Erik H. Cohen

The Jews of France at the Turn of the Third Millenium

A Sociological and Cultural Analysis

In memory of

Prof. Annie Kriegel
After serving as my PhD advisor, she devoted herself unstintingly to my studies on Jewish education and especially on French Jewry, from 1986 until her death in 1995. I cannot exaggerate her historical and sociological input.

Prof. Shlomo (Seymour) Fox
His help in the pioneer research on French Jewry during 1986-1988, when I finished my studies at Jerusalem Fellows, was decisive and most influential, especially in helping me address the community leadership dimension of the results.

It was an honor and an immense opportunity to learn under the inspiration of both these mentors.
May these pages serve as a modest reminder of their blessed memory!

ERIK H. COHEN

THE JEWS OF FRANCE AT THE TURN OF THE THIRD MILLENIUM

A SOCIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL ANALYSIS

The Rappaport Center for Assimilation Research
and Strengthening Jewish Vitality
Bar Ilan University – Faculty of Jewish Studies
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Erik H. Cohen

The Jews of France at the Turn of the Third Millenium

A Sociological and Cultural Analysis

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Preface

Dr. Erik Cohen was educated in France, where he gained his B.A. and M.A. degrees at the University of Lyon and a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Nanterre. He teaches at the School of Education of Bar Ilan University, and is involved in multi-facted areas of research. These include youth culture and leisure; Jewish education; educational evaluation; educational tourism; peace education, and methodological development in multidimensional analysis. In this publication, Dr. Cohen returns to a realm of research that has commanded his attention in the past: The Jewish Community of France.

Currently numbering slightly less than 500,000 persons, the Jewish community of France is, after Israel and the United States, the third largest Jewish community in the world. However, it has not received the attention it deserves, from the rest of world Jewry and from Jewish leaders and policy makers. One reason for this may be linguistic: the status of English as the primary foreign language studied in Israeli schools and as *lingua franca* on the internet facilitates communication between Jews in Israel and in English-speaking countries. The mass immigration of Russian-

speaking Jews to Israel and (to a lesser extent) to North America has firmly imprinted the existence of that community upon the consciousness of other Jews. The Jews of France do not benefit as much from open avenues of communication, being – quite naturally – Francophone; and the influx of French Jews to Israel has not been of similar quantitative effect upon Israeli society as that of Jews from the FSU. Thus, the Jews of France remain almost *terra incognita* for many of their brethren in other lands.

The present study by Dr. Erik Cohen is an important contribution to changing this reality, to creating awareness of the characteristics and qualities of the Jewish community of France and thus to enable that community to take its rightful place in the decision-making process of Jewish leaders throughout the world. It is a privilege for the Rappaport Center to be able to include this important study among our publications and thus to facilitate processes which are at the heart of our Center's concerns.

The marriage of research and analysis as a basis for critique and planning is characteristic of the basic orientation of the Rappaport Center at Bar Ilan University. As we understand it, assimilation is not an inexorable force of nature, but the result of human choices. For many Jews, maintaining Jewish involvements and affiliations seems less attractive than pursuing the alternatives open to them in the pluralistic societies of contemporary Europe and America. We are convinced that the tendency of many Jews to disassociate from Jewishness reflects real flaws and weaknesses existing in various areas and institutions of Jewish life today. However, such weakness itself is man-made; having understood current dynamics, it is important to move beyond analysis, in the direction of mending and repair. These two aspects are reflected in

our name: The Rappaport Center for Assimilation Research and Strengthening Jewish Vitality, founded in Bar Ilan University in the spring of 2001 at the initiative of Ruth and Baruch Rappaport, who, through the manifold activities of the Rappaport Center, have made an important contribution to ensuring the future well-being of the Jewish people worldwide. May G-d grant them and their family much health and well-being, and may they continue to derive a justified sense of pleasure and accomplishment from their manifold philanthropic activities.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those whose efforts have enabled the publication of this paper: Ms. Iris Aharon, organizational co-ordinator of the Rappaport center, who was also in charge of proofreading and co-ordination with the press; Mr. Yehonatan Chipman (text editor), Ben Gassner studio (cover graphics), and Art Plus press.

Zvi Zohar, Director
The Rappaport Center for Assimilation Research
and Strengthening Jewish Vitality

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How can we possibly thank all those who donated their time and shared their wisdom and knowledge? We hope that this study will serve as an expression of our deepest gratitude. The names of those who assisted us are indicated at the end of this report. We hope we have forgotten no one.

Data for this study were initially collected in the course of a study commissioned by Le Fonds Social Juif Unifié and the United Jewish Appeal of France in collaboration with Research and Evaluation Office of the Aliyah Department of the Jewish Agency for Israel, with the support of the L.A. Pincus Fund for Jewish Education in the Diaspora. The Pincus Fund translated the original French reports of research projects conducted in 2003-2005 into English. This translation served as a preliminary basis for the present text, although the manuscript has been thoroughly reorganized and updated with further data and analysis collected during studies conducted under the auspices of AMI, the Department of Education and the Department of Aliyah of the Jewish Agency. This study would not have been possible without the financial and particularly moral support of these

institutions and their managing staff. I would like to thank each of these agencies for their generous support.

My thanks also go to Maurice Ifergan for his contribution in the preparation of the French report; to Allison Ofanansky for firstly editing the English manuscript; to the School of Education at Bar Ilan University for providing me with numerous opportunities to present and discuss the results of this research; to Chaim Zohar, for spending many hours with me sharing his knowledge of French Jewry; and, last but not least, to the Rappaport Center and its Director, Prof. Zvi Zohar, for encouraging me to prepare this publication in English.

Introduction: The Jewish Community of France

The Jewish community of France is the second largest and one of the most vibrant Diaspora communities in the world today.[1] While the other major Diaspora communities—the United States, Russia, Argentina, Canada, and the United Kingdom—are all predominantly Ashkenazic, the French Jewish community represents the largest predominantly Sephardic (over 70%) Diaspora population in the world. Paris and its suburbs, where the preponderance of French Jews live, is the largest Sephardic-Jewish urban center in the Diaspora. Due to its numerical significance and its unique history, an understanding of the values

1 According to DellaPergola's estimate (2004), France is home to just under half a million Jews, while Russia has just under a quarter of a million Jews. Other sources estimate the Jewish population of Russia as significantly higher, possibly making it the second largest Diaspora. Thus, the U.S. State Department 2005 Religious Freedom Report estimates between 600,000 and 1 million Jews remaining in Russia. The Jewish Virtual Library website reports 717,000 Jews in Russia. Based on my familiarity with DellaPergola's work and methods, I accept his figure as the most accurate, but recognize the inherent difficulty in assessing the number of Jews remaining in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

and identity of French Jewry is critical to the field of contemporary Jewish studies. This study, based on comprehensive empirical surveys of the Jews of France, offers rich data and analysis on this fascinating segment of the Jewish population, presenting the most recent data available on the Jews of France. The empirical data are analyzed using sophisticated multi-dimensional tools and techniques, facilitating the development of a typology of French Jewry. The axiological typology developed, based on universal values, allows for comparisons of French Jewry to other populations. Thus, this study offers an in-depth survey of the French Jewish population and a theoretical platform for international or cross-cultural comparisons.

A Brief History of the Jews in France

Archeological evidence of Jews living in the region of what is now France has been found from as early as the first century CE. Evidently, Jews moved throughout the Roman Empire, and eventually to the Gaul region, following the defeat of the Israelite kingdom and the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE. Though their numbers in the Gaul region remained low, the Jews developed important trade enterprises and professions, and some had close relations with the royal families and their courts. As the Catholic Church gained political strength in the area, from the sixth century CE on, Jews were subject to legal restrictions and taxes, as well as to periodic violent attacks, forced conversion attempts, blood libels, and expulsions. Nevertheless, Jewish communities slowly grew through immigration from other European countries and some conversion to Judaism, and the Jews maintained relative autonomy over their daily lives. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, this Jewry experienced a

golden age of Torah study, producing such luminaries as Rashi[2] and his disciples, as well as famous religious schools in Paris and Provençe. However, the Crusades sparked waves of violence against Jews, and in the late Middle Ages a series of expulsion orders were issued against the Jews of this region, eventually reducing them to a few small, scattered and isolated communities subject to restrictive laws such as those requiring them to wear distinctive clothing and confining those who did not leave to ghettos. As the French Crown annexed territories, neighboring Jewish communities were brought into the kingdom. Thus, while the Paris region had very few Jews, there were larger Jewish communities in such areas as Alsace-Lorraine, the city of Metz, Bordeaux, the papal cities and surrounding regions of Avignon, Carpentras, Cavaillon and the Comtat Venaissin. Due to their important economic role and the ability of the new territories to maintain some control over local laws, Jews were allowed to remain in these areas, despite the official expulsion of Jews. For example, in Bordeaux, Sephardi Jews were tolerated under the euphemism "Portugese merchants". Over the centuries, the French Jewish population fluctuated from highs of up to 100,000 to lows of several thousand individuals. On the eve of the French Revolution there were an estimated 40,000 Jews in France, primarily in two regions: the German/Ashkenazic Jews in Alsace-Lorraine and Sephardic Jews in the southern part of the country *(historical background compiled from Encylopedia Judaica, 1971; Schechter, 2003; Wikipedia, 2006a).*

2 Rashi (an acronym for Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki) wrote commentaries on the entire Torah and Talmud which, to this day, are considered among the most important sources in Jewish religious study.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the ideas of the Enlightenment, which led to the eventual fall of the *Ancien Régime*, also shifted attitudes and official policies towards the Jews. Thus, in 1791, shortly after the French Revolution, France became the first European country to grant political emancipation to the Jews. According to the philosophy of the French Republic, this newly granted civic equality required that all allegiances to religion or ethnic group be subordinated to allegiance to the State. As Clermont-Tonnerre stated in 1789, "We must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and accord everything to Jews as individuals… the presumed status of every man resident in a country is to be a citizen" (quoted in Hunt, 1996:88). Welcoming the freedoms and political rights accorded them by the Republic, the Jews of France assimilated into this secular political culture, which relegated Jewish identity and ritual practice to the private realm. This philosophy still guides the cultural political environment of France, and forms the ideological background against which the modern Jewish French community has emerged.

The Reign of Terror that followed the Revolution saw the suppression of all religious institutions, including Jewish ones. After Napoleon crowned himself emperor, he established the Central Consistory (Consistoire Israélite), that centralized supervision of local Jewish communities and convened an assembly of Jewish rabbis and leaders, named after the ancient Israelite governing body the Sanhedrin, to endorse and legitimize his policies for integration and assimilation of France's Jews as full citizens of the regime (for example, regarding intermarriage, usury, and French civil law: Encyclopedia Judaica, 1971; Hyman, 1998). The consistorial system established by Napoleon had profound,

long-lasting implications for the structure of community life of modern French Jewry. "To this day French consistorial Judaism has maintained religious diversity, a situation which has always curbed the few attempts to establish dissident, Reform or Orthodox, communities. This flexibility later enabled the integration of immigrants from North Africa". (*Encyclopedia Judaica*, 1971: 29).

Jews from other European countries and from Russia moved to France, although not in great numbers. The immigrants were often criticized, not only by French Gentiles but also by native French Jews, for not assimilating quickly enough or thoroughly enough into French culture, for remaining ethnically and religiously distinct. In fact, instilling French cultural values and patriotism towards the State were important goals of Jewish educational and community institutions in France (Hyman, 1998). These goals were achieved with much success, and the Jews of France were, on the whole, well acculturated and strongly patriotic. During this period the term "Israelite", perceived as more neutral, was generally preferred to the term "Jew". The dominant French Jewish institutions, such as the Alliance Israélite Universelle created in 1860, distanced themselves from Jewish nationalism as embodied by the emerging Zionist movement.

A century after their political emancipation, the Jews of France largely viewed themselves as fully integrated French citizens. French Jewry moved into the heart of France both geographically—concentrating more in the Paris region, particularly after Germany annexed Alsace-Lorraine—and economically, becoming part of the French bourgeois and academic elite. However, the persistence of anti-Semitism was revealed, particularly during the infamous "Dreyfus Affair". This

began in 1894 with the accusation and conviction of treason against Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the French Army. Although Dreyfus was eventually cleared of the charges, the affair brought to the surface expressions of virulent and widespread anti-Semitism, including riots against Jews.

Nevertheless, conditions were better for the Jews in France than in most of Europe. In 1905 (partly in reaction to the Dreyfus Affair), France passed a law separating Church and State. French Jews became prominent in artistic and literary circles. Jews came to France from Russia following the Communist Revolution and between the First and Second World Wars. As anti-Semitism moved across Europe, Jewish immigration to France from other European countries increased dramatically, by some estimates doubling the French Jewish population (Encyclopedia Judaica, 1971; Schor, 1985; Hyman, 1998). But then, under the occupation of France by Nazi Germany and with the collaboration of the Vichy regime, more than a quarter of France's Jewish population was deported or killed and the educational and institutional structure of the community was almost completely destroyed (Cohen, 1991). The psychological impact of the betrayal by Frenchmen of the slogan of *liberté, fraternité*, and *égalité* was no less devestating.

After World War II, displaced Jewish French citizens returned, along with refugees from central and eastern European countries (Hyman, 1979; 1998). However, the revitalization of the French Jewish community was brought about largely by the mass immigration of Jews from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria during the 1950s and 1960s.

Jews had lived in North Africa since the period of the Roman empire. Under Muslim rule, Jews were tolerated but relegated to second-class status. Their political, economic and religious

freedoms and security varied under successive local Muslim rulers. They were often restricted to *mullahs* (ghettos) and taxed heavily. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, large numbers of Jews fled to North Africa from the Iberian peninsula. In addition to their religious basis in Rabbinic and mystical teachings (Talmud and Kabbalah), the North African Jewish communities were influenced by the many cultures with whom they came in contact: Oriental, Arab, Berber, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian.

France annexed Algeria and established protectorates over Tunisia and part of Morocco. Many Jews of the Maghreb, particularly in Algeria, became French citizens during this time. The Alliance Israelite Universelle established schools for Jews in French North Africa, which emphasized French language and culture. As each of these countries gained independence and came under the sway of distinctly Muslim-Arab nationalist movements (Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, Algeria in 1962) the majority of Jews left, most migrating either to Israel or to France. Of those who remained in North Africa after its independence, most left following Israel's Six Day War (1967). Today, only a few thousand Jews remain in North Africa. Though often viewed as a homogenous population, each of these nations has its own distinctive history, influencing in subtle ways the character of contemporary French Jewry. For example, Jews from Algeria, which had been a department of France for over a century and was settled by Europeans, tend to be somewhat more thoroughly assimilated into general French society than those from Morocco or Tunisia (Cohen, in press). Although the Jews of North Africa who arrived in France are citizens, fluent in French, and familiar with the culture, patriotic and supportive of the ideals of the Republic, they and their children also have a strong sense of Jewish identity

and connection to Israel (Bernheim, 1997; Shurkin, 2000; Laborde, 2001; Cohen, 1986, 1991). Their presence was a major catalyst for the rebuilding of Jewish institutions in France: synagogues, community centers and Talmud Torahs (Hyman, 1998).

Today, together with France as a whole, the Jewish population is struggling with fundamental questions related to national, ethnic and religious identity. Based on current empirical data, this study explores various facets of the demographics, community structure, identity, and values of French Jews.

The Current Social, Political and Cultural Climate

Before turning to a discussion of the particulars of demographics and indicators of Jewish identity explored in the survey, we shall take a brief look at the socio-political climate in which contemporary French Jewry exists. It should be noted that the survey was conducted in January 2002, which was a stressful period for the Jewish community of France (see, for example, Taguieff, 2002; Trigano, 2002). "Never before, in post-war France, have anti-Jewish elements emerged in so many social settings and encountered so little political and intellectual resistance, as since the autumn of 2000", wrote Pierre-André Taguieff, director of research at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique, in January 2002. A study of anti-Semitism in France recorded 300 "hostile acts" against Jews in the Paris region between September 2000 and November 2001 (*Observatoire du monde juif*, 2001; CRIF 2004; UEJF 2002).[3] Most of these hostile acts were

3 A list of incidents affecting the country's Jewish communities since the beginning of the Second Intifada was first published in the *Observatoire du monde juif*, Bulletin No. 1, November 2001. In February 2002, the front

committed by young Muslim immigrants, who ideologically link their violence towards Jews with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In addition to physical attacks, the French Jewish community feels itself on the defensive in light of the pervasive anti-Israel sentiment, particularly in the Left and on university campuses in France. The ongoing debate as to a possible distinction between "anti-Zionism" and "anti-Semitism" touches on deep issues related to French values. As mentioned earlier, French Republican philosophy demands loyalty to the State of France alone, and French-Jewish identification with the State of Israel may be considered to some extent disloyal.

Even strong identification with a local ethnic community may be seen as conflicting with French values. Jews are sometimes accused of being "communitarian". This label, as pointed out by Wieviorka (1998, 1999), implies having to choose between "the one and indivisible Republic and the community". In this context, Jews (and members of other minorities) may find their loyalty to the State questioned on the ground of their involvement with their ethnic or religious community.

Not only the French-Jewish community, but all of contemporary French society is facing this "identity crisis". The Jews of France form their individual and communal identities within the context of the larger debates surrounding multi-culturalism, religious fundamentalism, Republican values, and international politics.

page headline of *Le Monde* referred to a study of antisemitism in France (*Le Monde*, Tuesday, February 19, 2002). As for antisemitic acts in France, data collected in 2002 indicate that 21% of French Jews suffered antisemitism personally during the previous five years. This is a figure of great weight, substantially confirming the trend recorded during 2000 and 2001.

Relationship with Israel

A major aspect of contemporary Jewish identity in any contemporary Diaspora community is the relationship with Israel. In the international context, Israel-Diaspora relations have undergone a series of stages. Zionist ideology predicted and advocated the "negation of the Exile" following the establishment of a Jewish state. As it became apparent that significant numbers of Jews, particularly in Western democracies, were not going to relocate to the State of Israel, a new type of relationship had to be established between the State of Israel and Jews who voluntarily remained in Diaspora communities. Emphasis was placed on financial and political support for the new state and its immigrants. The Six Day War of 1967 marked a turning point and a new stage in Israel-Diaspora relations. Following Israel's victory, feelings of pride and identification with Israel intensified (Lederhendler, 2000), one indicator of which was the sharp increase in participation in educational tours to Israel during the years following the war (Cohen & Cohen, 2000; Cohen, 2002).

