

HATE CRIMES



against London's Jews

An analysis of incidents
recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service
2001-2004

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KEY FINDINGS

Trends in antisemitic incidents

- The number of incidents recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) each month fluctuates. Peaks are commonly attributed to international political events, and especially conflicts in the Middle East and flare-ups in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Troughs indicate a possible seasonal trend.
- An early upward trend in recorded incidents between 1996 and 2000 may reflect a real increase in incidents, but it may be wholly or partly an artefact resulting from developments in the policing of antisemitic crime by the MPS.
- A downward trend in incidents since 2001 is evident, but it cannot be concluded from the police data alone whether this represents an actual decline in victimisation, especially as it runs counter to the trend recorded by the Community Security Trust (CST).
- Racist incidents recorded by the MPS from January 2001 to December 2004 also show a downward trend in the frequency of incidents across the four years.
- An analysis of a sub-sample of antisemitic incidents recorded by the MPS suggests that many incidents appear to be opportunistic and indirect in nature.

Location of antisemitic incidents

- One-third of antisemitic incidents are recorded as occurring in the London Borough of Barnet. This matches the proportion of London's Jewish population that live in the borough. Incidents reported in Barnet, Hackney, Westminster and Camden account for just under two-thirds of all incidents reported.
- Most incidents occur either at identifiably Jewish locations (such as places of worship and schools) or in public locations where the victims are identifiably Jewish. It is also notable that incidents taking place at Jewish locations are directed more frequently at individuals rather than at property, synagogues or Jewish organisations per se.

Characteristics of incidents

- When grouped into types of allegations, incidents involving threats and harassment, criminal damage, malicious communications and violence account for most of the incidents reported.
- The data clearly show that similar proportions of incidents occur on every day of the week. This has important implications for police awareness of the potential for victimisation.
- Generally, the antisemitic incidents recorded by the MPS appear to be opportunistic and indirect in nature.
- Just under one in ten of the sub-sample of incidents involved direct contact with and explicit targeting of an

individual by a perpetrator where there is some evidence of a political or antisemitic belief or 'mission' that appears to have driven the incident.

- Moreover, whilst a number of the incidents were clearly politically motivated, the majority of incidents reported to the MPS in April and May 2002 did not appear to be carried out by perpetrators who were active in organised or extremist groups.

Profile of victims and suspects

- Substantial numbers of victims of antisemitic incidents report these either to the MPS or to the CST, rather than to both agencies. However, regular dialogue between the two agencies ensures that both are aware of any differences in reporting.
- Male victims experience proportionally more incidents involving violence and fewer incidents involving malicious communications than female victims.
- The age range of victims is fairly evenly distributed across the age groups, whereas the age range of suspects is skewed towards the younger age groups.
- Just over four in five victims are White European in ethnic appearance, compared to just under three in five suspects.
- Almost two-thirds of incidents were carried out by male suspects against male victims.
- In over one-third of incidents, there was no suspect identified or recorded on the crime report. Just under one in

ten incidents resulted in a suspect being charged, cautioned or having other proceedings taken against them.

- Of the persons accused of committing antisemitic incidents (suspects who were charged, cautioned or had other proceedings taken against them), the largest proportion fall within the 41–60 age range.
- In just over three-fifths of the antisemitic incidents in which there was an 'accused', the offender was a neighbour or business associate.
- There was evidence of anti-Israeli sentiment in the discourse of perpetrators in approximately one in five incidents in a sub-sample of the 'peak' months (April and May 2002) selected for an in-depth analysis.

Implications for the policing of antisemitic incidents

- In policing antisemitic incidents, the focus of the police needs to be on the quality of the initial investigation in order to increase the likelihood of identifying and dealing with the perpetrators.
- More weight should be given to the correct flagging of antisemitic incidents in the initial training received by police recruits and this training should be continually reinforced through the proactive supervision of initial investigating officers.
- Other elements that are vital to the effective progression of the initial investigation include:
 - correct identification of repeat victimisation, even if not previously reported to the police;

- following up any leads on suspects and fully detailing any actions taken to trace them;
- providing full details on evidence-gathering considered and undertaken, as well as on any witnesses spoken to.
- Effective supervision is key in ensuring and reinforcing effective initial investigation, as well as providing the necessary reassurance to the Jewish community that these incidents are being taken seriously by the police.

UNDERSTANDING ANTISEMITIC
INCIDENTS RECORDED BY THE
POLICE IN LONDON:
AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

On 20 of April 2004 the House of Commons debated the apparent rise of antisemitic incidents and the prevailing antisemitic climate in Britain (House of Commons 2004). Events elsewhere in Europe provided a backdrop to the debate, as a report produced by the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2004) observed an increase in antisemitic incidents in 2002–2003 in Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, as well as in Britain. In opening the House of Commons debate, James Purnell MP argued that ‘anti-Semitism is on the rise and we must combat it as we do all forms of racism’. In responding on behalf of the Government, Home Office Minister Fiona Mactaggart reported that ‘together with the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, the Metropolitan Police is conducting research into such incidents to get a more accurate feel for their nature and to develop a more effective response to them’. In commenting on the research a month earlier in the House of Lords (17 March 2004), Baroness

Scotland of Asthal suggested that 'it is important for us to understand the basis of such prejudice and dreadful behaviour, because it is only by understanding it that we might be able to craft something that will work to stop it' (House of Lords 2004). This report presents the findings of that joint research project with a view to understanding more clearly the dynamics of antisemitic incidents recorded by the police in London.

The aim of the project was to understand better the nature and social context of incidents in terms of the characteristics and the possible motivations of offenders, the circumstances in which incidents occur, the events that precipitate incidents, and the consequences and the management of incidents by victims, offenders and the police. In short, the overall aim was to get a feel for what was going on in incidents, and to see if patterns and commonalities could be observed. The Community Security Trust (CST), which advises and represents Britain's Jewish community on matters of antisemitism, terrorism and security, has been systematically compiling reports of antisemitic incidents since 1984 (Whine 2003). Reports have been gathered from victims, press reports and the police. Since that year, whilst there have been fluctuations in the annual number of incidents recorded, the overall trend has been upward, and in 2004 the CST recorded its highest yearly total of antisemitic incidents (Community Security Trust 2005). Close liaison has been established between the CST and police services, and in 2001 the CST was accorded third-party reporting status, which allows it to report antisemitic incidents to the police and to serve as a channel of communication between the

police and those victims who are unable or unwilling to report incidents to the police directly.

Although the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has been systematically recording antisemitic incidents since 1996, and, because of its investigative powers, recording more information about incidents than can possibly be collected by the CST, none of the data have been published. This report therefore provides the first published analysis of the MPS police records of antisemitic incidents. Drawing from MPS crime reports for the calendar years 2001–2004, we report on the nature and location of incidents, and the characteristics of victims and offenders, and use the qualitative information in the crime reports to theorise about the social context and potential motivations behind reported antisemitic incidents. In addition, we highlight the implications that the data have for the effective investigation of such incidents by the police.

The report offers the most comprehensive data and information on incidents that have been available to date. It also represents the outcome of a unique working partnership between academic and professional researchers and between a charitable, communal research organisation, the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, and a statutory policing body, the Metropolitan Police Service.

THE RECORDING OF ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS BY THE METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE

Defining incidents

Following the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and subsequent Inquiry Report published in February 1999 (Macpherson 1999), racial crime became established as a policing priority and the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force (RVCTF) was set up within the London Metropolitan Police Service. In the context of three nail bombings which occurred in April 1999, which were believed to manifest racial and homophobic bigotry, the remit of the RVCTF was extended to include homophobic crime amongst other things, and eventually renamed the 'Diversity Directorate'.

The Diversity Directorate has until recently been responsible for overseeing 32 borough Community Safety Units (CSUs). The CSUs were launched in June 1999 and incorporated not only racial and homophobic crime into their remit, but also domestic violence. The responsibility for overseeing the operational aspects of policing hate crime passed in January 2005 to the Territorial Policing Group. However, the Diversity Directorate still retains the role of leading and

influencing the MPS in the areas of race, age, faith, disability, sexual orientation and gender.

The MPS Hate Crime Policy of October 2004 defines hate incidents in the following way: '[a]ny incident that is perceived by the victim, or any other person, to be racist, homophobic, transphobic¹ or due to a person's religion, belief, gender identity or disability.'

In defining racist incidents specifically, the MPS utilises the definition outlined in the Lawrence Inquiry Report (Macpherson 1999): '[a]ny incident, which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.'

Recommendation 13 of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report states that 'the term "racist incident" must be understood to include crimes and non-crimes in policing terms. Both must be reported, recorded and investigated with equal commitment' (Macpherson 1999: 329). Furthermore, the ACPO Guide to Identifying and Combating Hate Crime states that 'it must be clearly understood that to report or record an incident as racist or homophobic, evidence is not needed. Evidence is not the test. Perception on the part of anyone is all that is required' (Association of Chief Police Officers 2002: 26). The MPS has adopted these criteria and therefore investigates all incidents that are perceived to be hate incidents.

The MPS definition sets out a standard in terms of recording potential motivation for a criminal act that is both inclusive and open. It extends the previous definition of a racist incident used in the MPS since 1996, which was: '[a]ny incident in which it appears to the reporting or investigating officer that the complaint involves an element of racial

motivation or any incident which includes an allegation of racial motivation by any person.’

This is a far more inclusive criterion for what is investigated as a hate incident than the criteria used by most other police forces around the world. It accounts, for instance, for the fact that the annual number of hate incidents recorded by the MPS for London is higher than the annual number of hate crimes recorded by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for the whole of the United States (for FBI hate crime data, see www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm#hate).

The separate recording of racist incidents and antisemitic incidents was introduced onto the Crime Report Information System (CRIS) on 1 April 1996. This set up individual markers, or ‘flags’, for racist incidents (‘RI’) and antisemitic incidents (‘RS’). Consequently, the MPS CRIS database can be searched for all antisemitic incidents recorded since that date. However, changes in the definition of racist incidents will have had an impact on the number, range and types of antisemitic incidents recorded from 1999 onwards.

Formation of the ‘Understanding and Responding to Hate Crime’ project in the MPS Diversity Directorate

The data used in this report have been accessible through the processes established by the Understanding and Responding to Hate Crime (URHC) project of the Metropolitan Police Service. It is instructive, therefore, to explain briefly the establishment of the project and its value for the MPS.

The idea for the project began when Deputy Assistant Commissioner John Grieve, head of the MPS Diversity Directorate (1998–2002), invited several leading academics to advise on how routinely collected information could be used on a regular basis in the MPS to drive strategy and policy regarding the combating and preventing of domestic violence and hate crime in general. These initial discussions established that the MPS had access to a vast amount of routinely collected data, but that this was not easily accessible or presented in a format that would enable it to be used to drive strategy and policy.

As a result, a joint project was set up between Professor Betsy Stanko and the MPS Diversity Directorate, funded by the Home Office 'Targeted Policing Initiative' for a period of 22 months beginning in January 2001. This project joined specialist academic knowledge and methods with police information for the first time.

The first stage of the project involved establishing the range and type of information held on hate crime by the individual CSUs as well as centrally in the MPS. The core data were taken from the Crime Report Information System (CRIS), which stores electronically all crime records completed by police officers on a routine basis as a result of a criminal incident being reported. In addition, the project team had access to various intelligence databases on offenders held by the MPS.

Using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, the project identified common themes and patterns as well as using in-depth analysis to provide context and richness to the overall patterns identified. This also enabled the

project to test the relevance and reliability of the routinely collected information. Additional qualitative analysis of individual incidents, victims or offenders was undertaken to identify particular factors or features that, in turn, inform assessments of police actions and initial investigation, vulnerabilities of victims, and dangerousness of offenders.

Further exploration and analysis of this information then took place in the light of current knowledge about hate crime and targeted violence. This enabled a profile of hate crime to be developed that intersects with police work in London. This information was then used to inform and direct strategic thinking, policy-making, practical investigation and training. Amongst other results was the development of practical tools to assist CSUs and others to assess the potential impact of targeted violence. The project was thereby able to demonstrate that routinely collected information can provide a useful means to target resources more effectively and provide officers with tools to do so, and moreover that the findings from this information can raise a number of questions about how hate crime is conceptualised.

In recognition of its usefulness and value to the MPS, the project was incorporated into the Diversity Directorate in November 2002. The remaining team members are now responsible for developing an enhanced Performance, Development and Monitoring Unit within the newly restructured Diversity Directorate.

