Ildikó Barna and Tamás Kohut, together with
Michał Bilewicz, Oľga Gyarfášová, Jiří Kocián,
Grigorij Mesežnikov and Maria Babińska

SURVEY ON ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICE IN THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES

Research Report

SURVEY ON ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICE IN THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES

Research Report

Authors:
Ildikó Barna and Tamás Kohut, together with Michał Bilewicz,
Oľga Gyarfášová, Jiří Kocián, Grigorij Mesežnikov and Maria Babińska

Expert Reviewer:
András Kovács

Managing Editor:
Evelin Verhás

Copy editor:
Daniel Stephens

Typesetter:
Gergő Németh

Project partner:
The Institute for Public Affairs (Inštitút pre verejné otázky, IVO), Slovakia

ISBN 978-615-6324-06-1

This report was funded by the European Union's Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme (2014-2020). The content of this report represents the views of the authors only and is their sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains.

Table of contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study was commissioned by the Tom Lantos Institute. The aim of the study is to explore the extent, scope and prevalence of antisemitic prejudice in the four post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe known as the Visegrád Four: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Furthermore, it explores how antisemitism is related to various socio-demographic and attitudinal factors in order to understand what causes antisemitic prejudice and identify which social groups are prone to such prejudice. In addition, regional specificities, including victim consciousness, historical perceptions of Holocaust bystandership and their relationship to antisemitic prejudice are also examined.

The term "antisemitism" is often used in this report to refer to the phenomena studied. While antisemitism may be understood as the process by which antisemitic prejudices within some segments of society are transformed into a culture of antisemitism that social and political actors exploit for political ends, we do not examine antisemitism in this sense (Kovács and Fischer 2021). Our study provides information about the first step in the process, the prevalence and intensity of anti-Jewish prejudice. Additionally, despite widespread belief to the contrary, there is a broad consensus among experts, supported by empirical evidence, that there is no direct relationship between antisemitic prejudice and violence. Indeed, it is possible for antisemitic atrocities to be negligible in societies where anti-Jewish prejudice is widespread (ibid.). Therefore, this study is not a suitable basis for drawing conclusions about the level of or potential for anti-Jewish violence in the countries under scrutiny.

The research was carried out uniformly in all four Visegrád countries in June 2021. The sample size was around 2,000 respondents per country, a total of over 8,000 individuals aged 18 or older. Due to the pandemic, we selected online data collection over face-to-face interviews. While the online nature of the data collection had some consequences for our study, it allowed us to conduct a survey-based research study at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic when other data collection methods would not have been feasible.

The data was collected via online access panels[1] using standard questionnaires. Online surveys can only aspire to be representative of the internet user population. The sample accordingly deviated from national demographic data in two respects: respondents were younger than average and had a higher socio-economic status. We therefore anticipated that the percentage of antisemitic

1 We initially intended to conduct the quantitative research through face-to-face surveys, as this is the most appropriate method for drawing conclusions about an entire population based on a small and representative sample. In the late spring of 2020, however, it became evident that it was no longer feasible to collect data through personal interviews due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the research was accordingly redesigned. Instead of conducting face-to-face interviews, we carried out an online survey.

respondents in each country sample would be slightly lower than in a representative sample of the total population of the country concerned.

To measure antisemitic prejudice, we used the methodology developed by the sociologist András Kovács, which has been applied in several antisemitic prejudice studies throughout Europe (Kovács 2011; Kovács and Fischer 2021). In order to assess the overall level of antisemitic prejudice, we examined its cognitive (content), affective (emotional) and conative (behavioural) dimensions. In terms of content, we measured traditional religion-based anti-Judaism and conspiratorial antisemitism. To capture the behavioural aspects, we measured the readiness to engage in prejudicial action, such as a willingness to accept discrimination. To assess the emotional intensity of antisemitic prejudice, we used feelings thermometers and social distance measures. Based on the cognitive, conative and affective dimensions, we developed a combined index for measuring manifest antisemitic prejudice, referred to as primary antisemitism. We used this index to estimate the size of prejudiced groups (i.e. non-antisemitic, moderately antisemitic, strongly antisemitic) in each Visegrád country.

Aside from manifesting itself in the acceptance of classical stereotypes about Jews that are suitable for expressing anti-Jewish hatred, antisemitic prejudice can also appear in latent forms. We therefore examined antisemitic prejudices expressed indirectly in relation to Holocaust (secondary antisemitism) and Israel (new antisemitism). Moreover, since the open expression of antisemitism is generally perceived as a strong social and political taboo, we separately investigated the issue of latency pressure (Kovács 2011).

In addition, we sought to identify the factors determining the prevalence and intensity of antisemitism and the social groups most susceptible to prejudice. Empirical studies have established a link between antisemitic prejudice and various socio-demographic and attitudinal factors. In this study, we examined the following factors: religiosity, law-and-order conservatism, political affiliation, prejudice towards other groups, nationalism, populism and socio-demographic factors such as gender, age, highest education level, settlement size and social status. We explored the causal relationship using a linear regression model, allowing for an analysis of the shared explanatory power of variables.

Furthermore, to better understand regional specificities, we explored the connection between antisemitism and perceptions of collective victimhood and historical responsibility concerning the Holocaust. Using correlation analysis, we examined the relationship between antisemitic prejudice and exclusive and inclusive victimhood, competitive victimhood and historical perceptions of Holocaust bystandership (Kovács 2011; Antoniou, Dinas and Kosmidis 2020; Young and Sullivan 2016; Bilewicz and Stefaniak 2013; Hilberg 1992; Bilewicz and Babińska 2018).

The following paragraphs summarize the key research findings. First, we consider the cognitive, conative and affective dimensions of prejudice. After this, we determine the proportion of prejudiced groups (i.e.

non-antisemitic, moderately antisemitic, strongly antisemitic) in terms of primary, secondary and new antisemitism. Next, we discuss the main factors underlying antisemitic prejudice and which social groups are more susceptible to such prejudice. Following this, we address the issue of latency. Lastly, we examine how victimhood beliefs and historical perceptions of Holocaust bystandership relate to antisemitism.

The highest rate of traditional anti-Judaism was found in Slovakia, where over half of respondents (51%) were antisemitic to some extent. In Poland, this percentage was only slightly lower (45%). The proportions were lowest in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 40 and 39 per cent respectively. The proportion of respondents classified as strongly antisemitic is lowest in the Czech Republic (4%). It was a bit higher in Hungary (9%), Poland (8%) and Slovakia (10%). Slovakia has the highest proportion of moderate antisemites (41%). For the other countries, this proportion ranges between 31 and 37 per cent.

Conspiratorial antisemitism was most prevalent in Poland (71%) and Slovakia (67%), followed by Hungary (62%). Approximately one-fifth of the Polish and Czech respondents classified as moderately antisemitic and half of them as strongly antisemitic. Although a similar proportion of respondents in Hungary fell into the category of strongly antisemitic respondents, the proportion of moderate antisemites was lower there. Among the respondents, the Czechs were the least antisemitic (53%), with nearly half of them categorized as moderately antisemitic, and 6 per cent as strongly antisemitic.

Polish respondents were also the most willing to act on their antisemitism (47%), followed closely by Slovakians (43%) and then by Hungarians (35%). The rate of behavioural antisemitism was the lowest in the Czech Republic (28%). In Poland, the proportion of respondents classified as strongly antisemitic was 9 per cent, while 38 per cent of the respondents fell into the moderately antisemitic group. These proportions were similar in Slovakia (7% and 36%). The proportion of moderate antisemites was the same in the Czech Republic and Hungary, accounting for one-quarter of respondents in each country. However, the proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents was higher in Hungary (9%) than in the Czech Republic (2%).

Overall, 59 per cent of Polish, 56 per cent of Slovakian and 49 per cent of Hungarian respondents are cognitive antisemites.[2] The lowest rate was found in the Czech Republic (36%), where the proportion of respondents classified as strongly antisemitic was also the lowest (2%). The proportion of stongly antisemitic respondents is much higher in the other three countries, ranging from 10 to 14 per cent. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, the proportion of those classified as moderately antisemitic is similar (34% and 37% respectively). The proportion of moderate antisemites is also similar in Poland (45%) and Slovakia (46%).

2 The composite measure for overall cognitive antisemitism was based on items of traditional religion-based anti-Judaism, conspiratorial antisemitism and the conative dimension of antisemitism (for details, see section 1.9.4.)

The rates for affective antisemitism show that 22 to 25 per cent of respondents in the countries in question have negative feelings towards Jews. The proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents in the Czech Republic is slightly lower (9%) than in the other Visegrád countries (13% to 14%). As can be seen from the results, the proportion of cognitive antisemites is higher than those admitting to disliking Jews. Respondents who accept prevalent antisemitic ideas are therefore not necessarily hostile to Jews. This indicates that accepting negative antisemitic stereotypes can also be part of social knowledge without negative emotions towards Jews.

Examining the cognitive (including conative) and affective dimensions together, we find that overall primary antisemitism is the highest in Poland and Slovakia (33%), followed by Hungary (27%) and then by the Czech Republic (25%). Among the four countries, the Czech Republic has the lowest rate of strongly antisemitic respondents (6%). In the other countries, this rate ranged from 13 per cent to 16 per cent. The proportion of moderately antisemitic respondents is relatively high in the Czech Republic (19%). The rate is about the same in Slovakia (20%), while it is slightly lower in Poland (17%) and Hungary (12%).

Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion were the most prevalent in Poland (53%) and Hungary (52%), followed by Slovakia (49%) and then by the Czech Republic (38%). Czech respondents were also the least likely to be prone to strong antisemitic prejudice (2%). In contrast, Hungarian respondents were the most likely to be classified as strongly antisemitic (12%). This rate was somewhat lower in Poland and Slovakia (7%). Poland has the highest proportion of respondents who are moderately antisemitic (46%). The rate is also relatively high in Slovakia (42%) and Hungary (40%), while it is lowest in the Czech Republic (36%).

The non-response rate was relatively high for new antisemitism, resulting in high proportions of non-classifiable respondents.[3] Due to the possible lack of knowledge behind non-responses, we decided to analyze the full sample. We were therefore unable to make direct comparisons between countries. From the data obtained, we could only conclude that 52 per cent of respondents in the Czech Republic, 49 per cent in Hungary, 71 per cent in Poland and 58 per cent in Slovakia could be classified as moderately or strongly antisemitic respondents.

Compared to surveys based on face-to-face interviews, our results indicate lower levels of antisemitism in all four countries (for comparison, see Kovács and Fischer 2021). This was consistent across all types of antisemitism. In fact, the cross-country comparisons revealed similar patterns to those found in face-to-face surveys. Hungarian, Polish and Slovak respondents were significantly more antisemitic than Czechs.[4] Moreover, the relationships between variables were in line with previously measured trends.

3 This proportion was the highest in Slovakia (28%), closely followed by Hungary (27%) and then by the Czech Republic and Poland, which had the same rate (13%).

4 In our survey, Slovak respondents tended to be more antisemitic than Hungarians, whereas in the survey based on face-to-face interviews it was mostly the other way around.

Overall, the explanatory variables included in our model were best able to explain primary antisemitism and least able to explain new antisemitism. The results indicate that the direct effect of socio-demographic factors on antisemitic prejudice is far less significant than the effect of attitudinal variables. Among all explanatory factors, prejudice towards other groups and populist attitudes[5] had the strongest effects in all countries and on nearly all types of antisemitism. Respondents who tended to be more prejudiced and populist were more likely to be antisemitic, except for the Czech respondents. In their case, prejudice against other groups did not affect new antisemitism. The effect of populism was weaker on new antisemitism among Czech and Slovak respondents. In these two countries, respondents with a left-wing political orientation were also more likely to harbour Israel-focused antisemitic views. On the other hand, political orientation plays no role in primary or secondary antisemitism in the Czech Republic. In Hungary and Poland, right-wingers tended to be more susceptible to all types of antisemitism. Nationalism had no significant effect on the final explanatory models. However, this is primarily due to its effect being fully mediated by populism: the more nationalist respondents were more antisemitic because they tended to be more populist.

Socio-demographic variables and religiosity do not play a significant role in any of the countries or for any types of antisemitism. A few exceptions were observed, but these had a small effect size. In the case of Hungarian and Polish respondents, men were more prone to Holocaust denial and distortion. In the Czech Republic, it was the women who were more prone, while in Hungary and Poland younger respondents were more likely to harbour Israel-focused antisemitic views. Those with lower social status were also slightly more prone to Holocaust denial and distortion in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. In Poland, settlement size also affected primary antisemitism. Overall, socio-demographic variables had the most significant impact in Slovakia.

In addition to examining the manifestations of antisemitic prejudice, the size of prejudiced groups and the determinants of antisemitic prejudice, we also measured the latency pressure respondents felt about expressing their anti-Jewish feelings. Hungary had the highest proportion of respondents perceiving strong latency pressure (35%), followed by the Czech Republic (26%), Slovakia (21%) and Poland (20%). In all four countries, the proportion of respondents perceiving medium-level latency pressure was relatively similar, ranging between 35 and 42 per cent.

In order to better understand regional specificities with regard to antisemitism, we examined the relationship between victimhood narratives and antisemitism. We explored whether certain historical perceptions – especially those anchored in victimhood narratives – increase susceptibility to antisemitic views. We also analyzed whether there are significant differences between the Visegrád countries in this regard.

5 Populist attitudes are characterized by anti-elitism, scepticism towards parliamentary democracy and a desire for grass-roots decision-making (Kovács and Fischer 2021). They are generally associated with radical left-wing and right-wing movements.

We investigated two forms of collective victimhood: exclusive and inclusive victim consciousness. The former focuses on the uniqueness of the suffering of the ingroup, whereas the latter emphasizes similarities and finds it comparable to the suffering of other groups (Vollhardt 2012). We found that exclusive victim consciousness strongly predisposed respondents to antisemitism in all Visegrád countries. We also investigated competitive victimhood and found that those with a stronger exclusive victim consciousness were more likely to be characterized by competitive victimhood. Additionally, in every country, competitive victimhood correlated with antisemitic attitudes. The strongest association was found among the Hungarian respondents (r = 0.532 with primary and r = 0.498 with secondary antisemitism), and the weakest among the Polish respondents (r = 0.342 with primary and r = 0.244 with secondary antisemitism).

Closely related to victimhood narratives is the phenomenon of Holocaust bystandership (for details, see section 1.18). We explored the respondents' perceptions of how their societies behaved towards Jews during World War II. We also explored the relationship between these historical perceptions of bystandership and antisemitism using correlations (see Appendix for details). Only negative historical perspectives are associated with antisemitism in the Czech samples: the more Czech respondents attribute negative behaviour to their societies during the Holocaust, the greater their likelihood of harbouring antisemitic attitudes (r = 0.222 with primary and r = 0.211 with secondary antisemitism). However, in Hungary, only positive historical perceptions are associated with antisemitism (r = 0.162 with primary and r = 0.099 with secondary antisemitism). Both positive and negative perceptions correlate with antisemitism in Poland, whereas in Slovakia neither is correlated with antisemitism.

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, the Tom Lantos Institute launched a research project investigating modern antisemitism in the four post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe known as the Visegrád Four: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The first phase of this project explored the main debates, topics and actors dominating contemporary antisemitic discourse in these countries (Barna and Félix 2017; Barna et al. 2018). The research revealed local specificities in need of further exploration. It subsequently became evident that systematic research was necessary to understand how modern antisemitism is rooted in the region's cultural and political heritage and the specific ways in which it differs from Western European patterns (Barna and Félix 2017; Barna et al. 2018). The second phase of the research investigated the distinctive characteristics of modern antisemitism in the Visegrád countries through online focus groups conducted by local researchers.[6] This qualitative research focused on three principal types of modern antisemitism: conspiratorial, secondary and new antisemitism (Barna et al. 2021). The focus group research assisted in the conceptualization of the present quantitative research and contributed to the formulation of region-specific survey questions.

The present research aims to understand modern antisemitism and its local specificities by means of an online survey conducted in the Visegrád countries. This report presents the methodology and key findings of this research.

The main research questions are as follows:

- What is the content of prejudiced stereotyping in the Visegrád countries? To what extent do religious anti-Judaism and conspiracy theories about Jews contribute to anti-Jewish prejudice? What is the emotional intensity of antisemitic prejudice? How widespread is the intention to discriminate against Jews? What is the size of the prejudiced groups?
- How prevalent are antisemitic prejudices related to the Holocaust (secondary antisemitism) and the State of Israel (new antisemitism) in the Visegrád countries?
- What are the main factors underlying antisemitic prejudice in the region and which social groups are prone to such bias?
- Is there a perceived latency associated with the expression of antisemitic views? Are there also suppressed inclusive views towards Jews?
- How do victimhood beliefs and historical perceptions of Holocaust bystandership relate to antisemitism in the region? What are the major differences between the Visegrád countries in this regard?

6 Conspiratorial antisemitism was explored in 2018 as part of our research project "Manifestations of modern antisemitism in the Visegrád countries". Secondary and new antisemitism were investigated in 2019 and 2020 as part of the research project "Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Region – Countering Distortion", co-financed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. The results of this qualitative research were published in Ildikó Barna et al., *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries – Countering Distortion Report* (Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute, 2021).

The structure of the report is as follows. In Part I, we specify the different types of modern antisemitism that are most relevant to our inquiry and describe the main concepts relating to the multidimensional measurement of antisemitic prejudice. This is followed by a short section focusing on the regional specificities of antisemitism. We then go on to discuss the explanatory variables employed in the research. In Part II, we summarize the results of the preliminary online focus group research. In Part III, we start by describing the main aspects of the research method, including its limitations. We then present our key findings according to the main conceptual blocks, including the cognitive and affective dimensions of antisemitic prejudice and the overall level of primary antisemitism. Each section begins by describing how the construct was measured, followed by an analysis of the results. Next we present our main findings regarding the prevalence of secondary and new antisemitism in the region. Next we discuss other issues related to antisemitism, such as sympathy for Jews, the latency of antisemitic opinions and reversed latency. The last section in this part describes the various explanatory models and the related findings. Part IV examines the relationship between victim consciousness, competitive victimhood, historical perceptions and antisemitism. In the conclusion, finally, we summarize the key findings of the quantitative research and examine the potential contribution of our research to the field of antisemitism studies.

I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Antisemitism: an introduction to the research

There is a wide-ranging debate concerning the scope and severity of antisemitism in contemporary Europe. The so-called "deniers" and "alarmists" hold opposing views on these issues (Bunzl 2005; Fine 2009). Despite their differences concerning the significance of antisemitism in Europe, neither side disputes its existence. Although the open and often state-sponsored political antisemitism of pre-war Europe is long gone, it is said that anti-Jewish prejudice still "lies hidden beneath the surface of public life" and that "the work of understanding and judgment" is required to be able to recognize it (Fine 2009, 460). Anti-Jewish sentiments today tend to be fragmentary in nature rather than constituting a coherent ideology (Bergman 2009). Moreover, although antisemitic attitudes are sometimes still expressed through public statements and acts of violence (WJC 2020; FRA 2020; CST 2021), they are generally considered to be taboo under prevailing social norms. Thus, they are typically expressed in private interactions (Bergman 2009). While post-Holocaust antisemitism is a new phenomenon in the sense that it is characterized by latency, it is still closely linked to old antisemitism (Fine 2009, 460). Arguments that use old antisemitic tropes are commonly reworked to incorporate new themes. An example of this is the re-emergence of old conspiratorial forms of antisemitic rhetoric in discussions regarding the Covid-19 pandemic and its wide-ranging economic and social effects.

Because antisemitic prejudices can still be entangled with novel social problems, which are consequently framed in antisemitic terms, it is crucial to understand antisemitic prejudices and their underlying factors. However, relatively few systematic studies of modern antisemitism have been conducted in Visegrád countries. It is not yet adequately understood how antisemitism in the region is related to its cultural and political heritage or how it differs from patterns observed in Western Europe (Barna and Felix 2017; Barna et al. 2018; Barna et al. 2021). This research aims to fill this gap.

1.2 Definitions and types of antisemitism

Antisemitism is part of a broader spectrum of prejudices directed at various outgroups. Studies on group-focused enmity have found that prejudices towards different outgroups are related and adhere to the same underlying belief of unequal status (Zick et al. 2008). We also rely on this conceptual framework in the present study. However, antisemitism is a distinct type of prejudice. One of its distinguishing characteristics is its long history and its ability to take different forms and fulfil different functions over time. Its grave consequences,

including the Holocaust, also differentiate antisemitism from other forms of prejudice. Anti-Jewish prejudice is often associated with conspiracy theories that claim Jews possess sinister intentions and hidden powers. Antisemitism also differs from other prejudices that portray the "other" as fundamentally inferior. In contrast, antisemitism is directed upwards. It is often based on the belief that Jews possess extraordinary and superior political and economic power that is used to oppress non-Jews.

In addition, antisemitism is a complex phenomenon that goes beyond personal attitudes or prejudices against Jews to encompass a variety of social and cultural practices that often culminate in a conscious, crystallized worldview (Bergmann 2009).

The complexity of the phenomenon is also reflected in the lack of consensus regarding its definition. Although the Working Definition of Antisemitism[7] adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and endorsed by 29 European states and regional organizations is employed by many scholars studying antisemitism, some of its elements are still hotly debated both in academic circles and among the general public.[8]

In this study, we examine modern antisemitism in the Visegrád countries. We define modern antisemitism as the form of antisemitism that came into existence with the Enlightenment and is generally secular in character, being based predominantly on the concept of race rather than religion (Kovács 1999). In the following sections, we summarize the main conceptual approaches used in this research to investigate modern antisemitism.

1.2.1 Traditional religion-based anti-Judaism

Traditional religion-based anti-Judaism – also known as Judeophobia or traditional antisemitism – is hatred of the Jewish people rooted in the centuries-old Christian tradition. It gradually lost its significance during and after the Enlightenment, and antisemitism started to incorporate racial ideologies in the second half of the 19th century. While the relevance of religion-based anti-Judaism has diminished in modern times, certain motifs, such as blaming the Jews for deicide, remain part of contemporary antisemitic ideas. Indeed, in some parts of European society, anti-Judaism can still be observed (Benteler et al. 2014). The persistence of religion-based anti-Judaism shows that anti-Jewish imaginary from the past can still influence contemporary anti-Jewish sentiments. Consequently, while the focus of the current study is on modern antisemitism, it is still necessary to examine some aspects of traditional antisemitism as part of the research.

1.2.2 Conspiratorial antisemitism

Antisemitic conspiracy theories are one of many surface forms or expressions of Jews being regarded as the "alien other". The conspiratorial nature of anti-Jewish beliefs

7 See https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism.

8 See https://isgap.org/post/2021/05/isgap-scholars-support-the-ihra-definition-of-antisemitism/; see also https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1910/1910.01214.pdf.

has been a key aspect of antisemitism for centuries, from *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* published in 1903 to current antisemitic myths related to the coronavirus. Anti-Jewish conspiracy theories are often based on old antisemitic stereotypes, including the belief in the existence of a secret Jewish government and the assumption that Jews control the media, economy, politics and other important aspects of public life.

Conspiratorial antisemitism can also be understood as a manifestation of intergroup anxiety (Bilewicz 2007). Jews are often perceived as a particularly threatening outgroup, and this perceived threat can facilitate the attribution of conspiracy motives to Jewish people (Bergmann 2008; Groh 1987; Kofta and Sedek 2005; Krzeminski 1993; Pipes 1997).

The content of antisemitic conspiracy theories can be seemingly infinite. Jews can assume the form of any enemy needed by a particular victim, a phenomenon known as the chameleon effect (Bronner 2003, 8). In *The Protocols*, the alleged "hidden hand" of the Jewish people pulling strings behind various phenomena served as a powerful explanatory narrative that helped mitigate legitimate feelings of powerlessness and paranoia. Holocaust distortion can also take the form of antisemitic conspiracy theories, for instance, when Jewish people are accused of leading a movement that spreads "lies" about the Holocaust to gain financial rewards (Mathis 2003). Anti-Zionist and anti-Israel antisemitic conspiracy theories are also widespread (Gerstenfeld 2007; Nahmias 2006; Wistrich 2013).

Although the conspiratorial nature of antisemitic views is usually easy to detect, it is difficult to formulate a precise definition of conspiratorial antisemitism. For the purposes of this study, conspiratorial antisemitism pertains to conspiracy theories about Jewish people. Its main elements include "the idea of a secret Jewish government, common intentionality, need of dominance, and the demonological tradition behind it" (Cohn 1967, cited in Bilewicz et al. 2013, 824).

1.2.3 Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion

In the aftermath of the Holocaust, public expressions of antisemitism became increasingly unacceptable. As a result, new forms of antisemitism have emerged in the post-Holocaust era. One aspect of post-Holocaust antisemitism is the search for topics that both permit and legitimize the formulation of antisemitic ideas (Kovács 2011).

One particular form of antisemitism that emerged after World War II is secondary antisemitism. It can be summarized as "antisemitism not in spite, but because of the Holocaust" (Imhoff and Messer 2019, 2). Secondary antisemitism is widely understood to be a result of the socio-psychological after-effects of the Holocaust. (Adorno 1955; Schönbach 1961, quoted in Imhoff and Messer 2019, 2). Jewish people embody the inconvenient memory of the Holocaust, triggering resentment by their mere existence. Remembrance of the Holocaust may exacerbate this resentment, leading to the reproduction of anti-Jewish sentiment (ibid.).

Holocaust denial and distortion constitute a key aspect of secondary antisemitism (Bergmann 2009).[9] Guilt related to the Holocaust is often accompanied by attempts to suppress its memory and externalize guilt. The process can lead to the projection of guilt onto survivors and the distortion of other historical facts related to the Holocaust, resulting in its trivialization or relativization (Gerstenfeld 2007; Heni 2008; Shafir 2012; Braham 2016). Holocaust denial and distortion also perform a legitimizing function for those harbouring antisemitic prejudices. It justifies anti-Jewish sentiments by accusing today's Jews of fabricating historical facts and exaggerating the number of victims and extent of their suffering in order to gain more profit and power at the expense of the majority of society (Kovács and Fischer 2021). Denial and distortion can also alleviate feelings of guilt associated with the persecution of Jews.

Holocaust denial, as it is widely understood, is an attempt to deny or question the historical truth of the Holocaust. The present research relies on the conceptual framework of Lipstadt, in which hard-core Holocaust denial refers to the rejection or negation of the historical truth of the Holocaust and soft-core denial to the more covert questioning of certain aspects of the Holocaust (Lipstadt 1993).

1.2.4 New antisemitism

Another type of post-Holocaust antisemitism is anti-Jewish animosity targeting Israel, widely referred to as new antisemitism. We define new antisemitism as expressions of anti-Jewish sentiments projected onto Israel as a focal point (Chanes 2004). A fundamental function of new antisemitism is that it allows for the expression of antisemitic views in a politically correct manner (Wetzel 2017). In the present study, the so-called "3D test" proposed by Natan Sharansky is used to distinguish new antisemitism from legitimate criticism of Israel. The "3D test" refers to "demonization, double standards and delegitimization" concerning Israel (Sharansky 2004). The term "demonization" refers to instances in which Israel is depicted as inherently evil. The double standard implies that Israel is judged differently and more negatively than other nations. Delegitimization, finally, relates to situations in which the existence of Israel is questioned.

1.3 Tripartite model of prejudice and the multidimensional measurement of antisemitism

The distinction between the different types of antisemitism described above is only one aspect of the research's conceptual framework. Another important element pertains to the different dimensions of antisemitic prejudice. This research adopts the so-called ABC model,[10] which originates in social psychological theories. According to this approach, there are three dimensions of prejudice: its content (the cognitive dimension); its emotional intensity (the emotive or affective dimension) and the willingness to act upon this prejudice (the behavioural or conative dimension).

9 It should be noted that certain distortions of the Holocaust are not always the result of antisemitism, such as distortions made by individuals who are unaware of the Holocaust or who make uninformed remarks or comparisons.

10 The ABC model suggests that prejudice has three elements: affect, behaviour and cognition.

The cognitive dimension of antisemitic prejudice refers to the various antisemitic stereotypes, beliefs and ideas about Jews. The affective dimension captures the intensity of feelings towards Jewish people. The conative dimension indicates a propensity to act on anti-Jewish prejudice, such as an inclination to discriminate or a willingness to accept discrimination.

The present research relies upon a multidimensional measurement of antisemitic prejudice, developed by sociologist András Kovács and applied to antisemitic prejudice studies in Hungary and Europe (Kovács 2011; Kovács and Fischer 2021). The content of prejudice (cognitive antisemitism) is measured by respondents' agreement with anti-Jewish stereotypes derived from traditional religion-based anti-Judaism and conspiratorial antisemitism. Feeling thermometers and measures of social distance are used to gauge the level of emotional intensity (affective antisemitism). The behavioural dimension is measured by asking questions about readiness to engage in prejudicial action, such as willingness to discriminate (conative antisemitism). Based on the items measuring cognitive, conative and affective antisemitism, a composite measure for assessing the overall level of antisemitic prejudice is created. This composite measure is referred to as primary antisemitism.

In addition to primary antisemitism, we will also measure when antisemitic prejudice is expressed in more indirect forms in relation to the Holocaust (secondary antisemitism) or the State of Israel (new antisemitism).

