said that she was being discriminated against, not only because she was a woman, not only because she was black, but also because she was Jewish, and at times, that particular part of her identity was being targeted the most.

And so it was in the immediate aftermath of that conference, during which I shared constituent elements of a National Action Plan to Combat Antisemitism – that the Canadian government at the Malmo Conference on Holocaust Remembrance and Combatting Antisemitism in October 2021 made a series of country pledges, as all countries were asked to do, and where in those country pledges referenced some of the constituents of the National Action Plan to Combat Antisemitism, which included:

- The support for Holocaust education, and education regarding antisemitism across generational lines. In other words, the Holocaust as a paradigm for radical evil, and antisemitism as a paradigm for radical hate
- The support for the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and the enhancement of both the adoption and implementation of the IHRA Working Definition on Antisemitism
- The combatting not only of Holocaust denial, but increasingly of Holocaust distortion and inversion
- The combating of online antisemitism
- The establishment of the Office of the Special Envoy (at that time I was the only person occupying the office), not only as a permanent office, but one that would be funded with a staff, and the like

It was during this tipping point, continuing through to the end of my tenure as Special Envoy, and just after the heinous October 7 Hamas assault, that I compiled 11 principal findings from my tenure and corresponding recommendations for action:

The first principal finding is simply that we are witnessing an alarming, at times exponential, rise in antisemitic incidents, both in Canada and globally, as documented in this Report and others.

The second principal finding is the congruent rise in antisemitic beliefs, no less disturbing.

The third finding, which I have already referred to is a rather paradoxical one. At the same time that antisemitism is at the highest level ever recorded, we have more forces combating antisemitism, more resources dedicated to fighting antisemitism, than ever before.

The fourth finding, evident during the third tipping point of the May 2021 Israel-Hamas war and during also the ongoing fourth tipping point in the wake of October 7, is the globalization of antisemitism. Not only the interactive and intersecting nature of globalization, but also the orchestrated character of that interaction and intersection itself, facilitated in particular by social media.

Indeed, the fifth finding is the incendiary increase in antisemitic hate speech on the internet – a significant cause of antisemitism’s global rise. A report from the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH) found that, on average, 84% of reported antisemitic social media posts on Facebook, Twitter, TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube did not generate responses from the platforms. A different report, analyzing TikTok content between February and May of 2020 and 2021, found a 41% increase in antisemitic posts, a 912% increase in antisemitic comments and a 1,375% increase in antisemitic usernames in that time period. Online antisemitic hate has continued its dramatic rise since then. Young people are especially vulnerable, and are increasingly being exposed to online antisemitic hate on a daily basis. Simply put, social media has become a breeding ground for hatred and radicalization.

The sixth finding is the changing paradigm for the combating of antisemitism. I have often spoken, including when I first became the Special Envoy, about the paradigm of combating antisemitism from the far right, from the far left and from radical Islam. Although that remains true, one of my most important findings has been the increasing mainstreaming, normalizing, and legitimization of antisemitism in the political culture, the popular culture, the entertainment culture, the sports culture and, in particular, in the campus culture, with an absence of corresponding outrage, and underpinned by increasing indifference and inaction. Antisemitism has become mainstream and socially acceptable throughout our society.

That leads me to the seventh principal finding, and that is the marginalization of the combating of antisemitism within the broader framework of combating racism and hate. Let there be no mistake about it: we must be engaged in the combating of systemic racism against Indigenous people, Blacks, Muslims, people of color, Asian Canadians, and the like.

Yet, what I found in my time as Special Envoy was that the combating of antisemitism has been marginalized in the overall struggle against the combating of all forms of racism and hate. To provide just one example of many, calls to action by the Privy Council in 2020, representing the government public service, properly and necessarily called for the combating of all the other forms of racism and hate that I mentioned. Yet they made no reference, not one reference, to antisemitism. Although that was later rectified, I have found countless similar instances of this sort of marginalizing or erasure of Jews, the notion that Jews don’t count – only dead Jews count.

The eighth finding is that, alongside the marginalizing of antisemitism within the broader racism struggle, there is an actual laundering of antisemitism under the very cover of anti-racism itself. Indeed, in Canada, we had a situation where antisemitic individuals and organizations were actually the recipients of grants from the government for anti-racism work.

In other words, the Canadian government was funding racism under the very cover of anti-racism. That, too, has been exposed, and that, too, has been redressed, but the phenomenon of the laundering of antisemitism under the very cover of anti-racism is ongoing, currently more than ever before.

The ninth finding, related to the previous one, is the laundering of antisemitism under universal public values: under the protective cover of the UN, under the authority of international law, and

under the culture of human rights. This has been especially notable in countries like Canada, as the United Nations is part of our DNA, international law is a centerpiece of our identity, and human rights is an organizing idiom of our foreign policy.