There is a common assumption that police data on crime are inherently contaminated by the recording practices and procedures used by the police. Additionally, not all crime is reported in the first place. The result is an underlying sense

of mistrust by practitioners, policy-makers and academics, and an assumption that police information cannot be used to further criminological debate on, and understanding of, hate crime. Moreover, there is an overall anxiety from the social science community that because of the difficulty in translating 'real-time' social phenomena into static electronic records, there is, consequently, a weak understanding of the dynamics of the policing and social processes involved.

However, we challenge these fears and underlying notions that the data are of no help in understanding hate crime. Furthermore, we believe—as the URHC project established—that using a grounded, evidence-based approach to police records can offer vital information in challenging crime. By looking at the already existing routinely collected police information on hate crime, and by specifically taking into account the social context within which these incidents occur, the project was able to question and reconsider the way in which these forms of targeted crime are conceptualised. In addition, this analysis informed the evaluation and development of police services in this area.


TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS

Overall trends, distribution and characteristics of incidents

We focus here on the four calendar years of 2001 through to 2004. These years correspond with the second 'Intifada' which marked an upsurge in violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The focus is on these years because commentators generally make a connection between events in that conflict and fluctuations in antisemitic incidents in Britain. Additionally, changes in police practices between 1996 and 2000 mean that the data from 2001 onwards are more consistent than for the earlier period.

In looking at the pattern of incidents recorded over time across the four years, it is immediately evident that there is no consistent level of incidents recorded each month: instead, the monthly totals fluctuate (see Figure 1).² The temporary peaks in the number of incidents between September and November 2001, April and May 2002, April 2003 and March and July 2004 are particularly notable. Some of the peaks have been attributed by commentators to international political events, such as the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in

Figure 1 Antisemitic incidents recorded by the MPS from January 2001 to December 2004



September 2001, the violent conflict involving the Israel Defence Force in Jenin in April 2002, and the Iraq war in the spring of 2003 (see Whine 2003). The troughs in the number of recorded incidents in November and December in each of the four years are also notable, possibly indicating a seasonal trend to victimisation.

It is also immediately evident from the data that there is a downward trend in the frequency of incidents across the four years, which at first sight appears to contradict recent press reporting of an upward trend. The apparent downward trend in antisemitic incidents is similar to the trend in racist incidents recorded by the MPS over this time period (see Figure 2). However, it cannot be concluded from these data alone whether this trend reflects a fall in the actual number of incidents over time, or a decline in the reporting of incidents to the police by victims. Nevertheless, these data provide a rich and vital source of information for understanding antisemitic incidents, and this report represents the first time these data have been published.

The British Crime Survey (BCS), which is based on self-reporting of incidents by victims, also suggests a downward trend in racist incidents (Home Office 2000, 2004) (see Figure 3).

Putting the downward trend in antisemitic incidents in the context of the full period over which MPS data are available—since 1996—a polynomial trend line reveals the shifting rate of change over time (see Figure 4). This trend line allows us to understand the volume of incidents reported over a particular time period and also allows us to place this in a longer-term historical context of changes in policing.

Figure 2 Racist incidents recorded by the MPS from January 2001 to December 2004





Figure 3 British Crime Survey estimates of the number of incidents considered by the victim to be racially motivated




Between 1996 and 2000, the rate of increase of incidents may reflect a real increase in the number of incidents occurring, but it could be an artefact resulting from developments in the policing of hate crime in the MPS and the public's awareness of police responsiveness, especially in the light of the publication of the Lawrence Inquiry Report in 1999, the setting up of the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force and subsequently the Diversity Directorate, the establishment of local Community Safety Units and the introduction of minimum standards for the investigation of hate crime.

Geographic distribution of incidents


It is estimated that between 169,000 and 198,000 Jews live in the Greater London area. Nearly one-third (29.5–31 per cent)

Figure 4 Antisemitic incidents recorded by the MPS from January 1996 to December 2004



of London's Jews live in the borough of Barnet (Institute for Jewish Policy Research 2003: 50–53) (see Appendix A for a more detailed discussion). It is perhaps not surprising therefore that one-third (33.3 per cent) of the antisemitic incidents recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service from 2001 to 2004 occurred in Barnet. Four London boroughs combined—Barnet, Hackney, Westminster and Camden—account for just under two thirds (61.2 per cent) of all incidents reported in London.


Figure 5 London Boroughs in which incidents are reported



Types of incidents recorded

If one looks at the antisemitic incidents recorded by the MPS between 2001 and 2004, the top five allegations made to police are criminal damage (203 incidents), non crime book racial incidents³ (163 incidents), common assault (150 incidents), malicious phone/text/voice messages (116 incidents) and threatening/abusive/insulting words or behaviour (116 incidents) (see Appendix D, Table D1, for further details). When grouped together into wider allegation categories, ‘threats and harassment’ make up over


Figure 6 Type of incident recorded



one in four of all incidents reported (see Figure 6). Additionally, incidents of physical violence account for approximately one in six of all incidents.

Though incidents were clearly severe or threatening enough for the victims to report them to the police, the great majority (80.9 per cent) were recorded by the MPS as resulting in no physical injury to the victim.

Figure 7 Level of injury experienced by victims



Distribution of incidents across the week

There are strong grounds to speculate that the vulnerability of many Jews to victimisation would vary across the week, owing to their differing visibility at particular times of the

week. To judge from the detail in the crime reports, antisemitic incidents commonly involve targets made visible by their attire, or proximity to places of worship and other communal buildings such as schools. Some survey findings also suggest that greater visibility as a Jew raises the potential for victimisation. In a survey of the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) community in Stamford Hill, north London in 2002—a highly visible Jewish community—42 per cent of households contained at least one person who had been verbally abused in the year prior to the survey. Racist language was used in over three-quarters of the incidents. The researchers concluded that

Although the community's experience of all types of crime is extremely high, it is the sheer ubiquitous nature of racially motivated crime—particularly verbal abuse—that stuns. The comments . . . paint a picture of constant, daily, harassment. Its constant presence suggests the rates reported are an underestimate. Several female respondents (who are less likely to be targets) noted that their husbands and sons did not always mention episodes of abuse for fear of worrying their mothers. (Holman and Holman 2002: 74)

Additionally, in a survey of Jews in London and the South East in 2002 carried out by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (Becher et al. 2002), well over half—13 out of 21—male Haredi Jews in the sample, and those who are very visible as Jews from their attire, reported being called a Jew in an insulting way in the previous 12 months compared


with approximately 9 per cent of all Jewish men in the sample.

For Jews who are religiously observant, the peak period of visibility is from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday each week. They are more likely to be identifiable as Jews during these times, because of their travel to and attendance at religious services. In addition, Orthodox Jews are more likely to be seen walking on the streets during these times, as their religious code prohibits use of a vehicle. Religiously observant Jews in general will potentially be more visible from their mode of dress—men may be wearing a yarmulke or formal hat—and families and friends are more likely to be walking around in groups and visiting the homes of neighbours and relatives on foot and formally dressed. Not only is the potential for crime targeted against persons raised during these times, owing to the increased visibility of potential victims, but the visibility of particular buildings—synagogues and homes—is also raised as a consequence of the greater visibility of Jews entering and leaving them. Furthermore, Jews belonging to the strictly Orthodox community will not notify to the police any incidents that occur between sundown on Friday and sundown on Saturday, with the potential for these being under-reported at a later date. Any time delay between the incident occurring and its being reported to the police will also have an impact on the ability of the police to gather evidence and identify the perpetrators.

It is instructive to consider whether the MPS data do indeed indicate a relationship between greater visibility as a Jew and the potential for victimisation. Figure 8 indicates

that a slightly higher proportion of incidents occur on a Friday. However, the data clearly show that similar proportions of incidents occur on every day of the week, and this has important implications for police awareness of the potential for victimisation. The pattern of incidents is similar to the weekly distribution of racial incidents overall recorded by the MPS, hence it perhaps reflects offending patterns in general, rather than the particular targeting of Jews.

Figure 8 Incidents by day of the week committed



Victims, suspects and accused

The MPS crime reports list all reported victims and suspects, with the primary victim and suspect appearing first. Because

of the constraints of the recording format, the most detailed information is contained for the first-listed victim and first-listed suspect. In addition, if multiple witnesses describe the same suspect, multiple descriptions of the same suspect are coded as separate suspects on the crime report. Consequently, we confine our observations here to the first-listed victim and suspect.

In over one-third of incidents, there was no suspect recorded on the crime report (see Appendix D, Table D2). Only 8.7 per cent of incidents resulted in a suspect becoming an accused—that is, they were charged, cautioned or had other proceedings taken against them.

The majority of victims (67.2 per cent), suspects (83.4 per cent) and accused (76.4 per cent) were male. Where the sex of both the victim and the suspect were known, almost two-thirds of incidents were carried out by male suspects against male victims (see Appendix D, Table D3).

As Figure 9 shows, male victims experience proportionally more incidents involving violence (21.8 per cent compared to 11.4 per cent)—as is the case for violent crime in general—and fewer incidents involving malicious communications (14.7 per cent compared to 22.0 per cent) than female victims.

As can be seen in Figure 10, the age range of victims is fairly evenly distributed across the age ranges of 21 through to 60. The age range of suspects, on the other hand, is skewed towards the lower age ranges—as is the case for crime suspects in general—with the largest proportion of suspects being aged 16–20. Whilst the age ranges of the accused (i.e. those suspects who were charged, cautioned or had other

Figure 9 Allegation grouping by gender of the victim






Figure 10 Age range of victim, suspect and accused



proceedings taken against them) are again more varied, the largest proportion of accused fall within the 41–60 age range.

The MPS uses the following categories to record the ethnic appearance of suspects: White European, Dark European, African Caribbean, Indian/Pakistani, Chinese/Japanese, Arabic Egyptian and Unknown. These are classifications based on an assessment of the appearance of the individual made by the victim, informant, witness or police officer rather than the individual's self-classification, as used in the Census.

Figure 11 Ethnic appearance of suspects



However, with this caution in mind when interpreting the data, it can be seen from Figure 11 that the majority of suspects were classified as White European. The ethnic group distribution of suspects was generally consistent across the different allegation categories.

The ethnic appearance of the majority of victims is also White European (81.7 per cent). This proportion falls below the 96.6 per cent of London's Jews who classify themselves as White in the 2001 Census (see Table 1). However, as previously noted, the way in which ethnicity is determined in the Census differs from how it is determined

Table 1 Ethnic groups in London according to the 2001 Census

Category	Total population (%)	Jewish population (%)
White	71.2	96.6
<i>British</i>	84.0	84.8
<i>Irish</i>	4.3	0.3
<i>Other White</i>	11.7	14.9
Mixed	3.2	1.1
Asian	12.1	0.8
Black or Black British	10.9	0.4
Chinese or Other Ethnic Group	2.7	1.1
Base	7,172,091	149,789

Source: ONS 2004 Table S104


in police data, so that some caution is necessary in drawing conclusions from comparisons between the two data sources.

In the context of over one-third of incidents not recording an identified suspect on the crime report, the majority of incidents (84 per cent), also did not specify any relationship between the victim and the suspect. It has been demonstrated in the case of racial incidents, however, that there is often some level of knowledge between the victim and suspect (see Stanko et al. 2003), in that the victim has at least some level of suspicion that the suspect is a neighbour or lives in the locality or is otherwise known to them, even

if this is not specified in the relationship categorisation given on the crime report.

By their very nature, incidents where suspects have become accused (i.e. have been charged, cautioned or had other proceedings taken against them) will contain more detailed information about those individuals. If we focus therefore on those incidents, it can be seen that in just over three-fifths of the incidents in which there was an accused, the offender was a neighbour or a business associate (see Figure 12).

Figure 12 Knowledge of the accused



UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATIONAL DYNAMICS OF ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS

Everyday and extremist antisemitism

This section reports on an in-depth analysis of the textual information in the MPS crime reports for a sample of recorded antisemitic incidents. The overall aims of the analysis were to try to unravel—with a view to understanding—the situational dynamics of antisemitic incidents reported to, and recorded by, the police and, in particular, to attempt to assess the extent to which ‘extremism’ might be involved in the incidents. There is arguably a common perception about racist incidents—and the same argument applies to antisemitic incidents—that they are committed by extremists and other committed bigots. Perhaps the understandable media attention given to extreme racist incidents —such as the murder of Stephen Lawrence in south London in 1993—leaves the impression that extremist bigots are behind many so-called hate crimes. Indeed, in discussing the perpetrators of antisemitic incidents in Europe in general, the authors of a controversial report produced for the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (Bergmann and Wetzel 2003) observed that

for many anti-Semitic incidents, above all naturally for the violent and other punishable offences, it is typical that the perpetrators attempt to remain anonymous. Thus in many cases the perpetrators could not be identified, so an assignment to a political or ideological camp must remain open.