1.4 Latency of opinions

Antisemitic views are typically expressed in private settings, as open expression of antisemitism is usually regarded as a social and political taboo (Kovács 1993; Bergmann 2009). Studies have shown strong latency pressures regarding antisemitism as "respondents perceive it as risky to express antisemitic views" (Kovács 2002, 180). Antisemitic remarks are often accompanied by efforts to conceal or deny their antisemitic nature. This often results in heated debates regarding what constitutes an antisemitic statement. This issue is of particular concern when criticism is levelled at Israel's policies (Bergmann 2009, 55). According to some scholars, a major driving force behind new antisemitism is the desire to conceal antisemitic views, which are considered socially unacceptable and can therefore be projected onto Israel (Wistrich 2017). Additionally, criticizing Israel can be seen as a politically correct way to express antisemitic views (Wetzel 2017).

Latency studies differentiate between conscious or factual latency and communicative or functional latency (Luhmann 1984; Bergmann and Erb 1986; Kovács 2002). Individuals who exhibit factual latency lack an opinion regarding a given subject, while individuals who exhibit communicative latency conceal their thoughts or feelings on the issue. Those who wish to hide their opinions have two main choices: avoid expressing their opinions altogether or express opinions that diverge significantly from their actual beliefs.

This study examines communication latency using measures from past research (Kovács 2011). Measures of latent antisemitism include respondents' perceptions of latency pressure, their beliefs about the strength of antisemitism and their views on whether they consider more or less antisemitic statements to be antisemitic (Kovács 2011).

Additionally, we assess what we call "reversed latency" pressure. This concept originates from the focus group research (Barna et al. 2021). The measure was developed by Ildikó Barna and Tamás Kohut to explore respondents' perceptions of the pressure to conceal their disagreement with antisemitic expressions in public and their willingness to engage in counterarguments when confronted with such statements.

1.5 Regional aspects

Previous research and literature review conducted by the Tom Lantos Institute on the subject indicate that research on antisemitism rarely investigates regional specificities of modern antisemitism in the Visegrád countries (Barna and Félix 2018). Earlier research by the Tom Lantos Institute concluded that commonalities in the history of the Visegrád countries led to the entanglement of conspiratorial, secondary, and new antisemitism. (Barna and Félix 2017; Barna et al. 2018).

Other regional differences between Visegrád countries and Western Europe are due to their different historical trajectories and the communist past of the Eastern Bloc. During the post-war period, antisemitism was reinforced by Holocaust denial and anti-Zionism both in Western Europe and in the counties of the Eastern Bloc. However, while the extreme right, and to a lesser extent the extreme left, were principally responsible for the resurgence of antisemitism in the West, antisemitism in the former communist countries was fuelled by antisemitic, anti-Zionist, and anti-cosmopolitan campaigns and propaganda organized from the top down by one-party states. (Braham 1994). While communist regimes never explicitly denied the Holocaust, their policies stifled discussion about the Shoah (ibid).

In addition, after 1967, Eastern Bloc countries (except Romania) also severed diplomatic relations with Israel. In many cases, the anti-Zionist campaigns of communist regimes had direct consequences. During the height of the anti-Zionist campaign in Poland, around twenty thousand Jews were forced to emigrate (Barna et al. 2017). Following the transition period of 1989–1990, all countries in the region restored diplomatic relations with Israel. Nevertheless, the anti-Zionist campaigns of the communist regimes continue to have an impact in the Visegrád countries. Although new antisemitism is less prevalent and intense in these countries than in Western nations, it is nevertheless still present in some form (ibid.).

Moreover, Central and Eastern Europeans commonly perceive themselves as victims of both the Nazi and communist regimes, resulting in competing concepts of victimhood. Additionally, this is sometimes accompanied by the myth of an international Jewish communist conspiracy, so-called

Judeo-Bolshevism, which alleges hyper-loyalty of Jews to Bolshevism and extreme involvement of Jews in communism. This may result in victimhood narratives that maintain that the Jews are both victims and perpetrators, and that Eastern Europeans are victims of the Jews.

Moreover, groups that were also victimized by the Nazi regime—although to a different degree— frequently dispute the extent to which Jews were victimized by the Holocaust "to preserve the unique character of the victimization of their own ingroups" (Bilewicz and Stefaniak, 2013). This may result in Holocaust trivialization or relativization. Competitive victimhood narratives are also employed by societies with a perpetrator history to absolve themselves of responsibility and guilt for past wrongdoings and restore their ingroup's moral identity (ibid.).

Another consequence of ther region's historical trajectory is the prevalence of collective and competitive victimhood narratives in the region, especially in Hungary and Poland. Collective victimhood refers to the notion that one's own nation has suffered as a result of history. It often leads to prejudice by downplaying the collective suffering of others (Antoniou, Dinas and Kosmidis 2020, 2). Studies distinguish between two types of victimhood, namely exclusive and inclusive victim consciousness, which are covered by the umbrella term "collective victimhood" (Vollhardt 2009, 2012, 2015). The former focuses on the uniqueness of the suffering of the ingroup, while the latter emphasizes similarities between the suffering of the ingroup and the suffering of the outgroup and finds the two comparable (Vollhardt 2012). These two types of victim consciousness have different effects on intergroup relations. While exclusive victim consciousness is likely to increase outgroup hostilities, inclusive victim consciousness is negatively correlated with prejudice as it is more likely to lead to an inclusive mindset (Vollhardt 2009; Vollhardt, Nair and Tropp 2016; Szabó, Vollhardt and Mészáros 2020).

Collective victimhood is closely related to competitive victimhood, which can be described as "the attempt by conflicted groups' members to demonstrate that their ingroup suffered more than the outgroup" (Bilewicz and Stefaniak 2015, 2). Although competitive victimhood is not considered to be a completely independent determinant of antisemitism but rather a result of nationalism in a particular country, research has shown that both collective and competitive victimhood often lead to antisemitism and various forms of Holocaust distortion (see, e.g., Antoniou, Dinas and Kosmidis 2020; Young and Sullivan 2016; Bilewicz and Stefaniak 2013). For example, competitive victimhood is an important element of the rhetoric of Polish and Hungarian far-right circles (Barna et al. 2018).

In this region, victimhood is closely intertwined with the question of responsibility and how these societies perceive their role in World War II, especially during the Holocaust. In this study, we sought to examine how respondents view their society during World War II in terms of bystander behaviour (Hilberg 1992; Bilewicz and Babińska 2018). A conflict between people's perceptions of the Holocaust, motivated by the defence of the ingroup may lead to antisemitism as "the

historical victim group threatens that validity of these representations" (Hirschberger et al. 2016, 34).

By employing bystandership measures in the current study, we attempt to capture historical perceptions from a moral perspective by asking respondents about their opinions on their society's role during World War II, ranging from saving Jews to actively participating in the Holocaust. Historical perceptions of the Holocaust may very well be affected by antisemitic attitudes. However, we also sought to examine this relationship from the opposite direction, namely to determine whether biased historical perceptions may foster antisemitic attitudes.

1.6 Explanatory factors

Empirical studies have long demonstrated the relationship between antisemitic attitudes and several explanatory factors. The factors used in this study have been empirically proven to be good indicators of antisemitic prejudice. Their inclusion resulted from three rounds of consultation with experts in the field. In view of the relative shortness of the online survey (20-25 minutes), we decided to examine the following explanatory factors: (1) religiosity; (2) law-and-order conservatism (Kovács 2011); (3) political orientation; (4) prejudice towards other groups (Zick et al. 2008); (5) nationalism (Dekker et al. 2003); (6) populism (Kovács 2011; Kovács and Fischer 2021; Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014; Silva et al. 2019); and (7) socio-demographic factors and social status.

1.6.1 Religiosity

Religiosity is the main factor contributing to one of the earliest forms of antisemitism, namely traditional anti-Judaism. Several studies demonstrate the continued existence of religion-based antisemitism in modern societies (see, e.g., Benteler et al. 2014). Religiosity is also connected to other explanatory factors, such as law-and-order conservatism or prejudice against other groups. On the other hand, survey data revealed that the strength of antisemitism directly associated with the practice of religion within the traditional framework of religious institutions rather than religious belief in itself (Kovács 2011). For that reason, our measurement of religiosity include both subjective (such as self-proclaimed extent of religiosity) and objective (such as frequency attending religious services) aspects.

1.6.2 Law-and-order conservatism

Empirical research has found that law-and-order conservatism is a robust explanatory factor for antisemitic prejudice (Kovács 2011; Kovács and Fischer 2021). Law-and-order conservatism is not a strictly defined theory. It incorporates aspects of right-wing authoritarianism theory (Altemeyer 1981) and measures attitudes towards topics such as abortion, homosexuality and the death penalty. The measure we used in this study was derived from law-and-order conservatism items employed in previous representative surveys investigating antisemitic prejudice and its predictors (Kovács 2011; Kovács and Fischer 2021).

1.6.3 Political affiliation

Studies of antisemitism indicate that antisemitic views are connected not only to certain personality types and ideological attitudes but also to consciously held ideological and political positions (Kovács 2011). We accordingly maintain that certain political views may be important predictors of antisemitic prejudice. We measure respondents' consciously held political positions based on their self-identification (left or right), their political party preferences and the political parties they reject the most.

1.6.4 Prejudice towards other groups

As discussed earlier, we understand antisemitism as a part of a broader spectrum of prejudice against various social outgroups (Zick et al. 2008). According to the concept of group-focused enmity, individuals rejecting other social outgroups are more likely to harbour antisemitic attitudes as well (Zick et al. 2008). In order to investigate the relationship between antisemitism and prejudice against other outgroups, we measured respondents' attitudes towards Jews and other outgroups, such as people of Chinese origin, Roma and migrants.

1.6.5 Nationalism

Empirical studies have demonstrated the connection between antisemitic attitudes and feelings of nationalism (Kovács 2011). We therefore also explore the relationship between antisemitism and nationalism in the framework of this study. Several measures have been tested to assess the various dimensions of nationalism (e.g. EVS 2020; ISSP 2020). Our approach involves measuring three dimensions: (1) the importance of belonging to the dominant nationality of the respondent's home country; (2) the respondent's emotional attachment to the home country; and (3) the pride associated with the dominant nationality of the country.[11]

1.6.6 Populism

Over the past decade, populism has increased in many countries worldwide, including in Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, populist attitudes are receiving increasing attention in social science research (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014; Silva et al. 2019). Fundamental to populism is the division of society into two opposing groups: the people and the corrupt elite (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014; Kovács and Fischer 2021). Populists tend to view corrupt elites as foreigners or representatives of privileged social classes. Many of these groups are associated with conspiracy theories and Jewish stereotypes, such as "cosmopolitans, global bourgeoisie, bankers, speculators, international media elites" (Kovács and Fischer 2021, 16). Populist views may thus be entangled with antisemitic views. In fact, empirical research indicates that accepting populist views is a significant predictor of antisemitic attitudes (Kovács and Fischer 2021). We have therefore also included this explanatory factor in this study. While there are several reliable and tested measures of populism, the present

11 It should be noted that we slightly modified this part of the questionnaire for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia (see the detailed description in section 1.16.1).

study employs items that have been shown to be strong predictors of anti-Jewish attitudes (see detailed description in section 1.16.1).

1.6.7 Socio-demographic factors and socio-economic status

We also examine the extent to which socio-demographic factors and socio-economic status influence antisemitic attitudes. Theories on prejudice often presuppose a relationship between antisemitism and socio-demographic factors (Kovács 2011). Although surveys indicate that the main socio-demographic variables are relatively weak predictors of antisemitism, socio-demographic data is still regarded as an essential ingredient of such surveys. In this study, we measure a wide range of socio-demographic factors, such as gender, age, educational level and type of settlement, as well as several other variables measuring socio-economic status, including both objective (e.g. possession of consumable goods) and subjective (e.g. perceived socio-economic status) measurements.

II. QUALITATIVE ONLINE FOCUS GROUP RESEARCH

1.7 Main objectives of the research

Prior to the current study, two rounds of qualitative research were conducted. First, the debates, topics and actors dominating the contemporary antisemitic discourse were mapped. This revealed local specificities needing further exploration (Barna and Félix 2017; Barna et al. 2018). A focus group study was subsequently conducted to understand these specific characteristics. This study examined three principal forms of modern antisemitism – conspiratorial, secondary and new antisemitism – and how they reinforce each other (Barna et al. 2021). Additional research objectives of the focus group study included assisting in the conceptualization of the quantitative research and contributing to the development of the survey questionnaire. Presented below is a brief overview of the online focus group study, including its design and conceptualization, its method and sampling and a summary of its key findings.

1.7.1 Design and conceptualization of the focus group research

The focus group research study was designed to produce a map of attitudes and opinions in order to explore how conspiratorial, secondary and new antisemitism are manifested and how anti-Jewish opinions are framed, contextualized and justified. Although not all Holocaust distortion is motivated by antisemitism, Holocaust denial and distortion are essential aspects of (secondary) antisemitism, and a significant part of the research therefore dealt with these topics. We examined how participants addressed Holocaust-related issues to explore whether and how remembrance, national responsibility and education are related to antisemitic arguments.

Focus group research is a purely qualitative method, often used as an exploratory tool in social sciences. Hence, we developed our focus group guidelines in such a way that discussions always began with broad, neutral questions; more sensitive topics, such as antisemitism and national responsibility, were gradually introduced. As a result of posing a neutral question at the outset of the discussions, we were able to distinguish between "spontaneous" and "susceptible" responses. When an individual made an antisemitic remark in response to a question or topic unrelated to Jews, this was considered a spontaneous display of antisemitism. A susceptible response, in contrast, was one that was closely related to arguments or topics that were antisemitic. For example, if we asked participants whether they accepted an antisemitic stereotype or argument, we would refer to this as "susceptibility" to antisemitism.

1.7.2 Online focus group method and sampling

In order to ensure comparability among the Visegrád countries, the same guidelines and selection criteria were applied in all four countries. Two focus group sessions were conducted per country, with approximately ten participants per focus group. Participants in all four countries were selected according to various criteria, including gender, age, level of education and place of residence. The focus group members were all relatively young in age (25–40 years), which indicated that they were likely to possess a high level of digital literacy. Regarding qualification levels, the objective was to have one group with a lower level of education (having only basic vocational skills) and another group with a higher level of education (having at least completed secondary school) in each country. In the two groups, 60–65 per cent had a lower level of education, while 35–40 per cent had a higher one.

The use of focus groups can be an effective exploratory tool for identifying both the main topics related to antisemitism and the logic feeding antisemitic prejudice. It can also provide useful insights when it comes to developing survey questionnaires, since focus group discussions can shed light on how participants interpret well-established survey questions. Nevertheless, focus group research is a qualitative method based on a small sample size that is not representative. Online focus group research therefore cannot be used to make generalized claims about attitudes in the wider population. Differences between samples are considered normal.

1.7.3 Focus group research on conspiratorial antisemitism

Although focus group results cannot be generalized, even from the limited number of focus groups, relatively clear trends emerged that were more or less consistent with existing theories and the findings of representative surveys on antisemitism.

One of the key findings of the focus group discussions confirmed the widely accepted observation that feelings of powerlessness can lead to susceptibility to conspiracy theories. In all four Visegrád countries, participants who expressed feelings of powerlessness as individuals and as nations were more prone to believe in conspiracies. Participants generally believed that secret organizations existed. The descriptions of these organizations often resembled antisemitic arguments. Furthermore, participants generally agreed that there are groups and individuals who exercise too much power and that money, wealth and networks are the primary sources of this power.

Although Jews were rarely mentioned explicitly, respondents used stereotypical adjectives that are typically associated with Jews, such as selfish, greedy and rapacious, to describe those with too much power. In fact, in the opinion of proponents of Jewish conspiracy theories, these characteristics are what make Jews capable of and willing to weave global conspiracies. Furthermore, nearly every focus group asserted that there are *éminences grises* pulling the strings who are only interested in their own profit, which is another antisemitic trope.

1.7.4 Focus group research on secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion

Hard-core Holocaust denial – the rejection of the historical truth of the Holocaust – was absent during the group discussions in all Visegrád countries. The fundamental differences between the four countries make it difficult to summarize the key regional findings in greater detail. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the group discussions were essentially free of any antisemitic remarks. On the other hand, despite the absence of spontaneous antisemitic expressions in the discussions in Hungary and Poland, certain topics, including Holocaust remembrance, educational issues and questions of responsibility, evoked a relatively high level of anti-Jewish remarks.

Holocaust memory was among the topics most frequently discussed in antisemitic terms in the Hungarian and Polish focus groups. While discussing commemorations, some participants relativized the Holocaust, while others expressed antisemitic stereotypes. The Holocaust was also relativized by downplaying the number of Jewish victims or falsely comparing it with other historical events. For example, one Hungarian participant claimed that the Holocaust "had happened many times, under different names … like the Japanese encampment in the USA … or the encampment and starving of Ukrainians."

The Polish participants often resorted to antisemitic stereotypes during discussions about the role of Jews in commemorating the Holocaust, including alleging Jewish exploitation of the Holocaust for financial gain at the expense of Polish people. During one of the Hungarian focus groups, the tone also became increasingly hostile when Holocaust remembrance was discussed. It was asserted that Holocaust commemorations could "certainly" be overdone. Some Hungarian participants opposed films portraying the Holocaust, stating that "it is sometimes too much, all the films about it … because they make money out of a genocide of a people."

The three main types of modern antisemitism – conspiratorial, secondary and new antisemitism – were regularly interconnected in entangled narratives. Antisemitic stereotypes of a conspiratorial nature were often associated with Holocaust commemorations, such as the claim that Jews held prominent positions in international politics, business and the media. For instance, one Polish participant linked Holocaust memory to antisemitic conspiracies and Israel by asserting: "they [Jews] have a feeling of being victims and persecuted, they use it in international politics, and they oppress the Palestinians."

1.7.5 Focus group research on new antisemitism

One of the key findings of the focus group research on new antisemitism was that participants – except for those from the Czech Republic – made relatively few spontaneous antisemitic remarks. However, participants in all four countries were highly susceptible to antisemitic content, including Holocaust inversion.

Among the participants, only a few thought that Israeli Jews and Jewish people in their home countries were part of a homogenous, global Jewish group. Participants in all four

Visegrád countries overwhelmingly rejected the antisemitic belief that Jews are more loyal to foreign, Jewish and Israeli interests than their national interests.

Hard-core Holocaust denial was absent from the focus group discussions, and the Holocaust as a historical event was unambiguously defined as a negative event. However, the discussions about the role of the Holocaust today prompted several antisemitic remarks, including antisemitic stereotypes, Holocaust relativization and Holocaust inversion.

Topics related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict triggered the most and most extreme forms of anti-Jewish statements, including Holocaust inversion. In the Czech focus groups, several participants explicitly compared Israel's policies to those of the Nazis. One Hungarian participant also commented that "it is a very mean-spirited thing to slaughter innocents [Palestinians] while hiding behind the fact that the same was done to them [Jewish people]. Then they are no better than Hitler…."

The guideline included a set of questions designed to reveal participants' latency. Except for one focus group in the Czech Republic, most participants felt latency pressures and most likely hid their negative opinions about Jews and related topics. Participants also showed a high level of susceptibility to even quite extreme forms of antisemitic content when the guideline questions provided both antisemitic and alternative interpretations.

Furthermore, in all four countries, conspiratorial, secondary and new antisemitism were frequently expressed simultaneously in entangled narratives that reinforced each other. For instance, in the Polish focus groups, anti-Israeli statements often contained elements of secondary antisemitism and strongly alluded to controversies around the history of Poland, the Jews and the Holocaust. One of the Polish participants claimed that Jews "quickly forgot what the nationalist movements did in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. It is a pity they are doing similar things to the Palestinians now." In a similar vein, a Slovakian participant asserted that "Palestine is not responsible for Auschwitz", while other participants invoked the Holocaust to justify antisemitic remarks: "what happened – happened, I don't think they should do the same thing now."

1.7.6 Summary of the main findings of the focus group research

A key finding of the online focus group research is the relative lack of antisemitic expressions that characterized the group discussions in all four Visegrád countries. Also notable was the absence of hard-core Holocaust denial in the discussions.

Although participants rarely made spontaneous antisemitic remarks (i.e. antisemitic remarks that were made in response to neutral questions or off-topic remarks), the susceptibility to antisemitic statements and arguments was often high in all four Visegrád countries. An important aspect of this was the participants' general acceptance of narratives in which Israel-focused antisemitism was reinforced by Holocaust distortion.

Furthermore, the data suggests that some participants suppressed their opinions on issues relating to the Jewish people, the Holocaust or Israel due to latency pressures. It is therefore likely that anti-Jewish sentiment was more widespread than first appears from the focus group discussions. Moreover, it should be noted that, while the discussions were free from hard-core Holocaust denial, softer forms of denial and distortion were expressed on several occasions.

III. QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESEARCH

1.8 Consequences and limitations of the research method

In the Appendix, we describe the research method in detail, including the development of the questionnaire, sampling, fieldwork and the weighting of the database. This section discusses the limitations associated with the selected online survey method. While the online nature of the data collection had some consequences for our study, it allowed us to conduct a survey-based research study at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic when other data collection methods would not have been feasible.

Due to the pandemic, we selected online data collection over face-to-face interviews, as explained in the Appendix. This had several implications for the sample quality, length and – consequently – content of the questionnaire. The sample selection in most online surveys is based on so-called access panels, using quota sampling. By definition, such samples cannot be considered fully representative. We have attempted to mitigate the disadvantages of quota sampling by incorporating multiple quota criteria and applying not only one-dimensional but also two-dimensional cross-quotas.

There are two additional reasons why our samples are not representative of the entire adult population of the four countries. First, research based on access panels can only include people who regularly use the internet. To address this, we adjusted the number of respondents expected in the quota cells as previously described. As a result, the selected samples in all countries included more young people, more people with a higher education and more people who live in larger settlements compared to the population as a whole. The second reason why access panels are not entirely representative is that the sample is naturally limited to those who are willing to participate in such panels.

In light of the above-mentioned factors, the present study can only provide limited information regarding antisemitism within the countries' total population. Considering the sample biases discussed above, we anticipated the percentage of antisemitic respondents in each country to be lower than what would be expected in a fully representative sample. Nonetheless, by including all significant subgroups within the populations of these countries in the sample, we can still gain an understanding of country differences and the relationships between variables. As expected, our results reveal lower levels of antisemitism across all countries than those obtained from a recent face-to-face survey (Kovács and Fischer 2021).[12] However, this was consistently

12 The researchers involved in this study were able to complete the fieldwork before the pandemic began.

the case for all types of antisemitism. In fact, the patterns resulting from cross-country comparisons were similar to those found in the face-to-face surveys: Hungarian, Polish and Slovak respondents were significantly more antisemitic than their Czech counterparts.[13] Moreover, the relationships between variables were also in line with previously measured trends.

Changing the data collection method also had consequences when it came to content. Questionnaire length varies greatly between the two methods. An online survey cannot take more than 20 minutes to complete, whereas a face-to-face interview may take as long as 45-60 minutes. Consequently, the questionnaire for an online survey needs be shorter and thus covers fewer topics.

1.9 Cognitive antisemitism

As described in section 1.3, we employ a multidimensional measurement of antisemitic prejudice based on the social-psychological ABC model. In this section, we summarize the main findings regarding the cognitive and conative dimensions of antisemitism. As part of the cognitive dimension, we discuss traditional religion-based anti-Judaism and conspiratorial antisemitism. In conclusion, we present a composite measure of overall cognitive antisemitism derived from the aforementioned dimensions.

1.9.1 Traditional religion-based anti-Judaism

We measured traditional religion-based anti-Judaism with two items, both measured on a five-point Likert scale[14] ranging from "fully disagree" to "fully agree":

- *The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God.*
- *Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews.*

Figure 1 shows the distribution for the first item ("The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God") by country. The proportion of non-respondents is highest in Hungary (19%), while in the other three countries it ranges between 9 and 13 per cent. Among the respondents who gave valid answers,[15] the proportion of those who agree with the statement is very low (5–9%) in all four countries. The proportion of respondents who rather disagree with the statement varies little across countries (17–20%), whereas the proportion of those who fully disagree is higher in the Czech Republic (59%) and Hungary (55%) than in Poland (50%) and Slovakia (48%).

13 In our survey, Slovak respondents tended to be more antisemitic than Hungarian respondents, whereas in the survey based on face-to-face interviews it was mostly the other way around.

14 The Likert scale was developed by American social psychologist Rensis Likert to capture respondents' attitudes along a continuum of choices. Likert scales can vary in length. A five-point Likert scale, for example, includes the following categories: fully disagree, rather disagree, neither agree nor disagree, rather agree, fully agree.

15 This is a technical term meaning that the individual who answered the question did not select "no answer" or "don't know".

Figure 1: Agreement with the statement
"The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God" by country
(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA[16]: CZ = 2,095; HU = 1,758; PL = 1,878; SK = 1,803)



16 DK/NA refers to individuals who selected "no answer" or "don't know".

Figure 2 shows the distribution for the second item ("Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews"). Similarly to the first item, Hungary has the highest proportion of non-respondents (25%). In this case, however, the proportion is also high in Slovakia (22%). In the Czech Republic and Poland, these proportions are 16 and 14 per cent respectively. Among those giving valid responses, more respondents agree with the statement "Jesus Christ's crucifixion remains an unforgiveable sin of the Jews" than with the statement "The Jews' suffering is a punishment from God." The percentage of respondents who fully agree with the latter statement ranges from 4 to 10 per cent, whereas the proportion of those who rather agree ranges from 9 to 14 per cent. Among the four countries, the Czech Republic has the lowest proportion of respondents who agree with the statement, while the proportions vary little across the other three countries. The proportion of respondents who are neither in agreement with nor opposed to the statement is also highest in the Czech Republic (46%). In Hungary, more respondents fully disagree with the statement (37%) than in the other three countries, where this proportion varies from 26 to 28 per cent. Overall, there was a much lower agreement rate in the Czech Republic than in any of the other countries. It is also notable that the distribution of valid responses in Hungary shows an interesting trend: the proportion of people who agree or disagree with the statement is relatively substantial in both cases.

Figure 2: Agreement with the statement
"Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews" by country
(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,926; HU = 1,624; PL = 1,808; SK = 1,619)



Based on the composite measure[17] derived from these items, we created three categories: strongly antisemitic, moderately antisemitic and non-antisemitic.[18] Figure 3 shows the distribution for these categories. Hungary has the highest proportion of respondents who cannot be classified[19] into any of the categories (31%). This was to be expected based on the rate of non-respondents for the items indicated above. The proportion of respondents classified as strongly antisemitic is lowest in the Czech Republic (4%). It was a bit higher in Hungary (9%), Poland (8%) and Slovakia (10%). Slovakia has the highest proportion of moderate antisemites (41%). For the other countries, this proportion ranges between 31 and 37 per cent. Regarding the proportion of respondents who are not antisemitic, the results in the Czech Republic and Hungary are very similar (61% and 60%). In Poland and Slovakia, the proportion of respondents in this category was lower, at 55 and 49 per cent respectively.

17 The cohesion and reliability of the composite measure were tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha. Both yielded satisfactory results. It is unusual to make a principal component out of two variables. However, it should be noted that this is statistically not incorrect. The resulting principal component is a linear combination of the index derived from the sum of the variables. Cronbach's alphas, the principal component weights for the variables and the amount of explained variance are presented in the Appendix.

18 First, the scale scores from 1 to 5 were averaged for each respondent. Those who strongly agreed with both items thus also scored 5 on the composite scale, and those who strongly disagreed with both items scored 1. Then, those with less than 50 per cent of the maximum score were classified as "not antisemitic", those with 50–74 per cent as "moderately antisemitic" and those with 75–100 per cent as "strongly antisemitic". Although these calculations may seem arbitrary, the resulting indicator can be used to compare different countries, which is one of the main aims of this research. The same calculation was applied by Kovács and Fischer (2021).

19 We classified only those who answered both questions.

Figure 3: Traditional religion-based anti-Judaism by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 1,839; HU = 1,493; PL = 1,706; SK = 1,513)



1.9.2 Conspiratorial antisemitism

We measured conspiratorial antisemitism with six items, all measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "fully disagree" to "fully agree":

- *It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews.*
- *Jews have too much influence in [home country].*[20]
- *Jews seek to extend their influence on the global economy.*
- *Jews aim to dominate the world.*
- *Jews are more inclined than others to use shady practices to achieve their goals.*
- *Jews often operate in secret behind the scenes.*

Figure 4 shows the distribution for the first item ("It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews"). The proportion of non-respondents is similar in all four countries, ranging from 6 to 11 per cent. Among the respondents who gave valid answers, the proportion of those who agree with the statement is lowest in the Czech Republic, both in the case of those who fully agree (3%) and rather agree (13%). Hungary has the highest proportion of respondents who fully agree with this statement (10%), while the proportion is the same in Poland and Slovakia (8%). The proportion of respondents who neither agree nor disagree is relatively similar across all countries, ranging from 30 to 37 per cent. The proportion of those who disagree with the statement is lowest in Slovakia. Despite the differences detailed above, the distribution for this item is quite similar across the four countries.

20 In this question, the term "home country" was replaced by the relevant country, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland or Slovakia, as appropriate.

Figure 4: Agreement with the statement
"It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews" by country
(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,136; HU = 1,946; PL = 1,977; SK = 1,863)



Figure 5 shows the distribution for the second item ("Jews have too much influence in [home country]"). The proportion of non-respondents is highest in Hungary and Slovakia (both 15%) and lowest in Poland (8%). Among the valid responses, the proportion of those who agree with the statement to some extent is lowest in the Czech Republic (8%). It is higher in Slovakia (17%) and much higher in Hungary and Poland, where nearly one-third of respondents belong to this group. On the other hand, the Czech Republic has a particularly high proportion of respondents who rather disagree with the statement. In Hungary, where the proportion of those who agree with the statement is high, there is also a relatively high proportion of respondents who fully disagree with it.

