Secular or religious?
The outlook of London's Jews

David Graham

Contents

jpr/programmes of research
Planning for Jewish communities
Jewish culture: arts, media and heritage
Israel: impact, society and identity
Civil society

Planning for Jewish communities includes surveys and research into the infrastructure of organized Jewish communities, helping them develop policy recommendations and strategies for change in the welfare, educational and social sectors.

Introduction

This study focuses on a new theoretical concept: outlook. It is based on a single question in JPR's 2002 survey of the Jewish community of London and the South-east,[1] in which nearly 3,000 respondents were asked to choose between four options: Religious, Somewhat Religious, Somewhat Secular and Secular. It presupposes that there are differences along a continuum between people who consider themselves to be religious Jews and those who see themselves as secular Jews who are all, nonetheless, united in their claim to be members of a Jewish collective. The working hypothesis here is that outlook will affect an individual's propensity to believe in particular ideas, belong to particular institutions and behave in particular ways.

The concept of a secular–religious scale was first used in the United States in the 2001 American Jewish Identity Survey.[2] In the present study, the method has been refined by the creation of models based on outlook. Being replicable, changes in outlook can now be measured in future surveys, and the outlook of other communities can be assessed and compared with this data. For example, the tools developed here could be used to compare British with American or Israeli Jewish populations and also for comparisons with other, non-Jewish communities.[3]

Previous labelling typologies, such as the one used by JPR in its earlier 1995 survey,[4] represented *nominal* scales, that is to say, they consisted of descriptive, categorical items only (akin to different makes of cars). The items in such scales are imprecise, have

no meaningful magnitude and cannot be compared with each other on that basis. Such categories only have an associative correspondence. Also, being affiliation-driven, this approach becomes rapidly dominated by the all-encompassing 'Traditionals' and tends to miss the unaffiliated.

One of the main problems that sociological research into Jewish populations has suffered from in the past is that such scales have not been treated as nominal. Rather, practitioners and the public have tended to regard them as *ordinal*, that is to say, making use of the items as if they could be ordered by rank (akin to a military hierarchy), as if they had some comparable, intrinsic magnitude. Unsurprisingly, little progress has been made towards developing a deeper scientific understanding of what motivates different sections of the community to act as they do.

The problem is simple to demonstrate. What is the difference between the categories 'non-practising Jew' and 'just Jewish', if any at all? Is 'Traditional' more religious than 'Progressive'? What indeed do we even mean by 'religious' in this instance: more observant, more involved, more affiliated or what? This is not to say that such a nominal scale has no value. When 60 per cent of the British Jewish community said they were 'Traditional' they were acting in a homogeneous way by clearly identifying with an undefined concept, and this in itself is interesting. But it tells us nothing about what 'Traditional' means or how 'Traditionals' differ from 'non-Traditionals'. And what it certainly does not allow for is measurement.

The outlook scale, however, *is* ordinal. Its components are directly comparable because they evidence the quality of magnitude. In this report this ordinal outlook scale is analysed and developed to create an Index of Social Distance, an *interval* scale (akin to exam scores). Such a scale has the same properties as an ordinal scale but with the added advantage of the items becoming measurable with respect to each other. With this new, interval outlook scale researchers have a tool for carrying out sophisticated, analytical research to explain and describe the complex sociological idiosyncrasies of Jewish communities. In using outlook we have simply stepped away from chaos and towards order.

1 H. Becher, S. Waterman, B. Kosmin and K. Thomson, *A Portrait of Jews in London and the South-east: A Community Study* (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research 2002).

2 E. Mayer, B. Kosmin and A. Keysar, *American Jewish Identity Survey 2001. An Exploration in the Demography and Outlook of a People* (New York: The Graduate Centre of the City University of New York 2002).

3 B. Kosmin, 'As secular as they come', *Moment*, June 2002, 44–9.

4 In the 1995 JPR survey of the social and political attitudes of British Jews the following question was asked: 'In terms of Jewish religious practice, which of the following best describes your position? Non-Practising (i.e. secular) Jew; Just Jewish; Progressive Jew (e.g. Liberal, Reform); "Traditional" (not strictly Orthodox); Strictly Orthodox (e.g. would *not* turn on a light on Shabbat)'; for key findings of the 1995 survey, see S. Miller, M. Schmool and A. Lerman, *Social and Political Attitudes of British Jews: Some Key Findings of the JPR Survey* (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research 1996).

Given the fact that the particular outlook to which a person subscribes may not be the same outlook that others would ascribe to them, there is no definitive definition of 'outlook'. There are only indicators. Consequently, it might be thought that defining one's own outlook regarding Jewishness would not be an easy task. The 2002 survey of the Jews in London and the South-east found otherwise, since 2,867 people or 96.7 per cent of respondents answered the relevant question. This does not mean, however, that the concept of outlook is simple; but it does appear that in practice few survey respondents found it difficult to place themselves on the four-point scale offered.

A scientific approach

The results presented here represent democratic, scientific and innovative opinion research. This means that respondents placed themselves into categories rather than having (arbitrary) categories imposed upon them. The data are also empirical and the tests replicable. The results have produced indicators that allow, for the first time, direct measurement of the *Jewishness* of the Jews of London and the South-east on a number of trajectories.

Within the Jewish community the different denominations among affiliated, and generally religious, Jews is diverse (Satmar, Mitnagim, Federation, Modern Orthodox, Progressive, Reform and so on). This variation, however, also occurs at the more secular end of the community although it is rather less institutionalized and therefore less simple to delimit. Some secular Jews are secular because of their high level of *disinterest* in all things

Jewish while others are secular because of a conscious effort to *secularize their Jewishness*, to engage in non-theistic Jewish behaviour, which contributes tangibly to their choice of identifications. This is nothing new. There have always been Judaisms and not one Judaism, and only a tool such as outlook will illuminate this scientifically.

The survey data are presented in Part 1 of this report. These form a descriptive, bivariate analysis based on cross tabulations of the results of the outlook question and other pertinent variables. The analysis highlights the variables that differentiate and unite Jews. It demonstrates that the cause-and-effect relationship between religiosity and Jewish practice is unclear, and that no single variable, or set of variables, can adequately describe the multifaceted nature of being a Jew in Greater London. Being thus self-defined, the concept of outlook takes on a complexity all of its own. If two Jews choose independently to define themselves as 'secular', they may in reality exhibit very different Jewish characteristics. The old adage about two Jews producing three opinions is particularly apt.

In Part 2 standard sociological, analytic typologies are applied to the results using a multivariate approach, and some theoretical models of outlook, models that previous typologies have failed to produce, are developed. The aim of Part 2 is to show how this subtle and useful tool can be employed so as to improve our understanding of Jewish populations, and provide us with the power to predict their behaviours.

PART 1

Descriptive analysis of the outlook of Jews in London and the South-east

1 Demographic and socio-economic indicators

This study sheds light on what it is that defines an individual's outlook and how one outlook type differs from another in terms of various beliefs, behaviours, practices and attachments. Only the most statistically interesting and significant data are presented here.

JPR's 2002 survey of the Jews in London and the South-east measured outlook using the scale developed for the 2001 American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS).[5] Outlook is self-defined and allows respondents to identify themselves in terms of self-perceived degrees of 'Jewishness'. This allows the researcher to look objectively at what is essentially a 'subjective state of mind'.[6]

The 2002 Greater London survey included the following outlook question.

When it comes to your outlook, how do you regard yourself?
Tick one only

☐ Secular
☐ Somewhat Secular
☐ Somewhat Religious
☐ Religious

The question was placed within a section of the survey called 'Being Jewish', the implicit assumption being, therefore, that it was outlook from a *Jewish* perspective that was being referred to. The question attracted 2,867 responses representing 96.7 per cent of the sample (see Table 1).[7] Given

---

5 Mayer, Kosmin and Keysar, 35.
6 Ibid., 37.
7 This question was also posed in Leeds, where 93 per cent of respondents answered in the following proportions: 20 per cent Secular, 27 per cent Somewhat Secular, 44 per cent Somewhat Religious and 9 per cent Religious. The Leeds community was, therefore, more religious in its outlook than the London community (47 per cent were Secular or Somewhat Secular in Leeds compared to 58 per cent in London). See S. Waterman, *The Leeds Jewish Community Study* (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research 2003 forthcoming).

Table 1: Survey results: secular–religious outlook

Outlook	Valid responses % (count)	
Secular	24.9 (714)	SSS* 57.5 (1,648)
Somewhat Secular	32.6 (934)	
Somewhat Religious	34.0 (976)	SRR** 42.5 (1,219)
Religious	8.5 (243)	

* Secular and Somewhat Secular combined
** Somewhat Religious and Religious combined

that there were only four rigid options available (a relatively limited number for such a scale) this very high level of response suggests that respondents had virtually no difficulty at all in locating themselves on the spectrum.

Figure 1 shows that the majority of the sample located themselves on the secular side of the secular–religious continuum. One-quarter of the sample defined themselves as Secular (24.9 per cent) and well over half (57.5 per cent) fell into the Secular/Somewhat Secular category (SSS).[8] Less

Figure 1: Survey results: secular–religious outlook

---

8 The 2001 AJIS survey found that only 43 per cent of its sample fell into this category (Mayer, Kosmin and Keysar, 43), suggesting that respondents in the US were less inclined than those in the United Kingdom to describe themselves as secular.

Figure 2: The 'mean' outlook

than a tenth of the sample considered their outlook to be Religious (8.5 per cent).

The extent to which this sample is skewed towards the secular is demonstrated in Figure 2. In terms of an average or a 'mean' outlook we find that it lies towards the secular end of Somewhat Secular.

It is important to note that this result, as well as all the analysis that follows, is representative of the *sample* and does not necessarily reflect the precise make-up of the UK Jewish population (in terms of age, gender and affiliation). That said, the current data provide a good picture of the outlook of the Jewish population in the United Kingdom.

Outlook by socio-economic profile

Table 2 presents key socio-economic indicators of the sample related to outlook.

Gender
More men than expected responded to the questionnaire and more men than women considered themselves to have a Religious outlook. Nonetheless, since differences were small, the data suggest that, surprisingly, for this sample gender had *no* significant impact on outlook.