However, despite this caveat, the report tellingly concluded that 'Nevertheless, looking at the perpetrators identified or at least identifiable with some certainty, it can be said that the antisemitic incidents in the monitoring period were committed above all by right-wing extremists and radical Islamist or young Muslims' (Bergmann and Wetzel 2003: 25). The impression arguably given by this statement that much of the antisemitism on the streets in Europe is a manifestation of political violence against Jews is also reproduced in the report's section on antisemitic incidents in the United Kingdom (Bergmann and Wetzel 2003: 97).

The controversial EUMC report was produced against a backdrop of warnings by several commentators that a new antisemitism has been sweeping the streets of Europe. Inevitably, the spectre of extremism surfacing again in Europe, and targeted against Jews, has been invoked. However, there has been very little detailed analysis undertaken of the characteristics and motivations of offenders in antisemitic incidents, as is also the case concerning hate crime offenders in general. The small amount of research that there has been suggests that extremists are likely to be responsible for only a small proportion of incidents (see Levin and McDevitt 2002). Data on the characteristics of offenders

support this assertion. An analysis of the relationship between victim and suspect in homophobic incidents in January 2001, published by the MPS, showed that in just over one-fifth of incidents the recorded suspect was a neighbour. In over a quarter of incidents the suspects were other local people such as local youths. A similar analysis of racist incidents involving a snapshot of 49 incidents recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service in January 2001 showed very similar proportions of neighbours and other locals as suspects. Nearly 1 in 5 incidents were committed by school-children. Such research, limited though it is, barely paints a picture of premeditated extremism at work behind incidents. Instead, the data suggest that many incidents occur as part and parcel of the victim's and the perpetrator's everyday lives (see Stanko et al. 2003, and the factsheets located on www.met.police.uk/urhc/).

In this context, the overall aim of this section of the report is to shed more light on the possible motivations of offenders in recorded antisemitic incidents by examining the situational dynamics of incidents.

The analytic process

The analysis of qualitative data is truly an interpretive exercise. Consequently, it is potentially open to the charge that one person's perception about the meaning conveyed by the data might vary from another person's interpretation of the same data. To satisfy those who are cautious about the conclusions derived from the interpretations, it is

important to be explicit about the process of analysis—to set up an ‘audit trail’—so that, in theory, the analysis could be replicated to verify the conclusions drawn. It is in this spirit of explicitness that we outline our analytic steps below.

Our initial sample involved 110 crime reports from April and May 2002, a period characterised by substantial media coverage of the violent conflict involving the Israel Defence Force in Jenin. Our initial hypothesis was that if extremism, in terms of offender characteristics, were evident in incidents, it might manifest itself more obviously in these particular months of high political tension. We then took a further sample of 46 incidents recorded in November and December 2002 and August 2003 to test our analytic conclusions and to provide us, overall, with a spread of cases covering months of low, medium and high incidence.

We analysed the crime reports systematically, separately reading each report before discussing each case and reaching a consensus. Our initial discussions allowed us to develop inductively a coding frame that would allow us to unravel the situational dynamics of incidents. The coding frame consisted of a list of sensitising questions to assist us in interrogating the contextual information.

Eight major sensitising questions were used (sub-categories of the questions and code definitions are provided in Appendix B):

- What drives the incident—is it motivated or aggravated by antisemitism?
- Is some degree of planning evident?
- What language/symbolism (if any) is used?

- Is there any information available to suggest that the suspect is a member of a far-right or extremist group?
- What is the level of prior interaction/knowledge between the victim(s) and suspect(s)?
- Is the incident a one-off or part of a series?
- Is the incident directed at an individual, a building or organisation, place of worship or at public or private property?
- Did the incident take place in a private or public location?

Furthermore, these particular questions were used to sensitise us to potential extremism at work in incidents. Extremism is a nebulous concept, but we speculated that 'extremist' incidents are:

- more likely to be fuelled—or motivated—by animus than by other reasons;
- less likely to be spontaneous—or carried out on the spur of the moment—and more likely to have some degree of premeditation;
- more likely to be instances of where the victim and offender are strangers to each other and hence less likely to involve situations in which the victim has some prior knowledge of the offender and may have had some previous interaction with them, as, for example, in the case of aggravated neighbour disputes.

We also looked for any evidence that the suspect is a member of an extremist organisation, of the far right, or alternatively of a radical Islamist group.

We clarified our suppositions about these possible dimensions of 'extremism'—and modified them—by consultation with members of the Community Security Trust at a presentation of some of our early statistical findings.

The coding frame that was developed by the process described above was then applied to all 156 cases by each of us individually. Following this, we reconvened after coding sets of cases to develop a consensus about our individual codings. After around 30 cases, a categorisation began to emerge inductively from the analysis, and below we provide the final categorisation that was developed.

Typology of incidents


The majority of incidents reported to the MPS in April and May 2002, as well as the other months, did not appear to be carried out by perpetrators who were associated with organised or extremist groups. Generally, the incidents appeared to be more opportunistic and indirect in nature.

Only 7.7 per cent of incidents involved direct contact and explicit targeting of an individual by a perpetrator where there is some evidence of a political or antisemitic belief or 'mission' that appears to drive the incident ('mission - direct' incidents).

Mission incidents

We characterised the largest group of incidents as 'mission' incidents, drawing the label from a typology of hate crime

Figure 13 **Typology of antisemitic incidents**



developed by Northeastern University scholars Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt from an analysis of hate crimes recorded by the Boston Police Department. For Levin and McDevitt, mission hate crime offenders are the rarest type of offender: ‘they seek to rid the world of evil by disposing of the members of a despised group’ (2002: 91). From the textual information provided in the crime reports, though, we are unable to evaluate the offenders’ psychological motivations. However, the defining features of such incidents are that the offender takes some premeditated action to instigate the incident by engineering their interaction with the victim. In addition,

antisemitism seemingly drives the offender's actions—as manifest by their language or symbols they use. With these common characteristics, a number of sub-categories of mission incidents can be distinguished—delineated by the extent to which offenders make themselves visible to their victims.

One sub-category that we have categorised as 'mission-direct' involves direct face-to-face interaction between offenders and victims. A clear example is provided by a case in which—according to the crime report—'Arab-looking' suspects in a van called out to a Jewish male on the street, 'Are you a Jew?' and when the victim answered, 'yes', the offenders jumped out of the van, verbally abusing and assaulting him. In another incident, an Orthodox Jewish male was attacked from behind by a group of 'Arab-looking' suspects whilst walking from one synagogue to another. In both of these cases the offenders clearly instigated the incident with the apparent sole purpose of venting their bigotry. Given the contextual information available in the crime reports and the absence of any other information to the contrary, it suggests that the suspects were deliberately targeting the victim and that bigotry was the driving motivation for action.

In the largest sub-category of mission incidents, 'mission-indirect', there is most definitely premeditation on the part of the offender that is evident in the characteristics of the incident itself. The offender, however, does not reveal him- or herself face to face to the victim, and the interaction between the victim and the offender is therefore indirect. For instance, in one case two messages were left on a synagogue voicemail stating, 'Hello . . . F**k off you Jewish

cockney f****ing w****ers' and 'Hello, it's Dr Shlockel of the foreskin removal company. Err, I'm a bit short of business at the minute so I was wondering if you could send some dirty f****ing Jews our way to get their foreskins lopped off. Thank you.' In another case, mail containing antisemitic material was sent to a Jewish organisation and addressed to 'Bin Laden'. Both cases appear to involve mockery, in addition to their offensive nature. Additionally, in each of these cases, whilst the victims were clearly deliberately targeted, the suspect did not make themselves visible to the victim.

Other indirect mission incidents were simply threatening in nature. For instance, a letter sent to a prominent Jewish public figure warned 'you have sealed your fate' and 'keep a wary eye out'. In some indirect mission incidents, a person's property is targeted either as a proxy target for the victim or because of its symbolic value. For instance, a Jewish victim reported that religious symbolic scrolls (mezuzot) pinned to the front door had been burnt and damaged. Overall, then, the defining element of the indirect mission is that whilst the victim or their property is deliberately targeted for no other evident reason than the suspect's bigotry, the suspects do not go so far as to make themselves visible to their victims.

A further type of mission incident can be characterised as an indiscriminate mission in that the suspect acts out their bigotry in an arbitrary and sometimes diffuse manner in public locations. Anyone in the vicinity can therefore be targeted through shouting of abuse, graffiti or the depositing of stickers or literature in an area. An example of such an incident is a case in which graffiti had been sprayed on a garage door. The crime report stated:

A swastika has been sprayed on the garage door in orange paint There are no identifying numbers on the garage door although as the victim herself stated, there are a lot of Jewish people in the area and the suspect would probably have known there was a good likelihood of their victim being Jewish.

The final sub-category of mission incident is the inadvertent mission. This type of mission incident involves the expression of antisemitism that inadvertently is received or overheard by someone for whom the message is not intended. For example, an e-mail with antisemitic content was sent to a group of like-minded people. However, it was read by an unintended recipient, who took offence and reported it to the police. Another example involves a group of suspects who were shouting antisemitic abuse at a house and were overheard by a member of the public walking past, who was therefore inadvertently victimised and reported it to the police.

Opportunistic incidents

In what may be categorised as an opportunistic incident, the offender takes immediate advantage of an opportunity that presents itself to vent their antisemitism, rather than engineering the incident in a premeditated way. For the victim, it is a case of being 'in the wrong place at the wrong time', and for the offender, it is a case of being in the right place at the right time to vent their bigotry. One-sixth of all the incidents fall into this category. A good example is an

incident in which five 15-year-old boys were playing football in a park when they were approached by a group of 10–20 older youths who acted aggressively. One said, ‘look at those Jews’ and ‘Why are you picking up your bags? We’re not going to nick anything, you f***ing Jewish c**t.’ Further words were exchanged and two of the victims were punched and kicked. In another incident, the victim was walking in the street and had a coin thrown at him by one of four suspects. As he walked past, two suspects stood in his way and said ‘Jew’. In neither of these incidents was there any circumstantial evidence that would indicate that the suspects’ actions were pre-planned in any way.

Aggravated incidents

In what may be categorised as an aggravated incident, the offender and victim are caught up in a conflict situation that initially does not involve antisemitism. However, in the course of the conflict the offender’s bigotry emerges. The interaction between the offender and the victim begins as a commonplace episode, but one in which the offender possibly perceives that a wrong has been inflicted upon them and the expressed antisemitism is retaliatory with the intention of hurting the victim in return. For instance, during the course of a journey a minicab driver asked one of his passengers to take their feet off the seat of the car. An argument then ensued which escalated to a point at which the driver pulled over and radioed the minicab office to ask for another driver to complete the passengers’ journey. The suspect grabbed at and punched the driver numerous times,

shouting, 'I know your type, you're a f***ing Jew. You are the embodiment of everything that is bad about Jews in this country.' In another case, a victim was verbally abused by a driver when he complained about a car blocking the exit from the car park. The crime report states that

*The suspect was sitting in his car arguing with a female passenger. The suspect's car was stationary and blocking the road so the victim could not get by. The victim got out of his car and walked over to the suspect's car and asked the suspect to move his car. The suspect got out of his car in a fighting stance position. He said to the victim 'f***ing Jew, I'll spit on you', and 'I'll get you'.*

Interpersonal incidents

An interpersonal incident involves a prior personal relationship between the offender and the victim. Conflict emerges in the course of that relationship, and the offender's antisemitism then surfaces. For instance, one incident involved an abusive phone call, believed to be from a former employer who was being taken to court by the victim for racial discrimination. In another instance, an abusive and threatening voicemail was left on the victim's phone and was believed to be from a friend of an ex- girlfriend. As is the case with aggravated incidents, the antisemitism appears to be used as a form of retaliation, although in these instances the retaliation can sometimes be indirect, by the offender against the victim. However, the distinguishing characteristic of the interpersonal incidents is that the victim

believes that they know the instigator and it is someone whom they have had a relationship with, a relationship that has since turned sour.