Figure 5: Agreement with the statement "Jews have too much influence in [home country]" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,047; HU = 1,855; PL = 1,928; SK = 1,756)



Figure 6 shows the distribution for the third item ("Jews seek to extend their influence on the global economy"). The proportion of non-respondents is similar in all countries, ranging from 14 to 15 per cent, except in Poland where it is only 8 per cent. Among the respondents who provided valid answers, the proportion of those who agree with the statement is relatively high in all four countries. In the Czech Republic, one-fifth of respondents agree with the statement to some extent. In Slovakia, the proportion is 40 per cent, while in Hungary and Poland it is even higher, at 46 and 45 per cent respectively. The Czech Republic has the highest disagreement rate (40%). The proportion of those who disagree with the statement is similar in the other three countries (24–27%).

Figure 6: Agreement with the statement "Jews seek to extend their influence on the global economy" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,975; HU = 1,871; PL = 1,931; SK = 1,753)



Figure 7 shows the distribution for the fourth item ("Jews aim to dominate the world"). The proportion of non-respondents is similar in all four countries, ranging between 8 and 13 per cent. Among the valid answers, the proportion of respondents who agree with the statement is lowest in the Czech Republic (3% fully agree; 7% rather agree). The proportion of those who agree to some extent is quite similar in the other three countries, ranging from 24 to 28 per cent. Once again, the Czech Republic has the highest proportion of disagreeing respondents. While the other three countries have similar agreement rates, Hungary (50%) and Slovakia (49%) have higher disagreement rates than Poland (39%).

Figure 7: Agreement with the statement "Jews aim to dominate the world" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,082; HU = 1,885; PL = 1,932; SK = 1,799)



Figure 8 shows the distribution for the fifth item ("Jews are more inclined than others to use shady practices to achieve their goals"). The proportion of non-respondents is relatively high in all four countries (10–21%), especially in Hungary and Slovakia. Among respondents providing valid answers, the proportion of those who agree with the statement is highest in Poland, where 11 per cent of respondents fully agree and 20 per cent rather agree. The lowest proportion was observed in the Czech Republic (3% fully agree; 9% rather agree). The tendencies are similar in Hungary and Slovakia, where these two categories account for nearly a quarter of respondents. Once again, as expected, the Czech Republic has the highest rate of disagreement (52%). What is unexpected, however, is that Hungary, despite a significantly higher agreement rate, still has a similar disagreement rate (50%). The disagreement rates are lower in the other two countries: 33 per cent in Poland and 38 per cent in Slovakia.

Figure 8: Agreement with the statement "Jews are more inclined than others to use shady practices to achieve their goals" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,030; HU = 1,719; PL = 1,878; SK = 1,656)



Figure 9 shows the distribution for the last item ("Jews often operate in secret behind the scenes"). The non-response rates are relatively high in all four countries, with the highest rates in Hungary (21%) and Slovakia (22%). In Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the proportion of respondents who fully agree with the statement ranges between 10 and 14 per cent, but this rate is far lower in the Czech Republic (4%). Nevertheless, all four countries have similar proportion of those who rather agree with the statement (20–26%). All countries except Poland have similar disagreement rates. Around one-quarter of Polish respondents fall into this category, while the proportion ranges between 31 and 36 per cent in the other three countries.

Figure 9: Agreement with the statement "Jews often operate in secret behind the scenes" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,976; HU = 1,717; PL = 1,860; SK = 1,617)



Based on the composite measure[21] derived from these items, we created three categories: strongly antisemitic, moderately antisemitic and non-antisemitic.[22] Figure 10 shows the distribution for these categories. The proportion of non-respondents ranges between 8 and 15 per cent. The proportion of respondents classified as strongly antisemitic is lowest in the Czech Republic (6%). It is much higher in the other three countries, where it ranges between 19 and 23 per cent. Almost half of the Czech respondents fall into the moderately antisemitic group. The proportion of respondents who are moderately antisemitic is the same in Poland and Slovakia (48%). It is somewhat lower in Hungary (39%). Overall, conspiratorial antisemitism is most prevalent among Polish and Slovak respondents, slightly less prevalent among Hungarians and least prevalent among Czechs.

Figure 10: Conspiratorial antisemitism by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 2,048; HU = 1,840; PL = 1,925; SK = 1,746)



21 The cohesion and reliability of the composite measure were tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha. Both yielded satisfactory results, which can be found in the Appendix.

22 First, the scale scores from 1 to 5 were averaged for each respondent. Those who strongly agreed with all items thus also scored 5 on the composite scale, and those who strongly disagreed with all items scored 1. Then, those with less than 50 per cent of the maximum score were classified as "not antisemitic", those with 50–74 per cent as "moderately antisemitic" and those with 75–100 per cent as "strongly antisemitic".

1.9.3 Conative dimension of antisemitism

We measured the conative dimension of antisemitism with three items, all measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "fully disagree" to "fully agree":

- *I would vote for a candidate of Jewish origin to the European Parliament.*
- *It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations.*
- *It would be best if Jews left this country.*

Figure 11 shows the distribution for the first item in the list ("I would vote for a candidate of Jewish origin to the European Parliament"). The percentage of non-respondents is relatively similar in all four countries (7–14%), with Hungary having the highest non-response rate. More than two-thirds of Czech respondents who provided valid responses (68%) said they would vote for a Jewish candidate for the European Parliament. The same applies to about half of the respondents in Hungary (51%) and Poland (46%). In Slovakia, however, only one-third of respondents (32%) agree with this statement. It is also worth noting that Slovakia has a particularly high proportion of people who neither agree nor disagree with the statement (44%). Overall, Poland and Slovakia have the highest proportion of respondents who would not vote for a Jewish candidate (23% and 24% respectively). The proportion is slightly lower in Hungary (18%) and lowest in the Czech Republic (9%).

Figure 11: Agreement with the statement "I would vote for a candidate of Jewish origin to the European Parliament" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,155; HU = 1,876; PL = 1,893; SK = 1,844)



Figure 12 shows the distribution for the second item ("It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations"). The proportion of non-respondents varies from 6 to 13 per cent. It is not surprising that the agreement rate for this statement is generally low as it is highly discriminatory. Nevertheless, more than one-tenth of respondents in Hungary and Poland would still consider it appropriate to limit the number of Jews in specific occupations. In the Czech Republic, the proportion is 4 per cent, while in Slovakia it is 8 per cent. The Czech Republic has the highest disagreement rate (74%). The disagreement rate is almost 70 per cent for Hungary, which is a relatively high proportion. This reveals the heterogeneity of opinions among respondents in Hungary. The disagreement rate was 67 per cent in Slovakia and 56 per cent in Poland.

Figure 12: Agreement with the statement "It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jew in certain occupations" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,151; HU = 1,884; PL = 1,947; SK = 1,816)



Figure 13 shows the distribution for the last item in the measurement of the conative dimension ("It would be best if Jews left this country"). The proportion of non-respondents was similar in all countries, ranging from 6 to 13 per cent. Although this statement is even more discriminatory than the previous one, the agreement rates do not appear to be lower. In Hungary and Poland, slightly more than one-tenth of respondents agreed with the statement. The proportion was 8 per cent in Slovakia and 4 per cent in the Czech Republic. The disagreement rates are similar to those for the previous item. Also, as with the previous item, we find that the proportion of those who agree or disagree with the statement is high among Hungarians.

Figure 13: Agreement with the statement "It would be best if Jews left this country" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,159; HU = 1,896; PL = 1,946; SK = 1,844)



Based on the composite measure[23] derived from these items, we created three categories: strongly antisemitic, moderately antisemitic and non-antisemitic.[24] Figure 14 shows the distribution for these categories. Hungary has the highest proportion of respondents who cannot be classified into any of the categories (12%). Around 10 per cent of respondents in Slovakia, 5 per cent in the Czech Republic and 6 per cent in Poland are not classifiable. Among the classifiable respondents, a very small proportion of Czech respondents (2%) are strongly antisemitic. For the other countries, the proportion ranges between 7 and 9 per cent. The proportion of moderate antisemites was the same in the Czech Republic and Hungary, accounting for one-quarter of respondents in each country. However, the proportion of moderate antisemites was significantly higher in Poland (38%) and Slovakia (36%).

Figure 14: Conative dimension of antisemitism by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 2,184; HU = 1,916; PL = 1,972; SK = 1,871)



23 The cohesion and reliability of the composite measure were tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha. Both yielded satisfactory results, which can be found in the Appendix.

24 First, the scale scores from 1 to 5 were averaged for each respondent. Those who strongly agreed with all items thus also scored 5 on the composite scale, and those who strongly disagreed with all items scored 1. Then, those with less than 5 per cent of the maximum score were classified as "not antisemitic", those with 50–74 per cent as "moderately antisemitic" and those with 75–100 per cent as "strongly antisemitic".

1.9.4 Overall cognitive antisemitism

Based on all the items of traditional religion-based anti-Judaism, conspiratorial antisemitism[25] and the conative dimension of antisemitism, we created a composite measure[26] comprising three categories: strongly antisemitic, moderately antisemitic and non-antisemitic.[27] Figure 15 shows the distribution for these categories. Respondents who cannot be classified into any of the categories are more prevalent in Hungary (15%) and Slovakia (14%) and somewhat less prevalent in the Czech Republic (9%) and Poland (8%). With regard to overall cognitive antisemitism, the Czech Republic stands out for having a low proportion of those classified as strongly antisemitic (2%). The rate is much higher in the other three countries, ranging from 10 to 14 per cent. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, the proportion of those classified as moderately antisemitic is similar (34% and 37% respectively). The proportion of moderate antisemites is also similar in Poland (45%) and Slovakia (46%). Overall, more than one-third of respondents in the Czech Republic (36%) and nearly half of respondents in Hungary (49%) are cognitive antisemites. The rate is higher in Poland and Slovakia (59% and 56% respectively).

25 As mentioned earlier, the research also measured Holocaust denial and distortion, as well as new antisemitism. These types of antisemitism, as described in detail in the theoretical part of the report, differ significantly from so-called classic antisemitism. This is why they are not included in the composite cognitive antisemitism indicator.

26 The cohesion and reliability of the composite measure were tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha. Both yielded satisfactory results, which can be found in the Appendix.

27 First, the scale scores from 1 to 5 were averaged for each respondent. Those who strongly agreed with all items thus also scored 5 on the composite scale, and those who strongly disagreed with all items scored 1. Then, those with less than 50 per cent of the maximum score were classified as "not antisemitic", those with 50–74 per cent as "moderately antisemitic" and those with 75–100 per cent as "strongly antisemitic".

Figure 15: Overall cognitive antisemitism by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 2,097; HU = 1,849; PL = 1,923; SK = 1,789)



1.10 Affective antisemitism

The previous section focused on the cognitive dimension of antisemitism. When measuring antisemitism, however, one must also consider its emotional intensity. In this section, we therefore focus on the affective dimension of antisemitism. To measure the emotional intensity of antisemitism, we used three questions:

- *First, we asked respondents if they dislike Jews or do not have such feelings.*
- *The second question was a feeling thermometer. Respondents were asked to rate how sympathetic Jews are on a scale of 1–9.*
- *The third question was a simplified measure of social distance. The respondents were asked to indicate, on a four-point scale, how comfortable they would feel if a Jew was their neighbour.*

Figure 16 shows the distribution for the first item. It is important to note that the proportion of non-respondents in the Czech Republic is relatively high (18%). The percentage of non-respondents in the other countries ranges from 10 to 13 per cent. Of the respondents who answered the question, the proportion of people who dislike Jews is approximately 10 per cent in each country.

Figure 16: Answers to the question "Do you rather dislike Jews or do you rather not have such feelings?" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,882; HU = 1,965; PL = 1,897; SK = 1,791)



Figure 17 shows the distribution for the second item in the list.[28] The proportion of non-respondents is low in all four countries (3–6%). The Czech Republic has the lowest proportion of respondents expressing a dislike (12%) compared to the other three countries, where dislikes range from 16 to 18 per cent. Hungary has the lowest proportion of respondents who consider themselves sympathetic to Jews (50%) and the highest proportion of those who consider themselves neutral (32%). The proportion of respondents with positive feelings towards Jews varies between 57 and 60 per cent in the other three countries. An analysis of the mean shows that Czech respondents have the most positive feelings towards Jews (mean = 6.25). In Poland and Slovakia, these feelings are similar but more negative (6.09 and 6.11 respectively). The Hungarian respondents feel most negative towards Jews (5.74).

Figure 17: The feeling thermometer towards Jews by country
(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,167; HU = 2,048; PL = 2,032; SK = 1,953)



28 Respondents were divided into three groups. Those who answered 1–4 on a scale of 1 to 9 were classified as "disliking Jews", those who answered 5 as "neutral" and those who answered 6–9 as "sympathetic towards Jews".

Figure 18 shows the distribution for the third item in the list. The proportion of non-respondents is relatively high in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (20%) and lower in Hungary (6%) and Poland (10%). A slightly higher proportion of respondents in the Czech Republic (86%) and Hungary (85%) would feel comfortable living next to a Jewish neighbour compared to those in Poland (78%) and Slovakia (80%). The internal distribution reveals that a higher proportion of respondents in Hungary are totally comfortable with having Jews living next door (41%) compared to those in other countries (22–27%). The proportion of respondents who would feel uncomfortable is highest in Poland and Slovakia, where roughly one-fifth of respondents feel this way.

Figure 18: Answers to the question
"How comfortable would you feel if a Jew was your neighbour?" by country
(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,840; HU = 2,035; PL = 1,892; SK = 1,656)



Based on their answers to the three questions measuring the affective dimension of antisemitism, respondents were classified into three groups: strongly antisemitic, moderately antisemitic and not antisemitic. Figure 19 shows the method of their classification.[29]

Figure 19: Categories derived from the items measuring affective antisemitism

	Rather dislike Jews	Negative feelings towards Jews	Would be uncomfortable to have a Jewish neighbour
Not antisemitic	−	−	−
Moderately antisemitic	+	−	−
	−	+	−
	−	−	+
Strongly antisemitic	+	+	−
	−	+	+
	+	−	+
	+	+	+

29 Before constructing the typology, we defined two groups for each variable: those considered to harbour negative feelings towards Jews (indicated by a + sign in the table) and those who did not (indicated by a − sign). Since the first variable was dichotomous, this was self-evident. On the second variable, those who answered 1–4 on the 1–9 scale were classified as having negative feelings. The others were classified as having positive feelings. On the third variable, those who answered that they would feel completely uncomfortable or uncomfortable if they had a Jewish neighbour were considered antisemitic in the affective dimension. Those who answered that they would feel comfortable or completely comfortable in such a situation were classified as non-antisemites.

Figure 20 shows the distribution of this composite measure by country. The proportion of non-classifiable respondents is highest in the Czech Republic (31%), slightly lower in Slovakia (28%) and even lower in Hungary (16%) and Poland (17%).[30] Around one-quarter (22–25%) of respondents in the four countries are affective antisemites. The Czech Republic has a slightly lower proportion of those classified as strongly antisemitic (9%) compared to the other three countries (13–14%). In all countries, the proportion of cognitive antisemites (i.e. people who accept various stereotypes about Jews) is significantly higher than that of those who harbour negative feelings towards Jews. In other words, the proportion of respondents who agree with negative stereotypes about Jews is higher than that of those who willingly admit to disliking Jews. We can therefore assume that not all respondents who agree with prevalent antisemitic ideas are also emotionally hostile towards Jews.

Figure 20: Affective antisemitism by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 1,594; HU = 1,828; PL = 1,741; SK = 1,487)



30 It must be emphasized that the proportion of non-classifiable respondents is relatively high in the Czech and Slovak cases, resulting in considerable differences across the countries.

1.11 Overall level of antisemitism: combining cognitive, conative and affective antisemitism (primary antisemitism)

Based on the variables measuring cognitive, conative and affective antisemitism, we created a composite measure for the overall level of antisemitism. We also refer to this composite measure as primary antisemitism. The composite measure comprises four categories:

- Not antisemitic
- Moderately antisemitic
- Strongly antisemitic
- Not classifiable

Figure 21 shows how this composite measure was created based on the categories of variables measuring cognitive (including conative) and affective antisemitism. In the composite measure of overall antisemitism, those who were classified as not antisemitic: belonged to this category in both base variables; belonged to this category in one of them and to the moderately antisemitic category in the other; or belonged to the not antisemitic category in one of them and to the not classifiable category in the other. Those who were classified as moderately antisemitic: belonged to this category in both base variables; belonged to this category in one of them and to the not classifiable category in the other; or belonged to the not antisemitic category in one of them and to the strongly antisemitic category in the other. Lastly, those who were classified as strongly antisemitic: belonged to this category in both base variables; belonged to the moderately antisemitic category in one of them and to the strongly antisemitic category in the other; or belonged to the strongly antisemitic category in one of them and to the not classifiable category in the other. For those who were not classifiable in either of the base variables, we created a not classifiable category.

Figure 21: Categories derived from the composite variables measuring cognitive and affective antisemitism

		Affective antisemitism			
		Not antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Not classifiable
Cognitive antisemitism	Not antisemitic	Not antisemitic	Not antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Not antisemitic
	Moderately antisemitic	Not antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic
	Strongly antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic
	Not classifiable	Not antisemitic	Moderately antisemitic	Strongly antisemitic	Not classifiable

Figure 22 shows the distribution of overall antisemitism in the four Visegrád countries. The percentage of non-classifiables was low in all four countries (4–8%). The Czech Republic has the lowest percentage of strongly antisemitic respondents (6%). The rate is considerably higher in the other three countries, ranging between 13 and 16 per cent. The proportion of moderately antisemitic respondents is relatively high in the Czech Republic (19%). The rate is about the same in Slovakia (20%), while it is slightly lower in Poland (17%) and Hungary (12%). The proportion of non-antisemites in the Czech Republic and Hungary is very similar, at 75 and 73 per cent respectively. The rate is lower in Poland and Slovakia (67%).

Figure 22: Overall level of antisemitism: cognitive, conative and affective, combined by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 2,154; HU = 2,018; PL = 2,006; SK = 1,904)



1.12 Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion

One of the principal types of antisemitism in the post-Holocaust era is secondary antisemitism (see section 1.2.3). Holocaust denial and distortion are widely regarded as its key elements. This section describes in detail the measures and results of the current research on secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion. After presenting the various items used for measuring secondary antisemitism, we discuss the composite measure we developed to assess antisemitism expressed in opinions about the Holocaust.

We used eight items to measure secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion, all measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "fully disagree" to "fully agree". First of all, we presented items relativizing the Holocaust, blaming the victims and accusing Jews of inventing the "Holocaust myth" and using it for their own benefit:

- *The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed.*
- *Most of the horrors of the Holocaust were invented by the Jews only afterwards.*
- *Jews even try to forge benefits from their persecution during the war and the Holocaust.*
- *Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them.*

We also measured opinions about the preservation of the memory of the Holocaust. To this end, respondents were asked if there was too much discussion about the Holocaust, based on the following items:

- *Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust.*
- *After so many decades since the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda.*

In addition, two positive items were presented:

- *We must keep the memory of the persecution of the Jews alive.*
- *More should be taught in school about the Holocaust and the persecution of the Jews so that this does not happen again.*

In most examined cases, agreement with the above statements is indicative of antisemitic attitudes; however, this is not always the case. For example, Holocaust distortion may also be related to the state of collective memory. It may help ease the tension that respondents feel as a result of belonging to a perpetrator or bystander society. In addition, it may reflect support for a particular memory policy aimed at erasing dark spots from national history without being specifically associated with anti-Jewish prejudice (Kovács and Fischer 2021).

Figure 23 shows the distribution for the first item ("The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed"). In all four countries, the proportion of non-respondents is relatively high. Hungary has the highest rate (26%), followed closely by Slovakia (23%). In the Czech Republic and Poland, 15 per cent of respondents declined to answer. Among the valid responses, the agreement rate is low in all four countries (7–12%). It is notable that the proportion of respondents who did not provide a definitive answer is rather high. The proportion of those who "neither agree nor disagree" with the statement is lowest in Hungary (21%) and by far the highest in Poland (34%). The proportion of those who disagree with the statement is relatively high in Hungary and the Czech Republic, where two-thirds of respondents fall into this category, and relatively low in Poland, where only slightly more than half do so.

Figure 23: Agreement with the statement "The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,951; HU = 1,614; PL = 1,771; SK = 1,595)



Figure 24 shows the distribution for the second item ("Most of the horrors of the Holocaust were invented by the Jews only afterwards"). As shown, the proportion of non-respondents is similar for all countries. Compared to the previous item, it is slightly lower but still relatively high (10–17%). Among the valid responses, all countries except Poland have a low proportion of those who fully or partially agree with the statement (4–7%). In Poland, on the other hand, 12 per cent of respondents agree with the statement. Since this item is indicative of strong antisemitism, it is also worthwhile to examine more closely the proportion of respondents who do not explicitly express their agreement or disagreement. This proportion is highest in Poland (27%), slightly lower in Slovakia (21%) and lowest in the Czech Republic and Hungary (15%). Polish respondents have the lowest agreement rate (61%), followed by Slovakia (72%) and then by the Czech Republic and Hungary, where almost half of the respondents fall into this category.

Figure 24: Agreement with the statement "Most of the horrors of the Holocaust were invented by the Jews only afterwards" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,078; HU = 1,803; PL = 1,856; SK = 1,762)



Figure 25 shows the distribution for the third item ("Jews even try to forge benefits from their persecution during the war and the Holocaust"). The proportion of non-respondents is lowest in Poland (7%) and slightly higher in the other three countries, ranging between 11 and 14 per cent. Poland ranks highest among the valid responses in terms of the proportion of respondents who agree with the statement: 19 per cent of respondents fully agree with the statement and another 25 per cent rather agree with it. Hungary and Slovakia are quite similar in this regard: 14 and 10 per cent fully agree with the statement and 18 per cent of respondents in both countries rather agree with it. The Czech Republic has the lowest agreement rate: only 3 per cent fully agree with the statement and 13 per cent rather agree with it. Among the four countries, the Czech Republic has the highest rate of respondents who disagree with the statement to some extent (52%). This rate is relatively lower in Hungary (35%) and Slovakia (40%). Poland has the lowest disagreement rate, with just over a quarter of respondents falling into this category.

Figure 25: Agreement with the statement "Jews even try to forge benefits from their persecution during the war and the Holocaust" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,053; HU = 1,895; PL = 1,935; SK = 1,789)



Figure 26 shows the distribution for the fourth item ("Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them"). The rate of non-respondents is similar in all four countries (8–14%). The proportion of those who fully agree with the statement is lowest in the Czech Republic (2%). In the other three countries, the rate is closer to 6 or 7 per cent. Slovakia has the highest proportion of respondents who rather agree with the statement (16%). Compared to the previous items, the proportion of respondents who neither agree nor disagree with the statement exhibits a slightly different pattern. Slovakia has the highest proportion of such respondents (30%), followed by Poland (27%), the Czech Republic (26%) and Hungary (23%), with marginally fewer respondents. Slovakia has the lowest disagreement rate for this item (47%). The rate is slightly higher and very similar in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, ranging between 57 and 63 per cent.

Figure 26: Agreement with the statement "Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,094; HU = 1,873; PL = 1,919; SK = 1,773)



Figure 27 shows the distribution for the fifth item ("Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust"). In the category of non-respondents, there is not much difference between the countries (7–15%). What stands out most among the valid responses is the relatively low proportion of respondents in the Czech Republic who agree with the statement: only 3 per cent fully agree and 14 per cent rather agree. In the other three countries, 10 to 15 per cent of respondents fully agree and approximately one-fifth rather agree. The proportion of respondents who neither agree nor disagree is similar in all four countries, ranging between 28 and 34 per cent. The Czech Republic has the highest disagreement rate (49%), while slightly more than one-third of respondents in the other three countries fall into this category.

Figure 27: Agreement with the statement "Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,054; HU = 1,865; PL = 1,937; SK = 1,764)



Figure 28 shows the distribution for the sixth item ("After so many decades of the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda"). Compared to the previous item, the proportion of non-respondents was lower in all countries except the Czech Republic, where it remained the same. Among those providing a valid response, agreement and disagreement rates in the Czech Republic and Hungary are very similar to those for the previous item. In Slovakia and Poland, however, a significantly lower proportion of respondents agree and a higher proportion disagree with this statement compared to the responses regarding the previous item.

Figure 28: Agreement with the statement "After so many decades of the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,057; HU = 1,996; PL = 1,998; SK = 1,860)



Figures 29 and 30 show the distribution for the positive items ("We must keep the memory of the persecution of the Jews alive" and "More should be taught in school about the Holocaust and the persecution of the Jews so that this does not happen again"). In all four countries, the proportion of non-respondents is relatively low (4–9%), suggesting that most respondents have opinions on these questions. Compared to other countries, Hungarian respondents are least likely to agree with both statements (49% and 53%), whereas Czech respondents are most likely to agree with them (73% and 68%). Slovakia is positioned between these two countries in this regard (61% and 65%). Given the results for the previous items, it is somewhat unexpected that the agreement rates for the Polish respondents are most similar to those of the Czech respondents (73% and 64%). When comparing the responses to the statements within each country, the views of the Czech, Hungarian and Slovak respondents are fairly similar. Polish respondents were slightly more inclined to agree with the statement that the memory of the persecution of Jews should be preserved rather than with the statement that more should be taught about the Holocaust in schools.

Figure 29: Agreement with the statement "We must keep the memory of the persecution of the Jews alive" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,184; HU = 1,979; PL = 2,007; SK = 1,929)



Figure 30: Agreement with the statement "More should be taught in school about the Holocaust and the persecution of the Jews so that this does not happen again" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,190; HU = 2,067; PL = 2,012; SK = 1,973)



Based on the composite measure[31] derived from these items, we created three categories: strongly antisemitic, moderately antisemitic and non-antisemitic.[32] Figure 31 shows the distribution of these categories by country. In all four countries, the proportion of respondents who could not be classified into any category was relatively low, although Hungary and Slovakia had a slightly higher proportion. The first notable country difference is that the Czech Republic has the lowest proportion of those who are strongly antisemitic (2%). In Poland and Slovakia, the rate is 7 per cent, and in Hungary it is 12 per cent. Poland has the highest proportion of respondents who are moderately antisemitic (46%). The rate is also relatively high in Slovakia (42%) and Hungary (40%), while it is lowest in the Czech Republic (36%). The proportion of non-antisemites is highest in the Czech Republic (62%). The rate is lower in the other three countries, with approximately half of all respondents belonging to this category.

Figure 31: Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 2,140; HU = 1,932; PL = 1,964; SK = 1,860)



31 The cohesion and reliability of the composite measure were tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha. Both yielded satisfactory results, which can be found in the Appendix.

32 First, the direction of positive items was reversed. Then, the scale scores from 1 to 5 were averaged for each respondent. Those who strongly agreed with all items thus also scored 5 on the composite scale, and those who strongly disagreed with all items scored 1. Finally, those with less than 50 per cent of the maximum score were classified as "not antisemitic", those with 50–74 per cent as "moderately antisemitic" and those with 75–100 per cent as "strongly antisemitic".

1.13 New antisemitism

Another prevalent form of antisemitism in the post-Holocaust era is Israel-focused antisemitism, also known as new antisemitism (see section 1.2.4). New antisemitism is often perceived as a politically correct way for expressing anti-Jewish sentiments. This section describes in detail the measures and results of the current research on new antisemitism. After presenting the items used for measuring new antisemitism, we discuss the composite measure we developed to assess antisemitism expressed in anti-Israeli opinions.

We used five items to measure new antisemitism. Each item was measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "fully disagree" to "fully agree". The first two items extend the dislike of Israel to all Jews, while the third encompasses an inversion of the Holocaust in relation to Israel:

- *When I think of Israel's politics, I understand why some people hate the Jews.*
- *Because of Israel's politics, I dislike Jews more and more.*
- *Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians.*

We also included two positive statements expressing sympathy for Israel.

- *Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence against its enemies.*
- *Israel is an important ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism.*

Surveys conducted in the region indicate that in general there is a relatively high non-response rate for questions pertaining to Israel. This is partly due to the fact that many respondents lack sufficient knowledge about Israel. The focus groups confirmed this, and we also observed similar trends in the present survey. The non-response rates for Hungary and Slovakia were exceptionally high, with between one-quarter and one-third of respondents failing to respond. The proportion of non-respondents was about half this rate in the Czech Republic and Poland. The high non-response rate resulted in significant differences in the distribution of total and valid responses. We have therefore decided to analyze the rates for total rather than valid responses in this section.

It should also be noted that in some cases agreement with the above statements is not necessarily indicative of antisemitic attitudes. Supporting antisemitic statements concerning Israel may indicate political affiliations or a commitment to a specific ideology rather than prejudiced attitudes.

Figure 32 shows the distribution for the first item ("When I think of Israel's politics, I understand why some people hate the Jews"). The data show a gap between the Czech Republic and Hungary, on the one hand, and Poland and Slovakia, on the other, with lower agreement rates and higher disagreement rates in the first two countries. For Czech and Hungarian respondents, the agreement rate is 17 and 19 per cent respectively, while the disagreement rate is 28 per cent for both countries. In contrast, Poland and Slovakia respectively have a 34 and 27 per cent agreement rate and a 17 and 16 per cent disagreement rate.

Figure 32: Agreement with the statement "When I think of Israel's politics, I understand why some people hate the Jews" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,932; HU = 1,575; PL = 1,791; SK = 1,506)



Figure 33 shows the distribution for the second item ("Because of Israel's politics, I dislike Jews more and more"). The Czech Republic has the lowest agreement rate (8%) of the countries surveyed, while Poland has the highest (22%). The proportion of respondents who agree with the statement to some extent is almost equal in Hungary (14%) and Slovakia (15%). As expected, Poland has a relatively low proportion of respondents disagreeing with the statement (31%), but Slovakia has an even lower disagreement rate (29%). It is notable that the agreement rates are significantly lower – and the disagreement rates considerably higher – when respondents are asked about their own prejudices rather than the prejudices held by people in general (see the previous item).