Age
The data failed to highlight any clear relationship between age and outlook based on standard

Table 2: Social, economic and demographic profile, by outlook

Indicator	Secular	Somewhat Secular	Somewhat Religious	Religious	Sample mean
Gender (% male)	53	50	53	57	52
Age (median)	58	54	56	54	56
Marital status (% married)	70	73	77	79	74
Household size (people per household)	2.5	2.73	2.78	3.41	2.75
Household (% couple with children)	16	23	23	25	21
Household (% couple without children)	38	32	33	27	33
Household (% single person)	20	18	18	17	19
Education (% at least A-Level)	59	55	57	70	58
Education (% postgraduate or professional diploma)	33	29	31	40	31
Personal income (% over £50,000)	30	33	34	35	33
Household income (% over £50,000)	50	57	57	55	55
Home ownership (% own home outright)	66	60	65	63	63

statistical summaries. It is not possible to say that the younger tended to be less religious than the older or vice versa. The sample is skewed towards the older end of the age scale, the mean age being 57 and the median age 56, and this may be the reason for this surprising result. Different age-groups were analysed using several breakdowns but none showed any particularly revealing relationship or trends.

Marriage

There was a high propensity in the sample towards marriage (74 per cent) and the proportion was almost 10 per cent higher for the Religious category than for the Secular. When comparing the combined Secular and Somewhat Secular group (SSS) with the combined Religious and Somewhat Religious group (SRR),[9] there was still a slightly greater tendency for the religious to marry than the secular, but not to any significant extent (72 per cent SSS against 78 per cent SRR). There was, however, a clear difference in terms of the 'type of marriage' of respondents. Those who defined themselves as Secular were two to three times more likely to have had only a civil or Registry Office marriage compared with any of the other three outlook groups.

Household size and composition

There was a clear relationship between outlook and household size, although it was not a smooth one: the more religious the outlook the greater the household size. However, two points stand out: the disproportionately larger Religious household size of 3.41 persons, and the similarity in household size between the Somewhat Secular (2.73) and the Somewhat Religious (2.78). Overall the households were large, with even the Secular group showing a household size of 2.5 persons, larger than the UK national average of 2.4.[10]

From the perspective of household composition the pattern was similar. Single-person households were more likely to be Secular, although the data will have been compromised by the sample's under-representation of people living in flats. Households consisting of a couple with children were 1.5 times more likely to be Religious than Secular.

9 In the analysis it was often necessary, for clarity or statistical significance, to merge the four outlook types into two, secular and religious, which are referred to as SSS and SRR.

10 For the mean household size in England and Wales, see the Office for National Statistics, www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/commentaries/housing.asp (viewed 16 June 2003).

Interestingly, on both of these measures the Somewhat Secular and Somewhat Religious groups were virtually identical.

Income

In general the correlation of outlook with *personal* income showed a clear but unpronounced relationship: the nearer the religious end of the continuum, the higher the income. Among those with a personal annual income of over £50,000, the Religious made up the largest proportion of earners (35 per cent) but the Somewhat Secular and the Somewhat Religious were only 1 or 2 percentage points below this, and again showed a surprising similarity. The outlook type that stands out on this scale was Secular, with 30 per cent earning over £50,000, five percentage points fewer than the Religious group. The results also suggest that there is really very little relationship between *household* income and outlook.

Social class

A major finding of the survey is that there appears to be surprisingly little differentiation between outlook types as measured against socio-economic indicators.

Using the standard NS-SEC analytic categories no relationship was observed between class and outlook. Approximately one-third of each outlook type belonged to Class I (Higher managerial and professional) and one-third belonged to Class II (Lower managerial and professional).

Geographic location

The sample was selected based on what was known about the geographic location of the Jewish community in Greater London in 2000,[11] with two-thirds (65 per cent) being located in North or North-west London. For the purposes of data analysis the set was divided into eight localities, as shown in Table 3.

No neat and tidy relationship existed between outlook and location. However, two regions were considerably more Secular than the others: South London (51 per cent) and Inner London (35 per cent).

Based on the SSS/SRR dichotomy, apart from two regions (South and Inner London) where the

11 Becher, Waterman, Kosmin and Thomson, 8–10.

secular dominated, the ratio of SSS:SRR was roughly the same, about 14:11 (Table 4). No region had more religious than secular respondents. The region in which the greatest proportion of SRR lived was Outer North-west London (i.e. Edgware, Stanmore, Northwood and Wembley), where almost half (48 per cent) of the respondents had an SRR outlook. The region in which the greatest proportion of SSS lived was South London (79 per cent), with Inner London also having a substantial proportion of SSS (65 per cent).

Table 3: Sample, by geographic location

Region	% of sample	Postcodes included in the survey
Outer North-west London	30	HA, NW9
Highgate and Garden Suburb	17	N2, N6, N10, NW11
Redbridge	13	IG1, IG2, IG4, IG5
Outer North London	9	N12, N13, N14, N20, N21
Inner London	9	NW1, NW2, NW3, NW6, NW8, W8, W14
South Hertfordshire	8	WD
South London	7	BR, CR, DA, KT, SE, SM, SW, TW
Essex	6	IG6, IG7, IG8

Table 4: Region, by secular–religious dichotomy

	South Herts	Outer North-west London	Outer North London	Hampstead and Highgate	Inner London	Redbridge	Essex	South London
SSS* %	57	52	56	56	65	57	57	79
SRR** %	43	48	44	44	35	43	43	21

* Secular and Somewhat Secular combined
** Somewhat Religious and Religious combined

2 The relationship between upbringing and outlook

Informal education

Youth groups and youth activities

Almost three-quarters of the sample reported that they had attended a Jewish club or organization before the age of eighteen. Of these, three-quarters described themselves as either Somewhat Secular or Somewhat Religious in roughly equal proportions (76 per cent and 77 per cent, respectively). The Secular group, however, was noticeably different in that a smaller proportion (61 per cent) had participated in such activities. Nevertheless, this still represented a substantial majority of this group.

With regard to attendance of Zionist youth groups, a clear bias was evident. The Religious were 2.5 times more likely to have attended than the Secular (47 per cent against 17 per cent). The picture was similar for those participating in an Israel 'experience' or 'tour', although this was only applicable to 17 per cent of the sample. It is interesting to note that this does not reflect the pattern observed *vis-à-vis* recent visits to Israel, in which little difference exists between the outlook types.

Summer schools and summer camps

The more Jewish experiences a person had before the age of seventeen, the more likely they were to describe themselves as Religious. Just under a quarter of the sample said that they had had no teenage Jewish experiences (24 per cent), and this group were three times more likely to be Secular than Religious. The Religious stood out as having the most such experiences, even compared with the Somewhat Religious. Two-fifths of the sample reported having attended a summer school/summer camp (41 per cent). Of these, the propensity to attend seemed to be related to outlook, with three separate groups emerging: Secular; Somewhat Secular and Somewhat Religious combined; and Religious. Figure 3 demonstrates clearly that the 'Somewhat' categories have more in common with each other than either of the two other categories.

The final item of interest here concerns membership of a Jewish sports club, reported by 17 per cent of the sample. In this instance, unlike those mentioned above, there was no significant difference between the SSS and the SRR groupings or between each outlook type.

Figure 3: Attendance of summer school/summer camp, by outlook

Education

General education[12]

The data show that there was no significant difference between the outlook groups in terms of general education, except that the SRR group was proportionately ahead on every measure, but only very slightly. Roughly comparable proportions of SSS and SRR had achieved A-Levels or equivalent qualifications (57 per cent of the SSS against 59 per cent of the SRR). For education to the level of a first degree, the proportions were about 39 per cent each for SSS and SRR. However, when the data are looked at from a 'per outlook' perspective, the balanced relationship vanishes.

For all indicators the Religious outperformed all other outlook groups by a statistically significant margin. However, the next most educationally successful group was the Secular, *not* the Somewhat Religious, while the lowest achievers were consistently the Somewhat Secular. This pattern was consistent across all educational attainment categories (except for the level of Ph.D., where the data were not statistically significant). This discontinuity in the outlook continuum (an issue

12 The London and South-east survey included a separate section aimed specifically at parents of school-age children. A detailed analysis can be found in Oliver Valins and Barry Kosmin, *The Jewish DaySchool Marketplace: The Attitudes of Jewish Parents in Greater London and the South-east towards Formal Education* (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research 2003).

discussed in depth in Part 2 of this report) suggests that a complex sociological analysis is required to explain what it is about the educational ethos of both the Secular and the Religious that should unite them so closely, compared to the middle ground.

Jewish education
In the main the sample had received a reasonably high level of Jewish education. However, there were differences between the SSS and the SRR. For example, the survey examined Jewish education before bar/bat mitzvah age, and found that only 16 per cent of the sample had had no pre-bar/bat mitzvah education at all. Among this group there were twice as many SSS as SRR. Almost three-quarters of the entire sample had attended *cheder* (Sunday school) and, of these, the greater proportion were SRR although the differences were not too substantial (70 per cent SSS and 77 per cent SRR). Turning to Jewish education in the post-bar/bat mitzvah years, more than half of the entire sample said that they had had none (56 per cent), and the SSS were three times more likely to have had none than the SRR.

Jewish education in adulthood
Those reporting having taken a course to further their Jewish education in the previous five years amounted to one-quarter of the sample (25 per cent). Such activity was the domain of the SRR who were almost three times more likely to have attended a course than the SSS.

Perceived importance of education to a sense of Jewishness
Respondents were asked: 'How important to your own sense of Jewishness is having a good Jewish education?' Overall 86 per cent of respondents felt that this was at least 'somewhat important' (again, a high figure possibly reflecting biases in the sample). Figure 4 shows the results of this question based on outlook. What is overwhelmingly clear is the smooth inverse relationship between outlook and attitude to Jewish education. The closer to the religious end of the spectrum, the more likely the respondent was to consider Jewish education to be very important to their sense of Jewishness, and the boundaries were very well defined. Perceptions of the importance of a good Jewish education are therefore a defining contributor to outlook.

