



National Report Card on Government Measures to Counter Antisemitism and Foster Jewish Life

HUNGARY



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ABOUT THE NOA PROJECT

NOA – Networks Overcoming Antisemitism offers a pioneering approach to tackling the problem of rising antisemitism in Europe. With its unique partnership of major Jewish networks, it benchmarks EU Member States' policies across areas and helps them to develop holistic national action plans to address and prevent antisemitism and foster Jewish life. For more information, see: www.noa-project.eu.

ABOUT CEJI - LEAD PARTNER, NOA PROJECT

CEJI – A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe stands with people of all backgrounds to promote a Europe of diversity and respect. A Jewish voice at the European level, our activities include delivering diversity education and enhancing interfaith and intercultural dialogue while advocating in the EU against antisemitism and discrimination of all kinds. For more information, see: www.ceji.org.

NOA PARTNERS

[Association for the Preservation of Jewish Heritage and Culture](#)

[B'nai B'rith Europe](#)

[European Union of Jewish Students](#)

[European Union of Progressive Judaism](#)

[World Jewish Congress](#)

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FOREWORD FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION COORDINATOR ON COMBATING ANTISEMITISM AND FOSTERING JEWISH LIFE

We at the European Commission are proud to support the NOA-Networks Overcoming Antisemitism project, a unique partnership of six European Jewish organisations that came together in 2019 with the aim of supporting holistic policy and practice to overcome antisemitism and foster Jewish life. Its pragmatic approach pairs security, education, and support for Jewish life with preventive and interventive measures at transnational and national levels. The NOA partners bring complementary expertise, tools, and engagement techniques, drawing on hundreds of affiliate members as well as their own networks. Their vision is to advance an inclusive and democratic Europe where Jewish communities thrive.

The NOA project echoes and contributes to the European Commission's objectives to end antisemitism and foster Jewish life, as specified in its first-ever EU Strategy on the topic, presented on October 5, 2021.

NOA's long-term goals include mapping efforts to combat antisemitism; equipping educators with training and teaching tools; diffusing positive narratives through socio-cultural educational activities; garnering commitments from sporting authorities to ensure the creation of inclusive environments; and evaluating impact to improve and sustain the project's activities over time.

This Hungarian National Report Card is the second in a series and provides a nuanced snapshot of the current policy landscape in the selected areas and highlights the existing gaps as well as opportunities for further responses, which will no doubt evolve over time.

It is our hope that this benchmarking tool will aid in the development and implementation of National Action Plans to counter antisemitism.

I would like to thank the partners and stakeholders who contributed to this report for their openness, expertise, and valuable contributions. I am confident that it is an important step along the journey to countering antisemitism and fostering healthy and dynamic Jewish life.

Europe celebrates its diversity. Europe thrives when its Jewish communities thrive.



Katharina von Schnurbein

European Commission Coordinator on
Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish life

A NOTE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF CEJI – A JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO AN INCLUSIVE EUROPE

For the past thirty years, CEJI has stood with individuals and organisations of diverse religions, cultures and backgrounds to promote an inclusive and democratic Europe. Our activities, including training, education, dialogue and advocacy, are based on a human rights framework that has guided intergovernmental institutions since the mid-20th Century. This framework was established by the United Nations, affirmed by the Council of Europe and the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), reinforced and enforced by the European Union, and transposed into national law by all EU Member States as a guarantor of Jewish life present and future.

Every European Union country has its own unique story of Jewish life, dating back to ancient Greece and the Roman Empire and continuing through centuries that saw the emergence of Christianity, colonisation and development of the nation-state and democracy. The Jewish diaspora moved across the continent through waves of persecution from the Inquisition to the pogroms of the Middle Ages and the 19th Century and, in the still living memory of some, the Holocaust.

Despite periods of greater or lesser persecution, European Jewish communities have shown themselves to be resilient, capable of regeneration and integration. From craftspeople to merchants, artists and educators to philosophers and scientists, the history of Judaism in Europe is intertwined with the history of the region itself.

Today there are systems in place to monitor antisemitic attitudes, hate speech and hate crime, which is essential for responding to the warning signs of escalating anti-Jewish sentiment with measures of protection and prevention. The NOA project is doing something complementary but different and unique. We are monitoring what countries are doing to prevent antisemitism through their government institutions.

This research is a tool, perhaps not yet a perfect one, to help provide a realistic sense of the opportunities to strengthen policies and ensure governments are accountable to their international human rights commitments, reinforcing structural changes to break vicious cycles of hate. We hope that this policy-benchmarking mechanism will prove useful not only for preventing and addressing antisemitism but also in developing national action plans against racism and all other forms of discrimination as a flourishing life for marginalised communities is an indicator of safety and freedom for all.

We would like to thank our partners from across Europe: the European Association for the Preservation and Promotion of Jewish Culture and Heritage (AEPJ), B'nai B'rith Europe (BBE), the European Union of Jewish Students (EUJS), the European Union for Progressive Judaism (EUPJ), and the World Jewish Congress (WJC), in collaboration with their local affiliates and networks.

We express our great appreciation for the trust and support we have received from the European Commission for this work, which is a natural extension of the multiple initiatives taken by the European Union on antisemitism and racism in recent years.



Alain Philippson
President, CEJI

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The NOA-Networks Overcoming Antisemitism project, launched in 2019, is an innovative effort to develop new public-civil society partnerships and enhance collaboration within the nongovernmental sector to support the European Council's Declarations on fighting antisemitism and fostering Jewish life on the continent.¹ This report showcases the current policy landscape in 10 areas: culture, education, hate crimes, hate speech, Holocaust remembrance, intercultural dialogue, media, religious freedom, security, and sport. This research demonstrates that there is still much that the Hungarian government can and should do to combat antisemitism despite the goodwill expressed and measures already put in place.

KEY FINDINGS

1. The country is strongest in measures that provide a sense of safety for Jewish communities which enable Jewish cultural life to thrive. It is weakest in measures that encourage civil society collaboration or promote diversity within Hungarian society, important dimensions of a resilient democracy.
2. The policy area that scored the lowest is intercultural dialogue, despite the government's outward embrace of the Hungarian Jewish population.
3. The policy areas that received the highest scores are security, religious freedom, hate crimes and hate speech. This reinforces the general perception that the Hungarian government's "zero tolerance to antisemitism" policies effectively contribute to a safe environment for Hungarian Jews.
4. Overall, the State has demonstrated its commitment to addressing antisemitism with community-targeted measures, but there is much more to be done to dismantle the more fundamental aspects of exclusion and discrimination—mainly in the areas of education and intercultural dialogue.

¹ See: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/06/fight-against-antisemitism-council-declaration/>.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HUNGARIAN POLICY MAKERS

1. Formally acknowledge and empower the Department of Civil Society Relations² under the Prime Minister's supervision to develop and implement a National Strategy on antisemitism.
2. Initiate regular meetings on a variety of policy matters with an expanded "Jewish community Roundtable" and ensure that diverse voices are well-represented in the decision-making process. This consultative body should include not only religious representation but also draw upon Jewish civil society organisations from a wide variety of sectors, including culture, education, sport and security.
3. Regularly monitor progress of the proposed National Strategy on antisemitism.
4. Provide funding and human resources to ensure the implementation and sustainability of these general measures as well as the specific recommendations for the 10 policy areas.

CONCLUSION

Antisemitism and racism do not exist in isolation. Both have been constructed to maintain divisions in politics, economics and culture. As history has shown, the treatment of Jewish communities can vary at different times, leading to scapegoating which contributes to contemporary antisemitic narratives. Applying the EU fundamental rights framework fairly and consistently across Member States is the only guarantor of social cohesion and stability for Jews and other communities targeted by hate. Hungary now has an extraordinary opportunity to demonstrate its commitment by coordinating a National Strategy to prevent antisemitism and foster Jewish life, addressing the ideological underpinnings of discrimination so that a clearer path can be opened towards a more inclusive and democratic Europe.

² A Civil és Társadalmi Kapcsolatokért Felelős Helyettes Államtitkárság, see: <https://kormany.hu/miniszterelnokseg/helyettes-allamtitkarok>.

INTRODUCTION

The NOA-Networks Overcoming Antisemitism project is an effort to innovate and develop new public-civil society partnerships and enhance collaboration within the nongovernmental sector. Backed by European Union funding³, a consortium of six European Jewish organisations came together to develop concrete and effective initiatives to combat antisemitism. NOA developed a series of work streams ranging from creating training and teaching tools to developing socio-cultural activities and promoting inclusion in sport. The project takes a holistic approach that marries policy and practice, security and education, and transnational and national actions.

This is the second publication in a series of five NOA National Report Cards⁴ which support the European Council's Declarations on the fight against antisemitism.⁵ Through these Declarations, EU Member States committed to mainstreaming the prevention and countering of antisemitism in all its forms across policy areas, recognising that antisemitism is a pan-European challenge. Further, they make clear the need to engage in policy formation at local, national, and European levels. An initial Declaration was published in 2018, revised and refined in 2020, and confirmed again in March 2022,⁶ at which time a slightly broader scope was approved to include "countering antisemitism and fostering Jewish life" in order to create a diverse and inclusive Europe where Jewish communities thrive.

The National Report Cards have been created to serve as a benchmarking tool to aid in the development and implementation of National Action Plans to counter antisemitism in Member States. They take the measure of how well

European countries are doing compared to the goals set by the Declarations. This Hungarian National Report card reflects a multi-year project of stakeholder engagement to achieve the highest standard of research to evaluate the level of governmental compliance. This report should therefore assist Hungary in developing and implementing new policies by highlighting current strengths and weaknesses. In addition, the research provides a wealth of socio-cultural educational resources that will contribute to combatting antisemitism.

Nine areas of life are included in the Council Declarations and serve as the basis for NOA's scoring process. The research team added an additional area, "religious freedom," because some partners felt this has a direct bearing on Jewish communities' ability to thrive.⁷ The ten policy areas that the researchers assessed are culture, education, hate crime, hate speech, Holocaust remembrance, intercultural dialogue, media, religious freedom, security, and sport. In addition, other policy areas are touched upon within these ten areas, such as youth, discrimination, and integration policies; they each merit further attention in possible future iterations of this monitoring tool.