Figure 33: Agreement with the statement "Because of Israel's politics, I dislike Jews more and more" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,032; HU = 1,652; PL = 1,854; SK = 1,566)



Figure 34 shows the distribution for the third item ("Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians"). Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are similar in terms of the proportion of those who fully agree with the statement (9–12%). Moreover, in all three countries, the proportion of those who rather agree is relatively high (15–22%). In Hungary and the Czech Republic, disagreement rates were similar (26% and 22% respectively). However, this can be attributed to the fact that 40 per cent of respondents in the Czech Republic did not provide a definitive answer (i.e. neither agreed nor disagreed). Poland and Slovakia display similar disagreement rates, although lower than those in the Czech Republic and Hungary (13% and 18% respectively).

Figure 34: Agreement with the statement "Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,873; HU = 1,561; PL = 1,701; SK = 1,406)



Figures 35 and 36 show the distribution for the two positive items ("Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence against its enemies" and "Israel is an important ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism"). For each item, the Czech respondents show the highest agreement rate (43% and 41%) and the lowest disagreement rate (11% and 10%). There are lower rates of respondents agreeing (19–29%) and higher rates of respondents disagreeing (19–22%) with the first item in the other three countries, with the highest agreement rate among the Polish respondents. Regarding the second item, the agreement rate is also lower in the other countries (23–31%) compared to the Czech Republic.

If we compare the responses to the two items by country, Hungarian respondents are more likely to agree with the statement that "Israel is an important ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism" than they are with the statement that "Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence against its enemies." In the other three countries, the rates of agreement and disagreement with both statements are similar.

Figure 35: Agreement with the statement "Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence against its enemies" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,998; HU = 1,567; PL = 1,788; SK = 1,480)



Figure 36: Agreement with the statement
"Israel is an important ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism" by country
(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,952; HU = 1,503; PL = 1,777; SK = 1,461)



Based on the composite measure[33] derived from these items, we created three categories: strongly antisemitic, moderately antisemitic and non-antisemitic.[34] Given the high proportion of non-responses on the individual items, it is not unexpected that the proportion of those who cannot be classified into one of the three major categories is relatively high in Hungary (27%) and Slovakia (28%). It would therefore be misleading to analyze only the answers of classifiable respondents. Moreover, based on previous surveys and our qualitative research, we are almost certain that, in the case of Israel-focused antisemitism, lack of knowledge rather than the concealment of opinions is the primary reason for refusing to respond. This makes country comparisons difficult. From the data obtained, we can only conclude that the proportion of respondents falling into the category of moderate antisemites is 48 per cent in the Czech Republic, 39 per cent in Hungary, 58 per cent in Poland and 47 per cent in Slovakia, with the proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents being 4 per cent, 10 per cent, 13 per cent and 11 per cent respectively.

Figure 37: New antisemitism by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 1,990; HU = 1,584; PL = 1,815; SK = 1,500)



33 The cohesion and reliability of the composite measure were tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha. Both yielded satisfactory results, which can be found in the Appendix.

34 First, the direction of positive items was reversed. Then, the scale scores from 1 to 5 were averaged for each respondent. Those who strongly agreed with all items thus also scored 5 on the composite scale, and those who strongly disagreed with all items scored 1. Finally, those with less than 50 per cent of the maximum score were classified as "not antisemitic", those with 50–74 per cent as "moderately antisemitic" and those with 75–100 per cent as "strongly antisemitic".

1.14 Sympathy towards the Jews

The majority of items examined above dealt with anti-Jewish sentiment. However, it is also common for surveys on antisemitism to measure sympathy towards Jews. In what follows, we examine the measures and results of the items that aim to measure positive feelings towards Jewish people.

In order to measure sympathy towards Jews, we used two items measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "fully disagree" to "fully agree":

- *We should defend the Jews of our country against the antisemites.*
- *We should do everything we can to preserve Jewish religion and culture.*

Figure 38 shows the distribution for the first item ("We should defend the Jews of our country against the antisemites"). Slovakia has the highest proportion of non-respondents (13%). The rate was lower in the Czech Republic and Hungary (9% in both countries) and even lower in Poland (7%). Among those who provided valid answers, the largest proportion of respondents in Slovakia (18%) fully agreed with the statement. In the other three countries, the rate for these respondents is much higher (25–27%). The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia rank similarly in terms of the proportion of respondents who agree (31–33%). The rate is slightly higher in Poland (37%). Overall, Slovakia has the lowest agreement rate (49%), while the rate in the other countries ranges from 57 to 62 per cent. The disagreement rate was low in all four countries, ranging from 9 to 13 per cent.

Figure 38: Agreement with the statement
"We should defend the Jews of our country against the antisemites" by country
(n for total: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,086; HU = 1,975; PL = 1,956; SK = 1,807)



Figure 39 shows the distribution for the second item in the list ("We should do everything we can to preserve Jewish religion and culture"). The Czech Republic and Poland have a similar proportion of non-respondents (6% and 8%). The rate in Hungary and Slovakia is also similar (12% and 11%). Of the valid responses, Poland has the lowest proportion of respondents who fully agree with the statement (10%), followed by Slovakia (12%). There is a slightly higher proportion of these respondents in the Czech Republic (19%) and Hungary (16%). There are similar trends in the proportion of respondents who rather agree. The rate in this regard is relatively low in Poland and Slovakia (23% for both) but higher in the Czech Republic (34%) and Hungary (31%). Another notable finding is that a significant proportion of respondents in Poland (45%) and Slovakia (49%) failed to express a clear opinion (i.e. they neither agree nor disagree with the statement). The rate in the Czech Republic and Hungary in this regard is significantly lower (37% and 36% respectively). The Czech Republic has the lowest disagreement rate (10%). This rate is higher in Hungary (17%) and Slovakia (16%), while the highest disagreement rate is observed in Poland, where slightly over one-fifth of respondents fall into this category.

Figure 39: Agreement with the statement "We should do everything we can to preserve Jewish religion and culture" by country

(n for total: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,158; HU = 1,918; PL = 1,929; SK = 1,849)



We conclude by comparing the valid responses to the two items. The agreement rate for the second statement is lower among Czech respondents, but the difference is not significant. In contrast, there is a substantial difference between the agreement rates for the two items in the other three countries. Respondents are more likely to believe that they should defend the Jews of their country against antisemitism than that they should do all they can to preserve Jewish religion and culture. The difference between the agreement rates in Hungary and Slovakia is 13 per cent. It is even more pronounced in Poland, where the proportion of those agreeing nearly halved between the first and second statements.

1.15 Latent antisemitism and reversed latency

As the open expression of antisemitism is generally considered a strong social and political taboo (see section 1.4), surveys on antisemitism also measure latency, i.e. the fact that some respondents may feel compelled to conceal their true opinions. In addition to classic latency, we are also interested in measuring so-called "reversed latency" pressure. This refers to cases in which people feel compelled to conceal their discontent with public antisemitic comments or are unwilling to engage in counterarguments when confronted with such comments.

1.15.1 Latency pressure

In order to measure latency pressure, we asked respondents to indicate whether they considered the following statements to be true or false:

- *I don't tell anyone what I think about Jews.*
- *I think many people don't dare to say openly what they think about Jews.*
- *If you say something bad about Jews, you are immediately branded an antisemite.*

Figure 40 shows the distribution for the first item ("I don't tell anyone what I think about Jews"). The non-response rate is relatively high in all four countries, ranging between 18 and 24 per cent. Among the valid responses, it is notable that the Czech Republic has a relatively high proportion of respondents who consider the statement to be true. Given that antisemitism is least prevalent in this country, this is an interesting finding. In Hungary and Slovakia, about half of the respondents consider the statement to be true, while Poland has the lowest proportion of respondents agreeing (38%).

Figure 40: Agreement with the statement "I don't tell anyone what I think about Jews" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,792; HU = 1,794; PL = 1,689; SK = 1,573)



Figure 41 shows the distribution for the second item ("I think many people don´t dare to say openly what they think about Jews"). The non-response rate in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia is similar to the rate for the first item (17–24%). In contrast, the proportion of people who decided not to express their opinion is much higher in the Czech Republic (31%). The vast majority of respondents in Hungary and Poland consider the statement to be true (around 80% in both countries), while Slovakia has a somewhat lower rate (73%). The findings for the Czech Republic are particularly interesting. On the one hand, the previous item reveals that a very high proportion of respondents do not express how they feel about Jews to anyone. On the other hand, out of all four countries, the Czech Republic has the lowest proportion of respondents who believe that people are afraid of expressing their views about Jews.

Figure 41: Agreement with the statement "I think many people don´t dare to say openly what they think about Jews" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,595; HU = 1,800; PL = 1,704; SK = 1,564)



Figure 42 shows the distribution for the last item ("If you say something bad about Jews, you are immediately branded an antisemite"). The non-response rate for this item is higher than it was for the previous two items. It is around 20 per cent in Poland and Hungary and even higher in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (32% for both). Among the valid responses, Hungary stands out most. Eightly per cent of respondents agree that the statement is true. Poland and Slovakia have a slightly lower agreement rate (66% and 62% respectively), while the Czech Republic has the lowest (57%). Considering the distribution for the first item in this country, that result is unexpected.

Figure 42: Agreement with the statement "If you say something bad about Jews, you are immediately branded an antisemite" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,561; HU = 1,738; PL = 1,617; SK = 1,419)



Based on these items, a composite measure was created[35] to show the perceived latency pressure in each country. Figure 43 shows the distribution of the composite index by country. Hungary and Poland have fewer non-classifiable respondents (16%), while Slovakia and the Czech Republic have slightly higher rates (23% and 25% respectively). Among the classifiable respondents, Hungary has the highest proportion of those who feel strong latency pressure (35%). The rate is lower in the Czech Republic (26%), while Poland and Slovakia are similar in this regard (around 20% each). The proportion of respondents who perceive medium latency pressure is relatively similar across all four countries (35–42%), with Poland having the highest proportion. A similar proportion of respondents in the Czech Republic and Poland perceive a weak latency pressure (27%). The rate is slightly lower in Slovakia (24%) and lower still in Hungary (20%). In terms of the proportion of respondents who perceive no latency pressure, there is no substantial difference between the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (9–12%). In Slovakia, however, the rate is somewhat higher (17%).

Figure 43: Perceived latency pressure by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 1,724; HU = 1,837; PL = 1,752; SK = 1,605)



35 The composite measure shows how many items the respondent considered to be true. Respondents who felt that none of the statements were true were placed in the "no" category; those who believed that one statement was true were placed in the "weak" category, those who considered that two statements were true were placed in the "medium" category and those accepting all statements were placed in the "strong" category.

1.15.2 Reversed latency pressure

We measured reversed latency pressure by asking respondents to indicate whether they considered the following statements to be true or false. The first two items measure the respondents' likelihood of suppressing their own non-antisemitic opinions, and the third item measures the likelihood of their making counterarguments when confronted with antisemitic rhetoric.

- *I think many people don't dare to openly confront anti-Jewish remarks.*
- *If you stand up against antisemitism, you are immediately accused of serving Jewish interests.*
- *I am always ready to voice my discontent when someone makes an antisemitic statement.*

Figure 44 shows the distribution for the first item ("I think many people don't dare to openly confront anti-Jewish remarks"). The proportion of those who declined to answer is highest in the Czech Republic (36%), but it is also relatively high in the other three countries (22–29%). Due to the high non-response rate, the distribution of responses is very different when considering the total number of responses or just the total number of valid responses. When only considering valid responses, the proportion of respondents who consider the statement to be true is lowest in the Czech Republic (72%). The rate is considerably higher in Hungary (79%) and Poland (80%), with Slovakia falling somewhere in between (75%). When the total number of responses is considered, slightly less than half of the respondents in the Czech Republic believe that people are reluctant to openly confront anti-Jewish remarks. The rate is slightly above 50 per cent in Slovakia and exceeds 60 per cent in Hungary and Poland.

Figure 44: Agreement with the statement
"I think many people don´t dare to openly confront anti-Jewish remarks" by country
(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,479; HU = 1,685; PL = 1,621; SK = 1,474)



Figure 45 shows the distribution for the second item ("If you stand up against antisemitism, you are immediately accused of serving Jewish interests"). The proportion of those unwilling to express their opinions was higher in the Czech Republic (38%) and Slovakia (39%) and slightly lower in Hungary (26%) and Poland (29%). For this reason, we decided to analyze total responses rather than just the valid ones. Approximately one-quarter of Czech and Slovak respondents consider the statement "If you oppose antisemitism, you are immediately accused of serving Jewish interests" to be true. In Poland, slightly more than one-third of respondents fall into this category, compared to half of all respondents in Hungary. Respondents from Hungary are thus most inclined to believe the statement to be true.

Figure 45: Agreement with the statement "If you stand up against antisemitism, you are immediately accused of serving Jewish interests" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,426; HU = 1,611; PL = 1,491; SK = 1,253)



Figure 46 shows the distribution for the last item ("I am always ready to voice my discontent when someone makes an antisemitic statement"). The proportion of respondents who declined to provide an opinion is relatively high. This trend was particularly prevalent in the Czech Republic (46%) and Slovakia (44%), but it was also high in Hungary (26%) and Poland (31%). Based on the total number of respondents, 26 per cent of Czech respondents are ready to voice their discontent when someone makes an antisemitic statement. Hungary has the highest proportion of such respondents (44%), while Poland (39%) and Slovakia (40%) have a slightly lower percentage.

Figure 46: Agreement with the statement "I am always ready to voice my discontent when someone makes an antisemitic statement" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 1,249; HU = 1,615; PL = 1,439; SK = 1,163)



1.16 Explanatory models of antisemitism

Having examined the prevalence and intensity of antisemitic prejudice among respondents, we now turn to the factors that affect antisemitic prejudice. Our analysis focuses on three types of antisemitism: primary,[36] secondary and new antisemitism. We aim to determine which social groups are more likely to be antisemitic and what attitudes are related to antisemitism. We first consider the explanatory model for the composite indicator, which combines the cognitive and affective dimensions of antisemitism, before examining causal explanations for secondary and new antisemitism.[37]

1.16.1 Explanatory factors

In this section, we provide an overview of the different explanatory factors. As described in the analytical framework discussed in section 1.6, the following factors are examined: (1) religiosity; (2) law-and-order conservatism; (3) political affiliation; (4) prejudice towards other groups; (5) nationalism; (6) populism; and (7) socio-demographic variables.

Religiosity

The following three items were used to measure objective and subjective religiosity:

- *Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services nowadays?* There were seven categories for measuring this item, ranging from never to every day.
- *Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?* The item was measured using the same categories as the previous variable.
- *Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?* We measured this item using a scale ranging from 1 to 10, where one indicates not religious at all and ten indicates very religious.

These items were used to create a composite measure of religiosity in which higher values indicate higher levels of religiosity.[38]

36 As discussed earlier, we refer to the measure that combines the cognitive, conative and affective dimensions of antisemitism as primary antisemitism.

37 Since we needed a dependent variable measured at a so-called high level of measurement, the composite measure of antisemitism presented in section 1.11 was modified. To create a continuous (rather than the previously presented categorical) dependent variable, we omitted the dichotomous variable determining whether or not respondents dislike Jews from the composite indicator.

38 The cohesion of the composite measure was tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis. The results can be found in the Appendix.

Law-and-order conservatism

Conservatism was measured using four items:

- *Do you think that abortion should be banned – with the exception of some cases, for example rape – or should not??*
- *Do you support the death penalty or you don't?*
- *Do you consider homosexuality immoral or not immoral?*
- *Do you think that so-called light drugs such as marijuana /cannabis should be banned – with the exception of medical use – or should not?*

Respondents were asked to select either a yes or a no response to all four items. The respondent's level of law-and-order conservatism was determined according to the number of yes responses to the above items.[39] The composite conservatism variable therefore ranges from 0 to 4, with a higher value indicating a more conservative mindset.

Political affilliation

To grasp the respondents' political affiliation, we first asked them to place themselves on a left-right scale. The scale ranged from 1 to 9, with one signifying particularly left-leaning and nine signifying particularly right-leaning.

We then asked them about their party preferences. As mentioned previously, we did not ask the standard question about which party they voted for in the last parliamentary election. Instead, we wanted to find out if there was a particular party that the respondent felt closest to and, if so, which one. In addition, we asked respondents if there was a party that they would never vote for and, if so, which one. The parties in each country were grouped into the categories presented below.[40] We also created a separate category for respondents who did not specify their preferred party or the party they would never vote for.

Parties in the Czech Republic were categorized as follows:

- Dominant populist
  - Ano 2011 (ANO)
- Traditional conservative-liberal
  - Občanská demokratická strana (ODS)
  - TOP 09 (TOP 09)
  - Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová (KDU-ČSL)
- Liberal progressive
  - Česká pirátská strana (Piráti)
  - Starostové a nezávislí (STAN)
- Fringe populist
  - Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD)
- Other leftist
  - Česká strana sociálně demokratická (ČSSD)
  - Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (KSČM)

39 We only included those respondents providing valid answers for at least three items.

40 In Hungary, some parties were chosen by very few respondents and could not be classified in any category. These respondents were therefore excluded from the analysis. The impact of this was minimal, however.

In total, 62 per cent of respondents did not indicate which party they felt closest to in the Czech Republic. The highest proportion of respondents preferred liberal progressive and dominant populist parties (around 10% in both cases), followed by a slightly smaller proportion who preferred traditional conservative-liberal parties (8%). The proportion of respondents who preferred fringe populist and other leftist parties was the lowest (around 5% in both cases).

In contrast, the proportion of those without a least favoured party was much lower (20%). The largest proportion of respondents chose leftist parties as the party they would never vote for (24%), but liberal progressives also proved unpopular (21%). The results indicate that 17 per cent of respondents disapprove of the dominant populist parties, while 10 per cent disapprove of traditional conservative-liberal parties. The lowest disapproval rate was observed in the case of the fringe populist parties.

In Hungary, parties were categorized as follows:

- Governing parties
  - Fidesz (Fidesz/Magyar Polgári Szövetség)
  - KDNP (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt)

- Opposition: left, liberal
  - DK (Demokratikus Koalíció)
  - LMP (Magyarország Zöld Pártja/Lehet Más a Politika)
  - Momentum Mozgalom
  - MSZP (Magyar Szocialista Párt)
  - Párbeszéd (Párbeszéd Magyarországért)

- Opposition: far-right
  - Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom)

Compared to the Czech Republic, a similar proportion of Hungarian respondents do not have a preferred party (61%). The distribution of respondents that do have a preferred party is relatively even: governing parties (16%), left-liberal opposition (13%) and far-right opposition (10%).

As in the Czech Republic, respondents were more likely to indicate which party they would never vote for. Only 32 per cent of respondents did not have a least favoured party. Among the other respondents, 40 per cent said they would never vote for the ruling parties, 24 per cent would never vote for the left-liberal opposition and only 4 per cent would never vote for the far-right Jobbik party.

Parties in Poland were categorized as follows:

- Governing parties: United Right
  - Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
  - Solidarna Polska
  - Porozumienie Jarosława Gowina

- Opposition: Civic Coalition, liberal, centre-right
  - Koalicja Obywatelska

- Opposition: centre-right, green-oriented
  - Ruch Polska 2050

- Opposition: coalition of left-wing
  - Lewica

- Opposition: far-right nationalist, economic liberal, social conservative
  - Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość

- Other
  - PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe/ Koalicja Polska)
  - Kukiz 15
  - Inna

In Poland, a large proportion of respondents also declined to express their party preference (around 60%). The United Right (the ruling coalition) enjoyed the highest preference rate among respondents (13%), but only narrowly. The preference rate for the Civic Coalition (liberal, centre-right) was 9 per cent, while 6 per cent preferred the green-oriented centre-right. The preference rate for the right-wing opposition was also 6 per cent, while the left-wing opposition attracted 5 per cent. Only 2 per cent of respondents indicated that they preferred other parties.

The proportion of respondents without a least favoured party (27%) was much lower than the proportion of those without a preferred one. Although the governing parties had the highest preference rate (albeit marginally), most respondents also disapproved of these parties (45%). The disapproval rate for the Civic Coalition was 11 per cent. The centre-right, green-oriented party and the left-wing opposition were both identified by 6 per cent of respondents as parties they would never support. Only a small portion of respondents expressed disapproval of the green-oriented, centre-right party. Given that it is a relatively new party, however, this result is not altogether unexpected.

Parties in Slovakia were categorized as follows:

- Senior coalition party
  - OBYČAJNÍ ĽUDIA a nezávislé osobnosti (OĽANO), NOVA, Kresťanská únia, ZMENA ZDOLA

- Junior coalition party
  - Sloboda a Solidarita (SaS)

- Other parties in the governing coalition
  - SME RODINA
  - ZA ĽUDÍ

- Opposition (1)
  - SMER: sociálna demokracia (SMER-SD)

- Opposition (2)
  - HLAS: sociálna demokracia (HLAS-SD)

- Opposition: extreme right
  - Kotlebovci – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (ĽS Naše Slovensko)
  - Republika

- Hungarian minority parties
  - Aliancia-Szövetség (spoločná strana SMK-MKP, Most-Híd a Összefogás-Spolupatričnosť)
  - Maďarské fórum/Magyar Fórum

- Opposition: liberal
  - Progresívne Slovensko
  - SPOLU občianska demokracia

- Extra parliamentary opposition
  - Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie (KDH)
  - Slovenská národná strana (SNS)
  - DOBRÁ VOĽBA
  - VLASŤ

As in the other three countries, the proportion of those without a party preference was also the largest category in Slovakia (63%). Parties affiliated with the ruling coalition had a relatively low preference rate (3–5%). Approximately 5 per cent of respondents preferred the extreme-right opposition, while around 4 per cent preferred the liberal opposition. A similar proportion of respondents preferred other opposition parties (4–7%). Parties representing the Hungarian minority had the lowest rate of party preference (1%).

The proportion of respondents without a least favoured party was much lower than those with a preferred one (21%). Most respondents disapproved of the extreme right opposition (26%) and the leading coalition party (22%). The proportion of those who disapproved of the social-democratic opposition was also relatively high (18% combined). The disapproval rates for the minority parties and the liberal opposition were 4 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. The remaining parties had a disapproval rate of 1 or 2 per cent.

The most notable similarity between the countries is that respondents were more reluctant to express their party preference than to identify the party they would never vote for. This can be attributed to the phenomenon of protest voting, in which individuals do not feel closely associated with a particular party but nevertheless disapprove of at least one party and therefore vote against it.

Prejudice towards other groups

In order to measure prejudice against other groups, two types of items were employed.[41] The first was a feelings thermometer. On a scale of 1 to 9, respondents were asked to indicate how sympathetic they felt towards Jews. The second was a simplified measure of social distance. Respondents were asked to indicate on a four-point scale how comfortable they would feel if a person from a given group was their neighbour. The groups in question were:[42] Chinese, Blacks, Gypsies, Arabs, migrants and homosexuals. From these items, a composite measure was created.[43] The higher the value on the composite measure, the stronger the prejudice against other groups.

41 Both these question types may be familiar from the chapter on affective antisemitism (section 1.10) because we also used them in connection with Jews.

42 Initially, an eighth group was included: Americans were treated as a reference group. However, since the communality of the variable remained below 0.25 in almost all countries, this variable was omitted from the composite measure.

43 The cohesion was tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis in which all the variables were included. The reliability of the composite measure was tested using Cronbach's alpha. However, since the feeling thermometer and the social distance variables were measured on different scales, a separate Cronbach's alpha was requested for each of the two sets of variables.

Nationalism

Nationalism was measured using five items:[44]

- *It is my duty to stand up for [home country][45] even if it is on the wrong track.*
- *I'm proud to be [nationality of home country].*[46]
- *It really makes me angry when others criticize [nationality of home country].*
- *Please indicate how strongly attached you are to [home country].*
- *Please indicate how important it is for you to be [nationality of home country].*

The first three items were measured using a five-point Likert scale, ranging from full disagreement to full agreement. In response to the fourth and fifth items, respondents were asked to select from five options. For the fourth item, the options ranged from very weak to very strong. For the fifth item, from very unimportant to very important. A composite measure was created using these items.[47] Respondents with higher scores were more likely to be nationalistic.

Populism

Populism was measured using the following items:[48]

- *Political parties just argue and are unable to solve the serious problems facing our country.*
- *It would be better if people could decide directly, for example by referendum, on the most important political issues instead of Parliament deciding.*
- *It's better if people themselves take action to resolve social injustices because politicians and parties are generally unable to resolve them.*
- *What politicians call a compromise is in fact giving up principles.*

All the above items were measured using a five-point Likert scale, ranging from full disagreement to full agreement. Respondents with higher scores for this composite measure were more likely to be populist.

44 One additional statement was included in the questionnaire in connection to nationalism: "The government should act more strongly to protect national interests against supranational institutions such as the EU." However, since the communality of this item was very low in all four countries, it was not included in the composite measure.

45 The term "home country" was replaced by the name of the relevant country (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland or Slovakia) in the questionnaires.

46 The term "nationality of home country" was replaced by the name of the dominant nationality of the relevant country (Czech(s), Hungarian(s), Pole(s) or Slovak(s). The only exception was when we asked respondents in Slovakia how important it was for them to belong to their own nationality. In this case, Slovaks were asked about being Slovak and Hungarians about being Hungarian.

47 The cohesion and reliability of the composite measure were tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha. Both yielded satisfactory results, which can be found in the Appendix.

48 One additional statement was included in the questionnaire in connection to populism: "It would be better if a capable and strong leader decided on important issues, even if he or she were to break] certain rules." According to the reliability analysis, the indexes would have been more reliable without this item, and the communalities for this variable were low in all four countries. We therefore did not include this item in the composite measure of populism.

Socio-demographic factors and social status

The following items measured the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents:

- Gender: 1 was assigned to males and 2 to females

- Age: continuous variable ranging from 18 to 80

- Highest level of education: based on the following six categories
  - I have not finished school
  - Primary school
  - Vocational training without graduation certificate (matura)
  - Secondary education with graduation certificate (matura)
  - Bachelors' degree (and the equivalent from the pre-Bologna period)
  - Master's degree or higher (and the equivalent from the pre-Bologna period)

- Size of settlement: using the quota variable described in section 1.8.[49]

The social status of the respondents was determined using a composite measure created from variables measuring objective and subjective status. We measured objective status based on the availability of consumer goods in the respondent's household.[50] Respondents were asked about eleven consumer goods.[51] A higher score for the composite measure was indicative of a better financial situation.[52]

Subjective social status was measured using two items:

- *Which of the following descriptions come closest to how you feel about your household's income today?* (The following four answers were available: living comfortably on present income, coping on present income, finding it difficult to live on present income or finding it very difficult to live on present income.)
- *On the scale below, 1 represents the lowest standard of living and 10 represents the highest standard of living in [home country]? Where would you place yourself on this scale?*

49 We used variables with slightly different categories in the four countries. This was due to their different sizes and the different categorizations used by the national statistical offices.

50 An obvious measure of the objective status of respondents would be their income status. Unfortunately, this measure is not at all reliable.

51 Dishwasher, valuable artwork or paintings, home air-conditioning, washing machine, microwave, high-definition television (HDTV), laptop computer, personal computer (PC), car (younger than four years), car (four years or older), real estate (apart from the respondent's primary residence).

52 The composite indicator was created using a special procedure known as the z-score sum method. This method uses weighting based on the prevalence of a given good in society. We assign a higher value to the possession of a rare good, because we assume that it is more valuable. Similarly, we assign a lower value to a good that many people in society possess, because we treat it as having less value.

Using these items, we created a composite measure that combined objective and subjective social status.[53] A higher score for this measure was indicative of a higher social status.

Having reviewed all the explanatory variables used in this study, we now go on to discuss the impact of these factors on antisemitism in the following sections. The results are presented by country and in comparison with other countries.[54]

1.16.2 Overall explanatory model of primary antisemitism

As expected, demographic variables in the Czech Republic have a weak impact on antisemitism. Among the socio-demographic variables, age has a significant but not very strong effect. The older the respondent, the more likely they are to harbour antisemitic sentiments. However, the effect of age is partly mediated by other variables, especially prejudice against other groups. Older people tend to be more prejudiced against other groups and thus are also more antisemitic. Religiosity and political orientation have no effect on antisemitism in the Czech Republic. Although the effect of the highest educational level is significant and those with lower educational attainment tend to be more antisemitic, this effect is weak. Moreover, its impact is fully mediated by populism, meaning that respondents with lower education are more antisemitic only because they also tend to be more populist. Conservative attitudes go hand in hand with antisemitic prejudices. However, those who hold such attitudes tend to be characterized by general prejudice and populism, which explains much of their tendency to be antisemitic. In the Czech Republic, there is no correlation between political orientation and prejudice against Jews. Nevertheless, prejudice against other groups is a significant explanatory variable, and its effects are independent of other factors. In other words, when general prejudice is coupled with nationalism or populism, those who are prejudiced against other groups will also be prejudiced against Jews. In the Czech Republic, nationalism has a weak effect on antisemitism,[55] while populism has a relatively strong effect. Overall, the explanatory variables explained antisemitic sentiment in the Czech Republic to a medium extent.[56]

In Hungary, the overall impact of socio-demographic variables is also weak, and only gender and level of education are associated with antisemitism in a significant way. Men and those with lower education levels are more likely to be antisemitic. Although both explanatory factors are themselves associated

53 The cohesion of the composite measure was tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis. The results can be found in the Appendix.