Once it was recognized and accepted that significant numbers of Jews would choose to remain in Diaspora communities, Israel began sending emissaries to work in Jewish educational settings throughout the Jewish world, further increasing interaction between Israel and the Diaspora. By the 1980s, a reciprocal relationship had developed between Israel and Jewish Diaspora communities. Israel offered both a refuge for Jews (e.g. from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia) and a central reference point for Jewish identity. Diaspora Jews became more vocal regarding social and political events in Israel, and began donating to specific causes rather than to general funds. Following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, the relationship between Israel and the

various Diaspora communities was again reassessed. Questions regarding the conflict between the obligation of Diaspora Jews to unconditionally support Israel as opposed to their right to criticize events there, and issues of loyalty to Israel during times of crisis, were vigorously debated in the Jewish press and in Jewish communities throughout the world.

The Israel-Diaspora relationship has not only changed over time: it is not homogenous throughout the Diaspora. Attitudes towards and images of Israel are impacted by the host societies within which the various Diaspora Jewish communities live, and by the nature of the local Jewish communities and their educational systems. The relationship of French Jews to the State of Israel, explored in-depth in the surveys analyzed here, is inextricably tied to the social climate and political culture of France.

Methodology: The Surveys

The majority of the data presented in this study was collected in the course of a large socio-demographic and attitudinal survey conducted among a representative sample of French Jewry during the month of January 2002. This comprehensive survey included questions on issues such as Jewish identity, Jewish life, Jewish education and relationship to Israel. Potential interviewees were selected on the basis of family name.

Using a list of over 85,000 donors provided by the AUJF in February 2001 and another list provided by the Rabbinical Council of Nice in April 2001, we drew up a geographical distribution of valid names and addresses. Ten Jewish family names (five Ashkenazic and five Sephardic) were chosen. We searched for these names in every French Department on the lists of electronic directories available on the Internet. A comparison of the two lists indicated that the geographic distribution of the AUJF donors was basically the same as that of the ten selected patronymics. The number of Jewish patronymics was then increased to 50 (25 Ashkenazic and 25 Sephardic)—the same patronymics as had been previously used in a more limited study of French

Jews conducted in 1988 (Cohen, 1991). Inclusion of all variant spellings and composite forms of these names generated 685 distinct patronymics. Families with these 685 names represent approximately 17% of the households in the AUJF list.

30 French Departments were then selected for the survey: the seventeen that had been included in the 1988 study, plus thirteen additional Departments from across the country. Using Minitel (an online service provided by the French Poste, Téléphone et Télécommunications), we searched for these 685 patronymics, identifying 32,026 addresses in 30 departments. From this preliminary list, names were randomly chosen from each department. Each address was given a random number ranging from 1 to 10 million. The addresses for each department were then put in order according to the random numbers. For each region, we selected the first *x* addresses (*x* being proportionate to the total number of addresses in that region). The final sample thus reflected the regional presence of Jews of France. The list of names selected from the electronic directories and the AUJF list yieded virtually the same structure of regional distribution.

A pilot study of 15 households taken from the random lists was conducted in order to enable adjustments to the final questionnaire. Once the questionnaire was finalized, the full study was conducted via telephone between January 13-31 2001 by a team of 23 interviewers, supported by three administrators and five examiners. A total of 7,907 phone calls were made. In order to be included as a participant in the study, potential interviewees had to be Jewish and/or Israelite (according to their own self-definition) and either the head of the household or his/her spouse. The response ratio to the phone survey was 1:7. The scientific commission that oversaw the survey considered this ratio to be

more than sufficient to ensure that the sample and the data were accurate and representative.

3,447 potential interviewees were absent at the time of the call. 262 telephone numbers were incorrect. 351 were not heads of households and therefore did not meet our criteria for participation. 1130 potential interviewees (25.3%) refused to participate in the study after hearing the interviewer's introduction, even before answering the initial question concerning self-definition. This refusal rate was higher than that in 1988, which was 16.2%. It is possible that the climate of hostility felt by the Jews of France on the street and in the media in recent years dissuaded some from taking part in the study. 580 asked that the interview take place at a later date, but were not contacted again. 54 people began the interview but did not complete it, and therefore their responses are not included in the final analysis.

The first question asked was whether or not the potential interviewee is Jewish. The patronymic approach was only a first screening, as clearly not everyone in the phone directory with a last name common among Jews is necessarily Jewish. Of those individuals with Jewish patronymics who were contacted, 846 said they were not Jewish (18.9% of those contacted).[4] In the 1988 survey, 15.5% of those contacted said they were not Jewish or Israelite. None of those contacted who said they are not Jewish

4 It might be hypothesized that the reason why these individuals replied in this fashion was out of fear or suspicion as to the survey's bona fides. It must be said that all of those contacted by phone were able to check the survey's credentials with the FSJU. However, in total just 15 people called the phone number for the FSJU office in order to check that this was in fact a survey being undertaken by French Jewish community institutions. This figure strengthens the assumption that these 846 people were not Jewish.

or Israelite were included on the AUJF national list. It is therefore plausible to say that the populations contacted in the course of the two studies are comparable.

1132 phone interviews were completed with heads of household in the 30 geographical French Departments. A comparison of the percentage of certain categories with absolute numbers available on Jewish life in France provided an external validation. We strove to achieve gender balance (577 men and 555 women participated in the study) and age distribution reflecting the percentages of the previous study.

The data gathered in the study was weighted in order to accord with certain traditional socio-demographic distributions. A table presenting the main socio-demographic indicators before and after weighting is given in the appendix.

Additional Studies

A follow-up study commissioned by the Jewish Agency was conducted between January 25 and February 24 2005 (Cohen, 2005a). We were able to re-interview 600 (53%) of the heads of households interviewed in the first study, ensuring a high level of representation of the survey population. In a very few cases the spouses of the original respondents were interviewed in the follow-up study.

Additional data considered in this analysis are drawn from an ongoing survey of participants in Israel Experience youth educational tours (Cohen & Cohen, 2000; Cohen, 2008); a survey of French tourists commissioned by AMI in 2004; a study commissioned by the Jewish Agency in 2005 concerning attitudes towards Israel and particularly towards immigration among French Jews practicing "liberal professions" (primarily law and

medicine; Cohen, 2005b); a study of French students (high school and post-high school) studying in Israel commissioned by Sacta-Rashi Foundation; and last but not least, a study commissioned by the Fonds Social Juif Unifié conducted in January-February 2007 among 980 heads of Jewish households (national sample).

Demography of the French Jewish Community Today

Size of Population

How many Jews are there in France? Answering even this seemingly simple and straightforward question raises numerous difficulties and related issues (for details on the difficulties of demographic studies of Jews in modern France, see Bensimon and Sergio Della Pergola 1986: 11-21; Tapia 1977). The official French census, by law, does not record religious affiliation. A statistical study of Jewish community organizations (synagogue, community center, association) omits those who are not members of community institutions. A survey of larger social circles in which Jews are present entails the inherent problem of locating and accessing these circles. Interviewing a representative sample of the entire French population and asking interviewees if they consider themselves Jewish or if they were born Jewish would be exorbitantly expensive in terms of money and time. It was therefore necessary to adopt a research strategy that was both reliable on the scientific level and realistic on the operational level.

In order to ensure the highest possible degree of accuracy, we used three methods to estimate the number of Jews in France. The first two take a conventional, reliable approach. The third method is more innovative but also more problematic. We mention it nevertheless because it evaluates the number of Jews of France in a reasonably range close to the first two evaluations.

The first method is the patronymic, based on family names, as described above. This method was used in a study carried out between 1972 and 1978 by Bensimon and Della Pergola (1986: 35) as the primary tool in the creation of their sample. Based on this method, they estimated that at the time there were 535,000 Jews in France.[5]

In our online search for the 685 Jewish patronymics identified, we found 32,026 listings in the 30 selected Departments, representing approximately 17% of Jewish households in France, that is, a total of 188,388 households.[6] We made a complementary Minitel search based on the ten most common Jewish family names in all 95 Departments, including those overseas. In this search we identified 16,164 addresses. Of these, those households identified in one of the 30 Departments covered by the in-depth study represented 82.2% of the total population. While we know that Jewish culture and education are much less developed in the 65 Departments not covered in the in-depth study,[7] an estimation

5 To simplify matters, this study, which was undertaken in the field from 1972 to 1978, will be referred to in subsequent tables by the average date of 1975. See below the estimates by Della Pergola, Rebhun and Tolts (2000) for 2000-2010. These figures are very close to those of the present study.

6 The figures were 50 baseline patronymics and 685 variants and derivatives generated by these patronymics.

7 For example, Jewish schools are practically non-existent in these departments, as they lack a minimum student population. According to the

of 17.8% of French Jewish households in these 65 Departments seems high; however, as no other figures are available for these Departments, we shall adhere to this estimate. Thus, adding to the 188,388 Jewish households mentioned above 17.8% for the other Departments, we obtain a figure of 229,182 households. As we learned in the survey, the average density of the households in the Departments covered by the present study is 2.57 (again, assuming that Jewish households in the other Departments have the same average density); hence, we arrive at an estimation of 588,997 Jews in France.

The second method is based on the number of students in Jewish schools. In 2002, 28,391 Jewish children studied in Jewish schools in France (personal communication, Patrick Petit-Ohayon, Department of Education, FSJU, July 2002). We also found that 26.2% of children and adolescents who live in households covered by our study attend a Jewish educational institution. We therefore obtain a figure of 108,400 for the number of Jewish children in this age group (3-18). The children of this age group represent 22% of people in the households studied. We thus obtain a figure of 492,000 for the number of Jews in France. To this figure, we must add 17.8% as above, thereby obtaining a figure of 598,540 for the number of Jews in France. Finally, the survey revealed that due to intermarriage, approximately 13% of members of Jewish households are non-Jews. Subtracting this 13% yields a final estimate of 520,730 Jews in France.

figures of the Department of Education of the FSJU, only 426 students who attend Jewish schools live in one of the 65 Departments not covered by the in-depth study, representing 1.5% of the population of Jewish schools in France. Furthermore, the rate of intermarriage is higher in these 65 Departments.

The third method was suggested to us by our colleague Chris Kooyman, of Stichting Joods Maatschappelijk Werk (a Jewish organization based in the Netherlands). This method uses an algorithm to estimate the total population based on a comparison of two independent lists, in this case the Minitel and the AUJF.[8] Using this method, we obtained an estimate of 559,848 Jews in France. This methodology, while interesting, has two problematic aspects. The first relates to the particular nature of the Alps-Maritime region, which cannot be generalized to other regions with any certainty. The second problem is even more serious. In the framework of the present study, it was not possible to verify whether or not members of various sub-groups (i.e. age groups) were equally likely to be included in one of the sample populations. The results are, therefore, only indicative. Nevertheless, as the estimate is in fact similar to the estimates of the other two methodologies, it further strengthens our estimate. A summary of the findings using the three methods is shown in Table 1.

8 The algorithm used to compute the population is as follows (see also Seber, 1973: 59-70; Bishop, Feinberg & Holland, 1975; Smit, Brunenberg & van der Heijden, 1996):
a) number of identical patronymics = x population 1
b) population 2 = total population x

Table 1: Population of the Jews of France:
A Summary of the Methodologies

	Weight of selected Patronymics	**Extrapolation from number of students in Jewish day schools**	**Minitel/ AUJF comparison**
Estimated population	512,427	520,730	559,848

As already noted, the 65 Departments not covered by the in-depth survey undoubtedly represent less than the 17.8% of the Jewish population of France. It is thus plausible to conclude that in 2002 the population of the Jews of France was approximately 500,000.[9] If non-Jewish spouses are included, the "expanded" Jewish community may consist of approximately 575,000 individuals.[10]

9 Della Pergola et al. (2000) came up with the following results (projected average birthrate, zero migratory balance – assuming that the number of immigrants and those returning from Israel correspond to the figure of new immigrants from France).

Year (January 1)	Population
1995	525,000
2000	520,000
2010	502,000
2020	482,000
2030	455,000

10 Based on a SOFRES study of the entire French population, in 1977 Emeric Deutsch estimated that there were between 600,000 and 700,000 Jews in France. Deutsch's estimation was based on the level of belonging to Jewish identity through culture, conviction or tradition. In this discussion, reference must be made to Schnapper's (1987) comment about the demography of the Jews, which in connection with an IFOP study of the Protestants underscored the problems of studying a small group which is scattered

This estimate represents a decrease of 6.5% compared to the evaluation made 25 years ago by Bensimon and Della Pergola. It should be noted that the present study covers 30 Departments, thereby facilitating a more accurate estimation. That being the case, there are demographic factors which may be responsible for the decline in the Jewish population of France; First, the rate of reproduction has declined. In 1967-71, the birth rate in the Paris region was 1.7 children among Jewish women born in North Africa and 1.2 children per Jewish woman born in Europe. In 2002, we found the following rates for the number of children with mothers in these age groups: 18-29 years: 0.49; 30-39 years: 1.67; 40-49: 2.22; 50-59: 2.41; 60 years and over: 2.42. It is known that, in order to ensure the reproduction of a population, an average of 2.1 children per woman is necessary.

Second, over the last 20 years, the Jewish population has grown older (as will be discussed later), thereby lowering the rate of natural increase; The third reason is emigration. Between 1975 and 2002, more than 35,000 French Jews migrated to Israel (though some returned to France), and an unknown number settled in other countries, particularly in North America. Since the late 1960s, Jewish immigration to France practically ceased, though there were small numbers of immigrants from Morocco and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s.

Nevertheless, the figures for the Jewish population of France are very stable. This is not the case in many other Diaspora populations, as documented in the comparison between 1970

throughout the overall French body. The IFOP study identified two million individuals with close connections to Protestantism, while sociologists generally estimate their number at 800,000. The difference in estimates explains the "standard elasticity of a group's symbolic identity".

and 2004 figures published by the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute (2005). For example, a number of Diaspora communities, such as the US, Argentina, Hungary, South Africa and the former Soviet Union (particularly Russia and the Ukraine), are experiencing significant demographic decreases. In a few, most notably Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Australia and New Zealand, the Jewish population has grown over the last several decades.

Having established a reasonable estimate of the number of Jews in France (between 500,000 and 550,000 Jews), we may begin to examine the makeup of this population in greater detail.

Country of Birth

Twenty years ago, the Jewish community of France consisted largely of immigrants from North Africa. Between 1955 and 1965, the Jewish population of France doubled with the arrival of Jews from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, but by the end of the 1960s, as mentioned, immigration of Jews to France quickly dropped off. In 1988, 60% of the heads of French-Jewish households were born outside metropolitan France. By 2002, this number had dropped to barely over half (50.25%). Taking into account the number of children under the age of 18 in Jewish families, most of whom were born in metropolitan France, one can say that, in terms of absolute numbers, the majority of French Jews were born in metropolitan France. The largest percentage of those born outside metropolitan France were born in Algeria, followed Morocco and Tunisia. It should be noted that almost 2% of heads of Jewish households residing in France today were born in Israel. Virtually all (96.34%) are French citizens. Table 2 shows the place of birth of French Jews and, for immigrants, the year of immigration.

Table 2: French Jewish Population by Place of Birth and Year of Immigration

	France	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia	Others	Total
Percentage of Sample	**49.71**	**11.69**	**20.75**	**10.71**	**7.14**	**100**
Migrated in 1920-1955	-	8	15	6	37	15
Migrated in 1956-1961	-	23	26	38	21	27
Migrated in1962	-	6	52	8	4	26
Migrated in 1963	-	4	4	6	2	4
Migrated in 1964-1970	-	26	1	36	5	15
Migrated in 1971-present	-	34	1	6	31	14
Total	-	100	100	100	100	100

Geographic Distribution

French Jews tend to concentrate in certain geographic regions of the country. 72% of the Jewish population of France lives in just nine of the 30 Departments studied. More than a quarter of French Jews (25.81%) resides in Paris. Four Departments in the Paris region are also home to relatively large percentages of the Jewish population: Hauts-de-Seine (7.10%), Val-de-Marne (6.75%), Seine-St-Denis (5.63%) and Val-d'Oise (3.52%). Other major Jewish population centers are Lyon, Marseilles, Nice and Strasbourg. The majority of the remaining 28% of the Jewish population is distributed among the other 21 Departments studied. Few live in the other Departments. In the provinces, the highest Jewish populations are found in Bouches du Rhone (8.72%), Alpes-Maritimes (6.68%), Rhone (4.08%), and Bas-Rhin (3.80%).

We found that the Jews living in Paris are somewhat more economically and culturally integrated than those living in the periphery of the capital or the provinces. The reasons for this need to be examined in future research.

Age

As has the rest of the French population, the Jewish population of France has grown older in recent years, as shown in Table 3. Indeed, the "papa-boom" seen throughout the French population is even more pronounced among the French Jews. However, while there is a slightly higher percentage of people over the age of 65 among French Jews as compared to the general French population, there is also a slightly higher percentage of French Jews under the age of 20. As shown in Table 4, in 2002, 29.16% of French Jewish households were headed by someone 65 or older, up almost five percent from 23.39% in 1988. During the same time period, the percentage of French Jewish households headed by someone under thirty dropped from 14.62% to 12.29%, perhaps also indicating delay in marriage and starting a family.