As this report's main focus is the state's role and obligations, measures taken by civil society organisations (CSOs) and local communities are mentioned only in as much as they are relevant to the state's role. Further, researchers primarily examined the existence of state policies and practices and did not undertake a qualitative assessment of their measurable impact.

This brief report does not include the full scope of evidence gathered to inform the researcher's assessments of the key indicators. A detailed description of evidence is available upon request through the NOA website contact form.⁸

³ The project was funded by the European Union's Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme (2014-2020).

⁴ The other countries included in this project are Belgium, Italy, Romania and Spain.

⁵ See: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/06/fight-against-antisemitism-council-declaration/> and <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/02/antisemitism-council-declaration-on-fighting-antisemitism/>.

⁶ See: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/04/council-adopts-conclusions-on-combating-racism-and-antisemitism/>.

⁷ The EU cannot take a position on this topic because it is a national competence.

⁸ See: <https://www.noa-project.eu/report-cards/>.

METHODOLOGY⁹

The 2018 European Council Declaration on the fight against antisemitism was the starting point for the development of NOA's research methodology. The Declaration briefly mentions its expectations in multiple policy areas. Building on this, the NOA project partners—each experts in their field—explored how these broadly-worded directives could translate into measurable indicators. First, existing standards were compiled in order to set up a framework for assessment. Then a scoring system was developed to evaluate the key indicators. NOA's lead researchers gathered information to support these assessments through several methods. These included desk research, interviews, and focus groups to gain a holistic picture of the national policy landscape as they relate to the established indicators.

This project is a first foray into establishing a new set of European benchmarking norms, and every effort has been made to respect the highest ethical standards in this research. The researchers endeavoured to avoid bias in the design, data analysis, data interpretation, and other aspects of this research and honestly report results based on the available evidence. While some risk of subjectivity remains in the interpretation of results, it is important to remember that the purpose of this Report Card is to provide a snapshot of the current policy landscape in order to strengthen government measures to prevent and counter antisemitism going forward.

NOA Standards inform the roles and responsibilities of national governments. They are based on international norms established through regulations, directives, resolutions and other documents adopted by inter-governmental organisations such as European Union institutions, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and UNESCO.

NOA Indicators are markers of relevant policies and practices related to the fight against antisemitism. Thematic experts crafted key monitoring questions to measure the presence or absence of such policies in various areas.

The NOA Scoring System was developed to offer an easy-to-understand numerical representation of the current state of affairs in each policy area.

⁹ For further information on the standards, indicators and scoring system, see: <https://www.noa-project.eu/report-cards/>.

Thematic experts assigned a maximum value to the key indicators, then the researchers assigned a percentage score measuring how well the policies and practices in place corresponded to each, based on the information available. The scoring system is designed to:

- Enable users to easily identify existing gaps and policy areas that require significant attention from state actors
- Provide benchmarks to compare future development of policies

Assessments were made according to the experience and knowledge of the researchers in the field. In order to ensure depth and nuance, a multi-faceted approach to the final scoring was undertaken, including:

- Interviews with both government and civil society representatives
- Two advisory board meetings with a diverse range of community representatives reflecting expertise in the policy areas examined
- One stakeholder workshop with key government and civil society representatives who reviewed a detailed description of the evidence justifying the assigned scores and discussed and validated the overarching results

It should be noted that in the last few years, CSOs and human rights organisations with a significantly large percentage of foreign funding¹⁰ have become targets of escalating rhetorical attacks,¹¹ legislative restrictions,¹² and stigmatising policies¹³ to discredit them. As a direct result of these measures, governmental agencies often express serious reservations about engaging with CSOs regardless of their mission or objectives. The authors of this report made every effort to work directly with government authorities, filling in the gaps with available documentation and interviews with community professionals.

¹⁰ See: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/11/hungary-court-of-justice-of-the-eu-rejects-anti-migrant-stop-soros-law/>.

¹¹ See: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/23/hungarys-scrapping-ngo-law-insufficient-protect-civil-society>.

¹² LexNGO, see: <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a2100049.tv>

¹³ See: https://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Timeline_of_gov_attacks_against_HU_NGOs_07042017.pdf.

METHODOLOGY

1



STEP 1 Creation of NOA Project Partnership

NOA project partnership is created with Jewish experts and representatives to provide guidance on the topics, issues and needs to be addressed. The 10 policy areas to be researched are determined.

2



STEP 2 Creation of Indicators

Key research questions are developed for each policy area which are then translated into indicators, based upon existing international standards. For each of the 10 areas, multiple indicators are assigned, with input from thematic experts for transnational consistency and sustainability.

3



STEP 3 Collection & Analysis

Policy documents, legislation, national publications, and guidelines are collected and analysed. A National Advisory Board is formed to give guidance on the national policy landscape from different Jewish community perspectives.

4



STEP 4 Input & Interviews

To provide context and additional input, **24** people are consulted, including:

1 government representative	10 community representatives
8 civil society organisation representatives	5 academics

5



STEP 5 Scoring

Initial scoring of indicators is undertaken by the research team, given in percentages. Scoring system is developed to:

- ▶ compare national policies and practices with established standards
- ▶ enable overview for each policy area providing for future benchmarking
- ▶ assess each policy area to identify existing gaps and create points of reference

6



STEP 6 Validation

Consultation phase/stakeholder workshop:

- ▶ a select group of representatives from civil society and public authorities give feedback and validate scoring

7



STEP 7 Dissemination

National public events are organised to discuss findings, share good practices and provide policy recommendations. European conference 2023

HUNGARY BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

Hungary is a parliamentary democracy. The President is the Head of State and is elected for five years by the Parliament. The head of the government is the Prime Minister, whose task is to determine the general direction of government policy. The President appoints ministers according to the Prime Minister's recommendations.

Hungarian Fundamental Law is the foundation of the country's legal system. It establishes essential basic democratic principles, including that the three main branches of government—the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary—operate independently. The unicameral Parliament represents the Legislative branch, and currently consists of 199 members elected for four years.¹⁴ It has legislative power and may change the Fundamental Law with a two-thirds majority vote. Further, the Parliament monitors the work of the government and may withdraw its support for it through a so-called “constructive vote of no confidence.”

The country has three levels of governance: central, regional (county), and local, with a two-tier local government system. The judiciary functions separately and consists of a four-tier hierarchy.¹⁵ The Constitutional Court works separately from the judicial system and has jurisdiction over all constitutional questions. It reviews the constitutionality of legislation and rules on conflicts between national legislation and international treaties.¹⁶

HUNGARIAN JEWISH COMMUNITIES

Any understanding of the situation involving the Hungarian Jewish community begins with an awareness that there are substantial

difficulties in estimating its size. “Jews and Jewry in Contemporary Hungary: Results of a Sociological Survey”¹⁷ by the well-regarded academic researchers András Kovács and Ildikó Barna offer some insight into this challenge. After World War II, sources listing the number of survivors differed significantly. Furthermore, since 1949, no official data has been collected regarding the ethnic or religious composition of Hungarian society. Adding to this confusion, there are no reliable statistics on intermarriage or Jewish emigration from Hungary over the decades.

Nevertheless, a reasonable assessment of the size of the community has been made. Kovács and Barna, building on the available data of the numbers of Holocaust survivors in 1945 and using several demographic calculation methods, estimated that in 2017, the Jewish population in Hungary was between 73 000 and 138 000, including people with at least one Jewish parent.¹⁸ The same research estimates the number of people in the Hungarian population with at least one grandparent of Jewish origin at around 160 000. This would make it the largest in Central-Eastern Europe.¹⁹ These figures are confirmed by other statistics, such as the number of Jewish burials and the number of Holocaust survivors affiliated with relevant initiatives, such as recipients of social welfare or claims for compensation.

In Hungary, cultural identification with Judaism is much more prevalent than religious observance. Among observant Jews, Conservative and Reform traditions and practices are most common. According to official statistics on

¹⁴ See: <https://parlament.hu/web/guest/bevezetes>.

¹⁵ The judiciary is made up of district courts, administrative and labour courts, regional courts, regional courts of appeal and the Curia (the supreme judicial body). The Curia's main task is to ensure uniformity in the judicial application of laws by issuing binding decisions. Judges are appointed by the president as specified by law.

¹⁶ The constitutional court is the competent jurisdiction to try impeachment proceedings brought by the legislature against the President.

¹⁷ Kovács, András and Barna, Ildikó. Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon: Egy szociológiai kutatás eredményei, 2017. - Jews and Jewry in Contemporary Hungary: Results of a Sociological Survey Szombat, 2018.

¹⁸ Stark, Tamás. Kísérlet a zsidó népesség számának behatárolására 1945 és 2000 között. In: Kovács, András (szerk.): *Zsidók a mai magyarországon. az 1999-ben végzett szociológiai felmérés eredményeinek elemzése. Múlt és Jövő könyvek*, 2001, Budapest. 101–128.

¹⁹ See: <https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/about/communities/HU>.

religious affiliation from the 2011 national census, 54% of the population identifies as Christian, 27% reported no religious affiliation, 0,1% of the population identifies as Muslim, and 0,1% as Jewish (approximately 11 000 people).²⁰

The Holocaust resulted in the deaths of over half a million Hungarian Jews, approximately 68% of the Jewish population. Afterwards, roughly half of the survivors fled the country. Following the political transition toward democracy in 1989, there was a religious and cultural revival of Judaism.²¹ Today, there is a lively, diverse community in Budapest, with about 20 working synagogues and numerous Jewish institutions, including schools, museums, cultural centres, festivals, youth organisations and summer camps, sport clubs, hospitals, and nursing homes. There are also a number of small Jewish communities in the countryside,²² mainly in cities such as Szeged²³ and Debrecen.²⁴

Jews in Hungary are represented by several important organisations that play a substantial role in the life of the community. These include the umbrella organisation MAZSIHISZ (the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities),²⁵ EMIH (the Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation),²⁶ and MAOIH (the Autonomous Orthodox Jewish Community of Hungary),²⁷ all of which receive annual financial support in the form of state subsidies for recognised churches/congregations. These organisations then provide funding to CSOs and other groups as well as opportunities for cultural programs and projects.