Interpreted incidents

The defining characteristic of an interpreted incident is the interpretation that the victim, or another person such as a police officer, places on the incident where there does not appear to be any direct or objective evidence of antisemitism being involved in the incident. As is recommended in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (Macpherson 1999), it is important for the police to record these incidents. One-fifth of the incidents fall into this category. A good example of the uncertainty characterising such incidents is a case in which the victim reported to the police that their garden fence had been damaged. The victim's house is at the end of a row of houses next to a pedestrian short cut used frequently after pub closing time and is thus a potential location for anti social behaviour. There were no indications at all to suggest that antisemitism was involved in any way in any of the damage caused. The victim, however, believed that it was, stating that two years prior to this incident they had discovered 'NF' (the initials of the far right National Front party) graffiti spray-painted on their fence. There were, however, no indications of any connection between the two incidents, and in the current incident the offender left no graffiti or any other signs or symbols that might be interpreted as antisemitic. It is the perception of the victim that is key here.

Another incident reported to, and recorded by, the police as antisemitic concerned a brick thrown through a shop window that had several Jewish signs in it. The responding police officer—by their account—interpreted the incident as being ‘antisemitic’, owing to the prevailing state of tension in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and also because there was no obvious source for the brick in the immediate vicinity of the shop, suggesting that some element of deliberation was involved on the part of the offender. However, it was also recorded in the crime report that six other obviously Jewish shops in the vicinity of the targeted shop remained undamaged.

In each of those incidents, it is difficult to determine whether or not antisemitism is at work. As stated previously, however, it is important that these incidents are recorded to conform to the wide definition of racist incidents used by the MPS as recommended by the Lawrence Inquiry Report, which states that all that is necessary for an incident to be defined as racist is that the victim or any other person perceives it to be so (see page 12 for the definition used by the MPS).

Bigotry as a cultural resource

A view that has gained some currency in recent years is that much of the antisemitism on the streets in Europe is a manifestation of extreme political violence against Jews. Whilst it must be acknowledged that organised extremists, or individuals affiliated with extremist organisations, when

venting their bigotry cannot necessarily be identified as 'extremists' from their appearance, the detailed qualitative analysis of the sub-sample of incidents discussed above does not suggest that organised 'extremists', of whatever political shade, are responsible for a significant number of antisemitic incidents in London. When the situational contexts and dynamics of incidents are unravelled, there is little apparent evidence that such extremism is at work. Clearly, there are indications of targeted victimisation in which individuals or organisations are singled out for premeditated attack, as is evident in our characterisation of 'mission' incidents. Fortunately, such incidents are in a minority.

This is consistent with the pattern of racial attacks in general as, in drawing from their Home Office-commissioned research into the implementation of the 1998 Public Order Act, Burney and Rose observed that 'serious pre-meditated attacks are extremely rare' (2002: 28). Elizabeth Burney has further argued that

Serious race hate is fortunately rare—which is why the label 'hate crime' for these offences is so misleading—but probably most people harbour some kind of prejudice that, hopefully, they recognise and constrain. The people who get prosecuted for racially aggravated offences are often too ignorant or unsophisticated to exercise self-control. (Burney 2002: 111–112)

In this vein, the evidence presented above suggests that antisemitic incidents, as appears to be the case for so-called hate crimes in general, do not occur in a cultural vacuum.

Instead, they occur in cultural contexts in which bigotry, and in some instances the use of violence as a social resource, are norms that serve as a social basis for offenders' actions by determining who is an appropriate target (see Hewitt 1996; Ray, Smith and Wastell 2004). This point has been underlined by Home Office research into the perpetrators of racial violence and harassment (Sibbitt 1997).

Rather than being confined to an extreme and abhorrent margin of society, offenders mostly appear to come from the ordinary fabric of society, and incidents occur in the context of the unfolding dynamics of daily life, for many offenders and victims alike. In the case of antisemitic incidents, it is perhaps disconcerting to assert that perpetrators are not confined to an extremist fringe. However, although offenders are expressing a rather more commonplace bigotry in their actions, those who are prepared to act on their bigotry by engaging in criminal activity are without a doubt acting in the extreme.

FLUCTUATIONS IN THE MONTHLY COUNT OF INCIDENTS

Given the monthly fluctuations in the number of antisemitic incidents recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service and the apparent association between rises in the monthly totals and news reporting of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, it is logical to explore whether the type of incidents committed, and the type of offenders who commit them, differ in the months with higher numbers of incidents compared with other months. To enable such a comparison, the antisemitic incidents recorded between January 2001 and December 2004 were clustered into three separate groupings:

- 1 high months—those months that recorded a number of incidents above one standard deviation of the mean number of incidents for all months;
- 2 medium months—those within one standard deviation of the mean number of incidents for all months;
- 3 low months—those months that recorded a number below one standard deviation of the mean number of incidents for all months.

Features of incidents

Figure 14 presents the three clusters for the type of allegation recorded by the police for the reported incidents.

The profile of allegations recorded appears to be largely similar across all months (see Figure 14). Similarly, when one looks at the level of injury sustained by the victims of incidents, there are negligible differences between high, medium and low months (see Appendix E for further details).

The suspects appear to differ little between the months in terms of their ethnic appearance. 'White European' suspects accounted for the same proportions of suspects in the high and the low months (see Figure 15), with consequently little change in the proportions of suspects from visible minority ethnic communities as a group.

Discourse used by perpetrators

However, in contrast, the qualitative analysis revealed a clearly discernible difference between the sub-sample of reported incidents in the 'high' months of April and May 2002 and the low and medium months of November and December 2002, and August 2003. In approximately 20 per cent of incidents in April and May 2002, there was evidence of anti-Israeli sentiment in the discourse of the offenders, and in some instances sentiment drawing more broadly on the Arab–Israeli conflict, compared with just less than 5 per cent of incidents in the other months (Figure 16). Similarly,

Figure 14 Type of allegation recorded in high, medium and low months






Figure 15 Ethnic appearance of suspects in high, medium and low months



the Community Security Trust noted in its annual report for 2004 that nearly a quarter of the 532 incidents it recorded for that year ‘showed clear anti-Zionist or anti-Israel motivation’ (CST 2005: 4). Using the MPS records for the sub-sample of antisemitic incidents, it is instructive to illuminate the manifest anti-Israeli sentiment that accompanies the actions of offenders.

Figure 16 **Proportion of incidents in which Middle East discourse was used**



Some of the sentiment clearly constitutes political criticism, albeit of a rather crude form. When it is directed at evidently political targets, it would arguably be difficult to characterise it as ‘antisemitic’, despite its being given an ‘antisemitic’ flag in police records. For instance, in an incident that ostensibly involved clear political action and with

a political target, a group of young people forced their way into the offices of the Israeli tourist board and sprayed the word 'Terrorists' in large black letters. In another recorded incident, anti-Israeli stickers were found on a number of lamp posts in Oxford Street. Given their location, they were clearly targeted at the general public, which would of course include Jewish shoppers in the area, although Jews were not specifically targeted. The crime report states that the person who reported the stickers to the police

was walking along Oxford Street when he noticed stickers that had been placed on lamp posts. These showed an Israeli flag with a swastika at the centre and the caption 'fascist state'. The informant perceived this to be racist and was distressed by it.

In both of these cases the animus expressed was anti-Israeli and not specifically anti-Jewish.

In another incident, two informants telephoned the police after seeing posters advertising a demonstration in Hyde Park. In addition to giving details of the demonstration, the posters listed the organisers as 'Al-Muhajiroun the voice the eyes and ears of Muslims', along with website addresses for the organisers. This might initially appear to be merely an advertisement informing anyone interested that a demonstration would be taking place. However, the informants suggested to the police that the posters were 'very offensive about Israel' and 'anti-Jewish'. In the spirit of the recommendations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (Macpherson 1999), the incident was therefore defined as antisemitic.


Also, although the sentiment expressed in an incident might clearly be anti-Israeli rather than anti-Jewish, the location and the targeting of the sentiment can turn it into an antisemitic incident. For instance, graffiti with the words ‘Smash Israel’ was found on a postbox and a telephone kiosk. Whilst the sentiment expressed was solely anti-Israeli, the fact that a synagogue was located nearby suggests that Jews attending for worship were being specifically targeted—albeit indiscriminately. In another incident, stickers were found on phone boxes and lamp posts close to the Stamford Hill area of London—a neighbourhood populated by a highly visible Hasidic Jewish community. Although highly offensive to many Jews, the stickers by themselves might be described as solely anti-Israeli rather than antisemitic, as they consisted of an image of the Israeli flag with the words ‘Fascist State’ written on it, with a swastika superimposed on a Star of David in the middle of the flag. However, again the indiscriminate targeting of Jews in the neighbourhood by the stickers clearly crosses a line from anti-Israeli to anti-Jewish animus. Consequently, the combination of the location and symbolism or language used provides the necessary context for determining whether an incident can be regarded as antisemitic.

In another incident, the offenders themselves conflated anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish sentiment. Upon arriving in London on a flight from Tel Aviv, some passengers were verbally abused at the arrivals gate by the offenders, who had already been observed being abusive to cabin crew on the flight. The offenders singled out some passengers and shouted, ‘You’re British, how many countries do you need? You’re killing

Palestinian children, you have no right to be in these countries. You're in England, no one has put a gun to your head. How many countries do you Jews need?' In another incident, offensive mail was sent to a care home for Jewish residents. Part of the letter stated, 'We will avenge Jenin.' Drawn next to it was a Star of David with a swastika inside.

In other cases in which Jews were targeted, the anti-Israeli sentiment was accompanied by an unequivocal antisemitic or racist sentiment. In one incident, a message was left on a synagogue answerphone, stating, 'Al Qaida are going to get the Jews.' The message also mentioned Hitler and the Nazis. In another incident, which is a clear case of


Figure 17 **Clustering of incidents for April/May 2002**



an aggravated incident, the victim pulled up and parked his car outside an Asian restaurant. When he got out of the car to move aside on the footpath a board advertising the restaurant, the offender emerged from the restaurant and began swearing at the victim and said, 'You're not in Israel now. You can't do what you like. Go back to Israel.' The offender continued to swear and shout general racist abuse and kicked the car door, damaging it.

Revealing differences are also indicated by a comparison of the qualitative clustering of incidents for the 'high' months and the 'medium' and 'low' months (Figures 17 and 18) (for full details, see Appendix F). 'Mission' incidents and 'opportunistic' incidents constitute higher proportions of

Figure 18 **Clustering of incidents for November/December 2002 and August 2003**



incidents in the 'high' months, suggesting that in periods of heightened media reporting of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, offenders are more likely to take premeditated action to target Jews, and they are also more likely to take the opportunity to vent their bigotry if such an opportunity presents itself. This observation is supported by a breakdown of data on the location and targeting of incidents (see Tables 2 and 3). Arguably these indicate a relatively stable pattern of victimisation at or near victims' homes or their place of work across all months; there is, then, an increased frequency of targeting in public locations such as synagogues and schools in periods of raised tension.

Table 2 **The location of antisemitic incidents**

Location of incident	April/May 2002		Nov/Dec 2002, Aug 2003	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>
At/near victim's home	20	18.2	16	34.8
In public location	45	40.9	14	30.4
At/near synagogue	13	11.8	3	6.5
At/near Jewish organisation or school	14	12.7	2	4.3
Private e-mail/phone	9	8.1	1	2.2
Synagogue phone	1	0.9	0	0.0
At victim's place of work	8	7.2	10	21.7
Total	110		46	

Table 3 **The focus or target of the antisemitic incidents**

Incident directed at	April/May 2002		Nov/Dec 2002, Aug 2003	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>
Synagogue	10	9.1	0	0.0
Jewish building/organisation	9	8.2	2	4.3
Police	1	0.9	1	2.2
Person	66	60.0	34	73.9
Person and private property	3	2.7	6	13.0
Public property	5	4.5	1	2.2
Private property	14	12.7	2	4.3
Don't know/unclear	2	1.8	0	0.0
Total	110		46	

COMPARING THE NUMBERS OF
ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS RECORDED
BY THE METROPOLITAN POLICE
SERVICE AND THE COMMUNITY
SECURITY TRUST

As we stated in the introduction to this report, the Community Security Trust (CST) has been systematically recording antisemitic incidents since 1984, using information reported by victims, the press and also the police. Whilst there have been fluctuations in the annual number of incidents recorded by the CST, the general trend for Britain as a whole has been upwards (for a comprehensive discussion of the trend, see Whine 2003). Given the long record of the CST in monitoring antisemitic incidents, it is instructive to compare its records against police records, chiefly to determine whether similar levels of incidents are recorded and whether victims report incidents to both agencies.