Table 3: Age Distribution of the General Population of France 1990, 2002 and the Jews of France 2002

	Under 20	**20 to 64**	**65 and over**
General French population 1990*	27.8	58.3	13.9
General French population 2002*	25.3	58.5	16.2
2002 Jews of France	27.9	53.1	19.0

* data from INSEE

Table 4: Distribution by 5-year Age Groupings of Heads of Households in the Population: Jews of France 1988, 2002 and General French Population 1999

	Jews of France 1988	**Jews of France 2002**	**General French population* 1999**
Ages 18-19**	0.47	0.72	0.40
20-24	4.56	4.17	3.50
25-29	9.59	7.40	7.40
30-34	11.11	9.48	9.00
35-39	12.16	11.35	9.70
40-44	10.18	7.40	9.80
45-49	5.96	7.54	10.10
50-54	7.49	9.63	9.70
55-59	6.67	7.47	6.80
60-64	8.42	5.68	6.70
65-69	5.96	7.97	7.10
70-74	5.15	9.55	6.80
75 +	12.28	11.64	13.10
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

* Data from INSEE

** In INSEE 1999 survey this includes ages 15-19

Marital Status

The majority of heads of Jewish households in France are married (58%), as shown in Table 5. However, since 1975, there has been a constant, though slight, increase in the number of couples cohabiting. As with the rest of the French population, the phenomenon of divorce is increasing among the Jewish

population. One third of the heads of Jewish households do not have spouses or partners (i.e., they are single, separated, divorced, or widowed). This figure is similar to the national average.

Table 5: Marital Status of Jewish Heads of Households
1975, 1988, 2002

	1975	1988	2002
Married	63	63	58
Cohabiting	*	4	9
Widowed	6	9	10
Divorced	1	7	9
Single	30	17	14
Total	100	100	100

* The question was not asked

Table 6: Jewish Heads of Households according to Gender and Marital Status 2002

	Male head of household	Female head of household
Married	69	48
Cohabiting	6	11
Widowed	4	15
Divorced/Separated	6	12
Single	15	13
Total	100	100

When the data are broken down by gender, as shown in Table 6, we see a greater percentage of female heads of households who are widowed, divorced or living with their partners. This probably reflects a tendency to define married men as the "head of household". Female interviewees who identified themselves as "head of household" were more likely to be unmarried, thus affecting the distribution of these results.

Size of Family

In 2002, the average size of the Jewish households stood at 2.57, slightly higher than that of the general French population, as shown in Table 7. According to the population census conducted by INSEE (1999), the average size of French households has tended to decrease in the last twenty years (2.7 in 1982, 2.6 in 1990 and 2.4 in 1999).

Table 7: Number of People per Household according to Gender of Head of Household: Jewish French Population 2002 and General French Population 1999

	Male head of Jewish household 2002	**Female head of Jewish household 2002**	**Jews of France 2002 Total**	**General French population 1999***
One	22	32	27	31
Two	39	29	34	31
Three	13	13	13	16
Four	14	14	14	14
Five	8	9	9	6
Six and over	4	4	4	2
Total	100	100	100	100

* Data from INSEE survey March 1999

Large families are not a characteristic of the Jewish community of France. As seen in Table 8, the average is just 1.89 children. Large families with four children or more represent no more than 15% of the total number of Jewish households. Fifty percent of Jewish households have two to three children. Almost one quarter of Jewish families have no children (23%). This pattern is similar to the non-Jewish French population.

Table 8: Number of Children per Family in Jewish-French Households 2002

Number of Children	**Percentage**
None	23
One	15
Two	29
Three	21
Four	7
Five and over	5
Total	100

Our sample enabled us to count 700 children aged 3 to 18. The distribution of these children by school age is indicated in Table 9. The pyramid of children's ages would seem to indicate a rise in the birthrate in recent years.

Table 9: Distribution by Age of Children in Jewish-French Households 2002

Age	Percentage
1	8.14
2	6.57
3	6.96
4	5.20
5	5.20
6	5.78
7	5.88
8	5.10
9	4.41
10	8.33
11	4.12
12	5.98
13	4.90
14	4.51
15	6.67
16	4.61
17	3.33
18	4.31
Total	100.00

Level of Education

French Jews have taken an avid part in the country's higher education system. In fact, the educational level of the Jews of France is considerably higher than that of the rest of the population. It should be noted that the figures for the Jewish

population apply to the stated educational level of heads of families or their spouses aged 20 or over, while the figures for the general French population apply to the entire population and to diplomas acquired. While the INSEE data and that collected in our survey of heads of households are not strictly comparable, they do provide a general picture of the educational level of the Jewish population and the general French population.

Two thirds of French Jews have at least a bachelor's degree, compared to only 29% among the general French population. The figure for Jews residing within Paris is even higher: 73%, compared to 50% of the general population. Table 10 shows the level of education among French Jews and of the general French population in Paris and around the country.

Table 10: Level of Education of Jewish Heads of Households Aged 20 and over, and in General French Population

Level of Education	**Entire country**		**City of Paris**	
	French Jewish population 2002	**General French population 1999**[11]	**French Jewish population 2002**	**General French population 1999**
Less than Bachelor's degree	34	71	27	50
Bachelor's degree	18	12	12	12
Bachelor's degree + 2	17	8	13	10
Bachelor's degree + 4	31	9	48	28
Total	100	100	100	100

11 The INSEE data refer to diplomas/degrees, not to levels of education as is the case in the present study. This obviously makes an accurate comparison

According to the figures published by the Ministry of Education, the educational level of the French population has risen steadily over the past several decades. In 1911, only 1.1% of college age Frenchmen obtained a bachelor's degree. By 1970 this number had risen to 20%. Already then French Jews were attending college in far greater numbers, and in 1970, 61% of French in the appropriate age group had a bachelor's degree. During the 1980s, as a result of increased investment in education, participation in higher education rose significantly. In 1989, 38% of French students in this age group earned a bachelor's degree. This rose to 63% by 1995 and 70% by 2000. 82% of college-aged French Jews went on to earn a bachelor's degree.[12]

of the two populations more difficult. However, two comments must be made regarding any wish to compare the two populations in terms of bachelor's degree qualifications. In the case of French Jews who reported that they had achieved an educational level of bachelor's degree +2 or +4, it would appear obvious that in all such instances, they must have gained their bachelor's degree. Along the same lines, in the case of those French Jews who said that they had not achieved bachelor's degree level, they might have a diploma but certainly not the bachelor's degree. Hence there is still some question about those respondents who said that they had the baccalaureat, where we do not actually know whether or not they have this qualification. However, since this group is very small, it does not call the entire comparison into question.

12 Data downloaded from France's Education Ministry site: http://www.education.gouv.fr/default.htm. See also the speech by M. Xavier Darcos, Minister with Special Responsibility for School Education, at the conference on "High School Students in France 1802-2002" organized by the University of Paris IV–Sorbonne, Wednesday July 10, 2002. http//www.education.gouv.fr/discours/2002/lycees.htm. According to the SOFRES data, 24.4% of the French population for heads of households aged 18 or more have a bachelor's degree or more (information provided by Prof. Emeric Deutsch).

The phenomenon of increased higher education from generation to generation can also be seen in the different level of education achieved by the various age groups, shown in Table 11.

Table 11: Level of Studies of Jewish Heads of Households according to Age

Level of Education	**Aged 18-29**	**Aged 30-39**	**Aged 40-49**	**Aged 50-59**	**Aged 60 and over**
Less than Bachelor's degree	15	19	23	33	55
Bachelor's degree	21	11	20	22	18
Bachelor's degree + 2	24	27	25	18	6
Bachelor's degree + 4	39	44	33	28	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100

These figures show a particularly high level of education for the Jewish population of France. We shall see later the consequences of this level of education on modes of Jewish identification.

Employment

Just over half of Jewish heads of households in France (53%) are employed, very slightly less than the level of employment among the general French population (55.1% according to INSEE 1999). One should note that members of the lowest and highest age groups (under 20 and 65 and over), that are usually not employed, are greater in number in the Jewish population of France than is the employed age group (20-64). Thus, the

non-employed group (students, retirees, and the unemployed) represents 44.50% of heads of Jewish households. In 1988, 34% were non-employed. This represents a radical change, most likely explained by the age shift within the Jewish population, rather than by increased unemployment among those of working age. As discussed above, the older and younger age cohorts have both grown in recent years; hence, there are more pensioners and students among the French Jewish population than there were 15 years ago. As in other parts of the Western world, there are serious social and policy issues related to care of the elderly.[13]

Table 12 shows the breakdown of types of employment held by French Jews, showing the relatively high representation of French Jews in academic, executive, managerial and liberal professions. This is even more obvious in Table 13, which only takes into account those who are employed. Table 14 shows changes in field of employment over the last quarter century. The percentage of French Jews who are workers or merchants has steadily dropped, while employment as senior executives and in the liberal and intelletual professions has grown.

13 This made headlines in a particularly tragic way when almost 15,000 people in France, mostly elderly, died during a heatwave in August 2003. The high death toll was largely attributed to elderly left alone while their families went on vacation, as well as understaffed medical facilities during the vacation season (Wikipedia, 2006b). The death toll among the French Jewish population mirrored that of the general population (Carmel, 2003).

Table 12: Socioprofessional Status of Jewish Heads of Households 2002

Profession	**Percentage**
Artisans	1.65
Merchants	5.22
Managers	3.15
Senior executives	6.08
Liberal professions	7.08
Middle executives	7.30
Intellectual professions	7.87
Employees[14]	13.45
Unskilled Workers	0.93
Retired	30.26
Seeking employment	2.43
Unemployed	11.52
Students	2.72
Total	100.00

14 Employee positions by way of example: air conditioning technician, civil servant, commercial assistant, commercial traveler, computer graphics designer, consistorial assistant, cultural center employee, dental assistant, driver, food attendant, freight clerk, hotel maintenance, investigator, legal secretary, management assistant, nurse, presenter/demonstrator, production technician, salesperson, secretary, social worker, stylist, technician.

Table 13: Socioprofessional Distribution of Employed Jewish Heads of Households 2002

Profession	**Percentage**
Artisans	3.00
Traders	9.96
Managers	6.00
Senior executives	11.46
Liberal professions	13.78
Middle executives	13.78
Intellectual professions	15.01
Employees	25.24
Workers	1.77
Total	100.00

Table 14: Evolution of Socioprofessional Categories of the Jewish Population of France 1975-2002

	1975	**1988**		**2002**	
Artisans		8.30		3.00	
Traders	21.40	19.40	}30.50	9.96	}18.96
Industrialists/Managers		2.80		6.00	
Senior executives/liberal and intellectual professions	25.30	38.90		40.25	
Middle executives	18.40	18.10		13.78	
Employees	24.50	11.10		25.24	
Workers	10.30	1.30		1.77	
Farmers	0.10	0.10		0.00	
Total	100.00	100.00		100.00	

A study of French Jews practicing the "liberal professions" (physicians, dentists, medical experts and advocates) found that these individuals, particularly those in the medical profession, are more actively involved in their local Jewish communities and are more open to the idea of immigration to Israel than the general French Jewish population. However, professional and economic obstacles prevent many from actually making this move ("aliyah"), or delay the move until after retirement (Cohen, 2005b).

Ethnicity

Among the demographic changes experienced by the Jewish population of France, the Ashkenazi/Sephardi divide is continuing to evolve in favor of Sephardim, as seen in Table 15.

Whatever socio-cultural differences between Sephardim and Ashkenazim do exist, they are becoming less marked than in the past. The Sephardi immigrants who came to France in the 1950s and 1960s are somewhat less integrated than the Ashkenazim, who have been in France for several generations. Thus, the Sephardim have somewhat lower levels of education and income.[15] However, compared with other migrant populations in France, the Jews from North Africa are well integrated and assimilated into French society.

15 In this respect, it may simply be stated that, as far as profiling is concerned, place of birth (in France or outside Metropolitan France) is slightly more useful in making distinctions than ethnic origin (Ashkenazi or Sephardi).

Table 15: Distribution of Ashkenazi and Sephardi in French Jewish Population 1988, 2002 and Educational Level of Ashekenazi and Sephardi French Jews in 2002

	Ashkenazi	**Sephardi**
Percentage of the French Jewish population 1988*	34	50
Percentage of the French Jewish population 2002*	24	70
Level of education, 2002		
Less than the baccalaureat	27	37
Baccalaureat	15	18
Baccalaureat + 2	18	18
Baccalaureat + 4	40	27
Total	100	100
Family Income		
Low	21	34
Average	57	55
High	23	11
Total	100	100

* The figures do not total 100% because a small percentage of respondents in each year declared themselves either both Sephardi and Ashkenazi or neither.

Jewish Identity

What it Means to be Jewish

According to *Halakha* (Jewish law), a person is Jewish if he/she was born to a Jewish mother or is a convert to Judaism (Ben-Rafaël, 2001). For sociologists, the question is more complex. In this study, any respondent who identified him/herself as Jewish is considered Jewish, regardless of halakhic status (which, in any event, we could not verify in the framework of this survey). This reflects a subjective feeling of belonging to the Jewish people, rather than a legalistic definition.[16]

There are numerous sociological approaches to the concept of identity. One such approach emphasizes definition of group boundaries and the system of social relations.[17] According to

16 In the framework of the present study, it is possible for somebody whose mother is Jewish not to consider themselves Jewish. Similarly, somebody whose mother was not Jewish may consider themselves Jewish.

17 Schlesinger (1987) says, "Identity is as much about exclusion as it is about inclusion, and the critical factor for defining the ethnic group therefore becomes the social boundary which defines the group with respect to other groups ... not the cultural reality within those borders. ... All identities are constituted within a system of social relations and require the reciprocal

this approach, an individual may express different identities depending on the set of circumstances. Another approach considers identity *within* the group, the values, behaviors, and attitudes which define the internal social context. Identification may be based on the network of relationships between people or affiliation to a given group (based on race, ethnicity, religion, language, etc.). Since relationships within and between groups are often inconstant, the evolutionary nature of identity should be considered.[18]

How do the Jews of France identify themselves?[19] In

recognition of others. Identity ... is not to be considered a 'thing' but rather a 'system of relations and representations' ... Identity is seen as a dynamic, emergent aspect of collective action". See also Nagel (1994). On the threshold that separates difference from similarity and names given to these differences, particularities, resemblances and similitudes, see Perissini (1993): "It is precisely because it constitutes a simplifying ficiton, which creates homogeneous groups with the heterogenous, clear-cut borders with the continuous, and which turns groups into immutable essences, that identity is necessary and essential to social actors. Like the concepts which we use in order to name things and express ideas, categories of identity make it possible to grasp and understand reality. Faced with a world in constant flux, it is these which make it possible, nevertheless, to name oneself and to name others, to make oneself an idea of what we are and of what others are, and lastly to determine our place and that of our fellow human beings in the world and in society" .

18 As de Montaigne observed over four hundred years ago: "I have nothing to say entirely, simply, and with solidity of my self, without confusion, disorder, blending, mingling, and in one word, *Distinguo* is the most universal part of my logic… We are all framed of flaps and patches and of so shapeless and diverse a texture that every piece and every moment plays its part. And there is as much difference found between us and ourselves as there is between ourselves and others" (de Montaigne, 1996).

19 Levinas (1963: 73) notes an inherent paradox in studies of Jewish identity: "To ask questions about Jewish identity is already to lose it. But it also means

relation to whom and what do they identify themselves? We examined forms of identification among Jews as well as modes of identification of Jews in relation to non-Jews. This process enabled us to establish the basis for a typology of the Jews of France and thereafter to draw a picture of Jewish identity.

Jewish/Israelite

There are two terms in French for a member of the Jewish people: "Israelite" and "Juif". Each has its own connotations, as a result of which they have gained or lost popularity during various phases of recent history. Following the French Revolution, the term "Israelite" widely replaced "Juif", which at the time often bore derogatory connotations. The term Israelite was thought to represent a synthesis of respect for the French Republic, which emancipated its Jews, and loyalty to the Mosaic religion. It represents a sort of "regenerated Judaism", in the terms of the French Revolution: an essentially denominational Judaism, whose members have the status of co-religionists to one another. Schnapper (1980) used the term Israelite to designate "Jews who, for the most part, were born in France to French parents, are neither observant or militant, and adopt the manners of non-Jews of the same social background".

As mentioned above, the makeup of the French Jewish population changed radically during the 1950s and 1960s, with

to care about it, for without this one would not ask questions. Between what was and what is still to be, one finds the extremity, stretched like a tight rope, on which the Judaism of Western Jews dares to venture". Ultimately, "… we can never truly objectify identity and we can only grasp at the traces it leaves when it expresses itself – the material or spiritual signs and symbols that incarnate identity in social life" (Simon, 1998: 16-31).

the immigration of North African Jews. The Jews from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia were much more traditional and religious than native French Jews. While they quickly assimilated into French culture in many ways, the North African Jews did not fully accept consistorial Judaism, which allows Jews to be Jewish in the synagogue and at home but to be only French in public. For the North African Jews, family, tradition and community were equally important as state, nation and democracy. On the whole, they did not adopt the term "Israelite".[20]

As shown in Table 16, in 1977, one third of the Jews of France still preferred the term "Israelite". By 1988 only 5% defined themselves as "Israelite", and 32% used both terms. As of 2002, use of the term "Israelite" continued to diminish. While the percentage who prefer the term "Israelite" remained unchanged, the percentage of those who use both terms fell slightly. Given the implications of the terms, this shift may express a very real and profound change in the norms, values and consciousness of the Jews of France, a hypothesis explored by Mesure and Renaut (1996: 15).

Table 16: Self-Definition of Identity by Jewish Heads of Households 1977, 1988, 2002

	1977 (SOFRES)	**1988**	**2002**
Jewish	57	63	67
Israelite	32	5	5
Both	11	32	28
Total	100	100	100

20 On this issue, see Bensimon (1996).

Alternatively, it may be that the term "Israelite" was never truly internalized by the Jews of France. As expressed by Simone Veil (1998: 55), member of a well-established Jewish-French family and active in French and European political institutions, "We never used the word Israelite. I never heard this word in our home. We would say 'We are Jewish, we are French'. We were one hundred percent French. Even patriots". Her recollection reveals the public nature of the term "Israelite". It was not used at home, the most private of domains. This sheds light on the 28% of respondents who say they use both terms. Self-identification depends on the context. It may be that in private, they define themselves as Jews while in public they define themselves as Israelite.

As another way to explore the attitude of French Jews towards Israel, we posed a hypothetical question to the people we interviewed regarding the religious identity and nationality they would chose, if given a choice. The results are shown in Table 17. This question enables respondents to express attitudes about their feelings about Israel, France and Judaism without taking practical issues into account.