However, Reform Jewish communities do not enjoy the same status as those mentioned above. The new law on churches, which came into effect on 1 January 2012, deprived hundreds of religious communities of their legal status.

As a result, they no longer had access to state resources to which they had previously been entitled. In addition, the law made it impossible for them to receive a charitable donation of one per cent of people's income tax.²⁸ Among the disenfranchised communities were the two Reform Jewish communities: Bet Orim²⁹ and Szim Salom.³⁰ The Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in 2014 that this law violates the European Convention on Human Rights. In 2016, the ECHR ruled that churches affected by the 2012 law are entitled to compensation. A 2018 amendment to the Hungarian law again allowed these communities to receive donations from taxpayers. However, adequate compensation to the communities has not yet been paid.³¹

OVERVIEW OF ANTISEMITISM

Antisemitism in Hungary is a study of contrasts, and the overall picture is complex. Physical assaults directed at Jews are rare—in 2019, there was one recorded case, and in 2020 there were none at all.³² One explanation for this is that Jews are not readily recognisable, as most do not wear identifying clothing such as a kippah. On the other hand, a substantial number of people indicated they had been subjected to verbal attacks as Jews. According to a recent sociological survey of Hungarian Jews conducted in 2018, 20% of respondents reported they have been personally insulted. And while 42% of those surveyed stated they have never faced antisemitism personally,³³ 65% of Jews consider antisemitism to be a grave problem in present-day Hungary. Moreover, 90% of respondents assume that the majority of Jews are more concerned with antisemitism than they are.

²⁰ See: https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/nepsz2011/nepsz_10_2011.pdf.

²¹ Kovács, A. *Stranger at hand: Antisemitic prejudices in post-communist Hungary*. Boston & Leiden: Brill, 2010.

²² Jewish communities in the Hungarian countryside. See: <https://mazsihisz.hu/kozossegeink/magyar-zsido-adatbazis/videki-zsinagogak-es-hitkozsegek>.

²³ See: Szegedi Zsidó Hitközség, <https://szszh4.wixsite.com/szszh>.

²⁴ See: Debreceni Zsidó Hitközség, <https://www.dzsh.hu/en>.

²⁵ See: <https://mazsihisz.hu/>.

²⁶ See: <https://zsido.com/>.

²⁷ See: <http://maoih.hu/>.

²⁸ Taxpayers in Hungary are entitled to give one per cent of their personal income tax to recognised churches.

²⁹ See: <https://betorim.hu/>.

³⁰ See: <http://www.szimsalom.hu/>.

³¹ See: <https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/minority-faiths-under-hungarian-religion-law>.

³² See: https://mazsihisz.hu/files/public/filecache/ma_medialibrary_media/656/7656/antisemita_incidensek_2019-2020_hun%20FINAL.pdf.

³³ Kovács, András, Ildiko, Barna. *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon: Egy szociológiai kutatás eredményei*. Szombat, 2017. *Jews and Jewry in Contemporary Hungary: Results of a Sociological Survey*. Szombat, 2018. See: <https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-508>.

These inconsistent and paradoxical results may be explained by the nature of prejudice towards Jews in Hungary³⁴ which manifests itself primarily in political discourse.³⁵ Namely, many Hungarians believe in conspiracy theories involving secret global Jewish alliances,³⁶ and a popularly held belief is that Jews have too much control over the media, politics, and the economy.³⁷ Meanwhile, most Hungarians don't mind having a Jewish neighbour, friend, or family member, according to survey research. Thus, political antisemitism and belief in Jewish stereotypes (i.e., that Jews are rich and manipulative) are high, but personal aversion and interpersonal animosity are less common.³⁸

In 2013, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced “zero tolerance against antisemitism” and declared that the Hungarian government has a moral duty to protect the Hungarian Jewish community.³⁹ This viewpoint is intrinsically linked with the government's conservative Christian values, which dictate a stronger relationship between State and Church, which in this case includes the Jewish community. This contrasts with the government's treatment of Hungary's Muslim population. Indeed, following the refugee crisis in 2015, Muslims became the primary stigmatised group in the country, which ironically strengthened Judeo-Christian affiliations and sentiments, rendering Jews a less threatening political enemy. Orbán's government has also increased economic and diplomatic ties with Israel, which may have decreased anti-Zionism in the political sphere. The rare explicit antisemitic remarks voiced by political and societal figures usually result in strong reactions from the Jewish community, from civil society, from other religious groups as well as from senior members of the government, including the Prime Minister.

Despite this outwardly equitable relationship, there are ongoing conflicts between the Jewish community and the government. For one, the government supports revisionism in the form of nostalgia for the Horthy era (1920s-1940s), a period of severe political antisemitism leading up to the Holocaust. The State has also awarded several high honours to public figures known for their extreme antisemitism, such as Zsolt Bayer or Ernő Raffay.

Further, the Hungarian government openly launched an ideological war against “liberalism” and engages in partnership with those who endorse conservative critiques of contemporary European politics. Thus, support for the Jewish community is selective across ideological lines and has resulted in favouritism towards certain organisations which align themselves more with right-wing ideologies. This preference is symbolic but sometimes also financial.⁴⁰ In addition, the State does not recognise or support many Jewish civil society organisations—for example, the Aurora/Dor Hadas community⁴¹ or the Jewish Community Forum Association led by András Borgula.⁴² In effect, the Hungarian government has deliberately created divisions between various Jewish groups⁴³ to serve its political agenda.

³⁴ See: https://politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/EVZ_Anti-gypsyism%20Antisemitism_final%20report_%20summary_180228.pdf.

³⁵ Kovács, András, Ildiko, Barna. *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon: Egy szociológiai kutatás eredményei*. Szombat, 2017. *Jews and Jewry in Contemporary Hungary: Results of a Sociological Survey*. Szombat, 2018. See: <https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-508> and https://index.hu/tudomany/2018/06/30/ilyenek_a_zsidok/.

³⁶ See: <https://www.tarki.hu/adatbank-h/kutjel/pdf/b342.pdf>.

³⁷ Kovács, A. *Stranger at hand: Antisemitic prejudices in post-communist Hungary*. Boston & Leiden: Brill, 2010.

³⁸ See: https://politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/EVZ_Anti-gypsyism%20Antisemitism_final%20report_%20summary_180228.pdf.

³⁹ See: <https://miniszterelnok.hu/zero-tolerancia-van-az-antiszemizmussal-szemben/>.

⁴⁰ See: <https://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/mar-nemcsak-lepasszolt-allami-ingatlanok-es-milliardok-de-offshore-penzek-is-hizlaljak-a-novekvo-emih-vagyont-109346>.

⁴¹ See: <https://forward.com/news/breaking-news/375952/hungary-squeeze-on-jewish-center-sparks-outcry-at-home-and-abroad/>.


⁴² See: <https://akibic.hu/kibicek/>.

⁴³ See: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/world/europe/orban-hungary-antisemitism.html>.


HUNGARY – ALL POLICY AREAS




Culture and Heritage




Intercultural Dialogue




Education




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
Hate Crimes




Religious Freedom




Hate Speech




Security



Holocaust Remembrance



Sport




KEY GENERAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Formally acknowledge and empower the Department of Civil Society Relations under the Prime Minister's supervision to develop and implement a National Strategy on antisemitism.
2. Initiate regular meetings on a variety of policy matters with an expanded "Jewish community Roundtable" and ensure that diverse voices are well-represented in the decision-making process. This consultative body should include not only religious representation but also draw upon Jewish civil society organisations from a wide variety of sectors, including culture, education, sport and security.
3. Regularly monitor progress of the proposed National Strategy on antisemitism.
4. Provide funding and human resources to ensure the implementation and sustainability of these general measures as well as the specific recommendations for the 10 policy areas.

BREAKDOWN OF POLICY AREAS



CULTURE AND HERITAGE



KEY INDICATORS



Culture and Heritage

OVERVIEW

State funding for Jewish Heritage is a constitutional obligation based on specific criteria in national law.⁴⁴ The State therefore contributes financially to the promotion, preservation, and recognition of Jewish culture and heritage on an equal basis to other cultural policy strategies. An example of a recent initiative which demonstrates this point is the State-founded National Religious Tourism Committee, whose members include the directors of the MAZSIHISZ and EMIH.⁴⁵ At present, tourism brochures portray Jewish heritage as a significant part of the country's history and many Jewish sites are officially registered as national tourist sites or national landmarks.⁴⁶

Further examples illustrate these efforts to support Jewish culture and heritage. Some Jewish Museums and Memorials are partially financed by the State, and national art museums present the country's Jewish art as an integral part of its heritage. In addition, the State provides considerable funds for Jewish cultural

events such as the Judafest⁴⁷ and the Jewish Cultural Festival.⁴⁸ This financial support is mainly provided through contributions to Jewish umbrella organisations, who then independently decide how best to distribute subsidies. While the government does not develop national action plans for the protection, conservation and maintenance of Jewish heritage sites, it does directly allocate resources to at-risk sites, like the Rumbach Synagogue, which received a EUR 9 million grant for renovations.⁴⁹ In addition, Hungary financially supports and participates in certain EU-funded activities, like "The Hungarian Jewish Heritage Route in Eastern Hungary".⁵⁰

ASSESSMENT OF KEY INDICATORS

- 1. Preservation of Jewish Heritage:** The State includes Jewish heritage equitably in national heritage strategies and partially finances Jewish museums and memorials. There is cooperation between civil society actors, Jewish communities and regional or local public bodies in the development of Jewish heritage initiatives.

⁴⁴ See: <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a0100064.tv>.

⁴⁵ See: <https://mtu.gov.hu/cikkek/megalakult-a-nemzeti-vallastur-izmus-tanacs-2516>.

⁴⁶ See: <https://www.budapestinfo.hu/dohany-street-synagogue-2>.

⁴⁷ See: <https://www.judafest.org/>.

⁴⁸ See: <https://www.zsidokulturalisfesztival.hu/>.