54 The relationships between variables were examined using a linear regression analysis. Models were built in multiple steps, and the results are presented in the Appendix. It is important to note that the models only refer to respondents who had valid values for all variables. The number of respondents that can be taken into account is therefore significantly reduced in each country. The numbers were 891 in the Czech Republic, 895 in Hungary, 970 in Poland and 702 in Slovakia.

55 In the Czech Republic, if we look at the correlation between nationalism and antisemitism alone, it is not significant. The negative relationship (the less nationalistic one is, the more antisemitic one is) is caused by the association of nationalism with other variables. However, it should be noted that this negative correlation is very weak.

56 The explained variance of the model is 24 per cent.

with antisemitism, they are also mediated by other variables. In the case of gender, all other explanatory variables are also involved, and prejudice against other groups is the most important mediating factor. Men are more prone to prejudice, whether it be against Jews or other outgroups. Educational attainment is only partly mediated by general prejudice; populism also plays a significant role. People with lower education levels tend to be more prejudiced and populist, which predisposes them to antisemitism.

The impact of law-and-order conservatism, general prejudice and populism in Hungary are similar to those in the Czech Republic, although the effect of the last two factors is somewhat stronger in Hungary. Unlike in the Czech Republic, political orientation plays a significant role, even if its impact is partly mediated by other variables. It is clear that Hungarian respondents with right-wing orientations tend to be more antisemitic. The effect of nationalism is also weak in Hungary, but the direction of the relationship seems to be plausible: the more nationalistic the respondent, the more likely they are to be antisemitic. In general, the explanatory variables explain antisemitism in Hungary much better than in the Czech Republic.[57]

In Poland, as in the aforementioned countries, the overall impact of socio-demographic variables is weak. Among these variables, gender has the strongest explanatory power. Men are more likely to be antisemitic, but this effect is significantly mediated by political orientation and general prejudice. In other words, men tend to be more right-wing and prejudiced against other groups, which is associated with stronger antisemitism. In Poland, the size of the municipality also has some effect on antisemitism. Those living in smaller settlements are slightly more antisemitic, but this effect is very weak. In terms of religiosity, it appears that the more religious the respondent, the more likely they are to be antisemitic. However, this effect is fully mediated by law-and-order conservatism and political orientation. Those who are more religious are more likely to be characterized by law-and-order conservatism and a right-wing political orientation. In the case of Poland, religiosity affects antisemitism entirely through these variables.

As regards the other variables (law-and-order conservatism, political orientation, general prejudice, nationalism and populism), we find very similar correlations to those found in Hungary. The only significant difference is that in Hungary the effect of nationalism is partly mediated by populism (nationalists are typically more populist), but nationalism also has a weak but independent effect on antisemitism. In Poland, nationalists are antisemitic only because they are more likely to be more populist. In Poland, as in Hungary, prejudice against other groups and populism are the most dominant explanatory factors of antisemitism. The impact of the explanatory variables is stronger for Polish respondents than for Hungarian respondents.[58]

57 The explained variance of the model is 40 per cent.

58 The explained variance of the model is 42 per cent.

Among the Visegrád countries, socio-demographic variables have the most significant impact in Slovakia. Age, level of education and social status all have significant effects. Older people and those with lower education levels and a lower social status are more likely to be antisemitic. However, the effects of all three variables are partly due to their association with other variables. Prejudice against other groups plays the most significant role in mediating the effects of all three variables. Older people and those with lower education levels and a lower social status generally tend to be more prejudiced, including against Jews. Populism also mediates the effects of educational level and social status.

As in the Czech Republic and Hungary, religiosity has no effect on antisemitism in Slovakia. Nationalism is also not a significant predictor of antisemitism. As in the other three countries, prejudice against other groups is a major cause of antisemitism. Indeed, among the four countries, this variable has the strongest effect in Slovakia. Populism is also an important explanatory factor. As in the other countries, the effect of conservatism in itself is relatively strong, and those who are characterized by law-and-order conservatism are also more prone to antisemitism. In Slovakia, however, this is basically because such people tend to be more prejudiced against others and are also more likely to be nationalists and populists. An interesting correlation can also be seen in the case of political orientation. If we look at the effect of political orientation on antisemitism without any further explanatory factors, we find that the two variables are not correlated in the Czech Republic. In Hungary and Poland, we do find the expected correlation: those who consider themselves more right-wing are also more likely to be antisemitic. In Slovakia, however, we observe the opposite: those who consider themselves left-wing are more likely to be antisemitic.

1.16.3 Overall explanatory model of secondary antisemitism

The first thing to note is that, compared to primary antisemitism, the explanatory variables included in the model are somewhat less effective at explaining secondary antisemitism in all four countries. Among the socio-demographic variables, the highest level of education is the only significant variable in the final model for the Czech Republic. People with a lower educational level are somewhat more prone to Holocaust denial and distortion. Although the effect of age appears to be significant initially, it disappears as more explanatory variables are introduced into the model. In other words, its effect is fully mediated by other variables.

In the Czech Republic, religiosity has a slight negative effect: those who are less religious are more likely to be characterized by secondary antisemitism. Compared to primary antisemitism, law-and-order conservatism has a more significant effect on secondary antisemitism, while prejudice against others and populism have a slightly weaker effect. As with primary antisemitism, we find the same weak correlation with nationalism. On the other hand, the direction of the relationship is interesting: the variable itself is positively related to secondary antisemitism. In other words, those who are more nationalistic are more likely to be characterized by this type of

antisemitism.[59] However, due to its association with the other variables, the direction of the association is reversed in the final model.

Secondary antisemitism in Hungary follows very similar trends to primary antisemitism, with two notable exceptions. While gender makes no difference in the case of primary antisemitism, women are significantly less likely than men to deny or distort the Holocaust. In addition, while more nationalistic respondents were slightly more prone to primary antisemitism, nationalism has no significant impact on secondary antisemitism. Among the socio-demographic variables, educational attainment has a weak effect: those with a lower education level are more likely to be characterized by secondary antisemitism. Law-and-order conservatism, right-wing political orientation, populism and prejudice against others also contribute to Holocaust denial and distortion. Compared to primary antisemitism, the effect of the last two variables on secondary antisemitism is weaker but still relatively strong, especially in the case of prejudice against other groups.

The role of socio-demographic variables in the final model in Poland is very similar to what we observed in the case of primary antisemitism. Men are somewhat more prone to Holocaust denial and distortion. Settlement size has a very weak effect in the case of primary antisemitism and does not appear to affect secondary antisemitism at all. Prejudice against other groups is the most influential factor in secondary antisemitism, although its effect is weaker than in the case of primary antisemitism. Law-and-order conservatism, right-wing political attitudes and populism are also predictors of Holocaust denial and distortion. While the effects of the first two factors are somewhat weaker, the effect of populism is somewhat stronger than in the case of primary antisemitism.

In Slovakia, the trends in the explanatory models of primary and secondary antisemitism are also very similar. The effects of most socio-demographic variables (gender, age, highest level of education and social status) are partially or fully mediated by the other variables in the model. Among this group of variables, the effect of the highest level of education is strongest, but the effect size is very weak. Those with lower education levels are slightly more prone to secondary antisemitism. Men and people of lower socio-economic status are also more susceptible to Holocaust denial and distortion, although these variables have a very limited impact. Among all variables, prejudice towards other groups has the strongest effect, as we observed in the case of primary antisemitism, although its effect is somewhat weaker in relation to secondary antisemitism. Finally, populism also tends to make respondents more prone to Holocaust denial and distortion than to primary antisemitism.

1.16.4 Overall explanatory model of new antisemitism

When it comes to explaining new antisemitism in the four Visegrád countries, the explanatory variables are somewhat

59 The correlation between nationalism and secondary antisemitism is 0.116.

less effective than in the case of secondary antisemitism and much less effective than in the case of primary antisemitism.

In the case of the Czech Republic, new antisemitism is characterized by new trends compared to primary and secondary antisemitism. Gender has a significant effect: women are more prone to Israel-focused antisemitism than men. For the other two types of antisemitism, we found little or no difference between males and females.[60] In the case of Israel-focused antisemitism, most of the other demographic variables have no impact. The only observable impact relates to social status. Those with a lower social status are slightly more prone to this type of antisemitism. Furthermore, while prejudice against others was a strong predictor in the case of primary and secondary antisemitism, it does not have this effect in the case of new antisemitism. Besides gender, the strongest explanatory factors for new antisemitism are political orientation and nationalism. However, their direction is not the same: Israel-focused antisemitism is more characteristic of left-wingers and accordingly less characteristic of nationalists. The impact of populism is weaker in the case of new antisemitism, but its direction is the same we have observed so far: those who are more populist are more likely to be characterized by this type of antisemitism.

As in the case of primary antisemitism, gender has no effect in Hungary. However, age has a relatively strong effect. Younger people are more likely to be characterized by Israel-focused antisemitism. Other socio-demographic variables have no significant effect. In the case of the highest level of educational attainment and social status, however, this is because the other variables included in the model mediate their effects. In the previous models for Hungary, law-and-order conservatism had a significant effect, while religiosity had none. In the case of new antisemitism, it is the other way round: those who are less religious are more prone to Israel-focused antisemitism. New antisemitism is not significantly influenced by nationalism. We observed the usual patterns regarding political orientation and prejudice against other groups, but the effects are weak. Right-wingers and prejudiced people are more prone to Israel-focused antisemitism. Populism has the greatest impact on this model: populists are more prone to new antisemitism.

For Poland, the only significant socio-demographic variable in this model is age. Younger people are more likely to be prejudiced against Israel. For the other two types of antisemitism, age had no significant effect. In Poland, the trends remain the same for the other variables. Religiousness is not significant, while law-and-order conservatism tends to predispose individuals to new antisemitism to the same extent as seen in the previous two models. A right-wing political orientation, prejudice against other groups and populism are strong predictors of new antisemitism. However, their impact is somewhat smaller than in the case of primary and secondary antisemitism.

No socio-demographic variable is significant in the final model for Slovakia. While relationships can be observed in the

60 In the case of primary antisemitism, women were a little more antisemitic, but this effect was very weak.

initial model, they are ultimately weak and mediated by other variables. As in the case of primary and secondary antisemitism, religiosity is not a significant predictor of new antisemitism. Interestingly, neither is law-and-order conservatism. This may be related to the fact that left-wingers are significantly more antisemitic when it comes to Israel, whereas right-wingers are characterized more by primary and secondary antisemitism. Prejudice towards other groups and populism are important factors, but their impact is smaller than in the case of the other types of antisemitism. The direction of the relationships is the same: those who are more prejudiced and more populist are more likely to be characterized by new antisemitism. As in the case of the other types of antisemitism, nationalism is also not significant, but this is because its effect is mediated by other variables. If we look at nationalism alone, we find that those who are more nationalistic are also more likely to be characterized by Israel-focused antisemitism.[61]

61 The correlation between nationalism and new antisemitism is 0.138.

IV. VICTIM CONSCIOUSNESS, COMPETITIVE VICTIMHOOD, HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS OF HOLOCAUST BYSTANDERSHIP AND ANTISEMITISM

1.17 Victim consciousness and competitive victimhood

In addition to the explanatory factors used in previous surveys, our research also investigates the relationship between collective victimhood and antisemitism. As described in section 1.5, we measured two types of collective victimhood – exclusive and inclusive victim consciousness – and found the distinction between the two to be particularly important, since we expected that the former would reinforce antisemitic feelings and the latter would have the opposite effect.

1.17.1 Exclusive victim consciousness

We measured exclusive victim consciousness using three items, all measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "fully disagree" to "fully agree":

- *No other Central or Eastern European nation went through similar hardships as the [main nationality of home country].*
- *There is no suffering in the history of other Central or Eastern European nations that is comparable to the [main nationality of home country]'s suffering.*
- *The [main nationality of home country] were more frequently victimized throughout history than other nations.*

Figure 47 shows the distribution for the first item ("No other Central or Eastern European nation went through similar hardships as the [main nationality of home country]"). The non-response rate is similar in all four countries (8–12%). Among those providing a valid answer, a relatively small proportion of Czech and Slovak respondents agree with this statement to some extent (11% and 13% respectively). The agreement rate is significantly higher in Hungary, where nearly one-third of respondents belong to this group. However, the rate is even higher in Poland, with 52 per cent of respondents falling into this category. The disagreement rate is slightly higher in the Czech Republic (66%) than in Slovakia (56%). This is because a higher proportion of Slovaks had no definite opinion (neither agreed nor disagreed). The disagreement rate is 49 per cent in Hungary and 21 per cent in Poland.

Figure 47: Agreement with the statement "No other Central or Eastern European nation went through similar hardships as the [main nationality of home country]" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,096; HU = 1,988; PL = 1,949; SK = 1,819)



Figure 48 shows the distribution for the second item ("There is no suffering in the history of other Central and Eastern European nations that is comparable to the [main nationality of home country]'s suffering"). As can be seen, the distribution is very similar to the previous item. The non-response rate ranged from 7 to 12 per cent. Among the valid responses, the agreement rate is the same in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (10%), followed by Hungary (28%) and Poland (43%). The Czech Republic has the lowest proportion of respondents not providing a definitive answer (24%). The other three countries are quite similar in this regard (33–35%). The Czech Republic has the highest proportion of respondents who disagreed (66%), followed by Slovakia (55%), Hungary (38%) and ultimately Poland (24%).

Figure 48: Agreement with the statement "There is no suffering in the history of other Central and Eastern European nations that is comparable to the [main nationality of home country]'s suffering" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,065; HU = 1,950; PL = 1,938; SK = 1,827)



Figure 49 shows the distribution for the last item ("The [main nationality of home country] were more frequently victimized throughout history than other nations"). The non-response rate did not differ significantly from the first two items (6–12%). However, the proportion of those who agreed with the statement was much higher in all four countries. The Czech Republic and Slovakia had the lowest agreement rate. In this case, however, one-quarter of respondents agreed with the statement, compared to around 10 per cent for the previous two items. The agreement rate was also significantly higher compared to the previous two items in Hungary (52% compared to 30% and 28%) and Poland (61% compared to 52% and 43%). The disagreement rate was lower among Poles (14%) and Hungarians (19%) and higher among Czechs (47%) and Slovaks (39%).

Figure 49: Agreement with the statement "The [main nationality of home country] were more frequently victimized throughout history than other nations" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,119; HU = 2,015; PL = 1,967; SK = 1,823)



Based on the composite measure[62] derived from these items, we created three categories of exclusive victim consciousness:[63] weak, moderate and strong. Figure 50 shows the distribution for this composite measure. Because the trends for the items presented earlier were very similar, the distribution for the composite measure was not unexpected. The proportion of non-respondents is low in all four countries (6–11%). A noteworthy result among those who provided valid answers is the proportion of Polish respondents with a strong exclusive victim consciousness (62%). The proportion of Hungarian respondents with a strong exclusive victim consciousness is 18 points lower but still relatively high (44%). In the Czech Republic, only 16 per cent were classified as having a strong exclusive victim consciousness, while the rate was 20 per cent in Slovakia. On the other hand, the highest proportion of respondents with a moderate exclusive victim consciousness was found in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (both 67%). The rate was 49 per cent in Hungary and 35 per cent in Poland. The highest proportion of those with a weak exclusive victim consciousness was observed in the Czech Republic (17%), followed by Slovakia (13%) and Hungary (7%). As expected, the lowest proportion was found in Poland (3%).

62 The cohesion and reliability of the composite measure were tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha. Both yielded satisfactory results, which can be found in the Appendix.

63 First, the scale scores from 1 to 5 were averaged for each respondent. Those who strongly agreed with all the items thus also scored 5 on the composite scale, and those who strongly disagreed with all the items scored 1. Then, those with less than 33.32 per cent of the maximum score were classified as having a weak victim consciousness, those with 33.33–66.65 per cent as having a moderate victim consciousness and those with 66.66–100 per cent as having a strong victim consciousness.

Figure 50: Exclusive victim consciousness by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 2,105; HU = 2,000; PL = 1,968; SK = 1,852)



1.17.2 Inclusive victim consciousness

We measured inclusive victim consciousness using three items, all measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "fully disagree" to "fully agree":

- *Other nations in Central and Eastern Europe have been repressed/oppressed in similar ways as the [main nationality of home country].*
- *During their history, other Central and Eastern European nations have been harmed to the same degree as the [main nationality of home country] people.*
- *There have been many national tragedies during the 20th century. Regardless of religion and nationality all victims are equally important.*

Figure 51 shows the distribution for the first item ("Other nations in Central and Eastern Europe have been repressed/oppressed in similar ways as the [main nationality of home country]"). The proportion of non-respondents is relatively low in all four countries (9–11%). The highest rate of full agreement was observed in the Czech Republic (20%), while the rates in the remaining three countries were relatively similar (11–15%). Hungary and Poland have the same proportion of respondents who rather agree with the statement (35%), while the rate is higher in Slovakia (48%) and the Czech Republic (53%). The proportion of those who disagree with the statement either fully or partially is very similar in the Czech Republic (9%) and Slovakia (11%). The disagreement rate is higher in Hungary (16%) and Poland (23%).

Figure 51: Agreement with the statement "Other nations in Central and Eastern Europe have been repressed/oppressed in similar ways as the [main nationality of home country]" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,107; HU = 1,978; PL = 1,905; SK = 1,839)



Figure 52 shows the distribution for the second item ("During their history, other Central and Eastern European nations have been harmed to the same degree as the [main nationality of home country] people"). The proportion of non-respondents is relatively low in all four countries (8–13%). In all four countries, the proportion of participants who fully agree with the statement is fairly similar (11–16%). In terms of proportions, the difference between those who rather agree with the statement is much more evident. The lowest agreement rate is observed in Hungary (27%), followed by Poland (37%). The highest agreement rate is found in the Czech Republic (46%) and Slovakia (43%). In both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 3 per cent of respondents expressed full disagreement and 11 per cent expressed partial disagreement with the statement. These rates were slightly higher in Poland (5% and 18%) and even higher in Hungary (7% and 19%).

Figure 52: Agreement with the statement "During their history, other Central and Eastern European nations have been harmed to the same degree as the [main nationality of home country] people" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,091; HU = 1,968; PL = 1,926; SK = 1,805)



Figure 53 shows the distribution for the last item ("There have been many national tragedies during the 20th century. Regardless of religion and nationality all victims are equally important"). It shows that the distribution of the answers is similar in all four countries. The proportion of non-respondents ranges between 5 and 8 per cent. Approximately half of all respondents express full agreement with the statement (49–54%). An additional 30 to 33 per cent say that they rather agree. The proportion of respondents who neither agree nor disagree with the statement ranges from 12 to 14 per cent. In all four countries, the proportion of respondents who disagree was very low, ranging from 3 to 6 per cent.

Figure 53: Agreement with the statement "There have been many national tragedies during the 20th century. Regardless of religion and nationality all victims are equally important" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,166; HU = 2,065; PL = 1,989; SK = 1,913)



Based on the composite measure[64] derived from these items, we created three categories of inclusive victim consciousness:[65] weak, moderate and strong. Figure 54 shows the distribution for this composite measure. The proportion of unclassifiable respondents is relatively low in all four countries, ranging between 7 and 10 per cent. The proportion of respondents with a strong inclusive victim consciousness is higher in the Czech Republic (38%) and Slovakia (33%) and lower in Hungary (24%) and Poland (26%). All four countries have a similar proportion of respondents with a moderate inclusive victim consciousness (46–49%). The proportion of those with a weak inclusive victim consciousness is relatively low in the Czech Republic (16%) and Slovakia (19%) and higher in Hungary (27%) and Poland (28%).

Figure 54: Inclusive victim consciousness by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)

(n for % without those who cannot be classified: CZ = 2,134; HU = 2,025; PL = 1,951; SK = 1,865)



64 The cohesion and reliability of the composite measure were tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha, which can be found in the Appendix. As it can be seen, the communality of the third item ("There have been many national tragedies during the 20th century.") was significantly below that of the other two items for all countries. In Poland, it was particularly low. Cronbach's alpha values were also significantly lower for this than the other composite indicators. Once again, the third item was clearly "responsible." The reason for this phenomenon was that, as we saw above, respondents in all countries almost unanimously agreed with this statement. In light of all this, we have finally decided to include this item as well.

65 First, the scale scores from 1 to 5 were averaged for each respondent. Those who strongly agreed with all the items thus also scored 5 on the composite scale, and those who strongly disagreed with all the items scored 1. Then, those with less than 33.32 per cent of the maximum score were classified as having a weak victim consciousness, those with 33.33–66.65 per cent as having a moderate victim consciousness and those with 66.66–100 per cent as having a strong victim consciousness

1.17.3 Competitive victimhood

We asked two questions about competitive victimhood: one that was more closely related to the phenomenon and one that was more loosely related. First, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed with the statement "During World War II, the [main nationality of home country] suffered as much as the Jews."[66] Figure 55 shows the distribution of the responses. The non-response rate was relatively low in all countries (5–10%). However, we found significant differences between the countries in terms of valid responses. Among the four countries, the Czech Republic has the lowest proportion of those who fully (9%) or rather (25%) agree with the statement. The agreement rate is significantly higher in Hungary and Slovakia. Approximately one-fifth of respondents in both countries fully agree with the statement and one-third partially agree. Poland has the highest agreement rate, with over two-thirds of respondents agreeing with the statement. The proportion of those who fully agree and those who rather agree is the same (34%). In all four countries, the proportion of respondents who neither agree nor disagree is very similar (23–28%), with Poland having slightly fewer respondents (19%). The Czech Republic has the highest combined disagreement rate (43%), followed by Slovakia (25%), Hungary (22%) and finally Poland (13%).

Figure 55: Agreement with the statement "During World War II, the [main nationality of home country] suffered as much as the Jews" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,142; HU = 1,991; PL = 1,994; SK = 1,870)



For the second question, which is more loosely connected to victimhood competition, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed with the statement "The suffering of the Jews was unique in 20th century history." Figure 56 shows the distribution of the responses. The proportion of non-respondents among Slovaks was remarkably high (18%). Among the valid answers, the Czech respondents have a low disagreement rate (11%), which is not surprising given the results discussed above. The proportion of Polish respondents disagreeing with the statement is almost identical (13%), which was unexpected. The proportion of respondents who did not provide a definitive response is slightly lower in the Czech Republic (24%) than in Poland (30%). Hungary has a disagreement rate of 29 per cent, followed by Slovakia (24%). A similar pattern was observed in relation to non-definitive responses: the proportion of respondents neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the statement was 28 per cent in Hungary and 35 per cent in Poland. The highest agreement rate was found in the Czech Republic (65%), followed by Poland (57%). In Hungary and Slovakia, the rate was approximately 40 per cent.

Figure 56: Agreement with the statement "The suffering of the Jews was unique in 20th century history" by country

(n for %: CZ = 2,302; HU = 2,174; PL = 2,092; SK = 2,072)
(n for % without DK/NA: CZ = 2,115; HU = 1,938; PL = 1,938; SK = 1,707)



1.17.4 Victimhood and antisemitism

We analyzed the relationship between exclusive and inclusive victim consciousness using correlation.[67] In line with earlier research on this issue, the two types of victimhood are negatively correlated in all four countries. In other words, the more a respondent exhibits one type of victim consciousness, the less likely they are to exhibit the other. The (negative) relationship is strongest in Hungary ($r = -0.386$) and weaker in the other three countries (Czech Republic: $r = -0.199$; Poland: $r = -0.173$; Slovakia: $r = -0.194$).[68]

For all four countries, the correlation analysis shows that the stronger the exclusive victim consciousness of the respondents, the greater the likelihood that they believe that their nationality suffered as much as the Jews during World War II. However, the item regarding the unique suffering of the Jews is unrelated to inclusive victim consciousness in all four countries and relates to exclusive victim consciousness only in Slovakia. The correlation is not very strong ($r = 0.210$), but the direction is intriguing. The positive correlation indicates that the more respondents think that the suffering of their own national group is unique (exclusive victim consciousness), the more they also think this way about Jews.

Based on previous research cited in section 1.5, we expected that exclusive victim consciousness would predispose respondents to antisemitism, whether primary or secondary. In all four countries, the correlations are relatively high and, except for Poland, similar for primary and secondary antisemitism. In Poland, exclusive victim consciousness is much more strongly associated with primary antisemitism ($r = 0.422$) than with secondary antisemitism ($r = 0.256$). The direction of the correlation between inclusive victim consciousness and these two types of antisemitism was also as we expected. When respondents regard their own suffering as comparable to that of other nations in the region (inclusive victim consciousness), they are less likely to be characterized by traditional antisemitic thinking and Holocaust denial and distortion. That being said, it is important to note that this relationship is weaker in all four countries than in the case of exclusive victim consciousness. The relationship between inclusive victimhood and antisemitic attitudes is stronger in the Czech Republic and Hungary (correlations between −0.202 and −0.274) and weaker in Poland (−0.169 with primary and −0.137 with secondary antisemitism). In Slovakia, inclusive victim consciousness is barely associated with antisemitic attitudes, although the correlations are still significant (−0.088 with primary and −0.114 with secondary antisemitism).

Competitive victimhood in every country is positively correlated with antisemitic thinking. The strongest relationships are found in Hungary (0.532 with primary and 0.498 with secondary antisemitism), while the weakest are found in Poland (0.342 with primary and 0.244 with secondary antisemitism). Stronger agreement with the statement about the

67 Correlation tables can be found in the Appendix.

68 Since the direction of the relationship is not clear, correlation coefficients were used to analyze the strength of the relationships.

uniqueness of the Jews' suffering is associated with weaker antisemitism in all countries. Considering the similarity in content (i.e. competitive victimhood and secondary antisemitism are both related to the Holocaust), it is possible that the relationship is somewhat stronger in the case of secondary antisemitism than in the case of primary antisemitism.

1.18 Historical perceptions of Holocaust bystandership and antisemitism

In section 1.5, we discussed the perceptions of people in the Visegrád countries regarding the behaviour of their societies during the Holocaust. In doing so, we focused specifically on the phenomenon of Holocaust bystandership.

In the survey, six items were used to measure these historical perceptions. The first two items focused on positive types of behaviour, while the last four focused on negative types of behaviour. Respondents were required to move a slider from "no one" to "everyone" in order to answer the following questions.[69]

- *How many [main nationality of home country] sympathized with Jews during World War II?*
- *How many [main nationality of home country] saved Jews during World War II?*
- *How many [main nationality of home country] were indifferent to the suffering of Jews during World War II?*
- *How many [main nationality of home country] felt satisfaction because of the suffering of Jews during World War II?*
- *How many [main nationality of home country] cooperated with the Germans in their actions against Jews during World War II?*
- *How many [main nationality of home country] benefited from the persecution of Jews during World War II?*

Figure 57 shows the mean values for the positive items by country. Poland has the highest average perception rate for these items: the rate for saving Jews is 52 per cent and the rate for sympathizing with Jews is 63 per cent. In the other three countries, the average perception rate for saving Jews ranges between 42 and 45 per cent. The average perception rate for sympathizing with Jews is most widespread among respondents in Hungary (56%), followed by the Czech Republic (52%) and Slovakia (48%).

69 The place of the slider was then converted to a number between 0 and 100, which we treated as percentages. In the following analyses, we use the mean of these percentages.

Figure 57: The estimated proportion of societies engaged in positive behaviours during the Holocaust by country (mean)[70]



Figure 58 shows the mean values for the negative items by country. In the case of indifference to the suffering of Jews, the average perception rates of the Czech, Hungarian and Slovak respondents are very similar. In all three countries, respondents think that almost half of their society was indifferent to the suffering of Jews (45–47%). The average perception rate is lower in Poland (41%). With regard to the other three items, the differences between the countries are much greater, but the patterns are similar. On average, Hungarian and Slovakian respondents think that a relatively significant proportion of their society felt satisfaction at the suffering of Jews (37% and 34% respectively), cooperated with the Germans (41% and 40% respectively) and benefited from the persecution of Jews (45% and 40% respectively). In contrast, respondents from the Czech Republic and Poland estimated these to be significantly less. On average, they believe that a smaller proportion of their societies felt satisfaction at the suffering of Jews (28% and 25% respectively), cooperated with the Germans (34% and 28% respectively) and benefited from the persecution of Jews (36% and 33% respectively).[71]

70 n for item "sympathized with Jews": CZ = 2,049, HU = 1,976, PL = 1,983, SK = 1,845; n for item "saved Jews": CZ = 1,982, HU = 1,945, PL = 1,940, SK = 1,743.

71 When interpreting these results, it is important to bear in mind that Hungary and Slovakia were allies of Nazi Germany and that the Czech Republic and Poland were not.

Figure 58: The estimated proportion of societies engaged in negative behaviours during the Holocaust by country (mean)[72]



Using these items, we created two composite measures:[73] one measuring positive[74] historical perceptions and one measuring negative[75] historical perceptions.[76] Based on these composite measures, we created three categories of positive or negative historical perceptions: weak, moderate and strong.[77]

72 n for item "indifferent to the suffering of Jews": CZ = 2,003, HU = 1,954, PL = 1,959, SK = 1,795; n for item "felt satisfaction because of the suffering of Jews": CZ = 1,984, HU = 1,916, PL = 1,933, SK = 1,739; n for item "cooperated with the Germans in their actions against Jews": CZ = 2,005, HU = 1,922, PL = 1,930, SK = 1,749; n for item "benefited from the persecution of the Jews": CZ = 1,971, HU = 1,929, PL = 1,895, SK = 1,716.

73 The cohesion and reliability of the composite measure were tested using the communalities in a principal component analysis and Cronbach's alpha. Both yielded satisfactory results, which can be found in the Appendix. We tried to combine the positive and negative items into a single composite measure, but the tests showed that there were two separate dimensions.