41% of heads of households said they would prefer to be born again as Jews in France or in another Diaspora country. This group, apparently, believe that their identity as Jews is compatible with the French political system and culture and that it is unnecessary for them to abandon either their ethnic-religious difference, which they acknowledge, or their nationality. A slightly lower percentage, 38%, would choose to be born again as Jews in Israel. Whether or not they in fact move to Israel, these French Jews express a feeling that being Jewish in the Jewish state would be somehow preferable. A significant minority, 19%,

say that nationality and religion are not important to them. These French Jews seem to have internalized universal values. Only 1% of respondents would specifically prefer not to be Jews.

Table 17: "If you could be born again, how would you wish to be born?"

	Percentage
Jewish in the Diaspora	42
Jewish in Israel	38
Identity and place are not important	19
Non-Jewish	1
Total	100

Jewish Education

Choice of school is another important indicator of French-Jewish identity, with deep and far-reaching implications. Public schools socialize students to French ideals of citizenship, universalism and secularism. Sending one's children to a religious school is viewed by some as bordering upon the unpatriotic (Shurkin, 2000; Laborde, 2001). However, the institutionalized secularism of the public schools may present problems for traditional families. For example, neither students nor faculty members are allowed to display outward signs of religious affiliation such as *tzitzit* or a *kippah* and classes are held on Saturdays (Wasserstein, 1996; Shurkin, 2000). Non-religious Jewish families may opt for private school because of the atmosphere of violence, drugs and anti-Semitic incidents that plague some public schools.[21]

21 In a follow-up survey of the Jews of France, commissioned by Fonds

The Jewish school system, essentially destroyed by the end of World War II, has been rebuilt and is growing at an exponential rate. Today (2005) over 30,000 children attend a Jewish day school in France, an increase of over 75% over the last 15 years.[22] The development of the French Jewish educational system has strengthened the nucleus of the community, and its momentum has not yet slacked.

The families included in the comprehensive survey included 817 school-aged children. Of these, 134 are enrolled in Jewish day schools, while the other 633 are not. The majority of the latter attend public school, though some attend other private schools or are schooled at home.

A comparison of the attitudes expressed by parents whose children are enrolled in Jewish day schools and those whose children are not, revealed significant and interesting differences, highlighting the connection between Jewish education and identity (Table 18).

Those with children in Jewish day schools are more religiously observant and more involved in the local Jewish community than those whose children are not in Jewish day schools, although almost half of the families with children in public or other schools describe themselves as "traditional". Parents who enrolled their children in Jewish day schools feel

Social Juif Unifie which I conducted in 2007, it was found that up to a-third of French Jews send their children to non-Jewish private schools, predominantly Catholic schools. The reasons for and implications of this finding require further investigation (Lefkovits, 2007)

22 The conclusion of the previous study indicates that in 1986-1988 it appeared that "counting on 50%-100% extra Jewish pupils in Jewish schools is a perfectly plausible hypothesis" (Cohen, 1991: 153).

closer to Israel. They are far more likely to be considering moving there and/or to say they would encourage their children making aliyah. In response to the hypothetical question discussed in the previous section, in which respondents were asked what religion and nationality they would choose if they could be born again, a much higher percentage of parents with children in Jewish day schools said they would prefer to have been born Jewish in Israel. Those whose children are not enrolled in Jewish schools were more likely to say that they do not care into which religion and nationality they would be born. In addition, they are less firmly opposed to their children marrying non-Jews and are more likely to be intermarried themselves. Each of these last items may be considered an indication of internalization of the universal values emphasized in the French public school system.

Table 18: Comparison of Behaviors and Attitudes among Parents of Children Enrolled in French Jewish Day Schools and in Other French Schools

	Children not in Jewish day school	**Children in Jewish day school (kindergarten, elementary or secondary)**	**Total**
Number	629	188	817
Traditional	47	68	52
Orthodox	9	29	13
Always eat kosher at home	48	95	59
Regularly light Shabbat candles Friday night	55	95	64

Regularly make Kiddush Friday night	60	98	69
Regularly refrain from working on Shabbat	49	87	58
Feel "very close" connection to Israel	43	66	48
considering making aliyah "very soon"	5	30	11
Considering making aliyah "later"	17	34	21
Would encourage my children to make aliyah	44	60	48
"If you could be born again, what would you choose to be?			
• Jewish in the Diaspora	36	23	34
• Non-Jewish	0	0	0
• Jewish in Israel	44	72	50
• Identity and place not important	19	5	16
Participate in local Jewish community very often	34	72	42
Volunteer in the Jewish community	25	48	30
Religion of partner			
• Jewish	66	99	74
• Non-Jewish	33	1	26
Would ehemently oppose my children from marrying non-Jews	24	58	32

Forms of Solidarity

Community and Solidarity

In contrast to the largely negative notion of "communitarianism", Weber ([1914] 1971:41) defines a process of "communalisation", formation of a social relationship based on participants' subjective feelings of belonging to the same community. The notion of community involves a shared vision of a common goal, the existence of norms, and a concrete form of solidarity between its members. Boudon and Bourricaud (1982) try to resolve how "diffuse forms of solidarity" are sustained—for example, by dedicating time and resources to community affairs. It must be remembered that the solidarity of which we speak is primarily voluntary.[23] While there are complex sociological and theoretical discussions regarding the nature of various types of solidarity (Durkheim [1893] 1984), our main goal in this study is to understand the basis on which Jewish solidarity is built and to

23 This development regarding concepts of community, communalization, solidarity (both mechanical and organic), to mention just a few, is obviously brief and preliminary. Reference should also be made to the classic works of Karl Tönnies, Max Weber, Alain Touraine, Etienne Balibar, Claude Tapia, and others.

define the form of relationship the Jews of France have with one another. What are the major principles on which the perception and expression of solidarity is based in Jewish households? Is the emphasis on personal or communal motivations?

The data from the survey includes a number of items which may be considered indicators of solidarity with the Jewish people: participation in the local Jewish community, philanthropy to Jewish/Israeli causes and institutions (particularly as compared with donations to general charitable causes), commitment to Israel (indicated by visits, attitudes towards aliyah and political position on Israeli politics), and the level of importance attached to Jewish education.[24]

Participation in the Local Jewish Community

Community participation, like all social phenomena, is not one-dimensional. A well-developed community with diverse members offers multiple opportunities for involvement. Jews may participate in their local communities for a variety of reasons, which may be characterized as religious, familial, cultural, or social.

24 It cannot be denied that the importance attached to financial contributions and children's Jewish education is indicative of "attitudes", However, the same visits can be interpreted as expressing an attitude of solidarity. Many studies have been undertaken in the United States into philanthropy. Inter alia, we can cite Rimor and Tobin (1991: 51) who have come to the conclusion that synagogue membership and visiting Israel are factors which are more indicative of philanthropy than having Jewish friends, the level of religious observance, and religious affiliation: "It seems that the four variables – synagogue attendance, organizational membership, synagogue membership, and visiting Israel – are more basic in explaining contribution behavior than having Jewish friends, religious practices, and denominational affiliation".

Almost 30% of the heads of Jewish households surveyed stated that they participate frequently (once a month or more) in activities within a Jewish community setting. 18% said they never participate. These figures indicate a slight increase in participation in local community events since the 1988 survey, when 28% said they participate frequently in local Jewish community events and 35% said they never participate in the lcoal Jewish community. The percentage of those who say they participate occasionally or frequently (between 2-5 times a year) rose by 5% between 1988 and 2002. The percentage of those who consider themselves part of the community nucleus rose by 8%.[25] These findings confirm the feeling expressed by many community leaders that there has been a strengthening of the community nucleus in recent years. This may be seen as an acceleration of the process of communalisation.

25 During several visits to Nice during the Jewish New Year (Rosh Hashana) period, I had the opportunity to be present at an event which undoubtedly deserves to be studied on its own. This is the *Tashlich* ceremony, during which Jews symbolically cast all the faults of the previous year into a deep place (hole, river, etc.). Some 15 years ago, I attended a *tashlich* ceremony conducted on the beach by the late Chief Rabbi Jean Kling. There were some 80 to 100 people, all men, at the water's edge. There is no denying that the presence of these men, most of them bearded and garbed in festival attire, at the water's edge, surrounded on either side by practically nude men and women, was a very striking sight. But that was not the main point here. In 2002 I had another opportunity to attend *tashlich* in Nice. Imagine my surprise when I saw more than two thousand people there, men, women, children, ultra-Orthodox and traditional alike, a few men – not very many – without a skullcap, listening to the Shofar and a sermon by Chief Rabbi Mordekhai Bensoussan, most of which was about Israel. This was a very remarkable community event, a virtual community center, the chance to have a pleasant get-together, where many people were there before the ceremony started and just as many stayed on after the ceremony was over.

This process, however, is not unilinear. In a previous study I used the concept "Jews in eclipse" (Cohen, 1991: 82), which took into account the intensity and elasticity of community participation. In Kriegel's (1984: 131) definition of community, "…the level of belonging can vary from almost 0 to 100 degrees … the place where each person chooses to position himself on a very broad scale extending from the center to the periphery does not have the fixed character of a permanent commitment".

Synagogues are by far the most common community institutions in which French Jews are likely to be involved. Fewer numbers are involved with community centers, Jewish associations, or study groups.

Heads of households who frequently participate in a local Jewish community institution tended to identify themselves as religious and even as more religious than their parents while those who participate less frequently were less likely to identify themselves as religious. They described themselves as either equally religious as their parents, or less religious than their parents.

Another general trend found among French Jews is that all parameters of community life (community attendance, Jewish education, respect for *kashrut*, etc.) are stronger in large families and, particularly, in families where children study in the Jewish educational network. It appears that those with children in Jewish day schools are also the main users of Jewish community institutions in France.

Philanthropy

Contribution of money and time are another indicator of the level and direction of involvement in the social arena. The generosity

of the Jews of France towards general (i.e. not Jewish or Israeli) charitable or social institutions and organizations is almost identical to that of the larger French population (SOFRES, 2000).[26] French Jews' contributions to specifically Jewish or Israeli organizations are much higher, as seen in Table 19.

Table 19: Comparison of Contributions to General (not specifically Jewish or Israeli) Charitable Organizations by General French Population and French Jewish Population

Frequency of Contribution	**General French population (SOFRES 2000)**	**French Jewish population 2002**
Several times a year	28	27
Approx. once a year	21	19
Every two or three years	3	3
Less often	6	9
Never	41	42
Total	100	100

26 The questions in the two surveys were not phrased in exactly the same words, but were similar enough to allow for a comparison. On the SOFRES survey, the question was: "Do you help through financial gifts, gifts in kind or by devoting time, organizations, causes or people in distress who are not members of your family or friends?". In our survey of French Jewish heads of households, we asked "How often do you make financial contributions or do voluntary work to non-Jewish or non-Israeli organizations or institutions?". It should be noted that the question asked by SOFRES concerned all forms of solidarity (contributions in the form of money, time or kind). In the present study, we asked two specific questions: one on financial donations, the other about time and voluntary work. If we take these two questions together – financial donations and volunteer activities

Connections to Israel: Tourism, Family and Aliyah

Connection to Israel is a particularly complex issue. As mentioned, affiliation with any political entity other than the French Republic is perceived negatively in French culture and "dual loyalties" are subject to suspicion. Support for Israel, specifically, is highly controversial. Nevertheless, the Jews of France in general have strong ties to Israel. 86% say they feel close to Israel, and 49% "very close". This connection is not hypothetical, but is based on family connections and frequent visits.

Almost three quarters of French Jews have relatives living in Israel: 6% have children living there, 47% have other close relatives in Israel, and 23% have more distant Israeli relatives. Similarly, more than three quarters of the surveyed heads of Jewish households have visited Israel at least once. Nearly 30% have made six or more visits, for vacation (59%) or to visit family (38%). In the follow-up survey of French Jews conducted in 2005, we asked respondents the year of their most recent visit to Israel. Almost a quarter (24%) had visited Israel within the previous year. 16% had visited most recently between 2000 and 2003. This illustrate that even during the worst years of attacks against Israeli civilians during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, when overall tourism rates to Israel declined drastically, significant numbers of French Jews continued to visit. 30% visited most recently between 1982 and 1999, while 9% visited most recently before 1981. Only 21% said they had never visited Israel.

In October 2004, I directed a survey of French tourists in Israel. We interviewed 2,109 French Jewish tourists aged 15

by Jewish heads of households and outside the Jewish community – the data become comparable with the overall French population.

years and older who were vacationing in seven major Israeli cities. These tourists have strong Jewish identities. Most define themselves as traditional, are frequent participants in their local Jewish community, and have enrolled their children in Jewish educational settings.

The majority says they have considered making aliyah. Three-quarters of the adolescents said they do not envision their future as being in France, and a third hope to make aliyah "very soon". Three quarters of those surveyed said they hope their children will come to study in Israel. A little over a quarter of the respondents—and half of the adolescents surveyed—said they personally suffered from anti-Semitism during the previous five years.

In a study conducted in the summer of 2000, shortly before the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, I explored the differences in the images of Israel found in various Diaspora communities. In questionnaires distributed to 5,648 young Jews at the outset of "Israel Experience" tours, participants were asked to indicate which items from a list of places, names and symbols expressed their image of Israel. While the American participants had a highly idealized image of Israel as the Holy Land and a pilgrimage site, the French participants held a much more balanced and realistic image of the modern State of Israel and were far more likely to consider Israel as a possible home (Cohen, 2003).

Tourism and aliyah are linked phenomenon among French Jews, as repeated visits serve not only as vacations or religious pilgrimages, but also as preliminary steps towards a more permanent move among those who are considering aliyah.

Views regarding aliyah have become polarized in the last 15 years. Whereas in 1988, 40% of heads of households had no

intention of making aliyah, in 2002 this category rose to more than 55%. In contrast, the percentage of Jewish heads of households who intend to make aliyah "very soon" doubled between 1988 and 2002 (from 3% in 1988 to 6% in 2002). The percentage of those considering making aliyah rises to 12% if one takes into account only households with school-age children, and to 28% for households where children are educated in Jewish schools.

We also asked interviewees how they would react if one of their children decided to make aliyah. This gives additional insight into the attitudes of French Jews towards the idea of immigration to Israel. Adults with homes and businesses may not think they can consider making aliyah themselves, yet may hope that the next generation will do so. Thus, it appears that the idea of immigration to Israel is accepted by the large majority of the Jews of France. Almost 70% of Jewish heads of households say they would be happy if their children moved to Israel. Another 13% say they would not be happy but would not oppose the idea.

Despite the almost universal connection with and support for the State of Israel, French Jews are divided in their opinion regarding specific political questions in Israel. In 2002, almost half of Jewish heads of households said they favor the idea of Israel handing over territories in exchange for a credible peace with the Palestinians, while 39% are opposed to the idea. The remaining 14% believe that it is not up to Jews living in France to give an opinion on the issue.

It should be noted that the educational level of the people interviewed impacts the positions they take on the conflict. 60% of the Jews of France who completed university studies favor handing over territory in exchange for peace, while only 35% of

those who do not have a bachelor's degree share the same view. This is indicative of the dominant attitudes towards Israel in the French academic world: even if French-Jewish academics are generally supportive of Israel, they are likely to take more left-leaning positions.

Marriage and Endogamy

The choice of spouse in a reference group is a widely used indicator of identity and group affiliation (Blau, Beeker & Fitzpatrick, 1984; Reitz, 1980; Romano, 1988; Spickard, 1989). In general, intermarriage is continuing to rise among the Jews of France. As seen in Table 20, the data gathered by the present survey shows that 69% of Jewish heads of households have a Jewish-born spouse, compared to 75% in 1988. Looking more deeply into the social dynamics of endogamy, the data collected in this study shed light on a complex situation.

First, it seems that cohabitation (i.e., without wedlock) is a form of sidestepping the problem of intermarriage. Of those who are married, three quarters have a Jewish spouse, while of the couples who cohabit (9% of the survey population), only 17% have a Jewish partner. Additionally, intermarried couples are less stable than endogamous couples: endogamous marriages have a divorce rate of 8.2%, while exogamous marriages have a divorce rate of 20%.

French Jewish men are more likely to marry non-Jews than are French Jewish women. This has important consequences for future generations, given that, according to Jewish law, Judaism is matrilineal.

Jews living in the provinces have a higher intermarriage rate than those in Paris or the area right around the capital, reflecting

the greater likelihood of meeting a Jewish partner in the marriage market in a place where there is a greater concentration of Jews and these are more likely to be involved in the local community.

The birthrate in marriages of two Jewish parents is higher than in mixed marriages. 20% of those in exogamous marriages have no children, as against only 7% of those in endogamous Jewish marriages.

Inmarried Jews have significantly higher levels of religious observance than out-married Jews and have stronger social ties to the Jewish community. They are far more likely to regularly attend community events and synagogue, and have a greater proportion of Jewish friends, underscoring the interrelationship among the various indicators of community affiliation.

Table 20: Religion of Spouses of Jewish Heads of Households, by Marital Status

	Married	**Cohabitating**	**Widowed**	**Divorced Separated**	**Total**
Jewish spouse	76	17	87	50	69
Non-Jewish spouse	24	83	12	46	30
Converted spouse	1	0	1	4	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100

In their 1977 study of intermarriage in France, Bensimon and Lautman noted that "intellectual circles undoubtedly represent a particularly favorable terrain for Jewish-Christian marriages".

As seen in Table 21, this is clearly the case among French-Jewish women, with endogamy sharply declining among women with the highest level of education. In fact, although Bensimon and Lautman noted that couples in which the wife is Jewish and the husband non-Jewish are an exception to the rule, endogamy rates are essentially the same among men and women with two or more years of study past the bachelor's degree. However, we did not find a consistent correlation between education level and intermarriage among French Jewish men. While it is true that those with the highest level of education (BA + 4) are more likely to be married to non-Jews than those without higher education, those who continued for two years past the level of bachelor's degree have higher rates of endogamy than those with just a bachelor's degree. This unexpected result indicates that the relationship between education and intermarriage is more complex than anticipated, and deserves further exploration through a specific in-depth study.