⁴⁹ See: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-60-years-of-decay-buda-pests-grand-rumbach-synagogue-has-new-lease-on-life/>.

⁵⁰ See: <https://jewish-heritage-europe.eu/2020/07/28/hungary-eu-funded-project-upgrades/>.

- 2. Promotion of Jewish Culture:** The State promotes and communicates Jewish traditions, customs, religious practices, language, food, music, and arts and crafts as part of the country's rich cultural heritage. It indirectly supports electronic media projects on various religions by providing financial grants. The State does not support cultural institutions concerned with endangered Jewish languages such as Yiddish and Ladino,⁵¹ but it does participate in the development of the Council of Europe's Cultural Routes programme.⁵²
- 3. Promotion of Jewish Heritage:** The State develops campaigns to promote Jewish heritage, both directly and indirectly.
- 4. Recognition of Jewish Culture:** Jewish content programming is integrated into regular national media broadcasts. The State includes the history of European Jewish culture in manuals on European history and supports Jewish organisations which develop cultural programmes to enable a better understanding and appreciation of the Jewish experience. There is some cooperation between the ministries responsible for heritage and for education in raising awareness among young people on the value of Jewish heritage, culture and history.

RECOMMENDATIONS


1. Develop action plans to ensure that Jewish heritage receives adequate levels of protection, conservation and maintenance.
2. Increase contemporary Jewish content in state-owned media.
3. Establish official cooperation between authorities and ministries of culture, heritage, and education to ensure general awareness of Hungarian Jewish culture and heritage, particularly amongst younger generations.
4. Advertise Jewish walking tours in rural areas, not only in urban areas, through the Hungarian Tourist Agency.

⁵¹ These languages are not culturally dominant among today's Hungarian Jewish culture.

⁵² See: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/cultural-routes/hungary>.



EDUCATION



KEY INDICATORS



Education

OVERVIEW

The Ministry of Education is part of the Ministry of Human Capacities. Public education is centralised with one national curriculum and accredited textbooks. In 2012, the Jewish Community Roundtable⁵³ was created, bringing together historians, informal educators and other Jewish community members to integrate Jewish culture, history and perspectives of coexistence and diversity into the then newly formed National Core Curriculum.⁵⁴ This new course of study notably included coverage of political antisemitism in Nazi Germany and Hungary during the period leading up to and including the Holocaust. In addition, the curriculum for the topic of Ethics included detailed information about the Jewish holidays and religious traditions.

Just eight years later, when this curriculum was being revised, the educational authorities were much less supportive than they had been previously and rejected the involvement of the Jewish Roundtable. Nevertheless, they did not remove any Jewish content. However, educational experts and many in the Jewish

community are concerned about what has been included⁵⁵—namely, controversial national historical and literary figures from the WWII era who were known antisemites.⁵⁶ Moreover, topics like inclusion, tolerance and human rights are only superficially mentioned; thus, students are not encouraged to consider antisemitism (or any other bias) in the larger context of societal behaviour. Generally speaking, a main challenge in the field of public education is that students are not acquainted with critical thinking and are minimally exposed to ideas about intercultural tolerance and inclusivity, which leads to ignorance of these topics and low commitment to social responsibility. This is a broader challenge that concerns antisemitism as well as other forms of intolerance.

Moreover, teachers across the country are not equipped to teach about these sensitive issues. Official national teacher guidelines indicate that teachers must create an environment of acceptance and tolerance and celebrate differences.⁵⁷ But there is a gap between

⁵³ See: <https://tev.hu/nemzeti-alapinteru/>.

⁵⁴ See: <https://www.szombat.org/politika/tajkep-tankonyvitak-kozben>.

⁵⁵ See: <https://hungarytoday.hu/more-patriotic-national-curriculum-accepted-amid-significant-protest/> and <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51612549>.

⁵⁶ For example, Albert Wass and József Nyírő.

⁵⁷ See: https://www.oktatas.hu/pub_bin/dload/pem/Tanfelugyeleti_kezikonyv.pdf.

guidelines and actual practice nationwide. School leaders don't receive encouragement or support from local authorities to deal with intercultural issues as these topics are deemed political and therefore taboo. A handful of CSOs organise workshops and other activities on Jewish studies and Holocaust education, but usually only if individual teachers reach out to them. This tends to be rare because CSOs are openly scrutinised by the current government, which in turn discourages schools from welcoming them.

In terms of official incident reporting, there is no specific mechanism for initiating or monitoring complaints within the school system.⁵⁸ Instead, schools must refer complainants to the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights⁵⁹ directly. There are, however, guidelines developed or supported by national authorities on how to handle bullying or intercultural bias at school. National educational authorities support anti-bullying programmes, such as ENABLE.⁶⁰ In addition, multiple CSOs offer programmes aimed at preventing antisemitism, including Tett és Védelem Alapítvány (TEV),⁶¹ a foundation which monitors antisemitic incidents.⁶²

ASSESSMENT OF KEY INDICATORS

- 1. Civil Society Partnerships:** There are no guidelines/recommendations in place that encourage schools to collaborate with CSOs in carrying out formal/non-formal educational activities addressing antisemitism. CSOs sometimes manage to collaborate with teachers to carry out such activities, particularly regarding Holocaust education, but it is not supported by the State and therefore appears to have limited effectiveness.
- 2. Classroom Teaching and Assessment:** Teaching materials and methodologies for addressing antisemitism and Jewish studies do not focus on the distinction between historical and moral lessons, diversity

⁵⁸ See: <https://www.ajbh.hu/ebff>.

⁵⁹ See: https://www.ajbh-hu.translate.goog/ebff? x_tr_sl=hu& x_tr_tl=en& x_tr_hl=en& x_tr_pto=sc.

⁶⁰ See: https://www.oktatas.hu/pub_bin/dload/kozoktatas/pok/Budapest/tpn2018/ENABLE_hazai_bevetese_Budapest_Jarmi.pdf.

⁶¹ See: <https://tev.hu/en/>.

⁶² See: <https://sokszinusegoktatas.hu/hirek/utmutato-az-elotelet-alapuiskolai-zaklatas-megelozesehez-es-kezelesehez>.

of experiences, harmful stereotypes, nor on establishing supportive and open environments to discuss sensitive topics. The transmission of knowledge about antisemitism and Judaism is assessed in the same way as any other material in the curriculum. Only CSOs monitor the specific impact of this teaching.

- 3. Curriculum:** The national curriculum addresses antisemitism and Jewish studies. This content, however, is restricted to the K-12 school system and not included in other educational settings. It is not connected to topics such as global citizenship, diversity, social engagement, anti-racism and tolerance, or hate crimes, which are not explicitly represented in the curriculum.
- 4. Higher Education:** The inclusion of students of any ethnicity or religion is regulated by law, and discrimination is illegal. There are university policies/regulations establishing the relevant standards, including the rejection of any bias due to ethnicity or religion and ensuring the safety of students. These are not incorporated in teacher training, however, and the existence of internal reporting mechanisms is unknown.
- 5. Holocaust Education:** National law or policies establish or recommend Holocaust Education as part of curricula with clear scope and guidelines and require schools to observe the "Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust" in some form. Some collaboration exists between policy-makers, textbook authors, and educators to ensure the quality of Holocaust education. At the same time, there are no specific guidelines or trainings about how to introduce this material into the classroom nor how to adapt it to various age groups and students' sensibilities. CSOs may take on this role if invited to do so by an individual teacher.
- 6. Incident Response:** There is established national policy on schools' response to and reporting of cases of antisemitic incidents, just as there is for any discrimination based on ethnicity or religion. However, neither school staff nor students are trained or informed about these mechanisms. There

are materials available to resolve bullying in schools, but they are not specific to ethnic/ religion-based discrimination.

7. **School Leadership/Governance:** There are no formal guidelines offered by school directors concerning activities that address antisemitism, nor are there staff trainings on methodologies for intercultural education. School governance is not encouraged or required to promote democratic and human rights values or the cultural openness of students, staff and parents.
 8. **Teacher Training:** Educators and/or in-service teachers are not trained to address antisemitism, the Holocaust or genocide, and there are no such guidelines available for this endeavour. Curricula for teacher training institutions are decentralised and therefore variable, but most do not encompass these topics.
 9. **Textbooks:** There are no specific guidelines for inclusive language, but current textbooks were approved by educational experts on antisemitism and Jewish studies. Nevertheless, some worry that the new national textbooks currently in preparation may leave out important topics and context and include controversial historical figures that were “reinstated” in recent years.
4. Integrate Jewish studies as well as anti-prejudice, democratic citizenship concepts and methods into pre- and in-service teacher training. Provide and promote existing resources (such as those from the Zachor Foundation⁶³ or the ODIHR-UNESCO teacher training curricula⁶⁴). Encourage teachers by offering accreditation for participation in such training.⁶⁵
 5. Evaluate the effectiveness of educational efforts by monitoring acquired knowledge on Jews and Judaism through academically verified research.
 6. Support non-formal education organisations and encourage school leadership and staff to partner with civil society organisations to promote intercultural tolerance and inclusion. Create a list of accredited and expert organisations in the official online portal of the national educational authorities and provide more funds to these civil society organisations that help strengthen the resilience of Hungarian society to resist antisemitism.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Consult with Jewish studies experts to provide input and feedback on the new national curriculum, framework, and textbooks and revise according to expert opinion.
2. Ensure the new national curriculum includes more complex materials that address the social, political, and psychological mechanisms that lead up to discrimination and violence against minorities in society, such as the Holocaust.
3. Equip and encourage school leadership as well as teaching staff to prioritise an inclusive educational climate.


⁶³ See: <https://zachorlearn.org/>.

⁶⁴ See: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/470712>.

⁶⁵ See: <https://ofi.oh.gov.hu/kepzesek-listaja-es-az-akkreditalt-kepzesek-ismertetoje>.