An analysis of the results, outlook by outlook, shows that 90 per cent of the Religious considered a good

Jewish education to be 'very important'. For the Somewhat Religious, the equivalent figure was over half (52 per cent) but, even here, 96 per cent believed that a good Jewish education was at least 'somewhat important'. Crossing the secular–religious divide attentuates the importance level once more. Two out of three (61 per cent) of the Somewhat Secular believed that a good Jewish education was 'somewhat important'; even so, 87 per cent still fell below the important end of the 'importance' spectrum. Finally, the Secular complete the picture of a smooth shift away from the high importance attributed to Jewish education by the Religious. One-third said that a good Jewish education was 'not at all important', well over half (57 per cent) of all those that selected this option. Yet even here over two-thirds (67 per cent) of the Secular group selected at least 'somewhat important'. That substantial proportions of secular Jews considered Jewish education to be important is not only notable for its own sake, but is also highly visible in the examination of opinions towards Jewish secondary education.

Figure 4: Responses to the question: 'How important to your own sense of Jewishness is having a good Jewish education?', by outlook

Jewish secondary education
To test the hypothesis that Jewish outlook affects an individual's attitude towards Jewish education, several attitudinal statements were presented to respondents (as shown in Table 5) relating to secondary education.

Respondents were broadly in favour of Jewish secondary schooling regardless of outlook type, with the main anomaly being, as already

Table 5: Views on Jewish secondary education, by outlook

Statements with which respondents agreed or agreed strongly	Secular (%)	Somewhat Secular (%)	Somewhat Religious (%)	Religious (%)	Base
A non-Jewish secondary school is fine if Jewish studies are on the curriculum	49	58	57	41	1,432
A non-Jewish secondary school is fine if it has sufficient Jewish pupils	47	58	53	35	1,368
A Jewish secondary school would be fine if it had a secular cultural outlook	51	53	51	33	1,326
A non-Jewish secondary school is desirable to prepare a child for contemporary society	56	43	34	17	1,073
A non-Jewish secondary school is fine if a child attended a Jewish primary school first	16	22	29	30	609
Jewish children should attend a Jewish secondary school	10	14	29	61	598
Jewish children should attend a Jewish secondary school regardless of cost	5	8	16	47	355

mentioned, the Religious who strongly favoured an all-Jewish environment. All three of the other outlook types were, significantly, in almost harmonious agreement on most of the issues explored.

This Religious/Others cleavage was visible in the responses to several of the statements. The statement, 'Jewish children should attend a Jewish secondary school regardless of cost', produced 26 per cent of Religious strongly in favour. They were three times more likely than even the Somewhat Religious to select either 'Agree' or 'Strongly agree' (47 per cent against 16 per cent respectively). This pattern was repeated for the statement 'Jewish children should attend a Jewish secondary school'. Here the Religious stood out with one-third (32 per cent) strongly in favour. This was the single largest response for any extreme position. For the statement regarding a school with a 'secular cultural outlook', the Religious were much more likely to disagree than agree, in stark contrast with all the other outlook types which again displayed a remarkably similar pattern. Also there was a clear avoidance of selecting 'Strongly agree' among even the Secular group, which resulted in a large bunching of responses in the 'Agree' category.

The fourth statement on which the Religious stood out related to a non Jewish secondary school being 'fine if it has sufficient Jewish pupils'. The above pattern was repeated, with the Religious tending to disagree more often than the other groups which

showed a homogeneous response pattern. Similarly, but to a lesser extent, the fifth statement regarding a non-Jewish secondary school being 'fine if Jewish studies are on the curriculum' also repeated this response pattern and two points were of particular interest. First, the Somewhat Secular and the Somewhat Religious shared an almost identical response pattern and, second, there was a clear vote from the Secular in favour of this Jewish studies option. The final statement on which the Religious stood out posited that a non-Jewish secondary school was 'fine if a child attended a Jewish primary school first', but on this option the difference was far less pronounced.

Upbringing and current practice
A key advantage of the outlook continuum is that it compartmentalizes and therefore simplifies what is, in fact, a very complex sociological concept, i.e. Jewishness. This advantage is brought into sharp relief when set against the use of such vague categories as 'Traditional' and 'just Jewish' for defining both Jewish upbringing and current practice. In terms of outlook, the only clear finding was that no simple overlap between, say, 'Traditional' and Somewhat Religious, or 'just Jewish' and Secular, existed. This emphasizes the limitations of such categorizations.

Although the trend for the whole sample was away from the religious end of the continuum when comparing upbringing and current practice, it would be incorrect to conclude that a straightforward shift

had occurred over time. For example, the majority of the sample had had a 'Traditional (not strictly Orthodox)' upbringing (55 per cent) and the current outlook of this sub-group was equally split between SSS and SRR. Three-quarters of those with a 'Traditional' upbringing fell into the 'Somewhat' categories. However, one-fifth of the sample was brought up 'just Jewish' (19 per cent) and over a fifth of those described their current

outlook as Somewhat Religious (22 per cent), the opposite of what might be expected.

In conclusion, it seems that the expected patterns (whereby 'just Jewish' maps Secular and Somewhat Religious maps 'Traditional' and so on) do not occur when comparing Jewish upbringing and current Jewish practice with current outlook. However, these are complex relationships that need further study.

3 Being Jewish: practice and observance

Current religious practice and outlook

How does current religious practice relate to current self-defined outlook? It would be incorrect to suggest, for example, that those describing themselves as currently 'Reform' were Somewhat Secular, or that those currently 'Traditional' were all Somewhat Religious. Certainly those who saw themselves as being currently 'just Jewish' (22 per cent) were more likely to be Secular. However, as already seen, 16 per cent of this group were Somewhat Religious. Marriage may provide a possible explanation for this.

Two out of five people in the sample saw themselves as being currently 'Traditional' (41 per cent) and, as expected, the majority of them were Somewhat Religious. However, over 40 per cent of these 'Traditionals' fell into the combined Secular/ Somewhat Secular (SSS) grouping, highlighting further the lack of a straightforward correlation. A similar, but opposite, pattern was evident in the case of those describing themselves as currently 'Reform/Progressive'; over a third described their outlook as being in the combined Somewhat Religious/Religious grouping (SRR) (36 per cent; note that only 17 per cent of the sample identified themselves as 'Reform').

Jewish consciousness

The survey of the Jews of Greater London investigates 'Jewish consciousness' in a manner that explicitly ignores the issue of *observance* (discussed separately below). It found that the SSS had a very high level of Jewish consciousness, with 80 per cent stating that they were either 'quite strongly' or 'extremely' conscious of being Jewish. This sits uncomfortably with the fact that only 9 per cent of the sample described their outlook as Religious.

There are many possible explanations as to why the level of Jewish consciousness was so high while that of religiosity was so low. Perhaps the label 'Religious' was associated with actual *practice* (as opposed to *outlook*). For example, the Religious 9 per cent is similar to the proportion who did not travel on the Sabbath (11 per cent) and the proportion who would not turn on a light on the Sabbath (7 per

cent). These might be defined as 'religious practice markers' breaking down the perceived smoothness of the outlook continuum.

Religious observance and practice

The survey examined four 'markers' of religious Jewish practice. These were: lighting candles on Friday night; attending a *seder* at Passover; fasting on Yom Kippur; and keeping kosher. These four will now be analysed with regard to outlook.

Lighting candles

Eighty-two per cent of respondents said that they lit candles on Friday night either 'occasionally' or 'every Friday'; as expected, the more religious tended to light candles more frequently. For those with a Secular outlook, almost half 'never' lit candles; this is a considerably higher proportion than either of the other three outlook groups. However, this obscures the fact that 73 per cent of the SSS group lit candles either 'occasionally' or 'every Friday'. In fact, 12 per cent of those who lit candles 'every Friday' considered themselves to be Secular. Clearly, those with a Secular outlook considered it important to carry out this ritual.

The frequency of candle lighting appears to be a good indicator of which side of the Somewhat divide a person might fall into. In other words, the Somewhat Secular, as a rule, lit candles 'occasionally' (46 per cent of all 'occasionally' responses) while the Somewhat Religious lit them 'every Friday' (46 per cent of all 'every Friday' responses).

Attending a Passover seder

A similar picture emerged when it came to attending a Passover *seder*. Three-quarters of the entire sample said that they attended a *seder* 'every year'. Again, the more religious people were the more likely to select 'every year'. But here the results were surprising: almost half of those who considered themselves to be Secular selected 'every year' as well (47 per cent), and 82 per cent said they attended a *seder* 'some', 'most' or 'every' year. This trend continued with three-quarters of the Somewhat Secular attending a *seder* 'every year'.

So, once more, significant secular Jewish religious practice is evident. As to why this is the case, the

answer probably lies in the family-oriented nature of the activity. That attending a *seder* is even more pervasive than candle lighting suggests that there might be an issue regarding commitment: less time needs to be invested in attending a meal once a year than in lighting candles every week. That said, the Somewhat Secular had much more in common with the Somewhat Religious than with the Secular regarding this activity. Of those that said they 'never' attended a *seder* (admittedly only 6 per cent of the sample), almost three-quarters were Secular (71 per cent).

Fasting on Yom Kippur
In each of the outlook groups the propensity to fast on Yom Kippur was lower than that to attend a *seder*. Almost a quarter of the SSS 'never' fasted (23 per cent) and, significantly, those with a Secular outlook were 2.5 times more likely 'never' to fast than those with a Somewhat Secular outlook. This is another religious practice marker that tangibly separates the Secular group from the others. Even so, 30 per cent of the Secular fasted 'every' year, as did a significant 56 per cent of the Somewhat Secular. Thus, over three-quarters (78 per cent) of the SSS fasted or, if health permitted, would fast at least 'some years'. Incidentally, twice as many Somewhat Religious as Religious would refrain from fasting for 'health reasons'.

Keeping kosher
The final indicator of religious practice examined by the survey was keeping kosher. As one might expect, the less religious the outlook the greater the likelihood that non-kosher meat would be eaten outside of the home. This factor is another key variable in distinguishing the Somewhat Secular from the Somewhat Religious. Almost three-quarters of the Somewhat Religious either 'never' or 'occasionally' ate non-kosher meat outside the home (72 per cent). The equivalent proportion of the Somewhat Secular was half that: about one in three (38 per cent), as shown in Table 6.

As for those who 'occasionally' ate non-kosher meat outside of the home, the two Somewhat outlook groups were roughly similar, with one-quarter of each (24 per cent of the Somewhat Secular and 28 per cent of the Somewhat Religious) doing so, although the Somewhat Religious were three times more likely than the Somewhat Secular 'never' to eat non-kosher meat outside the home. Conversely, the Somewhat Secular were twice as likely as the Somewhat Religious to eat non-kosher meat 'frequently'.