It should be noted that there are some differences in recording practices. However,

regular meetings at Scotland Yard [confirm] that the CST's statistical trends by incident type and quantity very closely

match those of the police, but the CST's absolute totals are constantly lower than those reported to the Metropolitan Police Service. That the CST under-reports is suggested by the fact that it records the mass distribution of a single leaflet as one incident although there may be hundreds of recipients, whereas police forces may each record the receipt of that item as a separate incident. (Whine 2003: 24–25)

The CST normally publishes aggregated data for Britain as a whole and we are very grateful therefore for the data for London for 2003 and 2004, which the CST has provided for this report, enabling a comparison to be made between the recording systems (see Table 4).

The Metropolitan Police Service recorded nearly 40 per cent more incidents than the CST for 2003. However, for 2004 the number of incidents recorded by the CST was slightly in excess of the number in police records.

When one compares the types of incidents recorded respectively by the MPS and the CST (see Table 5), it is notable that in 2004 the MPS recorded over twice as many incidents of damage and desecration of property as the CST. The necessity to have a police crime record for insurance claims purposes might possibly explain this difference. In contrast, the CST recorded over three times as many incidents of threatening behaviour as did the MPS. It also recorded a higher proportion of incidents it classified as 'abusive behaviour'. For a full outline of the definitions used by the CST, see Appendix G.

There is a limitation to the comparisons made to this point in that it is impossible to determine from the aggregated

Table 4: Comparison between the number of incidents reported to the MPS and CST in London per month for 2003 and 2004

Reported month	MPS 2003	CST 2003	MPS 2004	CST 2004
January	25	11	19	11
February	20	11	19	17
March	29	30	39	74
April	37	19	28	45
May	27	16	28	18
June	27	18	23	33
July	24	18	44	32
August	17	12	12	14
September	21	15	30	23
October	35	32	26	19
November	21	21	14	14
December	15	12	12	11
TOTAL	298	215	294	311

data how many incidents were reported to, and recorded by, both the CST and the MPS, or alternatively to one but not to the other organisation. To explore this, we focused on reported incidents for the months of April and May 2002, the months for which individual crime reports were analysed for the detailed analysis reported in Section 5 of this report. The CST very helpfully provided anonymised confidential details of the cases it recorded for those two

Table 5 Comparison of the MPS and CST incidents reported in 2004 using the CST groupings

Allegation	MPS	MPS (%)	CST	CST (%)
Extreme violence	1	0.34	1	0.32
Assault	46	15.65	41	13.18
Damage and desecration of property	47	15.99	22	7.07
Threats	26	8.84	82	26.37
Abusive behaviour	109	37.07	142	45.66
Literature	26	8.84	23	7.40
Other	35	11.90		
N/A	4	1.36		
Total	294		311	

Source: analysis conducted by MPS Racial and Violent Crime Task Force Strategic Intelligence Unit, February 2005


months to enable us to make a comparison with the MPS data.

The comparison, as detailed in Figure 19, shows that fewer than a quarter of the cases recorded by the MPS in April and May 2002 were also recorded by the CST. A higher proportion—over half—of the cases that were recorded by the CST were also recorded by the MPS. However, four of the cases recorded by the CST were not flagged in police crime reports as antisemitic incidents, and they were found by a trawl of all of the racial incidents for April and May

2002. A higher proportion of the incidents reported to the CST are also to be found in police records, compared to the number of police records found also in incidents reported to the CST. This might be explained by the encouragement given to victims by the CST to additionally contact the police if they had not already done so before reporting the incident to the CST, and by the less inclusive definition of incidents used by the CST compared with the MPS.

In addition, the CST collects and analyses incidents of information collection that target the Jewish community, and

Figure 19 **Overlap of CST and MPS records for April/May 2002**



* These 17 records include 14 that were not found on MPS records, 1 that was unclear and 2 that were n/a as they occurred in London but were reported to other police forces.

also suspicious behaviour and criminal activity at Jewish locations that are not included in the CST figures if they do not meet the definitions the CST uses to determine which incidents are antisemitic (see Appendix G for further details of this).

Some major conclusions can be drawn from the comparisons made:

- The most obvious is that substantial numbers of victims of antisemitic incidents report incidents to only one of the agencies.
- The data published separately by the CST and the MPS are an undercount of the total number of incidents reported by victims to both agencies combined.

POLICING ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS

Implications for the policing of antisemitic incidents

Our findings reveal that most antisemitic incidents recorded by the police do not appear to be carried out by perpetrators associated with organised or extremist groups; this is contrary to the common perception of the type of antisemitism that is thought to be prevalent in Britain. In addition, many incidents are opportunistic and many are indirect in nature. Only a small minority of incidents (7.7 per cent of our sample) involve both direct contact and explicit targeting of an individual by a perpetrator where there is some evidence of a political or antisemitic belief or 'mission' that appears to drive the incident.

What is evident, however, is that the discourse used by the perpetrators appears to shift in months of high political tension in the Middle East. Rather than using symbolism or discourse referring to Nazism or antisemitism in general, more specific commentary is made about events occurring in the Middle East. It is important to note that this occurs in a context where the nature of the incidents and the profile of the perpetrators have not perceptibly changed. This indicates that these incidents do not involve new types of

perpetrators with extremist views committing new crimes during these times. What we are seeing instead is similar types of perpetrators using the current political climate as a way of having a greater impact on the perceived vulnerability of their targets.

As in the URHC project's findings relating to racial incidents and homophobic incidents in general (Stanko et al. 2003), antisemitic incidents recorded by the police seem predominantly to involve perpetrators coming from the everyday fabric of society rather than from an extremist fringe, committing these incidents as they go about their daily lives.

This has important implications for the policing of these incidents. When dealing with identifiable, organised or extremist groups and individuals, police are able to gather specific intelligence on those perpetrators and put in place proactive operations to target and prevent their actions. The more opportunistic and indirect nature of the incidents that are occurring presents difficulties to this traditional policing focus. By their very nature, these incidents are unpredictable, and perpetrators are not always identified or identifiable. This makes it difficult for police to target and disrupt the activities of these perpetrators.

Consequently, the focus of the police needs to shift towards increasing and consolidating the quality of the initial investigation so as to enhance the possibility of identifying and dealing with the perpetrator(s). In addition, the police need to be aware of the connection between improving the quality of the initial investigation and providing reassurance to the individual victims and the Jewish community as

a whole. The current moves within the Metropolitan Police Service towards Neighbourhood Policing teams and 'Citizen Focus' support the priority being given to the two-way links with local communities in terms of listening to their needs and priorities, as well as providing reassurance and policing support.

Our research has identified several key factors that will assist the police in improving their initial investigation of these incidents and, in turn, in improving the service they provide to the Jewish community.

The initial investigation and supervision of antisemitic incidents

Some key factors relating to the initial investigation and supervision of the recorded antisemitic incidents emerged in our qualitative analysis of cases. It is instructive to explore these further, with a view to considering the implications for policing practice.

Identifying antisemitic incidents that are reported

Whilst most incidents were flagged as antisemitic ('RS') by the initial investigating officer, several were subsequently flagged 'RS' by other officers at a later date. In particular, some were later flagged as antisemitic by the Diversity Directorate, with the following explanation entered into the crime report: 'owing to the tensions in the Middle East we are closely monitoring antisemitic incidents

within the MPS'. Whilst it is encouraging to note that gaps in flagging were picked up in these instances, it does suggest that the MPS may be under-flagging antisemitic incidents that come to its attention. This might be particularly problematic at times when tensions are not so high and the level of monitoring is lower. Similarly, our research looking into the overlaps between the MPS and CST data (see Figure 19 in Section 7) has also highlighted several reports relating to antisemitic incidents that were not flagged as such.

The existence of such reports could suggest that incidents are actually being reported to and dealt with by the MPS but are not highlighted as antisemitic; it also means that potentially they are not being passed on to the Community Safety Units to continue the investigation. Alternatively, it could suggest that some incidents are being flagged as racial incidents or faith hate incidents and are therefore picked up by the CSUs, but they are not reflected in the figures produced on the level of antisemitic incidents reported.

Either way, the quality of service provided by the police to the individual victims involved and the Jewish community in general cannot be monitored effectively (either by the MPS Community Safety Units or by others) if the incidents are not being identified as antisemitic in the first place. We would therefore suggest that more weight be given to the correct flagging of these incidents in the initial training received by police recruits and that this training should be continually reinforced through the supervision of frontline officers.

Accurate identification of repeat victimisation

Several victims were highlighted in the crime reports as repeat victims. However, a thorough reading of the crime reports showed that additional crime reports contained information in the 'details of the investigation' ('DETS') section to suggest that the victims' experiences were ongoing or repeat in nature. Whilst some of those additional reports contained details of other linked crime records, either in the officer's notes or in the DETS section, the information given about these linked records was often insufficiently detailed. These findings suggest that the actual level of repeat victimisation (according to the MPS definition of incidents reported to the police over the past 12 months) is somewhat higher than the 'repeat victimisation' identifier would suggest.

If the identification of repeat victimisation under-represents the information actually held by the police about the extent of repeat victimisation, this again has an impact on the quality of service that can be provided to the victim(s) of these incidents. There is a need to pay particular attention to victims' explanations of the ongoing nature of some of their experiences, whether or not these have previously been reported to the police, and to record their explanations in detail in the crime records. This information not only is important for the police when they are developing action plans for dealing with the level of targeting faced by individual victims, but could also provide them with details they require to progress their enquiries in relation to possible suspects and assist their identification of perpetrators.

Effectively utilising any knowledge that exists about potential perpetrators

Any knowledge or relationship that may exist between victims and perpetrators is identified on crime reports using a series of relationship codes or categories. In the sample of incidents we looked at for our analysis, only a small number of incidents had a relationship code listed on the crime report, all of these being classified as 'neighbour'.

However, when additional information contained in the DETS section is taken into account, it emerges that often there is a greater level of knowledge between the victim and the suspect than is implied by the coding, or lack of it. It is also evident that these leads do not always appear to be as proactively followed up by the initial investigating officers as they could be. Any level of knowledge or suspicion, though perhaps insufficient to subsequently charge an individual with having committed a specific offence, may still provide avenues for additional evidence-gathering and follow-up action. At the very least, it may provide useful information to police investigating any subsequent incidents that occur in the vicinity or in focusing on specific locations for preventive action.

Following up suspects for all incidents would have a positive longer-term impact on preventing potential escalation of the actions of individual perpetrators or groups of perpetrators. It would also allow for police to be more proactive in dealing with incidents that may start off as anti-social but may develop into more targeted hate crimes.

Detailing actions taken to trace or search for suspects

In the majority of incidents, the suspect was not present when the police attended the scene. Consequently, the level of information provided about actions taken by initial investigators to trace or search for suspects is extremely important. It is encouraging to note the level of proactive measures undertaken to trace or search for suspects. However, there are still incidents where no immediate action is taken or no information is provided about whether action was taken. It is important that initial investigating officers provide full information about any actions they have taken, with reasons being given when no action is taken or action is delayed. This information not only aids supervisors in determining whether all options have been pursued appropriately, but can also demonstrate both internally and externally that the initial investigation has been as robust and proactive as possible.

Providing full details of any evidence-gathering and witnesses spoken to

Whilst the inputting of witness details onto the crime reports is reasonably comprehensive, there were some instances where further witnesses were spoken to and briefly mentioned in the DETS section of the report without this information being included in the section of the report that is designated for recording specific details of any witnesses. This requires any subsequent investigators to read through the whole report to determine whether any witnesses were spoken to rather than being able to refer

immediately to the witness detail section of the report for that information.

Immediate evidence-gathering at the scene was generally thorough, and documented in the crime reports. However, the details provided were often brief and did not outline the full level of consideration given to collecting particular forms of evidence, even if these were eventually considered not to be appropriate or applicable in furthering a particular investigation. Whilst it is encouraging to note that some documentation of the evidence-gathering undertaken is generally provided, the information provided on the crime reports needs to fully reflect the actions that have been taken. If full information is provided on the level of consideration given to collecting particular forms of evidence and why this was or was not followed through by the initial investigating officer, this allows supervisors to assess the decision-making of their initial investigating officers. In turn, this will ensure that the quality of the initial investigations and the level of service provided to the victims by the police remain as high as possible.