Table 21: Endogamy and Educational Level
(Percentage with Jewish Spouse)

	Less than Bachelor's degree	**Bachelor's degree**	**Bachelor's +2**	**Bachelor's +4**
Among entire Jewish population	75	70	75	59
Among Jewish men	66	58	73	59
Among Jewish women	84	82	74	58

Social Issues

Happiness, Satisfaction and Worry

This chapter addresses the psychological well-being of the Jews of France and the social issues with which they are primarily concerned. We asked Jewish heads of households in France whether they are happy, worried or satisfied with their lives. We compare the answers with objective parameters (age groups, income level, and marital status). The matrix of correlations (see appendix) indicates that, while happiness or "subjective wellbeing" (Veenhoven, 1997) is highly correlated with satisfaction with life, the two concepts are not completely synonymous. Even more, being happy and satisfied with one's life does not mean to be free of worries. While the large majority of the Jews of France say that they are happy, they also articulate deep feelings of concern, thus expressing a state of "worried happiness" as Veenhoven calls it.

In general, the Jews of France are happy and satisfied with their lives. Indeed, 92% of Jewish heads of households affirm that they are happy (23% very happy). Similarly, 90% of Jewish heads of

households affirm that they are satisfied with their lives (15% very satisfied). On the other hand, 65% of the respondents said they are worried, 11% "very worried".

As seen in Table 22, the older cohorts are progressively less likely to describe themselves as "very happy" than the younger heads of households, and were somewhat less satisfied.[27] Table 23 shows that those with average or high incomes were happier and more satisfied than those with below-average incomes, thus confirming a slight correlation between happiness and educational and income levels. Ruut Veenhoven, for his part, affirms that, in rich countries, the correlations between educational and income levels are weak. Interestingly, worry does not seem to follow the same pattern. Among the Jews of France, even the happiest, most satisfied groups also express high levels of worry.

The only factor which seems strongly linked to worry is marital status, as seen in Table 24. Those with a partner (married or cohabiting) are the least worried, while those who are divorced and especially those who are widowed are the most worried. Those with partners were also happier and more satisfied than those alone (whether through divorce, death or never having been married).

27 This goes against Veenhoven's (1997) hypothesis which states that "contrary to general opinion, life does not seem less satisfying with age, even in very old age".

Table 22: Happiness, Satisfaction and Worry according to Age Groups

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50 +	Total
Very happy	34	30	26	17	23
Happy	63	64	68	72	69
Not happy	3	6	5	9	7
Not at all happy	1	0	0	2	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Very satisfied	18	19	12	15	16
Satisfied	77	73	73	73	74
Not satisfied	5	7	11	10	9
Not at all satisfied	0	1	3	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Very worried	12	9	9	13	11
Worried	47	50	58	56	54
Not worried	32	32	25	25	28
Not at all worried	9	9	8	6	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 23: Happiness, Satisfaction and Worry by Income Level

	Low income	Average income	High income	Total
Very happy	19	28	27	21
Happy	69	69	71	69
Not happy	11	3	2	9
Not at all happy	2	1	0	1
Total	100	100	100	100
Very satisfied	13	20	17	15
Satisfied	72	76	83	74
Not satisfied	12	4	0	9
Not at all satisfied	3	0	0	2
Total	100	100	100	100
Very worried	13	10	5	12
Worried	53	54	56	53
Not worried	26	32	27	27
Not at all worried	8	4	11	7
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 24: Happiness, Satisfaction and Worry according to Marital Status

	Married	**Cohabitating**	**Widowed**	**Divorced**	**Single**	**Total**
Very happy	26	29	10	12	20	23
Happy	68	66	65	72	71	68
Not happy	5	5	19	14	8	7
Not at all happy	1	0	6	2	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Very satisfied	20	10	8	6	13	16
Satisfied	73	82	74	66	76	74
Not satisfied	6	7	13	25	10	9
Not at all satisfied	1	2	5	3	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Very worried	11	12	18	10	10	11
Worried	55	40	56	65	51	54
Not worried	27	40	21	21	31	28
Not at all worried	7	9	5	4	9	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Issues of Concern

What specifically worries the Jews of France? We gave respondents a list of possible issues of concern and asked them to indicate to what degree they worry about each. Among those issues directly related to Jewish identity that most worry the Jews of France, terrorism, anti-Semitism, racism, and the future of Israel top the list, highlighting the troubling political-social climate of contemporary France, including the sometimes aggressive hostility of certain sectors of the French population as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see Table 25). In addition, 21% of heads of households affirm having personally suffered from antisemitism during the last five years. It should be noted that "foreigners" are not an issue of concern for the Jews of France. Indeed, some interviewees said they didn't understand the question since they themselves had been foreigners. The phenomenon of intermarriage, however, is at the bottom of the preoccupations of the Jews of France, which leads us to presume that the Jews of France are primarily worried about what they feel are external threats to Jewish existence.

Table 25: Issues of Concern for French Jews 2002
(Percentage answering "very worried")

Issue of concern	**Percentage 'very worried'**
Terrorism	77
Anti-semitism	76
Racism	70
Future of Israel	64
AIDS	50
Drugs	50
Islam	46
Unemployment	32
Pollution	31
Food insecurity	22
Intermarriage	24

Values

Values of French Jews

In the next section, we deal with the basic values held by the Jews of France. Rather than focusing on specifically Jewish values (which were dealt with in the section on Jewish identity), we selected universal values, similar to the lists of values included in such international surveys as the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 2004) and the European Values Study (Halman, 2001). In this way, we were able to create an axiological typology of the Jews of France comparable to typologies of other populations.

The term "value" is used here in the sociological sense of "the criteria by which a group or society judges the importance of people, models, goals and other socio-cultural objects" (Fichter, 1971). According to Boudon and Bourricaud (1982: 644), "Values are nothing more than collective preferences, which emerge in an institutional context and which, because of the way they develop, contribute to the regulation of this context". Rokeach (1976) defines a value as the persistent belief that a specific mode of conduct or life goal is personally or socially preferable to another. Guttman and Levy define a value as a particular type

of attitude toward any object that is judged in greater or lesser terms of importance.[28]

We asked heads of Jewish households in France to assess the importance of imparting various values to their children. The results are shown in Table 26. At the top of the list, one finds behavioral qualities directed at others: *tolerance, sense of responsibility,* and *generosity*, and a personal, behavioral quality: *perseverance.* These are followed by qualities related to personal expression and creativity: *spontaneity, imagination, independence*. *Religious faith, obedience* and *sense of economy* received the lowest ratings.

Table 26: Importance of Qualities which Parents should Impart to their Children as Assessed by French Jewish Heads of Households 2002

(average rating: not important = 1, important = 2, or very important = 3)

Quality to be imparted to children	**Average rating**
Tolerance and respect for others	2.78
Sense of responsibility	2.61
Generosity	2.48
Determination, perseverance	2.46
Dedication to work	2.39
Good manners	2.38
Independence	2.28
Imagination	2.22

28 According to Guttman and Levy, the *range* for replies (from very important to not at all important) itself defines the subjects of the question in terms of the values attached to them. See: Guttman (1982); Levy (1990, 1994).

Quality to be imparted to children	Average rating
Spontaneity	2.16
Religious faith	2.06
Obedience	2.03
Sense of economy, not wasting money or things	1.94

This same question has been posed, for some years, in the French section of an international survey (EVS, European Value Survey) and carried out by ARVAL (the Association for Research on Systems of Values).[29] The system of values of the Jews of France is, in general, similar to the system of values of the society in which they live, as seen in Table 27. This confirms a finding of Wach and Hammer (2003) who, using Schwartz's model (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) to analyze the values of the approximately 6,000 French interviewed during the period 1994 to 2000, found a similarity between the structure of values of the French and the Jewish population.

The top two values chosen by the Jews of France are the same as those chosen by the French in general: *tolerance and respect for others* and *sense of responsibility* (although a higher percentage of the general French population selected each of these). There are, however, a number of differences. Most graphically, the Jewish population puts more emphasis on instilling religious faith

29 The survey was administered by Research International between March 23 and April 10, 1999 to a national sample of 1,615 individuals who were representative of the French population, aged 18 and above, and supplemented by a sub-sample of 206 young people aged 18-25 (total number of people: 1,821). Representativity was assured by a quota method (sex, age, occupation and socio-professional categories).

in their children, compared to the strongly secular general French population.[30] In addition, the Jews of France give somewhat more emphasis to values that contribute to individual success: *independence, determination and perseverance* and *imagination* and less emphasis on *obedience* and *good manners.* They place more emphasis on generosity and significantly less on thriftiness (*sense of economy*)—an interesting point in light of common stereotypes of Jews.

Table 27: Qualities which Parents Consider "very important" to Impart to their Children: Comparison of European Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1999 and Survey of the Jews of France 2002

	EVS 1981	**EVS 1990**	**EVS 1999**	**French Jewish heads of households 2002**
Tolerance and respect for others	59	78	85	79
Sense of responsibility	39	71	73	62
Good manners	21	53	68	43
Dedication to work	36	53	50	42
Generosity	22	40	41	49
Determination, perseverance	18	39	39	48
Sense of economy	54	36	37	18
Obedience	18	Np	36	23
Independence	16	27	29	35
Imagination	12	23	18	32
Religious faith	11	13	7	36

30 Prof. Paul Ritterband (CUNY, Haifa University) has confirmed that in the USA, Jews tend to be less religious than their non-Jewish counterparts.

In addition, we asked the interviewees to assess 14 values by scale of importance. The average of the responses to each is shown in Table 28. The responses to this list of values form the basis for a typology of French Jewry, to be discussed in depth in the next sections.

The two values which have the greatest importance to the Jews of France are related to the family nucleus: *honor your parents* and *founding a family* – two fundamental traditional values. Parents and family have always been considered the principle pillars of social organization and they involve values such as respect and authority. Next come two elements related to the individual: *studying* and *being oneself.* These are followed by two variables relating to social law: *Helping others* and *Being useful to society.* Lastly one finds values that could be described as individualistic: *Caring for one's appearance, going away on holiday* and *earning a lot of money.*[31] These egoistic values, in the real sense of the word, are not considered among the most important by the Jews of France.

Table 28: Importance of Values, French Jewish Heads of Households 2002

(average rating: not important = 1, important = 2, or very important = 3)

Value	**Average rating**
Honor your parents	2.73
Founding a family	2.61
Studying	2.55

31 On the computer-generated map, we gave the name "region" to a set of variables characterized by a common semantic criterion.

Value	Average rating
Being oneself	2.52
Helping others	2.42
Enjoying life	2.37
Doing what I like	2.31
Being useful to society	2.24
Having a good time with friends	2.18
Believing in God	2.14
Going away on holiday	2.04
Caring for one's appearance	2.01
Engaging in sport	1.76
Earning a lot of money	1.70

Structure of the Value System of the Jews of France

To further investigate the value structure of the Jews of France, several multi-dimensional data analysis techniques were used. Smallest Space Analysis graphically portrays the correlations between items, thus revealing regions of correlated items. The basis of the SSA is a matrix of correlations between the responses to the values, shown in the appendix:

In the matrix of correlations among the 14 variables, we find only three relatively weak negative correlations. This confirms that we are dealing with a coherent system (Gratch, 1973; Guttman & Levy, 1982).

The correlation matrix is then plotted in a cognitive "map" according to an intuitively understandable principle: strongly

correlated variables are plotted close together and weakly correlated variables are far apart. This map allows the researcher to recognize distinct semantic regions. Its apparent simplicity simultaneously represents the spatial relationship between the correlation pairs. The cognitive map of the responses of French Jews to the 14 value items is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Axiological Graph, Geometric Representation (WSSA1) of the Values of the Jews of France

The distribution of the variables over the entire graph shows that the semantic terrain was well covered by the questionnaire. Six axiological regions emerge. At the center of the map is a region consisting of one value: *Making the most of life*. The multi-faceted nature of this largely consensual value enables individuals to impart different meanings to it. For some it means enjoyment and for others it may mean enrichment through study or work.[32] Surrounding this center are five regions: materialism (*caring for*

32 *Making the most of life* is a value which is undoubtedly linked to an ethic of the present which is extremely important in Judaism, and profoundly grounded in Jewish awareness. To cite just two examples, we will first quote the comment by André Neher (1962: 262), to the effect that Jewish metaphysics is set apart by a "geotropism which prevents it from becoming disembodied, on whatever level. Neither theology, nor ethics, nor collective history, or the individual's existential destiny are envisaged, in Judaism, outside the physical universal and its progress". Some might advance the contrary argument by referring to the concept of *Olam ha-Ba* (the world to come), which would be the reward of all those who have lived according to the principles and rules of the Torah. This comment was frequently directed at Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who would reply that the notion of *Olam ha-Ba* is not to be found in any of Judaism's texts, or even in the Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashana prayers. However, Leibowitz gave an explanation for this concept by quoting Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin (1986:39), one of the disciples of the Vilna Gaon: "Our Masters say: all of Israel have a part in the world to come. They say: *in* the world to come, and not part *of* the world to come, which would make it sound as if the world to come exists as something on its own, ready from the outset, and part of which is granted, as reward, to the righteous. In truth, the world to come is the work of man himself, who by his acts extends, increases and builds up his own part". Thus, the world to come is given this name because an individual is not born in that world but reaches it through his works which are guided in heaven's name. See an interesting letter of Yeshayahu Leibowitz where he explains this notion of "the world to come" as built up by deeds in the here and now (1999:274). Lastly, some see in the notion of "making the most of life" a response to the Holocaust, a 614th *mitzvah* or commandment!

one's appearance, earning a lot of money); tradition (*belief in God, honor your parents, founding a family*); altruism (*helping others, being useful to society*); authenticity (*being oneself, studying*); and enjoyment. The enjoyment region is divided into two sub-regions: recreation (*going on holiday* and *engaging in sport*) and social life (*having a good time with friends, doing what I like*).

In modern society, the values of autonomy, subjectivity, and self-fulfillment have become largely consensual. One might have expected to find the variable *Being oneself* at the center of the graph of values. But for the French Jewish population self-fulfillment is not a nodal value. Instead it is linked to study and training, through which an individual forges his future. Similarly, the value most directly linked to individual liberty, *Doing what I like*, is correlated with social conviviality, *Having a good time with friends.* One may thus assume that *Doing what I like* does not mean exercising one's freedom or having total power over one's destiny, but relates more to a value that represents relaxation, pleasure, a state in which an individual frees himself from social constraints and moves towards autonomy.

The same graphic representation may be interpreted complementarily in another way. An important feature of the SSA technique is that, while the placement of the variables is objective, based upon the correlations between the data, the interpretation of the map is subjective, enabling the researcher to look at the same set of results from different theoretical approaches.

The graph of the values of the Jews of France may be read according to two diagonals that represent choice of values: a political diagonal, which deals with collective life in an organized group (Lalande, 1985: 101, 412), and a social diagonal, dealing

with relationships with others. We may thus define four poles that organize the graph of values, as indicated by the arrows in Figure 1.

The two poles of the political diagonal are:

* **Autonomy:** an individual (or a collective) defines his own principles of behavior and obeys only the rules chosen after examination (*Having a good time with friends, Doing what I like, Studying, Being oneself)*;
* **Authority** (heteronomy): an individual (or a collective) looks to the outside for principles and rules. This is the pole of values that are imparted; it is thus the pole of tradition and authority. In other words, duty, discipline, and respect for values based on imitation and continuation (*Founding a family, Honor your parents, Belief in God*).[33]

The two poles of the social diagonal are:

* **Altruism:** an individual (or a collective) places the most emphasis on the wellbeing of others (*Being useful to society* and *Helping others*).
* **Egoism**: an individual (or a collective) makes the interest of the individual the main guiding force of his behavior (*Going away on holiday* and *engaging in sport, Caring for one's appearance* and *Earning a lot of money).*

33 Reflecting on identity, Milan Kundera (1993: 21) asks two questions;' What is an individual? Where is that individual's identity to be found? In order to provide some form of answers to these questions, Kundera refers to Thomas Mann, who observes that it is memory and myths which guide us from what he calls the "well of the past": "We will find ourselves facing a phenomenon which we would be tempted to call one of imitation or continuation, a view of life according to which everyone's role is to resuscitate certain mythical outlines drawn up by our ancestors, and enable them to be reincarnated".

This interpretation of the map is particularly useful, as it defines core issues within the French Jewish community and, indeed, within many communities and societies today.

Axiological Typology: Profiles of the Jews of France

This structure of values was then used as the basis for an axiological typology of the Jews of France. The axiological typology presented here differs in several important ways from previous typologies of the Jews of France. Nevertheless, these previous studies provide an important basis for the current study and are worth briefly reviewing. The best known is the distinction made by Schnapper (1980) between *observers* (representing a continuation or return to tradition), *militants* (who pass on tradition by political means), and *Israelites* (who associate primarily with non-Jews of the same social group). More recently, Hannoun (2000) distinguishes between *militant* Jews, *spectator* Jews and *indifferent* Jews.[34] This intuitive methodology is limited because

34 "First of all there are militant Jews. Those who are aware both of their Jewishness and of the duties that it requires, play a more or less active role in the life of social, religious, cultural, sports etc. community organizations. These militant Jews are to be found in all age groups, from childhood (normally via their parents) to adolescence and adulthood. These are the ones whose beliefs are an integral part of their day-to-day lives. Secondly, I would refer to the onlooker Jews. They have an awareness of their Jewishness, but this does not always make them want to put it into practice. They accept others, but rarely give of themselves. They are the 'thought Jews'. Rarely the Jews of action. Lastly, the third face, which is also represented in the Jewish community, is that of the indifferent Jews. They are the ones who, although aware of their Jewish origins, do not allow any consequences of the latter to affect their lives in terms of how they think or act in any form in terms of such implications as cultural, social, religious, philosophical or others. They happen to be Jews but essentially

it is essentially based on the level of attendance at community institutions. Others prefer a scientific approach. Azria (1991, 2003) examines the typology of traditional practices and distinguishes two axes. The first is based on traditional Judaism, *Halakha* (Jewish religious law), as opposed to *Minhag* (Jewish traditions). The second axis distinguishes between individual and collective practices. The advantage of this methodology is that it does not consider modernity as the antithesis of religion. Indeed, Azria believes that modernity produced two apparently inversed results: the decline of religion and, simultaneously, its reactivation in the form of new modalities. Hers is a typology that is based on adherence to the law and has, as its center of reference, the observant Jew or world of observance.[35]

An axiological typology has several advantages over typologies based on religious practice or ethnic behaviors. First, as previously mentioned, the question of values presented to the Jews of France has already been investigated among other populations, enabling development of a universally applicable typology which may be used in cross-cultural comparisons.