Only half (52 per cent) of the sample bought meat solely from a kosher butcher, and of these 37 per cent were among the SSS grouping. This is

Table 6: Response to question, 'Do you ever eat non-kosher meat outside of the home?', by outlook

Response	Secular (%)	Somewhat Secular (%)	Somewhat Religious (%)	Religious (%)	Base
Never	8	15	45	84	830
Occasionally	18	24	27	8	630
Frequently	74	61	28	8	1,383
Total	100	100	100	100	2,843

Table 7: Keeping kosher at home and outside the home, by outlook

	Secular	Somewhat Secular	Somewhat Religious	Religious
Outside of the home %	8	15	45	84
At home %	22	43	74	89
Number of times more likely to eat kosher meat at home than outside the home	2.6	2.9	1.6	1.1

surprisingly high, given how relatively low the overall proportion was. Even more peculiar was the fact that one out of five of the Secular group said that they only ate kosher meat at home (22 per cent). Eating kosher meat at home appears to be less of an indicator of the secular–religious divide than eating non-kosher meat outside of the home.

Table 7 highlights a key difference between the SSS and SRR outlook categories regarding the consumption of non-kosher meat in general. An SSS respondent was up to three times more likely to eat kosher meat at home than outside the home, whereas the SRR were only 1.5 times more likely to do so. In other words, those who describe their outlook as being secular are considerably more likely than the religious to eat non-kosher meat outside the home, even if they only eat kosher meat at home.

Synagogue activity
Synagogue attendance
The survey showed that attending synagogue services was almost the exclusive realm of the SRR (see Table 8). One out of five (19 per cent) did not attend any synagogue services at all and 89 per cent of these were among the SSS. That said, almost three-quarters of the SSS (71 per cent) attended at least once a year, and, of these, two out of five attended 'three times a year', i.e. the High Holy Days only (40 per cent). But the clearest division emerged in those selecting the response 'most Sabbaths or more often': the Somewhat Religious were 5.5 times more likely to select this response than the Somewhat Secular (56 per cent against 10 per cent). The difference is also stark when the 'not at all' response is analysed. The Secular were 2.5 times more likely 'never' to attend services than the Somewhat Secular (49 per cent against 15 per

Table 8: Attendance of synagogue services, by outlook

Frequency of synagogue attendance	Secular (%)	Somewhat Secular (%)	Somewhat Religious (%)	Religious (%)	Base
Not at all	49	15	5	4	535
High Holy Days	33	46	19	5	851
Some other festivals	9	19	17	3	405
Monthly	6	13	23	10	407
Weekly or more often	3	7	36	78	609
Total	100	100	100	100	2,807

Table 9: Synagogue membership, by outlook

Denomination	Secular (%)	Somewhat Secular (%)	Somewhat Religious (%)	Religious (%)	Base
None	40	14	5	3	468
Haredi/Independent Orthodox	1	1	2	20	83
Federation	4	4	6	7	138
Mainstream Orthodox/United Synagogue	28	47	64	60	1,390
Masorti	2	6	5	2	116
Reform	23	26	16	7	567
Other	2	2	2	1	58
Total	100	100	100	100	2,820

cent). Eighty-five per cent of the Somewhat Secular attended at least some services in the year. The equivalent Secular proportion was 50 per cent.

Synagogue membership

Actual membership of synagogues was even more complex. Of those that responded, half belonged to a 'mainstream Orthodox/United Synagogue', and a substantial proportion of these described themselves as being SSS (46 per cent). However, the SSS were clearly a diverse group since a quarter were not members of any synagogue at all. This contrasts with the findings of the AJIS study, in which a secular outlook was associated with a relatively low level of affiliation.[13] One out of five respondents were members of 'Liberal/Reform' synagogues (20 per cent), almost 30 per cent of whom described themselves as being SRR in outlook. In other words, many who identified themselves as 'Reform' were more likely to be Religious than the Somewhat Secular were to have no membership at all.

13 Mayer, Kosmin and Keysar, 47.

4 Social attachments and lifestyle

Jewish friends

The findings on Jewish friendship can best be summarized as 'All of my best friends are Jewish!' The results of the survey of the Jews of Greater London suggest that Jewish friendship is little affected by outlook. Over three-quarters of even the Secular group said that at least half or more than half of their friends were Jewish (77 per cent). In fact, in the most extreme case, namely when 'all or nearly all' of an individual's friends are Jewish, there was no difference between the proportions of SSS and the SRR reporting this: it split 50:50.

Jewish cultural activities

The survey presented a list of five Jewish cultural pastimes/activities in which respondents might have participated in the previous twelve months. These ranged from reading a Jewish book to buying Jewish art (see Table 10). Overall, the Religious were most likely to report participation, while the Secular were least likely.[14] However, it is clear that having a SSS outlook does not preclude one from partaking in such activities, as four out of five of the SSS selected at least one option (85 per cent).

Two out of five of the SSS had read a book on a Jewish subject (42 per cent). Furthermore, over half of those who had listened to a radio programme on a Jewish topic were SSS (53 per cent). The proportion was even higher for watching a television programme on a Jewish topic: over three-quarters of the SSS had done so (76 per cent). These figures suggest, therefore, that interpreting the term *secular* to mean *uninterested* is inaccurate.

The survey further examined Jewish cultural activity by asking respondents about such activities as attending public lectures on Jewish topics or seeing Jewish films in the previous year. Respondents were more likely to have participated in four or more of these activities if they were Religious (42 per cent compared with only 12 per cent of the Secular).[15] Yet even for these activities that require a greater commitment, half of the SSS selected at least one option, and over half of them had 'attended a Jewish film, theatre or music festival event'. One in five of the SSS (21 per cent) even 'attended a public lecture on a Jewish topic', all of which suggests, yet again, that the SSS are culturally very interested in their Jewishness.

Finally, and most intriguingly, the survey showed that of those who selected 'visiting a Jewish museum outside the UK' (one-quarter of the whole sample), almost half were among the SSS (46 per cent). As Becher *et al.* put it: 'The important point here . . . is . . . the high levels of Jewish cultural consumption.'[16]

Table 10: Participation in Jewish cultural activities during the previous twelve months, by outlook outlook

Activity	Secular (%)	Somewhat Secular (%)	Somewhat Religious (%)	Religious (%)	Base
Read a book on a Jewish topic	39	45	63	87	1,517
Listened to a radio programme on a Jewish topic	46	50	57	64	1,503
Watched a TV programme on a Jewish topic	72	80	86	79	2,275
Bought a book on a Jewish topic	22	32	48	73	1,092
Bought a Jewish ritual object	7	19	35	64	724
None of these	19	13	4	2	295

14 Becher, Waterman, Kosmin and Thomson, 35.

15 Ibid., 37.
16 Ibid., 39.

Internet usage

There is a linear and statistically significant relationship between Jewish outlook and whether respondents regularly use the Internet to access information of 'Jewish interest': the more religious, the more the respondent is likely to do so. This relationship is shown very clearly in Figure 5: a fifth (20 per cent) of the Secular regularly used the Internet for this purpose compared with almost three-quarters of the Religious (73 per cent).

Figure 5: Internet usage, by outlook

A similarly pronounced relationship can be seen regarding accessing the Internet for information of 'Israel interest'. The Religious were four times more likely to use the Internet for this purpose than the Secular. However, on this subject, the relationship was not quite so linear with a bias towards the more religious. The Religious were also proportionately more likely to access the Internet for 'world and local news' than the other outlook groups.

Visiting Israel

Israel appears to be another uniting factor for the sample. Overall, a very large proportion had visited Israel at some point (88 per cent) and, although it is true that the more religious tended to have gone more often, there was no real difference between the propensities of the secular and the religious in this regard. Over 80 per cent of the Secular and over 88 per cent of the Somewhat Secular had visited Israel. This contrasts starkly with the United States where only one-third of American adult Jews have visited Israel,[17] and where twice as many

religious as secular individuals have done so (47 per cent compared with 23 per cent).[18]

A sub-sample of parents were asked whether they would be willing to send their child(ren) on an organized trip to Israel while at secondary school. If their child had already attended such a trip parents were asked to indicate this. The result was conclusive and somewhat surprising given the then (February 2002) climate of political uncertainty and perceived danger in the region. Eighty-nine per cent of parents said that they would or had sent their child to Israel, and their propensity to do so was linked reasonably strongly to outlook: the more religious, the more willing to send their children to Israel (see Figure 6). Nevertheless, 83 per cent of Secular parents also said they would be willing to do so.

Figure 6: Willingness to send own child(ren) to Israel

Fundraising and charitable giving

The JPR report *Patterns of Charitable Giving among British Jews* (1998) found that the religious tended to donate more to charities than the secular, and that there was a strongly significant relationship between a religious outlook and a perceived responsibility to support charities.[19] Outlook was one of the two main factors influencing giving, the other being income. In the survey of the Jews of Greater London, respondents were asked, 'How often do you do voluntary work for each of the following [twelve organizations/service providers]

17 Mayer, Kosmin and Keysar, 7.

18 Ibid., 48, Exhibit 19.
19 Barry Kosmin and Jacqueline Goldberg, *Patterns of Charitable Giving among British Jews* (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research 1998), 1–2; Becher, Waterman, Kosmin and Thomson, 41.

specifically for Jewish people?', and then asked the same question regarding organizations for 'the wider community'. Over a quarter of those responding reported that they did some Jewish fundraising (29 per cent) but the SRR were twice as likely as the SSS to do so (21 per cent against 40 per cent). However, with regard to non-Jewish fundraising, the propensity ratios were virtually equal (16 per cent against 18 per cent). This finding highlights how outlook discriminates in the Jewish sphere.

Respondents were also asked to report which of the following causes they thought had the highest priority: Jewish charities in the United Kingdom; general UK charities; aid for the poor in countries outside the United Kingdom; and Israeli causes. Over the entire sample, 'Jewish charities in the United Kingdom' were given the highest priority (46 per cent) and 'Israeli causes' the second highest (30 per cent). Table 11 shows the relationship between outlook and the priority given to different charitable cause. Respondents were asked to rank charitable causes by selecting their highest-priority and second highest-priority cause from a list of wide-ranging Jewish and non-Jewish charitable options.