74 The composite measure of positive historical perception was created from the first two items (sympathizing with and saving Jews).

75 The composite measure of negative historical perception was created from the last four items (being indifferent, feeling satisfaction, cooperating with the Germans and benefiting from the persecution of the Jews).

76 In the case of the positive and the negative items, we calculated the mean of the respective items.

77 First, the scale scores from 0 to 100 were averaged for each respondent. Those who had a high score on all items thus also scored high on the composite measure, and those who had a low score on all items scored low. Then, those with less than 33.32 per cent of the maximum score were classified as having weak positive/negative historical perceptions, those with 33.33–66.65 per cent as having moderate positive/negative historical perceptions and those with 66.66–100 per cent as having strong positive/negative historical perceptions.

Figure 59 shows the distribution of positive and negative historical perceptions, with the proportion of non-respondents included. What is most notable, albeit not unexpected, is that respondents in all countries think that members of their society behaved more positively than negatively during the Holocaust. The composite indicator shows that the Polish respondents perceive their nation's role during the Holocaust the most positively (57%), followed by the respondents in Hungary (51%), the Czech Republic (47%) and Slovakia (46%). When attributing negative attitudes, we see the opposite trend. Polish respondents perceive their nation's role during the Holocaust the least negatively (32%), followed by the Slovak (40%) and Hungarian respondents (42%) with similar rates, and finally the Czechs (36%). Compared to the other three countries, there is thus a large difference between the averages for the two composite indicators among Polish respondents. While 57 per cent of them have a positive perception of their society's behaviour during the Holocaust, the negative perception rate is only 32 per cent.

Figure 59: Positive and negative behaviours during the Holocaust by country (average)[78]



78 Correlation tables can be found in the Appendix.

1.18.1 Historical perceptions and victimhood

The relationship between historical perceptions and victim consciousness was examined using correlations.[79] As regards positive historical perceptions, the countries are very similar. The correlations show that if a respondent is characterized by exclusive victim consciousness their perception of their own society's involvement with Jews during World War II is likely to be more positive. Although the correlations are relatively narrow (0.133–0.220), it should be noted that the relationship between the two variables is strongest in Poland. It is therefore not surprising that respondents who think that their nation suffered as much as the Jews during World War II also think more positively about their society's role during the same period. The relationship between positive historical perceptions and victimhood is clearer when examined from the perspective of the relationship between antisemitism and historical perception.

The picture is less consistent when it comes to negative historical perceptions. In the Czech Republic, the more respondents perceive their nation's suffering as unique (exclusive victim consciousness), the more likely they are to hold negative historical perceptions. The converse is also true: when respondents are characterized by a strong inclusive victim consciousness, they have weaker negative historical perceptions. However, the situation differs significantly in other countries. In Hungary and Poland, negative historical perceptions and collective victimhood are practically unrelated, regardless of type. In Slovakia, there is no correlation between negative historical perceptions and exclusive victim consciousness, but in the case of inclusive victim consciousness we find a similar direction and strength of correlation as in the Czech Republic. In both countries, stronger inclusive victim consciousness is associated with weaker negative historical perceptions.

Competitive victimhood is only linked to historical perceptions in Poland: the more negative the historical perceptions of the respondents, the less likely they are to think that Poles suffered at least as much as the Jews.

1.18.2 Historical perceptions and antisemitism

Positive historical perceptions are not correlated with antisemitism in the Czech Republic, but negative perceptions are. It appears from the correlations that the stronger the negative historical perceptions of the respondents (i.e. their belief that a significant proportion of society played a negative role in relation to Jews during World War II), the more likely they are to harbour antisemitic attitudes, whether primary (r = 0.222) or secondary (r = 0.211). In Hungary, by contrast, only positive historical perceptions have a significant relationship with antisemitism. Respondents who believe that a significant proportion of society was characterized by positive bystander behaviour tend to be more antisemitic. In this case, the relationship is stronger with primary (r = 0.162) than with secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion (r = 0.099). In Poland, antisemitism is correlated with both positive and negative perceptions. Strong perceptions of positive or negative bystander behaviour during the Holocaust are both associated with higher levels of antisemitism. The strongest correlation (0.186) is observed between negative perceptions and secondary antisemitism. In Slovakia, finally, the relationship between historical perceptions and antisemitism is not significant.

79 n for positive %: CZ: 1,967, HU: 1,913, PL: 1,918, SK: 1,715; n for negative %: CZ: 1,981, HU: 1,920, PL: 1,918, SK: 1,724.

CONCLUSION

Before summarizing the main findings of the research, the limitations of the data collection method should be briefly highlighted. As a consequence of the online nature of the data collection, the sample is not representative of the entire population of the surveyed countries and deviates slightly from national demographic data. The respondents in our sample are somewhat younger and have a higher socio-economic status than the national average. There are other deviations as well.[80] Despite its limitations, the method enabled us to conduct survey-based research at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Compared to surveys based on face-to-face interviews, our results indicate lower levels of antisemitism in all four countries (for comparison, see Kovács and Fischer 2021). However, this was consistently the case for all types of antisemitism. In fact, the cross-country comparisons revealed similar patterns to those found in face-to-face surveys: Hungarian, Polish and Slovak respondents were significantly more antisemitic than their Czech counterparts.[81] Moreover, the relationships between variables were also in line with previously measured trends.

A summary of the key regional findings is presented below, based on our research objectives. The aim of the research was to gain a more in-depth understanding of modern antisemitism in the Visegrád countries by examining the extent, scope and prevalence of antisemitic prejudice there. Relying on a multidimensional measurement of antisemitism, we examined both the content and the intensity of antisemitic prejudice. We also explored the respondents' readiness to engage in prejudicial action, such as willingness to discriminate. We created several composite measures to assess the level of antisemitic sentiments and attitudes harboured by the respondents (see sections 1.9 and 1.10). We also used these measures to estimate the size of the various prejudiced groups (i.e. non-antisemites, moderate antisemites and strongly antisemitic respondents) in each Visegrád country.

Depending on the country, between one and two-thirds of respondents can be classified as cognitive antisemites. The small proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents in the Czech Republic (only 2%) is notable, given that these numbers are much higher in the other three Visegrád countries (between 10% and 14%). Moreover, Czech respondents were also significantly less likely to be classified as moderately antisemitic (34%), although comparable levels were found in Hungary (37%). The rate of moderate antisemitism among Polish and Slovak respondents was significantly higher (45% and 46% respectively).

80 In the case of Hungary, for example, the proportion of those choosing the governing party as their favourite was much lower than would have been expected in a representative survey. As this group is among the more antisemitic ones in society, its low proportion may explain the lower level of antisemitism.

81 In our survey, Slovak respondents tended to be more antisemitic than Hungarians, whereas in the survey based on face-to-face interviews it was mostly the other way around.

The rates for affective antisemitism show that 22 to 25 per cent of respondents in the countries in question have negative feelings towards Jews. The proportion of respondents classified as strongly antisemitic in the Czech Republic is slightly lower (9%) than in the other Visegrád countries (13% to 14%). Based on the results presented above, it appears that the proportion of cognitive antisemites is higher than the proportion of affective antisemites. Respondents who accept prevalent antisemitic ideas are therefore not necessarily hostile to Jews. This indicates that accepting negative antisemitic stereotypes can also be part of social knowledge without negative emotions towards Jews.

Combining the cognitive and affective dimensions of antisemitism, we developed a composite measure to gauge the strength and prevalence of overall manifest antisemitic prejudice, which we refer to as primary antisemitism (see section 1.11 for details). Overall, between two-thirds and three-quarters of respondents are not antisemitic. In accordance with other surveys, Czech respondents are the least antisemitic, as only one-quarter of them hold moderately or strongly antisemitic views. Although a similar proportion of respondents in Hungary fall into these two categories (27%), the proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents is significantly higher there (15% compared to 6% in the Czech Republic). In fact, it is almost the highest of the four countries examined. The proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents in Poland (16%) and Slovakia (13%) is similar to Hungary, but the higher rate of moderate antisemites in these two countries means they have the highest proportion of primary antisemites among the four countries (33%).

We also created a composite measure using items encompassing various dimensions of secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion (see section 1.12 for details). Overall, a relatively high proportion of respondents are strongly or moderately antisemitic in this area, ranging between 32 and 53 per cent. Compared with the other Visegrád countries, the Czech Republic has the lowest antisemitism rate (38%), including a very low proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents (2%). Meanwhile, in Poland and Slovakia, the proportion of strongly antisemitic respondents is 7 per cent. The highest rate is found in Hungary (12%). In general, we find that the Czech Republic has the lowest proportion of antisemites (38%) compared to Slovakia (49%), Hungary (52%) and Poland (53%). A key finding regarding this particular form of antisemitism is that Hungarian respondents are most likely (12%) to be classified as strongly antisemitic, while Czech respondents are least likely to be classified as such (2%).

In order to assess the overall level of new antisemitism among the respondents, a composite measure was also developed using items reflecting attitudes towards Israel (see section 1.13 for details). The non-response rate was relatively high in this area, resulting in high a proportion of non-classifiable respondents. The proportion was highest in Slovakia (28%), closely followed by Hungary (27%) and then by the Czech Republic and Poland (both 13%). Due to the possible lack of knowledge behind non-responses, we decided to analyze only the full sample. We were therefore unable to make direct comparisons between countries. As a result, we can only

conclude that 52 per cent of respondents in the Czech Republic, 49 per cent in Hungary, 71 per cent in Poland and 58 per cent in Slovakia could be classified as moderate or strongly antisemitic respondents.

The research results described above indicate that a significant proportion of respondents hold anti-Jewish prejudices. A further aim of our research was to understand the causes of antisemitic prejudice and identify which social groups are prone to it. We therefore examined the relationship between different forms of antisemitism (primary, secondary and new antisemitism) and socio-demographic and attitudinal factors. The explanatory variables included religiosity, law-and-order conservatism, political orientation, prejudice against other groups, nationalism, populism and various socio-demographic variables, such as gender, age, highest educational level, settlement size and social status.[82] Prejudice against other groups and populism have the strongest effect in every country and for almost all types of antisemitism. With the exception of the Czech respondents, those who are prejudicial and populist are more likely to be antisemitic in all cases. Prejudice against other groups does not affect new antisemitism in the Czech Republic, and populism has a less significant effect on new antisemitism among Czech and Slovak respondents. In these two countries, respondents with a left-wing political orientation are also more likely to hold antisemitic views directed at Israel. In contrast, political orientation does not play a role in primary or secondary antisemitism in the Czech Republic. Although right-wingers in Hungary and Poland are more susceptible to all forms of antisemitism, nationalism does not have a significant effect on the final explanatory models. This is primarily because its effects are fully mediated by populism: the more nationalist respondents were more antisemitic because they also tended to be more populist.

Socio-demographic variables and religiosity do not play a significant role in any of the countries or for any type of antisemitism. A few exceptions were observed, but these had a small effect size. In Hungary and Poland, men are more likely to deny and distort the Holocaust. In the Czech Republic, by contrast, women are more likely to do so. In Hungary and Poland, young respondents have a greater tendency to hold antisemitic views focused on Israel. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, those with a lower social status are also slightly more likely to deny and distort the Holocaust. In Poland, settlement size also affects primary antisemitism. Among the Visegrád countries, socio-demographic variables have the greatest impact on antisemitism in Slovakia.

In order to investigate regional specificities of antisemitism, we examined the relationship between victimhood narratives and antisemitism. We explored whether certain historical perceptions – especially those anchored in victimhood narratives – increase susceptibility to antisemitic views. We also analyzed whether there are significant differences between

82 The models were built hierarchically to capture the relationships between explanatory variables as well. However, only the final models are described here.

the Visegrád countries in this regard. Our investigation focused on two forms of collective victimhood: exclusive and inclusive victim consciousness. We hypothesized that exclusive victim consciousness would predispose respondents to antisemitism, while inclusive victim consciousness would have the opposite effect. After creating a composite measure using exclusive victim consciousness items (see section 1.17.1 for details), we found that the proportion of Polish respondents with a strong exclusive victim consciousness is relatively high (62%). We also found a high rate among Hungarian respondents (44%), while the rate is lower among respondents in the Czech Republic (16%) and Slovakia (20%). Over 90 per cent of respondents in Hungary and Poland are classified as having a moderate or strong exclusive victim consciousness. The rate is lower, but still very high, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where it ranges between 80 and 90 per cent. In the area of inclusive victim consciousness, similar trends can be observed. The proportion of respondents with a strong or moderate inclusive victim consciousness is higher in the Czech Republic (84%) and Slovakia (81%) than in Hungary (73%) and Poland (72%).

The distribution of exclusive and inclusive victim consciousness was an interesting finding in itself, but our main goal was to explore the relationship between victimhood narratives and antisemitism. We investigated this relationship by using correlations (see section 1.17.4 for details). The findings indicate that exclusive victim consciousness influences both primary and secondary antisemitism in all four countries. Correlations are relatively high in all countries, and the association with both types of antisemitism is similar in magnitude. The only exception is Poland, where exclusive victim consciousness is much more strongly associated with primary antisemitism (r = 0.422) than with secondary antisemitism (r = 0.256). The direction of the correlation between inclusive victim consciousness and antisemitism is as expected: the more respondents perceive the suffering of their own group to be comparable to the suffering of other nations in the region, the less likely they are to be characterized by antisemitic views. Furthermore, the results indicate that competitive victimhood – a phenomenon closely related to exclusive victim consciousness – also predisposes participants to antisemitism (see section 1.17.3 for details). The strongest association was observed in Hungary (0.532 for primary antisemitism and 0.498 for secondary antisemitism) and the weakest in Poland (0.342 for primary antisemitism and 0.244 for secondary antisemitism).

Closely related to victimhood narratives is the phenomenon of Holocaust bystandership (see section 1.18 for details). We explored the respondents' perceptions of how their societies behaved towards Jewish people during World War II. We developed a composite measure of historical perceptions using six positive and negative items. We then used correlations to investigate the relationship between historical perceptions of Holocaust bystandership and antisemitism. The results reveal significant differences between the four Visegrád countries in this regard. In the Czech Republic, only negative historical perceptions are correlated with antisemitism: the more Czech respondents attribute negative behaviour to their societies during the Holocaust, the more likely they are to harbour antisemitic attitudes (the correlations with primary and

secondary antisemitism are $r = 0.222$ and $r = 0.211$). In Hungary, by contrast, only positive historical perceptions correlate with antisemitism (the correlations with primary and secondary antisemitism are $r = 0.162$ and $r = 0.099$). In Poland, both positive and negative historical perceptions correlate with antisemitism. Regardless of whether respondents attribute positive or negative bystander behaviour to a significant proportion of their societies during the Holocaust, both are associated with higher levels of antisemitism. In Slovakia, on the other hand, neither positive nor negative historical perceptions correlate with antisemitism.

Lastly, one of our main research questions sought to explore latency pressures connected to anti-Jewish sentiments (see section 1.15 for details). We created a composite measure using three well-established items that explore latency pressures, resulting in five categories of perceived latency pressure: none, weak, medium, strong and unclassifiable. Although the proportion of respondents who could not be classified was somewhat high in Slovakia (23%) and the Czech Republic (25%), the results still show clear trends. First, the proportion of respondents who feel a strong latency pressure is highest in Hungary (35%). While the rate is lower in the Czech Republic (26%), and even lower in Poland and Slovakia (around 20%), this still represents a sizeable portion of the sample. Additionally, if we combine the respondents who perceived either strong or medium latency pressures, we see that a majority of respondents fall into this category. The lowest combined rate was found in Slovakia (59%) and highest in Hungary (71%).

As noted at the beginning of this conclusion, the data collection method had some implications for our research. While online data collection has its limitations, it allowed us to conduct quantitative research at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, when other data collection methods would not have been feasible.

In addition, our research offers an opportunity to take a closer look at the experience of conducting online research studies based on access panels. This is useful given the increasing use of online quantitative tools in the social sciences, a trend reinforced by the Covid-19 pandemic. Our research can help identify the main directions, challenges and frameworks of online data collection in the field of prejudice and antisemitism research. Future research could investigate the reasons behind the differences in the results of face-to-face versus online data collection, with a specific focus on latency, which appears to characterize a significant portion of respondents. Moreover, our online focus group research results show that participants repeatedly failed to advance counterarguments in response to antisemitic comments. In our opinion, this might be connected to the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, thus this finding merits further scientific investigation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adorno, Theodor W. 1975. "Schuld und Abwehr." In *Gesammelte Schriften* 9: *Soziologische Schriften* II.2, edited by S. von Buck-Morss and R. Tiedemann, 121–326. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

- Akkerman, Agnes, Cas Mudde and Andrej Zaslove. 2014. "How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(9): 1324–1353.

- Altemeyer, Bob. 1981. *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. Winnipeg: University of Minnesota Press.

- Altemeyer, Bob. 1998. "The Other 'Authoritarian Personality.'" *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 30: 47–92.

- Antoniou, Giorgos, Elias Dinas and Spyros Kosmidis. 2017. *Collective Victimhood and Social Prejudice: A Post-Holocaust Theory of Anti-Semitism*. Accessed July 14, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3011983.

- Barna, Ildikó, and Anikó Félix, eds. 2017. *Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries*. Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute.

- Barna, Ildikó, Anikó Félix, Grigorij Mesežnikov, Rafal Pankowski and Veronika Šternová. 2018. "Contemporary Forms of the Oldest Hatred: Modern Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries." In *The Noble Banner of Human Rights*, edited by Anna-Mária Bíró and Katrina Lantos Swett, 303–338. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff.

- Barna, Ildikó, and Árpád Knap. Forthcoming. "Coronavirus-related online antisemitism in Hungary using quantitative topic model and qualitative discourse analysis."

- Barna, Ildikó, Tamás Kohut and Katalin Pallai, together with Olga Gyárfášová, Jiří Kocián, Grigorij Mesežnikov and Rafal Pankowski. 2021. *Antisemitism in the Visegrád Countries – Countering Distortion Report*. Budapest: Tom Lantos Institute.

- Benteler, Lara, Michał Bilewicz and Mikołaj Wisniewski. 2014. "Traditionell und doch modern? Über die Zunahme von traditionellem Antisemitismus in Polen." *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 23: 65–82.

- Bergmann, Werner, and Rainer Erb. 1986. "Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und Öffentliche Meinung." *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 38(2): 223–246.

- Bergmann, Werner. 2008. "Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Europe: A Comparative Perspective." *Journal of Social Issues* 64(2): 343–362.

- Bergmann, Werner. 2009. "Anti-Semitism." In *Handbook of Prejudice*, edited by Anton Pelinka, Karin Bischof and Karin Stöger. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press.

- Bilewicz, Michał. 2007. "History as an Obstacle: Impact of Temporal-Based Social Categorizations on Polish-Jewish Intergroup Contact." *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 10(4): 551–563.

- Bilewicz, Michał, and Anna Stefaniak. 2013. "Can a Victim Be Responsible? Antisemitic Consequences of Victimhood-Based Identity and Competitive Victimhood in Poland." In *Responsibility: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, edited by Barbara Bokus. Warsaw: LEXEM.

- Bilewicz, Michał, and Maria Babińska. 2018. "Bystander, czyli kto? Potoczne wyobrażenia Polaków na temat stosunku do Żydów w czasie okupacji hitlerowskiej." *Teksty Drugie. Teoria literatury, krytyka, interpretacja* 3: 97–116.

- Bilewicz, Michał, and Maria Babińska. n.d. "Perceptions of Poles' Bystandership during the Holocaust as an Expression of Anti-Semitic Prejudice." Manuscript.

- Bilewicz, Michał, Mikołaj Winiewski, Miroslaw Kofta and Adrian Wójcik. 2013. "Harmful Ideas: The Structure and Consequences of Anti-Semitic Beliefs in Poland." *Political Psychology* 34(6): 821–839.

- Braham, Randolph. L. 1994. "Antisemitism and the Holocaust in the Politics of East Central Europe." *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 8(2): 143–163.

- Braham, Randolph L. 2016. "Hungary: The Assault on the Historical Memory of the Holocaust." In *The Holocaust in Hungary: Seventy Years Later*, edited by Randolph L. Braham and András Kovács. Budapest: Central European University.

- Bronner, Stephen Eric. 2003. *A Rumor about the Jews: Reflections on Antisemitism and the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Bunzl, Matti. 2005. "Between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe." *American Ethnologist* 32(4): 499–508.

- Chanes, Jerome A. 2004. "What's 'New' – and What's Not – about the New Antisemitism?" *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16(1–2): 111–124.

- Cohn, Norman. 1967. *Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocol of the Elders of Zion*. New York and Evanston, IL: Harper & Row. Quoted in Michal Bilewicz, Mikołaj Winiewski, Miroslaw Kofta and Adrian Wójcik. 2013 "Harmful Ideas: The Structure and Consequences of Anti-Semitic Beliefs in Poland." *Political Psychology* 34(6): 821–839.

- Community Security Trust (CST). 2021. *Antisemitic Incidents: Report 2020*. London: Community Security Trust. https://cst.org.uk/public/data/file/7/2/Incidents%20Report%20 2020.pdf.

- Dekker, Henk, Darina Malová and Sander Hoogendoorn. 2003. "Nationalism and Its Explanations." *Political Psychology* 24(2): 345–376.

► European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). 2020. *Antisemitism: Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the European Union, 2009–2019*. Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-antisemitism-overview-2009-2019_en.pdf.

► EVS. 2020. *European Values Study 2017*. https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/.

► Fine, Robert. 2009. "Fighting with Phantoms: A Contribution to the Debate on Antisemitism in Europe." *Patterns of Prejudice* 43(5): 459–479.

► Gerstenfeld, Manfred. 2007. "Anti-Israelism and Anti-Semitism: Common Characteristics and Motifs." *Jewish Political Studies Review* 19(1–2): 83–108.

► Groh, Dieter. 1987. "The Temptation of Conspiracy Theory, or Why Do Bad Things Happen to Good People?" In *Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy*, edited by C.F. Graumann and S. Moscovici, 1–37. New York: Springer.

► Gyárfášová, Oľga, Péter Krekó, Grigorij Mesežnikov, Csaba Molnár and Marley Morris. 2013. *The Conspiratorial Mindset in the Age of Transition: Conspiracy Theories in France, Hungary and Slovakia – Survey Results*. Budapest: Political Capital. https://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/The_Conspiratorial_Mindset_in_an_Age_of_Transition.pdf.

► Hann, Endre, and Dániel Róna. 2019. *Anti-Semitic Prejudice in Today's Hungarian Society: Representative Survey 2018*. Budapest: Action and Protection Foundation.

► Heni, Clemens. 2008. "Secondary Anti-Semitism: From Hard-Core to Soft-Core Denial of the Shoah." *Jewish Political Studies* Review 20(3–4): 73–92.

Hilberg, Raul. 1992. Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe, 1933–1945. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

► Hirschberger, Gilad, Anna Kende and Shoshana Weinstein. 2016 "Defensive Representations of an Uncomfortable History: The Case of Hungary and the Holocaust." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 55: 32–43.

► Imhoff, Roland, and Mario Messer. 2019. "In Search of Experimental Evidence for Secondary Antisemitism: A File Drawer Report." *Meta-Psychology* 3: 1–22.

► International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). 2016. "Working Definition of Antisemitism." https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism.

► International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). 2020. *National Identity Cumulation 1995/2003/2013*. https://www.gesis.org/en/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/national-identity/cumulation.

► "ISGAP Scholars Support the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism." Open letter, May 12, 2021. https://isgap.org/post/2021/05/isgap-scholars-support-the-ihra-definition-of-antisemitism/.

► Jikeli, Günther. 2021. "A Model for Coming to Terms with the Past? Holocaust Remembrance and Antisemitism in Germany since 1945." *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 143: 427-446. https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2020.1859247

► Jikeli, Günther, Damir Cavar and Daniel Miehling. 2019. "Annotating Antisemitic Online Content: Towards an Applicable Definition of Antisemitism." Preprint. arXiv:1910.01214v1.

► Kofta, Miroslaw, and Sedek Grzegorz. 2005. "Conspiracy Stereotypes of Jews during Systemic Transformation in Poland." *International Journal of Sociology* 35(1): 40-64.

► Kovács, András, ed. 1999. *A Modern Antiszemitizmus*. Budapest: Új Mandátum.

► Kovács, András. 2002. "Public Identity in Defining the Boundaries of Public and Private: The Example of Latent Anti-Semitism." *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 69(1): 179–194.

► Kovács, András. 2011. *The Stranger at Hand: Antisemitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary*. Leiden: Brill.

► Kovács, András, and György Fischer. 2021. *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe: Survey in 16 European Countries*. Budapest: Action and Protection League.

► Krzeminski, Ireneusz. 1993. "Antisemitism in Today's Poland: Research Hypotheses." *Patterns of Prejudice* 27(1): 127–135.

► Lipstadt, Deborah. 1993. *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory*. New York: Macmillan.

► Luhmann, Niklas. 1984. *Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

► Mathis, Andrew E. 2003. "Holocaust, Denial of." In *Conspiracy Theories in American History: An Encyclopedia*, edited by P. Knight, 321–324. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

► Nahmias, Roee. 2006. "Syrian Paper Accuses Israel of Having Spread Bird Flu to Kill Arabs." Ynetnews.com, February 9, 2006.

► Pipes, Daniel. 1997. *Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where it Comes From*. New York: The Free Press.

► Schönbach, Peter. 1961. *Reaktionen auf die antisemitische Welle im Winter 1959/1960* [Reactions to the antisemitic wave in the winter of 1959–1960]. Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt.

► Shafir, Michael. 2012. "Denying the Shoah in Post-Communist Eastern Europe." In *Holocaust Denial: The Politics of Perfidy*, edited by Robert S. Wistrich, 27–66. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter / Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press.

► Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

► Silva, Bruno Castanho, Sebastian Jungkurz, Marc Helbling and Levente Littvay. 2019. "An Empirical Comparison of Seven Populist Attitudes Scales." *Political Research Quarterly* 73(2): 409–424.

► Sharansky, Natan. 2004. "3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization." *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16(3-4): 3.

► Swift, Art. 2013. "Majority in U.S. Still Believe JFK Killed in a Conspiracy." Gallup, November 15, 2013. https://news.gallup.com/poll/165893/majority-believe-jfk-killed-conspiracy.aspx.

► Szabó, Zsolt, Johanna Vollhardt and Mészáros Zsuzsanna. 2020. "Through the Lens of History: The Effects of Beliefs about Historical Victimization on Responses to Refugees." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 74: 94–114.

► Vollhardt, Johanna R. 2009. "The Role of Victim Beliefs in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Risk or Potential for Peace." *Journal of Peace Psychology* 15(2): 135–159.

► Vollhardt, Johanna R. 2012. "Collective Victimization." In *The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict*, edited by Linda R. Tropp, 136–157. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

► Vollhardt, Johanna R. 2015. "Inclusive Victim Consciousness in Advocacy, Social Movements, and Intergroup Relations: Promises and Pitfalls." *Social Issues and Policy Review* 9(1): 89–120.

► Vollhardt, Johanna R., Rashmi Nair and Linda R. Tropp. 2016. "Inclusive Victim Consciousness Predicts Minority Group Members' Support for Refugees and Immigrants." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 46(6): 354–368.

► Webman, Esther. 2017. "Stealing the Holocaust from the Jews? The Holocaust as a Metaphor in the Public Discourse." In *Antisemitism Before and Since the Holocaust*, edited by Anthony McElligott and Jeffrey Herf, 279–304. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

► Wetzel, Julianne. 2017. "Soft Denial in Different Political and Social Areas on the Web." In *Antisemitism Before and Since the Holocaust*, edited by Anthony McElligott and Jeffrey Herf, 305–331. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

► Willis, Gordon B. 2015. *Analysis of the Cognitive Interview in Questionnaire Design*. Oxford University Press.

► Wistrich, Robert S. 2013. *Parallel Lines: Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the 21st Century*. Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism.

► Wistrich, Robert S. 2017. "Antisemitism and Holocaust Inversion." In *Antisemitism Before and Since the Holocaust*, edited by Anthony McElligott and Jeffrey Herf, 37–49. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

► World Jewish Congress (WJC). 2020. *Antisemitic Conspiracy Myths*. New York: World Jewish Congress.

► Young, Isaac F., and Daniel Sullivan. 2016. "Competitive Victimhood: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature." *Current Opinion in Psychology* 11: 30–34.

► Zick, Andreas, Carina Wolf, Beate Küpper, Eldad Davidov, Peter Schmidt and Wilhelm Heitmeyer. 2008. "The Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity: The Interrelation of Prejudices Tested with Multiple Cross-Sectional and Panel Data." *Journal of Social Issues* 64(2): 363–383.

APPENDIX

Research method

We initially intended to conduct the quantitative research through face-to-face surveys, as this is the most appropriate method for drawing conclusions about an entire population based on a small and representative sample. In the late spring of 2020, however, it became evident that it was no longer feasible to collect data through personal interviews due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the research was accordingly redesigned. Instead of conducting face-to-face interviews, we carried out an online survey.

There were two primary reasons for this change: (1) it would have been irresponsible to put interviewers and interviewees at risk of infection; (2) we assumed that many respondents would not allow interviewers into their homes during (or shortly after) the pandemic. The result of this would have been a severe and unpredictable distortion of the sample, as participation in the survey would not have been random.