Second, the axiological typology avoids the debate on the nature of Judaism (a body of practices or a feeling of belonging, a religion or a culture, etc.). In this sense, it is scientifically more objective and more neutral, as it does not presuppose an "ideal" Jewish model. Third, as we shall see below, the axiological typology enables the construction of non-hierarchical categories.

do not experience any difference between them and the non-Jews. In this since it would be wiser to call them un-different rather than indifferent".

35 We would also draw attention to the reading suggested by J. W. Berry in his attempt to understand the dynamic of how the surrounding culture and the original culture are related to within the migrant population.

The typology avoids classifying the populations according to a one-dimensional scale (along the lines of more religious/ less religious, more observant/ less observant, etc.), offering instead a multidimensional approach.

Several previous typologies of values conducted among general (not specifically Jewish) populations guided this analysis.[36] Rokeach (1976) identifies 36 values which he divides into two categories: personal or social end values, and moral or beneficial instrumental values. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) expand the list to 56 values and propose a division into ten groups: autonomy, universalism, kindness, conformism, tradition, security, power, self-fulfilment, hedonism and stimulation. Finally Schwartz and Bilsky detect four major moral positions: the desire to surpass oneself, conservatism, self-improvement and openness to change. Guttman and Levy (1982) depicted the various axiological tendencies on a geometric graph as polarities, with the different domains revolving around a center. The main polarities on this graph are: authority/autonomy; altruism/egoism. This basic structure has been verified many times all over the world, indicating that the universe of values is fundamentally structured in the same way in all human societies.

The current typology was developed using a combination of multi-dimensional scaling techniques. Other data analysis procedures were used to transform the regions of the SSA map into indices, which were then used to identify various profiles of the interviewees. Four basic categories of profiles were

36 See for example: Epstein, 1989; Kluckhohn, 1951; Levy, 1990.

identified.[37] These are used to further examine the issues related to French Jewry discussed in previous sections.

Based on the analysis of the values of the Jews of France according to the procedure described in the appendix, we were able to distinguish four profiles among the Jewish population of France.[38]

Profile 1 places the emphasis on the values *Going away on holiday, Engaging in sport, Earning a lot of money* and *Caring for one's appearance*, which are related to pleasure, self-gratification, material comfort and personal satisfaction of the individual. One may even call them egotistic and hedonistic values. We call this group *Individualists.*

Profile 2 places the emphasis on autonomy and favors sociability values based on independence and the freedom to choose, explore and create, such as *Having a good time with friends*, and *Doing what I like*. The individual is not an end, but a means, a part of the whole and society in general. Thus we chose to call this group *Universalists.*

Those in Profile 3 place the emphasis on *Belief in God, Honor parents* and *Founding a family.* It could be said that they defer to an external authority for their concept of existence, behavior and feelings. Their system of values is not linked with individualistic or liberal notions. They reject values such as *Doing what I like,* a value that is characteristic of contemporary society, favoring

37 For details on these procedures see: Guttman, 1968; Canter, 1985; Levy, 1985, 1994; Shye, 1978; Cohen & Amar 1993, 1999, 2002.

38 The way that these different groups define themselves as well as their preferred approaches is an interesting case of social representation along the lines of the theory developed by Serge Moscovici (Moscovici, 1981, 1988).

submission to rules and respect for tradition. We have called them *Traditionalists.*

Profile 4 bridges the poles of Authority and Autonomy: they put the emphasis as much on belief in God, parents, family as on conviviality between friends and freedom. This is a profile with a double heritage: Jewish tradition and Republican tradition. We call this group *Revivalists.* [39]

Table 29 shows the distribution of these four profiles among the surveyed Jews of France. It should be noted that these four profiles are balanced, with only a slightly higher representation of Traditionalists.

Table 29: Distribution of the Four Axiological Profiles among the Survey Population

Profile	**percentage**
Profile 1: Individualists	22
Profile 2: Universalists	24
Profile 3: Traditionists	31
Profile 4: Revivalists	23
Total	100

39 In this connection we would draw attention to one of the conclusions of Guy Michelat's study about the Catholic identity of the French: "In the old days, there were few differences between the parents' religious system and that of the children. Today, this is no longer the case: the strictly religious content is being watered down and losing its structured nature, and there are more and more instances where individuals patch together [Michelat uses the verb *bricoler*, from *bricolage*] a personal version of their religion, combining the system that they have inherited with elements from other systems" (Michelat, 1990: 630).

The four profiles identified may be used to better understand some of the general issues discussed in previous sections, such as religious observance, community participation, attitudes towards Israel, etc.

Significantly, there is no correlation between the profiles and political leanings (right/center/left) of the interviewees, as seen in Table 30. This is a somewhat unexpected result, for one could put forward the hypothesis that political tendencies reflect fundamental value choices. But this hypothesis does not hold for the Jews of France. The Traditionalists are just as likely to espouse leftist politics as the Universalists; the Universalists are just as likely to espouse center-right or rightist tendencies as the Traditionalists. This seems to indicate that the traditional left/right division in politics is no longer an accurate or relevant way to distinguish social groups, at least not among the Jews of France. The categories of political tendencies are not relevant to the values held by French Jews.[40]

In preliminary presentations to various Jewish groups in France, this typology was met with widespread favor and intuitive understanding. It is hoped that it can be further verified among Jewish populations in other parts of the world and among non-Jewish populations in France and in other countries, possibly leading to the development of a universal axiological typology. Rather than seeing social stratification along lines of political ideology and assuming that certain sets of ideas and doctrines are particular to a given social group or class, it appears that sets of

40 Indeed, it may be that these political categories are not relevant to the values held by the general French population, and their usefulness as social categories are outdated.

general values are more useful in differentiating between groups. One may even talk about an ideology of values. Indeed, Boudon and Bourricaud (1982) describe the major function of ideologies as offering a justification for values on which a consensual social order may be founded, particularly in societies where the social order is not traditional.

Table 30: Political Tendencies and the Profiles of French Jewry

	Individualists	**Universalists**	**Revivalists**	**Traditionalists**
Extreme left	0	3	1	1
Left	42	47	40	46
Center-left	12	16	15	14
Center	22	14	15	17
Center-right	12	10	9	6
Right	12	11	18	16
Extreme right	0	0	2	1
Total	100	100	100	100

A summary of each profile is given, followed by a series of tables (Tables 34-40) in which the data for a wide selection of the items included in the survey, according to the profiles, are given.

Individualists

Respondents in this profile were most commonly born in the 1940s (i.e., in their 50s or 60s at the time of the survey). The majority were born outside metropolitan France and therefore educated for at least some of their school years outside France. They have an average level of education and average or lower than average

income. They have a fairly high rate of intermarriage (40%) and consider it acceptable for their children to marry non-Jews. Their Jewish educational background is similar to that of the Universalists, but with slightly higher percentages who attended more intensive settings, such as Jewish day school or Talmud Torah. They are somewhat more likely to attach importance to giving their children a Jewish education, although only a small minority (13%) enrolls their children in Jewish day schools.

They are well integrated socially, with many non-Jewish friends, though they have a somewhat higher rate of participation in the local Jewish community than to do the Universalists.They are distinctly more traditional than the Universalists, but less so than the Traditionalists or Revivalists. Their level of contribution to non-Jewish institutions is similar to that of the Traditionalists and Revivalists, while their level of contribution to Jewish/Israeli institutions is similar to that of the Universalists. Despite their lower economic status, the Individualists have visited Israel more often than the Universalists. This may be related to their age and their greater likelihood of having close relatives in Israel. Like the Universalists, the Individualists tend to prefer the social aspects of Judaism to the religious ones (i.e. family Shabbat dinners as opposed to refraining from working on Shabbat). Close to half can read Hebrew, though far fewer can speak or write it, indicating the emphasis on Hebrew as a language of prayer and study. Few are considering making aliyah.

Interestingly, we found a distinct difference between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Individualists regarding the importance of belief in God and honoring one's parents, as shown in Table 31. While strongly linked to material values and diametrically opposed to the altruistic values, the Sephardi individualists are

far less likely to say that belief in God is not important and more likely to say that honoring their parents is very important. This relative traditionalism even among "secular" Sephardi Jews has been noted in other surveys, such as a study of Israelies in public high schools (Cohen, 2005c). The Jews of North Africa did not experience the ideological split of the European Enlightenment, during which the rationalist and secular worldview became opposed to a religious worldview; in other words, secular Sephardi Jews are not necessarily atheists. However, such a graphi difference in values between Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews was not found in the other three profiles, and the relative prevalance of these two traditional values among Sephardi Individualists may be linked to the fact that individuals fitting this profile are somewhat older and therefore more closely linked to the traditional North African culture.

Table 31: Comparison of the Values of Ashkenazi and Sephardi Individualists

	Ashkenazci Individualists	**Sephardi Individualists**
Belief in God		
Not important	65	39
Important	32	46
Very important	3	15
Total	100	100
Honor your parents		
Not important	2	2
Important	63	52
Very important	35	46
Total	100	100

Individualists are the least likely to say they are "very happy" and "very satisfied". The social isolation which may result from an individualistic worldview tends to lessen their happiness and satisfaction with life.[41]

Universalists

Of those fitting the Universalist profile, the majority was born between 1960 and 1970 (i.e., are between 30 and 40 years old at the time of the survey). Most were born in France. This is a function both of their age (the waves of immigration from North Africa having already dropped off by the time most respondents fitting this category were born) and of the relatively high representation of Ashkenazi Jews among the Universalists. In Paris there is a higher percentage of Universalists than of any other profile.

Only half the heads of households fitting this profile are married, the lowest rate of the four profiles. They are the most likely to be cohabiting, and the most likely to have no children. They tend to have an above average level of income and are the most likely to have completed higher education.

They are well-integrated into general French society, with many non-Jewish friends and the lowest rates of participation in the local Jewish community. They are the most likely to

41 See Gauchet's conclusion (1985: 302): "The cost of the decline in religion is the difficulty of being oneself. […] Because this is a society which is psychologically exhausting for individuals, where nothing helps them or provides them with support any longer in the face of the question which constantly hammers them […]. What am I to do with my life when I am the only one to decide? […] We have vowed to live henceforth naked and in anguish, which is something that we were more or less spared since the beginning of the human adventure through the grace of the gods. Every one has to work out his own responses on his own behalf".

regularly donate to non-Jewish organizations, indicating a mark of gratitude towards the general French society and expressing a certain emotional distance from the Jewish community. When asked the hypothetical question about being able to choose a religion and nationality if they could be reborn, one third of Universalists answered that identity and place of birth would be of no importance. Half would wish to be reborn Jewish in the Diaspora and a little less than a quarter Jewish in Israel.

The level of observance among Universalists is the lowest of all the profiles, and they are the most likely to describe themselves as "non-observant". Half say they are less religious than their parents. They have the highest rate of intermarriage and only one in ten would disapprove of one of their children marrying a non-Jew, illustrating the Universalists' weak ties to Jewish traditions. Nevertheless, even among this relatively non-religious sub-group, over a quarter describe themselves as religiously traditional. 36% regularly have a family Shabbat meal, 24% regularly recite *Kiddush* and 20% regularly light candles on Friday night, confirming the prevalence of religious tradition, not strict observance, among French Jews. The number is lower regarding the religious aspects of Shabbat: only 10% do not watch television on Shabbat and even fewer (6%) regularly attend synagogue on Shabbat. The Universalists have the weakest Jewish educational backgrounds, far less than the Traditionalists and Revivalists and slightly less than the Individualists, although 65% did receive some form of Jewish education. Few speak or write Hebrew and only just over a third can read Hebrew. They are the least likely to have their own children enrolled in Jewish day schools and express little interest in doing so, even if a free, quality, convenient Jewish day school were available, and they

are the most likely to say giving their children a Jewish education is "not important" .

Over three quarters of Universalists describe their connection to Israel as very close or fairly close, and two thirds have visited Israel at least once. Though somewhat weaker than the connection seen among the more traditional profiles, this still indicates a strong connection to Israel among French Jewry as a whole. The Universalists are the least likely to be considering making aliyah. They are the most likely to say that Israel should exchange territory for a peace treaty.

They are largely happy and satisfied with their lives, and the least worried of all the profiles.

In summary, this group is characterized by a high level of social integration within the general society. It could be said that Universalists are the heirs of the traditional Israelites as defined by Dominique Schnapper: that is, Jews who have adopted the values of their social environment. However, 80% prefer the term "Jew" to "Israelite", the highest of any of the profiles, indicating that the term "Israelite" may no longer have the same connotations it once had and that the younger generation of integrated French Jews do not relate to this term, even if they embody the attitudes it once represented. It seems that "universalist French Jew" is today a more appropriate way to describe this group than "Israelite".

Revivalists

Like the Universalists, this profile was most common among younger heads of households, particularly those between the ages of 30 and 40 at the time of the survey. However, the Revivalists are more likely to be Sephardi. They also have a lower average income and level of education.

The majority of Revivalists defines themselves as traditional and they are far more similar to the Traditionalists than to the two other profiles. They have a relatively low rate of intermarriage (less than 20%) and are slightly more opposed than Traditionalists to the idea of their children marrying a non-Jew. Interestingly, the higher endogamy rate among women mentioned earlier does not hold true for the Revivalists. Among this profile the males have a slightly higher rate of being married to another Jew.

They abide by the laws of *kashrut* in and out of their homes and adhere to the laws and traditions of *Shabbat*. The number of Revivalists who never watch television or work on Shabbat is only slightly lower than that of Traditionalists. Their level of participation in the local Jewish community is almost equal to that of Traditionalists, and almost half are part of the community nucleus. They have the highest levels of Jewish education and attach great importance to giving their children Jewish education. Over a third send their children to Jewish day schools, four times the rate found among the Universalists. Their social life includes many Jewish friends. Almost one-quarter say all their friends are Jewish. They donate frequently to Jewish organizations. A greater percentage of Revivalists than of any other profile say they feel very close to Israel. They are the least likely to have never visited Israel, the most likely to have visited six or more times and the most likely to be considering aliyah . They have the greatest proficiency in Hebrew.

The Revivalists are the happiest and most satisfied with their lives. This may be because they are connected with a cultural/ relgious tradition and community while at the same time well-integrated into general French society. At the same time, the Revivalists are more concerned than the other profiles with

every one of the problems in the list (Interestingly, although the percentages of respondents in each profile who indicated they are very worried about the various issues varied, the order of priority is essentially the same among all four profiles.)

Their involvement in both Jewish and general French society may widen the range of issues with which they are concerned. Revivalists are also the largest group to say that they have personally suffered from antisemitism in recent years.

Traditionalists

This profile was most common among those aged 50 and older with lower income and level of education. The majority of Traditionalists were born outside metropolitan France and has a relatively low level of education and income. 44% do not have a bachelor's degree. In the areas surrounding Paris and in the provinces, the Traditionalists are more numerous than any other profile.

The Traditionalists are religiously observant, the large majority adhering to the rules of *kashrut* both in and out of their homes and keeping Shabbat.[42] They have a high level of Jewish education and one-third send their children to Jewish day school. They are active in the local Jewish community. We find in this group the highest proportion of those who define themselves as Orthodox, although the vast majority defines themselves as traditional. It must be remembered that the profile Traditionalist

42 We found that watching television on Shabbat is a significant discriminating practice among the French Jewish population. This indicator differentiates between those who have family traditions surrounding Shabbat but do not strictly adhere to the laws concerning work on Shabbat, and those who rigorously observe religious laws and therefore do not watch television on Shabbat.

cannot be equated with the traditional religious stream, but rather indicates a traditional set of values which does not necessarily include religious observance.

Almost fifty percent of Traditionalists say they are more religious than in the past, yet barely one-third say that they are more religious than their parents (The rest are equally divided between those who say they are as religious and those who say they are less religious than their parents). This may indicate a return in middle age to the religious behavior patterns with which they were raised, which may have played a lesser role in their younger years.

The Traditionalists feel far closer to Israel than do the Universalists and Individualists, but somewhat less so than the Revivalists. Their Hebrew skills are only slightly less than those of the Revivalists. Again, we see an emphasis on reading over writing and speaking, attributable to the importance of being able to read Hebrew prayers and religious texts.

Traditionalists are slightly more likely to say they are not happy or satisfied. The Traditionalists who are unhappy and dissatisfied with their lives (still a small minority, less than 15% of those fitting this profile) may be unable to bridge the cultural gap between the traditional society in which they were raised and the modern, predominantly secular culture in which they live.