HATE CRIMES



KEY INDICATORS



Hate Crimes

OVERVIEW

In 2012, the Hungarian Criminal Code introduced a substantial legal framework addressing violations of freedom of conscience and religion,⁶⁶ violence against a member of a certain group,⁶⁷ genocide,⁶⁸ crimes against humanity,⁶⁹ apartheid,⁷⁰ and the use of symbols of totalitarianism, including the swastika, the insignia of the SS, and the arrow cross.⁷¹ Judicial practice considers bias motivation as a significant element in criminal acts,⁷² and in an effort to ensure they are being properly taken into account, in 2019, police issued the Országos

Rendőrfőkapitányság (ORFK) instruction on managing hate crimes.⁷³ Accordingly, police and prosecutors must consider indicators of prejudice when investigating crimes, with the aim of eliminating and responding effectively to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.⁷⁴

As this trend in legislation shows, over the past two decades, a clear effort has been made to create the necessary legal environment to combat hate crimes. However, several systemic problems remain in the area of jurisprudence. For instance, due to a low level of trust in law enforcement, hate crimes are often not reported to the authorities. In addition, authorities sometimes ignore or inadequately assess bias motivations, meaning some incidents that should be qualified as hate crimes are not recorded that way. Moreover, the police often fail to properly investigate the circumstances of these crimes, making it difficult or impossible to prove a bias motive in court.⁷⁵

While national legislation corresponds to and covers all the elements of the EU 2008 Framework Decision against racism and

⁶⁶ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XXI, Section 215: Any person who: a) restricts another person in his freedom of conscience by force or by threat of force; b) prevents another person from freely exercising his religion by force or by threat of force; is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years. See: <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1200100.tv×hift=20221101>.

⁶⁷ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XXI, Section 216 (1): Any person who displays an apparently anti-social behavior against others for being part, whether in fact or under presumption, of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, or of a certain societal group, in particular on the grounds of disability, gender identity or sexual orientation, of aiming to cause panic or to frighten others, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years. (2) Any person who assaults another person for being part, whether in fact or under presumption, of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, or of a certain societal group, in particular on the grounds of disability, gender identity or sexual orientation, or compels him by force or by threat of force to do, not to do, or to endure something, is punishable by imprisonment between one to five years.

⁶⁸ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XIII, section 142.

⁶⁹ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XIII, section 143.

⁷⁰ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XIII, section 144.

⁷¹ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XXXII, section 335.

⁷² See: https://kuria-birosag.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/osszefoglo_lo_velemen_y_4.pdf.

⁷³ See: <http://www.kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/Kozlonyok/12/PDF/2019/41.pdf>.

⁷⁴ See: https://gyuloletellen.hu/sites/default/files/gvem_indikatorlis-ta_haromolozopos_vegleges.pdf; https://gyuloletellen.hu/sites/default/files/gvem_kihallgutmutato_3.pdf.

⁷⁵ Balogh, Lídia – Halász, Iván, Pap – András László. 2020. A jogrendszer reagálóképessége 2010–2018: Egyenlőség, kisebbségi jogok, nemzetpolitika. Budapest: MTA. See: <http://gyuloletellen.hu/sites/default/files/iccpr-gvem-arnyekjelentes.pdf>.

xenophobia,⁷⁶ there is no national framework supporting a comprehensive approach to hate crime recording and data collection. The most accurate data available on antisemitic hate crimes is provided by the monitoring organisation TEV.⁷⁷ According to their data, since 2013, there have been approximately 100 antisemitic incidents, and over 90% are related to hate speech. A report from MAZSIHISZ shows that in 2019 there were 53 hate crimes reported, while in 2020, there were at least 70.⁷⁸ Figures from the OSCE show that between 2016 and 2019, Hungarian police generally reported less than 200 hate crimes per year (mostly desecration of graves).⁷⁹

Regarding investigation and prosecution, according to an expert from the TEV, there are virtually no antisemitic hate crime cases that are not investigated, and most of our interviewees emphasised that they have trust in the police and feel secure. However, it should be pointed out that, like other hate crimes, antisemitic hate crimes are severely underreported. According to the research by András Kovács and Ildikó Barna, slightly more than three-quarters of those who were victims of some form of antisemitic hate crime did not report it. Generally speaking, hate crimes are more likely to be directed against members of the Roma or LGBTIQ+ communities. Jews also have significantly better access to justice than some other minorities, including Roma, for example, since the Jewish population is concentrated in cities rather than in disadvantaged rural areas. Moreover, they also have better advocacy skills due to their generally higher social position.

ASSESSMENT OF KEY INDICATORS

1. Investigation and Prosecution: The Hungarian police and prosecution have adopted hate crime guidelines and trainings. However, it is not entirely clear whether prosecutors use them in practice. There

is substantive cooperation between the authorities and CSOs.

- 2. Legislation on Hate Crimes:** The Hungarian Criminal Code includes several criminal offences related to hate crimes. Antisemitic bias is not explicitly mentioned in the hate crime provision as the list of possible biases is open-ended, making it possible to protect unforeseen social groups who may become targets due to a changing social environment. Some feel “the symbolic message of solidarity for historical injustices is diluted by extending extra protection to a wide variety of groups.”⁸⁰ However, Hungarian legislation does provide an opportunity to take action against antisemitic hate crimes, as the language in the Criminal Code includes protection for ethnic and religious groups. Moreover, malice aforethought or malicious motives, including bias, are considered aggravating circumstances.
- 3. Recording of Hate Crimes:** Generally, data on crimes reported by the authorities are collected in a Unified Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Crime Statistics System (ENyÜBS).⁸¹ However, there is no national framework supporting a comprehensive approach to recording hate crimes specifically, and therefore it is impossible to obtain an accurate number. CSOs, particularly the TEV, have put into place a reporting system that makes officially prosecuted cases comparable.
- 4. Victim Support:** A general victim protection system is available to everyone, although it is less accessible in rural areas due to inconsistent geographical coverage and lack of information. Otherwise, there do not appear to be any surveys of victims or other special assistance provided. In addition, no Jewish organisation has a hotline that meets international standards.⁸² Jewish

⁷⁶ See: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:%3A32008F0913>.

⁷⁷ See: <https://tev.hu/eves-jelentesek-2/>.

⁷⁸ See: https://mazsihisz.hu/files/public/filecache/ma_medialibrary_media/656/7656/antiszemita_incidensek_2019-2020_hun%20FINAL.pdf.

⁷⁹ See: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/hungary>.

⁸⁰ Bárd, Petra. “Prerequisites for the effective fight against hate crimes.” *Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies* 61, no. 3 (2021): 255-268.


⁸¹ See: Egységes Nyomozhatósági és Ügyészégi Bűnügyi Statisztika (ENyÜBS), <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1800012.bm>.

⁸² For an example, see: <https://cst.org.uk/report-incident>.

communities are ready to offer support to victims who need it. However, no such cases were found in the course of this research.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Develop protocols and guidelines for prosecutors that explain the precise evidence needed to prove bias and incorporate existing guidance on bias indicators.
2. Develop a crime recording system that includes the perception of victims and witnesses; allow the recording of hate incidents; allow disaggregation by the grounds mentioned in section 216 of the Criminal Code to obtain clear data on hate crimes and victim groups.
3. Introduce compulsory training for:
 - a. Police officers – on hate crime investigation, the use of the Országos Rendőr-főkapitányság Instruction, and sensitive treatment of and communication with hate crime victims
 - b. Prosecutors and judiciary – on hate crime prosecution and sentencing and sensitive treatment of and communication with hate crime victims
4. Openly communicate information about current efforts to counter hate crime, including publishing statistics and available guidance relating to investigation and prosecution.



Hate Speech

OVERVIEW

The Hungarian Criminal Code includes sections on the incitement against a community⁸³ and the open denial of Nazi and Communist crimes,⁸⁴ which fall into the category of hate speech. Since 2013, there have been less than 100 cases of hate speech recorded. Of these, 72 were prosecuted, and almost all resulted in

a conviction, including a far-right politician from the municipality of Debrecen.⁸⁵ The TEV’s most recent report emphasised that the number of hate speech incidents against the Jewish community had been decreasing since 2016, but according to experts interviewed, they are on the rise again, probably due to the pandemic. According to interviewees, such incidents are usually connected to the lack of knowledge and awareness of Judaism in general and usually

⁸³ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XXXII, section 332.

⁸⁴ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XXXII, section 333.

⁸⁵ See: https://hvg.hu/itthon/20151126_Jogerosen_eliteltek_a_a_cigan-yok_deportal.

manifest themselves in verbal insults based on old conspiracy theories or stereotypes rather than planned attacks.

In general, hate speech against other vulnerable groups, in particular the Roma, LGBTIQ+ people, migrants, and asylum seekers, is much more common and has been an issue of growing concern for civil society, including governmental communication campaigns such as “Stop Soros” or anti-immigration rhetoric.⁸⁶ The overall climate of intolerance in political discourse and in the media hinders the free expression of disadvantaged groups and foreshadows the potential for increased hate speech.

ASSESSMENT OF KEY INDICATORS

1. Legislation on Hate Speech: The Hungarian Criminal Code legislates against violations of freedom of conscience and religion,⁸⁷ incitement against a community,⁸⁸ the use of symbols of totalitarianism, the desecration of a national symbol,⁸⁹ and the open denial of Nazi and communist crimes.⁹⁰

2. Partnership with Civil Society Organisations: Certain educational programmes are in place for police, and CSOs and police cooperate.⁹¹ Some victim support programmes exist, but they are not designed specifically for Jews because of the relatively small number of antisemitic crimes. In such cases, victim support may be provided by the Jewish community services.

3. Reporting and Monitoring: Hate speech can be reported online to the National Media Authority, which is empowered to conduct investigations to determine if a law has been broken.⁹² The Code of Administrative Offenses may also be applicable since Section 174 prohibits

participation in the activities of dissolved associations, such as banned neo-Nazi groups.

4. Role of the State in Challenging Antisemitic Attitudes in the Media: Prime Minister Orbán announced a zero-tolerance policy regarding antisemitism, and government members and senior officials have emphasised numerous times that hate speech and hate crimes against Jews are unacceptable in Hungary.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Hungarian government should discontinue its aggressive communication campaigns against disadvantaged groups and undertake measures to promote tolerance.
2. The National Media Authority should be provided with comprehensive and regular training about the relevant hate speech standards.
3. Law enforcement authorities should engage in a meaningful dialogue on developing investigative guidelines for prosecuting incitement to hatred and hate speech based on international human rights law.
4. All public officials, including politicians and government officials, should recognise and promptly speak out against intolerance and discrimination, expressing support to the targeted individuals or groups.