Further investigation and supervision

Specific actions were taken to progress the investigation in almost all cases. However, it was apparent from our reading of the incidents that there were additional and specific actions that could potentially have been undertaken by investigating officers in some of the cases.

Although in many of the cases the initial supervision of the crime records was undertaken by civilians or police

constables rather than by police supervisors, subsequent supervision of the investigation by police supervisors was evident. In almost all cases, the investigating officers were actively sent memos with requests for further information or further action to be taken. This level of monitoring and supervision by the appropriate police supervisors is positive to note. Effective supervision is vital to ensuring and reinforcing effective initial investigation. By increasing and consolidating the quality of the initial investigation, it provides police with the greatest possibility of identifying and dealing with the perpetrators and also with the means to provide reassurance to individual victims as well as the Jewish community as a whole.

Therefore, our conclusions mirror the key issues identified by the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia's report on racist violence (2005), which states that:

Criminal justice agencies, namely the police, . . . can begin to more effectively target the problem with respect to the following key issues:

- *Victims of racist violence—encourage victims to report incidents by taking their experiences seriously; in the process, develop accurate knowledge about 'who' victims are; offer support to victims, and refer victims to specialist support agencies where these exist.*
- *Communities vulnerable to racist violence—respond to fear and insecurity among vulnerable communities by building trust; developing sensitive, effective and visible*

policing responses can enhance trust and will encourage reporting of racist victimisation.

- *Perpetrators of racist violence—develop accurate knowledge about the perpetrators using existing and well established criminal intelligence systems and procedures to build up an effective database; by effectively policing and punishing racist violence, perpetrators will know that criminal justice agencies—and therefore the State—consider racist violence as a serious crime.*

CONCLUSIONS

For many people, the term ‘hate crime’ arguably conjures up an image of a violent and highly emotive crime committed by extremists, by neo-Nazis, racist skinheads and other committed bigots—in other words, hate-fuelled individuals who subscribe to racist, antisemitic, homophobic and other bigoted ideologies. It is not surprising that many people think this way about hate crimes, because of the tendency of the media to focus on the most extreme incidents—as is the case for antisemitic incidents and crime reporting in general. This focus might be more credible if ‘antisemitic’ incidents are indeed *mostly* committed by ‘extremists’. As our data show, this is unlikely to be the case. The antisemitic incidents recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service demonstrate that incidents instead occur as part of the unfolding of everyday life rather than through political extremism.

Over a decade ago, in the case of antisemitic incidents, Kushner (1991: 18–19) argued that

It is far easier to identify nazi-style antisemites whose hatred of Jews is clear and unambiguous. For the media especially, photographic evidence of fascistic activity, particularly the swastika, has a ‘marketability’ much greater than any other evidence of antisemitic activity.

In short, the drama of extremism is news, for academics as well as journalists.

As we argue, 'antisemitic' incidents, like so-called hate crimes in general, do not occur in a vacuum. They occur in cultural contexts where bigotry, and in some instances the use of violence as a social resource, are norms that serve as a social basis for offenders' actions by determining who is an appropriate target.

Much of what is recorded by the MPS as hate crime has been categorised as 'low-level' or 'ordinary' crime (such as damage to property, theft and name-calling) and this needs to be understood within its wider social context. This is not to deny the threat of hatred or the fact that 'extraordinary' forms of hate crime exist. However, it is 'ordinary' hate crime that makes up the bulk of the workload of the MPS and has a huge impact on the lived reality of Londoners.

This has important implications for policing. When there are clearly identifiable, organised or extremist groups and individuals behind incidents, intelligence-led policing plays a valuable role in gathering specific intelligence on those perpetrators and implementing proactive operations to target and prevent their actions. However, the 'everyday', opportunistic and indirect character of the incidents that we have shown to be occurring presents difficulties to this traditional policing focus. By their very nature, these 'everyday' incidents commonly cannot be predicted or anticipated. This makes it difficult for police to target and disrupt the activities of many perpetrators.

The challenge for policing, therefore, is to focus more on the quality of the initial investigation of incidents to

gather all evidence available to raise the potential for identifying and dealing with perpetrators. Such an approach hopefully will provide reassurance to the individual victims and the Jewish community as a whole.

APPENDIX A

A SNAPSHOT PROFILE OF LONDON'S JEWISH POPULATION

David Graham

Geographical distribution

A voluntary question on religion in the 2001 Census reported that of the 7.2 million people living in London, 149,789 were Jewish, i.e. about 1 person in 50.⁴ With the exception of four wards in the City of London, Jews live in every ward in the Greater London Authority (GLA) area. Figure A1 shows the proportion of the population in each ward that is Jewish, including the GLA area and contiguous districts. London's Jews are residentially concentrated in the North London boroughs of Barnet (46,700 Jewish people), Redbridge (14,800), Harrow (13,100), Camden (11,150), Hackney (10,700), Westminster (7,700) and Brent (6,500). There is an 'overspill' of the Jewish population across the GLA boundary into the counties of Essex and Hertfordshire, and especially the district of Hertsmere (10,700) (ONS 2004: table UV15).

The Jewish population is concentrated in a small number of wards in the boroughs in which Jews are clustered. There was no ward in which Jews formed a majority. Nevertheless,

many Jews still lived in very close residential proximity to each other. The 2001 Census data showed that a quarter of all London's Jews lived in just 10 out of its 649 wards: Garden Suburb—where the 5,460 Jewish residents comprised 37 per cent of the ward's population, the highest proportion of any ward in the United Kingdom—Edgware, Golders Green, Hendon, Finchley Church End, Childs Hill, Hale and Mill Hill in Barnet, as well as Canons and Stanmore Park in Harrow.


Age profile

The median age⁵ of the population of England and Wales was 39—based on the 2001 Census data—and for London it was three years younger at 36. In contrast, the median age for London's Jewish population was 43 years, a substantial gap of seven years.

Figure A2 compares the age structures of the Jewish and the general populations in London and shows several important differences. There were proportionately fewer Jews in every age cohort up to the age of 50, and proportionately more Jews in each older age group.

Overall, then, London's Jewish population is much older than the general population. Whilst some areas, such as Hackney, do have young Jewish age profiles, the majority do not. Whereas London's general population is dominated by a large working-age population, this is not the case for the Jews, whose age structure has not benefited from any major migrant influx for more than 50 years.

Figure A2 Age structure of the Jewish and general populations in London, 2001



Source: ONS 2004: table S149

Economic activity

In general, London has a relatively young workforce, reflecting the young age profile of its population.⁶ The 25–to 34-year-old age group, made up 31 per cent of the London workforce in spring 2002, compared with 23 per cent in the United Kingdom as a whole. According to the 2001 Census, there were 64,000 economically active Jewish people aged 25 years and above in London, and 27,000 economically inactive (ONS 2004: table S153). Of the active group, Jews were twice as likely to be self-employed compared with the general population (31 per cent against 15 per cent for all Londoners). Within the inactive group, Jews were more likely to be retired than London's general population (45 per cent against 38 per cent for all Londoners). For younger people (aged 16 to 24), the Census reported that of the 13,000 Jewish people in this group, 50 per cent were economically inactive, compared with 40 per cent for all Londoners. The majority of these people—85 per cent in the case of the Jews—were students.

Occupation and industry

Very clear differences can be seen in the pattern of jobs between London's Jews and the general population. A quarter of all economically active Jewish people in London classified themselves in the 2001 census as 'Managers and senior officials', with a further 23 per cent in 'Professional occupations'. These two categories account for almost half

(49 per cent) of all jobs held by London's Jews, compared with a third (32 per cent) for the general population in London. The geography of work is not uniform across London boroughs, however. Over 40 per cent of jobs held by Jews in Kensington were in the 'Managers and senior officials' categories as were 38 per cent in Westminster and 32 per cent in Kingston. This contrasts with 18 per cent in Redbridge and 21 per cent in Brent. In Hackney, 26 per cent of Jews worked in 'Professional occupations' (many of whom were 'Teaching and research professionals').

Industry

According to the 2001 census, Jews were proportionally most numerous in 'Real estate; renting and business activities' (a sector that employed 30 per cent of the economically active Jewish population). It was also the largest industry amongst London's general population, but to a much smaller extent (20 per cent) (see Table A1). The next largest category, 'Wholesale and retail trade; repairs', employed almost 16 per cent of Jews, a proportion similar to that for the general population (14 per cent). In other industries, such as 'Construction', 'Hotels and restaurants', 'Transport; storage and communications' and 'Public administration and defence; social security', Jews were relatively under-represented.

Table A1 also shows that compared with males in the general population, Jewish men were more likely to be in the 'Real estate; renting and business activities', health and retail sectors. Compared with females in the general population,

Table A1 Industry according to the 2001 Census, London and by gender (%)*

Sector**	General population	Jewish population	Male population		Female population	
			<i>General</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>General</i>	<i>Jewish</i>
			A, B, C and E Agriculture, extraction, utilities	0.8	0.4	1.1
D Manufacture	7.6	7.1	9.2	7.9	5.9	6.0
F Construction	5.3	1.9	8.8	2.7	1.2	0.9
G Wholesale and retail trade; repairs	14.4	15.5	14.5	16.4	14.3	14.4
H Hotels and restaurants	4.6	2.2	4.7	2.3	4.5	2.1
I Transport; storage and communications	8.1	5.5	10.9	7.3	4.9	3.4
J Financial intermediation	8.0	7.5	8.3	9.5	7.6	5.1
K Real estate; renting and business activities	20.3	29.6	21.3	32.6	19.1	25.8
L Public admin. and defence; social security	5.4	2.8	5.1	2.5	5.7	3.1
M Education	7.5	8.7	4.1	4.5	11.3	14.0
N Health and social work	10.1	9.8	4.6	5.8	16.4	14.8
O, P and Q Other***	8.0	9.0	7.5	8.1	8.5	10.2
Base	3,319,132	67,547	1,775,017	37,234	1,544,115	30,313

Source: ONS 2004: table S155

* For all people aged 16 to 74 in employment the week before the April 2001 Census

** The industry categorisation is based on the 'UK Standard Industrial Classifications of Economic Activities 1992' (SIC92)

*** 'Other' industry includes Agriculture; hunting and forestry, Mining and quarrying, Fishing, Electricity; gas and water supply, other community; social personal service activities; private households with employed persons and extra-territorial organisations and bodies which include activities of international bodies.

Jewish females were more likely to be in the 'Real estate and business activities' and education sectors, and less likely to be working in restaurants, transport and financial intermediation.

Housing tenure

According to the 2001 census, 57 per cent of all households in London resided in accommodation which they owned either outright or with a mortgage (see Table A2). For the Jewish population, the proportion was over 75 per cent. Jews were almost three times less likely than the general population to live in socially rented accommodation (9.5 per cent compared with 26 per cent, respectively). They were also less likely to live in privately rented accommodation, though to a smaller extent.

There are geographical differences in tenure within the Jewish population, some of which are related to the overall availability of housing stock in a particular area. In Harrow, for example, almost 90 per cent of Jews owned their own home either outright or with a mortgage, but in other areas, particularly in Inner London, there were very low levels of Jewish home ownership. For example, in Tower Hamlets only 28 per cent owned their own home, and in Hackney the proportion was only 38 per cent for Jewish households (ONS 2004: table S156).

The place where Jews were most likely to be accommodated in social rented housing was Tower Hamlets, applicable to 57 per cent of its Jewish households. In Hackney the proportion was 35 per cent, and in Islington it was 21 per

Table A2 Tenure according to the 2001 Census, by household (per cent) Source: ONS 2004: table S156

S156	London all	London Jewish	Barnet	Redbridge	Camden	Harrow	Westminster	Hackney
Owned	56.5	75.2	84.3	86.0	68.5	89.5	58.6	37.9
Owns outright	39.0	53.0	52.5	51.4	53.3	56.5	59.2	47.9
Owns with mortgage or loan	59.3	46.3	47.0	48.2	46.1	43.1	40.1	49.5
Shared ownership	1.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.7	2.6
Social rented	26.2	9.5	3.7	6.5	7.5	4.0	9.2	34.5
Rented from council	65.3	50.6	38.9	45.4	60.0	39.6	37.6	43.1
Other social rented*	34.7	49.4	61.1	54.6	40.0	60.4	62.4	56.9
Private rented**	15.5	13.6	10.4	5.8	21.9	5.1	29.5	26.5
Private landlord or letting agency	92.6	92.9	91.9	91.0	91.8	87.4	95.7	95.0
Other	7.4	7.1	8.1	9.0	8.2	12.6	4.3	5.0
Living rent free***	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.0	1.3	2.7	1.2
Base	3,015,997	67,877	18,923	6,485	5,776	5,730	4,449	3,666

* Other social rented includes rented from Registered Social Landlord; Housing association; Housing Co-operative and Charitable Trust.
 ** Private rented: renting from a private landlord or letting agency; employer of a household member; or relative or friend of a household member or other person.