Table 32: Regional Distribution of the Four Profiles of French Jewry

	Individualists	**Universalists**	**Revivalists**	**Traditionalists**	**Total**
Paris	20	33	25	23	100
Paris region	26	17	23	34	100
Provinces	21	23	22	34	100

Table 33: General Demographics and the Profiles of French Jewry

	Individualists	**Universalists**	**Revivalists**	**Traditionalists**
Gender				
Male	59	53	45	42
Female	41	47	55	58
Ethnicity				
Ahkenazic	34	33	16	15
Sephardic	60	58	80	80
Both	6	9	4	5
Total	100	100	100	100
Marital status				
Married	58	50	60	65
Cohabiting	10	12	9	5
Widowed	9	6	7	15
Divorced/ separated	7	10	9	8
Single (never married)	17	22	15	8
Total	100	100	100	100
Number of children				
None	25	33	25	14
One	15	15	14	14
Two	35	34	25	22
Three	16	14	20	28
Four	4	3	10	12

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Five or more	4	1	6	9
Total	100	100	100	100
Family income				
Below average	24	25	40	38
Average	62	54	52	54
Above average	13	21	8	8
Educational level				
Less than bachelor's degree	34	18	37	44
Bachelor's degree	20	14	18	20
Bachelor's degree + 2	14	19	21	15
Bachelor's degree + 4	32	49	24	21

Table 34: Jewish Identity Indicators and the Profiles of French Jewry

	Individualists	**Universalists**	**Revivalists**	**Traditionalists**
Preference for term:				
Jewish	70	80	58	61
Israelite	6	4	3	5
Both	24	17	38	34
Total	100	100	100	100
Friends				
None are Jewish	7	10	6	4
Most are NOT Jewish	31	36	12	15
Half are Jewish	33	29	24	26
Most are Jewish	21	20	33	33
All are Jewish	7	5	24	22
Participation in local Jewish community				
Rare	47	57	22	26
Average	37	29	33	33
Part of community nucleus	15	14	45	41
Total	100	100	100	100

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Level of religious observance				
Non-observant	41	59	11	11
Liberal	18	13	13	15
Traditional	40	27	70	64
Orthodox	1	1	6	10
Total	100	100	100	100
Hebrew skills				
Can read Hebrew	46	37	61	53
Can speak Hebrew	16	18	31	28
Can write Hebrew	10	13	31	28
Donate to Jewish or Israeli organizations				
Several times a year	36	35	59	57
Once a year	17	18	16	19
Every two-three years	4	4	3	5
Less	11	8	6	5
Never	31	35	15	15
Total	100	100	100	100

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Importance of giving to Jewish or Israeli organizations				
No contribution	53	54	32	34
Small contribution	18	19	17	16
Average contribution	19	14	25	21
Large contribution	9	8	17	21
Very large contribution	2	4	9	8
total	100	100	100	100
Donate to non-Jewish organizations				
Several times a year	17	26	17	14
Once a year	24	26	24	18
Every two-three years	3	5	3	4
Less often	13	10	8	8
Never	43	34	48	56
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 35: Jewish Education and the Profiles of French Jewry

	Individualists	**Universalists**	**Revivalists**	**Traditionalists**
Jewish educational background				
Attended any Jewish educational institution	67	65	79	75
Jewish day school	23	18	36	34
Talmud Torah	43	36	53	49
Jewish youth movement	32	34	49	43
Jewish camp	27	28	36	30
Yeshiva	2	3	4	6
Jewish student movement	7	14	17	14
Currently have enrolled their children in Jewish educational system	13	8	34	33
Would enroll children in a good, free, convenient Jewish day school	64	33	90	85
Importance of giving children Jewish education				
Very important	34	32	77	73
Fairly important	46	38	19	21
Not important	20	30	4	6
Total	100	100	100	100

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Preferred level of Jewish observance of Jewish day school for one's children				
Total observance	14	12	21	29
Mostly observant	28	21	40	38
Partial observance	46	49	37	28
No observance	12	18	2	4

It is worth noting here that the data on attitudes towards Jewish education shown in Table 35 indicate possible developmental strategies for Jewish schools. There is a large pool of parents of potential students, particularly among the Traditionalists and Revivalists, who are discouraged from sending their children to Jewish schools by distance and cost. There also seems to be a significant number of Individualists and, to a lesser extent, Universalists who, in addition to these material difficulties, prefer a school that is not overly religiously observant.

Table 36: Intermarriage and the Profiles of French Jewry

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Religion of spouse				
Jewish	58	52	79	80
Non-Jewish	40	48	19	20
Convert to Judaism	1	0	2	0

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Total	100	100	100	100
Jewish men with Jewish spouse	56	47	83	75
Jewish men with non-Jewish spouse	44	53	25	17
Jewish women with Jewish spouse	66	58	80	83
Jewish women with non-Jewish spouse	34	42	20	17

Table 37: Indicators of Connection to Israel and the Profiles of French Jewry

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Connection to Israel				
Very close	36	31	64	57
Fairly close	46	46	27	34
Fairly distant	16	15	8	7
Very distant	3	8	1	2

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Family or friends in Israel				
children	5	2	7	8
Close relatives	43	36	58	52
Distant relatives	24	27	21	20
Close friends	8	12	6	6
No-one	20	23	8	14
Number of visits to Israel				
None	27	33	19	25
One	22	16	11	15
Two	13	13	11	9
Three	6	9	8	8
Four	4	6	8	7
Five	3	5	6	5
Six or more	25	20	37	32
Total	100	100	100	100
Intention to make aliyah				
Very soon	3	0	10	9
In the future	5	4	21	17
Considered it but changed my mind	7	7	9	8

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Not considering it, but not opposed to the idea	16	12	15	19
No intention	69	77	45	47
Total	100	100	100	100
Attitudes towards children making aliyah				
Would be happy and encouraging	33	33	54	53
Would be happy but cautioning	40	38	34	36
Would not be happy but would not oppose	23	19	9	7
Would not be happy and would try to dissuade	4	9	3	3
Would strongly oppose	1	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Should Israel exchange territory for credible peace guarantees?				
Yes	56	61	36	42
No	28	25	53	46
It is not up to Jews living in France to say	16	14	11	11
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 38: Satisfaction, Happiness and Worries of French Jews, by Profile

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Happiness				
Very happy	15	22	33	22
Happy	77	70	60	68
Not happy	7	8	6	8
Not at all happy	1	0	2	3
Total	100	100	100	100
Satisfaction				
Very satisfied	10	18	21	15
Satisfied	79	73	72	72
Not satisfied	10	8	6	11

	Individualists	Universalists	Revivalists	Traditionalists
Not at all satisfied	1	1	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100
Worried				
Very worried	8	5	13	16
Worried	53	50	54	57
Not worried	31	35	27	22
Not at all worried	10	10	6	6
Total	100	100	100	100
Very worried about:				
Terrorism	63	72	89	83
Antisemitism	58	69	89	83
Racism	59	66	85	71
Future of Israel	54	52	75	72
AIDS	38	48	64	51
Drugs	37	41	63	55
Islam	41	36	61	47
Unemployment	24	28	44	33
Pollution	21	30	41	32
Food insecurity	14	19	34	23
Intermarriage	12	8	36	38
Foreigners	4	8	17	13

Profiles of French Jews in the Structure of Values

These four profiles were introduced as external variables into the graph of the values, as shown in Figure 2. External variables are introduced into an SSA map in such a way that they do not affect the structure of the primary variables.

The Traditionalists are located at the periphery of the map, at the authority pole of the political diagonal, in the tradition region. The Universalists are in the Social life region, close to the Autonomy pole of the political diagonal. The Individualists are between the Materialism and Social Life regions, close to the Egoism pole of the social diagonal. They are disassociated with the political concepts of authority and autonomy. The Revivalists are also in the tradition region, but closer to the center of the map. Their position near the center of the map indicates an equally strong correlation with all (or most) of the values listed. They create a synthesis between the political poles of authority and autonomy (though with a slightly stronger emphasis on authority) and between egoism and altruism (though with a slightly stronger emphasis on altruism). Within the context of French Jewry, the revivalists may be said to have an integrative approach to identity while the Traditionalists and Universalists have oppositional approaches to identity. The individualists may be said to have a passive approach to identity.

These four profiles may be seen as two sets of oppositions: Universalists who stress the principle of autonomy opposite Traditionalists who stress the principle of authority; and Individualists who constitute a rather "disconnected" profile opposite Revivalists who combine all the elements together. These value systems represented by these profiles impact the

modes of identification and varied practices of the Jews of France and expressions of feelings of solidarity.

The order of the profiles on the graph does not indicate the character of the members of the group. This geographic organization simply highlights tendencies, propensities, which we call the dominant traits. This does not mean that the members of these profiles are authoritarian or autonomous. It means that these profiles have a greater tendency to conform to principles of authority or autonomy.

It should be noted that no profile is positioned close to the altruism pole. This does not mean that the expression of Jewish identity does not take into account the welfare of others. It simply means that it is the pole that is least correlated with the profiles. Can we see, in this, a sign that traditional community activism (for Israel, human rights, the liberation of Soviet Jews, etc.) has lost strength as an identity modality? This may be linked to the decline of voluntarism in favor of the growing professionalism of community institutions.[43] A concrete expression of this may be seen in the virtual disappearance of youth movements from the community landscape, previously a site for community mobilization. The decline in such informal educational structures may be expected to have a profound influence on the values of the Jews of France.

The Individualists are primarily distinguished by their antipathy to authoritarian values and the low level of importance

43 "The return to specific practices and the specifically Jewish reinterpretation of Judaism which has been taking place in the last decade are very striking, insofar as they appear to call into question an age-old development … Right now, the heads of the [Jewish] organizations are more likely to be observant than militant". Schnapper (1991:112).

they attach to such traditional values as faith in God, family and parents. They are passive regarding values of autonomy, not a militant group that is actively promoting social individualism. Their main characteristic is a negative attitude towards traditional values, which they nevertheless have not fully rejected and which they maintain to some extent. Their level of religious observance is relatively low, and yet there are as many Individualists who define themselves as religiously traditional as those who say they are non-observant. To some extent they are still tied to the values of more traditional societies, yet emphasize individualistic values.

Figure 2: Axiological Typology with Profiles as External Variables



Profiles of French Jews and Socio-Economic Factors

The SSA program was used to graphically portray the relationship between several basic socio-economic features of the French-Jewish community: age, educational level, income and whether they were born in or outside metropolitan France. The map, shown in Figure 3, is structured along two axes. The vertical axis corresponds to age; the horizontal axis corresponds to both income and education levels. The four axiological profiles were then introduced as external variables. Each profile occupies a distinct place in the socio-economic structure, indicating that values are simultaneously linked to education, economic status and age. The Universalists and Traditionalists are of a similar age group, but the Universalists have a much higher level of education and income. Therefore we can say that, among this generation, higher level of education corresponds to adoption of more universal values, and rejection of traditional values.

Yet similar level of education and income does not necessarily produce the same value structure among different generations. The Individualists and Revivalists are similar in terms of education and income level, yet the Revivalists, who tend to be much younger, are *more* closely tied to tradition, and balance between values that emphasize the individual and those that emphasize religion and community. It seems that for the older generation, education and economic success were tied to rejection of traditional values in favor of individualist values among the middle socio-economic class, and in favor of universalist values among the highest educated and most financially successful. Among the younger group of French-Jewish heads of households, however, education is not tied to a rejection of traditional values, but rather to the development of a value structure blending their

religious tradition with the universalist and individualist values of the society in which they were raised.

Figure 3: Geometric Representation (WSSA1) of the Socio-Cultural Positions of the Jews of France with the Axiological Profiles as External Variables



Issues of Concern among Profiles of the Axiological Typology

Figure 4 portrays the structural relationship between the items on the list of concerns. There is a clear distinction between general concerns (AIDS, pollution, etc) and those more directly reated to the Jewish community (anti-Semitism, future of Israel, etc.) For

the Jews of France, concern with terrorism, Islam and racism are linked with the Jewish community. The item "foreigners" lies on the border between the two, hinting at the ambivalent or conflicted perception the Jews of France may have of this issue, given the high percentage of immigrants among their own population.

Individualists and Universalists are more closely correlated with general worries. The Universalists are at the extreme edge of the map, far from the specific Jewish-Israeli concerns. The Traditionalists and Revivalists are more closely correlated with concerns related to the Jewish community and Israel. However, both these profiles, and particularly the Revivalists, are close to the center of the map, indicating that the general issues concern them also.

The "very happy" respondents are closer to the Jewish-Israeli concerns, while the "very satisfied" are in the region with the general concerns. In studies of "subjective well-being", researchers have gradually begun to include multiple indicators of this complex psychological phenomenon, differentiating between satisfaction (general and with specific life areas such as family or work) and happiness (experiencing pleasant emotions, lack of negative emotions) (Diener, 2000). The unhappy and not satisfied are also in the region with the general worries, far from the Jewish-Israeli concerns.

Figure 4: Graphic Portrayal of Concerns of the Jews of France with Axiological Profiles, Happiness and Satisfaction as External Variables



Conclusion

Over the past two decades, the Jewish population of France has been experiencing a major transformation; yet another chapter of change in their long, rich and sometimes difficult history. The influx of North African Jews, which began in the 1950s, revitalized Jewry in France after the psychological trauma and physical destruction of World War II. They have become successfully integrated to their new home, culturally and economically. However, their more open and public style of Judaism has raised fundamental questions regarding the nature of French Jewish identity; which must be addressed against the background of the public debate regarding French identity and the accommodation of ethnic-religious minorities in the Republic. The media portrayal and government response to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as resurgent anti-Semitism, has led to a level of alienation and insecurity among French Jews. As a result, we are witnessing a kind of symbolic departure from France. A significant portion of French Jewry expresses uncertainty that the future of their families will be in France. Involvement with local Jewish communities has intensified, despite cultural discouragement of

such "dual loyalites". Aliyah rates are climbing. Travel to Israel is so common as to be virtually universal and seems, particularly among the younger generation, to represent a sort of intermediary step or trial period for potential aliyah.

Studying the French Jewish community at this juncture in its history and witnessing the changes firsthand is fascinating and exciting. Ongoing and in-depth research of this population has revealed insights not readily apparent even to those living in France. For example, the outbreak of violent anti-Semitism in France, which erupted along with the second Intifada in Israel, took many Frenchmen, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, by surprise. Yet the warning signs were there, and had in fact been noted by myself and others (such as Trigano, 2006) intimately familiar with the political and historical context of French Jewry.

Methodologically, too, research on French Jewry has evolved over the past several decades. Thirty years ago, studies of French Jews were essentially limited to demographic descriptions. With Schnapper (1980) and Hannoun (2000), we saw indices and typologies of Jewish identity and community participation developed. In the current study, a survey of basic values provides a universally applicable instrument to explore the specifics of the French Jewish community.

Based on a number of large-scale empirical studies of French Jews, we have drawn a picture of the community at the turn of the millennia. It consists of slightly more than half a million individuals, a slight decline over the past quarter of a century due to low birth rates,[44] the end of the waves of immigration,

44 In 1967-71, the birth rate in the Paris region was 1.7 and 1.2 children per Jewish woman born respectively in North Africa and Europe (Bensimon &

and emigration of French Jews (primarily to Israel).[45] They are concentrated in Paris and the departments surrounding the capital. They are a highly-educated, financially successful and socially well-integrated population, generally happy and satisfied with their lives. Yet they are also deeply worried about terrorism, anti-Semitism, racism and the future of Israel, indicating a level of disquiet with the current atmosphere in France. Indeed, a rising number are considering the possibility that their future, or their children's future, may not be in France.

Based on multi-dimensional analysis of the core values held by French Jews, a typology was developed that provides a framework for understanding the dynamics within the community. This typology of four categories (Individualists, Universalists, Revivalists and Traditionalists) seems more useful in describing segments of the population than do classic divisions such as the political left/right spectrum.

The demographics and attitudes represented by each of these four profiles tell us much about the nature and evolution of the French Jewish community. It seems that the older generation

Della Pergola, 1986: 143). These figures apply to women who are still in the younger, child-bearing age group. For women aged 40-45, the averages were: total for Jewish women, 2.6; women with a European background, 2.0; women from North African backgrounds, 3.1. Women aged 40-45 in 1975 would today be aged 70-75. For them we found a very similar fertility rate: 2.42. In 2002, we found an average of 1.99 children per adult Jewish woman of any age.

45 As Bensimon (1989: 265) noted: "While in the past French Jewry always had the possibility of renewing itself through the influx of immigrants from traditional communities, today these migratory waves have virtually ended. French Jewry must now find the strength to affirm its Jewishness and to fight against the demographic factors that threaten it from within its own ranks".

of heads of French Jewish households tend to be either Traditionalists or Individualists, while the younger household heads tend to be either Universalists or Revivalists. These profiles may reflect Azria's observation (1991) that modernity produced two apparently inverse results: the decline of religion and, simultaneously, its reactivation in the form of new modalities.[46] Like the older Traditionalists, the Revivalists are religiously observant, but Israel plays a larger role in their Jewish identity and they have integrated into French society to a greater degree. They represent a bridge between the traditional-religious value system and the secular, Republican value system. Among the less observant pair, the older cohort tends to be Individualists while the younger cohort tends to be Universalists, an interesting ideological and attitudinal difference. The former stresses personal success and the interests of the individual as opposed to the collective. The latter stress personal freedom and enjoyment, embracing a global (or perhaps more accurately in this case, French-Republican) worldview as opposed to a particular Jewish worldview.

46 "Traditionally, on the one hand we specify an array of knowledge inherited from the past, accumulated over the centuries and handed down to our days in the form of written and oral teachings. On the other hand, there is the whole array of practices comprising gestures, rites, customs and beliefs, also handed down from one generation to the other. Jewish observance: a religious definition which will by necessity be restrictive and normative. For the purposes of the restrictive definition, Jewish observance can be summarized as the practice of the religious prescriptions contained in the Law, Halacha, whereby the specific modalities for their implementation have been laid down by acknowledged rabbinical authorities, for the time and place in question, and by custom (*minhag*), a more or less extensive and non-normative definition. It recognizes as Jewish observance any gesture, behavior, attitude, social practice, which is part of the group's culture, indicative of Jewish affiliation, identity, and specificity".

In the preface to the publication of an earlier study (Cohen, 1991), Annie Kriegel wrote, "…under the shock of external and internal events and at the end of a process full of hesitancy, circumvolutions and rebounds, as soon as this community began to reconstruct itself following the Holocaust, it largely cut itself off from what was its destiny – that is, to slowly, inexorably and inexcusably blend among the mass of the French nation. We accorded this a metaphorical significance, for the concept of community became charged with a reality that was enriched, structured and much more stable than we believed possible".

Sixteen years afterwards, it seems that this prediction has been largely confirmed.

Operational Implications

In addition to their sociological interest and importance, the data and data analyses presented in this book have policy implications for the contemporary French-Jewish community. The purpose of this chapter is not to make specific policy recommendations. Policy-making is a sophisticated process involving the decision-makers, leaders and policy researchers of the local community, and is guided by a given agenda and direction. Rather, in this chapter I will locate the main issues that, on the basis of my research, I concluded should be considered by community leaders and policy makers. The empirical data in this book may be used to guide and inform the policy and decisions made.