Table 11: Priority of charitable causes, by outlook

Priority	Secular	Somewhat Secular	Somewhat Religious	Religious
Highest	General UK	Jewish UK	Jewish UK	Jewish UK
Second highest	General UK	Israel*	Israel	Israel

* This result was very close with counts of 209 for 'Israeli causes' and 200 for 'General UK charities'

With regard to outlook, a clear anomaly in the overall pattern emerged. The Secular showed a very different set of priorities compared with all the other outlook groups, for whom the pattern was one of UK Jewish charities coming first and Israel-related causes coming second. Interestingly, the anomalous Secular group prioritized neither of these options but instead ranked general UK charities as both their highest and second highest priority. (This odd result was due to the wording of the questions.) This difference is a key determinant differentiating the Secular from all the other outlook groups.

One final point stemming from this analysis concerns the one cause that united the sample and might be summarized as 'charity begins at home'. None of the groups prioritized 'causes outside the United Kingdom' or the option 'none of these'.

Propensity to give
Nearly nine in ten (89 per cent) Religious respondents had given at least half of their donations to Jewish charities, compared with three in ten Secular respondents. Meanwhile, one in four (25 per cent) Secular respondents had not given any of their donations to Jewish charities; the equivalent figure for Religious respondents was only 1 per cent.[20]

The survey showed that the propensity of the SSS to give to *Jewish charities* was weaker than that of the SRR: four times as many SSS as SRR gave nothing to Jewish charities, although the proportions were very low (3 per cent against 6 per cent). It also showed that the propensity to give 'all' donations, or 'more than half', to Jewish charities was almost twice as strong for the SRR than the SSS (42 per cent against 74 per cent). Giving to the United Jewish Israel Appeal (UJIA) followed a similar pattern, with almost twice as many SRRs giving as SSSs (30 per cent against 56 per cent); similar differences were seen with regard to the other major Jewish UK charities.

The picture changes, however, when it comes to giving to *non-Jewish charities*. Proportions of donors are either balanced or biased towards the SSS (see Table 12). Cancer research charities received a very

Table 12: Proportion of SSS/SRR that gave to a non-Jewish charity

Charity	SSS* (%)	SSR** (%)
Cancer research charities	67	71
Oxfam	17	9
NSPCC	27	23
Other	48	49
None	12	13

*Combined group, Secular and Somewhat Secular
**Combined group, Religious and Somewhat Religious

20 Becher, Waterman, Kosmin and Thomson, 45.

high proportion of the sample's donations (69 per cent), and this was split evenly between the SSS and the SRR (67 per cent and 71 per cent, respectively). Only 8 per cent of Religious respondents had made a donation to Oxfam, compared with 23 per cent of Secular respondents. The numbers of the SSS and the SRR that gave nothing were the same (12 per cent against 13 per cent).

Donation levels
It is clear from examining the actual amounts given that the SSS were more likely than the SSR to give smaller amounts. The survey showed that those giving up to £500 in the previous year were more likely to be SSS than SRR (65 per cent against 51 per cent, respectively). However, for those that gave over £500, the position reverses: the SRR were more likely to give than the SSS (34 per cent against 20 per cent, respectively). Note, however, that these figures take no account of the 'Not mentioneds' and the 'Don't knows', which may well have affected these results.

Trusteeship and volunteering
The Religious were proportionately far more likely to serve as a trustee of a *Jewish* voluntary organization than the Secular (34 per cent against 4 per cent, respectively). In terms of volunteering, 'those respondents who described themselves as "religious" were consistently more likely to volunteer at least occasionally than more secular respondents'.[21] There were, however, no obvious differences when it came to volunteering in the wider (non-Jewish) community.

Figure 7 shows what respondents felt about their own level of volunteering, and how this relates to outlook. Those who reported that they did no voluntary work were significantly more likely to be secular; in fact, the SSS were 1.5 times more likely to do no voluntary work than the SRR. The more religious were also more likely to feel that they did not do enough voluntary work, although the differences here are less marked (SRR 29 per cent against SSS 23 per cent).

At first sight, it appears that secular respondents did not feel that they did sufficient amounts of voluntary work. However, it was still religious respondents that were more willing to say they would 'definitely' do more voluntary work if asked.

Moreover, it was secular respondents who were more willing to admit that they would 'definitely' *not* do more. However, since only 15 per cent of respondents said they would definitely not be prepared to do more voluntary work, it is not possible to conclude that the more religious respondents exhibited higher actual and potential levels of volunteer work. Almost two in every three respondents said that they were unwilling to do more voluntary work 'at the moment' (61 per cent), a rate that was not significantly affected by outlook.

Figure 7: Responses to the question, 'How much voluntary work do you feel you do?', by outlook

Health and leisure
Donor cards
Table 13 shows the relationship between outlook and various issues relating to health and leisure activities. The carrying of a donor card links philanthropic, altruistic and health-related issues together. Although actual numbers were small, a clear relationship existed with respect to the carrying of organ donor cards. The Secular were more than three times more likely to carry one than the Religious, 'a reflection of the view among some Orthodox Jewish religious authorities concerning the permissibility of organ transplants'.[22]

Exercise
The more secular a respondent was, the more likely they were to take regular exercise. The pattern was clear and statistically significant, with only one in

21 Ibid., 48.

22 Ibid., 30.

three of the Religious choosing to exercise regularly compared with nearly half of the Secular (33 per cent against 46 per cent, respectively).

Alcohol consumption
Respondents were more likely to consume alcohol if they were among the Secular group, of which 19 per cent drank regularly (albeit in small amounts compared with the general population), compared with 10 per cent of Religious respondents. Meanwhile, Religious respondents were more likely to be occasional drinkers: 78 per cent compared with 70 per cent of the Secular group. There was very little difference between outlook types for those that didn't drink at all.

Smoking cigarettes
Similarly, Religious respondents were less likely to smoke cigarettes than Secular respondents: 95 per cent were non-smokers, compared with 89 per cent of the Secular group.[23] But clearly very few respondents smoked at all.

Table 13: Leisure activities, by outlook

Activity	Secular (%)	Somewhat Secular (%)	Somewhat Religious (%)	Religious (%)	Sample mean
Exercising regularly (%)	46	43	41	33	43
Drinking (% 'Not at all')	11	11	12	12	12
Smoking (% 'No')	89	90	92	95	91

23 Becher, Waterman, Kosmin and Thomson, 28.

PART 2

Developing models for understanding the outlook of Jews in London and the South-east

1 A model of outlook: the Jewish Market Framework

The distribution of outlook types

The distribution of respondents' outlook (see Figure 1, page 5) clearly highlights the skewed nature of the sample, with a distinct leaning towards a secular outlook. The difference between the percentage of respondents reporting Secular as against Somewhat Secular was very small compared with the number reporting Religious as against Somewhat Religious (7 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively). This dramatic drop-off between Somewhat Religious and Religious is very interesting since one might expect to see a normal (bell-shaped) distribution for such a continuum in which most responses cluster around the middle.

It seems that the Religious category has in some way *lost out* to the other three, suggesting that Secular, Somewhat Secular and Somewhat Religious outlooks have more in common with each other than with the Religious category. It appears that the outlook continuum might not be as free-flowing as one might have presumed. An element of friction was apparently at work preventing people from committing themselves to a Religious outlook, evidenced by the fact that Somewhat Religious was the largest group. Indeed this 'continuum' may not be a continuum at all but rather a set of discrete categories.

Dividing the sample simply into four groups based on the four-step outlook continuum—Secular, Somewhat Secular, Somewhat Religious and Religious—is therefore problematic. Although the typology is a definite improvement on the Traditional, Reform, Just Jewish etc. breakdown (used in the 1995 JPR survey),[24] the make-up of London's Jewish community is often sociologically too complex for such an approach. For example, just because a person adopts a particular practice or attitude it does not a priori mean that their outlook can necessarily be predicted.

However, we can make better use of the typology if the question 'Who is secular?' is addressed, not from the perspective of the particular practice or attitude but from the perspective of the outlook. In other words, instead of asking, 'Among those who buy kosher meat, what is the predominant outlook?', we can ask, 'Among those with a Secular outlook, what variables (such as buying kosher meat) are likely to be most evident?' Since there is nothing peculiarly *secular* about the Secular outlook, there are perhaps activities in which the Secular, more than any other outlook group, tend or tend not to participate. At this level, outlook groups do indeed become distinctive. However, they do not constitute a neat four-way typology. We find that the Secular will stand alone on one particular issue as often as the Religious will on another issue.

Also, in much of the analysis thus far, the Secular and Somewhat Secular groups have been combined to create SSS, and the Somewhat Religious and Religious groups have been combined to create SRR. However, in many cases this dichotomy has proved to be misleading since the Somewhat Secular and the Somewhat Religious groups sometimes had more in common with each other than either of the two alternative categories, Secular or Religious.

A new analytical typology

By agglomerating outlook types based on the item measured, five sub-models of outlook have been identified that, together, encompass much of the data resulting from the London survey. These are Unity, Religious Unique, Middle Ground, Secular/Religious Split and Secular Unique (see Table 14).

Each of the five models represents a particular Jewish 'market', and data from the survey contribute to the specific flavour of each of them. Hence, the Jewish Market Framework.

Unity

This model encompasses those factors held in common by all the outlook types, i.e. there was no obvious bias based on outlook. The items that constitute the Unity model include:

- membership of a Jewish sports club;
- reading the *Jewish Chronicle* 'frequently' or 'occasionally';
- having previously visited Israel;

24 Miller, Schmool and Lerman.

Table 14: The Jewish Market Framework

Model type	Outlook agglomerations		
Unity	Secular/ Somewhat Secular/ Somewhat Religious/ Religious		
Religious Unique	Secular/ Somewhat Secular/ Somewhat Religious		Religious
Middle Ground	Secular	Somewhat Secular/ Somewhat Religious	Religious
SSS/SRR Split	Secular/ Somewhat Secular	Somewhat Religious/ Religious	
Secular Unique	Secular	Somewhat Secular/ Somewhat Religious/ Religious	

- at least half of all friends are Jewish;
- having recently read a book on a Jewish topic, listened to a radio programme on a Jewish topic, watched a television programme on a Jewish topic or visited a foreign Jewish museum;
- making financial donations to non-Jewish charities;
- attendance of part-time classes in synagogue or *cheder*.