*** 'Living rent free' could include households that are living in accommodation other than private rented.

cent. There were also many Jewish households in private rented accommodation, especially in the Inner London boroughs. In Westminster, the proportion reaches 30 per cent, in Kensington 29 per cent, Hackney 27 per cent, Camden 22 per cent, and in Hammersmith 21 per cent.

Household composition

The 2001 Census reported almost 68,000 Jewish households in London. Just over half of these consisted of a single family living alone, about the same proportion as for the general population. However, there were few other structural similarities between the two populations. People living alone made up 35 per cent of all households amongst the general population of London. At 38 per cent, the proportion of Jews living alone in the capital was similar, but this hid an important difference: compared with the general population, those in Jewish single-person households were far more likely to be pensioners. According to the census, there were 13,800 Jewish pensioners living alone, unevenly distributed across the boroughs. In Harrow, 71 per cent (N = 1,240) of all those in Jewish single-person households were pensioners; in Islington the figure was only 23 per cent (N = 382).

Jewish identity

Although Judaism is one of the three oldest monotheistic world religions, Jewish people themselves increasingly


identify culturally rather than religiously. Religious and cultural identity were examined only marginally by the Census, and so we must turn to alternative sources of data to gain a clearer understanding of how Jews see themselves in twenty-first-century London. The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) carried out a survey of 2,965 Jewish households in London a few months after the 2001 Census (Becher et al. 2002). The questionnaire included questions about Jewish upbringing, current practice, secular/religious outlook, synagogue life, local communities and Jewish identity in general.

Respondents were asked to describe the type of Jewish upbringing they had experienced as a child. Over half (55 per cent) of the respondents were 'Traditional (not strictly Orthodox)'; a further 27 per cent reported that they had been brought up in homes best described as 'Non-practising' or 'Just Jewish'. Fewer than 10 per cent said that they were brought up in Orthodox Jewish homes. Two out of five respondents described their current Jewish practice as 'Traditional', which means they identified with an Orthodox community but did not necessarily observe religious practices to any great extent. A third of respondents (33 per cent) reported that they saw themselves as being either 'Just Jewish' or 'Non-practising'.

Another, more democratic way of looking at identity is by means of an outlook scale. Rather than circumscribing respondents into pre-defined and somewhat arbitrary categories, the outlook scale is more logical and presents four options: religious, somewhat religious, somewhat secular and secular. Although none of these 'outlook types' can be

precisely defined, the scale tends to be a more accurate predictor of Jewish behaviour than the Traditional/Orthodox categories noted above. The survey results showed that a majority of the sample (58 per cent) saw their identity as secular or somewhat secular and that only 8 per cent described their outlook as religious (see Becher et al. 2002). It does not follow, however, that being secular precludes a person from following practices that might otherwise be regarded as religious, and vice versa. So, for example, many Jews who very rarely, if ever, attend a weekly synagogue service will nevertheless observe the 25-hour fast of Yom Kippur (The Day of Atonement) and celebrate the festival of Passover with a family meal.⁷

Figure A3 Secular/religious outlook of London respondents



According to Schmool and Cohen (2002), 70 per cent of the United Kingdom's Jewish population was affiliated to a synagogue in 2001 and of these, two-thirds (58,000 people) lived in Greater London and were paid-up members of 192 congregations. However, these figures mask a long-term downward trend. Over the period from 1977 to 2001, total synagogue membership in London declined by 18 per cent, from 61,500 to 57,800 members. Since 1996 alone, the overall decline has been nearly 6 per cent (Schmool and Cohen 2002: 7).

Table A3 Synagogue attendance

Attendance	%
Not at all	19.3
Only on the High Holy Days	30.4
On some other festivals	14.4
About once a month	14.3
Most <i>sabbaths</i> or more often	21.6
Total (N)	2,888

Source: JPR London survey 2001 Q48

Over several generations, London's Jews have built not only synagogues but also a large and complex infrastructure of property and services across the capital. Table A4 shows the distribution of these sites across London. Some

Table A4 Jewish infrastructure by London borough, 2003

Borough	Census pop	School	Synagogue (activity)	Care facility	Charitable and social service	Library/Museum	Cemetery
Barnet	46,686	35	70	46	74	5	2
Brent	6,464	5	9	0	6	0	3
Bromley	1,098	0	2	0	1	0	0
Camden	11,153	1	6	2	21	3	0
City of London	226	0	1	0	0	0	1
Croydon	999	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ealing	1,488	0	2	0	1	0	0
Enfield	5,336	3	4	0	3	0	4
Greenwich	464	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hackney	10,732	25	53	6	9	0	2
Hammersmith & Fulham	1,312	0	1	0	0	0	0
Haringey	5,724	0	8	1	4	1	0
Harrow	13,112	3	8	0	12	2	0
Havering	1,123	0	2	0	0	0	0

Hillingdon	1,977	0	4	0	1	0	0
Hounslow	684	0	1	0	0	0	0
Islington	1,846	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kensington & Chelsea	3,550	0	3	0	0	0	0
Kingston upon Thames	999	1	2	0	0	0	2
Lambeth	1,211	0	2	0	2	0	1
Lewisham	699	0	0	0	1	0	0
Merton	882	1	2	1	0	1	0
Newham	481	0	0	0	0	0	1
Redbridge	14,796	5	17	4	8	2	0
Richmond upon Thames	1,576	0	1	0	0	0	0
Sutton	630	0	1	0	0	0	0
Tower Hamlets	1,831	0	4	1	0	0	2
Waltham Forest	1,441	0	3	0	0	0	0
Wandsworth	1,691	0	1	0	1	0	0
Westminster	7,732	0	12	0	8	3	1

Source: Board of Deputies of British Jews, 2005; CST 2004 Data were not available for the Boroughs of Barking & Dagenham and Southwark

of these facilities, such as schools, tend to follow the population as it has slowly relocated over time from the East End to the north of London, whereas others, such as care and social service facilities, are less mobile. Various sites present different challenges to those who are charged with protecting them. A school is in constant use and is typically located in places with high Jewish population densities. The cemeteries in use today, on the other hand, tend to be located far away beyond the boundary of the GLA. In contrast, historic and disused cemeteries exist in places such as inner-city areas where today few Jews reside. Desecration of gravestones in such places has been the traditional method of antisemitic vandalism in London.

APPENDIX B

SENSITISING QUESTIONS TO GUIDE CODING WITH A FOCUS ON EXTREMISM

- 1 Is the incident motivated by antisemitism, or is it aggravated?

Motivated	Antisemitism is the driving force behind the incident, i.e. the intent is driven by bigotry or bias
Aggravated	Incident was happening for other reasons, but antisemitism was brought in (conflict already taking place)
Unclear	Some evidence of antisemitism there, but unsure whether this is what drove the incident or not
Don't know	Not enough information to make any judgement on this

- 2 Was the incident pre-planned in any way?

Pre-planned	Interaction between the victim and the suspect appears to have some degree of planning (by the suspect) that has gone into it prior to the incident taking place
Spontaneous	Interaction between victim and suspect doesn't seem to show any planning prior to the incident taking place
Unclear	Some evidence of some degree of planning, but unsure whether this triggered the particular incident
Don't know	Not enough information to make any judgement on this

3 What language and symbolism was used by the suspect?

General anti-Jewish	Language/symbols draw on generalised abuse against Jews
Nazi discourse	Language/symbols draw on Nazi-related discourse
Middle East conflict	Language/symbols
Unclear	Some evidence of particular symbolism or language used, but not sure of source/ideology/background
Don't know	Not enough information to make any judgement on this

4 Is/are the suspect(s) a member of a far right/extremist group?

Is there any information/intelligence available to the police and stated on the crime report that the suspect(s) is/are members of or are linked to any far right or extremist groups?

Note: If the suspect was not identified, this should be recorded as 'SNI'. If the suspect was not identified but there appears to be some indication that they are members of particular far right or extremist groups, then both should be noted.

- 5 Do the victim and the suspect know each other? Has there been any interaction between them prior to the incident?

Relationship	Previous interaction has taken place between the victim and the particular suspect(s) involved
Knowledge	Some knowledge of the particular suspect(s), but no previous direct interaction between the victim and the suspect(s)
Stranger	No knowledge of or previous interaction with the suspect(s), but some awareness/interaction for this particular incident
Unknown	Suspect(s) not identified (no interaction/awareness)
Don't know	Not enough information to make any judgement on this

- 6 Is the incident part of a series of incidents?

One-off	This incident is a one-off incident that is not linked in any way to any other incidents that may have taken place previously.
Series	This incident is part of a series of separate and distinct incidents that have taken place before; these incidents may be similar in nature and/or involve the same suspect(s), but there needs to be some information available to link the incidents together in some way.

7 Who was the incident directed at?

Building/ organisation	Is the incident directed at a Jewish organisation or building (or an organisation or building that has links with the Jewish community)
Person	Is the incident directed at a particular individual or group of individuals?
Public property	Did the incident involve the damage of public property?
Private property	Did the incident involve the damage of private property?

8 Where did the incident take place?

Public	Did the incident take place in a public location (e.g. organisation, religious building, school)?
Private	Did the incident take place in a private location (e.g. inside or in the immediate vicinity of a person's home)?

APPENDIX C

SENSITISING QUESTIONS TO GUIDE CODING IN GENERAL

- Is the incident motivated or aggravated by antisemitism? What's the evidence for your conclusion?
- Is it neither motivated nor aggravated by antisemitism? Is something else going on?
- Was the antisemitism evident in the incident premeditated in any way?
- Was the incident spontaneous?
- Why did the interaction between the suspect and victim occur?
- Could the victim in that incident have been interchangeable with another victim? If yes, what's the evidence to say that?
- Why did the perpetrator do it? What did they get out of it?
- Was it instrumental for the perpetrator in some way? Did it have some purpose in terms of an outcome?
- Who was the perpetrator? What are their characteristics?
- Was the perpetrator doing other unlawful and/or antisocial things as well as the antisemitic incident?

- What was the perpetrator doing at the time of the incident? Were they going about their day-to-day life, job, etc? Was the interaction between the perpetrator and victim an artificial one in that it was manufactured by the perpetrator?
- What was the victim doing?
- Why was it antisemitic? Who identified it as antisemitic? If it was things that were said, what was said?
- What was the suspect's attitude towards the police officer when they arrived? Did their attitude have an impact upon the way that the police officer managed the situation?
- Were social norms being followed by the offender towards the victim in any way, perhaps, for example, respecting norms of gender, age?