Frequency of visits to Israel

As we saw, a large percentage of French Jews visit Israel on a very regular, even yearly, basis. Clearly, this information helps us to understand the character of French Jewry, particularly in comparison to other Diaspora populations which do not visit Israel in equal numbers or with equal frequency. In terms of policy, the rate of visitation to Israel has a number of implications. Lay and

professional leaders in local French Jewish communities may find that during vacation times a significant percentage of their constituency is in Israel. It may be that major campaigns and community activities need be planned for other times of the year, when the vacationers have returned home. Activities conducted during the vacation months may need to be tailored for a sub-population of the community which is less likely to be visiting Israel. This may include the elderly, those whose occupations do not allow for frequent trips to Israel, and/or those with a less strong attachment to Israel. Community leaders, planners and policy-makers may need to begin to note whether a large number of their community members are absent during vacations and if so, who remains in France during the vacations, in order to plan appropriately. Additionally, they may choose to partner with organizations and institutions in Israel in order to offer activities (i.e. seminars, workshops, Shabbat gatherings, etc.) specifically for French Jews. These activities may be designed to also strengthen the local community in France. In general, the activities and policies of the French-Jewish community should take into account the strong attachment of French Jews to Israel.

Caring for the elderly and socially isolated individuals in the community

My survey of French Jewry found that a third of the heads of French-Jewish households live alone. This includes the widowed and divorced, primarily elderly people. Given demographic trends, it may be assumed that this population will continue to increase. These individuals are often socially isolated and disconnected from the community. The tragedy which befell France during the summer of 2002, when thousands of elderly who lived alone died

during a heat wave, revealed the crucial importance of addressing the issue of caring for the elderly and socially isolated. No less than for society as a whole, this presents a major challenge to the French Jewish community. Public and highly visible campaigns often bypass the needs of this population. The work needed on their behalf is often virtually invisible. However, this work touches on core values of the French Jewish community (parents, family, caring for others). There are numerous alternatives—organizing volunteers to visit the elderly in their homes, hiring professional social workers, founding a community center with activities specifically organized for the elderly with the necessary outreach to those who live alone. Community leaders and policy makers need to consider the best ways for their particular community to address this growing issue.

Jewish students in Catholic schools

As we saw, approximately a third of French Jewish students attend Jewish day schools. Some 40% attend non-denominational public schools. The remaining 30% are enrolled in other private schools, predominantly Catholic. That such a significant portion of French Jewish children are being educated in religious, non-Jewish settings is a surprising finding of this study, with profound and far-reaching implications. Jewish leaders and educators must assess the extent of this phenomenon within their own communities and decide what course of action (if any) to take in order to address it. Is there a need for expansion of the Jewish day school system? Is there a desire for a wider variety of Jewish day schools (i.e. for various levels of religiosity)? Are there problems of anti-Semitism in the public schools which the Jewish community may address? Are the Jewish community leaders and

institutions going to try to discourage the enrollment of Jewish children in non-Jewish private schools, and if so, how?

The decline of informal education

For the past two decades there has been a steady decline in the extent and impact of informal Jewish educational settings (youth movements, summer camps, etc.) in France. In part, this decline is the result of previous policy decisions. The budget for the entire network of informal Jewish educational settings in France is less than the budget of a single Jewish day school. However, Jewish day schools are reaching only a third of Jewish students. Additionally, it is not necessary to take an either-or approach: the community may decide to simultaneously strengthen the formal and informal educational systems, prioritizing and compromising as necessary, given budgetary and logistical restrictions.

There is a wealth of research in Jewish Diaspora communities around the world attesting to the importance and strength of informal education (see among many others Ackerman, 1986; Chazan, 1991; Cohen, B. & Schmida, 1997; Cohen, E.H., 1992, in press-2008; Cohen, S. & Horenczyk, 1999; Kahane, 1997; Lorge & Zola, 2006; Reisman, 1990). For day school students, informal education adds an important, primarily affective, dimension to their Jewish education. For those who do not attend Jewish day schools, informal settings may be the primary or only Jewish education they receive. There are numerous ways in which informal Jewish educational settings may be strengthened, including training counselors who may become future community leaders, encouraging participation in group tours to Israel, revitalizing youth movements, organizing summer day and sleep-away camps, etc. Local leaders and policy makers

may determine which particular forms of informal education are most appropriate for their community.

Endogamy/exogamy

As in many other Diaspora populations, exogamy rates are climbing in France. In particular, we saw that a large majority of Jews who are living with but not married to their partner has a non-Jewish partner. Exogamy has already become a crisis for the Jews of the United States and even more so among the Jews of the CIS. Currently intermarriage rates are lower in France, approximately 30% for the whole population. I would suggest that now is the time to formulate a policy on this issue. How may young Jews be convinced of the importance of marrying a Jew? What social opportunities to meet Jewish potential spouses may be offered? What position will Jewish community institutions take regarding involvement of non-Jewish spouses? How will they relate to children of intermarriages (particularly if the mother is not Jewish and thus the children are not Jewish according to Halakha)? How will Jewish educational settings present and address the issue of intermarriage?

APPENDICES

Table 1: Matrix of correlations (MONCO) between happiness, lack of worries and satisfaction[47]

		1	2	3
Happiness	1	100	31	83
Not worried	2	31	100	38
Satisfaction	3	83	38	100

Table 2: Correlation matrix for the values of the Jews of France

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Studying	1	100	44	45	9	29	23	5	25	57	28	27	16	36	41
Doing what I like	2	44	100	21	32	45	40	-17	22	46	15	53	31	9	12
Family	3	45	21	100	28	18	19	53	12	38	63	34	19	33	47
Money	4	9	32	28	100	20	34	14	10	-5	16	28	41	-1	-2
Friends	5	29	45	18	20	100	54	-9	28	34	19	48	22	32	33
Vacation	6	23	40	19	34	54	100	2	34	24	11	44	33	13	6
Belief in God	7	5	-17	53	14	-9	2	100	7	8	67	13	31	20	42
Sports	8	25	22	12	10	28	34	7	100	32	17	35	29	26	22
Being onself	9	57	46	38	-5	34	24	8	32	100	52	49	8	41	53
Parents	10	28	15	63	16	19	11	67	17	52	100	56	38	44	65
Making the most of life	11	27	53	34	28	48	44	13	35	49	56	100	44	34	38
Appearance	12	16	31	19	41	22	33	31	29	8	38	44	100	35	25
Community	13	36	9	33	-1	32	13	20	26	41	44	34	35	100	85
Help others	14	41	12	47	-2	33	6	42	22	53	65	38	25	85	100

47 The question that was asked about worrying must have been reversed in calculating correlations.

Typology: Methodology

The process by which we established a typology of the Jews of France involved 9 stages, which we shall describe in brief.

We asked the interviewees to assess fourteen values. The question was formulated in the following way:

I shall read you a list. Please assess whether the following are not important, important or very important in your life?

	Not Important	*Important*	*Very important*
1. Studying	1	2	3
2. Doing what I like	1	2	3
3. Founding a family	1	2	3
4. Earning a lot of money	1	2	3
5. Having a good time with friends	1	2	3
6. Going away on holiday	1	2	3
7. Belief in God	1	2	3
8. Engaging in sport	1	2	3
9. Being oneself	1	2	3
10. Honor one's parents	1	2	3
11. Make the most of life	1	2	3
12. Caring for one's appearance	1	2	3
13. Being useful to society	1	2	3
14. Helping others	1	2	3

Stage 1: We created a structural order of the values of the Jews of France using the Smallest Space Analysis procedure, as described on page 59 and shown in Figure 1. The examination of the values of the Jews of France enabled us, with the use of the Smallest Space Analysis method of the HUDAP statistical package, to create a very pertinent structural order for these diverse values

and present them on a graph. Six regions with a central value "Making the most of life" emerged. See the axiological graph in the body of the study.

Stage 2: The variables for the same region are semantically linked and can thus be transformed into an index. Because the central variable "Making the most of life" can be taken in many senses, it was not retained in the following stages. Six indexes were thus constructed, one for each region. For example, Index 1 adds together the variables 3, 7 and 10.

Stage 3: Once the six indexes were constructed, we verified their different frequencies. Here, for example, is the distribution of Index 1.

3	**0.09**
4	**0.90**
5	**7.50**
6	**14.54**
7	**19.51**
8	**22.13**
9	**35.32**
Total	**100.00**

Since each of the three questions, which are the basis of this index, consist of three categories, the minimum of their total equals 3 and the maximum equals 9.

Stage 4: We then calculated the average for each index. We found an average of 7.6 for Index 1.

Stage 5: Each index was binarised, that is, transformed into two categories: one category representing answers below the average and one category representing answers above the average. In respect of Index 1, answers 3 to 7 were transformed into 1: answers 8 and 9 were transformed into 2.

Stage 6: Using the POSAC (Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Base Coordinates), a unique program from the HUDAP statistical package, we were able to establish a partial order of the 64 profiles assigned to each interviewee on the basis of the six indexes.

Here is the list of 64 profiles, their identity number, score, and frequency.

id	Index 1	Index 2	Index 3	Index 4	Index 5	Index 6	Score	Frequency
1	2	2	2	2	2	2	12	78
2	2	2	2	2	1	2	11	24
3	2	2	2	1	2	2	11	24
4	2	2	1	2	2	2	11	39
5	1	2	2	2	2	2	11	21
6	2	1	2	2	2	2	11	21
7	2	2	2	2	2	1	11	13
8	2	1	2	2	2	1	10	19
9	2	1	2	1	2	2	10	16
10	2	1	2	2	1	2	10	13
11	2	1	1	2	2	2	10	33
12	1	2	2	1	2	2	10	11
13	1	2	1	2	2	2	10	20

14	2	2	2	2	1	1	10	8
15	2	2	1	2	2	1	10	17
16	2	2	1	1	2	2	10	13
17	1	2	2	2	2	1	10	3
18	1	1	2	2	2	2	10	12
19	1	2	2	2	1	2	10	18
20	2	2	2	1	2	1	10	8
21	2	2	1	2	1	2	10	33
22	2	2	2	1	1	2	10	5
23	1	1	2	2	1	2	9	7
24	2	2	1	1	2	1	9	6
25	1	2	1	2	1	2	9	32
26	2	2	1	2	1	1	9	10
27	2	1	1	2	1	2	9	44
28	1	2	2	1	2	1	9	8
29	1	2	2	1	1	2	9	15
30	2	2	1	1	1	2	9	8
31	1	1	1	2	2	2	9	11
32	2	1	1	2	2	1	9	18
33	2	1	2	1	1	2	9	6
34	1	2	1	1	2	2	9	9
35	1	2	2	2	1	1	9	8
36	2	1	2	1	2	1	9	16
37	2	2	2	1	1	1	9	2
38	2	1	2	2	1	1	9	4
39	1	1	2	2	2	1	9	4
40	2	1	1	1	2	2	9	22
41	1	2	1	2	2	1	9	7
42	1	1	2	1	2	2	9	7
43	1	1	1	2	2	1	8	11
44	2	1	1	2	1	1	8	35
45	1	1	1	2	1	2	8	47
46	1	2	1	1	1	2	8	19
47	2	1	1	1	1	2	8	22
48	2	1	1	1	2	1	8	20
49	1	2	2	1	1	1	8	10

50	1	1	1	1	2	2	8	9
51	2	2	1	1	1	1	8	9
52	1	1	2	1	1	2	8	3
53	2	1	2	1	1	1	8	8
54	1	1	2	1	2	1	8	8
55	1	2	1	2	1	1	8	16
56	1	2	1	1	2	1	8	2
57	1	1	2	2	1	1	8	3
58	1	1	1	1	1	2	7	35
59	2	1	1	1	1	1	7	35
60	1	1	1	2	1	1	7	30
61	1	2	1	1	1	1	7	12
62	1	1	2	1	1	1	7	4
63	1	1	1	1	2	1	7	7
64	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	53

The non-linear correlations (MONCO) between the six indexes can be seen in the following matrix.

		1	2	3	4	5	6
Index	1	1.00					
Index	2	.03	1.00				
Index	3	.24	.49	1.00			
Index	4	.22	.30	.08	1.00		
Index	5	.48	.29	.56	.13	1.00	
Index	6	.08	.41	.24	.34	.21	1.00

The 64 profiles identified by the statistical package can be seen in partial order in the following scalogram.



Profile 1 appears on the top right-hand side of the scalogram. This is the "biggest" profile. Profile 64, the "smallest", appears facing it diagonally. Between these two extreme profiles, the statistical package identified the remaining 62 profiles, according to their partial order.

Stage 7: The statistical package enables one to make a more in-depth analysis and to locate the axes of the scalogram.

It emerges that the axes are perfectly correlated with Indexes 1 and 2 (the first designates the index of variables, *Belief in God, Founding a Family, Honor one's Parents*; the second designates *Doing what I Like, Having a Good Time with Friends*)

As a result, the statistical package divides the scalogram according to these two indexes, as seen in the scalogram below.

If one refers to the list of 64 profiles shown above, one can see that the distribution is almost perfect. Nearly all the profiles below the horizontal line fall into Category 1, Index 1. Similarly, nearly all the profiles to the left of the vertical line fall into Category 1, Index 2.



Stage 8: Each of the four categories of these new variables was then transformed into a binary variable, each representing one of the four areas of the scalogram.

Stage 9: These four binary variables were introduced into the graph of values as external variables. An external variable, by definition, plays no part in the order of the graph (Cohen & Amar, 2002). Only the original variables can do so. Once the graph is defined and fixed, an external variable is identified based on the correlations between this variable and the original variables. The external variables are introduced one by one into the SSA map, as shown in Figure 2.

Comparison of Certain Weighted and Non-Weighted Variables

	Non weighted	Weighted
Men	51.06	49.22
Women	48.94	50.78
	100.00	100.00
Provinces	44.26	44.07
Paris	27.56	26.01
Paris region	28.18	29.92
Total	100.00	100.00
Less than the Baccalaureat	35.03	34.14
Baccalaureat	17.96	17.78
Baccalaureat + 2	17.34	17.39
Baccalaureat + 4	29.67	30.72
Total	100.00	100.00
Aged 18-29	12.58	12.21
Aged 30-39	20.52	20.83
Aged 40-49	15.43	14.94
Aged 50-59	16.59	17.17
60 and over	34.88	34.84
Total	100.00	100.00
Jewish spouse	75.05	68.28
Non-Jewish spouse	23.75	30.60
Converted spouse	1.20	1.12
Total	100.00	100.00
Community participation		
Never	15.48	19.97
Rarely	14.04	17.52
Occasionally	18.27	16.73
Frequently	19.35	16.65
Very frequently	32.85	29.43
Total	100.00	100.00
Ashkenazi	18.12	24.06
Sephardi	72.20	69.89
Neither	9.68	6.05
Total	100.00	100.00
Married	60.50	58.35
Live together	5.99	8.74
Widowed	9.56	9.59
Divorced / Separated	8.49	8.96
Singled	15.46	14.36
Total	100.00	100.00

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List of Publications

The Rappaport Center publishes Research and Position Papers, authored by outstanding scholars and experts. These papers present original and interesting findings concerning issues pertaining to assimilation and Jewish identity. Written at a high level of cultural and conceptual analysis, they are nevertheless not 'ivory tower' research; they bear operational implications for ameliorating and improving real-life situations. The Research and Position Papers of the Rappaport Center are an invaluable and original series, constituting a significant addition to the collection of any public and research library and to the bookshelves of individuals interested in, or concerned with, the future of the Jewish people. To date, the following publications have appeared in this series:

- **Israeli Assimilation: The Absorption of Non-Jews into Israeli Society and its Influence on the Collective Identity**, by Asher Cohen (Hebrew)
- **A Critique of Jewish Identity Discourse**, by Avi Sagi (Hebrew)
- **Halakhic Responses to Assimilation**, by Ariel Picard (Hebrew)
- **Training American Orthodox Rabbis to Play a Role in Confronting Assimilation: Programs, Methodologies and Directions**, by Adam S. Ferziger (English).

- **Making the Jewish Canon Accessible to Our Generation**, by Yedidia Z. Stern (Hebrew/English).
- **Psychological Aspects of Identity Formation and Their Implications for Understanding the Concept of Jewish Identity: A Review of the Scientific Literature**, by Michal TurKaspa-Shimoni, Dana Pereg and Mario Mikulincer (Hebrew)
- **"The Jewish Story": The Meaning of Jewish Identity and the Factors Shaping it Among Jewish Youth in Mexico City and Tashkent**, by Dana Pereg, Mario Mikulincer and Maya Aksakalov (Hebrew)
- **The Quintessential Dilemma: American Jewish Responses to Intermarriage**, by Gerald Cromer (Hebrew/English)
- **"Jewishness" in Postmodernity: The Case of Sweden**, by Lars Dencik (Hebrew/English)
- **Assimilation in Italy and the Methods of Confronting it**, by Yaakov Andrea Lattes (Hebrew/Italian)
- **The Rosenzweig Lehrhaus: Proposal for a Jewish House of Study in Kassel Inspired by Franz Rosenzweig's *Frankfurt Lehrhaus***, by Ephraim Meir (English)
- **The Emergence of the Community Kollel: A New Model for Addressing Assimilation**, by Adam S. Ferziger (English)
- **Caucasus Jews in Daghestan: Identity and Survival**, by Chen Bram (Hebrew/English)
- ***Tikkun Olam*: Engaged Spirituality and Jewish Identity**, by Gerald Cromer (English)
- **Identity, Assimilation and Revival: Ethno-social Processes among the Jewish Population of the Former Soviet Union**, by Ze'ev Khanin and Velvl Chernin (Hebrew/English)
- **Israeli Emigrants Abroad – Jewish Continuity or Assimilatiom?**, by Lilach Lev Ari (Hebrew)

The Rappaport Center also publishes Field Reports, which provide insights and information with regard to specific issues of Jewish life and give a voice to local community members addressing those issues in a straightforward manner. The insights expressed in these publications aim at motivating communities and leaders to take a new look at the strengths and weaknesses of the ways in which they have until now related to community life, and encourage them to seriously consider and implement new strategies, better suited to ensuring the future of the community in today's turbulent times. To date, the following publications have appeared in this series:

- **THREAT AND OPPORTUNITY: ASSIMILATION AND RESPONSE AMONGST BASEL'S JEWS**, by Valerie Rhein (English)
- **JEWISH IDENTITY PATTERNS AND ASSIMILATION TRENDS AMONG YOUNG ADULT JEWS IN HUNGARY**, by David Bitter (English)
- **WHY DON'T THEY PARTICIPATE? A SHORT VOYAGE INTO THE HEARTS, MINDS AND CONCERNS OF THE JEWS OF SUBOTICA, YUGOSLAVIA**, by Sara Stojković (English)
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