Religious Unique
This model encompasses those factors that distinguish those with a Religious outlook from all the other outlooks. The key factors are:

- attendance of synagogue services weekly or more often;
- very high number of Jewish social, cultural and educational experiences;
- willingness to pay for a Jewish secondary school education whatever the cost;
- tendency to live in Outer NW London.

Middle Ground
This model encompasses those factors that unify the Somewhat Secular and the Somewhat Religious outlooks, distinguishing them from the two extreme outlooks (Secular and Religious). The key factors are:

- attendance of Jewish summer camps during teenage years;
- attendance of a Jewish club or organization during teenage years;
- 'Traditional' upbringing;
- tendency to live in South Hertfordshire, Outer North London and Redbridge.

SSS/SSR Split
This model was introduced at the beginning of the report, and much of the analysis is based on it. It is the binary distinction between secular (Secular and Somewhat Secular combined) and religious (Somewhat Religious and Religious combined). In the following list of items that produce this cleavage, the brackets indicate whether it is the secular (SSS) or the religious (SRR) that is being represented.

- only kosher meat eaten outside the home (SRR);
- having had post-bar mitzvah Jewish education (SRR);
- attendance of adult Jewish educational activities (SRR);
- reading a synagogue magazine (SRR);
- lighting candles 'every Friday night' (SRR);
- attendance of synagogue 'most Sabbaths or more often' (SRR);
- attendance of synagogue 'not at all' (SSS);
- fundraising for Jewish charities (SRR).

Secular Unique
This model is the converse of Religious Unique , and encompasses those factors that distinguish the Secular from all the other outlooks. The key factors are:

- marriage in registry office;
- 'never' lighting candles on Friday night;
- 'never' fasting on Yom Kippur;
- 'never' attending synagogue services;
- prioritiszing UK charities over UK Jewish and Israeli charities;

- tendency to live in South London and Inner London.

Summary of the Jewish Market Framework

We have concluded that, by themselves, the four outlook types are not a sufficiently sophisticated model to explain the sociological make-up of the Jewish community. However, by grouping items measured in the survey and agglomerating the outlook types associated with them, a clearer picture of the community emerges.

2 Belief, Belonging and Behaviour

Testing outlook as a function of Belief, Belonging and Behaviour

The aim of this chapter is to help clarify the meaning of 'outlook' from an Anglo-Jewish point of view by defining it as a function of the sociological categories Belief, Belonging and Behaviour. What is it that causes respondents to label themselves 'secular'? What does 'secular' mean to Secular respondents? To what are they attached? What are their opinions? What do they do in the secular and religious spheres? Moreover, what are the differences and similarities between secular and religious respondents?

This analysis uses the following definitions of Belief, Belonging and Behaviour:

- *Belief*: attitudes and opinions (but *not* faith);
- *Belonging*: membership, attachments, participation and labels;
- *Behaviour*: actions and answers to the questions, 'do you ever?', 'how often?', 'how much?', 'how many times?'

In order to represent these three categories, questions were subjectively selected from the questionnaire used in the London survey, as shown in Table 15.

Consensus vs 'dissensus' among outlook types

Which of the three sociological categories of Belief, Belonging and Behaviour exhibited the greatest and

Table 15: Questions representing the categories Belief, Belonging and Behaviour

Subjects	Belief	Belonging	Behaviour
Jewish identity	How conscious of being Jewish are you?	What is your outlook? What type of marriage did you have?	What is the proportion of your friends that are Jewish? Have you watched a TV programme on a Jewish topic . . .?
Youth activities/ upbringing	--	Which youth groups did you attend? What type of upbringing did you have?	--
Jewish rituals	--	How would you describe your current Jewish practice?	Do you attend a Passover seder? Do you fast on Yom Kippur? How often do you light candles?
Sabbath/ synagogue	--	What type of synagogue do you belong to?	Do you travel on the Sabbath? How often do you attend services?
Food	--	--	Do you eat only kosher meat at home? Do you eat non-kosher meat outside the home?
Education	Does a Jewish secondary school matter? Is a good Jewish education important for Jewish consciousness?	Did you receive pre- or post-bar/bat mitzvah Jewish education? What type of adult Jewish education have you had?	How much adult Jewish education have you had?
Charitable giving	Which are more important, Israel or UK charities?	--	How much money do you donate to charity?
Volunteering	Do you think you do enough voluntary work?	Are you a trustee of an organization?	How many hours a week do you volunteer?
Israel	--	Are you a member of an Israel-related organization?	How often do you go to Israel?
Other	Are you happy to live next door to non-Jews?	What do you use the Internet for?	How much do you drink/smoke? Do you carry an organ donor card?

least amount of consensus (coming together) between the four outlook types?[25] The highest levels of consensus appeared in the Belief category, that is, respondents' attitudes and opinions. The level of consensus was almost as high in the Behaviour category, which includes items actually *done* by respondents. The highest level of 'dissensus' (segregation) was recorded in the Belonging category, namely, the membership and attachment patterns of respondents.

Belief

With regard to the category of Belief, in which the highest level of consensus was observed, opinions converged on attitudes to volunteering and diverged on Jewish identity (see Table 16). Attitudes to Jewish secondary school education were mixed but tended towards consensus, especially regarding the importance of Jewish studies being an available option at school and the idea that attendance of a non-Jewish secondary school would be acceptable if the child had previously attended a Jewish primary school.

Belonging

With regard to Belonging, the category with the lowest levels of consensus between respondents, the only experience that the outlook groups shared was participation in Jewish youth activities (see Table 17). There was one aspect of Jewish identity that achieved some consensus, namely having a Jewish religious wedding, suggesting that the institution of Jewish marriage is still an important bonding factor across all the various outlook types. Nonetheless, there was 'dissensus' with regard to most of the questions relating to Jewish identity, as there was to questions relating to the synagogue and religious practice in general.

Behaviour

The category that encompassed by far the largest number of survey questions (and therefore statistically represents the most significant results) is Behaviour, the extent to which respondents participate in various Jewish and secular activities. With regard to Behaviour, a very clear dichotomy emerged: consensus was achieved on issues relating

Table16: Consensus and 'dissensus' for Belief items

Education	Agree that a non-Jewish secondary school is fine if Jewish studies are on the curriculum
Education	Agree that a non-Jewish secondary school is fine if a child attended a Jewish primary school first
Volunteering	Not willing to do more volunteering at present
Volunteering	Feel that they do too little volunteering
Charitable giving	Jewish charities are the highest priority
Education	Agree that a secular Jewish secondary school is a good idea
Education	Agree that a non-Jewish secondary school is fine if it has sufficient Jewish pupils
Education	Agree that non-Jewish secondary school better prepares pupils for contemporary society
Charitable giving	Israeli charities are the second highest priority
Education	Agree that Jewish children should attend a Jewish secondary school regardless of cost
Education	Agree that a good Jewish education is *very* important for Jewish consciousness
Education	Agree that a Jewish state secondary school is a good idea
Jewish identity	Extremely conscious of being Jewish

Level of consensus

High consensus (1st quartile)
Low consensus (2nd quartile)
Low 'dissensus' (3rd quartile)
High 'dissensus' (4th quartile)

25 For the methodology of the Consensus-Dissensus model, see Appendix A.

Table 17: Consensus and 'dissensus' for Belonging items

Education	Attended part-time pre-bar mitzvah Jewish education classes
Volunteering	Trustee of a non-Jewish organization
Youth activities	Attended a Jewish youth group
Youth activities	Attended a Jewish sports club
Jewish identity	Had a religious Jewish wedding
Sabbath/synagogue	Belong to a Liberal/Reform synagogue
Education	Attended part-time post-bar mitzvah Jewish education classes
Israel	Attended a Zionist youth group
Jewish identity	Outlook
Volunteering	Trustee of a Jewish organization
Upbringing	Had a Traditional Jewish upbringing
Upbringing	Had a Just Jewish upbringing
Jewish identity	Current practice is Traditional
Jewish identity	Current practice is Just Jewish
Sabbath/synagogue	Belong to a mainstream Orthodox US synagogue
Sabbath/synagogue	Do not belong to any synagogue

Level of consensus

High consensus (1st quartile)
Low consensus (2nd quartile)
Low 'dissensus' (3rd quartile)
High 'dissensus' (4th quartile)

to secular and leisure activities whereas 'dissensus' was evident in relation to religious and communal activities (see Table 18). So, for example, there was a convergence with regard to donations to non-Jewish charities, the propensity to drink or smoke, and to do fundraising for non-Jewish charities: roughly similar results on these questions emerged in all the outlook groups. However, with regard to the performance of Jewish rituals (fasting, regularly lighting candles and synagogue attendance) and donating to Jewish charities, divergence was observed.

Conclusion

Three categories (Belief, Belonging and Behaviour) were used to examine the extent to which respondents 'matched' each other in their responses. In other words, where does consensus lie within the sample? Belief items achieved the highest level of consensus and Belonging items the lowest. What emerges is a picture of the types of factors within the three categories on which consensus/'dissensus' was most clearly observed. Basically, this meant differentiating between religious and secular activities.

This was highlighted most clearly in the Behaviour category, suggesting that there are two sides to respondents' propensity to converge or diverge. On the one hand, there is an *external* (public) aspect, which shows a general homogeneity between the outlook groups. Behaviours tend to be conforming and unified with regard to Jewish social activities, to non-Jewish voluntary/social activities, and, to a limited extent, to 'low intensity' Jewish religious practices.

Across all outlook types, respondents are uniform in social class, they tend not to smoke or drink, they show equal propensities to do non-Jewish voluntary work and fundraising, to watch a television programme on a Jewish topic and so on. However, between outlook types, the reverse is evident. When less secular and more religious items are examined, especially relating to Jewish 'religious' activities such as keeping kosher, attending adult education courses or donating to Jewish charities, little consensus can be found. These 'Jewish differences' ('dissensus') seem to be uniquely about Jewish matters; thus outlook is a predictor for items in the specifically Jewish sphere.