APPENDIX D

FULL TABLES OUTLINING FEATURES OF ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS REPORTED TO THE MPS FROM JANUARY 2001 TO DECEMBER 2004

Table D1 Allegation description of recorded antisemitic incidents

Allegation Code Description	Frequency	%
Actual bodily harm	55	4.2
Affray S.3 P.O.A 1986 (wef 01/04/97)	1	0.1
Assault S.18	2	0.2
Assault S.20	4	0.3
Bomb hoax (wef 01/04/97)	9	0.7
Burglary (non-res)	6	0.5
Burglary (res)	7	0.5
Causing harassment/ alarm or distress S5 P.O.A 1986	107	8.3
Common assault	150	11.6
Criminal damage (£5,000 or less)	203	15.7
Criminal damage (over £5,000)	1	0.1

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Criminal damage by fire to motor vehicle	1	0.1
Criminal damage by fire	15	1.2
Criminal damage to motor vehicle	55	4.2
Drugs, possession	1	0.1
Firearms offences (wef 01/04/97)	2	0.2
Football offences (wef 01/04/97)	2	0.2
Force to prop (not victim) stolen; physical possess. of victim; theft snatch	4	0.3
Indecent assault, female	2	0.2
Interference with motor vehicle	1	0.1
Malicious/obscene/threat/nuisance phone/text/voice message	116	9.0
Malicious/obscene/threatening/nuisance comms (letter/e-mail/fax)	107	8.3
Non crime book domestic incident	3	0.2
Non crime book homophobic incident	1	0.1
Non crime book racial incident	163	12.6
Other beat crime	5	0.4
Other major crime	6	0.5
Prop. stolen from near a person not physically in their possession, other theft	8	0.6
Prop. stolen from victim using force or fear of force, robbery of the person	28	2.2
Protection from Harassment Act offences	80	6.2
Taking conveyance	1	0.1

Theft from motor vehicle	5	0.4
Theft in dwelling	1	0.1
Theft of pedal cycle	1	0.1
Threatening/abusive/ insulting words or behaviour etc. (S.4 P.O.A. 1986 only)	116	9.0
Threats to murder	25	1.9
Using force/threat of steal prop. bus. ven or comm. prop/CIT, robbery comm.	1	0.1
Violent disorder S.2 P.O.A. 1986	1	0.1
Total (N)	1,296	100.0

Table D2 Incidents in which suspect was identified and level of knowledge recorded

How suspect was known to the victim	Frequency	%
Acquaintance of victim	11	0.8
Au pair of victim	1	0.1
Brother/sister	2	0.2
Business associate	7	0.5
Business associate of victim	4	0.3
Client of victim	6	0.5
Colleague of victim	3	0.2
Employee	2	0.2
Employee of victim	1	0.1
Ex-boyfriend of victim	5	0.4
Ex-employee of victim	3	0.2
Ex-husband/wife	1	0.1
Father of victim	1	0.1
Father/stepfather	1	0.1
Friend of victim	6	0.5
Girlfriend of victim	1	0.1
House/flatmate	4	0.3
Husband of victim	1	0.1
Neighbour	52	4.0
Neighbour of victim	62	4.8
Other relationship	24	1.9
Person living in same premises (flat/housemate)	2	0.2

Social	6	0.5
Son-in-law of victim	1	0.1
Suspect/accused known by victim in another way	23	1.8
Teacher of victim	2	0.2
Tradesman	1	0.1
Tradesman of victim	1	0.1
No relationship code entered into crime report	596	46.0
No suspect identified	466	36.0
Total	1,296	100.0

Table D3 **Gender of victim by gender of suspect**

	Female suspect (%)	Male suspect (%)	Gender of suspect unknown (%)	Total
Female victim	9.7	18.5	0.1	214
Male victim	6.9	64.2	0.0	537
Gender of victim unknown	0.0	0.5	0.0	4
Total (N)	125	629	1	755

APPENDIX E

**FULL TABLES OUTLINING LEVEL OF INJURY
EXPERIENCED BY VICTIMS**

Table E1 Level of injury experienced by victims by the type of allegation reported (frequency)

Level of injury to victim	Violence	Non crime book	Threats/ harassment	Malicious communications	Criminal damage	Theft	Robbery	Sex-related	Other	Total
No injury	80	157	280	182	226	25	18	0	12	980
Threats only	2	3	37	18	1	2	3	0	1	67
Minor	94	3	6	5	4	0	9	2	1	124
Moderate	31	0	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	36
Serious	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Total (N)	210	163	325	205	232	27	33	2	14	1,211

Table E2 Level of injury experienced by victims by the type of allegation reported (per cent)

Level of injury to victim	Violence	Non crime book	Threats/ harassment	Malicious communications	Criminal damage	Theft	Robbery	Sex-related	Other	Total
No injury	38.1	96.3	86.2	88.8	97.4	92.6	54.5	0.0	85.7	80.9
Threats only	1.0	1.8	11.4	8.8	0.4	7.4	9.1	0.0	7.1	5.5
Minor	44.8	1.8	1.8	2.4	1.7	0.0	27.3	100.0	7.1	10.2
Moderate	14.8	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	3.0
Serious	1.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
Total (N)	210	163	325	205	232	27	33	2	14	1,211

Table E3 Level of injury experienced by victims by high, medium and low months (frequency)

Level of injury to victim	Above one STDEV	Within one STDEV	Below one STDEV	Total
No injury	231	676	73	980
Threats only	16	44	7	67
Minor	32	84	8	124
Moderate	7	26	3	36
Serious	1	3	0	4
Total (N)	287	833	91	1,211

Table E4 Level of injury experienced by victims by high, medium and low months (per cent)

Level of injury to victim	Above one STDEV	Within one STDEV	Below one STDEV	Total
No injury	80.5	81.2	80.2	80.9
Threats only	5.6	5.3	7.7	5.5
Minor	11.1	10.1	8.8	10.2
Moderate	2.4	3.1	3.3	3.0
Serious	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.3
Total (N)	287	883	91	1,211

APPENDIX F

FULL BREAKDOWN OF GROUPINGS DEVELOPED FOR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Table F1 **Categorisation of incidents from qualitative analysis of selected cases**

	April/May 2002	Nov/Dec 2002, Aug 2003
Mission	45	16
<i>Mission: Direct</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Mission: Indirect</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Mission: Indiscriminate</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>Mission: Inadvertent</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>0</i>
Interpersonal	9	3
Interpreted	22	9
Aggravated	10	12
Opportunistic	22	5
Unclear	2	1
Total	110	46

APPENDIX G

DEFINITIONS USED BY THE COMMUNITY SECURITY TRUST TO CATEGORISE ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS

- 1 *Extreme violence*
Any attack potentially causing loss of life.
- 2 *Assault*
Any physical attack against people that is not a threat to life.
- 3 *Damage and desecration of property*
Any physical attack directed against Jewish property that is not life-threatening.
- 4 *Threats*
Includes only clear threats, whether verbal or written.
- 5 *Abusive behaviour*
Face-to-face, telephone and targeted abusive/antisemitic letters (i.e. those aimed at and sent to a specific individual) as opposed to a mailshot of antisemitic literature, which will be included under Category 6.

Antisemitic graffiti on non-Jewish property are also included in this category.

6 *Literature*

Includes distribution of antisemitic literature, based on the following criteria:

- a) The content must be antisemitic (except see (d) below).
- b) The recipient must be either Jewish or non-Jewish.
- c) The literature must be part of a mass distribution, as opposed to that directed at a specific individual.
- d) Racist literature that is not specifically antisemitic is included when it is clear that Jews are being deliberately targeted for receipt because they are Jews (implying an antisemitic motive behind the distribution).
- e) It should be noted that the statistics for this category give no indication of the extent of distribution. Mass mailings of propaganda are only counted as one incident, although antisemitic leaflets have been circulated to hundreds and possibly thousands of Jewish and non-Jewish individuals and organisations.

NOTES

- 1 (Chapter 3, page 12) Transphobia is an irrational fear or hatred of individuals who are, or appear to be, transsexual, transvestite or transgenderist. A transphobic incident is a hate incident, motivated by transphobia, committed against people who are, or appear to be transsexual, transvestite or transgenderist. The term 'transgender' is an umbrella term that includes transsexual, transvestite and transgenderist people. A transsexual person believes that they do not belong in the gender assigned to them at birth. They suffer profound discomfort and wish to change, or are in the process of changing, to their chosen gender. A transvestite sometimes dresses in the clothing worn by people of the opposite gender. This is, in the majority of cases, in an effort to explore the opposite side of their personality. A transgenderist is, in effect, a transsexual person who, for various reasons of their own, will live as a member of the opposite gender without undergoing, or wishing to undergo, major surgery. (Definition taken from the MPS Hate Crime Policy, 2004)
- 2 (Chapter 4, page 17) Throughout our discussion, we do not subject the data to tests of statistical significance as the data we use cover all antisemitic incidents recorded

by the MPS from 2001–2004, not samples of incidents. Observed differences are therefore actual differences, and not potentially due to sampling error.

- 3 (Chapter 4, page 24) A 'non crime book' racial incident is an incident that may not constitute a criminal offence when first reported, but falls within the category of a 'racial incident' within the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report definition and is therefore recorded as a serious matter by the police. According to the definition, the perception of the victim or any other person involved is the defining factor in recording it as a racial incident on police databases. On further investigation of this matter, if it can be confirmed that a crime has been committed, then it may later be reclassified as a criminal offence.
- 4 (Appendix A, page 83) The real demographic picture is not as simple as this suggests, however. Jewish identity is enigmatic, and is as much about ancestry as it is about belief. This has meant that historically there has been an incongruity between the numbers of people who self-identify as Jewish and the numbers of people whom others identify as Jewish. By asking people the voluntary question, 'What is your religion?', the 2001 Census located that group of people who willingly self-identified as Jewish by religion. But even here, not every person who is Jewish by religion self-reported as such. For example, some older Jews with memories of Nazi-occupied Europe and passports bearing a Jewish stamp were understandably reluctant to complete a voluntary question on an official form. There is also evidence that secular Jews identify less by faith than by culture and a

'shared ethnicity'; they see their Jewishness in terms of heritage or culture rather than a religion. Evidence of an undercount for Jews in London in the 2001 Census is provided by data from a JPR survey of 2,936 London Jews carried out shortly after 29 April 2001 (Census day). This found that 9 per cent reported that they did *not* state their religion as Jewish in the Census. This suggests a minimum undercount of 16,000 Jews in London. A further 7 per cent 'could not remember' which response they gave in the Census (Becher *et al.* 2002: 17).

- 5 (Appendix A, page 84) This is the midpoint of a table of ages of a population ordered from oldest to youngest. The median age is in the centre; half the ages in the list are below the median and half are above it. It is useful as a rough guide to age structure and avoids the awkwardness of fractional ages produced by using the mean calculation.
- 6 (Appendix A, page 87) For a general overview, see the ONS report *Focus on London* at www.statistics.gov.uk/focuson/london/.
- 7 (Appendix A, page 94) A full discussion of outlook is given by Graham (2003b) or online at www.jpr.org.uk. A thorough discussion of Jewish identity is also given by Graham (2003c).

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GLOSSARY

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
BCS	British Crime Survey
CRIS	Crime Report Information System
CST	Community Security Trust
CSUs	Community Safety Units
DAC	Deputy Assistant Commissioner
DETS	‘Details of the Investigation’ section of a crime report
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GLA	Greater London Authority
GOL	Government Office For London
JPR	Institute for Jewish Policy Research
MP	Member of Parliament
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
N/A	Not applicable
NF	National Front
NCB	Non Crime Book
ONS	Office for National Statistics
PC	Police Constable
POA	Public Order Act

RI	Identifier for 'racist' incidents on crime reports
RS	Identifier for 'antisemitic' incidents on crime report
RVCTF	Racial and Violent Crime Taskforce
S 4 POA	Section 4, Public Order Act
SNI	Suspect Not Identified
TPG	Territorial Policing Group
UK	United Kingdom
URHC	'Understanding and Responding to Hate Crime' project
wef	With Effect From

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In April 2004 the House of Commons debated the apparent rise of antisemitic incidents and the prevailing antisemitic climate in Britain. Responding on behalf of the Government, Home Office Minister Fiona Mactaggart M.P. reported that 'together with the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, the Metropolitan Police is conducting research into such incidents to get a more accurate feel for their nature and to develop a more effective response to them.' This highly informative book presents the findings of that joint research project with a view to understanding more clearly the dynamics of antisemitic incidents recorded by the police in London.

For the first time in published form, Metropolitan Police Service records of antisemitic incidents in London are analysed and placed in the context of the attention drawn to the increasing problem of street-level antisemitism reported by the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2004) and the U.S. State Department (2005). Drawing from crime reports for the calendar years 2001–2004, the book discusses the nature and location of incidents, and the characteristics of victims and offenders, and uses qualitative information in the crime reports to theorise about the social context and potential motivations behind incidents. The implications that the data have on the effective investigation of such incidents by the police are also drawn out.

The authors critically examine the assumption that there is an increasing problem of antisemitism in London and, through their detailed analysis of official records, establish that most antisemitic incidents recorded by the police do not appear to be carried out by perpetrators associated with organised or extremist groups, but instead occur as part of the dynamics of everyday life. The authors have developed an innovative typology of these incidents that will provide a valuable addition to current debates being held internationally on antisemitism and hate crime.

'This book provides the most comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of European antisemitic bias crimes that has ever been completed. I recommend it to all those seeking a deeper understanding of the dynamics of bias crime.'

PROFESSOR JACK McDEVITT, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE ON RACE AND JUSTICE, AND THE CENTER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, BOSTON.

'It is only through improved understanding of the nature of crime that we can better tackle it and hold offenders to account. This report into antisemitism provides an important focus that will assist us in this aim.'

COMMANDER STEVE ALLEN, HEAD OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE DIVERSITY DIRECTORATE

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