⁸⁶ See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/stop-brussels-europe-an-commission-responds-hungarian-national-consultation_en.

⁸⁷ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XXI, section 215. See: <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1200100.tv×hift=20221101>.

⁸⁸ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XXXII, Section 332

⁸⁹ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XXXII, Section 334


⁹⁰ Hungarian Criminal Code, Chapter XXXII, Section 333.

⁹¹ See: https://gyulotellen.hu/sites/default/files/gvem_strategia_en.pdf, <https://hatter.hu/tevekenysegunk/jogsegelyszolgalat/uni-form-egyutt-mukodes-rendvedelmi-szervekkel>, <https://gyulotellen.hu/aktualitasok/rendszeres-egyezettetes-rendorseggel-gyulolet-buncselekmenyekrol>, https://gyulotellen.hu/sites/default/files/2014-03-31_orfivalasz_eset-megbesz.pdf.


⁹² See: <https://nmhh.hu/tart/report/2>.



HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE



KEY INDICATORS



Holocaust Remembrance

OVERVIEW

Holocaust education is mandatory and part of the national curriculum, although the content of teacher training varies and depends on the institutions’ own guidelines. The government marks Holocaust Remembrance Day,⁹³ and it recognises the trauma of second-generation survivors with a special fund for their medical needs.⁹⁴ In addition, “denying, questioning or making light of the Holocaust” is a criminal offence, and this extends to the media, including websites.⁹⁵ However, discussion of the Holocaust is not particularly encouraged in educational institutions as it is considered political, and the State does not promote intercultural dialogue regarding the Holocaust. Teachers can voluntarily participate in CSO-led workshops on how to teach the Holocaust and learn about the appropriate methodologies.

The State’s protection, preservation and promotion of the memory of the Holocaust at cultural and heritage sites are considered satisfactory by experts. However, most monuments and memorials are supported by

Jewish private donors and organisations, not the government, unless particularly at risk.

ASSESSMENT OF KEY INDICATORS

- 1. Culture and Conscience:** The State has developed action plans to ensure that Holocaust memorials receive an appropriate level of protection, conservation and maintenance and directly allocates resources to heritage sites most at risk.
- 2. Dialogue:** The State facilitates interfaith commemoration of the Holocaust to a certain extent. Some religious educational institutions train their students about other religions and their history, fundamental rights and democratic principles, and the principles of dialogue.
- 3. Education:** National law requires educators and/or in-service teachers to be prepared to address the Holocaust and genocide education. There are established structures for collaboration between policy-makers, textbook authors, school leaders and educators to ensure the quality of the curriculum. However, there are no guidelines by educational or other agencies on how to develop and choose relevant teaching materials, adapt them to the students’ levels, or establish a supportive and open environment to discuss such

⁹³ See: <https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/hungary-marks-holocaust-memorial-day>.

⁹⁴ See: http://web.balintthaz.hu/Pages/198_egyutt_mazs_alapitvany_a_masodik_generacio_tamogatasrol.

⁹⁵ See: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/hungarian-court-blocks-holocaust-denial-websites/>.

difficult topics. A day of “Remembrance of the Holocaust and Prevention of Crimes against Humanity” is observed in public schools.⁹⁶

- 4. **Hate Crime:** Key elements of the EU 2008 Framework Decision⁹⁷ relating to hate crimes have been transposed at the national level. The State investigates and prosecutes the vandalisation of Holocaust memorials.
- 5. **Hate Speech:** Key elements of the EU 2008 Framework Decision relating to Holocaust denial have been transposed at the national level.⁹⁸ However, State authorities do not provide guidelines to internet providers on the removal of offensive content.

⁹⁶ See : <https://www.coe.int/en/web/holocaust/home?desktop=true>.


⁹⁷ See: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:%3A32008F0913>.

⁹⁸ See: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698043/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)698043_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698043/EPRS_BRI(2021)698043_EN.pdf).

- 6. **Media:** There are national laws and guidelines against Holocaust denial, distortion, and trivialisation in the media and Holocaust Remembrance Day is recognised. However, there are no direct measures against using dehumanising imagery in social media.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Educational authorities should provide guidance materials and in-service teacher training on addressing contemporary antisemitism through Holocaust education and encourage schools to cooperate with CSOs in school initiatives on the topic.
2. Authorities should develop mechanisms for monitoring and penalising hate speech, Holocaust denial and distortion in social media.



Intercultural Dialogue

OVERVIEW

The relationship between Jewish and Christian religious leaders has been strong for decades. There is space and opportunity for interfaith dialogue, which is not discouraged by the government, although there is no official framework for it. One exception is the National Religious Tourism Committee, which was recently founded by the State and includes

directors of two Jewish religious organisations (MAZSIHISZ and EMIH) as committee members. Interfaith events, like the ecumenical prayer week in January,⁹⁹ are encouraged but not supported financially.

Many religious educational institutions promote interfaith knowledge and dialogue, but this is

⁹⁹ Christian leaders welcome Rabbis to a historical Church where Jews were saved during WWII, and they pray and celebrate together. For more information, see: <https://vasarnap.hu/2021/01/24/zsido-keresz-teny-imaoraval-zarul-az-okumenikus-imahet/>.

not the result of government efforts, as the curriculum and programmes in these institutions are not regulated by the State.¹⁰⁰ Some cultural events and civil initiatives emphasise intercultural solidarity (between Roma, Jewish, and other minorities, for example),¹⁰¹ but these are not funded or promoted by the government either.

In general, the State does not promote intercultural diversity or the reduction of prejudice and discrimination against ethnic or sexual minority communities. There is no training in religious or cultural diversity for public officials and decision-makers.

ASSESSMENT OF KEY INDICATORS

- 1. Financing:** Minimal financial support is provided by national authorities for community-led projects that promote intercultural dialogue and respect for diversity. The State does not organise regular events for the purpose of multifaith dialogue.
- 2. Frameworks:** Some dialogue mechanisms are ensured between different religions/ cultures and public authorities. However, public authorities do not develop the necessary framework for dialogue through educational initiatives involving minorities nor particularly facilitate, promote, and support inter-community solidarity.
- 3. Religious and Cultural Literacy:** Policy and decision-makers within public administrations do not provide training to better understand the religious diversity within the country. Intercultural competencies are not prioritised through any policies. Government representatives do not typically demonstrate sensitivity to religious diversity in public statements.
- 4. Representation:** There is no mechanism for addressing questions linked to the training of religious leaders and teachers to ensure respect for dialogue, fundamental rights and democracy. Religious educational institutions impart knowledge about other religions and convictions but less about fundamental rights, dialogue, or democratic

principles. There are some initiatives for Jewish and other religious communities to meet and collaborate on joint projects. There are no institutional initiatives to reject antisemitic notions expressed in religious interpretations.

RECOMMENDATIONS


1. The State should ensure that religious leaders and teachers, as well as policy and decision-makers, receive interfaith/ intercultural knowledge and training in dialogue skills.
2. Public authorities should facilitate, promote and financially support inter-community solidarity programmes and projects.
3. The State should build dialogue mechanisms (communication, events, venues) between Jewish communities, other minority communities, and public authorities in social sectors, especially in cultural and educational initiatives and public policies.
4. The staff of public authorities should promote principles of diversity, inclusion, and democracy. They should be given anti-bias training and be held accountable when communicating biased statements about communities and inciting hatred and intolerance.

¹⁰⁰ See: http://real.mtak.hu/54695/1/Csepregi_Andras_u.pdf.


¹⁰¹ See: <https://www.worldjewishstravel.org/listing/bankito-festival/>.



MEDIA



KEY INDICATORS



Media

OVERVIEW

The Hungarian Constitution protects freedom of the press, but the government has undermined these guarantees through extensive legislation and the consolidation of pro-government outlets. Indeed, over the past ten years, Hungarian media's financing and ownership structure has been overhauled,¹⁰² leading to devastating results for the free press. Furthermore, in 2018, the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA)¹⁰³ was created which resulted in an unprecedented level of ownership concentration in the Hungarian media market. The foundation owns 476 media outlets, all of which were voluntarily donated by their owners to KESMA. The Media Authority did not need to review the creation of this extraordinary media giant since it was declared to be of strategic national importance.¹⁰⁴

While some private, opposition-aligned media outlets still exist, national, regional, and local media are increasingly dominated by these government-friendly channels,

which are used to smear political opponents and highlight false accusations.¹⁰⁵ The media generally takes a pro-Israel point of view and actively maintains that the government's anti-migrant policy is advantageous for the Jewish community because it protects them from Islamist threats.¹⁰⁶ Public Service Media usually condemns any speech associated with antisemitism and often groundlessly accuses politicians opposed to the Orbán government of antisemitism. Supporting the Jewish community thereby becomes the means by which to attack other minorities and perceived enemies. As for the radically antisemitic, far-right media outlets such as Kuruc.Info and Vadhajtasok.hu, it is possible to take legal action against content that unlawfully incites hatred.

Promoting faith and religious traditions is common in the Public Service Media. While this is concentrated around Christianity,¹⁰⁷ there are numerous Holocaust remembrance documentaries and sometimes Jewish holidays such as Hanukkah are mentioned.¹⁰⁸ The two umbrella organisations MAZSIHISZ and EMIH

¹⁰² See: <https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2019/12/03/new-report-hungary-dismantles-media-freedom-and-pluralism/>.

¹⁰³ See: <https://cepmf.hu/>.

¹⁰⁴ See: Máriás, Leonárd, Nagy, Krisztina, Polyák, Gábor, and Urbán, Ágnes. 2018. An Illiberal Model of Media Markets: Soft Censorship 2017. Edited by Urbán, Ágnes. Vol. 15. of Mérték Booklets. Budapest: Mérték Media Monitor Nonprofit Ltd.