Therefore, we in Canada have to be especially wary of the laundering of antisemitism under universal public values. Former U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan put it best, when he said that a United Nations that does not put the struggle against antisemitism at the forefront of its international agenda is a United Nations that has forgotten its past and origins, and will forfeit its future.

The tenth principal finding is the weaponization of antisemitism, whereby antisemitism is called out in the other's political party, but not in one's own. The phenomenon of using antisemitism as a partisan tool in part reflects the growing divisiveness and polarization that we are increasingly witnessing in the political sphere. To combat antisemitism, it is crucial that one combats it wherever it may rear its ugly head – whether that be in another party or in one's own.

The eleventh and final finding is the disconcerting erosion of allyship. In recent years, other marginalized communities who the Jewish community has stood by and stood with have increasingly begun to turn their backs on the Jewish community. There has been a concerning distancing by other marginalized groups from the Jewish community, rather than a coming-together.

In light of, and in response to, these eleven alarming findings on antisemitism, there must be a strong, multifaceted response, guided by the following recommendations:

First, governments should enact and implement a National Action Plan to Combat Antisemitism. There needs to be a national strategy, and that national strategy must be not only developed, but implemented and monitored. The National Action Plan must be seen as a whole of government commitment and, therefore, there must be commitment to its implementation at the highest levels of government.

From my many years in government, I have seen firsthand how departments and ministries tend to work in silos. In order to effectively implement the National Action Plan, numerous entities and individuals within the government must work both singly and collectively.

Canada is currently working on a new National Action Plan to Combat Hate – also a crucial initiative. Indeed, as Minister of Justice and Attorney General, I enacted Canada's first National Action Plan to Combat Hate. At the same time, this action plan cannot be used as an excuse to not have a distinguishable National Action Plan to Combat Antisemitism, which, as this report has demonstrated, is distinguishable from other forms of hate.

Second is the need not only for Holocaust education, but for broader antisemitism education, the whole underscored by the importance of appreciating the interrelationship of the Holocaust as a paradigm for radical evil and antisemitism as a paradigm for radical hate. Disturbingly, reports have shown that approximately 50% of millennials in Canada and the U.S. cannot

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name one concentration camp; they cannot even name the death camp Auschwitz. Some 30% believe that the Holocaust is exaggerated or did not take place.

These disturbing findings, again, paradoxically come at a time when more resources are being invested in Holocaust and antisemitism education than ever before. The one promising data point from these reports is that approximately 90% of young people said that they are not only open to, but desirous of Holocaust education.

While we must enhance Holocaust education, so too must we enhance education on antisemitism and on the relationship between antisemitism and the Holocaust. To use Auschwitz, the most brutal extermination camp of the 20th century, as metaphor and message: 1.3 million people were deported to the death camp Auschwitz. 1.1 million of them were Jews. Let there be no mistake about it: Jews were murdered at Auschwitz because of antisemitism, but antisemitism itself did not die at Auschwitz. It remains the bloody canary in the mineshaft of global evil, and as we've learned only too painfully and too well, while it begins with Jews it doesn't end with Jews.

Third is the significance of celebrating the positive contributions of Jewish people in Canada, such as through Jewish Heritage Month. Similarly, of learning about, understanding, and celebrating the history and heritage of the Jews as a prototypical indigenous people – a people that still inhabits the same land, embraces the same religion, studies the same Bible, observes the same traditions, speaks the same indigenous language, Hebrew, and bears the same indigenous name, Israel, as it did 3500 years ago – a prototypical anti-colonial people; and of Israel as a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual society.

Fourth, it must be emphasized that antisemitism is toxic to democracies, and therefore, the combating of antisemitism must be on the agenda for democracy summits, and must be part and parcel of efforts to support, safeguard, and promote democracy. It also constitutes an assault on our human rights and fundamental freedoms, and therefore the promotion and protection of human rights must include the combating of antisemitism both domestically and internationally.

Fifth is the importance of parliamentary principles and precedents on combatting antisemitism. These include the Ottawa Protocol on Combating Antisemitism – supported by parliamentarians from over 50 countries when it was adopted in Ottawa in November 2010, and the London Declaration on Combating Antisemitism, which preceded the Ottawa Protocol by a year. It also includes a unanimous motion adopted by the Canadian Parliament in 2015, which stated that the combating of antisemitism must be a priority for both domestic and foreign policy.

I have found that few parliamentarians today know about resolutions that were adopted by past Parliaments, even those adopted less than 10 years prior. Institutional memory is not something that necessarily can be relied upon, and so we must teach about and act upon these parliamentary principles and precedents and their commitments to the combating of antisemitism.