Questionnaire development and testing

A questionnaire was designed to measure the antisemitic attitudes of Internet users in the four Visegrád countries. It is of fundamental importance to a quantitative study to ensure that the questionnaire is of a high quality, valid and applicable. We accordingly developed the questionnaire in a series of carefully designed steps. We also tested the questionnaire using both qualitative and quantitative methods before its finalization. The development and pretesting of the questionnaire involved the following five stages:

- analyzing the results from the preliminary focus group and their implications for the current research;
- reviewing theories and measures of antisemitic prejudice, including literature and surveys;
- feedback from experts consisting of three rounds of discussions with leading experts in the field and translation of the questionnaire;
- qualitative cognitive pretesting involving cognitive interviews in each Visegrád country;
- technical pretesting involving quantitative testing of the online questionnaire.

As a first step, the results of the focus group study were reviewed and evaluated from the perspective of policy and social action. This involved a series of discussions with antisemitism experts, policy experts and a diverse group of professionals with a good understanding of the local political context and social climate. This equipped us with a more nuanced understanding of interconnected issues, practical considerations and insights for further research to help us formulate region-specific survey questions.

The second step was to review relevant theories and surveys. The purpose of this stage of the questionnaire development process was to form a so-called question pool: a collection of the most relevant existing survey questions and items.

Additionally, the leading researchers reviewed the most relevant theoretical approaches. The range of preliminary theories was broad, including long-established models as well as more recent ones, and encompassed a variety of disciplines, such as right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1981, 1998), social dominance orientation (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), group-focused enmity (Zick et al. 2018), collective narcissism (Golac de Zavala et al. 2009), siege mentality (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992) and exclusive and inclusive victim consciousness (Vollhardt et al. 2019).

In light of the fact that the questionnaire was to be used in four different languages (Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovak) and that experts from all countries in the region participated in the development process, the so-called master questionnaire was developed in English. It was then translated into the four languages of the Visegrád region. Ariosz[83] – the polling company in charge of the overall management of the online data collection, including the programming of the questionnaire and the field work – entrusted two independent translation agencies with this task. The translations prepared by the agencies were then compared by the country experts and the lead researchers involved in the project to find the most suitable and appropriate language solutions. The two translations for each country were then merged into one final translation and proofread by the country experts and an independent proofreader in Hungary.

After completing the translations, the questionnaire was pretested in each country using cognitive interviews. Using a qualitative method known as cognitive pretesting (Willis 2015), survey questionnaires can be assessed for applicability and validity. We used the same methodology in all four countries.

In the present study, the purpose of cognitive pretesting was to determine the validity of the survey questionnaire or, to put it differently, to determine whether the questions, items and response categories were understood in the same way by the participants as by the researchers. Cognitive pretesting of questionnaires can help determine whether a questionnaire measures

83 See https://ariosz.hu/en/.

what it is designed to measure. This is particularly relevant when measuring sensitive and complex topics, such as anti-Jewish attitudes. It is common practice to recruit subjects for cognitive interviews based on loose quotas. Quotas are typically based on age, gender and socio-economic factors.

In each Visegrád country, at least six cognitive interviews were conducted by the leading researchers and country experts involved in the project (Czech Republic: six, Hungary: nine, Poland: seven and Slovakia: seven). We used quotas for age, gender and educational level. However, these were not strict quotas due to the small sample size. We attempted to include both younger and older interview subjects. We also balanced the sample according to gender and educational level. Interview subjects were selected to represent lower (elementary and vocational) and higher educational (secondary and tertiary) levels. Those with a background in social sciences and history or familiarity with our research topics were excluded. Because of the Covid-19 pandemic, the cognitive interviews were mostly conducted by telephone or online.

The cognitive pretesting included two phases. In the first phase, the interview subjects completed the survey questionnaire on their own. We recorded the time it took them to do so in order to evaluate the questionnaire's length. The second phase of the cognitive pretesting consisted of interviewing the subjects based on the semi-structured interview guideline. First, we asked them for their opinions on the questionnaire in general, followed by more specific questions about how they interpreted certain survey questions.

It was apparent from the cognitive interviews that the questionnaire was too long. Interview subjects typically required at least 30 minutes to complete it. As the online survey was designed to last 20 to 25 minutes, we needed to exclude two entire blocks of questions from the questionnaire to reduce its length. Based on the results of the cognitive pretesting, it also became evident that interview subjects in all four countries had difficulty answering questions relating to the theories of siege mentality and collective narcissism. Mainly because the questionnaire had to be shortened, the questions exploring siege mentality and collective narcissism were therefore eliminated. In addition, minor adjustments had to be made to make the questions more user-friendly, such as slightly modifying the answer categories.

Final questionnaire blocs

Questions were included on all main concepts discussed in section 1.2. These concepts formed the basis for the so-called constructs of the questionnaire, i.e. the main areas we attempted to explore. Due to the complexity of these constructs, we measured them all with multiple questions. When it was feasible content-wise, for example in the case of different types of antisemitism, we mixed questions measuring different constructs to reduce the monotony of the questionnaire. This was also important to reduce the risk of respondents abandoning the questionnaire.

Moreover, in order to reduce the so-called context effect,[84] most of the questionnaire blocks were randomized, meaning that the order of the questions was different for each respondent.

The Slovakian questionnaire included a question about the ethnicity of respondents to differentiate between ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Slovaks. This was important because we slightly modified the questions concerning nationalism for the Hungarian minority when we asked about the respondents' ethnic group. (However, when the question concerned the respondent's home country, Slovakia, both ethnic groups received the same question.)

The survey questionnaire consisted mainly of previously tested measures. However, some items were developed by the researchers. The following paragraphs present the main constructs of the questionnaire, including the sources of the various items.

As discussed in section 1.3, we applied a multidimensional measurement of antisemitism. We "mixed" questions relating to traditional religion-based antisemitism, conspiratorial antisemitism and secondary antisemitism in two questionnaire blocks. We measured traditional religion-based antisemitism with two questions (Kovács 2011; Hann and Róna 2019). Our measure of conspiratorial antisemitism consisted of six items previously used by leading experts in the field (Bilewicz and Stefaniak 2013; Kovács 2011; Hann and Róna 2019; Kovács and Fischer 2021). Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion were measured using eight items used in international surveys (Kovács 2011; Hann and Róna 2019; Kovács and Fischer 2021). In the same questionnaire blocks, we also included three questions measuring the conative dimension of antisemitism (Bilewicz et al. 2013; Kovács 2011; Hann and Róna 2019; Kovács and Fischer 2021). A separate questionnaire block was used to ask questions relating to new antisemitism. New antisemitism was measured using two positive and three negative items (i.e. two statements supporting Israel and three antisemitic Israel-focused statements). These questions were tested previously in Hungary and Europe (Kovács 2011; Hann and Róna 2019; Kovács and Fischer 2021). The affective dimension of antisemitism was measured using three types of questions: a feeling thermometer, a question about social distance and a direct question about respondents' relations to Jewish people. All questions were based on previously tested measures (Kovács 2011; Hann and Róna 2019; Kovács and Fischer 2021).

In addition to measuring antisemitism, we also measured the latency of opinions (see section 1.4 for details). We examined different aspects of latency in three questionnaire blocks, using previously tested items. (Kovács 1995) We also developed a set of questions designed to determine whether individuals suppress their non-antisemitic opinions and their tendency to voice counterarguments in antisemitic situations. This set of questions is referred to as "reversed latency".

84 A context effect occurs when previous questions affect responses to subsequent questions.

As discussed in section 1.6, we explored various explanatory factors relating to antisemitism. Our measure of law-and-order conservatism, prejudice against other outgroups and populism was derived from items included in previous surveys (Kovács 2011; Kovács and Fischer 2021). In addition, we examined distorted historical perceptions using a series of questions focusing on the Holocaust and questions of responsibility. We examined the respondents' perceptions of their societies during the Holocaust, as discussed in section 1.5. We were particularly interested in the role of bystanders. Our questions were designed to capture the different roles of bystandership in terms of morality: from actively saving Jews or sympathizing with them, via neutrality, to taking advantage of or even feeling satisfied at the suffering of Jews (Bilewicz and Babińska 2018).

As part of this study, we examined different dimensions of nationalism using four items in one question block and two separate questions in another question block (Dekker et al. 2013). We measured victimhood narratives, including collective and competitive victimhood, as well as exclusive and inclusive victim consciousness (Szabó et al. 2020). A simplified version of the latter was used in our questionnaire, consisting of six items (three inclusive and three exclusive statements) within one questionnaire block.

As the questionnaire was administered online among a panel of respondents, the first section of the survey contained several socio-demographic questions. These questions also served as the basis for determining quotas. The remainder of the demographic questions were included in the final questionnaire blocks, as were some of the further explanatory questions. We also used previously tested measures to examine respondents' political orientation (ESS 2018).

Once the last changes to the questionnaire had been translated, the questionnaire was sent to Ariosz for programming. The survey was conducted via Ariosz's LimeSurvey server. Using a single platform ensured both the consistency of data collection and the smooth transmission and storage of data in compliance with GDPR requirements.

During the final phase of questionnaire development, the questionnaire was pretested by (1) polling company Ariosz; (2) Internet-user respondents recruited by Ariosz; and (3) leading researchers and country experts involved in the project. The final stage of the pretesting process ensured that the online survey questionnaires were free of spelling errors, typos and other mistakes and that all functions worked as intended.

Sampling, fieldwork and weighting

When conducting representative online surveys, companies specializing in this field use so-called access panels as a starting point for selecting respondents. Typically, these panels consist of tens of thousands of respondents. Along with key socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, type of residence, education, etc.), these panels more or less "cover" the segment

of the adult population that regularly uses the Internet. When selecting the sample, so-called quotas are used to guarantee that the composition of the respondents is close to the composition of the total (adult) internet-user population.

The polling company followed the above-described procedure. In order to improve the quality of the sample, Ariosz used several quota variables during sampling. Moreover, we used both one-dimensional and two-dimensional quotas (so-called cross-quotas), as follows:

- Cross-quotas for gender (two categories) and age (five categories)
- One-dimensional quotas for region, type of settlement (in Hungary) and settlement size (in the three other countries), and highest level of education.

In order to determine the number of responses expected in each quota cell, the quota categories had to correspond to the categories used by each country's national statistical offices. Table 1 shows the quota categories for all four countries in the study:

Table 1: Quota categories by country

Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Gender and age group cross-quota			
male, 18–29 years old			
male, 30–39 years old			
male, 40–49 years old			
male, 50–59 years old			
male, 60+ (<74) years old			
female, 18–29 years old			
female, 30–39 years old			
female, 40–49 years old			
female, 50–59 years old			
female, 60+ (<74) years old			
Highest level of education			
ISCED 0–2 (Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education)[85]			
ISCED 3–4 (Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education)			
ISCED 5–8 (Short-cycle tertiary education, bachelor, master, doctoral or equivalent level)			

85 ISCED stands for the International Standard Classification of Education maintained by UNESCO. For more on this, see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=International_Standard_Classification_of_Education_(ISCED).

Region			
Praha	Közép-Magyarország	Makroregion Centralny	Bratislavský kraj
Střední Cechy	Közép-Dunántúl	Makroregion Pólnocno-Zachodni	Západné Slovensko
Jihozápad	Nyugat-Dunántúl	Makroregion Pólnocny	Stredné Slovensko
Severozápad	Dél-Dunántúl	Makroregion Poludniowo-Zachodni	Východné Slovensko
Severovýchod	Észak-Magyarország	Makroregion Poludniowy	
Jihovýchod	Észak-Alföld	Makroregion Województwo Mazowieckie	
Střední Morava	Dél-Alföld	Makroregion Wschodni	
Moravskoslezsko			
Settlement size (inhabitants)			
< 1,999		<,999	<,000
2,000–9,999		5,000–9,999	1,001–5,000
10,000–49,999		10,000–19,999	5,001–20,000
50,000–99,999		20,000–49,999	20,001–100,000
> 100,000		50,000–99,999	> 100,001
		100,000–199,999	
		200,000–499,999	
		500,000–999,999	
		> 1,000,000	
Type of settlement			
	Budapest		
	County seat		
	Town		
	Village		

After designating the quota criteria, various statistical databases were used to determine the number of expected respondents and the quota limits in each quota cell. The following databases were used:

Databases of National Statistical Offices:

- Czech Republic, https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/home
- Hungary, https://www.ksh.hu/?lang=en
- Poland, https://stat.gov.pl/en/
- Slovakia, https://slovak.statistics.sk

and the Eurostat database, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/data/database.

Since the data from the national statistical offices was for the total adult population, it had to be corrected in order to be representative of regular internet users. This correction was made by Ariosz based on Eurostat data and expert estimates.

Ariosz determined the actual, minimum and maximum number of respondents required for each quota cell using the above-mentioned data. After the technical pretest, the fieldwork commenced. Ariosz provided the Tom Lantos Institute with a web interface that allowed us to track the status of the survey in real time, broken down by quota cells. Two thousand successfully completed questionnaires were set as a minimum requirement for each country. A completion was deemed successful if it met the following two quality criteria: (1) the respondent needed to reach the end of the questionnaire, and (2) the respondent spent at least ten minutes completing it.

The data collection was carried out between 4 and 14 June 2021, with the following results:

Table 2: Results of the fieldwork by country and in total

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Total
Questionnaires started	4,243	3,514	3,946	2,832	14,535
Questionnaires completed	2,777	2,634	2,951	2,423	10,785
Questionnaires completed with the quality criteria	2,302	2,174	2,092	2,072	8,640

Upon completion of the data collection, the following steps were taken in order to produce the final database:

- primary data cleaning;
- organization and consolidation of the collected data;
- weighting.

The weighting was performed using multicriteria, multidimensional and iterative factor weighting, based on the statistical data used for the quota criteria. Table 3 shows the minimum and maximum weights for each country.

Table 3: Minimum and maximum weights by country

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Minimum weight	0.36	0.37	0.29	0.40
Maximum weight	2.80	2.80	2.61	2.10

Table 4: Quotas in the Czech Republic: gender and age group

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
male, 18-29 years	**196**	75%	147	150%	294
male, 30–39 years	**219**	75%	164	150%	328
male, 40–49 years	**256**	75%	192	150%	383
male, 50–59 years	**175**	75%	131	150%	263
male, 60+ (< 74) years	**163**	75%	123	150%	245
female, 18–29 years	**185**	75%	139	150%	277
female, 30–39 years	**205**	75%	153	150%	307
female, 40–49 years	**242**	75%	181	150%	362
female, 50–59 years	**171**	75%	128	150%	257
female, 60+ (< 74) years	**189**	75%	142	150%	283
Total	**2,000**				

Table 5: Quotas in the Czech Republic: education

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
ISCED 0–2	**161**	50%	81	150%	242
ISCED 3–4	**1,373**	75%	1,029	150%	2,059
ISCED 5–8	**466**	75%	350	150%	699
Total	**2,000**				

Table 6: Quotas in the Czech Republic: region

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
Praha	**275**	75%	207	150%	413
Strední Cechy	**249**	75%	187	150%	374
Jihozápad	**228**	75%	171	150%	343
Severozápad	**200**	75%	150	150%	301
Severovýchod	**276**	75%	207	150%	414
Jihovýchod	**320**	75%	240	150%	480
Strední Morava	**227**	75%	170	150%	340
Moravskoslezsko	**223**	75%	167	150%	335
Total	**2,000**				

Table 7: Quotas in the Czech Republic: settlement size

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
< 1,999 inhabitants	**525**	on best efforts		150%	788
2,000–9,999	**429**	on best efforts		150%	644
10,000–49,999	**427**	75%	321	191%	818
50,000–99,999	**165**	75%	123	191%	315
> 100,000	**454**	75%	340	191%	868
Total	**2,000**				

Table 8: Quotas in Hungary: gender and age group

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
male, 18–29 years	**228**	75%	171	150%	342
male, 30–39 years	**205**	75%	154	150%	308
male, 40–49 years	**245**	75%	184	150%	368
male, 50–59 years	**158**	75%	119	150%	237
male, 60+ (< 74) years	**151**	75%	113	150%	227
female, 18–29 years	**213**	75%	160	150%	320
female, 30–39 years	**195**	75%	146	150%	293
female, 40–49 years	**239**	75%	179	150%	359
female, 50–59 years	**166**	75%	125	150%	249
female, 60+ (< 74) years	**199**	75%	149	150%	298
Total	**2,000**				

Table 9: Quotas in Hungary: education

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
ISCED 0–2	**287**	50%	144	150%	431
ISCED 3–4	**1,224**	75%	918	150%	1,836
ISCED 5–8	**489**	75%	367	150%	733
Total	**2,000**				

Table 10: Quotas in Hungary: region

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
Közép-Magyarország	**668**	75%	501	150%	1,002
Közép-Dunántúl	**228**	75%	171	150%	342
Nyugat-Dunántúl	**220**	75%	165	150%	330
Dél-Dunántúl	**165**	75%	124	150%	248
Észak-Magyarország	**188**	75%	141	150%	281
Észak-Alföld	**279**	75%	210	150%	419
Dél-Alföld	**251**	75%	188	150%	377
Total	**2,000**				

Table 11: Quotas in Hungary: settlement type

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
Budapest	**405**	75%	304	150%	607
Country-seat	**421**	75%	315	150%	631
Towns	**636**	75%	477	150%	954
Village	**538**	50%	269	150%	808
Total	**2,000**				

Table 12: Quotas in Poland: gender and age group

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
male, 18–29 years	**210**	75%	158	150%	315
male, 30–39 years	**258**	75%	193	150%	387
male, 40–49 years	**223**	75%	167	150%	334
male, 50–59 years	**157**	75%	118	150%	236
male, 60+ (< 74) years	**144**	75%	108	150%	215
female, 18–29 years	**202**	75%	151	150%	303
female, 30–39 years	**249**	75%	187	150%	374
female, 40–49 years	**219**	75%	164	150%	328
female, 50–59 years	**163**	75%	122	150%	245
female, 60+ (< 74) years	**176**	75%	132	150%	263
Total	**2,000**				

Table 13: Quotas in Poland: education

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
ISCED 0–2	**189**	50%	94	150%	283
ISCED 3–4	**1,160**	75%	870	150%	1,740
ISCED 5–8	**651**	75%	488	150%	977
Total	**2,000**				

Table 14: Quotas in Poland: region

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
Makroregion Centralny	**189**	75%	142	150%	283
Makroregion Pólnocno-Zachodni	**321**	75%	241	150%	481
Makroregion Pólnocny	**310**	75%	233	150%	465
Makroregion Poludnio-wo-Zachodni	**207**	75%	156	150%	311
Makroregion Poludniowy	**415**	75%	312	150%	623
Makroregion Województwo Mazowieckie	**296**	75%	222	150%	443
Makroregion Wschodni	**262**	75%	196	150%	392
Total	**2,000**				

Table 15: Quotas in Poland: settlement type

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
< 4,999 inhabitants	**190**	on best efforts		150%	285
5,000–9,999	**388**	on best efforts		150%	583
10,000–19,999	**440**	75%	330	150%	660
20,000–49,999	**228**	75%	171	150%	342
50,000–99,999	**163**	75%	122	150%	244
100,000–199,999	**173**	75%	130	150%	260
200,000–499,999	**169**	75%	127	150%	254
500,000–999,999	**147**	75%	110	150%	221
> 1,000,000	**101**	75%	76	150%	152
Total	**2,000**				

Table 16: Quotas in Slovakia: gender and age group

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
male, 18–29 years	**214**	75%	161	150%	322
male, 30–39 years	**233**	75%	175	150%	349
male, 40–49 years	**229**	75%	172	150%	343
male, 50–59 years	**169**	75%	127	150%	254
male, 60+ (< 74) years	**152**	75%	114	150%	228
female, 18–29 years	**204**	75%	153	150%	307
female, 30–39 years	**221**	75%	166	150%	332
female, 40–49 years	**219**	75%	164	150%	328
female, 50–59 years	**173**	75%	130	150%	260
female, 60+ (< 74) years	**185**	75%	139	150%	278
Total	**2,000**				

Table 17: Quotas in Slovakia: education

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
ISCED 0–2	**212**	24%	50	150%	318
ISCED 3–4	**1,289**	75%	966	150%	1,933
ISCED 5–8	**500**	75%	375	150%	749
Total	**2,000**				

Table 18: Quotas in Slovakia: region

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
Bratislavský kraj	**250**	75%	187	150%	375
Západné Slovensko	**682**	75%	511	150%	1,023
Stredné Slovensko	**498**	75%	374	150%	748
Východné Slovensko	**570**	75%	428	150%	855
Total	**2,000**				

Table 19: Quotas in Slovakia: settlement size

Quota categories	Proportionally expected	Minimum required		Maximum accepted	
<1,000 inhabitants	**289**	on best efforts		150%	434
1,001–5,000	**580**	on best efforts		150%	871
5,001–20,000	**331**	75%	248	177%	585
20,001–100,000	**546**	75%	409	177%	966
> 100,001	**254**	75%	190	177%	449
Total	**2,000**				

Table 20: Traditional religion-based anti-Judaism: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 1,839; HU = 1,493; PL = 1,706; SK = 1,513)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God.	0.671	0.764	0.771	0.734
Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews.	0.671	0.764	0.771	0.734
Total explained variance (%)	67.134	76.421	77.139	73.365
Cronbach's alpha	0.509	0.684	0.699	0.635

Table 21: Conspiratorial antisemitism: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 2,048; HU = 1,840; PL = 1,925; SK = 1,746)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews.	0.509	0.770	0.599	0.686
Jews have too much influence in [home country].	0.577	0.781	0.744	0.689
Jews seek to extend their influence on the global economy.	0.631	0.777	0.705	0.704
Jews aim to dominate the world.	0.671	0.828	0.770	0.783
Jews are more inclined than others to use shady practices to achieve their goals.	0.634	0.740	0.765	0.712
Jews often operate in secret behind the scenes.	0.636	0.780	0.751	0.711
Total explained variance (%)	60.946	77.927	72.237	71.415
Cronbach's alpha	0.871	0.943	0.923	0.920

Table 22: Conative dimension of antisemitism: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 2,184; HU = 1,916; PL = 1,972; SK = 1,871)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
I would vote for a candidate of Jewish origin to the European Parliament.	0.616	0.719	0.638	0.642
It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations.	0.767	0.802	0.792	0.802
It would be best if Jews left this country.	0.788	0.825	0.827	0.826
Total explained variance (%)	72.364	78.190	75.238	75.681
Cronbach's alpha	0.803	0.858	0.833	0.836

Table 23: Overall cognitive antisemitism: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 2,097; HU = 1,849; PL = 1,923; SK = 1,789)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God.	0.359	0.379	0.419	0.389
Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews.	0.395	0.504	0.437	0.440
It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews.	0.447	0.751	0.621	0.685
Jews have too much influence in [home country].	0.525	0.708	0.673	0.623
Jews seek to extend their influence on the global economy.	0.502	0.637	0.546	0.558
Jews aim to dominate the world.	0.622	0.760	0.700	0.694
Jews are more inclined than others to use shady practices to achieve their goals.	0.644	0.745	0.735	0.711
Jews often operate in secret behind the scenes.	0.546	0.726	0.663	0.653
I would vote for a candidate of Jewish origin to the European Parliament.	0.431	0.495	0.433	0.476
It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations.	0.586	0.662	0.657	0.605
It would be best if Jews left this country.	0.583	0.652	0.685	0.631
Total explained variance (%)	51.290	63.808	59.723	58.772
Cronbach's alpha	0.903	0.942	0.931	0.928

Table 24: Overall level of antisemitism (cognitive, conative and affective combined):[86] communalities of variables and total explained variances of principal components by country[87]

(n: CZ = 1,373; HU = 1,156; PL = 1,385; SK = 1,033)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
The Jews' suffering was a punishment from God.	0.349	0.369	0.388	0.374
Even now, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is an unforgivable sin of the Jews.	0.376	0.477	0.404	0.418
It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews.	0.431	0.745	0.628	0.692
Jews have too much influence in [home country].	0.513	0.678	0.654	0.601
Jews seek to extend their influence on the global economy.	0.470	0.607	0.520	0.534
Jews aim to dominate the world.	0.601	0.735	0.674	0.691
Jews are more inclined than others to use shady practices to achieve their goals.	0.624	0.733	0.709	0.699
Jews often operate in secret behind the scenes.	0.521	0.705	0.644	0.632
I would vote for a candidate of Jewish origin to the European Parliament.	0.466	0.525	0.486	0.529
It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations.	0.595	0.667	0.645	0.624
It would be best if Jews left this country.	0.595	0.671	0.697	0.657
How sympathetic or disliked are to you: Jews	0.422	0.476	0.494	0.483
How comfortable would you feel if someone from this group moved to your neighbourhood? – Jews	0.429	0.461	0.479	0.521
Total explained variance (%)	49.189	60.367	57.100	57.341

86 The dichotomous variable measuring whether the respondent dislikes Jews or does not have such feelings is not included, due to its low level of measurement.

87 As the variables were measured on different scales, no Cronbach's alpha was calculated.

Table 25: Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 2,140; HU = 1,932; PL = 1,964; SK = 1,860)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Jews even try to forge benefits from their persecution during the war and the Holocaust.	0.525	0.690	0.385	0.603
More should be taught in school about the Holocaust and the persecution of the Jews so that this does not happen again.	0.364	0.511	0.325	0.480
After so many decades of the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda.	0.405	0.615	0.491	0.540
We must keep the memory of the persecution of the Jews alive.	0.471	0.514	0.427	0.599
Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them.	0.537	0.654	0.650	0.658
Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust.	0.591	0.697	0.642	0.651
Most of the horrors of the Holocaust were invented by the Jews only afterwards.	0.583	0.631	0.674	0.628
The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed.	0.591	0.677	0.509	0.624
Total explained variance (%)	50.833	62.367	51.271	59.812
Cronbach's alpha	0.856	0.912	0.860	0.902

Table 26: New antisemitism and Holocaust distortion: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 1,990; HU = 1,584; PL = 1,815; SK = 1,500)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence against its enemies.	0.570	0.471	0.344	0.481
When I think of Israel's politics, I understand why some people hate the Jews.	0.526	0.634	0.564	0.572
Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians.	0.646	0.585	0.597	0.691
Israel is an important ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism.	0.572	0.396	0.348	0.489
Because of Israel's politics, I dislike Jews more and more.	0.582	0.695	0.607	0.604
Total explained variance (%)	57.920	55.595	49.181	56.737
Cronbach's alpha	0.818	0.799	0.737	0.808

Table 27: Social status (objective and subjective combined): communalities of variables and total explained variances of principal components by country[88]
(n: CZ = 2,099; HU = 2,067; PL = 1,899; SK = 1,869)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Durable goods (z-score sum)	0.449	0.519	0.470	0.426
Which of the following descriptions come closest to how you feel about your household's income today? (Living comfortably on present income, coping on present income, finding it difficult to live on present income or finding it very difficult to live on present income).	0.705	0.759	0.705	0.731
On the scale below, 1 represents the lowest standard of living and 10 represents the highest standard of living in [home country]? Where would you place yourself on this scale?	0.712	0.721	0.724	0.715
Total explained variance (%)	62.182	66.631	63.316	62.402

88 As the variables were measured on different scales, no Cronbach's alpha was calculated.

Table 28: Religiosity: communalities of variables and total explained variances of principal components by country[89]

(n: CZ = 2,158; HU = 2,042; PL = 1,933; SK = 1,916)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are? Use a scale ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates that you are not religious at all and 10 indicates that you are very religious.	0.788	0.794	0.835	0.814
Apart from special occasions, such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?	0.665	0.720	0.818	0.763
Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?	0.801	0.782	0.792	0.807
Total explained variance (%)	75.145	76.556	81.497	79.493

89 As the variables were measured on different scales, no Cronbach's alpha was calculated.

Table 29: Prejudice against other groups: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country[90]
(n: CZ = 1,536; HU = 1,742; PL = 1,621; SK = 1,272)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
How sympathetic or disliked are to you: Chinese	0.245	0.267	0.446	0.333
How sympathetic or disliked are to you: Blacks	0.540	0.458	0.535	0.588
How sympathetic or disliked are to you: Gypsies	0.541	0.483	0.532	0.507
How sympathetic or disliked are to you: Arabs	0.624	0.561	0.663	0.627
How sympathetic or disliked are to you: Migrants	0.615	0.545	0.688	0.647
How sympathetic or disliked are to you: Homosexuals	0.293	0.385	0.465	0.456
How comfortable would you feel if someone from this group moved to your neighbourhood? – Chinese	0.300	0.312	0.424	0.354
How comfortable would you feel if someone from this group moved to your neighbourhood? – Blacks	0.549	0.495	0.515	0.590
How comfortable would you feel if someone from this group moved to your neighbourhood? – Gypsies	0.503	0.513	0.466	0.488
How comfortable would you feel if someone from this group moved to your neighbourhood? – Arabs	0.609	0.581	0.603	0.615
How comfortable would you feel if someone from this group moved to your neighbourhood? – Migrants	0.609	0.562	0.609	0.610
How comfortable would you feel if someone from this group moved to your neighbourhood? – Homosexuals	0.273	0.362	0.442	0.405
Total explained variance (%)	47.512	46.030	53.245	51.836
Cronbach's alpha 1	0.803	0.808	0.868	0.842
Cronbach's alpha 2	0.815	0.824	0.855	0.844

90 Since the feeling thermometer and the social distance variables were measured on different scales, a separate Cronbach's alpha was requested for each of the two sets of variables.