¹⁰⁵ See: <https://mertek.eu/en/2019/05/02/fdesz-friendly-media-dominate-everywhere/> and <https://mertek.eu/en/2020/06/16/in-hungary-could-fake-news-take-the-place-of-soros/>.

¹⁰⁶ See: <https://pestisracok.hu/izraelbe-menekulnek-az-europai-zsidok-az-antiszemizmus-elol/>.

¹⁰⁷ See: <https://mtva.hu/2017/09/20/keresztényi-deru-es-hitval-las-a-kozmedia-ezen-az-oszon-is-megmutatja-nezoinek-es-hallgatoinak-a-keresztenyseg-ertekeit/>.

¹⁰⁸ See: <https://mtva.hu/2021/04/14/a-kozmedia-tortenelmi-filmek-kelemlekezik-a-holokauszt-magyarorszag-i-aldozataira/>.

generally represent the Hungarian Jewish community. Their leaders are basically public figures, often speaking to different media outlets about the Holocaust, historical revisionism, and/or other politically sensitive matters. Intercultural discussions are somewhat rare, but programmes occasionally focus on Jewish-Christian conversations.

ASSESSMENT OF KEY INDICATORS

- 1. Funding:** With the exception of the Public Service Media, direct State ownership has not become the rule. However, the government's control over State resources, regulatory bodies, and certain business circles means that the lines between State, government, and government-friendly businesses have become exceedingly blurred.
- 2. Holocaust Remembrance:** Holocaust Remembrance Day is commemorated in the media and the Public Service Media often reports about it. The Public Service Media also runs documentaries and other movies concerning the Holocaust.
- 3. Legislation:** Legislation regarding antisemitism in the media appears adequate. However, in practice, editorial independence is seriously endangered by commercial influences like State advertising.
- 4. Media/Responsibility of Public Figures:** Mechanisms are in place to report racist or xenophobic discourse, based on a clear legal framework.¹⁰⁹ However, enforcement is inconsistent, suggesting political bias. In addition, numerous independent monitoring bodies have highlighted the shrinking space for independent or government-critical journalism.¹¹⁰ There are cases of independent journalists resigning, while others seem to be hired explicitly for political reasons.¹¹¹ Leaked audiotaped

¹⁰⁹ See: <https://e-nmhh.nmhh.hu/e-nhh/4?urlapok/esf00120/> and https://nmhh.hu/cikk/194686/Egy_aktualis_vita_margojara_Btk_vs_Sajtotorveny.

¹¹⁰ Conclusions of the Joint International Press Freedom Mission to Hungary, December 2019, see: <https://ipi.media/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Hungary-Conclusions-International-Mission-Final.pdf> and <https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2022>.

¹¹¹ See: <https://www.szabadeuropa.hu/a/volt-mtva-dolgozo-uta-nam-nyulhatnak-barhol-nem-akarok-munka-nelkul-maradni/30957169.html>.

conversations between journalists reveal a lack of press freedom, including enforced political guidelines and off-limit topics.¹¹²

- 5. Monitoring:** A monitoring system exists. However, some CSOs question its independence.¹¹³ Incidents of open incitement to hate or violence against Jews are practically non-existent. However, the Public Service Media arguably fulfils the criteria of incitement against other groups, and pro-government outlets hold alarming viewpoints about migration, Islam, and members of the LGBTIQ+ community.
- 6. Promotion of Faith and Diversity:** Promotion of faith and religious traditions is common in the Public Service Media. It is mainly Christian, but there are monthly programmes about Judaism on the national TV channel,¹¹⁴ and national radio has a bi-weekly 30-minute show exclusively about Judaism.¹¹⁵
- 7. Training:** There does not appear to be State-organised training in place.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The National Media Authority should take proactive steps to enable the free exchange of information and opinions, as these are the best means of addressing disinformation.
2. The government should comply with the Council of Europe standards relating to the protection of media pluralism and show due regard for the editorial freedom of all public and private media.
3. The National Media Authority and the Public Service Media should publicly and promptly condemn all incidents of hate speech and verbal attacks against journalists and other media actors and put an end to the spread of smear campaigns and misinformation about CSOs, human rights defenders and those who criticise the government.

¹¹² See: <https://www.direkt36.hu/en/ne-ird-meg-semmilven-formaban-kozsi-igy-hallgatja-el-a-kormany-nak-kinos-hireket-az-allami-hirugy-nokseg/> and <https://telex.hu/belfold/2020/11/12/kozmedia-kiszivar-go-hangfelvetel-ellenzeki-osszefogas-bende-balazs>.


¹¹³ See: <https://mertek.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Mertek-Fuzetek12.pdf>.

¹¹⁴ See: <https://mediaklikk.hu/musor/azutodokremenysege/>.

¹¹⁵ See: <https://mediaklikk.hu/musor/halljadizrael/>.

4. The government should immediately restructure State advertisements, and it should refrain from funding media outlets entirely for political purposes.

5. The National Media Authority and the Hungarian Competition Authority should immediately take the necessary steps to avoid monopolies in the media market.



Religious Freedom

OVERVIEW

The EU cannot take a position on this topic because it is a national competence. The “freedom of religion or belief” policy area was added by the NOA research team since some partners felt it has a direct bearing on Jewish communities’ ability to thrive. Hungary’s Constitution explicitly protects the “freedom to choose, change, or manifest religion or belief.” However, it also states that children must be guaranteed an “upbringing based on values stemming from our country’s constitutional identity and Christian culture,” which raises doubts about the State’s neutrality.

The Fundamental Law does not differentiate between churches or congregations, including Jewish ones,¹¹⁶ and freedom of assembly is guaranteed. There is a four-tier system of categorising religious groups eligible to receive state funding and tax-exempt member donations.¹¹⁷ For example, the Hungarian Jewish Cultural Association (MAZSIKE)¹¹⁸ and the Jewish Heritage of Hungary Public Endowment

(MAZSÖK)¹¹⁹ receive State funding in addition to the religious organisations MAZSIHISZ, EMIH, and MAOIH. As previously noted, the State shows a certain level of favouritism and does not recognise or financially support many Jewish CSOs and some religious communities.

Hungary explicitly recognises the right to circumcision and observing kosher rules as components of religious freedom.¹²⁰ Prime Minister Orbán opposed the European Court of Justice’s ban on kosher slaughter,¹²¹ maintaining that the decision violates freedom of religion in the EU, and the government provides financial assistance to one of the biggest kosher slaughterhouses in the region.¹²² Therefore, the Jewish community in Hungary may practice its rituals publicly without the imminent risk of harm.

On the other hand, senior government officials continue to make statements describing the

¹¹⁶ These sections are non-binding.

¹¹⁷ Act CXXVI. of 2016 section 4/A.§ para (1)

¹¹⁸ See: <https://mazsike.hu/>.

¹¹⁹ See: <https://mazsok.hu/index.html>.

¹²⁰ See: <https://trademagazin.hu/en/magyarorszag-lett-az-europai-kos-er-husellatas-egyik-kozpontja/>.

¹²¹ See: <https://hungarytoday.hu/orban-eu-ban-on-kosher-slaughter-freedom-of-religion/>.

¹²² See: <https://apnews.com/article/europe-hungary-global-trade-europe-095b45e70dc95b2a3ca0a14679ede6f2>.

threat of a “Muslim immigration invasion,”¹²³ and there are eyewitness reports of social abuses and discrimination towards Muslims. This public disparity in attitudes towards the Jewish and Muslim communities may have an impact on their relations and lead to increased antisemitism over time.

ASSESSMENT KEY INDICATORS

- 1. Equal Treatment:** Freedom of assembly is granted by law, and there are various forms of recognition of religious groups. In this sense, Jewish groups do not face any discrimination compared to other religious groups.
- 2. Freedom of Thought or Conscience:** Rabbis receive the same benefits available to other clergy members. They are paid by

the MAZSIHISZ, which is heavily funded by the government. The Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights has developed substantial case law on discrimination.¹²⁴


- 3. Freedom to Manifest:** There is the freedom to manifest Judaism, and the government contributes to various EU development programmes, like the Hungarian Jewish Heritage Route and special events like the Maccabi Games.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Avoid favouritism in State funding. Support Jewish congregations equitably.
2. Address and sanction xenophobic campaigns which fuel hostility against minorities and create divisions.

¹²³ See: <https://24.hu/belfold/2017/12/14/semjen-zsolt-a-migracio-isz-lam-invazio/>.

¹²⁴ See: <https://www.ajbh.hu/ebff-jogesetek>.



Security

OVERVIEW

Jews in Hungary are rarely faced with serious security challenges and/or direct attacks.¹²⁵ The last one occurred in 1991 against an Israeli tourist group at the airport. Nevertheless, the

government and the Jewish community consider security as a high priority. There are a relatively large number of Jewish institutions that require constant surveillance and protection, and for this reason, security expenses are generally high. The European Jewish Congress and other organisations contribute to the security of Jewish institutions in the countryside with over

¹²⁵ See: <https://24.hu/belfold/2019/05/29/zsido-biztonsagi-szolgalat-in-dul-a-bulinegyedben/>.

EUR 100 000 in funding.¹²⁶ Other international Jewish organisations offer training seminars on security.

The Jewish community, the police, and counterterrorism forces have a close relationship, both formally and informally. Police officers protect Jewish community events and assist with security.¹²⁷ In addition, like elsewhere in Europe, the Jewish community also has its own Security Service and a Crisis Management Team that is ready to respond to any danger.¹²⁸ This team includes community leaders, physicians, psychologists, rabbis, lawyers, communications, finance, and security professionals. They cooperate closely with authorities and in the past few years, several new security measures have been implemented, including at Jewish educational institutions.¹²⁹

ASSESSMENT OF KEY INDICATORS

- 1. Collaboration:** The police make continual risk assessments. There is a protocol for exchanging information with the Jewish Security Services.
- 2. Finances:** The community's security is financed entirely from MAZSIHISZ's budget. There are examples where the State has contributed to building high-tech surveillance rooms and steel/concrete security barricades in front of important institutions. Further, the State of Israel and the World Jewish Congress also support security measures primarily by organising trainings for the security personnel. Security is one of the community's largest expenses.
- 3. Measures:** The Hungarian police put in place a dedicated police service in order to assure the security of the Jewish community. Police are present at the

headquarters of the MAZSIHISZ, and there is a separate 24/7 hotline set up between the Jewish community Security Services and the Hungarian Police.