Sixth is the imperative for countries to act upon their “Malmö Pledges,” commitments made at the 2021 IHRA conference in Malmö, Sweden. Canada's pledges included the combating of

Holocaust distortion and denial; the importance of Holocaust education and education on antisemitism; the enhancement of our support for the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance organization; and the enhancement of our support for the adoption and implementation of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism. Each country that made pledges at Malmö must ensure that they are being implemented consistently and comprehensively.

Seventh, and relatedly, is the importance of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism – the most authoritative, comprehensive and international consensus definition that we have.

What is not so well known is that the IHRA Definition is the most transparently and democratically adopted definition of antisemitism. It was adopted over a 15-year decision-making period, in which I had the privilege to participate already as a member of Parliament, starting with the initial drafting, together with Nobel Peace Laureate Professor Elie Wiesel and Swedish Deputy Prime Minister Per Ahlmark, in the aftermath of the World Conference in Durban.

As Minister of Justice in 2005, I worked with the European Council to Combat Racism and Xenophobia, which drafted the building blocks of what would become the IHRA Definition. As a Parliamentarian, in 2010, Lord John Mann and I co-chaired the Inter-parliamentary Conference to Combat Antisemitism hosted by the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa, leading to the adoption of the Ottawa Parliamentary Protocol to Combat Antisemitism, which framed what is now the IHRA Definition without a change since.

In addition to this strong Canadian connection to the IHRA Definition, it has a strong human rights connection. It is anchored both in equality rights law on the one hand, and in international treaty obligations on the other; the obligations to protect against incitement to discrimination, hate and violence.

Eighth is the combating of hate crimes through the four P's, as I've called them: the prevention of such hate crimes to begin with, the protection of the targets of hate crimes, the prosecution of the perpetrators of hate crimes, and the partnerships between governments – federal, provincial, municipal and civil society – in the combating of hate crimes.

Ninth is the need to develop a standalone hate crime section in the Criminal Code. As proposed by former senior law enforcement officer Stephen Camp, this would enable better identification, understanding, and recording of hate crimes in Canada. It would also underscore a more serious commitment by the government and the justice system to combating hate crimes, including antisemitic ones.

Tenth is the inclusive approach that is necessary for the combating of explosive, incendiary hate speech on the internet, particularly antisemitic hate speech. I'm delighted that there is an Inter-parliamentary Task Force to Combat Antisemitism which has held hearings in Washington D.C., in which I participated, as well as in Brussels. Importantly, the task force issued an action plan with regard to the various responsibilities of governments and parliaments, social media companies and the like.

Eleventh is the importance of allyship. As Special Envoy, I met with many of the major law firms in Canada, each one of them having a Diversity, Equity and Inclusion program, to ensure

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that the combating of antisemitism is part of their DEI efforts, rather than being erased from it or turned on its head.

I also met with leaders of schools and universities, of major companies, and with civil society leaders, legal scholars, and students, seeking to engage a critical mass in the combating of antisemitism.

Twelfth, and finally, we must be wary of what we label antisemitism. If we are indiscriminate in our labelling of antisemitism, we will undermine the very struggle against it. Equally, we must guard against the weaponization or politicization of antisemitism, and guard against selective condemnations – calling it out across the aisle but not within our own ranks.

One of my last acts as Special Envoy was introducing Canada's current Special Envoy, former Ambassador and UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, Deborah Lyons. Deborah is the living embodiment of allyship, and there is no better person to have taken on the role.

The handover took place at a ceremony with multiple government ministers, community representatives, and the media. I also had the pleasure of addressing a national conference on antisemitism, which included the presence and addresses by the Prime Minister, Leader of the Official Opposition, and other opposition leaders, wherein I was able to share some of the above principal findings and recommendations. I then addressed rallies in Montreal and Toronto, calling for the release of the hostages taken on October 7, a standalone obligation and humanitarian imperative of the first order.

We need not only a whole of government effort to combat antisemitism, but a whole of society effort. Antisemitism is toxic to democracy, an assault on our common humanity. Jews alone cannot combat it, nor should be seen as being the ones who alone have to combat it. Antisemitism, in particular this current surge of antisemitism, amidst the ongoing fourth tipping point triggered by October 7, must give rise to a constituency of conscience on a domestic and international level.

We need a global action plan to combat antisemitism. We need that plan to be anchored in the individual national action plans that reflect and represent the particular character and culture of each country and community. And we need to join together in combating antisemitism and in the protection and defense of our democracies, the promotion of human rights, and the pursuit of justice in the service of our common humanity.

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