Table 18: Consensus and 'dissensus' for Behaviour items

Charitable giving	Give to general cancer charities
Charitable giving	Give to other non-Jewish charities
Jewish identity	Have visited Israel
Other	Drink occasionally
Other	Don't smoke
Other	Carry an organ donor card
Volunteering	Do fundraising for a non-Jewish charity once a month or less
Charitable giving	Gave up to £500 to charity in previous year
Charitable giving	Gave over £500 to charity in previous year
Jewish identity	All or more than half of friends are Jewish
Jewish identity	Listened to a radio programme on a Jewish topic in previous year
Jewish identity	Visited a Jewish museum outside the UK in previous year
Jewish ritual	Occasionally light candles on Friday night
Other	Use Internet to access world and local news
Volunteering	Do fundraising for a Jewish charity once a month or less
Charitable giving	Gave to UJIA in previous year
Charitable giving	Gave to Jewish Care in previous year
Israel	Use Internet to access Israel-related information
Jewish identity	Use Internet to access information of Jewish interest
Jewish ritual	Attend a Passover seder every year
Sabbath/synagogue	Never attend synagogue services
Sabbath/synagogue	Attend services only on High Holy Days
Charitable giving	Give at least half of donations to Jewish charities
Education	Attended an adult Jewish education course in previous five years
Food	Only buy meat from a kosher butcher
Food	Never eat non-kosher meat outside the home
Jewish identity	Attended a public lecture on a Jewish topic in the previous year
Jewish ritual	Fast every year on Yom Kippur
Jewish ritual	Light candles every Friday night
Sabbath/synagogue	Never travel on the Sabbath

Level of consensus

High consensus (1st quartile)
Low consensus (2nd quartile)
Low 'dissensus' (3rd quartile)
High 'dissensus' (4th quartile)

3 Quantifying social distance

Comparing Belief, Belonging and Behaviour by means of a weighted index

Although we know that Belief achieves the highest levels of consensus, we do not know exactly how much higher this is, compared with the consensus level in the Belonging and Behaviour categories. Creating a weighted index allows us to show relative comparisons *between* the outlook types for the Belief, Belonging and Behaviour categories, as well as whether or not there are any idiosyncrasies *within* the outlook types in terms of these three categories.[26]

Figure 8 is a three-dimensional representation of the indexed relationship between outlook and the

Belief, Belonging and Behaviour categories. The relationships can be seen in the *relative* differences shown in the figure, and not in its absolute dimensions, which can be disregarded.

The first analysis is *between* the three categories, comparing the shape of the curves created for Belief, Belonging and Behaviour with each other (reading Figure 8 from left to right along the category rows). With regard to Behaviour, the tall Somewhat Religious column (9) differs dramatically from the short Religious column (12), whereas along the Belief row, the difference between columns 7 and 10 is (proportionately) less marked. The height differences between Secular, Somewhat Secular and the Somewhat

Figure 8: Weighted index of Belief, Belonging and Behaviour

---

26 Please refer to Appendix B for the methodology involved in creating a weighted index.

Religious are proportionately similar with regard to both Behaviour (3, 6, 9) and Belief (1, 4, 7) but not with regard to Belonging, in which case Somewhat Religious tapers off, creating a less steep gradient (2, 5, 8).

The second analysis of Figure 8 involves looking at differences *within* individual outlook groups' responses in each of the three categories (i.e. reading the graph from front to back along the weighted outlook rows). Three salient trends are revealed. The first concerns the Secular, the second concerns the Religious, and the third concerns the Somewhat Secular and Somewhat Religious. The Secular show a proportionately equal score for all three categories (1, 2, 3). The Religious, by comparison, show a marked difference between the score for Behaviour (12) and that for Belief (10) and Belonging (11), between which the difference is marginal. The third trend shows that the 'somewhat' categories demonstrate a bias against Belief; they are both more coherent on Belonging and Behaviour than on Belief, which has a proportionately low score for both of the 'somewhat' outlook types (4, 5, 6 and 7, 8, 9).

When all four outlook types are compared, the Religious Belonging score (11) stands out as unusually (relatively) low. Based on this analysis, therefore, the Religious demonstrate markedly different patterns of belonging to all other outlook groups.

Factoring in quantifiable and meaningful *social distance*

The 'gap' observed in Figure 8 between, say, the Religious score for Behaviour (12) and the Religious score for Belonging (11) or between the Religious score for Behaviour (12) and the Somewhat Religious score for Behaviour (9) can be conceptualized as 'social distance'.[27] At this stage it is helpful to start treating the Secular, Somewhat Secular, Somewhat Religious and Religious outlook types as four discrete (and therefore mutually independent) categories rather than (as up until now) as a continuum of outlooks moving steadily from the secular to the religious and vice versa. For example, the Secular and the Religious may be 'socially closer' to each other than they are to the Somewhat Secular or the Somewhat Religious.

27 Please refer to Appendix C for the methodology involved.

Belief
Figure 9 shows the relationship between the four outlook types for Belief items, quantified using an 'index of social distance' plotted against the proportion of the sample each represents. The distance between the two most separated outlook types (Secular and Religious) is 66 index points, the widest spread for any of the three categories (cf. Figures 10 and 11). In addition, the Religious stand a full 41 index points from the next nearest type, the Somewhat Religious. The distance between the Secular, Somewhat Secular and Somewhat Religious is small, at only 25 index points, and these three are approximately equidistant from each other. This suggests that, on opinions and attitudes, the Secular, Somewhat Secular and Somewhat Religious are socially close to each other, while the Religious are far away and isolated.

Figure 9: Index of social distance for Belief items

Belonging
Figure 10 demonstrates what at first seems to be counter-intuitive. However, having abandoned the notion of a continuum, we can see that the distance between the two most separated outlook types (Secular and Somewhat Religious) is only 34 index points, the smallest of the three categories and almost half the distance observed for Belief (Figure 9). What is also clear is that, although the overall social distance is small, it is the Secular who stand

out from the other outlook types. The distance separating the Somewhat Secular, Somewhat Religious and Religious is just 13 index points, indicating that their belonging habits are socially very close. That the Secular stand 21 index points away suggests that they differ significantly from all other outlook types in their belonging habits.

Also of interest in Figure 10 is how the Religious, from a social distance point of view, stand almost on top of the Somewhat Secular and virtually midway between the Secular and the Somewhat Religious in terms of their Belonging. With regard to Belonging traits, the Religious are more 'secular' than either of the 'somewhat' outlook types.

Figure 11: Index of social distance for Behaviour items

Figure 10: Index of social distance for Belonging items

Behaviour

For Behaviour items distances between each of the four outlook types in Figure 11 are fairly even (about 16 index points each). The Secular are furthest from the Religious, next furthest from the Somewhat Religious and nearest to the Somewhat Secular with fairly equal spacing. Overall the distance between the two furthest separated outlook types (Secular and Religious) is 49 index points. So, with regard to Behaviour (amount and extent of religious and secular activity), the outlook model is a useful predictor.

Belief, Belonging and Behaviour compared

The narrowest social distance between outlook types is for Belonging, followed by Behaviour and then Belief, which shows the widest social distance. Figure 12 shows the relationships between all of the three categories. At the bottom of this graph is a bar showing how all the index scores relate to each other based on outlook type. On the left are the locations of the secular scores (S/SS) and on the right the religious scores (R/SR). The outlook type showing the greatest social distance across the three categories is Religious, which overlaps with both Somewhat Secular and Somewhat Religious (with at least 40 index points between the Belonging score and the Belief score). It is clear that the Religious scores are the main cause of the differing shapes of the three graphs.

Using these results it is possible to predict outcomes. For example, the Religious exhibit high index scores on matters of opinion and belief and low index scores on attachments. The same logic follows for the Secular, despite the expectation that they would score consistently low in all three categories. Finally, the Somewhat Secular and Somewhat Religious groups show a very similar spread and even overlap each other, with the Somewhat Secular shifted to the left of the scale and the Somewhat Religious to the right. The

overlap is again due to the Belonging category, suggesting that outlook does not correlate with this category as neatly as it does with Belief and Behaviour.

Figure12: Index of social distance for Belief, Belonging and Behaviour compared

4 Summary of the three outlook models

Three models have been developed whose purpose is to aid understanding of the significance of the outlook tool and to highlight how it might be usefully applied by communal planners. These are the Jewish Market Framework, the Consensus–Dissensus Model and the Social Distance Model.

The Jewish Market Framework

This model highlights items that are disproportionately subscribed to or carried out by one outlook type as compared with another. So, for example, *attending synagogue services weekly or more often* tended to be the preserve of the Religious *proportionately* more than any of the other three outlook types. Conversely, *donating to general overseas charities* tended to be done *proportionately* more by the Secular than any of the other three outlook types. It transpired that several of the variables fitted into one of these two types; these have been labelled Religious Unique items and Secular Unique items, the so-called 'niche markets' (see Table 14, page 26).

This bunching or 'agglomeration' of variables, however, goes further. It transpires that there are three further agglomeration types that are of relevance. The first is the Secular/Religious Split, which applies when a clear distinction of responses is evident between the secular half and the religious half of the sample (such as those who *eat only kosher meat outside the home*). The second is the Middle Ground, which applies when a clear distinction emerges between those who see themselves as Somewhat Religious or Somewhat Secular and those who see themselves at the two extremes (the Religious and the Secular). For example, those who *had a Traditional upbringing* were more likely to be in this middle group. The third agglomeration type, Unity, is the most important, and highlights those items on which there is broad agreement. It applies to variables that produce no significant distinction between any of the four outlook groups, such as having *previously visited Israel* and having *at least half of all friends being Jewish*. Interestingly, *attending part-time classes in synagogue or cheder* also produces Unity, which suggests that the *cheder* system has not exerted much influence on outlook type.

The key advantage of the Jewish Market Framework is that it enables planners to identify

Jewish markets be they 'niche' or 'cross communal'. In the past, if the aim of a project was to attract the Secular, planners had virtually to guess what it was that inspired and interested this group. We can now predict that they are as likely as any other outlook group, and regardless of gender and age, to be interested in television and radio programmes on Jewish subjects, books on Jewish subjects, visiting Israel, prioritizing UK charities above those concerned with issues outside Britain, and socializing in predominantly Jewish circles. This kind of knowledge provides planners with the means to deliver communal events, activities and services more efficiently and more effectively.