- 4. Preventive Actions:** The Hungarian police take the security of Jewish institutions extremely seriously. There is security and police surveillance around Jewish buildings during Jewish holidays and when there is increased political tension in the Middle East. Counterterrorism forces are prepared to act immediately. For example, after the Vienna attack in 2020, the most vital Jewish institutions in Budapest were secured in less than an hour.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Provide more training for law enforcement on how to recognise, investigate, prosecute, and sentence crimes motivated by antisemitic bias.

¹²⁶ See: <https://mazsihisz.hu/hirek-a-zsido-vilagbol/mazsihisz-hirek/jelentos-fejlesztések-a-mazsihisz-biztonsági-szolgálatánál>.


¹²⁷ See: <https://www.bzsh.hu/atadtak-a-felujított-sip-utcai-rendorsegi-objektumot/>.

¹²⁸ See: <https://mazsihisz.hu/hirek-a-zsido-vilagbol/mazsihisz-hirek/eu-ropai-szinten-is-peldaertekunek-itelték-biztonsági-szolgálatunk-munkáját>.


¹²⁹ See: <https://mazsihisz.hu/hirek-a-zsido-vilagbol/mazsihisz-hirek/jelentos-fejlesztések-a-mazsihisz-biztonsági-szolgálatánál>.



SPORT



KEY INDICATORS



Sport

OVERVIEW

Antisemitic discrimination within sport associations is not typical. However, antisemitic chanting and other racist slurs still occur during certain football games.¹³⁰ In the past ten years, sport associations have become more transparent and accessible. According to the head of the Hungarian Maccabi sports club, the Jewish community does not face any limitations in organising events. This might be due to the fact that Hungarian Jews have always had a significant presence in the country's sports history with a notable past that includes figures such as Ferenc Kemény, who contributed to organising the first modern-day Olympics, or Alfréd Hajós, who won Hungary's first Olympic gold medal.

In 2019, the 15th European Maccabi Games was the biggest multisport event in Hungary, with 2311 athletes competing from 42 countries, including a record 208 Hungarians.¹³¹ Preparation for the event took several years of close cooperation between the Jewish

community and the Hungarian government, which financed the event. According to an interviewee who worked closely with the government, there were no worrisome signs of antisemitism, and the project was beneficial for the Jewish community in terms of building valuable connections with different sport associations as well as financing the development of crucial institutions.

Concerning regulations, there are rules in place to fight discrimination in almost all the bigger associations.¹³² In practice, however, they are only enforced properly if a supervisory body is involved or the association is interested in competing internationally.¹³³ For example, FIFA regulations and recommendations are implemented and enforced as the Hungarian Football Association aims to participate internationally, and the improvements have been notable.¹³⁴ One instance involves the Fradi football club, which was widely known for its fans' antisemitic rhetoric. The club now has a close relationship with Israel, and its President is committed to fighting against antisemitism.¹³⁵

¹³⁰ See: <https://www.skysports.com/football/news/12010/12413651/hungary-fined-by-fifa-and-handed-stadium-ban-for-racist-behaviour-from-supporters-against-england>.

¹³¹ See: <https://hungarytoday.hu/ader-european-maccabi-games-bu-dapest/> and <https://mzsihisz.hu/hirek-a-zsido-vilagbol/zsido-vilag/deutsch-tamas-remeljuk-hogy-a-mienk-lesz-az-eddigi-legjobb-maccabi>.

¹³² See: [http://dokumentumtar.mlsz.hu/02_Szabalyzatok/01_Mukodesi_szabalyzatok/01_Altalanos_szabalyzatok/SZMSZ_2014_3_\(20141101\).pdf](http://dokumentumtar.mlsz.hu/02_Szabalyzatok/01_Mukodesi_szabalyzatok/01_Altalanos_szabalyzatok/SZMSZ_2014_3_(20141101).pdf).

¹³³ See: <https://akibic.hu/2020/03/10/antiszemita-rigmusok-miatt-indi-tott-fegyvelmi-eljarast-az-mlsz/>.

¹³⁴ See: <https://szovetseg.mlsz.hu/hir/az-mlsz-elkotelezett-a-rasszizmus-es-a-diszkriminacio-elleni-harcban>.

¹³⁵ See: https://www.nemzetisport.hu/labdarugo_nb_i/ftc-kubator-gabor-az-antiszemizmus-ellen-szolalt-fel-2839563.

ASSESSMENT OF KEY INDICATORS

- 1. Communications:** There are occasional anti-discrimination campaigns, and the results are usually publicly acknowledged.¹³⁶
- 2. Controls and Sanctions:** There are controls and sanctions in place. However, more minor incidents may occur on a personal level and enforcement is not always consistent.¹³⁷ Nevertheless, there has been a noticeable improvement over the past ten years. For example, there are fewer incidents of antisemitic symbols and slurs in football matches.
- 3. Education:** Sport education seems to lack any notion of social responsibility, antidiscrimination, or diversity and does not emphasise sport history.
- 4. Ensuring Equal Opportunity:** The Hungarian Football Association is committed to fighting against discrimination.
- 5. Legislation:** There is legislation in force against racial discrimination in sports.¹³⁸
- 6. Networking and Cooperation:** Associations cooperate with each other, and there are conferences as well. However, there is little networking or cooperation around sport education. The Maccabi club rarely gets invited to take part in informal educational programmes, for example.
- 7. Regulation:** The Sports Act and Government Decree No. 54/2004 contain detailed provisions to prevent discrimination and ensure safety in sports associations and events. The State and municipalities share responsibility to ensure fair and equal participation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Create a centralised training programme to address discrimination and antisemitism and promote the history of Jewish Hungarians in sport.
2. Enforce internal regulations equally in every association, not only in associations with an international governing body.
3. Create a long-term action plan against racism and antisemitism enforced by sport associations.

¹³⁶ See: <https://www.mlsz.hu/hir/a-gyulolet-nem-palya-kampany-a-sportszeru-szurkolasert>.

¹³⁷ See: <https://www.standard.co.uk/sport/football/england-hungary-racism-uefa-statement-fifa-b953567.html>.

¹³⁸ See: <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a0400001.tv>.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The history of the Jewish people in Hungary dates back centuries and despite the traumatic events of the Holocaust, they remain an important part of Hungarian society. The Jewish community, currently the fourth largest in Europe, continues to take an active role in building a better future for all the country's citizens, driven by values such as openness, solidarity and inclusion. Today, Hungarian government policies are contributing to a sense of safety that is enabling Jewish life to thrive. Many aspects of the European Council Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia have been transposed into national law and stakeholders interviewed for this report gave a score of 88 out of 100 in the field of security.

Yet recent surveys on antisemitic prejudice present a mixed picture overall. A report presented in June 2022 by the European Jewish Association in partnership with the Institute of Jewish Policy Research finds Hungary the second safest and "friendliest" place for Jews to live in Europe.¹³⁹ This data corresponds with the findings of the Fundamental Rights Agency's Second Survey on Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in the EU, which states that Hungarian Jews are feeling significantly safer than before.¹⁴⁰

However, a study on antisemitic prejudice published in October 2021 by the Action and Protection League found that Hungary ranked as one of the worst of the 16 EU countries where the research was conducted.¹⁴¹ This research makes the distinction between antisemitic hate crimes and antisemitic prejudice, asserting

that prejudicial attitudes persist despite relatively low instances of reported hate crimes. Moreover, the lack of official reporting and recording mechanisms makes it difficult to accurately assess the depth of antisemitic attitudes and develop methods to counter them.

This NOA National Report Card is a benchmarking tool to identify new priorities for action and advocacy. It is important to keep in mind that the policy gaps highlighted in this report are not merely challenges but opportunities for the government to manifest its commitment to eradicating antisemitism. This is especially important in the areas of education and intercultural dialogue, which arguably have the largest impact on prejudice, particularly regarding the younger generations.

Some of those interviewed for this research expressed concern that the current sense of security for Jews in the country may be fragile, given the government's ambivalence about engaging with diverse civil society actors. Indeed, points of contact between the government and CSOs appear to be few and highly centralised. The only officially named national representative for Jewish issues is US Ambassador Szabolcs Takács, whose efforts were highly acclaimed as the head of the Hungarian IHRA delegation.¹⁴²

However, the daily work of liaising with the community and developing and implementing a National Strategy, as envisaged in the 2018 Council Declaration on the Fight Against Antisemitism,¹⁴³ requires a resourced and mandated office. This could be integrated into the Department of Civil Society Relations under the Prime Minister's supervision. Formalising this structure, as well as strengthening the consultative role of the Jewish community Roundtable, should be the cornerstones of a holistic strategy moving forward.

¹³⁹ See: <https://ejassociation.eu/eja/which-european-countries-are-best-for-jews-answers-may-surprise-you/>

¹⁴⁰ For example, "Fear for loved ones" decreased from 66% to 26% since the first survey six years earlier. See: "Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism - Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU," European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018, p.36. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf

¹⁴¹ See: https://apleu.org/files/2021/09/Antisemitic-Prejudice-in-Europe-2021_web-CORR_2022_01.pdf

¹⁴² See: <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/>

¹⁴³ See: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/06/fight-against-antisemitism-council-declaration/>

Antisemitism and racism do not exist in isolation. Both have been constructed to maintain divisions in politics, economics and culture. As history has shown, the treatment of Jewish communities can vary at different times, and the scapegoating that regularly occurs invariably contributes to contemporary antisemitic narratives. Applying the EU fundamental rights framework fairly and consistently across Member States is the only guarantor of social cohesion and stability for Jews and other communities targeted by hate.

Hungary now has an extraordinary opportunity to demonstrate its commitment by coordinating a National Strategy to prevent antisemitism and foster Jewish life, addressing the ideological underpinnings of discrimination so that a clearer path can be opened towards a more inclusive and democratic Europe.

ANNEX – STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED FOR THIS REPORT

With gratitude to the many people and institutions who contributed to this research

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