Table 30: Nationalism: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 2,124; HU = 2,060; PL = 1,975; SK = 1,945)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
It is my duty to stand up for [home country] even if it is on the wrong track.	0.352	0.487	0.554	0.365
I'm proud to be [nationality].	0.610	0.719	0.716	0.647
It really makes me angry when others criticize [nationality].	0.288	0.521	0.454	0.453
Please indicate how strongly attached you are to [home country]?	0.642	0.742	0.742	0.658
Please indicate how important it is for you to be [nationality]?	0.759	0.797	0.779	0.744
Total explained variance (%)	53.041	65.334	64.900	57.358
Cronbach's alpha	0.761	0.858	0.853	0.799

Table 31: Populism: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 2,125; HU = 2,015; PL = 1,949; SK = 1,923)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Political parties just argue and are unable to solve the serious problems facing our country.	0.489	0.537	0.438	0.545
It would be better if people could decide directly, for example by referendum, on the most important political issues instead of Parliament deciding.	0.575	0.488	0.535	0.588
It's better if people themselves take action to resolve social injustices because politicians and parties are generally unable to resolve them.	0.521	0.592	0.564	0.581
What politicians call a compromise is in fact giving up principles.	0.497	0.418	0.412	0.535
Total explained variance (%)	52.054	50.871	48.701	56.212
Cronbach's alpha	0.691	0.676	0.647	0.738

Table 32: Exclusive victim consciousness: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 2,015; HU = 1,890; PL = 1,883; SK = 1,703)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
No other Central or Eastern European nation went through similar hardships as the [nationality].	0.755	0.792	0.800	0.772
There is no suffering in the history of Central and Eastern European nations which is comparable to the [nationality]'s suffering.	0.731	0.774	0.736	0.759
The [nationality] were more frequently victimized throughout history than other nations.	0.616	0.681	0.731	0.683
Total explained variance (%)	70.031	74.907	75.568	73.829
Cronbach's alpha	0.783	0.832	0.838	0.821

Table 33: Inclusive victim consciousness: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 2,042; HU = 1,893; PL = 1,860; SK = 1,729)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Other nations in Central and Eastern Europe have been repressed/oppressed in similar ways as the [main nationality of home country].	0.672	0.648	0.735	0.681
During their history, other Central and Eastern European nations have been harmed to the same degree as the [main nationality of home country] people.	0.657	0.655	0.734	0.670
There have been many national tragedies during the 20th century. Regardless of religion and nationality all victims are equally important.	0.437	0.325	0.247	0.402
Total explained variance (%)	58.853	54.275	57.186	58.423
Cronbach's alpha	0.645	0.577	0.614	0.640

Table 34: Positive historical perception: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 1,967; HU = 1,913; PL = 1,918; SK = 1,715)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
How many [main nationality of home country] sympathized with Jews during World War II??	0.779	0.774	0.752	0.819
How many [main nationality of home country] saved Jews during World War II??	0.779	0.774	0.752	0.819
Total explained variance (%)	77.943	77.429	75.216	81.852
Cronbach's alpha	0.717	0.708	0.668	0.778

Table 35: Negative historical perception: communalities of variables, total explained variances of principal components and Cronbach's alphas by country
(n: CZ = 1,865; HU = 1,825; PL = 1,851; SK = 1,605)

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
How many [main nationality of home country] were indifferent to the suffering of Jews during World War II?	0.348	0.427	0.488	0.470
How many [main nationality of home country] felt satisfaction because of the suffering of Jews during World War II?	0.697	0.670	0.754	0.686
How many [main nationality of home country] cooperated with the Germans in their actions against Jews during World War II?	0.775	0.690	0.793	0.759
How many [main nationality of home country] benefited from the persecution of the Jews during World War II?	0.706	0.624	0.762	0.709
Total explained variance (%)	63.150	60.274	69.925	65.595
Cronbach's alpha	0.794	0.778	0.853	0.822

Table 36: Explanatory model of primary antisemitism in the Czech Republic[91]
(n = 891)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	0.046	0.067*	0.070*	0.069*	0.075*	0.068*
Age	0.195***	0.177***	0.178***	0.082*	0.106**	0.098**
Highest level of education	−0.089**	−0.081*	−0.082*	−0.070*	−0.074*	−0.051
Settlement size	0.053	0.064*	0.067*	0.079**	0.075*	0.078**
Social status	−0.028	−0.027	−0.018	−0.019	−0.009	0.009
Religiosity		0.027	0.028	0.058	0.059	0.044
Law-and-order conservatism		0.229***	0.227***	0.119***	0.129***	0.099**
Political orientation			−0.051	−0.075*	−0.075*	−0.044
Prejudice towards other groups				0.356***	0.361***	0.328***
Nationalism					−0.089**	−0.095**
Populism						0.176***
Explained variance (R^2)	4.8%	9.9%	10.1%	20.4%	21.0%	23.5%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

91 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 37: Explanatory model of primary antisemitism in Hungary[92]
(n = 895)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	−0.127***	−0.113***	−0.095**	−0.051	−0.055*	−0.045
Age	0.001	−0.024	−0.025	−0.034	−0.048	−0.035
Highest level of education	−0.158***	−0.146***	−0.140***	−0.109***	−0.106***	−0.081**
Settlement size	−0.028	−0.010	0.000	0.008	0.011	0.008
Social status	−0.052	−0.028	−0.062	−0.039	−0.045	−0.026
Religiosity		0.026	−0.011	0.024	0.009	−0.025
Law-and-order conservatism		0.348***	0.278***	0.114***	0.105**	0.104**
Political orientation			0.240***	0.146***	0.127***	0.155***
Prejudice towards other groups				0.431***	.0.429***	0.413***
Nationalism					0.068*	0.083**
Populism						0.224***
Explained variance (R^2)	4.6%	16.8%	21.7%	35.3%	35.6%	40.2%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

92 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 38: Explanatory model of primary antisemitism in Poland[93]
(n = 970)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	−0.153***	−0.145***	−0.112***	−0.078**	−0.081**	−0.083**
Age	0.000	−0.048	−0.039	−0.013	−0.031	−0.018
Highest level of education	−0.030	−0.023	−0.023	−0.022	−0.019	−0.010
Settlement size	−0.094**	−0.058*	−0.053	−0.049	−0.048	−0.057*
Social status	−0.043	−0.105***	−0.101***	−0.036	−0.042	−0.045
Religiosity		0.103***	0.046	0.070*	0.050	0.047
Law-and-order conservatism		0.367***	0.303***	0.188***	0.181***	0.165***
Political orientation			0.194***	0.108***	0.092**	0.119***
Prejudice towards other groups				0.439***	0.433***	0.426***
Nationalism					0.073*	0.041
Populism						0.166***
Explained variance (R^2)	3.1%	19.9%	22.4%	38.7%	39.0%	41.6%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

93 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 39: Explanatory model of primary antisemitism in Slovakia[94]
(n = 702)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	−0.059	−0.032	−0.038	−0.009	−0.014	−0.015
Age	0.154***	0.122***	0.117***	0.038	0.025	0.044
Highest level of education	−0.111**	−0.106**	−0.105**	−0.075*	−0.072*	−0.064*
Settlement size	−0.029	−0.007	−0.006	0.020	0.024	0.029
Social status	−0.184***	−0.134***	−0.117**	−0.056	−0.058	−0.041
Religiosity		0.034	0.044	0.053	0.038	0.046
Law-and-order conservatism		0.248***	0.232***	0.066*	0.058	0.043
Political orientation			−0.097**	−0.097**	−0.095**	−0.055
Prejudice towards other groups				0.533***	0.521***	0.480***
Nationalism					0.082*	0.059
Populism						0.168***
Explained variance (R^2)	8.9%	14.7%	15.5%	38.6%	39.1%	41.2%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

94 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 40: Explanatory model of secondary antisemitism in the Czech Republic[95]
(n = 956)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	0.004	0.036	0.039	0.041	0.047	0.042
Age	0.092**	0.067	0.067*	0.003	0.027	0.019
Highest level of education	−0.120**	−0.105**	−0.106**	−0.099**	−0.102**	−0.085**
Settlement size	0.039	0.047*	0.049	0.056	0.052	0.052
Social status	−0.050	−0.052	−0.046	−0.044	−0.036	−0.024
Religiosity		−0.077*	−0.076*	−0.059	−0.058	−0.063*
Law-and-order conservatism		0.251***	0.250***	0.173***	0.185***	0.161***
Political orientation			−0.035	−0.052	−0.052	−0.031
Prejudice towards other groups				0.245***	0.248***	0.222***
Nationalism					−0.090**	−0.095**
Populism						0.135***
Explained variance (R^2)	2.5%	8.9%	8.9%	13.7%	14.3%	15.8%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

95 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 41: Explanatory model of secondary antisemitism in Hungary[96]

(n = 1,044)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	−0.199***	−0.186***	−0.171***	−0.127***	−0.128***	−0.118***
Age	−0.032	−0.055	−0.053	−0.059*	−0.061*	−0.050
Highest level of education	−0.131***	−0.117***	−0.105***	−0.091**	−0.091**	−0.068*
Settlement size	−0.034	−0.018	−0.011	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002
Social status	−0.002	−0.016	−0.015	−0.005	0.004	0.017
Religiosity		−0.023	−0.058*	−0.029	−0.031	−0.015
Law-and-order conservatism		0.320***	0.254***	0.110***	0.109***	0.109***
Political orientation			0.227***	0.147***	0.144***	0.170***
Prejudice towards other groups				0.374***	0.374***	0.357***
Nationalism					0.011	0.025
Populism						0.188***
Explained variance (R^2)	5.9%	15.6%	12.7%	30.2%	30.2%	33.4%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

96 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 42: Explanatory model of secondary antisemitism in Poland[97]

(n = 1,027)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	−0.161***	−0.151***	−0.124***	−0.101**	−0.101***	−0.104***
Age	−0.087**	−0.122***	−0.114***	−0.098**	−0.103**	−0.087
Highest level of education	−0.067*	−0.062*	−0.065*	−0.063*	−0.062*	−0.050
Settlement size	−0.037	−0.016	−0.011	−0.012	−0.012	−0.027
Social status	−0.007	−0.049	−0.043	−0.005	−0.006	−0.010
Religiosity		0.069*	0.019	0.033	0.027	0.023
Law-and-order conservatism		0.244***	0.194***	0.124***	0.122***	0.103**
Political orientation			0.157***	0.097**	0.093**	0.127***
Prejudice towards other groups				0.279***	0.278***	0.265***
Nationalism					0.019	−0.013
Populism						0.197***
Explained variance (R^2)	3.8%	11.1%	12.7%	19.2%	19.1%	22.7%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

97 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 43: Explanatory model of secondary antisemitism in Slovakia[98]
(n = 750)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	−0.116**	−0.095**	−0.100**	−0.063*	−0.066*	−0.067*
Age	0.138***	0.114**	0.107**	0.038	0.026	0.051
Highest level of education	−0.140***	−0.133***	−0.131***	−0.111***	−0.110**	−0.098**
Settlement size	−0.011	−0.005	−0.003	0.022	0.026	0.029
Social status	−0.210***	−0.164***	−0.149***	−0.093**	−0.093**	−0.075*
Religiosity		−0.018	−0.008	0.008	−0.008	−0.002
Law-and-order conservatism		0.207***	0.192***	0.067	0.062	0.043
Political orientation			−0.105**	−0.106**	−0.102**	−0.058
Prejudice towards other groups				0.419***	0.407***	0.358***
Nationalism					0.079*	0.053
Populism						0.192***
Explained variance (R^2)	11.7%	15.2%	16.1%	30.2%	30.7%	33.5%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

98 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 44: Explanatory model of new antisemitism in the Czech Republic[99]
(n = 954)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	0.156***	0.166***	0.174***	0.174***	0.184***	0.181***
Age	−0.080*	−0.088**	−0.084*	−0.093**	−0.061	−0.068
Highest level of education	−0.071*	−0.065*	−0.066*	−0.065*	−0.070*	−0.058
Settlement size	−0.023	−0.019*	−0.009	−0.008	−0.012	−0.010
Social status	−0.115**	−0.116**	−0.092**	−0.093**	−0.081*	−0.070*
Religiosity		−0.023	−0.020	−0.017	−0.016	−0.024
Law-and-order conservatism		0.078*	0.072*	0.061	0.077*	0.057
Political orientation			−0.154***	−0.157***	−0.155***	−0.134***
Prejudice towards other groups				0.036	0.043	0.022
Nationalism					−0.127***	−0.131***
Populism						0.115**
Explained variance (R^2)	4.8%	5.2%	7.4%	7.4%	8.8%	9.8%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

99 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 45: Explanatory model of new antisemitism in Hungary[100]
(n = 971)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	−0.041	−0.031	−0.020	0.006	0.006	0.017
Age	−0.127***	−0.134***	−0.134***	−0.133***	−0.130***	−0.115***
Highest level of education	−0.116**	−0.096**	−0.090**	−0.080*	−0.081*	−0.044
Settlement size	0.052	0.055	0.057	0.055	0.054	0.052
Social status	−0.078*	−0.072*	−0.087*	−0.073*	−0.072*	−0.050
Religiosity		−0.111**	−0.128***	−0.107**	−0.105**	−0.085**
Law-and-order conservatism		0.142***	0.108**	0.002	0.003	0.002
Political orientation			0.120***	0.056	0.059	0.102**
Prejudice towards other groups				0.275***	0.275***	0.250***
Nationalism					−0.012	0.001
Populism						0.274***
Explained variance (R^2)	3.8%	6.2%	7.3%	12.8%	12.7%	19.6%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

100 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 46: Explanatory model of new antisemitism in Poland[101]
(n = 1,000)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	−0.016	−0.014	0.006	0.024	0.023	0.020
Age	−0.110**	−0.130***	−0.124***	−0.109**	−0.111**	−0.102**
Highest level of education	−0.021	−0.016	−0.016	−0.016	−0.015	−0.007
Settlement size	−0.003	0.010	0.014	0.012	0.012	0.002
Social status	−0.063	−0.087**	−0.085**	−0.053	−0.054	−0.058
Religiosity		−0.023	−0.057	−0.047	−0.050	−0.051
Law-and-order conservatism		0.210***	0.171***	0.117**	0.117**	0.104**
Political orientation			0.118**	0.079*	0.077*	0.098**
Prejudice towards other groups				0.210***	0.209***	0.203***
Nationalism					0.010	−0.013
Populism						0.128***
Explained variance (R^2)	0.9%	4.8%	5.7%	9.4%	9.3%	10.8%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

101 The first model is significant at the 0.05 level; all the other models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 47: Explanatory model of new antisemitism in Slovakia[102]
(n = 707)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	−0.029	0.054	0.043	0.060	0.055	0.055
Age	0.088*	0.066	0.049	0.014	0.004	0.020
Highest level of education	−0.098*	−0.085*	−0.081*	−0.069	−0.067	−0.064
Settlement size	−0.005	−0.028	−0.024	−0.014	−0.009	−0.009
Social status	−0.084*	−0.049	−0.015	0.021	0.021	0.031
Religiosity		−0.110*	−0.074	−0.065	−0.075*	−0.069
Law-and-order conservatism		0.157***	0.125**	0.045	0.037	0.023
Political orientation			−0.218***	−0.215**	−0.212***	−0.184***
Prejudice towards other groups				0.264***	0.256***	0.226***
Nationalism					0.068	0.052
Populism						0.118**
Explained variance (R^2)	2.4%	4.8%	9.1%	14.6%	14.9%	15.9%

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

102 All the models are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 48: Correlation between victimhood and antisemitism in the Czech Republic
(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Exclusive victim consciousness		−0.199*** (1,971)	0.304*** (1,951)	−0.072** (1,935)	0.358*** (1,322)	0.337*** (1,605)
2. Inclusive victim consciousness			0.045* (1,973)	0.044 (1,957)	−0.202*** (1,324)	−0.207*** (1,607)
3. "During World War II, [main nationality of home country] suffered as much as the Jews."				−0.137*** (2,038)	0.379*** (1,360)	0.340*** (1,669)
4. "The suffering of the Jews was unique in 20th century history."					−0.262*** (1,363)	−0.389*** (1,672)
5. Overall level of antisemitism (cognitive, conative and affective)						0.798*** (1,296)
6. Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion						

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 49: Correlation between victimhood and antisemitism in Hungary
(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Exclusive victim consciousness		−0.386*** (1,813)	0.363*** (1,803)	−0.060* (1,769)	0.425*** (1,128)	0.375*** (1,355)
2. Inclusive victim consciousness			−0.046* (1,798)	0.069** (1,781)	−0.260*** (1,118)	−0.274*** (1,345)
3. "During World War II, [main nationality of home country] suffered as much as the Jews."				−0.290*** (1,858)	0.532*** (1,147)	0.498*** (1,389)
4. "The suffering of the Jews was unique in 20th century history."					−0.345*** (1,149)	−0.511*** (1,403)
5. Overall level of antisemitism (cognitive, conative and affective)						0.850*** (1,077)
6. Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion						

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 50: Correlation between victimhood and antisemitism in Poland
(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Exclusive victim consciousness		−0.173*** (1,807)	0.350*** (1,833)	0.036 (1,795)	0.422*** (1,325)	0.256*** (1,517)
2. Inclusive victim consciousness			0.050* (1,814)	0.094*** (1,779)	−0.169*** (1,329)	−0.137*** (1,514)
3. "During World War II, [main nationality of home country] suffered as much as the Jews."				−0.045 (1,890)	0.342*** (1,374)	0.244*** (1,593)
4. "The suffering of the Jews was unique in 20th century history."					−0.266*** (1,379)	−0.370*** (1,591)
5. Overall level of antisemitism (cognitive, conative and affective)						0.802*** (1,311)
6. Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion						

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 51: Correlation between victimhood and antisemitism in Slovakia
(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Exclusive victim consciousness		−0.194*** (1,618)	0.291*** (1,628)	−0.048 (1,529)	0.463*** (978)	0.400*** (1,226)
2. Inclusive victim consciousness			0.201*** (1,643)	0.004 (1,533)	−0.088 (967)	−0.114*** (1,212)
3. "During World War II, [main nationality of home country] suffered as much as the Jews."				−0.117*** (1,630)	0.411*** (1,022)	0.385*** (1,295)
4. "The suffering of the Jews was unique in 20th century history."					−0.135*** (1,000)	−0.247*** (1,265)
5. Overall level of antisemitism (cognitive, conative and affective)						0.866*** (952)
6. Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion						

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 52: Correlation between historical narratives and victimhood in the Czech Republic
(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Historical narratives: positive role		−0.212*** (1,814)	0.133*** (1,798)	0.000 (1,810)	0.186*** (1,878)	0.017 (1,868)
2. Historical narratives: negative role			0.119*** (1,717)	−0.137*** (1,727)	0.081*** (1,786)	−0.076*** (1,779)
3. Exclusive victim consciousness				−0.199*** (1,971)	0.304*** (1,951)	−0.072** (1,935)
4. Inclusive victim consciousness					0.045* (1,973)	0.044 (1,957)
5. "During World War II, [main nationality of home country] suffered as much as the Jews."						−0.137*** (2,038)
6. "The suffering of the Jews was unique in 20th century history."						

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 53: Correlation between historical narratives and victimhood in Hungary
(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Historical narratives: positive role		−0.144*** (1,784)	0.171*** (1,741)	−0.078*** (1,743)	0.192*** (1,801)	0.021 (1,772)
2. Historical narratives: negative role			−0.065** (1,681)	−0.008 (1,680)	−0.093*** (1,729)	0.066** (1,701)
3. Exclusive victim consciousness				−0.386*** (1,813)	0.363*** (1,803)	−0.060* (1,769)
4. Inclusive victim consciousness					−0.046* (1,798)	0.069** (1,781)
5. "During World War II, [main nationality of home country] suffered as much as the Jews."						−0.290*** (1,858)
6. "The suffering of the Jews was unique in 20th century history."						

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 54: Correlation between historical narratives and victimhood in Poland
(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Historical narratives: positive role		−0.206*** (1,816)	0.220*** (1,762)	0.009 (1,750)	0.192*** (1,852)	0.068** (1,804)
2. Historical narratives: negative role			−0.044 (1,707)	0.060* (1,701)	−0.138*** (1,792)	−0.060* (1,746)
3. Exclusive victim consciousness				−0.173*** (1,807)	0.350*** (1,833)	0.036 (1,795)
4. Inclusive victim consciousness					0.050* (1,814)	0.094*** (1,779)
5. "During World War II, [main nationality of home country] suffered as much as the Jews."						−0.045 (1,890)
6. "The suffering of the Jews was unique in 20th century history."						

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 55: Correlation between historical narratives and victimhood in Slovakia
(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Historical narratives: positive role		−0.188*** (1,540)	0.145*** (1,495)	−0.043 (1,507)	0.139*** (1,594)	0.050 (1,480)
2. Historical narratives: negative role			0.035 (1,415)	−0.140*** (1,423)	−0.071** (1,501)	0.020 (1,402)
3. Exclusive victim consciousness				−0.194*** (1,618)	0.291*** (1,628)	−0.048 (1,529)
4. Inclusive victim consciousness					0.201*** (1,643)	0.004 (1,533)
5. "During World War II, [main nationality of home country] suffered as much as the Jews."						−0.117*** (1,630)
6. "The suffering of the Jews was unique in 20th century history."						

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 56: Correlation between historical narratives and antisemitism in the Czech Republic

(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4
1. Historical narratives: positive role		−0.212*** (1,814)	0.016 (1,263)	0.001 (1,533)
2. Historical narratives: negative role			0.222*** (1,213)	0.211*** (1,476)
3. Overall level of antisemitism (cognitive, conative and affective)				0.798*** (1,296)
4. Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion				

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 57: Correlation between historical narratives and antisemitism in Hungary

(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4
1. Historical narratives: positive role		−0.144*** (1,784)	0.162*** (1,105)	0.099*** (1,333)
2. Historical narratives: negative role			−0.014 (1,081)	−0.018 (1,304)
3. Overall level of antisemitism (cognitive, conative and affective)				0.850*** (1,077)
4. Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion				

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 58: Correlation between historical narratives and antisemitism in Poland
(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4
1. Historical narratives: positive role		−0.206*** (1,816)	0.102*** (1,308)	0.067*** (1,512)
2. Historical narratives: negative role			0.097*** (1,288)	0.186*** (1,483)
3. Overall level of antisemitism (cognitive, conative and affective)				0.802*** (1,311)
4. Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion				

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 59: Correlation between historical narratives and antisemitism in Slovakia
(n: displayed in brackets under the correlation coefficients)

	1	2	3	4
1. Historical narratives: positive role		−0.188*** (1,540)	0.010 (932)	0.050 (1,173)
2. Historical narratives: negative role			0.018 (908)	−0.023 (1,130)
3. Overall level of antisemitism (cognitive, conative and affective)				0.866*** (952)
4. Secondary antisemitism and Holocaust distortion				

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

CONTRIBUTORS

András Kovács is a sociologist, Professor in the Nationalism Studies Program and the Academic Director of Jewish Studies at the Central European University in Budapest/Vienna. He has held teaching and research positions at Paderborn University (FRG), École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris), New York University (New York), TH Twente (The Netherlands), Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (Vienna), Moses Mendelssohn Zentrum für Jüdische Studien (Potsdam), Internationales Forschungszentrum Kulturwissenschaften, (Vienna), Institut für Soziologie, Universitat (Vienna), Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung, TU (Berlin).

He led several large-scale research projects on Jews and antisemitism in post-Holocaust Hungary (Jews and Jewishness in contemporary Hungary, 1999-2000; 2016-2018; Jews and Politics under Communism in East-Central Europe, 2010-2016; Longitudinal analysis of antisemitic prejudices in Hungary, 1995-2018, and collaborated as principal investigator in others, such as Identity a la carte: Jewish identities in five European countries,2008-2009; Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in selected EU Member States, 2012-2013;2017-2018, promoted by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency). He has published over 100 scholarly works, including *Anti-Semitism and the Young Elite in Hungary* (1996), *Antisemitic Prejudices in Contemporary Hungary* (1999), *Jews and Jewry in Contemporary Hungary: Results of a Sociological Survey* (ed., 2004), *New Jewish Identities: Contemporary Europe and Beyond*(co-editor, 2003), *NATO, Neutrality and National Identity: the Case of Austria and Hungary* (co-editor, 2003), *Stranger at hand:Antisemitic prejudices in post-communist Hungary* (2005), *Communism's Jewish Question* (ed., 2016).

Grigorij Mesežnikov is a political scientist, and President of the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO). Between 1983 and 1993, he worked at Comenius University in Bratislava; from 1993 to 1997, he served at the Political Science Institute at the Slovak Academy of Sciences. He is a founding member of IVO, which he joined full-time in June 1997. In 1999, he became the Institute's president. He has published expert studies on party systems' development and political aspects of transformation in post-communist societies, illiberal and authoritarian tendencies, populism, radicalism, nationalism and antisemitism in various monographs and scholarly journals in Slovakia and other countries. He regularly contributes analyses of Slovakia's political scene to domestic and foreign media. Since 1993, he has been an external correspondent for Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe. He has edited and authored dozens of books, including the Global Reports on Slovakia (1995 – 2011), the comprehensive analysis of the country's development in all relevant sectors of society. He was a key author of the report on Slovakia in Nations in Transit published by Freedom House (1998 – 2014). In 2006, he was awarded the Reagan-Fascell Fellowship by the National Endowment for Democracy (Washington, D.C.). In 2012, he was a research fellow of the Taiwan Fellowship Program at the Department of

Political Science of National Taiwan University in Taipei where he researched similarities and differences of democratization and civil society development in Taiwan and Central Europe. He is the author of the book *2018. Year of Protests* (with journalist Tomáš Gális). In September 2019 – June 2020, he was a fellow of the Institute for Human Science – Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (Vienna) at Europe's Futures programme.

Ildikó Barna is a sociologist and an Associate Professor in the Department of Social Research Methodology at ELTE University's Faculty of Social Sciences in Budapest. She also serves as the Chair of the Department. She is the co-leader of the Research Centr for Computational Sciences where one of her main research topics is the analysis of online antisemitism using automated text analytics. Dr Barna wrote her habilitation thesis on the identity of Hungarian Jewry and has participated in many research projects on the Holocaust and post-Holocaust period, Jewish identity and antisemitism, published articles and books, and presented her research at international conferences. In 2015, she was a Visiting Fellow at the Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), where she began a research project on Hungarian Jewish displaced persons.

Jiří Kocián is a Research Fellow of the Department of Russian and Eastern European Studies of the Institute of International Studies. In his research, he focuses primarily on the modern history of Romania and its contemporary development, transitions to democracy in former Eastern Bloc states, and the history of Jews in the area of Southeastern and Central Eastern Europe. Among his activities at the Department, he participates in the international research projects H2020 *DEMOS* and *POPREBEL* dealing with populism. Alongside the Institute of International Studies, he also serves as the coordinator of the Malach Centre for Visual History at the Faculty of Mathematics and Physics of the Charles University, where his research focuses on the history of Jews and the Holocaust through oral history methods and sources and the implementation of digital technologies in social science research.

Maria Babińska is a sociologist and social psychologist. She is a PhD candidate in psychology at the University of Warsaw. In her research, she mainly deals with issues related to the perception of history, in particular Polish-Jewish relations during the Second World War. She is investigating the ambiguity of the concept of a witness to the Holocaust, as well as the sources and psychological consequences of this ambiguity. She is also leading a project funded by the National Science Centre on populism, radicalization and conspiracy theories.

Michał Bilewicz is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Warsaw, where he chairs the Center for Research on Prejudice. He developed the three-component model of antisemitism, and his current research is mostly focused on hate speech proliferation in online communities and interventions reducing this proliferation. He is the author of numerous studies on the social psychology of intergroup relations, including topics such as dehumanization, collective moral emotions, intergroup contact and stereotyping. He has published in key

scholarly journals (including Nature Human Behavior, Psychological Inquiry and Current Directions in Psychological Science) and contributed to various newspapers (e.g. Haaretz, Gazeta Wyborcza). In 2021, he received the Nevitt Sanford Award for Outstanding Professional Contributions to Political Psychology. This annual award of the International Society of Political Psychology recognizes the impact of scholars who engage in the practical application of political psychological principles. He also serves as the Chair of the Scholarly Advisory Board of the Forum for Dialogue, an institution devoted to the improvement of Polish-Jewish relations.

Olga Gyárfášová is a sociologist, assistant professor at the Comenius University in Bratislava, and analyst at the Institute for Public Affairs, an independent public policy research think-tank. She graduated in sociology and holds a PhD in comparative political science. In her work, she focuses on political culture, minority rights, public opinion, and electoral studies. She has been working on many domestic and international projects. For example, she is the national coordinator of the European Election Studies (EES) and the principal investigator of the worldwide project Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES). She is the author of dozens of expert publications. Recent examples include: ´Antisemitismus in der Slowakei: Trends über die Zeit´, in *Europäische Rundschau* (1/2019), ´Slovakia's conflicting camps´ (with G. Mesežnikov), in *Journal of Democracy*, 29:3 (2018) or ´The fourth generation: From anti-establishment to anti-system parties in Slovakia´ in *New Perspectives*, 26: 1, (2018).

Tamás Kohut is a sociologist, he completed his MA degree at Eötvös Loránd University of Science Budapest. He is a PhD candidate at the Center for Research on Antisemitism, Technical University, Berlin. His doctoral research focuses on the emergence of antisemitism in Hungary from the outbreak of the First World War until the consolidation of the Horthy regime, investigating two political currents that played a major part in spreading anti-Jewish sentiments: the long-established political Catholicism and the then newly formed circles of the radical right. His other research interests include antisemitism in contemporary contexts and the social history of twentieth-century Hungary.

The TOM LANTOS INSTITUTE (TLI) is a Budapest-based independent human and minority rights organisation with a particular focus on Jewish and Roma communities, Hungarian minorities, and other ethnic or national, linguistic and religious minorities. As a research and education platform, TLI aims to bridge the gaps between research and policy, norms and practice.

The INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (IVO) is a Bratislava-based independent non-governmental, nonprofit organization bringing together experts from different professional areas. It was founded in 1997 with the aim of promoting the values of an open society and a democratic political culture in public policy and the decision-making process.