The Consensus–Dissensus Model

The Consensus–Dissensus Model is slightly more sophisticated than the Jewish Market Framework. Instead of grouping variables according to market segmentation, it compares outlook types in relation to the three sociological categories Belief, Belonging and Behaviour. Here the focus is on whether there is something unusual or different about the sociological traits of specific outlook types compared with other outlook types, on where they agree and where they disagree. For example, we could analyse Behaviour by looking at the nature and extent of charitable giving among the different outlook groups to see what, if any, differences exist. Moreover, this model can be used to identify what it is that unites and divides the four outlook types in terms of Belief (opinions), Belonging (affiliations) and Behaviour (religious practices). In short: the Consensus–Dissensus Model.

This analysis has yielded two key findings. The first is that factors that are not especially 'Jewish' (such as donating to non-Jewish charities) or that have a specifically social flavour (such as having many Jewish friends or attending a Passover seder) showed high levels of consensus across all the outlook types, regardless of whether it was a Belief, Belonging or Behaviour item. These are items of 'Jewish exceptionalism', defining the Jewish social boundary in relation to the wider society. More importantly, these are the items that attract or involve *all* members of the community. They tend either to be not especially 'religious' in nature (though not necessarily *un-Jewish*) or else to be

familial/meal-oriented activities (Passover seders) or Jewish activities that require minimal effort or commitment (watching a television programme on a Jewish subject).

Second, the analysis shows that variables relating to Belonging (such as synagogue membership and participation in youth groups) are more likely than those relating to either Belief or Behaviour to exhibit 'dissensus' between the outlook types. Of particular interest are synagogue membership (highlighting the isolation of the secular group), self-reported current Jewish practice and upbringing, and doing volunteer work for Jewish charities. All of these Belonging items show high levels of 'dissensus'.

Belief items achieve the greatest consensus, suggesting the homogeneity of Jewish opinion. Accordingly, we find that Jews tend to exhibit similar values as a group but display individuality in terms of attachments.

With regard to Behaviour variables (such as keeping kosher, volunteering, charitable giving and socializing) respondents tend to act in similar ways if the variable is secular in nature—often in ways that diverge from society at large: London Jews of all outlooks drink less alcohol than the British mainstream—but act individualistically if the item involves Jewish ritual. Thus, from the point of view of Behaviour, consensus is achieved on issues relating to general leisure activities but 'dissensus' occurs when items relate to (specifically Jewish) religious or communal spheres.

The Social Distance Model
The Social Distance Model is, logically, the next analytical step, and allows for a more precise measure of the different sociological patterns that have been observed. It attempts an actual quantification of how far apart the four different outlook types are in terms of the three sociological categories, Belief, Belonging and Behaviour. Such a quantification is achieved by developing an index that makes possible statements such as 'the distance between the Secular and the Religious is, with regard to Behaviour, twice what it is with regard to Belonging'. This is similar to making a quantitative declaration such as 'John likes football twice as much as Jim but only half as much as James'. Such a representation of social distance enables us to quantify what is essentially qualitative information.

The advantage of being able to *measure* differences (e.g. of Behaviour) between outlook types, relative to one another, is that planners can more accurately assess the most important and least important items dividing and uniting the community. That is, they can understand which outlook types stand furthest away or closest together on specific groups of items.

Conceptualizing social distance
One way of conceptualizing social distance is to imagine four typical respondents standing in a queue, each representing one of the four outlook types. The nature of what is offered at the front of the queue will influence how near to the front each of the respondents wishes to stand, as well as how near or far their position is from the other respondents in the queue.

If what is being offered at the front of the queue is a Belief item, we would notice first that, compared with Behaviour or Belonging offerings, the greatest spread between the individuals in the queue would be produced, the greatest overall social distance. Furthermore, we would notice that the Religious respondent would stand alone at the front, and the other three respondents some way back in the line but not particularly close to each other either.

In the queue for items relating to Belonging respondents do not even stand in order of their outlooks. This time the queue is much more bunched than the queue for Belief, with little space between each respondent. Here, the Somewhat Religious respondent (*not* the Religious) is at the front, with the Somewhat Secular respondent behind him. The latter in turn is almost standing on the toes of the Religious respondent who is right behind him. Someway off behind this group is the Secular respondent.

In the queue for Behaviour items, the respondents line up just as we might expect if outlook is thought of as a smooth continuum. They stand in order from Religious to Secular, spaced equidistantly. Only in this queue do the respondents behave as their outlooks would predict intuitively. In other words, when it comes to Belief and Belonging items, the outlook labels are not necessarily the best guides to predicting responses. Thus, according to this analysis, the outlook tool works best as a predictor when it comes to items relating to Behaviour (e.g. fasting).

5 Conclusions and policy implications

Every year community planners need to make strategic decisions about how best to allocate their budgets. Traditionally this has been done by instinct as there has been little empirical evidence about what actually 'sells' and what different groups within the market are prepared to 'buy'. Outlook now provides us with a sophisticated tool that can show planners what the market looks like. It is capable of identifying 'attributes' and 'products' that unite the community (mass market) and segment the community (niche market). It can actually *predict* how different sections of the community will be motivated as well as those items that will motivate everyone, religious or secular.

The following 'attributes' tend not to differentiate between outlook groups but are exhibited across all groups and are consequently categorized as mass-market markers:

· at least half of friends are Jewish;

· attending Passover seder;

· previously visited Israel;

· willing to send their children on an organized trip to Israel;

· membership of a Jewish sports club as a teenager.

Similarly, the following 'products' tend not to be affected by an individual's particular outlook. They are equally likely to be 'consumed' regardless of whether someone is secular or religious:

· books on a Jewish topic;

· *Jewish Chronicle*;

· radio programmes on a Jewish topic;

· television programmes on a Jewish topic;

· Jewish museums in foreign countries.

This is a list of Jewish 'cultural products', strongly suggesting that the binding force or 'glue' that unites the highly complex and segmented Jewish community has a distinctively cultural flavour. Of course there are many other items, some distinctively Jewish, some that distinguish Jews from the wider society, that Jews of all outlook types connect with, engage in or are attracted to.

The very existence of these items, attractive as they are to even the most secular people, shows that these are real, all-encompassing markers for which the community should cater effectively. Similarly, outlook, as presented here, shows that Somewhat Religious Jews are not necessarily interested in everything that is religiously Jewish, as one might have surmised given their religious self-definition. This again highlights how planners can make use of outlook when attempting to motivate sections of the Jewish market. Outlook underscores what has and has not worked in the past, and, crucially, what will and will not work in the future.

From an academic perspective, outlook enables sociological researchers to *measure* the extent to which different segments of the Jewish market converge and diverge. This report presents scientific evidence to show that the Jewish population tends to *converge* on behavioural traits pertaining to non-religious, leisure activities and general attitudes, but tends to *diverge* on issues relating to religious affiliation and practice, such as fasting, regularly lighting candles, synagogue attendance and donating money and time to Jewish charities. But, as highlighted in the above list, this divergent cleavage is not true for *all* Jewish activities.

Outlook is context-specific: it can provide accurate predictions with regard to matters in the 'Jewish world' but would be of limited predictive value for exploring issues such as environmentalism or the work habits of Jews. Nevertheless, the evidence assembled here shows that outlook works and is useful. In a specifically Jewish context, outlook—consisting of the four options ranging from secular to religious—coherently *sorts* people. It does this more easily (96 per cent of respondents answered the outlook question) and more accurately than any other definitional label used to date in the study of British Jewry. It is able to extract the intra-group differences far more efficiently than alternative, loaded and essentially arbitrary labels such as 'just Jewish' or 'Traditional'. Such labels have suffered from a lack of scientific rigour and imprecision, and have produced misunderstandings and misrepresentations. Outlook on the other hand is logical and empirically testable and is consequently a superior and more robust instrument.

This report is only the beginning of the investigation into outlook, which demands further exploratory analysis. The models identified here require considerably more development but it is hoped that the potential power of the outlook tool has been demonstrated. One recommendation is that future studies of Jewish populations incorporate this tool into questionnaires and focus groups. In this way, the analysis of outlook might be refined so as to determine, for example, whether or not it is legitimate for an individual to claim to have more than one outlook position depending upon the Belief, Belonging and Behaviour aspects of their 'Jewishness'. The investigation into outlook will also require a more sophisticated approach, perhaps using advanced multivariate and multidimensional statistical techniques to identify many more relevant items for which outlook is a good predictor.[27]

27 A useful example of how this might be done using factor analysis is explained in S. Miller, 'Changing patterns of Jewish identity among British Jews', in Z. Gitelman, B. Kosmin and A. Kovacs (eds), *New Jewish Identities: Contemporary Europe and Beyond* (Budapest: Central European University Press forthcoming), 47–62. The emphasis is on changes in Jewish identity with age and uses the traditional labelling typology as a basis of analysis.

Appendix A

Consensus vs 'dissensus'

Items were selected, using personal judgement, from the survey to represent the three categories, Belief (13 items), Belonging (16 items) and Behaviour (31 items). For each item, cross-tab scores were recorded for each outlook type (Secular, Somewhat Secular, Somewhat Religious and Religious) thus creating a matrix. The standard deviation of these scores was calculated per item and the resulting lists were then sorted in ascending order. The inter-quartile range of each of the three lists was used to divide the items: first quartile high consensus, second quartile low consensus, third quartile low 'dissensus' and fourth quartile high 'dissensus'.

Appendix B

Comparing Belief, Belonging and Behaviour by means of a weighted index

As per Appendix A, except that rather than calculating the standard deviation of the cross-tab results, scores were weighted to account for different response levels. For each outlook type these weights were summed to produce a single weighted Secular score, Somewhat Secular score and so on. These three sets of four weighted outlook scores were further weighted to account for the differing number of variables in each of the Belief, Belonging and Behaviour categories.

Appendix C

Factoring in quantifiable and meaningful *social distance*

Using weighted scores calculated as per Appendix B, and then accounting for the differing cross-sample response proportions in each outlook type, social distance scores were then calculated (effectively creating a weighted index), the results of which are shown in the table below.

Social distance result*	Weighted index			
	Secular	Somewhat Secular	Somewhat Religious	Religious
Belief	24	19	-1	-42
Belonging	19	-2	-15	-2
Behaviour	25	8	-9	-24

* Distance scores are based on the percentage difference (positive or negative) from the mean of the indices for each of the three categories, Belief, Belonging and Behaviour calculated in Appendix B.

jpr /